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dc.contributor.authorChang, Zheng
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Di
dc.contributor.authorHämäläinen, Timo
dc.contributor.authorHan, Zhu
dc.contributor.authorRistaniemi, Tapani
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-10T07:40:15Z
dc.date.available2019-12-10T07:40:15Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationChang, Z., Zhang, D., Hämäläinen, T., Han, Z., & Ristaniemi, T. (2020). Incentive Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Wireless Virtualized Networks with Multiple Infrastructure Providers. <i>IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing</i>, <i>19</i>(1), 103-115. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2889046" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2889046</a>
dc.identifier.otherCONVID_28820802
dc.identifier.otherTUTKAID_80093
dc.identifier.urihttps://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/66686
dc.description.abstractTo accommodate the explosively growing demands for mobile traffic service, wireless network virtualization is proposed as the main evolution towards 5G. In this work, a novel contract theoretic incentive mechanism is proposed to study how to manage the resources and provide services to the users in the wireless virtualized networks. We consider that the infrastructure providers (InPs) own the physical networks and the mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) has the service information of the users and needs to lease the physical radio resources for providing services. In particular, we utilize the contract theoretic approach to model the resource trading process between the MVNO and multiple InPs. Two scenarios are considered according to whether the information (such as the radio resource they can provide) of the InPs are globally known. Subsequently, the corresponding optimal contracts regarding the user association and transmit power allocation are derived to maximize the payoff of the MVNOs while maintaining the requirements of the InPs in the trading process. To evaluate the proposed scheme, extensive simulation studies are conducted. It can be observed that the proposed contract theoretic approach can effectively stimulate InPs’ participation, improve the payoff of the MVNO, and outperform other schemes.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.subject.otherwireless virtualized network
dc.subject.othercontract theory
dc.subject.otherpower allocation
dc.subject.otheruser association
dc.titleIncentive Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Wireless Virtualized Networks with Multiple Infrastructure Providers
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:fi:jyu-201912055139
dc.contributor.laitosInformaatioteknologian tiedekuntafi
dc.contributor.laitosFaculty of Information Technologyen
dc.contributor.oppiaineTietotekniikkafi
dc.contributor.oppiaineMathematical Information Technologyen
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle
dc.date.updated2019-12-05T13:15:13Z
dc.description.reviewstatuspeerReviewed
dc.format.pagerange103-115
dc.relation.issn2161-9875
dc.relation.numberinseries1
dc.relation.volume19
dc.type.versionacceptedVersion
dc.rights.copyright© 2018 IEEE
dc.rights.accesslevelopenAccessfi
dc.subject.ysoresursointi
dc.subject.ysolangattomat verkot
dc.subject.ysoresurssit
dc.subject.ysoallokointi
dc.subject.ysokannustimet
dc.format.contentfulltext
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p24562
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p24221
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p19352
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p1033
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p7458
dc.rights.urlhttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en
dc.relation.doi10.1109/TMC.2018.2889046
jyx.fundinginformationThe research is partially supported by US MURI AFOSR MURI 18RT0073, and US National Science Foundation CNS-1717454, CNS-1731424, CNS-1702850, CNS-1646607, and ECCS-1547201.


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