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# Literature Review of Scientific Articles about Cyber Information Sharing

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**Abstract:** *This literature review presents a review of cyber information sharing based on systematic queries in four scientific databases. Hundreds of articles were handled and clustered. Relevant publications concerning cyber information sharing are succinctly described in the paper. The findings are discussed from the perspective of how to develop a cybersecurity information sharing system and what possible features might be included in the system. The literature review will comprise a new database for the Echo Early Warning System (E-EWS) concept. E-EWS aims at delivering a security operations support tool, enabling the members of the ECHO network to coordinate and share information in near real-time.*

**Keywords:** *CIP, Cyber-Ecosystem, Emergency Response, E-EWS, Cyber Information Sharing*

## Introduction

This research belongs to the European network of Cybersecurity centres and competence Hub for innovation and Operations project (ECHO), which is part of the Horizon2020 program. The ECHO consortium consists of several partners from different fields and sectors including: health, transport, manufacturing, ICT, education, research, telecom, energy, space, healthcare, defence, and civil protection. The main objective of the ECHO is to strengthen the proactive cyber defence of the European Union. The literature review aims to gather essential scientific articles and official materials about cyber information sharing models. The literature review is based on systematic queries in different kinds of databases, such as IRIS. The findings will be discussed from the perspective of the added value that the review will offer to the stakeholders. The literature review will comprise a new database for the Echo Early Warning System (E-EWS) concept. E-EWS aims at delivering a security operation support tool, enabling the members of the ECHO network to coordinate and share information in near real-time. Within the E-EWS, partners of ECHO can retain their fully independent management of cyber-sensitive information and related data management. The early warning system will work as a parallel part of other mechanisms in the Public Protection and Disaster Relief environment. The development of the E-EWS will be rooted in a comprehensive review of information sharing and trust models from within the cyber domain. The literature review will present occasional scientific literature and official materials concerning information sharing between partners and stakeholders.

How to share sensitive data between stakeholders? What kind of information sharing-solutions already exist? The literature review is going to answer these questions as well.

## **Background**

Modern infrastructures include not only physical components but also hardware and software. These integrated systems are examples of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that integrate computing and communication capabilities with monitoring and control of entities in the physical world. In CPS, embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes. Cyber-Physical Systems enable next-generation ‘smart systems’, such as advanced robotics, computer-controlled processes, and real-time integrated systems (Lee & Seshia 2015; Hevner & Chatterjee 2010).

There are separate cyber threat functions at the national and EU levels. Lack of synergy and separated functionalities concerning artificial intelligence solutions produce more potential vulnerabilities for vital functions. Therefore, it is important to develop functionalities in the ecosystem and to gather relevant data for the next generation’s early warning solutions.

The content of the literature review is divided as follows. After the introduction, the next section handles shared situational awareness and cybersecurity information sharing. ‘Base for the Research’ covers methodologies used and the literature review process of the research. The next section discusses the overview of the findings. The last section presents conclusions.

## **Shared Situational Awareness and Cybersecurity Information Sharing**

This section covers the notions of ‘shared cyber situational awareness’ and ‘cybersecurity information sharing’. It aims to provide a theoretical framework and to limit the area of the literature study. It defines what to share, how to share, and with whom to share cybersecurity information. Shared (cyber) situational awareness is closely related to (cybersecurity) information exchange, because, without trusted information sharing, common situation or situational awareness is insufficient. The importance of this common situational awareness can be seen in a variety of areas. For example, public safety actors such as European law enforcement agencies need a common shared situational picture for the cross-boarding of tasks so that operational cooperation is based on a reliable platform.

According to Endsley and Robertson (2000a), good team situational awareness is dependent on team members understanding the meaning of the shared information. This means that teams need to share pertinent data and a higher level of situational awareness (Endsley & Robertson 2000a, 2000b). Bolstad and Endsley (2000) write that the development of shared situational awareness consists of four factors: 1) shared SA requirements (team members’ ability to understand which information is needed by other team members); 2) shared SA devices (communications); 3) shared SA mechanisms (shared mental models); and 4) shared SA processes (effective team processes for sharing relevant information) (Bolstad & Endsley 2000). According to Munk (2018), cooperation between cybersecurity organisations is based on the effective and efficient exchange of information. Information interoperability is the joint capability of different actors—such as persons, organisations, and groups—necessary to ensure the exchange and common understanding of the information needed for their success (Munk 2018).

## **The Basis for the Research**

In case of a hybrid incident, how can response and procedures be improved? Humans are not as good as automation at quickly and consistently processing large volumes of data. Flexible auton-

omy should provide a smooth, simple, seamless transition of functions between humans and the system (Endsley 1988). The target audience covers the ECHO partners, including several research organisations, large enterprises, industrial actors, and EU agencies across the countries. Clearly, a common platform for creating common cyber situational awareness is needed.

The fundamental needs concerning information sharing among ECHO partners are the basis for this research. The research question of the literature review is ‘What are the main features of cyber exchange models?’. Collected materials are based on scientific literature, research articles, and official publications. The following scientific databases have been used: database of the JYKDOK library at the University of Jyväskylä (wide database concerning cybersecurity that provides access to resources such as the IEEE Xplore); the IEEE Xplore library (provides web access to more than 4.5 million documents from publications in computer science and to about 200 journals and about 1700 conference proceedings); Springer link (a database area of engineering that contains 17,000 books); and AI—a tool called IRIS, which is a search engine based on 100 entered keywords. The qualitative analysis was made by using traditional half-manual processing and Glue (Orange3) Python to explore the collected databases.

### **Search queries**

In each case, the search queries such as ‘cybersecurity information sharing’ were entered, with no temporal limitation. A query without quotation marks returns some variations where the search engine allows for permutations and inflections. The so-called Artificial Intelligence tool IRIS returns wider variations, but the search engine works well. The author had to use quotations in some queries because some combinations made the searches too comprehensive.

As an initial screening, titles and abstracts have been read and the number of clusters has been identified. The selected list of groups can be regarded as a universal description of the research area. There were four main tasks of the research:

- Identify existing early warning systems and frameworks within public safety organisations;
- Identify information sharing models and governance models in private and public safety organisations;
- Identify features of cyber exchange model—for example, best practices and defensive measures;
- Classify phenomena, such as events, incidents, vulnerabilities, threats, and others.

Following the initial analysis method, a review form is an iteratively relevant aspect of the research. The aim is to cover the most relevant aspects of cyber information sharing models. Classification areas were used after the initial screening (an independent classification apart from the title, authors, or other text fields). Selected areas are solution area of results, threats and types of cybersecurity-related information, proposals, models, artefacts, and experiments/technology.

As noted above, findings create the fundamental database for the E-EWS, which is based on the framework of CPS (Cyber-Physical System). ECHO EWS will deliver a secure sharing support tool for personnel to coordinate and to share information in near real-time. It will support information sharing across organisational boundaries, will provide the sharing of general cyber information as

a reference library, will ensure secure connection management from clients accessing the E-EWS, and will combine different kinds of functions required in the management of information sharing functions—including sector-specific cyber-sensitive data. Thus, it concerns the whole ecosystem.

### The systematic literature review sources

After defining the search queries, the initial search in Springerlink returned 1612 results for ‘cybersecurity information sharing’ within content computer science, and it returned 31 researches with a quotation as **Table 1**, below, illustrates. Sharing technologies without the word ‘cybersecurity’ returned 517 results Features of cyber information sharing models without quotations returned 279 results.

Item Title	Authors	Publication Title	Year
Network Externalities in Cybersecurity Information Sharing Ecosystems	Z Rashid, U Noor, J Altmann	Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services	2019
Risk Management Using Cyber-Threat Information Sharing and Cyber-Insurance	D Tosh, S Shetty, S Sengupta, JP Kesan, CA Kamhoua	Game Theory for Networks	2017
Using Incentives to Foster Security Information Sharing and Cooperation: A General Theory and Application to Critical Infrastructure Protection	A Mermoud, M Keupp, S Ghernaouti, D David,	Critical Information Infrastructures Security	2017
Three Layer Game Theoretic Decision Framework for Cyber-Investment and Cyber-Insurance	DK Tosh, I Vakiliinia, S Shetty, S Sengupta, CA Kamhoua, L Njilla, K Kwiat	Decision and Game Theory for Security	2017
Distributed, Collaborative, and Automated Cybersecurity Infrastructures for Cloud-Based Design and Manufacturing Systems	J Lane Thames	Cloud-Based Design and Manufacturing (CBDMD)	2014
Toward a Safer Tomorrow: Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure	S Karchefsky, R Rao	The Palgrave Handbook of Managing Continuous Business Transformation	2017
IoT: Privacy, Security, and Your Civil Rights	CD Mares	Women Securing the Future with TIPPSS for IoT	2019
Part 2: Legal and Regulatory Framework	RH Weber, D Staiger	Transatlantic Data Protection in Practice	2017
Cybersecurity in the U.S.: Major Trends and Challenges	B Fonseca, JD. Rosen	The New US Security Agenda	2017
Cyber Attacks, Prevention, and Countermeasures	N Lee	Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity	2015
Regulation of Cyberspace and Human Rights	K Kittichaisaree	Public International Law of Cyberspace	2017
Toward a Holistic Approach of Cybersecurity Capacity Building through an Innovative Transversal Sandwich Training	J El Melhem, A Bouras, Y Ouzrout	Industry Integrated Engineering and Computing Education	2019
Frameworks and Best Practices	B Keys, S Shapiro	Cyber Resilience of Systems and Networks	2019
Economic Valuation for Information Security Investment: A Systematic Literature Review	D Schatz, R Bashroush	Information Systems Frontiers	2017
Main Initiatives to Safeguard Cyberspace Sovereignty	B Fang	Cyberspace Sovereignty	2018
Transatlantic Cooperation in Cybersecurity: Converging on Security as Resilience?	G Christou	Cybersecurity in the European Union	2016
Learning Quasi-Identifiers for Privacy-Preserving Exchanges: A Rough Set Theory Approach	C Wafu SohL, L Njilla, KK. Kwiat, CA Kamhoua	Granular Computing	2018

Item Title	Authors	Publication Title	Year
IT-Security in Critical Infrastructures Experiences, Results, and Research Directions	U Lechner	Distributed Computing and Internet Technology	2019
Proposed Model for a Cybersecurity Centre of Innovation for South Africa	JJ van Vuuren, M Grobler, L Leenen, J Phahlamohlaka	ICT and Society	2014
Trends in Cyber Operations: An Introduction	F Lemieux	Current and Emerging Trends in Cyber Operations	2015
Cybersecurity in the U.S.	N Kshetri	The Quest to Cyber Superiority	2016
Sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence under the General Data Protection Regulation	A Albakri, E Boiten, R De Lemos	Privacy Technologies and Policy	2019
Vanishing Boundaries of Control: Implications for Security and Sovereignty of the Changing Nature and Global Expansion of Neoliberal Criminal Justice Provision	RP Weiss	The Private Sector and Criminal Justice	2018
International Cyberspace Governance	Chinese Academy of Cyberspace Studies	World Internet Development Report 2017	2019
The Role of Blockchain in Underpinning Mission Critical Infrastructure	H Jahankhani, S Kendzierskyj	Industry 4.0 and Engineering for a Sustainable Future	2019
Cyber Attacks, Prevention, and Countermeasures	N Lee	Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity	2013
Interpretation of the Concept of 'Cyberspace Sovereignty'	B Fang	Cyberspace Sovereignty	2018
Dark Web: Deterring Cybercrimes and Cyber-Attacks	FM De Sanctis	Technology-Enhanced Methods of Money Laundering	2019
Towards a Systematic View on Cybersecurity Ecology	W Mazurczyk, S Drobniak, S Moore	Combating Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism	2016
More than Humans	S Iaconesi, O Persico	Digital Urban Acupuncture	2017
Digital Security – Wie Unternehmen den Sicherheitsrisiken des digitalen Wandels trotzen	A Weise	Digitalisierung in Industrie-, Handels- und Dienstleistungsunternehmen	2018

**Table 1:** Relevant Springerlink research publications

IEEE Xplore returned 147 results by using the following words: cybersecurity, information, and sharing altogether. Access was obtained to 129 files of data: Conferences (82), Journals (28), Magazines (16), Courses (15), Early Access Articles (3), and Books (2). Fifteen inessential IEEE Xplore courses were removed from the results, including results for Web Server & Web Application Security, Footprinting, and Network. Features of cyber exchange models returned 29 results. Information sharing returned 36 results and both 'cyber information sharing' and 'cyber information exchange' returned 5 results in which one was the same, as **Table 2** illustrates.

Document Title	Authors	Publication Title	Year
<b>'Cybersecurity information sharing'</b>			
A System Architecture of Cybersecurity Information Exchange with Privacy (CYBEX-P)	F Sadique, K Bakhshaliyev, J Springer, S Sengupta	2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)	2019
Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange Mechanism	I Vakulinia; DK Tosh, S Sengupta	2017 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS)	2017

Document Title	Authors	Publication Title	Year
A Coalitional Game Theory Approach for Cybersecurity Information Sharing	I Vakulinia, S Sengupta	MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)	2017
An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Framework for Cyber-Threat Information Sharing	D Tosh, S Sengupta, C Kamhoua, K Kwiat, A Martin	2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)	2015
Developing a Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform for South African Organisations	M Mutemwa, J Mtsweni, N Mkhonto	2017 Conference on Information Communication Technology and Society (ICTAS)	2017
<b>'Cybersecurity information exchange'</b>			
3-Way Game Model for Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework	I Vakulinia, DK Tosh, S Sengupta	MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)	2017
Attribute Based Sharing in Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework	I Vakulinia, DK Tosh, S Sengupta	2017 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS)	2017
Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange Mechanism	I Vakulinia, DK Tosh, S Sengupta	2017 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS)	2017
Structured Cybersecurity Information Exchange for Streamlining Incident Response Operations	T Takahashi, D Miyamoto	NOMS 2016 - 2016 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium	2016
A System Architecture of Cybersecurity Information Exchange with Privacy (CYBEX-P)	F Sadique, K Bakhshaliyev, J Springer, S Sengupta	2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)	2019

Table 2: Specified IEEE returns

JYKDOC returned 9 results by using the following words: cybersecurity, information, and sharing together. Access was obtained to 9 files of data. Separate words cyber, exchange, and models returned 22 results. The term 'information sharing technologies' returned 268 results.

The AI tool IRIS requires the title of the research question and problem statement. The author has used the following words to describe the problem: "The research question of the literature review is 'What are the main features of cyber exchange models?' in order to capture a reasonably full range of the literature concerning the main features of cyber exchange models". Therefore, it was necessary to identify information sharing models and features of cyber exchange models. Early warning solution will deliver a secure sharing support tool for personnel to coordinate and to share information in near real-time, will support information sharing across organisational boundaries, will provide the sharing of general cyber information as a reference library, and will ensure secure connection management from clients accessing the early-warning system. The AI tool IRIS returned 270 results by using the following words in the title: cybersecurity, information, and sharing altogether, as **Figure 1** illustrates. The system calculates the relevance percentage for the results. All the results were between 78% and 95% relevant.




Figure 1: Identified papers by AI tool IRIS

Several studies were based on fundamental level public-related sources, which formed the main frame of the research. The most relevant public-related documents in this research are the following:

- Department of Homeland Security 2013, ‘NIPP 2013: Partnering for critical infrastructure security and resilience’, DHS, U.S.
- MITRE 2018, “Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information — TAXII™ Enabling Cyber Threat Information Exchange”.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST 2016, *Guide to cyber threat information sharing, Special publication 800-150*, Tech. rep., Gaithersburg, MD, U.S.
- Johnson C, Badger M, Waltermire D, Snyder J, & Skorupka C, *Guide to cyber threat information sharing, Special publication 800-150*, Tech. rep. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, US.
- OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC, DHS (CS&C) 2017, *TAXII™ version 2.0. committee specification 01, OASIS Open*, Tech. rep. taxii-v2.0-cs01.
- OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC, DHS (CS&C) 2017, *STIX™ version 2.0. part 2: STIX objects, OASIS open*, Tech. rep. stix-v2.0-wd03-part2-stix-objects.

As the results summarise, the information-sharing related models and frameworks are widely used among public safety organisations.

## Findings

### Cybersecurity information sharing architectures, frameworks, and models

There are few existing cybersecurity information sharing architectures and frameworks for the warning systems within public organisations divided into main groups. As the figure below illustrates, Mitre (2018) categorises information sharing models into three main models. The fourth model comprises a combination of the others.






Figure 2 Traditional classification of information sharing models

- **Hub-and-Spoke:** Several data producers and consumers share information with each other; but instead of sending information directly, the information is sent to a central hub, which then handles dissemination to all the other spokes as appropriate. This model can be viewed as similar to email distribution lists, by which a sender provides a message to a mailing list service, which then forwards the message on to all list members.
- **Peer-to-Peer:** A group of data producers and data consumers organises direct relationships with each other. Members share directly with each other in a mesh pattern. The group may have a single governing policy, but all sharing exchanges are between individuals.
- **Source-Subscriber:** A single entity publishes information out to a group of consumers. This is a common model in commercial environments, where the data source is a vendor and the subscribers purchase access to the vendor's information. This is also a common model for free alerts from some authoritative source (Mitre 2018).

Despite the classification, many models are based on a hybrid structure. According to Sedenberg and Dempsey (2018), information sharing models can be divided into seven categories: government-centric; government-prompted—industry-centric; corporate—initiated-peer based (at the organisational level); small, highly vetted, individual-based groups; open-source sharing platforms; proprietary products; and commercialised services. Procedures and elements differ marginally from each other.

Government-centric is a centralised model, where one central organisation may share the information exchange or perform processing to enrich the data to others (NIST 2016; Meilin, Devine & Zhuang 2017). The Department of Homeland Security is one kind of hierarchical government-centric organisation. The central infrastructures use open, standard data formats and transport protocol (Meilin, Devine & Zhuang 2017).

Sector-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) are one kind of government-prompted, industry-centric sharing model. Centres are non-profit, member-driven organisations formed by critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information between government and industry. ISACs work through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (Department of Homeland Security 2013). The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Centre (NCCIC) works in close coordination with all of the ISACs via the National Council of ISACs (NCI). They serve as collection and analysis points for private sector entities to share data on a peer-to-peer basis, to feed information into the federal government, and to provide a channel for federal information to flow out to the private sector. The purpose of Information Sharing and Analysis Organisations (ISAOs) is to gather, analyse, and disseminate cyber threat

information; but unlike ISACs, ISAOs are not sector-affiliated, and they are for any sector or community. ISAOs do not need to be part of the 16 critical infrastructures.

Corporate-initiated, peer-based groups are privately sponsored cybersecurity information sharing entities. These companies have undertaken their initiative without government intervention to coordinate information sharing. These information exchanges can be tailored to fit the specific needs of their members (Sedenberg & Dempsey 2018).

Individual-based groups are small online communities of peers that share sensitive information with the goal of immediate combat attacks. This kind of group requires a high degree of trust (Sedenberg & Dempsey 2018).

Open communities and platforms are open-source sharing platforms. For example, STIX indicators and open source intelligence feeds are examples of this kind of format. The Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) is a free, open-source platform developed by researchers from the Computer Incident Response Center of Luxemburg, the Belgian military, and NATO.

According to Sedenberg & Dempsey (2018), proprietary products and commercialised services consist of, for example, antivirus software and firewalls that disseminate cybersecurity information through software updates. Companies offering these products and services may participate in any of the other information exchanges to enhance the security of the small companies.

### **Features of Cyber-Threat Information Exchange Models**

Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) participants connect to a Department of Homeland Security-managed system in the Department's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) that allows bidirectional sharing of cyber threat indicators. A server housed at each stakeholder's location allows each to exchange indicators with the NCCIC. Participants receive and can share DHS-developed indicators they have observed in their network defence efforts, which DHS will then share back out to all AIS participants (Department of Homeland Security 2015a).


Stakeholders who share indicators through AIS will not be identified as the source of those indicators to other participants unless they affirmatively consent to the disclosure of their identities. Senders are anonymous unless they want DHS to share them (Department of Homeland Security 2015a). Indicators are not validated by DHS, as the emphasis is on velocity and volume: their partners tell the DHS they will vet the indicators they receive through AIS. The Department's goal is to share as many indicators as possible as quickly as possible (Department of Homeland Security 2015a). The U.S. Government also needs useful information about indicators (Department of Homeland Security 2015b).

AIS utilises the Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) and Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) specifications for machine-to-machine communication (Department of Homeland Security 2015a). STIX is a language and serialisation format that enables organisations to exchange Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) in a consistent and machine-readable manner (Oasis 2017a). Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII™) is an application layer protocol used to exchange Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) over the HTTPS (Oasis 2017b).

OASIS defines several STIX Domain Objects. 1. Attack Pattern is a type of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that describes ways threat actors attempt to compromise targets. 2. The campaign is a grouping of adversarial behaviours that describes a set of malicious activities or attacks that occur over time against a specific set of targets. 3. A course of action is an action taken to either prevent an attack or to respond to an attack. 4. Identities mean individuals, organisations, or groups, as well as classes of individuals, organisations, or groups. 5. The indicator means a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber activity. 6. Intrusion Set is a grouped set of adversarial behaviours and resources with common properties believed to have been organised by a single entity. 7. Malware is a type of TTP (also malicious code and malicious software) used to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a victim’s data or system. 8. Observed Data means conveyed information observed on a system or network (for example, an IP address). 9. The report consists of collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more topics, such as a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack technique, including contextual details. 10. Threat actors are individuals, groups, or organisations believed to be operating with malicious purpose. 11. The tools are software that threat actors can use to perform attacks. 12. A vulnerability is a software-based error that a hacker can directly use to gain access to a system or network (Oasis 2017a).

### Cybersecurity information sharing governance and mechanisms

As **Figure 3**, below, represents, collection-based communications describe the situation when a single TAXII client requests a TAXII server and the TAXII server carries out that request with information from a database. A TAXII channel in TAXII server enables TAXII clients to exchange information with other TAXII clients in a publish-subscribe model. TAXII clients can push messages to channels and can subscribe to channels to receive published messages. A TAXII server may host multiple channels per API root (Oasis 2017b). TAXII is the main transport mechanism for cyber threat information represented in STIX. Stakeholders may share indicators with DHS through an ISAC or an ISAO without TAXII client.



**Figure 3:** Flow of cyber threat information in TAXII

According to NIST (2016), cyber threat information is any information that may help an organisation identify, assess, monitor, and respond to cyber threats. Threat information is any information related to a threat that might help an organisation protect itself against a threat or detect the activities of an actor. Major types of threat information include the following:

- Indicators are technical artifacts or observables. Indicators can be used to detect and defend against threats. Indicators may consist of the Internet Protocol (IP) address of a suspected command and control server, a suspicious Domain Name System (DNS)

- domain name, a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that references malicious content, a file hash for a malicious executable, or the subject line text of a malicious email message (NIST 2016).
- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) describe the behaviour of an actor. TTPs could describe an actor's tendency to use a specific malware variant, order of operations, attack tool, a delivery mechanism (for example, phishing or watering hole attack), or exploit (NIST 2016).
  - Security alerts, also known as advisories, bulletins, and vulnerability notes, are brief and usually readable technical notifications regarding, for example, current vulnerabilities. Security alerts originate from sources such as the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs), the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Product Security Incident Response Teams (PSIRTs), commercial security service providers, and security researchers (NIST 2016).
  - Threat intelligence reports are generally prose documents that describe TTPs, actors, types of systems and targeted information, and other threat-related information that provide greater situational awareness to an organisation. Threat intelligence is threat information that has been aggregated, transformed, analysed, interpreted, or enriched to provide the necessary context for decision-making processes (NIST 2016).

### **Information sharing methodologies between Certs and Law Enforcement**

Enhancing cooperation between EU member states and related Network and Information Security communities (NIS) as Certs is also a crucial part of the cyber-ecosystem. It is not enough that small, closed groups share information without synergy with public safety organisations.

The main goal of the Europol Information System (EIS) is to be the reference system for offenses, individuals involved, and other related data to support EU Member States, Europol, and its partners in their fight against organised cybercrime, terrorism, and other forms of serious crime. For example, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), as a part of Europol, uses an open-source MISIP platform (DG Home Affairs 2014). A Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) is a tool for information sharing about malware samples and malicious campaigns related to specific malware variants. It offers architectural flexibility, allowing the utilisation as a centralised platform (for example, CIRCL and FIRST instances), but also as a decentralised (peer-to-peer) platform (ENISA 2015). According to Europol (2019), there is a need to develop new information management architecture and to continue improving operational capabilities and tools by focusing on automation and modernisation, for example, to continue automating the direct follow-up processes through SIENA for successful (self-) searches on Europol's and EU member states' data. There is also a need to harmonise further the Technical Infrastructure Capability including Identity and Access Management (IAM) landscape of Europol by integrating more IT-systems with IAM and taking further steps towards establishing a single enterprise identity, taking into account various networks and security standards, including IAM for Basic Protection Level (BPL) business solutions (Europol 2019).

SIENA is a VPN (Virtual Private Network) designed to enable a swift, secure, and user-friendly exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information and intelligence between member states, Europol, law enforcement cooperation partners, and public safety organisations (DG Home

Affairs 2014). SIENA has been used to allow the EU member states to communicate and to share intelligence information.

In the U.S., National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) is an XML-based partnership mechanism between the U.S. Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) and enables information sharing focusing on information exchanged among organisations as part of their current or intended business practices (Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 2013).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hosted InfraGard's Secure Web Portal, which allows secure messaging that promotes communication among members. Members give access to iGuardian, the FBI's cyber incident reporting tool designed specifically for the private sector. InfraGard membership also allows peer-to-peer collaboration across InfraGard's broad membership and information-sharing and relationship-building with FBI and law enforcement. InfraGard engages subject matter experts and addresses threat issues across each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors recognised by Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (Department of Homeland Security 2013).

Digital Forensics XML (DFXML) is an XML language (Garfinkel 2012) intended to represent the following kinds of forensic data: metadata describing the source disk image, file, or other input information; detailed information about the forensic tool that did the processing (for example, the program name and where the program was compiled and linked libraries); the state of the computer on which the processing was performed (for example, the name of the computer; the time that the program was run; the dynamic libraries that were used) (Garfinkel 2012); the evidence or information that was extracted (how it was extracted, and where it was physically located); cryptographic hash values of specific byte sequences; and operating-system-specific information which is useful for forensic analysis (Garfinkel 2012).

The Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework (CYBEX) will advance the development of automating cybersecurity information exchange. The CYBEX Forensics domain is an operation domain that supports law enforcement operations by collecting evidence. The necessary information for this operation is stored in the evidence database. CYBEX provides a framework for exchange information between a network mediation point and a law enforcement facility to provide an array of different real-time network forensics associated with a designated incident or event (Rutkowski *et al.* 2010).

CYBEX-P and the Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange mechanism are modified from CYBEX and both are based on an information-sharing platform with a robust operational and administration structure. The Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange mechanism enables the organisations to share their cybersecurity information without revealing their identities (Vakilinia, Tosh & Sengupta 2017). CYBEX-P platform addresses the inefficiency in dealing with cybersecurity problems by an individual entity. Real-time exchange of threat data helps organisations analyse threats to predict and to prevent future cyberattacks. There are three parties involved throughout the complete lifecycle of the threat data: 1) Client organisation; 2) CYBEX-P; 3) analysts and researchers. The client organisation acts as a source of threat data. It can be

any external or internal threat data source willing to share threat data with others. CYBEX-P works as the intermediary between all organisations and data analysts. Threat data may be machine-generated or curated by a security specialist (Sadique *et al.* 2019). The processing server in CYBEX-P has a TPM Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM verifies the integrity of the software and hardware running in the processing server (Sadique *et al.* 2019).

Making Security Measurable (MSM), led by MITRE categorises heterogeneous information and standardises data formats and exchange protocols (MITRE 2013). MSM presents a comprehensive architecture for cybersecurity measurement and management, where current standards are grouped into processes and mapped to the different knowledge fields. MSM standards can be grouped into six major knowledge areas, each of which refers to a process (put in parentheses): asset definition (inventory); configuration guidance (analysis); vulnerability alerts (analysis); threat alerts (analysis); risk/attack indicators (intrusion detection); and incident report (management) (MITRE 2013).

In many cases, a fundamental structure of the information-sharing mechanisms does not differ significantly. It is, therefore, suitable to continue on this issue in the conclusions.

## Conclusion

This literature review indicates that ‘cybersecurity information sharing’ is not precisely defined in the area of cybersecurity. As mentioned above, the structures of information sharing models are generally very sector-specific and are created in different environments. There is a need at the EU level to determine the development of a common Early Warning Solution. Usually, the word ‘warning’ also refers to preventive functions, as U.S. intelligence services operate. The fight against hybrid threats means not only preventing cyberattacks but also identifying, tracing, and prosecuting a criminal/criminal group. This means an even deeper integration of government systems in the future.

Relevant information from the site of a major hybrid incident must be directly shared with the national participants—for example, cybersecurity centres. It is relevant to allocate additional reliable data for determining discrepancies of limits. Combining pieces of information to ensure the correct and reliable information to be shared is of primary importance. The essential information should be processed to the desired shape for the participants. In the future, cyber defence operations will be more integrated and automated according to local capabilities, authorities, and mission needs. The shared common operational picture means that real-time communication links from the local level to the national and EU level exist. A common cyber situational awareness is needed for operating CPS and emergency and crisis management. There should be a connection between cyber situational awareness functions and emergency management.

When developing an early warning system at the EU level, it is important to account for three requirements: 1) the possibility that some EU member states may leave an early warning system (Edgington 2020); 2) the need to engage participants in the values of the western world (Tidey, Gill & Parrock 2020); and 3) the possibility of combining some elements of the Cyber Threat Warning System to NATO Cyber Situational Awareness Solutions. These factors have a direct link to sharing confidential information (Simola 2019, Ilves *et al.* 2016).

It is important to consider how national Cyber Security Centres cooperate with other organisations within critical infrastructure at the national level. The state departments of the United States work closely together in the fight against threats in the field of cybersecurity. The organisations of public administration in the European Union work together more formally. This is important to notice when cybersecurity expertise is being strengthened. The fundamental problems of the European community must be solved before permanent solutions can be built. While this does not prevent the development of operating models, this factor must be taken into account when developing new systems. Confidence between member states must be on a stable basis.

As Ilves *et al.* (2016) mention, there are no crucial barriers to increase collaboration concerning, for example, early warning solutions between the U.S., NATO, and the EU. According to Dandurand & Serrano (2013), for example, Cyber Security Data Exchange and Collaboration Infrastructure (CDXI) provide a knowledge management tool for the NATO partners. The U.S. Cybersecurity Sharing Act and Europe's directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) have similar goals. In addition to this, the EU and NATO signed a technical arrangement in 2016 to increase information sharing between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) (Ilves *et al.* 2016). Common E-EWS solutions would create an effective way to respond to cross-bordering hybrid threat situations. All major companies whose businesses are related to critical infrastructure should be linked to an early warning system.

Before closer cooperation on information sharing can be achieved, legislation, bilateral agreements, data management standards, and certifications need to be brought to an acceptable level of privacy. The holder of the information is the winner in the smart society. Protecting privacy is also part of the Western tradition, as is crime prevention.

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