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Author(s): Nguyahambi, Ajali M.; Chang'a, Haji H.; Matunga, Benta N.; Kilonzo, Rehema G.; Kontinen, Tiina

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6 Contextualizing citizenship in Tanzania

Ajali M. Nguyahambi, Haji H. Chang'a, Benta N. Matunga, Rehema G. Kilonzo and Tiina Kontinen

Introduction

In order to explore citizenship habits, it is important to examine the circumstances and environments in which they have been formulated and where they are currently exercised (Holma & Kontinen, this volume). The circumstances relevant for our purposes include both the historically evolved societal and political environments where citizenship is practiced, and the forums of citizenship learning that shape these ideas and practices. In this chapter on Tanzania, we approach them through the notion of *maendeleo* (in Swahili lit. “development”), which is continuously used in public discourses to emphasize the roles and responsibilities of the state and its citizens. From the point of view of citizenship practices, the idea of *maendeleo* does not only define the explicitly political features of citizenship, it also affects everyday participation and how shared issues are addressed.

In contemporary Tanzania, *maendeleo* is not a new term, as it was central before, during and after independence in 1961. Tanzania has passed through different phases of leadership and plans; however, in each phase the main issue has been development for the people. In recent years, the slogan, “*maendeleo hayana chama*” (development has no political affiliation), has increasingly become popular, especially with government officials and the ruling party – the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – emphasizing that development is meant for everyone regardless of political affiliation. In addition, it denotes the specific political orientation of the state and the expected, “unpolitical” form of citizens’ participation in governance and development processes. Further, this discourse has emphasized the role and responsibilities of ordinary citizens in contributing to development, portrayed as the task of every individual in the country. Consequently, in Tanzania, strong contestations over citizenship rights and roles have not been prevalent; rather, citizenship has been exercised more or less within the framework defined by the governing political party: first during the single-party era of African socialism, and second, after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992. Overall, citizenship in Tanzania has been characterized by phases of decolonization, post-independence nation-building and one-party African socialism,

with later liberalization of the economy and re-introduction of multiparty politics with regular elections (Aminzade 2013).

In planning development, the focus has been on technical issues and formal institutions, with the construction of citizenship taking place simultaneously in diverse situations. While a large number of different ethnic groups live in Tanzania, the consolidation of Kiswahili as a national language has strengthened shared “Tanzanian” values in the belonging and identity of its citizens (Rwengabo 2016; Kessler 2006). Moreover, the educational system prioritizes training people to become good citizens through the school curriculum, moulding individuals into responsive citizens who will participate in their own development. In the post-independence decades, education in general and adult education in particular has been a valued way to strengthen the competencies and commitment of citizens. Citizenship learning has taken place in multiple spaces and places such as the formal school system, official civic education and through practical learning in civil society and everyday life.

In this chapter, we provide an understanding of Tanzanian history and the contemporary moment through the lenses of development, citizenship and learning. We first revisit pre-colonial history and the birth of the nation, discussing the emergence of the discourse of *maendeleo* in nation-building in a single-party era. Following that, we reflect on the implication of the introduction of multiparty politics, highlighting contemporary aspects related to citizenship.

Independence and the birth of a nation

Like most of the African countries, Tanzania’s history is intertwined with colonialism. Contemporary mainland Tanzania, Tanganyika, was initially part of German East Africa (1885–1918), and then a British colony until 1961. The ways in which these two different colonial powers established their relationship with their subjects (rather than citizens) have shaped the habits and structures of governance until today (Schneider 2006). In the pre-colonial era, communities in Tanganyika aligned in political and societal structures based on traditional arrangements according to the different ethnic groups established in the chiefdoms. During the colonial era, the Germans supported the Swahili culture, establishing a government school system along the coast with Swahili as the language of instruction; consequently, coastal leaders cooperated with the German colonial administration. The British, on the other hand, exercised “indirect rule” (Schneider 2006, 98) through pre-existing chiefs who would do their bidding, hence favouring the larger ethnic groups, such as Chagga (in Kilimanjaro) and Sukuma (in Shinyanga and Mwanza), over the small ones (Mpangala 1992). Given the environment of potential ethnic and tribal divisions created by the British colonial regime, pre-independence movement leaders preferred to employ associations capable of bringing together different ethnic groups. Thus, they organized their struggles through the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and later the

Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which had already assumed a national character, to attaining political independence in December 1961.

Soon after this, Tanganyika embarked on a nation-building project that ranged from altering existing British colonial policies to radically departing from them, with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 providing the framework of implementation. Nation building was guided by the policy of Ujamaa socialism – which encouraged citizens to participate in communal activities in their respective villages – and was an overtly top-down political project that aimed to address ethnic divisions created during the colonial period and create a sense of national unity. The purpose was to inculcate citizens with desirable political ideals, that is, a strong attachment to the nation that transcended ethnic and regional identities. Nation building was thus meant to foster national identity (Aminzade 2013), which was required due to the multi-ethnic nature of the political society. Additionally, explicit efforts to reduce divisions on the basis of religion were made; the secularity of the state was announced from the beginning and the independent government promised equality for all religions. This is the background for discontent among religious activists (i.e. Muslims) who often complain about “unequal opportunities” in education and government employment compared with the Christian population (Liviga & Tumbo-Masabo 2006; Bakari & Ndumbaro 2001).

The nation-building project involved the establishment of associational bonds across ethnic groups alongside the adoption and experimentation of progressive social policies. For example, Ujamaa villages were created in order to facilitate the provision of shared common resources and social services, as well as making it easier to mobilize them politically. Among others, the nation-building project was meant to consolidate social cohesion, which was considered important in sustaining collective community projects. Nation building required state power and resources to enforce (Rwengabo 2016), and the first president of the country, Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1961–1985) provided leadership agency in the implementation of the project. It started in the early years of independence with the goal of cultivating national cohesion by integrating populations into the emerging state apparatus wherein a common identity was claimed. Thus, today’s national citizenship identity resulted from a deliberate domestic process, which was politically top-down rather than the result of spontaneous actions initiated by the people.

Despite the multiplicity of ethnic groups in postcolonial Tanganyika, the nation-building project managed to develop a relatively coherent identity – in comparison to Uganda, for instance (Alava et al., this volume) – through a fusion of sub-national and ethnic social identities. As a move towards establishing a centralized government legitimized by the goal of building cohesion and national identity (Pratt 1981) all unions based on ethnic identity were abolished and religious associations were warned to stay out of politics. This was when the chiefdom system was banned and the potential discontent of influential chiefs controlled by giving them civil service posts. Consequently,

nation building acquired shared cultural resources and symbols such as the Swahili language, which served as an ideological and political communication tool. In addition, nation building achieved the loyalty of populations to the same geo-political unit, and the elimination of ethnic dominance over political institutions (Miguel 2004). Overall, post-independence nation-building in Tanzania is generally regarded as a success, as Tanzania has avoided the seriously violent ethnic and religious conflicts prevalent in many other African countries.

The emergence and formulations of “*maendeleo*”

The notion of *maendeleo*, development – considered one of the strongest pillars in the nation-building project – was embedded in the post-independence policies of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* (familyhood and self-reliance). *Ujamaa* as a political notion denoted a strong sense of communal spirit, a sense of belonging and the assumption of mutual responsibility for societal development, which was explicitly related to traditional African values (Stöger-Eising 2000). In this respect, it constituted a societal project: African socialism that combined nation-building policies with social and economic development strategy. Hence, *Ujamaa* offered a distinct set of egalitarian principles that formed the bedrock of values and efforts to institute profound social change in collective ways of living, directed and shaped by the state.

The *Ujamaa* philosophy promoted the total participation of all community members in communal labour in the rural sector, communal ownership of land, nationalizations in the private sector and the provision of public services such as health and education at the national level (Jennings 2017). As such, citizens’ participation in development activities was to be realized through mutual help and voluntary engagement in everyday community life. Indeed, notwithstanding the rhetoric of voluntarism, *Ujamaa* community members had an obligation to work, which took the form of cooperation in production and sharing in distribution (Stöger-Eising 2000). Therefore, a communalized work force and collectivized means of production were the cornerstones of *maendeleo*; people who were reluctant to participate in communalized development activities in *Ujamaa* villages were referred to as parasites (*kupe* in Swahili).

The rights and duties of citizens were defined alongside the kind of education that aimed to transmit values compatible with the creation of an egalitarian society. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the *Ujamaa* policy and attainment of its egalitarian goals, a powerful bureaucracy was installed to take control of its management. The policy was part of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which was a concrete set of prescribed leadership codes, such as “freedom”, “justice” and “unity”, to be adopted by political officials and bureaucrats. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was the only political party within the single-party

system, was entrusted with a supervisory role and leadership. The Ujamaa policy advocated state-led development that emphasized nation building and nationalism (Hyden 1981). Therefore, Ujamaa as the framework for the path of development in Tanzania denotes a specific ideological focus in the promotion of nationalism, the transformation from colonial hegemony to a meaningful sense of nationhood and citizenship, and African particularism in a socialistic form of governance. State-led implementation of the Ujamaa policy germinated into “developmental paternalism” (Pratt 1981; Schneider 2006), hence embedding Ujamaa in the rise of an authoritarian state that was supposed to take a paternalistic care of the development of its citizens. Although Nyerere (1968) elaborated on the connections between development and the participation of people in the communities, the realization of expected outcomes started to dwindle as the government largely took over the responsibility of development without much involving the grass roots level.

Different mechanisms were employed to implement the nation-building project, including the adoption of Kiswahili as a national language, the presence of civic curricula in schools and the official use of national symbols and slogans. In addition, some specific laws were made to promote national unity and discourage divisiveness. The nationalism discourse was monopolized by the ruling party, TANU (later CCM), through widespread party branches in all villages, schools, public services, major industries, major civic groups and trade unions (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994). The population was mobilized to extremely high levels of support for the party, notwithstanding the generally passive roles occupied by ordinary people, while the government controlled political expression, political organization and the message of nation building. The primary objective of the government was to address three declared enemies (ignorance, diseases and poverty), hence it limited any potential voices of dissent or alternative nationalizing narratives (Nyerere 1962; 1968). Those who did not participate in the national building project were considered traitors, which helped to guarantee the involvement and support of every citizen in development projects, across classes, races, ethnicities and gender. The limited space for political expression and organization, however, produced a post-colonial citizenship agenda that was political and propagandistic rather than focused on citizenship rights and corresponding duties. Citizens became mere receivers of party policies and instructions, which they were to support and implement whenever they got the opportunity (Lawson & Rakner 2005; Komba 1996).

State institutions managed the citizenship education agenda during the post-colonial era. President Julius Nyerere spearheaded nation-wide civic education through his speeches and other programs, moulding a new political orientation among citizens, guided by socialism and self-reliance (Mushi 2009). The pedagogical approaches employed were non-participatory and devoid of critical analysis, allowing the censorship of contradicting perspectives. The definition of a “good citizen” by the independent government

included the need for all citizens to pledge their commitment and loyalty to the ruling party, the government and key national leaders. In this regard, critical citizenship was associated with the notion of violence, and hence not acceptable in interactions with the state. The delivery channels of civic education included formal political education for the youth in schools and colleges, as well as adult education. There were also public campaigns promoting economic and social development, while radio commentaries (Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam – RTD) and print media (government and party-owned newspapers, e.g. *Uhuru*, *Mzalendo*, *Sunday News* and *Daily News*) publicized programs on issues like *Ujamaa Vijijini*, *Mtu ni Afya*, and *Siasa na Kilimo* (Ujamaa, health, science and agriculture). Ultimately, citizenship education cultivated a parochial political culture that enabled the group holding power under the one-party ideology to have maximum control with the minimum conflict (Mallya 2008). All general elections between 1965 and 1990 were held in a single-party system, hence with limited policy alternatives, even when the ruling party did not please citizens. For example, the presidential position had one candidate and the electorates were required to vote YES or NO, with no optional candidate.

Over time, however, international ideas of “development” influenced the internal debates in different ways. For example, throughout the 1970s the development discourse was dominated by the “participatory development model”, which focused on the need to involve people in decision making and in the implementation phase. Following the series of global economic disasters¹ during the late 1970s, the development discourse from the early 1980s was dominated by Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that embraced a market economy as opposed to one that was state planned. Under the guidance of the Bretton Woods Institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) – countries in sub-Saharan Africa were pressured to adopt privatization of state-owned enterprises and resources, deregulation and devaluation of currency, reduction of trade barriers, elimination of subsidies in public service provision and the agricultural sector, and principles of good governance and pluralism in politics. However, Tanzania, under the leadership of President Nyerere, was reluctant to subscribe to international development strategies engineered by the Bretton Woods Institutions, rather favouring state-planned strategies (Kiondo 1993). Nyerere was of the view that SAPs were modern imperialist mechanisms of colonization that minimized the ability of the government to organize and regulate its economy in the face of multinational companies. This threatened sovereignty over the economy because international institutions could dictate the nation’s economic policy; yet, despite pursuing policies of self-reliance, Tanzania was heavily dependent on international development aid. Therefore, in the late 1980s, the neoliberal agendas of the international community forced Tanzania to reduce the public sector, embrace the market economy and initiate governance reforms in the direction of multiparty politics to address the pressures of democratization.

Era of reforms and multiparty politics

After three decades (1960s–1980s) of experimenting with socialism and a policy of self-reliance, Tanzania decided to undertake political and economic liberalization. Political liberalization materialized through the introduction of a multiparty political system and greater space for civil society organizations to function with autonomy from state control. Economic liberalization came through change from a planned economy to a free market economy, which allowed the privatization of state-owned means of production. Politically, Nyerere's post-independence policy had abolished the multiparty political system² which had existed during the pre-independence period. Nyerere's argument was that colonialism was defeated and what lay ahead of every citizen was the fight against the three new enemies of ignorance, poverty and disease. According to Nyerere, the three enemies did not require multiparty politics, hence perpetuating negative images of opposition political parties in order to diminish their public support. The later retreat from the Ujamaa policy came as the outcome of internal and external factors. Internally, President Julius Nyerere and other political activists started to advocate for change from single-party to multiparty political system. Nyerere realized that political pluralism had awarded a victory to the global agenda of democratization, which could no longer be resisted. Meanwhile, the Ujamaa policy had become associated with economic shortcomings and the failure of the state in the field of public service delivery at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s (Mogella & Kiondo 2006). Consequently, the country adopted a National Economic Survival Programme (1981–1982) and successive SAPs (1982–1986). Externally, pressure and conditionalities from donor countries, the WB and the IMF made the government implement SAPs, though these reform packages were strongly resisted by Nyerere.

Toward the end of 1980s, Ujamaa lost popularity as a favourite lexicon of development in Tanzania. Instead, vocabularies such as *mageuzi*³ (literally, change or transformation) and *utandawazi* (globalization) captured the social, economic and political discourses. The new terminologies suggested new duties for the state and corresponding rights among citizens in these fields. In 1992, a multiparty political system was re-introduced through Political Parties Act 1992 (No. 5 of 1992), ending nearly three decades of a single-party system. The newly established opposition political parties took the lead in introducing and promoting the new political language that propagated *mageuzi*. However, the agenda for changes took place in a context in which the notion of Ujamaa was still alive in the intellectual sphere and diffused across the country by the authorities and ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), whose stance has remained conservative. Although Tanzania amended its constitution in 1992 to become a multiparty state, the CCM has continued to control the government.

Currently, there are 22 political parties that participate in general elections, which involve the election of the president, members of parliament and ward

councillors. They also participate in elections for local government authorities to elect village and hamlet chairpersons. To date, Tanzania has conducted five general elections at intervals of five years from 1995 to 2015. All five elections have witnessed a peaceful transition from one government to another, while retaining the leadership of the CCM. The influence of opposition political parties has continued to grow, especially among the few active parties that have representation in the national assembly, including Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), the Civic United Front (CUF), the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR) – Mageuzi, and the recently established Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT – Wazalendo). Currently, the national assembly and ward councils are generally dominated by the ruling party with more than 70 per cent of about 390 members of parliament and about 5350 ward councillors respectively (Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi 2016). The rest of the seats are distributed among the opposition parties although the numbers are also affected by the defection of members of parliament and ward councillors from opposition parties to the ruling CCM party.

When the reforms were taking place in the early 1990s, the majority of citizens seemed to be under the influence of the ideas and charismatic leadership of Nyerere and accustomed to the prevalent rule of the CCM at all levels of the society; indeed, there was some resistance to change in the political system. For instance, a public opinion survey reported in the Nyalali Commission Report (1991) indicated that 80 per cent of population had said “no” to the proposed multiparty system (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania 1992); ironically, the new political environment necessitated the provision of civic education in order to promote political pluralism (Mallya 2008; Komba & Ndumbaro 2003). Since the adoption of political liberalization, civic education (at least in theory) has aimed to create well-informed citizens who show their affection for their country by critically examining state institutions. The purpose is to enable citizens to engage and participate actively in critical discussions regarding government policies, structures and actions, in contrast to the historical narratives of the 1960s that carefully framed the past, picking and choosing facts in order to emphasize national unity and peace (Kessler 2006). However, the ideal of a good citizen as a participant in the process of political change rather than the subject of the state is far from being realized.

These reforms have, however, also opened civic space for various interest groups, private sector actors and civil society organizations to play a part in development processes (Mundy 2008). Previously, civil society mobilization, such as women or youth movements, was co-opted by the state into centralized mass organizations. The opening of civic space was accompanied by the mushrooming of civic organizations; in the first decade, for example, the number of registered Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) increased from 224 in 1993 to 8,499 in 2000 (Lange et al. 2000). As part of the structural adjustment package, the plethora of CSO interventions was fuelled by the expansion of donor funding for civil society and NGOs, as donors searched

for alternative channels through which to support social and political development due to their disappointment in states.

Despite being criticized for working for the people instead of working with the people (Shivji 2007), civil society organizations succeeded in influencing macro level issues such as the democratization agenda, human rights, gender equality and social justice by maintaining public discussion on the issues, and contesting the policies and actions working contra to these principles. Meanwhile, new kinds of civil society organizations provided forums in which people could address their particular challenges at the local level, and a way to acquire potential external financial support for these initiatives. Thus, NGOs and civil society organizations at different levels promoted a variety of ways of perceiving citizenship, and opportunities to “think differently” in terms of, for instance, the state-citizen relationship. Simultaneously, potential donor support created a number of organizations that manifested what Green (2012) calls anticipatory development: continually applying and waiting for donor funding before initiating any activities, resulting in their being conversant with donor policies rather than people’s challenges. The priority given to registered organizations has also excluded people without the time or capacity to participate in formal CSO activities (Dill 2009; Mercer 2002).

Contemporary multiparty politics as a context of citizenship

The contemporary multiparty political system in Tanzania reflects the prior movements and civic associations from which the present parties derive their origin. At the time of the shift from single-party to multiparty politics in 1992, movements and civic associations had not articulated clear political agendas that would have amounted to a struggle to win political power. The new political parties were established on the basis of the ideas of elite individuals, with no clear political ideology, meaning that some political parties only gained strong social support from areas where the founder members originated; this may be compared with the CCM which was supported across the country and had a clearly articulated political ideology. Thus, the drive for a multiparty political system in Tanzania has largely been the outcome of external forces and pressures from the international community rather than internal changes (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994). Moreover, although not exclusively, political changes have been the product of legislation rather than resulting from the claims of social movements. Thereafter, the established political parties and other elite institutions went on to socialize individuals and the larger society into the new political system. In this respect, while it was expected that the new political system could guarantee a high level of civic activism, the contemporary era still experiences a shortage of social movements.

After the re-introduction of a multiparty system, the ensuing regimes embarked on a project of revitalizing the *maendeleo* discourse, which is partly born out of the post-socialist situation, characterized by increasing concerns

about economic inequality, threats to national cohesion and the high visibility of corruption in the political sphere (Fouéré 2014). Political elites from the ruling party and opposition parties compete in capitalizing on the moral legacy of President Nyerere to build political legitimacy and renew the national consciousness. All political parties claim to advocate social equality and economic justice, prolifically referencing the political principles for which Nyerere stood. However, opposition parties view the ruling party as perpetually striving to impose the state and CCM hegemony on common citizens, while the ruling party claims that opposition parties merely use Nyerere's name to earn popularity, considering itself the only party that should be closely associated with his legacy.

The ability of the government and ruling party to control national discourse has diminished considerably due to presence of opposition parties, the rise of independent media and the role of civil society organizations. However, despite a major overhaul of the civic education curriculum in recent years, the high level of commitment to changing education policy offers evidence of mixed feelings. For example, in 2005 the government banned the operations of HakiElimu⁴ on the grounds that it had presented a “baseless” critique of the government's progress in improving access to primary education (Mongula 2007), which implied the possibility of limiting space for autonomous CSO activity. Recently, the phenomenon of the “shrinking space of civil society” (Civicus 2018) also continues to affect active citizenship in Tanzania. Political pluralism is inhibited by limited freedom of association and restrictions on peaceful demonstrations. The media have remained under strong state control despite expectations that they would be the sounding boards for political concerns, hence hampering the principle of media independence. Freedom of speech is also constrained through various control mechanisms such as social media registration and political party legislation. This has been revealed in the recent public discourse that indicated dissent on the enactment of the Cybercrime Act of 2015, the Media Services Act of 2016, the amendment of the Statistics Act of 2018 (Cap 351) and the Political Party Amendment Act of 2019. Twa-weza (2019) asserts that enforcement of those legislations undermines civil society activism, independence of the traditional social movements, freedom of expression in social media, the promotion of human rights, political activism and the autonomy of political parties.

The legal framework for political pluralism formally provides space for multiparty political activities and civil society engagement while the space to claim the rights of excluded groups is de facto limited by social and economic conditions and political constraints (Mallya 2008). Despite restrictions on the claimed spaces, however, development partners provide support for the creation of invited space for dialogue between civil society and local and national authorities. In this way, donor countries, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and international CSOs play a significant role in influencing contemporary multiparty politics and the general state of

the political atmosphere. However, there is some level of laxity on the part of the ruling CCM in adopting the comprehensive practice of liberal policies, taking the conservative stance that unmonitored liberal practices tend to compromise the state of peace and tranquillity that has existed since independence in 1961.

The formal education system provides political socialization through a nation-wide curriculum of Civics (ordinary level secondary schools), General Studies (advanced level secondary schools and colleges) and Development Studies (university). These subjects offer a wide range of topics, including the state and society, and issues of human rights, gender, the environment and globalization (Komba 2013). For adult citizens, learning in the course of participation takes place in different groups that present meaningful spaces; co-operative societies and production groups (Maghimbi 2010), mutual help groups (Rodima-Taylor 2013; 2014) and local savings and loan groups (Green 2019) are all examples of arenas in which people come together and promote their development, while participation in funeral and wedding committees and cultural groups plays a much more significant role than taking part in civil society organizations (Dill 2009). These are all largely autonomous from state control because they do not directly involve a politically related agenda. By taking part in these groups, citizens learn different ways of living in society while fulfilling social and cultural duties and exercising corresponding rights. Political participation, especially in rural areas, refers to taking part in village meetings where joint issues are discussed; however, such participation is passive rather than active engagement in local debate, compared to similar meetings taking place in urban settings which exhibit relatively greater critical reflection.

Political parties also provide citizenship education in order to recruit members and encourage the general population to participate in various political processes, including the general elections. On the other hand, they appear rather to publicize their biased and propagandistic party policies than to present a general agenda for a democratic society (Mallya 2008). Instead of aiming to develop an informed citizenry, political parties use the opportunity to promote their own agendas and attempt to persuade people to vote for them, rather than to exercise their right of individual choice. Meanwhile, since the introduction of political pluralism in the late 1980s, CSOs have also been instrumental in the provision of civic education and promotion of human rights, citizens' agency, democracy and social transformation (Nyang'oro 2006). However, CSOs must operate under strong state monitoring and control and are dependent on their donors' agendas. Their ideal of promoting a vibrant civil society faces the reality that most CSOs are under-resourced, dependent on donor funding, lack democratic leadership and are mostly urban-based. With some longstanding exceptions, they promote issues such as active citizenship, social accountability or democratization only insofar as they receive funding for such programs. Indeed, donors may influence or compel CSOs to shelve their primary objectives, such as facilitating social change, in order to respond to donor funding demands.

Citizenship in contemporary Tanzania: Contestations and everyday realities

The legacies of different historical phases can be seen in the contemporary manifestations of citizenship. The initial focus of the nation-building project was the creation of a crosscutting national identity by reducing the legitimacy of sub-group polarization. Despite dismantling the Ujamaa policy and single party politics, people in Tanzania live with the legacy of a political agenda that emphasized nationhood and unity. Consequently, collective debates about citizenship and imaginaries of the nation in contemporary Tanzania continue to be shaped by Ujamaa as a set of moral principles. The images embodied in the figure of President Julius Nyerere have continued to provide an important model for Tanzania's identity and civic values. Most Tanzanians even today refer to Nyerere either as "Mwalimu" (teacher) or as "Baba wa Taifa", the father of the nation, indicating that he is an honoured and benevolent paternal figure and, as such, citizens should be grateful and respect his personality and political principles.

Generally, Nyerere continues to stand as a symbol promoting national unity and criticism of the shortcomings of Ujamaa inside Tanzania is scarce (see Hunter 2008; Schneider 2004). In a similar vein, any open criticism of power holders, or explicit contestations between different political views is not prevalent except for the most vocal, mostly urban-based, civil society activists and opposition politicians. Overall, the on-going democratization, the change from a one-party system to a competitive multiparty system, offers both opportunities and threats to contemporary political citizenship. At the end of the 2010s, the political and legal conditions for political parties and civil society to flourish are deteriorating, although political and civil society activism persists.

Although the state has opened many new avenues to participation, it still strongly resists criticism or public involvement, hence creating tension between state and citizens, CSOs, political parties and media. Remnants of the Ujamaa policy continue to exist, with ordinary citizens displaying fear of the effects of too much political competition. Tanzania has, however, already begun to redefine its national identity for a new era by accommodating new civic virtues in a competitive political culture. The adoption of the latter is happening in a context where political parties and other civic activists continue to pursue peaceful and non-divisive modes of competition, echoing Nyerere's ideas. The fundamental negotiation, at least in rhetoric, is between maintaining a peaceful path and attempting to accommodate a competitive political culture.

The emerging citizenship discourse emphasizes the promotion of democracy, but only to the extent that enjoying civil liberties does not compromise the unity and security of the nation from the point of view of the power holders. For instance, sometimes civic movements, certain forms of political activism and critical individuals are labelled as violent, often facing strong-

handed reprisal from the state for trading peace and stability for rights. The discourse of *maendeleo* is also used to de-legitimize critical voices, as anyone not supporting the current path defined by the power holders can be framed as being against development and the good of the country's citizenry as a whole. Moreover, appealing to African particularism and culture is also a means of criticizing "Western democracy" or not acknowledging the full rights of some groups, such as sexual minorities.

Conclusions

On the basis of our brief overview of the historical evolution and contemporary characteristics of the citizenship environment in Tanzania, we can conclude that ideas and practices of citizenship have been formed through nation building, one-party politics, liberalization and the intertwining of the traces of all these in discourses of *maendeleo*. The legacy of the nation-building project has created a relatively strong sense of the responsible citizen who participates in development, following the path marked out by paternalistic political leaders: a model strengthened by the merging of party, state and society during socialism, which did not provide much room for manoeuvre for autonomous civil society or individual citizens. While space has gradually expanded as a result of liberalization, there are still tensions in regard to civil society and its opposition today.

The notion that *maendeleo hayana chama*, wherein the ruling CCM mobilizes support from citizens in order to supply them with development in return, shapes and defines what citizenship is and how it can be practiced in everyday life. Good citizens are those who support government development efforts by being involved in the discourse that promotes peace and national unity. Despite the slow pace of change, the spirit of *mageuzi* – which differs from that of the Ujamaa era – is flourishing. The new goal is to develop critical minds and participatory citizenship and, indeed, there are many more voices in the political debate with reasoned opinions from different points of view which represent post-liberalization narratives.

Nonetheless, the country faces a great challenge to the practice of democracy because of the limited command of political and citizenship issues and debates among the majority of citizens. The population is predominantly rural dwellers who are not easily reached by social and political activists or civil society organizations. In addition, opposition parties lack good leadership which makes them disorganized often characterized by internal conflicts. Besides, as most party leaders were originally in the ruling party and joined opposition parties after losing their positions, they have neither a clear political agenda nor any desire to institute change. All these elements act as obstacles for the fulfilment of civic duties and the exercise of rights, especially during interaction with state institutions or when citizens try to hold their leaders accountable.

Box 6.1 Facts about Tanzania

Population (projection, 2017): 57.3 million

Urban population (2017):33.1%

Area: 947300 km²

Capital city: Dodoma/Dar es Salaam

Official languages: Kiswahili, English

Governance: Republic, executive president, multiparty system

Literacy rate (2015): 77.9% (15 years and older)

Life expectancy (at birth) (2018): 66.3 years. Female 68.1 years, Male 64.6 years

Infant mortality (2016): 40.3/1,000 live births

Employment percentage (estimate, 2017): 81.5% (15 years and older)

Religions: Muslims (appr. 1/3), Christians (appr. 1/3), Traditional and other religions (appr. 1/3).

Ethnical groups: Overall about 120 groups

Human Development Index (2018): Value 0.538 (Rank 154)

Civic space: Repressed

Freedom house indicators (value 100 most free, value 1 most free, 7 least free):

Aggregate freedom score: 45/100

Freedom rating: 4.5/7

Political rights: 4/7

Civil liberties: 5/7

Governance indicators (2017) (100 the highest rank):

Voice and accountability: 37/100

Political stability and absence of violence: 26/100

Government effectiveness: 28/100

Regulatory quality: 30/100

Rule of law: 35/100

Control of corruption: 39/100

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Notes

- 1 Economies in many countries across sub-Saharan Africa experienced economic glitches such as oil and debt crises and multiple economic depressions, leading policy makers to decide that deeper intervention was necessary to improve a country's overall well-being.
- 2 Tanganyika had a multiparty political system before attaining independence in 1961. The parties included the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the African National Congress (ANC), the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) and the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). However, soon after independence, Mwalimu Nyerere, who was TANU chairman and the first president of Tanganyika, announced a single party political system in 1962 and banned other political parties although they had all struggled for independence. Hence, a Single Party Constitution was introduced in 1965; TANU became the only party and all citizens joined it.
- 3 Mageuzi reflected political and economic liberalization, a critical turn from a single party to a multiparty system, and from socialism to a free market economy.
- 4 HakiElimu is a civil society organization that strives to transform education, in and out of schools, and to influence policy making and its effective implementation, while stimulating imaginative dialogue and social change.

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