

Annika Saarikoski

**MANAGING THE EMBODIED MIND: A STUDY ON  
THE COGNITION AND RECOGNITION OF AGENTIC  
VALUATION AND RESTRAINT**



JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO  
INFORMAATIOTEKNOLOGIAN TIEDEKUNTA  
2019

## TIIVISTELMÄ

Saarikoski, Annika

Ruumiillisen mielen hallinta: Tutkimus toimijakohtaisen arvonannon ja maltillisuuden tiedostamisesta ja tunnistamisesta

Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2019, 238 s.

Kognitiotiede, pro gradu -tutkielma

Ohjaaja: Saariluoma, Pertti

Tässä tieteidenvälisessä käsitteellisessä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ensinnä kognitiotieteen ja fenomenologian suhdetta, erityisesti sitä kuinka niiden tieteenfilosofiset lähestymistavat ihmisen mielen, tietoisuuden ja kokemuksen tutkimuksessa eroavat, sekä täydentävät toisiaan. Työn menetelmällisenä tarkoituksena on siten selventää tieteellisen ja filosofisen ihmistutkimuksen käsitteellistä epämääräisyyttä, sekä rakentavia yhtymäkohtia yhteisöllisesti merkittävien ongelmien tutkimiseksi. Tutkimuksen toisessa osassa sovelletun fenomenologisen orientaation tavoitteena on korostaa näkemystä ihmisen tietoisuudesta maailmasuhteena. Kiinnostus kohdistuu erityisesti luonnon ja kulttuurin jännitteisyyteen eletyn kokemuksen tasolla. Tutkimusongelma liittyy nykyajan itse-hallinnallisia organisoinnin muotoja koskevaan keskusteluun.

Ruumiillisen mielen hallinnan tarkastelussa tutkimus yhtyy kriittisiin näkemyksiin, jotka yhdistävät itse-hallinnan käsitteen kapeaan talousnormatiiviseen rationaalisuuteen. Tätä hallinnan muotoa kutsutaan myös tunnetaloudeksi, ja sen tarkoituksena on hyödyntää ihmisten tunne-elämää. Sen operationalisointi perustuu oletukseen, että ihmiset ovat heikkoja ja irratiionaalisia arvioitsijoita, joiden alitajuisia impulsseja ja käyttäytymistä voi manipuloida. Kyseenalaistan tunnetalouden käytännön tilanteita ja vuorovaikutusta ohjaavana strategisena mekanismina. Pyrin avartamaan toisenlaisia näkökulmia ja mahdollisuuksia kriittisesti omaksuttuun ja myötätuntoisempaan sosiaaliseen mielikuvitukseen ja merkityksien tulkintaan. Oletan, että uudet näkökulmat edesauttavat parempaa ymmärrystä tunne-elämän käsitteellistämistä ja ilmaisusta kokemuksellisen itse-säätelyn tasolla.

Orientoin itse-hallinnan käsitteen uudelleen suhteessa klassiseen tunteiden säätelyn metaforaan joka mielletään vertauskuvallisesti hevosten käsittelyyn. Käytän hevos-metaforaa käsitteellisenä herkisteenä kognition ruumiillisen, kokemuksellisen ja elämismaailmallisen perustan tunnistamiseksi. Korostan siten toimijan henkilökohtaisen arvonannon, maltillisuuden ja empaattisen käsityskyvyn painoarvoa, tunteita välineellistävän ja funktionaalista typeryyttä aikaansaavan hallinnan mallin sijaan.

Asiasanat: ruumiillinen kognitio, kriittinen fenomenologia, itse-hallinta, metaforat, radikaali humanismi, tunteiden säätely, toimijuus organisaatioissa, ihmisen ja eläimen vuorovaikutus, empaattinen apperseptio

## ABSTRACT

Saarikoski, Annika

Managing the embodied mind: A study on the cognition and recognition of agentic valuation and restraint

Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2019, 238 p.

Cognitive Science, Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Saariluoma, Pertti

This interdisciplinary conceptual study will firstly provide a review on the philosophically distinct characteristics of cognitive science and phenomenology when researching the mind, consciousness and experience. The methodological purpose of this inquiry is to clarify the human scientific and philosophical research cultural confusion, and to identify the constructive connections for studying the problems of communal significance. Phenomenological orientation is then applied to emphasize human consciousness as a relationship to the world. A core interest is on the natural-cultural intersection of tensions that appear at the level of lived experience. The research problem relates to contemporary discussions on the self-managerial forms of informal organizing.

The problem of managing the embodied mind is seen in light of critical theories that connect the concept of self-management to the narrow normativity of economic rationalization. This model of control is also known as the emotional economy, which can be understood as a system of governance that utilizes human emotionality. It is operationalized on the assumption that people are weak and irrational evaluators, who can be manipulated to intensify their subpersonal impulses and behaviours. I will call into question the taken for granted role of the emotional economy as a strategic mechanism of directing real life situations of interaction. The goal is to open the possibilities for a more compassionate social imagination and critical sensemaking. I assume that new perspectives enable us to better understand the elementary experiential level of self-regulation in relation to the conception and expression of emotional life.

I re-orient the concept of self-management with a classical metaphor of emotion regulation that is figuratively assimilated with the imagery of handling horses. I use the horse-metaphor as a conceptual sensitizer for the purpose of recognizing the embodied, experiential, and lifeworld grounds of cognition. I thus accentuate the personalistic agentic weight of valuation, restraint and empathic apperception, instead of the instrumental model of emotional control that circumscribes cognitive achievement to functional stupidity.

Keywords: embodied cognition, critical phenomenology, self-management, metaphors, radical humanism, emotion regulation, agency in organizations, human- animal interaction, empathic apperception



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In more ways than one, this cognitive scientific graduate thesis has provided me the necessary reflective platform, time and space to think through concepts, and for this I am most grateful. The realization of this problem-based and conceptual interdisciplinary study could not have been achieved without the support from many persons in and outside the University of Jyväskylä.

Firstly, I thank Professor Pertti Saariluoma and the HD-research group in cognitive science at the faculty of Information Technology, for providing an open community of thought with a truly multidisciplinary atmosphere. Professor Saariluoma has perpetually challenged my thinking in a tactful way, and widened the possibility space to develop my research position and argumentation over the years. The intellectual variety of his knowledge on human research has also been a source of inspiration. The fact that I was able to write this study in the manner of arts and humanities rather than according to the standard scientific format, attests to the notion of scholarly openness.

This is also a pre-study in relation to my double doctorate studies in the disciplines of entrepreneurship, management and leadership, and applied economics, so I wish to express gratitude to Professor Iris Aaltio from the Jyväskylä University School of Business and Economics (JSBE), and to Professor Frank Lambrechts from the University of Hasselt, for patiently enabling the educational background for studying the experiential constitutes of organizing.

I am grateful for Professor Sara Heinämaa from the department of Social Sciences and Philosophy and the Academy of Finland, for the rigorous cultivation of my understanding on phenomenology as a radical philosophy. As a critical organization researcher, I have found that phenomenology is a highly relevant, yet challenging research methodological orientation to learn to apply. I also thank Jussi Saarinen and Joonas Taipale for advice and suggestions.

My socio-historical and cultural political awareness would have been more insufficient without being a member in an aspiring research group in Social Sciences and Philosophy, thanks to Professor Miikka Pyykkönen.

I thank Elina Jokinen for creating a space of peer support that helped to initiate the writing process. I also warmly thank Alexander Fleischmann, Laura Mononen, Kristiina Niemi-Kaija, and Päivi Raitanen, for the insightful discussions and comments that helped me to advance the drafts of this project.

I wish to thank Auli and Wouter Lamers, the owner-managers of a riding school establishment Laku Stall in Tikkakoski, who are running their organization with a dedication for the good of the animals, and for the good of the people who participate in this welcoming local community of practice.

I hold cordial regard for my family members and friends, especially Tiina Riihinen and Anna Talvinen, who have kindly encouraged (and endured) my horse-metaphorical ponderings, and also concretely joined the configuration of the artwork case chapter. And last but not least, Kiitos Aila Saarikoski.

## **PICTURES**

PICTURE 1. "No Life Lost II" (2015) by Berlinde De Bruyckere..... 138

PICTURE 2. "Portret" (2013-2014) by Berlinde De Bruyckere..... 139

PICTURE 3. "K21" (2006) by Berlinde De Bruyckere..... 140

# CONTENTS

TIIVISTELMÄ

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PICTURES

1	INTRODUCTION .....	9
1.1	The purpose of the study .....	9
1.1.1	The research questions .....	11
1.2	Meta-rationality: cognitive-philosophical reform of valuation .....	12
1.3	Problematizing the concept of self-management.....	16
1.4	Positioning in the tradition of embodied cognition.....	22
1.5	Metaphorical mode of inquiry and empathic apperception .....	26
1.6	Connecting radical reflection and critical theories .....	30
1.7	The structure of the thesis .....	35
2	COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY .....	36
2.1	Combining philosophy and empirical sciences of the mind .....	37
2.2	Comparing natural scientific and phenomenological research .....	39
2.3	Naturalistic solution to the hard problem of consciousness .....	43
2.4	The phenomenology and neuroscience of intersubjectivity .....	48
2.5	The mundane and radical empathic apperception.....	50
2.6	Self-agency in relation to embodiment, emotions and affects .....	52
2.7	Constitution of the natural and the cultural-historical worlds.....	57
2.8	The universal ethical life of self-regulation and value .....	59
2.9	On the communal crises of humanity and sciences.....	63
2.10	The question of animal cognition, morality and agency.....	66
2.11	The naturalization of economic rationale and normativity.....	69
2.12	Psychoanalytic perspectives on the emotional economy.....	77
2.13	Concluding thoughts.....	81
3	THE CLASSICAL ETHICS OF SELF-RESTRAINT .....	87
3.1	The ideal and real of mastering passions: Plato and Xenophon.....	88
3.2	Plato's Chariot as a model for human psyche and society .....	89
3.3	The ideational faculties in view of economy, religion and eros .....	94
3.4	Xenophon's horsemanship ethic of economizing passions.....	98
3.5	The capitalist reformulation of social and emotional life .....	105
3.6	An embodied conception of classical (horse) management .....	109
3.7	Cultural returns to the animalistic roots of human sociality.....	114
3.8	Recognizing the lower and the higher layers of conscious life.....	119
3.9	Concluding thoughts.....	127

4	THE AESTHETIC REGULATION OF VALUE .....	134
4.1	Truthful recognition of the actual and the possible in art .....	135
4.2	Visiting the art exhibition of Berlinde de Bruyckere .....	137
4.3	The horse-metaphorical empathic transfer of meanings .....	140
4.4	The emotionology of mechanistic organizing metaphors .....	145
4.5	Empirical and philosophical approach to aesthetic experience.....	150
4.6	Circular intensification of affect in the aesthetic economy .....	155
4.7	Concluding thoughts.....	159
5	THE HOBBY HORSE AS AN IMAGE OF SELF-MANAGEMENT.....	163
5.1	Re-imagining organizational life and culture with metaphors.....	164
5.2	The cultural-historical background of equestrianism .....	168
5.3	The emotive roots of image-making in creation of substitutes.....	173
5.4	The idea of revolutionary agency as peaceful transformation.....	179
5.5	Subjective experiences disclosed in 'Hobbyhorse Revolution' .....	189
5.6	Bodily horizons, embodied communities, and moral emotions.....	192
5.7	Concluding thoughts.....	197
6	SYNTHESIS.....	202
6.1	Studying the empirical and the transcendental in experience .....	202
6.2	The embodied cognitive constitutes of personalistic agency .....	205
6.3	The motives, limitations and projections of the study .....	208
	REFERENCES.....	209



# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 The purpose of the study

*“Managing the embodied mind: A study on the cognition and recognition of agentic valuation and restraint”* is an interdisciplinary conceptual study on the agentic valuation and restraint of emotions and affects. The methodological purpose of this research is to forward the phenomenological perspective among the cognitive disciplines and the philosophy of mind. I review literature with a goal of discovering thematic interconnections between theoretical, practical and axiological reasoning related to contemporary self-managerial concerns. I argue, that i) there are basically two different *attitudes* to orient oneself toward human research phenomena, and that the ii) *lived experiential* motives and meanings related to intersubjective community life and culture, are *irreducible* to economic rationalization. I will emphasize the critical phenomenological approach for recognizing the *emotive* and *ethical* sense-constitution of possibilities. I re-orient the concept of self-management with three *metaphorically* interconnected cases, through which I distinguish the *animalistic* and the *spiritual* layers of cognition in view of the *embodied* and *socially situated* foundations of agentic experience.

The terms *cognition* and *recognition* in the title stand for the cognitive scientific *empirical-factual* and the radically reflective *transcendental-phenomenological* approaches of analysing the human mind, consciousness and experience. I hold that after they are carefully differentiated, their irreducibility, terms of compatibility, and application becomes more intelligible for human research purposes. Whereas *cognition* is related to specifying the *variant mental acts* of processing information, phenomenological *recognition* concerns the acts of uncovering *the invariant intentional sense-givenness* that appears in experience to the experiencer. The recognition involves *re-orienting* our cognitive faculties of acquiring knowledge in the world, as we turn our cognizant attention back to *how* we come to know, what we *think* we know, or *naturally* take for granted when absorbed in activities. (Saariluoma 1990; Heinämaa 2007; Cerbone 2017).

The systemic problems of self-management relate to the hegemony of economic governance in late capitalist societies, which make 'the economy' appear as a deterministic natural law (NEON 2018; Whitehead et al 2018) and as a metaphysical order of existence (Hovas 2009; Viren 2018). The established normativity of top down economic rationalization is also known to escalate socioeconomic uncertainty and inequality through the upward redistribution, centralization and privatization of wealth (Piketty 2014). I problematize the *homo economicus* belief system as related to *informal* self-managerial practices that can cause hostile modes of sociality, narrow mode of valuation, and corrosive outcomes on *identity formation*, *affect regulation*, and *interpersonal relations* (Fleming 2017ab; Lash 2018; Verhaeghe 2014). I argue that cognitive-behavioral sciences are insufficient alone to study these problems, which is why I propose more comprehensive and critical assessment of self-management through other epistemic traditions, methods, and conceptual lenses, such as 'emotional economy' (Böhme 2017) and 'functional stupidity' (Alvesson & Spicer 2012; 2016). The notion of the emotional economy is here understood as a subtly effective regime of governance that reduces the subjective socio-emotional life of motivated reasoning to an economized mode of cognitions and behaviors that can be organized and characterized in terms of functional stupidity.

The core argument is, that if we are to *rethink* the problem of self-management *anew*, we need *adequate conceptual tools* as open-ended guides to study and theorize the elementary and socially mediated *self-regulatory* constitutes. The recognition of adequate conceptual tools, in turn, involve the embodied cognitive capacities of *abstraction with respect to experience* through critical reflection, interpretation, and sensemaking (Heinämaa 2000; Tomperi 2017). The research practical concerns relate to historical, epistemic, ontological, and methodological issues in cognitive science and phenomenology (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). In my view, they can *together* inform us with truly relevant and evidential insights on the *content, generation and structuring* of the contemporary emotional economy, in the personal and societal sense of the term.

I take a *meta-rational* perspective on motivated reasoning that includes the enactment of complex emotions and cultural *embeddedness* of human mentality, for these are present in all *higher-order evaluative struggles* that differentiate us from the non-human animals (Stanovich 2004; 2013). I emphasize the *unsettled* lived experiential tension between *nature* and *culture* that affect the *embodiment of moral agency*, and which can be better understood through fine-grained phenomenological analyses on *moral emotions* (Steinbock 2014; 2018).

Self-management is re-imagined in metaphorical and philosophical terms in order to explore the *different ways to conceive* and *articulate* the problem. I intend to bring forth the intersubjectively accessible reminders concerning *the possible conceptual frames, levels, patterns and modes of thought* in relation to agency, culture, emotions, power and control in managing and organizing, which Jouillié and Spillane (2015, 35) see as originating from Plato's Academy for the *education of rulership*. The core themes of the study are hence traced to classical philosophical notions on freedom and control, and on the mastery of passions.

This is an attempt to connect cognitive scientific, phenomenological, and critical management studies. I explore the intersections of these fields through the precept of *personalistic agency*, which is also a normative stance of study that respects the human person as *an agent with a mind of one's own*. The aim is to discover *complimentary* contributions, while acknowledging their *different ways of arriving* to the question of human agency as an object of inquiry. I intend to elaborate on the *embodied cognitive* constitutes of agentic valuation and restraint, and to emphasize the fundamental experiential foreground that *precedes* the *critical sensemaking* of social phenomena in terms of *agency-in-context* (Helms Mills, Thurlow & Mills 2010; Aromaa et al. 2018). I combine theories and lifeworld reflection with a purpose of identifying the *deeper senses and meanings of self-managing*. I reflect upon social phenomena that may reveal relevant cues for analysing how self-management can be understood in the *open-ended*, rather than in the normatively narrow instrumental sense of the concept. The goal is to articulate the foundations through which self-management can be *re-oriented* as a lived, self-regulatory, other-regarding and relational agentic accomplishment (Husserl 2006; 2011; Merleau-Ponty 2013; Heinämaa 2014; 2015; Slaby 2019).

In other words, I attempt to rethink self-management as a bottom-up *human scale* phenomenon, for the *meta-level* purpose of learning to differentiate the philosophical, the psychological and the social theoretical perspectives in management research. I intend to connect phenomenological analyses with special scientific empirical and theoretical studies on the subject area. The overall purpose is to research the locus, context, direction, and depth of *emotion regulation* as a contemporary organizing concern. The goal is to clarify what is at stake *at the root* of the problem of self-management, and *to what ends*?

### 1.1.1 The research questions

The research questions explored in the first part of the thesis (*Ch. 2*):

- What are the distinctive historical, epistemological, ontological and methodological differences of cognitive science and phenomenology when studying the human mind, consciousness, and experience?
- What kind of problems, contributions and limitations there are regarding the different explanatory projects of naturalizing human consciousness?
- How can we distinguish and possibly combine the natural and the phenomenological attitudes of inquiry, especially in order to gain better understanding on the first-person experiential accounts in relation to topics like agency, embodiment, intersubjectivity, ethics, and empathy?

The research questions explored in the second part of the thesis (*Ch. 3-5*):

- Based on the review of the philosophical, research cultural and methodological questions, how is it possible to *apply* the phenomenological approach *together* with the selected special scientific and critical social viewpoints? Specifically, how is it possible to conduct

inquiries that can broaden the *conceptual-interpretative horizon* on the cultural-historical, on the psycho-physical, and on the lived experiential sense-constitutes of self-management in terms of *agentic valuation and restraint*, while keeping in mind the task of '*reexamining and revising the dichotomy between the empirical and the transcendental*' (Zahavi 2004, 344)?

The second part is purposively centred on the following core themes:

- Self-management in radical humanist view of managing and organizing - *to emphasize the embodied experiential roots of agentic valuation and restraint*
- Critical phenomenological perspective on emotion regulation-*to activate radical lifeworld reflection and problematize mechanistic accounts of control*
- The lower and higher layers of conscious life informed by human-animal relation -*to recognize the animal and spiritual in embodiment and sociality*
- The natural-cultural tension and the conceptual role of the metaphor -*to explore the experiential interconnections between the emotive and the ethical*

## 1.2 Meta-rationality: cognitive-philosophical reform of valuation

This study can also be characterized as an experimental inquiry of the concept of self-management through the different *language-games*, which in this case are seen to refer to the elementary and socially mediated self-regulatory constitutes. I interpret the concept of a language-game in the broad philosophical sense that Wittgenstein (1953) introduced to mark the situated and changing ways how language is *used* to convey meanings in relation to particular *cultural forms of life*. One such academic language-game that I find particularly informative to begin with, is the modern cognitive scientific *dual process -theory* of rationality that assumes two qualitatively distinct ways of cognitive processing in the mind. The dual processes are generally distinguished between the *rapid autonomous processes* (Type 1) and *higher order reasoning processes* (Type 2). The *first* type is correlated with nonconscious, contextualized, associative, parallel, and high capacity characteristics, and the *second* type with conscious, abstract, rule-based, serial, and limited capacity processing that requires working memory e.g. in hypothetical thinking, and in conscious judgment and decision making. The first type is seen as the early "old" mind that is similar to *animal cognition*, and that encompasses implicit knowledge and basic emotions. The later evolved, second type is related to explicit knowledge and complex emotions. (Evans & Stanovich 2013). The Dual process/system research has developed empirical accounts for analysing information processing heuristics, biases and fallacies related to *the fast* automatic (System 1), and to *the slow* effortful (System 2) types of thinking (Kahneman 2011). The researchers of this academic field also examine cognitive developmental aspects through reasoning tasks that involve different cognitive abilities, such as executive functions, and thinking dispositions, like open-mindedness (Toplak, West & Stanovich 2014).

Rational thinking can thus be seen as a much more complicated problem area than what the standard intelligence tests measure (Stanovich 2009), or what is considered 'rational' in the instrumental goal-directed sense according to the utility maximizing axioms of rational choice theory (Searle 1983; 2001). Stanovich (2013) argues that non-human animals can actually excel humans in rationality, that is, when rationality is defined in the narrow instrumental axiomatic sense, because *non-human cognitive architecture* is not hampered by contextual and symbolic complexity, or by the *evaluative struggles* in the manner that *human* decision and judgment making is constantly affected and altered with. It is thus important to acknowledge that rationality cannot be separated from the environment in which it occurs, and that there can be both *benign* and *hostile* features involved. As Stanovich (2012, 198) explicates:

A benign environment is an environment that contains useful cues that, through practice, have been well represented in System 1. Additionally, for an environment to be classified as benign, it must not contain other individuals who will adjust their behavior to exploit those relying only on System 1 heuristics. By contrast, a hostile environment for heuristics is one in which there are no cues that are usable by System 1 (...) Another way that an environment can turn hostile is if other agents discern the simple cues that are triggering the cognitive miser's System 1; and the other agents start to arrange the cues for their own advantage (...) One of the most telling (and horrifying) is that extreme cognitive misers (those with extremely lazy System 2 s) do not have 'a mind of their own'. What their mind will process is determined by the most vivid stimulus at hand, the most readily assimilated fact or the most salient cue available. The cognitive miser is easily exploited by those who control the labeling, who control what is vivid, or who control the anchor.

Stanovich pronounces the notion that humans are "cognitive misers", and also susceptible to being exploited as such especially in hostile social environments, because of the lesser extent, and limited energetic strength of *effortful* mental deliberation. The folk psychological faith in the "chief executive -model" of personal reasoning does not therefore stand far in comparison to the fast and instinctive *intuitive mind* and the implicit ways of knowing. The slower *reflective mind* has far less conscious cognitive control over the totality of one's actions than what our common sense, wishes and beliefs would normally lead us to assume. (Evans 2010). Pennycook, Fugelsang and Koehler (2015), for instance, undertook a study with the goal of enabling *debiasing* interventions and hence better decision making. They developed a three-stage dual-process model to explain how the bottom-up factors of analytic thought (type 2 processing) are caused, as opposed to relying on intuition or stimulus cues alone (type 1 processing, stage 1). They found that *conflict detection* (stage 2) and *cognitive decoupling* (stage 3) in correcting biases, were distinguishable sources and stages of type 2 thinking, but also subject to monitoring and decoupling errors.

As Byrne (2017) notes, Edmund Husserl stated in his early inquiries that human thinking can be divided in lower and higher psychological activities, and that the latter required more mental efforts. Husserl saw that *the teleology of thinking* is generally oriented toward achieving *efficiency*, which means that

mental acts are *functionally* inclined toward being *economized*. He concurred that we innately prefer to utilize the easier associative and passive recognition that require less expenditure of cognitive energy over the more active efforts of thought, also depending on one's interests and inclinations. (Byrne 2017, 214).

For the combined cognitive, philosophical, and social theoretical purposes of this inquiry, I find congruence with Stanovich (2004; 2015), who proposes the *broad* view on rationality. He terms it as *meta-rationality*, which concerns our *stronger evaluative* capacities, instead of the *thin* epistemic accounts of motivated reasoning, i.e. of *economized rationalization*. The 'thin' accounts, that still dominate decision theory and practice, also connect to the narrow instrumentalism that underlie the prevalent economic models of governance. In neo-classical economics, that Friedman (1953) posited as a supposedly "*value-free positive science*", economic assumptions need *not* be descriptive of empirical reality, but *prescriptive* and simplified instead, to benefit the "*calculative engine of analysis*". In his view, the profit and utility maximization postulates could already be extracted from the behaviors of people and firms when they merely "*act as if*" they were rational self-interested optimizers, without complicating the models with the actual messy realities infiltrated with value judgements.

In this study, I seek to problematize the simplified economic modelling of behaviors, and especially its *mechanistic application* to real life situations. I hold that the complex, broader and higher-order mental capacities are exactly what need more careful attention with conceptually profound, empirically accurate, and socially conscious, i.e. emphatically *stronger* theorizing on the human mind. As Stanovich (2015) argues, we should strive for meta-rationality because it encompasses the *higher volitional* aspects of reasoning that enable cognitive critique against our own beliefs and desires. In his view, it can also counter what people generally experience as a sense of *alienation* from their own choices, which is commonly attributed to the weakness of the will.

This study joins Stanovich (2004; 2015) in his proposal of a program of meta-rationality as a *cognitive reform* that entails the activation of a broader conception of autonomous and epistemic rationality, in order to unravel the "*internal logic of an agent that values its own evaluative autonomy*" (2004, 273). Stanovich acknowledges the behavior-shaping forces at play in the market-based consumer societies, as the exploitation of individual irrationalities has become an ordinary part of our living environment and embodied institutional orders. He draws from the dual-process theories to scrutinize the narrow instrumental rationale of self-interest and maximization, which operates on the assumption that humans are *weak* evaluators, like *wantons* that primarily seek the genetically short-leashed *subpersonal* first-order desire satisfactions. The second-order desires and preferences and the *strong* evaluative capacities, i.e. the higher-order realm of *reflective* rationality and personal *autonomy* that enable us to *morally transcend* our primal features, are typically unrecognized in the market and excluded from economic equations. (Stanovich 2004).

As philosopher Frankfurt (1971) has also argued, rationality is only the *precondition*, and not the highest faculty available for humans *as persons*. Higher

order *volitions*, instead, are the mark of a person of *free will*. In other words, a rational wanton is not free in the metacognitive sense to ‘want what it wants to want’, since wanton behavior does not involve any deeper *care* about the *desirability* of the desires. Frankfurt describes the subject position of the narrowly rational wanton as someone who “*ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclinations is the strongest.*” (1971, 11). The notion of free will is in theory and practice at stake today, given that there are certain social, political and economic interests to reduce human reasoning to its primitive, animalistic, simplified, controllable and calculable components.

I take the concept of meta-rationality, which combines cognitive scientific, philosophical and practical concerns, as a fruitful starting point. Yet I divert from the explanatory dual process studies, e.g. which analyse the meta-representational abilities and self-correcting strategies to scrutinize the inner logic of beliefs, desires and rationality (Stanovich 2011). I follow the *lifeworld philosophical* route to disclose the *deeper legitimacy* that is the embodied foreground of all the basic perceptual and higher-order complicated cognitions like meta-rationality (Merleau-Ponty 2013). I emphasize *the phenomenological philosophical attitude and orientation*, in order to sufficiently consider what the management scholar John Shotter calls “*the poetics*” of expressivity and responsiveness that are inherent to relational complexities *in-between* persons in everyday encounters. He notes that “*our current methods of inquiry can lead us to achieve only the power of manipulation and control*” (Shotter 2005, 113), and proposes the practice of intellectual inquiry in Wittgenstein’s style, first of all, to distinguish *the kind of relations* we have with living beings, as opposed to dead (non-conscious) things. I will distinguish the methodological appropriateness of phenomenology for the research task to discern the primordial, expressive and responsive elements of social interaction, for the goal of inquiring *how the objects of evaluation gain their senses and meanings* from the first-personally lived, embodied and intersubjective experiential constitutes of human intentionality.

While I acknowledge the importance of analytical distinctions, I am not adhering to any *determinism* or dualistic divide between *nature* and *culture*, or between the *materialist* and the *idealist* stances of study. I approach the *real* and the *ideal*, or the *empirical* and the *transcendental*, mainly from the lived experiential standpoint of inquiry. In this view, the sense of *alienation* in human experience in relation to both the natural and the cultural-historical worlds, is *not* seen as something that could be completely surpassed. Psychoanalytical theorists conceive the motion in the psyche between the felt contradictory tendencies as an *ontological gap* between the *lived-real* and the *socio-symbolic* realm (Kurki 2010; Bjerg 2014). Existentialist thinkers also recognize the *irreducible gap* between experience as *lived*, and as *known* (Reynolds & Stokes 2017). This experiential contradiction can be phenomenologically understood as the insurmountable “*paradox of subjectivity*”, which Husserl termed to emphasize that we are *both* natural and historical beings who are situated in nature *and* in history, as Taipale (2014, 166, emphasis original) explicates:

The “paradox of subjectivity” resides precisely in the fact that our existence takes place in the meeting point between “primordial” and “intersubjective” self-constitution and hence in the fact that our self-constitution is both *genetic* and *generative*.

I recognize this paradox also at the lived experiential core of the problem of self-management, which is to accept that socially mediated self-regulation of emotions and affects involves both primordial and intersubjective constitutes.

### 1.3 Problematizing the concept of self-management

Self-management can be *organized* with a range of conceptions with different normative roots, relations and goals of action. Self-management is a notion that entails a variety of conflicting interests, theoretical perspectives, and taken-for-granted assumptions, which begets the need for a comprehensive and critical assessment. Most commonly it relates to the discussions on the *informal modes of social and economic organizing*. Management consultants typically propose it as a practically necessary disposition for conducting one’s career in the post-industrial knowledge economy (Drucker 2008/1999). Self-management is also defined as a skill of ‘*handling emotions in oneself or in others*,’ and it has been widely popularized among the mental abilities of “emotional intelligence” (EI). Emotional intelligence is basically a *rationalistic* management psychological construct that is designed for the conducts of “*harnessing passions productively*,” in order to increase *competitive advantages* by improving job performance and *auto-regulated* adjustment to the given normativity of work. (Goleman 1995; 2000; Lewis & Simpson 2007, 5-6). Critical theoretical and empirical studies, on the other hand, *problematize* self-management as a much more *ambiguous* issue that cannot be disconnected from the broader socioeconomic conditions or political interests of governance, which now extend to all economic, social and personal areas of life (Miller & Rose 2008). Self-management can be more critically understood, for example, through the following conceptual lenses:

- in terms of the *emotional economy* that refers to the *intensification of life* in the *aesthetic stage* of late capitalism (Böhme 2017),
- as a *compulsory* conduct akin to a “harsh realization” resulting from the informalization, or “*uberization*” of work (Cederström & Spicer 2015; Fleming 2017ab),
- as an internalized master-slave struggle in the form of voluntary *auto-exploitation* (Lordon 2014; Han 2017a),
- in relation to the commercialization of feelings and utilitarian goals in the sense of “*managing the heart*” (Hochschild 1983),
- in relation to a fusion of the instrumental and the sentimental that forms an “*emotionology*” of arranging social affairs (Fineman 2008),
- as a post-bureaucratic *style* of organizing (Maravelias 2009),



- as a subject position of an enterprising employee, i.e. “*manopreneur*” in managerialist enterprise discourse (Hjorth 2005),
- in relation to the 21st century forms of *emotional labor* (Grandey, Diefendorff & Rupp 2013; Lindebaum 2017),
- in terms of modern *world-alienation* - of being overwhelmed by the private interests of “*worry and care about the self*” (Arendt 1958, 254),
- as related to neo-classical economic market theory of value that “*offers us economic reality as an escape from the world*” (Bjerg 2016, 92),
- and as a complicit mode of behaviour that may serve adjustment to *functional stupidity* in organizations (Alvesson & Spicer 2012; 2016).

A core difference between the rationalized and the critical perspectives on self-management can be located in their relation to the *social ontology* of ‘*capitalist realism*’. Mark Fisher (2009, 16) saw capitalist realism as a better term in place of postmodernism today, and described it as a “*pervasive atmosphere, conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action.*” The purely practical or rationalistic stances take the market *mode of valuation* of ‘*capitalist realism*’ for granted, thus accepting *the belief system* supposing that everything in society should be run in the manner of profit-driven transactions. The critical accounts, in turn, find the coercive market template of interaction as exceedingly intrusive and detrimental to private and public life. I agree with the critical social theories and philosophies that identify *the systemic* problems of self-management as related to the vested business interests, especially of large monopolistic corporations to enforce an all-consuming calculated form of life. This produces new forms of *unfreedom* and *conceptual confusion* that has been traced to a ‘*narrative programming*’ - of translating the progressive and universal humanistic values, like freedom and reason, according to the rationalities and the aims of the economic enterprise (Miller & Rose 2008, 49-50).

The trend of organizational *informalization* also connects to what Isin (2004) has termed as ‘*neuroliberalism*’, meaning a rationale of “*governing through neurosis*”, which posits a ‘*neurotic citizen*’ as the main subject of governance, and “*arises from and responds to fears, anxieties and insecurities*”. Whitehead and others (2018) have traced the new 21<sup>st</sup> century *neo-behaviorist* neuroliberal governance phase to the paternalistic governance techniques that were more widely established in most Western countries after the 2008 financial crisis. The neuroliberal policy initiatives are focused on externally enforced cognitive-behavioural “*nudging*” of citizens by *targeting their emotionality*. The targeted human behavioral system is more often the *automatic-emotional*, instead of the *deliberate-rational*, and the fictional figure of the ideal economic man (*homo economicus*) is now “*More-than-rational Homer Simpson*”. The main role of the state, in this view, is to ensure the free functioning of the market, and moreover, to make all individual citizens more “*market-compliant*” through the advocacy of widespread commercial business techniques and subtle behavioural interventions. (Whitehead, Jones, Lilley, Pykett, & Howell 2018, 60-61).

The ideas related to these shifts are not new. Hannah Arendt (1958), drew insights from ancient Greek society, and defined *animal laborans* as a mode of unfreedom that accounts for the *life of necessity*: the bodily incorporated pleasures and intensities of toil and trouble, including the economic labor and consumption as properly located and protected *within* the private (*oikos*) sphere of life. She problematized the situation that we're living with today, when the basic private and economic necessities have been *socialized* and entered the public (*polis*) realm, which cancels the true significance of the public sphere as the commonly shared *worldly* realm of human agency, plurality of others, true freedom, and the pursuit of higher ends. When humans are thus primarily conceived and socialized in the image of labouring animals, the notion and meaning of *action* may be replaced with mere automated, rationalized and controllable notion of *behavior*, that is, with what can be conditioned and prescribed in a deterministic top-down economized fashion, when individuals are merely presupposed to submerge within a depersonalized totality of the 'economic life-process'. (Arendt 1998/1958; see also Hyvönen 2017).

Economic theorist Schumpeter (1942) also saw how the "perennial gale" of capitalism creates progress in technological efficiency, bureaucratization and automatization, at the expense of personal agency, emotional attachments, social relationships, and cultural traditions: "*unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest*" (1942. 145-146). The 21<sup>st</sup> century characteristic pathologies are *neuronal* illnesses, like the 'burnout syndrome' that "*occurs when the ego overheats, which follows from too much of the Same*" (Han 2015, 6). Han (2015) attributes the rise of neurological disorders to the systemic violence of '*excessive positivization*' that has generally been dissolving the self-other boundaries. This study connects to the real life concerns regarding *the incidental proliferation of psychic ailments and corrosion of social trust* that undermines the sense and attribution of human agency in organisational and civil life at large. Notwithstanding the implications on the *eco* as our habitat.

The real life concerns are not restricted to those who identify with formal managerial or leadership positions, for anybody can face the requirement to *first and foremost manage themselves* regardless of the associated social group, role or situation. The problem of internalizing "*the boss function*" is growingly relevant for the people who find themselves situated in short-term, self-employed, rental, platform, or other self-managerial conditions of 21<sup>st</sup> century working and living. These situations can also be commonly experienced as *precarious*, i.e. pervaded by the felt sense of insecurity, vulnerability, destabilization and endangerment (Lorey 2015). I am engaging with social theories from a *radical humanist* organizational stance to account for the related forms of unfreedom (Burrell & Morgan 1979). This radical humanist intention, however, is not 'anti-organizational' in the sense of refuting the *social practice* of management, leadership, trade or new organizing *as such*. The practices of organizing and self-managing can also be designed, coordinated and enacted in a way that is conducive for creating and maintaining worthy action goals and socio-ecologically justified sense-giving qualities of agentic cooperation.

Instead of narrow rationalization, I intend to approach self-management through *profound reasoning* that can be traced to the classical philosophical notions of *good life*. Profound reasoning is grounded in concrete first-personal experience, yet exceeds the particular psycho-physical and social circumstances with an aspiration toward universally valid abstraction. I assume that the universal philosophical goals of the *good life* may motivate the acts of *discerning the deeper layers* of experiencing, and of recognizing the concrete human and social realities that are affected by the “*corporate life-hacking*” of subjectivities (Steinbock 2014; Zuboff 2015; Cederström & Spicer 2015; Slaby 2016; Slaby & von Scheve 2019; Lash 2018; Anderson 1993; 2019; Goldie 2010). Phenomenology, as an advanced heir of the Socratic method, is particularly suited for analysing the experiential structuring of *embodiment in context* (Ladkin 2008; Thøgersen, 2014; Küpers 2013; 2014; 2015). Attending to the notion of the good life as a general ethical framework, firstly requires the detection and decoupling of the *economic* and the *non-economic* values. The act of recognizing the different social *domains of valuation* can be illustrated with Guillet de Monthoux’s (1993, 260) view on *good management based on concrete economics*:

The concrete economists do not mean that all is enterprise. On the contrary, the essence of life has little to do with economics. But without a balance between production and consumption and between investment and saving, we can never obtain the peace and energy to engage ourselves in life’s higher non-economic values.

Many critical organization scholars urge that it is time to revive the image and the practice of economic, social and epistemic *justice* with a wholly new post-capitalist vocabulary (Gibson-Graham 2013 et al; Zanoni et al 2017). This would imply that economically rationalized managerialism is not to be assumed as the *superior* logic of public sense, nor the univocal ethical framework that we’re supposed to take for granted (Koikkalainen 2012; 2017). The second part of this inquiry is centered on *re-orienting* the problem of “managing the embodied mind”, for the purpose of recognizing how the basic life necessities overlap and differ from worldly freedoms. The goal is also to proceed new economic thinking by firstly bringing the economic rationale ‘down to earth’ to the experiential level. The ‘*homo economicus*’ ideology is hereby refused as a *non-sensical view from nowhere*, in its tendency to deplete human motives, values and goals as calculable attributes, while forcing *existential* concerns upon the many who are not economically or socially safeguarded and have to live within the grip of monetary *indebtedness* (Lazzarato 2009; 2012). According to Lazzarato (2012), debt has become the most powerful governing technique to control the future. He criticizes the related “self-managerial gospel” that has been spread by management gurus since the 1980’s, meaning the “epic narratives” that were constructed around the “conceptual types” of the entrepreneur: the ‘creative visionary’, and the ‘independent worker’, assumedly “proud of being his own boss.” (2012, p. 9). Many practicing, “empirical” type of entrepreneurs have also refuted the hyped-up language that exerts overly romanticized bias over reality. Yet the heroic fantasy figures, narratives and stories can also be deemed ‘useful’

precisely because of the *paradoxes* and *impossibilities* that may both exhaust and sustain the dynamism of desiring (Johnsen & Sørensen 2016).

Leadership concepts are similar in this regard, as Spoelstra (2018, 127) remarks: “*Leadership concepts, even if they claim to represent empirical objects, are primarily expressions of a way of thinking about leadership: they offer images of leadership.*” The biggest paradox operative in contemporary business discourse, he mentions, is the image of “*business without business*”, in which both leaders and workers *appear* to transcend the mundane realm of managing economic affairs. We are hence persuaded to conceptualize, i.e. think about and act upon work in terms of “*passion and play*” instead of “*labouring for a paycheck*”. (Spoelstra 2018, 130). From the standpoint of everyday experience, the relation between *the ideal* and *the real* can thus be seen paradoxical, unsettled, unstable and incomplete. This is of relevance for the practice of research as well, as we can never completely step outside our own subjective preconceptions, intuitions, feelings, visions, beliefs and ideologies, which are in many ways connected to our socio-historical situation. That is what Schumpeter (1948) also confirmed through his historical analyses of economic thinking over time. He wanted to bring forth *the human element of indeterminacy* for the practice of social sciences like economics, for it is always possible to examine one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions, and the ways they can guide scientific theorizing:

That prescientific cognitive act which is the source of our ideologies is also the prerequisite of our scientific work. No new departure in any science is possible without it. Through it we acquire new material for our scientific endeavors and something to formulate, to defend, to attack. Our stock of facts and tools grows and rejuvenates itself in the process. And so – though we proceed slowly because of our ideologies, we might not proceed at all without them. (Schumpeter 2007/1948, 220).

Cognitive scientists have developed theoretical and empirical knowledge on why and how *human errors of thinking* actually tend to occur in complex and dynamic organizational settings, regarding the *natural* and the *artificially designed* boundaries of human information processing and rationality (Simon 1996; Saariluoma 2002; Pohl 2004). Given the *genetic* and *generated* fallibilities of human reasoning, modern artificially intelligent machines can surely excel human performance, *if* intelligence is defined and measured in terms of information processing efficiency *within* a causally determined closed system. When this *logic of machinery* is applied to the organization of human social interaction, however, our higher capabilities and values tend to be undermined through the instituted pressures of rationalized efficiency, and practically overrun by *functional stupidity*, defined as the “*inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything other than narrow and circumspect ways*” (Alvesson & Spicer 2016, p. 239). Philosopher Nicolas de Warren (2018) sees stupidity as a shadow of intelligence, rather than opposite of intelligence. He refers to Sartre’s analysis of bad faith, and defines *the problem of stupidity* in ontological terms as a form of self-immunization and a problem of *self-deception*. A person thus becomes invested in one’s own importance and beliefs in a way

that life “is organized in terms of a desire not to know”, which involves “de-coupling truth from evidence and paradoxically raising truth above evidence” (2018 p. 63). The practitioners of psychoanalysis confirm that there are always things that we do not want to know (Verhaghe 2004). Yet what is left unthought, or inaccessible to introspection, can all the more determinately affect the ways we perceive and value in the world. The digital humanities pioneer Katherine Hayles (2017) formulates a *planetary cognitive ecology*, and defines the *unthought* as a kind of ‘thinking without thinking’ that indicates both biological and technical forms of “cognitive nonconscious” that function within *assemblages of distributed* cognitive systems. The contemporary *emotional economy* is technically equipped to utilize the *subpersonal* determinants of behaviour, and as a system of beliefs and governance, it sustains the *a priori axiomatic homo economicus* world view with its mechanistic assumptions regarding humans as *utility-maximizing animals* (Lash 2018). Philosopher Gernot Böhme describes the situation in view of everyday life patterns in ‘*Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism*’ (2017) as follows:

In view of the finitude of existence, one cannot afford to go through life with a constant feeling of dissatisfaction, sub-optimality and stress. One must win back independence from the economic system by managing one’s needs. This requires, above all, a certain serenity, an attitude of being content with things as they are. It also requires a degree of restraint and circumspection regarding the outward trappings of one’s life. By this I mean that, in fitting out one’s home, for example, one needs to rediscover oneself through expression and taste, and to achieve a certain degree of restriction and stability – instead of using one’s home to demonstrate fashion-consciousness, up-to-dateness and status. In addition, one should learn not to allow needs to be transformed into desires in one’s emotional economy, in the same way as one avoids addictions. This act of caring for oneself is, admittedly, related to classical asceticism, but it certainly does not mean simply a renunciation of consumption and enjoyment. It does, however, require the discipline of not letting oneself be drawn into an upwardly-open spiral of increase, as urged by the consumer world in the aesthetic economy. To achieve this discipline one needs to gain insight into the structure of that world, and an awareness of how one’s own emotional economy can be shaped by it. (Böhme 2017, p. 18).

This is one inevitably incomplete, but engaged attempt to conduct such an inquiry, to gain insight on the basic and the normative constitutes of *agentic* valuation and restraint of emotionality. I trace the scholarly views, the powerful thinkers, and the ideas worth sustaining, which can possibly enable us to recognize the elementary sense-constitutes of community life and culture, *apart* from the profit or productivity motives. Managing the embodied mind in the emotional economy is riddled with multifaceted problems, which cannot be reduced to numbers or solved with market mechanisms. The related *informal* social control techniques, like ‘self-branding’, only echo the banal axiom of wanton self-interest, and sustain the imperatives of efficient accumulation that spur the socio-ecologically destructive cycles of increase. I will emphasize that cognitive-sensory evidence is not sufficient alone to gain better understanding on the emotional economy. Critically aware, meta-level and compassionate *modes of thinking about what we are doing* appear to be of ascending importance. That is, if the goal of self-management is to identify and set the *logical, natural* and *normative* boundaries to the emotional economy as a regime of governance.

The overall task of the study is to broadly *map out* the kind of *cognitive routes and tools of recognition* that can potentially forward the purpose to *refuse* becoming *stupefied* through the calculative downgrading of social and emotional life.

#### 1.4 Positioning in the tradition of embodied cognition

Cognitive science has emerged as a scholarly field alongside the development of modern information societies and knowledge economy. Today it represents a multidisciplinary human scientific field that is open for the combination of different perspectives for the purposive establishment of new grounds of research. (Saariluoma, Kamppinen & Hautamäki 2001). This study joins the *embodied cognition* -tradition, which is a research program that has been a particularly constructive area of exchange between cognitive scientific and phenomenological studies. It is an open arena also for identifying the foundations for an *applied* phenomenological orientation to empirical research.

The notion of *embodiment* is a central conceptual theme through which I aim to i) connect cognitive scientific, phenomenological and social theories, to ii) pronounce the phenomenological methodology as an adequate approach among the cognitive disciplines, specifically as a critical alternative to the neo-behaviouristic inclinations, and iii) to acknowledge my own embodied researcher position in learning to enact the self-critical praxis of research.

I intend to re-orient the problem of self-management with respect to the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) that Edmund Husserl (2011/1936) conceived as the *intersubjective ground* of shared human experiences. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002/1945; 2013) was another prominent phenomenological philosopher who has provided inspiration for many *embodied cognition* -theorists, for he sought to engage with the arts, the humanities and the human sciences. Martin Heidegger (2000/1927) has also been influential for many cognitive scientific researchers. Hubert Dreyfus, in particular, has done pioneering work in introducing phenomenological and existentialist imports to cognitive science (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986; Dreyfus & Wrathall 2009; Dreyfus 2016). Yet his interpretations of phenomenological philosophy and its relation to cognitive science have also been problematized (Varela 1996; Heinämaa 1999; Gallagher & Zahavi 2008).

The late 20<sup>th</sup> century embodied cognition -movements have furthered the phenomenologically inspired shift toward a broader mode of thinking about the cognition beyond the cognitivist, computationalist, dualistic, reductionist and representationalist stances. They have connected the thesis of embodiment with human cognition, which is now more adequately seen as *bodily* grounded, shaped and constrained, and interactively *enacted* in terms of *mind-body-world* interdependencies (Maturana & Varela 1987; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, 2016; Petitot, Varela,, Pachoud, & Roy 1999; Gallagher 2005; Andler 2009; Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). In a similar vein, the embodied mind can also be better understood as *situated* and *extended* toward, and *embedded* in the agent's world beyond the brain and the body. It is possible to explicate, for instance,

how the *tools* and *technologies* of our daily use can habitually become “part of us”, as they are routinely included in our embodied grasp of agentic experience, while these can also modify the patterns of neural circuitry. Cognitive processes involved with thinking and reasoning are hence now better understood in terms of their regulatory and executive functions *beyond* the simple causal spread. Cognition is seen as intimately enmeshed and intermingled with the whole bodily multisensory apparatus, and as *entrained* through *embodied action* as “informational self-structuring” in the world. (Clark 1997; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2002; Robbins & Aydede 2009; Clark 2012; 2016). In the revised (2016) edition of the landmark book, ‘*The Embodied Mind*’, Thompson notes on the ongoing tension between science and experience:

(...) either accept what science seems to be telling us and deny our experience – thereby forgetting that lived experience is the source of science, and that science can never ultimately step outside it – or hold fast to our experience and deny science – thereby forgetting that experience itself constantly seeks to enlarge its own horizons through scientific investigation. Our present culture is still caught up in the constant oscillation between these two tendencies. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2016, p. xix)

This tension has re-surfaced the discussion in relation to brain sciences and to recent neuroscientific trends of studying human behavior that have also been influencing other human and social scientific fields (Rose & Abi-Rached 2013). It is not uncommon today to popularize the self-managerial association of the “inner boss” in terms of neurological plasticity or bio-mechanisms of the prefrontal cortex, for instance, which tends to bypass the *intentionality* of first-person experiences that cannot be reduced to brain chemistry or failures of mental execution. Zahavi notes that ‘*neurologism*’ characterizes the current proposals that posit neurobiology as the base for all human activity. As a deterministic position, neurologism basically commits the same error as *psychologism* in Husserl’s time, by *confusing* the *ideal* domains of logic and the *factual* domains of empirical sciences. It also often implies other, *non-scientific* interests, not only toward naturalizing human consciousness, but toward naturalizing *ideality* and *normativity* as well. (Zahavi 2004; 2009).

The “*explanatory gap*”-problem, as Roy and others (1999) saw it, concerns the relation of cognitive science to ‘phenomenological data’, i.e. the *contents* of consciousness and experience. Roy, Petitot, Pachoud and Varela (1999) describe their project of “naturalizing phenomenology” as an attempt to bridge the gap. They integrate phenomenology and cognitive sciences by connecting the idea of *phenomenality*, i.e. the notion that things have *appearances* in human cognition, into a natural scientific explanatory framework. As Varela (1996) anticipated, adopting the phenomenological research strategy *on its own terms* could be very challenging, and even unthinkable for those with persistently functionalist inclinations, given the long standing objectivist attitude and culture in the cognitive scientific research field. In contrast to the assumed divisions in cognitivist *representationalism*, which posits an *outside world* as a mental representation to the *inside mind*, phenomenology approaches the mind and the

world as *mutually overlapping*. The *embodied, embedded, extended* and *enacted* (also termed as the 4E:s of cognition) cognitive scientific projects attempt to adopt the phenomenological insights, and typically refute the first person/third person - opposition as a misleading categorization. (Varela 1996).

Phenomenologists contest any third-person view that disregards the *cognizant subject* as a “non-sensical view from nowhere”, and insist upon the world we live in as *the point of departure* for all inquiries. Cognitive scientific research community has nonetheless gradually come to acknowledge the ‘phenomenological mind’ that was initially mistaken and rejected as an irrelevant introspective stance. (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). The realm of inner awareness can also be understood as indispensable to the studies of the mind, and as Breyer and Gutland (2016, 15) argue, phenomenology affords a *broader heuristic meaning* to approach the controversial debate on introspection:

In short: *experiencing* something is one thing, *noticing* it is another, and *communicating it to others* is yet another step. We believe that if these challenges are met, introspection can become a more reliable instrument to intersubjectively explore the general features of consciousness. Awareness and communication of the factors and the resulting scope would then become very much like communicating to others *the perspective* one takes on one’s consciousness. Rather than taking introspection as absolute, reflection of this perspective will then help to mediate between the different introspective results. (Breyer & Gutland 2016, 15, emphasis original)

The experience of understanding, of discerning the *generalizable* from the *nongeneralizable*, and of *learning to see and articulate differences*, are central in the discussions concerning the phenomenology of thinking and cognitive experience (Breyer and Gutland 2016). Crowell (2016) argues that the phenomenology of *thinking*, as a distinct conscious act and a cognitive achievement, can be better understood through the phenomenology of experiencing *truth* - when something anticipated is *understood* as fulfilled - since thinking, according to Husserl, “is experienced as a kind of “emptiness,” a way of anticipating the world”, and which “presupposes that the world can be show itself in a meaningful way, *as something*” (Crowell 2016, 185 emphasis original).

The *profound* theoretical and practical implications of the embodied cognition as a conceptual device, however, can be easily *underrated*, for it may naturally seem like common sense, as something that we can already spontaneously confirm through our own lived experiential evidence. As Edith Stein described, “(T)he will employs a *psycho-physical mechanism* to fulfill itself, to realize what is willed, just as feeling uses such a mechanism to realize its expression.” (Stein 1989/1917, 55). While the cognitive scientific strategies to investigate the bodily based elements are influenced by phenomenological imports and insights, cognitive scientific accounts differ from phenomenological philosophy in that they derive *explanatory* models from theory development and empirical experiments. They seek to specify the particular *psycho-physical mechanisms* of how cognition is embodied, enacted or situated, while in the Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment, the *lived body* is not *the object* of knowledge, but the *locus of possibility* to acquire any knowledge in the first place.



Consciousness is seen as our intentional bodily based *relation* to the world, which precedes and enables all artificial configurations. In comparison to the *positive scientific analytical variant* (as in Roy et al. 1999), the Husserlian philosophical phenomenology is a methodical *transcendental movement of thought* with an emphasis on critical self-reflection, imaginative variation, and empathic apperception. Embodiment is thereby seen already as the *irreducible* position of the researcher (Heinämaa 2007; Zahavi 2009; Taipale 2014).

Phenomenology can also be understood as an invitation to transcend the naturally absorbed perception of everyday social realities in a more self-consciously *reflexive manner* (Schütz 2007/1932). In Husserlian phenomenology, the *transcendental* standpoint refers to the active and passive *sense-constituting character* of human consciousness, which does not rely on something 'otherworldly', but "*on our human capacities of critique, discrimination, and reflection*", and which proceeds the acts of radical philosophical questioning in conducting "*an investigation into the senses operative in our experiences*" (Heinämaa, Hartimo & Miettinen 2014, 2). Merleau-Ponty (2002/1945; 1964; 2013) furthered the way out of both narrow materialist determinism and abstract intellectualism, and dissolved dualistic thinking between *realism* and *idealism* with more ambiguous perceptual notions of embodiment. He remarks on Husserl's distinction between *the natural* and *the phenomenological* attitudes:

The truth is that the relationship between the natural and the transcendental attitudes are not simple, are not side by side or sequential, like the false and the apparent and the true. There is a preparation for phenomenology in the natural attitude. It is the natural attitude which, by reiterating its own procedures, seesaws in phenomenology. It is the natural attitude itself which goes beyond itself in phenomenology - and so it does not go beyond itself. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 164)

As Zahavi (2004) emphasizes, some of the most interesting and relevant aspects of investigating consciousness and experience may be *lost* by missing *the critical* transcendental philosophical dimension. Husserl's phenomenological conception of transcendental philosophy starts from the evidence of concrete first-person experience in the world, and thus departs from the Kantian logically principled path of an isolated ego. He was extending the traditional Kantian understanding of transcendental analysis toward *transcendental intersubjectivity*, including the necessary mundane aspects of worldly existence, like body (*embodiment*) and culture (*socialization*). Phenomenological transcendental analysis thus attempts to integrate the empirical-factual and the transcendental perspectives in *complementary co-existence*. (Zahavi 2009). Embodiment and intuition hence have a prominent role in the Husserlian phenomenological movement, as Taipale (2014, 169) elaborates:

By introducing embodiment into the midst of the transcendental dimension, Husserlian phenomenology restores intuitivity to transcendental philosophy and revises the transcendental tradition as a whole. At the same time, this move makes phenomenology more responsive and open to empirical sciences.

Phenomenologists contest the *authoritative* accounts of naturalism, and generally hold that empirical scientific knowledge is *not* to be understood as equal to our most *fundamental* understanding of the world. This lifeworld, as Husserl stated, is always presupposed in all our instrumental attempts of practical or theoretical organization. It is always already, and remains there, regardless of whether we misinterpret, or quietly forget about it. Restricting inquiry only to empirical sciences is *a failure to recognize the fundamental empirical ground* that all interpretative efforts depend upon, which also implies an unnecessary *confusion*. While phenomenologists reject the *strong* forms of naturalism and dogmatic scientism, they accept scientific accounts as such, although the interaction between special sciences and phenomenology has often proved to be problematic, instead of the possible “ongoing processes of mutual reinterpretation”, as Ratcliffe concludes. (Ratcliffe 2009; Gallagher 1997).

According to Arendt (1958, 183), the basic error of all materialism “*is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material objects.*” The embodied cognition is indeed a well justified thesis, if we accept that human *mental capacities* are not solely determined within our brains, and that they can be *uniquely* augmented and transformed through our interpretations and interactions in the world. Embodiment is a key notion also for cognitive scientists Lakoff and Johnson, who have elaborated on the *figurative* use of language by way of *metaphorical expressions*. Metaphors are central in the *embodied organization* of our thought and action, because we think and act through our conceptualizations, and the way we make use of language tends to reveal our conceptualizations through metaphorical expressions. Metaphors are *bodily grounded* in our lived experience and everyday interactions, though we’re not always explicitly aware of using them. They are coherent with the values embedded in culture, relative to what is given priority, and correlative to the emotional and practical importance that they signify for different subcultures, groups and individuals. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; 1999).

## 1.5 Metaphorical mode of inquiry and empathic apperception

Metaphors have been the subject matter of research for a variety of multidisciplinary cognitive scientific investigations (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; 1999; Gibbs 2008). The metaphorical style and deliberate mode of conceptual elaboration, however, as most notably exemplified in the works of Plato and Nietzsche for instance, is rarely applied but still a valid approach within the cognitive scientific field that is yet more accustomed to the Aristotelian trajectories of logic (Saariluoma 2018, personal communication). Plato’s Chariot allegory, for example, has been conducive for the initial ideation and procession of this thesis. Analytical philosopher Dennett (2013, 4), counts analogies and metaphors among the “hand tools of the mind”, and dubs them as follows: “*Mapping the features of one complex thing that you already (think you) understand is*

a famously powerful thinking tool, but it is so powerful that it often leads thinkers astray when their imaginations get captured by a treacherous analogy." The essential function of the metaphor, according to Arendt's (1981, 105) phenomenological description, is about "bridging the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearances". Both accounts, as I see it, are relevant, yet the phenomenological view acknowledges the first-personal experience of the "abyss", instead of assuming a unified background of experiencing the world.

Metaphors are understood in this study also as potentially powerful, yet flexible mediums of understanding everyday organizational contexts (Morgan 1980; 2006/1986; 2016). Berardi (2018), for example, uses the metaphors of *poetry* and *breathing* to reactivate *the social body* comprised of 21<sup>st</sup> century cognitive workers, as a body which in his view has been suffocating and dying under the rule of financial absolutism: "Only the self-organization of cognitive cyber-workers, only an alliance between the engineer and the poet, might reverse humanity's slide toward self-annihilation." (2018, 8). He encourages the rediscovery of the semantic potency of *language* as the universal grammar that enables true escape from the invisibly 'handed down' and data-driven determinism of automated codes. Dennett's note on the "treacherous analogies" is particularly applicable considering the persistently powerful hold of *the machine metaphor* in management theory and practice, whereas the remnants of Tayloristic (1911) principles of "scientific management" remain to inform the contemporary *mechanistic* forms of rationalizing and quantifying the organization of human social interaction (Takala 2004). The metaphors of warfare also provide a resonant *emotionology* that readily "fits" all competitive arenas of social life (Fineman 2008, 2-3). The *ideology* of economic growth associates to organic phenomena, although it represents a *coherent narrative* that covers real life contradictions (Bjerg 2016). Machines, militarism and naturalistic determinism can thus be seen as "treacherous analogies" for organizing. They sustain the narrow calculative modes of valuation and relating, which operate like an invisible straightjacket that downplays or trivializes the *originally* and *profoundly* significant, inter-personally *revelatory moral value* of emotions (Steinboch 2014).

The *experimental* phenomenological purpose of engaging with metaphors in this thesis, is to elucidate the possible alternative *ways of living* and *modes of relating* that entail wider experiential and ideational reach, also beyond the 'instrumental phenomenological' regime of producing the emotional economy. The so-called instrumentalized mode of utilizing phenomenological insights is presupposed to construct an all-encompassing and thoroughly calculated 'Lifeworld Inc.' with the aid of advanced socio-technologies. (Thrift 2011). The radically reflective approach, by contrast, proceeds the original philosophical aims of *fighting the closure of meanings* that is implied through positivistic enclosures (Tsoukas & Chia 2011, 15), and thus aids the goal of challenging the mechanistic machine-metaphorical models of control *from within* through the conceptual roots of "managing" as "handling a horse" (Alvesson & Willmott 2012, 20-21). In reference to Arendt's notion of the metaphor as a medium for bridging the invisible and the visible realms of apperception, the guiding hypothesis of the study is that the horse-metaphor can function as a *conceptual*

*sensitizer* to articulate the *intuitive presuppositions* and *meanings*, e.g. of freedom, power and control, with respect to the *intersubjective lifeworld ontology*. The goal is to enable an attitudinal shift to problematize the top-down mechanized assumptions on self-management through the imaginative transfer of the core ideas of managing from one action domain to another, and to reveal the intentional, temporal, structural and value-laden senses of emotion regulation. The point is to activate the reflective efforts to refuse assuming the *lifeless world of inanimate value-free and neutral objects*, which characterizes the ‘reductionist captivity’ upheld in scientific managerialism (Jouillié & Spillane 2015).

In this view, *managing the embodied mind* entails the notion of *altering the ego* through recognizing the regulatory and moral significance of otherness to selfhood (Zahavi 2014; Steinbock 2014). The applied phenomenological emphasis of this thesis is hence informed by the *human-animal*, instead of the *human-technology* -interaction, which is a resolute choice for making a more pronounced distinction between the *radical-empathic* and the *mundane-mechanistic* apperception of *the other*. The perception of a non-human animal, *the horse* in this particular study, may lack certain evaluative presuppositions, and afford us to recognize the already *embodied, encultured* and *situated* elements of conscious life. It is thus possible to become more aware of the similarities and the differences of other *living intentional* conscious beings, human and non-human animal kind. (Ruonakoski 2011; Rossi & Lundvall 2018). I assume that the embodied, emergent and spontaneous acts of witnessing and *radically* empathizing with the other, as different and unique *in its own terms*, can possibly broaden the perspectival horizon of experiencing and theorizing beyond narrow rationalization, and aid the discovery of *inter-corporeality* and *inter-affectivity* through *kindness* and *careful* regard, instead of impulse-driven *race* and *rivalry* (Ratcliffe 2012; Fuchs 2017). We may also begin to see how the *topic of the animal* has bearing on many philosophical, ethical, political and organizational issues (Midgley 1983; Connolly & Cullen 2017). It forwards the recognition of *embodiment* and *ethics* as intertwined experiential dimensions of organizational life and culture, even when the practices of moral agency are misperceived or misguided as such (Borgerson 2009; Pullen & Rhodes 2015).

The horse-handling analogy is conceptually derived from the semantic roots and history of the noun “management”, and from the verb “manage”<sup>1</sup>. The use of the word was extended from horses to people and common economic affairs along with the rise of the mercantile class and the shift away from feudal societal arrangements. Management is nowadays also a “tainted” word that carries the weight of *real social contradictions*, pertaining to its modern use in the establishment of a social division. (Alvesson & Willmott 2012; Parker 2018). The division can be crudely stated as the one between those who hold power and control (i.e. *the ‘handlers’*), over others who supply the labour (i.e. *the*

---

<sup>1</sup> Manage (v.): 1560s from Italian *maneggiare* "to handle", especially "to control a horse", from Latin noun *manus* "hand". Influenced by French *manège* "horsemanship". Earliest English sense was of handling horses. Extended to other objects/business from c. 1570s. (etymonline.com).

'horses'). The concept of self-management relocates the division as an inward relation that is often articulated in relation to an image of an "inner boss". This is still an *ambiguous* social position that can be repressive *and* liberating, also depending on the context of agency. A recent study suggest that there is a "cognitive hole" in public understanding concerning how the economy works as a system of *human design* instead of a "natural force" (NEON 2018), which is another reason to *disambiguate* the concept of self-management.

The horses are hereby understood as both corporeal and spiritual *companions*, rather than objects of human control or "useful possessions" (Keaveney 2008). The horse-metaphorical conception of self-management resonates with the emerging field of studies that investigates *the equine culture* and the human-horse -interspecies relation from an *ethical* rather than from an *ethological* view, and which acknowledges the horse as another conscious, sensing, feeling, acting, and relational being (Leblanc 2013; Bornemark, Andersson & Ekström von Essen 2019). The horse-metaphor also relates to the broadly construed and counter-hegemonic "animal turn" in social sciences and humanities that allow and seek after the diversity of perspectives on *sociality* (Swart 2007). The horse has cultural-historically far-reaching empirical and socio-symbolic significances. They are understood as partaking a concrete role in shaping human histories, as well as evoking our aspired imaginations, e.g. of traveling between different worlds and connecting the unconscious and conscious frontiers of the mind. Carl Jung, for example, recognized the socio-symbolic designation of the black mare (*night-mare*), as representing the "feminine mode of wisdom" which was feared and virtually banished to the nether-regions of the collective unconscious in some patriarchal tribes. The enlightened conception of "the feminine way" of equines relates to the insight that horses can also awaken more intuitive, caring, creative, compassionate and *non-predatory* spirits within and between humans. These also signify the qualitative ingredients for generating more *balanced* forms of ecological co-existence. (Kohanov 2007, 15-17, 25). While the different human-horse cultures can be experienced as *gendered* in terms of masculine or feminine communities of practice, the intercorporeal relationship between humans and horses can also enable the *subversion* and *re-inscription* of dominant gender practices and ideals (Birke & Brandt 2009). The practice of horsemanship has nonetheless mostly been understood as an occupation for privileged men in connection to military leadership, managerial rules and hierarchies (Xenophon c. 350 BC). The main *cultural model* for the role of the horse in human society has been shifting from a *servant* to a *therapist* (Leinonen 2013), which connects to wider societal, political, economic and technological changes during and since the last century

The meanings that we project and transpose to animals also reflect *what it means to be human*, in addition to differentiating cultures and historical periods of time. We have natural anthropomorphic tendencies to seek *social connections* by way of *mind attribution*, and it has been found that people are more receptive to identifying the *intentional* mental states and actions of others when they *like* the target agent of attention (Kozak, Marsh & Wegner 2006). Inanimate objects,

like modern machines and technologies, can also *appear* to us as having a goal-oriented 'mind of their own', while we also tend to apply the supposedly value-free logic of machinery to the whole of living nature, including ourselves (Kaila 1990/1934). It is not uncommon to succumb to the "*impersonal arts of calculation*", if the *acts of thinking* are reduced to technical calculative procedures that are patterned to function like "*surrogate intentionality*" (Gorz 1989, 122).

The self-other relations can become distorted in many ways. As Steinbock (2014) has argued, assuming the self as *sovereign* is a form of false consciousness, where otherness is *present as resisted*. The inter-personally and also ecologically destructive implications of the self-occupied *moral attitude of pride* is manifested through the disregard of others in their own right, and through the refusal of the *earthly* world as the ultimate grounding horizon. When they are thus *denied of integrity and inherent value*, they "can" be conceived as mere objects or playfields of *manipulation*. This calculative mode of interaction is typically issued in circumstances, in which '*our focus on use-value and exchange-value for the purpose of survival "demands" the sacrifice of deeper human and personal values*' (2014, 151). In this attitudinal and contextual sense, the other is dehumanized, devalued, and objectified akin to a mindless automaton, or a virtual platform.

Edmund Husserl pronounced the *personalistic* emphasis on ethics, the multiplicity of guiding values in life, and the core values as being freely and personally chosen. This does *not* disregard the communal and co-dependent nature of human beings, but denies the priority and primacy of *externally imposed* norms and imperatives. Some values are experienced as being socially shared; others as personally decisive, and still others as transcultural. The multiplicity of human values involves also the freely chosen values that define *personal vocations*, i.e., the occupations on which the person decided on the basis of his or her skills and interests and types of challenges and satisfactions that they involve. (Husserl 2006; Heinämaa 2015). I assume that the purposive thought-experimentation with a conceptual metaphor can engage and broaden the critical, creative and meta-cognitive faculties, and illuminate the *intuitive presuppositions* that we tend to hold in relation to other minds and bodies, to scientific theorizing, and to different types and domains of social practices.

## 1.6 Connecting radical reflection and critical theories

The critical theoretical undertone of the study comes from the educational background of *critical, philosophical* and *humanistic* streams of management, organization and entrepreneurship studies (e.g. Alvesson & Deetz 2000; Peltonen 2016; Gagliardi & Czarniawska 2006; Ogbor 2000; Jones & Spicer 2005; Sørensen 2008; Hjorth & Steyaert 2009; Tedmanson, Verduijn, Essers, & Gartner 2012; Johnsen 2015; Bjerg 2014; 2016). In organization theory, the study relates to the *person-centered* rather than structural or strategic sociological approaches to emotions, culture, power and control in organizations (Hochschild 1983; Mumby & Putnam 1992; Weick & Sutcliffe 2001; Fineman 2000, 2008; Parviainen,

Kinnunen, & Kortelainen 2016; Aromaa et al 2018; Fotaki, Kenny & Vachhani 2017; Zietsma, Toubiana, Voronov & Roberts 2019). This is not to say that structural and strategic dimensions are unimportant, but to emphasize the ways they connect with subjective appropriation. As Fineman (2000, 12) points out: “Organizational cognitions are emotionally laden because they are inextricably tied to politicized organizational discourses where they take place.” Alvesson (2013), for example, observes the “triumph of emptiness” that is manifested through the persuasive performances of *grandiosity* in contemporary organizational and educational landscapes. He connects this to the way how social life appears to function today like a *zero-sum game*, where someone’s achievement always implies someone else’s failure. When the need to manage outward impressions overpowers the reasoning to question *why* we ought to do so in the first place, it widens the perceived gaps between the concrete experiential circumstances and the surface appearances, which is likely to generalize the sense of emptiness.

The assumptions and goals of the study reflect the sociological paradigm of *radical humanism*, which is generally concerned with human freedom, with a “focus upon human consciousness within the context of the totality which characterizes a particular social formation” (Burrell & Morgan 1979, 306). Top-down instrumental approaches to self-management, on the other hand, tend to deploy the idea as a useful tool for rationalizing managerial functions (e.g. *planning, organizing, directing and controlling*). The self-managerial *informalization* of work can then be conceived as a cost-effective *personalized responsibility* that valorises incessant self-improvement with the mechanistic principle of efficiency. When self-management is imposed as a rule that asserts the *compulsion to compete* over cooperation, it relates to the perceived *lack* of accountable authority figures, and to the insecure socio-economic conditions of *social darwinism*, which is a deeply hostile mode of interaction. (Verhaeghe 2014; Berardi 2015; Fleming 2017ab).

The radical humanist intents and purposes of this study are centrally *human scientific* and *philosophical*, and realized through *questioning* and *problematizing* the positivist epistemology, realist ontology, and mechanistic imperatives of efficiency, especially when these relate to top-down *prescriptive* economic rationalization, manipulation and control of behaviors. The adjective of the *radical* is understood in the technical sense of going to the *experiential roots* of explicating phenomena. The thematic areas of the study relate to the phenomenological philosophy of mind (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008; Dahlstrom, Elpidorou & Hopp 2016), to phenomenology of sociality and emotionality (Steinbock 2014; Szanto. & Moran 2016; Drummond & Rinofner-Kreidl 2018), and to feminist discussions (Oksala 2016; Gardiner 2018; Shabot & Landry 2018). The enactment of phenomenological inquiry, as *radical reflection*, is hereby seen as an encompassingly embodied, critical and ethical endeavour. It also means that the notion of *critical phenomenology* employed in this study is *not* a wholly new invention. Critical phenomenology designates an *enlivening* of the original phenomenological premises, in combination with the structural and the real life concerns that critical social theories accentuate. As Salamon (2018) explains:

(...) when asking what a critical phenomenology is, we might maintain that it reflects on the structural conditions of its own emergence, and in this it is following an imperative that is both critical in its reflexivity and phenomenological in its taking-up of the imperative to describe what it sees in order to see it anew. In this, what is critical about critical phenomenology turns out to have been there all along. (2018, p. 12).

(...) if phenomenology offers us unparalleled means to describe what we see with utmost precision, to illuminate what is true, critique insists that we also attend to the power that is always conditioning that truth. (2018. p. 16).

I intend to bring forth the critical phenomenological significance of recognizing the *subjective experiential roots and the intersubjective cultural currents of social interaction* that are normally taken-for-granted, and often insufficiently articulated. Radical humanist critique attends to pathological *social causation* of psychological defects, like greediness, self-serving ignorance and irrational beliefs, when they are merely *culturally patterned* as “normal” (Fromm 2002/1955), and which hinders real progressive change (Marcuse 2002/1964). Another related point is to acknowledge the demoralized *modes of relating* that can now also be characterized as *depressive* on a global scale (Roudinesco 2001; James 2008; Fisher 2009; WHO 2017). This study is also inspired by the new interdisciplinary movements that involve *intercorporeality* of multi-agent *bodies-in-interaction* (Meyer, Streeck & Jordan 2017), and combine *philosophy, culture* and *empirical studies* by bridging the *individual intentionality* of emotions, and the *situated dynamic relatedness* of affect (Slaby & von Scheve 2019; Slaby 2019).

The dynamic relatedness of affectivity can be recognized from everyday interactions at the level of persons *more accurately*, if we learn to discern *why* and *how* the lived experiential circumstances can also compel us to think and act in certain ways, and often against our better awareness, judgement or knowledge. Radical humanist engagements with phenomenology, as exemplified in the post-war French existentialist movements (cf. Sartre 1943; Beauvoir 1947), basically share the actor-centered assumptions of the interpretative approach to organizing, but differs from the constructivist stances in that it goes *beyond* understanding the social co-constitution of meanings, and seek to *liberate* the human consciousness and potential from creating and sustaining the *modes of social organizing* that are recognized as repressive (Burrell & Morgan 1979, 306).

There are also many economic thinkers that depart from, and question the orthodox economic paradigm. Raufflet and Mills (2009), for example, have enlightened the dark sides of business management and argued, with consequent series of real life cases, that managerial *decision-making* should also be approached as a question of *judgement-making* when referring to the turbulent social, economic and environmental conditions. Research in management psychology has also surfaced an alarming topic of *corporate psychopathology* during the recent decade (Boddy 2006; 2010; 2015). The emergence of extremely ruthless managerial behaviors in organizations has been connected with the profit-driven corporate logic (Boddy, Miles, Sanyal & Hartog 2015), which does not, in itself, necessitate any deeper acts of reflectivity



regarding the human realities, possibilities and boundaries that reside beyond the interest of cost-efficient administration, levelling and modification of behaviors. The mainstream economic theorizing is rather infamous for the *lack* of such critically thoughtful considerations (e.g. Schumacher 1973; Sen 1977; Waring 1988; Gorz 1989; Anderson 1993; Ghoshal 2005; Nussbaum 2010; Spitzeck et al. 2009; Smith & Max-Neef 2011; Alvesson 2013; Piketty 2014; Hanlon 2016; Pirson 2017; Spicer 2018). The mainstream management discourse accelerates the cultural affectation, ignorance and excess, while obscuring the presupposed intents of *dissolving and isolating social relations* for the benefit of transferring wealth to the already privileged (Spicer 2018; Hanlon 2016). It promotes the cultural models that tend to fuse the instrumental-sentimental, and the work-life divisions, and which colonize all spheres of life by way of becoming individually appropriated and habitually normalized (Arendt 1958; Hochschild 1983; Illouz 2007; Berardi 2009; Fleming 2009; Gregg & Seigworth 2010; Grandey, Diefendorff & Rupp 2013; Ahmed; 2004, 2014; Nikkola & Harni 2015; Brunila, Onnismaa & Pasanen 2015; Jokinen & Venäläinen 2015).

This study is concerned with the *personalistic ethic*, also in consideration of the exceedingly virtual, cybernetic means of communication. While technology in itself is innately neither “good” nor “bad”, we can hardly escape the fact that *the use* of pedagogical or manipulative social control techniques is also based on embodied cognitive *intentionality* and *incorporation*, while their cultural transmission has become mechanized in the computerized era (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986; Thrift 2011; Shilling 2017; Greenfield 2017; Hayles 2017). Digital spaces and platforms of interaction can be operationalized basically because humans are well capable of visually registering and intersubjectively recognizing others also in the “phantasmatic co-modes” (*co-feeling, co-sensing, co-willing* etc.) of experiencing (Lohmar 2006). Techniques of control are hence extending toward what has been traditionally understood as the “unmanageable” or “irrational” realms of *subjectivity*, through the fantasies, myths, narratives, symbolization and stories, which have always helped humans in paving the way to the inner dreamworld of imagination, where even the *harshes realities may be refashioned* into something meaningful and endurable (Gabriel 1992). Critical theorists themselves can also get caught in the past “excesses of history” that are artificially preserved through “retrospective narrative sensemaking”, and which tends to stifle the recognition of *situationally emerging* histories of becoming in the *living stories* here-and-now (Boje 2009).

The neurotic subject of neoliberal governance remains anxious, confused, and more often depressively exhausted, insofar as he or she lacks the interpretative means to address illusionary constructs, and keeps on believing in the *impossible* promises of capitalist society: that the *absolutely perfect* health, wealth, happiness, security and body is possible and empirically attainable (Isin 2004). The flexibility of human conscious life, that affords us the degrees of indeterminacy, i.e. freedom to *modify our relation* to many kinds of conditions and situations, e.g. through entertaining fictional belief systems, coherent

narratives and other available forms of anxiety relief, can also end up serving a self-corrosive cycle. As Konings (2015, 94) elaborates:

Re-engaging the very norms, symbols and institutions at the root of its problems, the subject dampens the intensity of its anxiety by sustaining the mechanisms that produce it. In this way, its emotional economy comes to be governed by the logic of wounded attachments, the subject shaping its identity around and becoming ever more deeply invested in its anxiety.

The emotion-targeting model of governance is subtly operative in and through the *human consciousness*, yet therein also resides the potential to *refuse* the degenerative modes of social interaction. The increase of anxious relationships resulting from ontological uncertainty and social insecurities can also be better acknowledged in technological development and future scenario planning (Fuller 2017). There is no shortage of examples that attest to the possible benefits of technological innovation and progress that need *not* be premised on the narrow profit accumulation rationale. Ontological uncertainty also differs from the speculative take on uncertainty in economic modelling, e.g. in the Knightian (1921) sense of measuring risks and profits, or from conceptualizing risk as a defining societal feature of reflexive modernity (Beck 1992). By all accounts, self-critical and socially conscious theorizing or technological engineering acknowledge the *unsustainability* of the presumption that individuals *ought* to be pressured to function *as if* they were mindless utilitarian automatons. One of the reasons why we now have to be reminded of many such *elementary distinctions*, relates to an essentially *anti-humanist* mind-set:

According to the idea that the fittest survive, and the unfit are doomed to fail, contemporary Neoliberal ideology erases the Humanist distinction between the sphere of the natural law and the sphere of moral reason (Berardi 2015, 40).

In its part, this research joins the goal of advancing *better information society* and the *good life*, as outlined in the Life-Based Design (LBD) -perspective on technology development by Saariluoma, Cañas and Leikas (2016). The LBD -framework features an emphasis on developing the human scientific conceptual understanding on the *human dimension* of human-technology interaction (HTI)-research. It accommodates practical methods that professionals can use for the purpose of improving the quality of people's everyday lives, by designing technologies that *enrich or ease living* and give people the possibilities to meet their action goals in life. My intended contribution relates to the "*ethical and value oriented design of human life actions*" in the multidisciplinary LBD-framework. I would add that *lifeworld* -based design, in the *radically* ethical and value oriented sense, is not primarily technical, industrial, or commercial matter of crafting new ideas, products, services, or solutions to *predefined* problems, but a question of discerning the intuitive experiential recognition of what is *already here*, and what possibly needs to be *differently problematized* in the first place.

## 1.7 The structure of the thesis

### *Chapter 2: Cognitive science and phenomenology*

In reviewing and clarifying the relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology, this study will firstly provide a thematic exploration of their distinct characteristics when approaching the same objects of study. The basic disciplinary differences can be very briefly summed as follows:

- *Cognitive science* seeks to specify, measure and explain the particular information processing cognitions, actions and behaviors, through empirical experimentation and universal theoretical models.
- *Phenomenology* - as a transcendental philosophy - considers the broad range of human experiential intentionality, temporality, plurality, normativity, ambiguity, and fallibility that *precede* scientific explanations.

By pronouncing the analytical and experiential distinctions, I mean to i) introduce some *critical philosophical measures* to the human scientific discourse, ii) to identify the *limitations* of *naturalizing*, *objectifying* and *positivizing* human consciousness, and iii) to complicate the standard explanatory models by emphasizing *the transcendental* function of human consciousness, which can also genuinely enrich the contents of experiencing (Husserl 2011/1936, 237). The empirical and the transcendental traditions are brought together for better understanding *how we can study* and more *carefully conceptualize* the ways we *originally* come to understand, and are *shaped* by, the other minds and bodies.

### *Chapters 3-5: The horse-metaphorical experiments of re-orienting self-management*

The *second* part of the thesis proceeds to explore the *sociocultural embeddedness* of human mentality, and to discern the *animalistic-spiritual* nuances in view of the embodied cognition. I follow and diagnose the idea of self-management with the classical metaphor of human consciousness and emotion regulation assimilated with the imagery of handling horses. I revisit ancient texts (*chapter 3*) and elaborate on two contemporary cases that involve the horse-metaphor: the artwork of Berlinde de Bruyckere (*chapter 4*), and the hobbyhorse girls (*chapter 5*). The examples are chosen to articulate the *natural-cultural* tensions concerning the *embodiment of moral agency*, and the *empathic transfer* of meanings related to the *emotional* and *ethical* sense-givenness of experiencing. The goal is to re-orient the idea of self-management by relying on the *intersubjective accessibility* of the figure of the horse, to which humans can relate to as an *embodiment* of spirited powers subjected to valuation and restraint in the world of appearances.

The cultural-historicity of the human-horse *relationship* is elaborated to *assist* lifeworld reflection, so the contribution is not centred on animal cognition or concrete horse handling as such. I approach the horse-metaphor as a *conceptual sensitizer* - as a resonant carrier of meanings and affects that is salient and dynamic enough to activate imaginations and reflections on the topic of *emotion regulation* from different philosophical, psychological, and social perspectives.

## 2 COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

This chapter contains a thematic literature review and conceptual clarification regarding the relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology. I will firstly explore their distinct philosophical and methodological characteristics when approaching the research fields of the human mind, consciousness and experience. In addition to the academic disciplinary, and the cultural-historical differences and developments of cognitive science and phenomenology, I identify the possible terms of exchange between the approaches, inspired by Gallagher and Zahavi's (2008) elaboration. The *natural* and the *phenomenological* attitudes of inquiry are distinguished to endorse the mutual re-interpretative efforts between the scientific and the philosophical communities of thought and research cultural practice. The emphasis of elaboration is on the less well-known phenomenological orientation. The main problem under consideration concern the explanatory scientific projects of naturalizing human consciousness. I will also introduce the particular systemic and intersubjective problem area of interest that concerns the deterministic tendencies in relation to the *homo economicus* rationale, logic and normativity.

I write this chapter in defence of understanding the two kind of research positions and their respective *attitudes* as distinct, irreducible, and yet in certain terms compatible approaches to *cognitive phenomena*, when seen in the broad sense of the notion that accommodates the *lifeworld* of human experiencing (Husserl 2011/1936). The motivation behind this inquiry relates to the project of *foundational analysis* by Pertti Saariluoma (1997), in that I also aim to articulate the *tacit presuppositions* that we often take for granted when researching human experience. As Saariluoma argues (1997), scientific advancement is about *renewal*, and foundationally dependent on *thinking anew* the presuppositions that prevail in any given tradition of scholarly thought. I intend to identify the intuitive and the deliberate ways of how we tend to adopt and use assumptions, for it is both reasonable and responsible to become more fully and critically aware of *the personal* and *the communal* origins of research as a social practice. They have central bearing on the way we learn to enact certain conducts of study over others, which are not always readily conducive to the *universal*

ideals and goals of truthful scientific advancement. Needless to say, there is no *artificial intelligence* that could perform such *elementary* tasks for us, of recalling, rethinking and revising the ways we relate to the world of facts, in the manner that only a *living intentional consciousness* can evaluate the *truth value of knowledge* that is not fixed but historically changing. My point of view is critically integrative rather than special scientific, as I seek to clarify the philosophical and the human scientific conceptual confusions that are common across the many different fields of inquiry. The ultimate goal is to gain better understanding on the research cultural and conceptual foundations for applying the phenomenological orientation, for the purpose of conducting *critical research on the subjective experiential foregrounding of social phenomena*, which is attentive to both the *empirical* and the *transcendental* domains of inquiry.

## 2.1 Combining philosophy and empirical sciences of the mind

The common view of philosophy as a solely “armchair” activity has been widely contested in both analytical and continental divisions of thought during the recent years. This has subsequently woken a renewed interest toward methodological and metaphilosophical questions: on *how to do philosophy from different perspectives*, but also regarding the *style and format of writing*, and whether it is better to follow the tasks of the ‘good life’ and the literary manners of philosophy, or the generalized format of the sciences. There is a new field of experimental philosophy, for example, that uses the standard methods of empirical sciences in testing the philosophical theses. The naturalization of phenomenology is one of the most extensive cognitive scientific projects in this naturalistically motivated stream of positive research strategies, with an aim to collect or otherwise explicitly rely on empirical data. (Overgaard & D’Oro 2017, 1-6). Kornblith (2017), defends the naturalistic methodology and refutes the overly abstract ‘armchair’ approaches, arguing that they: “*are likely to go badly astray, losing contact with the very phenomena they seek to illuminate. The methodology of philosophy must involve input from the sciences if it is to engage properly with its subject matter.*” (2017, 159). Still, it seems too simplistic to assume that philosophy is only concerned with abstract theorizing without any kinds of empirical commitments whatsoever. In following Husserl’s original conception of phenomenology, for instance, it could be argued that his methodology entails a more *radically* empirical attitude of reality in comparison to the objectivist and detached scientific accounts. Yet the phenomenological approach is not the same kind that empirical scientists or analytic philosophers of mind would normally adopt for empirical investigation. (Zahavi 2004).

Cognitive science is a multidisciplinary field, and a term that broadly covers the scientific disciplines that investigate the mind: psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and the analytical philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008) have joined the recent developments that endorse the inclusion of the phenomenological perspective among these

cognitive disciplines. They specifically advocate *a phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind*, in order to enhance communication between phenomenology and the analytic and experimental approaches. Cognitive scientific community has been gradually moving toward acknowledging the ‘phenomenological mind’ that was initially rejected as “introspective” and irrelevant. These developments in the cognitive scientific field have been furthered by i) an intellectual shift away from computational models which also renewed an interest toward the ‘phenomenal consciousness’ during the late 1980’s, ii) through the *embodied cognition* approach that was initiated in the 1990’s, and most recently iii) with the progress of *neuroscientific* methods and technologies that involve experimental subjects and experiential descriptions. The integration of the phenomenological-philosophical and the cognitive scientific-empirical traditions of thought, however, is not one without frictions. The main difference that provokes an intermediary tension and frequent misunderstandings is that phenomenology is traditionally a *non-naturalistic* discipline. As such it entails an *alternative* method of the transcendental study of *a priori* conditions of experience, whereas cognitive sciences are experimental *natural* sciences of the mind. In contrast to cognitive science, phenomenology does not *primarily* regard consciousness, cognition or the mind as an *object* of study, but as *a priori* necessary condition for being able to study anything in the first place. As Edmund Husserl conceived it, phenomenology can *support* the practice of sciences through clarifying their epistemic foundations, but it does not serve the same interests that *positive sciences* are necessarily concerned with. (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 1-6, 31). When it comes to the practice of applying the phenomenological *conceptual tools of thought* aside the orthodox professional philosophical domain, Zahavi (2019a) provides a pragmatic suggestion:

Any method, procedure, or approach that is supposed to merit the label *phenomenological* must be familiar with phenomenological theory. This is a necessary requirement. In a non-philosophical context, however, a relevant and creative use of central phenomenological concepts such as lifeworld, intentionality, empathy, pre-reflective experience, horizon, historicity, lived body, etc. will be more valuable and productive than a strict adherence to and insistence on the performance of the epoché and reduction, since the latter procedures have an explicit philosophical focus and aim. (Zahavi 2019a, 137, emphasis original).

Zahavi recommends a heterodox approach that is not overly simplified nor unnecessarily complicated, and that is comprehensible and flexible enough to serve the actual purposiveness of the practical field in question. Zahavi is not convinced of the phenomenological approach to qualitative research configured by Van Manen (2014), or by Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009). In his view, they do not meet the requirements mentioned above for the adequate application of phenomenology (Zahavi 2019a; 2019b). Given the profound, persistent, and practically complicated nature of the central differences between cognitive science and phenomenology, the issue will be explored at length in the following pages from different thematic angles, and primarily from the less well known, and still often misunderstood, phenomenological perspective.

## 2.2 Comparing natural scientific and phenomenological research

Phenomenology has been contrasted with natural sciences by the disciples from both sides since the inception of the field, but as Himanka (2010) also remarks, the respective views can also be seen as *complimentary*, after their foundational differences are explicated and understood. Edmund Husserl saw the crisis of natural sciences as a severe detachment from the experiential nature of reality, and developed phenomenology accordingly as a method that aims to bridge the gap in-between sciences and philosophy. Phenomenology is concerned with bringing forth what is *seemingly absent*, but not with the measurement of exact views that characterizes the methodology of natural scientific research. Phenomenological legitimacy is 'measured' in relation to *truthfulness* that creates correlative *intersubjective resonance* when something is seen as generally valid for all human beings. This emphasis on the intersubjective grasp of reality cannot disregard the *subjective* meaning of values like the objective empirical stance does. Natural sciences are occupied with theory development by relying on what has been discovered before, while phenomenology evokes the perception of *originality* by continuously questioning our assumptions of reality. The founding principles of phenomenology are based on concrete realizations of lived experience - not on maintaining purely theoretical aspirations. Phenomenological inquiries recognize that we have a natural tendency toward explaining the causes of our action. Hence one of the key challenges of phenomenological description is about abstaining from this strong theorizing propensity, and turn to discovering the experiential essence of '*things in themselves*'. The natural attitude of simplifying complex realities is a powerful tendency within and without, as it is commonly enhanced by education and other forms of social conditioning. The phenomenological attitude is consequently very difficult to elicit or attain. (Himanka 2010, 86-87, 90-96).

In comparison to other contemporary philosophies, phenomenology does not provide a rigid system of thought for verifying the results of any special sciences. Phenomenological stance is traditionally rather critical toward the positivistic approaches that seek to build theory by explaining phenomena through causal extraction. Phenomenology remains attached to the phenomena in experiential terms, and can also be regarded as an autonomous field of descriptive science. Moreover, Husserl pointed out that by going beyond traditional methodological contradictions, phenomenology forms *a radical base of acquiring knowledge* for special sciences by showing their inherent partiality and boundaries when it comes to explaining the lifeworld. It reveals the *multiplicity* of experiential manifestations, of how experiences may be perceived, remembered or imagined, for instance, and how the multiplicity of the ways of experiencing relate to bodily existence, temporality, history, culture, other beings, entities and communities. (Miettinen, Pulkkinen & Taipale, 2010, 12-14).

Phenomenological inquiries are not mainly interested, in the manner of psychotherapy for instance, in the *idiosyncratic* descriptions of personal experiences, but on the *invariant* properties of experiencing that are essentially possible for everyone. Hence it is not the best suited approach to investigate the specified particularities of psychological, physical or behavioral processes. Phenomenological inquiries are not too concerned with the substantial nature of objects, and require an 'unnatural' interest also toward the natural world. They are concerned with different *cognitive types of world-disclosure* that we can gain access to only *via* consciousness. Phenomenology does not adhere to drawing a line between 'inner' and 'outer' world like representationalism. In the lifeworld philosophical analysis, consciousness *is* subjectivity, and it is our *relationship* to the world that makes the world *appear as meaningful*, rather than an object among other material or natural objects in the world. Phenomenologists contest any view that disregards the *cognizant subject* as a non-sensical 'view from nowhere', and insist upon the world we live in as the *point of departure* for all inquiries. Attaining the phenomenological philosophical attitude of inquiry through the phenomenological method is not to be understood as a strictly linear procedure, but it can be summarized as involving four different technical terms and steps, or *reflective moves*: 1) the *epoche* –*suspension* of the natural attitude, 2) the phenomenological reduction – attention to the *correlation* between the object of experience and the experience itself, 3) the eidetic variation – identifying the core essential and *invariant* structures and properties through the use of imagination, and 4) intersubjective corroboration – the degree to which the discoveries can be verified in terms of *universal* resonance and intersubjective accessibility. (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 23- 31).

The primary focus of phenomenological research thus remains attached to the experiential constitution of the *ways and structures of intending* in the world. It is about understanding *how we connect* in the world and *participate* in the constitution of meanings. Husserl described the phenomenological attitude with the verb *ausschalten*, which indicates separation from the crowd. As further characterized by Merleau-Ponty, this is a conscious act that *pauses* otherwise naturally occurring activity in order to investigate its *connectivity*. It is *not* an introspective act of isolating one's consciousness outside the world, but on the contrary, it is about *becoming aware* of our physical, social and cultural ties to the world, and of how our beliefs relate to reality. Husserl compared phenomenology to geometry as an *eidetic* science, for both of them include the investigation of eidetic objects, i.e. *essences*, and their necessary structural features. *Temporality* and *intentionality* are examples of such essential structural elements of experience. Quantities or inductive generalizations are not important, for both geometric and phenomenological method are instead interested in eidetic variation of differences between the individual cases of exemplary significance. The fixed nature of mathematical units in geometry however differs from the temporally *open flow* of experiencing, which sets a distinct challenge to phenomenology. It is nevertheless important to attempt to achieve utmost precision when describing the qualitatively multifaceted field of



experiences in the empirical world of temporal and spatial manifestations. Merleau-Ponty defined phenomenology as the “architecture of experience”, whereas the perceived essences resemble *styles* rather than fixed objects. Phenomenology has a particular kind of relationship towards other empirical and formal sciences, and as Husserl argued on many occasions, philosophical phenomenology is distinct but *not* disconnected from them, because it studies their *foundational* conditions and ideas that they rely upon. Philosophy and special sciences share a *theoretical stance* toward the *actual* and the *possible* of the world. The task of philosophy, however, is *not* to solve practical problems, but to study the *elementary meaning* of special scientific accounts. Philosopher’s task is thus to present radical questions that render us aware of the constitutional nature of reality, and *our part* in its constitution. (Heinämaa 2000b, 73–82).

When it comes to the distinctive phenomenological *style and format of writing*, David Cerbone (2017) elaborates that it is not concerned with providing information in a textbook manner, but aims ‘to facilitate a kind of recognition on the part of the reader’ (2017, 296). In other words, phenomenological writing invites the reader, in a way, to practice phenomenology: to *recover* her own thoughts in the text and *confirm* the insights for herself. Cerbone finds some similar philosophical intentions of evoking personal discovery in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (1921), and moreover argues that the theme of *recognition* and the kind of *self-discovery* are specifically central to understanding what *doing* phenomenology is all about. According to Husserl, the subject matter of phenomenology is *invisible* to the *natural attitude* that we’re in when we are ordinarily occupied with everyday objects and affairs, and simply accept or reject their informational relevance to us. But we can change our attentional focus by a reflective phenomenological *turn away* from those objects of experience toward revealing the ‘*sense-bestowing world of phenomena*’ intimated in one’s *experience* of them. As Cerbone explicates:

Although the processes Husserl seeks to delineate are ‘invisible’ from the standpoint of the natural attitude, they are nonetheless *there to be seen* in a way that causal processes, for example, are not. In being led to such processes by reflection, I am being *led back* to something that I recognize as having been operative in my experience all along. (Cerbone 2017, 303, emphasis original).

The natural and phenomenological attitudes do not exist in a continuum, that is, the latter does not simply follow from the former, but instead requires a *change* in consciousness. The natural attitude may endorse naïve kind of reflections that are not yet *radical* enough to be accounted for as phenomenological or transcendental. Merely thinking *about* oneself in the naïve sense does not suffice, for phenomenological reduction relies upon more active self-objectification as thinking *for* oneself. However, as Cerbone demonstrates, in following the modern philosophical initiatives of Descartes and Eugen Fink’s phenomenological elaboration, reflection in the natural attitude can still produce the motives or ‘extreme situations’ conducive for the momentary *flashes* of ‘transcendental cognition’. Cerbone also relates the problem of

differentiating the natural and the phenomenological attitudes to Heidegger's notion of the *transition* from being *lost in everydayness* toward *authenticity* of being itself, which represents his attempt to bridge the gap in-between through grounding both views to the facticity of lived existence. The natural attitude or 'everydayness' still presented a problem for Heidegger:

Dasein, as *inauthentic*, is variously *fallen, dispersed, and tranquilized*, busily *absorbed* in its tasks, and both *curious* and *fascinated* by the endless *novelty* and *ambiguity* of what surrounds it." (Cerbone 2017, 312, emphasis original).

In Heidegger's account, the transition to the authenticity of being may be achieved through *radical ontological disruptions* – similar to the 'flashes of transcendental cognition' – that differ from everyday complacency and absorption, and which he articulated with concepts like *anxiety, being-towards-death, guilt, and conscience*. In both Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological accounts then, according to Cerbone, the attitudinal problem remains, and extends to personally concern the reader of phenomenological writings. If the reader fails to subjectively engage oneself with what is written, and does not intuitively recognize or take notice on the hidden steps and moves for herself *within* a phenomenological perspective, such texts may be seen at best only superficially comprehensible. (Cerbone, 295-305, 312-314).

While the 'impersonal' or 'disembodied' natural scientific format may well suffice the objectively oriented scientific tasks of acquiring and disseminating theoretical information, it is arguably important to appreciate the fact that there are also other forms of reading, writing, and conducting inquiries pertaining to other *epistemic traditions*, such as phenomenology. As a counter-example of a dogmatic preference toward the natural scientific format and the naturalistic attitude of study, consider the following passages from J. B. Watson, who was a founding figure of behaviorist psychology, and a strong believer in naturalism:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation. (Watson 1913, 158)

I feel that *behaviorism* is the only consistent and logical functionalism. In it one avoids both the Scylla of parallelism and the Charybdis of interaction. Those time-honored relics of philosophical speculation need trouble the student of behavior as little as they trouble the student of physics. The consideration of the mind-body problem affects neither the type of problem selected nor the formulation of the solution of that problem. I can state my position here no better than by saying that I should like to bring my students up in the same ignorance of such hypotheses as one finds among the students of other branches of science. (Watson 1913, 166, emphasis original)

The plans which I most favor for psychology lead practically to the ignoring of consciousness in the sense that that term is used by psychologists today. I have virtually denied that this realm of psychics is open to experimental investigation. I don't wish to go further into the problem at present because it leads inevitably over into metaphysics. If you will grant the behaviorist the right to use consciousness in the same way that other natural scientists employ it—that is, without making consciousness a special object of observation—you have granted all that my thesis requires. (Watson 1913, 175)

Watson was a prominent 20<sup>th</sup> century proponent for *the mechanization of human conscious life*, and he found application to his mechanistic ideas also as an executive in an advertisement firm. Behaviorism has long since been refuted as a stance in psychology, and largely so along the rise of cognitive science. Behaviorist ideas, however, have gone through a peculiar 21<sup>st</sup> century revival, and reappeared in other fields of study, such as in economics (as further elaborated later on). It is hence worth to make a revisit to Watson's initial claims, which arguably ought to remain as a *cautionary* reference from the past.

When studying the foundational differences of phenomenological and empirical scientific traditions of thought, it is possible to detect a certain kind of *productive tension* that may also be conducive to fruitful exchange between them. In practice it still often seems to be the case that their inherent differences are keeping them apart and generally widening the gap between philosophy and sciences. Daniel Dennett, for example, insists upon the natural scientific parameters and vocabulary in the study of human consciousness. He sees the Husserlian phenomenological method as introspective “autophenomenology”, and has thereby formulated a third-person “heterophenomenology” framework for studying first-person phenomena with a “simple twist” that better suits the objectivist natural scientific preferences, of what he terms as the “business-as-usual science” (Dennett 2013, 342, 353). There is an apparent interest toward phenomenological philosophical concepts in different human and social scientific domains, yet the insights are not always apperceived or readily appreciated with due regard to original phenomenological terms of inquiry. The project of ‘naturalizing phenomenology’ represents one such ambitious, yet also problematic contemporary attempt of joining phenomenology with the empirical sciences. The main difficulties of this project can be connected to the *strong* forms of naturalism and *scientism* that are solely predicated on translating the phenomenological insights into natural scientific language, and premised on expanding an all-encompassing scientific worldview.

### 2.3 Naturalistic solution to the hard problem of consciousness

David Chalmers (1995) proposed human *experience* as the “hard problem of consciousness” that cannot be easily explained away through the standard materialistic models, particularly in light of the difficulties in “bridging the gap between cognition and experience”. Francisco Varela (1996), in turn, argued

that this problem could only be properly addressed by turning to the continental tradition and methodology of phenomenology. That is, by radically changing the whole framework of cognitive scientific discussions and gain insight on the *structures* of human experience, instead of figuring out “yet another abstract, theoretical model” or “piecemeal empirical correlates”. He chose to use the term ‘neurophenomenology’ to designate the project of combining the cognitive sciences (including the psychological and evolutionary correlates in addition to the neurological) and the method of phenomenology, as a pragmatic research strategy that significantly differs from the Anglo-American ‘neurophilosophy’. Varela identified a diverse group within the cognitive sciences that already shared an explicit concern for the first-person experiential accounts, yet lacked the practical means to actually take it into consideration in a fertile manner in relation to the traditional empirical scientific accounts. Varela also refuted the work of Hubert Dreyfus who was an early proponent of phenomenology in the cognitive scientific community, for his “misleading, cognitivist and seriously flawed” interpretation of Husserl, and phenomenology in general. Varela anticipated that adopting the phenomenological research strategy on its own terms would be unthinkable for many, especially to those with persistent functionalist inclinations. In contrast to the traditional cognitive scientific *representationalism* that posits an *outside* world as a mental representation to the *inside* mind through sensory-perceptual devices, phenomenology approaches the world and the mind as *mutually overlapping*. The *embodied, extended, embedded* and *enacted* cognitive scientific projects are consequently the kind that attempt to adopt the latter orientation. They also tend to reject the usual *first-person – third person* -opposition as a misleading categorization. Varela himself, perhaps necessarily for the intended audience, still talked about the cognitive scientific stand as ‘external’, and rather categorically separated the notions of ‘science’ and ‘experience’. While he aimed to advocate radical changes and transformations in the *attitudes, styles* and *values* of the cognitive scientific research community, Varela also recognized the major challenges of his proposed program due to the long-standing tradition of *objectivist* science that also provides a certain kind of *cultural identity*, in addition to the particular kind of scientific training. (Varela 1996).

Roy, Petitot, Pachoud and Varela (1999) described their project of naturalizing phenomenology as an attempt to integrate phenomenology and cognitive science, by connecting the idea of *phenomenality*, i.e. the notion that things have *appearances* in human cognition, into a natural scientific explanatory framework. They aimed to reorient Husserlian anti-naturalism in line with the naturalist perspective, and close the “explanatory gap” that has long troubled the cognitive science community and has already urged various analyses and formulations. “Explanatory gap” was named as such by Levine (1983), who argued that psycho-physical identity statements of materialism should be epistemologically, rather than metaphysically problematized. According to Thompson (2010), it is ‘the gap’ between biological life and consciousness of the mind, and which can be seen as existing in a kind of *continuum*, for both the life

and the mind share similar *self-organizing*, or 'autopoietic' features, which can be revealed through phenomenological investigations. The problem of the gap, as Roy and others (1999) see it, concerns the relation of cognitive science to 'phenomenological data', i.e. the *contents* of consciousness and experience. Their problematization also indicates the failures of cognitive science to account for the fuller range of mental phenomenal qualities beyond the physicalist view of explaining cognitive functions and behavioural data. Hence with regard to *behaviorism*, it is important to note that the historical emergence of cognitive science as a field in response to behaviorism signified only a partial break with behaviorist ideas: cognitivists shifted the focus toward the cognitive capacities *inside* the organism, while retaining the interest in objectivist investigation of behaviors. The assumption remained that the various 'information processing' activities can be explicitly assimilated in systemic and functional terms, from the biological to the abstract levels of postulating entities. Roy and others outline the three major trends in cognitive science since the inception of the field in the 1950's: (1) the initially dominant *computationalist-symbolic* approach, (2) the *connectivist-dynamic* reformulation, and (3) the *embodied-enactive* view that has been gaining more ground in recent decades. The authors themselves are representatives of the third group, which is the most advanced in terms of phenomenological imports. They attempt to tackle the contrast between the objectivist-functionalist explications of the 'cognitive mind' that seem to stand in opposition to the 'phenomenological mind', which in their view broadly concerns the experiential realm of "*what is it like to be a cognizing mind*". The authors claim that the 'explanatory gap' will persist unabridged if cognitive science provides only a theory (hypothesis) of the *mind* without developing the theory of *consciousness* (see also Revonsuo 2010) that intrinsically includes the phenomenality and intentionality of subjective experiencing. Their apprehension of 'phenomenological data' involves a division of mental phenomena as internal or external, the definition of consciousness in terms of awareness, and between self-consciousness and object-consciousness. These are among the analytical tools by which they seek to extend the notion of naturalization to a broader range of mental phenomena. In other words, they attempt to capture the internal events, emotional states and interactive processes involved in the "*phenomenalization of reality*" into the scientific framework of knowledge. (Roy, Petitot, Pachoud & Varela 1999, 1-11).

Dan Zahavi (2004) finds the lines of argumentation in Roy and others' (1999) research manifest as fundamentally problematic, crucially because they seem to altogether discard the Husserlian anti-naturalistic notion of *transcendental subjectivity*, that is, a *different way* to conceive the same subject of research, and not some 'otherworldly mysticism' that it is often erroneously assumed to denote. He suggests, however, another phenomenological approach to consciousness – *phenomenological psychology* – which is descriptive, non-reductionist, eidetic and intentional, yet remains within the natural attitude and may thus commune better with the positive sciences than the transcendental philosophical stance that inherently opposes naturalization (see also Perttula &

Latomaa 2008; Latomaa & Suorsa 2011). But as Zahavi notes, some of the most interesting and relevant aspects of investigating the conscious life may be *lost* by missing the transcendental *critical* philosophical dimension. In conclusion, Zahavi does not refute the idea of philosophical and scientific collaboration, but encourages '*reexamining and revising the dichotomy between the empirical and the transcendental*' (2004, 344). Matthew Ratcliffe (2009) also provides some counterarguments from the philosophical point of view regarding the naturalization project of Roy and others (1999). He elaborates that 'naturalism' is often loosely applied to various doctrines, but it can be specifically identified, 1) by the *epistemological* thesis that empirical scientific methodology is the sole and primary way to acquire knowledge about *everything* in the world, and 2) by the *metaphysical* thesis that there are no other kinds of objects, properties or relations in the world than those posited by causal empirical scientific theories. The doctrine of naturalization thus entails the acceptance of an all-encompassing scientific worldview that seeks to integrate every aspect of the world and understanding systematically under the empirical scientific standpoint. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, contest the *authoritative* accounts of naturalism, and generally hold the view that empirical scientific knowledge is *not* to be understood as equal to our *most fundamental understanding* of the world that *precedes* all scientific explanations. This *lifeworld*, as Husserl stated, is always *presupposed* in all our instrumental attempts of practical or theoretical organization. The lifeworld is *always already* there, as can be consciously discovered through phenomenological inquiries, and it always already remains regardless of whether we misinterpret, or quietly forget about it. As Merleau-Ponty also agreed, restricting inquiry to empirical sciences is *a failure to recognize* the fundamental ground that all interpretative efforts depend upon, which also implies an unnecessary *confusion*. While phenomenology rejects naturalism, it accepts scientific accounts as such, although the interaction between science and phenomenology has often proved to be problematic. Ratcliffe is most concerned with the illegitimately *inflexible* manner that Roy and others assume to 'surrender' phenomenology to naturalism: they 'extract' descriptive insights from the phenomenological philosophical context, which are then reconstructed and explained with naturalistic models according to the cognitive scientific agenda - that does not itself undergo any ontological or epistemological *re-interpretative* procedures in the process. Ratcliffe states that this leaves the troubling conclusion that "one is simply being put to work to serve the other", rather than representing "an ongoing process of *mutual reinterpretation*" which could be possible as well. (Ratcliffe 2009, 329-332).

The naturalistic inclinations in contemporary cognitive science can be traced back to the natural scientific orientation of psychology that has dominated the conception of the field from 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards. Wilhelm Dilthey was among the first counteractive thinkers who saw that the field of psychology needed a shift toward the humanities to account for the subjective experiential dimension. Yet it was Edmund Husserl who gave the most developed and prominent arguments on behalf of differentiating the *ideal*

structures of reasoning as irreducible to *factual* psychological processes, firstly against *psychologism* that posited empirical grounds as the cause for all psychic phenomena. According to Husserl, ideality should be maintained with an 'unnatural' epistemological interest toward the very *possibilities of knowing*, in order to reflect upon the intentional experiential structures of the subjective *acts of knowing*, as distinct in relation to the *objects of knowledge*. While sharing the interest toward consciousness, phenomenology is not concerned with the empirical nature of the psyche like psychological sciences typically are, hence it does not seek to naturalize, objectify or psychologize experiences. Cognitive scientist often still (mis)take phenomenology as the mere performance of introspective first-person descriptions, on 'what is it like' to experience something as a natural occurrence in the psycho-physical sense. Intentionality thus understood remains naturalistic, as in Brentano's (1847) work on the foundations for psychology. While being influenced by Brentano, Husserl formulated his new method of phenomenology to account for the *transcendental* dimension of subjectivity, as a non-psychological perspective *within* subjectivity aside the naturalized one, that is, the realm which is still largely *unrecognized* by the accounts that take intellectual lead strongly from naturalism. Both Husserl and Heidegger insisted that philosophy does not contest the reality or existence of the natural, social or cultural worlds, but it has its *own aims of investigation* that are not to be identified with naturalistic presuppositions. Positive sciences are necessarily preoccupied with the world and its objects as given, while phenomenology clarifies *the ways of givenness*, as an *appearance of something for someone*, as a subjective accomplishment. As Zahavi (2009, 256) elaborates:

If we wish to understand how physical objects, mathematical models, chemical processes, social relations or cultural products can appear as they do and with the meaning they have, then we will also have to examine the subject to whom they appear. When we encounter perceived, judged, evaluated objects, a thorough philosophical examination of these objects will lead us to the experiential structures which these modes of appearance are correlated with. We will be led to the acts of presentation, perception, judgment and valuation, and thereby to the subject (or subjects) which the object as appearing must necessarily be understood in relation to.

Husserl's phenomenological conception of transcendental philosophy starts from the evidence of concrete first-person experience of the world, and thus departs from the Kantian logically principled path of an isolated ego. He was extending the traditional Kantian understanding of transcendental analysis toward *transcendental intersubjectivity*, including the necessary 'mundane' aspects of worldly existence, like body (*embodiment*) and culture (*socialization*). Phenomenological transcendental analysis thus attempts to integrate the empirical-factual and the transcendental perspectives in *complementary co-existence*. As Merleau-Ponty has noted, this attitude is found at the core in both Husserl and Heidegger, so contrasting the two authors in this sense is rather futile. In brief, the topical relation between phenomenology and science can be summarized as follows: transcendental and empirical sciences of consciousness

share the *content* of investigation, but they *foundationally* differ in their *attitude* toward the human mind, consciousness and experience. (Zahavi 2009, 247-262).

## 2.4 The phenomenology and neuroscience of intersubjectivity

There are several possible intersecting points of exchange between neuroscientific discoveries and phenomenology, particularly regarding the study of *interpersonal* relations, and the ways we seek to gain 'access' to other minds. Instead of employing the standard reductionist model of cognitive neurosciences that basically ignores the environmental and the lived bodily embeddedness of the brain, Fuchs (2011) suggests that we can adopt a more relational *ecological* view of the brain as a *mediating organ*, and not as the sole mechanistic origin of the mind. Advanced technologies and methods (e.g. MEG, TMS, PET, fMRI) of brain- and neurosciences provide image-based systematic empirical evidence concerning the structures and patterns of conscious life that phenomenologists have been articulating in theory (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 5).

Dieter Lohmar (2006), for example, takes a cue from the neurological findings of *mirror neurons*, and translates them phenomenologically as an internal view on *co-feeling* through concrete bodily sensations and movements. The mirror neurons were originally discovered in non-human primates (by Rizzolatti, Gallese and colleagues around 1995) as a *pattern* of premotor cortex neuronal activity that was analogous in relation to one's particular bodily movements, and to those provoked by the visual sight of the same moves performed by another animal. The mirror neuron activation in the respective brain areas was weaker in intensity when animals observed other animals, than when conducting the same action themselves, and interestingly occurred only in case of *purposeful action* that contained visible action goals. Lohmar suggests that the discovery of mirror neurons presents an inspiring challenge for further deepening the descriptive phenomenological analyses on the experiential side of intersubjectivity, in bringing forth *useful hypothesis* and contributions for interpreting neurological and empirical psychological findings as an addition to the third-person observational accounts. Phenomenological descriptions could then also be broadened in scope from the *kinaesthetic* experience of movements to the *experience of purposive actions* as a whole, that is, to the deeper levels of *seeing* the aims, feelings and volitions, when we visually register the actions and goals of others. Lohmar argues that co-experiencing (co-feeling, co-sensing, co-acting, co-willing etc.) in the "*phantasmatic*" whole of *sense-bearing intentions* in the "*as if*" mode is always weaker than the "*full*" self-performative mode that is the more *intensive* and *real* base of one's own personal experience. Lohmar's phantasms -thesis of co-experiencing applies also in our relation to animals since it does not posit reliance on conceptual knowledge or linguistic ability as the basis of interaction and interpretation, in order to *have an idea of what is going on in the other mind*. In this view, our personal capacities of co-experiencing develop according to the development of our personal experiences in the *strong*



sense, and they can encompass all dimensions of experience in the less-intensely felt phantasmatic “co-mode” that is also more amenable to *self-regulative* control. Experiencing “co-action”, e.g. when watching movies, is not the same as real action, and it does not necessarily lead to real action either. Lohmar’s central proposition is that the discovery of mirror neurons, seen together with the phenomenon of *phantasmatic co-experiencing*, demonstrate that we readily have these action tendencies and indications of *equal bodily standing* with the other human and the many non-human animals. (Lohmar 2006).

Ratcliffe (2009) presents the foundational philosophical reasoning on behalf of phenomenological interpretation regarding the evidence of mirror neurons in humans, and its particular indications for a more *primary* understanding on intersubjectivity, than elaborated in terms of “theory-theory” or “simulation-theory” on interpersonal relations. He firstly notes the neuronal discovery that *human* mirror system seem to be already more receptive to *all* postural changes and physical movements, whereas primate mirror neuron system remains specifically responsive to the *teleological* goal structures of action, to different *kinds* of action and to the *manner* or *style* that goals are achieved. Furthermore, in humans, mirror neurons are suggested to support our abilities of recognizing the variety of facial expressions, and the role of our ability to *imitate* for developing verbal communication skills. Ratcliffe argues that Husserlian phenomenology can be seen as *interactive* in relation to mirror neuron research and that they are complementary in showing how all accounts of intersubjectivity depend on *personally engaged*, perceptual and affective awareness of others as purposive animate agents, such as oneself: ‘*Mirror neurons, if they facilitate an inter-modal bridge between perception and action, show how an understanding of others can rest upon a shared, practical, bodily, affective togetherness.*’ (2009, 334-335). This perceptual appreciation, *pre-theoretical* awareness, and bodily *givenness* of the agency of others is *already* experienced and hence primary to any secondary formulation of abstract theorizing, whether assigned by way of inference, analogy or simulation. Ratcliffe suggests that these grounds of intersubjectivity can also be used in questioning the inflexible naturalistic assumptions that exclusively favor the epistemic standpoint of *theoretical detachment*, as if our *cognitive processes* were simply a *means* to reveal objective entities, instead of being an object of inquiry in itself. Adopting the epistemically detached and ontologically objectivist naturalistic worldview typically implies ignoring the ‘personal stance’ that is *self-engaged*, directly *practical* and *interactive* in relation to others, as also in terms of one’s own sense of agency. However, the actual complementarity between the neurophysiological findings and phenomenological descriptions on intersubjective experience, as Ratcliffe points out, demonstrate the value of the latter orientation as a rich ‘directive and interpretative framework’ for scientific experiments - that may in turn clarify the *nature* of phenomena that phenomenology attends to describe. (Ratcliffe 2009, 332-342).

## 2.5 The mundane and radical empathic apperception

The problem of empathy is basically concerned with discerning *how we come to understand – and are shaped by – the other minds and bodies*. Edith Stein (1917) wrote a comprehensive phenomenological analysis on empathy, as concerning “*the basic nature of acts in which data of foreign experience is comprehended*” (1917, p. 6). According to her thesis, the problem of empathy is to be approached from the standpoint of *embodiment*, that can be seen as the intertwined relation between an “I” and the “living body” as a subjective constitution of a *psycho-physical unity*. Empathic comprehension of ourselves as embodied beings is hence the very basis from which we can begin to empathize with the mental states or the somatic sensations of other living beings. Positive sciences, in turn, typically posit an artificial unity of the world and exclude the distinct issues of embodiment and empathy from their equations. As Ratcliffe (2011) remarks, phenomenology is definitely not anti-scientific as such and it can still be seen as *compatible* with *weaker* notions of naturalism which can adequately acknowledge the distinctive role of phenomenology in relation to science, and specifically, can recognize the *contingency of the ways of being* at the basis of empirical human sciences. He defines the common anti-naturalist position of the different strands of phenomenology as an attempt to *cease presupposing a background sense of belonging to a shared world in which some things ‘are’ and others ‘are not’* (2011, 34). Instead of complementing or enhancing any abstracted view of the world that claims to be unitarily fixed, phenomenology complicates the issue by explicating the *concrete plurality* of views and ways of being in the world:

Hence, phenomenology facilitates a heightened appreciation of the ways in which and the extent to which other people’s experience of the world can differ from one’s own. It stretches the bounds of empathy, enabling what we might call a kind of “radical empathy” – an ability to suspend the world that one ordinarily takes as a backdrop for interpersonal interpretation, so as to engage with forms of experience that depart substantially from one’s own.” (Ratcliffe 2011, 34).

The two previously mentioned, main strands of cognitive scientific theories on interpersonal understanding suggests that we either have a mainly *tacit* ability to deploy domain-specific conceptual knowledge (theory-theory), or rather a conscious ability to *simulate* and use our cognitive resources (simulation-theory), to understand, replicate or model other people’s *mental states*. Dennett, for example, suggests that all first-person accounts of experience should be taken as “fictional narratives” than can be objectively explained from the third-person perspective. Similar to other objectivist approaches to experience, Dennett’s heterophenomenological stance naturally assumes the world as a background of experiencing that is one and the same for everyone. Phenomenology, on the other hand, can *open* and *expand* the articulation also regarding the interpersonal realm, with more nuanced inquiries through empathic apperception of *alien worlds* from *the second-person-perspective* of

otherness. In joining the lines of Husserl, Scheler, Stein and Zahavi on the subject, Ratcliffe (2012) further argues, that the phenomenological method enables a distinctive form of empathy that can be characterized as *radical*. Radical empathy differs from “mundane empathy” by employing the *attitude* that is specifically appreciative of the distinction between *the self* and *the other*. It becomes operative when we suspend the habitual acceptance of the world as a unified background, and become more engaged and receptive to *other* people’s personal experience in the world *as theirs*. As Stein (1989/1917) already remarked, empathy is not simply a matter of first-person projection, nor “emotional contagion” that arrives to a comprehensive “*feeling of oneness*”. Moreover, empathy can possibly occur in relation to fictive characters as well when we’re engaging with a written text, for instance. As Ratcliffe suggests, radical empathy involves a *wilful openness to be affected by others*, and this self-affecting propensity enables the experiential possibilities of *self-transformation* that phenomenologists generally see as potentially present in all kinds of interpersonal encounters. They do *not* assume, however, that possibilities are *equally* experienced as similarly present, seen or felt by everyone, or at all times. Many experiential states of mental disorder, like *depression*, can fundamentally *alter* the whole *background sense* of inhabiting the world, in a way that induces a felt sense of temporal stagnation, and the overall diminished sense of possibilities that radically affects one’s perception of the interpersonal field as a space of possibilities as well. (Ratcliffe 2012; 2015). Moreover, a recent study suggests that the use of antidepressant medication, not depression in itself, diminishes the ability to empathize with the pain of others (Rütgen et. al 2019). When human emotionality and goal-oriented action are seen as intimately intertwined processes, the lived experience of depression can also be understood as an *impairment of agency* (Slaby & Paskaleva, A. & Stephan 2013).

Phenomenological inquiries, in the sense of radical empathic apperception, can thus remind us that we all inhabit a unique backdrop of experiencing, and that we can also learn to appreciate, in the fundamental experiential sense, the other ways of seeing and being in the world. They can be more carefully discerned also through recognizing the *interaffectivity* and *intercorporeality* of socially situated agentic interactions, whereas it is “*mainly bodily resonance* which conveys an intuitive understanding of other’s emotions in our embodied engagement with them. ” (Fuchs 2017, 3, emphasis original). In following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty defined intercorporeality as the pre-reflective *carnal* foundation and condition of possibility for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that mainly refers to the shared relations and understandings between the minds of subjects (Meyer, Streeck & Jordan 2017). As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, 168) remark, intersubjectivity is “*primarily an encounter between agents*”, whereas agency is not just a designated social role, entity, function or a privileged propensity to act, but can be most originally understood as a *mode of relating* in different domains of practical significance.

## 2.6 Self-agency in relation to embodiment, emotions and affects

The problem of agency and how it relates to different types and modes of action is not without theoretical or philosophical interest, although it is often narrowly conceived in terms of practical objectives or physical causation. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) concur, our everyday life, the lifeworld, or *being-in-the-world*, as Heidegger termed it, is largely driven, defined and structured by various *practical* and *social* concerns, references and contexts of use. The perceived practicalities, or *tools of value* that concern us, render us aware of something as “present” or “absent”, as “here” or “there”, in the *spatial* sense of using the term. Our actions are also *guided by norms*, i.e. what is socially seen or agreed as the “normal”, as in differentiating the “right” and “wrong” ways of doing something. The immense complexity of the relations and patterns that contribute to the *meaning* of any particular action in a *lived situation*, and moreover to the sense of agentic action, can hardly be reduced to a mere stimulus-response -mechanism. Gallagher and Zahavi also contest the view of Hubert Dreyfus, for disputing the phenomenology of agency, for he has suggested that subjectivity and self-conscious awareness somehow disappears in “absorbed coping” when we are completely engaged and immersed in worldly affairs and activities. Only the brain’s detection of errors or significant disruptions, according to Dreyfus, can then awaken the *mindful* consciousness or the conscious mode of experiencing in place of the automated stream of processing signals from the environment. In contrast to this view, Gallagher and Zahavi define the sense of agency as essentially depending on the agent’s consciousness of agency, which includes even the thin pre-reflective forms of awareness of being engaged in intentional action. All actions, in this view, are *intentional movements* that are directed by some kind of a *goal*, which can also be the action in itself. When we’re interested in the explanations or the rationality behind a certain pattern of action, we should firstly differentiate between the *personal reasons* that *motivate* and *justify* action, and the *subpersonal* (e.g. neuronal) explanations that point towards the *physical causation* of action. The action motivating reasons that are deemed personal, are also always further complicated by the *normative* dimension of social living, so If we aim to gain a better understanding on human reasoning and action, we should know about the cultural settings and the social arrangements that are shared in the society or social group in question. As Gallagher and Zahavi remark (*ibid.*, p. 176): “*The rationality of behaviour is not given a deeper explanation by specifying the involved neural facts.*” The information gained of subpersonal processes contribute to the overall framework of knowledge, but they do not clarify the meanings and motivations involved. (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, 171-172, 174-177).

There is also a difference between the pre-reflective *experiential sense of agency* that occurs at the basic first-order level of consciousness, and the secondary higher-order level of the *attribution of agency* that depends on the first level. The first-order experiencing is embodied and temporal in anticipation and fulfilment of movements in a non-conceptual manner. Another central

distinction can be made between the *sense of agency for action* and the *sense of ownership for movement*, which are normally experienced as closely coincidental. Deviation to the normal state of these senses, like in a sudden involuntary loss of kinaesthetic control, if you're pushed over from behind and fall down, for instance, can evoke a more consciously perceptive notions of self-agency or ownership of movement, along with the motivation to restore them. Certain psychiatric disorders, like schizophrenia, can also notably alter the attributions of ownership and authority in relation to one's actions. Proponents of the *radical top-down* view, like Daniel Dennet, propose that the sense of agency is primarily constructed as a conceptual level attribution that depends on our second-order retrospective or prospective interpretations, beliefs and desires. The *bottom-up* account, in contrast, starts with the phenomenal first-order sense of experiencing agency, and the *most* radical bottom-up explanatory accounts are further attempting to link neural processes and the efferent signals (*from brain to body*) as the originating source of experiencing agency. There are also the *intentional* theories that focus on the reflective level and realm of intentional action, e.g. when explicating the pathological cases, such as when experientially losing the sense of agency. It is altogether reasonable to assume that there are *multiple* levels, directions and processes of feedback involved: the efferent, the afferent (*from body to brain*) and the intentional. It is still beneficial to know how the different explanatory frameworks actually *differ*, since there are several difficulties and inadequacies, for instance, when subpersonal causal or neuronal explanations are *projected* to the experiential level of consciousness. At the level of experiencing, we are already intentionally *action-situated* agents in the world of "organized usefulness" that we can most of the time *immediately recognize* in a non-inferential manner. (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 179-182, 186-189).

The body is a central element in traditional as well as in contemporary phenomenological discussions, and one of the areas where natural scientific and phenomenological accounts quite notably differ when approaching the subject matter of the body and its constitution. As Heinämaa (2011) argues, Edmund Husserl's classic account provides a valid foundation for all phenomenological studies, also regarding the notions of the body and embodiment. Husserl was early on attentive to the world of *sensations* and *movements*, of how the lived body is given to us in the level of concrete experiences. He emphasized it as a fundamentally subjective phenomenon that has *expressive* and *communicative* value in everyday practical life. He was also aware of how natural sciences approached the *physicality* of human beings in terms of spatial objects, as purposefully separated from their *unique historicity* and *emotive relations* in their lifeworld. Husserl stated that the aim of phenomenology was to attend to these aspects of human life that were disregarded or taken for granted by natural sciences, and proceeded to make a clear distinction between the two very different but complementary orientations: the *personalistic* and the *naturalistic*. Husserl apprehended the naturalistic separation between the mind and the body as an artificial abstraction, for we primarily experience ourselves as *expressive wholes*, and

perceive ourselves and others with the modes of immediate or mediated givenness. One's own *lived body* (*Leib*) is necessarily a primary experiential constitution, through which the apperception of other living beings becomes possible. We are able to perceive ourselves and others also as dimensional physical organisms (*Körper*), but as embodied beings we connect with others through *empathic transfer*. In the classical phenomenological account, the perceiving body, and the body that is perceived, are composed with two kinds of sensations: *presentational* (vision, touch) and *kinaesthetic* (movement). The task for phenomenological research is to study these *constitutive sensory structures* of human understanding, and specifically their *possibilities* and *boundaries*. We may concretely or imaginatively distance ourselves from others, for instance, but we are bound to our own lived body, which to some extent remains a mystery for us. One's lived body is nevertheless the main multisensory instrument for intersubjective understanding, and necessary *elementary base* for all - personalistic *and* naturalistic - human scientific inquiries. (Heinämaa 2011). The *double sensation* of human bodily perception also applies to our intercorporeal understanding of other acting animate bodies, which Meyer, Streeck & Jordan (2017) describe in terms of the 'ego' and the 'alter' as follows:

The existential given of being a body – this, *my* body – can be extended – prolonged – not only as conjectural interpretation, but as real experience, into *alter's* body. And while *ego* extends into *alter*, *alter* simultaneously extends into *ego*. This, in our view, is the central and seemingly paradoxical property of intercorporeality: that as humans we are able not only to embody the other while the other simultaneously embodies us, but also embody ourselves in the same way we embody the other. Our body can be a subject or object for us in the same way as the other can be one." (Meyer, Streeck & Jordan 2017, p. xx, emphasis original):

Husserl's disciple Edith Stein approached embodiment as a phenomenological question of *how my living body is constituted in consciousness; as how and what is it given to us?* (Stein 1989/1817 p. 41). Her thesis on empathy concerned also the topical issues of embodiment: of the 'fusion' of soul and body; and of *how the pure "I" is related to the empirical "I" in a living body*, which is also a question concerning *the ontological problem of how an extended substance is related to a non-extended one* (ibid. p. xx). Stein describes the phenomenological standpoint on embodiment as the constitution of a *psycho-physical unity*, as seen distinctly differentiated from the empirical causality models in the natural sciences. The living body is thus phenomenologically approached as a '*scene of manifold sensations*' that are perceived in and through the body, and while there is a special givenness in the bond between "I" and "my body", that cannot be escaped - there is yet *freedom afforded by movement*, as concerning the unfolding disclosures of the world. These 'moves' however, can occur in fantasy as in reality, so in a way it is possible for me to "leave my body" through the acts of imagination. Yet essentially, a body without an "I" is a corpse, so psychic and somatic experiences are thus not divided but always reciprocally co-dependent. There are many possible themes that can be further elaborated after Stein's thesis on empathy, such as "*the relationship between feelings and their expression*", the

different “ways of unloading the energy of feeling”, and generally on the close relation that feelings have with action, motivation and will, through discerning how the “will externalizes itself in action”. (Stein 1989/1917, 3-6; 39-55).

Cognitive scientific accounts on emotional life usually posit the individual as an actively self-determining agent. One of the most salutary aspects of the advanced cognitive stances is that emotions and affects are not outright assumed or classified as simply “irrational”, but they are nowadays also seen as essential within human intelligence, as “*intelligent responses to the perception of value*” in acts of evaluation (Nussbaum 2001, p. 1). Hence emotions are no longer artificially contrasted with reason, which is partly due to neuroscientific discoveries and the popularized dissemination of knowledge based on the neurobiological accounts on human behaviour (see e.g. Damasio 1994; 2018; Sapolsky 2017). The role that human emotionality partakes in *cognitive appraisals* is generally seen as indispensable to all forms of reasoning (Lazarus 1999).

Perhaps the most widely established psychological construct related to emotion regulation today is *emotional intelligence*. The concept of emotional intelligence (EI) was originally developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990) as a mental ability -based framework, for an academic study of “*a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one's life.*” Davies, Stankov & Roberts (1998) developed a four-dimensional emotional intelligence -model, comprised of: 1) appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself, 2) appraisal and expression of emotion in others, 3) regulation of emotion in oneself, and 4) use of emotion to facilitate performance. EI is also approached as a subset of social intelligence and it has been included among the group of “hot” intelligences that feature personal emotional salience and emotion related skills, as opposed to the “cool” standard intelligence. In addition to the more widely dispersed popularized accounts (after Goleman 1995), emotional intelligence is a topic of social psychological research interest particularly in the organizational behavior (OB) and management psychological domains. Emotional intelligence has been compared and differentiated from personality traits that are typically measured with the ‘Big Five’ -scale (McCrae & Costa 1987). EI has been developed as an ability -based construct, which also makes it an attractive construct for competence measurement, testing, peer review, and training, e.g. in relation to job performance (Law, Wong & Song 2004; Ashkanasy & Daus 2005 Mayer, Caruso & Salovey 2016). Emotion regulation in work and organizational settings, however, cannot be separated from the particular context and expectations related to the social function: of how emotions or emotional events are talked about, framed, used, or *abused*, in an organization (Lindebaum 2017; Lindebaum, Geddes & Jordan 2018). Goleman’s commercial rather than scientific construct of emotional intelligence has also been subjected to scholarly critique, e.g. for its use of extravagant, rationalist, masculine-gendered rhetoric, and the presupposed frame of business profitability and success (Fineman 2000b, 2004; Matthews, Zeidner & Roberts 2002 Lewis & Simpson 2007).

Emotional intelligence has also been studied in the field of criminal psychology and psychopathology. Investigating the individual differences in deception detection and display in facial expressions, Porter, ten Brinke, Baker and Wallace (2011) found that higher emotional intelligence, in the ability to perceive and express emotion, was related to more convincing deceptive *simulation* of emotional expressions. While this talent for emotional deception was also associated with *psychopathic* traits of interpersonal manipulation, the researchers found that psychopathy is negatively correlated with EI because they can be seen to reside at the opposite ends of an “affective continuum”. They also note that the *accuracy rate* regarding deception detection and credibility assessment is generally poor, which leaves room for emotional deceit with manipulative intent: “*Management of one’s emotional presentation may assist the psychopath in controlling the potential victim’s reaction, establishing and maintaining a coercive relationship*” (2011, 136). Baker, ten Brinke and Porter (2013) also discovered that some features of high EI were associated with impaired accuracy and overconfidence in detecting deceit from insincere expressions, which generally presents no harm when dealing with everyday trivial lies that mainly serve *social cohesion*, but when the deceit is connected to seriously harmful intent, the ‘generosity of trust’ can lead to serious damaging outcomes.

Phenomenological approach seek to discern the deeper *intentionality of emotions and affects*, firstly by revealing the structural *necessity* and *passivity* of emotions in view of the fundamentally *embodied*, and inherently *affective* core of subjectivity (Taipale 2014). Affectivity is also a *dynamic relational* force that can intersubjectively and culturally circulate in-between individuals, groups and collectives (Ahmed 2014; Slaby 2019). Phenomenological analyses can uncover the emotionality related to *sociality*, and clarify the situated, interpersonal and value-laden embeddedness of lived experience (Steinbock 2014; Szanto & Moran 2016; Drummond & Rinofner-Kreidl 2018). Such analyses can remind us that we cannot at all times correctly grasp the full meaning of emotions, e.g. we may be “carried away” and be “dispossessed” by them in states of passion (Maclaren 2011). The philosophical take on embodiment, emotions and affectivity, also enable us to recognize the notion of *agency* as already relationally shaped and intimately tied up with emotions, as ‘*acted-out engagements with the world*’ in varied modes, emphasis and intensities, thus clarifying the *action-* and *value-oriented* side of affectivity (Slaby & Wüschner 2014, 212). The concept of *embodiment* can also be seen as a *connecting paradigm* for interdisciplinary studies, for instance, on psychopathologies with enactive and ecological approaches in cognitive neuroscience (Fuchs & Schlimme 2009). It is also possible to combine phenomenological and analytical philosophical analyses together with social psychological research, for example, as Szanto’s (2018) elaboration on the affective intentionality of hatred as a collective level phenomenon demonstrates.

Agency and passion are also among the central themes of existentialist philosophy, which is typically traced back to Søren Kierkegaard, who was occupied with the *radical possibilities* of human agentic experiences. Yet existentialism is nowadays often seen as belonging to the cultural-historical past rather than in the present professional practice of philosophy. It has certain



philosophical and methodological affinities with phenomenology, especially due to its focus on the first-personal givenness of experience. Existential philosophers insist that there is an *irreducible asymmetry* between the first-person and the third-person, or rather *impersonal* “God-like” view of the world. They urge us to become aware of the ‘irreducible gap’ between experience as *lived*, and as *known*. The key question is “*the richness of the category of experience, and just how recalcitrant or divergent it is in relation to belief and knowledge*” (Reynolds & Stokes 2017, p. 331). Existentialism is less concerned with the *transcendental methodical* procedures of suspension for disclosing the structures of experiencing. Existentialists are more relentlessly preoccupied with situating the subject in the first-personal actuality of existence, particularly in relation to *transformative experiences* in “limit situations” (after Karl Jaspers) that hold most epistemic and emotive *power* to disclose the world to us. Existentialists emphasize the *ontological*, not the psychological, significance of emotions, feelings and moods, like passion, anxiety, shame and guilt, and they would reject any naturalistic account of *meaning* or *morality* as an inherently *inadequate* stance to approach such issues. (Reynolds & Stokes 2017, 317-320, 326-327-329).

## 2.7 Constitution of the natural and the cultural-historical worlds

Husserl’s *methodical* commitment to the first-person perspective always remained, and he saw *critical self-reflection* as the foremost procedure, also when approaching the question of communities and their constitution. According to Husserl, “transcendental subjectivity” never appears in isolation, but rather enables the possibility of subjective “transcendental communities”. The ontological base of communal life begins with our experience of the surrounding world that *necessarily* involves other subjects who also experience the world. In our shared experience, we are part of a communal subject that cannot be reduced to a single subjectivity. The most elementary human communality of *we* as a subject is thus universal. That is, until we find ourselves in, and acquire particular *normative* structures; conceptions and values, which differentiate and define ourselves in relation to various other communities and lifeworlds. Husserl also made a conceptual separation between the communal subject, and the irreducible cultural objects that were produced. In this view, the cultural-historical world as a whole is collectively generative *before* and *beyond* an individual, who is the subject *and* the object of culture; as the *modifier* and the *modified*. Husserl noted that all communal life is not equally *productive*, i.e. capable of sharing a goal and willful acts of creation, and thereby entailing some form of practical significance. He referred to the nation state as an example of such a higher order communal subject. Moreover, he saw it as a sovereign kind of *artificial* entity with a primary task of maintaining societal order. Husserl criticized the *egoistic conception of men* at the base of modern liberalism, because he saw that it precluded the possibility of *ethical communality*. He also stood against the notion that individual selfhood is mainly

'constructed' through social relations, but he emphasized that the constitution of meanings is in many ways dependent on sociality. (Miettinen 2010, 156-163).

While all the living creatures, human and animal, inhabit the same *natural world*, there is another kind of constitution of the world that is specifically human, that is the *cultural-historical world*. Heinämaa (2014) elaborates on this natural-cultural division by tracing Husserl's philosophy of intersubjectivity, and his account on the central differences between the natural and the cultural historical worlds, and how they relate to different *types of consciousness*. Firstly, in order to study the conditions of intersubjective experiencing, Husserl proposes a methodological reduction, in which we abstract our sense of others and begin with our own lived bodiliness in artificial isolation. The purpose of this transcendental operation is to get a clear ground for exploring the many senses of *otherness* and of *alienness*, as they appear to us in experience. The point of the method is to analytically explicate the different senses, their constitution and transfer. For example, the phenomenon of 'double sensation', of *sensing* and being *sensed*, indicates the double character of the body as *living* and *lived*, and similarly, the two ways of apprehending sensations as *subjective* and *physical*. The perception of other living bodies is based on the similarity to our own case, and the spontaneous detection of movements and behaviours of other living beings as meaningful and significant is a primal feature, and primary to any causal explanations offered by psychology or life sciences. The perception of the unified whole of the world instantly differentiates between material and living beings, and is *immediately* motivating. In other words, we *perceive* and *move* (e.g. withdraw or approach) before we use reason to interpret other relational bodies and the complexity of their behaviour, which is why experiential reality should be seen as distinct from all conceptual constructions and constellations. Intersubjective experience proceeds in stages according to the perceived sensory material, and the experience has also an *anticipatory structure*, whereas we anticipate the movements of others to unfold in *certain ways*, ultimately through association to our own lived bodily condition and experiential habituation. New coming sensory material either *confirms* or *conflicts* with these anticipatory expectations. Our sensory-motor similarity towards other bodies can be merely partial and include all kinds of animals as other conscious beings, even the most "anomalous" ones. All vital beings of the perceivable natural world share a *distinctive way of responsive, spontaneous and reflexive movement*, and our own *embodiment* enables us to experience other conscious, sensing and living beings as such through *empathic apperception*. (Heinämaa 2014).

The cultural-historical world, though grounded in the natural world, departs from it in particular ways. As Heinämaa elaborates, *stepping into the world of culture changes one's relation to nature since cultural practices are precisely practices of inspecting, manipulating and developing nature within the openness-horizon of the cultural*"(2014, 136). Cultural-historical world has a temporal character in its sense of the past and the future, which requires a certain type of consciousness and a subjective awareness of the self as a *natal* and a *mortal* being. Therefore all the subjects of the natural world cannot fully participate in the constitution of the cultural-historical world. As Husserl indicates, *animals*

and *infants* are lacking the necessary awareness of the generational links to historical, as well as future others, that reach beyond what is presently at hand. The sense of the world as simply given and the narrow relation to time, essentially disable them from addressing other subjects that are absent, which restrains their *generative* participation in the cultural community. Mature adults however, can consciously relate to their predecessors and successors in an *open-ended horizon* of time, and mainly so through *linguistic mediation*. Our conscious participation implicates that we can also share the achievements of shared transgenerational practice - all the cultural products from the very basic to the most spiritually advanced. Once we grasp this communal and open essence of our world horizon, there is yet another sense and consciousness of the world. We recognize that besides our particular sense and habituation in the world, there is a *plurality* of other communities of cultural practice, of people *alien* to us with their own kind of interests, means and activities - of other horizons. In comparison to these *alienworlds*, we then realize the particularity of our own *homeworlds* among the wider horizon of the world as a whole. (Heinämaa 2014).

## 2.8 The universal ethical life of self-regulation and value

Given that we are natural beings, and mature adults participating in the constitution of the cultural-historical world, how do we initially begin to navigate our way and move in the world as *ethical subjects* before, and among the various communities of thought and practice? According to Husserl's (2006/1924) practical philosophical essay on the *human* core of active ethical *renewal*, the truly human life is necessarily a life of continuous self-education, self-perception, self-discipline and self-cultivation, as oriented by human *reason* and conscientious *will* to the ethical life. Ethical life, in this essentially self-agentic sense, *cannot* be imposed or directed from the outside, and it proceeds quite unlike the passive mode of *organic growth*. Husserl is clarifying the *a priori* essential constitutes of *the idea* of the ethical human life, that is, the general guiding principles and structures that make it possible for the human subject to become intentionally committed *in the direction* of the ethical. He makes a clear distinction between *the truly personal acts* that are genuinely free and self-determined, and *the passive submission* to one's instincts, inclinations and affects. A person is also capable of actively *restraining* the essentially *unfree passive* mode of "being moved", and can *critically question* the *passive motivational base* of one's taken-for-granted assumptions. A person who is acting willingly, out of personal freedom and choice, is a person capable of self-critique and re-evaluation of the past, and of re-adjusting one's perspective, and generally retaining free judgment regarding actionable future possibilities. According to Husserl, human life is essentially a *positive motivational aspiration* toward something of *value*, which leads to varied satisfactions and disappointments. As goal-oriented beings, humans constantly strive for a *life worth living*, that is continuously *enriched* in terms of what is considered valuable, and preferred to

be *shielded* from the future losses, deflations and disappointments of value. The expectations of satisfaction and value can also be *negated*, through concrete *experiential evidence* and/or deliberate re-examination, which places the previously held conceptions and convictions and their *truth-value* in question and subject to critique. Negative experience can thus be *originally* perceived as a rather painful threat to one's system of attained and anticipated values, which introduces a potentially self-critical *reflective assessment* that pauses the affective flows of lived experiencing. The personalistic processes of experiential *affirmation, negation* and *renewal* of values, can also pave the way for the *motivational structuring* of self-regulatory conscious life and practical aspiring towards *universally truthful* valuation and norms of reason. Husserl also mentions, that the ethical life is essentially a constant *struggle*, and even when the original motivational powers toward the ethical life have lost the initial forces of will, a person who is "*ethically enslaved*", can still manage to *renew the ethical will to life* with radical contemplations, and by re-enacting the originary constitutive motivational settings. (Husserl, 2006/1924, 75-80, 97-98, 102-103).

Heinämaa (2015) elaborates on Husserl's personalistic *ethics of renewal*, as highlighted by the different *types of valuing* in life, whereas Husserl made distinctions between four different forms of life; *natural, professional, vocational* and *ethical* that may well exist in parallel in one's life. The most simplistic *natural* life is characterized by animal-like boundaries and customary adoption of values and goals. The other remaining types represent specifically *human* qualities such as capacities for self-reflection and self-regulation. *Professional* life is motivated mainly by material wellbeing and does not require deliberate cultivation of personal values in the sphere of its activities. *Vocational* life is a more advanced form of choosing personalized values that one deems necessary and best suited for the actualization of personal capabilities. A person then strives to commit to certain kinds of values and goals despite the evaluation or devaluation of them by others. Here, the vocational purpose of valuation is to bring inner satisfaction and unity to the experiences of one's life as a whole. However encompassing vocational values may be in structuring one's life from within, they do not cover all action in the form of *universal critique*. The higher form of self-regulative life is the *ethical* life, which stresses self-criticality and self-responsibility as central for personal constitution in the most radical sense. Ethical life is characterized by critical reassessment of goals and methods, where ethical *renewal* refers primarily to *questioning and transforming one's relation to oneself*. In other words, the purpose of critical reflection is the disclosure of ethical values that will concern the whole life and all possible action, also in the unforeseeable future. Ethical life brings forth enduring inner security and satisfaction, for ethical values will retain their relevance regardless of situational variation and change of circumstances in a person's life. Hence universal values, as understood in Husserl's personalistic ethics, do not grant priority to externally imposed moral obligations of "good" or "bad". As Heinämaa (2015, 12-13) concludes: "*The goal is to determine 'the best possible' on the basis of one's individual capacities and their variations, and to act and live according to this understanding*". (Heinämaa 2015; Husserl 2006/1924).

Objectifying one's historicity of experiences in the self-reflective sense is not the same as simply *rationalizing* them. It rather means that a person is better able to recognize the hermeneutic situations of understanding and interpreting social realities with more *self-responsibly* determined, practicable and truthful conceptualization when elaborating on experiential phenomena. It also concerns the self-reflective *narrative* construction and *imaginative* reconstruction of the personal horizon of possibilities when orienting oneself, and acting upon the world. The emotional responses to affective stimuli are not necessarily diminished, but they can be more *adequately* measured and judged, also in relation to one's particular practical concerns and significant others, and with more coherent understanding regarding the cultural constitutes of communal life. Spontaneous psychic impulses can thus be seen *in context* and to a certain extent replaced with higher emotional sensibilities, as aligned with the personally determined values and goals, and the developmental level of maturity. The ideal self-transcendental virtues of the higher spheres of conscious life include a sense of responsibility, clarity of valuation, moral courage, sensitivity toward others, and the *capacity to liberate oneself* from the lower level human limitations, social ambitions and material preoccupations. Personally chosen ideals do not depart from the concrete *embodied experience* in an arbitrary manner of esoteric abstraction, but can potentially and eventually *enrich* the actual qualities of everyday experiencing. (Rauhala 2005, 67–69). As Husserl himself noted (2011/1936, 237), phenomenological movements of thought are intrinsically ethically imbued, for transcendental operations can genuinely endow the contents of experiencing phenomena in the lifeworld.

Bandura's (1997; 2001; 2006) social psychological views on human agency, particularly his social cognitive theory of *self-efficacy*, also point toward the decisive importance of developing the *inner* locus of control, which is individually characterized as the general belief and sense of being in control and responsible for one's own actions and life as a whole. Situating cognitive learning with social learning, Ryan and Deci (2000) have also similarly examined self-regulatory concerns, in differentiating *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* motivation, and by connecting the purposiveness of self-regulation to the basic human psychological needs of *autonomy*, *competence*, and *relatedness*. Self-regulation is nowadays a central multidisciplinary concept that is researched in all fields of psychological inquiry, from basic conscious and non-conscious regulatory processes, to cognitive, physiological, neurological, developmental, personality and sociality dimensions, as well as from the perspective of self-regulatory problems and failures, e.g. in cases of addictive, impulsive or compulsory behaviors, pathologies and disorders (Vohs & Baumeister 2011).

Jungian analytical psychology emphasizes the psychological processes of psychic individuation and integration in terms of individual differences that manifest through different psychological *types of consciousness*, or *cognitive complexes*. The nowadays popular Myers-Briggs sixteen-type (MBTI) model is basically an offspring from the Jungian typology. A psychiatrist and Jungian analyst John Beebe, in turn, has developed the C. G. Jung's archetypal and

depth psychological theory further. He explicates on the eight cognitive functions, or *perspectives* that we naturally learn to *prefer* and habituate in different degrees and combinations. The early formation of certain cognitive preferences is based on the experientially gained senses of balance and control when *organizing and interpreting one's emotional life*. The judging ('rational') functions are: introverted thinking (Ti), extraverted thinking (Te), introverted feeling (Fi) and extraverted feeling (Fe). The perceiving ('irrational') functions are: introverted intuition (Ni), extraverted intuition (Ne), introverted sensing (Si), and extraverted sensing (Se). The cognitive preferences influence the particularity of ways how a person is situationally inclined to invest and regulate the psychic and emotional energies. (Beebe 2016). The typological approach is an applicable conceptual tool, mainly for appreciating the fact that there are several different ways to *process information* and to *orient* oneself in the world, and that a given mode of behavior may represent a cognitive comfort zone for some people, while being more or less stressful to others, for example.

The personalistic self-regulatory significance of the higher-order cognitive functionality of the psyche is relevant for all the psychological perspectives that accommodate *developmental* aspects. Keltikangas-Järvinen (2008) defines the overall *life control (elämänhallinta)*, as similar to *stress control*, and essentially descriptive of *inner balance* and *autonomy* – as a personal belief in one's ability to have influence on, and effectuate betterment in relation to internal and external circumstances. It is a *mature* ability to live one's life in a *responsible* way that is *not* characterized by continuous problem-solving in personal relationships or by solutions that lead into trouble after another. It is ideally about the *inner locus* of control, so that a person does not merely drift through life at the mercy of circumstances or luck. Psychological life control is also about autonomous decision-making and capacities to handle problems in one's mind so that stress does not evolve into somatic or psychic illness. A person does not then simply feel as bombarded with random thoughts, for instance, but is engaged in *thinking for oneself*. She or he can thus gain *reflective* and *interpretative distance* from immediate external stimulation, and *choose* a singular style and situationally proper manners of conduct, even relatively irrespective of one's natural temperamental disposition. Such life control requires, however, self-awareness on the deeper elementary grounds of understanding, i.e. *self-knowledge*, regarding one's unique temperament-related emotional inclinations like pleasures, fears, rhythms and regulatory concerns, which form the individually unique basis for deciding upon the socio-cultural values, interests, goals and commitments that also make a person grasp oneself as different in relation to others. A strong sense of life control is also connected to a strong *sense of identity*, that is, a relatively steady conception of one's own selfhood that is integrated with prior experiences in harmony with one's decisions, values and preferences. Identity is modified through social interactions and it can take a long time to develop, if ever, into a self-determinately sustainable sense of identity that is not overly susceptible to external expectations. Strong identity, as related to a strong sense of life control, deep self-knowledge, sense of self-

actualization and satisfaction, enables a person to endure changes, difficulties and pressures, and the possible *conflicts* she or he may face in contrast to prevailing models and norms of the cultural environment. Yet there are also the kind of situational influences and different realities of life that are largely beyond the individual control. Keltikangas-Järvinen remarks that it takes a particularly strong identity to excuse oneself from contemporary norms like the 'rat-race of success', which, like many other *culturally accelerated* phenomena, proliferate precisely through people's *weak* or *weakened* sense of identity. Weak sense of identity can spur the search for self-identity from outside the self, and hence renders many people prone to seek external agencies of control in view of fashionable expectations. (Keltikangas-Järvinen 2008, 256-258, 275-279).

## 2.9 On the communal crises of humanity and sciences

Husserlian phenomenological movement of thought pronounces the *intersubjective* validity of inquiries generally for all human beings. Miettinen (2010) aims to correct the nonetheless widely held assumption that phenomenology concerns merely individual subjectivity, and has nothing substantial to say about the practical issues of communal nature, which is still a common misconception also in the critique towards phenomenology. Societal and political issues, however, were visibly raised among later phenomenological philosophers, but already the early phenomenological project of Husserl can be regarded influential for the constitution of social realities, and not least for the fundamentally *ethical* motivation of his endeavour as a whole. Husserl's later work in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (2011/1962/1936). was most explicitly dealing with the communal and the cultural concerns at the time, and particularly concerned with the narrow conception of rationality, i.e. the naturalistic tendencies to materialize all conscious life and therefore marginalize the central areas of humanity. Husserl was calling after a *cultural renewal* of European and Western worlds, against approaching the human psychological, social, cultural and historical life in the manner of August Comte's positivism. Husserl insisted that the task of phenomenology was about *bridging the gap* between theory and the lifeworld, in a critical way that would *not* be submissive to any given practical or political agendas. (Miettinen 2010 151-155).

Heinämaa's (2000) philosophical elaboration on the crisis of the European culture and sciences tackles the *communal failures* of our theoretical culture, as related to the *generalized lack of self-critical theorizing*. She firstly defines the European cultural identity or spirit, after Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as a *mode of relating* that is manifested in situations where people act in a specifically European way, which is not a question reducible to psychology or geography. According to this definition, the specific contents and the *central ideas of the European cultural heritage* can be seen through three respects. Firstly, in human *relationship to nature* – not just human being as part of nature but also seen in

radical separation from it, as in approaching nature as an object of knowledge with truths that can be revealed. This connects to the Greek idea of objective truths that is the basis of science and technology. Secondly, in our *attitude toward reality*, that is, to modify the environment and not simply accepting it as given. It connects to the ideas of producing, changing and modifying, and to the conception of work as an arena of culture. Thirdly, in *the idea that combines the State with freedom*, whereas state authority is seen as a guarantor that provides a cultural habitat where human freedom can be realized, where the goal of living is related to freedom, and not just to economy and production. The European crisis can thus be seen as a crisis related to: *the idea of truth and objectivity*, to *the meaning of work*, and to *the respect of freedom*. The problem is, that science is being reduced to technology and technological attitude defines our lives, nature is thought of merely as a resource that we consume or save according to our needs, and the conception of freedom has been restricted to concern only the mobility of labor and products. Also, while there is more technological variety in the communicative means, the communication itself (in speech and writing) has become standardized and narrowed. (Heinämaa 2000, 15–18).

Heinämaa also emphasizes how Husserl's later work (1936) illuminates the constitution of this crisis. Truth, for Husserl, is a task or a duty, not achievement, privilege or property. It is a *responsibility* to read, interpret and understand others and other ways of thinking. In his view of the world, that is still descriptive of the world we're living in today, advanced technologies are becoming assimilated with mystical, religious and quasi-religious worldviews. Our culture is losing the foundational ability to say anything substantial about the ideal and spiritual life of the mind - including the theoretical thought. The natural scientific model governs all sciences with the ideas of *aimless* and *indifferent* natural processes, which is a symptom of a deeper crisis: the problem is shared and it concerns our conception of the meanings and goals of the universal scientific project. It is currently not based on reason but is rather mythical or determined by utilitarian practicalities of life. *Unscientific attitudes* - both dogmatic scientism and extreme scepticism toward sciences - are telling of our inability to say anything substantially foundational about scientific projects, that is, about their meanings and goals. But as Heinämaa also emphasizes, we can remind ourselves of *the ancient Greek civilization* that gave birth to the ideas of theoretical universal sciences and philosophy - of knowledge that concerns the totality of the past, the present, and the future, the actual and the possible realities of life, and the idea and practice of humanity that aspires toward the infinite while grounded in finitude. Philosophy was then originally conceived as a universal science and a mode of culture that is characterized by the ideal and the theoretical, in other words, what can be deemed valid for everyone and everywhere. (Heinämaa 2000, 18–22; Husserl 2011/1936).

According to Heinämaa's (2000) philosophical clarification, theoretical attitudes can be realized in basically three different ways. In *the practical attitude*, the theoretical interest is mainly submitted to serve practical interests, e.g. when politicians aim to gain practical utilities for a group of people. The religious-



mythical attitude is practical as well, for its goal is not to seek truth but *happiness*, in its various manifestations in life. *The purely theoretical attitude* means separation from all point of views of utility, and it designates the inner responsibility of theoretical culture to the whole of the scientific community overtime. *The critical attitude* (synthesis) is the critical praxis of theoretical life, which means absolute responsibility, radical self-critique, and the universal critique that can target any kinds of life forms, beliefs and theories. The critical attitude resembles both purely theoretical and religious-mythical attitudes in that it is universal. The universe of philosophy, however, is not the same as that of religions or theories. Philosophical inquiries are not directly concerned with the world, but with our *attitudes* in the world. According to Husserl, the crisis that we're living in relation to knowledge, nature and our own actions, is not resulting because we have somehow been separated from the practical side of living and live our lives led by reason alone. On the contrary, the crisis has emerged for we have *not* been able to develop our theoretical culture *far enough*, so that it would have created a critical, particularly *self-critical attitude and practice*. The realization of the critical attitude would mean that as humans, we would seriously think about our boundaries and take responsibility over our life, history and philosophical tradition. Whereas as Husserl saw it, this project has been seized by *dogmatic* naturalism and logicism. In order to continue the universal project toward generalizing the self-critical attitude and practice, we should turn attention back to *the cognizant subject*, to her *living body* and the natural and the cultural habitat. This does not designate a return to past forms of living, but means that we investigate *how* our theorizing and scientific achievements gain their limitations and meanings from pre-thetic practices. Hence, as Heinämaa concludes, radical critical studies do not produce facts, theories or predictions, but provide a better understanding regarding the *original* foundations and structuring of theories. (Heinämaa 2000, 23–27, 34–36).

The ways we prefer to perceive, evaluate and judge social realities, is undeniably connected to how we conduct research through certain trajectories. Tsoukas and Chia (2011), discuss the *ontological*, *epistemological* and *praxeological* routes that connect philosophy to organizational research. They firstly note exemplary works like the landmark contribution made by Burrell and Morgan in explicating a typology of underlying philosophies and assumptions in the *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis* (1979). Another significant instance of redefining the predominant positivistic modes and mentalities of research commitment was provided by organizational theorist Karl Weick (1995), who made an influential ontological distinction between the foundationally different *ways of seeing* organizations. In his view, organizations are typically taken-for-granted as objectively predefined *entities*, yet *organizing* can also be more adequately approached as an interactively *enacted* processual phenomenon. Tsoukas and Chia further illuminate the different philosophical foundations regarding the *nature of strategy*, which provides an example of *ontological* commitments that entail differing assumptions and images of structuring the social reality in organizational life:

“For *rationalists*, strategy is largely what is intended; it is a plan. For *process* theorists, strategy is largely contextual and improvisational; it is a pattern. For *practice* theorists, strategy is what practitioners actually *do*, intended or not, planned or improvisational; it is a praxis.” (Tsoukas & Chia 2011, p. 8 emphasis original).

Tsoukas and Chia exemplify the *epistemological* commitments through a similar triad, which entail differing ways of acquiring and justifying knowledge. Traditional *contingency models*, for instance, are concerned with tracking regularities, while explaining and predicting behaviour extracted from large populations through objective criteria. The beliefs and desires of actor’s themselves are not of relevance to this normative rationality. They are central, however to the *process-sensitive*, contextualist, interpretive and constructivist epistemologies, which hold the view that individuals cannot simply be reduced to a “variance of behaviour”. The epistemology of *practice* goes further into the everyday actions and interactions to gain better understanding on the real life complexity of individual and communal phenomena. The main purpose of philosophical clarification, is to *fight the closure of meaning* that occurs when the conduct of scientific research becomes institutionalized, in a way that may serve mere instrumentality of reproducing itself. Philosophical analysis enables *better theorizing* by taking issue with the whole *meta-level framing* and the *grounding* of research questions, and essentially, by keeping the conceptual movement of thought *open* in any given field of study. (Tsoukas & Chia 2011, 6-12, 15).

## 2.10 The question of animal cognition, morality and agency

We may not *exactly* know what experience and life is like for other animals, or how they perceive the human species. It is possible that many of them have a much more complex conscious awareness of the world and other animals, than merely being restricted to a *naïve immediacy* of being that we often suppose, and sometimes even *envy* of them. There were speculative notes on the animal mind already in Aristotle’s philosophy, but the modern study began with Darwin’s biological studies and has today become a research area in cognitive science that is connected to various others areas of study. (Shettleworth 2012). The interdisciplinary study of *animal cognition* is relatively new, and it is encompassing research fields such as cognitive ethology, behavioral ecology, experimental psychology, field biology, neuroscience, computer science and philosophy (Bekoff, Allen & Burghardt 2002). Some researchers of animal cognition have also recently supported the view that animals may have a sense of morality, when defined as “*a suite of other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups*”, and which can appear in a wide spectrum of cooperative and altruistic behaviors in different species of animals (Bekoff & Pierce 2010, 82). Beside the special sciences, however, the *topic of the animal* has also general bearing on many philosophical, ethical, political, and organizational issues (Midgley 1983; Connolly & Cullen 2017).

Considering the animal perspective on ethics is anything but new, and one example that resembles contemporary debate on *animal ethics* can be traced back to the dialogues of Greek biographer and essayist Plutarch (c. CE 45 – CE 120). His writings on animal mental capacities included the belief that animals have a mind of their own, with varying capacities of reason and imagination. Plutarch did not set any divisive contrast between reason and emotion, and he contemplated on the possibility that animals can indeed use their sensibilities to memorize and learn from their experience through emotions like humans can. He saw that morality or moral virtues were not exclusively reserved for human beings, since human conducts demonstrate the fact that we don't always manage to be moral at all. Yet he noted that we should strive to act according to our best ethical principles, in our relation to animals as well. Plutarch's views on animal mentality thus differs from the mechanistic assumptions on animal life, e.g. as elaborated by Descartes 1500 years afterwards, or in more recent behaviorist accounts. (Aaltola 2015). Stanovich (2004) argues that we are now living in the materialist "age of Darwin", which compels us to assume ourselves as "host organisms" to *genes* and *memes* that only seek to replicate themselves. He defines "*the struggle to achieve consistency between our first-order preferences and higher order preferences*" (2004, 273) as the most decisively unique human cognitive feature that separates us from the other animals, and which we should recognize as the rational basis to reclaim self-determination, morality, and meaning. Nagel (2012) has also recently argued that the materialist-physicalist take of nature is insufficient, particularly for explicating conscious life that in his view emerges in *teleological* rather than in reductionist manner.

Amanda Rees (2018) explores the *idea of agency* by comparing the notions of agency between human and non-human animals, which in many contemporary discussions already comes down to our differences *in degree*, rather than *in kind*. The most recent generally agreed assumption is that what separates us from other animals is not agency as such, but more specifically, our *deliberate* and *reflective* capacities of *self-conscious* agency. The Enlightenment conception of agency as denoting a "rational, autonomous, disembodied, and liberated self" still remains a powerful image of humanity as such, albeit it is still mainly reserved for the *privileged groups* in society. The prevailing ideas regarding the historical and social *distribution* of agency is hence a central aspect, when elaborating on *agentic action* that interacts with, influences and changes the situated environment under which it occurs. Yet we can readily witness, for instance, the *embodied* kind of non-human consciousness and *kinaesthetically* based communication within a herd of animals, where understanding seems to emerge immediately at the collective level. Less *anthropocentric* observations can aid the realization that there are in fact multiple elements and ways that make it possible for agency to *emerge*, not only as a human or merely individual, but also as a *collective achievement*. Moreover, many achievements that are considered typically human have actually emerged as a result of our relationship with non-human animals, and quite often in history with *equine assistance*. Researchers of animal consciousness have also more widely began to

appreciate the *tacit* and *practical* knowledge of those who routinely work with and handle animals, in recognizing that there is such a thing as “animal individuality” or “animal personality”. The early founders of ethology and ecology actually discovered in the 1930’s that this individual identification is the first step toward figuring out “*what it might mean to be an agent in an animal’s world*”, while observing the animal as embedded in its natural habitat. As Rees concludes, the attempt to understand other ways of being and seeing in the world is important *in itself*, and it has also central bearing on the “*ethical and emotional sense of what it means to be human*”. (Rees 2018). Animal encounters, even with the ones that appear most *strange* at the outset, such as cephalopods, can help us to decipher *the problem of other minds*, by revealing the mutual, essentially *interactive* origins of conscious life in nature (Godfrey-Smith 2017).

Phenomenology is a well-suited approach of inquiry to study the human-animal *relation*. The experience of *otherness* or *alien* ways of seeing and being in the world can thus become more intimately palpable and intelligible, when we attempt to understand experience from the perspective of non-human lived consciousness through *empathic apperception*. Erika Ruonakoski (2011) follows and revises Stein’s, Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analyses regarding the structures of embodied experience, also *in dialogue* with empirical studies, as concerning our perceptual experiences in relation to non-human animals. She argues that we generally suppose animals as having at least *pre-reflective* consciousness, and that we commonly find that their behavior is expressive of *operative intentionality*, i.e. that animals are *internally motivated* and *oriented* towards their environment in action. Our *empathic sensations*, as Ruonakoski proposes, may also *temporally* relate to *lifeless* objects and *mechanistic movements* when they only *appear* to us as *goal-oriented*. Our empathic apperceptions remain to be seated in our own perspective, and we experience and interpret also the non-human other’s *bodily situation* always in relation to our own bodily habituated case as *the norm*, wherefrom we recognize the similarity and difference of movements in terms of *situational appropriateness* mainly according to our own case. She also argues that the experienced possibilities for *reciprocal communication* with the other species are not necessarily dependent on the perceived similarity of particular communicative gestures, but that very *strange* kind of movements can also be *understood* as intents of seeking or maintaining contact with us, for instance. Although our own perspective is the experientially normative one, the other species of animals can also *widen* our *perspectival horizon* beyond the typical human case toward the possibilities of empathizing with different meanings and ways of experiencing the world, for example, through the different elemental dimensions that are not so natural in terms of human habituation. We do not, however, perceive the *meaning* of the behavior of animals as immediately as we understand other humans. Overall, Ruonakoski concludes that human existence is *intertwined* with non-human animal existence in four experiential areas: *empathic sensations, communicative reciprocity, experience of the world, and self-definition*. She argues that our empathic processes of comprehension and

differentiation in relation to different species of non-human animals are more varied, complex, holistic, dynamic and situational, than assumed by previous phenomenological accounts on the experiential constitutes of the human-animal difference, for they have been concentrating on the human-specific temporality, spatiality and reflectivity. (Ruonakoski 2011, 249-255).

Rossi and Lundvall (2018) report some interesting interactive-experiential observations on the psychological and social benefits of “equine assisted leadership training”, where the participants were encouraged to interact with horses in different situations at the stables. The horses’ outward manifestation of emotions, the immediacy of their embodied presence, and the non-verbal communication in the human-horse interaction seemed to evoke emotions, reflection and insight, also regarding the trainees’ past experiences related to social dynamics in work organizational settings. They were better able to recognize and articulate the *bodily based* ways of how they relate to, and sometimes conflict with other people, and see how social phenomena *already* occurs at the *pre-reflective* and *affective* level of interaction. The bodily sensations of lived experience provided the primary kind of contents of consciousness that are not easy to conceptualize. Rossi and Lundvall argue, that taking them into account can broaden the traditional *rationalist* perspectives of management theory and practice. I agree, and would alternatively suggest that the embodied-experiential empirical evidence can be most constructive for the purposes of *reforming*, not just in terms of extending or ‘filling the gaps’ of mainstream management theorizing. A reformation would imply a philosophically *ground-breaking* take on the *core assumptions* that are typically taken for granted in management discourse. There are also experience -oriented conceptual frameworks that can accommodate and furthermore nurture the development of such evidential insights, and which are less prone to reduce them in favor of preordained managerial principles and goals (see e.g. an empirical study with the *organizational aesthetics* -approach in Niemi-Kaija, 2014).

## 2.11 The naturalization of economic rationale and normativity

If psychology would follow the plan I suggest, the educator, the physician, the jurist and the business man could utilize our data in a practical way, as soon as we are able, experimentally, to obtain them. (Watson 1913, 168)

Contrary to Watson’s “behaviorist manifesto” (1913), there are evident failures that are also practically bound to arise, when people are treated according to the reductionist assumptions of mechanized naturalism, akin to *lab rats* (Lyons 2019). Moreover, it may have benefitted J. B. Watson himself, to become less fretful toward the study of consciousness, and more *critically aware* of profound philosophical issues, if even to precaution and prevent him from applying his semi-religiously obsessive calculative stance to child care - through which he allegedly ended up damaging also his own children who became suicidal later

on (Hartley & Commire 1990). We can thus return to elaborate on the earlier remark regarding the 21<sup>st</sup> century revival of behaviourism, and consider the infamous J. B. Watson (see also Saari & Harni 2015 on Skinner) as one of the initial ‘culprits’ in view of contemporary research or policy programs, which i) notably utilize behaviorist ideas, and ii) are principally aligned with the instrumental-functionalist goals of *controlling* and *manipulating* human behavior. Watson (1913) foresaw the appeal that the behaviorist tenets –basically of reducing and thus simplifying behavior down to predictable and controllable determinants - readily represented to different practical fields of application:

One of the earliest conditions which made me dissatisfied with psychology was the feeling that there was no realm of application for the principles which were being worked out in content terms. What gives me hope that the behaviorist's position is a defensible one is the fact that those branches of psychology which have already partially withdrawn from the parent, experimental psychology, and which are consequently less dependent upon introspection are today in a most flourishing condition. Experimental pedagogy, the psychology of drugs, the psychology of advertising, legal psychology, the psychology of tests, and psychopathology are all vigorous growths. These are sometimes wrongly called "practical" or "applied" psychology. Surely there was never a worse misnomer. In the future there may grow up vocational bureaus which really apply psychology. At present these fields are truly scientific and are in search of broad generalizations which will lead to the control of human behavior. (Watson 1913, 169)

It is not difficult to imagine “vocational bureaus” that are receptive to practical applications derived from naturalized assumptions and “*broad generalizations*”, for the aims of mass governance, “*which will lead to the control of human behavior*”. The operative credo of 21<sup>st</sup> century economic managerialism seems particularly welcoming toward the tools and measures that serve the engine of calculation.

Williams (2017) clarifies the ideology of *neoliberalism* that has dominated the contemporary economic discourse ever more forcibly since the millennium. He notes that there are also several critical attempts that have tried to dismantle the so-called neoliberal perspective that can be detected from the explanatory models and policies enforced by influential global and national institutions, from the structural developments that accelerate the formation of *informal* economic and employment relations, and from the *deregulation* initiatives that seek to give *free reign to markets*, which predominantly serves the interests of large corporations. Work in the informal economy sector is largely based on different modes of *self-employment*, which is a factual consequence of the informalization that typical neoliberal explanations seek to portray in the most positive light. The proponents of neoliberalism suggests that people exit the formal economy (including employment security and benefits) out of their own *rational* and *volitional*, often conceptualized as the supposedly “entrepreneurial” choice, rather than out of situational or structural necessity. This choice is ideologically framed in terms of a “*free-spirited creative response*” against the “*over-regulation*” of the state that is *categorically* assumed to be heavily burdensome, bureaucratic, and corrupted. Yet there is little empirical evidence

to support the validity of the all-consuming neoliberal approach. When light is shed on its empirical effects on the political economy as a whole, the actual downsides can be revealed: reducing the market regulating role of the state in favor of narrow economic interests and measures, reduces the collective benefits of social transfers, social protection and stability. (Williams 2017).

One of the most influential neo-classical economists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Milton Friedman (1953), posited economics as a “value-free” science, and stated that economic assumptions need *not* be descriptive of reality, but *prescriptive* and simplified instead, to benefit the “*calculative engine of analysis*”. In his view, the profit and utility maximization postulates, for instance, could already be extracted from the behaviors of people and firms when they merely “act as if” they were rational self-interested optimizers, without complicating the models with the actual messy realities infiltrated by value judgements. While Friedman was adamant in claiming the status of economics as a “positive science” like physics, the neo-classical prescriptive modelling of behaviors he adheres to is in fact a heavily *normative* stance. Neo-classical economic theorizing contains “*the assumption of the invariable pursuit of self-interest in each act*” (Sen 1977, 343). Its fictional “economic man” conjures an unflattering image of a “rational fool” or a “social moron”, which is why economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1977) developed the element of *social commitment* as another base of behavior, to device more elaborate re-structuring of economic models in accordance with the real human preferences and welfare: “*the empirical evidence for this cannot be sought in the mere observation of actual choices, and must involve other sources of information, including introspection and discussion*” (1977, 342). Hence he was also critical of the behaviorist assumptions and the metrics related to gathering ‘evidence’ for the economic self-seeking –model, which however, could not simply be replaced by universal utilitarianism or consequentialism: “*rejection of egoism as description of motivation does not, therefore, imply the acceptance of some universalized morality as the basis of actual behavior*” (ibid. 344). Sen (1999) has further advanced his socially complemented approach in terms of freedoms and unfreedoms linked to local and global economic development. Together with philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2003; 2010), they have developed the *capability*-approach, and argued against social injustices connected with economic, or economically engendered unfreedoms, by tracing how they hinder the grounds of developing the *human capabilities* that are *fundamental* to human flourishing.

Humanistic management movement advocates human dignity and well-being in view of natural scientific and philosophical revision of understanding human nature. It forwards a shift away from the *economistic paradigm* and its narratives that reduce human agency to oversimplified *amoral opportunism* (Pirson 2017; Pirson & Steckler 2019). Historical and evolutionary economic theorists have similarly challenged the orthodox economic ‘utility maximizing rational actor’ model of explaining human behavior, e.g. by considering the *cognitive epistemological* processing, of how people factually derive informational content from sense-data and how it is conceptualized into some meaningful form. They have also made efforts to accommodate the actual *dynamism* of the

interactive levels of social conduct into meta-level theorizing (Schumpeter 2012/1911; Nelson & Winter 1982; 2002, Hodgson 1992; Kuhmonen 2010).

Behavioral economists have also revised the purely abstract “as if” *homo economicus* -model of explanation and prediction. Herbert Simon was among the pioneers who sought to introduce “psychological realism” to economic analysis with a set of cognitive-behavioral ideas. He revised the rational choice model of decision making with the concept of *bounded rationality* (1957), which is premised on the notion that humans are “satisficers” rather than optimizers because of their *cognitive limitations, biases and fallacies* i.e. “irrationalities”, and generally due to the *lack of available information* to deal with complicated problems. Rather than optimizing their behavior according to some abstract ideal, he argued that people use practical heuristics and settle with the “*good-enough*” solutions. Mumby and Putnam (1992), in turn, challenged the bounded rationality -model that they saw as reinforcing male-centred and rationalistic engineering assumptions to organizing. They introduced an alternative concept of *bounded emotionality*, which encompasses a broader, socially situated and mind-body integrated view on expressing emotionality in organizations. Emotionality is thus understood as invaluable to interpersonal work relations.

Other behavioral economists have since taken up, and developed the bounded rationality -approach (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Thaler & Sunstein 2008). Kahneman (2011), for instance, recognizes the key role of positivity biases, optimistic temper, and overconfidence as traits that help to fuel “the economic engine of capitalism”, for positive moods and the related illusions can help to shape the lives of others and enhance risk taking and persistence in the face of constraints. Positivity biases generally rely on the *ease* and *coherence* of the story we tell ourselves, rather than on truthful informational accuracy, and depends more on what Kahneman (2011) terms as the *automatic* system of fast thinking, and less on the *effortful* system of slow thinking. Taking certain things for granted, as givens, also serve our psychic needs of coherence “*The associative machine is set to suppress doubt and to evoke ideas and information that are compatible with the currently dominant story.*” (2011, 239). Kahneman pronounces that we are naturally prone to lazy thinking and prefer the least effortful route to get things done, also in the realm of mental exertion. (Kahneman 2011, 35, 239, 256).

Foolish behavior, as opposed to wise, relates to the felt sense of *omniscience, omnipotence* and *invulnerability*, which implies an imbalance and deficit in the action-oriented acquirement and use of *tacit knowledge*. Those who hold socially powerful positions are typically more susceptible to foolishness by assuming and generalizing their positive capacities and influence across domains. (Sternberg 2002). The *metacognitive* skills and abilities of *critical self-assessment* are found to be of key importance, for these can be recognized as *lacking* when incompetence is compensated with *overconfidence* (Kruger & Dunning 1999).

Cognitive scientists Lakoff and Johnson (1999), have also joined the attempt to refute the rational actor-model as a human imposition that actually makes no sense based on how real life human rationality functions. They state that reasoning as conscious decision making occurs only in limited periods, and not all the time. The conceptual systems that we’ve incorporated largely work



in an unconscious and non-consistent manner, especially in our use of multiple kinds of metaphors and moral frameworks in determination of what is deemed “good” or “best”, or worth any effort in different situations. The conscious determination of our goals or what is “good” can easily be contradicted by unconscious forces, so there is no single nor stable location for some globally univocal “self-interest” that could be empirically validated. The impossibility of universally defining self-interest in the first place, entails that there are no reliable measures for its “maximization” either. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the mathematics behind the *game theory* of calculating rational choice and strategic action are abstract suppositions that are separated from the *interpretative metaphorical layers* of rationality. They conclude that the rational action theory is to some extent descriptive, but *inadequate* when prescriptively applied to human action *as if* it contained some “inherent laws of the universe” with the accompanying *misuse* of statistics. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 515, 559).

Stanovich (2004) developed a cognitive scientific account for unravelling the “*internal logic of an agent that values its own evaluative autonomy*” (p. 273). In his critique toward the narrow instrumental rationale and “desires connected to dollars”, i.e. to the “ability to pay” in economic market terms, Stanovich draws from the *dual-process theories* of reasoning. He elaborates on the analytical division of human information processing into the “System 1”, as: *associative, holistic, parallel, automatic, relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity, relatively fast, highly contextualized*, and the “System 2” as: *rule-based, analytic, serial, controlled, demanding of cognitive capacity, relatively slow, and decontextualized*. Stanovich recognizes the “behavior-shaping forces” at play in the market-based modern societies, as the exploitation of individual irrationalities has become an ordinary part of our living environment and embodied institutional orders. The narrow instrumental rationale of self-interest and maximization operates on the assumption that humans are *weak* evaluators, like wantons that primarily seek the genetically “short-leashed” and subpersonal (system 1) first-order desire satisfactions. The second-order desires and valued preferences (system 2) and *strong* evaluative capacities, i.e. the higher-order realm of *reflective* rationality and personal autonomy that enable us to *morally transcend* our primal features, are typically unrecognized in the market and excluded from economic equations. Stanovich notes on the two technically and profoundly *demoralizing* aspects of this “subpersonal market optimization aggregated across people”, for it *disregards*: i) those higher-order values and desires that are *not* directly displayed through market behavior (e.g. public goods), and ii) actual persons, other than the most powerful holders of money, i.e. the multi-billionaire “utility monsters” who determine what is done in the “memeplex” called market in the first place. Instead of acting as irrational hosts to the *genes* and the *memes* that merely seek to replicate themselves through our organism, he proposes a *cognitive reform* that entails the activation of the much *broader* conception of autonomous and epistemic rationality, and not only instrumental rationality, which “even insects can achieve”. He terms the needed cognitive reform as “*a program of meta-rationality where rationality is used to evaluate itself and to evaluate institutions in which the cultural products of rational evolution are also embedded.*” (p.

269). Stanovich states that this is a program of strong evaluation regarding the first-order desires, also in the sense of escaping the “Humean nexus” by way of *not* letting our emotions enslave our reason. (2004, 35, 254, 258-260, 266-269).

The quantitative social scientific field of economics and the positivist organizational scientific fields, for instance, are now also using neuroscientific discoveries to broaden their explanatory frameworks (Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec 2005; Senior & Butler 2011). Bridle (2018, 138) connects Friedrich Hayek’s individualized market views to current technological developments in terms of “neurocognitive corporate capitalism” that favours the artificial connectionist model of the brain. Popular discourse, political discussion and policy making are also notably influenced by the trends of scientific materialism and empiricism. While it seems more empirically plausible to research the actual fallibilities of reasoning rather than presupposing a *fixed* ideal, the problem remains, whether the advanced knowledge on psychological or neurological realism can actually revise the *homo economicus* -model, if the same basic frame of norms, values and goals is assumed operative as usual. There are also the profound ethical questions to consider, for instance, when behavioral economic strategies, like financial incentives, are being used in fields like health services, e.g. to enhance mental illness medication adherence (Guinart & Kane 2019). The first problematic issue is that these strategic behavioral interventions are typically based on some economically *fixed presumptions* on ‘the best interest’ of the people, which undermines human dignity and agency to decide for oneself.

Whitehead and others (2018) suggests that *neuroliberalism* is a more informative conceptual tool than the concept of neoliberalism to characterize the new phase of 21<sup>st</sup> century governance. It describes the *neo-behaviorist* tendencies of policy making that also entail directive effects on contemporary research activities. They trace these changes to paternalistic governance techniques that were established in most of the Western countries after the 2008 financial crisis. The neuroliberal initiatives are focused on externally enforced cognitive-behavioural “nudging” of citizens by *targeting their emotionality*. The associated discourse is riding on the rhetorical appeal of the “freedom of choice” narrative that is supposed as the prime mover of the people, while the actual implementation of procedures, like cutting down or privatizing public services, are in effect diminishing choice for the majority of people. This new governance phase represents a set of shifts from the ideological premises of neoliberalism. They are still interconnected ideological projects that share certain key features, most notably *the market orientation* and market-oriented policy making, whereby “the market” is assumed to stand for the best possible interactive arena to achieve proper social order and the sensations of freedom. Neuroliberalism is also further connected to austerity politics and to the increasingly powerful role of financial institutions. It is mostly inspired by the new *behavioural economics*, and takes the market orientation even further by assuming that it is *the people* who should be made “*fit to markets*”, to guarantee its efficient functioning. The targeted human behavioral system is more often the *automatic-emotional*, instead of the *deliberate-rational*, and the fictional figure

of the ideal economic man (*homo economicus*), in this view, is now “*More-than-rational Homer Simpson*”. Decision making is no longer primarily seen as an information-based individual capacity, it is rather assumed to occur in a social context in reference to artificially engineered behavioural environments. The main role of the state in this view is to ensure the free functioning of the market, and moreover, to make all individual citizens more “market-compliant” through the widespread advocacy of commercial business techniques and subtle behavioral interventions. The most troubling conclusion on the question of freedom, is how the conception of freedom is *reduced* to concern the *unequal* monetary-based ability to choose between *market-determined* options and *market-based* opportunities, while civil participation becomes restricted to *market-oriented* activities. (Whitehead, Jones, Lilley, Pykett, & Howell 2018, 60-61).

Foucault defined *governmentality* as the modern art of governing people, and the pioneers of governmentality studies, Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (2008), set out to find the most appropriate conceptual tools and methods to study the actual patterns at work in contemporary forms of governance. They constructed an interdisciplinary approach to *critical empirical* research to examine the administrative expansion of interventions, conducts and technologies, as starting from the most mundane practicalities that serve the new modes of power in advanced liberal democracies. After decades of comprehensive research, they emphasize the importance of a broad perspective that encompasses *the economic, the social, and the personal life* as the fields of governance that are not to be seen as separated spheres of action, but operative precisely due to their *complex interconnectedness* in our everyday lives. Above all, they criticised the vocabulary of the enterprise that has been disseminated by various experts and consultants. This has had a key role in the ideological programming of a new *image of subjectivity*; “the autonomous, active, creatively self-fulfilling, self-managing, entrepreneurs of themselves”, which is supposed as an applicable model of conduct everywhere. They trace the success of this narrative programming to the way it has been done through *translating* the progressive, humanistic values, and *associating* them with the rationalities and the aims of the economic enterprise. (Miller & Rose 2008, 49-50).

There are also research projects that target the normativity of economic rationalization by tackling the *narratives* that prevail in popular discourse. One such collaborative research project called “Framing the Economy” (see research report NEON et al. 2018), was set in 2015 to investigate the values, cultural models and explanatory metaphors for the economy among the British public, in order to propose and test a foundationally new narrative framing and forge a *new common agenda* for shaping the public opinion. The overall purpose of the project was to accelerate a concrete societal shift away from the broken economic system that is undeniably unequal, insecure and unsustainable. Instead of money and markets, they pronounce other *measures of value*: “Equality and human dignity”, “Solidarity and community”, “Autonomy and liberation”, and “Stewardship of the environment”. One of the central findings from their first cognitive interviews was that many people seemed to have a

“*cognitive hole*” in understanding how the economy works. It furthered the realization that civil society was seriously in need of *tools for thinking* about the system as a whole, and importantly, better ones than were provided by austerity politics, or populism that ran rampant as a result. The most insidiously persistent beliefs were found to be centred on the notion of economy as a “*natural force*”. Therefore it was deemed especially significant that the new cultural models and narratives were the kind that enabled the sense of *collective efficacy* in thinking and talking about the economy as a *human system of design* that *is* and *can* be shaped by policy. They also found that using the popular “rules of the game” –metaphor as related to economy was also intimately associated to the idea of *natural fatalism*, so they advised not to use it when referring to how economy works. In place of natural determinism, they experimented on other *explanatory metaphors* that were better aligned with collectively based cultural framing of values and goals in an economy: “Reprogramming the Economy” (computing), “Economic Tracks” (railway), and “Economic network” (phone). They further developed the more flexible collection of narratives of the economy that would capture attention of most audiences in a reconstructive manner. One such storyline was named “The common ground story—Meeting Our Need”, which includes the value of *Fulfilment*, and the explanatory metaphor of *Economic Tracks*:

A good society makes it possible for everyone to lead a meaningful and fulfilling life. Yet, our society is currently focused solely on profit, and people are forced to chase money rather than happiness.

Our economy is like a railway network—it’s built to take people to particular places. The laws and policies that we make lay down tracks that determine where the economy takes people. Right now, our economy is built around profit, rather than being built to get people to their true needs. By allowing businesses to use zero-hour contracts, provide low wages, and require people to work more and more hours for the same pay, we have built economic tracks that move profit forward but leave people without the things they need to achieve wellbeing and realise their potential. When people don’t have decent wages or stable jobs, this undermines wellbeing in all sorts of ways. And for those of us who do have stable jobs, the need to work more hours means less time with our families and to pursue our goals in life outside of work.

As a society, we need to prioritise happiness and fulfilment over profit. We need to lay down economic tracks that make it possible for people to arrive at a meaningful life. We can build an economy that gets people to happiness by guaranteeing decent wages for the least well-off, banning zero-hour contracts, and reducing working hours. Creating a good society means laying down economic tracks that enable us to get to our real needs rather than keeping us all on a train whose only destination is profit. (NEON et al 2018, p.53).

The debate involving counter-arguments against the “as if” economic model and its conceptual underpinnings continues in different fields of studies. Despite the immense range of scholarly critique and empirical evidence with

contrary implications, the founding assumptions of the *homo economicus* model still continues to direct societal discourse and policy making. The naturalization of the economic rationale and normativity represents an attempt of governing subjects through enforcing “*modes of compliance with the demands of prevailing political and economic powers.*” (Slaby & von Scheve 2019, 3). It seems that if the *homo economicus* -critique is to account for the first person-level though which it is supposed to operate, the model has to be problematized as a normative set of values, beliefs and goals that people can *both* enact and resist through a wide repertoire of responses and expressions. The imposed modes of compliance also need to be better understood in terms of why and how the *social mediation* of behavioural modification can target the *dynamic potentialities* of emotionality.

## 2.12 Psychoanalytic perspectives on the emotional economy

Psychoanalytic theories have been both manipulatively and critically adopted to take issue with the *enculturation* of the mind, in connection with recognizing the relevance of the ‘more-than-conscious’ emotive dynamisms of the psyche. Janne Kurki (2010) states that Lacanian concepts, in particular, represent the kind of intellectual heritage and ardour that we ought to preserve and work with, if we want to transform mere “dogmatic jargon” and narrow-minded calculation into *powerful thinking*, that is by definition touched by the *Real* of everyday living. Kurki couples the classical Lacanian axiomatic dimensions of *the Imaginary*, *the Symbolic* and *the Real* with more empirically and historically accessible categories as follows: the Imaginary - as what is *Sensible*, the Symbolic - as what is *Thinkable*, and the Real - as *Liveable*, i.e. that which can only be *lived through*. The ‘sensible-imaginary’ relates to what we perceive around us and how phenomena appears to us, and which is today largely modified through the media. The ‘thinkable-symbolic’ is partly but not wholly dependent on what we can sense, and as Kurki reminds, the *what* and the *how* we can think is also opened, directed and limited by the media. The realm of the ‘liveable-real’ must be understood from the everyday practical perspective, although it is not directly or fully sense or thinkable, but primarily lived through in the sense of *traumatic episodes*, like apathy or depression, for instance. Kurki also describes the Lacanian notion of *the Sinthome*, as the unique kind of chain that ties these dimensions and our singular mental knots together, which practically enables us to survive the conflicts between the sensible, the thinkable and the lived, and without which our psyches would collapse. He is particularly critical of the infrastructures that govern our everyday lives and political identities, as related to the current situation where *the economy* has become the dominant dimension and the shared language that is disseminated through large corporate medias. Capitalist economic discourse has hence replaced the classical political and the universal domains. It also means that the role of the media, as the mediator and modifier of the imaginary-symbolic signifiers of possibilities, has been restricted to the sharing of private enjoyments and sufferings, which “happens” to be tied

to the capitalist system that functions as a *sinthome*-like structure that is by and large kept together in motion *via* the psychic economy of our private passions. The capitalist growth economy thus appears like the only possible avenue, when the whole of our psychic energetic balance has become deeply invested, reliant and tied with the capitalist chains of harnessing our private pleasures and pains. At the same time, *the conflict* between the media content and the real infrastructure has significantly grown, which is to say that *the gap* between the perceivable-Imaginary and the lived-Real is only getting wider. The imaginary-symbolic constructs are also ever more *unequally* distributed, among those who can afford the infrastructural support for the “illusions of infinity”, and those whose concrete realities are *left behind* the digitalized world of seemingly limitless possibilities. The economy, or money, is usually the primary accepted boundary-setting force, even before the pending threat of ecological catastrophe. What only the lived realities can show us, with silent yet profound impact, is that it is *impossible* for humans to keep up with the pace of technological developments. Kurki also reminds that even when the ‘impossible’ Real is chased out of mind, it never disappears, and tends to “return with a vengeance” if denied. The Real is typically manifested as *ruptures, excesses* or *disturbances* amidst the everyday toils of busyness, through anxiety, burnout, impotence, and as the overall nagging sense of *inadequacy* in living up to a growing variety of expectations. The symbolic-imaginary realm is also necessary for our mental coherence, for when we are able to *modify it for ourselves*, we are also able to bear the everyday burdens, e.g. without resorting to medication or drugs. The imaginary and the symbolic dimensions of producing, creating and enjoying, however, are getting overwhelmingly complicated and multi-layered, while our biology basically remains the same. We may realize that there is enough time to enjoy *only the idea* of enjoyment, for which there is an overabundant supply of virtual multisensory data to consume. Kurki notes how this data is manufactured by the imaginary-symbolic world of popular media, marketing and entertainment industries, which have apparently taken over – and incidentally *stupefied* – our shared *universal horizon*, and replaced the already impoverished role of thinking and writing that rarely truly serves *the common ground* or purposiveness anymore. (Kurki 2010, 102-128).

Psychoanalytic theories can thus be seen as particularly adept in tackling “the capitalist engine” by explicating how it may appear to us like a “natural” system, while it is largely based on *artificial* signification that resembles the structuring of our psyche as speaking subjects. The psychic appeal of the capitalist *imperative of accumulation* operates mainly through the symbolic-imaginary realms of the human psyche, through which we can to some extent *transcend* our instinctual animalistic roots. As a cultural model, it taps into the *virtual* worlds of fantasy and desire, and capitalizes on the subjective sense of absence, loss and failure that drive subjects to perpetuate the system by seeking new objects or possibilities of satisfaction. These are nonetheless destined to fail, since the *fundamental lack*, as the perceived gap between the *symbolic* and the *real*, is irreducible and constitutive of subjectivity as such, which means that this

sense of lack is *ontological* and not empirical. Hence we tend to *misrecognize* how we actually gain satisfaction, i.e. *not* from obtaining the objects of desire, but from the enacted processes of *sacrificing*, *struggling* and *striving* towards ever new objects or projects to embark upon with the fleeting hope of ultimate satisfaction. The logic of calculation is symbolic, while the imaginary operates in the form of fantasies through which we try to manage or reconcile the ultimately irreconcilable ontological *contradictions* between what is lived through, and what we think we know. (Bjerg 2014; McGowan 2016).

One related psychic entrapment is that of becoming invested in one's own *dissatisfaction*. Advertisements, for instance, serve us with constant images of our dissatisfaction and inadequacy, and offer a variety of *sublime* objects that contain the promises e.g. of personal growth, discovery and happiness. McGowan states that we can rightly applaud capitalism for the achievement of *bringing the sublime down to earth from the heavens*, but that it is high time to take responsibility in locating our own enjoyment in the present, to recognize and reject the cycle of crises, as accelerated through the false promises that are always temporally projected to some distant future, as "yet another something to desire". He states that only *interpretation* can break the repetitive cycle and the assumed self-evidence of being emotionally invested in the transcendental imperative to accumulate, which seduces us with the happy, yet false promises of a better future that never actually arrives. (McGowan 2016).

Bjerg (2016) explicates the issue with deep philosophical remarks on *why* it is so hard to give up the prevailing growth economic imperatives that presume the economic subject as a "social moron". In his '*eco-analysis*' on the economic and the ecological *modes* of inquiry, he notes how both modes refer to a shared object of the "eco" as "*oikos*", understood in Greek etymology as a household or habitat, in other words the "*place that life takes place*". *Eco-logy* concerns the discourse and logic, and the *eco-nomy* the laws of governing the habitat that we all share. The notion of growth is originally descriptive of real natural phenomena, before the conflation with the "laws of the market". Bjerg elaborates on the underlying assumptions of growth with the Lacanian real-symbolic-imaginary ontological triad, for it is crucial to see that "*ecology and economy are both symbolic accounts of the reality of the eco*" (2016, 8), to counter the misconception of economy as a "natural" entity in itself: "*the gap between reality and the real appears to have been closed in the case of economy*" (2016, 56). As Bjerg argues, contrary to the notion of ecology, the economy is now an ideological success because it is presented as a supposedly *coherent* symbolic order. He also reminds that symbolic orders as such are generally recognized as being socially constructed, but psychoanalytic theory departs from mainstream social constructivism by insisting on the insurmountable *ontological gap* at the heart of subjectivity itself, namely between the *lived real* of experience and its symbolic identification, which we imagine as something to overcome through fantasy:

In psychoanalytic terms, the relation between the real and the symbolic is always already traumatic. The imaginary order is where this irreconcilable gap between the symbolic and the real is managed. Since there is no logically consistent solution to the

problem of the relation between the real and the symbolic, the imaginary order has the form of fantasy. [...] Fantasy projects an image of the ontological gap between the symbolic and the real as merely a technical, practical and temporary problem, which may be overcome if only the proper measures are taken and incidental obstacles are cleared out of the way. (Bjerg 2016, 25-26).

In his *genealogical* analysis over the differing economic attempts to solve the problem of equating *value* and *price*, Bjerg differentiates the contemporary market-based neo-classical paradigm of economic thinking, from the (18<sup>th</sup> century) physiocrat economics and its land-based “real” *substance* theory of value, and from the (late 18<sup>th</sup> -mid 19<sup>th</sup> century) classical economic thinkers who configured a “symbolic” *labour* theory of value. In contrast to the physiocrats and the classicists that were still openly aware of “the traumatic gap” between the *real origins* of value and *the pricing of value*, and driven to find proper measures to evaluate commodities, the neo-classical school has succeeded in *suppressing* the fundamentally insurmountable gap between value and its quantification. It has covered it with the fantasy constructions of “free and efficient market”, imagined as perfectly operating in itself by the “law of equivalent exchange” where “prices correspond to real value”, “personal wellbeing corresponds to economic prosperity”, and “nations experience perpetual economic growth” that is “unconstrained by limits of the natural environment”. As Bjerg remarks, the persistent success of neo-classical economics has nothing to do with empirical accuracy. It resides in its provision of an *attractive simplification* and easily mathematically measurable and predictable assumptions that “offers us economic reality as an escape from the world” (2016, 92). Yet the problems of value remain, since the narrow (GDP) modelling of the economy can only account for those forms of labour, productivity, exchange and value that are subjected to quantified symbolization through the pricing mechanisms and monetary exchange. This is also why we are bound to experience exceeding sense of dis-ease with the colonizing effects of economic rationalization, as it is used to expand the quantifiable realm in order to serve *the fantasy of growth*, and produce it at least in numbers. The outcomes are bleak, among other things for education that is turning into mere “employability training” in all levels, as Berg observes: “Education has increasingly been reduced to job training, preparing young people not for responsible adulthood and citizenship but for expert servitude to the corporations.” The expanding totality of “the market” has use only for a narrow kind of knowledge that serves the fantasies of growth and sustains the idealism behind *the market theory of value*, which only recognizes the value of something insofar as it can be price-tagged and exchanged for money. Hence it ignores or disdains all else it fails to enclose. (Bjerg 2016, 4-8, 25-26, 56, 59, 86, 92-93, 176, 184-185, 229).



## 2.13 Concluding thoughts

I side with the argumentation of Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), and with Varela (1996) among others, who have for several decades advocated a thoughtful inclusion of phenomenology among the cognitive disciplines. Cognitive science is today a scientifically, philosophically and practically extensive field, and a multidisciplinary educational platform for exploring human scientific research on *cognitive phenomena*. Phenomenological *recognition* involves a personally engaged way to re-orient our cognitive faculties of acquiring knowledge in the world, as we turn our cognizant attention back to *how* we come to know, what we *think* we know, or *naturally* take for granted when absorbed in activities. (Saariluoma 1990; Heinämaa 2007; Cerbone 2017). Given the different historical developments, modes of inquiry, and styles of thought cultivated within these traditions, the ongoing projects of combining the research fields of cognitive science and phenomenology will most likely remain to present a challenge - yet possibly a rewarding one - to whomever decides to embark on it.

I also agree with the argument that it is generally advisable to understand cognitive science and phenomenology as *distinctly different attitudes* of conducting inquiries on human experience, *before* they can be seen in certain terms compatible in different human and social scientific domains. In this chapter, I have also attempted to identify the most persistent problem areas of human scientific research practice, and based on this review, they can be traced to the *dogmatic* forms of naturalism and scientism. It seems duly wise to exercise caution toward any strongly reductionist forms of *naturalism* and *scientism* that are inadequate, or insufficient to say the least, when applied to understanding human action and social practices. The naturalistic notion and position of *psychologism* that Husserl set out to question, is not too far from what Dan Zahavi calls *neurologism*, that is, the currently “revived form of psychologism” that posit neurobiology as the base for all human activity. The position of neurologism still basically commits the same error as psychologism, in *confusing* the *ideal* domains of logic and the *factual* domains of empirical sciences. It also implies the non-scientific, i.e. practical and political interests toward naturalizing *ideality* and *normativity* as well. (Zahavi 2004; 2009, p. 249, footnote).

There are also the intellectual movements that endorse critically oriented and phenomenologically attuned interdisciplinary approaches toward the brain and neurosciences, which present the kind of projects that attempt to *question* the taken-for-granted foundational legitimacy of strong materialist assumptions, and aim to articulate the common ground *anew* (Slaby & Gallagher 2015; Slaby & Choudhury 2018). The naturalization of conscious life can also lead to the mechanization of reason, as modelled in terms of artificial intelligence in the exceedingly computerized era, and which Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) quite rightly found to be *socially alarming*. The “big data fallacy”, i.e. the almost magical belief that “numbers speak for themselves” when produced by “value-neutral” machines - supposedly without human efforts of knowledge and

understanding - logically results from *scientific reductionism* taken to its end. This has proven to be not only insufficient, but practically detrimental disposition to the scientific method and process. (Bridle 2018, 83-85).

It appears that any attempt of spanning the boundaries between the known and the unknown frontiers of knowledge, must involve self-critical examination of taken for granted assumptions and beliefs related to research as a social practice itself. Critical self-assessment may entail the realization that all sense of mastery in knowledge is always *incomplete*, while the usual solution is to seek safety in convention, as Verhaeghe (2004, 35 emphasis original) explains:

The impossibility of maintaining the position of the master makes one retreat into the anonymous safety of the group. The formula dates back to Socrates, albeit more as an admonition than advice: if *episteme* (loosely translated: knowledge) is unable to ground *arête* (loosely translated: truth), one settles for *doxa* (group conviction, dogmatism). In other words, one rationalizes in accordance with the recognized and approved paradigm of a collective authority that anonymizes the master figure because it is hidden behind an apparently unanimous, conventional system. The conscious argument concerns what is considered the accuracy of the theory; the subtext shows how this accuracy is actually the product of shared conventions.

The ongoing debates over the differing perspectives, underlying paradigms, and on the variety of intellectual and practical conceptualizations in a given field, seem typical across the social and human sciences. Design studies, for instance, are often closely connected with the practical fields of design, with argumentation *for* and *against* the way of seeing problems in a linear and predetermined fashion (Rittel & Webber 1973). There is a well-known contrast between understanding design as a *science*, and design as a *discipline* that better characterizes the “*designerly*” *ways of knowing, thinking and acting*” (Cross 2001, 54-55). The concrete problems of design, as a creative practice, also brought on the *wicked-problem* approach to ill-defined social ambiguity (Buchanan 1992, 16). It is also recognized, that the way we use language is involved in the problems we may want to escape: “*The true nature of wicked problems can be easily misunderstood because Rittel and Webber stayed within the language of the discourse that they tried to escape.*” (Cockton 2017, 749). In reference to the misperceived purposes of “taming” - or rationalizing - the wicked problems, Cockton has noted that the opposite of tame is wild (*like a horse*), and not wicked as it were:

The biggest problem with wicked problems is that they are not problems in the way that tame ones are. Also, ‘wild’ and not ‘wicked’ is the opposite of ‘tame’. A ‘wild’ problem is like a mustang (horse, not car), which needs to be ridden to tame it, but like any mustang, there is always a risk of a complacent rider being thrown off at any time. However, misunderstandings in HCI and IxD have domesticated ‘wild’ Wicked Problems. (Cockton 2017, 749).

The problems of cultural path dependency and intellectual confusion are not restricted to academic efforts to explicate phenomena, however, as the issues of concern can easily escape the grasp of the “learned circles” and official establishments of sciences and take up the form of popularized *mythical* assumptions, as Mary Midgley (2002) points out. According to her horse-metaphorical description: “*the horse of myth had bolted long before this stable door*

was locked” (Midgley 2002, p. x). “Trans-humanist” beliefs in genetic engineering and artificial intelligence as the supposed “*next step in human evolution*”, for example, may be appealing to some groups within the wider public, as well as to some of the practitioners of sciences themselves, and telling of what Midgley calls “*a quasi-scientific faith approximating to a religion*” (ibid, p. x). She notes that these contemporary avenues of faith are rather like displacement activities which effectively prevent us from actually facing the *real social* and *moral* problems with the relevant *human reformations*, instead of dreaming up how mechanistic devices would somehow save us from ourselves, improve us, or perform the necessary remedies *for us*.

The scientific format and vocabulary can also inadvertently contribute to maintaining or enforcing the ideas of *natural determinism* and *natural fatalism* regarding the popular opinions and interpretations of *social* phenomena. The explanatory projects of naturalizing or mechanizing human consciousness can thus have influence on civil society also indirectly and subconsciously through the cultural models, conceptualizations and metaphors that prevail in a society. Philosopher Alfred Mele (2014), for instance, has tried to influence the popular imagination by arguing *against* the deterministic natural or social scientific accounts that renounce the whole notion of *free will* as a mere illusion and regard it as wholly irrelevant for the purposes of explaining human behavior. I would also endorse Mele’s arguments, that there are in fact no philosophically nor scientifically valid reasons to altogether discard *human intentionality*, and what we can identify as *degrees of freedom and flexibility* already in the phenomenology of our everyday experiencing. The intentional acts of valuation, deciding and judging assuredly involves the biological organismic level and may well be interdependent on many artificial designs and situated contingencies, but they are not *completely* dictated by either nature or culture, or by genes or memes. The communal and the personal *beliefs* about the nature of human action, i.e. *whether* and *how* we understand it as essentially *free* or *determined*, can hold a great ethical and practical significance on how and why we engage or withdraw ourselves in the world. Dimitri Ginev (2011), for example, has also interestingly *reversed* the taken-for-granted natural scientific directedness, by re-positioning the *hermeneutic situation* and the *critical philosophical* take on naturalism as *the* starting point of research. He is proposing a continental philosophy of science, termed as ‘cognitive existentialism’. Existential ontology has also been applied in computer science engineering, and configured as ‘*thinging*’ instead of the orientation of *objectification* as the basis of conceptual modelling (Al-Fedaghi 2019). These kind of moves represent an inspiring gesture in the sense of demonstrating that we can always *rethink*, *revise*, and *reform* the previous tracks of commitment, however sternly privileged their conceptual hold may seem in directing our thought and action. Yet if there is no time to *think things through*, then it may seem simply natural to assume the most convenient option as given without friction, that is, without acknowledging the divergent perspectives and possibilities of world-disclosure.

It is worth to consider, whether the increase of *atheoretical* practical interests also play a role in the decline of public trust in academic research (Collini 2012; Berglund 2013; Alvesson 2013). Also, the matter of cognitive illusions, biases or misconducts is not to be seen *irrespective* of the socio-cultural, material and technological contexts of research, since “human errors” are also facilitated through the institutional *efficiency pressures* to publish research, even regardless of its universally valid content, actual quality, or meaning to personal or public life (Weick 1999, 2007; Grey 2009; Alvesson 2013; Alvesson, Gabriel & Paulsen 2017). Grey (2019, 356) reflects on the situation in management and organization studies, concerning the *lack of intellectual courage* as connected to the lack of institutional *licences to think* and write differently:

I believe that the consequences of this situation for the intellectual life of our field (and I suspect it is true of other fields as well) are depressing and dangerous. It is surely central to intellectual life, and central also to the social purpose of universities, that orthodox thinking be challenged. Yet such challenge becomes difficult to impossible if conformity is institutionalized in journals, in career paths, in universities.

There is, in other words, an instituted lack of “*willingness to tackle difficult ideas and subjects*”, including the areas that involve real life social and political issues (Courpasson 2013, 1243). The unwillingness also relates to the incentives for conducting conservative and narrow “*boxed-in*” -research instead of the more risky and time-consuming, yet potentially generative “*polymorphic*” inquiries (Alvesson & Sandberg 2014; Alvesson, Gabriel & Paulsen 2017, 90). The dogmatic, intellectualist, rationalist, pretentious or careerist formats and vocabulary of writing and communicating knowledge, however, can also be challenged with more ethical, experiential, embodied and humane terms of scholarship (Grey & Sinclair 2006; Gilmore, Harding, Helin & Pullen 2019).

My intention is to write this thesis in a way that involves the task of self-critical attentiveness concerning my own intuitive presuppositions and taken-for-granted assumptions, particularly as *a subject, object and agent of management*. It means that I have regularly tried to make the effort of countering the natural inclinations to safely excuse and detach myself as somehow wholly external to the problems at issue. The multifaceted problems of managing, as it were, include the recognition of the *stupefying effects* related to objectified efficiency pressures that tend to induce anxiety, scattered attention, haste conformity and confusion. I regard the embodied sense-givenness of my bodily being as an inescapable position, and grant equal importance to the *inseparable* critical transcendental sensibilities of consciousness. Yet I see the latter also as the more pressing area of concern at stake in more general terms in this inquiry.

Schelling (1809, 338), for instance, aspired to *(re)connect embodiment with the spirit of freedom*, as a *dialectical* attempt to reveal and reconcile the contradiction of necessity and freedom in the higher realm of thought and action:

Hence it seems that the connection between the concept of freedom and a total world view will always remain the subject of an inevitable problem which, if it is not solved,

will leave the concept of freedom ambiguous and philosophy, indeed, totally without value. For this great problem alone constitutes the unconscious and invisible mainspring of all striving for knowledge from the lowest to the highest. Without the contradiction of necessity and freedom not only philosophy but every nobler ambition of the spirit would sink to that death which is peculiar to those sciences in which that contradiction serves no function. To withdraw from the conflict by forswearing reason looks more like flight than victory. Another person would have the same right to turn his back on freedom in order to throw himself into the arms of reason and necessity, without there being any cause for self-congratulation on either side.

What is generally at stake here is human *freedom* understood as an *inner necessity*. The contradiction between freedom and necessity can thus be seen as a task of higher order balancing that concerns personal selfhood. As Merleau-Ponty saw it, our lived experience of concrete actions and commitments in the world can reveal to us that contradiction *as such* is already a truth of existence:

What then is freedom? To be born of the world and to be born into the world. The world is already constituted, but also never completely constituted: in the first case we are acted upon, in the second, we are open to an infinite number of possibilities. But this analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both ways *at once*. There is, therefore, never determinism and never absolute choice. I am never a thing and never bare consciousness. (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945, p. 527, emphasis original)

The conflicting social, political and economic interests and stakes behind the differing conceptions of freedom also remind us to keep asking *who*, in a given contextual setting, is *the intended* author of power and control, and *to what ends?* (Brady 1943). Critical management study pioneer Hugh Wilmott (2017), advocated the reinvigoration of the *sociological imagination* after C. W. Mills (1959). He combined it with the classic feminist essay by Carol Hanisch from 1970: "*The Personal is Political*" - for the purposes of identifying and re-connecting contemporary 'private troubles' and 'public issues'. He evoked these notions to be *seen in a new way*, in order to counteract the increased privatization of public concerns and the (a)political enforcement of "*rationality without reason*", which somehow tends to seduce and conform people into acting like "*cheerful robots*", and hence becoming more or less consciously *complicit* in the normalization and reproduction of their own *unfreedom*. Wilmott remarked that critical scholarship itself is *not* immune to the 21<sup>st</sup> century behavioural modification procedures, and its imperatives and techniques. This is why he suggested that we should all *sharpen* our engagement and efforts in recognizing and articulating the new oppressive - as well as the emancipatory - sources and modes of thinking about power in organizational life. The Critical Management Studies (CMS) Domain Statement<sup>2</sup> is also worth attention here, as it describes the overall motives and goals of this present inquiry as well:

---

<sup>2</sup> Retrieved 15/11/2018 from <http://aom.org/Divisions-and-Interest-Groups/Critical-Management-Studies/Critical-Management-Studies.aspx>

The Critical Management Studies Division is a forum within the Academy of Management for the expression of views critical of unethical management practices and the exploitative social order. Structural features of contemporary society, such as the profit imperative, patriarchy, racial inequality, and ecological irresponsibility, often encourage managers to see organizations as instruments of domination and exploitation. Driven by a shared desire to change this situation, we aim in our research, teaching, and practice to develop critical interpretations of management and society and to generate radical alternatives. Our critique seeks to connect the practical shortcomings in theories of management and managerial practices to the demands of a socially divisive and ecologically destructive system.

In the following chapters, I examine the problem of *managing the embodied mind* with the above considerations in mind, and attempt to identify the complementary special scientific, radical philosophical, and critical theoretical viewpoints. The goal is to explore the possibilities of cultural-historical understanding for the purposes of re-framing, re-imagining and re-orienting the problem of self-management in a way that *fundamentally* differs from the narrowly rationalized form. I assume that this goal can be met by *learning* to better distinguish the cognitive sense-data, the philosophical insights, and the managerial concerns, *in* and *through* one's own project. This is a *problem-based* inquiry that involves theoretical engagement across disciplines, so this is not a pure phenomenological study. Yet I aspire toward phenomenological research objectivity in terms of *intersubjective truth value*, which concerns the *general accessibility* of the written outcome. That is, whether the text can be *recognized* by the reader as generally valid and truthful, which is not the same as univocal agreement. It is also a question of *self-recognition*, given that the self never appears in isolation to itself, but always in relation to some communicative communal realm of others. (Himanka 2010a; Cerbone 2006; 2017).

This Master's thesis can also be characterized as a conceptual *pre-study* to my forthcoming doctoral dissertation on the subject of small business practitioner experiences, in which I intend to apply the phenomenological orientation. I have found phenomenology as a highly relevant yet a challenging methodological orientation to adopt in a typically non-philosophical context of management studies. Cognitive scientific field is relatively receptive to phenomenological method and insights, and I have here been granted with certain liberties to philosophically *explore*, rather than scientifically explain, the contemporary self-managerial concerns in a wider cultural-historical horizon of inquiry. The framework of ideas represents the interpretative metacognitive mapping and cross-fertilization between disparate research fields and emergent themes from over the years, which also means that the space for the specified development of analysis is limited in this study. I have taken lead from *the generic questions* that I have consistently found most significant, in order to *refine the lenses* through which to approach and analyse qualitative empirical material with philosophically clarified *conceptual* understanding and articulation. This *thought-in-process* may be of possible interest for others who have also been perplexed with the philosophical, methodological or thematic areas that I have here chosen to gather, review and connect in a non-conventional way.

### 3 THE CLASSICAL ETHICS OF SELF-RESTRAINT

In this chapter, I will trace the horse-handling analogy of emotion regulation to Ancient Greece. I interpret Plato and Xenophon as reminders of *embodied theorizing* (Bell & Sinclair 2014), and as proponents of *classical humanism*, which remain influential also in more recent philosophical and psychological accounts that combine *natural* and *normative* ideas (Pippin 2009). The main task is to recognize our natural inclinations to misinterpret life and forget the most *profound* level of embodied experiencing, for modern machines and technologies allow us degrees of detached control over nature, which relates to our tendencies to apply the logic of machinery to the whole of living nature, including ourselves. (Kaila 1990/1934; Morgan 2006). According to the phenomenological conception of embodiment, the lived body is our irreducible position and the locus of possibilities that is originally given to us in *twofold senses* of bodily perception: as a living-relational subject (*Leib*), and as a spatial-physical object (*Körper*) (Heinämaa 2011). In my view, Plato and Xenophon can provide an *open* further perspectives for thinking about the *embodiment of moral agency*, for instance, on how emotional experiences can reveal the regulatory significance of *otherness* to personal selfhood through the self-movements of “*altering the ego*” (Steinbock 2014; Han 2019). Their writings provide insights on the self-regulatory distinctions between the lower and the higher layers of conscious life. They can also demonstrate how the figure of the horse can be found *expressive* of *inward*, *outward* and *interactive* manifestations of emotion regulation, and seen as a *connection* to pre-reflective primordial experience.

I favour the notion of *self-restraint* in place of self-control, for the semantic connotation of self-restraint does not initially suggest the mechanization or rejection of passions, but rather the Socratic practice of *critical self-mastery* in handling emotions and affects while acknowledging their potentiality. It is reminiscent of the classical concept of ‘*sophrosyne*’ that basically means “*mindful self-restraint over intense passions*”, and which was represented in the Greek literature as an antonym of *hubris* (North 1946; 1966; Else 1968; Kemp 1968).

Ancient Socratic writer Xenophon saw the practice of *self-restraint* as the seat and precept of virtues, true freedoms, self-knowledge, real enjoyment and all good deeds. The good life, according to him, was based on the human efforts of reasoning that sought to integrate the ideals and values such as *goodness, beauty* and *truth*, with the real contents of life, and aspired to cultivate the notion of *fitness* between the motives, measures, means, and ends of human action. (Xenophon 1960, 100, 145-147). I agree with Peltonen (2016), who forwards the idea that ancient Greek thought can help to revise the current state of social theories with much needed ‘balanced integralism’, as a “*type of re-introduction of the metaphysical counterforces to the prevailing materialism and scientific empiricism*” (2016, 26). In today’s artificially imbalanced global economy, the economy and money also appear to be given as the ‘*quasi-religious substitute for the gods*’ and even as the ultimate ‘*transcendental a priori condition*’ for the public sense, policy making and everyday life (Hovas 2009; Viren 2018). This conceptual confusion can be understood as another timely reason to rethink the *empirical-transcendental* divisions, and the related taken-for granted assumptions.

### 3.1 The ideal and real of mastering passions: Plato and Xenophon

Ancient humanism can be understood only when it is grasped as one opponent in a media contest: that is, as the resistance of the books against the amphitheatre, and the opposition of the humanizing, patient-making, sensitizing philosophical reading against the dehumanizing, impatient, unrestrained, sensationmongering and excitement-mongering of the stadium. What the educated Romans called *humanitas* would have been unthinkable without the need to abstain from the mass culture of the theaters of cruelty. Should the humanist himself occasionally stray into the roaring crowd it is only to assure himself that he is also a human being and can thus be infected by bestialization. He returns from the theater to his house, shamed by his involuntary participation in the contagious sensations, and can now claim that nothing human is foreign to him. But, thereby, it is affirmed that humanity itself consists in choosing to develop one's nature through the media of taming, and to forswear bestialization. The meaning of this choice of media is to wean oneself from one's own bestiality and to establish a distance between yourself and the dehumanizing escalation of the roaring mob in the arena. (Sloterdijk 2009, p. 16).

The literary media, like classical humanism, seem to be waning against the unprecedentedly massive entertainment industries, and the general loss of savour in humanistic ideas (Braidotti 2013). Yet I prefer to hold that they are not altogether lost. I will discuss the ancient Greek thought of Plato (c. 427–347 B.C) and Xenophon (c. 430-355 B.C), as related to the virtues of self-restraint in reference to “handling horses”. Plato and Xenophon were contemporaries during the “Golden Age” of Greece (c. 500-300 B.C.) that is generally held to be an era that laid the foundations for Western civilization. They were both devoted pupils of Socrates (c. 470 – 399 B.C) in the city state (*polis*) of Athens, and familiar with the *negative* Socratic method: of arriving towards better hypotheses and toward the core essence of any given problem or phenomena through *questioning*. They were also prominent writers of Socratic dialogues. Plato was *the* quintessential philosopher, and it is not certainly known how



much he asserted his own views through Socrates. In Plato's writing, we get a typically idealist picture of his master, while Xenophon's depiction of Socrates was more ordinary, which may have echoed his own social disposition and preference to elaborate on the perceivable manifestations of the visible world within his proximity. While Plato was a synthetic theoretical thinker who emphasized the world of ideas, Xenophon's depictions of reality are more prosaic and practical. Both of them emphasized the *virtue of restraining one's passions* in their respective views on human agentic and social morale. (Waterfield 1993; 2002; Tervahauta 2009; Bragg 2011). Plato has been conducive for later critical and political philosophy, as well as religious and economic thought, while both can also be seen as the early proponents of *managerial* and *organizational* concerns. When elaborating on the self-restrained mastery of passions, Plato relies on metaphysical imagination and symbolic horse figures that represent the emotive dynamism in the human soul, whereas Xenophon reflects upon the practical *arts of horsemanship* as expressive of self-mastery.

This is not an exhaustive inquiry to ancient philosophical or virtue ethical traditions. I will elaborate on the ideas that I have recognized as thematically significant to self-managerial valuation and restraint in my own reading of the selected texts. These include the spiritual features that we tend to attribute and transpose to non-human animals, also for the reason of deepening and refining our *self-recognition* amidst the natural and the cultural-historical worlds. The purpose of engaging with these classical texts is about *re-thinking* our own intentional embeddedness in the world today, of how we find ourselves as other-regarding subjects of regulation within the *biosphere*, and within the *socio-historical* sphere. The central transhistorical and transcultural problem to reconsider is the ethic of *good life*, and how it may be personally appropriated, for instance, *i*) in light of compassionate experiential evidence from human-animal interaction, and *ii*) with respect to radical empathic apperception, e.g. of 'freedom', 'beauty', 'love', 'truth', 'goodness', 'power', and 'kindness' as they appear to us in and through interacting with the other embodied minds.

### 3.2 Plato's Chariot as a model for human psyche and society

Plato's *Phaedrus* dialogue (c. 370 B.C) concern *transcendental aspirations* of the soul, which is also referred to as "gaining the wings". Plato deploys the Chariot allegory (246a-254e) in elaboration of his tripartite model of the human soul that he similarly introduced in the *Republic* (c. 370-380 B.C), as different action tendencies *in motion* in the psyche, and in the society at large. These tendencies can be represented according to Plato's chariot analogy as follows:

- The charioteer (logical, *logos*) - desire for reason, truth and good life
- The white horse (spirited, *thymos*) - desire for recognition and status
- The dark horse (appetitive, *epithymia*) - desire for immediate pleasures

The lowest level (*dark horse*) is characterized by the most primitive sensuous urges, lustful pleasures, short-term goals, and unbridled immediate desires. The second level (*white horse*) is the more spirited and courageous in its inclinations, it desires worldly status, glory and fame, and is capable of higher emotions like shame. The highest part of the soul (*charioteer*) represents the inner rule of logic and reason, desire for justice, truth and the good life as a whole. It loves wisdom and strives to learn from mistakes. Plato locates the lowest part of the soul in the *stomach*, the second part in the *heart*, and the highest one as representing the *head* in the body. The chariot allegory displays the model of the soul as *inherently dynamic*: the different parts of the soul are in constant strife with one another for the power to rule over what actions to take and directions to go. The lowest part, that is, the 'bad horse' in the chariot, is the fervently arbitrary force that causes most *tension* in the dynamism for it is easily seduced by fast impulses. The dark horse runs rampant during sleep, which also makes it represent the unconscious elements of the psyche. It needs conscious efforts of *assertiveness* and *persuasion* to join the chariot as a *team*, in following the more righteous lead of the "good horse", and the guidance of the charioteer. This inner struggle between our better and worse natures, and especially the part that habitually and systematically manages to dominate the others, also assumedly determines the developing character of the person and his or her role in a society, and in social hierarchy. According to Plato, the ones mostly determined by their *primitive drives* were best suited for bodily labor. Those who were possessed by *social ambitions* were seen as naturally adept soldiers. The people who were mainly governed by *reason* were most inclined to love wisdom and educate themselves as philosophers, and suitable to govern others and the state after they reached enough wisdom and maturity, approximately at the age of fifty. Plato was cautious against all things that manifest themselves *in excess*, since they go against our better nature and prevent the proper rule and governance of reason. Psychic ailments were similarly seen as caused by excessive disturbances in the ideally *harmonious* balance between the elements of the soul. (Saariluoma 1985, 57-60). In *Phaedrus*, Socrates gives an eloquent description of the two horse-like elements that every soul ought to manage in the best possible way:

The one in the better position has an upright appearance, and is clean-limbed, high-necked, hook-nosed, white in colour, and dark-eyed; his termination to succeed is tempered by self-control and respect for others, which is to say that he is an ally of true glory; and he needs no whip, but is guided only by spoken commands. The other is crooked, over-large, a haphazard jumble of limbs; he has a thick, short neck, and a flat face; he is black in colour, with grey, bloodshot eyes, an ally of excess and affectation, hairy around the ears, hard of hearing, and scarcely to be controlled with a combination of whip and goad. (253 d-e).

The ethical task outlined throughout the model appear to be centred on self-knowledge, and *learning* – firstly from experience and failures – in order to control and direct the dynamic forces of the psychic life as a whole. The element of reason ought to be able to *restrain* both the base appetites and the worldly

ambitions, and *compel* these passions to work in harmony toward the good life. The model is urging us to recognize the existence and *power of passions* which cannot be completely erased or suffocated, but at best *bridled* for good purposes.

According to Plato's Socrates, the *love of forms* that also marks the philosophical search for the essence of phenomena, is our most helpful guide in this pursuit. Before elaborating on the chariot analogy in *Phaedrus*, Socrates makes a distinction between the *harmful*, and the *divine* inception of madness (*theia mania*), especially in reference to love and lovers: "*in fact some of our greatest blessings come from madness, when it is granted to us as a divine gift.*" (244a), the kind that "*is given by the gods to help us achieve the greatest happiness*" (245 b-c). He goes on to provide proof of the immortal nature of the soul: "*Every soul is immortal, because anything that is ever-moving is immortal, whereas anything which causes motion elsewhere and is moved from elsewhere stops living when it stops moving.*" (245c). Socrates concludes that the soul contains the source and generation of movement from its own resources – it is a *self-mover* (245e). The purpose of deploying the chariot analogy in what then follows in the dialogue is to understand the *character* of the human soul that naturally differs from godlike perfection. It makes the human condition more palpable, since human soul should always be seen in relation to its mortal bodily predicament, i.e. the earthly grounds that factually *constrains*, yet also *enables* all transcendental human aspirations. A complete godlike soul, as also the godlike chariot, is "winged", so these aspirations are symbolized as the growing of wings: "*Anything divine is good, wise, virtuous, and so on, and so these qualities are the best source of nourishment and growth for the soul's wings, but badness and evil and so on cause them to shrink and perish.*" (247e). In this model, the human souls go through different kind of cycles of reincarnation based on the mind's ability to recognize the divine on earth, that is, the realm of "true being and knowledge" (247c-d). The recognition is achieved through the cultivated use of one's memory, in "*recollection of the things which our souls once saw during their journey as companions to a god, when they saw beyond the things we say now "exist" and poked their heads up into true reality.*" (249c). When one is getting closer to these reminders of divinity and becomes possessed by them, he or she furthers away from the most mundane human concerns, and is hence easily misunderstood by the others. Socrates calls this the kind of madness that lovers of beauty are possessed by, but which leaves the (thousands of years) "old" or "corrupted" souls untouched and incapable of *seeing* true beauty in the world:

This fourth kind of madness is the kind which occurs when someone sees beauty here on earth and is reminded of true beauty. His wings begin to grow and he wants to take to the air on his new plumage, but he cannot; like a bird he looks upwards, and because he ignores what is down here, he is accused of behaving like a madman. So the point is that this turns out to be the most thoroughly good of all kinds of possession, not only for the man who is possessed, but also for anyone who is touched by it. (249d-e).

For the keenest kind of perception the body affords us is the one that comes through seeing, though we are not able to see wisdom, because as with everything else which

is an object of love, wisdom would cause terrible pangs of love in us if it presented some kind of clear image of itself by approaching our organ of sight. But as things are, it is only beauty which has the property of being especially visible and especially lovable. Anyone who has been initiated long ago or who has been corrupted is not given to moving rapidly from here to there, towards beauty as it really is. Instead, he gazes on its namesake here on earth, and the upshot is that the sight does not arouse reverence in him. No, he surrenders to pleasure and tries like an animal to mount his partner and to father offspring, and having become habituated to excess he is not afraid or ashamed to pursue unnatural pleasures. (250d-e-251a)

For Plato, the logical essence of the human soul was interconnected to the soul of the state, and all the way to the wider cosmic soul and logic of the universe. Human society was thus also seen as a manifestation of better or worse alignment in relation to the higher realm of ideas. The ideal harmony of the state was correlated with the holistic principle of *justice*, and the “justice of the soul of the state” was hierarchically incorporated as follows (Pojman 2006, 52):

- The guardians – representing the head and the virtue of wisdom
- The auxiliaries – representing the heart and the virtue of courage
- The economic class – representing the stomach and genitals and the virtues of obedience and self-control

Plato’s moral contemplations on the structuring of psychic life, as assimilated to the structuring of social life, have been foundational also for later political philosophical thought. In the *Republic* -dialogue, he linked different personality types to different forms of governance and evaluated them in a descending order as: *aristocracy*, *timocracy*, *oligarchy*, *democracy* and *tyranny*. In his view, the most reasonable and balanced person lived in aristocracy, which represented a society most governed by justice and truth. When people start to appreciate bodily exercise over the cultivation of their minds, aristocracy degrades into timocracy due to internal conflicts among the rulers who become mere rivals for glory in lack of education. Timocracy turns into oligarchy when material possessions and wealth become the most decisive value in a society. In a state of oligarchy, people only care about money and society is severely divided between the rich and the poor. A person of oligarchy is a scoundrel who may only seem superficially respectable. Democracy is founded when the poor get fed up with the rich and take over their power. But the free person of democracy is anxious and prone to follow his impulses and serve his own desires. A tyrant may rise up to rule when the state is no longer organized enough to defend itself against the power hungry mass turned into ruthless competitors. As a thoroughly rotten person, the tyrant fills all seats of governance with the like-minded obscene and excessively self-indulgent people, while ordinary citizens descend to slavery. (Saariluoma 1985, 61-62). In Plato’s psychology, excessive tendencies reside within each and every human being, so the main purpose of social conditioning, like education, was to curtail them with careful regard of the soul. After the death sentence of his master Socrates, however, Plato became disillusioned with real politics. (Waterfield 1993).

The social frame of moral expectations were assumed to become effective through *conscience*, which was also the ancient term closest for *consciousness*. Any given society, however, was *not* necessarily seen as the end point of valuation since there was always the sphere of higher ideals to aspire toward. In Plato's view, humans can only hope for - and occasionally mirror - truly divine rationality and ethical virtue, but they can be *motivated* to achieve virtue whilst factually remaining within the earthly confines of the natural world. Hence contrary to the most common misperception, Plato's emphasis on the soul does not necessarily mean that he discarded the body. He rather encouraged people to embrace more *thoughtful relationship* with the material world. As Plato conceived it, the human soul was necessarily embodied, and the body (*soma*) was the visibly animated side of the soul that could be empirically accounted for most evident for the senses and the mind. As Mark Vernon (2017, 6) puts it, "*It was the tangible end of a span of being that reached from the physical world to the domain of invisible spirit.*" One of the central questions that Plato (in the *Republic*) thus raises for us to consider for ourselves, is whether "*the boundaries of your body share the boundaries of your spirit?*" (Vernon 2017. p. 6). The question of the soul, when seen as originally seated in *embodied experience*, is far from mechanistic or simply amenable to only medical solutions. It comes down to the *essence of who you are* as a person, and who you are as a part of the larger cosmic whole of life in the universe. Plato's views suggest that sciences can surely inform us on the empirical mechanisms of the living cosmos and our participation in it, but they are not sufficient alone. Plato's dialogues seek to awaken our *felt appreciation* of beauty and harmony which intimately resonates to us and reflect what is essentially true and good for the self, and to the people at large. (Vernon 2017, 6-8). According to Plato, it is the soul that *breaths* life to the body, and without a soul the body is merely *passive* and *mechanistic*. A thing that does not enclose a soul hence cannot be considered as *living*. Plato's dualism is similar to psycho-physical interactionism that Descartes adopted later on. His ideas on the immortality of the soul are clearly not based on scientifically validated empirical evidence. The hypothetical idea and arguments of the soul are rather *persuasive* and *ethically purposive*, which still grants them a certain merit and interest as such. (Saariluoma 1985, 65-68).

Importantly, Plato introduced the dimension of *human* choice, intention and rationality, and his emphasis on the inner life of the psyche beyond the world of visible appearances marked the beginning of Western philosophy. It began to replace the influence of ancient Greek *heroic* poetry, whereas '*man is what he does*' through demonstrating his *factual body* and *outward behavior*, that were mainly seen as morally governed by the Gods. (Jouillié & Spillane 2015, 4-5, 21). As Peltonen (2016, 9-10) remarks, modern *anti-metaphysical* interpretations of "theory" also radically differs from the Greek Platonic original conception of *theoria*, which still included the whole *embodied* person, and the *practical* and *passionate* dimensions of theoretical contemplation.

### 3.3 The ideational faculties in view of economy, religion and eros

Hovas (2019) argues that Plato's rather righteous disposition and primary concern with the immortal soul rendered his philosophy as an early proponent for Christian religion, and that his ideas were also already amenable to modern *economic ideologies*, particularly regarding the metaphysically "omnipotent" role of the economy in today's secularized societies. In Plato's dialogues, taking care of economic prosperity was only the third and the last concern, after the care of the soul and the secondary importance of the body, but it was nonetheless included in his ethos. Moreover, his whole logic of justification may be portrayed as an *economic affair*, as a kind of "commercial exchange of souls with the gods", whereas gods represent the "creditors" that were able to grant immortal happiness in the afterlife to the "indebted" mortals, on the basis of properly virtuous care of the soul in life. (Holvas 2009, 16, 99-100). Jouillié and Spillane (2015, 35) argue, that through his multilevel and integrative modelling of the psychic and the cultural life, along with their control mechanisms, Plato was the initial inventor of *organization theory* and set out the tenets of *management psychology* - and that the Academy that he established to *educate rulership*, can also be seen as the prototype for modern management schools.

Eino Kaila (1990/1934, 637) used the term "*mental insurance-faculties*" to designate all metaphysical systems, like that of Plato's, as well as all types of *religious* worldviews. If spiritual aspirations and religious sentiments are seen in terms of fundamental human needs *before* the introduction of any particular system of *absolute* norms or dogmatic beliefs, they appear to hold deep existential significance to the peoples of all eras and faiths: "Religion is the reconnection (*re-legio*) of man with reality, whether this Reality be called God, Truth, Allah, Sat-Chit-Ananda, or Nirvana" (Schumacher 1977, 71). As Han (2019) also remarks:

Religion is awakened by the experience of finitude. It is crucial that human beings, as opposed to animals, are explicitly *conscious* of their finitude, that they are able to make their finitude an object of *knowledge*. Thus the *pain* leads beyond the immediate sensation to a *universal* idea of finitude. (Han 2019, 56, emphasis original)

In Han's conceptual account, religion is originally *deeply peaceful* and rooted in cosmic *friendliness*: it contains a deeper meaning before and beyond the introduction of any economic calculus of power, rationality and utility (2019, 57). F.W.J. Schelling, in his spiritually elevated conception of nature, was also connecting spirituality and religiosity to the real substances of personal being:

We understand religiosity in the original, practical meaning of the word. It is conscientiousness, or acting in accordance with one's knowledge, and not acting contrary to the light of understanding. A man to whom the latter is impossible, not in human, physical, or psychological way but in a divine way, one calls religious, conscientious in the highest sense of the word. He is not conscientious who, in a

given case, must first hold the command of duty before himself in order to decide to do right because of his respect for it. (Schelling 1809, 392)

Schelling was rejecting both the arbitrary equilibrium of choices and empirical determinism, and defended *the spirit of freedom*, which he saw as “the light” that gives birth to higher commitments that come from higher inner necessities:

We have seen how the spirit of man lays itself open to the spirit of lies and falsehood through false imagination and learning oriented towards non-being, and soon fascinated by it, is deprived of its initial freedom. (...) True freedom is in accord with a holy necessity, of a sort we feel in essential knowledge, when heart and spirit, bound only by their own law, freely affirm that which is necessary. (Schelling 1809, 391-392)

This ideal unity of knowledge and action essentially allows *no choice* to do things otherwise: no illusions of autonomous control or “optional morality”, no spirit of pride or “strict performance of duty” - but the heroic courage “*not to be inferior in action to that which one has recognized in knowledge*” (1809, pp. 392-394).

Eino Kaila also stated that *Eros* is a formidable source for the religious-like *deeply spirited* states of intensive emotional experiencing, and that sexual eroticism is the most usual way *to transcend the mundane* and momentarily achieve the metaphysical or religious registers of experiencing reality. He also notes that it is often *the only* route, particularly for those who are constrained by “*mental impotence*” when it comes to other possible or platonic ways of devotion and discovery of the “divine” and “sacred” on earth (Kaila 1990/1934, 632). Drawing insights from the psychoanalytic discourse of inner unconscious drives and desires, Jean-Francois Lyotard saw the *erotic forces* at play in the structuring of all types of human conducts in terms of the “libidinal economy” (2015/1974). His elaboration on the dynamic features that set the libidinal economy *in motion* suggests, that as individuals, *what* we continuously strive to capture, conceptually in *linguistic* terms, or possess *within* our bodies, are the “*energies*” or “*intensities*”, which nevertheless rather unexpectedly only *pulsate* and *pass through* us with varied *metamorphic* potentials. The libidinal motion perpetuates itself since there is no ultimate assurance or guarantee to our demands, or pretensions, of *exclusively* capturing the *tensive charge* or the *fully felt intensity* of these “effects that travel through us”, which in Lyotard’s view applies to love affairs and theoretical endeavours alike:

Theory demands the same thing as the amorous mistress and the unkind one: only love should erect the penis, only truth should erect the world! Such was Plato’s demand, and so it remains, even in apparently cynical, but in fact very religious, modern discourse. (Lyotard 2015/1974, 268).

In Lyotard’s account, the rise of the political economy is both metaphysical and driven by the *libidinal*, rather than dialectical or historical *materialism*. It is also *effectively* - without any definitely reliable *cause* we can refer to - confusing the elusive site of *intensities* and the socio-political realm of *identities*. The religious

undertone, that is to say, the demand for some “discourse of profound reasons” was in this sense no more original in ancient Greek than it is today. (Lyotard 2015/1974, 267-270). In his rare lecture on ethics, or rather on his own *moral struggles* to be as intellectually honest and precise as possible, Wittgenstein sought to correct the common misunderstandings regarding his work as “positivist” and “anti-metaphysical” in spirit (in Monk 1990, 227-228):

My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk on Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (Monk 1990, p. 227)

Wittgenstein was occupied and troubled with profound questions, especially toward the end of his life (Monk 1990). The ethical problems that relate us to the *deeper meanings* of life may indeed be best understood as *intrinsically valuable* and *irreducible* to the rational ‘world of facts’ and to the limits of language, as something *fundamentally* experiential, which we nonetheless try to seek, attain and express symbolically through verbal languages. Plato apparently knew the *purposive* benefits of using myth and fiction, in relation to the deeply seated sense and need of “intensities”, in what was termed as the *vital* “pangs of love”, or *harmfully* excessive desires as subject to restraint and conditioning. A Jungian economist Eugen Böhler maintained that *modern economic life of consumption* is primarily determined by *irrational collective impulses*, rather than by the rational processes of production. It is consequently dependent on the artificial crafting of marketable *fantasies, myths and mysteries* that may serve to gratify the human imagination as a *compensatory release* from the pressures of the rationalized organizational order. Depressions are then bound to occur if or when the economy loses the *collective faith* in its propelling myths and the *incentive* force of fantasy coordinates. (Ellenberger 1994/1970, 735-736). Böhme (2017), in turn, defines *aesthetic capitalism* as the current phase of capitalist development in which the pursuit of capital accumulation has saturated the private sphere to the extent that the *production of aesthetic values through the intensification of life* is the only way to produce more economic growth from extensive consumption.

In following Plato’s philosophical *doctrine of eros*, Han (2017b, 43-46) clarifies the distinction between *eros* as the “universal power, guide and spur of the soul”, in opposition to the compulsively positivized, obsessively visible and repetitive banality of “soulless” *sexuality* and *pornography*, which have *structurally* replaced the erotic forms of *energetic renewal* in contemporary neoliberal society, which he qualifies as a *depressively* achievement-oriented “burnout society”. Roudinescu (2001) is also alarmed by the contemporary state of societal valuation, and advocates the psychoanalytic approach for cultural criticism and revision of social thought: “*in these circumstances it ought once again today to be able to bring a humanist response to the gentle and death-dealing savagery*”



of a depressive society tending to reduce human beings to machines without thought and feeling (2001, 55). Roudinescu (2001) is particularly critical toward the current dominance of psychopharmacology in mental health professions, and sees it as *symptomatically* linked to the functionality of the 'depressive society', which is an impoverished one by virtue of its own bent toward serving the interest of *tranquilizing* people into voluntary submission:

All the sociological studies also show that the tendency of the depressive society is to destroy the essence of human resistance. Between the fear of disorder and the valorization of competitiveness based only on material success, there are many subjects who prefer to give themselves over willingly to chemical substances rather than speak of their private sufferings. The power of medicines of the mind is thus the symptom of a modernity tending towards the abolition not only of the desire for liberty but also of the very idea of confronting that experience. Silence is therefore preferable to language, which is a source of distress and shame. (2001, 18).

The views above suggest that profound truths can also be *lived through* and recognized from the embodied flashes of insight, which can emerge via multiple hermeneutic routes that generally involve a certain ideals of reasoning, valuation or purposiveness as a *directive* emotive guide for human projects. According to Mark Fisher's (2009) Gothic description of capitalism as a 'hyper-abstract impersonal structure' and 'remorseless meat grinder', however, such endeavours are all too often pre-empted in our era of 'capitalist realism', for: "*Capital is an abstract parasite, an insatiable vampire and zombie-maker; but the living flesh it converts into dead labor is ours, and the zombies it makes are us.*" (2009, 15). The ambiguous experience of conflicting forces that spur and drain desires, can also be understood after Sloterdijk (2009, 16), as an *ongoing universal struggle* between the *humanizing*, linguistically mediated *resistances*, and the *dehumanizing*, sensation-seeking medias of "bestialization". The means and ends of the latter media rather *deteriorates* the qualifying and the structuring properties of language as a *careful* form of inquiry, expression and communication, in favor of proliferating the consumption of instantaneously "digestible" pleasures attached with certain *psychosomatic* appeal and purchase. The current stage of technological development also allows for the fast and wide distribution of *affectivity* through cybernetic digital terrains (Parisi & Terranova 2001). The apprehension of reality may thus be "seized", in its unquestioned *givenness*, as seemingly "pure" and "certain" in the present, which tend to *overwhelm* and *restrict* self-consciousness to "pure being" that Hegel described as the immediacy of "*sense-certainties*", which precede the more complex processes of reflective thought that involve *self-conscious conceptual mediation*. He noted that this *sense-knowledge* may firstly *appear* like the *richest* and *truest* knowledge there is, but it is rather yet the most *abstract* and *poorest* form of knowledge, when deemed sufficient as such. (Hegel 1977/1807, 58-59). Zahavi (2014) is acknowledging the *epistemically enabling* function of pre-reflective experiencing, and furthermore emphasizes the possibilities of *transformation* as the cognitive value of reflection:

In order to obtain proper knowledge about one's experiences, something more than pre-reflective self-consciousness is indeed needed. Reflection does not simply reproduce the lived experiences unaltered; rather, the experiences reflected upon are transformed in the process, to various degrees and in various manners, depending upon the type of reflection at work. This transformation is precisely what makes reflection cognitively valuable. (Zahavi 2014, 37)

The use of formal languages is not the only way to communicate, or even to think, if we accept the "scenic-phantasmatic" mode of imagining past and future events, e.g. in daydreaming, as a *non-linguistic mode* of thought (Lohmar 2016). Or, if we understand 'thinking without thinking' in terms of "cognitive nonconscious" that is still a powerful and a necessary function of consciousness (Hayles 2017). Language surely involves limits and conflicts of communication, but also the virtually open symbolic possibility domain of ideas and concepts that enable us to *modify, clarify* and *enlarge* the personally lived and the shared experiential regard of realities. As Ellenberger (1994/1970, 723) remarks: "*The greatest danger threatening mankind, according to Jung, was the substitution of a mass mentality for a true democratic mentality based on educating and perfecting the individual.*" The cultivation of reflective capacities is arguably necessary for self-knowledge, and also for gaining the interpretative means that enable a person to effectively *resist* the kind of medias that tend to 'deaden the soul' by resorting to the short-cuts of superficial sensationalism simply in order to seize attention.

### 3.4 Xenophon's horsemanship ethic of economizing passions

A long-reaching historical outlook on the subject of economic affairs suggests that the core significance of trade as a type of human interaction has rested upon the perceived *differences* between the natural conditions, and between the peoples. Commencing trade between different geographical regions and cultures has in its part also served the purposiveness of *mutual aid* and development of humanity. The political organization of society, economy and commerce had no insignificant role to play when it comes to the intellectual succession of Greek culture, and its heritage that has been foundational for Western civilization. The transgenerational glory of the ancient Greeks can thus also be attributed to their overall succession in harnessing the economically productive material spheres of life to *serve the culture* of the human civilization for sufficient periods of time. (Voionmaa 1924, 5-6, 13).

Xenophon is known as a Greek writer who elaborated on the many facets of ancient economics. The theme of *leadership* was central to him and it permeated all his writings. He was an upper class aristocrat, a soldier, a cosmopolitan, and a prosperous land owner who had an estate outside Athens. Whereas Plato seemed to prefer the urban life of the state, Xenophon loved the land: hunting, riding and all the festivities outside the city life of Athens. He expressed vivid admiration of women in many of his writings and was

pronouncedly heterosexual, while Plato's dialogues often depicted homoerotic friendship and love relations. His privileged position spared him from having to work for a living, so he could afford to pursue also his philosophical and other various interests and travels. Xenophon was a prolific historicist and writer, covering immensely wide range of topics, but he was keen on *moralizing* rather than *analysing* events. His wide-ranging intellectual pursuits were grounded on conservative ethical and political views on *how to live* life, and not on epistemological and ontological questions as such. He was at heart a pious man who never questioned the given order of things. Yet Xenophon was righteous also in a socially conscious way: he favoured relatively egalitarian manners of conduct when they served the overall interest of running the *oikos*, i.e. the household economy. Xenophon valued women for maintaining the everyday order in the household, yet for him it was still a man's duty and privilege to transcend the most ordinary practicalities, in order to oversee, educate and steer the conducts of the particular micro-economy under his rein. According to him, managing the household differed only in size in comparison to governing the state. In Xenophon's view, a man best demonstrated his *leadership morale* and the "*gentlemanly virtues of reason*" in the *control of his own emotions*, which was manifested through the way he was able to manage his property, including the land, animal stock, the servants and family welfare. Like Plato, he preferred the *top-down* order, and held that those who were regarded as *more able* should govern the *less able* in every social hierarchy. (Tervahauta 2009; Bragg 2011). Xenophon wrote a well-known Socratic dialogue on the virtues related to economic management of the household (*Oeconomicus*, c. 362 B.C), which can also be seen, according to Foucault (2010, 217-227), as an informative historical account on the everyday life and domestic relations between men and women in the ancient world, especially regarding the ancient Greek ideologies of power within and beyond the household.

Another, more specified text written by Xenophon, where he demonstrates the *man's control of emotions* as reflected through *outward manifestations*, is the earliest known (in the Western world), and still widely read manual on the '*Art of horsemanship*' [c.350 BC], in which he elaborates on the equestrian arts of choosing, caring, training and riding of horses. Xenophon was a skilled horseman in the Greek cavalry (*hippeis*), and his elaboration on horsemanship concerns the animal's suitability mainly for the situations of warfare and battle. Wealthy land-owners like him were also required to provide trained horses for the military purposes of the state. Horses were expensive and highly valued part of the *war machinery*, since human life and success in battle often depended on their willing cooperation: "*A disobedient servant is of course a useless thing, and so is a disobedient army; a disobedient horse is not only useless, but he often plays the part of a very traitor.*" (ibid. p. 24). He frequently delivered his points by positing the behavior of horses *in parallel* with human characteristics:

In the first place you are to know that mettle is to a horse what temper is to a man. (...) Every abrupt sign that you make him - sudden sights, sounds or impressions - all disturb high-mettled horse as they do a man. If you want to collect a high-mettled

horse when he is dashing faster than is convenient you should not draw rein abruptly, but should try to win him over gently with the bit, calming him down and not forcing him to be still. Long stretches, rather than frequent turns, calm horses down, and does not rouse the spirit of the horse of mettle. But if anybody expects to calm such a horse down by tiring him out with riding swiftly and far, his supposition is just the reverse of the truth; these are exactly the circumstances in which the high-mettled horse tries to carry the day by main force, and in his wrath, like an angry man, he often does much irreparable harm to himself and his rider. A high-mettled horse must be kept from dashing on at full speed, and utterly prevented from racing with another; for as a rule, remember, the most ambitious horses are the highest-mettled. (pp. 52-53).

Above all, Xenophon was urging the practical principle of approaching and treating horses always with *gentle* manners, calmness and kindness, already from early on when choosing and grooming a young horse, in a way that would make the animal 'love' and seek human handling:

See to it that the colt be kind, used to the hand, and fond of men when he is put out to the horse-breaker. He is generally made so at home and by the groom, if the man knows how to manage so that solitude means to the colt hunger and thirst and teasing horseflies, while food, drink, and relief from pain come from man. For if this is to be done, colts must not only love men, but even long for them. Then, too, the horse should be stroked in the places which he most likes to be handled; that is, where the hair is thickest, and where he is least able to help himself if anything hurts him. The groom should also be directed to lead him through crowds, and to make him familiar with all sorts of sights and all sorts of noises. Whenever the colt is frightened by any of them, he should be taught, not by irritating but by soothing him, that there is nothing to fear. (pp. 21-22).

He claims, considerately, that failing to restrain one's impulses and use reason with horses in recognition of the animal's viewpoint can have long reach, since horses can be extremely sensitive to, and persistent in emotional contagion:

Next we ought to observe how he receives the rider upon his back; a good many horses hardly let come near them things whose very approach is a sign that there is work to be done. (p. 24)

And washing under the belly should be done very sparingly; it worries the horse more than washing anywhere else, and the cleaner these parts are made, the more they attract things under the belly that would torment it. (p. 33).

When the moment comes to dismount, never do so among other horses, nor in a crowd of bystanders, nor outside the riding ground; but let the horse enjoy a season of rest in the very place where he is obliged to work. (p. 44).

The one great precept and practice in using a horse is this, -never deal with him when you are in a fit of passion. A fit of passion is a thing that has no foresight in it, and so we often have to rue the day when we gave way to it. Consequently, when your horse shies at an object and is unwilling to go up to it, he should be shown that there is nothing fearful in it, least of all to a courageous horse like him; but if this fails, touch the object yourself that seems so dreadful to him, and lead him up to it with

gentleness. Compulsion and blows inspire only the more fear; for when horses are at all hurt at such a time, they think that what they shied at is the cause of their hurt. (pp. 37-38).

Xenophon's comments on transcendental aspirations in terms of *religious* (in reference to gods) and *aesthetic* sentiments (in reference to beauty), regarding the artful and performative side of the human-horse interaction:

For what the horse does under compulsion (...) is done without understanding; and there is no beauty in it either, any more than if one should whip and spur a dancer. There would be a great deal more ungracefulness than beauty in either a horse or a man that was so treated. No, he should show off all his finest and most brilliant performances willingly and at mere sign. (pp. 62-63)

This is the attitude in which the horses of gods and heroes are depicted, and men who can handle a horse gracefully in it are a magnificent sight. The horse rearing thus is such a thing of wonder as to fix the eyes of all beholders, young or old. Nobody, I assure you, either leaves him or gets tired of watching him as long as he presents the brilliant spectacle. (p. 63).

Xenophon saw the good practices of horsemanship as part of economically balanced managing that brings status and prestige to those who master it:

To conclude, if a man buys his horses skilfully, feeds them so that they can bear fatigue, and handles them properly in training them for war, in exercising them for the parade and in actual service in the field, what is there to prevent him from making his horses more valuable than when he acquired them, and hence from owning horses that are famous and from becoming famous himself in the art of horsemanship? Nothing except the interposition of some divinity. (p. 64).

Xenophon's ethos of horsemanship generally echoes his other moral concerns regarding the virtues and deeds of good living as a whole, which he elaborates most notably in reference to Socrates. His writings represent a more practice-based view of the ideals of the good life than Plato's philosophy. In Xenophon's depiction, Socrates did not make a distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, but saw them as intertwined, since "all virtues are wisdom", and all just and virtuous deeds are "beautiful and good". A person could hence be regarded as both stupid and weak in character, if he *knew* what should be done, but actually did the opposite despite the better awareness and knowledge. Something was seen as good or beautiful only when it *fitted* the given purposiveness of its use or being, for example, "what is good for hunger, is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever, can be bad for hunger." According to Socrates, happiness that was derived from mere *good luck* was the opposite of *action*; i.e. of studying, practicing and of *doing the right thing*, which was seen as the real measure of a truly worthy human being and living. He emphasized that no amount of monetary or material wealth could ever replace the significance of the cultivation of the soul (Xenophon 1960, 100, 102, 104, 120).

Xenophon's Socrates was teaching the virtues of *self-restraint* as a beautiful and noble trait that best demonstrated the character and *trustworthiness* of a person. He considered that "unrestrained" people - those proven "*weaker than their stomachs, wine, love, suffering and sleep*" - were harmful to others and to themselves, in corrupting any given tasks, their managed properties, as well as their own minds and bodies. Actually *becoming* capable of something where one wants to *appear* capable through education and training, was seen as the most *beautiful path* to social fame, instead of sheer *fortune*, or *pretense*. Also, it was not enough to be in possession of traits such as beauty or wisdom, since they could be put to a *shameful use*, as in merely selling them for any willing recipient in exchange of money, like prostitutes or sophists did. Those with noble characters could already be persuaded with *noble manners*, whereas "lower friends" would always require altogether something else. (Xenophon 1960, 33-34, 37-38, 56).

Xenophon emphasized that meeting Socrates was always *beneficial* to anyone who was able to appreciate his demeanour, because he encountered every person in a way that was subtly attuned to their unique disposition. For example, when someone was *proudly* convinced of *naturally* possessing a noble character, and simultaneously despised education and any effortful cultivation of the soul, Socrates endeavoured to demonstrate that those who can be deemed as the *most gifted* ones, are also those who are *most in need* of education. He evidenced this in reference to *fine horses* that may originally be the most boisterous and fervent, and that become the most splendid and even-tempered if they're groomed from early age onwards - but even more troublesome to handle unless tamed with care. Socrates also forwarded the importance of *guidance* and *cultivation* in reference to *dogs* that seem naturally most energetic, resistant and eager after prey, as potentially the most useful hunting dogs, but only when they're properly trained. He used these animal examples to suggest that the most vigorous and strong-minded people may similarly become the best and *most beneficial* ones to themselves, others, and society, when they are well taught what to do. In case their education fails, as Socrates concluded, they fail to make *good decisions* on what to embark upon, and as scarcely inhibited and stubborn individuals, they easily end up doing the *greatest mischief* instead of the *greatest service* to themselves and to others. (Xenophon 1960, 119-120).

It is possible that Xenophon asserted his own interactive observations on animal behavior through the words of Socrates, since his writings demonstrate a tendency to *assimilate human and animal* behavior for the purposes of *moral persuasion*. Overall, Xenophon's morale seems to grant merit to those who were able to master their passions and exercise influence upon other living beings with *tact* and *care*, while certain unpredictable contingencies were credited to originate from deities. Well organized economic prosperity was, at least to a privileged and intellectually curious man like Xenophon, the means that enabled him to pursue higher cultural aspirations. Xenophon's practical outlook made him rather abandoned as a philosopher, but his engagement with everyday subjects and wide-ranging topics are still of interest in their own right.

Perhaps the most enduringly appealing, and interesting features of Xenophon's horsemanship ethic are shown through his elaborated expressions of *empathy* and *compassion*, together with the *precept of self-restraint*, when approaching another sentient living being like the horse, with an emphasis on the importance of *mutual understanding* over one-sidedly forced compulsion. These kind of notes remain recognizable guidelines for the practice of horse handling, training and riding today. His self-transcending *orientation* and display of care towards the other in its own terms, signifies a conspicuous contrast to merely *calculating* or *abstracting* their material worth, notwithstanding that it was probably most rational to act this way in order to secure the animal's trusted cooperation in the battlefield. After all, he aspired to embody the philosophical and moral lessons of Socrates through his own take on leadership concerns. While it is possible to identify certain *ancient heroic* elements in his ideas regarding the *outward performances*, he also seemed to represent a *Platonic Ruler* (Jouillié & Spillane 2015), who admired the universal ideals of *harmony* and *balance*, whereas people would *ideally* know their "proper" place and most "fitting" duties, and would care for cultivating virtues also in accordance with the *inner psychic* makeup or state of their soul.

Spoelstra discusses the concept of *leadership* that has been loaded with many expectations in the popular imagination since the ancient Greece. Aristotle, for example, also wrote that the "best men" should be the leaders of other men. Max Weber, assumedly inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche and his notions on the absence of God, proposed the idea of a "charismatic leadership" that remains paradigmatic today, along with its religious connotations that are maintained within the recently added prefixes such as "transformative", "spiritual", and "authentic". Leadership is most often distinguished from management, in that leaders are seen as extraordinary individuals that are capable of *transcending* and *transforming* the organization, while managers stay functional within the ordinary boundaries of a given organizational hierarchy and structural order. The leader is usually gendered as a *masculine* figure, while women are still more readily issued with managerial tasks. (Spoelstra 2018, 3-4).

The very idea of a leader indicates that there are those who are willing to follow. Followers *constitute* the leader by recognizing the higher authority of another person in the position of a director, who *envisions* the way to go, or represents a *role model* to imitate. By contrast, someone who follows some pre-given impersonal rules instead of a person, is likely deemed a *bureaucrat* rather than a follower. Followership through imitation can be traced to Plato's *Republic* and his *ontology of mimesis* whereas the "philosopher kings" were stated as the ideal leaders due to their closer proximity to eternal essential forms, i.e. the divine truth of things. In Plato's utopian constellation, philosophers were best suited to lead and govern because they were guided by truth and love for knowledge, and *not* persuaded by material possessions or gains. Plato was more progressive than Aristotle in that he included women as equally capable of achieving the status of a philosopher. He also thought that people were

suggestible to imitate whatever superficially masqueraded itself as “truthful”, instead of following the uneasy Socratic path. (Spoelstra 2018, 106, 109).

One of the most influential ideas that has gained ground since the 1990’s is that leaders should firstly be humble followers and servants themselves, and encourage the inherent transformative potential in others through some form of *self-leadership*. The leader-follower -relationship may hence resemble that of a teacher and a pupil who presume an equal standing of *co-learning* from each other. On a more cynical note, this also represents the increase of *secular spiritualism* in organizational life, which can apparently function as a redeeming force for the crudely instrumental business side of things. The leader/follower -distinction has nevertheless been blurred to the extent that we can now speak of “leaderless leadership”, as in the formulation of “collective”, “team”, “shared”, “distributed”, and “co” -leadership concepts. People are thus more often expected to follow the *spirit* of some assumedly common movement or purpose, rather than particular path-setting “heroic” individuals. It is also important to note that hierarchical top-down power structures are not altogether disappearing, even when they are *faded out in sight* as such, and seem to be ‘*nowhere and everywhere*’ at once. (Spoelstra 2018, 117). At the same time, it appears difficult to contest or negotiate the rules of conduct when they’re based on some abstract spirit of things in the absence of authority figures who could actually be held accountable if or when things go wrong. The perception of reliable authority figures and structures, is not altogether something detrimental, for they can also provide certain guarantees of freedom, and true perception of *autonomy* that can only be experienced in relation to a relatively steady ground of a commonly agreed set of boundaries (Maravelias 2009). According to Freudian group psychology, *eros* drives the followers to denounce their individuality and seek *common identification* through the leader. This libidinal dynamism binds the leaders and followers together also in the sense of covering the elementary *aggressive drives*, which tend to surface if the illusion of togetherness and group cohesion breaks down. (Ellenberger 1994/1970, 527).

There are also phenomenological approaches to leadership practices and inter-practices of leading and following, which attempt to restate the notion of *embodiment* into investigating and theorizing the organizational life-worlds. (Ladkin 2008; Küpers 2013). Küpers (2013) develops embodied leadership concepts, because: “*carnal leadership studies embrace a more sensorial and fleshly stance in relation to bodies of all its members and the mediating embodiment at work as part of organizational every-day worlds*” (2013 p. 347). After Merleau-Ponty, she is critical of the one-sided accounts of empiricism and intellectualism alike, and yet careful not to posit everything as strictly bodily based, or falling prey to some form of “neo-sensualism”. Only a truly multifaceted and cultural-historically informed phenomenological accounts of organizing bodies and embodiment, in her view, can counter the neglect of the body in organizational theorizing, when bodies are “*merely seen as constructed or rendered only as instrumentalized objects for an utilitarian exploitative ‘practicalism’*” (2013, p. 348). Ladkin (2008) draws from Plato’s ideas and category of “*the beautiful*” and takes it as applicable to authentically embodied enactment of leadership



performances, “as an essence which could imbue human form as well as art works and nature” (2008 p. 33). She highlights the acts of becoming more attentive to seeing whether the aesthetic dimension of leadership enactment is “fitting” the aesthetic *responses* that are implicitly invested with the *qualitative* essence, knowledge and values of organizing, and which ultimately determine the *fitness of practices* with respect to establishing genuinely life-enhancing common goals.

### 3.5 The capitalist reformulation of social and emotional life

The ancient Greek ideas of economic management seem *foundationally* different in comparison to the contemporary ideology of *strategic managerialism* in the military (McCann 2017), and in other sectors of society (Koikkalainen 2017), where the *large-scale concerns* of predicting, modifying, and controlling nature and human behavior have taken over the metaphysical “seat of the Gods”. In Fleming’s (2017a) outspoken account, the economic rationality that is prevalent today is nothing but a “*deformed bastard child of reason*”, spurring bureaucratic managerialism that is further colonizing our everyday life and objectifying and exploiting our every move in the name of necessity. He describes it as an “*absent presence*” which represents a tautology of nothingness, a “*self-referential mysticism of numbers*” that is spiralling the empty logic of “*utility without purpose*” and the *dead-end* instrumental ideology of work *unconnected* to actually useful or existentially meaningful functions in a society. (2017a, 260-267).

The capitalist “laws of motion” are often mistakenly associated with linear accounts of history, as somehow “destined” and aligned with different progressive movements. Capitalism is even conceived of as a system that exemplifies the inevitable realization of human nature and rationality itself. Ellen Meiksins Wood (2017) seeks to challenge *the naturalization* of capitalism and the many common misperceptions with a more accurate historical account of the origins of capitalism that highlight *the specificity* of the capitalist system, and the *discontinuity* –rather than smooth continuity – between capitalist and non-capitalist societies in Europe. She traces how capitalism was actually invented and introduced - as a *qualitative transformation* of previous ways of organizing material and social life - that was *not* simply a quantitative acceleration, or mere extension to earlier practices of trade and commerce. Meiksins Woods also makes some necessary distinctions, between the capitalist and the *bourgeois* (non-noble town-dweller in its original French meaning), which, similar to the notions of capitalism and modernity, or technological improvement of productivity and social progress, are mistakenly *conflated* in Western culture. The ideology of *improvement*, originates from the early British projects of agrarian capitalism and empiricism. According to Meiksins Wood, this idea of improvement was mainly about “*the subordination of all human values to productivity and profit, rather than in the Enlightenment*” (2017, 189). That is to say, the early rise of capitalism was not initially (nor afterwards) too invested in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Enlightenment ideals of improving *humanity* and universal

emancipation, but on the “*practices of dispossession and enclosure*” for the sake of profit and property. She also notes that this ethic of improvement has been implemented in the name of the supposedly self-regulatory “invisible hand” of the market, rather than in terms of Weberian rational planning.

Meiksins Wood gives an example of the *agrarian* origins of the British economic development into capitalist imperialism already in the early modern (16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century) period, through an imposition of a new order of economic coercion, pressures and change of property relations, that the English state forced upon the Irish and their land, through which the: “*Englishmen schooled in the Irish colonial venture transported their experience to the American colonies*” (2017, 155). She emphasizes that “the market” only became capitalist, when it became *compulsory*. The idea of the capitalist market “*forces*” then, is rather descriptive of actual *coercion*, contrary to the still typically entertained, yet illusory rhetoric of “freedom”, “opportunity”, and “choice” as associated to market transactions in commercialized societies. A realist long-term historical or futural account of capitalism, hence must proceed through recognizing how the actual “*dictates of the capitalist market – its imperatives of competition, accumulation, profit-maximization, and increasing labor productivity – regulate not only all economic transactions but social relations as well.*” (2017, 7). The main point that Meiksins Wood aims to advance, is about distinguishing between the very different, capitalist and non-capitalist historical developments, instead of “lumping” all together in the worst postmodern style, which merely naturalizes the logic of capitalism and prevents us from understanding the nature of this deeply contradictory and essentially exploitative system itself. She argues that we are currently only passing further beyond the point where the destructive effects of capitalism by far outweigh the material gains: “*the imperatives of the market will not allow capital to prosper without depressing the conditions of great multitude of people and degrading the environment throughout the world.*” (ibid. p. 107). We are hence witnessing the ever more obvious disparities between productive capacity and the *quality of life* that is in most parts deteriorating.

As a theorist of the political economy, Albert Hirschman (1915-2012) was also troubled with the single-minded procession of economic thought during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He criticized both the reduction of human nature into “self-maximizing utility machine”, and the communist account for “utopian nostalgia” as regards to social life. In *The Passions and Interests* (2013/1977), Hirschman turned to seek solace from the intellectually rich historical discussions of ancient economic thought. He also traced the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century philosophical, political and social thought (e.g. of Montesquieu, Sir James Steuart, and Adam Smith) on the paradoxical relation between reason and passions, especially in terms of their *capitalist reformulation* that set a certain social rules of conduct. Hirschman notes on a particular shift of thought taking place. As suggested by Machiavelli and Spinoza, among others, it was no longer deemed sufficient to think of human beings normatively as they “ought to be”:

The overwhelming insistence on looking at man “as he really is” has a simple explanation. The feeling arose in the Renaissance and became firm conviction during

the seventeenth century that moralizing philosophy and religious precept could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men. (ibid. p. 14-15).

The main idea and the solution that followed was that of positively *harnessing the passions*, instead of repressing them by external authorities which was then considered largely ineffective on human nature. Hirschman makes a compelling case regarding these initial high expectations - of *self-interest as the bridle of wicked passions* - for the capitalist economic order, a notion which differs from the historical process views of Marx and Weber. The key idea disclosed in the essay is the recognition of the *endogenous power of unrealized intentions*, that is, the *expected* harmonizing effect of individualist, self-interested acquisitions for the societal order and common wealth. Hirschman's argument is not severed by the subsequent failures of these expectations: the high hopes were there and can be understood in relation to the broader intellectual atmosphere of that time.

Theoretical innovators, such as Darwin and Freud, also often get undeserved disdain due to the social *applications* related to their ideas, despite the generally *unpredictable* way ideas are appropriated with respect to historical circumstances and developments. Hence it is not typically broadly understood why or how their ideas were modified and carried forward in accordance with technological and socioeconomic changes. 'Social darwinism', for instance, was an ideological modification that serves the system of mass consumption, hard work and competition. In addition to responding to the terrors of the World Wars, the task of psychotherapy also became centred on strengthening the individual ego to cope with tensions and anxieties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century *hedonistic-utilitarian* system of mass governance (Ellenberger 1994/1970, 548-549).

Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) was another 20<sup>th</sup> century economic theorist who was concerned with the actual historical developments of capitalism. He is often regarded as an ideological proponent of capitalism, yet he was in fact rather pessimistic toward the degrading *moral horizon* of capitalist societies. In his multi-disciplinary views on capitalism, as "*a perennial gale of creative destruction*", Schumpeter (1942) recognized how the capitalist system accelerated and instrumentalized the use of economic rationalization, to the extent that it was in the process of taking over the whole human outlook on life:

And thus defined and quantified for the economic sector, this type of logic or attitude or method then starts upon its conqueror's career subjugating - rationalizing - man's tools and philosophies, his medical practice, his picture of the cosmos, his outlook on life, everything in fact including his concept of beauty and justice and his spiritual ambitions. (1942. pp. 123-124)

As regards the economic performance, it does not follow that men are "happier" or even "better off" in the industrial society of today than they were in a medieval manor or village. As regards the cultural performance, one may accept every word I have written and yet hate it - its utilitarianism and the wholesale destruction of Meanings incident to it - from the bottom of one's heart. (...) one may care less for the efficiency of the capitalist process in producing economic and cultural values than for the kind of human beings that it turns out and then leaves to their own devices, free to make a mess of their lives. (1942, p. 129).

Things economic and social move by their own momentum and the ensuing situations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain ways whatever they may wish to do - not indeed by destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing the list of possibilities from which to choose. (1942. pp. 129-130).

Secular improvement that is taken for granted and coupled with individual insecurity that is acutely resented is of course the best recipe for social unrest (...) But in the case of capitalist society there is a further fact to be noted: unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest. (ibid. pp. 145-146).

Third, there are the daily troubles and expectations of trouble everyone has to struggle with in any social system - the frictions and disappointments, the greater and smaller unpleasant events that hurt, annoy and thwart. I suppose that everyone of us is more or less in the habit of attributing them wholly to that part of reality which lies without his skin, and emotional attachment to the social order - i.e., the very thing capitalism is constitutionally unable to produce - is necessary in order to overcome the hostile impulse by which we react to them. If there is no emotional attachment, then that impulse has its way and grows into a permanent constituent of our psychic setup. (ibid. p. 145).

This lengthy sample of Schumpeter's argumentation in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942), imply that he did not see that mere "technological efficiency" of the economic rationale could suffice to counter the incidental destruction of social and emotional attachments by way of rationalization that disregards the realm of deeper and higher meanings, significances and values in the process. He predicted that capitalism evolves toward annihilating also all the institutional, moral and vital grounds that it was initially depended upon to function. The capitalist economic rationalization also tends to level out the small and medium-sized proprietors, and the concrete kind of owner-management and leadership practices that used to "call forth allegiance", while disappointment, boredom and hostility grows from within the rationalized corporate systems, since "(T)he stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail." (1942, 137). With similar regard concerning the late (post-war) developments of capitalism, and suspicion towards the logic of state fiscalism and company capitalism alike, Guillet de Monthoux (1993, 260) argued for "concrete economics", against what he termed as "empty symbolic services", "lack of duty to nature", and the "middlemen arising from the leaky separations" between management, ownership and workers:

The concrete economists do not mean that all is enterprise. On the contrary, the essence of life has little to do with economics. But without a balance between production and consumption and between investment and saving, we can never obtain the peace and energy to engage ourselves in life's higher non-economic values.

De Monthoux (1993) was drawing insights from the 18<sup>th</sup> century French *Physiocratic* school of economic thought that placed primary emphasis on land agricultural production, and that was influenced by the idea of harmony with the natural order derived e.g. from Chinese Taoism. Generally, he advocates a return to the concrete interactive measures of *good* owner-managerial-work productivity and responsibility of business enterprising, over the exploitative

conducts of yielding fast profits or inflating practices with a bewildering increase of all-consuming yet essentially pointless tasks. Lordon (2014) uses the term “passionate exploitation” to appoint attention to the way how capitalist institutions do not necessarily separate individuals from their *powers to act*, but seek to *capture, fixate, remould, and align* their affective powers according to the dominant ‘master-desire’ of capital accumulation instead. In his view, this typically results in “*the condition of the mind filled with too few things, but completely so, thus impeded from expanding comfortably.*” (2014, 146). Lordon draws from Marx and Spinoza to discuss the contemporary forms of servitude, which do not solely reside within the money economy as such, but heavily rely on the “economy of joy” that concerns *all* action. As opposed to the *intrinsic* enjoyment of collectively produced objects *as such*, the economy of joy typically takes the interpersonally annoying form of the “economy of recognition” that mainly seeks the gaze of others and public approval, as a “*monopolistic appropriation aimed at obtaining extrinsic joys, namely, the joy of contemplating oneself as the cause of the joy of others*” (2014, 154). It means that individuals are nowadays more anxiously prone to enact self-deluded attempts of claiming and capturing the collective profits for the purpose of showing their own ‘competitive advantage’.

### 3.6 An embodied conception of classical (horse) management

The distinctiveness of the *radically reflective* attitude of inquiry can also be discussed in reference to actual horse handling. Taking a lead from Plato’s and Xenophon’s ideas above, I explore the elementary *intercorporeal* and *embodied cognitive* constituents of the human-horse interaction, in light of the classical ideals of care, balance and harmony. These ideals are still generally valid guides in the practice of *horse management*, and probably most proficiently cultivated through the universal - verbal and carnal - language game of *classical dressage* that has long since historically evolved from the context of battlefield tactics, to the professional, recreational and competitive sport arenas of today (Kyrklund & Lemkov 2013, 33). Branderub (2014), for example, pronounces the relevance of returning to the “*old masters*” like Xenophon, in order to develop the original classical approach, which he terms as the “Academic Art of Riding” that respectively starts from the psycho-physical aspects of the horse’s wellbeing.

A classical dressage professional Anja Beran states that the necessary *prerequisites* for learning the *high arts of riding* involve a well-trained horse, a good riding instructor, proper riding gear, and a training arena preferably with a quiet atmosphere. The nowadays popular biomechanical view on horse riding is also based on physiological knowledge regarding the psycho-physically dynamic requirements and the anatomical features of the *rider’s seat* that is the main point of direct contact with the horse. It is centred on maintaining an *erect posture, subtlety of aids, and sensitivity* of the seat. The most important challenge for the rider is to employ these aids together with the utmost physical comfort and precision of the given *signals*, as *primarily* through the seat and with the

other aids like the reins, with respect to the horse. The rider needs a) *mobility* of the anatomy, e.g. in the pelvis and the hip joint regions, to get in sync with the movements of the horse; b) *stability* to retain the correct posture, which can be strengthened by training the *deep* muscle groups especially in the abdominal, back and hip regions of the body; c) *coordination* to flexibly adjust the body to the ongoing and anticipatory changes between mobility and stability, and between the muscle tension and relaxation, in order to achieve optimal balance and control of the movement patterns; and d) *body perception* as the very first step to *recognize* and improve the errors of incorrect posture with mindful and critical self-perception, and to use *the abilities of mobility, stability and coordination* with more harmony, i.e., *less distortion* of movement and less gesturing of *contradictory* signals to the horse. The functional and communicative importance of deep and relaxed *free breathing* is also essential for the body perception and control, and consequently for an *effectively relaxed* seat. Elevated levels of stress and tension that usually originate from the rider's felt insecurities or too much cognitive concentration, restricts breathing and hence restricts the supply of oxygen to the muscles, and constrains the circulation of energy to the body and the brain. The body posture and muscle tension are thus also intimately connected to the *mental state* of the rider, which is transferred to the horse through the rider's body. Horses react to our *actual* mental and emotional states, for better and worse, also according to their individual temper, habituation and situation. The horse is a living being with a mind of its own, and it makes the art of riding practically highly challenging. The inter-species communion can nevertheless proceed with much more psycho-physical ease and interactive rapport for both the rider and the horse, when it is *already self-consciously approached openly and truly as a joy and a privilege* to be seated on the back of a horse. Technical knowledge gained from the theories of riding is not sufficient alone, since horse riding involves the *whole body and character* of a person, including the possibilities to improve self-knowledge, self-control, and other skills and abilities that we can also more generally find beneficial to learn to habituate and embody in life. (Beran 2017, 71-79, 83-86, 91-92, 149, 161).

Horses are socially intelligent prey animals with natural needs to exercise their motility. They can be highly responsive to human guidance, and rarely fail to *perceive our emotions as they presently are*, so it is quite futile to hide our real intentions, the same way we may theoretically "disembody" ourselves. The riding school teaching horses are therefore typically chosen on the basis of being both well-trained and also temperamentally steady, trusting and "forgiving" when it comes to encountering a vast variety of people who are not always very fluent in *reading or speaking horse*, or not too comfortable within their own skin, especially when confronted with a respectfully large and *emotionally resonant* presence of a horse. The significance of the rider's consciously embodied *orientation* toward the horse and *the event* of handling and riding a horse, as Beran (2017) also implies above, has *transcendental constitutive* significance to the experience and performance *as a whole*. The goal of horse riding, in the classical sense, is definitely not about breaking the spirit

of the horse with the imposition of the human order, but ideally about *cultivating the higher potential* of both the human and the horse, which is necessarily connected with the *longitudinal* (back-front) and *lateral* (left-right) flexibility and suppleness of carnal motions. The art of riding can hence proceed with the old master's motto of: "*Two spirits who want to do what two bodies can*" (Branderub 2014). When aligned with respect to the original classical ideals, *the spirit* or 'soul' of dressage can be enacted with subtle communicative microactions, transitions and rhythms of movement, and importantly through the *embodied* development of *trust as a deep bond in-between*. Classical dressage involves aspiration for the best possible fusion between the *visible* and the *invisible* dynamic features in every unique encounter, which is an intercorporeal, co-operatively intentional and *relationally* emergent agentic accomplishment. This is arguably an opposite kind of an *ethical framework* and *orientation* to horse handling or to enacting an animal ethic, than one-sidedly efficiency-driven *mechanistic enslavement*. That is, what Nietzsche also possibly witnessed right before his mental breakdown in Turin in 1889, as the known tale goes, when he saw a horse being whipped to the ground in the street, rushed to wrap his arms around the shamelessly abused creature, and collapsed.

The instrumental--functionalist assumptions of top-down rationalized managerial governance, that mainly implies *imposing* power, order and control *over* others for the primary purpose of extracting profit, are clearly not sufficient nor desirable as models to *prescribe the reality of what is going on* when we concretely interact with others, human or non-human animal kind. This logic is typically *impersonalized* and *disembodied*, and hence separated from the evidence of lived experiencing, as it is from the semantic and practically artful senses regarding the classical origins of managing as handling a horse. Yet also the corporate-bureaucratic managerialist formula of *overpowering* others, e.g. those identified as subordinates or rivals, is arguably most *fragile* and *ineffective* when the exercise of power is perceived to be enacted *forcibly without negotiation*, that is, when it lacks the necessary forms of *mediation* that essentially induce trust. By contrast, power is only *stabilized* when it is *tacitly* accepted and *inhabited* in everyday life, and disappears from sight as such, as according to Han (2019):

What makes power more effective is not coercion but the automatism of habit. An absolute power would be one that never became apparent, never pointed to itself, one that rather blended completely into what goes without saying. *Power shines in its own absence.* (Han 2019, 40, emphasis original)

Byung-Chul Han's (2019) conceptual explication on *power* is quite applicable when the exercise of power is more broadly understood as a relationally complex, and *not* as a one-sided linear phenomenon. While power makes itself appear in the world most saliently when it *lacks* the subtlety of mediation and takes the more direct form of *coercion*, it is thereby already effectively weakened. As Han notes, it is also due to *selective perception* that we often hold onto the impression that power is solely destructive, as if it was always inherently something coercive or *apparent*. Yet when it is understood as a *directive* medium

of communication, it may as well be seen as constructive and not necessarily repressive, if those subjected to power *affirm the will* of the holder of power and *voluntarily* internalize or align it as their own. The complex relational interdependencies of power cannot be described in terms of simple causality, not even at the organic life level, since *linear cause-effect* -models can only be well suited to explain *passive* and *lifeless* things. Han criticizes these kind of views and articulates power in the Hegelian sense as a dialectical *domain of orientation*, which may precede and exceed the conscious deliberation of particular individual actors. It is rather a *hermeneutic opening of a sense-giving space* for a course of action. The logic of power, in his view, also basically operates the same way in *terrestrial* and *digital* domains. All forms of power *presuppose a self* that seeks to maintain itself in and through *the other*, by forming a *continuum* between *the ego* and *the alter*. The 'alter' has also power to accept or reject the will and decisions of the 'ego', because 'ego's' power is ultimately *dependent* on the acceptance from the 'alter'. In order to be *truly* powerful, the holder of power should be able to exercise *free choice* in making the decisions oneself, and elicit the *emphatic affirmation* from others indirectly without coercion, explicit orders or the threat of sanctions. The power of the 'ego', when it is subtly and intensely *mediated* and accepted by the 'alter' - possibly with enthusiasm and not just "passive endurance" - can be experienced in terms of *self-determination* and *freedom* on both ends. The act of obeying and following certain given trajectories still occur within a *communicative* power relation when it involves, in principle, the minimum of freedom to say "yes" or "no", that is, the element of *free choice* as the possibility to refuse the ordering, which entail the option of *resistance*. Sheer acts of violence, by contrast, do not form a *relation, sense, time* or *space* of power. Violent acts are rather *senseless* signs of *powerlessness* as they lack all mediation and communicative intention. Also, without any mediating *ethical* dimension, the *self* or the *system* of power only strives to extend, repeat and enlarge itself, to gather and appropriate more *unto itself*. Han suggests the *site of friendliness* as a type of mediation and *reconciliation* that may ethically counter the merely self-serving powers with *the care for the other*. It differs from Foucault's *care of the self* that he suggested for practicing the proper use of power, but which Han sees as too easily turned into a narrowly self-occupied "*economic calculus*" that is already part of the problem with contemporary governance. (Han 2019, 2-7, 10-11, 15-19, 22-23, 82-89).

Higher level theoretical abstractions, like Han's carefully detailed account regarding the complex relations of power, are *not* necessarily divorced from *lived reality* or devoid of practical relevance, quite the contrary. They can be most illuminating when contextualized to real life situations, in this case with the example of organized horse riding, and *the experiential horizon* that generally unfolds around the perspective of the horse rider. The rider can be seen as representing the *cognitively* complicated 'ego' in this situation, and who is nevertheless *interdependent* on the horse as the 'alter' that naturally holds the advantage of physical power over the rider. The *rider-self* hence needs the *horse-other* to accept her or his *lead*, which requires an *intentional communicative*



*relationship* with the horse. This relation is ideally *mediated* with subtle gestures and signs that *make sense* to the rider and to the horse, and preferably so that certain degrees of freedom and flexibility of reciprocated movements, directions, and rhythms can be maintained with *mutual trust* and *cooperative intent*. The exercise is complicated by the fact that the rider needs attentive body perception, not only of one's own, but also of the horse's body and possibly regarding the proximity of other bodies that may be present and mobile in the same site, which may affect, adjust or disrupt the initial *orientation* of the encounter with differing ongoing attunements. The material-physical and social arrangements are both significant elements of influence, and the natural weather conditions or other environmental features may be more or less kinaesthetically demanding, for instance. Typically there is also a riding instructor who represents a temporary 'super-ego' that holds *directive* power above all the riders and the horses. The master-apprentice coordinates of power in this domain are normally affirmed according to apperceived merits of substantial knowledge and superior level of abilities to recognize *the essential* features from the outward expressions of riding, and to direct others in the pursuit of better balance and mastery. Accountability is also related to the basis of *ownership* and *authorship* of the socio-material arrangements that facilitate and afford the practice. The *ethical* element of *friendliness* can also be regarded as *integrally valuable* for the socially coordinated organization of the equestrian establishment as a whole, as a tacit and spontaneous aid for the interpersonal communication and *reconciliation* of perceived difficulties and conflicts that inevitably arise in any socially and emotionally complex and dynamic domain. Keeping up certain degrees of *habituation* and *routine* is also necessary for the humans and the horses in order to *stabilize the conditions* of practice, so that the participants can learn to incorporate the basic requirements of responsivity.

Engaging in the acts of *expressive exchange* with living beings like horses, facilitate *empathic communicative awareness*, and typically most vividly through misperceptions and disturbances. They are often initiated by erroneous *mechanistic expectations* (by the habit of operating machines, e.g. driving a car), that are soon proven inadequate in concrete interaction. The perception of misaligned intentions, and the multisensory confrontation with the need to correct the errors of *misguided orientation*, e.g. when seated on a highly spirited horse, can also retrospectively *affirm* the notion that one's subjective *sense of agency, power, freedom or control* do not occur in isolation, nor simply by imposing one's will. Such reminders tend to spring to mind through confrontations that are interdependent on trusted and wilful cooperation and essentially rely on *social recognition*, which machines do not require nor perform in the emphatic sense of recognition. It is relevant to acknowledge the possible *gaps of understanding in-between* the species, and how one's intentions are communicated through *sense expressions*, like muscle tension or tone of voice, with respect to *horse-logical* expressivity and translation. While it is accurate to expect the *unexpected* rather than mechanistic causality when interacting with an embodied non-human consciousness, anticipatory awareness can sharpen

the regard on the contextual circumstances as *bodily resonant spaces of intercorporeality* and *inter-affectivity* (Fuchs 2017; Slaby 2017), for horses are more spontaneously vigilant in relation to possible signals of disarray and danger.

As Xenophon already centuries ago implied, *mutual rapport* can be achieved through empathic enactment of self-assured composure, foresight and gentle manners, in *showing par exemple* that there is nothing to fear or worry about. Humans and horses can also co-create a non-verbal bodily based language system of communicating *shared signals and meanings*, which opens up another dimension of the intersubjective world that *precedes* the verbal languages that we tend to privilege (Brandt 2004; Kyrklund & Lemkov 2013, 25). It has been empirically demonstrated that horses can also be highly motivated to *learn* different *symbols* to better communicate their needs to humans (Mejdell, Buvik, Jørgensen & Bøe 2016). As the many enthusiastic practitioners of the equine arts may confess, the sense of mutual connection and understanding, even if momentarily gained, is among the most emotionally satisfying and motivating experiences in the human-horse relation. Yet as Birke (2007) has observed, those that favor the discourse of “natural horsemanship” as a return to kind and gentle methods of horse handling, use both *emotional partnership-centred* and *natural scientific explanatory* narratives, with certain tensions in between these different dispositions of horse-related sensemaking. Birke suggests that these two ways of speaking reflect *contradictory ideas about freedom and control*, as manifested in how we talk about horses in a way that portray the horse in human terms. The contradiction is also understandable, given the *twofold senses* of comprehension already present in our own *bodily perception* and *self-constitution*, and since we cannot completely escape our own case (Heinämaa 2011). Yet despite the inevitable gaps of comprehension, we can try to imagine the animal perspective (e.g. Nagel 1974), and gain scientific knowledge (e.g. Leblanc 2013), while learning the good conducts of human-animal relationship through the practice of radical empathic apperception.

### 3.7 Cultural returns to the animalistic roots of human sociality

Our relation to non-human animals is influenced by different cultural-historical patterns and prevailing models of interaction, which may be demonstrated with a more peculiar case regarding *the animalistic roots within humans* themselves. There are, as it seems, *sub-cultural* groups whereas adult people engage in a “double-life” occupation of *dressing up* and *acting as if* they were pet animals, like horses or dogs, or “ponies” and “pups” together with their “handlers”. The interesting thing is that the *attributed motives* to act this way are primarily *spiritual*, in the sense of aiming at *self-discovery*. According to some of the internet sites and videos linked to these social groups, the participants of such genres of everyday role play explain that immersion to the “restricted immediacy” and the “primal language” of the “animalistic alter-ego”, or the “second skin” of being, appears as an *escape* from the ordinary weariness of

contemporary working life, and represents “*a deliberate form of dehumanization*” for them. Assuming the animalistic self-image, as claimed, provides an “extraordinary headspace” to “express yourself” and more self-confidently become “who you want to be”. It appears to afford them a “friendly playfield” of living in the present tense of time, “*where no one cares about your records of history, identity, money or material possessions*”, in short; where all your “*civil boundaries disappear*”. There already seems to be an industry of commerce and national as well as international competitions around this “alternative animalistic life style”, and an estimate of over 10 000 practitioners, e.g. in the “UK pup community”. The apparent popularity of enacting the animalistic role play implies that this is a real psychological, social and cultural phenomenon of our time, which could be further researched and analysed as such.

The “extreme” kind of cases like these are not necessarily simply whimsical or arbitrary isolated incidences, for they can disclose potentially *revelatory cues* concerning the characteristic patterns and interdependencies of contemporary social life. The stated need to *refuse* the world of civil boundaries, and reassert the self within a “friendly head space” expressed as an “animalistic pretense” of being, provokes certain critical phenomenological questions (Salamon 2018). Specifically, regarding the possibly *distorted structuring of social relations*, which in this case appears to enforce *divisive* assessment *within* oneself, between what is perceived as *the inner self-experience*, and *the outer* recognition, or *absence* thereof, in relation to the “ordinary” social domain. As Taipale (2018) explicates, *normally* developing social self-awareness requires, not only the recognition of our *external behaviors*, but also the recognition of our *subjective intentions*, i.e. *what* is expressed *beyond* the sense expression:

As long as the “two” affirmations proceed hand in hand, in good balance, the person – whether a child or an adult – is not forced to sharply distinguish between how she feels and how she appears from the outside. The firmly habituated impression that our feelings, opinions and judgments *can* be made visible and intelligible to others – i.e. our sense of social potentiality – is central in human interaction. This sense of social potentiality enables us to endure occasional misunderstandings and even humiliations. (Taipale 2018, 24, emphasis original)

The aspiration to return within the “animalistic alter-ego”, suggests a *negated* sense of social potentiality, which may be traced to the *disappointed expectations* related to the *cause-effect schemes of (dis)ordered* social life that typically imply behaving and appearing to others as a mere *unit of calculation*, rather than as a *unique and dignified* human person. Mechanistic rationalization of everyday work and other interpersonal relations is not uncommon today, and it *can* also partially serve a sense of safety and privacy. If we think about the way that people typically interact with their pet animals, by contrast, it seems to involve the *immediate recognition* of them as individual *intentional beings* that have inner motives and needs that are subsequently lovingly catered for. Maintaining a relation with tamed animals, including horses, has been found beneficial for the sense of health, wellbeing and life satisfaction, for pet animals can make us feel

connected with nature, and they may satisfy our needs of emotional attachment, social support, stress relief, and self-definition (Honkanen 2013). The potential health and wellbeing effects related to the *inter-species social contact* are not restricted to the human side of interaction, as was indicated in a study that examined the psychosocial, hemodynamic, and central nervous system mechanisms of horses. These were observed from their outward behaviors and measured from their *slowing* heart beat rate and rhythm, as recorded in the EKG during successive trials of human petting. (Lynch et al. 1974). Some people even claim to prefer the company of animals to human relationships, because tamed animals are found to be able of expressing *unconditional* love and trust toward their care takers, without judgment, ridicule, or generally without the *emotional risks* of rejection, conflicts, and hurt that humans can inflict upon each other.

Perhaps then, what is at stake when somebody adopts a self-image akin to a “pet animal” *in relation* to a “handler”, is a restatement of the *basic* experiential needs of *identification* and *selfhood* that are structurally *dependent on the other*, i.e. on *becoming recognized* by and through the other; to feel appreciated, potent and significant as a living, intentional soul, who’s innermost basic needs are sensed to coincide with outward expressions, and *can be safely seen and met* in some trusted social relation. From the standpoint of embodied cognition, the act of altering one’s self-image by staging an “extraordinary” scene of interaction, can also be seen as *originating* from the motives to resolve *cognitive dissonances* (Festinger 1957), uncomfortable tensions, and the *negative sense of social potency*, through concretely felt and sensed *self-other* and *mind-body* connections. The ‘handler’, in turn, suggests the need for a reliable figure of authority and care. The possible motive to refuse being mechanistically objectified is legitimate as such, aside how abased the escape mechanism appears from outside the circle of “role play”. The aspiration of self-discovery imply *subversive* potential, yet the enactment does seem like an over-reaction against the negatively assessed civil world horizon and the *devalued* sense of humanity. Moreover, even bizarre forms of *escapism* seem today to become “normalized”, insofar as they retain submissive internalization of *presupposed social divisions* between those who have social power, and those who have not (Cederström & Fleming 2012).

When the phenomenon is thus portrayed in light of *distorted relations*, it may seem less perplexing to grasp *why* humans tend to seek others as “mirrors” to affirm – or fleet – “*the essence of who they are*”, how and where they can find it *possible and meaningful in their own case*. It is also informative to connect the phenomenon to the broader *context* of social relations and practices that are currently pervaded by the ‘*spirit*’ of ruthless market competition, whereas any identifiable “difference” is a potential object of commodification. There seems to be a market, legal or illicit, for any kind of life style, entertainment, or drug of choice that “speaks” to the base needs to *survive* the socially objectified and atomistic *ontology of capitalist realism* with some flickering remnants of selfhood, while the non-consumptive cooperative options for *resistance* and *thriving* are obfuscated from sight (Fisher 2009; Boltanski & Chiapello 2018). Peculiar cases can shed light on the *degraded modes of interaction* that are also recognizable from

less obvious manifestations, which can also appear *strange* and less than *humanely* satisfactory. The discussion can thus be analytically deepened and also turned to concern *the generalized degradation of intersubjective community life and culture*, which effectively now extend to most economic, social, and personal areas of life (Miller & Rose 2008). The related rationale of *managerialism* tends to enforce the ensuing social insecurities, divisions and isolation, for the overall benefit of *economically safeguarded* groups (Hanlon 2016).

The search for a *'true self'* from the pure sense-certainties of tamed animalism, as a self-occupied turn within the boundaries of one's body, also resemble what Steinboch (2014; 2018) has phenomenologically analysed as the interpersonally destructive, occluded, world-refusing and self-dissembling subjective *moral attitude of pride*. This inability to transcend oneself or enact actual self-transformative change, may rest on *"an impotence of being able to transform the social and economic structures necessary to divest myself concretely of the offenses"*, as issued in circumstances, in which *"our focus on use-value and exchange-value for the purpose of survival "demands" the sacrifice of deeper human and personal values"* (Steinbock 2014, 151). The self-limiting lures of pride and the aesthetic of *"bare life"* rather *befits* the current neoliberal repertoire of behaviorist policy techniques (Whitehead et al. 2018), that are equipped to reproduce, rather than resolve the wide ranging problems reminiscent of *spiritual vacancy, deprivation and confusion*. The behaviorist model of governance is centered on the *irrational*, rather than rational *self-interest*, and often limited to naïve realist assumptions on *"what people desire"* based on *"what they do"*.

The peculiar case in question can also be seen through Paul Verhaeghe's elaboration on the Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts of subjectivity and identity formation. He sees them in close connection with the dominant force of the economy and capitalist discourse, including the *evaluative primacy* of short-term profits over *knowledge and experience*, which has led to the entanglement of the economy, politics and subjectivity, and to a situation where traditional authorities have been replaced by *anonymous pure power* of the global market. In Lacanian terms, subjectivity is already inherently *structurally divided* between conflicting drives and desires, mainly because the identity signifiers that we gain from the imaginary-symbolic realm, can never fully represent the unconscious drives, or what we sense as the lived bodily real. The experience of an identity comes from identifying with the signifiers of *the other's* desire, and due to the *irreducible* structural divide between the lived real and the imaginable or symbolic elements of our self-experience, subjectivity is not a unified whole to begin with, and our identities are never complete. The experience of *alienation*, as due to being defined by the other, is in this sense a *necessary* mental construct, for it also opens the space of separation from the other. The traditional function of symbolic authorities has been to synthesize and guarantee this sense of lack, and hence ensure the necessary *degrees of distance* from authority. We can thus readily witness the major effects of contemporary societal structural changes to personal identification through the popular media, that is, the new totalitarian signifier and the *"perverse"* other, as Verhaeghe terms it, which compels us to *enjoy* rather than restrain ourselves,

and which obscures the necessary boundaries and distance. The constitutive importance of lack to subjectivity, creativity and freedom, is no longer recognized, for capitalist discourse claims that a perfectly full answers can be found from *ready-made* market objects and *calculative measures* of modern sciences. The overwhelming abundance of potential objects of desire, as represented through the medias, however, are more adept to cause anxious frustration, impotence and boredom instead of fulfilment. *The body* has consequently entered the stage with unprecedented prominence, at the same time when *the socio-symbolic* ties and bases of identity formation are disappearing. Verhaeghe observes that people are fervently searching for *new primal herds* to fill the sense of loss and the void of identity, in order to be *somebody*, to feel secure with some degree of narrative certainty: to become an identifiable subject through the other, and to gain some socio-symbolic decor of recognizable meanings and significances as the marks of identification that “cover” the surface level of one’s body. Yet when the formation of subjectivity is restricted to the most elementary biological, sexual and reproductive bases of identification, the forms of interaction are also bound to regress to more primitive manifestations. In addition to this “pre-oedipal” return to the biological determinants of existence, Verhaeghe mentions another typical contemporary assessment that is also telling of *unstable* identification: *the fundamentalist solution*, with attempts to restore the “law and order of the authoritarian father”, i.e., the boundaries for identification, in place of the *symbolic other* that has by far already lost its weight of significance in contemporary societies. (Verhaeghe 2010, 22-25, 29-41, 45-51; 2014).

The literally “pet-like” means of “self-taming” also warrant a return to Sloterdijk (2009), and his elaboration on the established political and cultural “breeding” or “domestication” programs of the “human zoo” ever since Plato, and the central question of *the media*, defined as “*the means of communion and communication by which human beings attain to that which they can and will become*” (2009, 16). He notes that the concept of *humanism* raises due suspicion today, as it did for Nietzsche, since European history appears to be in retrospect riddled with “*humanistically camouflaged*” militant battles and tortures in the namesake of “human wellbeing”. It may well be true that literary acculturation is insufficient alone against the contemporary *medias of disinhibition*, which readily seem triumphant in comparison to the bookish means of self-taming, while: “*A titanic battle is being waged in our contemporary culture between the civilizing and the bestializing impulses and their associated media.*” (2009, 24). It seems clearer that the acknowledgement of this struggle – as already residing *within* and *between* ourselves – is an important step, if we are to *move forward* from exploitative “bestialization” or the confused ambivalence of “humanism”. Freud (2010, 63) described ‘civilization’ as designating “*the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes – namely to protect men against nature, and to adjust their mutual relations.*” Ultimately, he saw it as a unifying “*process in the service of Eros*” (2010, 111), and as a constant struggle against the aggressive instincts that oppose civilization. The betterment of civilization seems a duly relevant task, if civil

boundaries are being degraded in favor of raw rivalry through the “means of communion and communication” that disseminate hostile modes of sociality.

### 3.8 Recognizing the lower and the higher layers of conscious life

Plato’s mark overtime on modern philosophical and psychological thought can be detected, for instance, in the development of Freud’s psychoanalysis: and his structural division of psychic functions to i) the instinctive disorganized drives of the *Id*, ii) the *ego* as the organized reality mediator of the preconscious and conscious reasoning, iii) and the *super-ego* as representing the moral regulatory agency, also attributed as the *conscience*. Freud’s further elaboration is far from simplistic or rigid, and the parts are understood as being mutually involved in an ongoing complex dynamic interaction. Freud saw that any temporally felt sense of “inner unity” is merely an illusion, and his acknowledgement of *inner divisions* (defensive mechanisms) is the main feature that sets his theory apart from mainstream academic psychology that presupposes an undivided psychic unity. (Verhaeghe 2010). The fluctuating levels of *energetic tension*, i.e. the *increase* of tension experienced as *unpleasure* and the *decrease* to the “optimal” level of tension experienced as *pleasure*, exemplify the synthesizing *economic* function of mental life in Freud’s *metapsychology* (Ellenberger 1994/1970, 512-513). Plato has had influence on the philosophical accounts on psychology, most notably also perhaps in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Wittgenstein. What mostly unifies Plato’s own disparate analyses is the question of the *good life*, and the critical schools of thought are generally more receptive to Plato or Platonic areas of inquiry than mainstream empirical psychology. Plato considered the empirical world as only one dimension of reality, and it was the easily misleading one in comparison to his formulation of the higher world of ideas beyond the visible realm. (Saariluoma 1985, 70-71). Those human scientific and philosophical accounts that are concerned with *human development* with respect to the *level of lived experience*, tend to make similar distinctions between lower and higher levels of conscious life. Yet it is not analytically too helpful to theorize *emotional* and *cognitive* processing of the mind in hierarchical terms. The notion of hierarchy may also be misunderstood as nominating some *definite* duality, structure and order of development, or used for questionable social purposes. Rather than as representing a fixed order, the relation is more accurately understood as a *dialectical struggle*, both *vertically and horizontally*, between the two *ways of knowing*, which preferably proceeds toward more harmonious *integration* in mental maturity (Lazarus 1991). The following thinkers are chosen for their emphasis on the value of psychology as a source of *self-knowledge*, while acknowledging that psychological theories can also be used for *social manipulation* and *control*. They also explicate the other-regarding and value-laden *normative* dimensions as integral to mental development.

F. W. J. Schelling is marked as a figure among the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century movements of German idealism and Romanticism, and as a philosophical

forerunner of existential and psychoanalytic thought, for his dialectical emphasis on personal freedom, deep contradictions, passion and action, and early notes on the unconscious. He criticised (1809) abstract and mechanistic views of nature as lifeless and passive, and rejected the rationalistic ethics of his time, which artificially divided all *good* and *virtuous* and *free* as derived from the intellectual mastery of "pure reason", and that identified all *evil* and *vice* with the animalistic or the earthly realm of passions, senses and desires. He saw that animalism cannot be deemed good or evil as such, and that deterministic views are ignorant of human freedom as a higher inner necessity, which "*springs from the essence of the active agent itself*" (p. 383), and that the "activated selfhood" was necessary for life's intensity, whereas "*the passions are the very strength of virtue itself and its immediate tools*" (p. 410). That is, when passions are elevated to the spiritual realm of personal selfhood, combined with the principle of light, and operative in the direction of the good, for "*Goodness without effective selfhood is itself an ineffective goodness.*" (p. 400). In Schelling's dialectic, the dark selfish principle or "enthusiasm for evil" always accompanied the good, as they were seen as *coupled*, similar to joy and sorrow, each of which could only rise to awareness in relation to the other (Schelling 1809, 371-372, 383, 400-401, 410).

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, philosophy was more often still seen as interconnected with psychological studies than it is today. Eino Kaila (1890-1958) was a ground-breaking naturalistic philosopher and logical empiricist in Finland at that time. His writings remain to attract interest because he was a holistic thinker, and among those rare figures who were seeking to combine the human and natural scientific world views and research cultures in academia (Lagerspetz 1997). Kaila advocated *psycho-physical parallelism*, and rejected the reductionist and mechanistic attempts to reduce psychic phenomena of consciousness to causal physical determinants. His characteristic style contained both strictly scientific and romantic tones, and his scholarly ambition was to bridge the gaps between the *material* and the *immaterial*; the *qualities* and the *quantities*; the *animate* and the *inanimate*; and the *carnal* and the *spiritual* dimensions of life, in terms of a unitary monistic world view throughout his work. (Niiniluoto 1986). In his popular book '*Syvähenkinen Elämä*' (1943), Kaila discussed the *conceptual ideal* of the "*deep-spirited life*", and both the *psychological* and the *ethical* aspects of its development. He also referred to Plato's Chariot allegory to demonstrate the natural animalistic base and the multilevel dynamisms of human consciousness, which in his view could be cultivated through deeply felt emotive tensions, toward the *richer and higher organizational forms* of consciousness - but only in case this procession was sufficiently nurtured and cultivated through personal choices in life. Kaila (1943, p. 181) argued that we're better off when we acknowledge the fact that our "vital stratum of powers" will inevitably start to diminish as we age, which implies that our emphasis over the *energetic sources* of our personality should shift toward the higher, more spiritually rich layers and deposits of experiencing. In this book, he employed the Socratic dialogue form in communicating the different perspectives, the general importance, and the inevitable difficulties of



consciously refining ourselves toward apperceiving the higher, finer, and deeper things in life. In other words, toward appreciating the invisible or “non-perceivable” properties of “truth”, “goodness” and “beauty”.

In another influential work on human *personality* (1990/1934), Kaila praised Freud’s psychoanalysis for the acknowledgement of the principle of *dynamism* in psychological theorizing, while rejecting certain mechanistic proposals of his theory. He criticized intellectualist accounts, and was also inclined to side with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who revealed the dynamic forces of emotionality, and unmasked the overly idealistic picture of humanity that enlightenment thinkers were prone to forward. Kaila renounced all mechanistic, i.e. “*machine-like*” theoretical assumptions as *inadequate* in comparison to *holistic understanding* related to all living beings, which he saw as particularly central for psychological inquiries. Mechanistic systems, like all the material *tools* of our daily use from the most basic to the more sophisticated ones, contain *stable* functional parts that regulate and determine the whole mechanism as a *closed* systemic structure. In a living organism, by contrast, the structure and functions are *dynamically malleable* throughout the processes of development and decline. Our machines and technologies allow us a degree of control over nature, which is why we have an *anthropomorphic* tendency to apply the *logic of machinery* to the whole of living nature, including ourselves. We are thus naturally inclined to *misinterpret* life. As Kaila notes, one of the main sources of confusion in psychological theorizing is that concepts can contain *double meanings*: in the sense of lived *phenomenality*, and in the sense of general *functionality*. Common sense wisdoms, however, often imply the *tacit* kind of practical understanding that scientific accounts also ought to appreciate, while articulating them in more systematic and clarified terms. We may intuitively recognize from our own experience, for instance, what it *means* when someone uses the expression of “*sour grapes*”, which can be more explicitly defined as ‘belittlement of something that is perceived as unattainable’. Kaila explicates that the *functional* purpose of *denouncing the value* of something that is apperceived as valuable but personally unattainable, is to avoid the feelings of inferiority and depression of self-esteem. It is also telling of the element of *social competition*, which most often occurs as a *primitive* subconscious urge. It can be hampered, however, with genuine affection towards the other person, so that her or his achievements can be felt as a source of joy instead of envy. The way we normally form personally *sustainable* ideals, principles and valuation is based on *active compensation* that is initiated by the perceived *lack* of something that we are unable to attain, and which forces us *from within* to find other avenues of thought and action. The “sour grapes” mentality, in turn, describes *reactive* compensation, whereas the formed ideals and values are more *socially conditional* and still personally *inauthentic* in that they are suspect to change at any time merely according to circumstance. (Kaila 1990/1934, 564-588, 645-655).

In Kaila’s biologically grounded holistic system, the development of human personality is based on the dynamic development of the more or less *deep spiritual needs* that are, at least momentarily, capable of transcending the

*great pressures* of our animalistic base of needs and the *primitive* level of sociality. It involves restraining them through higher and more complex levels of self-consciousness and the *experientially* based recognition of *interdependencies* in the world. He criticized the mechanistic and the intellectualistic psychological accounts also for positing “the social” as a somehow *automatically* higher order unit of natural organization. In his view, the directive orientation of the *analytical* and *dissociative* human development should rather be seen *from* the collective *toward* the individualized, and from the homogenous *toward* the heterogeneous forms of life. Social affiliations and ties are always *instinctively* stronger in the primitive, than in the advanced cultural communities, for *atavistic* social morality is more binding than any *personalistic ethic*. Social affinities are a part of our instinctually reflexive repertoire, and adaptation to social groups resides already among our strong animalistic base of needs. Humans are highly suggestible to affective contagion in social life, and *in-group conformity* tends to at some point lower the individual level of mental development and achievement. But contrary to non-human animals, we have highly complex and adaptive layers of conscious life which *theoretically* permit and enable also the degrees of *liberation* from the subconsciously binding pressures of the “herd”. (Kaila 1990/1934, 652, 636-638).

Human sociality and morality, in comparison to animals, may hence be seen as less *organically* determined and more complex in kind. We have also the need to adapt ourselves to the worldly, and particularly social realities we find ourselves in, but in order to do so we need to attain higher order *factual knowledge* that is *valid* beyond introspection or instinctive momentary awareness. Kaila elaborates on the natural human *errors of thinking*, and notes that the realms of reality which we factually know very little about, are also the ones most crowded and coloured with need-driven wishful thinking, illusions and trivialities. It is not uncommon that our ideas tend to portray reality in a more positive light than what our actual personal historicity of experiences would suggest. Adopting the scientific attitude, for instance, is ideally more self-consciously sincere regarding the articulation of experience, as it is based on achieving a *gratuitous* state of mind that is trained to be temporally and habitually capable of suspending the lower, but generally much stronger instinctively-driven needs of perceiving the world in a certain way that tends to serve our subconscious level of desires. (Kaila 1990/1934, 652-654).

The modern cognitive scientific *dual process -theories* of rationality attempt to account for the multilevel phenomenal side of experiencing, and can provide an analytical compass for better understanding information processing fallacies, as well as cognitive development. The dual processes can be differentiated according to certain defining features, and broadly distinguished between the *rapid autonomous processes* (Type 1) and *higher order reasoning processes* (Type 2) that require working memory involved, e.g. in hypothetical thinking (Evan & Stanovich 2013). Dual process theories have been developed to examine also the unconscious, subconscious and conscious functions with the “two minds” hypothesis, which emphasizes the analytical distinction between the *two*

*overlapping ways of knowing*, learning, thinking, rationalizing, and of making decisions and value judgments. Dual-process theories can also revise the folk psychological beliefs regarding the extent and strength of one's own conscious executive control over one's actions - what Evans terms as "the chief executive - model" - for in comparison to the autonomous, fast and instinctive *intuitive mind* and implicit ways of knowing, the slower *reflective mind* has far less cognitive control over the totality of our behaviors than what our common sense, wishes and prior beliefs would normally lead us to assume. (Evans 2010, 3-5). Our positivity biases generally rely on the *ease* and *coherence* of the story we tell ourselves, rather than on truthful informational accuracy, and depends more on what Kahneman (2011) terms as the *automatic* system of fast thinking, and less on the *effortful* system of slow thinking, which suggests that we are prone to lazy thinking and naturally prefer the least effortful mental exertion.

The phenomenological approaches to human conscious experience commonly insist upon identifying the *epistemic* differences between the empirical and transcendental realms of inquiry, *before* approaching them as *mutually overlapping* dimensions of lived experience. Lauri Rauhala (1914-2016) was also a thinker who pronounced the holistic understanding of human nature, and was committed toward developing a comprehensive existential phenomenological methodology and conceptual outlook on human nature (see also Tökkäri 2015). He followed the phenomenological anthropology of Max Scheler in making an analytical distinction between what he termed as the *psychic* and the *spiritual* (*psykykkinen vs. henkinen*) levels of human conscious life. The psychic level of consciousness encompasses the phenomenal senses of experiencing that we basically share with animals. The psychic denotes the *unreflective* states of being and behaving that are largely determined by immediate automatic sensations and routinely occurring states and affairs, e.g. the varied feelings, moods, needs and urges that are *not* consciously examined as such, and thus not *objectified* as a phenomenon. But a human person can achieve an *attitudinal* shift toward a higher mental level in one's conscious attitude toward phenomena, and thus gain *objective distance* from the immediacy of experiencing. The spiritual - or the transcendental - function of human consciousness enables the flexible use of memory that can be used to transcend the confines of the present as it factually occurs. It can also be seen as the level of self-consciousness which can induce *higher social emotions*, like shame. One of the central differences that can be identified between human and non-human animals is that a human person can *conceptualize* one's feelings, emotions and moral concerns in the higher attitudinal sphere of consciousness. The use of concepts makes it possible to generalize the essential features of phenomena, and exert influence on their elaborate recall, reform and reconstruction in the mind. The elementary significance of developing the spiritual, or the creative openness of consciousness is particularly essential in education, and Rauhala recommends that the *psychic-spiritual* distinction should be remembered in all kinds of human related professions. This is because human development can only occur through learning to refine the conscious

conceptual ability to gain *reflective distance* through objectifying one's primary experiences, namely by discerning and articulating the different intentional objects, states and nuances of *lived phenomenality* with more clarity and adequacy. It can thus also reduce the harmful effects of affectivity, impulsive responses, and self-destructive behaviors. (Rauhala 2005, 65–67).

Psychologist-psychiatrist Kazimierz Dabrowski's theory of *Positive Disintegration*, is another original and comprehensive psychological theory that emphasizes the importance of the *uniquely* personal, particularly *emotionally guided value-hierarchical* development through *experiential crises*. He focused on the individuals with identifiable 'overexcitabilities' (intellectual, emotional, sensual, psycho-motor and/or imaginal OE), that were generally occurring through heightened neurological sensitivity toward inner and outer stimuli and manifested as the *felt intensity* of lived experiencing. Dabrowski derived philosophical influence from Plato's ideas of *essences*, and from Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's *existential* views, and saw them both as necessary core elements for explicating and encouraging personality growth. Based on the many years of clinical and pedagogical work, and observations amidst the societal turmoils of 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe, Dabrowski constructed a broad ranging synthetic view concerning both the *empirical* and the *normative* dimensions, i.e. regarding the mental *and* the moral health at the center of humanity and its development at large. The Positive Disintegration -theory explicates a *multilevel* framework, where the lowest *first factor* of development stands for the primitive biological impulses, and the *second factor* denotes, the better and worse, influences derived from the *social milieu*. Their *primary integration* represents the most primitive level of being that some people tend to succumb to for the rest of their lives. The most decisive factor for the actual individualized formation and growth of personality, including the higher system of valuation, is the *third factor*, which signifies the *developmental potential* of the self-determined *motivational* drive that resides in the unique inner psychic milieu of a person. In comparison to mainstream psychology, the most outstanding feature of the theory is that it does *not* nullify the significance of existential anxieties, depressions, tensions and emotional conflicts as something *inevitably* pathological to get rid of, e.g. with medication, but regards them as neurobiologically *necessary preludes* for any structural and qualitative mental development to emerge. Experiential discrepancies and dissonance – i.e. the *feelings of tension* between “what is” and what “ought to be” that typically evoke anxiety between the self and the social realm in different situations, can thus positively push the stability of lower mental structures toward the state of *disintegration*, which can either lead to regression, or potentially towards organizational integration at the higher levels of mental development, as aligned with one's own *personally* determined *hierarchy of values*. The theory forwards *self-organizational* and *auto-educational* principles and the notion of *positive maladjustment* in relation to lower forms of socialization and social control mechanisms. In principle, it accounts for actual individual differences in terms of neurological sensitivities and other complex, dynamically malleable, and situational co-determinants of personality

development as a whole. Dabrowski did *not* posit a rigid theory of needs or stages that everybody supposedly goes through, at same pace, or in the same way. In his view, that places emphasis on the role of subjective *idiosyncrasies*, development is *not* presupposed to occur in any objectively predefined or linear manner of procession or purposiveness, like his friend Abraham Maslow was inclined to propose (Dabrowski 2015/1967; Mendaglio 2008; Tillier 2008).

The distinction between the lower and the higher layers of consciousness also resembles the philosophical differentiation between the *aesthetic* and the *ethical* ways of life that Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) introduced in *Either/Or* (1843). In Kierkegaard's conceptualization, the *aesthetic level of existence* represents the lower way of living that is innately constrained by the boundaries of immanent immediacy, material necessities, and the body. The primary locus of control is then determined *from without* the subject, who is primarily striving after differing needs and desires. The ethical level, in comparison, signifies the beginning of self-reflective spiritual development, of *becoming who you are* as a "living spirit" in the passionate sense of existence. (Lehtinen 2008, 91). Kierkegaard described (under the pseudonym of *Johannes Climacus*) in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (1846), that real existence in this passionate sense is like "*riding a wild stallion*", whereas complacent conformity stands for "*falling asleep in a moving hay-wagon*" (Cohen 2008, 186). Passion, for Kierkegaard, was seen as the *way to subjective truth* when coupled with reflective insight. Kierkegaard distinguished truly reflective capacities as those exceeding mere "shrewd calculative cleverness". He describes the sequences of "enthusiastic" apprehension and comprehension at play in what can also be termed as the *metacognitive* or *transcendental* virtues of our reflective powers, which can restrain the rash sense of complacency, and intensify one's actions through *the universal* view and direction of thought:

The stages of all action which are performed with enthusiasm are as follows: first of all comes immediate enthusiasm, then follows the stage of cleverness which, because immediate enthusiasm does not calculate, assumes with a calculating cleverness the appearance of being the higher; and finally comes the higher and most intensive enthusiasm, which follows the stage of cleverness, and is therefore able to see the shrewdest plan of action but disdain it, and thereby receive the intensity of an eternal enthusiasm. (Kierkegaard 1962/1846, 60)

He announced the "death of rebellion" as closely related to the increase of "shrewd action" as people were "*seduced*" and "*enchanted*" by the "calculative cleverness" that he proclaimed as the stage that would most probably retain its popularity over the "intensive enthusiasm" of higher intellectual life of action (Kierkegaard 1962/1846, 59-60). Existentialists were generally extremely cautious against what they saw as the "modern herd mentality", and people enslaved to their technologies. As Pojman (2006, 189) remarks, already in his journals from the 1840's, Kierkegaard presaged the coming of time, "*when people would stare mesmerized into a box that would inform them on what to believe.*" Existentialist view pronounces concrete experiencing, especially the deeply felt

*paradoxes and contradictions of life* that can succeed in alienating the subject from the peer pressures of the crowd, which typically precedes the awakening of will to engage oneself in the painstaking quests for truth (Pojman 2006, 189-190, 195).

In one of his aphoristic works, *Human, All Too Human* [1878], Nietzsche was rather sceptical about the future of sciences and higher culture alike, if the search for scientific truths become routinized, loses interest, ceases to give pleasure in itself, and turns to scorn the higher cultures, i.e., “*the comforts of metaphysics, religion and art, then the greatest source of pleasure, to which mankind owes almost its whole humanity, is impoverished.*” (s. 251). To prevent the ruin of sciences and to guard the *pleasurable* quests of knowledge, Nietzsche stated that higher culture ought to provide humans with a “double brain”, as two distinct yet necessarily complimentary brain chambers - the other, regulatory one to experience *science* and the other, passionate one to experience *nonscience*:

Lying next to one another, without confusion, separable, self-contained: our health demands this. In the one domain lies the source of strength, in the other the regulator. Illusions, passions must give heat; with the help of scientific knowledge, the pernicious and dangerous consequences of overheating must be prevented. (1878, section 251)

Nietzsche was observing the modern life of his day, and was particularly concerned with the declining appreciation regarding the *vita contemplativa*, that was being replaced with incessant work and industry that sometimes appeared to “rage like a disease” without the signs of a moral compass of previous times:

Because there is no time for thinking, and no rest in thinking, we no longer weigh divergent views: we are content to hate them. With the tremendous acceleration of life, we grow accustomed to using our mind and eye for seeing and judging incompletely or incorrectly, and all men are travellers who get to know a land and its people from the train. (1878, section 282)

He was, however, willing to cast some hope for the esteem granted back to the meditative life, of “*when the genius of meditation makes a powerful return*” (s. 282), which would require correctives “*applied to the character of humanity*” as a “*massive strengthening of the contemplative element*” (s. 285). Yet the main modes of the modern life, for the time being, Nietzsche saw as better characterized in terms of *agitation* and *restlessness* ending in a “new barbarism”. It occupied and provided a hasty kind of “*enjoyment of bondage*” for the “*active people*”, who despite their ant-like industrious appearances, were *lazy* at the bottom of their soul. The laziness of the restless man’s soul “*hinders man from drawing water out of his own well*” (s. 286). Whether statesmen, officials, businessmen or scholars, such: “*Active people roll like a stone, conforming to the stupidity of mechanics.*” (s. 283). Given the popular interest around the practices of meditation in recent decades, there may be signs - if we allow *congenial* over *cynical* interpretation - that suggest the rise of demand for the contemplative elements of existence. Meditation can open the avenues to forward the value of *active thinking*, e.g. in the form of in-depth conceptual exploration (Ziegler & Weger 2018).

### 3.9 Concluding thoughts

The authors presented above generally adhere to the *personalistic ethical* importance of critically reflective self-understanding, in learning to regulate one's passions in a way that is conducive to vital emotional and social life as a whole. They reject scientific and religious dogmatism, and the mechanization of conscious life, in recognition of the emotive and practical dynamism, plurality and fallibility of human beliefs, values and goals. Such views differ, perhaps most radically, from the mechanized naturalism of behaviorist psychology (Watson 1913). Their views are holistic, and in favor of the *study of consciousness* while siding with the argumentation *for* the notion of free will, in the sense of assuming "who you are as a person" as dependent but *not identical* to physical processes. Concepts like agency, choice, or indeed self-restraint would not make sense in a completely deterministic, or in a completely arbitrary world.

We do not have to accept the whole of Plato's philosophical enterprise, in the scientific sense as empirically accurate, in order to allow his *ideas to enliven our thoughts*, especially when appreciated in the sense of "*spiritus animalis*" that refers to the practice of philosophy (Heinämaa, Reuter & Yrjönsuuri 2003, 7-8). Plato's integrative efforts can already remind us of the value of recognizing the interrelationships between self-experience and societal normativity. Instead of attempting to locate, mechanize or naturalize all problems of contemporary organizational life and culture within the individual *psyche* or *physique*, there are also recognizable *connections* and *disconnections* between the many realms of *intensities* and *identities*. As Tsoukas and Chia (2011) note, "the study of organizations is inextricably dependent on the prior *organization of mentalities* and modes of thought." (p. 4, emphasis original). Yet the everyday social realities, norms and groups that we identify or find ourselves associated with, are not the *absolute end points* of valuation. We can use our cognitive-evaluative, i.e. organizing and "self-taming" auto-educational capabilities also to *renew* and *re-organize* the way we approach, relate to, and make sense of phenomena, while learning to decipher the embodied intentionality of emotions and affects. We can even manage to befriend the features of 'the beast', which Plato and Xenophon sought to accomplish in reference to actual and imaginary horses.

Plato's model of the 'self-moving' soul in the Chariot allegory may be read as rooted on bodily grounded awareness on the facticity of human life in its fallibility and finitude. The continently situated self-experiences that constrain the cultivation of reason are depicted as necessarily and inevitably uncertain, confused, troublesome and difficult, as displayed through the figure of the "bad horse" within one's nature: '*Any charioteer who has trained this horse imperfectly finds that it pulls him down towards the earth and holds him back, and this is the point at which the soul faces the worst suffering and the hardest struggle.*' (*Phaedrus*, 247b). The model hence grants a role to *experiential evidence* that is gained from possibly destructive patterns of action that can be concretely felt as convincing enough to enforce the voluntary exercise of choices, instead of the blind obedience to impulse, ambition or routine. It suggests that the self-regulatory

agentic sense of freedom and control is an ongoing strife, which can be realized through the *embodied personal weight* of the recognition that one is *radically* responsible for making choices and decisions in the first place. Freedom, in this sense, is mediated by others, but also forced from within the self. Thus understood, the virtue of self-restraint can be experientially *discovered* as a dynamically situated, embodied, and intuitively reasonable concept, rather than as a merely externally imposed imperative, or an empty idea yet to be fulfilled.

Plato's tripartite classification concerning the different body regions (the head, the heart, and the lower body areas) also reflect the concept of the *embodiment of moral agency*. A recent empirical study on the "bodily maps of emotions" supports the view that the conceptual associations of certain emotional semantics with certain bodily location and sensation patterns are *culturally universal* rather than language or culture-specific (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari & Hietanen 2014). Nummenmaa and others conducted computerized experiments with a topographical self-report tool that the participants (n=701) used in response to the perception of emotional words, stories, movies, and facial expressions. They were given the task of colouring the body regions where consciously felt emotions were associated in relation to their somatosensory mapping in the human body. The colours represented a continuum between bodily sensation *activation* (warm colours), neutrality (black), and *deactivation* (cold colours). The "basic" emotions (classified as *anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise* and *neutral*) and the "nonbasic" emotions (*anxiety, love, depression, contempt, pride, shame* and *envy*) signified some changes in the upper-chest area (the heart and breathing), in all but depression, and were notably activated, e.g. in pride and anger. The head (including the facial area) was found to be variedly involved with all the emotions. Happiness was the only emotion coloured with elevated sensations throughout the whole body. Approach-oriented emotions, like anger, love and happiness, were seen to arouse also the upper-limb sensations, whereas sadness and depression signified deactivation in the upper *and* lower limbs. (Nummenmaa et al. 2014).

Phenomenological analysis, on the other hand, can offer the most nuanced descriptions on emotional experiences as *lived* and *relational*, also in view of the generally deeply seated *ethical* and *social* significance of emotional experiencing (Drummond & Rinofner-Kreidl 2018). Acknowledging the emotional and the ethical experiential interdependencies can also advance the formation of integrative frameworks of research. Thompson (2010) defines the similarity of biological life and human consciousness as sharing an *autopoietic* self-organizing nature that are existing in the same *continuum of life*, which also resembles Plato's metaphysical idea of the human soul as interrelated with the larger 'cosmic soul' of the universe. The idea of a soul, in Stein's (1989/1917) analysis, can be experientially understood as a "*relational fusion*" of the "pure" and the "empirical" "I". The soul is seen as something that intimately *connects* me, the conscious "I" to my body as *living*. This, in turn, relates to the *primary* bodily experience of ourselves as *expressive* and *relational* wholes (Heinämaa 2011).



The notions of good life, and the problem of mastering emotionally excessive tendencies, were matters related to *moral agency* and *self-knowledge* in both Plato and Xenophon. Moreover, they seemed to share a certain awareness regarding actual equine characteristics, for example, when describing the ravenous or the spirited animals, and explicating on how to handle their mischievous or noble tempers. Xenophon had notable familiarity with the animals, due to his relation with everyday economic as well as military concerns. Plato conceptualized and generalized the horse-analogy in the higher level of abstraction. They were the pupils of Socrates (in addition to Aristotle and Aristophanes) whose Socratic writings are preserved to this day, but they had rather separate and diverse ways of living, also according to historical references, as Saarikoski (1960) notes. Hence it is only speculative, albeit curious to wonder whether they had possibly conversed, e.g. on the topic of animals and moral analogies. Their comparative Socratic ideas, however, suggest that non-human animals were seen to possess mental and moral features that were assimilated to human psychic and spiritual characteristics, though these were deemed more advanced, or complicated, in the human soul. The way they were able to assimilate certain emotional and moral qualities between humans and animals, could not have been *originally* based on any objective criteria, but on the particularities of *sense givenness* that were *revealed* to them through experience in the courses of concrete interaction. As Anthony Steinboch (2014) elaborates: “if we become cognizant of shame, love, pride, humility, it is because they will have opened up interpersonally in and through the emotional experience itself, with its own kinds of evidence, modalities, and so on, peculiar to that sphere of experience” (2014, 16). Xenophon’s horsemanship, in particular, exemplifies the fact that we tend to have no trouble with including animals into our relational sphere and moral sense-givenness of experiencing, already in the *primary* sense of *pre-reflective* recognition. The ‘anthropomorphic’ acts of *conferring qualities* upon other animals are *secondary* conceptual procedures that rely on the lifeworld, whether the original lived sense-givenness is explicitly recognized or not.

The problem of restraining the animalistic passions of the soul is not new, and the dominant frameworks of value through which the inner, the outer, and the interactive *regulatory* concerns were organized and articulated, has varied in different historical periods of human civilization. There is reason to assume that the problem itself predates the documentation that has survived to this day. We are fortunate to have access to rich literary resources whereas we can retrospectively detect patterns and tendencies in relation to the formulation of *normative ideas* of the social order on the one hand, and the assumed *human nature* on the other (see Pojman 2006). The vast intellectual resources can also be used to enlighten the present educational efforts to *revise* the way we study and teach management (Saarinen 2008; Lambrechts et al. 2011; Hendry 2006; Bell & Bridgman 2017; Blok 2019). The classical texts of Xenophon, for example, suggest that the economy of ancient Greece was territorially centred on the private household and concrete property management. In Xenophon’s elaboration, taking care of economic affairs of all scales, was a *balancing act* that necessarily involved virtuous qualities and deeds of the good life, over the

economic managerial measures of production, transactions and exchange. Plato and Xenophon adhered to *economical balance* in the sense of advocating the higher forms of knowledge that could *temper* the *real* economic pursuits after wealth. However, we know by now that economic governance has exceedingly infiltrated all societies as a hegemonic discourse of justification and judgement with the *axiom of self-interest* since the capitalist reformulation of sociality. We can witness the privileged status of statistically reiterated economic rationalization, as issued by the proponents of mainstream economic paradigm who claim it represents the correct and superior form of public sense. (Schumpeter 1942; Arendt 1958; Gorz 1989; Hirschman 1977; Fisher 2009; Fleming 2017a; Kantola 2014; Meiksins Wood 2017; Eskelinen & Jonker-Hoffrén 2017; Lash 2018; Christensen 2018). The ideology of *managerialism* has also been instituted as a top-down *strategic mode* to rationalize the limitless pursuit and accumulation of wealth (Koikkalainen 2012; Hanlon 2016; Chia & Holt 2009).

Contingencies are no longer issued after otherworldly divinities, unless the notion of “economic metaphysics” (Hovas 2009) counts as a sort of *semi-religious substitute* for the gods. Yet the *profound* ethical dimension, including the question of the *soul* and the problems pertaining to the spiritual meanings like *creativity* and *freedom*, have not gone away, and far exceed the narrow calculative realms by virtue of being *absolutely valuable to humans* as such. The spiritual aspirations, however, are often *a priori* assimilated with the *homo economicus* fantasies of growth and limitless accumulation, with vested interests to arouse ever new desires and profit from the confusions and emotional conflicts that are bound to arise against the cold mercy of the utilitarian teleology (Illouz 2007; Lordon 2014; Bjerg 2016; McGowan 2016; Purser 2019).

It does not seem sufficient to diagnose the moral universe of economic authoritarianism as socially degenerative. It appears to be of key importance to recognize *the lures of epistemic ease* involved with voluntary subjection to the “*impersonal arts of calculation*”, as possibly based on the way they are perceived to relieve us from uncertainties and from the higher-order evaluative struggles, i.e. from the *radical sense of freedom and responsibility over our actions, decisions and judgments*. It can also seem like the natural way to proceed when all the spheres and conducts of life, including the *acts of thinking*, are being reduced to technical calculative procedures that are almost reassuringly patterned to function like “*surrogate intentionality*” (Gorz 1989, 122). Given our natural tendencies as ‘*cognitive misers*’ in the realm of effortful thinking (Stanovich 2009), less personal accountability and ownership can momentarily or habitually secure us with a sense of accomplishment with the minimum of efforts. Given the culturally accelerated cognitive strains and overload that we are typically subjected to endure in the data-driven knowledge economy, our natural inclination to *economize* our efforts of thinking may even seem perfectly reasonable. Reduced sense of freedom as well as responsibility, then, equals less energy consuming pains of thinking, for the sake of a mental ‘balance sheet’. Greenfield (2017), however, cautions us against the related “*post-human*” transcendental rhetoric

that typically accompanies ‘the utopian sales speeches’ for furthermore *radical technologization* of everyday life that is falsely supposed to liberate our efforts:

And perhaps we could do a better job at pushing back again the rhetoric of transcendence we’re offered. Every time we are presented with the aspiration toward the posthuman, we need to perceive the predictably tawdry and all-too-human drives underlying it, including the desire to profit from the exploitation of others and the sheer will to power and control. It doesn’t take a trained psychologist to detect that these motives are present, and being clearer about them might give us at least momentary leverage over those pushing so hard for our own eclipse, who in doing so have consecrated their considerable gifts to the task of achieving the smallest, shallowest and most shaming of dreams. (Greenfield 2017, 314-315)

The greater degrees of freedom in the flexibility of human conscious life, does *originally* suggest greater responsibility of co-inhabiting the world together with actual others and nature at large, instead of passively pretending to act *as if* social automatons in organizational life, and particularly in relation to scientific advancement. These problems were at the core of what Husserl (2011/1962) saw as *the crisis of humanity and sciences*. According to De Santis (2019), Husserl saw Socrates as a “practical reformer” who set the trail for the ideal of a *rational life grounded upon an intuition-based form of knowledge*. De Santis also endorses the view that Husserlian phenomenology continues to tackle the tensions between the different modern - Galilean and transcendental - forms of ‘rationality’, and that phenomenology joins and broadens the Socratic tradition with rigorous development of the procedures initiated by the Socratic methodical discussions.

Husserl (2006/1924) also noted that since human beings are fundamentally incomplete, *self-regulatory ethical life* is not a matter of attaining absolute perfection. It is about *continuous movement* toward the ethical ideals of *renewal* that are conducive for the personal and the intersubjective cultural betterment of civilization. Whereas a non-human animal is more passively tied with *the actual* reality of the natural world, the human is also a cultural-historical being who has access to *the ideal* and *the infinite*. It means that *the possible* of reality has primary significance over *the actual* in human consciousness, and we are *essentially free* to choose and control our own realities through consciously controlling our *horizon of possibilities* (Husserl 2006/1924). As Viren (2018) argues, it is precisely this inherent human motive towards *the dynamism of the possible*, that is, towards *the virtual* and *the potential*, that are today more forcibly being captured, controlled, emptied and exploited through abstract monetary control techniques that are strengthened by the financialized economic paradigm. This also means that “money”, more often than not, is *the foremost a priori* “transcendental condition of possibility.”

If we think about the current political tendencies, extremist ideologies and socioeconomic conditioning in terms of the horse- metaphor, it seems that we have released too much rein to the unruly impressionable ‘beasts’ of our own nature, i.e. to *affectation* and *ignorance*, at the expense of concrete experiential evidence and self-critically reflective ethical boundaries of reason. Not to mention the *resentment*, *aggression* and *violence* that the increasing social

*inequality, injustice and insecurity* breeds around the world, and effectively coerces masses of people to variant modes of *survivalism*. In addition to unbridled dark passions and moral defeat, they can generate untimely encounters with the *pale horse*, that is, the 'steed of death' in apocalyptic imagery. Maybe it is necessary to revoke 'archaic' and even 'fatalistic' ideas for the Western imagination in the attempt to dethrone the *metaphysical order* of the economy from our lives, like Hovas (2009) proposes. Or differently stated, to seriously account for the fact that there are certain relations and interests of power behind the man-made design of myths and fictions, which make 'the economy' *appear* like an *absolute* force that cannot be redesigned or repurposed. People may also prefer to save the efforts of re-forming the accustomed ways and forms of life. The sense of economic determinism is hence premised on our own emotionally invested complicity, which is something that is simply easier to ignore, until the perpetual crises accumulate to unbearable degrees. Perhaps such a stage of affairs resembles that of gradually 'boiling frogs'. The *disordered* organizing practices of the depressive society after all, as the many critically-minded authors concur, can *suck the life out* of our vital sense of self –the living soul - long before our *final* natural demise. According to Franco Berardi (2009), our current form of alienation can be defined as "*putting the soul to work*":

Our desiring energy is trapped in the trick of self-enterprise, our libidinal investments are regulated according to economic rules, our attention is captured in the precariousness of virtual networks: every fragment of mental activity must be transformed into capital. (2009, 24).

This is hardly the Socratic definition of '*the way we ought to live*' or '*the examined life worth living*'. Humans are nonetheless capable of better accomplishments than settling with the short-cut reassurances of 'immediate enthusiasm' or 'shrewd calculative cleverness', as Kierkegaard put it. It appears that all kinds of organizations would benefit from the efforts of rethinking the reified assumptions that operatively guide what is considered as doing the 'right' or the 'wrong' thing, and examine whether these ideals sustain generative rather than degenerative intersubjective coordinates of orientation, valuation and volition. There is no shortage of research proposals and applicable models for *socially* and *ecologically* measured, egalitarian, commons-saving, co-operative, community-based, circular, degrowth and post-growth economic coordinates of organizational conduct (e.g. Waring 1988; Fournier 2008; Peredo & Chrisman 2006; Eskelinen & Sorsa 2011; D'Alisa, Demaria & Kallis 2015; Daly 2013; Blok 2015; Stahel 2016; Johnsen et al 2017; Raworth 2017). It is high-time to question the legitimacy of the 'limitless growth economic' -logic, since it has effectively become *uneconomic* in producing 'illth faster than wealth' (Daly 2013).

In addition to a profound theoretical and ideological *paradigm change*, it will no doubt require real political and legislative reforms to realize alternative concepts, which could also structurally support and encourage personalistic commitments to enact such values, goals and deeds, as the *non-economic* attitude of *benevolence*, the virtues of reflective *dignity* and *distance*, and the conventional

*tacit rules* and communal *rituals* in the *exchange of goodness*, which Hovas (2009) suggests as the 'archaic remedy' for our times. The archaic or ancient ideas that designate certain benevolent core patterns, cordial manners, and self-regulatory boundaries for interaction, are not necessarily outdated. They also differ from mere primitivism, in that they do not simply idealize regression to atavistic forms of sociality or disinhibited 'bestialization' that still firmly reside in the ground layers of humanity, whether we like it or not. The new tribalism, i.e. tendencies to seek solace from like-minded associations, has been virtually unleashed in digitalized network societies, and *not automatically* in the most reconstructive sense of virtual agency or social identification (Verhaeghe 2014). Self-centricity is often scorned as a character trait of capitalist societies, which implies that it is not entirely something to be classified as an inborn disorder. It is closely related to a *weak sense of identity*, when a person has lost, or never gained any sustained sense of belonging to a social group or meaningful purpose to identify with. While feeling deprived of safety and protection, it comes across as a rather fragile self left to its own devices - as a self that is centred on itself by *circumscribed necessity*. (Verhaeghe 2010, 27; Lasch 1984). I thus agree with Berardi, who states that "*Only the self-organization of cognitive cyber-workers, only an alliance between the engineer and the poet, might reverse humanity's slide toward self-annihilation.*" (2018, 8). He uses the metaphors of *poetry* and *breathing*, in order to 'poetically' and 'erotically' reactivate *the social body* comprised of 21<sup>st</sup> century cognitive workers, as a social body which has been suffocating and dying under the rule of 'financial absolutism'.

In case a person truly wants to override the prevailing - and ever more affectively urging - abstract economic imperatives to simply "act as if" a replaceable "*cog in the machine*", there is little point in waiting for major top-down reforms or disasters to enforce the necessary changes. It is as intuitively reasonable as ever to *question* the given values and justifications of conduct, to *rethink* the notion of good life and what does it mean for ourselves, and *discover* the practice of self-restraint as the seat of true freedoms. Becoming better *human* animals, also by learning *about, from* and *with* non-human animals, still seems the more plausible option than reversing or abandoning the whole project of humanity by succumbing to the social ontology of survivalism or tamed animalism. That would amount to accepting the corrosion of the spirit and meaning of *freedom*, which is the nexus of possibilities and creation, as Schelling (1809) saw it. Reclaiming the agentic mastery of passions, and refusing to enact the hostile modes of sociality, are arguably among the *elementary good life -skills* already available within our own powers to cultivate. Yet without the citizens who aspire to learn, *and* who can equally enjoy the possibilities to educate their capabilities of *abstraction* and *interaction*, it does not seem liable to bring about systemic change that actually works in the direction of good life.

## 4 THE AESTHETIC REGULATION OF VALUE

In this chapter, I seek to clarify the different ways to conceptualize the *lifeworld* of human emotionality, and the *embodied* basis of cognition that is already silently operative through the *expressivity* of carnal intersubjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945; 1964; 2013). I respond to the problem of “aesthetic muteness” which means the general lack of appropriate language to articulate the *qualitative* dimensions of experience in organizations (Taylor 2002). I consider the *sense-givenness* of aesthetic experiencing, and the intersubjective *circulation of affectivity* (Ahmed 2004) as related to the *intensification of life* in the aesthetic economy (Böhme 2017). The self-regulatory evaluative significance of aesthetic experiencing relates to the subjective appropriation of the *aesthetic, epistemic and moral demands* that are *revealed* to us through emotional experiences, and which can implicitly both constrain and enhance the perception and judgment of *value* (Steinbock 2014; De Monticello 2018). I engage the *radical empathic apperception*, through which *embodiment* and *sociality* connect us also to non-human animals, and which makes it possible for us to find their *earthly predicament* as similar to our own case (Ruonakoski 2011). The elaboration draws from a particular horse-metaphorical artwork that enabled both *emotional arousal* and *reflective distance*. It inspired examination on the notion of *truth-value* in the way we originally perceive the actual and the possible, especially when encountering something that can alter one’s background sense of possibilities (Ratcliffe 2015). The chapter involves critical phenomenological reflection (Salamon 2018), with *descriptive* and *normative* considerations, for art can be seen as a potentially revelatory social domain concerning the *moral substance* of living. The art in question reminds us of the dark side of modern progress and industry, by requiring the confrontation with the surrogate sufferers of mechanized human bestialization. The horse-metaphor is “*bridging the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearances*” (Arendt 1981, 105), in this case, as an embodiment of *critique* toward the militaristic machine metaphors of organizing. It enhanced the apprehension of *essential* qualities and *possibilities* of valuation that intentionally and temporally span *beyond* the immediate actuality of what is presently at hand, or psycho-physically given through the senses.

I attend to this case similar to the style of a *critical-creative experiment* (Brewis & Williams 2019; Salamon 2018) and as a philosophical methodological exercise in lifeworld research by way of *radical empathic apperception*. According to Ratcliffe (2012), radical empathy involves a *wilful openness to be affected by others*, and this self-affecting propensity enables the experiential possibilities of *self-transformation* that phenomenologists see as potentially present in all kinds of interpersonal encounters. Thus I initially engaged with the particular horse-metaphorical artistic creations in an aesthetically, epistemically and morally attuned, rather than theoretically detached manner. The main interest was on the *subjective sense-constitution of meanings*, of how the horse-figures become to *appear to embody concepts* like power, beauty, or death that are also intimately analogous to the human situation, and on whether or how such a recognition can possibly affect the *cultural cognition of value*. In the following pages, I gather and reflect upon the themes, ideas and insights that emerged in and through concretely approaching the horse-metaphorical aesthetic objects through the senses and the mind. I will describe the event of visiting the art exhibition of Berlinde de Bruyckere, and elaborate on the subject of aesthetic experience with a selection of philosophical, psychological and social theoretical viewpoints.

#### 4.1 Truthful recognition of the actual and the possible in art

In the *original* phenomenological sense, the aesthetic experience is understood as a *subjective accomplishment*, which is to say that it is a *freely emergent and creatively oriented movement* of personal appropriation. It is based on and motivated by *the basic experiences*, that Steinbock classifies i) at *the person level* as “*the experience of absolute uniqueness*” and “*the ability-to-be*”, and ii) at *the aesthetic level* as “*the absolute lived bodily presence*”, “*the ability-to-do*”, and “*self-temporalization*”. To understand these basic ground level senses of self-experience as essentially *motivational*, also means that they are operative in the *positive moves* of sense-giveness and constitution of the “*truth-character*” of experience, especially when something is recognized in the affirmative sense as something of value. Moreover, the works of art solicit an “*aesthetic demand*” “for the subject who is then “*expected*” to fulfil it mainly by *conforming* to the *intended* sense-giveness and truth of the artistic object (whether concrete or performative). This is qualitatively distinct from “*epistemic demand*”, as issued in the acts of gaining theoretical and practical knowledge, which is more a matter of subjective control and determination. These differ from “*moral demand*”, e.g. as sensed through the experiences of quilt, which cannot be fulfilled in the same way like aesthetic and epistemic ones. (Steinbock 2014, 37-43, 112-115; 2018, 55).

De Monticelli (2018) outlines a *bottom-up* approach to experimental phenomenology, which is a branch with origins in Gestalt and experimental psychology, and in phenomenology (see also Heinämaa 2009). She defends a *thick* conception of value as seen embedded in the works of art, to surpass the

traditional (top-down strategic) “fact-value dichotomy”, and to demonstrate how the phenomenologically descriptive *contents* of experience, or the pre-conceptual “qualitative data”, is the ultimate source, and the ideal normative “matter” which all talk and judgment of value is based upon. She contemplates on the *paradoxical* nature of values, specifically, how the paradox is manifested in lived experience of value as a “tension between the ideal and the real”. She notes how: “*positive values are never as vividly given as they are in the painful recognition of their absence on earth, when (...) the corresponding negative values are realized in their place.*”(2018, 117). The normative power of the aesthetic perception, according to De Monticelli’s material axiological view, is already present in the *quality of demand*. As an example, she uses *the value quality of ‘ferocity’*: “*quality of demand is a global feature of perceptual configurations, constraining possible (co)variations of their contents, in all possible worlds in which ferocity is instantiated*” (2018, 120). The essential (*eidetic*) qualities, e.g. of ferocity, can thus be grasped through *abstraction* as conveyed through aesthetic objects that are distanced from the “genuine exercise of ferocity” in the first-hand practical sense of reality. As such, art does not immediately compel us to act in some way or another, but it rather improves our deeper *understanding* on matters that hold agentic and societal relevance: “*Aesthetic experience switches off action and at the same time deepens cognition*” (2018, 122). Aesthetic experience of artistic objects involves a “dispassionate cognitive attitude”, and an “*as if*” motivational mode of *pretense*. Art can thus allow us *reflective distance*, in the sense of freedom from the everyday practical tasks and demands that our perception is ordinarily occupied and assigned with. (De Monticelli 2018).

Horse figures have often been displayed through the works of art. Perhaps what most vividly comes to mind are those paintings and equestrian statues that portray victorious leaders or commanders of the war field on horseback (see e.g. ‘*Napoleon Crossing the Alps*’ by Jacques-Louis David, c. 1801, or ‘*The Charging Chasseur*’ by Théodore Géricault, c. 1812). Horses have factually been used for military purposes for centuries, and they are also signified as symbols of *power* and *domination* over others, while appearing to enhance the social prestige of the men they seem willing to carry in and out of battle. The physical appearance and motility of the war horse is usually artistically captured in a position that accents the potently spirited qualities of the animal, while the posture of the socially high-ranking rider gives an impression of valiant managerial rule and leadership over the natural forces of the horse, which appear to be subjected to the man like a seamless extension of his own, less impressive physique in itself. In case we made an imaginary *thought experiment* in the visual register, and *un-horsed* the men (or in more rare occasions, the women or goddesses) in those paintings or statues, we could empathically realize the *transcendental leverage* of the value qualities that are invisibly implied through the *empowering* figure of the horse. Even though the forces of war equipment have since been mechanized and multiplied in terms of *technological efficiency* during the last century, the image of the four-legged animal reinforcement of warriors remains credible in today’s popular culture, as the



equestrian performances are still displayed in movies and television series that remind us of other, assumedly more *heroic* scenes and epochs of time.

There is also the kind of art that upfront reveals the realistic flipside of the imagined glory of warfare. Berlinde de Bruyckere's horse-metaphorical artwork is one such contemporary expression of the large-scale *disempowerment* that results from the organized power of machinated violence, and the excessive social havoc that consequently ensues. Her seminal piece "*No Life Lost II*" displays wounded and dead horses left behind in the battlefield during the WWI. In my evaluation, it succeeds in delivering the essentially *unsettling* purposiveness of art: of seeing and thinking differently, in *truthful recognition of earthly and worldly realities* as they can appear to us through artistic conveyance. De Bruyckere's ingenious resides in her creative appropriation of our *embodied conceptual* sensibilities, which affords the empathic apperception of the horse as a powerful ontological metaphor though the perceived *absence* of power- in vulnerability, suffering, death and decay. The aesthetic recognition of the untimely decay of another sentient being, can thus *remind* us of our own finite and fragile carnal existence, and deepen the conception of higher values.

## 4.2 Visiting the art exhibition of Berlinde de Bruyckere

Berlinde de Bruyckere's art exhibition was in display at the Sara Hildén art museum in Tampere between 10.2. - 20.5.2018. The private showcase was her first one in Finland, and specially arranged for the centennial (1918-2018) anniversary of the Finnish Civil War. I went there with two of my friends, and we participated in the narrated tour. Approaching the occasion as an interpersonal event that could be later on discussed together, broadened the social imagination and conceptual awareness concerning the multiple meanings, sensations and feelings evoked by the artistic artefacts. I had certain preconceptions in mind before entering the exhibition, after reading several reviews on the internet (see e.g. Vapriikki 2018), so the other first-person impressions and on-site interpretations were a contribution also in this sense.

Berlinde De Bruyckere (born 1964) is an internationally acknowledged sculptor and painter, who lives and works in Ghent, Belgium. She is exceptionally skilled in creating life-like multi-layered sculptures with wax. Her production is famed for addressing the *questions of life and death*, in a way that is both subtle and profound. De Bruyckere's artistic work can be characterized as *research of beauty from things that are experienced as losses*. They open a way to cope with issues of humanity that are essentially painful and difficult. The conceptual starting points of her work come from the history of fine arts, Christian iconography, classic literature and antique mythology. Her international artistic breakthrough originates in her purposive use of horses as a metaphor of human suffering, which also caught my attention toward her work. Initially, she was commissioned (in the year 2000) to make an artistic artefact to represent the devastation of war in the Belgian area of Flanders in the World

War I. She conceived the horse-metaphorical idea when she saw old photographs of the WWI battlefield, where human corpses were already removed, but the dead horses were left behind in the grounds. Berlinde's idea of using dead animals in her art was never about being shocking or grotesque, but rather about expressing down-to-earth compassion. Her father used to be a butcher and a hunter when Berlinde was growing up, and even though she didn't like the corporeality of dead animals, she got familiar with them early on. (The Sara Hildén exhibition info leaflet & tour 6/5/2018).

The first, most famous and central piece at the exhibition, "*No Life Lost II*" (2015, see PICTURE 1), was displayed right at the entrance. It depicts a pile of wounded and/or dead horses as the innocent victims of war. The three life-sized figures were cast and modelled in wax, covered with actual horse skin and hair, and were displayed in an old class cabinet. De Bruyckere had used the actual corpses of dead horses, working in collaboration with an animal clinique and with the animal owners' consent on the purpose of giving them a new life and value through her art. Placing the figures in a class cabinet signified that they are protected, esteemed and valued. In this particular piece, however, the horses did not fully fit within the frames. This was perhaps an intended reminder of the *unnecessary* and *excessive* suffering, waste and loss of life that overflows beyond all measures of reason in the context of warfare. The significance of protection, compassion and care were also manifested through the acts of bandaging the wounds, and covering or hiding the individual features, like the eyes of the horses. Covering the eyes could indeed be seen as a gesture of kindness, one that can usually calm a distressed animal. In humans or non-human animals the opposite effect may sometimes be common as well: the uncertainty related to the diminishing of sight can also be a source of anxiety. Yet if the external circumstances seem too much to cope with, it can be most reassuring to divert or confine the psychic contours inward.



PICTURE 1. "*No Life Lost II*" (2015) by Berlinde De Bruyckere

The other two notable horse-metaphorical sculptures at the exhibition, named “*Portret*” (2013-2014), and “*K21*” (2006), bared less physical resemblance to actual horses but they nevertheless transmitted the idea of horses through the perception of substantially weighed horse-skinned and -haired creatures, that were displayed in unusual resting or hanging positions (see PICTURES 2-3). At first instance, many spectators tended to circle around the vitrines that enclosed them. They were for searching for their individual distinguishing features, like the head, for identifying them according to the general schematic preconception of what a horse normally looks like. After a while, however, their apparent disfiguration seemed less odd and even appealing in their combination of *familiarity* and *strangeness*. Like all the sculptures that assimilated horse-like appearances, they elicited an urge to touch and stroke their soft-looking surfaces by hand, perhaps as a self-assuring gesture. The other two pieces could not be touched, however, as they were placed within closed class cabinets, which enhanced the impression of them as valued and sacred items. The enclosed space gave them a certain air of veneration and respectful distance.



PICTURE 2. “*Portret*” (2013-2014) by Berlinde De Bruyckere



PICTURE 3. "K21" (2006) by Berlinde De Bruyckere

There was also another kind of equine-reference in De Bruyckere's artwork, which was related to her use of old halters as a symbol of empowerment, in "Sibylle" (2015-2016), and "Glassdome with Penthesilea" (2015-2016). The halters were positioned as supportive of the flesh-like pieces of wax - many of them which resembled female genitalia - and the sculptures were placed in display within small glass domes. As associated to harnessing the power of horses when people used to employ them for daily labor, they were now represented as powerful carriers of femininity, and specifically composed as a harmonious combination of masculinity and femininity, as De Bruyckere herself explained in a featured video at the exhibition. There were also references to Greek mythology attached to these pieces, related to less well-known tragic fates and struggles of female *heroines*, and De Bruyckere's re-interpretation of them. She said that she did not want to overdetermine the meanings of her artwork, but thought that it was important to "*charge the pieces with stories*", with the ideas she had in mind in processing them. Throughout the exhibition, it was possible to witness her in-built and carefully articulated intentions of comforting others by giving new life, value, and a degree of materiality and significance to things that are ordinarily often considered *useless*, or habitually unrecognized.

### 4.3 The horse-metaphorical empathic transfer of meanings

In this study, the horse-metaphor is used as a *conceptual sensitizer* for recognizing the *intuitively* resonant experiential senses and meanings of self-regulation in view of the *embodied* cognition. The real life examples of horse handling are elaborated for the goal of opening the *social imagination* and for eliciting the transferral of meanings *beyond* what the conception of self-management stands for in the narrowly rationalized form. The figure of the horse is not intended to designate a fetishist object, nor an arbitrary leap of

imagination since horse-related images are accessible in the lifeworld of shared experiences. The ethical use of the horse-metaphor is both a *totemic* and a *critical* gesture of recognizing resemblances, as well as *dissociating* and *decoupling* the concept of self-management from the personally and interpersonally hostile *homo economicus* -modes of behaving and relating. The horse-metaphor is in this view based on *radical empathic apperception* related to *corporeal existence*, which means that it is genetically *primary* to any top-down objectivist regime of managing emotions and affects. The point is to activate the radically reflective consciousness of possibilities, instead of passively assuming the “as if” model of wanton self-interest. I assume that the horse-metaphorical *empathic transfer* can function as an intersubjective and intercorporeal bridge between subjective experience and social identification. I believe it can also remind us of our critical capacities to *re-imagine* and *incorporate* wholly other possibilities than what we’re persuaded to accept as the mechanistically fixed conception of things.

The interdependencies of *the emotional* and *the ethical* sense-givenness in the level of experience also relate to the intuitively recognizable eidetic core or essence of phenomena, when a person is openly attuned to something that captures her or his attention. In reference to Heidegger, and the development of our abilities to distinguish between things and the essence of *things-in-themselves*, Haynes (2001, p. 10) describes the act of *imposing our subjectivity* into objects, as making a shift between *calculative* and *perspectival* thinking:

We find examples of “the what” in the physical world, and these are objects, which we may care to look at or consider or reflect upon. If we look at an object without wondering what it is or how it came about, then we do not engage consciously with that object. That is, we do not introduce any of our subjectivity into the question of what it is or how it came to be. But once we begin to associate our experiences with that object and thereby introduce our subjectivity upon that object, the objectivity of the object (what it is) comes into focus with what we think it is or begin to think about what it might be. So we begin to impose our subjectivity upon the object and while the object itself does not change, our interpretation of it begins to emerge and this is precisely why the object as some kind of “what” begins to emerge as some kind of “how”.

As Haynes (2001) argues, *asking a question* that we *intuitively* care about - in the personally engaged manner when *themes* begin to emerge in relation to objects - often *already* contains a subconsciously hidden answer, or the *seeds of an answer*. *Perspectival thinking* hence seek to ask and uncover things with respect to one’s *personal ethical system* of accepted convictions as a whole. This implies that *subjective engagement* with an object is the condition without which the apperceived object alone could not reveal the *possible* meanings - including the emotive qualities - to the perceiver beyond the most obvious sense-properties.

In elaboration of human *higher-order* cognitive capacities, Zhikowski (2006) emphasizes the three processes that we often use to organize our understanding of the world: *categorization*, *cross-domain mapping* and *conceptual models*. Firstly, we aim to categorize the objects we perceive in the world through language into conceptual pieces, groups and hierarchies, quite habitually from early age onwards, already because it is naturally convenient to do so for practical and communicative purposes. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 25) remark: “Once we

can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them – and by this means, reason about them.” We can still comprehend that our categorization of the world is never completely fixed nor stable in real life. Moreover, we have a fundamental *metaphorical ability* for cross-domain mapping when making sense of situational dynamism, in constructing new meanings in combination of what we already know: “Humans create meaning by using what they know about a familiar domain to structure a less familiar domain, and by blending concepts from two correlated domains together in a new domain.” (Zhikowski 2006, 125). Conceptual models are also among the basic guiding structures informing our conscious reasoning, and which enclose a rich network of cultural and historical associations when the models are contextualized in different domains and situations. (Zhikowski 2006, 115-131).

The most interesting human sensemaking tool, for the purpose of this particular inquiry, is the *mind-body-world* intermediary role of the metaphor. The purposive use of metaphors can arguably engage our *creative* and *cultural cognitive* faculties, and help to illuminate the *intuitive presuppositions* that we tend to hold in relation to our theoretical and practical efforts of organizing. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have elaborated on the figurative use of language, and emphasized the *embodied* basis of cognition. They see that metaphors are central in *the organization of our thought and action*, because we think and act through our conceptualizations, and the way we make use of language tends to reveal our conceptualizations through *metaphorical expressions*. Metaphors are bodily grounded in our lived experience and everyday interactions, though we’re not always explicitly aware of using them. They are coherent with the values embedded in culture, relative to what is given priority, and correlative to the emotional and practical importance they signify for different subcultures, groups and individuals. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; 1999). The same linguistic metaphorical expression can also entail different values and domains of valuation, as pertaining to unique personal historicity of sense-making. In De Bruyckere’s art, the horse is deliberately portrayed as an *ontological* metaphor that reflects our shared existential conditions of life. In my view, the horse-metaphor of human finitude presented an *aesthetic* and a *moral demand*, before an *epistemic* demand of theoretical and practical significance.

Ruonakoski (2011) argues that human existence is *intertwined* with non-human animal existence in four experiential areas: *empathic sensations*, *communicative reciprocity*, *experience of the world*, and *self-definition*. She states that we generally suppose that animals have *pre-reflective* consciousness, and commonly find their behavior expressive of *operative intentionality*, i.e. that animals are *internally motivated* and *oriented* towards their environment in action. Our *empathic sensations* may also similarly temporally relate to *lifeless* objects and *mechanistic movements* when they only *appear* to us as *goal-oriented*. We experience and interpret also the non-human other’s *bodily situation* always in relation to our own bodily habituated case as *the norm*, wherefrom we recognize the similarity and difference of movements in terms of “situational appropriateness” mainly according to our own case. She also notes that the experienced possibilities for *reciprocal communication* with the other species are

not necessarily dependent on the perceived similarity of particular communicative gestures, but that very *strange* kind of movements can also be *understood* as intents of seeking or maintaining contact with us. Although our own perspective is experienced as the normative one, the other species of animals can also *widen* our *perspectival horizon* beyond the typical human case toward the possibilities of empathizing with different meanings and ways of experiencing the world, e.g. through different elemental dimensions that are not so natural in terms of human habituation. (Ruonakoski 2011).

The empathic horse-metaphorical transfer can thus connect the senses and meanings based on the originating acts of witnessing how horses *concretely* express their instinctive emotional responsiveness in the lifeworld. Concrete witnessing also initially enables us to distinguish the functional-mechanistic assumptions as properly attributed to *lifeless* things, as very different from the intercorporeal and interaffective mode of relating with the other *living* beings. We may also begin to see the interwoven ways how the embodied cognitions, feelings and sensations of emotional experiencing *attach* us, not only in the natural world, but also to the intersubjective *cultural-historical world* that is yet inaccessible to non-human animals and human infants (Heinämaa 2014).

We tend to include animals like horses into our own socio-symbolic field of linguistic signification, e.g. by giving them humane pet names and other characteristics that in some ways reflect our own conditions of life. Thus submitted to our emotional projections and imaginative transfers, horses have not only served human-made action goals, they have also assisted human *self-understanding*. Horses can also present *companionship* when we are coping with emotionally demanding situations, e.g. when they're made to participate in human adventures and struggles, conquests and losses - today so in the fields of competitive sports instead of war. The horse can be seen as a source of both physical and metaphysical *powers* through the apperceived *spirit* of the horse that has drawn the human race to seek partnership with these animals for several millennia. During more recent history, the prevailing *cultural models* and *roles* of the horse in human society have changed in their general emphasis from "servant" to "therapist" (Leinonen 2013). Yet the *primordial* intercorporeal elements of the interaction have basically remained the same, which is a core reason why Xenophon's (2006/c. 350 B.C) rich descriptions related to the arts of horsemanship may seem resonantly familiar to practitioners throughout the ages. Technological progress in machinery has enabled a great shift in the purposiveness of the human-horse relationship, hence possibly enabling more *reflective* space to recognize the *non-predatory, playful* and *co-operative* possibilities of motivated reasoning and social agency that horses can elicit in us through their presence. In horse trainer Linda Kohanov's words (2007, p. xii):

These days, when a turbocharged SUV harnesses the power of six hundred horses, these animals seem intent on helping adventurous people explore the frontiers of consciousness itself, fulfilling a promise foreshadowed in myth and legend. To the Greeks, the Celts, and countless other cultures, horses were magical beings, gifts from the gods, fierce protectors, explorers and psychopomps capable of carrying a

warrior between the worlds as deftly, and bravely, as they literally carried our kind around the globe.

Art-centred approaches to horse-culture can also open new ways of recognizing how the human-horse relation may take place beyond the usual models of interpretation (see e.g. the Finnish 'Trans-Horse' -project 2014-2019). One such revelatory insight from the critical artistic viewpoint, is that horses can nowadays be understood as our fellow *emotional labourers*, for performing the therapeutic task of *stress relief*, which appears to be one of the main roles that we assign for horses today (Maukola 2016). Horses may thus be approached as our companions in the "*animal laborans*" sense (Arendt 1958), for they render us with natural and social remedies for the effects of 21<sup>st</sup> century human *emotional labor* (Grandey, Diefendorff & Rupp 2013), and for the aesthetic *intensification* of life (Böhme 2017). In other words, we seek their therapeutic presence for helping us to endure the culturally accelerated *fast-paced rhythm* of life, which is an overall defining feature of late capitalist existence that we are not biologically or psycho-physically well-equipped to handle (Kurki 2010).

It is reasonable to concur with the critique towards equestrian culture in its most instrumental and anthropocentric forms. Our relationship to the other species of animals could indeed be more sensitive with respect to the *other* perspectives, the asymmetries, and the ways of life aside our own. The growth of horse-related sport and leisure activities has also given rise to a new applied research field of "equestrian science" (Randle & Waran 2017). In addition to the pragmatics of everyday care and maintenance, this field of study advocates a wider concern for educating people regarding the horse-rider -relationship, for developing the psychological and physiological knowledge base as the means for improving the mutual communication, performance and wellbeing (Williams & Tabor 2017). Many contemporary horse trainers, like Rachaël Draaisma for example, forward more empirically accurate, situated and holistic attentiveness to how horses perceive and "handle" us humans on their own terms, instead of focusing solely on our own needs to "manage and control all situations", or on the anthropocentric questions of what the horses '*should do for us*'. Draaisma is philosophically inspired by Wittgenstein's famous proposition in *Tractatus*: "(T)he limit of my language means the limit of my world". She takes it as a central guiding principle for learning the nonverbal horse language of communication that she elaborates in her book "*Language Signs and Calming Signals of Horses: Recognition and Application*." (2018, p. 1). Her aim is to achieve better understanding on how sensitive, expressive and responsive social prey animals like horses communicate, and "self-manage" their own differing levels of tension and stress, through subtle but also humanely "readable" *bodily signals* that appear, for example, in the sense of "calming", "displacement" and "distancing" gestures. Her study of horse behavior appears to involve particularly *horse-logical* concerns through radical empathic apperception.

When it comes to public resource distribution, horse-related activities are still typically neglected or downplayed in favour of other, more instrumental sports. Yet there is also a trend of developmental social strategies to restore the



horse-based conducts back to societal and civic life, aside the purely recreational or competitive spheres. Equine-assisted services are recognized as giving a sense of warmth, environmental sustainability and incentives of interaction when embedded in the town milieu. In Malmö, for instance, there are now horse-driven garbage carrying services in different regions of the city. Horses have also already been introduced to health and elderly care, to psychological and physiological therapeutic work (e.g. Ford 2013), and to professions like leadership-training (Rossi & Lundvall 2018). There are many possible logistic, delivery, transport, service, care and social work -related tasks that could be *redesigned* through the inclusion of the *animal-based ethic* into the everyday scenes of life, in both rural and urban landscapes. Horse-related ways of spending time and making a living are on their way to diversify, and the number of people who appreciate the significance of animals, nature and biodiversity for the benefit of the overall *quality of life*, will probably increase in view of the current socio-ecological crises. (Kågström 2016, 166-172).

Natural horsemanship (NH) is another cultural model for human-horse -interaction that is gaining popularity today. It originates from an American style of Western riding with loose reins, and from what is popularly termed as “horse whispering”. It is nowadays mainly informed by natural scientific ethological studies on non-predatory herd animal behavior, including their basic needs, instincts and reactions. NH highlights the use of *body language* and *energy* as the main means of communication and for setting clear boundaries between the humans and the horses. Natural horsemanship opposes the methods of horse training and handling that force the horse to surpass its instincts and switch into a “robotic” psychic state of “learned helplessness”. (Kågström 2016, 101), which is also found in humans and some other animals.

The horse-metaphor also relates to the emerging field of studies that investigates the equine culture and the human-horse -interspecies relation from an *ethical* rather than ethological view, and which acknowledges the horse as another conscious, sensing, feeling, acting, and relational being (Bornemark, Andersson & Ekström von Essen 2019). The horse-metaphor contributes to the *counter-hegemonic* “animal turn” in social sciences and humanities that seek after and allow the diversity of perspectives on *sociality* (Swart 2007). When conceived, cultivated and taken to practice in the above emphasized ethical manner of companionship, the horse-metaphor may encompass furthermore real life interaffective *counter-images* for the mechanization of social relations.

#### 4.4 The emotionology of mechanistic organizing metaphors

Dividing the multifaceted problems of regulating the emotional life as either an individual-psychic or a collective-behavioral problem to solve, implies a dualistic attitude toward the mind-body relation, and is also telling of the outdated *indoctrination* to impose rationalized control over the natural world, including ourselves. The concretely felt experiential contradictions that the

dualistic modelling of behaviors ensue in organizations, relates to what Vaill (1989, 77) identified as “*the grand paradox of management*”: the persistent perception of a felt *gap* between the standard rationalist managerial objectives of *comprehension* and *control*, that is, the task of understanding the system and operating it accordingly as *efficiently* and *effectively* as possible – and, on the other hand, the experiences of the managers and the workers who actually *live* amidst these systems, and “*continue to find them mysterious, recalcitrant, intractable, paradoxical, absurd, and even funny*”. If narrowly rationalized and presupposed orders of organizing are typically seen as inherently devoid of deeper significance and sense, how do they then succeed to mobilize people?

Fineman (2008) explains, that in order to produce efficiency in social practices through the rationalization of human behaviours, all administrative agencies have to establish *plausible links* between the *instrumental* and the *sentimental* aspects of social life through assembling an “*emotionology*”: ‘(T)he social valuation produces an *emotionology* –society’s “take” on the way certain emotions are to be directed and expressed.’ (2008, p. 2, emphasis original). The “*state of war*” is a prominent example of a conceptual metaphor that transfers affects related to a traumatic and historically enduring collective significance for the whole of humanity. War and battle thus provide an extremely resonant emotionology that readily “fits” all competitive arenas of social life in general, and today the discursive and emotive reproduction – and extension – of the market sphere in particular (Fineman 2008, 3). Marshal et al. (2015), for instance, suggest the deliberate use of military metaphors to activate the efforts to tackle corporate psychopathy (CP), as an organizational problem that is apparently embodied by ruthlessly manipulative and opportunistic leaders.

Gareth Morgan (2006) elaborates on how the machine metaphor has been utilized in scientific theories, philosophy, everyday life and organizational practices. He discusses the *machine* model and metaphor of organizing that still remains to represent the most pervasive form of organizational thought, and which can be observed today as “*re-creating the old industrial revolution in a new twenty-first-century form*” (2006, p. xii). Although we have a tendency to naturally assume mechanical ideas, the mechanistic conceptions are not “natural” but originate from the human *use* of machines and technologies:

The use of machines has radically transformed the nature of productive activity and has left its mark on the imagination, thoughts, and feelings of humans throughout the ages. Scientists have produced mechanistic interpretations of the natural world, and philosophers and psychologists have articulated mechanistic theories of human mind and behavior. Increasingly, we have learned to use the machines as a metaphor for ourselves and our society and to mold our world in accordance with mechanical principles. (Morgan 2006, p. 12)

Even the earliest formally organized activities were centred on some *goal-oriented instrumentality*, i.e. the development and use of tools and devices in order to reach a given target in the most efficient manner available. Mechanical inventions inspired the mechanistic modes of thought first perhaps most

notably in the *military context*. Mechanistic ideas were already recorded in the ancient Greek natural philosophy of atomism that reduced all matter to indivisible particles, as atoms that move about in an infinite void. Mechanistic vision has ever since influenced scientific thought and experimentation, such as Aristotle's mechanization of animal movement, Newton's "celestial machine" theory of the universe, or Galileo's attempt to explain reality in terms of the physical laws related to matter in motion. Descartes proposed the (in)famous dualistic divide between the mind and the body, and also sought to understand the natural world in terms of mechanical interaction. The mechanical toys of the time, and the idea of "*automated men*" were a source of inspiration for Descartes and influenced his views on human nature. His mechanistic conception was a century later adopted and furthermore developed by a French materialist Julien de LaMettrie. According to Morgan, LaMettrie's controversial ideas that he published in *L'Homme Machine* (1748), were nonetheless welcomed in the Prussian court and army. (Morgan 2006, 369-374).

As Morgan elaborates, the Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740-1786) reformed his army as a *mechanistic prototype* that was ideally comprised of toy-like soldiers reduced to "automatons", according to systematically regulated specialization and standardization of tasks, ranks and the language of command. The increasingly mechanized military practices and ideas were undoubtedly influential also for the economic realm of factory production, whereas organizations and workforce were management-wise understood to be mechanically adapted according to the new machine technologies. The industrial revolution accelerated the large-scale trend toward mechanization, bureaucratization and routinization of organizing, and of life in general. The machine-like, predefined operative order can also be termed as a bureaucracy. German sociologist Max Weber wrote comprehensive theories on these developments and was also concerned with the ways how the mechanized bureaucratization invaded all spheres of human life, while eroding the human spirit, skills and capacities, as part of the general processes of rationalization in social life as a whole (Morgan 2006, 113, 13, 15-17, 371). Mechanistic, object-oriented formulations of order to systemically explain, control and predict organizational social affairs were taken to extreme in Taylor's (1911) principles of '*scientific management*', and the mechanistic mode still persists to influence and modify today's organizational activities, despite an array of problems that are *known* to arise (Takala 2004), and forgotten early contrarian voices against the mechanization of social relations, like that of Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933). Follett's participatory, dynamic and integrative management views have been rediscovered and seen prophetic in retrospect (Graham 1995). Morgan (2006, 13) states that he brings worth the other kind of metaphors for organizing, precisely for the reason and purpose of challenging and replacing the mechanistic views with more fresh alternative ideas and approaches.

Artistic portrayal of the war horse as *the surrogate* of incomprehensible suffering, is a plausible reminder of the real occurrences of warfare. In Finland for example, the war horses have been in retrospect esteemed with great

importance. A total of 71 805 horses were taken to serve in the Winter War (1939-1940), from which 7204 died and 34 945 were wounded. In the Continuation War (1941-1944), the military had a total of 62 168 horses at use, and 14 573 of them died or went missing. The Finnhorses were also given as war reparation to Soviet Union after the wars. (Björs & Koivula 2017, 34-35). Leinonen (2005) has collected the stories regarding the sense of significance and value attributed to the Finnhorses that were by law acquired from private homes by the military during the wars. The collection of memories is filled with emotional tones, as concerning the *sorrowful* situations of their extradition, the *joyful* moments of their possible return, and the role of the horses as a source of great *comfort* and trusted *companionship* in the home front, and in the war field. The recollection of stories show how horses were remembered as being capable of *unconditional* trust and affection toward their care takers and handlers. The traumatic background of war appears to intensify the sentiments of gratitude and admiration toward the animal companions that were forced to participate in something that was out of their range of comprehension and choice.

Economic theorist Joseph Schumpeter, as also a talented horseman himself, used the horse-metaphors on several occasions in his writings, particularly in reference to *the heroic* glory of those “extra-rational” powers esteemed in battle that were once deemed useful and readily impressive for persuasive purposes in the concrete *conducts of rulership*, and which now appear to form a striking - and nostalgic - contrast against the contemporary rationalistic backgrounds:

Also, capitalist civilization is rationalistic and “anti-heroic.” The two go together of course. Success in industry and commerce requires a lot of stamina, yet industrial and commercial activity is essentially unheroic in the knight’s sense - no flourishing of swords about it, not much physical prowess, no chance to gallop the armored horse into the enemy, preferably a heretic or heathen - and the ideology that glorifies the idea of fighting for fighting’s sake and of victory for victory’s sake understandably withers in the office among all the columns of figures. (Schumpeter 1942, 127-128).

Holding onto “militaristic sensemaking” through the cultural models and strategy discourse of “war managerialism” (McCann 2017), may also represent subconscious needs to restate a sense of “manly” heroism and purposiveness to the bleakness of overly rationalized existence. Yet the conducts of warfare are arguably not the most constructive ones among the metaphorical “hand tools of the mind” as Dennett (2013, 4) describes: “*Mapping the features of one complex thing that you already (think you) understand is a famously powerful thinking tool, but it is so powerful that it often leads thinkers astray when their imaginations get captured by a treacherous analogy.*” The notion of *heroism* is nonetheless something that we inherently crave regardless of sex or gender, according to Ernest Becker (1973) who saw *the denial of death*, as a “vital lie” that is coupled with the need for self-esteem retrieved through *heroism* as a “nourishment of fortitude” against the idea of death. Becker saw this as a universally shared problem ingrained in our psychological make-up, and on our existential condition throughout the ages. He posed a potentially revelatory question, and some insightful remarks:

How *empirically true* is the cultural hero system that sustains and drives men? (...) The crisis of modern society is precisely that the youth no longer feel heroic in the plan for action that their culture has set up. They don't believe it is empirically true to the problems of their lives and times. (1973, 6, emphasis original)

Modern man is drinking and drugging himself out of awareness, or he spends his time shopping, which is the same thing. As awareness calls for types of heroic dedication that his culture no longer provides for him, society contrives to help him forget. Or, alternatively, he buries himself in psychology in the belief that awareness all by itself will be some kind of magical cure for his problems. But psychology was born with the breakdown of shared social heroisms; it can only be gone beyond with the creation of new heroisms that are basically matters of belief and will, dedication to a vision. (...) The most that any one of us can seem to do is to fashion something – an object or ourselves – and drop it into the confusion, make an offering of it, so to speak, to the life force. (1973, 284-285)

Inspired by Becker's work, the proponents of the Terror Management theory (TMT), Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski (2015), have conducted social psychological experiments regarding the fear of death, and traced the variety of personal attempts and socially configured solutions through which we desire to transcend "the worm at the core" as William James put it. For obvious reasons, terror management theory may not be the most comfortable of readings. Yet it represents a grounded perspective that rings more "empirically true" than pop psychological platitudes of '*the happiness industry*' that is colonizing our emotional life while lacking any deeper *emotionological* resonance (Davies 2016).

Certain popular cultural trends are also telling that people are ripe for a *language of escape* from the self-improvement hype, resulting from "*a blinkered philosophy of endless growth and general cultural acceleration*" (Brinkman 2017, p. 11). Psychology professor Brinkman's 'anti-self-help' book "*Stand Firm*" (2017) was inspired by stoic philosophy. He aimed to introduce a literary relief - ironically in the seven-step self-help-format - against the superficial currents of positivity industry and culture, and the book became an almost overnight success in Denmark. Another similar example was Frankfurt's essay (1986) '*On Bullshit*', which was re-published as a book (2005) that instantly became widely read. This was probably due to its timely resonance with the proclaimed "post-truth" era with respect to politics and culture. Frankfurt defines "bullshit" as the kind of speech that only aims to *persuade* people and does not *care* about truth, but only managing impressions. Whereas liars still care about the truth enough to hide it, Frankfurt argues that "bullshitting" is a more dangerous enemy to the quest for truth and public sense at large, due to its utter disregard of whether the communicated content is true or false. Spicer (2018), in turn, connects the notion of '*business bullshit*' to the proliferation of meaningless corporate jargon. He advocates a return to the *core organizational activities* to defy the empty management speak as a menace to all kinds of institutions today.

## 4.5 Empirical and philosophical approach to aesthetic experience

Aesthetic experience can be broadly understood as a *perception of taste* through the *emotional arousal* of the senses and the mind, and as such it lends itself to varied objects, levels, qualities and capacities of evaluation. Emotional arousal in aesthetic experience entails *engagement* in making sense and meaning of the object of apperception. Aesthetic experience can entail any variety from the whole range of emotions, and the meanings that we feel as most *moving* can reveal us the most powerful causes of both human joy and suffering. (Lazarus & Lazarus 1994, 129). There is no clear-cut academic agreement on what is the relation between philosophical and scientific investigations in the domain of aesthetics and art, or how we should methodologically approach and analyse aesthetic phenomena: whether traditional philosophical accounts are sufficient, e.g. as Kant and Wittgenstein concurred, or whether we should rather employ the modern methods of empirical sciences. (Currie et al. 2014). The stance that is taken here is moderate in the sense that I do not intend to claim exclusive superiority of one over the other. I see that it is firstly important to understand the distinct differences in orientation between philosophical *understanding*, and scientific *explanations*. Acknowledging the distinction is then a precondition for seeing their complementarity for the *critical sensemaking* of aesthetic phenomena.

A naturalistic account on aesthetics within the evolutionary framework has typically focused on human *appetite for beauty* as a functional trait that drives adaptive behavior. A cognitive account, as elaborated by Steen (2006), seeks to expand this view while acknowledging the biological basis for our internal symbolic ordering, in solving complex adaptive problems in reference to what we find manifested in the external world. He also recognizes that the immense reality of what aesthetically attracts us to objects and events can never be fully explained in theory. Aesthetic appreciation of nature, for example, does not require conscious conceptual models or other deliberate symbolic referential in order to affect our inner order. We may readily recognize the instantly calming effect of walking in the woods, or the *sense of awe* evoked by the view of mountains, for instance. The adaptationist account suggests that the kind of primary experience of natural aesthetics contains an *invisible generative order* that appeals to our *unconscious self-construction*, effectively through calibrating the multidimensional perceptual systems and patterns of the brain. This means that, in satisfying our natural appetite for beauty in nature, we *resonate* with the *organizational mode* of the universe, ideally bring our senses back to life, and discover our place within the world. The urban environment, on the contrary, can be *deeply disquieting* because it often seems deprived of such deep, qualitatively rich sensations in terms of aesthetic affordances. (Steen 2006, 57-71). The experiential horizon, as generally afforded in city life, may also be purposively limited and conducive to self-absorbed or detached anonymity.

Aesthetic experience derived through artificial artistic creations should be differentiated from the aesthetics of nature, because it relates us to the human

social order and organization that are more conceptually complex in their design and triggering of aesthetic responses than the instinctive processes of natural adaptation alone. According to Steen (2006, 65), “*Any adaptation will have a built-in slack – areas where it may function in interesting and potentially useful ways even though it was not designed to do so*”. This evolutionary ‘built-in slack’ enables an endless variety of ways through which human scaffolding can affect how we apperceive artefacts. Art can thus tap into the aesthetic response *and* it can also be deliberately used to *propose new orders* that we may affectively incorporate through perception and the senses. The related notion of *virtual agency* means that we can employ our imaginative capacities to *act in pretense*, and simulate other *possible* situations and *alien worlds* without any actual eliciting conditions presently at sight. (Steen 2006, 65-68). Steen’s elaboration of *virtual agency* comes close to Lohmar’s (2006) phenomenological conceptualization on the *phantasmatic co-modes* of intersubjective experiencing. The co-mode of agency also relates to smart technologies and digital platforms that are able to capture our attention through our capacities of virtual co-experiencing. Such devices can also appear to offer momentary refuge from the contingencies of the terrestrial world by way of enclosing the individual psychic contours inward.

The orientation of philosophy, in the sense of critical inquiry, takes more fully into consideration *the possible* aspects of aesthetic phenomena that the positive natural or social scientific accounts typically leave unexamined. The foundational differences between philosophy and science may become more palpable when comparing their relation to language and knowledge in the pursuit of truth. Sciences take the symbolic order of language primarily as a means of communication, and seek to formalize, categorize and simplify its use as such, to efficiently serve the scientific acquisition of knowledge. Philosophy, in turn, can be more explicitly inspired by the *non-propositional* significances and nuances of art and aesthetic experience. Philosophy appreciates the recognition that our thinking relies on language also as a medium of *creative* expression and representation. This distinction has been articulated in relation to art, for example by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), who was a posthumously renowned philosophical thinker who contributed to both aesthetic and critical theories. He famously stated, that “*Truth is the death of intention*”, which signifies the truth as an ideal that easily escapes all intentional attempts of neat capture. He saw art as a source of *truth content*, and forwarded the conception of art as a nourishment for critical philosophical thinking. (Ross 2015, xi).

Art can afford us the space and time that a reflective mode of thinking requires, for properly *questioning* the settled pathways, fixed meanings, predefined problems, or any given framework of values: “*For thinking, this [realm of the familiar] always remains the real danger zone, because the familiar carries an air of harmlessness and ease, which causes us to pass lightly over what really deserves to be questioned.*” (Heidegger, 2004/1958, 154). Unexpected everyday events can also provoke a person to surrender the ordinary operational mode and enable the momentum for in-depth reflection regarding the ‘realm of the familiar’, like in Nietzsche’s (1878, s. 289) aphorism on “*The value of illness*”:

The man who lies ill in bed sometimes perceives that it is usually his office, business or society that has made him ill and caused him to lose all clear-mindedness about himself; he gains this wisdom from the leisure forced upon him by his illness.

The emphatic notion of *experience*, when seen in the hermeneutic-dialectic sense (*Erfahrung*), implies a conflict, discontinuity, or *transformation* rather than mere information. In technical terms, it means a *negation* that radically disrupts the stream of lived experiencing (*Erlebnis*) with something subjectively unexpected and new. (Kakkori 2009; Backman 2018). Welcoming a degree of contingency and possible dis-order into our lives is to risk the seemingly safe comfort of habitually adopted norms and beliefs. The aesthetic and imaginative worlds of art invite us to set aside our familiar preoccupations, even momentarily, and freely explore the worldly *space of possibilities* in another frame of mind. As Byung-Chul Han, following Adorno, elaborates, the genuinely *sublime* aesthetic experience is not simply pleasant, “*it tears the subject out of its captivity in itself*” (2018, 3). In Han’s (2018) critical philosophical interpretation, the inherent mystery and disruptiveness of beauty is *smoothed out* in the digital age of *incessant positivity* and *instant affectation* that produces easily consumable pieces of information and data, which renders all things *compulsively* visible, transparent and immediately communicable in a “pornographic” manner. He states that it destroys the uneasiness of *negativity* and *erotic distance* that are necessary for *experiencing* in the strong (*emphatic*) sense of the word:

But *seeing* in the emphatic sense always means seeing *differently*, namely *experiencing*. It is impossible to see differently without exposing oneself to injury. Seeing requires vulnerability. Otherwise the same keeps on repeating itself. Sensibility is vulnerability. One might also say that injury is the *moment of truth in seeing*. (...) There is no truth in the *hell of the same*.” (Han 2018, 33-34, emphasis original)

The conception of ideal beauty thus presents itself experientially as a *deep* and *dense* kind of rupture, especially when ‘concept’ is understood in the Hegelian sense as “*the living and enlivening form, which shapes reality by reaching all the way through it*.” (Han 2018, 52). The phenomenology of the subjective aesthetic enjoyment of nature or artistic creations indicates that genuine aesthetic experience is a gratifying *end in itself*, and that we tend to instinctively associate beauty with a personal kind of truth, narrative coherence and harmony, even when it is difficult to explicate it as such. Like Steen (2006, 58) suggests, aesthetic appreciation is *insatiable* and hence differs from needs like hunger and lust, so we should restrain our instrumental explanations and honour the experience of beauty also as its own reward. Beauty has an *intimate kind of truth value* for human beings, without directly practicable utilities attached. Kant, for example, also saw the inherent epistemological importance of imagination and understanding as central *cognitive faculties of free play*, specifically as the necessary prerequisites for the production of knowledge (Han 2018, 19). Also, if we consider after Steen (2006, 67), that the “*act of pretense*” is both naturally and socially adaptive, and “*central cognitive innovation of the organizational mode*”, we may also better understand what it means to recognize the ‘absent presence’ of



something of value. In other words, we become to acknowledge the seemingly paradoxical phenomenological relation between the *factual* and the *fictive*, the *real* and the *ideal*, or the *actual* and the *possible*, in experiential terms.

It is not uncommon to find that the *original* senses of experiencing the world seem to get lost in linguistic translation. This relates to the philosophical problems that occupied Wittgenstein throughout his life, which he elaborated as the difference between the propositions that can be *said*, and the senses and meanings that appear in our relationship to the world as something that can only be *shown*. It made him come to the conclusion, that contrary to logic that is “non-sensical” as such, *ethical* and *aesthetic* truths are inexpressible in language alone. He summed up this view with his famous propositional statement in the *Tractatus*, as: “*What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.*” For example, in a personal letter to a friend, he commented on how one poem that shortly depicted the life story of a man, in its plain elegance and simplicity, could silently convey a full “*picture of a life*” to the perceiver of the poem (in Monk 1990, p. 151, emphasis original):

And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then *nothing* gets lost. But the unutterable will be – unutterably – *contained* in what has been uttered.

There are, in other words, the possible deeper senses and meanings that can still be imaginatively connected between the lines of what is explicitly expressed in speech or writing, on the condition that the communicative expressions are *carefully* crafted, and the perceiver is attuned to *recognize* the more than meets the eye, like the sense of emotional cues, tones, moods and ideas as embedded in the portrayal. This also relates to the *intentionality of emotions* and the way they can confer and strengthen our conception of the invisible and *desirable* qualities of phenomena, and thus modify our perception, or the personally *purposive misperception* of things. (Thompson 2017, 47-48). When the conscious mind and the world are phenomenologically understood as *mutually overlapping* rather than as physical-causal mechanisms, the *world-directedness and temporality* of human emotions becomes more distinguishable. Emotionality can thus be seen as differing also in terms of the *subjective weight*, in addition to the particularities of the cognitive content or feeling-qualities, which warrants the need to conduct more *bottom-up* and *fine-grained* inquiries on emotions. (Drummond & Rinofner-Kreidl 2018, 7). Emotions are an ethically significant dimension inherent in all *value cognitions*, as De Monticello (2018) concludes:

“Goodness” is a proxy word for “any positive value quality”. (...) As a moral predicate (“morally good”) it is a thick, –not thin, concept, ranging over all moral virtues and qualities of an intention, action, or person enabling them to realize the best value(s) possible in a given situation, which presupposes that we are capable of perceiving what is required in the first place, in short, that we are capable of attention. (2018, 127).

For Husserl (1924/2006), the whole of human life was a *positive motivational movement* towards something of value. While negative experiences pose a threat to what we held as valuable, they can also make us pause and re-examine the *truth-value* of our personally accepted convictions and their motivational foundations. As he saw it, the *self-regulatory ethical life* involves also the personally *free* and *active negation* of movement, which can introduce a *radically reflective* interruption to the familiar ease of experiencing the world as given. The motivational structuring of experience, and *aesthetic experiencing* in particular, can be *positive* also in the *passive* sense of merely *being moved*, when a person is in the *natural attitude* of receiving the world as ready-made and complete. The experience of being absorbed in activities, or of being swept away, can thus also readily appear subjectively truthful and satisfactory.

Ratcliffe (2005; 2008; 2015) defines the phenomenological category of *existential feelings* as a fundamental, pre-reflective bodily based affective background sense of experiencing, which constitutes how we orient ourselves in the *world horizon as a possibility space*, and how our experience as a whole is structured. He is drawing mainly from Husserl, who recognized the *possibility-based* structuring of human intentionality and experience. A change in existential feeling, then, implies a change in the kinds of possibilities incorporated in experience, e.g. through a sense of *belonging* or *alienation*, or what is sensed as *real* or *surreal*. These shifts can be described in terms of *loss*, *addition* and *change* in the relationship between the self and the world, including both active exploring and passive witnessing. The others are also implicated in multiple ways, e.g. as signifying an openness to, or even as signalling the death of possibilities, and the *intersubjectivity* of my world horizon means that the objects or entities of my perceptual horizon are potentially accessible to others as well, and that the others can potentially *alter my* possibilities. Existential feelings are fundamental in the sense of determining how or whether one is able to find anything practically or otherwise *significant* in the lifeworld in the first place, as something of value or utility related to one's ongoing concerns, projects and commitments. The degrees of determinacy, certainty and confidence in actualizing any given possibility differs, and depends on a *dynamic interplay* between anticipatory expectations and their negation or fulfilment. When anticipated expectations are unfulfilled, it can also induce a *sense of absence* in the present. The feeling of *uncertainty* can introduce a sense of doubt, conflict and disappointment to the default mode of certainty. The perception of possibilities contains an *affective force*, like an emotive pull or push as an invitation to realize them, which necessarily involves felt bodily dispositions. Goal-directed activities are typically initiated as a response to experiencing something as lacking, or as actually falling short of what is perceived as potentially possible or a desirable state of affairs. As Ratcliffe conceives them, existential feelings can integrate and shape the experience of one's worldly surroundings in multiple, intricate ways. (Ratcliffe 2015, 43-47). Saarinen (2015; 2018), for instance, investigates the concept of '*oceanic feeling*' as a fundamental and comprehensive kind of an existential feeling that can be

defined as “*a feeling of dissolution of the psychological and sensory boundaries of the self*”, and which can appear in transient episodes or more permanent forms of world-relatedness. He (2015) analyses the conception of oceanic feeling specifically in reference to self-transformative experiences of artistic creativity in painterly aesthetics, aside from religious connotations and from the infantile sense of oneness with the universe that are also associated with the concept.

#### 4.6 Circular intensification of affect in the aesthetic economy

The confusion between the actual and the possible can also be witnessed in the global political landscape that currently seems to be *apolitically* premised on calculated fictions, trivialities, falsehoods, and *careless* speech rather than on reflective reasoning with respect to concrete social realities, and experience as it is lived (Hyvönen 2018). In contrast to certain political failures to respond to actual existential urgencies, artistic creations can – at least they often aspire – to deliver us a *better in-formed* sense of reality, concerning our concrete powers to *affect and be affected* in Spinoza’s definition of power (Lordon 2014). As political theorist Brian Massumi points out “*All rationalizations have their seat in affect, and remain creatures of affect*”, which he connects to oppressive structures of power that keep up the appearance of rationality, while being emotionally parasitic in their relation toward the majority of people like *vampires* that seek to capture and live of the *energy* and *mobility* of others. (Massumi 2015, 102). Aesthetic experiencing is hence susceptible to social intents of manipulation and control:

Aesthetic understanding can therefore be seen as a model of knowing which adds the sensory to discursive processes, and which can serve to mask, negate, demean and diminish. Embedded within cultures, aesthetics works upon the psyche and, carefully manipulated, can achieve subordination. (Harding 2003, 118)

In cultural theorist Sara Ahmed’s (2004) conception of the *affective economy*, feelings may appear in objects (of consumption) in a fetishist manner, but it is important to recognize that affects do *not* positively reside in any object, and the attached emotions are not, in this *intersubjective* cultural sense, bound within the body. They rather “*circulate and are distributed across a social as well as psychic field*” (p. 120). Emotions thus ‘ripple’ and move in all directions through ‘sticky’ associations: they participate in the constitution of materiality, boundaries and surfaces through *intensification*. Her theory of “*emotion as economy*” is taking cues from the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud and Lacan that assume *subjectivity* as fundamentally “*a lack of being*”, i.e. as the sense of *absence* and *loss* in the presence, which essentially initiates and accelerates the circular movements of affect, and consequent *displacements* between the different signs, figures and objects that *accumulate passion* and *affective value* over time. She demonstrates how emotions work at the sociocultural sphere in the case of immigrants and refugees: of how they become the “*imagined other*” and

materialize as a “collective body” toward which the hostile reactionary groups can thus form a *negative emotional attachment* through the emotionality of hate. When something or somebody is in this manner “displaced” and “read” as the cause of hate, or of any other emotion, the “absent presence” of the past *historicity* of such affective *associations* is always operative underneath, yet typically remains *subconscious* or even necessarily concealed to the subject of experience him- or herself. (Ahmed 2004).

Gernot Böhme (2003) also recognizes the current trend of *intensification* in what he terms as the *aesthetic economy* of late capitalism. The aesthetic economy is no longer primarily concerned with satisfying basic human and material needs. Instead, it concentrates on the *appearances* of commodities, on the *staging* of aesthetic qualities, and on the production of values that are based on *desires*, not on actual needs or utility as such. The excessive and deliberate provocation of human desires has economic significance because desires remain essentially *unsatisfied*, and can only be *intensified* through illusory or transient satisfaction and symbolic exchange. What they serve is not a basic, but another fundamental human need: the *intensification of life*. Aesthetic economy thus *appears* as a passage from the mundane realm of necessity towards the “vital realm of freedom”. Böhme also develops the concept of “*aesthetic labour*”, as the “*totality of those activities which aim to give an appearance to things and people, cities and landscapes, to endow them with an aura, to lend them an atmosphere, or to generate an atmosphere in ensembles.*” (2003, p. 72). He makes a connection from the personal needs to manage one’s own *emotional economy*, to the broader political economy that shapes those “outer trappings” of life that are generally based on the mental mode of *scarcity*, and production of ever new addictive *desires* for the purpose of increasing consumption. Aesthetic capitalism is an advanced phase of late capitalist development in which the pursuit of capital accumulation has saturated the private sphere to the extent that the *production of aesthetic values through the intensification of life* is assumed as the most viable way to produce more economic growth. In this *system of desires*, the most economically relevant ones, according to Böhme, are the desire to *equip one’s life*, desire *to be seen and heard*; desire for *fame*, and the desire for physical and virtual *mobility*. The whole sphere of life can now be designed for *show value*, which also indicates that everything requires constant *performative staging*. Aesthetic appearances and atmospheres are thus not only appreciated for their own sake, they are being *strategically* manufactured to an unprecedented rate. (2017, 11-14, 104).

At the outset, it may even seem ecological to shift the emphasis toward accumulating affects rather than material goods, yet there are more or less obvious side effects resulting from the rationale of unbridled desires. The economic cycle of *speculative opportunism* is notoriously proficient in conflating the visible and the invisible through the culturally over-exerted lines of fictitious financial justification (Haiven 2014). The economic paradigm of rationalization has furthermore extended influence and hold over societies during the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century. This was in part accelerated by the political doctrine of ‘*changing the heart and soul through the method of economics*’, that Margaret Thatcher (1981) introduced and explained as follows:

What's irritated me about the whole direction of politics in the last 30 years is that it's always been towards the collectivist society. People have forgotten about the personal society. And they say: do I count, do I matter? To which the short answer is, yes. And therefore, it isn't that I set out on economic policies; it's that I set out really to change the approach, and changing the economics is the means of changing that approach. If you change the approach you really are after the heart and soul of the nation. Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul.

Despite the sentimental appeal in referring to a “personal society”, this is an entirely unconvincing argument. It is unclear *why* the economic method should determine “the heart and soul” of personal or political realities. Yet economic enterprise appears to be the definitive model that we can by now witness in most social domains of life in late capitalist societies (Miller & Rose 2008). Organization theorists Hancock and Tyler (2008) also raise a critical concern over the current practices and relations of power behind the management and organization of aesthetic experience, as “*it is tied up with and embedded within the production, reproduction, and distribution of society’s economic resources*” (2008, 203). Building on the pioneering work of Strati (1999) on *organizational aesthetics*, they seek to bridge the gap between dualistic accounts that separate the emotional and the aesthetic as different - either internal/external to individual, or mind versus body - fields of study. They aim to link belief and action by considering the *ideological structures and rules of feeling* that give us values, meanings and norms that guide and shape the way we expect, and are expected to feel and express ourselves in a given social context. This includes *the discourse* of the “entrepreneurial self”, supposed as an improved ability to *self-manage* and *self-regulate* the body, which is aligned with the demands of the expanding service-sector. They argue against *the falsehood* of the “corporate aesthetic” that attempts to reconcile corporate identity and subjective sense of self through *encoded* desires and emotional responses. (Hancock & Tyler 2008, 212-213, 208-209).

Thus ‘the personal has become political’, in the more dubious sense of the phrase than originally intended in its feminist designation (Hanisch, 2006/1970). This is why Hannah Arendt scholar, Seyla Benhabib (2003) has argued that the personal is *not* political. Benhabib (2003, 232-233) reminds us of the importance of *not* letting the politics to “*invade the fragile domain of human attachments and friendships*” or “*force individuals to make public the shadowy and obscure recesses of the human heart*”, of which Arendt was adamantly concerned with:

Above all, Arendt teaches us that without a measure of personal intimacy, nurturing, and privacy, “shielded from the public eye,” there can be no vibrant, fulfilling public life. And that without distinguishing economic questions about the just distribution of scarce resources from political questions about how we, as a collectivity, will form the institutions that will govern us, we cannot be free citizens. (Benhabib 2003, 232).

Truly creative acts in the everyday organizational life can still encourage self-expression *and* reflective distance from the imposed normative pressures that affectuate the need to seek after a sense of affirmation and recognition from the *mirror of the social*, which can be heavily *distorted* as such (Gerardi 2018). Incorporating the rationalized managerial structures, on the other hand, tends

to impede situational sensitivity and genuine creative responses to novelty and change, which effectively serves to “kill creativity” (Amabile 1998; Mack 2013; Ortmann & Sydow 2018). As Frankfurt (1971) has argued, rationality is only the precondition, and not the highest available faculty for humans *as persons*. In this view, higher order *volitions* are the mark of a person of *free will*, particularly when seen in comparison to *careless* “wanton” behaviors:

I shall use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second -order, they have no second-order volitions. The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. The class of wantons includes all nonhuman animals that have desires and all very young children. Perhaps it also includes some adult human beings as well. In any case, adult humans may be more or less wanton; they may act wantonly, in response to first-order desires concerning which they have no volitions of the second order, more or less frequently. (Frankfurt 1971, 11)

A non-human animal may well be a rational being, and relatively free to do what it wants to do, and such an animal does not feel the need to examine the actual *desirability* of its desires. In other words, a rational wanton is not free in the *metacognitive* sense to “want what it wants to want”. By contrast, a rational person who *owns* and *cares* about her or his own will through a critical awareness and capacity to form higher order volitions, also recognizes *the problem* of free will and when it is lacking, e.g. through frustrations related to the (un)freedom to act, and to the deprived possibilities of being in the position to satisfy second-order desires in a self-determined manner. (Frankfurt 1971).

Unlike advertisement that may technically *mimic* the appearance of artistic creations, real art does merely seek to conform or re-adjust us to the hegemony of the social. The purposiveness of art is principally on the side of *positive maladjustment* to any pre-ordained totality called ‘social reality’. The central cognitive aspect of aesthetic judgment seem to concern the self-regulatory choice of facing the sense-data of harsh realities with *reflective conceptual control* over impulsive conformist responses, e.g. in learning to circumspect on one’s sentiments and whether, how and why they are pertinent in a given situation or state of affairs. This actively reflective self-regulatory propensity has also been called as attaining a degree of psychological “hardiness” to cope with stressful circumstances (Maddi 2004). In critical philosophical terms, it involves adopting an *ethical attitude of unsentimentality* that is especially relevant in areas that still remain to represent *the public* and *the political* realms of speech and action (Nelson 2017). Above all, it appears reasonable to recognize the experiential tensions between the ideal and the real, and to set better in-formed *boundaries* between the systemic and the personal *emotional economy* (Böhme 2017).

## 4.7 Concluding thoughts

Berlinde De Bruyckere created a concrete artistic configuration of the classical metaphor of *human consciousness* and emotional *self-regulation* assimilated to the notion of “controlling, harnessing and handling of horses”. Her flesh-like sculptures did not represent the frictionless and lean normativity of beauty that seem to define the late modern landscape, but rather a negation of the superficial smoothness of the digital age (Han 2018). Although the immediate perception elicited sensations that were disturbing and abject rather than pleasant, the experience as a whole could be characterized in the more deeply affirmative sense as peaceful. The felt sense of compassion with the animated expression of decay was possibly related to the subliminal consciousness of *finitude*, or the *sense of limit* that is a constitutive element of human experience (Backman 2018; Haaparanta 2019). The metaphor of death was also a reminder of the philosophical notion of “*learning how to die*” that Socrates discusses at length in Plato’s *Phaedo*. When dying is thus understood *in life*, in the sense of cultivating mindful restraint over the desires and impulses that seduce attention and lead astray, it designates more than a tragic event. Death as a metaphor can thus evoke a person to examine the structures of experiencing through critically reflective distance from the immediate sensory impressions. The art exhibition afforded a securely open atmosphere to contemplate on the bodily grounded cycle of life that holds inherent significance to human beings, but which is typically cleared out of sight and mind (Becker 1973; Han 2018). The horse-metaphorical artwork disclosed traumatic issues in a *non-traumatic manner*, so that their rough surfaces captured attention rather as an invitation to seek deeper levels of meaning beyond the first impressions.

Technical innovations have historically often been facilitated *not* for the progress of all humankind at heart, but as *weapons of war*. This was also the case with Alan Turing and artificial intelligence (AI) during the World War II. Technological progress generally means *advance in efficiency*, but this progress in efficiency does not yet tell us anything about the potential social consequences, for “*in principle all technical modification can become an act of exercising power*” (Popitz 2017, 127). When the phenomenon of war is approached with a different kind of interpretative-conceptual framing of the event, where the horses appear as the embodiment of *destruction* and *death*, and *not* the positive assertion of *power* and *potency*, we bear witness to the profoundly tragic loss, instead of the typically one-sided triumphs of war. The aesthetic experience can thus awaken the humane awareness of ourselves as *moral agents* - as also capable of *moral transgressions* - empirically through the visceral-somatic route that is more emotively effective than any kind of objectivist rationale alone. When the lived dynamism of being affected by others is experienced as a demand in the *pre-reflective* phenomenological sense, that is, *before* making any judgments of value or worth, we become *morally involved* agents already by virtue of being affectively *moved* through the perception of another suffering being.

A sense of existential realism was most probably heightened by the fact that the sculptures were cast after real *perishable flora and fauna*, like fallen trees and deceased horses. They were combined with human artifice, like old religious items, household furniture and cloth that would otherwise be disposed. De Bruyckere achieved to create new life and value out of what was aged, profane or forgotten. It was admirable in the sense of demonstrating that it is possible to *revalue* the mundane that is habitually taken for granted. After the several careful sequences that she appeared to invest in the craft, the ordinary objects became like sacred, spiritually imbued creations that had the potency to induce imagination and self-transcendence in a perceiver who openly attuned to them. When the concept of beauty is experienced in the mutually overlapping sense of *presence* and *absence*, one begins to see how the *loss of life*, or the *lack of order* implied through the surface appearances, can innately animate the presence of life, or the notion of harmony. It is agreeable to say that these artistic creations were apt for transferring the kind of truths that are both *intimate* and *universal*, basically for all humans and everywhere.

Whether, or how the depth of aesthetic recognition unfolds, is primarily something for the perceiver to discover for herself or himself. I was left with the impression that the down-to-earth and compassionate – both the physical and the metaphysical – designation of De Bruyckere’s artistic craft offered a transformative aesthetic experience. The event afforded the time and the space to reflect upon the *fundamental* constitutive structures of human experience, as well as to notice how meaning-making relates to the recognition and attribution of qualities, like *fortitude* and *vulnerability*. When we discussed the event later on with my friends, what firstly returned to mind were *the stories* attached to the original conception and making of the pieces. The narrated tour supported the self-discovery of meanings, and conveyed the image that the artist was subjectively engaged in the material and discursive creation of the artwork.

Despite the evident saturation and fatigue associated with the contemporary self-improvement hype culture, the need for better grounded, i.e. *empirically true* and *morally profound* conceptions related to the notion of *heroism* may remain constant (Becker 1973). Nietzsche’s ‘*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*’ [1883], for example, has been referred to as a modern precursor for today’s psychological self-help genre. In his words (2012/1883, 29): “*The creating Self created for itself esteeming and despising, it created for itself joy and woe. The creating body created for itself spirit, as a hand to its will.*” That is to say, those who despise the body, are more likely destined to become enslaved by their own subpersonal impulses. For unless we acknowledge our embodiment, and learn to discern the bodily based ways we are spiritually related and moved in the world, we are inclined to *hand over our will* at the mercy of cultural affectation.

Artistic creations can also remind us that cognizant beings, unlike artificial entities, can *resist* being reduced to lifeless *anesthetic* mental states *as if* they were mere ‘*cogs in the machine*’. The experience of inner disquiet within the cost-efficiently smooth landscapes (think of e.g. open offices), may be positively captured in verbal or physical responses to stress. They can also be articulated through a philosophical study of appearances, of inquiring how the intentional



objects of consciousness always *appear some way as something to someone*. No single artificial design is equally suited for everyone, but there are definitely better and worse combinations in *form* and *style* of socio-material organization, which can be better understood with respect to the *embodied cognitive organization* of consciousness (Pallasmaa 2009; Burrell 2013). Our social and emotional reflexivity and responsiveness can surely offer a “profitable resource” for the hostile modes of affectation. Yet in hermeneutically benign situations, aesthetic receptivity toward the worldly arousals and affects can be genuinely conducive for the enrichment of consciousness, which is not always or primarily a soothing experience. As anthropologist Marc Augé observes:

Art must express society (which today means the whole world), but it must do so purposely. It cannot simply be a passive expression, a mere aspect of the situation. It has to be expressive and reflexive to show us anything beyond what we see every day in the supermarket or on TV. The vocation of art is to be disturbing. The forms of contemporary art unsettle us by transforming familiar objects into objects of reflection; in doing so, far from sublimating reality, they *subvert* it. Their aims counteract the efforts deployed by the consumer society to persuade us that everything goes without saying. (Augé 2012, 56, emphasis original)

Aesthetic sensibility is hence a matter of linguistic framing and interpretation in addition to involving the multisensory corporeality. Many are already all too familiar with *empty corporate jargon*, and why it is a poor substitute for a shared language (Spicer 2018). In terms of a *language game*, it is seemingly effortless to adopt and transfer to many social domains. Yet the use of the empty vocabulary implies functional complicity with exceedingly feckless and divided social realities that characterize the corporatized form of life. The ‘bullshit’ speak, as it were, is not as neutral as it seems, since it tends to obscure our *ability to see* those stakes of power that can be hostile toward *profound reasoning* that is truth-seeking and hence reminiscent of socially progressive change. However, if we accept the notion of *power* as already present in all kinds of social relations, we may begin to see the subtle patterns of how power is *made*, and can be *re-made* through genuinely creative acts of redefining the boundaries of everyday organizational life (Popitz 2017; Pearl 2018; Contu 2014). Indignation and discontent are still adequate emotional responses to the perception of injustice, and art can cultivate our cognition on the possibilities of enacting betterment.

We can, for instance, become more cognizant of our own inherent *quest for beauty*, as also related to our need of coherence and desire for harmonious *belonging* in the world, which constitutes a powerful emotive basis we’re prone to be exploited upon as well. The human need and willingness to seek both *meaning* and *form* out of uncertainty and disorder can be inter-affectively manipulated, and sometimes against our better will. According to De Monticelli (2018), the main cognitive value of artworks is that they can *deepen* our understanding on matters of agentic and interactive significance. As Arendt (1958) also recognized, art is interconnected with the *human capacities of thinking*:

The immediate source of the art work is the human capacity for thought, as man’s “propensity for truck and barter” is the source of exchange objects, and as his ability to use is the source of use things. (Arendt 1958, 168)

In his last essay '*Eye and Mind*' [1961], Merleau-Ponty warned us *not* to extend the powers of cybernetic engineering modelled after machines, if we want to avoid succumbing to a '*nightmarish cultural space*', where human beings have lost their humanity, historicity and all notions of truths and untruths by way of making themselves *completely manipulable* (Merleau-Ponty 2013, 417-418). This is a timely caution to keep in mind, since we have already created, and become to depend upon a cyberspace that can also be used for the pre-calculated aesthetic manufacturing of virtual lifeworlds with manipulative intent (Thrift 2011).

In reference to Merleau-Ponty's admonitory note, De Bruyckere's quaint artisan craft appeared to be aligned with sincerely benevolent intersubjective intentions. The art worked, in the sense of evoking new thoughts, bodily sensations, and feelings in the direction of truthful recognition. The horse-metaphorical memento of mortality disclosed *the limitations* of both *romanticized* and *rationalized* war metaphorical possibilities as a horizon of moral agency. I saw the animated display of horses left behind in the battlefield *as an aesthetic form of critique* toward the militaristic mode of mass rationalization. I also saw it as a silently profound *moral demand* of attention to the *dead-end* failures that the spirit of mechanized efficiency can ensue. The aesthetic encounter enabled a deeper embodied cognitive regard of valuation and restraint, to *call into question* the *war emotionological* hold in shaping our conceptions of organizing.

## 5 THE HOBBY HORSE AS AN IMAGE OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

This chapter concerns the 21st century phenomenon of hobbyhorsing that has become a popular avocation amidst young girls in Finland. I approach the hobbyhorse movement as a personalistic and a communal phenomenon that is informed by the *subjective experiential* accounts on the senses and meanings of hobbyhorsing. Hobbyhorse activities are hereby seen as a manifestation of self-management in the *non-economic* evaluative sense of practice. The conceptual purpose of this inquiry is to explore the image of the hobby horse as a possible radical humanist *organizational metaphor* for self-managing in the *dynamic, other-regarding, passionate, and open-ended* sense of the term. I'm interested in the *embodied* and *interpersonally emergent* aspects related to the hobbyhorse community formation, which can demonstrate the *socially mediated* emotive sense-givenness of lived experience. This relates to the intersubjective problem of *how we come to understand – and are shaped by – the other minds and bodies*. It involves self-regulatory relevance in terms of *living through* the tensions between self-experience and social identification. Hobbyhorsing is understood as a co-creative social domain, which is culturally interdependent on, but not wholly determined by the past socio-historical horizon of identifying and engaging oneself in the world through equestrian activities. The world of equestrian sports appears to guide the *collaborative sensemaking* of meanings in a way that enables *transcending* or postponing the *ego-logical* confines of the adult world normativity, as balanced with *eco-logical* immersion to the playful *bodily horizons* and *inter-spaces* of togetherness. The hobbyhorse girls are, in their own ways, *repurposing* the figure of the horse apart from the traditional socio-symbolism of *paternalistic war managerialism*. Thus understood, the peaceful “hobbyhorse revolution” affords a conceptual *re-orientation* of self-management as a *reproach* to the top-down informalized forms of total managerial control - as an expression of valuation and restraint emerging through a bottom-up *self-organization*. In socially and emotionally complex worlds pervaded by the *absence* of formal guarantees, the idea of self-management is enacted in a way that can reveal an *extraordinary mode* of intercorporeal self-other -identification.

## 5.1 Re-imagining organizational life and culture with metaphors

When the research goal is to gain a better *understanding* on self-management as a new *informal* logic, norm and pattern of organizing, it is plausible to start with the question of *how to study* the subjective appropriation of meanings, norms, values and goals that generally motivate individuals to engage in *cooperative* activities, which can involve a variety of emergent and deliberate modes of *self-regulation*. The connections that have already been made between the phenomenological orientation and the critical management and organization studies is a fruitful intersection to begin with unravelling the question.

Phenomenology was introduced to social science as an alternative to positivistic approaches already almost a century ago by Alfred Schutz. Schütz (2007/1932) concentrated on the phenomenological epistemology of everyday life, on how the social world and its realities *originally become to appear* subjectively *meaningful*, with differing degrees of consistency or dissonance. Trained both in Husserlian phenomenology and sociology, Schutz was concerned with the subjective foundations of meaning and understanding (*Verstehen*) that Max Weber, in his view, had failed to clarify for interpretative sociology. Schutz's work provided insights also for Berger's and Luckmann's (1994/1966) study of common-sense knowledge in construction of social realities, for Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, and to the development of institutional theory. The second wave of phenomenological influence to social theory was mostly initiated by the work of Heidegger, in itself and through the development of hermeneutics, existentialist philosophy and poststructuralism. Moreover, Heidegger's phenomenology was influential to Bourdieu's practice theory, Giddens's structuration theory, and to the critical theory of Marcuse and Habermas. He is also often referenced in the recent 'practice turn' in social sciences. (Holt & Sandberg 2011, 225-229). Critical and qualitatively oriented management and organization scholars of today seek to elaborate on the everyday *embodiment* and *enactment* of social realities, and the *sociocultural embeddedness* of experiential sensemaking of interaction (e.g. Weick 1995; Fineman & Gabriel 1996; Hassard, Holliday & Willmot 2000; Fineman 2000, 2008; Küpers 2014 Helms Mills, Thurlow & Mills 2010; Fotaki & Harding 2018).

Zahavi elaborates on the notion of *phenomenological sociology*, and remarks that due to the strongly held regard on intersubjectivity in phenomenology, it is not too difficult to see it already as a kind of "*form of meta- or protosociology*", mainly because "*a reasonable theory of social reality presupposes a reasonable account of human (inter)subjectivity, which is something that phenomenology can offer.*" (Zahavi 2019, p. 105). Phenomenological inquiries approach agentic experience as a *mode of relating*, recognize intersubjectivity as an encounter between agents, and distinguish, for instance, i) the anticipatory *and* the concrete negative or affirmative experiences in relation to the activity concerned, ii) the perception of situational, interpersonal and intercorporeal *affordances* of the activity, and iii) the related conscious *attributions* of agency. (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008).

Metaphors, and their role in human organizational life is one of the most interesting phenomenologically attuned perspectives in organization theory. In his widely acclaimed book, *Images of Organization* (2006/1986), Gareth Morgan presented eight different metaphorical notions, to gain better understanding on the nature of organizations and management: 'mechanization' - *machine*; 'nature' - *organismic*; 'learning' - *brain*; creation - *culture*, 'power' - *political systems*; 'Plato's cave' - *psychic prisons*; 'logic of change' - *flux and transformation*; and 'the ugly face' - instruments of *domination* (for further developments, see Örtenblad Putnam & Trehan 2016 and Morgan 2016). The book was written for the aim of creating the kind of problem solvers who can become better *skilled at reading* the situations of organizational life from *new angles* instead of a fixed standpoint. Morgan does not claim to offer an exhaustive list of possible organisational metaphors, since old and new ones emerge all the time, but he demonstrates the role and power of the metaphor in *structuring* and *motivating* our everyday life. (Morgan 2006, 3-8). Different metaphorical notions have also been elaborated in relation to the conception and conduct of leadership, to illustrate how leaders can be seen as diversely as '*saints*', '*gardeners*', '*buddies*', '*commanders*', '*cyborgs*', and '*bullies*.' These leadership metaphors were identified for the purpose of developing an *ambiguity-centred* theoretical approach to leadership that is grounded in the real world. (Alvesson & Spicer 2011).

The essential function of the metaphor, according to Arendt (1981, 105), is about "*bridging the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearances*". Metaphors are inherent in language and they *mediate* the senses and meanings between the different domains and communities of practice. In this study, the horse-metaphor is deployed for the purpose re-orienting the notion of self-management. It is also used as a critical conceptual tool to problematize and challenge the narrow mechanistic forms and goals of action that exploit *the affective core* of human subjectivity (Taipale 2014; Salamon 2018).

If human organizational life is understood broadly, withstanding critical phenomenological understanding, it can include a wide range of alternative conceptions and manifestations with *different roots and relations of action*, aside from the one-sided models of management in modern work and business organizations. The mediating and motivating effects of the metaphor are here explored for the purpose of *re-imagining* the possible ways how '*people and things come together to do stuff*' (Parker 2018, 147). I elaborate on the conceptual-metaphorical idea that *the hobby horse* may be understood as a *radical humanist* organizational metaphor. This configuration involves a real life social practice, and feminist philosophical concerns related to managing the embodied mind with *compassionate* regard to otherness (Beauvoir 1947; Irigaray 1994; Oksala & Werner 2005; Shabot & Landry 2018). The hobby horse metaphor has affinities also with the organizational feminist theory (Fotaki & Harding 2018), as a *counteractive* image for the circumscribed imposition of self-management that connects to the functionally stupefied normativity of economic rationalization.

The idea of the hobby horse as an image of self-management is etymologically drawn from the semantic roots and history of the noun

“management”, and particularly with the verb “manage” that originates from old French *manège* as “horsemanship”, and Italian *maneggiare*, that designate “handling, controlling, and steering” a horse. The use of the word was extended to people and economic management along with the rise of the mercantile class and the shift away from feudal societal arrangements. Management is nowadays also a “tainted” word that carries the weight of *real social contradictions*, pertaining to its modern use in the establishment of a *social division* between those who hold mastery and control (i.e. *the “handlers”*), over others who supply the labour (i.e. *the “horses”*). (Alvesson & Willmott 2012, 20-21; Parker 2018, 99). This controversial division also echoes the *man versus nature* and *mind-body* dualisms. Those who hold power to “manage”, “govern”, or “lead” others, still appear to be entitled with the enlightened cognitive rule of the mind, over those who are presupposed to represent the materially confined bodies, or *emotional labor* in the contemporary sense of service work (Hochschild 1983; Fineman 2008; Grandey, Diefendorff & Rupp 2013).

The hobby horse can also be interpreted as a symbolic representation for the creative expression of personalistic aspirations and passions. A cultural theorist Andy Merrifield (2017) follows an eighteenth century English author Laurence Stern, and defines ‘Hobby-Horsical matters’ as “*something that turns your interest on, that fills your sky, that lights your fire.*” (2017, 155). The main point is that this ‘something’ cannot be determined or imposed on the self from the outside. The ‘Hobby-Horsical amateur spirit’ encompasses the kind of activities that defy the institutional drive of professionalization, which in Merrifield’s view “*eventually leads anybody operating under it’s dictates to hate their job, even though they might love what they do, love the doing itself.*” (2017, 159). The problems, as it were, do not necessarily ensue from *the content* of doing, but from *the form* and context of *how* things are done. The rationalized mechanization is hence an efficient format, if the goal is to alienate the doer from the object of doing.

The quest for personal authenticity, however, is more often today co-opted within the positivized cultural politics of work that tend to divert all subversive potential into the productivity matrix (Fleming 2009). Corporate cultural control mechanisms are more subtly attuned to deploy the socio-symbolic means that function like “*mind invasive life-hacks*” (Slaby 2016), and which operate through the human desires, imaginations, affects and subpersonal impulses. They extend toward managing the “*unmanageable*” realm of human *subjectivity* through the fantasies, myths, narratives, symbolization and stories, which have always served humans in paving the way to the dreamworld of imagination, where even the *harshest realities can be refashioned* into something meaningful, satisfactory and enduring (Gabriel 1992). As Hancock and Tyler (2001) argue, today’s corporate culturalism is highly questionable, to say the least, as an *intersubjective organizational mediator* for the self-conscious realization of embodied subjectivity, in other words, for the *ethical life*. The socially divisive disaffection that the “*corporatization of the heart*” conjures, can still be recognized from the persistent *contradictory* tensions that dwell within the subjective consciousness and resonate through the *anxiety-ridden* undercurrents of culture.

I believe that the stance of *radical humanism* can still challenge the repressive regimes of managerial conduct with a wholly different *paradigm, worldview* and *metaphors* for organization theory and practice (Morgan 1980). The *radical* is here understood in the technical philosophical sense of the term as an *experientially grounded* methodological stance of inquiry, and as an *ethical attitude* (Husserl 2006; Beauvoir 1947; Heinämaa 2014, 2015; Steinbock 2014; 2018). Lifeworld theoretical reflection can open the perspective toward the generative intersubjective views concerning the personalistic, existential, and also non-human animal ethics of organizing (Dahlberg, Dahlberg & Nyström 2008; Yue & Mills 2006; Pullen & Rhodes 2015; Connolly & Cullen 2017).

The potential of re-imagining self-managing as an organizational *verb* with the *friendly* and *peaceful* emblem of the hobby horse, resides in the recognition that it is *not* intended *nor* particularly suited to be appropriated by the usual calculative top-down managerial strategies of power and control in profit-driven corporations. This relates to Parker's (2018) recent call after adopting a much broader notion of *organization* and *organizing*, for the purpose of *replacing* the political-ideological advocacy of *corporate managerialism*. He encourages a benevolent conception of self-management as a form of *enactive co-operation* that can be understood in contrast to those strictly "management by managers" – administrative models that are implicitly based on the assumption that people are generally "*too stupid to manage themselves.*" (Parker 2018, 118-119, 147). The concept of self-management already implies a certain, at least *potentially* emancipatory shift of perspective, through acknowledging that people can also voluntarily internalize the "*boss function*" in the sense of *self-organization*, and can also personally *choose to assume or refuse* certain normative expectations in order to *handle* any given practical field of care and concern as they prefer.

The concept of self-management can also be understood as a contemporary re-formulation and restatement of the modern enlightenment ideals that pronounce the *autonomous use of reason over passions*. Yet, as Steinbock (2014, 268-278) remarks, the narrowly (e.g. intellectually, economically or technologically) *rationalized* ideals of reason have largely already been realized *at the expense of emotions*, without recognizing their *fundamental* moral significance in structuring our interpersonal practices and imaginations. He sees this as *the key concern* that ought to be reconciled if we are to *move forward* from the *impasses* of modernity, and postmodernity alike. It is therefore not theoretically nor practically sufficient to simply assume the "cognitive mode of control" without actually appreciating the *fundamentally embodied* and deep-grained *affective core* of subjective selfhood (Heinämaa 2011; Taipale 2014). In terms of cultural-historical signification, the more-than-conscious, subconscious or unconscious emotional dynamisms are typically related to the instinctive animalistic side of nature (Ellenberger 1970). They are also often still transposed to the figure of the horse in the world of appearances, which I assume can also help us to '*re-embody*' the conception and expression of emotionality as our own.

In order to illuminate the hobbyhorse phenomenon, I will firstly introduce the general cultural-historical background of the human-horse interaction and

horse riding sports. The focus is on the Finnish context, where hobbyhorsing has resurfaced as a social phenomenon, albeit the many drawn insights are transcultural. The hobby horse is then recognized as a *phantasm of a horse* - an intentional object of psychological significance (Gombrich 1963). This notion is accompanied by a selection of psychological and psychoanalytic theories, to explore the possible *psycho-physical* aspects that are seen influential in relation to the *emotive-ethical dynamisms* that modify the ways we *perceive something as lacking* and which prompts *image-making as creation of substitutes*. I continue with tracing and connecting critical philosophical and social theories related to the transformative constitutes of revolutionary agency. I will finally present some experiential descriptions disclosed in the documentary film "*Hobbyhorse Revolution*" (Vilhunen 2017), which is followed by a set of chosen phenomenological philosophical viewpoints. The purpose of returning to the subjective *experiential level* of the phenomenon at the end of the chapter, is to disclose the more *fine-grained* foundations of embodied experiencing, in a way that can be *informed*, but not *predetermined* by any given belief system, theory, or rationalized means-ends matrix of education or work. The phenomenological elaboration on the *deeper* senses and structuring of embodied intersubjectivity, can reveal the *shared* experiential significance of the *inter-personally* emergent self-regulatory *modes of givenness* and *becoming "who you are"* through the self-creative movements in the world with respect to *otherness* (Steinbock 2014). The hobbyhorse experience is also related to the *bodily horizons* of exercise (Klemola 1998), to the *embodiment of otherness* and practical fields of *handiness* (Slatman 2014), and to the embodied *we-community* formation (Zahavi 2018). In conclusion, the hobbyhorse self-organizational movement is interpreted as a *benevolent moral horizon* in terms of intercorporeal self-other -identification.

## 5.2 The cultural-historical background of equestrianism

The present day popularity of hobbyhorsing in Finland can be illuminated in relation to the societal developments and cultural-historical background of the human-horse interaction and equestrian activities. It has been estimated that the human-horse relationship originally began within *nomadic tribes* in Central Asia around 3500 BC. The tamed horses eventually spread to Europe with the tribes, and were cross-bred with wild horses that have been found to exist up to the Baltic region, but not in Finland. The earliest bone traces of tamed horses in Finland dates to Bronze Age c. 2800 years ago. Discoveries from the Iron Age suggests that horses have had a high symbolic and status value for humans early on. The rising Christianity during the Middle Ages diminished the consumption of horse-meat: the horse was esteemed and valued as a living creature, and feared as a dead one. The horses were rather small then, only 120-130 cm height at the withers. The genetic heritage of the modern Finnhorse is a mixture, mainly of Nordic rural and European horses. They formed a locally distinctive population of small tenacious horses that were well adapted to



endure the Nordic climate. From the beginning of the 19th century onwards, they were more deliberately fed and bred in order to grow and stabilize their appearance. The official and more systematic breeding of the Finnhorse began in 1907, as part of the societal projects of constructing the Finnish national identity and national symbols. The Finnhorses were initially classified in two types: the heavier built working horse, and the lighter universal riding horse for the military purposes. The breed has since diversified into draught, trotter, riding and pony types, and today there are around 19 500 Finnhorses, which represent the third of the whole stock of horses in Finland. The number of horses in Finland peaked to 408 797 in the year 1950. The number decreased rapidly after the subsequent technological developments, industrialization, and urbanization of Finland. (Björs & Koivula 2017, 30, 32, 35).

The first private horses for the leisure riding purposes for wealthy civilians were transported from Sweden to Finland in the 1860's. The socio-historical conception of horse riding as an *exclusive* and *hierarchical military* occupation was then a general apprehension of horse riding activities. In the 1920's and 1930's, for example, international horse riding associations permitted only 'officers and gentlemen' as members. The World Wars seized practically all equestrian activities also in Finland. Many leading members of horse riding associations were killed, along with over 22 000 horses, and the training grounds were unmanaged and ruined. The ministry of defence terminated military related equestrian investments, and the state sold or put down the remaining horses by 1955. The governmental agencies did not consider horse riding as a viable sport for making any more large scale investments. First women riders participated in the Olympic level competitions in show jumping in Stockholm 1956. Young people and children started to spend time in the stables, and a new literary field of *horse fiction* books was popularized. By the 1980's, horse riding activities were taken over by girls and women (in Sweden and Finland). Private horse riding enterprises were established, which answered to the incrementally rising demand of the civil society from the 1960's onwards. According to one free-time study from 2016, horse riding is today the 8<sup>th</sup> most popular leisure time sport among the 7-29 year olds in Finland. Some stable owners have observed that young girls tend to be busier with many kinds of recreational activities, and that adult riders emphasize *mental wellbeing* as the central motive for coming to the stables to spend time with the horses and with the other horse-enthusiastic people. While horse riding is on the rise as a leisure activity, this concerns mainly adult women, many of who are returnees to the stables, and another notable rise is seen in the age group of over 60 year olds. Statistics also imply that the popularity has decreased among children in comparison to the 1990's when the majority of horse riders were under 18 year olds, while now they're representing about third of all the riders. Some of the speculated reasons can be traced to the lack of natural contact with the horses in today's urbanized living environments, to the increase of risk averse attitudes toward sports that involve the risk of physical injury, and to

the fact that horse riding is fairly expensive in Finland, for there is little public funding support for the sport. (Kågström 2016; Partanen 2018a; 2018b).

As noted above, the horse riding schools in Finland are today populated by women and girls, who represented around 97 % of all riders (n= 45 477) that were members in the Finnish equestrian union (SRL statistics 2016 in Björs & Koivula 2017, 190). This however, is not the case everywhere: in Southern Europe, for example, horse riding is still more popular among boys and men. As the modern cultural image of horse riding as an occupation of leisure or sport has traditionally been reserved for upper-class men, it may still generally influence the related popular imaginations. The history of horse riding as an organized sport relates to the military also in Finland, and it started to gain more interest among Finnish civil society only since the early 1960's. Another notable rise in popularity can be detected in the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The number of people who engage in horse riding as a leisure activity has increased from 60 000 to approximately 170 000 people between the time period of mid-1990's until today. Despite the socio-historical exclusivity related to militarism and elitism, horse riding activities are today, at least in the global North, essentially *egalitarian* in terms of gender and age (yet still rather conservative in terms of ethnicity or sexual orientation), which is most visibly manifested by the fact that men and women can in principle compete in the same range, and there is basically no upper age limit to participate in the sport since the performance is not about physical force, and not only about technical ability. It importantly relies on embodied communicative skills that can be much improved with experience in practice. Horse riding is nowadays a more community-centred activity also in the sense that the affection for the animals tends to bring all kinds of people from different social backgrounds together at the stables and to horse-related events. The horses, of course, do not evaluate or discriminate people the way we are inclined to assess each other. They are still instinctively responsive social animals that appear to prefer clear boundaries, consistency and routine, and seem to be most content when they know their relation to other horses and human handlers. (Björs & Koivula 2017, 10, 12, 22).

The hobbyhorse movement has been initiated and virtually organized as a popular phenomenon in Finland in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. It has become more visible through different digital medias during the 2010's decade, and it is gaining visibility also elsewhere around the world through the internet because of its peculiarity. The rise of interest can also be detected from the increasing demand, supply and sales of the hand-crafted hobby horses, including their accessories and equipment. They appear to be appealing mostly to young girls, but many adults also seem to admire them and wish to acquire them as ornaments for themselves. Hand-made hobby horses are personalized products that can be differentiated in material outlook, horse breed and texture, and they can be specifically assembled to suit the preferences of the prospective buyer-owners. Hobbyhorsing has also been established as a *competitive sport* with national level championship competitions. Many riding stables and other horse associations provide training camps and local competitions. While many girls

engage in both type of activities, it is not uncommon that some altogether give up actual horse riding in favor of hobby horse riding. (Leino 2018).

The hobbyhorse playing and training involves bodily *motility*, as the lower part of the body simulates the leg movements of a horse. As a type of physical exercise, it may also be connected to the historical developments in the *social cultures of sport*. The nature of exercise has changed from everyday physical labor towards more organized forms of movement, and the amount and variety of sport activities, associations, and their members has grown enormously in Finland during the last 100 years. The sport culture has also become more *technical, commercial and competitive*. According to Itkonen (1996, in Zacheus 2010), the contemporary phase of sport culture is best characterized as “divergent”. Certain meanings, however - like *sociality, physicality, relaxation, health and wellbeing* - that are associated to exercise, seem to persist over time. This was the case in the Finnish survey and sample of retrospective meaning factors from different generations and groups between the ages 15-79 (n = 1490). Other exercise-related meaning-factors that were found significant included *competition, fashion, manliness, spiritual growth, economic affordability and solitary exertion*. The results of the survey also indicated a shift in overall cultural emphasis over time from hard competitive orientation toward softer experiential valuations and goals, such as the meanings of joy and togetherness of exercising that brought a sense of wellness and stress relief. (Zacheus 2010).

The hobbyhorse movement connects to the sociocultural trends of sport that has given way to increasing *diversity, instrumentality and competitiveness*, and to a more emotionally rounded outlook in the variety of meanings that are given to different forms of physical exercise. The realm of sports is today also seen as a viable domain to integrate the cognitive scientific, neuroscientific, sport and social psychological studies. They are brought together to contribute to the *embodied cognition* theory regarding the *mind-body-brain* interconnections in the practice and development of *athletic skills*, which is also defined as a *form of intelligence* (Cappuccio 2019). Our general *kinaesthetic abilities of body perception and motility* can also be understood at the experiential level through the phenomenology of embodiment. Klemola’s (1998) phenomenological study on the western philosophical dimensions of exercising, for example, clarifies the essential experiential *meanings* and deeper *personal* purposiveness of physical exercise, as related to broadening *bodily consciousness*, and personal *spiritual* aspirations. Another point of view that can illuminate the transhistorical and transcultural popularity of sports, is the appeal of the rule-based normativity related to the ancient notion of *heroism*, as Jouillié and Spillane (2015) remark:

The sports arena is another domain where parallels with heroic life present themselves readily. Within a sports team, one is to hold one’s place only as long as one performs as one’s position and the conditions on the field dictate. Poor performance leads to exclusion; intentions are not accepted as substitutes. Difficult or desperate situations, rather than sources of dishonour, are proving grounds for the best performers; unlikely recoveries create sports legends. As in a heroic setting, rules are not open for discussion; breaking them results in instant penalisation or dismissal. (2015, p.9).

The possibilities to actually perceive the performance of women as role models in the domain of equestrian sports, can also provide a gender-related images of *empowerment* not to be downplayed in significance. Hedenborg, (2015) has studied the 20<sup>th</sup> century destabilization of the traditional gender order, which has provided opportunities for women to participate also in the equine sector of activities. She brings forth a pioneering Danish equestrian Lis Hartel (1921-2009), who, despite being disfigured by polio, was the first woman to won an Olympic (silver) medal in dressage in 1952, the same year it became possible for women to enter the equestrian Olympic games as a gender-mixed sport (Hedenberg 2017). Gender is not a decisive social condition for being able to participate in the competitive sports of riding anymore. Moreover, it is possible to *witness* the fact that when women have gained basically the same resources of training that were previously reserved for upper-class men, they can also excel men in the same competitive range and rules of the game. This has been in effect demonstrated through contemporary equestrian world championship competitions. The success of women riders started in the realm of classical dressage, and the 'heroine' sportswoman abilities are now also shown in the most challenging and esteemed horse riding trials of *Eventing*, that is, the equestrian triathlon of dressage, cross-country and show jumping.

Forsberg (2007) studied the identity creation of horse riding young girls, and concluded that the horse stables were an encouraging growth environment, in the sense of enabling the girls to deviate from traditional gender roles and to develop inner strength and the power to act, among other leadership skills. Fransson (2015) interviewed women business leaders in consideration of the possible benefits of their equestrian background, with Goleman's (2000) emotional intelligence framework. She found that the skills that were deemed most useful could be theoretically connected to *self-management* in Goleman's classification. The equestrian women leaders of the study associated confidence, assertiveness, emotional control, power-of-action, and communication skills as the leadership qualities that were learned from handling horses at the stables, and which they saw were most beneficial for them also in their business careers.

Birke and Brandt (2009) explored how the different communities of horse-related practices are *experienced as gendered* in terms of masculinity and femininity, as figured through the concrete *relationships* between humans and horses. They emphasize the lived corporeal bodily base of experiencing, and note that horses themselves play a significant role through their body and companionship, and thus centrally contribute to the constitution of how the different horse-human cultures are experientially formed. They argue that the concrete presence of a horse can shape the ways that gender is experienced and expressed through the body: "*The presence of horses enables a subversion of dominant gender practices particularly at the localized (private) level, while at the same time enables a reinscription of traditional gender ideals at the global (public) level*". The interaction can thus effectuate a profoundly transformative impact in altering the embodied self-image and intersubjective identification, basically through the bodily resonant level of inter-affectivity and inter-corporeality (Fuchs 2017).

The contemporary sport culture, however, can also enforce rather mixed experiences as related to both agentic empowerment *and* disempowerment resulting from ambiguous social norms regarding *the body image*. Lunde and Gattario Holmqvist (2017) interviewed young female sport participants, and found that they had many positive subjective experiences in relation to the *physical performance* of the body within their sport. Yet they also perceived conflicting expectations concerning the *objectified physical appearance* of the body that they saw as coming from the culture outside their sport, which affected e.g. the notion of food as a source of *shame* rather than fuel, and increased body type *prejudice* instead of accepting body type *diversity*. Engaging in the sport then appeared to them as demanding a *balancing act* between these conflicting views.

### 5.3 The emotive roots of image-making in creation of substitutes

The activities of hobbyhorse -riding have thus far been loosely connected with the general cultural-historical conditions of interaction. The particular characteristics of the activities in question firstly appear to center around the virtual horse through an *imaginary intercorporeality* as an *imaginary other*. This elicits interest concerning the *invisibly* dynamic features that are possibly operative before and beyond the more obvious behavioral dimension. In one of his essays concerning the theory and history of art, Ernst Gombrich (1985/1963) contemplates on the hobby horse as a material and a cultural manifestation, and what it stands for as a psychological object of perception. He observes a concrete item and infers that the hobby horse is *not* a representation of a horse - unless representation is originally conceived as the *creation of substitutes out of given material* - but it is a *man-made* horse, a kind of an "*idol*". More precisely, he conceives the hobby horse as a *substitute* of a horse, since the common determinant factor is *function* rather than form, whereas even the form of a simple broomstick can already fulfil the *minimum requirements* to perform the function of the hobby horse in terms of *ridability*. The requirement of ridability is hence the determinant of hobby horse *functionality*, so that any object that is perceived as *ridable* can serve as a horse, for someone who is *motivated* enough to ride, and content to settle for the *phantasm* of horse riding: "(T)he greater the wish to ride, the fewer may be the features that will do for a horse" (1963 p. 7). The second decisive condition, he mentions, for the "*stick to become a horse*", is the psychological *projection of meanings* that are largely transferred through convention and collective imagination. As Gombrich remarks (1963, p. 7):

Fortunately it still needs no great effort of the imagination to understand how the horse could become such a focus of desires and aspirations, for our language still carries the metaphors moulded by a feudal past when to be chivalrous was to be horsy.

Gombrich connects the projection of meanings to the degree of receptivity to automatically recognize 'something as something', which, in turn, is to a degree

dependent on some biologically based factors of relevance. This recognition of resemblance can be approached as “*keys which happen to fit into biological or psychological locks*” (ibid. p.4). He does not consider the hobby horse as art, however, but he admits that they could be interpreted with *iconological* interest, “*as demonstrations, as satirical symbols, as a declaration of faith in humble things or as self-irony*” (ibid. p. 11). Gombrich is interested in the hobby horse mainly as an exemplary object in reference to the *original* functional purposes of *substitution* in human living. The hobby horse is in this sense telling of the *roots* of all “*image-making*” as creation of substitutes (ibid. p. 9):

The contrast between primitive art and 'naturalistic' or 'illusionist' art can easily be overdrawn. All art is 'image-making' and all image-making is rooted in the creation of substitutes. Even the artist of an 'illusionist' persuasion must make the man-made, the 'conceptual' image of convention his starting point.

Gombrich’s art historically informed meditation is an interesting starting point for thinking about the possible *psycho-physical constitutes* of hobby horse riding and what it may signify as a material and a cultural object. It also raises further questions on the *emotively dynamic nature* of senses and meanings that initiate the subjective desire to *create substitutes* through *image-making*, which become manifest through the intentional acts of performing the function of ridability.

According to Eino Kaila’s perspective on the *emotional dynamism* of needs and desires, all *surrogate* reactions and actions can be seen as the kind of activities that *release tension* in a way that is somehow *analogical* and *compensatory* in relation to the originating situation(s) that build up emotional pressure within a person. They involve the perception of *lack*, or the *shortage of expectations* in some personally valued domain, leading up to disappointment which may then steer one’s attention towards seeking *affirmation* elsewhere. The notion of “*active compensation*” in regard to feelings of inferiority (after Alfred Adler), or what is *experienced as lacking*, simultaneously concerns both the organic-biological, and the mental-spiritual levels of human action. As Kaila notes, the highest human cultural achievements often spring forth through deeply felt sense of deficiency, which can drive compensatory activities like a “*thorn in the flesh*”. Conversely, a sense of *satisfaction* rarely brings forth revolutions, or new formulation of ideas. He also notes that the realm of *imagination* is perhaps the most usual human route and resource to recompense for the perceived shortcomings of life (Kaila 1990/1934, 641-643).

The objectivist-mechanistic accounts on human emotional life are arguably insufficient, and can be replaced by introducing the multifaceted *intentionality of emotions* into the discussion. Emotions can thus be considered integral in both the content and in the generation of personal meanings (Lazarus 1991). In Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) cognitive-evaluative theory on emotions, they are seen as “*intelligent responses to the perception of value*” (p. 1). She notes that emotions can also inform us on the areas of life that are either within or without the grasp of our personal control, as “*acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency*” (2001 p. 22). In his existential depth psychological account, Thompson (2017) proposes that the emotional type of sagacity “*aims to make my*

*life as agreeable as possible, whether I want them to or not*” as it can “*shelter me from realities that are too harsh for me to stomach*” (p. 47). Taking a cue from Sartre’s elaboration on emotions, he remarks on the “magical” force of emotions, in that they can *confer qualities* upon any given intentional object, essentially by modifying our *perception* of it. If ‘emotion’ is in this sense basically understood as a “structure of desire”, the everyday emotional *mediating patterns* become more palpable: our emotional repertoires can, for example, enhance enjoyable desires, or help *remove* desire when it concerns the person with something that is too risky or unattainable in reference to past experiences. It is worth to note that emotions can quite easily seem like ‘magic’ or similarly, interpreted as “*non-intelligible cause-effect mechanisms*”, because they most often tend to *evade* our conscious grasp and efforts of rationalization. This may also partially explain the appeal of reductionist theorizing in its preference to *explain away* the *unpredictable* dimensions of human agency and free will, as due to their variant and complex fallibilities that are then ignored for the sake of *simplification* or sheer convenience. Psychodynamic approach, in turn, is more apt to make us attentive to the *more-than-conscious* emotionality of reason. (Thompson 2017, 48)

In the Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition, the particular action patterns of the individual that involve *substitutive* tendencies, are seen as manifested through *symptoms*, i.e. the mechanisms of defence and repression that revolve around *the fundamental lack* of being or having, that is seen as *constitutive of the subject* as such, and which also initiate the essentially unsatisfied and unconscious circulating forces of *desiring*. Desire can be basically understood in the Lacanian sense as *the desire of the Other’s desire* that differs from instinctive biological needs that *can* be satisfied, since the structural role of desire is precisely *not* to attain any specific goals, but to keep on desiring whilst “serving” the unconscious *drives*. The formation of symptoms has a *twofold structure*, as related to psychical representations, and to unconscious drives, or in Lacan’s terms, to the *upper stratum* of Symbolic constructions that circle around the *ground layer* of the Real of drives and of *jouissance*, that is, the *repetitive* fixations termed as “death drive”, and the *traumatic* bodily enjoyment that assumedly hold a ‘mind of their own’. Both Freud and Lacan, in their later work, concentrated on this latter dynamism of the Real, which persistently proved to be the more determinate kind of force than any symbolic interpretative construction during their years of practicing analysis. They concluded that the goal of successful treatment was *not* about removing all the pathological reactions and symptoms, as this was proved untenable, but to enable the person to articulate his or her particular symbolic constellations out loud to the analyst, to revise the old repressions, and to *strengthen* the decisive functions of the ego, in order to cope with the particular personal idiosyncrasies *anew* with better standing. In Lacan’s view, the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis is about *choosing to identify* with the particularities of the “pure” Real of one’s symptom, hence learning to “enjoy” the symptom in a singular manner, instead of keeping to *believe* in the symbolic constellation of signifiers that are internalized in the attempt to repress or cover up the inherently symptomatic

formations of the unconscious drives. From a therapeutic perspective, the socio-symbolic particularities have to be *inter-personally* elaborated within the context of one's own case, before the "real enjoyment of the Real" can be even partially revealed, and *handled* in the best possible way. (Verhaeghe & Declercq 2002). The subjective access to the Real self-knowledge, however, is paid with the loss of initial enjoyment as a positive source of ontological consistency to our being: "*enjoyment, in its stupidity, is possible only on the basis of certain non-knowledge, ignorance.*" (Žižek 2008, 73). Misrecognition thus serves the everyday purpose of positivity by shielding us from the more fundamental knowledge of ourselves.

The symbolic-imaginary constructs transfer *the ethical framework* of beliefs, norms and values that prevail in a given social discourse or context. They hold undeniably central significance to social identity, of how we typically come to identify *who we are* through *interacting* with others and the society we live in:

When all is said and done, norms and values are our way of dealing with our bodies and those of others. They define us, and consequently form an integral part of our identity. Changes in the ethical sphere spark changes in the sphere of identity and vice versa, always reflecting changes in the wider environment from which individuals derive their identity, and, as a result, their norms and values. (Verhaeghe 2014, 39)

Verhaeghe (2010; 2014) is particularly concerned with the human effects of neoliberalism, of how it produces some seriously corrosive outcomes on our *identity formation, affect regulation, and interpersonal relations*. He defines economic neoliberalism as the contemporary form of "social darwinism". He sees it as an ideology that feeds the illusions of ultimate fulfilment and endless possibilities, while denying all lack – as it is primarily based on the monetary *ability to pay* for keeping up with the illusion of limitless potential, and for the strive to ignore the trauma of lack. Verhaeghe sees this ideology as underlying the recent decades of changes in societies and the organization of work toward a direction that actually *goes against* the ingrained social nature of human beings. Neoliberalism directs individuals to seek objects of *jouissance* rather than knowledge or other subjects to ease their deep sense of deficiency. The false promises of fulfilment and the related expectations are bound to fail, which typically creates resentment and *arbitrarily directed aggression* toward one's own fallible body or that of other's, e.g. in the form of road rage. As Verhaeghe emphasizes, the core problem relates to the *destruction of the original purposes of personal identity development and affect regulation* – also known as *education* – which is essentially about *learning to handle* the fundamental inevitability of lack. The deeper acknowledgement of lack, i.e. of *impossibilities, imperfections, fallibilities* and *boundaries* of existence, have traditionally also served as genuine guarantees of subjectivity and creativity. Nowadays, we're mainly captivated by the "fantasies of perfect fulfilment". (Verhaeghe, 2014, 2010, 50-52).

Understanding our deep bodily interconnectedness with the ethical sphere, as Verhaeghe states, can still enable us to make more *self-determined choices* regarding the norms of social identification. The *belief* in the symptom, versus *identification* with it, implies a belief in the Other, as the *final*, yet fictional



guarantee of signification and meaning that supposedly contains no lack. This Symbolically determined identity is weak in the sense of still being wholly *unconsciously* coupled with *the lack* of being. The Real identity, by contrast, defines the *attitude* of a subject who chooses to identify with one's innermost determinations, and who is no longer convinced or "duped" by the belief that other people or authority figures will somehow provide all the answers and could fill the *elementary sense of lack*. Real identification situates one's jouissance in the Real of the body, which functions as a *suppletion* for the *recognized* lack in the other, whereas symbolic suppletion that still rests in the belief in the Other, is always inevitably destined to fail. Lacan's reformulation of the symbolic realm replaces Freud's rather paternalistic and empiricist emphasis on the "function of the father", with the general process of *name-giving*. The name-giving function still remains to represent the *symbolic suppletion*, that is, the societal regulating factors that socio-symbolically shape the unconscious formation of symptoms, without reaching the Real cause of desire in terms of singular jouissance (and the *object a*). There are also *creative* effects to be found in replacing the less stable Symbolic, with the Real bodily based suppletion, on the condition that the subject has liberated oneself from the Other: "A new knowledge can be created only at the place of the lack of the Other. As long as one stays under the umbrella of the Other, there is no new knowledge possible." (Verhaeghe & Declercq 2002, 15). For Lacan, this relates to the function of art and is enabled by the notion of *the sinthome* that designates a different kind of name-giving signifier: a *self-created fiction*, which ties the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary registers of the psychic life together in a particularly idiosyncratic, self-created way. In this approach, the question of gender or sexual differences may be seen in a new light, since Lacan posits men as typically being more tied with the *belief* in the symbolic register: "Woman turns out to be superior in the domain of jouissance, on account of her bond with the knot of desire being much looser" (Lacan 2014, p. 183). A man may nonetheless create his own sinthome as "the other gender" within based on his particular *way of handling* his particular jouissance. Creativity, for Lacan, is always something non-interchangeable, subjective and unique. The self-created fiction of the sinthome is also seen as the condition for any relationship (*rapport*) to take place. Verhaeghe and Declercq describe the "feminine line" in the Lacanian psychoanalytic treatment:

(S)he entertains a special relationship to the object a and the jouissance. Due to this double relationship, a woman is "naturally" invited to create something of herself, in the very process of becoming a woman. In this sense, the Lacanian conclusion of the treatment - the identification with the Real of the symptom, the choice of jouissance, and the creation of a neosubject - is a particular process that is situated entirely in the line of femininity. (Verhaeghe and Declercq 2002, 17).

The inter-personal psychoanalytic process and the goal of a bodily based self-creation clearly differs from the corrosive corporate-ideological engineering of ego-centric and objectified individualism in the new economy, as described by Sennett (1998). In the mental health domain, Lacanian psychoanalytic approach can be originally characterized as an ethical approach, for it does *not*

simply seek to medicate and re-adjust the person to whatever norms happen to prevail in a *depressive* society, that is “*written into the movement of economic globalization that is transforming people into objects*” (Roudinesco 2001, 29). Psychoanalytic treatment does not readily fit the profitability template of measurable efficiency, when its definition of a cure “*is nothing other than an existential transformation of the subject.*” (2001, 35). Psychoanalytic theories have also been used to contribute to organization theory, e.g. as seen through the psychodynamic lens of Morgan’s (2006/1896) ‘*psychic prison*’ metaphor. The psychoanalytic approach to organizational experience can help to explicate why people fail to handle the *more-than-conscious* and *less-than-obvious* aspects of social communication and interaction, which reflect both the conditions and the abilities of coping with difficult emotions. (Halton 2004; Contu 2018).

In comparison to phenomenology, the psychoanalytic tradition is a *nontranscendental* and a strongly *developmental* approach, yet they share resemblances regarding the *centrality of bodily experience to selfhood*, while both of them differ from the mainstream academic psychological and social constructivist accounts in that they acknowledge *the self-constitutive bodily tension* at the intersection of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience (Taipale 2014b). Ayouch (2009) compares the Merleau-Pontian *lived* “phenomenological body” and the Freudian *fantasmatic* “erogenous body”, and locates the main difference between the two as a *reversal* of the categories of perception and imagination (Ayouch 2009, 350, emphasis original):

For Merleau-Ponty, the *Lebenswelt* (the world of life) given to me through my body, the other to whom I am linked in primary intersubjectivity, or the sensing of myself, are direct and self-evident relations that derive from a lived, historical world organised by sense. For psychoanalysis, by contrast, these relations derive from an Imaginary Ego constructed out of a primary filtering of perception through the principle of pleasure-displeasure. They arise from a level of fantasies coloured by my personal history and structured by my affectivity. What I consciously grasp as my body is a misconception; my “genuine” desire-body can appear only insofar as it is spoken, in the unwinding series of associations that express my unconscious desire.

Taipale (2014b) proposes that psychoanalysis can complement and challenge phenomenology, e.g. through a following question: “*What kind of role does the dimension of needs, desires and fantasies play in the organization of bodily experiences and in the early formation of the self-other relationship, and has this role been sufficiently taken into account in phenomenological scholarship?*” (2014b, 231). Hence fruitful dialogues between the Freudian and Husserlian traditions are possible (see also Smith 2010). Both psychoanalytical and phenomenological approaches to human experience can be seen as radically humane, for they depart from the reductionist accounts that foreclose or mechanize the complicated aspects of what, why and how something becomes to appear as something to someone.

## 5.4 The idea of revolutionary agency as peaceful transformation

If we are to qualify a mode or manifestation of human agency as revolutionary, we need the efforts of *critical sensemaking* to gain better understanding on organizational power and *agency-in-context*, including the situated and emotive complexities of social interaction (Helms Mills, Thurlow & Mills 2010; Aromaa et al 2018). Approximately since the 1980's, most notions of revolutionary agency in popular discourse have been associated to the world of business enterprising, and particularly with technology entrepreneurs (Kantola 2014). It is, however, more theoretically and empirically accurate to *hesitate* before attaching the notion of transformative agency to economic activities that are structurally *heavily dependent* on 'the market', or more precisely, dependent on the demands and desires of those who can *afford to pay* and thus determine what is 'valuable' and what is not. As Jones and Murtola (2013) note, the ideology of entrepreneurship has been driven by the culturally floating values of *freedom* and *independence*, yet for the majority of practicing entrepreneurs, this ideology rather stands for a "*false expression of a true demand*", since the entrepreneur is "*the most dependent figure of capitalist economy*" (p. 6). The truly legitimate demand of freedom from servitude to external powers has always been at the core of all *emancipatory struggles*, which remind us of the economic, political and historical fact that there is no such thing as strict 'independence from others' in human society. Instead of being directly dependent on an employer, an entrepreneur is in turn typically dependent on investors, customers, employees, legislators, *etc.* The capitalist ideology thus obscures the actual relations of dependency, while *selectively* appropriating the ideas of freedom. The sheer *power of ideas* can be witnessed through the *transcendental* notion of 'capital' that can *bind* individuals with the profit-making imperative to accumulate. (Jones & Murtola 2013). There are also differences between the social and the industrial innovators, who may share a deep philosophical disdain toward *determinism*, while their respective political stances and the nature of the aspired transformative changes typically differ (Lordon 2014).

There are relevant insights to be gained from feminist philosophy, which is the most novel philosophical movement of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It continues to problematize the persistent structural repudiation, and seeks to unsettle the canon of philosophy that tends to reject what is considered to belong to the *feminine* realm, such as nature (versus culture), private (versus public), sensory (versus moral), darkness (versus light), and body (versus mind). In the history of philosophy, all that has been associated with women, feminine and female, have been for centuries systematically *constructed* as the "dirty" opposite remainder of what is deemed as "pure, clear, stable, disembodied, rational, transcendental, and sublime" (Werner 2005). Contrary to most simplistic prejudices, the feminist movements, ideas and theories are not solely constricted to concern women, or conceived by women alone. When related to the theory and practice of organizing, feminist philosophical perspectives can

contribute to identifying the intellectual, the everyday relational, and the structural sources of social injustices. They can also disclose the possible *remedies*, which can similarly affect anybody, but which the narrow rationalistic measures typically fail to account for (Fotaki & Harding 2018; Gardiner 2018).

Since ancient Greece, philosophy has been predominantly seen as the search for eternal truths, which begins with a state of *wonder* or *admiration* in the face of an infinite universe, and it remains important to cultivate this *non-evaluative* state of mind in the practice of philosophy (Heinämaa 2018). Yet there is also another kind of experiential state that appears adequate for the initiation of philosophical inquiry: *concern* and *care* regarding the realities of the world we live in, as argued by Oksala (2005) who has been inspired by Foucault's ontology of the present. She discusses feminist philosophy as an heir of the enlightenment tradition, in the sense that it involves historically informed critical examination of the present predicaments, with a conscious aim to change them for the better. Her view on the ontology of the present traces to Heidegger's conception of metaphysics as the foundation that structures how we understand ourselves in relation to the world, and to his statement that the world view of our current time is *determined by technology*. In comparison to previous eras of human civilization, we relate to the world in a different way through technology, which also reflects our *over-emphasis* on utilizing the kind of reasoning that is instrumental and economical. Oksala reminds that unless we make these and other underlying structures of meaning visible and under scrutiny, there is no ground to suggest alternative ways either, and the present ones continue to govern our self-understanding, thinking and action. It is hence important to remember that this ontological structuring of our being is *not* a fixed destiny, for it can be changed - that new cultural concepts and modes of thinking and practice can be interactively created. Oksala (2016) also reminds that feminist philosophy is a *form of critical practice* that has to remain open to other scientific fields of inquiry, and that it needs to attend to those traditional and metaphysical philosophical questions that feminist theories have sometimes too adamantly aimed to replace with the 'concrete' and the 'real'.

Calas and Smircich (2002) argue that Simone de Beauvoir's work can provide original critical insights to organization scholarship, particularly in relation to *epistemology* and *ethics* on the topics of gender, identity and power that are currently populated by positivist approaches in social identity theory. They note that Beauvoir's analysis on Hegel's *master-slave dialectics*, for example, brings forth her *socially situated* ethical principles of subjective *recognition*, *reciprocity* and *generosity*, which can *revise* or *reverse* the asymmetric master-slave relationships in real life situations. Her philosophical demeanor continues to inspire *human agentic capabilities* to transcend oppressive conditions, and not only for women but for all individuals, social groups and also with respect to non-human animals, that are still systematically "othered" or "slaved" in a society. According to Heinämaa's (2017) interpretation of *The Second Sex* (1949), Beauvoir's main ethical emphasis and insight is that there are *no natural nor historical* explanations or *fundamental causes* for women's subordination to men,

but *we, ourselves* are, in the *radical ethical* sense *responsible* for making the choice of reaffirming or questioning the established repressive practices and valuations, for: “oppression is reestablished in our *own acts* of dismissal and neglect operative *in the present*” (Heinämaa 2017, p. 141, emphasis original).

Beauvoir’s existentialist phenomenological orientation in ‘*The Ethics of Ambiguity*’ (2011/1947), suggests that the ontological sense of *ambiguity* can be subjectively felt as a basis for both repression and transformation. Living through and acting upon the contradictory tensions of life revolves around the *lived* notion of *authentic freedom*, which can be personally realized, not by attainment of particular goals or possessions, but by the *transcendental movement* in the world. It can be enacted and willed whenever we are *committed* to pursue a project that has some unique content and purpose for us. When we are thus engaged with something that we care about, we are also bound to face obstacles and constraints that can ultimately *reveal* this sense of *free movement* to us, and often precisely *because* we learn to value this sense of freedom when perceiving it *at risk*. If we find ourselves as being able and willing to transcend, that is, to self-responsibly handle the situational challenges, we can *renew* our sense of freedom and commitment in the world. Experiencing concrete hardships can thus be seen as *disclosures of the full emotive density* of existence, in contrast to merely “being” in the world in the passive sense of accepting the world as taken-for-granted, ready and given (Beauvoir 2011/1947). Commitment in this transcendental *worldly* movement of freedom can become the most meaningful *qualitative measurement* for living, also in relation to temporality. Beauvoir cautions us concerning the pitfalls of sustaining those kind of conditions that are marked by the experiential *absence of concrete bonds of commitment* in the world, which stagnates the inner sense of directive movement that normally purposively spans from a past toward a future. The subjective sense of *uprootedness* can then lead to an obsession with incessant novelty and change:

It is true that it is in the nature of man to transcend the past toward the future without pause or stop. But to transcend is also to preserve; if uprooted, the movement toward the future becomes an indefinite flight. The aim of going faster becomes an alibi for going nowhere. The continual negation of the past in the end wounds the present, and the future, also. (Beauvoir 2004/1947, 310).

Beauvoir thus identified the ontological problems of rootlessness that have since multiplied through incessant cultural acceleration. These concerns now appear to connect to a collectively shared sense of “going nowhere,” or of merely postponing the pending socio-ecological disasters. Today, the idea of “becoming a robot” may even contain some escapist appeal of identifying with machine-like invulnerability and powers, as “*The body is being kitted out, drugged and doped with increasing efficiency*” (Augé 2014, 48). This also relates to the circulation of affects like *fear* that can now escalate through the globalized communication networks, and to the generalized sense of being *held captive* in a state of an *eternal present*; of being uprooted from the past, while lacking any grasp of vital new passages toward the future (Augé 2014).

According to Sara Ahmed (2003), the affective arousal of the emotion of fear is a subject-object –relation that comes from the *perception of an approaching threat*, which creates a reaction of *withdrawing inwards*. In her view, the negatively intensive feeling of fear is sensed as an *absent presence* that subjectively runs deep and does not necessarily remain attached to any particular object, but rather shifts from one passing object replaced with another that is *anticipated* as a potential cause of danger and harm. The centrally social dimensions of fear connect with the prevailing narratives on what is considered as a threat. Fear can alter the world relation through *motivating avoidance* of the perceived threats in the world, and hence it holds the power to *shrink* the spatial and temporal grounds of motility for some-bodies, while opening it for others. Hence, the affectivity of fear is potentially a very effective political tool for the different practical agendas of mobilizing or constricting certain groups of people in the global economy. (Ahmed 2003).

Fotaki and Harding (2018, 10) have noted that in comparison to feminist organizational theoretical accounts, there is a particular kind of “*patriarchal pessimism of CSM*”, implied in the works like the “*Dead Man Working*” by Cederström and Fleming (2012). I recognize an “air of pessimism” and certain tendencies of haste dismissiveness in some male-authored critical management studies (CMS). Philosophical pessimism, as perhaps best exemplified in the works of Schopenhauer (1991), can also be honest with respect to the reader, and inspire the search for the possible remedies for troubled predicaments. Schopenhauer’s ethic (2010), for instance, acknowledges *suffering* as a shared, human and non-human animal condition of existence, and is centred on emphasizing the *moral acts* of compassion and altruism. Freud (2010, 57) traced the main sources of human suffering to “*the superior power of nature*”, “*the feebleness of our own bodies*”, and to “*the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in the family, in the state, and in the society*” Freud then noted that these conditions of frailty rather direct than paralyze human action. In this sense, pessimism does not necessarily denote utter resignation. Many feminists also initially rejected Freudian psychoanalysis on the grounds that he was seen to represent the patriarchal society, but as Juliet Mitchell has argued, a feminist reading of psychoanalysis is not only possible, but also necessary in order to advance the movement (Mitchell 2000/1974).

In their short collection of essays titled as ‘*Dead Man Working*’, Cederström and Fleming (2012, 69-75) formulate a “*method of exit*” from the contemporary ideology of work, by deploying the emancipatory figure of *the child* as a counter-force to the dead-end work-life arrangements, to encourage more “*rich and life-affirming flows of social living*” (2012. p. 73). They follow the lines of thought developed by Deleuze and Quattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (2013/1980), that was, in turn, inspired by Nietzsche’s camel – lion – child spiritual metamorphoses in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (2012/1883), according to which: “*we must move from the camel who carries too much, to the lion who fights too much, to the child who simply let’s go and starts to live again on its own terms*” (2012, p.74, see also Weiskopf & Steyaert 2009). Cederström and Fleming suggest that

it is precisely “the angry indolent female child” that may be conceived as the most emblematic *revolutionary subject* that can genuinely stand for removal, withdrawal and separation from the established relations of power – and inspire the purpose of “*de-working*” our bodies and social relations, as we find them under the current predicaments that subjugate the whole of our emotional lives to the banalities of cost-benefit-calculus. They derive examples of revolutionary child figures from the movies *The Shining* (1980) and *Firestarter* (1984), which in their view already presaged the rise of neoliberalism that has been colonizing our lives. If or when we have internalized the “boss function”, in the sense that we have become to *embody the corporation* ourselves, they see the only viable *route out* as through personally revoking the classical philosophical practice of “*learning how to die*.” That is, of learning to achieve *radical distance* from the ordinarily handed out obligations and trappings of existence, by way of using our critical faculties of reasoning, or more precisely, through “*unlearning how to live*” the way we have been accustomed to accept as the mere namesake of ‘living’. In other words, as Cederström and Fleming suggest, we need to commit a kind of a “*symbolic suicide*” in order to get rid of ‘the self’ that is emotionally invested in, and firmly identifies with repressive regimes. This is why they propose a *human strike* as a symbolic act of violence firstly *against ourselves*, against the person we have come to incorporate:

Unlike the dead man working, the child is neither depressed nor caught in a circle of bizarre escape attempts. The child is merely on strike. Indeed, it’s not the usual worker’s strike we encounter here, but a strike that goes to the bottom of who we are, a *human strike*. When there is no clear separation between *what we do* and *who we are* – the great tragedy of the post-industrial condition – we have to extend the meaning of the strike to include our very person. (2012, 69)

They posit what is seen as *the* revolutionary question: *What does a little girl want?* As Cederström and Fleming point out, the force of the figure is not necessarily *empirically* restricted to actual little girls, but *imaginatively* open to anyone who wants to *refuse* the corporatized human (resource) image of ourselves that we have been ever more forcefully persuaded to adopt during the 21st century. Their choice of the *female* child figure is based on the assumption that boys, or men in general, tend to identify more closely with the socio-symbolic realm in a way that makes them more readily tied up with or duped by all kinds of authorities, even or *particularly* when they appear to rebel against them. In this sense, their ideas resemble the Lacanian psychoanalytic “line of femininity” elaborated above, as the way towards *renewal* that can be understood in the sense of bodily grounded self-creation. Consider, for instance, what Lacan (2014) stated about women in comparison to men in his seminars on “*Anxiety*”:

Men’s anxiety is linked to the possibility of *not being able*. [...] what matters to us is to grasp the woman’s bond to the infinite possibilities or rather indeterminate possibilities of desire in the field that stretches out around her. (Lacan 2014, p. 189, emphasis original)

By and large, woman is much more real and much truer than man, in that she knows the worth of the yardstick of what she is dealing with in desire, in that she takes this

route with the greatest peace of mind and in that she has, if I may, a certain disdain for its being mis-deigned, which is a satisfaction man cannot give himself. (ibid. p. 191).

For the woman, it is what initially she doesn't *have* that constitutes the object of her desire at the start, whereas, for the man, it is what he *is* not, and that's where he falters. (ibid, p.201, emphasis original).

Again, there is no point to conclude that *all* women, and not men, are somehow *naturally* more capable of *embodied* identification in a way that enables a steadier ground for self-understanding. Women may as well firmly choose to believe and reproduce the socio-symbolic convictions, norms, discourses and values *as given* without seeing a need to question them as such. Although Nietzsche was also known to entertain rather ambivalent views in regards of women, one of his statements, in '*Human, All Too Human*' [1878] attest to a positive regard: "*The perfect woman is a higher type of human than the perfect man, and also something much more rare.*" (s. 377). He goes on to state that: "*The natural science of animals offers a means to demonstrate the probability of this tenet.*" (s. 377). He does not elaborate on this or on the following animal referral there. It seems possible that he meant to suggest that the female sex may *naturally* represent the more *polymorphic* manifestation of the species, while being aware that women have been *cultural-historically* presupposed and accustomed to an inferior status.

Feminist thinker, psychoanalyst and philosopher Luce Irigaray has criticized, on many occasions, the male-centric *natural-cultural* division as a way of restating sexual difference in a way that sets culture above nature, and women on the side of nature. In '*Thinking the difference: for a peaceful revolution*', Irigaray (1994) also discusses the world of commerce and business at large as an imperialistic male-neutral patriarchal regime where the more or less hidden inequalities, privileges - and the metaphors of warfare - may thrive. The very notion of private property traces back to the establishment of patriarchal order throughout the social and natural universe, that Irigaray calls enforcing the rule of *men-amongst-themselves*. She is also criticising the Freudian psychoanalytic discourse for sustaining the male image of women as inevitably reduced to either *matter* or *mysticism*, while deprived of the cultural status as civil subjects capable of speech and action. To counteract this possessive and utilitarian view of the world, she offers a feminist reading of the mythic figures of Antigone, and mother-Goddess Demeter, and suggests a collective re-connection with the maternal ancestry and re-establishment of honour in the mother-daughter relationship. Instead of the continuous waging of war and other 'male religious' sacrificial rites of passage and power struggles of control - to restore civility between people, is to facilitate peaceful social organization and respect toward difference, living beings and nature as a whole. It starts with facing the reality of *what is*, as rooted in earth and spirit alike, here and now:

To re-establish elementary social justice, to save the earth from total subjugation to male values (which often give priority to violence, power, money), we must restore this missing pillar of our culture: the mother-daughter relationship and respect for female speech and virginity. This will require changes to symbolic codes, especially language, law and religion. (Irigaray 1994, 112)



Fotaki, Metcalfe and Harding (2014) confer that Irigaray's ideas can help to counter the rationalistic *mind-body* and *subject-object* dualisms, and the neglect of materiality – also concerning the ways that contemporary *academic bodies* are embodied and gendered through different organizational writing practices.

The narrowly rationalized form of self-management is also riddled with and operationalized through dualisms in a way that mainly serve the top-down economic paradigm. Cederström and Spicer (2015) discuss one of the new and most pervasive *informal* self-managerial modes of social control: the notion of *wellness* as a syndrome-like construct that signifies the *moral imperative* to be happy and healthy, and *not* primarily for the value of good health *in itself*, but for the sake of labor market employability and efficient corporate performance. The toxic flipside of this corporate cultural "*biomorality*" is that it denotes everything that is considered 'un-happy' or 'un-healthy' as easy targets for demonization. The most damaging aspect of the related *ethos of positivity* is that it preaches individualized responsibility, and does not recognize the social or systemic causation in relation to the contemporary symptoms of ill-health. The economic rationale that underpins the 'wellness-syndrome' also suggests that we're simply better off with the pragmatic acceptance of business ontology and full devotion to work, as if these were natural predicaments: "*For the neoliberal agent the body is no longer personal. It is not even political. Instead it is an enterprise which, to create maximum returns, needs careful monitoring and optimization.*" (2015, 105). The story that we're supposed to internalize, in this view, is that unless we constantly demonstrate ourselves as "up for the game", of being productive, effective and competitive, we might be missing or left out from the "playing field". This "life-hacking", and the "gamification of life" paradoxically appears to demand both self-actualization and social conformity:

Life-hacking is not just the fatalistic realization that we are products to be sold on the market. The implicit message is much worse: we are products which, unless continuously upgraded will rapidly become obsolete. Neoliberal agents may be depoliticized, but not because they are trapped in narcissistic dreams of future fame. Rather, they are trapped by the harsh realization that self-management is the only avenue available. (Cederström & Spicer 2015, 108).

Happiness, according to Žižek (2018), is akin to *desire*, in that it only comes from *dreaming* about something that we cannot or do not even want to attain in real life, but which keeps us going "as usual". He urges us to realize that it is not enough to demystify the new "happiness", "wellness", or "positive" genre of studies, and reveal their inherent, even scientific alignments with the new forms of social control and manipulation - we should *also* recognize why and how the essentially elusive notion of "happiness" actually functions at the personal level:

(N)ot only are we controlled and manipulated, "happy" people secretly and hypocritically demand even to be manipulated for their own good. Truth and happiness don't go together - truth hurts, it brings instability, it ruins the smooth flow of our daily lives. The choice is ours: do we want to be happily manipulated or expose ourselves to the risks of authentic creativity? (Žižek 2018)

The concept of *functional stupidity* can be seen as similarly related to the intents and purposes of control that steer the positivized wellness and happiness industry. Critical management scholars Alvesson and Spicer (2012; 2016) were prompted by the events of the 2008 financial crisis, and the global aftermath that we're witnessing today as the ever more socio-economically uprooted and accelerated centralization of the financial hold over societies. They introduced a *stupidity-based* theory of organizations with the concept of functional stupidity, defined as the "*inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything other than narrow and circumspect ways*" (2016, p. 239). They state that functional stupidity is persistent because it is a paradoxical condition that may induce positive outcomes in addition to probable disasters. No one is immune to functional stupidity, and it keeps many kinds of organizations running smoothly around certain habits and routines. Being economical with thinking may serve *given* objectives in the *short-term* span of time, yet it tends to disregard the *long-term* consequences of keeping up the surface appearances of coherence and control at all cost. The concept of functional stupidity may also be associated with the action goals modelled after the instrumental imperatives of *machine-like efficiency*. Machine intelligence, however, is hardly a sufficient template for coordinating human relations and social interaction. Brockless (2019), for instance, reminds that we are naturally disposed to respond to all the other living beings with *an attitude towards a soul* (after Wittgenstein), and that regardless of their (causally determined) computational complexity or efficiency, machines do *not* possess thought or consciousness, for they are still mere products or *extensions of the behavior of their designer* that act in accordance with the given rules that originate from multiple sources of human deliberation (see also Rauhala 2018).

As Buchanan (1992, 19) has noted "*the machines of our culture often appear out of human control, threatening to trap and enslave rather than liberate.*" Now over two decades later after this remark, it seems that we have been furthermore accustomed to the pervasive influence that technologies hold in the structuring of culture and everyday life. The perceived threats of *entrapment* and *enslavement* have been hailed many times over, but they are also increasingly *better understood* in terms of why and how advanced technologies can be used, e.g. to manufacture consent or dissent, and addictive behaviors in their *users*. One of the main problems with the new *cybernetic* forms of behavior modification is that they can *machinate addiction* through algorithms that nobody *alone* can fully comprehend, let alone control. (Thrift 2011; Zuboff 2015; Neyland 2015; Hayles 2017, Lanier 2018; Flyverbom, Deibert & Matten 2019). Greenfield (2017) is cautious of the rhetoric that disseminate false expectations:

Virtually everywhere, decision algorithms are touted to us on the promise that they will permanently displace human subjectivity and bias. And yet every instance we find that these ambitions are flouted, as the technologies that were supposed to enact them are captured and recuperated by existing concentrations of power. They will not spontaneously bring scarcity to an end, or capitalism, or oppression. Laminated

in the standing ways of doing, making and selling, the only thing they seem to be capable of spontaneously reproducing is more of the same. (2017, p. 303).

The very aim of “*displacing human subjectivity and bias*” seems misguided, when artificially intelligent machines *automate* human intelligence, and contribute to making human beings more ‘functionally stupid’ instead of better beings at *autonomous* reasoning. Philosopher Byung-Chul Han (2017a) challenges the whole notion of “intelligence” and reclaims the more *idiosyncratic* notion of “idiotism” that he reconfigures as a conscious counteractive *practice of freedom* against the contemporary “psychopolitical” technologies of governance:

The idiot is a modern-day heretic. Etymologically, *heresy* means ‘choice’. Thus, the heretic is one who commands *free choice*: the courage to deviate from orthodoxy. As a heretic, the idiot represents a figure of resistance opposing the violence of consensus. The idiot preserves the magic of the outsider. Today, in light of increasingly coercive conformism, it is more urgent than ever to heighten the *heretic consciousness*. (2017a, 83, emphasis original).

Han (2017a) sees the regime of economic neoliberalism as merely deploying our shallow sentiments and “feelings of liberty” in the service of data gathering. We are thus affectively persuaded to accept the automated form of positivized interaction, e.g. of *compulsory, fast-paced* and *transparent* communication and networking as the new normal way of co-operating. As Han further points out, what is defined as “intelligent action” is always heavily *contextually co-determined* by the system under which it is supposed to operate:

Intelligence means *choosing-between (inter-legere)*. It is not entirely free in so far as it is caught in a *between*, which depends on the system in operation. Intelligence has no access to outside, because it makes a choice between options in a system. Therefore, intelligence does not exercise *free choice*: it can only *select* among the offerings system affords. Intelligence follows the logic of a system. It is system immanent. A given system defines a given intelligence. Accordingly, intelligence has no access to the *wholly Other*. It inhabits a horizontal plane. (2017a, 85 emphasis original).

It is possible to recognize the idiosyncratic seeds of “heresy” already from the *anxiety-ridden* flashes of *radical freedom* in Kierkegaard’s (1844) sense, when all symbolic orders seem to fail and lose their significance, that is, from those moments that are most *intensely lived through* and personally intimated as absolutely important. Such events may appear as an inner ‘*calling of conscience*’ that can touch us in a profoundly clear, yet *silent mode* in Heidegger’s (2000/1927, 333) terms. Radical insights are something that can never be reduced to any “system of intelligence” or *exhausted* by objectified criteria. They can, however, remind us of our innermost *boundaries of existence* and strengthen the self-responsible attentiveness toward our own *deeper* priorities of life.

Based on the elaboration above, it would seem adequate to propose that the *transformative* agentic processes of valuation and restraint can be more appropriately understood in terms of “*emotional idiosyncrasy*” rather than through “*emotional intelligence*”. Especially when the latter notion is conceived

in Goleman's (1995; 1998) terms that does not entail much *in-depth* reflection or regard to wider socio-cultural contexts whereas the "emotional intelligence" is supposed to be applied. On the contrary, the concept of EI seems to advocate naïve realist adjustment to the prevailing norms, values and goals as *given*. Goleman's economically rationalized skillset of emotional intelligence also incorporate the normative language of efficiency, whereas, "those who excel in managing emotions" are those who are able "to soothe oneself", "to shake off rampant anxiety", and "to bounce back far more quickly" (Goleman 1995, 43). Goleman (1995, 268, 303-304) favours a "Self Science"-curriculum as a model for teaching and measuring emotional intelligence, and which basically promotes a supposedly scientific manner of self-assessment that is recommended already to school children. In this system of intelligence, selfhood and interpersonal relations are subtly refashioned as mere instruments: "Thus handling emotions in someone else – the fine art of relationships – requires the ripeness of two other emotional skills, self-management and empathy" (1995, 112). One notable problem with the business of "harnessing emotions productively" (1995, 282), is that it takes the non-existent third-person view of the economy as a taken-for-granted entity of absolute order. There is little space to question or negotiate what is actually created or produced, why, and to what ends. When the existing *concentration of powers* is coupled with the narrow objectivist frame and definition of intelligent action, it is predisposed to rationalize and smooth over the possible *insurgent edges* resulting from the "errors" of human subjectivity, which designate an ever-present 'threat' to all conveniently mechanized calculations of (dis)order.

Another problem with the naïve realist and positivist assumptions of emotional intelligence is that it ignores the obvious dark sides, like the links that have been made between rampantly profit-driven corporate logic and psychopathology, that is managerially characterized by extremely *ruthless* behaviors and *uncaring* willingness to "get things done" (Boddy, Miles, Sanyal & Hartog 2015). Psychopathy has been related to conducts that induce crises in the financial sector (Boddy 2011), and generally to the kind of corporate practices with parallels to *employee burnout*, as correlating positively with experiences of emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and decreased personal accomplishment (Oyewunmi, Akinnusi & Oyewunmi 2018). Hence, if the questions of emotional sincerity and ability to experience genuine empathy and affect, are considered only decorations and actually irrelevant for the equations of corporate performance, the concept of emotional intelligence may be applied as a mere tool to leverage the 'useful' pathological facets, like "antisocial behaviour", "interpersonal manipulation", "cold affect", and "impulsive thrill-seeking" (dimensions of *Hare's Psychopathy Checklist-Revised PCL-R*, according to Porter et al 2011). In this sense, EI may as well be associated with white collar crime scenes, and with the notion of *impression management* as a skill that can be used to manoeuvre one's way within the corporate system of intelligence.

The so-called 'workplace monsters', nominated after the dark triad - psychological traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, are also now literally accounted for as liabilities in terms of a minimum of "\$US1.15 trillion per annum productivity loss attributable to anxiety and depressive disorders"

(Michalak & Ashkanasy 2018). The language of efficiency and money is indeed by now a salient attention catcher for many people. It is not entirely clear, however, where does the line go here between pathology classified as a *genetic* individual trait, and pathologies seen as *generated* patterns of behavior, e.g. if people are perceived to *acts as if* psychopaths in a context-dependent manner. Dark behavioral tendencies are nonetheless to some extent *encultured* and even habitually *normalized*, which makes them corrosive for all communal forms of life and culture. Interdisciplinary research collaboration could be beneficial also to raise *the context* of agency under serious scrutiny - to be regarded at least equally relevant dimension in parallel to pinpointing malevolent individuals.

Against the contextual background of mechanistic social systems that operate according to *the logic of machinery*, what appears to constitute the transformative potential of agency - in the peaceful sense of revolution - already resides in *subjectivity* as such. More precisely, it is the inherently resistant *indeterminacy* of the *emergently creative* and *spontaneous* responses and *desires* that can at any point *diverge* from the externally imposed courses of action. The possibilities of transformation are experientially grounded in *free-moving subjective appropriation*, and involve the attitude of *openness* toward the uncertain, unfamiliar, unmanageable, unforeseeable - and incalculable - terrains that can introduce the *unexpected* breaks to habitual manifestations. This may defy all regulatory regimes through revealing when, why and how they fall short. The acts of recognizing the shared *emancipatory struggles*, and of bringing forth the counter-cultural images and routes of refusal, can also be vital *ethical antidotes* for those disordered systemic modes of administering emotionality that cause functional stupidity, along with a range of pathologies, depression and burnout.

## 5.5 Subjective experiences disclosed in 'Hobbyhorse Revolution'

The "*Hobbyhorse Revolution*" (2017) is a Finnish documentary film directed by Selma Vilhunen. It is centred on the characters of three approximately 15 year old teenage girls, *Aisku*, *Elsa* and *Alisa*, who openly talk about and express their relation to hobby horses. They are attending the upper elementary school, live apart, and apparently do not know each other personally. What they most notably share is the interactive virtual space of identification and recognition that the hobbyhorse community affords, and which they tend to demarcate from their 'ordinary' social realities. The film begins with a scene where *Aisku* and another girl are waiting with their hobby horses around the corner of a public playground. *Aisku* seems frustrated, she is wishing that the other kids would leave the ground so that they could go training there without being seen by anyone they know. She prefers to separate the hobbyhorse world as a private realm from the 'non-hobbyhorse' people, because of the potential shame and stigmatization that many are readily keen to project upon those who practice hobbyhorsing. She appears to be an ambitious practitioner, as she excels at all the hobbyhorse motions, and likes to coach and train younger girls

to master the equestrian arts of hobbyhorsing. Hobbyhorse training involves a shared language, a set of rules, roles, skills and performed rituals that are based on equestrianism. This seems to be significant especially for Aisku who enjoys the competitive side of training. When the attended national hobbyhorse competitions do not bring desired success for Aisku or the team members she has trained, she gets disappointed, loses the inspiration, and may put the hobby horses literally "to the closet" for couple of months. Aisku says, however, that she tends to "get into trouble" during these breaks, when she spends time only with her non-hobbyhorse friends, and finds it then compelling to return again to the hobbyhorse community and circle of activities: *"you're always positive with hobby horses – there's no negative sides, in the reality elsewhere there is"*, as she remarks. Getting in trouble in the ordinary social sphere, like by disobeying her mother, also means that she has to spend some time in an institution of foster care, whereas she feels restrained and unable to practice because of the higher risk to "get caught". She then strives to get back in the spirit and to get a chance to enter the hobby horse competitions, at least as a trainer. The organized hobby horse competitions, as events, seem to be filled with the atmosphere of excitement, and they appear to afford an energetic space and outlet for a whole range of emotions. Already when the girls are together training for competitions, as we're shown, it can be characterized as inclusive of a full variety of passionate expressions, with occasional outbursts of harsh language. The evaluative criteria of hobby horse dressage is concentrated on the stylistic features of movement, e.g. on the degrees of vividness or haste of rhythm, in addition to performing the moves and routes in the arena with technical correctness. The goal of show jumping, again as in actual horse riding, is about completing a field of fences without dropping the bars, in the correct order, and as fast as possible. There are also the expressions of liberation, that seem to balance the highly disciplined realms of training and contests. This can be witnessed, for example, from the scene of the film where the girls are presented as galloping through the natural landscape with their hobby horses, with joyful expressions in their faces, and wind blowing through their hair.

Elsa comes across as an insightful and artistically gifted girl. She has been suffering from depression that was brought on by bullying at school. She talks about an emotionally callous boy who seemed determined to make her less joyful and talkative, and he succeeded in this demeanor. Others would also join the abuse, while some others would simply say that they pity her, which she resented: *"I didn't want the pity, just that they would correct their own actions"*. Elsa found a great source of consolation from a real therapy horse called Fiona, which her mother arranged for her to visit on a regular basis: *"Even though it was sometimes hard at school, I knew that I could always go to Fiona."* She deeply related with Fiona, and assimilated her self-image with the horse that was calm and "steady as a rock", and that seemed to hold everything together. When Fiona then passed away, Elsa felt devastated: *"I lost my best friend"*, as she wrote in her online hobby horse virtual stable -account. Her collection of hobby horses, one in particular, is specially important to her because it reminds her of Fiona.

Elsa says that she has eventually learned to survive without Fiona, by way of grounding the peaceful presence of the horse within herself. The hobbyhorse community provides a platform of sharing, where it is possible to express yourself more freely in comparison to being reserved and afraid of what other people will say or do. The girls of the film seem to be familiar also with the unkind sides of social medias, for while they can ease the access of communication and allow some degrees of impersonal distance, they also make it easier for the less than benevolent spectators to target and spread mischief.

There is a sense of tension that the viewer of the film may also empathically recognize, between the two social domains that the girls tend to separate in terms of the “negative normal” and the “positive hobbyhorse” - mentalities. They say that they perceive themselves as occupying two different personas in these different environments of social interaction. The hobbyhorse domain is experienced as the background whereas they become more able to affirm what they deem as their positive and authentic sense of self. The digital and terrestrial forms of projecting ridicule, bullying and even outright violence, in turn, is experienced as originating from “the normal” everyday side of social interaction. Aliisa, for example, talks about one particularly brutal incident that took place in a nearby forest where she was hobby horse riding with her friends, when a group of other school kids attacked them by fists and by throwing blocks of ice and stones at them. For her, hobbyhorsing started initially as a solitary practice of self-expression. She was happily immersing herself for hours of self-disciplined simulation and training of the equestrian movements, while she also began to record them on video so that she could evaluate and improve the moves afterwards. Aliisa is remembering how she felt at that time:

I felt, like my hobbyhorse-things were at their best, I was feeling joyous with them all the time. I could not somehow restrain myself in it, like I would be editing videos, I would ride, it always stayed the same way, I liked it really a terribly lot. But then outside the hobbyhorse occupation I changed completely...and... I really became like, real careful and quiet, and I couldn't like talk to anyone, I felt that everything I say is like there's something really embarrassing. And, I tried to keep myself like in silence, so that nobody would laugh at me.

She recalls that she was confident on her own, but became unsure of herself and felt ashamed in relation to the idea of exposing her “hobbyhorse persona” under the evaluative gaze of others. Aliisa became one of the pioneering figures of the hobbyhorse movement when she posted her creatively designed videos through her social media account, and gathered many inspired online followers and spectators. Eventually, as she shared her videos and encountered also the affirmative kind of interest around her hobby horse creations, she became convinced that engaging herself with the hobby horse movement, particularly as a community of practice, is worth the effort and possible emotional turmoil. She deemed it important enough also to battle against the associated ridicule as a collective force. Aliisa was central in organizing a hobbyhorse street takeover and flash mob in Helsinki, where a large group of young hobby horse advocates gathered in Kamppi and walked together to the steps of the

Parliament house, demanding “honour to hobbyhorses!” as their punchline. Similar kind of hobby horse get together -events have been organized once a year ever since the first large gathering, with hundreds of participants.

At the end of the film, we’re informed that Elsa has spend a gap year after elementary school. She has been recovering from depression, is making her art, and has applied to a visual arts -oriented line in a high school. Aliisa is studying bioanalysis, making hand crafted hobby horses, and coaching younger hobby horse riders. Aisku has also graduated from the elementary school, and has obtained a place to study horse care at the Ypäjä Equine College. We’re also given the estimate of 10 000 young people, who currently (in 2017) practice hobbyhorsing in Finland, and the estimate of few thousand in Sweden.

## 5.6 Bodily horizons, embodied communities, and moral emotions

What kind of *possible* elements there are, that can be identified from the first-personal accounts related to the experiential senses and meanings of hobbyhorsing? At the outset, the hobbyhorse community seems to afford a benevolent social domain to *handle the emotional conflicts* that are encountered in everyday social interactions. It also appears as an *extraordinary* experiential space to express oneself and participate in a community of others who share an understanding on the rules and rituals of the play, which in this case resemble the actual handling and riding of horses. Slatman’s (2014) phenomenological elaboration on the practical field of *handiness* and the *embodiment of otherness* in case of phantom limbs; Klemola’s (1998) phenomenological thesis on the *personal projects* of physical exercise as related to one’s *bodily consciousness*, Zahavi’s (2018) conference speech on the subject of *embodied communities*, and Steinbock’s phenomenological analyses on *moral emotions* of self-giveness (2014, 2018), are here the chosen theories to discern some of the possible experiential elements that may *also* be related to hobbyhorsing as a way of enacting the agentic self-regulatory skills and abilities with respect to others.

Jenny Slatman (2014) follows Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of *bodily presence* and *absence* in reference to the experiential phenomenon of phantom limbs that can appear after the surgical removal of an actual limb, for instance, and which can be described as a “*disruption between the manageability of the world and the possibility to handle it*” (2014, p. 63) that marks discrepancy between the *factual* and the *habitual* body perceptions. Merleau-Ponty called forth the notion of our “own body” that can also be simultaneously experienced in terms of *otherness*, as a *strange* object or as a thing-like entity while retaining the sense of *mineness*. He highlighted the embodied *ambiguity* of existence, of being a *part of* the world among other objects and also subjectively *relating to* the world of objects. The habitual bodily existence in the *practical field* of physically dealing with and handling things in a certain way in the world, is normally performed in a *pre-reflective* manner that *coincides* with the actual physical body perception. The phantom limb phenomenon is telling that one’s own body is not merely a thing-



like factual matter, but also *a relation* to the possibilities of “*handiness*” in the world, as a *bodily mode* of interpreting what I “*can*” or “*cannot*” do in managing the given practical fields and situations in terms of functionality and usefulness. (Slatman 2014, 58-66). Experiencing the absent presence of a phantom limb differs from the positive functionality related to the hobbyhorse *phantasm of a horse*, which appears in the sense of *addition* rather than removal of body parts. It is nevertheless similarly demonstrative of how the horse as *imagined other* can be intentionally incorporated as a *relational* and not as an actual physical thing.

According to Timo Klemola’s (1998) phenomenological study on the Western philosophical dimensions of exercising, the essential experiential *meanings* of physical exercise can be found from its potential to sensitize one’s *bodily consciousness* and *silence the ego*, which enables the effect of broadening awareness that reach into the *deeper layers* of human experiencing. He recognizes this purposiveness as also familiar from different religious traditions. Ultimately, Klemola relates the activity of exercise to spiritual aspirations, so that physical exercise can be seen as the *means* to achieve different personal corporeal *projects*, termed as: Winning (*competitive sports*), Health (*strong and healthy body*), Expression (*communication*) and Self (*authentic existence*). He is following Merleau-Ponty’s elaboration on embodiment and motility, whereas consciousness is *not primarily* characterized by thought – the “I think” – but by action, the “I can”. The body can likewise be understood as a *natural subject* that is the *center* of perception and being in our ongoing intentional relationship to the world. Klemola also makes a distinction, after Max Scheler, between the “*mental-spiritual horizon of experience*” as the background of our *ego consciousness*, and the “*bodily horizon of experience*” connected to different levels of agility, speed, strength, and tactile sensitivity, as the background of our *body consciousness*. Borrowing from Heidegger’s terminology, Klemola notes that our processes of socialization and convention can easily *confine* us to the everyday *ego-logical* body of “*das Man*”. We can, however, “*transcend the ego*” through transpersonal body experiences that reintroduce us with the *deeper connectivity* of being, which resembles the pre-objective, the *unified* and *rooted* body experience of the *playing child*. Reaching these experiential states of being through exercise does not necessarily designate regression in the *negative* sense, but rather a positive procession of thought, which Klemola (p.179) defines as a “*way of moving forward: integrating into present living a sense of being, and of life’s possibilities, from which we have become detached.*” (Klemola 1998, 172-173, 175, 179-180). The main characters of the film were between the adolescent and adult stages of life, which is also a transitory situation of being required to make certain life-defining choices on future vocations, in view of anticipated possibilities and boundaries of adulthood. Ensuing Klemola’s elaboration, engaging with hobbyhorse exercises may be seen as a *means* of sensitizing the *deeper consciousness* through *bodily immersion* in the world. Hobbyhorse activities may thus be experientially conducive for the self-developmental purposes enacted in-between the broadly unified *eco-logical*, and the relatively confined *ego-logical* modes of being that entail differing senses of body consciousness.

Zahavi (2018) discusses the phenomenology at the core of human sociality and group formation. Specifically, he characterizes the *embodied* formation of *we-communities* and the ways they differ from mere associations and partnerships. He reminds that we belong to shared traditions and communities already when being born, firstly into a family, and through participating in particular historical situations, rather than through asserting our rational choice alone. Our identities, however, cannot be reduced to any collective membership, and it is not enough to look at external properties that we may or may not share with others, since the constitution of communities involves both subjective and objective features. While *empathy* towards the other usually *preserves the difference* between individuals, the joint experience of something as 'ours', and the feeling of being a *member of a "we" body* can temporarily *dissolve the difference* between the individual authors. In Zahavi's elaboration, the specific affective ingredient of embodied "we" communality appears to involve *the feeling of togetherness*; of belonging, of solidarity, and of mutuality. The objects, goals and rituals can thus be shared through empathy, sympathy and emotional contagion, with or even without concrete bodily interaction. While face-to-face bodily interaction is essential for sociality, it is not the end point of socialization. Due to the extra emotional dimension - that is *not* necessarily always sentimentally positive - community membership goes beyond mere association and the domain of rational choice. An association may be *transformed* into a community, but initially we join associations and partnerships out of personal decision simply because it somehow *serves our interest*, and associations may also be more easily *discontinued* at any time out of *personal will*. There are clear experiential differences between these group formations when they are seen as a matter of *subjective appropriation*, of "how you *internally* find yourself" as a member of a particular social group. Zahavi also remarks that communities should *not* to be deliberately reduced to mere self-serving, ideological or political associations. Embodied communities also differ from emotionally weaker or "disembodied" kind of social ties in that they *enable* the preservation of cultural heritage *and* subjective affirmation, ideally in a way that individual differences are not forcibly submerged, but *bridged*, with genuine mutual concern and solidarity. (Zahavi 2018).

Anthony Steinbock's phenomenological analyses are concentrated on the *hidden depths* of interpersonal meanings, that are to some extent available to be uncovered in the *everyday* and through the *ordinary* use of language: "To bring forth the unfamiliar in the familiar expressively is to clarify experience." (2014, 26). He is elaborating on "pride", "shame" and "guilt" as moral emotions of *self-giveness*; on "repentance", "hope" and "despair" as moral emotions of *possibility*; and on "trust", "loving" and "humility" as moral emotions of *otherness*. For the purposes of this inquiry, it is sufficient to restrict the review on the moral emotions of "self-giveness", which can already convey the general idea of moral emotions and the *profound* methodological level of analysis in question. Steinbock defines the moral emotions as ingrained at the very core of *social imagination*, aside from any predetermined normative

structures or judgements, and as manifested *in and through* the *lived* emotional experience itself. They are co-revelatory personal *modes of givenness* that originally *open up* the *interpersonal* field to the experiencer herself or himself. He firstly separates the experience of *pride* as distinct from all other interpersonal emotions, as a “self-dissembling” subjective moral attitude of “*resistance to and refusal of contributions from others interpersonally and world as a horizon*” (2018, 69). Pride, in this sense, differs from being “*proud of*” or “*taking pride in*” something, which essentially *includes* a worldly event or others as valued *contributors* into the field of self-understanding. In Steinbock’s analysis, pride also differs from genuine self-love, self-confidence and self-esteem, insofar as they pertain to a *dynamic openness* of self-movement, and a legitimate claims of *self-integrity*. The exclusive self-givenness of *self-grounding* pride, on the contrary, involves the assesment of “*myself as the ultimate source of meaning*”. It presupposes, yet “turns a blind eye” to others and to the world as *the interpersonal nexus* of shared meanings. Steinbock says that despite the assumed self-sufficiency, the moral attitude of pride is *self-dissembling*, for it dissembles the “deeper relational core” of *Myself*. It is then also *self-limiting* as it resists all *otherness* and hence limits the very constitution of the self that is still essentially dependent on others. Assuming the self as *sovereign* is akin to a “false consciosness”, however, and otherness is still *present as resisted*. The interpersonally, and likely also ecologically *destructive* implications of subjective pride come from the disregard of the others in their own right, and refusal of the earthly world as the ultimate grounding horizon. When they are thus *denied of integrity and inherent value*, they “can” be conceived as mere objects or playfields of *manipulation*. Pride is also related to the *basic* personal and aesthetic levels of esperience – which may retrospectively entail certain “*lures for pride*” due to the possible, inherently positive “*truth-character*” enabled by these basic experiences. Yet these base grounds of self-experience are not “prideful” in themselves, but when configured through the self-movements of pride, they are appropriated and *fixated* upon, and creatively assessed as the “*absolute unique presence*” of one’s own self and lived body, for instance, or “aesthetic pride” as Husserl saw it, which also implies refusal to acknowledge *the intercorporeal* sphere of communal sense-givenness. The *positively* insistent self-salient self-givenness of pride, implicate that it is an *inherently excessive* moral attitude. The aspiration toward “the absolute” status of the self also discloses the spiritual or *religious* dimensions of pride. Pride is still an interpersonal moral attitude that can be, however, *interpersonally* subjected to what Seinboch calls “moral reduction”, which may spontaneously call one’s pride into question. (Steinbock 2018, 54, 62-69; Steinbock 2014, 16-17, 26, 43-44).

The emotional responses or acts that are capable of challenging pride, of “revealing me to *Myself*”, and inducing *re-orientation*, are those that are essentially *other-oriented*. Steinbock considers shame and guilt as the *diremptive* moral emotions of self-givenness that include the mode of *self-revelation* and *moral self-critique*. The experience of shame can be understood, again, as what *precedes* rational choice or self-reflective assessment, as a qualitatively unique,

spontaneous, emergent and *creative response* to what is *lived through*. In the case of shame, there is a distinct *sense of tension*, that is more “substantial” or “shattering” to my expectations, and to the basic orientation and continuity of “who I am”, than *embarrassment*, that is experienced as a mere *rupture* to the harmonious flow of events and actions. In shame, the previous internal coherence is momentarily “dis-oriented” and hence subjected to *questioning* through the simultaneous presence of *unity* and *difference*, and the *normative contrast* between competing ways of being or doing. Shame is experientially characterized by a *negative valence* (e.g. un-comfort, dis-grace), with potentially *debilitating* or *positive* results for the becoming of a person. Debilitating shame can result in the self-destructive direction of *hate* that typically arises from the internalization of *prescriptively “disordered” values and ideals* concerning the self-other relation, as projected to abused children or marginalized social groups, for example. When the “disordered heart” (nominated after Scheler), or disordering becomes the norm, it implies the *closure* of meanings and the subordination of *spiritual values*, such as creativity and freedom, to material or instrumental values and ends. Shame, in the sense of *positively transformative self-critique*, emerges through a *loving* relation with otherness, in a way that discloses the *deeper possibilities* of becoming, of fulfilling the uniqueness of Myself in the present as living up to “who I am”. Steinbock remarks that the perceived “other” operative in shame, is not restricted to a *concrete* another, for there are many possible interpersonal “modes of otherness” capable of exposing and revealing myself before, in, and through the other, e.g. in the sense of a social group as a “collective person” like a family or an organization, in the sense of “Myself as another” in terms of my own accepted personal, professional or vocational norms, roles and expected duties, or in the sense of more generally held sociocultural and ethical norms, and historically shared co-experiences of shame. (Steinbock 2014, 48. 51, 72-75, 78-79, 98-100).

The moral and the religious registers of personal *guilt* are also emotionally qualified with negative valence, as a violation to a *moral demand* to another, which reveals me to Myself as *not* living up to my absolute “better self”. The sense of guilt relates to past accomplishments experienced as *mine*, and it involves the site of transcendence as it opens the realm of questions concerning the “*essence of who I am*” as evidently transgressive of *and* responsive to others. Steinbock analyses guilt as closely related to *vocational experience*, i.e. the uniquely experienced and interpersonally co-determined and “charged” *calling* that I can creatively take up in some personally meaningful way, and through which I become responsible to Myself and to others in the same token. Vocation is not a matter of rational will, like choosing a profession may be, for it can only be discovered as *living through* the possibilities that evoke the deeper sense of meaning and purpose of one’s existence, as in: “*What dignifies me with a sense of being at home with Myself also burdens me.*” (2014, 126). Shame and guilt produce inner tension with varying weights of burden, that can spur the *creative moves* of reconciliation and repentance in relation to otherness. They can relegate pride through the *dynamic streams* of responsive living. (Steinbock 2014, 125-133).

## 5.7 Concluding thoughts

When considering the embodied cognitive constitutes of organizing in the sense of agency-in-context, I found it fruitful to pose some philosophically profound notions for guidance. In her phenomenological thesis on empathy, Edith Stein remarked, that *“To act is to produce what is not present.”* (1989/1917, p. 55), which relates to the question of *“how does the will externalize itself in action”* (1989/1917, 55). These kind of notions have evoked my curiosity to uncover the meaning of experiencing something in the sense of *absence* or *lack*, and how this can initiate goal-oriented activities. It often also seems more plausible to reflect on others’ demeanour in this regard, since humans and certain non-human animals are known to be ‘mentally wired’ to comprehend the operative intentionality of others (Lohmar 2006; Ratcliffe 2009). The interpretation of the intentionality of other minds, however, is further complicated when the goal of an activity does not readily present itself from outward appearances, or when the goal of the activity is rather the activity in itself. The complexity of human cognitive architecture can also make us prone to misperceive what we do not recognize according to our own intuitive presuppositions of goal-oriented purposiveness.

All conceptual portrayals of reality will remain approximations with less than perfect symmetry with respect to experience as it is first-personally lived. As Zahavi (2014, 23) remarks, *“what most fundamentally distinguishes my experiential life from the experiential life of others is not the specific content of experience, but rather the for-me-ness, or how of experiencing”*. The main problem with the objectivist third-person accounts is that they discard the unique historicity of experiencing and presuppose a one common world as a unity that we all supposedly inhabit the same way. Phenomenological orientation of radical empathic apperception allows a person to recognize the second-person experiential accounts *as theirs*, without ignoring or confusing the different stand points of experiencing. (Ratcliffe 2012). This implies acknowledging that *what, why* and *how* a person perceives something as lacking, will differ, as will the efforts to seek theory, explanations, social support, and practical solutions for *managing* what may be seen as an absence of something innately held valuable.

It is not too easy to find the kind of theoretical perspectives that are adept for articulating the lived experiential complexity of interactive identification and group formation that cannot be reduced to conventional categories. I find that Gareth Morgan’s (2006/1986; 2016) metaphor-approach represents a thought-generating pragmatic framework that can spark new social imaginations and flexible models for organizational research and practice:

This focus on the generative power of metaphor is particularly helpful in encouraging us to focus on finding and using metaphors that can have major impacts on thinking and action as opposed to those that are more superficial, decorative, clever or cute. The generative focus also helps us to adopt a forward-looking and open approach that thrives on an open-ended evolving process where we can expect and encourage one metaphorical insight to catalyze another, stimulating thought and imagination in both convergent and divergent ways. This creates a very different mindset when it comes to the use of metaphor in everyday and

academic contexts. Instead of being preoccupied with a narrow focus on finding 'the right metaphors', we can engage in using new metaphors in a more free-flowing and experimental mode in search of important insights with regard to whatever we are trying to understand. This more open-ended approach can help us to create clusters or constellations of metaphors that offer important insights about the same phenomenon in different yet related ways. (Morgan 2016, 1035).

Understanding metaphors as open-ended and powerful *modes of thinking and acting*, also relates to the upside of taking a lead from a relatively new and unconventional kind of social practice, which may more readily afford open-ended inquiry and "fresh eyes" for interpretation. So instead of ignoring, ridiculing or patronizing the teenage girls (See also Liukas 2019), and their hobbyhorse avocation, it is more analytically constructive to make the effort of recognizing that they may be onto something of co-revelatory significance when it comes to the motives and meanings of 21<sup>st</sup> century community life and culture. The appreciative frame of mind also allows the acknowledgement of their legitimate aspirations to discover a sense of agency among a collective of others. Self-management can thus be understood in the *open-ended* sense, as a practice of *learning to handle* the dynamic tensions of social life, while incorporating a sense of *otherness* as already embodied *within* (Slatman 2014). As a phantasmatic object, the hobby horse may stand for a *present absence* representative for the ontological *lack of being*, which can be psychoanalytically understood as a necessary ground for subjective expressions of creativity.

Those who were born in the Western world during or after the 1980's, have grown up in the so-called neoliberal era. Lordon (2014, 136-138) describes the common revulsion against deterministic thinking, and the appeal of the idea of unconditioned *creative freedom* as most fitting to the "people of the neoliberal era". In his interpretation, these are characteristic liberal features connected to the inability to perceive the causal production and lengthy incubation behind events. Neoliberal subjects are in his view prone to qualify things as "new" merely for being *surprising* when they exceed the ordinary experience, and which then leads to confused metaphysical postulates. I would, however, generally defend the personalistic willingness to opt for creative freedom against externally imposed determinisms. Although it is agreeable to dissociate the notions of creativity and freedom from the blunt common sensism, utilitarianism and ignorance that characterize the worst neoliberal scheme of things. As Schelling (1809, p. 383) put it, "*where ignorance enters, determination all the more certainly takes place*". Yet those who value their own evaluative autonomy, are not to be automatically portrayed as historically determined, yet "ahistorical dupes" for the established systems of emotional exploitation or governance. A person can as well choose to thwart the transgenerational historicity of destructive social and economic trajectories. Open-minded disposition toward the world of ideas can also aid the processes of attaining the critical interpretative means to make sense of past and present sociality.

The hobbyhorse community seem to harbour the free cultivation of *creative passions* with an "amateur spirit", that is, without any obligatory corporate cultural frame or form (Merrifield 2017). The formation of a hobbyhorse we-

community is *not* initially an economically rationalized affair. It appears more akin to a civic movement of discharging and mobilizing emotions, desires and affects. The search for collective identification can also be seen as a matter of political organization, especially if politics is understood in the pluralist partisan sense that Mouffe (2013) proposes as ‘*the agonistic*’ model of democracy, that is “*recognizing the role of passions in the creation of collective identities*” (2013, p. 139). Agonism, rather than antagonism, is in her view expressed as a relation of mutual respect between ‘*adversaries*’, who hold “*a conflictual consensus – they agree about the ethico-political principles which organize their political association but disagree about the interpretation of these principles.*” (2013, p. 139). The *social function* and (*self-*)*organizational form* through which the activities take place, are central issues to recognize also in the hobby horse -case. Hence I see that there are personally deeper, as well as intersubjectively interesting issues at stake in their collectively stated enthusiasm to demand “honour for hobbyhorsing”.

The line between the *informal* and the *formal* organizational arrangements can be blurred from sight, especially when informalization mainly refers to the procedures of increasing top-down economically rationalized cost-efficiency. Hobbyhorse riding is not a formal vocation, but an informal *avocation* with low entry barriers and affordability as a space of play. Therefore it also differs from the field of actual horse riding, which on a global scale remains a relatively conservative, competitive and hierarchical cultural domain. Some practitioners also attest that it can be very challenging to divert from the prevalent orthodoxies in the equine sector of activities (Mäkilä 2018). The lived intercorporeal human-horse encounters can nonetheless evoke the embodied kind of self-understanding and relational identification that defies dualisms and stereotypes (Birke & Brandt 2009). Such encounters can enhance the abilities of coping with stress through *affect regulation* - by way of living through emotional resonances and dissonances in a reasonably pragmatic and benign *context of agency* that necessarily involves *care* and *responsibility* for other living beings.

Work in the increasingly information-dense and data-driven knowledge societies, on the other hand, can involve deeply ambiguous real life experiences as the critique of “cognitive capitalism” points out (Brunila, Onnismaa & Pasanen 2015). The Matrix (1999) movie, for example, was among the most popular cultural creations at the turn of the century that seemed to capture the ambiguous undertones of the millennial experience. It made the technologically issued conditions of governance more palpable for the collective imagination (Berardi 2015). Science fiction can indeed offer parables to contemporary social realities where our *minds*, rather than *hands* in the traditional (*manus*) sense of managing, are constantly put to work on tasks that are characteristically transient and virtual rather than concrete and conclusive (see also Davies 2018).

M.I.T professor Sherry Turkle (2018) has made a thoughtful remark on the contradictory notion of “artificial intimacy”, as she says, “*Being human today is about the struggle to remain genuinely empathic ourselves. To remember why it matters, to remember what we cherish*”. The concept of ‘artificial intimacy’ relates to the idea of escaping hurtful realities of human and social existence to *virtual platforms* that are now available and appealing to many people. The hobbyhorse

community is both a digital and a terrestrial domain, and the hobby horse is technically speaking a *low-tech instrument for performing the function of ridability*. The arousal of desires and the intersubjective generation of *affectivity*, however, do not reside in particular objects (Ahmed 2004). The sentient interactive side of the imagined equine -assisted agency may also encourage a person to traverse the culturally handed down ideas that endorse mechanistic forms of interaction.

I find that Steinbock's phenomenological analysis of *pride* is particularly descriptive of how the narrow axiom of self-interest emerges and functions at the experiential level. Already by virtue of being responsive to the possibilities of being *empathically affected by others* - even by risking being ridiculed - the girls appear to be capable of transcending the self-absorbed subjective moral attitude of pride. (Steinbock 2014; 2018). The girls appear to demonstrate their agentic authorship of valuation and restraint also in the *meta-rational* sense of abstaining from settling with the path of least social resistance. They do not come across as "social morons" or "careless wantons", but well capable of articulating - in the self-reflective and other-regarding manner - the emotionally and ethically complex higher order *evaluative struggles* (Stanovich 2004; 2013; 2015), which can be experientially understood in terms of a dynamic tension between lived experience and social identification. The hobbyhorse community may also be generally described as a *benign* (non-exploitative) agentic environment with useful cues for fast thinking heuristics (Stanovich 2012). Engaging the language game of equestrianism involve the rules and concrete rituals that mimic the equestrian sports. They may also contribute to the emergence of a *heroic* setting (Jouillié & Spillane 2015), which means that the evaluative criteria is commonly agreed to concern the rule-based enactment of kinaesthetic performances. The collaborative intercorporeal field of play also appear conducive for co-creating a mental sanctuary from more arbitrary prejudices, presuppositions and norms.

Only up until the last century that was riddled with unprecedentedly violent societal turmoil (see e.g. Hobsbawn 2014/1999), the conducts of horsemanship were also socio-historically associated with the privileged right for the entitled few to rule over many others. The *social imagination* that the hobbyhorse -girls bring to the fore instead, is more aligned with an *interdependent sense of freedom* as an openness toward the intersubjective world horizon of potentially transformative interactive possibilities. The practices of hobbyhorsing also display the fact that we are already to some degrees 'strangers' to ourselves within our own skin. This may entail the kind of self-objectification that involves the recognition of self-responsibility in a way that does *not* necessitate the degrading repression of actual others in the attempt to *surmount* or *surpass* the perception of something as lacking or threatening. The cognitive acts of *pretense* in the form of virtual riding also disclose that our relationship to reality is in many ways *fictionally*, and not in the narrow realist sense only *factually* structured. The embodied hobbyhorse translation related to the equestrian arts can be characterized as a *self-created* one in comparison to the elitist fabrication upheld in paternalistic war managerialism. The hobbyhorse girls manage to recuperate the *emotionology* (Fineman 2008) based on the



cultural-historically and affectively transferable senses and meanings that carry the emotionally resonant potency related to the “horsy” undertones (Gombrich 1963). Yet the intents, purposes and manners of incorporating the *empowering equine imagery* is expressive of a wholly different kind of an interactive formation for expressing as well as bridling the passions. Moreover, the image of the hobby horse, as a material and a cultural object, is not a token of war, but rather a *peaceful emblem* of friendship, or a ‘soft weapon’ of humble play that signal counter-agency against warfare (Nario-Galace 2014).

Transcendental movements of engagement in the world often come with intimately *ambiguous* expectations and realizations (Beauvoir 1947). Both the *negative* (freedom away from something) and the *positive* (affirmative freedom to act) conceptions of freedom can simultaneously play a role and vary in felt intensity (Fromm 2001/1942). In this conceptual-metaphorical framing, the hobbyhorse girls may stand for an ‘*escape into life*’ (Cederström & Fleming 2012). It means that they appear able and willing to gain a sense of liberation *from* being captured in a social reality that is *not* of their own making, and a freedom *to* co-create another relational ontology that is nevertheless no less real, and of their own choosing. They are participating in the *generation of alternative social realities* that can better harbour the realization of personalistic action potentials, in a way that is *not* totally planned, predictable or pre-calculated. In this sense, the hobbyhorse movement can be seen as a contemporary variation in the *motive and exercise of freedom and control: freedom to change the ordinary frame* to an *extraordinary* scene of sociality, i.e. to another inter-affective field that enables the possibilities to achieve a balanced sense of selfhood through the dynamic interplay of self-discipline and self-expression. According to my admittedly congenial interpretation of the movement, the hobbyhorse girls represent a grassroots sign of vitality for the self-organizational enactment of *egalitarian values* (Anderson 1999). They are also empathically transferrable to other causes and arenas of interaction, and still generally worthwhile to *preserve forward*.

The concept of self-management is herewith flexibly re-centered in “*the relational, emergent, co-constitutive, egalitarian, open-ended, emotive, creative, purposive and other-oriented*” sense, instead of “*the atomistic, mechanized, self-disassembling, hierarchical, closed, stale, passively adaptive, empty and prideful*” sense of the notion. The applied phenomenological purpose of re-imagining and reframing self-management with the radical humanist hobby horse -metaphor, was to proceed the recognition that *before* all the instrumental attempts and conceptualizations of management, there is a *more fundamental level* to determine the values and principles of organizing, than the narrow rationale or other ‘useful fictions’ that we may naturally presume, and through which we are routinely thinking, acting, being divided, ‘boxed-in’ or ‘tamed’ with. The deeper personal and inter-personal foundations of valuation and volition, i.e. the *elementary self-regulatory constitutes* cannot be reduced to static, objectivist, naturalistic, mechanistic, nor fixed hierarchical formulas. They are, in principle, available to be discovered as *already here*, for anybody who is open for recognizing the *subjectively foregrounded* experiential consciousness of possibilities and the *intersubjective generation* of practical worth in the world.

## 6 SYNTHESIS

### 6.1 Studying the empirical and the transcendental in experience

The methodological purpose of this study was centered on the task of learning to differentiate and apply the critical phenomenological orientation. A central goal was to gain better *understanding* on the philosophical foundations for connecting the *empirical* and the *transcendental* realms of inquiry. The *natural* and the *phenomenological* attitudes, and the *naturalistic* and the *personalistic* stances of study were distinguished in order to clarify confusion, and to identify the connections for advancing the communicative efforts between the different communities of research practice. I brought together the ideas, themes and references that I have found most relevant for *opening* and *thinking anew* the conceptual-interpretative horizon for the *critical sensemaking* of managerial and organizational phenomena, with certain distinctions in mind:

- between scientific and philosophical attitudes
- between top-down and bottom-up strategies
- between natural laws and moral reasoning
- between primordial and intersubjective consciousness
- between economic and non-economic valuation

The main point was to draw attention to *the different ways to perceive, imagine and articulate* experiential phenomena, and to recognize how concepts can modify *the ways we think and act* in the world. I followed the broad philosophical intents and purposes of inquiring the *foundations* of knowing, which necessarily and primarily involves the *embodied cognizant subject* as the inquirer. The notion of *personalistic agency* was emphasized out of a real life concern for *autonomous* human evaluation, decision making and judgment, and the meta-level cognitive capabilities were brought forth with respect to our limitations as 'cognitive misers'. I emphasized the *systemic causation* of mental defects, by connecting the proliferation of psychic ailments to hostile modes and mediums of sociality.

I also came across the contemporary scholarly discussions that criticize the ‘anthropocentric’, ‘eurocentric’ and ‘androcentric’ – cultural models that are in part credited to originate from the Western philosophical schools of thought. It has been suggested that humanities, in particular, needs a “posthuman” turn of thinking in order to face the socio-ecological crises of the ‘anthropocene’ age. A critical posthuman theory, according to Braidotti (2013), subscribes to a post-anthropocentric position, nomadic ‘eco-sophical’ thinking, process ontology of becoming and transgression of disciplinary boundaries. It is concerned with: “*a nature-culture continuum in the very embodied structure of the extended self*” (p. 8); the *change of location of humans from mere biological to geological agents*” (p. 8); “*stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality*” (p.9); of combining “*historical subjectivity with ‘species thinking’*” (p.13); re-uniting the “*philosophy, the sciences and the arts in a new alliance*” (p.14); with “*post-identitarian, non-unitary and transversal subjectivity based on relations with human and non-human others*” (p. 15); and embracing “*non-profit as a key value in contemporary knowledge production (...) linked to the construction of social horizons of hope*” (p. 15). I recognize the reasoning on why the conditions of knowledge production are in need of revised attention, and agree with most of the general points and the aims of the proposal.

I am not, however, entirely ready to enroll with the posthuman move. In this context and stage of studies, I have been more inclined toward *learning from the scholarly past*, in the sense of aspiring to gain a cultural-historically informed conceptual awareness to better ground the attempts to *rethink* the present challenges. Hence I would rather follow the lines of reasoning in defense of *human understanding*: the value of classical humanities, as outlined by Nussbaum (2010), and of philosophical cultivation of the *non-evaluative emotional state* of Cartesian admiration and wonder in the face of uncertainties, as emphasized by Heinämaa (2018), for instance. In my view, some post-humanist, trans-humanist, and anti-humanist movements tend to disregard the elementary questions of what it still means to be a *fallible human in a fallible world*. This, in turn, may leave room for superficial spiritualism that disseminates indifference, and for demagogue figures that readily seem to provide fast and easy answers to contemporary moral and spiritual vacancies of identification.

The classical humanistic ideas on the *good life* were revisited for the purpose of tracing the historical roots of the self-critical praxis of embodied reasoning (Saariluoma 1985; Heinämaa 2000). Plato’s universal philosophical doctrine of *eros*, for instance, remind us of the real qualities of *otherness*, without which ‘*logos is deteriorating into data-driven calculation*’ (Han 2017b, 43). The purpose of engaging with a variety of philosophical, psychological and social theories, was to conduct more comprehensive and critical review concerning the human conscious powers of abstraction and interaction. It was about activating the broader cognitive architecture of *meta-rational* thinking that involves phenomenological *recognition*, in addition to the cognitive *detection* and *decoupling* of the wanton rationale and the vocabularies that persuade us to incorporate the repressively narrow, sub-personally affectuated, and inherently

*hostile* modes of sociality. I see the hostile modes as those that can keep us mentally paralyzed and anxiously fixated on the *disordered* system of affairs.

The horse-metaphor was a personally familiar and interesting way to examine self-management in reference to equestrianism and horse handling. I found it as a suitable challenge for practicing self-critical reflection in the attempt to flesh out an experimental path of conceptual elaboration. The horse handling analogy helped me, in a way, to differentiate the phenomenological methodology from the special sciences, and prompted the pauses of *questioning* my own taken-for-granted and deeply seated theoretical, practical, and axiological assumptions. The concrete human-horse encounters can also serve as a reminder of the principle of *openness* toward the *original* disclosure of senses and possibilities in the world, as a core feature of reflective lifeworld research (Dahlberg, Dahlberg & Nyström 2008). Interacting with horses is *one* possible way to realize the sense, meaning and value of *radical empathic apperception* as a communicative orientation, and to learn *abstraction* with respect to experience. I could see connections, in the philosophical sense, e.g. between mixed normative pressures and cognitive dissonance, and how that can lead to *unfounded* positive claims of certainty and control over contingency.

The reason for differentiating the strong (*emphatic*) notion of experience was also to emphasize how the *unexpected limits* to the ordinary flow of lived experiencing can carry the mark of emotional salience precisely due to what is perceived as a '*present absence*' of some ideal value when it is discovered *at risk*. The actual value of health and wellbeing, as a common example, may appear to us in its fullest significance when we're struck down with illness. The radically moving events are also *epistemic events*, especially when they are personally experienced as evidentially truthful enough to re-orient the acts of sensing, feeling and thinking about something *anew*. They can also lead us to call into question the supposed certainties of practicing a given language-game, as Wittgenstein (1969, pp. 81c-82c) remarked while using the equestrian metaphor:

616. Why, would it be *unthinkable*, that I should stay in the saddle however much the facts bucked?

617. Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the *sureness* of the game. Indeed, doesn't it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?

The contextual evidence that may stir the ways of seeing and thinking can be convincing enough to alter one's previously held assumptions. This, however, firstly applies to one's own case, which does not yet necessarily yield to broader generalizability. Phenomenological analyses can enable us to recognize the *generalizable* lifeworld structuring of sense that all human evaluative struggles, conceptions and interpretations rely upon, and reveal how everyday goal-oriented activities, like managing, always emerge in relation to *subjectively* perceived, remembered or imagined possibilities, boundaries or inadequacies.

The radically reflective phenomenological regard on empirical matters can disclose the fact that there is a *pre-reflective* level of experiencing that is already operative in and through our consciousness. Transcendental analysis attends to what is in the *naturalistic* sense wholly absent or silent, and provides the adequate conceptual tools to articulate phenomena that is very difficult to utter in the first place. I see that phenomenologically clarified *conception of value* offers a profound basis for making decisions and judgments, e.g. in choosing to *accept* or *refuse* the dominant normative status of *exploitative economic behaviorism* as a society-structuring force. I am convinced that it is firmly reasonable to refuse the quasi-religiously applied and narrow top-down manner of rationalizing and mechanizing - i.e. *stupefying* - socio-emotional life, as a vastly overrated and poorly justified excuse for an ethical framework of valuation.

If the goal is to develop *the meta-rational* evaluative skills and the interpretative abilities of *critical sensemaking*, and we accept that our emotional experiences are interrelated with our action-orientation and normative concerns, then we need to account for the agentic *intentionality* of emotions and affects, and recognize them in terms of the *other-oriented* consciousness of possibilities. Also, when the embodiment of the dynamic tension between lived experience and social identification is understood as *the existential base ground of all cultural manifestations*, and the *lived evidential role of emotions* is taken into reflective consideration - preferably in this case for the benefit of repurposed social imagination - the self-critical need for questioning our own naturally taken for granted assumptions can be seen *in parallel* with the task of questioning, negotiating and renewing the cultural-historical core assumptions and common structures of civil society, scientific advancement and economic production.

## 6.2 The embodied cognitive constitutes of personalistic agency

When the study of organizing is broadly re-defined to concern "*how people and things come together to do stuff*", as Parker (2018, 147) suggests, then it also seems relevant to study *how we originally come to understand the other minds and bodies*, which is also a question that concerns *self-recognition*. Therefore I set out to explore the concept of self-management from the *embodied cognitive* perspective with an applied critical phenomenological purpose of connecting lifeworld reflection and theories. I intended to keep in mind both the meta-rational cognition and the phenomenological recognition of the intersubjective lifeworld grounds of sense-giveness. The horse-metaphorical case chapters represented a gesture of '*un-horsing*' the emotional economy as a governance regime in its current formation. The goal was to critically review the *roots, intents* and *purposes* of regulating emotions and affects in late capitalist societies, and to re-imagine the *agentic cognitive embodiment* of evaluative authorship and ownership, in the personalistic sense of motivated reasoning and restraint.

I identified the problem of self-management in light of critical, philosophical and humanistic management and organization studies. The usage

of the concept was problematized in connection with the normative imposition of a *prescriptive* economic rationale that *presupposes* certain socially narrow behaviours and goals while excluding others. The related mode of unfreedom in an *informalized* emotional economy was connected to *culturally accelerated and intensified pressures* of incessant self-improvement, socioeconomic uncertainty, and to the generalized sense of *confusion*, when the boundaries between our private lives and vocational or professional roles dissolve *in favour of* predefined economic coordinates that enforce the expectations of *machine-like efficiency*. The corporate cultural ideals and measures of self-management were seen as biased toward attributing the 21<sup>st</sup> century problems of work as originating from naturalized and individualized, rather than social, systemic or structural causes. What could be more attentively recognized, is that if the *concrete affordances* of the work-life situation are consistently experienced as *inadequate* and *lacking*, the anticipatory states of tension and perpetual disappointments can affect the personal *and* the communal sense of possibilities, meaning, value, agency, justice and health, among others, in various distressing, malign and corrosive ways. If the social domains of practice are thus *perceived as unmanageable* to a large extent, that is, as chiefly determined outside and irrespective of self-agentic valuation and choice, then self-management can be circumscribed to concern the *bare necessities* of life. In this sense, Hannah Arendt's notions of *unfreedom* and *world-alienation* seem descriptive concepts of today's lifeworlds.

Another core point concerns *self-critical reflection*, which according to Husserl is the essential practice for the cultural betterment of civilization. It is still timely to insist upon the balanced significance of *negative distance* for the acts of thinking, and for enabling the general conditions of possibility for cultivating *the life of the mind*. (Husserl 1936; Arendt 1981; Merleau-Ponty 2013; Breyer & Gutland 2016). Contemplative efforts are often deemed untenable, and if the practice of research is reduced to a mere accumulative conduct, it hardly represents the foreground for thinking about anything *anew* in philosophically or scientifically truthful sense of advancement. Enculturating the self-critical praxis could arguably help to counter the functionally stupefied landscapes of interaction, and also possibly activate the political will to demand reasonable *public control* mechanisms *over* the economy. The hostile social modes of interacting are still firstly sustained through our own choices in everyday life, yet they can also be decidedly and habitually altered, if we will. That is, if we care about our freedom enough to refuse being *subscribed* as mere wantons.

I find that it is deeply problematic to conceptualize human organizational phenomena after *dogmatic* and *deterministic* assumptions. It is by no means novel to point this out, but I see that it is nonetheless relevant to do so for better distinguishing *the real* and *the ideal* constitutes of value in society. When human-made social orders are primarily narrated and presupposed to function akin to a natural organism – with machine-like efficiency – it renders the personally *and* politically vital human constitutional questions of civil participation and negotiation under impotent *apolitical* determinism, cynicism and ignorance. The notion of the *free will* surely means more than a “vital lie”, even if it needs to be

portrayed as such for enlivening the *social imagination* of best available possibilities with respect to dignified *earthly* and *worldly* existence. Without a generalized sense of integrity, e.g. gained from the felt sense of participating in the generation of better worlds, it is hard to *move forward* in the personal or cultural-historical sense of betterment. The problem of agentic valuation and restraint thus originates from, and must *adequately* be understood in recognition of the *lived consciousness* as our *primary* relation to the world, but which the reductionist models tend to confuse or explain away. Scientific explanations are not sufficient *alone*, if the goal is to gain more profound and nuanced understanding, for example, on the multifaceted interrelationships of emotional engagement or detachment and intercorporeal self-other identification.

Embodied minds are curious to inquire and connect, on the condition of finding something of value to *care* about in the world, and meta-level thinking does *not* rule out compassionate concerns. *Functional stupidity*, in turn, seems like a fruitful concept to characterize the *passive modes* of thought and action that we tend to fleet into, e.g. through psychoactive substances, lower pleasures, positive illusions or excessive busyness, when something seems too tiresome, painful or difficult to attend to in an *actively reflective* manner. Human-animal interactions may offer *non-evaluative* relief from the objectified expectations and mechanistic pressures, and proceed the awareness that we can also *unlearn to embody* the naturally and culturally destructive customary habits if or when they are recognized as such. Human efforts are still nonetheless required in *choosing the best possible modes, manners and medias* through which our *egos are altered*. In addition to complicating one's awareness on the qualitative *whatness* in the world, the embodied consciousness of possibilities can also be enriched by identifying the structures, patterns and interrelated dependencies of *why* and *how* we tend to translate perceptions into meanings, or ideas into actions.

The sensitizing role of the horse-metaphor was to mediate a more *relational, dynamic, and lived* recognition of our own 'beastly' - 'divine' qualification of tendencies and aspirations with respect to *socially situated* and *emotion-laden* action potentials and possibilities. The three metaphorically inspired chapters were centered on exploring the senses and meanings that may enable us to *rethink* managing and organizing from different perspectives. I have decidedly referred to the existential and cultural sources of valuation - like art - that can accommodate the *economically disinterested* reasoning, and the *non-economically* emotionally invested activities. I intended to accentuate the values of creativity and freedom through emphasizing that living beings *cannot* be levelled down and simplified as calculable entities in the same way we handle machines. To insist upon the importance of recognizing *otherness* through the radical empathic apperception of respective similarity *and* difference, is also to benefit more open-ended and reciprocal negotiation on the generation of action goals that can be innately and generally worth the effort in the long term.

The radical humanist purpose of provoking the thesis of the embodied cognition, was to activate *profoundly* reflective efforts on a wider range of human evaluative struggles: the intellectually *broader, socio-emotionally complex,*

empirically *accurate*, and ethically *radical* value theorizing on motivated human reasoning. I found that *the attitude of radical reflection* enables a person to examine the conflicting contradictions of life in-depth without becoming overly confused or consumed by them. I concurred with the notion that *the tension* between subjective experience and objective identification cannot be completely erased: it cannot be *totally* explained away with dogmatic determinisms, obscured with positive sensations, or covered with coherent stories. The 'gap', however, also appears conducive for any generative mode of creativity: if there were no failures between lived experience and its conceptualization and organization, then it would be correct to prescribe us as mindless automatons.

The *homo economicus* - control techniques of the emotional economy are nonetheless geared toward capitalizing on the inherently *economical* teleology of human mental exertion. It may indeed seem easier to detach oneself from the confusions, contradictions, injustices and inequalities of the world through assuming some variant of self-deception. The philosophical, psychological and social perspectives that seek to gain better understanding on *personalistic agency* as an embodied, intercorporeal and intersubjective concept, appear to share similar concerns over the *fast and calculative modes of social relating* that are also strategically endorsed to stifle our actively reflective capabilities. The utility maximizing paradigm seems to favor cognitive indolence as a disposition connected with the notion of wanton self-interest, which I see as a topical concern for further critical inquiries across the disciplines.

### 6.3 The motives, limitations and projections of the study

The original personal motive of this educational project was centered on *renewing* the creative impulse of intellectual inquiry. The research practical aim of the study was also to examine my own *intuitive presuppositions*, and to take the necessary time and space to flesh out a set of ideas, themes and concepts, and think through them, while connecting *cognitive scientific, phenomenological* and *critical management studies* in a loosely structured manner. I experimented with the conceptual applicability of the horse-metaphor as a way of *rethinking* self-management from an embodied cognitive perspective that encompasses the lifeworld of experiencing. Given the essentially *tentative* nature, the *exploratory* purposes, and the wide range of viewpoints gathered and reviewed in this inquiry, the *main limitation* concerns the lack of attention afforded to a specified development of analysis. I acknowledge the risks involved when referring to a plurality of traditions and conceptual openings that could have been articulated with more precision. This is basically a *metacognitive mapping* of ideas, and still yet a *work-in-progress*, which was conducted with an intention to elaborate on certain core questions and concerns in more detail later on. If reading the text has at some point somehow enabled the reader to recognize or rethink something *anew* from other perspectives, then it has satisfied an intersubjective communicative intent that I have tried to convey through writing this thesis.



## REFERENCES

- Aaltola, E. (2015). Jälkisanat, teoksessa: *Plutarkhos (Plutarch), Eläinten älykkyydestä ja muita kirjoituksia*, Suomentaneet Tua Korhonen ja Liisa Kaski, s. 222-225. Tallinna: Gaudeamus.
- Ahmed, S. (2003). 'Pelon politiikka', alkuperäinen teksti: 'The Affective Politics of Fear' paper presented in Tampere 8.2.2002, suomentanut Laura Huttunen, teoksessa *Erilaisuus*, s 189-211, toimittaneet Mikko Lehtonen ja Olli Löytty, Jyväskylä: Vastapaino.
- Ahmed, S. (2004). Affective Economies. *Social Text*. 22(2): 117-139.
- Ahmed, S. (2014). *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. (2nd ed.) UK: Edinburgh University Press.
- Al-Fedaghi, S. (2019). Existential Ontology and Thinging Modeling in Software Engineering. *International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security (IJCSIS)*, 17,3: 70-80.
- Alvesson, M. (2013). *The triumph of Emptiness. Consumption, higher education, & work organization*. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Alvesson, M. & Deetz, S. (2000). *Doing Critical Management Research*. UK: Sage
- Alvesson, M., Gabriel, Y. & Paulsen, R. (2017). *Return to Meaning: A Social Science with Something to Say*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Alvesson, M. & Sandberg, J. (2014). Habitat and Habitus: Boxed-in versus Box-Breaking Research. *Organization Studies*, 35, 7, 967 -987.
- Alvesson, M. & Spicer, A. (eds.) (2011). *Metaphors we lead by. Understanding leadership in the real world*. UK: Routledge.
- Alvesson, M. & Spicer, A. (2012). A Stupidity-Based Theory of Organizations. *Journal of Management Studies* 49 (7): 1194-1220.
- Alvesson, M. & Spicer, A. (2016). *The Stupidity Paradox: The Power and Pitfalls of Functional Stupidity at Work*. London: Profile Books.
- Alvesson, M., & Willmott, H. (2012). *Making Sense of Management: A Critical Introduction*. 2nd edition. Cornwall: Sage.
- Amabile, T. (1998) How to kill creativity. *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1998, 77-87.
- Anderson, E. (1993). *Value in Ethics and Economics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Anderson, E. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? *Ethics*, 109(2): 287-337.
- Anderson, E. (2019). *Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don't Talk About It)*. US: Princeton University Press.
- Arendt, H. (1998)[1958]. *The Human Condition*. 2nd edition. Chigago: University of Chigago Press.
- Arendt, H. (1981). *The Life of the Mind: One/ Thinking, Two/Willing*. One volume Edition. New York: Harcourt.

- Ashkanasy, N. M. & Daus, C. S. (2005). Rumors of the death of emotional intelligence in organizational behavior are vastly exaggerated. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26, 441-452.
- Augé, M. (2014). *The Future*. Translated by John Howe from *Futuro* (2012). London: Verso.
- Aromaa, E., Eriksson, P. Helms Mills, J., Hiltunen, E., Lammassaari, M., Mills, A. J. (2018). Critical sensemaking: challenges and promises. *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 11/27/2018, <https://doi.org/10.1108/QROM-05-2018-1645>
- Ayouch, T. (2009). Lived Body and Fantasmatic Body: The Debate between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 28(2): 336-355.
- Backman, J. (2018). 'Äärellisyyden kohtaaminen: kokemuksen filosofista käsittehistoriaa'. Teoksessa *Kokemuksen tutkimus VI : kokemuksen käsite ja käyttö*, 25-40, Toikkanen Jarkko ja Virtanen, Ira A. (toim.). Rovaniemi: Lapland University Press.
- Baker, A., ten Brinke, L., & Porter, S. (2013). Will get fooled again: Emotionally intelligent people are easily duped by high-stakes deceivers. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, 18(2), 300-313.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control*. NY: W. H. Freeman.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective. *Annual Review of Psychology* 52:1-26.
- Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a Psychology of Human Agency. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1(2):164-180.
- Beauvoir, de, S. (2004)[1947]. 'An Existentialist Looks at Americans.' Reprinted form the *New York Times Magazine*, May 25, 1947, In Simons, M. A., Timmerman, M. & Mader M. B. (eds.). (2004). *Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings*. US: University of Illinois Press, 307-315.
- Beauvoir, de, S. (1976)[1947]. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Translation by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Citadel Press.
- Beauvoir, de, S. (2011)[1947]. *Moniselitteisyyden Etiikka*. suom. Erika Ruonakoski alkuteoksesta *Pour une morale de l'ambiguite*. Tampere: Tutkijaliitto.
- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Translated by Mark Ritter. UK: Sage.
- Becker, E. (1973). *The Denial of Death*. New York: Free Press.
- Beebe, J. (2016). *Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type: The reservoir of consciousness*. New York: Routledge.
- Bekoff, M., Allen, C. & Burghardt, G. M. (eds). (2002). *The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition*. Croydon: MIT Press.
- Bekoff, M. & Pierce, J. (2010). *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals*. Chicago, US: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bell, E. & Bridgman, T. (2017). Why Management Learning matters. *Management Learning*, 48(1): 3-6.

- Bell, E. & Sinclair, A. (2014). Reclaiming eroticism in the academy. *Organization*, 21(2): 268-280.
- Benhabib, S. (2003). 'Appendix: The Personal is not the Political', In *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*, 221-233. Revised and abridged version of an article that originally appeared in *Boston Review* (October-November 1999, pp. 45-48). New edition. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Beran, A. (2017). *Dressage Seat: Achieving a Beautiful, Effective Position in Every Gait and Movement*. English translation from *Der Dressurssitz* (2015). Vermont: Trafalgar Square Books.
- Berardi, F. (2009). *The Soul at Work. From Alienation to Autonomy*. Translated by Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e).
- Berardi, F. (2015). *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*. Croydon: Verso.
- Berardi, F. (2018). *Breathing: Chaos and Poetry*. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e)
- Berglund, K. (2013). Fighting against all odds: Entrepreneurship education as employability training. *Ephemera*. 13(4): 717-735.
- Birke, L. (2007). Talking about horses: Control and freedom in the world of 'Natural Horsemanship'. *Society and Animals*, 16(2): 107-126.
- Birke, L. & Brandt, K. (2009). Mutual corporeality: Gender and human/horse relationships. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 32(3):189-197.
- Bjerg, O. (2014). *Making Money: The Philosophy of Crisis Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Bjerg, O. (2016). *Parallax of Growth. The Philosophy of Ecology and Economy*. UK: Polity Press.
- Björns, M. & Koivula, J. (2017). *Suuri suomalainen ratsastuskirja*. Helsinki: Readmi.fi.
- Blok, V. 2015. The human glanze, the experience of environmental distress and the 'affordance' of nature: Toward a phenomenology of the ecological crisis. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 28(5):925-938.
- Blok, V. (2019) 'Xenophon's philosophy of management', In, Neesham C., Segal S. (eds): *Handbook of Philosophy of Management*. Handbooks in Philosophy. Dordrecht:Springer, Cham.
- Boddy, C. R. (2006). The Dark Side of Management Decisions: Organisational Psychopaths, *Management Decision*, 44 (9-10): 1461-75.
- Boddy, C. R. (2011). The corporate psychopaths theory of the global financial crisis. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 102, 255-259.
- Boddy, C. R. (2015). Organisational psychopaths: a ten year update. *Management Decision*, 53(10): 2407-2432.
- Boddy, C., Miles, D., Sanyal, C. & Hartog, M. (2015). Extreme managers, extreme workplaces: Capitalism, organizations and corporate psychopaths. *Organization*, 22(4): 530 -551.
- Boje, D. (2009). Excess of History and Dance of Narrative with Living Story Noticing. *Tamara Journal of Critical Organisation Inquiry*. 8,( 1/2): 89-94.

- Boltanski, L. & Chiapello, E. (2018). *The new spirit of capitalism*. Translated by Gregory Elliot, from *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (1999). New updated edition. Croydon: Verso
- Borgerson, J. L. (2009). Witnessing and Organization: Existential Phenomenological Reflections on Intersubjectivity. *Philosophy Today*, Spring 2010, 78-87.
- Bornemark, J., Andersson, P. & Ekström von Essen, U. (eds.)(2019). *Equine Cultures in Transition: Ethical Questions*. Routledge Advances in Society. London: Routledge.
- Brady, R. A. (1943). *Business as a system of power*. New York: Columbia University Press. Online: <https://archive.org/details/businessassystem00bradrich>
- Braidotti, R. (2013). Posthuman humanities. *European Educational Research Journal*, 12(1): 1-19.
- Branderub, B. (2014). *Academic Art of Riding: A Riding Method for the Ambitious Leisure Rider*. Cadmos Publishing.
- Brandt, K. (2004). A Language of Their Own: An Interactionist Approach to Human-Horse Communication. *Society & Animals*, 12(4): 299-316.
- Breyer, T. & Gutland, C. (eds.) (2016). *Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences*. New York: Routledge.
- Brewis, D. N. & Williams, E. (2019). Writing as skin: Negotiating the body in(to) learning about the managed self. *Management Learning*, 50(1): 87-99.
- Bridle, J. (2018). *New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future*. Croydon, UK: Verso.
- Brinkmann, S. (2017). *Stand Firm: Resisting the Self-Improvement Graze*. UK: Polity Press.
- Brockless, A. (2018). Thought, Consciousness, Brains and Machines. *Philosophy Now*. February/March 2018: 16-19.
- Brunila, K., Onnismaa, J. & Pasanen, H. (eds.) (2015). *Koko elämä töihin: Koulutus tietokykykapitalismissa*. Aikuiskasvatuksen 52. Vuosikirja. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Buchanan, R. (1992). Wicked problems in design thinking. *Design issues*, 8(2), 5-21.
- Burrell, G. (2013). *Styles of Organizing: The Will to Form*. Croydon, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis*. Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life. Reprinted. UK: Ashgate.
- Byrne, T. (2017). Surrogates and Empty Intentions: Husserl's "On the Logic of Signs" as the Blueprint for his First Logical Investigation. *Husserl Studies*, 33:211-227.
- Böhme, G. (2003). Contribution to the Critique of the Aesthetic Economy. *Thesis Eleven*, 73, 1: 71-82.

- Böhme, G. (2017). *Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Atmospheric Spaces Book series n:1. Berlin: Mimesis International.
- Cappuccio, M. L. (2019). *Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology*. US: MIT Press.
- Calas, M. & Smircich, L. (2002). Ignored for 'Good Reason': Beauvoir's Philosophy as a Revision of Social Identity Approaches, *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 9(2):193-199.
- Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G. & Prelec, D. (2005). Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics. *Journal of Economic Literature* Vol. XLIII (March 2005):9-64.
- Cederström, C., & Fleming, P. (2012). *Dead Man Working*. Alresford, UK: Zero Books.
- Cederström, C. & Spicer, A. (2015). *The Wellness Syndrome*. US: Polity Press.
- Cerbone, D. R. (2006). *Understanding Phenomenology*. UK: Acumen.
- Cerbone, D. R. (2017). 'Phenomenological Method and the Achievement of Recognition: Who's Been Waiting for Phenomenology?' in *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, edited by Giuseppina D'Oro and Søren Overgaard, 295-316. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2, 3: 200-219.
- Christensen, J. (2018). Economic knowledge and the scientization of policy advice. *Policy Sciences*, 51(3):291-311.
- Chia, R. & Holt, R. (2009). *Strategy without Design: The Silent Efficacy of Indirect Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. *Analysis* 58: 7-19.
- Clark, A. (1997). *Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again*. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press
- Clark, A. (2012). 'Embodied, embedded, and extended cognition'. In *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*, 275-290, edited by Frankish, K. & Ramsey, W. M. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, A. (2016). *Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cockton, G. (2017). New process, new vocabulary: Axiofact = A\_tefact + Memoranda. CHI 2017.
- Cohen, M. (2008). *Philosophical Tales*. Singapore: Blackwell Publishing.
- Collini, S. (2012). *What Are Universities For?* London: Penguin Books.
- Connolly, L., & Cullen, J. (2017). Animals and organisations: An ethic of care framework. *Organization & Environment*, 1-19.
- Contu, A. (2014). On Boundaries and Difference: Communities of Practice and Power Relations in Creative Work. *Management Learning*, 45 ( 3): 289-316.
- Contu, A. (2018). Psychoanalysis, Critique and the Unconscious at Work. (March 2, 2018). *HUMANISTIC MANAGEMENT eJOURNAL*. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259562>

- Courpasson, D. (2013). On the erosion of 'passionate scholarship'. *Organization Studies*, 34, 1243–1249.
- Cross, N. (2001). Designerly ways of knowing: Design discipline versus design science. *Design issues*, 17(3), 49–55.
- Crowell, S. (2016). 'What Is It to Think?', in Breyer, T. & Gutland, C. (eds.): *Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences*, 183–206. New York: Routledge
- Currie, G., Kieran, M., Meskin, A. & Robson, J. (eds.) (2014). *Aesthetics and the Sciences of the Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dabrowski, K. (2015) [1967]. *Personality Shaping Through Positive Disintegration*. UK/US: Red Pill Press.
- Dahlberg, K., Dahlberg, H. & Nyström, M. (2008). *Reflective Lifeworld Research*. Malmö: Studentlitterature.
- Dahlström, D. O., Elpidorou, A. & Hopp, W. (eds.) (2016). *Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches*. New York: Routledge
- D'Alisa, G., Demaria, F., & Kallis, G. (eds.) (2015). *Degrowth: A vocabulary for a new era*. New York: Routledge.
- Daly, H.E. (2013). A further critique of growth economics. *Ecological Economics*, 88: 20–24.
- Damasio, A. (2005/1994). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. US: Penguin Books.
- Damasio, A. (2018). *The Strange Order of Things: Life, Feeling, and the Making of Cultures*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Davies, W. (2016). *The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold Us Well-Being*. UK: Verso Books.
- Davies, W. (ed.). (2018). *Economic Science Fictions*. UK: Goldsmiths Press.
- Davies, M., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional intelligence: In search of an elusive construct. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75, 989–1015.
- De Monticelli, R. (2018). The Paradox of Axiology. A Phenomenological Approach to Value Theory. *Phenomenology and Mind*, 15: 116–128.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (2013)[1987] *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translation from French *Mille plateaux* (1980) and foreword by Brian Massumi. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Dennett, D. (2013). *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- De Santis, D. (2019). The Practical Reformer: On Husserl's Socrates. *Husserl Studies*, First online 21 May 2019 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-019-09245-7>
- D'Oro, G. & Overgaard, S. (eds.) (2017). *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Draaisma, R. (2018). *Language Signs and Calming Signals of Horses: Recognition and Application*. Trans. From Dutch by Sarah Strous. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Dreyfus, H. L. & Dreyfus, S. E. (1986). *Mind over Machine. The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer*. US: Free Press.

- Dreyfus, H. L. (2016). *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action*. Edited by Mark A. Wrathall. US: Oxford University Press.
- Dreyfus, H. L. & Wrathall, M. A. (eds.) (2009). *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Drucker, P. F. (2008)[1999]. *Managing Oneself*. Boston, US: Harvard Business Review Classics.
- Drummond, J. J. & Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (eds.) (2018). *Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Ellenberger, H. F. (1994)[1970]. *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. US: Fontana Press.
- Else, G. F. (1968) Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature by Helen North (Book Review). *The American Journal of Philology*, 90, 3: 360-365.
- Eskelinen, T. & Sorsa, V-P. (2011). *Hyoä Talous*. Keuruu: Like.
- Eskelinen, T. & Jonker-Hoffrén, P. (2017). Taloustiede episteemisenä yhteisönä ja kamppailu asiantuntijuudesta. *Poliittinen Talous*, 5 (1):91-12.
- Evans, J. St. B. T. (2010). *Thinking Twice: Two minds in one brain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, J. St. B. T. & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 8, 223-41.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Fineman, S. & Gabriel, Y. (1996). *Experiencing Organizations*. London: Sage.
- Fineman, S. (ed.) (2000). *Emotion in Organizations*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Wiltshire: Sage.
- Fineman, S. (2000b) 'Commodifying the Emotionally Intelligent', in Fineman (ed): *Emotion in Organizations*, 101-114. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Wiltshire: Sage.
- Fineman, S. (2004). Getting the measure of emotion—and the cautionary tale of emotional intelligence. *Human Relations*, 57, 719-40.
- Fineman, S. (2008). *The Emotional Organization: Passions and Power*. Singapore: Blackwell Publishing.
- Fisher, M. (2009). *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* Chippenham, UK: Zero Books.
- Fleming, P. (2009). *Authenticity and the Cultural Politics of Work: New Forms of Informal Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fleming, P. (2017a). *The Death of Homo Economicus: Work, Debt and the Myth of Endless Accumulation*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fleming, P. (2017b). The Human Capital Hoax: Work, Debt and Insecurity in the era of Uberization. *Organization Studies*, 38(5):691-709.
- Flyverbom, M., Deibert, R. & Matten, D. (2019). The Governance of Digital Technology, Big Data, and the Internet: New Roles and Responsibilities for Business. *Business & Society*, 58(1):3-19.

- Ford, C. (2013). Dancing with Horses: Combining Dance/Movement Therapy and Equine Facilitated Psychotherapy. *American Journal of Dance Therapy*, 35, 2: 93-117.
- Forsberg, L. (2007). *Att utveckla handlingskraft Om flickors identitetsskapande processer i stallet*. (PhD). Luleå tekniska universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik och lärande.
- Fotaki, M., Metcalfe, B. D. & Harding, N. (2014). Writing materiality into management and organization studies through and with Luce Irigaray. *Human Relations*, 67(10): 1239 -1263.
- Fotaki, M., Kenny, K. & Vachhani, S. J. (2017). Thinking critically about affect in organization studies: Why it matters. *Organization* 24(1): 3-17.
- Fotaki, M. & Harding, N. (2018). *Gender and the Organization: Women at Work in the 21st Century*. UK: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (2010) [1976-1984]. *Seksuaalisuuden historia. Tiedon tahto. Nautintojen käyttö. Huoli itsestä*. Suomentanut Kaisa Sivenius. Toinen, uudistettu laitos. Tallinna: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press.
- Fournier, V. (2008). Escaping from the economy: The politics of degrowth. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 28 (11/12): 528-545.
- Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68, 1, 5-20.
- Frankfurt, H. G. (2005). *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Frankish, K. & Ramsey, W. M. (eds.) (2012). *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Fransson, J. (2015). *Leadership skills developed through horse experiences and their usefulness for business leaders*. Master's thesis. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala.
- Freud, S. (2010)[1930]. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Translated and edited by James Strachey from *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Friedman, M. (1953). 'The Methodology of Positive Economics', in *Essays in Positive Economics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Fromm, E. (2001)[1942]. *The Fear of Freedom*. Cornwall, UK: Routledge Classics.
- Fromm, E. (2002) [1955]. *The Sane Society*. London: Routledge Classics.
- Fuchs, T. & Schlimme, J. E. (2009). Embodiment and psychopathology: a phenomenological perspective. *Current Opinion in Psychiatry*, 22, 6: 570-575.
- Fuchs, T. (2011). The Brain – A Mediating Organ. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 18, 7-8: 196-221.
- Fuchs, T. (2017). 'Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity', in C. Meyer, C., Streeck, J. & Jordan, J. S. (eds.), *Intercorporeality: Emerging Socialities in Interaction*, 3-23, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fuller, T. (2017). Anxious relationships: The unmarked futures for post-normal scenarios in anticipatory systems. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 124, 41-50.
- Gabriel, Y. (1992). The Unmanaged Organization: Stories, Fantasies and Subjectivity. *Organization Studies*, 16, 3: 477-501.



- Gagliardi, C. & Czarniawska, B. (eds). (2006). *Management Education and the Humanities*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Gallagher, S. (1997). Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 4, 3: 195.-214.
- Gallagher, S. (2005). *How the Body Shapes the Mind*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2008). *The Phenomenological Mind*. London: Routledge.
- Gardiner, R. A. (2018). Hannah and her sisters: Theorizing gender and leadership through the lens of feminist phenomenology. *Leadership*, 14(3):291-306.
- Gerardi, N. (2018). Recognizing the human: A psychoanalytic engagement with HRM and its discontents. *Ephemera*, special issue 'Managing the human', 18(2): 363-370.
- Ghoshal, S. (2005) Bad management theories are destroying good management practices, *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 4(1): 75-91.
- Gibbs, Jr, R. W. (ed). (2008). *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson-Graham, J. K., Cameron, J. & Healy, S. (2013). *Take Back the Economy: An Ethical Guide for Transforming Our Communities*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gilmore, S., Harding, N., Helin, J. & Pullen, A. (2019). Writing Differently. *Management Learning*, 50(1): 3-10.
- Ginev, D. (2011). *The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. (2017). *Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Goldie, P. (ed.)(2010). *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Gombrich, E. H. (1985){1963}. 'Meditations on a Hobby Horse, or the Roots of Artistic form', in *Meditations on a Hobby Horse And Other Essays on the Theory of Art*, pp.1-11.: University of Chicago Press.
- Gorz, A. (1989). Critique of Economic Reason. Translation by Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner, from *Metamorphoses du travail* (1988). London: Verso.
- Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Goleman, D. (1998). *Working with Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Goleman, D. (2000). Leadership that gets results. *Harvard Business Review*, March/April 2000, 78(2):78-90.
- Graham, P. (ed.) (1995). *Mary Parker Follett - Prophet of management: a celebration of writings from the 1920s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Grandey, A., Diefendorff, J. & Rupp, D. E. (eds.) (2013). *Emotional Labor in the 21st Century: Diverse Perspectives on Emotion Regulation at Work*. Routledge.
- Greenfield, A. (2017). *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life*. Brooklyn, NY: Verso.

- Gregg, M. & Seigworth, G. J. (eds.) (2010). *The Affect Theory Reader*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Grey, C. & Sinclair, A. (2006). Writing Differently. *Organization*, 13(3): 443-453.
- Grey, C. (2009). Licence to think. *Management Learning*, 40(4): 353-356.
- Guillet de Monthoux, P. (1993). *The Moral Philosophy of Management: From Quesnay to Keynes*. First published 1993 by M.E. Sharpe. NY: Routledge.
- Guinart, D. & Kane, J. M. (2019). Use of Behavioral Economics to Improve Medication Adherence in Severe Mental Illness. Open Forum article, *Psychiatric Services*, Published Online 19<sup>th</sup>/June/2019 <https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201900116>
- Haaparanta, L. (2019). *Rajan taju: Filosofisia esseitä*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Haiven, M. (2014). *Cultures of Financialization: Fictitious Capital in Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Halton, W. (2004). 'Some unconscious aspects of organizational life: contributions from psychoanalysis', in *Communication, Relationships and Care: A Reader*, edited by Sheila Barrett, Carol Komaromy, Martin Robb and Anita Rogers, 297-306, Cornwall: Routledge.
- Han, Byung-Chul. (2015). *The Burnout Society*. Translated from *Müdigkeitsgesellschaft* (2010). California: Stanford University Press.
- Han, Byung-Chul. (2017a). *Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power*. Translated from German by Erik Butler. Croydon, UK: Verso.
- Han, Byung-Chul. (2017b). *The Agony of Eros*. Translated by Erik Butler. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Han, Byung-Chul. (2018). *Saving beauty*. Trans. by Daniel Steuer from *Die Errettung des Schönen*. (2015). UK: Polity Press.
- Han, Byung-Chul. (2019). *What is Power?* Translated by Daniel Steuer from *Was ist Macht?* (2005). Bungay: Polity Press.
- Hancock, P. & Tyler, M. (2001). Managing Subjectivity and the Dialectic of Self-Consciousness: Hegel and Organization Theory. *Organization* 8(4): 565-585.
- Hancock, P. & Tyler, M. (2008). 'It's All Too Beautiful: Emotion and Organization in the Aesthetic Economy.' In *The Emotional Organization: Passions and Power*, 202-217, edited by Stephen Fineman. Singapore: Blackwell Publishing.
- Hanisch, C. (2006)[1970] 'The Personal Is Political' - The Women's Liberation Movement classic with a new explanatory introduction by Carol Hanisch. articles online at: <http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html>
- Hanlon, G. (2016). *The dark side of management; A secret history of management theory*. Croydon: Routledge.
- Harding, N. (2003). 'On the manager's body as an aesthetics of control.' In: Carr, A. & Hancock, P. (eds). *Art and Aesthetics at Work*, 115-132, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hartley, M. & Commire, A. (1990). *Breaking the Silence*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Hassard, J., Holliday, R. & Wilmott, H. (2000). *Body and Organization*. London: Sage.

- Hayles, N. K. (2017). *Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Haynes, J. D. (2001). 'Calculative Thinking and Essential Thinking in Heidegger's Phenomenology'. Working paper In AMCIS Proceedings, 1-18.
- Hedenborg, S. (2015). Gender and Sports within the Equine Sector – A Comparative Perspective *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 17 March 2015, 1-14.
- Hedenborg, S. (2017). Lis Hartel – an extraordinary equestrian. *Sport in Society*, 20(8):1030-1046.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1977)[1807]. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. US: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (2000)[1927] *Oleminen ja aika*. Translated in Finnish by Reijo Kupiainen from *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Heidegger, M. (2004)[1954]. *What Is Called Thinking?* Translated by J. Glenn Gray from *Was Heisst Denken?* From Freiburg lectures 1951-1952, Max Niemeyer Verlag. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Heinämaa, S. (1999). Merleau-Ponty's modification of phenomenology: cognition, passion and philosophy. *Synthese*, 118: 49–68.
- Heinämaa, S. (2000). *Ihmetys ja rakkaus: esseitä ruumiin ja sukupuolen fenomenologiasta*. Helsinki: Nemo.
- Heinämaa, S. (2000b). "Merleau-Pontyn havainnonfenomenologinen muunnelma". Teoksessa, *Ihmetys ja rakkaus: esseitä ruumiin ja sukupuolen fenomenologiasta*, 73-106. Helsinki:Nemo.
- Heinämaa, S., Reuter, M. & Yrjönsuuri, M. (toim.). (2003). *Spiritus animalis: Kirjoituksia filosofian historiasta*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Heinämaa, S. (2007). "Selfhood, Consciousness, and Embodiment: A Husserlian Approach". In *Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy*, edited by Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki and Pauliina Remes., pp. 311-328. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Heinämaa, S. (2009). 'Phenomenological Responses to Gestalt Psychology'. In S. Heinämaa and M. Reuter (eds.), *Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*, 263-284. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Heinämaa, S. (2011). 'Body', In Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*, 222–232. London: Routledge.
- Heinämaa, S., Hartimo, M. & Miettinen, T. (eds.) (2014). *Phenomenology and the Transcendental*. London: Routledge.
- Heinämaa, S. (2014). 'The Animal and the Infant: From embodiment and empathy to generativity'. In *Phenomenology and the Transcendental*, 129-146, edited by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo and Timo Miettinen. London: Routledge.
- Heinämaa, S. (2015). 'Husserl's Ethics of Renewal: A Personalistic Approach'. In M. Tuominen, S. Heinämaa, & V. Mäkinen (eds.), *New Perspectives on*

- Aristotelianism and Its Critics*, pp. 196-212. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History (233). Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Heinämaa, S. (2017). 'Ambiguity and difference: Two feminist ethics of the present', in *Differences: Rereading Beauvoir and Irigaray*, eds. Emily Anne Parker and Anne van Leeuwen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 137-173.
- Heinämaa, S. (2018). 'Love and Admiration (Wonder): Fundamentals of the Self-Other Relations.' In *Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance*, edited by John J. Drummond and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, pp. 155-174. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Heinämaa, S. & Reuter, M. (eds.) (2009). *Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Helms Mills, J., Thurlow, A. & Mills, A. J. (2010). Making sense of sensemaking: the critical sensemaking approach. *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management*, 5 (2): 182-195.
- Hendry, J. (2006). Educating managers for post-bureaucracy: The role of the humanities. *Management Learning* 37(3): 267-281.
- Himanka, J. (2010a). 'Filosofia itsenäisenä ajatteluna - fenomenologian hahmotus', teoksessa *Mitä on filosofia?*, toimittaneet Henrik Rydenfelt ja Heikki A. Kovalainen, 201-214. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
- Himanka, J. (2010b). 'Fenomenologia ja luonnontieteet', teoksessa: Miettinen, T., Pulkkinen, S., & Taipale, J. (toim.) *Fenomenologian ydinkysymyksiä*, 79-96, Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Hirschman, A. O. (2013)[1977]. *The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism Before it's Triumph*. US: Princeton University Press.
- Hjorth, D. (2005). Organizational Entrepreneurship: With de Certeau on Creating Heterotopias (or Spaces for Play). *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 14, 4, 386-398.
- Hjorth, D. & Steyaert, C. (eds). (2009). *The Politics and Aesthetics of Entrepreneurship*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Hobsbawn, E. (2014) [1999]. *Äärimmäisyyksien aika: Lyhyt 1900-luku (1914-1991)*. Suom. Pasi Junila teoksesta *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. (1999). Tallinna: Vastapaino.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hodgson, G. (1992). 'Rationality and the influence of institutions', in *Real Life Economics: Understanding Wealth Creation*, 40-48, edited by Paul Ekins, and Manfred Max-Neef, Taylor and Francis, 1992. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Holt, R. & Sandberg, J. (2011). 'Phenomenology and Organization Theory', in *Philosophy and Organization Theory*, edited by Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia, Research in the Sociology of Organizations vol. 32, Emerald Group Publishing, ProQuest Ebook Central, 215-249.
- Honkanen, T. (2013). *Turpaterapiaa ja karvaista kaveruutta: Ihmisen ja eläimen välinen suhde sekä eläinten koetut vaikutukset hyvinvointiin ja*

- elämäntyytyväisyyteen*. Psykologian pro gradu –tutkielma. Yhteiskunta- ja kulttuuri-tieteiden yksikkö. Tampereen yliopisto.
- Hovas, J. (2009). *Talousmetafysiikan kritiikkiä*. Väitöskirja. Helsingin yliopisto, humanistinen tiedekunta, filosofian laitos. Episteme. Tutkijaliitto: Helsinki.
- Husserl, E. (2006)[1924]. Uudistuminen yksilöeettisenä kysymyksenä, in (1954/1989/2006). *Uudistuminen ja Ihmisuus. Luentoja ja Esseitä*, p.71-110, edited by Sara Heinämaa, translated (in Finnish) by Timo Miettinen, Simo Pulkkinen & Joonas Taipale. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto.
- Husserl, E. (2011)[1936]. *Eurooppalaisten tieteiden kriisi ja transsendentaalinen fenomenologia*. Translated in Finnish by Markku Lehtinen, from *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die trans zendentale Phänomenologie*, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1962). Tallinna: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press.
- Hyvönen, A-E. (2017). *Illuminating Political Experience: Exercises on Hannah Arendt's Thought*. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 592. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.
- Hyvönen, A-E. (2018). Careless Speech: Conceptualizing Post-Truth Politics. *New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations*, 26(3), 1-37.
- Illouz, E. (2007). *Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism*. London: Polity Press.
- Irigaray, L. (1994). *Thinking the difference: for a peaceful revolution*. Translated from the French by Karin Montin. Cambridge UK: Routledge.
- Itkonen, H. (1996). *Kenttien kutsu. Tutkimus liikuntakulttuurin muutoksesta*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Isin, E. (2004). The Neurotic Citizen. *Citizenship Studies* 8(3), 217–235.
- James, O. (2008). *The Selfish Capitalist – Origins of Affluenza*. UK: Vermilion.
- Johnsen, C. G. (2015). *Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats? A Philosophical Examination of the Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader and the Entrepreneur*. PhD Series 27/2015. Copenhagen Business School.
- Johnsen, C. G. & Sørensen, B. M. (2016). Traversing the fantasy of the heroic entrepreneur. *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research*, 23(2): 228-244.
- Johnsen, C. G., Nelund, M., Olaison, L. & Sørensen, B. M. (2017). Organizing for the post-growth economy. Editorial. *Ephemera*, 17(1):1-21.
- Jokinen, E. & Venäläinen, J. (2015). *Prekarisaatio ja affekti*. Nykykulttuurin tutkimuskeskuksen julkaisuja 118. Jyväskylän yliopisto.
- Jones, C., & Spicer, A. (2005). The sublime object of entrepreneurship. *Organization*, 12(2):223-246.
- Jones, C. and Murtola, A.-M. (2013) 'The independent entrepreneur?', *The Cyprus Dossier*, 4, February, pp. 4-7, online article retrieved from <https://issuu.com/cyprusdossier/docs/cyprusdossier04/6>
- Jouillié, J-E. & Spillane, R. (2015). *The Philosophical Foundations of Management Thought*. Lanham, US: Lexington Books.
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. *Econometrica*. 47(2): 263–91.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Kaila, E. (1986)[1943]. *Syvähenkinen Elämä. Keskusteluja viimeisistä kysymyksistä*. Kolmas, täydennetty painos. Keuruu: Otava.
- Kaila, E. (1990)[1934]. 'Persoonallisuus', lyhennetty versio teoksessa: *Eino Kaila: Valitut teokset I 1910-35*, Toimittanut ja johdannon kirjoittanut Ilkka Niiniluoto, 561-662. Keuruu: Otava.
- Kakkori, L. (2009). Hermeneutics and Phenomenology Problems When Applying Hermeneutic Phenomenological Method in Educational Qualitative Research. *Paideusis*, 18, 2: 19-27.
- Kantola, A. (2014). *Matala valta*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Keaveney, S. M. (2008). Equines and their human companions. *Journal of Business Research*, 61(5), 444-454.
- Keltikangas-Järvinen, L. (2008). *Temperamentti, stressi ja elämänhallinta*. Kolmas painos. Helsinki: Werner-Söderström.
- Kemp, J. (1968). Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature (Book Review). *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 18, 73: 359-360.
- Kirekegaard, S. (2016) [1844]. *The Concept of Anxiety*. Liveright Publishing.
- Kierkegaard, S. (1962) [1846]. *The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion*. Transl. by Alexander Dru. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Klemola, T. (1998). *Ruumis liikkuu - liikkuuko henki? Fenomenologinen tutkimus liikunnan projekteista (väitöskirja)*. Filosofisia tutkimuksia Tampereen yliopistolta Vol 66. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto.
- Knight, F. H. (2009)[1921]. *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*. Orlando: Signalman.
- Kohanov, L. (2007). *The Tao of Equus*. Novato: New World Library.
- Koikkalainen, P. (2012). Managerialismi ideologiana. *Niin & Näin* 4/2012: 42-50.
- Koikkalainen, P. (2017). Politiikkaa ilman yhteisön kahleita? - Strateginen managerialismi kulttuurisena ideaalituypinä. *Managerialismi & estetiikka & tieto, Niin & Näin* 4/2017:27-40.
- Konings, M. (2015). *The emotional logic of capitalism: what progressives have missed*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kornblith, H. (2017). 'A Naturalistic Methodology', in D'Oro, G. & Overgaard, S. (eds.): *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, 141-160, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kozak, M. N., Marsh, A. A. & Wegner, D. M. (2006). What do I think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.90(4): 543-555.
- Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. *Journal of Personal and Social Psychology*, 77(6):1121-1134.
- Kuhmonen, T. (2010). *Metatheory of Small Business Performance and Entrepreneurship*. Dissertation. Research Report 4. Kuopio: Fin-Auguuri.
- Küpers, W. M. (2013). Embodied inter-practices of leadership - Phenomenological perspectives on relational and responsive leading and following. *Leadership*, 9(3): 335-357.

- Küpers, W. (2014) *Phenomenology for embodied organizations: the contribution of Merleau-Ponty for a carnal organisation studies and practice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Küpers, W. (2015). Emplaced and embodied mobility in organizations. *Ephemera* 15(4): 797-823.
- Kurki, J. (2010). 'Identiteetti ja media: Aistittava, ajateltava ja eletävä', teoksessa *Medua ja identiteetti*, Paul Verhaeghe, Slavoj Žižek, Tere Vadén & Janne Kurki, toim. Janne Kurki, 102-128. Aletheuein 1. Helsinki: Apeiron Kirjat.
- Kyrklund, K. & Lemkov, J. (2013). *Kyra ja ratsastuksen taito: järjestelmällisesti ja johdonmukaisesti*. Suomenkieleinen uudistettu laitos, suomennos Ulla Lindgren Fagerholm. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Kågström, A. (2016). *Takaisin tallille*. Suomentanut Milka Koiranen teoksesta *Tillbaka i stallet* (2015). Tukholma: Werner Söderström.
- Lacan, J. (2014). *Anxiety*. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan/ Book X, [1962-1963]. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Transl. by A. R. Price. Malden: Polity Press.
- Ladkin, D. (2008). Leading beautifully: How mastery, congruence and form create the aesthetic of embodied leadership practice. *Leadership Quarterly* 19(1): 31-41.
- Lagerspetz, K. (1997). Eino Kaila - "Kahden kulttuurin" sillanrakentaja. *Tieteessä Tapahtuu*, 15(7).
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lambrechts, F. J., Bouwen, R., Grieten, S., Huybrechts, J. P., Schein, E. H. (2011). Learning to help through humble inquiry and implications for management research, practice, and education: an interview with Edgar H. Schein. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 10(1): 131-147.
- Lanier, J. (2018). *Ten Arguments For Deleting Your Social Media Accounts Right Now*. UK: Random House.
- Lasch, C. (1984). *The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Lash, S. M. (2018). *Experience: New Foundations for the Human Sciences*. Croydon, UK: Polity Press.
- Latomaa, T., & Suorsa, T. (toim.)(2011). *Kokemuksen tutkimus II: ymmärtävän psykologian syntyhistoriaa ja kehityslinjoja*. Rovaniemi: Lapin yliopistokustannus.
- Law, K. S., Wong, C-S. & Song, L. J. (2004). The Construct and Criterion Validity of Emotional Intelligence and Its Potential Utility for Management Studies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(3): 483-496.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Cognition and Motivation in Emotion. *American Psychologist*, 46(4): 352-367.
- Lazarus, R. S. & Lazarus, B. N. (1994). *Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Lazarus, R. S. (1999). *Stress and emotion: a new synthesis*. London: Springer.
- Lazzarato, M. (2009). Neoliberalism in action: Inequality, insecurity, and the reconstitution of the social. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(6): 109-133.
- Lazzarato, M. (2012). *The making of the indebted man. An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition*. Transl. by Joshua David Jordan. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
- Leblanc, M-A. (2013). *The Mind of the Horse: An introduction to equine cognition*. Transl. by Giselle Weiss. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Lehtinen, T. (2008). *Søren Kierkegaard: Intohimon, ahdistuksen ja huumorin filosofi*. Juva: Arktinen Banaani.
- Leino, P. (2018). 'Keppihevosompelimo hukkuu tilauksiin'. Yle Radio Suomen haastattelu 29.6.2018, <https://areena.yle.fi/1-4448754>
- Leinonen, R-M. (2005). *Hevojen ja ihmisen kumppanuus sota-aikana*. Hevostietokeskus:  
<http://www.hevostietokeskus.fi/uploads/files/Artikkeli1.pdf>
- Leinonen, R-M. (2013). *Palvelijasta terapeutiksi – Ihmisen ja hevosen suhteen muuttuvat kulttuuriset mallit Suomessa*. Acta Universitatis Ouluensis. Series B, Humaniora 115. <http://jultika.oulu.fi/Record/isbn978-952-62-0183-2>
- Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64: 354-361.
- Lewis, P. & Simpson, R. (eds.) (2007). *Gendering Emotions in Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lindebaum, D. (2017). *Emancipation Through Emotion Regulation at Work*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Lindebaum, D. Geddes, D. & Jordan, P. J. (eds.) (2018). *Social Functions of Emotion and Talking About Emotion at Work*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Liukas, L. (2019). 'Linda Liukkaan kolumni: Tulevaisuus on teinityttöjen' Yle Internet kolumni, luettu 23.1.2019, <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10600977>
- Lohmar, D. (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 5, 5-16.
- Lohmar, D. (2016). 'Non-Linguistic Thinking and Communication – Its Semantics and Some Applications', in Breyer, T. & Gutland, C. (eds.): *Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences*, 165--182. New York: Routledge.
- Lordon, F. (2014). *Willing Slaves of Capital*. Translated by Gabriel Ash from *Capitalisme, desir et servitude* (2010). Croydon, UK: Verso.
- Lorey, I. (2015). *State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious*. Trans. by Aileen Derieg from *Die Regierung der Prekären* (2012). London: Verso.
- Lunde, C. & Gattario Holmqvist, K. (2017). Performance or appearance? Young female sport participants' body negotiations. *Body Image*, 21, 81-89.
- Lynch, J. J., Fregin, G. F., Mackie, J. B. & Monroe Jr., R. R. (1974). Heart Rate Changes in the Horse to Human Contact. *Psychophysiology*, 11(4): 472-478.
- Lyons, D. (2019). *Lab Rats: Why Modern Work Makes People Miserable*. London: Atlantic Books.
- Liotard, J-F. (2015)[1974]. *Libidinal Economy*. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant. Chennai, India :Bloomsbury.



- Mack, K. (2013). Taking an aesthetic risk in management education: Reflections on an artistic- aesthetic approach. *Management Learning* 44 (3): 286–304.
- Maclaren, K. (2011). Emotional Clichés and Authentic Passions: a Phenomenological Revision of a Cognitive Theory of Emotion. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 10: 45-65.
- Maddi, S. R. (2004). Hardiness: An operationalization of existential courage. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 44: 279–298.
- Maravelias, C. (2009). 'Freedom, opportunism and entrepreneurialism in post-bureaucratic organizations'. In Hjorth, D. & Steyaert, C. (eds). *The Politics and Aesthetics of Entrepreneurship*, 13–30. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Marcuse, H. (2002)[1964]. *One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (1991). Croydon, UK: Routledge.
- Marshall, A. J., Ashleigh, M. J., Baden, D., Ojiako, U. & Guidi, M. G. D. (2015). Corporate Psychopathy: Can 'Search and Destroy' and 'Hearts and Minds' Military Metaphors Inspire HRM Solutions? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 128:495–504.
- Massumi, B. (2015). *Politics of Affect*. Croydon, UK: Polity.
- Matthews, G., Zeidner, M. & Roberts, R. D. (2002). *Emotional Intelligence: Science and Myth*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1987) *The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Maukola, R. (2016). "Tunneammattilaiset yhteistyössä" *Teatteri & Tanssi*, 5/2016.
- Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (2016). The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence: Principles and Updates. *Emotion Review*, 8(4): 290–300. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916639667>
- McCann, L. (2017). 'Killing is our business and business is good': The evolution of 'war managerialism' from body counts to counterinsurgency. *Organization*, 24 (4), 491–515.
- McGowan, T. (2016). *Capitalism and Desire. The Psychic Cost of Free markets*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52: 81–90.
- Meiksins Wood, E. (2017). *The Origin of Capitalism. A Longer View*. First published by Monthly Review Press (1999). London: Verso.
- Mejdell, C. M., Buvik, T., Jørgensen; G. H. M. & Bøe, K. E. (2016). Horses can learn to use symbols to communicate their preferences. *Applied Animal Behaviour Science*, 184, 66-73.
- Mele, A. (2014). *Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mendaglio, S. (ed.) (2008). *Dąbrowski's Theory of Positive Disintegration*. Scottsdale AZ: Great Potential Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002)[1945]. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Trans. by Colin Smith from *Phénoménologie de la Perception* [1945]. London: Routledge.

- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964) *Signs*. Trans. from *Signes* (1960) by Librairie Gallimatd, Paris. US: Northwestern University Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). *Filosofisia kirjoituksia*. Toimittaneet ja suomentaneet Miika Luoto ja Tarja Roinila. Toinen painos. Keuruu: Nemo.
- Merrifield, A. (2017). *The Amateur: The Pleasures of Doing What You Love*. Croydon, UK: Verso.
- Meyer, C., Streeck, J. & Jordan, J. S. (eds.) (2017). *Intercorporeality: Emerging Socialities in Interaction*. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Michalak, R. T. & Ashkanasy, N. M. (2018). Working with monsters: counting the costs of workplace psychopaths and other toxic employees. *Accounting & Finance*, 05/18/2018, 1-42.
- Midgley, M. (1983). *Animals and Why They Matter*. US: University of Georgia Press.
- Midgley, M. (2002). *Evolution as a Religion: Strange hopes and stranger fears*. Revised edition. Norfolk, UK: Routledge Classics.
- Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008). *Governing the Present. Administering Economic, Social and Personal life*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Mills, C. W. (2000)[1959]. *The Sociological Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miettinen, T. (2010). 'Fenomenologia ja sosiaalisen todellisuuden rakentuminen', teoksessa: Miettinen, T., Pulkkinen, S., & Taipale, J. (toim.) *Fenomenologian ydinkysymyksiä*, 151-167. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Miettinen, T., Pulkkinen, S., & Taipale, J. (2010). (toim.) *Fenomenologian ydinkysymyksiä*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Mitchell, J. (2000)[1974]. *Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis*. New Edition, With a New Introduction by the Author. New York: Basic Books.
- Monk, R. (1990). *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty Of Genius*. NY: Penguin Books.
- Morgan, G. (1980). Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25, 4: 605-622.
- Morgan, G. (2006)[1986]. *Images of Organization*. 3<sup>rd</sup> updated edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Morgan, G. (2016). Commentary: Beyond Morgan's eight metaphors. *Human Relations*, 9(4): 1029 -1042.
- Mouffe, C. (2013). *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically*. Croydon: Verso
- Mumby, D. K. & Putnam, L. (1992). The politics of emotion: A feminist reading of bounded rationality. *Academy of Management Review*. 17(3): 465-486.
- Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? *The Philosophical Review* LXXXIII, 4: 435-50.
- Nagel, T. (2012). *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nario-Galace, J. (2014). 'Women's Agency against Guns.' In, I. Geuskens, M. Gosewinkel & S. Schellens (eds.): *Gender and Militarism. Analyzing the Links to Strategize for Peace*. The Hague: Women Peacemakers Program.

- Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G. (1982). *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G. (2002). Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16, 2: 23-46.
- Nelson, D. (2017). *Tough Enough: Arbus, Arendt, Didion, McCarthy, Sontag, Weil*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- NEON et al. (2018). 'Framing the Economy: How to win the case for a better system'. Project report by New Economy Organisers' Network (NEON), the New Economics Foundation (NEF), the Frameworks Institute and the Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC), February 15th 2018, NEF publications, online: <http://neweconomics.org/2018/02/raming-the-economy-2/>
- Neyland, D. (2015). On organizing algorithms. *Theory, Culture & Society* 32(1): 119-132.
- Niemi-Kaija, K. (2014). *Kokemuksellisuus työelämässä organisaatioestetiikan viitekehyksessä: Työntekijöiden subjektiiviset konstruktiot tehokkuudesta*. Väitöskirja, Jyväskylän Yliopiston Kauppakorkeakoulu. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä University Printing House.
- Nietzsche, F. (2004)[1878]. *Human, All Too Human*. First published by Ernest Schmeitzner (1878). Translated by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. Reprint. London: Penguin Books.
- Nietzsche, F. (2012)[1883]. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A book for Everyone and for No One*. Translated by Thomas Common. New York: Sterling publishing.
- Niiniluoto, I. (1986). 'Ajatuksen levottomuus: Eino Kailan syvähenkinen filosofia.' Johdatus Eino Kailan teokseen *Syvähenkinen Elämä. Keskusteluja viimeisistä kysymyksistä [1943]*, 9-33. Keuruu: Otava.
- Nikkola, T. & Harni, E. (2015). Sisäistyneet ristiriidat, tunnettyö ja tietotyöläissubjektiviteetin muodostuminen. *Aikuiskasvatus* 35 (4): 244-253.
- North, H. F. (1948). The Concept of Sophrosyne in Greek Literary Criticism. *Classical Philology*, 43, 1: 1-17.
- North, H. F. (1966). *Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Nummenmaa, L., Glerean, E., Hari, R. & Hietanen, J. K. (2014). Bodily maps of emotions. *PNAS* January 14, 2014 111 (2): 646-651.
- Nussbaum, M. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2003). Capabilities as fundamental entitlements: Sen and social justice. *Feminist Economics*, 9(2-3): 33-59.
- Nussbaum, M. (2010). *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ogbor, J. (2000). Mythicizing and reification in entrepreneurial discourse: ideology-critique of entrepreneurial studies. *Journal of Management Studies*, 37(5):605-635.
- Oksala, J. (2005). 'Feministinen filosofia nykyisyyden ontologiana', teoksessa *Feministinen filosofia*, 156-173, toim. Oksala, J. & Werner, L. Tampere: Gaudeamus.

- Oksala, J. (2016). *Feminist Experiences: Foucauldian and Phenomenological investigations*. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. USA: Northwestern University Press.
- Oksala, J. & Werner, L. (toim.) (2005). *Feministinen filosofia*. Tampere: Gaudeamus.
- Ortmann, G. & Sydow, J. (2018). Dancing in chains: Creative practices in/of organizations. *Organization Studies*, 39(7): 899-921.
- Overgaard, S. & D'Oro, G. (2017). 'Introduction', in D'Oro, G. & Overgaard, S. (eds.): *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, 1-9, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Oyewunmi, A. E., Akinnusi, D. M. & Oyewunmi, O. A. (2018). Of Predators and Preys: Corporate Psychopathy and Employee Burnout as Parallels. *Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences*, 26(2): 149-156.
- Pallasmaa, J. (2009). *The Thinking Hand: Existential and Embodied Wisdom in Architecture*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons.
- Parisi, L. & Terranova, T. (2001)- A matter of affect: Digital images and the cybernetic re-wiring of vision. *Parallax* 7(4): 122-127.
- Parker, M. (2018). *Shut Down the Business School: What's Wrong with Management Education*. London: Pluto Press.
- Partanen, M-M. (2018a). 'Tyttöjen suosikkilajissa huolestuttiin: Ponien tenho ei enää pure - nuorten ratsastajien määrä kääntyi laskuun' HS/Urheilu\_3/3/2018: <https://www.hs.fi/urheilu/art-2000005589577.html>
- Partanen, M-M. (2018b). 'Ruotsissa ratsastustunnit maksavat jopa puolet vähemmän kuin Suomessa - Miksi ratsastus on meillä niin kallis harrastus?' HS/Urheilu 11/3/2018: <https://www.hs.fi/urheilu/art-2000005599513.html>
- Parviainen, J., Kinnunen, T. & Kortelainen, I. (2016). *Ruumiillisuus ja työelämä: Työruumis jälkiteollisessa taloudessa*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Pearl, J. L. (2018). Popitz's Imaginative Variation on Power as Model for Critical Phenomenology. *Human Studies*, published online 6th June 2018: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-018-9470-z>
- Peltonen, T. (2016). *Organization Theory: Critical and Philosophical Engagements*. Critical Management Studies Series. UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A. & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. *Cognitive Psychology*, 80, 34-72.
- Peredo, A. M., & Chrisman, J. J. (2006). Toward a theory of community-based enterprise. *Academy of Management Review*, 31 (2): 309-328.
- Perttula, J. & Latomaa, T. (toim.) (2008). *Kokemuksen tutkimus. Merkitys - tulkinta - ymmärtäminen*. 3. painos. Tampere: Lapin yliopistokustannus.
- Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J-M. (eds.) (1999). *Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
- Pippin, R. B. (2009). Natural and normative. *Daedalus* 138(3): 35-43.

- Pirson, M. (2017). *Humanistic Management: Protecting Dignity - Promoting Well Being*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pirson, M. & Steckler, E. (2019). A Humanistic Ontology for Responsible Management. *Humanistic Management eJournal*, 7, 1: 1-33.
- Plato (1993) [c. 370 BC] *Republic*. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford World Classics. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Plato. (1993). *Phaedo*. Translated with an introduction and notes by David Gallop. Oxford World's Classics. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Plato (2002) [c. 370 BC]. *Phaedrus*. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford World's Classics. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Pohl, R. F. (ed). (2004). *Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgment and memory*. NY: Psychology Press.
- Pojman, L. P. (2006). *Who Are We? Theories of Human Nature*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Popitz, H. (2017)[1992]. *Phenomena of power: authority, domination, and violence*. Trans. from *Phanomene der Macht* (1992) by Gianfranco Poggi, edited by Andreas Göttlich ad Jochen Dreher. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Porter, S., ten Brinke, L., Baker, A., & Wallace, B. (2011). Would I lie to you?“Leakage” in deceptive facial expressions relates to psychopathy and emotional intelligence. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 51(2), 133-137.
- Pullen, A., & Rhodes, C. (2015). Ethics, embodiment and organizations. *Organization*, 22(2), 159-165.
- Purser, R. E. (2019). *McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became the New Capitalist Spirituality*. Repeater Books.
- Randle, H. & Waran, N. (2017). Breaking down barriers and dispelling myths: The need for a scientific approach to Equitation. *Applied Animal Behaviour Science*, 190:1-4.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2005). The Feeling of Being. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 12, 8-10, 43-60.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2008). *Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2009). “Phenomenology, neuroscience and intersubjectivity”. In H. Dreyfus and M. A. Wrathall (toim.): *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 329-345. Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2011). Phenomenology Is Not a Servant of Science. *Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology: PPP*. Baltimore, 18, 1:33-36.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2012). Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy. *Inquiry*, 55,5:473-495.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2015). *Experiences of Depression. A Study in Phenomenology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raufflet, E. & Mills, A. J. (2009). *Dark Side: Critical Cases on the Downside of Business*. 1st edition. Sheffield, UK: Routledge Greenleaf Publishing..
- Rauhala, E. (2018). Kuinka inhimillisiä tietokoneet ovat? *Tieteessä Tapahtuu*, 36(1). Noudettu osoitteesta <https://journal.fi/tt/article/view/69275>
- Rauhala, L. (2005). *Ihmiskäsitys ihmistyössä*. Ensimmäinen julkaisu (1983) Gaudeamus. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

- Raworth, K. (2017). *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-century Economist*. New York: Random House.
- Rees, Amanda. (2018). 'Animal agents'. Essay on Biology edited by Marina Benjamin. Aeon newsletter published and retrieved 26/February/2018, online: <https://aeon.co/essays/can-animals-shape-their-own-lives-or-the-course-of-history>
- Revonsuo, A. (2010). *Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Reynolds, J. & Stokes, P. (2017). 'Existentialist Methodology and Perspective. Writing the First Person.' in D'Oro, G. & Overgaard, S. (eds.): *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, 317-336, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Robbins, P. & Aydede, M. (eds.)(2009). *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N. and P. Miller (2008) *Governing the present: Administering economic, social and personal life*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Rose, N. & Abi-Rached, J. M. (2013). *Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind*. US: Princeton University Press.
- Ross, N. (ed.)(2015). *The Aesthetic Ground of Critical Theory: New Readings of Benjamin and Adorno*. US: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Rossi, P. & Lundvall, P. (2018). 'Kehollisesta kokemisesta kohti sanallistettuja kokemuksia: hevoset reflektoinnin mahdollistajina'. Teoksessa *Kokemuksen tutkimus VI : kokemuksen käsite ja käyttö*, Toikkanen Jarkko ja Virtanen, Ira A. (toim.), 191-208. Rovaniemi: Lapland University Press.
- Roudinesco, E. (2001). *Why Psychoanalysis?* Translated by Rachel Bowlby from *Porquoi la psychoanalyse?* (1999). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Roy, J-M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B. & Varela, F.J. (1999). 'Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology', in *Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science*, 1-80, edited by Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J-M. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ruonakoski, E. (2011). *Eläimen tuttuus ja vieraus. Fenomenologisen empatiateorian uudelleentulkinta ja sen sovellus vieraslajisia eläimiä koskevaan kokemukseen*. Episteme. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto.
- Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions. *Contemporary Educational Psychology*, 25, 54-67.
- Rütgen, M., Pletti, C., Tik, M., Kraus, C., Pfabigan, D. M., Sladky, R., Klöbl, M., Woletz, M., Vanicek, T., Windischberger, C., Lanzenberger, R. & Lamm, C. (2019). Antidepressant treatment, not depression, leads to reductions in behavioral and neural responses to pain empathy. *Translational Psychiatry*, 9 (164). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41398-019-0496-4>
- Saari, A. & Harni, E. (2015). Kyyhky ja opetuskone: inhimillisen ja ei-inhimillisen yhteenliittymiä B.F. Skinnerin behaviorismissa. *Kasvatus & Aika*, 1/2015, 41-55.

- Saarikoski, P. 1985 [1960]. 'Sokrates ja Ksenofon'. Ksenofonin teoksessa *Sokrates: Muistelmia, Pidot ja Sokrateen puolustuspuhe*, 213-231, suomentanut ja selityksillä varustanut Pentti Saarikoski. Keuruu: Otava.
- Saariluoma, P. (1985). *Psykologian Historia: Kreikkalainen kausi*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Saariluoma, P. (1990). *Taitavan ajattelun psykologia*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Saariluoma, P. (1997). *Foundational Analysis: Presuppositions in Experimental Psychology*. Routledge Progress in Psychology. Routledge.
- Saariluoma, P., Kamppinen, M. & Hautamäki, A. (toim). (2001). *Moderni Kognitiotiede*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Saariluoma, P. (2002). *Ajattelu työelämässä*. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Saariluoma, P., Cañas, J. J. & Leikas, J. (2016). *Designing for Life: A Human Perspective on Technology Development*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saarinen, E. (2008). Philosophy for Managers: Reflections of a Practitioner. *Philosophy of Management* 7, Supplement 2008.
- Saarinen, J. A. (2015). *A Conceptual Analysis of The Oceanic Feeling: With a Special Note on the Painterly Aesthetics*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä University Printing House, University of Jyväskylä.
- Saarinen, J. A. (2018). A critical examination of existential feeling. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*. 17(2): 363-374.
- Salamon, G. (2018). What's Critical about Critical Phenomenology? *Puncta: Journal of Critical Phenomenology*, 1(1): 8-17.
- Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional Intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, 9(3):185-211. <https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG>
- Sapolsky, R. M. (2017). *Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst*. UK: Bodley Head.
- Sartre, J-P. (2001)[1943]. *Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*. Translation and introduction by Hazel E. Barnes. Special abridged edition. New York: Kensington Publishing Corp.
- Schelling, F. W. J. (1936/1986). *Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom*. Translation with critical introduction and notes by James Gutmann, from *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* [1809]. 2nd paperback reprint. Chicago: Open Court Classics.
- Schopenhauer, A. (2010). *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. transl. D. Cartwright & E. E. Erdmann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schopenhauer, A. (1991). *Pessimistin Elämänviisaus: Valittuja lukuja Schopenhauerin teoksista*. Viides painos, suom. Sirkka Salomaa. WSOY:Juva.
- Schumacher, E. F. (2011)[1973]. *Small is Beautiful. A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*. Vintage Books: London.
- Schumacher, E. F. (2004)[1977]. *A Guide for the Perplexed*. Reprint. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (2012)[1934/1911]. *The Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle*. Reprint,

- 16th printing, translated by Redvers Opie from *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (1911). New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (2008)[1942]. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Reprint from the 3rd edition (1950). New York: Harper Perennial.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (2007)[1948]. 'Science and Ideology', in *The philosophy of economics: An anthology*, 207-221. 3rd ed. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Schütz, A. (2007) [1932]. *Sosiaalisen maailman merkitykseks rakentuminen: Johdatus ymmärtävään sosiologiaan*. Introduction and translation in Finnish by Veikko Pietilä, from *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie* (1932). Jyväskylä: Vastapaino.
- Searle, J. (1983). *Intentionality, an essay in the philosophy of mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J. R. (2001). *The rationality of action*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sen, A. K. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4): 317-344.
- Sen, A. K. (2001). *Development as Freedom*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Sennett, R. (1998). *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. New York: Norton.
- Senior, C., Lee, N. & Butler, M. (2011). Organizational Cognitive Neuroscience *Organization Science*, 22, 3, May–June 2011, 804–815.
- Shabot, S. C. & Landry, C. (eds.)(2018). *Rethinking Feminist Phenomenology: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Shettleworth, S. J. (2012). 'Animal cognition'. In *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*, 292-311, edited by Frankish, K. & Ramsey, W. M. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shilling, C. (2017). Body pedagogics: Embodiment, cognition and cultural transmission. *Sociology*, 51(6): 1205-1221.
- Shotter, J. (2005). Inside the moment of managing: Wittgenstein and the everyday dynamics of our expressive – responsive activities. *Organization Studies* 26(1): 113-135.
- Simon, H. A. (1957). 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', in *Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting*. New York: Wiley.
- Simon, H. A. (1996). *The Sciences of the Artificial*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Slaby, J., Paskaleva, A. & Stephan, A. (2013). Enactive Emotion and Impaired Agency in Depression. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 20, 7–8: 33-55.
- Slaby, J., & Wueschner, P. (2014), Emotion and Agency. In: Todd, C., & Roeser, S., (eds.), *Emotion and Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 212-228.
- Slaby, J., & Gallagher, S. (2015). Critical Neuroscience and Socially Extended Minds. *Theory, Culture and Society* 32(1), 33-59.
- Slaby, J. (2016). Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 7, 2016, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00266.
- Slaby, J. (2017). More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical Situatedness. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 41(1), 7-26.
- Slaby, J. & Choudhury, S. (2018). Proposal for a Critical Neuroscience. In: Meloni, M, Crombie, J, D. Fitzgerald, & Lloyd, S. (eds.). *The Palgrave*



- Handbook of Biology and Society*, pp. 341-370. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Slaby, J. & von Scheve, C. (2019). 'Introduction: Affective Societies - Key Concepts.' In *Affective Societies: Key concepts*, edited by Jan Slaby and Christian von Scheve, 1-24. Routledge Studies in Affective Societies. UK: Routledge.
- Slaby, J. (2019). 'Relational Affect: Perspectives from Philosophy and Cultural Studies.' In *How to Do Things with Affects? Affective Triggers in Aesthetic Forms and Cultural Practices*, edited by Ernst van Alphen and Tomáš Jirsa. pp. 58-80. Netherlands: Brill/Rodopi.
- Slatman, J. (2014). *Our Strange Body: Philosophical reflections on Identity and medical Interventions*. Translation by Ton Brouwers from 'Vreem Lichaam: over medisch ingrijpen en persoonlijke identiteit' (2008). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University press.
- Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Rules for the Human Zoo: A response to the Letter on Humanism. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27: 12-28.
- Smith, J.A., Flowers, P. & Larkin, M. (2009). *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*. London: Sage.
- Smith, N. (2010). *Towards a Phenomenology of Repression – A Husserlian Reply to the Freudian Challenge*. Doctoral Thesis in Theoretical Philosophy. Stockholm Studies in Philosophy 34. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm University.
- Smith, P. B. & Max-Neef, M. (2011). *Economics Unmasked: From Power and Greed to Compassion and the Common Good*. Totnes: Green Books.
- Spicer, A. (2018). *Business Bullshit*. UK: Routledge.
- Spitzeck, H., Pirson, M., Amann, W., Khan, S. & von Kimakowitz, E. (2009). *Humanism in Business*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spoelstra, S. (2018). *Leadership and Organization: A Philosophical Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Stahel, W. R. (2016). Circular economy. *Nature*, 531, 435-438.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2004). *The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin*. Chigago: The Universty of Chigago Press.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2009). *What Intelligence Tests Miss: The Psychology of Rational Thought*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2011). *Rationality & the Reflective Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2012). Book review: Environments for Fast and Slow Thinking. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 16(4), 198-9.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice. *Thinking & Reasoning*, 19,1, 1-26.
- Stanovich, K. E. (2015). Meta-Rationality in Cognitive Science. *Journal of Marketing Behavior*, 2015, 1: 147-156.

- Steen, F. (2006). 'A Cognitive Account of Aesthetics.', in *The Artful Mind: Cognitive Science and the Riddle of Human Creativity*, edited by Mark Turner, 57-71. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stein, E. (1989)[1917]. *On the Problem of Empathy*. The Collected works of Edith Stein. 3rd revised edition, translated by Waltraut Stein. Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications.
- Steinbock, A. J. (2014). *Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart*. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- Steinbock, A. J. (2018). 'Pride as Self-Dissimulation and Refusal of the World.' In *Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance*, edited by John J. Drummond and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, pp. 53-71. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Sternberg, R. J. (2002). 'Smart People Are Not Stupid, But They Sure Can Be Foolish: The Imbalance Theory Of Foolishness.' In *Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid*, 232-242, edited by Robert J. Sternberg. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Swart, S. (2007). "But Where's the Bloody Horse?": Textuality and Corporeality in the "Animal Turn". *Journal of Literary Studies*, 23:3, 271-292.
- Solomon, S., Greenberg, J. & Pyszczynski, T. (2015). *The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life*. New York: Random House.
- Sørensen, B. M. (2008). 'Behold, I am making all things new': The Entrepreneur as Saviour in the Age of Creativity'. *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 24(2):85-93.
- Strati A. (1999). *Organization and Aesthetics*. London: Sage.
- Szanto, T. & Moran, D. (eds.)(2016). *Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the 'We'*. Routledge Research in Phenomenology: New York: Routledge.
- Szanto, T. (2018). In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, pp. 1-28, article online <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9604-9>
- Taipale, J. (2014). *Phenomenology and Embodiment: Husserl and the Constitution of Subjectivity*. US: Northwestern University Press.
- Taipale, J. (2014b). 'The Bodily Feeling of Existence in Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis', in *Phenomenology and the Transcendental*, 218-234, edited by Sara Heinänaa, Mirja Hartimo ja Timo Miettinen. London: Routledge.
- Taipale, J. (2018). The Unseen, the Discouraged, and the Outcast: Expressivity and the Foundations of Social Recognition. *SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy*, 19 (1), 21-39.
- Takala, T. (2004). *Liikkeenjohdon kehityshistoria*. Toinen tarkastettu painos. Saarijärvi: Gummerrus.
- Taylor, S. (2002). Overcoming aesthetic muteness: Researching organizational members' aesthetic experience. *Human Relations*, 55, 7: 821-840.
- Taylor, W. F. (1914)[1911]. *Tieteellisen liikkeenhoidon periaatteet*. Suomentanut Jalmari Kekkonen teoksesta *The Principles of Scientific Management (1911)*. Hämeenlinna: Karisto.

- Tedmanson, D., Verduijn, K., Essers, C. & Gartner, W.B. (2012). Critical perspectives in entrepreneurship research. *Organization*, 19(5):531-541.
- Tervahauta, U. (2009). 'Johdanto', Ksenofonin teokseen *Talouden taito* [c. 362 B.C], 9-45, Tampere: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press.
- Thaler, R. H. & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Yale University Press.
- Thatcher, M. (1981). 'Economics are the method: the object is to change the soul' Margaret Thatcher Interview for *Sunday Times* by Ronald Butt, 1981 May 1<sup>st</sup>, online archive: <https://www.margareththatcher.org/document/104475>
- Thøgersen, U. (2014). The Embodied Emotionality of Everyday Work Life: Merleau-Ponty and the Emotional Atmosphere of Our Existence *Philosophy of Management*, 13(2):19-31.
- Thompson, M. G. (2017). *The Death of Desire: An existential study in sanity and madness*. Second edition [1985]. Cornwall: Routledge.
- Thomson, E. (2010). *Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Thrift, N. (2011). Lifeworld Inc - and what to do about it. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 29(1): 5-26.
- Tillier, W. (2008). 'Philosophical Aspects of Dąbrowski's Theory of Positive Disintegration'. In S. Mendaglio (ed.). *Dąbrowski's Theory of Positive Disintegration*, pp. 101-121. Scottsdale AZ: Great Potential Press.
- Toikkanen, J. & Virtanen, I., A. (toim.) (2018). *Kokemuksen tutkimus VI : kokemuksen käsite ja käyttö*. Rovaniemi: Lapland University Press.
- Tomperi, T. (2017). Kriittisen ajattelun opettaminen ja filosofia. Pedagogisia perusteita. Managerialismi & estetiikka & tieto, *Niin & Näin* 4/2017: 95-112.
- Toplak, M. E., West, R. F. & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Rational Thinking and Cognitive Sophistication: Development, Cognitive Abilities, and Thinking Dispositions. *Developmental Psychology*, 50(4): 1037-1048.
- Tsoukas, H. & Chia, R. (2011). *Philosophy and Organization Theory*. Research in the Sociology of Organizations vol. 32, Emerald Group Publishing, ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Turkle, S. (2018). 'There Will Never Be an Age of Artificial Intimacy', *The New York Times*, The Big Ideas, Opinion, online article, August/11th/2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/opinion/there-will-never-be-an-age-of-artificial-intimacy.html>
- Turner, M. (ed.) (2006). *The Artful Mind: Cognitive Science and the Riddle of Human Creativity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tökkäri, V. (2015) (toim.). *Kokemuksen tutkimus V: Lauri Rauhala 100 vuotta*. Rovaniemi: Lapin yliopistokustannus.
- Vaill, P. B. (1989). *Managing as a Performing Art: New Ideas for a World of Chaotic Change*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Van Manen, M. (2014). *Phenomenology of Practice: Meaning-giving methods in phenomenological research and writing*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press

- Vapriikki (2018). "Haurasta, kaunista ja koskettavaa – sanattomasti suoraan iholle", s.5, Museokeskus Vapriikki Tampere, Issuu online (Jan 3, 2018) [https://issuu.com/vapriikki/docs/vapaalla\\_kevat2018\\_netiversio](https://issuu.com/vapriikki/docs/vapaalla_kevat2018_netiversio)
- Varela, F. J. (1996). "Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem". *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 3, 4: 330-349.
- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2016). *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. Revised edition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Verhaeghe, P. (2004). *On Bring Normal and Other Disorders: A Manual for Clinical Psychodiagnosics*. Translated by Sigi Jottkandt. New York: Other Press.
- Verhaeghe, P. (2010). 'Identiteetti etsimässä peiliä', teoksessa *Medua ja identiteetti*, Paul Verhaeghe, Slavoj Žižek, Tere Vadén & Janne Kurki, toim. Janne Kurki, 10-57. Aletheuein 1. Helsinki: Apeiron Kirjat.
- Verhaeghe, P. (2014). *What About Me? The Struggle for Identity in a Market-based Society*. Salisbury South, Australia: Scribe.
- Verhaeghe, P. & Declercq, F. (2002). Lacan's analytical goal: "Le Sinthome" or the feminine way. In: L.Thurston (ed.), *Essays on the final Lacan. Re-inventing the symptom*. New York: The Other Press, pp. 59- 83. Retrieved from <http://www.paulverhaeghe.com/>
- Vernon, M. (2017). Rediscovering Plato's Vision. *Philosophy Now*, October/November 2017: 6-8.
- Vilhunen, S. (2017). "*Hobbyhorse Revolution*". Documentary film directed by Selma Vilhunen, Tutti Films production. Retrieved online from <https://arena.yle.fi/1-3749975> (April 3rd, 2018).
- Viren, E. (2018). *Raha ja Työvoima. Tutkimus rahasta yhteiskunnallisena suhteena, sen voimasta ja vaikutuksista työvoiman luokkakokoonpanoon*. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto.
- Vohs, K. D & Baumeister, R. F. (eds.) (2011). *The Handbook of Self-Regulation: Research, Theory and Applications*. 2nd edit. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Voionmaa, V. (1924). *Kaupun historian pääpiirteet*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Waring, M. (1988). *If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics*. Harper & Row.
- Warren, de, N. (2018). '7. Nicolas de Warren', in *Phenomenology: Five Questions*, 57-65, edited by Felipe Léon and Joonas Taipale. US/UK: Automatic Press.
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. *Psychological Review* 20: 158-177.
- Weick, K. E. (1995). *Sensemaking in organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Weick, K. E. (2007). The Generative Properties of Richness. *Academy of Management Journal* 50 (1):14-19.
- Weick, K. E. (1999). "That's Moving: Theories that matter." *Journal of Management Inquiry* 8 (2): 134-142.
- Weick, K. E. & Sutcliffe, K. (2001). *Managing the unexpected: Sustained Performance in a Complex World*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Weiskopf, R. & Steyaert, C. (2009). 'Metamorphoses in entrepreneurship studies: towards affirmative politics of entrepreneuring', in *The Politics and*

- Aesthetics of Entrepreneurship*, 183-201, edited by Daniel Hjorth and Chris Steyaert, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Werner, L. (2005). 'Johdanto: Feministinen filosofia likaisena ajatteluna', teoksessa *Feministinen filosofia*, 11-24, toim. Oksala, J. & Werner, L. Tampere: Gaudeamus.
- Whitehead, M., Jones, R., Lilley, R., Pykett, J. & Howell, R. (2018). *Neoliberalism: Behavioural Government in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Routledge.
- World Health Organization (WHO). (2017). 'Depression: "let's talk" says WHO, as depression tops list of causes of ill health'. News release 30<sup>th</sup> March 2017, Geneva: <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2017/world-health-day/en/>
- Williams, C. C. (2017) Tackling employment in the informal economy: A critical evaluation of the neoliberal policy approach. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 38(1):145 -169.
- Williams, J & Tabor, G. (2017). Rider impacts on equitation. *Applied Animal Behaviour Science*, 190: 28-42.
- Willmott, H. (2017). "The Personal and the Political at the Heart of Critical Scholarship", Keynote lecture at the International Doctoral Consortium 2017 (IDC7), University of Jyväskylä, Finland, June 12-14, 2017.
- Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*. 9 (4): 625-636.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1984)[1921]. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus eli Loogis-filosofinen tutkielma (Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, 1921)*. Suom. Heikki Nyman (1971), kolmas tarkastettu painos. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1972)[1969]. *On Certainty*. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. Wright. Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Xenofon (Ksenofon). (1985)[1960]. *Sokrates: Muistelmia, Pidot ja Sokrateen puolustuspuhe*. Suom. Pentti Saarikoski. Keuruu: Otava.
- Xenophon (2006) [c.350 BC] *The Art of Horsemanship*. Edited and Translated by Morris H. Morgan. US: Dover Publications.
- Xenophon (Ksenofon). (2009) [c. 362 B.C]. *Talouden taito [Oeconomicus]*. Suom. Ulla Tervahauta. Tampere: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press.
- Yue, A. R. & Mills, A. (2006). Making Sense out of Bad Faith: Sartre, Weick and Existential Sensemaking in Organizational Analysis. *Tamara*, 7:67-82.
- Zacheus, T. (2010). Liikuntaan ja urheiluun liittyvät merkitykset suomalaisten elämän aikana. *Kasvatus & Aika*, 4 (2): 55-68.
- Zahavi, D. (2004). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 3: 331-347.
- Zahavi, D. (2009). 'Philosophy, Psychology, Phenomenology'. In S. Heinämaa and M. Reuter (eds.), *Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*, 247-262. Dordrecht: Springer.

- Zahavi, D. (2014). *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame*. Croydon, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Zahavi, D. (2018). 'Embodied Communities', a conference talk in Time, the Body and the Other: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches, International Conference in Heidelberg September 13th-15th 2018. Online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqWH6Isr-Jw&feature=youtu.be>
- Zahavi, D. (2019a). *Phenomenology: The Basics*. London: Routledge.
- Zahavi, D. (2019b). Getting it quite wrong: van Manen and Smith on phenomenology. *Qualitative Health Research*, 29(6): 900-907.
- Zanoni, P., Contu, A., Healy, S. & Mir, R. (2017). Post-capitalistic politics in the making: The imaginary and praxis of alternative economies. *Organization* 24(5): 575-588.
- Ziegler, R. & Weger, U. (2018). Exploring conceptual thinking and pure concepts from a first person perspective. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, pp 1-26, online first <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9593-8>
- Zietsma, C., Toubiana, M., Voronov, M. & Roberts, A. (2019). *Emotions in Organization Theory*. Cambridge Elements in Organization Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Žižek, S. (2008). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. US: Verso.
- Žižek, S. (2018) 'Cambridge Analytica didn't abuse the happiness industry - it was used exactly how it was intended to be', *Independent*, 27/ March/2018/ article online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/cambridge-analytica-facebook-happiness-industry-didnt-misuse-it-a8275961.html>
- Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. *Journal of Information Technology* 30(1): 75-89.
- Örtenblad, A., Putnam, L. L. & Trehan, K (2016). Beyond Morgan's eight metaphors: Adding to and developing organization theory. *Human Relations*, 69(4): 875 -889.