dc.contributor.author | Oinas, Simo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-24T17:28:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-24T17:28:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.other | oai:jykdok.linneanet.fi:1270808 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/41838 | |
dc.description.abstract | The aim of the thesis is to examine various views that have been advocated in contemporary discussions concerning the content of perceptual experiences. The nature of the contents posited in those views is the focus of this study. In the views that are discussed here, perceptual contents have been argued to be either conceptual, externalist, nonconceptual or particular. In this thesis, John McDowell is presented as the proponent of conceptual content, Jeff Speaks as the proponent of externalist content, Christopher Peacocke as the proponent of abstract nonconceptual contents, and Tim Crane as the proponent of particular nonconceptual content. The revised view of John McDowell, as well as the view of Charles Travis, is also briefly presented.
The views are discussed with the emphasis on how they explain experiential aspects of our perceptual experiences, with somewhat less attention given to epistemological concerns. As a common method of analysis, the contents advocated by the views are analysed by applying classical philosophical distinctions. The contents are further analysed by examining what kind of perceptual relations they could be the contents of.
The analyses indicate that there are differing conceptions or understandings of content in play in the current discussion. These understandings can, however, be evaluated and compared in relation to what experiential aspects they can explain. Regarding such explanations, particular contents appear as perhaps the most promising alternative as the fundamental contents of perceptual experiences. The main problem with the view of particular content, as it is advocated by Tim Crane, is that it is too sparing in its descriptions of what kind of features figure in that content. Therefore, it is concluded that a genuinely descriptive account of particular psychological content is needed in the context of understanding the nature of perceptual experiences, and perhaps also in the context of understanding the nature of beliefs and mental concepts. | en |
dc.format.extent | 1 verkkoaineisto. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.rights | This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and
print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is
prohibited. | en |
dc.rights | Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty. | fi |
dc.subject.other | perceptual experience | |
dc.subject.other | content | |
dc.subject.other | conceptualism | |
dc.subject.other | nonconceptualism | |
dc.subject.other | particular content | |
dc.title | Perceptual contents : a study on the nature of the contents of perceptual experience | |
dc.identifier.urn | URN:NBN:fi:jyu-201306242037 | |
dc.type.dcmitype | Text | en |
dc.type.ontasot | Pro gradu -tutkielma | fi |
dc.type.ontasot | Master’s thesis | en |
dc.contributor.tiedekunta | Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta | fi |
dc.contributor.tiedekunta | Faculty of Social Sciences | en |
dc.contributor.laitos | Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos | fi |
dc.contributor.laitos | Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy | en |
dc.contributor.yliopisto | University of Jyväskylä | en |
dc.contributor.yliopisto | Jyväskylän yliopisto | fi |
dc.contributor.oppiaine | Filosofia | fi |
dc.contributor.oppiaine | Philosophy | en |
dc.date.updated | 2013-06-24T17:28:47Z | |
dc.rights.accesslevel | openAccess | fi |
dc.type.publication | masterThesis | |
dc.contributor.oppiainekoodi | 201 | |
dc.subject.yso | konseptualismi | |
dc.subject.yso | nominalismi | |
dc.subject.yso | käsitteet | |
dc.subject.yso | sisältö | |
dc.format.content | fulltext | |
dc.type.okm | G2 | |