“THIS IS NOT IMMIGRATION. THIS IS INVASION”: The representation of Islam and Muslims in the speeches of Gerard Batten

Master’s thesis

Heikki Saira

University of Jyväskylä
Department of Language and Communication Studies
English

November 2019

JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO

Tiedekunta – Faculty Humanistinen tiedekunta	Laitos – Department Kieli- ja viestintätieteiden laitos
Tekijä – Author Heikki Saira	
Työn nimi – Title “This is not immigration. This is invasion”: The representation of Islam and Muslims in the speeches of Gerard Batten	
Oppiaine – Subject Englanti	Työn laji – Level Pro Gradu -tutkielma
Aika – Month and year Marraskuu 2019	Sivumäärä – Number of pages 84

Tiivistelmä – Abstract

Oikeistopopulistinen politiikka on ollut viime vuosina selvässä nousussa ympäri maailmaa, mikä on tarkoittanut huomattavaa muutosta myös poliittisessa kielenkäytössä. Niin mediassa, kuin vaalikampanjoinnissa ja parlamentti-istunnoissakin, on ollut mahdollista havaita äärinationalistisen, rasistisen ja diskriminoivan retoriikan uudelleentuleminen, jollaista tuskin on länsimaissa nähty sitten toisen maailmansodan.

Tutkimalla Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan itsenäisyyspuolueen (UKIP) puheenjohtajan ja ex-europarlamentaarikko Gerard Battenin Euroopan parlamentin täysistunnoissa vuosina 2014-2019 pitämiä puheita koskien islamia ja muslimeja tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena oli selvittää, miten merkityksiä konstruoidaan diskriminoivassa ja rasistisessa poliittisessa kielenkäytössä. Tutkimus pyrkii osaltaan myös kuvaamaan sitä, miten tuonkaltaiset diskurssit voivat kyetä levittämään ja toisintamaan rasismia yhteiskunnallisella tasolla. Hyödyntämällä diskurssihistoriallista lähestymistapaa kriittiseen diskurssianalyysiin, kulttuurista rasismiteoriaa, parlamentti-istuntojen diskurssitutkimusta sekä Toulminin argumentaation analyysimallia tämä tutkimus perehtyi siihen, kuinka Batten kuvaa islamia ja muslimeja puheissaan, sekä siihen miten hän argumentoi näiden kuvausten puolesta.

Tutkimuksessa selvisi, että Battenin diskurssissa islam edustaa vaarallista toiseutta, joka uhkaa Euroopan turvallisuutta ja homogeenisenä esitettyä eurooppalaista kristillisiin perinteisiin nojaavaa kulttuuria. Hän hyödyntää useita oikeistopopulismille tyypillisiä argumentaatiostrategioita luodakseen retoriikkaa, jossa muun muassa kristinuskon ja islamin vastakkainasettelu vertautuu sotaan, Koraanin lukeminen aiheuttaa terrorismia ja muslimit esittäytyvät piilorasistisesti kauttaaltaan epäluotettavina muukalaisina. Kaiken kaikkiaan tällaisen rasistisen ja muslimeja vahingoittavan kielenkäytön voidaan nähdä olevan erityisen ongelmallista juuri transnationaalisessa parlamenttikontekstissa kahdesta syystä; ensinnäkin, sieltä sen on median ansiosta mahdollista levitä mittaamattoman laajalle ja siten toisintaa rasismia ympäröivässä yhteiskunnassa. Toiseksi, EU-parlamenttikontekstissa tällainen kielenkäyttö kykenee myös vaikuttamaan suoraan ihmiselämiä sääteleviin Euroopan laajuisiin lakeihin ja asetuksiin.

Asiasanat – Keywords
kriittinen diskurssianalyysi, retoriikka, oikeistopopulismi, rasismi, islam

Säilytyspaikka – Depository
JYX

Muita tietoja – Additional information

Table of contents

1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………….3
2 BACKGROUND……………………………………………………………………………...5
2.1 Parliamentary discourse on Islam and Muslims……………………………………….5
2.2 Theoretical framework of the present study…………………………………………….11
2.2.1 Race and racism………………………………………………………………….11
2.2.2 Culturalist racism and racialization……………………………………………...13
2.2.3 Racism and discourse…………………………………………………………….17
2.2.4 Parliamentary debates: characteristics and general strategies………………...18
3 THE PRESENT STUDY……………………………………………………………………….21
3.1 Aims and research questions…………………………………………………………….21
3.2 Data selection and collection…………………………………………………………….22
3.3 Methods of analysis……………………………………………………………………..23
3.3.1 Critical discourse analysis……………………………………………………..23
3.3.2 The discourse-historical approach…………………………………………….25
3.3.3 The Toulmin model of argumentation…………………………………………27
4 ANALYSIS……………………………………………………………………………………..30
4.1 'Islam 101' by Gerard Batten……………………………………………………………31
4.1.1 "The death cult of Mohammed"………………………………………………31
4.1.2 Source of terrorism……………………………………………………………38
4.1.3 Cause of antisemitism…………………………………………………………43
4.2 "This is not immigration. This is invasion" – Islamic immigration
and Islam in Europe…………………………………………………………………………50
4.3 "The terrorists and the extremists all have one thing in common:
they are all reading the same book" – The Qur'an…………………………………………63
4.4 "They are not the problem" – Moderate Muslims……………………………………66
5 DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………………………………..71
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………..79

1 INTRODUCTION

Recent years have marked a significant rise in the popularity of right-wing populist politics in Europe, the US and beyond, with some parties garnering a significant number of votes and high-ranking seats not only in national governments, but also as part of transnational institutions, such as the European Parliament. This has also meant a noticeable shift in the way language has come to be used in more or less every discourse context available for the influence of politics and politicians. These include contexts both formal and everyday, such as media in its traditional forms, for example, TV, newspapers and radio, but also – and perhaps even more importantly – in its digital and social forms on the Internet. In addition to these media contexts, this change in political language use has appeared in election campaigns, rallies, speeches, legislation, and so forth. On all of these socially powerful platforms one has been able to witness a proliferation of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and antisemitic rhetoric, the extent of which has quite possibly never been seen before in the post-World War II West.

By investigating the 2014-2018 European Parliament speeches given about Islam and Muslims by Gerald Batten, then-MEP and incumbent leader of the Eurosceptic and right-wing populist United Kingdom's Independence Party (UKIP), this study aims to contribute to creating a better understanding of how meaning is built and structured in discriminatory political discourse and textual rhetoric. Moreover, this study is an attempt to at least partially illustrate how and why this type of fear-mongering language can be seen as being quite powerful – especially in Europe, but also in the contemporary West in general – in influencing, convincing and persuading people into taking discriminatory stances against other people they may consequently come to consider as alarmingly foreign, unwelcome and dangerous. Gerard Batten's speeches are under scrutiny here, because of his inclination to talk about Islam and Muslims quite often in his speeches during his later years in the European Parliament, but also because he has had a reputation of being quite controversial and polemic regarding ethnic issues and immigration, even by his own party's standards – especially when it comes to Islam's role in Europe. In fact, during Batten's leadership, which began in February 2018, the majority of UKIP MEPs left the party, with several citing Batten's push to focus the party more on opposing Islam and his seeking of closer relations with the far-right as their reasons for departure. Although no UKIP MEPs were elected in the European Parliament elections of 2019, the party still remains a player in the British political field and, with Batten on its helm, continues to have a voice with which to spread its discriminatory discourse against Islam and Muslims. Especially, since as of late that discourse seems to have been

originating from an increasingly radical far-right territory, I consider it meaningful in the present study to attempt to uncover and deconstruct its mechanisms.

The operational realm of this study in its broadest sense is discourse analysis (DA), which can quite concisely be characterized as a multidisciplinary approach to studying real (as opposed to invented) language in use as part of social life and as used by people as social beings (Fairclough 2003: 2-3). However, in a more focused manner, this study can be positioned in a DA sub-field called critical discourse analysis (CDA), which specializes in examining how discourse is related to the reproduction of power, dominance and inequality (van Dijk 2000a: 28). Although several CDA forms present a strong connection between discourse and political and social issues, it is perhaps the discourse-historical approach (DHA) with its distinct historical dimension which has proven the most efficient when analyzing ethno-political aspects of discourse, such as racism in political speech (van Dijk 2000a: 28; Hafez 2017: 395). Therefore, it is seen appropriate to apply the DHA in the present study, too.

One of the leading researchers of parliamentary debates in the field of critical discourse analysis, Teun A. van Dijk, wrote nearly twenty years ago that parliamentary debates are a form of political discourse quite rarely studied, which is why one cannot rely on a “ready-made genre theory” when attempting to characterize such interaction in discursive terms (van Dijk 2000a: 19). Especially the latter part of the statement still holds very much true to this day, and – even though since the early 2000s several influential studies on parliamentary discourse have been published, many of them by van Dijk himself – parliamentary debate analysis still remains somewhat in the margins of political discourse studies (Ilie 2010: 3). This is particularly true when considering parliamentary discourse analysis related to ethnic issues, and even more so when considering such analysis related to Islam and Muslims. Certainly, these types of studies on Islam and Muslims have been conducted – perfectly successfully, too – by at least a few very prolific researchers laying the firm groundwork. Nevertheless, it is quite probable that much still remains undiscovered. For this reason, I believe there exists a real need to make further contributions to this important field, which is precisely the purpose of this study. Moreover, to my knowledge at least, there has yet to be any previous in-depth research into the representation of Islam and Muslims in the political speeches of UKIP leader Gerard Batten, much less in the context of the European Parliament.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Parliamentary discourse on Islam and Muslims

Although there has not been much previous research into the way politicians talk about Islam and Muslims in the context of parliamentary debates, there are a few notable exceptions. In fact, these studies in question can be considered groundbreaking and enlightening, not the least for the purposes of the present study. One of the early examples comes from van Dijk (1997) who examined how politicians in Western parliaments talk about race and ethnic relations, and how that talk contributes through its media coverage to the ethnic consensus in societies dominated by white people. Applying critical discourse analysis to debates on immigration in the *Assemblée Nationale* in France, he was able to reveal several key strategies of discrimination and derogation employed by right-wing populist politicians against Islam and Muslims, which, still to this day, seem to repeat in parliamentary contexts around the world. Van Dijk's (1997: 57) French examples were taken from a 1986 debate about a bill proposed by the conservative government concerning immigrants' entry and residence conditions and regulations. In his analysis he was able to show perhaps one of the most distinctive differences between the more traditional forms of racism and their 'modern' equivalents. While traditionally racism has often been understood as being heavily influenced by biology and blatantly misguided beliefs about race, it is increasingly culture which works as a substitute for biological race in modern racist discourse. By carefully concentrating on cultural aspects in their immigration critique, the politicians in van Dijk's study attempted to avoid accusations of racism by construing an outsider threat originating from a problematic *culture* as opposed to a problematic *people per se* (van Dijk 1997: 58, 62). This results in a black-and-white dichotomy between 'our own' culture (i.e., Western culture) and 'their' culture (i.e., Muslim culture), where Muslim culture is seen as posing a threat to Western norms, values, principles and to the Western way of living, in general. Moreover, according to his study, this dichotomy completely ignores the vast variety of differences regarding cultural lifestyles and values found among both of these cultures which in the politicians' views appear rather monolithic instead (van Dijk 1997: 61).

Building on faulty argumentation, presuppositions, overgeneralization and persistent denials of racism, the politicians – especially from the far-right – present Western culture and values uncritically in an idealized light and themselves as their inspired defenders. At its most blatant, this discourse supposes a natural hierarchy between the French and Others, which echoes sentiments similar to traditional supremacist thinking (van Dijk 1997: 60). Although van Dijk (1997: 62)

acknowledges that parliamentary speech is quite rarely as overtly racist as in some of his examples, he points out that "when we make explicit the presuppositions and implications of such talk, we often discover the beliefs that make up the cognitive representations that are the basis of modern elite racism". In addition, he reminds that such talk is not merely impotent words or nothing more but an expression of veiled social values and attitudes. Instead, it functions directly in influencing other Members of Parliament and, ultimately, – through the often unsubtle filter of mass media – the public opinion, as well. In other words, these speeches carry the power to drastically affect the daily lives of numerous immigrants and ethnic minorities via their widespread influence on a range of social and institutional decision-making bodies (van Dijk 1997: 62-62). In line with this particular research by van Dijk, the present study adopts a similar "culturalist" theory of racism and takes heed of the suggestion to examine critically the subtleties of political discourse in order to be able to uncover the possibly discriminating representations of Islam and Muslims in the speeches of Gerard Batten.

In many ways building on the foundation laid by van Dijk in the nineties, recent years have seen critical discourse analytic research on representations of Islam and Muslims in Western parliamentary debates done in several different contexts and from different perspectives, as well. It also bears mentioning that such studies have not been limited to European parliaments only, but similar studies have been conducted across the sphere of influence of the so-called 'Western culture', of which Saghaye-Biria's (2012) study on the reproduction of racism against Muslim Americans in the United States Congress is a good example. Saghaye-Biria's data is a transcript of a congressional hearing held by the Homeland Security Committee of the United States House of Representatives entitled "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response". Utilizing van Dijk's (1997) multi-levelled analytic framework in analyzing political racism, Saghaye-Biria (2012: 511) examines how discourse layers of meaning, semantic moves, storytelling and argumentation structures contribute in expressing or opposing racism. She argues that two competing and polarized discourses emerge from the data (Saghaye-Biria 2012: 522). On the one hand, there is the majority Republican representatives' definition of Muslim radicalization as "a unique systemic problem within the Muslim community" which originates in the Muslim leadership and which is a grave threat to US national security. This discourse essentially sees American Muslims as unlawful citizens. On the other hand, there is a discourse, produced by the minority Democrat representatives, that rejects the whole hearing by describing it as stereotypical and calling it a case of scapegoating a whole community because of the actions of a few radical individuals. In this discourse, Muslims are characterized as loyal and

law-abiding citizens, who should be protected by American norms and values, such as civil liberty and religious freedom.

Interestingly, Saghaye-Biria (2012: 522-523) also points out that the voice of Muslims and Muslim organizations themselves were very limited during the hearing as only one expert Muslim witness – a person advocating the absolute curbing of political Islam in America – was invited to join the panel by the Republicans who called for the hearing in the first place. Thus, the voices of Muslim organizations with potentially differing assessments regarding the matter were effectively muted. This type of discourse *about* a minority group (nearly) exclusively among dominant group members is characteristic of parliamentary debates about ethnic affairs (van Dijk 2000c: 88). Without a sufficient representation of the minority itself as able to take part in the discourse, such discourse may lead to the reproduction of ethnic prejudices or ideologies. In other words, it could lead to the fostering of racism not only on an interactional, but also on a deeper, cognitive, level. The importance of a study such as Saghaye-Biria's – or of the present research, too, for that matter – lies in the argument that intra-group discourse about minorities in the context of parliamentary debates possesses the power to influence the representations of those minorities "within a socio-political context of legislation and public opinion formation" (van Dijk 2000c: 88), for better or worse. Therefore, it is the belief of the present author, too, that such discourse, whenever encountered, ought to be studied and analyzed thoroughly.

Another recent example of research conducted outside the European context is Cheng's (2017) very thorough and extensive work on anti-racist discourse on Muslims in the Australian Parliament. Although the perspective and topic quite obviously differ from the ones in the present study – Cheng mainly studied discourse which opposes and resists racism, whereas here the focus is exclusively on racist discourse –, there are also similarities, as we will soon see. Moreover, beneficial theoretical and methodological lessons could be learnt from her study to aid in the present research endeavor. After all, in order to examine and analyze the anti-racist discourse in her data – debate transcripts from the Australian Parliament spanning two years, 2006-2007 –, she first had to deconstruct the racist, xenophobic and discriminatory arguments towards Muslims which the anti-racist discourse is aimed against. In order to do that, she employed the theory of culturalist racism and a strand of critical discourse analysis, the discourse-historical approach (Cheng 2017: XXII). These two theoretical concepts also form the main theoretical and methodological background of the present study. Here, of special interest is the way Cheng employs the theory of culturalist racism in order to argue that 'racism', indeed, is the appropriate term in regards to

discriminatory discourse against Muslims, even though Muslims do not constitute a ‘race’ in the traditional sense. This is a compelling argument, which the present study also adopts.

Cheng’s findings reveal, in line with van Dijk (1997: 62), that blatantly racist statements in a parliamentary context are quite rare, which is why she focused on manifestations of the aforementioned culturalist racism, instead. In her data, this mainly means examining how talk about Muslims regards them as not Australian or as not belonging to Australia. This discursive exclusion from the nation, Cheng argued, is one of the most common forms of culturalist racism in Western liberal democracies. In fact, one of the main hypotheses of the present study is that there exists discriminatory language use also in the speeches of Gerard Batten, and it, too, will upon further inspection manifest itself in the form of culturalistically racist and exclusionary discourse.

Moreover, quite influential especially to the phrasing of the research questions of the present study has been Cheng’s (2015) research on parliamentary debates in a European context where she took a discourse-historical approach to studying parliamentary discourses on Islam and Muslims in debates on a minaret ban in Switzerland. Through analyzing Swiss parliamentary debates on banning the construction of minarets in Switzerland, her main concern was to examine what the terms ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘Muslimophobia’ cover exactly, and what their relationship to racism is. Her analysis demonstrated that, although Islamophobia and Muslimophobia are two different things, they mostly appear together within the debate texts. She also asserted that:

> Muslimophobia can be but is not always a form of racism due to the ‘manipulation of culture’ in which proponents of the ban can de-essentialise, as well as essentialise, cultural traits to argue that Muslims can become integrated if they fulfil certain conditions. Such conditions can, however, be easily manipulated to continually exclude undesirable ‘others’ (Cheng 2015: 562).

On the other hand, despite the fact that Islamophobia co-exists with Muslimophobia, Cheng (2015: 582) defined Islamophobia in and of itself as hostility towards Islam as a religion, whereas Muslimophobia is targeted against people practicing Islam – or against people assumed to do so on the account of, for example, their skin color. She clarified this distinction further by arguing as follows:

> Within explicit Islamophobia, there is always an implicit Muslimophobia with Muslims as performers of the religion. However, in contrast to explicit Muslimophobic discourses, Muslims themselves are not depicted as violent and intolerant and lacking in cultural compatibility, but rather they 'perform' the alleged violence, intolerance and cultural backwardness of Islam (Cheng 2015: 582).

The general basis of the Muslimophobic and Islamophobic arguments in Cheng's data lies in a variety of gratuitous and erroneous claims about a perceived threat the arrival of more explicit aspects of Islam – such as the building of minarets – would pose to the Swiss society (Cheng 2015: 582). Furthermore, the pro-ban advocates see Islam as nothing but a negative influence on Western liberal democracies. Most blatantly, they voice their concerns about Muslims eventually imposing Sharia Law on Switzerland, if the 'spreading' of their religion is not properly curtailed. Cheng (2015: 582) suggests that this argument is 'a slippery slope fallacy' and noted that it appears as the pro-ban side's key argument throughout the debate.

It is worth noting that the present study is not geared towards asking whether or not a piece of discourse can be said to be Islamophobic or Muslimophobic. Instead, here the focus is on determining whether Gerard Batten's talk about Islam and Muslims can be *in any way* seen as discriminating against its subjects, and, if so, *how* this effect is created in his talk. Therefore, it is not the purpose of this study to categorize and name such discriminatory discourses as accurately as possible, *per se*. However, Cheng's (2015) treatment of Islam and Muslims as separate entities in her analysis also allowed her to examine whether or not Islam and Muslims are constructed separately in the discourse, as well as whether there are any differences in the way they are depicted and described. These are questions that are relevant and of real interest in the present study, too, which is why, in this regard, Cheng's study is taken as a prime example.

When it comes to recent research on xenophobic and discriminatory discourse against Islam and Muslims in the context of politics, Austrian studies appear to loom quite prominently above the rest in the field. Austria has a long and notable history of populist politics, beginning from the end of World War II, with especially the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) mustering strength and a firm following since the turn of the millennium (Wodak 2015). During the past few decades, FPÖ, quite similarly to UKIP, has moved towards a more radical, far-right, anti-immigrant and especially anti-Muslim agenda, which has also caused real concern among academics in the field of critical discourse analysis, and has in fact spurred many of the said academics into deconstructing and analyzing the party's often openly racist language use in order to understand it better. Perhaps not so

surprisingly then, Austria has also been a hotbed for the development of CDA – especially in the field of political discourse study – with the discourse-historical approach being sometimes described as representing a Viennese school of critical discourse analysis; largely due to the fact that one of the leading scholars in the field, Ruth Wodak, is based there (Hafez 2017).

Out of these discourse-historical studies appearing in the Austrian context, Hafez's (2017) bears the most similarities to the present study in terms of research questions and data. Unlike many of his colleagues, he used parliamentary debate texts as data in his study, where he analyzes how the highly controversial and criticized Austrian Islam law of 2015 was interpreted by both the political parties in power and those in opposition. In addition, and most relevantly in regards to the present study, he examined the types of arguments employed to defend, support or alter the proposed law. Very similar to the present study, Hafez's work is influenced by van Dijk's (2000c) methodology and presents his analysis as giving "insight into the ways in which politicians speak (a) about 'the Other', (b) about their social representation of 'the Other', (c) about the possible effects on the representation of recipients and (d) 'within a socio-political context of legislation and public opinion formation'" (Hafez 2017: 394). In his utilization of the DHA, Hafez drew on argumentation analysis, discourse strategies and the identification of topoi – three aspects which as a whole constitute a methodological approach very similar to the one in the present study.

The listing of topoi, i.e., the rhetorical themes or topics in a piece of discourse, is characteristic of the DHA. It gives a clear overall impression of the grounds on which the arguments presented – in this case in a parliamentary debate – are based. Consequently, this helps the analyst to, for instance, pinpoint and uncover the fallacies which serve as the building blocks of racist and discriminatory arguments. However, as Wodak (2015: 52) reminds, topoi are not always fallacious and could instead under certain circumstances be conducive to perfectly logical arguments; topoi are, in other words, "a useful shortcut appealing to existing logic". However, the ways topoi are *used* in specific contexts may mean ignoring and evading issues in a manner which can be misleading and fallacious (ibid.). All of these aforementioned characteristics of topoi make them an intriguing and important argumentation strategy to study in a context such as parliamentary debates on ethnic issues, which is why several topoi are identified from Gerard Batten's parliamentary speeches also as part of the analysis in the present study. The topoi Hafez (2017) observed on the side of the far-right opposition parties, including the aforementioned FPÖ, were either restrictive, such as the topos of law and order, or culturalist, such as the topos of belonging. Via employing these two topoi taken as examples here, the far-right called for an ability to control and discipline the Muslim subject (topos

of law and order), as well as argued that Islam does not belong in Austria (topos of belonging). Both of these topoi are very commonplace in populist far-right discourse concerning immigration and ethnic issues (Hafez 2017; van Dijk 2000c).

In sum, the studies discussed in this section demonstrate the many benefits of utilizing the discourse-historical approach along with the theory of culturalist racism in studying parliamentary debates on Islam and Muslims. Firstly, the results of these studies include several key revelations of the types of arguments typically employed when debating such issues. More importantly, however, the studies are also able to uncover the often implicit and (thinly) veiled discriminatory representations of Islam and Muslims in the politicians' speeches. Furthermore, and perhaps *most* importantly, the studies manage to deconstruct mechanisms of racism which, if left unchecked – especially considering the powerful political standing of the people involved –, can have serious repercussions on a broader societal level, too (see 'Discussion' below). Hence, as this multi-faceted theoretical and methodical approach has already yielded these very compelling results in previous research with data resembling mine, I feel it sensible to apply a similar approach in the present study, as well.

2.2 Theoretical framework of the present study

In this section, the theoretical framework of the present study is presented. At first, brief etymological and theoretical histories of 'race' and 'racism' are offered, which are then followed by the definition of 'culturalist racism' (including the process of 'racialization') – the theoretical construction of racism applied in the study. Next, the general relationships between racism and discourse are discussed as they relate to the study at hand. Finally, some commonplace strategic characteristics of parliamentary debates concerning ethnic or multicultural issues are summarized.

2.2.1 Race and racism

It has already been a widely known and indisputable fact for several years in the fields of biology and genealogy that the concept of 'race', when in reference to human beings, has nothing to do with the reality of human biology (Wodak and Reisigl 2000: 32). In a social functional sense, 'race' is a social construction, which can and has been used as a tool or an idea in different ways to achieve different results. On one hand, the concept of race has, as described by Wodak and Reisigl (2000: 32), "been used as a legitimizing ideological tool to oppress and exploit specific groups and to deny

them access to material, cultural and political resources, to work, welfare services, housing and political rights". On the other hand, the authors continue, the groups affected by this oppression have claimed the idea of 'race' as their own, reversed the concept, and used it in positive identity construction, as well as a foundation for political resistance.

Wodak and Reisigl (2000: 32-33) describe how linguistically, the term 'race' is quite young and how its etymological history is somewhat blurred, too. In the big European languages, such as English, German, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese, the pre-18th century meaning of 'race' had primarily to do with aristocratic descent and membership with a specific ruling house or dynasty. Until the 18th century, the term had no reference to somatic properties, but was instead mainly used to convey 'nobility' and 'quality'. However, the arrival of new pseudo-biological and anthropological theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries quite swiftly associated its meaning to "over-generalized, phenotypic features designed to categorize people from all continents and countries" (Wodak and Reisigl 2000: 33). The idea of 'race' was now closely tied with politics and incorporated into political-historical literature, as well as used conceptually in the formulation of human history. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a link between the concept of race and social Darwinism was established and 'race' became a fashionable word also outside the natural sciences. A new interpretation of history emerged as race theorists begun to see it as a racial struggle – a survival of the fittest among different races. The politically powerful word 'race' started to be used interchangeably with words, such as 'nation' and 'Volk' for purposes of eugenics, racial cleansing and birth control (Wodak and Reisigl 2000: 33). Subsequently, race theory became highly radicalized in the applications of the German National Socialists, who infamously based their ideology to legitimize systematic genocide on it. This extreme use of race theory eventually led to a more critical view on the idea of race in Europe and North America and to the birth of the concept of racism in the 1930s (Miles 1993: 29). Since 1945, the use of the term 'race' has been a taboo for politicians and academics more or less everywhere in Europe, and has fallen from favor among the general public, too. However, in the UK and the US, one can still encounter discussion on 'race relations', which is something research needs to consider when, for example, attempting to formulate universal analytical categories to tackle racism (Wieviorka 1994, as quoted in Wodak and Reisigl 2000: 33).

In recent years, the term 'racism' has become so widely used and its meaning so multidimensional and ambiguous that there is currently no hard-set consensus on how the term should be defined (Wodak and Reisigl 2000: 33). Moreover, overt and blatant racism, where a juxtaposition of

biological superiority and inferiority is proposed, has become by-and-large a taboo under the influence of contemporary social norms in Western civilizations. Instead of race in a more traditional biology-based sense, modern racism is increasingly based on culture and cultural differences, which is why it can be seen as also encompassing certain forms of, for example, ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism (van Dijk 1997: 33). Therefore, although some might still insist on the crucial role of biology and somatic properties when defining racism, it is believed in the present study that enough evidence exists to justify applying the term in a somewhat broader sense. There is also motivation here to be as unambiguous and uncomplicated as possible regarding different terms describing discrimination against Islam and Muslims, which is why the terms 'racism' and 'racist' are used nearly exclusively from this point on when describing such discourse found in the data. After all, racism is seen here as an umbrella term, which encompasses terms such as 'Islamophobia', 'Muslimophobia', 'ethnicism' and 'xenophobia' – all terms which are observable in research literature concerning parliamentary discourse on Islam and Muslims. Moreover, in the vein of Wodak and Reisigl (2000: 34), my desire in the present study is to acknowledge "the active and aggressive aspect of discrimination", which is why terms employing the disease metaphor of 'phobia', such as Islamophobia and Muslimophobia are disregarded. According to the authors, these terms can be seen as quite problematic, also because of their downplaying of racism through the implication of racism as a disease, which to some extent at least, even exonerates racists. As Wodak and Reisigl (2000: 33) note, racism as a word has a lot of power and is not easily dismissed. Therefore, since it is argued in the present study that racism is an appropriate word to describe discriminating political discourse against Islam and Muslims, the word is used first and foremost to highlight the importance of the research topic and the gravitas of the issue at hand – the issue of unjust discrimination of human beings.

2.2.2 Culturalist racism and racialization

As has already been mentioned, racism in this study is understood in a broader sense than merely from a biological standpoint. It is argued here that although racism has not by any means disappeared from Western societies, the way in which people express it has undergone a significant shift during the past few decades. People still communicate fears and prejudices towards different 'Others' and believe that their own culture and 'race' are somehow superior to those of other people, but these expressions are nowadays less based on biological hierarchies than they are on cultural differences (Cheng 2017). This 'new racism' or 'culturalist racism', as it is called in the present study inspired by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 9), was conceptualized for the first time in the early 1980s (Barker 1981) and has since been developed and employed – even if not always under the

term ‘culturalist racism’, specifically – widely across different fields of academic research, including the parliamentary discourse studies on Islam and Muslims presented previously (Cheng 2015, 2017; Hafez 2017; Saghaye-Biria 2012; van Dijk 1997). In the present study, the term ‘culturalist racism’ is preferred over ‘cultural racism’ because, as Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 9) argue, “racism has always been a cultural phenomenon” and the word ‘culturalist’ more accurately describes this type of racism’s “ideologizing orientation” towards culture.

As Cheng (2017) explains, when people talk about ‘problems’ with immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, they tend not to express any biological deficits or weaknesses as the root causes of those problems, but instead claim that things such as cultural differences, not knowing the national language properly, and a reluctance to integrate, are the reasons why these ‘Others’ cause trouble in the society. These claims thus prompt exclusionary motions, in which immigrants are either physically prevented from entering the country or heavily pressured to speak the national language and integrate into the local culture. Furthermore, the proponents of these motions defend them as not racist – since the motions do not mention race or any biological differences. However, culturalist racism still discriminates and defames minorities on the basis of how they are seen as ‘Others’, and it can have several negative effects on those people’s lives. Muslim minorities living in the West suffer the consequences of culturalist racism, especially because as followers of a religion they do not constitute a biological ‘race’. Discrimination against Muslims is therefore presented as not racist and can even be thought reasonable under certain circumstances (Cheng 2017).

In a more practical – yet also general – sense, the theory of racism applied here in the present study is summarized by van Dijk (2000c: 87) as being “a system of social inequality in which ethnic minority groups are dominated by a white (European) majority on the basis of origin, ethnicity, or attributed “racial” characteristics”. Dominance in this case implies abuse of power, that is, illegitimate control over others, their actions or resources. Structural inequality involves limited access to material social resources, such as jobs, income or adequate housing, or symbolic social resources, such as knowledge, information, education, respect or public discourse (media, scholarship, etc.). In this study, however, it should be specified that “attributed “racial” characteristics” as van Dijk puts it, are also perceived as encompassing cultural aspects, such as religion, as is the case here with the data on Islam and Muslims. In fact, this is a view van Dijk, too, endorses and elaborates on elsewhere in his writing (van Dijk 1997: 33).

The phenomenon of ascribing ethnic or racial identities to groups which do not identify themselves as such has been the topic of much contemporary literature in sociology and critical discourse studies, especially in the burgeoning field of ethnic and racial studies (see, e.g., Schmidt 2002; Blackledge 2006; Meer 2013; Gans 2016). Typically, in this research the process has been given the moniker 'racialization'. As Schmidt (2002: 158) explains, "racialization works by rendering others as having certain characteristics so foreign or 'alien' that it is impossible to conceive of being equal members of the same political community with those so racialized" – the point of this social process being inequality. The 'characteristic' Schmidt himself has studied in the case of the US is language, however in the present study it is argued that it is religion which in Gerard Batten's speeches works in exactly the same way; as a tool to promote hegemonic identity politics.

In like manner as Schmidt (ibid.) claims in the case of the American conflict over language policy – that the issue is not so much about language *per se*, but about political *identity* – it is proposed here that Gerard Batten portrays Christianity as being at the heart of his distinct representation of 'Europeanness'. In other words, for Batten it appears that – as Europe obviously does not have a common language, the command of which could be viewed as being central to the matter of belonging to 'the people' of Europe in such a traditional ethno-nationalist way – religion offers the arena where a clear distinction between 'Us, the Europeans' and 'Them, the non-European immigrants' can most easily be made. For Batten, then, 'European Christianity' constitutes a homogeneous and hegemonistic 'culture' within the borders of Europe and is in direct opposition to the equally fallaciously homogenized 'Muslim culture'. Hence, it is important to note that in Batten's discourse matters of religion do not solely contain issues regarding faith and an individual's belief in a higher power, but also those, such as terrorism, which have something to do with cultural or social matters and can still somehow – erroneously or not – be traced right back to religion.

Therefore, again following Schmidt (2002: 58), for Batten, as for several other right-wing populist politicians (Wodak 2015), religion (a *cultural* construction) is a boundary marker, and as such is thoroughly connected to race in that both are deeply embedded in identity politics. As the end result of this discursive process of discrimination both 'European Christians' (in a nationalist manner) and 'non-European Muslims' (in a racist manner) become racialized, with the positive characteristics and attributes of the former constantly being juxtaposed with the negative ones of the latter. It should also be noted that in the context of the present study racialization as a process is seen as being encompassed by the overall theory of culturalist racism applied to the data, which is why any

notion of culturalist racism appearing in the analysis of Batten's speeches is also taken to include racialization to some extent. To put it concisely, for the purposes of this study, whenever it can be argued about the data that there is observable culturalist racism, it can be argued that there is racialization as well.

In this study, racism is also defined as a system with two main dimensions: social and cognitive (van Dijk 2000a: 20-21). The social dimension of racism is based on interaction and everyday discriminatory practices. Locally, at the micro-level of analysis, it involves the so-called 'everyday racism': discriminatory actions, which can be blatant and explicit, but in fact often display racism in fairly subtle ways. At the macro-level, social analysis of racism is interested in a system of groups, organizations and institutions – that is, how discriminatory practices manifest themselves in larger contexts. Thus, the source of data in this research (the European Parliament) can be understood as belonging to the macro-level social study of racism, whereas the actual data (parliamentary debates) belongs to the micro level, where it is examined whether the interactions of Gerard Batten are involved in the reproduction of racism and, if so, how.

The second main dimension of racism – the cognitive one – is very important to this particular research, since an attempt is made here to illustrate how racism can be reproduced through legislation, policy-making and parliamentary debates on ethnic and racial issues. In order to be able to justify any claims on parliaments being involved in the reproduction of racism, one first needs to clarify what is meant by racism, and how parliamentary action may facilitate it. By adding the cognitive dimension of racism to the analysis, it becomes possible to cover both areas. The cognitive property, as van Dijk (2000a: 21) puts it, encompasses the "shared social cognitions of groups, and involves the opinions, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values that constitute racist prejudices and stereotypes, and that underlie racist social practices, including discourse". Therefore, it is of paramount importance to study dominant group members' shared social cognitions, such as ethnic prejudices, in order to understand the inner workings of both discriminatory social practices and the larger system of social inequality, which in and of itself is a product of the practices. Only with the aid of this fully realized theory of racism is it possible to reveal how beliefs and ideologies about 'Others', i.e., immigrants and ethnic or cultural minorities, result in dominant group members – in this case, white Europeans – discriminating against those they perceive as non-Europeans (van Dijk 2000a: 21).

Finally, following van Dijk's (2000a: 21) argumentation further, it should be emphasized that a study of parliamentary debates about Islam and Muslims needs to incorporate both the social and cognitive approaches to racism. On the social level, the debates need to be viewed and analyzed as local political interaction between members of different parties and ethnic groups, but also on the global scale of active policy-making and legislation in a trans-national parliament, where decisions are made which position ethnic minorities at a power disadvantage compared to the white European majority. This approach could be defined as being the socio-political side of the analysis. On the other hand, an adjacent socio-cognitive approach is also needed to examine how the debates about ethnic or cultural affairs are structured and formed content-wise as a result of the attitudes, beliefs and prejudices of the Members of Parliament, in this case, MEP Gerard Batten. In addition, the socio-cognitive approach is needed to reveal how the debates help reproduce racism on a larger societal scale by way of public opinion forming.

2.2.3 Racism and discourse

Considering the social nature of the phenomenon that is racism, it is only natural that discourse and racism be intertwined in several different ways. Here, it is mainly discussed how racism and discourse are related in the context of parliamentary debates, but it is nonetheless useful to begin with some general remarks. The talk and texts which comprise everyday discourse can be discriminatory, for example, when members of a dominant ethnic group (e.g., white Europeans) use insults or slanderous remarks when talking to members of a minority group (e.g., Muslim immigrants). Discriminatory discourse may also play a role in situations where dominant group members talk about minority groups among themselves in ways that create negative representations of the minorities, thus contributing to the reproduction of ethnic prejudices or racist ideologies. In sum, discourse plays a role in racism and discrimination on both the social, i.e., interactional, level and the cognitive level (van Dijk 2000c: 88). Parliamentary debates about Islam and Muslims fit into this latter type of discriminatory discourse, since they are an example of a platform where there is almost exclusively talk *about* minority groups as opposed to talk *to* or *among* them. Moreover, as politicians MPs are in a position where they have a significant influence on the formation of public opinions, ideologies and attitudes, which makes their discourse practices' potential to reproduce cognitive racism that much more intriguing.

Van Dijk (2000c: 88) summarizes the benefits of analyzing parliamentary debates about ethnic affairs and immigration as follows:

> Analysis of such debates yields insights into the ways politicians not only (a) speak about minorities or immigrants, but indirectly also (b) about their social representations they share about the Others and (c) the possible effects of parliamentary debates on the representations of recipients, in this case (d) within a socio-political context of legislation and public opinion formation.

As a researcher one must turn his/her attention to the examination of the discourse structures or categories that are most commonly involved in displaying or influencing ethnic representations on both the social and cognitive level. Obviously, as discourse – and language as communication, in general – is always influenced by context, such research should also consider the particular contextual aspects of the debates in question, as in, for example, the setting (physical and/or political), participants, interaction between parties, and so on. When relevant, such interplay between discourse and context should always be exhibited and analyzed in order to justify any inferences about discourse expressing or affecting individuals' mental representations (van Dijk 2000c: 88). This issue is elaborated on in the next section in the context of parliamentary debates.

2.2.4 Parliamentary debates: characteristics and general strategies

According to van Dijk (2000c: 89), the characteristic features of parliamentary debates can be split into two categories: genre-specific and topic-specific. Genre-specific features are those that define all parliamentary debates, such as formal address, speaking in controlled turns and rigid time limitations per speaker. These features comprise the etiquette Members of Parliament are expected to adhere to. They are also non-dependent on topic, which means that MPs follow these rules, guidelines and formalities when speaking about any topic. Topic-specific contextualization, on the other hand, may also be encountered in other contexts and genres in which dominant group members speak about ethnic affairs, in this case about Islam and Muslims, besides parliamentary debates. Such topic-specific features of discourse are, for instance, disclaimers, mitigation, active control of impression, and a plethora of others – all of which the goal is that the speaker appear considerate and sufficiently sensitive when discussing such controversial matters.

In addition, a characteristic aspect of all parliamentary debates, as observed by van Dijk (1993: 65-66), is that they generally contain little if any spontaneous speech – with the exception of rare ad hoc, 'on line' dialogues – since they are often read from a prepared written text with perhaps some slight 'on the spot' alterations. This means that such speeches are generally quite well thought-out, premeditated and formulated beforehand. Furthermore, van Dijk (1993: 66) continues, Members of

Parliament are well aware that their talk is ‘for the record’, which is apparent in the way they conduct their speeches. Not only do they argue for or against, for example, a bill or a policy, they also make official statements that reflect party positions, which are to be stored in the archives and later made publicly available. Before the final version of the records is published, the speakers even have a right to make changes to their contributions. Therefore, once the final version has been made public, the news media, for example, are able to quote it freely and the speakers can be held politically and morally responsible for their words. For the purposes of this research, this distinctive nature of parliamentary debates is crucial, since it justifies the argument that whatever perceptibly negative is said about Islam and Muslims in the data is very likely not a spontaneous ‘error’, but something that in fact quite accurately and truthfully reflects the speaker’s thoughts, attitudes and agendas regarding the subject. This is especially the case when the subject in question is as controversial and sensitive as Islam and Muslims, because ethnic topics almost always require that the politicians be very mindful of what they can and cannot say (van Dijk 1993: 66).

It should be taken into account however that, as van Dijk (1993: 64) points out, here lies an important question regarding the inferences which can be made from analyzing such data: if political statements which seem to reproduce racism are taken as being truthful, then what about the statements that seem to resist it? After all, when politicians say they are not racist or they speak about ethnic minorities in a positive manner, it is quite likely that an analyst might treat it merely as a display of rhetorical strategies, such as disclaimers or positive self-presentation, instead of a representation of the politicians’ genuine attitudes and beliefs regarding ethnic minorities. Yet when politicians make negative remarks about minorities, analysts tend to treat them as believable, and are often quick to make inferences about social representations that underlie such discourse. One could argue that this is a biased operation, which seeks to denigrate politicians as racists regardless of what they say. However, as van Dijk (1993: 65) contends, that would not be accurate. It is not in the interests of his research – neither is it in the interests of the present study – to show or prove whether individuals are racist. Instead the aim is firstly, to examine how ethnic groups are talked about, and secondly, to discover which processes, activities and cognitions are involved in the reproduction of racism as part of the social system. Thus, the purpose of the present study is not to make generalizations and to say, for example, that Gerard Batten is a racist on the basis of his statements in the European Parliament’s plenary debates. Instead, some of his remarks may be interpreted as contributions to the reproduction of racism in their specific contexts, because of the remarks’ characterizations as examples of certain types of styles, rhetorical figures or arguments commonly related to racist discourse.

Moreover, it is assumed here that there would be no benefits for a politician to pretend to be racist in his/her statements, which is why any overtly racist statements are consistently taken at face value. In the words of van Dijk (1993: 65):

> Although an expression of xenophobic or racist attitudes may appeal to some voters, it will be assumed that this very political strategy is racist, and that there is no point in assuming that such politicians may not mean what they say.

Therefore, even if some politicians would resort to racist remarks merely as election campaign tactics, it is presumed that they would not be able to do so were their genuine beliefs and attitudes incompatible with such a strategy. The same does not hold true for positive statements or denials of racism, however, since they may also be attempts at positive self-presentation and face-keeping under the pressure of official – and tolerance-demanding – values and norms. In general, the laws and norms of Western societies prohibit overt expressions of blatant racism, which is why it is rare to encounter such expressions in parliamentary debates. For this reason, any reproduction of cognitive racism that may be observable in parliamentary data is bound to be quite subtle and indirect. Indeed, the main benefit of the type of systematic and rigorous discourse analysis employed in the present study is its ability to deconstruct and evaluate this subtle and 'delicate' talk on race (van Dijk 1997: 36). In his extensive analyses of parliamentary debates on ethnic issues, van Dijk (1997: 36-38) has found several distinct strategies which are characteristic of such discourse. They can be summarized as follows: positive self-presentation, negative Other-presentation, denial of racism, apparent sympathy, fairness, top-down transfer and justification by referring to the force of facts. These strategies will be examined more closely as they are relevant to the data at hand in the analysis chapter of this study.

3 THE PRESENT STUDY

This study builds on the previously described research done in the field of discourse analytical studies on parliamentary debates about Islam and Muslims by applying a theory of culturalist racism (Barker 1981; van Dijk 1997, 2000a, 2000c; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Saghaye-Biria 2012; Cheng 2015, 2017; Hafez 2017) and van Dijk's (1993, 1997, 2000c) theories and analytical tools for doing parliamentary debate analysis on ethnic issues as part of a discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse analysis (CDA). This composite approach is supplemented by insights provided by the Toulmin model of argumentation (Toulmin 2003). In this chapter, the discourse analytical methodology of the study is firstly presented and further defined. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief description of the Toulmin model and its applications insofar as they are relevant to the present study.

3.1 Aims and research questions

By applying the DHA jointly with the theories of culturalist racism, racialization, parliamentary debate analysis and the Toulmin model of argumentation, the aims of this study are, firstly, to identify how Gerard Batten speaks about Islam as a religion, and Muslims as a cultural minority group in his speeches in the European Parliament's plenary debates, as well as what types of representations of these subjects he in so doing conveys. Secondly, my aim is to acknowledge, uncover and deconstruct the arguments, processes and cognitions in the discourse, both explicit and implicit, which could potentially contribute to the broader reproduction of racism in Europe. In order to meet these goals, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. How are Islam and Muslims represented in UKIP Leader Gerard Batten's speeches in the European Parliament's plenary debate sessions? What broader or more general topics or themes (e.g., religion, immigration or terrorism) are the representations connected with?

2. What arguments does Batten employ in order to construct and support his remarks and representations regarding Islam and Muslims?

3.2 Data selection and collection

The data of this study were collected in October 2018 and consist of verbatim plenary debate reports (i.e., full transcripts of the meetings of the whole Parliament, which are held in Strasbourg and Brussels and are compulsory to all MEPs) from the European Parliament's 2014-2019 parliamentary term. The debate reports are made available for download on the European Parliament's official site (The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos 2018). The plenary debate transcripts from the 2014-2019 parliamentary term were first searched by speaker using the search key 'Gerard Batten'. The resulting entries, all speeches made by Batten, were then searched for instances of the word stems 'Islam' or 'Muslim', wherein the stem 'Islam' was also able to identify such possible strings as 'Islamic' and 'Islamist'. The data search was narrowed down to contain either the word stems 'Islam' or 'Muslim' or both, in order to limit the scope of the study appropriately and to avoid any ambiguity in terms of content. This resulted in 23 entries, an amount which was further reduced to exclude a few short statements given in writing, one 'blue card question', i.e., an *ad hoc* question posed to another MEP holding a speech, as well as one answer to such a question. This elimination was done in order to retain unity and data-internal comparability within the data sample. Ultimately, 16 orally delivered and (most likely) beforehand written speeches by Batten containing the words 'Islam' or 'Muslim' remained and were subsequently chosen to serve as the data of this study.

The data were analyzed in their official text form into which they were transcribed from speech by The European Parliament. Further, to preserve the integrity of their contents, and to comply with the European Parliament's copyright requirements (The European Parliament: Legal notice for users of the website - Copyright n.d.), they were not altered or modified in any way. The copyright requirements permit the reuse of the EU's official data, provided that all items are reproduced in their entirety and their sources properly acknowledged. In case of partial reproduction, the URL link of the complete item must also be cited. These legal matters are certainly carefully considered throughout the study. The analysis chapter of the study is accompanied by text excerpts which were chosen from the whole of the 16 speeches analyzed for the purposes of this study, in order to illustrate and support the findings of said analysis. Plenary debates were chosen as data, instead of other parliamentary discourses, such as committee debates and unofficial discussions, because of their mandatory nature – all the members of all the parties are expected to attend them. This characteristic was interpreted as highlighting the official and influential nature of plenary debates, which suited the purposes of this study.

3.3 Methods of analysis

As previously stated, on a general level this study belongs to the field of discourse analysis, which – although itself not really a method of analysis – comprises many directions of research and approaches to the study of discourse that can be viewed as 'methods' in the more traditional sense of the word. The way in which discourse analysis is conducted in the present study can be described as being 'critical' because of its focus on highlighting social issues, such as inequality and discrimination, as they manifest themselves in asymmetrical power relations (namely, in an MEP's speeches about a religious minority); hence its categorization under the moniker 'critical discourse analysis', or CDA, for short. Within this general framework of CDA, the focus is on political discourse, and racism thereof, which is why the more detailed discourse-historical approach (DHA) is employed in order to fully appreciate the role context plays in the analysis of such language use. In addition, as part of the argumentation analysis process involved in the application of the DHA, the Toulmin model of argumentation is implemented, although in a somewhat streamlined form to appropriately correspond with the scope and aims of the study. Next in this section, a brief description of critical discourse analysis, the discourse-historical approach and the Toulmin model are presented – along with a step-by-step description of the study's analytical process, where these and the other aforementioned theories, methods and approaches are utilized.

3.3.1 Critical discourse analysis

Before delving deeper into the way discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis are understood in the present study, it is useful to note what is meant by the very term 'discourse'. On a somewhat abstract level, Fairclough (2003: 3) describes discourse as "an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements". In a more concrete way, 'discourse' as a countable noun, as in 'a discourse' or 'several discourses', works to differentiate between different discourses, such as schoolyard discourse and parliamentary discourse, in order to highlight the individual discourses' unique features, properties and implications (Fairclough 2003: 124). The social dimension of discourse is crucial, since it determines that not all language use counts as discourse. Although the manifestations of discourse and the objects of discourse analysis are texts in a broad sense of the word – including all actual instances of language use, such as transcripts of spoken conversations and websites, but also visual images and, e.g., television sound effects –, discourse is not found nor analyzed at the level of text structure or within invented texts. Instead, discourse is what happens when people as social beings use language as a social practice. Discourse, therefore, is language in social use, and different social groups create their own discourses, which are governed and characterized by their own sets of rules, preferences and features (Fairclough 2003). In Fairclough's

(2003: 124) view, discourses are different representations of the world, as well as different perspectives on it. Included are all aspects – the material, mental and social worlds. Hence discourses are perspectives on what is seen, felt and experienced in the world around us, as well as within our thoughts, feelings, beliefs and social relationships. Discourses are also connected with and influenced by the positions people have in the world, their identities and social relationships. In addition to being representations of the world as it is, or is perceived to be, discourses are “projective” and “imaginary”. They present alternative and possible versions of the actual world, as well as contribute to changing it. Moreover, discourses interact with each other much in the same way as people do – they cooperate, compete, dominate, and so on. In fact, if one desires to understand the relationships between different people, the element of discourse is always a very useful aspect to study (Fairclough 2003: 124).

Discourse analysis, in general, is therefore interested in the social use of language. It deems it crucial to look beyond the sentence level and into the social context of every utterance and piece of discourse in order to find meaning and answers to its questions. Critical discourse analysis, however, is particularly interested in the relationship between language and power (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). As van Dijk (2008: 85) puts it: “Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.” Thus, critical discourse analysts take explicit position in wishing to “understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality”. Rather than a specific approach or a school of discourse analysis, CDA can be viewed as a perspective – a critical lens through which different theories and applications may be employed throughout the whole field of discourse analysis. This critical perspective requires the analyst to be very well aware of his/her role in society and understand that his/her research, social structures, social interaction and societal values are all intertwined. Therefore, in research, all theory formation, research findings and discussion thereof are socio-politically positioned, which means that their presentation needs to be as transparent and explicit as possible throughout in order to avoid any type of cloaked scientific bias (van Dijk 2008: 85-86). This is a crucial issue, which the present study also has to take into account.

As Wodak and Meyer (2001: 2) summarize, CDA is especially interested in examining institutional, political, gender and media discourses which are in some way related to struggle and conflict. Most importantly, however, it is not enough in the realm of CDA to merely *describe* discourse. Instead, it also attempts to explain its structures with regard to social interaction and social structures. This is

why successful critical discourse analysis is often multidisciplinary and has to at all times pay close attention to all the relevant contexts and sub-contexts of discourse (van Dijk 2008: 86). In order to adequately do that in the context of parliamentary discourse on Islam and Muslims, this study applies the discourse-historical approach, which will be discussed next.

3.3.2 The discourse-historical approach

The discourse-historical approach (DHA) is one of the many theoretical and methodological approaches in CDA, and as such it has been successfully applied in studies on political discourse regarding ethnic affairs (e.g., Wodak and Van Dijk 2000; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Hafez 2017; Wodak 2015). In recent years, the DHA has been actively developed and, in fact, one of its most prominent areas of application has been the field of political discourse studies (Reisigl and Wodak 2016). The strong and multifaceted focus on context makes the DHA an ideal tool for analyzing such discourse, which is why it is also used in the present study. As Wodak (2009: 311) explains:

> This approach focuses on multiple genres, large data corpora and on argumentative, rhetorical and pragmatic interdisciplinary analysis, while integrating multiple layers of socio-political and historical contexts in order to theorize dimensions of social change and identity politics.

Like CDA in general, the DHA is politically engaged and strives for the practical applicability of research results. It also prefers to tackle problems emanating from ‘authentic’ data with multiple methods of analysis (Reisigl 2017: 49). However, the differences compared to other strands of CDA – which are most relevant to the present study’s perspective – are its emphasis on history and the importance of rhetoric, where argumentation analysis especially is a key concept. The role of history in the DHA is described by Reisigl (2017: 49) as the DHA putting more weight on “historical subjects and on the historical anchoring, change and echo of specific discourses” than other CDA approaches, whereas the focus on argumentation is notable especially in political contexts. What this means in practice for the present study is that I strive not only to acknowledge the discourses that emerge from my data in their relevant historical – as well as contemporary – contexts in politics and social affairs, but I also seek to recognize possible changes which have happened in the way Gerard Batten talks about Islam and Muslims during the study’s data span of five years (2014-2018). Observing these changes and relating them to relevant contemporary world events allows me to offer interpretations as to what might have caused them in the first place, which

is an important step along the way towards a better general understanding of such polemic discourse involving ethnic and cultural minorities.

Moreover, in order to be successful, research such as the present study inevitably has to involve a degree of the type of ‘historical thinking’ which recognizes the role the ever-fluctuating contexts of time, place, events, ideas, thoughts and attitudes play in the actions of people. After all, as Wineburg (2001: 110) asserts, in order to be able to understand others different from ourselves, it is crucial we come to see the limitations of our own point of view and try our best to experience things as if ‘in their shoes’, so to speak. To this end, he continues by asking: “If we never recognize that our individual experience is limited, what hope is there of understanding people whose logic defies our own, whose choices and beliefs appear inscrutable when judged against our own standards?” Sure, Wineburg is writing mainly with the study of historical people in mind – whereas the scope of this study is very much contemporary –, yet his insights are substantially relevant here as well. Admittedly, the goal in the present study is not so much to understand *why* Gerard Batten says the things he says about Islam and Muslims as it is to answer the questions ‘what?’ and ‘how?’. Hence, this study differs from a biographical historical study, not only by its temporal scope, but also by the fact that here the main interest lies not in the effort to understand the person *per se* but in the attempt to understand the characteristics, as well as the possible effects, of the language he uses. However, this context-oriented research ethos, which indeed is central to all study of history, is useful also to discourse studies, such as mine, which strive to determine as broadly as possible the different meanings associated with a given piece of discourse – inasmuch as those meanings are relevant to the research questions at hand –, since every utterance is always and necessarily influenced by the person uttering it and the context it is uttered in.

The step-by-step analytical process of the present study was inspired by Wodak (2015: 50-51) and consisted primarily of two levels. It began with the entry-level analysis, where the data were analyzed thematically, i.e., the texts were firstly coded for themes which were identified as being the main ones regarding Islam and Muslims in the data, namely immigration, terrorism, antisemitism, the Qur’an and moderate Muslims. Next in the entry-level analysis these themes were further defined into discourse topics, which effectively summarize the text and include its most relevant contents, as well as constitute the headings and subheadings in the ‘Analysis’ chapter under which the analysis itself is structured. At this point, the analysis also drew on van Dijk’s (1993, 1997, 2000c) theories and categorizations of racist discourse in a parliamentary setting as well as on The Toulmin model of argumentation in order to locate and deconstruct the key arguments and

argumentation strategies within the text. After the entry-level analysis followed the level of in-depth analysis, where the investigation of different layers of context became prominent. Here, once again drawing on Wodak (2015: 51), a four-level model of context was followed in which I took into account the historical development of the political party, i.e., UKIP (the socio-political/historical context), discussions which were central to the specific debate (the current context), the specific text (text-internal co-text) as well as other related events, discourses and texts which had in some way influenced the specific piece of discourse (intertextual and interdiscursive relations). Only after all these four levels of context had been carefully taken into account, could the previously distinguished arguments and argumentation strategies be fully understood within their appropriate range of meaning. Moreover, it bears mentioning that generally this type of attentive consideration of context at this later stage of analysis may even reveal some elusive arguments – and other implicit discourse elements – which originally managed to evade the analyst's probing gaze. In the following 'Analysis' chapter these contextual considerations are explicated as part of the analysis of a given text inasmuch as they are deemed relevant in relation to the findings of the analysis.

3.3.3 The Toulmin model of argumentation

As already suggested, one of the key aspects of the DHA is the identification and analysis of topoi. Moreover, as Wodak (2015: 52-53) illustrates, these "useful shortcut[s] appealing to existing logic" are essentially thematic and commonly accepted argument types, and as such are based on certain 'warrants' which need to be exposed and scrutinized in order to fully be able to understand the arguments themselves. This method of deconstructing an argument to lay bare its warrant and other elements to understand the argument better as a whole – a method the present study employs frequently when analyzing the topoi present in Gerard Batten's speeches – comes from the philosopher Stephen Toulmin.

In Toulmin's (2003: 90-91) model any given argument forms a pattern consisting of three major components: the claim (or conclusion), data and the warrant. The first of these components, the claim, is quite simply the assertion argued for. For example, if I said 'My barber is poor', I would be making a claim, that is, providing a conclusion whose merits could then be sought to be established by, for example, a friend of mine who does not believe my barber to be poor. Data, on the other hand, are the pieces of information that I could provide as the alleged proof to support this claim of mine. Therefore, my friend could ask me 'What is your evidence?' at which point I could, for example, appeal to my knowledge of my barber having very little money. However, now my

incredulous friend could also challenge my conclusion in another way; by challenging me to explicate the connection and congruity between my claim and data. In other words, she could posit the question ‘How do you arrive there?’. There would be little benefit for me in trying to answer this second question by providing more data, since every such offering could simply be countered with the same question all over again. Instead, I would need to introduce rules or principles of some kind which I could adhere to in order to show that, taking these data as a point of origin, it is appropriate and legitimate to arrive at the original claim or conclusion. These hypothetical statements that can be generalized to act as bridges in this manner can, in their briefest form, be written ‘If D (data), then C (conclusion)’, but also more explicitly, as Toulmin (2003: 91) suggests: “Given data D, one may take it that C.” These kind of statements Toulmin (ibid.) calls warrants. To continue with the previous example, I could then maintain that my barber is poor on account of the warrant ‘If someone has little money, he is poor.’ An important distinction between data and warrants is the fact that, whereas one *explicitly* appeals to data, warrants are appealed to *implicitly*. For this reason, it can be added that warrants are general and certify “the soundness of *all* arguments of the appropriate type” (Toulmin 2003: 92). It should be noted that there is much more to be said about argument patterns, about additional elements in an argument – and about warrants, especially (e.g., about the potential need to add qualifiers before the use of certain warrants can be conducive to sound arguments) (Toulmin 2003: 93) –, but for the purposes of the present study this more fundamental level of understanding shall suffice.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that by no means should all warrants be deemed as correct and legitimate. In fact, as we shall clearly see later on with the excerpts from Gerard Batten’s speeches, most – if not in fact all – of the typical topoi used by him and other right-wing populist politicians are based on warrants that are insufficient in terms of constructing a sound argument, which is to say that they are downright fallacious. This fallaciousness of the warrants (and hence by extension the fallaciousness of the arguments as whole) along with the implicit nature of appealing to warrants in general are among the key reasons why right-wing populist argumentation and rhetoric should be meticulously analyzed. Where it is originally observed – already at a mere glance perhaps – that an argument is (most likely) fallacious, and potentially discriminatory as well, it thus becomes crucial to be able to show *why* and *how* that is the case. Only then can those fallacious arguments be fully unveiled and prevented from masquerading as sound ones. Considering the damage fallaciousness in political argumentation and rhetoric is able to cause also on a broader societal level, especially when dealing with such volatile topics as Islam and Muslims, I think it is

imperative that I strive to answer these questions as thoroughly as possible regarding my own data, as well.

4 ANALYSIS

In this chapter the European Parliament plenary debate speeches by Gerard Batten concerning Islam and Muslims are analyzed utilizing a toolkit consisting of a combination of the discourse-historical approach, van Dijk's (1993, 1997, 2000c) theories and categorizations of racist discourse in a parliamentary setting and an application of the Toulmin model of argumentation. The chapter is structured in a thematic fashion wherein the data are categorized into four main topics and three sub-topics. Altogether, these topics can be viewed as a summary of Gerard Batten's main talking points regarding Islam and Muslims as they have been interpreted and construed from the 16 plenary debate reports comprising the data of this study.

As part of its own section, and with the illustrative aid of data excerpts, each topic and sub-topic is then dissected and evaluated in terms of what discourses are drawn on and (re)articulated in Batten's speeches, as well as in terms of what representations of Islam and Muslims are constructed and conveyed. Moreover, I examine what types of argumentation strategies are involved in the treatment of each topic (a more detailed description of these themes and topics is provided in the next paragraph). Although almost a tautology, it bears mentioning that Batten applies different argumentation strategies, which include the use of topoi and fallacies – as well as lexical choices and several other rhetorical tools –, in order to support his claims and propositions involving Islam and Muslims. In other words, the strategies work to 'sell' his ideas to the audience. Furthermore, the fact that he is a politician makes it safe to assume that the ultimate objective of his every official speech performance in the Parliament is to influence political opinion and sway votes, both inside and outside the hallowed Hemicycle. How exactly he uses these tools and strategies in his attempts to meet these goals, and what representations of Islam as a religion and Muslims as people he in so doing constructs and conveys, are the questions of interest here. As mentioned above, the chapter is divided into four main topics. The first one of these topics, ''Islam 101' by Gerard Batten', involves Batten's descriptions and representations of Islam and is further broken down into three sub-topics. The remaining three main topics deal with subjects such as immigration to Europe from Islamic countries and the role of Islam in Europe (including the antithetical relationship between Islam and Christianity), The Qur'an and moderate Muslims, respectively.

4.1 ‘Islam 101’ by Gerard Batten

In order to understand Batten’s views and arguments regarding anything related to Islam or Muslims – whether that is, for example, immigration, terrorism or cultural compatibility issues – one first needs to discover what, to him, seem to be the key defining features of Islam. Since essentially every argument and political proposition Batten voices in his speeches in the data (e.g., regarding EU’s immigration policies) is ultimately based on some representation of Islam, it can in fact be argued that his whole political agenda concerning these issues is greatly affected by the way he sees Islam both as a religion and – in a conspicuously simplified manner – also as a homogeneous and monolithic culture. Furthermore, Batten’s remarks about Muslims as people, for example in terms of whether or not they are a threat to Europeans, are also in direct relation to the religion they follow, or more accurately, to Batten’s own definition of it. For these reasons it is deemed appropriate to begin the present analysis by exploring in this section how Batten defines Islam and sees its role in the (Western) world. In addition, I observe here what the most prominent and defining representations of Islam are in his speeches as well as consider their implications.

4.1.1 “The death cult of Mohammed”

> (1) Most religions are named after their founders – Christianity, the religion of Christ; Buddhism, the religion of Buddhists; Judaism the religion of the Jews – and yet we accept the word Islam – submission to the will of Allah. It is not. It is the construction of a person. Let us go back to what we used to call this religion 30 or 40 years ago: Mohammedanism. It is the cult of Mohammed, and these people accept the death cult of Mohammed (Speech 7: Recent terrorist attacks (debate) 2015e).

One of the most prominent monikers for Islam used by Gerard Batten in his speeches is “the death cult of Mohammed” or – in its somewhat more moderate reductions – “the cult of Mohammed” or “Mohammedanism”. In the present data Batten premiered the term ‘cult’ when referring to Islam in a speech he gave during a sitting on 8 July 2015 in Strasbourg, of which Example 1 above is an excerpt. His speech was a part of a larger discussion centered on a series of Islamic terrorist attacks which had occurred twelve days earlier on 26 June in France, Kuwait, Syria, Somalia and Tunisia. By examining this current context (i.e., the full transcript of the debate) of the above excerpt it quickly becomes clear that the tragic chain of events provoked many MEPs – and understandably so, of course – to speak at length and address several issues which, in their mind, should be better acknowledged, understood or handled in order to prevent such attacks in the future. These speeches also virtually without exception included firm condemnations of the strands of fundamentalist Islam

which the terrorist groups responsible for the attacks employ as their doctrine – again, a very understandable and reasonable reaction. Where Gerard Batten's speech most distinctly differs from those of his colleagues', however, is in the way he in fact disparages the whole religion of Islam – not just its fundamentalist interpretations.

By calling Islam "the death cult of Mohammed", Batten first of all utilizes powerful rhetoric with the lexical choice of 'death cult', where both the words 'death' and 'cult' carry obvious negative connotations – especially when used about a religion. In the very formal context of plenary debates, where euphemisms are usually the norm when discussing issues as controversial and sensitive as terrorism – terrorists could often be referred to as 'perpetrators' for example –, this strategy of speaking very plainly and in openly polemical terms is sure to make Batten stand out from the crowd (van Dijk 1997: 35-36). An important part of this strategy is to avoid hedging of any kind; therefore, issues are presented as categorically true without much consideration for alternative viewpoints or gray areas between 'is' or 'is not' – of which the several truth claims in Example 1 provide ample evidence. More precisely then, it can be argued that Batten does not use any expressions of epistemic modality. In other words, he does not assess the truth of any of the propositions he makes in terms of certainty, probability or possibility, as in, for example, 'X may be Y' or 'it is possible that X is Y' (Downing 2014: 343-344). Instead, he exclusively talks about Islam and Muslims in categorical assertions: "we accept the word Islam – submission to the will of Allah. It is not. It is the construction of a person." and "It is the cult of Mohammed". As we shall see later on with further examples, this assertive way of speaking with its nearly complete avoidance of epistemic modalities is in fact very typical of Batten.

This blunt and to-the-point language use, which may very easily err to the side of presenting complex issues in an overly simplified manner, is also well in line with what Wodak (2015: 2) calls "arrogance of ignorance" and claims to be characteristic of all right-wing populist parties. It incorporates the endorsement of anti-intellectualism and the strategy of appealing to common sense, which in Wodak's (ibid.) words "mark a return to pre-modernist or pre-Enlightenment thinking". This type of discourse is predominantly aimed at the layman, i.e., the conceptualized 'common person', who might as a voter feel alienated by all the hedging and euphemism-ridden jargon exhibited by many mainstream politicians, and can be seen as central to the popularity and rise of Batten and other populist politicians in recent years.

Batten's negative 'rebranding of Islam', if you will, is a solid example – in van Dijk's (see, e.g., van Dijk 2000a) terms – of 'negative Other-presentation'. In the remark "these people accept the death cult of Mohammed" Batten is referring to Muslims, who he positions – as Riggins (1997b: 3) puts it – as the 'external Other', that is, as a group of people he perceives as fundamentally different from himself. This notion of 'the Other' is considered a key concept throughout the rest of this study as it essentially forms the core of Batten's representation of Islam and Muslims. Moreover, the way Batten argues for this aforementioned rebranding in Example 1 is also noteworthy. By utilizing the topos of definition, as in 'If I, Gerard Batten, define this as X, then this is X (and not Y)' (Wodak 2015: 98), he juxtaposes Islam with several other major religions, including Christianity, and argues that, like them, Islam is a "construction of a person" – that is, a religious following centered around a person instead of an actual deity or some other 'higher power' – and that the name of the religion should also reflect this; hence his suggestion of 'Mohammedanism'. Consequently, he strongly opposes the idea of Islam being seen as the reflection of "the will of Allah". However, by comparing Islam to Christianity in this sense Batten is effectively arguing that Christianity, too, is nothing more than a cult of personality, the cult of Christ. After all, in the same way as Muhammad and his teachings are central to Islam, so are Christ and his teachings to Christianity. Batten's quite dismissive stance on Christianity here seems somewhat contradictory to his statements found elsewhere in the plenary records, where he on several occasions essentially presents himself as a defender of Christendom in an ongoing war between Christianity and Islam (see Section 4.2). As Wodak (2015: 2) notes, however, this fluctuation of strategies and political views depending on the context and specific audience is typical among right-wing populist politicians, who at times seem to behave as if virtually nothing was out of the question in their surge for votes. In Batten's case it becomes evident here that he is even prepared to discredit the very culture he strives to protect, if it also means maligning Islam even more so in the process. Most often, however, as will become apparent later on in this chapter, Batten employs strategies of negative Other-presentation in order to promote positive self-presentation. In other words, he resorts to rhetoric moves, such as oversimplification and hyperbole, in making 'the Other' (Islam and Muslims) look bad while at the same time making 'the Self' (his perceived in-group of (white) European Christians) look good in comparison (van Dijk 1997: 49).

Finally, Example 1 also demonstrates how Batten invokes a sense of history – and simultaneously also the topos of history (Wodak 2015: 53) – in "Let us go back to what we used to call this religion 30 or 40 years ago: Mohammedanism." As one of the more frequent topoi in right-wing populist rhetoric (Wodak 2015: 53), the topos of history is essentially based on the warrant 'Since history

teaches that particular actions have particular consequences, one should act in a particular way in a particular situation (supposedly) comparable with the historical example referred to' (ibid.). In this particular variation of the topos of history Batten is effectively arguing that people "30 or 40 years ago" were right in referring to Islam as "Mohammedanism" – which in fact was already at that time largely considered an offensive term, at least among Muslims themselves (Kramer 2003) – whereas the nowadays generally accepted term 'Islam' is a representation of unacceptable appeasement. This argumentation strategy where Batten is more or less revising the past to suit his own needs is, as Wodak (2015: 40) notes, an essential part of "right-wing populist rhetoric and propaganda". In addition, she goes on to argue that because collective identity is always shaped by the memory of the past, it is typical for right-wing populist politicians to engage in politics of the past when doing their identity politics in general.

In Example 1, Batten notably displays this strategy of subtle rewriting of history also by resorting to the fallacy of sameness in "Let us go back to what we used to call this religion […]" By employing the personal pronoun 'we', Batten makes an assumption of the existence of cultural homogeneity among him and his listeners regarding the issue of historical denominations of Muslims (Wodak 2015: 54). In other words, no matter what differences Batten might otherwise feel there are between him and his fellow MEPs, he appears quite certain that at least they all share a history of slinging racial slurs at the 'Muslim Other' – that 'history' in question being either an actual experience once-lived and personally participated in, or perhaps simply something that the MEPs might view as an appropriate characterization of a past to which they can feel a meaningful connection by virtue of some degree of historical continuity. As van Dijk (2000c: 95) notes, in the same degree as with several other small and formal structures of language, pronouns are generally used rather automatically, which is why an analysis of their use by any given person can yield some interpretations regarding his/her identification with one or more in-groups. However, such interpretations can only be tentative at best when based solely on the use of pronouns. Therefore, as a stand-alone clue – especially as the speeches under examination here have (most likely) been written beforehand – Batten's pronoun use could simply be seen as a consciously used rhetorical device to persuade his audiences, which would not reveal much about his actual inclinations to identify with any in-groups. Yet accounting for other textual evidence in addition can markedly strengthen the credibility of one's interpretations. In this case, Batten's pronoun use can therefore be seen as a piece of evidence *among others*, which all taken together imply that he quite prominently identifies with the in-group of (white) European Christians. By definition it can also be argued that

an in-group cannot exist without the existence of an out-group, and as we have already begun to see, in Batten's language use that out-group is quite clearly Muslims.

Although the example at hand may not seem like much in terms of revisionist historical propaganda – unlike perhaps some of the other examples presented later on in this chapter –, it is nevertheless a useful little window onto Batten's characteristically right-wing populist practice of using so-called 'knowledge' of the past in order to argue for his discriminatory and even plain racist statements about Islam and Muslims. Moreover, I would argue that it is exactly these on the surface less than scandalous – even quite innocuous-looking – remarks which are the most important pieces of discourse from the analyst's point of view, since they carry the power to transmit highly injurious ideas, attitudes and ideologies far and wide, even in these modern Western societies of ours where blatantly racist language use has already more or less disappeared from the public arena. For this reason, I believe it is of the utmost importance here in the present study – and also in the broader field of political discourse studies dealing with racism and ethnic issues – to properly deconstruct these types of implicit acts of racism as well, instead of merely striving to highlight those instances where racism in politics is at its most blatant.

A later reference in Gerard Batten's speeches to Islam as "the cult of Mohammed", as seen in Example 2 below, comes from a 2017 debate concerning EU wide security issues. The debate in question was held on 15 March – a week before the anniversary of the Brussels suicide bombings, which at this point must have still loomed very prominently also in the minds of many MEPs, since one of the three bombs exploded at Maalbeek metro station; a mere stone's throw away from the European Parliament. In Example 2 Batten once again promotes his own terminology regarding Islam, with an added expansion in the form of the derivative "Mohammedans" in reference to Muslims, but also uses his allotted speech time to elaborate on his views on the history of the religion:

> (2) Mr President, the Brussels terrorist attacks in March 2016 saw 32 people dead and over 300 wounded. It was just one in a very long list of tragic and pointless acts of violence by religiously-motivated fanatics. They carry out their senseless violence in the name of Allah and Islam. More accurately, they act in the name of Mohammedanism – the cult of Mohammed – which has always fed on blood for the 1 400 years of its existence, and Mohammedans kill their fellow Muslims just as much, if not more, than they kill non-Muslims (Speech 13: Topical debate – EU security agenda: one year after the Brussels attacks (debate) 2017a).

Here, again, Batten exhibits the use of the topos of history in order to present the past in a rather straightforward and selective light, while effectively sidestepping any other perspectives in the process. He talks about “the cult of Mohammed” having “always fed on blood for the 1 400 years of its existence” and in so doing – through the topos of definition – reduces Islam to essentially nothing but, as he himself eloquently encapsulates later on during the same speech, “an ideology of blood-soaked regressive nonsense” (Speech 13 2017a). Clearly, the word and phrase choices, such as “fanatics”, “pointless acts of violence”, “senseless violence”, “the cult of Mohammed”, “fed on blood” and “kill”, alone are rhetorically very effective and manage to get the message across instantaneously in the form of vivid images of blood and primitive, even animal-like, Muslims slaughtering Christians without much in the way of reason or morality holding them back. These strong, affective and violent expressions work to convey a representation of Muslims as dangerous and as a threat to ‘Us’ and to ‘Our’ Europe – a manifestation, according to Wodak (2015: 2), of a “politics of fear”, which she claims is central to the operation of *all* right-wing populist parties in one way or another. Thus, by propagating this rhetoric of fear Batten can be seen as attempting to create an environment where fear and mistrust of the ‘Others’ could be exploited for a political advantage.

Moreover, Batten’s argument on “Mohammedanism” constitutes a rudimentary example of negative Other-presentation where only the ‘Others’ are accused of transgressions both them and ‘Us’ have made. After all, it almost seems like too obvious a point to make that in the history of Christianity blood has been shed in the name of God just the same, and that there the motivation for killing Muslims has much in the same manner been religious as it has been for the Muslims killing Christians. Nevertheless, with the repetition of the pronoun ‘they’ in claims such as “They carry out their senseless violence in the name of Allah and Islam” and “they act in the name of Mohammedanism”, Batten is resorting to the fallacy of difference – that is, he is presuming a clear distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, between the followers of a sensible religion and the followers of a religion of “senseless violence”, while conveniently excluding any mention of violent acts committed on the part of Christians throughout history. This type of rhetoric is at the heart of right-wing populism. As Wodak (2015: 67) puts it: “Right-wing populist rhetoric divides the world into good and bad, into ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, insiders and outsiders, by constructing simplistic dichotomies and by positive self- and negative other-presentation.”

The supposed lack of reason and logic in the murderous ways of Muslims is further emphasized in Example 2 with the claim about “Mohammedans” killing “their fellow Muslims just as much, if not

more, than they kill non-Muslims". The whole degrading tirade in this example is a clear instance of hyperbole used as a tool for remarkably negative Other-presentation. On the other hand, this particular deliberately vague argument about Muslims killing people of their own religion "just as much, if not more" than those of others, while rhetorically convenient, would ostensibly be quite difficult for Batten to prove as a factual statement. The same certainly goes – and probably even more so – for the claim about Islam having "always fed on blood for the 1 400 years of its existence". Then again, Batten clearly is not worried about having to prove these statements true – or any of his statements regarding Islam and Muslims for that matter –, since the driving force behind his politics, as is arguably the case with virtually any right-wing populist politician, seems to be to appeal to emotions in lieu of reason, armed with mostly inflated rhetoric rather than actual facts and figures (Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013: xvii-xviii).

In line with this strategy, Example 2 also includes perhaps the most central topos to Batten's arguments about Islam and Muslims – the topos of threat. The topos of threat, too, is essential to right-wing populist rhetoric in general and relies on the rather simple warrant "If there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something against them" (Wodak 2015: 53). Indeed, as Wodak (2015) is able to show, it would hardly be possible to imagine successful right-wing populist politics without any explicit references to external threats, whether they are seen to originate from immigrants, the so-called 'political elite' or from some other group of people who do not fit the homogeneous – and also often romanticized – description of 'Us, the People'. Gerard Batten is therefore no exception and, as we shall continue to see in the course of the analysis, Islam and Muslims to him are by-and-large tantamount to 'threat'. In Example 2 the most dangerous and concrete manifestation of this threat as it is presented and articulated across Batten's speeches is on full display: terrorism. In Batten's view Islamic terrorism is a threat which is in direct relationship with the immigration of Muslims to Western countries. As he explains later on in the same speech (Speech 13 2017a): "All Muslims are not fundamentalists and terrorists, but the more Muslims you have in a population, the more Islam you will get, and the more Islam you have, the more terrorism you will get." Therefore, the way Batten puts it, Islam is clearly very threatening to European security, since he is explicitly claiming that an increase in Islam guarantees an increase in terrorism. Hence, Batten is resorting to a slippery slope fallacy (Cheng 2015: 582), as in 'If we Europeans continue to allow the ongoing immigration from Islamic countries, we will face an increasing amount of terrorism'.

In this remark Batten also exhibits one of the most fundamental strategies of positive self-presentation in the toolbox of right-wing populist discourses – the denial of racism (van Dijk 1997: 37). Although at this stage of his impassionate speech he has already quite nonchalantly committed himself to openly negative talk about Islam and Muslims, Batten nevertheless feels it necessary to utter a disclaimer in the form of "All Muslims are not fundamentalists and terrorists, *but* […]" lest someone could accuse his talk and underlying cognitions thereof of being prejudiced – let alone racist. This strategy of 'apparent concession', as van Dijk (2000b: 62) puts it, as well as other disclaimers, will certainly be revisited and examined in connection to additional data examples in due time – especially in terms of what they mean in relation to Batten's representation of Muslims. However, in the next section a closer look is taken at this aforementioned and supposedly intimate relationship between Islam and terrorism as it is formulated and argued by Batten.

4.1.2 Source of terrorism

> (3) Madam President, this report completely fails to acknowledge the cause of the current terrorist threat, which is ideological. That ideology is fundamentalist Islam. From its creation, Islam has been propagated by force and violence.
>
> President Hollande has said that we are at war. The first casualties in this war must be appeasement and political correctness. We face one of two choices: we can accept eventual submission to the ideology of an ever-increasing Islamic population, or we can take the first step in resistance and end any more mass immigration from Islamic countries. Only then can we start to address the difficult issue of integrating the existing Muslim population (Speech 9: Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations (debate) 2015g).

Example 3 above is an excerpt of the speech Gerard Batten gave during a sitting held on 24 November 2015 in Strasbourg in the aftermath of the infamously deadly Paris terrorist attacks, which had happened only 11 days earlier on 13 November. Therefore, the related world events pertaining to the analyzed data's societal context, which corresponds with the fourth level of context (i.e., the text's intertextual and interdiscursive relations) in the discourse-historical approach adopted by this study (Wodak 2015: 51), are here once again those of tragedy and shock. At this particular point of the plenary sitting of November 24, from which the above excerpt is taken, the MEPs were in fact quite aptly examining and discussing a report tabled by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs entitled 'Report on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations' – to which Batten's opening remark is

also in reference. As with all tabled reports in the European Parliament, along with the motions for resolutions the reports contain, this report was put to vote, which it also passed – by a landslide in fact –, and was consequently adopted as a text to be published and forwarded to the appropriate authorities. In the plenary the vote on a report and its motions can be taken with or without a debate (The European Parliament: Plenary – Texts adopted n.d.); however, in this case quite a lengthy debate ensued – perhaps rather unsurprisingly given the aforementioned context and topic of the report.

Especially of interest in this debate is the way Batten – as opposed to the majority of his colleagues – is displaying a substantial degree of tunnel vision by focusing solely on fundamentalist Islam, and Islam in general, as the cause of terrorism: “Madam President, this report completely fails to acknowledge the cause of the current terrorist threat, which is ideological. That ideology is fundamentalist Islam.” Thus, Batten is exhibiting the type of straw man fallacy which, as can be seen later on throughout the study, permeates the bulk of his discourse on Islam. That is, in his arguments Batten consistently attacks a fallacious concept of ‘Islam as the cause of X’ when debating issues that, in reality, are not quite as uncomplicated in their causality as he makes them seem. Hence, this strategy also betrays a reliance on the topos of cause which ultimately implies that because Islam (the cause) exists, so does terrorism (the effect) (Wodak 2015: 53, 59). Batten’s approach stands in stark contrast against those taken by nearly all of the other speakers in the debate, who mainly focus – as, too, does the report itself – on the plentitude of different reasons they think are causing and empowering the phenomenon that is fundamentalist Islam (Speech 9 2015g). Therefore, compared to the point of view of these other MEPs and the motions forwarded in the report, it seems as though Batten is eager to tackle the symptoms without striving to cure the disease, so to speak. In other words, it appears that Batten is unwilling, or unable, to recognize in his speech the complexity of the economic, social, psychological, etc. issues which might trigger such extreme thinking, attitudes and ideologies in individuals and act as a catalyst to the formation of extremist groups, as well as – ultimately – lead to acts of terror.

In fact, Batten begins his speech by immediately criticizing the report for “completely” failing to acknowledge that “the cause of the current terrorist threat” is in reality fundamentalist Islam. Next he goes on to add the already familiar hyperbole in the form of “From its creation, Islam has been propagated by force and violence.” Noteworthy here is how Batten immediately makes a straightforward connection and as a rather crude generalization ends up associating the whole religion of Islam with terrorism. In other words, similar to Example 1, he is again making a

categorical assertion (X = Y) without any hedging or actual proof supporting his claim. Moreover, in this case it is quite apparent in fact that the modifier 'fundamentalist' is essentially irrelevant to him in the end. In the manner that van Dijk (2000c: 91) presents as being a typical case of prejudiced thinking, he takes for granted the idea that all of Islam is fundamentally responsible for terrorism, simply because all of Islam has always been spread by means of violence. However, it remains unclear how and on what grounds exactly Batten sees the Paris terrorist attacks as an endeavor to propagate the religion of Islam.

At the beginning of the second paragraph of Example 3 Batten paraphrases then-President of France, Francois Hollande, as in "President Hollande has said that we are at war." Most likely this remark is in reference to a speech Hollande had held on 18 November 2015, five days after the attacks, at a national assembly of the mayors of France (CNN 2015). As with most argumentative discourse, there is a need for parliamentary discourse to provide some kind of 'evidence' in support of its claims or beliefs, which is why it is only natural for Batten to cite someone of the authoritarian and political standing of Hollande in order to bolster his own credibility as a speaker (van Dijk 2000c: 93). However, it is interesting to note how Batten actually uses this intertextual evidentiality to his advantage in practice, as what Hollande in fact said in his speech was: "These actions confirmed to us once again that we are at war – a war against terrorism, which itself has decided to bring war to us" (translated from French) (CNN 2015). Batten, for his part, significantly omits the detail about terrorism from his citation altogether and instead goes on to talk about the threat "an ever-increasing Islamic population" poses to Europe. Hence, although Batten seems keen to make it seem otherwise, it appears that Hollande and Batten were never quite talking about the same war after all. Furthermore, Batten adds: "We face one of two choices: we can accept eventual submission to the ideology of an ever-increasing Islamic population, or we can take the first step in resistance and end any more mass immigration from Islamic countries." This is a clear display of not only the typical topos of threat – to which the only antidote in Batten's mind is severely restricted immigration –, but also of a slippery slope fallacy in the form of 'If we continue to allow the ongoing immigration from Islamic countries, we will eventually have to submit to their ideology' (Cheng 2015: 582).

Fully in line with his direct references to war, Batten also displays the thematically appropriate rhetoric, including the demand: "The first casualties in this war must be appeasement and political correctness." Here the deontic modal verb 'must' contrasts with the abundant use of the epistemic modal verb 'can' of the latter parts of the speech, where Batten for instance argues that "we" *can*

make “one of two choices”. However, in reality those choices seem like the equivalent of the choices of a frightened animal backed up in a corner, since Batten essentially – and somewhat melodramatically – claims that “submission” or “resistance” are the only options we, as European Christians, are left with amidst this ongoing invasion. Hence, his offer of “two choices” is merely rhetorical, since, unless ‘we Europeans’ were willing to regard a quiet capitulation and acceptance of defeat as a real choice, there really is no other way for us to move forward except to take his lead; ‘properly’ acknowledge ‘the threat of Islam’ and defend ourselves against it. Moreover, Batten makes the conditions of action for Europe very clear indeed, and claims that there is no question of what needs to be done. Namely, “appeasement and political correctness” “must” be eliminated, Islamic mass immigration has to be stopped, and “Only then can we start to address the difficult issue of integrating the existing Muslim population.” As a whole, Example 3 constitutes an *argumentum ad baculum* – a fallacy, according to Wodak (2015: 54), where a reference is made to (alleged) dangers which are seen as a threat to national homogeneity; in this case, to the so-called religious and cultural homogeneity of Europe. We shall return to Batten’s use of the rhetoric of war and struggle in Section 4.2, where his pitting of Islam against Christendom is examined in more detail.

Example 3 is not the only time Batten has criticized the EU for not properly acknowledging the fundamental role of Islam in the growth of terrorism – and crime in general. Before the debate of 24 November 2015 discussed above, Batten challenged the at the time still newly-adopted European Agenda on Security for the period 2015-2020 during a debate held in Strasbourg on 7 July of that same year:

> (4) Madam President, this motion for a resolution calls for the implementation of the European Agenda on Security, and various spurious reasons are given for the growth in international crime and terrorism. As usual, the EU solution to any problem is to call for an increase in its powers and to usurp the powers of the democratic governments of nation states. The fundamental problem in relation to the increasing crime in some Member States is the EU’s own open borders policy. The fundamental problem in relation to the increase in terrorism is the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. Neither of these problems is addressed in this motion. The start of a solution is to return border controls to nation states, which would discourage and hamper the movement of criminals, illegal migrants and terrorists. When such barriers are in place, we can then adopt genuine security cooperation measures between independent nation states (Speech 6: European Agenda on Security (debate) 2015d).

Here, once again – in true populist fashion – Batten reduces complex issues into oversimplified representations (a straw man fallacy), and effectively dismisses the whole EU security agenda as

giving “various spurious reasons” for both the increase in crime and the rise of terrorism, whereas in his own view there is only one reason for each: the EU’s “open door policy” in the case of the former and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the case of the latter. All and all, Example 4 – which is a transcription of Batten’s 7 July speech in its entirety – is a classic example of recent UKIP policy (UKIP: Interim Manifesto 2018), and of European populism at large, with its representation of EU as essentially a usurper of national governments and its call for the restoration of nation states’ absolute control of their own borders.

Here is also a point where one is able to begin to observe the extent of the straw man fallacy emerging from the data excerpts considered so far; that is, the presentation of restrictions imposed on Muslims – be it on their movement or on their lives in general – as a panacea for Europe. In other words, because of the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism, Batten’s solution to severely restrict immigration would in practice be completely based on religion in its selectiveness. This use of the topos of threat is especially enlightening, since it exposes the underlying prejudiced attitude of viewing all Muslims as potentially dangerous and untrustworthy to an extent where it is seen acceptable to limit their rights and movement solely on the basis of their religion. Moreover, this particular finding bears interesting similarities to those made by Hafez (2017) about the Austrian far-right’s use of the topos of law and order in their effort to impose restrictions on Muslims, as well as on Wodak’s (2015: 54-55) insights into the way several European far-right populist parties have in recent years routinely functionalized terrorist attacks to justify exclusionary politics against Muslims. Therefore, it appears that Gerard Batten’s rhetoric on the issue represents yet another epitome in a long line of anti-Muslim discourse among right-wing populist politicians who appeal to security as a justification for their exclusionary aspirations. In the next section the applicability of this restrictive, exclusionary and discriminatory panacea outlined above is further maintained by Batten, as a selection of his remarks on the role of Islam as the cause of modern European antisemitism is presented and analyzed.

4.1.3 Cause of antisemitism

> (5) Madam President, the fact that few want to recognise is that the rise in anti-Semitism is in direct relation to the rise in fundamentalist Islam. There are many verses in the Koran calling on Muslims to make war on unbelievers. Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments reportedly said in March 2014 quoting from the Hadith 'We hope that the words of the Prophet Muhammad will be fulfilled: 'Judgment Day will not come before the Muslims fight the Jews, and the Jews will hide behind the rocks and the trees, but the rocks and the trees will say: O Muslim, O servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him'. If you want to understand the rise in anti-Semitism, that is a good place to start. There is some hate speech for you.
>
> Now regarding Islamophobia, a phobia is defined as an irrational fear. Many people have a perfectly rational fear of fundamentalist Islam. Would you deny them the fear that leads to self-preservation? (Speech 3: Rise of anti-semitism, islamophobia [sic] and violent extremism in the EU (debate) 2015a).

In Example 5 we are again able to examine an entire speech by Gerard Batten dedicated to discourse on Islam and Muslims. Again, as with the earlier examples on terrorism, one of the dominant topoi here is the topos of cause, since Batten makes it clear right away that in his view there would be little antisemitism in contemporary Europe if it were not for fundamentalist Islam. Staying true to his rhetorical tendencies Batten opens his speech by portraying himself as a rare voice of honesty and integrity among his misguided colleagues with the remark "the fact that few want to recognise is that the rise in antisemitism is in direct relation to the rise in fundamentalist Islam". The word "want" implies here that in Batten's view this majority of people he is speaking of – presumably mostly MEPs – is rendered unwilling to say what they *really* think because of an adherence to political correctness or some other form of social pressure. However, Batten presents himself as being one of those "few" who are immune to such pressures, which is why he can freely speak his mind; in other words, he is able to be *honest* in his discourse and policies – or, at any rate, so he wants his listeners (and voters) to believe.

Next, he goes on to give evidence for his statement regarding this (alleged) cause-and-effect relationship between the rise in fundamentalist Islam and the rise in antisemitism; firstly, by making a rather vague reference to the Qur'an, before striving to support that reference with an illustration in the form of a reported quotation from Egypt's Minister of Religious Endowments. Illustrations in general, van Dijk (2000b: 66) notes, are a contextual tool used in order to enhance one's credibility as a speaker, and they also manage to cognitively bridge the gap between abstract social

representations and mental models of specific events. In this case the illustrating example, a few lines from the Hadith as quoted by the minister, works to create a tangible memory of a concrete instance of Muslim antisemitism in the minds of the listeners. These types of 'real-life' cases, stories and anecdotes are certainly useful, since they appeal to listeners' opinions and emotions as well as add to the credibility of the speech (van Dijk 2000b: 64). Batten's use of this kind of specific example is therefore arguably a lot more powerful cognitively than any abstract or general representation of the same phenomenon could be – especially, since the quotation in question contains very powerful rhetoric with explicitly racist and violent imagery, as well as incitements to hatred and acts of killing, with Jews portrayed as cowering "behind the rocks and the trees" and Muslims encouraged to "come and kill" the Jews merely because of their religion. Somewhat confusingly, however, this particular illustration comes from the Hadith, which in fact are religious texts independent from the Qur'an (Brown 2014), even though Batten appears to 'sell' the illustration by claiming that "There are many verses in the Koran calling on Muslims to make war on unbelievers."

Moreover, in line with Kienpointner (2009: 69-70), the quotation can also be seen as a fallacious strategy of *argumentum ad misericordiam*, i.e., an appeal to pity as an argumentation fallacy. After all, Batten has most likely been quite calculated indeed in choosing specifically such an emotionally charged quotation to present in the plenary – of which the desired effect, at least one of, has presumably been to arouse pity towards Jewish people among his listeners. These feelings of pity Batten can then be seen exploiting in Example 5 in an implicit attempt to win support for his policies regarding Islam and Muslims, which, as we have learnt so far, are mainly to do with restrictions on the movement of Muslims and on the expression of Islamic culture within the EU. The fallaciousness of this strategy, however, stems from the notion that this dramatic and horrifying example of an Egyptian minister relaying antisemitic words from the Hadith carries the potential to block a fully critical assessment and discussion in terms of whether or not the rise in antisemitism can actually be directly traced to the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, or whether there could also be some other explanatory factors involved, since the attention of critical opponents is instead drawn to the dramatic contents of a few lines of Islamic scripture in an individual minister's speech which in all likelihood have little to do with the totality of the actual issue at hand. As Kienpointner (2009: 71) suggests, this type of strategic maneuvering can be viewed as an attempt "to silence critical opponents in an illegitimate way", which makes it highly problematic conduct in the political context of the magnitude of the European Parliament.

After presenting the quotation, Batten then leaves it by stressing its rhetorical weight: “If you want to understand the rise in antisemitism, that is a good place to start. There is some hate speech for you.” By closing the argument with such an utterance about hate speech Batten is performing a subtle reversal of blame, which becomes more apparent when some intertextual context is once again first taken into account (van Dijk 2000b: 62). After all, at that point in 2015 UKIP had only spent a mere year or so in the political mainstream of the UK, but had already during that short time garnered quite a reputation in the media as a party in many ways associated with hateful and racist remarks about minorities of many kinds, not only Muslims (Dominiczak 2014; Watt 2014). Therefore, this comment from Batten can be interpreted as a jab at his and his party’s critics, while at the same time it can also be seen as a blame reversal where he attempts to transfer the onus of hate speech onto the very group he and his party at large are accused of disparaging. This ‘It is not us but them’ disclaimer works especially well here, because the Hadith quotation is so clearly and blatantly hateful that it overshadows in comparison the more subtle and intricate discrimination of Batten’s and his colleagues’ discourse. However, it bears noting that a discourse of a certain kind does not lose its characteristics and essence merely because there exists another one with a whole lot more of the same attributes. One could argue that a Siberian husky is in a sense *more* of a dog than a chihuahua on account of its closer kinship with the wolf, yet both are nevertheless dogs and are also treated as such. Therefore, it can be argued that this strategy also constructs an implicit straw man fallacy in which an attempt is made to make UKIP’s rhetoric seem unprejudiced in comparison to prejudice of a more extreme kind (Wodak 2015: 59).

As a conclusion to his speech in Example 5 Batten tackles the issue of Islamophobia. To begin the argument, he straight away resorts to the topos of definition by suggesting that Islamophobia is tantamount to the fear of *fundamentalist* Islam – which, of course, is a drastic reduction of the full semantic meaning of the word ‘Islamophobia’ and, as such, also fails to comply with its dictionary definition of “irrational fear of, aversion to, or discrimination against Islam or people who practice Islam” (Merriam-Webster 2019b). This fallacy of definition is another example of oversimplification as a rhetorical move to make ‘the Self’ appear rational and fair. With the claim “Many people have a perfectly rational fear of fundamentalist Islam” Batten is also declaring popular animosity as a justification for his anti-Islam agenda. As van Dijk (1997: 38) explains, referring to popular animosity in order to justify exclusionary policies – although the animosity itself is often to a great extent constructed and exacerbated by the politicians – can be viewed as a strategy of justification by referring to the “force of facts”, as in ‘Because the facts are what they are, certain (even undesirable) actions must be taken’. As Wodak (2015: 53, 60) shows, this type of

argumentation strategy can also be described as an *argumentum ad populum* and as an invocation of the topos of people, since the (alleged) 'will of the people' is considered here as the basis of political action, and – similar to justification by the force of facts – as an invocation of the topos of reality (as in "Because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made"). Other similar justifications in the present example are the aforementioned references to the Qur'an and the Egyptian minister's speech. In van Dijk's (ibid.) words, they all are "among the many "good reasons" being used in justification tactics for negative decisions".

Because of the somewhat complex yet largely implicit nature of Batten's Islamophobia argument as a whole, it is useful to thoroughly deconstruct it into its individual elements. Following Toulmin (2003), it can firstly be observed that one of the main underlying arguments Batten is effectively – if only implicitly – making here is: 'Fear of fundamentalist Islam leads to self-preservation, so fear of fundamentalist Islam must be rational'. Secondly, this implied argument can be broken down to its constituents, where the phrase 'Fear of fundamentalist Islam leads to self-preservation' can be recognized as providing the argument with its data. The data in turn exists as evidence to support the actual claim (or conclusion) of the argument, which is 'Fear of fundamentalist Islam must be rational'. Finally, one is able to locate the warrant of the argument as being something along the lines of 'A fear leading to self-preservation is rational'. Note, however, that just as Batten is making the whole argument implicitly, he also does not explicitly state its warrant. Instead, he assumes that his listeners take it for granted that a fear which leads to self-preservation is always rational. It is safe to say, though, that the warrant 'A fear leading to self-preservation is rational' is not exactly a straightforward fact or a rule without exceptions. One could ask, for example, what about a case of agoraphobia where a person might feel threatened and unsafe anywhere outside his/her home? After all, it *could* be argued in such a case that the fear leads to self-preservation as the person in question consequently ends up spending essentially all of their life indoors in avoidance of severe anxiety and/or panic attacks. However, hardly anyone would describe such a fear as being rational. In effect, therefore, the above process of argumentation analysis can be said to have managed in Batten's comment to uncover an argument which is not only based on a crude fallacy of definition, but which quite frankly also rests on logical quicksand.

Finally, Batten closes his speech in the form of a rather provocative rhetorical question aimed at his colleagues: "Would you deny them the fear that leads to self-preservation?" By taking the side of the vaguely put "many people", to which the pronoun "them" is in reference, Batten is not only invoking the topos of people and referencing popular animosity in the way described above, but he is also – as with the previous "There is some hate speech for you" comment – attempting to dodge

any accusations of prejudice that might be directed towards him. Here he does it by shifting the onus of dubious behavior onto his critics sitting in the plenary chamber in a way which is meant to make *them* seem like the unreasonable and oppressive ones in the argument. This shifting of blame, as Wodak (2015: 67) explains, is a characteristic part of right-wing populist rhetoric, in which it is important to maintain a strong and unwavering front when confronted with accusations of wrong-doing – even when having been caught making obvious 'mistakes'. Therefore, right-wing populist politicians are often quick to assign blame to someone else in order to save face.

Here this strategy also fits well into the traditional right-wing populist narrative of 'the people's' antagonism towards 'the elite' (Akkerman 2003: 151), who in this case are Batten's fellow MEPs, with Batten himself aspiring to project an image of the relatable everyman striving to make 'the people's' voice heard. Interestingly, however, in doing so Batten once again commits a clear fallacy of definition, as he essentially implies that any denunciation of Islamophobia is equivalent to 'denying' the people their right to be afraid. Moreover, his question also constructs a blatant straw man, since, to be sure, none of Batten's opponents in the plenary actually *made* the argument which his rhetorical question is in fact refuting – that is, that people should not be allowed to be afraid of fundamentalist Islam. Thus, Batten's rhetoric here manages to show once more that he is not by any means above the strategies of exaggeration, dramatization and 'truth-bending', which indeed are generally very familiar to right-wing populist politics *en masse* (Wodak 2015: 67-68), but instead is even quite willing to engage in some rather questionable feats of argumentation in order to promote his exclusionary politics concerning Islam and Muslims.

> (6) Madam President, anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe and this resolution does not attempt to understand the reasons behind it. Studies show that European Muslims are 10 times more likely to hold very unfavourable views about Jews than non-Muslims. There are two main reasons for the growth of the current strains of European anti-Semitism. The first is the anti-Semitic content of the Islamic tracts, the Qur'an, the Hadith and the Sunnah. The second is the dramatic growth in the number of Muslims in Europe over the last 50 years, a growth that is now spiralling upward (Speech 15: Combating anti-semitism (debate) 2017c).

Another example of Batten expressing his views on the underlying causes of the increase in European antisemitism comes from a debate entitled 'Combating anti-semitism', which was held in May 2017 in Brussels, approximately two years after the debate of Example 5. On the agenda during the plenary was a motion for a resolution containing a myriad of solutions, instructions and pleas regarding an EU-wide campaign against antisemitism. In his take on the issue, of which Example 6 above is an excerpt, Batten's main arguments and talking points are more or less the

same as in 2015, but he does in fact introduce some new evidence to bolster his by now already familiar claims. In the speech Batten once again establishes his firm stance right at the beginning by very matter-of-factly dismissing the whole resolution more or less as a massive failure: "anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe and this resolution does not attempt to understand the reasons behind it". This trademark rhetoric of unrelenting certainty and confidence continues throughout the excerpt as Batten makes one strong claim after another without so much as a fleeting hedge to cushion the impact of the battering blows of 'there is' and 'there are'. Therefore, the topoi of cause and threat are – similar to previous examples – once again explicitly articulated and evidence for the claims is presented in a very self-assured manner.

This time, however, Batten does not exclusively rely on quotations from Islamic authority figures or scripture to back up his claims, but instead – albeit rather vaguely – also refers to 'studies' which "show that European Muslims are 10 times more likely to hold very unfavourable views about Jews than non-Muslims". In the vein of Kienpointner (1996, as quoted in Wodak 2015: 52) it is evident that Batten employs the topos of authority here by referring to these unspecified – yet presumably still scientific – 'studies' as the source of this information. In general, the credibility of science as an authority can be viewed as being rather solid. Therefore, scientific findings as the data of an argument would in most cases be seen as markedly more reliable than, for example, if similar claims were made only by a single person of high authority. Accordingly, Batten does not question the findings of these studies either. Instead, he proceeds to use the findings as indisputable evidence of the widespread antisemitism of Muslims by largely resorting to them in his argument of Islam and Muslims as the fundamental cause of modern European antisemitism. To him the studies prove, first of all, that the antisemitic content of Islamic scripture does in fact make European Muslims "hold very unfavourable views about Jews", which, in turn – because of "the dramatic growth in the number of Muslims in Europe over the last 50 years" – greatly increases the amount of antisemitism on the continent.

In a very similar manner to his arguments in Example 5, Batten then traces the source of the phenomenon of Muslim antisemitism back to "the anti-Semitic content of the Islamic tracts, the Qur'an, the Hadith and the Sunnah". The recent increase in antisemitism in Europe he in turn – perhaps somewhat predictably – attributes to the "the dramatic growth in the number of Muslims in Europe over the last 50 years, a growth that is now spiralling upward". As already established, Batten presents these two factors as unequivocal and undeniable 'reasons' for the rise in antisemitism, and his use of powerful words such as "dramatic" and "spiralling" further add to the

effect. This type of lexicalization is a distinct instance of negative Other-presentation, since it implicitly assigns qualities to Muslim immigrants which are clearly unfavorable. The Muslims are represented as a "number" and as an uncontrollable mass, which is quickly swarming over Europe and causing alarm and problems wherever it reaches. This constitutes an employment of the 'flood metaphor', which is often used in the context of migration (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 54-61), and is here supported by the topos of threat, too. The verb "spiralling" as in "a growth that is now spiralling upward" is especially persuasive, since it conveys a sense of chaos and a loss of control, which demand swift action and a firm restoration of order. In sum, therefore, these rhetorical strategies work to exacerbate the idea of Muslims as the treacherous 'Other' which needs to be controlled and contained (Wodak 2015: 57). Moreover, by solely laying the blame for the recent increase in European antisemitism on Muslims, Batten is overlooking the significant role the growing movement of the 'new' far-right plays in the proliferation of antisemitic discourse, rhetoric and other activity in the EU and beyond (Wodak 2015: 97). This tunnel vision, naturally, is problematic, but not only in terms of fallacious negative Other-presentation where Muslims as a homogeneous group are constructed as the sole scapegoat, but also in terms of effective policy-making, since it fails to consider contemporary European antisemitism as the multifaceted problem it actually is, and thus may critically hamper the formulation and execution of possible solutions to tackle the issue properly.

With this addition of antisemitism to the array of topics deduced from the data so far, the full multilayered nature of the straw man fallacy Gerard Batten time and again constructs in his discourse regarding Islam and Muslims is beginning to emerge. By utilizing the topos of threat first and foremost, Batten produces heavily generalized and racist representations of Islam and Muslims where the religion and its followers as a fallaciously homogenized group are fundamentally blamed for the near Europe-wide rise in, not only terrorism, but also in antisemitism and crime in general. As has also become evident, for Batten the great enabler of this 'threat', which he sees harassing Europe on several fronts, is Islamic immigration. In the next section it is therefore appropriate to examine and analyze more closely the arguments and representations Batten employs and constructs when addressing the topical and greatly controversial phenomenon that is the immigration of Muslim people into Europe. Furthermore, alongside the topic of immigration, I shall next deconstruct some additional arguments Batten makes about Islam's overall role and general right to exist here.

4.2 “This is not immigration. This is invasion” – Islamic immigration and Islam in Europe

> (7) One of the main reasons that migrants flood to Europe from all corners of the world is the EU’s open borders policy, because once in one European country it is easy for them to make their way to their European country of choice, and in many cases the migrants’ country of choice is the United Kingdom. We only have to look at the chaos and anarchy in Calais where thousands of illegal immigrants daily fight to gain entry to Britain after having travelled across Europe to do so.
>
> We need genuine cooperation among nation states to address the root causes of mass migration and to police our borders, but while we still have an open borders policy in Europe these efforts will be in vain. Britain’s priority should be to regain control of our borders by leaving the European Union (Speech 1: Joint police operation "Mos Maiorum" (continuation of debate) 2014a).

The first time Gerard Batten made a reference to Islamic immigration to Europe in the span of this study’s data was in a plenary speech he gave in October 2014 – of which Example 7 above is an excerpt. In the timeline of migration in Europe this debate was held at a juncture where the continent was on the cusp of its migrant situation developing into a full-blown crisis (the European migrant crisis of the 2010s is a period commonly viewed as having begun in 2015 (The European Parliament: Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures 2017)) and can therefore be seen as an interesting point of comparison with regards to Batten’s later discourses and rhetoric concerning the issue, especially since the escalation of the migration situation in the following few years coincided with several major terrorist attacks on European soil. I shall return to these chronological considerations and more general conclusions in the ‘Discussion’ chapter.

Example 7 demonstrates how Batten clearly establishes his stance on the side of Britain against the allegedly harmful immigration policies imposed by the European Union. Rather predictably, considering UKIP’s ideology of hard Euroscepticism and the already at the time promising early stages of the Brexit movement, he concludes his speech with a plea for his country to leave the Union altogether. In this particular instance of positive self-representation Batten is mostly identifying with Britain in an effort to lay blame on the EU for forcing his, especially in immigrants’ eyes, desirable and superior home country to suffer under the yoke of “mass migration”. This example of Batten ‘choosing sides’ is especially interesting, since it is arguably quite revealing of his constructive macro-strategies regarding the making of national identities (Wodak 2015: 57-58). As a Eurosceptic politician hailing from London, Batten’s priorities naturally

lie in forwarding the national interests of the UK, yet – as we have seen on several occasions already – he repeatedly, as Wodak (2015: 58) puts it, "highlights the common culture of different European nations and attempts to unify them by emphasizing a common threat". As will become evident below with Example 8, in Batten's rhetoric this strategy mainly involves the use of implicit discursive strategies, such as the fallacy of sameness, which effectively constitute an illusion of Europe as culturally more or less homogeneous. Wodak (ibid.) goes on to suggest that this type of rhetoric is very similar to that witnessed in the context of "exclusive nationalism" and thus propagates "a quasi-national, elite identity based on a cultural hybrid and the discursive construction of fear".

In Example 7 the topos of threat is once again apparent as the (Muslim) immigrants are represented as active, even hostile, agents selfishly taking advantage of all the good Europe, and Britain in particular, have to offer; they "flood to Europe" and choose whatever country they like the best, because it is "easy for them", all the while causing "chaos and anarchy". The flood metaphor, in its most literal form, is prominent in the expression "migrants flood to Europe from all corners of the world", where the origin of the migrants is also expressed in a vague hyperbole to give an impression of the absolute immensity of the 'problem'. In Batten's words these "thousands of illegal immigrants" "fight" to make their way to Britain while causing "chaos and anarchy" in doing so. Firstly, the word "thousands" constitutes an example of one of the most prominent rhetorical strategies in the realm of immigration discourse: 'the number game', where sizable numbers – often exaggerated and/or vague – are stated in order to convey an image of vast masses of immigrants on the move and trying to gain entry to another country (van Dijk 2000b: 75). As part of his overall strategy of negative Other-presentation, Batten's lexical choice of "illegal" as opposed to, for example, "undocumented" when talking about the immigrants can also be seen as quite telling in terms of the type of qualities he assigns to them. As van Dijk (2000c: 95) maintains: "Few properties of discourse are as immediately revealing about ethnic opinions as the words being chosen to describe Them and Their actions and properties." Batten continues along the route of exaggerating rhetoric with the claim that these people "daily fight to gain entry to Britain". Here the verb "fight" is obviously powerful, since it packs all the drama Batten wishes to convey about the situation and then some. The way in which he describes the situation in Calais, France is that of the immigrants violently pushing and slinging themselves across the border by virtually any means necessary as the border officials – debilitated by the EU's border policy – helplessly stand by and watch, or at most, try to do what little they can to stop the 'oncoming wave'. This lexicalization also

fits appropriately with the general rhetoric of war and struggle, which – as we will come to see – to some extent pervades more or less every one of Batten's speeches on Islam and Muslims.

Moreover, Batten even goes as far as to claim that because of the "open borders policy" of the EU the immigrants have a 'choice' among all European countries and that it is in fact "easy for them" to go wherever they want. In other words, Batten implies that this immigration is in truth – to a great extent, at least – economic and opportunistic by nature, and appears worried that the immigrants come here only to take and give nothing in return. According to van Dijk (1997: 36), this is a popular view of immigrants among right-wing populist politicians, who often also label such immigration as 'fake', because – in their eyes – it does not derive from an absolute necessity to flee one's come country, as is the case with so-called 'real' refugees, nor does it contribute to the economy of the destination country. In sum, by utilizing the topos of cause, Batten – in a manner we have already come to see as typical of the rhetorical structure of his speeches – establishes a straightforward and crudely simplified cause-and-effect scenario where the harmful effects of a particular phenomenon (Islamic mass immigration) can be nullified by the removal of a single clear-cut cause (the EU's open border policy).

The topos of law and order also features prominently in Batten's suggestion as to how the immigration situation in the EU should be managed. Namely, Batten expresses a dire need for all nation states Europewide "to police our borders" as well as, in the case of Britain, "to regain control of our borders". Interestingly, Batten on one hand admits that European nations must work together in "genuine cooperation" in order "to address the root causes of mass migration" – yet on the other hand he does not seem to have much faith in such endeavors, as he essentially insists that immigration to Europe from the so-called 'problem countries', which are mostly Islamic, must be brought to a halt before anything else can be done to try to alleviate the situation on a broader, causal level. Here one can also observe an intriguing case of Batten taking on a double identity as he begins the second paragraph by aligning himself with a European identity with the use of pronouns 'we' and 'our', as in "We need", "to police our borders" and "while we still have", but then switches to a distinctly British identity in the closing sentence: "Britain's priority should be to regain control of our borders by leaving the European Union." This final remark clearly shows that despite his identification with 'Europeanness' to some extent, at least when contextually beneficial – for example, when constructing a unified European identity against a common threat (i.e., Islam) in the manner discussed above – he identifies first and foremost as British. Moreover, the speech-final positioning of the remark manages to grant it additional importance and weight. Therefore,

Batten's nationalistic EU policies are not only apparent in the content of his speeches, but also in the way he delivers them. Finally, having thus established his identification as predominantly British, Batten implies his disillusionment towards the EU by voicing his party's (arguably) main agenda: to achieve Britain's exit from the union – hence creating an image similar to that of rats abandoning a sinking ship.

> (8) Mr President, (inaudible as microphone not switched on) ... the so-called Arab Spring, the idiotic foreign policy of the British Government and others was to support insurgent groups against their oppressive rulers. Unfortunately, the liberators turned out to be more savage and tyrannical than those they sought to replace. The unfortunate inhabitants of these countries now leave in droves by any means that they can. If we want to have a holistic approach to this problem, then it has to recognise the root cause, and the root cause is, of course, a fundamentalist and extremist interpretation of Islamic ideology, most notably expressed by the so-called Islamic State.
>
> The countries best placed to tackle the problem and with the money to do so are, of course, the vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, etc. These are the countries that should take these people because they can afford it. They share similar cultures and the same religion (Speech 2: Situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (debate) 2014b).

As opposed to the representation of immigrant Muslims as extensively active agents – as hostile invaders, even – in Example 7, in the above example (Example 8), which constitutes Batten's full speech from a debate held merely a month after the speech featured in Example 7, the Muslim immigrants are contrastingly depicted as "unfortunate inhabitants" of war-torn, miserable countries, who "now leave in droves by any means that they can". As van Dijk (2000c: 92) suggests, this kind of strategy constitutes an impression management move in the form of a disclaimer of 'apparent empathy', which is meant to make Batten himself appear fair and just – no matter how strongly he might in fact be against providing these "droves" (another flood metaphor) of people a place to *go to* after they have left their unhospitable home countries.

Therefore, it becomes apparent from considering these two examples presented in this section so far that Batten's representations of Muslims are liable to change and fluctuate depending on the context and political angle at hand. In Example 7 Batten called for stricter border control – an argument which certainly benefited from depictions of immigrants as threatening and causing chaos, since any demand for improved security and added control naturally needs to be accompanied by an indication, or as is often the case in right-wing populist rhetoric, a construction – explicit or implicit

– of a great enough threat to legitimize it. By contrast, here in Example 8 Batten's focus is on 'selling' the idea of fundamentalist Islam as "the root cause" of the 'immigration problem', which in turn is assisted by referring to the dreadful conditions in the immigrants' home countries – allegedly caused by fundamentalist Islam – which "the unfortunate inhabitants" are desperately trying to escape. Hence in order to effectively convey his message of fundamentalist Islam as a tremendously destructive force uprooting entire populations, it behooves Batten to highlight the suffering of the immigrants. In other words, Batten essentially elevates these people – if only in rhetoric – from villains to victims in the course of two short speeches separated only by a single month in time.

The typical overall strategy of constructing an honest, unshakeable and confident appearance through the favoring of ostentatious language ("idiotic", "savage", "tyrannical") and statements as unequivocal truth claims over any form of hedging is once more very much apparent. In fact, in Example 8 Batten takes his usual self-assured rhetoric one step further by suggesting that his main arguments denote truths which – as a matter of fact – should be accepted as totally obvious. That is, he twice uses the emphatic phrase 'of course' to indicate both that "the root cause" of the immigration problem is "of course, a fundamentalist and extremist interpretation of Islamic ideology", and that "The countries best placed to tackle the problem and with the money to do so are, of course, the vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, etc." This is therefore another clear example of Batten's penchant for strong categorical assertions in lieu of epistemic modalities, such as 'X could be Y' or 'it is possible that X is Y', when talking about issues related to Islam or Muslims. Following Wodak (2015: 80), both of the above claims constitute Batten's very prominent tendency to make "hasty generalizations" about issues regarding Islam and Muslims. His so-called 'root cause' argument has already been discussed at length in the previous two sections concerning terrorism and antisemitism – with a generalized representation of Islam as the cause of both – and here it surfaces once again to designate fundamentalist Islam as the cause of the mass immigration of Muslims to Europe. However, as has already been established before in Section 4.1.2, Batten is in fact well inclined to discard the term 'fundamentalist' altogether, since at the core of his argument lies the claim that the religion of Islam as a whole is to blame for the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. So, it naturally follows then that Islam itself is the cause of "the problem" of Islamic immigration, as well.

The second significant generalization Batten makes in Example 8 has to do with his self-imposed question of who should bear the burden of facilitating these "droves" of unfortunate people. In his answer Batten demonstrates a clear employment of the fallacy of sameness with his proposition that

“the vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states” should “tackle the problem”, since not only does Batten make this argument on the grounds of these countries being convenient options both geographically and economically, but also – and most significantly – because “They share similar cultures and the same religion.” According to Wodak (2015: 54), the fallacy of sameness is most often used by right-wing populist politicians to construct “the ‘own’ nation as a culturally homogeneous community”. However, here Batten can be seen resorting to it in an extended fashion where ‘the Muslim community’ of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula is in the same way generalized and homogenized as the ‘culture’ of European Christians Batten himself identifies with.

Culture thus becomes essentialized in Batten’s discourse as, in the words of Wodak (2015: 55), it is “regarded as a static entity which somebody either knows about or does not, has or does not have”. Batten therefore not only constructs a fallacious homogenization of a so-called ‘Muslim culture’, but also employs a common argument about culture which is often present in media and political debate discourses regarding immigration and religious differences. This involves the implication that culture is a bounded entity which is threatened by the existence of residents allegedly belonging to another ‘culture’, since those people are seen as unwilling to accept ‘our’ norms and values. In other words, they are seen as unwilling to assimilate (Wodak 2015: 55). This strategy also betrays the implicit use of the culturalist topos of belonging, which is another topos typical for populist far-right discourse concerning immigration and ethnic issues (Hafez 2017; van Dijk 2000c), as Batten clearly insinuates that not only do ‘we’ not have the resources to accommodate “these people”, in the end they and their culture do not even really belong here. Therefore, they should go be with ‘their kind’ instead. Thus, the fallacy of difference and the age-old populist rhetorical strategy of ‘Us vs. Them’ are once again on clear display.

> (9) Meanwhile, our security is endangered because of the results of mass immigration. Under Mrs Merkel's leadership you have brought in millions of people from Africa, the Middle East and beyond, and you intend to bring in millions more. You have turned many parts of Europe into foreign countries. You use the emotional blackmail argument of talking about helping defenceless refugee families, and yet the reality is that the vast majority of these migrants are young men from Islamic countries. This is not immigration, this is invasion.
>
> Traditionally, Europe resisted Islamic invasion. Heroic struggles in the Siege of Malta, at the Gates of Vienna, have now been replaced by abject surrender. Islam offers two options: submit or resist.
>
> You have decided to surrender and submit on behalf of your citizens. But some states are resisting. Rebellion is now stirring in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and elsewhere (Speech 16: Debate with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, on the Future of Europe (debate) 2018).

Our next example on the topic of Islamic immigration and habitation in Europe is Example 9 above, which is an excerpt from – even on Batten's standards – a rather confrontational and heavily anti-EU speech that he gave during a somewhat exceptional sitting involving the prime ministers of all EU countries, with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, as the invited guest speaker. The topic of the debate was 'the future of Europe', on which Rutte spoke at length right at the beginning. After Rutte, leaders of parliament groups were able to speak on behalf of their groups, and many in fact took the opportunity to address Rutte directly in the form of questions and comments. This is also what Batten did as part of his thorough attack on the EU of past and present, which more or less climaxed at the vehement anti-immigration rant observable in Example 9.

After criticizing The European Union for being in essence a power-hungry bastion of elitism, Batten arrived at the issue of security, which is also where the example at hand begins. Example 9 as a whole is brimming with topoi typical of right-wing populist discourse (Wodak 2015: 53), of which perhaps the most common, the topos of (security) threat, is the first one to which Batten resorts in the line: "Meanwhile, our security is endangered because of the results of mass immigration." This, of course, is an apt beginning to this section of the speech since it establishes – in the fashion of 'first things first' – the most prominent, and definitely also the most central, argument in Batten's discourse about Islam and Muslims; that of the religion and its followers as a major threat to Europe, the European people and the European way of life. As Batten has thus set the basis for his further argumentation and his stance, he is then able to proceed with the handling of the finer details of this position – his main argument – in a more systematized manner. To be sure, the utterance also

includes the usual topos of cause, which Batten employs here to blame the immigrants for endangering “our security”. Furthermore, with the pronoun ‘our’, Batten once again displays a degree of opportunism by invoking a sense of a united ‘Europe’ and a ‘European identity’, despite his usual tendency to be aggressively anti-EU and pro-nation state, apparently because here such identification happens to suit his political agenda. This opportunist strategy is quite common among right-wing populist politicians, as, for example, Wodak (2015: 54-55) is able to show in the case of Austrian politician and former leader of the controversial FPÖ, Jörg Haider. The number game makes an appearance here as well as the EU is then blamed for letting “millions of people” immigrate with the intention of bringing in “millions more”; an instance of negative Other-presentation intended to exacerbate the sense of alarm one is expected to experience in the face of this oncoming ‘wave’ of immigration.

Batten’s next claim, “You have turned many parts of Europe into foreign countries”, however, is where the gloves really come off. It incorporates the topos of belonging in a distinctly explicit manner by essentially stating that the ‘Muslim culture’ – as it is homogenized in Batten’s rhetoric – simply does not belong in Europe. Not only that, via the topos of threat Batten is also warning that it is destroying ‘our’ ‘European culture’ by deforming it into something foreign. Thus, Batten is not only arguing for causality, as in ‘They are making Us foreign’, but is also providing ‘Them’ a great deal of active agency in the form of the argument ‘They have the *power* to make Us foreign’. With the accusation “You have turned many parts of Europe into foreign countries” Batten is therefore blaming his fellow MEPs and other European policymakers for allowing Muslims to exercise that power freely on ‘our’ soil. Following Wodak (2015: 57), it can also be argued that Batten is scaffolding his argument with the topos of definition, as in “If a group of people is named as Europeans, then they feel attached to the (European) civilization their ancestors created.” This is a topos which is further strengthened by his references later on in the excerpt to historical battles between (Christian) European powers and the (Islamic) Ottoman Empire, references which shall be addressed in greater detail in a moment. Moreover, in pitting ‘Europe’ against Islam in a cultural conflict – with roots that span centuries – Batten can be seen invoking the topos of (common) European culture, which hinges on the conditional: “If we share the same Christian culture, then we are citizens of Europe” (Wodak 2015: 57). Thus, in a typical ethno-nationalist way, Batten is excluding Muslims from Europe, not based on definitions of territory, but on distinctions concerning religion and culture. As Wodak (ibid.) puts it, both of these culturalist topoi “establish and legitimize the opposition between ‘Us’, the ‘Europeans’, and the ‘Others’” – with the ‘Others’ in this case doubtlessly being Muslims.

Batten then moves on to accuse the EU of "emotional blackmail", which is where we get to witness him once again explicitly assign the immigrants an active and hostile role – as opposed to his exhibiting of apparent sympathies towards the "unfortunate" victims of Example 8 – thus providing further proof of his strategy of constructing different – even conflicting – representations of Islamic immigrants depending on his political angle in the overall context of the debate at hand at any given time. With the claim "yet the reality is that the vast majority of these migrants are young men from Islamic countries. This is not immigration, this is invasion" Batten also quite literally displays the use of the topos of reality in order to justify his restrictive stance on immigration. More precisely, he implies – with the help of the strengthening modifier 'vast' – that the fact that up until the point of his speaking the majority of those arriving in Europe had been men (which admittedly is correct especially for the first six months of 2015 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015: 7) and to a lesser extent still continues to be so at the time of writing this) means that Europe is being 'invaded'. In other words, Batten is saying that these migrating men have ulterior motives similar to those of a ruthless, invading army; that is, to conquer, rule by force and terrorize. Although not to deny the actual potential problems skewed sex ratios among asylum seekers might in fact cause – as it is true, for example, that in the majority of terrorist attacks committed by migrants the assailants have been unmarried young adult men, and that the over-abundance of men in relation to women could pose some long-term problems to European societies with low birth rates (Hudson 2016) – it nevertheless has to be noted that Batten's argument offers a "reality" which is remarkably blinkered.

To quote Wodak (2015: 2), Batten completely ignores in his "arrogance of ignorance" the reasons which in reality account for most of the cases of men immigrating alone without their families. The overwhelming majority of those men do not immigrate alone in order to commit terrorist acts, nor do they come here to take part in any sort of 'population replacement' scheme or any other of the myriad of conspiracies and criminal activities they are often accused of, especially by the far-right. Instead, they attempt to first find a safe place to live and work before later looking to reunite with their families once those secure living and working conditions have (hopefully) been established (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015: 7). Young men are also perhaps the most at-risk demographic in countries like Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, since they are often coerced into fighting for terrorist groups and other belligerents, or more likely to be killed rather than captured by such groups (Hudson 2016). Therefore, it is only to be expected that such gloomy future prospects for young men would also show in the immigration statistics. However, as has already become quite clear in the course of the present analysis, accepting the fact that a multitude of

complex reasons might lie behind an equally complex phenomenon is not exactly Batten's strategy of choice when it comes to his rhetoric. After all, the act of presenting political issues as anything but black-and-white simplifications would make his brand of right-wing populism considerably harder to propagate among voters (Wodak 2015: 2).

By redefining Islamic immigration as "invasion" Batten is making a powerful claim via the topos of definition. Thus, he is also constructing an alternative representation in which a phenomenon generally viewed in terms of humanitarian good will and international cooperation in contemporary Western democracies is instead understood through discourses of violence and war. The rhetoric of war is a Batten favorite, and it can in fact be found in nearly all of his speeches concerning Islamic immigration; not least because it ties well with his attempts to manipulate and rewrite concepts of history to suit his and his party's own political agendas. This use of the topos of history is especially apparent in the analogical comparison in Example 9 between historical battles and present-day immigration: "Traditionally, Europe resisted Islamic invasion. Heroic struggles in the Siege of Malta, at the Gates of Vienna, have now been replaced by abject surrender. Islam offers two options: submit or resist." This excerpt betrays the typical strategy of right-wing populism of romanticizing the past in a way which charges it with nationalist concepts of homogeneity, as well as manipulates it in order to construct a simplistic historical narrative readily appealing to political endeavors invoking 'common sense' and past collective experiences (Wodak 2015: 39). In Batten's case, this argumentation scheme promotes in a fallacious way the idea of learning from the past as crucial to being able to understand the present, because of the way the topos of history is employed. Namely, Batten is making the argument that the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic immigration is comparable to the invading, pillaging and destructive armies of the 16th and 17th centuries' Ottomans. Clearly this is extremely harsh rhetoric, which can even be seen as blatantly illogical, yet the purpose of it is not to be able to stand the test of fact-based scrutiny. Instead – as is the case with all forms of propaganda – it is an attempt to influence public opinion by creating images and representations which are easy to understand and adopt for the target group in the context of their personal 'world(s) of experience' (Smith 2019). By invoking the image of a homogeneous (Christian) Europe, Batten is also propagating the idea of a 'common' European history, which by definition excludes Muslims as the non-European 'Other'. In the name of the topos of history he is then able to claim that the immigration crisis of the 2010s is in fact a case of history repeating itself; once again the Islamic world is attempting to conquer Europe and once more 'We' must fight to stop 'Them'.

Notably Batten also uses the topos of opposites to his advantage as he neatly weaves the past and the present together in a clear dichotomy: either 'we' as 'Europeans' distinguish ourselves in "heroic struggles" – as did our courageous forefathers – or concede in "abject surrender" in the manner which, at least as far as Batten is concerned, the EU is forcing us to. The topos of opposites is another topos especially notable in right-wing populist rhetoric (Wodak 2015: 53). It aligns well with the common thread in Batten's rhetoric about Islam and Muslims – that of the religion and its followers as distinctly 'other' as opposed to Christian Europeans. Throughout Batten's discourse one can distinguish a rigid division between everything non-European Muslim and European Christian where the distinguishing features of Islam are presented as the polar opposites of those of Christianity. This black-and-white dichotomy carries over to his depiction of the essence and inner characteristics of Islam, as in "Islam offers two options: submit or resist". Without hesitation, Batten again presents this claim per usual: as an undisputable fact in a very abrupt and to-the-point manner. Thus, this instance of negative Other-presentation characterizes Muslims as fierce propagators of an invasive religious movement which does not accept 'no' as an answer.

Therefore, in the same way as Batten depicts Islam in a fallaciously simplified manner in terms of opposites – "submit or resist" – he also presents the relationship between the fallacious constructs of the 'European culture' and 'Islamic culture' as completely antithetical. Furthermore, with the use of the topos of history and the analogy between immigration and historical wars of religion he is able to create historical continuity; an unbroken narrative spanning centuries of Europe and Islam as each other's arch-enemies – a narrative which, as Batten implies, merely testifies to the natural order of the universe, that is, as light battles darkness, so should Europe resist Islam. Evidence of this same strategy can in fact already be found in an earlier speech (Speech 12 2016) where Batten addressed ISIS and its systematic mass murdering of religious minorities: "ISIS represents a revival of the original ethos of the Mohammedan cult that conquered its way up to France before being driven back in the 8th century. Thank God, not Allah, most Muslims do not follow this literalist interpretation." This is another application of the topos of history as Batten very confidently and matter-of-factly sets out to interpret history in a blatantly anachronistic and simplified manner to suit his own political needs. His use of the racist term "Mohammedan cult" only serves to underline the fact that this allegedly clear-cut ideological connection between medieval Ottoman wars of expansion and modern-day Islamic terrorism is hardly more than an overgeneralized construction of his own creation – much like the term itself.

In the dry-humored jab “Thank God, not Allah, most Muslims do not follow this literalist interpretation” Batten also resorts to the strategy of ‘singularization’, that is, as Wodak (2015: 54) puts it, to the rhetorical strategy “of constructing oneself as unique or superior” in comparison with the inferior ‘Other’, by suggesting that ‘our’ Christian God is the one deserving of our gratitude for the fact that most Muslims are not terrorists, not Allah. Thus, through the built-in fallacy of comparison, Batten presents Christianity as superior to Islam, with the added rhetorical support of a dose of biting humor. The same brand of negative Other-presentation reappears later on in the speech where Batten first repeats his typical demand to stop mass immigration from Islamic countries before concluding with a – mainly rhetorical – question: “And why do the leaders of the Christian churches not recognise a recruitment opportunity and launch an ideological crusade to convert European Muslims to Christianity?” With phrases such as “a recruitment opportunity” and “an ideological crusade” it appears Batten is to an extent making light of institutionalized religion in general – nevertheless, the main criticism is still aimed at Islam through the topos of belonging; Christianity is *the* religion of Europe, whereas Islam in Europe is only an abnormality – an abnormality in need of conversion.

Finally, as has already been hinted at above, Batten’s argumentation in Example 9 is also fraught with fallacies. The clear presence of the fallacy of difference has already been established by distinguishing the clear division between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in the excerpt, yet the example contains a few others as well. To begin with, one can observe in the example a very prominent instance of *argumentum ad baculum*, i.e., an appeal to (the threat of) force, which is a fallacy referring here to (alleged) perils threatening the supposed transnational homogeneity of the so-called ‘European society’ (Wodak 2015: 54). Both the fallacies of difference and *ad baculum* are of course at the heart of right-wing populist rhetoric, because of the populist right’s general presupposition of a political ‘Other’ – whether it is the immigrants or the elite – of which is made the scapegoat for any number of hardships the ‘common citizen’ is facing in his or her daily life. In order to be effective this process of scapegoating naturally requires that a clear difference is made between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and that ‘They’ are somehow made to seem threatening towards ‘Us’, which is often where these particular fallacies come into play. The third fallacy apparent here (“This is not immigration, this is invasion […] Islam offers two options: submit or resist”) is the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy, which acknowledges as a cause something that is not a cause, and essentially implies the conditional ‘If Europe accepts this so-called ‘Islamic’ culture and denies the superiority of ‘European’ culture, then Europe will fall’ (Wodak 2015: 56). Embedded here is also the slippery slope fallacy, as Batten is clearly issuing a warning about the devastation which will face ‘our’

society and culture if we continue to welcome Islam to Europe. This argument is undoubtedly further bolstered by the aforementioned historical analogy, which works to remind listeners about the lessons history has supposedly taught us about the various terrors a foreign invasion on this continent can inflict on a population.

Batten also made similar claims 15 months earlier in a speech regarding Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism on European soil (Speech 13 2017a), as he spoke of the dangers and problems inflicted upon Europe by "our arrogant and illiberal political elites of Western countries" with "their open-door immigration policies and the doctrine of multiculturalism". In this earlier instance of fundamentally the same argument as in Example 9, Batten not only made distinctly explicit the tripartite link between immigration, multiculturalism and societal threat, but also included the common right-wing populist trope of blaming the – in a fully unambiguous way at least – rather indefinable 'political elites' for creating the 'problem' in the first place. Furthermore, in Speech 13 (2017a) Batten talked about "the doctrine of multiculturalism", which only further serves to stress the culpability of this 'elite' by portraying multiculturalism as a type of dogmatic coercion imposed on the resistant majority of the people from above with the aid of unpopular regulations and related sanctions. Therefore, Batten implicitly employs the topos of people to support his argument; as the "doctrine" (allegedly) does not have the backing of 'the people', it should not be exercised (Speech 13 2017a; Wodak 2015: 53).

The same invocation of 'the will of the people' against the immigration policies of the elite can be found in the conclusion of Example 9: "You have decided to surrender and submit on behalf of your citizens. But some states are resisting. Rebellion is now stirring in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and elsewhere." The fervent rhetoric of war rears its head once more with the concept of 'resistance' being juxtaposed with the concepts of 'surrender' and 'submission'. With such rhetoric in a European context the mental leap in listeners' minds towards 20th century warfare on the continent is presumably not very long; one can indeed quite easily be left with the impression of EU as a nation state crumbling under the pressure of a foreign invasion, whereas the aforementioned countries – all of them with a strong far-right presence – are likened to resistance movements fighting back and refusing to accept the official national policy of surrender. However, these resistance movements are not only fighting against an external threat (the spread of Islam), but are also 'rebelling' against those in power, quite as if in – as Batten explains further on in the same speech in relation to Brexit – "a modern Peasants' Revolt against their out-of-touch overlords" (Speech 16 2018). Thus, Batten can once again be observed resorting to a form of othering and a

clear dichotomy of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’, yet this time around the focus is on perhaps the most traditional populist distinction; between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, with Batten obviously identifying as belonging to the former – despite the high economic and social standing accompanying his position as an MEP and a prominent party leader. The quintessential historical overtones are also present; enabling the subtle use of the topos of savior, too, as in ‘Rebellion and resistance have saved us in the past, therefore they will be able to save us again’ (Wodak 2015: 53).

4.3 “The terrorists and the extremists all have one thing in common: they are all reading the same book” – The Qur’an

> (10) The threat that we all face in the West – and not just in the West – is from fundamentalist Islam. The terrorists and the extremists all have one thing in common: they are all reading the same book, and it is called the Koran. It contains exhortations, such as ‘kill unbelievers wherever you find them’, ‘make war on unbelievers’ and ‘strike terror into the hearts of unbelievers’. Some people take that literally.
>
> We are told by our leaders that Islam is a religion of peace and love. The problem is that it is actually a contradictory mishmash of nonsense. The problem is that the extremists and the fundamentalists actually choose the bits that they like in order to satisfy their bloodlust and earn themselves 72 virgins in paradise, although nobody has actually come back to confirm that they get them (Speech 7: Recent terrorist attacks (debate) 2015e).

In previous sections we have already seen some examples of what kind of intertextual evidence Batten uses to support his arguments and enhance his credibility as a speaker. Nevertheless, in order to understand this aspect of his discursive strategies even better, a more focused examination is pursued in this section into the one piece of evidence which constantly keeps reoccurring in his speeches about Islam and Muslims: the Qur’an. Example 10 above, which comes from an already familiar speech regarding a series of Islamic terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, is an especially illustrative excerpt in terms of the role and significance the Qur’an possesses in Batten’s view on Islamic terrorism.

Firstly, Batten makes it clear right from the beginning that *all* Islamic terrorists and extremists are reading the Qur’an and, secondly, claims that ‘fact’ to mean that there is a straightforward correlation between reading the Qur’an and committing acts of terrorism. To bolster the effect of this claim he then includes illustrations in the form of “exhortations”, which all include very

powerful and dramatic imperatives, such as “kill”, “make war” and “strike terror”. Unquestionably this is extremely violent, warlike and fearsome language, which is sure to unnerve any “unbeliever”, i.e., any non-Muslim, – especially if taken at face value, as Batten can be seen doing here. In addition to attempting to emotionally affect their audience, these illustrations also appear to reflect Batten’s own rhetoric to a certain extent; although Batten is surely not attempting to provoke any violent acts towards Muslims, he is – as previous examples have shown – nevertheless resorting to similar rhetoric of war when urging his listeners to join the battle against the spread of Islam. Hence it seems Batten is in fact willing to accept the message of these hand-picked “exhortations” and agree that there indeed is an ‘eternal war’ raging between Them, the Muslims, and Us, the “unbelievers”.

There are, however, again a few fallacies Batten is guilty of with this argument. To begin with, his claim about all of the extremists and terrorists reading the Qur’an and, as he adds in the second paragraph, effectively choosing “the bits that they like in order to satisfy their bloodlust and earn themselves 72 virgins in paradise” is a hasty generalization (Wodak 2015: 80) and, in a manner typical of Batten, also a crude simplification. After all, it seems highly unlikely that a religious text alone, even with such lofty promises, could be able to compel ordinary Muslims, merely because they take what they read literally, to kill and murder other people and – in the process – often themselves as well. Therefore, Batten’s blinkered representation of Muslim extremism with its sole focus on the culpability of Islamic holy texts is altogether sidestepping the complexity of the circumstances and possible reasons, for example, social and psychological, which ultimately lead some Muslims to commit terrorist acts in the name of their religion.

The attack on the Qur’an in Example 10 can thus be seen as involving a *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy, that is, an acceptance as a cause of something which in reality is not a cause (Wodak 2015: 56). Furthermore, it entails a refusal on Batten’s part to consider these extremists and terrorists as rational or, quite frankly even very intelligent, people. This is a harkening back to the findings presented earlier in Section 4.1.1, in which historical Muslim violence against Christians was depicted as being very primitive and almost animal-like. In a similar fashion, Batten is arguing here that Islamic terrorists and extremists are simply on a mission to “satisfy their bloodlust” and to claim what is rightfully theirs as promised by the Qur’an. This negative Other-presentation is highly problematic, since it essentially implies that Muslims, compared to ‘Us, European Christians’, are violently irrational and somehow more gullible. Batten is claiming that Islam, on account of its scripture, is “a contradictory mishmash of nonsense”, yet does not appear to feel the need to address

the somewhat contradictory nature of most religious texts, including the Bible, which also include "exhortations" hardly acceptable in a modern democratic society. Hence the implication stands; only Muslims are impressionable enough to take literally what is written in their nearly millennia old religious texts and irrational enough to systematically act upon them, too. Moreover, Batten stresses this belittling point further by indulging in some sardonic humor regarding the 72 virgins he mentions the Qur'an as promising for jihadists: "nobody has actually come back to confirm that they get them". This is not only humor for rhetoric's sake, but also communicates the idea of these teachings of the Qur'an as something worthy of ridicule and as credible only to fools.

Batten takes a stance on the side of 'the people' here as well, thus showing his true populist colors again, by declaring that "We are told by our leaders that Islam is a religion of peace and love." Thereby, he is crucially excluding himself from the group of said "leaders", i.e., 'the elite', and instead is identifying with 'the people' – who he claims have effectively been lied to by the privileged few on top of the proverbial ivory tower of politics. Batten is clearly aiming to make a mockery of both such 'soft' representations of Islam, which he considers hopelessly naïve, and the terrorists and extremists who commit acts of extreme violence in the hopes of a rewarding afterlife – yet in the process he is quite explicitly also degrading the whole of Islam. Surely, there is no hedging or holding back in his sardonically dry humor, nor in such soberingly informal and blunt expressions as "a contradictory mishmash of nonsense", which are visibly aimed at the religion *en masse*, not just at its most extreme manifestations. Lastly, one cannot help but be left with an acute feeling of irony when considering Batten's explanation about how terrorists and extremists reading the Qur'an "actually choose the bits that they like in order to satisfy their bloodlust and earn themselves 72 virgins in paradise". After all, that type of hand-picking seems awfully similar to what Batten himself is doing here in his effort to disparage the Qur'an.

In a later speech – again, on Islamic terrorism – Batten (Speech 13 2017a) doubled down on the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy of Example 10:

> If you want to address the problem, you first have to understand and confront its fundamental cause. A minority of Mohammedans take literally some passages in the Qur'an. They read the bits that say 'make war on infidels, strike terror into the hearts of infidels, and kill infidels wherever you find them', and they act accordingly.

The representation of the literal interpretation of the Qur'an as the "fundamental cause" of Islamic terrorism is not only completely fallacious, and a crude oversimplification of a tremendously more complex matter, but it is also especially troubling in regards to any measured and concerted efforts to combat Islamic terrorism on an international scale. If the type of rhetoric Batten is propagating is allowed to take root – and more and more people consequently come to believe that the Qur'an is indeed fundamentally to blame for the rise in international terrorism – we will face the danger of the focus of politicians and other people with the power to act becoming skewed and directed away from the multitude of social, psychological, economic and environmental reasons at play in contemporary Muslim countries – often in result of war – which can demonstrably be shown to affect people, especially young men, truly detrimentally and result in a higher likelihood of them joining terrorist organizations and/or committing violence in the name of Islam. Put differently, by scapegoating the Qur'an Batten's rhetoric is contributing to a myopic political climate in which any meaningful actions to tackle the *real* reasons behind Islamic extremism and terrorism would be woefully difficult to undertake.

4.4 "They are not the problem" – Moderate Muslims

> (11) Western liberal democracies must make it plain that extremist, fundamentalist Islam has no place in western society. We all come into contact with moderate, peace-loving Muslims every day. They are not the problem. Their ideology is. We must support the moderates against the extremists.
>
> Let us make it plain that we do not accept this ideology and take practical measures to defeat the extremists and support those moderates who want to stay in western liberal democracies. If they want to live under Sharia law, then they should go and live in one of the countries where they can do that (Speech 7: Recent terrorist attacks (debate) 2015e).

The 'Recent terrorist attacks' speech (Speech 7 2015e), which was already previously examined in Examples 1 and 10, receives attention for one last time in this final section of analysis, where the focus is on Batten's representation of a group of people he calls 'moderate Muslims'. Example 11 above consists of two paragraphs from the latter part of said speech and displays Batten's efforts to distinguish between "peace-loving Muslims" and "the extremists". Batten begins his argument by stressing the necessity in Western liberal democracies of condemning "extremist, fundamentalist Islam", and does this with the help of the topos of belonging: "extremist, fundamentalist Islam has no place in western [sic] society". This particular topos is an especially interesting one in Batten's

rhetoric, since its existence was noted earlier in this study as well (see Section 4.2), yet in those cases it was used as a tool to implicitly exclude *all* Muslims and forms of Islam from the West, not merely those with extremist or violent tendencies. In fact, this is effectively what Batten is doing here in Example 11, too, by rather confusingly assuring that it is not the “moderate, peace-loving Muslims” which are “the problem”, but their ideology. The confusion, of course, arises from the fact that Batten is at the same time claiming he has nothing against those Muslims who essentially ‘know how to behave’ in the ‘European’ culture context, as he is condemning the ideology of the very same people. Ideology – by definition – is commonly understood as a collection of those values and beliefs which essentially form an individual’s or a group’s view of the world, and thus also fundamentally affects how they live in it (Merriam-Webster 2019a). Therefore, for Batten to make such a claim seems rather contradictory; on one hand he is maintaining that “moderate” Muslims do not pose any problems to a ‘Western society’, on the other he is taking a stand against the very values and norms they live by.

Throughout the strong message in Example 11, and its demands to act against Islamic fundamentalism, runs a parallel disclaimer which functions to highlight positive self-presentation via a forthright denial of racism in the form of the underlying argument ‘I have nothing against Muslims, but…’ As van Dijk (1997: 37) points out, denials such as these are a typical part of elite racism, and are often used by politicians to make sure that their statements and public opinions are not perceived as prejudiced or racist. This also seems to be the case with Batten here as he is quick to specify that he is exclusively attacking the “extremists” with his exclusionary argumentation, not the “moderates”, since “We all come into contact with moderate, peace-loving Muslims every day.” In fact, on the surface this effort to steer clear from accusations of racism or prejudice seems quite successful. Moreover, his clear distinction between “peace-loving Muslims” and Islamic terrorists appears reasonable and entirely logical – commendable even. However, under further scrutiny Batten’s linguistic choices betray implications of some less than fully egalitarian views on Islam and Muslims in Europe. First of all, Batten’s choice to refer to these people he so clearly does not want to offend as ‘<u>moderate</u> Muslims’ is intriguing, and as an expression it can also be interpreted as perhaps revealing some aspects about the underlying cognitions dictating its use. To Batten, it seems that Islam in a European environment is a phenomenon which is tolerable, perhaps even acceptable, as long as it manifests itself ‘in a moderate fashion’. Therefore, it appears as though Islam and the homogenized ‘Muslim lifestyle’ are likened to consumables such as junk food or alcohol; essentially bad for a person, but can be tolerated in moderation.

In addition, Batten's way of describing how 'we', as in (white) European Christians, "come into contact" with these 'unproblematic Muslims' on a daily basis further contributes to the othering effect of his discourse, as the phrase "come into contact" can hardly be interpreted as conveying much in the way of meaning or mental imagery related to actually knowing a person or actively associating with him or her (Riggins 1997b). Instead, the phrase's core message is that of distance, and its effect a further widening of the gap between 'Us' and 'Them'. Batten portrays Muslims as a fundamentally foreign group of people with which 'We, the Europeans' have mostly cursory contact – almost as if only because we lack choice in the matter. Somehow, however, there is enough of this contact for us to determine whether the Muslims we meet are "peace-loving" and "moderate" or not, but generally still not enough, it seems, to actually 'bridge the gap', so to speak, and build deeper connections and meaningful interpersonal relationships with 'Them'. This constitutes a strategy which borrows heavily from ethno-nationalism by resorting to the fallacy of difference (Wodak 2015: 54); although 'moderate Muslims' are not "the problem" *per se*, they are still fundamentally too different and un-European to be accepted fully into the homogenized (fallacy of sameness) 'European society'. This underlying cognition is also reflected in the way Batten confidently addresses his colleagues in the parliament hall as a heterogeneous group; as if they were all included alongside Batten himself in the in-group of 'true', i.e., non-Muslim, Europeans. For Batten the distinction is clear: there are the "Us" of the parliament (the MEPs), and "Them" (the Muslims), who are 'out there' in the world. These two distinct groups merely "come into contact", and mainly because it is only inevitable as a result of them existing in the same society. Therefore, Batten makes the – most likely incorrect – assumption that there are no Muslims in his audience, and by doing so renders his speech a clear example of a typical parliamentary debate regarding any minority; as in, all speech is conducted by the dominant group *about* the minority group without the minority group themselves having a say in the matter (van Dijk 2000c: 88).

Finally, Batten firmly underlines his preferred policy in dealing with the 'fundamentalist problem': "Let us make it plain that we do not accept this ideology and take practical measures to defeat the extremists and support those moderates who want to stay in western [sic] liberal democracies". Batten also explicitly calls for "support" for the moderates against the extremists. Batten's actual ideas regarding these "practical measures" are left vague, however, since he does not describe them any further. Nevertheless, the apparent support and good will towards "the moderates" in his proposition can be questioned on the basis of his denouncing their ideology in the very same speech, as well as based on all of his prior exclusionary rhetoric on Muslims analyzed in this study so far. Hence, more than appearing genuine, Batten's strategy of détente seems rather like an

attempt to gain a useful – yet unilateral – ally in 'moderate Muslims' in the battle against "the extremists". Especially since Batten does not specify how he envisions this "support" in practice, one is easily left with the sense that he is willing to offer it for these people, not because he views them as truly welcome and belonging in Europe, but mainly because he sees in them an opportunity which could be harnessed for political gain. In the same vein, his closing statement about living under Sharia law reads as a stern reminder, as in 'You, the Other, are able to live in Europe *only*, because We, the real Europeans, allow it'.

Batten revisited the topic of 'moderate' Muslims later that same year, and was even more explicit about the dangers of Islam this time around:

> (12) The current terrorist threat comes from Islamic fundamentalists who want to establish a world caliphate under Sharia law. We are told that the vast majority of Muslims are peace-loving and non-violent, and I accept that is true. But the majority are not the problem, the minority are; and they all follow the same religion. The teachings of that religion, if taken literally, are totally incompatible with democracy and Western civilization (Speech 11: Protection of victims of terrorism (debate) 2015i).

Moreover, in Example 12 Batten no longer spends time talking about personal contact with "peace-loving" Muslims, but instead accepts the claim that "the vast majority of Muslims" are peaceful and "non-violent" as a fact "we are told". Thus, although Batten is willing to believe the statement, the way he presents it as something 'We, the people' are told – clearly by some authority – positions himself, firstly, once again as one of 'the people' as opposed to 'the elite', but also – and more importantly – creates a notable distance between Us and Them, the Muslims. This distance communicates the fallacious generalization that we Europeans are not able to rely on our personal experiences in determining whether or not the majority of Muslims are in fact non-violent, but have to rely on someone's word for it instead. Therefore, the image in Batten's discourse of Muslims as the perpetual Other is further strengthened.

Also, whereas in Example 12 Batten took particular aim at 'the ideology' of Muslims, here he is being more explicit in saying that it is in fact religion into which the problem with Islamic fundamentalism ultimately reduces: "the majority are not the problem, the minority are; and they all follow the same religion. The teachings of that religion, if taken literally, are totally incompatible with democracy and Western civilization." This represents another crude generalization on Batten's

part, on two levels in fact, since he is, firstly, resorting to the fallacy of sameness in presupposing that all Muslims follow their religion in a way which greatly determines how they live their lives and interact with their surroundings and the people around them – otherwise it ostensibly would not even be worth mentioning that they *are* Muslims in the first place. Also embedded is the assumption that all Muslims actually read the teachings written in the Qur'an and other Islamic literary works, which – similar to assuming that all Christians read the Bible – is obviously an overgeneralization. Secondly, Batten is fallaciously generalizing – this time without bothering to specify *which* teachings of Islam – by boldly claiming that *all* of them "if taken literally, are totally incompatible with democracy and Western civilization". Hence, there is again quite a conspicuous contradiction in Batten's argumentation, as he is on one hand saying that the majority of Muslims are unproblematic, yet on the other is pointing out that they are all followers of a fundamentally problematic religion. A certain level of threat is thus inherent in all Muslims, since essentially the only thing separating the "peace-loving" majority from the extremist minority is the fact that the "peace-loving" do not take the teachings of their religion literally. Therefore, although Batten appears keen to indicate otherwise, a close inspection of his discourse, with its above-described distancing expressions and the use of the topos of belonging, and fallacies of sameness and difference, fails to unearth much in the form of trust towards Muslims in general, regardless of the level of extremeness in their beliefs. Considering Batten's arguments about the Qur'an, which were analyzed in the previous section, this is hardly surprising; after all, if all it takes for a person to turn from non-violent to violent is an uncritical reading of a book, then one would understandably be quite wary of all people reading that particular book.

In sum, these findings about 'moderate Muslims' are well in line with Gerard Batten's representations of Islam and Muslims in general. As we have continually come to see in the course of this chapter, the analysis of Batten's rhetoric on the religion and its followers reveals heavily generalized representations, which implicitly – despite his best efforts to explicitly claim otherwise – malign all Muslims. These representations, firstly, denigrate the whole of Islam, including its scripture, as fundamentally absurd, dangerous and foreign to Europe, and, secondly, portray all Muslims as foreign invaders and as the ultimate 'Other' to the essentialized 'European Christian'. Therefore, although Batten routinely employs disclaimers of apparent empathy and concession in order to appear sympathetic of "peace-loving" Muslims and their religious ways, his open attack on Islam, which includes blaming it for the rise of terrorism and antisemitism in Europe, clearly suggests that, as far as he is concerned, every Muslim in Europe is an alien and more or less a threat to 'our' security and culture in the end.

5 DISCUSSION

In investigating UKIP leader Gerard Batten's European Parliament plenary debate speeches on Islam and Muslims from his 2014-2019 term as an MEP, the purpose of the present study has been to contribute to a better understanding of how meaning is built and structured in discriminatory political discourse and textual rhetoric. More specifically, this study has utilized the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis, jointly with the theories of culturalist racism, racialization, parliamentary debate analysis and the Toulmin model of argumentation, in an effort to discover how Gerard Batten speaks about Islam as a religion and Muslims as a cultural minority group, as well as to discern what types of representations of these subjects he in so doing conveys. And secondly, to acknowledge, uncover and deconstruct the arguments, processes and cognitions in the discourse, both explicit and implicit, which could potentially contribute to the broader reproduction of racism in European political discourse. As part of the discourse-historical approach adopted in the study, the findings of this analysis were classified into four main topics, one of which, ''Islam 101' by Gerard Batten', was further broken down into three sub-topics. Together all of these topics are taken to represent the main themes and talking points which encompass the whole of Batten's discursive representations and arguments regarding Islam and Muslims inasmuch as they have been deduced from the plenary debate data.

On the basis of the findings of the present study it can first of all be concluded that, when describing Islam from cultural and religious perspectives, Batten consistently – with the abundant use of categorical assertions – constructs representations which are both overgeneralized and fallaciously homogenized, as well as often – in a culturalist sense – racist, too. As shown in the more detailed summary below, with the aid of a series of topoi (such as the topoi of definition, threat and history) and several other fallacious argumentation strategies (including the slippery slope fallacy and fallacies of sameness, difference, comparison, *argumentum ad baculum* and *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*) – all typical of right-wing populist rhetoric –, Batten establishes an elaborate straw man fallacy in which the religion of Islam, as a monolithic whole, is blamed of being the fundamental cause of terrorism and antisemitism in contemporary Europe. In Batten's speeches Islam – fundamentalist or not – is presented as tantamount to threat, both to European and national security and – in the fashion of exclusive nationalism – to the fallaciously idealized 'common' European culture. Therefore, Batten, who is usually very much anti-EU in his policies, nevertheless employs the fallacy of sameness to construct a homogenized European identity centered around Christianity and an essentialized European culture. Moreover, he strongly identifies with this identity and attempts to

propagate it in order to achieve a united European front in the fight against the threat of Islam. As part of his identity politics he also, in true populist manner, presents himself as one of ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘the elite’, and employs the topos of people in order to argue for the illegitimacy and error of the “doctrine of multiculturalism” imposed on ordinary European citizens by their ill-advised leaders. Moreover, in his employment of the topos of history Batten manipulates past events and contexts to suit this agenda by constructing racist representations of Islam as the perpetually blood-thirsty “death cult of Mohammed” and – even more prominently – as the quintessential ‘Other’. The topos of definition and the fallacy of difference are key here, as Batten redefines Islam as a fundamentally senseless and violent religion, as opposed to the more civilized and rational Christian faith common to the nation states of his ideal Europe.

When accusing Islam of being the main cause of antisemitism in modern Europe, Batten heavily resorts to the topos of cause, as well as presents himself as a rare voice of honesty in Western politics on account of his willingness to publicly voice this alleged cause-and-effect relationship between the two. He also relies on vague references to ‘studies’ (topos of authority) and on illustrations taken from Islamic scripture as his evidence of the antisemitic nature of the religion. These illustrations also able Batten to appeal to his audience’s emotions and – in a manner typical of right-wing populist rhetoric – to manage a blame reversal regarding the issue of hate speech with the suggestion that rather than accuse him or his party of speaking hatefully about minorities, people should in fact direct such accusations towards Islam and its teachings instead.

Batten’s grand scheme in regards to Islam and Muslims, which consists of stopping Islamic mass immigration into Europe and notably restricting Muslims’ religious and cultural activities on European soil, is also largely propagated by these strategies of othering and racist representation. By invoking the topoi of threat and history, as well as by relying heavily on the rhetoric of war, Batten portrays Islamic immigration as a dangerous invasion which is threatening the very existence of the ‘European culture’ of Christian heritage – much like the Ottoman invasions did in the 16th and 17th centuries. Moreover, he describes this invasion as willing to stop at nothing until Europe has successfully been submitted under the rule of Islam. By reproducing this image of unyielding and uncompromising ‘savages’, Batten is portraying Islam and Muslims as something primitive – a stark contrast to his representation of a sophisticated and diplomatic (religious) ‘culture’ of independent European nation states, a culture he appears vehement in defending. This juxtaposition between Christianity and Islam is further strengthened by the topos of opposites, the strategy of singularization and the fallacy of comparison, which together construct a representation of

Christianity and Christian culture as vastly superior to Islam and Islamic culture. Central to this othering representation are also such fear-mongering rhetorical strategies as the number game and the flood metaphor, which manifest themselves clearly in Batten's lexical choices, that is, in his descriptions of "thousands" of immigrants, who "flood to Europe" and leave their home countries "in droves", and create an image of an immense and alarming problem in need of an assertive and swift resolution. Batten's lexical choices also grant a great deal of threatening agency to the immigrants, as he depicts how they "fight" to cross European borders and cause "chaos and anarchy" while doing so. Similar agency is also apparent in Batten's expressions of the fear of Muslims having the power to change the 'European culture' into something foreign and worse, a fear which is especially visible in his resorting wholeheartedly to the fallacy of *argumentum ad baculum* when describing the threat Islam and Muslims impose on Europe. Thus, embedded in Batten's verbalizations of this fear is also the slippery slope fallacy, as in 'If Europe accepts this so-called 'Islamic' culture and denies the superiority of 'European' culture, then Europe will fall'.

Following the aforementioned analogy of historical wars of religion, Batten presents Christianity and Islam in an antithetical relationship spanning centuries, in which it is only natural for the 'Christian Europe' to battle the invading Muslims and strive to keep them outside its borders. This is conducive to a case of positive self-representation, where the romanticized concept of 'long traditions' is invoked in order to produce powerful and self-glorifying nationalist rhetoric. However, haphazard exploitation of history such as this can be viewed as potentially quite dangerous in a political setting, because it makes hasty generalizations without appropriate evidence, as well as sees connections and historical similarities where there in reality are none – or if there are, they are significantly less straightforward than as presented. Hence, a major problem arises when these hasty generalizations and fallacious connections are then used to meet political ends in ways which – as especially the history of the 20th century can unfortunately demonstrate – are able to establish and spread racist or otherwise detrimental ideas and attitudes on a far-reaching societal level.

Notably, however, immigrant Muslims are not only presented as hostile invaders in Batten's discourse, but – in the form of disclaimers of apparent empathy – are occasionally also depicted as being unfortunate and deserving of pity, yet only if the context at hand happens to make such a strategy appear politically advantageous. After all, Batten not once calls these people 'refugees', only 'immigrants' or 'migrants'. Also, although Batten explicitly for the most part only denies the rights of fundamentalist Islam and 'extremist Muslims' to exist in Europe, he implicitly, in his use of the topos of belonging, in fact argues that Islam, as a whole, does not legitimately belong in

Europe, and that Muslims will always represent 'the Other' to the 'real', that is, Christian, Europeans. Therefore, Batten can be seen politicking in a way which involves him taking stances that are mutually contradictory; in one context he appears to be sympathetic of the immigrants, whereas in another he portrays them as hostile invaders. As discussed below, a similar strategy can be observed in the way Batten navigates the issue of 'moderate' Muslims already living in Europe.

One of the key pieces of evidence Batten takes advantage of in justifying his othering discourse and racist representations of Islam and Muslims is found in the Qur'an: the exhortations to violence against Christians and Jews. Batten reads aloud these and other excerpts of Islamic scripture on several occasions in his speeches in order to present the religion as utter nonsense, and as something completely irrational and fundamentally violent. As a crude overgeneralization he also presumes that all Muslims read the Qur'an and live their lives by it, and claims that whether or not Muslims become terrorists is only a question of whether or not they take the Qur'an's teachings literally. This clearly blinkered view constitutes another straw man and is based on a *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy, as Batten claims that the Qur'an is the fundamental source of Islamic terrorism – with its 'hateful teachings' and the literal interpretation thereof being the ultimate catalyst that begets terrorists.

The final major theme discussed in this study was the so-called 'moderate Muslims', which constituted an exploration into the way Batten, as a disclaimer of apparent concession, seeks to distinguish between those Muslims who are extremist and violent and those who are 'normal' and non-violent in an attempt to avoid being accused of prejudice or racism. In voicing this disclaimer, Batten once again resorts to the topos of belonging, and claims that these 'moderate' Muslims are not "the problem", but their ideology and religion are. Therefore, although Batten explicitly states that his opposition and hostility are only aimed at the extremist and fundamentalist manifestations of Islam, he is implicitly denouncing all Muslims by attacking their base values and the very core of their belief system. Moreover, Batten's lexical choices regarding this 'moderate' group of Muslims can be considered quite revealing in terms of their underlying cognitions. First of all, Batten's choice of calling these non-extremist and non-violent people 'moderate' in the first place conveys a view of European Islam as a phenomenon which is tolerable, perhaps even acceptable, but only if it manifests itself in a moderate fashion. Secondly, Batten's word choices when discussing the relationship non-Muslim Europeans have with Muslims, for example, as he describes how the two "come into contact", reveal an understanding of marked distance between the minority Muslims and the continent's non-Muslim majority. These lexical nuances entail that these two distinct groups

mainly meet by accident or by cause of some sort of social necessity, and that genuine and egalitarian interpersonal relationships between the two are rare. All in all, the above notions comprise a sense of distrust on Batten's behalf towards Muslims in general and imply that there is a definite level of threat inherent in *all* Muslims, not just in those with extremist tendencies.

Whereas in his explicit language use Batten consistently denounces the whole of Islam as bad, he does admit that not all *Muslims* are bad – as long as they follow their religion in a 'moderate' fashion. Therefore, in principal, Batten represents Islam as always detrimental for Europe, but nonetheless concedes it a tolerable, subdued and minimal existence here in the form of 'moderate Muslims', provided it is kept in check and not allowed to deform or contaminate 'our' superior cultural heritage. However, as already determined, this type of concession nevertheless implicitly discriminates against all Muslims, since it in no way spells acceptance. Instead, it merely communicates that these strange, ever-suspicious 'Others' are only just tolerable and allowed to inhabit our societies on the condition that they do not excessively engage in the rituals of their irrational and dangerous religion.

To summarize, the findings described above testify to a great extent to the validity of the theories and universal generalizations suggested by the previous research done in the field. Van Dijk's (1997) groundbreaking notions regarding the prevalent phenomena of culturalist racism and the viewing of Muslims as the dangerous and essentialized 'Other', which is threatening a fallaciously homogenized construction of 'our Western culture', are just as much present in Gerard Batten's contemporary discourse as they were in the talk of those politicians who van Dijk studied over twenty years ago. Moreover, Batten's argumentation strategies (including, for example, the use of presuppositions, overgeneralization, disclaimers and certain fallacious topoi) are very much similar to those found, not only by van Dijk, but also, e.g., by Wodak (2015), Saghaye-Biria (2012), Cheng (2015, 2017) and Hafez (2017) to be typical in the context of racist or discriminatory political discourse concerning Islam and Muslims. However, although most of Batten's exclusionary rhetoric indeed appears to be based on strategies similar to those revealed by previous research, it is noteworthy that Batten relies a lot more on the rhetoric of war than the politicians of earlier studies. Therefore, it can be argued that Batten's discourse on Islam and Muslims is distinctive in the way it repeatedly incorporates several strategies of negative Other-presentation aimed against the religion and its followers in order to justify a fear-mongering grand argument of the Christian Europe being in war against the alien Islamic invaders. In future research it could be interesting to study whether this prominence of warlike rhetoric observed in Batten's speeches is a sign of a more major trend in

contemporary right-wing populist rhetoric on Islam and Muslims, perhaps as a reaction to the rise in Islamic terrorist attacks on European soil in the past few years, or if it is in fact more of a personal favorite strategy of Batten.

Inspired by the discourse-historical notion of ‘change’, I also argue that Batten’s discourse regarding Islam and Muslims experienced a degree of ‘hardening’ throughout the five-year period (2014-2018) under scrutiny in the present study. Therefore, I believe it is useful to view that individual development vis-à-vis the type of general evolution which occurred in right-wing populist rhetoric during that time – a development which still continues in the present day. The Global Populism Database, which contains the analysis of the populist discourse of presidents and prime ministers from 40 countries worldwide between 2000 and 2018, reveals that the most significant international rise in populist rhetoric has happened only lately – during the last five years of the study’s time span – thus coinciding with the span of the present study. Those five years saw populists, almost always right-wing, come to power in central and eastern Europe as well as in some of the world’s most populous countries, including the United States (Donald Trump), India (Narendra Modi) and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro) (Lewis et al. 2019; Hawkins et al. 2019).

Essentially this rise has meant that right-wing populist rhetoric and discourse have to a considerable extent become normalized in the field of politics – and therefore by extension also in the media – on a truly global scale. I would argue that during these five years, which both this study and The Global Populism Database cover, Gerard Batten’s rhetoric – especially regarding Islamic immigration – experienced a noticeable hardening, with his claims and lexical choices becoming ever bolder and more damning towards Muslim immigrants as time went on. For example, whereas in 2014 Batten could still be seen referring to Muslim immigrants as “unfortunate inhabitants” of their former home countries, in 2018 Islamic immigration to him represented nothing short of an invasion. This phenomenon not only coincided with the aforementioned international and near-mercurial rise of right-wing populism, but also with UKIP’s decline in popularity and Batten’s personal seeking of closer relations with the far-right in his capacity of party leader. Hence this escalation of inflammatory rhetoric can first of all be seen from the perspective of increasing competition among populist politics in terms of making oneself ‘stand out from the crowd’. However, it can also be interpreted as having been influenced by a brush of the political extreme, which culminated in Batten appointing Tommy Robinson, the founder of the far-right activist group the English Defence League, as his personal ‘special adviser’ in November 2018 – a move which can be viewed as further consolidating UKIP’s move towards the far-right (Walker 2018).

The current scarcity of discourse analytic studies on parliamentary debates on Islam and Muslims means that there is most probably still quite a lot left undiscovered in the field, especially since this appears to be the first time such research is done with Gerard Batten's speeches as data. To this author, this particular area of political discourse analysis represents – especially in today's political climate – an exceedingly important field which deserves plenty of further research, not least because studies such as the present one stand to have substantial implications on a broader societal level, as well. As Ilie (2010: 1) puts it: "Parliaments are democratically constituted fora for political deliberation, legislation, problem solving and decision making. Crucial debate issues and political standpoints are being put forward, (re)defined and challenged in parliaments." She then goes on to note that, as politics are nowadays becoming increasingly polarized and several countries continue to struggle with social turmoil, it is vital we examine closely the persistent linguistic patterns and rhetorical strategies favored by Members of Parliament in order to expose the undisclosed agendas and biases – ideological or other – that might influence the nature and consequences of parliamentary action beneath the surface. This is also exactly why I personally believe that research such as the present study is tremendously valuable. After all, negotiation processes in parliaments do not merely reflect the *status quo* of political, social and cultural configurations in the turbulence of the modern world, but they are also partly responsible for shaping those configurations in a linguistic and rhetorical manner (Ilie 2010: 1). In Batten's case, his blinkered discourse and rhetoric fail to consider Islamic immigration and terrorism and contemporary European antisemitism as the multifaceted problems they actually are, and thus, if adopted by other politicians and people of sufficient influence, may critically hamper the formulation and execution of possible Europe-wide solutions – political and other – to tackle these issues properly.

In similar vein van Dijk (2000a: 17) cautions that ideologies, attitudes and prejudices are, indeed, learned. Moreover, ethnic opinions, which are the basis of everyday discriminatory interaction, are most often obtained through text and talk. These include a myriad of everyday discourses reaching people through mass media, education or mundane conversations, ranging from political speeches to gossip among friends. That is to say that the social cognitive basis of phenomena such as racism are to a great extent produced and reproduced in discourse and communication. Van Dijk (2000a: 17) continues his reasoning – in a way which also defines the possible implications of the present study – by maintaining that it is specifically the political elites which should be under scrutiny here, since "their legislative and policy-making positions place them in the crucible of discursive power and influence, namely there where discourse is not merely empty words, but has the direct force of law and regulation". With the recent resurgence of right-wing populism – along with its ever-

hardening political rhetoric, which works to create polarization, tribalism and widening chasms between people on an international scale and is increasingly subjecting minorities, such as Muslims, to racism and discrimination – these words by van Dijk probably ring truer today than ever before since their time of writing.

Having to cope with spatial and temporal constraints the present study has been able to provide – in the form of a concise case study – a mere introduction to the widespread and multilayered phenomenon that is racism in parliamentary politics. Nevertheless, if I were to conduct this study again within the same parameters of time and space, I would not change much, as I believe that with the present data and methods I successfully managed to achieve what I set out to do, which was to examine how Islam and Muslims are represented in Gerard Batten's European Parliament plenary debate speeches, as well as to deconstruct and analyze the main arguments Batten employs when constructing and supporting those representations. However, I do think I could have been able to reinforce my findings even further had I also compared my data to examples of Batten speaking about Islam and Muslims in other, quite different, contexts, such as in the media, during election rallies, etc., especially with regard to making interpretations about his overall political and rhetorical strategies concerning Islam and Muslims. In fact, this type of comparative approach to studying racism in political discourse spanning different genres of text would surely be very useful to future research, as well; for example, in learning what makes contemporary parliaments discursively different from the myriad of other communication channels modern politicians have at their disposal. Indeed, a lot of work still remains to be done in this fascinating field, especially in tackling the difficult task of determining the actual extent of the effect of racist parliamentary discourse in terms of the reproduction of racism in society. However, for the time being at least, perhaps the most important challenge for future research lies in being able to still further define and characterize what racist language use in parliaments looks like and how it operates, and – most importantly – to do it with the type of scope and visibility which could once and for all strip the persistent cloak of invisibility off of implicit elite racism. After all, as van Dijk (2000a: 17) notes, we are not dealing with "empty words" here. Instead, racist words uttered in a parliament setting are nothing short of figurative weapons, weapons which carry the power to seriously harm human lives via the most powerful weapon of them all: the law.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Speech 1: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2014a). Joint police operation "Mos Maiorum" (continuation of debate) – Wednesday, 22 October 2014 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y4xowzgb. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 2: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2014b). Situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (debate) – Tuesday, 25 November 2014 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y6flgusl. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 3: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015a). Rise of anti-semitism, islamophobia and violent extremism in the EU (debate) – Wednesday, 11 March 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y364wuge. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 4: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015b). Relations between the EU and the League of Arab States and cooperation in countering terrorism (debate) – Wednesday, 11 March 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y2qem5qa. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 5: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015c). Unstable situation in Libya and its consequences (debate) – Wednesday, 11 March 2015 – Strasbourg https://tinyurl.com/y2oyho23. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 6: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015d). European Agenda on Security (debate) – Tuesday, 7 July 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y48gq5kq. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 7: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015e). Recent terrorist attacks (debate) – Wednesday, 8 July 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y49vhq4e. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 8: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015f). Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and hate speech in Europe (debate) – Wednesday, 14 October 2015 – Brussels. https://tinyurl.com/y5o9fy4f. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 9: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015g). Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations (debate) – Tuesday, 24 November 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y2n586m7. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 10: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015h). Outcome of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 November 2015 and of the G20 summit of 15 and 16 November 2015 (debate) – Wednesday, 25 November 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y67zcfrk. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 11: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2015i). Protection of victim of terrorism (debate) – Monday, 14 December 2015 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y5yauw7k. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 12: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2016). Systematic mas murder of religious minorities by ISIS (debate) – Wednesday, 20 January 2016 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y48svngr. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 13: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2017a). Topical debate – EU security agenda: one year after the Brussels attacks (debate) – Wednesday, 15 March 2017 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/y5eyuk3x. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 14: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2017b). State of play in Turkey, in particular with regard to the constitutional referendum (debate) – Wednesday, 26 April 2017 – Brussels. https://tinyurl.com/y5bwd9u5. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 15: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2017c). Combating anti-semitism (debate) – Wednesday, 31 May 2017 – Brussels. https://tinyurl.com/y3d6efpt. (25 October, 2018).

Speech 16: The European Parliament's Plenary Debates and Videos. (2018). Debate with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, on the Future of Europe (debate) – Wednesday, 13 June 2018 – Strasbourg. https://tinyurl.com/yya7azn4. (25 October, 2018).

Secondary sources

Akkerman, T. (2003). Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology? *Acta Politica* 38 (2), 147-159.

Barker, M. (1981). *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. Junction Books.

Blackledge, A. (2006). The racialization of language in British political discourse. *Critical Discourse Studies* 3 (1), 61-79.

Brown, J.A.C. (2014). *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy*. London, England: Oneworld Publications.

Cheng, J. E. (2015). Islamophobia, Muslimophobia or racism? Parliamentary Discourses on Islam and Muslims in debates on the Minaret Ban in Switzerland. *Discourse & Society* 26 (5), 562-586.

Cheng, J. E. (2017). *Anti-racist Discourse on Muslims in the Australian Parliament*. Netherlands: John Benjamins.

CNN 2015: President Hollande: We are at war. https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/11/18/paris-attacks-hollande-addresses-mayors france.cnn. (30 May, 2019).

Dominiczak, P. (2014). Nigel Farage: Links to a 'racist age' could 'bury' Ukip. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nigel-farage/11319576/Nigel-Farage-Links-to-a racist-age-could-bury-Ukip.html. (27 June, 2019).

Downing, A. (2014). *English grammar: A university course* (3rd edition.). London: Routledge.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. London; New York: Routledge.

Flowerdew, J. and Richardson, J.E. (2017). *The Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies*. London: Routledge.

Gans, H. J. (2017). Racialization and racialization research. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (3), 341 352.

Hafez, F. (2017). Debating the 2015 Islam law in Austrian parliament: Between legal recognition and Islamophobic populism. *Discourse & Society* 28 (4), 392-412.

Hawkins, K. A., Aguilar, R., Jenne, E., Kocijan, B., Kaltwasser, C. R., and Silva, B. C. (2019). Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders 1.0.

Hudson, V. (2016). Politico. Europe's man problem. https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-man problem/. (14 August, 2019).

Ilie, C. (2010). *European parliaments under scrutiny: Discourse strategies and interaction practices.* Amsterdam; Philadelphia, Pa.: John Benjamins Pub. Company.

Kienpointner, M. (2009). Plausible and fallacious strategies to silence one's opponent. In: F.H. van Eemeren (ed.) Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic Maneuvering. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub. Co., 61-75.

Kramer, M. (2003). Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists? *Middle East Quarterly* 10 (2), 65-77. https://www.meforum.org/541/coming-to-terms-fundamentalists-or-islamists. (21 May, 2019).

Lewis, P., Barr, C., Clarke, S., Voce, A., Levett, C. and Gutiérrez, P. (2019). Revealed: the rise and rise of populist rhetoric. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric. (8 August, 2019).

Meer, N. (2013). Racialization and religion: Race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (3), 385-398.

Merriam-Webster English dictionary. (2019a). Ideology. https://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/ideology. (12 September, 2019).

Merriam-Webster English dictionary. (2019b). Islamophobia. https://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/Islamophobia. (15 July, 2019).

Miles, R. (1993). *Racism after "race relations"*. London: Routledge.

Reisigl, M. (2017). The Discourse-Historical Approach. In: J. Flowerdew and J.E. Richardson (eds.) The Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies. London: Routledge, 44-59.

Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism*. London; New York: Routledge.

Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2016). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In: R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) Methods of critical discourse studies (3rd edition.). Los Angeles, California: Sage, 23-61.

Renkema, J. (2009). *Discourse, of Course: An Overview of Research in Discourse Studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.

Riggins, S. H. (1997a). The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse. Thousand Oaks (Calif.): Sage.

Riggins, S.H. (1997b). The Rhetoric of Othering. In S.H. Riggins (ed.) The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse. Thousand Oaks (Calif.): Sage, 1-30.

Saghaye-Biria, H. (2012). American Muslims as radicals? A critical discourse analysis of the US congressional hearing on 'The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response'. *Discourse & Society* 23 (5), 508-524.

Schmidt, R. (2002). Racialization and language policy: The case of the U. S. A. *Multilingua - Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication* 21 (2-3), 141-161.

Smith, B.L. (2019). Propaganda. Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda. (17 August, 2019).

The European Parliament: Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and migration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures. (23 July, 2019).

The European Parliament: Legal notice for users of the website - Copyright. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en/legal-notice. (22 October, 2019).

The European Parliament: Plenary – Texts adopted. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/texts adopted.html. (29 May, 2019).

Toulmin, S. E. (2003). *The uses of argument* (Updated ed.). Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.

UKIP: Interim Manifesto – Policies for the People. (2018). https://www.ukip.org/pdf/UKIP_Manifesto_Sept_2018.pdf. (24 October, 2019).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2015). The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/5592bd059.html. (14 August, 2019).

van Dijk, T.A. (1993). *Elite discourse and racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

van Dijk, T.A. (1997). Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments. In S.H. Riggins (ed.) The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse. Thousand Oaks (Calif.): Sage, 31-64.

van Dijk, T.A. (2000a). Theoretical Background. In R. Wodak and T.A. Van Dijk (eds.), *Racism at the Top*. Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag, 13-30.

van Dijk, T.A. (2000b). Parliamentary Debates. In R. Wodak and T.A. Van Dijk (eds.), *Racism at the Top*. Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag, 45-78.

van Dijk, T.A. (2000c). On the analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration. In M. Reisigl and R. Wodak (eds.), *The Semiotics of Racism: Approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis*. Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 85–103.

van Dijk, T.A. (2008). *Discourse and power*. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

van Eemeren, F. H. (2009). Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub. Co.

Walker, P. (2018). Tommy Robinson appointed as Ukip's 'grooming gangs adviser'. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/22/tommy-robinson-ukip-grooming-gangs adviser. (8 August, 2019).

Watt, N. (2014). Ex-Ukip leader condemned for Qur'an comments over Lee Rigby murder. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/25/ukip-lord-pearson-quran-lee rigby-murder. (27 June, 2019).

Wieviorka, M. (1994). Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity. In A. Rattansi and S. Westwood (eds.), *Racism, Modernity & Identity. On the Western Front*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 173 188.

Wineburg, S. (2001). *Historical thinking and other unnatural acts: Charting the future of teaching the past*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Wodak, R. (2009). The semiotics of racism. A Critical Discourse-Historical Analysis. In J. Renkema (ed.), *Discourse, of Course: An Overview of Research in Discourse Studies.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 311-326.

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2001). *Methods of critical discourse analysis*. London: SAGE.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2016). *Methods of critical discourse studies* (3rd edition.). Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage.

Wodak, R. and KhosraviNik, M. (2013). Dynamics of Discourse and Politics in Right-wing Populism in Europe and Beyond: An Introduction. In R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik and B. Mral (eds.), *Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse*. London: Bloomsbury, xvii-xxviii.

Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M. and Mral, B. (2013). *Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse*. London: Bloomsbury.

Wodak, R., and Reisigl, M. (2000). Discourse and Racism. In R. Wodak and T.A. van Dijk (eds.), *Racism at the Top*. Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag, 31-44.

Wodak, R. and Van Dijk, T.A. (2000). *Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*. Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag.