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dc.contributor.authorOinas, Simo
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-24T17:28:47Z
dc.date.available2013-06-24T17:28:47Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.otheroai:jykdok.linneanet.fi:1270808
dc.identifier.urihttps://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/41838
dc.description.abstractThe aim of the thesis is to examine various views that have been advocated in contemporary discussions concerning the content of perceptual experiences. The nature of the contents posited in those views is the focus of this study. In the views that are discussed here, perceptual contents have been argued to be either conceptual, externalist, nonconceptual or particular. In this thesis, John McDowell is presented as the proponent of conceptual content, Jeff Speaks as the proponent of externalist content, Christopher Peacocke as the proponent of abstract nonconceptual contents, and Tim Crane as the proponent of particular nonconceptual content. The revised view of John McDowell, as well as the view of Charles Travis, is also briefly presented. The views are discussed with the emphasis on how they explain experiential aspects of our perceptual experiences, with somewhat less attention given to epistemological concerns. As a common method of analysis, the contents advocated by the views are analysed by applying classical philosophical distinctions. The contents are further analysed by examining what kind of perceptual relations they could be the contents of. The analyses indicate that there are differing conceptions or understandings of content in play in the current discussion. These understandings can, however, be evaluated and compared in relation to what experiential aspects they can explain. Regarding such explanations, particular contents appear as perhaps the most promising alternative as the fundamental contents of perceptual experiences. The main problem with the view of particular content, as it is advocated by Tim Crane, is that it is too sparing in its descriptions of what kind of features figure in that content. Therefore, it is concluded that a genuinely descriptive account of particular psychological content is needed in the context of understanding the nature of perceptual experiences, and perhaps also in the context of understanding the nature of beliefs and mental concepts.en
dc.format.extent1 verkkoaineisto.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThis publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.en
dc.rightsJulkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty.fi
dc.subject.otherperceptual experience
dc.subject.othercontent
dc.subject.otherconceptualism
dc.subject.othernonconceptualism
dc.subject.otherparticular content
dc.titlePerceptual contents : a study on the nature of the contents of perceptual experience
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:fi:jyu-201306242037
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.ontasotPro gradu -tutkielmafi
dc.type.ontasotMaster’s thesisen
dc.contributor.tiedekuntaYhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekuntafi
dc.contributor.tiedekuntaFaculty of Social Sciencesen
dc.contributor.laitosYhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitosfi
dc.contributor.laitosDepartment of Social Sciences and Philosophyen
dc.contributor.yliopistoUniversity of Jyväskyläen
dc.contributor.yliopistoJyväskylän yliopistofi
dc.contributor.oppiaineFilosofiafi
dc.contributor.oppiainePhilosophyen
dc.date.updated2013-06-24T17:28:47Z
dc.rights.accesslevelopenAccessfi
dc.type.publicationmasterThesis
dc.contributor.oppiainekoodi201
dc.subject.ysokonseptualismi
dc.subject.ysonominalismi
dc.subject.ysokäsitteet
dc.subject.ysosisältö
dc.format.contentfulltext
dc.type.okmG2


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