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Doping and moral disapprovals

Abstract

This paper explores variance in how people morally disapprove wrongs related to doping. The variance may pertain to what type of moral disapproval a person uses or to what they disapprove of. Our exploration is both conceptual and empirical. Conceptually, we distinguish between four types of moral disapprovals that we call blame, judging blameworthy, condemnation and sadness. We elaborate these four moral phenomena through a conceptual scheme that we call the matrix of moral disapprovals. The matrix is the central conceptual innovation of our paper. It depicts how the four moral disapprovals relate to each other and characterises their typical instances. In the empirical part of the paper we use the matrix of moral disapproval to examine how decision-makers in Finnish elite sport organisations talk about doping. The empirical examination is based on 31 interviews with decision-makers from Finnish elite sport organisations. Although we distinguish between the conceptual and empirical approaches in our paper, they are not fully separate, but support and inform each other.

Keywords: blame, condemnation, doping, moral philosophy, sadness

Introduction

Doping is most clearly defined as committing an anti-doping rule violation (ADRV). There are 10 ways of committing an anti-doping rule violation listed in section 2 of the World Anti-Doping Agency Code (WADA 2015). These ways include evading, refusing or failing to submit to doping control measures, being complicit in an ADRV or trafficking. It is sections 2.1 and 2.2 though that outline the most common ways in which doping is understood. 2.1 refers to 'Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete's Sample'. 2.2 refers to 'Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method' (WADA, 2015: 19-20).

When people talk about doping, they often talk about it in a morally disapproving fashion. One clear objection to doping is that it breaks a set of sporting rules, as outlined in the WADA Code (WADA, 2015). Intuitively, though there seems to be something morally wrong with doping that extends beyond the fact that it is against the rules. Philosophers of sport have tried to explain why doping is morally objectionable (see for example Devine, 2011; McNamee, 2008; Miah 2010; Schneider & Butcher 2000; Simon 2003). Some of them have also questioned whether doping is morally wrong at all (see Savulescu, Foddy & Clayton 2004; Tamburrini 2000). However, philosophers of sport have not paid attention to the variance in how people morally disapprove of wrongs related to doping.

This paper explores this variance. There are at least two kinds of variance in morally disapproving doping. First, a person may use different types of moral disapprovals when they talk about doping: for instance, they may blame the specific athlete, team, coach or supporting personnel that they

deem the doping violator. Or they may condemn doping in general without reference to particular actors or cases. Second, a person may refer to different kinds of wrongs when they talk about doping: for instance, they may think that using doping substances is wrong or current doping sanctions are morally unsatisfactory.

Our exploration is both conceptual and empirical. Conceptually, we distinguish between four types of moral disapprovals that we call blame, judging blameworthy, condemnation and moral sadness. We draft a matrix of moral disapprovals that describes how these moral phenomena relate to each other. It also characterises their typical instances. The matrix is the central conceptual innovation of our paper. Empirically, we look at decision-makers in Finnish elite sport organisations. We are interested in the forms of moral disapproval they use and what wrongs they disapprove of. Although we distinguish between conceptual and empirical inquiry, they are not fully separate in our study, but interconnected projects that inform and support each other. These two endeavours also have the same foundation: they are rooted in 31 interviews with decision-makers from Finnish elite sport organisations.

We have arranged our paper into five main parts: background, methodology, conceptual clarification, empirical results, and conclusion. The background part clarifies the scope and frames the sporting and doping context in Finland. The methodological section describes the interviews we conducted and depicts our methodological tools. In the conceptual part, we introduce the matrix of moral disapprovals and elaborate the four moral disapprovals. In the empirical part, we apply the matrix of moral disapprovals to the 31 interviews with decision-makers from Finnish elite sport organisations. Last, we conclude by bringing the conceptual and empirical parts together.

Background

Scope elaboration

This study represents a descriptive approach to ethics. It also utilises metaethical considerations, but it does not contribute to the normative ethical examination of moral disapprovals, that is, to the question of when it is appropriate to use which moral disapproval or when a moral disapproval would be inappropriate (see Coates and Tognazzini 2013b, 17–23; Scanlon 2008). For instance, we study whom the interviewed decision-makers blame and for what, but do not comment on whether they have the standing to blame or whether the persons whom they blame are truly blameworthy (see Bell 2013; Kelly 2013). Furthermore, we retain a neutral or impartial stance with regard to the specific wrongs that decision makers talk about: our aim is to record and understand how they talk about wrongs, not to argue whether a wrong has truly occurred or not.

Despite normative questions about moral disapprovals being outside the scope of this paper, we address briefly two normatively relevant considerations because they help to understand better the character of our study. These considerations also highlight what remains to be studied about the moral disapprovals in future research.

First, athletes' reasons for doping may be related to the appropriateness of moral disapproval. Hauw and McNamee (2014) classify research in this area into three programs and argue that certain assumptions underpin these programs. They argue that some research programs, classified

as 'cognitive' imply that the decision to dope is a rational or calculated one for which the individual might be held accountable. They refer to two other approaches, 'somatic' where doping is viewed in a less calculating fashion as a response to unconscious distress. Finally the authors refer to the 'situated dynamic program' paying more attention to situational factors as the athlete career develops. The framework that Hauw and McNamee provide encourages reflection upon the myriad of reasons that might explain an ADRV. Further it is worth pointing out at this stage that not all ADRVs are intentional. Doping may be inadvertent where athletes fall foul of strict liability rules that ensure an anti-doping rule violation is deemed to have been committed, and a sanction likely (although not necessarily) follows, even if the offence is unintentional. An athlete may have consumed a contaminated supplement or food for example. Bearing in mind the complexity evident here it is likely that moral disapprovals are not always founded on a nuanced understanding of anti-doping policy, or indeed of the reasons why the rules might have been broken. However, our primary interest lies in discovering the use of the moral disapprovals, not whether their use is well-founded.

Second, the field of doping and even the use of the term doping is almost always associated with disapproval. Doping is, as Fost (2008: 337) has described a pejorative term. Doping offences can, however, cover a range of violations. In some cases the authorities might themselves accept that the rule breaker was at no fault at all. They may have been extremely cautious but still had a positive test result as a result of contamination of some kind. Cases in which athletes are found to be at no fault at all, and therefore not sanctioned (but still found to have committed an ADRV) are few and far between (one example is CAS 2017a). The chronology of events (the report of the positive test, and a likely suspension prior to further exploration) can mean however that doping cases are often accompanied by moral disapproval, such as blame, without proper consideration

of the nature of the act. Again, our goal is not to evaluate whether the recorded moral disapprovals correspond to the nature of the act.

Next, it is worthwhile to point out that we focus on moral disapprovals but ignore praise and other positive moral approvals in this paper. This qualification may initially sound that our ethical enquiry might be incomplete. However, moral disapprovals deserve a scrutiny of their own at least for three reasons. First, it is not clear whether each of the four moral disapproval pairs with a positive moral phenomena. For instance, Coates and Tognazzini (2013b, 4–5) suspect that blame and praise may not be a usefully opposed pair as Strawson implies (1974, 6). Second, moral disapprovals and especially blame play an important role in our moral lives. McGeer (2013, 162) states: ‘Certainly blame, by anyone’s reckoning, is a pervasive feature of our moral experience’, and Coates and Tognazzini suggest in a similar vein that ‘*blame* is, for better or worse, a central part of human relationships’ (Coates & Tognazzini 2013b, 3). Third, moral disapprovals, and again especially blame, may have positive effects in the end, since they can protect important values, such as doping free sport (see Coates and Tognazzini 2013b, 5).

The Finnish sporting and doping context

In Finland, which is a rather small country with a population of approximately 5.5 million (Statistics Finland, 2019), sport has had a strong connection to national identity (Laine, 2006; Aslama & Pantti, 2007). Historically from 1910s onwards competitive sports were regarded as a vehicle through which a small, peripheral and poor new nation was able to gain international prestige and to construct an image of itself as a viable nation (Blain, Boyle & O’Donnell, 1993) which ultimately

had its effect on how sport is perceived even nowadays in Finland. Moreover, there have been strong roots in creating the Finnish sports system based on the sports clubs which have had an especially focal role in organizing and implementing Finnish sports. The Finnish sports system has been based on the Nordic Sports Movement Model, where access to sport for all has often been prioritized and a priority domain of national sport policy above that of elite sport development (Green & Collins, 2008). The development of the Finnish sport system has evolved into the idea that all levels of sport are under one umbrella organization. Within this umbrella organization, all aspects of sports – such as mass and elite, old and young, professional and amateurs – have been affiliated. A good example of this kind of organization is the Finnish Olympic Committee, which started in its new form from 1st of January, 2017, as a result of the merger of the Finnish Sports Confederation Valo and the Finnish Olympic Committee. This new organization represents all sport and physical activity from grassroots to elite sport in Finland.

Finland can be regarded as a country which has had its own specific type of history related to doping. A central feature in this history was the doping case during the 2001 Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti, Finland, where a total of six Finnish cross-country skiers were sanctioned for violations of the doping regulations. There have been other doping cases of course, Finland is not an exception compared to other countries, yet this case is still even after 15 years the case which is referred and mirrored when doping is discussed. Laine (2006) concluded that national identity has an important emotional dimension and that competitive sports certainly provide a powerful opportunity for the emotional alignment of a community and the expansion of a 'we-feeling', which happened also in Lahti. This particular event had a strong impact on Finnish national identity and led to a feeling of national shame (ibid.). Naturally, people also wanted to explain this shame, and in this particular case, the blame was placed on the globalisation and

commercialisation of sports and the national shame and humiliation of the Lahti doping scandal quickly turned to anger towards the globalisation and commercialisation of sports. All in all, the scandal was seen as a symptom of the crisis of Finnish identity within the globalising world (ibid.).

Methodology

Interviews

Our exploration of moral disapprovals is based on 31 anonymous interviews with decision-makers and sport managers from Finnish elite sport organisations. The interviewees include 23 males and 8 females. They hold both paid positions (24 persons), such as chief executive officers, and unpaid positions of trust (7 persons), such as president or vice president. The age ranges from 34 to 66, and the average is 49 years. The interviewed persons belong to the national umbrella organisations of sport (9 persons), national sport federations (13 persons) and private sport clubs (5 persons). However, when we present quotations of individual interviewees, we do not refer to their demographic background or gender. These are precautions to protect their anonymity; anonymity was the precondition to enable the interviewees to talk openly.

A unifying feature of the decision-makers is that they are partial or biased agents. One of their explicit or implicit goals as the representative of their sport organisation is to perform in their position so that the athletes or teams affiliated with the organisation have possibility to gain success in sport. For instance, a CEO of a private ice hockey team or football club tries to manage

the business so that the team can strive for the championship. To take another example, a president of a national ice hockey or football federation attempts to make decisions to ensure that the national team is internationally competitive. The partiality implies that the interviewed persons are likely to identify or sympathise with losses and victories of the related athletes and teams. Thus, they are likely to suffer if their athletes dope and are caught or if athletes from opponent countries or teams dope and are not caught.

Two authors of this paper belong to the four-member research group that conducted the interviews in Finnish in 2017.¹ The research group used qualitative interviewing with stimulus texts (see Törrönen 2002). The purpose of the stimulus text, such as citation, claim or picture, is to encourage the interviewees to talk about the topic (Törrönen 2002). This method seems to be apt in approaching morally sensitive topics when the interviewees might include the potential wrongdoers or victims (Siltaoja 2017). The interviewers recorded the discussions electronically, and two language agencies transcribed the recordings afterwards. The citations that appear in this paper are approximate translations from Finnish to English by the authors.

The general theme of the interviews was management and decision-making in Finnish elite sport organisations from an ethical perspective. The framework for a single interview consisted of 15 thematic slides. Each slide had a statement, case description or picture to motivate the discussion about the topic. The theme of the tenth slide was doping: it contained a picture of an athlete making palm prints on a wall that featured a text 'Every athlete has a right to clean sport. World Anti-doping Agency'. Occasionally, the interviewees talked about doping in other parts of the interview as well. The passages in which the decision-makers talk about doping in morally

¹ The research group conducted a total of 49 interviews, but we have attempted to include in this analysis only those interviews that feature a partial decision-maker as described above.

disapproving fashion lie in our interest. We approach the passages through conceptual and empirical methodologies.

Conceptual approach

The interviews with decision-makers ignited our conceptual exploration. When conducting the interviews and reading the transcribed interviews, we started to pay attention to the range of ways in which decision-makers talked about doping in a morally disapproving fashion. We first set off to look at the philosophical literature to describe conceptually the variance we had encountered. Philosophers have written about blame and other moral disapprovals separately (see Coates & Tognazzini 2013a), but we did not find attempts to relate moral disapprovals to each other comprehensively or systematically. Therefore, we tried to pull together the main ideas from the existing literature into a single model that would capture the variance of moral disapprovals from our interviews. This single model could not contain all the nuances of the philosophical discussion. Instead, its purpose was to portray a general conceptual scheme that would allow nuances to flourish. Designing the scheme required philosophical reflection and several adjustments, but finally, we arrived at the current version of the matrix of moral disapprovals, which is the central conceptual innovation of our paper.

Empirical approach

The empirical part analyses the 31 interviews with the decision-makers from Finnish elite sport organisations by utilising the matrix of moral disapprovals. We are interested in how the

interviewed decision-makers verbally express their moral disapproval for wrongs related to doping. Moral disapprovals, however, have a wider variety of instances than mere verbal expression, but an interview has limited capacity to bring forth these other forms. For instance, McKenna (2013, 121) distinguishes between private blame, overt blame and directed blame. Private blame occurs when a person reveals her blaming attitude to nobody but keeps it to themselves. Overt blame means that a person is manifesting blame when the wrongdoer is absent. Directed blame refers to the situation in which a blamer is personally addressing the wrongdoer. Overt and directed blame can manifest behaviourally or verbally (see also Scanlon 2013). For instance, French biathlete Martin Foucarde seemed to express his direct blame behaviourally against Russian team at one medal ceremony in 2017: He left the podium during the ceremony when the Russian team stood on the third place of the podium. The majority of blaming instances in the interviews are overt blame expressed verbally.

The matrix of moral disapprovals was our primary methodological tool for analysing the decision-makers talk about doping. We complemented this tool with other methodological approaches. Roughly, our empirical analysis had four steps that partly overlapped, and sometimes, we needed to return to the previous steps. First, we read all the interviews. Second, we searched for passages in which interviewees talk about doping. Third, we employed the matrix to recognise and classify passages that contain a moral disapproval. For each passage, we recorded what the wrong in question was, who the wrongdoer was and who the victim was. We also tried to recognise which country or which countries the interviewee was primarily addressing (if any) in the passage. Fourth, we relied on thematic analysis to sort out what types of wrongs the moral disapprovals pertain to (see Braun & Clarke 2006; Nowell et al 2017). We recorded our observations initially in

qualitative research software Atlas.ti, but later we transferred the information to excel spreadsheet.


Our empirical exploration is largely interpretative. That is, how we classify the decision-makers' speech into four moral disapproval may differ from how other people would classify the same speech by the same decision-makers into the four moral categories. We point out three possible sources of divergences. First, our classification of four moral disapprovals is largely unprecedented: There are no prior examples of how to apply it. Second, it seems that a variety of verbal expressions can function as moral disapprovals. For instance, an expression 'What a jerk!' can represent blame (Macnamara 2013, 152). Third, understanding a moral disapproval may sometimes require specific background information. For instance, an individual A might be blaming individual B, but individual C may not recognise that A is blaming B because C does not have enough information about the wrong that B has committed.

Conceptual clarification

The matrix of moral disapprovals

We introduce and elaborate the matrix of moral disapprovals in this section. The matrix helps us to understand the moral phenomena of blame, judging blameworthy, condemnation, sadness and their variance. Nevertheless, the matrix is not inherently a philosophical explanation about their nature. It is rather a philosophical description or conceptual map about these phenomena. Importantly, the matrix provides a tool for distinguishing between typical instances of the four

moral phenomena and recording their typical instances. The merit of our conceptual approach is that the matrix can be compatible with various explanations about the nature of the four moral phenomena. Picture 1 portrays the matrix of moral disapprovals.



Picture 1: Matrix of moral disapprovals. The matrix portrays a crossroads of two continuums and approximate areas that moral disapprovals occupy in the matrix.

The matrix of moral disapproval is a crossroad of two axes. Both axes represent a continuum. The horizontal axis stands for a continuum between emotions of anger on the left and sadness on the right. Anger is here a collective term for a wide variety of antagonistic emotions, such as hostility, wrath, irritation, resentment and indignation. Sadness is a collection of less tormenting or heated emotions including sorrow, bemoaning, despair and disappointment. In the middle of the continuum, there is an emotionally neutral stance.

The vertical axis represents a continuum that has a particular end on the top and universal end on the bottom. For instance, talking about Ben Johnson's doping case in 1988 Seoul Olympics belongs to the particular end while talking about the use of doping without addressing a specific case belongs to the universal end. In detail, the particular–universal continuum pertains to the underlying structure of moral disapprovals. Each moral disapproval has an underlying abstract structure that consists of four elements: 1) disapprover, 2) wrongdoer, 3) wrong and 4) victim (see McGreer 2013, 162). These elements can have particular or universal references depending on which moral disapproval is in question.

Each of the four moral phenomena occupies a specific area in the matrix, and this area describes its typical instances. However, the areas have blurred lines, which mean that the differences between the phenomena are gradual and vague. For instance, when we move from blame downwards towards condemnation, it is difficult to determine where blame exactly ends and condemnation begins.

The matrix of moral disapprovals portrays the four moral disapprovals as separate, though vague-bordered independent moral phenomena. The moral disapprovals can be also layered or

interconnected if we look at how they are constituted. For instance, to blame a wrongdoer for use of doping typically requires that the blamer (i) condemns the use of doping and (ii) judges the wrongdoer as blameworthy (explicitly or implicitly). In this paper, we focus on the four moral disapprovals primarily as independent moral phenomena as the matrix of moral disapprovals portrays them. Furthermore, moral disapprovals vary from temporal or transitory to more permanent like. For instance, if an athlete blames a fellow competitor for being a doping cheat today, the athlete does not necessarily blame this opponent anymore after five or ten years.

Blame

Coates and Tognazzini write that Peter Strawson's article *Freedom and Resentment*, which was published in 1962, marks the start of contemporary philosophical work on blame (Coates and Tognazzini 2013b, 3–5; see also Strawson 1974; Wallace 1994). According to the Strawsonian view, to blame somebody is to target reactive emotion, such as resentment or indignation, towards that person. However, philosophers have not reached consensus about the nature of blame (see Coates and Tognazzini 2013a). Blame appears to be 'an elusive notion', as Michael McKenna (2003, 119) suggests. He thinks that philosophers have not yet described its nature satisfactorily: 'It is maddeningly hard to nail down a theory that gets the extension even close to right.' (McKenna 2013, 119.) As we stated earlier, we do not try to explain in a philosophically rigorous way what blame is. Instead, our aim is to provide a conceptual tool for recognising its typical instances through the matrix.

Blame occupies the left-top area of the matrix: it is characterised by anger and particularity. In the following excerpt from the interviews, a decision-maker seems to be blaming Norwegian cross-country skier Therese Johaug. Johaug gave a positive doping sample in 2016, and she defended herself by stating that sun had burned her lips in Italy and she had used a cream that the Norwegian team doctor had given to her. In February 2017, Norwegian sport authorities declared a 13 months ban for Johaug. However, Court of Arbitration for Sport, or CAS, extended the ban to 18 months in August 2017 (CAS 2017b). At the time of the interview with the decision-maker, the CAS's final decision did not yet exist, and the decision-maker states:

I have been thinking several times whether I want to have a job in which I can look directly at the eyes of those people [...] and then, Therese Johaug was training there [...] I was wondering several times, when she said that the track is good and fits for her. I almost said to her that there is world cup here in two days, but you won't compete in the world cup, and I think that you won't compete here in the next year either.²

Our conceptualisation of blame through the matrix of moral disapprovals shares the intuitive plausibility of the Strawsonian account of blame, but is able to survive one of the criticisms towards the Strawsonian view. The Strawsonian accounts of blame succeed well in capturing the force or sting of blame: it focuses on reactive emotions of resentment and indignation (Smith 2013, 32). Our conceptualisation of blame through the matrix of moral disapprovals shares this

² Johaug's case illustrates the complexity related to doping and blaming. The particularities of anti-doping policy exist to try to ensure that sanctioning can reflect the range of ways in which someone might test positive for a substance on the prohibited list. The Court of Arbitration for Sport accepted that Johaug did not seek to enhance her performance deliberately, but nevertheless, under WADA's strict liability rules a sanction may still follow. If for example the athlete's negligence is thought to have led to the positive test, the athlete may be deemed to be at some fault (while not necessarily significant) and this can still lead to a lengthy ban. Here the decision-maker seems convinced that the case is of significant moral concern (that might be implied from the discussion of looking into the eyes of the athlete) and does appear to endorse a significant ban.

feature with the Strawsonian view, since it records these as typical instances of blame. However, criticism against the Strawsonian view suggests that it is possible to blame somebody without a reactive emotion, such as resentment. For instance, blame against a loved one can be void of hate or hostility (Sher 2006, Smith 2013, 32). The matrix of moral disapprovals allows these kinds of instances of blame: they are located around the vague borders of the area of blame, near the middle part of the horizontal axis that is emotionally dispassionate.

Judging blameworthy

Judging blameworthy resembles blame, but lacks the special force of blame: it refers to noting or recording that somebody has done a wrong without targeting an emotional response towards the wrongdoer (Coates and Tognazzini 2013b, 8–10). When a person judges that X is blameworthy she presumes that X has done a wrong and that X is morally responsible for this wrong. Nevertheless, the evaluator of blameworthiness holds an emotionally neutral stand in this respect. For instance, she may think that she is not in standing to blame the wrongdoer (see Bell 2014; Kelly 2014; Pereboom 2014).

Judging blameworthy lies in the middle-top area of the matrix. For instance, a decision-maker notes the doping case of Finnish footballer Roman Eremenko who was caught for using cocaine in 2016, but she appears to be emotionally calm or neutral:

But I believe that it [doping] is not that kind of issue in team sports. They probably use there, because [some are] caught, like the case of Roman Eremenko [demonstrates].

Judging blameworthy is a milder response to wrong compared to blame. Even milder responses would be recording a wrong but exempting the wrongdoer from blameworthiness (see Pereboom 2014). For instance, the doping users sometimes defend themselves by appealing to accident and unintentionality: they got the banned substance in their body without their own fault. In other words, it was wrong that their bodies contained the banned substance, but they are not blameworthy for it. The matrix of moral disapprovals does not include exempting the wrongdoer from blameworthiness, since it is not necessarily a morally disapproving response.

Condemnation

Our term condemnation comes from Elisabeth Lane Beardsley (Beardsley 1970, 164; see also Hughes 1958). She focuses on blaming, and contrasts it with condemning: ‘Another form of moral disapproval is directed toward an act itself, without reference to its agent. ... For act-directed moral disapproval the analogue of blaming is condemning the act as wrong’. (Beardsley 1970, 164). Following Beardsley, we use the term condemnation to refer to moral disapproval that does not focus on specific persons. However, some authors use the term condemnation in a different sense to us, even as synonymous with blame (see Bell 2013, 266).

Condemnation is located on the left-bottom area of the matrix. It is hostility targeted against a wrong in general or at an impersonal level. Here, our interviewee rejects doping in a general statement that doping is forbidden:

Doping makes me think that it is forbidden. It has to be made clear, that doping is unacceptable. Whether it is the general Finnish discussion culture, [or] a single sport culture.

The interviewee appears to condemn the act of doping, but does not refer to individual cases. Therefore, her expression represents condemnation.


Sadness

David Goldman (2014) favours moral sadness instead of resentment and indignation as response to wrongs in our interpersonal lives. In other words, Goldman wishes to replace the Strawsonian way of blaming with moral sadness. Our goal is not argue in favour of any of the four moral disapprovals, but elaborate each of them and explain what kind of roles they primarily play according to the matrix of moral disapprovals.

Moral sadness occupies the right-top and partly right-bottom area of the matrix. It is thus a moral phenomenon in which sadness conveys the moral disapproval in the context of particular wrongs or at a more universal level. In the following example, a decision-maker mourns that those who were involved in the doping use of six Finnish cross-country skiers in 2001 Lahti World Championships have suffered unreasonable consequences for their actions:

I think that humans make mistakes, that athletes make mistakes, so condemning the human dignity as the consequence of a mistake. [...] I have been terrified and annoyed about the fate of the people who were involved in the cross-country skiing, how they have received a ban of decades which is not proportional to any transgression in the society.

Moral sadness includes different types of sadness. On the right-top area of the matrix is located person-directed sadness and around the right-bottom area is located impersonal moral sadness. Person-directed sadness can be further divided into sadness towards wrongdoer or sadness towards victim. Again, sadness towards the wrongdoer can be further disapproving or sympathetic. Picture 2 depicts the relations between these different types of moral sadness. We look at examples of them in the empirical section.



Picture 2. Different types of moral sadness.

Empirical results

Overview

We recognised totally 62 passages containing a moral disapproval related to doping in the interviewees' speech. In addition, we identified three broad groups of wrongs in these passages: use of doping (37 instances), anti-doping work (16 instances) and talk, attitudes and reputation (9 instances). The use of doping in the decision-makers' speech refers to the wrong of using doping in general but also to more specific breaches, such as systematic, state managed doping. Wrongs classified as anti-doping work represent, for instance, unjustified variance in sanctions, partial sanctions and testing problems. Talk, attitudes and reputation may refer, for example, to making problematic accusations about doping use.

Blame

We identified totally 17 passages in which decision-makers are expressing blame. As defined above, blame is moral disapproval triggered by a particular wrong. Therefore the majority of the instances of blame have a specific country or countries as their focus, typically as the origin of the wrongdoer. Finland, Norway and Russia are the most frequent countries of relevance. It is not a surprise that Finland is among these countries, since the interviewed decision-makers are from Finnish sport organisations. Instead, it is more interesting that the major part of the blame in the Finnish context is connected to talk, attitudes and reputation. For instance, in the following example a decision-maker blames the national broadcasting company YLE for unprofessional

journalism during 2017 Lahti World Ski Championships. She is frustrated that YLE reminded viewers of the doping case of 2001 Lahti World Ski Championships without good reason:

I was very, I almost felt irritated, our public news provider, our own YLE intentionally shows some old matters, from the 16 years old Lahti World Championships during the current World Championships, I think that it is irrelevant. Somehow then, I started to feel, that is there any point left?

Therese Johaug, 'Norwegian millionaire skiers' and partial Norwegian decision-makers trigger blame when decision-makers of Finnish sport organisations are speaking about Norway. These wrongs belong to the classes of doping use and anti-doping work. For instance, a decision-maker blames the Norwegian authorities for favouring Johaug and for giving her too light sanctions:

On the other hand, if we look at the case of Johaug and Norway. Despite the political system is different, there might be an inner circle of the sporting life, in which people favour their own athletes... they will record the violations, but give sanctions that favour their own athletes. That is, the sanctions are short enough that their athletes can take part in the next important event

The decision-makers' blame related to Russia pertains to largely systematic, state-managed use of doping. One interviewee expresses her blame towards Russia by describing the situation as challenging in that country and by emphasising how doping threatens sporting integrity:

Globally, the situation is challenging, for instance the situation in Russia. But we have to put our own things in order and keep it so. International elite sports, how we know it, it is in risk due to doping.

It seems that the decision-makers' blame in the Norwegian and Russian context stems from the global situation of doping and topical news during the interviews. The aforementioned research group interviewed the decision-makers during the first part of the year 2017 when the discussion about Therese Johaug's doping sanctions was going on, and McLaren's report about the systematic doping use in Russia had been released in the previous year, that is in 2016 (McLaren 2016a and 2016b). Nevertheless, it is an intriguing question whether the blame especially towards Johaug and Norwegians exemplifies more deeply rooted antipathy towards Norwegian cross-country skiing. If one reads news or listens to publicly expressed opinions in Finland, this interpretation may sound plausible (see Iltalehti 2016; Reponen 2015; Savon Sanomat 2016).

Judging blameworthy

Decision-makers' speech includes only 3 instances of judging blameworthy. In one of them, the decision-maker describes that she was spending time with Norwegians after Therese Johaug's doping incident. These Norwegians were defending Johaug, and the decision-makers seem to think that protecting or glorifying the doping users is wrong or morally suspicious. Nevertheless, she states that she does not blame these Norwegians because it is their way of thinking:

I was in Norway when Johaug's first doping violation came out, and I spent a weekend there. I had a couple of decent dinners there with smart people, and nobody talked about the matter. They were silent about it, next time when I saw these same persons, they were all absolutely sure that Johaug is a victim. And I do not blame them because it is their way of thinking.

Condemnation

Moral condemnation is the most frequent response in the decision-makers' speech with 27 instances. Among these 27 instances, over half, that is 17, concern the use of doping. Here is an example in which the decision-maker rejects doping by comparing it to disease: 'Doping is the cancer of sport.'

The several instances of condemning doping use is predictable. As remembered, we use as a stimulus a picture with the text: 'Every athlete has right to clean sport'. This statement makes it easy or 'natural' for the interviewee to respond by condemning the use of doping.

Decision-makers condemn wrongs connected to anti-doping practices frequently. The majority of these condemnations concern the existence of different doping sanctions in different countries or in different sport federations. For instance, in the following example, a decision-maker rejects a situation in which doping violations are concealed in one country but not in other:

There will be bad news from some sports every now and then, and these should be tackled quickly, we should get clear practices so that it would be equal. Not in that way that in one country they are concealing and in another country they are revealing, and then we could create a feeling for the athlete that they are competing with the same rules.

Sadness

Decision-makers' speech contains 15 instances of moral sadness, and majority of these instances concern the wrong of using doping. Finland is the most frequent country of relevance among the 15 instances, and passages concerning Finland are also typically about use of doping. We will next give examples of the different types of sadness in the decision-makers' speech.

There is one instance of disproving sadness towards the wrongdoer. The decision-maker is expressing her disappointment towards Finnish cross-country skier Tero Similä who was caught for doping use in 2014:

I receive information that he [Tero Similiä] has been caught [...] I had a feeling that I had been cheated also. But I don't want to push people over the cliff because of these kinds of issues, these are always tragedies and that way.

Sympathetic sadness towards the wrongdoer in decision-makers' speech is typically a combination of two wrongs: there is an original wrong committed by the wrongdoer and additional wrong targeted towards the original wrongdoer. This scheme occurs when a decision-maker is sad for the excessively harsh treatment of famous Finnish cross-country skier Mika Myllylä who was caught

for use of doping in 2001 Lahti World Championships. Myllylä had difficulties dealing with the public pressure after the doping revelation that started a downfall in his life, including divorce and alcohol problem. He died at the age of 42 in 2011. The decision-maker thinks that Myllylä has received too harsh criticism for his doping use:

Earlier, I was angry, but nowadays I take these issues in a more relaxed way, but cases like those of Myllylä, well all right, probably the athlete himself did not fully realise what was his role in the case [...] It is right that athletes will receive the financial consequences and lose sponsors if the case is true and certain. However, we need some sense of proportion, in other words, he hasn't killed anybody, he doesn't deserve lynching but fair sanction for his action.

In a sense, the sympathetic sadness towards the wrongdoer is founded on an assumption that this is a case where two wrongs do not make one right (see Wertz 2000; Groarke 1982).

Our example of sympathetic sadness towards victims comes from a decision-maker who was a coach in the 90s. She states that she was sad or depressed at a time when her athletes did not seem to have a possibility of success against doped athletes:

Well, then I felt powerless and thought whether there is any point in this. Do I have to go back to the junior sport to enjoy the daily results and trust that the neighbor doesn't have any extra substances, that we compete honestly. [...] In the 90s, I had a lot of meetings with young athletes when it was not worthwhile to reveal to athletes my true view about the situation.

Impersonal moral sadness is typically neither particular nor fully universal. In the following example, a decision-maker is skeptical whether doping testers can ever catch all the doping users. Her melancholic skepticism is not targeted to any specific event, but rather several unspecified cases or experiences:

but then the race between users and testers still exists. And I don't know whether the gap between users and testers will be ever bridged, hopefully. But it would require that global anti-doping work would be as strong as in Finland, for instance. In a sense, that we could reach all countries, and then that would be almost an endless road.

Conclusion

This paper has aimed to promote conceptual and empirical understanding on the varied ways in which people morally disapprove of wrongs related to doping.

Our conceptual contribution is the matrix of moral disapprovals. The matrix describes conceptually four moral disapprovals and their relations to each other. These disapprovals are blame, judging blameworthy, condemnation and sadness. The matrix of moral disapprovals represents a conceptual map or scheme in which each moral disapproval occupies an area, and these areas characterise their typical instances. Blame is antagonistic emotion towards a specific wrongdoer for a wrong that the wrongdoer committed. Judging blameworthy refers to acknowledging a particular wrong without targeting an emotional response towards the wrongdoer. Condemnation is antagonistic emotion towards a wrong at general level. Moral sadness is sorrow caused either

by a particular wrong or wrong at a more general level. However, moral disapprovals' borders are vague in the matrix. In other words, it is difficult to say where instances of one phenomenon end and the other begin.

Our empirical results reveal the variance in how the 31 interviewed decision-makers in Finnish elite sport organisations morally disapprove wrongs related to doping. We identified three large thematic groups of wrongs in their moral disapprovals: (i) use of doping, (ii) anti-doping work and (iii) talk, attitudes and reputation. We also looked at how they each use moral disapprovals. The decision-makers' expression of blame included especially three countries of relevance: Finland, Norway and Russia. Blame concerning Finland was triggered mostly by wrongs that belong to the class of talk, attitudes and reputation. In contrast, blame in the cases of Norway and Russia was typically connected to the wrongs related to anti-doping work and use of doping. Judging blameworthy was marginal moral phenomena in the decision-makers speech. Instead, condemnation was the most common moral disapproval. The decision-makers condemned most often doping and variance in doping sanctions. For moral sadness, Finland was the most frequent country of relevance, and decision-makers mourned typically wrongs related to use of doping in the Finnish context.

We highlight three conclusions or observations based on the empirical results. First, topical issues seemed to affect the decision-maker's particular moral disapprovals, especially blame connected to Norway and Russia. Second, if we constructed an imaginary average decision-maker in a Finnish elite sport organisation based on the results, she or he would be a partial decision-maker who is concerned how the Finnish athletes and teams are treated inside and outside the competition. In other words, the results strengthen our original supposition that the chosen interviewed decision-

makers are partial agents. Third, the imaginary decision-maker condemns the use of doping and variance in doping sanctions.

Our paper provides several possibilities for further research for applying the matrix of moral disapprovals. We mention here two opportunities. First, the future research could inquire into how decision-makers morally respond to doping in everyday situations. Second, the future research could address athletes' moral responses to doping either in interviews or in everyday situations.

Our study does not lead to direct policy recommendations. Nevertheless, it helps decision-makers and practitioners in sport organisations to understand the moral realm of moral disapprovals and provides tools for discussing doping issues ethically.

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