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EDITORIAL

THE MODES OF POLITICAL THEORY

Political theory" is an ambiguous notion. At least in the contemporary academia, it refers to at least two distinguishible modes of activity. By doing political theory, we may try to formulate our own conception of political activity, or a good or just *polis*. Lacking a better term, I call this activity as "normative." Or then, we may study the conceptions of the others. I call this activity as "historical."

Coming from a department of Philosophy, I am (unlike the earlier Editors-in-cfief) more at home in the normative political theory. Should I, then, be interested in the work done by my more historically-minded collegues at the department of Politics? What is it for me, except, perhaps, an interesting additional pastime? I would answer by giving an example, the history of liberalism.

The history of liberalism is full of paradoxes. As an institutional arrangement and as an ideology, it has won a decisive victory. Never in the history of the human race has a single socio-political formation had such a hegemonic status. The academia faithfully reflects this new constellation of forces: after the demise of more orthodox forms of Marxism, there are no serious challengers of the liberal *institutional* solution. Almost no-one – at least inside the walls of the Western universities – seriously denies the value of the basic freedoms, or of general suffrage, or an independent judiciary, or the

constitutional mode of government. As compared with the intellectual struggles of the earlier centuries, our present disputes about the exact content and limits of the freedom of expression, or the proper range of the market mechanism, are but family quarrels. In this sense, we are all liberals now. In this intellectual environment, it is possible for some people to take seriously even such absurdities as the thesis about the "end of history."

At the same time, liberalism as an academic political theory is under a cross-fire. It is attacked from every possible angle: all theoretical newcomers define themselves as critics of liberalism. What is challenged is not liberalism as an institutional solution, but the (allegedly) liberal views about the nature of politics, of morality, and of human being. In this context, we can see the political relevance of the historically oriented study of politics. Most critics as well as supporters of the liberal world-view tend to agree on one point: there exists a well-defined strain of thought which can be traced back at least to the 17th century and which can be legitimately called as "liberal". Thus, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightment, or the American Revolution are praised as liberals, and any critic worth of his salt has to discuss critically their views. Once again, history has become the battlefield of present struggles.

What is liberalism? According to *Petite Robert*, the term *liberal* acquired a political meaning in French ca. 1750, while *liberalisme* appreared as late as 1821. And according to *Oxford Dictionary*, "liberal" was at the first time contrasted to "conservative" in 1800. Only in 1820 it became an epitet of a party. As far as I know, the first organized political group calling themselves liberals were *los liberalos* of the Spanish Cortes in 1812. In this sense, there were no liberals before the beginning of the 19th century. It is no wonder that some historians of ideas (e.g. Knut Haakonssen and Ghita Ionescu) have rejected the current practice of calling 17th and 18th century classics as liberals.

But, certainly, liberal ideas did exist before the coinage of the term? Yes, of course. Another powerful current in the academia – especially in the departments of philosophy – emphasizes discontinuities in our intellectual history. It tends to see the history of ideas as a series of Kuhnian revolutions or Foucaultian *ruptures*. Paradoxically, although both Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and Foucault's *Les mots et les choses* were, in their times, invitations to

take certain neglected aspects of history seriously, the emphasis on discontinuity may also be used as an excuse to ignore the history. If the past has nothing in common with the present, we may simply choose to forget it. However, a more consistent historist position is that the differences between continuity and discontinuity, evolution and revolution are themselves perspectival matters. (For a modern student, the struggle between the Catholic and the Protestant world-views looks like a family quarrel, and the future students are bound to look our present disputes in the same way.) Quite often, it is more fruitful to search continuities and common themes than discontinuities and differences. The liberal idea of inviolable rights has grown out from the predominantly authoritarian tradition of the post-Renaissance Natural Law, while the modernist ideas of citizenship and of self-government are largely a product of the classically-oriented republicanism. The historians have done a great service to their normatively oriented collegues by revealing the origins of those ideas we habitually call as ”liberal.” They have shown that there is no original essence of liberalism which could be distilled out from the works of, say, Locke, Smith, or Kant. ”Liberalism” exists as an institutional solution; but there is no consistent liberal philosophy to be found from history. There are only themes which might be called ”liberal”. Given this, it is no wonder that the three distinguishibly liberal commitments, the commitment to inviolable rights, the commitment to democratic self-government, and the commitment to welfare, may be conflictual with each other. (As Amartya Sen has shown, even the least -demanding formulations of these principles may lead to incompatibilities.)

In this sense ”liberalism” is just a theoretical term which might be more or less fruitfully applied to different historical periods. By using it we do not mean that it refers to a well-defined entity. The recent studies of republicanism of the 17th and 18th centuries is a brilliant example of how historical research may render our concepts more useful by making them more precise. (At least in this sense, the history of ideas is a progressive science.) By seeing the classics – Locke, Montesquieu, Kant, the Founding Fathers – as late republicans rather than early liberals, we may, for example, understand why the concepts of liberty they used were not compatible with the ”negative” conception famously defended by Sir Isaiah Ber-

lin in his inaugural lecture and reiterated in almost every textbook of political philosophy. One of the most fatal shortcomings of the recent disputes on liberalism among normative theorists is the shared belief that there exists a fundamental contrast between the negative and the positive concepts of liberty, and that a commitment to the negative concept – liberty as the absence of coercive constraints – is the distinguishing mark of "liberalism." The truth is that no political theorist before Bentham and Paley (who were not unambiguously proto-liberal thinkers) used the term "liberty" in this restricted sense. For the earlier classics (as well as for such proto-liberal contemporaries of the Utilitarians as Price or Priestley) at least one legitimate meaning of "liberty" was always "rational self-government." In our terminology, this is a "republican" rather than a "liberal" view of human freedom. Of course, the term "republicanism" is itself a nexus of similar problems as "liberalism." It is also a theoretical term which can be used in a more or less fruitful way. We should be aware of the possibility that in some contexts it may also conceal more than it reveals. The republicanism of Machiavelli is quite unlike the republicanism of the American Revolution. Again, the continuities and discontinuities are perspectival.

Although there is no direct route from "is" to "ought," nor a simple way to learn from history, I believe that the history of political thought is truly "political" in the sense that it may also be relevant to the normative theory. The example of liberalism illustrates this potential. Coming from a philosophical department, and having no systematic historical education, I consider cooperation with my more historically oriented collegues an important and challenging task. In my view, there is no absolute contrast between the normative and the historical disciplines. But there is, and should be, a certain tension between the two. The role of the normative theorist is to discuss our present problems: not only the intellectual but also the institutional ones. But she cannot do this without referring to the past. Both the intellectual and the institutional hegemonies are legitimated through historical traditions. Here, she needs the help, but is also an object of critique of the historically oriented political theorists. The future issues of *The Yearbook* will, I hope, reflect this unavoidable but fruitful tension.

EERIK LAGERSPETZ

ARTICLES

Topic 1: Republicanism

Patricia Springborg

CLASSICAL TRANSLATION AND POLITICAL SURROCACY

English Renaissance Classical Translations and Imitations as Politically Coded Texts

Overview

One of the great virtues of the modern Western state is said to be its demarcation into public and private spheres, the latter characterized by great commercial and cultural vitality. It is a model that has proven surprisingly transportable, to the New World through colonization and to the Third world by emulation. In the fluid politics of the post-Cold War world, privatization and the creation of civil society have become catch cries of campaigning democracy in new efforts at state-building in the republics of the former Soviet Empire. But the new nationalisms raise all sorts of questions about political obligation and compliance that we can best address by looking more carefully at modern state formation in its initial phases. Why, for instance, did citizens acquiesce to the concentration of state power that characterizes modernity? How did political institutions regulated by law produce juridical subjects with rights and duties who were nevertheless capable of resistance and revolution in cases of perceived injustice? The answer lies at the juncture of humanist

and juridico-political discourses. It involves a specific historical narrative.[1]

Early modern political theorists came to a juridical solution to the problem of political obligation by a circuitous route. The great plate shifts of modernity were possible because of the receptivity to change of great masses of people in a relatively ordered way so that they not only salvaged much of their past but were able, under the new order, to give it new meaning. This demanded great shifts in how historical agents saw themselves, and the preparedness to think different thoughts, to respond to different and constantly changing institutions and yet somehow draw their collective histories with them. Great modern revolutions in Europe, the Americas, China and South East Asia managed to accomplish this feat; and they did so by discourses of persuasion that made of their cultural heritage a seamless web. The point of this project then is to advance our understanding of how these techtonic plate shifts were accomplished, the mentalities required to fit subjects for their historic roles, and how the creation of a reading public contributed to this task.

Modernity, in its early phase, as literatures generated by Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck have claimed, is associated with two mutually dependent phenomena: the rise of print culture and the rise of the nation state (Foucault, 1980; Habermas, 1987; Koselleck, 1985). Print culture created from a disaggregated mass the first modern reading "public" (Anderson, 1983). But how did it do it? The power to write and the capacity to read are bridges across the void between the expectations of rulers and those of the ruled. For all that has been written about social change, very little attention was given until recently to how great social movements translate into the power of individual agency. Print culture unlocked the past, at the same time opening up great vistas into the future. This is why the civil wars and revolutions of antiquity gave us flashes of modernity. It is not by accident, for instance, that English Jacobean courtiers on the cusp of modernity, looking across to the Continent with premonitions of civil war, scoured their classical texts for omens of what was to come and ways of dealing with it by reading Lucan and Ovid as well as Virgil and Homer. In fact, after the Bible, what rolled off the printing presses of early modern Europe were classical translations and imitations of Greek and Latin texts, forma-

tive in transmitting theories of state management and notions of citizenship. By the localization of texts hitherto associated with "universal" imperial culture, they succeeded in creating a cosmopolitan vernacular.

This project aims to test the hypothesis of a nexus between nationalism and the rise of vernacular print culture, by analyzing a specific universe of canonical texts: translations and imitations of classical Greek and Roman works undertaken by the great Renaissance humanists of the early modern age. The literary merit of these translations, on which critical analysis has tended to focus, is less my concern than a conceptual analysis of notions of human agency, the scope of political actors to effect change, free will and determinism, the relation between leadership and followership, the virtues of citizenship and prerequisites for leadership, problems of freedom and democracy, premonitions of unrest and civil war, and the problem of political order – the conceptual armoury of modern citizenship.

The now ubiquitous hypothesis on the convergence of the rise of nationalism and the emergence of a cosmopolitan vernacular has engaged major contemporary European figures, Foucault (1980), Koselleck (1985), and Habermas (1987) in debate. Although apparently universal in its sweep, the claim about the nexus between nationalism and print culture was initially restricted to European contexts. Even Anderson's claim that print culture created from a disaggregated mass the first modern public had specifically European referents. But a growing body of literature is beginning to extend the thesis into non-Western fields. Althought this is the topic of hot debate among Sanskrit specialists, for instance, there seems to be considerable evidence for a wave of vernacularization accompanying proto-nationalist movements that swept not only through Latin Europe, but also through the Arabic-speaking, Sanskrit and Sinitic empires from West to East Asia and the Subcontinent" from roughly 1000 to 1500 AD, in what Sheldon Pollock has termed "the vernacular millennium" (Pollock, 1998; Wittrock, 1998). Comparative studies have shown how the vernacularization of the Sanskrit Mahabharata, other foundational epic and dramatic material, contributed to the development of regional consciousness in India (Subrahmanyam, 1998); and how Chinese Literary academies func-

tioned as centres of opposition to the court from at least the Ming dynasty, creating the conditions for a limited civil society (Wakeman, 1998).

Although I am in no position to evaluate the claims of a convergence of nationalism and print culture in what Pollock has claimed to be "the vernacular millennium", it does not surprise me that the thesis should have application to non-Western as well as Western states. The main alternative hypothesis, that the modern state is specifically Western, due to particular exigencies of the development of capitalism, namely the Industrial Revolution, and the preparation of a skilled working class for its role (Gellner, 1983), has always seemed to me wildly telelogical and implausible. To dismiss cultural artefacts as epiphenomenal, especially in the case of social movements which have specifically sought literary and aesthetic instrumentalities, seems to me perverse. It is only by careful empirical examination of the relevant artifacts that we can test the hypothesis. Moreover, assumptions underlying Gellner's argument and those of the majority of theorists of nationalism, that this is a peculiarly modern and Western phenomenon, leave unexplained the fact that from its very inception the modern state depended on cultural syncretism. If we ask what in fact rolled off the printing presses of early modern Europe we find that they were mainly "exotic" works, the Bible and translations of classical Greek and Roman texts. Multiculturalism is no postmodern add-on. Print culture had the power to absorb any exotic culture that could be translated, fashioning out of these elements a cosmopolitan vernacular, universalist in its sweep. This universalism enabled the Western state to incorporate non-Western elements, Near Eastern religions and social forms very early. This is a story that I have told elsewhere, and that I believe must take center-stage in the account of Western identity formation: it concerns the struggle waged between the East and West for the mantle of the *polis*, a story whose immediate outcome was the victory, at least temporary, of the West (Springborg, 1986, 1987, 1992). Only by understanding the role of cultural syncretism are we also able to understand how non-Western societies of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, many of them subjugated by imperial conquest, have been to absorb Western elements and make them their own.

This project will try to answer these questions by addressing a print culture in which the translation and recirculation of classical texts was specifically designed to assist in the fabrication of national identity – that of Great Britain. Processes of collective identity formation and civil rights developed there were repeated in modern state building processes transported to the New World, including America and Australia. Moerover, they appear to parallel the vernacularization of imperial, cosmopolitan literatures that accompanied proto-nationalist movements in non-Western states, like India, the Middle East and Asia, as area specialists have established.

In short, we can begin to answer my question about how a civic "public" was created as a precondition for modern citizenship, by consulting material culture – in this case by examining what in fact rolled off early modern European printing presses and the specific political content it transmitted. It takes only a moment's reflection to see that, given the devotion of scarce resources in a strategic environment, the convergence of early modern print technologies and the choice of material to disseminate could not have been accidental or dictated by amusement. The world's great rare book libraries – the British Library, the Bodleian, the Herzog Auguste Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Germany, the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, DC, and the Huntington Library in Los Angeles – house hundreds of volumes of unedited early modern texts in print and manuscript form, whose publication in critical editions is indispensable for any systematic study of the origins of modern citizenship.

Out of this vast array of material, surprisingly little attention has been given to early modern classical translations, produced in great number and often the work of foremost literary figures of the English Renaissance (but see Norbrook 1984, 1993; Grafton & Jardine, 1990; Jacob & Raylor, 1991; Sharpe, 1993; Zwicker, 1993; Skinner, 1996). I am thinking in particular of the translations of Homer by George Chapman and Thomas Hobbes, of Virgil by John Dryden and Alexander Pope, of Ovid by Christopher Marlowe and George Sandys, and the translations of Lucan by Arthur Gorges and Thomas May. Attention to the formative role of specific classical translations and imitations in the development of modern concepts of citizenship can inform broader issues: for instance, the widely commented

upon correlation between the delayed development of vernacular print culture and the failure to produce a modern "public," which thwarted the development of civil society in Hapsburg Spain and its legatees in Latin America (Perez-Diaz, 1998). Spain's development stands in marked contrast to the vernacularization of cosmopolitan culture in the Indian sub-continent and Arabic-speaking West Asia. And yet political processes in these latter countries did not give rise to democratic citizenship based on participation either. In other words, the vernacularization of imperial cosmopolitan culture to create a reading public of a critical size is the necessary but not the sufficient condition for the emergence of modern forms of political agency and citizenship.

A cautionary note is in order. Objections may be made to my use of the terms, ethnicity, identity and nationalism as anachronistic. I am fully aware of the now well-entrenched view that nationalism is a quintessentially modern phenomenon (see Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986, 1991, 1998, 2000). However, it is a view that I challenge. To the same extent that the significance of phenomena like classical translation and political surrogacy may fall victim to disciplinary and curricular compartmentalization between "moderns" and "greats," so do phenomena like "nationalism" and "the state". Not only did antiquity know large-scale state systems with wide-ranging political, administrative, and fiscal competence, which precisely inspired the fledgling nation states of the European Renaissance; but it also knew the techniques of national consciousness-raising and propaganda in service of the state cult, popular resistance based on ethnicity, and crowd control in its many manifestations. This thesis it has been my purpose to develop elsewhere (Springborg, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1992, 1993).

Thesis: Classical Translation and Political Surrogacy

The European Renaissance, that great flowering of the arts and sciences, is curiously bereft of political and philosophical treatises apart from a few isolated examples like the mirrors for princes of Machiavelli

and Guiccardini, Thomas More, Richard Hooker and Thomas Hobbes. But in fact we have been looking for them in the wrong places. In a world of harsh censorship and draconian punishments for unorthodox political views, Renaissance courtiers chose drama, poetry and the visual arts to reach their political audiences. Lest such a statement appear too voluntarist, it must be pointed out that in lands where literacy was restricted, oral and visual performances, sacred and secular, were the accepted vehicles of public communication. Sacred or secular, these vehicles were highly differentiated in terms of intended audience, and comprised sermons, emblem books, royal processions and performances, masques and music, opera and epic, celebratory coinage, architecture, murals and frescoes, sculture and even gardens (see Jacob & Raylor, 1991; Claydon, 1998). Moreover, as a consequence of the long tradition of manuscript culture preserved by the monastic orders, universities and the great libraries, the melding of ancient texts (religious, as well as cosmopolitan and imperial), to a local vernacular did not seem strange.

The invention of printing signaled a Renaissance Europe obsessed with the production of canonical texts. First the Bible, then vernacular translations of the Greek and Roman classics rolled off the presses of early modern Europe, accompanied by a furious debate about the relative merits of print as opposed to scribal publication.[2] Was it safe to broadcast book culture to the masses, or should it be the closely circumscribed monopoly of those involved in the circulation of manuscripts? The very issue of print culture was too dangerous to debate openly, usually discussed obliquely in diatribes about rivers – which turned out to be those on which printing presses were located – the banks of the Thames where the thriving London book trade was located; or the Main, site of the famous Frankfurt book fair.

But why among these precious early books should classical translations have featured so large? Very few scholars have thought to look at these translations for their wider political significance.[3] It has passed unremarked, for instance, that major literary figures and political theorists, canonical in their own right, invested great time and effort in classical translations that have rarely seen the light of day since. So, for instance, Christopher Marlowe undertook to translate the great Hellenistic classical writers, Ovid and Lucan, although thwarted by the Stationer's Register, who would not allow publica-

tion on the grounds of sedition. Thomas Hobbes, author of *Leviathan*, a foundation text of modernity, which the author intended to be the Bible of modern politics, but which almost earned him the hangman's noose, began his writing career by translating Thucydides and concluded it by translating Homer. John Dryden, who besides being a prolific Restoration poet, and who with William Davenant rewrote so many of Shakespeare's already canonical plays, also undertook the translation of Virgil. For what purpose was this great effort to bring the Greek and Roman classics to a wider popular audience?

It is my thesis of this project that the great spate of Renaissance classical translations and imitations represent works of political surrogacy in an emergent nationalist discourse. For reasons of censorship in a harsh literary environment, but also because this is how people expected to get their information, certain classical works, for instance, Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Virgil's *Aeneid*, and Lucan's *Pharsalia*, were read as coded texts. The educational curriculum of Renaissance and early modern public schools designed to educate courtiers, often of humble background, required the thorough knowledge of a closed universe of classical texts. Some of these texts, transmitted from antiquity with the epistemological and ontological baggage which Christianity borrowed, were superfluous to, and even seditious of, its purposes and those of fledgling Reformation states. Draconian in their punishment of political or religious unorthodoxy, these states closed off overt forms of political discourse which were displaced into the aesthetic realm of poetry, drama and epic history. Ever inventive in their search for instruments by which to ply their trade, upstart courtiers found to hand a body of texts which covered the political spectrum from Greek and Roman classical republicanism to Hellenistic imperialism, of which they were the masters due to the peculiar monopoly on the distribution of knowledge that court politics accorded them.

The great epics of Homer, Hesiod, and later Virgil, like the stories of the Old Testament, to which as belonging to the great Eastern Mediterranean Epic cycle they bear a family resemblance, were stories about the rise and fall of empires, and the founding of small nation states, Chosen People of the Gods. Designed to be read aloud on state occasions, they also told of ancient cosmologies, the crea-

tion of the earth, everything above the earth and under the earth, and so provided cosmic justifications for kingship. But as they began to attract a body of competing works, especially those of the Hellenistic and Alexandrian schools, they also opened up spaces for allegorical political critique. The choice of text, whether apologetic or critical, and the undertaking to translate it, represented a political statement, not without risk in a political environment in which texts were scrutinized for sedition by the Stationer's Register, if not for treason by the Secretary of State. So surrogate political discourse sought relatively innocent vehicles for satire in what was to become a long tradition, imitated by Refusniks under twentieth-century repressive regimes.

Like the Bible, classical translations could be scissored and pasted to create new works that were pastiches of their coded messages, so that mere mention of a motif, for instance the seduction of Mars by Venus, or the triumphs of Hercules, conjured up a world of discourse. These motifs flew out of the texts themselves and onto the walls and ceilings of villas, public buildings and palaces, where they were visual reminders of epic events in the founding of nations. An entire repertoire of politically freighted motifs was transferred from Greek and Roman classical texts to the walls of Renaissance town villas and country houses, only to be re-recorded in a series of "painting poems" by poets who addressed their pictorial representations, and no longer the texts themselves. Or they found their way into music, masques and opera for visual representation on the stage. They included Homeric images of the fall of Troy; Virgil's depiction of the foundation of Latium; accounts of storms at sea as metaphors for the Ship of State in the works of Virgil, Ovid and Lucan; pastoral images of a settled, shired and cultivated countryside of shepherds, and sheepfolds safe from the proverbial wolf, from Virgil's *Eclogues*; reminders of corruption and intrigue in the dreaded halls of the siren Circe's house and Calypso's palace in Homer's *Odyssey*; Horace's reflections on the virtues of city and country life; and Martial's epigrams depicting the relation of the city to the countryside in time of war.

Gentlemen and nobles who undertook the Grand Tour further disseminated these images through imitation. So, for instance, the great Italian painter Annibale Carraci decorated the Villa Farnese in

Rome with motifs of colonization and tyranny: Hercules the bringer of civilization who kills the Nemean lion and the multi-headed beast, was shown facing off against the cave-dwelling Cyclops, Polyphemus (see Dempsey, 1995). Images of Hercules, Polyphemus and the cave were repeatedly played out in the three-dimensional semiotics of grotto construction in Roman imperial and Renaissance gardens. The labours of Hercules represented the pacification of the warrior spirit by the arts of civilization, just as Circe and the land of the Lotus Eaters were idioms for the poisons of priestcraft. These motifs found their way to the walls and grottos of Chatsworth and Bolsover, exhibition houses of the earls of Newcastle and Devonshire, the latter Hobbes's patron, whose children he escorted on the Grand Tour on several occasions. They are important motifs in Hobbes's long neglected literary works, his country house poem, *De mirabilibus pecci carmen*, his *Historia Ecclesiastica*, and his translations of Thucydides and Homer.[4]

My proposal is to produce critical editions with commentary of major English Renaissance works of classical translation or imitation as policy manuals usually overlooked by political theorists and historians because of their literary form. The works chosen have a peculiar unity due to two factors. Firstly, they are works of the client poets and dramatists whom James I gathered around him to fabricate a national identity for Great Britain, newly formed by the Union of England and Scotland. And secondly, there is abundant manuscript evidence to suggest, not only that these poets and political theorists knew one another, but that they belonged to University clubs which met frequently for an exchange of views in the form of after-dinner speeches, poems and plays. The idiom of this table-talk is the same Neo-Latin and classical discourse of the interlocutors' published works, where Virgilian tropes of the Underworld and the struggle of the Titans functioned as idioms for political opposition and sedition.

Contributors to James I's nationalist project included royal historians and new scientists, court poets and dramatists, as well as members of the Virginia Company who were merchant adventurers and colonizers. The poets laureate, Ben Jonson and William Davenant, possibly Shakespeare, and certainly the chorographers Camden and Speed, were primary architects of the project. But less well known

are the contributions of Michael Drayton, John Donne, Thomas Carew, Thomas May, George Chapman, Edmund Waller, and the humanist Hobbes. Hobbes was an associate of the poets laureate, Ben Jonson – whose advice he sought for the Dedicatory Preface of his translation of Thucydides – and William Davenant, whose long and tedious nationalist poem *Gondibert* is prefaced by an essay on poetics drawing on Hobbesian sensationalist psychology, to which Hobbes replies. And in the forums of the Virginia Company, that important political school for imperialists, Hobbes joined the poet and playwright brothers Sandys, the playwright brothers Killigrew and John Donne, all active members.

Modeling themselves on the great Roman imperial clients, Horace, Ovid, Virgil and Livy, these English humanists believed in the power of poets to discipline the court. Obsessed with dynastic instability and their own volatility, they engaged in a court discourse which formulated a deliberate program of political pacification which included heroic poetry for the elite, masques and operas for the masses. It is no accident that translations of Homer and Virgil should be chosen vehicles for public policy. George Chapman, in the royal epistle dedicatory of his celebrated translation of Homer, pointed out to James I that it was not without reason that the Ptolemies read Homer as a manual for kings, which he should look to himself. Thomas Hobbes's translations of Homer, on the other hand, present a pacific plain-speaking world as a model for English society that illustrate his stipulations about "significant speech" in *Leviathan* and *De Cive*, his celebrated political treatises considered so seditious in his day.

George Sandys's *Ovid* and Thomas May's *Lucan* also represent significant interventions in court discourse conducted between members of this coterie. Five or more English translations of Ovid were completed between 1590 and 1632, which include those of playwrights such as Arthur Golding, Christopher Marlowe, and John Dryden, and George Sandys, whose textual apparatus is by far the most elaborate. Sandys began his translation on the hazardous Atlantic crossing on the way to his post as newly appointed Treasurer of the Virginia Company in 1623, as its minutes record, "amongst the roering of the seas, the rustling of the Shroude and the clamour of the sailors." Once in Virginia he completed it, taking the manuscript back with him to England, where it was published in 1626

and republished in 1632.[5] It is believed to be the first work of poetry in the English language written in the Americas.

Why did a Virginia Company official in transit to the New World under such difficult conditions feel compelled to labour at such a task? Why were these pioneers of the English theatre and fabricators of the nation engaged in the translation of Ovid at all? Because Ovid was foremost representative of the foundation myths of the Greeks, colonization stories onto which the discovery and settlement of the New World could be grafted. In tropes of mutability and metamorphosis, Ovid posed the problems of cosmic generation, genealogy and identity, epistemic and categorial questions that lay at the heart of new national identities under construction. At the same time he transmitted the stories of cosmic battles between gods and heroes that had, from time immemorial, provided legitimacy for kings.

Lucan's *Pharsalia*, by contrast, chronicles the descent of the Roman Republic into civil war and tyranny under warring consuls, to produce a courageous critique of Nero's court. The *Pharsalia* which secretes a prophecy of successful tyrannicide into the heart of its ritual and formulaic praises of monarchy, was a Renaissance text for republicans.[6] Among its early translator's and publicists, Christopher Marlowe was accused of outright sedition and Milton, whose *Paradise Lost* is indebted to Lucan, of revolution. Hugo Grotius, the political theorist to whom Hobbes owes much, was said to have always traveled with a copy of Lucan in his pocket, urging Dutchmen to read the Spanish-born, Roman Senator and tyrant-hating poet, against the current Spanish king. In 1613 Grotius was received in London as a Dutch republican and the following year Sir Arthur Gorges produced his translation of Lucan's *Pharsalia* with commendatory verses by Sir Walter Raleigh, Gorges' friend, already languishing in the Tower for his irreverent comments about princes in his *History of the World*.[7] Thomas May's *Lucan* lies even closer to the heart of this surrogate Jacobean court discourse. Published between 1626 and 1627, it was dedicated to William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes's patron. Its publication date, like that of Sandy's *Ovid*, coincides with that of Hobbes's country house poem, *De Mirabilibus Pecci Carmen*, presented to his patron as a New Year's Gift in 1627.

Thus the literary works of Jacobean poets and dramatists covered the entire political spectrum and were by no means confined to sup-

port of the court. Clients of the great baronial class, these poets wrote estate poems celebrating in a pastoral mode the great spate of country house building in the wake of the dissolution of the monasteries. Enlisted to write archaizing poems in the manner of the great Roman client poets, Virgil, Horace and Ovid before them, English bards immortalized the Neo-classical piles built by a local aristocracy in imitation of the Roman senatorial oligarchy, to create facts on the ground. One of the purposes of this project is to demonstrate that the country house phenomenon has significance beyond the architectural and artistic feats of its patrons. It represents the consolidation of a baronial class vying with the Crown for political power in the early modern state, and holding it to account by the model of the Roman Republic. In this way country-house poetry of the English Renaissance conceals a discourse about the relative merits of Imperial, Catholic and cosmopolitan culture versus local, vernacular and "Gothic" traditions. Localism inserted itself as a defense of vernacular, anti-court and anti-city pastoral and sometimes in the struggle for control of texts. Much of the impact of Renaissance Neo-classical art and architecture is left unexplained if the role of classical translations as foundation political texts is not understood. Taken together, textual, pictorial and architectural Neo-classical works created a richly textured fabric to which the local and vernacular were seamlessly melded. Quite why and how the European Renaissance succeeded in disseminating this classical idiom so widely – first in Europe, and then to the non-Western and New Worlds – still defies explanation, despite a voluminous literature.

Wider Significance

The great Renaissance spate of translations and retranslations, as works of political surrogacy, offered spaces for reflection on systemic changes and the role of human agency. Humanist literary discourses, the employment of classical rhetoric, epic poetry and poetic history for a classically trained elite, music and masques for the masses, were instruments of persuasion deliberately mobilized to prepare political subjects for their historic roles. Only when the English Civil

war opened the floodgates of history did courtiers lose faith in their power to discipline the court and manipulate the masses. It was then that they turned to juridical solutions to the problem of political order in the form of Social Contract.This project aims to test the hypothesis of a nexus between nationalism and the rise of vernacular print culture by analyzing a specific universe of canonical texts: translations and imitations of classical Greek and Roman works undertaken by the great Renaissance humanists of the early modern age. The literary merit of these translations, on which critical analysis has tended to focus, is less my concern than a conceptual analysis of notions of human agency, the scope of political actors to effect change, free will and determinism, the relation between leadership and followership, the virtues of citizenship and prerequisites for leadership, problems of freedom and democracy, premonitions of unrest and civil war, and the problem of political order – the conceptual armoury of modern citizenship.This project seeks to place social contract theory back in context, as a politico-juridical solution to the problem of taming the masses crafted by humanists disillusioned with the power of poets to discipline the court, once the English Civil War opened the floodgates of history. It is designed to accomplish two tasks: (a) to test the received wisdom about the coincidence of the rise of nationalism and the emergence of print culture; and (b) to test it with respect to a specific universe of texts. It will treat English Renaissance translations and imitations of classical Greek and Roman works as a test case for the political use of print media.

Now some may say of this project that it runs into the very trap that it seeks to avoid: the disjunct between text-production, which assumes a literate public, and collective identity formation, which involves mobilizing the (mostly illiterate) masses. My response is that when state resources are put to work as part of a large-scale propaganda project, these problems tend to disappear. The proposed study focuses on the propaganda machine that James I of England, who was also James VI of Scotland, put together to create out of his two kingdoms a new entity: Great Britain. In this deliberately calculated effort, scarce resources were expended to furnish texts for wide dissemination that somehow could jump the literacy barrier, mainly by means of performances such as by reading aloud, or in the form of plays, masques and even operas. This was particularly true of the court

masque, which used ingenious mechanical devices and magnificent visual display to convey its political message (Holbrook & Bevington, 1998). This court-centred ideological exercise in collective identity formation included epic poetry as a form of political instruction for the elite. Epic poetry, a vehicle for the dissemination of the foundation myths of the peoples of Greece and Latium in the hands of Homer and Virgil, was always intended for wider dissemination, by being read aloud to the non-literate and by memorization.

This project involves primary research that has in fact been done before. No one has taken the trouble to ask why, after the Bible and certain devotional texts, translations of Greek and Latin texts should have been among the first items produced by the new printing presses of Europe. Nor has any one considered the sheer volume and duplication of these translations a matter of any significance. There are no works that systematically compare the translations – or compare them to the originals. It is acknowledged that the King James Bible and Shakespeare's works had the power to shape the vernacular speech of peoples as far afield as America and Africa. Yet very little thought has been given to the way in which translations of Greek and Latin works were capable of framing the political mentalities of a new reading public.

The degree to which early modern thinkers were preoccupied by empire and its exigencies is often forgotten in our enthusiasm for the modern nation state. Greek and Latin historians specifically addressed question about how great empires were created and the institutional means necessary to their survival. Livy, Tacitus, Polybius and their imitators come immediately to mind. Edward Said has persuasively argued in *Culture and Imperialism*, for instance, that the early modern novel was written against the horizon of global expectations of empire, as demonstrated even in the case of Jane Austen's novels, exquisite in their microcosmic settings. Much has been written about *Shakespeare and the Imperial Theme* (Knight, 1961; Greenblatt, 1980; Gillies, 1994), and the political contexts of Cavalier poetry and Restoration drama have been the subject of important literary studies (Norbrook, 1984, 1999; Zwicker, 1993; Sharpe, *et al.*, 1993; Raylor, 1994; Erskine-Hill, 1998). But much less notice has been taken of Neo-Latin poetry, while translations of Greek and Latin epics have been more or less ignored.

Little thought has been given to the structural position of the Renaissance courtier and the client poet, or why so many major political figures, members of the clergy and prominent citizens – for instance almost all the members of theVirginia Company in early modern England – were poets, often Latin poets. Even less attention has been given to the time spent by prominent political and literary figures in the translation of Greek and Roman texts. For instance the translations of Homer, Ovid and Virgil by Christopher Marlowe, George Chapman, Thomas May, George Sandys, John Dryden, Alexander Pope, and Thomas Hobbes, have been very little studied, assumed to be juvenilia, works of senilia, or something that prominent political and literary figures did on the side. One simply flourishes the term Renaissance Man, as if that settles it.

Hobbes, of all early modern political philosophers the most renowned, is known precisely for his politico-juridical solution to the problem of political obligation in the form of social contract. That he, of all people, should have devoted a substantial part of his life to book-length Latin poems, and translations of Thucydides and Homer, raises very important questions. Hobbes's Latin poetry had never hitherto been translated, apart from very free eighteenth century paraphrases, and one very recent Italian translation. Neither his Latin poetry nor his Homer exist in modern editions, or have attracted substantial scholarly attention (but *c.f.* Davis, 1997). And yet these are deeply political works, pursuing a deliberate court-centred policy agenda. Written in Neo-Latin, the coterie-language of Renaissance humanism, and intended for scribal publication, their disarming literary form disguises a degree of seditiousness that Hobbes dared not display in his print-medium treatises intended for general circulation, such as *Leviathan*.

Hobbes was also renowned for his theories of sensationalist psychology, famous in his day and employed for widely disparate purposes. Works as different as his patron, the Duke of Newcastle's manual on how to train horses, and his friend William Davenant's theory of poetics, drew on them. The latter, a disquisition on the power of the image prefacing Davenant's long and tedious poem *Gondibert,* was published together with Hobbes's lengthy rejoinder. In his preface Davenant acknowledges his debt to Hobbes's sensationalist psychology for laying the theoretical basis for social condi-

tioning, which his *Proposition for the Advancement of Morality* sets out to exploit. Addressed to Charles II, whom Hobbes tutored in his youth, Davenant's *Proposition* was designed to ensure public compliance to Royal policies by means of mass media events and carefully crafted image-management. So great was Hobbes's commitment to crowd control that, I believe, as I have argued elsewhere (Springborg, 1997), even his studies in optics were motivated as much by the desire to understand the mechanisms of image production and control, as by a commitment to the new science. Davenant's formula for political pacification comprised music and masques for the masses, and classical epic poetry (i.e., Virgil and Homer) for the elite. The translation projects of Hobbes and other prominent courtiers, may well have been a contribution to Davenant's programme. That this programme was based, with explicit acknowledgment, on Hobbes's psychology, as making possible the bridge between the mentality of the rulers and that of the ruled, is also highly significant.

Important recent theoretical work in the social sciences on the rise of modernity, if imaginatively applied, can bring the position of the Renaissance courtier into proper focus. This work, sometimes characterized by bold hypotheses and sweeping statements, nevertheless represents robust theory on the relation between the creation of a reading public and the emergence of civil society (see Foucault, 1980; Habermas, 1987; Magnussen, Heilbron & Wittrock, 1998). Early modern European translations and imitations of classical Greek and Latin texts, were formative in transmitting theories of state management and notions of citizenship. What they achieved was the creation of a cosmopolitan vernacular in service of the nation state. They did so by discourses of persuasion by which Renaissance humanists deliberately set out to meld indigenous elements of their cultural heritage to exotic elements in a seamless syncretic web (Kristeller, 1969). Greek, Roman and Jewish classics were read as policy manuals, which is why they were translated and imitated many times over. Translations, by convention very free in this period, varied widely in the way in which they transposed settings to satisfy different political agendas, each a rhetorical exercise in cultural syncretism for state purposes.

Post-modern discourse analysis has been particularly attentive to the status of texts as the most powerful evidence we have for the

past. In confronting this evidence historians must ask whether we have universal powers of translation, or whether universes of meaning may be closed off to us in the absence of direct or non-textual forms of access to an historical period. Although complicating the normal problem of textual translation by adding that of *re-translation*, this project also has the power to simplify it. For, Renaissance translations of widely known, and even widely translated, classical works can be measured against a foreign language control text, as well as other foreign vernacular translations with their own horizons of meaning. Difficult epistemological questions concerning different mentalities, how knowledge can be transmitted from one context to another, and to what extent we can enter the minds of those from another era, are all given specificity and some means of validation when addressed through translation. The adoption of consciously archaizing behaviour, in the textual, pictorial and architectural imitation of earlier aesthetic forms, is a particular demonstration of the possibility of such transmission in an age-old tradition. For, like the Romans and Greeks before them, Renaissance translators and imitators chose archaic forms to lend to their texts and monuments an antiquity that was deliberately faked up. What new messages are encoded in the transmission process is, of course, an intriguing question. Here too, the specific context for translations tells us that great deliberation went into the coding of these messages, that they were shaped for specific ears, and the fact that these works were eventually to become canonical was not by accident, but by design.

It is not my purpose to fall victim to the overschematization of complex historical processes of which I convict others. But an understanding of how the processes of modernity accomplished their task requires us to outline the grand projects and trace the institutional foot-prints and decision-making processes of policy makers, without whose industry and resources these changes could not have taken place. How it was that they produced, on the one hand, centralizing institutions of the state and political institutions regulated by law and, on the other, juridical subjects with rights and duties who were nevertheless capable of resistance. This is nothing less than the problem of civil society and the state, which looms so large in current discourse. But here is addressed in terms of material culture, specific agents and mechanisms of transmission and the analy-

sis of a closed universe of texts that allowed space for reflection on human agency, civic virtue, problems of leadership and followership.

The hypothesis that there is a correlation between the rise of nationalism and the emergence of a cosmopolitan vernacular, which this project is designed to test, has significance for New World and well as Old World, Third World as well as First World, social movements. If it is broadly true that the creation of an English-language vernacular belonged to a wave of vernacularization that swept the East as well as the West from 1000 to 1500 AD, a large question mark hangs over the received wisdom that nationalism is the hallmark of modernity and we are in a better position to understand the new nationalisms of post-modernity. This project will try to isolate the moment at which historical agents inserted themselves, with selected texts as their instruments, to bring about this effect.[8]

Notes

[1] It may thus contribute to the project on Collective Identity Formation jointly undertaken by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and the Berlin Wissenschaftskolleg.

[2] See Harold Love *Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 1993). Michael Drayton, author of the great chorographical poem that maps and shires England in allegorical verse, *Poly-Olbion* (*[Great Britain]* 1613), took the side of printing, for instance, against John Donne and Hobbes, who elected for scribal publication. Drayton opened his Preface to *Poly-Olbion*, thus:

In publishing this Essay of my Poeme, there is this great disadvantage against me; that it commeth out at this time when Verses are wholly deduc't to Chambers, and nothing esteem'd in this lunatique Age, but what is kept in Cabinets, and must only passe by Transcription.

Hobbes opened chapter 3 of *Leviathan* (1651), "Of Speech," by declaring that "The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter."

[3] See especially the dialogue opened up by Glen Burgess, in his review of Conal Condren's *Language of Politics in Seventeenth Century England* (London, 1994), *History of Political Thought*, 12, 4 (1996), 632-9. Quentin Skinner's magisterial *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996) lays the groundwork for extensive treatment of

rhetorical and literary works as political. See the pioneering works by literary scholars: David Norbrook, *Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance* (London, 1984); Kevin Sharpe *et al., Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England* (Stanford, 1993); *Poems on Affairs of State*, ed. George deF. Lord (2 vols, New Haven, 1963); and the exercise in textual archeology by Lise Jardine and Tony Grafton, 'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey read his Livy (*Past and Present*, no 129, 1990, pp. 30-78), uncovers discrete readings of a classical author, for each of which the text is treated as a policy manual.

[4] See the forthcoming editions of Hobbes's *Historia Ecclesiastica* (Oxford, Voltaire Foundation) and his *De mirabilibus pecci carmen* by Patricia Springborg and Patricia Stablein (Reading: Whiteknights).

[5] George Sandys, *Ovid's Metamorphoses Englished, Mythologized and Presented in Figures* (Oxford, 1632).

[6] For the account of the reception of Lucan that follows I am indebted to David Norbrook, Lucan, May and Republican Literary Culture, in Kevin Sharpe *et al., Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England* (Stanford, 1993), p. 49, and Norbrook's *magnum opus*, *Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660* (Cambridge, 1999).

[7] Ben Jonson claims in *Discoveries*, to have written a section of Ralegh's *History of the World*. And Hobbes acknowledges having shown his 1628 translation of Thucydides, a work critical of demagoguery, to Ben Jonson, implicated in the same year over commendary verses to John Felton, the Lucan-inspired assassin of Buckingham the royal favourite. See David Riggs, *Ben Jonson, A Life* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), p. 300 and Norbrook, Lucan, May and Republican Literary Culture, p. 55.

[8] It may thus contribute to the project on Collective Identity Formation jointly undertaken by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and the Berlin Wissenschaftskolleg.

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Markku Peltonen

'THE MILLER OF HUNGTINGDON': FRANCIS BACON – STATESMAN AND PHILOSOPHER[1]

I

Francis Bacon was a politician and statesman for most of his life. He received an education designed to train him for an active life and sat in the House of Commons for the first time at the tender age of 20. He considered himself first a *bonus civis* – which amounted to being 'a good and true servant to the Queen' – and only after a '*bonus vir*, that is an honest man'.[2] Up to the time of his unexpected fall in 1621, Bacon was actively involved in high politics at the courts of Elizabeth I and James I, rising ultimately to become a Lord Keeper of the Great Seal 1617 (as his father had been) and being granted the title of Lord Chancellor the next year. After his fall in 1621, he never abandoned hope of a political comeback. A month after his impeachment he was already planning to offer instruction in politics,[3] and

his *History of Henry VII*, written in 1621 and published in March 1622, was partly intended to show his abilities as a counselor. At the same time he planned to ask the king to employ him again 'publicly upon the stage,' and, in 1624, he declared himself ready to travel to the Continent to negotiate a league with France.[4]

Bacon's pursuits in natural philosophy were hardly less long-standing. According to his literary secretary and first biographer, William Rawley, Bacon 'fell into the dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author ... but for the unfruitfulness of the way' as early as when he was a student in Cambridge (from the age of 12 to 14).[5] This used to be taken as a sign of Bacon's precocity in natural philosophy, but recent commentators have often dismissed it as more or less pure fabrication. But if there is something in it, it more probably referred to the impact of a humanist culture on Bacon and the attendant dislike of scholasticism than to any more specific philosophical criticism of prevalent natural philosophy.

Nevertheless, from the early 1590s, when Bacon was around 30, we have the first proper evidence that he had grand schemes of philosophical reform in mind. In 1592 he wrote in his famous letter to his uncle, Lord Burghley, that

> I confess that I have taken all knowledge to be my province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular [i.e. hearsay] traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries; the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity, or vain glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably) *philanthropia*, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed.[6]

At approximately the same time, on two different occasions, Bacon spoke about his philosophical schemes, noting that 'all the philosophy of nature which is now received, is either the philosophy of the Grecians, or that other of the alchemists.' Whereas the former, he went on, 'hath the foundation in words, in ostentation, in confutation, in sects, in auditories, in schools, in disputations,' the alchemists had theirs 'in imposture, in auricular traditions, and obscurity.'[7]

These briefly expressed opinions sketched many of Bacon's central philosophical themes. He argued against the barrenness of scholastic philosophy (the Greeks, or Aristotle alone, stood for it) and against the preposterous claims of alchemy. He promised to form a new method, which would replace both exploded schools, and produce not just words but works. He expressed confidence that, once this method was applied, it would enable men to make new discoveries that would benefit humankind. Moreover, knowledge, he insisted, was 'the worthiest power,' thus making already in the early 1590s his novel link between science and power – that science could become an operative action.

By the first decade of the seventeenth century Bacon examined many of these themes in much greater detail in several natural philosophical tracts and treatises. In 1605 he published *The advancement of learning*, which was his first published philosophical work (and incidentally the only one which he published in English; all the other were in Latin, which is an indication of the international scope of his project). *The advancement of learning* was not so much an account of Bacon's methodological principles, but rather an eloquent defence of the importance of learning and a general survey of the contemporary state of knowledge, pointing out deficiencies in contemporary knowledge and supplying Bacon's broad suggestions for the ways of improvement.

At the same time Bacon composed various tracts and treatises on natural philosophy, which were only published after his death. In these he developed his notions of an operative natural philosophy (or science) and his proposed new method which would bring it about.

Although in the 1610s Bacon was heavily involved in politics he carried on his philosophical pursuits, so much so that at the pinnacle of his political career in late 1620, he also published his most important philosophical treatise the *Novum organum* (i.e. the New *Organon*) – together with the preliminary material of his whole philosophy – the *Instauratio magna* (i.e. *The great instauration*). It offered a comprehensive plan 'to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge.'[8] The ultimate aim of this reconstruction was nothing less than 'to enlarge the bounds of Reason and to endow man's estate with new value.'[9]

After his fall in 1621 Bacon had much more time for his literary and philosophical projects and during the remaining five years of his life he made haste and published, among other things, several natural histories, an expanded version of *The advancement of learning* in Latin and wrote several other philosophical pieces, including his utopia – the *New Atlantis*.

II

The purpose of this summary sketch of Bacon's life is to highlight the well-known fact that throughout his life Bacon pursued both a political and philosophical career. At the same time as he wrote famous and celebrated works on natural philosophy he was also a principal figure in contemporary politics. The first one to comment on this fact was Bacon himself. Every time he indulged in a piece of autobiographical comment he thought it worth his while to emphasise this fact. When he wrote to his uncle, Lord Burghley, in 1592 Bacon distinguished between his 'contemplative ends' (i.e. his philosophical pursuits) and his 'civil ends' (i.e. his political career).[10] Approximately ten years later he pointed out that 'I was fitted better for the contemplation of truth, than for other things'; yet, 'by birth and education I was directed to civil affairs.'[11]And towards the end of his life he confessed that 'my *Instauration* ... is the work that in mine own judgment ... I do most esteem,' but also hastened to add that 'I cannot altogether desert the civil person that I have borne.'[12]

How are we to relate these two pursuits? Of course, we can merely wonder how Bacon had enough time for both his philosophical investigations and his active political career. But it is easy to see that the problem is more serious and complicated than that. In its most provocative formulation the question can be posed as follows: Are we producing several Francis Bacons or is there a way in which different aspects of his career can be integrated to each other?

Clearly, this is an absolutely central question in any biographical study of Bacon, and it has often been asked, at least if the titles of several recent studies of Bacon are anything to go by. The titles of these studies include for instance: *Science, faith, and politics* or *The making of the instauration: science, politics and law in the career of Francis*

Bacon or *Francis Bacon, the State, and the reform of natural philosophy* or *Francis Bacon: history, politics and science* or even simply *Francis Bacon and the politics of science*.

It almost goes without saying that answers to this central question of Bacon scholarship have varied enormously. Sometimes it has been argued that a strict separation of these two pursuits yields us the most truthful picture of Bacon, and sometimes it has been insisted that the integration of them as closely together as possible is the most fruitful way of examining his life and career and gaining an understanding of his philosophy.

Traditionally, Bacon's two careers were kept quite separate. Thus in the standard edition of Bacon's collected works, published by the great Victorian Bacon scholar, James Spedding, Bacon's philosophical works are firmly separated from his occasional papers, which mostly concerned his political career. Moreover, several scholars detected a fundamental gap between Bacon's lifelong attachment to the monarch and the attendant inclination towards absolutism on the one hand and the democratic notions of his scientific schemes on the other.

The most usual way of solving the dilemma between science and politics in earlier scholarship was to regard Bacon's philosophical pursuits as more important and to examine therefore their impact on his political career and thought. For Spedding, Bacon sought political power merely as a means to promote his great philosophical enterprise.[13] According to another scholar, Bacon was 'the first scientist to enter politics ... primarily for scientific ends.'[14] Bacon's writings about politics were merely attempts to apply his new scientific methods into a new area.[15]

More recent commentators have, however, detected a completely different kind of interconnectedness of Bacon the philosopher and Bacon the politician.[16] They have put much more emphasis on Bacon's political career and have examined its impact on his natural philosophy. This has meant first of all that the democratic character of Baconian science has been questioned. It has been pointed out that 'the ideas which underlay his political and scientific schemes' were strikingly similar. According to one recent commentator, Bacon 'stood squarely for a view of science which emphasized its closed, nonpublic character' and that 'his vision of science was elitist and hierarchical.'

Such arguments rest on the assumption that 'Bacon's political outlook formed an important key to his whole approach to science and that much of what he did – or at least intended to do – in the scientific realm amounted to the application of political analysis, political wisdom, and political solutions to the predicament of scientific inquiry.'[17]

But while in such an account Bacon's philosophical plans are to a large extent shaped and conditioned by his political experience, they (i.e. his philosophical plans) still assume a central place in his thought and career. It is the separation between political and scientific ideas in Bacon's thought which is questioned in this analysis, not the primacy of science.

Nonetheless, it is precisely this central assumption of the primacy of science which has been increasingly questioned by recent commentators. They have argued not only that Bacon's ideas were shaped by his education and his career as a politician, but also that politics was always more important for him. His philosophical plans, in other words, served purely political aims. Perhaps the most forceful argument to this effect has been put forward by Julian Martin in his book *Francis Bacon, the state, and the reform of natural philosophy* (Cambridge 1992). Martin insists 'that Bacon's legal and political career was crucial in the creation of his natural philosophy and that his natural philosophy cannot be separated from his political ambitions.' Bacon's passion and his great project was a political one – to create what Martin calls 'an imperial state' or 'an imperial monarchy' or 'an imperial *Britain*'. Natural philosophy was geared to serve this purely political end. As Martin puts it, 'Bacon's natural philosophy was a subordinate part of this programme and cannot be understood adequately in isolation from it. His was a natural philosophy made appropriate to a centralising monarchy.'[18]

This interpretation has been widely accepted. Thus Graham Rees has recently declared that 'it is the imperial vision, the vision of Great Britain as an efficient, centralized, prosperous and expansionist monarchy' which provides 'a single grand design that unifies Bacon's writings.'[19] The idea that Bacon's entire natural philosophical project was serving purely political end of his vision of the imperial state has quickly become a commonplace regurgitated in many textbooks. Steven Shapin accepts it in his recent textbook, *The scientific revolu-*

*tio*n, pointing out that Bacon made 'a joint case for the reform of learning and the expansion of state power.'[20] Another recent textbook also maintains that, for Bacon, 'natural philosophy should be capable of providing support for the imperial state.'[21]

III

In the rest of this paper, I would like to take a fresh look into Bacon's career and thought. I shall argue that whilst there are some similarities between his political career and his writings in natural philosophy, the differences between them are much more striking. Despite many recent claims to the contrary, Bacon's natural philosophy and political career and thought were not, therefore, parts of the same project. At the end of the paper, I shall propose that, instead of trying to solve these differences and contradictions, we should rather endeavour to study Bacon's natural and political philosophy in the context into which they were meant as interventions.

If we now turn to Bacon's writings the first thing to note is that the degree to which his political career and thought on the one hand and his writings in natural philosophy on the other had similarities is indeed striking. When, at the beginning of the 1590s, Bacon quite suddenly broached the topic of natural philosophy, he did this in a political context. In his famous letter to Lord Burghley in 1592 he was above all preoccupied in searching for a place in politics. He expressed a youthful determination to serve the queen, not as a soldier, nor a statesman, but as a philosopher. He suggested that if he were granted political office, he would use this to supervise a large-scale reform of natural philosophy.[22] 'I do easily see,' Bacon wrote to Lord Burghley, 'that place of any reasonable countenance doth bring commandment of more wits than of a man's own.'[23] Not only were Bacon's philosophical ambitions expressed in his suit for political office; natural philosophy, he claimed, could serve the queen. Moreover, Bacon also implied that natural philosophy must be better administered.

An important part of this administration of natural philosophy was the search for patronage, which of course linked Baconian natu-

ral philosophy with politics. In his contribution to a Christmas Revels in 1594-95, Bacon had a counsellor to a prince, advising the study of philosophy, to commend the erection of a 'general library,' 'a spacious, wonderful garden,' 'a goodly huge cabinet' (i.e. a museum) for displaying 'whatsoever the hand of man by exquisite art and engine hath made' as well as a 'still-house' (i.e. laboratory) 'furnished with mills, instruments, furnaces, and vessels, as may be a palace fit for a philosopher's stone.'[24]

Throughout his career Bacon emphasised the importance of political support for the advancement of learning and was seeking for patronage. In 1605 he dedicated his first published philosophical work, *The advancement of learning*, to the King James I. He pointed out that old universities should be reformed and new universities and research institutions should be founded and that they must be better equipped. Proper laboratories and libraries were necessary and salaries should be commensurate to the importance of the scientist's work, for this would be the only way to attract the best qualified people to science.[25] All this should be funded by the public since it was the public at large which would benefit from the fruits of science.[26]

When Bacon published his *magnum opus* – the *Instauratio magna* – in 1620 he appealed for a collective natural history project (i.e. a collection of natural phenomena which would serve as the basis on which the new science was to be built). This project, he deemed, was a political project because only the king had sufficient resources to accomplish it. 'A collection of history natural and experimental,' Bacon wrote, 'such as I conceive it and as it ought to be, is a great, I may say a royal work, and of much labour and expense.'[27] And lest the king missed the message, Bacon again dedicated the volume to the king, making a request to the royal reader in the epistle dedicatory; he sincerely hoped that James I would launch 'the collecting and perfecting of a Natural and Experimental History, true and severe ... such as philosophy may be built upon.'[28]

Underlying these ideas was a more general conviction that natural philosophy must not be seen so much as part of the contemplative life than the *vita activa*. Knowledge was not primarily contemplative *episteme* but rather a discovery of the unknown and thus part of the practical, active life. In one of his writings from the early 1590s Bacon called knowledge as 'the worthiest power.' He wrote

> Is this but a view only of delight, and not of discovery? of contentment, and not of benefit? Shall he not as well discern the riches of nature's warehouse, as the beauty of her shop? Is truth ever barren? Shall he not be able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to endow the life of man with infinite new commodities?[29]

But if the ultimate aim of knowledge was not 'delight' and 'contentment' but rather 'discovery' and 'benefit,' 'to produce worthy effects' and 'to endow the life of man with infinite new commodities,' then, surely, as Bacon went on, 'the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge.'[30] 'The last or furthest end of knowledge,' he insisted in *The advancement of learning*, is nothing but 'the benefit and use of men'. Similarly, he wrote in the *Instauratio magna* that 'the true ends of knowledge' are 'the benefits and use of life, as well as 'human utility and power.'[31]

Apart from the fact that Bacon expressed such convictions for the first time in a political context there is another and much more important way in which they were closely linked with his political career and thought. If he emphasised the values of *vita activa* in natural philosophy, equally so did he in the world of politics. In his political writings Bacon always stressed the centrality of a virtuous active life. 'Men are born,' he wrote, 'not to cram in their fortunes, but to exercise their virtues'. This meant, he went on, a 'dedication of yourself to the public.'[32] Bacon was convinced that it was an obvious indication of self-love that a man wanted to avoid appearing 'in public' or engaging 'in civil business' and to live a 'solitary and private life.'[33]

Given Bacon's strong commitment to the ideals of a virtuous civic life, it is hardly surprising that in his political writings he set great store by those who were engaged in this mode of life. The best way to win honour and praise, since they were nothing but 'the reflexion of virtue' was to embrace virtue itself. The promotion of the common good brought such an everlasting glory to a man that he could claim to have 'the character of the Deity.' The proper goal for a man's life was therefore to perform 'great and lofty services to the commonwealth' and to seek 'immortality by merit and renown.'[34]

Bacon's entire account of moral philosophy in *The advancement of learning* was based on the assumption that the virtuous active life was invariably preferable to a private contemplative life. Virtue, he

declared, consisted of 'the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society.'[35] *Vita activa* was thus a central notion for Bacon which genuinely links his philosophical and political theories and pursuits.

IV

Yet, although the degree to which Bacon's natural philosophical project on the one hand and his political career and thought on the other seemed to converge is striking, the glaring differences between them are even much more striking.

Bacon always made a clear distinction between his pursuits in natural philosophy and his career in politics. When, towards the end of his life, he took stock of his life, he made a clear separation between his writings in natural philosophy and his life as a 'civil person.'[36] He was, he said, naturally fitted for a contemplative life but had been born 'into the business of active life.'[37] At the same time, he disparaged the importance of philosophy in politics. Philosophers lacked any practical experience, so that their writings about politics 'are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high.'[38]

Moreover, in all his search for patronage, Bacon never promised any short-sighted economic or military gains in return. When he failed in his numerous attempts to win patronage, it would have been tempting indeed, had he had such a vision of science serving the purely political ends of state power as many recent commentators have claimed he had, to make a frank declaration to this effect. But we do not find such a declaration.[39] If Bacon had conceived science as merely serving an imperial state, then, surely, it would have made sense to say so when, at the pinnacle of his political career, he dedicated the *Instauratio magna* to the king. Yet, far from doing so, he only apologised for the precious time of a statesman spent on a project, which did not have any political relevance. The only way Bacon endeavoured to defend and justify writing a philosophical treatise was in purely philosophical terms: 'Your Majesty may perhaps accuse me of larceny, having stolen from your affairs so much

time as was required for this work.' The effort, Bacon insisted, would make James's reign 'famous to posterity' by 'the kindling of this new light in the darkness of philosophy'. 'The regeneration and restoration of the sciences,' he concluded, was highly apposite 'to the times of the wisest and most learned of kings.'[40]

Although such a defence was a far cry from those alleged imperial visions, it was close to Bacon's more general pleas for his natural philosophical project. He always emphasised that a reformed science would serve and bring benefits for the whole of humankind. He thus distinguished three kinds of ambition: first, the extension of one's own power, which he deemed 'vulgar and degenerate'; second, the extension of the power of one's own country, which had 'more dignity, though no less covetousness'; third, the extension of 'the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe,' which was the noblest pursuit.[41] Needless to say, it was the third (the extension of the power of humankind over the universe) rather than the second ambition (the power of one's own country) which Bacon linked with science. In the preface of the *Instauratio magna* Bacon proclaimed that 'the cause' of his 'haste' to publish a part of an unfinished project 'was not ambition for himself, but solicitude for the work; that in case of his death there might remain some outline and project of that which he had conceived, and some evidence likewise of his honest mind and inclination towards the benefit of the human race.'[42]

Closely linked with this emphasis on the benefits of the whole humankind was the fact that Bacon always conceived the cooperation, which was a highly important and necessary part of the new science, in international, rather than national, terms. 'Nor is mine a trumpet,' said Bacon, 'which summons and excites men to cut each other to pieces with mutual contradictions, or to quarrel and fight with one another; but rather to make peace between themselves, and turning with united forces against the Nature of Things, to storm and occupy her castles and strongholds, and extend the bounds of human empire.'[43] The aim was thus the enlargement of power, but not the power of a state but that of all humankind. It is not surprising therefore to find Bacon proposing systematic cooperation between European universities. According to him, learning would make tremendous strides 'if there were more intelligence mutual between

the universities of Europe than now there is.' This was so simply because scientific knowledge knows no political boundaries. 'We see,' Bacon went on, 'there may be many orders and foundations, which though they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the other.'[44]

V

The differences between Bacon's natural philosophy and his political thought are most glaring, however, when we turn to consider his imperial vision of the true greatness of states. As we have seen, many recent commentators have claimed that Bacon's project for a new science formed an integral part of his vision of a great state. Bacon, of course, composed several treatises on civic greatness or the true greatness of states, so much so, in fact, that it is a central theme in his political philosophy. But I find it difficult to link these treatises with Bacon's natural philosophical project. He never mentioned natural philosophy in these treatises on civic greatness. More importantly, the kind of life and the kind of qualities Bacon proposed in his writings on the greatness of states mark a sharp contrast with the qualities and values inherent in the promotion of natural philosophy.

Since Bacon conceived science as a co-operative, international enterprise discarding political boundaries, it required universal peace. In *The advancement of learning* he argued that one of the reasons why his own times were so conducive to learning was 'the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace.'[45] Two years later in 1607 he expressed the same firm belief that his own age would witness the advancement of learning, since 'the balance of power' in Europe would maintain peace which 'is fair weather for the sciences to flourish.'[46] In the famous letter sent with a part of the *Instauratio magna* to his friend Toby Matthew Bacon described himself: 'Myself am like the miller of Huntingdon, that was wont to pray for peace amongst the willows; for while the winds blew, the wind-mills wrought, and the water-mill was less customed. So I see that controversies of religion must hinder the advancement of sciences.'[47]

When Bacon spoke or wrote about civic greatness – or the true greatness of states, as he called it, he always argued that the most important quality of a truly great state was 'the valour and military disposition of the people.' 'Above all, for Empire and Greatnesse,' he wrote, 'it importeth most; That a Nation doe professe Armes, as their principall Honour, Study, and Occupation.' He summarised his entire argument by emphasising that 'no nation, which doth not directly professe Armes, may looke to have Greatnesse fall into their Mouths.'[48]

While civic greatness demanded a warlike disposition and consequently also wars, science made its advancement only in peace. 'Nor is mine a trumpet,' said Bacon in his call for the co-operative advancement of science, which I have already quoted but which is worth repeating, 'which summons and excites men to cut each other to pieces with mutual contradictions, or to quarrel and fight with one another; but rather to make peace between themselves, and turning with united forces against the Nature of Things, to storm and occupy her castle and strongholds, and extend the bounds of human empire.'[49] Whilst revealing the similitudes between the pursuit of the advancement of science and the quest for civic greatness, this passage shows the irreconcilable gap between their methods. The chief aim of both enterprises was the enlargement of power, and the former (the advancement of learning) could be expressed in the military terms of the latter (civic greatness). But these analogies failed to bridge the gap between the acquisition of an empire through warfare and the new science through permanent peace. Science was an international pursuit, progressing only in universal peace. The quest for civic greatness was its diametrical opposite; it was a purely national undertaking demanding not only a warlike disposition, but continuous wars.

A central argument for the alleged connection between Bacon's natural philosophy and his political thought has been the claim that his idea of civic greatness constitutes an essential part of the voyage to his utopia – *New Atlantis*. It has been claimed that the society described in Bacon's utopia not merely represents the ideal society of his scientific writings but is also the embodiment of his 'vision of an imperial monarchy sustained by natural philosophy,' as Julian Martin puts it.[50]

Nevertheless, the values and qualities emphasised in the *New Atlantis* stand in complete contrast to those lying at the heart of civic greatness. There are several glaring differences between *New Atlantis* and a truly great state, but shortage of time allows me to touch on only the most crucial one. The society of New Atlantis is practically completely devoid of the chief ingredient of civic greatness – war. Only one warlike incident is mentioned in the history of New Atlantis, but even then the enemies had been enforced 'to render themselves without striking a stroke.'[51] The society of New Atlantis was organized as a self-contained unit which had as little as possible to do with other countries – indeed it was described as being of 'solitary situation,' 'divided by vast and unknown seas' from the rest of the world. Little wonder the society of New Atlantis rarely admitted strangers to the island.[52] This society, governed both by internal and external peace and tranquillity, is in marked contrast with the state which aimed at civic greatness. The crucial quality of the latter was military spirit and warlike disposition and to accomplish its desired end it had to wage continuous wars. Moreover, whereas New Atlantis was of 'solitary situation,' a truly great state, in Bacon's scheme of things, had to be 'seated in no extreme angle, but commodiously in the midst of many regions' or 'in the very heart of the world.' And whereas New Atlantis rarely admitted strangers, it was one of Bacon's most crucial arguments that those states which had been fit for empire, had been liberal in granting naturalization.'[53] Thus New Atlantis's exclusion of itself from the rest of the world into peaceful perpetual existence is hardly compatible with the state which searched for civic greatness by martial enterprises.

But nor was the science of New Atlantis merely serving the interests of the state. The core of Bacon's utopia was formed by his exposition of Salomon's House – the scientific research institute which ultimately accounted for the success of the whole society. Far from obediently serving political power, the scientists of Salomon's House kept for themselves the ultimate decision 'which of the inventions and experiences which we have discovered shall be published, and which not: and take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret: though some of those we do reveal sometimes to the state, and some not.'[54] This was emphatically not a scientific community merely serving the interests of a state, 'imperializing' or otherwise.

VI

Where does all this lead us? There is little doubt that Bacon's natural philosophy and his political outlook had several important similarities. But there is no question that there were also many wide discrepancies between them. Should we therefore return to the idea of several Francis Bacons? I think the answer is 'no.' Bacon's natural philosophy and his writings on civic greatness were not parts of the same project, but perhaps forming such a great project was not his aim in the first place.

As an intellectual historian, my primary interest lies not in Bacon as the author of a single and coherent life-long project or a unified philosophy which embraced every single aspect of his writings. Instead, I see him above all as a contributor to series of central philosophical and intellectual debates within early modern culture. Bacon has traditionally been depicted as a great philosopher who without forerunners created modern science in general and its inductive method in particular. Such an account often carried with it the idea that Bacon's texts are independent of their restricted historical context; they are classic texts making sense on their own and having a transhistorical audience. As one commentator put it, 'Bacon need not be studied in the terms of some narrow historical context, because he gives an account of our modern history's nature'.

Paradoxically, the recent account of Bacon's single imperial project which embraced both his natural philosophy and his legal and political careers and writings yields a strikingly similar picture.Such an approach, as Julian Martin acknowledges, is 'rigorously local in its attentions'. 'Its premise is', he goes on,'that the origin and nature of Bacon's natural philosophy can be explained satisfactorily only with careful attention to *his* context' (i.e. his career and writings).There is, in other words, no need to look beyond Bacon himself.

Such an approach, whether in its traditional or more recent attire, strikes me as a particularly unhelpful approach to gaining an insight in what Bacon was *doing* in writing his treatises on natural or political philosophy. Rather than connecting them merely with himself we should try to contextualise them also with his times. Such an approach strikes me as a more helpful one precisely because it would

enable us to interpret Bacon as a participant in ongoing debates and thus perhaps to historically identify his arguments in and contributions to them.

I should like to conclude by giving very briefly a single example of what I have in mind. Consider the example of Bacon's notion of an operative science. This absolutely central notion of his natural philosophy, as I have argued, was closely linked with the conception of the *vita activa* which Bacon embraced in his political writings and career throughout his life. This is of course an interesting conclusion. But it is of much greater significance to endeavour to connect Bacon's notion of an operative science with his times rather than simply with himself. For such an attempt would make it possible for us to see to what extent Bacon was perhaps criticising certain prevalent conceptions and endorsing others – in brief what he was doing in putting forward this particular notion. By studying this context we would be in a position to see that he was reacting against the entire tradition of Aristotelian natural philosophy where theoretical sciences were strictly separated from practical or productive disciplines. In the Aristotelian tradition the scientist was merely organising an already existing world; he was thus a mere spectator who took no part in forming or changing it. Science was a closed system built on necessary knowledge and the scientists only arranged this formally perfect system. An art as operation rather than knowledge had nothing to do within this system.

With his notion of an operative science – that science was not so much a contemplative *episteme* as a discovery of the unknown and the part of the practical, active life – Bacon was nothing less than challenging this dominant view of natural philosophy. By focussing only on Bacon himself and assuming that the nature of his natural philosophy can be explained satisfactorily with careful attention only to himself we would completely deprive ourselves from such an interpretation. There is no prospect of understanding Bacon's natural or political philosophy and thus the full range of his versatile thought historically unless we study them in the context into which they were meant as interventions – in the context of early modern discussions about natural and moral sciences.

Notes

[1] This is a slightly revised version of the inaugural Francis Bacon Foundation Lecture which I gave at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California in January 2001 I should like to thank both the Francis Bacon Foundation and the Huntington Library for this invitation. My thanks also to Robert C. Ritchie for looking after me with characteristic generosity.

[2] *The works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding et al. (14 vols., London, 1857-74), XI, pp. 132, 190-1.

[3] *The works*, XIV, p. 285.

[4] *The works*, XIV, pp. 349, 443-4.

[5] *The works*, I, p. 2.

[6] *The works*, VIII, p. 109.

[7] Brian Vickers ed., *Francis Bacon* (Oxford, 1996), p. 35.

[8] *The works*, IV, p. 8.

[9] *The works*, XIV, pp. 119-20.

[10] *The works*, VIII, pp. 108-9.

[11] *The works*, III, pp. 518-19.

[12] *The works*, XIV, p. 373; VII, 13-14.

[13] *The works*, VIII, p. 107.

[14] J G. Crowther, *Francis Bacon: the first statesman of science* (London, 1960), p. 16.

[15] Ronald S. Crane, 'The realtion of Bacon's *Essays* to his program for the advancement of learning,' in *Schelling anniversary papers* (New York, 1923), pp. 87-105.

[16] See eg. Lisa Jardine & Alan Stewart, *Hostage to fortune: the troubled life of Francis Bacon 1561-1626* (London, 1998), p. 19; Lisa Jardine, 'Introduction,' in Francis Bacon, *The new organon*, (ed.) Lisa Jardine (Cambridge, 2000), pp. xxv-xxviii.

[17] Leary, *Francis Bacon*, pp. 11-12; see also p. 20.

[18] Julian Martin, *Francis Bacon, the state and the reform of natural philosophy* (Cambridge,1992), pp. 2-4, 68, 134, 175.

[19] Graham Rees, 'Introduction,' in *The works of Francis Bacon* (14 vols, London1996), I, pp. ix-x.

[20] Steven Shapin, *The scientific revolution* (Chicago, 1996), p. 127.

[21] John Henry, *The scientific revolution and the origins of modern science* (Basingstoke, 1997), p. 87.

[22] Mark S. Neustadt, 'The making of the instauration: science, politics and law in the career of Francis Bacon,' Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1987, p. 82.

[23] *The works*, VIII, p. 109.

[24] Vickers, *Francis Bacon* , pp. 54-5.
[25] Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, pp. 169-73.
[26] Paolo Rossi, 'Bacon's idea of science,' in Markku Peltonen ed, *The Cambridge companion to Bacon* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 25-46; Antonio Pérez-Ramos, 'Bacon's legacy,' in ibid., p. 328.
[27] *The works*, IV, p. 101.
[28] *The works*, V, p. 12.
[29] Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, p. 34.
[30] Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, p. 36.
[31] *The works*, IV, p. 21.
[32] *The works*, XIII, p. 6.
[33] *The works*, VI, p. 705.
[34] *The works*, VI, pp. 501, 403, 722.
[35] Markku Peltonen, *Classical humanism and republicanism in English political thought 1570- 1640* (Cambridge, 1995), pp 139-45; Brian Vickers, 'Bacon's so-called "utilitarianism": sources and influences,' in Maria Fattori ed., *Francis Bacon, terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo* (Roma, 1984), pp. 281-313.
[36] *The works*, XIV, pp 373; VII, pp. 13-14; V, p. 79.
[37] *The works*, III, pp. 474, 270, 428-9.
[38] Antonio Pérez-Ramos, 'Lawyer at large: variations on old Baconian themes,' *Physis Rivistainternazionale di storia della scienza*, nuova serie, 31 (1994), pp. 341-53.
[39] *The works*, IV, pp. 11-12.
[40] *The works*, IV, p. 114.
[41] *The works*, IV, p. 8.
[42] *The works*, IV, pp. 372-373.
[43] Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, p. 174.
[44] *The works*,III, pp. 476-7.
[45] Benjamin Farrington, *The philosophy of Francis Bacon: an essay on its development from 1603 to 1609 with new translations of fundamental texts* (Liverpool, 1964), pp. 94-5; *The Works,* III, p. 613.
[46]*The works*, XI, p. 335.
[47] *The works*, VII, p 48; Francis Bacon, *The essayes or counsell civill and morall*, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford, 1985), pp. 95-6.
[48] *The works*, IV, pp. 372-3.
[49] *The works*, III, p. 142.
[50] Markku Peltonen, 'Politics and science: Francis Bacon and the true greatness of states,' *Historical Journal*, 35 (1992), pp. 294-5.
[51] Peltonen, 'Politics,' pp. 294-5.
[52] Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, p. 487.

[53] Jerry Weinberger, *Science, faith and politics: Francis Bacon and the utopian roots of the modern age* (Ithaca, 1985), pp. 19-21, 28, 29, 128, 132-3, 199; HowardB. White, *Peace among the willows: the political philosophy of Francis Bacon* (The Hague, 1968), p. 11.

[54] Martin, *Francis Bacon.*

Ari Helo

IS THERE A MORAL POINT TO REPUBLICANISM?

Jefferson's Ethics of Virtue and the Modern Notion of History

Introduction

When concentrating on tracing the so-called Machiavellian elements in early modern and modern political thinking, most historians, in both departments of history and political science, seem to be surprisingly uninterested in what can still be thought of as the most interesting question of the whole scheme: what are and what have been the usual arguments for circumventing the obvious moral deficiencies of this science of republicanism in its development into various versions of *realpolitik*.[1]

Leaving aside the problem of the Lockean-derived liberal understanding of what politics is about my question is: what is the morality of the conception of the polity as something that begins, to use Hannah Arendt's language, before any fully institutionalized forms of the public sphere? In fact, even the recent discussion of the term "deliberative democracy" involves all the basic elements of the long-lasting debate over the relation between the Lockean and the so-called republican paradigm(s).[2] As a historian I will not seek to actually answer the question, but only to illuminate it with a historical example that concerns the longstanding coexistence of human rights thinking and slavery.

Most European intellectuals, while keen on situating recent developments in the European Union in various historical contexts, show little interest in the early history of the only superpower in the world today, the United States. Some academics from those former colonies dare claim that the American founding fathers had some crucially modern thoughts in mind when forming "a more perfect Union" in 1776–1789, and that they helped the French in articulating what it is that we, modern "republicans," still think of such an intellectually basic issue as human rights.

There is a classic question of whether one of the most respected historical figures of the American founding, Thomas Jefferson, truly believed what he wrote in the American Declaration of Independence about the "self-evident" truths that "all men are created equal" and therefore entitled to the inalienable rights of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." This question arises from a simple historical fact about the author himself. Jefferson was not only the central figure in the American Enlightenment, or only the third president of the United States, or only the first leader of the present American Democratic Party – but also one of the largest slaveholders in the country.[3]

This article will suggest that Jefferson's characteristically eighteenth-century understanding of the grand concept of progress suffices as the historical, intellectual context for explaining his conduct of the slavery question. Whether or not one would see Jefferson's moral dilemma as interesting in itself, there is a theoretical aspect to all this, and it has much to do with republicanism as handled by both historians and political theorists. Quentin Skinner's, I would think, a bit hastily formulated maxim that "unless we place our duties before our rights, we must expect to find our rights themselves undermined" would leave us poor historians with exactly the same moral anomaly as the Machiavellian Prince himself.[4] Were our rights truly known, we hardly need moral philosophy for anything. As it comes to the relation between politics and morality, one may well ask could there possibly be anything wrong in a human effort to unite Italy, if not Europe? And if not, what is the statesman's duty in this respect?

For a historian it may still appear worthwhile to cling to the conception of "the Aristotelian polity as the paradigm of all civic humanism" as offered by J.G.A. Pocock, in *The Machiavellian Moment*

(1975) a quarter of a century ago. His approach, in fact, seems to offer a sufficient rationale for freeing historians, though hardly political theorists, from precisely the kind of anomaly Skinner's formulation would still leave us with.

The purpose of this article is to outline how civic humanism can be seen as related to modern individualism by studying Jefferson's understanding of the slavery question. Then will follow an examination of what can be understood as the fundamental paradigm of all republican thinking in relation to a whole series of paradigms in the field of political science throughout Western history, ranging from Aristotle up to the most recent visions of a new republicanism.

Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and a Vision of Hope and Fear

Thomas Jefferson, as is well known, was not only the author of the Declaration of Independence. In his home state he played the key role in the committee to revise Virginia's civil legislation and drafted the famous statute for religious freedom. He also advocated the abolition of primogeniture and, though in vain, the extension of universal male suffrage. As the Secretary of State in George Washington's cabinet he became a bitter opponent of the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, whose large-scale fiscal program – based on the idea of a permanent national debt – strongly favored commercial interests and manufacturing. Jefferson, who always remained skeptical about the patriotism of the financial elite of the north and of Hamilton as their spokesman, became the nation's leading advocate of extensive democratic rights and a visionary with regard to rural, agrarian America. To a large extent the first American party system, the Hamilton-minded Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans, resulted from the fundamental differences of opinion between these two visionaries. In 1800 the Federalists lost the battle. Jefferson was elected to be the third president of the United States and the period known as the Jeffersonian era began. Whether this so-called Revolution of 1800 should be counted historically as a triumph of modern, democratic society is quite another matter.

Historically speaking, of course, the term "republicanism" refers to a combination of Aristotelian and Polybian patterns of thinking in politics centered on the concepts of public virtue and the balance of governmental powers, the latter offering the theoretical basis for securing public virtue against political corruption. The constituents of the ideal mixed regime (the republic) were handled in terms of the Aristotelian-inspired, sociopolitical grouping of the people – living in any human association describable as the state – into the one, the few, and the many. Each of these constituents of the classical ideal of the republic was supposed to embody an aspect of civic virtue so that the polity as a whole would be held stable against the ever-present threat of corruption. In this sense early modern political science was a science of civic virtue aimed at defining the best theoretical way to secure the state against the corruption of the civic virtue of either prince, his court, or the citizenry.[5]

To summarize the intellectual framework of the American foundation in terms of this view: the origins of American republican thought can be traced back to the Aristotelian ideal of a mixed regime and to the Polybian view of cyclical history in which political corruption and the renewal of civic virtue frequently succeed each other. The early modern characteristics of American political thinking, in turn, can be seen as originating in the teachings of Machiavelli and other Renaissance political writers, while its neoclassical elements are often associated with such English republicans as James Harrington and Algernon Sidney. Finally, the immediate ideological context of the thinking of the revolutionary generation is definable not so much in terms of Lockean social contract theory as in terms of post-Lockean political thought, represented by Blackstone, Bolingbroke, and the pseudonymous Cato (Trenchard and Gordon), a group of thinkers more or less explicitly identifiable as the Country ideologists.[6] The central question arising out of this intellectual framework was to what extent the commercial interests of the king and the Parliament, comprising "a court," in opposition to the gentry and the people, comprising "a country," were corrupting civic virtue and deforming the ancient, presumably mixed, British constitution. In John Adams's words, England was like Rome in decline, "a venal city, ripe for destruction, if it can only find a purchaser."[7]

My suggestion is that Thomas Jefferson saw the American Revolution as the renewal of the Lockean principles of government simply because the corrupt British government had violated those principles. What, in Jefferson's eyes, was truly novel and even perhaps epoch-making in the American founding was that it drew heavily on the superiority of the modern, historically self-conscious understanding of political freedom in the sense that the natural rights of man were a matter of morality only there where people themselves manifested such rights in reality. For Jefferson republicanism was about preserving, not about creating, one's rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

From a sociopolitical perspective this view stood in sharp contrast to the early modern, totally extra-historical notion of the naturalness of social hierarchies. In Jefferson's words, the republic was a "state of society in which every member of mature and sound mind has an equal right of participation, personally, in the direction of the affairs of the society."[8] Such a "state of society" was not equivalent to the form of government, for Jefferson treated it as an ideal towards which "all governments" should be directed. He, in sum, spoke of the notion of the polity; i.e., the perspective from which political discussion is always prior to any historical social ordering of the human regime.[9]

Considering the complicated historical relationship between the notions of personal freedom and of civic humanism, it still seems useful to peruse John Pocock's fundamental thesis in *The Machiavellian Moment* according to which Renaissance republican thought marks the emergence of the first mode of historicist thought in Western intellectual history.[10] Few historical studies in republican thought have been so often and so severely criticized as this one, and most often criticism has been offered without any consideration as to how Pocock's mystic "moments" relate to historicist thinking.

The machiavellian "moment" is a seized "present," a relative permanence of time, acquirable by means of human, individual action and possible only within a rudimentarily linear conception of time related with the notion of politics. Being only an early modern view, it was still fully circumscribed by the notion of a closed future in two ways. Firstly, it was linked to the Polybian view of the inescapable, cyclical recurrence of different forms of government; secondly, it was linked to the central Christian notion of truly meaningful

time, namely the non-recurrent cycle of time linking the Fall and the Redemption.

Pocock's central concept, the "machiavellian moment," is in his words "a name for the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal finitude." The notion of "conceptualized time" might be identified with the concept of process. In distinction from mere narrative, whether historical or fictional, which is based on a linear view of time and explains things as a sequence of occurrences, process is something that includes time as only one of its dimensions.[11] To take an example, the Christian meaning of the sacred time; the Fall and the Redemption may be taken as a type of process, which, due to its fundamental significance to an individual Christian, must take precedence over any secular type of occurrence, whether personal or public. This is why Pocock points out how "to a Christian it would appear that the primacy of politics was possible only on the blasphemous supposition that some *civitas saecularis* could be the *civitas Dei*."[12]

Two kinds of processes must be distinguished. Pocock formulates the distinction by noting that, "the being and not-being of a thing is not identical with the replacement of the thing by another thing: it is a closed process whereas the latter is open-ended."[13] In terms of the early modern Christian view, the argument goes, a political event was bound to take place within the Polybian scheme of the transience of governments. It could amount to an act of replacement, but not to any truly meaningful change in terms of the only significant process, namely that of the Fall and the Redemption. All human attempts to build up a system of justice were doomed to repeat the story of the Fall.[14] Even if the central Christian time conception is taken to be a linear one, it is certainly not open-ended in terms of the future, which explains its use for various eschatological notions of politics.[15]

In Renaissance civic humanism the novel element, therefore, was the consideration of the domain of politics as something truly significant despite its lack of eschatological meaning. In this sense the Machiavellian notion of politics as a specific sphere of human action contributed to the gradual emergence of the secular Western world view that made particular events and individuals significant, in striking contrast to the medieval philosophy that found significance only in universals and in certain extra-temporal truths of theology.[16] An

individual, not only his soul, was coming to be seen as something worth consideration within time.

The Aristotelian and Machiavellian elements of civic humanism should not be confused with each other, for they serve quite different functions in relation to the fundamental question about human agency in history. For Aristotle it was clear that the extension of democracy in Athens ever since Solon did not occur "according to Solon's intention but as a result of circumstances."[17] The Machiavellian Prince is first and foremost an actor on the historical stage. He acts in a distinct sphere of human action defined as political. Therefore the ancient figures of Lycurgus and Solon could be excluded from this scheme as mere reformers.[18]

The tragic element of the Machiavellian figure of the prince stems from the perception of the historical particularity of man as an individual, albeit still only as a political being, no matter how universally benevolent his ends may appear. Anyone who subscribes to human historicity simultaneously submits himself to the notion of mere replacement of a thing with another thing and so on, potentially *ad infinitum*, meaning that the process he intends to contribute to is recognized as open-ended.[19] In a truly open-ended process all the consequences of any particular action can never be fully known. As a political being one may become aware of both the conception of secular history as an entity in itself and of oneself as an agent within that history. Yet, within the early modern view, no statesman questions the only non-recurrent cycle of time between the Fall and Redemption as the ultimate image of all history. Regarding any effort to build up a merely human system of justice this means, in Pocock's words, that "the politicization of virtue had arrived at the discovery of a politicized version of original sin."[20]

It is only what Pocock calls the "Rousseauean moment" that associates the ancient notion of man as naturally political with the notion of man as an individual within, at least, a rudimentarily open-ended view of all history – not only political history. It consists of finding the individual in a constant process of becoming alienated from the Rousseauean natural sociability of man, the latter notion being fully distinguishable from the contemporary, merely historical and by definition partly twisted, social order of modern, eighteenth-century society. Reversing this unfortunate development of Western

society – which apparently was going on despite all "the modernists" and their talk about progress – could occur only by turning back to the politics of small republics.[21]

What makes the Rousseauean scheme a "moment" is that it represents neither a mere description of the state of things, nor a utopian vision. Instead, it can be viewed as a call for the individual to conceive the fate of mankind as a process in a purely secular sense of the term. It was now secular history itself that mattered: man in history was both the subject and the agent of the process.[22] This is, broadly speaking, why Rousseau's political thought marks the emergence of the view in which the ultimate significance of the process of history became converted from Christian eschatology into a secular ideology connected with the image of the modern individual. In Pocock's words, "since by its nature society humanized man and by the same processes distracted and alienated him again, there was no point in past, present, or future time at which this double effect had not been going on."[23] The historical vision flowing from this view is equally ambiguous, for it consists of both hope and fear. It is this perspective which gives rise to Pocock's assertion that

> the quarrel between civic virtue and secular time has been one of the main sources of the Western awareness of human historicity; but at the same time, the continued conduct of this quarrel – largely because it is anchored in a concern for the moral stability of the human personality – has perpetuated a premodern view of history as a movement away from the norms defining that stability, and so as essentially uncreative and entropic where it does not attain to millennium or utopia.[24]

There are certain doctrinaire aspects related to the prevailing liberal approach to the history of the American founding that tend unnecessarily to brand any pattern of sociopolitical thinking short of Lockean liberal ideology as inherently incapable of envisioning a better future. The term "ideology" has a myriad of meanings and connotations. Most often, perhaps, it is used to refer to what Bernard Yack characterizes as "grand ideologies that involve claims about the direction of human history."[25] It might be illuminating to distinguish ideological thinking from idealistic one in terms of such concepts as distribution of political power and differentiation among

the members of society. Contrary to what I would call a purely "idealistic" perspective – that fully acknowledges only the presumably Lockean and definitely ahistorical, view of free society as inherently non-political and fundamentally alien to all notions of social differentiation – it is the fundamental presumption of the historicist perspective that in order to have an ideology one would first have to admit that society is always historical, and therefore, inevitably differentiated as well. Human society is inhabited, not by some standard ideal of man as equivalent to the individual, but by people, who are genuinely different precisely because they are historical, cultural, and individual, beings.[26]

This is why the so-called Country argument used in British politics in the early eighteenth century can be called an ideology, although it was confined to being only a "vision" of "English politics."[27] This is also what was at stake with the constant discussion among eighteenth-century enlightenment thinkers who viewed civil society as distinguishable from the natural law conception of the absolutely free and absolutely moral "state of nature." Ideally, or metaphysically, or *only* theoretically speaking, all mankind had always lived (and was always to live) under the moral law of nature, while ideologically the problem was how best apply the dictates of that law to historical reality. Most often it was claimed that the best chance to discharge one's moral duties was to cling to the notion of civil society and to the possibilities it offered in terms of human perfection.

In this respect it usually made little difference whether such a scheme of progress was expressed in terms of three rather than four different stages of history.[28] Given the fact that Thomas Jefferson personally translated Destutt de Tracy's *A Critical Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws*, the book appears quite applicable as a point of departure in studying Jefferson's thought of history. The authors vision consisted of three phases of civilization as epitomized in certain general patterns of thinking and the corresponding political modes of society:

> I noticed that the human mind is progressive in the social as in all other sciences, that democracy or despotism were the first governments imagined by men, and mark the first degree of civilization .... that aristocracy under one or more chiefs, whatever name may be given to it, has every

> where taken the place of these in artificial governments, and constitutes the second degree of civilization .... and that representative democracy under one or several delegates, is a new invention, which forms and constitutes the third degree of civilization. I added, that in the first state, it is ignorance which governs or force that dictates .... in the second, opinions are formed, and religion has the greatest power .... in the third, reason begins to prevail and philosophy has more influence.[29]

This is a kind of progress theory based on Montesquieu's categorization of different governments. Most importantly, however, Destutt de Tracy is arguing that general ignorance may bring about a pure democracy just as well as pure despotism. This ambiguity results from the fundamental presumption lurking behind the author's, as well as Jefferson's, view of scientific progress, namely that representative government – which coincided with the predominance of reason – is the regime by which man may gain control over the course of his history. That the idea of natural, inalienable rights of man was a necessity for this ideological endeavor to get into control of one's history is what shall be discussed.

Jefferson's Inalienable Rights to Preserve the Freedom of Free Man

Whether or not there is a break between the Jeffersonian and Lockean views of natural rights depends on what is claimed about them. What is known, is that in the Declaration of Independence Jefferson replaced the third item on Locke's famous list of the natural rights, "property," with "the pursuit of happiness." This is how the doctrine of the natural rights of man is referred to in the famous preamble to the Declaration of Independence:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government...[30]

Even while Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration seems epistemologically more consistent than the final one, because he, in the former, spoke of "the preservation of" these rights rather than only of "rights to" or "rights of" life and liberty, there is no doubt that both the original draft and the Declaration hold that an individual cannot morally alienate such rights from oneself.[31]

Morton White's renowned account of Jefferson's rights thinking, *The Philosophy of the American Revolution* (1978), relies too heavily on the idea that the term "unalienable" makes the very notion of a right fully reciprocal with that of a duty in the spirit of Samuel Pufendorf's category of the perfect rights. This view led him to argue that, in Jefferson's view, once a given individual has a morally inalienable right to preserve his life and liberty, he must find himself under the duty to preserve them.[32] Thus far, the duties and rights seem to be in balance; but in order to hold that the pursuit of happiness would be a morally inalienable right, one is compelled to argue that every free man must be, not only under some natural constraint but also under the moral obligation to pursue happiness. The traditional voluntarist argument would be, in fact, necessary to make this reading of the Declaration entirely comprehensible. Such an interpretation is totally incompatible with Jefferson's own assertion that "in strict language" man cannot owe moral duties to himself.[33]

The most logical way to maintain that the rights of "the preservation" of one's life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are undeniable, and even perhaps self-evident, seems to be to conceive of these rights as rights to activities including their own ends. When Jefferson suggested corrections to the Marquis de Lafayette's draft for the French declaration of rights, he crossed out the term "property" among the inalienable rights of man, but accepted the notion of the preservation of the use of human faculties among them.[34] Once again in 1817 Jefferson enumerated the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and this time supplemented the list with the right to use "our faculties."[35]

Jefferson's consistent interest in the notion of the free use of one's faculties brings his view close to the Aristotelian conception of *praxis*. Morton White brings up this explanation only in the appendix of his book, which is probably due to his unstated assumption that the use of such an argument would be tantamount to maintaining that Jefferson believed in Aristotelian elitist social views.

On the whole, ancient virtue ethics examine the objectively best way of living. Yet, regarding Garrett Ward Sheldon's formulation of the widely held understanding of all ancient ethics, namely that "classical social ethics ... imply an objective standard – revealed by God or determined collectively," it is necessary, for reasons of clarity, to note that the eudaimonistic view of morality does not in itself demand a once and for all settled view of such a standard.[36] As John McDowell has pointed out, the Aristotelian definition of the good for man (*eudaimonia*) as "rational activity in accordance with excellence" does not have to be interpreted as if it excludes all "competing views about what it is the business of a human being to do."[37] To fully grasp the historicist aspect of this view, it is useful to pay attention to John McDowell's central thesis that all choices which reveal something of the character of the agent – and which the agent always makes by the means of his moral virtue and for the sake of truly eudaimonistic ends – can be viewed as cases of "doing well here and now."[38]

Indeed, as far as there is to be found any fixed view of man in Jefferson's moral thought, it results from the conception of the morally inalienable rights of a free man to preserve his free agency and moral responsibility, meaning that the individual is morally bound to preserve his freedom whenever such freedom has been truly achieved. In other words, freedom is meaningful only in the framework of historical time. In his often quoted letter of June 13, 1814 to Thomas Law Jefferson turned the whole issue of morality in the language of virtue ethics by noting that "nature has constituted utility to man the standard and test of virtue. Men living in different countries, under different circumstances, different habits, and regimens, may have different utilities."[39]

Jefferson should not be dismissed as a utilitarian thinker on this account. First of all, he never suggested that a man's virtue could be defined by the number of people whose happiness he has managed to advocate. Instead, virtue always devolved from the notion of justice. Second, human capacity for virtue was inherent in every man. Third, any virtuous character trait had to comply with human sociability in order to appear as a real virtue.

To his nephew, Peter Carr, Jefferson once sent a list of reading material for religious studies with the advice that the young man should not feel despair even if he would end up thinking that "there is no

god," because he would find "incitements to virtue in comfort and pleasantness you feel in it's exercise."[40] Virtue, in Jefferson's eyes, was a matter of habitual exercise of desirable behavior in the most classical sense of the term: moral virtues were always acquired first as mere habits. "Politeness is artificial good humor," wrote Jefferson, "it covers the natural want of it, and ends by rendering habitual a substitute nearly equivalent to the real virtue."[41] Politeness, of course, would equal the real virtue after the person in question had acquired it as a personal, permanent disposition of mind. Morality was a sheer matter of learning and practicing virtue. Thence, it was best to "be very select in the society you attach yourself to," as Jefferson wrote to his grandson, Thomas Jefferson Randolph, strongly advising him to "avoid taverns, smoakers, and idlers and dissipated persons generally."[42]

Political and personal virtues were strictly linked together. When explicating his preference for the agrarian America over contemporary European social models, Jefferson famously asserted that "the mobs of the great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body." This conclusion followed from the inherent distinction between the Jeffersonian image of the socio-economically autonomous yeoman and "the manufacturing man." Men in manufacture and trade were dependent for their subsistence "on the casualties and caprice of customers." It was this "dependance" that suffocated "the germ of virtue," while they were only "the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigour." Finally, a "degeneracy" in these manners was what Jefferson called "a canker which soon eats to the heart of … the laws and constitution" of the republic.[43]

Most essentially the menace of the corruption of virtue could not be eradicated by clinging to any particular form of government. Nor could the American Revolution make any drastic change in this respect. Such a threat simply concerned all human virtues in all history. The central concept of all republicanism, civic virtue, referred to the human capacity for self-government in the sense that some good was seen to inhere in the idea of self-government itself. Corruption was what happened to people in terms of their *political freedom*, due to the absence of virtue.

As Pocock formulates this position in relation to the Revolution, "there was no remedy which Americans could seek short of

rinnovazione and *ridurre ai principii*; a return to the fundamental principles … of the constitution of the commonwealth itself."[44] Considering the Revolution in terms of the renewal of civic virtue meant considering it in terms of the cyclical, Polybian notion of political history, meaning that it was conceivable as a return from a corrupted regime to an uncorrupted one. In this sense it made little difference what specific kind of mixed or unmixed regime one was dealing with, since what was known was that whether mixed or not, the British regime had failed to hold corruption at bay.

In Jefferson's view, corruption in manners was always a hindrance toward more civilized modes of sociability and common understanding of the dictates of natural law. In its extreme form, when even the natural duties became neglected, moral depravation was a threat to the very existence of a society. Jefferson remained constantly worried about the apparent lack of virtue among his fellow citizens. This was the case even with the revolutionary elite of the slaveholders, whose moral instincts suddenly ceased to function whenever their property in slaves was at stake: "What a stupendous … machine is man," lamented Jefferson, when noting how an individual could "inflict on his fellow men a bondage, one hour of which is fraught with more misery than ages of that which he rose in rebellion to oppose."[45] By taking a closer look at how Jefferson described the moral depravation in the courts of Europe the picture becomes even clearer:

> The practice of Kings marrying only in the families of Kings, has been that of Europe for centuries. Now, take any race of animals, confine them in idleness and inaction, whether in a stye, a stable, or a stateroom, pamper them with high diet, gratify all their sexual appetites, immerse them in sensualities, nourish their passions, let everything bend before them, and banish whatever might lead them to think, and in a few generations they become all body and no mind … Louis the XVI. was a fool, The Queen of Portugal, A Braganza, was an idiot by nature. And so was the King of Denmark … Gustavus of Sweden, and Joseph of Austria were really crazy, George of England, you know, was in a straight waistcoat… In this state Bonaparte found Europe; and it was this state of its rulers which lost it with scarce a struggle.[46]

No wonder, the classical language of republicanism made perfect sense to Jefferson, who, even as a stern believer in the moral progress

of all mankind as a whole, wrote: "God bless … all our rulers, and give them the wisdom … to fortify us against the degeneracy of one government, and the concentration of all its powers in the hands of the one, the few, the well-born or the many."[47]

Jefferson's Letter to Edward Coles

To clarify how central the notions of moral training and the constant exercise of the human faculties were for Jefferson's thought regarding the slavery problem, it is necessary to examine in some detail his astonishingly harsh views on the "deteriorated state" of the black man in the letter he wrote to Edward Coles in 1814. Edward Coles was a former secretary of President James Madison and one of the most ardent opponents of slavery among the Virginian slaveholding elite. In the letter in question Jefferson not only denied his support for Coles's plan of emancipating his slaves and migrating with them to Illinois, but also held that it would be unpatriotic on Coles's part to leave his home state, Virginia.[48] What makes his stunningly harsh assessment of the slaves particularly interesting here is that it was, once again, articulated in terms of human virtues (excellences) and moral training in both practice and in theory:

> The love of justice and the love of country plead equally the cause of these people, and it is a moral reproach to us that they should have pleaded it so long in vain, and should have produced not a single effort, nay I fear not much serious willingness to relieve them & ourselves from our present condition of moral and political reprobation … For men probably of any color, but of this we know, brought from their infancy without necessity for thought and forecast, are by their habits rendered as incapable as children of taking care of themselves, and are extinguished promptly wherever industry is necessary for raising young. In the mean time they are pest in society by their idleness, and the depredations to which this leads them … Their amalgamation with the other color produces a degradation to which no lover of his country, no lover of excellence in the human character can innocently consent.[49]

The most obnoxious feature of the argumentation here consists of Jefferson's comment on how "no lover of excellence in human char-

acter" can hope for the amalgamation of the black man with white society. The blueprint seems to be that the degraded condition of the African-American is in itself a deficiency of "the excellence in the human character," and that the black man suffers from this deficiency simply because of being a black man. Such a notion suggests that moral virtue, in the case of the black race, is perhaps not simply an inherent moral quality susceptible of individual exercise and development, although Jefferson elsewhere handles it as derivable from the concept of the moral sense common to all of us.

What Jefferson probably meant to say when resorting to such an argument, however, was that slavery was the cause of such a thorough moral degradation among its victims. Rearing a child in slavery was analogous to bringing up a child in freedom. It was only that bringing up a slave was meant to deprive that individual of the very possibility of virtue – namely, by keeping that person in the state of an innocent child and therefore incapable of moral reflection.

In Jefferson's memorandum on Condorcet's treatment of the slavery issue, the notion of the slave as someone deprived of the very use of human faculties to pursue happiness was stated in the following terms: "In fact the slave is despoiled not only of all property moveable and immoveable but of the faculties of acquiring it, of property in his time, in his strength, of whatever nature had endowed him with to preserve his life or to satisfy his wants. To this wrong is added that of taking from the slave the right to dispose of his person."[50] In other words, it was the exercise of virtuous dispositions that truly made man an individual and that was what the slave was not allowed to attain.

Jefferson's suspicions about Edward Coles's implicit advocacy of an immediate slave emancipation against public opinion can be seen as deeply connected with the idea of a man acting as the liberator of another human being when the other had been deprived of his inalienable rights as an individual. Given the view that the slave had been deprived of his free will, making a man a moral being was at issue here. There was a remarkable difference between viewing the Revolution as the act of retaining one's inalienable rights and as that of embarking on the mission of liberating other human beings. Regarding the end the method was of crucial importance, as Jefferson made clear to the young Coles:

> As to the method by which this difficult work is to be effected, if permitted to be done by ourselves, I have seen no proposition so expedient on the whole, as that as emancipation of those born after a given day, and of their education and expatriation after a given age. This would give time for gradual extinction of that species of labour & substitution of another, and lessen the severity of the shock which an operation so fundamental cannot fail to produce.[51]

This emancipation program offered to Coles in 1814 was something Jefferson had advocated for thirty years. In the only book Jefferson ever published, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1787), he had proposed that black children should be allowed to stay with their parents only "to a certain age, then be brought up, at the public expense, to tillage, arts or sciences, according to their geniusses, till the females should be eighteen, and the males twenty-one years of age, when they should be colonized to such place as the circumstances of the time should render most proper, sending them out with arms, implements of houshold and of the handicraft arts, feeds, pairs of the useful domestic animals, &c."[52]

Jefferson, in other words, thought that slaves were not proper educators, or tutors, for the first black generation destined for freedom. He did not intend to free adult slaves, but suggested freeing black children who had been educated for freedom by white society. Nor does he ever seem to have suggested that the educators would inquire whether their "students of freedom" would choose to stay among the oppressors of their parents or leave them for good when allowed to do that. This was really a modernization program à la Rousseau: people had to be forced to accept their freedom. Jefferson's program was not suggested as the most humane way of bringing about general emancipation, but as the only method for ensuring the emancipation without risking a large-scale slave rebellion, and most importantly, a civil war in his home republic. This is how Jefferson expressed his concern about the role of the emancipator to Edward Coles in 1814:

> This enterprise ... shall have all my prayers, & these are the only weapons of an old man. But in the mean time are you right in abandoning this property, and your country with it? I think not ... I hope then, my dear sir, you will reconcile yourself to your country and its unfortunate

> condition; that you will not lessen its stock of sound disposition by withdrawing your portion of the mass. That, on the contrary you will come forward in the public councils, become the missionary of this doctrine truly christian; insinuate & inculcate it softly but steadily, through the medium of writing and conversation; associate your labors, and when the phalanx is formed, bring on and press the proposition perseveringly until its accomplishment. It is an encouraging observation that no good measure was ever proposed, which, if duly pursued, failed to prevail in the end.[53]

Jefferson simply asked Edward Coles to stay in Virginia because of Coles's "sound disposition." Virginia, in Jefferson's eyes, was in need of men like himself and his most trusted friend, James Madison – slaveholders who sought to get rid of the distinct "nation in chains," as historian Peter Onuf has described the status of all African-Americans in Jefferson's eyes.[54] Jefferson warned Coles of too much sensibility, which would only serve to weaken the antislavery cause in Virginia and deepen the conflict between the free and the slave states on the national level.

The use of the term "innocently" in Jefferson's statement according to which "no lover of excellence in the human character can innocently consent" to the idea of amalgamating ex-slaves into American society is particularly interesting. His use of the term "innocently" in such a context suggests that Coles erred if he regarded private manumission to be an innocent act. Benevolent motives did not make Coles an innocent benefactor of mankind, but rather a fool who seriously confused the ends with the means. No conception of an innocent adult was involved in Jefferson's moral outlook, for people without full moral responsibility were not what he said he loved in his countrymen. This is how he compared himself as an American founding father with the founders of the Colombian republic: "We both consider the people as our children, and love them with parental affection. But you love them as infants whom you are afraid to trust without nurses; and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-government."[55]

Finally, it is worth remarking that when this latter part of the Coles letter is considered in the context of the alleged deficiency in virtue among the slave population, it appears that when speaking of "their amalgamation with the other color" Jefferson did not necessarily re-

fer to genetic racial mixing. Coles's plan of settling his slaves as tenants among free, white farmers in Illinois did not entail racial mixing, while it certainly would have led to creating a class of free blacks in white society, at least temporarily.[56]

This is not to argue that Jefferson could not have been equally worried about the possibility that any such plan would end with "miscegenation." Jefferson's abhorrence towards racial mixture, as he indicated in *Notes on the State of Virginia*, had led him to take a stand according to which "a lover of natural history" must be allowed to "excuse an effort to keep those in the department of man as distinct as nature has formed them."[57] He appears to be asking Coles to consider the threat that his plan might – in the long run – serve to advance an unnatural process in terms of Jefferson's stunningly premodern view of natural history. Breaking with the known principle of prudence that "ignorance is preferable to error" could on no account be deemed a matter of simple, pure benevolence. In Jefferson's eyes, the emancipation of slaves was a political issue just as much as it was a moral one. Virtue always devolved from morality, but it was identifiable with its utility.

To conclude: on Jefferson's position regarding slavery, three main points are worth keeping in mind. First, even while Jefferson was a genuine racist, his distaste for any permanent mixture of races in the United States, in fact, emanated from the fear of civil conflict in the federal republic in the case that former slaves would be allowed to remain in the country and form a racially distinct lower class of American society. Second, during his political career, both as a legislator in Virginia and as the President of the United States he hardly ever aimed at weakening the legal, institutional basis of slavery itself, but seems rather to have thought that without its being strictly regulated it would remain impossible to abolish such an efficient economic arrangement of labor by a commonly made, purely political, decision. Third, regardless of what he thought of racial issues as such – for he was not certain what to think of them – it was his lifelong precondition for the general abolition of slavery that free Americans must get rid of not only the institution, but also the slave population itself.

The ultimate rationale for Jefferson's position, in sum, was his constant concern about the possibility that the slavery question, if not

solved in a methodologically right way, would inevitably lead either to a racial or a civil war in the American republic itself. In this sense, he was a predecessor of Abraham Lincoln, who faced exactly the situation Jefferson for the whole of his life had feared.

History and the Republican Paradigm(s)

It is time to return to the central ideological problem of the Jeffersonian progressive view of history, namely how to gain control over that history in a given polity. The prevailing interpretation of the historical meaning of the American founding rests heavily on the view that the adoption of the Constitution marks the fundamental replacement of early modern notions of a mixed constitution by a modern, constitutionally mixed, notion of government. In other words, political science was finally abstracted from the notion of sociopolitical elites, and, consequently, from the classical notion of politics as based on the balance between the Aristotelian concepts of the one, the few, and the many.[58] Next it will be discussed how this view can be connected with a certain, historicist, notion of the civic humanist paradigm.

Contrary to what is usually thought, the very idea that American political thought detached itself from the classical republicanism is not historically antagonistic to what can be taken to be the paradigm of civic humanism. In so far as such a "paradigm" is supposed to concern republican language, it does not represent an ideology or an "ism," in itself. Even when considered as a kind of theoretical presumption of what republican language is about, Pocock's characterization of civic humanist thought – as it pertains to historical study – is supposed to function only as a method for historical study of political discussion. From a historian's point of view it is quite possible to reserve the paradigm, in Pocock's works, "to denote to its employment as an interpretative matrix."[59]

What makes the republican language "true" in a historical sense, is simply that its usage by various historical political thinkers has been documented.[60] One should distinguish between the republican language and the paradigms of political science, whether classical,

neoclassical, or modern, as well as distinguish between them and the particular theories occurring within such different scientific paradigms in the Kuhnian situation of "normal science." Most importantly, however, it is necessary not to confuse the use of a language with the particular political ideas of a given thinker deploying such a language.[61]

To illustrate the meaning of the latter point, it suffices to turn to Bernard Bailyn, who, after a careful categorization of different kinds of pamphlets issued during the American Revolution, notes that "some pamphlets were political events in themselves to which other pamphleteers responded."[62] This is, of course, how political discourse functions. Such "political events in themselves" may be understood as acts of speech in the sense that any of them may in itself create a new intertextual context for the one who takes the trouble to respond. Situating such a reciprocal event of discourse in a historical context, in turn, involves determining some extratextual political reality in which the writers acted, while it may also involve determining a historical language context in which the discourse itself appears meaningful.[63] Fundamentally, each and every such an act may be considered separately in terms of its historical context, meaning that historical interpretation in itself is always about determining the so-called "proper" political or historical context.

Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* provides a history of an Aristotelian-inspired language of republicanism more or less closely describable by the civic humanist paradigm.[64] The paradigm has very little to do with what is usually referred to as political Aristotelianism, because it allows us to subscribe to the notion that irreversible changes take place in history. The author's formulation of what the conception of polity is about is offered in terms of "a society" that in the eyes of classical republican thinkers was

> organized in such a manner that any theoretically conceivable group had opportunity to contribute to decisions in the way for which it was best fitted, while any individual citizen might contribute many times over, both as a member of any specialized group, for which his attainments might qualify him and as a member of the non-elite demos, the citizen body as a whole.[65]

The formulation, indeed, sounds broad, but its strength lies in the fact that it enables the historian to consider different political theories ranging from the classical period up to the early modern as well as the modern usages of political concepts within a single scheme. Most importantly, this formulation is not morally charged in any other sense than that "any theoretically conceivable group" *can* "contribute" to society in some theoretically conceivable way. There is no inherent reason even to consider such a contribution as equivalent to duty. The paradigm, then, is neither a political nor a moral theory in itself. It provides us with no theory of even the best way to theorize about the relation between people and their government, except in the suggestion that the theoretician should have something positive to say about how people are supposed to promote their own good in terms of any association describable as political.

Lance Banning's formulation of the paradigm is essentially similar to the one offered here, although he speaks of it only as either a classical or an early modern paradigm. The reason for this is that his definition involves the notion that each "individual attains his highest good" when "contributing his virtue to decisions." Such a notion about one's "highest good" does not inevitably belong to the paradigm when used for an historical analysis of a given polity. An individual's "highest good" may well lay elsewhere even while a given political society sees his political action as a true contribution to the common decision making process.[66]

It is of definite importance to distinguish between the theoretical efforts to formulate a republican political theory and the historical use of the Aristotelian polity as "the paradigm of all civic humanism."[67] The latter term refers simply to the historian's paradigm within which to compare different historical theories within different political paradigms.

To illuminate the distinction it is useful to discuss briefly Quentin Skinner's exceptional essay "The republican ideal of political liberty" (1990). What makes this essay exceptional is that it is an exercise in political science rather than in history even though written by a historian. Skinner, indeed, argues that the republican tradition can be turned into "a vision of politics." His vision aims at resolving nothing less than "a false dichotomy" which he identifies with Alasdair MacIntyre's insistence that there is a moral opposition "between lib-

eral individualism in some version or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some version or other."[68] In delineating the origins of this "false dichotomy" Skinner begins by reminding us of various formulations of negative and positive liberties put forward by such authorities on the liberal tradition as Jeremy Bentham, Isaiah Berlin, and Donald Dworkin. Then he contradicts the liberal tradition with what he calls "the exercise theory of liberty" embraced by such more or less Aristotelian-inspired theorists as Hannah Arendt, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor.[69] I doubt whether the dichotomy is as false as Skinner presumes.

Tracing the anti-Aristotelian elements in Machiavellian republicanism, Skinner works out a broad republican thesis of politics, and asserts that "the Aristotelian and Thomist assumption that a healthy public life must be founded on a conception of *eudaimonia* is by no means the only alternative tradition available to us if we wish to recapture a vision of politics based not merely on procedures but on common meanings and purposes."[70] Skinner offers us "the traditions of Machiavellian republicanism as a third force" within which the "exercise theory of liberty" can be taken as compatible with modern rights theories. Even so, "the republican vision of politics" cannot tell "us how to construct a genuine democracy," because – as Skinner says – this is "for us to work out." All this, at least, seems fully compatible with the conception of *eudaimonia.* Nor is the Aristotelian notion of numerous, if not infinite, possibilities for organizing a workable regime in any sense antagonistic to Skinner's adherence to human agency in time. A genuine democracy is, indeed, a good idea.

What makes Skinner's argument problematic is his implicit suggestion that one can derive reliable normative proposition from the republican vision of politics itself, in the form of a warning "that unless we place our duties before our rights, we must expect to find our rights themselves undermined."[71] Speaking of duties as something to be preferred to something else means simply that one has no moral predicament to solve. Skinner, in other words, does not inform us what is the constitutive good from which such a "duty," or an imperative, or rationale as his notion of "placing our duties before our rights" is derivable. Nor is it clear whether such a good is supposed to be found as residing in the vision of republicanism.

The assertion that the republican tradition, or any other political view, in itself, may inform us of the necessity of seeing political awareness as a *duty* is vulnerable from the perspective of moral philosophy. It is like claiming that there is no real distinction between deontic and aretaic notions of morality. The strength of the historicist analysis of civic humanism is that no such claim is necessary, because republican thought can be viewed as consisting in the notion of virtues exercising powers; as Pocock states: "We know that the Aristotelian polity, the ultimate paradigm of all civic humanism, was simultaneously a distribution of political functions and powers and a partnership between many kinds of virtue."[72] Some good (or some human value) is simply presumed to exist among the people before a theorist may begin his work.

When regarded as an "interpretative matrix," the republican paradigm aims at disproving neither the deontic nor the aretaic views of morality; nor does it refute their respective historical notions of how morality relates to politics, if at all. What the paradigm refutes is merely taking paradigmatically ahistorical notions of morality and politics as the method of historical analysis of these concepts. As Alasdair MacIntyre phrases the question about the connections of history and morality: "There was the-morality-of-fourth-century-Athens, there were the-moralities-of-thirteenth-century-Western-Europe, there are numerous such moralities, but where ever was or is *morality* as such?"[73]

To return to the theme of the modern character of the American founding, one may conclude that speaking about constitutionalism by using classical terminology of virtue and corruption did not have to mean that no ideology was involved.[74] Neither Jefferson nor his adversaries lived under the spell of the Polybian notion of history. While Jefferson strongly believed in the general moral refinement of mankind, his fundamental concern was to preserve a confessedly historical, and admittedly morally deficient, human system of justice, the American republic. Nor did he ever think that the hypothetical failure of that experiment should be considered the final proof of a human incapacity for progress. It was the possibility of losing his political experiment in a war about slavery that most concerned him. It is good to bear in mind, however, that Jefferson was

an exceptional slaveholder due to his claim that there *was* a slavery question. One of the most "innovative" statements regarding this dilemma is undoubtedly the one put forward in Gerald Gunderson's *A New Economic History of America* (1976). He pinpoints the economic motives of the slaveholders in going to war in 1861 by noting that it was only the later "historians who failed to recognize that war was not necessarily always a poor course of action."[75]

History, of course, teaches us nothing, nor does a historical account of Jefferson's moral predicament. In relation to that problem we live in the post-bellum era. Yet, with our own moral predicaments – whether they concern animal rights, ethnic tensions in many member states of the European Union, or the continuously widening gap of living standards between our internet-freedom in the West and the reality of the underpaid (child) labor in the Third World – we might well live in an antebellum era. Perhaps practicing virtue simply means constant and conscious sensitivity to such obvious moral issues. As modern individuals we, of course, live in history ourselves and one may always ask whether there is a better reason for hope than for fear. This said, it remains only to state that even when interested in such "dramatic" academic ideas as finding politics in the language itself, we, in our own uses of language, no matter which Union we are discussing, hopefully never end up being only academic animals.

Notes

1 It is worth noting here that this article will not handle the problem to what extent eighteenth-century thinkers applied moral and political concepts to women. Only for practical reasons, I will therefore use the term "individual" as referring primarily to men, as I would guess did Hannah Arendt when stating that, "No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth." Arendt 1958, 1998, 234; I want to express my gratitude to Roger Clarke, Pasi Ihalainen, Allan Megill, and Peter Onuf, for their comments about the manuscript.

2 This is how James Bohman and William Rehg characterize deliberative democracy in discussing Jon Elster's essay on the concept: "Elster's essay brings out two key elements in the deliberative conception of democracy: that political deliberation requires citizens to go beyond private self-

interest of the "market" and orient themselves to public interests of the "forum"; and that deliberation from this civic standpoint is defensible only if it improves political decision making, especially with regard to achieving common ends. Both points invite further questions. Exactly how, for example, should one conceive the civic standpoint and public good? The classical civic-republican view stemming from Plato and Aristotle conceived the common good substantively, in terms of shared traditions, values, conceptions of virtue, and so forth. The quality of deliberation requires insight into, and the retrieval of, these traditions and values." Bohman & Rehg 1997, xiv.

3 This view has very little to do with the much discussed Thomas Jefferson-Sally Hemings relationship. The historical and historiographical aspects of that issue are best handled by Annette Gordon-Reed. See Gordon-Reed 1997, passim.; For particularly valid views on Jefferson's thinking in general, see, for example, Matthews 1984, passim. and Onuf 2000, passim.; On the relationship between republicanism and Jefferson's Republican Party, see Banning 1978.; For a balanced view of Jefferson scholarship generally, see Onuf 1993.

4 Quotation, Skinner 1990, 1993, 308-309.

5 See on "the science of civic virtue," Pocock 1975, 484; cf. Pocock 1988, 57.

6 Bailyn 1967, 1971, passim.

7 Bailyn 1967, 1971, 136.

8 Quotations, TJ to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816. Ford 12:7; TJ to Isaac H. Tiffany April 4, 1819. *Jefferson. His Political Writings*. (ed. by Dumbauldt) 1955, 55.

9 Quotations, Lienesch 1993, 1994, 330.

10 Pocock 1975, 3, 551.

11 See Pocock 1975, 5.

12 Pocock 1975, 552.

13 Pocock 1975, 5.

14 Pocock 1975, 77-78.

15 See Falk, 1988, 379.

16 Pocock 1975, 3-47, esp., 5.

17 Aristotle, *Politics* 1273b27-1274a11, 160-161.

18 See Pocock 1975, 168.

19 See Pocock 1975, 5.

20 Pocock 1975, 167.

21 Shklar 1969, 1987, passim. This is how Judith Shklar sums up what one may regard as modern ideological thinking in Rousseau: "Even when Rousseau wrote about a policy or an institution that he recommended, it was always a matter of attacking the existing system. Not equality, but

the destruction of inequality matters, all the more so since the psychological predisposition to inequality is a manifest part of the experience of association." Ibid., 170.

22 When considered in terms of a process the end result of all history might well appear as the end of man with all his potentials actualized. About all the qualifications of such an end, however, an individual may remain equally certain or uncertain as to the significance of the sacred time. And only by clinging to the notion of not being able to foresee such an end may one see any point in finding a relative permanence in the cyclical recurrence of human life as consisting in innumerous human beings coming to be and ceasing to be. The very notion of human action may therefore appear relevant only in the present tense that simultaneously acknowledges the relevance of irreducible changes in our experience of the continuity of time. Cf. Arendt 1958, 1998, passim. esp., 96-99, 232-234.

23 Pocock 1975, 504.

24 Pocock 1975, 551; The process, by definition, involves its own fulfillment. One may see Christianity as contributing to Western political thought only when politics came to be seen as the means for fulfilling some extra-political, namely eschatological, hopes; for some radical groups, such as the Fifth Monarchy Men, the English Revolution appeared as the moment for turning England into a godly nation ready for the end of time. What makes their millenialism historically interesting is that some *secular political action* was deemed significant in itself even while it still acquired its significance from certain eschatological views on the part of the historical actors themselves. In a similar manner, the Machiavellian figure of the prince – as a political innovator – could be seen as an integral part of the process that basically consists in fulfilling the function of a *polis*, such as Italy in becoming a moral and political entity of its own kind. The Machiavellian innovator – whether Moses, Romulus, or a prince – is truly a lawgiver and cannot break any moral codes, for he is generating a process, not acting a given process. See Pocock 1975, passim. esp., 35, 157, 345.

25 Yack 1993, 240.

26 To take an example of the fundamental differences of perspective between the historicist and more traditional approaches to political history: Joyce Appleby's fundamental disagreement with the republican school of scholars stems from her different notion of what is *ideological* thinking. By claiming that even according to the republican view, "ideologically the society is undifferentiated," she, in fact, defines *ideological thinking* as identical with thinking of *only the ideal* of a free society. No wonder that, in her view, the problem with classical republicanism is that some people "may benefit

more than others from the distribution of authority built into the society's conceptual language, but the distribution nonetheless presents itself as a given embedded in the minds of all." (Appleby 1986, 29.); The central civic humanist concern with the distribution of political power may well be connected with Hannah Arendt's conception of the notion of power itself. Power, according to her view, is not determinable as an opposite of any indefinable, not to say absolute, notion of human liberty, or personal freedom. Instead, it is something to be found within such forms of discussion and common action that primarily take place in the public sphere. The public sphere is distinguishable from the concept of personal freedom, not because of its inherent connection with power, but because of the necessity to keep public discussion in guard so that the common decision-making processes would always respect the genuinely modern notion of privacy belonging to each of us – alone. This is not at all to claim that there are no power claims involved in the private sphere of human life, but only to cling to the basic, actually liberal, belief in the notion that the individual is capable of deciding in what kind of power games one is willing to participate – as an individual. Power is the very subject matter of all significant discussion. In order to keep it so, Arendt remains very suspicious about all efforts to breach the line between the public and the private. Power is, therefore, not the opposite of freedom, but the opposite of violence. Not power, but only violence threatens the continuity of discussion. (Arendt 1958, 1998, passim., see esp., 201-203.)

27 Bailyn 1967, 1971, 35.

28 Such favorite authorities of Jefferson as Lord Kames, Montesquieu, Thomas Reid and Destutt de Tracy often supplanted the four-stage view of history based on hunting, pastoralism, agriculture and commerce by the three-stage view simply by connecting hunting with pastoralism.

29 Tracy 1811, 148-149. (The ellipses in the original.)

30 Papers 1:429.

31 White 1978, passim., esp.196, 199, 202.

32 White 1978, 166-167.

33 TJ to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814. Papers. Second Series 1983, 356.

34 Wills 1978, 230.

35 TJ to John Manners, June 12, 1817. Ford 12: 66.

36 Sheldon 1991, 15.

37 McDowell 1998, 13.

38 McDowell 1998, 26.

39 TJ to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814. Papers. Seccnd Series, 1983, 358.

40 TJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787. Papers 12:16-17.

41 TJ to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Nov. 24, 1808. *TJW*, 1195.

42 TJ to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Nov. 24, 1808. *TJW*, 1196-1197.

43 *Notes* (1787), Query XIX. *TJW*, 290-291; See also TJ to Jean Baptiste Say, Feb. 1, 1804. Ibid., 1144.

44 Pocock 1975, 508.

45 TJ to Jean Nicolas Démeunier, June 26, 1786, *TJW*, 592.

46 TJ to John Langdon, March 5, 1810. *TJW*, 1221-1222.

47 TJ to Joseph C. Cabell, Feb. 2, 1816. *TJW*, 1381.

48 Edward Coles requested Jefferson's blessing for his plan only after getting a cold response from James Madison. McCoy 1989, 1996, 312.

49 TJ to Edward Coles, Aug. 25, 1814. *TJW*, 1344-1345.

50 TJ's Notes from Concorcet on Slavery, Jan. 1789. Papers 14:496.

51 TJ to Edward Coles, Aug. 25, 1814. *TJW*, 1345.

52 *Notes* (1787), Query XIV. *TJW*, 264.

53 TJ to Edward Coles, Aug. 25, 1814. *TJW*, 1344-1346.

54 Onuf 2000, passim.

55 TJ to P.S. Dupont de Nemour, April 24, 1816. Ford 11: 522.

56 It is uncertain whether Coles's private colony of freed men was aimed at colonizing his freedmen "back" to Africa. He later, in vain, tried to persuade them to remove to Africa. See McCoy 1989, 1996, 316-318.

57 *Notes*, (1787) Query XIV. *TJW*, 270.

58 Behind this thesis, put forward by Gordon Reed, lies the standard notion of modern, constitutionally established, equality of opportunity, which Wood probably shares with most of the advocates of the Lockean interpretation of the Founding. (See Wood, 1969, passim., esp. 604.) The fundamental premises of this view are present in Rawlsian philosophical liberalism as well. According to John Rawls, "a well-ordered democratic society" has "no final ends or aims," nor can the modern individual become judged in accordance with "their role in gaining those ends." Rawls 1993, 41.

59 Pocock 1983, 236.

60 Pocock 1987, 1990, 26. Pocock brings up the notion of language as a "language context" – such as the classical republican language – which the historian may not invent, but only find in history.

61 This is, of course, not to claim that the language context itself remains intact when used in these various "speech acts," Pocock 1987, 1990, 31, 34.

62 Bailyn 1967, 1971, 7.

63 Pocock's use of the term "language" may well appear problematic, but the essential point is that not any single language or any single political context should be offered as the only possible context for any given text. See Pocock 1987, 1990. passim.; Quentin Skinner offered the classic formulation of this approach in 1969, see the reprint in Skinner 1969, 1988.

64 This is why Pocock may use such formulations as, "the civic humanist ideal is applied as a paradigm in the interpretation of social thought in the eighteenth century." Pocock 1983, 236. (Tyrannical forms of such arrangements are excluded, since they are corrupt prior to the analysis.)
65 Pocock 1975, 71.
66 See for this insightful summary of Pocock's overall view, Banning 1988, passim., esp. 201.
67 Pocock 1975, 478.
68 Skinner 1990, 1993, 293.
69 Skinner 1990, 1993, 308; Regarding the latter position, MacIntyre is ready to assert that "there ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one of political and moral theorizing ... Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action." MacIntyre, 1981, 1985, 61.
70 Skinner 1990, 1993, 308; Skinner is certainly correct in claiming that the champions of classical republicanism were not Aristotelians in any strict teleological sense, because they never argued that "we are moral beings with certain determinate purposes." (Ibid., 306.) This, however, is not what, for example, MacIntyre's reading of the Aristotelian ethics is about, since it is based on the fundamentally modern (and in this sense anti-Aristotelian) notion that we, indeed, do not know man's purpose. MacIntyre certainly does not take Aristotle to be a historicist thinker. (See MacIntyre 1981, 1985, 277.) The suggestion is, rather, that in order to make an intelligible moral argument we are supposed to find some moral purposes for ourselves instead of adopting mere strategies aiming at political or economic success, regardless of whether the strategy was republicanism, socialism, or something else. On MacIntyre's views on the relations of the Aristotelian ethics and modern identity, see MacIntyre 1981, 1985, 154, 216-217.
71 Skinner 1990, 1993, 308-309.
72 Pocock 1975, 478-479. What Pocock refers to with the latter notion is "a partnership of different social virtues within a *politeia* or *res publica*." (Ibid., 479.).
73 MacIntyre 1981, 1985, 266.
74 In Pocock's words, "as we now see it, modern and effective government had transplanted to America the dread of modernity itself, of which the threat to virtue by corruption was the contemporary ideological expression." (Pocock 1975, 509.); And as he once lamented: "It is the historicity – if historicism is too strong a word – of the American debate that I, as the author of *The Machiavellian Moment*, have been trying to establish; and I have been astonished by the determination of some of

my colleagues to treat me if I were seeking to entrap American culture in its past. All I have claimed is that American culture was sophisticated enough to know that it had a history and that it shared its problems with other cultures." (Pocock 1988, 66.)

75 Gunderson 1976, 266.

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ARTICLES

Topic 2:
Politics

Michael Th. Greven

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS

A Critique of the Common One-dimensional Concept of Politics

> *Politics is too often regarded as a poor relation, inherently dependent and subsidiary; it is rarely praised as something with a life and character of its own.*
>
> Bernhard Crick (1993, 15)

At first glance, today it seems almost ridiculous to pretend that even in present times of "globalization" politics still plays the essential role in shaping the future of human welfare and societies; a role and function it gained only during the formation of a specific historical type of society for which I therefore have proposed the name "political society."[1] In contradiction to this, for some years in almost all public discussions as well as in most scientific analyses the assumed evidence of a decisive and irreversable dominant role of economic processes and developments seem to have been overriding any other perspective. According to this common sense politics has recently abdicated and surrendred its former capacity of guidance and government to the anonymous forces of "disembedded global markets." Politics, according to this actual ideology, is thus left only in the place of a reactive repair-workshop, at best able to soften the desastrous impacts of the global economy on various local social and cultural structures.

What would be at stake, if this pretention was true, is more or less the central idea of democratic government that citizens by exercis-

ing their political rights and liberties and through a complex set of institutions, by various organisations and by taking part in formal and informal procedures can have a substantial impact on the character and normative status of their regime and the policies this regime will choose to implement.[2] As will be briefly remembered at the end of this cotribution, it might be even their freedom, which will be lost. What is without any doubt at stake in the present disputes is the consciousness of human selfdetermination in history which in the modern democratic perception after the American and French revolutions definitely never has been absolute and without the recognition of all kinds of constraints, but which since then cannot be completely given up, if the idea of democracy is to keep some substantial meaning, which would go beyond the mere electoral recruitment of governing elites. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it: "The human condition is not pre-empted by its past. Human history is not predetermined by its past stages. The fact that something has been the case, even for a very long time, is not the proof that it will continue to be so. Each moment of history is a junction of tracks leading towards numbers of futures. Being at the crossroads is the way human society exists. What appears in retroperspect an 'inevitable' development began in its time as stepping onto one road among the many stretching ahead" (Bauman 1988, 89). So any kind of "structural" determinism, by economy or more recently genetics, as well as any kind of "development" or "evolution," which does not leave at least a nontrivial realm for human choice and political action determinating the regime itself, finally fails to understand human history properly and cannot be the epistemological and practical foundation of democracy.

As common and popular ideas along the line of the globalization-argument have become, even in serious scientific publications, as rare until today remain analytically sound works of research which try to support the presumed evidence of the impact of "globalization" on politics[3] by indicator-based empirical research. Those projects, which at least tried what could finally be done with more perfection only by a compelling and longlasting integrated collective research cooperation at international level, have immediately produced serious doubts about the pretended character and dimension of those processes and changes. Some of the often heard common-

sense-indicators for the globalization-thesis prove false if tested in a stricter sense. Most important: the "de-nationalization" of certain dimensions of politics and policy-making as a presumed consequence of "globalization" does not at all equal with the assumed abdication of politics or any complete loss of future potential for political governance (Zürn 1998). In some fields, as for instance in the European Union, national governments are even gaining increasing independence from the structures of responsiveness established in national representative democracies. Within the European Union itself the Council, the Commission, and the European Central Bank represent transnational agencies of substantive political power; while the European Union is just an example of a very visible and institutionalized transnational political agency, there exists a whole bulk of others not very acessable for public recognition. "De-nationalization" thus seems to coincide with a de-parliamentarization inside of democratic nation-states, but not automatically with a retreat of political regulation of others kinds. Other levels and structures of governance and thus dominance and politics appear beyond the nation-state and respective democratic systems of responsible government. And while the role of nation-states and national governance institutions and structures changes, it does not just disappear in the rapid process of transnationalization of politics (Greven/Pauly 2000). We thus experience an historical change of the formal, institutional, and informal aspects of politics inside and beyond the common nation-state and new levels of policy-formation and governance are added to those already present at national and subnational level. The power relations between these levels of policy formation and execution are in a dynamic development and it will be finally an empirical question to find answers as to where today and in the near future the "real powers" are or will be located.[4]

Consequently, the relation between politics and "globalization" thus is far more complex as presumed in the popular deterministic scenarious and in certain aspects "globalization" seems even to be initiated and voluntarily set into practice by political choice.

The dominant so-called "neoliberal" discourse, claiming the vanishing role of government and politics altogether in a "free world" of "free global markets"[5] has neither an appropriate understanding of markets nor of politics as a fundamental *condition humane*[6] which

will not and cannot just more or less disappear, because some herolds of certain economic and cultural practices are for the time being very successful in framing the worldview of intellectual and public media. Since politics[7] is my concern in this contribution - just a few brief remarks about markets: as everybody could know ever since Adam Smith and Karl Marx, markets have to become established, put into practice and remain protected by "external" factors they cannot provide for by themselves[8], namely law and politics; the former being a more or less contingent result of the latter in modern political societies. Even if we still do not have enough empirical research for any detail yet, we never the less have no serious reason to belief that these statements will one day prove to be wrong at the new transnational or global level. Consequently the term "disembedded markets" formulates a truism only with reference to a concept of nationally disembedded markets[9] without even asking the immediately arising question of the new structures, institutions and actors which actually and in future potentionally form the new "bed" for global or at least transnational markets. Since at no level markets can by themselves provide their preconditions, the fundamentals in their relation to politics remain the same, but the forms and institutions of markets and politics change at these new levels as well as – in consequence – at the older ones.

So while there does not seem to exist much new in the fundamental relationship between markets and politics the real problem today is to keep our understanding of politics *uptodate*. If we will not be successful in doing so we will also not be able to develop forms and strategies of political practice for tackling the consequences of a "globalization" which then will continue to appear as an economic process only. What in the forgoing sentence at first glance seems like a logic circle is in fact the result of the epistemological and in practice contingent character of politics. Politics as a concept of understanding and politics as a concept of practice are themselves part of the same reality which they try to understand or to influence.[10] And while on the one hand the kind of understanding, whether in the empirical political culture of the people or in the more theoretical way of political science[11], cannot in a strict sense determine political practice, it is obvious on the other hand that no political practice

can act beyond that realm of common consciousness which incorporates the political culture of a society. The reason is that politics is always a somehow intentional and thus conscious form of common practice – and not just behaviour, which also plays a role, but cannot by itself constitute politics.

For rendering a given situation "political" through "politicization" at first the consciousness of its non-selfevidence has to appear. Only then and if the consciousness becomes present and common that this very situation also could be different, the possibility and potential for politics arises. I call this epistemological precondition of politics contingency. It has quite different consequences for the past, the present and the future. In relation to the past people may become aware that what once happened to them was not at all been destiny but the result of somebody`s decisions and actions. This knowledge never the less in the present always comes too late: the past remains the past. But the way people have learned to view their past has much to do with their present degree of freedom. The present finally counts, because only the present – fluid as it is: no *status* but a permanent flow of events and perceptions – turns contingency into a practical dimension, opens the very possibility of influencing the future; something, which can be done only in the present. This contingency as an epistemological and practical prerequisite of politics has not to be confounded with the historical concept and consciousness of "malleability"[12]; while the former refers to the consciousness of actors in their consciousness, the latter refers to the perception of a situation and its evaluation as changeable by instrumental action in the sense of the Greek word *téchne.* The difference, abstract as it seems, is of practical relevance because also actors with a principle consciousness of contingency, i.e.modern *homini politici*, will at a given time evaluate some circumstances and situations still as not malleable and therefore not political; this judgement then reflects not only a judgement about the objective, but also about the subject's potentials and possibilities of dealing with it. The politicization[13] thus relates for at least certain relevant actors or groups of actors the emergent knowledge of contingency with the belief of the malleability of a given situation in the future. The very process of politicization thus may become the battlefield of different groups in the specific sense that some claim that certain situations are not open for politicization while others do; but the former "conservative" per-

spective then has already lost its earlier convincing while unconscious prevalence. Once a situation has become recognized as contingent, even those who are not convinced are left with no other practical option as to argue in the public battlefield of politics – and thus contribute to the politicization themselves.

Societies in history then can be compared according to the scope of contingency and malleability they consciously realize. In a political society virtually every social relation, institution, organisation, in brief, all conditions of human[14] life seem to be contingent and thus open to political dispute and decision. “Life,” “age,” “sex,” even the “climate” or “weather” today have become political concepts, open to disputes and conflicts and depending on political or legal regulation which in pluralistic societies never can settle such dissent once and for all – but always only until a new decision will be taken. “Validity” in political societies thus has become absolutely and exclusively depending on contingent political decision making and beyond this the single remaining definite *condition humaine* is the common recognition of relativism.Without systematically referring to a definite theoretical concept of the present society like for instance “political society” Georg Kohler is right in stating: “...the political is not any longer a subsystem besides other social systems, but the place at which through communicative power, experience and reason decisions about the limitations and general authorizations of all other social systems are taken.”[15]

The recognition of contingency in a political society by itself refers to a complex situation which can analytically be distinguished into three levels:

- At the first level we can empirically observe what in a present situation of a society is by tradition and routine undisputably recognized as political; being political in this sense means that it is accepted in this society, that regulations are necessary and could be found and put into practice only by the legitimate political process institutionalized in that society; we may call this the cognitive aspects of its political culture and from a comparative diachronical or synchronical perspective we then will find political cultures which are more or less inclusive; less inclusive would be those political cultures in which a minor number of situations, issues and problems are recognized and practically treated as political.

- At the second level we can empirically observe that a quarrel may take place between relevant actors about the question, whether certain situations, issues and problems are political at all; those who would support the political option and – if impertinent enough – thus *defacto* politicize the question for all, claim that in future binding or common solutions in this question ought to be found by the political process and that traditions or customs or the like in future would not anly longer settle the issue; but never the less, beyond the cognitive aspect, on the procedural and institutional level of politics of a given society it remains still a contingent question whether enough support and resources will turn such a claim into a success; a success would mean that in the institutionalised political decision-making process this new question will in future be routinely treated and settled by a decision – but not necessarily with results which the former supporters of the issue would accept. And since the contingency of political decisions is inevitable also after they once have been taken, we will also find the reverse process: actors or groups who claim that issues formerly settled by political regulations should in future not be solved that way. Putting it this way makes one immediately aware, that the popular talk about "deregulation" or "privatization" refers to a certain type of political action and political decision, namely the political decision not to use political decisions for regulating a certain field of action in the next future. So, in a political society even the non-political spheres are constituted by political decisions – as it is well recognized in the most prominent example of the human rights.
- Finally and probably most controversial, we at least should try to imagine[16] issues which at present are not recognized as political by anyone but may become so in the future; obviously the assumption of such an imaginative level of future contingency is at first nothing but an abstract deduction and consequence of the basic assumption of my own theory about the political character of present modern societies and the argument thus seems to be caught in a circle. The thesis that in this type of society *virtually* every issue is political and thus can *defacto* become politicized is not in the strict textbook sense an empirical statement; it is an evaluative historical judgement which claims validity and plausibility in the same sense as concepts like "modern society" do.

Maybe I should try to demonstrate these distinct levels of politicization with examples. On the first level – and supposedly least controversial – we will find in modern societies the whole corpus of positive law, in which earlier law-producing political decisions of the legislative bodies[17] of that society are laid down. Even if

after some time the impression may be widely spread that no alternative exists to the very way, in which issues and situations have been regulated by law[18], today everybody at least in principle must recognize the complete positive character of such a body of regulations. It is true that the production of formal law and legal regulations can also be seen as actual depoliticization[19] of formerly controversial and conflictual issues; but this depoliticization through legislation always remains temporary and precarious and works as such only until new a dispute arises – which in turn is made more likely if and when people are and remain aware of the political decisions behind the legal regulations.

Once a legal regulation exists then in principle a situation is given, that this regulation could also be changed by decisions of the legislative bodies or the authorities involved. It is exactly the complete body of positive law in a given historical society, as juridical and unpolitical it may appear, which thus reflects the dimensions and range of the political culture of a specific society – and its contingency at once. If we compare this legal body of western societies at various stages of its development ever since the early nineteenth century, using its volume as indicator for the range of issues formally politizised, we will find empirical evidence for the impressively growing inclusiveness of the political process leading to a situation which then could be evaluated as political society. Nevertheless, comparing different societies today, we will also find that this inclusiveness varies in degree. Certain issues may have been regulated by political decisions here – but not everywhere. Examples in different spheres of criminal or public law are for instance recent German laws concerning violence between husband and wife[20] or between parents and children[21] as a means of education, the ban of nuclear power plants "for all future" by the recent German governing coalition or women's right for legal abortion in former East, but not in West Germany – or the legal ban of smoking in public places in some US-American States. Especially the recent political debate about the future of West-European welfare systems, including radical proposals of a complete withdrawal of public unemployment allowances are significant examples for the irreducable contingency of political regulation; even after almost half a century these citizen rights in the Marshallian sense are at any time disposible to political majorities. If

we even remember the "dark" history of the last century, we must remain absolutely aware of the contingency[22] of the most fundamental political institutions and individual rights; in political societies, against a massive political movement no other defensive forces exist but political ones.

As has been already stated, the most difficult intellectual task would be to imagine the politicization of a situation or issue which never before has been seen as a political one by anybody. If one tries one immediately has to recognize that especially since the last century almost everything somewhere has already been politizised by somebody, whether we screen the spheres of economy, religion[23], science, or *nota bene* art, education and more general culture. Not always has this claim been successful in the sense that legal regulation now exists and in some cases the former result of a successful politicization has been withdrawn by deregulation. The history of socialism in its political and theoretical core and claim is a history about the democratic or undemocratic politicization of economic structures and processes. Where a "socialist" economy formerly had been introduced, as was the case in the Sowjet Union, it had been the result of political decisions – and the same holds true for its reversal and the establishment of a capitalist market economy. Since modern feminism in the late sixties claimed "The private is political" the very distinction and borderlining between the private and the public sphere not only in "gender issues" has become all over the world a major political conflict and concepts formerly perceived as "natural" like "male" and "female" have become reflexive in public and in turn all of a sudden needed legal definitions and regulations – including the recognition of "transsexual" identities and "queer-studies." Niklas Luhmann, despite of the different fundamentals and aprioris of his systems theory, sometimes describes the ubiquity of political decisions in democracies in a way most similar to my version of political society: "...everything which happens on the agenda of politics, becomes a decision... This universalism of decisionism reaches its perfection in the scheme of democracy, which using the code government/opposition quasi by routine and almost unreflectively takes care that everything which politics wants to see as decision also can be represented accordingly."[24]

The question remains: Is there anything left today in this type of society for which no public regulation exists or has at least already been demanded by somebody? I can't imagine anything.

* * *

In this contribution up to this point I have been using a concept of politics not very explicitely elaborated. For the purpose of better understanding I started with a vague meaning of the concept by which its dominant present sense in political science and the political society should be adequately represented. I call it the functionalist concept of politics and it is very well known in the definition given to it by David Easton:"what distinguishes political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions is that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society" (1965, 50). Despite the popularity of this concept even in approaches different from the Eastonian version of systems analysis, the consequences of the functionalist background in this view are too often neglected. According to this approach political action has no aim or *telos* in itself, as inherently proclaimed in the motto to this text by Bernhard Crick, but serves other purposes in an instrumental orientiation. Using Aristotele's distinction, Easton and the common use of politics in political science today refers not to *praxis* but to *téchne*. As such, politics is predominantly perceived as a kind of problem-solving action or process. In this process human interaction and the organizations and institutions framing and enabling it immediately fall under the jurisdiction of a certain concept of rationality, which is, by and large, the economic principle of effectiveness: how to get things done with a minimum of scarce resources. Not by accident then especially governmental politics and policies at the first glance more and more resemble the patterns of action known from big companies – and a somehow emerging new class of top politicians recently seems not any longer to take the difference between running a company and a democratic government very seriously.

Before political scientists with different approaches and especially divergent normative understandings of politics start with their regular academic critique of this type of popular politics they ought just for a moment hesitate and start to reflect also upon the fact that

especially in modern mass democracies this instrumental approach to politics as a means to reach out for other goals is not a privilege of ruling elites and governments but seems to reflect also the aspirations and demands of significant proportions of the population – the socalled *citizens*. As abundant comparative empirical research demonstrates, big majorities in western democracies are from a republican point of view de facto nothing but *clients,* who demand exactly this type of instrumental expert government and what ever they see as a proper solution of problems through what ever kind of political regulation. In a democratic regime everybody who opposes in theory or praxis this style and quality of dominant politics in these societies thus easily runs into a normative trap: if the system is really responsive in at least some general manner then the government cannot be blamed alone for a situation which contradicts the normative or evaluative standards of some theoretical approaches. The real situation in present democratic societies, properly described, and not the theories seems to be aporetic: if not only some normative democratic theories presuppose *citoyens* in a republican tradition but the constitutions and more or less offical creeds[25] of western democracies themselves then their absence could not be compensated by "democratic" elites who, neglecting the normative democratic demand for participation, de facto substitute the actual failure of citizenship by some kind of advocatory elite behaviour. Either the normative demands referring to a republican concept of citizenship or the claim for responsive government then must in practice be denied. If the democratic elites would choose to give normative priority to the republican elements in their normative foundations they would have to become critics more than representatives of their fellow countrymen. Given this aporetic situation, it seems to be evident that in the political reality of present mass democracies we find more and decisive elements of a responsive electoral system of democratic representation as we find rudiments of republican citizenship participation; the latter forms of politics, whether we like it or not, are more present at local levels and in accidential forms of dissent and protest behaviour. Their impact on the routines of the political process may become important once in a while, but the structures and routines of the regime are not essentially shaped from this marginal edge of the political society. As has been mentioned earlier in this contribution,

theoretical statements and judgements on politics are themselves part of the political communication of the political society. If they reach beyond mere descriptive statements they become political positions with reference to a given status quo as well.[26] In consequence of these brief considerations much of today's normative democratic theory – what ever else its professional or scientific status may be – in political societies is part of a political opposition against the dominant societal understanding of democratic government; less than explaining it, these theories try to influence political communication as part of a somehow republican and more participatory opposition. In as much as this normative literature refers today in a positive manner directly to the already mentioned explicit 'republican' claims in constitutional documents and the propagated political creed of western democracies it tends to have forgotten what during other periods of *critical* democratic theory[27] had been the task of a critique of ideology. One has to become aware of this status of large sections of normative political theory today to avoid the misunderstanding that a proper analysis and understanding of given democratic regimes in present political societies results from there. On the contrary, essential parts of normative democratic theory in political science do not at all contribute to the understanding and explanation of real political systems and processes.

Turning back to political science literature on present politics and political systems the at least immanent functional approach is clearly dominant. It more and more resembles a special branch of (public) business administration. While one-dimensional models of human behaviour in the *homo oeconomicus* tradition[28] have for a long time been contested by mixed-motive-approaches these policy studies in political science usually unreflectedly pretend that egoism is the only valid single motive for the "explanation" of human conduct – be it of individuals or collective actors of the type 'interest groups.' Strangely enough then, analytically modelling the praxis of governments or 'the state,' it's all of a sudden not any longer egoism but 'common good' or 'rational problem solving' which is the apriori attributed motive of action.

Being usually in its empirical case studies not uncritical against the strategies and instruments of governments and the ways in which

"the political system" is tackling policy-problems of societies, this approach thus tacitly implies a more or less uncritical identification with a 'governmentalistic' perspective or point of view. This identification very often starts already with the definition of the problem, continues in a limitizing view at the instruments of (governmental) policy interventions and ends up too often with an evaluation of the political outcome which remains restricted to the (governmental) programming and definition of aims at the starting point of the 'policy-circle.'[29] This uncritical identification with the policy centres of a society[30] and their programmes is not given up and hardly modified in substance, when for instance Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf[31] in their research are working with corporatist or network concepts or "actor-oriented institutionalism" (Scharpf 2000). Either by empirical observation or by more theoretical, even normative presuppositions "the state" or the government in this approach is observed as just one participant in bargaining or arguing processes with other important collective actors of the specific policy domain and the assumption is that successful cooperation in networks or the corporatist informal arrangements creates more rational and more effective ways of government and problem-solving than a hierarchical strategy of decision-making could ever achieve. Thus the normative orientation and perspective still remains governmental – even when the government is not any longer perceived as an omnipotent actor within a society who could reign it sucessfully top-down .[32]

My objection here does not aim against a subfield of policy studies within the study and theory of politics which can contribute valuable knowledge about reforms or the value of instruments of an interventionist policy in such fields like health or environment or traffic. My objection is critical against a threatening state of the art of political science in which this partial approach becomes so hegemonic that some specific aspects of the complex and rich reality of politics in present societies are taken *pars pro toto.* One problematic consequence is then that the whole field of politics is perceived as a field of rational behaviour – not in the sense that one is seeking scientifically for opportunities to increase rational problem-solving, but in the sense that all of a sudden such a political science is taking the supposed rational premises of governmental actors and their collaborators for granted.

But the reflection of politics in an academic discipline like political science has unfortunately no serious reasons to perceive of all politics, neither at the level of governments nor at the level of collective actors or individuals in the so-called civil society, as rational problem-solving and thus should frame its central research interests and concepts accordingly. A concept and understanding of the very notion "politics" like in David Easton's today widely accepted definition is much too one-dimensional to cover other important dimensions which are and remain essential for a more valid understanding of politics.

We do not have to remember the Holocaust for finding relevant examples of political action which under no circumstances could be conceptionalized and scientifically reconstructed as rational problem solving policies; again unfortunately, this horrible kind of the inherent destructive capacities of politics in modern times did not disappear from the surface of our planet by the end of World War II and since then plenty of occasions[33] appeared in which politics developed its destructive and violent irrational potentials to a degree without precedence in earlier centuries. So, whoever talks about a "process of civilization" in an unspecific manner ought to avoid the misunderstanding that modern societies or the process of modernization has until today sucessfully reduced the violent potentials inherent in politics.[34] It must only be remembered that the population of the world is still threatened by some thousands of nuclear weapons which at the end of World War II have already shown in Hiroshima and Nagasaki how they can multiply in seconds, and with consequences enduring for at least a generation, the numbers of victims of conventional warfare. While during the period immediately following their first employment public consciousness and political thought has been quite aware of this new stage and quality in the historical development of instruments for violent politics[35], since then, paradoxically supported by the cold peace of the "cold war" between two blocs with functioning second-strike-capability and thus deterrence-capacity, the knowledge that these weapons are still there and always ready for use has been widely and sucessfully repressed. In textbooks of International Relations they are hardly mentioned any longer, while international regimes and "games of cooperation" are *à la mode*. But especially political scientists should not repress their

knowledge about two facts: that these terrible weapons have been used by a liberal democratic government and that the programme of so-called non-proliferation has turned out to be a failure. The first fact questions all optimistic ideologies, often inherent in the literature on the so-called Third Wave of Democratization[36], that democracies by their internal development of "civility" become quasi automatically immune against the use of such instruments of genocide; and the second fact means that sucessful mutual deterrence as the possibly main factor for the non-employment of these weapons during the cold war cannot any longer be used as an argument for their future non-employment. Today these weapons might also more and more easily get into the hands of so-called bandit-states or even armed factions[37] in civil or what has been called "new wars" (Kaldor 1999) – and their impact will be as terrible and not only local as more than fifty years ago.

So whoever wants to theorize[38] the human capacity for politics ought not to circumvent the problem of violence, which by itself is a reality not always and automatically synthecized with politics – but which is still the most powerful and threatening means for a wide range of political behaviour.[39] Even Hannah Arendt writes: "Although power and violence are phänomena of different kind they appear mostly together" (1970, 53).[40] Taking thus her realistic approach especially in the analysis of contemporary politics for granted, her fundamental message in political theory, often neglected today in her one-sided reception in neo-republican writings not only in the feminist context, hints at another dimension of politics which does not play a significant role in a political science dominated by policiy-studies and the instrumental approach. In her words we can and must distinguish between the purpose, the aim and the sense or principle of politics.[41] And: "The sense of something in difference to its purpose always is inherent to it and the sense of some action can only last as long as this action lasts itself" (Arendt 1993, 126).[42] It was then her critique that "since the decades of the American Revolution" especially the latter, "the search for the principle of acting does not any longer move our thinking about politics" (1993, 130).[43] But what is the "principle of acting in politics?" According to her it presupposes peace or the absense of violence, recognizes the fundamental and irreducible pluralism

between individuals, because they are different, thus tries to establish the coacting and living together of different people who treat themselves as equals and in doing so realize their freedom – whatever the contingent content of this spontanious coaction in accordance with these principles may be. This is the context in which one must try to understand her sentence:"The sense of politics is freedom" (Arendt 1993, 28) and "freedom does only exist in the peculiar in-between-space of politics" (Arendt 1993, 12).[44] One radical consequence of this dimension of the understanding of politics is that human freedom in the strict sense exists only in and during political action and, since many people in present representative mass democracies rarely experience this during their live, that freedom today is still a privilege of minorities. "Freedom was born as a privilege and has remained so ever since" states Zygmunt Bauman (1988, 9).[45] What liberal democracies with their, at best, responsive system of mass representation by professional politicians can only bring into existence are what Isaiah Berlin distinguished as negative liberties from positive ones (1969). Only citizens politically coacting with others can establish their freedom and only in their common pursuit of freedom the sense of politics is actualized. I leave out here the interesting question whether the professional political action which forms the daily routine of the actual political elites in western democracies, could be seen as a seperate quasi-*polis* in which the politicians as citizens realize this dimension of politics exclusively among or "in-between" themselves. What is important in my context is that this dimension of politics in principle does not coincide with the dominant instrumental or functional understanding of politics in policy science. "Politics of identity" of social movements, mobilized ethnicities or regions (Schmidtke 1996) or the politicization of life styles (Ritter 1997) are examples recently discussed in this respect.

The slogan "The private is political" at the end of the sixties was not the only one: even less instrumental already then people believed: "Wrongly live those who don't defend themselves."[46] From here a line could be drawn to versions of common cultural dissent and protest behaviour of groups and milieus which are not always treated as political by political science.

* * *

Starting with the present discourse on "globalization" which often implies the idea of a secular abdication of politics I tried to illustrate that political science today is in danger of becoming nothing else but a branch of (public) business administration thus limiting the scope of its understanding of politics to a specific version of purpose-rational action. Remembering extreme forms of political action which by no means deserve the judgement as "rational" I briefly sketched out the still essential connection between politics and if not the actual employment then at least the permanent threat and preparation of the use of violent means without precedence in human history. Both these dimensions of politics in political science are usually seen from a restricted perspective focussed on governmental politics and policies and thus in permanent danger of an unconscious identification with the normative aims and the specific criteria for "rationality" of those who govern. Political science then loses its possible and in my eyes even necessary critical distance and becomes affirmative with a situation in which not only rational problem-solving via policies is on the agenda, but still human domination and if not exploitation then at least redistribution; those who govern never lose in this respect and beyond those there always exist winners and loosers of politics. This is true not only in a materialistic sense but also with reference to the justification of norms and principles which in our days of political societies is – as far as public norms and sanctions are concerned – not any longer the business of churchs or 'ethic commissions' but of politics and political decision-making. Finally I touched an understanding of politics which according to my judgement is not – as it seems at first glance – 'old fashioned' and 'out of time.' May be that just a very traditionalistic political science is not any longer sensible for appearances of politics beyond its perception of the "political system" and especially has lost all contacts to certain branches of cultural studies or other fields of social science which observe human behaviour and common forms of action as if they were political. This is especially true and most evident when cultural studies look into protest cultures of young people. But there exist other, less evident and spectacular examples: if some hundred persons who think that the tax-load is unjust form an interest associa-

tion and start lobbying for their aims, political science would be prepared to subsume this in its subfield interest mediation and research on interest groups; but if some millions of citizens of a society, perceiving that their tax-load is unjust, by routine and all the time try to illegally diminish their legal tax-load political science either ignores this or understands it as "private" criminal action. At the other hand, when some proportion of the population demonstrates antisemitic prejudices in questionnaires individually completed this immediately would be taken as a political factum. The only thing I wanted to make aware of is: the traditional routines of political science exclusively choosing subjects of reflection and research need examination. One way how this choice and selection is more or less unconsciously made is the unreflected use of certain concepts of politics.

This choice of concepts and their popularization with the *aura* of science can by itself be reflected as a kind of action which shapes the political "in-between" or public space which then is our "world;" in the words of Kari Palonen it is thus by itsself a way of "politicking" (Palonen 2000, 7). The aforementioned abdication of politics in the rhetorics of political scientists is the result of such processes and thus contributes to a situation which it believes just to analyze

Notes

[1] See the full argument in Greven (1999) and some applications of it to more specific matters in Greven (2000); in this contribution I try to specify some questions around the present use of the very concept "politics" – both in political science as well as in practical political discourse – without referring in more detail to the underlying assumptions of the theory of political societies. Please be always aware that I´m not using the concept for a functional subsystem or part of societies but as a characteristic of certain type of societies – like in "industrial society" or more recently "risk society."

[2] The term "regime" in this sentence takes the place of "politeia" in the first paragraph of Aristotle´s book on "politics" (1943) – which despite of this reflected a completely different understanding of the role of "politics."

[3] Be aware that altogether I do not question the idea of a new quality of economic interdependence with the tendency – not yet reality – of "global

sourcing, global pricing, global costing" (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996, 41); my subject is the relation of these processes to the role and potential of politics which is in most of those popular essays only deducted from these evident facts.

[4] For an interesting analytically complex approach to these new forms of politics see Forschungsgruppe Weltgesellschaft 1996 and Brock 2000.

[5] Interestingly enough, not only hardliners of liberalism but also the remains of orthodox marxist or marxist-leninist "base-superstructure" determinism contribute to the present talk of the end of politics and governance; while ideologically fighting against the "neoliberalists" those former or present orhtodox marxists pretend that they have always known everything better as concerns the economic determination of politics (and culture, and ...everything else).

[6] In the sense of such various, in details quite often strictly opposed, authors like Hannah Arendt, Bernhard Crick, Max Horkheimer, C. Wright Mills, Carl Schmitt, Jean Paul Sartre, Max Weber, and *tutti quanti*.

[7] "*Politics are* refers... to 'that which belongs to polis'..., 'that which belongs to the subject area of the discipline Politics... *Politics is* refers to a concept for which the grammatical plural has lost its significance," "when politics is understood as action" (Palonen 1993, 9).

[8] For a recent discussion of these aspects see for example the contributions in R. Czada/S. Lütz (2000).

[9] A truism in the recent popular debate, based on a wrong perception not at all present in Karl Polanyi's often quoted but rarely read book "The Great Transformation" (1978).

[10] In the sense of Niklas Luhmann according to whom "theories about the society are also theories in the society" and therefore a "transcendental" position in the Kantian sense is a fiction which cannot any longer function as a common ground of cognition. (Luhmann 1990).

[11] It is not quite evident that political science as an academic discipline today has much influence in framing and forming a society's consciousness and concept of politics – but the academic discourse as a whole – most prominently law and economics – definitely does.

[12] My translation for Christian Meiers illuminating German neologism "*Könnens-bewußtsein*" (1983, 469 - 499)

[13] As can be seen, in this case I do not agree with Kari Palonen's statement "*politisieren* in German only refers to talking about politics" (1993, 10); in fact ever since the times of the student's movement and the APO in the late sixties the German term "politisieren" has meant always more, i.e. rendering a situation into a political one which thus needs political solutions by authoritative decision or consensus-oriented discourse; conservative critics at that time did confirm my reading (Hennis 1970);

as can be also seen, Kari's and my approach, analytically and normatively dedicated towards "politicking and politiziation," never the less do very much coincide.

[14] Note that even the term *condition human,* in its classical use referring to ontological or anthropological preconditions of human existence, in modern selfreflective societies has become contingent; as present debates about "cognition" or "genetics" openly reflect, the recognized validity of concepts like "dignity of the individual", "integrety" or even "individual" in political societies can only be the result of political decisions.

[15] My translation from: "...ist also das Politische nicht mehr ein Subsystem neben anderen sozialen Systemen, sondern der Ort, an dem durch kommunikative Macht, Erfahrung und Vernunft über die Grenzen und allgemeinen Berechtigungen der anderen gesellschaftlichen Sphären entschieden wird" (Kohler 1999, 61).

[16] Political Science today very often lacks imagination.

[17] I use the plural, because besides parliaments in parliamentary democracies in many cases also certain courts act as legislators; if we include legal regulations with authoritative character issued by certain bureaucratic institutions like tax authorities or the governments themselves, the political and contigent quality immediately becomes more evident.

[18] This is an illusion which turns especially advocates and bureaucrates into representatives of some kind of a superficial "retraditionalization" of (positive) law and themselves into a class of its priestermen.

[19] N. Luhman (2000, 80) uses the concept "indirect politizisation" to hint at the political character of "juridification" (my translations).

[20] In comparative perspective probably a good indicator for inclusiveness of the political process.

[21] A similar proposition by the Blair Government has not been successful in the British Parliament.

[22] In a less political and more sociological perspective Zygmunt Bauman (1992) refers to this historical sensibility with the term "ambivalence."

[23] It's not only religion, today it's also the very concept of "God" ("Godess") in Christian theology and faith (Matthiae 1999).

[24] "... wird damit alles, was im Themenkreis von Politik geschieht, zur Entscheidung... Dieser Universalismus der Entscheidungsunterstellung erreicht seine Perfektion im Demokratieschema, das durch den Code Regierung/Opposition quasi routinemäßig und fast unreflektiert dafür sorgt, daß alles, was die Politik als Entscheidung sehen will, auch so dargestellt werden kann" (Luhmann 2000, 86).

[25] Used here in the sense of Gunnar Myrdals famous study of the "American Dilemma," first published in 1944, (1969).

[26] Given the professional scientific language and abstract content of most of these contributions their effect on the real political process never the less is normally neglectable.

[27] Just to mention one name of this kind of critical approach, very prominently in international political science communications only some twenty years ago, hardly to be found in today's overviews about "democratic theory," C.B. Macpherson, see for instance (1973).

[28] A tradition which, as all tradition, is a fabrication, neglecting for instance the mixed-motive perspective of the founding father of modern economics Adam Smith (Schultheiss 1999, 118-135).

[29] This description of an approach as much differentiated and elaborated over the years comes close to a caricature and is necessarily unfair to highly sophisticated *and* critical works as for example carried out by many members of the Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung at Cologne, namely Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf – who never the less in principle share the characteristics of this perspective.

[30] Fritz W. Scharpf (2000, 34) characterizes "the dominant but not always explicitly stated perspective" of what he calls "problemoriented policy analysis" as that one of a "benevolent dictator." ("die vorherrschende <aber häufig nicht explizit gemachte> Perspektive des 'wohlmeinenden Diktators'...von der die meisten Analysen der materiellen Policy-Forschung ausgehen").

[31] See the programmatic contributions in R.Mayntz/F.W. Scharpf (1995).

[32] In a sense by which very often the abstract legal concept of "sovereignty," attributed to the "state," has been mixed up with omnipotence of the state as an (collective) actor.

[33] It is a question of context and perspective – but for thousands and millions of men and women for instance in the former Soviet Union, or in Vietnam, Cambodia, or the Sudan, the question so very important to Germans and Jews and their relation to their respective history, whether the Holocaust was "unique," must remain fairly abstract and a positive answer would be even in danger to see their suffering only as relative.

[34] Even if the general theory of Nobert Elias (1976) is taken for granted as a general description and understanding of the internalization and monopolization of violence in "modern" societies it does not tell us anything about the degree and amount of violent acts and situations still characteristic for present societies.

[35] Just to remember two very different examples of this literature from the fifties upon a *present* problem see Anders 1956 and Herz 1959.

[36] "So-called" – because many of these new "democracies" are "democracies with adjectives" (Collier/Levitsky 1997), "illiberal" (Zakaria 1997) or "defekte Demokratien" (Merkel 1999).

[37] See the (horror-)scenarios with realistic background information in Bruce Hoffman (1998).

[38] What ever this term then might exactly mean to him or her...

[39] Writing this I'm fully aware of Hannah Arendt's critique of Max Weber's definition (!) of politics in a state ("politischer Verband") (Weber 1972, 30 et passim) via the concept of power and the indispensibly related concept of violence – but I'm not convinced by the foundations of her critique which presume a categorial gap between politics and power at one hand and violence at the other (Arendt 1970).

[40] "Obwohl Macht und Gewalt ganz verschiedenartige Phänomene sind, treten sie zumeist zusammen auf."

[41] "Wir müssen also in der Politik zwischen Zweck und Ziel und Sinn unterscheiden" (Arendt 1993, 126).

[42] "Der Sinn einer Sache im Unterschied zu ihrem Zweck liegt immer in ihr selbst beschlossen, und der Sinn einer Tätigkeit kann nur so lange bestehen, als diese Tätigkeit währt."

[43] "Die Frage nach den Prinzipien des Handelns bewegt unser Denken über Politik nicht mehr... seit den Jahrzehnten der Amerikanischen Revolution."

[44] "Der Sinn der Politik ist Freiheit" und "Freiheit besteht nur in dem eigentümlichen Zwischen-Raum der Politik." By the way: while Aristotle seems to found his idea of politics in an anthropology of the individual *zoon politicon,* for Hannah Arendt, usually labelled as "neo-aristotelian," an individual can never "be" political, but only act together with others in a way that "politics" arises in an "in-between-space" ("Zwischen-Raum") among them, which she calls "world;" and "at the centre of politics always lies the concern for the world and not for men – i.e. the concern for a world as it is or as it could be different" ("denn im Mittelpunkt der Politik steht immer die Sorge um die Welt und nicht um den Menschen – und zwar die Sorge um eine so oder anders beschaffene Welt") (Arendt1993, 24 et 25).

[45] I neglect here the different theoretical background of Bauman's quotation.

[46] "Das Private ist politisch" and – in German with a nice rhyme – "Wer sich nicht wehrt der lebt verkehrt."

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Kari Palonen

TRANSFORMING A COMMON EUROPEAN CONCEPT INTO FINNISH: CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF '*POLITIIKKA*'

The meaning of the word political depends, thus, largely on the purpose and context in which it is used.

R.E. (Rafael Erich), *Poliittinen*, Tietosanakirja, vol. 7, 1916, 772-773]

The Conceptualization of Politics on a Periphery

The point of this essay is to relate the Finnish history of the con cept of politics, *politiikka*, to the general European history of changes in the concept.[1] My point of departure is the 'decentering' of the concept of politics by means of the four nouns *policy, polity, politicking* and *politicization* (cf. Palonen 1993, Palonen forthcom-

ing), taking each of them as presenting a horizon of possibility for the conceptualization of politics, with my primary interest being in the politics-as-activity concept as opposed to the concept of politics as a sphere. (cf. Palonen 2000) I am mainly interested in the explicit thematization of the concept, i.e. in contributions in which authors attempt to problematize the concept for one purpose or another. In other words, my concentration on the direct thematization aims at the "illocutive" or performative dimenstion of "linguistic action," and not to the "locutive" or indicative use of the concept of politics. (cf. Skinner 1996) This perspective has led me to accentuate the individual variations over the commonplaces, the exceptional over the regular. We can, however, better understand both the changing horizons of the regular and their overriding even when the conventions are not broken down.

I will cut the substantial European story short and present the Finnish material extensively, although in a manner in which my general interpretation of the European history of the concept of politics posits the problems to be taken up in each chapter, and the progression of the chapters illustrates conceptual changes in the understanding of politics in the 19th and 20th century Europe in general.

The character of the sources used is related to the research intentions. The dictionaries, encyclopedias, word archives etc. play a rather minor role in a study of this kind, while prior to the late 1960s there have been hardly any attempts to rethink the concept in academic monographs. Authors of some of the contributions have attempted to explicate the state of the discussion on it (cf. Rantala 1963 in the handbook *Yhteiskuntatieteiden käsikirja*). Especially some literary authors have developed a more personal view on the concept, and I have often found the works of authors such as Eino Leino and Jouko Tyyri to be more fruitful than those produced by academic writers. In addition, I have used diaries, collections of speeches, debate books, academic literature, and occasionally even Parliament proceedings. In order to understand the change in the post-war years, I have extensively examined issues of the main critical organ of the period in question, the Helsinki student weekly *Ylioppilaslehti*, from 1950 to 1965. The translations from Finnish are my own.

The Adoption of the Polit-vocabulary

During the formative phase of Finnish as a written, public and academic language in the mid 19th century, several 'translation' strategies were used. In some cases old Finnish words, such as *valta* (power), were revived to also include a meaning associated with their conceptual usage (for related problems cf. M. Hyvärinen 1998), while in others Finnish neologisms, such as the term valtio, were created, which more or less took over tai adopted the conceptual problems of the European state vocabulary with its certain inherent peculiarities (Pulkkinen 2000). In the case of the term *kansalainen* (citizen), a kind of direct translation of a Swedish particularity was carried over into Finnish, having a number of unanticipated consequences (cf. Stenius 1999). In other cases, however, both the Finnish neologism *kansanvalta* and the 'internationally' derived word *demokratia* were used as partly synonymous and partly as having different implications (cf. M. Hyvärinen 2000).

From the late 1840s onward we can distinguish several alternative modes of referring to the phenomenon of politics in Finnish. Let us briefly recapitulate the situation:

a) the Greek vocabulary of *polis, politeia, arkhé politike, politiké techné*
b) the Latin vocabulary of *civis, civitas, societas civilis sive politica*
c) the "early-modern" European vocabulary of *stato, state, Staat, stat* or *gouvernement, government, Regierung, regering*
d) the "post-Sattelzeit" European vocabulary of *politics, policy, la politique, Politik, politik*, which was became generally accepted during the 19th century (cf. Palonen 1985, 1990b, 1993, 1999a,b, 2000)
e) the possibility of inventing a pure Finnish neologism

In the case of politics the first attempts were based on alternative c). However, the alternative d) was adopted in the 20th century, and it was no longer contamined by the vocabulary of alternative a). The Latin and the neologism models did not play any noticeable role in this process.

Some attempts were made in the 19th century to create a "Finnish translation" that would replace the polit-vocabulary, however, these translations directly connected the concept with the state and gov-

ernment vocabularies. Amongst the proposed translations only two were relatively successful. *Valtiotaito* (art of the state, *Staatskunst*) – and not *politiikka* – was the subject of an entry by K.R. Brotherus, the first professor of *yleinen valtio-oppi* (a direct translation of the *Allgemeine Staatslehre*) in the handbook *Valtiotieteiden käsikirja* (vol. 4., 1924). The adjective *valtiollinen* (stately) was more successful in the translation of the terms *politisch*, *politisk* or *political* (cf. Pulkkinen 2000). In the bi-lingual Liberal programme of 1880, from amongst the more than 20 polit-words in the Swedish vocabulary only one remained in the Finnish vocabulary. In the Social Democrat's Program of 1903 based on the programme of the Austrian Social Democrats from 1901 *politisch* was translated as *valtiollinen*. This practice was, however, slowly beginning to vanish. To mark the end of it we can quote the Swedish People's Party's programme of 1964 and its contemporary translation: in it *politisk* was always translated as *poliittinen* (For the documentation of the party programmes cf. Borg [ed] 1965).

The 'trial balloons' for a Finnish translation of politics appear today as curiosities. The conceptual changes primarily concern the adoption and acceptance of the polit-vocabulary as something that is no longer a foreign word in Finnish, the meaning of which must be learned, but, rather, is a word which people are able to use as fluently as those words for which a pure Finnish neologism was found. The history of the changes in this fluent use forms the second step, in which both the diversifications and the revisions of the polit-vocabulary are reached in a more or less intimate relation to the change in attitudes toward the phenomenon of politics as such.

One characteristic of the Finnish polit-vocabulary from the late 19th century until at least the 1920s is the strong presence of compound terms ending with the word *politiikka*. In this Neocameralist jargon the polit-vocabulary is depoliticized from within. In the fields of economic and social policy, an explicit break with this tradition has been never made, and an open struggle over policy questions has until now been shadowed by quasi-objectivist formulas. In Finnish foreign policy the Meineckean (1924, 1) idea of one best possible policy-line, the singularized *Staatsräson* for each country, shaped, for example, president Paasikivi's views (Paasikivi 1958, 93-96).

Certain tendencies, resembling for example the German discussion, can also be detected in the Finnish polit-vocabulary. The verb *politikoida* was first understood as merely "talking politics," but was also used by some, such as the poet Eino Leino in his political causeries, in the sense of "acting politically" or "politicking" as early as 1904 (quoted from *Pakinat*, 116-117). This latter understanding also made its way into a dictionary of foreign words (Haavisto 1911, 37). Indeed, the Finnish term *politikoida* resembles the English *politicking* in its ability to use for 'acting politically' one single word – something that is impossible in German, French or Swedish.

Politisoida (to politicize) was originally used synonymously to *politikoida*. At the encyclopedic level it was only in 1964 when the difference was accepted by 'defining' *politisoida* in the formula: "render political, mix with politics" (*Uusi tietosanakirja*, vol. 16). In its everyday use the term for politicization had long carried a merely negative meaning: *politisoituminen* refers to politicization through the act of others. For instance, the Leftist writer Raoul Palmgren speaks in 1935 "against the politicization (*politisoituminen*) of the literature" (*Tekstejä...*, 62).

The noticeable increase in the early 20th century of the polit-vocabulary in other languages (for the German cf. Kann 1973) also clearly holds true for the Finnish vocabulary. In this respect the differences between textual genres deserve to be taken into account. In such a popular genre as the causeries in the newspapers, the polit-vocabulary was already accepted around the time of the Parliament Reform of 1906, while in academic literature the state-vocabulary persisted for until much later.

The Disappearance of the Discipline Concept

Aristotle's famous book *Tà politikà* was a study of the polis, and similarly, the academic discipline of *politics* in the medieval and early modern universities was a discipline on "political matters" (cf. Sellin 1978), the Latin plural being *politices*. Also at the University in Turku, founded in 1640, there was during some decades a chair called *politices, ethices, historiarum* (cf. Klinge 1988). The term *politices* re-

ferred to an array of different matters, both those between states and those dealing with internal legal, financial, administrative and other questions. The German *Polizeiwissenschaft* (cf. Maier 1966, Brückner 1977), as well as its analogies elsewhere, was a variant of this kind of an 'umbrella discipline,' within which it was not necessary to identify things that were specifically 'political.'

Reinhart Koselleck (1967, 1975) has detected that *die Geschichte* was grammatically transformed from the plural to the singular and became contaminated by the term *Historie* between the 1760s and 1780s, beginning thus to refer also to the *res gastae* – to a phenomenon itself and hence not only to a story about one. Something similar happened with politics from ca. 1800 onwards: the subject matter of the discipline was being turned by a metonymic operation into a phenomenon in its own right, and since then we have referred to certain kinds of activities as "politics" or as "political" (cf. Palonen 1985, 1990b, Vollrath 1989). I have spoken of a "horizon shift" in the understanding of politics. As for politics, the horizon shift was more or less simultaneous in French and German sources, and it also seems that there is no radical difference from the British sources, either.

The thematization of politics during the 19th century consists of attempts to draw the contours of the new horizons. Authors used to refer to politics as if there was still a relative level of continuity to the Aristotelian view. However, upon closer examination of the texts it becomes clear that the discussion of a science or an art of politics actually referred to the instruments used to improve the quality of politics as an activity. The thematization of politics in the Finnish language began at a time in which the discipline concept had already become anachronistic elsewhere. A kind of a dualist view, distinguishing between "theoretical" and "practical" politics, can be found e.g. in the dictionary of the conservative Fennoman Meurman, for whom *politiki* means a "science of the state" and "its adaptation to the affairs of the state is called practical politics" (Meurman 1883/90, 639).

In particular, a remnant of the discipline concept can be detected in the interpretations of the various policy-fields, in which the relation between an action and a discipline was never explicated. The sense of a break with this discipline view was, nonetheless, indicated in an article on social policy by Böök, a government official, in the handbook *Valtiotieteiden käsikirja*.

In academic literature politics means both the science of the state, and the life of the state and the action concerning the life of the state. In daily parlance politics only has the latter meaning (Böök 1923, 435).

The chair of political science, or *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, at the University of Helsinki was founded in 1921.The applicants, Brotherus (1924a,b,c) and Laurila (1923), Erich (1924), who wrote the expert review to the faculty, and Ruuth [later: Ruutu] (1922a,b, 1924), who applied for a private docent's position, all had something to say on the concept of politics. At that time none of them was entirely free from the remnants of the discipline concept, and especially Georg Jellinek's idea of politics as a *praktische Wissenschaft* (1900, 13-19) was often mentioned. The academic discourse did not adopt any reference to the usage of the concept by political agents, among whom no one referred to politics in the disciplinary sense in Finland.

A Policy of the Finnish People

There have been few thematizations of a systematic account of the policy-conception of politics (for its distinction from the politics and polity conceptions cf. Rohe 1978/1994). Especially those interested in "policy-analysis" in political science seem to have been uninterested in asking why a definite policy should be preferable to an oblique, opportunistic and situation-oriented form of politicking. Nor have I found any systematic explication of how the coordination of different activities into a policy could be realized, how the primary acts are transformed, or when they are included into a policy. In this sense, policy does not seem to play the role of an independent concept. (cf. Rohe & Dörner 1991)

In the 19th century Finland was a semi-colonial country in which the personal experience of acting politically was almost entirely lacking. Times, however, began to change in the early years of Czar Alexander II's reign as the Finnish Grand Duke through such events as the nomination of the Fennoman ideologist J.V. Snellman to the the Senate, or "domestic government," the convocation of the Finnish

part of the medieval Swedish Estate Diet in 1863 with its regularization of the Diet sessions since 1869. An elementary party competition between the Fennoman, the Svekoman and the Liberal fractions began amongst university students in Helsinki. (cf. Klinge 1967, vol. 2).

The Fennoman "party leader" professor Yrjö Koskinen (orig. G.Z. Forsman, later Y.S. Yrjö-Koskinen) rewrote the history of the Swedish empire from a "Finnish" perspective. In his writings we find for the first time the expression of the idea that the Finns also had a policy. In Hegelian style he writes in 1869:

> The highest form of the national life is, of course, the political (*valtiollinen*). The Finnish people is no exception in this respect, and we shall not forget that it also has a policy of its own (*oma politiikkinsa*) (Yrjö-Koskinen 1869, 541).

This is a good example of the application of the *policy*-perspective. Every 'state' or 'people' has, according to Koskinen, a policy of its own. The word policy was used, above all, to refer to a foreign policy in the European concert, in the balance system of the great powers. In spite of Finland's being part of the Russian Empire, Finnish writers (for example Mechelin 1873) claimed that it was a 'state,' and Koskinen's view contained the idea that the 'Finnish people' was a policy-agent.

State or government were in general considered as the main policy-agents in Finnish sources around 1900, but the formula was extended to refer, for example, to the policy of a Bismarck or of popes in *Tietosanakirja* (1909-1922). In the 1920s this formula was applied, at least in the daily parlance, to the activities of individual politicians, although this extension was also the target of a great deal of criticism. In his diary, President Relander wrote on the ambassador Holsti that:

> ...Holsti tries, to too great an extent, to follow a policy of his own at the cost of the policy of the government. (Relander I, 61, from 1925)

The idea here was that a state or a government cannot have but a single policy. Koskinen and others legitimated this view by the

essence of a nation, and Paasikivi and Kekkonen later legitimated it by the necessary singularization and unification of the policy in the name of the *Staatsräson* (cf. Palonen 1987). Kekkonen states that in the international politics there are two "leading factors," "the national interest of the states" and "relations of power between the states," which should be balanced with each other as the a criteria of identifying a proper line for the foreign policy of a state to follow. (Kekkonen 1944, 13-14, 25-26) Both subscribed to the conclusion that "the domestic policy should be adapted to the facts dictated by the foreign policy and not vice versa" (Kekkonen 1943, 32).

The policy to be followed was understood as being determined by the "being" of the Finnish state in its relation to the great powers, as a question of detecting the demands of the *Staatsräson*. That the leaders of Finnish foreign policy had to make a choice and had to deliberate among the competing alternatives was something that these leaders tended to rather avoid facing. Or, the existence of an open choice was being publicly thematized only when the old "line" had become obsolete, as was the case after World War II (cf. Kekkonen 1944) and again following the collapse of the Soviet Union. To mitigate the moment of choice, a policy had to be based on a 'line' or a 'doctrine': The Paasikivi-Kekkonen-line as a doctrine in Finnish postwar foreign policy was understood to be a foundation independent of political conjunctures.

A point of debate has been the "necessity" of Finland's entering the war against the Soviet Union alongside Nazi Germany in June 1941. After the war the 'national' historians constructed the so-called "driftwood theory" to legitimate the necessity thesis. It was, however, criticized already by the Prime Minister Paasikivi in February 1946. He put forth a counter-factual thought experiment in favour of a policy the aim of which would have been to avoid the war in 1941 by the methodological criterion that without imagining the realizability of that which had not happened, no historical judgement is possible. (*Paasikiven linja*, esp. 51-57) Acknowledging a *Spielraum* of action as a condition for all politics and for every policy long remained a minority view.

From the State to the Political System

The demarcation of a definite "political" sphere, sector or field from other spheres was the dominant trend in the 19th century understanding of politics. The problems of demarcation, especially in terms of legal topics and their relation to politics, could be delicate and, hence, of immediate importance politically (cf. already Guizot 1821, 1822). The questions of "political" crimes, criminals, prisoners and refugees were perhaps the concrete cases in which a demarcation between the political and the legal sphere were experienced as urgent (cf. Riila 1993). Nonetheless, the results of attempted demarcations in international law remained fragile. For instance, both the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 and the League of Nations in the 1920s tried to draft a list list of "non-political" questions, but, of course, no consensus could be achieved between the participating states about its content. (cf. Morgenthau 1933, 27-32).

Characteristic of the Finnish political vocabulary, especially as opposed to the British one, is, however, the absence of a quasi-natural distinction between the public and the private sphere as a criterion of the political. *Political* is rarely rendered as *julkinen* (public) in Finnish. In two important 'definitions of politics,' the public is, however, evoked. In the entry by Forsman – he was a law professor – for *Politiikka* in *Tietosanakirja* (VII, 1916, 774), public life is used as a differentiating criterion for politics as activity. A half century later the same distinction played a key role in professor Jan-Magnus Jansson's textbook (Sw. 1969, finn. 1970, quoted from the translation. 39-41) in the demarcation of a 'narrower' interpretation of politics from a 'wider' one, the interpretation of an "organized activity" in general. Jansson's claim that the act of a doctor caring for a patient in a state hospital might be taken as a political act, while the same act in a private hospital is not (op. cit, 61), sounds quite strange to present-day Finnish readers.

The relation between *valtiollinen* (stately, etatist), *oikeudellinen* (legal) and *poliittinen* are dealt with extensively in the *Tietosanakirja* by constitutional law professor Rafael Erich. He interpreted the relation between the legal and the political as follows:

> … we often speak of political, matters, viewpoints, reasons etc. as opposed to the *legal.* The political is, then, a kind of matter etc., which is essentially determined by the cause of the purposes of the state and not the pure principles of justice. In international law disputes of a political character are such disputes, which cannot be principally judged by a legal criterion (TSK, VII, 1916, 772).

Here, Erich uses the teleological judgement as the main criterion of the political, as opposed to normative legal judgement. He wanted to restrict the range of the political and was not prepared to define the political as independent of the state. He followed the usage of the Jellinekian *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (cf. esp. 1900, 158), which would later be criticized for its etatism by a number of German authors of different backgrounds, such as Max Weber (1919), Carl Schmitt (1927/1932), Otto Hintze (1929), (and) Hans Morgenthau (1929, 1933) in post-World War I Germany.

The questions of polity and constitution, which were actualized by the Parliament Reform of 1906, the formation of new mass parties with their own programmatic statements, as well as by the first elections to the unicameral *Eduskunta* with universal male and female suffrage in 1907, were hardly described as political. When the polity-questions were treated in terms of *valtiollinen*, the policy-dimension gained a special significance in the Finnish polit-vocabulary.

In certain situations the use of the adjective *poliittinen* (political) was in itself the expression of a partisan view in an acute dispute. A clear case in this respect is the creation of the special courts dealing with "crimes against the state" (*valtiorikostuomioistuimet*) after the Civil War of 1918. In a parliament debate on the amnesty for the "Reds" in 1920, only the Social Democrats spoke of them as *political prisoners* (cf. the proceedings of *Eduskunta*, 30.5. 1920, 600-624).

Indications of an extended usage of the term *poliittinen* can be found in the diary of President Relander, in which it frequently appears together with metaphors of play, theatre, and even sport (*political arena, ballet, farce, stage, playboard* etc.), and Relander, a doctor of botanics, also uses metaphors of nature (*political climate, heaven*). Many of these expressions are clearly pejorative, while others manifest the president's distance from the "ordinary" politicians. Simi-

larly, his attitude toward political tactics is ambivalent: some of his expressions, such as *political humbug and intrigue,* are derogatory, while a certain appreciation of political cleverness is manifested in such formulas as *political constellation, puzzle, maturity, wisdom* and or also *political eye*, *move* (veto), although also directly moralistic formulas, such as *political goodness* (hyve) or *political conscience,* play a role in his vocabulary.

Jussi Teljo, in his inaugural lecture of 1949 as political science professor at the University of Helsinki, advocated an Americanization and "behavioralization" of Finnish political science (Teljo 1950). However, in his monograph concerning the period of rupture of 1905-1908 in the Finnish "state life" (Teljo 1949b), Teljo still uses *valtiollinen* in dealing with constitutional or 'macro-political' questions as an epithet for such concepts as reforms, events, aims, history, and life. The range of reference of the term *poliittinen*, in the other hand, has to do with the the 'micro-political' questions of strategy and tactics. *Poliittinen* refers to a *situation, position, question, attitude, struggle, orientation, or stage.* The state still appears to be the framework of politics.

A shift in the vocabulary took place among Teljo's students in the 1950s. Jaakko Nousiainen's (he later became a professor of political science at the University of Turku) textbook from 1959 was called *The Finnish Political System*, and the title itself was a program for a shift from the state to the "political system" (although not in the strict system theoretical sense, advocated by Easton in 1953). The figure of the system serves as a new framework for the polity, by means of which politics was domesticated into a sphere or sector of "society," which was the name given to the new "super-system" by the expanding "social sciences" (cf. Nousiainen 1959a, 4). In Nousiainen's *Puolueet puntarissa* ("Weighing the Parties"), also published in 1959, there is no mention of *valtiollinen,* but *poliittinen* is applied in the content of questions of life, history, and, above all, the parties themselves. The political parties are the main political agents in the the post-war political science and in public opinion. The ordering character of the parties in the polity-sphere is also expressed by Nousiainen's claim that political parties are a means of avoiding "anarchy, confusion, or chaos" (1959a, 9). In *Ylioppilaslehti* the socialist student politician Teuvo Olli almost identifies politics with "party politics":

> It is, then, the parties which formulate and realize in practice the programmes and goals of different currents of political ideas. It is for this reason (the) political activity is also an activity of the parties. Correspondingly, all municipal and parliamentary politics is party politics. And it is simply natural that this is the case. (*Ylioppilaslehti*, 31/1960)

Thus, the older practice, which partly followed both the Swedish and the German usages, giving priority to the state-vocabulary, was replaced in Finland by the more Anglophone use of the polit-vocabulary. The older usage, restricting *poliittinen* to strategico-tactical questions, which are subordinate to the constitutional ones, was replaced by a twofold strategy by making the political more acceptable through its domestication into a separate sphere within the supersystem of "the society." Thus, the claims of change, struggle, tactics and intrigue were no longer held to be essential aspects of politics, but, rather, as a subsystem *politiikka* (i.e. the polity) gained a respectable position both within the academic world and within the general public.

The Professionalization of Politicians

According to Max Weber (1919, 41), professional politicians can be found only in Western countries. Nonetheless, the reputation of politicians has remained highly contested, and they have tended to be despised by the "establishment." This has particularly been the case with the new types of professional politicians, who have been recruited with the extension and democratization of suffrage. Relying on the critical studies of modern party politics by James Bryce (1886/1910), Moisei Ostrogorski (1903/1912) and Robert Michels (1911), Weber (1917, 1918, 1919) stresses the formation of professional politicians as one of the conditions for the existence of a democratized mass polity. The whole reputation of politics, the differentiation of a political sphere and a thematization of politicking as a professional activity are all closely related to these new "realities" of professionalized politics. From these slightly different viewpoints the politician as a figure deserves a separate discussion (within) in the conceptual history of politics.

In the Finnish polity we cannot speak of there having been professional politicians prior to the formation of the Social Democratic Party (1903), the Parliament Reform of 1906 and the first parliamentary elections to the new *Eduskunta* in 1907. The dependence of the Finnish parliament, and especially the Senate, on the Russian rule prevented the full realization of democratized politics before 1917-1919. With the exception of a few Social Democratic "agitators," the existence of professional politicians who earned their living off politics became possible after that time, if not even later.

The development of politicians abroad was, nevertheless, keenly followed in Finland. The Committee for Parliamentary Reform warned against the professionalization of politicians, and the historian E.G. Palmén spoke in the Clergy Estate against a "class of politicians, who exist solely in order to participate in politics" (28.5. 1906, 614). The debate was revived with new intensity in 1917, with the plans to extend the session period (and, correspondingly, the fees) of the M.Ps. Several bourgeois representatives saw the reform as contributing to the formation of a profession of politicians who earned their living off politics. For example, Hornborg from the Swedish People's Party referred to the fact that in some countries two professions lack prestige, that of a politician and a journalist (op.cit., 707, cf. Weber 1919, 54, 68), drawing the implicit conclusion that a special competence in politics is not commonly appreciated. As opposed to the bourgeois politicians, the Social Democratic M.P. Walpas-Hänninen asked: "Which one of you is not a professional politician?" Accordingly, he considered the professions of a professor or a chief banker as secondary businesses that enabled them to "politick every day" (proceedings of *Eduskunta* 1917, 708). He called for the improvement in the salaries of politicians in order to attract "more competent professional politicians " (ibid.).

The Finnish bourgeois parties were also reluctantly yet increasingly prepared to accept the professionalization of the activities in the polity by introducing a monthly salary for M.Ps in 1947 and by increasing the number of functionaries earning their living from politics. Another matter, however, is the parodying of the conventional critique of politicking, as in the following formula of then nationalist student politician (and later professor of folklore), Martti Haavio.

> "Youth should not be engaged in politicking," we often hear said by those wise men who, who find it inconvenient that the youth is not content with their "statesmanship" (1923, quoted from *Ylioppilaslehti*, 1913-1963, 42).

The first person I have found to use *politikoida* (to politick) to characterize his own activity was the Social Democratic politician and history professor, Väinö Voionmaa. In a courier letter to his diplomat son, Tapio Voionmaa, who was during war time in Switzerland, he writes: "I have been politicking the whole afternoon" (*Kuriiripostia*, 280, from 1943).

Still, in the post-war time the professional politicians, in particular the "district secretaries" of the parties and trade unions, were often ridiculed by the *literati* and journalists (see for instance Paavola 1959, 96). To some extent it was the growth of the field of academic political science that enabled the consideration of politicians as belonging to an honourable profession among others. Jaakko Nousiainen contributes to this by calling *politicking* the "profession" of politicians:

> ... the number of those people who earn their living from politics has increased... . Their profession is politicking (Nousiainen 1959a, 40).

Perhaps the most eloquent defence of politicians can be found in Johannes Virolainen's chronique of his time as Prime Minister (1964-1966). Appointed to the post of Prime Minister after a non-party presidential government of high officials in the ministries and central offices, Virolainen defends the politicians as follows:

> ... the Prime Minister should be an active politician. I myself have been an active politician my whole life, beginning with my student days (Virolainen 1969, 55).

Also among the younger academics and *literati* a clear shift in the mood toward the acceptance of politics, and politicians in particular, can be seen in the late 1950s. This is most clearly visible in the pages of the student weekly *Ylioppilaslehti*, which became an "academic culturo-political weekly." For example, Jaakko Itälä, later a Liberal minister himself, parodies the unpolitical attitudes manifested in schools.

> Oh awful word, politics. It has created a disaster in our fatherland. It has mixed itself with all kinds of things, especially today, and dirtifies them immediately. It prevents ordinary men from holding leading positions and beats down competence based on schooling (*Ylioppilaslehti* 5, 1957, cf. also Itälä's contribution in *Suomen Kuvalehti* 34, 1957).

A direct exhortation to students not only to follow political events but also to join political student associations and parties was given by Teuvo Olli. Doing so would make up a "new chapter in Finnish student life" and an action "in the spirit of the developing society of the 1960s" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 30/1960).

Already a certain ironic distance from the new pro-political mood can be found in the poet Pentti Saarikoski's entry *Politiikka* in his "Guide to raising intelligentsia":

> Politics. Fashionable. It is old-fashioned to claim that politicians are stupid. You have to give an impression that you personally know at least one politicians (*Ylioppilaslehti* 37, 1959).

For the history of the concept this story of the relative, and usually not so enthusiastic, acceptance of the professionalization of politicians has several important, although rather indirect implications. The legitimacy of politics as such becomes a rather pragmatic matter, while the position of taking a stand in favour of politics but against professional politicians, which was especially strong in the pre-democratic British political discourse (cf. Palonen 1999a and the sources quoted there), becomes obsolete. The metonymic quasi-identification of politics with the practice of professional party politicians earning their living from politics strengthened the understanding of politics in terms of spatial metaphors of a sphere, sector or field. The increasing significance and legitimacy of professional politicians can, however, also lead to closer attention being paid to the very activity of politicking, its qualities and characteristics. This attention is, however, independent of thinking in terms of the metaphor of spheres.

Qualifying the Activity of Politicking

The activity of politicking is bound to be a queer, oblique, opportunistic, situational and self-changing mode of action, while policy attempts to reduce the range of variation within the activity. The first dimension in the qualification of politics as an activity exclusively concerns just its relation to the form of a policy. The arguments in favour of a clear and definite policy might be questioned as being incompatible with the radically discontinuous and dispersive, plural and conflicting character of the political aspect in the phenomena. It is in the breaking points and in dealing with them as challenges and opportunities for change that politics manifests itself.

This situational view on politics was introduced in the early 20th century German thinking about politics that was initiated by Max Weber and followed in the Weimar Republic foe example by Helmuth Plessner, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. After World War II the situational perspective transcended the Rhine and can be detected in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and at least partially Raymond Aron, as well as in the works of such German emigrants in the United States as Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau (cf. Palonen 1985, ch. 6, 1990h, 1998).

In the vocabularies this shift can be pinpointed to the partial replacement of the word politics by *the political. Das Politische* in German was known already around 1800, used for example by Georg Jellinek (1900, 158). It was made famous by Carl Schmitt's *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1927/1932), and was transformed into French in Morgenthau's book *La notion du 'politique' et les différends internationaux* (1933), although taken up by French authors only much later (cf. Freund 1965, Debray 1981). In the Anglophone discourse "the political" seems to be an even later expression, although it has been used increasingly since the 1980s (cf. Mouffe 1993). Sometimes, from Schmitt onwards, "the political" is used as a counter-concept for politics as activity, in the sense of devaluating the latter. Hence, from this sort of view there is not much to be gained by the qualification of politicking as activity. The works of Weber, especially his criteria of the politician living for politics, and Arendt, her metaphor of politics as a performing art in particular, still remain the starting points for any discussion on politicking.

In the Finnish literature, characterizations of politicking remain rare until the late 1950s. The contexts in which it used to be formulated were encyclopaedias and textbooks. The evasive character of politics is acknowledged explicitly by Yrjö Ruutu, who at that time was acting professor of political science in Helsinki and probably the person best acquainted with the international literature on the subject in Finland, in his textbook on international politics:

> Politics is a concept of which there are only few definitions in literature. Either this concept is considered to be self-evident, which it by no means is, or is otherwise so complicated that one cannot possibly confine it to one single definition. It is a word which is used in everyday language without close consideration of its content (Ruutu 1934, 5).

Amongst the definitions of politics that Ruutu offered on various occasions, the most explicit is this one from 1938. Polemizing against "unpolitical liberalism," Ruutu, then a member of the Social Democratic Party, writes:

> ... politics... means the common action of different societal groups for common interests, as well as common action for the guidance of societal development by means of the state for specific values (Ruutu 1938, 9).

Ruutu represented an evolutionistic philosophy of history, in which values, interests, and groups appear as quasi-natural entities and the state as the only proper policy-agent. He advocated an instrumentalist view on politics, as did Forsman (1916), Swentorzetzski (1928, 11), and later Teljo (1949a). In these views, politics is understood as a fabrication of an artefact, not as an activity in its own right.

A slightly different perspective appears in the views of some postwar political scientists, who have taken power (*valta*) as the key concept of politics. Risto Hyvärinen, a soldier-diplomat, departs from the power politics tradition and singles out "the struggle for power in society or politics" as the main object of political science and "the struggle on power between the states" as that of international politics (R. Hyvärinen 1963, 191).

In an early article preceding his dissertation on Kelsen's theory of the state (1950), Jan-Magnus Jansson defined politics by combining a Weberian and Kelsenian view, as the struggle over new laws (Jansson

1948, 131). According to him, the point is to claim that "the primary object of political action is power" (Jansson 1961, 31), and it is the generality of the object that enables politics to comprehend all the phenomena of power. Weber's point is thus so far well taken up by Jansson as he sees that in politics "power serves other purposes" (ibid.), although he refrains from discussing either the priority of the medium over purposes or the specific Weberian view on power as a *Chance*.

In his textbook, Jansson proposes a "wider" formula of politics, one which replaces power by *Herrschaft* as a key to politics. As every political science student in Finland until very recently used to know, Jansson understands politics, as "ruling over organized groups of human beings" (1970, 38). By using the resources of Weber's formal concept of *Herrschaft,* Jansson's 'definition' is not as so *von oben* - oriented as it first appears. Yet both the concepts of organizing and of ruling introduce elements of continuity and regularity that are hardly suited to the consideration of a Weberian *Macht*-based interpretation, namely in the consideration of the elements of *Chance* and the situation.

In the *Politiikka* article in *Yhteiskuntatieteiden käsikirja,* Onni Rantala, later a professor at the University of Turku, combines an instrumental perspective with the metaphor of art. He demands à la Bismarck, some qualifications before the activity can be counted as politics:

> Essential in the art of politics is the choice between different ends and means, as well as the realistic judgement of different existing possibilities. The task has been defined briefly by Otto v. Bismarck in his remark that politics is the art of the possible. The final decision is based on the known facts of the moment and not on idealistic hopes. A free and prejudiceless deliberation belongs thus to the essence of politics. It implies two characteristics for political activity. Reason has a greater influence than emotion, and the policy followed (poliittinen menettely) varies according to the situation (Rantala 1963, 501-502).

Thus, Rantala views politics as the deliberation between possibilities, although not necessarily in the reductionist sense of the *Realpolitik.* Correspondingly, policy is understood as changing according to the situation. In general, in the Finnish understanding of politics (as claimed by Pekonen 1997), the possibility of changing

the government through electoral defeats has played a marginal role. However, this shift in governments has been present in the everyday understanding of politics, as we can see from a remark by the writer Arvo Turtiainen concerning the treatment of political prisoners (he was himself a prisoner during the War due to pro-communist views):

> Political prisoners are treated more cautiously. The Finnish prison officials have during the years come to realize what a burden (*riesa*) they can come to be. Politics is, moreover, politics. You can never be sure what kind of men will hold leading position next year, or even tomorrow sit on the leading positions (Turtiainen 1945, 164).

In terms of searching the qualifications for politicking as an activity the literati are often better than political scientists. The most explicit formula is presented by Jouko Tyyri in an aphorism (written originally in the early 1960s)

> No party can be designed in advance, because politics is an action and acquires its form from counteraction. The whole affair (*puuha*) arises from the diffuse foresight that something must and can be done together. And nothing can be realized without resistance (quoted from Tyyri 1975, 110).

Here, we can see a strong Arendtian component both in terms of the unpredictable action and in the "action in concert." It is complemented by the Weberian insight on the constitutive role of struggle and resistance in politics. The works of the authors do not, however, seem to be an explicit source for Tyyri, but, rather, he is more prepared than the more conventional academic writers to look for these aspects of politicking in politics (cf. also his views on politics as freedom, discussed below).

The Controversies over Politicization

By politicization I do not mean an increased "interest in politics" among the people, but, rather, the naming of something as political or interpretation of something politically. In this sense, any refer-

ence to politics presupposes some level of politicization. The controversy has to do with what is named as political.

However, the recourse to the vocabulary of the *polis* and the polity as something given and already commonly known became the primary naming of some phenomena as political rather than uncontroversial. Only in borderline cases did the naming became controversial during the differentiation of the political sphere in the 19th century. Already in the late 19th century there were, at least in the German and French contexts, some signs of change that were related to the qualification of the political as being independent of the spheres – for example in Weber's Freiburg inaugural lecture (1895). What was hence being qualified as political did not belong to the polity in the conventional sense.

The noun *Politisierung* seems to have been introduced by Karl Lamprecht in 1907, without revising the concept of politics. But he originated a discussion in which the expressionist *literati* Ludwig Rubiner and Kurt Hiller reinterpreted phenomena such as theatre and literature by claiming their political character (cf. Palonen 1989, 1985, 57-59). By calling for the politicization of diverse phenomena they rendered the topics controversial and politically significant, as well as created new subject matters for politicking beyond the conventional polity sphere. In addition, they also questioned the political character of conventional politics (cf. esp. Hiller 1913). Thus, what was eminently political was no longer a matter of tradition or convention but, rather, a matter of the quality and intensity of the question disputed. The reactions to such claims, as represented by Thomas Mann's *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918), were also shaped by the reconceptualization of politics in terms of the possibility of politicization.

The German expressionist *literati* thus played a pioneering role in the politicization of questions independently from their "locus." The academic debate on the revision of the concept of politics, beginning with Max Weber, continued along the path paved by the *literati.* Outside Germany this usage gained ground slowly, emerging in France only after World War II, with the "existentialist" *literati* and philosophers posing as the "avant-garde" (cf. Palonen 1990a, 1990b, 89-90). The claims of the "end of ideology" in the 1950s were frequently seen to indicate the "decline of politics" without really thematizing

the concept of politics itself. One exception was the French debate on *dépolitisation*, which also offered chances for the rethinking of politics, although the critique of the *dépolitisation* thesis was not turned into active demands for politicization, as it was once done by the German *literati* a half century earlier (Palonen 1990b, 90-93).

A politicization was, thus, needed in order to create a Finnish polity. Perhaps Koskinen's call for Finns to have their "own policy" can already be interpreted as representative of this. However, when looking at the greatest politicizing event, namely the 1906 Parliament Reform, one is struck by the scarcity of the polit-vocabulary used in the debates of the Estate Diet. Only Magnus Lavonius of the Bourgeois Estate talks about the awakening of the "sleeping of the political life" in Finland (proceedings, 28.5. 1906, 612), and Paavo Snellman of in the Clergy Estate wanted to educate the Finns into a "politically self-conscious nation" (proceedings 28.5. 1906, 597). At the same time Eino Leino made a request of the unicameral Parliament for "a new..., more vigorous [*vireä*] political life" (*Pakinat* II, 62). He had written a month earlier on the comprehensive character of politics:

> Politics continues to fill the minds of everyone. Its phenomena concern, as it is well known, the whole country and the entire people (op.cit., 55).

No overall awareness of politicizing moves as being necessary aspects of the creation of the specific Finnish polity was attained during the rapidly realized Parliament Reform. The same seems to be the case in the critical years of 1917-1919, also on the Socialist side: the above quoted apology of professional politicians by Walpas-Hänninen was perhaps the most remarkable exception in this respect.

A sort of populist anti-politicism played a role in the Finnish discussion, for example, when Arvo Turtiainen referred to a fellow-prisoner during the war years

> Politics was in his opinion "garbage and deceitful" (*huijausta*). ... in him was harvested that sewing of high patriotic and reactionary propaganda,

> which aims at defaming and depreciating political life and action. By means of this propaganda especially the youth in this country has been successfully "depoliticized" (Turtiainen 1946, 66).

The critique over disturbing culture with politics was a widely held stance in the inter-war era. Even the young Marxist Raoul Palmgren spoke in the 1930s of "our politicized" time and referred to the danger of reviewing literature from a purely political point of view (*Tekstejä*..., 93). In the debate volume *Pidot tornissa,* however, Olavi Paavolainen, a well-known pro-European writer, both acknowledged and at the same time regretted that "our time has been politicized and economicized" and at this time, "when we speak about culture, that unfortunate political colouring must immediately be present. There are no purely cultural activities any longer" (*Pidot tornissa*, 1937, 32).

An astonishing denunciation of all politicization by someone who was considered by others as a politician herself is contained in the answer of Liberal M.P. Irma Karvikko, to a query of *Ylioppilaslehti*. She writes:

> Since the wars life in our country has become badly politicized. The ultimate reason for this is the entrance of Communists into stately (*valtiollinen*) life. They do not feel responsible for the fate of their country and their people, and therefore they have readily made great and small promises in all directions. The error of the others is that they have followed into half-way, in order to prevent danger. As a result of this error stately life has been continuously politicized and party goals have dethroned the general interest of the entire country (*Ylioppilaslehti* 5/ 1953).

This quote is certainly representative of the mood amongst some bourgeois circles in the post-war years. They participated in politics in order to delimit both the politicization of questions and the conscious politicking. The politicization of life in general was also acknowledged by academic writers, for example by Nousiainen, who speaks of the "politicization of the different fields of the societal life" (1959b, 3). In his inaugural lecture as a professor of political history, L.A. Puntila emphasized that "present-day human being encounters

politics at every step" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 10/1952). Later Puntila also spoke of "politicization," in the sense of the increased significance of politics, as being one of the current trends (*Ylioppilaslehti* 11-12/1959). He also saw that it is "the dictatures, in which the direction of development is determined entirely politically" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 10/1952). It is probably this identification of "politicization," with its maximum of state or party intervention, which led to the attempts to keep something out of the grasp of politicization. Both the right wing M.P. Georg C. Ehrnrooth and the left wing M.P. Eino Kilpi wanted to treat the world refugee problem as a "purely humanitarian" and not a political issue (*Ylioppilaslehti* 29.1. 1960).

Critics of the common lamentations of politicization can be found among the young *literati* of the late 1950ss and early 1960s. They saw a lack of politicization in the common claims of unanimity in both domestic and foreign policy, strengthened by the *ex post* idealization of the experience of the War. Jouko Tyyri criticized the "demonstrations of unanimity" (*yksimielisyys*) (*Ylioppilaslehti* 7/1959), Arvo Salo wrote an editorial called "The Art of Quarrelling" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 39/1959) and Jörn Donner, later a M.P. and even M.E.P., parodied the protests "against the politicization of the society" (1969, 274). Professor Antti Eskola objected to the alleged "unpolitical" decisions of the experts, on the grounds that all decisions have political consequences (1968, 38).

Generally speaking, it has tended to be easier to criticize the claims that something is unpolitical rather than insisting on the existence of politicization. The critique was restricted to the width of the political sphere, or to the definiteness of its boundaries, for instance with regard to sports (cf. Holappa 1970, 26, 1986). Provocative claims of the further politicization of different aspects of life and culture are lacking in the Finnish discussion. The ideas that the level of controversy would be increased or the *Spielraum* of action extended by politicization seems to have been explicitly defended. This seems to be the case even with the *literati* writing in *Ylioppilaslehti,* which at its peak was the key organ of the culturo-political debate in Finland around 1960. Politics beyond the conventional polity-sphere was indicated but not really explicated in the writings of Tyyri and other *literati.*

Legitimating Politics – Necessity or Freedom?

What is the more general human and historical significance of politics? Such a question becomes possible to answer only after the acknowledgement of the horizon shift of politics as an activity, and it is, to a considerable extent, precisely by thematizing such questions that the drawing of the contours of the new horizons occurs. To dramatize the question I exclude from my discussion a purely instrumental view on politics and concentrate instead on conflict legitimization in the dichotomous terms of necessity and freedom.

A functional or necessitarian view could be combined with a Hegelian philosophy of history but also with a more prosaic and implicit form of the belief in "progress" as a force in its own right, reaching beyond the variations in political activity. In the early twentieth century such German thinkers as Hans Freyer and Rudolf Smend advocated this kind of functional view on the significance of politics (cf. Palonen 1985, 64-66). Later the functionalist or structuralist mode of social science as well as many Marxists have strongly relied on the necessity of politics.

As expressions of the freedom legitimation we can count the non-teleological views on politics as a play or game, as an activity which is not measurable by the aims or results of the activities themselves, but, rather, by their qualities. This argument is already implied in British politics of the late 19th century, and in some respect also by thinkers who insisted on the autonomy of politics, such as, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-1840). As comprehensive conceptions of politics as an expression of freedom these views appear perhaps most eloquently in Max Weber's (1919) ideal type of a politician living for politics and Hannah Arendt's view of politics as paradigmatic form of action, as contrasted with labour and fabrication (1958), as well as a view of freedom as the *Sinn* of politics (1993).

In the Finnish context the "necessitarian" view was already advocated in Koskinen's ultra-Hegelian interpretation of world history (1879). In insisting, however, on the role of the Finnish people's "own policy," Koskinen combined a certain instrumentalism of politics as a necessary condition for the progress of nations.

Perhaps the most explicit necessitarian view on politics in Finland was presented by Reinhold Swentorzetzski (later Svento), a Social Democrat of Polish origin, in a pamphlet entitled *Politiikan taito* (The Art of Politics). He used biological analogies, comparing politics to the circulation of blood "through the organs of the state" (1928, 11). What is considered to be positive in politics is that which is necessary, i.e. the solution of great problems of the state, and it is "life itself" that "requires political activity from the citizens" (op.cit., 47). The necessity of politics means, from a certain perspective, that the citizens cannot avoid mixing with it.

> We have to talk of politics, which today penetrates all … of the organisms of state and society like a necessity, independently whether we like it or not. In an expanding democracy, politics is diffused by the daily mediation of newspapers to all circles of society, and it obliges citizens to think "politically," to deal with political topics, to personally feel the force and importance of politics, to detect its negative aspects, to participate in itor to despise it and to be its unconscious victim (op.cit., 7).

This necessity of politics thus appears as necessary for its sustention and for the functioning of an order. This view, resembling Durkheimian functionalist sociology, however, also contains traits of a *condition humaine*, which leaves the choice of action to the vast number of political agents. Here however, Swentorzetzski sees the potential danger of a situation in which problems become more complicated (op.cit., 34), insisting that the remedy is the role of the "art" of politics, which must remain a privilege of the few. In terms of the foundations of the art of politics, the author searches for the "evidences" (*selviöt*) of politics, as something comparable to the laws of nature. Politics should be subordinated to nature and reason, and "reason is the final winner also in politics" (op.cit., 140). Thus, politics is viewed from a strongly progressivist perspective, although progress is by no means a self-sufficient force, but, rather, the "art of politics" is a necessary instrument in its realization.

A strain of the functionalist necessity of politics is also contained in the post-war discourse on politics as a subsystem of "society." This is perhaps most clearly visible in professor Erik Allardt's Durkheimian political sociology (1964), but also otherwise the

Parsonsian and Eastonian variants of the functional necessity also entered not only sociology but also political science in Finland, as in Nousiainen's aforementioned view on the parties as necessary for the prevention of chaos and anarchy.

The most popular "definition" of politics in Finland, the "management of common affairs" (*yhteisten asioiden hoito*), has a pseudo-Aristotelian orientation toward a given "good life," and also includes a shift from the public to the common. The most characteristic term of this formula is, however, *hoito* (literally: nursing or curing), which I have translated as 'management' in order to stress the functional necessity implied by it. However, in the 1960s the formula was also invoked by some rather leftist authors in order to counter the popular anti-political mood (Ahlroos 1965, 7, Holappa 1970, 165). The necessitarian presupposition is most explicitly expressed by Pertti Hemánus, who later became a professor of journalism. He objects to the popular accusation of the dirty character of politics by presenting the following formula:

> Talking about the dirtiness of politics is as meaningful as, for example, the claim that labouring (*työnteko*) is to be despised. Labouring belongs to the necessities of life, which is also the case with the management of common affairs, which we call politics (Hemánus 1963, 48).

Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* was published five years earlier. Had it reached the Finnish audience at that time it would have been outrightly rejected, particularly by social scientists. For Hemánus, Arendt's defense of politics as freedom-in-action as opposed to a necessary function of "society" would have seemed completely incomprehensible. If the 'driftwood theory' of history was a paradigm of a right wing apolitism, a social-science-like subsuming of politics to functional necessities was popular on the "left."

Still, the conceptualization of politics in terms of the possible is not entirely absent from the Finnish political vocabulary. However, it remained primarily connected with the German *Realpolitik* tradition, in which the possible is used to delimit the realizability of certain aims (cf. Rochau 1853/69). This was the core of the Bismarckian formula of politics as the 'art of the possible.' Nonetheless, in the late Wilhelmine Germany several authors, ranging from Max Weber to

Karl Liebknecht, inverted the formula, demanding that an attempt at conquering the impossible was necessary in order to achieve the best possible (for the debate cf. Palonen 1985, 38-41, 75-79, 106-110).

In Finland, the purest example of the Realpolitik style reductionist view of appealing to the possible in politics can be found in Kekkonen's writings toward the end of the war.

> Politics, and foreign policy in particular, is – to quote Napoleon's well-known definition – the calculation of the states of affairs and of possibilities (Kekkonen 1944, 25).

As I already mentioned, J.K. Paasikivi defended the continuous presence of a realizable alternative, posing the question: "what would be the position of our country had another policy been followed" (*Paasikiven linja*, 54). In the rhetoric of the *Paasikivi-Kekkonen-line*, there was, thus, a tension between the narrow *Realpolitik* and the discussion of possibilities. The latter line was taken by the young *literati* of the 1950s, who were opposed to the claims of the "societal" activities of the students, as proposed both by right-wing student organizations and by social and political scientists whose reputations and level of fame were beginning to gain ground. Among the *literati* particularly Pekka Lounela connects politics with freedom by referring to ancient Athens, where "*free men* walked in the alleys and market places by talking politics – and they were not responsible for anything and did not politick as a duty" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 21/1955). Some years later Lounela advocated an unwittingly Weber-inspired view on power as a medium of playing with possibilities:

> Power is an end in itself only for a bad politician – for a good professional it is means, an instrument for realizing his purposes… power allows a more suitable opportunity for acting politically (Lounela 1959, 80).

Jouko Tyyri was another prominent writer who criticized the implicit monopoly of social and political scientists in terms of talking about politics. As an answer to the critique of not talking about politics proper – a topic also addressed to him by the sociologist Mauno

Koivisto, who later became the President of the Republic (*Ylioppilas-lehti* 38/1958) – Tyyri explicates his position: "I posed the question: What kind of language is politics?" (*Ylioppilaslehti* 7, 1959). As compared to the conventional "specialists of politics," he finds that "the relation between signs and significances is a problem closer to my interests" (*Asenteet* 1959, 67, also 101), and he insisted that Paasikivi "observed without fatigue the *signs of time*" (op.cit., 71). In this respect Tyyri's view predated the "linguistic turn" in Finnish political science by some two decades .

It is the distance made possible by this – in a broad sense the rhetorical approach – which allows Tyyri to see in politics the question of freedom and choice:

> Politics is about choosing. A conversation is possible only between alternatives, and politicking is possible only in so far as freedom is possible. Politics ends when we encounter a necessity. Politicking in a compulsory situation is no longer politics but suicide. To deny the implies the declaration of war, whether it be internal or external, of ideas or of weapons (*Asenteet* op.cit., 138).

In the next sentence he insists the correlate of freedom and choice, namely contingency, the *Spielraum* for action as a constitutive criterion of politics.

> In a free country people have a *Spielraum* (*pelinvaraa*). We dispute the more or less suitable possibilities, none of which are fatal. If a disaster is looming, politics must be ended (ibid).

Relating his discussion to Paasikivi's diplomatic and negotiating attitude towards the Soviet Union, Tyyri uses the play or game metaphorics as opposed to the legalistic *non possumus* view:

> The most important rule of the game is, thus, that the presence of a *Spielraum* is acknowledged. Correspondingly, the political language shall be, above all, a language of negotiation, emphasizing the relativity of matters and the internal relations between them. A politician can at any time claim that it should and would be possible to obtain better results, to industrialize more rapidly, to govern more cleverly. His terms are comparative and avoid all categoriality (op.cit., 138-139).

These views presented by Tyyri are probably the best expressions of politics in terms of freedom and contingency in the entire Finnish literature on politics until this point. As compared to Tyyri's views, the social scientific jargon of the functional necessity of politics sounds apolitical, like something which turns acting politicians into a kind of puppetry of "deeper social and historical forces." Conversely, Tyyri's view also acknowledges the reality of a politician's experience of the omnipresence of contingency, of the chances of acting differently, without *a priori* claiming that it does not matter how one acts, for it is the functional significance that matters and not the acting itself.

I have exaggerated here the contrast between the two styles of thinking about politics, for a certain degree of freedom that is embedded in the activity of politicians is allowed by the social scientists. But this aspect is, rather, considered to be a by-product in the understanding of politics, as in Jan-Magnus Jansson's textbook, in which the Weberian perspective is diluted by the Eastonian systems theory. Jansson admits, however, the obvious role of contingency in politics:

> We can, of course, say that the more 'political' a decision is, the more it contains the freedom of deliberation (Jansson, 1970, 60).

The omnipresence of contingency in politics and, more specifically, the qualification of degrees of politicalness is seen as clearly dependent on the degree of the freedom of contingency in deliberation. For Jansson, however, that is not the primary qualification of the political.

The Profile of Thematization

In retrospect, the understanding of politics appears more coherent and one-dimensional, more well-known and unanimously accepted than it actually was, if we consider the contemporary views and debates. Despite this, however, the impression that there existed an established politics in post-war Europe had a certain 'reality' within the audience of the media, the general public, the rank-and-file politicians as well as mainstream political scientists. For example

it has been possible to conduct Gallup polls on the question "Are you interested in politics?" for decades now without having to specify the concept.

On the international level we can detect at least two waves of the questioning of established politics. The first can be loosely spoken as that of the New Left of the sixties, extending politics beyond the conventional polity sphere. The second is formed by the "alternative movements," beginning with the Feminists, claiming that they had created "new" or "alternative" politics. In addition, there has been an academic rethinking of politics, which was inspired by both of the aforementioned groups and which reactualized the work of older theorists, such as Arendt, Weber, Schmitt and Oakeshott.

The "New Left" argument for politicization frequently operated with the "societal" rather than the political, and it emphasized the political consequences and conditions of diverse social phenomena. A Neo-Republican view was present especially in the French discussion, understanding "La politique … comme prolongement des expériences quotidiennes," as André Philip (1962, 62) put it. For Jean-Paul Sartre politics was "une dimension de la personne" (1964, 132). Sartre's views can, however, already be seen as a bridge to the second wave of the critique, especially due to his critique of voting and elections as paradigms of politics (cf. Palonen 1990a, 1992).

The search for "alternative" politics was prominent in the German discussion of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The key idea here was the rethinking of politics as an existential condition and as a specific lifestyle, which soon appeared as an insufficient replacement for "old politics." Participation in the parliamentary and electoral process without accepting all the conventions and practices involved in it was the original idea behind alternative politics in west Germany.

Since the 1960s, the Finnish debate has been more closely connected to the new European trends than in the past. A vast array of new practices and theorizations seem to have settled in the Finnish debate within a short interval. This does not mean, however, that their reception has been any more direct or imitative than in earlier decades. The dominant tone, rather, is that the interesting views from the French and German discussion are almost entirely watered down within the context of Finnish political agents.

In the discussion in the 1960s neither the republican extension of the public life to the personal nor the existential reinterpretation of established politics from the personal viewpoint seemed to have played any role at all in the Finnish debate (cf. M. Hyvärinen 1994). Even Feminism was etatistic and not manifestly political (cf. Holli 1990, Parvikko 1990). Similarly, the reception of "green" and "alternative" ideas were partly related to a few spectacular extra-parliamentary activities having to do with the content of environmental policies. The critique of the forms of parliamentary politics in terms of questions surrounding lifestyle have remained marginal outside of the sphere of a few political science professionals who are sympathetic to the Greens.

When considering the Finnish contributions to the concept of politics, the primary impression is that the general Western European patterns of conceptual change are repeated in the Finnish debate. The shift from treating politics as something occurring abroad to a topic about which almost every Finnish adult citizen has her/his own opinion has taken place in an astonishingly short period of time, roughly speaking in the 100 years between 1870 and 1970. The conceptual changes can be considered as a part of this relatively rapid learning process, turning the Finnish views from those of a semi-colonial periphery into those corresponding to the views in any Western European country. In the thematization of politics as a concept, the Finland of the 1960s was no longer a *verspätete Nation* (Plessner 1959).

This rapid "Europeanization" of Finnish political culture is a main source of the Finnish *Sonderweg* in the history of the concept of politics. Compared with Great Britain in particular, a strong sense of a kind of traditional wisdom, which was experienced as being threatened by the democratization and novel practices in politics, is lacking. In Finland, practically no defence of the old order in the name of politics can be found. Politics was, rather, experienced as new object of learning, an instrument of change, which also required that actors have a certain level of self-confidence. Its proponents, from Koskinen onward, attempted, however, to find some "objective grounds" for politics above itself and thus lessen the burden of responsibility. The 20th century conceptual history of politics in Finland is, to a remarkable extent, a story of liberation from these "ob-

jective grounds," which retained their last resort in the foreign policy and which return even in the claims of "the only possible financial policy" in the early 1990s.

Within Finnish texts the policy perspective has been given priority over the polity perspective in the thematization of conventional politics. Policy refers here to a teleological orientation, combined with the demand for a unitary purpose and not an open deliberation on the direction of policy choices. In addition, Finland was viewed for a long time as being an "underdeveloped" country with a strong belief in progress as a force that moves above politics, even when realized in the sense of economic growth and social improvements (cf. Kuusi 1961).

The questions surrounding primary politicization as the constitution of a separate and definite Finnish polity were never thematized in detail, which is due in part to the usage of the state vocabulary, which was legitimated by authors through their emphasis on Finland's character as an autonomous state within the Russian Empire (cf. Jussila 1989, Pulkkinen 2000). The view of "Finland" as an ancient political unit constructed within the national historiography can be added to this legitimization. Neither the Parliament Reform of 1906 nor the constitutional struggle 1918-1919 appeared as the constitution of a new polity, creating new horizons for political action. The polity perspective was adopted only in the 1950s, based on the notion of "the Finnish political system" and the legitimization of party struggles as parliamentary and electoral practices as something normal within "advanced" political cultures.

This relative secondary nature of the polity perspective also implies – as compared with the Anglophone quasi-identification of politics with the "public sphere" – a certain flexibility in the understanding of politics following the superseding of the old etatist view. This flexibility involves both the increasing diffuseness of the borders of the "political sphere" and an increasing openness to the conceptualization of politics as an aspect of any phenomenon, independent of its "location." Here, we could speak of a certain readiness toward a quantitative or qualitative politicization.

Qualifying politics in terms of its character as an activity has turned it into a temporal phenomenon, and the priority of policy over polity also implies a certain temporalization of politics, namely in a

"futuristic" sense. The inversion of the conventional depreciation of politicking was facilitated by the introduction of the rather elegant verb *politikoida*, particularly in the literary "discourse" ranging from Leino to Tyyri. A critique of Finnish politicians as political players, because of their rule-bound and predictable style of playing, has been emphasized more recently by the writer Paavo Haavikko:

> The Finnish politician is never surprising. This, therefore, is why he always loses the game. He remains by the game board after the winners have already left (Haavikko 1992, 167).

The lack of provocative politicization can also be viewed as the fear of the consequences of the unregulated contingency of politics. But perhaps it is precisely this incompetence of conventional 'politicians' that has strengthened the sense of contingency in the understanding of the non-established forms of politics and its theorization in Finnish political science in the 1980s. In the changing political practices of the Finns there are now good reasons to advocate the view of politics as an expression of contingent freedom, not only as joyous but also as something that forces people to face the the dreadful consequence of the existential "being condemned to freedom," as Sartre put it in *L'être et le néant* (1943).

Not only has the separateness of the specific Finnish polity been shaken to its very foundation by its joining the EU and EMU, but the provincial "shelter from politicization" has been challenged by the increasing numbers of foreigners and refugees in the country, as well as by the loss of the monopoly of the family paradigm and monoculture in terms of sexual identity. The philosophies of history legitimating the subordination of individuals to national and social entities have similarly lost their hold on the Finnish audience.

Thus, when human beings are condemned to freedom they are also condemned to politics. Having to face existential, stylistic, strategic, tactical and technical choices is one of the daily experiences of both Finnish politicians and citizens, called by Weber "occasional politicians" (Weber 1919, 41). As such, to fear politics is to fear freedom.

Notes

[1] Having written extensively on the concept both in Germany (Palonen 1985) and in France (Palonen 1990b), sketched an interpretative perspective of the concept of politics in 20th century Europe (cf. esp. Palonen 1993) and as I am currently working on a comparative monograph (for the first versions cf. Palonen 1999a,b, 2000), I believe that I am well equipped to achieve the demanded *Verfremdungseffekt* in relation to the Finnish discourse.

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James Connelly

Politicisation and Political Participation:

BEYOND APATHY

Introduction: Politicisation and Depoliticisation

In his paper I want to make the claim that there is room for a cautious optimism concerning the present state of politics and that we should not fall into despair either because of the apparent apathy of the many or the seemingly anti-political activism of the few.[1] Perhaps one of the most curious things about the contemporary world is that it includes both widespread political apathy and increased politicisation. Politicisation, of course, takes different forms: negatively, there has always been concern about politicisation of the judiciary, of the police, of the civil service. In this respect there is a standing battle against politicisation – a battle to ensure that certain things are not made (in the party sense) political. But there are other senses of politicisation too and these are the ones I am interested in here. One difficulty is that the term 'politics' and its cognates is irredeemably ambiguous. In what follows it is sometimes used to refer to political activity in the broadest and most inclusive sense of the term, sometimes to the established political order, sometimes to party politics, and sometimes to extra-party political activity. The context will, I hope, make it clear which is intended on each occasion.

If we take a standard measure of democratic participation, for example, willingness to vote at elections, the state of politics in many parts of the modern world may be said to be parlous. In recent British parliamentary by-elections turnout fell to around thirty per cent; in the recent American presidential election it was just over fifty per cent. Throughout the industrialised world electoral turnout has steadily declined[2] over the past thirty years, people are less likely to identify strongly with a political party than ever before, there is declining confidence in public institutions, and less than half of the European public say that they have confidence in their political representatives. Thus, as Anthony King suggests, 'the overwhelming impression ... is one of voter weariness' (cited in Bentley, 2001). Whether we should call this apathy, however, is less certain. Tom Bentley, for one, argues that:

> The fault is not so much apathy as political disengagement. People do not talk less or care less about politics than they did in the past; rather, they have become more detached from the institutions of politics and government. (Bentley 2001, 25).

Perhaps people do not talk less about politics, but it does not follow that the overall level of political debate is unaffected by political disengagement. To illustrate. It is frequently said that all politicians are corrupt or merely self-interested, and that they therefore have no interest in reforming the political system out of which they do so well. This sounds plausible, and indeed a well-articulated scepticism might be appropriate. However, the claim as typically made is indicative of unargued cynicism rather than critical scepticism. Reasons can usually be found to accept at least part of the cynic's claims, but it is a matter of proportion. The cynic proceeds a priori; empirical evidence is either interpreted favourably as proving the case or discounted. Cynicism is therefore always hard to refute: but the truth is invariably both more subtle and more interesting than the cynic supposes and will reveal its secrets only to the careful observer seeking to establish conclusions empirically without prejudice. To take one example, all observers can agree that the British Labour Party has little immediate political incentive to alter the electoral system out of which it benefited considerably in 1997 and from which it

will again benefit in 2001. Nonetheless, the Labour government has introduced a variety of new electoral arrangements outside Westminster, thereby creating political experience and expectations which in turn affects the debate over the election of the House of Commons itself. The UK now has party list proportional representation for European Union elections, German style proportional representation for Scottish, Welsh and London assembly elections, preferential voting for the Mayor of London, and the House of Lords is currently being reformed: renewed pressure to reform the House of Commons is bound to follow.

Cynicism and the forms of political argument it inspires damages political argument and is corrosive to the body politic: if left unchecked it deforms and degrades debate and leaves us all open to the ultimate cynical conclusion that politics as such is worthless and best avoided. This is, of course, a nonsensical and dangerous conclusion. Politics is not an optional extra from which we can disengage. If we do not engage politically, either as participant or as intelligent voter-spectator-critic, we do not thereby bring about a better world free from the politics and politicians we despise; on the contrary, the opposite outcome is perhaps more likely.

Perhaps the real issue is what we take to count as politics and what therefore counts as political participation. On the one hand it could be argued that politics is alive and well and that it is merely party politics which is not: witness the rise of pressure group activity, new social movements and the rest. On the other hand it could be argued that politics might occur in ways unrecognised by the participants as politics in the pejorative sense of the word. Much political activity is not carried out under the name of 'politics,' precisely because 'politics' is tainted by association or identification with party politics. At the other extreme would be claims which amount to the politicisation of all activity, whether traditionally regarded as political or not. On this account everything could be regarded as political: this implies a reshaping of the boundaries of the political. But surely not everything can be politics? Or, if it is, it can't all be politics in the same sense. Complete politicisation is either intolerable or vacuous: if it implies that everything is a matter for the state authorities or collective determination it is intolerable; if it does not imply this, it is the extension of a category beyond sensible bounds.

If everything is political then perhaps nothing is political. Where, by contrast, the term 'political' denotes not a particular type of activity then. In this paper I want to identify genuinely political activity through observation rather than through re-definition and to observe some of the ways in which the political expresses itself in new forms and in new spaces.

Forms of Repoliticisation

Many young people appear to be apolitical or anti-political. They tend to see politics and politicians either as a problem or as an irrelevance. But that does not mean that they don't engage in politics; it merely means that when and where they do, they engage in forms of politics untainted by the clammy hand of conventional party politics. The rise of single-issue political protest is an example. In the sequel I shall argue that such protest may contain, as the diamond in the rough, the origin of genuinely politically action in a (broadly speaking) Arendtian sense.[3] But whether it does or not, it is clear that (if we leave these forms of protest to one side) political indifference and ignorance are Europe-wide concerns. In Britain there is extensive debate currently surrounding the issue of citizenship education which is poised to take its place as part of the national curriculum. The premise of the argument for the inclusion of citizenship education is that there is under-participation in forms of democratic political activity because there is insufficient understanding of the nature and importance of politics and its accompanying institutions. Despite the difficulties of succeeding in this enterprise, it is to be welcomed. One reason for this is that it is at least an attempt to rescue politics from privatisation, from its descent into the realm of the purely private. Politics can be depoliticised in many ways, and one way is to deny the distinction between the public and the private, reducing one to the other. Where the public sphere is reduced to the private sphere, the distinctive features of the public and its associated values (the common good, the general will) are lost; where the private is reduced to the public, everything is politicised, as discussed earlier. Further, reduction of public to private is frequently

twinned with a view of the citizen as a consumer or customer, and the associated conception of the public good as merely the aggregate of individual preferences, where these are typically assumed to be identical with preferences in the market. Here the 'public' sphere comprises simply the aggregate of competing private claims; deliberation is absent and participation is reduced to private acts of consumption on the one hand and occasional acts of voting on the other. Debate is degraded through being reduced to the product of exogenous preferences which are taken to be not the product of rational deliberation, but the a priori which shapes debate, but is not in turn shaped by debate. Of course such preferences can be modified, but the inference is that they will be modified through manipulation, not reason.

The antidote does not lie in some constitutional remedy or new type of electoral system, desirable as these might be on other grounds. Rather, the antidote lies in a reconstruction of political activity as a deliberative activity within a vibrant and active public sphere. Is this possible? My answer is yes: and we can see examples of it in various forms of political protests, whether they be anti-capitalist, anti-genetically modified food, or environmental protests of various types. I am not claiming that each of these forms of protests is a fully constituted re-establishment of the public realm, merely that they are the location of emergent possibilities. Environmental protest (where it goes beyond NIMBYism[4]) is action for the public good, taking place outside the confines of traditional politics. Protest politics (in particular, environmental protest) 'puts the politics back into politics' by challenging the established political forms: it is a challenge to the privatisation of politics.

Categories of Political Feeling

I shall organise my discussion by employing a four-fold classification of different kinds of attitude or feeling towards politics. The categories are: apathy, antipathy, empathy and sympathy. These are not mutually exclusive – on the contrary, they are likely to overlap both in intension and extension. An activity may exemplify more

than one category, and there might be relations of mutual implication between the categories themselves.

Apathy implies absence of a concern with politics, indifference, an absence of feeling for politics. It is a lack of interest both in the political system and in political alternatives; in this form it is passive disillusion. If interrogated, apathy is found to rest on pessimism: in so far as it takes an interest in political life, it tends to be cynically pessimistic both about the present system and about the possibility of change.

Antipathy is, broadly, a feeling of dislike or hostility towards those who do politics or towards the possibility of politics itself. Like apathy it is pessimistic but in different and more complicated ways. There is no space here for a full taxonomy, but it could be argued that there is a multiplicity of possible political antipathies. These depend on the precise proportions of cynicism or scepticism, pessimism or optimism and whether these take active or passive forms; all of these can be predicated both on conventional political arrangements and of their alternatives or supplementaries. The important point, however, is that it is possible to combine a negative or pessimistic view concerning the political status quo with a positive or optimistic view concerning its reform or concerning supplementary forms of political action. At root, antipathy takes the form of rejection of established forms of political participation; this is often combined with the positing of alternatives. In general it is active disillusion with the current system. It tends to be at least sceptical about the current system; if it becomes cynically passive both about the present system and alternatives to it, it reverts to the condition of apathy. However, it can take a different direction and combine scepticism or cynicism about the present system with an attitude of active opposition to standard forms of political engagement. In other words it can be sceptically pessimistic about the present system whilst optimistic about alternatives. Antipathy implies disengagement with established forms of political participation, but it can go together with willingness to engage with other forms of activity, whether in the form of protest or moves towards self-government.

Empathy implies understanding of politics and of established forms of political participation. It implies at least an acceptance of the importance of political arrangements and a willingness to see value and

purpose in it. It is not apathetic as it is not inactive; it may be relatively passive – but it is not actively opposed to politics. It is a precondition of fuller forms of political engagement and it is the point at which education for citizenship enters the picture. Political participation requires at least a proper understanding of the forms of participation and the structures within which the citizen is operating. Citizens may proceed no further than the standard forms of conventional democratic participation, but this and all activities which go beyond it presuppose the ability to understand and imaginatively enter into the nature of political activity as such. A voter ideally seeks the enlarged mentality in which they subsume their own purely individual desires to the second order desire to take account of the desires and preferences of all in forming their political judgement. This seeking of the common good cannot be achieved in the absence of the requisite forms of political education and imaginative ability to extend the boundaries of one's thinking and feeling beyond the boundaries of the self.

Sympathy implies active and uncynical engagement with politics either within the present system or with supplementary forms of political activity. It is optimistic, but it is not on that account uncritical. Ideally (but not invariably) sympathy presupposes empathy and it is therefore an educated mode of political activity. In general, where its critical moment is not to the fore, it is prey to fits of enthusiasm and zealotry and an inability to see its place within the spectrum of political activity. But this is not to diminish its value. If, as Goethe remarked, nothing great is ever achieved without passion, then those passionately committed to political change are to be welcomed. Indeed one of the themes of this paper is precisely the extent to which movements appearing as powerful but shapeless achieve results accepted as politically valid only after the event.

Each category will have a different relationship with political (dis)engagement. Apathy, for example, implies general disengagement, whereas antipathy might combine disengagement in one arena with engagement elsewhere; thus apathy and antipathy overlap. Where antipathy leads to disengagement, it will tend to be active and conscious, not the passivity associated with apathy; however, disengagement can slip back into apathy. To take another case, sympathy normally overlaps with or presupposes empathy; but empa-

thy does not necessarily lead to active political sympathy or engagement.

Apathy

There is plenty of evidence that apathy is currently rife. For example, a report published by the Third World and Environment Broadcasting Project in 1995 was entitled 'What in the World is Going on.' The authors of the report were worried that TV coverage of world affairs is shrinking: 'in the last five years the number of documentaries shown in Britain on international subjects has fallen by well over a third.' And they quote examples:

> Maxime Frances, 31, a community development officer who thought Alaska was Israel on a map, and didn't know who the leader of the opposition was, cheerfully explained why. "These things have nothing to do with me. I'm a single mother, black, working with homelessness and young people on the streets. I'm not interested in people at the top. They don't help us. The people who help are local people, big companies like Boots. I could name you 30 friends of mine that don't vote. I like soaps, I know about jazz, and soul and fashion." (*Independent on Sunday* 1995)

The implicit claim here is that it is the shrinkage of serious political coverage which is responsible for this level of ignorance and apathy. This may be, of course, a reversal of cause and effect. Maybe ignorance and apathy lead to shrinking audiences for such programmes and thereby to shrinking provision? Another argument is that, implicitly, people are dissatisfied with the political system and therefore seek to escape from it and its claims on them. Thus:

> The flaw lies in the system itself – the way we are governed. And that means our constitution. The British people woke up to this fact long ago, even if few dare say it. Polling data consistently shows a decline in esteem for our institutions and the system which links them together. While 48% expressed 'quite a lot of confidence' in the House of Commons in 1985, that figure had halved by 1995. A year later a European Union poll found that Britons had less faith in their parliament than the

> people of any member country bar Portugal. Local government's standing has never been weaker, with turnout in council elections dropping like a stone. Trust in our institutions is in freefall, with the young especially disenchanted. One Mori survey found 71% of first time voters convinced that their ballot would 'make little or no difference to their lives'. We are beginning to vote with our feet – by staying away from the polling station. Britain's turnout figures are in decline, with recent by-elections lucky to involve more than 30% of the vote. (Freedland, 2000).

Some of what is reported here clearly falls within the sphere of antipathy. Apathy implies mere passive disaffection and disengagement: antipathy, by contrast, is a more complex state of affairs and seems to fit this picture better.

Antipathy

By antipathy I mean a feeling against politics – a state of being or feeling anti-political. That antipathy is common seems to be evident in the absence of trust in government, institutions and politicians, in disillusion with politics and all its works. The Eurobarometer surveys over the past few years show this very clearly throughout Europe. It is also evident elsewhere in the world. But what could being 'anti-political' mean? One can be 'anti' certain aspects of politics or 'anti' the established forms of political participation; but surely it makes little sense to be anti politics per se? Politics – whatever we take it to be – is inescapable: we can tilt at all the political windmills we can find, but the sails stubbornly continue turning. Again, being anti-politician is easy (and lazy) but it means little if it is not accompanied by a proper appreciation of what it means to be a politician. Of course not all politicians or systems are the same; certain types of systems breed certain types of politician, and so there are many different reasons for political disenchantment. However, my point is that to be 'anti-political' is an unstable condition, therefore the anti-politician, to attain equilibrium, must either turn away from politics entirely and revert to apathetic non-participation or convert anti-politics into political action. Thus, as Bogdanor points out, the anti-political may assume an active form:

> There is, in much of the western world, a distinctly anti-political mood, as voters come to feel that they can make better decisions for themselves than politicians acting on their behalf. (Bogdanor 2000).

Antipathy, then, may go the direction of apathy (sour grapes withering on the vine – 'politics, who wants to do that sort of stuff anyway?') or it may take the alternative form of a call to new forms of participation or action (the sort of exasperation which leads people to say 'I'll do the job myself'). I shall return to this active form of antipathy (where it becomes an active feeling for politics) later. First some words about empathy.

Empathy

Creating Understanding

What I mean by empathy is the possibility of imaginative understanding (both rational and emotional) and, by extension, the removal of misunderstanding and ignorance. In furtherance of creating greater political understanding, there are an enormous number of debates and proposals doing the rounds, all of them somehow or other to do with politicisation with a small p (as we timidly say). We don't want to make people 'political' as such (in the everyday sense of that term), but we do want them to be politically educated; we want them to possess at least the rudiments of whatever political education is regarded as necessary to becoming a good citizen. I shall not enter into the detail of these proposals here, but rest content by indicating both the virtues and difficulties of creating political empathy.

Most people will not feel political activity to be a primary focus in their lives and they do not therefore necessarily feel obliged to engage in political activity. This raises the issue concerning what terms such as 'participation' imply. Does it imply that we should all participate? And if so, to what degree? Does it imply that some of us should participate? Some more than others? At the very least we should, I think, pay heed to Michael Oakeshott's measured scepticism about

these matters and question the extent to which participation is inherently a good thing and the extent to which we can induct people into citizenship in the absence of their own direct participation.

> For most people, political activity is a secondary activity - that is to say, they have something else to do besides attending to these arrangements. But, as we have come to understand it, the activity is one in which every member of the group who is neither a child nor a lunatic has some part and some responsibility. With us it is, at one level or another, a universal activity. (Oakeshott 1991, 137)

It is secondary, but universal; it cannot be avoided, although its pursuit is not for most a primary activity in life. It requires knowledge and understanding, but this in turn presupposes an appreciation of what sort of knowledge and understanding is appropriate. For Oakeshott, knowledge can be conceptually distinguished into technical and practical. The former can be formulated into rules; the latter exists only in use and cannot be formulated into rules. In the UK the teaching of citizenship is currently being introduced into schools as a compulsory part of the national curriculum. The plans prompt a number of questions. For example, the national curriculum refers glibly to 'skills.' This is an all pervasive (but typically ambiguous) term in current educational discussion. Leaving to one side personal prejudices about this language, the question arises of how these skills are to be learnt; this in turn raises questions about what type of skills they are. To be skilled in the performance of something is to be in possession of practical knowledge – knowledge which arises out of participation in an activity. But what sort of participation are we looking for or expecting to find? Are pupils expected to 'participate' in a strong sense of the term? This seems implausible. Of course, they can participate in other senses, in the senses in which engaging in debate and discussion is appropriate. But it is hard to see how more than this can be demanded or expected (which is not to say that some pupils might not independently choose to do more). One suggested remedy is the simulation: but this (assuming that the time can be made available for it) may fall some way short of what is desired. There emerges a danger not only that participation as such is proposed as an end

in itself (over and above basic civic duties), but also that the way it can be taught will be misunderstood. This point is addressed by Bernard Crick when he remarks that:

> the teaching of participation as an end in itself is only likely to create disillusionment in practice ... The virtues of participation are an important half-truth, but a lame half-truth if advanced alone. ... debates, mock parliaments and class elections etc ... may be fun, may teach some political manners, may develop some expressive skills and provide some alleviation of routine, but they are no substitute for a realistic knowledge of how the real system works. (Crick 1972, 199-200)

Overall, we must be careful of approaches which assume that it is possible to provide short cuts to understanding political systems. Again, Oakeshott makes a typically pertinent comment:

> Since a tradition of behaviour is not susceptible of the distinction between essence and accident, knowledge of it is unavoidably knowledge of its detail: to know only the gist is to know nothing. What has to be learned is not an abstract idea, or a set of tricks, not even a ritual, but a concrete, coherent manner of living in all its intricacy. It is clear, then, that we must not entertain the hope of acquiring this difficult understanding by easy methods. Though the knowledge we seek is municipal, not universal, there is no short cut to it. Moreover, political education is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition, it is learning how to participate in a conversation: it is at once initiation into an inheritance in which we have a life interest, and the exploration of its intimations. (Oakeshott 1991, 151)

This point can be developed further by considering Oakeshott's view of the nature of political principles, practice and ideology.

Liberal Democratic Principles and Practice

Oakeshott is well known for arguing that doctrines, ideologies and political principles are not derived from theory and put to practice but, on the contrary are distilled from practice itself. We should be careful in suggesting or implying that certain political or constitu-

tional arrangements are the application of prior ends or principles to practice. Oakeshott warns against this explicitly:

> one of the most insidious current misunderstandings of political activity – [is] the misunderstanding in which institutions and procedures appear as pieces of machinery designed to achieve a purpose settled in advance, instead of as manners of behaviour which are meaningless when separated from their context... (Oakeshott 1991, 153)

How easy it is, for example, to construe debates surrounding the electoral system, justice, social justice and rights in this way. This leads to an important related observation, which is that the current proposals for citizenship education (in so far as they fall into the trap of which Oakeshott warns) might be in danger of depoliticising the politics in what they teach. Further, it can be argued that the very term 'citizenship' is used as a way of avoiding the politics. As Frazer (2000a) points out, it is not a term typically used in self-description and the content of citizenship education is typically expressed as though it were essentially uncontentious. But the truth is the reverse: virtually everything within it is contentious and inherently political. And this is clearly a problem: on the one hand there is the constant (even if frequently misguided) fear that political bias will appear in the classroom; on the other, 'politics' as a term has negative connotations for many, including trainee teachers. It would appear that the coming generation of teachers are themselves sceptical or cynical concerning politics. How exactly do we expect them, therefore, to induct pupils into an understanding of a political tradition with which they themselves feel at odds or of which they perhaps have limited practical knowledge? Again, although emphasis is laid on the importance of discussion and reflection, this may be insufficient to convey the full content of real politics. As Frazer points out, conflict may be inherent in the engagement and therefore political discussion in the absence of expression of conflict lacks its essential quality. She goes on to suggest that our political arrangements are situated not only within a tradition, but within a complex of power relationships, and that this has to be addressed. Pupils will therefore need:

> education in the skills necessary for engaging in conflictual encounters. Of course, values such as justice, non-violence, autonomy, and democracy itself are a necessary background to such political engagement. If the values are wrong, then the politics will undoubtedly be wrong. However, it is clear ... that it is not the case that getting the politics right is simply a matter of getting the values right. (Frazer 2000a, 100).

Getting the politics right implies that one has to recognise the politics in citizenship; it implies that contestability and partisanship are in turn recognised; it implies that values, structures and constitutional arrangements have to be understood concretely within a full historical and developmental context. This implies that the list of desiderata identified for citizenship education is taken not as an indisputable set of principles, but as the starting point for activity and reflection: in other words, politics as a real shared activity. At this point we turn to sympathy.

Sympathy

By sympathy I mean 'feeling with,' sharing feelings and understanding and, in particular, sharing political activity – ultimately, the creation of a public realm.

The Practice of Citizenship

The theme of this section is that politics needs to return to the people, but not in a privatised form, and that there are indications that it is indeed being returned to the people. A few years ago Princess Diana died in a car crash in Paris. This event sparked a bewildering (to many) outbreak of un-British emotional instability bordering on the hysterical, which was commonly dismissed as lacking real substance or political import. But this view was shortsighted. The events were significant and real, even if they defied the standard categories of political criticism, and they were more political in their implications than was perhaps immediately apparent. In considering the political significance of the events, Eliza-

beth Frazer collected some of the press indications that there was something politically new afoot:

> The Guardian reported that 'thousands inscribed their words like citizens' … The Sunday Times wrote that 'these people at the shrines or on the Internet are claiming a place in the public realm … all of them see this as the moment when they can seize a definite public role for themselves.' Moreover, the Royal Family was criticised, by journalists and by members of the crowds, for remaining in Scotland rather than coming to London, for wanting a 'private' rather than a 'state' funeral, for planning a short funeral procession rather than a long one and for sticking to protocol in the matter of flag flying at the Royal residences. Paddy Ashdown … argued that it was a symbolic change in which people had started behaving like 'citizens rather than subjects' … From a Conservative political viewpoint, however, such 'citizenship' looked more like 'mob rule'. (Frazer 2000b, 204).

Frazer summarised suggested that:

> Ideals of and hopes for change in political culture were articulated very clearly by newspaper editors and leading commentators. The role of the press and other mass media in modern democratic societies was questioned. The idea that ordinary people should participate in public life was acted out. Theories and arguments about citizenship and democratic political culture that had been made in academic and policy circles for some years were discussed in a concentrated and extensive fashion, in a supremely practical and concrete context, in the pages of newspapers. (Frazer 2000b, 205)

Thus political movements, or movements with immense political significance, emerge unbidden in response to unanticipated events which crystallise otherwise un-noticed movements of thought and feeling. For an earlier example we might look to late 1994, when Britain experienced a huge surge of protest against the live export of animals for slaughter. The Independent reported that

> Britain's animal welfare movement has achieved its biggest success in years with the abrupt decision of the major ferry companies to stop mass transport of live farm animals …. The RSPCA and CWF have spent years and hundreds of thousands of pounds on advertising to try to

make the public put pressure on the government to end the trade. It was pressure on the ferry companies from passengers who hated the thought of travelling alongside suffering animals that did the trick. (The Independent, 1994a)

The same paper argued two weeks later that the animal welfare lobby was strong in Britain and that it extends across the vast body of middle England and is not confined just to organised 'extremists'. Further, unlike other issues animal welfare will make even Tories act:

the sniff of the farmyard, the sight of Dobbin and Daisy – and Tory logic turns on its head. Suddenly compassion means we must reach for the law book and act. A tip for trade unionists: the next time you want some help from Westminster: learn to moo. (*Independent* 1994b)

Commentators were uncertain what to make of the whole spectacle, with its distortion of the proportions of conventional political life. Some were argued that the really important thing was to press for legislative change at national or EU level; others were sceptical of the movement; some commentators were simply revolted by the whole thing. Polly Toynbee, for example, called it 'A spasm masquerading as a movement' and claimed that 'Protesters who take to the streets demanding animal rights are indulging in juvenile politics':

All of us, commentators and politicians alike, have been dumb-founded by the strange explosion of animal rights activism. Everything about it is unexpected, unfamiliar and odd. It doesn't fit into the deep, dull ruts of party politics. These people seem to have little to do with conventional Left/Right divisions. Their view of the world appears at Westminster to be upside down. ... Those depressed by the political apathy of our times have tried, somewhat frantically, to find hope in Shoreham and Brightlingsea. At last, is there a flicker of life-blood in our veins after all. The argument goes something like this: disaffected with the ideological dust-bowl at Westminster, the people are at last rising up and expressing passionate political emotion about something, anything. ...Most of these are people who have never demonstrated about anything before and they are proud of it. They wear badges saying this is the single issue about which they care very passionately, and they have never cared so

> much about anything else ever; not their fellow citizens and their social conditions, not difficult questions like distributing income more fairly while promoting economic growth, not hard issues such as the relationship of nations in a fissiparous world. This is juvenile politics, not even politics at all but a spasm masquerading as a movement. ... (The *Independent* 1995)

For Toynbee, the movement's claim to political seriousness was immediately disqualified by the mere fact of its being expressed in a non or anti-political way, especially where this took the form of expression of sentiment. My view is this: the point is not whether the protests were initially based on sentiment alone. Rather, the point is that a group of people spontaneously came together to protest something – surprising both themselves and others. They were of course middle class – but why should that be held against them? They were powerful because they were non-violent. They had much to consider and think through: they had quite clearly not thought through all the issues prior to protesting; but reflection on acts of protest can lead to a heightened awareness of the political significance of actions and a desire to render views politically consistent and coherent. Irrespective of the original lack of reflection, the action was implicitly the creation of a new public space. Some might say that this is too large and implausible a claim and ask whether it is really possible to regard protest of this sort, and others akin to it (such as Reclaim the Streets, anti-GM foods campaigns, anti-roads protests, anti-capitalism protests), as political action in the Arendtian sense, as the creation of a public space, as the opening up of genuine politics. Before reviewing this Arendtian theme further, let us broaden the empirical context a little by examining some other environmental protests over the past decade. The examples are mostly from the UK, although they could have been drawn from elsewhere in Europe or North America.

A New Wave of Direct Action and Civil Disobedience

The early 1990s saw a remarkable rise in the level of non-violent direct action (NVDA) in the UK. In defiance of environmentally de-

structive developments, the slow pace and apparent intransigence of government responses to environmental concerns, and the lack of real democratic opportunities to make a difference, widely disparate groups began to engage in direct action. Nowhere is this more vividly illustrated than by the ferocious protests against roads and the live transport of animals. In many ways this new mood of defiance can be traced to the events surrounding Twyford Down, beginning in 1992, where all sectors of the community were radicalised and became involved in forms of protests in which they would never previously have thought of participating.[5] This radicalisation was further evident in a number of campaigns against road building in the UK. Participation in such protests, and the media coverage they have enjoyed, has politicised a wide range of people, putting the issue of transport and the environment firmly on the political agenda.

In many ways the rise in direct action can also be traced to a reaction against the activities of the established environmental pressure groups and the apparent 'professionalisation' of environmentalism. As the expertise of groups such as Greenpeace and FOE has grown they have begun to challenge the scientific methods and evidence of national governments and industrial companies. A new breed of 'expert' environmentalist able to articulate environmental concerns and to negotiate competently on a highly technical level has emerged. This has had the effect of creating a gulf between the 'experts' who run the leading environmental groups and both their core supporters and the general public. In many ways the rise in direct action can be seen as a practical response by concerned citizens to political alienation – a reclaiming of the environmental agenda. As Tim Allman of Road Alert! argues:

> There were a lot of people who didn't like what was happening around them, but who didn't see what they could do that would make much difference. Direct action changed all that. It empowers people. It makes them feel that they, as individuals, can make things happen. (*Alarm UK* 1996, 21)

The national wave of NVDA has called into question the sceptics' accusation that environmental protest is merely a form of NIMBYism. The accusation of 'NIMBY' is a frequent form of abuse toward those

who object locally to development. Sceptics argue that protestors do not oppose developments in principle, but merely object to their proposed location. Certainly, in the roads protests and the actions against live animal exports, a proportion of the campaigners are local people opposed to the immediate local impact. However, for most of those involved it has become a matter of principle and NIMBY has evolved into NIABY ('not in anybody's backyard): this can be seen clearly in the development of the roads protest movement after Twyford Down.

Protest at Twyford Down and the Formation of an Anti-roads Movement

In the UK, direct action against road construction projects now seems commonplace. The images of protestors physically placing their bodies between machinery and environment, being 'cherry-picked' from trees and aerial walkways and taking their protests underground are all familiar. It is perhaps surprising then to consider that such actions are a comparatively recent phenomenon. The story of the Twyford Down campaign, which reached its peak in 1992, reaches back over two decades. It is worth dwelling on some of the aspects of the campaign as it was without doubt one of the major influences in the evolution of a national anti-roads campaign and it is an exemplary case of how environmental groups can be 'mobilised out' of the political process.

In Winchester, local people and organisations came together to object to the proposed extension of the M3 motorway by digging a cutting through the historic and beautiful Twyford Down[6]. The Conservative party won the 1992 election with the promise of extending the roads programme and thereafter construction of the road commenced. Local activists were faced with the option of resigning themselves to defeat or continuing the campaign in a new form now that all the legal and political institutional processes had been exhausted. Earlier processes included challenging the decision and its antecedents at public inquiries. However, because the issues that are open to debate are so narrowly defined, public inquiries provide only a 've-

neer of participation.' Objectors are not allowed to challenge either government policy or to challenge the use of particular decision making procedures, in this case an elaborate form of cost-benefit analysis. Inspectors have always ruled such challenges illegitimate. This is particularly frustrating to protesters as, although the cost-benefit analysis produces apparent benefits to the economy of millions of pounds, the environmental and social impact of road schemes tend to be overlooked. The expert knowledge of economists is not open to challenge and the reality of public participation is thereby degraded. As Ray Kemp contends, 'the professionalisation of planning with the introduction of technical terms and standards, bureaucratic and legal devices, may be seen to have led to merely token public involvement in many important planning matters (Kemp 1985, 183-4).

Following the exhaustion of political and legal procedures and standard forms of protest, the nature of the campaigning began to change. In order to raise public and media awareness, demonstrations took place on the site itself. Actions that stopped short of full confrontation were co-ordinated by Twyford Down Association (TDA) and Friends of the Earth (FOE). The transition from one form of protest to another is described by Barbara Bryant:

> As far as the Twyford Down campaign itself is concerned, the transition from conventional campaigning tactics (consciousness-raising, legal representation at Public Inquiries, political lobbying, high-profile events) to non-violent direct action was not an easy one. The rationale behind such a transition was overwhelmingly clear: in February 1992, TDA activists and Friends of the Earth (who had been working together for more than a year) argued that the Government was itself breaking the law in proceeding with preliminary works before the EC has ruled on the complaint before it concerning breaches of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. This unlawful behaviour entirely justified the use of responsible, non-violent direct action to slow down or even prevent the work continuing. A railway bridge due for demolition was therefore occupied on 14 February by Friends of the Earth. (Bryant 1996, 300–301)

FOE and TDA continued such actions for a couple of weeks, successfully halting construction before an injunction was served against

FOE. At this point 'lawyers advised them that to break it would risk contempt of court proceedings, which would result in fines of up to a quarter of a million pounds. This would bankrupt the organisation. FOE left the site, leaving a breach that was soon filled by the direct action protestors' (Lamb 1996, 6). The changing nature of the campaign continued with local people and green activists taking more confrontational but non-violent direct action against the construction. It is interesting that many of the direct action activists felt that FOE had let them down by pulling out. This reflects the tension between the newly emerging direct action (dis)organisations and the more established and well-resourced pressure groups. As well as the financial and legal problems that they could have faced, the new activists caused a problem for FOE 'who were anxious about being associated with mass illegal protests over which they had no control' (Doherty 1997, 149).

In late 1992, members of a newly formed local group, Friends of Twyford Down, as well as members of Earth First! and the Dongas Tribe who had camped on the Down, began 'bulldozer-diving' and 'crane-sitting,' squatting the proposed route on St. Catherine's Hill. What followed was to set the scene for future confrontations around the country. One incident in particular made protestors realise the physical power that could potentially be unleashed upon them. 'Yellow Wednesday,' 9 December 1992, saw private security guards hired for the first time to ensure that the site was cleared for the contractors. The violence meted out to the protestors, with the police looking on, shocked those present and those who viewed the footage on national television.

Undeterred, the Twyford campaign continued throughout 1993, slowing down the construction process and in the end adding some £3.5 million in security costs, including the hiring of private detectives by the Department of Transport (DOT) to gather information on the protestors. 1993 also saw seven activists jailed for breaking court injunctions and returning to the site. Further, the DOT attempted (unsuccessfully) to recoup the £3.5 million by suing a group of 67 protestors indiscriminately picked from a particular action that involved thousands. Although the road was completed in late 1994, Twyford radicalised groups all over Britain who previously might have given up the fight after the public

inquiry had given approval to the scheme. As Jonathan Porritt writes:

> The trauma of Twyford Down galvanised thousands of people into a host of actions that might otherwise never have taken place. It was so horrific, so visible, so palpable. Even now, there is no amount of cosmetic landscaping and tree planting that can conceal the sheer scale of the wound inflicted on the countryside. It screams out at you, and will go on screaming out to all with ears to hear and eyes to see. ... Ruling politicians and their self-serving advisers consistently underestimate the power of symbolism in politics. Long after the Twyford Down campaign was lost, and the Dongas had been brutally routed, Twyford Down continues to work its magic as a symbol of opposition to undemocratic, ecologically wanton road-building, wherever it takes place. (Quoted in Bryant 1996, 299)

It is important to remember that before the 1990s there was no national anti-roads campaign at a grassroots level. Organisations such as Transport 2000 and FOE had campaigned at policy level against the road building programme and in support of an integrated transport policy; but at the level of individual schemes there was no real grassroots movement. This began to change in the 1990s. After having successfully co-ordinated local opposition throughout London against the London Road Assessment Studies in the late 1980s, ALARM, the umbrella body for over 150 London-based groups, went national. Roads for Prosperity, published by the DOT in 1989, promised a £23 billion national roads programme. Alarm UK's response strategy was to set up a network supporting local groups fighting proposed road schemes before, during, or after a public inquiry. Alarm UK became 'a central, umbrella organisation which supplies local groups with information on transport, environmental and campaigning matters, which staged occasional nationwide stunts (including a "Stop That Road Week") and which held conferences where the groups could meet' (Alarm UK 1996, 13–14). By 1995, about 300 local groups opposing particular road schemes were members of Alarm UK.

Following their experience of direct action together with the realisation that road schemes were under construction all over the UK, a small group of Friends of Twyford Down members set up Road

Alert!. As Rebecca Lush, one of the protestors who went to jail for their actions, explains:

> Many people have been inspired by the protests that have sprung up since Twyford and have wanted to defend their land too. Road Alert! exists to help these people by passing on protest skills and helping others to get involved. (*Alarm UK* 1996, 21).

Without doubt the actions at Twyford Down acted as a spur to other NVDAs at proposed new road schemes and airport runways. The courage and commitment of activists is beyond doubt and we are witnessing a new form of flexible, non-hierarchical and spontaneous protest (Porritt, in Bryant 1996, 303). Certainly the techniques and forms of organisation utilised by activists are becoming more and more sophisticated. Direct action offers the possibility of new forms of political action in the face of political institutions that stifle meaningful public participation and that are unresponsive to environmental values. As Tim Allman, another founder of Road Alert! contends:

> There were a lot of people who didn't like what was happening around them, but who didn't see what they could do that would make much difference. Direct action changed all that. It empowers people. It makes them feel that they are individuals, can make things happen. (*Alarm UK* 1996, 21)

Thus the Twyford Down campaign, whilst unsuccessful in its immediate goal of halting the destruction of the Down, was successful as a spur to further direct action across the country. And the direct action that followed has become more sophisticated and generated increasingly widespread public support. Twyford Down showed both that the public inquiry system is seriously flawed and that the standard legal and political channels of influence are weak and unresponsive. Furthermore, concern is no longer limited to particular local schemes but to the roads building programme as such and the way in which public discussion of road schemes is limited and circumscribed by an inadequate inquiry system. Chris Gillham, a veteran of the Twyford Down campaign (and a person far removed from the media image of the dreadlocked, unemployed youth) remarked:

> I came from a background of concerned but respectable and restrained involvement. I spent years in formal committees of preservation groups, not achieving very much. Here is the justification, whenever it is needed, for non-violent direct action. The system allowed us to spend decades in argument, and huge sums of money, making an intellectually unshakeable case, only for the system to brush it all aside. When you hear the brazen words 'democratic process' and 'rule of law,' reply quietly with 'Twyford Down.' (Road Alert, 1996).

In these forms of protest we can see environmental activism emerging as a form of antipathy to the established political order; overall activists were knowledgeable about the system but deeply sceptical about its ability to respond to matters of pressing environmental and public concern. They took the view that they had to create their own possibilities for action. Both roads protesters and protesters against live animal export in their different way expressed and enacted the possibility of emergent new forms of political participation. But to what extent did their actions create a genuinely political movement?

Hannah Arendt and New Forms of Political Action

Hannah Arendt insisted on a proper distinction between the private and public realms. Political action has characteristics of its own, one of which is its unpredictability, another of which is its public and deliberative nature. My question here is whether the movements I have described in any sense measure up to Arendt's estimation of what constitutes a proper political realm. Arendt was deeply concerned with the loss or decline of the public sphere. The public sphere being, in the words of d'Entreves,

> that sphere of appearance where freedom and equality reign, and where individuals as citizens interact through the medium of speech and persuasion, disclose their unique identities and decide through collective deliberation about matters of common concern. (d'Entreves 1994, 140)

Public interests are not the same as private interests writ large, and they are certainly not the mere aggregation of private interests:

> What Arendt is claiming is that our public interests are quite distinct from our private interests as individuals. The public interest cannot be automatically derived from our private interests: indeed, it is not the sum of private interests, nor their highest common denominator, nor even the total of enlightened self-interests. In fact, it has little to do with our private interests, since it concerns the world that lies beyond the self, that was there before our birth and that will be there after our death, and that finds its embodiment in activities and institutions with their own intrinsic purposes which may be often at odds with our short-term and private interests. (d'Entreves 1994, 148-9)

I would suggest that it is possible to see some environmental and animal rights protests as a spontaneous form of action of the sort that Arendt sought to conceptualise. In other words they conform to Margaret Canovan's characterisation:

> Whatever the particular purpose or occasion that brought them together, those involved find themselves constituting a public space with its own common life, within which they participate not as rulers and subjects but as equals who find their relative positions only by merit gained in the eyes of their fellows. Such public spaces can spring up unpredictably from nowhere and just as unpredictably disappear again. (Canovan 1974, 68-9).

But before we get too carried away, we have to concede that Polly Toynbee, quoted above, makes a good prima facie case when she expresses concerns about the animal protesters. She has at least put her finger on the point that political action is (and has to be more) than the mere spontaneous coming together of a number of private consciences, albeit in a public space, albeit disruptively and powerfully. In her view politics requires more than this, and in this she shares common ground with Arendt for whom there was an important distinction to be drawn between 'the private unpolitical stand of conscience and the public, political stance of actively caring for the affairs of the political community' (d'Entreves 1994, 51). In so far as animal rights protesters are concerned merely with their own con-

sciences they cannot attain to the political, they cannot enter or create a public realm. The emotion of compassion or the dictates of an absolute morality are, in Arendt's view, dangerous bases for political action as they tend towards the fabrication of a uni-dimensional political realm rather than the creation of a pluralistic public realm emerging as the outcome of action. As we have seen above, some forms of environmental protest are more and some are less prone to this danger. Direct action against road building is, I suggest, less prone to it while animal rights protest is more prone to it: however, I contend that even there we may find the germ of a genuine politics.

Arendt's own examples shows that there might be hope for political renewal here. Her objection to Thoreau's account of what constituted civil disobedience, for example, was that it was a washing of the hands, a simple wish to disassociate oneself from something of which one disapproved rather than a purposeful attempt to alter that state of affairs. Clearly both roads and animal protesters are trying to bring about change. It can readily be admitted that caring for the environment may not the same as directly intervening in the public sphere in the purely self-referential and contentless political way which Arendt sometimes seemed to endorse. But nonetheless it does take the self beyond the self (and thereby moves beyond private conscience) by seeking to address an issue of public concern through public protest whilst engaging with the public authorities and appealing to fellow citizens for support. Along the way it challenges prevailing political orthodoxies and conventions and insists on creating a public space for its expression. Thus the public realm opens up as an indirect intention, as a consequence of the throwing of the private self into the public world beyond the self. It is a step towards going beyond what Arendt calls 'this modern concept of government, where the only thing people have in common is their private interests' (Arendt 1958, 69). But, in the end, for Arendt this sort of activity is going to be unsatisfactory if it fails to engage with the public world qua the public world. This is where there is a clear difference between broader environmental protest and action which contains as part of itself reference to the public world and to critique of the institutions appropriate to it, and narrower forms of protest which may, it has to be admitted, stall on the road to the public realm. Despite all this, however, it is certainly worth remembering

that action may start as one thing but emerge, unpredictably, as another. That is the nature of political action for Arendt:

> Action ... no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries. Limitations and boundaries exist within the realm of human affairs, but they never offer a framework that can reliably withstand the onslaught with which each generation must insert itself. (Arendt 1958, 190-191).

Conclusion

Somewhat bleakly, Arendt suggested that people are increasingly withdrawing into the private realm because they regard freedom as essentially freedom from politics:

> More and more people in the countries of the Western world, which since the decline of the ancient world has regarded freedom from politics as one of the basic freedoms, make use of this freedom and have retreated from the world and their obligations within it. This withdrawal from the world need not harm an individual ... but with each such retreat an almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed between this individual and his fellow men. (Arendt 1974, 4-5).

Such pessimism is understandable, and such a situation (if true) regrettable. However, the burden of this paper has been to emphasize that politics and politicisation, in the sense of creating something akin to Arendt's public sphere, can be found in the 'non-political politics' we increasingly see around us. Admittedly not all of this is fully formed and coherent – but then, on Arendt's own account, one would not expect it to be. The power and variety of the various types of response to current forms of political participation is easy to underestimate. Underestimates tend to arise through a one-sided evaluation of the way people respond to the possibilities of political participation. In employing the categories of apathy, antipathy, empathy and sympathy I sought to show that pure apathy is rare; that antipathy frequently leads to the emergence of fresh forms of partici-

pation; that empathy needs to be promoted (although its promotion in the form of citizenship education can be problematic); and that sympathy for political participation is more widespread. than always recognised. I have argued that there is a case to be made for regarding some (at least) of the environmental protest of the past ten years as indicative of serious political sympathy on the part of people who regard themselves (for one reason or another) as excluded from the conventional forms of political participation. Such action should, I suggest, be taken seriously as political action and its existence should alert us not to draw premature conclusions about declining political activity, sympathy and participation. Of course the sympathy displayed is not sympathy with conventional politics but it is still political for all that. The fact that is tends to arise out of despair or disillusion with the current possibilities for significant participation reflects the point made at the outset, which is that the categories will tend to overlap. Political sympathy, for example, might emerge out of political antipathy, where antipathy takes the active form of determining to do something as opposed to the passive form which tends to revert to apathy. It is equally important, in my view, to recognise that critics such as Toynbee and others are right in their insistence that 'demonstrations alone do not politics make,' in other words that sympathy needs to rest on a platform of proper political understanding – what in this paper is called empathy.

A final point: this paper has been largely concerned with the responses of the public to the political possibilities facing them. It is important, as a final point, to stress that political structures are equally important. We should not shift the entire burden of responsibility for political activity on to the citizen. Citizens need the space and opportunities within which to act and should not be blamed for the failure to remedy all of the imperfections of an imperfect system. Again, it is important to remember that participation is not the same as democracy, and that a highly participatory society is not necessarily a democratic society. Direct action and other extra-representative forms of participation should not be allowed to usurp the structures of liberal representative democracy. Although direct action can be a sign of political health, the need for it might sometimes indicate a state of political disease. In other words, the new forms of politics examined in this paper may be both symptom and cure. Citizens

need structures within which their citizenship can flourish: they should not be charged with sole responsibility for remaking these structures anew.

Notes

1 I would like to thank all of the participants at the Politics Revisited symposium held in Jyvaskyla in December 2000, and especially Tuija Parvikko for her comments on an earlier draft.
2 The national average decline is 10 per cent
3 In this paper I am going to focus primarily on the world of environmental protest. This is not to deny the importance of other forms of political engagement.
4 NIMBY: an acronym for 'not in my back yard.'
5 For a discussion of Twyford Down, see below.
6 Near Winchester, Hampshire, in the south of England.

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Other Articles

Michael J. Shapiro

CODES AND VIOLENCE: A POLITICS OF "WORD ABUNDANCE"

The soldier, that corpse in a trenchcoat, to his military autism.
Semezdin Mehmehdinovic (1998, p. 54)

Prelude: Mr. "Fuck It"

In a seemingly enigmatic scene in Michael Cimino's feature film *The Deer Hunter*, Mike and Nick, two guests at a Russian Orthodox wedding celebration, spot a Green Beret, on leave from the Vietnam War, standing at the bar. Because they, along with the groom, Steve, are soon headed to the war, they are excited about seeing someone who can tell them what it's like "over there." However, the Green Beret proves to be remarkably inarticulate. In response to all their queries, his only utterance is "fuck it;" he is unable to tell them (or the viewers) anything about the war. Weary of the unfruitful interrogation, Mike and Nick begin calling the bi-syllabic Green Beret "Fuck it." As it turns out, the film as a whole is about people who are remarkably inarticulate. And because the inarticulateness of the film's primary characters renders them susceptible to an unreflective transition – from working bodies (they are all employed in a steel mill)

to warring bodies – the film is an apt vehicle for exploring the question of why people adopt and enact enmities that have little to do with (or are even disjunctive with) their personal experiences.

Much of my analysis, which is aimed at approaching this "why"question, is focused on an extended reading of *The Deer Hunter*. But before exploring what in effect the Green Beret, aka "Fuck it," is telling us, I want to begin at the level of the larger question, which Immanuel Kant raised in *Perpetual Peace* and *The Contest of Faculties*: what is *history* telling us? In *Perpetual Peace* Kant expresses optimism about the peace-fostering potential of publicity. He posits the pervasive global development of an "unwritten code of political and international right" (1991, p. 108), so that "we can flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace" (*Ibid*.). And in *The Contest of Faculties*, he suggests that there are exemplary events (Kant has the French Revolution in mind here) that serve as a "rough historical sign," which allows us to infer that there is an increasingly peaceful tendency. The publicity generated by such events is producing, Kant thought, a level of enthusiasm which bodes well for the development of a "universal community" (1991b).

However, because of his philosophy of consciousness, which is based on a narrative of mental faculties – the story begins with the process of interpreting raw experience, moves on to a productive understanding and eventuates in a publicity that universalizes perspectives (see 1952) – Kant neglects what Michel Foucault calls "the coercive structure of the signifier" (1997, p. 42). With a commitment to humanity's historically enlarging and increasingly shared consciousness, Kant provides no way to discern the variable power of signifying systems, which are especially coercive when they are deployed on people who possess a limited "stock of signs" (e.g. Barthes 1981) with which to confront them critically. And, it should be noted that, in keeping with Barthes' and Foucault's models of discourse (and the spirit of Cimino's film), the language deficits are primarily a feature of discursive economies (the available discursive assets) rather than of particular individuals.

In this investigation, I begin with a brief review of the rapid change from hospitable co-existence to antagonism in the former Yugoslavia; then, using as my primary vehicle a reading of *The Deer Hunter*, I elaborate a framework for examining people's relationship to signi-

fying practices, such that they can be readily turned from peaceful citizens to warring bodies. Finally, I contrast the susceptibility to nationalistic codes of the characters in the film with the writers, Semezden Mehmedinovic, Manuel Puig, Salman Rushdie and Hanan al Shaykh, who articulate and exemplify the complex coding systems associated with the hospitable cosmopolitanism that Kant hoped would be a universal human disposition.

The Bosnian "Deconstruction"[1]

Sophisticated conceptualizations of the history of state-initiated nation building projects, from the "national-philosophism" of Kant and Hegel (Derrida 1992, p. 17), to the "imagined communities" of Benedict Anderson (1991), have emphasized a narrative of increasing human accord at the level of felt attachments. But just as (à la Adorno) "Auschwitz is an abyss in which the philosophical genre of Hegelian speculative discourse seems to disappear" (Lyotard 1989, p. 393), the fate of the former Yugoslavia is an abyss in which Benedict Anderson's account of the growth of imagined communities seems to disappear.

Treating "the geography of violence" and the reversal of the Andersonian process, Robert Hayden has described the rationale of the "forced unmixing of peoples" in the former Yugoslavia. The "continuing coexistence" of peoples in the Yugoslav state, he notes:

> was counter to the political ideologies that won the free elections of 1990. Thus extreme nationalism in the former Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of imagining allegedly "primordial" communities, but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable (1996, p. 783).

Examining legal texts, especially the new constitutions in which the idea of the "nation" has been ethnicized (p. 791), Hayden sees the law as the primary mechanism through which an "imagination of an ethnonational community" (p. 793) displaced the former national consciousness promoted in the former Yugoslav state. And, ironically, the implementation of the various ethnonationalisms was most violent in those regions in which the "nations of Yugoslavia were most intermingled" (p. 783).

In accord with Hayden's finding, the (now exiled) Bosnian poet, Semezden Mehmedinovic discovered, when he examined the Sarajevo phone book under the family name of the leader of Serbian ethnonationalism, Karadzic, that (inferring from ethnic surnames) there were "10 Muslims, 9 Serbs, and 1 Croat." He concludes that, "on the basis of such a Bosnian ethnic inventory, any racist idea – of necessity – becomes grotesque" (Mehmedinovic 1998, p. 22). The violence attending the practice of the "grotesque" robbed Mehmedinovic of his illusions:

> I myself no longer have any illusions about people. I know that someone I've just spent a nice afternoon with could knock on my door at any second with a stocking over his head...So I don't have any illusions left about people or, for that matter about nations...It is not only my world that has been deconstructed but language as well (p. 23).

But the violent "unmixing" in a formerly heterogeneous community has not robbed Mehmedinovic of his ability to resist the ideological condensations activating the ethnonational initiatives. Refusing to be "subjugated to a disturbingly reductive vocabulary" (Alcalay 1998, p. xv), Mehmedinovic relies on his writerly commitment to a "word abundance" (1998, p. 90), a perspective he developed through his experience of the boundary-breaching literature in the former Yugoslavia, where Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian writing manifested an "inextricable connectedness and diversity," and where, "there was absolutely no nationalist omen or hidden agenda between the lines of this literature..." (p. 115).

Intermittently, in his account of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mehmedinovic contrasts the story of national literatures, which have been enriched through their accretion of new idioms from in-migrating peoples, with the coercive effect of nationalistic cant on naive bodies with little discursive defense: "Soldiers... are just young people..." (p. 44) who, he implies, lack the conceptual sophistication to resist nationalist mythology. Mehmedinovic's treatment of the discursive frailties that grease the skids for youth to slide from child-like innocense to nationalist-macho violence is poetic and thus necessarily cryptic. Michael Cimino's film *The Deer Hunter* provides an elaborate treatment of the transition, as it features a group of young

men whose lack of a discursive rapport with themselves – much less with each other – makes them susceptible to becoming "warriors," sent out to an exotic venue in order to "proudly serve their country" (as the MC directing the wedding festivities in the first half of the film puts it).

The Deer Hunter

Sometimes because of genre confusion and sometimes for simple hermeneutic reasons, much of the critical reaction to Cimino's film has been obtuse. With respect to the former: apparently it must be emphasized that *The Deer Hunter* is a FEATURE FILM, i.e. it is a fictional genre, not a documentary. That its mountain scenes are not faithful to the Pennsylvania landscape or that the Russian roulette imposed on American and South Vietnamese prisoners by the Viet Cong "never actually happened in Vietnam" are irrelevant to an interpretation of their significance in the film (as in e.g. Dempsey 1979). With respect to the latter: the viewer is also mislead if asked to judge the film's ideological position on the Vietnam war or its sensitivity to the relative suffering the war imposed on Americans versus Vietnamese (as in e.g. Kinder 1979). While the war venue plays an important role in the film, the story is not about Vietnamese or indeed not even very much about the Vietnam War.

To adopt a basic hermeneutic standpoint at the outset (which I will subsequently attempt to vindicate with details), the film, as I have suggested above, is primarily about linguistically-challenged Americans, who, lacking a discursive *savoir faire* with themselves and others, are coerced by simplistic patriotic codes to risk their lives in a violent conflict that makes little sense to them. That said, the first major scene in a steel mill in the mythic, ethnically Ukrainian town of Clairton Pennsylvania sets the stage for a film whose major storyline pursues its theme of discursive impoverishment by focusing on the interpretation and exchange of signs. After an opening in which the camera pans the town's streets and buildings, the scene shifts to the inside of a steel mill, where heavily costumed and visored men are surrounded by gigantic machines that spew smoke

and fire. Barely visible to each other and unable to communicate verbally over the roar of the blast furnaces, they coordinate their work with simple hand signals, until one signal overcodes all the others – the loud blast of the whistle that indicates the end of their work shift.

What follows is a scene of animated male bonding, mostly in the form of exaggerated physical horseplay. When the friends – Axel, Mike, Nick, and Steve, and Stanley – speak to each other, it's only in the form of cliches and typical men's sexual jokes and innuendos, for example Nick's joke: "Have you heard about the happy Roman: glad-he-ate-her." As they exit the mill, still grabbing and jostling each other, the mood suddenly changes as Mike looks skyward and calls their attention to black spots in the air (doubtless caused by the sun hitting the heavy particulates in the polluted air). Using the code of the now absent Native Americans, he refers to the spots as "sun dogs," which he notes are "an old Indian thing," a "good omen" for a deer hunt.

The arresting effect of Mike's code reading evinces two kinds of interpretive response. The first kind is within the film. Stanley responds to Mike's pedagogy by saying that Mike makes no sense. Here and in another scene in which Mike insists that the only way to hunt a deer is to use one shot (to which Nick responds by calling Mike a "control freak"), Mike is established as not only the primary deer hunter but also the primary interpreter of experiences. Whether or not his codes are persuasive, at least he has some, which he applies resolutely, because, as he says to Nick, he "just doesn't like surprises." The second kind of interpretive response belongs to the viewer, who has just gotten a clue about the film's title, the *Deer Hunter*. A contemporary deer hunter is standing in for James Fenimore Cooper's American *Deer Slayer*. But the "old Indian thing(s)" are no longer on the scene. This is a different America, operating with different, largely imported, codes.

The break in the flow of the story, as male horseplay is interrupted by a discussion of enigmatic signs, should evoke another interpretive response in the viewer, one which, if the film is to be intelligible (in a critical sense), must pervade the viewing experience of the entire story. While Cimino's story has the film's characters read signs and omens, the viewers are having a parallel experience; the cinematic deployment of signs continually demands attention. For ex-

ample, one of the signs, to which the audience alone is privy, is a bad omen provided during the wedding of Steve and Angela. As they drink wine from cups with their arms intertwined, they are told that if they don't spill a drop, they are guaranteed lifelong good fortune. While the wedding guests assume that the couple is successful as they drain their glasses, the viewer is shown, through a close-up shot, two tiny drops of red wine landing on the bride's gown.

The deployment of some of the other signs places heavier hermeneutic demands on the viewer. For example, when Michael returns to Clairton from Vietnam and Nick is AWOL, Linda, seemingly giving up on the return of her fiancé, decides to make Michael her romantic partner. Just before she suggests that they go to bed together to (in her euphemistic expression) "at least comfort each other," a cross is visible around her neck. But before she delivers her proposition, with an un self-conscious and barely discernible hand gesture, she flicks the cross to one side so that it is hidden by her hair.

To locate the gesture in the economy of signs within the Russian orthodox subculture of Clairton, it is necessary to heed the gender differentiation that the film provides in its early scenes. After leaving work, the men assemble in a bar, run by their friend John. As before, their verbal exchanges are sparse, banal, and hackneyed. There, and subsequently, the lowest common denominator of their discursive poverty is exemplified by Axel, whose response to all queries, rhetorical or otherwise, is "fuckin' A" (Axel says little else through the film). While assembled in the bar – effectively a hall of worship to their comradeship – their bartender/friend John presides. He pours and they drink. The beer and the romantic ballad, playing on the juke box (to which they occasionally sing along) are the primary media that unites them, as they unwind together and begin an early, largely non-verbal, celebration of Steve's wedding that will take place that evening.

While the beer drinking proceeds, constituting the primary code of manhood and comradeship, the scene cuts to the women, whose preparation for the wedding shows them consuming a different set of signs: the cultural and the religious. Steve's mother is shown seeking the Russian Orthodox priest's counsel about her fears about the sacrilegious depravity of the groom and his friends and the cultural insensitivity of the wedding couple's generation as a whole. And the younger women are shown observing the cultural forms as they dress

for the wedding. Insofar as cultural and religious practices are sustained, it is primarily the job of the women. Like the men, they live in a world of signs that are pre-packaged and demand little reflection. And, like the men, they have secrets; they sedulously manage the signs they emit.

The sign management demands on the women are most evident in Angela, Steve's bride, and Linda, who is to become Nick's fiancée. As Angela dresses for the wedding, she turns sideways to see if her gown reveals her pregnancy, which is known to her mother but not the groom. In Linda's case, she applies makeup to hide a bruised face, which is a sign of family violence. Her drunken, abusive, bedridden father, reciprocates for her care taking with blows. Michael's sign management, propelled by his immense self-alienation, is the most exemplary among the men. It is signaled early in the film during the factory scene, where he is shown slamming his visor over his face, masking the only canvass on which his thoughts and feelings might be rendered. Thereafter, his retreat from his self- and other-engagement takes the form of a dogmatic application of codes (for example, his demand that a deer hunt must use one shot) and through an extended displacement; the deer stands in for a dear. It becomes clear, for example (from the camera shots that follow his eyes during the wedding celebration), that he is attracted to Nick's romantic partner, Linda, but there he muzzles his desire by turning to the alcohol-as-media that characterizes his experience among men; he suggests that he and Linda have a beer.

The deer hunt for Mike, who is the only one that takes it seriously – Nick says he just likes looking at the trees and the other men just drink and carouse on the trip – is thus a substitute for the pursuit of romantic attachments.[2] And during the hunt, while his friends goof around and exchange platitudes, Mike is involved in assiduous coding. For example, when Stanley, having forgotten his boots, asks to borrow Mike's, Mike refuses and, after lamenting the constant lack of seriousness of Stanley on their hunts, justifies his refusal with the remark: "This is this." In a response that reflects the impoverished level of meaning-exchanges among the men, Stanley says: "*This is this!* ...What's that bullshit supposed to mean?" It's a remark that reinforces Stanley's earlier assertion about Mike (outside the mill, after the "sun dogs" are spotted), which suggests that only a symptomatic

reading could make sense of Mike's utterances: "Sometimes only a doctor can understand you."

To return to the scene in which Linda suggests that she and Mike have sex, Mike's response to the proposition is of a piece with his earlier self-alienation, now deepened by his war experience: "I don't know, I feel a lot of distance – far away." Hitherto, all of his expressions of intimacy have been with men, expressed primarily through physical horseplay. He has had a code to pursue a deer but not a dear. However, apart from a lack of romantic *savoir faire*, Mike's response evokes a powerful theme in the narrative, the extent to which the young men are homeless. When Mike returns from Vietnam to Clairton, without his friend Nick (to whom he had made a promise to bring him back), home no longer seems like home. In the taxi on the way into town he spots a banner across the street that says "Welcome Home Michael," but he deliberately avoids the reunion. Was he ever at home? After the film's initial deer hunt, right after the wedding, Mike is able to enact his one-shot code and bring down a deer. But after the hunt, Mike is sitting among the men assembled in the bar, as John plays a melancholy Chopin sonata on the piano.

The music of this "noted exile" (see Burke 1992, p. 252) evokes a somber mood among men who seem to be never at home. They too are exiles from home, and the melancholic music reflects their state of melancholy. They confuse loss and lack (Zizek 2000, p. 659); they are mourning a lost object – home – which they never possessed. And their fundamental non rapport with themselves (their inability to make sense of themselves) has rendered them vulnerable to hackneyed sense-making codes. The confusion over home remains fundamentally unresolved for Nick, while Mike finally achieves a measure of resolution. Once Nick's suicide removes him from Mike's confused conception of home (he goes on a final deer hunt without him) and Nick can no longer mediate his relationship with Linda (he is finally able to have sex with her), he is able to stop enacting his deer-dear displacement. When he has the deer in his sights, he fires into the air instead of killing it and says, by way of release, "O.K."

Inasmuch as "what melancholy obfuscates is that the object is lacking from the very beginning " (Zizek 2000, p. 660), it is clear that Nick is the exemplar of one who manifests the most severe melancholic symptoms. More precisely, Nick, in keeping with the tendency

of "the melancholic to [engage in] an excessive, superfluous mourning for an object even before this object is lost" (*Ibid*, p. 661), anticipates estrangement from his home – in an early scene, as he and Mike dress for the wedding and contemplate their nearing departure for Vietnam. Reflecting on his attachment to Clairton as his home, he says, "I love this fuckin' place… It's all right here," and he follows this remark with a plea to Mike: "if anything happens, don't leave me over there." But what is that "all" that is "right here?" Once Nick suffers the trauma of his temporary capture in Vietnam, his ability to connect verbally with home is finally sundered. Two adjacent scenes testify to Nick's linguistic incapacity to express his attachment. First, while in the trauma unit of the hospital in Saigon, he cannot come up with his parent's names for the doctor, and afterwards, when he looks at Linda's picture in his wallet and then begins to call her on the phone, he aborts the call and rushes off.

Ultimately, when Mike returns to Vietnam to bring Nick home (Nick has stayed and become a player in a Russian roulette gambling enterprise, compulsively repeating his experience as a captive), he fails because Nick rejects his offer to bring him home, spits in his face, and shoots himself in the head. As a result, Mike ends up bringing home his corpse. Why does Nick die? One commentator on the film has put it bluntly, but is more or less on the mark: "Nick is inarticulate. It's why he pulls the trigger" (Wood 1980, p. 368). There is certainly abundant evidence of Nick's discursive limitations. For example, at the wedding, when Linda's eligibility to marry is signaled by her catching of the thrown bridle bouquet, Nick's attempt to bring what is on his mind into discourse is muddled. After asking Linda to marry him he says: "I don't know what the hell I mean."

However Nick's discursive poverty is a general characteristic of the men as a whole, the most extreme case being Axel whose "Fuckin' A" response to all queries is symptomatic of not only the friends' inarticulate interactions (for example, to greet friends, Mike simply says "Heyyyyy!) but also of the community's inability to respond to tragedy. They defer to ritualized signs rather than discussing their fears or examining information from the global mediascape. For example, the ballroom where the wedding is celebrated has signs of death – for example flag-draped pictures of young men who have died in Vietnam – but the only way the war is explicitly brought into discourse is

in the form of a patriotic slogan on a banner that says, "Serving God and Country Proudly." Cimino's story, constructed with its cinematic cuts and juxtapositions, emphasizes the senseless brutality of the war and points out that the determination of who lives, who dies, and who gets maimed is more or less a game of Russian Roulette (In the film, chance is inflected ethnically to accommodate his Russian American characters). Meanwhile, the community relies on ritual practices – weddings and funerals – and ritualized utterances.

The community's constant resort to platitudes rather than discussion is shown early in the film. Once the wedding celebration is in full swing and untoward acts are committed – e.g. Stanley's girl friend is shown getting groped while dancing with the master of ceremonies – the response is always ritualized. The interpretation John offers to Stanley about the groping, when Stanley seeks affirmation that what he is seeing is wrong, is "it's a wedding!" And when platitudes will not avail, no words are used. Stanley simply gets up and slugs his girl friend. Similarly, when Steve returns maimed from Vietnam and ends up in a Schriner's hospital, unwilling to come home because, as he tells Mike, "I don't fit in," his wife Angela can't talk about it. When Mike insists that she tell him where Steve is, she silently writes a telephone number on a piece of paper.

Whatever home is for the people of Clairton, it's not a place for an elaborate exchange of meanings. "Home," as the cinematic signs tell us, is simply a Pennsylvania town, where in everyday life and in times of stress they resort to simple labels. For example, they drink Rolling Rock beer (the labels are clearly visible on the first bar scene) while "over there" has meaning also on the basis of simple labels; during the coerced Russian Roulette game in Vietnam, the beer drunk by the Viet Cong is Miller. The minimal coding and the lack of self-reflection about "home" is ultimately underscored in the film's last scene, the post funeral breakfast served in John's bar. As the mourner's enter after attending Nick's funeral, John says, "make yourselves at home," a remark that has ironic resonance inasmuch as we have been witnessing people who are fundamentally not at home, who are unable to come to terms with what they feel or think. Because Nick's suicide makes no sense to them, and because they cannot find articulate ways to provide each other with solace, they finally resort to an empty patriotic gesture, a querulous singing of *God Bless America*.

Throughout the film, the men-turned-warriors cannot escape the insularity of their small town and the claustrophobic steel mill in which they work. Indeed they never seem to escape from their work venue, even while in Vietnam. The opening scene in the mill, where the men are surrounded by flames, appears to be repeated when they get to Vietnam, where the opening scene also shows the men through a fiery haze created by the burning of a village. But the macho male bonding and community rituals that provide solace for their life around blast furnaces do not avail them in the fire fights of their war experience (where the senseless brutality traumatizes them, rendering them virtually speechless). There, even farther from home, only Mike's coding (demanding three instead of one shot in this case to triumph over their captors) provides a temporary sense. But just as Mike's one shot sense-making during their deer hunt is shown to have its limitations once the hunt is over – as shown in the melancholy post-hunt bar scene, where John plays Chopin on the piano – his three shot sense-making, which provides a temporary rescue in Vietnam, does not avail the community, which is unable to make anything but ritualistic sense of the what the war has done to its men, as shown again in the final bar scene.

Cimino's film has men going to war because that is what men are supposed to do, especially if their only discursive resort is a set of macho and patriotic codes. And men are still going to war. Since Immanuel Kant's hopeful reading of the signs of history in the eighteenth century, there has been no sign of a generalized accumulated wisdom which suggests that the publicity from momentous events will generate a "universal community" moving in a more peaceful direction. Recognizing contemporary history's negation of Kantian optimism, Jacques Derrida essayed another reading of "the signs of the times" – two centuries later but with a cautious ambivalence:

> Hope fear and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violences are those that we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed, mixed up, mixed up with each other, but also there

> is nothing fortuitous in this, mixed in with the breath, with the respiration, with the very 'spirit' of promise (1994, p. 6).

Rather than posing the larger issue of a generalized, collective basis for a "'spirit of promise," I want to evoke the perspectives of those people who have exceeded the experiential and discursive insularity of the community in *The Deer Hunter*, in particular, writers who, like Semezden Mehmedinovic (discussed above), have been able to think themselves outside of the violent and coercive codes that turn a citizen body into a "soldier" to whom Mehmedinovic refers as "a corpse in a trenchcoat, to his military autism."

Conclusion: Breaking the Codes

As I noted in my discussion of *Sarajevo Blues*, Mehmedinovic's writerly commitment to "word abundance" was encouraged by his experience of "the boundary breaching literature in the former Yugoslavia." Another diasporic intellectual, Salman Rushdie, articulates a similar attachment to boundary breaching, which, in his recent novel *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* (1999), is articulated within a musical frame. Challenging the structure of enmities within the contemporary geopolitical world of nation-states by elaborating a metaphor of the shaking ground, the novel begins with the death of a world renowned rock singer, Vina Apsara, who is swallowed up in a Mexican earthquake. Thereafter, the narration foregrounds the value of multiplicity of codes while disparaging Hindu nationalism in particular and national attachments in general. That multiplicity is realized musically, we are told, especially in the "earthquake songs" of Ormus Cama, which "are about the collapse of all walls, boundaries, restraints" (p. 24). Rushdie, like one of his characters in his novel (Rai), is a permanent exile from his home country. He attributes his creativity as a writer to his resistance to the "reason" of any particular nation-state. His novel expresses the same East-West hybridity that Rushdie prizes:

> We are now partly of the West. Our identity is at once plural and partial. Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures; at other times, that we

> fall between two stools. But however ambiguous and shifting this ground may be, it is not an infertile territory for a writer to occupy (Rushdie 1992, p. 15).

In accord with these sentiments, Rushdie's sentences in the novel contain American and British idioms, and Bombay argot, as well as various other idioms from diverse language formations. And the novel as a whole is constructed out of diverse cultural genres,. as well as idioms, reflecting the inter-cultural semiosis (encounter of meaning systems)[3] through which fused musical forms emerge. As Rushdie puts it, his writing is influenced by both the western "idea of the fable"...which was originally a moral tale," and eastern "oral narration techniques...still alive in India." (1999b, p. 7). Rushdie's writing is therefore stylistically homologous with the music of his Ormus Cama, who admits at one point that his lyrics – "cockeyed words" and "vowel sounds" – are simultaneously his, and someone else's (1999, p. 93). Like Rushdie's prose, the world's musical hybridity is always already present in the pre-musical sounds of many national patrimonies. As the narration notes, Ormus' incorporation of so-called "western sounds" in his music is not a betrayal of a pre-existing purity:

> The music he had in his head during the unsinging childhood years, was not of the West except in the sense that the West was from the beginning, impure old Bombay where West, East, North and South had always been scrambled, like codes, like eggs (p. 95-6).

As in Rushdie's novel, the Lebanese writer, Hanan al Shaykh's *Beirut Blues* (1995) operates within a musical idiom to contest the nationalistic codes of macho men. Shaykh's novel contests the reasons of state and the macho codes that drive the enmities of the fighting men. Born in Lebanon and brought up in a "strict Shi'a family" (Sunderman 1997, p. 297), Shaykh is also a diasporic intellectual, who was educated in Cairo and has lived subsequently in London. But apart from the contribution of her travels, which have moved her outside the frame of particular nationalistic imperatives, Shaykh achieves her distance from martial codes through her focus on the loci of enunciation of "strong women" (p.304). And, like Rushdie, she expresses the distance with a musical idiom. She appropriates the imagery of blues singer, Billie

Holiday (to whom her narrator writes as part of the novel's epistolary structure). Moreover, her narrator is named Ashmahan, which is "also the name of a famous singer in the 1930's whose strength is inspiring" (p. 303). Born a princess, the historical Ashmahan "fled from her country, Syria, to Egypt, leaving behind a husband, daughter and a principality of macho men..." (p. 304).

The strong women providing Shaykh's detachment from violent nationalism inspire her to recode the civil war and see it as a function of a conceptual claustrophobia, which she expresses in a passage reminiscent of Mehmedinovic's imagery of the unreflective warrior :

> Now I understand why when they are in tanks soldiers feel they can crush cars and trees in their path like brambles, because they're disconnected from everything, their own souls and bodies included, and what's left is this instrument of steel rolling majestically forward (1995, p. 67).

Finally, yet another diasporic intellectual, the novelist, Manuel Puig, who grew up in Argentina and spent much of his adult life in New York, was also influenced by the penetration of the world's mediacape into the macho male, nationalistic culture surrounding him. Unlike Rushdie, whose escape from local perspectives was inspired by the Western rock music he was able to receive from Radio Ceylon, Puig, who expressed suspicion of the numbing qualities of much of rock & roll, was more attuned to local music and instead used Hollywood film as a vehicle to detach him from local, macho codes (Freedman 2000, p. 2). As one biographical sketch puts it:

> The movies played a liberating, almost transcendent role in Mr. Puig's own life. Born in Vallegas, Argentina, in 1932, he started his movie going career with "The Bride of Frankenstein." Through his childhood and adolescence, he went to the local theater five nights a week, using the same seat for 10 years (Freedman 2000, p. 3).

Beginning as a film script writer, Puig turned to novels, which he wrote in a cinematic style and, most significantly, his novels staged encounters between the intensely ideational codes of political characters and the fantasies of characters whose imaginations are constructed from popular culture: pulpy romance novels, radio and tel-

evision, the stories in the sensationalist press, and especially, the world of film. Puig's movement into the world of imagination looms larger than his exile to New York, for even as a child and adolescent, he was already outside of the local imaginary. Ultimately, the ideational transcendence of a Puig – and the other diasporic intellectuals I have juxtaposed to the characters in *The Deer Hunter* – cannot, for example, stop the tanks driven by those in thrall to a "military autism." But the contrast serves to highlight the importance of "word abundance," genre disruption, and the scrambling of codes as antidotes to the linguistic claustrophobia that often attends unreflective transitions from citizen subjects to warring bodies.

Notes

[1] See Campbell (1998) for a deconstructive reading of the war in Bosnia.

[2] For another treatment that sees the deer hunt as a symbolic displacement, see Burke (1992).

[3] For an analysis and explication of semiosis, see Walter Mignolo's discussion of the semiotic interaction between diverse meaning systems and their material realizations during the Euro- and Meso-American encounter in the Renaissance (1995, pp. 7-9).

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Book Reviews

Bo Stråth

REPRESENTATION, NATION AND TIME

Jussi Kurunmäki (2000): Representation, nation and time: the political rhetoric of the 1866 parliamentary reform in Sweden. Jyväskylä studies in education, psychology and social research, Jyväskylän yliopisto. 253 pages.

Jussi Kurumäki's PhD thesis *Representation, Nation and Time. The Political Rhetoric of the 1866 Parliamentary Reform in Sweden* throws much new light on a crucial period in Swedish history. However, the interest and the relevance of this thesis go much beyond Swedish history in the 1860s. The theoretical and methodological approach of the author opens up new perspectives on the conditions of policy-making and politics and how to analyse them. The general problem the thesis confronts is how the past is mobilised to legitimatise politics, and how the construction of a specific history is related to images of the future. The question of social inclusion and exclusion in such processes is discussed as well as how a nation is defined both in terms of its demarcation to other nations and in terms of its domestic democratic potential. Moreover, the thesis connects the Swedish parliamentary reform in the 1860s to broader and more long-term trends in European political thought and institutional change. Therefore, the problems addressed in the thesis are not only the problems of the 1860s but very much also the problems of today in politics.

The historical example sheds light on the preconditions of our own times.

The main question deals with the concept of "national representation": what is a nation? How and by whom is the nation represented? Who are in and who are out in what with concepts like "nation," "folk," "society," and so on is described as an entity and entirety. Jussi Kurumäki demonstrates how the concept of national representation is embedded in a semantic field of adjacent concepts like "patriotic," "citizen," "society," "public opinion," and "progress". The mobilisation of history, of the past, and the political legitimatising construction of continuity is central in the analysis as is the image of time among the constructors. The reform was as so many other reforms a redefinition of the Swedish polity. Kurumäki introduces two analytical tools to investigate this redefinition: nation by representation and representation by nation, which express constitutive and constructive views on the phenomenon of the nation. The problem of representation became particularly relevant after the Jacobin experiences in the French Revolution. These experiences had longlasting impacts and played no doubt a role in the Swedish debate in the 1860s. The issue of representation was a matter of how to establish social freedom and equality under protection from violent influences by the masses. From here a link is built from questions of democracy and equality to the question of social inclusion and exclusion.

The method can be described as conceptual history where Jussi Kurumäki has two points of reference: the German "founding father" of *Begriffsgeschichte* Reinhart Koselleck and the English specialist in political theory Quentin Skinner, who in his approach has emphasised the contextualisation of political thought. The two points of reference are in crucial respects different, and therefore the combination of them can at the first glance seem astonishing. However, the author is convincing in his argument for using both of them together as an intellectual source of inspiration.

The main argument of the thesis confronts the conventional wisdom where the transformation from an order of estates to a parliamentary order of two or one chamber is the consequence of democratisation and modernisation processes where in a more or less functional way claims and pressures from below are integrated and chan-

nelled by the elites into political reforms. Basically this conventional view reflects an evolutionary and linear view on historical change where there is some "deeper" structural meaning ("cause," "reason") under/behind the change. In both Marxist and liberal versions of this view modern societies proceed more or less according to plan to ever higher and more sophisticated levels. Jussi Kurunmäki questions and challenges this view. The architects of the reform in the 1860s in Sweden did not at all envisage any break-through of a new era of bourgeois and liberal individualism. Particular interests were not rejected but they represented/reflected the entirety of society rather than the interests of the individuals as such in the view of the reformers. In the obsolete old order the estates represented the entirety of society. By the mid-19th century new social groups and classes had emerged without being represented in that order. The "reform" was a kind of refiguration of the institutional arrangements to cope with this development. It was nothing but a kind of up-dating or fine-tuning of the representation of the entirety ("the society," "the nation"). The issue at stake was not to turn the social organisation upside down and take the individual instead of the nation as the point of departure. The problem was to save the entirety. The reform was not a democratisation of the suffrage rules and a step towards a more universal suffrage. Nobody was interested in an extension of the suffrage to the masses. Neither was it the matter of a step towards parliamentarism, i.e. a displacement of power from the king and his government to the Diet. It was in this respect rather the matter of saving the existing balance of power established in the Constitution of 1809. The reading of the Parliamentary Reform in 1866 as an important evolutionary step towards democracy with universal suffrage and parliamentarism is nothing but a retrospect reading in the light of later developments.

Jussi Kurunmäki comes to this conclusion through a distinction between *ex ante* and *ex post* views. *Ex ante* is the view of the actors before they knew what was going to happen. What concepts, what language, what images of future horizons did they develop and what did they mean? How did they use their language? *Ex post* is the retrospect view from a position of knowledge about what happened. Much reflection on society has taken this *ex post* position as the point of departure for describing social developments, which have got the

touch of being predetermined. Kurumäki confronts this view and suggests historical processes with much more open outcomes and where alternatives to what actually happens always exist although they often are forgotten by the posterity.

In conclusion, this is a convincing and in many respects innovative PhD thesis. It is well written and well argued. The text is based on the reading of an extensive literature. The research in this field is presented convincingly and from this presentation Kurumäki defines his own fruitful problem, which he attacks with both energy, consequence, and creativity. The connection of the Swedish reform debate to the broader European context of politics and theoretical reflection is made with precision and accuracy.

Pasi Ihalainen

ANTI-TELEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF CONCEPTS TAKEN TO THE EXTREME

J.C.D. Clark (2000): English Society 1660-1832: Religion, ideology and politics during the ancien regime. Second Edition. Cambridge: CUP. 580 pages.

Though one of the most controversial works of late twentieth-century British historiography, the first edition of Jonathan Clark's *English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, social structure and political practice during the ancien regime* (1985) has earned the status of a classic in the history of ideas due to the long-lived scholarly debate it initiated. This debate contributed to changes of focus in studies on eighteenth-century England and the entire English-speaking world. The second edition of the book (2000), which provides Clark's conclusions after fifteen years of discussion, will certainly meet with widespread interest among historians.

For the second edition, Clark has rewritten much of the original book. Both the academic and political contexts of rewriting have certainly been very different from those of the early 1980s. Clark now wishes to explain away some of the criticisms met by the first edition by referring to his need to react to the established values of the early 1980s. The debate for and against Clark's favourite concept

'the long eighteenth century' has also made him reconsider some aspects of his approach. He now states that the hypotheses of the first edition were 'provisional' and that, in some aspects, it has been necessary to draw different kind of conclusions as a result of further scholarly work. Yet Clark has not rejected his major argument on the survival of the religion-dominated ancien regime character of English society well into the 1830s. This thesis remains highly controversial to this day, particularly as Clark now considers the Restoration of 1660 (instead of the Revolution of 1688) as a decisive moment in the formation of ancien regime English society, thus extending the long eighteenth century to cover 170 years.

By year 2000, Clark sees his 'anti-teleological' perspective, which appreciates the religious basis of much of the eighteenth-century belief system, to have established itself. Undoubtedly, after thorough reassessments in historiography, no equal need to trumpet methodological flaws in earlier studies, to insist on the study of the eighteenth century on its own terms, or to emphasise the importance of focussing on continuities (and not mere changes) now exists. Our knowledge of various aspects of eighteenth-century England has increased considerably since an interest in the role of religion in the lives and thoughts of early modern people began to be taken more seriously in the 1990s, partly as a result of the publication of the first edition of *English Society*.

Clark presents his book as one of several endeavours among historians of ideas to 'defamiliarise' early modern society in order to free our understandings from distortions that have for long affected historiography of the period. Clark's book is intended to 'discern the unities and continuities which established society's basic public formulations, and the moral and religious experience of Englishmen' (p. 2). He points out, however, that his method differs from other available approaches to the history of past thought, including John Pocock's study of political discourses, Quentin Skinner's study of authors' intentions, and Reinhart Koselleck's study of the history of concepts.

Clark's methodological approach deserves particular attention. As Clark expresses some sympathy towards historians focussing on the changing meanings of concepts, one might ask whether his work could be considered a type of the history of concepts. Clark regards

language and substance as intimately connected and thus emphasises the central role of the history of ideas in understanding past societies. In accordance with the Anglophone contextualist tradition, he underscores the importance of studying the history of language use, pointing out that 'the history of concepts is here presented as the history of their uses in argument' (p. 2). Clark's method, as expressed here, indeed seems to be combining strategies applied in various approaches to the history of ideas.

Clark's work emphasises 'continuities, collectivities and man's sense of the sacred.' In the first two aspects at least, it resembles some of the basic assumptions of the history of concepts. Clark's book opens with a statement shared by all historians of concepts: 'Words change their meanings over time; new concepts are coined to describe new ideas.' Likewise, most historians of concepts would agree with Clark's warnings for the 'mortal sins' of anachronism, prolepsis and teleology which may rise if eighteenth-century 'keywords' are interpreted as anticipations of what was to come in the nineteenth century. Though such keywords appear as familiar to us, they often carry meanings that are completely different from those we attach to them. Clark goes even further, as he also rejects the application of concepts and categories dating from later periods to the study of the eighteenth century. Above all, he considers the use of terms such as 'conservatism', 'liberalism' and 'radicalism' in analyses of the long eighteenth century as seriously misleading. Such a fundamentalist view unavoidably affects research work in important ways. For instance, instead of 'radicals,' we had better characterise some early modern thinkers as extremists, or merely as disaffected. Attempts to remain strictly loyal to contemporary terminology may also cause considerable difficulties in the translation of eighteenth-century experiences to modern language. If we wish to be totally orthodox in our rejection of anachronistic terms, can we discuss 'identities' or 'pluralism,' for instance, as a number of historians and even Clark himself is forced to do?[1]

Though sharing with historians of concepts an aversion to anachronism, Clark's method contains features that differ radically both from conventional approaches to the history of ideas and from the history of concepts. Most provocative is Clark's willingness to abandon the concepts of 'the Enlightenment' and 'industrial revolution'

as tools of analysis. Many scholars may wonder what would remain out of the eighteenth century if these commonplace models of interpretation were rejected. Clark's rejection of 'the Enlightenment' is, of course, well-founded in a sense that such a mixture of traditional and innovative elements of thought flourished in the eighteenth century that the application of the name of a single intellectual 'project' to an entire era may seriously distort our understanding of the period. Yet not all eighteenth-century scholars may share Clark's view that 'the Enlightenment can no longer be used as a reliable and agreed term of historical explanation and is even losing its usefulness as a shorthand signifier of an accepted body of authors and ideas' (p. 9). For the time being, it is impossible to imagine that the nearly two thousand scholars focussing on the eighteenth century, who attend congresses on the Enlightenment every four years, would change the name of the event into a 'Congress on the Long Eighteenth Century'.

The history of concepts in its Koselleckian form pays attention to contemporary experiences of change, particularly with reference to the eighteenth century which most scholars regard as a key period in the transition to modernity. Clark, in contrast, sees the discussion on the nature and timing of the transition to modernity as one originating from political science and argues that there are no reasons why historians should look for signs of 'modernisation' from the eighteenth century, as 'eighteenth-century Englishmen had no sense of living through such a process' (p. 11). For Clark, the transition to modernity had not happened during the Civil Wars of the 1640s. Neither did it happen in the eighteenth century, and hence 'the employment of the long eighteenth century to illustrate a watershed between pre-modernity and modernity is historically illegitimate' (p. 124). More particularly so because the eighteenth-century English did not yet possess concepts that historians have used when creating what he considers an arbitrary division between the past and present. Furthermore, argues Clark, neither did seventeenth and eighteenth-century Englishmen feel that they were living in a traditional society experiencing 'secularisation,' that is, emancipation of various branches of social life from religion. In brief, Clark rejects the secularisation thesis as inapplicable to a period when, instead of materialism, it were versions of heterodoxy which challenged the established ideology.

Clark thus calls for a fundamental reassessment of the widely shared ideas about the relationship between 'old' and 'new'. For him, there was no conflict between traditional and modern society in the eighteenth century. Instead, he sees 'the long eighteenth century' – a period between the political changes of the Restoration of 1660 and those of the Reform of 1832 – as a period neither pre-modern nor modern, yet one which possessed a considerable ideological integrity. According to Clark, ideas of religious and political hierarchy, formulated in the aftermath of the Restoration and expressed in frequently repeated phrases such as 'Church and State', only strengthened throughout the following century. The Church of England and society remained intimately linked, and may even have become more so in the course of the century. Such a link is undeniable, yet it might be worthwhile also to consider intellectual changes that could take place within continuity and orthodoxy of the established Church.

According to Clark, in a 'confessional state' with a distinct ideological hegemony, economic and social changes could occur and be understood within the established religion-dominated ideological framework. It was only in the 1830s, argues Clark, when the established set of beliefs quickly disintegrated as values changed and a number of phenomena became reconceptualised. Importantly, for Clark, the changes which brought the old society to an end occurred in attitudes, ideas and beliefs, not in the material basis of society.

For Clark, no simple transition to modernity ever happened. Undoubtedly, Clark is right to reject simplified secularisation and modernisation theses as far as they tend to deny the continued public significance of religion in the eighteenth century. Yet it might be more helpful to see secularisation and modernisation as gradual and evolutionary processes – in the same way he sees English economy as evolutionary – rather than to place all major ideological changes in the 1830s. Taken the fundamental changes which English society went through in the course of the eighteenth century, emphasised by many historians,[2]it is difficult to agree with the argument that the Englishmen experienced no transformation to something completely new happening. The pace of change must have been noticeable, and, indeed, a number of contemporary statements refer to a recognition of an on-going change. One might ask, for instance, does not suspiciousness towards things modern, innovation, novelty and change,

apparent in many early eighteenth-century texts,[3] express an awareness of modernity, though often condemning or denying it?

One aspect that the historians of concepts, often relying on interpretations of the eighteenth century as an era of the Enlightenment, have not taken seriously enough, is the interplay between the spheres of politics and religion. Clark strongly emphasises the fact that the discourses of religion, popular culture, political theory and high politics were, throughout the century, closely interrelated. The discourses of religion and law still dominated political discourse. Even the major revolutions of the period had religious dimensions which, according to Clark, older 'political science' failed to appreciate.

Clark is certainly right to point out that much of the secular terminology of modern political science only came into existence in the nineteenth century. Eighteenth-century politics, in contrast, continued to a great extent to be conceptualised through religion. This thesis on the religious origin of major eighteenth-century political concepts finds support from several recent studies on English politics, though not all scholars see the dominance of religion as unchanging throughout the century. Historians have placed the starting point of decline in the dominance of religion differently, ranging from the Restoration to the late eighteenth century. Clark remains an exception when timing this turn only with the reforms of the 1830s and seeing no fundamental discontinuity in the history of the long eighteenth century. For Clark, it is only the early nineteenth century which deserves to be called 'a period of remarkable conceptual innovation,' These innovations included the translation of freethinking into liberalism and atheism into radicalism, the rise of the language of class, and the narrowing of categories such as family and friend into their modern restricted senses. Though recognising such conceptual changes in the early nineteenth century, Clark remains deeply sceptical to the Koselleckian hypothesis of *Sattelzeit*, or a period of transition to modernity between 1750 and 1850, at least with reference to English history.

One feature in Clark's type of the history of concepts probably appears as disturbing to many historians of concepts. Like most other historians of ideas writing on eighteenth-century English history, Clark often refers only to Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary* (1755) and the *Oxford English Dictionary* when tracing word history. Other dic-

tionaries or sources conveying information on semantic change are all too often ignored. Points on conceptual change would certainly be based on a much firmer foundation if they were supported by the consultation of all available dictionary sources and not merely one eighteenth-century authority, particularly as Johnson is known to have held extremely traditionalist views on a number of phenomena and even to have manipulated dictionary entries to express his doubts. Furthermore, though Clark points to a need to compare English and continental developments in the eighteenth century, that is something he and most of his colleagues continue to exclude from their accounts of English history, even if scholarly literature in other languages usable for comparisons already exists.

* * *

Turning from the method to the substance of Clark's interpretation of eighteenth-century English political theory, one can only admire the depth and thoroughness of his analysis. Developments in political theory between the Restoration and Reform have been subjected to scholarship of the highest degree. Clark shows how, during the Restoration, an initially religious approach to royalism turned increasingly legalistic. Religious idioms, however, remained in constant use in political discourse. New forms of religion-derived political rhetoric were also introduced: in the rhetoric used by the government, republicanism, sectarianism, fanaticism and nonconformity were linked, whereas opposition rhetoric associated absolute monarchy with popery.

Clark's interpretation of the events of the Revolution of 1688 can by now be regarded as rather conventional. He illustrates how, among the political elite, the thesis of royal abdication soon substituted extremist interpretations of the Revolution, including John Locke's contractual and resistance theories. The Revolution turned the ancient constitution into the Protestant Constitution which practically meant Anglican hegemony, within which divisions among members of the political elite also took place. Clark argues that the revolutionaries were not reaching for either a new political or social order, and neither was the Revolution a distinct victory of constitutionalism. Importantly, republicanism (which has been so eagerly studied by his-

torians of ideas) was to remain a marginal line in English political discourse throughout the eighteenth century, whereas providence continued to be used as a major source of legitimation for political power even by the governing Whigs. As Clark puts it, the republicans were 'the anomaly, a minority of "Freethinkers" in a Christian mental universe' (p. 324).

Clark correctly reminds historians of political theory of the danger of creating a distorted image when basing their conclusions on eighteenth-century political thought on mere canonical thinkers. Furthermore, Clark wishes to demonstrate that also great philosophers such as John Locke held assumptions inherent in a traditional society and cannot be considered founders of traditions of thought that later 'led' to the rise of nineteenth-century political ideologies. Clark plays down the role of Locke, for instance, by pointing out that he wrote outside the mainstream political discourse. Furthermore, his and other models of human character, on which political theory built, remained subject to religious influences. Most English political theorists continued to be clergymen (and thus not politicians, lawyers or other secular thinkers), which ensured continuity in English political theory and prevented it from taking secular forms of the kind of the French Enlightenment.

Political and ecclesiastical establishments continued to work in close cooperation in the eighteenth century. Well-known political language originating from the Bible, natural law and the history of the English monarchy remained in constant use. Above all, Clark maintains, 'the secular state was no easy or natural formation' (p. 107). He concedes, that, by 1760, it had become evident that the traditional doctrine of divine indefeasible hereditary right of monarchy could never again be revived, but Clark does not see this as a major turn in English political discourse. Here, for instance, it might have been helpful to compare English developments with those of other Protestant nation states such as the Netherlands and Sweden. In both countries, political language used even by the clergy of the established churches appears to have experienced changes by the 1760s. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the concepts of official political theory and national identity, as used in sermons preached to political authorities on national days of prayer, had gone through a considerable transformation by the 1760s in England as well.[4]

National identities have been an object of attention of a number of historians in recent years. Faithfully to his insistence on the need to avoid anachronistic categories, Clark rightly rejects the use of the nineteenth-century terms 'nationality' and 'nationalism' with reference to the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, references to 'the nation', which had been frequent indeed in English political discourse ever since the Reformation, must not be interpreted as precursory nationalism in its nineteenth-century race and language-oriented form. Yet Clark finds it legitimate to study changing expressions of collective consciousness ever since early medieval times. He argues that an ancient English identity was based on widely (though not universally) shared assumptions on religion and on a long national history and that this identity experienced no profound changes no matter what political and social developments England went through. It was only in the 1790s when a few thinkers, provoked by the French Revolution, began to denounce this inherited conception of Englishness.

Clark rejects Linda Colley's (1992) thesis of Anti-Catholicism and Protestantism as bases for a national consensus. The intensity of Anti-Catholicism declined particularly after 1760, when the threat of a Catholic restoration vanished. Disagreements between different Protestant denominations became visible during the American War of Independence. But religion continued to have an impact on 'the monarchical nature of English identity' in the reign of George III. Clark gives Robert Hay Drummond's sermon in the coronation of George III as an example of a new focus on monarchy as a promoter of religious and political virtue instead of monarchy as a divine institution. Yet Clark argues that it was only very slowly between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries that the principle of divine right was secularised so that divine sanction was transformed from the person of the monarch to the entire political system. Clark supports his point by presenting early nineteenth-century evidence to illustrate a continuous belief in some circles in the necessity of a union between the State and the established Church. Here it might have been possible to focus on how official political theory and definitions of national identity had in fact already been transformed by the time of Drummond's sermon (1760) from one of an Israel-like guilty nation to one of a moral community in which thankfulness

was due not only to God but also to the constitution. As Clark himself states, by the mid eighteenth century, a number of clergymen had rejected political theology based on a direct application of the Bible to forms of government, even if many still continued to defend the doctrine of divine providence in human affairs. Such changes in clerical assumptions were consequential as the clergy formed the group responsible for the political education of the nation. Besides, some leading churchmen even suggested, in official connections, that divine interventions of the kind of seventeenth century were no more needed.[5]

One of the most frequently disputed aspects of the 1985 edition of *English Society* was Clark's interpretation on English radicalism. Also in the second edition, Clark insists that any disaffection with the established politico-religious order could have (though not all disaffection had) religious origins for as long as society and Church were regarded as identical and the established Church continued to work as the major agent of State at local level. In other words, Clark argues, eighteenth-century disaffection was not so much directed against the franchise system of parliamentary elections but against the status of the established Church and its creed. According to Clark, heterodoxy in deistical or Anti-Trinitarian forms was 'conceptually basic' to the ideological positions of extremist thinkers (p. 339). Though Clark provides sufficient evidence to illustrate the connection between heterodoxy and political extremism, with an extended conceptual analysis, it might be possible for him to demonstrate this conceptual linkage more distinctly. An excellent illustration of a fruitful contextual analysis of concepts is provided by Clark's demonstration of the emergence of the nineteenth-century meaning of radicalism in the writings of Jeremy Bentham in the late 1810s and 1820s (pp. 498-9).

* * *

With his self-confident argumentation, Clark endeavours to show that his approach to the long eighteenth century has by now been universally adopted. Any review of recent scholarly debate in history, however, demonstrates that this is not the case: a widespread Clarkian school of eighteenth-century enthusiasts does not exist, and

there is a risk that even his modified interpretation will remain in the margins of historical research. However, Clark's interventions in the debate have always been extremely fruitful ones, forcing historians to reconsider their approaches to a period the 'modern' features of which they easily take as self-evident but which they are in serious danger of misunderstanding because of their innate inability to view the period on its own not-so-modern terms. To an historian of concepts, Clark's work teaches further awareness of the dangers of anachronism, including the need to avoid an illusion that religion suddenly turned into a private matter with little real public influence as societies entered modernity in the eighteenth century.

Notes

[1] For a discussion on the concept of identity, see Colin Kidd, *British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800*. Cambridge 1999, 291.

[2] See J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton 1975, 423, 425, and Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783*, Oxford 1989, 677.

[3] Pasi Ihalainen, *The Discourse on Political Pluralism in Early Eighteenth-Century England*. Helsinki 1999, 74-80.

[4] Discussed in more detail in Pasi Ihalainen, 'Kansallisesta syyllisyyden tunteesta isänmaanrakkauteen: Englantilainen kansallistunne valtiollisten vuosipäivien virallisissa saarnoissa 1688-1762,' forthcoming, Helsinki 2001; see also James Claudle, *Measures of Allegiance: Sermon Culture and the Creation of a Public Discourse of Obedience and Resistance in Georgian Britain, 1714-1760*. Unprinted doctoral dissertation. Yale University 1995.

[5] Ihalainen 2001.

Alexis Keller

ROUSSEAU AND THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION

Merja Kylmäkoski (2000): The Virtue of the Citizen. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Republicanism in the Eighteenth-Century French Context. (forthcoming: Peter Lang)

The idea of writing about Rousseau after two centuries worth of reflections about the author of *Du Contrat Social* may seem, at first glance, rather audacious, if not of little interest. We may even believe that everything has been said, that the force behind Rousseau's thought has faded with time and lost its relevance. Merja Kylmäkoski's thesis proves just the opposite. Not only does she remind us of the extent to which the popularized Rousseau is a myth, but she also guides us to rediscover certain decisive characteristics of Rousseau's philosophy by positioning it within the republican tradition brought to the fore by Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock. Moreover, Merja Kylmäkoski emphasizes David Rosenfeld's and Helena Rosenblatt's arguments on the importance of Geneva's political and religious context in Rousseau's thought[1] and offers us an original perspective by comparing Rousseau's republicanism to that of certain French writers.

In her Chapter II, Merja Kylmäkoski discusses the meaning behind the concepts of republic, virtue, and citizen, as well as how they interact with one another in Rousseau's political thought. She describes how Rousseau distances himself from French thinkers, how he warns his readers of his contemporaries' frequent confusions, particularly with the terms "bourgeois" and "citizen." "The real meaning of this [last] word has been almost wholly lost in modern times," wrote Rousseau in 1762 (*Du Contrat Social*, Chapter 6)[2]. She also discusses how Rousseau's concept of citizen is typically masculine, as compared to the eighteenth century's feminine and archetypal vision of economic and speculative man. At the same time, she emphasizes the political vision of virtue found in Rousseau's philosophy. Following Montesquieu, Rousseau was not looking to turn man toward God. His concept of virtue is not Christian; it is Stoic and, above all, republican. From this perspective, his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* and *Du Contrat social* are republican texts in which Rousseau pits ancient "mœurs" against modern corruption in a formula borrowed directly from Montesquieu's presentation of the principle of democracy: "The ancient politicians discussed morals and virtues incessantly; our politicians speak only of commerce and money." Even Rousseau's contemporaries made no mistake about the citizen of Geneva, seeing in his work "the first teachings on a Republic."

Consequently, we understand better why Rousseau, in his debate with Melon over luxury, rejected the theory of "doux commerce" put forth by Montesquieu, Hume, Millar, and Gournay (Kylmäkoski, Chapter IV). This theory challenged several main points of the republican concept of the citizen, beginning with the need for equality, the concept of frugality, and the idea of active participation in political power, a point dear to Rousseau. Merja Kylmäkoski is correct to point out that Rousseau's critics come from several angles (Chapters IV and VI). First off, in terms of politics, Rousseau insists that commerce promotes tyranny by distracting citizens from their public duties and confining them to their shops, making them love peace and stability more than liberty, and power of government more than its legitimacy and its submission to laws. In his *Lettres écrites de la montagne,* Rousseau explains to the citizens of Geneva how their concern for their private matters has caused them to let the magis-

trates and the "Petit-Conseil" encroach on their attributions. "You are neither Romans nor Spartans. You are not even Athenians. Leave the great names alone as they are not your own. You are businessmen and artisans, bourgeois who are always busy with their private matters, their work, their businesses, their merchandise, men for whom liberty itself is nothing more than a means to acquire freely and to own without fear." (*Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, Gallimard, tome III, pp. 881–882).

In terms of morality, Rousseau sees the issue of corruption as a crisis of values. By evoking Petty's and Mellon's claims that political arithmetic reduces everything, including men, to a common denominator, Rousseau asserts that virtue cannot be appreciated in such a formula. If a man's value is only measured by his consumption inside a State, we can only measure the difference in wealth and luxury; we definitely cannot measure military merit, resistance to being conquered – the only points that count in politics. Thus, between virtue and commerce arises a distinction between the being and the appearance, which separates the transparency of virtuous "mœurs" and the deceptive uniformity of a world in which "we no longer dare to appear to be what we are."

Throughout her work, and based on writings by Judith N. Shklar and Maurizio Viroli[3], Merja Kylmäkoski argues that Rousseau, in his critique of luxury and "doux commerce," develops a comprehensive theory of the "contradictions of the social system" (*Œuvres complètes*, tome IV, p. 311). What appears beneath the mask of civil peace is, in reality, a merciless war that pits men against each in other in a situation similar to what we find in Hobbes' natural state. What appears to be peace and quiet is nothing more than vile servitude and what appears to be a union is actually a division. Alleged kindness is nothing more than the exacerbation of passions, politeness nothing more than the art of deception, sociability nothing more than mistrust and jealousy, and ties of commerce and civility nothing more than the knots by which the powerful bind the poor to dependency. As for laws, they are nothing more than the formidable power with which the strong arm themselves against the weak. In short, modern society, which claims to be the chef-d'oeuvre of the art of governing and the masterpiece of the human mind, is a system of secret conflicts and competitions in which the fear that men inspire in each other

and the need they have to protect themselves causes them to renounce liberty.

By describing in great detail Rousseau's critiques of the theorists of "doux commerce," Merja Kylmäkoski makes a bold comparison between the author of *Du Contrat social* and Abbé Coyer (Chapter V). In 1756, Abbé Coyer published a 215-page work entitled *La Noblesse commerçante* in which he invites the nobility to become commercial and to step outside of their military roles. He explains that the benefits will be two-fold: the nobility, particularly the poor nobility who is confined by misery to lands it does not even have the means to cultivate, will become rich and be able to maintain its rank; commerce, free from prejudice that turns away those who are not businessmen, will no longer be despised, but become an honorable occupation. It will grow, agriculture will benefit, the population will increase, and consumption will rise. To convince the nobility to focus on commerce, Abbé Coyer uses the mercantilist connections between war and commerce, most of all, maritime commerce. He points out the similarities between them, the ways in which they complement each other, only to conclude that the age of military invasions is over and the age of commercial society is upon us. This idea is not new, but his work caused a great sensation and prompted reactions from all sides. In 1756, Philipe Auguste de Foix, the Chevalier d'Arcq, countered with *La Noblesse militaire, ou le patriote français*. Many others borrowed arguments from Montesquieu to state their belief in the incompatibility of the nobility, the monarchy, and commerce. In particular, the parliament of Grenoble, in consultation with General Inspector Moreau de Séchelles, published an *Observations sur un projet d'édit pour donner à la noblesse du royaume la faculté de commercer sans déroger* (1757) commentary about a proposition to give the kingdom's nobility the possibility of conducting commerce without losing any of its privileges.

Merja Kylmäkoski explains that, by partially dissociating luxury from commerce, Abbé Coyer links commerce to virtue and peace, which enables him to break the classic association between civic virtue and military virtue and to discredit republican criticisms of commerce. Clad in republican virtues, commerce becomes a positive model of society in Abbé Coyer's writings, a model that he uses to denounce the nobility's claim to create a system based on its values.

He can thus reject the idea of a kingdom founded on weapons and the virtues of war. At the same time, Abbé Coyer draws a connection between the republic and commerce. This connection benefits the latter, which in turn becomes an egalitarian model: commerce, like the republic, likes equality. "If it were true that commerce flourished in republics," writes Abbé Coyer, "we could only conclude that a monarch has to make its commerce republican." He goes on to say that "commerce belongs to everyone" and that it accepts "anyone who presents himself."

Yet Abbé Coyer is not seeking to found a republic. He does not resolve the debate over the republic and commerce; instead he sticks to generalities about a State that he wants, no matter what form it takes, to be prosperous and powerful. He thus refuses to address constitutional questions, believing there is no direct link between the *Magna Carta* and England's commercial success. Rousseau happily accepts the challenge of discussing constitutional choices and Merja Kylmäkoski emphasizes his difference of opinion with Abbé Coyer on that issue, while carefully noting that they both belong to the republican tradition. Perhaps she should have more clearly expressed the fundamentally egalitarian aspect of their two political systems. Of course, as she notes, they are not trying to answer the same questions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Abbé Coyer considers equality to be a basic rule and rejects those who believe, as did the patricians of corrupt Rome, "that birth is the first merit" (*La Noblesse commerçante*, Paris, 1758, p. 27). Everyone knows the significance of equality for Rousseau and its inseparable tie to the concept of liberty.

On this last point, drawing on the analyses of Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli[4], Merja Kylmäkoski clearly identifies the links between Rousseau and Machiavelli's republican tradition: the emphasis on political participation, the role of the armed citizen, and the requisite complementary nature of liberty and virtue (Chapter VI).

Marja Kylmäkoski knows Rousseau's work very well and skillfully paints him into the context of French Enlightenment in general and into the debate over luxury in particular. However, she was perhaps too ambitious. Even though she spared no expense to tackle all the concepts of the republican tradition, her thesis does not give enough weight to certain ideas that played a more predominant role than

others do in Rousseau's thinking. For example, she only devotes few pages to the concept of law and the concept of equality. Similarly, by concentrating mainly on French debates and even though she knows the Geneva's context very well, she has not made enough use of it for her argument. However, this does not affect the high quality of a work that sheds new light on the Rousseau's concept of the citizen, on the illuminating debates on virtue, and skillfully repositions the former "Citoyen de Genève" in the classical republican tradition.

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[2] All translations are my own.

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

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

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