Freedom and responsibility in Avicenna
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Kaukua, J. (2022). Freedom and responsibility in Avicenna. In D. De Smet, & M. Sebti (Eds.), Penser avec Avicenne : de l'heritage grec a la reception latine, en hommage a Jules Janssens (pp. 149-168). Peeters. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca, 20.
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2022Access restrictions
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© 2022 – Peeters – Bondgenotenlaan 153, 3000 Leuven, Belgium.
It is still a matter of some debate whether Avicenna grounds moral responsibility in a robust notion of free will. In this contribution, I will first delve into Avicenna’s theory of voluntary agency, arguing that he holds voluntary agency to be responsive to reasons but also thoroughly determined by the agent’s beliefs concerning the relevant goals, instruments, and qualifying circumstances. Since these beliefs in turn are caused, it seems that there is little room for a causally undetermined will in Avicenna’s theory. I will conclude by considering the question of whether Avicenna is some kind of compatibilist concerning the relation between determinism and responsibility.
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978-90-429-4919-5Is part of publication
Penser avec Avicenne : de l'heritage grec a la reception latine, en hommage a Jules JanssensKeywords
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The research that went into this paper was generously funded by the European Research Council (grant agreement no. 682779).License
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