Oikeudenmukaisuus elollisia olentoja kohtaan : Porfyrioksen pidättäytymisen etiikka

Abstract

In this article, I argue that Porphyry’s conception of justice in On abstinence is remarkable for several reasons. While I agree with Fay Edwards that Porphyry does not assume the moral status of animals to depend on their rationality, I argue that Porphyry’s claim is not based on any form of the assumption that animals deserve moral consideration only if they share some relevant property with human beings. Contrary to Edwards, I argue that this is not because justice is irrelevant to animals in On abstinence 3. Rather, extending abstinence from causing harm to humans to apply also to non-human animals and plants is a constitutive element in the higher forms of justice that Porphyry requires of philosophers.