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dc.contributor.authorHirvonen, Onni
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-02T04:51:12Z
dc.date.available2020-09-02T04:51:12Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationHirvonen, O. (2020). The Problem of the First Belief : Group Agents and Responsibility. <i>Journal of Social Ontology</i>, <i>6</i>(1), 1-20. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0029" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0029</a>
dc.identifier.otherCONVID_41851684
dc.identifier.urihttps://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/71589
dc.description.abstractAttributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency – face the so-called “problem of the first belief” that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of Social Ontology
dc.rightsCC BY 4.0
dc.subject.otherList, Christian
dc.subject.otherPettit, Philip
dc.subject.otherChristian List
dc.subject.othercollective beliefs
dc.subject.othercollective responsibility
dc.subject.othergroup agency
dc.subject.othermoral personhood
dc.subject.otherPhilip Pettit
dc.subject.otherphilosophy
dc.subject.othersocial ontology
dc.titleThe Problem of the First Belief : Group Agents and Responsibility
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:fi:jyu-202009025713
dc.contributor.laitosYhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitosfi
dc.contributor.laitosDepartment of Social Sciences and Philosophyen
dc.contributor.oppiaineFilosofiafi
dc.contributor.oppiainePhilosophyen
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle
dc.description.reviewstatuspeerReviewed
dc.format.pagerange1-20
dc.relation.issn2196-9655
dc.relation.numberinseries1
dc.relation.volume6
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.rights.copyright© 2020 Onni Hirvonen, published by De Gruyter
dc.rights.accesslevelopenAccessfi
dc.subject.ysovastuu
dc.subject.ysotoimijuus
dc.subject.ysoyhteisöt
dc.subject.ysouskomukset
dc.subject.ysoetiikka
dc.subject.ysoontologia (filosofia)
dc.subject.ysohenkilöt
dc.subject.ysomoraali
dc.subject.ysoryhmät
dc.format.contentfulltext
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p854
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p2335
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p3835
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p6088
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p3166
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p1055
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p1272
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p861
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p1127
dc.rights.urlhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.relation.doi10.1515/jso-2019-0029
jyx.fundinginformationFunding Source: Koneen Säätiö


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