Strategic Leadership and Organizational Transformation: A Leadership History of the British Royal Navy during the ‘Fisher Era’ 1904–1919

Abstract

This study draws on a number of contemporary concepts of leadership to investigate strategic leadership in the British Royal Navy (RN) during the period of 1904–1919. Significant historians of the time named the period the ‘Fisher era’ in the RN. Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841–1920) has been identified as the most significant architect of the sizable technological, organizational and cultural transformation the RN underwent during the ten years before the outbreak of the First World War (WWI). The transformation continued in many ways during the war years as the RN learned to fight efficiently with new technological weapons such as the long-range guns of the novel Dreadnought-type capital ships, submarines, torpedoes and mines. This organizational transformation has often been termed ‘Sir John Fisher’s naval revolution’. The main objective of the study is to provide answers to the following research question: How does the regime in the upper echelons of an organization influence the organization’s strategic capability for learning and change? What is more, the three articles related to the focal study pose the following research questions, which overlap with the main question and pertain more specifically to the context of the Fisher-era British Royal Navy. What personal and behavioural aspects or facets of Admiral Fisher’s strategic leadership can be identified in his mission of reforming the Royal Navy in 1904–1910? In other words, what were Fisher’s personal characteristics, and how was he able to capitalize on his ‘Fishpond’, especially while facing the fierce opposition to his reforms that arose from within the RN? (Article I) What are the key personal characteristics and effectuation mechanisms of top leaders who bring about the organizational adoption of a novel concept such as the battlecruiser? How does the process of adoption unfold and change when the technology is gradually proving less efficient than predicted? How do evolving organizational schemas or gestalts emerge and moderate this process? (Article II) What was the Fishpond in relation to the official structures and institutions of the RN? Who were the most influential officers in the Fishpond? How did their careers evolve in terms of carrying out Fisher’s central reforms? All in all, how effective was the Fishpond as a tool in the process of reforming the RN, especially in the face of the fierce internal opposition to many of Fisher’s major reforms? (Article III) Overall, the results of the study indicate that the quality of strategic leadership and the ability to control the direction of the RN varied considerably across different First Lord-First Sea Lord dyads during the period under study. There was no marked difference whether the navy was at war or not: there were both effective and ineffective regimes before and during WWI, and the onset of war did not ensure the presence of an effective regime at the top of the RN organization. The distinct organizational architecture of the RN did not guarantee the existence of efficient governance channels that would allow the organization to adapt swiftly to changing situations, either. The historical analysis provided in this Introduction and in the attached articles points towards the following dimensions in explaining the quality of strategic leadership in any of the regimes at the top of the RN organization: personality and leadership style, the management of organizational attention and strategic issues, and the building of management teams and networks of influence.