

Nils-Göran Sundin

Aesthetic Criteria for
Musical Interpretation

UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 1994

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN THE ARTS 45

Nils-Göran Sundin
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Musical Interpretation

A Study of the Contemporary Performance
of Western Notated Instrumental
Music after 1750

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Dr. KARIN ASPLUND in memoriam

(4.9.1949 – 13.3.1992)

"Pour un interprète consciencieux, je veux dire: conscient de la musique, la vérité d'une oeuvre jouée (quelle que soit cette oeuvre) est à chaque coup la vérité de toute la musique" (J.-Claude Piquet Ernest Ansermet et les Fondements de la musique, Payot, Lausanne 1964: 41).

ABSTRACT

Sundin, Nils-Göran

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The purpose of this study is to illuminate performers' and theorists' patterns of aesthetic thinking within musical interpretation in performance. The study examines in particular the cognitive processes and logic(s) of implementation of interpretational ideals based on phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, formalism and Schenkerian *Vortragslehre*.

By means of phenomenological analysis the study discusses the philosophical, scientific and musicological grounds for a methodology of interpretation analysis and proposes a **theory of interpretation** concerned with the relational network of intentional interpretive acts. The objective of this theory is to secure the grounds for description and evaluation of interpretational quality in musical performance. The presented model of interpretation-analysis demonstrates a possibility of founding interpretive decisions on rational argument.

The study identifies three degrees of cognitive decisional abstraction concerned with concrete shaping on different levels, the **interpretive** (correctness of execution; details of motivic design), the **interpretative** (apprehensible 'gestalting' of unities), and the **interpretational** (coherent wholeness in the manifestation of the work's identity in performance). Conscious acts of interpretation allow an interpreting direction either **from** (expretive) or **to** (impretive) the subject or the object of the encounter, entailing a selection and displacement of the interpreted content.

The application of this scheme in a series of critical analyses of conductors (Celibidache, Ansermet, Furtwängler, Dorati, Blomstedt, Sacher), pianists (Schnabel, Gieseking, Leygraf, Harry) and string players (Menuhin, Lorcovic, Casals) explains how aesthetic positions are implemented via interpretational procedures in concrete performance styles.

Key words: aesthetics and philosophy of music, musical interpretation in performance, phenomenology, music theory and analysis, methods and models for criticism, cognitive analysis and generative ideas; interpretive styles of conductors, pianists and string players.

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PRAEFATIO

Synopsis: Introduction of **INTERPRETATION SCIENCE (IS)**. The Humanities versus the Natural Sciences (NS). The appearance of interpretive acts as fundamental relations of subject and object in 'the world' in the sense of the integrity of the facts and phenomena that exist. Refutation of possible objections to (and a presentation of evidence in support of) the proposed foundation of a **critical theory of musical interpretation in performance (mip)**. Musical interpretation research (mir; MIR) as a branch of Musicology: aesthetic criteria for musical interpretation in the contemporary performance of notated instrumental music written since ca 1750 – the project of a **critical analysis of aesthetic theory and the ideas it has generated, along with an inquiry about the fundamental interrelations of intentional interpretive acts**. Basic terminology and acknowledgments.

In the encounter between human consciousness, the musical mind included, and a fact in the world, we are forced to categorize and classify what our senses transmit to us. We do so through a selection of suitable concepts or words from our language repertory or from other representations of fact. In order to maintain our relation to the world, such categorizing requires the exercise of certain cognitive acts by which we can classify the object we face. The 'interpretive act' is a kind of cognitive **modus** by which our mind is brought into connection with surrounding objects in the world, musical tones included.

In the history of humanity, two different broad systems (each employing its own paradigm) have evolved as basic approaches to reality: the humanities (H) and the natural sciences (NS). In the humanities a person retains a sense of self, i.e. a feeling of identity based on a 'unity' provided by experiencing consciousness through the senses and the mind, whereas natural science transcends the limited ability of our senses to observe the micro- and macro levels of fact representation in the world. Furthermore, there is a significant difference between the kinds of objects treated: H focuses on the **intentional** content of the human mind, whereas NS studies the **facts** and objects in our world.

The various preferred paradigmatic approaches ('principles'), sometimes empiric and sometimes abstractly theoretical, by which people have looked upon the world in different ways, have of course developed in parallel to (and in correspondence with) emerging interpretive traditions and methods. They

have also developed in relation to various views of the world, such as **idealism** and **realism**. It seems to be this evolving human act of understanding that enables us to grasp the consistency of the world.

The perceptual recognition of distinct patterns of approach to the world defers to interpretative paradigms on both a metascientific and a logical level. It remains my overriding conviction that the adoption of this view in treating musical objects is a fruitful endeavor and that it serves the purpose of **musical interpretation research**, which is merely a branch of the INTERPRETIVE SCIENCES. The final aim of the interpretive sciences is to increase our understanding and knowledge of ourselves, and also of the interpreted object. Interpretation research, then, can be seen as a step towards a more strictly formalized interpretation science.

To anticipate any possible misunderstanding on the part of the reader, I must here issue a terminological warning: I will distinguish 'interpretive' from 'interpretative' and 'interpretational'. These terms will be defined, in what follows, on successive levels of abstraction.

The basic model for the object of investigation in interpretation science is tripartite:

- (1) The observed fact is considered to be originally given.
- (2) Facts are linked by various potential and 'real' (intentional and material) paths taken by the interpretive acts of the human mind; these interpretive acts link the facts and lead to our third step;
- (3) The ultimately resulting **interpretation** entails a specific and profiled view, intentionally referring to the factor related to the **object of the interpretive act** by external attribution.

Such a view may involve evaluative components, e.g. a judgement or an assessment; it may imply a certain design or core notion. The interpretive view may entail an ontological determination in the form of an attribution (of the kind "this i is an x"), an indication ("x signifies this i") or a performative demonstration ("this i"). By such **cognitive modes** ('act modes') a 'fundamental' relation between the interpretive view and its object is established.

The basic model I will apply presupposes a model of man that states certain patterns of connection or interaction between mind and body. This age-old, unresolved philosophical problem can be handled by the model of interaction

between **soma** and **psyche** (ch. I:2). Essentially, the model proposes two basic modes of connection: (1) **intentionality** between the various phenomena of the conscious mind, and (2) **causality** between various facts of the physical body. Their intersection allows the derivation of four kinds of fundamental relations with their respective and different science–philosophical statuses: (1) somatosomatic causality, and (2) psychopsychic intentionality, versus the mixed modes of (3) psychosomatic and (4) somatopsychic relations.

(1) If **nothing** in the world is related to anything else, it is impossible to say anything about anything, since saying whatever it may be about something requires reliance on a relation; it implies the assumption of a relation in reality through establishing a relation *in verbo*, precisely by endowing with meaning the things involved. Everything would then be a matter of chance.

(2) If **everything** is interrelated, i.e. if all things are related to all other things directly or indirectly by chains of relations between these various things, then it can be inferred that we would be immured in a totally determined network; we could neither influence nor become influenced, nor make assessments, judgements or evaluations. Obviously we do. Both these first two assumptions about the world seem false, rejectable on the grounds of their preposterous sequels.

But (3) if **some things**, but not everything, are related to other things in the world, then there is a zone of freedom within which we are able to discover things that are already related, and to put other things into relation with one another; the world becomes as complex and interesting as it seems to be. I prefer this view since it is compatible with reason and rationality, but still allows for the effective actions of humans on the world as well as for their reversed effects on us.

In order for interpretation to logically exist as an overarching condition for this investigation, it is necessary to assume – and I will take it for granted – that even if causal determinism could be vindicated, it would not entail intentional determinism.

Within certain limits we can choose to think either causally or phenomenally by focusing our interest on various aspects, properties or qualities of the object. This permits us to "enter" into various "systems of cognitive patterning" while visualizing their respective sets of criteria. The task of interpretation theory is to

investigate such patterns. Various constituted paradigms for thinking within music performance can be recognized by illuminating the modes of conscious acts; for this purpose we have to develop a method of interpretation analysis for (and of) various interpretive perspectives: for example, conductors' interpretations (and their concepts) represent different aesthetic positions and ideals, corresponding to certain overarching paradigms for "intentional" acts of consciousness, such as modes of listening, reading, thinking and acting. A discussion on how these acts interrelate and relate to meta-interpretative choices on systematic levels is therefore pertinent.

However, it should be remembered that it is, principally, a paradox to express in linguistic terms the primordial musical mode of thinking that I endeavor to uncover in this study.

Neither the elementary introduction of the basic concepts of musical interpretation research, its field of inquiry, objectives and methods (MIP 7–13), including definitions of such fundamental concepts as "interpretation" (MIP 20), nor the introductory premises (MIP 21–24) and basic analytic distinctions (25–31) will be repeated here. Rather, this investigation attempts to develop an interpretation science based on the ground laid in earlier theoretical (and empirical) works, including FME (ch. 1 and 4) and MIP (pp 1–45), both in English, as well as MIR I and II (mainly in Swedish) and other materials referred to in the Appendix (ch. VII:3 and VII:6). A presentation in Finnish of MIR I was made by Heikki Malaska (1986) at the Department of Musicology, University of Helsinki.

An account of the theoretical investigation providing the initial framework for the proposed interpretation theory (MIR I) and for the methodology of phenomenologic interpretation analysis (MIR II) is given in ch. V:1 and V:2 respectively. Naturally, the central theses advanced there and in the relevant studies listed in ch. VII:2 cannot be repeated or related *in extenso* in this investigation, and will only be referred to when required for adequate argumentation. Only insofar as it forms a platform for the present investigation will the research in my earlier studies be hinted at, and then only in brief words.

The theory of interpretation introduced in earlier works is developed here as a **theory of relational intentionalities inherent in the interpretive acts of mip**

that are central to this treatise (ch. I:2); it is then applied throughout the whole study from the perspective of theoreticians (ch. II) approached, in turn, from a set of categories found to appear as the interpreters' problem of selecting an aesthetic position (ch. III), and from the perspectives of the participants in musical life (ch. IV). The theoretical framework is then cautiously applied in the research report of investigations (ch. V) in order to avoid circularity, since the material provides therein suggestions for the original outline of the theory.

The core of the theory, as well as the analytic method necessary for access to the problems posed, provides a coherent view throughout this work. In supporting it I have had to adduce quotational evidence for intentional notions and contents from a series of analyses taken from a broad range of empirical material, including treatises and replies from interviews; these citations instantiate a variety of possible and existing aesthetic positions, and constitute a more general *a priori* scheme on the theoretical level, which itself constitutes a kind of cognitive mapping of interpretive thinking within music performance.

It is important to note what is already implicit in the title of this thesis. As far as possible I have chosen **not** to treat criteria other than those which are **aesthetic** in nature. Social, purely artistic, technical, instrumental and pedagogical criteria fall outside the central aim and scope of this thesis, and are referred to only insofar as they bear on interpretational considerations or interpretative decisions. It can be questioned, though, from a strictly scientific point of view, as Ernst Lichtenhahn has done (p.c. 19.1.94), whether it is possible to leave out the historical dimension altogether since the listener himself necessarily participates in the social and historical context. Therefore, a purely 'formalistic' interpretation theory may not strictly be conceivable. The quasi-absolute philosophical position required for a purely structuralistic theory has the severe disadvantage of not providing the whole truth, but it also has the benefit of providing an analytical procedure that casts light on complex communicative interrelations in the interpretive process. Paradoxically, an operationally-postulated formalistic position, one which does not span the whole investigated area, but which is selectively applied, provides a reasonable strategy that allows the stepwise acquisition of preliminary knowledge.

Therefore, the method that I apply in this thesis does not provide any final solutions to the problems of interpretation, but aims merely to present a

framework and analytic nomenclature for the purpose of practically improving the precision of our tools in serious criticism. Thus, in order for it to grow into a fully-fledged theory and history of mip, a relational framework must be furnished by the concrete contextual content drawn from studies of individual cases and performance styles.

Such an endeavor was launched by Hermann Danuser on the initiative of Carl Dahlhaus. On the basis of the music-work's three time horizons (the time of the composer, of the tradition and of the current actuality) Danuser (1992:13–17) envisaged three **basic modes of interpretation**, viz. (1) historical reconstruction, (2) fidelity to the performance tradition and the continuity of an interpretive culture, and (3) the actualizing interpretation. The corresponding problems to the three time horizons are the target of this thesis, namely:

(1) that interpretive truth in the sense of a perfectly correct historical performance does not exist, which Danuser acknowledges. However, the idea of historical performance, embraced by Paul Sacher – inspired by Karl Nef – played a main role in the construction of the Schola Cantorum Basiliensis and the Forschungsinstitut für Alte Musik at the Musik-Akademie in Basel;

(2) that it remains unclear on what grounds the evidential or aesthetical value of tradition is secured; fidelity to tradition requires knowledge of "*Interpretationsgeschichte*", but the value and meaning of this "*überlieferung*" has been severely questioned. Among further issues that Danuser touches upon, the following relate to this inquiry. What does it mean to follow correctly the tradition, not the original, and why is tradition interesting? If its value is hidden within its role as substitute for the lost original mode of performance, then there must be a method of distinguishing between the quality of different traditions, some of which are labeled "*Schlamperei*" by Sergiu Celibidache and before him, allegedly, by Gustav Mahler; and

(3) that the listener-oriented interpretation requires adaption and actualization of earlier works especially, which is aesthetically necessary (Adorno), but which gives these works new meaning ("*neuen Sinngehalt*"); how then can fidelity to the composer's intention, as dependent on historical context, be maintained as an ideal requirement?

I am also restricting the focus of this study to those aspects that are distinctly pertinent to **contemporary** performance in a double sense: (1) as a performance belonging to a musical life orientated towards Western music culture, (i.e. a performance that already occurs, or could have occurred in this context), and (2) as a performance carrying the determinants of contemporary

aesthetic thinking. A performance (p) that explicitly or implicitly aims at realizing only historical aspects of the musical work (w), i.e. **pure historical reconstructivism**, with no traces of aesthetic consideration, is not of immediate interest, and is thus excluded from independent treatment here. And even if such a performance were to occur nowadays, it would hardly attract the interest of **aesthetic** interpretation research.

Furthermore, a performance that does not contain any **interpretative considerations**, reflections or longer deliberations pertaining to the model situation studied, e.g. a purely unreflected execution or 'mechanical' rendition of a score, is **not** the subject of this thesis, not even if such a performance were to be supported by a modern technocratic aesthetic. Only aspects (1) in fact, through practice or (2) *a priori* by hypothesis, bearing on either interpretative decisions or the design of performative soundshaping relevant to our interpretation theory, are included for treatment.

The terminology required for this project is partly innovative. I take sole responsibility for using non-idiomatic expressions in English that I felt were both unavoidable and comfortable: e.g. the word "experienceable" is generally not accepted, as David Lewin pointed out to me. On the other hand, Raymond Monelle considers such expressions to be "normal products of English live suffixes", adding that "some English critics would call them 'barbarisms'" (referee's report 8.4.94). It is not listed in *Webster's 20th Century Dictionary* (2nd ed, Simon and Schuster, N. Y. 1979), nor in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (6th ed, Oxford 1976). However, 'experienceable' is defined as "capable of being experienced" in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd ed, Clarendon, 1989, vol 5:564). The term is equivalent to (and operationally defined here as) "thus so conceived that it can be experienced", to be distinguished from "observable", meaning objects that can be perceived by sensory perception. In contrast "experience" is a much broader concept, including more cognitive modes (reflection, volition, emotion, etc.). Unfortunately "experienceable" cannot be replaced by "experiential" since the latter term implies that the experience in question does exist (*de facto*). The sensitive and well-educated reader will immediately understand my terminology, relying on phenomenology and aesthetics, or relating to medical science and music performance practice, in due context. For instance, I am taking the liberty of writing "parallelism" in

correspondence to German "*Parallellität*" (Celibidache), adducing logical reasons as justification; furthermore, "parallelism" is current. After his many decades of multilingual lectures, the central concepts of Celibidache's "*musikalische Phänomenologie*" must finally be acknowledged, even in English. "*Gestaltung*" is not an English word according to David Lewin (although other derivatives such as "gestaltism" and "gestaltist" are listed in Oxford 1976:444), but it logically derives from "gestalt", a concept perfectly established. "Genial" is only rarely used in the sense of "relating to or exhibiting genius" (1979:763), but was commonly used in this sense in the 18th century, according to Raymond Monelle; this obsolete meaning is useful for our purpose. "Objective" is in my nomenclature related to the "object", as is "objectivistic" to "objectivism".

Please note the difference in linguistic use and meaning in expressions like the following:

(1) "music experience" ("music performance", etc.) is music being experienced and an experience of music, not necessarily a **musical** experience having the specific quality of 'musicality'; the same is true for music performance.

(2) "musical experience" (cf. "musical performance"): logically a "musical experience" is more than a music experience; it is a characterization of a specific kind of experience that is exactly "musical". Most likely (and most often), such an experience is also "of music", i.e. it is a music experience in the first sense, but not necessarily so. Contemplating a beautiful poem or landscape, an impressive panorama of the ocean (etc.) might give some people an 'associatively' **musical** experience which is neither a music experience nor an experience of music. More obviously, the mere **act of looking** at a violin, not being played at the moment, can remind us of some favored piece and thus excite first a music experience, then a musical one. The question as to whether some 'thoughts' (imaginative acts) exhibiting **specific cognitive patterns** are musical while others may not be is as crucial as it is controversial. However, Radovan Lorkovic questions this distinction (p.c. 22.1.94) and posits an explicative definition of "musical experience" as that which is characterized by "the participation of an (instructed or innate) distinct capacity, generally called musicality", which entails "understanding music as a language in its expressive as well as formal aspects." The difficulties I see in this definition are (1) its circularity (what is musicality?), and (2) the restriction of understanding as the sole cognitive act indicative of musicality.

(3) "experience of music" (cf. "performance of music") is an overall experience of a specific kind of object, namely music. The expression does not

postulate the kind of music involved in the experience, nor what kind of an object that music is (whether it is 'experiential', intentional or an acoustic fact).

'Intentional' pertains to what is intended but need not be wanted in the volitional sense. Intentional acts have their origin in the cognitive processes and working patterns of the mind (with the 'material' content provided by sensory perception as the object of treatment), and are basically constituted internally. In contrast, an 'experience' is a mental (cognitive, perceptive) phenomenon that is **excited** (or 'incited') outside the mind, provoked by an external object or fact, but grasped (cognized, apprehended, comprehended, treated imaginatively) as an internal object (content). It must not be forgotten that an experience (including a musical one) can have its internal origin entirely in the imagination or through recollection. In its broader sense, 'experience' is seen as the final stage of both **assimilative** (perceptive, apperceptive) and **interpretive** (cognitive) acts (processings); intentionality is a mental force executing the interpretive commands, guided by its direction, and penetrating the object's features (properties), thus modifying its appearance in the consciousness.

A terminological caveat is inserted here *à propos* the pair of concepts 'intention' and 'intentionality'. Intention in "the popular meaning of the term" (Raymond Monelle, referee's report 8.4.94) can denote either (1) "real intention (which can be investigated only in composers' writings, interviews with composers etc)" or (2) "*implied* intention, which can be discerned in the text of the work – the usual meaning of 'intention'". In the first sense 'intention' has to do with volition, will and awareness of a certain purpose, wish or desire – e.g. the composer was aware of what he wanted to do in (and by) writing a work, what he meant about the work: c.f. the performer who may to various degrees be aware of the work he is going to perform (play) and what he wants to do with it in (and by) performing it. In contrast 'intentionality', as we have seen and will see, is a more abstract term not exhausted by the ordinary lexical definition in Webster 1979:955: "the quality of being intentional; aim, design." It is specifically used in phenomenology; intentionality here means the directed attention needed for the conscious mind in order for it to incorporate into its experience the object being focused on.

'To focus' is always to focus on some object, external or internal, but we can also talk about the **act of focusing** (often abbreviated to 'focusing' or 'the focusing of in this study) itself as an interesting phenomenon in the interpretative relation between us (our mind and/or sensitive body) and the object we are studying at the time. Obviously we are constantly changing the direction of our

intentionality to focus on various objects appearing in the perceptive field provided by the unorganised environment of everyday life. Listening to music may even be one of the rare cases when our intentionality is steadily fixed on the same 'object', as for example when an intriguing melody or part in a polyphonic texture – or an impressive symphonic development – catches our attention. Music has the rare quality of providing objects that are extended in time and retain their 'identity' – and yet simultaneously change, undergo metamorphosis, continuously.

Now the meaning of 'focus on' and 'the act of 'focusing'' that I adopt in this work is central to a phenomenologically oriented interpretation research. It is often proposed within this movement that the 'content of the mind' is made up of experiential objects, i.e. phenomena, which thereby constitute consciousness 'itself'. We are not merely aware of the 'existence' of the object we perceive (i.e. that it exists) but we also actively direct our **intentionality** towards the object, i.e. we **focus on** it; or a distinctly and energetically shaped object may actively draw our attention to itself, whereby intentionality attains a more passive role; the focusing is more passively guided by external stimuli, as when we hear the initial motif of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* for the first time. Psychologists usually say that we 'concentrate' our 'attention' on the object; but this seems to imply an intellectually governed **mode** of cognition that excludes the finer distinction between active and passive modes of cognition conceived of by phenomenological thinkers. These allow us to direct our intentionality, i.e. our 'energy of awareness' or our 'spotlight' of consciousness on and towards the object as well as to be 'transported with' ('captivated', 'carried away', 'enraptured over') or just 'enchanted' by the object in a mode of passive reception.

Empirical psychologists have espoused a fundamentally different view of this item; they tend to assume that perception depends on a stimulus directed from an external object; the stimulus creates an impression inside us by means of a process mediated by our senses; this process is the target of their research and has been studied in great detail.

In contrast, phenomenology attempts to programmatically avoid all presuppositions in favor of a pure investigation of the logical conditions for human experience. However, its investigations seem to take for granted a cognition that directs its intentionality from inside out; and it endeavors to state the conditions that must be met in order for us to incorporate in our experience the experiential correlate to the object situated outside us. I want to neutralize this difference in "directedness" by allowing both directions. The internalization

of experiential objects permits us to conceive of a double-directed exchange between subject and object. I can agree with phenomenologists arguing that there must be preconceived 'cognitive' (I use this word; they avoid it, e.g. J.-Claude Piguet, p.c.) patterns that suit objects in order for them to be included in our experience.

In sum then, I use 'focus on' in (1) the ordinary sense ("to fix on one object or purpose; to concentrate", Webster 1979:710), and (2) in the special sense derived from 'the act of focusing (on)' or simply 'focusing' passively. My operational definition of 'focusing' has two essential denotations: (1) to consciously (voluntarily) pick out an object (or idea) from the perceptual field and fix it by an act of directed attention; it (this first *definiens*) thus entails, 'concentrating' mentally on an object (idea) by means of selective attention; (2) to immediately experience an object (idea) by either passive or active intentionality; it (the second *definiens*) thus entails a distinction between two extreme model cases; first, when the object draws my attention to itself and I am in a mode of passive reception (the perceptible object is S, the subject, and my consciousness, I, is the object, O); and secondly, when I am directing my attention to the object in order to perceive and conceive of its many aspects, by actively 'focusing' on it (here, my consciousness, I, is the subject, S, who establishes an experiential relation within my perceptual field with an object, O, given by the world that I have access to). The active intentionality 'illuminates' the object, i.e. (1) finds it, (2) identifies its properties, and (3) internalizes it.

In this study I have adopted the view that language is a flexible instrument that should serve to express thought. This means that I prefer the 'original' sense of a word closer to that of its Latin stem. This is obvious in the definitions of my neologisms; I consulted professor Birger Bergh, Lund University, on their construction. Some words may seem unusual, as "transilluminate" (Webster's 1979:1939), but should not cause any trouble; to illuminate is not enough when a structure is thoroughly penetrated analytically. Other words, such as 'processuality' (not listed in Webster's) have now been used for decades in lectures with ample musical demonstrations given by Sergiu Celibidache; thousands of music students have heard them. By using such words I argue that they must now be considered established; it must be possible to use them at least in the professional literature. Celibidache fully realized that in musical phenomenology we need the notion of "directionality", since direction is too contaminated by spatial associations; his use of the term suggests that the "directional" quality of "direction" reappears in musical experience. Thus, for

this specific phenomenon, which is not only a subjective quality of musical experience, "directionality" is the recommended term. Furthermore, it is surprisingly exact from a logical point of view, and it is not loaded with visual connotations.

"Actuality" is defined by Webster's (1979:20) by reference to "actual", which has two denotations according to this source: (1) "existing in act; real" or (2) "existing at the present time". In my theoretical schemes I have adopted the second meaning. I regret that English, having accepted "fact" and "factual", does not allow the next level of abstraction ('facticity') to be comfortably expressed. Even forms that may seem awkward to purists, such as "factuality" or "facticity", do not disturb me as long as they are logically well-founded and fulfill a 'practical' purpose. Since prose is an instrument for communication, it fulfills its role in providing a rich repertoire of concepts based on logical reasons prior to aesthetical considerations. But 'factual' and 'facticity' are already terms which do not pose a problem to modern philosophers (Hans Ruin, 1994:186).

Terminology already brings us into the field of philosophy; it might therefore be wise to anticipate another of my arguments. I question the linguistic practice of applying linguistic syntax to the area of musical experience. I argue that there exists an independent way of thinking musically based on the specificity of musical experience. Language did not arise before reality; but language became an instrument to delineate, describe and define reality eventually in more refined ways. Since language is contained in reality it is difficult to get out of the problem of circularity without assuming an independence of reality that allows false description to be made.

My system of enumeration may strike some readers as unorthodox. I have specific reasons for applying numbers to facilitate the reading and understanding of the text, for the purpose of introducing distinctions, clarifying structure and disposition, or as a visual markaton – and not always necessarily to designate coordination of equal argumentative and/or syntactic relationships. I let "he" stand for he/she when personal pronouns are necessary (I, P, C, L). For reasons of conceptual comfort I use "apriorical" derived from the Latin *a priori*. Mostly, I am forced to rely on the reader's recognition of certain fundamental concepts, such as "consciousness", "phenomenon", "relation", "freedom", "art", "science", "life" etc, as far as concerns their general linguistic meanings.

The placement of quotation marks (") relative to punctuation marks (point, comma, semicolon) is strict. Whenever a punctuation mark occurs

within the quotation marks it is actually a part of the cited text as it appears in the source, whereas a punctuation mark after the quotation mark is mine and may imply that I have cut the citation where the quotation mark is placed.

In connection with the abbreviations that I use (i, p, w, etc., see ch. VII:2) the colon (:) with an –s indicates plural, as in p:s for 'performances', whereas the apostrophe (') with an –s means the possessive (genitive) case, as in p's for 'performance's'.

In a theoretical context the suffix –al of adjectives is chosen to indicate a closer connection with the following noun than indicated by adjectives without the same suffix, as in the following example: "ontological identity" (of, for instance an artwork) connotes that the identity itself is ontological, whereas "ontologic identity" (of the same artwork) connotes that it is the ontologic kind of identity, as opposed to other kinds of identities (e.g. psychological) that the discussion can possibly refer to. In a theoretical context I also frequently use the –ing form of the verb as a noun, as for instance in 'interpreting', to denote the individual act of doing what the verb indicates, here an 'interpretation'.

The connex –o– between two scientific terms, as in 'phenomeno–logical', 'musico–logical' and 'rhythmo–metrical', means 'and', i.e. that the concept pertains to both 'worlds' denoted by their two–part terms.

My use of the term 'logics' (plural) of interpretation (etc.) implies the existence of many different and specific kinds of logic within the realm of this study; the case is similar for 'gestics' standing for various conductorial styles of gestures and for musicians' patterns of motion; the term 'kinaesthetics' is established in science and among advanced artists, whereas 'kinematics' is a musicological term.

The innovative terms that I propose in the following chapters are required for logical reasons, for purposes of distinction and definition; their construction has been governed by the principle of logical consequence. I also must remind the reader that linguistic expression is severely influenced, loaded and limited by the human faculty of expressing our thoughts in **speech**, whereas modern cognitive philosophers (Peter Gärdenfors, Lund University, p.c.) recognize non–linguistic modes of thinking. Musical cognition, I submit, belongs to these modes and along with visual imagination it is one of our basic silent modes of cognition. Essentially, then, I argue for a non–linguistic view of musical cognition as an independent modality of consciousness; the analyses made by Ernest Ansermet (1989:169, 190, 225 pass.), although intended to be purely phenomenological, can be adduced to support my argument.

The use of a concept does not imply the material existence of what it signifies. The introduction of a concept like **consciousness** ("*Bewusstsein*") may rest on an assumption made *ad hoc* (for the purpose in question) or until further evidence can corroborate – or disconfirm – the hypothesis of its existence. But the use of notions such as consciousness, I and you, does not pose any problem since we can rely on a linguistic (and intentional) consensus of what kind of an **assembly of phenomena** these words refer to. Furthermore, each individual can rely upon his experiential evidence, albeit personal and individual, for his understanding of these terms, and for communicating his experience in exchange with other humans.

The works of music (i.e. the 'music-works') that I cite or refer to (score samples and analyses in my earlier books) are what a consensus of experts names "masterworks" of the classical, romantic and modern era. These are the works that predominate worldwide in concert houses within the tradition to which I relate; this study is exclusively dedicated to the canon of notated scores of Western music since about 1750, which is the music most commonly performed in public concerts. It is also accorded a great deal of weight in courses of public and private education at all stages from elementary training to university research. This is the social justification for my choice. Moreover, I also castigate some dear colleagues of mine who insist on using the simplest music such as folk tunes and nursery rhymes in their research; they may have launched the right methods for the purposes they espouse. I am not looking for answers to the same questions as them, but insofar as their analyses of elementary structures casts light on fundamental questions, their research is relevant to mine. My argument for the choice of repertoire is that **complex phenomena are special** and cannot be broken down into their material constituents without fundamentally changing the experience to another experience. This is the phenomenological justification for my choice.

But I am not saying that the problem of interpretation in performance cannot be studied within the fields of ethnomusic, jazz, 'mesomusic', pop, rock, etc.; on the contrary, it would be extremely interesting to investigate, in particular, the borderlines between interpretation and improvisation, and interpretation and composition within these fields. Needless to say, vocal interpretation is a wide area that I have, in principle, excluded from this study (with few exceptions, e.g. concerning Cone's important theory, ch. II:5), but it introduces many important questions into the scope of musical interpretation research.

Furthermore, there are more subtle reasons for my choice: it is exactly the compatibility of transparency and complexity defining the masterwork that presents an intriguing problem to the performer. The case of the masterwork simply transcends the threatening triviality of much music with a lighter mark. The complexity is needed to attract our attention, to establish and maintain the steady stream of intentional directionality towards the heard object. The focusing and integration of our mental energy prevents the indifferent noise and trivial distraction of disturbing thoughts that turn us away from the object **and which may 'split' our mind**. The sustained concentration on and penetration of one and the same complete object of our senses, i.e. the masterwork, is healthy therapy which has both a **musical** and a **musicalizing** effect on the attentively participating listener and which can I hope modify the discouraging – and possibly dangerous – recent tendencies of egocentric and autistic daydreaming. The compositions which meet the requirements of a masterwork are not merely musicworks; they are also **musical works** in a stronger sense.

Terminologically then, the looser connection between 'music' and 'work' found in 'music work' refers to a socially broad and vaguely delineated area of denotation indicating all kinds of work with music carried out by composers, performers and listeners. I tighten the link by introducing a hyphen: '**music-work**' means a work of art that contains music as an essential component. A **musicwork**, then, is a clearly individuated artwork of music which entails a well-defined identity (i.e. it can be distinguished clearly from others of the same kind) and which, although not necessarily a musical masterwork, attains a higher ontological status on the same level as the latter. The question of what criteria must be met in order for a musicwork to be a 'musical work' as a compositional fact, or to become a '**musical work**' through its kind of performance (or, through its appearance and properties), is much too vast to be answered by this study; we treat only one facet of this problem, the problem of rendering the musicwork in a way that exposes its 'musical' traits.

A closely related question is whether 'musicality' is adequately defined as the ability to detect, experience and render such traits. After the initial rigour of the analytical approach I will allow a gradual expansion of ideas in the later chapters in order to explore a broader panorama of the ideas on musical interpretation in recent times. I will use an analytical nomenclature to discover the crucial points in this material and finally come to the theoretical conclusions of my study.

I am thankful to have received critical and constructive comments that contributed both to the improvement of this text and to the scientific status of interpretation research as such.

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Naturally, the responsibility for all opinions expressed is mine alone. Even

in cases of cooperative participation, I do not claim to imply that my collaborators have endorsed either the whole thesis or all the parts thereof, or the general line of argumentation that I advance. In cases where such approval has been made, this is indicated, where necessary, in the relevant section.

Some experience of philosophical and particularly **critical analysis** as well as an acquaintance with musical and musicological terminology is required from the reader in this thesis. Needless to say, this book is a further step in the direction already envisioned in my earlier works; it continues, completes, elaborates, and is founded on the ideas presented in those works. The conscientious reader is strongly advised to consult these preceding and preparatory works (listed in ch. VII:3 and VII:6), since the limited space available does not permit repetition, and to utilize the appendices, indices and the list of abbreviations (ch. VII:2) in this and other MIR volumes (I and II).

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I INTRODUCTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND AESTHETIC PERSPECTIVE ON MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE

I:1 SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT: POINT OF DEPARTURE (MIR) AND THE AIMS OF THIS STUDY. DEFINITIONS OF BASIC CONCEPTS.

This thesis is about **interpretation** as phenomenon, act of consciousness, and relational constituent. Therefore, interpretation must be determined by reference to relevant and fundamental notions, such as freedom, relation, description, and performance. The treatment and distinction of these and other related notions serve to illuminate the core of interpretation focused in the scope of this investigation; the determination of central and interdependent concepts must necessarily be integrated in the analysis of our main concept of interpretation. The meaning of fundamental notions such as "phenomenon" and "consciousness" is gradually carved out in the course of this thesis.

I:1:1 INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTERPRETATION

Etymologically, the transitive verb *interpret* has its root in Latin *interpretari*, i.e. to explain, expound, via Old French *interpreter* and Middle English *interpreten* (Webster's 1979:960). The noun *interpretation*, from Latin *interpretatio* (-ionis), means "an explanation" and is, again, traced back to *interpretari*, to interpret, i.e. "to explain, translate" (Oxford 1976:566); *interpretes* (-pretis) means 'explainer'. The original meaning of *intéruptans*, the interpreter, the one who interprets, and, *interpretándum*, the object for this action, reveal the complementarity of subject and object in the interpretive act. Moreover, these two terms are frequently used in current philosophy in parallel to 'definiens' and 'definiendum'. The verbal noun *interpretatio* signifies both the objective fact of an 'interpretation' and the 'interpreting' action. Although the etymological origin of *interpretes* is not securely established, it has been used in commercial language to indicate a middleman, an agent: for instance *interpret* (-pres) translates "agent, broker, translator" (ODEE 1966:481). Of its two morphemes the stem *inter-* clearly means 'between' or 'among', whereas *-pres* may be derived from either *-pretium*,

price, or *-pars*, part (p.c. Birger Bergh; cf. OED vol 7:1131–1133, 1979). Latin etymologers (LEW 1930:711) listed the following basic senses of *interpres* (*-etis*): "Vermittler, Unterhändler, Mittelsperson (z.B. bei Kaufhandlungen); Ausleger, Erklärer; Dolmetscher; Übersetzer". The original meaning of this commercial and judicial term was "zwischen zeien Leistung und Gegenleistung festsetzen, den Vermittler (urspr. beim Kauf) spielen"; here "*preti*, *-ios*" derived from "*preti*" ("gegenüber") reads "gleichwertig" (of equal value) and the following connotations were attributed at a later stage to the concept central to us, *interpres*: "auslegen, erklären, [ausdeuten]", "verstehen", and the metaphorical "hinüberbringen".

In a modern sense then, the noun **interpretation** refers to: "1. an interpreting; 2. the result of this [interpreting]; explanation; meaning; translation; exposition; 3. the expression of a person's conception of a work of art, subject, etc. through acting, playing, writing, criticizing, etc., as in the case of the pianist's **interpretation** of the sonata" (Webster's 1979:960).

In contrast, J.-J. Rousseau treated only "*exécution*" and "*expression*" in separate articles of his *Dictionnaire de musique* (1st ed. Paris 1769). He defines *expression* with reference to the musician's concern for the **rendition** in performance based on his 'feeling', namely as a "qualité par laquelle le musicien sent vivement et rend avec énergie toutes les idées qu'il doit rendre, et tous les sentiments qu'il doit exprimer"; his concept of *expression* refers to both the performance and the work of music: "il y a une *Expression* de Composition et une d'*exécution*, et c'est de leurs concours que résulte l'effet musical le plus puissant et le plus agréable." (1781:353) In fact, Rousseau launched the basic definition of **execution**, a concept he elaborated on carefully. He explicates the "action d'exécuter une pièce de musique" as follows: "Comme la musique est ordinairement composée de plusieurs parties, dont le rapport exact, soit pour l'Intonation, soit pour la Mesure, est extrêmement difficile à observer, et dont l'esprit dépend plus du goût que des signes, rien n'est si rare qu'une bonne *exécution*." Execution, in Rousseau's sense, presupposes several abilities on the part of the musician, namely those of (1) reading the notation, (2) knowing the composer's ideas, (3) feeling and rendering the 'expressiveness' ("le feu de l'expression"), and (4) listening attentively (and following) the ensemble: "C'est peu de lire la musique exactement sur la note; il faut entrer dans toutes les idées du compositeur, sentir et rendre le feu de l'expression, avoir sur-tout l'oreille juste et toujours attentive pour écouter et suivre l'ensemble." (1781:351) But, clearly, his concept of execution does not entail that of interpretation in modern

sense, since *exécution* basically depends on the **technical** abilities of reading and playing (i.e. mastering) an instrument, namely (1; "premièrement") "d'une habitude parfaite de la touche et du doigter de son instrument" and (2; "en second lieu") "d'une grande habitude de lire la musique et de phraser en la regardant: car tant qu'on ne voit que des Notes isolées, on hésite toujours à les prononcer: on n'acquiert la grande facilité de l'*Exécution*, qu'en les unissent par le sens commun qu'elles doivent former, et en mettant la chose à la place du signe." (1781:352).

The concept begins to attain its modern sense in the Swiss music theorist Mathis Lussy's (1828–1910 Montreux) treatises. In two of his works, *Le Rythme Musical* (Paris 1883) and *Traité de l'expression musicale* (Paris 1874; 1885), he launches a modern program for the study of the artistical qualities of musical performance ("*execution*") in modern and classical masterworks. His concept is 'scientific' in the Linnaean sense (1883:IV) insofar as he applies the scheme of cause and effect to this field in order to trace the empirical laws ("*lois*", "*règles*", "*réglementation*") of interpretation to "l'*identité* d'expression, chantée ou écrite, chez les différents artistes" (1885:2). Since, according to Lussy, the expression is not arbitrary ("il n'y a rien d'arbitraire dans l'expression", 1885:2) and the same effects must be attributed to the same causes, he anchors the expressions in the notational context of the musical phrase. Despite this **objectivistic** effort, he acknowledges the necessity of the performer's free zone, "la latitude désirable pour manifester son [d'artiste] individualité" (1885:4). The dilemma between **compositional objectivity** and **interpretational individuality** is obvious; on the one hand "tout est cause et effet, rapport et loi" and "dans une interprétation artistique, aucune note ne peut être *arbitrairement* accentuée" (Préface, 1885), on the other hand "les artistes manifestent des *expressions identiques* sans autres différences que celles qui résultent de leur délicatesse de sentiment, de leur virtuosité plus ou moins grande." (ib., 2)

Mediated via the works of J.-J. de Momigny (1762–1842; MGG 9:449), the French encyclopedists' notions were 'rediscovered' and elaborated by Lussy and Hugo Riemann. But the latter refrained from expanding the basic terminology, mainly using "*Vortrag*" and "*Ausdruck*" as his central concepts, while Friedrich Blume, as editor-in-chief of MGG, abstained from including the concept in the nomenclature of his monumental dictionary; for historical musicology it was sufficient to treat related problems in articles about "*Aufführungspraxis*", "*Ausdruck*" and "*Vortrag*" (MGG 1:783–810 sc. 18, 1:863–869, and 14:16–31). Other related concepts touched upon were "*Auffassung*",

"Darstellung", "Einstudierung", and "Wiedergabe" which occasionally hinted at the same core meaning as our concept.

In *New Grove* (1980), Stanley Sadie recognized the concept and accepted it for inclusion in an international music dictionary of modern musicology (Grove 9:276). Although few lines are dedicated to the subject in referring to "Performing Practice" (14:370–393), related theoretical items are treated at length, e.g. "Analysis" covers 48 pages (1:340–388).

Obviously the concept of interpretation has a very broad application since it is used within the arts, sciences and ordinary life, and considered indispensable in various realms of society. For the survival and well-being of the individual it may be essential to **interpret correctly**, and a favorable opportunity to do so is commonly assumed to exist in medical diagnostics and the sciences, within the judicial system and in the humanities, including archeology, philology and history. The possibility that one can interpret correctly in Freudian psychoanalysis and religious exegesis has been intensively debated (Grünbaum 1985). False interpretation of signal systems, say in traffic, and in medicine (symptomatology, diagnostics), may be immediately life-threatening, and injustice to innocent individuals may cause severe human suffering. Interpretive mistakes in physics and capital risk management may, in addition to posing a life threat, be enormously expensive and cause great material damage to people and whole nations, as recently shown in nuclear power disasters and the world-wide economic recession, respectively. On the other hand, correct interpretation in medical research may relieve humanity from the curse of dreadful diseases, and ecological management of limited human and material resources may secure the survival of coming generations on earth. However, even political and social decisions are made by individuals: the patterns of human interaction and relationship studied in psychoanalysis (Grünbaum¹, Lesche², Sundin³) reveal an interesting understanding of the logical and cognitive structure of individual reasons for decisions and actions made on the basis of personal interpretation of the entire life situation, especially psychic interaction in family and pair relations.

Within the arts, interpretation as a broad notion has been used to explain the relation between artistic production and the assimilating social environment⁴. Under the headline of "The Artist's Intention", Beardsley⁵ acknowledges the existence of various "possibilities left open by the score" regarding music performance (*Aesthetics* 1988:22). He identifies "the problem of correct

performance" (21) without concluding that the solution to this problem requires conscious consideration and interpretive decision-making on the basis of some paradigm of a settled philosophy of science.

In *Musical Interpretation in Performance* (MIP 1983:20) I defined **interpretation** in its stricter sense, its general meaning, by applying to it the following denotations: (1) as an explanation of the meaning of something; (2) as a mediator or intermediary between a creator and a receiver; (3) as the activity of the musical artist; (4) as a realizing of the musical work as conceived by the composer; (5) as a phenomenon capable of being comprehensible to the listener. In its more specific sense, concerning mip, I proposed that the concept of interpretation can be understood (6) as a specific property pertaining to the case in which the performer has a thorough understanding and grasp of the entire work he is going to perform, and (7) as the specific quality in which he actually makes his musical realization in accordance with this overall view, whereas I determined that **execution** was "a simple sounding realization of a work and a correct rendering of the score". On an intermediary level, in between execution and interpretation, I introduced a definition of **gestalting** ("shaping" or featuring) that posits it as an elaborate rendition of phrases (themes, motifs) in cases where "small parts of the work are recreated, formed in various ways, above the simple rendition, but below the deeper perspective of interpretation" (MIP:20; with further discussion in MIR I:2-5,47-48). As Ernst Lichtenhahn noted (p.c. 19.1.94), these are two different concepts: 'shaping' refers to the formal, external aspect of the form in process, whereas "*Gestaltung*" ('gestaltung', gestalting) combines the internal with the external aspect of creating (perceiving, recognizing) musical sound. Obviously a definition of interpretation can focus alternatively on the "creative" or "reproductive" process or on the "productive" result. It may be useful to leave these two alternative possibilities open.

In contrast, Jerrold Levinson focuses more on the intended determinations of the sound features in accord with certain traditions of 'reading-out' in suggesting a definition of "performance interpretation" as follows (Krausz⁶ 1993:36, italics normalized; my enumeration of the *definiens* as postulates): (8) "a considered way of playing [presenting] a piece of music involving" (9) "highly specific determinations of all the defining features of the piece" (10) "as given by the score" and its (11) "associated conventions of reading". However, if a definition is bound up to a convention, **innovative reading** aimed at creative interpretation is unjustly excluded from the scope of interpretation research. Furthermore, interpretation does not of course only involve instrumental

playing, but indeed also conducting and singing. It can be questioned whether only consciously considered modes of making music shall be included. What if a talented young adept acquires his master's style of playing during the lessons by unknowingly imitating his teacher, minor differences disregarded? Does he not essentially make the **same** interpretation, based on a prototypical one as the original model ("förlaga"; FME:47)? I propose that the correct answer must be yes.

In the process of acquiring knowledge about an object, the basic relation between interpreting subject and object must first be established. In order to characterize this relation in its fundamental traits, we must conceive of it as having three levels: (1) **perceptive**, i.e. the object is focused by a subject-object (S-O) relation (abbreviations ch. VII:2); (2) **cognitive-reflexive**, $S-S = O-O$, presupposing some degree of self-awareness to make possible an internal relation in the subject, as well as an interrelation within the object (i.e. some structural traits is recognized, reflected on and/or considered); and (3) **interpretive**, $S_1-S_1 = O_1-O_1$, $S_2-S_2 = O_2-O_2$ (etc) where various consistent views of the object emerge and are recognized (considered) forming a sequence of options: the interpreter's mind must allow (entail, congruently contain) the view of the work and this is projected **onto** the work. However, this interpretive image of the work, albeit conceived with perfection, is not **identical** to the work; it remains 'an image of the object' or 'an objective image of w' under the pretext of likeness (similarity), at most an intended or pretended identity. There are several ways of understanding ('how I understand') the object, and this way of understanding ('how I understand') can in its turn be understood in three basic senses, depending on what cognitive procedure leads to the decisive view, namely: (1) if it is immediately and intuitively reached by sensory perception, by means of (2) conscious reflection **about** the perceived content, possibly entailing a cognitive consideration of the choice being made, or a surveying of available variants, or by (3) a conscious reflection or 'cognizing' on the basic modes and patterns of interpretive thinking according to various philosophical and aesthetic ideals, i.e. a mentation on higher level of abstraction.

It is worth noting a few operatively postulated taxonomic nuances, justified linguistically (Webster's lists the first two of the following three terms, 1979:960): (1) **interpretive** refers to the practical, concrete, positive choice of a version, the selective decision of the interpreting act and activity; 'interpretive' in the sense I apply the term is object-related and entails some sort of conscious awareness of the object, or at least its existence, of the interpreting act; (2)

interpretative refers to what pertains to the interpreting act, entailing conscious consideration (which eventually leads to the concrete decision to make a definite approach towards the object), or to the correlation on the level of consciousness of its implementing activity regarding a particular work or passage; the sensing or surveying of alternatives is presupposed; (3) **interpretational** refers to what belongs to the notion of interpretation on the theoretical or phenomenological level.

The concept of interpretation can also be delineated by distinction from **description**: while a description should be 'equational', the criterion for interpretation is its constructiveness, according to Joseph Margolis⁷. Whereas description refers to "a stable, public, relatively well-defined object available for inspection" (111), **interpretation** requires the "added contribution of the interpreter", includes "the performing aspect", and "cannot be reduced to equivocation of textual vagueness".

The relation and distinction between **interpretation** (i) and **performance** (p) is developed in chapter I:2 and subsequent chapters. For now, it suffices to say that p does take into account the determinative (usually limiting) circumstances of the specific instrument, the anatomic, physiologic, or motoric restrictions of the playing action, and the acoustics of the room, etc.; i does **not** include these factors.

The distinction between critical, or 'theoretical' ("T"), and performance ("P") interpretation suggested by Margolis is elaborated logically by Göran Hermerén in Krausz (1993⁸) as we shall see in chapter II:1. For now, this short introductory note on definitions will be sufficient. Further discussions are left to the presentations of interpretive systems where the concept of interpretation is involved in complex conceptions that have to be disentangled in due context. (*vide* FME: 46–50, MIP: 20 and MIR I:2–5).

What is it then that makes us ascribe something to the category of interpretation? Apart from what is already indicated in the definitions above, it is characteristic that the **act of interpretation** is what produces the **interpretans** required in order to fill in the indeterminacy of the alleged properties of an **interpretandum**; the resultant cleavage is indicated by the lack of consensus on the ontology of the work, i.e. the decisive traits of an interpretandum. There is something non-obvious, something not caught by ordinary description or even by analysis, that cannot be determined by other means than through interpretation, an intermediary understanding and transmitting activity that is based upon inference from the work.

Obviously, in the interpretive situation it is presupposed that an interpretandum carries indications (facts or phenomena) pointing in **some** specific direction from which we are able to discover **something**, and from which an interpretation can be recovered. Interpretation is not an arbitrary activity; it has an identifiable object, mostly stable (sometimes transient), often a specific problem (say of dynamic balance, or style), and it adduces **evidence** in order to corroborate its proposed conclusion. The result of an interpretive act does not seem to exclude other results or other interpretive acts towards the same object. Since an interpretive result is, in some sense, definite in its constitution (outline), the diversity of implied versions can be derived from (1) an inherent divergence of possibilities in the work and/or, on the part of the performing interpreter (2) differences in the process or act of interpretation. However, one should not *a priori* exclude any answers to the questions as to **what** is interpreted and **'where'** the solutions to the interpretive problem are supposed to be found; I submit they differ widely. Answers to the latter question may refer to the work, the interpreter himself, to the audience or its context, etc.

In order for this **indeterminacy** of the work, and for the variability in process and result of interpretation, to exist, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) a fundamental freedom must be the case in the original state of affairs (w, n) or in the process of i, and (2) there must be a constant relation to the constituents of the work (in order to secure interpretability), preserved through the whole process of interpretation and ending in a result. The stability of connection between subject and object requires the constant identities of the work and the interpreter, respectively. Indeed, circumstances indicate that the aim of interpretation is to **establish coherent interrelations in an optional relational network** that guarantees the manifestation of the identity of the appearing work in performance. We will therefore introduce a consideration about these basic notions of freedom and relation.

I:1:2 INTRODUCTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND AESTHETIC PERSPECTIVE ON MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE. A RESEARCH SYNOPSIS FOR INVESTIGATING AESTHETIC CRITERIA OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE, FOCUSING ON THE MAIN PROBLEMS AND POSTULATES OF THIS INVESTIGATION

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: FREEDOM AND RELATION

Musical interpretation can be regarded as the resulting intersection of two categories: **freedom** and **relation**. Freedom liberates the performer by hinting at a broader frame of open possibilities within which to realize the score ('text') and work out these possibilities into interpretative alternatives. Freedom evidently extends the scope of these alternatives, and increases the number of available choices.

Relation has much the opposite effect: The identified relations limit the interpretive possibilities through pointing to notational imperatives, restricting indications or setting bounds to style. Relations also make the demands on the performer more precise. Through clarifying what must inevitably be 'the case' in order for a performance to be judged acceptable, relations impose aesthetic limits on the basis of certain values. The evaluative aspect of interpretation, which seems unavoidably connected to complex relations, is most often implicit, while the aesthetic preference is generally formulated as a justification of choice. This means that the protagonist of one version argues for his choice by adducing (or explicitly presenting through his artistic media) allegedly objective indications, e.g. by pointing to structural markings that will most efficiently clarify the work. In everyday music life, very few 'auditors' would demand a full declaration of the arguments *pro et contra* from a musician before his concert. The interpreter is assumed to present the work in the mode of the resulting pro-argumentation for his version, and he leaves the listener a free option to be convinced or not by the performer's 'played argumentation'. Occasionally, in a critique published the day after a concert, some tacit arguments may often be explicitly formulated, provided the reviewer has understood the interpretative situation, including the plausible versions available to the performer.

It should be added that insofar as a relation between ontologic entities is 'fundamental', this means that the relation is valid in the formal theory (as in the one exhibited in ch I:2), irrespective of the individual case is represented by the

formular entity. The formal theory of fundamental relations should permit concrete instantiation within its framework. In principle, though, instances, incongruent to the scheme, that fall outside the frames of the model fail to support or even contradict the theory, and lead to gradual adjustment or complete revision of the theory depending on the severity of the incongruence.

Primarily three kinds of relations between the basic ontologic entities (n, i) subject to 'material' (i.e. auditive–acoustic) realization (or intentional actualization) in performances, including rehearsals, are especially interesting: (1) **intranotational** (n–n), (2) notational–interpretative (n–i) and (3) **intrainterpretative** (i–i) relations (MIR I:19–22 et passim; MIP 29–31). We can already establish the fact that point 2 is not ontologically reversible, i.e. it has a bidirectional ontology (n→i not equal to n←i), whereas 1 and 3 are reversible with a preserved ontology. Fundamental relations such as these, together with their different constellations, combinations and variants, necessarily constitute an important framework in a metatheory of interpretation as presented in this thesis and earlier related works. Basically i–i is an **intraintentional** ('psychopsychic', ch. I:2) relation, while the 'material' aspect of n–n can be thought of as intracausal (of the 'somasomatic' aspect of p–p). In contrast i–n and n–i form **interrelations** between the intentional and causal level of connection (psychosomatic versus somatopsychic links).

Furthermore, points 1 through 3 correspond to **productive** phases in a basic model of a **processual** pattern; an initial reading of an intranotational relation (n–n) is conceptualized as a n–i relation. This is a 'transformation' that requires some input in order to reprogram the constituents (and structures) of an intranotational ontology into the patterns of an n–i relation. The differences are phenomenologically twofold: (1) they require a rearrangement of an **intra** to an **inter**, and (2) they concern first n, then n and i together. Evidently, a fourth phase not yet mentioned (i–n) is basically one of a **reproductive control**, as in the case of checking the sound result with the notation (cf. the copy related to its template).

In order for a relation to appear, both cognitively and auditive, the two parts of a bipartite relation, or the three parts of a tripartite relation (designated "triangulation" by Sergiu Celibidache, ch. V:4), must be connected either intentionally or realistically (acoustic–auditive) by **continuity**, the basic phenomenon presented in MIR I: 31–32 and MIP 35–37, 52–64. The performed parts (of a work, w) indicated by a score are put in relation to each other through continuity, which makes these sequence of parts comprehensible to the experiencing

musical mind. Continuity of consciousness exists over a time span, as when we look back and forward from the present, as suggested by the **retentional** versus **protentional intentionality** of Husserl, and connects us to the past and future from the point of departure in the presently experienced sound. In the view of Husserl, consciousness is essentially constituted of a continuous time flux, the musical implications of which we shall examine more closely regarding its relevance to the interpretative criteria of musical performance (ch. I:3; *Husserliana*, hereafter *Huss.*, vol X)⁹.

A closer look at the notions of freedom and relation is required here, especially concerning the problem of interpretative selection, briefly treated in MIP (21–26; "preference choice"; MIR I:6–18). We will see what implications and limitations are concealed behind the notion of freedom in a musical context. Initially I submit that different **degrees of freedom** exist on the levels of notation, interpretation and performance. The degree of freedom in understanding notation is determined by an interpretive act of decision (n_i); simultaneously the interpretive act itself (i) has its cognitive limitations as well as its inherent degrees of freedom at the interpreter's disposal; e.g. he may apply a certain amount of fantasy to the act of interpretation. Technically, one can test the kind of freedom applied to an interpretation by trying to notate the traits that were added by the interpretation to a given performance; the additional traits are **notational properties** (they have a 'notational ontology', basis and source) to the extent that they are possible to notate. What remains impossible to notate belongs to the category of **interpretive qualities** in its proper sense. By applying such a procedure to practical cases, I have arrived at the conclusion that various degrees of freedom can be distinguished by a careful analysis that takes into account the possibility of overlapping different degrees of freedom on the levels of notation, interpretation and performance. In order to anticipate the following excursus on freedom in interpretation, I allow myself to note the **compensatory** relation often found between these levels; for instance, it is natural that a great freedom of notation leaves many decisions to be made on the interpretative and performative levels, whereas a strictly indicative notation may become subjected to an artistic mastery by which the virtuoso shows his handling of the wider limits of freedom without violating the notational implications. On the other hand, great notational freedom may give rise to considerable effort by another interpreter to sophisticatedly 'read between the lines' in the score in order to find grounds for a subtle interpretation of a given notational structure.

(1) **Freedom** is a necessary condition for interpretative choice. Interpretative choice entails the opportunity to select an alternative on the basis of the indications given in a notated music score, without violating these indications; conversely, even the possibility of violating the indications given in the original model requires freedom of choice. Here, "on the basis of given indications" means that, given the existence of freedom, the interpreter relies on common principles of rationality in his assessment of the reasons *pro et contra* and in his ascription of credibility to these reasons in view of certain experienced values and aesthetic goals. In respecting, rendering and thus realizing what he has understood (and brought out via contact with living experience from the given indications), the interpreter intends to create a performance that corresponds to his view of the work. However, various kinds of obstacles impede the implementation of his intentions, and an impaired intellectual and musical capacity limits a clear view of the w, thus primordially hindering its full realization in performance.

How can notation at the same time positively indicate certain decisive traits of interpretation, and give room for free choices of interpretative alternatives? This question touches upon an ontology of notation which comprises (1) prescriptive signs that vary in their degrees of denotative precision, and both (2) descriptive and (3) prohibitive indications. The frames of freedom are multidimensional in the field of notational indeterminacy as well in terms of the performer's aesthetic thinking. The alternatives which arise are obviously not arbitrary. They are limited by restrictions of the notation and by the interpreter's cognitive and imaginative equipment. Interpretative freedom is not freedom of every detail; the relations between details exhibit coherent patterns of discretely circumscribed interpretative alternatives.

(2) The set of **criteria** for each alternative can be defined by the notion of **relation**. A concrete interpretation is related in a specific way to the notation and to the listener. Both listener and work are parts of an historical context, and a performance (or audiothechnical reproduction) takes place here and now, in the present, for benefit of the listener. There is a necessary actualization of something that belongs to another historical context, a movement to '**hic et nunc**' (here and now; Huss III:1:327) from the '**tunc et ibi**' (then and there). This is a model which I have earlier presented (MIR I:367); the two-dimensional four-point scheme, with the **temporal** dimension (then–now) set against the **distantial** dimension (there–here), implies a fundamental polarity between the **actuality** (innovation: now–here) and the **historicity** (authenticity: then–there) of interpretation.

Concretely, every specific interpretation is defined by its position within this scheme of relations between the temporal and distancial aspects, and carries the history of the work and the performer into the beholder's actuality of experience. Obviously, in order for it to be perceived, a performance must take place or be reproduced now and here. Hence the coincidence of space and time, the physical and the experiential, is a very fundamental prerequisite for the sound event to take shape as it does in perceptible music performance. And it is the interpretative (and thus the intentional) perspective that unifies and connects the historical then and there (of *w*) to the actual now and here (of *i(p)*).

As we depart from the work we see that its relations are of two kinds, **internal** (structure) and **external** (to composer, performer and listener), which have different ontological determinants. In determining the identity of the work through performance, *p(w)*, the divergence of its 'sound' features in performance stands in opposition to the identity of the 'silent' work, *ID(w)*; the more divergent the traits, the more difficult it is to determine the core of work-identity through performance. Nevertheless, provided the divergent *p*-features pertain to the *w*-identity, their variety may even contribute to an all-round comprehensive determination of the *w*-ontology. The problem is complicated, though, by the fact that it is impossible to study interpretation in performance without considering the work, whereas it is possible to study the work in notation without relying on sound realizations; this means that a judgement of the interpreted performance must apply to the work, real or as imagined, as its point of departure. A qualified statement about a *p(i)* that concerns merely the soundshape, i.e. an *i-i* relation, does not reveal the full set of arguments for or against the interpretation in question, nor does it, even if descriptively correct, disclose the anchorage of the *i* in the *w*.

(3) An interpretation is supposed to preserve the **identity** of the work in spite of existing interpretative alternatives. How can identity and difference be compatible? The distinction between the identity of interpretation and the identity of performance, treated by Levinson¹⁰ (1990:216ff) in his debate with Kivy, must be maintained for the following obvious reasons: First, the question as to what extent the work provides any imperative indication for its realization in performance is crucial; i.e. what are the **implementation rules**? Secondly, and on a somewhat deeper level, it is possible to question how identity is created and preserved in music. A hint in one hypothetical direction would be to state that the '**processuality**' of performance in real time endows its interpretation with a certain and specific kind of **sequentiality**, on phenomenological grounds;

'processuality' then, is used in the sense of Celibidache's "*Prozessualität*" which, to my knowledge, is a concept derived from Ansermet's "*processualité*". In contrast, identity in interpretation does not require fulfillment of the conditions for processuality of sound in time flow, and implies only **indications** for its implementation in performance; but it requires **coherence** and **unity** on the conceptual level, in opposition to the experimental level of performance. The evidence for this experiential sequentiality is obvious. Basically, this sequentiality entails a connection through **proximity** and **order of sequence** in a time flux, depending on what tone follows after the previous one. Even if no logical connection between tone A and its sequitur B can be shown, the human mind (M), or more specifically its musical consciousness (m) will endow the sequence of tones with the quality of '**logicality**' (MIP:30) on the basis of retrospective proximity in experienced time-flow content. To avoid terminological confusion I should on this point include a note on the family of four central concepts: process – processual – processuality. 'Process' as a course of development can be applied to a sequence of objects, facts or states of condition (notation, sound, neurophysiology); I apply the terms 'process' and 'processing' on the 'objective' level of facts, but also as experiential terms; 'processual', referring to the quality of being a process, and 'processuality', referring to the 'fact' ('objective' phenomenon) of being a quality that depends on being a process, are both definitely experiential terms.

The following questions are pertinent to our investigation, as far as this problem is concerned: What are the criteria of (1) an identity of composition, ID(c), and (2) an identity of interpretation, ID(i)? Furthermore, (3) what are the "internal" intrarelations, i.e. the cognitively integrated factors, between the various criteria (and/or) within each set of criteria, for c(ompositional) versus i(nterpretive) criteria respectively? Also (4) what are the "external" relations between the "same" criterion (say, coherence of c related to coherence of i, coherence c-i, COH(c,i))? and (5) what are the cross-relations between different criteria (say, between c-coherency and transparency: coherency(c)-transparency(i); R(COH(c),TRANSP(i))? See further the List of Abbreviations and Definitions, ch. VII:2.

(4) **Objectivity** and **subjectivity** are two concepts widely used in discussions on interpretation, but their referents vary widely; e.g., objectivity may, according to its operational definition, imply definite relations of a p(i) to the notation (w), to the historical codeterminations (cx) or even to the "expressive truth" of the performer (p). Subjectivity may refer to either (1) the "idiosyncratic"

subjects, or (2) the polarity of the objectively conscious subject in the encounter with its musical object.

As we have seen the problem of freedom is of overriding importance: How is freedom warranted? On what grounds, and for what purposes, must it be secured in view of the demand for objectivity in order to preserve the identity of the work? The common sense reply is "for the sake of preserving artistic creativity". But how then can this, in its turn, be justified on other grounds than its own value? The solution to this problem requires a clarification of the scope of available interpretative choices (MIP: 21). According to the notion of relation, individual alternatives can be determined as to their position within the framework of freedom. The limits to the selected interpretative position are defined by the maximal distance from the core identity of the work to the performance that exhibits differing features of interpretation. The acceptability of digressions is determined by underlying evaluative stances towards the basic notions of objectivity and subjectivity, as well as by their operative definitions for the evaluator (acting performer, listener, critic).

Fundamentally there are two main categories of freedom that we discuss: (1) ontological freedom and (2) existential indeterminacy. **Ontological freedom** pertains to the music-work. It is assumed to be an indeterminacy of the work as a notated (n) and composed structure (c). This indeterminacy is supposed to be inherent in the form of representation, especially the notational signs, but it is also possible that the composer conceives his work in view of (1) **options for choice** ('facultativity') built into the composition, (2) the **aleatory** random choice of p, chance or 'total randomness' (unpredictability), or (3) **improvisatory freedom**. Thus ontological freedom, whether notational or structural, is a compositional fact that the professional composer is well aware of, and when once determined as to its kind and degree, it remains as a constituent of the composed work. In electronic music, pieces have been composed in order to completely escape ontological indeterminacy. It is possible for the modern composer who has access to an electronic music studio to determine precisely all the constituents of the work – to fix exactly all the parameters – and to avoid the variability in performance of all three kinds of freedom (facultativity, aleatory & random components, and improvisation); the performance then is predetermined, and the pure realization merely a technical matter (playing the tape recording, starting the computer), whereas the gestalting mip is reduced to zero in such a case; there is no interpretation (in p) whatsoever, only a

technical realization and reproduction in the communicative phase that corresponds to the conventional performance. But if there are non-objective components, or if interpretive moments are necessary in order to arrive at an ontological determination of what the work is (not how it should be performed), then the ontological indeterminacy of the work still remains. The ontological freedom would then be irreducible, inherent in the work itself, and not simply in its notation or composed structure.

Existential indeterminacy pertains to the interpretive act, not to the work. A performance interpretation occurs only if the performance is entrusted to **humans**, since they create a 'human imprint' ("mänskligt avtryck", MIR I:91) of unmistakable specificity on the soundshape, which does not preclude technical reproducibility of exactly such specific patterns (cf. G Mazzola 1990:284ff). That the free zone of **intended variability** is not randomly structured, that there are various kinds of intermediating interpretive acts and directions that define more or less precisely specific courses in the relation between the interpreting subject and the interpreted musical object, is the core of my thesis; I will show in this dissertation how these interpretative acts are constituted and how they interact.

So, the distinction between two kinds of indeterminacy must be established, the **ontological** pertaining to the work (w,n,c), and the **existential** pertaining to the interpretive act (i).

The act of **selecting** one alternative for immediate realization in a sounding version entails the **rejection** of all other plausible alternatives. But this interpretive rejection does not require a full and dense argumentation for its logical support, and the pro-arguments for the chosen possibility are not claimed to be logically sufficient for the selection being made; thus interpretive rejection is no logical refutation. A primary problem comprises finding, surveying and parsing (through analysis of the problem-situation, or by other means) the other plausible alternatives that can be accepted as candidates for at least theoretical consideration, if not for practical realization. It can be argued that the musician need not find, display or demonstrate any contrary alternatives, and that these alternatives could be disturbing during the phase of realization. However, during the preparatory phase, when the work is being considered and reflected upon, the act of surveying alternative interpretations may be essential for the process of deepening assimilation of the work and for the safe arrival at a well-supported selection of the work-views of most distinguished qualities. However, it is by no means sure that every interpretation is a **positive choice**; an

interpretation may be the result of a series of ('negative') **rejections**; such an interpretation in the end finds the only remaining acceptable version after all other appearing versions from eventually plausible alternatives have been discarded.

This problem is complicated by two possibilities: (1) that there are certain limitations to what the notational system can express, or conventionally does express, and (2) that the composer consciously or intentionally did not express all his imagings (or 'visions') about his piece by means of conventional notation. He may then actually **intend** a free zone for the performer to accomplish his work.

To a certain extent, the various interpretative opinions and positions among performers can be referred back to basic philosophical questions. The interpretations represent *idealiter* paradigms of solutions to aesthetical, ontological or existential questions which had already been posed in the history of philosophy and science, and which partly found their solutions within theoretical discourse. Therefore, the history of ideas concerning ancient cognitive patterns of interpretation is (insofar as precise knowledge is available) interesting in the perspective of interpretation science. Simultaneously, musicians had independently developed practical means for implementing their aesthetic positions in sounding performance. Despite a few promising attempts to clarify the cognitive and intentional structures of musicians' competence (Clarke in Sloboda 1988¹¹), whether conscious or unconscious, this question is insufficiently investigated. The fruitfulness of various theoretical positions, *per se* and for practical implementation, as well as the well-groundedness of artistic conceptions in music life, including some critical analysis of well-known star conductors, will be further discussed.

I:1:3 FORMULATION OF QUESTIONS OF MAIN INTEREST TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS INQUIRY

The aim of this study is to present and illuminate **problems** and crucial questions regarding precise and relevant aesthetic criteria in contemporary interpretation by reviewing the literature and practice of current musical performance practice. However, the focus is on individual solutions, not collective group norms of delineated periods or regions. My theory of

interpretation is gradually demarcated and demonstrated in relief against the background of ideas held among the interpreters and authors who are scrutinized in respect of their interpretative concepts. In addition to the primary questions of freedom and relation, the process of interpretation (MIP:32–45) involving analyses of the interpretive acts of consciousness will also be treated. Secondary questions relevant in view of their impact on different sets of criteria provide a survey of the following aspects of interpretation in the course of this investigation:

- (1) Historicity versus actuality: How can they be accommodated? Are they incompatible?
- (2) The expressive will of the interpreter versus the intention of the composer: Can both of them be legitimately and simultaneously realized in a performance?
- (3) The identity of the work (w): How can it be preserved in view of the differing interpretations?
- (4) Objectivity versus subjectivity in interpretation: What is preferred from an aesthetic point of view and from the point of view of the audience? What is realistic versus utopian? This point necessitates a discussion of the notion of intersubjectivity proposed within the phenomenologic movement.
- (5) Aesthetic ideals: How can they be manifested ('created') in a gestalted performance through the interpreter's activity?

First, the definitions of these concepts must be based on precomprehensive common sense. The definitions themselves within various aesthetic systems that we focus on, from the point of view of criteria (CRIT) for musical interpretation in performance (mip), are subject to our investigation. Then, the logics and frames of possibilities, conditions and interconnections can be investigated.

I:1:4 NOTES ON POSTULATES AND THESES

It is important to bear in mind that the theses forwarded in MIR I pertained to three different levels which I will briefly exemplify:

- (1) On the meta-level, I stated that there is a parallel between **musical interpretation** and the paradigms of **scientific practice**, namely in their reliance on basic patterns of thinking such as the principle of rationality (MIR I: 1–2, 82–87; cf. R. Nozick's lecture and p.c., Lund University 30.4.93). Interpretation theory can then be compared to various 'schools' within the philosophy of

science, such as phenomenology, hermeneutics and historical science. One example of such parallelism between philosophic views and interpretation theory is the following. The Husserlian notion of time flux (Huss X: 53–55 pass.) presupposes the participation of consciousness in time flux as a necessary condition for protentional and retentional relations. The interpretive acts studied by interpretation science are (with few exceptions) intentional in the Husserlian sense with regard to their temporal direction. Thus there is a connection between interpretation theory and philosophy of science. This point was repeatedly stressed by Carl Lesche (p.c.).

(2) On the intermediary level of **interpretation theory** I proposed that continuity is a decisive criterion for mip. (MIP: 30,35,52–64; MIR I:31)

(3) On the basic level, I have stated that, among other experiential interrelations between i-phenomena, legato strengthens the experiential quality of continuity (MIR I:64 sc. 2.29: point 1). This by no means excludes the existence of correlations between such phenomena, based on facts in the sense of NS.

Terminologically, "correlation" refers to a **constancy of relation and relational content** between the phenomenon and its material basis. The relation is maintained through all "normal" model situations and cases considered, and the "kind" of relation is constant, whether quantitative or qualitative. I conceive of a variety of interrelational kinds, in particular logical, phenomenological, experiential and causal. To the extent that interrelations are positively constant connections between appearing observable phenomena of identical or different kind(s), they are correlations. But I do not state, nor do I establish scientifically (neither here nor in earlier works), any causal, statistical, psychic-to-psychic or acoustic-to-psychic **correlations**, and I do not claim empirical validity for the correlations that I may indicate; I may merely suggest a **tendency** or 'close' **connection**, which may be "natural" or "cultural" in its origin, proposed for theoretical consideration and eventually for further empirical-experimental investigation. It is also rewarding to see what interpretive patterns emerge from new combinations of known modes of thinking, and what kind of hitherto untested p-versions will result from productions at a performance workstation by means of a 'cross-fertilizing creativity' on the basis of aesthetical standpoints illuminated by interpretation research. This, then, leads into another realm, that of the practical purpose and application of MIR on scientific, educational and artistic areas.

Obviously the musician's reading of the score is not a neutral act of consciousness

(MIR I:95): the **reading-in/out** is normally **intentional** and **directional**. What is rendered in sound is not the score, but an outcome of the musician's cognitive processing at reading the score, at reactualizing from memory, at improvising through inventing at the very moment or just shortly in advance, or at releasing certain "innervated" motor behaviors, i.e. in all, through the processing of cognitive acts that are to various extents creative, interpretive, or automatized (MIR I:98ff). Basically, as we focus on a crucial point of interpretational science, we distinguish different 'act modalities'; such acts can be (1) **receptive** or **assimilative** (MIP:32–33), (2) **processual** cognitive acts based on neural processes of CNS, as described by Wallin 1991a, and (3) **emittive** (by playing or singing). Other assimilative acts, such as "feed-back-listening" to alternative versions or the reactualization of memories from earlier hearings of the work, may be involved in the creation of a mental image of the work to be performed; such complex act sequences were presented in MIR I:94–108. The functioning of the sensomotorical nervous system can be an obstacle to realization of the "musical image" into corresponding sound, or unrealistic imagination may be the cause of a discrepancy between artistic intention and a corresponding ("produced") reality. My theory, therefore, has to recognize various overriding aesthetic ideals, due to the different educational traditions that govern the choice preferences of performance alternatives.

Cognitively, reaching such a choice is an **interpretative process** that can be analysed with regard to its logical structure. The term "interpretation" suggests that this may be a process which is more or less **consciously governed**, in contrast to being arrived at haphazardly or randomly, and the degree of conscious control over the decisions corresponds to the degree of the performer's freedom. In this connection "conscious" is used as the opposite to "unconscious", and I disregard the Freudian theory of "subconsciousness", whether or not the implied constitution of the human mind should be considered established in view of recent conflicting opinions within medical science; I did likewise in my study on the philosophy of science in psychoanalysis (1988). Therefore, musical interpretation research focuses on the apriorical logic and the intentional structure of interpretive thinking, as a basis for classifying concrete 'systems of interpretative notions / patterns'. Such cognitive systems inciting the musician's personal performance style critically differ from one another with respect to their (1) **internal coherency**, and their (2) **external correspondance** to the work structure. The structure of such systems can be described in alternatively (1) **intentional**, (2) **physical** (acoustical), or (3) **musical** terms, i. e. by using either

musicological terminology or the idiom of musicians' jargon.

A review of musical and musicological literature shows that the aesthetic and artistic criteria for interpretative systems can be analysed and discussed by means of some looser parallel to predominant ideas in the philosophy of science, such as logical formalism or empirism, structuralism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. However, the 'method' I propose is a **critical meta-interpretation analysis** about relevant aesthetic criteria, which were initially introduced in earlier works.


Together with documentation of interviews and rehearsal work, the **intentional** structure of musical interpretative thinking is treated in earlier research (MIR I–II, MIP) referred to in the dissertation. The question of **intentionality**, and its notions according to Husserl, Ingarden and Celibidache merit careful consideration.

I suggest (1) that interpretation is regarded by the listener as satisfying to the extent that the musical articulation, sound shape, dynamics and expressivity are elaborated in correspondence to a structure in the music work, which is then clarified in performance. Being sensible of this act of structural rendering cannot trespass on the performer's limits of perception; the *w*-structure must be graspable and the mode of rendition comprehensible to him. These conditions refer to the relation between the work and its performer. I shall refer to this as the **structuralist thesis of mip**, and (2) that interpretation reinforces spontaneous structural hearing and, of course, facilitates the active searching for structure in conscious listening; that interpretation by means of more complete and deeper realization of the score aims at clarifying the work's course of development as it unfolds in time; that it focuses its crucial moments (e.g. "turning-points", "events"), and stresses its essential content, creating a cohesive and meaningful experience for the listener. This is referred to as the thesis of **auditive cohesiveness**.

I will show that there is (1) a consensus and (2) that there are theoretical arguments that provide support for this thesis through confirmation (e.g., evidence by adduced quotations), or through suggested affirmative evidence pro the two hypotheses (1 and 2) just mentioned in this paragraph. To clarify the terminology I use, we can principally distinguish **passive experience** (as a 'result' of perception and cognitive/emotive processing) from the **active approach** of a certain intentional direction and depth of penetration. It is thus one thing to say that an *i* is experienced by the *L* as **convincing**, and another to say that it is

regarded as **satisfying**. Please note that 'satisfying' here is a **logical** term (satisfying certain stated or implicit conditions), whereas 'convincing' is a psychosocial term referring to an 'effect' or result arrived at by means of impression or manipulation forceful enough to provoke a change of opinion, should the term 'convincing' not already conform to a generally shared approval/disapproval of the interpretive achievement. 'Convincing' should be held apart from 'satisfying' in the sensuous sense, also relevant in the discussion on the emotional impact of performed music.

The main influential factors in a broader context variously related to interpretation can be presented concisely in a three dimensional diagram:



Among the ideas in the reviewed material that attain importance through evidence, save those presented by Hermerén (ch. II:1), I will especially point at (1) the **communicative** and (2) **transmittive functions** of mip that open an artistic, social dialogue between the participants of the informational chain. (FME: 48–50)

I:1:5 FURTHER AIMS OF THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION

The aim of this investigation is to analyze, compare and evaluate the main 20th century aesthetics and theories related to **contemporary** music performances of distinguished artistic and aesthetic quality, and of musicological and philosophical interest; I will investigate the "well-groundedness" of current quality criteria for i and clarify their bearing on practical musicianship in reference to current practice.

Obvious tasks for further research regarding pertinent aesthetic problems include identifying, defining, analyzing and investigating actual quality criteria, and relating them to (1) **consensus opinions** among musicians, critics and scholars, and (2) **aesthetical considerations** applied during our analysis and found in the sources: I will only be able to sketch out a few hints in this direction within this study.

The possible practical significance of MIR can be indicated here: in effect, the project (1) emphasizes the importance of working out aesthetical concepts for an individual interpreter, and the respect for these concepts within education; (2) it confirms the necessity of secure validation procedures in a critic's evaluation of music performance and attempts to clarify criteria for 'objective' analysis and evaluation of performances; (3) it suggests a fruitful connection between modern aesthetic thinking among musical artists and contemporary performance practice and the history of philosophy and cognitive science, meriting further consideration in future research projects. Recently proposed interpretational systems and their main problems are also reviewed in this study. The model of subdisposition that I apply follows the following scheme: (1) presentation (2) discussion (3) criticism (4) evaluation (5) conclusion. A survey **pro et contra** of the main foundations of i-aesthetic thought, including a demonstration of an argumentational structure, i.e. criticism and defense related to various central standpoints, is also included.

I:1:6 AESTHETIC POSITIONS – EXEMPLIFIED BY SIX CONDUCTORS

After a critical analysis and survey of ideas on interpretation (ch. II), four pairs of central problems, forwarded in terms of categorial contra-pairs, that the interpreter encounters, are treated in ch. III. Thereafter I investigate the specific problems and perspectives of interpretation as seen from the perspective of

various participants in music society (ch. IV). The account of results from analyses, interviews and special studies is followed by exemplifications of theoretically important standpoints evidenced through the work of a few selected conductors representing three different ideals (ch. V:6). In order to anticipate my conclusion, various philosophical ideals essentially feed the process of interpretation in terms of its successful performative realization. I concentrate on **highly integrated cognitive systems** that are **coherent as aesthetic positions**. These can be outlined as *a priori* positions, more or less consecutively fulfilled by confirmations through empirical study. On the basis of my preliminary acquaintance with conductors (from my introductory survey in earlier works) the six well-known conductors available for study here, with their mastery of encompassing repertoires central to our inquiry, were chosen for further studies (MIR II–IV) on the basis of the scope of problems they were able to formulate as well as on the relevance of their focus of interest. I submit this is a representative selection with respect to the leading principles of interest to us in this inquiry; they instantiate representative ideals that are interesting for theoretical reasons. During the progress of investigation, the following three distinct positions were disclosed and individually demonstrated by the conductors congruently in interview discussions, rehearsals or performances (live or recorded):

- (1) The historical authenticity of the composer's intention (Erich Leinsdorf ch. IV:2, Paul Sacher ch. V:3),
- (2) The hermeneutics of musical expression (Antal Dorati ch. V:3, Herbert Blomstedt), and
- (3) Musical phenomenology (Ernest Ansermet ch. IV:2:1, Sergiu Celibidache ch. V:4).

I:1:7 DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY

Basically this is an **explorative investigation** which includes comparative phonogram analyses (MIR II), interviews with musicians (MIR III), and phenomenologic analyses (MIR I). The primary focus in this volume is that of critically reviewing the validity and cogency of interpretational systems in the literature and in practice, for the purpose of developing an interpretational science.

According to Paul Feyerabend, theoretical and methodological pluralism is necessary for and characteristic of objective knowledge. He argues that a comparison of a plurality of rivaling theories secures new understandings and a more correct and precise result than that of a mere comparison of facts according to the empirical method, since facts do not exist independently of theories. I submit that at least the following conditions must be satisfied as fundamental principles of interpretation research: (1) facts must be accessible for observation, experience or measurement; (2) the terminological system used for description must be well defined and coherent; and (3) the description of a fact must be interpretable if it is to be understood. Basically, we observe, perceive or experience a fact, whereas a description of such a fact requires our understanding. At the same time this understanding necessitates (and facilitates) access to the fact. This idea is expressed in three different grades: (1) the modified version that a fact is not understandable separated from the theories in which it is embedded; (2) the medium version that a fact is not describable without the support of 'descriptive' theories (including the nomenclature required for its discrimination and correctness), and (3) the extreme version, embraced by Feyerabend, that a fact does not exist independent of theory: if it does not exist, I conclude that it cannot be observed or experienced.

Therefore, in order to avoid "dogmatic petrification"¹², I have adopted a metatheoretical approach. This in some respects corresponds to the perspective and method applied in my earlier research, notably MIR I–II, insofar as the metasystem that I advanced is non-dogmatic and allows for various, logically contradictory, aesthetic systems of interpretation and patterns of thinking that occur in our world and culture. Interpretation research aims at encompassing the scope of subjective and objective phenomena in an integrated view by means of illuminating the interpretive acts involved in the incorporation of these phenomena into the realm of conscious experience.

The general methodological progression moves from a survey of the ideas on mip in literature and practice, to a focus through analysis on the distinctions between idea, notion, concept and criteria. An overview of these ideas is followed by critical discussion and eventual integration into the theoretical system. Several levels of study necessarily appear during the analysis; the underlying philosophies of individual interpretive systems that are supposed to give the underpinning reasons for individual interpretive choices of preference are more or less coherent with the aesthetic principles guiding (and exhibited by) the concrete implementation of the interpretation into the sound-medium

manifestation of a given performance. If the aesthetic principles held by the performer are unknown and inaccessible, the possibility remains that one can study the concrete execution and corroborate from a list of performance-features a set of previously formulated hypotheses that generate the constitutive traits of a disguised w-interpretation.

The rendition of the structures of a work in performance, $p(w)$, is the basis for such conclusions, since the performance is 'normally' the non-score-reading auditor's sole access to the interpreted work. It is important to note that I am presenting an interpretation theory, not an empirical hypothesis on the nature of listeners' reactions. That a theory of interpretation cannot be conceived without a psychology of listening is an objection that requires reply. Various sciences focus on different parts of the activities of the human mind, while silently presupposing that the other parts behave as assumed by common sense; consequently, cognitive philosophy does not have to solve all the problems posed by psychology. Husserl justifies his procedure by adducing that the phenomenologic consideration is more fundamental than psychology; hence the questions he is treating must be answered prior to psychological investigation.

Interpretation research studies the fundamental conditions of acts of consciousness in the understanding of (here musical) objects on an *a priori* level by analysing criterial conditions under the general aspects of a particular instance. Why then should a phenomenology of interpretation account for the auditor's psychological emotions, associations and behavior?

Musicians may feel on one hand that physiological and technical and, on the other hand, that intuitive 'factors' play a much more decisive role in practical musicianship than is suggested by this thesis. But the means and limits of the technical implementation of an interpretation in instrumental or vocal performance fall outside the selected focus of interest in this project. There is a large literature on this topic, including manuals for the training of action patterns for pianists, string players and conductors. But the perspective in this thesis is much more systematic and overriding, since it requires reference to (1) a general theory of interpretation, and to (2) a special theory of mip. It is possible, though (and I aim to qualify this) that 1 and 2 have in fact a bearing on specific aspects of instrumental performance ($p(i)$), and that the manner of implementation is influenced by modes of aesthetic thinking. At the same time, interpretation research must recognize contributions to interpretation theory from the literature for instrumentalists (vocalists). But this treatise concentrates on instrumental interpretation only as a **model situation**, including merely a

few references to vocal and dramatic performance involving text and acting. The biographical, educational and largely psychological aspects of interpretation, therefore must be excluded from the scope of the present inquiry.

A series of investigations were carried through within the project Musical Interpretation Research (MIR; 1978–85), the procedures of which are accounted for below (ch. V) and in MIP:1–7. The investigations referred to comprise (1) theoretical considerations (MIR I), (2) comparative interpretation analyses (MIR II), (3) interviews with musicians and conductors (MIR III), (4) special studies and analyses of rehearsals (MIR IV), (5) considerations for (and of) music criticism (MIR V), and (6), in **this** volume (MIR VI), besides conclusions drawn from points 1 through 5, an investigation of the aesthetic criteria and intentional content of ideas in the relevant literature concerned with specific problems of "contemporary" mip.

Results from the early MIR project will be continuously referred to, but scantily presented. They comprise aesthetical and theoretical investigations that apply specifically developed methods of interpretation science, partly on phenomenologic grounds (MIR I), including broadly suggested, comparative, discographic analyses (MIR II), interviews with musicians (MIR III), pilot projects, i.e. more profound and more encompassing studies of a few interpreters, notably conductors (MIR IV), further contributions to a theory of interpretation (MIR IV:B), and metacriticism, critiques and reviews of live (i.e. not recorded) concerts and other presentations from performances, mainly in Stockholm during 1977–80 (MIR V). The results of these investigations are integrated with musical experiences and critically reviewed in the light of a specific philosophical approach.

My **empirical material** consists of (1) published (MIR I–II) and (2) unpublished sources (interviews, recordings from rehearsals and seminars, comparative analyses) in the documentation volumes MIR III–V. The documentation comprises tape recordings listed in the Appendix ch. VII:4.

The approach in this investigation is both (1) **general**, in terms of a study of the ideas of interpretation in performance, and (2) **specific**, for the benefit of various beholders (i.e. interpreters, audiences and critics) and kinds of musicians (conductors, pianists, string players). I submit that this multi-perspectival approach serves to illuminate my chosen categories of problems more thoroughly than a conventional, mono-dimensional, scientific inquiry can do.

The disposition of chapters I–VI follows the following line of thought: after an introductory presentation of the questions posed, the analytical and

theoretical framework of my theory with fundamental postulations are displayed (I). The analytic devices introduced are applied through a survey of selected meta-interpretive traditions posed by the **perspectives of theoreticians** (II), from which four pairs of constantly recurring problems are selected for a closer look at various solutions (III). Thereafter the more practical **perspectives from the participants in music-life**, and the problems stated above, are studied, including the approach to the problem of interpretive criteria espoused by selected composers, conductors, pianists, string players and critics – who have taken on the role representing the listener's perspectives (III). I am not stating that all audiences share the same perspective, nor that all acting interpreters share their listeners' perspective, but I am suggesting (1) that there is a common view on the performance (e.g. concert) situation adopted by audiences due to their **fundamental relational constancy in the communicative scheme** (thus 'audiences' approach' is a meaningful term), and (2) that performing interpreters share the role of listening with all the individual members of their audience; these points hint at the necessarily common conditions and premises of their approaches, which make up the perspective specific to them. Some of the few conditions for the listening situation in general are thereby revealed. The investigations are presented, as carried through in MIR I–V, by methods of theoretical consideration, interpretation analysis, interviews, special 'pilot' studies, and analysis of criticism, followed by exemplification of three aesthetic positions of great contemporary importance (V:6). Finally, conclusions are drawn (VI).

I:1:8 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERPRETATION RESEARCH AND PERFORMANCE PRACTICE

Principally, interpretation research analyses the problem of attaining 'aesthetically satisfactory' or convincing results in contemporary performance, i.e. of how to meet the requirements (fulfill the conditions) of the criteria exposed or implied by a specific aesthetic standpoint. In contrast "*Aufführungspraxis*" has its focus of interest on the historical authenticity of music performances of past epochs. The implicit assumption is that such research is required for the interpretation of music from older times, and for past or alien traditions to which the continuity of praxis has been interrupted. The continuity of praxis is otherwise assumed to guarantee the authenticity of work performance according to the formula of

recreating (1) the situation of the original first performance or (2) the performance style of the time when the work was composed, as opposed to those of other ages when the work was 'only' reproduced according to the prevailing local tradition, paradigmatically regarded as "false". Performance according to "*Aufführungspraxis*" by no means excludes aesthetic consideration, the presupposition being that a philologically correct performance practice is a condition for aesthetically successful interpretation. But the aesthetic aspects are considered to be restricted by the frame given by the historical setting, according to the proponents of performance practice. Thus the overarching determiner of performance practice is not aesthetic but **historic recreation**. An incomplete and/or insecure understanding of history shifts the focus over to the aesthetic aspect that attains the leading or more productive role in arriving at interpretive decisions.

Furthermore, "interpretation research is primarily interested in individual performances, in the interpreter's individual choice, what precedes it and in more general terms whatever can have a decisive effect on the artistic standpoints...of today's living interpreters." (MIP:8) In contrast, performance practice discusses "the musical customs of the past, the more general...historical or stylistically demarcated traditions of performance." (ib.) These are decisive differences.

But there is also an overlapping area. First, it can be claimed that the treatises of past ages in certain cases also aimed at an aesthetically satisfying result from the point of view of their circumstances, such as the availability of instruments, the predominant playing techniques and audience preferences of that time. Granted, the aesthetic perspective is not limited to contemporary consideration. Secondly, even a performance aiming at **authentic reconstruction** on the grounds of historical research, *de facto* must adapt to the compelling or imperative conditions of today: the musician cannot reconstruct the original context. Auditors and their modes of listening, due to other musical and extramusical experiences, are necessarily different, as is also the cultural and social environment of the performance, despite the musician's attempts to reconstruct the modes of playing, the original instruments and the **understanding** (not the fact) of past patterns of musical cognition. Third, performance practice has been much occupied by tracing composers' intentions as an allegedly secure original model for historically recreative performances. As Göran Hermerén pointed out, and as we shall see in chapter II:1, "the intentions are not irrelevant, but they are not the only important things" (1993:26–27). To disentangle the

complex interaction of historical and aesthetical aspects in productive interpretive thinking and performance is an important task of interpretation research.

I:1:9 THE STATUS OF EARLIER RESEARCH: GENERAL CONSIDERATION AND SHORT REVIEW OF WHAT MUST BE RECOGNIZED. MODERN PHILOSOPHIC AND AESTHETIC SCHOOLS RELEVANT TO THIS SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION

Modern philosophers of various schools have dealt with the different aspects of freedom and relation relevant for artistic decision in the interpretative process. Roman Ingarden analyzes the **ontological status** of the music-work as compared to that of its performance, but relies mainly on external properties (e.g., differences regarding having or not having localization in physical space). His determination of the score as just a system of imperative symbols disregards finer distinctions.

Performance then manifests the quality of the work, and Mikel Dufrenne discusses the possibility of gaining access, and rendering through man, the **truth of the work**. He distinguishes, though unsystematically, various acts of interpretation, and recommends assimilation of the work by a neutral, though absorbing and sensitive, reading.

Interpretation in performance is treated by Monroe Beardsley under the heading of various classes of presentation of the aesthetic object (*Aesthetics*, 43) which render different sets of qualities of the work. In dealing with characteristics of a composition we must distinguish between what is common to all presentations (in both Toscanini's and Furtwängler's versions of e.g. Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*, Beardsley ib. 57). Beardsley's presentation seems to concentrate more on the **discourse about music**, i.e. the linguistic expression or correlate to the experience of music or to music itself, than on music itself or experience per se of the music. Beardsley clarifies the concepts of a few "basic criteria", such as "unity", "organic form", "completeness" and "coherence" (190, 196) and, on a more general level, discusses "the logics of explication" (129). Whether a certain "production" is "adequate" to the work (56) is a legitimate question from which one may not, according to Beardsley, jump to conclusions about either the existence of one ideal production or the imperative of seeking ("in vain", Beardsley inserts) this ideal in the intention of the composer. Each interpretation may have its merit, though it may still be different from the other without

contradicting the work. Due to the principle of "intolerability of incompatibles", Margolis amends, two different interpretations may be mutually contradictory.

Margolis distinguishes carefully between the **description** and the **interpretation** of a work of art (1980:107). In contrast to Beardsley, Margolis does not so strenuously oppose interpretative reference to an author's intentionality (113). Of the two distinct senses of interpretation, the **performer's demonstration of the work** has priority over the critic's description (117). Interpretative divergencies cannot be reduced to ambiguity in the notation (115); i.e. the performers' **different interpretative perspectives are genuine**.

More specifically, Hermerén develops this idea, carries through an analysis of the logic of musical interpretation, and distinguishes interpretation in the performance (P) sense from other kinds of interpretations (T for theoretical, explicative, or comprehensive; in Krausz 1993: 9–31). In a series of works on aesthetics, Hermerén presents his scheme for an analysis of interpretative criteria and types in a combinative catalogue of classifications of various 'aspects' in interpretation, senders, objects, addressees and aims set against such types as emendation, linguistic or relevance explication, author's meaning, intention, symptom, theoretical elaboration, historical reconstruction and value maximizing. The logical criteria of **coherence** and **correspondence** in his scheme are applied to the process of interpretational argumentation (1981:277 & 1992). We will take a closer look at his system in ch. II:1.

Jerrold Levinson and Peter Kivy have been engaged in a lengthy debate about the ontology of the music-work versus the performance; Kivy takes a more platonic stance, whereas Levinson develops a logic that allows for the existence of both correct and incorrect performances (1990:86).

Other authors have focused on, among other issues, the problem of **historicity** and **authenticity** versus **actuality** and the **relevance** of aesthetic qualities of performance. Valuable contributions to the discussion on theories of interpretation can be found in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (JAAC), *The British Journal of Aesthetics* (BJA) and *The International Review of Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* (IRASM, ed. Ivo Supicic). However, to a large extent these articles, listed in the Bibliography (ch. VII:6), take their point of departure from literature and fine arts, a fact that limits their usefulness for a theory of musical interpretation¹³, and for a general interpretation theory. And, in the case of Supicic, the aesthetic thinking is concerned with Brelét's notions of time and expression, but does not merit recognition as an independent interpretation theory for our purpose.

Many artists and authors (Furtwängler, Walter, Narmour, Laske) discuss the appearance of the **unity** of the performance and its conditions: Among the important ideas treated by these authors are (1) **unity through 'processuality'** (progressive flow) of time; (2) **unity as an integrated structure** of the identical or similar moments and motifs, and (3) **unity as organic metamorphosis**, i.e. as constant processual growing (**organicism**; analogy with biological growth, ch. IV:2:2). With these ideas the performers suggest, more or less consciously, corresponding modes of shaping the sound ("*Gestaltung*", "*Darstellung*"). The elaboration of these (and other current) ideas in sounding performance seems to follow certain principles, of which corresponding criteria can be formulated. Basically, my thesis of meta-interpretative reference entails that the various patterns of interpretative thinking relate to different ideas regarding the world-view and possibly to philosophies of science and of life. My aim is to clarify in principle and in a paradigmatical manner how different world-views can affect the outcome of the interpretation. Consequently, the discussion must distinguish between interpretation as a 'cognitive process', and interpretation, phenomenologically, as an **act of consciousness**.

The subject of musical interpretation can be viewed from various perspectives. Those concerned with 'analytical aesthetics' may study the **principal problems** related to the encounter between man and an artwork, and may provide contributions to an ontology of notation (e.g. deciphering notation, the meaning of the notational sign, Kurkela ch. II:4) and aims at clarifying the epistemological status of interpretations based on various 'methods' of understanding art. In contrast, I attempt to treat the logical and metalogical questions through briefly reviewing current philosophical positions bearing on the situation of interpreting music.

The literature of aesthetics (Beardsley, Hermerén, Margolis, Kivy, Levinson) analyzes different possible **perspectives** towards artworks on a metatheoretical level, and provides terminology for classifying some aspects of the interpretational situation.

My comparative review of other authors' works excludes references to literary criticism and interpretation in vocal, operatic performance, and other arts such as the aesthetics of acting, staging and directing in theater (Souriau, Gouhier, Jouvet, Stanislavski).

Musicological literature has thoroughly treated the problems of historical performance practice, and to a much lesser extent it has occupied itself with the problem of interpretation on a principal level or from aesthetic and artistic

perspectives (Brelét, Cone). Hence, the subject of the proposed thesis has not gained sufficient recognition. Portions of music theory (Riemann, Schenker, Meyer) have a bearing on interpretational problems, but the scope of possible solutions is not worked out systematically. There are, however, contributions from various standpoints in the literature of musical hermeneutics (Dahlhaus *et alia*) and semiotics (Faltin & Reinecke, Tarasti). The literature by and for conductors, instrumentalists (in particular pianists and string-players), and vocalists provides suggested solutions, mostly from a technical perspective (Matthay, Szigeti); the proposed solutions governed by personally motivated artistic preferences (Furtwängler, Ansermet) or by means of advanced phenomenological investigation within the philosophy of music (Clifton, Piguet, Smith) are often more competent. Ansermet's extensive and profound thinking merits a special interest and focus in view of his double competence as a distinguished conductor and as a philosopher, shared only by few masters (Furtwängler, Celibidache, Narmour). An area of interest for the discussion on the relevance of phenomenological analysis for an interpretation theory is Ansermet's seminal treatise *Les fondements de la musique dans la conscience humaine*, and its sequels by J.-Claude Piguet¹⁴. Studies of individual interpreters, such as Numa F. Tetaz's¹⁵ on Ansermet, contribute to the discussion and must be carefully assessed as sources, in addition to other available materials provided by the *Association Ernest Ansermet* in Lausanne.

Contrapositions have been propounded by Stravinsky¹⁶ and Hindemith¹⁷ – both books originating in a series of Harvard guest lectures.

The following selective survey (1–10), made **merely for the purpose of an introductory overview** of suggested (possible or actual) grounds for relevant mip-systems roughly sketches various philosophical traditions of thought without any aim to present new research results and with no claim to comprehensiveness. I refer to propositions stated in the selected writings of the authors mentioned, **not** to the actual standpoints of the related authors as persons:

(1) **Historicism** (Dilthey, Schleiermacher, Betti; Palmer): the historical approach in music performance and its argumentation in musicology and aesthetics; the aim of interpretation is only to bring the object into appearance, i.e. into its objectivistic and contextual realization. The method is to bring the object into context with other objects through establishing a work-style relation and

consideration of a composer's oeuvre. This tradition treats the history of aesthetic ideas, e.g. the romantic idea of interpretation (Lichtenhahn); another branch of historicism is the empiricism of *Neue Sachlichkeit* (Positivism) and the music performance research of *Aufführungspraxis*.

(2) **Structuralism** (sc. musical, in a non-linguistic sense): in its trivial sense this concept refers to conventional music theory; a highly developed system for analysis of classical masterworks was launched by Schenker, and cultivated to the point of 'Schenkerism' by his successors in the U.S. (Ericson, Jonas, Yeston; Rothstein, to some extent Epstein) and adversaries (the partial antagonist Narmour). The core of their method can be rephrased in non-Schenkerian terms: The relation between the parts in a musical work is interpreted as unity by a highly specialized method of structural reduction down to the work's primitive root in a cadential scheme.

(3) **Functionalism** (Riemann): points of reference in the harmonic system of fifths, to which the distance (harmonic tension) is measured. The principal methods of treatment of music-works that he applied, of interest to our approach, comprise: analysis, comparison, reaction of processual development, as well as quantitative appreciation. In his early works he maintained scientific claims that may seem obsolete today.

(4) **Positivism** comprises the empiricism and the experimentalism of music performance research within or close to the ideals of natural science adapted to the analysis and (computerized) production of sound events: Seashore, Bengtsson, Sundberg, Edlund, Gabrielsson, Sloboda, Deutsch, Clynes, and Mazzola.

(5) **Analytical Philosophy** (conceptualized "analytical aesthetics" used by Schusterman)–the aesthetic object–interpretation analysis (Hermerén, Margolis, Levinson, Kivy). Within science philosophy the "postmodernist" variants of Feyerabend (with roots in Viennese logical empiricism) and the 'neorationalist' Robert Nozick. The logico-analytic musicology of Kurkela.

(6) **Semiotics** (Monelle, Nattiez, Tarasti, Lidov, Imberty, Stoianova, Faltin): their methods contain sophisticated analyses, including the assigning of a specific sense of weight (importance) to 'musical particles' by cutting out parts or fragments of a larger phrase, sequence or entity ("*decoupage*" by motivic comparison); they construct taxonomic schemes, and list the variants that occur in order of succession for each signifying unit. The development of this tradition involves the deepened philosophical and specific musical meta-interpretations by Monelle and Tarasti. The **generative musical grammar** launched by Lerdahl & Jackendoff is closely related in kind to the main stream of this group.

(7) **Formalism:** the American school of musicology influenced by names such as Stein, Cone, Berry; the enlarged scope in the humanistic direction by Meyer, and in the generative direction by Lerdahl & Jackendoff, Lewin and Narmour; Laske embarks for a more cognitive destination. Some roots are to be found in the works of Adorno who represents both the philosophical criticism of the Frankfurt School and the musical formalism of the Second Vienna School propounded by Arnold Schönberg and his circle.

(8) **Hermeneutics** (Heidegger, Gadamer, Schüssler, Ferrara, Lippman, Nachtsheim): the attentive subject is included in the notion of consciousness; existential reflection and contemplation is relied upon as a source of *a priori* knowledge.

(9) **Phenomenology** (Husserl; Ansermet, Piguët, Clifton, Smith, Ferrara; Furtwängler, Celibidache, Jochum and the late works by Leibowitz): reflection on the principally participating cognitive acts in the appreciation of art objects by the conscious mind: the logical structure of appearances of objects as 'objects of the mind': the formulation and investigation of conditions. Relevant secondary literature on Husserl includes works by Miller, Brough, Held, Kersting and Marbach.

(10) **Cognitive philosophy/science/musicology:** Influences on the development of this area may come from psychoanalytic (Lesche, Grünbaum) and medical research (Hundert), and from the philosophy of the mind (Honderich): Gärdenfors, Johnson-Laird; Laske, Sloboda, Gabrielsson and Deutsch are leading figures within cognitive musicology.

My screening of important authors relevant to the chosen subject with the aim of exploring the main criteria of interpretation in order to provide a background for an interpretation science must also include a consideration of the interpreters' (*inter alia* Walter, Leinsdorf, Markevitch; Gieseeking; Menuhin) and composers' (Schönberg, Stravinsky, Hindemith, Martin, Sessions) contributions to an ontology of interpretation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give an explicit and complete account of these authors' positions within the limit of this study: The selection I have made in this work is therefore guided by explicit reference to the interpretational criteria in their texts selected for analysis according to their respective relevancies to this dissertation; my critique is decisively influenced by this purpose. Thus, I do not claim to make justice to the oeuvre of any of these authors (especially Monelle, Tarasti, Nattiez, Kurkela; Gabrielsson *et alia*); consequently, the fact that I reject certain aspects of their theories merely

indicates that I question the completeness and usefulness of these theories for the purposes staked out in this study. The aspects and fields that they studied are thoroughly investigated and need not be restated here; and, the questions they pose are not all congruent to mine.

In order to anticipate possible misconceptions, I insert a short note on the current research in cognitive psychology on mip (not treated in this study) by referring to the comprehensive chapter on "Music Performance" by Alf Gabrielsson (1992, in press) to be published in *The Psychology of Music* (2nd ed. by Diana Deutsch). His presentation departs from the major problem of how to arrive—by means of favorable strategies and procedures of practice—at the level of well-functioning musicianship integrating the two components that he regards as contained in an excellent performance: the instrumental skill and the understanding of the music (its structure and meaning). The account of recent empirical evidence from psychometric experiments is concerned with the two broad issues of (1) the forming of a representation of the work, and (2) the generation of a p-plan. This research embarks on the program of science with the end of collecting the empirical knowledge of selected instances and is guided by an effort to provide advice for efficient practical training and solutions to problems such as sight reading and memorizing. The results confirm the expressed intuition of experienced musicians (e.g. Gieseeking; see ch. IV:3) who maintain that the combined methods of physically (motor-instrumental) practicing and mentally (cognitive-analytical) imagining the work are beneficial for the quality of p during the stage of rehearsal. For example, the motor processing and programming of training at an instrument can be studied in great detail, the perception involved in score reading and the retention after specified programs of training can be measured in controlled experiments, and various kinds of feedback in p are distinguished (auditory, visual, proprioceptive, tactile, and kinaesthetic). But advice comes up in this research that would be taken as self-evident if stated in a conductors' seminar, e.g. that it is wise to work with units of the score not longer than are manageable (Fansworth). Productive, though, is the effort to investigate performers' 'computation' of their individual p:s, involving cognitive abilities such as imagining the music, 'looking ahead' and planning the performance. Gabrielsson reviews the medico-psychological research on selected problems of performance, including the musician's ability to cope with stress and anxiety of various degrees. However, the problem of evaluating musical performance cannot be successfully solved without entering into the aesthetics of interpretation, unless the purpose of evaluation remains

equivalent to simple observation of errors of execution. To conclude, my principal view on the traditional academic music psychology of performance, I recognize its relevance for mip, but argue that it is not sufficient for the program of the present project. In the end, empiric knowledge is no substitute for aesthetic consideration.

I:1:10 INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS TO THE INVESTIGATIONS

In addition, it should be noted that the 'interpretation theory' I will advance in ch. I:2 develops a **theory of intentional relations in interpretive acts of consciousness** by differentiating these acts into nine basic interpretive modes (such as "expretation" and "inpretation"). It is worth mentioning that such a theory presupposes a cognitive model allowing a **freedom of choice** in two different senses and on two points in the entire sequence of cognitive processing. (1) There is **free variability and access** to the objects on the **receptive side** (the "input" of natural science, NS). I am free to choose the objects and focuses of my interest; I can restrict or extend the duration or phases of directed intentionality (NS: attention); so it is possible to vary, e.g., the 'expretive' content (ch. I:2) of my assimilation and processing. The core of cognitive processing (with its causal origin on a neurophysiological level), though, is not directly accessible to my consciousness, and consequently, it cannot be subjected to directed intentionality in the same sense as external and 'reflective' objects, even if we experience the result of this process. It is obvious from neurobiology, biomusicology and the cognitive sciences¹⁸ that physiological processes, unequivocally causal, determine certain "frames" of the core of neural processing (whether 'parallel' or 'linear' etc). Furthermore, I by no means deny that the anatomical constitution provides the framework for such processes: **introversion**, the opposite of extraversion, showed a correlation with cerebral blood flow (CBF) in the temporal lobes, interpreted as "emotional in function" by G. Stenberg (Lund 1990: Abstract). However, as long as we refrain from neuropharmacologic manipulation, which may influence neural processing (its velocity, level of activity, direction and engaged area), it is assumed that the outcomes of these processes are surveyed and guided (if not governed or controlled) by a consciousness that is volitionally steerable (modifiable): I contend that it is **not necessary** to settle this dispute more precisely for the purpose of solving the problems posed in this inquiry. Biomusicological science has been penetrated in depth by Nils L. Wallin (1991a);

although the neurophysiological functions are basic to the cognitive acts involved in conscious interpretation they are not the immediate focus of this study. The formulation of the general overarching role of consciousness is sufficient for the moment and for the purpose of interpretation research at **this** stage of its development. Evidently, our constitution permits the second kind of freedom at this point: (2) Even if the outcome of the cognitive processing should be "constant" for one individual under prevailing circumstances (conditionality presupposed), i.e., even if the point of departure for an interpretation (ch. I:2) were fixed, there would still be a free zone of conscious '**directionability**' towards the (musical) object focused by interest; and I am free to select the preferred path of processing the input that should be interpreted. I can make the choice to start my program for processing the information in the most objectivistic mode, allow for a mixing of modes, including recollections, emotions and intuition, or permit a substantial stratum of subjective involvement, engaging my fantasy in respect of arbitrary whims, freakishness, fancies and caprices. But we should be aware of when, where, and to what extent these faculties are applied; we achieve the acquired control by conscious decision. Interpretation research can assist in revealing the available options, and in dismantling their complex grounds.

It is true that the various modes of interpretation presented in chapter I:2 (e.g., from **intropretation** to **extropretation**, from **inpretation** to **expretation**) correspond to the general direction (development of an individual encounter with a work or a rehearsal process) **from the subject to the object**, entailing the opportunity for a maturing development **from subjectivity to objectivity** for the cognitive capacity of an interpreting subject in his encounter with noematic objects. This 'objectification' would correspond to the proposed development from noetic to noematic intentionality (in the mode of Husserl), suggested in phenomenology (ch. I:3 and II:3). But the picture is much more complex than this, as we shall see:

(1) It can be doubted whether an extropretation, which aims at maximal "extortion" from the work, is at all possible without access to the cognitive patterns of the subject; therefore, it can be shown that these acts are not strictly bound to the subject-object dichotomy; I submit that they are **independently intermediary**, and,

(2) that the interpretation can be **deepened** in two ways, first by penetrating the object or the subject (as I suggested in MIR I:88–89 – and this has nothing to do with objectivity and subjectivity *per se*), secondly by letting oneself become

penetrated by the object or the subject. An interpretation can become profounder by penetrating the object or the subject when this is required to attain the interesting **congruency between "contents" of subject and object through interpretation** (w-i-congruency). On the other hand, being penetrated by an object or subject enriches the consciousness and can implant new content or ideas for further reflective treatment and inclusion (i.e. cognitive processing) by the interpreting subject. Both these fundamental directions, outward and inward, entail an interpretive encounter.

The argument that I support, against reductionist overformalization, must be restated in preparation for the next chapter (I:2). In order not to illicitly simplify their richness, artistic phenomena cannot be reduced to 'dichotomic logic' without causing severe 'mutilation'. But the theory I present provides a relational framework for the i-situation.

The aim of an interpretive science that focuses conscious and experiential phenomena and relations must be to carefully and sensitively recognize the full richness of – in the case of this investigation – musical phenomena appearing in p(i) and their 'intentional relations'. The requirement of non-presupposition, of non-prejudice, to the extent that it is realizable, therefore must be respected. It is even reasonable, and in accord with rational principles, to abstain from applying established traditional systems of logic as a point of departure for our purpose, since these systems were not originally designed for the realm of experiential relations. The fact that one cannot demand their applicability in this project justifies our method of alternative proposals for a nuanced 'soft-logic formalization' that, in the end, aims at detailed correspondence to the varieties of forms of intentional interpretive acts.

This is why I recognize a difference between, say (1) pi and (2) p(i): (1) pi means that there is a **performance interpretation** (this complex concept is used by Levinson in Krausz 1993:33) in which, as I define it, performance and interpretation are on an equal level of priority, but one on which the performative aspects and decisions precede the interpretive ones. In contrast, (2) p(i) means strictly a **performance of an interpretation**, in cases where the main considerations and decisions are already made during the interpretive phase of assimilation and processing, while the performance fulfills its executive function of realizing the design of sound in accordance with the intended interpretation.

Note that (3) *ip*, **interpretation performance**, strictly means that the interpretive act precedes the performative action and that their respective arguments are equally important ('equipriority' of *i* and *p*), whereas (4) *i(p)* indicates a closer link between *i* and *p*, namely the interpretation of a performance.

It should be noted that I am applying the following terminological distinctions concerning descriptive traits: (1) "quality" refers to (1a) the **subjective pole**, which entails an experiential index pertaining to (1b) the auditor's (beholder's) experience as incited by properties of *p(w)*; (2) "property" refers to (2a) the **objective pole**, which entails a contextual index, and which is (2b) an ontological determination of *w*; (3) "feature" refers to (3a) the **intersubjective link** that connects the polarity between the two poles of subject and object, and to (3b) the experienceable property (-ies) of *w*. In ch. I:2 we will ask what 'acts' are conditional constituents of *i*. For further assistance be prepared to consult the List of Abbreviations and Definitions, Appendix ch. VII:2.

To prepare the reader for the subsequent chapters it might be useful to consider a few underlying arguments, namely:

(1) That I aim at exploring conceptual and notional categories of the interpreting mind;

(2) That the content of consciousness is constituted by an internal and/or external 'world', and this distinction is crucial; the internal world requires an external world to be objectified, whereas the external world requires the internal world to be understood and to be formulated conceptually; the external world can never construct its own concepts or notions about itself without the assistance of internal consciousness;

(3) That consciousness is characterized by **intentionality** directed towards either the external world of facts or the internal world of 'aware' contents; in the former case it is an irreflective act of the mind which aims to **objectify** the external world for the internal consciousness, and which also aims to reduce the subjectivity of the subject's involvement (i.e., to finally reach a non-interpretational stage); in the latter case it is an auto-reflective act of the mind;

(4) That the interpretative relations are 'transcendent' in the sense of not being limited to (or by) the material universe and not 'real' in the common sense of this word; but at the same time the interpretive act itself aims to establish an

'immanent' relation between the internal and external world. My use of "transcendent", however, does not in this sense indicate any opposition to phenomenology; I am **not** proposing a 'transcendental philosophy' as per ancient days.

Furthermore, I consider the following points to be candidates for the series of basic postulates:

(5) Human action is intentional (in the 'normal' case): our acting and handling depend on the concepts that we embrace, the framing of our mental conceptions, and on the cognitive processing of those conceptions (which incite their subsequent actions). In contrast, 'behavior' (in its most common sense and in its basic scientific sense, as observing an action, per the definition, from the outside) is not primarily intentional since the beholder's access to the corresponding and underlying intention of the behavior is restricted. This seems related to the following points:

(6) We do not have access to other humans' intentions (int), i.e. we lack the **direct** access to these intentions; the access we are able to achieve is indirect in the sense of being mediated; access to others' intentions is necessarily mediated by interpretive acts (interpretations, i:s);

(7) What we have to interpret are the **indications** of hidden intentions that are available at the moment of our investigating attention; this mode of observation is itself an intention, the intention of the beholder directed towards the 'studied' object with the aim of understanding it; an observer's intentionality is required for each act of i;

(8) If we observe a **static** object, say a coded (notational) sign, the intentionality is primarily on the side of the observer (S), and is secondarily read into the object (O). The justification for projecting (by directed listening or reading) intentionality into an object is that it is an artifact, that it must mean something to us (not only that/what we mean about it), since it was made by earlier human intention manifested in adherent creative action (of C). It is not only a matter of what we think about the object (what we think it should mean to us, what meaning was once purposefully laid down in the object, or whether and to what extent we can discover it), but also what we think the object itself would tell us imagining it could speak for itself, judged from its objectively existing properties and indications. To falsely assign a purposeful intentionality to the object serves the interpretive aim and should not *prima facie* be rejected as primitive animism. If the object is live, or an outcome of real time intentional acts (as a p, or an improvisation), then there is a 'double-sided' intentionality from

the perspective of the object, I_1 and P_i or I_1 and C_i or L_1 and P_i . Furthermore, the listener and the performer, as subject and object in an interpretive encounter, may interpret each other's intentionality: $L_1(P_{int})$.

The defense of this phenomenologic postulate may seem esoteric to modern scientific readers. But we have to realize that experience, especially of the subtle qualities of the arts, including music, is affected by fantasy, i.e. by imagination together with fact and reality.

I:2 A CONTRIBUTION TO (AND A CONSIDERATION OF) A CONCISE THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONS OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE IN REFERENCE AND COMPLEMENT TO THE THESES FORWARDED IN MIR I-II AND MIP


Introductory note: I have here basically adopted the concept of consciousness in the sense of Husserl's phenomenology, *mutatis mutandis* for the purpose of interpretation science. When this consciousness focuses on musical objects, it is essentially and functionally identical to what we mean by the concept of the "musical mind" (Mm).

The basic model that I presuppose designates possible and/or real interrelations, i.e. interconnections created by intentional acts, such as those between (1) **phenomena** (ph) of the conscious mind (ph1–ph2 at times t_1 and t_2 – successively, sequentially – versus ph1–ph2 at t_x – simultaneously), and (2) **facts** (f) of the physical world (body: physiological correlates, i.e. f_1 – f_2 at t_1 – t_2). The former type (1) displays **intentional** relations, whereas the second type (2) reveals **causal** relations. Note that intentional relations can be **bidirectional**: ph1→ph2 and ph2→ph1 are equally possible. An instance of ph1↔ph2 explains this: the fact that I intend to do something later on, at t_2 , influences what I do earlier, at t_1 ; I am doing one thing in view of what I expect to happen at a later time. This entails the cognitive faculty of surveying intentionally different points that vary in temporal distance from the actual present. In contrast, causal relations are thought to be unidirectional: the cause always precedes its effect, e.g. the sound is preceded by the pianist's unidirected hand movement. For instrumentalists this is quite obvious, while the separation between cause

(physiologic) and effect (sound) in vocal art seems indistinct: the physical act appears fused with its audible result. In conducting, bodily motion need not precede the sound, even if this is the normal and recommended way of actively directing the orchestra, namely by marking time characteristically ahead: the beat follows an intentional, not an acoustic pulse. But a conductor who is satisfied by what he hears from his orchestra may well and quite justifiably withdraw into a passive mode of following simultaneously the music's external p(i)-shaping as he hears it, optionally via internalized-externalized experience; or it may turn out that he acts out of the p(i)-gestalt on basis of c-form, w- α , or i-topography (i/n, i/s, i/w). Another option is the total passivity (Celibidache's "loslassen") in the conductor's beat-shaping (gestalting) after the sound: Thus we have three principal possibilities, namely conducting **pre**, **con** and **post factum**. Note the interesting fact that a conductor (as demonstrated by Celibidache) can switch voluntarily from the 'pure' intentional position, maintained intentionally regarding sound-beat or beat-sound relations, over mixed grades to the **quasi-causal** position. Obviously, the existence of pure 'real' causality in both direction of the beat-sound relation can be questioned when applied to conductor only (among musicians), but not to instrumentalists. Singers seem to represent a mid-position in this respect.

An additional 'interlevel' relation is: (3) ph_1-f_1 signifying a physiologic correlate as a prerequisite for the ph_1 under consideration: e.g. stating that a blood-flow of a certain volume, intensity (speed) and distribution (say in *lobus temporalis dexter*) is necessary for adequate melody recognition. Ph and f are 'correlates' which not yet imply causality in either direction. But f_1 is viewed as a physiologic correlate of the intentional ph_1 , and the intentionality of the researcher's investigation is clearly directed $ph_1 \rightarrow f_1$. Yet another 'interlevel' relation is: (4) the $f_2 \rightarrow ph_2$; this means that the focused f_2 , e.g. in an increased CBF, has a corresponding phenomenon on the conscious level, say increased melodic attention or precision in the recognition of a melody, or that f_2 creates the conditions necessary for certain experiential phenomena to appear. Note that relations (3) and (4) are directional, whereas (1) and (2) are neutral in this respect, according to the following scheme:

EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUSES OF INTERPRETIVE ACTS



A theory of relations for (1) the **external correspondence** of criteria in 'musical interpretation in performance' ('mip'), and (2) an **internal coherence** of mip must start with a consideration of fundamental relations in the process of communication. This communication is constituted by its (1) "form" and (2) "content"; (1) its form is (or can be regarded as) its constellation of elements or participators and parts in an informational "chain" comprising codifier, code, code carrier and decodifier; it has sender and receiver, and transmittory code carriers. Obviously the composer (C) and the performer (P) who realize the sound events are normally senders, and so is in some respects (cases) even the listener (L) who is not only listening. The compositional act results in a composition defined as a set of properties or qualities (c); correspondingly the acts of performance and listening result in performance (p) and the listener's 'sound-image' (l). All of them separately or jointly, some of them (or, exceptionally, none of them), are interpreter(s) in the wide sense, (I), who perform(s) intentional interpretative acts (act_{int} & act_l) resulting in (creating) interpretations (i), i.e. specifically determined versions of the work in question which, referring to P:s' i:s, are 'performative interpretations' (i_p ; Levinson: "performance interpretations", pi) or interpretative performances (p_i).

(2) The content is the communicated musical structure which, at certain points in the chain, is merely transmitted from one part to another in the form of "disguised" representations before arriving at its goal, whereupon a musical

experience is released in a human mind. A composer creates a composition which can be represented in its specific structure by notational (n) or auditive appearance (au), or possibly and accessorially through other phenomenal (ph) sense modalities, which takes on its own life independent of the composer, carves out its own identity in interchange with its context, i.e. becomes a work (w) and eventually contributes to (constitutes) a tradition. On certain points in the communicative circuit (or line; a chain may be closed or open) the participator (C,P,L;I) will cognitively process, experience, understand or analyze (a) the received acoustic (ac: physical energy through vibration) auditive (au: sound) or visual (v: esp. n for notational) information from the preceding stage in the communicative scheme. The minimal, fragmentary chain model, insufficient for artistic purposes and practically occurring only on an elementary instructional level, would read CcPpLl, which denotes a 'simple' execution and listening (by neutral, 'purely' auditive hearing on only physiologic grounds) to the sounds without any structuring of them whatsoever. The causal connections Cc, Pp and Ll do not state anything about the complex process of c, p and l's coming into existence 'from' C, P and L, but only a simple possessive relation within the binaries. The different ontological statuses of the constituents of the model (C,P,L are persons; c, possibly via n, refers to properties of an object; whereas i,l indicate experiential results of acts,) are reflected in the fundamental distinction between **real** and **intentional** objects.

My fundamental thesis is that real objects (C,N,P,I,L) basically are **non-interpretational** in the sense that they carry (convey) a definite identity at one moment in time, while sets of corresponding properties (c,n,p,i,l) are **intentional objects that are interpretational**. However access to the real object (c,n) is permitted (possible) only through interpretation (i). The performer's interpretation (Pi) can then be interpreted in its turn by, e.g., the listener or a critic (PiL; P_iP_iL_i); hence interpretation may become potentiated (ii,i²; iii,i³ etc.), whereby the final result of the experienced performance attains a higher degree of complexity. As a **conceived** object 'audialized' (I regret the necessary neologism for the analog to 'imagined' and 'visualized' on the mental and visual fields) by the musical mind (Mm; consciousness), music is intentional (in the sense of Husserl and Ingarden), but as a **perceived** object music takes on the same degree of **concreteness** as that afforded by the experience of perceiving an actual ('real') thing.

Various constituted communicative models stand on ontological grounds as available options within the apriorical and conventional limits of which the

performer (listener) creates their respective basic interpretational structures. Quite obviously, at least two personal participators must enter into dialogue in order to constitute a communicative relation (PL;PpLl), and there must be a **mode of reception** through conscious productive (Cc), emittive (Pp) and/or assimilative (li, Ll) **acts of mind** to achieve **interpretative relations**. I distinguish basically bipartite (w-i), tripartite (w-i-p, w-p-l), and more complex interpretive models (comprising quadruple parties, MIP:31). The ontological constitution of the actual model determines certain restrictions or options (allowances) of **intentionality** (intro/extra/interpretation) defining limits for various sets of available means of interpretation. A few basic models, including the conventional situation in the concert performance, should be critically discussed in this investigation and elaborated on with regard to their ontological and interpretational properties. A total reduction down to a two-part relation of CL or wl (cl), if intended and not logically but **intentionally possible**, would entail an immediate contact and **identification** between L and C. And yet the realizability of such a two-part model can be questioned: the late Husserl conceived of an intersubjectivity through interindividual sharing of the same "*Lebenswelt*"¹⁹.

The model case of the concert performance situation where the involved personal participants establish interrelations, both in between their interpretative acts of consciousness and indirectly in between their respective experiential results entails a w-p(i)-l relation where the productive persons, C, I=P, L are elided (see MIR I:98ff on elisions).

This analytic system, based on the ontology of mip as presented in MIR I-II, will be applied to interpretive patterns and successively completed during the course of this investigation. As an introductory distinction to the following system, it should be noted that the term "in-pretative" ("ex-pretative") with prefix and hyphen, stresses the **relational** and **directional aspects** ("in" versus "ex"), whereas "inpretation" ("expretation") without hyphen, refers to the specific interpretive (interpretative, interpretational) act under consideration. Essentially the following system emphasizes the qualities **depth** and **direction** as two most important and variously combined aspects of intentional interpretative acts.

First, in addition to the **short definitions** given in ch. VII:2, the explicative definitions of **nine basic subconcepts** (by admitting constructed neologisms) of interpretation that I propose are the following:

(A) From w/c/n/p to i/l:

(A1) **expretation**: outwardly directed interpretation either as
 (1) directed intentionality of the interpreting subject or as
 (2) directed emission of content from the object. Expretation is basically a neutral regard leading to independent consideration of content or structure that allegedly pertains originally to the object in the intersubjective encounter; its freely understood 'content' is drawn out from (or thought to be drawn out from) the w (or c) through often analytic or phenomenologic procedures. In order to avoid an arbitrary expretation that **assigns** interpretive qualities to an interpreted content (of subject or object) acceptability of the expreted content can be required within wide circles of auditors.

I suggest for further discussion that it may be inquired whether expretation is *a priori* counteracted by self-centeredness (in the psychic sense) and promoted by self-overcoming ("*Selbstüberwindung*"). The solipsistic ("autistic") personality makes him/herself immune to expretive content.

(A2) **extopretation**: an expretation (in either sense 1 or 2 above) that reaches its communicative target on its surface. Extopretation basically involves a directed neutral regard leading to transported independent consideration into a context other than the original context; i.e. a content or structure on the subject pole allegedly pertains to the object-side in the intersubjective encounter;

(A3) **extropretation**: an extopretation (in either sense 1 or 2 from A1) that penetrates behind the surface of its communicative target. Extropretation, in the sense of object-emission, involves an idea, a concept or structural view extracted from (or even 'extorted' from) c (or w) that cannot unequivocally be claimed to coincide with identified structures or properties pertaining definitely to the object's constituents. It may rely on a structural reduction in its rendering, arbitrarily or based on some theory (e.g. Schenkerian or Narmourian). One can state criterial conditions, or clear analytical evidence, for an extropretive relation to occur, and the relevance of the alleged content often becomes a matter of discussion. The relation must be clearly recognizable and identifiable; certain general comprehensibility and/or acceptability required. In order to avoid an arbitrary extropretation that **assigns** interpretive qualities to an interpreted content (of subject or object) intersubjective acceptability of the extropretated content can be required within wide circles of auditors.

It should be added that extropretation frequently has an object-dominated point of departure and contains a considerable component of work-analysis in accordance with some object theories of various kinds (e.g., music theories by Schenker and his followers, Lerdahl & Jackendoff and "generative" successors

such as Narmour or predecessors such as Riemann). Extropretation entails or incites an effort to "extort", or maximize the filtering-out of several different structural (and other kinds of) layers of the work (cf. Nicolai Hartmann).

(B) From i/l to w/c/n/p:

(B1) **inpretation**: inwardly directed interpretation either as

(1) directed intentionality of the interpreting subject, or as

(2) directed emission of content from the object. Inpretation is basically a neutral regard of content or structure allegedly pertaining to the regarder, but which through concordance (coincidence, prevailing congruency) is relevant to the object in the intersubjective encounter.

(B2) **intopretation**: an inpretation (in either sense 1 or 2 above) that reaches its communicative target on its surface. Intopretation, in the sense of subject-intentionality, basically involves an idea external to c (or w) that is projected, and intentionally directed towards the w (or c). It originally belongs to the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) of the i (or l), but may become accepted by musical society (actual tradition) and included as a part (constituent) of the work's (c's) lifeworld and thereafter influence secondary or subsequent i:s; intopretation often includes hermeneutic components of 'reinterpretation'.

(B3) **intropretation**: an intopretation (in either sense 1 or 2 from B1) that penetrates behind the surface of its communicative target. Intropretation, in the sense of subject-intentionality, involves the act by which the interpreter (listener) introduces (injects of a 'foreign' idea or concept or the 'places' – constructs, creates) a new quality (property) not originally pertaining to the object directly 'into the w'; the external moment immediately becomes a part of the interpreted w (or c). The requirements for acceptability and congruency with c–(n–, or w–) structures must be corroborated and are significantly greater than those in cases of intopretation. The intropretation may be a ca (na, wa), e.g., in cases of structural ambiguity (of c,n,w).

In order to avoid an arbitrary intropretation that **assigns** interpretive qualities to an interpreted content (of subject or object), acceptability of the intropretated content can be required within wide circles of auditors. It should be added that intropretation has a subject-dominated point of departure and can have a considerable self-analytic component; self-knowledge, "maturity" in common usage, may play an important or decisive role in this act; consequently psychoanalytic theories (in its non-Freudian sense) are interesting for a closer description of this interpretive mode of acting. Pure intropretation has no independent ontological status, since it is totally subjective, and idiosyncratically

determined.

(C) Within w or c (that is w–w or c–c):

(C1) **intrapretation**: the act by which the interpreter (I,P,L) forms his view on w or c on the basis of the internal relations of the w or c (or n) only, and understands and/or adjusts these internal relationships as manifested in his theoretical or performance interpretation. The question of the internal coherence of the intrarelations of w (c,n), as opposed to i, are crucial; it is crucial to establish whether these relations are facultative patterns or intracorrelations (in the sense of NS). The correspondence criterion is arbitrary. Intrapretative acts exhibit different directions, the forward or reverse directions implying protentional or retentional intentionality respectively.

(C2) **extrapretation**: an independent identification of content or structure allegedly pertaining to the external world as viewed in the direction from the work to the regarnder in their intersubjective encounter. Only based on external relations. Between w or c and i or l:

(C3) **inter-pretation** (in its specific sense): an exchange of ideas between w (or c,n) and i (or l) through assimilative and emittive acts (modes of intentionality) yielding an understanding or an adjustment of theoretical view or performance interpretation. The criteria of correspondence between w, c and n and i, p, and l, as well as between C and I, P, L, are crucial.

Evidently, the modes of acting (A1–3 with the initial signum "ex" as abbreviation) are important particularly in the **assimilative** mode of the interpreter's initial **reception** and **processing** of the work, while the modes of acting (B1–3, "in") are similarly pertinent to the interpreter's **emittive** phase, in the model case aiming at execution, 'gestalting' and performance. Ultimately, the balance between "ex" and "in" signifies congruent mip.

The prefix **ex-** denotes the outward direction, whereas the suffix **in-** denotes the inward direction of the interpretive acts. The two sequences (1) **ex-**, **exto-**, and **extro-**, and (2) **in-**, **into-** and **intro-** signify usually the subject's (occasionally the object's) **gradually increasing involvement** in the directional target (goal) of the interpretive act. The concepts capture **three degrees of depth** of the involvement: (1) **superficial contact** established with the surface layer ('foreground') of the target (ex, in); (2) **participation** in the content on a (where applicable Schenkerian 'middleground') deep layer of the target (exto, into: including the preceding degree), and (3) **deep involvement** in the core content of the deepest layer of the target (extro, intro: including the two preceding degrees).

The three **ex-acts** basically bring out a content (feature, structure) of (from) their respective target layers (usually objects) that cannot be perceived from the perspective of the initial act, but only from a different vantage point or on another **experiential layer**, whereas the three **in-acts** basically transfer a content (feature, structure) which is "new" to the target layer that they reach. In-acts normally interact with ex-acts, e.g., an interpretation from subject to object is "responded to" by an expretation from the object back to the subject, the latter functioning as a 'corrective' influence (NS: "feed-back").

Sensitivity to the **contextual relations** is crucial; it endows the interpretation with a 'complexity and richness' that attracts our aesthetic attention, and most likely influences our evaluation. These 'rewarding qualities' express: (1) an adequateness in the rendering of the intricate relational network that corresponds to the complexity of the situation seen from the interpreter's point of departure, and in his perspective; (2) a correct relational correspondence to the constitution of the 'reality', i.e. the relevant aspects of the external world; and (3) an adequate picture of the degree and quality of self-awareness (and insight) on the part of the interpreter himself, i.e. the degree of participation in his own internal world, as constituted interiorly and as a result of its external relations, with its complex of cognitive patterns.

Obviously, insensitivity to the contextual relations can be correctly **diagnosed** as a more primitively constituted interpretive act; it corresponds to a limited (restricted) scope of participation, i.e. to a merely **partial involvement in the relational context**, a "blindness" for the complexity of the external and internal world as seen from the interpreter's view. In contrast, sensitivity to the full complexity of contextual relations entails the possibility of **full participation** (in Swedish "delaktighet"); such a **positive and complete dedication**, identification and empathy aims at projecting the interpretive act into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation. Note that even a 'negative' involvement to the point of extreme submission, devotion, complicity, may be locally adequate; here a sensitive interpreter may intermittently be appointed to play a role that corresponds to pathological variants of exceeding self-effacement or exaggerated symbiosis in accordance with a wanted p-function.

In partial coincidence with Schenker and Hartmann concerning the object-side I conceive of the object having three layers: (1) surface, (2) middleground, and (3) core; correspondingly, I conceive of the subject having three layers, identically designated (foreground – or 'surface', middleground and background – or, as I prefer, core), which may, of course, **interact** with

regard to both subject and object. I presuppose (1) internal interaction within subject (S) and object (O) respectively, and (2) S–O interaction, either S→O or O→S directional.

Now, as just staked above, the suffix *ex* (*in*) indicated outward (inward) direction, but **outward** (alt **inward**) either (1) **to** or (2) **from**. This bicombinatory scheme accounts for the difference between (1) **perspective** (intentional, static), (2) **direction** (intentional, with a definite point of departure and a definite goal or 'target'), and (3) **motion** (with a series of varying qualities due to such factors as the direction in starting and ending, the shape of dynamic changing, the contrast between step and leap), which entails (*i*, *p* or *p*(*i*)) or implies the traversing of distance (between S and O), out from S, linking onto O, into O, (etc.) in cases of successful *i*, while failing to make up the full distance required for (S–O) connection in cases of *i* failure due to this cause; this is an **unfinished, incomplete *i* act** (attempt) not to be confused with over–, under– or misinterpretation. Fundamentally, the *ex*– and *in*–acts of interpretation then have four basic modes of combination: (1) **ex & to**, (2) **ex & from**, (3) **in & to**, and (4) **in & from**. Consequently, there is in principle an **object–expretation** and a **subject–expretation**, as well as an **object–inpretation** and a **subject–inpretation** acknowledged by the present general interpretation theory. This theory concerns the **form** and **content**, the **that** and **what** of what has to be as **influx** in order for the human interpretive act to gain access to the focused object, and as a prerequisite for understanding this object; the theory acknowledges the ontological status of the form and content, the **that** and **what** of what is 'acquired' as understood in this process, and which comes out of the object in response to the interpretive act (as an "exflux").

However, in *mip*, it is mainly the **object–expretation** that is relevant, since the aim of *mip* is to interpret (understand, perform) an object, namely (and normally) *w*. But *mip* may also involve components, moments or phases of **subject–expretation**. In contrast and for the purpose of comparison, psychoanalysis (Freudian, cognitive, Daseins, or phenomenologic) basically focuses on subject–expretation, or deeper subject–extropretation: The analyst and as arbiter of interpretations interprets his 'interior world' with the maieutic assistance of the analyst (Lesche p.c., Grünbaum 27–32, Herlofson p.c.; Medard Boss; Sundin). This is not irrelevant for a general interpretation science that recognizes the involvement of the subject in the interpretational process with regards to interpretive acts in scientific research; and it is not irrelevant for *mip*, where there may be influential subjective components in the interpretive act.

Basically, then, *mip*-*expretation* reaches over to the musical object and its 'world' (the 'world' taken as the *integratum* of the complete relational network with all its pertaining objects), and establishes contact with it; this creates a possibility for an exchange of content, even more so the deeper the interpretation penetrates and the deeper its origin. The exchange can occur only on the condition that the two depths are of a corresponding level (which does not *a priori* refer to the same layer): A very superficial inpretative act does not give a sufficiently transilluminating impulse to release an extropretative response from the depth of the core (of the *w*), and vice versa. So it seems that, from this point of view, the age-old dichotomy and opposition between **subjectivity** and **objectivity** must be resolved, and may well be substituted by another concept, as has been claimed by orthodox phenomenologists in discussions on Husserlian basics. The relation postulated between objectivity and subjectivity is of a much more positive correlation than a negative one. By increasing the depth of subjective involvement, one can evoke the forceful impulse for analytic transillumination of the object, a necessity if one wishes to penetrate the depth structure of a major symphonic score down to its core. But of course there is one additional, and essential condition: the content, the basic cognitive pattern, of the initial intropretive act may not be incongruent with the structure of the core layer of the *w*; i.e. a 'pathological expressivity' must be evaded since it destroys the exchange (dialogue and contact) with the pertinent layer of the *w*. In fact, the depth of the interpreter's self-analytic consciousness must correspond to the attained level of the object's depth in order for a successful (i.e. congruent) relation to occur.

For a true dialogue to occur it requires both *expretation* and *inpretation* (or, if the risk of destructive incongruency can be evaded, *extro*- and *intropretation*) in order to achieve a genuine exchange of content with its respective origins in different 'worlds'; i.e., both subject and object must be engaged, and contribute to the exchange.

Mip-*expretation* reaches the surface of the object, an *extropretation* goes deeper to its 'middle-layer' (middleground, if the Schenkerian appeal is preferred, ch. II:7), and *extropretation* reaches the core of the object world (*w*). *Inpretation* of the regarding act involves only the behavioral and habitual surface of the interpreter's world, *intropretation* departs from a deeper layer involving the "personality", "style", the held opinions, convictions, and "attitudes" within the frame of individual cognitive capacities, whereas *intropretation* engages the very core of the internal self in the interpretive process while encountering the

object.

It is evident that a **coupled congruent intro- & extropretation** would provide the conditions for the most profoundly penetrating interpretation; however such a mode of acting may also entail the risks known to follow with substantial subjective involvement. Provided the means for both an analytic penetration of the *w* and an **autoanalytic awareness of the subject** are adequate and on an equal level of communication, this risk can be managed successfully. Specifically, risk-reducing strategies are important in order to evade interpretive faults, as shown by the recent development on the financial market, involving the use of derivatives (Karl Olof Ohlson, CEO Stora Financial Services, p.c. 9.3.94).

The introduced modes of interpretation can be combined with the two basic modes of interpretational outcome, both theoretical (T) and performance-centered (P; abbreviations suggested by Hermerén, ch. II:1).

Interpretative moments, which can be inserted on many points in the communicative process, are principally of two kinds. If the interpreted object (**interpretandum**) is identical to the interpreting subject (**interpretans**; i.e. if the sender, producer, performer is equivalent to the listener, auditor, beholder) it is a case of **autoreflexive i**: C (P,L) reflects his ego C (P,L) and produces (performs, experiences) his result (art, music, conclusion) through the *i*-act. If the interpreted object is nonidentical to the interpreting subject (i.e. if the sender, etc., is non-equivalent to listener, etc.) it is a case of **commutative (distributive) i**: *ciP*, *piL*.

There are two different directions in the interpretive act, one towards the creator (C, even P versus L) and one towards the listener (L, even P versus C), though composers might succeed in obtaining a response or reactions from the audience, thus creating a feed-back informational loop (a closed circuit with several points of correction – or a hermeneutical helix, ch. II:1): LC and CL.


It is important to note that (ia) is not equivalent to (ai), with respect to the analyses presented in MIR II and MIP.

The noninterpretational ideal (ch. V:4) strives to reduce the distance and focus the intentional direction of the auditor (beholder), aiming at the closest possible nonintermediated connection between listener and composer: *CwPpLi*. In such a case the interrelations in the model can be further explicated in various ways: e.g. through (C*w*)→(P*p*)→(L*i*) or (C*w*P)→(p*Li*), indicating different priorities of governing/guiding relations. The discussion on the aesthetic criteria of mip concentrates naturally on the central *wi* and *pi*, which can be regarded as **functional relations** (namely the *i* of *w* resp. *p*; [*i*(*w*) and *i*(*p*)]). The

central core of wipi can be regarded as a focused (not separate) section of a larger entity such as ciwipili. The compositional structure (c) is reinterpreted and takes on the contextual features of a tradition (w) which is all interpreted and realized in a performance (p), and eventually grasped by a listener. This model refers to the interpretative acts that are proposed to be at stake in the conventional situation (e.g. the performance of Western notated music) by omitting personal participators (C,P,L).

It is possible, though, that the composition 'as notated structure' [c(n(s))] originating from the composer (Cc), after having absorbed ancillary traits by its course through tradition and thereby having obtained the status of w, is once more interpreted (by P) in the light of its new background and in order to establish additional 'meanings' of the w that appear through the given compositional structure: ci inserted gives ciwi(ci)pili.

Next, it is evident that during the course of extensive multi-interpretational processes, the **exclusion** of non-intended (non-perceived, non-selected) alternatives continues along the entire communicative sequence (succession). In performing complicated works that are highly dependent on a very few (or possibly only one) version in order to be aesthetically convincing (satisfying, successful) from the viewpoint of the auditors, the need for selection and exclusion criteria becomes greater: this guidance is called for especially during the steps taken by P(I) before the music reaches the listener: Let me illustrate a few of these hypothetical cases (sender-emittive or receiver-receptive models):



If **freedom** opens up the alternatives while, on the other hand, limits on freedom produce constraints without providing any guarantee of an appropriate selection, other conditions must be met for this purpose. Still other conditions must be met in order to create comprehensive connections that enhance communication.

The appearance of **relation** (MIR I:22) restricts and makes precise the given possibilities by requiring increased complexity. Relations are either intrarelations ($w-w$, $n-n$, $p-p$, $i-i$) or interrelations ($w-n$, $w-p$, $w-i$, their reverses $n-w$, $p-w$, $i-w$; $n-p$, $n-i$ with reverses $p-n$, $i-n$; $p-i$ and $i-p$, etc). It is interesting to note that **coherence** is relevant in intrarelations ($i-i$, $n-n$) in which it is directly involved, whereas **correspondence** is relevant, and primarily involved, for interrelations ($n-i$, $i-n$). Coherence may come into play indirectly in interrelations, through **intermediary correspondence criteria**, and correspondence may come into play indirectly in intrarelations, through **intermediary coherence criteria**.

As we proceed from (1) $n-n$, over (2) $n-i$ to (3) $i-i$, it seems to be the case that: (1) fewer **relations** occur with increased complexity; (2) **freedom** is maximized; and (3) **continuity** (MIR I:31–32) furthers mutual relations between its constituents.

Further distinctions between various kinds of relations must also be made. Relations may be **directionally neutral**, $i-i$ (as e.g. between simultaneously interconnected timbres appearing as transparent phenomena in an orchestral chord). The intranotational relation ($n-n$) is determined, unambiguously ('imperatively') signifying, since it points at what it stands for. But while $n-n$ can be **temporally neutral** (undetermined), a $p-p$ relation referring to two defined time points in the same performance may be a temporally-relevant and determined relation; $i-i$ seems to take a place in between, since it is temporally relevant but not precisely determined (the i -act takes different time for different interpreters, varying with some factors of talent). Non-approximate structures are indicated through internal reference within an original model.

The intrainterpretative relation is a relation without reference to its prescriptive model (n).

The interrelations $n-i$ and $i-n$ are normally valid in performance or its preparation, and in interpretation analysis (criticism), respectively. These interrelations refer to a determinate and indicative original model, which restricts the realization of the model's implications. The $i-n$ relation provides a possibility for **recursive** control of the i when it is viewed against the original model ("förlaga") provided by n .

Basically, relations (e.g. $n-i$ and $i-i$) can be specified by indicating: (1) their **direction** ($n \rightarrow i$, $n \leftarrow i$); (2) their **time** (e.g. simultaneous $n_{t_1}^1 - n_{t_1}^2$, or successive $n_{t_1} - i_{t_2}$); and (3) the **type (mode) of relatedness**: causal, musico-logical (conceptually logical) or phenomenologic, indicative, consequential, synthetic/analytic, connective-contingent, proximal, overbridging (etc). Direction and time

combined can be exemplified as $(n_{t1} \rightarrow i_{t2}; n_{t1} \leftarrow i_{t2})$.

The reason why fundamental relations are important in mip is that their predicates, logical properties and corresponding constitutions are generally valid, and the interpreter who wants to be successful must rely on the secure predictability of the logical and relational frame of the listener's reaction, despite empirical variation in listeners' differing dispositions. A reliance on empirical variety alone will not give the interpreter (or analyst) the same security of relational conditions for the mip.

A theory of the fundamentals of mip must comprise a characterization of its crucial relations on two levels involving (1) the personal actors (C,I,P,L) in the interpretative process, for the purpose of creating a descriptive terminology for researching influences within interpretative style traditions; the basic concepts must already be formed in order to develop a **history of interpretation** in performance; and (2) the corresponding 'products', i.e. the musical entities (c,i,p,l) resulting from the actors.

In particular, there is reason for interpretation research to focus on the following fundamental relations:

(1) i-i. Among the pertinent questions that must be considered are the reversibility, from the $(i \rightarrow i)$ to the $(i \leftarrow i)$, of this relation $(i-i)$, either in the synchronic $([(i \rightarrow i)_{t1} (i \leftarrow i)_{t2}]_{t0})$ or $([(i \rightarrow i)_{t1} (i \leftarrow i)_{t1+t1}])$ or the diachronic $([(i \rightarrow i)_{t1} (i \leftarrow i)_{t2}])$ or $([(i \rightarrow i)_{t1} (i \leftarrow i)_{t1-t2}]_{t0})$ view, where $t0$ is the time point of the regarder's simultaneous comprehension. If reversible, the relation $(i \leftrightarrow i)$ has two directional perspectives, that of **retrospectivity** $(i \leftarrow i)$ and that of **prospectivity** $(i \rightarrow i)$, corresponding to Husserl's retention and protension. Some complicating issues are those of defining criteria for identity and continuity, and those of similarity and development (the criteria for change, e.g. divergence, MIR I ch. 6) as conditions for the i-i relation. Another crucial question is: What can contribute to intrarelativ e cohesivity?

(2) w-i. Its reversibility $(w \rightarrow i)(i \rightarrow w) \rightarrow (w \leftrightarrow i)$ in the perspective of a work's history or interpretation history, $(i \leftrightarrow w)$ must determine the outcome of the question of the existence of mutual communicative exchange between the work and its interpreter. Such an exchange can then be regarded as evidence for the w-i reversibility only on the condition that the following relations remain uninhibited: $(I \rightarrow i), (i \rightarrow I); (C \rightarrow c), (c \rightarrow C)$ - i.e. *stricto sensu* between the historical

context (H) that determines the c as an instance w (of W) and its concrete result ($W \rightarrow w$). Unfortunately, it must be assumed (or even inferred) from empirical evidence (investigated in ch. II–IV and earlier works including interviews in MIR III), that interpreters are more seldom fully aware of their i :s. It is nonetheless questionable whether the case is different for composers.

(3) $w-w$. Prior to the question of the reversibility of this relation, $(w \rightarrow w)(w \leftarrow w) \rightarrow (w \leftrightarrow w)$, the problem of access to the work must be solved. There are various solutional opportunities of which I mention one: access to the work requires interpretation and may be arrived at through adducing knowledge of the biographical circumstances of the composer dependently, $[C(w-w)]_i$, or through independent interpretation $[I(w-w)]_i$.

(4) $i-l$. The fundamental consideration of this relation involves the question of the listener's acquisition of an understanding or a 'pure' experience through interpretative acts. The i is an i of another human being (and consciousness), for the most part the P who can be either C or I and who is also 'another' L . Furthermore, the i formed as an entity of the grasped interpretans is the i of the listener's cognitive processing; i.e. the li . In order for this relation ($i-l$) to appear, the relation between $i(P, C, I)$ and li must be to some degree congruent.

(5) $w-l$. Whether this relation occurs or not is a question of whether the basic structures of the work are 'congruent' with the cognitive processing capacity of the L in such a way as to make possible comprehension. This comprehension, then, as was the case in (4), is a condition for reversibility.

(6) $i-p$. In chapter I:1 we introduced a distinction between interpretation and performance. The circumstantial determinants of p is not shared by i , but i may be indirectly envisaged in view of such p -restrictions: i :s are more or less intentionally bound to **visionary** or **realizational** content respectively. The model of implication–realization, advanced by Narmour in his c -theory, would, when applied to an $i-p$ theory, indicate at least one half of the truth, namely the extent to which i (1) **can be realized** given the restrictions of p , or (2) the extent to which it **is realized** in a particular p given the restrictions either generally for p , for relevant p -kinds, for a defined set of p :s or for an individual p (the actual one or a prototypical p for purposes of comparison). Therefore, the $p-i$, $(p \rightarrow i)$ and $i-p$ ($i \rightarrow p$) relations – especially the **proportion of realizability** of an i (the p/i -quotient) – attract our theoretical attention. If the full contents of p and i respectively are quantified to "1", and the empty contents to "0", we have several liminal cases: (1) full p -realization of a "full" i -content (a completely determined i), when $i=1$, $p/i=1/1=1$, (2) empty p -realization, $p/i=0/1=0$ is an

extreme case of unperformability, (3) restricted p-realizationability over a full i-content: $p/i=0.5/1=0.5$. Obviously, **p/i-quotients <1 symbolize either redundant i ($i>p$) or underdetermined p ($p<i$)**. Two more cases occur: (4) restricted p-realization and incomplete (e.g. defective) i-content $p/i=0.5/0.5=1$. Notice, though, in this case, that when p and i are both unfilled (i.e. <1), the outcome "1" does not say much about the quantity of realization (i.e. the quality of interpretation) since the outcome depends on the degree of **p/i-congruency**, which then must be analyzed in each case; (5) given a full p-realizationability, in cases of no performative restrictions ($p=1$), over incomplete i yields $p/i=1/0.5=2$. A **p/i-quotient >1, given $p=1$ symbolize redundant p, i.e. underdetermined i**. In practice a case (6) where p/i approaches extreme values due to $i \rightarrow 0$ signifies **ininterpretability**. Obviously the level of realization can be related to the compositional degree of implications (implied by Narmour's model; ch. II:5), but if the latter leaves a zone of free choice there is room for interpretative decision (and interpretational consideration; so the following quotients can also be studied according to the model of implication-realization: $c/p, n/p; c/i$ and n/i). In the normal model case, the c (w, n) indeterminacy incites interpretative determination.

However, the level of completeness of both p and i, which are presupposed to attain equal or approximately equal values, is **phenomenologically important**, but this is not shown by the quantification indicated in the quotients; the level of completeness ($p \& i$) indicates the **degree of chance** (or inversely, determination) voluntarily or ignorantly left undetermined or unconsidered by the I-performer.

Evidently, the question of the **transitivity** of interpretational relations is relevant to this discussion. In the view of realistic determinism²⁰, necessary connections within logic are transitive without limitation: (1) if p then q and (2) if q then r, where these are dependent nomic conditionals, entailing (3) if p then r. However, this is not self-evident in interpretation research, insofar as it deals with **intentional entities**. It is obviously possible that our consciousness retains the original character of conditionality in the two first premises, whereby the conclusion stays independent as a conditional statement on **one level**; on **another structural level**, though, or "indirectly", the transitivity is valid. Even Honderich, who does not enter into the complexities of the arts, objects that "only because of an ambiguity", namely "because the consequent of the first conditional is in fact not identical with the antecedent of the second" (33), the conclusion (3) might fail to follow from (1) and (2).

Another condition for the w-l relation is the **transparency** of the P's intermediary i. The tripartite sequence l-i-w must appear in "total transparency" in order to communicate the w. This tripartite relation permits indirect comparison (concerning congruency/incongruency) between l and w and shows two different kinds of logic of its structure: (1) the outer parts framing the relation, and (2) direct comparison of the two interrelations, namely (1) l-i and (2) i-w. The l is directed towards the w and i; regarding the question of 'neutral acts' this allows **intopretation**, whereas w is directed towards i/l, allowing possible **extrapretation**. Regarding non-neutral acts, an i comprising **additional** moments such as structural relations, qualities, characters (etc.) that are not **prescribed** (foreseen, intended) 'by' c, allows **intopretation** in the i->w direction, and **extropretation** in the w->i direction. And such an additional i entails a depriving the w of something that was there as a fact or as a codification of C:s intention prescribed, foreseen or intended 'by' participants of its historical context according to the views of cultural consensus.

A theory of fundamental relations (of criteria) for internal coherence in mip should distinguish in particular the following relations:

(1) i-i, the constitution of the internal relation within one and the same interpretation;

(2) $I_{i1} - I_{i2}$, the interpreter's two different i:s at specified times;

(3) $I_{i1} - I_{i2}$, the relation between two different interpreters' converging interpretations (add w on both sides for 'of same work' if specification required);

(4) $I_{i1t1} - I_{i1t2}$, the interpreter's same interpretation played, performed or reproduced at two different moments ('sections') of time. The differences between the left and right sides are contextual and logical; the formula shows temporal sequentiality while the i-succession remains identical;

(5) $I_{i1t1} - I_{i2t2}$, the relation between, e.g., an interpreter's early and late interpretations at different points in time; the difference depends on (1) personal and (2) time-context factors, i.e. on $I_{i1} - I_{i2}$ and $I_{i1} - I_{i2}$ differences. E.g. the early and late i:s by Glenn Gould of Bach's first C major prelude in the first book of *Wohltemperiertes Klavier*;

(6) $I_{i1} \rightarrow P_2(i_{1p2})$, the case of a decisive influence of one interpreter on another performer's performance (dependent i, independent p);

(7) $I_{i1} \rightarrow (P_1 = I_1)(P_2, P_3, P_4 \dots)_{i1}$, the case of one interpreter influencing several performers to the point of indistinguishably identical mip:s;

(8) $I_{i1t1r1} - I_{i1t1r2}$, the case that the 'same' interpretation is rendered and reproduced at the same time in two different physical spaces, as, for instance,

a 'museal realization', a multi-art installation or as an unintended effect of comfortable living condition – say, when several radios broadcast the same program in a multiroom apartment to allow one to move around in comfort.

Of special concern is the question whether identical criteria can be applied to both c and i. The problem about the meta-relation (congruency?) between the valid criteria of the c as opposed to the i levels then arises. Lerdahl & Jackendoff, as well as L. B. Meyer seem to have presupposed such a correspondence, without exposing their postulate to the critical requirements of a "*philosophische Grundlegung*".

It is necessary to consider and distinguish between different types of interpretation theories: (1) conditional musico-logics; (2) production "rules" of the kind applied in computerized analysis-by-synthesis performance research (Sundberg *et alia*); and (3) processual theories, more or less related to actual cognitive science/philosophy. For instance, a conditional theory may state its conditions for 'similarity' (or identity) on various levels: two points in a musical process may be said to be 'similar' (identical) in one parameter (dimension; pitch, HP="Höhepunkt") in terms of (1:1) their **acoustic**, (1:2) **auditive**, or (1:3) **intentional** features. According to 1:1 a certain required level of amplitude may be stated to be a necessary condition for the defined similarity (identity) to occur, while 1:2 may state criteria for the conditions under which similarity in respect to a certain quality (e.g. in assigning the description "similarity strong" to the quality dimension of "strength") is supposed to appear in psychological tests, and finally 1:3 may state its criteria for the experiential appearance of similarity in reference to a required connection, to marking-out or to other structural phenomena.

Definable criteria may be applied by (1) performance research in terms of "rules" or recipes – "do this!" – i.e. by means of **descriptive imperatives**, e.g. if we have two notes, one of which is higher, the 'note' may imply 'play this note louder', or simply "the higher the louder" (J. Sundberg; ch. III:4); and by (2) interpretation research focusing on the interpretative process in conscious acts. This would involve an evaluation of interpretative acts in view of their intentional determinants. In the above case of two tones, such an evaluation would require a description of an intentional process of recognition. In the **assimilative** phase, the criteria would state the conditions for identifying notational highpoints that have **identity moments** (idm; Celibidache: "*Identitätsmomente*") in the dimensions of tonality, sonational ('sonance' as 'tonal' quality_{exp}) and extentional distances ('phonance') and possibly in other

categories of phenomena. Such a theory would also require the formulation of **criteria for the recognition and identification of similar moments** in a time sequence, a successive flow of sound events, and it would state the conditions for the appearance of experiential time relations. In the **emittive** phase, criteria can set the liminal values of actional and experiential thresholds which control the performer's 'natural' ('expressive') reaction to such factors as tone quality by means of modulating his attitude. The performer who masters his mode of acting can allow a profiled compositional design to appear transparently by adopting a passive approach to the w-topography ("let the music speak for itself" is often heard as advice during rehearsals). By controlling his activity, the performer can clarify his compositional shaping by emphasizing already indicated accents and/or by stressing crucial moments in the unfolding of the piece, e.g. by means of articulation.

The phases of the interpretative process can be outlined in the following manner: (1) the notational assimilation is a **visual** process, being (2) **cognitively** processed and 'translated' by intentional interpretation from visual into (3) **auditive** emission. Phase 2 allows various intentional modes: **in/expretation, into/extopretation, intro/extropretation** (thus enlarging the terminology), whereas the basic sensory perception is thought of as primarily physiologically determined and unidirectional. The neurophysiological basis for these interpretive processes, though, is a question clarified by biomusicological research (Wallin 1991), and the description of such a perception as unidirectional might be shown to be false; if neural efferent circuits modify (or guide the mode of) the assimilation, cognitive interpretative acts of consciousness may be included through a complex feed-back system in this 'early' perceptual stage. Phase (4), after motor implementation through action, is the auditive assimilation of the result created by the same person's intentions – i.e. this assimilation has, epistemologically, more favorable preconditions than the other assimilative modes, inferred interpretative acts not excluded. Phase (5) is **emittive** and projective. It is the interpreter's facultative realignment towards notation, presupposing an '**auditive → visual retranslation**' that can be the reversal of the 'translation' of phase 2. Basically, a distinction must be made between auditive and visual comparison, and their respective conditions.

Fundamentally, the question concerning the reversibility of the relation between man's (musical) mind (M) and music as an entity (m; w, n) is arrived at at this stage. Is this a duplex (two-part) relation, M-(w), or a triplex (tripartite) one. There is good reason to consider four cases in particular:

- (1) an **interpretational** triplex relation: $w - (\sim w)$
 $\quad \quad \quad \backslash M /$
- (2) an **intrapretational** triplex relation: $w - w$
 $\quad \quad \quad \backslash M /$

and among duplex relations: (3) **intopretation** (*'intolkning'*) directed from M to music – $M \rightarrow m$ – and (4) **extopretation** (*'uttolkning'*) directed from w to 'the me' (of man's mind) – $w \rightarrow M$.

Cases 1 and 2 are within w and 'music by man', as tripartite relations, not to be confused with Celibidache's **triangulation** as the relation between 3 points in the process of the performance of one musical work, whereas the 'contradictory' (5) **extrapretation** is outside the w–structure: $M - (\sim w)$ and a duplex relation.

Obviously, since evidence through reliance on the conscious belief in perceptive acts (as in looking at a rose and assigning the quality "red" to it), is relevant in aesthetic judgement, the evidence for or against a quality is assigned through interpretive acts that assign truth-values ($p, \sim p$) to the two categories of existence (E) and appearance (Ph). Given the quality q of w, p, or l a pure p(w)–**extopretation** is made on the condition of congruence between the truth values of E and Ph ($E:q \ \& \ Ph:q$); this may then be or appear as p or l qualities; a p(w)–**inpretation** will let the q appear as a quality of the w–ontology; an **existential intopretation** completes the w–ontology with a quality that appears phenomenal (but 'groundless'); an **existential extopretation** deletes the ontological basis for non–appearing phenomena (equalizes $E:q \ \& \ Ph:\sim q$ to $E:q \ \& \ Ph:\sim p$).

The estimation of the **degree of realization** in p(i) requires a determination of the **original model** ("förlagan"), i.e. (1) the notation, or (2) the intentional context. The phrase 'degree of realization' is ambiguous: its two senses are (1) the degree to which intended effects are realized, and (2) the degree to which the resulting sound events, as studied by performance research, are compatible with their constant (putatively "objective") original model (i.e. the notation). Two paradigms thus emerge: (1) interpretation research focuses the interpretational process, the intentional content, its cognitive patterns including aesthetic criteria and evaluative contentions ("*värdeföreställningar*", C. Lesche), and (2) performance research studies the result in terms of measureable or judicable sound events as functions of notational artifacts. It may be the case that intentional acts can be related to physiological facts, but this relational conclusion is itself the product of a conscious intentional act.

The term consciousness (as I use it) pertains to a particular human being who, as person ('subject'), 'carries his consciousness' world and performs his

interpretative acts: these are *prima facie* non-communicable, but experienceable. In contrast, the carriers of the 'objective' world/facts can be unidentified. A formulation of something external to human consciousness is supposed to guarantee communicability, although the 'objective' fact of the external world is non-experienceable – What do we communicate? Not the experience itself, but only its correlates. This is why Celibidache proposes that music is only experienceable, but not explainable.

The term 'objectivity' in this context indicates nothing more than (1) the experience pertaining to the object, a sound event for instance – i.e. to that which is not our consciousness or assimilable through it – and (2) the physical fact which is of interest to us. However, physical data about the world is as uninteresting by itself as the question of how many grains of sand exactly exist on the beach. Interpretational analysis is one way of avoiding naive objectivism and its sequel, **material particularism**.

The analytic question as to the object of the exercise arises through the musician's practising and rehearsing the score (on the levels of e and g) in various phases of assimilation. The musician may exercise (1) his body, (2) an instrument, (3) his consciousness, or (4) the work in its contextual world (composer, historical determinations, etc). Consequently, what is then recreated in sound are certain properties of the work *in toto* designated as the 'work structure' indicative of what object(s) has (have) been practiced. This 'indexical' w-structure is supposed to exist as an uninterpreted work structure (w_0), to which the musician gains access through the notated work structure (w_n). During practice an interpreted work structure (w_1) emerges, certain aspects of which are assimilated by the auditor (wl "vom Zuhörer aufgefasste Werkstruktur", R. Lorkovic 26.4.92, p.c.). If the interpreted work structure relies solely on notation it is a case of "Werkstruktur von der interpretierten Notation her" ($s(w_n)$). This may be demonstrated by applying a general scheme for interpretation analysis.

Principally, a comparative interpretation analysis considers the way in which the work is manifested in the mip ($w \rightarrow i$), as well as in terms of its i-i relations. The artistic continuity manifested in i-i relations can be understood "vom allgemeinen Konzept her". And the listeners' **recursive conclusion** from mip to w is then possible (the preconception of the work – $w_1 \rightarrow i_1$; the recursive analytic conclusion – $i_1 \rightarrow w_1$): "der Hörer macht Rückschlüsse von der Interpretation zum Werk" and "wie erscheint die Werkstruktur durch Zuhören von der Interpretation". The crucial question, though, is on what grounds of

shaping is the p(i) created by the performer – (1) through execution (e)? (2) gestalting (g)? or (3) interpretation (i)? – and what the relations are between these levels, should the performance involve several of them: e.g. (e→g) → i, i → (e→g), [(e→g)(g→e)] → i, etc.

Granted Lorkovic's objection that not all qualities can be expressed in formalized structural schemes, it is important to investigate more profound phenomena that might be accessible through psychoanalytic methods (Sundin, 1988). To exemplify this, three interpretations of Alban Berg's Violin Concerto were discussed as a background to Lorkovic's own T-interpretation (Lorkovic 1991: [1] Krasner/Webern BBC 1936, [2] Krasner/Busch Stockholm SO 1938 GunMar Rec., Newton Centre, MA, [3] Rostal/Scherchen, BBC SO 1953, Symposium, CD 1142). The quality of "sinnliche Konkretion", "Nähe und Konkretion im Klang" is perspicuous in Max Rostal's version. I agree with Lorkovic that Rostal's structural apperception ("*Strukturauffassung*") is simple, but there is a pertinent quality of **interpretative realism**, manifested by "klanglich eine sinnliche Konkretion". This **concrete realism** is hardly "gehörmässig greifbar" or identifiable in 'objects' of sound. Through the dominance of "sinnliche Konkretion", the details gain priority over the whole: "die Ganzheit wird den Details geopfert". Following Lorkovic, Rostal's approach was "personal, sensuous and imaginative, but his imagination was not very spiritual". Furthermore, the i-concept emerges by cognitive steps that show its structural traits, and can be recognized.

On the **intentional** level, however, concrete realism maintains that the interpreter's view "die komponierten Strukturen *gestaltungsmässig* strukturieren muss", i.e. that it incites a sharpening effect. Lorkovic arrives at his own i-concept from (1) principal "interpretationstheoretische Erwägung", and (2) historical considerations of style. He attains his ideal of "in Harmonie ruhen" in order to achieve a quality of immediate expression (e.g. a character of warmth) within the frame of a tonality. This, in fact, is also a general concept of Isaac Stern (ch. IV:4), though one has to consider the fact that the violin is not normally classified as a "harmonic" instrument. This concrete realism of Rostal and Lorkovic, as opposed to 'idealism', might have a cognitive scheme like (e→g) → i or [(e→g)(g→e)](e→i). It should be observed that the merits of concrete realism, in contrast to idealism, are (1) that it maximizes the extent to which the concrete sound shape becomes a carrier of the expressive and emotional content/quality of the music – the ideas are concretized and manifested in sound prior to the listener's assimilation and as a directive for the auditor's interpretation –

and (2) that it may **facilitate** the recursive conclusion mentioned above.

The unreflected '*lesenspielen*' is the basis for this ideal, and Rostal adopts a 'primary execution' in view of his concrete realism (which has a touch of "*neue Sachlichkeit*"). After establishing a point of reference, Lorkovic departs from the gestalt of the gestalting level (MIR I:47) and aims at "das Greifen von grösseren Zusammenhängen" on the higher i-level: [(g→e)(g→i)](i→e). It is a primary gestalting that involves both "*Gestaltungsrealism*" and "*Gestaltungsideal*". The tempo is adapted proportionally to the presumed knowledge of the listeners in order to allow them to follow the connections ("die Zusammenhänge vollziehen"). The complex interconnection between the levels of i-idealism, **gestalting realism** (& ideal) and **executorial realism**, demonstrates that "die innewohnende Zwiespältigkeit" has been grasped.

Lorkovic describes Rostal's concept as a series of sequential stages encompassed by "a personal realm of interpretation". This means that in the sequence e→g→i there are interpretational inputs on both the point of g and on the connection between g→i. On the basis of the fact that Rostal used and recommended reading without playing, Lorkovic argues that Rostal favored g→e in addition to a simple executorial e→g.

In contrast, Lorkovic favors a model of total and "perpetual" interaction comprising bidirectional relations (i↔g and g↔e). In addition, he conceives of an exchange between spiritual notions and g-factors, a direct relation i→e and an "informational" input on the e-level and feedback from the g-level. Note that g influences both i and e (g→e & g→i). In essence, this concept is based on a few fundamental postulates: "es gibt keine künstlerische Objektivität ausser der menschlichen Interaktion", which is reminiscent of phenomenologic intersubjectivity. "Truth is valid in meeting", says Lorkovic. Furthermore he contends that human consciousness is 'intuition' and that intuition is not inferior to intellect. In the end the **interactionism** of this concept is **holistic**.

Throughout this thesis I will maintain the possibility of distinguishing between, if not in all borderline cases of each of the nine act-modes, then at least four basic patterns (kinds) of general interpretation:

(1) **phenomenologic i**: model pattern interpretation → interpretation, or basically, extopretation. The "introjective", work-oriented phase is restricted to what is needed for identifying, reading, hearing-out and recognizing

phenomenally existing or implied structures.

(2) **hermeneutici**: model pattern into pretation → exto pretation, or basically, into pretation. A means for decoding, understanding, and "explaining" the work is needed and introjected, though not indicated in the notation or in the work's context.

(3) **impressionistici**: basically, exto pretation, coupled with an introjective phase such as in normal inpretation. This entails a primarily passive arousing, effecting, an ungoverned release of responsive capacities that incite certain 'moods', integrated and modified emotional patterns, and a free assimilation, such as a specific mode and act of consciousness.

(4) **expressionistici**: basically, into pretation, coupled with an 'extrojective' phase such as in normal expretation. This entails primarily an active reaction, a free emission, such as an act of consciousness.

Of course these four basic modes can be combined. What is especially interesting is the (1→2) phenomenologic–hermeneutic interpretation which is justifiable in that order, though less so inversely (as in a 2→1 hermeneutic–phenomenologici). Naturally the (3→4) complex impressionistic–expressionistic i can be occasionally justified under circumstantial conditions including an obvious indeterminacy in the emotional properties/characters of the work, whereas the (4→3) complex (expressionistic–impressionistic combined) mode primarily exploits the work for the purpose of personal expressive needs of the subjective kind. Expressionistic i can be regarded as a reinforcement of the tendency in hermeneutic modes, whereas this relation holds also between phenomenologic and impressionistic interpretative modes only as far as the main directionality of the act is concerned, since the impressionistic mode adds a subjective moment that is alien to the phenomenologic mode. Of course, other combinations forming triple and quadruple complexes are not *a priori* excluded. In practice, there often seem to be an interwoven exchange and mixture between the modes, and the suitability for various modes is assumed to be related to characteristics of style, genre and repertoire.

Although I acknowledge the importance of a notational work structure (ws) and a work analysis (wa) for the mip, I put forward my theory in contrast to its purported general validity: the formalistic theories of form (structure) and performance (Stein, Cone, Epstein, Berry), arrive at **normative** sets of requirements for preferred rendering of auditive structure, forming a particular **formalistic performance style**; more than the intemporality and rigidity of the notational model as object and point of reference for i speak against formalism

(ch. II:5). And I question its claim to establish a theory of performance that disregards the interpretative moments on the ground that this view excludes the closer look at the intentional acts necessarily already involved in the "purest" (most neutral) reading of the score. I argue that **structural interpretation** is important but not sufficient, and that mere "structural performance" is even more restricted and cannot be the sole basis for the encompassing view of a theory of mip.

In a phase of corroboration of the theory (T_0) there are two main ways to proceed: through (1) negation of T_0 and demonstration of three kinds of impossible consequences – (1:1) logical contradiction, (1:2) fragmentization into incoherent parts of T_1, T_2, T_3 , etc and (1:3) the restriction of the explanatory extension into too narrow a system which (a) cannot entail the manifoldness of possible logical patterns of implication–realization, and (b) becomes contradicted by major successful artistic concepts of interpretation; and (2) demonstration through the hypothetic–deductive method that the proposed law $T_0 \rightarrow p_0$ is supported by the outcome of observed cases. Where T_0 is fulfilled by T_1 the expected p_1 occurs; the theory $T_0 \rightarrow p$ is not conclusively proved by this procedure, but it is **not yet disconfirmed** – i.e. it remains a practically valid proposal until further evidence refutes it, as long as it is not corroborated by further support through confirmation of expected results $p_1, p_2, p_3 \dots p_n$ appearing in cases of overriding interpretational concepts or personal aesthetic/artistic/scientific theories through cases of $T_1, T_2, T_3 \dots T_n$.

The problem with the procedure of negating the systematic T_0 theory is not one of logical contradiction, incoherence of theoretical fragmentization or recalcitrant empirical evidence, but a more fundamental one. Given the established **basic relation, w–i**, the purpose of my conceptualization is to see this as an **implication–realization model** applied to w and i respectively, which is **based on this relation** – i.e. the w–i relation is a necessary condition for this **relational model of interpretation**. But then the negation of the relation excludes such an interpretation ($\sim E(w-i)$ which is incompatible in relation to i). Other kinds of interpretational possibilities might remain, such as a recomposition or arrangement for other instruments by the same composer, but this can be disregarded as a peripheral consideration for the moment.


Interpretation obviously entails the **assimilation** of w, c, w(c) or c(w).

Performance entails **emission** of either of them. Whether interpretation also entails emission, such as theoretical or conceptual emission (provided the interior audialization – cf. visualization, "*Vergegenwärtigung*" – can be heard – regarded/seen/viewed – as emissive) is a delicate question: I submit that the interpretative act must logically consist of three phases: (1) **assimilation**, (2) **processing** ("*Verarbeitung*", "bearbetning") and (3) the sending of an **emittive** impulse that allows the *i* to be **manifested** in some form, whether conceptual or performative (i.e. including actions).

Basically there are two main kinds of interpretation analysis (ia), the bipartite versus tripartite **ia**s:

	<i>tripartite ia</i>	<i>bipartite ia</i>
formulas:	$\begin{array}{c} i_1 - i_2 \\ \backslash \ / \\ n \end{array}$	$i_1 - i_2$
criteria:	correspondence (i-n relations) coherence (i-i relation)	coherence (i-i relation)

The focus of musical interpretation research (*mutatis mutandis* in interpretation science) are thus the intentional contents of interpretative acts illustrated in the following scheme:



The six interpretative acts (n_{c1} , n_{c2} ; i_1p_1 , i_2p_2 ; p_1l_1 and p_2l_2) are studied independently, whereas it is "normally" the case that $I_1=P_1$ and $I_2=P_2$. However, when for example Furtwängler refers explicitly to the writings of Schenker concerning Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* (FME:1, ch. IV:2:2), the question arises as to whether Furtwängler or Schenker was the "original" interpreter, or whether this honor has to be shared between one theoretical interpreter I_T (Schenker) and one practical "performer" I_p (Furtwängler). Careful scrutiny might settle the issue.

Since the conductor, in this model case taken *pars pro toto* as fully responsible and exactly controlling the utmost detail of the outcome of the **musicians'** performance, relies on a whole set of more or less impressionable musicians, with accordingly strong orchestral traditions, the relational scheme suggested becomes oversimplified for practical reasons. A full-scale model should also recognize other worlds, those of the composer and of the musicians, and on a secondary level the fact that all the participants in these worlds bring their personal worlds of relations into the scope of things should not be overlooked.

The limitation, and mistake, of music performance research (ch. III:4) lies in its inability to recognize this complexity of relations. It studies mainly nc as input varied according to suggested rules, and a corresponding computer-generated p as output, or at most p_1 and p_2 as two different outputs (or $n_p p_1$ and $n_p p_2$), without accounting for what kinds of criteria could be at stake in the comparison of the two outcomes or to what they should be related as point of reference; or what the presupposed original model is. Is it notational, structural (notated or interpreted?) or possibly something else? The problems with music performance research are (1) the assumption of causality, which conflicts with the evidence of diverging results (the "effects": p_1 and p_2) emerging from one identical point of departure (the sole "cause": n_c); and (2) the underlying notion of uninterpreted objective facts of notation; such objectivity is possible only if the fact is independent of the musical mind, which is of course the case with a computerized synthesis. But the contention that production is independent, incompatible with creativity, is invalid for the paradigm model of human performance. Only inclusion of intentional content seems to make aesthetic consideration possible and fruitful for artistic choice.

The fundamental thesis that I have advanced is that all the aesthetic criteria of mip are constituted by (and dependent on) the **relations** between various entities.

One postulate for the relational system on the metalevel that I propose as a conceptual framework for interpretation analysis (ia) is that of the relative determination inherent in the ontological status of the notions of w , n and c . These notions are related by **the sequence of decreasing indeterminacy: $w > c > n$** . This means that even if the exact extension of the determinations of the individual work cannot be defined for one and all, and must be determined for each interpretative occasion, it is nonetheless possible to establish the following relation:

(1) the work, including the extramusical and cultural context that it has attained during its history of reception (*Wirkungsgeschichte*), has broader implications from which the interpreter can select the preferred versions, whereas

(2) the composition remains a notion involving the basic structural pattern that can be synthesized by an experienced over-view that immediately recognizes the basic constituents, unities and gestalten.

Furthermore, the pure notation can be regarded as a signifying and signaling code system, not even entailing decisive compositional structures above the level of neutral reading-outs; the n would thus represent the pole of the most limited determinations. Note that a higher degree of ontological determination in the original model (the object of i ; "förlagan") can be meta-interpreted in two ways: the richer set of determinations can be seen as either (1) a necessary condition for the preservation of the w (c , n) identity (the ontological properties are necessary conditions constituting a set of **unified criteria** – fusion of criteria – for their realization in performance) or (2) a reservoir of implications constituting a set of ontological possibilities, not imperatives, from which the interpreter is allowed to select his own preferred set of criteria that he intends to realize, and whereby he conceives of having realized the necessary conditions for the w (c , n) identity. Naturally, the question of who is going to decide whether the interpreter "really" has achieved his intended goal, that of securing the ontological identity of his object of i , remains crucial; the opinion of the performer himself on this issue may be idiosyncratic and rightfully not shared by his critics. Or the interpreter may either

(1) due to his extreme talent see a coherence in the fused criteria which remains hidden to all his lesser talented critics and thereby hold a supported

interpretative view securing more of the ontological identity of the artwork than the critics can ever imagine; his *i* may then appear unrevealed and "idiosyncratic" to self-appointed 'experts' (obviously such a case occurred when Carl-Gunnar Åhlén rejected the bases of Celibidache's performance aesthetics *in toto* as sectarianism, SvD 16.7.85); or, conversely, the interpreter may (2) fail to recognize the most obvious and compelling ontological criteria – maybe he still sees something else in it – thereby destroying the identity of the *w* (*c*, *n*) in the performance and the accessible appearance to the auditors.


FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE FOUR-PART SYSTEM (MIRI:20, MIP:29–31)

Introductory remark

In the four-part schemes below, one should distinguish **position** (*w*, *i*, *wa*, *ia*) from **fulfillment of the individual case** (say w_1, i_2, wa_1, ia_2). Further analysis ("a" in *wa*, *ia*) can, conditionally, be substituted by *i* (*wi*, i^2). The crucial difference between **analysis** and **interpretation** – the latter occasionally including analysis (i.e. analytic moments, procedures, results) – is that interpretation requires **synthesis** for a coherent view, comprising an uninterrupted, continuous **coherence** of (1) "intent" (meaning), and (2) "content" – i.e. a sequence (succession, development, metamorphosis), namely the so-called "unity" of positions and facts, encompassing the fulfillment of coherent structural relations.

It is important to have a method that can identify the inconsistencies of the interpretive systems that we investigate. Such inconsistencies occur on different levels:

(1) on the **theoretical** ("systematic") level e.g. when a performer states that there are several acceptable *i*:s but only one acceptable *ia*, which is contradictory since each *i* must have its *ia*.



- one-to-one relation
- < one-to-many relation
proliferation, divergency
- > many-to-one relation
convergency

"theoretical inconsistency" versus "theoretical consistency"


Basically, however, the counterargument must be considered. Why must a $w-i$ relation, which is a one-to-many relation, entail a similar one-to-many relation in the subsequent $i-ia$ relation? The fact that this entailing seems evidently consistent does not mean that its opposite, the alleged inconsistency of $w-a$ /one-to-many & $i-ia$ /one-to-one, is (musico-)logically **incompatible**. And what does it mean if such a case can or cannot be shown to exist in the world? There is also an important distinction between the two model cases of the first figure above, either meaning (1) that each of resultant many i :s from the $w-i$ /one-to-many relation has its respective ia , or (2) that the unfortunate case of a severely deficient ia , or weak analytical skill on the part of a critic, has occurred; the i :s thus remain indistinguishable, i.e. they converge on one ia forming an adverse many-to-one relation.

(2) Is it consistent to maintain that there can be only one wa while there are several (equally) acceptable i :s? This system looks somewhat odd but is **not** inconsistent on the fulfillment of certain additional conditions: (1) The sole wa must ramify into the various i :s:



And since 'several i :s' is inconsistent with 'one ia ', according to point (1), the i :s must be represented by at least as many ia :s as there are i :s. There are evidently two possibilities that are consistent here: either (a) that each i has its ia , and there are several i :s and ia :s, or (b) that each i ramifies into several ia :s. This is a case of **i -ambiguity**. Here the question of the relation $wa-ia$ becomes crucial. If there is a multitude (as in the case of two ramifications in sequence) of acceptable ia :s, then it seems unlikely that there should be only one wa . But, if stated, this would **not** be inconsistent. However, this view can be maintained coherently only through **denying the relation of $wa-ia$** ; then, if there were a unidirectional relation ($wa \rightarrow ia$), the sole wa would be able to sort out its corresponding ia for acceptance from the set of many competing ia :s. However, the bidirectional relation $wa \leftrightarrow ia$ is excluded (together with $wa \leftarrow ia$) in this model, since there is no alternative to the sole wa that can be selected from the position ia , and it is even more uncertain from which of the many individual ia :s such a selection could depart were there any wa :s to select from.


However, the assumption that there is no relation between *wa* and *ia* seems odd. It may be that the assumption is not contradictory, but merely an exceptional case. Fundamentally, the relation *wa-ia* is **doubly indirect**, since it takes two steps to reach *w* and *i*; we must go exactly three steps to reach a point of identity, either in *w* or in *i*. If the point of identity is to be reached in (1) *ia* itself, or in (2) *wa* itself, then (1) *wa* must be derivable back to *w* from *i* and *i* from *ia* clockwise, or (2) *ia* must be derivable back to *i*, back to its *w* and *w* from *wa*, respectively. It should be noted that these two derivations contain one and two counterproductive steps respectively; namely (1) *wa* to *w*, and (2) *ia* to *i* and *i* to *w*. Evidently, to complete the system, by naming all members of the family, there are **four identities**, *w*, *i*, *wa* and *ia*, and (by neutral direction) one direct one-to-one-parts relation (*w-i*), the two one-to-two (two-to-two) direct relations *w-wa* and *i-ia*, the two one-to-two (two-to-one) indirect relations *wa-i* and *w-ia*, and finally the already mentioned double-indirect relation *wa-ia*.

I submit the postulate that  is the most general,

consistent and useful model for interpretation theory and analysis; it is a good point of departure for individual descriptions that can be made by slight modifications of the model. It is the main device of the analyst, since individual aesthetic positions can be determined by restricting this scheme at selected points. It is an antidogmatic system in that it does not *a priori* exclude any possibilities, except the very odd notion of "many works", as well as primitive total unrelatedness, which is not of interest to us. It presupposes the existence of one *w* with an analyzable versus an interpretable identity.

As the particle physicist Astri Kleppe has remarked (p.c. 22.5.93), the theory I advance is a **parametrization** of the area of intentional relations in interpretive acts.


It should be noted in preparation for the following investigations (in particular ch. V:4) that, in principle (i.e. from a theoretical perspective), it is **not inconsistent to claim full identity and transparency** concurrently in the same system. Insofar as *wi* is identical to *iw* (*wi-iw*-reversibility), *w(i)* is identical to *i(w)*, and *p(i)* identical to *i(p)*, which I have not proposed in my system. Such a scheme would be a **total singularism**:



In this case, when wa and ia are parantheticized (the application of the term *epoché* in this context can be considered), suggested by the "*musikalische Phänomenlogie*" of Sergiu Celibidache, there would remain **no interpreter's intentional wa oria**, due to an **intentional transparency and identity** (TRANSP_{int} & ID_{int}). Still, it is possible that listeners' wa and ia (i.e. wa₁ and ia₁) remain. This, however, does not refute the claim of TRANSP&ID(w-i), but the deviating listener's experience would have to be rejected on the grounds of an **ignorance to w**. In view of this, the often misunderstood notion of "*Ignoranz*" (Celibidache refers either to P or L) is perfectly reasonable. The achieved identity would not allow deviations, but this is a consequence of performance ontology, and **not** a genius' condemnation of lesser talented listeners. It is a fact, though, that the capacity of auditors to follow a complex w-structure varies, but this is a psychological, pedagogical and sociological problem, outside our actual focus.


The sequential **elisions** described in MIR I:98–108 were basically **processual**, while the 'disappearance' of wa and ia, and finally also i, is **ontologic** in this system, due to the TRANSP&ID(w-i). This artistic claim ("*Zusammenschmelzung*") is evidently extremely demanding, but would, if realizable, lead to **extraordinary and exceptional results** (ch. V:4). Therefore, in view of the apriorical possibility of attaining higher levels of quality in mip, it merits consideration. For this theoretical consideration I acknowledge the importance of Celibidache's non-interpretational thesis (ch. V:4) and its basis in his conductorial practice.

We have still to consider some implicit but fundamental aspects of the relational four-part scheme, which states basic ontologic relations that are primordially and directionally neutral. But if the aspect of origin-process-result (outcome) is considered under the aspect of the two directions clockwise and counterclockwise, the scheme of information flow can be elaborated as follows:




basic 4-part scheme origin-ramificative outcomes


The figure shows 2 cycles: (1) the **clockwise direction**: **i precedes ia** entails a productive direction from the listener's perspective ($i \rightarrow ia$); **wa precedes w** entails a counterproductive direction or an analytic perspective adopted by the first-time auditor's; in contrast, ($wa \rightarrow w$) may be productive from the researcher's perspective. The performer enjoys a productive perspective ($w \rightarrow i$):



Cf. the counterproductive directions of analytic access to w and i through wa and ia:




(2) The **counterclockwise direction** is productive from the perspective of the researcher ($w \rightarrow wa$), while it is analytic from the listener's perspective ($ia \rightarrow i \rightarrow w$), and counterproductive from the performer's point of view:




The phenomenology of **directions** can be elaborated as follows (numerals refer to arrows in the scheme):

DIRECTIONS (Ph(DIR))

- 1 natural
- 2 natural generative
- 3 generative
- 4 imitative
- 5 productive
- 6 counterproductive
- 7 clockwise
- 8 counterclockwise



No. 1 through 6 characterize the **qualities of the directions**. The researcher (R) can engage in a wa→ia production, as in a **generative ia** of the kind carried through in MIR II:238–361, while the **processual interpretation analysis** (w→i, i→ia and w→i→ia) focuses on the alternatives and variants during the rehearsal process, as in MIR II:362–391, as well as in the **analytic generative** procedure displayed and suggested in MIR II:392–411. In view of the question on the critic's role as an mip-analyst, it might be fruitful to consider of what points in our scheme the critic may appear in the role of an interpreter (I):



Obviously, the critic's role may occasionally be to

(1) interpret (I₁) and explain the composer's work in the contemporary context for the performer in view of the performer's performance. Even if it is generally possible to influence the cultural climate, critics seldom go into profound and particular detailed analyses of the kind that can serve either as indications for performance features or as general advice to the performer. This possibility, though, should not be underestimated, since a few qualified, highly recognized and influential critics in fact have acted 'correctly' in performance aesthetics. This is of course the case in Adorno's writing; but on the other hand Adorno was much more than a critic.

(2) The critics role as an interpreter (I₂) of particular performances or

performance traditions that are unusual and require introduction to be understood by the audience, may occasionally be important. But it is not normally conceived of as being the most specifically defined role of the critic. Reviews, though, do in fact often contain substantial comments on the artistic achievement of the performers, so this is surely a substantial component in the critic's metainterpretation that cannot be disregarded. But i-criticism can be justified as education for **presumptive** listeners – i.e., in fact, by preparing readers for listening more sensitively.

(3) Less important, and more of an exceptional speciality, is the role of the critic that explains and interprets (I_3) the researchers' work analyses (wa:s) to and for his audience.

(4) And the critic who interprets (I_4) the composer's work for the researcher is, if not a *contradictio in adjecto*, then at least a rarity, since this act would require a seldomly seen or heard level of competence and education on the part of the critic, who would then in all likelihood be taken quite seriously.

(5) The normal model case of the critic's role, and, I submit, the most substantial component in the critic's role, is his ambition to interpret (I_5) and explain the composer's work in its context for the audience; and the critic is supposed to explain the work in the actual contemporary context to the reading audience by notifying modifications in the process of actualization and adaption to current circumstances.

Finally, the reader is introduced to the formal language of interpretation analysis (suggested in ch. VII:2) by pointing to some important background considerations.

It is obvious that the musical work is a contextual entity, W_{cx} , since it is determined by gradually acquiring its features from the context where it is produced and performed. Nonetheless, it can be **represented** in different forms; its contextual constituents can be brought to life by different forms of appearance (modes of representation): the w_n notational, w_{ac} acoustic, w_{au} auditive, w_{exp} experiential, w_{ph} phenomenal.

The performer (P) stands in a **productive** relation to his product, the performance (p). In indicating a productive causal connection I refrain from the relational sign (–) and notate: Pp. Similarly, the listener produces his image of the music which involves the integration of the various aspects of w,c and p (if he knows the notation, even n): Ll. But the composer does **not** in this sense solely give rise to his work (w); he conceives his composition (c), which is Cc but not

Cw, since the w is gradually produced by its contextual participants. Furthermore a performer may envisage a performance, after having assimilated or produced an interpretative image of the work, with or without being capable of a full realization: a p_{int} is his intended performance, whether realized or not. Moreover, he may hold recollections of earlier hearings of the work in question as performed by himself or other performers, or he may relate, during practice or a concert, to earlier parts of his actualized performance, regardless of the extent to which his original interpretative view was realized. He may then have protentions and retentions of p: p_{prot} versus p_{ret} . These may, of course be real of intentional (p_{int}), while he and his auditors have p_{exp} .

The nine basic interpretive acts applied to a performance may look unfamiliar at first glance: an extpretative act displaying its result in a performance is simply represented as p_{ex} . In consequence then, the other abbreviations include p_{exto} (in the case of extopretation), p_{extro} (etc.); p_{in} , p_{into} , p_{intro} , p_{intra} , p_{extra} , p_{inter} .

In the preface I mentioned the aesthetic aspects of i as forms (and criteria) for mir: namely **which** aesthetic aspects and how they appear in (1) the interpretive act or interpretative consideration (reflexion), i_{AESTH} , and in (2) the performance, p_{AESTH} , respectively. Although the purely artistic (i_{ART} , p_{ART}) aspects involving the virtuosic, gestic and mimic motions, and the dramatic display are not excluded, they attract our attention mainly insofar as their relations to the aesthetic aspects of the work indicate an important quality, and their integration of features of a particular mip – p_{AESTH}/p_{ART} – is an interesting and complex relation. Normally p_{AESTH} is supposed to dominate p_{ART} for quality reasons; a dominating p_{AESTH} allows careful consideration of the w-ontology and the w-realization; hence it usually represents a **higher quality of mip** than the dominating p_{ART} . But this picture is complicated by (1) the positive independent value of p_{ART} per se, and not in reference to w, and by (2) the possibility of a p_{AESTH} - p_{ART} -congruency. In contrast, the value of p_{AESTH} is supposed to be dependent, primarily on w, and secondly on other constituents (i, wa, ia).

It is important to notice the difference between the performer's interpretation (i_p), a performative interpretation (i_p), an interpreter's performance (p_i), and the interpretive performance p_i . The indices indicate what "pertains to", or "belongs to" a personal participant, an act of consciousness or its result. Furthermore, a nuanced analysis requires a subtle distinction between an interpretation of a performance $i(p)$, and an interpretation performance ip , and between a performance of an interpretation $p(i)$ and a performance

interpretation p_i .

Obviously, strictly speaking, only p_i and p_i are music performances in the conventional sense – say – of, for instance, a live playing at a concert – normally $p(i)$ and ip also refer to this conventional sense. But a caveat on this point is necessary. Strictly, an ip and $p(i)$ may occasionally and **exceptionally** refer to the performance of an interpretation other than through a musical medium – in, e.g., a detailed and transilluminating lecture on a particular performance interpretation of Furtwängler to an interested audience. The ip and $p(i)$ therefore do not specify or restrict the performance medium to music and its rendering through live action. It should be noted that a music broadcast on the radio, or a rendering through a cassette recorder or CD player, is **not a performance per se** even if the performance may simultaneously occur somewhere else, in another room that is physically distant. A performance occurs only where and when the real playing that produces the sounds goes on. Technical reproductions made afterwards, however, still display the interpretations of their original performances; thus it is essential that they have different ontological statuses.


It is uncomfortable, however, to use the English language in the extremely stringent and rigid mode that would be required by these formal differences. For practical reasons, then, when a specific reference to the exact phenomenological denotations is needed, I will use the formulas given as abbreviations. In the normal situation, when there is no reason to understand our analysis otherwise, ip and $p(i)$ may well be used without the added 'nota bene', which normally indicates the conventional music performance situation.

Finally, it may be fruitful to integrate schematically the discussion advanced earlier on the theory of actualization:

actualizing	p:	nunc	hic	experientiability
interpretation	i:	↑actualizing	↑	actualization
	w:	tunc	ibi	referentiability
				(reference to source)
historical	p:	nunc	hic	experientiability
interpretation	i:	↓historializing	↓	historialization
	w:	tunc	ibi	referentiability

Please observe the **disintegration** between the level of **nunc et hic** and the level of **tunc et ibi** in the case of pure historical **i**, in which we aim to completely reconstruct authentic facts and contextual situations. Therefore, it may be postulated that a complete realization of such an ideal of **historical reconstructivism** is not possible.

The age-old Aristotelian notions of **potentiality** and **actuality** attain their importance in the following scheme of realization in reference to earlier investigations (Sundin 1988:20). It is fruitful to envisage the realizational process from potentiality to actuality as having two optional courses of intermediary functionality, via (1) the intentionality of the consciousness entailing its interpretive acts (**i**), and/or (2) the causality of these acts, entailing its performative acts (**p**). Note that in $w a_n$ ($w i_n$), the index n could legitimately be understood as (1) notational, and (2) numerical, both indicating the plenitude of options at hand.



The above figure demonstrates basic general **courses of realization** from potentiality to actuality via (1) interpretive acts of intentionality, and (2) performative actions of causality; furthermore, the following selected **relations** can be seen as steps towards realization: (1) the $w \rightarrow wa$ ($w i$) is a realization of w in the form of more specified wa s: ($w i$ s), a **to-complex** but direct relation; (2) the direct $w \rightarrow i$; (3) the direct $w \rightarrow p$; (4) the $wa \rightarrow i$ as an analytically 'grounded' interpretation, a **from-complex** (possibly direct) relation; (5) the $wa \rightarrow p$, which may be called for in cases where the w s (extreme) virtuosic demands require

analysis in order to be mastered in p ; (6) the $i \rightarrow ia$ specifying the i towards a more definite version in preparation of p ; (7) the $p \rightarrow pa$, possibly specifying the practical conditions for the performative implementation. In addition – and contrast – (8) the union of ia and pa into $ia \& pa$ is a specification and fusion of the aesthetic and practical conditions for p , and similarly (9) $ia \& pa$ via a supercomplex merging process of actualization to $p(i)$, more precisely $p(i(w))$ determines the limits of the outcome $p(i)$. Finally, (10) $wa \rightarrow ia$, a double complex and most likely indirect relation, similar to (11) $wa \rightarrow pa$, would be necessary to consider when preparing a first performance of a technically complicated modern instrumental work.

I:3 THE PROBLEM WITH AND A JUSTIFICATION OF A PERTINENT SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY: NOTES ON THE RELEVANCE OF FEYERABEND'S THEORY OF PROLIFERATION AND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY FOR MUSICAL INTERPRETATION RESEARCH AND FOR A META-AESTHETIC THEORY OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: INTRODUCTORY NOTES TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR INTERPRETATION SCIENCE

Interpretation science, including musical interpretation research, bases itself primarily on the study of **experiential phenomena** (ph_{exp}), whether intended or not, as do the humanities, and the social and economic sciences, including e.g. the law. The intellectual treatment of such ph_{exp} requires a set of interconnected notions and a correlating system of 'linguistic concepts'. This does by no means exclude the eventuality that certain central functions, especially common cognitive limitations, may be based in the constitution of human neurobiology. Moreover, it is possible to ask **what**, as opposed to **how**, experiential phenomena are (or can be) related to neural processes. But the experiential world retains priority, due to the very richness of its phenomena, over its physiological correlates, whether these are causal or not. Other reasons for this priority are (1) that cultural and social phenomena in all their complexity depend on intricate connections and relations to basic experiential phenomena, according to the postulate that traditional ways of thinking, social agreements and styles within the arts, including performance practice and interpretation aesthetics, are not randomly constituted, but function as **organizing** entities in perceptible and

apprehensible structures in order both to enrich and to differentiate the human experiential world; and (2) that the risk of neural science's curtailing of the experiential world through its categorial divisions of phenomena into those phenomena with and without causal ground, and into those with real/unreal dichotomies, must be avoided. Obviously an interpretation science conscientiously carried through will not nullify any results from brain research; this assumption justifies our approach.

In this chapter I will hint at fundamental similarities and differences between the 'logic' and the '**phenomeno–logic**' of music. Logic is reductive in that it reduces a tautology to its most concentrated form(ulas). It aims at its essential kernel: if 'p→q' is stated, a deduction such as '~q→~p', is a redundant duplication that should be avoided, since the latter does not say more than the former. In contrast, the logical development of music as a progressing temporal 'form' of soundflow follows a 'logic of ph_{exp}'; a theme ('sujet', motif) is explicated, and repetitiously modified. This redundancy is necessary in music since the musical object (auditive sound) **disappears** due to a property inherent in its form of existence (i.e. unfolding temporal progress). Whereas logic relations exist independent of spatial dimensions, (1) the physical–acoustic correlate of music requires transmission of pressure vibrations (through the medium of air) through a process of spatial extension; (2) music p requires physical motion to evoke instrumental or vocal sound; (3) musical pitch, rhythm, and sound qualities (including sonority) evoke an imaginative space which, I submit, includes and constitutes the imaginative experience of spatial tone–locale. This localization is not associatively arbitrary. Moreover, how the conductors' beat-gestics relate to the 'phenomeno–logic' of the music is not 'subjective': e.g. the melody starts at a definite point (distinctly perceived), deviates (if it does not remain on the same pitch level) in or from 'me' in two possible directions, falling or rising. If rising, it reaches its summit (highpoint), which becomes the turning point only in retrospective hearing; it most frequently returns by taking an opposite direction, falling back to its original level. If this is possible, music must have direction, motion, flow, and **extension** in time as well as in 'space' (sc. ph_{exp}–spatiality). If another highpoint is reached in the next phrase, it must be possible to **relate** and distinguish (1) the distance (extension) from the original level, and (2) the two 'zeniths' of the emerging melody.

To my question "inwieweit eine Interpretationstheorie allgemeingültig sein könnte, was zutreffen würde wenn sie (1) auf irgendeinige 'human universals' baut, und (2) nicht an der einzelnen Wissenschaften gebunden ist, d.h. wohl eher 'subjekt' als objektorientiert wäre", Paul K. Feyerabend replies to my letter: "I do not believe in 'human universals' – I do not even believe in physical universals and I think that whatever poses as such is either very restricted (for example, not valid for Terrian peasants) or empty." (27.1.93) Nonetheless, my next question remains open: "Somit spielt für die Interpretationstheorie, soweit ich es richtig verstanden habe, der erkenntnistheoretischer Status von Husserls Phänomenologie, insbesondere die Intersubjektivität, eine entscheidende Rolle. Sind Sie mit dieser Auffassung einverstanden?" An interpretation theory would be a framework theory, capturing interpretive paradigms and positions, not a microtheory²¹. According to the 'identification-hypothesis' (166–167, point 9) the question, in Feyerabend's view, concerns the epistemological status of **introspection**: "introspection leads to a *direct observation* of an otherwise quite inaccessible and very complex process *in the brain*". Furthermore, Feyerabend argues about thoughts, sensations, feelings: "the distinctions between what they are and what they appear to be does not apply." We are directly acquainted with at least our mental phenomena, if not, as Feyerabend claims, with our mental processes. There is no need to unveil such phenomena by experimental research, since they are **accessible and open to direct inspection**; whereas their physiological correlates, the consciousness–neural processes can be experimentally investigated (PET, MRT, MEG, EEG, ERP, CBF distribution and volume, and other measurements).

Essence and appearance coincide in the musical phenomena we experience, and "we are therefore entitled to take what they seem to be as a direct indication of what they are" (167). There is no logical possibility of denying an introspective statement, which is accessible only to one individual (168). This also limits access to the introspected fact.

This problem has received attention by phenomenologic thinkers and is relevant to interpretation science. My line of argument is this: first, the sole purported possibility of strengthening the epistemological status of introspective statements would lie in the corroboration of their generality. Since they are by definition individual, such a proof is impossible. They are introspective **because** they are individual. The only remaining way to move in the direction of a desired solution to this problem is to state a hypothetical condition under which two experiences of the 'same' external object (say a musical motif) could be

studied, as introspected by two different individuals whose different ph_{exp}'s' would, in comparison, approach (and adjust) their relative positions within the limits permitted by a theory of congruence. The general condition for such a comparison can be in this way: (1) the object must be the same for both individuals. However, since objects are contextual in the sense that their properties are related to other objects' properties, and their properties are interrelated to other properties of the same object, the contexts must also be the same – i.e. (2) the time and (3) physical space in which the object occurs (appears) must be identical (whether this is possible or not). Furthermore, the circumstances and perspectives at play during the intentional regarding of the object may not differ – or, as a phenomenologist would say, the **mode of the intentional act** must be the same. Then, however, it can be questioned whether the phenomena studied by Interpretation Science are in fact introspective. Counterarguments are available on this matter. If the 'form' of intentional interest (i.e. both the direction and the intentional object of the interpretive act) is not primordially derived from the subject, but is noematically the object that attains priority in the perceptive encounter, then the consciousness 'engulfs' the object and its content (also its form, phenomenologists would add) is constituted by the consciousness; then subjectivity is reduced to arbitrariness, provided that personal prejudices, idiosyncratic approaches and private perspectives can be overcome. This **objectivistic** standpoint compatible with the phenomenologic view posits a solution to the problem of solipsism and is never transgressed by subjectivistic perceptualism.

According to an idea advanced by Celibidache, the foremost task of the conductor in the concert situation is to unite both musicians and auditors in such a common mode. It would be possible, he argues, to enforce such a mode on all listeners by persuasive enforcement through the effect of a distinct shaping of the musical work in performance: to **coalesce the auditors' perspectives** and modes of approaches to the work, which then would – by circumstantial coincidence – appear to be nearly similar for all listeners in that very moment of **maximized identity**. The conductor attempts to fulfill the situational conditions, thereby attaining an experiential dimension of intersubjective identity. This unifying interpretation would require realization according to strong criteria of coherence and consistency. But the final version arrived at may have been preceded by alternatives that, after due consideration, were rejected for various reasons: e.g. because they did not meet the requirements of intersubjective coincidence. So in the primordial stage of studying the work,

there could be no overridingly active criterion of consistency, since this would have been an obstacle for the testing of other still plausible versions.

On the science philosophy level, Feyerabend rejects the consistency condition which claims that new hypotheses forwarded as innovative theories must agree with established and accepted older theories; it is not the provenience but the independent merits of a theory that are decisive. Contradictory theories "give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way"²²: "Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power". And conformity to the prevailing theories "endangers the free development of the individual" (24). This step does not come far from demanding liberation from prejudiced theories and an interpretation science focusing on various **artistic** ideals and realizations; such an open undogmatic approach would be the only acceptable way of catching the existing variety of creative results within mip; and the anarchistic liberalism of Feyerabend, his attack on the petrification of methodology in basic science, seems to provide a guarantee against anti-innovative conservatism in aesthetic research and artistic production.

Husserlian bracketing **neutralizes** such presuppositions and traditional theories: [T- \rightarrow] – p. The next step would be to reinforce the Husserlian method through **negation** of these theories by substituting contradictory hypotheses which operationally state the contrary and consider the outcome: (\sim T- \rightarrow ?). I would then propose that an application of Feyerabend's thought would allow for still more than this, namely a proliferation of theories (T_1, T_2, T_3, \dots). Obviously the imperative of producing alternative interpretations ($i_1, i_2, i_3, \dots(w)$) for testing is fruitful and innovative in music and in the arts in general.

The relevance of Husserl's phenomenology for musical interpretation research is obvious, and has been asserted by Ferrara, Arcaya, Smith²³ and others. Let me first exemplify this relevance, before vindicating it theoretically. I have stated that **continuity** is a highly ranked criterion for mip: "Continuity is intimately and mutually related to structure, continuity being an absolute condition for structure, and structure often helping to create continuity." (MIP:35) It has been established that for Husserl "discontinuity can be thought of only against the background of continuity, which is time itself"²⁴. Evidently two conditions must be fulfilled in order to create a relation between two following tones: (1) there must be a primordial continuity of time flux in which the two tones can occupy their defined positions; and (2) the human consciousness must be able to partake in this continuous flux, which is principally possible through at least one of the following suggested alternatives: (a) the consciousness

is itself constituted by temporal flux (Husserl); (b) there is a parallel progression between the screening consciousness and the continuously constituting time flux; and (c) there is a structural correspondence between consciousness and time flux.

The performer is involved in restructuring the relations within various parameters between tones in a continuous time flux. Continuity is a necessary condition for the relation occurring as an experience of two tones 'connected' in the same flux of time: if tone t_1 were related only to consciousness (=mind, M) and the following tone t_2 were related in the same way to the same (M) we would have

$$\begin{array}{cc} t_1 & t_2 \\ \backslash & / \\ & M \end{array}$$

i.e. we would end up with two separate relations that could not be projected back to the world of the time flux. It would have been impossible to relate Mt_2 to Mt_1 by means of **expretation** only. The consciousness would have been left on its own, forced to recreate internally a relation between t_2-t_1 by excluding (reducing) M: $Mt_2-Mt_1 \rightarrow (t_2-t_1)M$. The core of Husserl's thought seems to imply that this is not the case, but we are able to participate in the continuous flux of time, which entails that we have direct access to t_1-t_2 through participation in the continuous time flux, provided our consciousness shows a parallel continuity. In contrast, **inpretation** makes things easier by settling the relation between Mt_2-Mt_1 , irrespective of whether such a relation exists there or not. The connection created by the inpretative act emerges from an internal continuity within the interpreter's mind, whereas expretation requires continuity *in re* (to the w).

Musically then, the interpreter can, through a considered decision, facilitate the experience of relatedness through establishing or strengthening the relation between the two tones; he would use the interpretive means of increasing the legato, or the evenness of tone durations in *non-legato (portato)*, or he might smooth the dynamic change over the tone pair, thereby conceding to the aesthetic criterion of **continuity**.

I am restricting my intention to the sole investigation of possible points of departure, specifically for an interpretation science in terms of Husserl's phenomenology as applied to music performance. First, however, it is important to clarify, as pointed out by Horia Bratu and Ileana Marculescu, that "phenomenology goes further than the classical treatment of artistic intention by Beardsley and Wimsatt and its ensuing discussion"²⁵, who wanted to **reduce**

the importance of the author's intention in criticism of works of art. Phenomenology, however, applies **intentionality** as a basic notion, adducing as justification (and evidence) the conscious acts of the mind whereby we come into contact with objects. However, Dagfinn Føllesdal, who hints at the similarity between Frege's trichotomy "name–meaning–reference" and the "act–noema–object" of Husserl, finds that "mutual understandings, and perhaps even fruitful exchange" between phenomenology and analytic philosophy are possible²⁶.

Regarding the question of the interpretive act, I will now refer to a few selected items from Husserl's phenomenology which are essential for the purpose of interpretation science. Despite changing points of view ("subjektive Standpunkt", Huss. X:148), the object remains the same through our recognition of it in our outlook ("*Anschauung*"). This means that certain properties or aspects of the object are unchanged, or change continuously without instigating (provoking) conceptual change. The new material coming into existence in the auditor's consciousness through the flow of time can be classified as "now" only on the condition of **constancy** – where does this connecting constancy, which secures the tie between the **now of now** and the **now of then**, occur? It may be (1) a constancy of the object based on its documented properties (for instance, the prevailing tonality of a piece), (2) a constancy of its background factors (as experiential features of p(i)) or (3) of the experiencing mind. To orthodox phenomenology it is the 'absolute' time flow which essentially contributes to the constitution of consciousness, that provides the fundamental continuity of experience needed for experiential relation to occur (e.g. between the tones of a melody).

We experience continuity in time progression as identity, insofar as time is filled by an enduring object; something is continually identical whether the object presently appears in the now or has just receded into the past ("*kontinuierlicher Identitätsinhalt*", Huss. X:154).

So in the view of Husserl (X:8) the object endures while the phenomenon changes: "im Gegenstand Dauer, im Phänomen Wechsel". Such notions as experiential quality and intensity have their immanent durations (duration is inherent in the act of experiencing). A duration of experience and an experience of duration, however, are two different things, and a succession of experiences is not an experience of succession (ib. lines 12–14). Husserl rejects every attempt to reduce the conception of duration (succession) to the duration (succession) of mere psychic acts. If the notion of succession disappeared with causal stimuli, it would be split into merely a series of impressions ("eine Sukzession von

Empfindungen"); consequently, we would not be able to form an experience out of a time succession, for instance out of a sequence of tones. The crucial issue is that of the constitution of succession. The heard tone does not remain; if it did we would hear a sum of tones, resulting in harsh dissonance. Also the notion of **motion** ("Bewegung", ib. X:13) demands modification to that which refers to experienced objects in space; otherwise the space would be full of objects in every moment of our spatial experience, and there would be no room left for changes with the entrance of new objects. A consequence that I would draw is that **now** can be regarded as an **existential index** to other phenomena:

"Alles, was ist, das wird [...] in Folge davon, dass es ist, *gewesen sein*, und ist in Folge davon, dass es ist, ein zukünftig Gewesenes." (Huss. X:15) If, namely, a perceptive object of some temporal extension (say a melody) **is**, then it has already been, because all its phases must have transpired in order for it to have reached the existing melody. Phenomenologically, a melody comes into existence, through retrospective relation to phases that can no longer be heard, only at the very moment of the extinction of its last phase, which is, paradoxically, identical to the completion of the melody. Therefore, the melody is not its sound, but that which appears through transcending it.

But Husserl must account for the fact that the melody unfolds as long as it is not yet completed, and thus he discusses the perception of the time phases of a melody in the following way: "Die Melodie ist eins, aber sie ist nicht ein in allen Teilauffassungen identisch Erkanntes". So multiple phases of perception fuse into an **experience of unity** analogous to the unity, constituted by the multitude of our perspectives on a physical object in space – and regarding musical objects, I suggest, even **in time**. These perspectives merge into unity by constant confirmation of the identically constituted object. Since every moment on the way to the accomplishment of the melody contains the preceding tones intentionally as "intentionale Abschattungen", it is possible for our consciousness to grasp eventually the entire melody as a unity of experience. It is clear that the Husserlian "*Erfüllung der Intention*" allows for an **identification** of the emerging object (the unfolding melody) that enters into the scope of consciousness (the musical mind, Mm).

The phenomenologic mode of thinking presupposes that interpretive acts are **intentional**. However, I recognize a problem at this point. Does every interpretation really entail intentional acts? This question can be posed in view of a possible **pure existential position**: for instance, if an interpreter maintains that he does not do anything, but the outcome of his performance is only the

result of his existence in the context of his world, including the work to be performed. Therefore, an interpretation theory must account for the possibility of such a position. We should take care not to incorporate the presupposition of intentionality into our formalized relational system (ch. I:2).

However, phenomenological analyses must be considered for the purpose of creating the **theory of intentional relations** required for interpretation analysis and theory.

Husserl's analyses are pertinent to interpretation science in that they provide fundamental considerations for distinguishing the participation of the subject ("*subjektive Anteilnahme*") in the constitution of the object. Hence, his analyses are important for balancing subjectivity as opposed to objectivity in creative interpretation, as well as in criticism aiming at a correct distribution of responsibilities.

The hypostatized concept of science ("Science"), under which theories are classified according to the dichotomy science/nonscience on the ground of its relativistic compliance to the view occasionally held by the "society of scientists" (through ongoing reference to this ever-changing and unidentifiable entity), is a purely arbitrary and sociological notion of science philosophy insufficient for the purpose of interpretation science. It is also false in that, in effect, it conserves the areas of investigation, as well as its results, to what has already been delimited. If sociologically progressive, the result of this view becomes, scientifically, severely conservative in that all innovative research that falls outside the sociological boundaries, is consequently rejected sight-unseen. In the end, we have an authoritarian manipulation of scientific (and artistic) ideas and values by means of a dogmatic and repressive sociological power.

If it is possible that practical life, including human interrelations and interactions, displays regularities that are ruled by psychological constants, scientific invariances and correlations revealed to the ignorant by intelligent reflection or recurrent patterns (uncovered by some psychoanalytic method), then we would be permitted to develop a method of phenomenologic analysis based on the four fundamental directions of intentionality that I posit, in combination with the specific modes of acting presented in the previous chapter (I:2), namely: (1) introspection towards the internal by means of in-pretive acts; (2) 'extrospection' towards the external by means of ex-pretive acts; (3) 'retrospection' or hindsight by means of in-pretive acts; and (4) 'prospection' or foresight by means of ex-pretive acts. Such a model, although ego-centered, may be useful in further attempts to solve the contradiction between psychology

and phenomenology, and should be completed by the corresponding object-centered model. The epistemic level of the ego-centered model is transcended by a phenomenologic reflection which does not expose the arbitrariness (and sensitivity to subjective bias) of psychoanalytic (and psychoexperiential) material. Thus, the system I propose would not exclude, e.g., retrospective ex-acts. Introspective ex-acts would be congruent to a subjective style of interpretation, while extrospective in-acts correspond to an attentive and assimilative mode of understanding (listening) as a condition for a sensitive performance. By adopting a prospective in-act, the interpreter projects his mode of understanding – by means of personal insight and an awareness of the examined objects in the world – as an act of creatively planning the future; this is also the way in which composers, researchers, scientists and creative artists of all kinds make their personal 'imprint' on becoming history.

And if it is true that the arbitrariness of the individual perspective can (under the best conditions) be overcome by phenomenologic reflection, the interpreter who adopts this method would be enabled to attain an interesting and desired quality of experiential generality or 'objectivity' in the sense of an 'experiential concreteness of facticity'.

In defense of the method I have adopted, I will also put forward my argument in the following discussion.

The basic procedure I apply in this thesis is simple. I have conceived a theory T_0 of mip (ch. I:2, FME and MIR I). This T_0 on the metalevel entails as its consequence a specific constitution of its sequel t_0 on the 'basic' level of interpretational cognition (and its particular patterns). Similarly, the theoretically congruent T_1, T_2, T_3, \dots entail their respective t_1, t_2, t_3, \dots (T_0 and t_0 bearing the index 0 refer to the basic pattern of the metatheory and its theoretical consequence, connected by implication \rightarrow , whereas the indices 1, 2, 3 etc refer to the propositions of my theory, i.e. the 'content' of its statements). We will presently in the following chapters, after an introductory analysis of the conditions of incompatibility (ch. II:1), analyze the empirical evidence and see if it instantiates t_0 (t_1, t_2, t_3). We cannot expect to cover every possible outcome with an example, but even if the $T_0 \rightarrow t_0$ pattern is only partly instantiated, then this treatment will necessarily mean that T_0 is (1) not disproved by the existing evidence, (2) and that it is confirmed in due instantiated cases, and consequently may persist as

a proposed theory (hypothesis) until further evidence can be presented to invalidate it. Further, (3) the existing examples compatible with t_0 are support (but not more dense proof) for T_0 , as is also the existing evidence that is **congruent** with t_0 . If evidence cannot be reconciled with t_0 or T_0 (depending on which level of the theory is being tested), either (1) the theory must be modified on this point to cover the instance, or (2) the evidence must be scrutinized once more, and if possible more carefully, in order to see if the analysis was correct or not. If the existing evidence proves false, the new result must be tested in the same way against T_0 and t_0 , and/or against another set of the **proliferated contratheory** T_x and t_x . If this proves correct, the theory must be corrected or substituted *in toto*.

For the convenience of the reader, though, I will not constantly repeat this underlying theoretical pattern, but allow idiomatic variation.

A further account of the main points concerning phenomenology's relevance specifically to an interpretation science is required as justification of my chosen epistemological foundation. It is well known that phenomenology is explicitly opposed to psychologism, reductionism, phenomenalism and scientism in order to free the way for its own role as a rigorous fundamental science ('*grundlegende Wissenschaft*'). As such it "does not describe empirically observable matters of fact"²⁷ and uses the notion of **description** in a sense much broader than that which is usually encountered in either ordinary common-sense language or scientific observational practice, fields dealing with perception. The methodology requiring controlled conditions for observation that repeatedly lead to identical results, as postulated by science, is reproached critically in phenomenology. The priority of method and fact over **experience** and **phenomenon** is questioned on the following basis. A preconceived method applied to varying situations with different circumstantial determinants introduces a foreign element into the direct and pure encounter between subject and object, a primordial contact whereby the consciousness in some specific sense 'encloses' (embraces) the object that it contains and incorporates it as its own object. This sensible process adopted in phenomenology, a condition for full comprehension, is not interfered with by methods usurping the situation; such interference endangers the unadulterated assimilation of the full experiential content of the phenomena.

That this is no obscurantism has been shown by Husserl and his followers. Since psychological statements are based on empirical facts, their postulates are arrived at by induction derived from several individual cases: therefore their generalizations are vague and probable and can never attain the same degree of indisputable epistemological status as *a priori* logic. While empirical generalizations produce laws that at their best can predict correctly the outcome of causal correlations derived from events in a definite time and place, it is by no means clear how the conditional basis of what occurred 'then and there' can be overcome and generalized as valid for every point in space and in the flux of time. Even if the extrapolation of the theory derived from a registered invariance of events can be formulated in a formalized manner from which its sequels follow with logical 'security', the relation of correspondence to reality, which must be vindicated, is at most **probable** to a high degree. In contrast, it is possible to **start in the now and then** by appealing to the immediate experience of the phenomena occurring within it, while refraining from statements entailing causality in order to attain an '**evidentiality**' of description. The decisive criterion is the correctness of the description of a given experiential phenomenon. Therefore, reductionism is rejected since its statements conflict with 'facts about the world' as projections from an experience within it, unless based on sufficiently careful examination. Since the 'scope of focus' encompasses all the various kinds and modes of experience, along with their attendant contents, the risk of limitation to only complex **collections** of sensory qualities is evaded: The reflection about the phenomena themselves links them to a coherent framework, endowed by **experiential** structures.

The logical features of our sensory acquaintance with empirical objects are what provide the support for evidence concerning the constitution of the object's properties. In this, phenomenologists have been forced to appeal to intuition ('Wesensschau'), from which self-validating statements about essences were deduced. But there is no reason to seek support from **intuitionism**, which has refused to justify its appeals or failed to refute objections by adducing weighty arguments in defense of this supposed cognitive faculty. A descriptive account of the reflective enterprise (open to objection and revision) presuppositionlessly inquiring into the matter of the reflected object clarifies conceptually the conditions necessary for the object's status as an instance of the considered kind of *intentionum* in our conscious reflection. The methodological and epistemological circularities of phenomenology, which critics have ascribed to it, are discussed by Richard Schmitt (1967: 142f). They are namely that "it

clarifies its own method while using it", and that "it confirms its statements by reference to examples and then attests the accuracy of the descriptions of these examples by reference to the statements derived from them". These criticisms, respectively, have been considered resolvable. Obviously, the discovery of the necessary conditions for a thing being what it is resides in the recognizability of its features; the description and assignment of the object can be correct only to the extent that the properties of the object are accessible for recognition by the faculties of the human mind. This is why the **multiperspectivism** of complementary *ia:s* is important in interpretation science. The complementary perspectives secure the correctness of the description on the basis of repeated reflection, unless this yields contradictory results, which invalidates the preliminary interpretation or requires amendments of its outlined hypotheses.

The claim to independence and the legitimacy of a rigorous reflection concerning the very basis for scientific statements could not be vindicated by a philosophy restricted either to logic or to merely empirical and analytic statements. Such a program requires an interpretation science that takes into account and considers carefully the fundamental endeavor of phenomenology: i.e. not to base itself upon preconceived theories, but to scrutinize its basis while resisting the temptation to make committing assumptions. A detailed and sensitive description would allow full consideration of the complex relational lattice in experiential content and its framework. That the relational structure varies in aiming at exhaustive description, does not itself indicate arbitrariness, but only serves to stimulate an investigation of the interpretive, interpretative and interpretational patterns of cognition. That a nonempirical description of **phenomena** as 'intuited essences', "necessary and invariant features of objects" and "entities by virtue of which statements in phenomenology are said to be true or false" (139) is one necessary ground of an interpretation science seems inevitable, since phenomena "are those aspects of objects of every kind which are revealed by a particular way of looking at objects". But I do not propose that phenomenology is the sole ground for an interpretation science. Schmitt claims that "the phenomenal aspects of objects are not revealed by ordinary empirical observation but only by looking at them *as* phenomena", whereas I do not see the reason for any *a priori* exclusionary relation between empirical and experiential statements. The normal case will be to decide when they do coincide, and to what extent (and in reference to what parts of their content) they are congruent and incongruent, and to inquire on what conditions empirical observation does not contradict experiential content or statement. Normally, however, experiential

descriptions are multilayered and complexly interwoven cognitive textures that contain intermingled objects appearing on reflective and perceptive levels simultaneously, so that their scope encompasses more restricted empirical observations. Since the aim of interpretation science is to investigate the various modes of interpretative acts, the results of which complete the frames of perspective on the chosen object of consideration, the empirical observation will provide a contribution to its project. But it will not provide an exhaustive basis for interpretation science.

Since in practice it is impossible to realize all the sides of an object (for instance, a music-work, whether performatively or descriptively), it is necessary to rely on the "free imaginative variation of examples" that suspends the condition of belief in the existence of the focused object (e.g., an interpretive variant), in parallel to Husserl's bracketing reduction (*epoché*). Nonetheless, sensory experience furnishes material for reflective treatment, but reflection is not tied to it, while interpretation research investigates the possible and realized modes and perspectives of reflection, and analyzes their respective cognitive structure.

Therefore, interpretative science must always be open to reconsidering more profound evidence that reveals the object more authentically or from other perspectives. The crucial point is that the reliability of a proposed *ia* gradually increases as we take more perspectives into account. Therefore, it is, in principle, not possible to attain "truth", unless an infinite number of perspectives can be considered theoretically: in fact this seems to be what the musical mind can do when it provides its grasp of a *w*-identity through **integrating** all perspectives of reflection on actual, recollected and imagined versions into one *w*-experience on a superior cognitive level. In this way the identity of *w* is established. But the problem is that this seems to be possible only as a secondary reflection about the *w* in abstract *post-re*-consideration, not in direct (primary) experience. The T-*ia* is important not as a guarantee of the experiential **recognition** of *w*-features and related qualities, but as the necessary reflection and verbalization in order to identify and baptize the **criteria** implicit in such a primordial relation as recognition, which involves retentional and reactualizing acts. The features, and, though more loosely, even the associated qualities occurring in the encounter with the *w* can be ascribed to the *w*, attributed to its inherent properties by sequential multiperspective verifications.

Gradually some of the vaguely aroused qualities will hold as features in the double-directed intentional encounter, and eventually qualify as genuine properties of the *w* (object). It is also clear that the sets of criteria are framed

differently in the three stages of (1) performative, (2) descriptive and (3) recognitional realization. It is not a condition for being able to perform a specific and correct series of complex and coordinated manual actions on the keyboard that the pianist be able to give a detailed and accurate description of the procedure of his behavior, nor of the *w* thus being realized. The versatile critic changes from recognitional to descriptive modes of interpretation, but may not be able to specify the performative criteria, still less perform the sequence of actions correctly. But for all three stages (kinds or model cases), the explicit formulation of the criteria at stake depends on conscious reflection—a somewhat distanced consideration – that distinguishes our **performative** from our **descriptive** and **recognitional** criteria and assigns their respective epistemological statuses as **qualities**, **features** or **properties** pertaining to the subject and the encounter with the object respectively. In this sense, at the moment of final *i*-analysis, the conclusion is arrived at independent of the existence in real time and space of the focused object.

The epistemologic circle is resolved through the method of free imaginative variation, according to Schmitt (143): "A phenomenological statement 'p' is true only if we know that the description, 'e', of the corresponding example is accurate. But we can know that 'e' is accurate only if we know that 'p' is true. Hence, it would seem that we cannot know either that 'p' is true or that 'e' is accurate. But reflection begins with my being able to recognize the example described in 'e'. I know that **I describe the example accurately to the extent that I recognize the object in my description of it.**" (143; my emphasis) Schmitt concludes that both the accuracy of the description and the purported truth of the phenomenological statement that I submit are **interpretative**, that they "are tested by the criteria implicit in [our] ability to recognize the object." This conclusion is founded on the assumption of the priority of the auditor's (beholder's) recognition, which however, I presume, can be questioned. Approaches from other perspectives (C, P, + I), by means of other than recognitional acts (productive, reproductive, interpretive) are competitive.

Phenomenological statements about phenomena are about (1) essences and (2) intentional acts, and about (3) criteria that govern different types of acts, cf. Schmitt. They are considered to be self-validating and thus they methodologically result from a **bracketing existence**. On the one hand they are not empirical, neither in the particular sense of (1) refutability through one simple observation that shows the proposition to be false, nor in the general sense of (2) 'falsifiability', i.e. the indirect refutability of statements (concerning

unobservable objects such as relational entities) that are deduced from scientific theories and shown to be false by 'testing' through reference to direct experience. So in one sense "phenomenological statements may be invalidated by experience" (149); if the stated conditions, contexts or limits imposed on the performance of intentional acts are transgressed, they are in a very special sense empirically falsifiable. On the other hand they are at the same time *a priori* in a very special sense. The conventional *a priori* is a statement that is necessary because it is nonempirical and **true** regardless of the facts of the world, independent of empirical verification or falsification: its "truth is a necessary condition for any empirical statement to be *capable* of being either true or false" (149). The truth or falsity of empirical statements relies on the possibility of establishing a meaningful relation to which 'true' or 'false' can be assigned. Such a relation presupposes a coherent intentional act in which the empirical relation can be asserted.

However, the criterion of coherence of all involved intentional acts, including the act of assertion itself, must be correct, i.e. it must receive independent support in order for it to vindicate the **adequacy of the intentional act to its intentional object**. In this sense phenomenologic statements, which settle the criteria of coherence for intentional acts, are necessary presuppositions for the adequacy of intentional acts *vis-à-vis* their intentional objects. Therefore, phenomenological truth, if it does exist, is a condition for the determinability of truth in empirical statements and thus it is logically prior to the latter.

Thus, the intentional act is necessary for establishing the crucial subject-object relation, although the existence of an object is not inferable from the intentional act that does not state anything about the object itself. In fact, a tetradic relation, comprising the subject-act-object-modal or contextual determination of the object, is suggested by Schmitt as the core of intentionality (144).

Musically, it is easy to conceive of the basic condition for the dual relation of consciousness and object. In order for an interaction, and assimilation, to occur, the intentional time-extension of the consciousness must cover the time-extension of the object. This is a condition for the object-constituting intentional act. In order for two objects, for instance, tones, to form an experienceable entity, say an interval_{exp}, we must grasp a relation between the tones. A relation is not observable *per se*, but may be conclusively inferred by a functioning mind only under certain conditions. If the relation were *in re* the interval would occur only at an infinitesimal point of zero-duration (provided they did not overlap through a *legatissimo*), which cannot possibly be perceived exactly at the point

of connection that links the two legato tones; no interval_{exp} would ever appear at non legato places, let alone staccato tone pairs. However, we now assertively know, on clear experiential (and irrefutable) evidence, that intervals appear even in staccato: relations are established through cognitive functions and modes other than the perceptive one. The sequel is that interval relations are intentional in the sense that they are experiential phenomena appearing to the conscious musical mind. This, by extrapolation, allows a network of complex patterns of intervals that form the specific tonality matrix and qualities necessary for a piece to occur.

The required covering relation between the intentional extension and the object that furnishes the intentional object with sensory content can frame different model cases pertinent to the practice of mip (MIR I:58, 78). It is possible that an object–extension that is contained by the intentional act secures the continuity of the phases in that tone, while an intentional act that overlaps the link or gap between two tones secures the continuity of the **connective phase** in the tone–pair relation. Furthermore, an intentional act that embraces only some phases of a continuously sounding tone will turn out to be experienced as separated, even though this may seem an artificial device to gestalting separatively. There may be two principal options for cohesive gestalting within one intentional extension, or *mutatis mutandis* over succeeding intentional acts: (1) to increase the object durations, or (2) to shape a connective signaling that hints at the forthcoming or following tone(s). This would entail the opportunity of interpreting the p(w) by creating a structure of indications and implications throughout the w–structure, whether it be by means of (1) an unfolding latticework of 'identity moments', and/or (2) by a basic structure of developmental and directional 'forms' (Celibidache's "*Expansionsphase*" complemented and followed by "*Kompressionsphase*", the extrovert–introvert processual form). On the basis of a careful analysis of Izchak Miller's "Husserl's account of perceiving a melody"²⁸, it can be concluded that the distinctness of the relational encounter between the now–phase and past time–phases (actual tone versus past tones) does not depend only on the **retentional distance** in continuous time flux to the focused past tone event, but also on its identified shape as a point of departure for establishing qualitative relations (including the aesthetically attractive opportunity to **integrate** shapes to an encompassing character of the w). Therefore the distinctions between (1) *alfa*–accented, (2) continuous, (3) *messa di voce* (middle–accented) and (4) *omega*–accented (end–accented) tones take on an important musical significance, something I have

previously treated (MIR I:60–62: initial, central, and final accents, etc.): Different energetic shapes sustain powerful physiologic analogies or psychic associations.

Further analysis from both theoretical and practical points of view – provoked by the reading of Miller's investigation and Husserl's original text (Huss. X) – is relevant to the notion of musical time in actual performance and in reactualizing interpretation. However, musical time is not the subject of this thesis, although it has been a focus of major interest in phenomenology. But it is only one aspect of *mip*, and of interpretation science (its methods included), that will be touched upon during the course of the following chapters (II:3).

To conclude: the foundations of interpretation theory can be established only on the basis of a philosophical critique.

II THE THEORETICIAN'S PERSPECTIVE

II:1 THE CRITICAL DEBATE ON INTERPRETATION WITHIN AESTHETICS AND ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY. A PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE AND A LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INVESTIGATION.

Posing the pertinent questions for this investigation presupposes a precomprehension of the subject, obtained from theoretical and empirical explorations of the main problems that were presented in the MIR series, and from musical practice. The present investigation completes and comments on these earlier and related studies. Formulating the basic problems involves demarcating the area under scrutiny and requires a survey of the subject domain. Still, the most practicable way to start seems to be to relate to a few logically crucial questions to which the prevalent ideas of the aesthetic discussion on the whole subject can be boiled down.

A logical framework to the subject area of musical interpretation is provided by Göran Hermerén in a series of writings¹. After having tested rival ideas for a core definition of interpretation against his distinction between **theoretical (T)** and **performance (P)** interpretations (1993:9–31), which included his ideas on (1) **meaning** (related passages of mine in MIR I:88, 282), (2) **understanding** (MIR I:234–235), (3) **intention** (MIR I:46, 131, 141–144), (4) **explanation** (MIR I:126), (5) **process–result ambiguity** (MIP: 25–31; MIR I:23–25), (6) **application** (MIR I:183 in special sense of instrumental adaption), (7) **truth of the work** (MIR I:252 objectivism), (8) **truth of interpretation** (MIR I:118), (9) **norms** (MIR I:127), (10) **skill and talent** (MIR I:115, 119), and (11) **action** (MIR I: 94, 118), Hermerén recognized that "there is a concept of interpretation of music which has little to do with explaining meanings and intentions." (11) Evidently, of these, T–interpretations satisfy principles 1,2,4,5 (meaning, understanding, explanation and process–result ambiguity) and sometimes 3 and 6 (intention, application), whereas P–interpretations satisfy principles 9 and 10 (norms, skill and talent), sometimes 11 (action) but, claims Hermerén, never 5.

However, it seems likely to me that there is a process–result ambiguity in the P–interpretation as well, as is conclusively shown by analyses of the complexity of the interpretive act (MIR I ch. 3), and through comparisons of their results (MIR II ch. 1). Note even a transillumination of interpretive differences can

reveal the sole and definite p-version that is supposed to congruently represent "the work". The interpreter's artistic intention formed on the basis of notation and ancillary information on the work yields a **set of implications** which can only be brought into **realization** to some extent due to various limits in the rehearsal process, including mental, physical and acoustic obstructions. Since the result must also be interpreted by the listener, the difference in determinacy between P and T-interpretations is only gradual. The choice of a course through a series of alternatives during rehearsal demonstrates the ambiguity at the processual stage. Eugene Narmour (1990) applies the model of implication-realization to a cognitive theory of melodic structure, according to which the ambiguity includes even the compositional structure. This, I suggest, may even be one root of interpretative ambiguity.

The complex fact is this: in the moment of performance there is an **identity of the P-performance**, which in the model case is preceded by a **variety of tested p-versions during the rehearsal process**. Simultaneously, the criterion for the performer's (or for the i of an influential interpreter I or teacher who is not identical with the actual P) testing of these practical performances is to a great extent theoretical. The various performances are compared with implicit or explicit theoretical interpretations. There is a constant exchange between T-i and P-i in both directions. How T-i:s interact with P-i:s during the preparatory process, and how they relate as final results, are interesting questions for interpretation science.

Furthermore, there is no ontological requirement for completion of the T-i. In contrast a P-i, insofar as the whole piece is performed, and not only parts thereof, must be (1) complete in order to meet the requirement of being an i of the w in question, and it must be (2) determined in order for the w to be manifested in a P-i.

In the discussion about non-identity between p:s it must be stated that if process and result of the P-i were identical, it would be possible to identify a p as correlate to a w, and several different p:s would correspond to several different w:s; but this is absurd. There is only one w being considered. The interpretations of w are what can be so diverse.

The P-interpretation "is essentially concerned with expression or visualization", says Hermerén, "with rendering experiences in visual (audible) form, with creating a sound structure (or a pattern of actions) which can serve as something rather like that which Eliot once called '**the objective correlative**' [my emphasis] in poetry." (Hermerén 1993:11-12) Obviously, interpretations

need to be classified according to other principles of division, focusing respectively on their object, problem, material, method, purpose and result. He contemplates the interpreter's method of **selection** (MIR I:94) according to internal or external criteria, as well as a **reconstruction** on rational, systematic or critical grounds (12), compared with philosophical or scientific methods of reconstruction (MIR I:1), and proposes that "for the musical interpreter, aesthetic considerations, including the *Vorverständnis* of the artist [...] play a crucial role." The selection involves a focalization on various possible problems, including the question of what the interpreter wants to know: (1) the composer's intention, (2) the contemporary way of playing or understanding, and (3) how to realize "certain overriding normative concerns or interests" through interpretation, the result of which may become not only a new performance, but just as well a recording or critique, i.e. "actions, texts, and mental events." (13) As a necessary condition for the object of interpretation Hermerén determines that it must be (1) an "intentional object" in the sense of Ingarden, (2) "open and indeterminate", and I would add, (3) **accessible**, since this is an undismissible condition for achieving evidence of the work and its basic structure. The requirements of **accessible evidence** may refer to different materials, such as the notation, contemporary documents of literature or pictures as considered by "*Aufführungspraxis*", together with Hermerén's "facts or conjectures about the pragmatic context of the work" (12). In another sense the question arises whether w-structures are accessible through scores directly; I have assumed that they are not (MIR I:20), and I propose that they are indirectly accessible through (1) **contextual**, and (2) **notational** interpretation: the act of $i_n \rightarrow n_i$ denotes that the act of interpreting the notation leads to the interpreted notation; or $i(n) \rightarrow n_i$, the interpreting of the notation.

The **logic of indeterminacy** is not only a problem which has to be overcome, but an ontological definiens of interpretation: **indeterminacy makes something interpretable**. This logic of indeterminacy entails, provided accessibility is necessary for either notation or work (e.g. evidence through recording), that if notation unequivocally excludes ambiguity, the work will still suffer from indeterminacy, since it must be determined by recursive interpretative acts in order to discard all other alternatives but one. So the distinction between notation and work is crucial but insufficient. Obviously, notation is normally only capable of representing certain aspects of the work, namely those of the basic structure of fundamental dimensions (such as pitch, rhythm, meter etc). Consequently, the work would remain indeterminate, not

even capable of determination, if ancillary information about it were not available. The concept of **work** (w) includes the broader cultural context as necessary determinants or indicators for the interpretation (w_α), and these determinants are produced by **other** people, many of them who are normally an integral part of the social context of the work (the human non-individual, "collective" producers of the work: $W; W \rightarrow w$). Obviously an understanding of the **composition** (c) requires knowledge and reference to either (1) the contextual determinants with their origin in the personal producer, namely the composer ($C; C \rightarrow c$), or (2) access to models, procedures, techniques of **musicological analysis** according to some tradition of the relevant overarching paradigm. The c is regarded, as are all integrated structural relations, as interpretable by means of a recognized analytical method. An understanding of the **notation** (n) requires access to certain very basic sets of conventional symbols, normally acquired through elementary instruction, which strictly and in weaker sense, is also contextual. What is important to notice, however, is the relation of these three entities (w, c, n): I propose that this relation is a **sequence of decreasing indeterminacy**: $R(w > c > n)$.

Furthermore, the object of interpretation, according to Hermerén, "poses problems", i.e. it is "puzzling" in various ways for the musician who may even search for a "'hidden' message" (16), which "cannot be solved by consulting the composer" (17). But the object of interpretation is still "to some extent understandable", i.e. "the interpreter must understand the options [my emphasis; MIR I:15] offered by the score". Hermerén does not deny the possibility of "historical reconstruction" or a realization of the composer's intention, which may change over time, but recognizes the important epistemological limitation due to **restricted access to the producer's 'authorial' intention** at the actual time. And I would argue that there is no guarantee for the discursive communicability of the composers' intentions, not even if he were asked to formulate them in the very creative moment of composing. In contrast, an application of Kripke's theory of reference (23–24) would imply the principal possibility of a historical reconstruction by back-tracking to the original score. In practice, though, this is unrealistic. Such an option would occur extremely seldom. The problem is that by asking the composer about his intention, "what you get is only information about what the author *now* thinks that he *then* meant." Consulting contemporary literary sources written by the composer or contemporaries who shared his cultural context, would not, definitively, solve the problem.

"A performance of a symphony is an interpretation of that work. It is a way

of presenting the work to our senses [my emphasis], and thereby also to our cognitive or intellectual abilities." Therefore it has become natural to regard the 'auditive constitution' of the work, i.e. the auditively constituted conception (image, representative 'picture') of the work (the work structure) as a **guide** to the ontological assignment of a particular work identity ('the work', 'that particular work'). In practice, though, a listener hears a familiar tone–sequence played by the string section of an orchestra of classical size – say the melody consisting of the thrice repeated Eb–D,D motif followed by an ascending sixth to Bb; then he hears the melody descending from this pivotal tone by symmetrical motifs of thrice three tones (Bb–A–G, etc) while the harmony changes from G minor to a C minor sixth with the fifth (G) staying in the bass when the melody reaches the fresh C – and he immediately identifies the music as Mozart's well-known *G minor Symphony* (No. 40, KV 550). But he heard these tones as representing the notes just mentioned, or their relations, in a **specific performance** that he never had heard before, without having identified the heard tones with the correctly named notes of the score that define this masterwork.

The crucial problem here is our choice of criteria for the assignment of the w–identity. Among the various solutions proposed, except that of the much-debated author's intention, Kivy has suggested the criterion of **auditive recognition** (contra Davies), which contradicts his basic conception of reducing Levinson's fully equipped instrumental work–ontology to a reduced core structure.

It is tempting to define performance as "belonging to the ontological category of **action types**" (my emphasis), and it is evidently true that a performance normally involves "a series of actions" (MIR I:96 about action sequences, and 98 on the act of playing). Some pianists (Marek 1977) discuss this, and 'action patterns' (motion, gestic; cf. Matthey 1913/70, József Gát's photographic motion studies, 1965) is the subject of many instrumental manuals and conductor's textbooks of minor interest here. The focus on action sequences implies the risk of producing a mechanical quality, a lack of auditive coordination. A consciously governed act–sequence (MIR I:94–108) in which the **audition controls the action** seems to secure the possibility of implementing the chosen interpretation in (to) live performance. But apparently, Hermerén uses "action" in a much broader sense than this: "To follow a code or a tradition is to perform an action, and so is to violate a code or convention." (Hermerén 1993:21) Therefore, concludes Hermerén, action has a meaning and can be interpreted, as would also be possible with composers' intentions about their music (as

intentional object). To state that art is a collection of action types (31, with reference to G. Currie) would restrict the creative processes to the unconscious (subconscious) realm and exclude some of the most distinguished and elaborate artistic concepts of interpretation in performance from the scope of art, which is an unacceptable sequel.

If actions are both **intentional** and **interpretable**, the emerging scheme is this: Hermerén's T-interpretations are intentional but not actional, his P-interpretations are both intentional and actional. But what, then, is the relation between intention and action? They are both **directional** (since intention has a 'mental' object whereas action through its motion in space often has a 'physical' object hinted at) and, I submit, **interpretive**. But since all actions are not intentional, actions and intentions are not always congruent. Actions are of two kinds, intended and unintended, despite the **possibility** that they might both be intentional, though in two different senses (conscious and subconscious intentionality of the musical mind, Mm, respectively). Moreover, action is always performative, whereas intentions are conceptual. The incongruity of action and intention is the target of toilsome pedagogic instruction, aiming at **enforcing congruency of action and intention**. In the model situation both (1) action and (2) its auditive result are considered to be the royal road to intention, by means of the teacher's seeing and auditing.

Now, actions (i) and intentions (c) can be interpreted (P,T). But what about the intentions of the performer, and processes of composition? Performers holding **recreative ideals** (Furtwängler, and as far as rehearsal procedures are concerned, even Celibidache) refer to the **generative process of composition** as basis for their interpretation in performance (T – P connection), which is obviously a kind of **metainterpretation** (MIRI ch. 3). One has only to notice how critics discuss performers' intentions for comparative and evaluative reasons (MIR V:5–12 *et passim*); and their effort may be successful if they use the work (work structure) as *tertium comparationis* on the condition that they intend to judge the **interpretation** of the work and nothing else.

Of decisive importance is the determination of which conditions of P-interpretations must be fulfilled in order to correspond to the T-interpretation of the same work conceived and intended for the performance in question. What are the criteria of correspondence for P-i versus T-i? If conditions of T-interpretations can be logically tested against conditions for P-interpretations, an **objective correlative criterion** may appear as result. This is where the question of the **incompatibility** of P and T (and I would add in particular of the

connection between them (T-P)), becomes interesting.

First, though, I agree with Hermerén's refusal to "restrict interpretations by definitional fiat to interpretations of the intentions of the composer. The intentions are not irrelevant, but they are not the only important things." (26–27) The "mind of the composer" is not the only mind we are interested in understanding. "We may interpret in order to understand the intentions of the composer, but also to understand his time, the world today, or ourselves, or some combination of all these." Among the "many kinds of legitimate interpretation" that Hermerén only briefly touches upon, I suggest as a target for my attempt to understand the concept of *i*, especially the following additional entities: (1) the work itself, (2) what the work means to us, and (3) what experiences in me it evokes. Rightly, Hermerén points at "many ways in which the composer's intention can be relevant".

Hermerén treats the problem of **individuation** (under what conditions X is a P -interpretation of Y , on the basis of "Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernables") formulates certain questions about the **criteria of identity** [w , $i(w)$] and proposes two criteria for P and P' being performances of the same work: the conditions of (1) **similarity**, satisfied if there is a "minimal degree of resemblance between P and P' ", and (2) **causality**, satisfied if a "causal connection can be established between X and P and between X and P' ". Whereas the first is an **$i-i$ relation**, the second refers to the **$w-i$ relation** as I see them. The allegedly causal $w-i$ -relation ($w_i-p(i)$), the work-interpretation's relation to the performance of its interpretation, is logically possible, whereas such an exact and close relation is doubtful for $w_i-i(p)$, the relation of the work-interpretation to the interpretation of its performance. Furthermore, sequences of the kind $w-wa-ia-i-i(p)-p$ are possible when the next step in the formula does not contradict the following rules (i.e. with the conditions satisfied): (1) add or delete one letter in the two-letter formulas, or (2) change no more than one letter in them. I propose that direct access relations are impossible. A fairly normal model where the performer has also heard a performance by another interpreter would look like this (suggested for discussion): $w-w_{i2}-wa-wa_{i2(p)}-w_{i1}(p)-i_1(p)-p$, namely 'the work is interpreted, and more profoundly analyzed, the result of which, after having studied the other performance, is interpreted in terms of performative preliminary version(s), tested and interpreted by attentive listening, on the basis of which the performer arrives at his presentative version, final at least for this time' (the figures 2 and 1 in the formula in this case indicate the possibility of analytic content that cannot be realized in real p).

In MIR I: ch. 6 I proposed, on a musical basis, a more extensive list of rival descriptive and constitutive criteria for "mip:s", i.e. P(T)-interpretations, including transparency, motion, flow, direction, centering, cohesivity, congruence, convergence, divergence, polarity, complementarity and alternation. These may be viewed as phenomenologic i-principles.

Basically, I submit that in an **experiential** sense, incongruent theoretical (T) interpretations are not logically incompatible due only to an i_1-i_2 comparison. This means that a well-informed auditor can tolerate the simultaneous existence of logically contradictory i:s as long as these are seen as i:s of one and the same w, provided the w-ID is not threatened. Hence the basis for acceptance is the relation to a w, real or imagined; but since w is likely to be not directly **accessible**, the relation pertains to a listener-interpreted w, i.e. $w_1(w_{10})$, a **work-imagination**. Such T-i:s, i.e. experientially relatable explanations, may enrich and clarify the set of properties pertaining to the w, and may even gradually take on the character of contextual properties of the w, provided the i:s are confirmed by other auditors in similar circumstances. Basically, in the same sense, performance (P) interpretations are experientially incompatible:

	<i>experiential & practical/logical</i>	
compatible:	$T-i_1 \& T-i_2; i_1-i_2$	$p_1 \& p_2$
incompatible:	simultaneous $p_1 \& p_2$	i_1-i_2

Regarding the incompatibility of T-interpretations, Hermerén applies the same scheme of conditions, now concerned with the conditions of similarity versus causality for T and T' being two various interpretations of the same work, but expands his scheme by proposing two more criteria, the first of which is (3) the **intentional** condition, stating that "T and T' are interpretations of the same work X only if the authors [composers] of T and T' intended them to be interpretations of X."

The latter is a more admissible condition than the two preceding conditions, which Hermerén recognizes: "one cannot intend just about anything to be an interpretation of anything" (30). A barrier against the pure arbitrariness of intentionalism is needed. This is why the careful consideration of necessary criteria is interesting. But it is hard to see why the intentional criterion would not also apply to P-interpretations.

And, finally, according to Hermerén, his (4) **pragmatic** criterion says that "T and T' are interpretations of the same work X only if readers [and listeners,

since a T-interpretation can be derived from listening to a P-interpretation] familiar with X, T, and T' recognize T and T' to be an explication or elucidation of the meaning of X."

Regarding the interpreter's intention I suggest that (1) it is **directed** towards the 'same' work, and that (2) the **expretational act** can be used as a criterion for the ascription of T and T' to the same X (applying Hermerén's symbols). Given the multiperspectivity of *w*, there are several non-identical *w*-pictures; hence two expretational acts departing from w_1 and w_2 , respectively (where w_1 and w_2 are both independently legitimate representations of *w*) may well arrive at two different interpretations, i_1 and i_2 (corresponding to T and T' in Hermerén's terminology). It is important, though, that the performance of an interpretation, $p(i)$, and the interpretation of a performance, $i(p)$, are seen as two different things. This difference is not accounted for by applying the T/P-dichotomy. It is important to consider that a performance in itself requires an interpretation of **how** it is (i.e. by rendering the *w* in *p*, and regarding what aspects are realized, and which entailed) an interpretation of **what** it interprets, namely of *w*. Such an "analytic" interpretation proceeding from the result to its origin is something other than the productive interpretation envisaging the process from the origin to the result produced by the performer in view of his realization of the *w* in *p*. The strict qualification for the validity of such an *ia* is that the interpreter is – as is normally the case – identical to the performer.

Due to the weak logic prevailing in this area, (1) 'formal' **complementarity** is more likely to be the case than is (2) 'logical' **compatibility**. In cases where an interpretation is flatly wrong, the evidence adduced for this judgement is basically, and frequently, a reference to **notation**, since its indications are normative, 'unidirectional' and imperative **n – i relations**. The distinction "prescriptive/descriptive" of an intended sound event or action given by notation theorists (Bengtsson 1973:197; cf. Karkoschka 1966) is fruitful on this point. However, there seem to be cases not included in this dichotomy, e.g. if an "*a piacevole*" is not demanded as mandatory by the C. There may exist different "normative aesthetic canons" referring to the proposed mode of realizing this relation. These norm systems must be investigated, compared and evaluated in order to determine (3) the 'additional' **combinatoribility** of T-interpretations with P-interpretations.

However, since differing interpretations are 'simultaneously' accepted or tolerated by most people (significant exceptions operatively disregarded; MIP:21), and the differences hinted at are **i – i relations**, such connections seem

to indicate **facultativity**. This, though, does not solve the problem of defining the limits of free choice. In addition, what is tolerated may, naturally, depend on who is judging. The crucial issue is to decide what **tolerance criteria** to apply.

The problem about the criteria of similarity is this: Who judges the similarity? How much is 'similar', and what constitutes 'similarity'? Just a vague resemblance? Or a 'presentiment' of likeness? Or would one **in praxis** require **distinct structural criteria of identity** ("*Identitätsmomente*") as proposed by Sergiu Celibidache, who rejects the causality criterion because causality excludes the conscious musical mind from the scope of his musical phenomenology, comprising (and accepting) mainly **intentional interrelationships**? Celibidache's criterion of identity ("*Identitätskriterium*") is based on intentional relationships. On this point it is interesting to note that Celibidache and Lesche reject causality as a kind of relation between intentional phenomena, whereas Germund Hesslow in discussions and articles (referred to by me in 1988) considers causality on the intentional level neither excluded nor incompatible in principle.

The question then arises: If all musical objects are intentional, as they are according to Celibidache, does it then follow that the **relations** between these intentional objects are also 'intentional'? Intentional in the same sense? Celibidache seems to have taken his thoroughly reflected stance on this point, since his presumed answer would be: Yes, but not on the same level. The relations are **arrived at** by **transcending** the objects. And this is a necessary act not only for experiencing the relation, but for music itself to come into existence and thus exist. Therefore music is defined by Celibidache in purely intentional terms, as something that cannot be created, but only appears under certain favorable conditions. The only thing the performer can do is to create maximally favorable conditions for this music to appear as an experiential phenomenon in the auditors' minds: "Wir schaffen die Bedingungen damit Musik entstehen kann" to his conducting students (MIR IV). If, then, the experienced musical objects release 'musical *a priori*', which are not derivable from the given argument, it is possible that the relations between these experiences, appearing on another level, are **not** intentional in the same sense; they might **not** be directional as 'ordinary' intentions towards individual musical objects, but directionally neutral in the hypothetical (theoretical) model case. They seem to have a higher degree of generality or 'objectivity'. Considering the basis of Celibidache's reference to Husserl's "*intersubjektive Betreffbarkeit*", I submit that these musical *a priori* are intersubjectively coincident to a higher extent than experiential phenomena that appear in the process of regarding the musical objects.

However, the merit of the **causality** criterion is that it preserves the relation to the work in a **generative** mode; it is more neutral and objective, and seems to be a guarantor of work identity in an ontological sense. It would also be possible to specify compositional, i.e. structural, criteria that are essentially constitutive of the work, and that are required to be recovered from it in the T versus the P interpretations.

The incompatibility of P-interpretations deals with the question of our tendency to tolerate and appreciate the existence of differing versions of the same work. We even feel that musical experience is enriched by, and our access and understanding of certain works is deepened by our listening to **many** different interpretations. Obviously, there is a **perspectivic relation between:is and the w**. The basic question behind the problem of **limits of tolerance** is, in Hermerén's words: "what kinds of reasons for or against certain performances should be tolerated"? (29) His four **incompatibility theses** (27–28) state a common first condition for what it means "to say that two interpretations P and P' are incompatible": namely that they are both interpretations of the same work in the sense of the formerly stated criteria of **similarity** and **causality**. A secondary set of incompatibility criteria, i.e. conditions for each of the four theses, are advanced by Hermerén: namely that (1) "P expresses or implies a statement p and P' expresses or implies the contradictory statement not-p"; (2) that "P is correctly described by the description, D, which implies a statement p and P' is correctly described by the description D', which implies not-p"; (3) that "P is supported by the reason R, which implies a statement p and P' is supported by the reason R', which implies not-p"; and (4) that "P is in accordance with the canons of good taste, either those of the artist or those prevalent in his society, or those current today, whereas P' is not in accordance with these canons." Hermerén forwards (4) as an acceptable.

I agree with Hermerén that his thesis 1 is too strict for musical interpretation in performance, but would be more careful to reject thesis 8 in which he states that "interpretation presupposes the truth (of the interpretation)" (11), only because of its circularity; for then there are other additional criteria that can be applied to P-interpretations. One can propose further requirements, e.g. that each P-interpretation must fulfill the criteria of **internal coherency of i – i relations** and of **internal consequence**.

Another question that seems pertinent to me is whether the criteria of similarity, causality, intentionality and pragmatic explication or elucidation of meaning are all to some extent (in some respect or sense) **combinable** in the

interpretive act and process of rehearsal, which in practice can be of greater importance than the purely logical question of their incompatibility. Hence, I suggest that the difference between logical incompatibility and **experiential 'combinability'** (is the appearance of two simultaneous phenomena possible?) is maintained.

The positive outcome of Hermerén's discussion is that it opens up the possibility of strengthening the demands within the realm of aesthetics without falling into the claims of strict propositional logic. This is desirable for reasons of artistic quality, and suggests the combining of these criteria to the extent that they are applicable to P-interpretations. The criteria mentioned have their corresponding experiential terms, which suggests a parallelity between discursive and experiential notions.

Hermerén provides a general system of interpretation comprising fundamental distinctions regarding (1) the **complex concept** of interpretation, (2) the **types** of interpretation, and (3) the **criteria** for interpretation including, a typology of arguments. I argue that this system *mutatis mutandis* is relevant also for an aesthetics of musical interpretation in performance (1981/82:269–292).

Despite the fact that Hermerén's solutions to the problem of criteria are arrived at by means of analytical philosophy, his approach also recognizes certain values in hermeneutic theory. His moderate critique of this theory demystifies a terminological apparatus, e.g. the hermeneutical "*Horizontverschmelzung*" (257), which he finds hollow and groundless. But the hermeneutic problem, namely the question of under what conditions we understand, merits consideration, and he does not in fact question the main theses of hermeneutics, namely that (1) **contextuality** is a necessary condition for understanding, which in its turn doubts the equivocal postulate that unprejudiced interpretation is possible (advanced by phenomenologists and others); this thesis seems in accord with his proposition that interpretation evidently has its point of departure in a theoretical and normative frame of conception, and (2) the process of **understanding** is illuminated by the hermeneutic theory of mutually directed interaction between the whole and its parts. Concerning this process, which I have treated earlier (MIR I:83–85 *et passim*), Hermerén argues—in my view quite rightly—that it is more a **helix** than a circle. Understanding requires the readjustment of a comprehension of the whole after reconsideration of its parts: "den preliminära, intuitiva förståelsen av helheten är inte identisk med den preciserade helhetsbilden. Inte heller är

den preliminära förståelsen av delarna identisk med den preciserade förståelsen av delarna." (258)

In a critique of radical subjectivism Hermerén concludes as follows: the fact that the object (notes, words, things) does not have independent meaning, does not entail that its special meaning is ascribed to it idiosyncratically by the individual interpreter. Thus, subjectivism cannot be corroborated. For sign systems, among which I include notation, this is evident; their meaning are defined "in terms of systems of rules" (259), not by private assignment.

The problem with the historical relativism forwarded by Gadamer and Hirsch is that it leads to **traditionalism**: this is a normative doctrine stating that it is right to submit to tradition, and wrong to deviate from it. Such a conservatism would effectively hamper artistic choice and experiment, and restrict innovation on false grounds. And, it would even contradict another postulate advanced by Gadamer, namely that understanding, if seen as a preparative step for further aesthetic/artistic development, is **productive**, in contrast to Nachtsheim's main thesis that it is reproductive. However, there is a more fundamental problem with the argument of 'productionism'; that the interpreter (I) understands what the composer (C) means entails a **necessary interpretative difference** in the outcome of their considerations of the work, guided by different ends (e.g. productive versus reproductive). In other words, how is **communication** possible if production is unidirected (one-way-directed), and how is communication about and in different interpretations possible if the interpretive process is a closed circle, 'secluded' as the compositional process is assumed to be in the debate on the problem of access to the work? If this assumption is true, it leads to the following problem: it would not be possible to refer i to c, or i to w. Here, I believe it is fruitful to introduce a **distinction between understanding and experiencing**. We have no access to another person's experience, but if he interprets for us his own experience in words, by a drawing or by producing a sound sequence that points out the essential features he understood **in the way he understood it**, equating facticity ('that') with modality ('how'), he can **communicate** the core of his experience by demonstrating at least corresponding or representative features. This ability certainly is conditional, and talent is supposed to vary individually, since it requires the uninhibited function of cognitively expressive acts and their motor performance.

If the interpreter understands an utterance in the same way that the speaker does, their understanding is congruent. Applied to music, a few problems occur, and I will accordingly argue for the limited applicability of the

linguistic model (ch. II:4). (1) On what grounds is it presupposed that the performer (speaker) understands his own i–outcome in the same way that he **intended** it; assimilative, as opposed to emissive processes of consciousness (MIP:31) may well have different cognitive statuses (possibly grounded in the different modes of processing in separate "channels" of the afferent versus the efferent, the sensoric versus the motoric nervous system as well as in differences in the higher functions of CNS), and (2) the congruence of understanding between the content of experience and its putatively corresponding linguistic expression is not eternally given or fixed, since the composer's (author's, speaker's) statement may attain new 'meaning' in the light of new contextual evidence: e.g. the classical style was illuminated in a new way in the context of Stravinsky's neoclassical replicas. (3) With time the area of **consensus** may diverge into incongruency, or on the contrary, it may converge into a complete congruency of understanding. Epigones are generally thought to bring about an immediate congruency of understanding (and almost as quickly a rejection), whereas innovative visionaries attain congruency of understanding with their public only after a long process of cultural assimilation. Some works are considered never to be understood. But this common sense opinion may be stereotyped and prejudiced. Furthermore, (4) congruency of the understanding act is not *a priori* identical to the congruency of comprehension (alternatively the content of this act).

Another problem with musical understanding is that of the opposite position, roughly identical to the standpoint embraced in principle by Sergiu Celibidache, who postulates that **music cannot be understood, only experienced** (ch. V:4). This implies that all attempts to understand music are in vain, and all (at least verbal) descriptions 'of how I understand this piece' are bluntly false. Consequently, the classical concepts concerning modes of understanding, the *subtilitas intelligendi (explicandi et applicandi)* referred to by Hermerén, are completely refuted for the purpose of an aesthetics of music performance.

The problems related to understanding, historical truth, and communicability form a complex that turns around the crucial question as to whether music has a meaning. And if this can be affirmed, then what kind of meaning it is. As far as Celibidache is concerned he fervently denies that music has or can have any semantic meaning (MIR IV and ch V:4). A short excursus is justified in order to clarify my position, since the complex is deeply intervoven with the problem of meaning, cf. Hermerén's initial point (1). I consider 'meaning' in a sense far broader than that of 'signification', 'reference', 'denotation',

and 'connotation'. Consequently meaning does **not** have to be expressible by language; this allows for many other kinds of meaning than are covered by the linguistic sense of meaningfulness: e.g. in the fine arts, dancing, mime, acting (etc.) – and in music. In a limited sense, however, music entailing or implying definite external references with constant denotation is extremely rare; thus such an interpretability must be restricted, unless explicitly called for by the composer (as incidentally in 'programme music'). Kivy's study (1984/90) basically affirmed that music, under certain conditions, can attain representability, but that this trait is not inherent in the art form. I submit that **conventional meaning** in music is **arbitrary** and entails an associative additional interpretation, in the sense that it can always be reprogrammed; the conventional meaning in music pertains to a network of associative meanings and may be evoked by a certain context, but it is not 'natural'. And it is not 'given' by *a priori* or by empirical correlations. By **natural meaning**, I denote that the music primarily means what it is, or what it most closely, without an associative i, can strictly be described as: a rising scale entails a motion and ascending direction (since that is what it entails) as constituents in an unfolding network of complex interrelationships. Secondly, such motions and directions are then **analogous** to physiological patterns of reaction (physical motion, breathing etc.), that, corresponding to the compositional structures, endow these notion with qualities (tension, energy, pulse etc.). True, these qualities do not, in a strict sense, pertain inherently to the music itself but they correspond to it 'naturally' by subjective association, and not arbitrarily. Even if the qualities (features, properties) are 'associated', they are not linked to the object in the former sense of conventional meaning; and most importantly, the pertinent sense of 'natural meaning' cannot be changed, as it is possible for the conventional meanings to do. Thus, it is, of course, essential to analyze whether an interpreter instigates (releases, uncouples, evokes) the conventional or natural 'program' of musical meaning. In my earlier treatise I provided arguments for the existence of natural meaning in music and mip (MIR I:33,75, 169–170, 191, 199–202, 206). Needless to say, associated musical meanings comprise a gradual scope of nuances from idiosyncrasy to conventionalism.

The distinction between "conventional" and "analogous" meaning brings to mind the influential semiotic theory of C. S. Peirce; if distinguishes between **symbolic** and **iconic** meaning (R. Monelle 1992:193–201). This theory is based on a trichotomy of signs: a **qualisign** is an appearance, a **sinsign** is "an individual object or event", i.e. a performance (or an individual copy of the score)

which can be encountered directly, and a **legisign** is "of the nature of a general type" (Monelle 1992:195), i.e. the symphony itself. As shown by Monelle (1992:209–214) and Karbusicky (1987: 23–35), Peirce's third category, the **indexical**, plays a decisive role in musical signification, in compositional embodiment, interpretive attribution and in auditive comprehension of meaning in music.

The basic scheme explaining the concept of interpretation that Hermerén advances, "X interprets Y as Z for U aiming at V" (1981/82:270; my translations), would correspond to my model $w_i i_1 i_2 L$, with the core $i_1 i_2$ where the first i is the interpretans and the second i is a set of goals (ideals, "visions") held by the interpreter (I) for the whole process. P must then be introduced for performance (executive ["*verkställande*"] function); furthermore it must be inserted that the interpreter is identical to the performer [I=P] if this is the case and if the interpretation is to be delivered by sound media to the listener: $w_i i_1 i_2 [I=P] p L$. Hermerén's model formalizes the postulate that 'the interpreter interprets the object of the interpretation while considering a specific "aspect" of interpretation for an addressee and does this under the guidance of certain aims of the interpretation'. The formula reflects the variety of situations in which interpretation is called for. However, I propose that the complexity is even greater: The following elaborated version of Hermerén's scheme includes the chosen context (c_x) in view of which the interpreter (I) arrives at his "interpretation as" interpretans (i) of the object (i.e. work, w), and recognizes his ideals as a more general and normative frame theory (T_0) from which i_2 can be derived, enclosing the whole interpretive process and guiding its perspective. I interprets w as w_i in view of the w_i 's context, c_x for L, compatible to the overriding aim of T_0 : $(w_i I) c_x (i i L)$ or, while fulfilling the condition of sound performance delivery above, $(w_i I) c_x [I=P] p L$.

However, if the requirement of explicitness is posed, the formula must logically denote and not only **prescriptively indicate** what is important in the interpretative process, i.e. what is interpreted by whom, for whom, and in what order of succession, but also what is **prohibitively understood** or presupposed as self-evident, namely, that the composer is not identical to the interpreter (C~I) if that is the case, and perhaps it must state whether the context of the work and the interpreter pertains also to (1) the listener (L), who may be 'inside' or 'outside' of the music (the work as perceived by him) and of its tradition as the work is rendered by one particular performance, and to (2) the composer (C, omitted for the moment).

In addition, this model has its correspondence with the **receptive** side of the interpretational encounter. The listener, L, interprets (experiences, understands) the performer P's interpretation of the work, w_i (where $L=I_1$ and $P=I_2$), in view of the $L_w I_1$ context as I_1 for himself as L with the aim of T_0 . A decisive difference is that the **reception** is normally **reflexive** whereas **interpretation in performance** is **emittive** and normally, but not necessarily, aims at achieving interhuman **communication**. In another sense, though, it may be stated that the *ip* is reflexive, that *p* is the act (linked to its action) that established the evidential reference of *i* back to *w*. Performing the *i* might be the only method of testing whether the *i* is compatible with our view of *w* (i.e. w_a succeeded by w_i). At the stage of practice and rehearsal, a musician may be confined to testing the auditive outcome of his interpretation by (1) means of **listening**, i.e. **reflexively** (the musician may be alone with his instrument playing by himself); he may test his interpretation by (2) **imagining** a presumed audience or listener ('I will play the piece for my piano teacher'), or by (3) an **internal relating** to his conceptions and ideals (not only through auditive channels: proprioceptive, and more 'purely' cognitive), if not by the (4) 'normal' procedure of the listeners' **responding** to a *p*, including its 'feed-back' effects and reactions.

The detailed carrying through of formulas is no end in itself, but they are a useful and 'soft' formalization motivated merely for reasons of clarifying analysis.

Hermerén also provides an extensive list of concepts including various kinds of senders, objects, aspects, addressees and aims of interpretation suitable for combinations into a wealth of *a priori* possible constellations evidently corresponding to different approaches, stances, conscious or subconscious positions, that could all be further explicated and elaborated upon. The communicative structure would become even more diversified on the basis of the various types of interpretation that he presents (271–276). Despite its great interest to me, I will refrain from this, and instead focus momentarily on his crucial discussion of **criteria** and **arguments** as a point of reference for my analysis (MIR I ch. 6, and this study): namely, "That A is a *criterion* of B means that A is a sign of B." (277) It follows, according to Hermerén, that we can investigate whether A is the case in order to know if B is the case. In this sense A would imply B, ($A \rightarrow B$), if A is a sufficient condition; it may also, logically, be both sufficient and necessary. If A is an argument for (or against) B, it does not entail any logical necessity or sufficiency of the relation A to B; it simply means that A is a support for, or even on the contrary, that it speaks against B.

Principally then (in referring to O. Dahl and A. Trankell) Hermerén suggests, in cases of **historical truth–searching** interpretations, two criteria of **correspondence**, namely that the proposed interpretation shall be (1) "compatible [*"förenlig"*] with all (essential) known circumstances and well–confirmed [*"välbestyrkta"*] hypotheses", and (2) "the only one which is compatible with these circumstances and hypotheses" (277). Pertinent to criteria of correspondence is the idea that "the meaning [content; *"innebörd"*] of the interpretational hypothesis" determines the "circumstances" (*"förhållanden"*, [*omständigheter*]) and hypotheses against which it should primarily be tested, while the two criteria of the second kind, **coherency**, read as follows: The proposed interpretation shall be (1) "noncontradictory" (*"motsägelsefri"*), i.e. internally coherent, and (2) shall contribute to creating the "connection" (*"sammanhang"*). The imperative leads to (1) **rejection** of that i which is incompatible, or to (2) a **selection** of the i which is best compatible with the adduced argument.

Such arguments may be based on several grounds; the most relevant from Hermerén's listed categories are: (1) biographical, (2) historical, (3) contextual, (4) psychological, (5) matter–of–fact–oriented, (6) beholder (audience)–oriented, (7) normative, and (8) arguments of fruitfulness.

Biographical concordance with corroborated facts about the composer's (author's) aims and values may expand to wider sets of **historical**, social and cultural circumstances. If the proposed version creates a connection and a pattern which suits the known facts, and forms a unity, it may be a **contextual** argument. One may even adduce **psychological** arguments, according to Hermerén, concerning compatibility with common human experience or psychoanalytical theories, whereas such arguments are refuted in Celibidache's phenomenology, at least **in theory**. **Matters of fact** about the work, its reference or context may be included. Three of Hermerén's arguments are **oriented towards the beholder**, compatibility with the work's influence on a 'contemporary' audience of past epochs, the "normative" maximizing of the beholder's aesthetic enjoyment and the theoretical fruitfulness of applying a new method of interpretation.

In case of **conflicting criteria** the selection of an overriding system, based upon either its (1) historical or (2) aesthetical priority, may furnish its respective supporting sets of arguments, or provide the required means of distinction: the main method of choice is to **discard** interpretations that are contrary to documented facts, in the case of category 1, or to **select** the interpretation which maximizes aesthetical value (in the case of category 2).

Many **plausible** or, for other reasons, prospective versions, including very **visionary** ones, often become discarded, i.e. excluded from the set of options due to practical reasons such as a limited instrumental or vocal technique. This limits the choice and leads to necessary **compromises** between physical, logical, physiological and aesthetic and/or artistic reasons. Can a compromise between technical constraints and interpretive intentions yield an aesthetically and artistically satisfying or cognitively convincing result? This question remains to be answered.

On the level of the aesthetic ideal, the interpreter can answer this question by **accepting** or **rejecting** compromises between *i* and 'technique'. Essentially, if the **human component** in the artist's concept of interpretation dominates over the **technical component** these may become congruent in the interpretive outcome of the performance.

II:2 PHILOSOPHY OF INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: A BACKGROUND ORIENTATION IN THE FORM OF AN OUTLINE TO A HISTORY OF IDEAS ON THE 'REPRODUCTION' VIS-A-VIS 'INTERPRETATION' OF MUSIC, INCLUDING POINTS OF REFERENCE IN 'CLASSICAL' PHILOSOPHY REVIEWED FROM A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE. A PRESENTATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM AS A CONTRIBUTION TO AN ONTOLOGY OF MUSICAL REPRODUCTION VERSUS INTERPRETATION. INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE AESTHETICS OF PERFORMANCE IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS

Performance practice focuses on history, whereas interpretation is chiefly a matter of contemporary aesthetics. Concurrently, performance practice may face the basic problem of authenticity as historical truth including its reproduction in our time; and it may give preliminary replies to these problems as an operative basis for contemporary music performance. The crucial question therein is how to conceive of such notions as **freedom**, **relation** and **continuity** in view of the specific demands arising out of the reality of artistic conditions, as well as from the perspective of listeners' actuality of experience. It seems necessary to regard **reproduction** as a guarantee for reasonable **historical objectivity**, at least to the extent of **securing the identity of the work**, whereas interpretation deals with the more subjective aspects of realizing the

indeterminable or merely weakly indicated parameters of the score.

Stephan Nachtsheim points to the need for formulating the fundamentals for the historical research of "Aufführungspraxis" as an ontology of musical 'reproduction', which allegedly is the more neutral term he prefers in his dissertation².

It is important to distinguish between "reproduction" and "interpretation". However, it is not clear from Nachtsheim in what way "reproduction" is more neutral than "interpretation". "Reproduction" can even be misleading in that it suggests a view of the reproducer as taking part creatively in the production of the work to the same extent as the composer. "Reproduction", though, has the merit of **neutrality** as far as the question of subjectivity versus objectivity is concerned (ch. III:4); apparently Nachtsheim conceives of "interpretation" as having more subjective components.

In contrast, I would propose that "interpretation" has the merit of acknowledging the necessary **participation of the subject** in its encounter and involvement with the object, thus corresponding more closely to the constitution of 'phenomenological' reality, whereas "reproduction" runs the risk of misleading the reader to believe that the process of performance is only a matter of mechanical sequences of events (possibly causally connected). Intuiting this concept would also include a determination of "subject" versus "subjectivity", which Nachtsheim does not clearly distinguish between. "Subjectivity", I propose, can refer to "subject" without entailing any arbitrariness; one of my leading arguments in this study is that it is possible to objectify the amount of subjectivity in interpretive acts, to become aware of their target, direction and point of departure, thus enabling one to learn to master the component of subjectivity as a well-poised artistic component in performance.

The need for **ontological foundations in musical performance theory** is justified by Nachtsheim's criticism of the status of historical research, which he considers to be "Erforschung der historischen Aufführungsgewohnheiten ohne [...] gleichzeitig eine brauchbare wissenschaftstheoretische Grundlegung dieses Forschungszweiges."

The problems presented by Nachtsheim (7) which relate to our investigation are concentrated around the concept of **reproduction**. Which invariants are constitutive of the ever-changing modes of reproduction and thereby guarantee the identity of the work? What is the basic foundation ("*Grundverfassung*") of musical reproduction? What in performance is musical reproduction?

Ideas about "Reproduction" in the History of Philosophy

This survey aims only to provide a historical background to the concepts relevant to our subject; I do not claim to have presented any new results of historical research.

Plato's *mimesis* as a representation of reality refers to a simple appearance, evaluated as false, whereas *phantasma* refers to the form of such an appearance. Mimesis is "Darstellung des sinnlich Erscheinenden im Wieseines Erscheinens"⁶: This is a "herausstellende Wiederholung", i.e. an imitation in the sense that the "how" of the phenomenon appears through sensory qualities only. The performer's role is passive in contrast to that of the modern interpreter who assimilates, potentiates and actively projects an explanation of the work into reality ("potenziertes Herausbringen", ISchüssler, p.c.8.4&2.11.92). Nachtsheim reviews the history of ideas in search of fragments that can contribute to his analysis of reproduction. Plato's view focuses on the composer who projects his ideas. These are taken over by the interpreter who transmits them further to the beholder. In his *Ion* Plato determines the art of the rhapsodist who relates two roles (the poet as producer and the rhapsodist as reproducer) to one other; one presents something, and the other takes it over and by the act of transmitting bestows it upon others. There is already a useful distinction between creation and performance, between the performance and the performed. (MGG 10:1336ff; 5:840–881)

Interpretation, freely applying Aristotle's concepts, would entail interposing the "*meson*" between the work and its realization in a concrete and determined soundshape. This idea requires a *tertium comparationis*; if this "*meson*" (Schüssler 1982:18–23) can be understood as a method by which to relate music to the mind through human measures, this latter concept may be thought to stand for instrumental causality: the laws of nature appear through the physical conditions of the musical instruments. Aristotle's objectivistic physicalism, e.g. his notion of time referring to the physical now, allows 'natural reproduction', the manifestation of potentiality in actuality, but permits merely a limited analysis of the scope of rhythmical phenomena, and consequentially excludes the interpretive view. (MGG 1:36ff)

However, scattered instructions to the members of choir on how to sing show that the central concept of harmony ("*armonia*"), which was the aesthetic standard for Plato and Aristotle, refers to the relation of the parts to the whole. So the concept of harmony was applied to both production and reproduction.

It reveals an identical criterion for quality considered universally valid. If the subject of interpretation was the world, then this was also the identical point of reference for both composer and performer. On the contrary, if performance was classified – as later by Quintilian (MGG 10:1818) – under the heading of the practical arts ("*praktikai*"), it was completely exhausted in their "actus" and therefore lacked, in its transitoriness, the permanence of other objects pertaining to the world.

In the writings of Augustine (354–430; MGG 1:848ff), the Pythagorean idea of the number as an aesthetic and cosmological principle is expressed in the concept of '**proportion**'. The duality of hearable and non-hearable music is characteristic of the Middle Ages, which otherwise leaves few historical traces regarding matters of performance. A common opinion during this period is that the music theorist, the scholar, is the "true" musician at the top of the hierarchy, whereas the practical musician resides on a basic level in the general scheme and ranking order: musicologist–composer–performer. The reproducer ("*cantor*") only uses his talent and practical skill, without being a real "*musicus*": he simply adapts the rules of "*ars mechanica*".

During the Middle Ages, *harmonia* became the determining feature of the cosmos and of the arts (cf. Boethius 480?–524; MGG 2:49ff), with which reference to the universal aspect of the material as well as the organized spiritual world. Man discovers and imitates, but does not create *harmonia* – only God can do that – as a reflection of the creative unity of God; there is an **endless unity in the principium primum**, and all beauty is created by "*artifex divinus*". The created world thus serves as a model for musical art.

Tinctoris (1435–1511; MGG 13:418ff), who largely follows Aristotle, breaks away from the idea of the cosmological music of the spheres. A new view of music emerges, focusing on (1) the '**well-formedness**' of the musical organism, and (2) the bases for the allegedly **objective cosmological laws** that were transposed down to the subject level of music. Empirical musicology liberates itself from speculative theory and concentrates on creative composing and practical musicianship. The obstacles to a theory of reproduction are withdrawn at this point.

Kant (1724–1804; MGG 7:550ff) endeavored to find a cogent and definitive foundation of both science – through theoretical judgement – and art – through aesthetic judgement. The objective of autonomy in respect to the artistic aspect during the Renaissance was legitimized philosophically by Kant in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*.⁴

Mimetic representation, between the work and its performance, following Kant, becomes a **relation between the object and the human subject**. The absolute, i.e. instrumental music, leaves room for the mind to apprehend the music in the freedom required for its beauty to appear. The **category of relation** is at stake when music ties isolated tones together into melody or harmony, or connects them in such a way as to incite or **manifest cohesive aesthetic ideas that unite parts into beautiful wholes**. How then is this possible? Kant introduces the category of relation in his *Kritik der Urteilkraft*. According to Kant, the beautiful exists only in relation to the human subject, and this is also true in the case of artwork, to the extent that it is beautiful. By definition then, in order for an artwork to exist, it must be both produced and interpreted by man. There is no other way to establish an aesthetic relation. The **'processuality' of both production and interpretation**, which must occur in time, corresponds clearly to the basic **temporality of music** as an art.

The concept of reproduction was determined descriptively by Hegel (1770–1831). He proves the necessity of the concept of reproduction as a central and well-grounded factor within philosophic aesthetics. Hegel formulates the idea that **all arts which depend on an ephemeral and transient material depend on reproduction**: due to the momentariness of certain arts such as music and poetry reading, reproduction becomes necessary since their 'materiality' is considered deficient. This is a negative determination of the concept of reproduction, whereas interpretation is positively determined. The derivation of the reproduction concept from the transitoriness of the existence of the work is criticized by Nachtsheim: "Momenthaftigkeit [ist] weder eine zufällige Eigenschaft noch gar einen Mangel". In contrast, it is "eine höhere Stufe der Subjektivierung des Naturalen" (Nachtsheim, 17) or a Hegelian "Entwicklung des absoluten Geistes", "eine höhere Entfaltungsstufe des absoluten Geistes, eine bewusstseinsgeschichtliche Höherwertigkeit." Nachtsheim contends that "nicht die Eigenschaften des Materials bestimmen letztlich die Reproduktionsbedürftigkeit einer Kunst, sondern die besondere Form der Subjektivität, die sich jeweils des Materials bemächtigt, um ihrer selbst ansichtig zu werden. Weil die Musik die subjektive Innerlichkeit selbst zum Ausdruck bringe, sei ihr eine Weise der Präsentation angemessen, die selbst unmittelbar 'Mitteilung eines lebendigen Subjekts' ist". The purpose is this: "das subjektive Innere selbst [but for whom?] zum Ausdruck zu bringen." (17)

Hegel positively values the **performer as artist**, to whom he grants a certain degree of freedom, which varies according to the composition. Thus,

Hegel acknowledges two features of the performance situation: (1) **fidelity**, and (2) **extreme freedom**, both of which are legitimized. Their appropriate use is controlled by the degree of **compositional integration**. Nachtsheim doubts that the standpoint of faithfulness is abandoned as the musician pursues his participation in freedom: he finds it "Zweifelhaft, ob die Haltung der Texttreue aufgegeben wird, wenn sich der Musiker die Freiheiten nimmt" (18). It is unclear what kind of internal subjectivity is brought out in the performance, that of the interpreter or of the composer. If both, they must be compatible. But the question of how the identity of the work behind the diversity of interpretations can be guaranteed remains unsolved (Beardsley 1975:234ff, MGG 16:623ff).

The **human will** (cf. Schopenhauer 1788–1860; MGG 12:43ff), expresses itself sensitively and in all aspects of music as an outcome of the essence of the world. The **expressive tension**, as in Wagner's *Tristan*, directly propels the course of human emotions during the drama. This tension is forced into the **opposition between *ratio* and *emotio*** in the conception of Nietzsche (1844–1900; MGG 9:1521ff).

Husserl analyzes the **passive synthesis of assimilation** in the work, and recognizes the importance of the **consciousness of internal time** as a condition for the **rendering of the work in the experiential time flow**. He thoroughly penetrates the basics of musical time consciousness in an extensive phenomenological analysis of a single tone coming into existence from a projected intention and directed towards the future, prevailing and then disappearing into the shadows of memory in the past while new tones continuously enter into existence (Huss. X).

The performer is entirely in the service of the work and oriented towards it, according to the Heideggerians. Through the beholder's **directed *intentio***, **inherent in man's being**, man opens himself, to various degrees, depending on the competence and appropriateness of his intentionality, to the world and receives the work gestalted as an *intentum* through the manner in which it presents itself to his consciousness. Man, through listening, is addressed by the tone, through which the earth opens itself up materially. The musical work is "ereignishaft" (Schüssler). In Heidegger's *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, the **truth is the mode of existence that takes a position in the work**, and is carried by it, whereas Gadamer concentrates on the process of explicating the text ("*hermein*"), which comprises both historical reconstruction and ontological integration.

Nicolai Hartmann determines reproduction as a **realization of a layer in**

the work which remains 'unreal' in the "*Vorlage*" (prescriptive model of the score or original constituting the w). The reality and perceptibility of the work is essential and indispensable if the work is to become an aesthetic object. The "reproducer" thus participates in the final creation ("*endgültige Ausgestaltung*") of the foreground of the work in a way similar to the conception of Heinrich Schenker (ch. II:7). Due to the **necessary indeterminacy of the score**, the performer is awarded a certain degree of freedom, following Hartmann. In spite of the fact that the performer depends in his choices on the composers' intentions, the concretization of the work belongs to the performer. In agreement with the literary theory of Weller and Warren, Hartmann allows the **identity of the work** to be multiplied by the occurrence of **different interpretations**; or more radically formulated by Nachtsheim, "die Identität des Werkes zerfällt in die Reihe seiner verschiedenen Interpretationen". I do not agree with Nachtsheim's formulation on this point, since in the end this would yield a multitude of works which were never compositionally created.

Furthermore, the score warrants the persistence of tradition and the endless **reproducibility** of the work precisely because it uses what is left over for its preservation – but it lacks concreteness: "Diese Konkretheit und Anschaulichkeit wird durch die Kunst des Musikers gewährleistet. Der höhere Objektivationsgrad (des Ineinsbildens von Vordergrund und Hintergrund) muss aber mit dem Preis der Augenblicklichkeit und Vergänglichkeit bezahlt werden." (Nachtsheim, 21) The central core in Hartmann's **reproduction theory**, then, is his **theory of layers**⁵. He gives the grounds for why the work cannot be aesthetically perceived without performance, by proposing conditions that must be fulfilled as concerns the "Erscheinungsverhältnisse" of the layers of foreground to those of the background ("*Vorder/Hintergrundschrift*"). The musician must shape the sounding foreground in such a way that its background can appear without residuals. Musicologically, the close parallel to – or coincidence with – the Schenker theory and its bearing on performance is worth noting, especially regarding Furtwängler (ch. IV:2:2). It should also be noted that Sergiu Celibidache was among the students of Hartmann (Weiler 1993:12).

Nachtsheim refers to Johannes Volkelt as a modern aesthetician focusing on the **transmittive function** of reproduction:⁶ "Der Gestaltungswille des Künstlers ist ein Wille zur Mitteilung. Um sich mitteilen zu können, ist der Künstler aber auf den Umweg über die Natur angewiesen, d.h. er muss eine Versinnlichung der künstlerischen Idee leisten." Because of the link to material properties due to their written fixation in notation, it is necessary for recipients

to make artworks accessible through "sinnliche Vergegenwärtigung durch die künstlerische Tätigkeit" (19). The notation is necessary for preserving the work, thus guaranteeing its identity, as well as for making an endless series of artistic reproductions possible – but notation, in the view of Volkelt, has no artistic character, in contrast to Graziosi for whom notation is also a graphical art (ch. II:5). Hence, music is characterized by being a **transmission between creator and auditor**, connected by two intermediary arts, that of fixation in notes (notation) and that of performance. Aesthetically, then, reproduction in art has two components: the **concretization** (individualizing) of the work and the **gestalting** of it in p. But the problems of the identity of the work and that of the relation between score and performance are not treated extensively by Volkelt.

This, in particular the view of Hartmann, should be compared to that of Ingarden who starts by asserting the unwavering identity of the work as one delimited aesthetic object, to which various differing performances can be related. Ingarden must be acknowledged for his analysis of the ontological structure of the musical object, but he fails to secure the basis for the important 'subjective' perspective in the encounter between musician and work.

According to Nachtsheim it is the deficiencies of neokantianism that have prevented the development of a theory of musical reproduction. The concept of interpretation forwarded by Nachtsheim allegedly bases its philosophical foundation on the aesthetics of Richard Höningwald and Gerd Wollandt. Its notional components include the epistemological priority of the concept of validity ("*Geltungsbegriff*" 23), a critical transcendentalism and a theory of facts which acknowledges the independence of objects as 'objectivity of nature'. This monadic trait, which might sound outdated to Anglo-Saxon readers, is shown in the view of the concrete subject alone as the sole legitimized carrier of transcendental functions: "Die Monade ist Grundkorrelat des Inbegriffs der Gegenstände" (24). In his own words Nachtsheim claims to have made a "kritische Synthese von Geltungslehre, Subjektivitätstheorie und Gegenstandstheorie", which is close to the fusion of the validational and structural aspects proposed by Höningwald: "Die spezifische Zeitlichkeit des Erlebens geprägte Ganzheit" (cited from Nachtsheim, 24). However, the fact that "die Gestalt dank ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur Subjektivität und dank ihrer Erlebnisbestimmtheit nicht dem Horizont der Natur [sich] einfügen lässt" (25) is problematic. It is hard to see how this philosophic arsenal can clarify the notions of musical reproduction versus interpretation, all the more since

Hönigswald reputedly does not give any explicit theory of musical performance or artistic reproduction. But Nachtsheim holds that the monadologic philosophy of transcendence would be essential for such theoretical endeavors, which I seriously doubt. The subject seems to have been confused by an attempt to reconcile incompatible philosophical systems, neither of them fundamentally based on an unprejudiced inquiry into the matter of reproduction and interpretation itself. The vaguely suggested system of thought seems to lack any origin in the reality of the musical experience.

Nonetheless Nachtsheim advances "reproduction", with some justification, as a fundamental concept in an aesthetics of performance (26). This concept implies (1) the **reproducibility** of the work, and its preparedness to be repeatedly reproduced on elective points of historical progress, and (2) the purported **neutrality** and **objectivity** of a basically non-creative rendering of the artwork as a given entity. By admitting his intention to complete the allegedly deficient philosophy of Hönigswald, Nachtsheim avowedly justifies his introduction of the concept of reproduction and exposes the incompleteness of his theoretical construction through this dependence. It is an illegitimate simplification to subsume all problems related to reproduction under the structure "Schöpfer-Werk-Geniessender" (26), as he attempts.

The question relevant to the value of Nachtsheim's investigation is this: How can the seemingly insurmountable distance between **philosophy and art** be overcome? And the distance between **musicology and music**? He attempts to justify his philosophical investigation by reference to the vague notion of "*Geschmacksurteil*", taste judgement or aesthetic judgement, which he, inconsistently, holds to be an untheoretical concept. On the contrary, it is heavily theory-laden. Untheoretical correlates to experience are wanted by natural science in order to secure objective observability; but the neutrality, and even the existence of such correlates, can be questioned. It can be claimed, I submit, that notions graspable by human intention necessarily are 'theoretical', if not explicitly, then implicitly. The difference is principally between the notion of objectivity within the horizon of the world of an artwork and the notion of objectivity as it refers to natural (physical) objects; and Nachtsheim considers "*Vorwissen*" of this to be essential, or at least important: "Der Rang der fachwissenschaftlichen Leistung [ist] von der Sensibilität für Kunst abhängig" (28). Judgements of taste cannot be reduced to scientific judgements of reason or empiricism. It is therefore a great failure to deprive musicologists of their sense of taste in the

name of science, as I have argued earlier (MIR I:115 *et passim*); furthermore, "Als Forderung ist also die Vorgängigkeit des ästhetischen Urteils durchaus festzuhalten: Die wissenschaftliche Aufgabe [...] besteht [...] nicht darin, in allen seinen Erscheinungsformen und Zusammenhängen so zu erfassen, wie es den Forderungen theoretischer Objektivität und Universalität entspricht." (26) For Nachtsheim **intentionality** is closely related to **transcendence**: "Nur sofern das Subjekt auf einen Gegenstand gerichtet ist, kommt ihm Subjektivität (Transzendentalität) zu [...]: überall hat der Gegenstand seine Bestimmtheit im Hinblick auf ein Denken, und überall bezieht der Geist seine Dignität aus der Gegenstandsgerichtetheit" (39).

Indeterminacy is derived from the fundamental correlative relation subject–object: This correlation "bleibt [...] unterbestimmt" (40): "Nur in differenzierter und materialiter artikulierter Form ist die Grundbeziehung in concreto" completely determinable: "Die Vollbestimmung führt auf eine Reihe von Abwandlungen der Fundamentalkorrelation". The constituents of the fundamental correlation (*Grundkorrelation*) – subject, object, relation, validity – are differentiated and marked by a distinguishing intentionality, i.e. the **fundamental correlation depends on intentionality**.

Nachtsheim states that manifestations of subjectivity, "Index der Subjektivität" (44) – such as non-scientific literature, mimics, gestics, and artworks – are not only determinants of subjectivity, as natural objects toward which the subject is directed from the perspective of 'phenomenological reference to the consciousness' ("*Ichbezogenheit*", in fact a kind of intentional reflexivity), but are also determined by subjectivity ("*Ichbestimmtheit*").

Performance depends partly on practical implementation involving a **practical intention** ("*praktisches Vermeinen*") as opposed to **theoretical intention**. This practical intention relates to something dependent, says Nachtsheim: "Von der Theorie unterscheidet sich das praktische Vermeinen dadurch, dass es sich nicht auf ein Unabhängiges bezieht, das gegen sein Erfasstwerden indifferent bleibt, sondern auf einen Gegenstand, der seinen Bestand erst durch dieses Vermeinen gewinnt." (45)

Common experiences of musicianship would not support Nachtsheim's statement that "in der Praxis das Denken auf das Subjekt selbst richtet [gerichtet ist]". He proposes that practical thinking is "*Selbstkonstitution*", which would only require "Anschluss an die Weltorientierung" without being determined by it ("ohne dass freilich [die Weltorientierung] den intentionalen Sinn [der

Selbstkonstitution] erschöpfen oder gar nur bestimmen könnte." (45) The subject projects out in the world; this "*Hinausgreifen*" Nachtsheim designates "*praktischen Entwurf*". Why does it project into the future, as Nachtsheim proposes by stating "Im Selbstentwurf entspringt ein 'projektiver' (in die Zukunft hinein vermeinter) Gegenstand" (46)? A reason for this would be that projecting into an existing object in the present world would bring the practical intentionality back into a subject-object relation between what is given by the world, entailing a reduction of the scientific approach. It is interesting to notice that from this insecure proposal, Nachtsheim concludes: "Das Subjekt gewinnt sich aus seiner Zukunft indem es seine Zukunft bewirkt"; in a similar way Sergiu Celibidache explains his notion of **transcendentality**: "In meiner Zukunft wiederfinde ich mich", "In der Musik ist dann ein Ton da, weil er nicht da ist" (MIRIV:180–182 *et pass*); and the speculative interval theory of Ansermet (1961 / 87:232) suggests the **musical mind** (Mm) as the point of reference for his crossworking parameters of **past-future** and **passivity-activity** ("*passé passif*" a1–d1, "*futur passif*" a1–d2, "*passé actif*" a1–e1, and "*futur actif*" a1–e2; ch.IV:2:1). The background premise is that of the **original temporality of the subject**. It is questionable to subscribe to Nachtsheim's tendency to constitute the world from separated subjects. He is close to a solipsism that, I claim, can be avoided; "Der Entwurfsgehalt ist nur von dem jeweils einzelnen entwerfenden Subjekt zu vollziehen, der Gegenstand ist hier allenthalben mein Gegenstand und 'nur' der meine, weil letztlich 'ich selbst' dieser Gegenstand bin." By this approach, I fear, we shall never reach the unity and coincidence of various individual views.

But I agree that the **projecting activity of the subject** evokes **endless realization** within the frame of one cognitively coherent consciousness that maintains a unity of experience; and the degree of determination would increase with the number of experienced i-perspectives on the 'same' object, i.e. objects assigned as identical: "der Abstand zwischen der Mundanität des Subjekts und seinen idealen Möglichkeiten bleibt unaufgehoben" (47): "Jeder verwirklichte Entwurf [...] wird zu einem Sachverhalt in der Welt" (47). So the projective intentionality is creative, and a condition in interpreting the composition (48): "die ästhetische Einstellung begründet die Bestimmtheit ihres Gegenstandes" (48). This **projective act of consciousness constitutes the musical object**, but it neither refers to itself nor projects into the future: "sie ist nach aussen gewendet". "Gegenstandsbestimmtheit und Erlebnisbestimmtheit fallen im ästhetischen Objekt [Gestalt] zusammen" (49), i.e. "*esse*" is "*percipi*". The "Gestalt" is only to be found in experience, but it is still more than only

experience, since it has a positive relation to nature; the gestalt appears "präsentuell", "nur im Vollzug, Erleben" and it connects temporally different elements into an easily graspable structure ("einem überschaubaren Gebilde", 49). The intention directed towards the gestalt fuses with the originally different entity by providing a continuous connection.

Compare this with scientific thought. The objects of scientific observation are independent, autonomous. Theoretical judgement entails the validity of an object and its validity for all subjects (the claim of universality). Separate subjects involved in the same network of object-relations are **intersubjectively** connected by the same goal for their intentional acts: "die intersubjektive Gültigkeit einer jeden Einzelsetzung [51] impliziert auch die Forderung nach universaler Kohärenz der Einzelbestimmungen untereinander."

Knowledge about another's internal subject (internality) must be transmitted by an intermediary object to me as beholder; it cannot be known directly (52). And it must be an object that brings out a subjectively produced gestalt (shape) "durch die Subjektivität produzierte gestalthafte Gliederung". "Nur durch Gestaltung kann Geist in fremde Materie gebunden werden" which should be regarded as an outcome of the "objektivation" idea by Hartmann (1966:93ff, 121–125, 229).

BEARINGS ON PRACTICAL AESTHETIC IDEALS AND IDEAS OF PERFORMANCE

The manifoldness of differently sounding manifestations are understood by common sense as performances of an identical work. It is obvious, says Nachtsheim, that notation warrants this identity of the reproduced, and provides the basis for many various performances (93–94), whereas technical reproduction by a phonogram, by a repeated rendering of the "same" "manifestation", is also possible.

The status of first performance and its authenticity

It is not possible, according to Nachtsheim, to claim a special position, i.e. an ontological status, for first performances, apart from their designating of a pure historical point in the "*Rezeptionsgeschichte*" or "*Werkgeschichte*". The first performance can become the model for later performances but this requires separate justification in the form of independent motivation with supportive

arguments for the priority of its particular properties (qualities) as compared to other performances, which could become models on their own merits.

The designation of "authentic interpretation" for the performance by the composer would be paradoxical. In what way would a performance be "authentic" if it is unclear what kind of performance an 'unauthentic' p would be: Performances by those other than the composer cannot reasonably be called "unauthentic". To dichotomize the concept of "interpretation" into **authentic** and **unauthentic** areas would require a clear motivation; and how would this be possible by independent argument connected to the factor of personal union between composer and performer? Why would the performance by the composer of a notated work be more valid than a performance of the same work by another performer, presupposing that the notational system has clearly defined indications?

The question of authenticity consequently must be derived from more basic determinations – namely, postulates Nachtsheim, from notation. But this determination is not sufficient, and, Nachtsheim's proposal (95) that all works – and even an improvisation – that can be performed must also be notatable, is not convincing: It is correct but trivial that unnotated music (e.g. that from the oral tradition) can also be performed. So notation is no prerequisite for performance, which can also take place from memory. But the performance itself cannot be fully determined by notation. Only certain aspects can be indicated by notation. The aspects that remain undetermined by notation are the ones we are prone to designate as interpretative involving factors such as the detailed shaping of dynamics, the grading of accents, and the subtle rhythmical agogics, etc., in both performance and notation.

By way of Nicolai Hartmann's notion there is a **twofold objectiveness**, in notation and in performance. The prevailing notation contrasts with the transient (ephemeric) performance. Remarkably, we derive our aesthetical judgement and experience from the latter, in spite of its disappearing "*Verlaufsgestalt*" (Nachtsheim 96; Hartmann 1966:118ff).

The 'Quality' of Interpretation: unity of gestalt in performance

The artistic concept of a gestalt, manifested in imagination, has a certain affinity to the practical, since lack of practical skill will obstruct the implementation of the artistic concept. The materialization will become deficient or incomplete even if the concept was an optimal gestalt (116).

Under the headline "*Mitgestalten*" Nachtsheim focuses on the **unity** brought about by the **connection of gestalting**; it is "eine optimale Einheit, d.h. überschaubarkeit des Manifestierten", which depends on the part of an entity (w, i, or, p(i)) being (1) a part of the whole ("Glied einer Ganzheit") and (2) the order of perspicacious elements in concreteness ("die Anordnung der anschaulichen Elemente in der Konkretion"). This is the phenomenon of "Determinationskraft der Gestalt", which creates its own validity in concreteness ("*geltungspositive Konkretion*"). The artistic quality level of "*Mitgestalten*" depends on the adequacy of completion in relation to the composition ("Adäquatheit der Ergänzungen im Verhältnis zur Komposition"). Nachtsheim states only one criterion, but a supreme one: "Die Art und Weise, wie jeweils Einheit der Gestaltung erreicht wird: dies ist das entscheidende, im Geschmacksurteil anzuwendende Kriterium für die Bedeutung der Interpretation." The general aim of a performance, he justly proposes, is to achieve "ein Optimum an Gestaltungseinheit" (141).

Exemplifying with the popular question of tempo, Nachtsheim states, that "sein optimales Tempo, d.h. einen optimales Zeitwert seines Ablaufs, der sich zwar physikalisch bestimmen lässt, letztlich aber als Funktion der Ichbestimmtheit". This should be compared to the concept of tempo as a purely experiential quality in the view of Sergiu Celibidache and Ernest Ansermet; this 'internal tempo' cannot be measured physically. We have different concepts of tempo to deal with and to clarify within interpretation research. As a matter of definition, tempo need not be subjectively psychological. Still, in an objectivistic "theory" of the phenomenological kind, it is outside the world of physical entities, and, therefore cannot be described by concepts of physical science, such as "second", "millisecond" etc.

Nachtsheim uses the concept of "*Nachentwurf*" hinting at the completion (Ergänzung) of the composition as a scheme. Such a postcompositional concept is always related to the present; it has "*Präsenzbezogenheit*". It focuses on the **internal relations** within the entity, and it warrants an "ästhetisch überschaubare Abwägen der gestaltimmanenten Relationen." So the congenial interpretation shows an optimum of "*gegliederte Einheit*" (142), which Nachtsheim derives from an "Allgemeinheit des Geschmacksurteils" (143). But while he makes no attempt to provide a foundation for this aesthetical judgement, the argument must be a failure (What is his "*Geschmacksurteil*"?). It must be possible to concretize the conditions for such an "*Optimum an gegliederte Einheit*" or to give some hints on how this can be achieved practically, so that a situation can be

created in which a listener can "test" his experience of this quality of unit while relying solely on his phenomenologically sensitive and assimilative musical consciousness. The borderless subjectivity which Nachtsheim conceives of as "subjektive Allgemeinheit und Notwendigkeit" of "der reine Geschmacksurteil anderen Subjekten" (143) requires "*Zustimmung*" from others in order to attain its validity and become "die gültige Interpretation" (143) that he envisions. I consider it questionable whether this "*Geschmacksurteil*" must necessarily be undetermined in the way Nachtsheim proposes.

It is also hard to see why it would be impossible to shape congenial interpretation within the patterns given by historical restrictions imposed by authenticity research (*Aufführungspraxis*) without aiming at authenticity in the present, actual performance. But Nachtsheim is acute in his denial of the aesthetic importance of this research tradition: "Jede Streit um die Anwendung historischer Aufführungspraktiken [ist] von philosophischer Seite her betrachtet als *sinnlos*"; because in such a performance "verfehlt völlig das Wesen des Mitgestalten, den autonomen *Geltungssinn der Konkretion*." A performance legitimizes itself only through the validity of its meaning at the moment of performance, a point on which I agree. But does this really entail that "*Mitgestalten*" exactly must become the decisive criterion? Nachtsheim constantly refers back to the undefined and vague entity of "*Geschmack*", i.e. back into the subjective diversity of a multiplicity of alternatives; which to me constitutes nearly total arbitrariness if not to aesthetic anarchy. this arbitrariness is also entailed in his proposal to include even performances of lesser quality – on what I would classify as the second and third levels of importance – in the history of performance. Such uncritical inclusion can be done only by music sociologists, who legitimately focus on musical life broadly in society without claiming to account for the artistic aspects of quality in performance: "Die zweit- oder drittrangige Leistung zählt deshalb mit, denn auch sie ist *einzigartiger Ausdruck*." It is in my opinion wrong to accept every trial as an interpretation of the work in performance, and most musicians would certainly **not** accept their rehearsals as full renderings of the work, or claim that their practice sessions should attain status in the history of music, which is what Nachtsheim's standpoint effectively implies. The lack of aesthetic criteria in the investigations of Nachtsheim shows here its negative sequels (191).

INTERPRETATION AS EXISTENTIAL HERMENEUTICS

The basic postulations that musical interpretation depends on human experiences which the musician shares with other beings merit critical review. Sergiu Celibidache rejects Heidegger's philosophy as a basis for the art of musical performance, and J.-Claude Piguet questions Heidegger's 'musicality', i.e. his ability to understand and treat fruitfully musical questions. On the other hand Ingeborg Schüssler argues fervently for the possibility of a fundamental ontological hermeneutics of music, on Heideggerian grounds. In so doing she provides an important incitement to a philosophical aesthetics of music outside the frames of a cognitive theory of musical interpretation. Comments on music are remarkably few in *Sein und Zeit*⁷, but more rewarding in a few other works (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*), illuminated by Ferrara (ch. II:3).

Still, hermeneutics as a method of understanding, which necessarily includes interpreting texts in the light of their historical context, completes a long tradition of biblical exegesis, which in only a very restricted way can be considered relevant to our investigation.

Concerning existential hermeneutics, Per-Johan Ödman⁸ points to the connectedness between interpretation and time. Heidegger's "understanding" refers to the future, and projects into it. It has "*Entwurfscharakter*" and concerns the nature of understanding. We are 'understanding' in the now, from the perspective of present time and from facts that appear to us in the present situation to which we are bound by "*Befindlichkeit*". And we understand within an entity of relations which are already understood; we understand from what we understand ("*Bewandtnisganzheit*"); I admit this sounds as circular as Carl Lesche's words to me (p.c.): "We must understand in order to be able to understand" ("Vi måste förstå för att kunna förstå"). We are interconnected and intertwined with things in the world by our understanding of the function and instrumentality of things in our surroundings. This is shown to us by examples in the world. Interpreting is exposing what we already have understood; the thing is seen as an instrument to us, because it displays itself as such in front of us. According to Gadamer⁹ the open encounter between man and artwork is an existential confrontation within the frame of a common cultural horizon. The subject-object dichotomy is not acknowledged, since the work appears as experienced phenomenon or even as a subject. The interpretation process occurs only when we let a world open itself in front of us (21).

In the history of interpretation, a pertinent problem had always been to overcome dogmatism in early theological exegesis. The original pattern of interpretation was developed within the hermeneutics of biblical exegesis, according to Palmer¹⁰, and then differentiated into a method under the pressure of more precise demands within philology and jurisdiction.

Schleiermacher's divinatory method, which aimed to reconstruct the author's meaning, necessitates the transforming of oneself into the other person (Palmer, 90). His project was to reach a general method of understanding through interpreting.

Due to a structural similarity and a certain universality of the human mind, it is possible within the humanities, following Dilthey (Palmer 98ff; MGG 15:1797ff), to understand our human object of study from inside. There is a basic identity among human being as a result of the common endowment of this capacity, i.e. the fact that man is enabled to understand. The researcher can not only gain insight into others, but also reach a more profound understanding of himself precisely through understanding others.

To interpret is to decipher signs ("Att tolka är att tyda tecken", Ödman, 44), and to indicate or declare meaning through saying that we see something as something. If you cannot see the famous rabbit-duck of Wittgenstein as a duck, you have not understood that your seeing the figure as a rabbit is an interpretation: your interpretation is not seen as interpretation. In order to be able to survey the various interpretive alternatives, you have to realize that your *prima facie* view of the object is an interpretation and only such. Following Ödman, to interpret is to select an aspect towards the occurrence (45).

The process leading to an overview occurs unconsciously and immediately as an intersubjective mutual agreement, but it can evidently be focused upon in a self-critical review after the first attempt to understand the object. An important and subtle task would be to investigate the role of culturally assimilated knowledge or to acquire competence in pre-comprehension as a condition of this allegedly unconscious first, preliminary act of interpreting through perception of one's sense data. Principally, we are forced into an awareness of the interpretive act and into an investigation of its different parts only insofar as we recognize (and after having recognized) the unreasonable or unpalatable result of our interpretive attempt in a situation where it is obvious that something has gone wrong. Consequently, given this view, recognition of the object's identity would be a primordial intentional act, perceptive rather than interpretive and reflective. This assumption leads to a reconsideration of

other alternatives, testing their reasonability and plausibility against coherence and contradiction criteria. In his attempt to clarify the act of interpretation, Ödman makes several valuable distinctions. The interpretation (1) adopts a specific perspective towards the phenomenon or its object (thus defining the), and before understanding its meaning we (2) confer and (3) uncover the meaning of the interpretive object. Within the time perspective, interpretation is bound to time, dependent on its point of departure, but it has freedom in its appearance either towards (1) a retrospective or (2) a prospective direction of time (46). Among the "hierarchical order" (50) of interpretive categories that Ödman recognizes, he distinguishes (1) elementary, (2) accountive, (3) scientific and (4) theoretical interpretations. In particular, he points at the dependence of interpretation on **totalization** and **focusing** (51) and divides paradigm situations or modes of interpretation into (1) utterance (emittive, as I would propose for the category of "*sägande*" in Ödman), (2) explanation and (3) translation. The criteria for these divisions remain partly hidden and they are drawn from a consideration of the literature only. It is not yet clear to what extent these distinctions can be adopted by a general aesthetic theory of interpretation, or by theories of interpretation specific to each art. The aim of Ödman, however, is to clarify the process of understanding according to hermeneutics. It is important that in the emittive mode ("*utsägande*", 59) we understand readily in a single act, that the explanatory mode starts being applied when we do not understand but are still trying to do so (cf. Lesche 1976:42,68), and the translational mode transforms and reconstructs an incomprehensible text within a system familiar and comprehensible to the audience.

According to Ödman (68) the "rational explanation" proposed by Dray (1957) gives grounds for the handling person, explained in the background of the agent's aims. This is, still according to Ödman, the "good-reason-assay" defined by Carl Lesche (1971:13) as "an integration of handling, good grounds for it and the principle of rationality." This "good-reason-assay", however, is classified by Ödman as a subordinate category of interpretation (Ödman, 71) since it has liberated itself from the demands of the authors' intentions, and it refers instead to the aims of the interpreter and the common principle of rationality.

The relation between part and whole

More generally, the interpretation process is described as that which proceeds from vagueness to clarity in its attempt to circumscribe the work identity. The much bespoken hermeneutical circle introduced by Ast and Schleiermacher (ch. II:3, Ferrara) is a dialectical pendulating movement between part and whole. In the presentation of Ödman, though, precomprehension in the process of understanding is necessary and guided by the manner of posing the question, which (according to Gadamer's idea, 1975:157ff) already contains a view on the world that constitutes the answer (Ödman, 84). The question directs the searching, and the art of questioning is a kind of testing process of various models which according to our precomprehension could possibly be applicable in the specific case in context of their respective cultural environment. It is not evident why the interpretation process must have no beginning and no end. An underlying lack of clarity seems to lurk around this point. What is meant is that each chosen interpretive alternative could still be developed and deepened, but once chosen the other main alternatives are left behind. This item brings us to the problem of criteria.

It is possible to create alternative interpretations, which open up the question of their compatibility, treated in our previous chapter. What could be the basis for our choice? What criteria should we apply? First, one can consider the logical consistency of an interpretative system as a reasonable criterion. Secondly, the individual interpretations within such a system must have connection with the interpretative object (Ödman, 86) insofar as they (a) explain the data, (b) reveal the truth of the utterance (Gadamer) or (c) insofar as they are logically consistent with the object. Third, interpretation yields an increased understanding of the object; it gives the reader (1) increased competence in similar interpretational situations, or (2) a fair chance of following the interpretative process through our open account of it. The question about criteria is linked to the question of which grounds can be provided as a basis for our acceptance or rejection of interpretative alternatives. The mutual dependence between part and whole in hermeneutic theory is described as a dialectic process of understanding wherein a preferred main interpretation of wholeness is confirmed by our subsequent and concomitant interpretations of its parts. This pattern entails what I described as an "i-i-relation" in my formalization (MIR I:20; ch. I:2). Ödman distinguishes two methods of control by which the receiver can relate and compare the interpretation with the work; through (1) an

inner logic of the interpretative system (inner control); and through (2) confrontation with the text (work) object (outer control, 89). It is difficult to determine how the relation according to the whole/part-criteria shall be logically established. The first method of control, that of testing the inner logic, presupposes that the beholder has a knowledge and memory of the work.

Furthermore, Ödman distinguishes **existential** from **outer reality** interpretations; the first focuses on relative concepts of reasonability, whereas an outer reality interpretation can be definitively confirmed or disconfirmed. An interpretation is confirmed when it solely explains all the data or available information both reasonably and completely. This is why documentation of data and arguments for or against a proposed interpretative alternative shows the basis of the actual interpretation for the beholder, which enables him to reconsider his choice, and reject or accept the outline of a proposal as an interpretation.

In this respect, I submit, an openly and exhaustively documented interpretation in performance can always be contemplated, investigated, considered and reconsidered as a proposal that can be compared and countered by other possibly more thoroughly-grounded proposals. It is a proposal open to critical access and performative improvement. Since this process can continue eternally, i.e. the facultative options provided by the work seem infinitesimal, there is no end to the interpretive process in the first sense. And, in a second sense, since the interpreter must repeatedly recover the aspects considered relevant in order to arrive at a definite decision even if his interpretation turns out to be the same for each attempt, the interpretive process is necessarily endless.

A problem does arise, however, in finding the boundary between fact and interpretation, and mastering the communicative problem regarding the variable interpretative layer. How shall we formulate our proposals in order to maximize opportunities for the beholder to compare, assess and control our arguments for our interpretation? By what means can this be done? In the medium of the art itself? Or only by discursive presentation of arguments and conclusions? Do we have to present a full interpretation analysis to justify our performance? No, this would be an irrelevant demand, interfering with the personal process of the artist's formation of his version. Legitimately, we may require a certain level of qualitative result, but the listener has no right to dictate the methods for achieving this.

THE ONTOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE ACCORDING TO INGARDEN

In his book on the ontology of art¹¹, Roman Ingarden declares his program of investigating through relating and confronting the prescientific opinion on what a musical work of art is against a theoretically founded opinion. Intentionally, he bases his presentation of the problem on concrete phenomena, though one could continually question whether he keeps true to his promise.

First, I will sketch a brief outline of the prescientific conception, according to Ingarden. There are music performances differing in quality, some of which are good, others bad. The good ones exhibit the "work itself" with all its properties. Then, the music work is not the same as the score; while the music work consists of tonal creations (forms: "*tonale Bildungen*"), the score is a system of signs. At this point of departure from a concordant view, Ingarden inquires: How can it be the same work in spite of the differences inherent in various performances? Where is the musical work of art? The latter question hints at the problem that the work cannot be found subjectively in each of the listeners, which would entail as many works as listeners. Nor is it to be found objectively in the score; then it must be accessible only to readers, not to listeners.

Ingarden determines the ontology of performance thus: every performance is (1) an individual event ("*Vorgang*") and a time object ("*Gegenstand*"). There is a point of reference for temporality at the beginning of the performance in a certain given moment; the performance endures a certain time and ends at a later equally certain point of time. In principle, the performance is unrepeatable, (2) an acoustic event with a series of physical causes in the background such as fingers, keys, the medium of air and pressure vibrations, (3) objectively and phenomenally localized in a room. The physical event must occur somewhere, and the listener experiences it from the point where the music originates, e.g. at a concert. The listener can confirm his first impression by hearing the same performance, though not the same sequence, by moving from one to another vantage point and on to yet another, accordingly. Furthermore, the performance is (4) received (and 'given' as experiential phenomenon) through the listener's hearing, by which he encounters an acoustical "*Ansicht*" of the music (p(c)), i.e. we hear the music from different places; this fact, I submit, entails the notions of **experiential position, direction and space**. Moreover, the musical experience is marked by its specific **perspective**, i.e. an intentional quality. This "*Ansicht*" changes when I move to another seat during the concert, or if I were to hear the performance from the rear instead of from the first row. The "*Ansicht*" (or

Hörbild I would say) depends also on our attention and concentration; these are likely to apprehend more or less sharply contoured or vaguely heard images. And the performance is (5) determined by various kinds of qualities, such as tonecolour, tempo, dynamic particularities, varying degrees of "*Ausgeprägtheit*", the differing evocations of melodic lines (e.g. in a fugue or contrapuntal piece) and emotional colouring. Finally, the performance is (6) **unambiguously** determined by its qualities. However, since perspective is a spatial metaphor, as applied to music, its signification within interpretation research and auditive performance must be specified: an 'interpretive perspective' suggests that the w can be approached from different 'angles' forming various structural focuses, aspects from which the w can be heard (considered, reflected on cognitively). This presupposes (1) an indeterminacy of w, as well as (2) the application of a specific set or system of cognitive priorities inherent to the interpretive act, and compatible with the overarching meta-interpretive preconditions.

Since all these peculiarities cannot be displayed by the silent music work, Ingarden relates the work to the performance. The ontology of the music work is relevant to this investigation only insofar as it defines negatively what the properties of the performance are not. About the music work, Ingarden states: that (1) all of its parts exist simultaneously (in contrast to a case of performance) but with an indicated one-after-another succession in time; (2) that it depends on creative processes in the mind, not on "real", i.e. physical processes of, e.g., keys and air pressure vibrations; (3) that it is not localized to any specific room or otherwise placed in this room; (4) and that it cannot be perceived nor is it an acoustical phenomenon. It is an ideational system ("*ideales System*") of auditive images ("*Ansichten*") that can be made accessible only through performance; (5) it is an **individuum**, and one must distinguish between reference to an expression as "too fast" to either the work or its performance; (cf. various forms of existence in Bengtsson, 1973:8). Finally, (6) Ingarden inquires into the problem of the music work as either unambiguously determined in all respects or not. He gives two answers to the question of whether the music work can be thought of as still being differentiated *per se*. If the music work is taken as 'the being in the score' ("*Gebilde*"), as text, it is not fully determined, since the score indicates only what the instruments should play, not the individual tone colour. If, on the other hand, the music work is taken as the correlate to aesthetic understanding ("*Korrelat der ästhetischen Erfassung*"), it is determined in the sense of being identifiable as that specific work and not another work. Ingarden concludes that there are clearly good reasons for distinguishing the music work from the

performance. And the question we must pose concerns what it is that can be read from a score if not from the work. The *c*-image drawn from reading *n*, is not *a priori* identical to the *w*-image drawn from contextual consideration.

For aesthetic appreciation, Ingarden looks at the music work and the score (his ch. 3); the score cannot be regarded as relevant, since it has only an intentional function and there are music works without notation in other traditions than the Western classical one, e.g. folk music and improvised jazz. The score is just a system of imperative symbols, but melodies and harmonies cannot be found in it. During aesthetic appreciation we apprehend the music work directly through hearing a performance without knowing or without necessarily knowing the score. The music work is something quite different ("gänzlich verschieden") from the score. It is conceived intentionally and determined by the composer through the score.

The distinction by Ingarden essential to our investigation is that which clarifies the varying ontological status of the music work as opposed to that of the performance. In short, then, the performance on which we focus is bound to time, space and perception, while the music work has its own time structure, i.e. a time relationships not fixed in the time flow, and it is not bound to an acoustical room.

Critically and primarily, Ingarden states that the music work is conditioned by creative processes, in contrast to the performance, which is conditioned by real processes such as, e.g., strings and vibrations. So, unfortunately, Ingarden does not acknowledge the creative component in the performer's interpretative profession. Secondly, Ingarden concludes that the music work is not unambiguously determined, which would entail that it can be differentiated further in and throughout the performance. According to him this should stand in contrast to the performance. It is obvious that several different performances of the "same" work are possible. Ingarden does not solve the inherent contradiction.

I doubt, though, that the individual performance discussed in Ingarden's context refers to an 'indetermined' music work (**how** would it then be constituted?), or even more to an 'undetermined' work (**what w**, leaving the option to choose another work). What is ambiguous here is the word "determined", which must refer to something more precise than "the music work". What is it in the music work that is not fully determined, in the ontological sense? One might just as well state that through its very existence in the notation, certain aspects of the basic structural relations have been fixed, i.e.

unambiguously determined. If it is possible to claim a simultaneous contradiction, namely that the music work is both **indetermined** (in its facultative options of performance) and **determined** (by notation), the conclusion is either that its determinacy or indeterminacy is a matter of (meta)interpretation, and/or that the interpretive process entails a productive sequence of increasing determinacy at various stages of the process from undetermined work to determined performance. The **increasing determinacy** can be thought of as either gradual or **relative**: notation is determined relative to the work, but indetermined relative to performance.

However, one can propose that the performance, in the sense of something with "real" sound properties, is (or represents) one unambiguously determined auditive image of the work. The auditive sound properties of a performance are objectively determined in a given point in time and space, i.e. from a specifically chosen perspective. Even if the work as intended by the composer, and explicitly indicated in the score, were still not fully determined, the sound result of a specific performance is necessarily fully determined. Therefore the gap of determinacy is fulfilled by the intermediately interpretative process. I submit that the following distinction is called for: **indeterminacy** constitutes a latitude of optional (facultative) variants as interpreted from existing and identified indications (of n, e.g. a score), an inherent ambiguity in the semantic sign system. On the other hand, **non-determinacy** constitutes a lack of indication, an empty instruction (of n, c); this necessitates a fundamental **lack of reference** in terms of the completion required to arrive at a p; the i then necessarily becomes conjectural, interpolative, extrapolative or complementary. Naturally, there is also another kind of non-determinacy drawn from practical music life. A musician most probably does not play the same work exactly in the same manner at two different performances, and he most likely would not be able to reproduce precisely his own gestalting of the sound structures from his last performance if he intended to maintain an unchanged interpretative view of the work. But this is a kind of **marginal inconsistency**, which seems not to be so essential. Why not? A suggested explanation would be that what listeners normally listens for are the **intended** essential shapes and developments; they see no reason for scrutinizing each detail of the sound result. And the variability is within the latitude of the w-identity, which obviously contains a certain indeterminacy.

Principally, the ambiguity can exist more or less close to the work, most closely in the **neutral reading process** of the score according to the **rule system**

for score reading, or more remotely (from the work) yet closer to the cognitive processes in the mind of the interpreter, which (in some sense more subjectively) fills the gap of indeterminacy. In contrast, I conceive of overcoming rough non-determinacy as a matter of volition. Necessarily the interpreter chooses his priorities, and arranges various orders of determinacy (MIR I:15). So even if the interpreter selects the aspects, certain facts, relations or structures of the work that he will stress, he still presents in the end only one version of the work, which can be regarded as the final version for this particular interpretative undertaking. This selection of a path towards a **determined** goal is a fundamental process in the cognition of interpretive acts.

A recently published edition of Ingarden's writings on music, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity* (1986:9–23), might renew the interest in his considerations on the ontology of musical performance that they merit; these considerations are philosophically fundamental, but remains musically primitive.

INTERPRETATION FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT AS AN AESTHETIC OF CORPOREAL EXPERIENCE

Dufrenne dedicates a chapter in his book¹² to "The Work and its Performance", in which he presents his view on main concepts such as "performance", "interpretation" and "creativity". Performance is a transformation of the work from its potential to its actual form of existence. The work remains in a **virtual** existence, and the need for its execution corresponds to the demand for concretization of the work – an idea allegedly drawn from Ingarden. The silent reading of a score is a kind of "imaginary performance" that lacks sensuous presence but "retains of it only what exercises thought, namely, its structure and signification." It is necessary that "the aesthetic object passes through man" (21), but Dufrenne never specifies why this is necessary, not in what respect this passage through man will change anything in him or in his view of the artwork.

That "the performer's will is in the work" is a way of expressing a kind of corporeal extension characteristic of phenomenological thinking. Clifton and Merleau-Ponty develop a similar idea, that of a perceptive body. But it does not say a thing about how the performer achieves his general grasp of the work and its structure. The performer is "possessed, alienated, submissive to a foreign intention". (Dufrenne)

But how can the performer have direct access to authorial intention? Instead of clarifying this problem, Dufrenne focuses on the qualities of

manifestation that are bound to content and meaning. One must inquire: the meaning of what? And Dufrenne's reply is: "What we say is inseparable from what we mean and from the way we say it".

Dufrenne uses his corporeal idea to explain how performance can become a human event. "The instrument [is] to the performer what the throat is to the singer, namely, an extension of his body". So Dufrenne maintains that it is in the human body (cf. Boon, Brelet and Clifton, ch. II:3) that the music becomes incarnate, in a body disciplined by the instrument. Through training, the body becomes "the instrument of an instrument". About the conductor, who does not play a physical instrument at the performance, Dufrenne proposes that "the work finds its unity in him because it unfolds within him as if it dwelled inside his body". And "he renders it visible by his very pantomime". Dufrenne seems to consider conducting a *synaesthetic* act (and art), an opinion that can be questioned from several points of view. The naivety of some of his formulations is disturbing: "the happier the musician is in playing the work, the happier the result" and e.g. "the ear is pleased by what pleases the performer's fingers". This could be criticized as 'primitive' animism.

In theory, then, the function of performance according to Dufrenne is to **manifest** the quality of the work. (23)

Now concerning his concept of interpretation, Dufrenne clarifies the mutual dependence between work and interpretation: "When we abandon the aesthetic attitude in order to appraise the interpretation of a work, we **judge the interpretation in terms of the work** – but only because [despite the fact that, I would say, not only because!] we know the work from its interpretation". Philosophically, then, Dufrenne says that "we do have to grant a truth of the work which is independent of its performance or anterior to it". The truth of the work is "what it aspires" to be and "what it becomes precisely through its performance, namely, the aesthetic object". This seems to be the only, and the most necessary, way for Dufrenne to gain **access to the work**, for he asks: "Where do we obtain the truth of the work, if not from the performance?", and "through the performance, we aim at the truth of the work". Dufrenne never really writes thoroughly about the possibility of obtaining access to the work by means of analytic methods. His way of **assimilating** the work is a **neutral reading**, though **absorptive** and **sensitive**. One has to ask how a conductor can ever grasp the gross "corestructure" of a Brahms, Bruckner or Sibelius symphony in this way. Certain complex scores, at least, seem to require an active analysis, and some a reworking and scrutinization of the score, before an assimilation is

possible. This complex of problems is inevitably intertwined with the question of the evidential **judgement of interpretative quality** in performances. One must know "whether the performance meets the demands of that work". The listener gets caught in a circle in his attempts to make a judgement. How can he form his opinion of the work without listening to a specific performance, which realizes only certain aspects of the many reasonable variants of work realizations? In sum, the four problems treated by Dufrenne are: (1) **circularity** of the performer's judgement of the work (relativism? quality criteria?); (2) **validity** of judgement; (3) **truth** of the work; and (4) **access** to it. Thus, there must be another method of surveying rival interpretative alternatives. But Dufrenne fails to provide such a method.

However, Dufrenne sees another risk, that of evidential criticism, and avoids the more principal problem of judgement: "If such interpretation ["embodiments too perfect"] imposes itself not by its fidelity [...], it may then mask the face of the work and distort our judgment." The idea of **embodiment** (or, even of 'incarnation') as accessible and sensual concretization of an interpretation in performance sounds questionable for several reasons. How, and by what standards of judgement, can an embodiment too perfect mask the face of the work? If the embodiment, i.e. the concrete topography of a specific interpretation in performance, is perfect, then it implies exactly the 'face' of the work and nothing else. It cannot be "too" perfect. Either it corresponds to what we know from our access to the truth of the work, or it does not. And this point of conviction can occur at different stages in the interpretive process.

Dufrenne leans toward the idea that "the performance invents the truth of the work" and therefore, "performance is interpretation". So interpretation necessarily signifies reaching the truth of the work, and interpretation in some way expresses this truth through a performance and by no other means. In this case, if it so is, "the truth of the work is not fixed beforehand and several interpretations of the same work are possible, with the result that it changes meaning with the times." The fact that the truth of the work lies in its interpretation in performance explains the existence of differing but still equally valuable realizations of the work during the evolution of its history. There is no truth in the work *per se*. The work always lies open to new and other interpretations. Each of them constructs a "truth in the performance situation" that must be valid during at least that very performance. How can Dufrenne evade relativism with this basic view? Would a recording of a recital broadcast thirty years later still be a valid interpretation? Under what conditions is validity sustained? And

what circumstances will change **validity** into invalidity?

Dufrenne tries to evade **relativism** by referring on this point to the link between performance and particular historical taste, on which our understanding of the work, according to Dufrenne, must base itself. Performance traditions constitute a history which reveals "the truth of the work through multiple trials and errors". But Dufrenne fails to provide the secure basis needed to overcome relativism. The lack of a basis is not remedied by references to historical taste and 'trial and error performances', an assumption which casts doubts on his stance.

Even if the critics, according to Dufrenne, may "refer to the intentions of the work's creator" in order to appraise the quality of performance, and even if performers should know the intentions of his work, "the aesthetic experience extends from the work to its creator". There is an order of priority for the work, as well as the experiences that are revealed by its truth in a performance which coincides with the work. Dufrenne is not too specific about **quality criteria**, but more generally expresses that "good performance fades away in the presence of the work, being and appearance coincide, and we wholly attain the aesthetic object."

Dufrenne tries to solve the threatening problem of relativism by proposing that the work attains its truth and the status of normative existence only through the concretization of performance: "The concrete existence which the work achieves is a normative existence: its reality must reveal a truth which makes itself known within this reality. The historicity of its performances does not completely relativize the work's truth." I must make one comment on this point. Naturally performance is historical in the sense that it takes place at a specific time, since reality is bound to time and performance takes place in reality. But this does not guarantee any truth in the performance. Historicity is not a sufficient criterion for a truth-revealing interpretation. There is the underlying paradox, beautifully expressed by Dufrenne: "The work is irreducible to its performances and yet graspable only through them."

The next problem that logically follows is: What are the **criteria** for a truth-revealing interpretation, revealing the truth of the work, that metaphysically evading entity? According to Dufrenne, the "chief virtue which the work [sic!] requires of the performer is submissiveness." The idea is that the performer should be assimilative and sensitive to the traits of the work, and that the passivity of his attentiveness will reinforce his sensibility towards the work. But as Dufrenne himself writes, "the work [...] does in fact allow the performer considerable initiative". Would Dufrenne require that the performer retains his

passive attitude even within this free zone of choice? Or would he allow him the liberty of active interpretation into the work, the implanting of outside ideas into the open parts of the work?

Dufrenne acknowledges the fact that there is a need for technical competence. At the same time this is a risk, related to the truth of the work: "The qualities of virtuosity and intelligence required of a performer are such that he cannot help being conscious of his own importance". So the performer must balance his instrumental agility against the limitations inherent in the work, he must let his technical efficiency work for the truth.

This is not always a successful procedure. Dufrenne explains the background for **errors of interpretation** as "the heresies of the performer [...] takes too much liberty with the work, either to win acceptance for his interpretation or to get into the limelight". (28)

The **ephemerality of p**—instances in musical works, in Dufrenne's opinion, adds value while it "takes place just once", something which corresponds to compositional **originality**.

Dufrenne hints at what I would label as the psychopathology of performance sociology: "The artist's hypertrophied ego answers the atrophied ego of his admirer" (29). The more sane conditions are characterized thus: "The spectator is driven by the same duty as the performer—namely, to be submissive and faithful to the work" (45). The artist is described as "creative". Does this mean that the P's p is not a neutral ('pure') rendering? Since the **distinction between artist and performance** is not made clear by Dufrenne, we cannot conclude that he would have endorsed this view. But first it is essential to distinguish various degrees and kinds (how much and what) of **creative involvement** (1st aspect) from the part of the artist/P. In my view the concept of P is neutral in this respect; it allows for a whole set of **degrees of creativity**. Then, **creative treatment** (2nd aspect) of the w can be seen primarily from the perspective of the w, by analytically considering what happened to the work through its progress from score to p, or secondarily, through the processing of the interpreter (artist/P).

The problem is that Dufrenne does not relate this creativity to the ontology of the work. Why should the artist be creative if his only duty is to be submissive to the work? My reply would be: because the identity of the work is not defined until the very moment of performance. Or, if I may interpret Dufrenne: "The artist [...] is precisely that individual in whom it all merges [...]. He creates himself by creating and he creates because he creates himself" (31). With Dufrenne, the identity of the artist is also undefined until the moment of clarifying interpretation

and the encounter with the truth of the work. At this point a severe problem arises if neither work nor performer is defined. How can a definition then take place, without reference to anything, or with reference to what? The Dufrenne thesis on the identity of the artist given through the encounter with the truth of the work does not hold. What about a marked profile such as Glenn Gould? He indisputably has a very clear identity as an artist through the originality, not the ephemerality, of his interpretation in performances. But his interpretations are fervently discussed and it is always controversial whether he has hit the truth of the works he played or not, notably those by J.S. Bach (e.g. the Goldberg variations; see ch. IV:3).

Dufrenne intimates that the **creative processes is irrational**, and that this process is more like meditation; and the character of artistic creativity is unconscious. At the same time, however, "the unconscious is not a creator, and the artist who is creating knows that he is creating", so the creator is not unaware of the fact that he is creating, but the closer processes of this cognitive activity, the origin of emerging ideas, remain hidden from conscious insight.

Finally, the question concerning the criteria for correctness in interpretation must be mentioned. Which is the right interpretation? "They can all [sic!] be valid, thereby revealing the inexhaustible character of the aesthetic object" (40). Unfortunately, Dufrenne never recognizes criteria on the different levels of simple correctness of rendering (e.g. notation), the forming of sound structures and qualified artistic interpretation of the innermost import in the work or in realizing the **unity** of the work in concrete performance.

II:3 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSICAL AESTHETICS: MERSMANN, ZUCKERKANDL, FERRARA, BRELET AND CLIFTON

In ch. I:3 we discussed a few crucial points in science philosophy inherent to the phenomenological mode of thinking, as initiated by Husserl. I refrain from all attempts to describe the complex interrelationships between various descendants of this ramified movement in referring to the presentation given by Herbert Spiegelberg (1982). However, it is fruitful to illuminate a few attempts to apply this paradigm to music, insofar as it is explicitly relevant to our chosen problems in mip.

In his *Angewandte Musikästhetik*¹³ Hans Mersmann outlines the basis of a phenomenologic aesthetics of performance, notably **phrasing**. Through a critical analysis of the application of Riemann's principle of upbeat-phrasing, Mersmann arrives at an alternative set of paradigm "laws" for performance. His phenomenologic standpoint "löst das Kunstwerk aus allen Assoziationen und subjektiven Beziehungen ab und merkt es als Phänomen". For the purpose of complete dedication to the artwork, "*Hinwendung zum Kunstwerk selbst*", he programmatically focuses on (1) the relationship between "des Betrachtenden Ich zum Kunstwerk", and (2) the structure and "*Wesenheit des Werkes*", in order to strengthen our competence "sie begrifflich zu fassen". He aims at activating the listening act to the degree of liberating the I from its subjective processes ("*Lösung von Ich-Geschehen*") which hinders the clear and objective apprehension ("*Erkenntnis*") of phenomena, enabling the listener to hear alertly and with full attention.

A condition for the assimilation of the artwork, then, is a gradual decrease in the beholder's obstructive and irrelevant associations with growing 'musical intuition' ("*musikalische Instinkt*"), a correlation asserted by Mersmann. The process of understanding an artwork occurs in parallel with its process of originating: the "*Erkennen*" of the artwork is governed by the same basic laws of cognitive patterning as its "*Entstehung*". The essence of an artwork appears in the conditions it provides for connecting in experience its elements. Certain elements occur in an interplay ("*Wechselbeziehung*"), such as "*ausgewogen*", or "*unabhängig*", and by their interplay they may 'potentiate' or 'neutralize' each other. The following dimensions of the musical artwork (using analogical concepts of space, "*Raubegriffe*"), are conceived of by Mersmann as the most all-embracing common denominators for the elemental forces in music: **horizontality** as the successive "zeitliche Nacheinander der Tonfolgen", and **verticality** as simultaneous chord structures ("*Klangbildungen*").

Now, if neither linearity nor simultaneity dominate, then the **intensity** of horizontal and vertical process would be **balanced**: "Intensitäten horisontellen und vertikalen Geschehens gegen einander ausgewogen". The horisontal aspects, Mersmann suggests, comprise **space** and **direction**, whereas the melody reveals **force**. In the interaction of elements, Mersmann, who refrains from the conventional terminology of music theory, nevertheless recognizes components of their appearance in a series of factors ("*Faktorenreihe*", "*Komponeneten der Erscheinung*") which are organized from the outside and penetrate into the interior of the work; these are material, element, style,

expression and "*Tektonik*", which grows immediately out of structure and element, and summarizes all gestalting forces in the artwork.

But Mersmann cannot abstain from using such terms as "*Agogik*", defined as "Lehre von den Einheiten und Veränderungen musikalischer Zeitgrade", and "*Dynamik*", defined as the units and changes of musical "*Stärkegrade*". In reference to similar thoughts by Fritz Jöde and Ernst Kurth, Mersmann explains how a melody grows out of an interval, a cadence out of a connection of chords; already in this basically constitutional principle, it is clear that this manifoldness refers to one common point of origin (cf. Celibidache's "*punta d'origine*", "*Herkunftspunkt*").

Therefore, Mersmann feels entitled to describe a "Beziehung höherer Art", a relationship of the higher level to its 'lower' origin: "sie wölbt an der Kadenz zwischen Ausgangs- und Zieltonika einer einzigen Bogen", and this unity on the higher hierarchical level is achieved by potentiation, not addition. Concretely, then, this view constitutes an 'aesthetics of tension and intensity'. The intensity of a relation attains its character of force through tension, which arises as an outcome of the fact that music is bound to temporal processes, namely in its movement. Tension occurs through an inner connection ("*innere Verbindung*") between relatedness and contrariness ('contradiction'; "*Beziehung und Gegensatz*"). The tones in an interval strain simultaneously, according to the tendencies resulting from adopting this phenomenologic consideration, away from and towards each other, which is the origin of **experiential tension**. However, contrariness presupposes a relation.

Given an interval, e.g. a fourth, for instance c_1-f_1 , as in Mersmann's instantiation of his principle, the center of this interval must be either **outside** both of the tones, or above or between them. If not, the interval would never, logically, appear as an **interval**. In fact, this perspectivistic view on the interval is also a component in Ansermet's and Celibidache's interval phenomenologies. Tension, according to Mersmann, derived from the simultaneously contrary forces of **expansive growing** and **centripetal unification** (which "eint", "ordnet", "bindet" and "bezieht") between the constituents of an interval, is, in the end, a logically necessary phenomenon. It follows that an interval, having size, direction and blending ("*Verschmelzung*"), is always seen from the listener's (beholder's) perspective: from the center diverging towards its constituents both upwards and downwards, from the top note to the bottom, or reversely, from the lower to the higher note, which is an interpretative **perspectivism** (cf Narmour's concepts "bottom up" and "top down", 1992:361). The justification

for the proposition that Mersmann adduces is: (1) that the fusing unity of the octave can be projected on the whole scale ("Einheit der Oktave auf Gesamtheit der Töne projizieren [lässt]"), and (2) that "die Ausdehnung des Verschmelzungsbegriffs [ist] eine natürliche Folge des durch das Hören hergestellten Beziehung." What follows is a **generalization by close analogy**: the evidentially appearing fusion of the tones in the octave presupposes a connection provided by cognitive audition, which as a logical parallel open for testing by experiential evidence may be applied to all intervals that show some grade of fusion. This "*Verschmelzung*" is, through experiential simultaneity and continuity, related to the qualities of size and direction in the interval. The two aspects, **horizontal and vertical relation**, are essentially constitutive of the interpretive character. Now Mersmann arrives at his 'laws', i.e. the principles that govern **tension**: "die Spannung eines Intervalls wächst" (1) "mit seiner zunehmende Grösse", and (2) "mit seiner abnehmenden Verschmelzung". In addition, the integrative result of these two 'laws' is, insists Mersmann, determined by "dem Spannungscharakter der ganzen Linie."

I suggest that Mersmann here traces an important phenomenon, that of **linearity**, which I proposed as one of the bases for the **i-coherency** (of melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, dynamic or 'sonoric' species: COH_{mel} , COH_{ha} , COH_{rhy} , COH_{dyn} or COH_{son}) in my early theory (MIR I:163, MIP:8:I:point 2). This theory conceives of linearity as a coherency phenomenon within several interacting parameters, including developmental and metamorphosic linearity.

Gradually, to derive from Mersmann, the complex qualities emerge from the joint effects, through coinciding or neutralizing forces that appear at the level of larger melodic units. In conclusion, confirmed from his adduced experiential evidence, Mersmann arrives at his set of correlations between the named phenomena that are pertinent to a phenomenology of performance.

First he observes that a proportional change from larger to smaller note values in a rhythmic diminution progress will either increase or decrease tension. Gradually, though, as an established pattern prevails, (1) the process loses **tension** with prolonged **continuity**; (2) a loading, e.g. by dotted rhythms, of strong beats, where the rhythm is congruent to the metrical scheme, will principally smooth out this tension, as will also (3) a resolution into smaller note values; on the other hand, then, (4) a loading of weak beats, as in syncopation, as well as (5) a changing to rhythmic values against metric unity, e.g. triols in 2-beat measure (Brahms), suddenly introduces a moment of tension.

On the basis of these criteria, Mersmann finds himself justified in claiming

the following principles for performance: (1) the phrasing must be **large-scooped** ("gross zu phrasieren"); (2) the shaping ("*darstellen*", "*gestalten*") should demonstrate **connections**, not parts; (3) the aim of phrasing is to **follow the process of the artwork** ("*mitzumachen*") without unduly intruding or manipulating its constitution and character, while (4) **phrasing** also is of concern for reasons of **style** ("*Stilangelegenheit*"); for instance, the "*Atem*" of Bach is different from that of Mozart, which distinguishes Beethoven from romanticism; finally (5) the performers should respect the 'typology' of **movement** ("*Gangart*", Bengtsson p.c.; "*Schreiten*" Mersmann). On this point, Mersmann gives just a few interesting cues. Each motif has a separate life ("*Einzelleben*") and therefore must be delimited as such, whereas the music of Mozart has an even breathing in 'closed surfaces'. In contrast, Mersmann conceives of the music of Beethoven as represented by a large-spaced experiential 'room' bound to a fixed course of events.

In sum, maximizing the extension of relations by emphasizing large-scope connections while remaining passively receptive is the core of Mersmann's recipe to the performer.

On a closer look, phrasing, then, becomes a precondition ("*Vorbedingung*") for the recognition of the elements in their interaction, namely by either unifying that which belongs together or by delimiting from one other that which is separated in the composition. Music depends even more than language, which has its syntax of denoting reference, on unambiguously clarifying declamation. Mersmann argues, in a scarcely disguised polemic against Riemann, that phrasing is not a matter of rhythm only. On the contrary, Mersmann expounds his **phenomenology of phrasing**: In essence, then, phrasing is no voluntary act, "*kein Eingriff den der Erkennende am Kunstwerk vornimmt, sondern lediglich eine Erfüllung der im Werke beschlossenen Forderungen*". Consequently, Mersmann conceives of phrasing, in principle, as "*ablesen*", not "*konstruieren*", and claims that a theory of phrasing must be independent of all schemes given through *a priori* consideration. However, in this Mersmann is not consistent, since he violates this dictum in conceiving his phenomenology. In a series of examples, then, Mersmann demonstrates that Riemann's upbeat structuring does not hold, while through such a phrasing "elementare Einheiten [wird] zerissen". Mersmann forwards his "*Gesetzmässigkeiten*", 'laws of phrasing', in the form of a systematic taxonomy on the basis of his phenomenological considerations.

He claims: (1) that it is necessary to phrase in different dimensions, i.e. on

various structural levels (1:1); that the smaller the 'dimension' in which the phrasing occurs, the more it concerns the 'elements' (1:2); that the whole **period** must be delimited by phrasing (1:3); that phrasing of only an antecedent or consequent phrase–half will always give questionable results (1:3:1); and that if the juxtaposed half–phrases stand close to each other, the phrase incisions (*caesura*) is 'naturally given' (1:3:2). More disputable is the model case in which two half–phrases stand openly confronting each other (1:3:3); even more difficult is the interpretive decision regarding the relation between two connected half–phrases ("in einander verschränkt"); in this case (1:3:3:1) a tone or chord may simultaneously start a phrase and end another; in effect this is, as a model case, a two–part phrase, where no incision can be applied at the point of connection, either before or after the phrase–overlap (1:4). An overriding claim is to maintain the unity of 'elementary' growth and "*Bedingtheit*" (1:5). No *a priori* principles can be supported regarding neither upbeat/ downbeat nor motivic/ metric choice of phrasing, since delimitation of phrasing can only legitimately be based on a knowledge of connections of more encompassing scope (1:6). The performer must respect those compositional **unities that may not be broken**, for instance (1) the unity of outflow of a proceeding melodic line from a center of force, or, reversely, (2) the unity of resolving outflow in motion from a stagnated force of seeming calmness.

In contrast, Victor Zuckerkandl refrains from setting up any rule system for performers. A conductor, philosopher and musical scholar himself, he is dedicated to present music as an outcome of the encounter between man and nature. Of his currently available books, *Sound and Symbol. Music and the External World* (1956; 1973) and *Man the Musician* (1965; 1973) exhibit the philosophical core of Zuckerkandl's phenomenological aesthetics of music, whereas *The Sense of Music* (1959, 1971) is an instructive guide to attentive listening, achieved by endowing conscious listening with basic concepts of the elementary building stones of musical structure and texture. The central notions that he sets out to explicate in the **external world** are the basic phenomena of music (namely **tone, motion, time and space**) and in the **internal world** they are, in man i.e., his **musicality, musical ear and musical thought**. The world of music is a tonal world which appears as a complex of "*purely dynamic*" manifestations of forces governed by natural laws which determine the general direction of tendencies,

such as the development from tension to release. The individual realization of this tendency is still subject to free artistic choice and there are no physical laws that determine the causality of the course of musical events (*Sound and Symbol*, 364–365): "the forces that act in the tonal world manifest themselves *through* bodies but not *upon* bodies", and "the physical event – air in vibration, stimulations of the sense organ, excitation of the nervous system – [...] is here only the conveyor of the action; it is not itself the action." (365)

The encounter between inner and outer world which "face each other like two mutually exclusive precincts on either side of an impassable dividing line", is manifested in the quality of "from-out-there-toward-me-and-through-me" (368). Zuckerkandl argues that because immaterial tones present themselves to us, "the immaterial" does not only come "from within", i.e. it "does not exist only 'psychically'." Music, says Zuckerkandl, "helps the thing 'tone' to transcend its own physical constituent, to break through into a non-physical mode of being". Tones are the medium through which the world of "action of non-physical forces" becomes transparent to our senses. Zuckerkandl regards this "purely dynamic reality" (371) at "the point where the external world gives up its secret and manifests itself, immediately, *as symbol*." The defining 'force' then, becomes a problem. Zuckerkandl's attempt is not intellectually satisfying on this point, even if his pointing to the experiential importance of this notion seems intuitively convincing, although it rests barely on analogy: "It is not impossible to describe the phenomena of the physical world without introducing the notion of force. But in music, there would be hardly anything left to describe if force had to be excluded from the discussion. Force is as real as music itself. [...] The immaterial – 'spirit', 'soul' – breaks through the artificial barrier of the enclave 'inner world'; the distinction between the material as the real and the immaterial as the unreal is gradually reduced; the area of contact is named 'force'." (373) The "miracle" of the creative process studied in the sketchbooks of Beethoven that Zuckerkandl approaches reveals itself in the "self-realization" of the musical law, "the form it assumes on emerging from its hiding place, when it finally manifests itself", and this process "combines conformity to law with newness, internal consistency with unpredictability." (*Man the Musician*, 343)

His liberatingly unprejudiced work analyses, tracing the basis for "hearing organic structure" in unorthodox adaptations of Schenkerian thought are, then, viewed in the perspective of certain science of philosophy considerations: "They certainly cannot be termed universally or objectively valid. They can be valid only subjectively, that is, accepted by some persons, rejected by others" (198).

But this "subjective validity", according to Zuckerkandl, is not a severe weakness of the art. It is still possible for a composer to express himself, and his "essential statements are understood as he intended." On the other hand, the validity of these analytical interpretations is not objective in the sense that they are "independent of the listener's personality; yet it is not purely subjective either, is not dependent upon any individual's whim. Rather, it extends to a group, a collective personality, and is binding within the group" (199). But Zuckerkandl does not unreservedly forward as a solution the idea of intersubjectivity, since neither of the two ways of establishing intersubjective validity, namely reference to (1) logical or psychological laws or (2) conventions, is considered satisfying. If the "psychological theories of aural perception do not fit the facts of musical experience" (199) and if validity is "coextensive" with a convention that "merely creates arbitrary links, whereas tonal relations develop out of themselves, out of inner necessity" (200), it only remains to be stated from the convincing evidence of experience that "music confronts us with a claim to validity at once unassailable and yet dependent neither on logical proof nor on experimental verification, nor indeed on convention." (201) Although Zuckerkandl's aesthetics is musically powerful in the sense that substantial implications can be drawn from it for the purposes of musical performing art, he has never himself systematized this prospect. His works are loaded with references to philosophers (Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, James, Husserl, Heidegger, Gebser, Teilhard de Chardin; Wittgenstein, Gilson, Ogden & Richards, Langer), scientists (Huygens, Newton, Helmholtz, Mach, Mendel, Ehrenfels, Koffka, Fermat, Révész, von Uëkkull), composers (Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Bruckner) and poets (Nietzsche, Rilke, Musil), whereas performers are only rarely mentioned.

An argument between Toscanini and Ravel, though, about whether the tempo should be accelerated or not over the "endless repetition of the same rhythmic formula" in Ravel's "Bolero" is referred to, but Zuckerkandl abstains from taking a stance with the following comment: "the tempo might be gradually accelerated or must be strictly maintained to the end. Wholly different effects are produced according to whether one does the former or the latter – lets oneself be carried along by the stream or meets its increasing force with increasing resistance." (176) And, he concludes, in accordance with his cognitive musical thinking on motion and tonal pattern (1973: 337; 1956:176n), that "one could even divide artists into psychological types in accordance with how each decides the question." Concerning Pablo Casals (ch. IV:4), he states that an **upbeat** normally falls on the last part of the **ascending phase** of the metric wave.

Zuckermandl inquires about the basis for our reaction to a first tone (such as in the C major melody in Brahms' *First Symphony*) "with a kinetic impulse of this particular kind" (1956:188). He refutes the explanation that the upbeat quality might be an "illusion" which becomes clear to the listener only **retrospectively** due to stronger stress on the second tone, by means of which we would "understand that it, and not the first tone, bears the principal accent of the measure. **This explanation may apply to a poor performance.**" [my emphasis]

Zuckermandl then advances the alternative case, still with the same "masterly interpreter" (Pablo Casals): "then we do not have to wait for a second tone in order to find out where we are with the first. The ascent and advance so characteristic of the last phase of the metric wave are so clearly perceptible in the tone itself that even if nothing else followed, if the player stopped after the first tone, we should still know that it was an upbeat. Certainly, it is the particular kind of tone production, scarcely apprehensible characteristics of the tone itself, which produces this effect and sets up in the hearer the kinetic sensation corresponding to the upbeat."

But Zuckermandl distinctly denies that "the motion is in some way *in the tone itself*; that the tone in some way reproduces the motion". This, could be seen as be just another false "**projectionist interpretation**" (189). Consequently, Zuckermandl holds the view of **projectionism** (cf. the beholder's projection in looking at a portrait of "the features of the sitter's face into the colors and forms of the picture") to be a **false escape from truth**. The analogy applies to our performer, then, as Zuckermandl suggests: "It may be objected here that it is not the observer but the artist who projects the features of the face portrayed into the colors and forms on the canvas, and does so out of his own mind – especially when he is not painting from a model. Why should not the performing musician likewise project into the tone a particular kinetic idea, which we then hear from the tone?" (189) This, then, is obviously **possible**, but not **recommended** by Zuckermandl. "To do so only pushes the problem a step further back" he argues, and pursues his inquiry: "What idea guides the cellist's bow hand? The idea of a motion? What determines this particular idea; of what reality is it a representation?" Zuckermandl, in effect, argues that the musician, or conductor, does not concentrate on motion, but "completely and exclusively upon *the tone* that is about to sound" (196); "he always begins *with* the tones, not *before* them. And what guides his hand is not some idea of a motion by his own body, but an idea of the motion that *the tone* is to make, that, strictly speaking, the meter in the tone, *time* (why not?) in the tone, is to make." (197) This, however, is

controversial among musicians.

The position that comes to mind here is that of **interpretational pragmatism**, which states that the qualities of performance, for instance the tempo, are determined, and legitimately may so be, on the **basis of situational circumstances**. The tempo is determined by the time it takes to play the passage, or to read it. It claims, in its extreme variant not remote from an attitude of "*laissez-faire*", that no overriding aesthetic, analytic or 'structuralistic' decision should be enforced on the playing. The tempo is merely an outcome, not of human willpower; it is just the result of the manual procedure of executing the passage, i.e. all the notes, by performing an adequate hand and finger motion on the keyboard, or by striking the bow over the strings on that particular cello, at the precise moment and place required.

As an interlude on pragmatism, I insert the following note. In the teaching of the Swedish piano professor Gottfrid Boon, the **preparation** of the tone, both mentally and sensorially through **tactile** feeling of the key, was important (MIR III: 255–267). Boon, whose master was Arthur Schnabel, and who was the most influential piano teacher in Sweden for several decades, numbering Ingmar Bengtsson, Nils Andersson and Hans Leygraf (my 1st and 3rd piano teachers) among his students, sent for me in his last days to complete an interview we had conducted in order to stress his leading ideas. "The sensitivity of the finger-tip", he said, "must be developed to the same extent as for a blind person in order for him to be capable of reading" (Sollentuna sjukhus, 5.2.81; MIR III:256) and "the different dynamic grades and all-becoming musical gradations must **before the attack** [my emphasis] be experienced in the inner ear, and felt in the finger-tip's nerve" (*ibidem*).

But what Zuckerkandl aims at is not to describe the technical artifices, devices and procedures of realizing a performance but, in my view, to conceive a **transcendent interpretation**. The conductor has the "**time unit**" of the time flux **in his mind**, which only secondarily guides his hand to execute the adequate motion that "corresponds to his idea of the correct time unit" (196). The experienced conductor and philosopher Victor Zuckerkandl declares, about the impressive opening bars of Bruckner's *Fourth Symphony*, that "the only thing that can impart the proper measure to his movements is his precise idea of the metric wave beating in the unmoving chord. But this idea cannot in turn itself be an idea of a movement of his own body: otherwise we should have to ask what provides the proper measure for this latter movement, and so on ad infinitum." (197)

PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS AS A BASIS FOR MUSICAL APPLICATION

In his recent "postmodernist" book¹⁴, pianist and professor Lawrence Ferrara proposes the application on the metalevel of three different methods; (1) the phenomenological, (2) the conventional and (3) the hermeneutic, corresponding to the study of sound-in-time musical form and musical reference (xiii). The empirical correctness of a formal analysis can be corroborated by observing the corresponding facts in the score, while a referential theory of music never can build on, or invoke, these secure foundations. The prevailing opinion is that the referential theory must rely on conception only, not on perception. Since "significance in music includes but goes beyond form or syntax" (xv) it is possible, according to Ferrara, that "music can be expressive of the most profound human concerns (...) of which ordinary language cannot". The problem that arises seems to be a lack of connection between formal and referential methods. This confusing situation is not made any better by the tradition within phenomenology of suspending, parenthesizing, both formal and referential aspects in its analyses, focusing on only one level of musical significance, that of (1) **sound-in-time**. Ferrara is opposed to this limitation and designs a more encompassing view in which both (2) **sound-in-form** and (3) **sound-and-form** are also included as grounds for reference in his "systematic report on all three levels of musical significance." A second problem arises from the fact that artists and scientists often create their methods first, as if the method should gain primary status over the object. It can be questioned whether or not the result of this procedure responds to the diversity of musical significance. Critically, the conclusion is obvious: music analysis should be applied for the sake of music, i.e. for the purpose of deepening our understanding of music; the method is only instrumental and should not gain priority over its object, an argument in accord with Paul Feyerabend's critique of science.

Performers must respond to all levels of musical significance, and synthesize them, by way of engaging in "1) sound-in-time, 2) the manner in which sound has been 'formed' into musical syntax, and 3) the unfolding message of a work's reference" (xvi), which is what great performers do, following Ferrara: "the articulation of that bridging of sound, form and reference is manifested in their performance, not in a written report."

Suspending historical context, Husserlian phenomenologists hope to achieve a purely descriptive analysis of musical sound, and on this particular

point they are in agreement with conventional formalists who, due to underlying assumptions, aim at approaching a "scientific" stance towards music through their "objectifying" method. The decisive difference is that while phenomenologists describe the sound-events as they are appearing in front of the experiencing mind, formalists try to explain musical structure within the frame of some (weak or strong) causal metatheory required for reference theories.

Consequently, one point of disagreement is over whether or not the temporary suspension of theoretical presuppositions afforded (provided and suggested) by phenomenologists is at all possible, which is denied by formalists, who can at least claim that they overtly present theoretical presuppositions that, necessarily, cannot be evaded. This sharp distinction is, however, refuted by Ferrara, who considers every act of musical understanding to be biased in one or another direction. The merit of Ferrara is that he adopts an openly multimethodological approach in accord with that of Feyerabend, a "tempered relativism" which reveals the underlying logic (or logics) behind several of the methods practiced, his so-called "dialectic" method. His critical stance towards all kinds of dogmatic uses of one ideal or another aims at uncovering "the underlying logic that directs and structures the method under review" (xviii). Consequently, there is no *a priori* correct method for the application of our knowledge in matters of musical significance, which does not mean that all approaches are equally rewarding and fruitful, i.e. that they reveal the same depth of meaning.

Ferrara arrives at a very positive evaluation of Heideggerian hermeneutics for his purpose of projecting an "eclectic" method of musical analysis. The question I will touch upon concerns which concrete evidence can be shown for this predilection. First, however, it is necessary to sketch a brief outline of the main ideas in Heidegger from which Ferrara draws his conclusions. According to Heidegger it is considered essential that interpretation be something that takes place within a historical context; a system in which traits can be derived from defined positions related to common ideas that were highly esteemed in a certain cultural context is said to be inevitable. The problem is how to relate the concrete and precisely describable stylistic traits of a specific work to extramusical facts from past times. The argument that a prejudicial preunderstanding is necessary on the part of the interpreter cannot directly have any influence on how we are supposed to appreciate the stylistic traits of the work. It is the work that shall be interpreted, not the interpreter. If Heidegger's argument were

correct, that the lifeworld of the composer is context-loaded and that therefore his work will also reflect this, then the conclusion would have to be that our understanding of the work must depend on the context. This is evidently wrong since the correct premise should be that **the work is context-loaded**, which does not in itself mean that our interpretation must share the same context to which the **work** pertains. The interpretative choice of position allows a free overview of different alternative ideals, congruent to the preferred and selected **context of the interpreter**.

First, there are two different contexts, that of the work and my context as an interpreter or listener of the work. Second, it is not clear how one can show how these two contexts are related to each other. Third, understanding is not the same as interpreting. I am, in my process of understanding, dependent on my education and talent; I can grasp things with which I am familiar quickly, and complicated innovations more slowly. Above all, I seem to be limited through my limited scope of consciousness, which surely is, I admit, dependent on experiences from the cultural context, i.e. me in relation to my cultural environment. But interpretation is something more fundamental, about how we relate to objects, how we perceive and reflect on our own content of experiencing, derived both from the senses, and from memory and cognitive functions on several levels. Thus, I cannot so easily concede to the proposition that context is a condition for understanding, at least not in such a generalized form without any explanation of what the process of understanding entails.

The experiencing mind is projected towards phenomena, which is a genuinely phenomenologic postulate; and this sets up the horizon for the understanding, adds the hermeneutician. But projection towards a phenomenon is something more fundamental, since it is inherent in the act of understanding. We cannot think of understanding without also having in our mind the idea that we have to have an object for this understanding. The horizon of understanding is involved in our experiencing, and is constituted by context-dependent memory-material, but it still does not limit the phenomenologic possibilities for interpretation since these various **intentional perspectives** are conceived of as being *a priori* (provided this is possible and a correct fact). **The hermeneutic thesis** that all acts of description are interpretations needs to be qualified; the reversed implication that interpretation contains descriptive moments or, as after the *i*-decision, that it can be substituted for description, is rarely denied. On the one hand, since describing presupposes understanding and interpretative modes of intention are fundamental to basic perception, descriptions

must be interpretative. Perceptions can be described almost neutrally, but understanding requires further cognitive acts which, I contend, involve interpretive perspective. However, I believe that our concept of understanding should be differentiated from that of interpretation. One can understand things on several levels. So the question arises: on what level is understanding a precondition for description? It is also essential to clarify this problem concerning the question of **relativism**, since we can discern various levels of interpretation in such a way that differing depths, and degrees of profoundness can become a distinguishing mark of interpretation in performances. The reverse, description as a condition for understanding, is not necessarily the case, at least not if description is taken as the **explicit** formulation of decisive traits; however the essential content referred to by the explicit description may well be identical to the content implicitly referred to by the act of understanding.

Concerning its background in the history of ideas, it may be noted that the **perspectivism**, which was also expressed in the works of Husserl, according to Ferrara, was evolved by J. M. Chladenius in the 18th century. When historians disagree on this matter, it does not necessarily mean that if one is correct, then the other must be incorrect. There are several correct perspectives, views and angles on the same event. The fact that there are diverging opinions regarding the same object does not entail subjectivism, but only an **interpretative relativism**.

Holism is generally presented by hermeneuticians as that which entails a mutuality between the whole and its parts; in order to understand the work one has to understand its parts, which should be seen in the light of the whole. (MIR I: 85) Thus, the work can either be regarded as a whole in relation to its constituent parts, or can be regarded as a part in relation to a larger historical context, or to the spirit of the age as the related and all-embracing entity. (cf. Friedrich Ast, 1778–1841)

Schleiermacher's art of understanding provides a canon of rules for interpretation, allegedly common in all fields, on the basis of **authorial intent** (Palmer 1969:84). The interpreter re-experiences the creative process of the author, which must be reconstructed through the process of understanding. The problem is, as Ferrara notices (93), how one can put oneself in the position of the author in order to "recreate the author's process of creation". Schleiermacher assumes a preexisting and universal connection between all individuals and a human ability to transcend one's dependence on one's roots in the history and culture of one's own time. This is his solution to the problem of avoiding interpretative misunderstanding caused by cultural bias. So Schleiermacher

constructs a 'negative hermeneutics' with objectivistic aims, by proposing an act of avoiding misunderstanding through transcending cultural background. Against this, Gadamer requires a 'positive hermeneutics' and maintains that one's experiences in the world enrich potential interpretive understanding.

In order to evade positivistic fragmentation into materialistic particularities and a narrowing perspective, as allegedly found in natural science (at least of that time), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) sought a middle ground between empiricism and idealism. His aim is to understand the human condition on the basis of verifiable historic and concrete instances of life, thus retaining a rigorous methodology. (Palmer, 98ff)

The criteria that we posit in this thesis can unorthodoxly be explained by means of hermeneutic or phenomenological patterns of thinking; e.g. continuity is essential for two reasons: (1) it is necessary in obtaining the identity of the work and it keeps the piece together as a whole from the one moment to the other (phenomenological), and (2) it is also what keeps life together and is a condition for personal identity, and thus brings music closer to life (hermeneutic, existential).

A MUSICIAN'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF CREATIVITY AND EXPRESSION IN MUSICAL INTERPRETATION. CREATIVE INTERPRETATION IN THE TRIPARTITE RELATION WORK–EXECUTION–EXPRESSION.

There is a tradition of "musical" thinking among musicians with considerable experience and artistic skill which has been nurtured above all by the philosophy and aesthetics of the first half of this century: Husserl, Etienne Souriau, who inspired J.-Claude Piguet¹⁵, Louis Lavelle and Henri Bergson served as sources for this impulse.

The French pianist and musicologist Gisèle Brelét (1915–1977) expounded the interpretative act into a voluminous aesthetics of creativity, seen from her particular philosophical point of view. A constant difficulty with reading and understanding her work results from the question of the role in which she wrote her books: as philosopher more or less than as musician? It seems to be a personally experienced philosophy – her aesthetics at the keyboard – which does not demand any universality. Insofar as this also reflects her experience as a performer, the question arises as to what extent her presented impressions are bound to her personal style as a pianist, or to what extent her statements refer to something general in the performer's situation.

Her main ideas can be outlined as follows: Brelét bases her *L'interprétation*

*creatrice*¹⁶ on a concept of musical time, which had been the subject of her investigation a few years earlier.¹⁷ The work is continuously renewed, or even innovated, through the performer's act of endless actualization. We carry the work in our consciousness, but it is never a permanent object; it changes due to our constant reconsideration.

The **incompleteness** of the work is due to its forms of existence. The outer appearance of the work is only a symbol for the invisible inner existence of the work, though it is paradoxical that the work in some way exists within the score as a not fully developed possibility.

As a basic form, time is transient and ephemeral, since it cannot conserve form. The essential property of time is its **constant actuality**. Brelét says that time cannot preserve permanent forms, but it can entail the permanent possibility of continually realizing latent forms. The time of music is a "*temps intemporel*", an untimely time which takes part in experience, interplaying with other conceptions and imaginations, not with physical realities.

The work refuses to enter into real time, which warrants a constant and renewed contact with "*la réalité du temps*". The constant regeneration of the work in performance overcomes the cleft between cognized and experienced time, and between imagined and realized time, respectively. This is also the 'paradigmatic model' for the basic problem of the relation between **idea and realization**, as well as for that between **essence and existence**. What the executor does is find a core of invariance which is the midpoint of the work where the facts merge to a given constellation, which becomes related to the many alternative versions heard as a realized manifold of its inherent potentiality.

The notation is always more devoid of determinate features than the corresponding imagination, which, however, is an abstraction never fully faithful to the depiction of the work, i.e. the model of the work shown in notation. Notation can never embody imagination; only the execution is an embodiment of it. The diversity of different executions bears witness to incomplete and intact possibilities still existing and inherent in the work: therefore there is an endless possibility for the 'rebirth' of the work in execution.

Brelét approaches the concept of interpretation in the following way: one who regards the work with the intention of understanding it and rendering it, is necessarily **recreative**. This is the normal procedure of creative interpretation, appearing through the **gestic** in time, and the gestic is necessarily bound to time. The interpreter is an intermediary who warrants the immediate expression and the spontaneous statement.

What Brelét aims at is a holistic view on the experiential situation of the musical performance. The problem is that she mixes subtle phenomenological observations with seemingly more subjective material. There is, however, in my opinion, a constancy behind the everchanging picture of the interpretative process she paints for us, which cannot be understood if one dissects her text too harshly. The question is whether we want to understand her. If so, one has to operationally subscribe to the presuppositions of her basic view. The justification for such an aesthetics, though, could be that it rewardingly points to phenomena that we did not recognize without her guidance. Such unprovable subtleties, designed to aid in sensitizing the musician, can also be found in her books on musical time (1949).

Among the essentials must be counted her view on the human will, which, according to her, is not wholly determinative. The artist must be sensitive to the instrument and to inner spontaneous forces, which also determine the outcome of the performance. She considers it characteristic of the great performers that they yield to an inner inspiration which gives the tone a richer resonance and qualitatively surpasses consciously will-guided action (469). Brelét presents these and other experiences without giving sufficient *a priori* or *a posteriori* evidence, and there is no clear ambition to present a consistent system, or to analyze and criticize alternative views.

It can easily be considered a trivial truth to state what Brelét states namely that the actualization of the work, phenomenologically, must always be new and unique every time. But this 'type' of statement should be regarded holistically, within the context of her aim to give an encompassing view, which is more deeply felt and personally experienced than precisely or logically apprehensible.

Brelét advances her certain attempts at generalizations that are extremely dangerous. She states that if *tempo rubato* destroys the measure, then it is good for the musical time flow. But this is too much. What I concede to is her saying that one gives way to an inner time flow that characterizes the 'gestalting' (ch. I:1 and *Praefatio*) and emanates from the inner 'life'. In this there is a hidden truth that Brelét could have explicated. Necessarily, a gestalting takes place in time, and because the process of gestalting takes place in the process of mentation, i.e. within or through consciousness, it becomes colored by the experiential time rate, regardless of the physicality of its origin. One should not refute Brelét only by criticizing her subjectivist formulations. The subjectivism is itself dissolved into an mirage, since one can always find an objectivist aspect of such observations.

Brelét herself rejects psychologism, which stands outside her aims to research the interpretation. She finds another foundation in referring to an idea that is more a reflection of the discussion at the time and specifically of the French intellectual environment of Sartre and the "existentialist" assimilation of Heidegger's ideas. The metaphysical anguish over empty time, *horror vacui*, which we would always like to fill up with something, is reflected in the performer's way of mastering time's flow; performing is to exist in this time flow.

The execution should, according to Brelét, emerge from a "spiritual universe", whereas the act is linked to the material and external process. This explains why it is destructive for a performer to imitate recordings of a performer (453), since it will ruin the quality of 'liveliness' in execution (the vividness of performance), i.e. it will destroy its interiority (internal originality). Brelét considers the gestic to be the link between the interior and the exterior, and also to be the connection between form and emotion (the interiorization and exteriorization of the performance processes are designated as "*unicité d'exécution*"). Why is this link irreducible to sensory perception? I submit that the phenomenological view allows consideration and meaning of experiential qualities not yet describable in terms of perceptible concepts. Besides, it can be argued that the point of departure should be experiential rather than perceptual when one aims to comprehend phenomenal entities such as p(i)-qualities. These cannot be arrived at by adding a series of perceptions, but are holistic phenomena that must be engulfed by intentional experiences.

Brelét provides no convincing set of criteria for acceptable interpretation, but gives only scattered and indirect hints at these. Through the execution it emerges which kind of work-consideration confirms, actualizes, or denies (contradicts) the work. So the execution is a testing of the work interpretation. And the execution expresses an evaluation of the work.

The gestic is closely connected to the more general or encompassing concept of the "*acts*". This act is an extrapolation of the already existing (*a priori*) formal coherence. The act occurs before the fact, which, I submit, requires conceptual notions created by cognitive functions inherent in the interpretive act: "before" in the primordial sense, and in the sense of "*durée interieur*", which guides the tempo.

Under the headline of "*Respect ou creation*", Brelét treats the problem of creativity in relation to the requirement of faithfulness, or fidelity to the original intention of the composer. She observes the endless manifoldness of possible executions, and states that the individual execution surpasses the work in

precision and concretion. Hence, the inherent conflict in the performing situation is this: the executor will preserve the potential richness of the work and as far as possible render a universal (I would amend, universally valid) interpretation. But this leads to the problem of **identity.** The endless richness of the concrete indicates its authenticity, and Brelét exemplifies this by referring to virtuosi. Their act of playing is inseparable from their understanding (she restates her high esteem of virtuosi more often than needed). But they must avoid two risks: becoming enslaved either by the material or by too supreme a spirituality.

Brelét states in her discourse a few principles of rehearsal that reflect her concept of interpretation. The first encounter with the work should be a silent reading. The seducing force of concrete solutions may not influence the interpretation of meaning in the work. The executor adds to the work, i.e. there is a necessary **intopretation.** On this point it should be commented that, in spite of strong phenomenological traits in the Brelét mode of thinking, she seems to espouse a somewhat delimiting idea of another ideological origin. She claims that one chosen possibility in *p* excludes all others and there is a risk of not strongly enough rejecting the other alternatives. This is a principle which is evidently valid *a priori* as our analysis of P-incompatibility has shown (ch. II:1), and Brelét draws the conclusion for practice cogently. The solution of the dilemma between expression and fidelity is solved by her through her consideration that **merely** respect is not sufficient for an adequate style of rendering (but her concept of style in this connection all too suddenly involves larger circles). One recognizes the cultural level of an executor in the way he uses freedom, which not only results from knowledge but emanates from life experience ("*la profondeur existentielle*").

The ambiguity of the work is countered by the act of interpretation, but the work also reveals its tendency and inexplicitly – its aim, end of fulfillment and aims of direction. There must be a testing of the work in performance. And on this particular point, regarding the choice of repertory, Brelét, provides a cue, although it seems to me, that she never fully realizes the all-embracing aspects of the concept of *mip* involved: her principle is that **worthy works appeal to performance, whereas mediocre works withstand performance.**

Brelét conceives of the problem of **historical authenticity** as a dilemma which must be solved through stating a chosen priority. Her preference is to regard the expressive aspects viewed from the perspective of artistic realization, whereas historical truth must concede to this demand. Even a "perfect" execution

is never final, not exhausting, not definitive. One must reserve an area for the creative moment when unexpected outcomes can occur and be artistically motivated: this is the necessary leaving of "room" for "*la spontanéité improvisatrice*".

The execution and the work are at one time "*correlatives*" and "*indépendantes*". Every individual execution has its limits and boundaries, since the number of true performances is principally unlimited. This is also the reason why execution is necessarily creative. There always remain untested possibilities for risky but promising endeavors.

Brelét refers to the spontaneity of the child and to its natural sympathy for the instrument as her ideal. She prefers the **unconscious** way of finding the most appropriate movement, which is not an act of will through the muscles, but an outcome of a motor pattern arrived at via the **inner experience**. This is the kernel of her message, but the lack of clear analysis leaves out essential distinctions.

Finally, I am exemplifying her concept of connection between execution and tempo (*Execution et tempo musical*): "*Le tempo rubato [312] unit et distingue, comme le dynamisme il exprime les solidarités et les liaisons, les distinctions et les contrastes. L'exécutant varie la durée relative des sons conformément à leur importance mélodique ou harmonique. La durée des sons, dans une belle exécution, ne cesse de s'infléchir délicatement selon leur importance structurelle.*"

MIP FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSICAL AUDITION

In his important but controversial contribution to applied phenomenology, commonly regarded among musicologists as one of the most interesting contributions to musical phenomenology, Clifton¹⁸ introduces his central notions. Musical meaning is **presentative** and is experienced as a first-order experienced ('lived') phenomenon. The listener engages in an internal **communicative dialogue** (not an inner monologue) with himself, and this is why description is useful and even necessary. The question can be raised as to whether this requires a disruption of the subject's identity. It is not enough to have musical experiences: "We must be willing to reflect on all the possible ramifications of these experiences." Since music exists in and originates from the world, **music speaks about the world**, of which I learn something when I am listening. "Insofar as music is of the world, it teaches me **about** the world." (6–7) Some of the most intriguing ideas of phenomenology apply beautifully to music: "The subject

without an object to experience, and an object without a subject for whom it has a meaning, are both unthinkable situations." (8) At this point a problem occurs: Would it not follow from this that the music work comes into being the moment I become aware of it, and would pass away as I turn my attention away from listening? Clifton does not take this paradox into account.

The meaning of a piece transcends its various appearances in particular performances according to Clifton (9) and contrary to the opinion of Cone (1974). If Clifton's view were not the case, then one could never reject a performance, since there would be nothing to compare the individual performances with. The conditions for an actual performance cannot, Clifton argues, build upon individual performances; these conditions must "cover up [in his example] the sonata's essence". These essences are what phenomenological description concentrates on, Clifton hopes. This kind of description must be able to define a limit below which we can say that what we just heard, whatever it was, wasn't the Mozart sonata announced in the program. Our description of a musical work must allow for rejecting individual performances as instances of this work. Phenomenological description should elucidate the essence of the work, thus allowing us to recognize the work behind the sound surface of an unsuccessful performance, i.e. in spite of a misinterpretation of the work. (10) Clifton also stresses the reciprocity between person and sounding object: "an interpretation of the world is inadequate if it does not consider the role of the interpreter". It follows from the phenomenological thesis of mutual dependence between musical object and experiencing subject that "if these interpretations are true, then they must apply to the standpoint of the person making them" (16). Clifton recognizes the interpretation problem in saying: "His standpoint is then likewise conditioned, subjective, and locked within his mind." In the background lurks the old philosophical problem of solipsism.

Clifton never specifies the **criteria** for determining which performances can be considered to be accepted as instances of the musical object behind the individual experience. He states (16) that in concentrating on essences "one does not exclude the experience of the object embodying those essences". The circularity of his argumentation arises in saying that "it is only through experiencing the object that it can be known". According to Clifton (17), the fact that we can argue over a description indicates that there is a **truth as a general essence**, which exists but cannot fully be experienced through individual presentation.

Performance problems are treated under the headline "Heuristics" together

with problems involving extramusical association, rhetoric and structure. Curiously, Clifton dedicates only about one page to this item, and his treatment reveals certain signs of conventionality. It seems to me that he never comes to the point of realizing the possibility of applying his evolved phenomenology within the area of interpretation in performance, and does not see its full relevance in this area. He just gives us a few hints of such a possibility by remarking that his own "brief foray into performance problems" neither exhausts "the possibilities for heuristic solutions, nor denies the validity of a more deductive approach" (226–227). About Bach, *Partita* no. 2, he notes that "the range of acceptable interpretations is quite small", which I would not deny, without giving any grounds for his conclusion. There are just a few indications of Clifton having thought through what criteria might possibly be relevant to this question: "Neither is a good interpretation invalidated for its inability to be fixed in terms of the future, or to be predicted in terms of the standpoint of the present." (224) Related to historical performance practice, Clifton remarks that neither the treatises of the early theorists nor our heuristic discoveries from phenomenological description can give any sign of absolute validity, but "only an indication that a certain way of performing the piece does make sense." (227)

Clifton writes about the "prior notion" of these fundamentals: time movement, space, feeling – essences by which the human world is delineated (16). Clifton, consequently, concentrates on the piece itself, and not on this or that performance of it. However, one then arrives at the following problem: what is his experience an experience of? The essences that he experiences, movement, space, etc., can only be experienced as he describes them by listening; and you can only listen to a particular performance; if not, the score would be used to indicate the true identity of the work and, therefore, score reading would be the sole way to arrive at its essence. But this is not a conclusion that Clifton draws. (16) Other performances will most probably reveal other or slightly different essences, or at least present them in another way. But the mode of presentation cannot be arbitrary in the view of phenomenology, not even in Clifton's personal version of this philosophy. Essence is also central to Gisèle Brelét (1951, I:129); according to her the written work is considered to be only an essence, not an existence.

II:4 THE SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: NATTIEZ, TARASTI, MONELLE, AND KURKELA

In this chapter I will question the usefulness of the semiotic approach for the purpose of conceiving a theory of musical interpretation in performance. However, at single points, especially regarding the contributions from Tarasti, Monelle and Kurkela, I have found valuable notions and distinctions that I believe could fruitfully be adopted in the perspective of an transilluminating *ia*. The main question, as to whether an objective or, as semioticians say, a "neutral" analysis of the artwork and performance respectively is attainable, bears on interpretation in the following way. If objective analysis is possible and indicates the priority of **one** structural pattern as the sole correct description of the work, then one could certainly make a strong argument for its relevance in guiding the performer in his interpretation of the work. If, however, as the proponents of semiotics tend to think, the allegedly possible objective analysis reveals several "neutral" representations of the work, the interpreter's choice of his preferred version has to be based on grounds other than those which semiotic analysis can provide.

First my analysis, and then, at the end of this chapter, a critical summary.

Influenced by ideas from the linguistics of Roman Jakobson and Mukarovsky and the anthropological structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, Barthes and others, a group of researchers around the leading figure of Jean-Jacques Nattiez, including Nicolas Ruwet, Francois-Bernard Mâche, Michel Imberty and David Lidov developed a musical semiotics, published in articles in the *Musique en Jeu*, the series of *Monographies de sémiologie et d'analyses musicales* (Université de Montréal) and in separate monographs. In essence, Nattiez's semiology aims at presenting a method for the **neutral analysis of compositional structure** through not acknowledging the perceptual aspect alone. Nattiez claims the necessity of including in analysis both **creative** ("*poiétique*") and **assimilative** ("*esthésique*") considerations: "on ne peut rendre compte de la manière dont une oeuvre est symbolisée qu'en prenant en considération et le poiétique, et l'aspect immanent, et l'esthésique"¹⁹.

Through motivic division in three basic formats on corresponding hierarchic levels, the structure of a piece can be concisely presented in taxonomic ramification. At an advanced stage of this process, where the semiologist has revealed all the motivic transformations through comparative listing, the outcome of several alternative structurings can be related by simple observation

to the solutions given by recorded interpretations. This approach presupposes the neutrality of the analysis, in the sense that the analytic presentation of the work must comprise openly all feasible versions. In the end, then, following Nattiez's *Fondements*, it is only those aspects that were foreseen by the choice of **criteria for motivic delimitation** that secure the **alleged objectivity**, comparability and compatibility of the method for demonstrating relations to interpretative devices. The discussion of such criteria, derived from considerations and procedures developed by Ruwet and Mâche, should be a crucial point for the semiotic endeavor. A more profound analysis of these criteria would be necessary for a more flexible and encompassing system to enable it to become a descriptive tool for the richness of interpretative qualities.

The lack of **transformational rules** does not allow any bridging of the gap between the work's composition and executional modes of existence. And, unfortunately, Nattiez does not take into account the variously constituted interpretative means and their necessary bearing on the **frames of possibility for structural rendering** in experienceable performance. This disregard severely limits the usefulness of an application of the semiotic method for the purpose of assisting aesthetical judgment and decision in both practical interpretation and its evaluation by interpretation research.

The basic analytic device applied by musical semiotics, according to Nattiez, is a method which regards the variables of melody and rhythm "qui permettent de le[s] comparer, de le[s] classer, de le[s] hiérarchiser par rapport à tous les autres segments du morceau." In order to compare different parts of a composition against one another, with the aim of creating a descriptive system that can also compare on the metalevel various proposals from the musicological literature concerning preferred structural variants, the work must be **decomposed into its constituents** according to some criteria. This **analytical method of decomposition** is problematic. Nattiez does not fully recognize the necessity of **explicitly stating the applied criteria**. Referring to the analysis of *Le Sacre du Printemps* in "Stravinsky demeure" by Pierre Boulez²⁰, Nattiez insists: "il s'agit de travaux extrêmement sérieux et minutieux, qui reposent sur l'analyse empirique de données du corpus, mais qui ne prétendent ni à la scientificité méthodologique, ni à l'exhaustivité. L'objectif est de caractériser l'*essentiel* [...], du rythme stravinskien, sans formuler les critères de découverte sur lesquels l'analyse repose." The neutrality of this analysis, written in 1951, is, following Nattiez, "son indifférence *a priori* vis-à-vis de la poétique et de l'esthétique." (280) However, this analysis, if technically virtuous, is a forerunner in

decompositional analysis, but does not contain any considerations about the **relation between analysis and performance**. The overriding aim, then, of a more recent semiology of music, does include a metalanguage for the rigorous statement of rules, approaching a hermeneutics for epistemological reasons: "A partir de segmentations taxinomiques [...], la sémiologie musicale, au niveau neutre, a donc pour tâche de définir un métalangage capable d'exprimer les relations combinatoires entre les unités." The analysis is based on the method of Cartesian dichotomizing: "fondée sur un découpage explicite et reproductible, elle *tend* vers l'exhaustivité (jamais atteinte) en n'excluant pas *a priori* tel ou tel phénomène intéressant; elle respecte ainsi le vieux principe cartésien des dénombrements complets à partir desquels elle peut faire apparaître un *ordre*, c'est-à-dire une hiérarchie entre les éléments inventoriés qu'elle est amenée à *classer*." (103) Nattiez adduces the fact that such taxonomy can be found in fields other than linguistics but; it forms a basis of methodology in traditional classificatory sciences such as biology, botany and chemistry, where, in principle, "l'énumération de traits abstraits permettant d'assigner à une espèce une place dans un tableau". He refers to the **combinatory classification** of "tableau d'intégration phonologique en linguistique" (104) which, nevertheless, provides no support or evidence for his **theory on music**.

Nattiez discusses the need for 'explicit procedures of verification' for the validation of his models but does not demonstrate this practically in relation to his analytical results. And he insists (280), inconsistently, that the taxonomic analysis should not be based on any criteria, presupposing that such criteria would endanger the neutrality of the analytical method, which, in my view, must still be able to produce results which can comprise structural versions representing various sets of criteria. So there seems to be an inherent contradiction in this method.

The neutral level ("*le niveau neutre*", 344 *et passim*) is supposed to provide the basis for an 'area of collection' for the formalized description in paradigmatic tables: Nattiez asserts the "caractère neutre de la type de découpage" (345). In this connection, he distinguishes paradigmatic relations **in absentia** from syntagmatic relations **in praesentia**.

Among the criteria touched upon (in MIR I:310–312, 326, 357; MIP:35), decisive for the segmentation process, Nattiez discusses **identity** (293), **continuity**, **complementarity** (144), and **opposition** of two kinds, "*distinctive*" (AB) and "*contrastive*" (A_1A_2), respectively; these deserve consideration. It is clear that "*opposition*" in the musical phenomenology of Celibidache refers to the

contrastive kind (MIR IV: 192). Mâche distinguished between "*ressemblance et différence*", but Nattiez does not accept his proposals as those adhering to **distributive** (through reading and listening) and **transformative** criteria: i.e. addition (repetition, amplification, interpolation), subtraction ('amputation', filtering, elimination), and, permutation. The structural potentiation that constitutes hierarchic levels should also, I submit, be mentioned here as especially important in the mip of large scale works, e.g. the successful p(i) of symphonic form in Beethoven, Brahms and Bruckner.

According to Nattiez, it is the transformations of motivic designs through the piece that explain the contrasts and familiarities between units, whereas Mâche maintains that the perceptive and the creative, i.e. **aesthesis** and **poiesis** as **strategies in analysis**, are similar, which would be in accordance with the views of Furtwängler and Ansermet. Critically, then, the criteria of **identity** and **difference** for the analytical "*decoupage*" into **units** must be exploited and defined more precisely; it must be clear to what **compositional factor** the identity or difference refers in order to allow for the full descriptive capacity of the various resulting couplings of complexes and priorities of **interpretative factors** (w-i relation). Otherwise the system loses its neutrality. (MIR I:305ff)

Nattiez conceives of signification in music as revealed through **audition** as something that cannot be reduced to a common form, in accordance with an idea by Imberty: signification can be derived from "*l'ordre du vécu*", and "l'image de la chaîne des interprétants permet, en tout cas, de se faire une idée plus juste des raisons de ces difficultés. L'oeuvre musicale se charge de signification variées parce qu'elle est insérée dans un contexte socio-historique au moment de sa réception" (191). Poetry and music are both dependent in their meaning on the context of the epoch and culture that produce them, and this enables us, argues Nattiez, to "projeter des *interprétations* construites à l'aide des filtres théoriques qui nous sont contemporains." (191). Simultaneously, music presents itself as "*un langage qui se signifie soi-même*" (212), which entails a formalism not alien to the tradition of Hanslick and Stravinsky, according to whom music is "un jeu de formes [...] *poiétiquement normatif*." (213) Maintaining the aim of neutrality, Nattiez acknowledges two equivalent components of interacting signification in music: "le système référentiel extrinsèque et le jeu de renvoi entre les unités intrinsèques." These two parameters, **extrinsic** and **intrinsic references**, are essential to the conception of music as experienced ("*émique*"

derived from "*phonemics*") entity: "dans les renvois des unités intrinsèques sur les axes syntagmatiques et paradigmatisques, il y a également jeu d'interprétants [...] Le niveau neutre, c'est l'inventaire de ces possibilités et son élaboration constitue un élément non négligeable de la sémiologie: il permet la mise en relation du matériau musical avec ses dimensions poétiques et esthétiques." (214)

The alleged **neutral delimitation of unities** viewed in perspective from below or above (297, 303) of various levels of structure (I–III; 300) refers to a 'sectionizing' (division) into motives and figures of different extensions: two or more bars, one bar, and one note value ("*rhythm*"), respectively, indicated by capital, lower-case and Greek letters. Nattiez's indices designate related paradigmatic transformations from a common unity, "rencontré antérieurement". However the principles for and relations between these "*liens paradigmatisques*" differ in kind and are never explicitly exposed.

In his analysis of Brahms' *Intermezzo* op. 119 no. 3, Nattiez, after an inventory of all the assigned rhythmic units (294), provides a list in vertical columns of all motivic variants (that he can find within this section) in the work's original presentation: this conspicuously demonstrates the transformations of a motif through the course of a piece (tables 304–308, 311–319). One would be inclined to confirm Nattiez's assertion of "la pertinence, au moins esthétique, du découpage mélodique", if he had provided evidence for the stated **correspondencies of interpretations to semiological analyses**: "Julius Katchen²¹ le joue 'detaché' et son phrasé est conforme à notre analyse I", i. e. the on-beat (if not downbeat) version; "Walter Klein²², au contraire, met l'accent sur la répétition mélodique de l'analyse II", i. e. off-beat (upbeat) of at least 2 bars each, bars 1–2, 3–4 etc. (326; 311–319).

Nattiez concludes from this juxtaposition of semiological analysis and 'esthysical' listening observation: "Notre analyse, terminée avant que nous n'écoutions ces deux versions, rend compte d'un phénomène *esthétique* considérable: les interprètes ont décidé de privilégier une variable plutôt qu'une autre, chez Klein, la cellule mélodique, chez Katchen, le rythme harmonique. [326] Dira-t-on que Klein n'a pas compris Brahms? On est toujours libre de l'affirmer, mais pas plus qu'on ne saurait reprocher à Boulez d'interpréter – dans tous les sens du mot – le *Sacre* dans un esprit différent de Stravinsky, on ne saurait affirmer qu'il existe une vérité dans l'exécution des œuvres."

The maintaining of neutrality necessarily entails a dangerous **indifference**; if not, the semiological system could be completed by further criteria for

metainterpretative distinction and decision. Further criteria for **consistency** could be developed in order to secure the **internal coherence of the alternative analyses**. However, Nattiez does not conceive of musical semiology as a provider of advice to performers, since the aim of neutrality forbids such a role: "La sémiologie musicale, comme l'analyse en général, ne saurait édicter à l'interprète ses choix. Mais elle doit envisager de les expliquer. Le niveau neutre, parce qu'il multiple les possibilités d'organisation d'une même matière musicale, fournit une *base* pour rendre compte des phénomènes esthétiques, et d'abord de l'interprétation." (327) And, finally, Nattiez **rejects completeness of the system**: "S'il est assez complet, il permet aussi d'expliquer certaines décisions analytiques. C'est par là que nous allons terminer."

A more detailed comparison between the interpretations by four flutists (Karlheinz Zoller, Severino Gazzeloni, Michel Debost and an anonymous flutist conducted by Robert Craft, playing Edgard Varèse's *Density 21.5*) and a segmentational and transformational analysis is provided by Nattiez in no. 2 of the monographic series from the University of Montreal (op. cit, 1975). The observations on phrasing are pertinent contributions to interpretation analysis. His basic idea, however, is to delimit the task of semiologic analysis for interpretational purposes: "Le niveau neutre n'est là que pour faciliter la compréhension des phénomènes musicaux et fournir, comme on le voit ici, une base de comparaison." (103)

TARASTI'S MUSICAL SEMIOTIC

Eero Tarasti's work in progress, his "Theory of Musical Semiotic", cannot be anticipated. This résumé relates a few thoughts relevant to interpretational considerations from his lectures at Lund University under the title *Semiotics of Culture and the Arts* (summer 1992). Based on the theoretical framework of A. J. Greimas, which Tarasti applied to musical interpretation as early as 1981 (1982²³), he proposes a series of fundamental categories and criteria, arriving at a convincing cognitive philosophy of semiotics. The "semiotic square" is a combinatory model consisting of two contrary pairs of 'cognitive positions', to which music with great explanatory force can be referred: it need "not necessarily be connected with the modal concepts of being/not being and doing/not-doing" (Raymond Monelle, referee's report 8.4.94), which can be considered **modes and degrees of activity**; but for the purpose of this study it is fruitful to construct such a connection. In his study of Chopin's *Polonaise-Fantaisie* (1984:

53–59) Tarasti shows how different narrative interpretations of this work function as grounds for semantic structures.

Interpretation is the "art of *modalization* in music", according to Tarasti. The performer provides distinct versions of the work to be performed, through applying the various modes and grades of **willing, being and knowing** at his disposal, and decides on the bases of indications for the performance in the score, the "modalities" in which the work will appear.

In *MIR II (294 et passim)*, I have presented the related concepts by analyzing the relations between "*veta, vilja och kunna*" (knowledge, intention and capability): the interpreter who **wants** to do something, must **know** what he wants and he must **be able to do** what he wants and knows. "Being able to" ("*kunna*") refers to both theoretical **knowledge** and **practical competence**, including a series of mixed acts such as

- (1) the ability to realize imagination in **actions**, and
- (2) practical attainments, proficiency and skill, including instrumental (or vocal) **dexterity**.

Tarasti's "*modalities*" have a wide denotation within a developed "generative trajectory" (Greimas), comprising also: (1) **isotopies**, i.e. levels of signification as criteria for segmentation; (2) **spatiality**, viz. outer distribution in the register or harmonical movement in inner space; **temporality** and "**actoriality**", including considerations of sender–receiver, subject–object and helper–opponent relations – categories that can be "articulated" according to "their degree of disengagement/engagement" ("*débrayage/embrayage*"); and (4) "*phemes/semes*", namely analysis of the musical substance, as signifier / signified, of recurring modal configurations in a piece or oeuvre. **Being, doing and becoming** are considered fundamental modalities concerned with "actionals", which make music anthropomorphic, and are intimately involved in the **modal logic of performance choices**. Further modalities presented by Tarasti which are of interest to the interpreter are; '**will**' (volition), such as "kinetic energy", "inner tendency" of direction and "volitive logics", with reference to L. B. Meyer and Charles Seeger; 'know' (knowledge) such as "the cognitive moment"; '**can**' (capability, ability) such as "the power of efficiency" and the "technical resources" of instrumental or vocal performance; '**must**' (imperativeness) refers to the performance restrictions of a piece by means of "stylistic and formal norms" and through a kind of "deontic logic"; and **belief** to "epistemic values of music", persuasiveness of musical reception, "music felt as 'true speech' [Assafiev] and 'Wahrhaftigkeit' [Schönberg]."

Obviously, a realization within the frame of these modalities, requires a

redundancy of information. In *The Semiotic Web* (1986) within the "Musical Signification project"²⁴, Tarasti explicates his notion of interpretation: "Interpretation. Either [1] 'phenomenological' (although in such 'raw' experiences undercoding is really at work) or stylistic interpretation, or further interpretation. [2] *Stylistic* interpretation is the attribution of meaning via further associations as constrained by correlations: the pursuit of interpretants; [3] hermeneutic and creative reading based on the kind of growth and creativity constrained by the style, including strategic interpretation. Such interpretation ranges from the type generalization of undercoded macrounits in a given work through interpretations in terms of emotional, psychological, or spiritual states (cultural units) and progressions among these states. [3] *Further* interpretation, (overcoding) is that which goes beyond stylistic interpretation, specifically 1) interpretation in light of a later style, and 2) interpretation in terms of private, subjective codes or needs, including overly precise programmatic interpretations, leakages from other associations and codes, etc." Tarasti's distinctions on the intentional level are incisive and useful, but they do not refer to explicitly (or are not referable to) the structural properties of the work. Judgment on the applicability of his categories remains intuitive and varies for each encounter between interpreter and a specific work. This instability of the theory has not yet been compensated for by reference to any fully developed cognitive theory of the interpreting musical mind, which would be needed in support of this creative and ingenious endeavor.

LOGICS OF NOTATION SEMANTICS

Kari Kurkela of the Sibelius Academy investigates in his thesis the signification of notation by analyzing the projective relation between *Note and Tone*²⁵ through application of Richard Montague's possible worlds' semantics, originally conceived for the English Language.²⁶ My objection to this theoretical application is that even if it were valid for notation as a **signifying reference system**, which can be circumstantially questioned or at least requires the fulfillment of conditions that already entail **interpretive decisions** so as to exclude freedom of prejudice on the metalevel, this linguistic theory does not say much about music, and even less about musical interpretation. There seems to be a hidden circularity in the procedure, seen from the perspective of interpretation science. But the implication of this theory for interpretation research merits consideration; an analysis or merely an objectively intended description of an interpretation requires a return

to the work as represented by the notation, and to the formulation of an explicit theory of notation as a basis for interpretation.

The point of departure for Kurkela is the question: In what way does notation actually represent sound events? (preface) Since "principles of a language can be formalized in a manner familiar in mathematics and formal logic" (xii), and since musical notation is assumed to be a written language, Kurkela undertakes to exploit the consequences of these premises for a theory of musical notation. In language, entities form complexes according to (1) syntactic rules, and when these entities have a representative function, they are (2) semantically interpreted. Music notation, then, is postulated to be a notation language, i.e. "a syntactically and semantically organized system of symbols." Kurkela exploits the "semantic implications of the assumption that notation is a language" (4) on the basis of a review of suggestions by Wittgenstein, Nelson Goodman (*Languages of Art*) and Gadamer. Without explicating the mode of projection between notation and the sound event, Wittgenstein proposes in *Tractatus* (4.01, 4.011, 4.014 and 4.0141) that a score can be a description of sound in parallel to the sentence of a natural language describing a state of affairs. This assumption is also made by Nelson Goodman, whereas Gadamer's hermeneutical analysis of interpretation places the score on par with historical sources. Other authors, e.g. Gardner Read, have pointed to the comparable relations between notated-sounding music and written-spoken language. Both the score and a playwright's script hint at a future realization. Kurkela distinguishes, as basic expressions of notation, (1) the separate note sign indicating a relative duration, from (2) a qualifier indicating properties (qualities) such as pitch, dynamic degree or progression, including those referred to by **performance markings** (6). This, though, is already a questionable ontological division concealed in the **formula of the note sign and its qualifier**, in parallel with the logical proposition of language. Why is pitch classified as a "qualifier" to duration, and not the reverse? Before we could enter into an analysis, the criteria to such a distinction would have to be stated. In my view, then, Kurkela's proposition already contains a meta-interpretational presupposition (or decision) that can be explicitly accounted for. The independent note sign normally maintains its constant indication of **potential relative durations** only within the contextual frame of other note signs which it can encounter by the reader's **interpretative act**, due to the graspable **proportionality** that the interpreted notes receive in the context of other note signs. Kurkela states that the note represents a sound event, whereas the properties of a sound event are represented

by a qualifier. But a "sound event" must have both pitch and duration, whereas a note may indicate alternatively the following "aspects" of the sound event: (1) only the event as such, (2) only the sound qualities, or (3) both sound and event. Furthermore, a note may refer alternatively to: (1) an **imagined**, i.e. a conceptual, sound event, as when the conductor reads the score silently; (2) a **real** sound event; or (3) a sound event **imagined (conceived of) as real**, as when the conductor 'audializes' (cf. "visualizes") the situation he will encounter in front of the orchestra by playing tones corresponding to the actual notes. The problem of Kurkela's notion of a formula that distinguishes (1) the note representing sound event from (2) the qualifier representing its property is the fact that a tone **in re** cannot be thought of either as existing without having properties, or as having properties without existing. These are indivisible, necessary attributes that are mutually conditional. The signification of a qualifier or note **per se**, then, remains an abstraction. This is the reason for the inconsistency of (1-1, 6), in which it is stated that pitch is represented by a qualifier, and of (1-5, 8), in which it is stated that the sign that stands for the property of having a specific pitch indicates the property of a sound event; a bare property (representing its qualifier), without any note (representing its sound event), would then still represent (indicate) a sound event, which is contradictory: if n entails sv , and q entails p ; now given q but not n ; then p , but we know nothing about sv . What Kurkela states is that notation (n) entails the sound event (sv), and that the qualifier (q) entails the sound event (sv). But then on what basis is the dichotomy note/qualifier founded? Kurkela adduces the inconceivability of a timeless sound event, vaguely suggested from a quotation from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, as support for his proposition of "duration as the basic property of a sound event." (9) So duration still is a property; but could as well have been indicated by the qualifier. The claim "A sound event cannot have pitch or intensity [dynamic grade] without duration", is not more true than the reverse proposition, that a duration cannot be a sound event, at least not **sound** and hardly an **event**, without pitch and "intensity". The Stockhausen idea of pitch as based in time through wave frequencies is physicalistic²⁷ and cannot provide support on an experiential level.

Although this principal problem is not solved, it is important to note that Kurkela, constructively for interpretation research, explains the notational formula's reference to "possible worlds" as a "set of [a] state of affairs" and "an assemblage of possible situations, each of them fulfilling the requirements that the formula expresses." (12)

The relation between the decoding of the formula via note and its qualifier in the score and the sound event with its properties, according to Kurkela, is logically expressed by the relation between a possible world and a realized world.

The function of notation in the communicative sequence following Bengtsson²⁸ and Seeger ("prescriptive" and "descriptive" method; 1960 and 1970) is basically **descriptive, prescriptive and mnemotechnic**; and, for Ingarden, the score gives an implicit directive for a performance, whereas Dahlhaus distinguishes "*Resultatschrift*" from "*Aktionsschrift*". If seen as a coding–decoding operation (Kurkela 19), its function can be understood as translation (conversion) in two directions: "a real sound event (s_s) is reported in terms of notation", and "the score (S), in turn, is transformed into a real sound event (s_s) [...]: $s_s - S - s_s$." This would correspond to our $c_{ac} - n - c_{au}$, with a problematic indication regarding whose c the formula refers to; assuming L or P, difficulties remain in relating c_{ac} to **some** human beholder. However, Kurkela indicates a productive sequence including a C or C_i : "The way of understanding sound events is regulated by the notation used, and the completed score, correspondingly, reflects the author's way of conceptualizing sound stimuli."

The idea of Nelson Goodman (1976:128), that the function of the score is authoritatively to identify a work over different performances, is, according to Kurkela, problematic in the version given by Goodman, who thinks in the sequence of an original score – its performance – a copy of the score – its performance another score copy, etc. Kurkela proposes that it is not the copy, but the [adequate] description that serves as a basis for the next performance in the everlasting sequence, and as Kurkela recognizes, preserving a work in this way would not allow any **derivation** (37). However: (1) Goodman proposes that the preservation of the score, and thus the adequacy of the copy used for performance at any point in the history of the work, is a condition for the preservation of the work, but this is not the whole truth, since (2) a reconstruction of a work, even its preservation and performance, is possible from memory or from a recording.

Kurkela argues that "an adequate conceptual background", perhaps a competence acquired by the appropriate education and training into a 'code familiarity' (Bengtsson "*kodförtrogenhet*", p.c. *et op. cit.* 1973:294–296), "may rule out a set of theoretically possible interpretations" (33), and conventions help to rule out what Roger Sessions designated as "impossible performances". By this, Kurkela approaches the problem of **notational indeterminacy**; for instance, the borderline is not distinct: > may be understood as an accent sign or diminuendo

mark in manuscripts (by Chopin). Such cases demonstrate that music notation does not, occasionally, fulfill the requirements in natural languages of being "syntactically disjoined" and "finitely differentiated". Normally, though, tonality (or 'tonicity' in its modern sense within cognitive musicology, E. Agmon 1993:74–87) can guarantee the univocal auditive–cognitive interpretation of pitches: whether e or f flat, can be determined within the **logic of the tonal reference system**.

The inexactitude of conventional notation bears on the question of **work identity**; the idea of the "primary function of the score as the determinant of identity of a musical work [i.e. of a musical work's identity]" (34) does not convince Kurkela as long as the "identity of a sound event and [the] identity of a musical work do not coincide" (34). The missing link, an "artistically qualified entity", as final result of the interpretative process meant to be communicated, is not determined by the notation. So, in the end, concludes Kurkela, the score does not guarantee the identity of the musical artwork. Still, this identity must be "inferred out of [i.e. from] a score." (35) And the alleged "structural incompleteness inherent in [the] descriptions of a score (as in declarative sentences) causes [requires] the demand of [an] implicit understanding based on tradition" (37), which justifies the adducing of relevant historical and cultural evidence for completing the work identity by interpretative amendment. "Work identity is, then, based only partly on explicit descriptions written in a score: aesthetic and historical understanding is also needed. If severe gaps take place between source and interpreter, then the identity of a work is endangered." (37) Kurkela also assumes that "the need for presuppositions in the understanding of notation may be a far more prominent factor than accidental deviations in single performances as far as work–preservation is concerned."

Under the heading *From a score to realisations* (2.3.4.;39) Kurkela advances his conception related to the subject of our investigation: "When a performer interprets a score he is [...] like a reader of a newspaper or director of a play." He adduces this equivocal analogy to the reader while both [1] drawing attention to "special features of the event and [2] omit[ting] other details" which can be supposed to be self–evident, relying on the listener's previous knowledge. Kurkela suggests that this marking out of essential traits will make it possible for all to understand the event; in analogy, the justification for interpretive shaping would be communicative in nature, allowing for a free application of Kurkela's idea. This zone of indeterminacy would also be related to the constancy provided by the composer who "describes the properties of sound

events that must remain unchanged from one performance to another" (40), "and that he supposes not to be obvious to the performer." In agreement with Roger Sessions, then, Kurkela, criticizes the idea of "*canonized performances*" ("ideal", "authoritative", Sessions). Kurkela's argument is that "a composer is not necessarily aware of all the possibilities concealed in his manuscript", so there may be both "pleasant as well as unpleasant surprises" for him, and, presenting an argument from Sparshott, the composer "hardly knows in advance the limits of what he will accept as a possible performance" (cf. Kurkela, 41), whereas Sessions advances the position that "the music is not totally present, the idea of the composer is not fully expressed, in any single performance, actual or even conceivable, but rather in the sum of all possible performances" (cf. Kurkela *ib.* 40). However, Kurkela's argument concerns the composer's professional skill in imagining his score as sounding event; Sparshott's argument refers to a certain presupposed undecidedness on the part of the composer that would not be considered as qualitatively convincing; and Sessions' argument, that the sum of all possible performances could be expressed in the score, is impossible since its differing performances are *a priori* incompatible and contradictory. It is not the number of possible performances, but only their **potential range** that can be stated, not explicitly but **implicitly**, in the score. Interpretation thus has a **restricting function** in that it excludes alternatives **on the basis of aesthetic criteria** from this full range of possibilities, technically implied by the indeterminacy of notation. Unfortunately, though, Kurkela provides no such criteria; or, rather only one is suggested: "only after an execution has acquired a proper spirit can it be considered as an artistical whole." (41)

An important clarification by Kurkela is his conclusion that (1) semantic constraints implied by the notation include some of the possible worlds suggested by the score, and exclude others, and (2) that this set of possible worlds which fulfill the semantic requirements is further restricted by aesthetic restraints. Interpretation research identifies such restraints, and investigates their role and interaction as aesthetic criteria.

Kurkela propounds the idea (135–137), advanced by Veikko Rantala 1985, that sound structure can be defined, logically, as the ordered pair of a score (S) and a logic (L): $\langle S, L \rangle$. "Each [formulation of] logic as an ordered pair of syntax and semantics determines the way a notation describes sound events." If the logic's and the score's descriptive code are known and fixed, i.e. constant, then it is possible to judge "whether a score is a description of a given sound event", i.e. in effect, whether **correspondence** between notation and sound holds. The

properties of sound events would then be specified by the score and its pertinent logic: "an aesthetic aspect has to be taken into account when a formal definition of an acceptable performance is to be given." (136) So, the "aesthetic constraint" (E) must be included in the logical formula $\langle S, L, E \rangle$, which "determines a class of acceptable performances". (136) The basis of an evaluation for "an acceptance value assigned to a performance of a score" depends on the same logical construct $[S, L, E]$. Kurkela suggests that the progressive change in a work over the course of time is caused by changing L and E. However, this equivocality can be solved. It is the completed artistic performance, and the underlying cognitive and auditive procedures of interpretation, that change our view and the appearance of the work. In order for us to be able to identify, designate and discuss such 'change' and such 'views' related to the work, the work must have some ontological mode of existence that can guarantee its **constancy**. How would it otherwise be possible to recognize changes in performance styles? We conceive of performance as an appearance of the work, as a mode of existence and an instance of the work, but not as the work itself.

Kurkela finely discusses the introduction of context (C) into the scheme $\langle S, L, E, C \rangle$ for "factual music work", suggested by Jerrold Levinson's proposal in order to account for the unlikely possibility of two separately created scores that are in every respect identical. Kurkela considers this reasoning to be redundant, because the aesthetic argument is superior and contains contextual considerations, i.e. E overrides C, and, thus, C may be omitted. (138) And because Levinson's criterion confuses and disregards the overriding criterion of **original creativity** (O) with that of the context, I would argue that it would be more adequate to exclude the case of epigonic forgery in copying the original score or style, by introducing O into the formula: $\langle S, L, E, O \rangle$. Logically, though, the problem remains unsolved, since two creative artists may still concurrently produce identical scores; Levinson's criterion of context may then be reintroduced to reduce the remaining infinitesimal probability to zero.

Kurkela summarizes (139): "A score describes a set of possible chained worlds. To compose is to define features of possible worlds. A performance is a completed realization of one of the chained worlds accepted as [the] potential instance of an actual musical work."

Pebr Sällström has presented an interdisciplinary survey and comparison of notational systems within the arts and sciences. His book²⁹ candidly illuminates

the **ontology of notation**. Notation attains, through its outer permanence, autonomy and independence from the author's inner intention (vision, conception or musical imagination), its own 'history' in a **polarity between actuality and authenticity**. Sällström treats basic question concerning how notation can mean anything, and points out its function for the accumulation and handling of concisely formulated information, which liberates the performer from immense demands on his memory capacity. Notation may either become a source of inspiration for expressing what can be expressed by it (in which case it becomes a 'language') or it may impede creativity. Essentially, notation changes our relation, or perspective, to time (19), in that it allows us to liberate ourselves from the **demands of real time flow** and rely on memory and inner conceptualization. Pehr Sällström's idea, that notation does not eliminate the necessity of intuitive reference (21), i.e. the relation between the explicit and implicit is still a crucial point, is supported by the fact of (1) the indeterminacy of notational indication, and (2) the need for internal and external reference in the reading process. Musical notation "has the character of" not only **depiction** ("seeing"), but also "**language**" in the sense of a **readable code**. In focusing on its function in practice and in the history of music, Sällström insists that notation must have effected music in a **formalizing** direction. He also expands the concepts of **action notation** ("*spelinstruktion*", 29) and **ideogram** (40) and reviews Swedish (Hambraeus, Bengtsson, Flyckt, Törnblom) and international authors (Karkoschka, Goodman) on notational theory. Against his identification of the work in the score, Goodman argues that the **score is but one instantiation of the 'idea of the work'** (68). And from the point of view of musical practice, one could consider differing performance versions essential for such identification, especially when the frames of possibilities indicated by notation are broad. Sällström relates a suggestion from Carl Axel Moberg, based on recitation rules for the Koran and its signs for rests (56), which may be adapted in the discussion of interpretative criteria. There are several steps between the **prescription** and **recommendation** of signs for rests: pauses, and, *mutatis mutandis*, means of expression within other parameters, may be **prescribed, desired, permitted, undesired, or prohibited** as indicated by performance marks corresponding to a **scale of intentional directedness and volitional modes** towards the interpreted basic structures and substance of the work.

To sum up, the few most controversial points from the discussion above, regarding the usefulness of semiotic theory for the purpose of musical interpretation theory, which suggest theses and contratheses are as follows:

(1) The lack of explicit criteria for motivic division is problematic. This division ("*decoupage*") is a prerequisite for the segmentation of semiotic analyses presented in taxonomical trees. There is no support for the postulated neutrality of this divisive method.

(2) The argument advanced by semioticians, that neutrality is guaranteed by a lack of criteria for the decompositional analysis, is very weak. One can question the soundness of total arbitrariness, or anarchy of rules, and I believe the semioticians would not themselves concede to that idea.

(3) The exhaustive dismembering of motifs does not *a priori* show any of the **interesting** features of the work. Such features seem to appear in particular via complex hierarchical order. In contrast, I propose that the most fruitful analysis goes in two simultaneous directions, in an interplay between **unity** and **detail** (the whole and its parts): the work-analysis (wa) from unity to detail, and the synthetic interpretation-analysis (ia) from detail to unity. The latter, **the unifying interpretative analysis**, is essential in view of the performance, which must be a performance of the **whole** work in order to attain the level of an identity of a particular work.

(4) Semiotic theory applies similar strategies in creative (*poiesis*) and perceptive (*aesthesis*) analyses. It is true that both **synthetic** and **analytic** moments are involved in both functions, and that both are necessary. In order to find a powerful method of analysis, with forceful explanatory consequences, the suggested **paradigmatic relations in absentia on the metalevel** must be shown to communicate with the **syntactic relations in presentia on the basic level** of the work unfolding in time. This is where things diverge: the aesthesis **must** occur in **real time**, whereas poetic work allows the composer to conceive his work in e.g. **slow motion** as a method for the intellectual control and survey of the created structures.

(5) "Musical signification" is derived from "*l'ordre du vécu*", following Imberty. A sociohistorical context imparts music (or loads it) with meaning which we are enabled to interpret by means of a **contemporary theoretical filter**.

(6) The distinctive definition of Nattiez's two layers of meaning, extrinsic versus intrinsic reference, is not entirely clear.

(7) Concrete semiological interpretation analyses are very limited as far as the applied criteria are concerned, (e.g. Nattiez, 311 on Brahms).

- (8) The alleged neutrality of semiotic analysis seems to imply interpretative indifference.
- (9) There is no supporting internal coherence of the alternative analyses.
- (10) The logical basis for the identity of the work is a disregarded prerequisite for a neutral level, meant to be used in the comparison of different interpretations.
- (11) Nattiez's reflection on the completeness of analytic–semiotic systems is questionable. This demand cannot be withdrawn without weakening the theoretical basis of the system.

It is true that the semiotic movement within music is a much broader endeavor than can be shown here; its achievements and applicability to a variety of musical problems, especially its solutions to that of **understanding** music and the question whether (to what extent, and how) musical meaning can be based in **immanent structures** of the music–work, have been demonstrated by Raymond Monelle (1992). My argument touches upon only the fact that semiotics has not yet produced a theory that captures the essentials and the complexities of musical interpretation in performance.

Concerning the notational semiotics of Kurkela:

Kurkela's thesis is that notation represents its corresponding sound event. But a contrathesis would be that notation represents alternatively:

- (1) **intentional and/or experiential auditive content imagined by the musical mind**, i.e. that notation hints at an intended entity. This, however, is problematic if you hold a precise image of *w* but read a score badly, since the interpretation of notation is not arbitrary; can such a reader identify his image in the score? (2) an abstracted image of – and correlate to – auditive conception/imagination; (3) that part of the auditive intentional content which corresponds to the auditive–acoustic signification of the relevant rules within the notational system: What about the non–auditive connotations? Is structure indicated by notation, directly or indirectly? and, (4) that part of the performer's auditive consciousness content which corresponds to the composer's meaning in the notational language he uses.

The thesis of Kurkela that pitch as a qualifier is subordinate to duration, i.e. duration is the central feature, can be questioned: This is true only of the visually appearing notation, through regarding its sign. A theory of the visual notational sign system used for indicating music which sounds in an auditive medium does not apply to this idea. The notion of music as the art of sound, and

what appears in the sound–medium, provokes a critical reconsideration of this thesis, even if some poets, such as Paul Valéry, hold that 'everything comes from rhythm'. The contrathesis is possible, and has not been disproved by Kurkela: that the generative durations and rhythms grow out of the pitch relation – an idea that is compatible with the central European tradition of Schenker–Furtwängler–Celibidache. According to this tradition, complex pitch relations, ascending or descending intervals, motifs, etc. are **self-generating**, as analogous to biological processes. This can be practically demonstrated easily in improvisation, gestalted improvisation and generative composition.

Furthermore, the note's route from sign (notation) to reality can take two directions, one over (1) the **imagined silent reading** of the score, the other via (2) the conductor's envisaging, visualizing and concretizing of an **imagined (virtual) soundworld reality**: Cognitively, 1 involves visual–to–auditive connecting and transformation while 2 involves 'pure' auditive imagination.

Kurkela is correct, logically, in suggesting the "inconceivability of timeless sound events". My inquiry is whether pitchless sound events are less inconceivable. One aspect of the former proposal can be criticized: the **indeterminacy of duration *per se*** is not inconceivable, since we never in practice imagine precisely absolute durations. Temporal audition focuses mainly on **relative durations** and is more sensitive to them. By agreement a sign, e.g. "x/", could have this meaning even if its pitch is determined.

Conceivability of the meaning of a sign as **sign–meaning**, such as an 'indeterminacy of duration', *in abstracto*, is possible. But Kurkela is correct in that, *in concreto*, the auditive conception (imagination) of indeterminate duration is **contradictory**, *ergo* not possible. However, **notation** is abstract, and does not constitute concrete sense–data for any 'pure' sense modalities, e.g. auditive, visual, tactile, proprioceptive, and synaesthetic. These are all concrete.

The distinction **interpretation/work** is logically equivalent to that of **realized world/possible world**. Interestingly a very similar idea can be found in the writings of Eugene Narmour who proposes the model of implication–realization (1990).

Interpretation depends on decoding the operation of descriptive/prescriptive notation, according to Kurkela. But what is a 'real' world? Must there be a physical correlate? No. The model suggests precisely that the codifying notation is opposite, the reverse of the decodifying interpretation. And there are two kinds of **WORLDS**: the **REAL** and **POSSIBLE**. But are these

both imaginable, conceivable? I think they are. This is what makes **creativity** possible and the alternative logical systems conceivable, what enables unheard music to be composed: there must be a **transformation from the possible to the real world**.

I would propose that the **work identity** has **notational indeterminacy**, i.e. that it depends on ambiguities of sign, which is a **qualitative** feature. The **quantitative** one refers to the **inexactitude of conventional notation**. **Structural incompleteness** requires an implicit understanding and justifies the recognition of historical and cultural evidence. The incompleteness has this aesthetic consequence: it demands an **aesthetic unifier** and/or an **historical relator**. These are the two possible ways by which necessary unity can be achieved due to original incompleteness. The **now/then** must be transformed into the **now/now** to obtain the level of actuality required for aesthetic access to the work (which, logically, can only occur **now**). This means that the **historicity of the w must be reduced** or somehow **projected onto the now and here**. The **priority of the now, the here and the concreteness of p(w) is fundamental** ('*nunc, hinc et in concreto*'). The historical relator establishes a relation to the past and elsewhere to the dimensions of time and space, to all those historical facts that are adduced, and constitute the (A) **fundamental relations to the actualization** (1) **now–then**, (2) **here–there**, (3) **here–then**, and (4) **now–there**, including its pertinent (B) **modes of reality**: (1) **retrospectivity–prospectivity**, (2) **concreteness–abstractness**, and the corresponding (C) **modes of intentionality** (retentional–proportional directedness; Husserl's "*Vergegenwärtigung*", ch. I:2) relevant to and **actual for the specific case**.

Kurkela does not go on to explain why "presuppositions in the understanding of notation" would be more important than "accidental deviations in single performances". His critique of "canonized performance" on the basis of two premises (that the composer is not aware of all possibilities and that the composer does not know the limits that he will accept) is based on correct presumptions, but underestimates the theoretical impact of serious interpretation in performance, which can take into account the same knowledge of the relation to the natural tendencies that the composer does. The interpreter can acknowledge the relations of w–w through research, and relate his findings to various realizations of i–i–relations that were not yet available to the composer. The epistemological situation necessary for access to the work, through work analysis and interpretation comparisons, is more favorable for the interpreter than for the composer.

I will treat further the metaphoric expressions of musical experience in p, hinted at by semioticians, in connection with the problems of criticism (ch. V:5).

II:5 FORMALISM: MODERN 'SCHOOLS' OF THEORY ON FORM AND PERFORMANCE: CONE, STEIN, GRAZIOSI, BERRY AND NARMOUR

Formalism is probably the most dominant aesthetic position within contemporary musicology, especially in the USA. A few preeminent authors whose work is relevant to our subject are mentioned for orientation: Wallace Berry (1989), David Epstein (1979/80), David Lewin and Eugene Narmour. Formalism's roots are usually traced back to Eduard Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (1854), which defended an autonomic formalism on the aesthetic level, partly countered by Edmund Gurney's *The power of Sound* (1880), which asserts the existence of musical expression in "impressive music" without acknowledging this expression as an "inseparable or essential part of its function"³⁰.

But it is among knowledgeable musicologists and musicians that the concrete devices of formalism were developed for the purposes describing and analyzing musical structure. However, very few of the modern formalists have contributed substantially to a performance aesthetics or designed their profiled positions within an aesthetics of interpretation while maintaining a clear connection between the aesthetic and musical levels in a derivable manner.

Erwin Stein (1885–1958) who combined a career as conductor and researcher of modern music belonged (together with Alban Berg and Anton von Webern) 1905–10 to the close circle around his musical mentor Arnold Schönberg, and studied in particular the music of the Second Vienna School and its performance practice. During 1924–29 he was editor-in-chief of the Vienna Journal *Pult und Taktstock. Fachzeitschrift für Dirigenten*, and, later, in 1939 he initiated the London journal *Tempo* with similar aims³¹. His *Form and Performance* with a foreword by Benjamin Britten was published posthumously³². In the first issue of *Pult und Taktstock* (April 1924), Stein encircles the problem area of his concern. He focuses on the **executorial** level of p(i), mainly with regard to the problem of **notational** interpretation. According to Stein the conductor needs to penetrate matters such as: (1) "revision" of the balance relation between orchestral groups and the possible amending or reediting of the score for this purpose; (2) the rendering of performance markings; (3) tempo finding; (4) and

the shaping of form in performance ("Die Gestaltung der Form", 3). Stein expands the following point: the problem of performance comprises all "von der plastischen Wiedergabe des Charakters der Themen, über die Disposition der einzelnen Teile mit ihren Gegensätzen und Wiederholungen bis zum Zusammenschluss des Ganzen zu einem lebendigen Organismus". His proposal for approaching a solution of this problem is defined in his claim for "eine neue Art der Analyse, diese Gestalt werden der Form an den einzelnen Kunstwerken zu beschreiben".

In his article *Vom Vortrag*³³, Stein distinguishes three hypothetical performers' "attitudes" towards the work: those of the **interpreter**, the **reproducer** and the **reconstructor**, all of them legitimate in their due contexts. On the one hand, "Der *Interpret* betrachtet sich gewissermassen als den Partner des Komponisten" (96) but on the other hand "das Werk ist ihm nur das Material das er gestaltet". Referring to "z.B. Nikisch" – the allegedly very subjective shaping conductor – Stein gives the reason for such liberty in the imprecision of performance markings in notation: "Die Ungenauigkeiten der Vortragsbezeichnungen geben ihm die willkommene Möglichkeit sich selbst vorzutragen." In contrast, the stance of the **reproducing performer** is more **objective**: "Der Standpunkt des *Reproduzierenden* ist objektiver. Er sieht als seine Aufgabe an, das Werk wiederzugeben" and the task is to execute by completing the composer's cuing of how he intended the indeterminacy of the notation to be determined. The reproducing artist "hat auszuführen was jener [the composer] andeutete, zu vollenden, was er unbestimmt liess, zu offenbaren, was verborgen war. Kurz er hat das Werk darzustellen." (96)

Concerning the limits of interpretive freedom, Stein inquires about "welches Mass von Freiheit bei der Wiedergabe" would be appropriate. He discusses the interpretation of Mahler's works, and concludes that the amount of the interpreter's liberty depends on the composer's rootedness and participation in a well-established **tradition**: "Je tiefer diese in lebendiger Tradition und wirklicher Gemeinsamkeit verwurzelt sei, desto grössere Freiheit gestatte sie dem Vortrag des Spielers, je individueller aber und voraussetzungsloser, desto gebundener sei der Interpret". (97) If the composer is an exponent for such a defined tradition, then "sind die Vortragsbezeichnungen nur Anhaltspunkte, die viel Spielraum gewähren" and the indeterminacy of performance markings is fortunate in that it gives the interpreter enough room for his sensitive decisions within the frame of the tradition embraced: "Ihre Ungenauigkeit ist ein Vorzug." If, in contrast, the composer does not belong to the established spirit of the artistic community of

his age, "trachtet der Komponist, möglichst eindeutig zu sein, damit nur ja kein Zweifel über seine Intentionen aufkommen könne." (98) Furthermore, the limits of the interpreter's freedom are *a priori* determined, in the view of Stein, by the form and content of the work ("*Form*", "*Inhalt*"), and by the indications given in the score ("*Noten, Zeichen und Worten*"). However, within these limits, freedom is unlimited, or limited only by the player's imagination and creative ingenuity ("*Gestaltungskraft*" 99). So, in the end, the zone for independent **preference decisions** is extremely restricted from various points of view. For the remaining area of musical gestalting, Stein gives one indication: "was so labil ist, wie die Proportionen eines musikalischen Kunstwerkes, wird man schwebend im Gleichgewicht zu halten trachten müssen. Fixierung würde allzuleicht ein verzerrtes Bild ergeben." (99–100)

In December 1928, Stein summarized (*Pult und Taktstock*, 5th year) his 'aesthetical credo' under the title *Kriterien des Kunstwerks*, which must be understood as 'artistic performance criteria': "Massgebend kann nicht die Stärke und Breite der Wirkung sein, sondern allein ihre Tiefe und Dauer" (109). He postulates, as a basis for his principle, that "in Musik Allgemeingültiges gesagt [wird], ein Sinnbild der Welt, ein Mikrokosmos in Tönen", and arrives at a subscription to the **law of unity as the foremost criterion**: "Eines ist die Hauptsache: das Ganze. Alles andere, alle Details dienen dazu, sie darzustellen." (111) Thus, Stein's ideal is the **total structural integration of details into a whole**; this is his concept of unity, and should remind us of Schönberg's compositional innovation, the dodecaphonic invention with a view to maximal (cs) integration. The problem is that structural integration seems to require an hierarchic relation between the details and the whole, while the dodecaphonists envisioned a 'democratic' emancipation of the parts into an equality of larger units. If this was not feasible through c, Stein showed how in the end it should be practicable in p.

Benjamin Britten makes a series of complaints regarding contemporary performance practice in the introduction to Stein's *Form and Performance*, claiming first and principally that there is a lack of interpretation theory: "The details of performance have never systematically been investigated." (12) He feels that "a sense of proportion is often lacking, especially as regards music's extension in time." (13) Questions regarding the grading of interpretive devices are in the end "matters of form and proportions". Britten discusses "How much, and at what rate, a *ritardando* should slow down, an *accelerando* should speed up, a *crescendo* grow, a *diminuendo* abate; how long or short a *staccato*, a *tenuto*, a

pause, should be [...]." (13) However, he does not recognize the problematic notion of 'proportion' referring to its operatively postulated reference to both 'abstracted' form and performance as progressing in time. Can it be maintained that there is some experiential quality denoted by "proportion" which is common to both dimensions, while at the same time accepting Stein's definition of form as "arrangements of sounds"?

The notion of form is central to Stein's inquiry, since "*per-formance*" (17; Latin *per formare*) is for him the "realization of particular sounds in a particular order". And his justification for allowing "the absolute supremacy of form" to music as an art is its lack of a "correlative in the world of our daily experience." Furthermore, form is a "prerequisite of any artistic communication, for our perception is subject to the order we discover in the perceived object." Stein insists, for composer as well as performer, that "the act of artistic creation consists in the shaping of the material." The understanding of form, then, is pertinent to the performer, since his "conception of the music" which Stein claims must be "crystal-clear", is necessarily a **conception "in terms of sound [my emphasis]."** This vivid and distinct hearing with an "inner ear" depends on the performer's understanding of the form. The problem, though, is that Stein provides no explanation for the relation of his notions concerning form and conception to the time process of performance. And it is not clear whether this conception of form takes place as a **mental preparation** (on the basis of understanding the form), or whether it occurs only in real time as an ongoing comprehension of form during performance. Under the title of "structure", Stein defines "shape" as "any group of notes that are felt as belonging together and make musical sense [...] by virtue of its distinctive tonal and rhythmical features; and we comprehend it as a unit because we understand the relations and proportions of the features." (72)

The first criterion that Stein forwards is **coherence**: the performer must "put the notes together so that they make sense", and "every note must have its place and meaning in the context." Coherence is a condition for **meaningfulness** and **contextuality**. This position is related to the idea of attaining a **logical determinism in the shaping of form** in performance through a performance that meets these standards: "The succession or coincidence of the notes must sound logical and inevitable, each note having its due duration, no longer and no shorter, no louder and no softer." (19)

Coherence is supported by **continuity**, since the "listener's faculty of perception sets limits to both quickness and slowness" and perception is

presupposed to be a *conditio sine qua non* for the understanding of form. Therefore, "if long notes are unduly drawn out, the music's continuity is interrupted" and the comprehensive meaning endangered. Stein also formulates his more direct claim from his view on form, as "each shape must be clearly designed." Secondly, a "paramount concern" for the performer is that of "realizing the character of the music" (20). It is for the sake of this **character** that the music was written. In order to achieve this end, the performer "must seek the character in the music's formal features", and "should not begin with preconceived ideas about moods or emotions to be expressed". Still, Stein's **pure formalism** is not completely objectivistic because he acknowledges the necessity on the part of the performer to "account [for] the features of the structure and, in combining them, decide their precedence according to his sense of proportion and judgement of **balance** [my emphasis]": this is a **modified objectivism**.

Transparency (and "*lucidity*") is another criterion of high priority, considered as "a musical texture's most excellent quality" (59), valid for both homophony and polyphony, though complex textures may pose a problem in meeting this demand. (37) Obviously the concept of texture is central to Stein; it is a visual metaphor for the temporal unfolding of a structural artwork grasped as an integrated whole.

How, then, does Stein solve contradictory indications concerning form for a performance that cannot simultaneously and completely meet his foremost criteria, "coherence, clarity and distinction of both the details and the whole of a piece"? His formulations prefigure observations also made by other authors (Cooper & Meyer 1960, Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983) that the demands of specific detail may conflict with those of the whole: "Maybe one feature will tempt him to a manner of performance that is unsuitable to another feature, and he has to draw a balance between contradictory claims." This conflict is solved according to certain vaguely indicated priorities that Stein makes – e.g., that the performer "should not delay the momentum of a theme in order to clarify, say, its harmonic structure; or ease the severe slowness of a Grave lest coherence might suffer." So certain criteria are overriding in Stein's view, namely **character** and **movement**, which seem to integrate in **shape** the aspects of form. Concurrently, Stein advises the performer on how to approach a solution that respects conflicting "features" and clears away the hindrances of arriving at an **integrated interpretation** by explaining the interaction between various factors: "**Clarity** [my emphasis] within a fast tempo is a matter of technique, coherence in a slow tempo depends upon the ability to keep the sound of sustained notes alive." (20)

Edward T. Cone presupposes that the composer always assumes a role – a **persona** – which incarnates the character of the music, an idea inspired by T. S. Eliot's triple division in different personas³⁴. This is one of the few qualified theories of **vocal** interpretation in performance. The reader must be reminded of the specific preconditions that determine such a task. One pertinent problem is how interpretation could be thought of as a means to integrate **literary** meaning and **formal** aspects within the music, or, how these two "factors" can be made compatible in performance at all.

If music is a language, which is not a very illuminating metaphor, who is then speaking? And to whom? Each art projects the illusory existence of a **person** subject through whose consciousness and by whose voice an experience is made known; or, according to Eliot's triple division of the actor, as referred to by Cone: he **talks to himself**; in epic recitation he **addresses an audience**; in a drama he speaks through the voices of his characters or **assumes the role of a narrator**. This is relevant also for the performer, who in an opera impersonates dramatic characters, who in a concert piece addresses to an audience and who in an intimate piano piece plays as he **plays to himself**: "The performer [...] is a living personification of that spokesman [...] of the mind whose experience the music is" (5). "Only the vocal persona [Cone's paradigm example: the Son in the Schubert *Erkönig*] can be thought of as "incarnate" while it "expresses itself fully through the human voice." (18) By comparison "the instrumental persona may seem a creature of analogy, an imaginary construct", a "virtual persona." The "complete musical persona is to be inferred from the interaction of the other two", and would thus be called an **implicit persona**, which is held together by the unifying power of the musical line. This is the "vehicle of the composer's persona." Thus, there is a trinity of vocal, instrumental, and complete musical personas (21). Critically, though, the parallel to Eliot's triple division is less than perfect.

The "poetic" persona is transformed to the **vocal persona** of the piece, whereas the character who sings the original poem represents his part, becomes the **protagonist** of the song (21). I submit that the listener has to incorporate the same persona to grasp the p(i). This requires either **identificational flexibility** or a **congruency of personas**.

Cone's concept of interpretation suggests: "we tend to interpret the vocal character in terms of our sympathies and emotions [...] Each of us can thus participate in the sonic environment [...] the poetic person is universalized: the vocal character implicates in his own world every sympathetic member of the

world of his audience, and every such listener shares the character's experience." (22)

What are the criteria for legitimacy according to Cone? As "legitimate" performance he counts performances in which "the projection of the composer's persona" is realized (46). This claim may be overlooked or disregarded. About the consequences of personal egocentricity on the part of performers, Cone says: "it is not uncommon for a performer to use a composition as a vehicle for the self-indulgent display of his own personality" (46).

The sound balance between various instruments in the orchestra is something that can be influenced by the conductor, and according to Cone, this is the conductor's foremost task: "the *conductor's job* [is] to decide at every point whether a given instrument should be considered an individual or a member of such a group" (95).

Cone applies the idea of personas, and the relation between their roles as agents in the orchestra or ensemble, to his view of the main concerns of performance: "Agents, then can be permanent or temporary, unitary or implicit, leading or subordinate" (96). "What makes a unitary virtual agent of an instrument is its assumption of a specific role in a musical context", e.g. the unitary agent is permanent in a solo of a concerto, where he is also a kind of virtual protagonist (96).

Cone's "agent" is his leading concept, stressing the dramatic within his design for interpretational notion: "Every note of the piece, like every instrument of the orchestra, must help define some agent, permanent or temporary. Whether to 'bring out an inner voice', whether to play a passage as a melody with accompaniment or as a series of chordal blocks, whether to isolate accents or to incorporate them in a more inclusive live [...] all these decisions depend on an *interpretation* of the dramatic structure of a piece" (99).

By which means should the performer achieve his goals? "Every performer", says Cone, "must be at the same time a member of his own audience; indeed he should be the first and foremost member. *Qua performer*, his primary identification, [...] is with his own role; *qua listener*, he relates that role to the entire musical complex, and in so doing participates in the complete musical persona." (132)

Cone summarizes his opinion: "The ideal performance of instrumental music thus involves the same paradox that characterizes vocal performances: it is simultaneously predetermined by the composer and under the control of the performer(s)" (127).

However, Cone recognizes the problem of neutrality as opposed to

activity in the interpretive attitude. First he addresses the need for neutrality as a basic mode: "the ideal performance is assumed to be no more and no less than *the accurate and convincing presentation of a precomposed text*. Of course the ideal performance is [this], but to hear it only as such is to deny music its expressive power." (116) At the same time, Cone acknowledges the need for active interpretation in a context where his agent is supposed to appear more supremely: "the solo concerto especially cries out for dramatic interpretation, for it displays attitudes on the part of the protagonist and the orchestra that vary from mutual support to downright opposition. In particular, a work such as Berg's Violin Concerto, with its obvious personal references, cannot be intelligently followed without tacit reliance on concepts that make its dramatic structure comprehensible [...]. If one thinks of the solo violin as a virtual protagonist, one can imagine it as listening to the orchestra: developing the tone-row from hints thrown out by the other instruments [...]. For a musician the roles 'solo violin' and 'orchestral instrument' are sufficiently clear, and they are much richer in suggestion than my specific programmatic interpretations. But I insist that they are *roles*." (114)

Musical performance can also be regarded as a complex of forms of "utterance and gesture", which is a title in Cone's book: "A succession of sounds, actions, tensions, and relaxations", to various degrees, "is felt to be figuratively isomorphic with the form of composition" (167).

Cone gives general remarks on the question of validity in the criticism of performances, which according to him (154) depends on "the critic's objective knowledge and personal experience of the work in question. A complete criticism must try to do justice to a performance from the points of view of its structural clarity (as determined by analysis), its stylistic propriety (as determined by historical provenance), and its cogency (as determined by the critic's own experience of identification)". However, Cone does not believe in the sufficiency of a fully rational analysis: "Criticism [...] must be based on an intuitive personal response, which in turn may be deepened in perception and heightened in intensity by study" (154).

Interpretation in performance can be false, though, and as such a violation of the composer's right. The problem is: How do we know when this is so? What principal **criteria** must we rely on in order to justify our judgment of an interpretation of lesser quality? Cone suggests that a main cause of misinterpretations might have a psychological background: "misdirection of attention: a focus on the person and the personality of the performer himself,

rather than on the persona he is projecting. Equally to be avoided is undue concentration on the balletic aspects of the performance to the point where the music becomes a background for the dance" (139).

But every new performance must pass a certain benchmark; the performance is a test of the interpretation. Does it hold? What are the criteria for our acceptance of a new rendering of a familiar piece? "In order to accept a new reading of a composition we know intimately", Cone states, "we must make an unusually concentrated effort to follow the performance intently, accepting every event just as it comes [similar to a phenomenological approach] and resisting the temptation to fight each one by comparing it with private version."

It might be more questionable to posit one's visual senses as the basis for a quality judgement of musical interpretation. At least this would be a leap that would have to be supported by decisive arguments: "It is certainly easier to do this [evaluation] when we can see as well as hear, when every new detail of interpretation is supported by a visual cue." (138) Even if it were easier, i.e. if it were more comfortable for the listener, or any audience, to reach his judgement by senses other than those through which the art in question normally communicates, the evaluation would by no means be more secure or correct. There is a certain risk of simplification inherent in the kind of 'role concept' Cone proposes, even if its application may have a certain literary appeal: "Successful performance depends on the player's identification with his role." (132)

In his earlier book from 1967²⁵, which consists of 3 concise essays centering on the subjects of form, performance and style, respectively, and in a postlude on "Two Modes of Aesthetic Perception" (the immediate versus synoptic), Cone refers to Erwin Stein's *Form and Performance*. Cone's point of departure is an outline of "the nature of musical form", in effect a theory or aesthetics on musical form which particularly focuses on the following problem: How to achieve valid and effective musical performance?

Cone looks at the "extremes", the beginning and the end of a musical work of art (12) intended to be listened to, and says that these must be respected as dramatic events in the performance (12–13): "A proper musical performance" presents an action of a "certain completeness" comprising a **unity formed by the beginning, middle, and end** parts of the whole work. But where (and how) does a composition begin (or end)? inquires Cone. Music is separated from its external environment by the **frame of silence** (16), but, he claims, it has no "internal environment" in the sense of its own imagined surroundings (15).

Whatever it is about, Cone assures us, it "begins only when the music begins, and ends when the music ends." (15) But the claim that Cone advances is a **non-structuralistic concept of interpretation**.

Therefore, "silence should present to us [as the audience] a period of empty time in which *nothing* is happening." (16) Nothing should be happening before the music starts (16), and, "at the end, we need silence to cover our return to ordinary time." (16) The existence of *attacca* connections between movements and general pauses within movements indicates that there are silences belonging to the work. From the observation of the importance of silence before the first demarcating attack, Cone concludes that Riemann's doctrine of universal upbeat must be wrong. Cone competently exemplifies the different characteristics (16) of opening and close ('closure', 'cadence') guiding various stages of attention.

The listeners get involved in various ways through their participation in experiencing a performance: **physically** in the room through the stereophonic placement of instrumental groups for the purpose of dramatic accentuation (Cone gives the paradigm example of Berlioz's *Requiem*); or **internally**, active listening can be considered as "vicarious performance" (Cone refers to a term by Roger Sessions, *op. cit.* 97) or "mental coconstruction", which he derives from Paul Hindemith³⁶. A careful distinction between **upbeat** and **downbeat** performance must be made, and is decisive for the characterization of a performance. Behind a wealth of sensitive analyses of postponed, suspended, elided or deceptive downbeats and cadence phenomena like the "*reculer pour mieux sauter*" (24), Cone arrives at a basic principle, namely, that "the natural periodicity by which music normally proceeds" is constituted by "**tension followed by relaxation**" (25; my emphasis) – which is also (*mutatis mutandis*) a fundamental principle in Celibidache's musical phenomenology³⁷. If this was what Riemann meant by insisting on the **universality of the upbeat**, then he "was on the right track", according to Cone. The borderline between compositional and performance qualities is not always fixed in Cone's investigation.

Cone identifies the "essentials of form" with basically **rhythmic** qualities, in contrast to conventional analysis and Schenkerian analysis, both of which consider form as thematic and harmonic events, respectively. This is the **metainterpretative concept** Cone uses: "every tonal composition represents a variation on a single rhythmic form, viz. an extended upbeat followed by its downbeat", which is a variation on Riemann's postulate. The music flows through a continuous sequence of **antecedents and consequents**, thus creating formal layers of an overriding hierarchical structure: "A completely unified

composition could then constitute a single huge rhythmic impulse completed at the final cadence" (26), and, "the ultimate resolution often requires a feminine ending – sometimes quite extended – as a way of discharging its momentum" (26). The determination of the formal function of such various processes of closure – a 'true' coda – is represented by a diminuendo in the performance. Basically, "the larger rhythmic structure [in conventional rhythmic analysis] is treated simply as metric structure on a higher level" (26). Cone, however, insists that "on some level this metric principle of parallel balance must give way to a more **organic rhythmic principle**" [my emphasis] that supports the melodic and harmonic shape of the phrase and justifies its acceptance as a formal unit. (26)

But in what way does this bear on the **performance**? Employing an analogy to the forces at stake while throwing a ball, Cone introduces his concept of **musical energy**, its initiation, directed transition and goal, musically corresponding to the initial downbeat, motion (upbeat) and point of arrival (cadential downbeat), with the following schematic shape: /-\. Cone recognizes three types of strong points: (1) the initial, (2) the terminal and, (3) somewhat more weakly endowed, the medial – this in contrast to Cooper & Meyer's two kinds of accents.

The initial downbeat accent implies a following **diminuendo**, a cadential downbeat goal suggests a **crescendo**, and medial strong points vary according to the context. Because of the whole's greater demands, not every phrase should be considered an expanded upbeat directed towards its delayed downbeat as Riemann wanted it. The winding up at the preliminary starting position of a phrase is imagined as an **anacrusis** (9) and the rebound at the close as a feminine ending (\ /). Cone then arrives at his **rhythmic concept** of the standard phrase (/ \ / - \ / \), which he further develops by such notions as **elision** (cf. MIR I:106), and demonstrates this in a series of analyses. (27)

An indication within his analysis of the beginning of Mozart's *Piano Sonata* in A major, KV 331, which is also treated by Lerdahl & Jackendoff (1983), shows that Cone does not exactly think of a direct rendering in performance of this kind of basically dichotomizing rhythmic analysis: "The resulting emphasis on the beginning of the third measure of each phrase would be hard to make convincing in performance, for it is only after this point that the consequent begins to differ from the antecedent" (29): So there are other **criteria** derived from performance considerations that ultimately overthrow the analysis. However, (1) his analysis largely originates out from the experience of a

performance (or of an imagined p) – it is an analysis abstracting and classifying into rhythm–divisional concepts and relations that have their feed–back impulses from sound experience – and (2) if something does not correspond to his musical intuition he goes even further in differentiating the analysis into a formulated scheme as far as possible by relying on the musical experience (29). But, he never arrives at a theoretical framework that supports or generates an analysis which corresponds to or indicates the performance, i.e. he never reaches the stage of interpretation or performance analysis (31): "there is no necessary correlation between strong measures and dynamic accents. Analysis and performance, in the end, remain two different 'worlds'."

Cone concedes to the vague suggestion of a Platonic notion of one ideal interpretation, i.e. **singularism**; at least this doctrine appears vague as long as no explanation is provided in support of it: e.g. an interpretation exactly depicting a relation to the work. (32) But it is not quite clear to me how he achieves such an unambiguous relation without an encompassing and accomplished theory of interpretation that accounts for the **structural relations**, at least within the tripartite model w (or c) – i – p.

Paradoxically the 'time arts' to which music belongs, "are subject to readings, performances, and interpretations, all of which distort the true essence of the work of art. Nevertheless, this essence remains there [...] to be discovered and [...] exposed." (33) Even the "contemplation of works of spatial art" involve a performance of viewing the statue from various vantage points by walking around it. There is a **selection of aspect** in interpreting all arts. We decide what is important to us, what is to be made clear, at least in the single performance, knowing that there will be other performances drawn from the inexorably existing composition (34): "Every valid interpretation thus represents, not an approximation of some ideal, but a choice: which of the relationships implicit in this piece are to be emphasized, to be made explicit?" (34)

What if we find alternative relations incompatible in the same performance? Cone demonstrates that "whatever decision one makes, one gains something, but also loses something" in choosing to bring out either (1) motivic identities, or overarching ('synoptic') structural frame points in the bass part of, e.g., the Chopin *C minor Prelude* (bars 1–5). So there is an overriding priority structure (MIR I:15,72,128, 167,173) which can be described by means of structural hierarchies: i.e. **unity** can be created in several ways, by emphasizing an expanded cadential bass–note formula or by shaping a sequence of motivic identities. A descriptive system must be used to objectively expose the

metarelations appearing between such interpretative phenomena as **identity**, **coherence** and **continuity**. Through stressing certain sound relations, the conditions are created by the performer necessary for the listener's ability to experience these phenomena through hearing more or less clearly. Cone postulates:

(1) **choices** are not permanent but **instantial**, and

(2) it is by no means **logically** necessary that the composer be the best performer of his work. On the contrary composers often "fail to appreciate the way [their works] will sound to those less familiar with them", and they may "understate points that need to be emphasized for the sake of the listener" (36), and thus they are not even ideal judges of the performances of their own works.

(3) "The more complex any musical dimension becomes, the fewer liberties of interpretation it permits." (37) In the case of "arithmetically intricate temporal ratios, music so put together would demand, not 'interpretation', but maximum accuracy of every detail – an impossibility in the case of fallible human performance". (38)

(4) "Some performances are, after all, better than others. Some are superlative, and some are unacceptable." (38)

(5) Cone provides his one and overriding **criterion of valid performance** by stating that it "depends primarily on the perception and communication of the rhythmic life of a composition". We must, says Cone, "first discover the rhythmic shape of the piece [...] then try to make it as clear as possible to our listeners." (39)

(6) "Certain general rhythmic principles underlie common formal units", such as the phrase, the period, the three-part song form, etc. These principles work on higher levels to "explain an entire composition as one all-embracing rhythmic impulse. Such a comprehensive form can be made clear in performance, however only by virtue of another principle: that the whole is more important than any of its parts. Any conflict of interest must be resolved by suppressing the formal claims of the part in favor of those of the whole." (39) For example, Cone demonstrates the importance of avoiding premature closure (43) in the Chopin *A major Prelude*, by lightening the cadence (43).

(7) Concerning the decision of whether or not to make a repeat that seems purely conventional, Cone gives credit to the argument for providing the audience with another opportunity to absorb the material of the first exposition (47).

(8) If there are many different alternatives for understanding and rendering

the structure, we will feel at some point that "we are no longer achieving a performance growing out of a musical structure, but an 'interpretation' [restrictive use of this notion, as if entailing the application of outside subjectivity] more or less arbitrarily applied to it". Cone suggests that there is a risk in pursuing "variety for variety's sake" in adopting diverse readings and renderings of varied repetitions. Cone states 2 rules at this point:

(a) the **varied repetition** must be "consistent with the composer's expressed formal intentions and directions for performance", and, (b) it must be "specifically justified by some complexity [what could this stand for?] in the score that it clarifies" (49).

But it is not clear to me why reference to just the performer's consideration of the "rhythmic shape of the composition and of its parts" should *a priori* attain priority within an interpretative system. But apparently this is Cone's metainterpretative concept, his perspective, and his sole overriding **superordinated criterion for achieving the quality of unity of work performance**. This, though, is not yet **unity of work appearance in performance**, which is a notion that presupposes or requires the recognizability of the distinction between w and p. This problem can be overcome by introducing i as a referent common to w and p. The question then remains, as to whether the relation between w and p remains indirect: w-i and i-p gives (w-i)(i-p) or alternatively the tripartite connection w-i-p.

Cone recognizes two modes of perception: (1) "Synoptic comprehension" of structure (88) "which either recognizes a unity in what is perceived or else imposes one on it"; and (in contrast) (2) "the mode of *immediate apprehension*" (89), which is the "habit of enjoying vivid values", referring in this quotation to A. N. Whitehead³⁸. "We directly perceive the sensuous medium, its primitive elements, and their closest interrelationships" (89).

According to Cone the immediate mode enjoys both temporal and logical priority in perception: "our appreciation of an aesthetic object [90] begins with our apprehension of its sensuous qualities and, especially in the case of a time art, of its details". Logically then, the immediate mode gains priority in Cone's concept (90; priority structure, MIR I:16-20), because "enjoyment of such apprehension can lead to some measure of esthetic satisfaction whether or not it is accompanied by synoptic comprehension" (90), which, "for its part, is essential to the perception of esthetic *objects*, and particularly of works of art as individual *works*". Those artistic products that "defeat attempts at synoptic comprehension and respond to the immediate mode of perception only" Cone

classifies as "artistic surfaces" (93), in contrast to other artistic objects which are defined as "intentionally produced esthetic objects." (93) Cone intends to balance the formalistic lust for a 'structural mode of regarding' with an "unholy delight" in the primacy of the detail (suggested, says Cone (97), by Edmund Gurney who wrote about his enjoyment of the "successive notes and smallest fragments, as they turn up moment after moment"); this Cone designates as a "healthy hedonistic attention to the musical surface" (98).

A WELL-INFORMED, COMMON-SENSE OPINION ON MUSICAL INTERPRETATION

The Italian music scholar Giorgio Graziosi³⁹ (1911–1966), who had received his musical training at the Conservatory of Pesaro, represents in most respects a well-founded empirical commonsense opinion among musicians and audiences. I will review a few of his ideas since they provide a "neutral" background, in contrast to dogmatic, scientific, artistic, idiosyncratic or even narcissistic perspectives of uneven quality in the broad literature of musical interpretation.

It is natural for Graziosi to start with the ontology of notation, since he believes that notation is specific to music among all the arts. Whereas the music-work is not identical to the notation, but is in fact in the notation, the painted work is the painting. Graziosi maintains that the notation becomes a sort of mean value, an approximation of what was in the mind of the composer, which is fulfilled in the notation. It is, however, an abstraction, a scheme that must be regarded in a musical sense. At the same time, the notation already includes the intended sound world of imagined interpretations. It is therefore a perfect means for transmission; the only (intended) imperfection contained in notation is the "imperfection" of admitting an endless series of perfected interpretations – obviously a logical paradox. It is not the task of the interpreter to complete the imperfect notation, and the performance entails only a transient bridging of the gap of indeterminacy in the notation. So I notice in his concept a necessary mutual complementarity between music and notation: the work needs both for its constitution. More originally, Graziosi also considers notation to be an artwork. But this seems to contradict his opinion that the music-work is not the notation but *in* this, unless he is willing to concede that there are two artworks (the music-work *and* its notation), which would lead to other paradoxes.

Music is just what it is in the very moment of its execution, which is also in a way its creation, since it changes and varies continuously with the sequence

of the passing moments. Music instantiates the "*pantarei*" of Greek philosophy, since it is a continuous flow and the same moment never reappears. In this sense even a p(w) comes close to 'pure' creativity.

Heuristically important, but theoretically weak, is the notion, found also in Graziosi, that the interpreter "mentally" has the paradoxical feeling of creating something already created, of completing something completed, or giving life to something living.

Graziosi takes a neutral middle position between the **creationists** (Pugliatti, Brelét) and the **technicists** (Parente, including authors of the vast majority of pedagogical books for instrumentalists, which I will not consider in this investigation). This is what Graziosi considers to be "il problema dell'interpretazione" (47).

The ontological **indeterminacy** of the composition is reflected in the endless dialectics of interpretation. The composer, who rejected his earlier sketches, comes to a definite version, whereas the interpreter leaves the way open for other earlier or later interpretations by himself (the conductor) or others. Graziosi acknowledges the influence of personal experience, knowledge and maturity on the interpretation, and therefore the interpreter is always fighting to overcome the past (of w and P) in his reforming of the music work.

In his attempt to define interpretation, Graziosi determines its relation to technique, which, according to him, is a manoeuvring of the spirit ("*manualità dello spirito*", 54). And the aesthetic liberty in performance is not anarchy but selection ("non è anarchia ma scelta", 55). The creative originality of the musician is used to delineate and circumscribe the interpretation of the work. So the liberty of the interpreter is limited by its correspondence to "*un proprio ideale di bellezza*" and this liberty exists only in appearance ("non esiste che in apparenza").

The mind needs a physical means of expression (for the **transmissive function**), otherwise it would rest unmovably and incommunicatively. Thus, the art of interpretation necessarily involves technique. Having transformed the notation into sound through his intermediary function, the interpreter has substantiated ('incorporated') the composition; it becomes corporeal by the act of execution. This is a point of distinction, since I propose that the act of interpretation (without execution in performance) is not corporeal.

Focusing on the artistic quality of interpretation, Graziosi contends that the interpreter recognizes humanity in the music-work. These human qualities are revealed in his activity, which renders explicit what is intentional. By

allowing for the necessary involvement of the interpreter's personality and his assimilated cultural background – e.g. national styles, German versus Italian or romantic versus antiromantic which "sbocciare l'arte cristallina (e quanto ricca d'incanto) di Arturo Benedetti–Michelangeli" (76), Graziosi identifies musical quality with human quality, and this becomes evident as the experience of the interpreter at the moment of highest artistic concentration: "in quel momento si trova rivivere e risentire in un sol punto tutta la propria vita" (78). And "il vero interprete sente e presente anch'egli l'eterno in quelle pagine e vi s'incentra, e nello stato di grazia dell'intuizione raggiunta tutta l'anima si desta e sorge una nuova vita." Graziosi requires total involvement, identification and integration in the creative act of interpretation: "Niente di me resta escluso dall'atto interpretativo." (nothing of me remains excluded from the act of interpretation, 79).

This broad scope also allows for concepts of taste and style; the "technique" of interpretation is considered by Graziosi to be an "*intermediaria tra gusto e stile*" (81), a fusion, or compromise, between the demands of the context of historical origin, and manual instrumentality as a means for realizing the most precise and consistent rendering in execution ("configurazione più precisa e consistente", 81). His concept of taste includes considerations of: temperament, intelligence, feeling, sensitivity, critical accuracy, human and artistic experience, tradition, "school" (education), nationality, culture, maturity (etc.) all of which play a part in the creative process of interpretation. One notices that style and taste, in the view of Graziosi, also depend on technique. This should be compared to concepts in which even the slightest detail is presupposed to emerge from, and be permeated by, a carefully selected expressive character of the phrase. But Graziosi is not too far from a view that includes the personal encompassing of the emotional character of each phrase, since his general concept entails a resolution into unity, a synthesis or merging of two 'horizons' (my adaption of the concept), one of yourself and the other of the notation.

The interpreter has the role of translator, intermediary and critic. As a critical interpreter one assesses the deficiencies of the work by internal reference to the work in relation to itself and to its "body" of sound structure. Criticizing an interpretation, however, requires comparing it with the notation as text, which is regarded as the objective and universal norm for the work.

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

While David Epstein (*Beyond Orpheus* 1979) provides a concrete theory of musical structure basically founded on the concepts of shape, pitch, duration, phrasing and nuance, unity, ambiguity, local event, procedure and compositional dynamic, Wallace Berry (*Musical Structure and Performance* 1989) scrutinizes three works as model cases of analysis (Brahms' *Intermezzo* op. 76 no. 4; Berg's *Vier Stücke für Klarinett und Klavier* op. 5 no. 3; Debussy's *Ariettes oubliées*, no 1: "*C'est l'extase langoureuse*"). The central issue for Berry, though, is the **relation of analysis to performance**. Since analysis in effect makes the performer "consciously aware of the elements and processes of form and structure" (x) since and such awareness is assumed by Berry to be required for a successful, in other words a "thoughtful performance", his book is an attempt to justify his affirmative answer to the question of whether this awareness actually matters. His aim for a "thoughtful performance" is outlined as "an individual portayal arising out of searching scrutiny and justifiable selection" (xi). He acknowledges on one hand the importance of the "awareness of a network of complex relations (multileveled, explicit and implicit, registrally conjunct and disjunct)" and on the other hand "the hazard of an overloaded consciousness [of mip], when analysis has pointed to multifarious possibilities out of which a coherent whole, comprising compatible, chosen elements, must be derived and conveyed." This network of complex relations might even induce a "paralyzing, bewildering set of conflicting impulses in which the vital illusion of spontaneity [!] is manifestly out of the question." (x)

Berry, who is a **multiplist**, suggests that the thoughtful performance arrived at by the individual P represents (1) the **analytical** procedure ("searching scrutiny") and (2) a justified **selection**. He conceives of the modes of this representative rendering in general terms: there are "elements to project, underscore, or subdue – ideally falling into place in a motivated stream of action and reaction shaped by exhaustive prior thought and conditioning experiment." (xi) He concedes that an *i* is not constant, not even for the same *I*, since "an interpretation will vary – not of course capriciously – according to differing circumstances of time and place." (xi) Berry postulates additional empirical correlations, namely that an *i* will appear with "positive value and fascination for both interpreter and listener" insofar as the *p* is "shored up" and sustained by cogent consideration. Critically, this is what should have been proved, not a postulated premise. He arrives at a conviction that he finds supported by

testimony, namely that there is a high degree of generality in the kind of problems of structural rendering in performance: "however specific its individuated terms, any piece that embodies systemic procedures reveals principles of structure (and hence of realization in performance) that are analogously evident in other pieces." (xi) Therefore, it should be possible to clarify "a pervasive unity of many common principles of function and expression" (xii) and to describe typical interpretive patterns of interventions in "context(s) representing important genera". Berry's observation that "basic and essential questions recur in radically disparate stylistic idioms" indicates an open field for further investigation.

The interest in structure is justified on the premise that a "systematic rational examination" towards "demonstrable insights into **structure as immanent meaning**" [my emphasis] exposes its reflection in tempo, articulation and other aspects of w including subtle details of execution; this, then allows for an increased controlling survey over compositional details. However, Berry suggests only vaguely the kind of "relation between discerned structural elements and interpretive choices" by designating it as "complex" without entering into a probe of the modes of interpretive acts. At one point the existence of a decisional metalevel of interpretation is indicated: "the theoretical study of performance decisions and their articulate, rational bases is like analysis itself an interpretive art, telling the performer what not to do as much as what to do in bringing music to life." (44)

The underlying postulate is that "every analytical finding has an implication for performance" in two model situations: namely when the analysis suggests (1) "a relatively neutral execution that projects explicit, self-evident factors of structure", or (2) "specific, practical measures that will illuminate the less obvious relations of discerned elements cofunctioning to expressive ends." Unfortunately, under the heading "specificity and the lack of it", Berry doubts the just stated ~~one-to-one~~ relation between analysis and performance: "obviously any probing analysis reveals many important elements, not all of which can be expressed overtly. Indeed many inferred, comprehensive lines of structure may be incapable of interpretive realization" (9).

Evidently, not all "implications" for performance entail their own **realization** in performance; so there must be an intriguing and vaguely delimited area of **imagined performance**, perhaps the vital driving force in the process of implementing the implications into a performed reality. The realization of one implication may, according to Berry, obstruct the realization of another

implication: "a gratuitous interpretive stroke intended to project some analytic construct may intrude on and distort lines of structure inferred within other elements, or at other levels", the example being "overt emphasis on a chromatic alteration" that "may impair a vital middleground continuity, diminish some essential proximate event, or exaggerate the occurrence with regard to its formal context." However, it is not quite clear what Berry means by the **relation of analysis to performance**. First, it can be conjectured that it is an analysis of compositional structure (ca), not of *i*'s means or of *i* *per se*. Then Berry talks about this relation as if it were direct (unmediated), and yet he still recognizes a process of interpretation.

I submit that one must distinguish between at least the formal relations (omitted for convenience): (1) a–p, which is a direct "translation" of an analytic construct into performance (this is the unconscious or intuitive mode); (2) a–p(a), which indicates that the relation of an analytic construct and the performance of such a construct is a possessive relation; (3) a–p(i), which denotes that the performance is a performance of an interpretation but the internal relation of the analysis to it is left undefined; (4) a–i(a)–p(i(a)), which is a more developed three-part relation in which the construct must be interpreted to become subject for realizational performance, and finally (5) a–i(a)–p(a), which indicates that the interpretive moment of i(a) is omitted (cf. MIR I:106ff elisions) through the performative realization (p(a)).

The general principles postulated by Berry about structure and interpretation focus on how "structural relation exposed in analysis can be illuminated in the inflections of edifying performance" (x). The formerly suggested one-to-one relation is now countered by a **one-to-many** relation: "a particular interpretive intent is subject to fulfillment in more ways than one". Principally, though, "the determination that an impartial realization is warranted" (x) without interpretive intervention "is no less founded in analysis than is a decision to do something beyond playing the notes clearly and accurately". Berry explains the rarity of performers giving "time and thought to the problem of probing inquiry into musical structure, and theorists to the practical measures of performance" in referring to the "intense difficulties in pinpointing specific, plausible connections between the findings of analysis and consequent outlets in performance". The resulting temptation to rely instead on intuited feeling is all too well known.

The answer to the pertinent question of whether and how an *i*-decision follows the form or structure, is, I submit, not *a priori* coupled to the specific role

of "the intuitive factor", discussed in Berry's central chapter 2 (7–44). Form and structure do not only occur on deeper levels; they also comprise the surface of motion and the concrete soundshape. The decision to evince "expressive elements" that are "heard at the surface" can be arrived at either intuitively or consciously. Past theorists correctly pointed to the fact that the deeper lines of continuity under the surface of sound events play a major part in the structural hierarchy of *c*; but the reason for their observation may have been that the surface was too apparent and self-evident to require any explanation. A rhythmic shape or metrical organization may be theoretically inferrable without suggesting any specific properties of performance.

Consequently a second question must be posed as to whether the analytic construct (1) **does** in fact imply anything in respect to the performance, and whether it (2) **can** be rendered in some way by performative soundshape. Berry discusses a connective rule candidly advanced by Schenker (9; ch. II:7), namely that chromatic alterations be emphasized. Berry finds such "claimed precepts" unsatisfying, "far too sweeping in implication" (9) due to lack of widescoped theoretical support. Berry's 'postulate of specificity' implies that "any particular structural continuity or function can usually be served in a number of ways" so that the remaining stage of the *i*-decision after analysis is to select the preferred "portrayal of an accepted analytical construct". This process of decision must also contain a moment of 'pragmatic realism' insofar as the constructs that cannot be implemented, even if ideally preferred, must be rejected. Obviously the 'experimenting' method in the early stage of rehearsal is theoretically justified by Berry's postulate that **not** all structural elements recovered by analysis can be expressed overtly in performance. Here Berry's view supports the one-to-many relation of a diverging *a-i* (or *a-p*) relation: "a particular analytical construct by no means points to a singular, pursuant direction of realization." (9) What analysis can reveal is 'only' "plausible opinions", not facts and certainly not "incontrovertible truths" (10): **analysis is interpretational**.

But the experiential result of a *p* is not arbitrary in relation to the *w*: the performer must recognize what possibilities are realizable, while listeners and critics distinguish the *p* that illuminates the essential structures of *w*, in contrast to the *p* that merely distorts and misrepresents them by *i* intrusion. Berry seems to suggest that analysis above all indicates what should not be in *p*. Furthermore, the analytical outcome of the "multiple meaning of an event may suggest that the execution be as neutral as possible" (10), i.e. that the notes should be allowed to 'speak for themselves'. However, the notes cannot strictly be experienced

auditively by normal listening to a performance which focuses on the tones of a piece. Only in highly professional critical listening may a musician, critic or conductor invoke his image of the score as a corrective reference for assessment.

Berry presents his concept in 12 points which I will comment on:

(1) In cases of **ambiguous sources**, scant or diverging documents, it may be necessary to settle "what note to play", but this is primarily a **compositional conjecture**, since such a decision can be made for reasons (e.g., for preparing an edition) other than those in view of an immediate p or p–decision. However, it is correct that such extrapolations (decision about c–structure) are conditional for p. But they need not be determined by (dependent on) the specific 'ontic' requirements of p.

(2) Berry inquires whether the motif is "self-evident" or if it requires "deliberate projection". Should the performer make covert representations (say a turn motif, or imitative motifs in a multipart setting) more prominent? The question is how to treat analytically an "inferrable, textually covert manifestation" (13) in p. Berry simply poses this intricate question, but gives no solutional criteria.

(3) The principle of applying "dynamic inflection where none is indicated" (19) is understandable, but disputable, according to Berry. Schenker frequently suggested that such dynamic inflections (ch. II:7; Berry 20) serve the unity of progression, underlining melodic ascent, descent or "cadential ebbing motions". Berry does not subscribe to the consistency of Schenker's rules, but still seems to depend heavily on his mode of analytical thinking in the analytical section of the book.

(4) Berry deals with the device of enhancing **linear continuity** and integrating the parts into a unified context by 'prominentizing', e.g., a stepwise descent derived from two or more different voices in order to "convey the sense of a significant, not necessarily explicit, voice-leading connection" (20–22).

(5) An "analytical awareness of place in a formal process" elucidates the options of a decision for performance. This indicates a "purposeful thinking about interpretive conduct" (23), such as when a resolving recapitulation or concluding coda is needed at a certain point of development: formal functions (such as expository, developmental, recapitulative, closing, etc.) can be suggested or underlined by p–means.

(6) Berry inquires about which decisions concerning grouping follow from the analysis of form and structure: "a fundamental property of rhythm is evident in the groupings within co-functioning elements (form, meter, harmony,

timbre, and others)". These "grouping modes" often concur at certain places. It becomes the task of the performer, the interpreter included, to decide "which should prevail in effect". Berry assures us that "interpretive realization often favors motivic and other formal groupings. The listener may feel otherwise that something is unnatural, as when a singer sings through a formal dividing point to enforce semantic continuity in a line of text" (27).

(7) Should the p communicate "an implicit, relatively disguised imitation where this would interestingly complicate the texture"? (30). A "slight articulative intervention" will draw attention to the integrated c-context of vaguely suggested motivic imitations not indicated specifically for p; Berry recommends this in cases of vital relation in order to avoid an obscure sound-complexity that may appear merely as a "nullifying distraction" (33). Such clarifications are **functional**.

(8) Concerning **tempo choice**, it is commonly assumed that "metronomic tempo is best decided in relation to pace and context within pertinent structure elements". After having determined (by ca) the "putative formulaic schemes" as points of reference for a tempo decision, the problem remains to be solved whether tempo is "complementary or compensatory in relation to these elements". I submit, though, that tempo can primarily be seen as an **integrated result** deriving from the consideration of a manifold number of facts, elements, processes and structures in a piece, including the two modes of complementarity and compensation stated by Berry. Besides this basic situation, tempo can also, in exceptional cases, be allotted a role of an i-means: to underscore or otherwise enhance a developmental tendency according to some overriding aim (out of many options) that can be aesthetically justified. Intensifying the approaching climactic event (36) is a seminal example of tempo functioning as an i-device.

(9) The question of qualified performance concerns the articulation of surface metrical organization, the metric "fluctuation" and status of the primary metric downbeat; many pieces "speak without intervention by the performer, by virtue of their intrinsic properties". But Berry requires, as "imperative", that the performer at least "do nothing to violate them, imposing a gratuitous regularity where mobility is intended" (36). Furthermore, the age-old "idea of a dynamic structure disposed around a primary accent can be vital in guiding a performer's conduct through a piece, and circumspect interventions in tempo, in dynamic intensity, and in the timing of functional events can serve an encompassing design" (36). Berry concedes that "interpretive realization is ideally shaped in correspondent pointing and receding lines of action. This is a critical issue of performance [...]; it calls on the performer's command of shape,

direction, and control." Such focal points (as the example given of measure 12 in Chopin's *A major Prelude* op. 28 no. 7) obviously confirm Berry's observation on one crucial point by keeping the connection of relations together, and providing an option for i-unity of p.

(10) How do we evince the "problematic element of tonal background" (39) in p? Does the awareness of tonal structure matter? How does the performer distinguish "essential from auxiliary tonal events?". Tonal relations that help create a 'synoptic' view are matters of a delicate choice: should one expose these long-range relations or are they self-evident? I submit that: (1) the answer will vary, depending empirically on the audience to which the performer directs himself and; (2) beyond a certain limit of complexity it is plausible that the listener will need a 'performative clarification' or 'indicative suggestion' of the p in support of his comprehension, especially when essential tonal developments (events) occur on levels deeper than surface.

(11) How should the p, including "everything, from general interpretive deportment to the smallest detail of nuance" (41), be allowed to be influenced by descriptive, i.e. extramusically representative; elements (such as indicated by text or title)? This somewhat vague question instigates a vast area of problems related to interart and intermedia interpretation, and hints at the possibility of interpreting musically an i parallel to the connotations indicated by textual content, as in the song, program music and opera.

(12) The final issue, a very general one, concerns the possibility, approved by Berry, that a probing analysis may "reveal to the performer an attitude appropriate to the character of a piece", and not just the detailed choices of how to implement relevant soundshapes: "The performer's general attitude and physical approach to a piece are as much governed by the findings of analysis as are details of nuance and inflection" (43), as is the case in Brahms' *Intermezzo* op. 117 no. 1 in E flat major, which suggests a "concordant calm, a minimum of physical involvement".

Eugene Narmour touches on the subject of mip in referring to L. B. Meyer's ideas about "melodic nonclosure or implication". The core of Narmour's contribution, apart from his basic **compositional** theory of melodic implication, can be found in a chapter "On the Relationship of Analytical Theory to Performance and Interpretation" (1988:317-340, sc. 328, in *Explorations* [...]). He focuses on only the **performance of melody** and launches two hypotheses: (1) "the larger a melodic interval is, the more implicative it is". But he allows for a "possible exception" –

without specifying his argument for this—"of the leap of an octave". Consequently, "a single interval of a major sixth is more 'open' than a minor second. This principle is naturally true if and only if all other parametric things are equal. Harmonic and rhythmic context, of course, will play an important part in determining exactly what is implied from any given melodic interval."

The conception that a principle for shaping the melodic contour (2nd level, that of gestalting, MIRI:47) is 'true' or 'false' does not correspond to my view that it is an aesthetic principle or ideal, or even more a coherent cognitive pattern, **applied** to the performance. This principle may be more or less based on compositional fact, and Narmour's analyses (in a series of ingenious books) exhibits a differentiated system for the **analysis of compositional phenomena and facts of melodic construction**. But in order to arrive at a performance, the analytic precept requires a set of **performance implementation rules** that are interpretive in essence. There is the risk of a dogmatic failure in introducing the logical dichotomy true/false too early in the interpretive procedure. Furthermore, "in accordance with the Gestalt law of continuation" Narmour postulates in his other hypothesis that (2) "small intervals tend to imply a continuation in the same direction" (329), whereas "large intervals tend to imply a reversal of direction." This is in accordance with the 'phenomenological' tendency to fill out an empty tonal space.

II:6 AESTHETIC IDEAS OF INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE

It seems clear that the concrete shaping of sound in performance is the result of musical action related to:

- (1) certain cognitive processes of thinking and feeling;
- (2) basic assimilation through reading notation and listening to one's own and/or other performers' recorded or live renderings during exercise, rehearsal and concerts;
- (3) productive imagination ('fantasy') in the working through of the assimilated material, a processing related to memory, experience and awareness of one's practical faculty for instrumental limits and possibilities of treatment; and
- (4) certain natural restraints or self-imposed restrictions by the performer due to (a) **internal** limits of intellectual and emotional capacity and (b) **external** restrictions from physical ability and accepted style conventions: cf. the

"*Imponderabilien*" of Celibidache (Weiler, 276), restrictions outside the performer's power of decision and its other pertinent definitions (FME:50). In which of these processes and/or capacities (1-4) do 'aesthetic ideas' influence *i* as opposed to *p*? First, it is evident that the aesthetic ideas themselves, whether governing or merely suggesting, are *i*:s, not *p*:s. Also, they provide (1) a framework, and input of a sort in the act of cognitive processing; and (2) the idea of assimilation itself may define the extent and mode of actual assimilation. It is evident that (3) the content of imagination is furthered by particularly relevant aesthetic ideas, and (4) the limits of internal intellectual capacity may be set by the actual aesthetic ideas assumed by the interpreter. So points 1 through 4 *a priori* provide optimal (potential) connection to aesthetic ideas. And empirical instantiation also provides evidence for some of these points.

Within these dimensions, decisions by the interpreter are made through "internal communication" with overriding levels of aesthetic ideas and evaluations held by the performer, the outcome of which guides the interpretative process and helps to determine the interpretive result. Internally, there exists a mental or cognitive map of the processes and optional courses that the acts of interpretative consciousness can take; these can even be related to psychology, physiology and acoustics, and in their material or physical aspects they can be described in such terms. Externally, the performer's 'behavior' can be described by reference to **external measurement procedures that refer to internal phenomena**, which confront "two worlds", one with the other. Such 'internal phenomena' may be purely experiential and genuine in character, i.e. restricted to the individual consciousness and accessible only by recourse to its own experience, and recoverable through interviews only to the extent that it can be comprehensibly verbalized; or the internal experience can be made to announce itself in physical gestures, motions and mimetic expressions. In this case the experience is only communicated indirectly through its 'secondary' representation in another mode, that of action, for instance, or emotional expression. So if the assumption is that there is a **truth in performance**, either the truth of the work that presents itself to the listener through the **conditional transparency of performance** or a truth exposed through certain **properties of the performance itself**, then the problem of how to get access to these 'truths' still remains, as does the problem of how to attain a stable level of description of the experiential qualities that pertain to performance phenomena. And the restricted recoverability of such internalized phenomena creates an epistemological dilemma. On the one hand all observation is subject to

recoverability by reference to one's own experience; i.e. all evidence is in the end dependent on support from experience. On the other hand, the access to this primary experiential evidence is in some sense noncommunicable, restricted to its own world or even solipsistic. For experience to be evident it must by necessity be primary experience. However, the fact that a primary experience is shown to be evidential of a $p(w,i)$ -phenomenon (property, feature, quality) does not say anything other than that it is what it is, namely (1) a specific property (as opposed to a different property of another constitution) and (2) an implicit affirmation of that which it is in itself (despite the circularity of logic here). I submit we name these two types of confirmation **essential** versus **existential** evidence.

For the validation of such measurements and descriptions based on empirical experiments or investigations, an intermediate **translation rule** must connect the qualitative notions of internal experience with the quantitative concepts for data description and presentation of external findings. Principally one can take a stance for or against either one of these different methods, but it would be more fruitful to study the conditions and overriding ideas that support each of these views, clarifying various metainterpretative perspectives. The question of **truth** is inevitably connected to the problem of demonstrating a common human basis for experiencing that can guarantee communicability of internal experiential phenomena.

The idea of a true performance, "die Idee der wahren *Aufführung*", is studied by Jürgen Uhde and Renate Wieland in their *Denken und Spielen*⁴⁰, much on the basis of Theodor W. Adorno's aesthetics, particularly *Ästhetische Theorie* (Gesammelte Schriften 7) and an unpublished manuscript⁴¹. Since *Denken und Spielen* is a close study of exactly those texts by Adorno that bear witness to a contribution of what an interpretation theory specifically is I will rely mainly on the former. However, Adorno's analysis of Berg's *Violin Concerto* is treated in ch. IV:4, since this is relevant to the consideration of violinistic sonority.

A common source of thinking and playing, according to Uhde & Wieland, is intuition, which provides the cognitive impulse to both "*Denken*" and "*Spielen*". The following is an existential condition for the performance of a musicwork, which evolves in time flux, as stated by Uhde and Wieland: "das Werk ist ein Werden". In this process two factors of energy guarantee the unity of the aesthetic character: "*Sinnzusammenhang*" and "*Stimmigkeit*" (14–17). False interpretation disrupts the effect of the **continuity** and **coherence** phenomena of meaning and energy flow, respectively, and such false interpretation caused

by untrue ideas ("*unwahre Ideen*") lead to incoherence ("*Unstimmigkeit*"), which is a complex notional alternatively (complementarily) translated as **incongruency**. Uhde and Wieland depart from these leading concepts to formulate their basic rules for correct performance, "*Prägnanz und Konsequenz als die Grundgesetze richtiger Darstellung*" (16), without clarifying the connection of **pregnancy** and **consistency** to continuity and coherence, unless their reference to Adorno could account for this: "Das Prinzip, dem all die Kriterien von Stimmigkeit nach Adorno unterstehen, ist das der **Durchorganisation**." (18; my emphasis) According to Adorno there is also a decisive dialectic between **construction** and **expression**, an idea similar to the hermeneutical circle for gradually increasing comprehension. In hermeneutics, this process deepens the interpretation by twinning the network of semantic and comprehensional interrelations of meaning and understanding between the interpreter and the work. (MIR I:89) But, in the view of Adorno, following Uhde and Wieland, this dialectics is a condition for correct interpretation since, if interrupted, "*Unstimmigkeit*" will occur. The concept of "*Unstimmigkeit*" is now used to describe the lack of **correspondence** between interpretation and work, i.e. in its sense of "incongruency": "überschüssige Intentionen, leerstehende Strukturen [...] das also, was in umfassendem Sinn unökonomisch ist, nicht dem inneren Zusammenhang des Ganzen dient." (18) This **internal coherence** correlates with "*das Prinzipstruktureller Durchorganisation*", "*funktioneller Zusammenschluss selbständiger Glieder*", the original reason for which is the analogy and **formal correspondence** to the human "organism" (mental and/or corporeal?): "*ihr Urbild ist der Organismus zunächst der menschliche*." I can think of a possible justification for this analogy, if the reference also includes a postulate of composers' creation of their work in correspondence to the same human organism; thereby this "human nature" would be decipherable by the interpreter and transmittable through performance to the beholders.

The sociological dimension of performance aesthetics enters into the scope of our inquiry, if we consider the differences between people in terms of their experiences, values, knowledge, education and simple tastes. This provides a conflicting picture, at least on the surface. In order to save the Adorno-Uhde postulate that composers create their works on the basis of a constancy in the human organism, presumably including the musical mind, one would have to introduce the assumption that the underlying human nature still preserves its identity over and above all such differences: "das Ideal organisch schöner übereinstimmung wird problematisch, wo die Erfahrung von Widersprüchen,

Dissonanzen zwischen dem Einzelwillen und dem Gesamtgestus in die künstlerische Gestalt aufgenommen sein will." And this problem allegedly cannot be solved by further determination of the criterion "*Stimmigkeit*", since "vom Kriterium der Stimmigkeit lässt sich abstrakt wenig sagen" (19), which must be wrong. It is possible to clarify this concept, even if it leads to its substitution for, as I propose, the terms **coherency** and **congruency**. It is not only possible, as Uhde–Wieland suggest, to expand on the metaphysical question on "Wozu?"; I would concede that "*Die Einheit der Formselber ist mimetisch*" (21) only insofar as that which is imitated is the reality to which the interpreter's understanding corresponds on the basis of some considerations of what can be seen as the common denominator of human nature, i.e. of all the involved parts, composer, interpreter and listener included.

In this way we understand why it is so important for the interpreter to search for **truth** ("*der Interpret muss Wahrheit suchen*" 21); and I would expand a few lines on this issue by stating that truth can be necessary for:

- (1) securing the work identity in performance (it must be **the work** and not another work);
- (2) shaping the sound rendition that **corresponds to this identity**; and
- (3) fulfilling the condition required for the **communicative** process to occur (from composer through interpreter out to the audience).

What is **rendered** (not 'imitated', since truth cannot be imitated, *sensu stricto*) must already be 'there' in the w, primordially or prototypically, or as intimated by its context; it must have an independent existence that I can perceive from my perspective by approaching the work and entering into a closer relation with it. Neither Uhde–Wieland ("*Wahrheit und Technik: mimetische Technik*") nor Adorno ("*Mimesis [...] empfangend dem Gegenstand ähnlich werden*", 22) shed much light on this consideration. The pair of authors focus on the interpretative process, without justifying the use of "technique" in this respect: "muss die Technik des Interpretieren sich individualisieren, sich anschmiegen an die Innendynamik des Werks." (23)

The following is a more subtle dichotomy of the idea of "technique" and its "mechanical" origin as provided by Friedrich von Hausegger⁴²: "My differentiation of the interpretive level and the mechanical level in playing is partly theoretical, and the two do not exist in absolute isolation one from the other. The closer together the two levels are, however, the more meaningful will be the artistic, instrumental effect". His second distinction that concerns us couples **expression** with **emotion** (according to the convention) and **style** with

aesthetics according to his peculiar manner: "I am differentiating within the interpretative level between 'emotionally expressive' and 'aesthetically stylistic'. This is the point at which the truly artistic personality begins to find an acoustical outlet where the work reaches the listener and the musical statement exceeds that which we call aesthetic [...] A battle of conscience between interpretation and technique [also] arises from the markings in a composition". (13)

Learning on Adorno's notion of "*Aura*", explained as "*Abglanz von Wahrheit*" (24) Uhde & Wieland touch upon the problem of **how truth appears** and how it can be distinguished from what is false: "Die Idee des Auratischen erfüllt sich für Adorno in der 'apparition' der in ihrem Aufstrahlen vergehenden Erscheinung" (31), whereas the **false interpretation** (p) also has its **contrary mode of appearance**, according to Adorno: "in ihrer vorwaltend organischen Gestalt erkennt er die Phänomen von Disintegration, jener immanenten Gegentendenz" (32). Still, it is not clear from this statement how one can discriminate true interpretations from false ones without presenting trenchant criteria for this judgement. The true and the false both rely on their respective experiential evidence, their respective essences, but the false may be false in two ways: either it lacks its existence *in concreto* (i.e., it does not at the very moment of consideration appear to be a phenomenon) or it is false in the sense of being another thing than that which is stated (its essence is not the purported property of an *i* but there can still be another essence existing in its place).

Although the aforementioned primary experience is a necessary condition for establishing existence, it alone does not provide sufficient grounds for establishing the particular essence of the experiential phenomenon in question. Reflection, as a 'secondary experience', is the mode of consciousness necessary for establishing the exact kind and quality of the phenomenal property, and for securing its discursive communicability; this reflection is a mode of consideration regarding the fundamental properties of the experiential form in which its essence appears. Moreover, I question the consistency in the picture given, since artworks are regarded as a secondary reality ("*zweite Realität*", 48) that relates, reacts and communicates with values [espoused by whom? Others? Or the work representing values of the author?], without imitating reality ("*die Welt nicht abbilden*"). This line of argument would lead to the conception of independent values without any origin or relation to the artworks themselves.

Both with and without explicit reference to Sergiu Celibidache, Uhde & Wieland harmonize their explication of Adorno with a few leading ideas from the phenomenology of this conductor. Under the title of "*Artikulation komplexer*

Zeitgestalten" (204 etc.) they present four basic situations: (1) "*Aufstiegsphase*", (2) "*Entspannungsphase*", (3) "*Aufstieg einer Einzelwelle während einer grösseren Entspannungsphase*" and (4) "*eine Detailentspannung mit einer grösseren Ausatmungsphase*" (210). In the process of an interdependent "opening-up", which is responded to by a resolving falling-back ("*Sich-öffnende*" – "*Zurücksinken*" 208), the dialectic principles of Adorno run parallel to the phenomenological principles of Celibidache: "Es liegt an der Kraft des einzelnen Interpreten, ob die Dehnung seines Tempos die vorwärtsgerichtete Erwartung, das innere Drängen zu tragen vermag." These two authors conceive of the respect for passivity in the "*Ausatmungsphase*" (210) as contrary to the restlessness of a musical society under commercial pressure: "Um so überwältigender ist die Wirkung, wenn ein Interpret wie Celibidache das Wagnis der äussersten Reduktion eingeht. Gerade in der Zone des Nullpunktes finden die musikalischen Abenteuer statt, hier ist der Ort der Frage, ob und wie es weiter geht [in the processuality of the work-unfolding performance], ob ein neuer Impuls entspringt, ob eine Gestalt endgültig versinkt. Der Moment tiefster Ruhe birgt die höchste Dynamik; an den Krisenpunkten tritt die Dialektik musikalischer Zeit am reinsten zutage." (211). It should be noted, though, that reduction in the view of Celibidache is a "*Reduktion auf Eins*" (MIR IV:117,119, 127; Weiler, 279ff), i.e. a reduction to unity necessary due to the (1) identity of the conductor as auditor, (2) the presupposed identity of each of the listeners' consciousness, and (3) the fulfillment of the condition for transmission to the listeners through the presupposed validity of "*intersubjektive Betreffbarkeit*" (on basis of Husserlian intersubjectivity). The capability of human 'correlation' ("*die Werte korrelieren*") is constant over all changes, according to Celibidache (MIR IV:203): "*Musik ist göttliche Identität, mir in dir zu wiederfinden*" (MIR IV:79; ch. V:1:4).

The dialectic of dividing and connecting suggested by Uhde & Wieland ("*Trennen und Verbinden*" 207) reproduces itself in larger entities, the largest of which are form incisions ("*Formzäsuren*"). In working with these four basic situations, state Uhde & Wieland, all the dynamic and agogic aspects of individual gestalts have to be referred to the overall form ("*auf den Atem der Gesamtform*" 211): "Idealiter wäre der Gesamtprozess, ein Atemzug, eine dynamisch agogische Kurve mit *einem* Höhepunkt"; this "Idee einer durchorganisierten Entwicklung" was simply a gradual development of ornamental forms in the history of Western art.

The processuality of performance corresponds to the ontological idea of

the music work as a "Werden" (14 "ein Werdegang"; Weiler 275; ch. V:4). Music is not concerned with attaining the status of a 'language', since music is "sprachfremd" (48–49): "Erreicht Interpretation den spezifischen Ton dieser Sprache nicht, so ist sie, nach einem Wort von Celibidache, bloss Klang, noch nicht Musik." The level of communication must be attained, but this does not mean that music is a language. There are other ways of communicating, which is also often stressed by Celibidache. It seems to me that Uhde & Wieland have misunderstood the maestro. Still more, Celibidache's stance against Adorno as too 'literary' (read arbitrary) a music philosopher, is on the whole severely critical.

HISTORICITY AND ACTUALITY

The historical performance movement seems to have been a rather isolated musicological ideal, emerging from roots more grounded in the area of research than in musical practice. Gradually, though, after the Romantic resistance was broken down, its ideas were adopted, as it gave access to a forgotten repertoire. With time the demands upon it, and its proponents determined that its principles should be applied as a substitute for aesthetic consideration (discussed in J. Kerman, 1985:182–217, ch. *The Historical Performance Movement* sc. 208 ff). For the proponents of reconstructionism who claim that historical authenticity is the sole guarantor in performance of the work's purported preexisting identity, it must have been confusing to encounter the opposite idea in the writings of Ingarden, insofar as these were known to them. He postulates that the actual performance is necessary in order to constitute the identity of the work, since there is no other way of **individuating** the work than to exactly realize it through the medium of performance (v. ch. II:1 Hermerén; II:2 & 3 Ingarden and Hartmann).

A good deal of *Spielen und Denken* deals with Adorno's thoughts on historicity and actuality, relevant to our controversial question on how to secure the identity of the work in performance. How, i.e. by what form of existence, can the artwork preserve its identity throughout the process of historical change? Uhde & Wieland reach the conclusion that the work identity itself changes with time and circumstance, due to the age-dependent interpretation that the work is exposed to. I question this claim. First, it is a circular conclusion that every changing interpretation of the work over time disrupts the identity of the work that is interpreted; secondly, it is a slippery-slope kind of argument, since the

lack of any constant point of reference for the interpretation implies that no limits can be created for a reinterpretation of the work according to which the work identity may be preserved; the line of demarcation to other "works" disappears, or the concept of work itself is dissolved.

More fruitful is Adorno's notion of actuality (ch. III:2) communicating with the past in the relation between "*Geschichte*" and "*Aktualität*" (64). The understanding of a meaningful connection as seen from a present perspective (of 'nowness') entails a mutual alignment within an exchange of ideas from the past and present. We can modify our view, but this practice is not always beneficial if we wish to arrive at a coherent interpretation; since we must then also change our view of the work. The meaning we can read out of the work is marked by its history, but only graspable insofar as it corresponds to our context of actuality ("*Sinnzusammenhang*"); this "*Sinnzusammenhang*", then, determines the "*Strukturinterpretation*": "so kann erst in einem späten Stadium der Interpretation das 'Bild der musikalischen Totalität' differenziert erscheinen." (65) This is in the line of Dahlhaus' sceptical stance in regard to reconstructionism, or more specifically to the idea of the possibility of maintaining a p's authenticity by making use of available historical devices, which he dismisses as chimerical.

On the other hand, Rothschild⁴³, Donington, Dart, Dolmetsch and Harmoncourt subscribe to the thesis that diminishing the distance to the original p increases the value of the actual p considered. For Adorno (71) this issue stands as a conflict between style and meaning, and he prefers the latter. Uhde & Wieland remind us of the sound transparency of Glenn Gould's Bach-interpretations (e.g. *Goldbergvariationen*) on the modern grand piano, which I take as an argument against the incompatibility of historicity and actuality in ch. IV:3. Uhde–Wieland suggest the conclusion: "ob nicht die Bedeutung vergangener Spielkonventionen in der akademischen Diskussion völlig überbewertet ist gegenüber dem Postulat der rückhaltslosen analytischen und meditativen Versenkung in die Individualität der Werke". (72)

Hence, the modern interpreter would be justified in looking at the more profound functions of, e.g., ornaments in his interpretation (72–73), and in allowing it to be governed by an explanation of the content (such as aspects of brilliance and flexibility) or in just recognizing the inferior importance of ornaments which served to maintain the intensity over long notes on dynamically weaker instruments, as distinct from places of ornamental emphasis. The view of Uhde & Wieland – that the interpreter's foremost task is to represent and secure the occurrence of the music, in its emphatic sense as genuine experience,

in actuality, as opposed to the putative insufficiency of purely structural aspects of the composition – should be seen within the frame of Adorno's dialectic attitude to the historical idiom and conventions (77). Adorno's postulate is that actual interpretation of traditional music should orient itself to the compositional awareness of our time, in order to connect the work to our age and enable us to render an understandable performance of the work. (95) This proposal must, however, be regarded in the light of Adorno's musical engagement in the Second Vienna School as well as his participation in the philosophical movement of the Frankfurt School.

Adorno dedicates himself to the problem of the performance of contemporary music in his chapter *Neue Musik, Interpretation, Publikum* (7)⁴⁴. Here the lack of an understanding of contemporary music is proposed as an explanation for the specific aesthetic problems of modern music performance ("als Grund der problematischen Aufführungen neuer Musik mangelndes Verständnis annehmen müssen", 11).

But Adorno also touches on a more basic issue. Central to his concept of interpretation is the "*klangsinnliche Qualität*" to be attained by "*Verwirklichung der musikalischen Struktur im Hörbaren*," (10) which may not lead to "Unterwerfung unter die stereotype Vorstellung der Hörer". The priority of the composer may not be challenged by the audience. The problem of unsuccessful interpretation Adorno describes by using the analogy of a speaker of a foreign language which he pronounces well but does not understand himself. The impression will sound curious to the public, and "die Hörer werden ihn so wenig verstehen wie er sich selbst." But this parallel, I believe, is not entirely correct, since interpretation is not transmitted only by non-sounding qualities such as gestures (which the analogy has to allow), and it also is embodied in a sound-shaping reality. The problem goes into detail, though originally a matter of aesthetic principle: "die Schwierigkeiten reichen bis ins Einfachste hinein, in den Vortrag einzelner Melodien durch einzelne Instrumente [...] Unempfindlichkeit gegen Akzente, Mangel an dynamischer Flexibilität, starres Spielen nach den Taktschlägen, ohne 'Ausmusizieren', Vergröberungen von Ritardandi." (9)

TIME AND INTERPRETATION

Insofar as various conceptions of time logically correspond to their respective theories of interpretation, the question of their interrelation must be included in

the scope of our investigation. What support from musicological or aesthetic investigations can the proponents of various interpretive ideals obtain regarding the question of what parameters of interpretation pertain to scientific views on time qualities in performance?

The shaping of musical sound in performance takes place in the evolution of time; this **processuality** is acknowledged by many authors: Brelét (ch. II:3), Uhde & Wieland (ch. II:6), Friedhelm Klugmann; and, notably, among performers who emphasize this idea, Sergiu Celibidache must be mentioned. The formulations vary: the performer feels he is (1) shaping in time by directing the flow of tones that participate in the time-flow, or that he is (2) **shaping time by governing the p(w)'s time-flow**, which embodies, or is manifested in, the series of tones (ch. I:3). Klugmann investigates *Die Kategorie der Zeit in der Musik*⁴⁵ in relevance to this issue. By combining time parameters within form qualities and qualities of shaping within time progress ("*Zeitgestaltung*"), almost all phenomena are classified as "*Zeitlichkeiten*" only because of their appearance in time, which does not prove that the aspect of time within them is superior to (or dominates over) their other qualities as seen from different aspects (such as space, "sound", "character", "tone" with energetic volume). Experiential phenomena can be depicted and fixed into persistent images in consciousness even if this were to be considered as a secondary way of understanding a piece of music as an art of time. (Brelét's notions of musical time were referred to in ch. II:3)

"Das Hoch und Tief, Laut und Leise, Schnell und Langsam, Steigen und Fallen, Schreiten und Springen, Konsonieren und Dissonieren [etc] umschliessen eine Fülle musikalischer Sinngebungen. Die einzelnen *Zeitlichkeiten* erscheinen in Gegensatzpaaren, wobei die Kontrastmöglichkeiten sich aus der oben beschriebenen Matrix ergeben. Der idealen Identität wird in der musikalischen *Zeitgestaltung* das Iterationsprinzip zugeordnet [...], der idealen Heterogenität das Variationsprinzip [...]. Beide kommen immer vermischt vor [...]. Musikalische Formen sind in umfassenden Sinne Variationen von Element-Iterationen." (80) The evolution of constitutive phenomena, which are conceptually formalized in pairs, appears in the shaping of the progress of time, where **identity** and **heterogeneity** emerge as more basic principles compositionally constituted by **iteration** and **variation**, respectively. In contrast, these concepts, in particular Klugmann's principle of iteration, should be related to the Dahlhaus' concepts of "*Differenzierung und Integration*" (Carl Dahlhaus *Analyse und Werturteil* 50–54). These phenomena appear compositionally in different and distinct constellations, and their reproduction in time is an evolutionary product of the

reconstituting and presenting of those phenomena in performance as the result of the superior governing principles of iteration and variation. They appear as phenomenal effects, such as identity and heterogeneity, projected characters of the work performance. In this way the performance becomes not only **reconstitutive**, but also – *mutatis mutandis* – a **creative recomposing** guided by the predetermined laid-out scheme of the score:

"Die Konstellation der Parameter beim Akt des Produzierens ist einmalig unwiederholbar dahin. An jeder Reproduktion erfüllt sich das Gesetz der zeitlichen Veränderung, also einer 'Neukomposition'. Diese kann alle Grade von der angenähert richtigen Interpretation bis zum völligen Missverständnis und totalen Verfälschung des gemeinten musikalischen Sinnzusammenhangs durchlaufen. Denn aufgrund der bis jetzt noch kümmerlichen Zeitsymbole in der Notation ist schon der physikalisch-physiologische Teil dem musikalischen Vorgänge schwer rekonstruierbar." (76)

Klugmann explains how **unity** of the wholeness of the work appears through the constitution of large rhythmical structures in time progress: "Elementarkombinationen bilden zusammen einen in sich vielfach differenzierten "*Grossrhythmus*" [...] Wie können aber Werte in Zeitverläufen erscheinen, da ihr Wesen doch in überzeitlichkeit und Ideenhaftigkeit bestehen soll? (...) In der Musik fallen [...] die Prozessualität der Erscheinungen und das Vorhandensein von Wertqualitäten gar nicht auseinander. Diese entstehen vielmehr durch die jeweilige, individuelle Kollokation der Zeitparameter und sind sofern mit dem 'Grossrhythmus' identisch. Musikalisch-künstlerische Werte bestehennicht 'vor' der musikalischen Realisation sondern kommen erst in und mit ihr zustande. Sie haben überhaupt kein An-sich-Sein, sind vielmehr auf das 'Musizieren' angewiesen, um in die Existenz zu gelangen." (81–82).

Klugmann considers Augustinus' definition of music plausible: "*musica est ars bene modulandi*", translated and thereby interpreted as follows: music is the art of organizing time beautifully.

From the point of view of the recreative interpreter's temporal horizon, Paul Fraisse, possibly also having absorbed some influence from Husserl, arrives from his scientific standpoint at the concept of an **invariancy of the human constitution** regarding time consciousness and its relations to future, memory and the past: "Les deux perspectives – reconstruction du passé et anticipation de l'avenir – ne se développent pas du tout dans les mêmes conditions. Le passé se constitua, avons-nous vu, grâce au signe temporel que recoit tout événement vécu et par l'organisation sérielle des souvenirs. Les

perspectives futures sont, elles, fonction de la possibilité d'échapper à un présent déterminé par la situation ou par l'emprise du passé. Il n'y a avenir que s'il y a, en même temps, désir d'autre chose et conscience de la possibilité de le réaliser."⁴⁶

Finally, unaffected by science, Marcel Herwegh, on the basis of common sense aesthetics and musical experience, presents his view of the role of the interpreter, allowing for the influence of **imaginative reexperiencing** and **participative communion** with the (imagined) composer: "Dans l'interprétation de l'oeuvre, dans son analyse, où, [...] toute la force vive de nos facultés est mise en jeu, l'imagination ne doit pas être exclue. Elle a un rôle considerable. Elle est un des grands facteurs de l'émotion indispensable dans l'oeuvre d'art que l'interprète doit ressentir pour demeurer en communion avec le créateur initial, et pour que cette émotion soit éprouvée à leur tour par les auditeurs."⁴⁷

Moreover, Herwegh acknowledges simultaneously the creative and recreative aspects of interpretative activity: "Exécuter une oeuvre musicale, c'est, [...] la créer à nouveau, c'est vouloir reproduire un original qui n'existe que virtuellement, sous la forme d'un type idéal, établi d'après des données plus ou moins précises," (13) and "l'exécutant a ainsi, en quelque sorte, le rôle d'un créateur, les principes de l'interprétation sont en relation directe avec les principes mêmes de composition." (14) Herwegh, finally, gives a well-formulated **criterion for interpretative quality in an integrated comprehension of the morphology of the work**: "Une bonne interprétation suppose une compréhension intégrale de la morphologie de l'oeuvre que le texte seul ne suffit pas à donner; il faut le compléter." (13) The necessity of **complementary interpretation**, including conventional adjustments, is caused by the *a priori* incompleteness of notation, but the decisions over and above those prescribed must be governed by maximizing overall **comprehension**, primarily of the whole and, consequently, of the specific details. Since the performance discloses the work in the flow of time, the **conception of time** yields the frame for the morphological disclosure of the work in p. The **gestalt** is the one parameter of the **evolving topography of the work**, time is the other.

II:7 HEINRICH SCHENKER – THE INFLUENCES FROM THE IDEA OF HIS THEORY OF "VORTRAG"

This chapter will focus on the influential music theory of Heinrich Schenker (1867–1935), only regarding its bearing on performance aesthetics: for the purpose of basic information I refer to a few excellent books⁴⁸ that introduce Schenkerian theory.

I intend only to treat the background to the ideas in his thinking, which is important from the point of view of performance, and I will present quotations which indicate that Schenker himself constantly endorsed the idea of applying his theory to the interpretation in performance. Schenker is of interest to us in this investigation since he asks which bases for interpretation can be adduced in the form of structural criteria, i.e. regarding the i – w connection. A basic knowledge of his system is presupposed.

First, one must point out the fact that Schenker's overriding intention with his impressive theoretical oeuvre was not to write scientific works, but to create a musical aesthetics in order to promote artistic understanding among composers, performers and audiences. For this purpose he limited his choice to the mainstream of classical masterworks: "Musik ist jederzeit und überall Kunst, in der Komposition, im Vortrag, sogar in ihrer Geschichte, nirgends und niemals aber ist sie Wissenschaft."⁴⁹

Schenker, who regarded music as more than a **cultural** product, was searching for the profound roots of music in **nature**, and in **human nature**: "In ihren Zügen spiegelt die Musik die Menschenseele in allen ihren Bewegungen und Wandlungen wieder [...]." More or less unspecifically he refers to the human being and his language as the basis for **articulation** in performance: "Wurzel und Gleichnis der *musikalischen Artikulation* ist die menschliche Sprache." (167) It remains unclear whether he thought about the relation between music and man as an analogy, a parallelism, or whether he even tried to find an **organic** foundation in human physiology: "An die Stelle des menschlichen Atems, der in der Sprache und in der vokalen Musik Darstellungsmittel der Artikulation ist, tritt in der Instrumentalmusik der *Bogen des legato*. Durch solche Bogen werden Tonfolgen abgegrenzt, verschiedene kontrapunktische Wirkungen, sowie Verknüpfungen von Stimmen und Formteilen erzieht [...] Die Bogen richten sich nach dem Inhalt der Diminutionen, ihrem parallelistischen Verhältnis und ihren Gewichtsbeziehungen, nach Zeitmass und Dynamik, nach dem Charakter des Instrumentes, sowie beim Orchester nach dessen

Zusammensetzung und dem Ineinanderspiel." (167–168)

More precisely, Schenker defines the duty of the performer by means of his crucial theoretical concepts of background, middle ground and foreground ("*Hinter-, Mittel- und Vordergrund*") in evolving structures in the musical process. One recognizes also the idea of **organism** as analogue to the musical artwork, which is also a "*Leitmotiv*" of Furtwängler's conception of the foundation for musical interpretation. Schenker presents his central idea about "*Vortrag*" in *Der freie Satz*:

"Der *Vortrag* eines musikalischen Kunstwerks kann nur auf dessen organische Zusammenhänge gegründet sein. Der Vortrag ist nicht zuertanzen, zu erturnen, nur aus dem Wissen um Hinter-, Mittel- und Vordergrund ergibt sich die Möglichkeit, über 'Motiv', 'Thema', 'Phrase', 'Taktstrich' usw. hinaus die wahre musikalische Interpunktion über Silben und Worte hinausgeht, genau so strebt auch in der Musik die wahre Interpunktion weiteren Zielen zu. Nicht aber etwa, dass die Urlinie so ausgerufen werden musste, wie fälschlich im Vortrag einer Fuge die Einsätze ausgerufen werden; schon allein das Wissen um die Zusammenhänge genügt, um dem Spieler Mittel des Vortrags einzugeben, die einen Zusammenhang empfinden lassen. Wer so vorträgt, wird sich hüten, die Züge zu ertönen und dadurch unsere Teilnahme zu lähmen, den Taktstrich zu überschätzen, der wahrlich noch keinen Zug, keinen Weg bedeutet. Also ist die Lehre vom Hinter-, Mittel- und Vordergrund auch für den Vortrag entscheidend und praktisch, und heute geben das auch schon die namhaftesten Dirigenten zu." (34–35)

According to Schenker's view, the performer must know the three grounds of the piece in order to shape the true 'interpunction' of the music, following its **natural tendency** to strive towards a goal; and to him this becomes the means of performance by which the larger connections of the work can be perceived. It is worth noting that the same basic conception of the musical artwork serves both as compositional analysis and interpretation in performance.

Schenker espouses the idea of generative parallelism. This idea appears, outside Schenker, in various guises. A looser variant states that the **process** of composition is creative in a sense similar to the creative process of performance rehearsal. Therefore, goes this non-conclusive argument, the performer arrives at a good performance, if he relies on generativity. But the problem of access to the **compositionally generative process**, for instance by reliance on a theory of the kind espoused by Reti's or Zuckerkandl's kind, is not solved. First, *sensu stricto*, such access is impossible. Then, if it is acknowledged that the c-creative

process is represented by a taxonomic motif analysis showing the main developments of variants (ch II:4), then no clear distinction between the creative methods used in c- and i-processes are by any means evident. But the difference appears on the level of generative processing: c-generativity starts in a way by **constructing** a definite structure, from "nothing", whereas i-generativity starts by regarding and treating an existing object, thus establishing a relation to it. Access to c-generative processes requires a knowledge of explicit intentions from the C.

There is a preconceived deeper identity of the work structures that captures the essentials in a presentation to the listener. The properties of the work are identical with the properties of a good performance. This is ideally what I have indicated as "*w-i congruence*" (MIR I:352).

One basic idea of the Schenkerian "Lehre" is that the rules of counterpoint also apply to relations within more distant developments, and that the composition in fact should be regarded as a **prolongation** of simple contrapuntal two-part settings. Such prolongation is made by the "*Auskomponierung*" of a basically harmonic ground structure that enables the parts to evolve through progression in time, creating an internally guided development of the piece. Behind all the passing notes, passages and melodic diminutions Schenker finds a recurring "*Urlinie*" in the background, which appears embellished by figurations in the foreground. This system of layers (*Schichten-Lehre*) shows superordinated versus subordinated points in the progress of the piece. According to Schenker the masterworks are and must be structured in this way (in order for them to belong to their category), and the musician should learn to recognize and perform these structures through shaping corresponding sound forms. Schenker represents implicitly his **structural theory of interpretation** by means of his *Urlinientafeln*, but does this in such a differentiated mode that even other layers, instantiated by the complementary **linearity theory** (MIR I:163), are also included. "The evolving constituents establish and refer to [...] reference systems" and structural levels, creating a network of supra- and subordinated relations in the auditive medium of the performance (MIR I:167): prolongation is realized by linear phenomena in a performance based upon structural priority.

"§50. *Die Genies überlassen sich vertrauensvoll ihrem Weitblick*" assures Schenker (59) and Oswald Jonas explicates the maestro: "In der Fähigkeit des **Fernhörens** [my emphasis], in der Fähigkeit der Meister, den Ausgangspunkt im Ohr zu behalten, wenn sie sich auch noch so sehr auf dem Tummelplatz auskomponierter Klänge ergehen, gerade darin liegt ihre geniale Begabung."

(51) Furtwängler also subscribed to this idea (see my *Five Music Essays*, 1987:2).

As Maury Yeston has noticed, the "extreme foreground is accentually uninterpreted by definition"⁵⁰ (67). Uninterpreted rhythmical structures can be clarified by attack points, timbres, dynamics, density and pattern recurrence by which various strata appear related in the performance. The Schenkerian middleground analysis which recognizes triads is a "pitch-to-rhythm approach" (75), in contrast to the rhythm-to-pitch variant, which puts itself "in the same position to the music as a listener who does not have the written score as a guide". In this way tonal and rhythmic structures become intimately interrelated and thus bear directly upon the listener's image of the work transmitted by the performance.

It is therefore plausible to go further in tracing the ideas behind the Schenkerian system. This is my view of the main ideas in his voluminous oeuvre, including *Der Tonwille*, *Meisterwerke der Musik*, 'Erläuterungsausgaben', *Urlinien-Tafeln*, his books on harmony and counterpoint and his main theoretical treatise *Neuermusikalische Theorien und Phantasien*, of which *Der freie Satz* appeared as vol III.⁵¹

To characterize the Schenkerian system in modern jargon as a **holistic paradigm** would be to give it an insufficient label, but it would not be groundless. Schenker himself presented *Der freie Satz* as a new "*Lehre*" on the **organic connections** of master works. The book demonstrates the roots of these works in stringent and law-bound counterpoint as the basic form underlying the sound surfaces, which can be unraveled layer by layer to reveal this "*Urform*".

At this point, a few questions of more general bearing must be briefly touched upon: What metatheoretical views or paradigms are considered to be scientific? What are the specific conditions required for an interpretative system to become a candidate for this category? How can one define the borderline between scientific and artistic interpretative systems? And what are the conditions required for these artistic systems? I am inclined to believe that the borderline changes with history, so the answer will appear in a future historical view of science. This is a pertinent question, since Schenker's system is a "*Kunstlehre*", not a science. Let us observe that:

(1) scientific methods and systems of interpretation can be applied to the performance situation when the performer necessarily chooses to do so on **some** grounds. These grounds can be more or less profound, more or less adequate, and the properties of the cognitive reasoning – or emotional "feeling" and

intuitive identification ("*Verschmelzung*") with the work – can then be assessed precisely and objectively. This is evidently one basis for interpretation research. But then we must also recognize that there are

(2) non-scientific interpretational systems for which it would be possible to argue. These can be justified on artistic or aesthetic grounds. In this study I am adopting the distinction between artistic and aesthetic systems advanced by Göran Hermerén (*Aspects of Aesthetics*, 1983:53).

Interpretation research should try to assist in clarifying the cognitive structure of such justifications, without *a priori* limiting its scope to scientific systems. What is of interest in this connection is the asymmetrical cross-relation: in the arts and in musical performance both scientific and non-scientific methods can be applied, whereas the scientific community has shown considerable hesitation in assimilating even the most successful artistic paradigms.

All of Schenkerian music theory rests upon the premise that auditively-based phenomena do not need support from extramusical justifications like mathematics or physical measurement. What Schenker aims at studying is given 'naturally'; nature's relations to art and man are his objects. The mind of the individual artist was his 'elitist' point of departure. In contrast, the 'listener's experience' that I refer to is a more democratic notion. For logical reasons the artist is also a listener and the artist's mind shares the same conditions for experiencing. The foundation of his experience is stable – he is not referring to psychologically subjective (and ever-changing) perceptions of tones – since, in depth, music evokes similar experiences among different individuals; man has a common inner nature and this includes a musical mind.

Schenker realized from experience that the weight and function of harmonically identical chords according to their position within the whole are never theoretically clarified; his short critical reviews of earlier theorists are to the point. By conceiving his *Schichtenlehre*, he was able to demonstrate that a few structural harmonies decisively directed the more elaborate progression of the piece. The structural weight of the individual chord now had to be estimated according to its position within the whole process, by an analysis connecting it into a network with other points of similar weight on the same layer and to other points of stronger or lesser structural importance on higher or lower levels respectively, altogether forming a network of complex multilayered interconnections of priority structures. This completely revolutionized the earlier form of harmonic analysis outlined by Hugo Riemann (1849–1919), who

originally based his system upon a more rigid analysis of chord sequences according to a narrower one-after-the-other chord-by-chord principle. This encyclopedic scholar had considered musical systems "*nicht naturnotwendig*" (MGG 11:485). What Schenker did opened the musical mind to the possibility of mastering analytically 'long-term' developments of musical works, as if they were grand yet simple architectonic abstractions, which was exactly what performers, especially conductors and pianists, needed in order to handle comprehensively the monumentous summits of the classical era.

Now, are these Schenkerian analyses 'experienceable'? The crucial question is to what extent the Schenkerian analysis: (1) displays 'experienceable' **auditive patterns** corresponding to the generatively interconnected multilayeredness and complex relational networks that it demonstrates theoretically and (2) is **realizable in performance**. These two questions are interdependent, insofar as the performer cannot possibly realize relations that are not experienceable, since his *gestalting* is restricted by the limits of the auditive mode of presentation: what this mode allows is given as a prerequisite for p, not determined by either P, C or R.

During our hearing of a music work we perceive the inner constitution behind the surface of figurations and rhythm. The notation left by the composer is an image of the extreme foreground. In its depths the music is conceived as layers of parts governed by voice-leading principles, constituting a structural skeleton of the anonymous background devoid of individuality; through analysis the music can be reduced to this most simple and common "*Ursatz*", from which all its ornaments have been peeled. The *Ursatz* is a dependent entity and must be read in relation to the other more evolved layers; only heard together with these and in relation to the completed work does it reveal any truth of the work. In the middleground the work attains its identity through the liberation of general voice-leading principles in elaborated melodic lines. In order to make sense Schenkerian analyses must be regarded as procedural schemata for the evolution of music unfolding in time.

According to Schenker, we must proceed in both directions, from the simple to the elaborated and vice versa. It is exactly this multidimensionality that appears in the form of multilayeredness and the existence of calmer subcurrents endows the music with its dignity. It is interesting to note that Schenker participated in the exuberant culture of Vienna during the early decades of this century, as did Sigmund Freud; who proposed that man's behavior and experiences were guided by interaction between conscious and

deeper unconscious layers. It is difficult to disregard this parallel, should it not be more than a casual coincidence, even if Schenker refers his system to the principles of biological growth, including nascency–development–death. Also for Freud, natural science, i.e. medicine and the ideas of Helmholtz, figured in the background of his theories as an inachievable ideal for psychoanalysis (see my *Psykoanalysens vetenskapliga status*, 1988:8). Schenker writes: "*Das Genie bedeutet ein Atemholen aus dem Unbewussten*"⁵²; genius refers to a deep breath from the unconscious. The sound surface of music is the fulfillment of tensions in deeper layers, and this is considered by him to be the supreme law of all art, which profoundly relates art to the human condition: "Am Ende wird sich als gemeinsames oberstes Merkmal sämtlicher Künste feststellen lassen: das Gesetz von der inneren Spannung und der entsprechenden Erfüllung nach aussen, das aber in verschiedenem Stoff sich verschieden auswirkt." And: "In Spannung lebt der Mensch sein Leben lang, Erfüllung erlebt er selten: nur allein die Kunst beglückt ihn mit einer Erfüllung, allerdings nur auf dem Wege von Auslese und Abkürzung." The following proud declaration manifests his aim to create a music philosophy of great generality: "Erst nach Aneignung meiner Lehre werden Philosophen und Ästhetiker daran gehen können, eine Theorie der Musik als Kunst überhaupt aufzustellen." In a footnote Schenker provides a motive for his adventure: "Wir entbehren in der Musik einer Ästhetik, die den Musikern Gesetze aufzuerlegen verstünde und ein Gewissen schüfe; wir entbehren, was eine Folge davon ist, eines eigentlichen Kampfes um 'Prinzipien'. [...] Mit meiner Lehre ist Nietzsches Wunsch erfüllt." (21). In contrast to the mainstream of his followers, Schenker himself conceives his theory more poetically as a "*heimliche Ahnung des Ineinanderfließens von Ursprung, Entwicklung und Gegenwart*" that through tradition reaches us "*in das Eins des Lebens fließender Zusammenhänge.*" (25)

So the origin of the constituting flow in musical experience is found in the present through intermediate law-bound development that warrants the continuity between then and now, and this is also the principle of life that guides the relation between current habits and past tradition. Schenker introduces the triadic concept *Hintergrund–Mittelgrund–Vordergrund* to correspond musically to the biological triad, origin–development–present state, a tripartite paradigm that Schenker applies also to history and man in loose parallelism to Hegel (25).

Schenker's idea that musical progressions correspond to more basic processes in human beings can be exemplified by his concept of "*Zug*". After

finding the "*Gerüstklänge*" of superior structural importance, a "*Zug*" fulfills by a stepwise descending (or ascending) movement the interval at the next structural point of importance on the same level as the last "*Gerüstklang*": This directs the process forward; the "*Zug*" points towards its goal, and the melodic prolongation of the development delays the fulfillment of the expectation. The master, says Schenker, has "*Vorwissen*", "*Nachwissen*" and "*Gesamtwissen*", and thereby ideally surveys the whole composition in one moment. Such a consciousness is a prerequisite of the complete interrelatedness of $i(w)$ in p , or simply of $p(w)$. Schenker states that his system is not "ausgedacht" but "erschaut". He does not intend to disguise the most profound mysteries of creativity; instead he attempts to provide a "*Kunstlehre*" that can assist in understanding the import of classical masterworks. He defends music as an art, just as he defends quality against the decay of the times that he felt was at hand. Following his intention, hearing should be developed so as to correspond with the demands of the masterworks. In this Schenker addresses himself to musicians, who need to know what they play. He teaches them a gestalting that is rooted in the essence of the work, and not simply in its superficial representation in notation or in the hasty virtuosity of scales and their disorienting multiplicity. Schenker's treatise gives the listener a cue to hear and attend to the 'simple' in depth, to perceive the generative depths behind a complicated sound surface. The idea behind this conception is *in nuce*: the integration of all foregrounds is chaos, whereupon the background emerges from a constant eternal harmony in the divine cosmos.

The technical system and its particularities arise from a philosophical view; Schenker states that the "*Zug*" reflects the human soul⁵³. Here he describes essentially the phenomena of cohesion and continuity, which I applied in my phenomenological terminology for an interpretation theory⁵⁴. These phenomena correspond to our natural need to find *gestalts* and logical or "*inner*" (e.g. emotional) connections in our perceptual field and experiential content. But, basically, Schenker is not psychological. His theory is more phenomenologically oriented. It is founded on the premise that what is new must have appeared from what once was, and the theory provides a view of the coming as that which is derived from core structures (of c) through an unfolding of its triadic patterns. The one leads to the other by internal force, quasi-compulsory; the organizing factor in this is our experience of cohesion and continuity in a manner that reflects the profound and basic reaction of the human mind, through the direction of its intentionality towards the world. This step is close to the

controversial procedure of retrieving constancy from biologism, to which Schenker refers: the musical work evolves as a seed grows into a plant.

The Schenkerian "*Vorschau*" appears in the moment when a "*Zug*" has been established but still not completed; the movement towards the goal of the "*Zug*" can be postponed or suspended on its way through many interruptions and deviations. Such suspended fulfillment in the middleground presupposes "*Zielstrebigkeit*", the experience of tension and the drive towards an expected goal, an 'in-tension' in an intentionally surveyed and directed process. A question is pertinent here: Does this *Zielstrebigkeit* belong to the encounter between mind and music? It does according to phenomenology. But in what way? Schenker is very close to the phenomenological view on this point, but fails to offer any reason for postulating biological constancy.

So the "*Vorschau*" is nothing mystical. It has its correlate in musical objects. According to Schenker this "*Zielstrebigkeit*" is an objective quality. We are reminded of Ernst Kurth's energy stream, providing an impetus through the musical work, a "*Kraftstrom [...], der durch die klingende Materie zieht*". Kurth also writes about "*die Einheit einer Spannkraft*"⁵⁵, which appears in various forms in polyphony or homophony, in when the melodic streams of energy "zu Klangzügen zusammenschmelzen". Earlier, Kurth⁵⁶ applied his basic concepts of "*kinetische Energie*" (9), "*Einheit des Linienzuges*" (14), "*genetischer Vorgang im Melodischen*", and harmonic and melodic "*Kohäsionswirkung*" (62) to the counterpoint of J. S. Bach.

Schenker's statement that 'all rhythm comes from counterpoint, and only counterpoint' is not as dogmatic as it sounds. He means that if the foreground is a 'composing-out' ("*Auskomponieren*") of inner relations, then melody, chords and rhythms must also be derived from the same origin ("*Urgrund*"), if the unity of the work is to be preserved. In the terminology of Maury Yeston, Schenker proposes a "pitch-to-rhythm" generative interpretation, which could be designated as a case of "Sn-Ri-relation" in my formalization (MIR I:71).

The "*Ursatz*", according to Schenker, is a manifestation of sound from a living force of nature: "§46. Wieschon der Ursatz ein Inslebentreten des Klanges aus einer lebendigen Naturkraft heraus bedeutet, so ist es wieder die Urkraft der einmal eingeleiteten Bewegung, die sich lebendig von selbst fortsetzen und steigern will: das zum Leben Geborene will sich mit Naturgewalt ausleben." (57) Music needs time to unfold; therefore, the progression towards the goal must be delayed, since too early an arrival at the goal would suddenly disrupt the kinetic energy and its resolution in motion, and prematurely end the piece.

Schenker demands of the intelligent musician that he be able to **anticipate in his imagination** in order to be able to render correctly those distant relations between structural points on the same level bearing on each moment in the continuous sequence of parts which must be related to the whole. This cannot be achieved without "*Weithören*" (the "*Fernhören*" of Furtwängler has a similar meaning), which Schenker designates as a genius ability. This intentionally directed anticipation **maintains the tension**, and unifies and connects its topography during the course of the piece through (1) self-experience of the intentional content, (2) influence on the shaping of the 'soundshape' in a performance, and (3) a re-experiencing of this soundshape, which feeds back on the intentional content of expectation, as well as on the 'direction' and intensity of anticipative imagination.

Schenker's project of deducing particularities from one common origin in the *Ursatz* is explained by an analogy to human physiology: "Immer dasselbe einfachste Urgeschehen, das in den Blutbahnen des Kunstwerkes kreist und immerwährendes Leben spendet."⁵⁷ The motto Schenker selected for his treatise (*Der Tonwille*), "*Semper idem sed non eodem modo*" (always the same, but in a different way), clearly exhibits the guiding aesthetic ideal of his conception, in apparent agreement with the cultural environment of that epoch. The original form, "*die Urform*", is the eternal form of life: it appears in the evident existence of birth and death. Between those "points" in time, organisms evoke and fulfill previously foretold or intended tracks of development. The "*Vorschau*" is *a priori*, not just a "*hellseherisch vorausempfunderer Zusammenhang*".⁵⁸

So, it is clear that composition according to these prescriptions of musicality is "essentially generative – Schenker demonstrates the force which controls the filling up of a postulated interval space and which is responsible for the movement's organic progress – in ways which are very similar to the musician making his way through the composition."⁵⁹

Schenker concludes with an exhortation to performers of music, which should be understood in light of his ideas and theoretical system: "*Singe aus dem Ganzen!*".

In his monumental analysis of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*, Schenker fragmentarily develops the preconditions for his concept of analysis for the purpose of performance⁶⁰. In the preface Schenker mentions the necessity of

acknowledging "*des Tonlebens*" (IX) as such. **Transcendentality** in regarding musical structures is a prerequisite of understanding them meaningfully and correctly ("*sinnvolle Verständnis*"). Schenker announces a planned publication, "*Die Kunst des Vortrags*" that was never completed and never appeared in print during his life⁶¹. In that treatise he intended "die Vortragsanweisungen soviel als möglich in allgemeine Grundgesetze und Regeln [zu] niederlegen" and to lay down exhaustive psychological justifications for these rules ("den Regeln überall ihre psychologische Begründung möglichst erschöpfend beizugeben").

Notation is regarded by Schenker as an outline of the intended goal, not as an indication of what means to use in order to realize this intention. The purpose of notation is, by suggesting the sound result, to achieve fictive – if not 'real' – contact with the composer. The detailed means for this purpose can be freely chosen. (XII) On this point it may be useful to keep in mind the distinction between **analytical** and **synthetical** notation, which I highlighted in previous studies. The function of an 'analytical notation' is to disclose (analyze) and define precisely what we can hear or what we can infer from what we just heard with immediate evidence; 'synthetical' notation represents the substance of the musical structures as a whole, and it defines the essentials of the main musical development of form, design and sonority (etc.) by means of **integrating** all experiential properties into the composition.

Schenker feels obliged to justify his performance instructions (and analyses) since they are not given by the composer. Furthermore, they may not appear congruent with the composer's notation: "Scheinbar befinden sich meine Vortragsanweisungen im Widerspruch mit der Schreibart Beethovens selbst, d. i. mit der Art, wie er den Inhalt aufgezeichnet hat. Doch löst sich dieser scheinbare Widerspruch, wenn ich das Wesen der Schreibart erkläre. Die Aufgabe der Schreibart ist nämlich nicht, etwa bloss, wie allgemein geglaubt und gelehrt wird, ganz bestimmte Mittel zum Zweck der Erreichung von angeblich nur durch eben diese Mittel angezeigten und erzielbaren Wirkungen dem Spieler an die Hand zu geben, vielmehr in ihm bestimmte Wirkungen a priori geistig anzuregen, wobei ihm aber die Wahl der zu ihrer Erreichung tauglichen Mittel freigestellt bleibt." So the point of departure for Schenker, once more, is the **metainterpretation of meaning in notation** ("das Wesen der Schreibart"). The role of the notation is to release certain *a priori* effects in the mind of the interpreter. Schenker explains the indeterminacy of notation as necessary, since (1) it is more correct that "sie [die Schreibart] dem Spieler völlig freie Verfügung über die Mittel gestattet", and (2) the notation "verkündigt und wünscht

Wirkungen, äussert sich aber gar nicht über die Mittel der Darstellung!"
 Notation according to Schenker is more descriptive than prescriptive.

In all, the **intentionality** of the composer's notation should be maintained, according to Schenker: "drückt z. B. ein Legatobogen zunächst bloss den Wunsch nach der Wirkung eines Legato aus, ohne aber anzugeben, auf welche Weise die letztere erzielt werden sollte, und es ist daher falsch, in Berufung oben auf die Schreibart als den angeblich authentischen Wunsch des Autors, z. B. mit einem Legatobogen zugleich auch schon die Vorstellung nur einer, und zwar ganz bestimmten Ausführung von vornherein zu verbinden."

Thus, dynamic markings and instructions in the score should, according to Schenker, be understood descriptively as intended effects, not as prescribed means: "wenn der Autor, um auch von den dynamischen Zeichen zu sprechen, z. B. ein *p* notiert, so will er damit bloss den Wunsch nach der Wirkung eines *p* ausgedrückt haben." And even if the dynamic signs ("dynamische Zeichen") "bloss dynamische Zustände anzudeuten", they still play "eine ganz eigene Rolle in bezug auch auf die Synthese, d. i. die Form [...] Sie zeigen in solchem Zusammenhang nicht nur Kadenzen, Modulationen u. dgl., sondern auch Formteile an, indem sie solche binden, auseinander treiben, dehnen, vor Zerbröckelung bewahren usw." Precisely through this relationship between dynamics and form, do those markings attain a coordinate role in transmitting the content of the work; dynamic and other **performance markings** are then not accessory, but **integrated in the form and content of the work**: "Gerade aus diesen Beziehungen von Dynamik und Form ergibt sich aber als Konsequenz, dass jene nicht etwa bloss eine willkürliche Bestimmung der Meister vorstellt, die schliesslich bei demselben Inhalt auch anders hätte lauten können [XIV], vielmehr ebenso wie der Inhalt selbst eine definitive Unabhängigkeit bedeutet!"

The tendency to "animism", or more correctly its analogy to "humanism" in a special sense, (i.e. the referring to human nature as a postulated constant), parallels the reference to "*Gesetze des Tonlebens*" which the musician "kennen muss". From this Schenker concludes 'logically' ("ergibt sich mit strengster Folgerichtigkeit") that **knowledge of the compositional laws is a priori a condition necessary for the understanding of notation**: "Unkenntnis der kompositorischen Gesetze die Einsicht in die wahre Bedeutung der Schreibart verhindert und so zugleich zur Ursache einer mangelhaften und falschen Inhaltsdarstellung werden muss!"

Schenker pretentiously directs himself to fully professional performers, and criticizes "Dilettanten und Laien" (XIX), who "weil sie eben den kausalen

Zusammenhang von Inhalt und Schreibart nicht kennen, sich so gerne just gegen den Meister in Widerspruch setzen! In ihrer Naivität berufen sie sich dabei auf die sogenannte 'Auffassung', die angeblich nur Gefühlssache sei [...]" . Thus is subjective opinion or arbitrary choice, which is sharply rejected by Schenker in favor of a superior directive for the interpreter, formulated as an ethical claim: "daraus eine Ehre zu machen, das eigene musikalische Fühlen in parallele Bahn mit dem des Meisters bringen zu lernen." This entails that Schenker appreciates the performer on the same artistic level as the composer: "in unseren grossen Meistern [...] auch die über alle bloss Reproduzierenden weit hinausragenden Vortragskünstler zu sehen."

In a way Schenker's proud declaration, that he aims to provide analytical devices as a guide for performers, was never fully carried through. Much of his text is explication of how the composer allegedly notated in order to secure an acceptable or correct rendering of his intentions. Or Schenker frequently dives into explanations of how one creates an impression of crescendo across rests in a progression (e.g. of the basses in the falling fifth sequence in measure 5–14, first movement of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*). Of interest is Schenker's reference to Wagner's "*Deutlichmachung des Melos*" as an interpretative corrective (in fact a tonalizing interpretation), in particular when applied to triads and motifs of thirds. (44–45) The instruction for measures 138–149 (64) could serve as a general ideal of Schenkerian interpretation in performance: "*die plastische Wirkung eines musikalisch-organisch völlig in sich abgeschlossenen Gedankens zu erzielen.*"

William Rothstein⁶² investigates the literary remains of Schenker available in the Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection at the University of California, including editorial, analytical and performance annotations in three different editions, in order to reconstruct a picture of Heinrich Schenker as pianistic interpreter of the Beethoven Piano Sonatas. The main sources of interest for us, however, are the incomplete manuscripts *Vom Vortrag* and *Entwurf einer 'Lehre vom Vortrag'*; however, as Rothstein states, these writings concern themselves, formally, only with performance on the piano, and they were apparently intended as preparation for Schenker's own piano performances, and, perhaps as educational material for his students⁶³; Rothstein preoccupies himself mainly with piano performance, as is shown by his considerations (4–5, 10) and conclusions (24–26) concerning Schenker's "general philosophy of performance". The basic idea, which Rothstein finds confirmed through his investigations of this and other source materials, including Schenker's own edition of the Beethoven Piano Sonatas⁶⁴, is that the "performance of a masterwork (and only

of a masterwork) is an objective and inevitable result of its *structure*." (5) In principle, it should be possible, according to Schenker, to arrive at such a performance even while disregarding the performance markings, e.g. the dynamics symbols, since "performance directions are fundamentally superfluous" and "the composition itself expresses everything that is necessary." (5)

In effect, then, performance markings, according to the Schenkerian way of thinking, should be regarded as an outcome of the work structure itself. By consequence a performance in accordance with these markings would logically become a result of the very structure that engendered the markings. But at this point an "intentional fallacy" can arise; the bare reproduction of the technical **denotations of the notes** in combination with the reproduction of the performance markings would cognitively and **intentionally** not necessarily be synonymous with reproducing an internal image derived from comprehensively understanding the **work structure**, nor would it secure the same sound result. The difference may even be decisive, and this difference regarding the subject of the reproductive act, may, in some not yet clarified way, directly or indirectly influence the listener's experience. Several channels of transmission could possibly be involved in such processes, and be responsible for subtle discriminative capabilities on the part of concert-goers, regarding recognition of, e.g., visual, gestic, mimetic or soundshape qualities.

This **objectivistic ideal of work reproduction** is the second important point in Schenker's view that Rothstein demonstrates: namely, that "all performances come from within", that they "must come from within the work" (10) and that "the work must breathe from its own lungs – from the linear progressions, neighboring tones, chromatic tones, modulations...About these, naturally, there cannot exist different interpretations." This claim of Schenker is, expressed in his dictum "No 'interpretation'!" ("*Keine 'Auffassung'!*"⁶⁵), expresses the view that "performance is the means of making audible that which is already objectively there in the work" (Rothstein, 10), and that, as Brahms stated, there should be "no individuality in relation to it [the work]", which Schenker quotes in one of his editions (*Erläuterungsausgabe*): "Wenn ich etwas von Beethoven spiele, so habe ich dem gegenüber gar keine Individualität, sondern bemühe mich, das Stück so gut wiederzugeben, wie es Beethoven vorgeschrieben, dann habe ich genug zu tun."⁶⁶ Celibidache shares Schenker's 'noninterpretational' thesis (ch. V:4).

Following Rothstein, the third point of importance confirms our observation about the way Schenker conceptualized the relation between notation and

sound; in Rothstein's words: "the composer's notation (according to Schenker) indicates only the *effects* that the composer desires; it does not specify the *means* by which the performer is to obtain those effects. In many cases the performer must actually use techniques that would appear to contradict the composer's instructions, precisely in order to obtain the effect that the composer intends."

This is not so much a realistic or sceptical distrust of the notational competence of the composer (as in the view of Celibidache), but a sequel of the consideration of the limitations of notational ontology. This means, Rothstein maintains, that "the performer may not take the composer's notation at face value and simply play everything exactly as written; neither may he assume that the structure of the work will express itself adequately without his help. Rather, he must seek those means that will communicate the structure and the affect of the work as clearly as possible." (10) Rothstein then enters into details regarding the various means of expression for piano performance, namely dynamics, rubato, articulation (especially legato), hand motions and pedaling. The reason why Schenker himself obviously intended to publish his comments on performance only in part may be, as Rothstein suggests, the Schenkerian opinion that "each performer must find his own way to the composer's intentions" (24) by doing his own analyses, which was exactly what Schenker did as a piano performer. Rothstein endeavors to determine in very common terms the general stylistic tendency of Schenker's own piano playing, based on the evidence of the remaining score annotations, which were "both clear and flexible: clear in conception and articulation, but without dryness; flexible in tempo, in rhythm, and in nuance. It was characterized by great variety of touch and of shading. It was goal-oriented playing" (25). Rothstein concludes that Schenker realized his idea of "a kind of spiritual bird's-eye view"⁶⁷.

The overriding criterion considered in the discussion on Schenker as a 'thinking performer', then, would be that of 'classical' balance, which Rothstein notices: "Thus the issue comes down, as it so often does, to one of balance: balance between the shaping of detail and the projection of the whole; between 'expression' and 'lightness': or, to put it in more theoretical terms, between the demands of the foreground and the demands of the middleground." So "balance is the central message of Schenker's work – balance not only within the realm of theory, but perhaps more fundamentally between theory and practice." (26)

III PROBLEMS AND CATEGORIES OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE

III:1 HISTORICITY VERSUS ACTUALITY IN INTERPRETATION

The notion of historicity, in view of the distinction between i–research and p–practice (ch. I:1:8), must be brought under further scrutiny. What is specifically historical can depend on several determining factors, such as (1) imperative **indications** (markings), containing precise (or semantically interpretable) meanings required by the C; (2) regional or local **traditions** required by α , either desired (intended) or enforced due to limited material resources (instruments, musicians etc); (3) unwritten or otherwise undocumented (quasi–collective 'unconscious') **conventions** appearing as the invariables of sound–shaping, i.e. specific audible and recognizable performative sound–patterns, individual obedience or conformity to a predominating ideal, or a collectively tacit agreement on it. Conventions, sometimes created for practical reasons, are more locally valid than traditions. And it may be added that (4) modern p–practice focuses on the content (not only on the structural and aesthetic aspects), cause and context, including the **extramusical** determinants of historic repertoire such as "*Affektenlehre*" (MGG 1:113–121) and "*musikalisch–rhetorische Figuren*" (MGG 4:176–182; *Riemann Musiklexikon*, Mainz 1967) as more genuine and profound bases for i than the obsolete concentration on 'pure' sound surface; meaning and significance ("*Bedeutung für den Menschen*", R. Lorkovic 2.12.93) are acknowledged, and thus enter into the realm of aesthetic consideration.

It is also fruitful to display a more systematic distinction between: (1) modes and conventions of playing, (2) the exhibiting of old forgotten sources that cast light on ancient practices and traditions, interpretive projections of either a **retrospective** or a **prospective** kind, and (3) the determinants and positions provided by aesthetic i–research.

Actuality, in a phenomenological view, refers primarily to the **now** which is our window on reality; through actuality the object appears in our consciousness. And the **now**, as the one extreme between two points connected through the distention of the 'time flow', is the time frame of our directed awareness. The distended interval between now and then, between actuality and historicity, is united only by consciousness steeped in time (the flowing phases of time cannot be arrested) and consciousness necessarily focuses on history through the existing ('living') actuality. The concept of 'memory',

however, is problematic: it mediates between our resolutions of the historic dilemma and our actual experience of now & here. How can it do that? The acts of recovering (remembering), storing and actualizing from memory always occur in the actual present. Now and then (the past) exclude each other within "a single temporal framework"¹. The **here** is the second condition for access to reality. But this condition is not primordially absolute in the same sense as the condition of 'nowness'. There exist different spaces not necessarily congruent, created by our imagination and by our different sensory modalities: (1) the **experiential** (imaginative) space, and (2) the **auditive** space (normally not congruent with the visual space) –these are relevant to our consideration.

The basic problems of **necessary actualization** (ch. I:2) and the possibility of **historical components in actual mip** have been treated in a limited way by scholars of musicological performance practice: "Performing practice", adapted from German "*Aufführungspraxis*", is defined by Howard Mayer Brown² as "the way music is and has been performed (especially as regards the relationship between the written notes and the actual sounds)." He adds that "the study of performing practice is of particular importance to the modern performer concerned with 'authentic' style" (370); in other words a certain aesthetic position, in fact, namely that of realizing an "authentic style", is already presupposed. Within this aesthetical direction the study of 'performing practice' traditions and idioms is pertinent.

Consequently, one question would be whether performance practice is relevant also to performers holding other aesthetic ideals; note that Brown does not limit the applicability of this concept to any age, or just to past times. There is also the performance practice, not so often studied academically, of contemporary music.

The problems that Brown includes within the scope of performance practice, related to and partly overlapping those pertinent to interpretation research, are the following:

(1) the ontology of musical notation, defined as a "set of instructions indicating to the performer how the composer wished his music to sound"; hence, the history of notation, especially the meaning of notation within various designative systems³, is relevant to performance practice. Since, however, "not all the elements of a performance can be fixed in writing", not even in the 20th century "when composers have taken more care than ever before to state exactly the quality and duration of each sound", different performances, even performances by the same musician cannot be guaranteed by notational

fixation to sound identically or uniformly; experience shows the contrary, that they vary in their sound appearances, regarding such qualities as tempo, phrasing, articulation and timbre (etc). Therefore, it is interesting to study the problem of:

(2) "the amount and kind of deviation from a precisely determined ideal tolerated [...] by composers." These deviations, according to Brown, depend in fact on such factors as (a) changing conventions, i.e. habit and training, (b) personal qualities, i.e. the psychological temperament of the performer, (c) the practical requirements and circumstances of the particular situation concerning the demands of the composition, style, size of the ensemble, etc. (d) the acoustics of the room, and (e) the nature of the occasion. Generally speaking, these kinds of deviations can be shown to refer, more or less closely, to certain ambiguities of notation, i.e. indeterminacies built into the system that allow performers a much cherished zone of freedom for their own more or less improvisatory creativity. The audience in particular has been given the impression that the music "is created anew each time it is heard." Brown proposes, not unopposed, in referring later to "the well-known aversion of Stravinsky towards 'wilful' interpreters of his music" (371), that "the principle that the performers should be allowed some scope to 'interpret' the notation subjectively has been challenged successfully for the first time in the 20th century, with the advent of recordings and electronic means of fixing a composition [or, I would say, interpretation or performance] in its definitive form once and for all."⁴

On the contrary, it is not clear to what extent **freedom** in performance in earlier ages, for instance before 1750, (1) was mainly intentionally **restricted** to deciphering, (2) took the form of rule-and-convention-governed amendments or (3) referred to improvisatory moments occurring within (or nearby) the frame of what was **indicated**, called for and suggested (by convention again) primarily through the notation, whereas the concept of **interpretative freedom** as a zone for gestalting, according to what emerges from the encounter between the performer and the work, was a notion that evolved gradually during the classical era, flourishing in, through and after the Romantic era. Brown acknowledges the importance of establishing "the amount of freedom allowed [to] the performer by determining which aspects of performance were not fixed on paper during a particular period." He demands a "distinction between those [1] elements of the original notation that may be misleading or confusing to a modern performer unless translated into symbols with which he is familiar," which are problems generally dealt with by editors, and [2] "those [elements of

notation] that originally had a fixed meaning which is now lost or ambiguous." Among the latter, some signs permitted but did not demand particular styles of performance, while others changed their meanings [in meaning] over the years." (370)

So, in fact, the problem is general: "Unwritten conventions make up the most difficult but also the richest category of problems of [in] performing practice", and "all players and singers must ask themselves certain basic questions about the compositions they perform [and why not also about the interpretative means, and their principal interrelations?], most of which have not been precisely answered by composers". Here Brown gives examples of some questions indicating relevant categories: (1) what is the exact [i.e. correct] tempo? (2) would alterations of the written rhythms be allowed or expected? (3) "which sonorities are best suited to the piece being played"? (4) how should each note be articulated? (5) which "melodic embellishments are permitted or forbidden within the convention in question"? (6) would the players be expected to improvise "or prepare themselves before the performance"?

The history of notation is the natural point of departure also for Hans Hoffmann in his controversial characterization of the concept of interpretation as opposed to "*Aufführungspraxis*"⁵: that interpretation is a necessary and distinct trait of music in contrast to other arts, such as architecture, painting, and poetry, all of which allegedly have no need to be interpreted. This is of course severely questionable insofar as the notion of interpretation is intertwined with that of understanding the artwork (as discussed in ch. II:1 and suggested by Hermerén *et alia*):

So if understanding art requires interpretation, then interpretation is not restricted to the performance of music. What Hoffmann hints at is the suggestion that all the other arts can be appreciated in the form that the author left the work in for his actual or presumptive audience (instating this though, hesitantly disregards dramatic theater, dance and – *mutatis mutandis* – film): we (most of us, but not all) can read poetry without missing any essential message from the author, even if a good actor is able to bring it to our mind and senses in a more lively manner, through interpretative performance. But it is doubtful whether we can rely on an actor's interpretation of poetry – that is, if we refer to 'dramatic' actors. Nor, I submit, would most poets and literary critics, unless such an actor was more than usually endowed with literary interpretive skills and theoretical knowledge. And in all the other arts to extrapolate the idea just weakly suggested by Hoffmann, there is a direct communication between audience and

author. But this is not the case in music, where the notation cannot be enjoyed by the reader as an artwork (for a contrary opinion, see Graziosi, ch. II:5). The history of notation, then, reflects the composer's will to gradually lay down more precise instructions regarding sound. Thus, interpretation has its basis and point of departure, according to Hoffmann, in the "written fixation", and thus, interpretation must respect:

(1) the explicit (imperative or prohibitive, I extrapolate) prescriptions given in the notation;

(2) the suggested function and purpose of the music, e.g. social or religious music, whether for entertainment, instruction, personal display, or for friendship, solidarity, communal spirit, or for political purposes (such as convincing or indoctrinating), or for providing a representative function or just for fun among your friends or for secluded amusement or by yourself – to expand Hoffmann's laconicity on this point. This would include the point (2d) made by Brown above, on acoustics: sacred music intended for church, romantic symphonies for the concert hall, etc.;

(3) the need to give the liveliness of inspiration to the sterility of the notation through performance;

(4) the appropriateness of selecting instruments for the piece to be performed (at this point Hoffmann recognizes various degrees of freedom);

(5) the need to determine the appropriate component of improvisation in the performance (in agreement with Brown);

(6) the need for adjustment due to changed acoustical circumstances related to original customs;

(7) the fact (and the imperative of adapting to the fact) that "*jede Zeit [hat] ihre eigene Hörfähigkeit*" (MGG 1:784); more precisely though, or even more correctly, I would say "*Hörgewohnheiten*" in order not to be obliged to prove any cognitive, physiologically-based changes in auditive capacity from a natural science perspective;

(8) the demand of knowing the "*Aufführungspraxis*", concurrently with Brown's claim that "the student of performing practice" must "investigate carefully the precise meanings of musical symbols in each period of music history and attempt to discover how they have changed over the years." The issue of reasonable demands concerning such knowledge for musicians is an educational question outside the scope of this investigation.

An attempt to contribute some points to an ontology of performance is made by Ulrich Siegele in his article "*Vortrag*"⁶: He points to the following facts:

(1) performance is integral to music, as analogous to rhetorical performance in speech;

(2) music is produced heading at ("in Hinblick auf", 21, if this indicates a kind of 'intentional causality' or 'influence') the performance of the work under a specific situation or set of circumstances: i.e., the planned conditions of and determinations for future performance of a piece essentially codetermine the production process of composition. Siegele gives the example of Haydn's having wanted to know, during the composing a piece for performance in 1768, "*die Personen*" and "*den Ort*" of the future performance of the piece he was composing. Composers who disregard performance conditions during their creative phase of composing are a late phenomenon, says Siegele – from the age of increased individuality and self-sufficiency of the cult of genius, I would add. Expanding this point, Siegele inquires what the notation means, suggesting that in the mutual coproductivity between composition and corresponding means of performance, the notation attains its decided meaning (22);

(3) the tradition of performance practice attains priority over the notation as a source for the work's performance traits, if we were to deny the **identity** of the work independent of its performances. If one were inclined to assent to this postulate, then one would have to concede that the identity of the work can be determined only in performance. This would then create the problem of finding **trenchant criteria** for unanimously determining the limits of acceptability for a performance, in order to secure the identity of such a work through its performance ("*Setzt man voraus, dass ein musikalisches Werk erst in einer Aufführung Wirklichkeit erhalte, so ist man gezwungen, die Identität des Werkes zu leugnen*", says Carl Dahlhaus to this problem?)

(4) the score is seen as a "*Faktur*", i.e. a texture of composition and "*präkonkreter Formulierung*" – logically with intentional status – in contrast to the music parts ("die Stimmen") and intabulations (of early music) which are **accommodations** for specific or even explicitly specified instruments, or even for a particular performance: i.e. "*konkretisierende Formulierung*" – with a logically real status. Siegele quotes an anecdote about Richard Wagner, who, at a rehearsal of *Die Walküre* ("*Feuerzauber*" section) encountered a recalcitrant harpist who claimed that his part was impossible to play. The alleged reply of Wagner bases itself on the purported intentionality of the composer's notation: "Sie sehen doch, was ich haben will. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die Stimme so einzurichten, dass es klingt, wie ich es mir vorstelle"⁸; moreover

(5) in an unsupported analogy to speech, Siegele uses the concept of

accomodation also in order to describe the entrance of the work into "*wechselnden Dialekten*", "*musikalische Mundarten*" which result in regional idioms within performance styles, in contrast to the international **compositional** style idiom at which Siegele points without sorting out the differences and parallelisms in relation to **interpretational** idioms⁹; more ingeniously,

(6) Siegele proposes research into the rules – however, still by using the unsupported analogy with "*die Grammatik*" of performance: "mit diesen Regeln über das schriftlich Fixierte hinaus weiter zu komponieren ins Erklingen, in den Vortrag hinein. Diese Regeln allerdings sagen nie ein einziges Notwendiges, sondern stets nur Mögliches." (22) After this introductory note, Siegele enters into his main concern, regarding

(7) **the transformation of meaning in the work through the process from historicity to actuality**: "Den Nachgeborenen muss an einem Musikstück anderes wichtig sein, als dem Komponisten wichtig war, ja, als er selbst erkennen konnte. Der Vortrag steht zwischen Historie und Aktualität." (22) In the indispensable process of assimilating historical material for the purpose of actual performance, Siegele recognizes the importance of **analysis**. Concurrently, and in concord with the thesis I advanced earlier (MIR I sc. 92, and II *passim*), the resulting **performance necessarily reflects the process of analysis**¹⁰. Consequently, if one subscribes to this statement, and if the performance displays the process of analysis in some way, this process of analysis cannot restrict itself to only historical means. This is where Siegele acknowledges an important limitation of historical performance practice. We will just give an example, below, of how these deficiencies can be successfully overcome by artistic means as they were treated by Glenn Gould¹¹.

First, though, a presentation of the argument Siegele pursues for the performer necessarily using modern means, in order not to let the piece fall apart in the interpretative reconsidering of its actual meaning in light of historical facts. Siegele seems to be willing to defend a **radical method of reinterpretation**, based on Adorno's idea of "stereophonic dissociation" (increasing divergence with time between work and its contextual implications for performance) which refers to the stringent and piercing analyses of ancient music made in the Vienna Circle by Arnold Schönberg and his students. The kind of analytical instrumentation¹² or "*Raumverteilung*" that Siegele refers to, however, can more adequately be considered an **interpretational experiment**, if not a **recomposition, rearrangement or reinstrumentation**, but it can hardly be considered a genuine interpretation that takes into account the original identity

of the work. However, this assessment is controversial; Peter Kivy and Jerold Levinson are engaged in a dispute on this issue, referred to in the latter's *Music, Art and Metaphysics*¹³;

(8) according to Siegele (22) the performance can reflect an emphasis on either the work or the listener. I agree with this distinction, and propose a more complete and closer description of **three** possible kinds of "centeredness" (i.e. the performance reflects the perspective of the composer, interpreter or listener¹⁴): "Das Recht des einen ist das Unrecht des anderen, verraten aber sind beide" (Siegele); and

(9) Siegele summarizes his concept of interpretation: "Der Vortrag zielt, ohne jemals zu treffen. Der authentische Vortrag ist Utopie. Versuch folgt auf Versuch, keine Aufführung gleicht der anderen. Es gibt nicht *eine* Art des Vortrags, nur Arten des Vortrags, kein Dogma, nur Paradigmata. Stets auf neue Erfahrung aus, ist dem Experiment die Vollendung der Perfektion versagt. Zum Leitbild des gegenwärtigen Musiklebens stellt es das notwendige Gegenbild. Bis der Versuch nichts Neues mehr einbringt denn das Verstummen." (23)

A qualified but ambivalent judgement of Glenn Gould as an interpreter of Bach on the modern piano is provided by Hermann Danuser¹⁵, who states about Gould that he "in seinem Bemühen, die Tradition zu negieren, merkwürdige, skurrile oder gelegentlich auch schlicht irrierte Wege beschreitet." (340) More objectively, Danuser explains that "Gould folgt die für aktualisierende Interpretationen im allgemein geltende Regel, dass die Neudeutung die historisch primären Eigenschaften des komponierten Tonsatzes [...] nicht antastet und ihre verändernden Massnahmen auf die zu Bachs Zeiten kompositorisch noch sekundären Eigenschaften, wie Klangfarbe (beim Klavier: Anschlag), Artikulation, Dynamik, dazu auch auf das Tempo richtet." (340) Characterizing Gould, he finds new and systematic traits within the deviations from tradition: "Goulds antisystematische Systematik [...]: der Wille nämlich, die manieristische Negation der Interpretationstradition in einer Fülle von Abweichungen zum Ausdruck zu bringen, der ein systematischer Zug auch dort eigen ist, wo phantasievolle Spontaneität das Spiel zu beherrschen scheint," which he summarizes as "antitraditionelle Eigenmächtigkeit". The crucial question in this description, concerns the formulation of **limiting criteria** for the independence of expressive means in relation to style: "Sobald sich die Klangdifferenzierung zu einem isolierten Eigenwert verselbständigt, wird der im Text angelegte musikalische Sinn nicht durch neue Mittel entfaltet und bereichert, sondern

ausgehöhlt." (344)¹⁶. This problem is further analyzed in the light of Glenn Gould's pianistic aesthetics (ch. IV:3).

The history of interpretation in the tradition of Danuser and Andrea Della Corte¹⁷ should be distinguished from the history of performance practice in its traditional musicological sense (Brown, Dart, Donington, and among its practitioners, Franz Brüggen, Nicolai Harnoncourt and Gustav Leonhardt).

So the problem with most authors' reflections about the historicity of musical performance is centered around the following question: How does one find a (the singularist would here say 'the') historical truth? And by this what is primarily meant is **the truth of music in its historical context**, which should be preceded by other principal questions: Is historical truth what we want? For what reason? From which perspectives are we to approach it? Through what means (versus ends), historical or actual? An apriorical scheme of four approach combinations is conceivable, namely: (1) **complete authentic historicity**: historic ends attained by historic means, (2) first form of correspondence between **authenticity and actuality**, and/or partial historicity: historic ends achieved by modern (actual) means for reasons of technical comfort, efficiency, or for aesthetic reasons, (3) second form of **authentic-actual correspondence**, and partial authentic historicity: actual aesthetic ends achieved by historic means, especially in cases of p with historic(al) instruments that are technically flexible and can be modulated expressively, and (4) attaining modern aesthetic ends and actual effects by means of recent expressive and instrumental (vocal, manual) techniques; the last variant maximally reduces historic relevance and is entirely interested in **actuality**.

And meant, secondarily, as the **truth of interpretation** or the **truth of interpretation in performance**: given that one accepts at least one of the rival applications of the concept of truth in this connection and takes 'truth' in some reasonable sense, even if it means regarding "true" and "false" with reference to music as metaphors, there are three ways of approaching a solution, and two "methods" that generally seem to be adapted in practice:

(1) **Externally** (to the interpreter), where the interpreter researches the remains and sources (by studying historical documents) of the determinants of the work, including its cultural roots and environment.

(2) **Internally** (to the interpreter), where the interpreter attempts to find in his interior consciousness and by means of his total cognitive and emotional faculties the meaning and expression correctly corresponding to the work, on the assumption that

(3a) human beings have a common basic structure for interior functioning (the "intersubjectivity" thesis), and (3b) that the composer succeeds in incorporating into the work an actual part of this common intersubjective structure, and symbolizes it by means of notation.

This seems to be more difficult with increasing distance from the w's age of conception. The interpreter tries to achieve a solution which he intuitively finds convincing to himself and by which this "level of conviction" can be presumed to be attained or nearly attained for the imagined or real audience also. Peter Gülke understands this problem as related to the aging of the masterworks in his articles¹⁸ and combines editorial skill with a contribution to interpretation research (e.g. regarding Furtwängler's view on Beethoven (64))¹⁹.

Historicity, then, applies not only to the musicwork, but also to the hearer; so, logically, Gülke defends the theory "die das Verhältnis zwischen dem historisch determinierten Werk und dem historisch determinierten Hörer beidseitig dialektisch begriffe." (10) The possibility of determining the means of interpretation from a compromise between "*Stiltreue*" and "*Sinntreue*", which must be found anew and separately for each work under consideration, will demand a method concerned with "eine Neubewertung der interpretatorischen Mittel." Gülke criticizes the anti-intellectualism of ordinary music practice in a harsh judgement: it is "erschreckend, mit wie geringem geistigen Anspruch die musikalische Interpretation auskommt"; and he proposes a "critical interpretation", a concept which Furtwängler used in a somewhat different sense (as the emotional immediacy of the music), which was brought out in the process of an organic and emotional logic. (10) In an effort to define interpretational faithfulness to the work ("*Werktreue*"), Gülke declares that such an interpretation "bezieht sich auf das Werk als fixen Punkt", but adds, in reference to Stokowski's free adaptations ("*Bearbeitungen*") of Bach works, that there should be an **ethics of interpretation** for judging of the value of such versions. In such an evaluation, one must recognize not only the distance of an interpretational version from the original, but also the **kind of deviation and its direction** away from the original: "beurteilt man Bearbeitungen nur nach ihrem Abstand von Original und nicht nach der Art und Weise, in der sie jenen Veränderungen Rechnung tragen" (9). Gülke also recognizes that "corrections" of the original may be necessary to achieve an authentic effect, and presupposes that the effect initially intended by the composer on his contemporary audience should be a governing force for the "*Einrichtung*" of the score in modern performance.

This is the aim of **restoring the original effect**, if such a goal is attainable

and desirable for some reason, which can be questioned on the grounds that conditions and circumstances for the listeners of today are changed; it may be difficult or impossible to achieve such a goal, and even more difficult to prove that a certain interpretation has the same effect on our public as it once had on the original one, should that for some reason be intended.

However, one can argue that the intended effect on the part of the composer has *a priori* nothing to do with the 'factual' effect the piece had on its audience at the first performance. But this would mean that the composer would likely become isolated by his own imagination of the effect of the piece that he writes, if this were not later corrected by means of feedback from his encounter with the audience's response. Moreover, it would be difficult, logically, to identify completely composers' unrealistic hopes of success that never occur in reality due to deficiencies in the mental and musical capacity of the audience. A measuring of the "author's intention" would thus be impossible, since it is inaccessible without open communication. Simultaneously, one must entertain the possibility that composers are ahead of their time, writing in a mode not yet comprehensible by the common listener; such a piece must not be devalued on insufficient grounds; room must be left over for further discoveries by more trained or careful listeners. This is the strategy of postponed judgement. And, since listening is a directed act – a "listening-for" depending on cultural concepts – it is possible that a future time may yet develop more appropriate modes of listening to a piece thus constituted by its composer in his hope of foreseeing this development. For the art of interpretation, and for critics, this possibility provides a challenge, since a good interpretation could be defined as the one performance that bridges the gap of understanding between composer and listener.

Gülke contends that "die überlieferten musikalischen Texte nicht einfach als Konstanten angesehen werden können: Die Wandlungen des musikalischen Hörens verwehren ihnen, weiterhin den ursprünglich intendierten Sinn zu erfüllen" and "das Koordinatensystem einer bestimmten musikalischen Erfahrungswelt in das der Musiker sie komponierend eintrug, hat seine Masse verändert und damit neue Relationen entstehen lassen." The romantic interpreters recognized the necessity of transmission, and understood that the ancient works were alien to this world and therefore needed a "translator". The faithfulness-centered interpreters aiming at "*Werktreue*", on the other hand, recognized that the methods of interpretation were historically relative, but they were wrong in not understanding that realizing works from past ages

required an intermediary.

In his article *Interpretation und die Wandlungen des musikalischen Hörens*²⁰ Gülke arrives at an assessment of the role of musicology in providing assistance for this mediating process. He states that musicology "die musikalische Interpretation als ästhetisches Problem bislang kaum anerkannte und lediglich Teilfragen wie z.B. historische Aufführungspraxis behandelte", but that "die Grundvoraussetzungen der ersigen Diskussion interpretatorischer Fragen ungeprüft [blieben]." He speculates about the reason for this deficiency. The ever-changing relation between different notational systems and performance practices could on the one hand have given the impression that the free room for interpreting was completely subjective and could not become subject to scientific or "*geisteswissenschaftliche*" investigation.

On the other hand, this room for interpretational freedom may have been reduced by musicological research, insofar as the findings of performance practice are taken as irrefutable demands for submission to documented historical rules of performance style: the justification for the aesthetic discussion of interpretational issues thus becomes limited. The roots of the more markedly aesthetic discourse are traced by Gülke back to the Romantic era, during which "die Präzisierung der interpretatorischen Aufgaben" continues "zugleich aber auch bestimmte interpretative Momente in der Partitur integriert."

The **changing conditions for listening** are, in Gülke's view, the main reason for the need of **actualizing interpretation**: "übermorgen werden die Intentionen des Komponisten das Ohr des Hörers nicht mehr voll erreichen, wird das Stück zwar in der Materialität des Klages. nicht aber mehr in den beabsichtigten Wirkungen auf den Hörer zu reproduzieren sein." (488) Interpretations which attempt to realize such a "Mechanismus von Wirkungen sieht sich vor einer schier unlösbaren Aufgabe." The core of Gülke's idea is to require independent support for the **intended effect governing interpretation**. If the interpreter disregards the problem of how effects change over time, he will contribute to "*Verfälschung der Werke*"; concurrently Gülke criticizes the art of interpretation guided by **unitarianism** and overriding **organicistic** analogies promoted by the romantically rooted German masterconductors, notably Furtwängler: "wenn sie das Problem übersieht und die Anpassung an bestimmte klischeehafte Wunschbilder unseres musikalischen Hörens betreibt und, beispielsweise dem Dogma vom 'organischen' Wuchs der Werke folgend, ihnen dort die organische biegsam kontinuierliche Linie zu geben bestrebt ist." (488)

Gülke in effect suggests two contrary tendencies of interpretation, the **romantic** (or even, more subjectively, the **romanticizing**) and the **authentic** (or, if such an interpretation is rejected as impossible, the **authenticating**), each of which can be exemplified:

Hans von Bülow expounds his view of an essential synthesis of hermeneutical content **intro-pretation** (ch. I:2) and structural observations as an allegedly correct understanding of the work. He freely recreates the score as an impressive conductor of his time, and his performing style can be viewed in light of the 'rise of the [19th century] virtouso conductor as the inspired interpreter of a composer's score, either his own (Berlioz, Liszt, Wagner and Mahler) or others' (Hans von Bülow and Felix Weingartner).²¹ Both in practice and in theory he aims at **promoting the work** through all available means, sans feeling, restricted only by the composer's precise markings. His self-reliance is sufficient cause for his feeling justified in amending the composer's score²².

In contrast, Georg Kulenkampff's point of departure is his "*unreflektierte Spielfreude*" and concession to "*Unantastbarkeit des Urtextes*". From these ideals, the violinist gradually approaches an inner feeling of maturity and through secure knowledge, finally attains a level of creative communication of communally shared human expression: "Nur ein langsames inneres Wachstum aber kannein noch so grossen 'Können' in die Sphäre schöpferischer Interpretation und zwingenden Lebensausdrucks erheben."²³

The influential and originally uncompromising **authentic reconstructionism** of Rudolf Kolisch was first presented in two much-quoted articles²⁴, and his works on performance practice, in particular on authenticity of tempo-rendering according to Beethoven's scores and metronome markings, were finally collected by Regina Busch, Károly Csipák and Reinhard Kapp²⁵. The technical details of performance practice in regard to the **tempo designation**, and compelling interpretation of metronome indications, cannot be the subject of this investigation; more relevant, though, is the question: What aesthetical ideals correspond to Kolisch's stance?

More recently, in *Violinspiel und Violinmusik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*²⁶, Kolisch criticizes the prevalent ideal of string playing: "Der deutlichste Ausdruck dieses Credo ist das Ideal, welches die Priester dieser Religion auf ihren Altar gestellt haben: *der schöne Ton*. [178] Dieser nun ist eine aussermusikalische, ästhetisch undefinierbare Kategorie. Aussermusikalisch in dem Sinn, dass ja kein Werk in der Kunstmusik je für schönen Ton geschrieben wurde, undefinierbar, da er ein rein *subjektives* Element ist. Infolge der überragenden

Rolle, welche dieses subjektiv-sensualistische, musikalisch indifferente Moment im pädagogischen Spektrum und von da aus im Bewusstsein des Geigers einnimmt, ersetzt es alle legitimen, dynamisch-expressiven Momente der Musiksprache. Unter der Ägide des schönen Tons vollzieht sich musikalische Reproduktion jenseits ihrer eigentlichen Aufgabe, der Enthüllung von Konstruktion [**disclosure of compositional construction**], lediglich als Kult des Schönen." (179; *Religion der Streicher*)

The intervention into historically false performance traditions by Kolisch became a project of reformation (presented as *Restitutio Musicae* by Heinz-Klaus Metzger²⁷, and ending up in a pretentiously dogmatic insistence on the uniformity of **tempo choices** considered to be extremely fast in comparison to the consensus of the contemporary performance tradition, insisting on a literally correct relation to score markings by a master increasingly hard of hearing (Beethoven) which proceeded according to the **principle of authenticity** only, supported by the findings and analyses of Kolisch, which include a meticulously related typology of characters in Beethoven's oeuvre.

Gülke acknowledges these "exzellenten Untersuchungen [von] Relationen zwischen Tempi und musikalischen Charakteren, die zur Temponahme wie zur musikalischen Stilistik von Werken, in denen 'wir...beynahe keine tempi ordinari mehr haben' (Beethoven), gleichermassen Wichtiges beitragen."²⁸

But Gülke, who is also an experienced conductor, feels himself obliged to defend the **artistic point of view**, by saying that "hier sind [...] andere Kriterien im Spiel, gewiss teilweise schwerer definierbare als das Tempo." Still, the investigations of Kolisch provide "in der Frage der Tempowahl solide Anhalte".

In the view of Gülke, the **performance history and tradition of the work** attains an independent status as an aesthetic norm through the long-lasting effects it has on **listeners' reception and memory as a point of reference for actual performance**: "Wie vermittelt auch immer, wenn wir Beethoven spielen und hören, klingt auch das mit, was die Deutung von mehr als sechs Generationen seiner Musik zugetragen, was sie an ihr als besonders wichtig genommen hat." So the history of the work forms expectations on the part of the listener that, artistically, may not be disregarded, according to Gülke, who also expounds this idea as "*Prägung durch vielfältige Hörerfahrungen*". This in effect may not contradict a parallel notion implicit in Celibidache's overriding 'artistic' criteria, which require as a condition for acceptable performance an **auditive comprehension of the structure of the work** from the listener's, i.e. primarily from the conductor's vantage point.

Gülke concludes that his claim will justify the choice of slower tempi, as will also the assimilation of competing music after Beethoven. So late music has a 'reflective' effect on earlier music, changing the conditions for its assimilation by contemporary listeners. And provided with an **interpretation concept** that takes notice of the **listener's comprehension**, the interpretation will change according to the changes other composers have made between Beethoven's and our own time.

Now, the more recent and practical aesthetics of Kolisch can be drawn from his debate with René Leibowitz, edited by Regina Busch, Károly Csipák and Reinhard Kapp²⁹, who preface the discussion with an introductory remark: "Wenngleich niemals schulebildend, hat er doch eine gewisse, zum Teil verborgene, theoretische und praktische Wirkung ausgeübt, nicht zuletzt durch das Verdienst Theodor W. Adornos". And this interview allegedly presents concretely the "*Aufführungstheorie*" of Kolisch: "Es dürfte deutlich werden, in welchem Ausmass Analyse, wenn sie hier auch selbst nicht expliziert wird, von der Interpretation vorausgesetzt werden muss [...] René Leibowitz ist vielleicht der einzige Musiker [hinting at Leibowitz as a conductor of Beethoven Symphonies] gewesen, der aus Kolischs Lehre praktische Konsequenzen gezogen hat."

Leibowitz arrives at three principles from his experience with the Kolisch string quartet: that

(1) "technische Anforderungen [...] nur ein praktisches Korrelat des geistig-kompositorischen Inhalts der musikalischen Werke darstellt" (149); and

(2) "die Darstellung eines musikalischen Werkes nur eins bedeuten kann, nämlich die Realisierung der Intentionen des Komponisten". He obviously disregards the intentions logically necessary on the part of the performer. These performers' intentions may be congruent with that of the composer, and this seems to be what Leibowitz vaguely suggests. Furthermore, such a performance essentially should be

(3) "authentische Wiedergabe der musikalischen Gestalten und Charaktere." Kolisch formulates his primary problem, namely that: "das Werk Beethovens in das Bewusstsein des rezipierenden Publikums in entstellter Form eingegangen ist". The romanticization of a Beethoven performance is a false tradition, because it takes into account only the 'expressive' side of his music, but disregards the decisive imposingly structural substance of the work. The technical means of instrumentalists have developed since the days of Beethoven (who according to Kolisch notated **phrases**, not bowing, 153), and

have reached a level at which his works can now finally be realized: "sollten Beethovens Texte unabhängig von der Tradition und sogar gegen sie aufs neu gelesen werden" (149), Kolisch argues.

Through "*radikale Anschauung*" Kolisch aims to achieve an interpretation which brings out completely the innovative aspect in Beethoven's music, which, Kolisch contends, is not lost through history.

But Kolisch's goal encompasses more than the interpretation of the work-immanent intention or the composer's intention supported by biographical evidence. He also works towards an **interpretation of what such concepts as "tradition" and "history" mean to us**, as well as of the work in light of how we conceive of these notions.

Then, Kolisch aims at **authenticity of tempi** through his precise knowledge after careful studies of the original metronome markings in their context. After distinguishing between subjective and objective categories he studies the significance of the tempo category and concludes from empirical indications "*dass Tempo eine objektive Kategorie ist und einen integralen Bestandteil seiner musikalischen Idee bildet*". On the other hand tempo is also an essential "element" in the **interpretation of character**, so according to Kolisch it can be confirmed about music by Beethoven that "*zu jedem seiner Charaktere gehört ein bestimmtes Tempo*". Kolisch endeavors to elaborate a **typology of character** (mentioned above), concretized in specific figures by which Beethoven allegedly enriched the musical vocabulary of his age. Beethoven exceeded the traditional four "*tempi ordinari*" of his and earlier times. This is the justification for the **innovative interpretation** that Kolisch wants to hear. Leibowitz agrees with most of Kolisch's doctrines, but warns against excessive **rubato**, especially in solo concertos (apparently a remark related more to bad performance habits than to Kolisch's ideas!), and yet, nonetheless, somewhat ambiguously recognizes rubato as the carrier of the 'subjective category' in musical performance. (15)

The legitimacy of **actuality** is the last and decisive factor in performance for live listeners, consequent of the necessity of the performance and its simultaneous hearing in the **now**, the necessity of the listener being present and "his" work occurring at the moment when it must take place. Obviously, the gestalting of the soundshape of the work-in-performance takes place in the now of the performer and "his" work. Thus, one might conclude that the crucial proof of simultaneity between the listener's **now** and the performer's **now** can be disregarded. (Schenker ch. II:7)

III:2 AUTHENTICITY AND EXPRESSIVITY IN MUSICAL INTERPRETATION: EXPRESSIVITY AS THE WILL OF THE INTERPRETER IN INTERPRETATION VERSUS AUTHENTICITY AS FAITHFULNESS; COMPLIANCE TO THE ORIGINAL INTENTION OF THE COMPOSER VERSUS THE PERFORMER'S AWARENESS OF HIS INTERPRETIVE INVOLVEMENT

1. AUTHENTICITY VERSUS EXPRESSIVITY

What is authenticity? The concept can be explicated as genuineness, a pure realization of the composer's conception of his work. If it is presupposed that the music-work has an existence and identity of its own, "the work itself" may be said to have a *w*-authenticity. In a more general sense 'authentic' can denote something that is what it appears to be, which, when applied to music among the performing arts, implies the interpreter's 'demonstration of what a music work is by paying it (or the *C*'s intention) full respect'. If authenticity means recreating the work by fully respecting the composer's intention, the interpreter must restrict himself to identification with the composer's presumed intention or with the intention thought to be layed down in the work. In this case, especially, due to the lack of fixed source materials or documentation, the problem of access to intentional phenomena is pertinent. This is why the application of consciously reflected systems of *i* may be necessary to justify a $p(i(w))$.

What is expressivity? It has to do with connecting the emotional atmosphere created by a continuum of 'cognitive' qualities, including the qualities of motion and feeling that permeate the performance. In a way it is a **personalization** and **individualization** of the work through performance, since only a person is supposed to be capable of (and this can be expressed through his actions) such subtle and differentiated cognitive acts.

What is the relation between authenticity and expressivity? It is clear that there is a congruence-incongruence relation between these notions. I can conceive of several situations, each of which gives a different answer to this question. The two concepts—authenticity and expressivity—can be contradictory, in which case there is no possibility for the interpreter's identification with the work; the interpreter cannot reach the *w* and its expressive realm lies outside the interpreter's imagination. It is no longer possible for such a performer to interpret the work. It is possible that some qualities of the *w* are contradictory or just incompatible, while others are complementary in various ways, e.g. by

strengthening or weakening its predominant quality or forming ambiguous expressive complexes of mutually incongruent emotional and motional atmospheres. To describe the parameters of empirical positions of human emotion and their various combinations, however, is the task of cognitive psychology. Interesting work is being done in this area, as referred to by Alf Gabrielsson and others in John A. Sloboda's anthology³⁰ in which some of the contributions deal with performance; and the subject is approached from various perspectives in the literature³¹ on this topic, most of which lie outside the focus of philosophical aesthetics and interpretation research.

The thesis I argue for in this chapter is that **authenticity**, defined as the exact quality and quantity of expression, **originally relevant** to or **immanent** in (by some decoding principle) the **w**, is necessarily required; it is a necessary means to secure the identity of **w**. Authenticity, however, requires the interpreter's **identificative embodiment** of the **w**. The search for authenticity is fundamentally an **extrapretation** from the work: this is an assimilative cognitive mode where the **w** impinges its properties upon the conscious–now of the beholder.

Authenticity is **complementarily** related to expressivity, because emotional identification is required to endow to the work with liveliness in its performance.

Full authenticity is impossible in performance; we cannot secure the **original identity & expression** of the **w** due to the relation that occurs through restricted access to (1) the **w**–identity and (2) the interpretative devices at hand in the performance. This gives a map which includes areas of incomplete, partial and full authenticity due to the varying degrees of congruency. The **equation of authenticity to the work's notational context** of information is **problematic**: what the notation represents (α_n) is by no means fixed once and for all. The composer may have codified his intentions (imaginative considerations) directly in the notation, as he **conceived** of it as a designative system: a system which, in this case, must be conformable to his imaginative considerations. Or the composer may have tested his ideas on his instrument and **then** codified the sound as he **perceived** it by notation: a case of real sound codification.

So, evidently, notation may represent different cognitive modes: conception or perception. This difference may be essential in the interpretation of notation, $i(n)$.

I will now analyze the evidence for authenticity (and then expressivity) as a decisive category of musical interpretation, and illuminate the positions related to its notion.

In his collection of thirty years of essays on musical interpretation in performance, *Le compositeur et son double*³², conductor and theorist René Leibowitz explicates under the chapter title of "Théorie et praxis" (13–81) his main notions of **authenticity, radical reading and praxis**. The notion of authenticity is illuminated in a specific way, connected to phenomenology via M. Merleau-Ponty³³ and Jean-Paul Sartre and inspired by observations of conductors, notably Pierre Monteux, Toscanini, Klemperer, Knappertsbusch and Fritz Busch. Leibowitz goes into great detail about the **orchestral retouching** of the symphonies by Schumann and Beethoven, and demonstrates its artistic necessity and logical justification according to the practical procedures of Wagner, Bülow and Mahler. Such contrary aesthetics as Busoni's radical innovation in paraphrasing for piano Bach's *Chaconne* for Violin (92–96) and Rudolf Kolisch's investigation procedures regarding tempo and character (adapted to Schubert symphonies, 138–140), as well as his eloquence in the performance of Schönberg's Violin Concerto (220), are analysed.

Leibowitz's point of departure, though, is the **ontology of the musicwork**. He asks what an **authentic** interpretation could be, apparently presupposing its desirability, and considers the inadequacy of the Toscanini formula of 'not playing anything that is not in the score': "imaginons [...] que deux interprètes aient la même attitude scrupuleuse à l'égard du texte musical et qu'ils s'efforcent tous deux d'en donner l'interprétation le plus exacte possible" (15). Their competition will inevitably, says Leibowitz, result in two different interpretations, and "à ce niveau, l'affirmation 'ne jouer que ce qu'il y a dans la partition' n'a presque plus de sens." In effect, then, Leibowitz **rejects notational 'restrictionism'** as a solution to the required authenticity, and advances the formulation of his problem: "si deux interprètes de valeur et de probité égales peuvent donner de la même partition des interprétations ne fussent-elles que très peu dissemblables, on en arrive à se demander si cette partition possède une vérité 'en soi', ou si, au contraire, elle fournit à chaque interprète une vérité différente?" So the fact that differing interpretations emerge from identical scores, calls into question the stability and rootedness of (or even the existence of a definite truth in) the work, the ontology of which becomes doubtful. This problem of **apparently identical interpretative intentions with diverging outcomes** explains the reason for Leibowitz's ontological discourse. He relates the idea, allegedly stated by Sartre, that the music work is situated not only outside time and space, but even outside reality ("hors du réel") and outside existence, whereas the execution of the work, which is situated in time and space, is an **analogon** to the work. Consequently,

the work "*n'existe pour personne*" (Leibowitz, 15) until it is executed, and it is only the execution of the work that makes it exist for both interpreter and audience. Since it follows that the work is **imaginary** ("*un imaginaire*", 16), Leibowitz deduces from the fact of his contact with it that "le fait que je la saisis, l'appréhende, la comprends", that the work is only realizable through the process of **imagining consciousness** ("*conscience imageante*").

But this does not mean that the work is whatever the interpreter imagines, which would be a degeneration into loose arbitrariness, since the work possesses its determinants of form, structure, duration, nuances and other constituents: "imaginer 'n'importe quoi', puisqu'elle ne peut se faire *qu'à partir de l'oeuvre*, c'est-à-dire que je la quitte, je la laisse échapper, je la perds": So the work is only what the interpreter imagines it to be in the sense of, or to the extent that it is "*l'objet visé intentionnellement par ma conscience imageante*". In sum, then, the work is an **intentional object**, which was also the conclusion of Roman Ingarden.

This object, though, is a **particular** work which Leibowitz distinguishes and gives a defined sense apart from composition in general, for instance of a symphony: "quel'imagination du compositeur a créées et cordonnées, et qu'il a doté, de plus, d'un sens précis qui est justement celui qui se dévoile à moi lors de l'acte intentionnel de ma conscience, au moment même où cet acte vise l'objet."

Leibowitz proceeds in inferring his conclusions, supporting his **modified authenticity**, namely by stating that: (1) there cannot be a multitude of different truths in one and the same score for various interpreters or listeners, since this score is unique due to the unique creative act that conceived it; and (2) its sense and constituents provide the **stimuli** for the interpreter's imagining consciousness – i.e., as Leibowitz explains, "ce à partir de quoi ma conscience imageante entre en action, s'exerce, se réalise." The interpreter makes the work exist for himself and for others by imagining it. And he is able to disclose the work because it discloses itself to him, and because, claims Leibowitz, the **work discloses its interpreter**.

In considering the notion of 'playing what the work is' ("*joue ce qu'elle est*", 17), Leibowitz is forced to introduce an aspect of **evaluation**, by stating that **only a good execution of a work signifies exactly that the interpreter plays what is in the score**. This implies that an interpreter who illegitimately transgresses the limits of freedom does not change the sense of the work, but his rendering of it is not **authentic**. This is where authenticity becomes essential within a modern performance aesthetics intended to secure the artistic quality of performance.

So, to the extent that the execution is an **analogon** to the work, the interpreter is also an analogon to the composer. The interpreter's function consists essentially in a "prise de conscience authentique du sens de l'oeuvre [...] dans un acte de complète probité artistique à l'égard de ce sens", and "ayant pénétré ce sens, il se substitue en quelque sorte – pour la durée de l'exécution – au compositeur lui-même." At this very moment the interpreter attains the role of analogon, i.e. he becomes, as suggested in the title of Leibowitz' book, the composer's "double".

2. EXPRESSIVITY

Peter Kivy distinguishes (1) historical from (2) personal authenticity: 1 may be constituted by reference to (1:1) authorization, (1:2) reproduction of sound or (1:3) the performance practice of the period, whereas 2, the personal authenticity to which the expression of some emotion must be ascribed, truly emanates from the artist. "Personal authenticity" in Kivy's sense refers to a performance that (1) is not a "deviative imitation", and that (2) "bears the stamp of the artist's personality": it is a "unique product of the artist" and has both (1) personal style and (2) originality. Kivy states, following his lectures in Lund and Uppsala (13.5.93 and 4&6.5.93)³⁴, that performers, all artists who produce artworks, are originally creative; this raises the question of the ontology of the work. With one w and two performances (products) p1 and p2, Kivy asks: do we have three w:s? Kivy claims that historical authenticity and personal authenticity are incompatible in the sense of being two entirely **separate projects** on which the performer can embark. If performers are artists producing artworks the question arises of what it is performers put into their p.

However, if the performer through the interpretation process, which cannot be disregarded, expresses only that which emanates from himself, there is no guarantee of preserving the w: the required condition is that the expression of i be **congruent** with the expression of w. Since the work is the meeting point between its two aspects of authenticity (artistic–personal versus compositional), carried in the form of contextually dependent qualities, and actualized by the congruent identification of performers, the two kinds of authenticity, I submit, are not *a priori* incompatible.

It is true, I concede, that it is very unlikely that the performer will arrive at the same sound sequence as 'the original' one at the first performance, but it is not logically impossible; it may happen. Nonetheless, this cannot be held to be an aesthetically and artistically satisfying goal. Kivy himself mentions other

definitions of historical authenticity: the composer's intention and the practice of the period (they are possible points of reference), the authenticity of sound, in most cases and taken as a model pattern, is not known, and there is generally no original sound model to compare with (exceptions of recorded first performances by composers as performers do occur); hence there is nothing real for the **personal authenticity** to be incompatible with.

Clearly, **historical authenticity** in the sense of a definite soundshape of a past *p*, can be assumed only exceptionally to attain the precision in rendering a work demanded by composers, who, in ancient days, often complained about bad circumstances for and obstacles to work-instantiation. It should be added that there are other kinds of 'historical' intentions to try to relate to, even if access to them is normally restricted; composers could have (1) a precise **auditive imagining** of their *w*, but then they would leave us sound remains in form of prototypical **recordings** as the 'original model' for another performer to consider, not notational scores as their musical remains. Most composers still seem to prefer to write scores, although non-notated electronic (electro-acoustic), 'computer-program-coded' music and performing composers do exist; the *w*-concept can be held by these composers in the form of (2) certain basic structures or (3) as auditive images with a **latitude of sound variance**. Furthermore (4) the composer may consider the conventional **notation** as something which represents and corresponds to just the kind of structural imaginings & *w*-concepts that he needs in order to express what he wants.

Composers may presume and allow that performers realize congruent (but not the identical) emotional expressions within this relation, within the indicated/intimated emotional world of the work; a performer then violates the *w* only if the performer's realized *p*-'world' is incompatible with the *w*-'world'. This raises the crucial question: Whose 'world' is the *w*-'world'? The idea is evidently that the *w*-world, in principle, can be **shared** by the composer and performer.

I claim that the *i* process cannot be disregarded; the process explains the result. The outcome of the interpretive process can develop in either diverging or converging directions; and the result can be either convergent in or divergent from the *w*. But through the P:s' **personal identifications** with the postulated expression of the *w*, by the process of **assimilation**, the P may be able to bring his view of *w* into congruence with the works' inherent qualities. A careful study of the P:s' intentional acts is therefore desirable.

Kivy acknowledges the possibility that composers may have intended

that the P:s explore their personal authenticities, that composers might not want to control the outcome to the utmost detail, that they could have intended a freedom of variability **in order to** allow for personal identification of the P:s and their **human imprint** in the soundshape-rendering of the w.

It is true, as Kivy concludes, that the ideal of historical authenticity would force p:s to "collapse into text", and that it would consequently end up in a kind of pedantic archeological reconstruction. Furthermore, a **reduplication of an historically authentic soundshape** *per se* is uninteresting. Moreover, the interesting question about p:s concerns the possibility they may allow for **listeners** to identify, recognize and reexperience certain emotional states associated with the characteristics of sound, imprinted in the gestalts of the soundshapes.

The ontological problem of distinguishing p-versions from c-works is in practice not very disturbing. The risk of the slippery-slope fallacy between the individual constituents of the tripartite relation performance-arrangement-composition is a problem that can be solved through reference to a **constant basic c-structure** (w-, w(c)-structure). Kivy makes a fruitful distinction between (1) 'showing how things go' by bringing them into being (actualizing p), and (2) 'telling us how things should go': this is done by an i (T-i) that "informs us how things go". Kivy assigns a prominent indispensable role for i, but does not enter into its ontology.

In the debate on his seminal article *Orchestrating Platonism*³⁵ Kivy argues that the fact that a performance is **recognizable** (as to what work it renders), despite the possible ignoring of original or "conventionally assigned instrumentation", does not mean that it is "ideally authentic" (148). Davies demands of Kivy that he be able to show that "a performance is no less authentic for ignoring a work's specified [...] instrumentation" and that "changes in instrumentation do not affect the accuracy of a given performance". But this criticism of Kivy *in nuce* sees the work identity as constituted by the basic tonal structure of the composition. Only in exceptional cases in the canon was this the fact; only lately, during the Romantic era, for instrumental works, were qualities of timbre structurally integrated into the composition. There is no general answer to the question of 'how it is'; only a musicological w-analysis that determines the limits of the c-structure, and the degree of involvement and interpretation of timbre in the w, can settle this issue.

The age-old idea of **vocal singing** as that which naturally brings out the quality of **inner expression** can be traced back to ancient times; the idea of

mimesis could be applied as the justification for instrumental music, which was not as easily explained. The instrumental performer could imitate the vocal character of sound and thereby attain a secondary form of **vocal expression** that was commonly considered to be more directly understood. Through the ages this idea prevailed. Johann Mattheson (1681–1764), to whom Kivy dedicated a study³⁶, writes in 1739 in his *Der vollkommene Capellmeister*³⁷: "he who wants to compose or play something well on instruments would necessarily have to *understand* the art of singing". So understanding the **vocal art** is a prerequisite for the successful instrumentalist.

In 1979, in an interview, Isaac Stern confirmed the essence of exactly this quality in performing the Brahms *Violin Concerto*. I argue therefore that certain essential qualities of musical performance are **not** historically epoch-bound, but depend on the fundamental relation between (and capabilities of) the participants in the 'musical encounter' of a performance: "Everything that Brahms wrote has to do with song – yes. But not a particular song. Brahms uses the violin as he uses the voice" (MIR III:186). This inwardly quietly singing quality is also a means of creating intensity without much volume in the interpretational concept of Antal Dorati (ch. VI:3 et MIR III:126–136).

In an interview in *The New Yorker* (5.6.65; 49–117) Isaac Stern points to two main problems for the performer, namely the risk of either (1) **overinterpreting**, or on the contrary, of (2) **unduly disregarding the discarded alternatives** of interpretation. It is a self-evident (but still an important) observation that one chosen interpretation in a **specific performance** entails the (explicit or implicit) refutation of all the others, discarded for various reasons alternatives. In view of the risk of overinterpretation, this is a pertinent problem, since overinterpretation can be defined as the inappropriate application of the available means of expression. Most commonly, musicians in our time are taught to apply critically such means as **rubato, agogics, dynamic accent, and intonational deviation**, since their **excessive application** is considered a violation of certain rules of aesthetic decency and appropriateness of style.

The justification for limiting expressiveness in musical performance varies in accordance with the general guiding ideal of interpretation embraced by the judge. Simultaneously, musicians require "space" (in both the physical and metaphorical sense) for their elaborative action of demonstrating the work to their audience or to themselves as listeners in a feedback–corrective circle during preparative rehearsal (and for some musicians who regard themselves as the first and foremost listener, even at a recital or public concert

or performance). Isaac Stern argues: "The worst crime is to play notes instead of making music. Playing the violin must be like making love – all or nothing [...]. There can be no real performance without **inner tension**, and every man must find his own way of **resolving this tension**." (my emphasis; 58)

The **interplay of emotional identification and intellectual analysis** seems ambiguously and complexly intertwined in some cases: "I never play instinctively. It's a more dangerous way to live, but it's infinitely more rewarding [...]. The thinking performer constantly faces all the possible dangers. His mind sees more than the mind of the unthinking performer."

The danger would be for the interpreter to see more than there is in the work, i.e. to overinterpret it by means of instinctive musicality. Obviously Stern feels that this way is both insufficient and wrong (MIR III:183–197, our interview 24.1.79 plus analysis).

And consequently, in search of a method, he feels interested in "what makes it possible for one human being to make music". (184)

Among the **expressive means**, Stern discusses **vibrato** (MIR I:65–67), which "is one of the most poignant weapons the violinist has. The vibrato is not a standard – when you hear it it is too early or too late. You must never notice when it's [not] there, and it must change all the time as your voice changes, as you speak." (185) If a vibrato is "applied" (**on**) to the music, it will be experienced as something separate from it; it is then already an overinterpretation. The expressive means must not appear to be applied, an imposed restriction which Stern also postulates in regard to the prohibited overinterpretation by performers' in duplicating *ritardando* on Brahms already composed rhythmometrical *ritardandi* (MIR III:186).

Insofar as no rules can be given for the appropriate use of vibrato and other similar elaborative devices, the **expressive means are subjective**, according to Stern: "What does red mean to you, or black, or brown – or beer or coffee, or salt or pepper, or onion – they mean different things to every person. These are accents, colors – you must learn to use them in your own way – some people like more, some less, some see the combinations in different ways. There is no answer – this is a question of knowledge and of taste. And of searching constantly for more and more variety of color. There are no simple rules. One of the rules is that there are no answers. There is always a search, always a little step." (187)

Stern gives an image of a constant **testing and adjusting** of interpretive means according to **personal taste** and the result is **sensitive listening** with an

aim to adjust personal expressivity: "Do you know what the one secret is, for me? Ears, to listen, to learn to listen, to know what the difference is between one way and another [...] There are many possibilities, but each one is a little different, but you must hear, you must know and you must feel: How do you create all those differences?" (188) and: "the main thing is to make the result – *convincing*: A person who listens [...] says: He knows what he wants to say and I understand. That's the only way to do it."

So Stern relies on '**auditive judgement**' (if this is not a *contradictio in adjecto*), but he does not logically explain the disjunction between the **listeners' judgement**, on which he relies, and that of his own judgement, i.e. the **musician's judgement based on auditive taste**. Inquiring about the possible connection between aesthetic or ethical ideals and their corresponding results in expressive means such as rubato, Isaac Stern insists that "there is a generally accepted **limit to taste** beyond which – if you go – it's really bad taste. Now, what you do within that limit is a whole world. So first you have to learn the limit – you have to learn the **construction** of the music, [its] general principles. And the other you can't play. It could be described – but I don't think anyone ever can explain it." (188–189; MIR I:256, 259)

For Antal Dorati (MIR III:130–131), **intensity** is not the same as expression, but it **includes expression**: "Intensity is **presence**." And Dorati recognizes the need for further operative definitions of "expression": "Sentiment is for example not always the same as expression [...] expression can mean many things. When I say 'espressivo' it can be joyful, it can be sad, it can be passionate, it can be angry, it can be mournful; that is all expression. If a composer writes down *espressivo* he leaves a great margin to the performer as to what he wants to express." (131)

So expression, in the view of Dorati, is an overriding concept under which the **creation of different musical characteristics** ('qualities') can be subsumed; relevant interpretative means, such as articulation, dynamics, rubato, vibrato and *espressivo*, have been treated separately (MIR I:58–70, 259–260 and about Dorati 263).

Béla Szigeti dedicates an instructional booklet, *Das Vibrato. Seine Bedeutung und seine Lehrbarkeit*³⁸, to the artistic practice of vibrato in various stylistically defined combinations with dynamic levels and changes; in it he distinguishes the basic forms of **vibrato–crescendo** from the **vibrato–decrescendo** (33), and gives the following characterizations of the styles of vibrato: (1) **classical**: "Beherrschung, Zurückhaltung, Verinnerlichung; enges langsames Vibrato" (36); (2) **romantic**: "überschwenglich, draufgängerisch, mit Temperament und

Freiheit in Zeitmass und Gestaltung; starkes Vibrato"; (3) **impressionistic**: "zartesten klanglichen Abstufungen, verfeinertes und differenziertes Vibrato" and; (4) **modern**: "Für die moderne Interpretation ist ein bewusstes und beherrschtes, differenziertes Vibrato unerlässlich notwendig" (37).

Still, within the limits of these determinants of style, there is "room" for "*das Vibrato der individuellen Persönlichkeit*", and for those who master the technique of a well-differentiated vibrato, there are "unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten für die *Lebendigkeit* der Interpretation. Dennoch äussert sich die Eigenart einer künstlerischen Persönlichkeit wie in allen Stilarten, Ausdrucksmitteln und Auffassungen auch in der charakteristisch bevorzugten Art des Vibrierens." (37)

So the resulting vibrato is both a causal imprint from the interpreter's personality, and a consciously regulated means of expression (ch. IV:4).

In contrast, an earlier author, Alexander Truslit, provides an original and systematically aimed contribution to the attempts to determine expression from the phenomena of **motion** that can be found scattered among various authors and statements on the part of "thinking musicians". His treatise³⁹ departs from the wider aim of investigating the foundations of **musical gestalting**, allegedly identical to **experiencing**, by revealing music's profound sources in life. These are thought of as being biologically and physiologically based, and reflected in the **internal movement** of music. This bold hypothesis is insecurely erected on the basis of a speculation about the physiology of hearing that has grown obsolete in view of modern medical audiology. But still, in essence, Truslit provides and carries through his metainterpretative idea of **human expressiveness as the outcome of the basic motion of biological life**, i.e. as a variant of **organicism**, which bears directly on his system of the linear elaboration of shaping curvatures in performance. The pseudoscience of Truslit would, paradoxically, provide an impulse for the psychological, acoustic or pedagogical investigations into interpretive experiments, and there are some similarities in the thinking of phenomenologically positioned interpreters (Furtwängler, ch. IV:2:2), who emphasize the organic shaping of the whole work in their performance. Still, it is no interpretation theory or aesthetics, since the supporting science philosophy, which is either absent or weakly voiced, remains unclear. The resulting performance shapings are determined only by unsupported, allegedly physiological causes and the role of musical consciousness, as if the system were simultaneously (though in some diffuse way) phenomenologically based. The proposed laws of musical shaping in

performance presented as unconsciously shaped by physiological functions, in contrast to conscious interpretation, are all founded in the possibly phenomenologically derived or coinciding **laws of motion** in music; basically, music is derived from movement, as the tone releases an experience of motion.⁴⁰

So our sense (and, following Truslit's thought, our **sensory sense**) of gestalting essentially depends on our 'sense of' (and, consequently, **sensorium** for) **movement**, and these movements correspond to the emotional experience: "Bewegung ist das Urelement der Musik." (53) Truslit derives and assigns those movements which are efficient in music-making and ~~experiencing~~ from biological and acoustical mechanics and distinguishes two ways of releasing experience of movement: (1) immediately, through psychophysiological response, and (2) mediated through "*Assoziation*". He arrives at a description of basic forms, graphically represented curves of movement in music – "*das Erfassen und Feststellen der musikalischen Bewegung*" (77) – through ear training, musical instruction and cultural education in order to develop our sense of movement, thereby **sensitizing our sensorium for motion**. This is a preparatory step leading to the **mastering of musical gestalting** as supported by a differentiated sensorium and discrimination capacity in the musical movement:

Melos is the foremost carrier of this movement in music, and Truslit endeavors to determine its relationships first to rhythm, and harmony, then to technique, tempo, meter, articulation & phrasing, rests and fermatas, performance markings, gestics and visuality factors, emotion and feeling, temperament, apprehension and memory. It is an early attempt at **holistic integration**, but also a monothetic doctrine based on labile grounds. Its significance lies in its ability to point to the complexity and existence of double aspects in the phenomena of motion and movement. Truslit focuses on the **corporeal and spiritual unity of experiencing** of music as it evolves, which on the level of aesthetic reflection occupies Merleau-Ponty in part I of his *Phénoménologie de la Perception*⁴¹.

The use of specific expressive means can be studied in the history of its application, tracing the idea back to early theoretical treatises, such as Caccini's *Le nuove musiche* (Firenze 1601) in which the use of **expressive rubato** is described.

The prevailing perspective, though, cf. Gaston Belotte⁴², is that of a synchronous view of the age of the studied composer. And, in a theoretical excursus, Belotte attempts to determine the "elementi fondamentali di questa

["rubato italiano"] oratica esecutive" (30). He distinguishes between the (1) "*rubato ritmico*", defined as "una o più note aumentano o diminuiscono il loro valore a favore, o a danno, di altre, con infinita varietà di sfumature [nuancing, grading] nelle ripetizioni", the (2) "*rubato melodico*", which refers either to "una nota" or to "l'intervallo tra due note", and the (3) **tempo rubato**, defined as "velocità diverse nei diversi periodi di uno stesso movimento." This may be compared to and completed by the theoretical distinctions made by Boris Bruck in his dissertation⁴³, who studies *Wandlungen des Begriffes Tempo rubato*: The tempo rubato, then, can be defined as (1) "Freiheit in der Wiedergabe der rhythmischen Quantität", (2) as a dynamic and/or agogic (rhythmic) quality due to deviation from an established pattern (such as the pf or fp accents), and (3) as "Freiheit in der Durchführung des Zeitmasses", i.e. varying tempo. This "curvature" of tempo—changes is supposed to be variously characteristic of each composer; Bruck mentions Chopin and Beethoven as obvious examples. Bruck concludes by providing a definition of the general concept of tempo rubato (60): "Das Tempo rubato ist ein bewusstes, jedoch durch unwillkürliche Impulse seinem Wesen und seiner Stärke nach vorgezeichnetes Abweichen vom taktischen Gleichmass oder vom herrschenden Tempo (oder von beiden zugleich)." (MIR I:62–64)

A Harvard Conference in 1957 on intonation was documented by Walter Piston in *Problems of Intonation in the Performance of Contemporary Music*⁴⁴, which treats the problem of intonation especially in free tonality and 'atonal' music, where it is difficult for the musicians to intonate according to the guidance of tonal leading notes. Still, other methods will naturally evolve in practice: "The performer more or less gradually acquires a sense of intonation, of hearing whether or not his tones are in tune with one another, and in tune with tones played by other performers." (72) Special problems touched upon are "absolute pitch" and "ensemble performance" which, in my view, depend on **interactionary patterns**: "A player reacts to the sounds of others and adjusts to them even when he feels he is right." The discussion also refers to the Harvard dissertation of Charles Stockford⁴⁵ which, by means of sound wave analysis, brought out that "players made considerable revision of intonation between the first sight-reading of a passage and the second or third reading, when they got to appreciate the melodic and harmonic significance of all the notes." The **function of intonation** is clearly defined: "The tonal feeling is made stronger in performance by nuances of intonation. The effect is a clearer communication of the music's message." (74)

So, since such a tonality–clarifying intonation depends on auditive discrimination and acute perception on the part of the performer, according to the **feedback–corrective circle of listening and acting by adjustment of intonation** (MIR I: 94–108 *et passim*), the "perception of musical meaning on the part of the performer is a prerequisite for playing in tune." (74) This adjusting of the pitch in ensemble playing, however, is an "instinctive reaction by the performer to the tonal meaning of harmony" that had allegedly been demonstrated. Further prerequisites would be to provide a definition of tonality, and a **translation rule** that corresponds to the resulting **intonational system of interpreted intervallic relations**, whereby also the **range of pitch tolerance** must be defined. The Harvard Conference pointed at further practical questions, such as the effect of concert hall temperature on intonation (80) especially that of, woodwind instruments.

The innovations in modern avant–garde music of expressive means for specific instruments have enriched the repertoire of sounds available to both composer and interpreter. An example of this kind of study is provided by Stanley Davis Petrusis⁴⁶. His investigation focuses on the means of expression specifically related to the instrument, in this case the bassoon, the scope of the possible sound realizations of which has been widely enlarged over the last few decades, as exemplified in compositions by Paul Chihara, Elliott Schwartz and Bruno Bartolozzi⁴⁷. Petrusis deals with recent performance techniques and special advice for performance preparation within the limits of this controversial repertoire. He lists many of the innovations in the **instrumental soundworld** for the bassoon (corresponding sounds for other wind instruments are treated by Bartolozzi): (1) multiphonics, (2) interaction and feedback with electronic sound, (3) improvisatory frames, (4) extension of "playing [i.e. pitch and sonority] range", (5) vibrato control, (6) *smorzato* ("fluctuations in volume similar to [those of] vibrato"), (7) quarter tones, (8) variations of timbre through changing the vowel formation of the mouth, and alternate fingering, (9) glissando, (10) tone "bending" (pitch deviation, as typical of jazz performance), (11) trills of an unconventional kind, (12) flutter–tonguing, (13) fluttering or clicking keys, (14) humming into the instrument, and others.

An earlier attempt to determine the expressive means and range of the piano was presented by Ludwig (sic!) Riemann⁴⁸. According to him the means of expression are related to the technique of piano playing, especially to investigating the dynamic range and components of timbre (**sonority**). Riemann arrives at his postulate ("*Grundsatz*"): "Die Ästhetik setzt durch


Eigensuggestion des Spielers oder Hörers die Töne und Geräusche in metaphysische Werte um. Die Umwandlung geschieht nur subjektiv" (his ch. 67:249), and "Ton- und Geräuschwolken" are included in his aesthetic evaluation ("ästhetisches Urteil" 256), since Riemann, as an early advocate of contemporary ideas, proposes the inclusion of components of noise for conscious (and conscientious) aesthetic purposes.

Every instrument can be regarded as a special case for investigation. For example, E. K. Rössler presents a series of concepts dealing with interpretive means, with specific reference to the organ: "*Farbencrescendo*" (8), "*Klangart*" or "*Klangfarbe*", "*Raumlinienstärke*" (22), which refers to **polyphonic clarity in performance**⁴⁹.

Uhde & Wieland (*op. cit.* 1988: 280) touch upon the concept of "*Ausdruck*": They refer to the idea forwarded by Kant that the 'identifiability' of the affects is warranted by the language-like, i.e. semantic, quality of the music. I submit that this idea is not valid, and agree with Adorno, who counters this by considering that "die Idee des intentionslosen objektiven Ausdrucks" (282), but acknowledges the problem of objectifying mimetical experience (285): "Jeder Interpret" insist Uhde & Wieland, "muss seine eigenen Impulse, seine eigenen Quellen finden. Der Zugang zum 'objektiven Ausdruck' liegt tief im Subjektiven", which hints at the idea of finding the interpretation through **interior profundity**. Still, the character is related to structure (*Struktur und Charakter*, 293). But rejection of the **semantic music interpretation** only creates a free space for 'objective' i-systems without vindicating any specific (out of several a priori possible) metainterpretations.

In short then the notion of **authenticity** is applied: (1) on a general overriding level, in the sense of 'genuine originality' or the search for this; and (2) specifically, as the opposite pole of expressivity. Both 1 and 2 can refer to different participants (C, I, P, L, R) and various i-acts (w-wa, i-ia, wa-ia), especially (1) the **expressive i** which produces (deriving, referring...to) i from w (wa, rarely ia), and (2) the **authenticating i** which concludes w (w-ID constituents) by testing versions of i (wa, rarely ia), or (3) by referring w to i (wa, ia). The aim of the expressive i-act is paradigmatically i (or p(i)), whereas the goal of the authenticating i-act is normally (usually) a determination of w. A mutual reference system is required for achieving a p(i) that balances the aspects of

expressivity and authenticity, which is most often considered aesthetically valuable (desirable) in 'classical' i. It should be mentioned that authenticity in the first sense aims at retrieving the original **intention** of, e.g., the composer; it refers in particular to the P's as I search for the C's **authentic intention** with w, whereas the C from his perspective may search for an authentic p(w)-rendering among available i-versions provided by P's. It would be possible to argue for different kinds of 'compositional authenticity'. It is easier, however, to recognize the composer's perspective in (1) w(n(c)) or its variant w(c(n)), or in (2) the direct form of i(w), than in (3) p(i) models. The practical aims of these searches for authenticity naturally differ from one case to the next: the P wants guidelines for his i, whereas the C looks for a p(i) that fully meets the demands of w that were inscribed or indicated through n(c). The R may want to attain **comprehension** of w, deepen his already attained level of w-comprehension, or confirm his preliminary hypothetical comprehension of w by a search for authentic w-meaning through assessing in view of the w the various competing wa:s. In search of richer experience the listener may listen to differing i:s and form his own ia:s, enjoying the various nuances and characters appearing at the relevant places. The pole of expressivity is generally thought to belong more to the pole of I and L (in the figure), but this is a somewhat oversimplified polarisation (C-, R-authenticity – I-, L-expressivity) since there is also (1) an **embodied** expressivity in the w (left aside), and (2) a **secondary** authenticity of P, I and L.



III:3 IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE IN INTERPRETATION: THE PARADOX OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE WORK IDENTITY VERSUS THE VARIETY OF INTERPRETATION. THE MEANS FOR SECURING WORK IDENTITY IN PERFORMANCE: THEORIES OF THE UNITING VERSUS THE DIFFERENTIATING EFFECT OF PHRASING BASED ON RHYTHMIC AND METRIC DISTINCTION – FORM AND GESTALTING. THE ZONE OF FREEDOM BETWEEN THE MUSICWORK AND ITS PERFORMANCE

This investigation focuses on the contemporary interpretation of Western classical music over approximately the last two centuries. In this tradition the work is represented by its notation, which can be regarded as a "fixed" point of departure for the interpretative handling of the work. Apparently, in this view, there is reason neither to deny the multiple and differing realizations in performance of the individual work, nor to question at a first glance the identity of notated works. The notation seems to secure the identity.

However, we shall see that the case is more complicated than that. What notation can guarantee is only that which it signifies. And if the signification of notation depends on interpretation, the identity of the *w* will likewise do so, since access to the *w*-ID necessarily is attainable through various stages of *w*-signification. The identity of a motif is what comprises its distinctive traits, what distinguishes or unifies it in comparison to other motifs. But this is compositional identity. Performative identity simply works on a finer scale, where the soundshape of a rendered motif can be distinguished from another rendering of the same motif. The means of differentiation used in *p* to create *p*- and *i*-ID:s are often extremely fine nuances that require an elaborate language of description and a supporting theoretical framework.

The crucial question then is: What constitutes identity? First, we must distinguish between two kinds of evident identity: **work identity** (*w*-ID) and **performance identity** (*p*-ID). If, as I propose, work identity is constituted by **work structure**, i.e. certain 'individual' and quasi-constant interrelationships within various (normally audible) dimensions, then there are two ways of attaining access to it, primarily through **notation**, and secondarily, through listening to the **sound appearance**. However, *w*-ID as compositional structure, although constitutional, may not be completely audible in *p*(*i*). The degree to which the *p*(*i*) is required to realize audibly the *c*-structure is an important *i*-criterion. Through the audibility of the *c*-structure in *p*(*i*) the *c*-structures

become manifested (embodied) in p. Obviously, the ratio of c-structure to audible p-structure is essential.

Theoretically, a piece can be learned by listening to it, and from its sound-appearance new performances can be produced (etc.) *ad infinitum*; conversely, then, access to the work can result through an (infinite) regression from a generated sequence of sound versions back to the work structure. Even if this is not the normal procedure of learning music, most people nowadays encounter, get acquainted with, and possibly apprehend music (i.e. to some extent and in some superficial sense they "learn" the music from auditive sources only) whereas the visual source of notation, at least nowadays, is used as a mode of access mainly by professionals and skilled amateurs. A hierarchy of primary and secondary sources in the sense of notational versus recorded versions may occur, including a complex pattern of derivative and interactive relations of provenance and productive influence, in some similarity with philological and historical research.

The question then arises: Does access to the work through notation and sound require **interpretation**? Evidently, the answer is yes. The aim of reading the notation is to achieve access to the work structure that lies in some sense 'behind' the notation, which does not imply the notion of realism (as Kivy concluded⁵⁰).

It is not the notation, not the code, but the result of its decodification which yields the explicit work structure. Furthermore, that listening to the soundshape requires some "abstracting" mental act in order to reveal the work structure is obvious. The work structure is not identical to the sequence of detailed sound events, neither to the acoustic nor to the appearing audible shapes, since the work structure, and thus its identity, does not change with some minor adjustments to, for example, dynamics nor with embellishments.

Does this mean that there is a third identity, a particular interpretational identity of the work? Evidently not, since it is possible to argue that the work acquires its identity through its definitive realization in the soundshape of the mip, regardless of the mode of access to the work structure, whether through notation or sound.

Since the final version presented at a performance is in a sense definite, there must be several ways of entering the work regarded from the "outside", leading to the various alternative goals. This means, according to one argument, that there must be "freedom of choice" which makes the various renderings possible. This postulation, however, can be contradicted. It can be argued on

neural grounds that the existence of many possible outcomes of a complicated cognitive process of production of this kind does not entail any real freedom of choice for the individual interpreter, i.e. in a situation where he faces the work. The interpreter in front of the work may be totally engaged by his commitment to rendering the work "as correctly as possible", and thus he may rehearse with undivided attention.

Even if the work can be seen from different vantage points (i.e. each of them, respectively, from the various perspectives of individual I:s) the interpreters are not necessarily aware of their own perspectives. Individuality need not be consciously expressed, according to this sceptical view.

We will now see how the problem of achieving the identity of a work through performance was treated by a major figure among the theorists of the late 19th century.

The decades around the beginning of this century were dominated in the field of music theory by Hugo Riemann (1849–1919) whose *"Funktionstheorie"* became the most influential of his grand oeuvres. His intense concern for practical performance was the spur to his industrious writings on the topic of musical rhythm and meter, expression and phrasing.⁵¹

At this time, *"Ausdrucksästhetik"* was still a main line of thought, and Riemann had just begun to emerge as a superior musical scholar in differing from the common hermeneutics of subjective ~~into~~-pretation (and ~~intro~~-pretation; ch. I:2) of extramusical content. This kind of aesthetics degenerated into a private projection of the emotions and synaesthetic associations allegedly found in the work.

In addition, Riemann focused gradually more and more on the music itself, the composition and the internal history of this art. He defines *"Ausdruck"* as an aesthetic concept and an *"Objektivierung einer Idee"* (1882:43).

The performer needs to give more than his expression, and refrain from subjective emotional effusion; he must find the correct expression as an objectification of the idea, the *"rechten Ausdruck"*, i.e. *"die charakteristische Ausprägung der Idee in ihren Details"* (43). This markedness, *"die Ausprägung"*, is explicated as *"plastische Heraustreten der Motive und Themen"*. Riemann distinguishes between the **expression of the work** and the **expression of the artist** by these formulations: "Ausdruck des Kunstwerks selbst [...] den der Komponist seiner Idee gegeben hat" versus "Ausdruck, den der reproduzierenden Künstler dem von ihm vorgetragenen Kunstwerke giebt, also von ausdrucksvollem Spiel und Gesang" (43–44).

The problem of performance consists in getting these two to coincide, which is an ideal possibility; they are "in sofern zusammenfallend, als der reproduzierende Künstler sein höchstes Ziel darin sehen soll, das Bild, welches der Komponist in den Stempel geschnitten, möglichst getreu auszudrücken".

The problem arises from the deficiencies of notation, which preclude any exact "imprinting" of the notation into sound. "Die Notenschrift ist keineswegs ein so vollkommen adäquates Ausdrucksmittel der musikalischen Gedanken" that its conversion into sounding music ("ihre Verwandlung in klingende Musik") could ever reach the precision of a reprint. The metaphor of the notation as an original and the performance as a print-out accounts for the supposition of a **work's unreproducibility**, as well as for the **reproducibility of the interpretation**, whereas the moment of individual performance is not reproducible; a second playing (by means of technical recording and reproduction) of the "same" interpretation occurs in a specific moment distinct from the first one, and even if the artist keeps his interpretative concept of the work constant and reproduces it several times, the realization of his concept in different renderings can (1) be more or less complete and precise, and (2) attain differing relations to the surrounding physical (i.e. also acoustical) space and time, including the varying cultural circumstances of the musical event.

There is then, a relation of correspondence between individual performances and their common (or changing) concept, and another relation of correspondence between this concept and the work (or its notation). In light of this, we return back to Riemann's concept of "*Vortrag*", by which he means something partly creative ("*Schaffung*"), essentially and more explicitly, "eine unendliche Zahl kleiner Nüancierungen des Tempos, der Tonstärke, selbst der Tonfärbung am rechten Orte anzubringen" (44), and, for these factors the notation lacks signs. The notation, according to Riemann, is only "*Zeichnung*", whereas "die stilgerecht klingende Ausführung schafft es zum farbenwarmen Gemälde um." The composer abstains from notating all intended details, taking into account the risk of small deviations from his intentions, in order not to reduce the reproducing artist "zum Automaten"; the composer is aware of the advantage of letting his work emerge "aus einer nachempfundenen Reproduktion." Riemann demands complete assimilation and recreation of the work, "nimmt das Kunstwerk ganz in sich auf und schafft es nun, erweckt es zu neuem Leben", and here refers to the everchanging nature of the work as analogy, pattern or model for performance: "*die Natur wiederholt sich nicht*".

Riemann explains why the study of performance was postponed for so

long; the existence of diversity in performances was understood as subjective arbitrariness: "Angesichts der unleugbaren Tatsache, dass auch derselbe Künstler dasselbe Werk nicht zweimal ganz gleich vortragen kann, hat man lange Zeit den musikalischen Ausdruck für etwas undefinierbares und schlechterdings nicht in Regeln fassbares gehalten."

The Riemann thesis on melody-shaping (1882:46) is formulated as a rule with pretensions to general validity: "Das allgemein giltige Gesetz für die dynamische Schattierung des Melodischen ist *Steigerung der Tonstärke bei steigender, Verminderung der Tonstärke bei fallender Melodie*." This means a dynamic shaping in accordance with a **distantial** (not 'sonantial') system, i.e. a **melodic interpretation by means of dynamic pronunciation**; the dynamic line becomes "treble-oriented" ("*diskantorienterad*" MIR II:11,50,421), as was often the case in performances by Sergiu Celibidache (ch. V:4; MIR IV). Riemann demands that exceptions from this rule must be explicitly prescribed or wanted by the composer. (1) The justification of the "general" rule is made by reference to a postulate that the ascending/increasing forms in melody as well as in dynamics have a common origin, or a coinciding phenomenological "*Wesen*": "sowohl die Steigerung der Tonstärke als die Steigerung der Tonhöhe [entsprechen] eine *Zunahme der Lebendigkeit*", and Riemann also refers to an acoustical "Vergrößerung der Bewegungsgeschwindigkeit". (2) The "audiological" explanation is more convincing from an experiential point of view: "Der höhere Ton setzt grössere Spannung voraus, verlangt also wie der stärkere eine grössere Kraftanwendung" (47) and he finds "[eine] innere Verwandtschaft der ansteigenden Melodie und des Crescendo". Agogical stringendo is also classified as "vermehrte Lebendigkeit" (47).

So, in effect, Riemann distinguishes between two respectively different forms of development, 'positive' and 'negative', the effects of which can be reinforced: "Steigend Tonhöhe, Crescendo und Stringendo sind Steigerungen, positive Entwicklungsformen; fallende Tonhöhe, Diminuendo und Ritardando sind Verminderungen, negative Entwicklungsformen." Both forms can contribute "zum Ausdruck derselben Seelenbewegung, derselben Empfindung" and cooperatively "deren Intensität verstärkend zusammenwirken" (47).

The observation in the score that should indicate the correct use of such interpretive means as dynamic and agogic nuancing, according to Riemann, is that which denotes a rise or fall of intervals, an ascending or descending melodic line. This is, in fact, a '**diastematic**' interpretation, in which, in principle, the turning points ("*Wendungen*"; pivot tones, changes of direction) may

become a decisive guide: "Steigerung und Fall der Tonhöhe erweisen sich oft als der erste Anhalt für rechte Vertheilung der dynamischen und agogischen Schattierungen" (47). But the performer must also respect and correctly render the metric organization and give a "*Darstellung der Metrik*" (49); where the analytical consideration gives a sequence of strong–weak weight, a *diminuendo* becomes appropriate in the performance, and correspondingly a meter understood as weak–strong becomes substituted by a *crescendo*.

Since, however, rhythm and meter, in Riemann's and in conventional theory, appear as an interwoven complex, we would designate this as **rhythmometric interpretation**: "Anstelle der Folge stark–schwach das *Diminuendo* und an Stelle der Folge schwach–stark das *Crescendo* einzutreten [hat]" (49), and "An Stelle der verschiedenen Accente ist also ein gleichmässiges *Crescendo* oder *Diminuendo* zu setzen" (50–51) in order to avoid "Zerhacken". Principally, Riemann distinguishes, in his *Rhythmuslehre*, three kinds of motifs ("*Taktmotive*", 51), classified according to the placement of the accent (emphasis) in the beginning, middle or end of the motif, which normally, according to Riemann and others, is supposed to correspond to the dynamic rendering by means of "stress" on those tones. The concepts are (1) "*anbetont*", (2) "*inbetont*" and (3) "*abbetont*", which are then demonstrated on different measures and rhythmical motifs of paradigmatic importance and turned into a cohesive system of music theory, which, however is outside the immediate scope of this investigation. It is intriguing to note, though, that Riemann tends to prefer an up–beat classification for not only rhythmic motifs, but also for the larger phrase, period and form. "*Auftakt*" becomes a central notion in his theory; the important idea behind this **structural interpretation** is the need for the **impetus** and **directionality** (a notion elaborated phenomenologically by Sergiu Celibidache) of movement and development, which should guarantee the apprehension of the **work as an unfolding unity**. This will also create a character of **energy flow**: "aufregende, vorwärtstreibende der mehrfach auftaktigen Formen" (52).

Rubato has a direct bearing on structural rendering by imposing **identity** on the phrase, or, contrarily, by enforcing a **difference** in the tone's phrase–adherence through compression, extension or incision. The rubato has, according to Riemann, a **divisional** function (54) through "*Abtrennung*", "*Getheilung*" or "*Verlängerung*" ("der Vorhaltsnote" at *con espressione*; 54); further terms used by Riemann in this connection are "*Zusammenziehung*" and "*Einschaltung*": compression ("*Zusammenziehung untergetheilte Werthe*" 59) is applied to small notes and passages, and gives a "*gesteigerte Figuration*" and

"*vermehrte Lebendigkeit*" (57–58). The syncope is just an instantiation of these forces that are supposed to become enhanced in performance: it ("*die Synkope*") is "vorwärtstreibend und abbetont", and "die dynamische Hauptnotesynkopiert ist vor auszunehmen; [...] die synkopierte Note [either] stark zu accentuieren" (60) or to render it by crescendo ("durchschattieren" 60).

In spite of his system of rules, which may seem rigid from the point of view of our time (when established rule systems are often overcome by imposing contrary or alternative rules on the step above in the hierarchy, thus creating innovation and breaking the constancy of tradition), Riemann sensitively acknowledges the limits of his theory for the purpose of artistic performance, in saying that the interpreter's decisions "muss vielmehr in der Praxis Sache der lebendigen Empfindung bleiben" (64).

Riemann declares that "Steigen und Fallen der Tonhöhe [ist] einer der wesentlichsten Faktoren der musikalischen Kunstwirkung" (1900:51). The positive direction of development is represented by melodic ascending and associated by analogy to "ein Anwachsen der Lebendigkeit", which is an **interpretation of character**. The indication for rendering rising pitch by crescendo is justified by reference to the **natural correspondence of form** (contour, curvature) between the compositional and interpretational layers; as in theories of philosophical truth the correctness of interpretation related to composition can be probed by means of one or both of the criteria of (1) **correspondence** and (2) **coherence**, i.e. by comparison to either (1) **external** relation between the original ("template") and its realization(s) ("printings"), or (2) to the **internal relation** within the individual realization. The (3) **pragmatic** truth theory has its correspondence within music performance: the most practical solution that leads to the goal is also in itself the goal, and the preferable version.

At the same time this dichotomy is crossrelated to the various **perspectives** of the probing, since the inter- or intrarelations can be perceived from **interior** or **exterior** vantage points, from the interpreter at the moment of performing, from the audience at the moment of listening to the performance (with more or less intimate knowledge of the work), or from the composer at the moment of hearing one realization of his work. In view of this, the postulate of **parallelism between form and emotion** in Riemann's thinking can be understood: "Das Aufsteigen der Melodie gleicht also der positiven Bewegung des Affekts, dem Hoffen, Sehnen, Verlangen, überhaupt der Bewegung nach etwas hin, dem aus sich Herausgehen [...]" (51) and "die natürliche Dynamik des Aufsteigenden in der Melodie ist das crescendo" (53).

These aspects are only a part of the more encompassing factors which Riemann intended to include in an aesthetics of performance. Other considerations relevant to this aim are "Zufälligkeiten der einzelnen Aufführung (Akustik des Saales, Stimmung des Hörers, Stimmung und Befähigung des Dirigenten und der Spieler oder Sänger, Güte der Instrumente, Störungen aller Art, u.s.w.)." (55). And even if the phrasing and articulation based on the understanding of the principles for **correct motivic division** ("*motivische Gliederung*"; 1889:88–96) and the rhythmic and metric meanings of individual motifs within the scope of the development of form of the piece are of foremost concern, he also dedicates a particular investigation to the conscientious and systematic use of agogics.

"Agogik" is viewed as the integration of a particular means of achieving detailed shaping of sound in performance as an interpretative device to be handled and mastered by the artist. The agogic serves (1) the clarity (**transparency**) and (2) the **expression** of performance: that "die Agogik [1] der *Deutlichkeit* dient, d.h. die Taktart, die motivische Gliederung und die Harmonie klarlegt, also ein unentbehrlicher Faktor des *korrekten Vortrags* ist [...], [2] dem Ausdruck erst Leben, Farbe, Wärme, Wahrheit giebt, sodass ein packender, *ergreifender Vortrag* ohne sie unmöglich ist." In contrast, Riemann also warns against (3) "*falsche Agogik*" which "den Ausdruck in's Fratzenhafte verzerren, das Erhabene zum Lächerlichen machen muss [...]" (1889:90). So the artistic purpose of agogics is clear; they serve to satisfy the superordinate aesthetic ideal of **integrating the transparency of the work's rendering with corresponding and coherent emotional vivification** in the performance, and the means for achieving this goal are simple: "kleinere Verlängerungen der Töne, welche Schwerpunkt der Motive sind, durch geringe Beschleunigung der Auftaktswerthe und allmähliches Verschwinden der Dehnung bei weiblichen Endungen" (91), and further specifying this: "Die zu dehnenden (einen agogischen Accenterhaltenden) Takte sind: Taktanfang (am meisten) [...], Taktmitte (verringert), die Schwerpunkte" at **crescendo** and **messa di voce**. At **crescendo** "werden die Werthe beschleunigt (**stringendo** [my emphasis])" and at **diminuendo** "nimmt die Dehnung allmählich wieder ab" (91): the ambiguity of reference in this statement is interesting.

Riemann proposes **stringendo/ritenuto** as the performer's response to **crescendo/diminuendo** as marked in the notation or its correlative within a **real sound shaping**. We can understand Riemann's rule as prescriptive of relationships between (1) **n-i**, (2) **i-i**, or (3) **n-i & i-i** or (as I notated in MIR I:21–

22) as $\{(i-i)-(v-i)\}$: whereas the exchange of n for v becomes a matter of subtle metainterpretation of the Riemann theory – alternatively $\{(i-i)-(n-i)\}$. Further rules by Riemann that could be investigated and formalized are: "Die zu verlängernden Werthe [sind] auf die Schwerpunkte fallenden Noten und zwar die kürzesten" (94), and, "den dynamischen Ausdruck trägt die Melodiestimme, den agogischen immer die, welche die kürzesten Werthe hat" (95), so the use of agogic accents, in effect, is restricted to small note values falling on metrical heavy points; the agogic means serve the function of clarifying the metrical structure of the work and its parts, overriding the recurrent scheme indicated by measure, whereas the dynamic means emphasize it by shaping the course and outline of the melody. In a polyphonic setting of several simultaneous melodic lines, or in highly integrated parts within a homophonic setting, "wird stets diejenige [Stimme] zum Träger des agogischen Ausdrucks, welche sich in den kleinsten Werthen bewegt" (94) – i.e. a proposed assignment of essential functions in performance to individual parts on the basis of their respective metrical role (of their rhythmical surface, filling the metrical scheme to various degrees) for the purpose of securing the pronunciation of conspicuous events in their full vividness and distinction against a background of regularity provided by part in slower motion.

As early as 1872, Riemann is referring to Moritz Hauptmann's writings on harmony. Riemann notices a few notions in his theory that could have been constitutive for a theory of **interpretation of intervals** (MIR I:75 et 201–202), though he never came to develop one; instead Riemann concentrated on the more integrative chordal harmonic and functional aspect of the musical setting. However, he mentions a few concepts ("*Oktavidentität*", "*Quintenzweiung*", "*Terzeinigung in dem zeitlichen Nacheinander*", 1872:1) that may have had a role for his notion of the logical meaning of chords and accents in the progress of a musical setting.

The philosophical attempts to found a theory of musical harmony in the works of Hauptmann contributed to Riemann's concept of musical logic: "Das Schöne schön zu finden, ist nicht Sache des Geschmacks, sondern des Verständnisses" (5) reflects this priority for conscious treatment of immediate perception on a cognitively experiential level. It is interesting to note that musical phenomenology later developed in this direction, and Sergiu Celibidache uses the notion of "*Oktavidentität*" not as a theoretical principle, but in his phenomenological analyses leading to the pronunciation of this interval in real performance (MIR IV).

The somewhat mechanical principle of "*musikalische Phrasierung*", which Riemann defined as "die Unterscheidung der einzelnen Phrasen im Vortrag" (67), aiming in effect at a structural presentation of phrases, their interconnections and divisions, needed a justification and reference to carrying aesthetic ideas or convincing principles of musical logic, which Riemann seems to have had in mind but never put into in a cogent theory. The best he could do was refer to intuition, once again: "Der beste Prüfstein für die Richtigkeit einer gewählten Phrasierung ist das Innehalten nach jedem Motiv; erscheint solches als natürlich (wenn auch übertrieben), so wird die Phrasierung richtig sein" (86, point 8); if it appears unnatural, then one has to search for another point of division ("*Teilungspunkt*").

For simple performance (i.e. "execution", "*exekutionsnivån*" according to the terminology presented in MIR I:47–48; Riemann uses "*Vortrag*" 1872:71), it is generally sufficient to respect the divisions of compositional phrases, "wenn die Phrasen von einander gesondert werden", whereas attaining the higher or middle levels of interpretation and gestalting, respectively (MIR I:47), requires a more thorough pronunciation of detailed motivic structure: "für die rechte *Auffassung* des Tonstückes aber ist auch noch die weitere Gliederung bis zum einfachen metrischen Motiv notwendig." Interesting for the purpose of performance is his motivation for the main rule that "Taktmotive sind entweder volltaktig oder ein- oder mehrfach auftaktig" (85 point 2): "Das Umsetzen [in performance] aus volltaktigen Motiven in auftaktige ist eins der wirksamsten Steigerungsmittel des musikalischen Ausdrucks; der Vortragende hat nicht einen Zwang zum Wechseln der Motive abzuwarten, muss vielmehr in auftaktige Form übergehen, sobald er dafür nicht mehr auf entschiedene Hindernisse stösst" (86); in fact Riemann here motivates a **systematic n-i transformation** (from a notated down-beat motif to interpreted up-beat performance within the same, identical dimension of rhythm).

The question of **compositional and interpretative culmination** is treated in two ways: first by reference to the internal coherence of interpretation (1872:86 point 5): "Die Phrase steigert sich bis auf den Hauptaccent und fällt dann ab. Phrasen, die mit dem Hauptaccent beginnen, sind daher *diminuendo*, solche, die mit dem Hauptaccent enden, dagegen *crescendo* vorzutragen, während solche, bei denen der Hauptaccent mehr in die Mitte fällt, bis zu demselben *crescendo* und sodann *diminuendo* vorzutragen sind"; and secondly, by reference to an external correspondence to the compositional fact of highest note ("*Spitzentöne*"; Kurth and Celibidache): "Die Gipfelnote

(Accentnote) der Phrase verträgt eine (nicht messbare) Verlängerung, und die letzte Note gestattet oft ein leichtes Absetzen, wo nicht eine wirkliche zugegebene Pause." (87)

Finally, Riemann restricts and limits the abuse of his rules in order to avoid dogmatism and open the free zone of artistic sensitivity in the selection of interpretiveshaping (87 point 9): "In all den hier angedeuteten Vortragsnuancen ist Masshalten die schwere Kunst, welche die richtige Phrasierung von der noch höher stehenden guten Phrasierung unterscheidet. Man hüte sich nur ja, sich allzusehr auf eine Regel zu verlassen und nehme überall das eigene kritische Empfinden zu Hilfe, das, wenn es nur *in die rechten Bahnen gelenkt* wird, von selbst weiter erstarken und ein zuverlässiger Führer sein wird." (87)

In 1909 Riemann himself summarized the rhythmical research with bearing on "*Vortrag*" and outlined the character of "*Phrasierungslehren*" and "*Erläuterungsausgaben*" by other authors, many of whom were influenced by his earlier writings – in somewhat more critically distanced words. Had Riemann himself begun to feel dubious about the value of this research for practical, and especially for artistic, study? He comments on the literature related to problems of phrasing by Otto Tiersch⁵². Strictly speaking, however, much of this literature is more about **compositional structure** and basically uses the concepts "*Motiv*", "*Phrase*", "*Period*" etc., including "*Motivverkettung*", "*Periodenbau*", etc. for designating and analyzing this kind of structure. But Riemann contends the following: "Die Mehrzahl der genannten Bücher verdankt der Absicht ihre Entstehung für den musikalischen *Vortrag* Gesetze aus der melodisch-rhythmischen und harmonisch-metrischen Beschaffenheit der musikalischen Bildungen abzuleiten. Meine 'Musikalische Dynamik und Agogik' gibt sich deshalb schon im Titel als eine Lehre vom Crescendo–diminuendo und dem Stringendo–ritardando als Mittel der Verdeutlichung der Formen im Vortrag."

He explicates his intention to prove the '*Sinngliederung*', which is primarily a **compositional device for structural analysis**, and from this to conclude with "der aus derselben sich ergebenden Vortragsweise." (8) The "*Erläuterungsausgaben*"⁵³ are characterized by "ins kleinste Detail die Sinngliederung durch Bögen und Lesezeichen, Balkentrennungen und die den Taktstrichen untergeschriebene Rangzahlen der Takte im Periodenaufbau nach, [...] aus diesen Prämissen die Folgerungen für die Vortragsweise, welche sie durch fortlaufende Vorschriften der Dynamik und Tempobehandlung, Accentzeichen und Dehnungsvorschriften andeuten." (8) The problem, however, is to **justify the underlying principles that guide the methods/criteria of**

division into phrases and motifs. Those methods disregard the decisive importance of justifying the overriding aesthetic ideals, which have a bearing on the guiding results of the analyses for application in performance, if not also in composition.

In one of the books mentioned by Riemann – by Carl Fuchs⁵⁴ – is the interesting attempt to develop a comparative method, albeit just a primitive beginning. Fuchs suggests seven possible phrasings of the Beethoven *Piano Sonata* op. 10 no. 3 first movement, and discusses their merits and deficiencies. The alternatives are not generated by any stated principles and seem randomly chosen, influenced more by the liberal practice of music society at that time than by the concern for fidelity to Beethoven. But, still, the attempt is important, and it puts the Riemann phrasings in another light, since Riemann did not expose himself to the risk of comparing his proposals to other alternatives. Fuchs concludes: "Auch nicht so wenige Möglichkeiten der Deutung einer Phrase innerhalb der Grenzen des leidlich noch Vernünftigen liegen [...] sind mehrere Deutungen einer Phrase zulässig. Wie sollte auch wohl die hier so eben versuchte Grenzlinie ein festes Kriterium abgeben können." (10)

Two points are important here: whereas Riemann's goal was to find the most correct, if not the one and only correct phrasing, Fuchs' investigation (in spite of its subjectivity) from the very beginning, aims to prove the possibility of several alternatives of the same or of a very similar (in any case an acceptable) value. Moreover, Fuchs immediately recognizes the decisive test by requiring **criteria for the limits of interpretation**, which would secure the **identity of the work** without depriving the interpreter of his justified zone of freedom. So Fuchs, in fact, and in spite of the submissive title of his book, embarks on another path than that of Riemann. Fuchs searches for the **logical basis for criteria** and attempts to ground his principles of phrasing on the laws of logic ("*Gesetz der Logik*" 11): "Man kann von einem Gegenstand nicht zu gleicher Zeit Entgegengesetztes aussagen, also auch nicht von einer Phrase die Möglichkeit dieser und zugleich einer anderer organischen, richtigen Eintheilung." Fuchs unfortunately cannot fulfill his expectations; he just verifies or proves the **impossibility of simultaneous contradictory interpretations** which is nevertheless significant.

But his conclusion provides support for the proposition of artistic freedom of choice: "der willkürlichen Verschiebung der Grenzen der Phrasen und der Motive". (19) And further conclusions contain a carefully weighted criticism of the dominant figure in the music theory of Riemann: "bei völlig identischer

Wiederkehr des schon Gehörten, einem **zu starken** Heraustreten einzelner Theile des Kunstwerkes [aesthetic criterion], einer zu groben Beleuchtung oder einer künstlerisch unfruchtbaren Verdoppelung derselben gleichkommt" (149), which is Fuchs' argument for varying the phrasing within the progress of a works performance; avoiding exaggeration is a criterion for **balance**, and "*unfruchtbare Verdoppelung*" indicates a concern for **continuity**. Fuchs is actually referring to the **internal coherence of the i-i relation**, which he wants to reinforce. He proposes a more subtle criterion for artistically justified changes: "wenn er [der Künstler, Interpret] bestimmte Veränderungen für die Reprise mit sich ausgemacht hätte, so müsste er noch verstehen, sie als ungewollt erscheinen zu lassen" – i.e. the changes should be just small enough to secure the continuity and vividness of the thematic progress so as not to introduce an unexpected and disturbing novelty. Especially in repetitious pieces, such as e.g. the Trio from the *Scherzo* of the Beethoven *Piano Sonata* op. 28. "agogisch achtmal dasselbe zu spielen, wäre auch wegen der Modulationen ein offener Fehler" (149). In view of this it is almost a surprise to read the final polite phrase by Fuchs: "ein grundsätzlicher Widerstand gegen H. Riemann's Methode der Phrasierung [ist] mit ehrlichen Mitteln nicht möglich." (156)

Recalling Riemann's notion of the beauty related to "*Verständnis*", Otto Tiersch connects with a long tradition in philosophy (Aristotle, Hume and possibly even Kant) in his definition of beauty: "Alles, was unsere Vorstellung lebhaft bewegt und unser seelisches Empfinden wohlgefällig erregt, nennen wir 'schön'." (1) And Tiersch refers to Aristotle in his definition of rhythm: "Ordnung in der Dauer und Energie der einzelnen Bestandteile" (7) and these organized quantities become means of expression, by analogy, and guide the "*speziell musikalische Kunstprinzipien*" (11): "diese geordneten Dauer- und Stärkeverhältnisse selbst geradezu Mittel des künstlerischen Ausdrucks werden [...]" (8). Insofar as Tiersch carries through his lofty intentions in the title of his book ("*Rhythmik, Dynamik und Phrasierungslehre der homophonen Musik. Ein Lehrgang theoretisch-praktischer Vorstudien für Komposition und Vortrag homophoner Tonsätze*", Oppenheim, Berlin 1886), his aims are the same as Riemann's, namely to create a systematic account of rhythm.

Franz Kullak⁵⁵ essentially presents 'correctives' related to the exaggerations of the misinterpretations of contemporaries, based on critical reviews of performers' reflections on their art: References are given to Anton Schindler, Hans von Bülow, Richard Wagner and Hugo Riemann, the dominant figures of "*Vortragslehre*" of that time. Kullak argues against applied **ritenuto** in


cantabile sections, since these are already composed in longer note values. The disguised principle behind this prohibition is that of **not doubling a composed tendency by interpretational means in the same direction**. Unfortunately, Kullak does not investigate under what stylistic conditions this criterion is valid: "Cantabile–Stellen eine Herabsetzung des Tempos am wenigsten erheischen wegen der in ihnen herrschenden **grösseren Nothenwerthen**." (10) The rule in effect is **compensatory**. The following rule would, I agree with Kullak, not be needed, unless practice has shown otherwise, namely the self–evident instruction that melody notes are to be played more emphatically than the accompaniment ("dass überhaupt Melodie–Noten stärker zu spielen sind wie Begleitungsnoten, würde ich, als selbstverständlich, gar nicht erwähnen [...] 84).

Whereas Hugo Riemann locates the rhythmical main accent of the phrase normally towards the end of the phrase or at least in its second half, Adolph Carpe⁵⁶ places the weight in the middle of the phrase: "Nach dem Gesetze der Schwere gravitirt nun jede grössere musikalische, zusammenhängende Tonfolge nach dem ihrer Mitte zunächst liegenden metrischen Hauptaccent" (138), which he proposes under the title of "*Der Rhythmus im musikalischen Vortrage*" (136). Of interest is the analogy to a **gravitational force** towards the middle point: under the subtitle "*Die innere Gravitation und die Anziehungskraft der Theile*" (155) Carpe relates the structure of phrase emphasis to the content of ideas and emotion: "In diesem Punkt liegt die Concentration des ganzen Gedankens, in ihm findet sich der Brennpunkt musikalischen Empfindens und er ist je nach dem Charakter der Phrase hervorzuheben." (138) Changing the basic paradigm of accent positioning (and formation; see MIR I:61) in the phrase architecture would 'kaleidoscopically' release a radical change in the holistic character of the performed piece.

Basically, then, the identification (ID) or difference (DIFF) (division) of the *w*, or of smaller or larger parts of it, is achieved through the *i*–means previously described as cohesive or separative. (MIR I:58–70) The experienceable features of ID/DIFF, if not directly accessible in *w* (for instance through reading its *n*), are displayed in at least three ways: (1) *w*→*i* or *p*(*i*); and correspondingly in the reverse direction of access, *p*(*i*) or *i*→*w*, (2) *w*→*wa*; access *wa*→*w*, and (3) *w*→*ia*; access *ia*→*w*.



The i-ID is displayed in the following ways: (1) $i \rightarrow w$, (2) $i \rightarrow ia$, and (3) $i \rightarrow wa$.



A further crucial question regards the ID_{exp} of part or whole: "How large a unit?" inquires about its **extention**, and (2) "What unifier?" asks about what unifying (fusing, linking, connecting) forces or factors are at stake. We have in this chapter analyzed a few representative theories in order to illuminate the problem of the relation between c-ID and i-ID.

III:4 OBJECTIVITY VERSUS SUBJECTIVITY. THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS. EXAMINATION OF THE CLAIMS TO OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC PERFORMANCE RESEARCH

First, I will distinguish between two denotations for "objectivity", referring either to (1) the observer's relation to the object, in this case the musical work to be performed, or to (2) the precision in comprehension of the meaning and significance of the musical work.

Secondly, the term "objectivity" can be applied to some thing or to some other definable factors in the performance, i.e. objectivity as related to factors of the performance, or the precision and exactness of certain specific factors or parameters in the sound shaping of the performance: **intrarerelative objectivity: i-i-relations** (MIR I:21), in contrast to **interrelative objectivity**.

In a similar way, "subjectivity" (1) can refer to the "subject" in the sense of the listening person, the identity of a human consciousness directed towards the soundshape arising from a performance; or (2) it can characterize the relation between the consciousness' content and performance factors which are in some

way identified as "corresponding"; or (3) "subjectivity" in the sense of arbitrariness. In his dissertation, Karl Fabian⁵⁷ endeavors to determine the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity as a necessary basis for the scientific treatment of interpretation problems. Fabian distinguishes objectivity from **adequacy**: the latter is defined as a reproduction of the sound–picture of which "dem Klangbild in des Autors Vorstellung oder seiner authentischer Interpretation effektiv gleich ist, die *kongruent* ist, sich also *vollständig* mit ihr deckt" (106). But this problem can be reduced to the question of the **adequacy of the criteria** for interpretation in performance.

Objectivity, according to Fabian, is furthermore an "Einstellung und Haltung des ausübenden Musiker die [...] durch das grundsätzliche Bestreben gekennzeichnet ist, das Kunstwerk im Sinne des Autors wiederzugeben". This is the conventional reference to the author's intention. But total adequacy is not possible, for principled and logical reasons. So, as the only denotation for "objectivity" remains the psychological "prinzipielle Willensrichtung und Gesinnung dem wiedergebenden Werke gegenüber", and "Tendenz zu einer der Sache gemässen Darstellung [...] die nicht durch subjektive Zutaten aus der Seele des Darstellenden getrübt oder entstellt ist." The alleged impossibility of adequacy is, according to Fabian, based on the following premises:

(1) perception cannot only be passive ("*passives Einströmenlassen*"); it is an **active reworking of the facts** ("*Verarbeiten jener Gegebenheiten*"), which includes taking a definite standpoint based on a spiritual attitude, which is necessarily individual;

(2) the **percepts** are inseparably bound to the 'factual' experience ("*dem tatsächlichen Erlebnis*"); the necessity of interpretation excludes the complete adequacy of the rendering;

(3) imaginations ("*Vorstellungen*"); the score reproduced in the internal imagination is even more interpretative because of "*die Eigenart der Vorstellungen*";

(4) adequacy of performance is impossible because of shortages of notation (how strong is a forte, how large a crescendo? These are the same questions that Furtwängler posed; ch. IV:2:2);

(5) the intuitively comprehended content ("*Gehalt*") of the work is not adequate because of three failures: (a) **underinterpretation**, i.e. the comprehensible image (of the content) does not fully seize or reach the content of the work; (b) **overinterpretation**, i.e. the image transgresses the intended content of the work, or (c) the comprehensive image is labile and may change,

whereas the content is regarded as stable;

(6) tradition depends on personal **memory** (supported by documents; sources), and thus is imprecise or approximative; memory gives no secure access to adequacy;

(7) the practical difficulties in finding the exact instruments used by those in the past; in Fabian's terminology, a **lack of congruency** between the compositional "*Urbild*" and interpretative "*Abbild*". Note that Fabian fails to carry through his logic on this point; in order to complete it, we propose the following terms: compositional "*Urbild*", intentional interpretative "*Abbild*", and the realized "*Realbild*" of the sounding performance;

(8) the effect on the **audience** changes due to "*dauernde Wandlungen im Hören und Erleben*" (108).

So objectivity must be understood as **intentional** ("*den Autor und sein Werk zur Geltung zu bringen*"). If 'hearing' has undergone changing conditions, performance must adapt to new circumstances. Two kinds of **intentional objectivity** must be considered: (1) that which correctly corresponds to authorial will, "*der vom Autor gedachten entsprechenden Wirkung*" (109), and (2) "*auf eine genaue, in allen Details korrekte Wiedergabe*", i.e. the intended goal of ensuring coincidence of work and recipient (109), which can lead to historic authenticity as an ideal.

Fabian actualizes the question of involving the audience in the circle of communication involved in the composer's original intention. His concept "*Wirkungsobjektivität*" refers to an **objective realization of the author's imagination** ("*Autor-Vorstellung*"), but this presupposes that the author intended his imagination (his conception of the work) to be recreated in the experiential consciousness of the beholder, which Fabian fails to observe. Recreating the original soundshape ("*Klangbild*") cannot be considered a "*wirkungsobjektiv*", as Fabian states (84, 88). Changed circumstances can give the work another effect. The involvement of the audience in "*wirkungsobjektive*" performances is favorable from the communicative point of view; it should ensure the "*Anteilnahme der anderen Menschen*" (80, 79).

Moreover, Fabian fails to recognize the possibility of a "*Künstler objektivität*": the composer writes his score by using symbols and signs which can be decoded by the performer, but not by the listener; the notation is intended for the performer, so, consequently, it should be designed in order to give objective access to the work through itself (the argument may seem circular, but is, in fact, governed by the idea of finality). This would be **performance**

objectivity, the goal of which is to transmit the correct image of the work primarily to the performer, for further transmission to the audience. The problem of interpretation in such a communicative system would center around (1) the performer's "geistigen Gehalt, der für die Wiedergabe des Kunstwerkes tatsächlich relevant ist" (66), and (2) "die Unzulänglichkeit der Notierung", but not only regarding the few aspects of notating "die Agogik, die Phrasierung und die Dynamik". (28) Furthermore, the larger problem remains of how to achieve "eine korrekte Rekonstruktion des Gebildes" (and Fabian here differentiates between "Gehalt", "Gefühl" and "Stimmung"; 37).

If we classify the decisive factors, we can regard objectivity and subjectivity as a **polarity**. The objective pole is constituted by faithfulness ("*selbstverständliche Objektivität*" and "*Treue und Pflichtbewusstsein*") and the submissive role of the interpreter in front of the work ("*Dienst am Kunstwerk*"). The **subjective pole**, however, also has positive determinations: "*Raum für Persönlichkeitsentwicklung*", "*Entfaltung des seelischen Eigenlebens*", "*freiere Entwicklung des Intellekt*", and "*Gefühls- und Temperamentswelten des Auslegenden*" (1). Furthermore, there is the hypothetical possibility of a correlation, or, phenomenologically, an **intersubjective coincidence** between the subject and object that would, if confirmed by evidence, reduce the arbitrariness of their interrelation.

Music theorists like August Halm and Theodor Lipps conceived of the existence of "*natürliche Tendenzen in dem musikalischen Material*" (56) and this is an expression that is used *verbatim* by Sergiu Celibidache in his lectures on musical phenomenology (MIR IV; ch. V:4); a similar idea occurs in various formulations by Schenker, Furtwängler and Ansermet.

On this particular point Fabian is in line with the tradition of music phenomenology. But regarding the understanding and grasping of content, he considers **passivity of the assimilative mode** to be insufficient (69), and refutes the standpoint that the content would express itself effectively only by passive regarding and reflection. This puts him more in the **hermeneutic tradition**, since pure phenomenologists tend to reduce the contribution from the subject in the interpretive encounter with the object through bracketing (Husserl's *epoché*⁵⁸). Fabian conceives of the content as the last instance for correct interpretation of subtle nuances – i.e. the work of art is not entirely determined by structural relations: "man kann nicht die Form reproduzieren, zu der doch alle jene Feinheiten gehören, wenn man nicht den Gehalt verstanden hat" (70).

Fabian seeks to justify his view on this point by logical argument: "ein

Gefühlsgehalt im Kunstwerk ist auch nur gefühlsmässig [...], nur durch ein unmittelbares *intuitives* Verstehen zu erfassen". (71) Fabian thus conceives of objectivity as "die Tendenz, das grundsätzliche Bestreben zu einer möglichst genauen Wiedergabe [...] durch die Ganzheit der Persönlichkeit" (72) and the performer's "seelische Anteilnahme" (74) "unter bewusster, *disziplinierter* Verwendung der Gemütskräfte im Dienste des Werkes als der Geistesschöpfung einer *anderen* Individualität" (74). Simultaneously, Fabian acknowledges the importance of a "*Dualism*" between passivity and activity in the interpretative act: The "objektiv verfahrenender Interpret" should (1) secure the "*Fülle*" and "*Tiefe*" through "ganz *passiv* dem inneren Gehalt hingegeben sein", and (2) secure the advantages of **recreation** (spontaneity; "nachschaffen") through "mit voller *Aktivität*, Besonnenheit und Zielbewusstheit dem Werke gegenüberstehen" (75). In order to attain a level of **correct rendering**, the interpreter must partly "gleichsam *in* dem Werke, teils *über* ihm stehen."

OBJECTIVITY IN THE SENSE OF NATURAL SCIENCE: SEASHORE

Music performance research within the tradition of natural science can be classified under the heading of objectivity for two reasons: (1) it claims or aims at objectivity, regarding its results, and consequently the **existence of objectivity** is a precondition for this research; and (2) it aims at **objective description**, which presupposes the existence of **objective methods of investigation**. Whether there is an underlying aim for it to primarily investigate already existing **norms** and display them neutrally, for it or to create norms, i.e. to be a **normative science**, is an open question that must be answered on the basis of each case.

A substantial contribution to our individual knowledge of the natural-science (NS) aspects of musical performance was provided by a series of investigations using experimental methods of physicalistic psychology under the guidance of Carl E. Seashore⁵⁹. The volume on vibrato contains a series of experimental studies of the range, velocity and outline of vibrato in singing and violin playing. By a phonophotographic measurement of pitch, intensity, attack, release, gliding intonations (etc.), the physical aspects of sound are described. The theoretical precondition is a simple **psychophysical model of correlation**. The problem with these investigations concerns the lack of the researchers' philosophy of science and their choice of simplified models for human consciousness. Music experience in the view of Seashore is reduced to the perception of physical parameters without the reworking of impressions by

cognitive acts. Seashore proposes the possibility of measuring qualities of beauty, which according to his paradigm can be measured by and are constituted by simple parameters; Seashore intends to provide "objective, verifiable definitions, analyses and principles." He "lays a scientific foundation for [an] esthetic theory in regard to this element of beauty in music, makes available exact measures in current practice, [and] develops esthetic norms" on empirical grounds (8–9). Unfortunately, Seashore never clarifies or defines his concept of beauty, but only refers it to other concepts of measurable and correlative parameters that remain likewise undefined.

"Musical esthetics falls naturally into four divisions: the musical medium, the musical form, the musical message, and the musical response. The medium is the physical sound which has musical values [it remains unclear why and in what way this is so], the form is the structure built with the medium in the musical art of the composer and the interpreter, the message is that which the composer or the performer, in turn, intends to convey, and the response is the effect that the musical medium produces in the listener." But there is no **reference to experience**, neither primary nor secondary. Seashore attempts to justify his method by the following motivation: he intends to "approach the problem of musical esthetics [which problem is not specified] primarily from the point of view of the musical medium, first, because that is what music, as music, in reality is [which, unfortunately, is a presupposition given as support by Seashore]; and, second, because musical form, message, and response can be treated scientifically in the best interests of the art from the point of view of this approach."

However, it is not clear how musical form and message, or musical form and response, relate to each other, and whether such a relation is conceived of as being *a priori* a relation. I myself would need to know before investigating the medium 'seen as' representing form and message, if the investigation is supposed to give fruitful results for the purpose of enlightening our knowledge of music performance.

The problem, in addition, is the unclear relation set up between the acoustic and psychic factors or phenomena: what kind of things are these entities? It is impossible to explain the "auditory fusion" of rate, extent, amplitude and tone coloring in vibrato (60) without first clarifying the relations between the basic concepts involved in the investigation. Seashore's method is further clarified by the introduction to his *Objective Analysis of Musical Performance* (5): he aims to bring "all aspects of the problem involved" under the control of the

experimental measurement situation, i.e. by recording the performances and stating the results of phonometry in **quantitative** detailed terms.

The main problem is that no relation is established to **experiential qualitative phenomena**, and no criteria for the overriding structure are provided. Seashore declares his **overt reductionism**: "We deal here with only three of the four aspects of musical tone, memory, pitch, time, and intensity." (8) In order to conceive an objective analysis of the acoustical components of musical sound, Seashore presents a scheme for informational processes (of value only for comparison in our investigation) comprising "the main factors in the singing situation" (13) where he also, though without definition, introduces the concept of interpretation:

"THE SINGER	THE SONG	THE LISTENER
<i>Production</i>	<i>Performance</i>	<i>Reception</i>
(Psychophysiology)	(Sound Waves)	(Psychophysiology)
Vocal apparatus	Pitch (frequency)	Auditory system
Neurophysiology	Loudness (intensity)	Neurophysiology
Sensitivity	Timbre (wave form)	Sensitivity
Motor skill	Duration (time)	
<i>Interpretation</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
(Psychology)	(Analysis)	(Psychology)
Perception	Norms	Perception
Cognition	Individual differences	Cognition
Emotion	Variability	Emotion
Action	Laws of artistry	Action"
	Musical form	

Seashore considers especially the following stated preconditional concepts – and investigates their relationships (151): the contribution of 'duration', 'intensity' and 'pitch' variations to phrasing.

Referring to a chapter on synchronization in piano playing by L. M. Vernon⁶⁰, R. A. Rasch investigated the "Synchronization in performed ensemble music"⁶¹. Asynchronization depends on the consistency of tempo between the various instruments of an ensemble, and it can also be influenced by the relative positions in the room of the instruments. Naturally, accurate synchronization in performance of simultaneous onsets and other aspects of ensemble interaction, of which I have presented some models (MIR I:39–43), are other "aspects of

ensemble performance". Seashore understood asynchronization as related to aspects of artistic performance in a determinable way. What Rasch shows is that synchronization has a perceptual and even an aesthetic function.

Rasch concludes: "Perfectly synchronized notes are difficult to distinguish. Small onset differences (up to 30 ms.) between notes [tones!] result in a clear and separate perception of the notes [*ibid.*] while they are still perceived as simultaneous notes." So the factor of synchronization is essential for such a quality as the **distinctness** of individual tones in a complex polyphonic sound matrix.

MUSIC PERFORMANCE RESEARCH: SUNDBERG

Music performance research aims for objectivity and claims to arrive at objective results. In a series of writings, the research group around Johan Sundberg endeavors to clarify quantitative relations between acoustical facts and a few experiential criteria. They have also developed a **generative grammar** for computerized music production: the output of these systems is compared to common sense evaluations and concepts of acceptable performance. The decisive points, from the perspective of interpretation research, are the aesthetic criteria of somewhat obscure origin that are used to serve the generative system of rules.

Sundberg⁶² investigates the physical correlates to pure and false intonation for solo violin, string quartet and wind ensemble (78), and his concepts of rough and smooth timbre and consonance/dissonance are defined by their relation to physical parameters in light of the theory of the "*critical band*" by R. Plomp and W. Levelt⁶³. Sundberg uses the method of **analysis by synthesis**⁶⁴ (71) in several works⁶⁵. The general underlying assumption is that "the ability to judge the musical acceptability of a performance is a psychological fact [...] in [a] previous formal test, most of the [...] rules have been approved by a jury of musically highly trained subjects." Without specifying objectively the interpretative tradition in which this jury was trained, the values of the presented rules remain relative; and even if indisputable musical masters participated in the judgement, the result would depend completely on the epistemological worth of their interpretative aesthetics. There is no presentation of the overriding or general interpretative concepts held by them that would serve to produce (or derive) the particular rules from evaluative listening. In the evaluative process one must refer to some concepts or constants, or to some **aesthetic principles** which, by

argumentation, can support the evaluative outcome; or one must construct *a priori* a system on the basis of some accepted philosophy of science, such as phenomenology, hermeneutics or cognitive science.

Nonetheless, the methods of the research group at The Royal Technical Institute (KTH, Stockholm) is fruitful in providing opportunities for more detailed comparative testing of various systems of rules, under the condition that the activities are open to alternative aesthetical approaches. Compared to the efforts and resources available for this research, the results are thin. Interestingly, though, some of the rules, **presupposed** (not discovered) by the analysis-by-synthesis approach⁶⁶ can be supported by other interpretative systems. The main problem with this method is that the possibility of discovering new rules can be questioned after principal consideration on the philosophy of science level; and if the input of the rules is the same as the output, the input depending on musical experience or aesthetic considerations, the circle is closed.

The main rules, all given on the level of "means of expression" (MIR I:26 and index 385: "*uttrycksmedel*") concern the following factors [first list]:

- (1) the higher, the louder (62 and 1985:69; see MIR II:320 etc, concerning the 'treble-orientation' in Celibidache's aesthetics, MIR IV, and ch. V:4),
- (2) sharpening durational contrasts (63; 1985:68),
- (3) shortening of lower note in rising interval (63 and 1985:69),
- (4) pauses in leaps [this is questionable in the aesthetically high-integrated systems I have investigated],
- (5) accents marking certain durational contrasts (65),
- (6) amplitude smoothing [seems to be too generally formulated to allow relation to any reference based in context or structure (cf. inter/extramusical reference systems; ch. I:2)]
- (7) amplitude marking harmonic distance (67),
- (8) marking tonic distance⁶⁷,
- (9) lengthening first note after chord change. This is, as with all the rules presented by this research group, presented without reference to any specific empirical instance as evidence. Who plays in this way? Any recognized interpreter? The problem is this: How can one distinguish just a testing of a whim, an idea occurring to one of the researchers from something that exists in a real interpretation in performance? The latter is not the subject of these studies, and, therefore, they cannot be related to either interpretative aesthetics,

which has its own history of ideas, nor to performance practice and traditions where the scientific and musicological consensus requires reference to specific documents.

(10) final lengthening (1983:70, 1985:71).

The mastering of technical abilities is acceptable in these studies, but the non-explicit philosophy of applied science used by these studies seems unsophisticated and provides no foundations for an encompassing theory of interpretation in performance. The entities treated are physical terms that remain unrelated to experience, and there is a confusion about whether the point of departure for these "rules" is imagined, heard, visualized or visually "seen" (i.e. notated) or whether they are conceived of as a physical-acoustic reality; the use of "note" alone (as a substitute for "tone") should draw attention to this ambiguity. Some of the "rules" are described in a few lines without their contextualizing conditions being stated. The rules of application remains unexplored, and there is no explicit discussion of aesthetic consequences. A more elaborated and sophisticated list of rules (1991:164–175) merits aesthetic consideration *per se*, but the rules are still presented as if they were separate from the structure of the work. However, it is difficult to defend the independence of these or other systems of rules. Such systems are phenomenologically related to the structure of the work and to the corresponding cognitive pattern of thinking on the part of the performer. It can be stated that there can be no independent rules, and that they must be related to a context, the structure of the work and the musical mind. The following rules which should be regarded as proposals for an aesthetic discussion on interpretation in performance (relating nominal notation to performed realization) are quoted from Sundberg *et alia* 1991:166 [second list]):

MELODIC RULES

A. DIFFERENTIATION RULES

I Duration Categories ("DDC"):

1 "The shorter, the shorter" shortens short notes and lengthens long notes ("DDC 1A"), i.e. a short n → i shortening;

2 "The shorter, the softer" reduces the sound level [experiential dynamics] of notes in proportion to their inverted duration ("DDC 1B");

3 Accents (defined as a sudden increase–decrease in loudness) on the first

note of a sequence, distributed to (1) a short tone, or the first in a series of equally short tones surrounded by longer tones, (2) the first long tone (cf. Sundberg: "appearing after an accented short note": However, I propose that two proximal accents will **unify**, not differentiate, even if they occur on tones of varying basic lengths; "DDC 2A");

4 "Double duration contrast reduction" reduces the durational contrast between adjacent notes in a 2:1:>1 durational context by lengthening the shorter note by 12 % and subtracting this same amount of duration from the preceding longer note. But a contrast reduction, I submit, is no differentiation.
II Pitch Categories ("DPC")

1 "The higher, the sharper" stretches the tuning as a function of fundamental frequency. (see MIR I:220–221 *et passim* where I stress the importance of context in the sense of musical function, and state that intonation must be regarded as an **interpretation of musical, i.e. structural, function**, including the judgment and assessment of harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, metric and other factors of the persistent work structure; "DPC 1A");

2 "The higher, the louder" increases the sound level as a function of fundamental frequency (DPC 1B): as in the former rule I:4 a quantitative value is given (3 dB per octave);

3 "Melodic charge emphasis" adds "increments in duration, amplitude and vibrato–depth to the tones, depending on the absolute value of their melodic charge" (1991:169; "DPC 2A");

4 "Melodic charge intonation" adjusts the intonation of the scale–tones according to "their signed melodic charge" (DPC 2B).

B. GROUPING RULES regarding I Micro Groups (171, "GMI") and II Macro Groups (172, "GMA"):

I 1 "Leap articulation" forms overlaps and micropauses between "narrow intervals" and "leaps", the duration of which "depends on the duration of the starting note";

2 "Leap tone duration" lengthens the target note in ascending leaps while shortening the initiating note "to an extent which depends on the interval";

3 "Faster uphill" shortens each note initiating an ascending interval;

4 "Envelope smoothing" reduces sound level differences between adjacent notes within a sub–phrase "by increasing or decreasing the final sound level value of the note". (But how can the dynamic grade of the preceding tone be assessed? In phenomenal or acoustic terms? How is the leap overbridged

phenomenally and acoustically in this case?)

5 "*Inegalles*" lengthens stressed and shortens unstressed beats, with a certain indicated quantity.

II 1 "Phrase marking" on subphrase, phrase and entire melody levels;

2 "Marking harmonic charge" according to (a) the note's position as tonic, third or fifth (assigned charges 0.50, 0.33 and 0.17) in the triadic chord, and to the chord's function as calculated from its position in the harmonic circle of fifths;

3 "Chromatic charge" for atonal music, calculated on the basis of "pitch distance, in semitones, between five adjacent tones";

The **ensemble rules** that are mentioned (174) concern (1) synchronization and (2) ensemble tuning, but are not yet elaborated.

I will here relate the above quoted "rules" from Sundberg's performance research to my preliminary formal language for interpretation analysis, presented under point 2.33 in MIRI:70–72: His "rules" follow the pattern of an input–output system. Outputs (in Sundberg) are of only two dimensions, namely dynamic (Dp) and durational (Rp; I use R for "rhythm", including duration, not to be confused duration with Dynamic, D). The inputs are of the dimensions pitch (M for melodic), duration (R), harmony (H) and form (S for structure). I make a principal distinction between input–output–pairs that belong to either the same dimension (identical, ID) and different dimensions (DIFF). A **transference rule**, not specified by Sundberg, should define the relation between (1) differing dimension pairs, as well as (2) identical dimension pairs, on a principal level; e.g. one should state the Mn – Dp interrelation of Sundberg's first "rule" as a paradigmatic example; an analyse would comprise at least the following points:

- (1) the notion of "pitch" (or "melody" for "melodic aspect") in relation to
- (2) the notion of "dynamic", as well as defining
- (3) the relation between "notational" and "interpretative", or in the physicalistic terms used by Sundberg,
- (4) between "acoustic" and "performed".

Furthermore, there is a need to explicitly define the basical notions and the lateral relations between these dimensions, i.e. transference rules or clarified

concepts relating "acoustic pitch" to "performed dynamic" as well as "performed pitch" to "acoustical dynamic". This would complete and clarify the importance of their system. Now, rules no. 2 and 6 of the first list are "identical" (ID) as far as the input-output dimensions are concerned.

Other mentioned rules concern the factor 'differency' (DIFF): these are Ra – Rp (no. 2) and Da – Dp (no. 6; it is somewhat unclear if the input refers to acoustical or notated entities). The others are Mn(a) – Rp (3,4), Rn(a) – Dp (5), Hn – Dp (7,8), Hn – Rp (9) and Sn – Rp (10; S for structure in my designation stands for "form" in Sundberg).

However the research of Sundberg and A. Friberg⁶⁸ is a first step in the development of methods for the testing of proposed criteria for performance, with the limitation that the parameters are defined by means of physical entities only. Critically, the proposed "system of performance rules determine the physical sound parameters with regard to specifically fixed formal parts of the score (triads, melodies) which are implemented in programs for PC with a synthesizer periphery. The authors are concerned with equal temperament and abstract from the dynamic as well as from agogic instructions in the score. For example, melody rule GMI 1C Faster Uphill requires that the duration of a tone in an ascending melody is shortened by $2k$ msec, where k is a constant of the rule system. Or else, harmony rule GMA 2A, Harmonic Charge, alters the loudness of a triad as a function of its tones, the latter being defined for a given tonic of major or minor tonality. The system is **not interactive** [my emphasis] and remains fixed during the performance of a composition. It only depends on the above constant k and the tonic for major or minor tonality."⁶⁹

Finally a note on the epistemological status of the proposed systems of "rules" in the performance research by Sundberg and collaborators. Since these rules are not evident by reference to some apriorical distinction on logical or metalogical grounds, they must be regarded as **hypothetical postulations**, generated freely more or less on the basis of empirical impressions and **common sense observations** corroborated to some extent through inquiring test groups. So if an empirical truth is supported by evidence and considered established only afterwards and exactly on such grounds, then all the rules consequently need to be tested in the same way in order to be confirmed **within the chosen epistemological system**. The problem is that the outcome of such tests, in its turn, must be confirmed or disconfirmed again, by reference either to findings supported by a mass of empirical material (e.g. phonogram recordings), or by any overridingly generative aesthetic ideal proved to be indisputable, or at least

made probable and accepted in the musical community.

Another way of testing them would be to secure those results by relating to a superior cognitive and metalogical structure. By substituting the concept of "rules" for "contextual and structural tendencies" (or even Celibidache's "natural tendencies") I can confirm certain points of Sundberg's research empirically through clearly supportive evidence from rehearsals and seminars with Sergiu Celibidache. For example, let us consider one of the proposed "rules" on both the intentional and realizational level of interpretative performance, the first, "the higher the louder", which I would prefer to designate as

(1) a "positive $M_n - D_p$ correlation" (notated melody – performed dynamic); I would accept this as a candidate for being a criterion in structural, contextual conditions, and in aesthetic ideals of delimited compositional and interpretative styles. A few of the other "rules" – a shortening of the lower note in rising interval, accents marking durational contrast, and amplitude marking harmonic distance, or, I would add, marking harmonic distance to main tonality, regional tonality or the immediate chord environment – may be discussed seriously within the systems of

(2) a "negative $M_n - R_p$ correlation",

(3) a "positive $R_n - D_p$ correlation" and

(4) a "positive $H_n - D_p$ correlation" respectively (abridged notational formulas). As an alternative system, and for practical reasons, I introduce signs for positive (+) and negative (–) correlation: letting + stand for a positive correlation and – for a negative correlation, would give: $M_n - R_p$, $R_n + D_p$ and $H_n + D_p$ respectively.

Compared to performance research (Sundberg), MIR concentrates on the cognitive pattern of musical thinking at another level. There may be a practical reason, along with the theoretical one: interpreters are generally not supposed to imitate any empirical results in their performance, not even to imitate other musicians, which is considered to be a sign of artistic dependence. In a consensus evaluation, a performance should represent an independent musical statement, and a genuinely individual interpretation of the work.

Despite the science–philosophical limitation of his experimental computer-aided synthetic performance research, Sundberg in his works clarifies the formal system and criteria of performance quality. However the loose relation to wa and ia remains, and the criteria he proposes are neither interrelated nor related to complex compositional structures.

A CRITICAL VIEW OF A SPECIAL CASE OF PERFORMANCE RHYTHM RESEARCH IN RECENT MUSICOLOGY. ITS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF THE BASES OF THE INTERPRETATION OF RHYTHMS AND METER: BENGTSSON, GABRIELSSON, EDLUND

My account of the Uppsala Rhythm Research Project, initiated by Ingmar Bengtsson, and in cooperation with the music psychologist Alf Gabrielsson, Stig-Magnus Thorsén, and others will focus on the thesis of Bengt Edlund who in his dissertation *Performance and Perception of Notational Variants. A Study of Rhythmic Patterning in Music*⁷⁰ treats the essential results from Bengtsson. This research continues the century-long traditional interest in musical rhythm and meter since Hugo Riemann (ch. III:3), and it critically deals with the modern rhythm theories of Cooper & Meyer (1960) and Lerdahl & Jackendoff (1983) and integrates the results from the Uppsala group on a more consciously reflecting level, combining empirical method with theoretical consideration. I will refer to rhythm research only insofar as it is immediately relevant to the aspect of the interpreter's intentional and aesthetic consideration.

Edlund's investigation applies the tripartite empirical relation between 45 notational variants of "Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star" to the renderings by three anonymous pianists and to thirteen listeners' judgement of perceived identification, preference and phenomenal grouping of rhythmic patterns. This is an analytic study of the n-i correspondence, opposing its "deviations", which entails a detailed reasoning as to the notational interpretation of a few rhythmic model patterns, but does not enter into the i-i interrelations (internal cohesiveness of interpretation), and mostly abstains from treating the conscious act (or cognitive process, as in Lerdahl & Jackendoff) of the performer's interpretation. Edlund critically discusses a series of hypotheses on performance shaping, which should be assessed and considered in the view of interpretation research, in spite of their disregard for the performer's intention. Notwithstanding the unidentified pianists, as if their personality-related performance style could be disregarded, the experimental methodology shows great stringency. The value of the results, however, which would be my main objection, would depend on some aesthetic assessment of the interpretative worth or quality of these notational renderings, which is difficult to obtain from the theoretical presentation.

Edlund critically and competently reviews the contributions of Bengtsson, who introduced the concept of "rhythmic dialect", defined as "the peculiar

rhythmic character of playing or singing, idiosyncratic for performers, traditions, genres or styles"; these are unnotated, pose difficult problems or even remain unnotatable in transcription attempts. According to Edlund "these dialects have been observed by clever musicians of all times" (15), and their treatment of the issue shows that it is possible to notice, recognize, describe and consider theoretically questions on the relation between notation and sound events. The notation, then, reflects only the mathematical norm of measurement. Edlund focuses on the "durational aspects of prescriptive notation" which refers to notation that (1) "*denotes* mathematically definite time proportions", and (2) "*corresponds*" to certain **durational relations**. Or, conversely, "difference sets of durational relations" in performance may "*comply*" with the same set of note values" (16). Edlund captures the dialectic between the "*conceptual strictness* of the notational imperative" and the "*actual freedom* of rhythm." And he actually defines what he conceives of a musicality in performance by determining **criteria for a musically correct interpretative relationship between musician and rhythmical notation**: "A good musician playing notated music *thinks* in terms of exact proportions (or rather he may do so when prompted to make certain musical discriminations), but *plays* in a manner that is comparable with notation *and* does justice to the character of the music" (16). First: if we leave out for a moment the questionable proposition as to whether musicians conceive of rhythmical notation cognitively and directly as "exact proportions" (and what kind of mental representation that would presuppose), the essential conclusion must be that in spite of the unambiguously proportionate indication implied by the notation there still must be ample room for differing durational proportions in performances. In this sense, one could argue that notation is inevitably **intentional**; and that its denotation is not only rational, since it hints at **real** durational values and proportions in the performance, which is approximate. Secondly: it is also true that the notation does not mean durational time proportions but **rhythms**. It seems to be possible to approach a notation according to a twofold perspectivism. When I see it as rhythm, the primary aspect of notation is rhythmic; when I see it as duration (sometimes indecisively designated by "meter" denoting "tone-lengths") it is just the durational aspect of the notation that prevails. This is a **principal** reflection that Edlund does not enter into, due to the declared primary empirical aim of his investigation. Instead he makes an important point on the **discrimination** of notated rhythm. The notated "8.16" (i.e. a dotted eighth note and a sixteenth note, according to the "numericode" designation system by Bengtsson⁷¹) can vary its **real** durational

proportion as long as it does not sound as a triplet (a quarter-note, eighth-note triplet); **then** it is a "violation of the text". So, interestingly, there is a projection from the auditory phenomena back to the notational sign system. The liveliness and intentional richness of the properties assigned to notation, felt by many musicians, may be explained by the projecting back of auditive experiences into visual imagining, a cognitive process which enables the notation to be deciphered, or at least contributes to its decodifiability. So performance enriches notation, and reality endows meaning to intentionality.

According to Edlund, "notation does not aim at bringing about definite time proportions in music making, but is intended to secure a certain rhythmic character." But his essential observation that "note values are 'normative' as far as they imply phenomenal character, but not as to exact durational relations in performance" (16), is supported only under the condition that my assumption of "back-projection", i.e. **notational intro-pretation** from experience to notation, is accepted as a hypothesis. Edlund states that the performance style of rhythm is often disregarded due to the nonobtrusiveness of the phenomenon: "the often inconspicuous character of rhythmic 'deviations' in the performance of notated music is no doubt partly explained by constraints upon rhythmic freedom due to the notational imperative", and the "style of rhythmic performance" is a "constitutive trait of notated music as performed." (17)

The performance style can be described as a deviational function of the notation's mathematical indications, which are conceived of as a background norm. Such deviations are explained alternatively or in terms of intersection as (1) unintentional mistakes, (2) "rubati introduced to meet expressive demands read out of the musical structure", or (3) "tempo fluctuations beingagogic means to articulate the formal constituents of the music: phrases, periods" (18). Furthermore, Bengtsson recognized certain (4) "systematic variations" ("SYVAR"), or, more precisely, systematically occurring deviations at certain metrical positions in a recurring and established scheme, defined by Edlund as "specific, recurring durational 'patterns' extending over some metric format, pervading and characterizing a particular piece of music" – especially motoric tempo giusto movements of regular meters which, essentially, give rise to "certain inaesthetic and/or emotional qualities". In this, though, one has to observe the distinction between **primary kinaesthesia** (bodily motion with the performer experiencing his own physiology, such as position and energetic movement against the resilience of the instrument or vocal apparatus, mediated through sensory and proprioceptive nerves) and **secondary kinaesthesia**, a

psychological effect on the listener from experiencing these expressive deviations in the performer's musical shaping, whether congruent or incongruent with the performer's visual, mimical and gestical appearance. Moreover, Edlund treats (5) "deviations reflecting the interpreter's efforts to recreate, imprint and clarify the rhythmic structure" (18), "the ways musicians handle such things as upbeats, syncopations, phenomenally coherent rhythmic groups"; and finally (6) deviations "caused by" (Edlund) articulation marks ("stress signs, slurs, dots") in the score. But these signs are qualitative indications which are in themselves ambiguous, and quantitatively imprecise (how much stress?) or undecided (ungraded "accent" signs).

The kind of relations hinted at in Edlund's list of "deviations" can be described by the terminology presented in MIRI (70 *et passim*): according to this phenomenological classification, they are all **n-i** relations, namely of **Rn-Ri**, **Rn-Di**, **RM(meter)n-Ri**, **RMn-Di** and **An-Ri**, **An-Di** in the formal language of interpretation analysis. Edlund focuses on the deviations of (1) the SYVAR:s, (2) on the representation of rhythmic structure, and (3) on articulation signs, which must be understood in light of Bengtsson's classification of different "domains of discourse": (1) "notated structures" (whereas I consider structure an outcome of the act of reading and understanding the notation entailing a necessary notational interpretation), (2) rhythm as a perceived phenomenon (actually, the ontological locus of 'rhythm') studied by music psychology (e.g. Alf Gabrielsson "Perception and Performance of Musical Rhythm" in Manfred Clynes [ed.] *Music Mind and the Brain*²), and (3) the physical events of performance that can be measured as acoustical data; Edlund expands Bengtsson's scheme on this point into (1) "rhythm-as-notated" – (2) "rhythm-as-intended" – (3) "rhythms-as-performed" – (4) "rhythm-as perceived".

Methodologically, Edlund considers rhythm-as-notated as something standing in a "part/whole relation to notation", as do physical data with regard to physical events, and test responses with regard to "rhythm-as-perceived"; in our view, Edlund defines his metatheoretical devices for **interpretative accessibility** as (1) rhythm as notated through interpretation of the notation, as (2) rhythms as performed through interpretation of physical data (which approximately represent the physical events that correspond to a specific performance), and as (3) rhythm as perceived through interpretation of test responses. He does not take advantage of the possibility of investigating the "causal" intentions of the performer, e.g. through interviews. And a further science-philosophical problem is the question regarding the compatibility of

these different kinds of subjects to interpretative acts, namely notation, physical data and test responses respectively, which, ontologically, may have different statuses. Edlund is aware of the problem that "both rhythm-as-notated and rhythm-as-performed are potentially ambiguous stimuli that may evoke different responses (i.e. intentions and perceptions, resp.)", and "rhythm-as-performed often approximately equals rhythm-as-intended, but the possibility of non-performed or mis-performed rhythmic intentions can not be excluded" (19). Still, Edlund conceives of "rhythm-as-intended" as (1) something "approachable from rhythm-as-notated, referring to common conventions of music reading or to some plausible theoretical framework", and (2) "not directly connected with any empirical category". This clarifies the distinction between empirical rhythm research and interpretation research, the latter of which focuses on the intentional content and cognitive processes of interpretative acts.

Bengtsson (& A Gabrielsson & S-M Thorsén)⁷³ studied **rhythmogenic factors**, recognizing three of them; namely (1) dynamic stress, (2) duration as the proportioning of time—according to Bengtsson of crucial importance—measured as the duration from the start of one tone event to the beginning of the next (Bengtsson 1969: his "Dii" as "duration in-in", i.e. the time from one onset to the next), and (3) the relation between the tone-duration to the silence before the entrance of the next tone (his "Dio/Doi"). Bengtsson considered the rhythmogenic factor of dynamic stress to be overestimated. Edlund summarizes Bengtsson's (1969) view: "it may often be operative in association with other factors, but if allowed to systematically imprint the event all by itself, the results are likely to be aesthetically defective; in measurements, the distribution of stress frequently turns out to be indiscriminate." The problem is that this view is based on observations that are too isolated, trivializing the aesthetic problem from the viewpoint of the interpreter, since the total complexity of a live performance and its interconnected large-scale constitutively rhythmogenic factors are disregarded. The idea proposed by Bengtsson is that these performance factors are interdependent and allow for the "possibility of factors replacing each other with preserved or similar effect" (21; Bengtsson 1974; for complete references to his rhythm research see Edlund).

Edlund endeavors to investigate the individual contributions of these three factors and their interrelation to the rhythm experience. In order to allow for deviation, the Bengtsson "Dii", "Dio" [duration in-out] and "Doi" [duration out-in] concepts must be determined in relation to some "norm", principally physical, physiological (cf. Clynes) or experiential, as an index to their

primary categories **temporality** and **duration**; there is a clarity problem here, due to the lack of a defined **reference system**; Celibidache's solution to this problem is consequently to restrict the phenomenon to **interrelations within the experiential reference system**. Still, this does not preclude the determination of a dynamic "norm" by reference to a thoroughly interconnective analysis of **intrastructural relationships** in the work. Since the *integer valor* (pulse unit) is derived from the rhythmometric common denominator of the *w*, a complete structural integration is possible. In view of this, the weak relation to the work itself and its constituent traits in Bengtsson's conception casts some doubt on the generality and applicability within performance aesthetics of Bengtsson's results.

Interestingly, though, the Bengtsson "Dio" factor, as Edlund notices (21), has no notational norm. Moreover, the articulation marks (such as the staccato point) modify the literal prescription of notational durations.

Edlund adopts the terminological distinction of Grosvenor Cooper and Leonard B. Meyer⁷⁴ (C&M) which intersects confusingly with the "common parlance" among musicians: (1) "accent" denotes "metrical strong position", (2) "stress" stands for the marking out of a tone by "dynamic means", which is the Bengtsson concept understood as "higher physical intensity", i.e. amplitude, and (3) "emphasis" denotes a "phenomenological quality no matter how it is accomplished" (22).

In "RHYTMSYVARD – A Computer Program for Analysis of Rhythmic Performance"⁷⁵ Bengtsson (& A Gabrielsson & B Gabrielsson) aims at constructing a standard procedure for analyzing bipartite relations between adjacent, consecutive tones ("sound events") in the comparison of tone-pairs, and for the purpose of determining **pattern tendencies** or systematic variations within various formats (Beat [B], Measure [M]) and levels. The distasteful scope, though, of these relations, is extremely limited for musical purposes, and the s-hierarchy never attains the *w*-encompassing level. Edlund supplements this terminology with "patterns of non-consecutive events" (23) such as "B 1-3" and "B 2-4", which overlap the B-level pattern within the 1/2-M-format, and give "reference points relating the strong and weak beats of each half of the measure" which "jointly [...] weigh the two halves of the measure against each other" (23), and expand the scheme of the analysis to the encompassing and recurrent "incongruous doublepattern" extending over four tones (24), as well as narrowing the scope to single events of "metrically recurring constant *Dii* values" (24). These would "introduce a certain stability in the everchanging stream of

consecutive Dii-relations", close to "equality". Edlund construes pattern sets by combining the Bengtsson Dio, Dii and Amplitude factors with fixed pairs of long (L; l), short (S, s), equal (EQ) and intense (I) or weak (W) categories within various formats for the purpose of clarifying factor interrelations: the important pairs are SL, LS, and IW as opposed to WI (short-long, long-short, and intensive-weak versus weak-intensive) applied to upbeat or downbeat positions. He points to the complexity of such interrelations, and possibly to their limited analyzability, due to our **perceptual tendency** to "take long durations [...] as cues for perceived accent[s], which, in turn, may wrongly be thought to entail dynamic stress" supported by alleged evidence from Fraisse (op cit), namely that duration can be confused with, and thus can be intentionally replaced by, stress. In addition, as Edlund states, dynamic and duration may be "united in the same 'natural' playing movement or gesture", and, I would add, it may simply be governed by the same intentional act.

In short, Edlund contributes theoretically to the clarification of the metatheoretical superstructure of rhythmic classification. Unfortunately, the music used in his investigation is too trivial and simplistic to merit interest from an advanced musical point of view. The securing of a methodological framework is essential for further experimental studies, but one could question whether anonymous listeners, showing varying capacities in their ability to judge, (and for that matter whether amplitude and duration measurements of anonymous pianists' notational interpretations of articulatory variants) reflect a situation that is essentially likely to occur or which bears any close similarity to artistic decisions within systems of aesthetic preference. The aesthetic reference systems seem so complexly interwoven with personal combinations of applied interpretive devices, that individual factors, such as rhythmic shaping, can hardly be isolated without manipulating the whole system. If such disturbances can be evaded, there still remains the problem of demonstrating that the observation of individual factors does not influence the complex of intentionally governing reference systems for interpretative decision. One may be allowed to suggest that the physical outcome of the interpretative act reflects only one limited aspect of the complex cognitive patterns preceding this result.

Under the title of "rhythmic ambiguity" Edlund recognizes (1) grouping ambiguity: that "the performer may choose to clarify the passage for himself and his audience by favoring one of the possible organizations with the means he has [at] his disposal, or he may choose to leave the passage in a state of

indetermination" (32); (2) the ambiguity of "the relation between the inherent meter [...] and the time signature meter imposed on it", i.e. the conflict in the relation between "inherent meter" and time signature congruent metric meter; (3) that an established and 'perpetual' normative (metric) meter will generate a **rhythm-metric conflict** if it is challenged by an inherent and oppressive rhythm-meter, and (4) that the "*pragmatic ambiguity* concerns the licence that notation allows performance", "the possibility and legitimacy of playing the same set of notes in distinctly different ways". Edlund describes notation as "open", as "ambiguous enough to permit performances having different sets of pattern tendencies." (35) Ambiguity, according to Edlund, refers neither to "the freedom to choose what rhythmic structure (or group organization) to bring out", nor to the "basic referential vagueness of notation as to exact durational proportions in performance" (35).

Edlund criticizes a series of earlier experimental studies for their naiveté, and sheer notationalism, and for the researchers' overestimation of the role of mathematical accuracy and lack of musical reflection (exemplified by authors such as Morton, Weaver and Drake). Moreover, the conventional prosodic terminology of metrics, still used by C&M for lack of better alternatives, confuses duration (length of syllable) with phenomenal accent (strong/weak) and, therefore, is not applicable to music. The Lerdahl & Jackendoff solution, of superimposing points denotive of various levels of beat accents that coincide on decisive structural places, gives, in my opinion, a graphic picture that can hardly represent anything essential in the experiencing of the music.

But C&M present a series of principles which are considered by Edlund: e.g. "the performer, interpreting this [amphibrach in double meter] rhythm, will automatically phrase in such a way that this grouping will be clear. He will [example, Edlund 19] make minute temporal adjustments, bringing the unaccented beats closer to the accent and cutting some of the value of the afterbeat by playing it staccato. This will create both coherence within groups and separation between them." (19) Due to the musical futility of the chosen melody for investigation, Edlund's hypotheses, principal reflections and critical comparison of theories are more essential than his results, at least for the purpose, and in the view of, interpretation research. The core principles stated by Edlund are mainly drawn from both C&M and Lerdahl & Jackendoff (L&J).

We could ask on what conditions these principles can attain **aesthetic generality**; the principles might then suit certain interpretative systems, while they remain incongruent and incompatible in others: "Weak events are played

closer to the accented event in order to tie them to the group. This slight manipulation of notated durations applies to both upbeats and afterbeats, and is called "*beat placement*" (51). But C&M (1960:15) focuses on the performer's placement of the weak beat as if the strong beat were immune to interpretative manipulation (tempo change): "It is most important to realize that the performer's understanding of a rhythm influences his placement of the weak beats." (C&M, 15) Edlund concludes that this principle works "in the same manner as the durational differences in the score: proximity [which is also a concept used in one of the proposed rules in L&J] in time keeps the group together, distance separates." (51) C&M (1960: ch. II 12–59, sc. 13) assert the "ability of temporal proximity to influence grouping". And "*stress–placement*", whether on a strong or weak beat, "mark[s] the beginning of a group" (C&M, 8). Edlund adds that stress or crescendo, at an accented or unaccented place, tends to tie the following event to the group, and conceives of "stress" as both a compositional and interpretative contribution, the distribution of which can be difficult for the listener to distinguish. Edlund clarifies the possible interaction between these two interpretative means (52): "beat–placement and stress–placement often operate together. This interaction tends to optimize the group clarifying effect: beat–placement is supported by stress–placement to give upbeat, downbeat and afterbeat unequivocal character. 'Late' upbeats are often stressed, thus combining temporal proximity with dynamical cuing of [the] group beginning" (52).

Edlund advances his own counterhypothesis specifically concerning anacrusis: "upbeats often seem to be played 'earlier' than rational notation prescribes, and they often seem to be supported by stress, and these 'too early' tone incidences have a strained quality that can be mistaken for, and indeed function as, stress", an observation allegedly supported by Fraisse. Edlund completes the C&M set of artifices with an expansive upbeat in cantabile, and thus distinguishes "two varieties of upbeats: the inconspicuous 'close' [...] upbeat, and a more or less intensely transitional 'expansive' variety to be found for instance in cantabile playing or in energetic passages" (52). It is important, for ontological reasons, that Edlund recognize the difference in his rhythmical analyses between (1) "stresses corresponding to dynamic markings actually *present* in the score" [] and (2) "stresses *implied* [] by notation according to conventional customs of reading/playing" (53). Among these implied stresses he distinguishes stresses derived from articulation marks, such as dots, slurs and portato–signs (the last not mentioned by Edlund in this connection), which

"also have a dynamic significance" (53). I would say that under certain **contextual conditions** of style convention and structure, and within certain interpretative systems, these articulation signs may be interpreted as having a dynamic connotation in addition to their articulative denotation. In Debussy, for example, it may be necessary to interpret articulation signs in a more generalized mode of marking for the listening conscious mind, when the connection across notes marked for articulation has to be provided by pedaling.

Bengtsson defined "positive equality" as "notational configurations in which the accented event is longer than the unaccented" (Edlund 58), i.e. the longer notes on accented beats. Bengtsson in fact envisaged the possibility of two interpretative devices, which either sharpen or smooth out durational contrast, for the purpose of clarifying the intended rhythmical structure on the part of the performer. Since Bengtsson preferred **non-intentional language**, he unfortunately never integrated these sensitive observations and reflections into a comprehensive and encompassing interpretation theory: his postulations were never fully confirmed by his ingenious experiments, and could not be confirmed as they remained essentially phenomena of an ontologically intentional status. The main limitation of Bengtsson's research was that it did not acknowledge the inevitable role of cognitive aspects within interpretation, or in other words, that it invited misinterpretation of the ontological status of his notions. Instead, he expected in vain to detect confirmations and verifications of empirical hypotheses where they could, in fact, never be found. Bengtsson's stance was sharply rejected as essentially non-musical, and criticized as a 'false position' by Sergiu Celibidache at his seminars for conductors in Mainz and Munich in the late 70's and early 80's.

The (1) "positive notational inequality", defined by Bengtsson, "appearing *between* beats tends to be smoothed out, played closer to durational equality than notation prescribes" (58), (2) the "positive notational inequality characterized by *intervening* beats, tends to be played approximately according to mechanical 'norm' (or [tends] to be somewhat exaggerated)", and (3) "the short tone in positive notational inequality is likely to be stressed". Similarly, "negative inequality", "notational configurations with short accented and long unaccented event", may be complicated by syncopations, but still operate in the same way, (1) "*negative notational inequality* appearing *between* beats tends to be smoothed out, played closer to durational equality than notation prescribes", and (2) "negative notational inequality characterized by *intervening* beats, tends to be played approximately according to mechanical 'norm' (or to be slightly

exaggerated" (59). It is the task of an aesthetic interpretation theory to assess the practicability and artistic consequences of these principles.

By means of articulation, "the performer must somehow prevent the listener from hearing the weak beat as accented. Thus he may counterbalance the stressed weak beat by emphasizing, reinforcing, the strong beat, using the *Dii* or *Dio* factors to that effect and/or by stressing the strong beat as well" (65).

Various "accent[-]preserving strategies" (65) that could have a bearing on interpretational decisions of performance emerge as feasible outcomes of combinations presented in a fruitful scheme provided by Edlund: Upbeat (passive/active) – Downbeat (heavy/light/reinforcing) – Afterbeat (soft/hard). (60) Active and passive upbeat, as conceived by Bengtsson⁷⁶, may have varying precedence according to (1) the **style** of music, (2) the **structural** demands for clarification, (3) the performance **traditions**. The dynamics, or, in Bengtsson's physicalistic language, "the amplitude" [with the concurrent problem of translating such values to experiential terms without having access to a consistent theory stating the connection between physicalistic fact and mental object], and tone-length ("*Dio*"-duration), practically staccato or legato, "appear to be consistent with either kind of upbeat" (67–68). (1) The **passive** upbeat, in the view of Bengtsson–Edlund (68), is "late and unstressed", and, logically, (2) the **active** upbeat, is conceived of as "early and stressed"; it seems risky, though, from an aesthetic standpoint, to produce superimposed means of achieving congruent effects on "lower architectonic levels" (C&M, 12). This is because "both the composer and the performer must [...] beware of overarticulating the lower architectonic levels at the expense of the higher ones. One should articulate the smaller units only as much as is necessary to make the musical intention clear" (C&M, 18) and the same warning would apply to dynamic devices. This, in a sense, is a practical consequence of the **economic** (or even ecological) principle in using interpretive artifices.

Furthermore, Edlund recognizes "two different downbeat/afterbeat varieties": (1) the **heavy–soft** pair having a "prolonged and stressed accented beat", and (2) the **light–hard** pair "presumably having [a] shortened and unstressed accented beat", and "accent–maintaining 'implied stress' is communicated by the 'reinforcing' downbeat, probably characterized by short [a] *Dio* value and dynamic stress" (68). Edlund sums up his theoretical concept in a hypothetical factor **interrelation scheme** by which the three durational and dynamic factors – "*Dii*" (S/L), "*Dio*" (s/l) and Amplitude (Intense/Weak) – are variously combined in the model of three tones following the scheme Upbeat–

Downbeat–Afterbeat.

There are "two different main options for recurrent deviation" of Bengtsson's "Dii". The LS (long–short) configuration "may be predominating in slow tempi" (49), and, conversely, Edlund suggests that the SL deviation would be more common in fast tempi. If this is correct, then for what reason is it so? Why would interpreters make their choices, consciously or unconsciously, according to this pattern? The deviative configurations, LS or SL, do not by themselves determine the tempo—but the choice of *integer valor* and pulse rate does! Then the deviation, on an interpretational level, adjusts the tempo, and the agogics (*rubati*), and gives rise to **tempo directionality** (Celibidache). SL creates a prompting effect **within** the selected tempo, whereas LS has a stemming, slightly arresting effect on the pulse flow ("effect" is not to be taken as a "psychological fact" in this connection; I am using 'objectivistic' language in the mode of phenomenology). The reason for this is phenomenological: a fast tempo gains its certain shortness of pulse unit from its relation to what is longer than itself in some sense and as identified by the musical mind. As Celibidache has noted, it is practically impossible for the conductor to change a tempo during orchestral performance by changing the duration of a weak beat. The strong beat, i.e. the strong metrical position, is always normative for the establishment of the pulse rate, and thus for the tempo. So the relation to the first sign in the constellations SL and LS, respectively, is decisive: a slow tempo is convergent to LS, and possibly the LS could reinforce the already emerging tempo character, whereas SL is divergent. An LS is divergent in fast tempo, due to the contradiction between fast and long, and could possibly reinforce its character, whereas an SL is convergent. To sum this up: slow is convergent with long, as is also fast with short, and slow is divergent with short, as is also fast with long. **Convergency** reinforces tempo character, to a certain limit beyond which the tempo range may be trespassed upon causing a perceptible change in the pulse unit, whereas **divergency** introduces a change in direction contrary to the basic character of the established tempo.

It must be advanced that it is a matter of personal interpretative style what overriding metarhythmical theory the performer embraces, and bases his shaping on: whether the interpreter conceives of any constant "intentional causality connection", or whether a **phenomenological correlation** just appears (disregarding the problematic causality/intentionality dichotomy) between durational "length" and metrical "weight". And, as Edlund suggests, the performer may, within certain limits, alter the system of accents through the

means at his disposal, appropriately and legitimately by "overstating, elucidating, subduing" (51) or even "controverting the rhythmical organization", or inappropriately by violating or misconceiving the meaning of time signatures, barlines and, I would amend, compositional grouping.

To sum up, then, Edlund's theoretical framework deserves consideration from the perspective of interpretation research. The problem is more the influence from Bengtsson's preference in dealing with simple, and non-artistic structures. However, it can be questioned whether it is possible to reach any valuable knowledge about the complexity of the masterworks if one does not directly deal with these works of art and the questions that are pertinent to illuminating their constitution and meaning. The problem will remain as long as there is no explicit statement of the conditions for supporting the idea that an analysis of such reduced structures is valid for the complexity of large scale symphonic performance. Lerdahl & Jackendoff (1983:7) are not completely unaware of this problem, since they choose examples from the concert repertoire. Still, every fragmentized section lifted from its natural place in the course of time during which the performance evolves is an artificial laboratory situation, where the changed circumstances must be accounted for.

Interpretation research cannot rely on the assumption that formulating principles parallel to those of generative grammar, as applied in analysis to separate parts or fragments of a musicwork, will give access to the essential qualities of the masterworks that need to be considered for the aesthetic purpose of performance. The arbitrariness and diversity of possible analytical perspectives in the musicological literature show the lack of justification for preferring this analytical method, something J.-Claude Piguet pointed out to me in personal communication 1992. What is most evident is that each performance is fixed, as to its sound relations, only and ultimately in the performance. Only in the performance do the tone relationships, the structural hierarchy of more or less important tones, gain the **status of reality**. So the test for an analysis of the work is not its cerebral fanciness; only performance can test the status in reality of an analytical perspective on a work.

So according to the cognitive approach favored by Lerdahl & Jackendoff⁷⁷ (L&J), composers and performers are all listeners that exercise a cognitive competence, such as **grouping** (7, 13), which is "common to many areas of human cognition":

"The ease or difficulty with which he performs this operation depends on how well the intrinsic organization of the input matches his internal, unconscious principles for constructing groupings". L&J take for granted the auditor's fundamental tendency to hearing "musical groups" in "hierarchical fashion", i.e. as an organized structure "composed of discrete elements or regions" related to each other on subordinate or superordinate (and small-scale or large-scale) levels. By means of placing a "phenomenal accent", "any event at the musical surface that gives emphasis or stress to a moment in the musical flow", the performer allows (establishes the precondition) for a 'creation' of the listener's perceptual access to the metrical accent system through points of "stress in the raw signal" that "serve as 'cues' from which the listener attempts to extrapolate a regular pattern of metrical accents" (17). Since the scheme of metrical accents, in the view of L&J, is a "mental construct" (18), or even a reconstruction from the cues given by the performer, the effect of the interactive result between the phenomenal accent system and the metrical accent system, respectively, lies to a large extent in the hand of the interpreter as to regarding them the available artistic devices. The resulting experiential metrics is also constantly in interplay with a "structural accent" system that is primarily of compositional origin: the performer can then cast light on the essential structural moment, focus on it more or less clearly, or bring it out in full relief by subduing the environment or by marking or lifting out certain tones. Thus it is essential to define "accent" in the three proposed conceptual combinations that L&J use, in a manner much more thoroughly than they do. It is true, though, that the "sense of metrical accent becomes attenuated or ambiguous" (17) if there is little regularity to the cues provided by the performance or if they conflict. "Regular and mutually supporting" cues, will yield "definite and multileveled" metrical accents. Established patterns are renounced by the listener only through overcoming resistance "in the face of strongly contradicting evidence."

The three traits pointed out by L&J as specific for musical metrics, as opposed to the prosodic metrics of literature and poetry, are the "restrictions on grouping hierarchies—nonoverlapping, adjacency, and recursion" (20). The two authors do not provide any support for their "nonoverlapping" idea: this is simply the way we hear, they propose. Simultaneously a "web of motivic associations" gives an "associational structure", in interplay with the established metrical system.

Where the "cues in the music conflict", as is the case already in large-scale metrical structures of the size of the 4-bar level, (or even more at the 8-bar level

e.g. in the Mozart *G Minor Symphony* KV 550, beginning; see music examples in MIP: 53 *et passim*; L&J 23), where the competing alternatives begin to emerge, and to attain an importance of an even still larger scope, the "conservative" (Imbrie, 1973; cf. L&J) hearing "seeks to retain the previous pattern as long as possible against conflicting new evidence", whereas a radical hearing would "immediately reinterpret the harmonies in measures 10 and 12 as hypermetrical appoggiatura chords"; "in such ambiguous cases the performer's choice, communicated by slightly extra stress (in this case, at the downbeat of either measure 10 or measure 11), can tip the balance one way or the other for the listener" (25).

The interaction of the grouping structure (i.e. hierarchically organized units) and the metrical structure (i.e. beats organized hierarchically) is essentially an experiential synthesis. L&J separate these concepts analytically in postulating that "groups do not receive metrical accent, and beats do not possess any inherent grouping" (26); i.e. they do not belong to the previous or the following beat: "Even though the two structures obviously interact, neither is intrinsically implicated in the other, that is, they are [in contrast to the view of C&M] formally (and visually) separate".

The concept of phase is essential in the reasoning over the interrelation between the reference systems, not only in the view of Sergiu Celibidache, but also for L&J: "the degree to which grouping and meter are in or out of phase is a highly important rhythmic feature of [a] musical passage" (30). But their concept of "structural accent" is problematic. Why should the "pillars, turning points or points of gravity" that L&J point to be regarded as "accents" in the tonal organization of a piece? They are elements, or rather moments, in unfolding complex tonal relations constituting various structures, and these structures have some phenomenological traits in common: e.g. they all have a beginning and an end ("cadence" in L&J). The term "accent" is too loosely adapted by L&J, denoting "specific function". There is no reason to associate or equate beginning and end with "accent", not from the phenomenological point of view, and seldom in performance shaping. The assertion that the "terminating structural accent takes place at the moment of resolution" (31) creates a contradiction in terms of musical common sense, sometimes L&J admit. This view leads to terminological confusion, and simplifies unduly our model of the complex interaction (to the detriment of artistic/aesthetic richness) between various reference systems (e.g. between accents and rhythmometric scheme).

Basically, then, L&J advance a cognitive psychology for structural

perception that is formulated in rules according to a logical and systematically progressive form with three kinds of rules as a theoretical framework: (1) well-formedness, (2) preference, and, (3) transformational rules (10). Their direct contribution to an interpretation theory is thin, but their rule system can be reinterpreted as being valid for all listening acts: the audience's, composer's and the performer's.

Specifically, and explicitly, L&J present the following notion of interpretation (63): the performer decides in selecting his interpretation the mode of both his actual hearing and his intended hearing of the piece. This interpretation is regarded as a largely unconscious **preference analysis**. It is not stated by L&J how this analysis can be unconscious, and still influential, or how it can be an analysis at all, while it is unconscious. In "projecting a particular conception of a piece" the performer can manipulate "the perception of grouping" as an important interpretive variable. This "grouping structure is a crucial link between the musical surface and the more abstract time-span and prolongational reductions". Through "execution of local details", which affect the choice of small-level and larger grouping boundaries, the performer achieves his "principal influence" on "grouping perception". The shaping of the musical surface may be in conflict with interpretational groupings, which may respond to various structural factors, in the view of L&J mainly of compositional rhythm. The beginning measures of the Mozart *A Major Sonata* for piano KV 331 (6/8) may be grouped as upbeat (on the last eighth) in accordance with C&M, but, according to L&J this is an interpretation that favors "local detail". Instead, L&J suggest "maximal motivic parallelism" as their criterion for interpretative choice, which would favor grouping whole measures as undivided units: this is achieved by sustaining "the quarter note all the way to the eighth, which will shorten the eighth and diminish its volume." The performer, thereby "creates the most prominent break", though I would argue that this break should be all but prominent (!), "and change in dynamics at the bar line". Here, though, I would rather suggest that the rule of **continuity** applied to dynamics warrants, through maintaining the phenomenon of **retrospective cohesiveness**, the perceptual classification of the last eighth note as **belonging to the group congruent with its metrical position**. Above all, the performer must avoid all disturbances of the bar motif unit, since in this interpretation two reference systems must coincide: the **grouping through legato articulation and dynamic continuity is congruent with the metrical system** established in this piece. What L&J suggest, is first (63) a shortening of the eighth and a diminishing of

its volume, and then, for the purpose of bringing out their same preferred interpretive version, "a slight shift in the attack point of the eighth, playing it a little early for grouping" (their whole measure motif), i.e. practically a **displacement** anticipating slightly the last weak beat of the bar (and, consequently, 'retarding' it slightly, compared to C&M's i). Thus, the last eighth will be shortened, and due to its weakness or the 'elasticity' (my term) of its metrical position, it can be postponed slightly without endangering the establishment of the metrical system in the beginning of the piece, through prolonging the quarter note over the schematic borderline of rational durations into the area of the last beat. The problem, though, is that the interpretation of L&J is not consistent. They in fact propose two different possible solutions to the problem of keeping the whole bar motif together, without stating this explicitly. One cannot, of course, both anticipate and postpone the same note in a metrical scheme. Such an inconsistency of interpretation would probably in practice lead to an unsatisfying artistic result. Otherwise, L&J are on the right track, theoretically, even if their proposed inclusion of interpretative means which contribute to the interpretation is in principle much too restrictive.

One attempt to provide objective grounds for the purpose of guiding performers in their choice of tempo should be mentioned. Allen Forte seeks to base suggested tempi and tempo relations through reference to the precise structural phenomena of various rhythmical and metrical layers, and their interaction, which leaves very small margins for variation in the choice of tempi for a successful performance that aims to render these substantial relations between, say, the individual variations in Brahms' orchestral works⁷⁸:

The "various *tempi* are derived from rhythmic configurations which are, in turn, conditioned – if not totally determined – by basic melodic–rhythmic patterns unique to this work." (138) Forte's conclusion, after his detailed investigation, is the proposition that it is "inconceivable that the *tempo* sequence is a random affair in a composition as highly integrated as this." Forte uses the concepts of middleground and foreground, of Schenkerian origin, for the purpose of denoting the rhythmic layers, but his concept is also processual, accounting for "*tempo* progression" (147) as "one of the larger rhythmic patterns in the composition." What factors in the musical structure determine these incisive tempo changes? Forte points at the use of a rhythmic technique;

"subdivision and shifting" (140) must be distinguished: "the metrical (foreground) accents coincide and if the subdividing pattern [...] consists of smaller values than the other pattern involved, then we get the effect of subdivision", and "if there is no coincidence of metrical accent and if the subdividing patterns consist of smaller or *equivalent* values [...] then we get the effect of shifting."

The intriguing observations by Forte can to some extent be confirmed by reference to the practical thinking of interpreters, and to the outcome in performance of similar observations of the **extremely restrained conditions** for interpretative variation within the "zone of freedom" for the performing of this "classicistic" masterwork of Brahms in accordance with Celibidache's opinion (MIR IV).

In an elaborated and sophisticated system in *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations*⁷⁹ by David Lewin, the performance of varying metronomic tempi transforms the structural grouping of the piece, which is described in terms of set theory. The influence of performance on the referentiality of structural relations is thereby proved. These changes are due to the various significance of the contextual interrelations that arise in performances of differing tempi (in Elliot Carter's string quartet no. 1). "Any time span has the potential for becoming a local contextual time unit, setting a local tempo" (67). It is clear from this that tempo decisions are made, with structural consequences, on both a notational basis and from the results, constantly being reviewed by critical hearing, during rehearsals.

The same highly objective level of reference and standpoint regarding the proper foundations for an interpretation focusing on performance is held by Reinhold Brinkmann, who very restrictively refers to this aspect of interpretation in his analysis of *Drei Klavierstücke* op. 11⁸⁰. Regarding his understanding of this piece "wird sich das gleiche Problem von einem [...] durchaus traditionellen Ausgangspunkt, den philologischen nämlich, her zentral stellen und zum Mittelpunkt der Interpretation werden." (55) He thoroughly investigates indications for a **compositional** interpretation focusing on **motivic organization**, "*Gliederung*" (74), intervallic invariances, "*Kontur*", "*Artikulation*" as indicated by notational markings, and "*Akzentverteilung*". Dynamic and tempo markings are explained through their interrelations and bearing on the development (80), and a few experiential concepts, which logically must depend on either real or imagined performance qualities, such as "*Klangbild*" (81), "*Spannung*" and "*Kontrast*" (87) are introduced. The "*Formgebung*" of parts and the whole ("im einzelnen resp. ganzen") as well as its "*Ausdruck*" is discussed and hints to the

performer are given very restrictively (104); finally, about op. 11 no. 2: "In T. 5 wird das – Oberstimme bleibende – es ins des (cis) weitergeführt, die ostinaten Achtel garantieren neu ansetzend die Kontinuität des Verlaufs. Eine minimale Nuancierung des Tonsatzes also (verbunden mit dem molto rit. [...]) hat den Schluss hervorzubringen."

STANDPOINTS CONCERNING THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS FOR ARTISTIC INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: A FEW EXAMPLES IN CONTRAST TO THE NOTION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF NATURAL SCIENCE: KÜHN, LICHTENHAHN, DELA MOTTE

The title of an article by Clemens Kühn formulates the following question: "*Verlust der Unmittelbarkeit?*". He questions the fecundity of analysis⁸¹, pointing at a successful fusion, the integration of intuition and thinking acts instantiated by E. T. A. Hoffmann and Robert Schumann, who "dem Instinkt denkend nachgegangen [seien]". With reference to common sense opinion, Kühn states that "kein ausübender Musiker, der um die Gewissenhaftigkeit seines Spiels besorgt ist, wird [...] gänzlich abstreiten wollen, dass analytische Erkenntnis, geistiger Nachvollzug des Notentextes, das Spiel beeinflusst" (129). This concerns the romantic definition of *i*, illuminated in the works of Ernst Lichtenhahn.

Lichtenhahn has traced the sources of certain intuitive concepts of descriptive interpretation ("*Innerlichkeit*", "*Musik als allgemeine Sprache*", and "*Zeitlichkeit*") to the literary works of E. T. A. Hoffmann, and he is presently the supervisor of a joint project at ETH (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule) and Zürich University in cooperation with Guerino Mazzola, Peter Läuchli and Jörg Waldvogel (p.c. 5.11.92; presentation by Dr. Mazzola). The project currently being pursued intends to explore the full combinatory patterns of selected quantifiable *p*-parameters that can be interpretively influenced by the performer. The emerging system with its "interpretational logic" (Schweizerischer Nationalfonds Request No 21-33-651-92; 3.1.) will be programmed in order to develop a new type of 'performance work-station' which will be at the disposal of interpretation theory. (3.8.) The project, entitled "Computergestützte Behandlung von Intonations-, Agogik- und Dynamikfeldern und deren Logiken als Beitrag zu einer mathematischen Theorie der musikalischen Interpretation", seems promising since, as outlined, it will provide entirely new methodological possibilities for comparative performance analysis; therefore a theory

expounding the framework to the aesthetic criteria needs to be developed. With this study I submit my contribution to this requirement in cooperation with the Zürich project.

The shared view among musicians is that "Instinkt und Bewusstheit, Intuition und Reflexion erscheinen als korrelative Begriffe." However, according to Kühn, one cannot disregard the problem of clarifying in which way analysis is supposed to influence performance, or, I would add, just avoid the problem by referring to an unproved a priori assumption of just such an all-embracing correlativerelation, since "eine analytische Deutung[...] ist schwerlich unmittelbar interpretatorisch umzusetzen. Und doch: Sie vermag die spielerische Haltung zu prägen, das Gespür für das Ineinander von musikalischer Logik und freigesetztem Klang zu schärfen." (129). Kühn's solution, which I consider insufficient, is to postulate a kind of analysis focusing solely on **compositional principles** which organize the layers of sound for the interpreter. But this is logically not possible without reference to some subset of audibly imagined interpretative means of sound shaping at the disposal of the skilled performer.

So, in the end, the compositional analysis needs to be completed by an **interpretative analysis**: "Eine 'vergewissernde' Analyse nun kann [diese] 'unmittelbare' Interpretation stützen und anreichern, eine Analyse nämlich, welche die kompositorischen Prinzipien verfolgt, nach denen die Klangschichten für sich und im Verhältnis zueinander geordnet sind." (130). Cleverly, Kühn notices the limited needs for analysis when understanding is unproblematic, but I would argue that this restriction of the demand for analysis only refers to the need for **compositional analysis**. Even if the work is transparent, the question still remains as to what means its clearly appearing structures should be rendered in p; there should be a focus on the **interrelative coherency of applied interpretative means** in such a case. With this comment, it is still clear that "Analyse in dem Masse notwendig werde, wie das spontane Verständnis auf Widerstand stosse [...]". (130)

In the same issue of *Musica*, under the title "*Denken und Vergessen*" (141), Diether de la Motte also takes a restrictive position towards the use of analysis for the purpose of performance. He apparently feels that fear of analysis may become a burden for the interpreter instead of giving assistance, and de la Motte hints at what analysis should focus on in order to fulfill its useful function: "Wir würden so [...] zielen, dass analytisch Erforschtes vom Interpretieren nicht als Belastung empfunden wird, dass er vielmehr als lohnend erkennt, seine Klugheit zu sensibilisieren und seine Spontaneität klüger werden zu lassen."

(141)

Diether de la Motte does not pursue the idea of investigating the cognitive acts related to the issue in the title of his article. It is not clear what he means by "*Vergessen*". Surely if all the influences or changes achieved by the analysis disappear through falling into oblivion, there is no need for an analysis, and no arguments that can support it. A more fruitful perspective would be to regard the question of the actuality of the analytical results in light of the concepts of *faculty* and *competence* (capacity, ability) for arriving at a successful interpretation by illuminating the conditions and prerequisites for being able to implement it. A positively estimated quality of 'preparedness' comes to the fore due to a thoroughly worked-through or carried-out interpretative process appearing at the moment of confronting the presentative implementation in a performance for an attentive audience: a faculty that could fortuitously be improved by pre-analytic work. It is surely a subject of interest for cognitive research, to clarify these processes of consciousness, and discuss how the outcome of an analytically influenced image of the composition guides or governs the shaping of a sounding reality. Still, de la Motte, somewhat dogmatically, states: "Einmal durchgedacht und bewusst realisiert, darf alles wieder vergessen werden; die Vorstellung des Musikers wird dem Werk nähergekommen sein." (145) But if it should be forgotten, then how can it be influential? To state that analysis is a fruitful means for the purpose of performance is to admit that it facilitates rehearsal and/or is favorable for (i.e. influences) i. What analysis reveals may be automatized, or 'innervated' during exercise. In this sense the analytic prescript may be integrated in the i-shaping of p.

More sceptical is Thomas Grubb⁵² in the material that he provides for students. Interpreting for him is taking a stance on the basis of the simple and cleverly practical advice that can be given in order to solve the pragmatic problems of performing. There is no demand for a profounder analysis of interpretative problems, and no need for the performer to know anything of the philosophical grounds for his art, according to Grubb, since the foundations are not to be found at the metalevel. *Prosody* and *diction*, as well as the knowledge of language, can guide the singer in finding his resultant interpretation (100): it is important to "preserve the message and mood of a line". His main idea is that the "composer's awareness of prosody will facilitate the singer's interpretation because the score and its details will serve as hints rather than obstacles to that interpretation", which corresponds to the text's correct diction and prosody.

Practical realism is sufficient for achieving an acceptable level of p, and its first rule is to 'respect the composer', which is not strictly defined by Grubb: "One's first duty in interpreting music is to observe all the composer's requests in the realization of his creation." (102) This is an '**objectivistic**' stance, or even **naive objectivism**. The only degree of analysis that is needed is the one that will "uncover" the interpretative demands of a composition, in respect of which the overriding rule would be to maintain "simplicity and honesty in one's confrontation of the text and its setting."

IV PERSPECTIVES OF PARTICIPANTS IN MUSIC LIFE: COMPOSER –MUSICIANS – CRITIC.

IV:1 INTERPRETATION FROM THE COMPOSER'S VIEWPONT: SESSIONS, SCHÖNBERG, STRAVINSKY AND HINDEMITH.

Composers represent the causative perspective from the point of view of the creator of the work, who checks the realization of the indications the composer has given in his score. The composer's view mainly focuses on the question of executional correctness, insofar as the composer's judgement of the performance is restricted to the aspects of the **realization of the notation and structure**. This may legitimately be the case if the composer considers his technique of notation sufficient to indicate all of the essential **compositional structure**. The realization of it, then, in cases where the notation cannot completely and lucidly reflect all the *c*-structures required to be heard in performance, becomes the second concern of the composer.

The interesting relation to focus on is *C-w-i*, where the composer is supposed to have full direct 'causative access' to *w*; thereby standing in transparent relation to *i*. But the danger is that he substitutes *w* for himself, *C*, or for himself in context, C_{α} , while ignoring the fact that *w*, as constituted and in effect, is not his product alone since it is created contextually, through **receptive interpretation of *c* in the context of *w***. The *c* absorbs its connotational and ancillary traits from *w*. In contrast, the composer is able to control the correspondence of the *c*-structure to the *i*-structure. In the creative phase of a particular *c*, he is supposed to have very good, full and direct access to his *c*, and no obstacles occur in the normal creative process. But it should be noticed that this ability of full *w*-access is not *a priori* exclusive to the composer; it is possible to acquire this through intensive training in score reading and long-term musicianship, as is shown by conductors of great competence.

SESSIONS

Roger Sessions reflects on the conditions and determinants of musical performance in his *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener*¹ with his point of departure in the "essential and inherent quality of music – its fluidity"; music is an art of time and "in music each moment is floating". This would be the core of the central experience to hold onto and on the basis of which

the performance should be shaped. However; time past has not disappeared forever. It remains in some non-chronological sense, and stays in memory as a reference, relatable to the 'absolute now'.

He exemplifies concretely what he conceives of as the central task of relating to the acoustical space and correcting the performance according to specific musical circumstances. He also gives examples of performers' **means of expression**. The performer is allowed to vary the sharpness with which the larger rhythmic articulations are to be "brought out of their timing and spacing—a large instrument in a small room demands a slower tempo than a small instrument in a large hall." But the requirement of sensitive adjustment to acoustic conditions is justified via experience, as is clearly exhibited in Celibidache's concept. Only man, not an acoustic space, can meet such a demand.

From the composer's viewpoint Sessions demands the universality of his propositions: "Composers of all times have demanded of performers whatever **liveliness and eloquence** [my emphasis] the latter could give. They have not, however, attempted to indicate the intangible factors in performance [...] they have known fairly well that these factors, which make all the difference, indeed, between a good performance and a bad one, cannot conceivably be indicated in any score." Sessions attempts to justify the indeterminacy of *w* through *n*. To a certain extent there seems to be unanimity on this point among composers with regard to notated music.

As to the question of **what composers can fix** through conventional **notation**, Sessions holds that they "indicate [...] the essential contours of the music, and the means required of the performer. Indications [...] are functional in intent [...] needed in order to lay bare the propositions, to underline the contrasts, and to clarify, through articulation and through various types and gradations of accent, the rhythmic outlines of his [the C's] score. Their function is to illuminate the form of the work by throwing its outlines into sharper relief." There is obviously much room left for action and shaping by the interpreter in performance, even after the composer has accomplished his creative act.

SCHÖNBERG

In his collection of articles *Style and Idea*², Arnold Schönberg provides a justification for the function of interpretation as that which **clarifies the structure** for the listener. He refers to Schenker (ch. II:7) who, according to Schönberg,

"insists [...] that the phrasing must be shaped so as to make motivic structure clear." (347) Schönberg holds that "phrasing has to do solely with *performance* [...]. The performer is justified in exposing motivic relationships to the listener ('performing' them for him [in the sense of *per-formare*]), in so far as it genuinely helps him to understand a piece". (347).

Otherwise, Schönberg gives a series of aphorisms on different levels of abstraction, and notes for instrumentation and the technique of notation.

He argues polemically for the right of the composer to decide the tempo in "About Metronome Markings" (342–343) from 1926 and provides intelligent clues to the interpretation of modern notation.

He proposes that the **free zone of interpretive decision and action** on the part of the performer should be handled with the aims of (1) realizing and clarifying the "author's ideas" and (2) making them "comprehensible" to the listener. The performer is regarded by Schönberg solely as the **composer's spokesman** without granting him any artistic independence: In the fragment "For a Treatise on Performance" (1923/24: 319), Schönberg insists: "in making the author's ideas and their flow comprehensible, a good deal can be done through a certain liveliness in rhythm and tempo, a certain emphasis in the delivery of phrases, in contrasting, opposing and juxtaposing them, a certain build-up in tempo and dynamics, a purposeful distribution of *espressivo* and its opposite [...]." Schönberg explains what interpretative devices can be applied in order to achieve an overriding aesthetic goal, in his case the **comprehensibility** of the composer's ideas (intentions), which must appear **fluent** to the listener in performance.

He also considers the aesthetic and ethical perspective of the average-educated listener, recognizing his difficulties in discriminating and evaluating: "the naive, less cultivated listener can more easily be convinced by this obtrusive and gesticulating type of performance than by reproducing the relationships of the ideas in a subtle, carefully considered manner." (319)

Concurrently, though, he sees an opportunity for the composer in **reliance on skilled artists**: "But, on the other hand, an outstanding soloist (Kreisler, Casals, Huberman, among others) has a way of working at his part; he tries to make even the tiniest note sound, and to place it in concrete relationship to the whole."

Theoretically, Schönberg realizes the necessity of interpretation from the **indeterminacy** of the relationship between notation and sound: "The sound-relationships established by means of notation need interpreting. Without

interpretation they are not understood. Not only does each age have different tempi and make different demands on performance (faster–slower, heavier–lighter, more pathetic–less pathetic, more tender–rough – such things as these fluctuate in an irregular way), but even the demand for greater or less clarity in the constitution of the texture alters".³ Principally, though, the demands of the composer are prior to that of the auditors and the composer is assumed to intend exactly what he has written: "for an interpretation to be in keeping with our technique one must expect to hear *all* the parts with equal prominence". This view expresses a high confidence in the notation as a codifier of the composer's intention, which presupposes that the intention can be formulated, communicated, and explicitly and completely expressed in a notation, and which could be taken as an argument against vague and intuitive moods, which, because they exist, in the composer's mind, are 'non–notationable' intentions.

Hence, the Schönberg idea of emancipation, equal status for all chromatic notes in the 12–tone scale, is, in a way, adapted from a principle of interpretation in performance. **All the parts** must be evinced with the same **clarity**. This uncompromising demand for complete **transparency** leads to the temptation of solving the problems of the **correct rendering of complex structures** by technical means of **reproduction**: "insofar as the mechanization of music [...] states as its main aim the establishment by composers of a definitive interpretation, I should see no advantage in it, but rather a loss, since the composer's interpretation can by no means remain the finally valid one." (328) Schönberg recognizes the advantage of the precise mechanical fixation through recording only "insofar as it is a matter of definitively settling the basic relationships within the musical ideas and of ensuring the production of sounds and their correct relationship to each other." (328)

Schönberg, finally, outlines his demands on his ideal interpreter: "A musician [knows] what he has to do: he needs an exact knowledge and understanding of the work he is to perform, and has to influence the reproducing apparatus so that in the matter of dynamics the performance attains a degree of clarity and expressiveness matching his insight and taste." (329)

Schönberg's scattered thought on the subject of interpretation was never built into a system by himself.

STRAVINSKY

Igor Stravinsky takes a stance on **intended objectivism** in his chapter on the performance of music.⁵ Stravinsky relies on the Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual music, where potential music depends on either preservation through documentation "on paper" or retention of memory. He grounds another distinction, that between **creator** and **performer** on these two forms of existence. Unfortunately, if it is true that "the language of music is strictly limited by its notation" (122), which he contends, then improvisation and improvisatory moments in performance based on notation would have to be excluded. This, evidently, is not the case, as is shown by the addition of ornaments and cadences also in the classical repertoire.

Stravinsky's third distinction, between **execution** and **interpretation**, is problematic. Whereas execution is defined by him as that which implies "the strict putting into effect of an explicit will" with the additional condition of a realization that is a **restrictive rendering** of "nothing beyond what it specifically commands", interpretation is not clearly defined as exclusively distinct from execution. Such interpretive restrictions concern:

(1) 'external' **limitations** upon the performer, (but imposed by whom? The composer or the tradition? Limitations from what? Notation or the audience's expectation?), and

(2) 'internal' **limitations** "which the performer imposes upon himself in his proper function", which, as Stravinsky determines it, is to "transmit music to the listener".

Transmission to the listener does not exclude the strictness of rendering; rather it implies that, exactly on the logical condition that it is **the music** which is supposed to be transmitted, i.e. on the condition of fulfillment of the **work identity criterion**. However, there are other conditions for the proper function of transmission to the listener, namely requirements of e.g. instrumental **dexterity**, acoustics and the listener's attention, not mentioned by Stravinsky, who recognizes a "conflict between these two principles" of interpretation and execution. His **logic of performance** assumes that interpretation (i) implies execution (e) but not the reverse: $i \rightarrow e$; but $e \rightarrow i$ is **not valid**. The aim of notation is to **reduce ambiguity**. At the same time he recognizes the fundamental and unavoidable **indeterminacy of notation**: "no matter how scrupulously a piece of music may be notated [...], it always contains hidden elements that defy definition" (123). Paradoxically, Stravinsky who trusted notation and nothing

but notation as a secure transmittable source for w , and as the primary ontological guarantee for $p(w)$ and p of nothing but w , doubts the possibility of notation to indicate exactly what the C intended it to indicate (i.e. C 's notational intention, $n_{C(int)}$), while Schönberg expressed his confidence in a notational system that he considered insufficient for codifying his compositional requirements of qualities other than most basic kind, such as expressivity in p (which he demands from musicians). My conclusion is that the incoherencies of both composers' view on notation ontology shows their inherent lack of complete determinacy, but in different areas.

On this point Stravinsky jumps to a surprisingly superficial conclusion: that the realization is a "matter of experience and intuition" left in the hands of "talent", which is not quite consistent with his own view. These vague concepts can be substituted by explicit criteria, as proposed in this project. Though insufficient, the criteria that he provides regard:

(1) that i be reduced to e ,

(2) that the P is aware of an (unspecified) 'musical law' ("consciousness of the law") imposed upon him "by the work he is performing" (127),

(3) that the P shows "submissiveness and culture", which demand a certain "flexibility" in the 'interpretive attitude' towards the w , and which require "technical mastery, a sense of tradition and, [a] commanding [of] the whole, [and] an aristocratic culture" on the part of the performer. By respecting the somewhat paradoxical finding of "freedom in extreme rigor", identical to the requirements that Stravinsky imposes on composers, the performer is promised success by Stravinsky. This legitimately will be rewarded to him only on the condition that he preserves a "modesty of movement and the sobriety of impression that is the mark of thoroughbred artists" (128), even in expression of "brilliant virtuosity".

Stravinsky interestingly recognizes a visual aspect of performance in contending that music must be "seen", thus adding a **choreographic** quality to the performance. The performer is compared to the dancer and dramatic orator, but the difference is that the singer is more "tightly bound to *tempo* and *melos*" (122).

The problem, though, is that Stravinsky's reference to "beautiful presentation" and "sure taste for expressive values and their limitations" (128–129) fails to explain whether and how this quality is supposed to be integrated in the musical recreation of sound in performance, which is self-contradictory in Stravinsky's conceptions since he allows no room for gestalting the soundshape;

such integration with other arts is excluded, as a consequence of his own theory, if the interart influence has not already been codified in the score. He also contradicts himself by simultaneously formulating an edict on **contra extramusical** grounds for interpretation: they may become "an excuse for gratuitous hindthought". (125) Not even the **title** of a piece gives a reliable directive, since it indicates a non-relevant influence. And if there is **no title** another problem will arise, according to Stravinsky: the performer may thrust a title upon the piece "for wildly fanciful reasons". In addition, and alternatively, the lack of a title may be taken as a liberal allowance, a *licentia poetica* for illicitly enlarging the performer's zone of freedom.

In referring to the proverbial "the sin against the spirit of the work always begins with the sin against its letter" (124) Stravinsky establishes his **purism**. Confusingly, he talks in the same breath about the habits of bad **taste** that must be evaded –(5:1) *crescendo* → *accelerando*, (5:2) *ritardando* → *diminuendo* – and he criticizes (5:3) the cultivation of extreme nuances (e.g. of *ppp*) to the detriment of accuracy in rhythm.

In proposing that "the worst interpreters usually tackle the Romantics" (125), Stravinsky hints at the "extraneous elements that are strewn throughout their works", i.e. **compositional** traits, which "invite betrayal". But why would the romantic repertoire invite subjectivistic betrayal more than the classical and classicistic do? The Romantic **work structure** is 'looser' while **performance markings** are 'stricter', in the sense that they are more elaborate, according to the basic style pattern. This contrariness can balance the outcome, which Stravinsky disregards. Furthermore, if the 'clean' classical page is less prescriptive to the performer, then **more room** is left for the performer's decision, contrary to Stravinsky's conclusion. The interpretation may instead need to base itself on the more stringent structure of the work, given the lack of directives. The fewer performance markings in classical scores may be compensated for by a clearer structure, which is supposed to entail more determinate **implications** for realization.⁶

Stravinsky requires respect for the effect of acoustics on the state of the sound reaching the public, and for the composer's intention regarding 'sonorital' mass, the number of musicians for each part and the size of orchestra. For aesthetic reasons he restricts the doubling of orchestral parts, because "thickening is not strengthening" (130) and allows such perilous additions only if carried through with a subtle and delicate discriminative "taste" for **proportioning**. Doubling may give the auditors "the illusion of strength" and balance only due

to its effect of psychological shock. Similarly, "beyond a certain degree", increased dynamics diminish the impression of intensity and dull the sensation. (131)

"Sound [...] acts differently according to the distance that separates the point of emission from the point of reception". (130) An increased number of points of sound emission from a larger surface will blur the reception, Stravinsky argues.

This tendency, though, can be counteracted by sharpening the demands for precision in ensemble **coordination**. In his work as conductor, Celibidache has demonstrated this possibility amply and convincingly. (MIR IV)

Stravinsky develops an **ethic** of performance from the composers' point of view: They are "the predestined victims of the criminal assaults" (125) of careless performers, who primarily seek "facile success that flatters the vanity of the person who obtains it and perverts the taste of those who applaud it" (124). The "fate of the work" (132) will finally depend on the "public's taste" and preferences. Due to the common fact that they usually have only one exposure to the work, and that they are insufficiently educated, the public is prone to hasty judgements. Therefore, the performer's role of **acting as intermediary**, as responsible presentator of the work, is decisive, argues Stravinsky, especially for first hearings where the listener (and the performer, I amend) has (1) "no point of reference and possesses [2] no basis for comparison".

Stravinsky proposes a **partnership** between interpreter and composer based on **confidence** in the merits of the performer and the **assurance** that he is aiming at "**conformity** [my emphasis] of [...] presentation to the composer's will", (133) as well as on the active participation of the listener involved in the propagation of music in society. (134–135)

HINDEMITH

Rarely has a composer and such a highly skilled musician engaged as fervently as did Hindemith in the practice of musicianship. Hindemith furthered pedagogically the interest and skill of young musicians in playing and exercising the chamber music repertory, a tradition that he also prolonged as a composer.⁷ He dedicates a chapter to the performer's (or, I submit, rather the conductor's) problem of handling the discrepancy between the composer's demands and the musicians' inefficiency. Hindemith, silently conceding to the ideal of realizing the artist's intention, traces the problem back to the early Middle Ages when

"despair over the singers' incompetence led Guido of Arezzo to his invention of notation". The "performer's eternal dilemma, his dualistic soul with both halves fighting each other", appears to Hindemith as a "permanent and obviously inescapable contradiction of the singer's or player's specialized technical achievements and the artist's comprehensive understanding", a conflict that arises when one musician tries to **reproduce** on his instrument what another musician has played before. The core of the problem that the notation was supposed to solve was the "parrotlike imitation of other performers' accomplishments, and such secondhand activity was [not] fit to strengthen the mental powers of the performer [...;130]." The cause of the problem was the **unreliability of auditive imitation**, i.e. direct transmission from one interpretation to another: $(i_a \rightarrow i_b)w$. Why must such an imitation be dull? The problem is this: the musician who learns to play a piece through listening to another's performance, by the "oral tradition" only, gains no direct access to the work as conceived by the composer. The musician must infer from one audible version backwards to a presumed **identity of the work**, which is as if he were mistakenly to reverse the implication or take it as an equivalence. This is a logically false and practically insecure operation, and the result gives the musician only a vague notion of the border between compositionally determined structure and tolerable interpretative creativity.

The tragic effect of notation that Hindemith complains about is the lost knowledge of guiding compositional laws such as harmony and counterpoint, which were replaced by the development of notation.

So we have clearly, in principle, three modes of performing music, (1) through a **generative act** based on knowledge of the **material** (chosen subject, theme, form, type and other **compositional determinants**) leading to the performer's recreation of the composition by performing it; (2) through the **realization of notation** as a representation of the work and guarantor of its identity, by knowledge of certain historically valid rules of the signficatory system (sc. notation); and (3) through combinations of 1 and 2.

Hindemith warns us against too "high [an] evaluation of the intermediate transformer station between the generator of a composition and the consumer" (132). The dangers of over-evaluation are that (1) it "deprives the composer of his liberty of thought and imagination" (this, however, is not conclusive, and (2) that it "diverts the listener's attention from the more momentous properties of a composition", which is not convincing: it depends on **how** the performer renders the work, i.e. it is a matter of interpretation. Hindemith's conclusions do

not hold. However, his contention that the listener is "a rather helpless prey in the performer's net" is formed on the correct basis, and it hints at the listeners' dependence on performers for their ability to access the composition: the listener "has to take the singer's or player's production as a *fait accompli* without further questioning" (133).

So obviously Hindemith excludes the possibility of a performance creatively shaped on mutual exchange through **auditive feed-back** (interactive reaction patterns), based on such acts as announcing, signaling, reacting and responding to the audience's reactions (as interaction between P and L), which is an untenable limitation.

Hindemith is ambivalent or contradictory on two more points: on the one hand he warns against technical virtuosity, "pleasant-sounding emptiness, [...] uninhibited superficiality" (132), and on the other hand he clearly acknowledged the need for "technical dexterity", for the purpose of "genuine musical appreciation of the performer's accomplishments" (133): First, this shows an ambivalence in the evaluation of instrumental skill as a value *per se*, positively through the gaiety and lightness in the feeling of **mastering the inertial sound material**, and negatively through its groundlessness.

Furthermore, the performer with "the more nearly perfect technique of reproducing and delivering a composition" obviously "is more likely to uncover its qualities than is his colleague who is hampered by his own inefficiency". Thus, the crucial point is in how to use this instrumental dexterity: it may "not assume a dictatorial attitude that overshadows all other factors of musical reproduction" (134). Secondly, it exhibits an ambivalence in the evaluation of instrumental skill as a **functional** value, positively in its provision of the means for correct compositional rendering, and negatively in the rising risk that it may cause of disturbing the listener's necessary 'focusing' on the composition just because of its perfection.

The role of the conductor, and his social role, Hindemith traces back to the time when the function of choral coordination and that of compositional supervision were badly needed to complement ambiguous and partly improvisatory rules of voice leading in the polyphonic practice of early music. The conductor was then one of the singers, the *primus inter pares*, who during performance made "the practicing, connecting, and prompting" which is nowadays made at rehearsals. Hindemith criticizes conductors' **despotism**, but fails to acknowledge and define their role as the figure responsible for the qualities of the w's interpretation, with the social consequence of presenting

seriously and preserving the composer's oeuvre.

Disposing of conductorial authority also requires the establishment of a substitutive functional network between the producers of a concert p. The conditions for democratic relation between conductor and musicians, possibly involving the public, then must receive support from investigation (see my analysis in MIR IV:1–58).

IV:2 CONDUCTORS' CONTRIBUTIONS IN THEIR WRITINGS TO A GENERAL THEORY OF INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE

The many various interpretational concepts reviewed correspond principally to different views (approaches) on the **nature of human existence**: to be or to **purport being** what the work is, in itself or in me as an interpreter; to be or **what to be**, in essence or in existence; to be or to **be being**; to be what you are versus what to be per se. These various positions correspond to (1) the idea that the performer is what he is in **genuineness of being**, congruently or incongruently in relation to the work (in the case of congruency the interpreter can identify 'himself' completely with the work; through the interpretation the performer brings out his **genuine identity**; the interpretation reveals the **performer's lifeworld**) and (2) the idea that the performer **represents** someone else, such as the composer, or something else, such as the **lifeworld of the work** (w_{α}) or its composer. The interpretation brings out a **representative identity**; the interpretation reveals **another or another's lifeworld**; this is the **existential thesis** of musical interpretation.

To **identify** oneself with the w as an I (in a double sense) means logically and ontologically that when I understand the w partly or completely my mind (consciousness) is intentionally constituted by ('filled' with) w-content to the extent that I understand it; what then is the crucial difference between the conscious content of myself (or of my mind) and the musical imagination (the mental representative concept of the w)? These are identical, i.e. the musical mind is constituted by a specific imaginative w-content, in a very i-moment: when $Mm(I)$ 'is' $Mm(w)$. If a reduction of Mm is allowed, I becomes congruent with ('identical' to) w. The case of complete congruence, though, is thought to be rare.

In the case of incongruency the **adaptability** required on the part of the interpreter determines the outcome of p(i); the question of **incompatibility**

between the performer's versus the composer's lifeworlds then becomes crucial (the relation w_c-w_p , namely w_c-w_i).

Hence, **representativeness** and **genuineness** of interpretational concepts form the polar positions. It seems that the fundamental freedom of taking aesthetic positions within a broad polarity of options is granted the conductor specifically, since he is not bound to the fixed restraints of instruments. Furthermore, the existential scope attracts his interest, since he is cooperating with humans on whom his result depends. If Furtwängler is the intuitively "*Mitgestaltende*" within this existential 'positionality' (ch. II:2:2; Weiler 1993: 302, 346f), then Weingartner, who represents the "*mitkomponierende Dirigent*" and who in order to **clarify** the score demands creative involvement and compositional responsibility, demands an '*eingreifende Durchgestaltung*' of the score from his "*denkende Dirigenten*" (1916:76: "Fagotte durch die Hörner zu ersetzen", Beethoven Symph. 5:1; ib. 31: "*Verdeutlichung*").

The proposition 'to be what you are' requires clarification in this connection: (1) it requires a confirmation of the interpreter's identity, since the identity of the interpreter is a *conditio sine qua non* for the interpreting relation. In the two-term relation **work–interpreter** the work is presupposed to entail several interpretive alternatives or possible realizations, whereas the interpreter provides his unity of consciousness. While the work is not definitively determined, it must be interpreted in order to be transmittable to the audience. And, in order to make an interpreting process possible, **the interpreter must provide (and guarantee) a definite (confirmed) identity** in his performance to which the work can be related by the interpretation in performance, and for the purpose of enabling the interpreter to carry through his interpretive process, also at the rehearsal stage. This is why interpretation research must study the interpretive process and methods, in order to illuminate the cognitive causes or bases for the interpretive result; **the interpreter's identity is a condition for the interpretational outcome.** 'To be what you are' also means (2) that the personal identity (I-ID) is confirmed in *i* and *p(i)* to the extent of its (I-ID) congruency with $w-ID$.

Is there a basic model of *i* valid for all conductors, **inherent** to the conductorial situation? Obviously, the conductor is the sole 'musician' who is an interpreter but not a performer in the strict sense: $I\sim P$. But, evidently, the fact that the conductor is no *P* does **not** mean that he is not causative of *p*. He is *I*, creates his *i* and **transmits** his *i* from himself (*I*) through convincing the performers (musicians) of the orchestra that his *i* is preferable. So, explicitly, the formula is $I_1i_1P_2i_1$ in the case of **total conductorial control**, which obviously is difficult but

not impossible to attain. A conductorial theory would explain the criteria and the technique of implementation for such complete mastery. The crucial question, though, for interpretation theory, is whether P_{2i_1} is a divergent entity *per se*. On this point empirical evidence shows a wide range of instances, obviously indicating that very good conductors succeed in fusing the phenomenologically divergent P_{2i_1} into an acceptable **unity**. This, namely, is a **communicative** condition for realizing his intentional i through the performance of others.

Specifically, the conductor who **interprets** also interprets the **musicians** and **what they play**, i.e. **how they respond to his gestical indications and verbal instructions**, and whether they **understand and render his $i(w)$** , which beautifully exemplifies the $i(S \rightarrow O)$ case (ch. I:2). But in this case the object is human; therefore there is simultaneously a **reverse interpretive act** meeting the conductor's i -act, namely $i(S \leftarrow O)$ as **auditively heard** from the conductor's perspective. Of course, the roles are reversed from the musicians' perspective, where the conductor becomes the object of the musician's (subject's) i -act. One major function of the conductor's role entails that he independently **impresses** his 'opinion' on the musicians more or less by cooperative **interaction**; therefore the conductor's action is **intentional** and **emittive**, as **visually seen** (sometimes, especially at rehearsals, even **auditively heard**) from the musician's perspective, whereas the musicians' action is fundamentally **reactive, related** (to w , n , conductor, and fellow musicians), and **dependent**.

If we consider the practical explanations of conductorial **gestures** – the 'gestic(s)' or 'kinematics' (N. Todd) – made by Ansermet in his *Ecrits sur la Musique*⁸ it is interesting to understand how, from these reflections, he gradually arrives at a distinct **communicative** aesthetics for practical purposes. In 1960 the first sign of his thoroughly thought-out general concept emerges, namely in "La musique et son exécution" (1971:71–75). Ansermet stresses the fact that the gestures are directed towards the musicians; they are not for the audience, who can nonetheless participate in the music through the conductor's gestures. This gestic component, though, has its origin in the music only: "ce que le chef a à transmettre à ses musiciens ne lui laisse pas de pensées disponibles pour d'autres soucis. Cela ne veut pas dire que le public ne puisse pas participer à la musique dans le geste du chef [...] mais le geste ne s'adresse pas à lui et ne comporte (ou ne devrait comporter) proprement rien qui lui soit particulièrement destiné; il est une affaire entre le chef et ses musiciens. Mais cette affaire se passe en public [...] Elle occupe le regard de l'auditeur cependant que la musique

provoque son activité intérieure." (33)

What is essential is that the conductor's gestures do not contradict or distract or interfere with what is going on in the listener. The **unity of the 'gestic'** is a condition for its **communicability**, so what it communicates must correspond to some integrative processes of the compositional evolution of structure in performance, and, for Ansermet, this is the **tempo** of interior origin from the **cadential structure** of the music. The cadences function as **interpunctions** in the rhythmical flow, which is intended to secure the interrelationship of the structural parts through adjustments of the tempo: "ce qui s'impose au geste du chef: c'est qu'il ne se produise qu'à un endroit à la fois, et là, qu'il soit un et simple" (35) and "le geste qui l'exprime est un; il n'est qu'une impulsion dynamique de mouvement, incarnée dans une cadence: tout le reste est luxe, ou théâtre."

So the 'gestic' acquires a profoundly musical sense on the level of artistically coherent and integrated interpretation in performance (which presupposes skilled musicians and a trained orchestra), compared to its origin as a technical sign for the **coordination** of pulse (through the beat) and moments of entrance in ensemble execution: "Ce que le geste du chef communique aux musiciens [...] ce n'est pas la musique [...] mais cet élément intérieur de la musique qu'on appelle son *tempo*, et qui est proprement la vitesse spécifique (spécifique pour chaque morceau) de ses tensions harmoniques. Le tempo est donc une certaine modalité d'un dynamisme de mouvement indiquée par notre pouls, comme celui de notre allure est mesuré par notre pas."

The integration of meaning and sign must be total, since "le battement de la mesure n'est que le moyen, pour le chef, de communiquer aux musiciens la cadence du mouvement. Portés par cette cadence, qui est comme l'âme de leur jeu, les musiciens alors modèlent leurs mélodies, leurs rythmes, leurs notes comme il convient: ce sont eux qui font la musique."

The **liveliness** and **plasticity** of a motif does not separately attain its proper force, unless projected by "l'impulsion *cadentielle*" (34), and the sequence, relations and frequency of such interpunctions are not constitutive of each piece "sous la main du chef", since "un morceau de musique n'est jamais qu'une **individualisation** [my emphasis] du monde des sons, une mise en oeuvre particulière du **continuum sonore** [my emphasis] que la mélodie et le rythme individualisent." (34)

The conductor's foremost task at the beginning of a concert is to find the "*l'élan initial*", and "il imprime à ses musiciens cet élan initial qui réside dans la cadence du mouvement, et leurs notes, leurs motifs, leurs rythmes

apparaîtront à leur place et avec leur valeur, si cet élan est assez fort et assez différencié, comme par enchantement." This practical aspect of the aesthetics of Ansermet now becomes congruent with a few of his main reflections in his later phenomenology: "L'esthétique [...] se réduisent à peu de chose. Sa première vertu est d'être vrai, c'est-à-dire **organique** [...] le chef, son geste livre ce qu'il est. Le dosage en lui de [1] l'exigence formelle et de [2] l'impulsion intérieure [my emphasis] manifeste les différentes natures de chef: la direction de Weingartner représentait l'équilibre parfait des deux facteurs; celle de Furtwängler, toute dominée par l'impulsion intérieure, ne connaît presque plus de normes formelles."

And Ansermet launches into a criticism of those contemporary conductors opposed to the art of Furtwängler (ch. IV:2:2); according to him their fatal mechanicity ends up in despiritualization and dissociation of "dynamisme harmonique".(36) In contrast, Ansermet proposes that the conductor feel the **unity** of the music: "Sent-on la musique comme un tout [...] les choses changent d'aspect et le geste du chef prend sa vraie place. La réalité [...] n'est pas le texte mais ce qui est contenu dans le texte; ce qui est écrit n'est qu'une donnée de sens et c'est ce sens qu'il s'agit de découvrir et de communiquer par l'exécution" (37).

So, in distinguishing the role of the performer, an ontology of the musicwork is needed: "le compositeur a fixé la substance musicale de l'oeuvre mais cette substance ne prend vie que dans une certaine qualité de mouvement que c'est le lot de l'exécutant, devenu interprète, d'éprouver et de mettre en oeuvre. Le geste du chef imprime-t-il au jeu de l'orchestre cette impulsion sous laquelle les notes délivrent leur sens, il se sera justifié – quel qu'il soit. Mais aussi, dans l'événement qu'il suscite et qui aussitôt emporte toute l'attention, il se sera fait oublier." (37)

Ansermet, in 1960, expanded this ontology of the musicwork as a basis for defining the role of the interpreter, with explicit reference to **phenomenology** (72). Music is no physical object made up of sounds; music is "faite de mélodies et d'harmonies ordonnées par le *rythme* dans un certain *tempo* et que les musiciens mettent en lumière par les sons" and it is "une *image* que son *exécution* et seule son *exécution* communique à l'auditeur par une certaine manière de lier, de modeler et d'accentuer les sons." (71) He finds support in the parallelism of the historical fact of human languages: the generality of their meaning and value among humans make them communicable, and these meanings appear always superindividually valid, since they are based on "une certaine intuition naturelle".

In a similar way, music is like a "langage *affectif*", successfully cultivated

by and creative for only those who show "ce génie particulier qu'est le *sens intuitif* du langage musical." The laws which govern this musical language, and which manifest themselves in the structures of selected musical sounds, were, according to Ansermet, never explicitly stated. Since such laws exist, according to Ansermet, it can easily be understood why he feels justified in correcting the rhythmical notation in "*la danse finale*" of Stravinsky's *Sacre du Printemps* from the original alternation between 5/16 and 7/16 measures (grouped 3+2, 2+3 and 3+2+2, 2+3+2 or 2+2+3 respectively) and reducing them to 2/16 measures variously combined with 3/16, since this corresponded to the natural structure. According to Ansermet, this proposal was accepted by Stravinsky (*op. cit.*).

Ansermet explains that he himself, in certain cases, "d'avoir vu plus clair que lui [Stravinsky] dans ses intentions mêmes" while merely accomplishing his "tâche d'interprète". (73) Ansermet aims by this example to clarify "la situation propre de l'auteur et celle de l'exécutant en face d'un texte à interpréter" – while the composer who conceives his work must obey his intuition of the possible structures of a general musical language, and thus concede to his findings that the executant, on the contrary, "en présence du texte, et pour se rendre compte de ce qu'a pensé l'auteur, doit d'abord en faire l'analyse, c'est-à-dire pénétrer au delà du texte jusqu'au *sens* de la musique que l'auteur a *schématisé* par l'écrit." (73)

Therefore, it is not sufficient to be a simple "*exécutant*" in the conductor's situation, which demands an "*interprète*": "il a à réaliser ou à faire réaliser, s'il est chef d'orchestre, ce sens de la musique dans l'exécution sonore et là, il a de nouveau à faire l'oeuvre d'interprète, car les accents, les phrases, les diverses valeurs sonores des voix instrumentales, les *qualités* du mouvement, tout cela, qui est impliqué non pas tant par le sens de la musique dans une oeuvre particulière que par le sens de la musique en général, n'est pas explicitement indiqué par le texte."

And, further arguing for the insufficiency of pure execution contrary to Stravinsky, Ansermet states that "si l'interprète était un simple exécutant du texte, toutes les oeuvres auraient pour l'auditeur le même style".

Thus, different works, in particular works from different ages and regions, require realisations and appropriate 'reshaping' according to the means provided by their respective w- (or c-) styles, which is not indicated in the notation or otherwise explicitly prescribed by the composer: "le *style* n'est pas un élément matériel et rien dans *l'écrit* ne l'indique." (73)

The **identity** of the work as it appears in performance is provided by the **transparency of structure** recognized by the interpreter, and is transmitted through the **intuition 'into' style** that he may attain by talent and experience.

At the same time, Ansermet points at a certain **community between interpreter and composer** in their intuition of common sources for their acquaintance with and sensitivity towards the profoundly human language of music: "l'interprétation de l'oeuvre dans sa réalisation sonore procède de la même *intuition* du langage musical chez l'interprète que chez l'auteur, seulement chez l'auteur elle vise à créer de nouvelles manifestations de ce langage, chez l'interprète elle vise à créer l'image concrète, reflétée par les sons, du langage particulier de l'auteur, ce qui implique une certaine congénialité de l'interprète et de l'auteur." (74)

The interpreter, then, is a **recreative artist** ("*nachschaffende Künstler*", 74) who creates "l'oeuvre réelle' *d'après* le schéma qu'en a donné l'auteur et dans le but de se faire le porte-parole de l'auteur, comme l'auteur est le porte-parole de l'homme dans un certain milieu et une certaine époque." This is the core of the relation between interpreter and composer; the P is the spokesman for the other, and the composer is the spokesman for humanity.

The audience is integrated into Ansermet's thinking only insofar as it sanctions the **secondary creation**, i.e. the **recreativity**, of the interpreter to a point at which he can recognize the work exactly and manifest the composer's will consciously and unconsciously in the performance.

At this point Ansermet rejects the view of Hans Pfitzner⁹, according to whom the idea of creativity in interpretation is contradictory of the objectivity of "wahre Wiedergabe" (Pfitzner 127). There is a decisive difference here, which would motivate two different concepts or kinds of creative action. Still, Ansermet wants to emphasize the similarity more than the difference in alleging that basically the same "intuitive" process ("*Vorgang*", 74) is at stake in both composing and interpreting, namely "l'intuition de sens de la musique et de ses voies possibles". It is just that while the composer creates "oeuvres", "l'interprète a à découvrir ce que ne contient qu'implicitement le texte de l'auteur et à créer *dans les sons* l'image musicale rêvée par l'auteur." (74) What this intuitive creativity would be in cognitive terms remains to be clarified by music psychology.¹⁰

Ansermet rejects distinctly "le slogan lancé par Toscanini et Stravinsky" that the executor has to play only what is written. This opinion – which I have designated **notationalism** – reflects in reality only the interpreter's attitude in

the presence of the text; it means just the self-evident rule that "en son effort d'imagination, l'interprète n'avait pas à introduire dans l'oeuvre des effets de son crû mais seulement ce qu'impliquait le texte de l'auteur" (74), namely "ce que *recouvre* l'écrit." Consequently, he also rejects the opposite precept on the extremely subjective pole, namely that of never playing what is notated, and suggests the substitution of the Stravinsky-Toscanini **imperative of notationalism** for a **prohibitive rule** against the rendering of anything **incongruent to musical meaning**: "on ne doit rien jouer que ne soit conforme au *sens musical* du texte."

Since the conductor is responsible for the performance, it is his duty to put into action his subordinated musician's intuition on the sense of the music^{11,12} ("mettre en oeuvre son intuition du sens de la musique, en un mot, sa musicalité" 75) by his clarification that they "subordonnent l'interprétation de leur partie au sens qu'a le chef de la fonction de cette partie dans l'ensemble et de l'expression qu'elle porte." Therefore, regarding **ethics**, the musician can not be made *a priori* responsible for the version of his part presented in the ensemble, since his role as an interpreter of **his part** is subordinate to, or dictated or suggested by, the conductor's interpretation.

"For conducting 'technique' [...] can be dismissed as hardly existing. There is an elementary set of signals which can be explained in a few minutes, and understood in less" argues Antal Dorati, which is a total rejection of beat technique in favour of **essential musicality**. Unfortunately, only a few pages are dedicated to this issue in his book of memoirs¹³. How can the conductor then communicate his interpretation to the musicians, if, as Dorati holds, he has "in fact, no means of his own to make his feelings, ideas concerning the piece he conducts come through in musical sounds"? In his cooperation with the orchestra, "he has to rely on his instrumentalist and/or vocalist colleagues to produce the sounds in a manner conforming to the patterns he silently imagines and suggests." Still, "the initiative is that of the conductor" who is "*expected* to convey to the player how to employ their skills", whereby the roles are "clearly divided". If, in addition, the conductor is the one "who knows the whole piece", then both "conditions are fulfilled", creating the "basis for a satisfactory performance." A "bad" result is caused by insufficiently trained musicians, and an even "worse" is the situation where the conductor fails; finally, it is a "disaster" when both fail. (307)

What the conductor has to accomplish is the "complete mastering of a

score" which is "a complex affair that cannot be properly described." Still, Dorati provides a fragmentary description of these skills that forms the core of his general interpretative concept^{14,15}. Besides the self-evident (1) "knowledge of the notes written on the pages" he mentions (2) necessary notational "checks and balances" that might include some **re-editon** or **correction** of the score or parts of it; cf. the German "*Einrichtung*", i.e. corrective re-editing or even rearranging of the parts before the first rehearsal. Dorati also requires the mastering of (3) the form of the piece, (4) its **emotional** content, which is essential in the Dorati concept (MIR III: 377–384), (5) its possible extra-musical implications, which is a fairly unusual concession among interpreters, (6) its style within a larger, aesthetic and historical scope, and (7) its "special place and meaning in the composer's *oeuvre*".¹⁶

The last point is congruent with the concept of Erich Leinsdorf. All those factors "must have entered into the conductor's mind and *body* so deeply that [they are] stored in the subconscious and emerge on the occasion of the performance as ingredients of an 'improvisation', i.e. spontaneous re-creation." Leinsdorf's concept of interpretation can essentially be reduced to the following essentials: knowledge of (1) "the composer" in his **historical context**, whereby it remains ambiguous exactly what it is of the composer that is supposed to be rendered or interpreted, (2) the **musical tradition**, in effect the "*Rezeptionsgeschichte*" of the work, (3) what the **composers' intentions** were, what they more exactly wanted regarding ('related to') their work (in the case of Leinsdorf, it is not clear whether the intentions to be respected refer to only one specific work or whether there is some general intention related to the whole oeuvre of the composer or to the "*Zeitgeist*" of that period) and (4) the **finding of the tempo**, to which Leinsdorf directs his main interest. In 1976 the booklet *Lesen Sie Musik*¹⁷ focused almost exclusively on the problems of **reading and preparatory re-editing and rearranging of the score and its parts** (12), with a few hints of "*Aufführungspraxis*" and characterization of the interpretation of the work as an entity. In contrast, he clarifies his position more eloquently in his more explicit and qualified book¹⁸: "The interpreter's chief task is to perform works of earlier times in ways that make them most meaningful to audiences of his own generation, without in any way distorting the intrinsic nature of the works or violating the intentions of the composers"; there is a positive ambition in interpreting the work that aims at endowing it with **meaning for the contemporary audience**, which, of course, could be

sharpened to entail also an even more specifically directed **interpretation of meaning for the present audience** – but this I cannot positively support by any instance in the books cited or in the course documented in Zürich in 1979. (MIR IV:346–376)

It is clear, though, that Leinsdorf's argument is that the composer wrote for more than his generation (*op. cit.* 52). Therefore, **constant renewal is justified**, at least as long as the **result of the interpretative innovation can be related to the tradition of performances of the work**. The reason for this is obvious: tradition, in this sense, may provide an essential contribution to fruitful views that enrich our repertoire of experiences and increase our chances of selecting the most appropriate interpretation related to the general character of that composer's style. Much of the material in his book relates specifically to the problem of opera staging and performance, including **cooperative compromises** with stage directors and producers.

Leinsdorf gives a practical view, and accounts for his working methods: he shows how he manages to solve problems connected with the opera scenes and concert podiums of the world. Unfortunately, the richness of experience does not correspond to the depth of the thought or lack thereof. There is an overt lack of aesthetical reasoning on the principal level, and no overriding theory in Leinsdorf's presentation or systematization; signs of awareness of the problems formulated in this investigation are scant, and the answers to my questionnaire (MIR III:6–11) as well as to my questions related to his lectures (MIR IV:346–376) confirm this picture. Above all, Leinsdorf seems to disregard the epistemological problems. In his personal interpretative concept, though, there is an 'objectivist' tendency in the priority of **reading** the score, which appears more important even than listening and reacting to the sounding outcome.

Leinsdorf presupposes highly skilled instrumentalists among composers; in effect he relies on their competence in realizing their work-intentions completely by prescriptive notation, so that the score already is a precept for playing with inherent corrections and balancing of the intended sound result. Still, Leinsdorf acknowledges the need for such adjustments (193), e.g. "between brass and strings" and aims artistically at establishing "a gradation of dynamic levels as a whole." This is not necessarily inconsequential, since the adjustments may be made within the realm of the interpreter's intention, not the composer's, effectively in the 'free zone' (my term).

As far as the crucial question of criteria is concerned, Leinsdorf disappoints us: "We have no sure criteria but our good taste, knowledge, and imagination

to set levels" (193).

Unfortunately, reference to taste, apart from the difficulty in distinguishing good taste from bad, in an effort to justify an interpretation is no substitute for explicit criteria.

Leinsdorf concedes to the common view of the **work as an entity with one climax** which can be understood as a phenomenological *a priori*. What makes it an entity is the fact that all the phases are structurally interrelatable; there must then be one point of last reference, to which all the parts can be directly or indirectly interrelated; this one point can be called the **structural climax**. It is plausible though that Leinsdorf means a dynamic or energetic climax, which must not converge on the structural one: "In nearly every great score there is one climax that should remain the high point" in the performance. Leinsdorf's concept essentially entails **interpretation of the composers's style** and his position is that of **notationalism** on the basis of historical contextuality and continuity of tradition.

More clearly, Bruno Walter¹⁹ emphasizes the **attention** of the conductor that must be directed towards the whole by recognizing the total process of the evolving work. This totality is a unit of form and a general atmosphere of emotion that marks the work. The natural flow of tones is a result of such a sensitive encompassing view of the work, which in fact yields the **tempo**; the function of the tempo is one way of **clarifying the organic form** of the work. So a clear understanding of the work is the condition for finding "the" tempo, i.e. the tempo that fulfills this function. The circularity of Walter's **tempo conception** may point at the dialectic process of mutual adjustment of two intimately interrelated aspects, **organic unity** and directed **tempo flow**. Or, possibly, it may be an indication of hermeneutic interpretation. In the latter case, one would still search for other additional criteria for the tempo finding. Walter conceives of a **qualitatively defined tempo**, the **quantitative** outcome of which must have the 'property' of "dialectical" adaptability due to varying practical circumstances. This, then, could possibly provide the decisive criterion for the tempo, when the initial dialectic fails. In any case, Walter recognizes complex relations between interpretative phenomena, and he shows a sensitive understanding of an alleged **sense of general lawfulness and an inevitability of the musical element's function within the whole**. In this view, concession to the law of **continuity** contributes to the aim of allowing those instances of lawfulness to appear in the performance (29). The recent ideas of technical perfectionism

among musicians should not excessively limit the zone of interpretive freedom (110). That would make impossible a **creative interpretation** where all the elaborated details reflect the original creative impulse through **one spontaneous act** (19). Through "*Beseelung*" the performance attains the character of **continuous emotional inspiration** without trespassing into 'expressive overload' or sentimentality. **Recreation**, on the other hand, consists of two acts corresponding to **inner and outer musicality: assimilation and rendering** (18, 82, 111), i.e. the performer's competence comprises both **receptivity and transmitability**. This focusing on inner musicality endows the Walter interpretational concept with a strong and unmistakable **feeling of closeness**: the I and Thou as listener (in a remote parallel to Martin Buber's idea), and, correspondingly, as an expressive outcome of the interpreting mind, the closeness between the I and the work. In this deeper sense, Walter acknowledges the influence of the interpreter's personality. However, this "I" is not the psychological ego; it is more like the phenomenological or existential "every-I" of intersubjective generality or validity. The musical result of this concept was studied through comparative interpretation analysis and recorded rehearsals in MIR III: 85–119, sc. 116–118.

Among the contributors to the historical anthology reviewing *The Conductor's Art* by Carl Bamberg (1967), Eugen Jochum's outline for a "phenomenology of conducting" is more ambitious in its analytical aim to clarify interpretation as an **objectified rendering** of the work as the outcome of the encounter between the interpreter and the "creative artist", i.e. the composer. (MIR II:92,110 *pass.*) For this to occur a specific interpretative talent is required (183–184). Such talent comprises the competence of creating an **inner conception through assimilation of the work**, which, says Jochum, must be an **organic, natural process of reproduction**. **Passivity** is the interpreter's general state of mind in approaching the work: (1) the **passivity of intention** characterizes the **receptive mode**, and through this "neutral receptivity" the tempo establishes itself on its own. This means that the conscious intellect must really be passive, since active thinking precludes the natural will from apprehending, mastering and gestalting the properties of the work (185; MIR II *passim*, see index 444). (2) The deeper layer of consciousness gives an **emotional field of tension** related to the work. Only then (3) does the conscious working-through of the piece commence by analyzing it with the utmost precision. In sum, it is important not to let the impulse of the personal will of the interpreter decide

the outcome through conscious control; the interpreter may not mix his own personality into his relation with the work at too early a stage in the working process. He must humbly accept the **lawfulness** of music, and sensitively listen to its inner meaning. Only successively, as this primary non-reflective and receptive relation is established, can the rendering of the true constitution of the work be enabled and room be given for a penetratingly analytical study of the work (183–185, 188). The basic "attitude" in assimilation of the work parallels that of Celibidache (MIR IV), in reliance on the 'method' of passive intuitive synthesis forwarded by Husserl.

A still wider conception of what constitutes the object for interpretation is revealed by Charles Munch²⁰: "The music of our own century interprets the preoccupations and the concerns of the world we live in" (42), which is, in effect, a **life-world interpretation**: "We must play it and listen to it, learn about advanced aesthetic positions, new theories of harmony, and new principles of construction". Focusing on the syntax, Munch suggests: "Musical construction has its likeness to sentence structure. There are commas and semicolons, periods, question marks, and exclamation points." (49) And "music stops and starts, breathes. You must find out where and when." Disrespect for this phenomenological fact, or a less than sufficient regard for it, will result in an unsuccessful performance—i.e. "it will be boring or altogether incomprehensible, like a literary text read aloud with no consideration of punctuation, of phrase or clause or sentence." Munch is sceptical towards the simple followers of tradition in accordance with the view of Celibidache (*et alia*) and questions the identity and legitimacy of such an **imitative ideal**: "What traditions? I often ask myself. Until the eighteenth century there are only the slightest hints of tempo or dynamics in the manuscripts and printed scores." (88). And Munch cites Albert Schweitzer's statement about the instability and insecurity of the interpretative endeavour due to ever-changing and ever-disagreeing opinions, which is an argument in Munch's favor: "How [do we] guess the tempos and the dynamics a composer really wanted?" – at least it cannot be done on the basis of differing performance traditions, the authenticity of which can never be guaranteed.

So Munch's problem, "How to know exactly where truth lies hidden", remains unsolved. Still, Munch's view entails that if the performance traditions really could be clarified by historical research, **then** its result would have a bearing on our knowledge about the imagined soundworld of the composer's work, and consequently, on current interpretations. Munch leaves this task to the musicologists and the philosophers. He wants to have the knowledge of

how "every generation since the work's creation interpreted it for itself" and gains awareness about "what has been the influence of the work upon the interpreter through the years" (88), since these answers would mean something to him in his interpretation.

This, then, is his concept: the **history of interpretation** in some sense is a part of the essential context around the work to be interpreted together with it.

Fritz Busch in most respects confirms the 'common sense opinion' on interpretation (represented by Graziosi *inter alia*), and he subscribes to a few well-known "rules" of performance referred to as "Selbstverständlichkeit einer natürlichen Phrasierungskunst, wie [1] unbetonte Auftakte, [2] stärkeres Hervortreten der Dissonanz gegenüber der Konsonanz."²¹ Methodically, he stresses the importance of "*voraus* hören und fühlen können" (93) and the intuitive feeling for the true tempo. (154)

Sir Adrian Boult accounts for the practice and technicalities of Arthur Nikisch's conducting²². Boult gives three distinct rules as his performance ideals: (1) establish "the exact pace at once" as a reference point, (2) form a definite idea of the plan of the work, and (3) keep in mind the structure of the work as a whole (29).

Leonard Bernstein gives advice on how to achieve contact with the orchestra and by establishing this contact about the function of 'gestics'. And, according to Bernstein, the interpreter transmits voluntarily designed emotional expression. Bernstein feels that there is something mysterious in the relation between conductor and orchestra, and that psychological sensitivity is an essential talent²³. In his Harvard lectures Bernstein²⁴ argues, without sufficient support, or convincing argumentation, for a "musical phonology", syntax and musical semantics (119), i.e. in fact a loose and superficial parallelism between affective expression in speech and music, e.g. "notes" (=phoneme), "motive" (=morpheme), "phrase" (=word), "section" (=clause), "movement" (=sentence), and, "piece" (=piece; 58). Bernstein accounts for sensitive observations on the "delights" of tonal and syntactic ambiguity²⁵, a concept confirmed by my analysis (MIR II:91–93 *pass.*).

The popular tendency to want to glorify conductors as unreachable stars is met by many biographical novels and critical books of various quality. Mostly, this literature is much too superficial to be of any interest for this investigation. But this does not prevent a few books from providing orientating information for a possible selection of suitable research objects. The descriptions, however,

may be popular and superficial on the level of **conductorial style** and holistic characterizations from a critic's view²⁶. Even more centered around the lives of these classical stars is Donald Brook.²⁷ Even an interview with a respectable conductor fails to provide essentialities, as e.g. Peter Heyworth's *Gespräche mit [Otto] Klemperer*²⁸: In the chapter on "Dirigenten und Dirigieren", Klemperer states: "Die Kunst des Dirigierens liegt meiner Ansicht nach in der Suggestionskraft, die der Dirigent sowohl auf das Orchester wie auf das Publikum ausübt." (163)

More seriously, but still not markedly so, the book of memoirs for the 100 years anniversary of the Berliner Philharmoniker²⁹ contains presentations of mixed interest and content, i.e. mainly biographical facts with scattered, occasionally valuable observations and general characterizations on interpretation by some qualified authors: Klaus Geitel on Hans von Bülow (12, 17) and Felix von Weingartner (33), Ernst Krause on Richard Strauss' "Anschaulichkeit, Einfachheit, Sachlichkeit" of conductorial style (64), Wolfgang Stresemann on Bruno Walter and H. H. Stuckenschmidt on Wilhelm Furtwängler. Joachim Kaiser contributes in a fragmentary way on Herbert von Karajan's interpretative concept (180–182).

Within the conservatory tradition of pedagogical books, mostly only of circumstantial importance, the familiarity with musical facts can appear impressive in spite of the lack of general considerations of principle. Hermann Scherchen outlines a general concept of interpretation for the conductor in the introduction to his *Lehrbuch des Dirigierens*³⁰: The **liveliness of the ideal conception** of the work as **sound image** and the claim for **realization of the conductor's intention** are his foremost concerns: "Der Dirigent muss in seiner Vorstellung das Kunstwerk ebenso vollkommen hören, wie es seinem Schöpfer erklang." However, this could be contradictory of the previous statement that the composer's or the conductor's intention must gain priority. That the conductor must hear in his imagination the work such as it sounded for the composer is not exactly what Scherchen literally states: (1) but does he mean to refer to what the composer **really** heard, say if he (C) was present at the first performance, or (2) to what he (C) **imagined** the work to sound like in the process of the work's appearance for potential listeners; (3) or just the sounds that he (C) imagined as he wrote the piece? Scherchen tacet. And what about the alternative cases where (4–5) P (I) attends the first p by someone else (P, I), (6–8) imagines the sound result for L (other P:s, I:s), (9) or for himself (P, I) as a phase of his **intentional realization**, not accounting for other cross-combinations (1–

9). The **creative artist** that Scherchen wants forms the music out **from his inner self**; we hear new sound colors, see the musical material in new perspective or find that the tones attain the mark of the personality of the conductor (161). Scherchen points at an essential and musically vital connection between **man and tone: the inner resonance of singing**.

Siegfried Naumann³¹, professor of conducting at "Musikhögskolan" in Stockholm 1976–83, mainly presents a manual on the notational technique of re-editing and preparing scores and parts for performance. It treats the **interpretation of the notational sign**, especially for contemporary repertoires. Notions such as "time" and "tempo" are derived from **composers' ideal conceptions**. Time is seen as having three aspects: (1) the creatively visionary, (2) the choice of symbols ("*Auskomponieren*"), and (3) the "durata" of the work, i.e. real duration (15). There is only one reference to "interpretation" in the index of this book, and no general considerations to support scientifically or philosophically the adopted approach to its problems. Due to this deficiency, many 'objectivistic prejudices' bias the analyses. For practical purposes, the conductor can favorably train his attentive score reading by using this book, which dives into a naive objectivist analysis of "parameters of sound" (89).

As an example, a conventional textbook for schools of music students in conducting by Emil Kahn³² is designed for educational purposes, with a technical concept of interpretation dominating the one chapter on this issue (161–202). The concept is much too simplified, and the unsupported presupposition is the "adherence to the letter of the score", its tempo, dynamic, phrase and ornament.

Paul Robinson's biographical presentation of Karajan³³ contributes for the most part to the same genre of devotional panegyrics in its uncritical evaluations and weak analyses. It serves as an introductory orientation through its discography (229ff). On a few points, though, Robinson endeavours to outline the interpretative concept of Herbert von Karajan's conducting on the basis of interviews (Karajan's secretary replied negatively to my inquiry as to the possibility of investigating his rehearsals; I could hardly refrain from concluding that this was a decision due to marketing considerations; it was more important for the circle around Karajan to uphold the image of the maestro than to contribute to the furthering of knowledge in this area). Clearly the criterion of **continuity** is primary in the Karajan concept, as was also confirmed by the comparative analyses³⁴ in MIR where I integrated observations into the concept of the **tonality continuum**. Concerning the interpretative criteria in playing the

theme of the first movement in the Mozart Symphony in G minor KV 550 (which I analyzed earlier³⁵) Robinson contends: "Karajan hält sich mit seiner Interpretation von Mozarts Melodie an alle Angaben der Originalpartitur und berücksichtigt nicht nur den melodischen Einfall [how, then?] selbst, sondern ordnet ihn zudem in einen übergeordneten melodischen Zusammenhang ein" (109) which is almost trivial. Then follows a discussion of Karajan's opinion on **the notational interpretation of staccato and legato**. More revealing are the references that Robinson makes to the "Platonic" dialectic as a method of studying the score, apparently on the basis of interlocutory replies from the maestro: he states that it "bei der Einstudierung, Interpretation und Aufführung, kurz bei der Wiedergabe eines Musikstücks um einen ganzheitlichen Vorgang handelt, der seinem Charakter nach weder als objektiv noch als subjektiv einzustufen ist." (122) He inquires how it is possible that in the process of working-out of an interpretation, "von seiner noch unvollkommenen Vorstellung her etwas Vollendetes zu schaffen" (120). Then, "für Platon ist [daher] Erkennen gleichbedeutend mit Sicherinnern. Dank der Wiedererinnerung ist die Idee Gegenstand einer unmittelbaren Intuition." (120) While "Sinnedinge notwendig [sind], um die Wiedererinnerung auszulösen, aber niemals sind diese Sinnedinge Ursache der Idee." (120)

He clarifies the relevance of the Platonic philosophy, and its reception as conceived of by Karajan, for the process and outcome of the **receptive assimilation**, working-through and rendering phases of the interpretation in performance: "die Beziehungen der Dinge untereinander zu erkennen und sich zur Wissenschaft, das heisst zu wahrer und eigentlicher Erkenntnis aufzuschwingen. Die Methode, die dazu führt, bezeichnet Platon als Dialektik. Mit diesem Begriff ist aber auch die Beweglichkeit des Geistes gemeint, die einen dazu befähigt, über die Sinneswahrnehmung hinaus zu den Ideen zu gelangen." (121) Karajan, according to Robinson, approaches a view that seems parallel to the method of **primary reflection** within the **phenomenological position** (Ansermet, Jochum, Celibidache): "Einfühlung" as "unmittelbares, ohne Reflektion eintretendes Erkennen des Wesens eines Gegenstandes, und genau so definiert sich die platonische Intuition." In the background figures the idea of **cognitively preformed patterns of thinking**, or the **a priori of Platonic notional realism**: "jeder Schritt dank Wiedererinnerung, Intuition und Dialektik mehr und mehr die zugrunde liegende Idee erhellt" [...] "So ist die Idee nicht nur das Prinzip der Existenz der Dinge, sondern auch das ihrer Erkenntnis. [...] Der Aufstieg vom Werden zum Sein wie auch zu den verschiedenen Stufen

menschlicher Erkenntnis vollzieht sich von der Vermutung der Meinung, von der Ansicht zur Vernunft oder zu der direkten Erkenntnis der Ideen, mithin zur Wissenschaft." (121)

The view of Karajan's concept of interpretation that can be drawn from Robert C. Bachmann³⁶ is not completely congruent with the one from Robinson. Clearly, the review of Bachmann, based on a consistently preformed questionnaire, is more critical, methodical, comparative and reliable; his scant conclusions are to some extent supported by instantiation (MIR II:444 references). Karajan as interpreter is presented as "Der Bewahrer grosser musikalischer Tradition" (55) with a classically artistic **confessio**: "Ideal der ästhetischen Schönheit der Harmonie", and he justifies the attachment to this classical ideal by reference to the **universality** of the classical repertoire, due to its bases in what I would designate as **common human values and patterns of musical cognition**: "Wenn wir immer wieder auf die grossen Meisterwerke zurückgreifen, so deshalb, weil sie wahrscheinlich einen allgemeinen, universalen Wert haben. Die menschliche Aussage über die Werte, die uns ewig und gültig sind, ist ja das, was letztlich allein massgebend ist. Sie hat ihren Niederschlag in den grossen Werken der Kunst gefunden." (63–64)

He also acknowledges his interest in the physiological bases for conductorial work, which has been the focus of experiments carried through by the Herbert von Karajan-Stiftung³⁷ in Salzburg. The bodily expression and behavior correspond to the difference in the **level of tension** between "Erreichtem und Gewolltem." (57) The interpreter is subject to "eine Beeinflussung [...] durch die Musik in dem Sinne, dass sie zu einer Dämpfung zwischenmenschlicher Spannung führen kann" which is an approach that Karajan formulates by referring to the proverb "*mens sana in corpore sano*" as personal device.

There is an indication of the idea of "zurück zur Musik" without explicit reference to Husserl ("*zur Sache*"): that "auch die Jugend von heute nicht mehr belastet ist mit geistigen oder bildlichen Interpretationsvorstellungen, denen die Generation meines Vaters zum Beispiel noch sehr verhaftet war, sondern dass sie Musik als Musik empfindet und hört – als Ausdruck einer inneren Dynamik der Seele und des Geistes." (59) Other evidence of **noninterpretational objectivism**, in concordance with Celibidache's musical phenomenology, would be: "Ein Konzert ist doch eine sehr komplexe Sache, weil es aus einer geistigen Idee entsteht und beim Hörer wieder in einer geistigen Idee endet. Was dazwischenliegt, ist ein Weg, über den man sich normalerweise nicht klar ist. Es ist zuerst einmal das Umsetzen einer geistigen Idee in eine musikalische

Form durch den Komponisten. Der Interpret steht dann vor der schwierigen Aufgabe, das Notierte zum Klingen zu bringen." (61–62) The notation, then, is just an ambiguous suggestion of what the composer wanted; therefore the role of the interpreter is constituted by the **relativity of notational markings** that need to be interpreted in view of the work: "Die Notenschrift aber ist bestenfalls eine Andeutung dessen, was der Komponist meint. Alle Angaben einer Partitur sind relativ. Wieviel Dezibel entspricht zum Beispiel ein Forte? Wann muss man mit einem Stringendo beginnen, wie verläuft die Dynamik eines Diminuendos? All das sind Fragen, über die die Noten nur unzureichend Aufschluss geben." The same argument is forwarded by Furtwängler and Celibidache, *et alia*.

On the level of interpretation in performance, though, it is interesting to note that Karajan **questions the possibility of objectivity in the rendering of the composer's intention**, due to the deficiencies of notation, since faithfulness (fidelity) to w ("Werktreue") is a *contradictio in adjecto*: "Schon deshalb kann man als Interpret nicht erwarten, den Intentionen des Komponisten gerecht zu werden. Eine objektive Darstellung ist schon deswegen schlechterdings nicht möglich. Und der Begriff der Werktreue ist ein Widerspruch in sich selbst." (62) Even if the conductor knows the score **exactly** and in all the details, it still does not provide a full basis for the "Umsetzen in lebendigen Klang", then "Es gibt auch in der Musik Dinge, die ein Dirigent in des Wortes eigentlicher Bedeutung in den Griff bekommen muss, so wie man eine Skulptur abtasten muss, wenn man ihre Form erfühlen will. Was man in der Musik empfindet, ist zum grossen Teil ein solches Formgefühl."

Still, Karajan endeavors to bring out his knowledge of the score with the utmost precision and highest level of mastery, and consequently he considers **conducting without the score to be a condition for optimal interpretation**. Karajan requires **memorization** of the score in concord with Celibidache. But comparatively, Celibidache extends this demand also to the rehearsals. On another point, though, Karajan's concept, namely of the inclusion of extramusical (sc. visual) moments, is totally contradictory of that of Celibidache's. Karajan states: "Die visuelle Darstellung sinfonischer Musik ist eines meiner Hauptanliegen. Dabei strebe ich nicht eine Reportage, sondern die Umsetzung von Musik ins Bild mit ästhetischen Mitteln an, eine optische Interpretation der Musik mit ihren Spannungsmomenten, lyrischen und dramatischen Werten – und zwar so, dass sie verstärkt auf den Hörer wirkt." (65) This, however, sounds contrary to the aim of 'returning back to music itself', the original sources of its

art. Moreover, it is not quite clear what criteria Karajan adduces in his proposed solution to notational ambiguities.

The "Sensibilität für subtilste Klangvaleurs" (58) is also acknowledged by Peter Cossé in his memorial chronicle³⁸: Karajan's conducting, which aims at "dem grossen, stark besetzten Orchester ein Maximum an Klangschönheit abzugewinnen", is based on his "Umsetzung [von] klanglicher und bewegungspsychologischer Vorstellungen".

Cossé questions the suitability of his use of the "Legato-Linie, also dem uneingeschränkten Genuss", i.e. the **principle of continuity**, exposed in the **tonality continuum** (MIR II:88), from a stylistic point of view, and he discusses whether Karajan trespassed "die Grenzen musikologischer, aber auch geschmacklicher Kriterien". And Cossé's scepticism points at the arbitrariness of coupling expressive means and meaning as well as interpretive exaggerations in Karajan's late performances: "Lautstärke als Gradmesser für Festlichkeit". Cossé ironically criticizes: "Nicht das Verhältnis dynamischer Feinabstufungen zueinander diente der Charakterisierung von Sinnverläufen. Vielmehr markierten die Extreme 'Fortissimo' und 'Pianissimo' eindimensional die beiden Pole am Ende der Ausdrucksskala. Dazwischen herrschte ein diffuses Licht, aus dem sich allenfalls die melodisch dankbarsten Linien herauskristallisierten."

Robert C. Bachmann's *Grosse Interpreten im Gespräch* (1967) is also a source for further information about the interpretative concepts of the following performers: the conductors Claudio Abbado (about limits of freedom 18) Rudolf Kempe (80–81), Erich Leinsdorf (89–93, 97), Lorin Maazel (113) and Sir Georg Solti (164); the pianists Geza Anda (about subjectivity 30), Claudio Arrau (particularly 38 and 43); and the violinists Yehudi Menuhin and Nathan Milstein.

Communicative aspects of conducting, including comparison between various ideals regarding expressivity, visibility, 'will-less-ness' (i.e. passive reception MIR I:88, 95; MIP 32), leadership, showmanship and other aspects are further studied in Herbert Garber's thesis³⁹. The pro-argument of passivity in assimilation is that it guarantees non-interference of irrelevant subjective ideas. Aspects of modern chamber orchestra performance, including the performance history of the work, is the subject of Paul John Tardif's *Historical and Performance Aspects of Alban Berg's Chamber Concerto for Piano, Violin, and Thirteen Winds*⁴⁰, whereas Paul Michael Matesky's thesis *Berlioz on Conducting* presents an early stage of the development of rehearsal and beat technique⁴¹.

In another series of interview booklets⁴², Christoph von Dohnányi

approaches the problem of interpreting contemporary music that has not yet unanimously established its value. This must have been an actual problem for those musicians, notably conductors, who dedicated their careers to promoting current music by preparing themselves for first performances⁴³. The problem, as formulated by Dohnányi, is "wie weit man als Dirigent bereit sein muss, Werke aufzuführen, mit denen man sich nicht identifizieren zu können glaubt, die man für schlecht hält" (3): The consequential logic is that "etwas, das man für schlecht hält, kann man verantwortungsbewusst eigentlich nur reproduzieren, um zu zeigen, dass es schlecht ist, und dazu muss man es, um sich nicht dem Vorwurf der Parteilichkeit oder der Befangenheit in Vorurteilen auszusetzen, ganz besonders gut aufführen." This, however, Dohnányi asserts, makes sense only insofar as one perseveres in aiming at "in einer unübersichtlichen Situation Klarheit zu schaffen" in order not to hurt the chances for the composer and his work: "Man will ja schliesslich keinem Komponisten schaden; man will auch nicht ein Werk, das andere vielleicht für gut halten, töten, sondern man will beweisen, dass ein bestimmtes Werk den Ansprüchen, die man auf einem gewissen Niveau an das Werk oder an sich selbst stellt, nicht genügt. Dazu muss man es sehr genau analytisch darstellen können, und auch das gehört nach meiner Meinung in den Aufgabenbereich eines Interpreten." (3)

This is in fact a sharply formulated **ideal of objective performance** in which Dohnányi defines (1) objectivity as **analytical rendering** ("analytisch darstellen"), and adduces the creation of a situation that entails (2) an **open possibility of the audience's independent evaluation of the work** through such an **analytically clarifying interpretation in performance**.

From another folder in the same series⁴⁴ it can be derived that Daniel Barenboim embraces the idea that the ideal of **objectivity is unattainable**, though still worth striving for: "Objektivität in der Musik existiert nicht. Was ist objektiv? Wenn Furtwängler und Toscanini genau dasselbe gemacht hätten, wäre die Musik statisch, unlebendig. Es ist sehr wichtig, dass Musik jedes Mal neu erlebt wird, so, wie ich es von Rubinstein gesagt habe. Wenn Furtwängler zweimal dieselbe Sinfonie dirigierte, war es nie genau gleich, und ich glaube, auch Beethoven hat seine Stücke nie unverändert gespielt. Das ist keine Textfrage, es betrifft 'the spirit of the law'; d.h. der Geist ist genauso wichtig wie das Geschriebene." (8) My study of Barenboim as piano soloist, rehearsing Beethoven's second piano Concerto in G major with Sergiu Celibidache in Munich 25.2.93, allowed an additional check on Barenboim's concept.

First, Barenboim confuses differences of interpretation with lack of objectivity in rendering the work. His contention is simply wrong, since the various possibilities for facultative alternatives in assigning work identity through interpretation are inherent, or immanently bound to the ontology of the notated work. The Barenboim view, would, logically, be possible only if the existence of a sole correct identity of the work could unequivocally be proved; that the existing diversity of performances could be reduced to pure altercation (even regarding the possibility of *a priori* unacceptable renderings) is most unbelievable. Barenboim's opinions are presented as unsupported dogmas.

Secondly, Barenboim fails to observe that his statement is contradictory in proposing both that the result would be "unlebendig" due to identical renderings by different conductors, and that there is no objectivity which would entail arbitrariness. Then, if objectivity allows only *n-i* congruency, and one undoubted work identity, and the result would be, as Barenboim contends, static and unlively, these properties, precisely, would have to be assigned to the **work**, not the performance. However, Barenboim does not attain this logical level, but simply evinces a pretended justification of interpretational variety by reference to the problems of objectivity.

Barenboim's autobiography (1992) has only recently become available. I have not been able to consider this book, in case he has modified and refined his position there.

IV:2:1 ERNEST ANSERMET – A PHENOMENOLOGIC MUSIC PHILOSOPHY OF INTERPRETATION IN CONDUCTING

In delineating the background influences on Ernest Ansermet's (1883–1969) oeuvre in music philosophy, I refer to my personal communication with J.-Claude Piguet, who was engaged by Ansermet in completing his *magnum opus*, *Les fondements de la musique dans la conscience humaine* (1961) and presented his thoughts in a series of books. I will refer mainly to the German translation, which is essentially equivalent to the French original according to Piguet (p.c.), and which was reworked and authorized by Ansermet later than the French original. Its title is *Die Grundlagen der Musik im menschlichen Bewusstsein* (1965), hereafter referred to as *Grundlagen*. However, in certain cases the French version illuminates more clearly the aspects that I concentrate on; in those cases the French quotation is included. Recently the interest in Ansermet was promoted

by the republications both of this work in the original French and of other works by Ansermet, edited and commented on by J.-Cl. Piguet (1987, hereafter FM), to which I also refer, and the publication of a collection including other works by Ansermet (1989) with comments by Jean-Jacques Rapin, Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Langendorf, Laurent Klopfenstein et alia.

Interpretational systems within the arts can be classified according to what level they belong to in encompassing a metatheoretical inquiry (MIR I:86). The thinking on various levels, and the corresponding literature in relevant areas of performance and interpretation, regard mainly (1) basic philosophical assumptions, (2) aesthetic principles (*a priori* or *aposteriori*), (3) the concrete executional problems of musical gestalting, and (4) technical implementation (gestic, manual or vocal) in conducting, instrumental playing and singing. I notice that Ansermet, as one of very few, was active in his thinking and writing on all four levels. A tempting investigation, which cannot be completed here, would be to analyze his remaining recordings in order to see if his performances show traits that can be explained or interpretationally related to his positions on these four levels. For musical concretization and interpretational comparison, I refer to my analysis in MIR II: 180–182, 190–193 et pass. Whether he managed to render his ideas in the reality of musical performance is a crucial question, and this should be possible to prove or disprove. Nevertheless a negative result such an investigation would not negate his relevant ideas; the practical circumstances and conditions for concrete implementation could have been unfortunate. A desire would then be created to fulfill his intentions quite occasionally. We shall see later how Sergiu Celibidache (ch. V:3; MIR IV) in certain respects, endeavors towards this end. Here, I will only deal with the interpretational aspects of Ansermet's ideas, and focus on the question of how his interpretational concept is an "application" of phenomenology, i.e. whether Ansermet principally, though not in every detail, practised phenomenology in his interpretative thinking. A comprehensive introduction to Ansermet's reflective thinking in his general music philosophy can be found in *Ernest Ansermet et les fondements de la musique* (1964) by J.-Claude Piguet and in his *La pensée d'Ansermet* (1983), which encloses and completes each presentation of Ansermet by relating to the history of ideas in our century. Our item of interpretation is mainly treated in Piguet's interview with Ansermet, which appeared in *Entretiens sur la musique* (1963) and *Gespräche über Musik* (1973).

This is not the place to trace the cultural background influences transmitted to Ansermet by his wife Marguerite Jaccottet and Victori Ocampo in Buenos Aires. Authors who, according to Piguet, may have influenced Ansermet are here mentioned: he learned to know works by Cocteau, Claudel, Thomas Mann, Berdiaeff, Tagore, Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Keyserling and not the least Husserl; and Ansermet visited Sartre at least once in 1946⁴⁵. The universality of Ansermet's broad interests included scientists (acoustics) such as Bouasse and Sir James Jeans, metaphysicists such as Lavelle, Bergson, and Romantists such as Bazailles, Lavignac, Ribot and Victor Basch. The "formalists" among musical thinkers, Hanslick and Vincent d'Indy, provided a fertile background of ideas for the intense battle with the ideas of Stravinsky in *Poétique musicale* (ch. IV:1) through personal communication during preparation for rehearsals of his works, notably the first performance of *L'Histoire d'un Soldat* in Lausanne in 1915. Stravinsky introduced Ansermet to the circles of Ramuz and Diaghilev, whose Russian Ballet found a most agile conductor in Ansermet during 1915–23. Early assimilations include Schopenhauer, with his idea of music as a revelation of the absolute⁴⁶, the astronomy of Charles Dufour and Pythagorean mathematics as distinguished from the "modern" school of mathematics by Bourbaki. In attempting to understand Einstein, Ansermet proposed a concept of energy of manifestly physical origin, and he pursued his studies of the physiology and anatomy of the hearing organ. Piguet refers (11) to a reply by Werner Heisenberg regarding the question of the scientific value of the peculiar application of logarithms in Ansermet's theory: "L'idée d'Ansermet, me dit-il, est une tres bonne idee, mais ses calculs ne sont pas de bons calculs." Following the idea of Dilthey, Ansermet preferred the understanding of facts in context through critical interpretation, to scientific explanations of isolated phenomena. His concept of history was evolutionary, as in theoretical biology. Essential to his philosophical education was the close friendship with Henri-Louis Mieville, formerly professor of philosophy at Univeristé de Lausanne, predecessor and mentor of J.-Claude Piguet.

In his *Fondements (Grundlagen)* Ansermet attempts to find bases for objective discrimination and valid aesthetic judgement. Therefore, it is reasonable to commence by examining his chapter "Die Strukturen der Reflexion. Anatomie des Bewusstseins" (772, FM 745)), the *raison d'être* of which is to underpin his reflective method. Ansermet embarks on his project to philosophically constitute an epistemology for music aesthetics, theory analysis

and interpretation. My angle of approach departs from music philosophy, gradually focusing on interpretation, and thus the theoretical and analytical music system of Ansermet will only be set forth insofar as it impinges **directly** on the interpretational concept treated in this investigation.

PHILOSOPHICAL BASES FOR THE ANSERMET INTERPRETATIONAL CONCEPT

One can distinguish three kinds of reasons for the classifying of *Les Fondements* as phenomenology: (1) **explicit** references to Husserl (e.g. 824, FM 794), (2) **implicit** indications of use of the Husserlian method, with or without application of the original terminology of Husserl, and (3) a **specific (i.e. personal) phenomenology** of Ansermet that corresponds in its general outline, interest, objectives and terminology, to his personal world view. It is an independent music philosophy that would not fit into the original conception by Husserl of what phenomenology was meant to be and become. Ansermet intends to show in his *Fondements* the mode of connection between consciousness and the world of tones (12).

For the consciousness in a situation specific to its environment, culture and epoch, music is (with an imprint of evidence) all that which is implicated by our self-evidently appearing musical experiences. Music has also the meaning indicated by all our **propositions** about the music, but this meaning of music is not explicit, since its sound objects remain unreflected at the moment of primary hearing. Its meaning can only appear through bringing this encounter between consciousness and musical object into existence once or again (13). Opinions, imaginings or theories about music occur as the result of **reflection** on music, and are 'above' music; thoughts about music never enter into the 'closed event' that appears as a meaning-assigning musical act which allows for the conditions of musical experience to arise. Poetic, aesthetic description and theoretical explication reflect this assigned meaning of the music more or less closely, or explain the transcendence of music, but **never reach the experiential phenomenon in itself**. It is important to notice that the difference between the **primary experience** ("*Erlebnis*") of the musical phenomena themselves, and the **secondary reflection** from outside the music and only about it, is decisive in *Les Fondements*. This differentiation would eventually correspond to the distinction made by Husserl in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Huss. III:1:165f, 174). The pertinent quotations

wherein Husserl defines reflection in coincidence with Ansermet's notion are the following. Reflection "ist nach dem soeben Ausgeführten ein Titel für Akte in deren der Erlebnisstrom mit all seinen mannigfachen Vorkommnissen (Erlebnismomenten, Intentionalitäten) evident fassbar und analysierbar wird" (165). Furthermore, Husserl conceives of reflection as "der Bewusstseinsmethode für die Erkenntnis von Bewusstsein überhaupt", and "jederlei 'Reflexion' den Charakter einer Bewusstseinsmodifikation hat, und zwar einer solcher, die prinzipiell jedes Bewusstsein erfahren kann" (166). Conventional music theory and musicology (*Grundlagen* 15–16) is the **codification of praxis** and reflects music only as fact and object ("Gegenstand") of nature. This "objektive Denken" (16) never reaches the experiential phenomenon of music, since music is not outside us but within us.

Therefore objectified theory applies through secondary reflection 'something' external to the genuine musical experience. It is assumed in Ansermet's phenomenology that theory as the codification of already achieved styles cannot even in its extrapolation give rise to any musical innovation; musical creativity never arises from theory. So the Goethean proverb that theory is grey would be true after all according to the mind of Ansermet.

Inserted here is Piguet's statement that the individual's knowledge ("*connaissance de l'individuel*") contains the act of recognizing the individual and identifying it as it is. This, he contends, is attained by acts of contemplation, comprehension or intuition. He delivers a concrete and beautiful image of what I would designate as **phenomenologic assimilation**: "Devant la *Symphonie en sol mineur* de Mozart, je dois entrer en son sens et le faire mien; je suis alors cette symphonie et elle habite en moi. Je la distingue de toute autre. C'est cette symphonie veille qui m'appelle et que ma pensée aimerait, de plus, connaître [...]" (Piguet 1975:0300–0310²). Piguet here allows for the possibility of complete identification and congruency between the interpreter and 'his' musicwork.

During the ages, styles and "aspects" alternated between the expressive, representative, metaphysical etc, but their advocates never came to discuss the evidence for the corresponding experiential events.

Ansermet refers to the preface of Sartre's *Theorie des émotions* in which Sartre endeavors to create an anthropological discipline which defines "das Wesen des Menschen und die menschlichen Bedingungen" (*Grundlagen* 21) and concludes for music: "Wenn die Musik sich nicht nur auf ihr blosses Objekt reduziert oder auf blosses Spiel, muss es ein Sein der Musik geben, dessen Sinn implizite in unseres Erlebnisses enthalten ist." (21) And while this

meaning does not appear clearly in light of the evidence, Ansermet feels a need to explicate this: "Und weil dieser Sinn in unserer historischen Situation nicht mehr im Licht der Evidenz erscheint, ist der Versuch notwendig geworden, ihn zu erläutern." Ansermet explicitly states that these aims can be attained through phenomenology: "Das Genie eines Husserl hat die Phänomenologie zu einer neuen Denkmethode gemacht, und die philosophischen Arbeiten Sartres erhellen sie auf bewundernswürdige Weise." (21). The relevant quotation that would support the view that Ansermet embraced an existential variant of phenomenology is the following: "L'événement vécu a donc une double transcendance de signification, car le vécu immédiat est pur sentiment tonal et rythmique. Sa transcendance immédiate, ou transcendance du premier degré, est faite des significations psychiques *généralement humaines* inscrites dans les structures musicales, qui constituent la substance même du vécu. (FM 332) However, he does not present himself as a philosopher or scientist, but only as a musician "der nur notgedrungen philosophische und wissenschaftliche Begriffe zu Hilfe nimmt, in der Hoffnung, dadurch ein ihn bewegendes Phänomen für alle Welt zu klären [...]." (23) **But Ansermet's view of phenomenology does not preclude interpretation.** In opposition to the concepts of Celibidache and Karajan, Ansermet's reason for this is that if "die Phänomenologie eine neue Weise zu denken, d.h. zu sehen, ist, dann hängt alles von der Schau ab, die sie uns von den Dingen gibt." (22)

As an extremely experienced and qualified conductor with a large repertoire including contemporary music – he conducted during 50 years 'his' *Orchestre de la Suisse Romande* (OSR) which he initiated, organized and managed 1918–1968⁴⁷. Ansermet bases his concept on the alleged **irrefutability of primary experience**, which is also an item in Husserlian phenomenology⁴⁸. He writes under the title "Die Unwiederlegbarkeit der Gegebenheiten der reinen Reflexion" (823, FM 793) that these "*Gegebenheiten der reinen Reflexion*", objects of pure reflection, are irrefutable, since they originate from an unreflected self-consciousness and from its immediate relation to the world through the senses: "sie entstammen einem nichtreflektierten Selbstbewusstsein und dessen unmittelbarer Beziehung zur Welt mittels der Sinne". But he leaves his reader (and listener) alone in his attempt to find support for the confidence in the interpreter necessary to guarantee the avoidance (or minimization) of subjective bias. Not even this is sufficient to dispose of false i:s; in addition, a control of the I:s' w-images in comparison to facts of w (as e.g. s-determinants) is required to

identify incongruencies, idiosyncratic (egocentric) perspectives, and bluntly false perception (cognitive grasp) of **unambiguous** s-relations.

Ansermet relates primary reflection to philosophy and science, in order to ground his standpoint and 'extrapolate' from it his phenomenological endeavour in music: "cette apodicticité, cette irréductibilité des données de la réflexion pure qui est la motivation première de la philosophie de de la science" FM 793; "diese Unwiederleglichkeit, diese Nichtreduzierbarkeit der Gegebenheiten der reinen Reflexion ist die Grundmotivierung der Philosophie und der Wissenschaft." (823) Ansermet views phenomenology as "une mise en oeuvre méthodique et généralisée de l'*entendement*" (FM 794; "die methodische und verallgemeinerte Anwendung des *Verstehens*" 824) and this philosophy aims at "unser Verständnis nicht der rohen Gegebenheiten der Reflexion, sondern der ihnen zugrunde liegende Bewusstseinsphänomene zu klären."

It is possible to clarify the musical phenomena of consciousness simply by tracing them to their double origin in man and in the world, namely through the **reconstitution of these phenomena** "en reconstituant ces phénomènes dès leur genèse en nous et dès leur source dans le monde" (FM 794). Our understanding of the phenomenon is clarified "c'est que notre entendement du phénomène ne s'éclaire que par la saisie du *rapport* entre le phénomène et sa motivation en nous et dans le monde." (FM 794) Obviously, is and cognitive processings provide such mental 'reconstructs'.

According to Ansermet we must turn back to our own experience ("en prenant du recul sur notre propre expérience" FM 794; "auf unsere eigene Erfahrung zurückwenden", *Grundlagen* 824) by focusing on our hearing activity from outside ("en envisageant notre activité auditive du dehors"; "unsere Höraktivität von aussen her angehen") in order to grasp ("*saisir*"; "erfassen") the relation between (1) hearing activity and sound phenomenon ("l'activité de l'oreille et le phénomène sonore"; "Hörtätigkeit und Klangphänomen") and (2) hearing activity and mental reflexion ("l'activité de l'oreille et la réflexion pure, mentale et psychique"; "Hörtätigkeit und rein mentaler und psychischer Reflexion"). This raises a critical question: Is it possible to relate hearing to 'mental' reflection by returning to the reliable 'primary experience' of Husserl? This procedure aims at reconstructing the phenomenon *mutatis mutandis* in order to understand precisely the meaning of the musical organism through grasping the relation between the activity of our musical consciousness and its auditive correlate: "cette reconstitution du phénomène nous amènera à comprendre, par la saisie du rapport entre l'activité de la conscience musicale

et sa motivation auditive" (FM 794).

What Ansermet, and originally Husserl, in effect propose is evidently a restriction to **w-~~ex~~pretational** acts. Even theoretical prejudices and secondary reflection are then rejected as **inpretational addenda** without relevance to w or evidence of substantial support from unambiguous w-content. Phenomenological research, according to Husserl (Huss. III:1) entails (1) a focusing on pure experience ("den Blick auf irgendwelche reinen Erlebnisse richten, sie zu erforschen", 137), (2) a recourse to the beholder's own consciousness ("Rückbeziehung der Phänomenologie auf sich selbst" §65, 137; "Rückbezogenheit auf sich selbst" 138), and (3) a peculiar self-exclusion of the beholder's mind ("Selbst-Ausschaltung des Phänomenologen" as "Norm phänomenologischer Reduktion die sich auf unser empirisches Dasein mitbezieht...", 137) under (4) retained 'objectivity' through 'eidetic' reflection in conformity with the methods of mathematicians ("Soweit es sich um individuelles Dasein handelt, verfährt der Phänomenologe nicht anders als jeder Eidetiker, z.B. der Geometer" sc: "das mathematische Subjekt gehört nicht mit in den eidetischen Gehalt der mathematischen Sätze selbst", 137).

Since the w appears in the guise of the 'mental' reconstruct provided by consciousness (Mm), the traits of its reconstitution by the musical mind (Mm) are characterized by the logical form given through the interpretively cognitive processing.

Now Ansermet approaches the crucial question regarding the **validity and apodicticality** (irrefutability) of this method. In reference to Sartre, he states that the phenomenological reflection is "*purifiante*" (FM 794; "reinigende"), i.e. our reflective objects can be divested of their ambiguity and mysteriousness. Of more **epistemological** interest is the proposal of Ansermet that the said method puts the investigator in a situation of complete objectivity in front of his consciousness phenomena. The problem, however, acknowledged by Ansermet, is that we have to **rely on intuition** for attaining knowledge in our attempt to reconstruct the consciousness phenomena, since the consciousness is nothing "que l'on ne peut pas toucher du doigt et qui ne se prête pas à l'observation directe" (FM 795) and it does not immediately expose itself to observation. So, the only remaining criterion for the 'evidentiality' of phenomena is their **correspondence with experience**: "le seul critère [...] de sa certitude, c'est qu'elle rejoigne notre expérience" ("Das einzige Kriterium der Gewissheit ist also, dass sie mit unserer Erfahrung übereinstimmt" (FM 794; 824).

The critical stance of Ansermet towards science – despite ample use of

physics in the acoustical chapters of his book – is reflected by his rhetorical question: "Mais pourquoi les certitudes de la science sont-elles relatives?" His answer, however, is rewarding and merits our concern, since it is the point of departure for "*le système de référence*" (FM 795; "Referenzsysteme") in the further concretization of a phenomenological concept of interpretation, particularly instanced in the personal version presented by Sergiu Celibidache (MIR IV). Ansermet: "Paru qu'elles dépendent toujours d'un certain système de référence qui peut être dépassé par un autre, rendant mieux compte du phénomène" (FM 795; "Weil sie [die Gewissheiten] stets von einem Bezugssystem abhängig sind, das von einem anderen übertroffen werden kann, welches dem Phänomen gerechter wird.")

Ansermet touches upon the problem of matching experiential phenomena with their corresponding phenomenological descriptions, but he never penetrates this problem more closely on a primary level that could be important for the problems of this investigation. Clearly, Ansermet acknowledges the fact that several rival descriptions of the 'same' object can be compared as to their correspondence to the original phenomenon, since he allows the primary experience to present for our consciousness the most pure and unbiased "image" of the constitution of the object. But Ansermet never reaches the conclusion that the **interpretive act** itself can be described; and its constituting of the meaningfulness of the world, the essential traits of its objects, must be derived from those cognitive processes involved in the interpretive act. This would, I propose, motivate our investigation of interpretive acts (MIR I: 82–108); and such an investigation could be made from a phenomenological angle, at least in the area of reviewing the role of consciousness' **intentionality** towards musical objects. Rewarding in this approach is the **multiperspectivity**, since the phenomenological method focuses on the consciousness structure itself and presupposes its unity based in the identity of the self.

One has to recognize the problem of circularity that, according to some critics, occurs in the phenomenologist's alleged method of referring consciousness to consciousness itself. Ansermet seems not to see this problem; he follows Husserl by stating: "[Or,] dans le cas de la phénoménologie, le système de référence, ce sont les structures de *conscience elles-mêmes; il se confond avec le phénomène; il est donc en tout cas certain que l'observateur, le phénoménologue, si sa description du phénomène est rigoureuse, est hors jeu*" (FM 795; "Im Fall der Phänomenologie [...] sind die *Bewusstseinsstrukturen selbst* das Bezugssystem; sie vermischen sich mit den Phänomenen. Es ist daher auf jeden Fall sicher, dass

der Beobachter, der Phänomenologe, *ausgeschaltet* ist, wenn seine Phänomenbeschreibung genau ist.") (824)

This problem of correct description is crucial to phenomenology and is a target of its opponents. In principle, solutions to ensure correct description can be suggested: (1) through repeated primary experience of the same object (O) it is possible for the interpreter (I) to control and correct his perspective, and (2) a conscious exclusion of inadequate (irrelevant, impertinent) conceptions (of the apriorical kind) and prejudices, should at least reduce the biased components of i, if not eliminate them entirely. This, though, would require a mature self-awareness and readiness for self-criticism. I will make two further comments on the preceding crucial quotation:

(1) Clearly, the fact that the consciousness merges ("*vermischen*") in the phenomena is both necessary within this system, and problematic. How should one prove which of our experiences originate(s) in cognitive acts of the mind and in a world of objects carrying their properties, respectively? Within the "closed" system of phenomenology, a stringent internal logic demands that only consciousness can be the reference system for occurring phenomena, since what appears in our experience appears in our consciousness. The "material" of 'primary reflection' is the content of our consciousness, since experience cannot take place anywhere else than within it. But this entails that the experiences, even if they primarily arise from immediate sensory perception, may be formed by our sensory and cognitive acts of assimilation. This leads to the question of the status of cognitive psychology as opposed to phenomenology; the latter claims independence and supremacy in the hierarchy of sciences compared to the former. The question can from one point of view be reduced to assessing the legitimacy of this demand. If phenomenology can be granted the status with which Ansermet endows it, then the scope for essential innovation in musicology would thereby be opened, which Ansermet indirectly intimates when he draws a clear borderline against what he describes as the limited traditional methods of scientific tradition within musicology (18–20). And

(2) Ansermet states that the observer ("*l'observateur*", "*le phénoménologue*"; "Beobachter", "Phänomenologe") becomes excluded ("*est hors jeu*"; "ausgeschaltet") if his description of the phenomenon ("Phänomenbeschreibung") is "*rigoureuse*" ("genau"), i.e. correct, and that there is a mingling between his consciousness structure ("Bewusstseinsstrukturen") and the phenomena. By using the word "*est hors jeu*" ("ausgeschaltet") Ansermet clearly indicates that he refers to the epoché of

Husserlian phenomenology (Huss. III:1:65; about "Selbstausschaltung des Phenomenologen", *ibid.* 137). But Ansermet gives no solution to the apparent contradiction in his statement. The "Bewusstseinsstruktur" belongs to the mind of the observing phenomenologist, which cannot possibly be both excluded (from the intersubjective merging between the observer and his object, I amend) and involved ("*vermischt*").

Ansermet invites us to give up our aims of achieving objective knowledge ("renonce à l'idéal de *connaissance*") since "la '*connaissance*' vise toujours une chose déterminée" (FM 795) because the understanding confines itself to the grasping of relations between things and to the comprehension of the meaning of these relations: ("auf das Ideal der *Erkenntnis* [zu] verzichten" since "'Erkenntnis' stets auf eine determinierte Sache abzielt" 825). Since everything in our world is allegedly relational, it is more likely, according to Ansermet, that we reach the truth of reality through the act of understanding, not through the explanation of allegedly objective facts excluded from our conscious horizon: "da alles in der Welt und in uns *relationell* ist, hat das Verstehen die grösste Aussicht, die Wahrheit zu erfassen [...]". This grasping of 'truth' must be achieved through respecting the adequacy between two kinds of determination, the determination of things through yourself and the determination of things for yourself: "l'adéquation de la détermination des choses par soi et de leur détermination *pour soi*" (FM 795; "die Adäquatheit zwischen der Dingbestimmung *durch sich* und ihrer Bestimmung *für sich*", 825). This should impel every conscientious musician to take the question of the evidence for his interpretation seriously.

THE GENERAL AND PERSONAL INTERPRETATIONAL CONCEPT OF ANSERMET

In his magnum opus, *Les Fondements*, Ansermet only briefly touches upon principal questions of interpretation in performance. Why did he not dedicate a specific chapter to this item? The answer can only be a matter of conjecture. There are several plausible reasons. First, interpretation could be considered as an application of his main effort to ground his general concept of music as an art on the basis of phenomenological philosophy. The practical consequences of this were self-evident, at least for him personally. Secondly, as an experienced conductor he had already gained the essential insights as a sensitively listening leader in front of the orchestra. There was no need to draw the obvious

conclusions, especially as his pedagogical interest on a basic level was limited. Third, the essentials presented in his voluminous book were meant only to guide the young interpreter in the most rewarding direction, aiming for artistic maturity at the highest level. For this purpose, obvious directives should not be too obvious in order to not risk or disturbing the personal maturation and free artistic development of the talented interpreter. Fourth, I am not convinced that Ansermet quite clearly and thoroughly intended (or saw the merit of thinking through) the bearings of his music philosophy in view of the situation of the performer; and it is not established that Ansermet himself, in spite of his splendid intellect, could analyze clearly what consequences his thinking would have for a **theory of interpretation**. One could imagine that he would feel inclined to limit himself to practically implementing these consequences with all his training, skill and experiences as a conductor in the background making up his total competence; further theories were unnecessary, and the phenomenology of music was supposed to be identified with a "phenomenology of interpretation in performance", since first, phenomenology does not recognize the value of theory and even holds that it is misleading, a supposition which Ansermet agreed with; and secondly, he may have held the view that **there is no separate phenomenology of interpretation** since interpretation is always interpretation of something, in this connection of music. If such an assumed postulation were true, it would merit careful consideration. Consequently any attempt to outline a phenomenology of interpretation would immediately be reduced to an underlying phenomenology of music, which was what Ansermet left as his legacy. Fifth, Ansermet looks upon his activity as a conductor as a recreation of compositions, which should be understood against the background of deep **involvement in the compositional processes**, as documented in the *Correspondance 1934–1968* between him and Frank Martin, and other publications presented by J.–Claude Piguet (1976).

Ansermet leaves as a few reflections on the **ontology of interpretation**. Through the "*Einbildungsakt*" (Grundlagen 149–151, FM 155–157) – investigated by Sartre in his "L'Imaginaire" – we create an **analogon** to a visual picture. However, in music, the analogon to the musical consciousness is the sound structure perceived in rhythm and tempo, "*das erklingende Werk*". So what, then, is the **notation**, Ansermet inquires. It is a prescription for performance to realize the analogon in such a way that the performer brings out the implicit musical image from the notation ("*das im Text implizierte musikalische Bild zur Erscheinung bringt*", 150, FM 156). The musical prescription is devoid of

the essential ("das *Wesentliche*") that transforms this static scheme into "un flux mélodique animé d'un dynamisme interne et d'un tempo qualifié. C'est pourquoi le texte appelle au *interprète*, qui ne saurait se réduire à un simple exécutant, comme le voudrait Strawinsky" (FM 156; "einen durch eine innere Dynamik und ein *qualifiziertes* Tempo belebten melodischen Fluss. Deshalb verlangt der Text nach einem *Interpreten*, nicht nur nach einem blossen *Ausführenden*, wie Strawinsky wünscht." (150) The composer needs the interpreter as soon as he notates his music and leaves it to others for performance.

In one respect, the interpreter creates ("*schafft*") the music found in the score, since he is allowing the music to arise ("*entstehen*"): "il crée une musique qu'il n'a pas conçue lui-même; il est, comme disent les Allemands, un *nachschaffender Künstler*; il crée de la musique d'après un texte schématisant une musique déjà imaginée" (FM 156; "aber er [the interpreter] schafft eine Musik, die er nicht selbsterdacht hat, er ist nur *nachschaffender Künstler*, der eine Musik nach einem Text schafft, welcher eine bereits vorgestellte Musik schematisiert.")

It is interesting to note that Ansermet considers that the composer is not the "*procréateur*" ("Erzeuger"), since he does not create his "langage". He uses "un langage musical déjà acquis *pour* produire une nouvelle oeuvre: il est *procréateur*, comme l'*interprète*;" (FM 156). So, in a way, Ansermet reduces the differences between composer and musician. Whereas the composer creates his work in order to communicate himself or something ("*pour se signifier ou signifier quelque chose*," FM 156), the interpreter creates the 'living' music in order to let appear in tones what the composer communicates: "l'*interprète* crée la musique animée *pour* faire apparaître dans les sons ce qu'a voulu signifier l'auteur" (FM 156; "der Interpret schafft die lebendige Musik, um in den Tönen erscheinen zu lassen, was der Komponist signifizieren wollte.")

Whereas the imaginative act of the composer contains the unreflected ("une part d'*irreflechi*, de choses non explicitement signifiées"), which has not been explicitly signified, the interpreter needs his clear imagination ("l'*interprète* doit se faire une idée claire" FM 156; "*klare Vorstellung*", 151) insofar as he intends to realize in p the music by the composer. Ansermet exemplifies this: "une idée claire ou du moins un juste sentiment du *style* de l'auteur, qui n'est pas écrit en clair dans le texte et dont l'auteur est souvent d'autant moins conscient que ce style, c'est lui." (FM 156) And Ansermet here reaches his conclusion about the required talent of the interpreter: "C'est pourquoi l'*imagination* est, à notre sens, la première qualité requise de l'*interprète*; mais une imagination qui, pour être créatrice, mais créatrice *par mandat*, doit

se consacrer tout entière à deviner *dans le texte* la musique qu'a rêvée l'auteur et qu'il a, lui, interprète, à faire apparaître par l'exécution sonore qui pose toutes sortes de problèmes" (FM 156; "Deshalb ist die Einbildungskraft nach unser Ansicht die erste vom Interpreten zu fordernde Eigenschaft; eine Einbildungskraft allerdings, die sich, um schöpferisch – und zwar schöpferisch *im Dienste eines Auftrags* – zu sein, ganz und gar der Aufgabe widmen muss, *im Text* die Musik zu erraten, die der Komponist erträumt hat und die er als Interpret durch die klingende Ausführung, die alle möglichen Probleme aufwirft, zur Erscheinung bringen muss.")

However, the interpreter can alternatively intend to realize himself primarily in *p*, something external to both *w* and himself (I) – such as us listener – or to realize only partly the *w*–content. In that case, when he uses the *w* as a vehicle for his realization in *p*, he (the I) needs his clear self–esteem and self–knowledge in order to distinguish and delineate himself from the external and from the unrealized part of *w*.

According to Ansermet it is not at all self–evident that the composer himself has the specific competence to let the musical image appear in the tones: "cette faculté, propre à l'interprète, de faire apparaître *dans les sons* l'image musicale, avec tout ce qu'elle comporte de non écrit et de non réfléchi" (FM 156; "diesedem Interpreteneigentümliche Fähigkeit [...], *inden Tönen* das musikalische Bild erscheinen zu lassen", 151, FM 156). But still, the composer enjoys as performer of his own works great confidence in the view of the audience, which does not in itself imply that his interpretation is the best one.

Ansermet's idea is that the interpreter is (in the phenomenological sense: i.e. "being immersed by") during performance in the actual sound structure; he is in the temporal structure and in the concrete sound ("*konkrete Klanglichkeit*", 744, FM 715). So if the interpreter is in the music in this intentional sense, he has to recreate ("*nachschaffen*") the music "here" where he is, where the work is supposed to be, and in the way the composer conceived it in his imagination ("*Einbildung*"). Conceptually, it is possible to recreate the situation of *hinc et nunc* in the sense that the composer also experiences the creative moment as occurring here and now for him. This is the conception of **complete identification** between interpreter and the interpreted object. The work mediates a close relation between interpreter and composer.

Exemplifying with a melody, Ansermet says it is the task of the interpreter to let the melody appear convincingly and in its whole context of meaning: "Es ist also Aufgabe des Interpreten, sie [die Melodie] überzeugend und in ihrer

ganzen Sinnfülle erscheinen zu lassen." Therefore, writes Ansermet, the interpreter must find a way back to the original situation in which Beethoven composed ("retrouver la condition où était Beethoven quand il concevait son oeuvre" FM 715; "die Situation wiederfinden in der Beethoven komponierte", 744). The same recreational idea is embraced by Furtwängler. (ch. IV:2:2)

Under the title "*Nécessité de l'interprétation*" (FM 715) Ansermet distinctly refutes the opinion of Stravinsky (ch. IV:1), who denied the **necessity of interpretation** in order to secure an objective rendering of his scores. However, Ansermet shows, convincingly in my opinion, by mentioning a sequence in Stravinsky's *Sacre du Printemps*⁴⁹, that it is not possible to perform this piece without interpreting the score: "Il faut donc bien 'interpréter' le texte, c'est-à-dire voir *au-delà* de lui ce qu'il veut signifier; et s'il en est ainsi, c'est bien que le texte *n'est pas* la musique." (FM 716; "Man muss also den Text 'interpretieren', d.h. *über ihn hinaus* nach dem schauen, was er signifizieren will." (744).

As to the question of the necessity of interpretation, it is worth noting that the affirmative answer to this question by Ansermet is turned into the negative by Sergiu Celibidache, who, as we shall see (ch. V:4, MIR IV) repudiates any necessity for interpretation in performance as a consequence of his attempt to more closely apply the Husserlian epoché, which is understood as a **parenthesizing of subjectivity**, including all interpretative perspectives save the sole remaining one as secured by the phenomenological "*Wesensschau*".

Back to Ansermet: The main points of interest for our investigation in the discussions between Ansermet and Piguet⁵⁰ can be resumed. J.-Claude Piguet outlines the essential core of the superordinate level of a **personal concept of interpretation for Ansermet**, concretized by his references to conductorial experiences, which merge into a **consensus**. Piguet perceives Ansermet's role as an orchestral leader as a **synthesis of man, musician and philosopher**. According to Piguet Ansermet in his conducting does not bring out the feeling of the musician, but he allows for "*die Musik selbst als Gefühl*" (ib. 92) to appear, as if music were **objective emotion** coming into existence (and thus 'standing') in front of the conductor, who regards it as it appears without entering intentionally into the emotional world of the music. Ansermet affirms this view by stating that "die Musik ist objektiviertes Gefühl, objektiviert in Gestalt des harmonischen Gefühls [...] das in Kadenzen Gestalt gewinnt und folglich bewegt ist und uns bewegt." (93) And in the same way as "meine innere geistige Tätigkeit zum Ausdruck kommt" as "I" speak(s), the inner harmonic feeling ("*innere harmonische Gefühl*") is externally manifested in the melodic

process ("*melodischen Verlauf*", 93): "Wenn ich dirigiere, ist deshalb mein Blick auf diese melodische Linie gerichtet, die in einem imaginären Raum über den Tönen erscheinen" and Ansermet continues about his essential experience in conducting: "bin ich also tatsächlich **innerlich beschäftigt mit dem Gefühl, aus dem die Musik besteht** und das sich meiner bemächtigt. Aber dieses Gefühl selbst lenkt meinen Blick nach aussen, zu den melodischen Bildern, die die bedeutsamste Ausprägung des musikalischen Verlaufs sind. Zugleich lenkt es auch meine Gestik" (93). So the experiential impact of the music on the mind of this conductor, in a quasi-automatic way, directs his **intentionality** (i.e. 'attention' in psychological idiom), as well as his shaping of the conductorial gestic. There is a coupling of assimilative and emittive modes of consciousness brought out in interpretative acts, as I principally proposed in the categorization presented in my metainterpretative theory (MIR I, chapter 3.3: 94–108, sc. 104).

Ansermet surveys his own 'gestic' (expressive and signaling) behavior "um ein stillschweigendes Verstehen zwischen den Musikern und mir herzustellen" (Piguet, 93); "ihr Musizieren wird durch meine Gestik von dem Gefühl geleitet, das die Musik in mir weckt", and "dieses Gefühl hat mir alles diktiert, was ich ihnen in den Proben über Phrasierung, Akzente und Klangwerte gesagt habe." But the problem is that "*Gefühl*" is a much too vague a term to be interpreted cognitively. The only important conclusion that this quote allows is that the gestic is not a consciously considered construction, but emanates from **intuition**, a cognitive category that may attain its decisive determination from the **emotional coloring** of the experience. In its essential traits this view is similar to that of Brelet (II:3); still, Ansermet comes far from subscribing to her intuitionism.

The conductor who only renders the text ("die Töne spielen", "den Text wiedergeben" cf. Piguet) "verwechselt den Buchstaben mit dem Geist des Buchstaben" (Ansermet in Piguet, 93–94). A rendering that remains faithful only to the "musical text" can only transmit to the audience an image of a static music, since the notation is only an abstract scheme of "*Tonstrukturen*" (I would say, "note-structures", i.e. intentional correlatives to n–n–relations). Such a rendering lacks the essential, namely "das Gefühl, aus dem die Musik gänzlich besteht". Therefore, the interpreter must not proceed from the text, but from the feeling which is disguised in the text and which can be disclosed through studying the text: "Deshalb muss der Interpret nicht vom Text ausgehen, sondern vom Gefühl, das im Text verborgen ist und das sich ihm beim Studium des Textes entdeckt." (94) The emotional reaction of the score-reading conductor is essential

in this concept.

Piguet formulates the principal question regarding the **legitimacy of the expressive will** of the interpreter being brought out into the performance: "Soll der Dirigent ein persönliches Gefühl vermitteln [...] oder soll er versuchen, die Eigenart des Gefühls wiederzugeben, die die Musik in sich enthält?" This formulation of alternatives reflects already the familiarity with – and preconditions valid for – a differentiated interpretative concept:

Logically, Ansermet claims that if music consists of feeling, then there is no need for the interpreter to add his feelings to it; thus the interpreter "soll das Gefühl, das die Musik enthält, zu dem seinen machen und nicht ein anderes, das er ihr verleihen kann oder durch das er die Musik noch beredter zu machen glaubt." So **the interpreter is supposed to assimilate the emotion of the work** through an act of identification, by making it his own through absorbing, incorporating or accepting the feeling that occurs in reacting by listening and otherwise naturally experiencing the music. He must feel **confidence** in the music and in his own response to it in a way that leaves him open for the impression of its feeling onto him, thus letting the music convince him that he can do no better than to transmit this feeling to the listener, whereby his feeling assumes the role of an **emotion transmitter**.

In this process, Ansermet sees two dangers by which the resulting interpretation may become faulty or defective: (1) It may become emotionally **exaggerated** or (2) it may **lack emotional intensity**, warmth and energy out of pure conscientiousness. At this point I notice an inconsistency in the proposed concept, namely in the statement "diese Wärme und diese Energie stehen ja nicht auf dem Papier und können nur von ihm selbst kommen" (i.e. from the interpreter, *sc.* conductor, 95) when compared to the proposition that the feeling must originate in the music, not from the interpreter. I propose the following solution to this paradox: In the music certain shapes are preformed in the encounter with the sensitive interpreter who recognizes these shapes as congruent with the corresponding feelings that he experiences first by an act of interpreting **into the work – intropretation** (ch. I:2) – through e.g. reading a score which is a process of identifying shapes; and then by allowing the sounding music through its impact to evoke either directly corresponding feelings or indirect images, which by their relation to content retained from earlier experiences bring about emotions colored by memory. Therefore, I see no contradiction in the abridged form of Ansermet's formulation on the state of facts on this item.

The emotional rendering (which could be compared to Tolstoy's theory of emotional transmission, *mutatis mutandis*; Hermerén 1983:66) is central to the task of the conductor, according to Ansermet's concept: "Aufgabe des Dirigenten ist es also, sich so weit wie möglich das Gefühl anzuzeigen, [and "anzueignen"] das durch den Komponisten musikalische Gestalt gewonnen hat, und damit seine Interpretation in der Weise zu beseelen, dass der Hörer alle Gefühlssignifikation in der Melodie, der Harmonie, dem Rhythmus und dem Tempo empfinden kann". (95)

The question on the matter of differences of interpretation receives a reply in this conception. Ansermet conceives that "der Interpret während der Aufführung das Werk ja immer aus einem bestimmten Blickwinkel sieht, wodurch er jeweils nur einige Aspekte überblicken kann, niemals alle zugleich." (95) This is pure interpretative **perspectivism** (MIR I:172–173; II:229,291). In the thinking of Ansermet, however, the perspectivity ("*Blickwinkel*", angle of approach) also bears concretely on the level of **gestalting** (and possibly of execution; see MIR I:47 on the criteria for three levels of interpretation): "Es ist sehr schwierig, jede einzelne melodische Phrase plastisch herauszuarbeiten, ohne den Verlauf der Form etwas aus den Augen zu verlieren; ebenso schwierig ist es, die formale Gestalt deutlich herauszuarbeiten, das heißt die Architektur, die dem Werk seine Einheit verleiht, ohne dass dabei die Einzelheiten an Relief verlieren." (95–96)

The formulation "*die dem Werk seine Einheit verleiht*" is ambiguous. If it refers to the compositional or notated structure (the static "*Architektur*" could be a hint in this direction), it would be a truism; but if the quotation refers to "*die formale Gestalt herauszuarbeiten*" this would be an indication on impact also on the higher level of interpretation, encompassing the view and grasp of the whole work in the progress of the performance. Piguet proposes the existence of an objective view of the work, "eine Objektivität in der Auffassung der Werke", i.e. that "es einen *objektiven Geschmack* gibt" (96), and recognizes a logical problem on this point, which he explicates in the context of the idea of music as feeling. As long as phenomenology has not proved that emotional experience "ebenso objektiv in seiner Realität ist wie jeder beliebige Gegenstand in der Natur", there are necessarily two alternatives: either music is **emotion**, and then it can only be **understood subjectively**; or understanding is **objective**, then music cannot be emotion (logical structure: if p then q; $\neg q$ then $\neg p$). Piguet proposes the solution: "Die Wahrheit scheint doch wohl zu sein, dass die Musik objektives Gefühl ist, ein Gefühl, das einem objektiven Verstehen zugänglich

ist" (96). This would provide the justification for the use of "emotion" as objectified feeling that can be incarnated or represented also in an artwork, and of "feeling" as a "characteristic atmosphere" held internally by a person and which can be regarded by the consciousness in relation to external shapings through the transcending imagination.

Based on experience, Piguet informs us about the unanimity of opinion among most great interpreters that the work demands of the performance "*la justesse du sentiment*" ("objektiv das richtige Gefühl", 96) and "*la justesse du ton*" ("den richtigen Ton"). The notation seems to force the vague emotional indications of music to become objectively codified, and thereby more precise. According to Piguet, the existence of differences in interpretations is no argument against objectivity of emotions in the musical work, since "die berühmte Verschiedenheit der Interpretationen [...] gibt es doch genaugenommen nur bei Interpreten zweiten Ranges, die dem musikalischen Gefühl [...des Werkes /my conjecture/] Gewalt antun." This is also the view held by Sergiu Celibidache, partly for other reasons (ch.V:3; MIR IV *passim*). Michael Krausz also discusses the related topic of **singularism** versus **multiplism** (1993:75–78). Ansermet, however, does not agree on this point. He acknowledges differing interpretations on a high qualitative level; an interpretative alternative does not entail a difference of value (presupposing that "value" is directly related to "quality") and various interpretative perspectives on the work will result in differing alternatives of not *a priori* lesser quality: "Die Verschiedenheit der Interpretationen bei den grossen Interpreten ergibt sich daraus, dass jeder einzelne einen bestimmten Aspekt oder einen bestimmten Charakter eines Werkes herausarbeiten will und das es sehr schwierig, wenn nicht unmöglich ist, in einer Interpretation alle Aspekte eines Werkes zum klingen zu bringen, wenn das Werk reich an Aspekten ist." This still seems to be desired by Ansermet. If an I considers all aspects, including contradictory T–i:s, he will have to shape overarching sound structures on the gestalting level in order to secure hierarchical unity; the hierarchy is necessary because it is a condition for the **relationability** of all individual parts to their common whole. It is required in order to create a **singular point of reference**.

So in the interpretative concept of Ansermet, which allows for various alternatives arising from a legitimate multiperspectivity, differing interpretations can enrich and contribute to the completeness and dignity of the work. The problem, though, becomes a matter of how you select your

alternative view or discard others, and of how to ensure that this aspect allows for (and promotes a) realization on an acceptable quality level. Otherwise formulated: What are the **quality criteria** of an interpretation in performance?

Ansermet proceeds to answer this question by stating a more personal choice that would guide the selection from the available alternatives. The interpreter plays for the audience, i.e. the foremost reason for him to perform is the presence of open-minded listeners. The interpreter therefore must create for himself an **image of the auditors** to whom he directs himself. This is a **communicative ideal**: "Ich für meinen Teil habe meine Wahl getroffen. Ich stelle mir meinen Hörer a priori als für Musik empfänglich vor"; Ansermet presupposes that his listener will be able to understand. This is an important precondition that bears on the concrete gestalting of the performance insofar as exaggerated effects in order to clarify the work structure in too-obvious ways are not needed: "Ich gehe von der Vorstellung aus, dass der Hörer verstehen kann und dass es folglich genügt, die Musik sprechen zu lassen, ohne zu Effekten zu greifen, die immer leicht zur Hand sind, die aber doch die Wahrheit des Werkes beeinträchtigen." (97) Ansermet also presupposes, in his relation to his audience, that our musical language can be generally understood, and that in due time, after repeated hearing of the work, every listener will gain access to the work through its performance(s). It is important to note a divergent opinion on this point: Celibidache rejects the idea of the audience's influence on p.

The further discussion between Ansermet and Piguet penetrates the question of memory, the concepts of "*auswendig*" and "*inwendig*" in relation to the philosophy of Henri Bergson, and the technique of conducting.

In a study of Ansermet as interpreting conductor Numa F. Tétaz⁵¹ presents a wealth of valuable detailed observations as a contribution to our knowledge of Ansermet's personal interpretive style ("*passion et lucidité*", 86), particularly in Debussy's *La Mer* (11), Ravel's *La Valse* (63) and *Daphnis et Chloë* (70) as well as in Stravinsky's *Sacre du Printemps* (75), the latter case in comparison with the composer's performance. Tétaz arrives at a more 'literary' conclusion, aiming at catching "l'humeur du moment, les circonstances, le lieu, l'atmosphère" (78) that modify their differing responses to the score of *Sacre*: "Avec Stravinsky, on entend une des partitions maîtresses de la musique du début du XX^e siècle, riche d'idées et d'inventions qui ont révolutionné la manière d'écrire la musique. Ansermet nous fait assister à une série de rites barbares qui aboutissent à cet acte terrifiant qu'est un sacrifice humain" (77) and "l'auditeur d'Ansermet ressent bouleversement et effroi, [...] celui de Stravinsky admire

la complexité, la richesse et la nouveauté de l'écriture" (78). Stravinsky defends the aspect relevant to the perspective of the composer, whereas Ansermet, sensitive to the "couleur" (94), regards the work as an independent artwork and an object for the realization of a specifically pertinent experiential content: "Or, le *Sacre* est en même temps une construction étonnante et un spectacle sur des rites cruels plus ou moins imaginaires; on ne voit donc pas en quoi il serait illégitime de mettre en évidence l'un ou l'autre aspect de la partition. Il est inévitable au surplus que cette mise en évidence ne peut faire sentir l'effroi du *Sacre* qu'au moyen des structures, qu'il faut donc bien qu'il réalise, et Stravinsky ne peut réaliser ces mêmes structures sans leur faire dire cette chose effroyable qu'elles expriment. Ce n'est donc pas une question de tout ou de rien, mais de plus ou de moins, ou, pour le dire de manière peut-être plus précise, de mise en perspective." (77)

The idea that Tetaz seems to suggest on this point is that even if small differences in the end prove to be significant, the identity of the work still guarantees on a basic level throughout these interpretive variations the transmission of both basic structure and content. The resulting differences can be grouped: "le choix du tempo, et les fluctuations qui peuvent intervenir une fois qu le tempo est posé. Ensuite, il y a l'attaque, la manière de produire et de prolonger le son, bref tout ce qui touche au maniement et à la technique des instruments. Une autre série de constats concernera les phrasés, et la dernière abordera la question de l'équilibre entre les registres" (79). However, the central point, I agree with Tetaz, is "la démarche de la conscience esthétique": "La convergence ou, mieux, la cohérence à laquelle cette action commune de traits dissemblables doit aboutir est probablement ce qu'il y a de plus remarquable dans les deux gravures", and Tetaz establishes the "cohérence dans chacun d'eux". This coherence is "un critère essentiel dans toute discussion relative à des questions d'interprétation", and it is regarded as an indispensable **quality** of an interpretation "qui échappe dans une certaine mesure à la subjectivité du jugement." (79) Tetaz refrains from all attempts to systematize the situation and opportunities of a critical interpretation analysis. Unfortunately, Tetaz's analyses are too momentary and shallow to ever arrive at an encompassing conception of the whole.

In a subsequent section Tétaz treats Ansermet's symphonic concept regarding the German repertory tradition, although applied too superficially to symphonies by Beethoven (no. 9) and Brahms (no. 1). Tetaz, though he relies on practiced musicianship, fails to provide the theoretical framework needed in

order to structure the experiential results of the intended naivety of his auditive attention ("Écoutons donc ces deux interprétations 'naïvement'", 76); such a support would be needed for his propositions regarding the remaining recorded performances, and regarding the personal impressions from recollected concert events that he presents without critical filtering through a method of i-analysis. However, Tetaz's simple descriptions of Ansermet's interpretive style traits as basically $p(i(w))$, and of his explanatory reflections in comparison to Stravinsky's allegedly neutral $p(c)$, instantiates the realization of different **perspectivic aspects** ($P=I$ versus $P=C$) within the provided relational scheme (ch. I:2).

Summarizing the **theoretical concept of Ansermet**, one can distinguish very broadly two categories in his reasoning, and these categories also serve as a general scheme of criticism in interpretation analysis. Interpretive decisions are vindicated along two lines, and these in fact correspond to (1) an **a priori** given **distinction** of possible justifications, (2) the two most commonly advanced theories of truth in philosophy (correspondance and coherence). As instantiated in his i-conception Ansermet warrants his standpoints by reference to (1) **internal coherence** (i.e. either coherence of composition or sound gestalting; principally one has to distinguish between **intentional** coherence of the imagination and conceptualization in the consciousness of either the composer or the interpreter; as well as, correspondingly, between these two kinds of intentionalities brought out in the work or performance-shaping respectively; this coherence refers to the **consistency in progress** of work performance) and (2) **correspondance to prescription** (notation) (i.e. faithfulness – cf. correspondance theory in logic which refers to reality; for the theoretical aspects of musical interpretation see MIR I:29 inter/intracoherence, 350 "*kohesion*", MIR II:199, 201, 224, 281–283; in English in MIP 30, 35–37, 92–94 *et pass.*).

It is clear that Ansermet stresses the importance of internal coherence more than the faithfulness to w , since he, concretely or intentionally in the preparation process, virtually recomposes the work whereby the outcome may slightly differ from that of the composer's indicated version, and elsewhere refers mostly to the shaping and processual qualities of performance that to a high degree depend on the internal coherence of interpretation. He does not disregard the notation, but fidelity to the score is not problematic in his

rehearsal process. In view of this, it is worth noting that Ansermet conducted **with the score in concerts**, stating that in this situation "dient die Partitur vor seinem [des Dirigents] Augen zu nichts anderem, als dass sie dem Dirigenten zeigt, was er erwartet, was sich ihm bereits ankündigt."⁵²

If we were to adapt the concepts of (1) profoundness, (2) creativity, and (3) logical clarity of [A] the concept of interpretation (in theory), and of [B] the implementation of it in performance (in practise, praxis) – as I have earlier proposed (MIR I:239 "*djup*", 393 "*kreativitet*" and *Journal of Musicological Research* 1984 vol. 5 p. 119 "*logicality*") – it is easy to discern a certain incongruency between the general music philosophy (and partly speculative theory) and his interpretational concept as his view of his own conducting aesthetics. He is prone to stress logical clarity more in theory than in practice, where emotional coherence overridingly guides the concrete shaping of the performance according to his own opinion a view I also find corroborated as far as the empirical evidence has been studied.

A summary in English of the results of my interpretation analysis of a performance of Frank Martin's *Petit Symphonie Concertante* conducted by Ansermet reveals the following (as shown in MIR II:180 and the complete comparative interpretation analysis of this work in German: "Interpretationsanalyse von Frank Martins *Petit Symphonie Concertante* anhand von sechs Schallplattenaufnahmen. Beitrag zu den grundsätzlichen Gestaltungsfragen", excerpts from MIR II, unpublished 1981:9–16): "Ansermet allows the musical material to act according to its own laws with a distinct, almost strident concreteness. The music appears to be a phenomenon of nature. Just as a poet can describe an apple and bring to the reader's awareness its very freshness, its smell and taste, so Ansermet **allows** the music's **own** qualities to sound out, without himself actually having contributed to any specific shaping. The music appears to be free from subjective impressions as no such impressions have been introduced via the interpretation. At the same time the music sounds with the full authenticity and richness of reality." The reference here to **transparency** and an improvisatory correctness of music-making, a leisurely quality of ensemble playing ('natural' coordination) is crucial for my diagnosis. The analysis was carried through before any study of Ansermet's theory. Further evidence, of melodic coherence (191) and other phenomena, is referred to in MIR II:444 (index).

Against Ansermet's philosophical method, Carl Dahlhaus proposes that Ansermet did not follow Husserl's clear line of thought⁵³: "doch vergisst

[Ansermet] dass Husserl bemüht war, die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft zu etablieren." (180) Husserl provides "eine Reflexion auf transzendente, die Erfahrung begründende Strukturen" (181). The basic idea is a logical consequence drawn from the evident fact that all knowledge is a content of our consciousness, and thus "unser Wissen über Tatsachen [...] aber in Wahrheit in Strukturen unseres Bewusstseins begründet." This is, according to Dahlhaus' view, "ein Versuch, verborgene Selbstverständlichkeiten zu entdecken." (181)

What Ansermet aims at, which Dahlhaus also conceives, is to create a phenomenology of music which discovers the transcendental structures of our experience of "sinnvoller Tonzusammenhänge", upon which it also bases itself. Dahlhaus never enters into discussion on the main item of what could possibly ensure the coherence of a closed system of internal evidence, if no pure external references can be provided for comparison. Dahlhaus explains that such a phenomenological theory must be able to clarify "was eine Melodie von einem Tonhaufen unterscheidet". Dahlhaus considers it "offenkundig, dass er [Ansermet] Husserl missverstanden hat" (and I will argue that Dahlhaus misunderstood Ansermet) because of Ansermet's all-too-easy reference to evidence through intuition. What Dahlhaus criticizes is mainly the confused ideas from logarithmic and pythagorean speculation that Ansermet presents in *Les Fondements* as alleged foundations for the quantitative aspects of his music conception. Ansermet, who uses mathematical notions as cognitive concepts and phenomena of the human mind, attempts to provide grounds for his intriguing but somewhat speculative **interval theory**.⁵⁴ This theory, however, should not be regarded as a theory of psychological facts; it is conceived of more as a cognitive justification of certain musico-logical phenomena that apparently call for systematic explanation. Behind this debate one recognizes differences in the view of cognitive acts it is that we perceive and experience music by; the crucial question is how to find a common criterion that can be accepted by musical society for the division into those parts and kinds of this experience that should be considered as belonging to the music itself or its effects, i.e. its experiential phenomena, as opposed to a more loosely associated content of consciousness. The opinion that empirical science can fully account for these kinds of experiential contents is not convincing, since there might be aspects of the experience that cannot be communicated or otherwise expressed through verbal or motoric output.

However, Dahlhaus dismisses the Ansermet tonality theory as psychological speculation because analogies are poor arguments. This debate

has its bearing on interpretation insofar as Ansermet, and later Celibidache (MIR IV), refers to the alleged interval characterization of this system in their performances. In Dahlhaus' words about critical distance: "Aus der Verschränkung von Intervalltheorie und spekulativer Psychologie resultiert ein simples Schema", based on the circle of fifths, f–c–g–d–a–e–h. A melodic interval is "aktiv", when it distances itself from its reference tone, and "passiv" "wenn es dessen Attraktion nachgibt." So the tone sequence f–c is active, whereas its inversion c–f is passive. Secondly, Ansermet accounts for the direction of movement in his system. Rising intervals are understood as "extravertiert", falling as "introvertiert". A rising fifth, then, would ("wenn man die psychologische Bestimmungen zusammenfasse" as Dahlhaus falsely interprets) be **actively extroverted**, (a descending fourth 'actively introverted', an ascending fourth passive–extrovert) and a falling fifth would be **passively introverted**. The misinterpretation of Dahlhaus is caused by his refusing to understand Ansermet's "philosophy" as an elaborated interpretative system conceived by a great authority, such as a musician or a conductor. Dahlhaus may be correct in pointing at the inadequacies of Ansermet's phenomenological method, but he is wrong in degrading it to psychological speculation. It is neither pure philosophy, nor psychology; but it is an elaborated interpretative concept based partly on phenomenological grounds. And it is essentially illuminating to understand Ansermet's internal interpretation in light of the relevant identification postulate ((I–w)ID).

As Dahlhaus criticizes Ansermet's analysis of the Wagner *Tristan–Vorspiel*⁵⁵, he disregards the fact that this is an analysis made by and for an interpreter who is not so bound up with the conventions of musicologically acknowledged tonality theories; the 'fact of background' is that Dahlhaus wrote an impressive investigation within the history of music theory, "Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität"⁵⁶. The Ansermet system, and every music phenomenology as well as a general interpretation theory, would not *a priori* limit the experiential potentials of tonal ambiguity phenomena in the *Tristan* harmonies. In this sense the Ansermet system is more open than traditional systems of functional, and even Schenkerian, analysis.

Still, Dahlhaus points at the weakness of Ansermet's "musical semantics", which he considers a risky hermeneutical endeavor, by which the third in a minor triad chord must be understood as central, against the logic of all musical experience (Dahlhaus, 183). Why must it be so understood? This seems to be a misunderstanding by Dahlhaus, since the falling fifth in the minor triad chord

would, by priority, point to the fundamental tone as a point of reference or, as Dahlhaus says, a "central" point: the minor third is not referred by sequence of ascending fifths to the fundamental tone, but secondarily as a "branch" to the fifth, so that two structural levels occur in the minor chord. (FM 67)

In further studies we will see how Ansermet's views on the mission of interpretation arise, not only as shown in this chapter from philosophical consideration, but originally in the practical experiences of his own conducting; his views of musical execution became decisively colored by the practical conditions of music life. Still, it is interesting to note that Ansermet did achieve a highly integrated general concept of musical interpretation, based in time-bound practice and at the same time carrying great aesthetic aims. The alleged falseness of his music theory does not touch Ansermet's interpretation phenomenology, since the target of this criticism is his technical description of compositional structures, and not the interpretative rendering of them.

IV:2:2 FURTWÄNGLER – HIS CONCEPT AND IDEAL OF INTERPRETATION

The famous German conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler (1886–1954) presented his thought on musical interpretation most cogently in the chapter "Interpretation – eine musikalische Schicksalsfrage" in his book *Ton und Wort* (1934), which I will relate and comment on. Music performance, in German "Vortrag" or "Vortragskunst", is a vital concern for the existence and destiny of music, according to this maestro. It is about the relation between the interpreter as the sole **transmitter** of the work on the one hand, and the past as **tradition** on the other hand. There are two main lines of thought, two "theories", in contemporary thinking, to which Furtwängler refers: (1) the **faithful** rendering of the notes, the "*Werktreue*" (fidelity to w), and (2) the **co-creative** rendering, where the performer is regarded as "mitschaffender" musician. The first idea, that of faithfulness to the original notation is problematic in that it renders invisible the interpreter, who is forced to recede into the background in order not to contradict or mask the appearance of the composer. Faithfulness is self-evident, Furtwängler declares, since it is the composer's work, as is also "*Sachlichkeit*", the demands created by the facts of the score. But this idea is too dry ("dürftig", 75)

as an ideal for the interpreter: "Als wegweisendes Ziel betrachtet, erscheint diese 'notengetreue Wiedergabe' mehr als dürftig; als 'Ideal' im besten Falle das eines Buchstabenfanatikers, eines geborenen Schulmeisters – wozu noch hinzukommt, dass sie praktisch schon in den einfachsten Fällen nicht durchzuführen ist."

The **neutral rendering** of the notation is not realizable, since the notation does not give a clear indication either of what the exactly intended force in a forte or piano should be, or of the intended velocity of a tempo. Dynamics and tempo must, according to Furtwängler, be modified by the 'room', i.e. the acoustic circumstances, placement and size of the orchestra. Furtwängler conceives of the whole theory of faithful performance ("*notengetreue Darstellung*") as a conception much more literary and intellectual than musical. It is not genuinely musical thinking, and even so uninteresting an idea that Furtwängler does not want to waste any words on it. Its origin is a reaction against extremely **irresponsible individualism**, e.g. concerning the use of rubato, over which Weingartner also complained by advancing his more purist ideal in his series of *Ratschläge für Aufführungen der Symphonien Beethovens* (1916) that gave an idea of 'Neue Sachlichkeit' to the most influential of his adepts, Paul Sacher. What Furtwängler presents is also an historical explanation of the contemporary aesthetic problem of interpretation.

Performance styles (Furtwängler's "*Darstellungsstil*") were created by composers, not by reproducing musicians, only as long as composers performed themselves and thus perpetuated, completed, the past. The problem arose as composers lost their contact with the past and started to "invent" music, the responsibility of which was given to the interpreters. Their importance as trustees of the past was exaggerated, which turned them into self-important musicians. The outcome of this conflict was countered in two different ways: one, composers tried to liberate themselves from interpreters, as later in the case of improvisatory, aleatory and electronic music, or, two, composers can try to restrict and control the interpreter by giving more indications or using more precise indicative sign systems in their scores, as in the case of the Second Vienna School with Schönberg, Berg, Webern (the problem of performance in this circle was treated by Joan A Smith, 1986:65–126), and even more so in the 50s and 60s with Boulez and Stockhausen.

The opinion had then gained ground, according to Furtwängler, that all interpretation is a question of taste, i.e. a position of **relativism**, and that it was legitimate to change the work ("*umgestalten*") according to one's idiosyncratic wishes. Thus, two divergent tendencies arose at the same time, with the

advocates of faithfulness balancing the adherents of free expression in performance. The deeper cause behind this situation Furtwängler **diagnosed** as a decay or decline of a secure musical instinct and intuition, after which a kind of retardedness evolved too freely.

This problem of lost musicality, had its roots in changes in the **history of mentality**. Furtwängler intimates that man's relation to himself must include the past, while we carry the past with us in a quasi-Husserlian sense (Huss. X:31,35 *pass*), and thus we need a clearer relation to it, with a fundamental bearing on the ontology of interpretation, and in practice, on the outlining of implementation in performance. The necessity of including the past in order to arrive at a present version of a work to be performed, shows the inevitability in the interpreter's duty of incorporating the historical dimension in his theoretical concept as well as in his musical imagining.

Furtwängler goes deeper yet, to the process of composition, in order to find his basis for interpretation. The composer creates from nothing; the compositional gestalt arises out of chaos, in that the musician in his performance departs from something created. This is fundamental, self-evident and even trivial from our point of view, but it exposes the only important basis for Furtwängler.

The next step is the following: the basic form for all musicianship, according to Furtwängler, is **improvisation**, since this entails real creativity. The mode of this creativity is that music arises as a representation of a mental process, and this process is both organic and self-active. It is not something wanted, logically thought or forced upon our mind. Music is a curving outward in space, an "*Ausschwingung*", and builds upon psychic processes given by nature. These processes are not less exact than logic, since music follows the law of **organic life** (FME 1–10). It follows a process of the mind with inherent tendency to attain its own accomplishment: "sich vollendend im Ausschwingen der ihm eigenen musikalischen Form." For the **reproducing** musician, who departs from a printed edition of a score that is a work created and gestalted by **another** human being (contrary to the corresponding situation for the composer), this means that the musician must go backwards from outside to inside, i.e. from the surface or foreground of the work to its deeper layers. The composer and improviser are privileged to go in the opposite direction, from the inside out. The musician, the interpreter, stands in front of his heavy task, which is to **reconstruct a vision of wholeness**, and which is supposed to be the one which originally guided the composer from knowing only fragments, parts and

particularities. For the musician, only **details** are given, and he has no direct access to the overall vision of the whole work. Therefore it is important, says Furtwängler, for the musician to consider not isolated details as themes or melodies, but only these parts as seen and taken together in the context of their "world", including the **before** with its **after** of all parts (the "*Vorher*" and its "*Nachher*"). This is a constant coming-into-being and "*Sichentfalten*", self-unfolding, by which the one follows from the other in a strict logical relation, although the logic is specific to each piece. Only when the whole appears do the parts assume their correct character. So, in fact, Furtwängler arrives at his conclusion that only one interpretation is simultaneously correct and impressive ("*wirkungsvoll*"), and this is even more the case, the more thoroughly a work is organized.

The decisive question, previously treated, arises (MIR I:85): How does the interpreter proceed from the parts to the whole? The situation could be compared to that of solving a puzzle, or tessellating a mosaic pattern from an inner image of the whole. But there is an essential difference: the interpreter recreates a living process; the performance is created in the process of his life and corresponds to the living and organic process of the original state of mind of the composer, and this is a **process of improvisatory necessity** (which only superficially seems to be a contradictory notion), which binds the parts into connectedness and relatedness to each other and to the whole. The interpreter aims at **recreating the originally creative situation** at the moment the work was taking shape from nothing, when it was gestalted out of chaos, and its parts were melted down for the purpose of reforging it into a wholeness. This way back to the creative origin is the only way by which the wholeness can be reflected in the performance of the work.

The interesting point is that Furtwängler in his analysis of the creative process of interpretation does not consider the ready-made score as a reliable and sufficient basis for a gestalted performance. The parts must be understood by the interpreter not in the sequence they occur in the score, not even in their structural interrelatedness, but in their very original and generative connectedness at the moment of creation. The problem is how one reverses time back to this moment. Although phenomenologically impossible, it should be done either by sheer **imagination** or by meticulous **reconstruction** of the circumstances of past times. Furtwängler rejects both possibilities as not musically genuine, and proposes his concept of organic growth as a phenomenological category that can be distinguished at real c-reconstruction

through I–w–identification.

The other point of interest for my investigation might sound rhetorical. But nonetheless, I must ask: how can one make something whole out of only fragments? One requisite is that all the fragments be available, which is self-evident in the situation of reading in a printed score. But one could even pose the questions: (1) how do we know which parts or fragments to consider as candidates for merging the parts together into a more integrated whole? and (2) how do we find the points of division of the whole into its parts? We do not have any universally established criteria for how to divide the work into parts, which could then be regarded as the potential constituents of a performed and gestalted whole. There are no methods of analysis indicated in Furtwängler's description. And extrapolating from his view, it would probably not matter so much which parts the work has disintegrated into, since the aimed-at recreation of the finally resulting whole is the overriding purpose of the performance, and this takes place in **real time**, in the procession from moment to moment. Therefore, the gestalt of the wholeness of the work, and its actual evolvment in real time, is the sole guide for the conscientious musician. His interpretation consists in his ability to retain and carry through his "vision" as extrapolated from fragments of the work, as an **identity of wholeness and unity**. The dismantling incisions are healed by the appearance of the parts as a whole through the reconstructive real time flow of performance.

It is difficult to describe in words these organic processes, following Furtwängler, but he asserts from his professional life that such a seeing ("*schauen*"; cf. "*Wesensschau*" of Husserl in Huss. X: 13, 144) and experiencing of such a wholeness, a work entity, can be attained by the human mind. Above all it is important, according to Furtwängler, that the interpreter evades mechanistic adding of monotonous processes into mere loose arrangements of the parts of a work.

The work performance should be a 'temporal explication' of an organism, presenting an organically living process – this being considered the essential point of departure for the interpreter.

Less essential differences or minor deviations, divergencies from the sound surface of the work ("unbeschadet belangloser Abweichungen an der Oberfläche", 83) between various interpretations exist, but basically there is only one deep-rooted and inherent work-interpretation, cf. Furtwängler: "nur eine Auffassung, nur eine Darstellung [...], nämlich eben die ihm eingeborene, ihm angemessene, die 'richtige'." This remarkable postulate is restated by Sergiu

Celibidache. (ch. V:3 and MIR IV)

It is essential, finally, to apprehend this living wholeness of the work, to be able to perceive correctly this living structure of a work: "Dies Lesenkönnen nun ist geradezu die eigentliche Aufgabe des Interpreten". What exactly Furtwängler puts into this "*Lesenkönnen*" must be understood only from the context, but in general the 'recording' implies a **natural act of assimilation**; he **summarizes** the interpretive process, including its creative aspects in the primary act of reading the score. This is not a simple **reading-into** (n-into-pretation), since there are no definitive requirements for relation to the work structures. The 'mode of acting' recommended by Furtwängler is not a 'pure phenomenological waiting-for' (attentively directed awaiting and expectation), a waiting for phenomena to come into existence with their full qualities and show their characteristics; it is not that passive. It is not the common **reading-out** (n-ex-pretation), trivially trained in music schools all over the world (see "*läsa in*" and "*läsa ut*", MIR I:27,286). It is an interpreting act, and mentally an active process that is very sensitive to the processual character of creation that can be traced in the work. And this interpreting implies a permeant **being in all parts**, having simultaneously the **unity** and overall character of the work in mind. Thus this character of wholeness permeates all parts. The interpretative time-consciousness of Furtwängler is present in (i.e. 'immersed' in) all imagined (possible) time points and emerging parts of the performance process to occur; and at the same time, but on another level, the interpreter, in Furtwängler's view, is experiencing a living time flow, while subtly controlling the narrow time-window on the future direction of each moment.

The decisive **criterion**, according to Furtwängler, is the organic rootedness of the interpretative conception of the work, "die Fähigkeit, die tragende Vision eines Werkes aus seinen Einzelheiten heraus mit Sicherheit verstehen und lesen zu können". (84) But in this case the unity unavoidably depends on n-into-pretation.

A few more of Furtwängler's positions are clarified in his discussion with Walter Abendroth⁵⁷, which took place in 1937. In particular, it contains considerations concerning the influence of the work on the **audience**. Furtwängler acknowledges the benefit he derives as a musician from listening to concerts by others, in opposition to Celibidache's general recommendation to his students. It helps him in his effort to regard his own achievements as an interpreter more objectively. This becomes an advantage to the artist, even if he only learns to know how not to perform the work in question. Hence, the reaction of the

audience does not seem to have much to do with the quality of interpretation in performance. Furtwängler distinguishes in his criticism of this fact between "illegal" effects which arise from outside "legal" effects, which are described in deeper sense as correct influences on the audience. What Furtwängler is apparently talking about here are effects of two kinds, **inherent** and **non-inherent** effects (MIR I:82: the concept "*verkegen*"). To achieve the competence of distinguishing between these kinds of interpretation requires knowledge, normally substantial training and experience. Furtwängler regards the audience as unable to form correct critical standpoints; it is more an automatically reacting mass, in his view. The problem behind this deplorable fact is the limited time available for the audience to get acquainted with the work. The time required for arriving at familiarity with a work, however, also depends on **performance qualities**, which unfortunately are not specified. The problem for the audience of appraising a work at a first performance is even more delicate, since in the end they cannot know whom to blame for the lack of effect, the composer or the performer. The dependence of works on performance accuracy varies according to such properties as **clarity, plasticity and lucidity** (well-arrangedness) of the lines of the compositional "*Erfindung*". Some works have their impact through their zeal to be influential, others just through their being. There is a certain contradiction, according to Furtwängler, between performers' aiming 'too much' at momentary effect and their achieving an enduring effect. And the force of the effect on the audience does not correspond to the depth of the effect. They are qualitatively distinguishable, claims the maestro.

The fundamental question hinted at in these principles suggested by Furtwängler, is this: What justification could there be for referring to audience taste in performing music, or more generally, within the performing arts? Furtwängler gives us a cue to his thinking on this item. He states that due to the **mutual interaction** between artist and audience both partners will become 'themselves' (i.e. regain their respective original identities), namely what they are; and this can be achieved only through the encounter with one another, thus accomplishing their identities. Therefore it is important for the performer to understand the unconsciously potential possibilities hidden in the audience. The artist 'creates' his audience by demanding from them their capacity of understanding, an idea that is exemplified by Furtwängler's mention of the Beethoven symphonies. The audience, on its part, expects to be subjected to demands from the conductor, and through living up to these demands it receives its dignity. Through alienation ("*Entfremdung*") performers in vain

apply exaggerated effects in order to overcome the gap between the requirements posed by the work and the capacity of the audience.

In the chapter on the problems of musical performance ("*Darstellung*"), Furtwängler gives his reply to what he sees as the main difficulties for an interpreter. The classical masterworks require a **balance** in the engaging of nerves, senses, temperament ("*Gemüt*") and reason. The particularities and moments in this music are directed towards **connections and logical consistency**, both of which permeate the whole piece. Later, after the classical age, music also acquired **spontaneous impulses or images from outside** (e.g. in programmatic music) as a substitute for the pure musical logic which Furtwängler elaborates. Works like these are musico-logically worked-through **organisms** responding to the **laws of musical immanence**, namely the laws inherent in musical form and material. This, contends the maestro, is also the reason why music during the 19th century mostly develops itself from the whole to the part, not from the part to the whole. Therefore, the problem of interpretation centers around **the gestalting of larger connections and the natural relations between whole and part**. One clearly recognizes the **parallelism** in the view of Furtwängler on **composition as production** compared to **interpretation as reproduction**. Due to the inherent nature of musical 'laws' (*paradigmata*) – such as the recurrence-patterns of tension, the development-tendencies and their processuality-shapes – the problem that occurs in programmatic music, namely that of integrating images from foreign arts or areas into the purely musical context, becomes crucial.

This is more difficult if the external references for instance in the musical drama, contain a representational material which refers to deeper layers of experience. This is an interesting point in the Furtwängler conception, since it suggests that there is a deep correspondence between the properties of pure musical structure and cognitive processes or characteristics of the human mind. Subsequently, Furtwängler states that the music of the classical epoch concerns the essential questions of the human soul.

Therefore, man more than music draws the natural limit for assimilation of complex sound structures and for the professional mastering of instrumental techniques. The degree of compositional complexity has been constant over centuries of music history, since the total demands of complexity on the human musical mind have never changed, but are just an expression of the natural limits within us.

The deeper human level of experience endows sense and emotional

coherence to the whole of the work as manifested in p. The aspect of wholeness ("*Gesamtaspekt*") is exactly what is difficult for the interpreter to master in every performance.

Conspicuously, Furtwängler is strongly aware of the communicative aspect of music. He discusses the listener's reaction and the importance of a knowledge of principles governing the effects on the audience, without allowing the audience to guide the interpretative thinking. The basis for the correct interpretation is evidently to be found in the work itself (w–immanence of i), but a performance which is correct from the perspective of the work – an unresidual realization of the intentions fixed and found in the work – also indicates that it is a good performance from the perspective of the listener. Furtwängler evades the possible conflict between these two perspectives (and interests that could be contradictory) by proposing that a cool, i.e. a negative, public response to a fully satisfactory performance of a complicated work would compensatorily – in the long run have a deeper and more prolonged effect on the audience. This hypothesis is not convincing to me, and Furtwängler fails to adduce any support for it.

Obviously, the main principle of relatedness between the whole and its parts begs the question of how these relations can be realized in concrete sound properties and processes. Furtwängler never explicitly clarifies what kind of interpretative n–i relations (w–i–relation etc; MIR I:19–22) he has in mind. Clearly he recognized the possibility of such connections, probably without feeling any need for investigating thoroughly, or determining systematically these relations either in his own professional activity or for the purpose of criticism of other performers' achievements.

In his book on *Johannes Brahms & Anton Bruckner*⁵⁸ Furtwängler dives into a 'profound' explanation of these two composers, delivering his specific interpretational concepts, which he subsumes under the overriding thesis that **the logic of the spiritual process of the soul corresponds to the musical processes** (7). He refers to the ideal of the age, the "neue Sachlichkeit" of the thirties, which he dismisses as only taking one aspect of its object into account, namely the faithfulness towards notation. This alleged objectivity, "*Sachlichkeit*", is "nichts Neues und nichts Altes, sondern Vorbedingung aller irgendwie gearteter grossen Leistung". It is self-evident that a musician conscientiously

keeps his "unmittelbare Beziehung zur Sache", which is also the Husserlian slogan. At the same time the musician must defend his independence from everything "nicht zur Sache gehörigen", i.e. in particular from "Zeit- und Modeströmungen". Bare fidelity will never give the musician the grounds he needs for the artistic performance, which requires "klare, präzise Einsicht in das, was die Musik zur Kunst macht." Artistic excellence requires full knowledge, I would submit.

And, in addition, Furtwängler's specification of **the criterion for the level of artistic quality in musical performance**, which he considers to be attainable, starts "da, wo die Logik eines seelischen Ablaufes zur Logik eines rein musikalischen Prozesses wird" (7). Music and soul must, according to Furtwängler, "so sehr eins werden". In its effect, this view functions implicitly as a basis for Celibidache's "*musikalische Phänomenologie*" (ch. V:4).

This entails two things: (1) a "logic" of some kind enters into the circle of interest in studying the cognitive aspect of interpretative thought, and – as Furtwängler himself concludes (2) it puts man into the central position in such studies: "den Menschen in den Mittelpunkt aller Kunst und Kunstaübung zu stellen".

Despite the circularity of his conception, Furtwängler conceives of man more in the more **phenomenological** sense of accepting the possibility of an aprioric constancy of meaning as a consequence of '*Wesensschau*' of such concepts as "man"⁵⁹, since he states: "den Menschen, der immer neu und doch immer derselbe ist" (22). Not the products, not even the cultural achievements, of man can provide the foundation for artistic performance, and consequently the determinants of the work are insufficient for this purpose, because "nicht Entwicklung der Materie – der Harmonik, Rhythmik usw. – ist Sinn der Geschichte, sondern der Ausdruckswille derer, die sich dieser Materie erst bedienen." (22) Perhaps the circularity of apriorical '*Wesensbestimmung*' is a prerequisite for the desired internal coherency of an artistic i-conception.

This profoundly human level of constancy, which can be understood on another level as the audilogically originating recurring patterns of cognitively processed experiential phenomena, must, in the general interpretative concept of Furtwängler, coincide and correspond to the same human constants from the depth of the musical work; i.e. the **same criteria of quality can be applied to composition and interpretation**, provided the profound coincidence is mediated by the constancy of man and his most enduring and spiritually essential faculties: "Grad der inneren Notwendigkeit, der Menschlichkeit, der

Ausdrucksgewalt ist Massstab für Bedeutung eines Kunstwerks." (22)

In fact, this allows the opportunity for **communication** with others, and for transmitting the musical values to the **audience**, in Furtwängler's view. In *Der Musiker und sein Publikum*⁶⁰ he concludes that "eine gemeinsame Weltanschauung" (7) is essential between the creative minds ("*Schaffende*") and the listeners ("*Hörer*"). Furtwängler therefore grants special import to the You ("*Du*"), in concord with Bruno Walter, in the communicative process of performance: "Musik als Kunst setzt eine Gemeinschaft voraus" (37). In a reference to Artur Schnabel, Furtwängler observes that Schnabel, who was also a composer, contends that "vor dem wirklichen Publikum, wie er es als Interpret kannte, andere Massstäbe gelten".

Now, this seems contradictory to the idea of "*Gemeinschaft*" as a condition for successful artistic communication. But what Furtwängler is stating is that the demands of communicating are more direct in the interpreter's situation, although for the composer too conditions of 'sharedness' (participation) must be fulfilled in order for communication to occur when his work is presented to the audience. But this does not automatically put the composer in front of the real-time and momentary demands of immediately communicating a human message to an eagerly, or even breathlessly expectant audience. Furtwängler seems to acknowledge the importance of being aware of the "mental structure" of the expectant attitude on the part of the listeners (which he describes in a typology as "*Wollender*", "*Wissender*" or "*Fühlender*"), but he never speaks of adapting immediately to their demands. The way of reaching the public is not horizontal but vertical: by 'sounding' into the work, he is certain to find **the point of profound coincidence** in the work which will constitute a common comprehension and span diverging experiences, thus making possible a silent musical consensus among listeners. This should be the artistically honest way of creating the conditions for the audience to follow the process of penetrating into the deeper layers of the work, and through identification open the way for the listener to become affected by the performance.

IV:3 IN WHAT WAY CAN PIANISTS CONTRIBUTE TO CLARIFYING THE CONCEPT OF INTERPRETATION? ARE THERE ANY SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PIANISTS?

Pianists reveal in their activity the identity of I and P, who produce i:s and p:s, namely through their presenting of p(i). In doing this they may be inspired by other I:s forming their own 'prototypical' i_0 as influenced from others' $i_1:s, i_2:s, i_3:s$ (etc) as **sources of inspiration**. The mode of acquiring an interpretive style from another I (P) can be direct, through receptive (assimilative) listening to (or even imitating in p) others' recordings, or indirect, through personal instruction.

The pianist is always his own P, as long as technical devices for implementing an i are not used; but he is not *a priori* entirely his own I; he might become his own I only gradually, during the process of studying the w for p. So he is more or less his own I and may be influenced by other I:s, i:s or heard p(i):s that had been assimilated and became **prototypical** for their own i:s. We can call this a process of 'self-identification' – meaning that P and I, and in effect p and i, will gradually grow more congruent during the stage of rehearsal.

The task of a history of i-style would be to clarify such **traditions of influence** in our time, whereas performance practice focuses on the style traditions of past ages.

The necessary reliance on technical, motoric, manual and instrumental dexterity (including virtuoso qualities) may set a limit on the realization of i to p. Normally, an **interpreter** (in the emphatic sense) will select his repertory **within** these limits, in order to be able to implement his i into p. In this case, initially, p-limitations do not have a retrograde influence on the i-design. But then, indirectly, a limited basic technique may after habituation tighten the scope of imagination of 'visionary' interpretive opportunities, and lead to loss of imaginative freedom and creativity ('fantasy'), since the pianist cannot realize in practice and test during rehearsal the various rival variants of i. The range of variability of i disappears, its liveliness, its concrete sensuous qualities dry up – to diagnose just one of the pertinent problems of contemporary piano-interpretation.

The teacher of an impressive row of internationally recognized pianists such as Svatoslav Richter, Emil Gilels and Artur Schnabel was Heinrich Neuhaus who wrote *Die Kunst des Klavierspiels*⁶¹ and defined for his students

what an artistic interpretation is: "dass eine Interpretation nur dann gut und künstlerisch sein kann, wenn wir all die unendlich vielfältigen Mittel der Wiedergabe völlig mit dem Werk, mit seinem Sinn und Inhalt, vor allem mit seiner formalen architektonischen Struktur, mit der Komposition selbst, mit dieser geordneten klanglichen Materie, die wir 'interpretierend bearbeiten' sollen, in übereinstimmung bringen." (31) This is the criterion of **congruency**. And "die Interpretation eines grossen Pianisten von klarer Individualität, mit leidenschaftlichem Willen" can be exemplified by the case of Rachmanninov, which, Neuhaus states, reflects two different categories of "interpretatorischer Kunst" (185), even if this may seem paradoxical. He played Tchaikovsky with "vollkommene Verschmelzung des Interpreten mit dem Interpretierten, eine Wahrhaftigkeit, wie man sie sich grösser nicht vorstellen kann", and he played Chopin's *B minor Sonata* in a Russified mode so "dass man ihn nach dieser Operation manchmal nur schwer wiedererkennen kann." (185) The great span between total identification and subjective expressivity that can be studied on the recordings left by Rachmanninov may function and interact as complex aesthetic criteria and imply impressive artistic effects.

The central core of Heinrich Neuhaus' ideal is this: the interpreter searches for the **truth**, and, "*Es gibt die Wahrheit, nicht alles ist erlaubt!*" Logically, Neuhaus' thesis implies that if the zone of freedom is restricted to the extreme point where only one possibility remains indicated, this sole version must be the **truth** of the $i(w)$: in this case $i(w)=w(i)$, which means the desired effect of perfect congruency. This then, should be rendered by the performance. And this entails the logical disappearance of **interpretation**. Then there would remain no place for the interpretative arts, and in the moment of finding the truth, the interpretation logically dissolves. (187)

The Neuhaus concept of truth may be understood in the light of the law of **non-interpretive congruency** that I advanced (I:2), and which can be formulated on this point: if $i(w)$ -ID- $w(i)$, then $i(w)$ -CONGR- $w(i)$, wherefrom $\sim i$ follows; namely that if, casually, cases where the interpretation of the work, $i(w)$, are identical to the work-interpretation, $w(i)$, then a congruency results that allows the i to be elided, and the w to appear as it is in itself, as a w per se, without the appearance of i -moments or i -qualities: This means that even if interpretative phases in the working process were essential in view of the projected result, they disappear during the rehearsal in favor of the pure work-appearance, which then provides its w -properties in full transparency. The experiential soundshape-design is completely derived from these w -

properties, and not from i-qualities, since the latter, if they still exist in the performance, do not appear transparently. The statement that there positively exist i-moments, then, must either be a causal assignment from p-features, or a logical sequel from an analysis of the i-process that must have preceded the p in order to arrive, through a **converging process of i**, at such a congruency (of w and i).

Behind the laconic aphorisms of Neuhaus, one finds a supportive concern for the broad education and individual development of the interpreter as a personality, and there is considerable allowance for this in his classroom catch phrase to his students: "*Es lebe die Individualität, nieder mit dem Individualismus!*", meaning freedom for the development of the **individuality** of a talent within the frame of **responsibility** for the work, but against arbitrariness and idiosyncrasy.

Influential on the same international level was Artur Schnabel, whose musical ideal was documented by Konrad Wolff⁶². His autobiography, *My Life and Music*⁶³ is mostly of interest as a memoir. In contrast to Neuhaus, Schnabel gave concrete suggestions, and made his own annotated edition of Beethoven's piano sonatas⁶⁴. In lessons he worked with shaping the parts of the work (142), whereas his way of personal analysis of the work, "von innen nach aussen" (141), seems to have been aiming more towards clarifying the whole character of the work.

Wolff mentions, as does Eduard Steuermann⁶⁵, that Adorno labelled this kind of analysis, which evidently was discussed in the circle of Schnabel's students, as "konkret".

The more general of his **interpretative** principles, though far from constituting a comprehensive system, can be classified in two broad categories, namely (1) 'interpretation of character and structure', and (2) the 'means of controlling the sound'. The most important of these principles are:

1. The bringing out of **melodic connective lines**, which he understood as Schenkerian "*Urlinien*" (ch. II:7), drawn more from the middle and bass parts than from the superior part;

2. Concentrating on the **harmonic connective lines** with "*Darstellung der musikalischen Architektur*" (157);

3. Creating the **individual character** of each work through making the structural division of the composition clear in the performance by means of connection, contrast and continuity (169); e.g. avoiding accents where no interruption is wanted, or vice versa, applying accents especially on upbeats where an insertion is intended (168);

4. A set of rules concerning the dynamic **balance** of chords, e.g. giving slight overweight to outer parts for the purpose of melodic **profile** (186), dynamic **relief** in polyphony or bridging a large chord ambit ('*ambitus*') by giving the middle parts more weight as a means of mediating. I can see a tendency to apply a principle of **compensatory relationship between composition and interpretation** in many varying instances: **compositional disintegration** (large ambit) is responded to by the performer by an **integrative means of interpretation**, through balancing the dynamic towards the center, thus creating **unity**; (see the concept of "centeredness", e.g. "*diskantcentrering*" in MIR I: 197, 346).

'Where one finds unity, **diversify**', and 'where one finds diversity, **unify**', reads the imperative derived from the aesthetic postulate which Carl Dahlhaus proposes as "das Prinzip des Ausgleichs von Differenzierung und Integration"⁶⁶. This principle is manifested in such instances as the 'profiling' of stressing one of the tones in octaves (187) – and of connecting pivot tones in a falling (or rising) sequential melodic overall–contour. The application of such interpretive means can also have the function of centering (e.g. pitch– and timbre–) **qualities towards the treble or base** ("treble–oriented" centering, see MIR II: 11, 50, 98, 159, 273).

Stressing a middle part in a chord sequence that can be connected by a common middle–part note is a concession to the interpretative demand of continuity (MIR I: 326), or functions as a clarifying of the tonality where the tonic is brought out as a "liegende Stimme" around which the other parts move (Wolff 190).

THE INTEGRATION OF EMOTION AND INTELLECT

Karl Leimer presents the method of Walter Gieseke in a widely distributed and influential booklet, *Modernes Klavierspiel*⁶⁷, recommended by such notable pianists and educators as Hans Leygraf (p.c. Salzburg, Mozarteum 1968–69; MIR III: 223–230). Leimer states that reflection influences our way of emotionally perceiving: "Wenn Überlegung und Logik uns gezeigt haben, welche Töne betont werden müssen, wo ein Anwachsen, ein Abschwellen, ein Langsamer– und ein Schnellerwerden richtig ist, und wenn wir dieser Auffassung mit aller Präzision technisch gerecht werden, so werden wir finden, dass das Gefühl dadurch wesentlich beeinflusst wird, dass wir wärmer empfinden lernen." (33)

Leimer accepts the **agogic rule** of Hugo Riemann, in the following form (ch. III:3): "Mit den Grundzügen der Agogik, unter der wir keine Ungleichheit der Töne, sondern proportionales minimales ritardando oder accelerando verstehen sollen [...]. Es ist eine altbekannte Tatsache, dass jede Phrase ihren Höhepunkt hat, bis zu welchem häufig ein kleines Vorwärtsgehen im Tempo, ein kleines Anwachsen in der Dynamik angebracht ist, während vom Höhepunkt bis zum Ende das Gegenteil eintreten soll."⁶⁸

In his autobiography and collection of articles on discography, Walter Giesecking⁶⁹ presents his interpretative concept (of 1942), which aims at achieving a balance between **intuition** and **faithfulness** as grounds for the interpretation: "Eine sinnvolle, künstlerisch gültige und wahrhaftige Interpretation ist mit dem Begriff Werktreue untrennbar verbunden. Jedes Kunstwerk von Bedeutung hat von seinem Schöpfer einen bestimmten Ausdrucksinhalt erhalten, den der Interpret verlebendigen und vermitteln muss." (97) And one recognizes the same remarkable assimilative open intentionality, a mode of **parentheticalized personal will** then, which can be grasped in phenomenological terms and which we found in the concept of Furtwängler (ch. IV:2; FME: 1, and MIR I *passim*): "der Ausdrucksgehalt, dem der Komponist in künstlerischer Form Gestalt gegeben hat, muss den Interpreten so zu intensivem Mitempfinden anregen, dass sich sein Ausdruckswille weitestgehend mit dem des Komponisten identifiziert. Diese Identität, in höchstem Grade verwirklicht, ergibt die Interpretation, die ich als Ideal ansehe." (Giesecking 97)

Giesecking gives further clarifications of his method that should warrant the achievement of this goal, and summarizes his artistic credo: "Wer sich so der Aufgabe, ein Meisterwerk zu verlebendigen, in voller Konzentration widmet und sich von dem diesem Meisterwerk entströmenden Fluidum beeinflussen und führen lässt – wer des Vorzugs teilhaftig wird, das Wirken der Intuition zu erleben, dieser Eingebung, die über Verstand und Gefühl steht, weil sie beides lenken und regieren kann –, der wird in inspirierten Stunden dem Ziel nahekommen, das ich eingangs als Ideal bezeichnete: dem möglichst vollkommenen Einklang der Ausdruckswünsche des Komponisten und seines gehorsamen Dieners, des Interpreten." (102)

It is interesting to note in what way Giesecking defends the playing of music by J. S. Bach on the modern grand piano: "eine künstlerisch einwandfreie Interpretation" can arise only from the interpreter's strive for executing "die Ausdrucksabsichten des Komponisten"⁷⁰; Giesecking postulates:

(1) It is impossible to know the original intention of composers from past ages.

(2) Every age has a tendency for "grosse Werke der Vergangenheit in eigener, zeitbedingter Weise zu deuten". (111)

(3) Music of supreme quality can more easily be reinterpreted according to the taste of our age, which means that

(4) its properties of modern direction can be brought out, and

(5) a completely correct interpretation of ancient music remains – nevertheless, as an unattainable ideal (112). Gieseking arrives at a proposal to practically compromise "eine zumindest erträgliche Synthese aus Tradition und Gegenwartsempfinden, zwischenstilistischer Erkenntnis und lebendigem Gefühl." (112)

A few such principles of dynamic interrelatedness (as referred to by Wolff) can be found also in the formerly well-known book among pianists, *Musical Interpretation* by T. A. Matthay⁷¹. He states some rules about how much force is required in high register, as opposed to low register, and proposes the "prominentising" of "the interesting features" of harmonic progressions (114–115), e.g. in the *E minor Prelude* by Chopin, but Matthay does not in any profound way seek justification for his rules in identifiable traits of the quoted works or compositional structures. He states his clever pianistic doctrines from impressive experience of the keyboard, and mainly as pedagogic guidelines. The substance of interpretative thought, however, is thin and lacks systematic cogency.

In the notes to his incompleting *"Gesamtaufnahme"* of the Beethoven piano works⁷², Alfred Brendel arrives at the decisive question after having conceded to all demands of authenticity through respect of the *"Urtextfassung"*: "Was bleibt dem Interpreten zu tun? Ich meine zweierlei. Er möge versuchen,

[1] die Absichten des Komponisten zu verstehen, und er möge

[2] jedem Werk die stärkste Wirkung geben."

Brendel's concept exhibits a possibility of connecting these two aims. He states that "oft, aber nicht immer, resultiert das eine aus dem anderen." (26) Due to the aims of this inquiry, I would like to investigate the cognitive structure of order and priority in his interpretive concept: "Die Absichten des Komponisten verstehen, heisst: sie ins persönliche Verständnis übertragen", which means that the intentions of the composer regarding his work come first in the order of interpretive determinants (for theory and a system of concepts, see MIR I:16,18 etc); this does not yet entail any specific priority structure between aspects [1] and [2] in the Brendel quotation above. Brendel states: "Musik kann

nicht für sich selbst sprechen" (26) and in a chapter about the "misunderstood" Liszt: "Diese Musik spielt sich also keineswegs von selbst. Man muss sie interpretieren, und zwar sinnvoll. Vom Erhabenen zum Lächerlichen ist hier manchmal nur ein Schritt"; in these statements Brendel intends to justify his personal involvement in the encounter with the Urtext version of the work. How much emotional involvement can be accepted? "Der Gedanke, ein Interpret könne seine privaten Gefühle einfach abschalten und an ihrer statt jene des Komponisten sozusagen von oben empfangen, gehört ins Reich der Fabel" (which is an argument that has been forwarded widely *pro* hermeneutics and *contra* phenomenology); i.e. Brendel proposes a balance between composer and interpreter.

Logically, Brendel justifies his view by proposing the necessity of emotional and intellectual identification with "was der Komponist mit seiner Niederschrift gemeint haben mag" in order to achieve a living performance, and this is possible "nur mit Hilfe des eigenen lebendigen Gefühls, der eigenen Sinne, des eigenen Verstandes, der eigenen raffinierten Ohren".

Brendel also recognizes the problem of **actuality** in conflict with **authenticity**: "Nicht immer sind in unserer Erinnerung die historisch 'richtigsten' Aufführungen eines Werkes die eindrucksvollsten." So, in the end he conceives of a personal concept as a point of departure for the reconsideration of meaning in ancient works. The personal concept is "so erhaben, so visionär, bewegend, geheimnisreich, versunken, humorvoll, graziös wie möglich zu musizieren" (27), which he designates as a moral demand that initiates the question of changing meaning over time: "Was gilt der Gegenwart erhaben, rührt sie, macht sie betroffen?" The solution is presented as a paradox, nevertheless attainable, "dass die zeitentrückte Leistung, in deren Gelöstheit historische Fesseln gesprengt oder überwunden scheinen, nur im Einklang mit dieser unserer Zeit erreicht werden kann."

So a complex concept of interpretation emerges: "Meine eigene Vorstellung von der Aufgabe des Interpretieren ist von jener Busonis abgerückt. Der Interpret sollte, in meinen Augen, eine dreifache Funktion erfüllen: die eines [1] Museumsbeamten, eines [2] Testamentsvollstreckers und eines [3] Geburtshelfers." Testing the original editions, and playing the Urtext will lead to the conclusion that it is not sufficient "zu spielen was dort steht" (161). The next step is to project the music of ancient times to our age as well as, in the opposite direction, by reaching back "in den Raum der Vergangenheit", and finally, in order to achieve a vivid, warm and emotionally spontaneous result, he feels

brought back "zum Ursprung der Musik" (162). Brendel's **projectionism** excludes both naive notationalism and pure historicism.

As far as analytic procedures are concerned, Brendel presents his way of working through to form processes in Beethoven's works, recognizing a compositional "*Verkürzungsprozess*" in the first movement of Beethoven's *Piano Sonata* op. 2 no. 1 (64). This analysis aims at clarification of the **processual principle of composition** that overridingly governs the development of this movement and the factors which ensure **continuity in performance** (MIR I:28 etc, II see "register", 430). Brendel also enters into **details of shaping** in his list of point-to-point rules, which appear as good pieces of pianistic advice (lacking governing generative principles or systemacy, though) on how to understand and realize Beethoven's notational markings in various contexts (*sf*, *fp*, *rfz*, *pp*, *dolce*, *espressivo*, *ritardando*). On a few points, the interpretative concept of Andor Foldes is parallel to that of Brendel. Foldes states that "Der Interpret darf sich nicht damit begnügen, jede Note korrekt oder sogar brillant zu spielen. Er muss den *Geist* der Musik erfassen. Er versucht die Gedanken Beethovens auf seinem Instrument wiederzugeben. Natürlich werden diese Gedanken von seiner eigenen Persönlichkeit gefärbt, und das erklärt die voneinander abweichenden Darbietung desselben Werkes durch verschiedene Künstler."⁷³ Foldes never presents cogently his criteria for interpretative quality, but he attempts to observe and describe in its essence the **steps of the assimilation and rehearsal process that lead to a successful performance**, involving also the performer's relation to his audience.

The chapter "Vom Lesen und Zuhören" provides simple and useful advice; his pedagogical realism in stating that the pianist can only grow, "nur dann wachsen und reifen, wenn man ihn an den Leistungen anderer Interpreten misst" (20), supports the usefulness of comparative interpretation research (MIR II), and he also recommends recording and listening to one's own interpretations: "Man muss Gehör und Gedächtnis so weit ausbilden, dass man nach mehrmaligem Anhören desselben Stückes imstande ist, all die verschiedenen Aspekte einer Komposition auf einmal zu erfassen [...] Man kann sein eigenes Spiel später nur beurteilen, wenn man Augen und Ohren allezeit weit offen hält."

This is the reason why **critical listening**, "gesunde Selbstkritik" (22) and "scharfblickende und hellhörige Selbstkritik" are cognitive prerequisites for "gutes Musizieren" (23). Foldes touches on the fruitful idea of clarifying the interrelationships between various cognitive acts of the interpretative and

performing processes, a theory which I presented in MIR I:95–108, for his recognition of the problem of simultaneously playing and listening ("gleichzeitig spielen und hören"). The listening act is, in his concept, and I agree on this point, directed and guided cognitively through the specific question which steers the attention: 'listening' is always listening for something specific (in opposite to 'hearing' for instance an incidental comment), which seems in accord with the phenomenological view of consciousness as that which is directed intentionality: the directed listening has a tonal 'content' (*Wahrnehmungsinhalt, Bewusstseinsobjekt*). The aim of Foldes is to reach the point where "man schliesslich imstande sein, sie alle [i.e. the listeners' aspects or questions] bei einmaligem Hören zu beachten." (23) This explains the various outcomes that result from different performers working with the same music. There is no intention on the part of these interpreters to differ in their views on the particular work. Foldes presupposes that all of them intend to render the composition correctly: "Diese Künstler haben nicht die Absicht, das Werk anders zu bringen. Die Erklärung für die Bindestrich-Interpretationen [composer–interpreter] ist vielmehr in der Verschiedenartigkeit der musikalischen Herkunft der einzelnen Künstler zu suchen, ihrer geistigen Haltung, ihres Geschmacks und ihres Temperaments. Wir hören niemals *ausschliesslich* Beethoven: Es ist entweder Beethoven–Backhaus, Beethoven–Furtwängler oder Beethoven–Heifetz." Foldes thus requires a "gewissenhaft nachschaffender Künstler" and distinguishes between three phases in the interpretative process:

(1) the I's reading of the work: "*schafft* der Virtuose die Gedanken des Komponisten in seiner eigenen Vorstellung *neu*," and

(2) the rendering of the w on his instrument ("*gibt* er sie mit Hilfe seines Instruments *wieder*") in order to

(3) present the w for his listeners ("*seinen* Zuhörern *vorzutragen*"; 56).

Friedrich Gulda's *Worte zur Musik*⁷⁴ presents in concise form a wealth of aphorisms and fragments of personal aesthetics, but it is difficult to recognize a clear interpretative concept. The governing concepts could be: "Spannung, 'energy', durch Hörbares erzeugt bzw. Hörbares erzeugend, ist das eigentliche musikalische Element" (93; 1968) and his reasoning around the notion of "kognitive Form" – "auf dem Wege zur Neugeburt des Postulates: Form ist Ausdruck. Will sagen: *Emotionsverlauf*" (89) and the short "Jeder Interpret erzählt seine Legende vom Komponisten – und ich erzähle euch die meine. 'Werktreue' ist Illusion" (1958:36), but he gives no guidelines for what direction to take within this zone of freedom. His philosophical view, however, has a

bearing on the ontology of the work, and thus on the concept of interpretation, which he does not himself complete: "Alle Dinge existieren nur in unsere Vorstellung. Alle Dinge, die wir uns vorstellen, existieren und sind ebenso real bzw. irreal. [1953] Die wirkliche Realität [ist] 'correct vision' [...]. Wir Musiker sind dazu da, um, wenn wir 'ausser uns' sind, die anderen im Sinne der compassion and unserer wahren Sehkraft immer wieder teilhaben zu lassen." (10)

INDIVIDUALITY OF INTERPRETATION

"Der Pianist kann seine Individualität beim Vortrag nicht verbergen. Durch die Interpretation wird der Charakter der Persönlichkeit offensichtlich und gleichzeitig deutlich, wie der künstlerische Inhalt des Werks durch ihr Prisma gebrochen wird." Alexander Goldenweiser's remarks concern the role of the interpreter in "Von der Interpretation, der Technik und der Arbeit"⁷⁵

A hypothesis may not become an axiom or dogma, and there are no rules without exceptions but, nonetheless, he thinks there is a series of basic rules which are "norms" for interpretation.

THE PROBLEMS AND PERILS OF PERFECTION

Jakow Milstein notices from practice that "das Streben nach technischer Perfektion, [...] hat aufgrund ihrer notwendigen Verknüpfung mit langfristiger Arbeit an einem Werk, [...] auch eine Kehrseite: Es treibt das unmittelbare, das improvisatorische Element des Vortrags aus, ja tötet es zuweilen ganz ab. Das lebendige und Markante an der Interpretation wird immer häufiger ersetzt durch hoffnungslose Standardisierung und durch Mittelmaß." ("Über Tendenzen in der Entwicklung der Interpretationskunst, der Interpretationskritik und der Erziehung des Interpreten" in *Notate zur Pianistik*, 174). He gives a second argument against "Stillstand, ja Verkalkung der Interpretation" (175): "Man kann behaupten, gewissermassen als These, dass heute im Sinne der exakten Reproduzierung des kompositorischen Textes fast alle exakt genug spielen; es herrscht der Standpunkt des aufgeklärten Akademismus: 'Man muss vor allem spielen, was in den Noten steht.' Man kann, gewissermassen als Antithese, auch das Gegenteil behaupten, dass heute fast alle ziemlich *ungenau* spielen, da man den Notentext manchmal nur formal realisiert, ohne das eigentliche Wesen der Konzeption, den Inhalt des Werkes erfasst zu haben." (175)

COMMUNICATION

Music is communication between people, and "thus a language", writes Käbi Laretei in her memoir.⁷⁶ The intermediary transmitter, the interpreter, apprehends a message in the notes, which are regarded as the symbols of the richest languages since it is also independent. Everyone can understand according to his or her sensibility and individual experience. Everything is expressed for the one who listens and searches. A wealth of human experiences and emotions is hidden behind the tones. The interpreter clarifies, influences and gives life. (138)

AUTO-EXPLANATION (AND POSSIBLE POST-REVIEW) OF A REHEARSAL PROCESS

In the series of books *Wie Meister üben*⁷⁷, Stefan Askenase gives a lesson with instructions and comments to a student playing the Chopin *Berceuse* op. 57. The problem with this presentation of detailed corrections is its singularity. It is difficult to identify the criteria for deciding whether a comment is only specific to the uniquely occurring situation and moment with this particular student (who remains anonymous), or whether the comments can be applied to other pianists. It is plausible that at least some of the interpretative problems could indicate particular "heikle Stellen", but it is also difficult to see on what grounds a generalization could be made. Askenase's introduction, however, provides a concept: "Logische Phrasierung, rhythmische Belebung, das klangliche Gleichgewicht, richtige Pedalisierung, die Wahl entsprechender Fingersätze stellen die am häufigsten vorkommenden Probleme dar, die alle miteinander zusammenhängen und deren bestmögliche Lösung angestrebt wird." Askenase considers the task of the teacher to be that of assisting in the technical solution: "Den vorhandenen Schwierigkeiten begegnen wir mit technischen Mitteln, auf die der Lehrer hinweisen und deren Gebrauch er vermitteln soll." Why does he not directly speak of solving the musical, interpretative problems? "Der Interpret setzt sich doch als Ziel, den Inhalt des Werkes zu erfassen, seinen wesentlichen Charakter zu bestimmen und die Vorstellung, die er davon bekommen hat, zu realisieren." But the problem, according to Askenase, is that interpretation is too personal a choice and preference, and thus cannot be transmitted as an opinion from teacher to student, and should not in any case be so imposed on the performer: "Damit ist aber der Lehrer bereits an der Grenze seiner Möglichkeiten angelangt. Er kann

zwar versuchen, seine eigene Interpretation einem andern beizubringen oder sie ihm sogar aufzudrängen. Aber daraus kann kaum eine authentische Interpretation resultieren, welche vom Talent, von der Intuition des Spielers diktiert wird und, was die Richtigkeit des Ausdrucks, die Wahl der Tempi und die Dosierung der Dynamik anbelangt, von seinem Geschmack und seiner Intelligenz kontrolliert werden muss." (13)

Askenase warns the performer not to seek the sources of interpretation of Chopin's music from other than purely musical sources. He believes that thinking of Chopin's love affairs, illness or nostalgia would distort the music and never lead to an "*echten Wiedergabe*". (14)

"Chopins Grösse beruht auf der Qualität und Originalität seiner Erfindung sowie in der vollendeten, wirklich meisterhaften Beherrschung der musikalischen Form [...]", and Askenase refers to the specific "Aroma" of Chopin's music which has to be respected. In addition to presenting his personal concept, Askenase expresses his belief that an intelligent pianist will find "gewisse Ratschläge von allgemeinerer Gültigkeit beim Studium anderer Werke" valuable. (15)

ANALOGY TO TRANSLATOR

Jörg Demus refers to the double meaning of "interpreter" as his ideal of interpretation: "meinem Interpretationsideal, ein Werk wirklich zu verdolmetschen" (198) and "wenn ich mich wirklich als eine Art Dolmetscher [fühle], der versucht, die in einer für den Laien fremden Sprache aufgezeichnete Musik zu verdolmetschen, so dass sie allgemein verstanden und empfunden werden kann."⁷⁸

EVIDENCE FROM COLLABORATION WITH THE COMPOSER

The French pianist Vlado Perlemuter reveals the comments of Ravel on the performance of his piano music, which he had the opportunity to discuss with the composer. In a series of interviews, published as "*Ravel d'après Ravel*"⁷⁹. Perlemuter gives a series of mostly fragmentary details partly without supporting explanation and without extending the generality of the views, a general assessment supported by our studies of his courses (MIR IV:409–420). His book remains a document of the composer's intention around his work, drawn from discussions held long after the date of composition. It considers more the

composer's ideal interpretation of his work, and not the decisive questions of interpretation in a planned contemporary performance. About the "Valse nobles et sentimentales" Perlemuter informs that "Le rubato chez Ravel est toujours mesuré" (2nd Valse; 44), but there is no discussion on a general concept supporting the detailed observations and instructions, neither from an *a priori* or an *a posteriori* stance. The main thread in Perlemuter's conception would be the concern of creating the specific character of each piece, and each moment of the piece. But the observations seem scattered, without logical progress.

THE FUSION OF ORIGINALITY AND TRANSPARENCY

The evident **structural transparency** that characterizes the ip:s (or pi:s) of Glenn Gould merits consideration and can be illuminated by a theoretical analysis. First, the ip–transparency that we are talking about here is primarily a performance of a wi in contrast to a pi–transparency where the transparency of the performing element (dimension) is prior to i: i.e. the i appears through the transparency of p, but in a pi–transparency the i does not have to be transparent itself.

So our ip–transparency, then, is a transparency of i appearing through a performance that must not itself be transparent. This situation poses an epistemological problem: if the p is not transparent and i is transparent, then how can we know of the transparency of i. Evidently, the stating of an ip–transparency must contain support from a consideration of the work, its compositional or notational structure (properties, qualities).

Then transparency can be defined as **recognizability** of the w–structure through the i–structure. Let us consider the congruency of Ti and Pi in Gould's first recorded performance of Bach's *Goldberg Variations* (Columbia ML 5060, 1956)⁸⁰ as established. There is a **direct** relation between w(c)–Pi: namely the work structures seem to appear in full transparency through the performance, without any obstructions from the emissive or motoric systems. The Ti–Pi–congruency can ontologically be of two kinds (with possible gradual combinations of both components): namely (1) that the Ti is explicit, or (2) that the Ti is implicit in the performance; the degree of manifestation (of Ti versus Pi in p) and the degree of their distribution vary widely. In any case the decisive properties of Ti:s are that they establish a relation w(c)–Ti on the level of man's (musical) mind (Mm); it is an intentional relation on the level of consciousness and has cognitive properties, whereas Pi has also **actional** properties with

motorical outcomes. An adversary would claim that T_i and P_i are noncongruent, i.e. that there is an area of a pure T_i -kind never realized through p and/or that there is an area of a pure p -kind (say motorically, instrumentally conditioned). The $w(c) \sim P_i$, the relation between work structure and performance including all its practical determinants and limitations, can never establish such a direct relation as that between $Mm:w(c) \sim T_i$. The indirect relation between $w(c)$ and P_i must be mediated through many vague intermediary factors, and actors: e.g. (1) instrumental dexterity via manual technique, (2) musical instrument technology: keyboard mechanics (etc) and (3) performance traditions. Our adversary could claim in addition that the composer might also be the performer (Bach was $C=P_1$) who arranged the music, including its voice-leading and chordal 'grasps' as manually as realizable on the keyboard according to the facts, uses and traditions of that age, but this is not a sufficient argument to conclude that the relation between $w(c)$ and P_i is as direct as $w(c) \sim T_i$, since: (1) $P_1 = \text{Bach}$ is not $P_2 = \text{Gould}$, and (2) it is unlikely that Bach adapted his compositional features entirely to the conditions of keyboard construction, playing techniques and making use of the neuromuscular motorical system of the human body. At least our adversary would have to come up with some support for this, though logically we could claim against him that then all compositions would look identical, insofar as composers conceded totally to the practical demands of the performing situation and adapted their mode of composing to it.

But we do not find evidence of an explicit total analysis of w in the writings of Gould. Does this throw doubt on our theory? The T_i is a conceptual image of the work, not necessarily a verbal analysis; and there are no requirements of presentation of this T_i , whether by publication or other kinds of communication, which (the T_i) would become, as I said, explicit or more often implicit. Of course, in the latter case the problem of conjecture or extrapolation enters into the researcher's arsenal of methods for an *ia*. On this point it is fruitful to adopt the idea of **free conceptual variation** applied by phenomenologists in order for us to reach the implicit T_i which would correspond to Husserl's *noema*. Avowedly our imagined adversary still is not satisfied and counters my thesis by adducing the problem of w -access of the epistemological priority of $Mm:w(c) \sim T_i$ over $w(c) \sim P_i$. Surely it could be claimed that access to the work can be obtained only through i (or p_i), but fortunately, this is not correct, as my four-part-scheme indicated (MIR I:20–21, MIP: 30–31):

w - i

wa - ia

If we do not have direct access to w, then we can study w through i. If we do not have direct access to i either, we can study i by doing an ia, and w by doing a wa. The relations between w-wa and i-ia respectively are characterized by a scale of ambiguity/unambiguity. If we listen to Glenn Gould's rendering of the Goldberg Variations and reflect around what we have found, and thereafter focus on how we have found it, i.e. the acts and its object, we notice an unambiguity of meta-interpretation of i to ia: namely, we evidently experience that (1) he knows what he wants to do (definite i: P_2i) and (2) we know that he knows what he wants to do (we have access to his intention through an act of identifying comprehension - P_2i_1) - and hence (3) we know what he wants - $P_2i=i_1$ - and one could discuss the possibility of arriving at an ia through this procedure: $P_2i \rightarrow P_2i_1 \rightarrow ia$). Through the unambiguity of Gould's interpretation (P_2i) we arrive at one unambiguous ia, i.e. there is an 'objectivation' of the ia, since further alternatives are doubtlessly discarded as long as only the more descriptively correct ia remains to be considered. If the study of Gould's i had yielded several conflicting ia:s, then it would have been worth asking whether this multiplicity should be attributed to (1) ambiguity in the performer's i (Gould's P_2i), or (2) an ambiguity, or multiplicity of aspects in the auditor's analytical approach (L:ia₁, ia₂, ia₃...). In this case we would have had an "identical" ia, comparable in both directions to a wa. However, as we have seen, the w could be represented by several different (conflicting) wa:s, namely wa₁, wa₂, wa₃ (etc) on the conditions that (1) the relation w-wa is ambiguous, and (2) we have no grounds for discarding all alternative wa:s but one. This is in fact our case, since Gould's unambiguous interpretation is unambiguous regarding the set of possible ia:s, but does not permit us to restrict the process of work-analysis to the outcome of only one wa. We simply have no grounds for discarding alternative work-analyses on the sole ground of an unambiguous performance interpretation, not even of the supreme quality of Gould's.

To sum up our conclusions in view of the discussion on methods of ia, it is clear that an ia concerns at least three levels of thought: (I) theoretical scientific considerations provide the overarching logical framework for (II) interpretation, theoretical/analytical considerations of procedures of ia, comprising further penetration of w-i and i-i relations for the purpose of establishing analytical

patterns (focusing on criteria such as transparency, continuity, etc); this aims at (III) the production of substantial results regarding the **personal style of interpretation** of a particular performer, say of Gould, concerning the repertoire in question.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTEGRATED SONORITY

Hubert Harry⁸¹ states the background to the monumental effects (piano recital, Luzern 3.11.92) of his aesthetics on the basis of received instructional impulses: "Es ist eine Vision, wie Klavier klingen sollte. Mich interessierte, wie man zu diesem Ton kommen konnte. Da ist wieder ein wichtiger Meilenstein: Ich las das Buch 'Zen in der Kunst des Bogenschiessens' von Eugen Herrigel [...] Da war diese Idee von 'Es spielt'. Von da an wechselte ich die Art und Weise, Dinge anzugehen. Der Leitgedanke, wie etwas klingen sollte, kam von Fischer, Lipatti und Rachmaninow. Aber die Idee, wie dieser Leitgedanke vermittelt werden sollte, kam aus diesem Buch." (69)

In this interview Thüring Bräm inquires whether Harry's relation to the instrument as sound producer is prior to his relation to the composer. But this, in the view of Harry, is a falsely posed question, since the composer whose work you play dictates the sound specifically with its inherent sound properties (70). Concerning the realization, Harry distinguishes "Musiker" from "Handwerker", in parallel to the ontological difference between *w* and *p*, in favor of the latter: "Als Musiker spricht man von der grossen Linie. Als Pianist (Handwerker) kann man keine grosse Linie spielen. Man spielt viele Ereignisse, man bewegt einzelne Tasten hinab und hinauf. Jeder Ton ist das Produkt eines einmaligen Anschlags. Es braucht sowohl den Handwerker, der weiss, wie man diese verbindet, als auch den Komponisten, der den Tonhöhenablauf so geschrieben hat, dass es als Linie klingt." (70)

The **instrumental realism** of consciously sensuous and concrete sound-creating is prior to general ideals pertaining to the composer's idiom. The second stage, after that of the successfully attained, primary sound-control, focuses on the **transmission** of the sound ("die Übertragung des Tones. Um die Botschaft, die übermittelt werden soll [...] Die Botschaft über die Art, wie die Musik durch eine Person geht.") But the 'message' ("*Botschaft*") to be transmitted is necessarily expressed by and through **sound quality**, and the transmission is arrived at by the mastering of it: "Was ist denn Musik sonst? Sie ist Klang. Alles andere kommt an zweiter Stelle." (72). The profound connection between the specific

technique of sound architecture and critical listening and physical self-awareness is central to Harry's method (72–73), e.g.: "wie sie den Arm fallen lassen können. Das kann psychisch tiefgreifend sein. Sie gehen dabei durch alle möglichen Stadien auf und ab. Es geht an ihre Wurzeln." (73). In particular Harry recommends playing Brahms and Debussy in order to sensitize the auditive senses to timbre, "das Ohr für Klangfarben entwickeln", and in order to learn to master and apply "viele Nuancen der Klangmöglichkeiten auf dem modernen Flügel" in various styles. Obviously, Harry was impressed by the voluminous and colorfully differentiated organs of (late-Romantic) gothic cathedrals: "Das beeinflusst mein Bachspiel auf dem Klavier. Da nützen intellektuelle Einsichten nichts [about historical authenticity; harpsichord]. Ich brauche das Pedal bei Bach, nicht um eine Sauce zu produzieren, sondern um eine Räumlichkeit zu erreichen, die alle vier Wände durchbricht." (73) The preference for space and instrumental sonority is precise, down to the make of instrument: "Ehrlich gesagt: Ich bin ein Steinwayman." The relational process links the listening to the physical action in one sequence (MIR I:94,98ff "*aktionssequenz*"): "Ihre Ohren werden sozusagen geöffnet. Der Körper sollte zur Verwirklichung der inneren Klangvorstellung den Weg des geringsten Widerstandes nehmen. Das innere Ohr leitet dabei den Körper. Es ist ein Prozess, in dem man in alle möglichen Tonschattierungen hineinschlüpft." (73)

It is necessary to regain access to the personal core of inner stillness. Harry aims at recovering "im Klang, den wir produzieren, unser Zentrum, unsere Ruhe zu finden, sozusagen im Zentrum des Wirbelsturms." (74)

Hubert Harry approved my analysis of his concept and found "nothing to correct" in this chapter on pianists (letter to the author 12.5.94).

Among pianists who either participated in the interviews or – as Perlemuter – were studied at rehearsals and/or courses, the following are included in MIR III (see its "content 1"): Hans Leygraf, Gunnar Hallhagen, Gottfrid Boon; José Ribera, Arne Torger, Staffan Scheja, Ander Wadenberg, Marian Migdal, Ingrid Lindgren, and Radoslav Kvapil. Martin Isepp held courses for pianists and singers in Stockholm, which were documented in MIR IV.

IV:4 STRING PLAYERS' VIEWS ON MUSICAL INTERPRETATION IN PERFORMANCE: VIOLINISTS AND CELLISTS

What was postulated in the introduction of the preceding chapter on pianists' interpretation is valid, in principle, for all instrumentalists. The specific trait of string music interpretation, though, is the **direct access to the sensuous and concrete qualities of tone and tone colour**, and the aprioric potentiality of the tone's **increased controllability** through performative mastery, involving subtle nuances of vibrato, intonation, dynamics and timbre in complex and supportive interaction for the purpose of decisive interpretative design. How these redundant (or even expulsive) means of expression are integrated in the appearance of the compositional soundshape, attain their demanded double adequacy to the *w* and to the personal–authentic expressivity of *I*, according to the various aesthetic concepts and positions among string–musicians, is the focus of **empiric interpretation research**. We shall take a closer look at a few representative systems that have a real or purported philosophical basis, and at the same time expose certain modes and patterns of application (habits or "uses" in typical situations of *c*–structure or *w*–context), which more or less (1) correspond to their superordinated aesthetic frameworks, and (2) cohere as musico–logical systems.

The philosophical excursus by Yehudi Menuhin (1916) in *Kunst und Wissenschaft als verwandte Begriffe*⁸² focuses on the **relation between science and art**. The approach is general and reflective, with scattered references to personal experiences of life, art and science, that serve as a general concept of interpretation, since performance involves these ontological categories. Art and science are each independent (and separated) and, in effect, harmonically synchronized. They may be fused in a human action, such as playing the violin. They are unconsciously fused by **creativity**: "Der schöpferische Akt ist an der Wissenschaft und der Kunst ebenso beteiligt wie an jeder Lebensäußerung." (8)

The problem, however, is the artificial division between art and science. Society allots delimited areas to each of these modes of thinking, thus distorting their natural unity: through this, "verletzen wir die Einheit und Harmonie, die charakteristisch ist für des Menschen Vorstellung von der vollkommenen Vergangenheit und ihrem Gegenteil, der vollkommenen Zukunft [...] wo **Kunst und Wissenschaft ohne Zweifel eins waren und immer eins sein werden.**" (8) This, however, is questionable: in the arts, including music, the development of composition precedes that of theory (science), which may call

into question the legitimacy of unstable results from **empirical** science.

Menuhin defines art as "das Gebilde eines lebendigen Augenblickes" (9) and science as "die Kristallisation einer ewigen Wahrheit"; furthermore, science is predictable whereas art is not: it is the lively moment ("*lebendige Augenblick*" 9) that is unpredictable as life itself, "und darin liegt ein der Hauptverwirrungen unserer Zeit. Wir möchten das Metermass an Unmessbares legen" which distorts the "Sinn für das Kontinuierliche im Kreislauf des Lebens, das der intuitiven Hälfte zugehört". (10)

Man attempts consciously to exist in the unpredictable, "in dem schöpferischen und intuitiven Augenblick, der sich in dieser besonderen Weise nie zuvor ereignet hat und nie wieder ereignen wird." Menuhin conceives of **intuition** as a specific form of knowledge that has two dimensions: (1) that of an instinct functioning for the purpose of survival, and (2) that of a magnetic ideal towards which the progress of humanity and development of nature are attracted in a **continuous and directed extension of intentionality**. And one recognizes the underlying idea of teleological finality. Since this irreversible process is directed, it must be predictable, Menuhin concludes, in purporting that an infinitesimally small material particle escapes every analysis and explanation on the basis of "des rohen materialistischen Dogmas von Ursache und Wirkung" (14):

Menuhin takes aesthetics and ethics ("die Moral" defined as another form of aesthetics) to belong to the same category. The natural phenomena of the world, such as "das Gefieder der Vögel" or "die Bäume, die in den Himmel wachsen", would otherwise not be explainable. He expands his definition of intuition as "das Wissen von Ewigkeit und Unendlichkeit, von der Zweiheit in der Einheit, vom Kreislauf des Lebens, der Materie und allen Geschehens." (15) This intuition seems to be part of a **philosophy of nature** and can be subject to "der Pflege, der Disziplin oder Verfeinerung", which indeed is the case for dexterity with the violin. Menuhin arrives at a determination of the **condition for the highest degree of intuition** in life and art, presupposing this as a condition for a corresponding level of artistic quality, which is "nur denkbar, wenn Verstand und Gefühl rein, hingebungsvoll und ungetrübt sind und wenn die Technik des Ausdrucks und Denkens eine hohe Stufe selbsttätiger Kontrolle und Freiheit erreicht hat. Dies ist der Punkt, an welchem eine Technik, die man sich mit Vorbedacht angeeignet hat, instinktiv geworden ist." (16):

(1) The notion of **objectivity** attains relevance to both the **discursive** and

intuitive modes of thinking: "Der Unterschied ist nur der, dass die intuitiven Resultate in unserem Innern selbst gewonnen werden, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung derselben Disziplinen und derselben Grundsätze, die auch im Laboratorium gelten: nämlich Präzision, Ökonomie, Zielstrebigkeit, Aufgeschlossenheit, Hingabe, Vorurteilslosigkeit, Demut. Diese Disziplin wird nur nach innen gekehrt, anstatt wie in der Wissenschaft nach aussen." (18) At this point – Menuhin attempts to present a logical progression of argumentation – he states two axioms, the first postulating an **equivalence between man and nature**: "Kein Phänomen oder Gefühlsmoment, das von der Wissenschaft entdeckt, ersonnen oder entwickelt wurde, wäre möglich, wenn sich nicht sein Äquivalent schon in der Natur vorfände" (18); in its support he adduces the value of immediate evidence for such a competence as the flying of birds.

(2) A second axiom regards the **common cognitive limits of science and intuitive intellect**, referring to the triadic unity of art, life and science: "Keine der grundlegenden Entdeckungen auf jenem Gebiet, das wir das wissenschaftliche nennen, übersteigt die Fähigkeit des einzelnen intuitiven Intellekts, sie in der verhältnismässigen Einsamkeit der Meditation vorzubilden." (19; italics in original)

Menuhin intends to demonstrate that human nature relates necessarily and complementarily to the truth which it reveals, and the same relation is valid for art and science: that "das menschliche Wesen als solches der Wahrheit, die es entdeckt, notwendig und komplementär ist, genauso wie es die Kunst für die Wissenschaft ist; und beide sind notwendig, um ein Gleichgewicht im Menschen herzustellen." (23)

It would be dangerous, contends Menuhin, to rely solely on an isolated and autocratic science, separated from intuition, and this emerges as an ethical issue: "wir setzen unser Vertrauen in die Intelligenz, die Sittlichkeit und die Moral menschlicher Wesen, von denen erwartet werden darf, dass sie auf Grund breiter Lebenserfahrung, regelrechter Ausbildung und Kenntnis und aus Liebe zu unserem gemeinsamen Erbe in Literatur, Kunst und Geschichte einen Wertmassstab besitzen und Schlüsse ziehen können und angesichts der Tatsachen, die sie wahrnehmen oder ihnen vorgelegt werden, zu handeln wissen." (26)

Menuhin, in effect, points to the inevitability and value of **praxis as intuitive competence**, which is a fact of life involving broad areas: "Schliesslich ist Architektur mehr als Ingenieurswesen; wie wir ja auch von Musikwissenschaftlern nicht erwarten, dass sie Musikstücke komponieren

und spielen, oder von Kunstkritikern, dass sie Bilder malen" (24). Consequently, Menuhin draws as his conclusion the **raison d'être of the performer**, by **justifying artistic competence as equivalent to scientific knowledge**: "niemals dürfen die Fachleute an die Stelle unseres Gehirns treten, das sich immer das Recht der letzten Entscheidung vorbehalten muss. [...] wenn auch heute niemand mehr eine so gute Violine baut wie Stradivarius oder so schöne Statuen meißelt wie Praxiteles, so kann ich doch [...] sogar auf der Violine spielen". (27) This decisive difference between competence and knowledge Menuhin illustrates by reference to the evident and poignant consideration: "die Geige wäre nie gebaut und nie gespielt worden, hätte die Menschheit darauf warten wollen, dass ein Laboratorium ihr vorschrieb, wie eine Geige gebaut und gespielt werden muss. Weder Kunst, noch Sprache, noch Musik, noch Medizin, schliesslich überhaupt Wissenschaft wären je zustande gekommen, wenn der Mensch auf wissenschaftlich sichere Befunde gewartet hätte." (33) It seems evident, and remarkable, that **praxis presupposes intuition**.

In a deviation into medical considerations concerning the ontology of cancer pathology, Menuhin correctly observes the similarity of principles within biology and aesthetics: "Was normalerweise Teil eines Ganzen und den Bedürfnissen dieses Ganzen dienstbar ist, achtet nicht länger diese Unterordnung, erklärt sich unabhängig und nicht mehr verantwortlich; oder umgekehrt ausgedrückt: ein einheitliches Ganzes verliert seinen Halt, den entscheidenden Sinn seiner Einheit und seines Zwecks und gestattet einzelnen Teilen zu wuchern." (28)

We are thus, in our living human nature effectively **artists in life** ("dass wir als lebendige menschliche Wesen Künstler sind" 34). But having this nature is not sufficient for being an artist in its proper sense: Menuhin describes the challenging demand of attentive and humble expectation. The interpreter must approach "das unvorhersagbare mit Entschiedenheit und Glauben und [...] mit entschlossen festem Griff angehen." (34) This, then, entails solving problems of **artistic decision-making**: "Als Künstler muss ich ständig neue und unumstössliche Entscheidungen treffen, sonst bin ich nur eine Setzmaschine in einer Druckerei, die auf jeden Tastendruck reagiert." It is clear though, that in the view of Menuhin, such decisions cannot be made on scientific grounds only, since they are **intuitive a priori**: "solange sich unsere Haltung vorwiegend auf den rein fachmännischen und wissenschaftlichen Ansatz stützt, solange wird sie schwankend und zögernd, verschüchtert und unsicher sein – oder anderenfalls, wenn sie ihrer selbst sicher ist, arrogant und irrig." (34)

Art, then, reflects the **transitoriness of a moment in life**, and it is "der Gesamtausdruck eines gegebenen Lebens–Augenblicks, wiederschaffen in bestimmten Formen, die den Versuch darstellen, das Vergängliche zu verewigen und uns einen unmessbaren kleinen Teil der Ewigkeit zu erringen. Kunst ist der Ausdruck des Idealen, aber nicht des Vorhersagbaren". And this art, or interpretative process, is a "Umbildung von Stimmung und Empfindung, Intuition und Denken in eine Handlung, in Klänge, in Worte, in Gebärde und Haltung." (43)

Still, there is much in art that could be designated **science**: "das immer wache, disziplinierte Streben nach Vorhersagbarkeit" in all **exercises** and training in order to master our hand and the implementation of *i in p*: "wir durchforschen alle Methoden, die uns das Steuer in die Hand bringen könnten, und wir ebnet jenem wunderbaren, geheimnisvollen und unvorhersehbaren Unbekannten in jeder Weise den Weg. Wir verfeinern die Kontakte". This is a **battle over predictability**, and for increasing, or, I would say **maximizing**, our mastering control of the sound–result.

In his view of **freedom**, Menuhin states that indeterminism is not possible in the physical world, "weil die Natur, das Universum in seinen Grundlagen auf der Zweiheit aller Phänomene beruht" (60), but only in the creative act of art. The obvious indeterminacy of notation, then, is such an **intentional act**. However, the creative act does not work in absolute freedom, since man must learn to know his own complex nature, which may restrict him, and which must be subsumed under some superordinating and unifying aim in order not to dissolve. So man can in fact make his choice between submission to authority or to inner and self–imposed rules: "Zwischen diesen beiden Extremen sind unendlich viele Übergänge möglich. Sie ergeben sich aus dem Mass, in dem die Autorität fest begründet ist und in dem ihr freiwillig Gehorsam geleistet wird" (61): Too much allegiance to the letter will lead to "Abtötung von Geist und Körper". (63)

Menuhin sees the interpreter in a position at the center of a symbolic cross, in my view an archetypical scheme of polarities, which I have earlier applied in an analysis of Mahler's *Das Lied von der Erde*: the horizontal axis refers to time, from past through the present to the future, and the vertical shows the ascent from basic nature via man up to spiritual humanity and eternity (transcendence, deity) and arrives at the typology of four varying constitutions apriorically related to human characters: (1) the forceful and bodily, "das im Materiellen Vorherrschende", which is a component of habitude and courage, (2) "das

Verdauende oder Sinnliche oder Besitzergreifende" as a component of art, (3) the cognitively coordinating mentation or "Verstandesmässige" as a component of science, and, (4) "das Geistige, welches ästhetisch und moralisch ist und all das umfasst, was jenseits unseres unmittelbaren Selbst liegt, und dem wir im letzten zugehören" as a component of wisdom. (67)

More concretely, then, repertoire and interpretation are focused in *Violin and Viola*⁸³: Menuhin points at the "advantage of the improviser over the musician who has learned to read and play the notes he sees on the music staff" – namely that "the improviser is usually carried by the stream of consciousness": This, in fact, is an observation that seems phenomenological in essence, since the music is regarded as dependent on the experiential flow and to the mode of grasping musical objects.

But Menuhin gives no support for his view, only a practical justification. To 'live' and play the music – one's experience being carried by the stream of musical consciousness which marks the soundshape with interpretive means that characterize its constitution – simply is to be musically **communicative**. The improviser will attain a more "convincing" performance that "will go to the core of his listener more naturally, just as the man who speaks from his heart without a text – if he is a good speaker – can reach his audience more directly than the one who has come with a prepared speech and just reads that text, regardless of audience reaction, regardless of the mood and feeling, the inclination of the moment." (103)

But it is not clear from Menuhin's presentation what is meant by "a good speaker", nor how the "convincing" performance effects the audience in exactly that way. There must be some connecting argument about **correspondence between consciousness and musical shape**, whereby the listener can recognize, identify and become effected in some way by the music heard. It is not that the sound reaches the audience "more directly", but there is a more efficient **transmission** of the import of the music to the beholder through the **fulfillment of correspondence and coherency conditions** in the presented soundshape.

In a similar way, Menuhin contends, playing from memory may convey the same **communicative qualities** to the performance, provided the violinist plays with "the conviction and intelligence and understanding" that the piece requires. But of these criteria, **conviction** is vague and ambiguous. Isn't conviction a matter of degree? Who is supposed to be already (become during the concert) convinced, and of what? Does this mean that if the player feels conviction, and conviction of, for instance, how the piece is constituted or

should be played – or of the w's emotive content – (and on the condition that the other criteria required are fulfilled), **then** this feeling of conviction will automatically and "directly" be transmitted to, or aroused in the listener? So that the performer's conviction implies the listener's conviction? If yes, there still remains the problem of establishing whether they are convinced about the same thing or not. Logically, the aprioric scheme for interpretative conviction in this respect is that of a simple 2x2 combinatory model. This should be seen against the common sense concept of feeling conviction as progressively "pro" in attitude towards the external object allegedly causing an emotionally valuable personal experience by immediate impress.

Menuhin, who adds the self-evident condition of instrumental mastery, attempts to convey a quality of "rapturous improvisation" to his audience, by which the player reveals to the listener (in a sense, diffusely) "a new secret" and "a new meaning which is particularly relevant to that very audience, to that very moment." (104) Now, the interesting idea is that **realizing this communicative quality coincides with following the composer's profound intention**, and this is a **process of deepening understanding that parallels the interpretive rendering**, which I briefly suggested in MIR I (89 *et passim*). "To achieve this quality of communication with a great classic it is necessary to enter completely into the composer's mind, to follow his thoughts and his pen [...], to follow evolution and impulses which carried him from one note to the next", Menuhin states, and claims that he has developed a "personal system" of analysis which he applies to every work (104).

In essence, this system disregards the conventional form-and-structure analysis of the "skeleton" as an **all too common property of the work**. Identifying and labeling the harmonies can be compared to learning the grammar of a language, states Menuhin, and concludes, "its cultivation should not form a major part of the type of analysis I have in mind". In essence, he intends "to contribute a form of analysis which proceeds from the first to the last note of a composition, which does not accept any labels, but rather explains each note in terms only of its consequence as logical succession to the notes which preceded it in that composition." In fact, this is a program for **phenomenological analysis**, emphasizing the bracketing of theoretical terms (Huss. III:1:130–134). One of its consequences, though, seems to be **transcendancy**, expressed in Menuhin's immediate conclusive exemplification: "Thus a D major scale in the Beethoven Concerto for Violin is no longer a D major scale." At the stage of personal assimilation, this method is clarified: "I

am actually hearing the piece not as a finished work but in conception, and it carries with it the myriad inflexions, the myriad intentions – even those unwritten, unspoken – which the composer had in his mind and which took the particular form [...] which characterize that work". (105) This view, Menuhin contends, is a condition for the **constant innovation** of interpretation through, I would insert, the wealth of potential constellations by combining **interpretational intentions** into variously constituted complex conceptions of the work to be rendered: "Only thus can a work be played with conviction and can it retain an ever-renewed freshness of conception. Only thus can it reveal new facets when it is repeated." (105) The crucial point, though, is that neither the common structure, nor the individual deviation from the 'form–model', is the essential core of a musical work. Instead the Menuhin idea, as I understand it, permits the **emotional atmosphere** to immerse the work and appear in the full **transparency** of performance, thus contributing to its **continuity**. However, I find no tenable argument for the contention that this emotional continuum (and character of appearance) is contradictory to the structural aspect. In contrast, subtle adjustments of micro– and macrostructural relationships are correlates of this emotionality, and carriers of its motional properties. For such a conception, even confirmation from music psychology can be at least partly adduced; e.g. the close correspondence between motion and emotion is explained by Alf Gabrielsson (in Sloboda 1988:27–51 *et op. cit.*).

The question of **freedom and discipline** is deeply rooted in the process of rehearsal. In practising the work in its due order of succession Menuhin follows his "method of perfecting interpretation" which is a **continuous process of distortion and correction**. So according to the Menuhin concept, the musician should **not** adopt the other possible **method of rehearsing**, namely in the **structural** order of the c–hierarchy. However, to practise in order of **structurally** related parts on the basis of a 'form–analysis' (ca) is a method that merit serious consideration; it can clearly not be rejected without argument (I applied the method in the Edsberg seminars in the late 70's inspired by Hans Leygraf in Salzburg 1968–69). The stages of rehearsal according to Menuhin (which can be summarized as (1) deciding the most important notes, (2) underlining stresses where "minute alterations of volume and speed [are] called for, and exaggerate them", and (3) "eliminate[ing] them, smooth[ing] them, plan[ing] them down, work[ing] at them with [a] metronome, so that nothing remains obvious, nothing shows" (106)) fulfill the final artistic aim of revealing "the line and the shape, the living ebb and flow". This aim,

interestingly, is also related to presumptively conceived audience responses, since the listeners are not supposed to recognize some "deliberate[...] twisting [of] the phrase in this or that way', because what remains is essential and discreet." But point 1 above is a structural criterion, which he just wanted to evade, and Menuhin fails to give any criteria for the selection of what notes shall have **structural emphasis**, and why; and of when to apply the primarily dynamic and agogic underlining of stresses of point 2. Are these notes the same as the important ones of 1? Do the stresses that are to be underlined refer to compositionally important notes that are supposed to correspond to a **preinterpretative structure**, or are these already interpreted in view of the imminent performance? The blunt contradiction between points 2 and 3 hints at an implicit intention of shaping profiled gestalts of impinging relief while constantly preserving the 'tight' relation to compositional facts, with an aim to subtly evince its inherent characteristics in performance. The problem of fusion can be pertinent, and where reconciliation cannot be reached, divergence or incongruency is threatening. The three point model is instructional, a pedagogical scheme, but not interpretationally innocent, and the lack of an aesthetic argument is disturbing. His interpretative concept is not fully coherent.

Menuhin also includes the concepts of **order and chaos**, and conceives of them as contrary forces (111). The problem of **historic faithfulness** to the score "versus freedom of expression", designated by Menuhin as "the problem of texture" (110) without clarifying this relation, is not treated in depth. "It depends", proposes Menuhin, "to a certain extent, on fashion. If you listen to old recordings of Hoffman, for instance, or Ysaÿe, and of some great pianists, you will find a very great latitude of personal interpretation and therefore a very general intensity of communication." It is obvious that Menuhin conceives of the **zone of freedom** (MIR I:157–158, 260–264) for personal expression as a means, but not a necessary condition (as we shall see below), for establishing convincing and direct **communication** with the audience. This is how Menuhin suggests the performer to use his limited degree of freedom. (MIR I:33–34)

Still, a restricted interpretation can effect successful communication: "Later, after the First World War, we entered the more disciplined era of interpretation, and in the hands of people like Toscanini it was still a remarkable achievement of communication; but in the hands of imitators [...] classical music lost a great deal of its meaning". (110) It should be noted that the concept of interpretation is also restrictively used in Menuhin's thinking.

Outside the focus of this investigation, Menuhin of course mainly deals

with instrumental techniques⁸⁴, and the technical conditions for implementing the interpretation through **bowing** and **bodily motion**. Regarding the conception of the mind of the player, Menuhin states that he requires in addition to "an intellectual and 'emotional' grasp of the musical work in hand", a "quality of grace or inspiration" for achieving "a good performance".

On a concrete level of violinistic mastery, Joseph Szigeti⁸⁵ examines thoroughly the expressive means of interpretative implementation related to successful artistic traditions and discusses Carl Flesch, Pablo de Sarasate (169), Leopold Auer, Joseph Joachim, Ysaÿe, Kreisler and others. Principally, Szigeti acknowledges the need for "enhancements to show what can be done to attain a fuller realization of the composer's implied intentions that cannot always be denied in the printed page." (184) Szigeti fails to provide explicit bases for his interpretative suggestions. Still, this book is valuable, and it is possible that a cogent system could be derived from the wealth of examples given there, but this would necessitate an analysis of Szigeti's personal concept and style of interpretation, which lies outside the frame of this investigation.

On the intermediate level, providing both examples and concluding with **principles of interpretation**, David Blum, who was the conductor and director of *L'Orchestre Symphonique Lausannois* in the 70's, presents in his *Casals and the Art of Interpretation*⁸⁶ a **musical concept** of the cellist Pablo Casals, based on his lessons, tape-recordings from courses at the University of California and other documents (including *Conversations with Casals* by José Maria Corredor, Dutton, 1956). It merits consideration and should be outlined in its essentials, since Blum is one of the few competent writers in this area, and his subject in this book, the aesthetics of Pablo Casals, is of great interest. The final instances of philosophical or aesthetic justification and the bases for those principles can be stated explicitly in a few points. If one were to integrate these points, it would be possible to present a coherent view of the condition of reliance on a **generally valid principle** of interpretation. The soundshaping must then correspond to widely known, accepted or experienced phenomena or principles which every presumptive listener, i.e. 'musical mind', is either acquainted with or constituted to encounter. On the basis of **physiological** principles, such as the **breathing and pulse** of the human body, this requirement of generality is fulfilled by reference to **nature**. The human **diction** of speech is another principle on a very basic level; that notwithstanding, this proposal is culturally

dependent, idiomatically varied, but still natural. As David Blume reminds us, Casals did not intend to leave "a doctrinaire system but an open door to our own experience" (xv).

The first principle, denoted "breath–resonance life–motion" (drawn from a Chinese art critic, Hseih Ho, 5th century A.D.), concerns "the way in which your spirit comes into subtle accord with the movement of life around you; at the same time it is an experience within yourself – at the very centre. It is active and passive, embracing and releasing; it is a profound sense of *being*." (1) This is interesting in view of Celibidache's reference to Zen Buddhism as a means of achieving total congruency in the consciousness' relation with reality: "Zen: die Realität, d.h. die Wirklichkeit was alles darunter zu verstehen ist" (p.c. with Celibidache, Munich 8.3.93).

This ancient idea, the "coming into harmony with the vital cosmic spirit or breath", which conveys to the artist's movement the "mysterious vitality of life itself", reflects a **contemplative** view and a "transfigured expression" in the "oneness with the spirit from which this music is born: infinite devotion, profoundest love." This endows the performance with a quality of **inward continuity of feeling**, which purports to represent a level of more original experience or resonance of feeling (3) as an outcome of the **basic emotionality** of the musical mind (Mm) and its interpretive acts. Musically, then, the formulation of feeling in interpretation, according to Casals, **emanates from a single source** and "flows together in a single stream" (4) when it takes its course into tones that incarnate or manifest the underlying – and driving – flow of energy.

There are scattered indications of **hermeneutic into–pretation**, not T–intropretation (i.e. without theoretical introjection), such as the "moment of final expiration as portraying 'the death of the hero'" in the Dvorák Cello Concerto, unless this should be understood as a **mnemotechnical** device in support of the more basic conception of expiration as a **physiological analogon**, assuming that this ancillary imagination facilitated Casals' finding of the exactly intended musical shape, attainable through this supporting analogon. It remains to be established by comparative interpretation analysis (MIR II:90–93, 105–108; ch. I:2) whether such a T–intropretation (the analogon to expiration) manifested itself in a P–intropretation (through phrasing, dynamic and expressive soundshaping, etc) that meets the requirements of structural congruency in Casals' art of cello playing.

More at the core of Casals interpretation is a carrying "inner vision which

illuminated the re-creative process" (5), the **ideal of vocal sonority** and the principle of **polarity of musical characters**. In effect, this vocal sonority entails a **constant changing color** as reflecting the subtle modulations of the human voice. Casals insisted on the principle that "every note has to have a different sonority" (9) since "it is a song". This principle has been questioned through more or less serious argument. The heaviest *pro* is that the singing character will enable the listener to attain a certain intimate identification, since this can release recollections from retentional experiences of the special internal timbre of one's own voice, feelings of bodily vibrations and vocal closeness. My cello teacher, Janis Ozolins, who studied with Enrico Mainardi (1897–1976; MGG 16:1196 and J. Bächli *op. cit.*), maintained that the sound of the cello bore the greatest similarity to the human voice among instruments, whereas other professors would claim this position for their instruments, e.g. the saxophone, bassoon or clarinet, and similarly for other string instruments.

Ever-changing sonority, criticized by Celibidache, could risk the continuity and even the identity of a line or development. But this criticism is moderated by the **instrumentally homogenous sonority** of, in particular, the cello sound and to a somewhat lesser extent even of the sound of the other members of the 'orchestral corpus' of our string quintet, since the limited variability of sonority works in a coherent direction, ensuring the identity of the melody. At the same time this homogeneity may pose a problem, especially when giving a solo recital – namely the opposite problem: how to achieve sufficient variation in sonority, in order to avoid monotony, as we shall see with Casals.

So the **vocal ideal**, for the sake of **variety**, is a mode of elaborating the solo part of an homogeneous instrument, but it is a **principle of limited adaptability** and cannot be applied *per se* for ensemble or orchestral interpretation. There is a particular **human attitude** in the core of Casals' concept of musical performance: the inevitable "joy in the process of music-making" (9), the risk of expressiveness, the luminous warmth and frank playing (10).

This forms itself into the concept of **psychological personality**. Here is a uninterrupted completeness of simple, forthright unsentimentality aiming at a **characteristic quality of more than beautiful sound** (12), which can be exemplified by Casals' discretion in the use of **vibrato**. This was not anti-expressive, but derived from "an openness of heart to the quality of innocence" (135). David Blum contends that this was an outcome of the way in which the music moved Casals in his inner life: "He plays for himself and yet not only for himself; for each of us is, in his own way, alone with that voice, speaking to us

in tones of inexpressible purity." (13)

In stating one of his foremost **principles of musical design**, "we must follow the line of the music; we must find the design" (15), he postulated a rule with many exceptions. Blum refers to the J. J. Quantz⁸⁷ dictum of good execution as revelatory of **diversity**, which corresponds to the expressive inflections in Casals' playing, and to his words: "Variety [...] is a great word – in music as in everything; variety is a law of nature. Good music has never monotony. If it is monotonous it is our own fault if we don't play it as it has to be played...We must give to a melody its natural life. When the simple things and natural rules that are forgotten are put in the music – then the music comes out!" (18), and, "Nature never stays at one level [...] there is a constant vibration." (19) By this analogy to perpetual change, or possibly of deeper and more necessary connection, music (as motion in nature) "partakes in ebb and flow – in the interplay between tonality and modulation, in the counter–poise of unity and diversity which together comprise form. Within the large structural spans there are smaller waves – expressive of melodic, rhythmic and harmonic intensities – wherein is contained the moment–to–moment life of music." (19) This, then, presupposes that the **continuity in nature** is matched by a **continuity in performance**. Casals insisted that "each note is like a link in a chain – important in itself and also as a connection between what has been and what will be." (19) In practice, Blum shows how Casals in his teaching consequently made his students recognize the "expressive implications of each phrase" and how this expression can be brought to "full realization by the use of dynamic variety, rhythmic flexibility, tone colour, intonation." Casals' aim to "give to a melody its natural life" (in Casals' words) is presumed by Blum to be realizable in the most "immediate and elemental way", by means of dynamic variety. In an analysis of the Adagio from Haydn's D major Cello Concerto, Blum shows by what principles Casals in practice aimed at **revealing the design of the melody "by means of dynamic inflection"** (19; original emphasis) which gives expressive form to the melodic curve (20–21):

(1) "the dynamic level does not remain constant; within the forte there is room for the nuances to evolve flexibly", and there is a range of nuances within each dynamic grade which should be used for modulation according to the principle of "follow the line of the music"; in Blum's words: "the dynamic inflections respond to the rise and fall in pitch" (20–21)⁸⁸;

(2) "repetitions bring about a subtle variance in intensity, whether in the reiteration of the same note [...] or the repetition of a phrase";

(3) "the long notes [...] increase in intensity, thereby contributing to the development of the overall line", though, more generally stated, "a long note will mean crescendo or diminuendo [...]. Variety – art consists of that!" (Casals). The aim of this interpretive program is to **express the innate architecture of the phrase**, e.g. in a gradually unfolding melody. Principally, the question must be posed on this point whether and under what condition(s) the clarification of melodic architecture by dynamic means is needed: (1) unconditionally, i.e. 'always' (for all p:s) or (2) only where the higher degree of complexity and thus auditive comprehensibility **needs** to be distinctly 'expressed' by additional means, on the basis of the innate shape of the melodic (c–) construction it is likely that a melody well known to the audience, although complex, would not require strong clarification by p(i)–means. Casals: "the diminuendo gives economy to the crescendo that follows," (23) which means that a "momentary easing of intensity gives the interpreter greater freedom to mould dynamic nuances within the phrase without exceeding the just proportions of the overall level of volume."

A consequence of point 3 is that long notes attain a particular expressive capacity since they are "sustained links in the chain of melodic evolution" which serves to **preserve the continuity of line** (26). A growing weight can support the construction of a melodic arch in performance, and a "delicate crescendo over the sustained notes" brings out the summit of a lyrical phrase at the climax. Under the group of **motion phenomena**, I would classify the characterization that Blum makes regarding the "gentle, swaying motion. The long notes, coming in diminuendo, provided a gliding sense of release" (27), referring to the principal subject of Wagner's *Siegfried Idyll*.

David Blum presents a series of dynamic forms and elaborations of motives and individual tones, of which only a few can be related:

(1) a curve of intensity reaches its peak at the bar line, after which it begins to attenuate;

(2) a tone may contain a dual impulse of relaxation and a subsequent renewal of tension. As a general rule, the dynamic of Casals' elaboration of melodies follows "its natural tendency towards expiration" (28). Such a **dual impulse** can be justified when "the note of resolution following an appoggiatura (which has an inherent diminuendo) is succeeded by a higher note to which it must establish a melodic connection." (29)

As a principle of **reiteration**, David Blum refers in a sudden analogy to speech⁸⁹ ("Repetition in music – be it of a single note or of a phrase – is similar

to repetition of words or phrases in speech") (29) to the "natural feature of expressive communication that we vary the emphasis when we say the same thing more than once."

The aim of Casals was to "achieve repetition without duplication". Casals insists that "it is a general rule that repeated notes or a repeated design must not be equal [...] and nothing is more monotonous than monotony!" This is a **prohibitive rule, precluding monotony**, that will explain many of Casals' detailed suggestions, e.g. the **graduation of a series of repeated single notes** "moving towards a point of rhythmic strength or receding from it" which corresponds to the prolongation of the upbeat within other theoretical systems (*vide* Riemann ch. III:3, Schenker ch. II:7).

The repeated application of the **principle of diversity** will lead to another principle, that of "ebb and flow" (31–32), actually of **pulsation**. The overriding need to **bring out the point of climax in a melody**, in order to let it appear in relief, can be met by Casals' way of "building tension over a long melodic span by the contouring of individual phrases" (34), and this **accumulation of tension** in phrase after phrase "had an overwhelming emotional impact" (36): "each phrase retained, in miniature, its ebb and flow; yet each increased in intensity, contributing to the cumulative growth of the whole." (35)

Each new sequence in a repetition of melodic segments, "express[es] something different from its predecessor" so that, in fact, we have an **n-i divergency** of intention and realization which can be bridged by interpretative continuity: "While these repetitions may look alike to the eye [notation], the subtle and changing relationships of tones and semitones within the structure of a scale produce continuous variations to the discerning ear. Casals [...] brought to each sequence a delicate modification of colour and intensity." (35)

Interestingly, a diminuendo, not only gives room for a **larger amplitude of nuancing in the coming phrase**, it also changes the character of the phrase into something more inward or intimate: "The diminuendo brings warmth" Casals contended. (41) The danger of diminuendo is that it may risk the **continuity** if made too suddenly. In order to counteract such disconnection of the phrase, Casals "was careful *not* to separate musical elements which belong together. Casals explained that where an appoggiatura is built into the melodic line, the note of resolution must maintain its natural connection to the appoggiatura even if not joined to it in a legato slur." (42)

In contrast, though, the "distinguishing between musical elements which should be separated from one another and those which should be drawn

together" (44) is pertinent, and occasionally Casals recognized that **more than one solution is possible**.

A general concept is the one of a **living structure** (45), and not only through Casals' claim to "give life to the sustained note" (47). Another overriding principle he provided is: "we must always give the design", which is an **interpretation of melodic shape and distance**.

Due to the principle of variety, "repetition in music means more piano or more forte" (49) and the highest note is a curvature, the turning point, and "must be heard – like **singing** – mezzo forte at least. It is not marked in the score; that doesn't matter. There are one thousand things that are not marked! [...] Don't give notes – give the meaning of the notes!" (49). But 'meaning of n' is contradictory in the following sense: notes cannot, strictly speaking, have meaning by themselves alone. They attain their meaning through the interpretive act. Evidently reading-out a meaning of n requires the 'application' of a full interpretational system of assimilation and processing and forms of emission.

Casals provides further rules of "diction for instrumentalists", mainly focusing on **clarity of articulation**, in which the **diminuendo in various constellations** functions as the main mode of achievement:

(1) an accent must have a diminuendo in order for us to hear the tone, not only the forte; without diminuendo the accent will disappear; Casals: "If you continue the forte you don't hear the accent. A strong accent must have a diminuendo: then it is more powerful and more natural" (51);

(2) the diminuendo fulfills a dual function: "it gives definition to the note on which it occurs and enables us to bring the following note into relief", and to enunciate it more distinctly;

(3) "a diminuendo gives interest to what follows; an accent has more importance by contrast" (Casals; Blum 52);

(4) the mode of "give way"–diminuendo indicates "a decrease in *volume*", but "there was no decrease in *intensity*" (53);

(5) "A prime function of the diminuendo is indeed to bring the attention of the ear to the little notes" (58);

(6) even in sequences of various **degrees of accentuation**, which must "vary according to the context" (59), "the principle of achieving clarity by means of the diminuendo retains its validity".

One consequence of the diminuendo could be risky in that the last note in the phrase too easily disappears. Casals counters this argument by stressing the importance of "bringing clarity to the concluding notes of a phrase which ends

in a diminuendo." (64)

An indication of Casals' underlying principal mode of thinking in questions of musical interpretation would be that he accorded the greatest significance to the "enunciation of the **first note**." (67, my emphasis) Such observations lean towards **phenomenological** considerations of the **a priori relations** of each **specific tone position**.

Contrary to the Schenkerian concept of interpretation, but in concordance with Menuhin, Casals "by means of dynamic contrast" brings "points of emphasis into the foreground, giving a sense of depth and relief to the musical line." (60)

The **legato** is still the "predominant interpretative element" in the concept by Casals: "The little notes must speak" (63); they were to be given clear enunciation within the "lyrical" line. And "the accentuation of an ornament held a significance even beyond the imperative act of clarification: "The ornament is the *exaltation of the note!*" (64)

The foremost **divergence from arithmetical exactness**, which is accepted or even demanded by Casals, is in **accordance with convention**. An interpreter may feel free to make lively rhythms a little shorter, or to displace them into a position a little later than that prescribed by the notation. (71) This principle is justified by the need to enhance in performance the rhythmic **vitality**, which is then considered to have an independently accepted aesthetical value. (73)

The same effect may legitimately be achieved through enlivening the dotted rhythm, in clearly articulating (or, exaggerating the clarifying effect of the articulation) by **simultaneously prolonging and diminishing** the dotted note, whereas the short notes "were to be delicately accented and a little quickened in time" (73). What we have here is in fact a series of **complex interrelations of interpretative phenomena** or criteria, more specifically **congruency as opposed to incongruency of the n-i relations** which, according to the hypothesis, will decrease or increase **tension**. The accented short tone is an incongruency between dynamic and durational quality that will normally be heard as **contrary to the natural tendency** (MIR I: 29, 58, 352 *et passim*; MIR II: 90-93, 105-108; *vide et indices*).

These principles are not rigidly applied, since Casals did not always quicken the short notes (**n-i congruency**) in dotted rhythms, as Blum noted. The decision regarding the quickening of short notes, naturally, was made due to the consideration of the rhythmic pattern "in reference to its specific setting." (76) Such a consideration may be needed for achieving a "springboard

for the syncopation" (79). This terminology reveals an essential experience of "intense concentration of energy" through grouping, by **compressing** the movement of small notes instead of letting them flow out in extended resolution (78), and indicates a 'bouncing' quality of integrated motion, weight and energy.

The task of the performer is, in large, to "establish convincing proportions" through determining the beat unit and securing an underlying basic pulse as a background to the necessary improvisatory moments, conscientiously balanced by the principle of **fantasy with order**: e.g. the performer must take care to "avoid weakening the architectural spans with which the rhythmic structure of a work is built" by overusing *ritardandi*.

In choosing the **tempo** an integrated view is necessary: "The musician must ascertain the most comprehensive vantage point which allows the simultaneous perception of the value inherent in each dimension." (89) But this entails also an elaboration of **tempo as a characterizing means** (MIP: 42 *pass*). Blum points at the "life-energy which each tempo conveyed, rooted as it was in Casals' way of understanding the unit of pulse which best expresses the music's content", which can be exemplified by the poignantly energetic eighth note pulse in the Finale of the Brahms' *Double Concerto* (*Vivace non troppo*, 2/4, A minor): "Casals demonstrated how the vitality of rhythm is actually enhanced when the quaver [eighth note] is felt as the underlying unit of pulse." (89)

Finally, Blum points to the "gravitational attractions" (Casals), which are "anything but academic; they are a vital aspect of musical communication." (104) These **gravitational phenomena**, acknowledged also by Celibidache (and presented in MIR I: 305–307, index 382, and MIR II: index 425 "gravitation"), Casals recognizes as an essential force in Mozart's *Symphony* No. 40 in G minor, opening theme ("*Molto allegro*" first violin part), which was analyzed in MIP: 53ff. In comparison, Blum relates Casals' assertion that: "The first note (Eb), being the sixth degree of the G minor scale, has an innate tendency, in descent, to lean towards the D. To play this properly in tune the string player should – by design or intuition – slightly lower the pitch of the Eb, bringing it closer to the D." (104)

So Casals, in this case, proposes the performer **give way to the natural gravitational tendency by means of intonation**, which in this context functions as a means for stating musically the belonging of the upper note to the lower in the second interval. The essential principle is that the upper note is seen in the

perspective of this gravitational system, which endows each of the notes with a specific significance, in contrast to the conventional view (and mode) of assigning the upper note the role of "ancillary note". There is on this point a systematic trait in Casals' concept of the **interpretation of interval and tone place in tetrachordic frames**, which David Blum presents (104), as far as the tetrachords are concerned, in accordance with Celibidache and Schenker.

The rehearsals and courses (in Stockholm) by the cellist William Pleeth, which were documented on tape recordings within the MIR investigations, have not all been transcribed and included in the unpublished volumes of MIR. For now, however, just a few points from his book *Cello*⁹⁰ will be sufficient in this context. William Pleeth insists on the "purity of vision" and the necessity to "develop a pure concept of the music's form and content" (62), and he relates this to technique: "Whenever we choose a fingering or a bowing, it should be because of its *musical* values." This is the idea of a **musicalizing technique**. The aim is to "produce something musically satisfying and valid" – i.e. "ultimately only the shape of the musical phrase, and of the units within the phrase, can determine the choice of bowings – it is misguided to think that they can be worked out apart from an understanding of this shape." (63) Pleeth intends to fulfill by his choice of bowing the **inherent shape of a musical line**. In this endeavor, he recognizes several alternatives of realizing a particular phrase: "different bowings, provided they are based on the same underlying logic, will only be different ways of serving the same end." (69) So in effect he conceives of a **musical identity** to be rendered by means of **technical differentiation**. But he does not solve the problem of what limits of differentiation can be accepted in view of the musical (i) purpose.

He also warns (as does Celibidache) the performer to imitate traditions by influence from recordings, since this will lead to "hearsay distortions that players go on repeating every mannerism, every cliché, without ever noticing that the composer never put it there" (74). Pleeth conceives of **imagination** as the source of all **creativity** in interpretation on cello. The "true artistic imagination" that he recommends "does not consist in inventing the musical sense of a passage according to a personal whim, but rather in discovering and demonstrating the sense already inherent in the music itself." (105)

The central task of the performer on cello is not to "fulfill[...] emotionally what one sees on paper without recomposing what the composer has written. [His] role rather is to discover the composer's intention through obeying what

he has given us and attaching our fantasies and emotions to that. [...] the fantasies and emotions within the score are endless, and *they* must be our starting point." William Pleeth also provides practical advice on "characterization in ensemble playing" (105 etc).

A much distributed and anecdotal book by cellist Gregor Piatigorsky⁹¹ unfortunately does not contribute to any serious interpretation research and does not deserve the level of its popularity.

A short but densely instructive review of Russian pedagogical string methods of interpretation is provided by Lew Ginsburg⁹², who manages to put the professional jargon among musicians in relation to serious questions of interpretational relevance. An important source of performance–practice aspects on violin playing, with scattered comments on interpretation in the proper sense of this concept, is given in the anthology *Violinspiel und Violinmusik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*⁹³. And two informative and orientative books reviewing violinists and cellists respectively must be mentioned. They both describe interpretation style on a level of qualified criticism: (1) Joachim W. Hartnack's *Grosse Geiger unserer Zeit*⁹⁴ which includes some discussion of (and suggested comparative) interpretation analysis in the introductory chapter (13, 19), and (2) Julius Bächli's *Berühmte Cellisten*⁹⁵, which has comparatively few notes on interpretive style.

The special problem of ensemble coordination and interplay was analyzed in MIP: 37–41 under the title "Interaction and ensemble structure" (*vide et* MIR I: 296–299): M. D. Herter Norton's *The Art of String Quartet Playing. Practice, Technique and Interpretation*⁹⁶ deals with ensemble problems, style, rehearsing, tempo choice and modification, phrasing, dynamics, and color and texture, and it gives much practical advice, though without presenting any systematic theory of interaction. David Blum made a detailed study of a string quartet's rehearsal work⁹⁷, and provides the most qualified reading within this special field.

Max Rostal, who participated shortly in the interviews (MIR III:198, 19.6.79), focused on the respect for the composer's intention as formulated in the notation. Interpretative differences among performers are caused by differing personalities, which endows a quality of liveliness to the performance. It is, according to Rostal impossible to determine what would be a correct

interpretation. In the ESTA publication No. 1/1976 (13–18) Rostal delves into the problems of reconciling performance practice with artistic aspects in the interpretation of J.S. Bach's G minor solo Sonata.

Alban Berg's Violin Concerto, considered a key work in our century by Herbert Blomstedt (MIR III:212; 13.3.1980 in preparation for a concert with Gideon Kremer and Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra in Berwaldhallen) presents many problems of **coordination between the soloist and the orchestra** due to the frequently changing and subtly graded pulse, at some places indicated ("tempo rubato", 2nd movement), at others not. The task of interpreting this work demands intimate knowledge of the score and competent cooperation of both conductor and soloist. In spite of the detailed performance markings, there is still room for interpretative choice, due to the ambiguous meaning of these marks: e.g. the articulation or staccato point under the phrasing line in the first bassoon bar 137, together with many other similar questions, must be solved.

Adorno's detailed advice on the performance of this work⁹⁸ is based on profound knowledge of the composer's intention in the original context of creation as a reference system for his observations in listening to the available recordings that he reacted against. This inspired him to produce a detailed account of the crucial points of interpretation, but the recordings are just a spring-board for taking the unidentified interpretation analyses as a pretext for a mixed i-w and w-i analysis with great eloquence and ingenuity.

In the introduction, Adorno extends his reasoning to statements that would have a general bearing on an aesthetics of musical interpretation: "Durchweg soll die wahre Interpretation ausgehen von den antagonistischen Forderungen der Werke; als Problem eines jeden visieren, was die sachgerechte Wiedergabe eigentlich verbietet. Nur in der Erkenntnis ihrer eigenen Unmöglichkeit wird authentische Interpretation überhaupt möglich. An wenig Stücken aber lässt die Aporie sogenausichnennen wie an dem Bergkonzert, das so gemässigt sich geriert." Adorno in fact devises a method of **transcending contradiction**; if creating unity through **transitoriness** is conceptually and cognitively possible, it remains unclear how this idea can be realized in practice in the concrete sound performance of the Berg Concerto. Adorno expands his idea of sensitively avoiding contrast: the "Kunst des Übergangs ist bei Berg universal entwickelt." (339) Adorno attributes the idea to the composer (Berg), but at the same time this is 'universally developed', i.e. it **must** be founded on intersubjectivity coinciding *a priori* to be communicable. I further submit that

such an idea can hardly be only expretational: it is necessarily preceded by inptretational acts (components, moments). Interpretation, then, "muss die undurchbrochene Einheit, und zwar in jedem Betracht, stiften, dabei aber doch jedes Detail so treffen, dass es sein eigenes Wesen hat, ohne im mindesten die Totale zu verletzen." (341)

Adorno demands "unermüdliche Reflexion ebenso auf den Formsinn des je Erscheinenden wie auf seine Vermittlung zu dem, was vorherging und was folgt" and recommends the interpreter "sich an das Ganze begeben, tun sie gut daran, jene Einheiten wie durchs Mikroskop zu betrachten". He identifies prominent notes ("*Zentralton*" 343) in the work structure, and justifies the need for analysis for performance purposes: "Keine Interpretation dürfte weniger reflektiert sein als die Komposition in sich selbst, der eigen Beschaffenheit nach und unabhängig vom Bewusstsein des Komponisten, reflektiert ist, wofern sie nicht objektiv hinter der Sache zurückbleiben will. Diese zu erschliessen, nicht mechanisch Musik auseinanderzunehmen ist der Zweck von Analyse, und ihrer bedarf die wahre Interpretation [Unfortunately, Adorno does not explicate this concept!]. So viel ist wahr an dem Misstrauen der Musiker gegen die Theorie, dass sie nutzlos wird für ihn und schliesslich auch untriftig an sich, wenn sie keine Spielanweisungen gewährt. Sie dürfen nicht von oben her aus der Deutung abgeleitet werden, sondern müssen sich erhärten an technischen Tatbeständen und von ihnen wiederum sich inspirieren lassen." (344)

Such required support in the **compositional state of affairs**, Adorno identifies in the beginning bars of the Andante: "vom unbeseelten Ausprobieren der leeren Saiten, noch diesseits der eigentlichen Komposition, wird gleitend die volle expressive Intensität erreicht." (346) And his compositional interpretation of the facts extends into an analogical and extrapolating consideration: "als während die leeren Saiten der Geige schon zu subjektiv, beginnen die Stimmquinten mit den womöglich noch orgelhafteren Registern von Klarinette und Bassklarinette", from which Adorno deduces the following interpretational prescriptions and prohibitions: "unter keinen Umständen darf etwa schon in Takt 6 forte erreicht sein. Im Sinn der Stimmidee ist glockenrein zu intonieren, auch die zunehmende Expression darf die Tonqualität nicht im mindesten beeinträchtigen. Portamento wäre unerträglich" – on the other hand, Adorno requires that respect be accorded to the indicated half bar legato in the solo violin. Obviously, Adorno intuitively senses an equable sonority undisturbed by interruptions that could endanger the continuity. In view of this, his analysis is perfectly coherent, and the proposed devices, effectively congruent means of

expression, for achieving this goal clearly defensible.

Adorno's prohibition of portamento Radovan Lorkovic⁹⁹ attributes to Louis Krasner as soloist, in one of his recordings, either with Webern (1936) or Fritz Busch (1938) as conductor. Lorkovic provides the complete and detailed presentation, encompassing the whole sequence from editorial revision, work-structure analysis of form, dodecaphony and content, and a close reading of ambiguities of performance markings with the scrutinizing comments that Blomstedt searched for. The divergencies of these recorded performances are identified and related to violinistic, aesthetic and analytical considerations. In this, Lorkovic refers to research by Reinhard Kapp¹⁰⁰, Jesper Christensen, Joachim Draheim, Christiane Heine (diss. Erlangen 1985 with reference to Celibidache), and Douglas Jarman. In other respects he refers to Michael Struck (*et alia*) and connects with the instrumental traditions of Flesch, Szigeti, Jampolsky, Rostal, and he evaluates critically Sevcik, Walter Levin and Kolisch.

The requirements of historical authenticity in performance practice are problematic: "wie alle grossen Interpreten überzeugen auch Krasner-Webern, trotz ihrer Nichteinhaltung der Komponistenangaben, mehr als korrektere, aber schwächere Interpretationen. Diese tief erlebte, eigenwillige Deutung soll deswegen, wenn auch nicht als Modell, so doch als Inspirationsquelle Geltung behalten."

Lorkovic, whose concepts were introduced to illustrate our theoretical discussion in ch. I:2, assigns an independent value to the expressive properties of the interpreter's version. This is formulated as an experiential fact, presupposing that the convincing direct effect is prior to the logic of interpretation. But the layer of personal expression from the performer does not permit divergencies or liberties against the score. The postulate is that the expressive predicates of performance are the result of elaboration within the frame of compositional and notational freedom. And the indications of these two factors are congruent, provided the notation is interpreted in the light of psychoanalytic insight into the personality of the composer. "Es ist für grosse Künstler wie Webern und Krasner bezeichnend, dass sie ein tiefes Erlebnis des Werkes in der Anfangsphase von dessen Konzertexistenz allem anderen voranstellten. Bei weiteren Bemühungen um eine gültige Deutung des Werkes sollten sich die Interpreten jedoch vermehrt auf den Komponistentext (und damit auch seine Tempoangaben, auch wenn sie schwer verständlich scheinen [on this point in accordance with the view of Blomstedt]) rückbesinnen". (170-171)

In effect, the view of Lorkovic is that the prototypicality of first performances

are not *a priori* valid, but they should be based only on the artistic merits of the interpretation. In regarding available recorded performances as **sources of inspiration** the interpreter allows himself to freely select successful solutions as contributions during the working out of the personally embraced interpretation. Lorkovic, who expands his issue on violinistic criteria and questions of discord between differing 'school' traditions, arrives by adducing support from his formal analyses at the proposal of **intervallic interpretation** as a justified means of expression ("*Intervalldeutung*", 187; "*Intervallcharakterisierung*", 188).

Lorkovic presents an interpretative **edition**, implementing technically his interpretive ideas on the solo violin part, including detailed consideration of fingering, bowing and intonation: "Die geigengerechte Werkformulierung des Violinkonzerts lädt im Bereiche der Fingersätze zu eindeutigen Lösungen ein [...] Sie eignen sich vorzüglich als teilweiser Ersatz für Portamenti, denn sie streben die Ausdruckscharakterisierung mit den Mitteln der Lagen-, Finger- und Saitenwahl an. Dasselbe gilt für einen differenzierten Vibratoeinsatz, den Berg oft präzise vorschreibt."

The point of disagreement regarding the justifiability of applying **portamento** can be used as a model case for the argumentation *pro et contra* of expressive means, not the least **intonation** in this case: Kolisch requires tempered intonation for string instruments in sharp contrast to the expressive intonation of, for instance, Pablo Casals, to which Lorkovic refers. It is also important to notice the difference between arguments valid for, alternatively, the aesthetic/artistic goals and the means themselves chosen for the implementation of these goals. In view of the requirement of historicity or authenticity, the end does not justify the means. The even more pertinent question on the **limits** for the appreciation of these means, related to **in** and **ex** acts, remains unresolved.

It is difficult to find aesthetic justification for Kolisch's doctrines, which were discussed also in ch. III:1 and 2. Empirically, evidence from violin instruction indicates that **technical perfectionism** hampers the musical development; Lorkovic was entrusted the artistic remains of his teacher Max Rostal, who in our interview 9.6.79 stressed the allowance for differences due to **personality** and **liveliness** as one of his ideals (MIR III:198): "die exzessive Intonationskontrolle lässt die Wiedergabe emotional verkümmern (obwohl sie auch den Ausdruck konzentrieren kann), und die Ausdrucksblässe der temperierten Intonation bei tonalen wie bei atonalen Werken erfreut kaum jemanden." (185) And Lorkovic acknowledges the merit of Kolisch, having furthered "im Geigenspiel eine Verbindung von bewusstem Denken und

Tradition, neuer Psychologie und Physiologie, Interpretationskritik, Textforschung mit natürlichem Musik- und Spielerlebnis" (184), and admits the demeaning effect of "*typische, mechanisch bedingte Intonationsgefahren*" (187) with no **musical justification**.

And "Kolisch's Forderung einer durchgehenden Anwendung von gleichschwebender Intonation ist im Zusammenhang mit der Illusion einer vergangenheitsunabhängigen Neuen Musik am Anfang der Atonalität verständlich: die leittonhohe Intonation, bei welcher (nach Kolisch) 'alle Halbtönschritte verkleinert' [deleted marking] seien, die damals noch viel ausgeprägter und verbreiteter war, ist bei einer Musik, die keine Grundtonorientierung duldet, prinzipiell untragbar und nicht nur unvereinbar mit derjenigen der Tasteninstrumente. Die Halbtöne in atonaler Musik mussten vom Konzept her alle gleich gross sein, was bei der heutigen Auffassung tonalen Hörens atonaler Musik ebenso modifiziert werden muss," which is Lorkovic's argument from an **aesthetic and actualizing** point of view.

Furthermore, Lorkovic adduces an **historical** argument: "Die Anwendung dieser Intonationsweise bei tonaler Quartettmusik verfälscht jedoch die historischen Tatsachen einer Intonationsvielfalt, die sogar damals auch bei den Tasteninstrumenten bestand und bis heute erhalten geblieben ist" (187), and advances the social aspects of ensemble intonation. Lorkovic's standpoint is that of a **musicalizing** interpretation –i.e. technical aspects have no artistic independence, they are **pure means** for achieving musical goals. On this item, his requirements are radical: "Die Verwendung gewohnheitsmässiger, lediglich unbewältigter Lagenwechseltechnik entstammender Portamenti (Glissandi), die eine musikalische Vorstellung oft nur vortäuschen, indem sie Töne ohne musikalischen Sinn verbinden oder betonen, ist bei Werken der Neuen Wiener Schule noch verfehlter, als bei jenen der Klassik, Romantik oder des Barocks, die auch bei falscher Sinnggebung nicht ihre ganze Verständlichkeit einbüßen müssen. Dies nicht nur deshalb, weil die Portamenti an das tonale Idiom der Romantik gebunden in den modernen Geigenstil eingegangen sind, sondern auch wegen ihrer Inkompatibilität mit den traditionsfremden Aspekten der Neuen Wiener Schule." (174)

This consideration, then, Lorkovic connects to Adorno's critical view on the appropriateness of portamento in the solo violin part: "Die echte romantische Empfindung in Bergs Violinkonzert jedoch hat schon Adorno und seiner Ablehnung üblicher geigerischer Ausdrucksmittel spürbare theoretische

Schwierigkeiten bereitet, denn sie lässt sich durchaus mit einem sinnvollen Portamentostil und sinnlicher Tongebung verbinden." Lorkovic concludes his consideration of applying portamento and vibrato: "die Intervallcharakterisierung sollte sich mit den antitraditionellen Aspekten des Werkes vertragen können und sie nicht vollends desavouieren." (188)

In sum, concerning Lorkovic's contribution and position, his approach propels the spiritual and intellectual orientation of vital and sensual violin playing that Flesch and Rostal established. His concept demonstrates the possibility of widening the frame of free artistic choices available in regard to the application of the player's means while retaining full responsibility towards the original intention corresponding to its entire creative context implanted in the score.

IV:5 THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CRITICS

Basically, the critic focuses on the **actual result** of a performance or the work that appears through it. Thus, he may chose to comment on either the (1) performance itself, (2) its entailed interpretation, or (3) the object of this p or i, namely w or c. The critic only exceptionally has access to the process (at the stage of rehearsal) of an emerging performance that he is supposed to form his judgement on (cf. chapter II:1, Hermerén's distinction process–result–ambiguity).

What, then, does the critic focus and comment on? Primarily, if his comments contain observation through his **focusing attention**, he establishes a subject–object relation that (1) entails the eventuality of reference to the matter of fact of the properties of the performance. This is the (ideal) case of full **convergence** between the judge and the object matter. If (2) the verdict he arrives at contains components of **interpretive interrelation**, interaction and exchange in the encounter **between the critic and his object**, then the p–features of w (p) are evaluated through intersubject–object polarity. And (3) if the critic fails to **reach** (establish contact with) the objective pole in his attempt to encounter the object, then the qualities that he describes would be either entirely subjective or randomly mixed up with intersubjectivity (point 1–3). Secondarily, the process of the critic's act may be intersubjectively founded on coincidence with the audience's reaction. It is important to note that even the



purely subjective variant (3), along with (1) and (2), can be intersubjectively coincident.

The critic's approach is usually to let himself be transported, and even inspired by his direct experience of the concert. This, at least, is the conventional model situation, as thought of by 'common sense' opinion. But more rigorously, the seriously working critic is doing interpretive ia (interpretative i^2a ; theoretical–interpretive Ti or theoretical–interpretative Ti^2) explication (i^2), and is even doing so if the conventional mission is to explicate the w -context for the (presumptive) audience. More rarely the critic attains the level of interpretational criticism (i^3). Occasionally, if time permits and he fulfills his professional call conscientiously, he (1) knows the score in advance before the concert or rehearsal, or on a still higher level (2) he may know various wa s of various origin: e.g. (1) composers' appended work–comments and (2) contextual information made by musicologists or (3) 'homemade' analyses. In crucial cases (1) he has additional access to the w through n , he makes an $i(n)$ or $i(w)$, $i(n(w))$; (2) he can compare his ia or i^2 from the concert with the known wa s; and (3) he may himself be an experienced musician with access to the specific problems of performance of the actual piece. It should be noted, though, that the comparison ia – wa is a **double–directed relation (I:2)**, entailing a high degree of **epistemological insecurity**.

In reference to our short discussion on the critic's five basic modes of interpreting presented in ch. I:2, it may be noted that the model case of the critic's role comprises two different sequences of transmission, between:

(1) C and L, via the (1a) straight route of C– w – ia –L or via one of the two derived bypass–routes, namely (1b) C– w – p – ia –L or (1c) C– w – wa – ia –L according to the figure. These three modes entail multi–interpretive acts: (1a) i^3 , (C– w , w – ia , ia –L), (1b) i^4 , (C– w , w – p , p – ia , ia –L), and (1c) i^4 , (C– w , w – wa , wa – ia , ia –L); and between:

(2) P and L, i.e. the critic explains to the listening audience that reads reviews what, in his interpretation, P (C,R) intends (wants to say, means) by his (their) p (w, wa), or what the p (w , more seldomly wa , or ia) **actually** means to us.



the critic focuses
on listeners'
approach in order
to facilitate
their comprehension

Such a qualified music critic as Joachim Kaiser has presented free characterizations and comparisons in a series of books, essentially based on his published reviews. In a review of Kaiser's *Beethovens 32 Klaviersonaten und ihre Interpreten*¹⁰¹ Egon Voss observes¹⁰² that "für Kaiser liegt der Grund für die Vielfalt der möglichen Interpretationen in den Sonaten selbst, in ihrer 'Grenzenlosigkeit' [...], ihrer künstlerischen Höhe und Grösse." Kaiser states in his introduction: "Sonaten hängen nicht in Museen. Was in den Notenbänden schlummert, sind Vorschriften. Sonaten brauchen Mitarbeit, Partnerschaft. Sie ändern sich in dem Masse, in dem sich die Menschen ändern, die sie spielen oder hören oder lesen. Schon darum gibt es keine ein für allemal gültige, absolut richtige Darstellung Beethovenscher Sonaten. Kein Pianist dieser Welt ist Beethoven ganz gewachsen. Das hängt nicht nur mit den Grenzen unserer Pianisten zusammen, sondern mit der Grenzenlosigkeit der Werke." (34–35) Egon Voss counters with a sociological explanation of the cause of the huge differences in interpretations. On the one hand "das Konkurrenzsystem, in dem wir leben und in dem besonders die Pianisten stehen, zumal jene, die Platten einspielen, zwingt zur Unterscheidung, zur besonderen Note, zur Abweichung vom Gewohnten" (97); but on the other hand, I would argue, communication through the distribution of records and television increase contacts between musicians and multiplies access to (and the L's familiarity with) other interpretations. This fact, though, can have complex results. The increased knowledge enlarges P's (I's, L's) scope of imagination, but simultaneously may risk the standardization of interpretations due to commercial market-directed regimentation and the uniformity of audiences' taste. Hermann Danuser points in his review of Kaiser's book to the exaggerations in description: "Über dem Wortreichtum geht die Genauigkeit in der Wahl der Wörter und Begriffe verloren" (98). Still, the arbitrariness of Kaiser's hermeneutics sometimes catches in poignant formulations what can be profoundly experienced in live performances of a qualified selection of great pianists of our time, and

recollects this by careful listening to recordings¹⁰³. In discussing Kaiser's concept of the relation between notation and interpretation, Egon Voss is sceptical about the significance of the references that Kaiser makes to **structure analyses**: "Wiederholt verweist [Kaiser] bewundernd und erstaunlich bedenkenlos auf Analysen von Schenker oder Réti, die anhand der klingenden Musik allein nie hätten gemacht werden können." (97–98)

Naturally, compositional analysis must be distinguished from interpretational analysis, which has other determinants (MIR II introduction, *pass*; MIR I:223ff), but Voss misses the decisive point of **relating** these two kinds of analysis, which would be fruitful. In a process of repeated reconsideration one can experientially 'test' the validity and coherence of a compositional analysis in the light of a particular interpretation: the **i–a** and **a–i** relations, as well as the **ia–i**, **wa–i**, **ia–wa** and other relations in our scheme (MIR I:20).

Kaiser makes important observations on interpretative details without subjecting his method to any critical scientific test; and he does not present any cogent system of interpretation theory or aesthetics to interrelate and support his observations. Still, he points to many interesting differences, which are presented as alternatives of interpretations, i.e. various relevant views on the work that can be emphasized in view of its central content from various perspectives. His suggestions could even function as creative stimuli for new p-realizations of classical masterpieces. The **plurality** not only of thought (the ontology of which is studied by Kathinka Evers in *Plurality of Thought*)¹⁰⁴ which correspond to "different conceptions of reality" (abstract) and "alternative worldviews" are "equally meaningful alternatives [168] levelled under the aspects of logical possibility", but also plurality of correlative performances completes and enriches our understanding of the complexity of the artwork's reality.

Regarding the question on the form of existence of the musical work, Kaiser arrives, from the wealth of his observations, at the conclusion that the **notation** is not more than a **prescription** for performance: "alle Musik, nicht zum 'Lesen', sondern zum Spielen und Hören bestimmt ist" (Kaiser, 409), and consequently, the interpretation provides the only possible access to the work. Egon Voss attempts, unsuccessfully, to argue against this position: "Dem ist entgegenzuhalten, dass auch und gerade der Notentext eine Existenzform des musikalischen Kunstwerks ist", to which I concede only on logical grounds. But that "differenzierte Stücke wie die Sonaten Beethovens [...] wesentlich [...] durch den Akt des Schreibens [geprägt sind], der die musikalische Reflexion in

erheblichem Masse visuell bestimmt" is partly self-evident as a description of cognitive acts and relations that may be involved in the creative process of composing, but this does not entail any primacy of the visual over the auditive in musical art, as proposed by the following quotation: "Auch teilt sich der Werkcharakter [sic!] der Stücke viel deutlicher im Notentext mit als in der klingenden Ausführung" (Voss 97), which is bluntly false, at least for the ontology of notated music in the Western classical tradition. Voss disregards completely several obvious facts: (1) that the composer intended his work to be auditive appreciated, and (2) that the notation is indetermined or underdetermined. Since the character of the work depends on the selection of one interpretation and the dispatch of the competing versions, unless two interpretations already appear congruent in the reading of the score, the uninterpreted notation would contain contradictory characteristics that cannot be participatively experienced at the same moment by one and the same beholder (if seen by back-projecting from the auditive experience into notation); let it be said, then, that such conflicting characters can be conceived of only theoretically when the work is regarded in abstraction from its intended appearance in a sensuous medium.


Other works by Kaiser deserve notice, though the substance of his comparative reflections on interpretative experiences does not reach the level of such an overall orientation as can be found in his *magnum opus*, the interpretation analyses of Beethoven's piano sonatas ¹⁰⁵.

Further literature on this topic does not essentially contribute to the discussion.¹⁰⁶ The history of music criticism and its sociology have been treated in several works that scarcely touch the decisive theoretical and aesthetic questions of this investigation. See chapter V:5 for additional information.

Finally, I summarize the relational 'world' in this study in its essential outline, details excluded:

researchers' analyses
influence performers'
style, habits, and
aesthetics (e.g. Furtwängler)

composers influence
listeners in their auditory
habits, approaches and
attitudes



listeners influence
composers through their
feedback reactions

performers influence
researchers' analyses
(e.g. Schenker)

V RESEARCH PROCEDURES AND RESULTS

V:1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND DISCUSSION ON METHODS (MIR I–V)

There give an account of earlier published and unpublished research by me that provides the basis for the interpretation theory presented in this thesis.

The (1) **area of research**, (2) **objectives**, and (3) **methods** relating to this project (MIR) were presented under the title of "A Research Project on Musical Interpretation in Performance" (MIP:7–13). It is to that study that I refer for basic information.

A broad explorative investigation was carried out, including (1) **theoretical analyses** and considerations (FME ch. I and IV, MIR I, MIP), (2) **interpretation analyses** (MIR II), (3) **interviews** with musicians and conductors (MIR III), (4) **special ('pilot') studies** of a few interpreters (mainly conductors') working in rehearsals and courses (MIR IV), (5) **music criticism** in practice with a focus on evaluating interpretational quality in performances by artists (MIR V), and, finally, (6) in this volume analysis of **aesthetic criteria** from the perspectives of theoreticians and practical actors in music life with a focus on general and specific problems of interpretation (MIR VI).

(1) The **theoretical studies** are basically phenomenological analyses (Huss. III:1) adopted and applied in an unorthodox way, *mutatis mutandis*, for the purpose of interpretation science. The critical stance of Paul Feyerabend against the priority of method over its object was considered worth paying attention to, in order to avoid the methodological dogmatism and ideological monism that critical scientists have advanced against phenomenologists, and that were associated with immature phenomenology.

(2) The **interpretation analyses** focus on the relation between the realization of musical sound and the implications of the notational model; or sometimes they go in the opposite direction from a w/c-analysis to its implications for mip, irrespective of existing realizations; finally, the process of rehearsal is studied through focusing on the problems occurring in the rehearsal situation, in light of possible concepts and goals.

(3) An **interview questionnaire** with general and specific questions to conductors, pianists and musicians was formulated and distributed to the participants in the study. Some subjects permitted more profound discussions over several meetings, others preferred to present their own concepts, separate

from the questionnaire. In such cases the interview had the character of a **depth interview**, on the basis of a dialogic technique discussed in psychoanalytic theory (Lesche 1976, who acted as adviser). This method was earlier studied by me (1988). Tape-recording of interview sessions was not always permitted. Therefore the recorded documentation covers the project irregularly and incompletely; but together with notes that were taken, and the interactionary working method, the collected material provides a sufficient basis for the problems that were posed.

(4) In a few cases mainly conductors, but also pianists and other instrumentalists, were closely studied during courses and rehearsals, and the research included interviews, discussions and analyses of their working methods and interpretive concepts. The situation where a conductor or teacher at a course in interpretation **corrects** his musicians or students is a source of knowledge about relevant criteria for the interpreter in question. However, such corrections must always be put into relation to the sounding result. Otherwise, the instructions given have value only as information on intentional content related to the specific part of the music being rehearsed.

(5) The practical situation of writing music criticism, especially that of debut concerts by young skilled musicians, as well as of experienced guest artists, particularly in the concert halls of Stockholm (Konserthuset, Berwaldhallen), offered the opportunity to acquire important personal experience of the specific setting in music life, as did also my own lectures given to young students at four schools of music in this city (Stockholms Universitet, Musikhögskolan, Edsbergs Musikskola, Nordiskt Musikkonservatorium). Intimate knowledge of the subject of this thesis acquired by my own musicianship should not be underestimated, despite its modest extent.

(6) A close reading and analysis of the treatment of aesthetic criteria in the aesthetic and musicological literature was initiated as early as the beginning of the 1970's (FME:59–61) and it is now completed by the present investigation.

This chapter (V) focuses on points 2 through 5 above, while in addition 1 was treated along with the presentation of the theory (ch. I:2), and 6 is summarized in the course of chapters II, III, IV and VI.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS (MIR I AND RELATED WORKS)

Obviously, **interpretation theory** (as in MIR I) and **interpretation analysis** (as in MIR II) are two central fields of interpretation research, the principal and final

aim of which is to create a cognitive foundation for the artistic performance of music, to achieve deeper insight and to enrich the listener's experience.

MIR I is a **metatheoretical** and phenomenological analysis of the basic artistic structures in musical interpretation and gestalting, including the basic means of expression at the disposal of the performer and the interpreter's various acts of consciousness, as involved in the process of interpretation. Ideas drawn from practical discussion in rehearsals and from theoretical reflection are presented with a view to renewing and deepening the art of interpretation, and the understanding of its foundations. The book concludes with a presentation of a "central theory of interpretation" (364) based on studies of fundamental interpretative phenomena, and the draft for a terminology of interpretation analysis is presented.

MIR II contains some of the concrete analyses and exemplifications underlying the development of interpretation theory in MIR I. Various types of musical interpretation and analysis in the broad sense have been grouped in three main chapters: (1) interpretation analysis of a sounding model – comparing different interpretations (gramophone records and tape-recordings); (2) 'interpretational' concepts – the interpreter's preparatory analysis of the composition prior to practical rehearsal, with the aim of realizing definite artistic intentions and ideas of the work; and (3) reports and analyses of interpretation experiments.

The central thesis that I initially advanced proposes that musical performance necessarily involves moments of both interpretation and recreative construction. Every musical composition contained within the model case allows the interpreter a frame within which to realize it. His interpretation is determined by the artistic standpoints he adopts in relation to prevailing aesthetic norms and also by the thought and conceptual pattern of his musical consciousness.

By "extrapolating" the "allusions" made in the original material (the score, etc.), an aesthetic framework can be established which defines rational (and aesthetically desired) types of interpretation. The composition permits attempts at historically authentic reconstruction and also an aesthetically based interpretation, to mention two opposing approaches.

The **direction**, **inherent consistency** and **depth** of the interpretation are examples of vital phenomenological criteria, the description of which is conditional to the listener's sympathetic understanding. Complete, openly accepted participation – being present in the flow of the music – is the starting

point of an intersubjectively valid interpretation analysis. The textures of sound are referable both to a human awareness of the relational system in which the performer is included and within which musical images are capable of being realized.

MIR I presents the beginning of our interpretation theory in six chapters, starting with a panorama of the metascientific premises of musical interpretation and interpretation research. The aim is to conduct a preliminary theoretical investigation of the most important general, aesthetic and theoretical problems connected with mip. Heuristically, I hope to have provided an **orientational map** for practical musical performance and for the selection of aesthetical positions. I develop, by means of an in-depth analysis of basic interpretative phenomena, studies of the individual expressive means of interpretation, the metainterpretative premises and acts of the interpretative process, and a nomenclature of musical interpretation and interpretation analysis, ranging from the micro level of audibility and hearing to the overall character of performance.

The principal fields of interpretation research are outlined, an attempt being made to achieve an overview of the essential tasks, functions and limits of research, teaching and practical interpretation. Close relationships are described between interpretation as a research topic and artistic ideas on the explication and gestalting of musical scores. It is established that 'musical criticism' as a criticism of interpretation is founded upon methods of interpretation analysis and grounded in metainterpretative premises.

The *a priori* standpoints which the musician can adopt in relation to the musical text provide the starting point of our argument, our main question concerning the way in which the musical composition is cognitively and auditively realised. But the *a priori* interpretative perspectives also provide a framework both for the listener's awareness and for the critic's assessments of musical interpretation. A selected standpoint will logically require sequencing decisions that finally form coherent sets of positions.

The hypothetical answers to the question concerning the fundamentally possible and plausible definitions of 'musical interpretation' lead to a series of nuclear definitions of our main concept which cover the resulting analyses of statements made by the interpreters consulted (MIRI:3.2) to the extent that their

theories received empirical support on decisive points.

The possible roles of the composer and listener in relation to the interpreter are described, together with musical consequences of the interpreter's musical standpoints.

Rehearsal methods are illuminated through research and closer studies of basic interpretative phenomena, the aim being to achieve a higher level of interpretative awareness; this development proceeds by way of heuristic analysis to intuitive synthesis.

Explicitly formulated criteria of continuity, consistency, logicity, balance and other basic interpretative phenomena are formulated through the various eyes of the critic, the soloist and the conductor. The musician may 'harvest' distinctions and descriptions, and provide his open musical awareness with more accurate instruments with which to structure, develop and control performance. The listening method that I adopt hints at a new listener attitude far from the indiscriminating consumption of music: a 'differentiated sensibility' on an *a priori* basis leading to an increasing preparedness and knowledge concerning what we can observe as listeners, though uninhibited by emancipating theory.

MIR I programmatically sets out to indicate the possibility of higher artistic and cultural awareness as a basis of musical interpretation: repeated attempts to define musicality in this context point in the direction of a multi-dimensional, all-embracing, well-structured consciousness with an illuminated relation to nature and the fundamental phenomena of interpretation. An *a priori* multiperspective overview of this kind imparts a balanced view on complementary 'natural' tendencies and confers a direct understanding of the structure of priorities and arguments; the alternatives which appear can be mastered analytically in the aware and self-evident manner revealed by the intuitive synthesis of the senses.

This awareness and its corresponding practical proficiency are deeply rooted in human nature, but first of all the feeling for the phenomenal abundance of natural tendencies (which can be demonstrated by the analogy of topicality) and perspectives has to be brought to life. The inevitability of realizing in the now makes historical pseudo-authenticity an insufficient basis for an interpretation which just as inevitably occurs in (and involves persons living primarily in) the present.

The various strata of interpretative acts – from the decoding of the score to the most profound interpretation of meaning – influence one another in both

directions: "straight" reading provides the factual foundation underlying musical understanding; at the same time reading is guided by the apprehension of musical meaning which is drawn towards definite points of attraction, via gestalt-grasping, which guides the attention. This 'dialogue' between music and consciousness, however, actualizes latent musical concepts *a priori* (MIR I:3.1).

The musician, therefore, must bring out the music as a reflection of human expression in relation to and against the background of natural harmony. **Human will** constitutes fluctuations on the surface of natural appearances on biological grounds, which imposes limits on our bodily activities; man's music is permeated by the same life-sustaining principles as nature itself. With this approach as a meta-interpretative premise, musical interpretation and articulation must ultimately be based on a sensory relationship between human consciousness and the laws of physical nature (so defined as to include acoustical phenomena); any other foundation denies obvious facts and can therefore be regarded as a false construction. Closing the circle between these two primary sources of music will serve to open channels of understanding of such qualities as profound musical interpretation and genuine *mip*.

The interpreter places himself in a two-directional stream of consciousness, obtaining a **dialectic between natural phenomena and volitional intention**. Not only a perceptive alertness towards external stimuli is required; the interpreter also directs his mind inwardly and opens it to internal forces by allowing the natural interchange between analytical and synthetic phases of the acts of interpretation and rehearsal to proceed. In this encounter the music appears as emitting a stream of intelligible signals to musical awareness, a living flow of signals that open up interfaces with man's musical mind for optional assimilation.

The artist's creativity – just as much as his non-artistic creativity – is thus dependent on 'living space' for intention and action as conferred within the framework of natural tendencies. The field of musical tension between the inherently human versus the natural realm in which the interpretative act takes place gives rise to an inevitable 'compass-needle' orientation in any audible or notional interpretation. There are three alternatives: interpretation as direction and movement **from 'man' to 'nature'** in the above senses; the reverse – interpretation as direction and movement **from the natural to the human world of phenomena**; and thirdly, a balanced exchange between a transcending **synthesis** of the two directions and its relevant perspectives (thought of as full

of tension in itself), and which appears as holistically poised aspects between the dialectic contraries of natural force and human tendencies, including those of man's consciousness. Basically the internal tension between the interpreter's imaginative capacity and his actionary capacity has no known correspondence in nature, but is mentioned since the gap between the two is mediated or bridged to an equivalent degree at the moment of implementation.

Music, as an experiential index to man's musical mind (in Celibidache's sense), then occurs when we achieve contact with the pole opposing that from which our interpretation has emanated.

Every single interpretation, and research about the same, moves within the four-point ambience of **now–here–then–there**: interpretation is the meeting point of the **inward** and **outward** intentional horizon, between here and there as regards **spatial** conception and spatial experience, between now and then as regards the **temporal** aspect and time experience.

One implication of this can be found in the case of the musician, who in order to achieve the required level of artistic dignity, must or should be aware of his interpretative premises in order to meet the corresponding prime conditions of **continuity**, **consistency** and **integrating** power in performance. The interpretative premises adopted by the interpreter from his standpoints decide the alternatives appearing to him and thus available for textural realization.

Technicalities – vocal, manual and instrumental – must be focused in order to support a superior orientation of individual interpretation; failing this, the interpretation will present deficiencies of **identity**, **logicality** and **inward coherence**.

To some extent no theory is gray, but it never imparts the whole truth. Feyerabend even suggested that all theory is a reduction from a richer reality (*Scientific American*, May 1993: 16–17). Theories of musical interpretation are always applicable in practical performance and can provide the artistic foundations of a living *mip*. And what falls outside the limits of realizability will be rejected by the test of practice. However, technical standards do not remain constant and can provide no secure empirical measure. Moreover, meta-interpretive theories may be **generative** or **intentional**, whereas *i*–theories can be concretely **prescriptive** or **directive** provided the rules of implementation are substantiated. The main idea, though, is that *at*–oneness and agreement between the musician's idea, composition analysis and intuitive synthesis (in Husserl's sense) may merge, reflect, and then become based on more profound strata of musical structure coinciding with interpretative acts adequate for the

purpose.

The internal structure of each individual interpretation, as of any verbally formulated concept of interpretation, can be descriptively defined with the aid of a four-part system comprising a network of relations between the **composition** (c, alt. wa), its **composition-analysis** (ca, alt. wa), the actual **interpretation** (which, accordingly, is not *a priori* a composition interpretation in the emphatic sense) and its **interpretation analysis** (MIRI:2.2): Obviously, the object of i can be primarily w, wa, c, ca or pa.

For every performance the musician, or conductor, makes a new choice of **position** and constitutes the pertinent relations within this four-part system, the result of which is manifested in performance through the way in which w is interpreted. The choice is made either *in mediis rebus*, or beforehand, i.e. preparatorily. As rehearsal proceeds, an individual interpretative structure may take shape within the system. Except the fundamental relation w-i, which is basically constitutive of the interpretational situation, all other relations, approaches, perspectives and ways of access to the w are liable to individual variation; interpretation obviously achieves its point of balance where it is fully consistent with the composition. Balance is apparent to us solely through manifest compatibility (1) between the interpretation analysis of the composition and the interpretation itself (ia-i), (2) between the analysis of the composition and the composition itself (wa-w, or ca-c), and (3) between the interpretation analysis and the analysis of the composition (ia-wa or ia-ca). Only when this is manifestly the case, i.e. these conditions are fulfilled, are the options of access completely taken into consideration, i.e. when used in the balancing of the decisive components of the mip; then the i should attain its full groundedness in the music: the system is balanced and we achieve in the 'ideal' case a sort of identity between composition and interpretation. The two remaining theoretical possibilities are: (1) the interpretation does not fully realize the relations which are fully based on the system (the analysis then is **overbased**) and (2) the concrete realization does not attain the objectives which the musician has set for himself in contemplating and rehearsing the composition, so that, conversely, the performance **overshoots** the mark, realizing a textural design (interpretation) which is not fully based on or justified by the system relations achieved. Conclusion: a composition analysis (ca) together with an interpretation analysis (ia) prior to a performance shows – insofar as and provided that the analyses are feasible – whether the interpretation is wellfounded or redundant. The **depth**, i.e. the richness of structural ramification and interconnectedness, the degree of

s–integration and the interrelatedness (the broadness of intercontextual bases) in which the interpretation is rooted in the composition are thus important criteria. Another prerequisite of this method of appraisal is **reciprocity** between composition and composition analysis: the composition must be referable back to the composition analysis and vice versa; much the same applies to interpretation versus interpretation analysis (MIR I:2.2).

Yet another system of determination is the tripartite relation between **composition, interpretation and listening**. The central relationship is that between the composition and its interpretation – the relationship which ultimately decides whether the interpretation is a rendering of the composition (work) in question, or just an interpretation of anything other than that work; next there is the **internal** relationship between an individual interpretation and, accordingly, the various textural strata and chronological phases of the realization; and, finally, there is the relationship between interpretation and listener. The interpreters' standpoints which are located within the system's field of tension – within the adequacy area – and which thus have their counterparts in the corresponding dimensions of the other constituents in the system, are orientations within the tripartite field: **composition-oriented, interpreter-oriented or listener-oriented** interpretation (MIR I:2.2). The various strata of subordinate meanings can be related to metainterpretative priority structures, which in turn are alternatively composition-centred, interpreter-centered or listener-centered (C, I or L centeredness and their due perspectives)

The process of interpretation – what actually goes on behind the textural facade of realization – comprises phases of (1) **experience**, (2) **reception (assimilation)** and (3) **reproduction**. The experiential phase consists of **perceptive** and **'conceptional'** acts, the latter creating notions that correspond to experiences or images as means for comprehensive notions, reflections and the experiencing of emotive qualities: first the reading and conceptualization of the score, and then conviction concerning the constitution of the composition. The **reproductive** phase comprises the realization and the indicative (or, at best, more strongly: controlling) **auditive presentation** (MIR I:2.3); after perception a secondary conceptualizing might occur, namely the creating of notions (such as i^2 and i^3) on the basis of the experience generated by mip.

In the act of interpretation we can discern elements of both input and output (MIR I:2.4), which is a useful model not bound to NS only.

We discover various patterns of **interaction** and ensemble structures which can be refined in graphic models for the purpose of interpretation

analysis or instruction (MIR I:2:11).

Three general levels of musical interpretation are defined with their accompanying criteria: execution (e), gestalting (g; including articulation) and interpretation (i; MIR I:2.15).

The analyses, both apriorical and empirical, point at two main groups of connecting forces between the sequence of parts in a performance. It seems justified to preliminarily designate them "the **linear theory**" and "the **structural theory**" (MIR I:163, emphasis here), respectively, of musical gestalting. According to the former, gestalting can be derived from a topographical process of tension, while the latter refers gestalting back to interrelative networks within a multidimensional structure. I will expand briefly on this issue; the **linear theory** of mip presupposes (1) that p(i) is a more or less parallel and **transparent i-topography** of development that lets its fundamental w/c-topography through or, in cases of limited transparency, filters it; simultaneously the w/c-topography supports the p(i)-topography, and (2) that the process (procedure) of i corresponds to **derivation** from $T_0 = w/c \text{ to } t_1 = p(i)$, where T_0 entails the assumption of a linear unity. The reverse process (procedure), where the p(i)-topography (i.e. the evolving p-sound shapes) follows (and results from) the w/c-topography step by step, thus creating with time flux a unity of linear shape without any overriding assumption of linearity encompassing the whole piece, seems possible. This, then would be an interpretatively undirected momentary gestalting of the 'empirical' kind. Whether the performance achieves unity or not is left to the w/c conditions and their more random chances of penetrating through into p-manifestation. The **structural theory** of mip presupposes: (1) that the resulting p(i) is an **integration** of all indications and hypotheses (t_1, t_2, t_3 etc) about the interrelations in the w(c); and (2) that the process (procedure) of i corresponds to an integration of t_1, t_2, t_3 (etc) into T_0 as representative of overarching **interpreted structure manifested in performance**. It is a matter of discussion whether one-to-one derivation from T_0 to t_1 on some principal level is required in order to allow realization of the assumed 'structurality' of w/c in p(i). In addition, the aforementioned **form theory** of mip (MIR I:164–165, 273f) presupposes (1) that the p(i) is (appears as) an **integral part** of the assumed whole (w,c) of the piece (MIR I:85) as a form (structure), viewed as abstracted from the time flux; and (2) that the process (procedure) of i corresponds to a nontemporal integration of compositional form-parts into an assumed wholeness of the w/c-structure ready for instant realization without interpretative modification. However, the assumption regarding unity of form which refers

to **compositional structure**, seems to require a one-to-one derivation of this overarching postulation of principal w/c-form-unity from T_0 to t_1 , since it is most unlikely that an interpreter would arrive at this view randomly from studying merely disconnected parts of the w/c.

Of course, the topic of the **three basic kinds of interpretative inference** namely (1) **derivation** (DERIV: $i_1 \rightarrow i_2, i_3$), (2) **integration** (INTEGR: $i_1, i_2, i_3 \rightarrow i_4$), and (3) **implication** (IMPLIC: $i_1 \rightarrow i_2$) can be analyzed under the aspect of (A) **plenitude**, defining the number involved parties (O and S) in the interpretive relation (namely (1) many-to-many, (2) many-to-one, (3) one-to-many, and (4) one-to-one) or under the aspect of (B) the **kind of logical connection** (i.e. (1) induction (INDUC), (2) indication (INDIC), (3) implication (IMPLIC), (4) integration (INTEGR), (5) derivation (DERIV), and (6) deduction (DEDUCT)) following a suggested scale of increasing **musicological stringency of interpretative** (i^2) and **interpretational** (i^3) **conclusion**.

'Natural', i.e. **phenomenological, tendencies** (in Celibidache's sense), are described between **tempo and character**, and similarly between **articulation and dynamics** (2.24), as well as between **tension and flow** and other paired concepts. Various strata of interpretative **sonority** are distinguished. Different types of **accent** (2.27) are presented: the three important types are **initial** accent, **medial** accent and **final** accent. Other means of expression in musical interpretation are analysed, viz. rubato, legato, vibrato, cantabile and espressivo (2.28–2.32).

A **formula language for relations** between different factors determining articulation is outlined for the purpose of developing methods of interpretation analysis (2.33).

Phenomenal listening reveals different **preferential tendencies** in favor of interpretative microstructures (2.34). Function and meaning in connection with distantal, directional, motional and positional phenomena of the conductor's gesticulatory patterns are briefly sketched (2.39).

The **metainterpretative levels** of the interpretation process, the interaction between different strata of awareness in musical performance, are studied, as are the interpretational concepts of interpretation research. Emphasis is placed on the value of the philosophical foundations for this type of work (3.1). The possibility is hinted at of basing **interpretative metasystems** on (1) phenomenology, (2) hermeneutics and (3) musical structuralism.

The meaning and submeaning of our main concept, interpretation, is described in a series of explanantions of its essential import. Eight basic ideas are

mentioned, viz. interpretation (1) as reproduction, (2) as realisation, (3) as human impress, (4) as bringing the notation to life, (5) as analysis presentation, (6) as gestalting, (7) as artistry and (8) as recreation.

These nuclear meanings of interpretation occupy different positions and have different orientations in a meaningful continuum which, to varying degrees, actualizes its various four-part constituents: **activity–passivity–objectivity–subjectivity**. We find here two mutually supplementary **metainterpretative systems**: a deepening enunciation of meaning broadens the alternatives in a direction outwards from the central sphere of the four-part constituents, and; a deepening enunciation of meaning concentrates the alternatives round a point, inwardly from the four-part sphere (MIR I:3.2).

Modes of consciousness of relevance to musical interpretation are analysed: **receptive** modes are listening and reading; **emittive** modes are playing, singing and correcting; **neutral** modes are conceptualizing (imagining) and correcting the image (3.3).

Thirteen different sequences of **modes of musical consciousness** are presented and built up from the single cell of playing via composite operations of the consciousness – e.g. **reading – playing – listening – conceptualizing** (the initial act) – to advanced **elisions** of reading and correcting in connection with artistically mature performance (3.3).

A wide sequence of theoretical fragments have been collected (for the purpose of promoting future research) under the heading of ideas for research, interpretation and analysis. Various problems of interpretation and interpretation research are dealt with in 195 paragraphs; a study is made of interpretation analysis and aesthetically based criticism from the viewpoint of the interpreter. Criteria are presented for the assessment of interpretation, patterns of articulation and interpretative profiles (MIR I:4).

Tonal continuity and certain basic phenomena such as the **cohesive or separative effects of articulation and dynamics** in various motif-like combinations are studied in somewhat greater detail (4.3.94 etc).

Fundamental questions of musical interpretation are presented in the form of a discourse on ideas surrounding our main concepts – namely various overriding ideals, interpretations and approaches, including the way in which they are understood by some of the musicians interviewed: the conductor Paul Sacher, representing the conscientious search for a composer-authentic interpretation, the conductor Antal Dorati as representing more of a free artistic interpretation, and the violinist Isaac Stern, on the basis of a number of his

explicit guiding ideals ("idea", "listening", "harmony"), Gottfrid Boon as the systematically listening and sensing pianist, and others (I:5). These interviews are excerpts from a more exhaustive body of documentation (MIR III).

Introductory consideration is given to questions of liberty, character, creativity, tradition, composition technique, meaning and emotion, not reading, visual, gesticulatory and kinetic factors, and the roles of the interpreter, composer and listener—all concepts connected to the performance of music. Chronological phenomena are analysed, viz. attentiveness, expectation and action, on the basis of instant experience during an ongoing passage of time involving relations to both what is to come and what is past, and proved, with coming into being, approaching and disappearing, as phenomena with which it is important the interpreter be familiar.

Introductory consideration is given to problems connected with **interaction** and ensemble coordination and more generally the art of playing together—the means and methods whereby interpretation and rehearsal can achieve maximal integration not only of time structures and precise entrance moments, but of all sound-constituting parameters into the 'last' outcome manifested in orchestral timbre.

Finally, we develop and condense our analytical findings in a central theory of musical interpretation in which the most important performance-related basic musical phenomena are presented under separate headings, while others are given only a brief mention in the broader synthesis attempted in the introduction (6.1).

Obviously, every musician's performance can be defined in terms of phenomenal **identity** and **character**. **Tension** and **continuity** as well as **flow** and **resistance** are experienced and immediately understood as pairs of two-directional tendencies, conditions for the attainment of the level of gestalting and interpretation (MIR I:47) or as criteria in other situations of analysis and assessment. These **basic phenomena** (MIR I: ch. 6)—together, for example, with **activity** versus **gravity** as well as **transparency**, **consistency** and '**relatedness**'—make up the background of **naturally dictated tendencies** by which the musician and the human being enters into a dialogue through his enunciation and articulation (gestalting): we play and sing in an unbreakable relationship with these natural forces, to the extent that our awareness, sensitivity and intelligence in the encounter with these forces make us aware of their existence. The basic interpretative phenomena are summarised in 45 paragraphs analyzing the conditions governing their occurrence, origins and impact, limits and

character, and their relations – co-operational conflict – with their sister phenomena.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE DISCUSSION ON MIR I AND II

In addition to the argumentation given in my official replies I will argue as follows. The method of studying *mip* requires a rare combination of and alternation between detachment and empathy. As we have seen (ch. II:1) more than just music needs to be interpreted since words can also be understood in many different ways, in keeping with many of the categories of interpretation applying to music.

The closely packed texts of interpretation theory (in particular *MIR I*) in the expansive developmental phase of research demand profound **musical** familiarity, musical experience and above all open-mindedness on the part of the reader. Understanding is to a great extent dependent on the response and the depth of personal musical acquaintance and recognition of auditive "images" aroused by the words, and on sensitivity towards and amenability of one's own experience. If the dimension of depth in living experience has a crucial bearing on the resonance imparted by the study of the interpreted texts, the same must be true of the musician when confronted by the text of the musical composition – what else can the musician refer to during his reading? What experience exists to form the foundations of interpretation, and what is the depth against the background of which the composition takes shape – forms a relief – in the conscious mind of the musician? There is no escaping the fact that the interpreter, just like the reader, fixes the height of his own horizon of understanding through his approach, experience, open-mindedness and ability of partition off the subjective delimitation from the w. This is implied by the existential thesis presented in *MIR I*:86.

Interpretation research is neither fantasy nor cerebral construction; it presents insights which naturally occur when a certain familiarity, or rather maturity, has been achieved in dealing with the musical material. It takes an immense capacity for response in order to arrive at these conclusions, together with a willingness to relate constantly to one's own collected repertoire of musical experience; this requires a fundamental belief in the truth and value of one's own experience as a reliable point of reference and an assurance that these insights are indelibly engraved in the memory. In this way they can be revived in the process of reading, which at best will be a continuous sequence of heuristic

experiences, an attitude tempered by a very free and relaxed feeling of being prepared casually to acquire a heightened awareness only by way of preparation for further music-making and -listening of one's own: the inclination for "*gnoti seawton*", the faculty of self-awareness, will greatly increase competence. The assimilation of the material definitely comes before the actively penetrating interpretative study.

It is the reader's own task to build up his musical familiarity and experience. Nothing can substitute for genuine musical experience through audition. Possibly a part of the difficulty is that our musical life and practice do not correspond to the thoroughly conscious elucidation which interpretation research ultimately confers upon us: in this sense, interpretation research is just as much vision as reality and wishes to be so. It has its social responsibility and pedagogic commitment. The versions of well-known compositions which have not yet been heard are no worse for not having been realized. Rather, we wish to transmit impulses to a future which will interest itself in a higher artistic awareness in connection with musical articulation, i.e. musical formation and soundshaping. At the same time we present categories and concepts based on more sensitive and subtle listening to nuances than is normally expected in ordinary music education and concert activities. The aim is more than to increase knowledge – if this approach is profound and real, its practical application will develop musical cognition and differentiate between the various kinds of musical sensitivity. The leading ideal corresponds to decisive requirements on aesthetic and artistic quality; both interpretation and interpretation research would otherwise be pointless: both art and research must have their guiding stars.

There is no pedagogical compromise conceded to in MIR I. Research in a pioneering phase must above all seek out truth, without any distractions. The teaching situation, which is conducive to understanding and is unique on each individual occasion in which we meet and eventually proceed through experiential coincidence in the same direction – guiding one another in an articulated tonal landscape of virtually infinite abundance – liberates and reveals fields of experience which are closed to us and concealed from us: the very admission that there is much which cannot be grasped at our present stage of maturity opens the way to new insights. Through disbelief we can only stifle the spontaneous intuitive musicality within us; where words fail to elicit response, communication is dead.

The MIR texts address themselves to all available and open minds with a

lively and living, a suggestible and sensitive presentation. They must be read with reflection and faith in the personal musicality to which the reader constantly refers. Quite obviously, texts dealing with a different medium – musical sound – are liable to be misunderstood since they are by definition intermedial; matters as subtle and elusive as experiences of musical gestalting can only be put down in writing with great difficulty. Moreover, the concepts of language and logic are likely to be insufficient to describe the phenomena referred to, and new conceptual formations, metaphors and similes from other fields of experience, must therefore be accepted as normal implements in research of this kind. The aim of getting as near as possible to the heart of things has precedence over pedagogical, sociological and stylistic arguments.

It is the auditive world of experience, evoked by realised, feasible and visionary articulations, with which we are concerned. This involves an antithesis: inevitably, we express ourselves within the syntactic limits of a language, and we are thrown back by the commonly accepted meanings of words. And yet these limits correspond remarkably poorly to our need for accurate tools of subtle description of all nuances. Sound in music is capable of evoking experiences which are indescribable in concrete terms and bid fair to break the bounds of logic and language. In this conflict between words and notes, we must side with music; it is only with unreserved dedication that we can open up the whole of our experiential sphere to musical art, as indeed it rightly demands.

Thus it would be reasonable to argue for the following postulate: only poetry could, as a counterpart to music, do the latter justice through the suggestive associations it is capable of evoking. But I am not seeking counterparts; my goal is music itself and a precise analysis of its being in auditive articulated form.

V:2 INTERPRETATION ANALYSIS

This chapter mainly refers to (1) my contribution to musical interpretation analysis, published mainly in MIR II, but partly also in MIR I and, for the convenience of those who do not read Swedish, in MIP; and to (2) the unpublished documentations within the same project, MIR III–V, listed in APPENDIX (ch. VII). I will shortly describe the methods, the procedure of carrying out these investigations, and their results. The overriding goal was to find evidence by exploring decisive criteria of interpretative qualities and

corresponding intentional ideas by means of comparative discographic analysis (MIR II), interviews with musicians (mainly conductors, pianists and a few violinists, MIR III), more profound pilot studies of a few indisputably highly recognized master–interpreters (sc. conductors, in particular Sergiu Celibidache; MIR IV), and an inventory of the problems through practicing interpretation analysis in the role of a music critic (MIR V; main part translated into English from published articles in *Svenska Dagbladet* 1977–80). The general aim was to broadly illustrate present–day aesthetic and artistic problems of mip, but also to enter into detailed analysis on certain items and strategic points. The choice of repertoire was governed by the interest in illustrating problems bearing on the construction of a general theory of musical interpretation, which must have its point of departure in evidential support from certain aesthetic criteria that can unanimously be regarded as relevant. For details, I refer to both published and unpublished documents.

Methods, Performance and Results of an Investigation Regarding Interpretative Criteria (Summarizing/Synoptic Comments on MIR II): three **methods** of analysis were applied:

(1) **comparative** interpretation analysis where details of the shaping of sound in their respective context are described as heard in repeated unfocused and focused listening; the aim is to encapsulate the essential traits of each individual interpretation, and to scrutinize the detailed realization of selected points in the score by comparing different recordings. The music examples (e.g. from 9 recordings of Mozart's "*Linz*" Symphony; MIR II:85) were cut from the tape, and the corresponding units of a few bars each cut out, separated from its source and juxtaposed for immediate comparison with the other interpreter's versions of the same segments.

(2) analysis from **work analysis** to interpretation. This was not carried through full conventional composition analysis, but from the very beginning I focused on those aspects that evidently were relevant in arriving at interpretational decision–making. To some extent these analyses are **generative** in the sense that they focus on aspects that can directly guide or govern the shaping process in performance. Avowedly these analyses are based upon certain aesthetic ideals that I try to expose as explicitly as possible. These analyses are not normative, i.e. they do not exclude other analytical results, not even those contrary to mine, since they include an overtly selected orientation of the interpretive process. Contrary results can be accounted for within a rule

system on a superior level, which is the suggested way of solving interpretative disputes (MIR II:238 and MIP:47).

(3) the interpretation can be disclosed as an illuminating procedure by following **rehearsal processes**. The researcher has to prepare himself carefully by studying the score and by listening to other live or recorded interpretations to have attained a wide range of imagined alternatives related to the compositional determinants. By relating directives given by the conductor (leader of the ensemble, teacher) to the actually realized sound in the ever-continuing process of perfecting the soundshape of the intended rendering, the decisive criteria are exposed (MIR II:362 etc; particularly MIR IV *passim*). The methodological questions are presented in MIR II:179–188, sc. 183 and 332–335.

MAIN RESULTS AND CRITERIA DRAWN FROM INTERPRETATION ANALYSES (MIR II)

I will present the distinctive features that appeared from the comparisons as the most important and recurring phenomenal qualities varying from one interpretation to another. It goes without saying that the *i*-phenomena_{exp} primordially fall into decisional categories to the extent that they are subject to the interpreters' (I:s', P:s') conscious consideration.

First, and phenomenologically, there are two **categories of experienced differences: degree and quality**.

Secondly, from the presented single tone, over two either successive or simultaneous tones gradually expanded to a full orchestral setting in an evolving elaborated form, the registered qualities increase in **number and complexity**, and the **attention focuses** on some qualities of single or dual tones that apparently disappear in **undirected attention** to the complex texture of an orchestral tone flow, e.g. timbre in a simple structure is substituted for by ensemble homogeneity in complex webs of sound, unless conscious focusing directs attention towards timbre in ensemble sound. I am claiming no determined causal relationships between **means of interpretation**, such as agogics, and simple and undirected **interpretational qualities**. It is often difficult to distinguish **general musical qualities**, such as compositional phenomena, from **specific interpretational qualities**. This distinction is made possible through (1) cognitive considerations, (2) empirical experience, and (3) comparative interpretation analyses. The qualities that can be applied as **criteria under certain conditions** (which are not specified here; they belong to a

generative interpretation research), are related, grouped, and sometimes the concepts overlap with reference to their corresponding experiences. Some of these interrelations between interpretational qualities and criteria are briefly touched upon in more general terms in JMR 1984:93–129 (MIP:15–46), but these are a complex subject of research that cannot be clarified in this investigation. The perceptual dialogue and debate on the phenomenology of music cannot be finally settled here; it must in its very fundamental traits be assumed to be known and established until proven false, since (1) it provides an explanation and furnishes an understanding of the process of interpretation, and (2) no other 'system' could be found that allows for such an elaborate and sensitive method of faithful description and analysis of genuine experience in the arts. I list the qualities appearing already in the simple structure, possibly for even a

(A) single tone, unfocused listening: (1) identity (MIR I:12), (2) extension (I:265–66, 278, 309–363, 170; II:423), (3) substance, (4) tension/energy, (5) dynamics, (6) activity, (7) character (315), (8) timbre, (9) transparency (II:10, 96, 276); and those appearing where some relational structure is involved, i.e. in principle for

(B) duple-tone occurrences and more complex musical objects. Naturally, undirected focusing concentrates on the processual more than the static individual tone. A group of qualities arises around (10) referentiality (II:12), (11) relation/relatedness, (12) direction/projectivity/orientation (14), other "grouping phenomena" (23) around (13) transition, (14) closeness/connection (123, "Anschluss"-quality), (15) conjunctivity, (16) disjunctivity and (17) interpunction, and, those related to the more structural aspect, e.g. (18) identity contra difference (see A 1 above; this appears on several levels), (19) continuity (240), for larger entities structural (20) conjunction versus (21) disjunction (see 15 and 16 above for tone "dyads", which in contrast refer to emerging simple-structure phenomena), (22) congruency and (23) incongruency; (24) successivity versus (25) simultaneity; a group of phenomena related to (26) rhythm-pulse-meter, another group oriented towards (27) emphasis-stress phenomena; a series of cognitive phenomena occur in the experience of listening, where the (28) focusing and (29) alternateness of focusing themselves become subjects of awareness. It is exactly the option for experiential complexity provided by *i*, or the adding to it of a sensual quality in (and 'of') *p(i)*, that attracts the listener's interest.

I will refrain from systematically expanding the scope of these qualities by accounting for each category, such as the logically successiv triple-structure-

entity, quadruple–structure–entity etc. In a "full" ensemble or orchestral setting, even in a string quartet or in piano music, the "repertoire" of qualities increases exponentially with relational complexity, and its integrated phenomena grow immensely more subtle; and the enrichment of structural constellations is made even more complex by correspondingly subjective combinations on the part of the prevailing patterns of focusing by the listener.

In a complex soundshape, it is possible to get impressed alternatively by e.g. sound colour qualities or intricacy of tone–texture; toneweb or toneflow are also aspects of the integral sonority that can be facultatively focused, due to differences in auditive and cognitive priority, i.e., phenomenologically, individual patterns of consciousness intentionality, or, psychologically, attention–directedness.

Some recurring complex qualities / phenomena referred to in MIR II are: (30) interaction / interplay, (31) linearity (27), (32) spatiality, (33) homogeneity – (34), as opposed to (34) heterogeneity (56) – (35) contrast (20, 227), (36) cohesiveness / cohesion (110, 199, 281), (37) complementarity / supplementarity (15; in form–relatedness), (38) treble– ('*discantus*') versus bass–orientation (98), and (39) compression (269) which is already a highly complex phenomenon. Also, (40) tonality phenomena may constitute an important set of interpretational qualities, since interval–marking (in particular the "driving" of thirds) illuminates chord progression and thus clarifies tonality. Other categories of complex phenomena observed that would be candidates for separate conceptualizing are (41) structure (260), (42) long–distance continuity (240, *et passim*), (43) expressivity (283), (44) opacity (280), (45) balance (272), (46) integration (270) – as opposed to (47) differentiation (270) – (48) complex "identity", i.e. "character" (251), (49) "logical" cogency of development (229), (50) rebounding, and (51) relief phenomena. Other candidates for the critical construction of an interpretation theory and further investigations can be found through the index of MIR.

The fact that these phenomena appear as concrete qualities in listening to specific pieces does not preclude an attempt on our part to outline a comprehensive list of general interpretational criteria for the purpose of finding candidates for a theory of interpretation. The phenomena are, naturally, specifically related to their respective situations, to the music, the performer and the listener; this is, however, what makes them real: their merit is that they are **unreduced occurrences of reality**. Whether imaginative content is identical to a corresponding notion is a philosophical issue related to the ancient question

of idea–realism (*Begriffsrealismus*); which is an issue that must be temporarily put aside in accounting for the results of the investigations carried out. The fact that the phenomena are genuinely experienced once is sufficient to prove their existence; thus they are rival criteria in a developing phenomenology of *mip*. As soon as their **experiential existence** is proved evident, their existence is bracketed in favor of a correct description of their **essence** (content).

The distinction between "concept" and "notion" cannot be more than operative for this purpose. Concept is that aspect or part of the notional content or import that can be grasped by words in a verbal or formal language, which is just an operative definition in this context, without the demands of validity in other contexts.

So the purpose of the investigations referred to here is to produce a list of criteria on the basis of aesthetic analysis that can be provided for progressive and eventual further testing within cognitive musicology, music phenomenology (or by music psychologists) and interpretation research.

The second volume of our series of monographs on musical interpretation (MIR II) concentrates on the individual and comparative analyses of concrete excerpts of recorded (and exceptionally, live) musical performance on the basis of previously penetrated theoretical and meta–theoretical fundamentals drawn from earlier investigations; see the indexes and lists of contents in MIR I and II.

In the everyday work of the musician, in musical criticism and the teaching of music, we encounter fragmentary or more thoroughly worked out interpretation analyses in practical context. Wherever it is conducted, however, interpretation analysis presupposes a fundamental awareness of what the musical text in question has to say and at least some of the gestalting variants which can be derived from this. In principle, the background comprises an insight into the difference between, on the one hand, the notation and other verbal or visual indications and instructions resembling a shorthand aid and, on the other hand, the genuine form in which the music exists: its true nature is achieved as **auditive, intelligible sound**. Even if systematic, thoroughgoing thought is lacking, as regards both the nature of the composition and the interpretative implications rooted in it, as well as the possible alternatives made restricted by the articulative capacity of the performer—the commands given by

awareness and their manual execution – the musician learns from experience to respond to the various situations and demands with which the performance of music confronts him. This type of acquisition through direct experience is founded on a natural musical open-mindedness and sensitivity which must also provide the starting point for an inquiry like the present one.

By listening we acquire knowledge of the musical effect of different articulations of one and the same phrase. The phenomenal correlations which then appear we are able, as interpreting musicians, conductors, instructors or ensemble leaders, to learn to handle better and, with time, to master, as soon as we are familiar with the superordinate system of basic interpretative phenomena and relationships behind them (MIR I). Which is not to say that preconceived theories – whether from a normative school of technique, a theory of harmony or an auditive method – should be allowed to control our experience, and not that our experiences, under the influence thus exerted by the analysis, should be pulverised into unrelated observations having little or no meaning.

It is only through a co-ordination of the two sides of our musical awareness – a conceptual preparedness for performance (based on an *a priori*) continuously actualized by our own experience – that the experiential picture of music can become fully 'musical', i.e. true, distinct and tangible. Through this kind of musical experience we come into close contact, or "merge", with the music, which we then also become capable of handling as performers. An awareness of what is given furnishes us with the external framework to which we can relate all the inward parts of the composition during performance. This opens the way to a holistic gestalting, an interpretation of the composition in the true and exact sense. Delicate feeling, musical sensitivity to the effect of articulation (gestalting), is as unlikely to be obtained through cerebral theorization divorced from auditive reality as it is from slavish submission to the diversity of natural phenomena. But in the encounter between those aspects, p can attain its due tension and forcefully persuasive drive.

For the sake of concrete musicianship and for the individual's chances of being able to cope with his experiences, we must – while retaining a holistic perspective – study the highly concrete auditive realizations of the musical text. Interpretation analysis focuses on this kind of study of gestaltings.

Our inquiry proceeds from studies of interpretation in (1) gramophone recordings and concerts, via (2) composition analysis with its implications for interpretation – including the analysis of interpretative criteria in our concepts of interpretation – to reports and analyses of supervised and generatively

planned (3) rehearsals of works.

In MIR II we also consider the question of how an interpretation is analysed. Questions of method and evidence are also touched upon. This is part of the main purpose of MIR, viz. to lay the foundations of interpretation in connection with musical performance and to create a platform for musical interpretation research, its concepts, theory and concrete analyses.

We endeavor to survey the various interpretative alternatives at certain points in the work under consideration, and move in two directions, with the aim of elucidating the anticipated and realized alternatives, respectively – both must come within adequacy criteria which are revealed step by step in the composition, just as much as in the course of the study; from the composition as codified in the score, and then to its possible realizations and conversely (from several – though of course not invariably all – auditive realizations available on tape, record or live performances) we move concentrically inwards towards the nucleus of the composition. This, however is an infinite process which can never be accomplished once and for all. It has to be repeated over and over again by every musician, scholar or critic individually and for every single one of their interpretations. The premises of the realization of a particular composition changeslightlywith everychangingmoment; the perspective of the composition, its character and identity, are individually different and determined by the position of the individual musician, etc., within a network of relations of meaning. Performers fill out the umbrella-like diversity of these perspectives, depending on the composition.

Interpretation analysis (ia) is a penetration into the musical sounding world. It opens up a world of musical experience, and our task is to try to put these manifold phenomena into words and concepts. The experiential world emerging from the analyses undertaken offers infinite variations, yet it is nonetheless structured. Along with deepening analysis, awareness is enriched by opening it up to the increasingly differentiated objects of musical experience. At the same time, this rediscovered world of musical experience, in some way preformed as the **experiential potentiality** of our mind, by way of its musical faculty, can be grasped by our consciousness insofar as it becomes perceptible: in other words, the unstructured remainders, unconscious and imperceptible, inaudible. And the **perceived and perceptible world of musical phenomena is itself structured**. This is the precise reason for the importance of focusing on structural phenomena in the analysis of interpretation in performance. Moreover, ia sets out to elucidate the relation between the human mind and physical

conditions for the implementation of p(i) as it can be experienced through listening. In this sense musical sound is nature's answer to man's activity. Sensitive listening to the auditive response of nature is the foundation of the musician's continuing activity; a relation of interdependence is achieved which is consciously surveyable: a dialogue of give and take, listening and responsive activity. In the most profound sense it is an interaction between two integrated parties. "Man" may in this context refer to both mind and body (provided a provisional but unifying Cartesian dualism is acknowledged), more specifically in respect to composers, conductors or performers, or the analyst, but also to the **listening human being** in the broad sense. The important thing, however, is that we are here confronted with an essential **criterion of music and musicality** that can become mastered as a manageable diagnostic instrument through awareness of its fundamental principles in our sympathetic consideration of articulate sound. Sensitive listening is a precondition to musical integration and cohesion. The final verdict – related or non-related – will indeed depend on our preparedness as listeners for fine and exact differences and on our capacity to immediately actualize this sensitivity in response to auditive reality, i.e. our preparedness for dialogue.

The ability of the performer to produce sound from his instrument (or: the conductor – orchestral sound), which unites that sound with what has gone before, which relates to it through the act and manner of working out the textural design of the performance, reveals his awareness or lack of awareness of the relationship between the forces of man's mind and nature's energy, which are inevitably involved. Where the conductor is concerned, there is also an intermediate stage: the person – the musician between himself and the instrument. We might say: the conductor plays on people. It follows that the performer's awareness of the composition is an awareness of the self-awareness of the musical mind and its physical conditions built into the composition: the composer's awareness is of the same kind. The precision and 'dependability' of interpretation analysis are related to the analyst's awareness of both the composer's and the performer's awareness. Interpretation analysis can thus be viewed as an **intercontextual** meeting between three participators' horizons of understanding. Everywhere the point of reference is that of the music, the natural phenomena of musical experience and their foundations in performed cognitive structures.

Through interpretation analysis we endeavor to acquire knowledge of the fundamental variants of articulation and the way in which they are rooted in the

musical structure. The constituents of sound and sonority, the bringing out and underlining of different structural levels and interrelations, are presented in the analyses. The basic character of interpretation is rooted in the performer's, the interpreter's, concept of the composition and his insights into interpretive actions and interpretative perspectives and processes. Two special components are identified as the foundations of musical interpretation: firstly, the performer has a **general** concept, what to him is a universally and *a priori* valid concept of what a composition is and conceptually can be, and secondly he also possesses a **special** concept of the nature of the individual work with which the performance is concerned. Both these 'aspects' are present – though often confusingly intertwined – in every musical performance. At a very general level we can distinguish between the two paths by which this insight is arrived at: on the one hand, the less specific feeling, the premonition in the actual listening experience of musical performances, that there is something of a general character to the performance, and on the other hand the distinct "revelation" of **what** type of character it is. The strong evidential intuition that conclusions from a p_{exp} are possible and justifiable must be considered. We will, for the moment, disregard the more theoretically circumstantial evidence pointing in this direction and confine ourselves entirely to what is given through immediate experience.

An interpretation analysis that exhibits full comprehension of musical phenomena would (gradually, by summing up and integrating experiences) bring us to a thoroughgoing musical awareness in which thinking would be entirely permeated by musicality; musical intuition and musical thinking would point constantly in the same direction. This is a thoroughly musical way of thought which penetrates our innermost being with a glowing sensitivity all the way from feeling and intuition to logical cogitation. From this emerges nothing less than a different way of regarding and relating to the world and the reality around us, namely that of listening to it – a truly **musical** world picture, complementing the visual one we are used to for orientation in our daily lives.

It is thus justified to state that art, and indeed the art of performing music (insofar as it is art, judged for each case separately), displays at its highest level the most integrated forms of human consciousness. Active interpretation demands a high degree of mental co-ordination. This level is seen to be attainable by those who feel and proceed from a conviction about the meaning of art and who entertain a fundamental confidence in their own experience. Distrust and negative attitudes appear to exclude supportive musical phenomena from the individual's panorama of focused intentional objects. In this concrete

sense experienced depends on **intentionality**. Accessibility is above all dependent on your own open-mindedness and your willingness to assimilate the music as sensitively and intricately as the music itself appears, requires and deserves.

Interpretation analysis is neither fulfilled nor exhausted with the achievement of the composer's intention. It seeks to go further and can delve deeper into the fundamental structures of the musical material, its manifestation and organization in the composition. Natural phenomena and tendencies bound up with the musical material are always actualized in the present material, even if the composer did not fully anticipate this; the composer's intention as artistic will depends on natural and human laws. Since the intentions of composers are never fully accessible to us in our search for knowledge—even if they were accessible to us, we would not understand them and the corresponding music in the same way as the composer—we must find a more stable foundation for our interpretations. It is reasonable to suppose that the musical phenomena themselves not only provide us with this stable anchorage, but also open a deeper channel to the nucleus of the composition as a starting point for the realization of an interpretation. At the same time, however, interpretation analysis aims for a cognitive foundation of more general validity in which individual analyses and comparisons are included in a wider pattern of consensus which would give us a maximum of interpretative preparedness and control.

One can distinguish between two essentially different ways of conducting and accomplishing interpretation analysis. Firstly, the analyst may choose to consider only that which is actually heard and can be heard by repeated listening (basically **expretation**). The problem with this kind of analysis is that it fails to distinguish between what is intentional and unintentional on the part of the performer. To overcome this element of uncertainty, one can adopt the other procedure, i.e. base the analysis on assumptions concerning what by all accounts would seem to be the performer's musical intention. But there is another danger lurking here, namely that of over-interpretation (entailing **inpretation**). The *apriori* existence of P:s' intentions cannot be affirmed. Therefore, it seems necessary to rid ourselves of the presupposition that **all** musicians really have specific musical intentions and conceptual images, for reason (1) that the logical necessity that the primordial intentions of others' (P:s) minds are inaccessible, and (2) that the heuristical necessity is required in order to obtain practical results from empirical methodology. We must base our analysis on a decision which is not easy to make: is the musician in front of us a performer pure

and simple or are we confronted with a conscious (or intuitive) **interpreter** in the more exact sense? If, on the other hand, we allow a substantial amount of **over-interpretation**, unsupported by the evidence of the case, to enter our analysis of a performance, the analysis will tend to be more of a listener's description – which is in itself valuable, but comes outside the essential purpose of interpretation analysis – and not so much an analysis of what the performer actually does with the composition in musical terms.

Clearly, we also distinguish between these two models of interpretation analysis. We put them side by side to see what essential consequences ensue: interpretation analysis based on what we hear, as opposed to interpretation analysis based on the substance and structure of the composition, taking the score instead of the auditive picture as our point of departure. These two analytical approaches can be understood as focusing on different stages, phases, of the interpretative process – they are mutually complementary, not mutually exclusive: (1) the performer's creative encounter with and processing of the composition, the elucidation of his relation to it, and (2) the study or merely the experience of the auditive result, immediately related to all the structural and substantial properties which the work displays (development, the textural design of the score).

Any composition is necessarily indeterminate in many respects. The interpretation makes good this indeterminacy. The taste of the performer is to **delimit** and **direct** the indeterminate in a particular interpretative direction, which is the overriding interpretative tendency. An **interval** is not just an interval: it has a host of different functions within its context. It may be that a conquest of new levels of distance and tension within an ongoing development of intervals possibly for the first time, becomes audibly experienced through the gestalted performance: the interval forms part of a structure which in turn has a particular function in a wider pattern of structures. The interval can be part of a chain making up a wider distance to which the individual intervals have already alluded in advance. Growing **distances** of intervals can be regarded – and accordingly interpreted – as **expansion**, **intensification** or, on the contrary, a widening release of tension (detension), entirely depending on the compositional and interpretative context. A successive reduction of intervals may have a **compressive** effect (heightening tension) or – in a different context – constitute less rigorous and more smoothly passing side movements, while loosening tension in motion ("*Auslauf*"). To sum up, different contexts arouse, through the performer's articulation, the **apriorical meta-systems** which manifest

themselves in **interrelative correlations** and **constellations** of, above all, phenomena such as **tension, distance, direction** and **movement** – all of them components forming part of the overall experience. Different delineated parts of a phenomenal space within the **multidimensionally experiential system** of the mip thus evoked appear one by one in the case of limited duration, with different dimensions having different extensions – or they appear as a constant transformation when the parts are actualized continuously through p(i). I have previously attempted to survey this metasystem in my theory of interpretation, MIR I, especially chapters 3 and 6. The present study, including that of MIR II, has revealed several confirmations and exemplifications of its validity for descriptive purposes. In a later sequence of studies we have returned to consider these questions, illuminating the main problems from different vantage points.

V:3 INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEWS WITH MUSICIANS (MIR III): INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON QUESTIONS POSED

The detailed letters explaining the project, in English and Swedish, that were sent or handed over to the musicians (III:2,9,12–14), including the **general questions** addressed to them (III:3,6,10–13), the researcher's comments on the exploratory interviews with comments and discussion on possible sources of failure or insecurity of judgement (III:4–5,8), as well as the recipients and participants in the project (III:1,14–16), are listed *in extenso* in MIR III. The pilot project of interviews within the frame of the entire project is outlined (III:18–20). Questions specific to repertoire, and inquiries specifically directed, appropriately selected and formulated in order to suit the receiver, such as those sent to Paul Sacher (III:22–28) in preparation for the interview, are followed by *in extenso* transcriptions of the tape-recorded interviews. Some interviews were interrupted due to unforeseen technical problems or presented in an abridged version for other reasons. A few musicians replied by letter (conductor Gerd Kühr III:138–143, pianist Anders Wadenberg 268–271 and flutist Ilari Lehtinen 396–398), or supplemented the interview by letter afterwards (Gottfrid Boon III:255). Pianist José Ribera requested the opportunity to reply at greater length in a further interview after having reflected again on the topics of the inquiries (III:300–364).

Naturally, due to the *force majeure*, the practical conditions and circumstances surrounding the interviews and meetings, regarding the locations and duration at our disposal, were varied greatly, mainly due to practical and financial limitations. This means that the original purpose of directly comparing point to point the replies from many musicians given on questions about general problems and concepts of interpretation could not always completely and fruitfully be accomplished. Moreover, the differences in the musicians' varying degrees of willingness and capacity to give answers to the questions were at first surprising. This, I concluded, must have been a reflection of deeply rooted individual views and values about the concepts presented in the questionnaires, and might even indicate the unwavering individual coherency of interviewees' concepts; many musicians stuck rigidly to their ideas and were convinced that no modifications whatsoever were needed. Since this discovery could contribute positively to the enrichment of the collected material on decisive points, I modified my initial strategy. The musician always had the written questionnaire, and I directed the interview according to it as far as possible, without ever trying to force the discussion to fit the pattern (including possible prejudices and limitations) of my general concept, reflected in my personal selection of questions in view of the main research topic. Some musicians showed incompetence in understanding even basic concepts, others had difficulties in formulating their ideas clearly. In this way the material became widely incongruent, but I am convinced that this correctly reflects the reality explored. However, it reduces the possibility of direct comparison; and the answers can seldom be regarded separately, since they are part of more all-embracing aesthetic ideals held by the interpreters. The material has served as a source for the aesthetic investigation, and may stimulate further investigation and complementary interviews that were not manageable within the given frame of this study. The questions posed were divided into general questions given to each interviewee and special repertory-related questions directed and distributed individually.

A major problem in presenting questions is to get the musician to communicate, not only through his instrument, but by verbalizing around the concept of interpretation. The direct question "how do you define musical interpretation" is risky since it may imply a veiled constructed definition that does not correspond to the actual concept in praxis – in other words, if such a concept is not presupposed, not explicitly stated (used) or allowed. Of the five general questions, I commenced with (1) "How do you describe musical

interpretation?", knowing that "describe" is ambiguous and can be understood either as an inquiry for a definition or more generally as a request to verbalize on a notional issue. Affirmative answers on this point were evidently a necessary precondition for continuing the interview. The next question focuses on what the interpreter sees as his task by introducing the fairly neutral implication–realization model: (2) "What implications in the work must be realized by interpretation in order to maintain the qualities and intentions behind the work?" Next, a question on the methods of access to the work by "analysis": "Which are the most relevant analytical questions and facts of the work important for the musician and interpretation?" At this point a vague outline of a personal concept emerges, and the question on the means of realizing an interpretation becomes interesting: (4) "What are the means of interpretation?" The underlying aesthetic ideals were often difficult to formulate for the interviewee: (5) "In what possible way can the attitudes and ideals of the musician be important for the interpretation?"

More detailed questions were: (1) On what do **problems** of interpretation depend, apart from the technical difficulties of the work? Are they related to or dependent on style, composer, individual instrument, the listener (auditorium) or what else? (2) Do you feel you **add** something to the work of music as an interpreter or do you feel that you primarily or entirely **realize** the work? Depending on the answer: What do you add, what do you realize in the work? (3) What means of interpretation can be used in this work and which ones cannot? (4) Is it possible for you –in terms of intentions regarding means of interpretation or otherwise – to describe (verbally) your interpretation (apart from the question of whether it is at all meaningful to do so)? (5) What about your intentions with 'this' work, what do you want to give the listener the impression, experience, etc. of? (6) Your view, ideas about, thoughts about (etc.) the work – are they same thing as your interpretation, do they correspond entirely...? (7) Do you think there is one best interpretation of the work, or are there several i:s of the same high value? If there are several, your particular interpretation is a selection from several possibilities – how do you make this choice? (8) What is the importance of emotions contra intellect in your way of working? (9) Are there any "points" in the rehearsal process of special importance? (10) What is the role of the musical imagination? (11) What is the difference – if any in principle – between playing at the concert and playing at rehearsal? (12) When studying a hitherto unknown work – are there any methods of analysis that you use or think could be of special value for others in the same situation? (13) If you

teach—how do you communicate when dealing with questions of interpretation? (14) Your intentions with the interpretation of this work, are they exact or do they "contain" an amount of variability, improvisation or similarity? (15) What could possibly be the role of structure in music for the interpreter? Similarly, what about the role and importance of the character of the music? (16) What do you think about the theory of each movement having one and only one peak (high point), culmination, point of maximal intensity, etc? (17) Interpretation—is it recreating a line or a structure (or both)?

Other questions specific to the repertoire (e.g. III:11 et passim) and regarding the communication of my interpretation criticism of their concerts (questionnaire III:12), together with the recipients of these questionnaires and participants in the interviews, are listed in MIR III.

CRITERIA EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERVIEWS (MIR III):

Inevitably, many of the criteria stated by the musicians will only confirm what the reader feels to be self-evident, provided he has some advanced musical training. Still, such **confirmations** will provide support in the end, namely for our common knowledge of this area, and specifically for distinguishing which **criteria** should be classified as generally **guiding** and which decisively **governing**, or whatever other role we will allot for them within the frame of an interpretation theory and aesthetics. Since I am going to focus in this and in the next chapter on the personal concepts of Paul Sacher, Antal Dorati and Sergiu Celibidache, I will concentrate on the first two of them in this review. The encounter with Sergiu Celibidache was first planned as a conventional interview, but became a long series of personal discussions, including participation in his conducting seminars and exercises, and documentation of his lectures and rehearsals. During these lectures, it was, to some extent, possible to inquire in an appropriate context about those problems that were the main interest in the series of interviews with other musicians. However, since Celibidache's **musical phenomenology** is a developed (but closed) system, it is more appropriate to present it as an aesthetic position in ch. V:4, because it does not permit interjection, non-congruent arguing and questioning. I will also leave the answers of many musicians out, or leave their documented replies open for future research, and for obvious quality reasons I will also leave out some answers that did or did not enter in the documentation (MIR III). The interviews presented in MIR III, even those not referred to here, are included in the General

Index of Artists ch. VII:5.

The **identity of the composition** as constituted and appearing in the notation, where all parts objectively can be read, is the foremost guiding principle in the view of Paul Sacher: "In einer guten Aufführung hören Sie wirklich alle Stimmen" (36, R. Strauss *Metamorphosen*). And the overriding criterion is the **transparency** of the notational instance of the work: "*Durchhörbarkeit*" is discussed recurrently (45 Strauss; 59 Bartók). Consequently, **identity** also becomes the principle of *gestalting*, and he aims at showing how the piece is constructed: it is "in seiner Struktur sehr klar" (33 Strauss). So this evidently is a **w-i identity** (one-way-directed relation, from work to interpretation) and an **n-i identity**. But, simultaneously, Sacher's concept of **structure** contains several aspects: harmonic (33), polyphonic (35) etc. **Balance** is discussed, in this case (Strauss), as a phenomenon that will appear correctly from the composition, since Strauss, according to Sacher, "hat sehr genau gewusst *wie* man schreibt" (33) – i.e. there is a conscious consideration of the composer's capacity to correctly notate his intentions. But still, it remains the task of the interpreter to survey the correct outcome of balance in the actual performance. The *gestalting* arises from **understanding** (35) and "*musikalischer Intelligenz*". The **exactness** or **accuracy** of the identity-relation between composition and interpretation is decisive for Sacher, who speaks about **absolute accuracy** ("absolut genau" 44) in the entrances of the fugue: "Ich glaube es ist hier keine Freiheit möglich" (Bartók *Musik für Saiteninstrumente, Schlagzeug und Celesta* 1936). But if no freedom is presupposed, how can there be any room for false interpretation; does not also the ideal of absolute accuracy presuppose a latitude of small variability. If not, it would never be possible to distinguish absolute from relative accuracy. But it is possible. Sacher recognizes the possibility of "*Alternanz-Wirkung*" (48) and stresses the importance of **clarity** and **comprehensiveness** ("klar", "verständlich", 49). He consequently **identifies** those structures in the progress of the piece that are compositionally important, e.g. identifying the **climax**: "alles drängt wirklich auf diesen Klimax zu [...] Das ist sicher [...] ein eindeutiger Höhepunkt des Stückes" (37 Strauss). Interesting is his idea of **growing** which corresponds to the **organicism** of Furtwängler: "ein biologischen Wachsen [about Bartók] Es wächst eigentlich wirklich wie eine Pflanze ganz von selber" (46). Regarding other interpretations, however, the decisive criterion is whether the outcome of the performance is identical with the music: "Also das ist schon so: Das liegt in der Komposition. Das ist nicht eine Furtwänglerische Interpretation sondern *so ist die Musik*", intimating an

objectivistic intention. Correspondingly, Sacher first considers the compositional kind of structure, "Er [Strauss] hat das Stück sehr rhapsodisch gestaltet" (32), and then concludes that this should govern the interpretation: "Wichtig ist [...] die rhapsodische Gestaltung" (35). However, in the interview the former quotation has a double-meaning, since Sacher is also relying on the **composer's prototypical interpretation**, concerning both Strauss (33) and Stravinsky (68): "Ich habe mir natürlich die Interpretation von Strauss [as he conducted his *Metamorphosen* at the final rehearsals before the first performance by Sacher as conductor of the Collegium Musicum in Zürich, 1946] – den ich also in dem Fall selbst gehört habe – zum Vorbild genommen." (33) There is evidence of an awareness of **complex interrelations between interpretational phenomena**: "Wenn etwas *sehr* klar deklamiert wird [Bartók, third movement] im raschen Spielen *wirkt es rascher* als ein *zu* rasches Tempo wo alles dann ein bisschen sich verhaspelt." (54) And **correspondence with the composer's intention** occurs as an overriding ideal: "So haben wir es auch in den ersten Aufführung gemacht und Bartók hat das also nicht korrigiert. Ich denke dass es seine Vorstellung entsprach" (56); and, about Stravinsky's preference: "die Härte mit der er seiner Musik gespielt haben will." (68) Sacher never questions the **authority of the composer**. So in places of ambiguity one cannot rely on personal interpretation but must base the performance on an **understanding of notation**, which is the aim of Sacher: "Es ist eine Frage der Notierung. Also ich interpretiere es, oder nicht interpretiere, ich *verstehe* es." (56) Respecting the classical weakness of an upbeat (ch. III:3 on H. Riemann's theory) is categorized as the **observance of a rule** (63), and, naturally in Stravinsky, **observance of composer's score markings** becomes a decisive criterion: "die Anweisungen von Stravinsky [sind] von kapitaler Wichtigkeit." (68) The musician's knowledge of the structural role of his part in the light of the whole orchestral setting (72), and the taking over of a melody between two different groups of musicians must be observed carefully, according to Sacher (80). He also discusses the composer's influence on the rehearsal process, though he considers this influence to be restricted to technical details (96). This, I propose, can be explained easily. The composer already notated in the score those instructions he wanted to transmit to future performers. Sacher acknowledges in principle the existence of several alternative solutions, especially as far as tempo choice is concerned, where each individual conductor has "ein ihnen innewohnendes Tempo." (102) The foremost task of the conductor is to convince his orchestra about the correct rendering, and if this attempt is successful, a corresponding suggestion will also influence the audience (100):

"die Aufgabe des Dirigenten [ist] zuerst einmal das Orchester [...] von einer Wiedergabe zu überzeugen – ihnen klarzumachen dass es *so* sein muss." Finally, there is a **general reference to human nature** in his concept as he proposes: "alles nach diesem menschlichen Mass zu richten." (105)

Antal Dorati's general conception and view on interpretive criteria was also studied through **observation protocols in rehearsals** (in MIRIV:I:377–384), in combination with (in this case two) interviews (MIR III:126–136). It was a psychologically delicate task to gradually build up confidence through several meetings during the rehearsals in the Stockholm Concert Hall, comprising one introductory interview and, after informal meetings, a final interview at the Wennergren Centre. I also made inquiries among the orchestral musicians, especially about the effects of the conducting during playing. First, however, we must show respect towards Dorati's own view of himself (27.2.1981): "I'm not a theorist, I cannot even think of theoretical questions. I'm a thoroughly practical man, my whole music [life] is music-making. I have just agreed to answer your questions but it is **you** who eventually, if you can, could make a theory out of that. For me it's simply music-making" (III:136). This is a markedly unintellectual approach: "What you call interpretation [...] is reading a creation." Dorati demands "complete dedication" from the performer who must "try to give as direct an access to the original creation as possible" (127). **Contact & communication, cultivation & experience** (128) as well as, are obvious ideals in his conception, whereas "rules cannot be established" (129) either in view of a performance, or for the purpose of projecting a recreation, since "rules are always established afterwards." (129). Still, Dorati concedes the importance of **spontaneity**. This spontaneity showed itself to be an **in mediis rebus experience**, partly due to the fact that "no preparation [is] good enough" (134). In the interviews and discussions, **expressivity and intensity** appeared as the overriding criteria. His concept of expressivity gives a "great margin to the performer as to what [the composer] wants to express." (136) And in response to my inquiry, **structure** (132), by analogy to the skeleton of the human body, had a "very great role". In the case of Dorati, however, there was a silent competence to discover at his rehearsal, which essentially clarified his conception. His verbal instructions to the orchestra, in transmitting, for instance, agogic instructions, in rehearsing Giuseppe Verdi's *Requiem*, were **complementary** to his conductorial behavior, which signaled tacitly through complicated, hardly decipherable movements the **internal intensity of expression** that marked his interpretation. This was a highly characteristic level of a basic state of emotion

with **small volume and large intensity** (378). The vibrating signaling of his conductorial movements in combination with gestic, mimetics, in all his **kinetic expression**, had an emotively suggestive impact and stimulating function on the musicians, and sometimes profoundly so. His concept of **identity** is primarily an **i-i relation**, such as his required **identity of vocal-instrumental sonority** (379,380). **Continuity** was secured by avoiding or counteracting the tendency to slow at phrase endings (380), and there was a kind of "rhetoric" in exposition, a **pronunciation** of the melody (this concept overlapped the vocal-instrumental border, and comprised most means of expression, including articulation, phrasing, dynamics, agogics, rubato, etc; 380). It was "not so important how much sound, not loud[ness], but [the] intensity is important", as the musicians were instructed (381). The method of Dorati was that of an empathic identification ("*Einlebung*", "*Verschmelzung*"), an emotionally colored sensitive insight into the natural tendencies of the musical material. Above all, it is the **liveliness of the sound-mass** which is aimed at through the **self-identifying power of living the music**. Intensity is molded in view of the **perspective of development related to the moving sound-mass**, the total "weight" of which is allocated (distributed) between **inner withheld intensity** and **outer "outspoken" intensity** (381), exhibited in the quality of 'volume'. This distribution, or **balance of inner and outer intensity**, governs by "natural tendencies" (Celibidache) the **direction of movement**. (381) There are indications of **interval interpretation** and a complex quality of **directionality**. Various degrees of **activity** can be distinguished, and this activity can be directed **internally** or **externally**. Tone places in a scale must be reached by **climbing against resistance** or by **overcoming gravity** (gravitational phenomena) within the interpreted tonal system, which is also one way of **characterizing tonality** in performance (382). In the range of interpretative criteria of great musical complexity, **sonority and timbre** were widely central concepts, as were **intensity through volume relation**. There is also a balancing of the effects of **sound-mass through sound-flow** (383): the **inhibiting mass** against the **forward-directed impetus** determines the **flow**. The control of "locomotive" power is an **acting and reacting** on the **sound-mass set in motion**, which governs the **outflow in realized kinetic energy** (383,384). I noticed moments of conventional **structuring** clearly aiming at **increased continuity** (383). Dorati sensitively acted in interplay with this mass in motion, directing an assemblage of such a mass in movement to a halt with the necessary recreative adjustments for obtaining the appropriate **balance of forces** (384). And he **reinforced the**

natural tendency of phrase to discharge forward-directed motion. This discloses a considerable sensitivity towards the basic passively **experienced, recreated and imagined self-activity of the sound-mass and motion** balanced against a voluntarily **active control of timbre and intensity.**

FURTHER REFERENCES TO RESEARCH SOURCES, METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARIES:

Parts of interviews have been published and presented in the form of annotated quotations in MIR I:252–270. The English Summary of MIR II and I remains unpublished: "Summaries of Musical Interpretation Research vols. 1–2 including a Postscript & a Bibliography" (Excerpts from MIR I–II; 1983/87). The reader should consult the index of MIR II and I for further references to the analyses. For a comprehensive survey related to this chapter, the following selected references are relevant:

CONDUCTOR	INTERVIEW/LECTURE	REHEARSAL-STUDY	DISCOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS or CONCERT REVIEW
E. Ansermet			II:180–182, 188, 190–193, 199, 208, 216, 218, 224, 416
H. Blomstedt	III:210–216	IV:385–386	V:79, 109, 229
S. Celibidache	[IV:59–345] [I:73, 79, 172, 180, 207–208, 242, 253, 302]	IV:A:59–345	
A. Dorati	I:255–256, 263–264, 288, 301	IV:377–384	II:145–147, 414
E. Leinsdorf		I:18, 236 IV:346–376	
P. Sacher	I:5, 257–270 III:21–125		II:180–182 208–210, 214, 224, 416

For further references see Appendix ch. VII.

V:4 RESEARCH STUDIES (MIR IV): SPECIAL STUDIES – A MUSICAL PHENOMENOLOGY TO SERVE A CONDUCTORIAL AESTHETICS OF PERFORMANCE AT A HIGH LEVEL OF ARTISTICAL DIGNITY: SERGIU CELIBIDACHE

Introductory remarks concerning sources and research procedure

The study of Sergiu Celibidache's art of interpretation as a conductor, and his courses on conducting and theory given in Mainz and Munich, including rehearsals with the *Münchener Philharmoniker* and *Orchester des Südwestdeutschen Rundfunks* in Stuttgart regularly during the years 1978–82 and periodically later, form the basis of this comprehensive presentation of his "*musikalische Phänomenologie*": This is his label of a compound of music philosophy and performance theory that serves as the basis for his successful conducting. He is generally and unanimously recognized as one of the foremost, if not the highest ranked conductor of our time, in spite of divergencies as far as personal sympathy concerns. That this part of the study is more expanded than the parts dealing with the rival aesthetic conceptions is due to the fact that Celibidache's phenomenology provides a substantial contribution to the central questions posed in this thesis. Obviously, his view, *mutatis mutandis*, allows for a differentiated treatment of the pertinent problems and possibilities of mip.

I base this account on the main unpublished **documents**, including analyses, summaries, references and transcriptions of selected tape recordings, which were allowed to be made of parts of his lectures and rehearsals, and which are collected in MIR IV:2–345, to which I constantly refer throughout this chapter, if not otherwise indicated. This documentation consists of [1] a few principles of phenomenological interpretation processes which are summarized (2–3), followed by [2] introductory notes (3–7; in particular 61–62) and [3] an independent and evaluative "Critical Review of the Celibidache Concept and Practice of Orchestral Performance" (8–58; in Swedish with parallel notes for an English translation). A report on his lectures given at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, May 1979, opens with preparatory remarks ("*Föranmärkning*" 61–62) and closes with critical summaries (88–92). Then follows the documentation protocol from his conducting courses in Munich (mainly 1980, partly 1981–82; 95–176; the left-hand pages contain handwritten comments, complementary additions and analyses by me not yet finally worked out) and notes from theoretical lectures (178–210; the left-hand pages 179 and 181 contain my comments).

A series of detailed analyses by me of the concrete bearings on musical shapings and structural appearance of Celibidache's performances as appearing during rehearsals with *Münchener Philharmoniker* in the presence of the conducting class (211–222) is followed by the documentation of lectures given by Celibidache preparatory to conducting with the orchestra and discussions during rehearsals and sessions with the orchestra under the leadership of conducting students (223–345). Celibidache's critical (and more seldomly his approving) comments to his students are of interest for our knowledge of his 'interpretative concept' insofar as they relate to the resulting sound-shapes that have been recorded on cassette tapes under difficult conditions (and taking the limitations of the technical equipment available into consideration; SONY TCD-5). The interview with Celibidache was transcribed from the tape-recordings *in extenso* (e.g. 225), but parts of the collected material remain untranscribed. A series of expanded analyses of crucial moments made by me immediately after hearing them have been inserted into the documentation since they directly concern interpretive (and interpretative) problems of decisive importance (indicated by blue margin line, particularly 211–221, 231–241, 243–249, partly 255–260, 270–272, 276–281, and 292–297; insertion of analyses of Brahms' 2. Symphony 2. movement 316–323 and stresses in the 1. movement 338; of Mozart's Symphony KV 201 in A major 4. movement 343 and scattered places, while the left-hand pages contain further quotations, my comments and fragments of analyses).

The growing literature on Celibidache is of varying quality as a source for our investigation. A few published notes by Celibidache and a selection of secondary references is listed in ch. VII:6. Among the works that merit consideration the following must be mentioned: Fischer–Holland–Rzehulka (1986), Hans–Klaus Jungheinrich (1986); about Furtwängler and Celibidache Joachim Matzner (1986) and Klaus Lang (1988); Eggebrecht–Müller–Schreiber (1992) and Klaus Weiler (1993).

Analysis of the conception of Celibidache's interpretational aesthetics of musical performance

In order to directly enter into the mode of thinking in the musical phenomenology of Sergiu Celibidache, I will, in an unorthodox manner due to limited space in this comprehensive account of my research, present a few core conclusions that are comparatively simple to grasp. Unfortunately these may appear as unsupported theses or doctrines, the alleged support of which,

advanced by Celibidache as *a priori* evident, will be reviewed in the following expanded presentation of the main concepts and reasonings, complex connections between phenomena, arguments and discussions, which only gradually converge into a consistent system that may attain validity. It is not possible to repeat the concrete musical facts and arguments referred to in MIR IV (and in the remaining untranscribed documentation); the selection is also justified by our focusing on the more general aesthetic criteria, ideas and principles of interpretation in performance within the frame of Celibidache's personal conception of musical phenomenology. For the relationship to phenomenological philosophy, I refer to the introduction (ch. I:3), the summaries of the investigations (ch. V:1–3) and the conclusions (ch. VI).

Presentation of theses and postulates advanced by Celibidache:

(A) **Music and meaning:** (1) music is a process ("*Werdegang*"), (2) the goal of which is to be heard **transcendentally**;

(B) **Reference systems**, i.e. integrated structures through interrelations between phenomena; constituents such as tones, motifs, phrases, etc., are experientially interrelated: (1) there are reference systems of various kinds: of melody (the octave), of harmony (the circle of fifths), of metrics, of periodicity, etc. (2) Within the reference systems may exist **identity** or **opposition**. (3) There is only one climax in each composition. (4) The climax occurs through the joint effect of the reference systems and their unification. (5) A reference system prevails until a stronger one replaces it. (6) If a reference system replaces a former one, the latter one still continues to work, as a 'background reference' (the metaphorical term 'relief' is avoided here). (7) When the reference systems run parallel, this results in "*Flächigkeit*". (8) Opposition exists between two elements, triangulation between three;

(C) **Hearing:** (1) we assimilate ("*zueignen*") what we hear; (2) there is **expansion** or **compression** in tension processes; (3) through **correlation** we perceive the relation to **the one** (the 'oneness'; unity of p(c) requires identity of the P's mind), (4) "*Repetition*" does not exist (in the conventional sense) since what appears in recurrence ("*Wiederkehr*") one has already heard once before, and it is either 'more' ("*zu mehr*") or 'less' ("*zu weniger*") the second appearance (thus it is always a 'process' in congruence with the phenomenon of time–flow): the recurrence constitutes a directed development, participates in either 'expansion' or 'compression'.

(D) "Interpretation" (my term, it is avoided by Celibidache, because it is loaded with the connotation of 'ignorance'): (1) the notation does not indicate

sound, so the performer must enter behind the notation; (2) an unarticulated sound–mass is perceivable, whereas an articulation of the sound–mass provides better communication as an epiphenomenon; (3) phrasing depends on tempo; (4) the difference between instruments (e.g. the violin as opposed to viola) necessitates **structuring** in orchestral combination and balancing of the sound–mass; and (5) in a two–part setting, the superior part enforces the inferior part.

With respect to (A), the point of departure is ontological: "Nichts ist Musik, sondern etwas kann Musik werden. Was in der Klang hat Fähigkeit Menschen zu interessieren? So als ontologische Erscheinung? Wir sind in einem Ruhezustand und wir hören [einen Ton]: Wir werden aus dieser Ruhe herausgenommen. Wir können auf diese Provokation auf zwei Weise reagieren: [1] Wir möchten noch etwas hören, oder wir können auch sagen: [2] Nein!. Darum: alle beide Einstellungen sind richtig." (155) The encountered sound event reveals immediately the state of our consciousness: we already become directed either outwardly by opening ourselves up in preparation for a preliminary incorporative or assimilative mode ("*Aneignung*"), or inwardly by closing ourselves, i.e. in the confrontation we should reject the impressive and disturbing tone coming from outside: "Bei der Musik ist natürlich die erste [Einstellung] massgeblich".

This is basically the open approach which, I contend, is a condition for the assimilative mode of listening to music. The reason to avoid the concept of "attitude" or to apply this concept only restrictively in connection with discussions on the process of assimilation, Celibidache's "*Aneignungsprozess*", is clearly not a concession to phenomenological doctrine; attitude is already a voluntarily directed attention, i.e. an active extension of the I in the outward world, and consequently an **onto–projection** of the I into the world of sound. Celibidache enters, already on this primordial level, into further phenomenological considerations of the encounter between man and music: "Wieso besteht ein Interesse auf was kommen kann, nachdem schon etwas da ist, was wir gehört haben? Was veranlasst mich dahinzuhören? Das [erste Geschehniss] hat mich aus der Ruhe gerissen. Ich habe gehört, ich habe eine Reaktion dafür. Wenn dieses selbe Phänomen nocheinmal kommt: Was arbeitet so dass ich immer auf einem weiteren Vorgang höre und nicht das zweite Phänomen punktuell aufnehme? So, dass es ist eine *andere* Initiative. Warum denn das alles? Die Beziehung. Und was ist die Beziehung? [...] Die zweite Erscheinung wirkt auf mich in bezug auf was vorher war. [...] Das wirkt auf meinem Bewusstsein direkt und hinterlässt keinen Eindruck. Wenn es

keinen Eindruck hinterlässt, sind sie [die Erscheinungen] das was sie waren; mehr hat sie gar nicht können. Was haben wir registriert? Dass das zweite Phänomen, auch wobei es absolut identisch dem ersten ist, kommt nicht mehr auf demselben Grund vor; sondern der Grund ist verarbeitet von dem ersten. Also: wie oft kann man auf frischem Schnee gehen? Einmal." (157)

So in the encounter of two tones Celibidache introduces the concept of **relation** in order to account for what appears to be connective of the two phenomena. To me this seems to create a problem, at least one of terminology: **this relation is also a phenomenon, since it is something that appears to our consciousness**; it is nothing introduced from outside or from theoretical thinking, but it is a phenomenon of another structural layer of hierarchic levels, of another kind and dignity. There are phenomena of various levels, constituting a hierarchy, and **relation is a second-degree phenomenon** lacking the sensuous qualities of first-degree tone phenomena.

Celibidache continues: "Was veranlasst mich weiter zu hören? Wenn sie [die Phänomene] nicht identisch sind, was ist geschehen? Das zweite Phänomen ist entweder stärker oder schwächer wirkend. Ist es zu mehr oder zu weniger? In beiden Fällen aber entsteht eine Differenz an Potential, an Spannung: Das [erste Phänomen] ist eine Lage, das [andere Phänomen] ist eine andere Lage an Potentialität." (157) So Celibidache proceeds by gradually introducing further notions that become defined by the increasingly complex context in which they occur. **Tension** is at stake, according to Celibidache, already at the level of a motif of simple recurrence of one tone. Tension ("*Spannung*") is presented as "*das allerwichtigste*", "*massgebend*", "*erster Aspekt*". The tension is closely related to **mass**, which is an experiential phenomenon based on acoustical grounds. Still, Celibidache states **no physical laws of causality**. The evidence for such complex interrelations between phenomena can only be supported by repeated recurrence of appearing contents in individual experience as evidence for the musico-cognitive functions of our primordially reflective consciousness.

At the same time, the logicity of these notions make them appropriate candidates for **musical a priori**. In order to pursue such an endeavor to find a consistent description based on experientially confirmed phenomenological consideration, Celibidache postulates the determinations of his notions ("*Wesenserschauung/erfassung*" cf. Huss. III:1:138 *pass.*): Thus for **tension**: "Was ist das Wesen der Spannung? [157] Opposition, Kontrast. Bei dem einfachsten musikalischen Intervall, bei der Prim, bei derselben Note haben wir gesehen wie der Kontrast sich zeigt. Es ist entweder von mehr auf weniger oder von

weniger auf mehr. Und das ist die reduzierteste Form von Spannung." Since music, by analogy to acoustics, is physically conditioned by the moving of a mass, Celibidache duplicates the justification of his consideration of mass phenomena and their interrelation to tension on the **experiential level**.

A single tone will bring into motion only a small mass, whereas a grand fortissimo chord over the whole range of the orchestral ambitus evidently appears to have the quality of mass. Celibidache attempts to clarify what the basis for the persistence in **musical experience of mass** could be: "Was gibt einer bewegenden Klangmasse das Recht in der Zeit bestehen zu dürfen?", and he gives the reply: "Oppositionen zwischen den bildenden Elementen aus denen die Masse besteht." (157) So **contrast**, or more precisely, **opposition**, effects (constitutes) the compelling **impulse** in the world of forces appearing on the scene of musical consciousness, which keeps the mass alive against its **natural tendency to disappear** ("*Verschwinden*", "*Absterben*" 159). The human effort to contribute energy for the purpose of initiating and upholding sound (by counteracting its natural **inertia**) opposes the natural silence of motionless matter in the cosmos: "Diesen Ton hat der Mensch nicht geschaffen, sondern aus dem Kosmos geraubt oder geliehen. Dieser Ton hat gekämpft gegen etwas als er aus der Initialruhe gerissen wurde. Er kommt in Schwingung [...] durch den Mensch. Der Mensch tut etwas, damit dieser Masse [...] ins Schwingen kommt" (159)

And consequently the gradual extinction of the tone, the fact that "das Phänomen abstirbt", means that "der Kosmos es wieder zurückgewinnt", and this reflects the double affiliation ("*doppelte Zugehörigkeit*" 159) of the tone: "Das [Phänomen] gehörte einerseits dem Menschen, denn wir machenden Ton ob auf der Trompete oder auf einer Saite, aber es gehört nicht nur dem Mensch: Es gehört auch dem Kosmos." Celibidache, in this way of thinking, arrives at a critical stance towards the existence of interpretation in the proper sense of that word: "Bei diese Betrachtung kommt jetzt ein ungeheuer wichtiger Konsequenz für uns [...]: Warum es keine Interpretation gibt. Was ist die direkte Konsequenz davon? Jede Erscheinung geht weg. Die Tatsache dass das Kosmos es wieder zu sich nimmt." So through the sound arising out of silence and through the persistence of this sound which persists through contrasts brought about by human action on nature (but still totally depending on its laws), the music develops "*von wenig auf mehr*", i.e. in an increase of tension: "eine Zunehmung von Spannung. Wir sind jetzt im Ansteigen. Indem wir ansteigen sind wir ein Schritt weiter als wir am Anfang waren. Wir sind engagiert jetzt. In einer Aktion.

Wir folgen diesen Werten. Und von etwas kommen wir auf der."("etwas anderes"; physiologic analogies; 157)

This is then the **phase of ascending tension**, or, according to Celibidache "*die Expansionsphase*" which after the culmination is countered by "*die Kompressionsphase*". Rising and falling tension is **neutral terminology**, whereas Celibidache's concepts, **expansion** and **compression**, also propositionally define the kind of **human action on nature** that would be needed to arrive at the outcome of these kinds of processes:

Expansion, in my conception, can ambiguously refer to either forces from inside which tend to enlarge the entity (by analogy to mechanical expansion) or, to enlarging by effort the volume and tension (as by analogy to bodily expansion in respiration); it seems to be a crucial question for this phenomenology of performance, whether the expanding change of sound occurs from inside, or only when acted upon by the performer.

Similarly, one could point at the problem of compression, which does not correspond to the analogy of respiration preferred by Celibidache as far as the **first phase of development** is concerned. The **second phase of development** would demand human action in order to reduce the motive force (or, less neutral, the "kinetic energy") in view of (or, more actively, projecting towards) the final resolution of tension. The question is, how does the **climax of the tension** become reduced? **Contraction**, which is a concept applied in some contexts by Celibidache, is still an analogy of increased muscular tension, not the relaxed tension of second-phase respiration, i.e. of expiration (breathing-out release). And compression seems more of a mechanical analogy, not reducing tension, but reducing volume actively from outside with the effect of increased tension: "Die Expansion einer Masse ist nur Funktion von Spannung. Musik ist nichts anderes als expandierende Masse." (127) But reducing tension, I submit, may require human force if, against the energy of the moving sound-mass, it is in contrast to the 'conceding' release as sensitively responding on the basis of a naturally decreasing sound-mass.

So **tension** and mass are both important notions in the development of an ontology of music. This may possibly explain why Celibidache finally characterizes the essence of music as the most concentrated and most crystalline of relations. With some reference to Zen Buddhism, he states: "Music is divine identity, to find me in you." This formula, "*ich wiederfinde mich in dich*" (79), may seem paradoxical, but it is congruent to the idea of phenomenological intersubjectivity.

It refers to the phenomenological concept of **objectivity** as "*intersubjektive Betreffbarkeit*" (Celibidache) or "*Einverständnis*" (Huss. III:1:102), which is based on the view that there is a reliable constancy, due to apriorical logic, in the constitutional "nature" of the functioning of the human mind. Simultaneously, Celibidache talks about **objectifying** in another sense, namely "*Verobjektivierung des Materials*" (183):

According to this idea, the objectifying of the material, i.e. the upheaval of acoustical objects into the realm of focused intentionality in the musical mind, where these objects appear as musical objects, is a *conditio sine qua non* for the phenomenological regarding, consideration and critical discussion of proposed (or alleged) qualities of these musical objects on the **objectivistic level of intersubjective coincidence**. In order to make possible a discussion of musical objects we must be able to identify them intersubjectively in a way that allows for each listener to appeal to his own experience for evidence, with the result of validation or invalidation of the experience or its description. We must attain unanimity in the identification (and, consequently, the discrimination) of these musical objects in order to coalesce the differing opinions among musicians into a single and 'sole' orchestral performance and facilitate comparison through, and gradual specification (clarification) of, partly conflicting or contradictory phenomenological descriptions. Thus the considerations that lead to such descriptions must also be commented on:

With respect to (B): **Reference system** is a concept that can be claimed to attain general validity for conscious listening, and is consequently within the phenomenological "nomenclature" of Celibidache. The **priority of tension**, postulated by Celibidache, proceeds from the fact that no specific reference system, say of rhythm, melody or dynamics, can be isolated as independent of **tension**; there is always some way to influence the **progress of tension** by elaborating differently the realization of individual dimensions occurring in specific reference systems or by interrelating them differently. However, in the end, the progress of tension ("*Spannungsentwicklung*") will appear as the **last reference system**. (183) So it is clear that the specific reference systems are related hierarchically; there are superordinate and subordinate reference systems forming a complex overriding network, according to Celibidache: e.g. "*Gesetzmässigkeit des Tempowirkens*" (78) is superior to the harmonic reference system. Both seem to contribute and fuse into the **tension system**.

In a melodic **reference system**, for instance, the **first** tone in the sequence of tones functions as the **point of reference**, (cf. Celibidache's "*punta d'origine*",

"*Herkunftspunkt*". Together with the last tone in the melody, they are **crucial moments**: "Kruzialmomente sind wie es beginnt und wie es schliesst." (163) And Celibidache further investigates **moments of identity, climax, and top and turning point tones** as essential points of reference that govern the evolvement of "*Spannung*" versus "*Auflösung*" (the **tension–resolution pair**), which produce the **integration of related moments** in the melody. The sequence of tension maxima arriving in a varying number of differentiated resolutions results in a specific curvature related to the specificity of the pattern of recurrence of the tension–contour varying its extension within a melody e.g. *alla breve* [2], "triangular" [3] and "Kreuz" [4] until advanced forms of 'unevenly' divided meters (*dispari*) [e.g. 7 as 3 beats of each – e.g. –2, 2 and 3 subbeats]; Celibidache's terminology reflects the form of the corresponding geometrical model for conducting the beat that he proposes for the melody. Thus, in agreement with Ansermet, and probably Dorati, Celibidache's system provides a close correspondence between the development of musical tension and the basic beat figures and their modifications, albeit in very different ways. However, the details of the ingeniously constituted principles of beat technique which can be studied in the documented material, are not the subject of the present investigation. Quite evidently, then, if the experiential melodic reference systems play the decisive role appointed by Celibidachean phenomenology, **relative pitch**, the inborn or acquired ability to identify and interrelate similar or 'identical' moments and to notice (distinguish) differences in the sound–flow by hearing, completely surpasses absolute pitch as a fundamental 'musicognitive' faculty.

Celibidache's concept of **directionality** ("*Direktionalität*") can be viewed as an application of Husserl's phenomenology of the **directed intentionality of time consciousness**. The Husserlian "*Retention*" and "*Protention*" (Huss. X:392,410: "Jedes Stück, jede Artikulation von Musik kennt 2 Phasen: eine Expansivphase und eine Kompressivphase." (137) The time consciousness is intentionally directed towards the climax during the introductory, allegedly expansive phase, whereas the direction is reversed after the climax in the second phase, which is considered by Celibidache to be compressive: "Die Zeit ist anders gerichtet von Höhepunkt bis Ende." (137) The direction of the time–consciousness during the course of the p(w) is first "*nach vorne*" and then "*nach hinten*", whereas the **direction of relations** are only **prospective** in the beginning (i.e. only the first tone or event in the piece), only **retrospective** in the end (i.e. last tone), and both prospective and retrospective (i.e. double directed) in

between (i.e. effectively during the "whole" course of) the piece (MIR I:308,313 "*processualitet*", and MIR II:143,269). I cannot presently document the terms "prospective" and "retrospective" in quotations by Celibidache according to my collected material (MIR IV); still, these concepts capture the essence of his thought on **directionality** (his term). This has bearings on (1) the **structuring** ("*Strukturierung*", "*Strukturierbarkeit*" 185) of sound, and (2) **tempo-shaping** ("*Tempogestaltung*"). The aim of structuring is to facilitate the **interrelating of moments within or between reference systems**, or more basically to create the conditions necessary for such reference systems to arise in the hearing of the performance. Naturally, the structuring in performance can also effect the tension and contrast within one and the same reference system of e.g. a certain phrase, and it is often 'applied' as a device for this purpose. The more integrated through the connective network of relations the piece appears by means of such structuring, the more likely it is that the listener will be able to **reduce the manifoldness into the one**. In the hierarchical levels of metrical structure it is clear that this "one" is the collective and coinciding point of the encompassing perspective of the whole work as an entity. Simultaneously, the experience of this unifying one, requires the **identity of the beholder**, to which the manifoldness becomes connectively directed, since all experiencing must be derived from myself, from the I in a double sense. Through assimilation of the sensuous content of the tone, our consciousness searches for the most simple relations, can be overcome and left behind by the directed (constituted) intentionality of the musical mind. This focuses on gradually larger unities, by reducing (adopting) the smaller into the larger and more comprising view. Such **transcending** ("*Überhören*") is facilitated by many densely integrating identity moments, e.g. in a melody (70).

With respect to (C): This transcending is defined by Celibidache as "*Darüberhören. Nicht dabei-bleiben.*" The concept of transcending attains a central position in the phenomenology of Celibidache, who explains his thesis "*Musik hat nichts mit Klang zu tun*" (135), in this way: "Musik ist nicht Klang. Klang kann unter gewissen Umständen Musik werden. Was geschieht wenn ich nicht alle Werte da verarbeiten die vor meinem Bewusstsein stehen? Wir bleiben beim Klang. Gibt es Musik ohne Klang? Nein. Der Urstoff ist Klang. Aber Urstoff allein wird nicht Musik. Er muss verarbeitet werden denn Musik kann höchstens im Geiste eines Menschen entstehen. Und jede Zeit *neu* entstehen. Es gibt nicht etwas so wie die Fünfte von Beethoven, sondern: sie *entsteht* jedesmal neu."

The core of Celibidache's artistical credo would be the **phenomenology**

of **transcendence** applied and formulated as the essence of music. This motivates an expositional quotation. In explaining the potential transcendency of music, Celibidache designs a curvature representing the course of the music work from its beginning over several waves towards its climax, and gradually descending over recurring wave forms back to the level of its origin. "Also das ist ein Stück Musik. Es fängt hier an, hat verschiedene Artikulationen [the "waves"], kommt zu einer Höhepunkt und endet hier. Was hier [say at a certain 'bar 14' of a piece] geschieht kommt aus dem Vorhergehenden [close to a **generative 'idea'** or experience], verarbeiteten Tatsachen. Wenn ich hier bei T. 14 bin ["T." here for "*Takt*"; the primary and direct experience of **imaginative space** triggered by p(w)/p(c)], ist diese T. 14 im Beziehung auf Anfang, oder nicht? Klar. Und wo ist diese Beziehung? Denn der Anfang klingt nicht mehr. Im Kopf oder im Geist. Irgendwie ist im T. 14 mitenthalten alles was ausgesagt wurde *vor* ihm. Will ich jetzt mir den T. 14 anzueignen. Und nur weil [ich bei] dem T. 14 bin, kann ich wissen was in ihm mitenthalten ist [...]: In dem T. 14 sei und auch *nicht sei*, denn wenn ich nur ausschliesslich bei T. 14 bin habe ich das was die anderen gesagt haben nicht mehr. So: es entsteht diese Aussage jetzt: Ich bin bei T. 14 und um das zu wissen was vor T. 14 war muss ich auch *nicht* da sein. Oder: Ich muss den T. 14 aufnehmen und doch **transzendieren** [my boldtype]. Denn wenn ich nur bei den T. 14 bin weiss ich nicht was zuvor war. Bloss: es entsteht diese kolossal schwer zu verstehende Situation: Ich *bin* bei den T. 14 weil ich *nicht* da bin. Das ist das Wesen der Musik." (135) And: "Das Transzendieren des angeeigneten Klanges ist das Wesen der Musik." (133) For the rest of the discussion I will designate this thesis as the **Celibidache ontological paradox of music**.

The paradox is that music becomes music only when it is transcended by human consciousness. This, then, can be related to the notion of "now" as a point in the time continuum: "Musik ist nicht eine Serie von punktuellen Eindrücken; das und das und das und das...Sondern: Dieses Jetzt, wo ich mich jetzt befinde kommt von irgendwoher, und steht in einer absolut ininterpretablen **Beziehung** zu den Anfang. Dieses T. 14 oder dieses Jetzt enthält alles was ausgesagt ist. Aber ich kann nichts davon wissen wenn ich mich vertiefe oder daranklebe an dem Jetzt. Ich muss weg von diesem Jetzt. Aber wann? Gerade in diesem Jetzt muss ich dabei sein und nicht dabei sein. Oder: Ich muss da sein weil ich nicht da bin. Umgekehrt, ist in diesem ersten Anfang auch das was aus ihm entstehen wird potential enthalten, wie ein Samen aus dem ein Baum wachsen wird. Der Baum ist noch nicht da. Aber die Möglichkeit dass der Baum so kommt wie die Samen ist, besteht. [...] Auch der T. 14 trägt in sich Potentialität." (136–137)

The **biological analogy** to growing (the idea of **organicism** pursued by Furtwängler *et alia*; 83, 135), which we found also explicitly in the thinking of Paul Sacher, and implicitly in the cognitive conception of the interpretive performance faculty of Antal Dorati, formulated by means of the concept of potentiality, has not the same logical consistency as the previous phenomenological considerations of interrelatedness within a composition. Still, Celibidache's view merges experiential with cognitive aspects in a comprehensive and impressively profound mode of musical thinking.

With respect to (D): The idea of **uninterpretability** concerns us (MIR I:155). The radical **refutation of interpretation** (claimed to be logically valid), as argued by Celibidache, on the one hand denies the existence of interpretation. On the other hand, and this seems contradictory, he defines interpretation as the world of arbitrariness of self-willfulness ("*Willkür*" MIR IV:199), which, allegedly, does not exist since the piece is already there before it begins. Now this argument is not consistent. Whether the piece exists in the form of some kind of prior potentiality (of the musical mind or object) is a question that has nothing to do with the existence of interpretation. Celibidache states (my translation): "I must find the way to it [the work]." (199) Now this statement conceals an argument against the *a priori* validity of all interpretations that must be respected and considered, since "the work is already there" entails a definite and in all respects **determined constitution of the work** that leaves no room for arbitrary interpretation. The only task of the performer is to "find the way to it". Consequently, all interpretations, according to Celibidache, are just indications of the I's **ignorance of the work** ("*Ignoranz*"). After having determined the ontology of w or c, the task remains to find access to it, preserve and realize it in p, which is an objectivistic position.

What immediately strikes one as questionable is the statement that the relation between one point in the course of the piece to its origin in the first tone would be an uninterpretable relation ("*ininterpretable Beziehung*"). The postulate concerning the uninterpretability deserves further analysis. The notion **interpretation** exists, but this does not prove the existence of interpretation as **phenomenon** or as **fact**. It is still possible, and does not violate logical consistency, to argue against the existence of interpretation as phenomenon or fact: (1) interpretative moments in musical acts, cognitive processing, or components of the audible (alt. acoustic) result could be reduced to objective relations between work-facts and experiential sound phenomena. (2) This issue is also a question of the **definition** of a concept baptized "interpretation". Several operative

definitions are possible; what is important is only what they say about the concept's relations to other concepts and notions, such as relation, freedom, structure, time, experience, and music. The question must be posed: what does Celibidache mean by interpretation when he uses the term in rejecting its existence as a phenomenon?

Interpretation, according to Celibidache, is false ignorance, i.e. the unjustified transmission of subjective or personal impressions from the performer to the work (199). Still, if one endeavors to study those processes generally denoted by "interpretation", it is necessary, according to Celibidache, to do so only by means of phenomenological investigation in order to learn about the **effects of the musical material**. (67) The music is definitively constituted in its **topography of processuality** ("*Topographie der Werdegang*" 91), and the audience's, i.e. the listeners', experience is a function of this capacity. So Celibidache concludes that **no interpretation can legitimately depend on the audience**, unless one allows for some adjustment of the tempo due to the changed acoustic conditions of a well filled-up concert hall compared to a half-empty one. But this, contends Celibidache, is just a **correction**, and has **no influence on interpretation as fact or intention**. (91) The problem of tempo-choice has more to do with physical conditions of volume and mass than it does with directed or undirected, cognitive or circumstantial influence.

In sum, then, Celibidache holds an **objectivist** stance regarding the mission of the performer: "*Wir interpretieren nicht, sondern schaffen die Bedingungen dass Musik entstehen kann.*" (132) And these conditions become fulfilled only when we transcend the sound: "*Transzendieren heisst von Sein aufs Werden zu kommen*" (197), which it is not possible to achieve through an intellectual approach, or a logical act or mode of thinking. The only "logic" that Celibidache acknowledges explicitly in music is the **logic of continuity** (197) Evidently, Celibidache believes that a correct phenomenological analysis can clarify the conditions for the emergence of this act of transcending in music.

Identity has two aspects in the general conception of Celibidache's metainterpretative view: it is (1) a **numerary** and structural reduction of plentifulness and manifoldness to the **one**, and (2) it functions with the aim of producing **unity** (83; 69,82). In the personal soundshaping of Celibidache, the structured sequence of **impact (impulse)–resolution** is characteristic. It is important to note that the resolution is regarded as a **consequence** of the impulse, as a "*Folge*": "*Impuls ist nicht anders als das Wesen der Tätigkeit*" (97), and this **integrated duality** is justified by reference to observations on a broad

consensus about the general value of extramusical derivation; the origin of this duality seems physiological: "Das Wesen einer Artikulation ist dass sie aus zwei Momenten besteht, ein *Impakt* (impact) oder Impuls und jeweils seine *Auflösung*. Das ist wahr für die Sprache, das ist wahr für jede andere Form von menschliche Tätigkeit: Das Gehen ist artikuliert, der Herzschlag ist artikuliert, das Atmen ist artikuliert usw." (97)

The resolution is characterized as "*Nicht-Tätigkeit*"; and Celibidache recognizes several sophisticated and subtle gradations, in due situations, of the relation between strong and weak elements within a rhythm. The Riemann doctrine of the weak up-beat is rejected. A stressed up-beat produces an increased driving impulse to the phrase which, apparently, can be explained as a method for avoiding tedious repetition of successive phrases in the course of the development of a larger form. Another possibility is the subtle *Verschmelzung* between the upbeat and following downbeat, or, logically formulated by Celibidache, "Identität zwischen Auftakt und das Folgende." (151)

All the constituents of the Celibidache interpretative concept cannot be pointed to; the analyses in MIR IV show more of them. One principle is the **treble priority** ('*Diskantpriorität*') for the multipart-texture (polyphonic, homophonic setting, multmelodic or counterpointal texture), i.e. for the relation between melody and harmony, as well as for the melodic or structural turning point tones (certain summits and contours) occurring in the web of parts.

Celibidache's aesthetic goal is to preserve the compositional relations of the phenomena aroused by a complex interplay of reference systems on all hierarchical levels. Celibidache conceded to my conjecture that relation in music appears only on the basis of hierarchical levels of structure, but he stresses that these relations are not explainable but merely experienceable. In music, then, a relation can appear as an experiential phenomenon, which is the property of this art (its logical predicate), as Celibidache confirmed in our discussion (Munich 8.3.93): the sound is related to itself; it can be experienced but not understood. The fact that consciousness is one ties all the facts together – i.e. all tonal phenomena are united by the identity of consciousness. Objectivity as the opposite of subjectivity is not possible; only intersubjectivity exists. But music is no topography and no object in itself; music has no definition, according to Celibidache. We have no access to its facts through thinking, in Celibidache's words: "Denken ist kein Zugang zur Musik, denn Musik ist Werdegang." The reply that thinking is also a process would weaken the

argument. But the quote hints at the fact that access can be obstructed by active cognition, especially creative S-expression (S→O ex-acts), since music appears as an experiential phenomenon. This is valid for simultaneous processings, but does not hold for post-factum 'secondary' reflection: I cannot see how a 'cognitive' consideration and contemplation after having listened to the music hinders access (and assimilation) either retrospectively (of the piece I just heard) or prospectively (of the piece I will shortly hear).

In reference to time consciousness, it is interesting to note that Celibidache conceives of the form of existence of music as a **transcendental simultaneity**: "Musik besteht am Ende durch Gleichzeitigkeit des Anfangs und Ende."

But if "*Denken*" is also a temporal process, would this not imply that access to the work is possible through thinking? In the conception of Celibidache, the answer is no, since thinking and experiencing music are two entirely separated cognitive modi. Does this entail that thinking has nothing to do with experiencing, that they are incongruent, and that their results, applied to music, are incompatible? No, music can influence, modify, amplify or calm down the stream of thoughts but its connection between experiential and cognitive phenomena is not determinative, it is associative and inconstant, individual, if not arbitrary. Therefore, thinking can be no basis for interpretation, and there can be no bases for interpretation whatsoever. This is the background to the **noninterpretational thesis**.

However, "was Musik nicht ist, kann definiert werden: Klang ist nicht Musik, aber Klang kann Musik werden." To my proposal that the core of a music phenomenology would be "die Musik so hervortreten lassen wie sie ist, d.h. (1) sie ist, (2) sie ist in ihrer Prozessualität, Topographie **nicht arbiträr**" Celibidache agreed only to the extent that "*die Werdegang ist vom Komponisten vorgezeichnet*", but this is no topography, since "vorgezeichnet ist schon Relation in die Natur, es ist sogar Spuren eines Erlebnisses, denn Notation gibt es nicht ohne Intention."

Principally, Celibidache rejects the postulate that tradition is a decisively influential factor on performance: **historicity** has no justification, and **authenticity** is a chimera. He acknowledges Ansermet's interpretation of intervals (72, 84). The principles of unifying development by means of the tonality's centeredness of the forces in attraction, as in Heinrich Schenker's writings (180, 189), gain recognition, as does the concept of "latitude", i.e. intonational tolerance, especially regarding the fifth in the theory of Jacques Handschin (97). Hanslick attracts some attention for his rejection of the idea of extramusical meaning in music

(194). Riemann's theory is rejected on the basis of the dogmaticism of the weak up-beat, and the same crucial issues caused problems in the theory of the upbeat by Arnold Schering.

The core of Celibidache's concept can be outlined by the following theses: (1) the relational thesis, (2) the experiential thesis, (3) the noncomprehensional (non-discursive, non-cognitive) thesis, (4) the transcendency thesis, (5) the unity thesis: consciousness is the condition for unity in music, (6) the nonobjectivist intersubjectivity thesis, (7) the nondefinitorial thesis: it is not possible to define what music is – it is only possible to define what music is not.

Regarding the physiological analogies, it may be noted that "expansion" as in respiration is **increasing tension**, since it is **expansion against inertia** ("*Widerstand*"), whereas compression or release ("*Auslassen*") appears as two different phenomena after the climax.

Only one's own genuine experience is the basis for music. To go against the **natural tendencies** of the music, i.e. of its material effects ("*Das Gegengehen der natürlichen Tendenzen*", e.g. "*Überwindung von Inertia*"), creates **opposition** and **tension**, which needs to be gradually resolved (released, "aufgelöst") in a phase of deconstruction and return by the **outflow of motion and increased surfacility** ("*Abbau*", "*Abbauphase*", "*Auslauf*"; "*grössere Flächichkeit*"). The surfacility ("*Flächichkeit*") refers to the proportion between the sounding mass and motion ("*Klangaufwand und Bewegung*"). Obviously, all 'factors', such as evenness of rhythm ("*Ausgeglichenheit der Rhythmus*"), dissonances, and instrumentation (including sound distribution on registers of instrument and orchestra respectively), contribute to the phenomenon of "*Flächichkeit*".

The philosophers that evidently form a background to Celibidache's studies, and to whom he refers are: Husserl (67, [114], 157, [182], 199), Heidegger (182); critically to Kant (180, 205), Schleiermacher (180, 193), and Dilthey (180, 204–205). The relations to aesthetic and philosophical traditions are treated briefly in chapter I:1 and II:2–3, whereas the problematization of the main aesthetic categories have a bearing on our conclusions (ch. VI); Celibidache's position is summarized in ch. V:6. He delivers ingenious and extremely critical verdicts of many currently praised artists; only a few of the latter are accepted.

He acknowledges his debt to Furtwängler whom he followed as a young conductor (Lang 1988, Weiler 1993:47–58). Franco Ferrara, treated in our unpublished documentations, but not included in MIR, and Victor de Sabata are among those few; they reveal "ein intuitives Gefühl für das Verhältnis Material

zum Tempo" (IV:242). A pianist who is accorded respect is Arturo Benedetto Michelangelo.

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF AESTHETIC PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM OR DECISIVELY INFLUENCED BY CELIBIDACHE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION, INCLUDING INTRODUCTORY AESTHETIC REFLECTIONS ON MIR IV

What would "phenomenological processes of interpretation" be? If music appears in the encounter between the musical mind and musicwork and the actualization of apriorical conceptions is released by the assimilated empirical world of the work, it would be reasonable to talk about a "musical *a priori*" corresponding to the limited courses of musical development in a work that are available to human consciousness. It is presupposed that this human consciousness is characterized by its "musical mind". It would be reasonable to talk about certain music-logical courses of development outlined by empirical instances of the "musical world", made possible through the potential cognitive processing capacity of our musical mind. If there are unreleased auditional possibilities, and a generative or processual "logic", it would be possible in principle to predict the outcome of a started musical progress. If the governing principles are held by an encompassingly visionary musical mind, it would make sense to claim that these variously emerging topographies pre-exist as unevolved potentialities in a human consciousness. Then the question becomes pertinent as to whether and to what extent all or some human beings share the same competence. This, however, would be a difficult question for cognitive music psychology to illuminate.

On conditions of (1) openness of the musical mind, (2) no hindrances, no screening off, no maskings, and (3) maximized circumstances, such as the most fortunate position related to the live sound source, it would be possible that a limited number of courses and ramifications of developments be 'engraved' in such a musical mind. Then a discussion on directions and trajectories of development would be the best preparation for an interpreter with these skills: the awareness of the apriorical logic of development would provide the sole secure ground for the expected imprint of the empirically impressed inflection in the auditive experience. The Husserlian concept of "*Vergegenwärtigung*" points at the act of our mind that reactualizes past experiences into present awareness: Husserl alludes to an active and conscious

act of the mind. But if another act, that of **passive reactualization**, is released by the sounding music in the very moment of present experience, as I propose, the performer would be enabled to hold protentional projections.

The question then arises about the extendedness of such protentional projections and their relations to the extension of the present moment, i.e. the "window of the now". It is possible that a protention and retention that encompass the entire work in its temporal evolvment yield no further alternatives for the course of development of the remaining part of the piece, provided the established complex pattern of relations are maintained through the performance (MIR IV:2 *et passim*). Then the result would have respected all the relations compatible to the system of this interpretation, in case it could not be excluded that there are other coherent systems available for realization in performance. If, as Celibidache claims, there can be no room for an interpretation of the potentially preexistent relations, I submit for hierarchical reasons, then there can be only 'disregard' for these, or "ignorance" (neglect, indifference), as he puts it. Now, if the window of now is contracted into an infinitesimally small time interval by the focusing of consciousness towards the limen of a "point of time", then the indeterminacy of development, as conceived by the projective musical mind, would increase to the utmost extreme of **total interpretability**. Therefore, if Celibidache's postulate of uninterpretability holds, musical consciousness must be all-encompassing. It then remains to be established what principles guide the musical mind, without falling into dogmatic exclusivity.

Paradoxically, it would be possible to deny all such principles, with reference to radical empiricisms of various kinds: (1) if phenomenological openmindedness were the sole source of access and knowledge to the world's constitution, including all paradigms of musical development (then there could be no "principles" guiding the musical tracks, only "principles" of the mind's constitution and mode of acting) and (2) musical phenomena could be reduced to the "facts of the world" in the sense of Wittgenstein.

If, however, some logical constancy of "processuality" can be maintained, a few of the guiding "logics" could be those suggested in MIR IV:2–3. There, principles of (1) **inertia** of the musical mass (if also an experiential 'analogy' to physics), (2) **repetition**, (3) **eternal change**, (4) **eternal continuity**, (5) **linear wave motion** (pendulation), and (6) **constant pendulation** between contrasts (in close physical analogy including weight, changes of direction at the two opposite extreme positions, motion and velocity; "oppositions"), are further explicated.

Concerning the problem of evidence for these musico-logical constancies,

and the further analyses and conclusions (MIR IV:8–58), let us imagine that person A states *p* which refers to an experiential fact. Person B replies: I understand that it must be so, or it must have been so. He grasps a general aspect of the individual instance, by asserting (assessing) the **possibility of the truthfulness** of the content of the statement *p*. This he does by reference to a shared principle of rationality: it must be **possible** to have such an experience in order for it to have (since it has) occurred in experiential reality, and in order for it to be true (since such instances have occurred as historical facts) and to attain credibility for the truth of the proposition stating that it has in fact occurred. Given the affirmative answer to this question of possibility, and given the acknowledged credibility of person A, there remains no reason for distrusting A, and no reason for rejecting his statement *p* (his assertion 'that *p*') on the putative ground of presuming its falseness. This implies that (1) it is true that it was actually possible that A experienced *p*, but only on the condition that this was possible, which was established; and (2) since A refers to such an experience, proving (establishing) that he had it, and relates it without violating any shared and acknowledged principles of rationality, given his credibility and the lack of an apparent reason for him to betray his interlocutor, it is indeed compatible with rationality and serious science to conclude that A really had the experience *p*. Since all knowledge is grasped by our assimilating consciousness, this consideration is crucial to the epistemology of interpretation research.

Finally, in the theoretical framework of ch. I:2 and its terminology, Celibidache represents the position of **internal (and experiential w-) expretation**.

An additional check—upon Celibidache was made in November 1993 at Gasteig Kulturzentrum, Munich, while he was rehearsing Haydn's Symphony no. 103 in E flat major, Tchaikovsky's Symphony no. 4 in F minor op 36, and Verdi's *Requiem* with *Münchener Philharmoniker*. The findings and discussions from these sessions will be included in the final integration of the descriptive material about conductorial functions and the *i*-profile, to the extent that resources can be found for the preparation and publication of the documents of MIR IV. A few of his comments are included in the discussion in ch. VI.

V:5 CRITICS

We have seen in ch. IV:5 that the main problems of criticism of pi were (1) the conflict between the demands of objectivity for ethical and i-research reasons and (2) the demands of comprehensible and expressive language for audiences. We will now make an additional attempt to reconcile these diverging aspects.

The basic conditions for the music critic are much wider than those pertinent to comparative interpretation analysis, since (1) the communication must remain understandable for the ordinary concert attender and newspaper reader. Therefore the music critic refrains from technical terms and analyses. Still the demands of precision and security of judgement are high, since the social and economic effects of the critic's verdict are considerable. Due to these and other constraints, it is possible that hermeneutic interpretation criticism on this communicative level fulfills a rational purpose; that the subjective components are required if communication with reader and listener is to be maintained. George Bernhard Shaw admits, on his account, that his "knowledge of music did not extend to its technicalities" but warns the young prospective critic against amateurism, and demands "three main qualifications" in his indeed very general article on "How to become a musical critic" (*The Scottish Musical Monthly*, Dec. 1894): (1) "good sense and knowledge of the world", as a prerequisite for communicability, (2) "a cultivated taste for music", i.e. the ability to discriminate, and (3) being "a skilled writer", "a practised critic", hinting at a requirement of literary qualities. Unfortunately, the principle differences between the various objects of criticism, whether composition, composer, interpretation, musicians or conductor, are not recognized by Shaw, whereas Wilhelm Peterson-Berger specifies his general ideals of "honesty, knowledge, matter-of-factness, led by good will" in demanding (1) practical skills, (2) auditive proficiency ("*gehörsanalys*"), (3) theoretical knowledge about essentials, genres and means, and demands (4) "a lively historical mind" from his critic, which sounds contradictory to his just stated demand for authenticity. By analogy to the cruelty of nature and biology, and as a consequence of his matter-of-fact ideal ("*saklighet*", 'objectivity'; my translations), he tries to justify a combination of ruthlessness and personal idiosyncrasy as musically legitimate: ("All konstkritik skall vara icke blott hänsynslös utan äfven – personlig!" he contends in "Några ord om musikkritik", *Idun* 1912:628–629). There is no attempt to analyze the prerequisites for such a purported objectivity, which is a veiled **subjectivism**. (see also ch. IV:5)

The arguments that could justify this position are that: (1) the critic writes about the wider context of the w (w_{∞}) in which even looser associations are involved; if these are a part of reality, they have also their due place in a description of reality. If the critic is a skilled author, his literary creativity is needed to furnish the w with its contextual content. This is necessarily a creative endeavor since the w does not originally have, as c has, its context, but only gradually attains it. In this, the w is completely cut off from its provenance, and does not carry its determinants; and the composer is *a priori* no more successful than the critic in his search for ancillary associations that will fit into the w and inscribe it with one out of several alternative contexts. There is a social and cultural arbitrariness about the argument that disallows the counter-argument about the inherence of w -contextuality; (2) both the critic and the criticism-reading concert-attenders are 'permeated' by (imbued with) a world of subjective contentions and ideas, and have to take their stance even in questions that cannot be determined objectively; and (3) a subjective language or poetic idiom will evoke more subtle associations or open the reader's mind to hitherto unprecedented experiences by arousing presentiments and emotions in him that he thought did not pertain to music experience. The associative interconnective network is developed, and increases interrelatedness, and possibly coherency of w -experience. Thus, the critic creates a complex network of associative images and imaginations, points to their 'relationability' to mip – and this is his duty in order to facilitate or enrich the auditors' experiences; the counter-argument being that the created associations are not w -inherent.

I will therefore allow myself to enlarge the scope of my argument in this chapter by inventorying subjectivity in a **nonformalistic** fashion at the very periphery of my theory. The propositions are tentative hypotheses that serve to provide material for a **cognitive mapping** of the relevant parameters in a subjective experience of mip . I will include a wider object of interpretation, regarding the concert situation as seen from the critic's perspective, by voluntarily giving a more personal account in summarizing my impressions in this work (MIR V). The justification for doing this is precisely to open up the discussion to include other qualities otherwise put at a disadvantage in the investigation of 'purely' musical phenomena that may seem abstract to the uninitiated reader. Whether or not this concept is legitimate, is an open question and must so remain, for scientific and ethical reasons. But I would rather practice an approach of unorthodox hermeneutical phenomenology within a more encompassing view as the basis for this exploration. The

questions I pose here will partly overlap the one chosen for the present investigation (ch. I:1), but from a vantage point in a less restricted experiential world. When I use "we", "I", or their derivations (self-reflective or possessive pronouns) in this connection, I refer to an **apriorical potentiality of experiential coincidence**, phenomenological intersubjectivity ("*varje-jag*"), not to an established empirical fact; "we" points to the fact that we (sic!) share certain experiences with other people in a social context, whereas "I" hints at the phenomenon of necessary individual experience. My aim is to show that music in the **uncensored experiential situation** of its total setting, if interpreted in that way, can contribute to creating **coherency in life** through its provoking of a reflective flow along the sounding progression of time, that music not only concerns "it" but is also "me" to the degree that I am involved in the experience. Phenomenology infers this from its presupposition that there is no empty consciousness, since the consciousness is constituted by its objects; it is, according to this philosophy, impossible to conceive of something without beholding the object that the mind is of. The object constitutes the 'form' of the mind by delimiting its experience. But the **content** of the phenomenological form is, crudely expressed, furnished by hermeneutic content, and this productive source needed for in-acts must contribute to that same degree as the w's indeterminacy.

However, in order to vindicate this 'digression' I will show in this excursus how a personally formulated criticism can be based on facts adducible as evidence against reproach, if a defence is called for to support the critical statements. The main idea is that subjectivity is defensible under the circumstances, provided it does not lead to extreme arbitrariness, since it is a natural component of human fantasy and the productive imagination. The argument is that subjectivity is not so 'dangerous' as is often suggested, since it is (1) genuine experiential content of the mind, (2) 'opinion' that does not interfere with the basic fact (c, n) of reality.

From the earlier studies I refer to critiques founded on ias, pointing at the favorable opportunity for critics to interact with mir. This has preliminarily been practiced in respect to Hans Leygraf (analyses MIR III:223–230 and critique V:48–49), Herbert Blomstedt (interview 13.3.80 III:212–216, critique V:79–80 6.12.77, 109–110 10.12.78, and 229–230), Antal Dorati (III:126–136) and Silvio Varviso (V:50–55), investigations not repeated here due to limited space.

In the case of Hans Leygraf, though, there is a personal consistency through the years (drawn from the courses that I attended in Salzburg 1969–70,

concerts, recordings, and p.c., including correspondence) of his well-documented basic i-concept, including his mode of structural clarification. There are i-devices that recur persistently, the **balancing** of expressive ingredients and the **integration** of these against the established ground of formal transparency, e.g. in his Schubert summer concert 1978 (MIR V:48–49, *Moments musicaux*): "The balanced form and expression conveyed by every note reflects humility and a sense of responsibility concerning art and its function [attaining an aesthetic level], a meeting point of profound insights into the conditions of composer and listener." Behind the hermeneutic relating to human characters ("humility" as a 'psychic attitude' and the analogon of the corresponding i-approach to "responsibility"), there is an i-theoretical basis in the sensitive responsiveness of the interrelative network within the actual relational system (C and L, ch. I:2). The persuasive distinctness of dynamic phrasing ("diminuendo to round off a phrase") is real, perceptually identifiable, distinguishable and recognizable, not airy imagination that remains incommunicable. Movements are interconnected in an encompassing developmental gesture, as when "the last of the six pieces gathers up the tension from the preceding movements, vocally and expressively elevating them to a superior and milder level" (48; my critique in *Svenska Dagbladet*, MIR V). The fusion between aspects of form and expression is almost a distinctive mark of Leygraf's i:s of Schubert's piano works: "Persistent minor chords burrow into the soul [this metaphor is a *licentia poetica*], collecting strength for vigorous rhythms – a struggle which opens out into [a resolution of] a compassionate song (sonata in A minor op 143)."

The critic's perspective allows the researcher to connect to the subject's experiencing aspect of the p(i(w)) in order to **transmit** (communicate) his comprehension. In principle, we learn from this act that achieving a more complex level of communication, especially involving the listener, say p(i(w))–l, not only pi, requires more artistic competence, and can be viewed as a criterion. The component of subjective arbitrariness in the critic's comprehension, restricted to the realm of metaphorical formulations held under control by their very explication of these, can be reduced by reference to the facts of both c and p(i), in a way similar to Leygraf's suggested integration of form and character (in his i-idiom): "The layers of sound are delicately moulded into shape, structures are made clear by gentle accents like subtle punctuation marks in a movement which otherwise causes trouble to the interpreter through its homogeneous, continuously ongoing character (*Impromptu* in F minor op 142:1)." (49)

The questions posed to Leygraf are listed in MIR III:223–225, followed by

my analysis of the i details of his Mozartinterpretation (Berwaldhallen 10.2.82), which presented an intensively expressive Mozart–C–i (within the carefully delimited frame of **formal implication**) of the *Sonatas* in B major KV 570, in C major KV 279, and the C minor *Fantasy*. The multitude of i–functions of the dynamic gestalting is evident and impressive. There are, among other devices, a 'purely' expressive dynamic, a developmental form–clarification by dynamic means, a pressure–mark of chromatic leadtones on a background of 'natural' (neutral) dynamics following the melodic line (a melodic–dynamic linearity–coupling); and the articulation is very finely differentiated – a *legatissimo* (with preserved dynamic continuity) may connect formal parts, including a device of '*Anschlussdynamik*', or prominentizing a motivic imitation. Furthermore, the dynamics are polyphonically balanced and respond to 'immanent' linearity (228), dynamically or harmonically dependent. The whole complex of expressive means is variously applied to chisel out the fine details of the 'delicate' c–structure, and the i–richness of this concept, involving a widely intertwined and ramified relational network of i–devices, allows for a considerable 'optionality' of the relational i–sets, and for an expressive variability within the personal framework of **aesthetic preferences** and selections. (229 for details of analysis)

To pursue my plan, I intend to include the context (of p) by asking what questions can be relevantly posed by **freely and imaginatively varying** the content of p, and seeing what necessarily (*a priori*) changes the frame of p in view of its aspects of 'general applicability'. A prelude to music criticism could start with the whole, the holistic experience of the openly observant concert visitor. We see and hear, we feel and reflect upon the external and internal environment, the season of the year, the time of the day, the auditorium with all its associations. This includes perceiving and reflecting on the **architecture**, perhaps as a symbolic frame for the musical content and its sounding texture; what sort of a building, which will determine the acoustic quality of the p? for the concert, are we inside? All these people, their faces and clothes, with their trivial belongings, or exclusive appearances, the hall with its furniture and 'things', together with the range of musical history indicated by the programme, constitute a **setting** and a framework for my experience (MIR V:5, 34–35).

The **size of the audience** does more than affects the acoustics, and fill up the audible medium through which music is transmitted from players to listeners; the more people there are in the auditorium, the shorter the resonance will be. These are just invariant natural changes in one direction or the other, but they are changes that always occur with the experienceable situation: the

experienced acoustic characteristics of a piece and its conditions, are coherent with the visual setting of the total concert hall situation. The latter is overridingly important: we are *co-listeners*, members of a circle of listeners which is never the same on any two occasions. The musician does not choose his audience, they choose him; what they share is the effect of the music in deepening their sense of community in a shared musico-social setting.

We are united by the fact that we have come "here" (to the physical place of the concert, causing us to adjust our internal "space" receptively to the physical space) with a common purpose, in the overt expectation of listening to and experiencing music. It is this common element which enables us as individual listeners to relate our experiences to that of the wider audience, at the same time as we, being members of that audience, share in the experiences of its other members.

How does the concert begin and with what? The opening sounds direct our thoughts to what is to come; they invite us to carry on listening and they give us an immediate background to refer to. By demanding our attention at this point – taking temporary possession of our awareness – the musicians declare that the music they are playing concerns each and every one of us; it is music written by, about and for people like ourselves.

We listen and judge what is rather than what is not, but the latter is not excluded as an ancillary determinant of the *w*-context (exclusionary determination); but listening focuses on what goes on, not to something we miss. This distinction is pertinent to the kind of cognitive activity that the concert setting stimulates us to perform. Matters of direct ('primary') experience are e.g. rhythmic buoyancy and vigour, whereas an historically authentic array of instruments appeals more to intellectual ('secondary') reflection. Many of us can recall our experience of *presence*, not least during a jazz concert with "improvisatory closeness": a feeling that the most important thing is what the musicians are doing *here and now*, as and where the concert proceeds.

Our spoken language and our sung language are also sounds which, when they occur in music, present their voiced aspect as an object for evoking identification; they also become *musical* sound, not just linguistic *phonemes*, sounds with conceptual import.

A person, performer or auditor, who has thoroughly mastered his piece – and not only in a technical sense – must grasp the mood of the work, the "atmosphere" constituting the emotional coherency of the work, and must have a sense of within what frames of *possibility* to recreate it at the moment

of performance versus experience. The musician must have a superabundance of that which he wishes to give and he must be capable of emancipating himself from the written notation in such a way as to be able to give an impression of improvisational liberty without any sacrifice of precision.

A formulation like "echoing sounds which impair clarity" (MIR V:34–35) indicates that the performer – perhaps for just a few moments – has failed to adjust or react adequately to the acoustics prevailing at the time. The important thing here is the general conclusion drawn concerning the **relationship between interpretation and acoustics**, not the rating of the individual performance.

Interpretative phenomena which we can relate both to the instantaneous experience of the concert and retrospectively to style have been compressed in reviews of mine (MIR V) into such metaphorical expressions as "brittleness" and "delicacy of chamber music framing". Brittleness refers to a quality of sound, **transparency and balance**, but these phenomenological categories cannot replace the **word itself**, with the capacity to evoke its associations from its context in the linguistic world. But we can, according to the phenomenological conception, talk about things which **are** in the way which they appear to us: brittleness and nothing else, without quotation marks.

Phrasing is the way in which musicians articulate **with** the composed shape of the phrase; whether they apprehend and articulate it this way **intuitively or consciously** is of minor importance, in the context of the listener's **reception**. Metaphors are justifiable and necessary in the description of experience, unless a full account of it is to be restricted for reasons of scientific precision.

The **apriorical frame of experience** forms a common basis for a phenomenology of mip. Those of us who play and sing, who speak and write about music, articulate our experiences. So too do the choreographer, the dancer moving to music, the poet interpreting music in poetry or the artist seeking musical inspiration for painting and sculpture. Whatever the way in which we choose to articulate our musical experiences, the original abundance of the **experience** must never be crammed into prefabricated categories. On the contrary, the **experience** generates and enriches thought and language. In this way **experience** ripens and takes on added shades of meaning when we articulate it. The music critic may have to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of vapid ingratiation or unbridled panegyric on one hand and, "hatchery" on the other.

The profession of the music critic demands self-mastery – total

emancipation from the limited private ego through awareness of the same. If music to us is just a more or less ill-concealed recognition of our own feelings – suppressed volcanic eruptions, frustrated passions, unsolved spiritual quandries – we ought preferably to leave all these things to one side in order to hear **the music**, which is something universal and not just an echo of ourselves. If music is only comprehensible insofar as we are able to identify with it, if the limitation of each individual's ego has to be reflected by the music in order for us to accept it and make it our own, then the listeners have drawn a narcissistic, egocentric and tragic chalk circle around their own musical experience. Listening to the music is a matter of self-mastery and transcending boundaries: we transcend our own boundaries by distinguishing the provenance of ancillary personal associations that conform to the proposed w-contextuality evoked by the actual $p(i(w))$, from those that pertain to 'me ultimately last and only me'. But where does this take us?

Through hermeneutic **int**ropretation, to take the extreme of subjectivist positions (ch. I:2), we experience a broadening of our own sphere of experience. And we 'enter' in a metaphysical sense another experiential world, namely that of the w , with 'superior' laws of its own which our material world and existence cannot surpass, a world which may be spared the fetters of our own; or fuse, through intercontextual encounter, our world with its, interconnecting their contexts for eventual exchange; it might be the case that these worlds as T-worlds are incompatible (ch. II:1), but incompatibility of experiential worlds in the arts ('E'-worlds to complete the Hermerén systemacy; or worlds_{exp}) is complementary, or else it is a **conflicting drive** or force of the **impetus** of the artworks, instigating and maximizing valuable experiences. There is an idealistic vision of such a musical world as more complete, harmonious, exact, humanly and spiritually better than the everyday world around us, until the point of romantic escapism is attained, with the attendant risk of escaping into something unreal or antisocial, taking refuge from the suffering and evil of our time or from the reach of man or fate. Insofar as this position merits consideration, it argues that music maintains within us, or evokes the image, the 'archetype' and exemplar of a world of a higher existence; it instigates the imagination of a superior reality or 'transcends' its imagined level, to which we in some sense have access (by means of interpretation) and to which we return – "return" because we meet this genuinely musical world with a self-evident recognitional or convinced affirmation, a "so it is" on our lips: it is phenomenologically preformed in our cognitive apparatus and our perceptual

sensorium has been adapted to it from the very beginning of the evolution of the human musical mind (see Wallin, 1992: 387–479). In some way 'we all' retain within us this untravestied harmonious archetype, mostly thought as a consciously rejected existential position, the mirage of which we share in and which is re–vived through our musical experiences. It is not recognition of reality but recognitions in reality of what we previously imagined "it" or "some other (other's) world" to be like. We can see from this that what appears as a qualified guess can in fact, turn out to be an empirical and conditional truth, or occasionally an *a priori* of musical cognition. This fine distinction is crucial.

It follows that our experiences are no longer confined to our personal ego, transcendable by revelation of a 'higher', genuinely musical world, insofar as we allow for participation and assimilation. Its criteria can be applied tentatively, operationally or dogmatically, to settle a personal conviction, i.e. to establish a position. It is against this background that we are able to say that temperament applied to music may disrupt, if incongruently applied, the essence of the music, or more exactly, that it may diverge from it. The music as performed does not remain what it is, in spite of (or perhaps just because of) all that the soloist's ambition and intensity have brought to bear on it. Elusive objectivity only materializes when one is not striving for it. The music itself, then, must be put before ourselves; as listeners or performers, we must first enter into the 'nature' of the music and in this way find within ourselves what the music is, as a basis and point of departure for legitimate private ornamentation. Experiencing music thus is also experiencing oneself, inventorying one's experiential options (capacity), and at best discovering new areas of self–knowledge that were hitherto unknown to ourselves in our lives; or even possibly expanding these limits of *de facto* experienced–content consciousness (and 'consciousness' itself as constituted by its content). This would, if possible imply, powerful therapeutic possibilities, including the development of strategies for inventorying and expanding the content and limits of the mind (Mm). But we cannot take as our starting point the isolated expressive needs of the individual ego, because then we risk reducing the music to a medium for our feelings, permitting the latter to play upon the music instead of, as intended in the model case, allowing the music to play on us.

But an embraced broader aim to diagnose not only the music and its performance, but also listeners through their experiences evoked by p (the degree of correspondence), may include the question of **how listeners become**

receptive, and how they are able to assimilate the nuances and the "spiritualized" dimension of the music. (MIR V:17–19)

In rough but concrete terms, how can we open our minds (senses) and those of other people so as to further the appreciation of the music. Our own essential ego is concealed behind a thousand barriers for the prevention of personal injuries, and there are few people who achieve the 'complete' openness and understanding in their listening required to transgress the limitations of ego-boundaries.

What dimensions and opportunities for inward life and true wealth we sacrifice through our defensiveness and blithe self-limitations! This is a matter of individual private choice, possibly on the basis of considered priority criteria. But then, how can we rid ourselves of all our inherent impediments in order to mature musicality? Our listening is liable to be coarsened, looking for sensation instead of depth. The seeker of 'sound sensations' must ever be resorting to more coarsely sounding intoxicants in order on each new occasion to experience an effect more powerful than that experienced last time. If musical maturity goes hand in hand with human maturity, as I propose, it means searching in that which exists rather than in that which does not exist. Music is not a chimera but supreme reality, 'real reality', the mind's materiality. Thus music can become an extremely powerful diagnostic and therapeutic instrument, comparable to psychoanalysis, but optionally more precise, as a method of individual maturation. By the suggested expansion of the mind's horizon, music shows new and wider borders of freedom, it indicates **personal liberation**.

Cultural life is profoundly infiltrated by what might be called "the cancer of ingeniousness". One step across the boundary from science and criticism to the concentrated analysis of meaning is taboo. If art is openly viewed where it is, identified as art and interpretable in its own genuine medium, the way is then for the artistic in art as the nucleus which we desire to reach, and which merits consideration on different levels. I assume that it is from this core, and not from the periphery that artistic creativity, that art, can be furthered in the best mode.

The preceding analysis in this thesis would in its peripheral consequence suggest a practical imperative. Often when musicians play and sing, and when composers write, they meet with cool ignorance and attitudes causing their notes to sound unheard or with a hollow echo. Since many people live on the periphery of music, the imperative arises to pull them into the eye of the

storm – in order to evoke reactions, create relations.

If we concern ourselves with the music we listen to, we will legitimately foster something within ourselves. By treasuring art we will be treasuring ourselves, or to put it extremely: do away with art and we do away with ourselves. In this particular sense it would be just to claim that **music is life** and one of the vital nerves of our society. With an open mind we hear what is going on within ourselves in parallel to the music; we 'enter' into it and allow ourselves to be surprised by its corresponding abundance (MIR V:10), as if we were simultaneously **investigating and discovering internal territories** and their opportunities to become realized from being merely existential potentialities. In this existential context music attains personal meaning; for p(w), the teleological argument is to **implement this potentiality**: it "means" something to someone, and "mean" means different things for everyone, since circumstances and preconditions for the realization of existential programs vary individually. So who are the listeners? To which person(s) does music address itself? If music does not **possess** but **attain** its meaning precisely and specifically for someone, then that meaning is defined by the person for whom it exists. This being so, we would need to know the nature of the person for whom music acquires meaning in order to understand the music. 'Man' as a listening *individuum* could be defined hypothetically by the pertinent existential program, by the music he correspondingly understands; and conversely, music could be defined by the listeners in whom its meaning is actualized. On what conditions do the music and the listeners mutually define one another?

In a conjectural switch of audiences, the avant-garde listener will experience the pop concert as an inarticulate, bestial roar, while the pop fans attending the avant-garde concert will encounter an unintelligible farrago of distorted sounds (I am temporarily disregarding the fact that the borderlines between genres have in many cases grown indistinct during the past decade as a result of assimilations in both directions). Both sides are right: the music means nothing to them. They are distinguished by radically different listener attitudes and envision the entirely different programs of existential realization that may be addressed at the respective concerts: the pop concert is above all a social phenomenon, the avant-garde concert exhibits phenomena of techniques of composition and is, at best, a musical phenomenon as well. The pop concert is a spectacular manifestation satisfying mainly social needs on the part of a large group of the population, which is its *raison d'être*. But the need for rhythmical movement, frequently with sexual suggestion, is a more primitive anticipation

of the genuinely musical. Avant-garde art has exploded the boundaries of the capacity of the normal listener for relation, it has transcended the musical; hence the compensatory need for visual-gesticulatory or textual bonding agents and modes of expression for the sounds which no longer cohere by themselves; the listener therefore needs to be assisted by visual reinforcement, in order to realign with the suggested existential outline.

Musical **interaction** involves an ancient trinity comprising **ear, eye, and hand**. The voice is the human body's own musical instrument, which allows **total embodiment** of musical intentions through a congruence of intentionality (Mm) and physiological causality (ch.I:2). The ear helps the hand of the executant (the player or singer), while the eye helps the ear of the listener. To this must be added the support given by the eye to the positional awareness of the player's hand. To the ear of the listener, the hand 'is' what it can do, namely an expressive gesture (that he recognizes from identifying with the P), and so it appears to his eye. But this brings us to the outermost limit of what is musical in the true sense of musical: the movement of a hand as the gesticulatory expression of a seeing eye is already theater or ballet, both of which as we very well know enter into a symbiosis with music. We have to recognize, however, where one finishes and the other begins, or the breadth of overlap between the two, whether they form another art in its own right or whether two spheres of meaning and reference simply co-exist and are simultaneously present in front of us. This is not a question of demarcational zeal, it is simply that we ourselves and our attitude as spectators and/or listeners are defined existentially by what it is. We want at least to know what we ourselves are, and so we must also know what art is, the latter being but a consequence of the former. (MIR V:122)

Fashionable sounds exist in many genres – avant-garde, pop, jazz, classical – just as buzz words, slang, new formations, dialects and idiomatic expressions exist in our spoken and written language. Their popularity varies; their's are ephemeral existences cresting the waves of style. Often the way in which musicians actualize or re-actualize their validity is crucial – whether or not the musicians sustain them and endow them with an expression of now. This involves the risk of music lacking resilience and standing or falling by the artists. The audience itself puts a price on its artists, but at the same time it puts a price on itself through its manner of reacting: every "this I understand" is delimited by that which is beyond the horizon of understanding, that which I do not understand; "I do not understand" as a statement, then, does not mean

that I do not understand the performed music. It may merely suggest that I have not drawn a borderline as required by conceptual and linguistic limits of denotation (referential meaning); with no boundaries, it may even paradoxically indicate that I do understand the music completely or essentially, in all relevant respects that can be demanded, namely also the **purely musical** mode of comprehending, if that is what is relevant for the piece in question; and my tacit response indicates that I do understand the music exactly.

How much accommodation and educational good intent can one expect of a musician? Putting it more drastically, does the musician have to deliver his 'merchandise' or must the listeners go and get it? The suggested answer: both, and we meet roughly half way. It follows, then, that the critic does not need to masticate the musician for toothless listeners; an audience of this kind is no credit to him: **Who** rather than **how many** come to my concerts is a yardstick of the "value of the performance", **what** I do and **for whom** I do it. This is how the musician legitimately can look at it, if structural metaphors are allowed. The program for a concert forms a kind of architecture, by analogy with "columns and architraves", load-supporting and load-relieving parts, "partitions and corridors": a thoroughgoing structure of ideas of effectful contrasts. The whole is a unity articulated into smaller parts: we must clearly **hear** which things belong together and which do not. Delicate balances are required in order for music to stay alive in its acoustic medium: just so much 'body' – and so much legato – for the notes of melodies (n) to keep together in melodies (i), the notes of the chords in harmonies, and structures in parts of forms (MIR V:13).

Musical performance is always **actualization** in an encompassing existential sense, and necessarily so, be it of an image, notation or the spirit of an age. The artist captures something in the present, legitimately or otherwise; if the work has been composed and written in another period, it is legitimate to find an **interface** between the present and the past in the music – this is the only chance the composition has of speaking to us in the present age; it is the window of actuality on the past, the reflection of past into now, and the **gradual projection of now into the future**. In another sense the very performance is always relevant to us listeners because it is happening here and now and the sounds are occurring where they are directly accessible to our senses. The sounds appear in the now as results produced from the preceding moment. The performance creates a *continuum* over past, present and future; it **constitutes temporality**. It would be illegitimate for the artist to exploit the temporary needs

of the listener; music that has survived traditional selection is not merely a short-term enjoyment, it is (represents, evokes, manifests) some aspect of 'eternal truth', the manifestation of which, admittedly, is also a source of enjoyment but offers more abiding, albeit intuitive spiritual insights: provided the relation between matter and mind that music indicates is 'eternal'. At least, as far as we know, it is permanent. Besides, concepts have no definite beginning or end.

Physical gestures and affectations are very much dependent on the present, a means of actualization: the definitely illicit music from the past and from our innermost being. But this makes it all the more necessary for them to be music-related and not just person-related, otherwise they will be experienced as mere appendages to the music. (MIR V:14)

Composers must be able to feel complete confidence in entrusting their works to musicians for performance. It is a concern of MIR to specify the conditions for that. The composer must obviously be able to depend on the musician's genuine experience and understanding of the music they are performing, in return for composers writing things which can be performed by them in mutual interdependence. It is in the interest of the audience for musicians to experience and understand "their" music, to have it assimilated and in some way made their own. Music which is not understood by its musicians remains, in the most profound sense, unintelligible to its auditors. And it is also a reasonable demand on the part of musicians to be able to do a socially and musically meaningful job; their work is socially meaningful if the music they play conveys meaning to the listeners and to themselves in their daily work as professionals.

Even if the composer leaves the field clear for interpretations – inviting the musicians with a generous gesture – arbitrariness will not be the result as long as the c-structures have been determined. Above this the C must rely on the performer's multidirected responsibility, unless C fixes his p prototypically. The composer himself progresses in his own development from one work to another; to him this is almost inexplicably natural. But for this very same reason (and for reasons more practical) we seldom meet the composer **in the creative situation of the compositional act**. Therefore the work itself and the point which it represents in the composer's development is what we try to understand as interesting contextual information for the w: we are faithful to the w and everything represented in it to which we have access, which may include existential perspectives from the composer that are already realized and made independent in the w. In contrast 'biographica' may be compulsory

to the knowledge of C, but is ancillary to w. But access to the composer as we see him with "our" composition in the focus of attention, with the ink still glistening on the manuscript, in his creative phase, is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the interpretive act.

Making music 'with' acoustics normally demands adroitness on the part of the musicians. In churches with a prolonged echo, to take a paradigmatic case, it is strictly speaking only compositions **written specifically for the acoustics** of the church's interior "space" that are suitable for performance there. Other works really have to be quite heavily adapted or transformed from one acoustic environment to another. For instance, organists performing on different instruments in churches can at best develop adaptive proficiency in the difficult art creatively adjusting of their articulation. However, the problem may arise that this development is liable to stop short at mechanically computed retouchings of registration to suit the specification of the individual organ in its setting, instead of what is really called for, namely a **reinterpretation**, including continuous, listening-controlled adjustment of phrasing, articulation, couplers, registration, dynamics, rhythm-sharpening agogics and tempi to elucidate the form and "content"; most important of all is the interaction between the performer and the acoustic space. And this would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to all musicians, from vocalists to percussionists. (MIR V:15)

V:6 EXEMPLIFYING THREE AESTHETICAL POSITIONS

The five questions introduced in chapter I:1, and investigated in chapter III, concerned the problems of (1) historicity contra actuality, (2) authenticity contra expressivity, (3) identity contra difference, (4) objectivity contra subjectivity in mip, and (5) the manifestation of aesthetic ideals through mip. The question then is: How did the selected conductors as representatives of their respective aesthetic positions answer our initial questions through their artistic achievements. Our investigations have shown that interpreters lay various degrees of stress on the different aspects thus constituting their personal aesthetic of interpretation. By means of short, nontechnical explications, I will present three types of conceptions variously related to these basic problems. There are three main sets of replies to these questions that correspond to three important aesthetic positions in our time, focusing respectively (1) historical authenticity, (2) the hermeneutics of expression, and (3) musical

phenomenology, as their primary guiding concepts. These seem to correspond to specific sets of criteria, which assume overriding importance in the aesthetic choice of interpretive alternatives. Details were given in V:1 with references.

V:6:1 HISTORICAL AUTHENTICITY (SACHER, LEINSDORF)

Basically the allegedly objective work structure is the point of departure, including documented instructions from the composer, and his markings in the score, for Sacher's "*Aufführung*" in the perspective of "*neue Sachlichkeit*". Leinsdorf stresses the contextual, cultural setting which starts off his retouching and 'staging' of the score, though still on the same grounds as an '*Urtextausgabe*' would be based upon. For both, authenticity is attainable in the actual performance and, in their views, through access to historical facts. In addition, Leinsdorf's fidelity presupposes a transparent interpreter. The composers' gestalted unities and identities are assumed to be preserved in the performance, despite the differences of visual and auditive media: there is, according to this conception, basically no need for critical reinterpreting of structures due to specific conditions for auditive gestalts and structures. However, Leinsdorf stresses the importance of attentive surveying and reactive audition. Thus, the objectivity of a rendering is in principle possible, and subjectivity, except for 'factual' and historical knowledge including an awareness of tradition (Leinsdorf), is superfluous. There is an intuitive precomprehension, a hermeneutic "*Vorverständnis*" of the historical conditions, in the case of Leinsdorf. The zone of freedom, and room for manifestation of aesthetic ideals is limited. The controlled realization of composers' documented intentions, compatible with historical context, is a main end.

V:6:2 HERMENEUTICS OF EXPRESSION (DORATI, BLOMSTEDT)

There are sets of basic criteria of continuity, mass, motion and activity (etc.) combined with a hermeneutic–expressive interpretation that focus on the actuality and human authenticity of an emotional quality (Dorati) aiming at a **general validity** of interpretation. On a formalist basis, Blomstedt endows the structure with concise expressive drive aiming at or arousing **emphatic (identificational) audition**. Authenticity is guaranteed by shared emotional interpretative–expressional modes. This is their solution to the structural problem of transferring identity and difference from notational to exigent auditive gestalts. Within this

system objectivity is not possible (Dorati), or is only partly attainable (Blomstedt), whereas the subjective component is legitimate as far as the emotional interpretation is concerned, i.e. for the purpose of creating an emotional *continuum* or an "atmosphere" of unifying (connecting) character. The set of alternatives within the frame of a free zone is considerably expanded, and provides legitimized opportunities for expressive gestalting (Dorati) as well as for opportunities for the manifestation of aesthetic ideals and ethical dignity in performance (Blomstedt).

V:6:3 MUSICAL PHENOMENOLOGY (CELIBIDACHE)

The historical truth is inaccessible; hence, the focus is on actuality. This is also the only moment when the work–authenticity can be manifested congruently with an expressive property, a fusion which is attained by a complex set of aesthetic criteria that are intended to guarantee a purportedly unique solution. This is meant to be an intersubjectively valid (coinciding) experience of identity and difference in the appearing musical evolution (w–unfolding), according to the topographies of structured processuality. The teleological end of the total phenomenal realization of the whole interwoven 'texture' of the compositional interrelationships transcends the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity. The extreme demands on (1) momentary and temporal awareness of complex relations, (2) real sound balances and (3) directed time–flow phenomena are based on general and apriorical principles of the musical mind and the corresponding natural tendencies of its physical and physiological correlates (the interplay of which provides e.g. the tempo conditions). Through the shared dimensions of time, space and musical sound, a common and communicable level of **individual transcendence** and a **general validity of experiences** is attained.

VI CONCLUSIO: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

VI:1 SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIONS

THE RELATION BETWEEN MIR AND MUSIC PERFORMANCE RESEARCH (ch III:4)

The MIR project is completed by vol VI. It is a broad survey of the science–philosophical bases for an **interpretation science** of musical performance. From an exploration of the various positions of theoretical schools (analytical philosophy, historicism, semiotics, formalism, contextualism, and Schenkerian *Vortragslehre*) four basic categories of aesthetic problems and decision–making are extracted: (1) historicity–actuality, (2) authenticity–expressivity, (3) identity–difference, and (4) objectivity–subjectivity. These are then compared to the ideas held among participants in practical music life. The perspectives are illuminated from the viewpoint of composers (Stravinsky, Schönberg, Sessions, Hindemith), conductors (Ansermet, Furtwängler, Karajan), pianists (Schnabel, Gieseking, Brendel, Gould, Harry) string players (Menuhin, Casals, Lorkovic), and critics (Shaw, Kaiser). More specific 'pilot' studies investigate the personal interpretative conceptions of conductors (Celibidache, Sacher, Blomstedt, Dorati) and pianists (Leygraf) through interviews and analyses of decisional patterns at rehearsals.

MIR focuses on the **intentional content of interpretive thinking**, while music performance research studies the **acoustic correlates and results** of such cognitive procedures. Since cognitive processing at the neural level cannot yet be surveyed with sufficient resolution we are restricted to using questionnaires to clarify the productive intentional content of various performance styles. Therefore, the aesthetic postulates (in MIR VI) refrain from claiming any physical objectivity whatsoever. On the other hand, the science–philosophical and musico–logical analysis of basic modes of consciousness, such as variously directed intentional acts of interpretation, involved in the processing of the assimilative and reproductive musical mind, becomes a crucial aim of this project. A main distinction is made between **inpretation**, directed interpretive intentionality from the subject's consciousness towards the determinants of the musicwork (a "reading–in" of content), and **expretation**, an interpreted direction from the work to the reflecting subject (a "reading–out" of content). A taxonomy

of finer subtypes of interpretive acts is developed (ch. I:2).

Consequently, the review of the research paradigm of music performance research (ch. III:4) comprises a metascientific study of the basic patterns presupposed and applied in this research. For example, the much-cited rule "the higher the louder" is designated as a "positive Mn – Dp correlation", or abbreviated Mn + Dp (Mn=Melody, notated; Dp=Dynamics, performed), according to the preliminary formal language for interpretation analysis given in MIR I:70–72. Another of Sundberg's rules, "shorten[ing the] lower note in [a] rising interval", is a Mn – Rp (Rhythm, performed), i.e. a negative correlation between notated melody (here interval) and performed rhythm. It is interesting to relate this rule, from an aesthetic point of view, to Sergiu Celibidache's concepts of "*distantial tension*" and "*natural tendencies*". A preliminary analysis of the rule systems given by Sundberg (1991:166) also treats the "accents marking durational contrast" (Rn + Dp), and the "amplitude marking harmonic distance" (Hn + Dp).

Aesthetically, a discussion should be instigated on how these and other rules interact in complex personal interpretive patterns. In particular, it is important to specify more carefully the structural and contextural conditions necessary for the application of a certain rule within the focused interpretive conception ('concepts') of each conductor, performer or scholar.

However, there is an important distinction: (1) a rule states a "correlation" as a given fact, without proposing anything about intentional procedures. In this case there is the possibility of a hidden third cause—i.e. the correlation might be an unwanted outcome of some other still unknown intention. Or, conversely (2) the rule can state an "implication", either logical, volitional or experiential. In this case the rule says something about intention, and we may assume an underlying cognitive processing. If volitional, and given the interpreter's awareness of his own intention and action, the repertory of rules forms a list of possible aesthetic choices, and each interpreter is 'obliged' to select his personal set from it. Therefore, the more rules in the "uncommitted" list, the more useful the generative system for further research of personal concepts.

The rules follow the pattern of an input–output system. Outputs are one or the other of two dimensions, namely dynamic (Dp) or durational (Rp; Rhythm performance including duration, not to be confused with Dynamic, D). The inputs are of the dimensions' pitch (M for melodic), duration (R), harmonic (H) and form (S for structure). With regard to input–output pairs I make a principal distinction between those that belong to the same dimension (identical,

ID, monodimensional) and those of different dimensions (DIFF, multidimensional). For example, the rules of "sharpening durational contrasts" (1985:68) and "amplitude smoothing" are monodimensional (ID) as far as the input–output dimensions are concerned, while the other rules are multidimensional (DIFF). A **transference rule**, should define the relation between (1) differing dimension pairs, as well as between (2) identical dimension pairs, on a principal level – or variously for each interpreter due to his preference for interpretive style. One should state the relations between the involved dimensions, taking the $M_n + D_p$ of Sundberg's first rule as a paradigmatic example: (1) the notion of "pitch" (or "melody" for "melodic aspect") to (2) the notion of "dynamic"; one should also define (3) the relation between "notational" and "interpretive", or in the physicalistic terms used by Sundberg, (4) between "acoustic" and "performed".

Furthermore, there is a need to explicitly define the cross–wise relations between these dimensions and notions: i.e. transference rules relating the "acoustic pitch" to the "performed dynamic" as well as the "performed pitch" to the "acoustic dynamic". This would complete their system.

The Music Performance Research project by Sundberg (*et alia*) represents a major advancement in the development of methods for the testing of proposed criteria of performance, with the limitation that the parameters are defined by means of physical entities only. One problem is that the system is **not interactive** and remains fixed during the performance without adapting to the actually unfolding phase of the composition (cf. Celibidache's "*Expansionsphase*", "*Kompressionsphase*", MIR IV:85). But nothing prevents further additions of complex rules to the system.

Finally, a note on the epistemological status of the proposed systems of "rules": Since these rules are not evident by reference to some apriorical distinctions on logical or metalogical grounds, they must be regarded as **hypothetical postulations**, generated on the basis of empirical impressions and musical **common sense observations**, even if they are later corroborated through inquiring test groups. This question concerns the **origin and production** of aesthetic rules. For example, the Schenkerian analytical system clearly generates a specific set of rules. Another inquiry concerns whether we have to distinguish epistemologically between the kind of rules demonstrated and invented by artists and those rules generated by researchers or music theorists on grounds other than practical.

If an empirical truth is supported by evidence and considered established

only after such a distinction and exactly on such grounds, then all the rules consequently need to be tested in the same way in order to be confirmed **within the chosen epistemological system**. The problem is that the outcome of such tests depends on what goal one refers to. A test can be confirmed or disconfirmed by reference to (1) findings based on massive empirical material (e.g. phonogram recordings), or by any (2) overridingly generative aesthetic ideal that is shown to be undisputed or at least made probable and accepted by (3) the prevailing opinion in the musical community.

Another way, which I have attempted to follow, would be to secure results by relating them to a superior cognitive and metalogical structure. By substituting the concept of "rules" for "contextual and structural tendencies" (or, even Celibidache's "natural tendencies"), I can confirm certain points of Sundberg's research empirically by adducing supportive evidence from rehearsals and seminars with Sergiu Celibidache. But it is important to note the difference between intentional and acoustic terms. Provided the "rules" may be regarded as both **intentional** and "real", I would, again, designate "the higher the louder" as (1) $M_n + D_p$; it then should be accepted as a candidate for being an **aesthetic criterion** of musical interpretation, within a given style frame. Its structural and contextual conditions must then be further specified. The pertinent ideals of compositional and interpretative styles to which it can be applied must be precisely circumscribed.

Other rules – "shorten[ing the] lower note in [a] rising interval", "accents mark[ing] durational contrast", and, "amplitude mark[s] harmonic distance", (or, I would add – mark harmonic distance to (a) main tonality, (b) regional tonality or (c) immediate chord environment) – should be seriously considered within the systems of (2) $M_n + R_p$, (3) $R_n + D_p$, and (4) $H_n + D_p$.

In sum: as opposed to music performance research, MIR deals with the cognitive pattern of musical thinking on the level of consciously reflected aesthetic consideration. The approaches are complementary, focusing on different domains of reality. There may be a practical reason for this different focus of MIR, in addition to the theoretical one. Interpreters are conventionally supposed not to imitate any empirical results in their performances: 'imitate neither other musicians nor yourself' is a guiding imperative. It is generally assumed that mip is a genuinely **artistic** and **creative** activity. The combined analytic approaches of Sundberg's performance research and MIR should be able to disentangle certain problems, and demonstrate whether this conventional opinion is true. In what sense is mip (and can it be) truly artistic and creative?

What criteria must be fulfilled in order for it to be an "art"? The criteria of **artistic independence** and **coherent interpretive patterning** within a limited zone of artistic freedom must be considered. In a consensus evaluation, a performance should represent an independent musical design, and a genuinely individual interpretation of the work. But the personal profile may not interfere with either the basic constituents, or the "essential" determinants of the musicwork.

Despite the **science–philosophical** limitation of experimental computer–aided synthetic performance research for the purpose of **aesthetic illumination**, music performance research provides a methodological foundation for investigations that aim to clarify the formal systems and criteria of interpretive style traits in performance. However, the aesthetic judgement of a musical mind cannot be dispensed with. Furthermore, the superficial relation to musical work–analysis (wa) and interpretation–analysis (ia) remains problematic, and the criteria proposed must be related to the complex patterns of interaction in ensemble playing and to the unfolding in time of complex compositional structures.

IMPORTANT INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS THAT WERE ESTABLISHED

The overriding aim of this research is to contribute to an aesthetics of musical interpretation in performance. By "aesthetics" I do not mean a set of ideals concerning the art of music performance, but a **theory** in the sense of a cohesive and comprehensive explanation for the pertinent phenomena, and a consequent method that provides a neutral survey of relevant positions and ideals embraced by contemporary performers. Such positions must be put in relation to the concrete level of sound phenomena in order for the theory to meet musicological requirements. To avoid a subjective bias the theory must basically be conceived on the metalevel, and its descriptive devices must be "neutral" in the sense of Nattiez's semiotics.

Thus we need a theory on the metalevel that can give the necessary neutral framework for a survey of aesthetic positions and ideals of interpretation. The metatheory must be able to display and specify the **criteria** for ip. This raises two questions (and elicits tentative replies): What keeps the individual i together? Coherency. And, how can we determine if the i is basically correct? Through **criteria of correspondence**. This gives us the following four most important relations (examples of **relational ontological entities** suggested within brackets; abbreviations in MIP and MIR VI):

- (1) internal coherency (i-i)
- (2) external correspondence (n-i, c*x*-i)
- (3) external coherency (n-n)
- (4) internal correspondence (w-i; w-I; C-I)

It is necessary to consider the **fundamental relations & patterns of interaction** in the (interpretive) **process of communication**; This process has its participants (C,P,I,L), and its interpretive ramifications (pathways) – see MIR VI ch I:2.

In order to handle and discuss these relations I use a light formalization: e.g. a **simple execution** (p) without distinguishable i-components is designated CcPpLl for "the Composer (C) produces the composition (c) – the Performer (P) produces the performance (p) of it – and the Listener (L) produces his listening image of the performed composition (l)". The Cc, Pp and Ll are thought of as **causative connections**, i.e. unidirectional **priority** dependent relations.

The **musical object** that we talk about requires the following distinction:

real objects (C,N,P,I,L)	<i>contra</i>	intentional objects (c,n,p,i,l) as objects of consideration (reflection)
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I am postulating that the real objects are **primarily non-interpretive**, i.e. they have a specific constitution independent of the beholder, whereas the intentional objects are **interpretive**. However, it can be countered that **access to real objects** is possible only through **interpretive reflection**. If this is so, the real objects referred to here, i.e. the composer, notation, the performer, the interpreter and the listener as objects are secondarily interpretive. Upon reflection their constituents are not fully independent of the reflective mind of the beholder (researcher).

"The musical object" also contains another dichotomy: (1) the **auditive image** which is an intentional entity, as opposed to (2) what appears as the **perceived sound**; its **concreteness** fills out our experience with distinctly determined features.

Obviously mir proceeds along the same lines as phenomenological research in one particular respect, in that it inquires: How does the object appear for/in our musical consciousness?

Earlier (MIR I ch 3.3), I showed that the communicative chain, now

designated e.g. CcIiPp(i)Ll in MIR VI, could become subjected to (intentional, not primarily causal) **elisions**, i.e. reductions of certain constituent acts, so that it can look very different in the end, e.g. Cl describing the extreme case of direct communication between the composer and the listener's image (or e.g. w–p(i)–l, designating 'the relation' (hyphen) of the work (w) to its performed interpretation (p(i)) on to its listener's image of the whole procedure). I also distinguished in principle bipartite (w–i) from tripartite (w–i–p) relations.

In order to characterize various **kinds of intentionality** (defined as relating the attentive mind's directedness of cognitive content) involved in **i-acts**, I postulated the following.

There is a fundamental polarity between the 'object' (O), i.e. the work (w) and the 'subject', i.e. the Interpreter (I). The relation that interests us is the one appearing between the work and the interpreter's product, his interpretation (i). In principle, then there are two possible perspectives, from w to I or the reverse, from I to w, i.e. the object's (O) versus the subject's (S) perspectives, in accordance with Eero Tarasti's abbreviations.

Now, let us consider the perspective of the w: The interpreter can either bring something out from w ('ex' = outward from w) or he can insert, add or bring something into w ('in' = inward to w). The normal way (for the musical mind) of considering the content of the w entails some **ex-act(s)**, but it may also involve **in-act(s)**, i.e. various modes of 'reading-in' content into the w. The difference is that in the latter case, of especially extreme **in-acts (intropretation)**, there is no independent evidence of what you are considering in the w – i.e. the intention is directed towards an indefinite object of w, or there is no target of the intentional act; then at least the point of departure in the interpreter's mind must be definite (its identity clear). In contrast, the extreme case of the **ex-acts (extropretation)** reveals extracted ideas (contents) from the w that can be aesthetically (re)considered without requirement of correspondence outside the w: it has to come from the w, but there is no need to find any preexistent support for it outside the w. The **in-acts** suggest quite another situation: there must be a preexisting phenomenon or supportive 'correspondence' to the constituent(s) that the I in-terprets into the w. Now the risk of exaggerating **ex-acts** ends up in an **overinterpretation**, whereas the risk of excessive or dominating **in-acts** may start from an initial state of **underinterpretation**. Within the **ex-acts**

there are degrees, from a fairly neutral 'reading-out' (listening-out) of (1) **expretation**, via the more clearly directed (and/or deeper 'excavating') (2) **extopretation** to the extreme, the profound and exhaustive exploration and projecting-out of the w-content, (3) **extropretation**. A more profound interpretation (whatever mode) requires a more forcefully directed communicative effort (whatever direction).

Similarly, the degrees of insertion (of putting an in-pretive content 'in there') into the w, are designated (4) **inpretation** for an intentional direction towards the w that reveals a coincident, congruent identification of content emerging from the subject (the I), i.e. a sensitive 'reading-in' (listening-in); (5) **intopretation** 'puts' or adds some content into the w without provoking contradiction, whereas (6) **intropretation** is the most active introjection of ideas (content) into the w, where the ideas are more profoundly implanted in the w. If this also requires that intropretive content must originate from more profound layers in the subject's acting mind, cannot the following be assumed *a priori*: that the intropretive content may be the production of the subject. Even if it 'suits' the w (which is a condition for it to be called intropretation; the in-act must succeed), the genuineness of its origin is not proved. On the contrary, it is not a condition that it have evidence for a preexisting structure or 'correspondence' in the w regarding its inserted content.

In addition, I have introduced the following concepts that I merely mention here: (7) **intrapretation** (e.g. i-i), (8) **extrapretation** (e.g. n-n, cx-cx, cx-n), and (9) **inter-pretation**, e.g. a p(i) arrived at by an exchange of ideas between w (c,n) inherent \leftrightarrow i (I).

Among the results arising out of fundamental considerations some evident conclusions (principles) had far-reaching implications. Nothing can sound in two different ways simultaneously; if two versions are played synchronously they will blend into one complex version. This is a case that actually happens in normal orchestral performance, and in all p:s where at least one part is doubled by several playing instruments (*ripieno*, in contrast to *solo*). The other case is the logically enforced one of selection-rejection. When you are forced to choose the better out of two good possibilities, you have to reject a good (plausible) version in favor of the better one. By repeated trial-and-error rehearsal it should be possible in this way to arrive at the best possibility, provided that all versions are comparable one against the other, and that the decision that one of them is better can always be taken on constantly coherent, defensible and correct grounds.

The investigations permitted the conclusion that the 'total **intentional competence**' inherent in i-acts involve both the faculty of **receptivity** of our multisensory sensorium and the cognitive processing capacity (of the CNS).

APPLICATION OF CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

The ex-modus is important **initially**, since the w must first be identified in its design (distinguishing constituents), and in the **assimilative** phase of **reception** (i.e. during the I:s' rehearsal). Comparatively the in-modes attain increasing importance during **interpretive processing** that aims at **artistic maturity**. Why so? Because the I must first learn to (1) **roughly grasp the outlines** of the c (w) that is being interpreted. Then, at a following stage, when he knows **some** determinant features of the c (w), the I will be able to (2) **test his own ideas** against these identified c-(or w-) determinants. An ultimate balance between ex and in seems to be attainable only when the final performance reflects a **congruent i**.

The sequences **ex-exto-extro** and **in-into-intro** respectively correspond to the gradually increasing I's **involvement in the w** during rehearsal and periods of reinterpretation. There are three degrees of depth in i-relations:

- (1) **superficial contact** with the surface layer of w-features
- (2) **participation** in content on a **middleground** (Schenker) layer.
- (3) **deep involvement** in the **core content** of the w, possible if this coincides with the corresponding deep level of the personality of the I. This would structurally correspond to what is implicitly meant by an "*Ursatz*"-rendering in p, applying the terminology of Schenker.

I am not arguing for a structural reductionism, since I believe that it is the **sensitivity to contextual relations** that is interesting about mip, and because it endows the i with a **complexity and richness of aspects** that attracts our aesthetic attention. A **phenomenological** reduction, though, is something quite different, implying **transparency of the w** as the prominent end of p (ip). Needless to say, the notion of transparency is central to interpretation research, and at least three levels of application can be distinguished: (1) the philosophical and conceptual transparency of interpretational logics, (2) the transparency of the holistic soundflow (integrity of multidimensional soundworld/shape, as e.g. the world of orchestral sound including its integrated sonority) and (3) the 'topographic transparency' of the interpretive/performative sound-layer over

its notational ground – i.e. the degree of manifestation of the w–structure in a p–soundshape.

Sensitivity, as used here, must be determined according to the following:

- (1) **adequateness** in the I's comprehension and rendering of an intricate relational network;
- (2) a **correct relational correspondence** to the constitution of the (so–called) 'reality', the relevant aspects of the external world, i.e. a **positioning**;
- (3) **an adequate picture of self–esteem (self–awareness)** on the part of the I; the exclusion of components from his own internal (private) world that do not fit the w.

It may be inserted at this point that the **selection** of preferred interpretive pathways by means of **exclusion** is generally considered (among musicians) as an advantageous method of rehearsing common to many conductors. It is easier to achieve the goal by saying no to the rejected options, as when the conductor tells the musicians of the orchestra what he dislikes. In this way the interpreter evades the problem of formulating explicitly by verbalizing his intended **auditive** version.

On the other hand, the **neglect–syndrome** (to apply a term from medicine) is an important **diagnosis** in critical ia: the **blindness to contextual relations** revealed in p can reflect cases of detachment, distantiation, self–isolation, or autism. One can apply categories from psychopathology: consider, for example, the interpretive approach of a totally submissive person, achieving an interpretive non–identity; or in contrast, a personality of exceeding self–effacement, or an exaggerated symbiotic dependence that would hinder an efficient action within the available free zone of i. This discloses an area for further investigation.

Consider the **light formalization** I have applied (MIR VI) to facilitate clear thinking. A **central core of i** can be designated, e.g.:

- (1) $wipi$, indicating that the w has to be interpreted as well as the p; the w_i is theoretical (T), whereas p_i is performative (p); a **congruent T–P–i** is presupposed where the first i is in effect equivalent to the second i;
- (2) w_1p_2 is a case of **noncongruent T–P–i**, where i_2 is not equivalent to i_1 ;
- (3) $ciwipili$ is a case of **more complete and successful transmission**.

In all formulas we have to carefully distinguish **epistemological differences**, for instance between

- (1) intrarelations, say n–n or i–i, regarding the aforementioned **COHERENCY**, or
- (2) interrelations, say n–i or i–n, regarding **CORRESPONDENCE**.

The reason why **fundamental relations** are important in mip is that their logical properties are universally valid. The I can rely on the **relational constellations** which provide a framework for interpretive content, despite wide empirical variation in listeners' predispositions and acquaintance with the actual w. This justifies the **apriorical** approach. Empirical material can never provide sufficient evidence for the clarification of **relational conditions for the communication** since these are more of a logical kind.

We have to create an **open theory** that allows for many categories, including all the expressive interaction and feed-back-exchange during live-p that the I might want to achieve.

To facilitate the reader's orientation I relate a few current **common sense characterizations of p-styles** to the **i-concepts of my theory**:

kind of i

(1) phenomenologic

determinations

expretation → inpretation

(cf. Husserl's "*passive Synthesis*")

occupied with w-i

no communicative criteria

risk of under-i

from L-perspective non-

communicative comprehension

(does not secure L's comprehension as condition/criteria)

e.g. E. Jochum (MIR II:85, 92-93, 114-115)

(2) hermeneutic

into → exto

goes deeper than (1)

more arbitrary than (1)

communicative criteria

possible but not necessarily

central to its aesthetics

risk for over-convincing and

over-interpretation

encloses w and L

- (3) **impressionistic** 'reading-out' of subtle c-content
that leaves little room for interpretation
leaves i-latitude for L
relies mainly on exto/extro
- (4) **expressionistic** intro (I->w->i(P)->L) or S->O->L
deep personal involvement
convinces through forceful gestalting

RESEARCH BACKGROUND IN 'AESTHETICS OF INTERPRETATION'

Musicological literature thoroughly treated the problem of **historical** performance practice, but neglected the problem of **i** on a principal level, i.e. from an aesthetic and artistic perspective. Many musicologists were – and are – good musicians, but few of them endeavored to cross the borderline between the domain of traditional musicology and the domain of artistic consideration – an artistic line of demarcation, I submit, drawn and upheld at least during the last century. Musicologists, in everyday discussion, adduced a purported **subjectivity** of p-aesthetics as justification for this neglect. They failed to see the possibility for **creative exchange** following a **careful aesthetic analysis** applied in this field. Their presuppositions were fundamentally wrong for the following reason: that something is **subjective** does not necessarily mean more than that it **pertains to a subject**. That it pertains to a subject may then include the connotation "being colored by a personality", but this does not entail **arbitrariness**. And even if their claims were granted, the treatment of a 'subjective' subject does not in itself have to be subjectively governed or delimited; this, I submit, would constitute a logical fallacy. Therefore, it should be possible to study and compare closely the components of performers' aesthetic thinking by avoiding "subjective" failure in the conventional sense. The "subjective" components are included in the scope of studied objects, and treated **neutrally** in the same way as "objective" objects, such as observations of measurements or facts of intranotational relations and proportions.

Scattered contributions to this subject – restricting the scope to the last 100 years – came from various schools of music theory (Riemann, Schenker, Meyer), and from artists (notably Furtwängler, Ansermet and Celibidache).

The possibility of writing a **history of i**, as recently attempted by Hermann Danuser, depends on a fundamental distinction between **interpretation** and **performance practice**:

In MIP:20 (1983) I defined "interpretation" in its general sense by the following denotations:

- (1) **explaining the meaning** of a musical w;
- (2) being a **mediator** or **intermediary** in the transmission between a creator and an addressee (receiver);
- (3) the **intentional image**–producing activity of the musical artist;
- (4) **realizing in sound** the musical w as conceived by the C; and, in a way that is **comprehensible to the listener**.

In comparison, Jerrold Levinson suggested the definition "a considered way of playing a piece of music involving highly specific determinations of all the defining features of the piece" (in Krausz 1993:36).

Interpretation research, then, focuses on the problem of **attaining aesthetically satisfactory results** in contemporary performance, and it is primarily interested in the traits of **individual performances**, "the I's **individual choice**, what precedes it and in more general terms whatever can have a **decisive effect on the artistic standpoints**...of today's living interpreters." (MIP:8).

In contrast, **performance practice**, and its research, focuses on "the musical customs of the past, more general ...[regional, national] historical or stylistically demarcated traditions of performance." This implies that p–practice is required for **past times & alien traditions**, in order to rescue these or to guarantee the **historical continuity** from past to present. There is a strong antiquarian interest in performance practice, a **historical recreationism** not taken for granted by i–research or contemporary performers.

SCHOOLS AND THEORIES OF IDEAS ON INTERPRETATION (ch. II)

Representing **analytic philosophy**, Göran Hermerén (MIR VI ch II:1) distinguishes P–i from T–i. He refuses to restrict i:s by definitional fiat to i:s of **intentions of the C**, and conceives of many kinds of legitimate objects for i, including aims such as **understanding our time** or **understanding ourselves**, not only the C. Basically Hermerén arrives at the following conclusion: P–i:s are not incompatible in the same way as T–i:s. Essentially, he states that T–i:s are incompatible, and P–i:s compatible, which is true only on the condition of non–

simultaneity, a condition that he does not mention. His basic distinction is essential, but he disregards the fact that P-i:s can well be compatible if non-simultaneous as, so I submit, in a case of i_1 and i_2 (performed at t_1 and t_2), which mainly overlap and together form a larger imagined whole (i_x) to which both i_1 and i_2 are coherent. And he points at the need for **logically specified criteria** for two i:s being i:s of the same work. It is not sufficient to **intend** an i to be i of this particular work. We must also take other criteria into account: **similarity**, **causality**, and the **pragmatic** criterion of demanding the listeners' recognition of an i to be what it purports to be.

Roman Ingarden determines the p as an **individual acoustic event** (which is wrong!; it is the **correlate** of the p that is this) **in time, objectively localized in a room and given by hearing** (which is correct), which unambiguously determines its qualities. In contrast, the score, not being localized in time or space, depends on creative processes of the mind; the parts of this 'individuum' (the score) exist simultaneously. But this **ontological dichotomy** provides no basis for further development of an aesthetics of i.

Mersmann, Zuckerkandl and Lawrence Ferrara, and in some part even Gisèle Brelét, develop an **intuitive phenomenology** that can be considered relevant in concrete detail. Mersmann's **phenomenology of phrasing**, based on the **criterion of correspondence** (c-i), regards **tension** and **continuity** as simple and evident phenomena of i.

For Adorno "*unwahre Ideen*", false ideas, lead to "*Unstimmigkeit*". This disruption in **continuity** and **coherence of meaning** and **energetic flow** has wide implications. The correspondence between external and internal phenomena he assumes is based on the general notion of "*Durchorganisation*", a **dialectic between construction and expression**, with the **human organism** as well as harmonic society as prototypes.

Heinrich Schenker conceived a "*Vortragslehre*" on the basis of his concept of the multi-layered masterwork. Since the "*Ursatz*" functions as the common denominator for the work structure completely unfolding in performance time, his **organicism** ends up in the recommendation "*Singe aus dem Ganzen.*"

The main problems treated in this thesis (ch. III) can be encapsulated in 5 questions/pairs of contradictory or complementary categories:

(1) **Historicity** contra **actuality**. How are these aspects accomodated? Are they

incompatible in any sense?

(2) The **expressive will** (or unconsciously expressed expressivity) of the interpreter contra the composer's **intention**. Can both be legitimately realized simultaneously in a p – and if yes, on what conditions?

(3) The **identity** contra **differency** (w-ID/DIFF and i(p)-ID/i(p)DIFF respectively, and their hybrids: e.g. wID-p(i)DIFF). How can the identity of the w–design (provided by 'constitutive' determinants) be preserved in view of the differences created in p, partly within the same p, partly across various and distinctly different p:s of the same w?

(4) **Objectivity** versus **subjectivity**. What is preferred from an aesthetic point of view, and from the perspective of the L?

(5) How can aesthetic ideals & positions be manifested in a gestalted p?

To illuminate the problem:

(1) **Actuality**, in its phenomenologic sense, refers to what appears in and constitutes the **now** (*in concreto et in praesentia*). It is extended to the point of **then**, outside our immediate scope of awareness. So the actuality gradually disappears into history, from which it can be recovered through retention or reactualization, as described by Husserl (Husserliana X).

Basically, actuality is characterized by **hic et nunc** (*in concreto et in praesentia*), here and now in contrast to the **tunc et inde** of historical fact, since the sounding musical tone of a p always has its **localization**, as well as its **determined extension in time flux**. But the **experiential correspondence** to the distributed places of the (multidimensional) 'acoustic room', is an **internal historical space** of 'virtual reality' where the laws of intentional consciousness govern. They are more free. The basic problem, then, for the performer, is the **actualization** of historical fact (including the score as artefact), the bringing (creation) of actual "experienceable" phenomena from remnants of the historical past.

(2) About the category of expressivity contra authenticity: Expressivity can refer to the I's **independent will of expression**, it is not necessarily **congruent** vis-à-vis the work. Authenticity can be defined as an originally relevant or inherent mode of expression, requiring **congruence** between i and w. It typically allows an enunciation to **embody** the w–expression by means of its **transparent sincerity**. Authenticity can be complementary in relation to expressivity, where the **emotional identification that authenticity allows for** is required to endow the work in its p with **liveliness**. Authenticity is necessary to create a feeling of performing "the work itself", from inside out, through

internal involvement (or personal identification) as seen from the I's perspective.

Leibowitz describes the I as the C's "double": According to his view, the role of the I is to create an **analogon** to the w, the w being both **imaginary** and **authentic** at the same time. Isaac Stern, in my interview (MIR III:183–197), relies on a constant "testing" according to "personal taste"; he adjusts the result by **sensitive** (attentive) **listening**. This is the musician's judgement based on **auditive taste**, but he also acknowledges the need to balance and modify expression in p against the **construction** of c. Antal Dorati pointed at the **broad range of possibilities** behind the label "expressivo", encompassing the **creation of different characters** and **nuances of expression** within that frame. He relies on an **energetic momentum** inherent to the **sound–mass**. Obviously **differences in personal concepts** of i should be compared. They may occasionally attain explanatory value vis-à-vis the w, but provisionally they describe individual I:s' concepts.

(3) ID/DIFF: A basic distinction is that between p-ID and c-ID (for example motivic unity). The identity of a w is guaranteed by its notation, according to Dahlhaus. But if **access to the w** requires i of the n, then the i is the **act of consciousness** required to **give the w its identity**; it is presupposed that an identity of the w is created in p through access to n, regarded as representing the determining w-constituents. On this point Hugo Riemann proposed certain **criteria for motivic identity (unity)** through phrase division in T or P, by talking about "*rechten Ausdruck*" as "die charakteristische Ausprägung der Idee in ihren Details" from "plastische Heraustreten der Motive und Themen." Riemann seems to have been the first among theoreticians who distinguished clearly between i- and c-identities (a distinction that returns in Celibidache's former concept of "*Topographie*" as the unfolding transparent i over the w as template; Riemann: "Ausdruck des Kunstwerks selbst...den der Komponist seiner Idee gegeben hat" versus "Ausdruck, den der reproduzierender Künstler dem von ihm vorgetragene Kunstwerke gibt, also von ausdrucksvollen Spiel und Gesang." And he even envisioned the **criterion of congruency** (c-i) when he talked about "in sofern zusammenfallend, als der reproduzierende Künstler dem höchsten Ziel darin sehen soll, das Bild welches der Komponist in den Stempel geschnitten, möglichst getreu ausdrücken."

But then, unfortunately, Riemann **oversimplified** the i-concept in postulating the rule: "Steigerung der Tonstärke bei steigender, Verminderung der Tonstärke bei fallender Melodie." Johan Sundberg uses the same rule: "the higher the louder" (MIR VI ch III:4); his conception is mainly restricted to a

coupling of **melodic distance** to the **dynamic** (Mn-D; MIR I:71 *et* VI ch. III:4).

(4) **OBJECTIVITY/SUBJECTIVITY**: Karl Fabian suggested (1929) that passivity was the required **mode of assimilation** in order to 'not destroy the w',...'let the w appear undisturbed'. Passivity would be a condition for the **objective** rendering of compulsory w-determinants. But another solution is provided by **phenomenological** thinkers who presuppose an **intersubjective coincidence** as the sole escape from the subject-object dichotomy. Recently, performance research, within the domain of natural science (NS), in accordance with the paradigm of basic science, has **claimed objectivity** by relying on overt **reductionism**: i(p) or p(i) is supposed to be reduceable to the level of physical facts, connected by an unseen **causality**-connection. Instigated by Seashore, this view attained its zenith in the **methodology of "analysis by synthesis"**. The problem, however, with this procedure and with using it to underpin science philosophy, applied by Sundberg *et alia*, is that the rules are formulated ("created") on certain **non-explicit grounds that are far from aesthetically neutral**. The computer produces only results in conformity with what it has been told to do, and the method does not exclude the **decisive aesthetic judgement** made by a human musical mind with certain preferences that remain implicit, namely as **aesthetic ideals of i in p**.

(5) The sound-manifestations of i(g) in p, or basically p(i), were extensively treated in MIP, MIR I, II and IV, and are the object of numerous studies within generative music performance research. Here it is sufficient to note that the **mode of coupling** between concrete sound-shapes and aesthetic aims (positions) is a complex relation on both perceptive and cognitive levels, which is also the focus of experimental music psychology.

Phenomenologically (and for mir) the i-intentionality, e.g. its **directional** (penetrational) aspects, can be manifested (enforced) in many ways, e.g. through dynamic means (cresc.) or accents, respectively, thus forming complex patterns of interactively expressive means of p(i). Such patterns were discovered, described and discussed during the course of the earlier phases of this project in order to illustrate the range of possibilities and interesting constellations ("solutions"), without claiming completeness on this point.

The review of perspectives in music life (ch. IV) starts with the **composers**.

In MIP:20 (and MIR I:4-5, 47) I proposed the distinction between three

levels: (1) execution, (2) gestalting, and (3) *i* in a specific sense. Composers primarily worry about **execution** which is the **simple sounding realization and correct rendering** of the score, i.e. the basic constitutional structure of all its parameters determined by the C (pitch, duration, tempo markings, dynamics, etc).

Stravinsky, who takes a stance of **intended objectivism**, even rejects the second level of gestalting by saying that there is **no need for the P's involvement** regarding the **clarification of compositional design**, shape or form. Sessions takes a contra-position, demanding of performers whatever **liveliness and eloquence** they can give. He justifies his view by referring to the **indeterminacy of the w** due to an **indeterminacy of n** (MIR VI ch IV:1). So, finally, for him there remains no other possibility than to ultimately **determine the c-ID by the P's i**. I am inclined to agree with his position on this point.

Scattered thoughts in *Style and Idea* show that Schönberg acknowledges a **free zone of artistic decision**. The I should (1) realize and clarify the "author's ideas", do more than execute pure notation (realization), and (2) make these ideas comprehensible to the listener by applying an appropriately distributed *expressivo* (ch. III:2 and IV:1). Schönberg feels forced to rely on **skilled performers**, without attempting to define what he means by this, nor to instruct the I what a P has to do to show his skill; in certain cases, however, it is self-evident what he means.

Hindemith wants to reduce the role of the intermediary between C and L, due to the **unreliability of auditive imitation**, but he acknowledges 3 bases for legitimate *mip*: (1) a generative act based on knowledge of the compositional material (cf. the "natural tendencies" of Celibidache; and the biological bases adduced by Wallin in his *Biomusicology*), (2) a realization of *n*, and (3) a combination of these two bases.

On the evidence found after investigation of **pianists' and string-players' concepts of i**, I argue that it is **methodologically legitimate** to regard, treat and discuss the **common problems of i** for various instrumental musicians in common. There is a **core of 'general' questions that make up a map of aesthetic positions**. The phenomenologic I will tend to **interpret pure structures** and to **subordinate expressivity**, whereas a **hermeneutic stance allows the expressivity** of the purported content to decide the structural rendering. Thus various **orders of priority** (MIP:26–30) characterize individual performers. A dominating **historical ideal** implies a secondary question as its sequel, on **how to establish communication** and how to secure the **audience's comprehension**, which

could as well be a condition for the former. A very adaptive and **communicative** p-ideal grapples with the problem of **justifying the enlarged zone of freedom** the P will need in his i-process to present the given **historical determinants in a new context**.

A slight tendency for **pianists** (Neuhaus, Brendel, Harry, Gould and others) to treat the problems of **overarching formal gestalting** – the sound-architecture – is counterbalanced by many **string players'** (Casals, Stern, Lorkovic, Pleeth) tendency to focus on the momentary quality of sound and expression. Due to instrumental differences, **analogies to human physiology** are generally considered (at least among musicians) to be easier to construct (and feel) for violinists (cellists) than for pianists (cf. the respiration-phrasing analogy).

Menuhin criticizes the **artificial** versus **intuitive** division between art and science, representing **discursive** modes of thinking respectively. But **intuition**, he claims, is a specific form of knowledge which **extends nature**. **Objectivity** is relevant to both modes, **scientific investigation** as well as **praxis as intuitive competence**. Art, according to Menuhin, defined as "*das Gebilde eines lebendigen Augenblickes*" reflects more closely the **transitoriness of the moment in life** (i.e. in 'reality'), than does science, defined as "*Kristallisation einer ewigen Wahrheit*". But in principle there is no difference of value ("level") from the science-philosophical point of view. It is reasonable to argue for an equality between art and science. It is possible, I submit, to point at full-fledged sets of **criteria of credibility** within science as well as art. I agree, in line with the science criticism delivered by Paul K. Feyerabend (throughout his oeuvre), with the position of **the possibility of equality** (regarding truthfulness) in science compared to in the art of music performance, adducing the support of empirical MIR material, its argumentation included.

From the investigations of **conductors'** aesthetic concepts it is interesting to note a **strong phenomenological tradition**: Ansermet and Celibidache explicitly refer to Husserl, whereas Furtwängler was impressed above all by Schenker's monumental analysis of Beethoven's 9th symphony.

The aim of science, in view of this consideration, seems to be to realize clearly simple relations; it may even be legitimate to simplify. This is by no means allowed by phenomenology. Art, then, seems to go in the opposite direction in

this respect, compared to science; simplification is not wanted for its own sake; it is legitimate only as a means for attaining in p **transparency of the w.**

THE SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATION RESEARCH

What follows is a brief survey invited discussion (ch V:3) on the **science philosophy of musical interpretation research** ("mir") in reference to MIR and our investigation of aesthetic criteria in intentional interpretive acts.

A preliminary remark is required. This section concerns the science philosophy of both musical interpretation research and the science philosophy of critical aesthetics. It relies on the reader's acquaintance with the present text including the MIR series of monographs. My aim is to show that it is fruitful and important to discuss those very general questions that are normally considered too self-evident to be incorporated in the daily work of basic science. I should also announce a caveat: my conclusion may appear as a provocative criticism of science indicating that the ordinary academically sanctioned Science Philosophy of Basic Natural Science **might** contain nothing more than a sophisticated form of systematic intolerance embodied in preconceptions of scientific consensus. This view is consistent with what Paul K. Feyerabend suggested in his *Against Method* (1975) and *Farewell to Reason* (1987), recently reflected in *Scientific American*, May 1993:16–17.

Consequently, my entire argument is a support for the necessity and justification of **science–philosophical reflection** required as an interwoven part of basic science. Such reflection is itself a mode of cognition studied by interpretation science. It follows that insofar as **acts of human consciousness** are the objects of research, an interpretation science is required to clarify the modes of intentionality that are involved in the cognitive processes at stake. Thus in mir there are several levels of study: (1) the concrete versions of performance, (2) the patterns of interpretive thinking leading to aesthetic decisions, and (3) the critical self–reflection on the science–philosophical bases of general (interdisciplinary) as opposed to specific interpretation research.

I am postulating that a performance requires an **interpretive process** that can be identified by surveying the alternatives of realizing the score. The much–quoted differences between various recordings of the same work available on

the CD market can be derived from differences in the **patterns of musical thinking**. My line of thought is that an investigation must consider these **cognitive differences** more on the conscious level, without relying on a reduction to a presupposed causal sequence in the infamous black box. Nor am I satisfied by references to methods that apply too many mechanistic patterns in their basic thinking. Instead I am inclined to argue for a **separate and independent area of research**, and with this aim I feel unprejudiced in my freedom of choosing the most adequate and sensitive method of studying.

An example: in the literature on this topic **artistic freedom** is a frequently recurring thought. But how can such freedom be attained if the world consists of merely causally interconnected hard facts? It is evident that this so–often–cited and beloved notion, adduced as a condition for **creativity** in performance, is a matter of **intentional content**. This artistic freedom is evidently obtained by (acts of) assimilating and by **transcending** the underlying musical facts. It is commonly considered a requirement for satisfactory interpretation since it presupposes a free zone available for volitional decision–making. But freedom is not arbitrary; it is not determined (in a deterministic sense) either; the point is that the various constellations of criteria and their interrelations form aesthetically interesting patterns, studied by interpretation science. Obviously, *mir* has to ramify into a metascience.

However, my focus is on the ideas embraced by the musician, and the analytical consideration of these ideas, *sc.* on the **ideas surrounding performance**, not the acoustical facts of it. For this purpose, it is evidently fruitful to analyze conceptually and consider aesthetically the **thinking** among musicians, critics and researchers on how to achieve a satisfactory musical interpretation in performance (*mip*). So at this time I am presenting more of a **concept of research** than I am the **results** of it, as an introduction to *MIR VI*.

Let the first question be: **Who** is doing the interpretive thinking? And of **what** is this thinking, *sc.*: What is the **subject** and what is the **object**, and what other **participants** are involved in the communicative chain established by *mip*, and by the imaginative acts that precede the performance. This is actually two questions: (1) What are the **apriorical** schemes of cognitive relations, possibly for the specified overarching aesthetic ideals; and (2) What **empirical** constituents of such apriorical relational schemes are concretely at stake in a particular performance (then occurring within a definite timespan). I expand in my recent work on such a **relational theory** of the indexical relations between constituents of basic schemes, and on the application of the pertinent **ontological** entities

such as w,c,n,i,p;a,l (abbreviations explained in MIP:29, and in ch. VII:2).

As a justification it could well be sufficient to state that the ideas themselves are interesting enough to justify their investigation, as **phenomena of human thinking** constituting the human history of ideas. But the focusing on ideas instead of facts implies a decisive difference of methodology. On a philosophical level, the determinism required to support the constancy of causal theories is not defensible when dealing with ideas. It is more interesting to inquire about **quality and content** of an aesthetic or conceptual position, and to show its existence as an instance, than it is to make the usual measurements in order to quantify qualitative experience. Why so? Because experience itself is basically qualitative: quality absorbs quantity. Quantity in the end (and in effect) is a quality among many other qualities. But quantity is rarely focused on as an experiential target. The sensuous stimulation of pure quantity is not sufficient for aesthetic aims.

It is of interest to us to discover the actual modes of thinking in interpretive acts aiming at performance, and to see if they represent distinguishable and specific cognitive patterns that can be described in an unprejudiced way. This means that I take a close look at the actual interpretive modes of musical thinking as **separate "creative theories"** of ideas that engender the particular performance by fulfilling intentional aims, its characteristics included. The requirement of validity of such theories, within the frame of intentional consciousness, is restricted to the one interpreting individual. But this in no way makes the choice of great musicians for this kind of investigation arbitrary.

In order to **proliferate the theories** that most closely correspond to their respective causative patterns of thinking, leaning once more on an idea of Paul K. Feyerabend, I have to conceive of a conceptual, or phenomenological metatheory that can encompass relevant patterns and positions within a broader scope of options. This metatheory must determine individual sets of relations between its cognitive constituents. A few dominating, prevailing relational patterns of interpretation emerge; they seem based on different *a priori* possible approaches to such basic issues as (1) the **actualization** of historical fact, (2) the emergence of historical fact through **actual sound-embodiment**, (3) the **modes of rendering** in sound of analyzed notational & compositional structures, and (4) the actual structural phenomena of experiential soundshapes. The **conceptualization** is a basic trait in the maturation of a consistent aesthetic interpretational ideal of mip.

In order to concretize, I will mention just a few relational criteria that

receive careful treatment in the MIR volumes and that were empirically confirmed by comparative analyses, explorations and interviews. Such criteria as IDENTITY, CONTINUITY, and TRANSPARENCY receive both analytical and empirical support. If these are seen as **phenomenal entities**, they are conceptually undefinable at the primordial stage of experience. They appear **before** conceptualization, in accordance with what Edmund Husserl suggested (Huss. III, detailed references in MIR VI ch. I:3). This does not mean that they are impossible to understand. They are not confused or unclear. They are just as clear and evident as the Cartesian idea of "*cogito ergo sum*", on which all knowledge was for a long time supposed to be based. This means that they are explained necessarily by reference to the subject's experience. Why the apodictical 'necessarily' here? Because this is the sole way of access to genuine experience through consciousness, whether of mine or yours. The phenomenal entities must, per definition, be experienced in order to qualify as CRIT_{exp} (experiential criteria). It can be postulated that the CRIT_{exp} attain priority over acoustical facts, since experiences are overriding in the sense that an experience of mip presupposes an acoustic fact (in contrast to other kinds of facts), whereas the reverse is not the case: It is possible to talk about an acoustical fact (among others of the same kind) without reference to specific experiences, and without evidential reference to the subject's experiential content.

Since all potential criteria (I refrain from stating them here; *vide* MIR I ch. 6 and MIP 35–37: "Nomenclature of some basic phenomena", and this volume, *passim*) have to be assessed on their own merits, the respective criteria viewed separately require **independent argumentation**. IDENTITY guarantees the graspable shape of the object to be related to: it is a condition for the occurrence of a relation between **subject** and **object** that can be established through the interpreter's listening and acting. For an interrelation in the sound–world to appear, a CONTINUUM is required, though not necessarily a continuity of sound or – if you wish – sound pressure, or of another modality, say within time experience; but the **conceptual continuity of an organizing principle** within **some parameter** is needed for a relation to occur, for example a **constant meter** or a **unifying development** of dynamics or of harmonic structure, or a fulfillment of a melodic complementarity. Many other such well-known **musicocognitive** notions may provide grounds for this **experiential continuity** (CONT_{exp}). This experiential continuity obviously has three components: (1) c–CONT, and (2) p–CONT. And, (3) an i–CONT secures the congruency of the p–CONT towards the c–CONT on the basis of the criterion of **correspondence**. And the i–CONT

itself reveals its internal coherence of i-i relations.

At an early stage of science-philosophical consideration one has to recognize that an attempt at an **objective analysis** reveals a fundamental problem: the physical, acoustical or physiological knowledge about what actually happens at the moment of the performance is not itself causative.

The **bodily motion** that causes the instrumental (or vocal) sound is itself an **effect**, a result of an intentional act, or at least **partly** caused by (or modified by) an intentional act. And this intentional act is **interpretive**.

The **performative "rules"** of music performance research (Sundberg *et alia*) are more results than causes. Therefore it is interesting to discuss cognitive modes and patterns of musical thinking on a very **principal** and **general** level. To give just one example of what can be a causative sequence: $w/c_n-i(c_n)-i(w)-p(i(w))$; *vide* 1993: MIR VI ch. I:2 and MIP 25-31 "Basic analytical distinctions".

Over the decades a **concept of science** has been developed, stating that (material or materially related) **reality** can be the only object for science, presupposing that **ideas** do not pertain to reality. This, of course is severely questionable. Furthermore, the presupposition that ideas are not causative is, as I intimated, **false**. It is just that we have to differentiate various kinds of **causative relations**, and the conditions for such an investigation is much more favorable provided one has first clarified the basic relational pattern; as, for example, when the question concerns an n-n, n-i or i-i relation. Therefore the **dichotomy idea-reality** cannot be maintained on the sole basis of causality as a distinctive criterion. What's more, the very idea of science precedes its praxis. Therefore, reality cannot be studied without ideas regarding it and regarding how one studies it. Since the way of studying reality will influence the resulting descriptive knowledge of the same reality, it must also be true that reality cannot be studied without an idea of what it is; this obviously is more than the conventional strictly formulated hypothesis, and includes all silent presuppositions held by the interpreter / researcher. This means, provided the principle is established, that **objectivity** cannot be achieved without an idea, at least a guiding idea, of what objectivity is: an apparently unavoidable circularity that need not scare us. But there is no **natural objectivity**, or an objectivity *per se*. This conclusion may sound provocative. That is why the various concepts of objectivity, and the related conceptual relations, in art and in science, must be illuminated by interpretation research.

In this section of the summary my argumentation implied (at least regarding mip & mir) that facts are not causes, but facts are effects of intentional

states. Interpretive acts, based on phenomenal criteria, instigate the performative action of mir. This has decisive consequences on the methodology of mir and, more generally, on interpretation science.

VI:2 CONCLUSIONS

The initial task was to design a non-normative metatheory and analytic aesthetics of musical interpretation in performance along the lines of the thesis given by the specified objectives of MIP: 7–13 and in ch. I:1. This has been done by focusing on an intentional analysis of the modes of existence in interpretive acts and in qualities manifested or manifestable in music performance.

The decisive conclusions that can be drawn from the total project, including the investigations of MIR I–V and the present volume (MIR VI) can be pinpointed concisely. The treatment through the preceding series of analyses (ch. I–V) of the initially posed questions (ch I:1:3, III) in the course of this investigation permits the following conclusions:

Question (1) concerns the compatibility of historical authenticity versus the aesthetic requirement of experiential actuality. These are reconciled by reworking the variable *w*-contextuality through merging it (in light of the chosen relevant aesthetic position/goal) with the auditor's contemporary contextuality, while the core of the *c*-structure remains constant. A precondition for this procedure is the constitution of the *w* (as entailing its *c* and *n(c)*) in different layers and their 'distinguishability' in the context of the implications of contemporary interpretation.

Question (2) concerns how a musicwork attains its identity through performance. It became clear that a work, having its preconditional *w*-identity conceived of as an intentional object, guaranteed in its core by notational fixation, can be retained (preserved) through the *i*-process, which allows for manifestation (of *w*) in *p*-identity. Thus, the crucial question centers around the conditions for preserving the core properties of a specific identity through (1) the various ontological forms of appearance of the *w* (in the guise of *n*->*i*->*p*->*l*) with their duly different epistemological statuses, and through (2) the phases of the concrete working and reworking process during exercise and rehearsal, i.e. through stages of preliminary outlines. The function of *i* is to preserve the identity once the conditions have changed for unity in real time performance from the initial conditions of the compositional *w*-identity. In order to carry

through this transmission the interpreter furnishes his set of decisive criteria above and beyond the simple habits of manual convention and compelling tradition. The interpretative enhancement of decisive points and the underlining of sound shapes that mark the processuality of development are aligned along with the demands for clarification of the c-structure in real time p: the criteria of auditive continuity and cohesivity are required to frame the appropriate extension in the time flux of the constant 'relationability' of the c-parts to their whole as a substitute for the different conditions guiding the notational relation of the structure at the initial stage of assimilative rehearsal.

Question (3) concerns the relation between the interpreter's expression through p(i) versus the composer's intention regarding the expressive content of his w. The expressive will of the interpreting performer is relevantly manifested through the congruency of expression and the corresponding frame of the w's expressive indeterminacy. The crucial relation $I_{\text{expr}}-C_{\text{int}}$ is made coherent by (1) congruency of the referential realms (areas of the denotational center & the connotational periphery) of meaning. What the C(1) is hypothetically assumed to intend (mean), or in rare cases what he (2) explicitly and unambiguously has enunciated as his intention (means), is made congruent with the I's "expressive intent". The expressive intent is basically either interpretative projection or ex-pretative penetration. Crucial, though, is that the congruency of I_{expr} as opposed to C_{int} is attained by means of (1) the identity of the beholder, i.e. $ID(I_M)$, the **identity of the interpreter's mind** (consciousness), and (2) the **identity of the interpretative act**, $ID(I_i)$: in other words, that it is, in case 1 above of a conjectured, extrapolated or hypothetically postulated (assumed) C-intention, the same person that holds the expressive and intentional conception (audialization) of (onto) the w. In case 2 above, of the explicit intantum formulated by C, if it is taken by I (P) in the actual encounter as a directive for p, an ontological problem paradoxically appears: it may actually be more difficult to arrive at a 'final' i, and consequently its p(i), when the interpreter (I, P) has to reconcile (realign) the two intentional conceptions, his own (authorial and in provenance, secondary, interpretationally original) and that of the composer (authorially original and primary, interpretationally of a complex status) in order to attain the congruency of i. The composer's intention has authorial status as a compelling source of reference for n and c, for his project of compositional construction and its notational representation, but not for the ultimate, coherently completed expressive interpretation that is required as the basis for p(i). The interpretative acts, though, attain their ontological and

epistemological status (and justification) from the **relational accomplishment** of the transmissionary function needed for achieving communication as a completion of the original project. The composer's project is put into a **relational and intentional system** by the interpreter's *i* and *p*, the former contributing conceptually with the imprint of its relevant complex cognitive pattern, the latter manifestly embodying this system by 'added' corresponding (and complementary) sensuous qualities and by a richness of nuances within the allowed zone of *w*-latitude that secures the coherency of $p(i(w))$, shored up on the basis of core *c*-structures.

Question (4) concerning "objectivity" and "subjectivity" clarified the complexity of these notions. They are closely intertwined. It is clear that the involvement of the subjective pole in the sense of perceiving and experiencing consciousness inevitably contributes to the interpretive encounter with the object of the *i*-intentional act. And in the sense of "correctness", "accuracy", objectivity is relevant in the usual sense on the level of primary execution of the *c* and *n*. The **structurally central core** of the *w* is or can be made subject to objectivity. But the peripheral structural properties often allow and evoke different sets of internally coherent alternatives for *i*. In addition, other realms of expression, such as of experiential qualities of the "character" and "mode" types require essential subjective involvement, including the introjection of comprehensible models or patterns bearing imprints from cognitive templates. The degrees of *i* originating from subject (act) as opposed to object (material) structures can be theoretically displayed in an analytical nomenclature (ch. I:2).

Question (5), about the manifestation of aesthetic ideals, was approached by mapping various positions within the broad panorama of options, and deducing the imperative and prohibitive consequences on the concrete level. However, in practice, interpreters were shown to hold personal concepts that cognitively mix normative premises and logical inferrability on different levels of abstraction, forming extremely complex and ramified musico-logical patterns of interpretation.

It may be concluded that a general 'positionality' of the subject-object relation is determined by the directionality of the interpretive act. A total object-centeredness will end up in an incommunicable attempt to realize an ideal of historical authenticity which is unattainable on two levels: (1) the total reduction

of subjective involvement is not possible insofar as the *p* is produced by an *i(w)*, i.e. of intentional acts, and (2) the original conditions (circumstances) of historical facts cannot be recreated. Contrariwise, a total subject-centeredness would end up in an idiosyncratic-narcissistic ('egocentric') *i* that is not able to retain its communicability in one of three ways: (1) the subjective expression may be isolated, (2) it may remain unrelated to potentially corresponding facts or structures of the *w*, and (3) it may be inexperienceable; there is no guarantee of the 'experienceability' of this divided (dichotomic, 'schizoid') *p(w)*. On the other hand, such a self-centeredness may leave room for creatively involved auditors who recreate their own *w*-images without *i*-impulses from the *I*. Consequently there seems to be an area of preferred communicability in-between the two extremes of subjectivity and objectivity; the balanced components and interrelatedness of subject and object secures one inevitable condition of *i*-communicability.

Many of the complexly formalized *i*-relations can, alternatively and for the purpose of improving communicability, be expressed, though in slightly simplified form, through ordinary language: the *i*-acts are directed towards specific layers of the *w* (or *c*); thereby they are more or less *w/c*-involving projections: (1) from the perspective of the subject's (*S*)*i* to (*in*, *into*, *intro*; *on*, *onto*, '*ontro*') (*O*)*w* or (2) from the perspective of the object's *w* (*ex*, *exto*, *extro*; *onto*, '*ontro*') to *i*; but the complexity of the *i*-relations are best visualized in illustrative figures. Basically the *i*-to-*w* is primordially intentional and secondarily 'factual', whereas the *w*-to-*i* is primordially 'factual' and secondarily enters into the intentional realm. The point of departure of the *w*-to-*i* in the world of the work is 'factual' to the degree that its properties are exposed, and in the sense that this shows its 'status as a fact' as 'objectively fixed', even if the determinants (the recognizable properties) of the *w*'s world were once endowed by intentional acts, namely creative and recreative as well as interpretive and experiential acts. Metaphorically the *w* is (an image of) frozen intentionality.

Furthermore the (1) originality (depth of subjective productive involvement, 'engagement'), (2) directionality and (3) authenticity (in the sense of depth of involvement in the object) are three overarchingly decisive determinations of the *i*-act (and its outcome).

Our investigation implies that an *i*-theory must be compatible with the conditions of interpretive processing on at least three levels: (1) within that of afferent sensory 'perception'; (2) within that of the causal processing of neural 'circuits', namely input-output, feedback and modificative neural sequences

(exciting/inhibiting neurons, uncoupling and on-off reaction sequences), including a basic emotional coloring; and (3) within that of higher **intentional** functions, such as conscious assimilation guided by interpretive views forming cognitive paradigms or complex associations including intellectual and emotional experience, memory, recollection, and patterns of behavior.

The preceding investigations (MIRI-V included) allow a conclusion concerning the empirically prevalent (and, congruently, the theoretically decisive) **criteria of mip**. Three constantly recurring criteria are **IDENTITY**, **CONTINUITY**, and **COHERENCY**. Their prevalence is explained by their overriding position in the required cognitive processes, as well as in the ontological setting of mip (phenomenological apodicticity).

The interpretive positions can be defined by **modalities** using the verbs 'appearing', 'being' and 'having to be' (the 'must be', necessarily being, or apodictic being) as constituents, following Tarasti's line of thought. This scheme expresses possible replies to the questions **how? what? why?** The answers can be 'digital' yes/no (y/n) answers or they can contain more subtly differentiated 'analogous' degrees of congruence/incongruence:

	(1) appearance	(2) being	(3) must be
(1) appearance	y/n	y/n	y/n
(2) being	y/n	y/n	y/n
(3) must be	y/n	y/n	y/n

the questions are: (1-1) Does the p appear (to be) as it appears (as ph_{exp}), does it reveal what it appears as? Logically the reply is always yes. Are there modes of aesthetic/artistic dissociation on this point? If appearance is taken in two different senses, the potential (*a priori*) **phenomenon** versus the appearance in the individually subjective percept, a relation of y/n and congruence can be constructed: e.g. the ph predicted from general/generative rules or phenomeno-

logic principles (derived from logical_{exp} or empirical_{exp} ph) can appear in the individual exp 'as they should' or digress from the pattern more or less incongruently. Also, (1-2) p can appear as it is, (1-3) appear as it must be, (2-1) be as it appears, (2-2) be as it is, (2-3) be as it must be (logical congruency between *a priori* and *a posteriori*), (3-1) must be as it appears (contrary to scientific thinking, this is a permitted mode in art_{exp}), (3-2) must be as it is (logically presupposed by determinism in certain scientific research), and (3-3) must be as it must be (logical tautology).

Tarasti's fruitful applications of semiotics to music makes use of a modal logics of performance choices (ch. II:4): want-know, be able to, being-doing-becoming, know-must-believe.

Basically I argued that on one hand (1) the **criteria** for (w-i) congruency of i are not simply a matter of **conviction**; they are not arbitrary, not **entirely** dependent on conviction; i.e. a basic phenomenon of congruency would – at least in its core – resist a changed conviction. An i does not exhibit **correct reference** (namely to the w, c, w_α) only because of its convincing force on a community of beholders (listeners), not even if these are socially specified. On the other hand: (2) there is no generally and unconditionally valid **objectivity of i-criteria**, since they depend (*a priori*) on the intentional focusing on an aesthetic goal represented by a specific standpoint in the scheme of *a priori* possible positions. This, though, entails neither logical hegemony nor practical anarchy, so that (3) new i positions may enlarge the aprioric scheme, and they carry their specific network of determinations due to what relations they uncover (what system they activate), pertinent to their respective **mode of actualisation**.

Conclusion: The musician's reading of the score is not a neutral act of consciousness. It involves specific modes of attentive and directed mental approach ("intentionality") meant to prepare the performance, facilitating the transformation from "visual" code to sounding musicwork. The specific paradigms of thinking, applied in order to provide favorable conditions for listeners' comprehension, are considered "interpretive".

What is rendered in sound is not the score, but an outcome of the musician's cognitive processing of "reading" the score. This processing entails **assimilative** and **emittive** acts of interpretation by which the performer arrives

at his rendering-in-sound of the musicwork. This sounding result always has a definite design. Within Western art music the notation is normally given as an object of interpretation: both the "origin" (i.e. notation as 'fact' and point of reference) and the outcome of the interpretive process have specific traits that can be compared and 'objectively' related. Such a juxtaposition indicates what paths of thought have been productive during the interpretive process. This process allows several alternatives due to different basic approaches to the notational fact and to the contextual determinants of the work. Furthermore, there may be a fundamental indeterminacy of the signification of notational signs adding to the "zone of freedom" for interpretation.

However, the practical implementation, i.e. the physical execution of the music in performance, requires neuromuscular dexterity and extensive training. The functioning of the sensomotorical nervous system can be an obstacle to the realization of this "musical image" into corresponding sound, or unrealistic imagining may be the cause of a discrepancy between artistic intention and performance reality. Communication of artistic intention is maximized at the point where the cognitive mastering of the interpretive process, including evaluative selection of an aesthetically satisfying alternative, is congruent with the technical skill of the performer realizing the w.

Other assimilative acts, such as feed-back listening to alternative versions and reactualizing memories from earlier hearings of the work, may be involved in the creation of a mental image of the work to be performed. Various overriding aesthetic ideals, due to different educational traditions, govern the preference choices in performing alternatives. Cognitively, reaching such a choice is an interpretational process that can be analyzed as regards its logical structure. The term "interpretation" suggests that this may be a process that is more or less consciously governed, whether actively or passively; and the degree of conscious control over the decisions correspond to the degree of the performer's freedom.

Therefore, musical interpretation research also studies the apriorical logic and intentional structure of interpretive thinking as a basis for classifying concrete "systems of interpretative concepts". Such systems, i.e. the musicians' personal performance styles, critically differ with respect to their (1) **internal coherency** and their (2) **external correspondance** to the work structure. The structure of such systems can be described in alternatively (1) intentional, (2) physical (acoustical) or (3) musical terms. This thesis focuses on alternative 1.

The analysis of interpretative processes requires consideration of basic

models of science–philosophical thinking, including a discussion on **intentionality** between conscious phenomena **contra causality** between physical facts and their complex paradigms of interaction.

A review of musical and musicological literature shows that the aesthetic criteria of interpretative systems can be analysed and discussed in view of main science–philosophical ideals provided by semiotics, logical formalism or empiricism, structuralism, hermeneutics and phenomenology.

Together with documentation of interviews and rehearsal work, the intentional structure of musical interpretative thinking was clarified in a series of monographs (MIR vols I–II, "Musical Interpretation in Performance" MIP, 1993, the unpublished MIR III–V, 1978–85, and this study MIR VI, 1992–94).

VI:3 DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

Otto Laske (28.8.93 1st International Conference on Cognitive Musicology, Jyväskylä) asked if the role of consciousness, whatever was meant by that term, is really so dominant over musical **intuition** for a performer as suggested by my theory.

I responded that it may well be an **empirical** fact (but it remains to be investigated and established whether performers do not interpret consciously or analytically the *w*), but this does **not** weaken my explicative system, since my research aims at consciously illuminating the creative and cognitive processes that might well be hidden from the performers themselves. This is the reason why interviews only play a minor part in my investigation. Were performers to be aware, and provided we had access through sound methods of deep interviewing, I would have confined my investigation to this method. But unfortunately this is obviously not the case. The topic must be researched by means of logical, phenomenological, and analytical methods. Furthermore, I suggest that in the case of a majority of performers it would improve their artistic achievements to become more aware of what they are doing to the work, both in relation to themselves and to the audience. Therefore it is legitimate to strive to attain the far-reaching goal of conscious control of *p(i)* required by superior artistic and aesthetic mastery.

Tarasti objected (3rd International Doctoral and Post-Doctoral Seminar of Musical Semiotics, Helsinki 24.9.93) that the theory of relations (e.g. entities such as *n-i*) is an empty theory that attains a meaning only when filled by a specific

musical content. I claimed that a theory of mip must be a metatheory, which was also what Tarasti had argued for earlier, on a certain level of generality. It cannot propose concrete solutions for each piece and each individual interpreter. If it did, it would easily become normative or dogmatic. If I had intended to write a style-dependent i-theory, it would have ended up in the same dogmatic historicism as often seen in *Aufführungspraxis*. I wanted to treat ideas with generative and creative impact on the descriptive and open-ended aesthetics of mip that I intended to develop.

Secondly, Tarasti commented that this theory is strongly focused on the **intentionality** of the i-act, whereas this is only one aspect of interpretation. I acknowledge the importance of complex semantic associations and structural 'meanings' in both T-i and P-i, but I contend that it is not possible to ground a theory of i on semantic complexes, since these vary widely among people; it is even possible that semantic meaning is either heavily loaded by personal psychic history (and associations) or that it is arbitrary in a logical sense. However, in a letter dated 8.2.94 Tarasti diffusely rejects the manuscript – and falsely attributes my science-philosophical stance to the tradition espoused by Ingmar Bengtsson, without specific argument or reference – thus missing the "sharper approach" that would unify my "many points of view under the same title and theme" (my translation; the Swedish original cannot be quoted due to linguistic problems). He does not specify what title would be the overriding one according to him. It is true, though, that musical interpretation research hardly can be subsumed under the title of musical semiotics – and its theoretical endeavor is not exhausted by the latter movement.

Since I dedicated a chapter to this theory, asking Tarasti to comment particularly my criticism, it is unfortunate, and I regret it, that our fruitful dialogue was interrupted. In his letter he apparently relies on his colleague Erkki Salmenhaara (22.1.94), who did not discover the key of this thesis; he feels disturbed by the text being visually "loaded" with boldtypes, as if the surface were more important than the content, but avoids mentioning any of the theses I advanced and argued for; it seems impossible to argue with him about the topics I have treated. His comments, made after the "exhausting task" of reading this manuscript (in an earlier version of Autumn 1993), which did not rouse him to dialogue, nor awaken the sensorium needed for comprehension, do not simply refer to what I wrote. His frequent use of "*förnuftig*" (cf. German "*vernünftig*") discloses his position, and a comment seems to indicate that he does not even know what MIR stands for; I cannot understand why he did not

simply look up the abbreviation in the appendix, read the preface (first page) or even take the uncomfortable effort to read one of my earlier books on the subject. The theoretical effort of this thesis requires serious reply in accordance with ethical standards of scientific discussion and communication. This is required from those who wish to participate in the development of an interpretive science; one has to realize the deeply **democratic** end of this endeavor shown in the respect for various interpretive views and ideals. This can never be substituted by a 'bold-faced' authoritarian attitude. Obviously, it is problematic to have already invested too much in fixed ideologic positions.

Steven P. Hartman, Stockholm University, advanced reservations (12.6.94) against what seems to be an inherent paradox (and an implication of my theory), namely the idea that a non-sentient object itself should have the capacity to direct intention, "which seems to be the implication if perceptual O is given to be S and S is given to be the O of that S". He is "willing to more readily imagine a situation in which the perceptual O is an 'indirect' (or secondary) O – similar to (though perhaps not exactly corresponding to) the case, within grammar, of an indirect object (or prepositional object) – and in which 'a set of conditions' (call them 'circumstantial') – fulfilling the role of the traditionally-viewed S – coalesce to elicit, albeit without psychological intention, the unintentional direction of the auditor's, your O's, concentration on the 'secondary' object; this, of course, would mean that neither auditor nor object are acting volitionally (whereas in your proposed scheme the object – your S – is furnished with a volitional trait – due to the very fact that it is acknowledged as an S – which, to me, seems impossible) but are instead being acted upon **in tandem** by an 'implied' S – the coalescing 'set of (circumstantial) conditions' eliciting the act of passive focusing – thereby avoiding the necessity of attributing volition (at least theoretically) to your S."

The reply to this objection is that it is not true that an S or O in itself, *a priori* or by definition, is endowed with a directed intention, nor does the neutral symbol S for subject, as I use it, imply anything volitional. S and O are, in my relational scheme, **functional** terms – i.e. it is a matter of determining what functions as an object in the **perspective** of a subject. Nothing prevents one single person, I or you, from simultaneously being S and /or O; in fact, this is the normal situation in complex social life. In psychoanalysis, the analysand is such a functional object for the analyst, who for himself is a subject, but for his patient may become the target for projections (i.e. the analyst is an object for the analysand); in fact, the healing effect of psychoanalysis is claimed to depend on

the opportunity for the analyst to direct **interpretational acts** towards his doctor; these may, in cases of congruence (between S and O) at the same time have S-expretational contents. In the arts – here especially the interpretation of a musical score – it is clear that the score, which is normally looked upon as a fixed object, can be the 'subject' merely in a secondary sense; but this sense – that it is an **embodiment** of the composition, the work and its context included – is important, if not decisive, in that it allows the interpreter to **identify** with the specific work – traits that can be seen as **imprints** of the composer's person(ality) or whatever belonged to him as characteristics (e.g. the mentality of the age and cultural environment he lived in, etc). Thus, the theory I advance may not be seen as furnished only for specific and limited situations within the conventional setting of his (contemporary) music performance of classical masterworks in our concert halls; it must be a flexible system, ready to capture innovative situations; for example, if the composer improvises in cooperation with the musicians of an ensemble in a performance of contemporary music, he will be looked upon as an object for interpretive hypotheses from the viewpoint of his artistic collaborators; simultaneously, however, he is a subject who directs his intentions in every possible sense of that word. It is only essential to remember the **mutuality** of the interpretive relation and to keep the distinction clear between (psychological) **intention** (which may entail or imply **volition**) and (phenomenological) **intentionality**, which is basically **nonvolitional**.

Celibidache's objection (Munich 10.11.93) is his argument against the existence of i: "Ich behaupte dass es keine Interpretation gibt oder geben kann". He states: "ich erkenne die Tatsache oder nicht. Wenn nicht, kommt nicht die 4:e Tjajkovsky". The problem, treated earlier, boils down to the question of whether the ontology of a musicwork allows **complete determination**, as Celibidache's noninterpretational postulate presupposes. I admit that this is possible, but only on the basis of a metainterpretative system that imposes a certain, perhaps well-formed, cognitive pattern on the **facts** of the w (n). I also admit that it would be possible to postulate in support of Celibidache's standpoint, that if n-n relations are indeterminate, the indeterminacy in i-i relations occurring in the **sound-media** is not necessarily the result. Notation and sound could have different ontologies, or different cognitive preconditions. It is evident that the time flow of sounding music as cognized from sensory auditive perception limits the opportunities for interrelating outside the now-window; the perception is not voluntarily or intentionally guided. Visual perception is favored by much greater freedom in its regarding of relations

unbound by the time flow.

But that the zone of freedom is more limited does not imply that it is restricted to zero. The small adjustments possible can have magnificent effects, something acknowledged not only by Celibidache. What is limited to total determinacy is the acoustic version of the performance as a fact, not as an experiential phenomenon.

It may be added that we have to respect the achievements made outside the walls of the universities. In the fine arts essential progress is being made in the 'ateliers' of the artists; in music, advancements—even a major break-through—can be made during rehearsals in our concert houses, or in the composer's private chamber, when few are listening except those within the professional circle.

It is important to admit the limitations of this theory of intentional relations in interpretive acts that apply a "*Raster von Relationen*" (Ernst Lichtenhahn p.c. 19.1.94) in order to define and classify aesthetic positions of mip. The method that I launch aims to provide a means for a more precise analysis in criticism and education than hitherto practiced. Its justification relies on the hope for a **practical improvement** of quality in criticism. Having been used for purpose of clarification, the method can be to a large extent disposed of in order that it not inhibit or impede the full personal exploration of the 'free room' of interpretation; that aims for a maximal development of aesthetically and artistically integrated maturity in mip.

It is true that I suggest a paradigm of interpretation research founded on four cornerstones: (1) phenomenological analysis, (2) the experience of practical musicianship, (3) traditional musicological research (including music theory), and the consideration of (4) biomusicological (neurophysiological) aspects. Lichtenhahn wonders how these are related. This question is central to the science–philosophical basis of interpretation research. Biomusicology describes the 'material' (i.e. neuromuscular) conditions for and limits to the practical performance, which together with musicologic T–is on the metalevel can become subjected to phenomenological analysis as a more neutral mode of conscious reflection. The terminology and conceptual framework of such an interpretation theory must itself be critically discussed. The criteria for evidence for such a 'science philosophy' relies on both experience and logic.

Commenting on the concept of **interpretive science**, Radovan Lorkovic (p.c. 22.1.94) proposed "eine Differenzierung der Interpretive Sciences in solche die die Welt und ihre Erscheinungen interpretieren: Klima, Atmosphäre,

Umwelt(–schäden)etc.dieihren *Interpretations*charakter der Undurchsichtigkeit komplexer Zusammenwirkungen einfacher physikalischen Gesetze verdanken, solche die die Bio–und Anthroposphäre untersuchen: Human–und Tiermedizin, Verhaltensforschung, Ideologiegeschichte, Soziologie, Philosophie etc. bis hin zur Religion (bei denen der wissenschaftlich beweisbare Anteil ein Inseldasein ist), und solche die sich mit Interpretation von *Menschenwerken* beschäftigen, die nicht geschaffen wurden um interpretiert zu werden (bildende Künste, Architektur, Literatur etc.) und schliesslich solche deren Leben allein durch Interpretation möglich wird wie Musik, Theater, Rechtswissenschaft, Politologie etc? Musikinterpretation ist ein sehr besonderer (der extremste) Fall unter den Interpretive Sciences!"

Lorkovic criticizes my whole logical distinction of relations, which includes a rejection of the possibility of nothing (everything) being related to anything (everything) else respectively, in favor of something being related to other things (but not everything; Praefatio) in the following way: "Wäre nicht eine positive Formulierung besser? Niemand redet ja von 'nothing...is related to anything else'. Sollte es nicht heissen: 'as everything in the world is related to anything else...' oder zumindest: 'If nothing in the world were related...it would be impossible...' And he also reasons: "Die Extreme eines festendeterministischen Netzes oder einer völlig beziehungslosen Welt bestehen nur in einer in Idealismus und Materialismus polarisierten Weltsicht. Die 'zone of freedom' ist überall (also keine 'Zone'). Dass 'everything would be chance' ist zu weit weg, ist schon längst ausserhalb jeder Diskussion. 'But if something but not everything is related to other things in the world' – suggeriert eine objektive Existenz der Relationen die nur in unserem Denken bestehen – und die wir zwischen **allen** Dingen oder Gedanken herstellen können. 'I prefer this view' springt aus einer objektiven in einer höchst persönliche Sphäre."

It is clear, though, that musicians cannot legitimately refute the present research concept by accusing me of having adopted an "intellectual" approach to the issue of musical performance aesthetics: "Intellectual" seems to be an empty designation in this critique, a term that masks underlying fear due to blissful ignorance. But this is a term that collectively stands for a set of cognitive faculties which can be specified and thoroughly investigated, as in cognitive science and research. It is unwise to apply this term in exclusionary opposition to 'emotion' or 'intuition', since e.g. the latter term can adequately refer to the synthetic or integrated result of several cognitive modes and processings in action. Experienced musicians may well and on good practical grounds

recommend, and pedagogically too, an intuitive (i.e. an unaware) approach, and consider this more artistically powerful. But this is not an argument against the procedures of this interpretation research, since it aims to make aware, to illuminate, intuitive concepts and imaginings in order to uncover the hidden factors behind them.

Correspondingly, academics cannot legitimately reject the present research by accusing me of not being sensitive to, or of not having consented unreservedly to, common or basic scientific assumptions and postulates. If research is restricted by the boundaries of the uncontroversial, it remains non-innovative. And the objection that interpretation research falls outside traditional academic disciplines does not prove that it is wrong. The conventional tracks of scientific methods must occasionally be put aside to allow for emerging paradigms and surveying self-criticism. Furthermore, the core of basic science is not univocal, and a closer look at conventional scientific methods reveals that the purported consensus is not unanimous. A general consent would impede the creative search for solutions to new problems that have occurred in recent society and of ancient problems that have not yet received optimal solutions. So if a frontier looks like a consensus, the hidden argument may remain unformulated. To the detriment of scientific development an academic convention that prevents innovation does not defend science but only the power that can be exerted from its position in society.

As Carl Lesche argued in personal communication, the aim of the **humanities** ("*vetenskap*", "Wissenschaft") is **knowledge** – to improve, increase, collect, organize, integrate and document it – whereas the purpose of **science** is instrumental, pragmatic, practical, economic or ecological: e.g. medical science aims at improving or securing health and the quality of life by **technical** means. For Lesche there was a distinct dividing-line between the methods and underlying values of the two paradigms: the instrumentality of science versus the humanities' end in itself.

The debate will surely continue around the crucial points of authenticity and actuality oriented along the various aesthetic priorities ("positions") that the corresponding cognitive patterns have established; these may even delimit (and guide) the development of traditions. There will always remain a free zone of interpretational determination for philosophical reasons, regardless of

composers' and performers' intentions. The very fact that objectivity and subjectivity as overarching interpretational categories can both be defended as adequate and legitimate does itself furnish the maintenance of the free zone of determination. This is beneficial to an art which stays alive by its constant renewal from creative sources.

I suggested a method of moderate formalization to retain communicability. I feel that certain sciences hide their philosophical problems by overformalization, as sometimes seen in mathematics, physics and formal logic. In contrast, I proposed that (1) we should keep the notions (and concepts) immediately imaginable, and (2) that this might be the preferred way to stay closer to the experience we treat in discussions.

In the preface I defined the purpose of interpretation research, to 'increase understanding', with obvious attendant practical and pedagogical implications. I would like to forestall the objection that 'increasing understanding' is vague because it lacks an object; it is perfectly valid to state that 'increase the understanding of w ' (i, p), which is what we intend, entails to 'increase understanding'. If we increase the understanding of something, then the conclusion that we have also increased understanding itself is trivial. But the reverse is not true: it is false to derive from 'increase understanding' an 'increased understanding of w ' (i, p).

VII APPENDIX

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⁵² "Rhythmik, Dynamik und Phrasierungslehre", 1886; Karl Fuchs "Die Zukunft des musikalischen Vortrags", 1884, "Die Freiheit des musikalischen Vortrags", 1885; Franz Kullak "Der Vortrag in der Musik am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts", 1897, including "meinen eigenen Arbeiten" (7) as Riemann writes.

⁵³ One apart example of this kind of edition, dubious for the purpose of authenticity of performance, but interesting as an attempt at analytical interpretation – can be mentioned: Jacob Fischer's "Erläuterung zur Interpunktionsausgabe", in which a series of semantic signs, "Satzzeichen der Sprachlehre", are used for the purpose of "sinngemässe Gliederung"; Schlesinger, Berlin 1926.

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⁵⁸ The notion of *'epoché'* is presented by Edmund Husserl in *Huss. III:1:55ff.*

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VII: 2 ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

(vide et indices MIR I–II) when otherwise not indicated:

–	(1) relation, (2) negative correlation (ch. III:4)
+	positive correlation (ch. III:4)
~	negation
→	implication
←	reversed implication
↔	bidirectional implication (phenomenologically not identical to equivalence)
→←	centered implications; e.g. $p \rightarrow n \leftarrow s$ implications for interpreting the notation derived from two sources, namely from fact(s)/consideration(s) of both performance and structure
a	analysis
ac	acoustic
au	auditive
c	composition, –al
C	composer
compr	comprehension, –al, –sive
cx	context
D	description (Hermerén)
e	execution, –al (level)
E	(1) executor; (2) existence (ch. I:2)
exp	experience, experiential
f	fact (esp. physical, physiologic including neural, material)
g	gestalting, soundshaping/forming (level)
i	interpretation; interpretive, interpretively (i; i ¹); interpretative, interpretatively (i; i ²); interpretational, interpretationally (i; i ³); (see NB 2)
I	interpreter
ia	interpretation analysis
id	identity, identical
idm	identity moment(s); Celibidache's " <i>Identitätsmomente</i> "
int	intention, –al

ir	interpretation research
IS	Interpretation Science
l	listening (act or experiential result of it)
L	listener
m	music, -al
mi(r)	musical interpretation (research)
mip	musical interpretation in performance
M	man's mind
Mm	man's musical mind
n	notation, -al
O	object (o objective: Oo object's objectivity; So subject's objectivity)
p	performance, performative
P	(1) performer, (2) performative (Hermerén)
ph;PH	phenomenon, -al (individual); Phenomenon, -al (category of)
phon	phonantial, phonoric, distantial and pitch aspects (of M or H)
prot	protential
r	research
R	(1) researcher, critic, -al; (2) R(a,b) relation between a and b; (3) reason (Hermerén)
ret	retentional
s	structure
S	subject (s subjective: Ss subject's subjectivity; Os object's subjectivity)
son	sonantial, sonoric, tonal (tonality) aspect of M or H
t	theory, theoretical
T	(1) metatheory, (2) theoretical (Hermerén), (3) theory
v	visual, mimetic
w	work; musicwork (work of music, music-work, musical work) as an ontological-aesthetical entity (and as an artistic object), its contextual determinants included
CBF	cerebral blood flow; rCBF regional CBF
EEG	electro encephalography
ERP	evoked response potential
MEG	magneto encephalography
MRT	magneto resonance tomography

PET	positron emission tomography
AESTH	aesthetic, -al
ART	artistic, -al
AUTH	authentic, -al
COH	coherency, coherent
CONGR	congruency, congruent
CRIT	criterion, criterial
DEDUCT	deduction, deductive
DERIV	derivation, derivative
DIFF	difference, different
EXPR	expression, expressive
ID	identity, identical
INDIC	indication, indicative
INDUC	induction, inductive
IMPLIC	implication, implicative
INTEGR	integration, integrative
TRANSP	transparency, transparent

*ABBREVIATIONS FOR PARAMETERS IN MUSICAL ANALYSIS as introduced in
MIR 1:71*

A	articulation, articulative
D	dynamic, -al
F	phrase, -ing
H	harmonic, -al
M	melodic, -al
S	structure, -al
R	rhythmic, -al
RM	'rhythmometric', -al
T	timbre, sonority, sonorical
cf.	confer, compare
H	Humanities
HS	Human Science
NS	Natural Science

<i>pass.</i>	<i>passim</i>
p.c.	personal communication
<i>sc</i>	<i>scilicet, vide licet</i>
UP	University Press
<i>v.</i>	<i>vide</i>
BJA	British Journal of Aesthetics
FME	Five Music Essays (v. no. 7 in list ch. VII:3 and Sundin, Nils-Göran 1987a & 1987b in Bibliography ch. VII:6)
Grove	The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, ed. Stanley Sadie, vol 1–20, MacMillan, London 1980
Huss	Husserliana, Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, ed HL van Breda, U Köln, Husserl-Archiv, Louvain, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag
IRASM	International Review of Aesthetics and Sociology of Music
JAAC	Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism
JAMS	Journal of American Musicological Society
LEW	Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Alois Walde, 3rd ed. J B Hofmann, Winter, Heidelberg 1930
MGG	Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Allgemeine Enzyklopedie der Musik, ed. F. Blume vol 1–16, Bärenreiter, Kassel & Basel 1949–79
MIP	Music Interpretation in Performance, Excerpts from MIR, vol I–II, Mirage, Stockholm 1983
MIR	Music Interpretation Research, vol I–VI, Mirage, Stocholm 1982–
OED	The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. by J A Simpson & E S C Weiner, Clarendon P, Oxford 1989
ODEE	Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, eds. C. T. Onions and G. U. S. Friedrichsen, Clarendon, Oxford 1966
Oxford	The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 6th ed. by H W Fowler & F G Fowler, Clarendon 1976
PUF	Presses Universitaires de France

ZM Zeitschrift für Musik
 Webster's Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd ed,
 Simon & Schuster, New York 1979

SHORT-DEFINITIONS in reference to the explications given in ch. I:2

S→O "in-act" directed from subject to object
 O→S "ex-act" directed from object to subject
 (manifestation + assimilation)
 S↔O bidirectional exchange between subject
 and object
 S(1,2,3)→O(1,2,3) figures specify layers of in-act (cf.
 correspondingly for O→S and S↔O acts,
 e.g. O(3)→S(3) a 'deep' object-i that
 is 'deeply' assimilated, received,
 understood, reflected: experienced
 [exp]; S(1)↔O(3) a deep object-i that
 is poorly exp)

INPRETATION intentional direction of the subject's
 (S) interpretive act towards the object
 (O); S reaches the surface layer of the O.

EXPRETATION the object's outwardly directed
 manifestation which extends to and
 reaches the 'superficial' layer of the
 perceptive apparatus (sensory
 registration)

INTOPRETATION interpretive act directed S→O;
 penetrates O with content on a
 middle-ground layer

EXTOPRETATION O→S directed manifestation of O's
 middle-ground layer reaching the S at

a corresponding layer(sensory perception
+ apprehension/comprehension)

INTROPRETATION i-act directed S→O that interjects
'new' content, material, into the O
(congruently or incongruently)

EXTROPRETATION assimilated O-manifestation that
presents, yields, extracts 'new'
content, material, for the S
(congruently or incongruently)

INTRAPRETATION coherent relation integral (and
'internal') to the basic S-O relation,
normally congruent to them respectively,
with demonstrable grounds or correlates,
thus involving primarily i-i, c-c, n-n,
w-w or i-i(c), i(n)-i(c), i(c)-i(w) and
i(w)-i(p) relations (etc)

EXTRAPRETATION coherent relation between interpretans
and interpretandum, external to both O
and S but applied, absorbed or
assimilated into the O-S relation, thus
involving secondarily i-c, i-w or i-α
relations (etc)

INTER-PRETATION i-relation involving two different i:s,
say i_1 and i_2 , $i_1(c)-i_2(c)$, or
 $i_1(w)-i_2(w)$ etc.

NB 1: An O(1)→S(3) is not intentionally impossible (nor inconceivable), but it is 'nonrelative', it exhibits a lack of unambiguous relations; O(1) does not fully support S(3) but they may not be incompatible (or incongruent). Reversely, an S(3)→O(1) exhibits an 'overinterpretation' in that O(1) is only partially corresponding to S(3).

The formula i(S→O) is used in ch. IV:2. Needless to say i(O→S) or the

equivalent $i(S \leftarrow O)$, and $i(O \leftarrow S)$ can be adequately applied in other places. While the 'prefix' i can be substituted by p , as in $p(O \rightarrow S)$ etc., and still remain a well-formed formula, it is perfectly relevant to expand the system to $w(O \rightarrow S)$, $w(S \rightarrow O)$, $c(O \rightarrow S)$, $s(O \rightarrow S)$, etc. in research that studies the interpretive processes in the 'creative arts', including composition.

NB 2: I want to be careful to make the distinction between the terms (1) **interpretive** (inpretive, expretive; etc.), (2) **interpretative** (inpretative, expretative, etc.), and (3) **interpretational** (inpretational, expretational, etc.):

(1) 'interpretive' (i) refers to the concrete design (shape, version), e.g. of a motif, and its rendering on an 'executorial (e) level'. It does not imply that the I is aware of the existence of other alternative i 's.

(2) 'interpretative' (i^2) refers to the surveying of several different i -alternatives and their rendering on the 'gestalting (g) level'. It implies the conscious choice of an i -alternative and an awareness of the process of selection and of available arguments *pro et contra* various i -versions.

(3) 'interpretational' (i^3) refers to the philosophical, phenomenological and cognitive surveying (and selection) of optional i -conceptions and implies a reflexive awareness of the I 's own factual or potential i -acts, procedures, processes and reasons *pro et contra* possible (i.e. realizable and imaginable) i -versions. It implies the result of a(n) (aesthetically) coherent interrelational system manifesting itself as an entirety on the level of interpretation (i) in its specific sense.

It should be noted that the nine individual acts defined above can be combined with these three levels of abstraction forming a classificatory matrix (9x3) of interpretational analyses on all accessible levels.

NB 3: Similarly (to NB 2), **congruence** is the term for a criterion on concrete level (e, g), whereas **congruency** is a criterion on 'abstract' levels (i , i^2 , i^3). The same terminological distinction applies to pairs of concepts such as transparency/transparency and coherence/coherency.

VII:3 LIST OF WORKS RELATED TO MIR BY NILS-GÖRAN SUNDIN
For complete information see also Bibliography ch. VII:6.

PUBLISHED: MONOGRAPHS

- (1) (1/1982, 2/1984) *Introduktion till musikalisk interpretation och interpretationsforskning*, MIR I, Mirage, Stockholm (pp 1–389)
- (2) (1/1983, 2/1984) *Musikalisk interpretationsanalys*, MIR II, Mirage, Stockholm (pp 1–453)
- (3) (1983) *Musical Interpretation in Performance*, Mirage, Stockholm (pp 7–96)

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- (4) (1979/80) *Interpretationsforskningsprojekt. Forskningsområde, mål och metoder. Sammanfattning av ett referat*, Nordisk Musik och Musikvetenskap under 1970-talet – en kongressrapport. Skrifter från Musikvetenskapliga Institutionen, 4, Göteborg (pp 170–176)
- (5) (1984a) *Musical Interpretation in performance: music theory, musicology and musical consciousness*, J. Musicological Research, vol 5 (pp 93–129)
- (6) (1984b) *Musik som konst*, Musik-kultur 3, no 48, (pp 16–19)
- (7) (1987) *Music as art and as science*, (pp 1–9), *Creative Interpretation*, (pp 43–61), in *Five Musical Essays*, Mirage, Stockholm
- (8) (1993a) *Aesthetical Criteria: Intentional Content in Musical Interpretation in Contemporary Performance*, in *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Cognitive Musicology 26–29 August 1993*, University of Jyväskylä
- (9) (1993b) *Aesthetic Criteria of Musical Interpretation in Contemporary Performance of Instrumental Music: A critical analysis of its theory. An investigation of fundamental relations of intentional interpretive acts. Lecture given July 31, 1993*. In: *Proceedings of the Stockholm Music Acoustics Conference 1993 (SMAC 93)*, Dept of Seech Communication & Music Acoustics, KTH, Stockholm 1993.

UNPUBLISHED (MIR Documentations, Lecture Manuscripts, and Articles)

- (10) (1981) *Interpretationsanalys von Frank Martins Petit Symphonie Concertante (1945) anhand von sechs Schallplatten-Aufnahmen*, Beitrag zu den grundsätzlichen Gestaltungsfragen, MIR, excerpts from MIR II (pp 1–33)

- (11) (1983) Summaries of Musical Interpretation research vols 1–2 including a postscript and a bibliography, excerpts from MIR I & II (pp 1–65)
- (12) (1984a) Interviews with Musicians (Samtal med musiker om interpretation) MIR III (pp 1–401)
- (13) (1984b) A Phenomenology of Musical Performance, MIR IV A (pp 1–430)
- (14) (1984c) A Phenomenology of Musical Interpretation in Performance, MIR IV B (pp 1–365)
- (15) (1984d) Music in Sweden, 1. Views & Essays on Stockholm Concert Life 1977–81 & Prelude to Music Criticism, MIR V (pp 1–306)
- (16) (1988) Aspekter på psykoanalysens vetenskapliga status i anledning av Adolf Grünbaums *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis* och debatten i *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 1986 vol 9, 2. Lund U, Medical Faculty (pp 1–25)
- (17) (1989/93a) Introducerande föreläsning om filosofiska grundfrågor som inledning till musikalisk interpretationsforskning och en introduktion till idén om Interpretation Science. Rev. 1993 (pp 1–9)
- (18) (1993b) Aesthetic Criteria of Musical Interpretation in Contemporary Performance of Instrumental Music. A critical analysis of its theory. An investigation of fundamental relations of interpretive intentional acts. Abstract and Paper presented at the 3rd International Doctoral and Postdoctoral Seminar of Musical Semiotics. Dept of Musicology, University of Helsinki, Sept 24, 1993, (pp 1–12)

VII:4 TAPE-RECORDINGS (CASSETTES)

Participant; number of tapes; type of session
(i=interview, r=rehearsal, c=course)

Agosti, Guido: 6 (i, c)

Blomstedt, Herbert: 9 (i, r)

Boon, Gottfrid: 1 (i) + 2 full-size (9 1/2') tapes

Celibidache, Sergiu: 66 (i, r, c)

Dorati, Antal: 6 (i, r)

Ferrara, Franco: 6 (i, c)

Frübeck de Burgos, Raphael: 6 (r)

Gazzeloni, Severino: 2 (c)

Giuranna, Bruno: 1 (i, c)

Gulli, Franco: 2 (c)

Hallhagen, Gunnar: 1 (i, c)

Isepp, Martin: 3 (c)

Kogan, Leonid: 2 (c)

Lindgren, Ingrid: 1 (i)

Navarra, André: 1 (c)

Perlemuter, Vlado: 6 (c)

Pleeth, William: 2 (i, c)

Ribera, José: 12 (i)

Scheja, Staffan: 1 (i)

Schilhawsky, Paul: 4 (c)

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VII:5 GENERAL INDEX OF ARTISTS

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VII:6 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Efforts have been made to control and correct the bibliographic details. However no claim of completeness and perfection can be maintained. Not all works listed in REFERENCES ch VII:1 are listed here. Dates of publication were not available for all items; in these cases parentheses are left void.

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