The research of my thesis has been focused on the 1935 diplomatic conference at Stresa, in Northern Italy and
observe how this meeting between the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Italy shaped the
diplomatic relations in interwar Europe. The goal of this meeting was to formulate a common policy against
Germany in reaction to the founding of the German air force. This action, which reneged on the 1919 treaty of
Versailles caused great worry in Europe. The aim of my research has been to examine developments that rose from
this and examine what measures the tripartite powers adopted in opposition to the German aims of territorial
expansion and confrontation with the neighbouring powers, mainly Lithuania and Poland in these early stages.
The paramount view presented in the context of these developments is, that in 1935 the Tripartite powers of the
United Kingdom, France and Italy were much more willing to concretely challenge German aggression than after
1935 when the pol
icy of appeasement replaced this willingness to both challenge and curtail German influence in
concord with different associated powers.
As a method of research, I have examined multiple newspaper sources on the matter through qualitative analysis
and further built my argument on the previously conducted research. As a method of research, I have employed
methods of discourse analysis with the theory of social agency of the reporters in this. In addition, my choice of
sources, The Manchester Guardian and the exiled German social-democratic newspaper, Neuer Vorwärts are chosen
as the main sources in this.
In lieu of these sources, reflected with the previous research on the matter, I present an argument. In light of the
research I have conducted, the tripartite powers and their attempts to maintain a policy of common action against
Germany were one of the most concrete ways in which German expansionism was challenged before the world war
and that it was its failure that gave way to appeasement.
I have presented the developments as they occurred, reflecting the early hopes of the success of the pact towards the
foundational disagreements that had begun to tear the pact apart mere months after its formation. Accompanying
this are presented the last attempts by the British and the French governments to reform this anti-German pact.
From my research, it can be seen that the slide to appeasement was not sudden or found some unwillingness to
challenge German plans for hegemony in Europe. Instead, the appeasement is presented as arising from the failure
of the tripartite powers to uphold their policy of collaboration against Germany.
From my thesis, it can be interpreted that interwar Europe was not simply following the rise of the Nazi regime
with bated breath, but actively sought to contain and even challenge the spread of Nazi influence in the European
continent. Shift to appeasement is also present in the form of the Anglo-German naval agreement, in which
Germany's right to rearm was officially recognised by one of the tripartite powers, the United Kingdom.
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