Freedom and responsibility in Avicenna
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Kaukua, J. (2022). Freedom and responsibility in Avicenna. In D. De Smet, & M. Sebti (Eds.), Penser avec Avicenne : de l'heritage grec a la reception latine, en hommage a Jules Janssens (pp. 149-168). Peeters. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca, 20.
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Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. BibliothecaPäivämäärä
2022Pääsyrajoitukset
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© 2022 – Peeters – Bondgenotenlaan 153, 3000 Leuven, Belgium.
It is still a matter of some debate whether Avicenna grounds moral responsibility in a robust notion of free will. In this contribution, I will first delve into Avicenna’s theory of voluntary agency, arguing that he holds voluntary agency to be responsive to reasons but also thoroughly determined by the agent’s beliefs concerning the relevant goals, instruments, and qualifying circumstances. Since these beliefs in turn are caused, it seems that there is little room for a causally undetermined will in Avicenna’s theory. I will conclude by considering the question of whether Avicenna is some kind of compatibilist concerning the relation between determinism and responsibility.
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PeetersEmojulkaisun ISBN
978-90-429-4919-5Kuuluu julkaisuun
Penser avec Avicenne : de l'heritage grec a la reception latine, en hommage a Jules JanssensAsiasanat
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https://converis.jyu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/164746352
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Euroopan komissioRahoitusohjelmat(t)
The content of the publication reflects only the author’s view. The funder is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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The research that went into this paper was generously funded by the European Research Council (grant agreement no. 682779).Lisenssi
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