Jean Bodin and biopolitics

Abstract

While the number of studies on biopolitics, the literal power over life (bios), continues to grow, some parts of Michel Foucault’s original analysis have remained virtually unchallenged. For example, only a few thinkers have managed to contest his claim of biopolitics as an exclusively modern phenomenon. This current study aims to take part in the ongoing discussions concerning the history of biopolitics and the connection between life-optimizing biopolitics and the technology of sovereign power, which either disregards life or negates it altogether. We approach these topics by analyzing Jean Bodin’s political thought, which acts as a prime example of early modern biopolitics. What makes Bodin’s political works especially interesting is the fact that they appear to exemplify both sovereign power and biopolitics. We examine these issues by combining Foucauldian genealogy with political theory and intellectual history. Bodin is a “populationist” who believes that the high number of citizens ought to be considered as the greatest wealth and strength of a commonwealth. The Angevin author is also interested in controlling the quality of the people with a magistracy of censors that purges undesirable individuals out of the commonwealth. Furthermore, he adopts other ancient and medieval ideas, such as those on climates, humors, and temperaments, which he believes hold considerable political weight. Bodin, who writes at the peak of the European witch hunts, maintains that sorcerers and sorceresses were behind many deaths, abortions, and even the fall of states. This problem includes a (bio)political element; purging the witches equates to safeguarding the people, the commonwealth, and the whole of humankind. Establishing a biopolitical reading of Bodin’s texts allows us to take part in two additional discussions concerning the notion of biopolitics. Firstly, we assert that Giorgio Agamben’s equation of sovereign power and biopolitics is invalid. Bodin’s political thought proves that the two technologies can co-exist while maintaining their conceptual distinction. Secondly, we argue that Foucault is mistaken to presume that biopolitics is an explicitly modern occurrence. We argue that Bodin acts as a prime example of what could be described as biopolitics before the “biopolitical era” of modernity as defined by Foucault.