Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection
Stajnrod, R., Ben Yehuda, R., & Zaidenberg, N. J. (2022). Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, 18(3), 259-269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-021-00413-y
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Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking TechniquesDate
2022Copyright
© The Author(s) 2021
ARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.
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Springer Science and Business Media LLCISSN Search the Publication Forum
2263-8733Keywords
Publication in research information system
https://converis.jyu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/103952880
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Open Access funding provided by University of Jyväskylä (JYU).License
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC BY 4.0