The Gender of the Cartesian Mind, Body, and Mind-Body Union
Reuter, M. (2019). The Gender of the Cartesian Mind, Body, and Mind-Body Union. In M. Reuter, & F. Svensson (Eds.), Mind, Body, and Morality : New Perspectives on Descartes and Spinoza (pp. 37-58). Routledge. Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 19. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351202831-4
Julkaistu sarjassa
Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century PhilosophyTekijät
Päivämäärä
2019Tekijänoikeudet
© Authors, 2019
The chapter examines what we can know about gender from the perspective of the three primary notions introduced by Descartes in his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. The first section discusses how the primitive notion of the mind strengthens the idea that “the mind has no sex”, an idea that was further developed by the Cartesian and early feminist François Poulain de la Barre. The next section focuses on the notion of the body and analyses what Descartes has to say about gender in his anatomical writings. The little known posthumously published notes Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium receive particular attention. Here Descartes assumes a difference between the native intelligence of men and women, which seems to contradict his claim that reason is equal in all humans, but it is argued that Descartes’ views are in fact reconcilable when we distinguish those modes of thought that depend on the mind alone from those that depend on the body. The final section examines what we can know about gender through the notion of the mind-body union. It is argued that when conceived as part of the union, the experience of gender is a hybrid of mind and body, which is irreducible to either the non-gendered mind or the body and its anatomical features. It is pointed out that it is particularly the irreducibility of the three primitive notions which contributes to the complexity of our understanding of what it is to be a gendered being.
...
![showless](/themes/JYX2//images/showless.png)
![showmore](/themes/JYX2//images/showmore.png)
Julkaisija
RoutledgeEmojulkaisun ISBN
978-0-8153-8494-6Kuuluu julkaisuun
Mind, Body, and Morality : New Perspectives on Descartes and SpinozaJulkaisu tutkimustietojärjestelmässä
https://converis.jyu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/33583994
Metadata
Näytä kaikki kuvailutiedotKokoelmat
Lisenssi
Samankaltainen aineisto
Näytetään aineistoja, joilla on samankaltainen nimeke tai asiasanat.
-
Introduction
Reuter, Martina; Svensson, Frans (Routledge, 2019)The introduction gives a brief overview of some important developments in recent scholarship on René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza. It is argued that there has been a shift of focus, away from Descartes-the-dualist towards ... -
Merleau-Pontyn Descartes-tulkinta : kartesiolaisesta duaalisuudesta uuteen ontologiseen rakenteeseen
Hotanen, Juho (Suomen Filosofinen Yhdistys ry, 2019)Englanninkielisen lectio praecursorian pohjalta suomennetussa artikkelissa johdatellaan väitöskirjan peruskysymykseen yleistajuisesti ja esittelevästi. Maurice Merleau-Pontyn (1908–1961) tulkinta René Descartesin (1596–1650) ... -
Merleau-Ponty's reading of Descartes : from Cartesian duality to the new ontological structure
Hotanen, Juho (Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2019)The duality between the mind and the body has been haunting a wide field of academic discussions since René Descartes’ (1596–1650) philosophy. The problem not only concerns the inexplicable relation between immaterial and ... -
Essays on early modern conceptions of consciousness: Descartes, Cudworth, and Locke
Lähteenmäki, Vili (University of Jyväskylä, 2009) -
Elisabeth on Free Will, Preordination, and Philosophical Doubt
Reuter, Martina (Springer International Publishing, 2021)Elisabeth is widely known as a critic of René Descartes' account of mind--body interaction and scholarly interpretations of her view on the will most often pose the question about the freedom of the will in relation to ...
Ellei toisin mainittu, julkisesti saatavilla olevia JYX-metatietoja (poislukien tiivistelmät) saa vapaasti uudelleenkäyttää CC0-lisenssillä.