UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

FICTION THROUGH METAPHOR

A case study of *The God of Small Things*

A Pro Gradu Thesis in English

by

Eeva-Liisa Kallionpää

Department of Languages

2003

HUMANISTINEN TIEDEKUNTA
KIELTEN LAITOS

Eeva-Liisa Kallionpää
FICTION THROUGH METAPHOR
A case study of *The God of Small Things*

Pro gradu-tutkielma

Englannin kieli
Kesäkuu 2003   108 sivua

Tutkielman   tarkoituksena on luoda yhtenäinen viitekehys   perinteisen formalistisen kirjallisuudentutkimuksen keskeisistä uudelleenarvioiduista käsitteistä 'etualaistaminen' (foregrounding)   ja 'vieraannuttaminen' (defamiliarization) yhdessä uudemman konseptuaalisen metaforateorian käsitteiden kanssa. Tämän viitekehyksen puitteissa on tavoitteena tutkia muodostavatko kirjallisen tekstin metaforat keskenään etualaistettuja rakenteita, joiden voidaan katsoa vieraannuttamisen kautta rakentavan tekstiin ylätason temaattisia merkityksiä. Tutkielman empiirinen osa koostuu *The God of Small Things*-romaanin ei-konventionaalisten metaforien ja niiden välisten semanttisten merkityssuhteiden kuvailevasta analyysistä yllämainitun viitekehyksen valossa.

Tutkielman teoreettisessa taustaosassa varmistettiin edellämainittujen kirjallisuudentutkimuksesta ja kognitiivisesta kielitieteestä peräisin olevien käsitteiden yhteensopivuus käsiteanalyysin avulla. Yhteensopivuuden havaittiin viime kädessä perustuvan teorioiden samankaltaiseen käsitykseen kielen ja todellisuuden suhteesta. Käytettyjen käsitteiden luonnetta ja sisältöä valotettiin myös sijoittamalla ne laajempaan aatehistorialliseen kontekstiin.

Empiirisessä osassa havaittiin konseptuaalisen metaforateorian rakennemallin   soveltuvan hyvin materiaalissa esiintyvien metaforien kuvailemiseen ja tulkintaan joitakin poikkeuksia lukuunottamatta. Metaforien välisten suhteitten muodostamien merkitysrakenteiden tutkimista varten mukaeltiin Andrew Goatly'n kehittämää mallia lievästi. Tämän mallin avulla pystyttiin analysoimaan sekä muutamaan metaforaan rajoittuvia semanttisia suhteita, että laaja ei-konventionaalisten metaforien muodostama strukturoitunut verkosto.

 Metaforien välisten yhteyksien ja niiden muodostamien rakenteiden havaitsemisen todetiin olevan välttämätöntä joidenkin metaforien ymmärtämiselle ja tulkinnalle. Metaforien välisten suhteitten ja näiden muodostamien tekstin sisäisten käsitteiden havaittiin luovan tekstiin koheesiota. Laaja-alaisempien strukturoituneiden suhdeverkostojen voidaan perustellusti sanoa muodostavan tekstiin etualaistetun tason, jolla luodaan temaattisesti keskeisiä merkityksiä. Myös metaforien kielellisesti innovatiivisella muodolla havaittiin, konseptuaalisesta metaforateoriasta poiketen, olevan merkitystä metaforien etualaistamisessa ja siihen perustuvassa merkitysten vieraannuttamisessa.

Asiasanat: text analysis, formalist literary theory, functionalism, semantics, conceptual metaphor theory, history of ideas, *The God of Small Things*.

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION

It is a long-standing assumption within the tradition of formalist literary research, that in literary texts formal linguistic features are foregrounded in a systematic and structured way, and that this systematic foregrounding contributes to the formation of a level of meaning that is typical of literary texts. This level of meaning supposedly differentiates them from non-literary texts, and constitutes their literariness, at least in part. Within formalist literary analysis, various means of linguistic foregrounding have mostly been studied on the sentential or sub-sentential level in the shorter genres of literature. In this thesis I propose to look at the use of metaphor as a foregrounding device within a novel. The specific aim of the present work is to study how meanings are constituted in an extended literary text through a systematic use of linguistically unconventional, interconnected metaphors. The literary work chosen for this purpose is *The God of Small Things* (1997) by Arundhati Roy. This particular novel was selected because its abundant use of metaphor was judged to provide enough material for the type of study intended. The purpose of the analysis of this text is not to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the novel, but to use it as a case study towards the development analytical tools for the study of literary texts.

The theoretical framework of this thesis consists of a theory of literature, a theory of metaphor, and the assessment of their compatibility. The method used is conceptual analysis. The theories in question will be placed within larger intellectual currents in the history of Western scholarly thinking, and each will be contrasted with one other major theory of the same phenomenon. The analysis and synthesis of the theories in question constitutes a major portion of this thesis, and is part of its more general aims. In addition to the purpose of providing a solid theoretical basis for the present work, the conceptual analysis within Chapters (2), (3) and (4) has the general aim of situating concepts used in contemporary literary and metaphor theory within Western humanistic traditions of learning and research in general.

In Chapter (2), the notion of literary text will be established through a description of central cultural functions of literature. This functionalist account will then be combined with a reassessment of two major concepts from formalist literary theory, foregrounding and defamiliarization. The goal is to build a

coherent understanding of the nature and functioning of literary texts. This formalist-functionalist view will be contrasted with a conventionalist position that grounds the concept of literature in social and cultural conventions.

Chapter (3) will trace the development of two major lines of thought about metaphor within Western philosophy, the Classical and the Romantic traditions. Contemporary conceptual theories of metaphor will be interpreted as a continuation of the Romantic tradition. The theoretical grounding and the terminology that will be used in the practical analysis of metaphors within Chapter (5), stems from conceptual metaphor theory.

In Chapter (4), the major concepts gained from the analysis in the preceding chapters - defamiliarization, metaphor and experientialism - will be brought together in order to assess their compatibility. This will be followed by a more fine-grained analysis of different types of metaphor relative to their role in the study of literary texts. Metaphors will also be contrasted to other major non-literal uses of language. Through a process of contrast and exclusion, unconventional specific level metaphors will be chosen for the analysis within Chapter (5). Finally, a framework of metaphoric interplay in literary texts by Goatly (1997) will be presented for the purpose of evaluating whether linguistically unconventional metaphors in *The God of Small Things* are further foregrounded by systematic interrelationships.

At the beginning of Chapter (5), Goatly's framework will be slightly modified for the purposes of the present study. After a summary of the storyline and characters of *The God of Small Things*, relationships between linguistically unconventional metaphors in the text will be analysed. The main purpose is to evaluate the usefulness of Goatly's categories for the study of fiction, even if the process naturally involves interpreting aspects of the particular text in question. The analysis will be essentially descriptive in nature. Examples of metaphoric interrelations found in the text will be described, and their textual functions will be considered. Also the question of the relationship between linguistically conventional and unconventional metaphors in literary texts will be re-evaluated on the basis of the findings. The last section of the chapter will present a case study of an extended group of interrelated metaphors in the novel.

2 LITERATURE

Modern literary theory, contrary to what the term would seem to imply, is not a theory in the usual sense of the word, with shared premises about the epistemological status of its object of study. Some writers enclose 'modern literary theory' in quotation marks, since it rather seems to be a term of convenience for a vast and heterogenous field of investigation with diverse, and sometimes incompatible views of what literature basically is about. Formulating a watertight definition of literature thus remains an unsolved problem. This reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of works of literature as linguistic and cultural artefacts. On the other hand, as has been demonstrated empirically (Van Peer 1991:131), individual readers of literature seem to have strong and straightforward intuitions in categorizing texts into literature and non-literature.

On the most general and unproblematic level we can say that literature is a linguistic form of art, i.e. a form of art that uses language as its main medium of expression in a socio-cultural and historical setting (Van Peer 1991:127-128, 139). Many pragmatic theories within linguistics - for example theories based on the co-operative and politeness principles, speech act theory and standard discourse analysis - aim to assimilate literary uses of language to more 'standard' uses as far as possible (e.g. Cook 1994: 40-46, 197; Miall and Kuiken 1994b: 337; Miall and Kuiken 1996: 1-2). These theories accordingly play down the specificity of literature as a type of linguistic communication. However, on a close reflection (see section 2.2), literary texts present so many distinctive characteristics and functions of their own, that a framework for their study should in my opinion incorporate these idiosyncrasies. For this purpose, I will within the ensuing sections of this chapter sketch out a descriptive and functional definition of literature and literary texts, mostly following Van Peer's (1991) analysis, and combine it with concepts from the formalist tradition of literary research, those of foregrounding and defamiliarization. These concepts accord importance to the elaboration of linguistic form as a distinctive characteristic of literary texts and their interpretation. The justification for the choice of each concept will be provided by the argumentation within the section in question. A first pair of concepts that is pertinent to elucidating the specific characteristics of literature,

is that of text and discourse.

2.1 Text and discourse

Usually, within linguistics and pragmatics, the concept of discourse stands as an equivalent to all language in use. If the notion of discourse is defined in this way, there is not much room left for the independent notion of text, which more or less evaporates. Yet the distinction is a meaningful one, especially for the study of literary communication, since in the phenomenon of literature a body of texts is unquestionably a central ingredient. On the other hand, the concept of text is sometimes extended within cultural studies in ways that leaves it devoid of any accurate and illuminating content. In order to avoid obvious sources of confusion, and in order to properly delimit the field of study of the present work, I will, with qualifications, follow Van Peer's (1991) differentiation between the notions of discourse and text.

Discourse will here be understood as direct verbal interaction between participants. It is the dominant mode in which language is both produced and processed. If compared to discourse, the most fundamental characteristic of text is its capacity of being detached from the utterance situation. The participants in a text need not be in each others' physical presence. Another salient difference is that texts are usually premeditated, compared to the impromptu character of discourse. A major reason for the development of text as a mode of communication in human societies is probably their need to constitute, maintain and pass on values and cultural traditions. Text has advantages over discourse in the transmission of culture because it can to a certain degree transcend the time and space limitations that discourse is subject to. (Van Peer 1991: 128-130)

The paradigmatic text exists in the form of writing or print. According to Van Peer (1991: 134-135, 138) texts may, however, be oral as well as written. As examples of oral texts he gives folk tales, myths, epics, sagas, riddles, ballads, urban legends, jokes and anecdotes. As justification for applying the concept of text to certain instances of oral verbalization Van Peer mentions that the teller of the aforementioned 'oral texts' is not, as a rule, its originator. Also, as with written texts, there is a spatial and temporal distance between the 'author' and the

recipient. Van Peer admits that on account of its material aspect the written text is more easily detachable from its utterance situation than the oral text. This further enhances its potential for preserving and passing on cultural traditions. Writing also objectifies the meanings of a text to the extent that the dimension of criticism can be added to its functioning.

Even if qualified in this way, Van Peer's notion of an oral text is a contestable one. It is an obvious extension from the study of written texts, and as Ong (1982:10-13) points out, it probably stems from the literate mind's inability to conceive of a heritage of verbally organized material that is not a variety of writing. As the usefulness of this extension for better understanding either oral or literate instances of verbal performance is questionable, the notion of text is better left to denote instances of written language according to its original meaning. Another fashionable and obscuring use of the notion of text within cultural and media studies mentioned by Gozzi (2001: 93-95), is its application to the analysis of electronic media, for example speaking of television or watching television as a 'text'. Different communication technologies have their own forms and dynamisms, not unconnected to the types of messages each medium is apt to transmit. Using the terminology of writing to describe orality or electronic communication will subtly reduce them in our minds to some kind of variants of writing - in addition to clouding our understanding of the specific nature of written communication.

2.2 Literary texts

Literature, obviously, belongs to the category of text, not discourse, and the notion of literary text needs further definition. Van Peer (1991:131-136) proposes to achieve this by extending the distinction of discourse, that originates with Ehlich and Rehbein (1980, as quoted by van Peer 1991:131), into institutional and homiletical types, to apply equally to the textual dimension of language use.

Institutional texts denote texts produced and used as an integral part of the way in which social institutions work. Examples of such institutions would be the educational, the medical, the administrative, the religious and the press institutions in a society. Texts like official documents, bureaucratic forms, school books and newspapers are central linguistic means by which these institutional

organisations operate. The phenomenon of literature is not an institution in the same sense as the ones mentioned above.   Texts like poems and novels do not easily fall within the category of linguistic instruments used by a particular social institution for its functioning and maintenance. It is true that literature has anchorage points to institutional structures within society through publishing houses, theatres, foundations and other bodies for promoting literary activities and the distribution of literary texts, but this is not enough to make literature an institution in its own right. Arguments against the institutional nature of literature include the lack of clear, specifiable aims within the structure of society. Such vagueness of function is atypical of definitions of social institutions within sociology.   A second major argument against the institutional character of literature is the nature of the reading act, a central stage in the process of literature. Private consumption of literary texts is very difficult to control institutionally; even the cultural policies of extreme totalitarian states have failed with this. Thirdly, it can be noted that whereas the functioning of institutions tends to be closely regulated and controlled by laws, literature seems to be exempt of this to a certain degree. As Cook (1994:40) mentions, in Britain, for example, authors of literary texts can use the argument of 'artistic merit' against charges of pornography.

According to Van Peer (1991:133), literary texts are thus not institutional in nature. Instead, they   are best characterised as homiletical forms of communication. It is typical of homiletical forms of communication to display a degree of distance from everyday economic and institutional concerns. Resorting to a procedure of exclusion, homiletical texts can be defined as texts not produced or read to fulfil a task directly linked to the functioning of a particular institution, as texts not directly contributing to labour, as texts not read to gain material profit, and not as texts used to exert power. If homiletical forms of communication are characterised with a positive procedure, they can be said to posses a potential for providing delight and for creating group cohesion. Group cohesion here refers to the ability of literary canons to act as cultural cement among individuals. Furthermore, homiletical texts are reflective forms of linguistic activity. The recipients of these texts have the possibility to contemplate the general nature of things, since the reading act is not concerned with the immediate concerns of daily life.

These three characteristics - the reflective, the socially cohesive, and the delight inducing qualities of literary texts - are according to Van Peer (1991:134) the most important ones for their definition, although others might be added, and the three mentioned characteristics could be analysed further in more detail. Even if particular cases of texts may involve complex issues of categorization, literary texts are usually quite distinct from institutional types of text. Some of the characteristics of homiletical texts listed above, may be found in other text types that are not usually called literature; for example philosophical writings have a strongly reflective nature and stand outside the realm of immediate practical needs. Van Peer (1991:135) proposes to speak of literature if and only if a text bears all the characteristics named earlier, while simultaneously not being bound by the aims and practises of a social institution. In addition, literariness can be conceived of as a continuum. By fulfilling the above mentioned conditions cumulatively, texts can have different degrees of literariness. Like all categorizations, the category of literary texts can involve fuzzy edges.

The characterisation of literary texts as a homiletical form of communication by Van Peer (1991), as summarised above, is done in functional terms. It is a tenet of functionalist theories that uses of language shape the system (Cook 1994:37). It is assumed that in order to realize particular functions, different text types will tend to develop different formal characteristics. According to Van Peer (1991:136-137), there is no a priori reason to assume that homiletical texts would be different in this respect. He names as the most salient formal characteristic of literary texts the extra attention given to linguistic structure that results in a general elaboration of linguistic form. During the past few decades, however, this has not been a mainstream view on the nature and status of literary texts within disciplines that study literary texts. Since the issue of distinctive formal characteristics of literary texts is crucial in the theoretical framework of the present work, I will in the next two sections briefly present two contradictory views on the matter to give it more clarity and content. Moreover, since the concepts that describe the different factors that participate in the existence and life of literary texts are necessarily interdependent, it is central for any study of literature. What content, relative weight and importance can be given to the concepts of author, reader, other related texts, and socio-cultural context, depends on how we see the role of language in literature, and vice versa.

2.2.1 The conventionalist position

Put very schematically, literary texts can either be seen as having formal linguistic features proper to them that specifically contribute to their literariness, or then the literariness of a text can be regarded as the product of text-extrinsic conditions. On the whole, post-structuralist and postmodern literary theories, like mainstream discourse theories within linguistics, accord no distinctive formal features to literary texts (e.g. Fish 1980:10-16, 95-96, 322-337; Eagleton 1983: 10-11; Smith 1988: 31-35). According to these theories, there are no properties of text that would not be common to both literary and non-literary fields. Literariness as a formal feature of texts is considered essentially an illusion, a product of interpretation. Likewise, literary texts are not considered to perform any functions that would be essentially different from those of any other text. Properties and features of a text judged as literary by a reader thus have to be considered as products of the reader's interaction with it, rather than as fixed properties and features of the text influencing all readers. Evaluative judgments of a literary text are seen to originate from the point of view of the evaluator, and not primarily from the qualities of the literary work itself. There is no text separate from the reader, and even linguistic 'facts' can be regarded as interpretation.

Within this view the concept of literature thus operates independently of textual qualities, it is instead strongly grounded in social conventions. Literature is regarded essentially as a set of practices in a socio-cultural system with different actors: writers, readers, critics and professors of literature. Reading is seen as an activity highly oriented and restricted by cultural and social conventions. For example, if a text is presented to readers as a poem, they will process it as a poem, and find 'poetic features' in it. So, if a text gets read in a literary manner, it becomes literature. These conventional modes of reading are seen to follow from cultural and educational norms, partly imposed by people in charge of aesthetic judgment, and they will vary according to social and historical context.

This position on the nature and status of literary texts, very summarily sketched above, is sometimes called the conventionalist position (Miall and Kuiken 1996:5; Pilkington 1991:46-48). As far as I can see, its main strength lies in pointing out that there are no fixed, context-independent meanings in literature, no freely interpreting readers, and that the value attached to individual literary

works can be transient. However, by totalizing its arguments it leads to a conception of literature that seems implausible and unconstructive. By annihilating the text's objectivity and denying the reader any independence, a pure conventionalist position makes writing and reading literary texts seem rather futile and unrewarding activities. If literature only provides readers with reflections of themselves and of the conventions they have internalized to be able to 'understand' literary texts, it is difficult to see why this particular medium would go on living and developing as it undoubtedly does. Taken to an extreme, the logical conclusion of the conventionalist position would be the total relativization and final disappearance of literature as an activity with its own generic features and functions. The same would, naturally, apply to literary theory (Eagleton 1983: 204).

2.2.2 The formalist position

The term 'formalist position' is here used to loosely denote a common central element in a long and developing tradition of literary analysis. This common element is the importance accorded to linguistic form in analysing literary texts. Functionalist views of literature, like the one by Van Peer presented in section 2.2, fall within this category because functionalist theories of language are based on the assumption that for uses of language to fulfil certain functions, they must possess formal qualities which allow them to do so. The idea of the importance of linguistic form in interpreting literary texts can also be discerned as a thread running through such traditions of literary theory as Russian Formalism, the Prague Linguistic Circle, some structuralist thought, Jakobsonian and Anglo-American stylistics through to some contemporary reader-response and reception theories (Cook 1994: 130). Some scholars trace its origins even further back, to the Romantic writers of the early nineteenth century, for example Coleridge and Shelley (Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 391-392; 1994b: 338).

In the heart of this formalist position on the nature of literary texts, if compared to the conventionalist position presented earlier, is the conception of literariness essentially as a quality of the linguistic features of these texts, not of the conventional circumstances of their production and reception. Compared to the

conventionalist position, the formalist view accords more importance and autonomy to literary texts as entities in their own right, without necessarily denying the role of the socio-cultural and institutional contexts in which they are created and read, as we have seen in the case of Van Peer in chapter 2.2, and as will become clear from section 2.3.3 below. If literary texts have a character and dynamism their own, they can have functions that are different from other text types.

2.3 Defamiliarization and foregrounding

The two central theoretical concepts that the point of view of the present work is based on, those of defamiliarization and foregrounding, originate within what has above been called the formalist position to literary communication. They were first formulated in the early twentieth century, and have influenced major currents in literary analysis, for example stylistics and New Criticisms. In the 1970s and 80s these concepts, and the type of theoretical thinking that brought them forth, largely fell into neglect. Since this period, there have been some attempts to reappropriate and to recontextualize them within literary studies from new perspectives (e.g. Cook 1994, Hasan 1985, Miall and Kuiken 1994a, Van Peer 1990, 1991). Unquestionably path-breaking concepts in the day of their conception, the notions of defamiliarization and foregrounding still have potential for describing significant features of literary texts according to the mentioned scholars. In the following three sections I will introduce them first in their original historical forms, and then present a reassessed combination that substantiates their usefulness and relevance for the analysis of literary texts.

2.3.1 The original concepts

The concept of defamiliarization was first formulated by Viktor Shklovsky (1917), a member of the Russian Formalist group of critics, who were active in the years immediately before and after the Bolshevik revolution. Another well-known member of the group was Roman Jakobson. The notion of foregrounded linguistic elements in literary texts has its origin with the Prague Linguistic Circle, founded in 1926. The most influential literary theorists of the circle were

Roman Jakobson and Jan Mukarovský. The concept of foregrounding was evolved by Mukarovský (1932), but its roots seem to go back to earlier work of the Russian Formalist critics (Cook 1994: 130-131; Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 391). Because of historical circumstances the Russian Formalist school had very short duration. It came to an abrupt end by the 1920s because of political suppression, and did not leave behind a fixed ready-made theory of literature. The compatibility of its concepts with those of the Prague Linguistic Circle is largely due to Roman Jacobson continuing in Prague the work started in Moscow. (Cook 1994: 139; Eichenbaum 1926: 139; Lemon and Reis 1965: xv)

The concept of defamiliarization, or 'making strange' (from the Russian *ostraneniye)*, by Viktor Shklovsky, refers to the purpose of various artistic techniques to deautomatize, impede and to slow down the perception of the artistic object (Skhlovsky 1917: 12, 17, 22). Our perceptions are usually too automatized to allow us to see reality surrounding us in itself; instead we tend to see things as we know them from habit. The prolonged process of perception that accompanies defamiliarization gives us a chance to break away from the dulling effects of habituation, and to see things in a renewed way. Art makes us notice things that daily life conceals, and enriches our perceptions. This prolonged process of perception that artistic works induce can also be considered an end in itself since it gives aesthetic pleasure.

Defamiliarization is achieved through the manipulation of form, not through new content. According to Shklovsky (1917: 7), "poets are much more concerned with arranging images than creating them". As to the formal devices used in literary art, there is no single essential device for creating defamiliarization, but the same effect is obtainable by any number of formal features; Shklovsky (1917: 9) mentions imagery, parallelism, comparison, repetition, balanced structure, hyperbole, rhetorical figures and sound. The stylistic variations that lead to defamiliarization do not facilitate or economize the comprehension of a text, but rather complicate it and make it more difficult. From the point of view presented above, literariness could be defined as the power of a text to defamiliarize through the manipulation of linguistic form and global structure.

Foregrounding (from the Czech *aktualisace)* refers to linguistic devises for violating established schemes; it is the opposite of automatization in language use. Foregrounding is based on contrast since foregrounded language attracts

attention against a background of familiarity and habituation. Complete foregrounding of all the elements of a text is thus impossible, since the units in the foreground occupy their position by comparison with the units that remain in the background. (Mukarovský 1932:19-20)

Linguistic foregrounding devises in literary texts encompass an array of stylistic features on different levels of linguistic structure. It can be manifest, for example, on the phonetic level as alliteration and rhyme, on the grammatical level as repeated sentence structure and ellipsis, and on the semantic level as metaphor and irony (Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 390). According to Mukarovský (1932:19-20), these linguistic features are not exclusive to literature, but only in literary texts are they exploited in a consistent and systematic way. They can work as foregrounding devices through patterns of deviation and parallelism. Deviant linguistic structures stand out because they violate linguistic rules or conventions. Parallelism, the repetition of similar structures, is in a sense the opposite of deviation, but is irregular in that 'ordinary language' or the rest of the work does not show the same degree of regularity (Verdonk 1991: 98-99).

Even if there is some empirical evidence that foregrounding is more frequent in literary texts than in other text types (e.g. Goatly 1997: 312-313; Miall and Kuiken 1994b: 347), it is not so much the amount of foregrounded elements than its consistency and structured nature that is taken to make foregrounding a significant feature in a literary text. Mukarovský (1932:20-21) describes significant foregrounding as happening in a stable direction, and as being hierarchically structured around a dominant element that gives the work its unity. Hasan (1985: 95) sees significant foregrounding as based on the stability of its semantic direction and the stability of its textual location. Stability of semantic direction means that the various foregrounded patterns point towards the same kind of general meaning, and the stability of textual location that significant patterns of foregrounding have a tendency to occur at textually important points. Within formalist thinking, structured foregrounding is taken to be one of the features that distinguishes literary from non-literary texts. This does not imply that there would be a definable cut-off point beyond which a text is non-literary; similarly to literariness described in section 2.2, we are not dealing with an absolute value but a continuum. Another surmised effect of structured foregrounding is that it helps to forge a particular text's unique identity (Miall and

Kuiken 1994b: 346, 1996: 8).

2.3.2 Reassessment of defamiliarization and foregrounding

As far as I can see, the original concepts of defamiliarization by Shklovsky and of foregrounding by Mukarovský both aim to describe how literary texts function through the manipulation of linguistic features, but they emphasise different phases of the process. The definition of the notion of defamiliarization by Skhlovsky, which temporally precedes that of foregrounding by Mukarovský by over a decade, encompasses both the formal linguistic features of literary texts and their effect on readers, with an emphasis on the effects. The concept of foregrounding by Mukarovský, that can be seen as a later development of the same idea, stresses the devices and their interrelations as an end and value in themselves, leaving their potential relationships with extra-textual reality more or less implicit. This change in focus can be seen as indicative of the subsequent development of formalist thinking on the whole within Jacobsonian and Anglo-American stylistics, New Criticisms and structuralism (Cook 1994: 51, 139, 154). There was a move away from an original holistic view of literature as a process that includes the reader, still very much present in the article by Shklovsky (1917), towards an examination of literary texts as autonomous objects without consideration of their interaction with the world. Jakobson was explicit about literariness being a feature of the linguistic code in isolation, without reference to extra-textual reality. In other words, the formalists wanted to limit the study of literature to that of means of defamiliarization without a consideration of the results. This shift in focus within formalism coincided with a move from longer texts to shorter ones as objects of study, and ended up in a search for literariness at the sub-sentential level (Cook 1994: 140, 153). This a priori isolation of literary form from extra-textual context is perhaps the most obvious theoretical weakness in past formalist thinking, since it is difficult to justify what the ultimate significance of a closed, introverted system of literariness might be. As Cook (1994: 174, 206-208) points out, it is paradoxical that the apparently most powerful and tenacious of the original formalist concepts, that of defamiliarization, under a semantic analysis of the word alone necessitates the reader, in spite of the explicit formalist tenet to the contrary. If a literary text

defamiliarizes, it has to defamiliarize something for someone. So defamiliarization cannot be a feature of an isolated text, but has to be a feature of the interaction of text with context, ie. the reader and the world.

2.3.3   Miall and Kuiken's model of literary reading

As mentioned in section 2.3.1, there was, for obvious historical reasons, no explicit connection established between the concepts of defamiliarization and foregrounding by the original creators. Some contemporary scholars that use formalist concepts to analyse the functioning of literary texts use only one of them; Hasan (1985) resorts solely to foregrounding, and Cook (1994) relies on defamiliarization, with the content of the two concepts falling under one term somewhat differently emphasized. They can, nevertheless, be combined in a very natural way that better captures the character of literature as a process, as Miall and Kuiken (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999) do in their model of literary reading. If foregrounding refers to the systematic use of various linguistic devices in literary texts, defamiliarization describes the cumulative effect achieved by foregrounding. Two interconnected concepts help to analyse the process into stages that can be studied separately. The whole significance of these stages can, however, only be fully understood in connection to one another.

The analysis of literary text within Chapter (5) of the present work will concentrate on the purported stage of foregrounding and its potential structuredness from the point of view of metaphor. It seems reasonable to suppose that the structures, if discovered, would be motivated by extra-textual purposes. To make a connection to such possible purposes, I wish to place the notions of foregrounding and defamiliarization within a larger framework of a model of literary reception. In addition to aiming at a holistic outlook on the nature and functioning of literature, such a model is of interest for the present study since the nature of literary comprehension is necessarily tied to the nature of what is to be comprehended, the literary text. I have chosen Miall and Kuiken's model (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999) for the purpose because it is more comprehensive than for instance Cook's (1994) schema refreshment model of literary reading, since it includes affect in addition to propositional content. Moreover, empirical research done to test the model in question offers some support for the validity of the

concepts of foregrounding and defamiliarization.

Miall and Kuiken (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1999) aim at elaborating a theoretical and empirically testable model of literary comprehension and response. Their model is based on the supposition that literary texts posses distinctive formal properties that distinguish them from other texts, and that these properties have a bearing on the psychological processes that a reader undergoes when encountered with such a text. It contests the generalizability of standard text understanding models to the literary domain as insufficient. Standard text theories and schema theories describe text interpretation as happening through prototypic propositional representations that are subjected to elaborative and inferential processes during text interpretation; they do not acknowledge response to literary style as an independent and qualitatively different factor that could influence comprehension. According to Miall and Kuiken (1994b: 350-351), in addition to the standard interpretation based on prototypic concepts, there is a simultaneous process going on in literary reading that challenges the adequacy of the immediate, prototypic understanding. This process is activated by foregrounded formal features of text, leads to defamiliarization, and is guided by affect. Miall and Kuiken (1994a: 404-405) claim the presence of this process in reading to be the hallmark of the literariness of a text.

The distinctive process of literary reading proposed by Miall and Kuiken (1994a: 392, 395; 1994b: 337-340, 350-351) unfolds in three phases. At first, foregrounded linguistic features of text strike readers as interesting, and lead to defamiliarization *per se.* Defamiliarization (see section 2.3.1) means the deautomatizing of perception where the referents of our prototypic concepts are rendered unfamiliar. Secondly, defamiliarization obliges the reader to slow down, creating a kind of interpretive suspense that allows the feelings created by the experience of defamiliarization to emerge. According to Miall and Kuiken's hypothesis, defamiliarization involves feelings in a way that is not characteristic of non-literary texts, even non-literary texts that explicitly refer to emotion; also Shklovsky mentions emotion as an ingredient in defamiliarization (1917: 9). Thirdly, these emergent feelings invite a felt engagement with the text that alters the interpretive possibilities available to the reader, and leads to the formulation of an enriched perspective on the literary work that cuts across the prototypic meanings developed so far. Miall and Kuiken (1994b: 340) thus propose that the

feelings evoked by foregrounding and defamiliarization are not merely incidental, but actually play a constructive part in the reading process. Feelings influence the reader's departure from prototypic understanding and guide the creation of a context in which the defamiliarized aspects of the literary work can be located and 'refamiliarized'. However, since feeling is involved, readers may vary considerably in the individual perspectives, experiences and memories they bring to bear on the text. This is how individual variations in literary comprehension come to be formed. The process, through its individuality, will also implicate the reader's self-concept. Miall and Kuiken (1994b: 351) take the personal variations in interpretive response to be another central distinguishing feature when literary text are compared to other texts.

Miall and Kuiken (1994a: 396-403) back up their model of literary comprehension with empirical research on reading. In a series of four studies, three literary short stories were divided into roughly equal segments using phrase and sentence divisions, and then coded for foregrounded features at the phonetic, grammatical and semantic levels (see section 2.3.1). This was done by three independent judges through discussion. Possible hierarchical structuring of foregrounded elements stretching across segments was not taken into account; instead the frequency of foregrounding within a segment was used as an index of the complexity of such structures. Using two types of readers - experienced students of literature and introductory psychology students with little experience of literature - measures for reading time per segment and ratings for strikingness and affect were elicited.

Significant correlations between these and the frequency of foregrounding were found with both test groups: segments with more foregrounded features took longer to read, were judged more striking and evoked more affect. The strikingness rating was taken to provide one measure of defamiliarization. The test involved two groups of readers with different levels of literary competence in order to get information about whether the measured effects were dependent on literary background and interest. Both groups appeared to be almost equally responsive to the presence of foregrounding, even if experienced students of literature gave somewhat higher affect and strikingness ratings. This was interpreted to suggest that the inexperienced readers were less committed to reading and less interested in it. (Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 404-405)

Miall and Kuiken (1996: 7; 1999: 130-134) have also obtained results with the same material of literary short stories that establish a correlation between foregrounding and the degree of uncertainty about text meaning experienced by the reader. This further substantiates the claim that foregrounding plays a role in the interpretive process. Another result that supports this hypothesis is that when readers were asked to talk aloud about a story, a wider range of different statements corresponded to the more highly foregrounded segments as compared to other segments.

The observations gathered during the studies summarized above suggest that a temporally extended interpretive activity is prompted by foregrounding, and that affect in somehow involved in the process. The nature of these interpretive activities, and how affect influences or guides them, remains at the level of speculation and would need further investigation. In general little research seems to have been carried out on these questions. However, what is important from the point of view of the present work, is that linguistic foregrounding was shown to be a significant feature of literary texts. The observation that foregrounded passages take longer to read and are found more striking and affect-evoking than more straightforward passages, makes them strong candidates for moments of indeterminacy in interpretation that will affect the subsequent development of interpretations of the text (Miall and Kuiken 1996:7). What further substantiates the formalist hypothesis about the nature of literary texts, is that response to foregrounded features did not seem to be dependent of literary background or interest. This result replicates and extends to short stories Van Peer's (1986, as quoted by Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 393) earlier findings from a study of reader response to poetry. The main result of this study was that all readers with general linguistic skills appear to be sensitive to foregrounding. Regardless of their prior level of literary training, readers showed remarkable agreement about the strikingness of foregrounding in six poems. This is counter-evidence to the conventionalist claim that literary texts achieve their effect in relation to norms of an interpretive community in charge of judging what is literary (see section 2.2.1). However, it is likely that readers with high levels of literary experience will more effectively develop a coherent understanding of the meaning of foregrounded passages. Literary education probably helps readers to build interpretive strategies upon the recognized textual features, and to assign these features a value within

the unfolding meaning of the text as a whole. (Miall and Kuiken 1994a: 404-405, 1996: 6).

The definition of literary texts in section 2.2, which follows Van Peers's (1991) analysis, was given in functional terms. Literary texts were described as primarily homiletical in nature, i.e. serving reflective, pleasure inducing and socially cohesive purposes, while simultaneously displaying a degree of distance from everyday economic and institutional concerns. The functional considerations that can be extracted from Miall and Kuiken's model of literary reading are compatible with this definition. Miall and Kuiken (1996:9) point out that if the dynamics of literary reading lie in defamiliarization and subsequent refamiliarization, ie. schema refreshment, literature can be seen to have an adaptive function that can equip us to better understand and respond to our environment. The act of reading can challenge our cognitive and emotional stereotypes, and retune and modify the ways we think. Rather than have meaning, a literary work can destabilize meaning, and make us uncertain. Literature is able to do this by invoking our feelings 'offline', in isolation from behaviours and actions in the everyday world that have real consequences. These considerations can be seen as elaborations of Van Peer's reflective and socially cohesive functions of literature, that are not bound by the aims and practises of social institutions or motivated by economic concerns, ie. reading literary texts must be experienced as meaningful in its own right.

3 METAPHOR

A metaphor is the bridge to reality - A classical Arabic saying (Cameron and Low 1999:149)

Metaphor has been an enduring object of study and fascination within philosophy, literary studies and linguistics for over two millennia, and the tonnage of paper devoted to the subject is awe-inspiring. The second half of the twentieth century has been especially productive in this respect, and during the past twenty years there has been a real explosion of metaphor research within the humanities and social sciences. One of the main reasons for this is probably the development of conceptual metaphor theory within cognitive linguistics. This theory claims that

conventional metaphorical expressions in language provide an important source of evidence for the existence of metaphorical conceptual structures and thought. Trying to get a handle on the apparently endless theorizing on metaphor is a somewhat overwhelming experience. In spite of the voluminous literature on the subject there are no infallible, crisp definitions of metaphor in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions to be squarely given. Paradoxically, the old Arabic metaphor of metaphor quoted above seems a startlingly accurate and concise expression for some of the central findings of contemporary metaphor theory.

Metaphor is simple and mundane, and complex and elusive at the same time. It is simple enough to be used as part and parcel of our daily activities, but notoriously difficult to get a firm grip on theoretically. The reason for this is the depth and width of metaphor as a phenomenon. Firstly, metaphor is not one thing but many; it exists in multiple forms, levels and layers both in human language and in cognition. Also the actual material used in metaphor studies naturally makes a difference for the results obtained; studying live contextualized metaphors is an altogether different enterprise than studying it within the 'A is B' framework familiar from philosophy of language and semantics, where, to quote Lecercle (1990: 162), "Sally is forever an ice-cube and Richard tiresomely a lion". Secondly, any serious account of metaphor will soon reveal how radically the scope of research into metaphor is defined by what type of system we suppose human language to be, and how we conceive of the relationship of this system with non-linguistic reality. There is no absolute or neutral notion of metaphor. All that we literally and absolutely have is the etymological origin of the term in the Greek word *metaphérein* that means 'to transfer', 'to carry over'.

A third related point that explains some of the confusion about the notion of metaphor is the inability of standard linguistics - with its traditional division into syntax, semantics and pragmatics - to deal with phenomena like metaphor. Metaphor fits a modular view of language very awkwardly. There has been a long dispute over whether metaphor is a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon, with rather meagre results; it is not altogether clear whether the main aim is preserving established disciplinary boundaries or understanding metaphor (Nogales 1999: 56-60). Consequently, standard linguistics and semantics have tended to treat metaphor as not central to the study of language proper, and to be accounted for as a special process that only occurs when there is a defect of some kind in the

default literal processing of language, as is done for instance in speech act theory (Lecercle 1990: 173-174; Nogales 1999: 163-208). However, the ubiquity of metaphor in all varieties of language, convincingly demonstrated by contemporary metaphor research, renders this position dubious.

Metaphor seems to destabilize even such founding Saussurean notions of modern linguistics as the arbitrariness of linguistic signs, and the strict separation of the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of language (Lecercle 1990: 146-147; Nogales 1999: 122). This is made apparent by transparent instances of polysemy and 'dead', lexicalized metaphors. Metaphor is one of the major mechanisms for extending the lexical resources of language and filling lexical gaps, which often results in polysemous words that can express a multitude of related meaning. Psycholinguistic studies have shown (Gibbs 1999:35) that people have tacit awareness of the metaphorical motivation behind such polysemous words as *stand*. The meaning of *stand* in statements like "*I can't stand the job I hav*e" and "*The law still stands*" is not independent and arbitrary in the consciousness of speakers, but motivated by the physical senses of the word exemplified by statements like "*We stand to sing the national anthem*". The ultimate motivation for the different meanings and uses of the word thus lies in our ordinary, recurring bodily experiences of standing.

Metaphor is also a point in language where synchrony and diachrony can be seen to mix and interlace. It can be claimed, for instance, that the only meaning of the idiomatized metaphor "*He was burned up*" in the consciousness of speakers at present is something like "*He was very angry*" (Lecercle 1990:146). This would be required by a linguistics that sees different *états de langue* as strictly separable systems, and is the position of some representatives of analytical language philosophy, for example Davidson. The claim is not very convincing, though, the metaphoric origin of the phrase being transparent enough to easily evoke various images and associations with fire.

In view of what has been said about studying metaphor so far, I propose to approach the subject through an analysis of two major traditions of metaphor research within Western scholarly thinking. These traditions have been named the Classical view and the Romantic view (Hawkes 1972; Gozzi 2001). I have chosen this approach because I feel that placing metaphor theorizing in a wider scholarly and cultural context furthers an understanding of the phenomenon more than an

isolated technical account. Scientific theories are not born in historical and cultural vacuums. Giving metaphor theories some roots helps to understand their motivations, presuppositions and implications, and thus allows some perspective on their possibilities and limitations. Discussing these scholarly traditions will equally bring up questions that are relevant for the methodology of sciences that deal with language and other cultural phenomena.

A second major aim of the general discussion of metaphor within this chapter is to sufficiently characterize and delimit the notion of metaphor for the purposes of studying metaphors in literary texts. Such a characterization should at least (1) explicate the nature and scope of metaphor as a linguistic and cognitive resource, (2) differentiate metaphor from other modes of language use and (3) types of metaphor from one another, and (4) motivate metaphor's importance in the study of literary texts.

The presentation will start with Aristotle, and culminate in conceptual metaphor theory. Conceptual metaphor theory was presented in the early 1980s as something new and dramatic with its ideas about the pervasiveness of metaphor in language and cognition. In fact there seems to be a long tradition of philosophers and literary theorists that have entertained similar ideas, and conceptual metaphor theory can rightfully be regarded as a development of this tradition. What is genuinely new about conceptual metaphor theory, is the strength of some of its claims about the inferences that can be drawn about cognition on the basis of linguistic evidence. Also its conceptual apparatus is more sophisticated than in preceding metaphor theories, and can thus give a more precise form to many earlier intuitions. In Chapter (4), the essential knowledge gained about metaphor within the present one will be related to the concepts for the study of literary texts analysed in Chapter (2).

3.1 The Classical view of metaphor

The major determining factor in attitudes towards metaphor within Western thought has been the way in which the relationship of metaphor and language is understood. At the extreme poles, metaphor can be regarded either as a device detachable from language only to be used to achieve specific effects at specified instances, or as a constitutive part of language that is essentially metaphorical

in nature. Hawkes (1972: 92) has named these general tendencies the Classical view and the Romantic view of metaphor respectively, according to their most outstanding proponents: Classical rhetoricians and the Romantic poets of the nineteenth century.

3.1.1 Aristotle and Classical rhetoric

Aristotle (384-322 BC) defined metaphor as "the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion" (Mahon 1999: 71). Some of his statements, for example

> ". . . we all find it naturally agreeable to get hold of new ideas easily: words express ideas, and therefore those words are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new ideas. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh." (Rhetoric III, 141ob, as quoted by Gozzi 2001: 56.)

clearly manifest a recognition and an appreciation of the creative and educational capacities of metaphor. However, Aristotle's discussion of metaphor, especially in *Poetics,* has been interpreted in the majority of subsequent writing as classifying metaphors outside 'ordinary' language, because of their inherent lack of clarity and because their correct use therefore requires a special talent. The validity of this interpretation can be questioned, like Mahon (1999) does, as an unfounded generalisation due to a failure to appreciate the context in which Aristotle at each instance discussed metaphor. At the risk of misrepresenting Aristotle, his view on metaphor will here be presented, very briefly, under the interpretation that has been influential from Classical rhetoricians until the twentieth century. The reason for this is that the purpose of the present work is not to discuss Aristotle as such, but to trace the development of attitudes towards metaphor within Western scholarly thought. However, this is a case in point for remembering that interpretations are always to an extent relative to the possibilities and interests of each historical period; what we find is influenced by what we are looking evidence for.

According to Hawkes (1972: 7-10), the primary aim of 'ordinary' language for Aristotle, poetry excluded, was to make manifest the bare facts of reality. This objective reality, and the words used to refer to it, are seen as separable and

distinct entities. Language is a means of describing the real world, it cannot interact with it, or change it. Transparency, clarity and the avoidance of ambiguity consequently become the foundations of good style, and these qualities are presumed to reside in 'ordinary' language, not in metaphor, which consequently gets to be seen like a linguistic additive that can have an enlivening, dignifying effect on style.

The formation of Aristotle's views on language and metaphor (Hawkes 1972: 11, 36, 51; Ong 1982: 80-82; Gozzi 2001: 20-21, 44-45, 48-51) are coincidental with incipient culture changes caused by the adaption of writing, and a gradual transition from an essentially oral society to a literate one. By Aristotle's time the written text is established as a privileged form of communication in many spheres of life. The notion of literal language, that is today currently used as an opposite of metaphorical and other figurative language, is historically associated with that of written language. With the adaption of writing, the notion of *literal* language came into being, first in the original literal sense of the word (from Latin *littera*, 'letter of the alphabet'), and then gradually in its current originally metaphorical sense, thus giving identity to the notion of figurative language that it presupposes as its counterpart. All language is, naturally, analytic and a form of abstraction in its relationship with the world, but it can nevertheless be argued that oral and written language promote and facilitate different noetic styles. Technologies like writing are never mere external tools, but, when fully internalized also interior transformations of consciousness (Ong 1982: 81). The abstractions of alphabetical writing, the letters, were arrived at in the first place through a process of separation, analysis and division, and communicating through writing further encouraged these cognitive habits. The immediate and concrete interaction of oral language with the human lifeworld is a very different experience from the intellectual and emotional distance that writing promotes. Linguistic elements like rhythm, rhyme and metaphor, which are central elements in the mnemonic structures of an oral culture for the preservation of knowledge, naturally decrease in importance with the adaption of writing. The analytic sequentiality and clarity of writing, produced by fixed marks arranged linearly on a surface, rises in value at the expense of the embodied presence and warmth of an oral language. In this mind set, metaphor becomes an inaccuracy and a difficulty, and gets demoted to the status of mere linguistic

decoration.

The Classical view on language and metaphor is further reinforced by rhetoricians like Cicero, Horace and Quintilian, whose views had a great later influence on theorists and artists in the Renaissance. Even if considered the 'supreme ornament of style', metaphor is reduced to 'a figure of speech', one of the tropes (from Greek *trepein* 'to turn'), a turning away from 'ordinary' language. These 'turnings' are seen to work negatively, rather than positively, by subverting the proper meanings of words. In their use the principle of decorum (i.e. the rules pertaining to the suitability of literary style) is stressed, whereby unusual and unseemly uses are to be avoided. (Hawkes 1972: 11-15)

3.1.2 Objective realism

A culmination in the kind of thinking on knowledge, language and metaphor represented by the Classical view is reached in the writings of the sixteenth century French philosopher and educationist Peter Ramus. In addition to reorganizing traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, Ramus developed the paradigms of the Western textbook genre. The Ramist textbook on various arts (e.g. dialectic, rhetoric, grammar, arithmetic) proceeded by successive definitions and divisions until every last particle of the subject had been disposed of. The arts that the textbooks dealt with were treated as totally self-enclosed and separate from every other art, and had no interchange with anything outside themselves With this method, truth is obtained from isolating the subject from its context, and then dividing it as far as possible. (Hawkes 1972: 23-24; Ong1982: 134-135) Here again we encounter an analogy with the dynamics of an alphabetical writing system referred to above. During the Ramist period these dynamics were being reinforced by the introduction of the printed text since the fifteenth century.

Ong (1982:168) calls Ramus's epistemology 'corpuscular', with a one-to-one gross correspondence between word, concept and referent. This type of world view postulates that there exists an objective reality outside and independent of us, and that we can state things about this reality which can be objectively and absolutely true. The objective reality is made of objects with inherent properties, which are understood through concepts that correspond in a one-to-one fashion

with the inherent properties of the objects. Language expresses these concepts, and to describe the world correctly, we need words with fixed, clear and precise meanings that fit reality. These paradigms further developed during sixteenth and seventeenth century Renaissance and the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and are the foundation of major Western philosophical and scientific traditions, and the Industrial Revolution (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 186-187; Gozzi 2001: 18-19, 22).

The epistemological and ontological assumptions of the Western scientific world view are generalized by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 186 -192) under the term objectivism. Objectivism, and the process of abstraction through isolation, analysis and division exemplified by the Ramist textbook, count as models for the proper conduct of rational thought, language use, and acquisition of reliable knowledge within dominant Western scientific traditions. Metaphor - a process of abstraction through analogy, similarity and synthesis that leads to units of higher complexity, and challenges the fixed meanings of words with univocal fits to the real world - is at odds with the objectivist scheme, where it is marginalised as misleading, unreliable and emotional. Western philosophical tradition from Aristotle until the present day has thus largely considered metaphor, with its use of words in 'improper' senses, as an agent of subjectivism and therefore as subversive of the quest of absolute truth. Literal language, with its supposed precision and unambiguity, came to be the privileged with regard to its supposed access to objective reality. Even if attitudes towards metaphor inherited from the Classical view have been dominant within Anglo-American philosophy and much of modern linguistics until fairly recently, there are of course Western philosophical traditions, for instance the phenomenological tradition, that do not share the objective realism of the Classical view, and consequently have different conceptions of language. The biases of an objectivist attitude towards language and metaphor were seriously challenged on all fronts only when scholars started paying attention to metaphors embedded in scientific theories themselves; for instance Black's (see section 3.3.1) early views on metaphor were inspired by Bohr's model of the atom as a miniature solar system (Cooper 1986:145; Gozzi 2001: 52).

3.2 The Romantic view of metaphor

As mentioned earlier, the leading poets of the Romantic movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, notably Shelley, Coleridge and Wordsworth, are historically the best known proponents of a conception of metaphor as an organic part of language, not as a device for certain tasks or functions of language as the Classical view purports. The Romantic poets were not, however, the first thinkers to propose alternatives to classical objective realism and its conceptions of language and metaphor.

3.2.1 Giambattista Vico and *sapienza poetica*

In 1725 Giambattista Vico, an Italian jurist and philosopher, published a work called *The New Science.* Its ambitious aim was to found a science of human society, with the natural science of Galileo, Bacon and Newton as its counterpart. In his analysis of human culture, Vico perceived 'primitive' cultures not as barbaric and ignorant, but as possessing *sapienza poetica,* a poetic wisdom that allows them to formulate their knowledge about the environment and their society in the form of myth, symbol and metaphor. Vico thought that the function of this type of knowledge was seriously cognitive, and that it had its grounding in actual generalized human experience, even if it was not intended to be interpreted literally as within modern analytical modes of thought. Myths and metaphors represented for Vico the attempts of people to impose a graspable, human shape on their experience of the world. This establishes the principle of *verum factum* : that which man recognizes as true *(verum)* and that which he has himself made *(factum)* are one and the same. When we perceive the world, we perceive without knowing it the superimposed shape of our own minds, and entities can only be meaningful or true in so far as they find a place in that shape. Humans are thus essentially 'makers' or 'poeticizers', they create their realities, societies and institutions in their own mind's image. And since this is not a one-way linear relationship, they in the incessant repetitive process also construct themselves as human beings. A distinctive feature of Vico's human *sapienza poetica* is the capacity and necessity to use language metaphorically, to deal with the world not directly and literally, but at one remove, by means of other agencies. Metaphor is at the heart of the *factum*, not a decorative way of presenting the facts, but a way of experiencing and projecting them. (Hawkes 1972: 38-39; Hawkes 1977: 11-15)

Vico's epistemological and linguistic theories are in stark contrast with the Classical view discussed earlier. They have and amazingly modern and actual flavour as they seem compatible with a lot of contemporary metaphor research within cognitive linguistics, and are reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) experientialist world view that will be presented in section 3.3.3.

3.2.2 Romanticism and the imaginative power of metaphor

Among the Romantic poets, particularly Coleridge studied Vico and was influenced by his thinking. The Romantic movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century was a reaction against a Classical conception of art and the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Classical art was concerned with depicting harmony in a well-ordered universe, where carefully distinguished elements are fitted to their proper classes according to the principle of decorum. The Romantic aim was, in a Platonist spirit, to destroy the Classical distinctions seen as artificial, and to discover the organic unity of all things that ignores clear-cut boundaries and surface distinctions. Coleridge, in a Vico-esque spirit, saw the human mind as a self-realizing system that actively imposes itself on the world and shapes it, with words as its tool. He formulated the notion of Imagination - the greatest faculty of the human mind - to describe the interaction of language and mind with reality. The Imaginative power is connective, and set against the divisive power of Reason, or discursive analysis. The ultimate realisation of Imagination is manifested in the sort of association of ideas that generates metaphor. Coleridge argues against metaphors of the type favoured in the poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose elements are precisely arranged in relationships of analogy to one another according to the tradition of Classical rhetoric. Imagination's unifying power through metaphor is not a process of assembly or a matter of clever comparisons involving simply the mechanical noting of resemblances. In the type of metaphor appreciated by the Romantics, the elements interact and blend, and the 'completion' of the metaphor requires the active participation of the audience. Imagination stretches the mind, because it stretches language by the linguistic means of metaphor. (Hawkes 1972: 44, 48-49, 55)

The Romantics equally expressed a preference in literature for language

organically related to and arising from "the language really spoken by men" in "low and rustic life", instead of poetic diction, ie. the type of language used in the poetry of the era (Hawkes 1972: 40). This language really used by men is of course speech, which only exists embedded in the concrete context of the human life world. This point seems to be less developed with the Romantics than their views on metaphor, but it is nevertheless clearly related to the different dynamics of oral discourse and written text discussed earlier in section 3.1.1. This is the question of the immediate concreteness of speech as compared to the visual and distancing abstraction of writing, and the different cognitive modes that these promote. We are dealing with the integrative-immediate-oral and divisive-reflective-written dimensions of communication that emerged when discussing the origins of the Classical view. We are also getting into a historical and cultural paradox. The Romantic poets were of course writers, and what made it possible, meaningful, and worth their while to praise the virtues of metaphor and the oral dimensions of language, was the existence and use of written language. This paradox apparently existed already at the time of Plato (429-347 BC), not that anyone could have been conscious of it at the time, when he warned the populace of Greece of the dangers of the new technology of writing, in writing (Ong 1982: 79,168). In addition to analytic distance, writing also encourages reflective introspection. Without written language, orality cannot even be identified; oral cultures do not contemplate orality, they just live it. (Ong1982: 76, 105, 168-169) The paradox is inevitable, and a maybe a fruitful one. Perhaps at the Romantic era of high, full-blown literacy, a new type of linguistic consciousness becomes possible, allowing orality and literacy to start conversing and feeding into each other. Orality and literacy are modalities of language use where different linguistic and cognitive potentialities, and biases, can develop to the full. Once they both fully exist, they can mix.

3.3 Some 20th century views on metaphor

During the first half of the twentieth century, Western philosophy and science, particularly the positivist tradition, still largely considered literal language the only tool with which reality could and should be described: in a clear, unambiguous and in principle testable manner. Other uses of language were

considered meaningless or trivial because they violate objectivist criteria of meaning, and metaphor's importance for language, thought and the acquisition of knowledge was denied. Metaphor research based on the paradigms of objectivism still continues within linguistics, semantics and language philosophy relying on formal logic. (Cohen 1979: 3; Ortony 1993: 1; Cameron 1999: 8-9)

For the Romantics metaphor appeared as uniform and mysteriously powerful, without limitations. Even if this holistic view ignored the exact content of the metaphorical process, its radical departure from the epistemological and ontological tenets of the Classical tradition would nevertheless enable consequent theories to see the internal structure of metaphor in a new way. The Classical view of metaphor's function as an embellishment and additive of style goes, naturally, hand in hand with a matching view of its content and internal structure: it sees metaphor as an alternative word or expression used instead of a literal one. In other words, metaphor is an instance of literal language being 'translated' into metaphoric form for a specific purpose, and can again be returned into literal form. As a substitute or a replacement, metaphor creates semantically nothing new, and allows no pluralism in interpretation. There is no possibility for a metaphor to receive more than one interpretation at a particular instance of its use, or for the context to influence the interpretation of a metaphorical expression at different instances. This analysis of metaphor's structure has accordingly been named the substitution theory. It has been extended into a comparison theory that shares the same assumptions about the relationship of literal and metaphorical language, i.e. metaphor's paraphrasability, but adds the notion of metaphor as an abbreviated, implicit comparison. The comparison theory sees metaphor as based on a similarity or analogy between its parts, that can be defined and expressed as the *tertium comparationis.* (Black 1979: 27; Nöth 1990: 129-132; Elovaara 1992: 9-14, 19-20; Goatly 1997: 116, 119)

The limitations of metaphor's paraphrasability are easy to see. Under a broad sense of the term, that does not require the paraphrase to produce exactly the same effect as the original expression, we could perhaps accept *John died* as an acceptable paraphrase of the conventional metaphor *John passed away.* Rich novel metaphors, on the other hand, are almost impossible to paraphrase in any meaningful way. Consider, for instance, an example from Amaral (2000: 4): "*The sense of an utterance is a dinosaur*". Even if in theory we could produce a list of

literal statements that would contain all that is implied by this metaphor, it would be too long and cumbersome for any communicative purpose. However, the notion of metaphor involving similarity or analogy, and the idea of the *tertium comparationis*, have proven to be enduring conceptualisations, and are still present in contemporary theories in some form.

3.3.1 The interaction theories of Richards and Black

A pioneering analysis of metaphor's content came from I.A. Richards, a post-romantic critic and literary theorist, in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* in 1936. His views about the nature of language are based on the heritage of Vico and Coleridge, in that he sees the generation of meaning in language as a process of interaction between language and experience where each modifies the other. For Richards, metaphor is the essence of language, the way in which all language works. In his opinion all languages contain deeply embedded metaphorical structures which covertly influence overt meaning, and no language can be free of metaphor. He sees ambiguity not as a handicap, but as a fundamental and necessary aspect that can deepen and enrich meaning. Richard's analysis of the structure and content of metaphor broke away from the word-centeredness of the substitution and comparison views towards a conception of metaphor as a linguistic process. He introduced the metaphors of *tenor* and *vehicle* to denote elements of metaphor that through their interaction make up its meaning. In the example quoted above in connection with paraphrasability, *the sense of an utterance* would represent the tenor, and *a dinosaur* the vehicle. In Richard's view, the juxtaposition of these elements in metaphor brings about a new dimension for them both, so that the result is different from a mere sum of the parts, and cannot be accounted for as a substitution or a comparison. This basic insight led to the development of the interaction theory of metaphor. (Hawkes 1972: 57-61; Elovaara 1992: 22-25)

As mentioned above, Richards saw the relationship of language and the world as one of interaction and transference. His analysis of the internal dynamics of metaphor can perhaps be interpreted as an analogical extension of this idea. The interaction of tenor and vehicle create the meaning of metaphor, like the interaction of language with the world creates our reality as we know it. In

addition, Richards saw all language as working on the basis of fundamentally metaphorical principles (Hawkes 1972: 60). This view of metaphor, language and reality, if unqualified and unconstrained, leads to obvious ontological problems. For example, if reality is equated with language in an unqualified manner, it is not possible for us to have physical or other experiences that we are nor able to verbalize. And if everything in language is metaphorical, there is no need for an independent notion of metaphor, which becomes vacuous and loses its descriptive and analytical power.

Richards' insights into the interactive nature of metaphor still remained rather general and vague, and his use of the crucial terms of tenor and vehicle was to an extent inconsistent (Cooper1986: 59). His ideas were developed and modified by philosopher Max Black towards a direction that can be said to underlie contemporary theories of metaphor. Black's *Metaphor* (1954) is considered a pivotal text in Western scientific thinking in changing attitudes towards metaphor from an inessential and frivolous figure of speech to a phenomenon of consequence (Cohen 1979: 3). Black was fascinated by the the 'mystery of metaphor', i.e. his intuition that something new is created when a novel metaphor is understood (Ortony 1993:11). Attempts at unravelling this mystery led Black to consider metaphor as a cognitively irreducible phenomenon that works, not at the level of word combination in metaphorical statements, but at the level of conceptual structures underlying the words. Whereas Richards had understood tenor and vehicle to denote ideas or things, Black (1979: 27) regards his corresponding notions of *frame* and *focus,* or the *primary subject* and *secondary subject* of a metaphor, as systems of relationships. The two systems of relationships each consist of an implication complex: a set associated commonplaces or standard beliefs shared by members of a speech community that is conventionally and spontaneously evoked, but may also be created or altered *ad hoc* by the author of the metaphor (Black 1979: 28; Amaral 2000: 4). The interaction of these systems is conceptualized as a projection that allows us to see one system in terms of the other, thus producing a redescription or a change of representations. The presence of the focus (i.e. the salient word or words used non-literally) in the literal frame   leads certain features of the focus to be activated. The implication complex thus evoked is then applied to the frame, so that   features of the frame's implication complex are selected, emphasized,

suppressed, and thus reorganized. This projective process is reciprocal, so that parallel changes are induced in the focus of the metaphor. (Black 1979: 27-28)

Black (1979: 29-30) describes the two implication complexes as isomorphic and linked by a 'mixed lot' of projective relations. This isomorphism is seen as a similarity, an analogy or a more general identity of structure between the focal implication complex, and the implication complex of the frame that it maps. In this perspective, Black considers metaphor as an instrument for drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects belonging to different domains. Black's (1979: 35) most radical suggestion is that the imputed isomorphism might not be prior to the metaphor, but at least in part created in the metaphorical process. This assigns a strong cognitive function to certain metaphors in that they would embody insights not expressible in another fashion, and would thus be ontologically creative. A weaker version of this thesis is that metaphors are ". . . cognitive instruments indispensable for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are *then* truly present." (Black 1979: 37). Black remarks on the possibly unsettling nature of these questions: metaphor might be self-certifying by generating the very reality to which it seems to draw attention. A proposition like this is naturally unsettling if we hold an objectivist world view, and believe in the possibility of getting at absolute truth about an objective reality. It is also unsettling in that it suggests that we, as language users, are for our part responsible for constituting, and changing, reality.

Black's interaction theory of metaphor still lacks precision and is to some extent contradictory. Black does not analyse how the content of the implication complexes of frame and focus, or how the projection from one to the other, are organized. Another unclear issue is the directionality of the metaphorical projection. Interaction as a notion, and also Black's explication of metaphor, implies reciprocal processes between the focus and the frame. Black does not discuss the constraints of metaphorical projection, and as it is left unqualified, the process would seem to be circular and unending. At other instances, Black has characterised the relationship of focus and frame in terms of the focus acting as a filter through which the frame is seen. The resulting meaning of the metaphor is being equated more or less with that of the frame, even if seen through the focus, and the focus is left unaltered in the process, which contradicts metaphor as truly interactive. (Cooper 1986: 44-45; Nogales 1999: 41- 42; Amaral 2000: 5)

Still another issue mentioned, but not satisfactorily dealt with by Black, is the question of different types of metaphor (Black 1979: 25-27). Faced with the prevalence and versatility of metaphorical statements, Black expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that the only entrenched classification should be the trite opposition between 'live' and 'dead' metaphors. He suggests a somewhat finer gradation from 'extinct' through 'dormant' to 'active' metaphors. He is, however, interested solely in the last category of metaphors, that he defines as recognized by speakers and hearers as ''authentically vital or active''. The other two categories he dismisses as not metaphoric at all, but merely expressions that no longer have a ''pregnant metaphorical use''. Black's interaction theory is thus not a general theory of metaphor. He developed it to understand how a sub-category of metaphors, that he calls 'strong', works. Black's strong metaphors seem to mean something approximative to non-paraphrasable novel metaphors that are rich in unstated background implications.

3.3.2 Conceptual metaphor theory

The analysis of different types of metaphor, hitherto inadequate, was drastically improved by the publication in 1980 of Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors we live by*. The ensuing death of 'dead' metaphor is one of the major events in twentieth century metaphor theorizing. On the basis of a linguistic and conceptual analysis of a multitude of established, conventional metaphors Lakoff and Johnson claimed that the so called 'dead' metaphors paradoxically are the most 'alive' metaphors in language because they are entrenched and get repeated in multiple forms as linguistic manifestations of underlying conceptual metaphoric structures of thought (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 54-55) . A big part of ordinary, everyday language was demonstrated to have a metaphorical basis or origin, even if this mostly goes unnoticed by language users because of the conventionalization and lexicalization of metaphors into standard elements of language. This observation makes metaphor a central part of ordinary natural language semantics, instead of an speciality or an anomaly to be explained away.

With this new, systematically cognitive approach, metaphor is penetrating unforeseen depths. It is postulated that under conventional metaphorical language there exists a highly structured system of metaphorical concepts. These conceptual

metaphors organise how we think about whole domains of human experience and action, thus providing them a coherent structure by highlighting some aspects of our experience and hiding others. Language reflects these conceptual structures and provides access to their study. A structural metaphor like TIME IS MONEY conceptualizes time in terms of our everyday experience with money, and is manifested in conventional linguistic expressions like "*How do you **spend** your time these days?*" and "*I've **invested** a lot of time in her*". This is in no way a necessary way for human beings to conceptualize time, and is culture specific. Through relations of entailment, structural metaphors form coherent systems of subcategorization. TIME IS MONEY entails that TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, manifest in expressions like "*You're **running** out of time*" and "*Do you **have** much time **left**?*", which in turn entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY, manifest in "*I **lost** a lot of time when I got sick*" and "*I don't **have** time to **give** you*". This type of metaphorical concept provides a partial, not a total understanding of a domain. If the structuring of one concept in terms of another concept were total, and the fit perfect, one concept would actually *be* the other, not a metaphor for it. Since time isn't really money, you can spend it on something but not get it back, and there are no time banks. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7-9, 12-13)

In addition to structural metaphors of the above type, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) postulate other layers of conceptual metaphors of an orientational and ontological nature as underlying language. Instead of one concept, they structure whole systems of metaphors with respect to one another. Examples of metaphorical expressions organized by orientational metaphors would be "*I'm feeling **up***" and "*I'm feeling **down***", the underlying conceptual metaphors being HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN. These metaphors are not arbitrary, but motivated by physical and cultural experience, that provides many possible bases for them. A plausible physical basis for the above metaphors and the corresponding linguistic expressions would be that in humans drooping posture typically coincides with sadness and depression, whereas erect posture goes along with positive emotional states. A rich source of metaphors is provided by our physical nature as containers bounded off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins, giving us an in-out orientation that we can metaphorically project onto other entities. We, for instance, conceptualize our visual field as a container, and what

we see as being inside this container. This gives us the very metaphor of visual field and is the grounding of expressions like "*I have him in sight*" and "*He's out of sight*". (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14-19, 25, 29-30; Grady et al. 1999: 8-9)

Conceptual metaphor theory aims at being a general theory encompassing all types of metaphors manifest in language, not just basic conventional metaphors. The specific characteristics of different types of metaphor will be discussed in Chapter (4) as far as they are relevant for the present study. The following account of the structure of the metaphorical process concerns all varieties of metaphor within conceptual theory. Unlike earlier theories, this theory does not see language as the main locus of metaphor, but human systems of conceptualization, metaphorical language simply being a consequence of the existence of metaphorical thought. Accordingly, the term *metaphor* designates a *cross-domain mapping* in the conceptual system, and *metaphorical expression* the linguistic surface realisation of such a mapping (Lakoff 1993: 203).

Conceptual theory employs a notational convention whereby expressions like LIFE IS A JOURNEY are names of conceptual mappings, or mnemonic devices for a fixed set of ontological correspondences between the conceptual domains of journeys and human life, manifest in metaphorical expression like *making one's way in life* and *getting somewhere with one's life* (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 117). In addition to making generalisations about conceptual structure at work behind various linguistic metaphors, the conceptual mappings are a model of, or a metaphor for, the structure of all types of metaphors and the metaphorical process. Metaphor is thus seen to have a tripartite structure: two distinct conceptual domains called *source* and *target*, and a detailed mapping bridging between them (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 203). The metaphors of source and target for the constitutive parts of a metaphor roughly correspond to the earlier terms vehicle and tenor, and frame and focus in the theories of Richards and Black, respectively.

Our knowledge about sources and targets is hypothesized to be skeletal in form, and to consist of well-differentiated components. For example the conceptual domain of JOURNEY has travellers, destinations and vehicles among its components. These skeletal knowledge structures are called schemas with slots for components. The slots in the source-domain schema get mapped onto slots in the target domain, thus allowing us to understand aspects of the target domain in

terms of aspects of the source domain. When correspondences between source and target are activated, the mapping can project various types of source domain knowledge and inference patterns onto target domain knowledge and inference patterns. This empowers us to think and reason metaphorically. In some cases the target-domain slots exist independently of the metaphorical mapping, other target domain slots are created by the mapping. For example, in LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the traveller gets mapped onto the living person slot, which exists in the domain of life independent of the metaphoric mapping, whereas to map the PATH slot of the JOURNEY schema into the domain of life means understanding the events of one's life as constituting the points of a path, which necessitates creating a COURSE OF LIFE slot in the LIFE domain. (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 59-60, 62-65)

According to this analysis, metaphor thus not only highlights similarities that are already there between two concepts, but restructures the target and affects our understanding of it. Similarity is involved, since a mapping always results in similarity of schema structure between source and target, but the similarity need not be of an objective, non-metaphorical kind. This analysis corroborates Black's hypothesis about metaphor as ontologically creative. Unlike the interaction theory of Black, however, conceptual theory sees metaphorical mappings as strictly uni-directional. Even is there is some ambiguity as to this matter (see section 3.3.1), the interaction view sees the metaphorical process as essentially bi-directional. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989:132) the interaction view is based on an erroneous analysis of metaphor as a process of comparing the two domains in both directions and picking out the similarities. This is a gross oversimplification of Black's theory, as Black was one of the first theorists to suggest that metaphors did much more than pick out similarities, even if the hypothesis of uni-directionality might be correct. The issue of the directionality of metaphorical mappings will be taken up again in the discussion of conceptual blends below.

Conceptual metaphor theory has proven efficient in making generalizations about postulated conceptual structures behind a wide variety of conventional linguistic metaphors. Since cognitive processes are open neither to introspection nor to direct observation, it nevertheless remains an open question how directly we can justifiably draw conclusions about mental representations like conceptual structures used in human reasoning on the basis of language use. The position of

Lakoff, Johnson and Turner on this question is very strong, as they expressly claim conceptual metaphor theory to be about basic mental operations that underlie language, which merely reflects underlying mental structures and processes (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:6; Lakoff and Turner 1989: 138; Lakoff 1993: 244). Not all researchers working within cognitive science share this view, and there are several possible hypotheses with varying degrees of strength on the interaction of metaphoric thought and language. The weakest possible hypothesis would maybe be that conceptual metaphors are merely generalisations about how parts of the lexicon of a language are structured, and have no connection to thought. Empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics supports some claims, but is not yet copious enough for any definitive answers on the question (Cameron 1999: 11, 18; Gibbs 1999: 42-43). As a result of this situation, a major lack of conceptual metaphor theory is that it does not even begin to explain how exactly linguistic structures and conceptual structures are related, and how we move from one to the other. The leading theorists in the field referred to in this work insist on keeping the linguistic and the conceptual levels distinct, and seem to assign each a very different value. It is difficult to avoid the impression that metaphor is considered as a matter of thought as *opposed* to language. It is as if the lack of knowledge about the relationship of the two levels were 'solved' by implying that one of them is only a necessary but trivial surface manifestation of the other. The conceptual structures are seen as all-important, whereas linguistic structures are repeatedly referred to as 'mere language', with words as prompts for us to perform mappings on the conceptual level (Lakoff and Turner 1989:93; Turner and Fauconnier 1999: 409). There seems to exist a tacit presupposition within conceptual metaphor theory that metaphors are consequential only if, and only as cognitive entities. Metaphor is undoubtedly more than language but it hardly follows from this that it is irrelevant to the study of metaphor how language resources are employed in metaphor. This lack of consideration for linguistic form is particularly blatant when conceptual metaphor theory is applied to literary texts. This matter will be brought up again in section 4.2.3.

Another open question in conceptual metaphor theory, like in every other metaphor theory so far, is how to determine the constraints of the metaphorical process. If anything could be anything, if we could randomly map anything on anything else, metaphor would lose its value as a cognitive and communicative

tool. Novel metaphors would not be interpersonally comprehensible, which is different from having several possible interpretations. To answer the questions of what is a possible metaphor and what metaphor is based on in the end, two things at least need further explication: how exactly are the elements in the source and target domains structured in relation to one another, and which elements have to be, can be, and can not be mapped for something to function as a metaphor. Lakoff (1993: 231-233) and Lakoff and Turner (1989: 245) propose the Invariance Hypothesis in the way of a limiting principle on metaphorical mappings which would explicate why, for instance, death is more readily metaphorized in terms of departure than in terms of teaching, filling the bath tub or sitting on the sofa. According to this principle, metaphorical mappings have to preserve the cognitive topology of the source and target domain schemas. Cognitive topology refers to structural elements like causal structure, aspectual structure and the persistence of entities. The Invariance Hypothesis does not, however, seem to be specified enough to fully satisfy the open questions (Nikanne 1992: 68, 77).

3.3.3   Experientialism

Systematic research of basic conventional metaphors, initiated by researchers like Reddy (see Lakoff 1993: 203-204) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980), has led to the argument that a big part of our conceptual system is metaphorically grounded. The less clearly delineated and less concrete concepts are partially understood in terms of the more clearly delineated and more concrete concepts, which are directly grounded in our experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 106-109). This observation is the basis of a founding principle of conceptual metaphor theory, and of cognitive linguistics, where research on metaphor occupies a central role. It should be noted, however, that cognitive linguistics is not a totally homogenous framework (e.g. Ungerer and Schmid 1997); what is said here concerns the experientialist approach of cognitive linguistics which pursues a practical and empirical description of meaning, instead of postulating logical rules and objective definitions based on theoretical considerations. A fundamental tenet of the experientialist approach is the embodied nature of mental and linguistic categories. Language and thought are not made of abstract categories independent of human experience of the world, but grounded in constant interaction with our

physical and cultural environments under the constraints imposed by our bodies. Linguistic structures are thus not arbitrary, but ultimately motivated by our bodily, physical and cultural experience. Language seen in this scheme is not an autonomous entity, as it is within structuralist theories of language where meaning in language is determined by the language system itself, or within the generative approach where the language faculty is viewed as an autonomous component of the mind, independent of other cognitive faculties. This brings us back to the intuitions of Vico and the Romantics about the relationships of language, thought and reality presented in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In this respect conceptual metaphor theory can be seen as a continuation and elaboration - through Richards and Black - of the Romantic view of metaphor, and its epistemological tenets.

This epistemology has been formulated as experientialism by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 163-166, 223- 231), with the purpose of breaking the fruitless opposition of objectivism and subjectivism, and providing an adequate philosophical and methodological basis for the human sciences. In an objectivist world view, objects and concepts have inherent properties independent of human understanding, and we can gain access to absolute and unconditional truth about them through the use of appropriate methods (see section 3.1.2). In an extreme subjectivist view, truth and meaning are private and obtained through pure imagination unconstrained by external circumstances. There is no natural structuring to our experience, and therefore there cannot be natural external constraints and structure to meaning and truth. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 223-224) In an experientialist view, things in the world do play a role in constraining our conceptual system and our conception of reality, but only through their interactional properties, i.e. through our experience of them. This imposes a structure on our experience and makes interpersonal communication and mutual understanding possible. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 226-230) Truth cannot be objective and absolute, but is always relative to a conceptual system and depends on understanding. In an experiential conception every truth is partial, it leaves out what is hidden or downplayed in the categories used to state it. This applies even to scientific truths like "*Light consists of particles*" and "*Light consists of waves*" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 165). Both statements are true relative to which aspects of light are picked out by different experiments, and accordingly, a scientific theory can hide as much as it highlights. The same constraints apply to

the concept of meaning in language. An adequate account of meaning can only be given relative to a theory of understanding, and not in terms of objective truth conditions, because linguistic expressions cannot denote the world directly without the intervention of human understanding in a context of use. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 183-184)

3.3.4 The blending framework

Within conceptual metaphor theory, the focus of research has been on everyday conventional metaphors. These metaphors have been described with the model of uni-directional, asymmetric and partial mappings between two conceptual domains as presented in section 3.3.2. In fact, the idea of a process between two linguistic and/or mental entities has been the cornerstone of metaphor theories since Aristotle. However, a two-domain model does not seem to be adequate to account for all unconventional, novel and unique metaphors that are processed 'on-line', even if Lakoff and Turner (1989: 53-54, 67-73) claim that most novel metaphors in poetry, for instance, are analysable as extensions, combinations and compressions of basic conceptual metaphors. These cases not describable with a two-space projection between a source and a target include the 'strong' metaphors that according to Black's intuition seemed to generate new meaning, or to have emergent structure as a part of them (Black 1979: 37; Fludernik et al. 1999: 389), but also some cases that on the surface appear simple and conventional (Grady et al. 1999: 2).

A more recent framework called conceptual blending or conceptual integration (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 1998) seeks to explain these cases. This very general theoretical framework or interpretive model has been constructed for exploring all types of human information integration networks. It is thus not limited to metaphor, even if it shares many aspects of conceptual metaphor theory, including its conception about the foundations of human cognition and language. In addition to metaphor, conceptual blending frameworks are meant to account for such varied phenomena as analogy, counterfactuals, concept combination, comprehension of grammatical constructions, invention of mathematical concepts and visual representation (Grady et al. 1999: 14-15; Turner and Fauconnier 1999:

409, 417; Coulson and Oakley 2000: 176). To cope with metaphors that can yield short-lived and novel conceptualizations, a blending theory account typically involves four mental representations, called mental spaces. These spaces are partial and temporary structures constructed by speakers in context as they think and use language. The temporary spaces are informed and constrained by more stable knowledge structures, for example entrenched conceptual metaphors, presumably stored in long term memory. The four spaces of a blend include two input spaces, that in the case of metaphor correspond to source and target, and a generic space representing conceptual structure that is shared by both inputs, plus a blended space where the material from the inputs combines and interacts. Besides inheriting partial structure projected from both the source and target spaces, the blend develops emergent content of its own. This new content results from the juxtaposition of the inherited elements, and cognitive composition, completion and elaboration processes that work on the inputs. (Grady et al. 1999: 1-8; Coulson and Oakley 2000: 178, 192-193)

A blending analysis of metaphor puts Black's interaction theory (see section 3.3.1), that seemed to waver on the direction of metaphorical projections, in a new light. Black's yet unanalysable intuition that metaphorical processes are not always exclusively uni-directional, seems to get support from blending theory. The ability of blends to recruit various knowledge structures to construct temporary mental spaces is equally reminiscent of Black's systems of associated commonplaces, or implication complexes, activated in the metaphorical process.

Grady et al. (1999: 14) consider conceptual metaphor theory and blending theory as essentially compatible and complementary frameworks that tackle different aspects of metaphor. A full account of contextualized metaphoric expressions would seem to require both a rich theory of metaphor and a fully specified model of conceptual blending. The blending framework seems promising also in that it might be able to comprise, in addition to inferences, such elements as the generation of aesthetic perceptions and affective reactions, so far neglected by cognitive theories of metaphor but essential for fully understanding literary metaphor (Gross 1997: 293-294; Coulson and Oakley 2000: 176). Blending models of metaphor are a very recent development, and such more comprehensive models that would include the emotive aspect of metaphor have not to my knowledge yet emerged. Such a framework would necessarily be

technically much heavier than the present ones. What makes applying a model of this type to the study of literary texts unwieldy, is that fully analysing one complex metaphor takes an inordinate amount of time and space; and analysing a few isolated metaphors does not contribute very much towards understanding the global functioning of a literary text. Even within conceptual metaphor theory (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989), with much fewer components in its apparatus than in blending models, only short poems or extracts of poems have been used to illustrate the theory, rather than vice versa. For these reasons, I will pertain to the two-space model of conceptual metaphor theory in the description of literary metaphors in Chapter (5). The application of this model will also be a test of its adequacy for the purpose at hand.

4. LITERATURE AND METAPHOR

4.1 Integration of the literary and linguistic concepts

The main organizing concepts of the present study, those of defamiliarization, metaphor and experientialism were presented within Chapters (2) and (3). If they are to be used together in a discussion of metaphor's role in literary texts, their compatibility needs to be established. This will be the first aim of the present chapter. A second more specific aim is to show on the basis of conceptual analysis how metaphor's inherent nature, as accounted for within conceptual metaphor theory, makes it an apt tool for foregrounding and defamiliarization.

4.1.1 Defamiliarization and experientialism

As was pointed out in section 3.3.3, research on conventional conceptual metaphors has revealed metaphor's considerable role in the semantic structuring of natural language. For this reason an objectivist account of human language and its ontological status must be considered untenable, an experientialist view of language giving a more plausible interpretation of the relationship of language and reality, and being able to accommodate prevalent phenomena like metaphor. In the experientialist scheme, linguistic categories do not correspond to an

objective reality in a mind-free manner, but are projections of the human mind. According to experientialism, we categorize and conceptualize reality, in thought and in language, within the limits of our interaction with the human lifeworld that includes both physical and cultural experience. Our cognitive and linguistic conceptualizations are cultural choices motivated and constrained by their experiential bases, but not predicted by them. This applies both to metaphoric and non-metaphoric uses of language, metaphoric language being only further removed from a direct physical grounding. As language is conventionalized into a cognitive and linguistic routine for fast and efficient communication, language users lose sight of language's ontological foundation, and take reality to correspond to linguistic and cognitive categories directly. Meaning then appears to reside in the words of human language themselves, not in the way we apply them to mean something to us. Metaphor is a point in language that allows degrees of transparence into the general ontological opaqueness of language. Conventionalized metaphors can be used automatically and unconsciously as conventional linguistic signs, but on reflection they nevertheless reveal how we in using them partly construct our reality by understanding entities in terms of other entities. This type of reflection is practised for instance within conceptual metaphor theory. Language equally manifests contradictory basic metaphors, for example LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION and LIFE IS BONDAGE (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 53) that disclose the equivocal nature of cultural reality.

In novel, unconventional metaphors ontological transparency is at its highest, as they are blatant proposition to conceptualize and make perceivable parts of reality in a way that is not customary. In doing this they can evoke feelings of surprise, revelation and puzzlement on account of their overt ontological presumption. Cultural and social realities are partly constituted through metaphors, and consciousness of one's metaphors is consciousness of one's world view. The way we talk about things is significant in every sense of the word, since in addition to establishing cultural and social realities, language also contains the means of their subversion. Language is paradoxical in that it allows individual expression, while on the other hand it is a collective institution, which allows only collective meanings (Lecercle 1990:105). Apparently there is a solution to this paradox since we continue, more or less successfully, communicating through, or rather in language. Part of the solution might lie in the inherent openness of the system

made visible by metaphor.

Experientialism is a language philosophical theory about the relationship of cognition, language and reality, whereas defamiliarization is a literary theory about the relationship of literary art, language and reality. As far as I can seen, their basic claims are compatible. Artistic defamiliarization, that in the reading of a literary text is activated by foregrounded formal features of the text, was defined in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 as the deautomatization of perception. The referents of our prototypic concepts are rendered unfamiliar, so that we are given a chance to reflect on the nature and limitations of our world view, and question our cognitive and emotional stereotypes. According to the theory of defamiliarization, one function of art is to make us notice things that have been so automatized as to remain below the level of consciousness; things that in spite of their unconscious nature have a powerful role in constituting human existence. In this perspective, art is not about being fancifully inventive and original, but rather about making reality more real for us, or about revealing the extraordinariness of the ordinary. In this defamiliarization can be seen as an artistic counterpart of a philosophical and linguistic analysis of conceptual structures and categorizations fixed in conventional metaphors that we are normally not conscious of, but that nevertheless exert a power over our thinking and perceptions - to wield them is to accept their validity. This type of conceptual analysis, like the artistic technique of defamiliarization, is a possible tool for becoming conscious of our reality-constructions, and taking at least parts of them into our own control.

4.1.2 Defamiliarization and metaphor

In Chapter (2), literature was described as a form of art that uses language as its main medium of expression. Literary texts were distinguished from other texts through their specific functions, relatable both to human cultures collectively and to readers of literature individually. These functions were hypothesized to correspond to the existence of configurations of formal characteristics in literary texts as means for realizing the functions in question. One such specific function of literary texts, defamiliarization, was proposed to be realized through the foregrounding of certain linguistic features, among them metaphor. If we want to study metaphor as a foregrounding device for defamiliarization, a consistent

functional view requires an argumentation for what makes metaphor a plausible tool for this particular function. Moreover, it seems reasonable that within any literary theoretical framework, the role of metaphor in literary texts should be organically related to its structure and workings as a linguistic and cognitive phenomenon in general. In other words, to be accessible and powerful, the use of metaphor in literature must be compatible with its linguistic and cognitive nature in general.

Metaphor has, indeed, enjoyed a special status in the interpretation of literary texts throughout the ages, and we are likely to find far more studies on the metaphors of literary works than, say, on their metonymies. This practice has been based on metaphor's assumed specificity as a literary device, as compared to other uses of language. The discovery within cognitive linguistics of metaphor's centrality for the semantic structuring of all language (discussed in section 3.3.2), naturally shakes the grounding of this argument. The tenacious belief in metaphor's significance in literary texts might still not be mistaken, but its grounds need to be reconsidered. In my view, the factors that make metaphor a credible candidate for a tool of defamiliarization lie in its inherent nature mentioned above in connection with experientialism, i.e. the potential (conventionalized metaphor) and overt (novel metaphor) ontological transparence of metaphor that other uses of language lack. In metaphor, language's function as a tool for exploration and comprehension, not just communication, is more evident than at other instances. As pointed out above, defamiliarization is essentially about ontology, since its aim is to bring into conscious awareness that our conception of the world is not the only possible one, but the result of cultural and personal choices and thus subject to various limitations.

Metaphor can also be considered to have inherent foregrounding potential because it transgresses and contests established semantic boundaries. The semantic 'anomaly' of metaphor is in fact one of its defining features both in conceptual metaphor theory and in blending theory. These theories describe metaphor as the creation of counterpart relations between conceptual domains or mental spaces that have to be incompatible in some important sense for there to be metaphor. If the fit between the entities in a metaphorical mapping were perfect, the result would not be metaphor, but a tautology or a literal comparison (see section 3.3.2). The necessary partiality of the metaphorical mapping provides an

explanation for the logical and emotional 'tension' that has traditionally been considered endemic to metaphor (e.g. Cooper 1986: 59-60; Elovaara 1992: 40-45; Goatly 1997: 118). Making and understanding a metaphor is thus not compatible with our current understanding of reality, as it involves suppression of critical knowledge of the target that has to yield to the source in the process (Grady et al. 1999: 11-12). This aspect of the nature of metaphor also explicates its 'dark side': consistently used strong and emotive metaphors that illuminate some aspects of a target but completely hide others are a powerful tool for manipulation, for instance for deliberately distorting cultural and social realities in the minds of people for political reasons. This kind of abuse of metaphor is made possible by its structure, and can be counteracted through an awareness of how metaphors work.

On account of its inherent properties, metaphor can thus be regarded as potentially defamilairizing in itself, because it foregrounds the ontological role of language in determining what exists for us, and how. Metaphor also calls attention to the relativity of established semantic boundaries in language, to what we are 'allowed' to mean by our words. Another way of saying this would be that metaphor challenges the conventions of the referential code. Furthermore, metaphor can be considered as foregrounded compared to other semantic configurations on the grounds that in proposing that we establish counterpart relations between entities that we know to be essentially different, it contests our current understanding of reality. It is plausible to assume that different types of metaphor would differ as to their foregrounding potential, and that a systematic and structured use of metaphor in a literary texts would augment it. These matters will be discussed in the ensuing sections of this chapter.

4.2   Types of metaphor and defamiliarization

Because of their complex nature, live metaphors are not classifiable into univocal categories without coercion. Metaphor is not essentially a matter for taxonomy, but rather a meeting point of several dimension. Metaphor being as common and multilayered as it is, each study of metaphor has to consider each dimension's pertinence to the questions it aims to answer, and delimit the types of metaphor to be analysed accordingly. Even if these choices are bound to be arbitrary to a

degree, they should at least be conscious. In this section, distinctions that are currently used to differentiate metaphor from non-metaphor, and types of metaphor from one another, will be discussed - not exhaustively, but as far as they seem relevant for a study of metaphor as a foregrounding device in a literary text. The aim is to delimit and to justify the choice of metaphors to be analysed within Chapter (5).

4.2.1 The traditional concept of literal language

There exists a traditional dichotomous opposition between the concepts of literalness and metaphoricity, or figurativeness in general, as natural classes: an expression is either literal or figurative, not something in between. The traditional concept of literal language, with its one-to-one correlation between external reality and the signs we use to represent reality in language, is a corollary of objectivism, and as such in contradiction with experientialism. The objectivist reality exists independent of human understanding, it is directly reflected in human concepts expressed by conventional literal language, which gives literal language the status of being true or false in an absolute sense. Within objectivism, the existence of conventional metaphorical language is denied - a position that the discovery of productive systems of conventional metaphors obviously contests (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 115-116). As was mentioned in section 3.1.1, the notion of literal language (from Latin *littera*, 'letter of the alphabet') is historically associated with written language, and is obviously of metaphoric origin. Like all metaphors, it highlights some aspects of the target and downplays others. The fixed and permanent nature of writing, and especially of print as compared to orality, promotes a bias towards language as a fixed and univocal system for denoting entities in reality independent of human conceptualisation and context. In spite of all these qualifications, no new convenient term has been suggested for semantically autonomous language (language that is not structured by metaphor, metonymy or other similar processes), and 'literal' still serves the purpose.

4.2.2 The dimension of conventionality

With conceptual metaphor theory, the limits of semantically autonomous language have moved towards deeper layers of language and conceptual structure, and the only type of language that can be taken as obviously non-metaphorical at first sight is language directly grounded in physical realities, for example expressions like *She poured the wine into the decanter*. The analysis of metaphor as a foregrounding device in Chapter (5) will not be concerned with the deepest levels of metaphor, because in the reading of a literary text they have no salience for us as metaphors. An example of such deep level metaphors are generic level metaphors concerned with ontology and orientation of the type HAPPY IS UP, or EVENTS ARE ACTIONS (see section 3.3.2). Instead, Chapter (5) will be concerned with specific level metaphors which, in addition to having generic-level structure, connect specific level schemas and thus have structure also on lower levels. Specific level metaphors can be either conventional or novel. If they are conventionalized both on the conceptual and the linguistic level, like the well known DEATH IS DEPARTURE, they are called basic metaphors (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 81-83).

Even if we use basic metaphorical expressions like *She is gone* in an automatic and usually unconscious manner to mean that the person in question has died, we can still have at least vestigial consciousness of their metaphoric grounding. The foregrounding and defamiliarizing potential of unconventional specific level metaphors is, however, more evident, as they are overtly semantically 'anomalous' in the sense defined in section 4.1.2. Conventionalization is a sign that the ontological claims of a metaphor have been accepted as part of our current understanding of the world, and that our conceptual and linguistic systems have accommodated them. Foregrounding was defined in section 2.3.1 to refer to linguistic devises for violating established schemes, and to be the opposite of automatization in language use. Unconventional metaphors then clearly seem to have more foregrounding potential than conventional ones. In addition to these arguments based on conceptual analysis, there are some results from psycholinguistic research on metaphor that can be interpreted from the point of view of foregrounding and defamiliarization. An experiment (Blasco1999:1078) that tracked readers' eye movements found out that low familiar (i.e. unconventional) metaphors are read more slowly and are more memorable than high familiar (i.e. conventional) ones. Defamiliarization as a

function of the reading of a literary text is made possible by the prolonged process of perception caused by foregrounded features of the text (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). This makes unconventional metaphors potentially more defamiliarizing than conventional ones. The higher memorability of low familiar metaphors can be interpreted as connected to another purported characteristic of foregrounding: its structuredness. Readers are more likely to be able to notice, or to create, connections between instances of metaphor that are memorable, rather than between less memorable ones. For these reason, conventionalization will be used as the main criterion when choosing metaphors for analysis in Chapter (5).

Conventional and unconventional are not absolute categories, but approximative locations on a continuum. Once a certain degree of conventionalization is reached, dictionaries will start recording the metaphorical extension of the source term in question as part of its lexical meaning, for example the word *departed* at the moment conventionally refers to people who have died, not only to people who have departed on a journey. Registered lexicalization in a dictionary is of course not an absolute measure of conventionalization of specific level metaphors in English, but provides an independent point of reference for delimiting the material. The exclusion of lexicalized conventional metaphors as less foregrounded than non-lexicalized ones, is also motivated from a practical point of view. Conventionalized metaphors are almost as common as to appear in every other sentence, depending somewhat on where we draw the line between metaphorical and semantically autonomous language. One of the aims of the present study is to look for the potential structuredness of foregrounding in the interrelations of metaphors in long stretches of text; if every type of specific level metaphor were included, the material would not be manageable within the confines of the work. Within the framework of defamilarization theory, the most justified line of demarcation runs between lexicalized and non-lexicalized metaphors. I will use the New Oxford Dictionary of English on CD-Rom (2000) as a reference for lexicalization on account of its comprehensiveness and contemporariness with the text to be analysed.

It should be noted, however, that linguistically unconventional metaphorical expressions are primarily breaches of the linguistic code, not of conventional ways of thinking, even if they can be both (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989:50). In other

words, linguistically unconventional metaphorical expressions can be based on conventional metaphorical concepts or other types of conventional ideas. Foregrounding is a feature of the linguistic form of a text, whereas defamiliarization is the cognitive and affective process initiated by the foregrounded form during reading in the mind of the reader, and its content and results are always unique. Each instance of defamiliarization is influenced by the reader's characteristics, experiences, perspectives, interests and motives (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). Since the aim of Chapter (5) is to investigate the interrelations of metaphors in a literary text as an instance of structured foregrounding, it will be concerned with metaphors that are linguistically unconventional in form, and not primarily pay attention to the conventionality or unconventionality of the concepts or ideas that they express. Nevertheless, the foregrounding of linguistic metaphors, like the very existence of linguistic metaphors, remain unmotivated and meaningless, if we do not consider them to be connected to more abstract and general processes, to defamiliarization and to the conceptual level of metaphor respectively.

4.2.3 Linguistic and conceptual metaphors

A practical analysis of metaphors in a text also brings up the linguistic-conceptual distinction: what level of entities are we dealing with? According to Lakoff and Turner (1989:55), among the parameters along which metaphors differ only one is binary: conceptual versus linguistic. At least in the case of an analysis of metaphors in a literary text, it is difficult to grasp the motivation and usefulness of such a categorical distinction. The exact relationship of metaphorical concepts and metaphorical expressions remains unclear, as was pointed out in section 3.3.2, but regarding this relationship as one of interdependence, rather than one of opposition, seems warranted for the following reasons.

Conceptual metaphors are on a higher level of abstraction from individual linguistic metaphorical expressions, but they are nevertheless closer to linguistic constructs than to anything else we know with any certainty. Writing words in capitals when they are intended to refer to concepts does not essentially change this situation. The relationship of conceptual metaphors to thought remains speculative: there is no definitive proof within cognitive linguistics or

psycholinguistic research that they could be paralleled to entities or processes of thought as such. This does not in my opinion undermine the value of conceptual analyses of metaphor in any way; we only have to take them for what they are: generalizations based on language use. A complicating factor in this linguistic-conceptual distinction is that natural language, necessarily and inevitably, serves as a metalanguage both for itself, and for concepts. Lakoff and Turner's (1989:109) way of expressing this situation is to postulate a metonymy whereby WORDS STAND FOR THE CONCEPTS THEY EXPRESS. Our current attempts at unravelling language, concepts and thought can perhaps be illustrated with Lecercle's (1990: 41) archaeological image, borrowed from another context in a slightly modified form: it is as if we were trying to shovel away the linguistic sand over Tutankhamun's tomb of cognitive treasures, but unable to delineate its exact contours with our present tools because the tomb is made of sand as well. This comment is not meant as an instance of pessimism, but of fascination.

Metaphors are obviously not 'mere language' as cognitive linguists point out, but on the other hand it is difficult to fathom what 'mere language' would be. Given the nature of human language as it exists for us, it is practically impossible to stop language from 'meaning' even if we strived to employ it as a formal exercise - for aesthetic or whatever reasons - so that our linguistic constructions could be perceived as pure form. It is not clear how we could 'mean' differently with conceptual systems than with linguistic systems. Isolating the abstract conceptual dimension of language from its concrete physical existence, and considering the first as all-important and the second as a mere jingle, is a distorting value judgement. On the basis of these considerations, the exact nature of the conceptual-linguistic distinction will be left as an unsettled matter that is not critical for the purposes of the present study. Metaphors in the material will be primarily approached as linguistic constructs, that can be abstracted into concepts in case it is useful for their analysis.

In addition to the binary opposition that conceptual metaphor theorists want to impose between linguistic form and conceptual structure, they are eager to demonstrate that knowledge of the system of conventional metaphors is needed to make sense of most poetic metaphors, and that both their accessibility and power relies on their grounding in conventional conceptual metaphors. Poetic metaphors are essentially seen as extensions, elaborations and compressions of basic

metaphors. It is admitted that they are more interesting, and that understanding them requires more effort than everyday metaphors, and that as conscious extensions of the conventional system they draw upon different cognitive resources than the automatic and effortless use of fully conventionalised modes of metaphorical expression (Lakoff and Turner 1989:53-54, 67-71). This, in my opinion, is in contradiction with the denial of the importance and consequentiality of linguistic form, as I fail to see how the elaboration and compression of basic conventional metaphors into complex poetic metaphors could *not* be a matter of linguistic form. Moreover, the motivation for the labourious exercise of creating and understanding literary metaphors is not overtly discussed by Lakoff and Turner, as the main thrust of their argumentation is to explicate poetic metaphors as instances of conventional conceptual metaphors, and thus to deny their uniqueness and originality - an enterprise for which I, again, fail to see the motivation, as the existence of original literary metaphors would in no way undermine the importance of conventional conceptual metaphors for language, thought and literature. The reason for the existence of 'hard to understand' poetic metaphors is not discussed overtly, but it is referred to by occasional statements that are, nevertheless, revealing:

> "It is by these means that poets lead us beyond the bounds of ordinary modes of thought and guide us beyond the automatic and unconscious everyday use of metaphor. What makes poetic metaphor noticeable and memorable is thus the special, nonautomatic use to which ordinary, automatic modes of thought are put." (Lakoff and Turner 1989:72.)

> "Poetry, through metaphor, exercises our minds so that we can extend our normal powers of comprehension beyond the range of metaphors we are brought up to see the world through." (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 214.)

All in all, what Lakoff and Turner (1989) say about poetic metaphor, even if contradictory to some extent, in my opinion amounts to a covert supposition about the existence of processes comparable to defamiliarization in the reception of literary texts, and about the importance of linguistic form in setting off this process.

4.2.4 Simile, non-metaphorical comparison and metonymy

It was pointed out in section 4.1.2 that understanding metaphor as a mapping

between two or more conceptual domains or mental spaces that need to be essentially different for the product to be metaphorical, provides an explanation for the intuition of 'metaphorical tension' and also justifies considering metaphor as semantically foregrounded on the basis of its inherent nature. Another consequence of this analysis of metaphor is that there have to be degrees of metaphoricity depending on the degree of difference between the entities mapped. Between prototypically metaphorical and prototypically non-metaphorical utterances stretches a cline with no clear cut-off points (Grady et al. 1999: 12). Metaphoricity gradually fades into non-metaphorcity, towards utterances that can be described as literal comparison, approximation and subcategorization (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 84-85; Goatly 1997: 20-22). Some of the cases naturally remain liminal, and are not strictly classifiable.

This question is related to, but not identical with, the traditional rhetorical distinction between metaphor and simile as two different figures, where simile is seen to be nearer a literal comparison between two entities than a metaphor. Simile has also been considered as a 'weaker' version of metaphor, or as an explicated metaphor. However, in a conceptual analysis of metaphor, the distinction seems to be meaningful only as a description of the syntactic form of the linguistic configuration - not that syntactic form is without significance - rather than denoting different categories. Configurations that are traditionally called similes can be as obviously and 'strongly' metaphorical as syntactically unmarked metaphors (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989: 133; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990: 7 ; Fludernik et al. 1999: 358). For this reason, there are no grounds for an a priori exclusion of simile from a study of metaphor. Whether a simile is nearer a literal comparison than a metaphor is to be judged case by case in the context of the text. The lack of syntactic marking in the latter of the following descriptions of two characters' looks in *The God of Small Things* does not make it a priori neither more metaphorical, nor more foregrounded than the first one that is syntactically marked as a simile by *looked like:*

> His hair, carefully brushed and slicked down in front, stood up in a stiff halo of quills at the back. He looked like an untidy, beatified porcupine. (241)

> Her thick, dark eyebrows were knitted together and somehow made a lovely contrast to the frothy, bridal white. A scowling cloud with

eyebrows. (240)

Also similes, like unmarked metaphors, are capable of lexicalization, e.g. *have eyes like saucers* has the conventionalized meaning of *haven an expression of amazement.*

Hawkes (1972: 65) even argues that similes can have more 'metaphorical vitality' than syntactically unmarked metaphors. He uses as an example Burn's well-known line "*My love is like a red red rose*" and compares it to the expression *"Love is a red rose"*. In my view, the 'metaphorical vitality' of Burn's line is, however, not due to the simile, but to its rhythmic qualities and to the alliteration. The inherent semantic qualitites of metaphor are not the only features that can foreground a metaphorical expression in a text, even if they are the features that will always be present. This phenomenon Lecercle (1990: 157-159) calls the overdetermination of metaphor: its foregroundedness is assured by the co-presence of other formal features. This tendency is a reminder of the global character of the reception of a literary text, and of language in general.

As an illustration of the literal comparison-metaphor continuum, I will quote a series of comparisons/simile-metaphors from *The God of Small Things* arranged according to how near the semantic fields that they bring into contact are to each other. The series starts with an obviously literal non-metaphorical comparison where the two semantic fields are identical, and proceeds towards cases that I have interpreted as increasingly metaphorical, and thus more foregrounded, even if there can be no absolute measures for this. From here onwards, a convention of underlining the target-terms, and **boldfacing source-terms** when analysing metaphors from *The God of Small Things* will be adapted. For the sake of clarity, the typographical marking will only concern the target and source elements under discussion at each instance. In addition to these, the expression might contain other metaphorical elements that will not be marked. It should be noted, however, that source- and target-terms are not always strictly separable, but might overlap or coincide. In such a case, an analysis into higher order conceptual units can be useful for clarifying the content and implications of the metaphor, but even so, it is not always possible to exhaustively entangle complex cases. Examples will also be numbered. When no other source is given, the page numbers in the brackets at the end of each example refer to the Flamingo 1997 paperback edition of *The God of Small Things*.

(1)   He was so small that he watched the road through the steering wheel. To passing traffic it looked like a taxi with passengers but no driver. (113)

(2)   Though it was December, it rained as though it was June. (254)

(3)   She called out names in a deep voice, like a man's. (133)

(4)   <u>Rahel drifted into marriage</u> **like a passenger drifts towards an unoccupied chair in an airport lounge. With a Sitting Down Sense**. (18)

(5)   <u>The fleshy anthuriums gleamed</u> **like gunmetal**.(332)

(6)   <u>She moved quickly through the darkness</u>, **like an insect following a chemical trail.** (332)

(7)   Ammu smiled at the silence around the table as she picked fried emperor fish off the bone. She said that <u>she felt</u> **like a road sign with birds shitting on her.** (161)

(8)   <u>Heat</u> **cleaved into things like a low fever**. (208)

(9)   Only <u>the vines kept growing</u>, **like toe-nails on a corpse.**

(10)   In the days that followed, <u>Baby Kochamma focused all her fury at her public humiliation on Velutha.</u> **She sharpened it like a pencil**. (82)

(11)   And Ousa the Bar Nowl watched <u>the pickle-smelling silence that lay between the twins</u> **like a bruise**. (198)

In a practical analysis of text, a complicating factor for classification is that literal comparisons can be elaborated in a way that foregrounds them, especially if the elaboration is connected to other foregrounded elements in the text, in this case water (see section 5.2.6):

(12)   But when they made love he was offended by <u>her eyes. They behaved</u> **as though they belonged to someone else. Someone watching. Looking out of the window at the sea. At a boat in the river. Or a passer-by in the mist in a hat.** (19)

In texts, similes and unmarked metaphoric elements often figure as constituents of the same metaphor. This would make treating them as conceptually different categories artificial. Here is an example of such a case:

(13)   He **drove** the thought away angrily. **It returned and sat outside his skull. Like a dog**. (212)

Even if similes and metaphors do not form essentially different categories in a conceptual analysis, this does not mean that similes could not have functions specific to them in a literary text. In *The God of Small Things,* similes are currently used as the first introductory element of a metaphor. After the ground has been prepared by a simile, the syntactic marking can be subsequently dropped:

(14)   The last strap of light slipped from the cherub's shoulder. Gloom **swallowed the garden. Whole. Like a python.** Lights came on in the house. (191)
Hours later, the moon rose and **made the gloomy python surrender what it had swallowed.** The garden reappeared. **Regurgitated whole**. With Rahel sitting in it. (192)

Because of its aptness for referring to precise detail, another common role of simile in the novel is as a specifying, concretizing constituent of a metaphor:

(15)   Looking at herself like this Ammu's soft mouth would twist into a small, bitter smile at the memory - not of the wedding itself so much as the fact that she had permitted herself to be so painstakingly decorated before being **led to the gallows**. It seemed so absurd. So futile.
Like polishing firewood. (43)

This same aptitude to specify can serve to revitalize (see section 5.3) a lexicalized metaphor by adding a concrete detail, and thus re-foreground it, as in the case of *thick air* below:

(16)   The slow ceiling fan **sliced** the **thick, frightened** air into an unending spiral that spun slowly to the floor **like the peeled skin of an endless potato.** (132)

Detailed visual reference provided by simile equally makes it a prime tool for creating atmospheric settings, humorous effects, and images of arresting beauty:

(17)   Dark palm leaves were splayed **like drooping combs** against the monsoon sky. The orange sun slid through **their bent, grasping teeth**. (187)

(18)   The thin priest was asleep on a mat in the raised stone verandah. A

<u>brass platter of coins lay near his pillow</u> **like a comic strip illustration of his dreams.** (228)

(19) <u>The moonlit river fell from his swimming arms</u> **like sleeves of silver**. (289)

Unlike simile, metonymy is considered to differ qualitatively from metaphor within conceptual theory, because it is not a mapping between different conceptual domains but takes place inside one single domain. When there is a conceptual structure that contains both concept A and concept B, and B is either part of A or closely associated with it, we can use B to metonymically represent A. In addition to contiguity, the relation of A and B can be that of causality. Motivation for metonymy can include that B, in a given context, is easier to understand or remember than A. (Papafragou 1996:171-173)

Metonymy's main function is considered to be identification of entities by making one entity stand for another, not understanding one entity in terms of another as in metaphor. Even if metonymy does not add information to a conceptual domain from an essentially different one, it nevertheless influences our understanding of the entity in question by choosing to focus on a certain part of it. Conceptual theory postulates the existence of conventional metonymic concepts that underlie language use, for example THE PART FOR THE WHOLE, instantiated by "*We don't hire* **longhairs**"and PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, instantiated by "*I hate to read* **Heidegger**". (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36-39).

Even if metonymies will be excluded from analysis in Chapter (5), it should be noted that the boundary between metaphor and metonymy is not as clear-cut as one might think. The same linguistic item can function both as a metaphor and a metonymy within the same text. This is the case of *fountain* below:

(20) Most of <u>Rahel's hair </u>sat on top of her head **like a fountain**. It was held together by a Love-in-Tokyo - two beads on a rubber band, nothing to do with Love or Tokyo.(37)

(21) In bed, Rahel took off her Love-in-Tokyo and put it by her sunglasses. Her **fountain** slumped a little but stayed standing. (116)

(22) She couldn't see them crouched against the door. A surprised Puff and **a Fountain** in a Love-in-Tokyo. (253)

Fountain is first introduced as a source for the target of Rahel's hairdo by a simile. It is then currently used to metaphorically refer to Rahel's hair without the target-term, and also metonymically to Rahel. The metonymic use is dependent on the prior establishment of the metaphor.

4.3 Metaphoric interplay and foregrounding

As has been demonstrated above, the foregroundedness and potentially defamilairizing nature of metaphor as such can be established on the basis of conceptual analysis. Whether the foregrounding of metaphors in a literary text is structured, is necessarily an empirical question. The structuredness of foregrounding has been a hypothesis of formalist literary theory from its beginnings until contemporary appraisals. In spite of this, there seems to have been very little discussion of what should be understood by structure in this case, and what type of organization we should be looking for. Any type of organization obviously involves connections between individual elements, but what counts as a connection, or how the relationship between the connected elements should be approached is not self-evident. *Structure* itself is an architectural metaphor conventionally applied to language and human phenomena. It has strong connotations of permanent, hierarchical organization.

4.3.1 Hasan's framework for the study of verbal art

In her framework (another building metaphor) for the study of verbal art, Hasan (1985:90-106) does not use the concept of structure, but sees the significance of foregrounding as residing in its consistency. Consistency means that the foregrounded patterns of phonetic, grammatical and lexical elements in a text are further patterned so that foregrounding globally has a stable semantic direction, that all the patterns point towards the same general kind of meaning. Pattern (a metaphor that originates in the domain of crafts) as a concept is not discussed, it seems to involve repetition and a degree of regularity. According to Hasan (1985:96), the significance of foregrounding thus relies on its semantic consequence, i.e. on its part in the articulation of the meanings of the text. Hasan

understands verbal art as involving two levels of semiosis: the first is the result of the use of the semiotic system of natural language, the second is the product of the artistic system through foregrounding and repatterning of the first order meanings. The art of verbal art consists of the use of language in such a way that the second order semiosis, which forms the deepest thematic level of meaning in a text, becomes possible. Hasan sees this second order semiosis, or the stratum of symbolic articulation, as essentially metaphorical in nature. Seeing meaning in literature as conveyed by metaphorical processes, where the whole work is s source for a target of general concerns, is by no means unique to Hasan: Lakoff and Turner (1989:146-148) call it global second-order metaphorical reading; Gibbs (1999: 40-41) distinguishes metaphoric processing of literature, that can be applied to any kind of situation and language, from processing actual metaphors. For a contextualized example of metaphoric processing, see section 5.2.6.

Hasan's account of the nature of the two levels of semiosis involved in the reading of literary texts is not entirely coherent. She proposes that the two levels of semiosis are analogous and have a similar interior design. The first order semiotic system of language involves the levels of phonology, lexico-grammar and semantics, and the second order semiotic system of literary texts the levels of verbalisation, symbolic articulation and theme. The stratum of verbalisation sums up the import of the three levels of primary semiosis and leads through the level of symbolic articulation to the stratum of theme that is ". . . a generalisation, which can be viewed as a hypothesis about some aspect of life of social man." (Hasan 1985:97). The level of symbolic articulation is thus presented as analogous to the lexico-grammar of the linguistic system. Seeing linguistic semiosis and the formation of thematic meanings in a literary text as analogous processes in this way seems an overextension of the structuralist linguistic model, and also contradictory in terms of what Hasan proposes herself. If indeed the second order semiosis is metaphoric in nature, it has to be qualitatively different from the phonological and grammatical systems of language, that are not metaphorical processes, but based on representation through conventional arbitrary signs. Compared to defamiliarization, Hasan's symbolic articulation is less rich as a concept since it does not include emotion. It also seems more collective in its content and motivation than defamilarization which gives more prominence to the individuality of the reader.

4.3.2 Goatly's framework of interrelated metaphors

 In Hasan's framework, metaphors are mentioned as a foregrounding device, but examples of patterns formed by metaphors are not discussed. Goatly (1997: 255-282) provides a discussion of types of interrelations between metaphors in literary texts that is based on an analysis of *Macbeth* by Shakespeare, *Paradise Lost* by Milton, *The Rainbow* by D. H. Lawrence and six early novels of William Golding. Goatly's analysis consists of tracing semantic paths along which metaphors seem to enter into contact. He conceptualizes seven different relationships that two or several metaphors can hold through their sources and targets, and three processes that can complicate these relationships. (Goatly uses the terms *vehicle* and *topic*; I will pertain to *source* and *target* for the sake of unity.) The concepts have been created in view of building a framework for describing the interplay of metaphors as a level of foregrounding that contributes to the articulation of the thematic level of meaning in literary texts, much in the vein of Hasan's framework presented above. Goatly's presentation, however, does not provide analyses of text, but only examples of each relationship involving no more than three metaphors.

The first of Goatly's relations is Repetition (Goatly 1997: 256-258), which occurs when the same source-term is used with same target-term more than once. The second relation, Modification (Goatly 1997: 261-264), resembles Repetition, only the source-terms are not identical but connected through synonymy, polysemy, hyponymy or superordinacy, or then they are members of the same lexical set. Relationship three and four, Diversification and Multivalency, form a complementary pair. In Diversification (Goatly 1997: 259-261) the target remains the same, but the source-terms are different. Multivalency (Goatly 1997: 258-259) is the reverse case where the same source is mapped onto several targets. The fifth relation of Extension (Goatly 1997: 264-269) occurs when the source-terms of several metaphors are members of the same lexical set or semantic field, and the targets of these metaphors belong to another distinct lexical set or semantic domain. When there is a syntactic link between the source-terms, the relationship is called Articulated Extension. Mixing (Goatly 1997: 269-271) as well is a subcategory of Extension. In a sense it is Articulated Extension gone amiss, since

the two source-terms are made to articulate even if their real-world referents can contract no such relationship to each other. In some cases this is involuntary, and the result easily ludicrous or confused, but mixing can also be used consciously for artistic effect.

The three processes that Goatly mentions as complicating the above basic relationships are Literalization, Overdescription and Compounding. Literalization (Goatly 1997: 272-279) occurs when a lexical item is used literally at one point in a text, and as a source-term at another. Literalization need not be verbatim, but can involve items that are related through synonymy, hyponymy or superordinacy. Reversal is a special case of Literalization where the sources and targets of two metaphors remain the same, but exchange roles. The process of Overdescription (Goatly 1997: 279-280) refers to a proliferation of descriptive detail in a text that seems unnecessary for the development of the plot, the setting a or the characters. In Compounding (Goatly 1997: 271-272), two metaphors are interlocked by the source of an already established metaphor becoming the target of a new one. Goatly points out on several occasions that the limits between the seven types of relation between metaphors are not always clear. He is also ambiguous about the status of Compounding: he first classifies it as a complicating process (1997:256), but later analyses it as a category of interrelation (1997: 271-272).

5 INTERRELATED METAPHORS

The aim of the analysis of metaphors in *The God of Small Things* within this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the novel, but rather to study and develop tools for interpreting literary texts. In the present case, this means studying whether the concepts proposed by Goatly are useful for describing the interconnectedness of foregrounded metaphors in the text, and whether these connections are regular or organized in a way that provides a further level of foregrounding. *The God of Small Things* was chosen as a text because its apparent abundance of metaphors promises sufficient material for the analysis. Even if the aim of the study is not interpretation, this does not mean that there will be no interpretation of the text. Interpretation is inevitable and necessary, and is not possible to look at the text from the 'outside'. Our ongoing

interpretations of the text while reading will necessarily influence our subsequent perceptions. This naturally includes the perception of metaphors and their meaning in the unfolding text.

With the above purposes in mind, Goatly's framework of metaphoric interplay will be simplified by excluding the syntactic element in it. Only the six purely semantic relations will be considered: Repetition, Modification, Diversification, Multivalency, Extension, and Literalization. Literalization is about the connections between the metaphorical and the literal levels of the text, rather than about connecting individual metaphors. Goatly (1997:276-279) sees the most important effect of Literalization to be that the presence of a lexical item both on the literal level, and as a source-term of a metaphor, gives symbolic status to the schema that the lexical item refers to. This can be interpreted as a type of foregrounding that can lead to symbolic interpretation. Another function attributed to Literalization by Goatly (1997: 276-277) is revitalization of conventionalized metaphors, or of inactive metaphors as he calls them. The occurrence of a literal lexical item near a conventional metaphor where this item, or an item belonging to the same lexical set or semantic field, figures as a source-term, makes the metaphor more manifest. It can be said that the Literalization thus re-foregrounds the conventionalized metaphor. Since the concept of Literalization touches the dimensions of foregrounding and conventionality, a factor that emerged in the analysis of metaphor and defamiliarization in section 4.2.2, it will be included among the relationships to be studied. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of lexicalized and unlexicalized metaphors in a literary text, the concept of Literalization promises to help delineate metaphor as compared to literary symbol, a subject that has not yet been discussed within the present work.

The analysis of metaphors in the *The God of Small Things* was conducted by closely reading the text, and extracting from it one by one all unlexicalized metaphors. The lexicalization of the source terms was checked in the New Oxford Dictionary of English on CD-Rom (2000). In addition to conventional metaphors, non-metaphorical comparisons and metonymies (see section 4.2.4) were excluded. Each unlexicalized metaphor was then tabulated with separate columns for the source and target terms, and the general semantic domains of the sources and targets, and a fifth column for marking perceived relationships between individual metaphors. Some 650 cases were initially tabulated in this way, even if on

reanalysis a part of them was judged to be closer to literal comparisons and various metonymies than to metaphor. The remaining cases were scrutinized for the semantic interrelationships defined above.

After a short presentation of the storyline and characters of *The God of Small Things* in section 5.1 , examples of interrelations between metaphors in the text, discovered within the analytical process described above,   will be given within section 5.2 with some consideration of their textual functions. The dynamics of conventional and unconventional metaphors in the text with respect to foregrounding will be discussed in section 5.3. The analysis will culminate in section 5.4 with a case study of how a conception of human mind, memory and identity is constructed in the novel through interrelated metaphors.

5.1 *The God of Small Things*

The God of Small Things (1997) tells the story of an upper class, upper caste Syrian Christian family in the state of Kerala in south-western India. The narrative begins as Rahel, aged 31, returns to the family home in the village of Ayemenem in the early 1990s to rediscover her twin brother Estha, and the memories of the few weeks in December 1969 that changed her life, and led ultimately to her separation from her mother and brother. The crux of the tragedy, the drowning of their visiting half-English cousin Sophie is revealed already in the opening pages, but the circumstances and the full meaning of the tragic events only gradually unfold as the narrative shuttles back and forth between the present and the past.

The narrative is primarily conveyed through the mind of a child, especially Rahel, interlaced with the point of view of an omniscient narrator. Alongside with the primary plot, the other characters in the novel get their stories told, the personal concerns of each mingled with larger social and historical issues. The other characters are defined through their relationship with the protagonists, Rahel and Estha. There is Ammu the mother (name never disclosed); Baba (name not given either) the Hindu father whom Ammu has divorced because of alcoholism; Mammachi (Shoshamma Ipe) and Pappachi (Benaan John Ipe) the maternal grandmother and -father; Baby Kochamma (Navomi Ipe) the grand-aunt; Chacko the maternal uncle; Margaret Kochamma (Chacko's divorced English wife); and Sophie Mol the cousin (daughter of Chacko and Margaret).

Estha and Rahel's world begins to unravel on the day that Margaret Kochamma and Sophie Mol arrive from England to spend Christmas with the Ipe family. During a visit to the cinema before collecting the visitors from the airport, Estha is sexually abused by a refreshment vendor. He is overcome with feelings of shame and guilt. The night of Margaret and Sophie's arrival coincides with the beginning of a love affair between Ammu and Velutha, the family's untouchable paravan carpenter and a close friend of the twins. Their secret affair is a dangerous transgression of traditional caste distinctions.

As the family's attention centres around the white child from England, Estha and Rahel feel even more rejected and unloved than before. Their mother Ammu has the despicable status of a divorced daughter within the family, and she lives on sufferance with her children in the Ayemenem household. Because of their feeling of being unloved exacerbated by Sophie's arrival, and on account of what happened at the cinema, the twins come to the conclusion that 'anything can happen to anyone', and start to prepare for an escape. On the verandah of a long-abandoned house on the other side of the river Menaachal, they make themselves a home away from home. They cross the river with an old boat they have found and repaired; Ammu and Velutha use the same boat at night to reach the same verandah.

After two weeks the love affair is revealed and the shocked family locks Ammu up in her room. In her rage Ammu shouts at her children through the door to go away. Convinced that not even Ammu loves them any longer they decide to run away, and Sophie Mol goes with them. The river is swollen with a storm, the boat is capsized and Sophie drowns. Distressed and panic-stricken, the twins eventually reach the verandah of the old house and fall asleep, not realizing that an exhausted Velutha banished by Mammachi has also taken refuge there. The twins are woken up the next morning by a posse of policemen beating up Velutha. The police has been summoned by Baby Kochamma who accuses Velutha of raping Ammu, kidnapping the children and murdering Sophie Mol. After the beating the police inspector realizes that there has been a mistake. He knows that Velutha will soon die in his cell and fears for his position. He threatens Baby Kochamma with prosecution for giving false evidence, and presents her with the choice of either Ammu filing a complaint against Velutha for raping her, or the children identifying Velutha as their kidnapper. Baby Kochamma deludes Estha

and Rahel into believing that the only way of saving Ammu and themselves from being sent to prison is to falsely denounce Velutha, which Estha volunteers to do. Chacko is beside himself with grief for losing his daughter and throws Ammu out of the house. Estha is sent away to live with his father, Rahel stays at the Ayemenem house to wait for Ammu to get a job so that she can support her children. She never manages to do this, and dies from an attack of asthma alone in a cheap lodge, aged 32.

The twins, aged seven at the time of the tragedy, do not fully understand what really happened and why, and who was responsible. They are more or less left to their own devices to grapple with the trauma and the guilt for the deaths of Velutha and Sophie Mol. Consequently they never really grow up emotionally. Estha has ceased to talk and lives in a world of his own, Rahel drifts around feeling empty. The story is essentially presented and structured through Rahel's attempts to remember and reconstruct the past, to take and heal what she can.

Arundhati Roy, born in 1961, grew up in Kerala. She trained as an architect at the Delhi School of Architecture, and has also worked as a screenwriter. Her debut novel *The God of Small Things* won the Booker McConnell prize in 1997. This novel was chosen for the analysis In addition to her novel, Arundhati Roy has published two works of nonfiction, *The Cost of Living* and *Power Politics.*

5.2 Realisations of Goatly's categories in the text

5.2.1 Repetition

The God of Small Things contains some verbatim repetition of metaphors both in close proximity:

> (23) The congregation gathered around the coffin, and <u>the yellow church</u> **swelled like a throat** with the sound of sad singing. (5)

> (24) The sad singing started again and they sang the same sad verse twice. And once more <u>the yellow church</u> **swelled like a throat with voices**.(6),

and at distances that make the same metaphor span nearly the whole of the text:

> (25) Over the years as the memory of Sophie Mol . . . slowly faded, <u>the</u>

Loss of Sophie Mol **grew robust and alive**. It was always there. **Like a fruit in season**. **Every season. As permanent as a Government job**. It ushered Rahel through childhood (from school to school) into womanhood. (16)

(26) Sophie put the presents into her go-go bag, and went forth into the world. To drive a hard bargain. To negotiate a friendship. A friendship that, unfortunately, would be left dangling. Incomplete. Flailing in the air with no foothold. A friendship that never circled around into a story, which is why, far more quickly than ever should have happened, Sophie Mol became a Memory, while the Loss of Sophie Mol **grew robust and alive. Like a fruit in season. Every season.** (267)

In addition to obviously emphasising crucial events in the story, the repetitions at a distance have a unifying effect on the narrative. They counterbalances the fragmented, nonlinear structure of the novel.

In *The God of Small Things*, much more common than the above kind of verbatim reiteration, is a phenomenon that could maybe be called lexicalizing repetition. It is similar to the general process of word formation in human language through the conventionalization of source terms (see section 4.2.2). When a metaphor gets repeated enough times because it is experienced as apt, or it fills a lexical gap in the language in question, the source term gradually starts to stand on its own for the target term it used to represent metaphorically In the fictive world of *The God of Small Things,* this general process appears over and over in a concentrated, contracted form. There is no need for gradual establishment of the metaphor, one instance can be enough. Notice also the considerable distance between the occurrences:

(27) It was raining steadily. Night rain. **That lonely drummer practising his roll long after the rest of the band has gone to bed.** (295)

(28) On the roof of the abandoned factory, **the lonely drummer drummed**. (328)

These lexicalizations can be transient and only be resorted to once, like in the above case, or a few times, or then they can span the whole text like in the case of the History House (see section 5.4).

Here is another set of examples to illustrate the phenomenon:

(29) Screams **died** in them **and floated belly up, like dead fish.** (308)

(30)   Estha and Rahel, **full of fish**, stared back at him. (311)

(31)   **Dead fish floated up** in Estha**. (320)

This lexicalization starts with a simile that maps dead fish that float belly up onto screams of horror that have to be suppressed.   The simile simultaneously revitalizes and   re-foregrounds (see section 5.3) the lexicalized metaphor of <u>screams</u> **died**. A few pages later, being full of fish is used on its own to denote being frightened speechless. The third occurrence describes Estha's feelings when he is presented with the sight of the mutilated Velutha in a police cell. The latter occurrences are interpretable only on account of the first one, together with the context. Comprehending the reiterations requires paying close attention to the text, and sometimes retracing them to their sources. This type of relationship between metaphors helps to create, with sparse linguistic means, an atmosphere of a dense, intimate narrative world that the reader is invited to enter and share.

In the following two instances, the sources stand on their own without the repetition of the targets, but their identification is nevertheless supported by the capitalization and the reference to outfits familiar from an earlier context:

(32)   <u>Rahel</u> looked around her and <u>saw that she was in a</u> **Play**. But **she had only a small part.
        She was just the landscape. A flower perhaps. Or a tree.
        A face in the crowd. A townspeople.** (172)

(33)   **The Townspeople** (in her fairy frock) saw Mammachi draw Sophie Mol close to her eyes to look at her. To read her as a cheque. To check her like a banknote. (174)

       and

(34)   His rumpled shirt was buttoned up wrong. His shoelaces were untied. <u>His hair</u>, carefully brushed and slicked down in front, <u>stood up</u> **in a stiff halo of quills** <u>at the back</u>.   <u>He looked like</u> **a**n untidy**, beatified porcupine**. (241)

(35)   Margaret Kochamma found herself looking forward to the **Rumpled Porcupine's** visit.(244)

(36)   So different from the amused **Rumpled Porcupine** she had met that longago Oxford morning at the café. (263)

Within Goatly's framework of interrelated metaphors, this type of instant lexicalization resembles, in addition to Repetition, the category of Compounding. In Compounding, two metaphors are interlocked by the source of an already established metaphor becoming the target of a new one. In lexicalizing reiteration the source term becomes an independent lexical unit, that could be used as a target term of a new metaphor, but in *The God of Small Things* this is not a recurring practice. In fact I was able to find one single case:

(37) The sound of a thousand voices spread over the **frozen** traffic **like a Noise Umbrella.** (65)

(38) Steelshrill police whistles **pierced holes in the Noise Umbrella. Through the jagged umbrella holes** Rahel could see pieces of red sky. (79)

5.2.2 Modification

Modification is akin to both Repetition and to Diversification, and it is not always clear whether the source terms are to be considered identical, modified or separate. Very close range Modification is obviously the result of searching for a source term to apply to a target that has special characteristics and is not easy to describe. Here the source term is made up of the superordinate **dormancy,** its hyponym **aestivation** and a specifying simile involving **lungfish**:

(39) Yet Estha's silence was never awkward. Never intrusive. Never noisy. It wasn't an accusing, protesting silence as much as **a sort of aestivation, a dormancy**, **the psychological equivalent of what lungfish do to get them through the dry season,** except that in Estha's case the **dry season** looked as though it would last for ever. (10)

Notice also the immediate lexicalization of **dry season** to refer to Estha's silence as an independent term. Immediate modification can also contribute to the richness of the overall visual image as in:

(40) A banana flower sheathed in claret bracts hung from a scruffy, torn-leafed tree. **A gem held out by a grubby schoolboy. A jewel in the velvet jungle.** (305)

where the Modification by quasi synonym **A jewel in the velvet jungle** implies

that the jungle is a jewellery box lined with green velvet that contains objects of jewel-like beauty. In cases of more distant Modification, the motivation can be approaching a central element in the narrative (here the violence of rain) in slightly different terms, thus avoiding exact repetition, but still clearly reinforcing its importance:

> (41) It was raining when Rahel came back to Ayemenem. **Slanting silver ropes** slammed into loose earth**, ploughing it up like gunfire**.(1)

> (42) It hadn't changed, the June Rain.
> Heaven opened and the water hammered down, reviving the reluctant old well, green mossing the pigless pigsty, **carpet bombing** still, tea-coloured puddles the way memory bombs still, tea-coloured minds. The grass looked wetgreen and pleased. Happy earthworms frolicked purple in the slush. Green nettles nodded. Trees bent. (10)

5.2.3 Diversification

The functioning of close range Diversification resembles that of close range Modification, only Diversification describes aspects of the target that are not closely related like in the case of Modification:

> (43) And Ammu's angry eyes on Estha said, *All right. Later.*
> And Later became a horrible, menacing, **goose-bumpy word.**
> Lay.Ter.
> **Like a deep-sounding bell in a mossy well. Shivery, and furred. Like moth's feet.** (145-146)

As an example of diversification in *The God of Small Things,* consider the series of source-terms for silence that starts with example 39, and continues as follows:

> (44) Once the quietness arrived, it stayed and spread in Estha. **It reached out of his head and enfolded him in its swampy arms.** It rocked him to the rhythm of an ancient, foetal heartbeat. **It sent its stealthy, suckered tentacles inching along the insides of his skull, hoovering the knolls and dells of his memory, dislodging old sentences, whisking them off the tip of his tongue. It stripped his thoughts of the words that described them and left them pared and naked. Unspeakable. Numb.** And to an observer therefore, perhaps barely there. Slowly, over the years, Estha withdrew from the world. He grew accustomed to **the uneasy octopus that lived inside him and squirted its inky tranquillizer on his past**. Gradually the reason for

his silence was hidden away, **entombed somewhere in the soothing folds of the fact of it**. (11)

(45) The silence **sat between grand-niece and baby aunt like a third person**. **A stranger. Swollen. Noxious**. (21)

(46) Silence filled the car **like a saturated sponge**.(70)

(47) Silence **hung in the air like secret loss**. (91)

(48) The silence **gathered its skirts and slid, like Spiderwoman, up the slippery bathroom wall**. (93)

(49) And Ousa the Bar Nowl watched the pickle-smelling silence that lay between the twins **like a bruise**. (198)

(50) In the factory the silence **swooped down once more and tightened around the twins.** But this time it was a different kind of silence. **An old river silence. The silence of Fisher People and waxy mermaids.** (200)

(51) The silence **dipped and soared and swooped and looped in figures of eight**.(202)

(52) 'And all our food is spoiled,' Rahel said to Sophie Mol and was met with a silence. **A rushing, rolling, fishswimming** silence. (293)

(53) The Inspector asked his question. Estha's mouth said Yes.
Childhood tiptoed out.
Silence **slid in like a bolt.** (320)

Judging by this proliferation of source-terms, silence is obviously a thematically central element in the novel. There are different kinds of silence, thus the need for diverse source terms to describe them. Silence is never empty, but always impregnated with content and meaning.

5.2.4 Multivalency

Above, in example 52, **rushing, rolling, fishswimming** acts as a diversified source term for silence. When considered in the context of another metaphor, it appears as a multivalent source for two different targets:

(54) Though you couldn't see the river from the house any more, **like a seashell always has a sea-sense,** the Ayemenem house **still had a**

river-sense.
A rushing, rolling, fishswimming sense. (30)

A straightforward and compact example of Multivalency is provided by the description below of the von Trapp family in *The Sound of Music* that Estha and Rahel saw in a cinema in Cochin. It is effective in emphasising the flawless cleanness and orderliness of the film family's life (everything is uniformly **peppermint**), as compared to Estha and Rahel's ambivalent and precarious reality.

> (55)   Captain von Trapp's seven **peppermint** <u>children</u> had had their **peppermint** <u>baths</u>, and were standing in a **peppermint** <u>line</u> with their hair slicked down, singing in obedient **peppermint** <u>voices</u> to the woman the Captain nearly married. The blonde Baroness who shone like a diamond. (110)

Multivalency is obviously an apt tool for drawing parallels between different narrative elements in a linguistically economical manner. Consider the following example that gives rise to complex and rich implications:

> (56) It hadn't changed, <u>the June **Rain.**</u>
> Heaven opened and the <u>water</u> **hammered down**, reviving the **reluctant** <u>old well</u>, green mossing the pigless pigsty, **carpet bombing** <u>still, tea-coloured puddles</u> **the way** <u>memory</u> **bombs still, tea-coloured** <u>minds.</u> The grass looked wetgreen and pleased. Happy earthworms frolicked purple in the slush. Green nettles nodded. Trees bent. (10)

In this passage **bombing** is used as a multivalent source-term both for the action of raining and the action of remembering. This creates an equivalence between the two activities that in a way complements or even overrides the simile whereby <u>rain</u> is seen in terms of **remembering,** so that the metaphor primarily feels like that of <u>remembering</u> in terms of **rain**, or then the relationship is symmetrically bidirectional. This case obviously contests the unidirectionality of metaphorical mappings that is a claim of conceptual metaphor theory (see sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4).

The equivalence created between rain and memory allows us to see both activities as simultaneously beneficial and painful. Rain is reviving for the nature but torrential downpour can be as violent as bombing; remembering forgotten things revives the mind but memories can be painful. This equivalence allows us to map rain onto memory, puddle onto mind, **reluctant** well onto mind that both

wants to and does not want to remember, the depth of wells onto the depth of memory (you can not see to the bottom, or remember everything), a dried up useless well onto a mind that cannot remember vital things, opaque water onto oblivion, clear water onto remembrance, green vegetation onto mental health etc., or vice versa. Lexically, the polysemy of *still* supports the rain- memory equation, ie. oblivious minds undisturbed by memories and thoughts inspired by remembrance are still and silent as there is nothing to say, like puddles are undisturbed and quiet when it is not raining. On a more general level, this metaphor establishes a connection between the setting of the novel in humid tropical nature and one of its central themes, that of the nature of human memory: Rahel who observes the violent monsoon rain has returned to Ayemenem to remember and understand the violent and traumatic events of her childhood. Notice how the foregrounding of these elements is supported by an additional relationship of Modification between examples 41 and 42, and a relationship of Extension (discussed in section 5.2.5) with example 39, where **dry season** figures as a source for silence caused by amnesia, and the example below where **flood** is used as a source for suddenly remembering forgotten things and the confusion and noise caused by this in the mind.

> (57) It had been quiet in Estha's head until Rachel came. But with her she had brought the sound of passing trains, and the light and shade that falls on you if you have a window seat. **The world, locked out for years, suddenly flooded in,** and now Estha couldn't hear himself for the noise. Trains. Traffic. Music. The Stock Market. **A dam had burst and savage waters swept everything up in a swirling**. Comets, violins, parades, loneliness, clouds, beards, bigots, lists, flags, earthquakes, despair were all swept up in a scrambled **swirling.** (14-15)

5.2.5 Extension

> (58) It could be argued that it began long before <u>Christianity</u> arrived in a boat and **seeped** into Kerala **like tea from a teabag**. (33)

> (59) The marxists worked from within the communal divides, never challenging them, never appearing not to. They offered **a cocktail <u>revolution</u>. A heady mixture** of Eastern Marxism and orthodox Hinduism**, spiked with a shot** of democracy. (67)

> (60) Kochu Maria could not stop wearing her kunukku because if she did,

> how would people know that despite her lowly cook's job (seventy-five rupees a month) she was a Syrian Christian, Mar Thomite? Not a Pelaya, or a Pulaya, or a Paravan. But a Touchable, upper-caste Christian (into whom <u>Christianity</u> **had seeped like tea from a teabag)**. (170)

These three metaphors are part of an Extension in Goatly's categorisation of interrelated metaphors: the source terms and the target terms respectively belong to the same semantic field, in this case those of drinks and ideologies. How much we can include within one Extension, depends on how far we can justifiably stretch a semantic field. The following two metaphors could be claimed to be part of the above Extension on the grounds that political and religious ideologies belong to the same semantic domain as human feelings, because actual manifestations of ideologies are often much more emotional than rational:

(61)   Cardamom Kings, Coffee Counts and Rubber Barons - old boarding school buddies - came down from their lonely, far-flung estates and sipped chilled beer at the Sailing Club. Thy raised their glasses. *'A rose by any other name . . .'* they said, and sniggered to hide their rising panic.
The marchers that day were party workers, students, and the labourers themselves. Touchables and Untouchables. **On their shoulders they carried a keg of ancient** <u>anger</u>, lit with a recent fuse. There was an edge to this <u>anger</u> that was Naxalite, and new.(69)

(62) And so, behind the Refreshment Counter, in the Abhilash Talkies Princess Circle lobby, in the hall with Kerala's first 70mm CinemaScope screen, Esthappen Yako finished his **free bottle of fizzed, lemon-flavoured** <u>fear</u>. His lemontoolemon, too cold. Too sweet. The fizz came up his nose. He would be given another bottle soon (free, **fizzed** <u>fear</u>). (105)

That **keg** in example 61 should refer to beer (as well as to an explosive matter), is suggested by the immediate literal co-text where chilled beer is associated with fear and panic. In fact a complex of implications and connections is created here: kegs usually contain beer, but could also carry gun powder, which is explosive like ideologies and human emotions can be. It is the **keg** of beer/gunpowder/anger on a communist march that brings all the three elements of drink, feeling and ideology together. Another possible interpretation for the relationship between all the metaphors would be Multivalency: drinks are used as a multivalent source for the targets of ideologies and feelings, thus pointing out that feelings and ideologies

share common ground in human psychology. If we wish to seek for the motivation or grounds behind these metaphors, one possibility might be that feelings and ideologies permeate our psyches and become an inseparable part of us in a manner comparable to the way drinks spread into and permeate our bodies. Drinks, obviously, are liquids, and this offers another point of contact with metaphors like

> (63) Occasionally, when Ammu listened to songs that she loved on the radio, **something stirred inside her**. **A liquid ache spread under her skin**, and she walked out of the world like a witch, to a better, happier place.(44),

where a feeling of longing and restlessness is described as a liquid ache spreading under the skin. Taken together, all these metaphors could maybe be generalized by <u>feelings</u> **are liquids**. Here are three more examples that fit the pattern:

> (64) <u>Fear</u> **fermented in her and the spit in her mouth turned sour.** (314)

> (65) She managed that by doing what she was best at. **Irrigating her fields, nourishing her crops with** <u>other people's passions</u>**.** (321)

> (66) Slowly <u>the terror</u> **seeped back into him.** At what he had done. At what he knew he would do again. And again. (337)

Metaphors, too, seem to be happy to spread like liquids. If we stretch the semantic limits a little, the following cases could be included within the same Extension **(a damp, clammy cheroot** is obviously not a liquid , but it is saturated with liquid):

> (67) Velutha's father, Vellya Paapen, however, was an Old World Paravan. He had seen the Crawling Backwards Days and <u>his gratitude</u> to Mammachi and her family for all that they had done for him, **was as wide and deep as a river in spate**. (76).

> (68) <u>Baby Kochamma's fear</u> **lay rolled up on the car floor like a damp, clammy cheroot.** . . . Hers, too, was an ancient, age-old fear. The fear of being dispossessed.   (70)

> (69) Estha sat up and watched. His stomach **heaved.** He had a **greenwavy, thick-watery, lumpy, seaweedy, floaty, bottomless-bottomful** <u>feeling</u>. '<u>Feeling vomity,</u>' Estha said. (107)

In the last one of these examples, <u>feeling</u> seems to refer to a physical sensation

rather than an emotion, but the larger context makes it clear that the cause of the nausea is psychological, i.e. a feeling of repulsion and fear.

Another type of configuration that could be called an extended metaphor, but is not covered by Goatly's concept of Extension, is exemplified in this scene that takes place in a cinema bathroom between a nauseated Estha and his mother:

> (70)   He was held up, wedged between the notclean basin and Ammu's body. Legs dangling. <u>The basin had</u> steel taps, and rust stains. And <u>a brownwebbed mesh of hairline cracks</u>, **like the roadmap of some great, intricate city**.
>   Estha convulsed, but nothing came. Just <u>thoughts</u>. **And they floated out and floated back in.** Ammu couldn't **see** them. **They hovered like storm clouds over the Basin City. But the basin men and basin women went about their usual basin business. Basin cars, and basin busses, still whizzes around. Basin Life went on.** (108)

Here an innocent looking simile grows into a linguistically compact metaphoric representation of a decisive experience in a child's life. We are not dealing with interrelated metaphors, but rather with one extensive metaphor. Its interpretation and import essentially depends on the integration of what is explicitly stated with co-textual and general world knowledge. This is clearly a case that is not accountable in terms of a two-space projection alone, as proposed by conceptual metaphor theory. A more complex model that, in addition to the source and target domains, recruits various knowledge structures and integrates them into a whole is needed, in the vein of the blending framework that is under development within cognitive linguistics (see section 3.3.4).

First a city is established as a source-term for the wash basin of the cinema bathroom through the simile of the hairline cracks in the basin resembling a roadmap of a city. Starting from this, we can map the clouds over the city on Estha's thoughts at the basin, the storm clouds over the city on Estha's mental turmoil at the basin, the City people's life undisturbed by the storm on Ammu's failure to realize the cause of Estha's nausea. The co-textual knowledge needed to interpret the metaphor includes that Estha has been sexually abused by the Refreshment Counter attendant in the lobby of the cinema, and is overcome by feelings of repulsion. To realize its full potential, the metaphor needs interaction with general world knowledge: small children often have the impression that their mothers are able to read their minds (which is a source of both annoyance and a

feeling of safety), and that mothers are absolutely able to tell good from bad. In this situation Estha suddenly comes to the realization that neither is true, as Ammu does not see his perturbation for what it is, and moreover mistakes the abuser for a kind person when she talks to him. The extensive metaphor is both conceptually and linguistically unconventional, which makes its interpretation even more context dependent than usual.

5.2.6 Literalization, metaphor and symbol

Literalization is about systematic connections between the metaphorical and the literal levels of the text. According to Goatly (section 4.3.2), Literalization occurs when a lexical item is used literally at one point in a text, and as a source-term at another. Literalization need not be verbatim, but can involve items that are related through synonymy, hyponymy or superordinacy. Here is a small scale compact example:

> (71) He began to look wiser than he really was. **Like a fisherman in a city. With sea-secrets in him.** . . . Some days he walked along the banks of the river that smelled of shit, and pesticides bought with World Bank loans. Most of the fish had died. The ones that survived suffered from fin-rot and had broken out in boils. (13)

In the *God of Small Things,* there is extensive Literalization within the semantic field of phenomena connected with water. The setting of the novel is a village by the river Menaachal in tropical Kerala on the Malabar Coast of the Arabian sea, which provides the literal level of elements connected with water. The same lexical items are copiously used as source terms of metaphors: rain, river, sea, pools, ponds, fish, fishermen, swimming, drowning, bubbles, fountains, froth, boats, octopuses. The characters - fat as whales or puffy with oedema - drift and float through their lives, cars have tailfins and sharksmiles, and the walls of buildings bulge with dampness that seeps from the ground. The effect is not so much the foregrounding of elements connected with water, as that of a deluge, and the foreground soon turns into a backdrop. What seems most significant in this particular case is the overwhelming weight of the mass. Analysing each individual metaphor separately and trying to connect them all systematically would not work here, there are simply too many metaphors and too many

connections. There are, nevertheless, significant sub-groups within the semantic domain of water, as we have already seen: silence in terms of drought (section 5.2.2), memory in terms of rain (section 5.2.4) and feelings in terms of liquids (section 5.2.5).

As was mentioned earlier in section 4.3.2, Goatly sees symbolization as one of the main functions of extensive Literalization: it gives symbolic status to the schema that the lexical items refer to. As a basic element necessary for human existence, water as such has symbolic value in mythological and spiritual traditions universally. Its 'meaning' within *The God of Small Things* remains very general, and essentially dual, it is in a sense like life itself. Water is the origin of the luxuriant, nourishing tropical nature, the fish in the river and the abundant fruit and crops. But it is also destructive through torrential rain and flooding that causes the death by drowning of one of the characters. Water is fruitful and life-giving, but the 'noxious swolleness' of the whole setting caused by humidity also evokes connotations of decay, and can be read as symbolizing the social and moral decay of the Ipe family.

The abundance of water on both the literal and the metaphorical levels of the narrative contributes to a general atmosphere of blurring of boundaries in the fictive world. Water as a natural element floods, seeps and saturates irrespective of boundaries. Also the very proliferation of metaphor, a case of semantic transgression (see section 4.1.2), in the language of the novel intensifies the foregrounding of one of the main themes, that of transgression and crossing of cultural and social boundaries. This general questioning of acceptable limits is also connected to the dominant narrative point of view of a child. Children of seven are supposed to be learning social and cultural limits from adults. The example that the Ipe family sets for Rahel and Estha is a confusing mix of rigidity and chaos.

Other semantic fields that are involved in Literalization in *The God of Small Things* include buildings, insects and fruit. These are not nearly as prolific as the water element. The building domain will be discussed in depth in section 5.4. Of the other two, I will give a few examples here that will illustrate differences between metaphor, metaphorical reading and symbol.

The literal level of the fruit domain is provided by the fact that the Ipe family runs a small pickle factory on the premises of the ancestral home. Paradise Pickles

produces pickles, jams and squashes from local fruit and vegetables. There are elements in the text that make possible a metaphorical reading (see section 4.3.1) of the whole activity of producing preserves that the family is occupied with, that is not dependent on individual metaphors, even if they may act as foregrounding signposts. The upper middle class Ipe family is on the decline, both socially and economically. All the members have failed in a way or another in their aspirations, the future is uncertain. The characters, incapable of transforming their lives, are merely enduring them, waiting on hold like pickle in a jar:

> (72) <u>Ammu</u> looked at herself in the long mirror on the bathroom door and **the spectre of her** <u>future</u> appeared in it to mock <u>her</u>. **Pickled.** Grey. Rheumy-eyed. (222)

> (73) And what Ammu knew (or thought she knew), smelled of the vapid, vinegary fumes that rose from the cement vats of Paradise Pickles. Fumes that wrinkled youth and **pickled** <u>futures</u>. (224)

Everyone seems to be in some kind of jam: Pappachi is embittered by his frustrated professional ambitions; Mammachi is a multi talented woman oppressed by a jealous and abusive husband; Baby Kochamma's chances for a respectable status (i.e. marriage), were ruined by unrequited love for a Jesuit priest; Ammu and her children, fatherless waifs from an broken intercommunity love marriage, live on sufferance in the ancestral home; Chacko's marriage to his English wife has failed, and in spite of his education he is hopelessly incompetent in running the family business. The family has its dark secrets, sealed and put away like pickles. They cannot stop these secrets from being revealed little by little to the community, like Mammachi is incapable of stopping her pickle jars from leaking in spite of her best efforts:

> (74) . . . Then she dictated a letter to Annamma Chandy's brother-in-law, who was the Regional Manager of Padma Pickles in Bombay. He suggested that she increase the proportion of preservative that she used. And the salt. That had helped, but didn't solve the problem entirely. Even now, after all those years, the Paradise Pickles' bottles still leaked a little. It was imperceptible, but they did still leak, and on long journeys their labels became oily and transparent. (167)

The factory also produces 'illegal' banana jam, a metaphor for the transgressions of the family members:

(75)   They used to make pickles, squashes, jams, curry powders and canned pineapples. And banana jam (illegally) after the FPO (Food Products Organization) banned it because according to their specifications it was neither jam nor jelly. Too thin for jelly and too thick for jam. An ambiguous, unclassifiable consistence, they said.
     As per their books.
     Looking back now, to Rahel it seemed as though this difficulty that their family had with classification ran much deeper than the jam-jelly question. (30-31)

There is a tendency in the narrative, based on obvious physical resemblances, to use fruit as source terms for body parts connected with sexuality: **mangoes** and **melons** for breasts, **plums** for bottoms. The effects of the sexual abuse that Estha falls victim to during a visit to the cinema are also described in terms of fruit: **a sticky orange**. Estha feels that his hand where the molester (the Orangedrink Lemondrink man) has ejaculated is squalid, and tries to hold it as far from his body as possible:

(76)   Back inside the the hairoil darkness, Estha held his Other Hand carefully (upwards, **as though he was holding an imagined orange**). He slid past the Audience (their legs moving thiswayandthat), past Baby Kochamma, past Rahel (still tilted back), past Ammu (still annoyed). Estha sat down, still **holding his sticky orange**.(105)

(77)   Oh Captain von Trapp, Captain von Trapp, could you love the little fellow with **the orange** in the smelly auditorium? (106)

(78)   It would have helped if they could have made that crossing. If only they could have worn, even temporarily, the tragic hood of victimhood. Then they would have been able to put a face on it, and conjure up fury at what had happened. Or seek redress. And eventually, perhaps, exorcize the memories that haunted them.
     But anger wasn't available to them and **there was no face to put on this Other Thing that they held in their sticky Other Hands, like an imaginary orange. There was nowhere to lay it down. It wasn't theirs to give away. It would have to be held. Carefully and forever.** (191)

The series of **oranges** starts as a simile for the manner in which Estha holds his hand, it then turns into something that is closer to a symbol than a metaphor. The **sticky orange** becomes a symbol for all the traumatizing experiences that the twins have been subjected to in their childhood. These experiences prevent them

from feeling worthy of love and from growing into adults able to lead satisfying lives. At their return to Ayemenem at the age of 32, the twins are still   unable to fully understand what happened to them and why, who was responsible, and how the past events are connected to the present.   The **sticky orange** is not part of a prototypical metaphor because the configuration lacks the structure of a metaphor; it is not clear how the source could be mapped onto the target, and what the similarities or analogies used or created in the process would be. Metaphor is essentially about understanding things through representation in terms of other things. If that which you have to represent remains largely incomprehensible, prototypical metaphor is not the best tool.

The same analysis applies to **Pappachi's moth** from the semantic domain of insects. It is anchored in the literal narrative world through Pappachi being an entomologist, and through the tropical nature where insects abound. **Pappachi's moth** is first introduced in its literal form, and the adopted and frequently repeated as a symbol of lovelessness and unhappiness in the Ipe family, rather than being a metaphor of it.

(79)　　　His life's greatest setback was not having had the moth that *he* discovered named after him. . . . In the years to come, even though he had been ill-humoured long before he discovered the moth, **Pappachi's Moth** was held responsible for his black moods and sudden bouts of temper. Its pernicious ghost - grey, furry and with unusually dense dorsal tufts - haunted every house that he ever lived in. It tormented him and his children and his children's children. (49)

(80)　　　**A cold moth with unusually dense dorsal tufts landed lightly on Rahel's heart. Where its icy legs touched her, she got goose bumps. Six goose bumps on her careless heart.**
A little less her Ammu loved her.(112)

(81)　　　Of the four things that were Possible in Human Nature, Rahel thought that *Infinnate Joy* sounded the saddest. Perhaps because of the way Chacko said it.
　　　Infinnate Joy. With a church sound to it. Like a sad fish with fins all over.
A cold moth lifted a cold leg. (118)

(82)　　The sight of Baby Kochamma made them suddenly sober. **The moth with unusually dense dorsal tufts spread its wings over both their hearts.** (315)

Where **Pappachi's moth** appears, the narrative point of view is that of a child. The twins as children - unlike the omniscient narrator with adult point of view or the adult reader - are not able to understand the nature of this lovelessness and unhappiness, its roots in the black emotional heritage passed on from generation to generation. They are not able to name the feeling that they feel when they meet this 'thing', or represent it through metaphor that would be a way of comprehension. It is symbolized by a chilly moth that descends on their hearts.

5.3 Conventional, unconventional or revitalized

In section 4.2.2, the scope of the analysis of metaphors and their interrelations within the present chapter was limited to unconventional, unlexicalized metaphors. This delimitation was based on a conceptual analysis of metaphor and some psycholinguistic evidence that indicate that unconventional metaphors have more foregrounding potential than conventionalized ones. On the basis of an analysis of metaphors in *The God of Small Things* this supposition seems to be correct in principle, as linguistically unconventional metaphors on the whole seem to stand out more and attract more attention than lexicalized ones. However, on account of various complicating factors that will be discussed below, differentiating unconventional cases form conventional ones proved less straightforward than expected. Each case has to be considered individually, from the point of view of several factors. The value of this exercise is not in assigning metaphors into absolute categories, but in the careful analysis of each metaphor it necessitates, and in the things it reveals about metaphor and language in general.

Many metaphors that are in principle unconventional according to the criteria that were set up in section 4.2.2 (i.e. the metaphorically extended meaning of the source term has not been registered in a dictionary), have nevertheless clearly had the ground for them prepared by semantically related conventionalized metaphors. Let us begin with two clear-cut examples:

(83)   Cardamom **Kings**, Coffee **Counts** and Rubber **Barons** - old boarding school buddies - came down from their lonely, far-flung estates and sipped chilled beer at the Sailing Club.(69)

Unlike **king** and **baron**, **count** has no lexicalized metaphorical meaning. Embedded in a tight scheme with the other two conventionalized source terms

from the same lexical set, its metaphorical meaning of 'important and powerful person' is nevertheless pre-emptively determined by the metaphorical meaning of the other two, independent of any other factors. If the set is foregrounded, it is because of alliteration, not metaphoricity.

(84) That they would watch with **dinner-plate** <u>eyes</u> as history revealed itself to them in the back verandah. (55)

(85) <u>Estha's eyes</u> were **frightened saucers**. (133)

(86) **<u>Four saucers</u>** stared back at her. Fascinated by the story she was telling them. (317)

(87) Ambassador E. Pelvis. With **saucer-<u>eyes</u>** and a spoiled puff. (319)

(88) Blue-lipped and **dinner-plate-**<u>eyed</u>**,** they watched, mesmerized by something that they sensed but didn't understand: the absence of caprice in what the policemen did. (308)

The way for **dinner-plate-eyed** as a source terms for the facial expression of Estha and Rahel is prepared by the existence of the lexicalized simile *have eyes like saucers*. This 'preparation' does not, however, determine its target which is established contextually. This case can be analysed as an Extension (of a conventional metaphor) in Goatly's framework: saucers and dinner plates belong to the same lexical set, as do being astonished and being astounded. **Dinner-plate-eyed** is thus a novel metaphor the interpretation of which is supported by the existence of a related conventional metaphor. This relationship also revitalizes and re-foregrounds the conventionalized member of the pair, just as the variations on the form do (**frightened saucers, four saucers, saucer-eyes)**. Metaphors do not necessarily lose on their foregrounding value by being related to lexicalized metaphors, but can gain some by the perceived relationship.

A third type of robust platform for new metaphors is provided by proverbs. Proverbs can be analysed as a sub-species of metaphor (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989). Here are three metaphors based on *one can't make an omelette without breaking eggs* with an increasing independence from the original:

(89) He dismissed the <u>whole business</u> as the Inevitable Consequence of Necessary Politics. **The old omelette and eggs thing.** But then, <u>K.N.M. Pillai was essentially a political man</u>. **A professional**

omeletteer. (14)

(90) **He broke the eggs but burned the omelette.** (280)

> Blue-lipped and dinner-plate-eyed**,** they watched, mesmerized by something that they sensed but didn't understand: the absence of caprice in <u>what the policemen did</u>. The abyss where anger should have been. The sober, steady brutality, the economy of it all.
> **They were opening a bottle.**
> **Or shutting a tap.**
> **Cracking an egg to make an omelette.** (308)

The relationships between a conventionalized and a novel metaphor can be viewed from essentially two points of view, sometimes simultaneously: old metaphors can be seen to support the creation and interpretation of new ones, or then novel metaphors can be seen as revitalizing lexicalized ones. Two instances of lexicalized metaphors having their transparence and foregroundedness restored have already been referred to: with **saucer-eyes** and **dinner-plate-eyed** above, and in section 4.2.4 while discussing the functions of simile. Here is another example of how similes can revitalize lexicalized metaphors by specifying them with concretizing detail. In the example below, what is concretized is the origin and grounding of the lexicalized metaphor. Laying bare the roots of a conventionalized   metaphor is   revitalizing   because it exposes the conceptualization of reality that it was based on in the first place.

(91) It appeared to be a civil, solitary form of corruption. And for this very reason, they all agreed (**<u>savouring</u> their teacherly disapproval, touching it with their tongues, sucking it like a sweet**) - all the more serious. (17)

In addition to simile, attribution can be used as a revitalizing technique:

(92) She turned away from the **screaming** steel **<u>bird</u>** in the skyblue sky that had her cousin in it, and what she saw was this: the red-mouthed roos with ruby smiles moved cemently across the airport floor. (139)

(93) But around her, the air was sad, somehow. And behind the smile in her eyes, the <u>Grief</u> was **a fresh, shining <u>blue</u>**. (143)

An interesting example of revitalizing concretization is provided by this case:

(94) As a young woman she had renounced the material world, and now, as an old one, she seemed to **<u>embrace</u>** it. She **<u>hugged</u>** it and **it hugged**

her back. (22)

There are two quasi-synonyms here, *embrace* and *hug*, with quasi-synonymous lexicalized metaphorical extensions. Their juxtaposition, with the creation of a concrete image of two individuals hugging each other by **it hugged her back**, exhibits the grounding of the metaphors and revitalizes them.

It was pointed out above that the relationship of Extension between **dinner-plate-eyed** and **saucer-eyes** revitalized the latter. This can happen to a whole group of lexicalized source-terms if they are combined in an Extension. In this case they call much more attention to themselves than they normally would on their own:

> (95)   Within minutes, the road was **swamped** by thousands of marching people. Automobile **islands** in a **river** of people. The air was red with flags, which dipped and lifted as the marchers ducked under the level crossing gate and swept across the railway tracks in a red **wave.**
>   The sound of a thousand voices spread over the **frozen** traffic like a Noise Umbrella. (65)

This is an extended image metaphor of a political march in terms of a flowing river, evoked in two simple sentences. All the source terms are lexicalized, but the image they form together is so coherent and vivid that the whole is foregrounded. In the image the river bed is mapped onto the road, the water in the river onto the marching people, the waves of water that rise and lower onto the flags of the marchers, the islands on to the cars, frozen water onto traffic standing still, and the potential violence of flowing water onto the potential violence of the marching, angry people. In addition to the Extension, the interpretation and foregrounding of the metaphor is reinforced by the presence of a flooding, violently flowing river on the literal level of the narrative, and by semantic parallels to another Extension discussed in section 5.2.5: feelings in terms of liquids.

Perhaps the most classic technique of revitalization, mentioned by Goatly (1997: 276-277) as one of the effects of Literalization, is using the same or a semantically related lexical item both in a conventionally metaphorical and a literal sense in the immediate co-text. Of these two examples, the latter is a combination of Literalization and concretization discussed earlier in this section:

> (96)   She had a cloth bag with food purloined from the fridge slung across her chest. Bread, cake, biscuits. The twins, **weighed down** by their

mother's words - *If it weren't for you I would be free. I should have dumped you in an orphanage the day you were born. You're the millstones round my neck* - carried nothing .(291)

(97) Slowly the old boat sank, and settled on the sixth step.
And a pair of two-egg twin hearts **sank** and **settled on the step above the sixth.**

As a final example of the relationship of conventional and new elements in metaphors, consider this case:

(98) Ammu gathered up her heavy hair, wrapped it around her face, and peered down the **road** to Age and Death through its parted strand. (223)

It wasn't what lay at the end of her **road** that frightened Ammu as much as the nature of the **road** itself. No milestones marked its progress. No trees grew along it. No dappled shadows shaded it. No mists rolled over it. No birds circled it. No twists, no turns or hairpin bends obscured even momentarily, her clear view of the end. This filled Ammu with an awful dread, because she was not the kind of woman who wanted her <u>future</u> told. She dreaded it too much. So if she were granted one small wish perhaps it would only have been Not to Know. Not to know what each day held in store for her. Not to know where she might be, next month, next year. Ten years on. Not to know which way her **road** might turn and what lay behind the bend. And Ammu knew. Or thought she knew, which was really just as bad (because if in a dream you have eaten fish, it means you've eaten fish). And what Ammu knew (or thought she knew), smelled of the vapid, vinegary fumes that rose from the cement vats of Paradise Pickles. Fumes that wrinkled youth and pickled <u>futures</u>. (224)

That afternoon - while in the bathroom the fates conspired to alter horribly the course of their mysterious mother's **road,** while in Velutha's backyard an old boat waited for them, while in a yellow church a young bat waited to be to be born - in their mother's bedroom, Estha stood on his head on Rahel's bum. (224)

Seven years of oblivion lifted off her and flew into the shadows on weighty, quaking wings. Like a dull, steel peahen. And on Ammu's **Road** (to Age and Death) a small, sunny meadow appeared. Copper grass spangled with blue butterflies. Beyond it, an abyss. (337)

This is an instantiation of a basic conceptual metaphor much discussed within conceptual metaphor theory (see section 3.3.2), LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The basic scheme of an entailment of it, THE FUTURE IS THE ROAD AHEAD, has been used

as a basis of an extended metaphor of Ammu's life and future. The new elements that have been filled in are those of an eventless life as a straight road with no bends or landmarks, a happy period in an otherwise dreary life as a sunny meadow that appears by the road, and annihilation as an abyss at the end of a straight road.

This is also a paradigm example to illustrate Lakoff and Turner's (1989) claim that most poetic metaphors are extensions or elaborations of basic metaphors, and that this grounding in conventional conceptual metaphor is the source of their power and easy accessibility. This is undoubtedly true in many cases, but by no means in all, as has already been seen within the present work. Earlier in section 4.2.3, I objected to Lakoff and Turner's denial of the importance of an original and innovative linguistic form in metaphors as 'mere language'; the only important level in their opinion being the conceptual level. The revitalization of metaphors discussed above offers a new perspective on the matter. Just as much as linguistically novel metaphors need conventional conceptual grounding to give them depth and resonance in our minds, linguistic innovation is needed to keep our basic metaphors in life. The basic, conventional metaphorical concepts of a culture have no life and real existence as abstractions, they only exist as they are reproduced and renewed in the use of language This is what culture and the passing on of cultural traditions is about: the constant reproduction, modification and development of basic concepts. By foregrounding age-old cultural themes and ideas through formal variation, by revealing their often metaphorical roots, literature defamiliarizes them and allows them to be reconsidered. Without conventional concepts language and metaphors lack in shared grounding, without creative linguistic form metaphors are dead.

5.4 The building of a metaphor - identity as a house

In the narrative world of *The God of Small Things,* two major houses are present. There is the Ayemenem house, the home of the Ipe family, and the house of Kari Saipu. The latter stands in the middle of an abandoned rubber estate on the other side of the river Menaachal. This house is empty; its owner, an Englishman 'gone native', committed suicide ten years earlier. In addition to being literally present in the fictive world, houses figure as targets, and especially as sources of metaphors of human life, identity and memory.

5.4.1 Individual lives

The first mention of the Ayemenem house on page one is as a target of a metaphor with the human body as a source, which is followed by a brief literal characterisation of how the house looks at Rahel's return to the childhood home.

> (99) <u>The old house</u> on the hill **wore** its steep, gabled <u>roof</u> **pulled over its ears like a low hat.** (1)

Later on in the text, there is another metaphorical description of the general air of the Ayemenem house in terms of an old man with rheumy eyes:

> (100) It was a grand old house, <u>the Ayemenem House</u>, but aloof-looking. As though it had little to do with the people who lived there. **Like and old man with rheumy eyes watching children play, seeing only transience in their shrill elation and wholehearted commitment to life**. (165)

This conception of buildings in terms of the human body is reinforced by an Extension: there are two metaphors on pages 5 and 6 of the village church as a a throat swelling with sad singing (examples 23 and 24). In the immediate co-text, this relationship is Reversed into one of the human body in terms of a building:

> (101) Mammachi was almost blind and always wore dark glasses when she went out of the house. <u>Her tears tricked down from behind them and trembled along her jaw</u> **like raindrops on the edge of a roof**.(5)

Once the interior of the Ayemenem house is entered, a few pieces of old furniture are mentioned, but the feature that gets the most detailed description is nevertheless how Baby Kochamma, the only remaining member of the Ipe family still inhabiting the house, keeps all the doors, windows and cupboards locked at all times out of a general feeling of insecurity and suspicion towards the world around her. The passage ends in a metaphor with the human <u>face</u> as target, and **cupboard** as source:

> (102)   Rahel tried to say something. It came out jagged. Like a piece of tin. She walked to the window and opened it. For a Breath of Fresh Air.
>   'Shut it when you've finished with it,' Baby Kochamma said, and **closed her <u>face</u> like a cupboard.** (29)

This can be analysed as a metonymic Extension of the body-as-house analogy introduced earlier, *body/face* and *house/cupboard* being part-whole metonymies. *Face* can also be taken to metonymically represent the mind here, as our facial expressions indexically represent what goes on in our minds. In addition to **cupboard,** there is Literalization also with the literal *opened* and *shut,* and the metaphorical **closed.** A few pages later, the human-as-house analogy is further Extended to include life histories (stories): dramatic and damaging incidents in human life are conceptualized in terms a fire burning down a house:

(103) Perhaps it's true that things can change in a day. That a few dozen hours can affect the outcome of whole lifetimes. And that when they do, those few dozen hours, **like the salvaged remains of a burned house - the charred clock, the singed photograph, the scorched furniture - must be resurrected from the ruins and examined. Preserved. Accounted for.**
Little events, ordinary things, smashed and reconstituted. Imbued with new meaning. Suddenly they become **the bleached bones of a story**. (32)

This is a complex metaphor where the source and target terms are partly merged. The most obvious mapping is that of a fire destroying a house onto dramatic events changing the course of human life. This entails that an intact house can be mapped onto an 'intact' life, and a burned down house onto an impaired life. The salvaged, charred remains from the fire get mapped onto the memories of past life and of the drastic events that changed its course, and the examination of the remains on a recollection of the past. The fact that the resurrected, smashed things from the fire need to be reconstituted for them to have a meaning, projects a conception of the nature of human remembrance: there is no clear and simple truth about past happenings that could be retrieved by memory. Remembering is giving meaning to the past by an act of reconstruction, and our memories are but the bleached bones of our story. This conceptualisation of human life in terms of a house is further reinforced by this metaphor:

(104) Ammu loved her children (of course), but their wide-eyed vulnerability, and their willingness to love people who didn't really love them, exasperated her and sometimes made her want to hurt her - just as an education, a protection.
It was as though the window through which their father had disappeared had been kept open for anyone to walk in and be

welcomed. (43)

If a father no longer present in his children's lives is said to have disappeared through a window, this entails that the lives of the children are understood in terms of a house.

Lives can be wrecked by happenings that are not in our control, like a house burned down by a fire, and minds can be deranged by trauma. This is the case of Murlidharan, the level-crossing lunatic whom Estha and Rahel as children observe from the family car that is held up by a train. Murlidharan is an armless war veteran who, after having lost his free first class railway pass for life allotted to him as a Grade I Freedom Fighter, spends his days naked on a milestone:

> (105) Murlidharan had no home, no doors to lock, but he had his old keys tied carefully around his waist. In a shining bunch. <u>His mind</u> **was full of cupboards, cluttered with secret pleasures**.
> . . . The homeless, the helpless, the sick, the small and lost, all filed past his **window.** Still he counted his keys.
> He was never sure **which cupboard he might have to open, or when.** He sat on the burning milestone with his matted hair and <u>eyes like windows</u>, and was glad to be able to look away sometimes. To have his keys to count and countercheck. (63)

In this passage, the human-as-house metaphor gets reinforced and filled in by room being mapped onto the human mind, the contents of a cupboard onto the contents of human mind (thoughts and feelings), and the windows of a room onto eyes. Madness in this scheme can be expressed by the contents of your mental cupboard being cluttered and secret, i.e. not communicable to others. Insanity also means being lost in the mind-room, and no longer knowing which cupboard to open and when, i.e. the thoughts and feelings of a deranged mind are confused. Here is a metaphor for Mammachi's blindness that repeats the *room-mind* and *windows-eyes* analogy:

> (106) Behind her slanted sunglasses, her useless eyes were closed, but she could see the music as it left her violin and lifted into the afternoon like smoke.
> <u>Inside her head</u>, **it was like a room with dark drapes drawn across a bright day.** (167)

Another fleeting encounter with insanity, during Rahel's adult years in New

York, is used in a metaphorical characterization memory.

> (107) The Sunday train was almost empty. Across the aisle from Rahel a woman with chapped cheeks and a moustache coughed up phlegm and wrapped it in twists of newspaper that she tore off a pile of Sunday papers on her lap. She arranged the little packages in neat rows on the empty seat in front of her as though she was setting up a phlegm stall. As she worked she chatted to herself in a pleasant, soothing voice.
>
> Memory **was that woman on the train. Insane in the way she shifted through dark things in a closet and emerged with the most unlikely ones** - a fleeting look, a feeling. The smell of smoke. A windscreen wiper. A mother's marble eyes. **Quite sane in the way she left huge tracts of darkness veiled.** Unremembered. (72)

Whereas example 103 conceptualized remembering the past as an act of reconstruction, here we are presented with another metaphorical understanding of human memory. Memory does not work linearly or logically, but is often activated through random associations. This is metaphorically represented as a madwoman retrieving odd things from a dark closet. This metaphor is interpretable because the contents of a cupboard have already been established as a source for the contents of the mind which in addition to our thoughts and feelings obviously include our memories. That the madwoman will not unveil the contents of the closet completely maps onto the partiality and unreliability of human memory - obviously a beneficial thing for our mental equilibrium.

Another development of the human-as-house metaphor lends itself to the description of Estha's and Rahel's psychological state as young adults. Estha stopped speaking after he was separated from his mother and sister, and Rahel drifts in the world, feeling empty. They feel guilt about what happened to Velutha, partly on false grounds because they were misled by one of the adults. As children they were not punished directly for what happened, instead they suffer from a lifelong, disproportionate mental punishment:

> (108) Some things come with their own punishments. **Like bedrooms with built-in cupboards.** They would all learn more about punishments soon. That they came in different sizes. That **some were so big that they were like cupboards with built-in bedrooms. You could spend your whole life in them, wandering through dark shelving.** (115)

> (109) Both she and he knew that there are things that can be forgotten. And things that cannot - **that sit on dusty shelves like stuffed birds with baleful, sideways staring eyes.** (128)

(110) They didn't ask to be let off lightly. They only asked for <u>punishments</u> that fitted their crimes. Not ones that came **like cupboards with built-in bedrooms**. Not **ones you spent your whole life in, wandering through its maze of shelves**.(326)

Houses distorted by cupboards with built-in bedrooms can be mapped onto the distorted and disproportionate nature of Estha and Rahel's punishment. In the context of the human-as-house scheme, and all its extensions and elaborations so far, having to wander through the shelving of a dark closet for the whole of your life, can be interpreted as a metaphor for the twins' inability to release themselves mentally from their traumatic past. The darkness of the closet that leaves the contents unclear can be mapped onto the twins' inability to understand the contents of their mind, their feelings. The terrible events that they experienced are stored in their memory and cannot be forgotten, but the twins are unable to access them and to understand their meaning, which leaves them wandering through the maze of their minds forever, shut away from authentic life.

5.4.2 The collective

The examples of the human-as-house metaphor analysed so far have involved individual lives, minds and memories. Metaphors concerning collective life, identity and memory have their origin in Kari Saipu's abandoned house, as shown by example 112 below. The metaphor employed in the description of the fictive building itself uses a sunken ship as a source term:

(111) It was a beautiful <u>house.</u>
White-walled once. Red-roofed. But painted in weather-colours now. With brushes dipped in nature's palette. Mossgreen. Earthbrown. Crumbleblack. Making it look older than it really was. **Like sunken treasure dredged up from the ocean bed**. **Whale-kissed and barnacled. Swaddled in silence. Breathing bubbles through its broken windows**.
A deep verandah ran all around. The rooms themelves were recessed, buried in shadow. <u>The tiled roof swept down</u> **like the sides of an immense, upside-down boat.** Rotting beams supported on once-white pillars had buckled at the centre, leaving a yawning, gapping hole. (306-307)

The same source of a ship, or the crew of a ship, is used for the Ipe family, and by

extension the whole of Indian people, in example 112 below. This Multivalency suggests an equivalence between the two targets, i.e. collective life and Kari Saipu's House.

(112)   Chacko told the twins that though he hated to admit it, they were all Anglophiles. They were a *family* of Anglophiles. Pointed in the wrong direction, trapped outside their own <u>history</u>, and unable to retrace their steps because their footprints had been swept away. He explained to them that <u>history</u> was **like an old house at night**. **With all the lamps lit. And ancestors whispering inside.**

'To <u>understand history</u>,' Chacko said, ' we have to **go inside and listen to what they are saying. And to look at the books and the pictures on the wall. And smell the smells.**'

Estha and Rahel had no doubt that the house Chacko meant was the house on the other side of the river, in the middle of the abandonned rubber estate where they had never been. Kari Saipu's house. The Black Sahib. The Englishman who had 'gone native'. Who spoke Malayalam and wore mundus. Ayemenem's own Kurtz. Ayenem his private Heart of Darkness. He had shot him through the head ten years ago when his young lover's parents had taken the boy away from him and sent him to school. After the suicide, the property had become the subject of extensive litigation between Kari Saipu's cook and his secretary. The house had lain empty for years. Very few people had seen it. But the twins could picture it.

The **History House**.

'But we can't go in,' Chacko explained, 'because **we've been locked out**. And when we look through the windows, all we see is shadows. And when we try and listen, all we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the whispering, because <u>our minds</u> **have been invaded by a war.** A war that we have won and lost. The very worst sort of war. **A war that captures <u>dreams </u>and re-dreams them. A war** that has made us adore our conquerors and despise ourselves.'

'*Marry* our conquerors, is more like it,' Ammu said drily, referring to Margaret Kochamma. Chacko ignored her. He made the twins look up *Despise*. It said: *To look down upon; to view with contempt; to scorn or disdain.*

Chacko said that in the context of the war he was talking about - **The War of Dreams** - *Despise* meant all those things.

'We're **Prisoners of War**,' Chacko said. 'Our dreams have been doctored. We belong nowhere. <u>We</u> **sail unanchored on troubled seas**. <u>We </u>**may never be allowed ashore.** Our sorrows will never be sad enough. Our joys never happy enough. Our dreams never big enough. Our lives never important enough. To matter.'(52-53)

The metaphor of human memory in house-terms is here extended to comprise collective memory, in other words the history of a family or a nation.

Understanding history is entering the old house and studying its contents. The Ipe family, and by extension the Indian people, have been locked out of their old house, i.e. alienated from their own history by colonialism. If a nation has no contact with its past, this means that it can neither have dreams (in the sense or ideals and aspirations) that are genuinely its own, only dreams re-dreamed by others. The scheme is further enriched by Estha and Rahel misunderstanding Chacko's metaphor. They take the old house to literally denote Kari Saipu's house. From this point onwards the History House is present in the text both as a literal and a metaphorical entity simultaneously. Its symbolic weight is augmented by the intertextual reference to Conrad's colonial novel *The Heart of Darkness* - only this time it is the colonizer who is the source of Darkness. Some twenty years later when Rahel returns to Ayemenem from New York, she finds the History House turned into a five-star hotel :

> (113)   **The History House (where map-breath'd ancestors with tough toe-nails once whispered)** could no longer be approached from the river. It had turned its back on Ayemenem. The hotel guests were ferried across the backwaters, straight from Cochin. They arrived by speedboat, opening up a V of foam on the water, leaving behind a rainbow film of gasoline. (125)

The fact that the ancestors no longer whisper in the History House, and that the house appears to have turned its back on Ayemenem because of the changed entrance, can be interpreted as indications of the community having lost its chances for an authentic contact with its own history. Instead, toy histories get displayed for the benefit of foreign tourists. The face of colonialism may have changed, but the attitudes remain:

> (114) Kari Saipu's house had been renovated and painted. It had become the centrepiece of an elaborate complex, crisscrossed with artificial canals and connecting bridges. Small boats bobbed in the water. The old colonial bungalow with its deep verandah and Doric columns, was surrounded by smaller, older, wooden houses -ancestral homes- that the hotel chain had bought from old families and transplanted in the **Heart of Darkness**. Toy Histories for rich tourists to play in. Like the sheaves of rice in Joseph's dream, like a press of eager natives petitioning an English magistrate, the old houses had been arranged around the **History House** in attitudes of deference. 'Heritage', the hotel was called. (126)

Once the source terms **History House** and the **re-dreaming of dreams** have been established or lexicalized within the novel (see section 5.2.1), they are used independently and economically on their own to represent the complex concepts analysed above, without any mention of the targets. Simultaneously, the human-as-house metaphor gets more and more fleshed out, as central aspects of being human (mind, memory, identity) are repeatedly represented is terms of a building, sometimes quite obliquely, as in this scene of emigrants returning to Kerala in 1969 to visit their families:

> (115) And there they were, the Foreign Returnees, in wash'n'wear suits and rainbow sunglasses. With an end to grinding poverty in their Aristocrat suitcases. . . . With love and a lick of shame that their families who had come to meet them were so . . . so . . . gawkish. . . . When long bus journeys, and overnight stays at the airport, were met by love and a lick of shame, small cracks appeared, which would grow and grow, and before they knew it, the Foreign Returnees would be trapped outside the **History House**, and **have their dreams redreamed**. (140)

It is significant that the conventionalized metaphors *lick* and *crack* should have been chosen here, since they both have strong associations with paint, and thereby metonymically with houses, i.e. the faltering identities of the Foreign Returnees are represented in terms of houses whose paint has started to crack.

Collective identity and memory are embodied by the traditional epic dance dramas of Kerala. After returning to Ayemenem as adults, Estha and Rahel go to see a kathakali performance at the local temple. When they enter, the play has already started:

> (116) It didn't matter that the story had begun, because kathakali discovered long ago that the secret of the Great Stories is that they *have* no secrets. The Great Stories are the ones you have heard and want to hear again. **The ones you can enter anywhere and inhabit comfortably**. They don't deceive you with thrills or trick endings. They don't surprise you with the unforeseen. **They are as familiar as the house you live in.** Or the smell of your lover's skin. You know how they end, yet you listen as though you don't. In the way that although you know that one day you will die, you live as though you won't. In The Great Stories you know who lives, who dies, who finds love, who doesn't. And yet you want to know again.
> *That* is their mystery and their magic. (229)

Here again is repeated the metaphor of collective history as a house you can enter

and inhabit.

5.4.3 Summary

The examples analysed in the above two sections show how the themes of mind and memory, history, and the frailty of human life are foregrounded through relationships of metaphors that have houses, or constitutive parts of houses, as their sources. The same words connected with this lexical field (house, window, room, cupboard, closet) naturally get repeated in the context of these metaphors, even if the metaphors are not repeated verbatim. The relationship that structures the totality of these human-as-house metaphors could be called a loosely spreading Extension. It starts with the small and the concrete - the human jaw as the edge of a roof (example 101) - and expands towards the big and the abstract, through characteristics of the human mind to the history of a nation in terms of an estate (examples 112 - 114). In this way, the Extension is hierarchically structured by smaller entities being contained in larger ones.

This Extension brings together the individual and private sides of human experience with collective concerns. One of the major sources of the interconnected building-metaphors is the History House, with all the symbolic weight it gathers during the narrative. The verandah of the History House also provides the literal stage of the fatal meeting between the small and the private (the twins and their paravan friend Velutha) and the representatives of collective order (the posse of policemen), to the detriment of the small and the private. This Literalization gives prominence to one of the themes of the novel, the supremacy of the collective over the personal in Indian society.

As the human-as-house scheme gets established and filled in, the source-terms gain independence, or are lexicalized within the narrative, and can be used to represent complex concepts created within the novel, without mention of the targets (see example 115). Grounding a group of metaphors in a basic scheme allows for economy in language use. Once the scheme has been established, metaphors based on it can be interpreted on the basis of elegantly sparse linguistic cues. The building scheme is an ideal meeting point of the universal and the particular, as practically everyone on this planet lives in some kind of building. It is both general and rich enough to allow interpretations independent of the

cultural or social background of the reader. The extension and the details of the interpretations are open-ended. Once the concepts of mind, memory and identity are defamiliarized by unconventional, interconnected metaphors, each reader can reflect on them within the scheme proposed by the metaphors, and refamiliarize them in a way, and to the extent, that is relevant for him or her. Another relationship that gives the metaphors naturalness and accessibility is Literalization, the presence of literal houses in the narrative.

In spite of the familiarity of the ingredients, all the metaphors analysed in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 are, as far as I can see, linguistically and conceptually unconventional. The viability of the extended human-as-house metaphor obviously relies on our ability to metaphorically conceive of our bodies, our minds, our lives, and the buildings we live in, as containers and as structures. In addition to this very general analogy, it is difficult to see what the precise underlying specific level conventional conceptual metaphors, manifest in conventional linguistic metaphors, would be.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The main findings of this thesis include the compatibility of the literary theory of defamiliarization and conceptual metaphor theory. This result was arrived at through an analysis and comparison of the central concepts in these theories, and of their epistemological grounding. The compatibility is ultimately based on the theories' shared view of the relationship between language and the constitution of cultural and social realities, and provides a solid basis for studying metaphor in literary texts.

The model of the structure of metaphor provided by conceptual metaphor theory was found to work well in the practical analysis of metaphors in *The God of Small Things*. The representation of metaphor as two skeletal knowledge structures with well-differentiated components, the source and the target, and a detailed mapping that relates the components to one another, permits both a detailed and a flexible analysis of live metaphors. The flexibility stems from two characteristics of the model. A variable amount of correspondences between the

source and the target can be activated during interpretation, and the mapping can also create new components in the target domain. These qualities are required by the often open-ended nature of literary metaphors. The structural model provided by conceptual metaphor theory not only permits well-defined and flexible interpretations of metaphors, but also delineates metaphors from other uses of language common in literary texts, for example metonymies and symbols, and contributes towards an understanding of the different function of each (see sections 4.2.4 and 5.2.6).

Even if the conceptual metaphor model was found to work well in most cases, there were some examples that it cannot fully account for. Metaphors were found where the projection of knowledge structures appears to be bidirectional, rather than exclusively one-way from a source onto a target (see example 56). Another complex type is metaphors that in addition to the source and target domains seem to integrate knowledge from other contextual or general knowledge domains (see example 70). The exact description of metaphors that seem to involve more complex information networks than is allowed by the unidirectional two-space model, would require the development of supplementary models, which seems to be under way within blending theory (see section 3.3.4). Still another element that the two-space model of conceptual metaphor theory is not able to accommodate, is affect. Emotion apparently is an important factor both in setting off and in influencing the interpretive process of metaphors in literature (see section 2.3.3). This is also my personal experience from working closely with the metaphors of *The God of Small Things*.

Applications of conceptual metaphor theory to the analysis of literature that dismiss the significance of linguistic form, were criticized in section 4.2.3 The counterclaim presented was that linguistically conventional and unconventional metaphors have different psychological prominence for the readers of literary texts, and that this should be taken into account in their analysis. Unconventional metaphors were claimed to be more foregrounded, and to be able to lead to a defamiliarization of meaning as an essential part of literary reading. The analysis of metaphors in *The God of Small Things* lends support to this claim. A group of unconventional metaphors was discovered in the novel that are systematically interconnected in such a way as to create a significant and structured level of meaning in the text (section 5.4). Many of the metaphors studied within Chapter

(5) were found to be not only linguistically, but also conceptually original. This contradicts the claims that most novel literary metaphors are extensions, combinations and compressions of basic conceptual metaphors.

One of the major goals set for this thesis was to study the usefulness of Goatly's (1997) categories of semantic interconnections between metaphors for the discovery and description of structured foregrounding of metaphors in literary texts. The analysis of metaphors in *The God of Small Thing* based on Goatly's categories revealed both local and restricted interconnections between metaphors and one network that spans the whole of the text, and cases that fall in between the two in scope. The categories thus appear to be a useful heuristic tool. The main difficulty in their application is the relativity of the concept of semantic field and its openness to ad hoc creations (e.g. section 5.2.5). All types of interconnections did not turn out to be equally present in the text, which is only to be expected as different texts obviously can favour different types of structures for their particular purposes. One indication of this is that *The God of Small Things* shows extensive use of a sub-type of a connection (lexicalizing repetition, see section 5.2.1) not described by Goatly.

The interconnections between unconventional metaphors in *The God of Small Things* proved to be significant in several respects. In some cases, the connections are so tight that one or several of the metaphors in a group are barely understandable outside the context of the other members. The interconnected metaphors, and the idiosyncratic concepts created by them, are a major source of cohesion in the narrative which does not rely on a linear structure. The more extensive semantic networks also constitute a further structured and apparently significant level of foregrounding, in addition to unconventional metaphors being foregrounded as such. The network described in section 5.4 very obviously contributes to the articulation of the meanings of the text. The study into the metaphors of *The God of Small Things* as conducted within this work thus for its part confirms the hypothesis of formalist literary theory that significant, structured foregrounding of metaphors exists in literary texts, in this case a long fictive text, and that the analysis of this level of foregrounding presents possibilities for the interpretation of extended fictive texts.

As the empirical part of this thesis consists of a descriptive case study of one novel only, what is concluded above obviously cannot be generalized to concern

all fictional texts. In the case of *The God of Small Things*, the interrelations of metaphors proved to be so numerous and complex that they could be used as a partial basis for a comprehensive interpretation of the text.   To substantiate this finding, the analysis should be extended to a contrastive study between several literary texts. This would reveal if similar structures can be found in other text, and how different texts use interconnected metaphors in differing ways to forge their own meanings, styles and identities. Nonliterary texts would also provide a valuable point of comparison for revealing whether the use of metaphoric interplay in literature has a specific character of its own, as compared to nonliterary uses. An excellent opportunity for this would be provided by the two nonfictional works of Arundhati Roy, the author of *The God of Small Things.*

Bibliography

Primary sources:

Roy, Arundhati 1997. *The God of Small Things.* London: Flamingo.

Secondary sources:

Amaral, Patricia Matos 2000. *Metaphor and relevance.* http://www.fu-berlin.de/
phin/phin12/p12t1.htm 22.5.2003.

Black, Max. 1979/1993. More about Metaphor, in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 19-40.

Blasko, Dawn G. 1999. Only the tip of the iceberg: Who understands what about
metaphor?, *Journal of Pragmatics* 31, 1675-1683.

Cameron, Lynne 1999. Operationalising 'metaphor' for applied linguistic
research, in Cameron an Low (eds.) 1999, 3-28.

Cameron, Lynne, and Graham Low (eds.) 1999. *Researching and applying
metaphor.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Ted 1979. Metaphor and the cultivation of intimacy, in Sheldon Sacks
(ed.), *On metaphor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1-10.

Cook, Guy 1994. *Discourse and literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cooper, David E. 1986. *Metaphor.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Coulson, Seana and Todd Oakley 2000. Blending basics, *Cognitive linguistics* 11,
175-196.

Eagleton, Terry 1983. *Literary theory: an introduction.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Eichenbaum B. 1926/1965. The theory of the 'formal method', in Lemon L. and
M. Reis (eds.) 1965, 99-139.

Elovaara, Raili 1992. *"Olen tyhjä huone" Tutkielma sanataiteen metaforista ja
symboliesta.* Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Fauconnier, Giles and Mark Turner 1998. Conceptual integration networks, *Cognitive Science* 22:2, 133-187.

Fish, Stanley 1980. *Is there a text in this class? The authority of interpretive communities.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fludernik, Monika and Donald C. Freeman 1999. Metaphor and beyond: An introduction, *Poetics today* 20, 383-395.

Gibbs, Raymond W. 1999. Researching metaphor, in Cameron and Low (eds.) 1999, 29-47.

Gluksberg, Sam and Boaz Keysar1990. Understanding metaphorical comparisons: beyond similarity, *Psychological Review* 97, 3-18.

Goatly, Andrew 1997. *The language of metaphors.* London: Routledge.

Gozzi, Raymond 2001. *The power of metaphor in the age of electronic media.* Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Grady, Joseph, Todd Oalkey, and Seana Coulson 1999. Blending and metaphor, in Gerald Steen and Raymond Gibbs (eds.), *Metaphor in cognitive linguistics.* http://cogsci.ucsd.edu/~coulson/joe l.html. 22.5.2003.

Gross, Sabine 1997. Cognitive Readings; or, The disappearance of literature in the mind, *Poetics today* 18, 271-297.

Hasan, Ruqaiya 1985. *Linguistics, language, and verbal art.* Victoria: Deakin University Press.

Hawkes, Terence 1972. *Metaphor.* London: Methuen & Co Ltd.

Hawkes, Terence 1977. *Structuralism and semiotics*. London: Routledge.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson 1980. *Metaphors We Live By.* University of

Chicago Press: Chicago and London.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Turner 1989. *More than cool reason. A field guide to poetic metaphor.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, George 1993. The contemporary theory of metaphor, in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 202-249.

Lecercle, Jean-Jacques 1990. *The violence of language.* London: Routledge.

Lemon, L. and M. Reis (eds.) 1965. *Russian formalist criticism. Four essays.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska press.

Mahon, James Edwin 1999. Getting your sources right. What Aristotle didn't say, in Cameron and Low (eds.) 1999, 69-80.

Miall, David and Don Kuiken 1994a. Foregrounding, defamiliarization, and affect: response to literary stories. *Poetics* 22, 389-407.

Miall, David and Don Kuiken 1994b. Beyond text theory: understanding literary response. *Discourse Processes* 17, 337-352.

Miall, David and don Kuiken 1996. *Forms of reading: recovering the self-as-reader.* http://www.ualberta.ca/~dmiall/FORMALISM.HTM. 22.5.2003.

Miall, David and Don Kuiken 1999. What is literariness? Three components of literary reading. *Discourse Processes* 28, 121-138.

Mukarovský, Jan 1932/1964. Standard language and poetic language, in Garvin, Paul (ed.), *A Prague school reader on esthetics, literary structure and style,* Washington , D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 17-30.

Nikanne, Urpo 1992. Metaforien mukana, in L. Harvilahti, J. Kalliokoski, U. Nikanne and T. Onikki (eds.), *Metafora. Ikkuna kieleen, mieleen ja*

kulttuuriin, Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.

Nogales, Patti D. 1999. *Metaphorically speaking.* Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Nöth, Winfried 1990. *Handbook of semiotics.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ong, Walter 1982. *Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word.* London: Routledge.

Ortony, Andrew (ed.) 1993. *Metaphor and Thought.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Papafragou, Anna 1996. On metonymy, *Lingua* 99, 169-195.

Pilkington, Adrian 1991. Poetic effects, in Sell (ed.) 1991, 44-61.

Sell, Roger (ed.) 1991. *Literary Pragmatics.* London: Routledge.

Shklovsky, Victor 1917/1965. Art as technique, in Lemon L. and M. Reis (eds.) 1965, 3-24.

Smith, Barbara 1988. *Contingencies of value: alternative perspectives for critical theory.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Turner, Mark and Gilles Fauconnier 1999. A Mechanism of Creativity, *Poetics today* 20, 97-418.

Ungerer, Friedrich and Hans-Jörg Schmid 1997. *An introduction to cognitive linguistics.* Harlow: Pearson Education.

Van Peer, William 1990. The measurement of metre. *Poetics* 19, 259-275.

Van Peer, William 1991. But what is literature?, in Sell (ed.) 1991, 127-141.

Verdonk, Peter 1991. Poems as text and discourse, in Sell (ed.) 1991, 94-109.