Strong evaluation without sources : on Charles Taylor's philosophical anthropology and cultural moral realism

Abstract

Kanadalaisen filosofin Charles Taylorin teorioihin perustuvassa väitöskirjassaan Arto Laitinen esittää, että inhimillinen toiminta, identiteetti ja persoonuus perustuvat ns. 'vahvoille arvostuksille'. Hän myös väittää, ettei vahvoille arvostuksille perustuva kulturalistinen ja ei-relativistinen etiikka tarvitse moraalisuuden lähteitä.Laitisen mukaan Taylor on oikeassa ajatellessaan, että ihmiset on 'tuomittu' tekemään arvoerotteluja, kun taas eläimet noudattavat luonnollisia päämääriään tai välittömiä halujaan ja impulssejaan. Inhimillinen toiminta perustuu väistämättä vahvoille arvostuksille. - Arkikokemuksen näkökulmasta on selvää, että ihmiset tekevät arvoarvostelmia. Filosofisesti vaativampi argumentti on osoittaa, että tämä arkikokemuksen näkökulma on oikeassa, ja että yritykset selittää inhimillistä toimintaa ottamatta toimijan arvostuksia huomioon voivat olla vain osatotuuksia, Laitinen selvittää.

This study examines three central claims by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1931 - ): 1) strong evaluations are inescapable for human beings, 2) strong evaluations are best interpreted in a pluralist, moral realist and 'cultural' way; 3) such cultural moral realism must ultimately rely on some 'constitutive goods'/'moral sources'. The first two claims are defended in the study in a qualified form, but the third one is criticized and rejected after close scrutiny. The first part of this dissertation studies some of the central concepts in philosophical anthropology (human agency, personhood, identity, interpersonal recognition) and asks how the concept of 'strong evaluation' can illuminate them. Taylor's concept 'strong evaluation' refers to value-judgements and evaluations which are based on qualitative distinctions concerning the worth of options. The first chapter is a detailed examination of this concept; criticizing some of Taylor's own characterizations, defending Taylor against Kantian criticisms, but suggesting a more extended theory than Taylor's own (making room for e.g. 'small values' and deontic norms). The next chapters specify and defend in qualified form Taylor's views that human agents are inevitably strong evaluators and that they ought to have the basic moral status of persons, and that a person's 'identity' consists of strong evaluations. Interpersonal recognition is analyzed in this study in terms of norms and values. Misrecognition consists of inadequate responses to the relevant norms and values. The second part of the dissertation develops a novel 'cultural moral realist' approach to ethics, claiming that values are relational, dependent on subjects and cultures, but that relativism, internalism and non-objectivism are wrong in restricting the validity of values. The moral theory defended covers questions of universal validity and relational ontology of goods, cultural diversity, plurality, generality and incommensurability of goods, moral knowledge and personal orientation. It draws upon the work of Taylor, J. McDowell and J. Raz. Taylor's concept of 'moral sources' or 'constitutive goods' is criticized for being harmful or superfluous from the viewpoint of cultural value realism. Keywords: strong evaluation, Charles Taylor, person, identity, recognition, cultural relativism, subject-dependence, moral realism, moral sources, constitutive goods, universalism, ethics, philosophical anthropology