PRINCIPLES
OF
REPRESENTATION
ENLIGHTENMENT
THOUGHT
HISTORY OF
FINNISH
CONCEPTS

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CONTENTS

Editorial

Articles
Topic 1: Principles of Representation

Topic 2: Enlightenment Thought

Topic 3: History of Finnish Concepts

Other Articles

Book Reviews

CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AS POLITICAL THEORY

In the contemporary discussion there is a tendency to distinguish between the "history of political thought" and "political theory". This is especially upheld by those who understand "political theory" in a normative sense, as the search for a good order, and who tend to consider historical studies as purely "antiquarian", having nothing to do with the problems of today.

My thesis is that the distinction between "political theory" and the "history of political thought" should be understood in more relative terms. In particular, "political theory" should not be monopolized by a certain fraction of theorizing. In addition, normative political theory clearly has a certain historical perspective of its own, often quite anachronistic from the viewpoint of the historians of political thought. Historical studies themselves have a contemporary reference and a *Wertbezug* in the Weberian sense, which enables them also to contribute indirectly to the theorization contemporary politics. If we, furthermore, accentuate the shift in the history of political thought from the history of ideas to the history of concepts, we can then claim that conceptual history subverts the very aim of normative political theory, the search for a good order. It is high time to do so.

"Political theory" is in a certain sense an *oxymoron*. One of its components refers to the *vita activa,* the other to the *vita contemplativa,*

and a "synthesis" of the two is hardly imaginable. Indeed, the title refers to two opposite possibilities of theorizing about politics: the perspectives of "theory" and "politics". This conflict originated in ancient Greece between the Platonic and the Sophistic approaches, which is, in a sense, re-actualized in the contemporary discussion.

What is today referred to as normative political theory or "political philosophy" is still based upon Platonic assumptions. The contemporary praxis of politics is considered to be a dirty phenomenon, which should be purified by applying to politics the principles which are considered to be valid in the purer spheres of life. The guiding idea of the normative theory is that of the "application to politics" of some of the principles that are constructed outside of it. Furthermore, the notion of application relies on the consideration of politics as one "sphere" among many spheres, to which the principles can be "transferred" through certain purifying operations. In addition, one of the conditions of the operation is that "politics", as is the case with other spheres, should have a limited number of unifying principles, which regulate and structure what is possible and what is allowed to do within this sphere.

This straw man picture of "normative political theory" has heuristic value insofar as it illustrates how secondary the fractional conflicts within this type of theorizing are. Viewed from outside, the quarrels between contractarians and communitarians are provincial, and the same holds for the question of whether the model for "politics" should be searched for in "morals", "economy ", "law", "society", "religion" etc. Common to all of them is a finalistic perspective in which the good order – however it is understood – acts as a kind of end of history. Correspondingly, "political theory" is indeed a theory, at least in the sense of reducing the intrigues, quarrels and moves of politicking. The aim of a "political theory" of this type is, thus, the victory of "theory" over "politics".

According to my thesis, the simple and seemingly harmless idea of politics-as-sphere already invites such a reglementation of politics. As opposed to it we can insist on politics-as-activity, as something that can neither be easily reglemented, nor conceptualized in terms of a "theory" that is in search of rules and regularities.

"Those who do politics and those who study it are different people" is a lucid formula posed by Ms. Tarja Halonen when questioned

as to why she thought she had been elected as the president of Finland in February 2000. Can politics be theorized at all "from within"? How is such theorization that does not reduce the contingency of politics possible?

One already classical answer was presented by Quentin Skinner in his *Foundations of Modern Political Thought* in 1978:

> For I take it that the political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear problematic, and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading subjects of debate (vol. I, p. xi).

For my present purposes, the most important implication of this formula is to take the actions, situations, formulations and self-understandings of those acting politically as the point of departure in the theorization of politics. "Point of departure" refers not to a "basis", but rather to something that can be taken as an initial approximation, which is then explicated, elucidated, interpreted, assessed etc. from different perspectives. As opposed to the Platonic style of theorizing, politics as activity is not devaluated or functionalized as a mere "indicator" or "symptom" of something else, but rather is taken quite seriously. "Political theory" can be understood as a second-order activity, but only if it upholds the lived reality of politics-as-activity as its point of departure.

Thus, we should, to use another oxymoronic formulation, take the games played by politicians seriously. In this sense, the "rational choice" theorists are also doing better than sociologically oriented theorists, but their seriousness is not extended to the analysis of the political agents' own "words", which they tend to disqualify as easily as the "functionalist" sociologists. The older "historians of ideas" were also all too eager to neglect the expressions and formulations in order to get to the "idea". However, the point of politicking is to understand that formulating "an idea" differently is by no means only a matter of taste, but it can also indicate every politically significant difference. Understanding that the content of politics is not independent of vocabularies and of modes of using them also helps us, e.g., in transcending the nineteenth-century jargon of "isms". Similarly, the political oratory should not be denounced as superficial or

misleading, but seen as an important source of especially democratized politics using the spoken and written word.

Why, then, it is wise to examine history when theorizing about politics? Why am I, for example, travelling around Europe and looking for pamphlets and revue articles written some 50 to 150 years ago, many of which nobody has read for decades? If I would be writing a *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the concept of politics, I would never look for such sources. The *Wertbezug* of the history of concepts of my style is, however, different: it consists of writing a "history of losers", which means the recovery of unnoticed or unappreciated conceptualizations of politics, sometimes presented in passing remarks to which the authors themselves did not pay any special attention. As opposed to this, the ideal of a *Wirkungsgeschichte* remains within the framework of the traditional "history of winners".

Even more important is that the history of concepts relies, as Reinhart Koselleck has repeatedly remarked, on a procedure resembling the *Verfremdungseffekt* in the Brechtian theatre theory. To gain a perspective on the understanding of an object – such as the speech of a politician – presupposes a certain distance to it. A kind of translation is needed, in order to get the point. The immediate "communication" with an audience is by no means the best source of understanding a political act. On the contrary, even contemporary speeches should be analyzed by means of a translation-like procedure making use of the *Verfremdungseffekt*.

Historical studies are, in a certain sense, intellectually superior to those using overly "familiar" contemporary sources. In particular, this is the case in terms of those keeping not only temporal, but also linguistic, cultural or intellectual distance. As a style of political theory, historical case studies are thus highly recommendable. Conceptual history as political theory also always aims at something other than basic historical research, when taking up – either as part of an historical interpretation or as a means of transcending it – more general questions, especially those highlighted in the contemporary discussion on political theory.

This distance also enables the historians of political thought to examine contemporary speech acts from a historical perspective. For example, one can do so by contributing to the debate as to whether the election of President Halonen signifies an end to the bourgeois-

socialist division as a key political watershed in Finland, while the existential questions of life-style and identity have gained importance.

The historical perspective also allows for the insistence of contingency and highlights the fragility of contemporary political arrangements and constellations. In this sense, studies of past situations of ruptures with conventions and traditions – or failed attempts to do so – can also be read as a questioning of the very idea of the creation of a stable order. A normative political theory could be renewed in the perspective of replacing the search for good order by a theory aiming at destabilizing any order. This also presupposes the rejection of the old prejudice that disorder is something less intelligible than order. Destabilization does not mean an apology of "creative destruction" but rather an analysis of situations of rupture or dissolution, as opportunities of both politicizing new aspects of human life and politicking with the newly opened aspects of the situation. All this is possible only by means of historical analyses of situations.

The opposition between the normative and the historical styles of political theory most dramatically concerns the attitudes toward concepts. In the Platonic style of theorizing the concepts are timeless: concepts transcend human agency; it is as if they are beyond history and above politics. It is from this perspective that contemporary normative political theories still seem to act as modern versions of advisers-to-princes literature, when intervening in the actual political debates.

Contractualism is a main variant of contemporary normative political theory. In contractualist theories concepts are understood to be constructs. Nonetheless the entire contract paradigm relies on the assumption of a consensus regarding the terms of the contract. Conflicts of interpretation become immediate threats to the conditions of upholding a contract and allowing for the possibility that concepts change when used, when the political constellation shifts. This does not prevent the contractualist theories from having a conceptual history of their own, but it is written in the narrow perspective of an increasing stabilization of concepts. To the outsider, however, it is quite evident that this aim remains hopeless, and it is precisely the failure of stabilization that makes the contractualist theories worth reading also from an historical perspective.

Max Weber already realized that concepts are instruments or tools of human actions. As such, their use is inherently contestable and liable to change. The historical and contestable character of political concepts can, conversely, be interpreted as a dimension of understanding political struggles and their shifting constellations. In conceptual matters, the common claim for introducing a consensus about the meanings as a condition of any debate appears as a hopeless and undesirable reduction of the range of political action. Concepts are neither outside frameworks nor preliminary distinctions, within which the "politics proper" would take place, but rather a central aspect of the very activity called politics.

Now we can finally present some implications of studies on conceptual changes for political agents. As opposed to the *Fürstenspiegel* tradition, the Weberian principle of W*ertfreiheit* relies on the autonomy of political agents: it is they who must invent decide upon the principles and practices themselves, and not to be regimented by theorists, as if they were the better politicians. Secondly, we should be conscious of the highly situational character of politics as activity, i.e. of the limited significance of such general principles as constitutions, and we do not want to act as apologists of regularity, which would easily extinguish political creativity. Furthermore, politicians should not rely uncritically on specialists, for there are no experts in judging the political significance of activities, but rather they should understand their responsibility for their own actions, even if they are unable to control their consequences. In short, conceptual historians should avoid denouncing politicians as dilettantes in conceptual matters and encourage them to suggest conceptual innovations of their own.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

After this volume the first editorial team of the F*innish Yearbook of Political Thou*g*ht* (Sisko Haikala, Jussi Kotkavirta and myself) is replaced by a new one from three disciplines (history, philosophy, political science). As editors we have remained amateurs who still make dilettantish errors and who still do not understand anything about the marketing of a Yearbook. Nonetheless, we are quite proud of the content and quality of the volumes, as well as of the formation of a

profile of our own. We would like to thank those who have made the volumes possible: the assistant editors (vol.1. Ari Turunen, vol. 2. Raija-Leena Luoma and vol. 3. and 4. Jouni Vauhkonen) the editor of SoPhi publications, Juha Virkki, as well as our financial supporters, with regard to volumes 3. and 4. especially Suomen Kulttuurirahasto.

The new team, led by Eerik Lagerspetz as editor-in-chief, and with Pasi Ihalainen and Tuija Parvikko as editors, has already contributed to the edition of the volume 4.

I wish the new team good luck.

KARI PALONEN

ARTICLES

Topic 1:
Principles of Representation

H.S. Jones[1]

POLITICAL USES OF THE CONCEPT OF 'REPRESENTATION'

How the French Debated Electoral Reform, c. 1880-1914

Practitioners of *Begriffsgeschichte* have devoted more attention to the period of the American and French revolutions than to the period since about 1850. The unspoken assumption seems to be that by that time the conceptual apparatus with which we today think about politics and society was essentially in place. In the case of the concept of political representation, a series of studies by Keith Baker, Bernard Manin, Pasquale Pasquino and others have elucidated the decisive role played by Sieyes in vindicating representative government not merely as a necessary substitute for direct democracy, but as an intrinsically superior political form in modern society. But it would be a mistake to suppose – as some scholars have[2] – that what Sieyes formulated was *the* modern concept of representation, and to imagine that the concept has not undergone fundamental transformations since then. Sieyes, after all, envisaged a world of indirect and non-plebiscitary elections, without political parties or even declared candidatures. The free exchange of ideas within the

legislative assembly was to be crucial in generating a unifying representative national will; and so the represent er was to have a key role in constructing the represented. But what happens to the classical concept of representation in a world of direct and quasi-plebiscitary elections and organized political parties?[3]

This paper is meant as a contribution to the task of charting the history of the concept of representation in the era of transition from classical representative government to mass democracy. Most western states were forced to confront challenges to established electoral systems in this period. In France, as elsewhere, there was a vigorous campaign for proportional representation, which was eventually introduced in a highly modified form in 1919. There were also schemes for the 'organization of universal suffrage' based on the representation of interests, whether in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, and proposals for plural voting or for the family vote were frequently aired, along with bills to institute secret or compulsory voting or to reduce the number of deputies. This paper will ask how proponents of these various reforms deployed the concept of representation. The focus will be on the tension between attempts to reconceptualize political representation in an era of political change, and the efforts of jurists such as Esmein to act as guardians of a stable concept in the name of a coherent and authoritative constitutional tradition.

What interests me is the possibility of using these debates about electoral reform as a way of putting disputed concepts of representation under the microscope, and exploring in detail how the idea of representation was deployed in political argument. I do not seek to explain why proportional representation was or was not implemented at any given moment, but instead to use the controversy about electoral reform as a window on changing understandings of representation. Ultimately the fate of schemes for proportional representation depended heavily on party interest. But party interest could not carry weight as a public argument: except in the most private of councils, it was not possible for a Radical to say: we shall not vote for proportional representation because the present system of the *scrutin d'arrondissement* clearly maximizes our representation as a party. I am interested in what kinds of argument could carry weight in public discourse, not for their explanatory uses but precisely because I am a historian of political concepts and public argument.

'Constructive' and 'Descriptive' Models of Representation

What kinds of assumptions about the proper meaning of representation did the advocates of proportional representation rely on? We need to begin by introducing some conceptual distinctions. Pierre Rosanvallon distinguishes between 'constructive' and 'descriptive' models of representation.[4] According to the former, elections are intended to give form to a collectivity which has no prior form. According to the latter, representation aims to replicate social reality, in all its diversity. An alternative way of expressing the same basic distinction would be to have recourse to F.R. Ankersmit's recent work on *Aesthetic Politics*. Ankersmit distinguishes between *mimetic* theories of representation, which like Rosanvallon's descriptive theories posit an ideal in which there is identity between representative and represented; and *aesthetic* theories, which presuppose an inevitable 'aesthetic gap', and recognize that representative and represented cannot be identical.[5] As his title indicates, Ankersmit sets out to defend the latter position, which rests on a recognition of the priority of the representation to the represented. 'Political reality', Ankersmit argues, 'is not something we come across as if it has always existed; it is not found or discovered, but made, in and by the procedures of political representation'.[6]

In the literature it is sometimes taken for granted that there is an easy correspondence between proportional representation and a descriptive model of representation. This seems to be Pitkin's assumption.[7] It is certainly possible to identify a host of writers who invoked metaphors such as mirrors or photography to explain the meaning of representation, and who deployed these metaphors in support of the case for proportional representation.[8] In practice, however, this model of representation, which owed a good deal to conservative advocates of the representation of interests at the foundation of the Third Republic,[9] was supplemented by an implied concept of personal representation: one is represented if a candidate for whom one voted is elected. This was certainly the position taken by Pierre La Chesnais, one of the most prolific advocates of proportional representation in the *belle époque*. He wrote of:

the true representative vote, whose essential characteristic is that any sufficiently numerous group of electors should be represented by the representatives it chooses and that the different opinions should have the same relative strength in the representation of the electoral body as in the electoral body itself.[10]

In the true 'representative vote', La Chesnais continued, the terms 'majority' and 'minority' have no sense. Likewise Paul Deschanel told the Chamber of Deputies in 1911 that 'there are in France two categories of electors: those who have the right to elect and those whose vote counts for nothing or receives only a contingent, arbitrary payback, those who participate in public affairs and those who remain estranged from it'.[11]

Strictly speaking we have here two distinct principles which stand in tension with each other: on the one hand the concept of personal representation, and on the other hand that of descriptive representation. The first view is, in Pitkin's terms, 'formalistic': it depends on the electoral bond. If the elector votes for a successful candidate, he is represented; if not, he is unrepresented, even if considered nationally parliament replicated voting patterns quite accurately, as La Chesnais's own figures indicated was sometimes the case in the Third Republic.[12] The Christian democrat Marc Sangnier spoke of the voter who votes for a losing candidate as 'frappé de mort civique'.[13] On this view the ideal electoral system would achieve 'unity of college', which is why 'majority' and 'minority' will disappear: a proportional system would effectively group electors into unanimous 'colleges', and confer on each its representative. This concept of personal representation is difficult to sustain coherently, for two reasons. First, it implies that the representative mandate is a kind of agency in which the deputy is charged with defending the particular interests of his electors, and this is a view that French constitutional law decisively repudiated.[14] Secondly, the only way of averting the consequence that a large minority, at least, must always be unrepresented is by removing the personal bond between elector and deputy altogether by instituting some kind of party list system with proportional representation. And yet this view of representation was commonly reiterated by a host of publicists, from the parliamentarian Etienne Flandin to the constitutional jurist Léon Duguit: they argued that

the Chamber of Deputies as currently constituted 'represented' only a minority of the electorate, because only a minority had actually voted for a successful candidate.[15] The other view implied in La Chesnais's definition, the descriptive view, is not formalistic at all, but instead depends on the real characteristics of the representative body and of the electorate. As Pitkin puts it, summarizing the descriptive view, 'representing means being like you, not acting for you'.[16] The contrast between the two views was brought out by the journalist Henri Avenel, one of the first serious students of elections in France: he noted that, considered nationally, 'la physionomie actuelle de la Chambre correspond d'une façon suffisante à la situation des partis en France'.[17] But he also showed that in many cases as many as three-fifths of voters were not 'represented' in the sense that they did not vote for successful candidates at either the first or the second round.

In practice the rhetorical case for proportional representation fed on both of these understandings of representation. They were rarely defended at a theoretical or conceptual level; instead, in both cases, it tended to be assumed that once they had been articulated they would be recognized as self-evidently true. Indeed, theoretically-minded opponents of proportional representation, in particular constitutional jurists, rebutted the descriptivist and formalist cases for proportional representation not by arguing for an alternative concept of representation – an 'aesthetic' or 'symbolic' concept, for instance – but instead by denying that in constitutional terms elections had a representative function at all. They were simply a technique for selecting legislators, and 'representation' was simply irrelevant. The assumption was that in a strict juristic sense 'representation' meant personal representation, or the appointment of an agent to act on one's behalf. This was not what elections were about, and hence the concept of representation was strictly a misnomer. This was the position taken by the jurist and economist Jean Courcelle-Seneuil in an important paper arguing that the concept of the legislative mandate was a contradiction in terms, entailing as it did an illegitimate transfer of a civil law concept (the representative mandate) to public law.[18] It was also the position taken by one of the great figures of French constitutional law, the Strasbourg jurist Raymond Carré de Malberg, author of a classic *Contribution à la théorie*

générale de l'Etat, published in 1920-2 but in fact completed before the outbreak of war. He insistently referred to 'le regime dit représentatif', for essentially the same reasons as Courcelle-Seneuil: he did not mean to disparage that regime – far from it – but instead to elucidate its precise juridical character.

This is the background against which we should read the electoral writings of the prolific jurist-cum-sociologist Raoul Guérin de la Grasserie, an advocate of electoral reform who was also an associate of René Worms and a frequent contributor to Worms's *Revue internationale de sociologie*. Grasserie explicitly addressed and rejected the view that elections were not intended to be representative in a strict sense. He acknowledged that one aspect of elections was indeed to *select* candidates for their intellectual and moral worth; but as an aspiring sociologist Grasserie was interested in the changing reality of elections, and he argued that increasingly they were concerned with the conformity of the candidate's opinions with those of the electors, and the conformity of his social background with the composition and interests of the constituency. In other words, the 'representative' aspect of elections was becoming much more important than the 'selective' aspect. Electors were less concerned than formerly with the personal qualities of the candidate. Instead:

> We give him above all the mission of holding aloft our political banner, that of our ideas, or our economic banner, that of our occupation, or that of our religious ideas or even of our locality, that is still our banner, and we require above all that he should not let go.[19]

Grasserie took it for granted that the idea of representation was closely tied to the idea of a mandate. That was the significance of his insistence that if elections were to be representative, all should be represented.[20] Curiously, however, Grasserie combined this belief in representation as agency with the notion – well entrenched in French constitutional doctrine, if not always in practice, ever since the Revolution – that the deputy represents the nation as a whole, and not a particular constituency.

Esmein and other critics of proportional representation argued that it was a betrayal of representative government properly conceived, which rested on the concept of national sovereignty, and that

it led logically to quasi-direct democracy. Proportionalists were taken to task for two heretical assumptions. First, they seemed to assume that electors individually have a right to representation. Secondly, they held that a representative assembly should be an exact image, though on a smaller scale, of the electorate as a whole. This axiom would be valid, according to Esmein, if the function of a representative assembly were *solely* to be representative, as it would be if it were a purely consultative assembly. But 'our representative-legislative assemblies' were not of this kind: they did not exist just to debate, but 'they decide, and in doing so exercise an attribute of sovereignty'.[21] From a juridical point of view, elections were simply a technique for selecting representatives who would make decisions on behalf of the nation. Hence, according to Esmein, it was irrelevant to argue that the system of representative government was not working properly because the assembly did not mirror the composition of the nation.

Esmein vindicated his principled preference for representative government over direct or quasi-direct democracy in an important article published in the first issue of the *Revue du droit public* in 1894.[22] There he argued that representative government was not to be regarded as a second-best proxy for the direct government of the nation by itself, but rather as a system of government preferable to direct government. This was not because direct government was impossible, but because (as Sieyes had demonstrated) indirect government alone could ensure enlightened legislation, carefully prepared and discussed. Here he explicitly invoked the authority of Sieyes. He went on to argue, however, that in his own day this system of representative government was under threat from a number of sources. These included the reaction against bicameralism in the United Kingdom and in her Dominions; the rise of the mandate as a consequence of the advent of party politics (e.g. the caucus in the USA); the growing demand for the more extensive use of the referendum; and the accelerating campaign for proportional representation or the representation of minorities by means of systems which were either arbitrary rather than strictly proportional (such as the cumulative vote and the limited vote) or else extremely complex to operate (for example, the electoral quotient or different kinds of list system).

Esmein went on to show how these four mechanisms together constituted the essence of an alternative and quite different form of government, which he termed *government by delegates*. The germ was to be found in the theories of Rousseau, and it was elaborated by his followers in the period of the Revolution and after. The essential duty of delegates was to follow the expressed will of the majority which elected them.

It is easy enough to see why the practices of the mandate and the referendum could be understood as incompatible with representative government in Esmein's sense. But why should proportional representation be identified as an integral part of a system of government by delegates? The answer, for Esmein, was that it rejected the majority principle. In a representative system, government must necessarily belong to the majority of the electoral body. It was only on the hypothesis that the legislative assembly was to consist of delegates rather than true representatives that it was possible to make sense of the campaign for the representation of minorities, for only on that hypothesis could it be maintained that the assembly should reproduce as exactly as possible the features, opinions and will of the electorate as a whole.

Esmein's position, then, was clear-cut and hard-hitting: representative government, which was intrinsically superior to direct democracy and no mere proxy for it, demanded the operation of a majoritarian electoral system. Proportional systems constituted an implicit acknowledgement that direct democracy was a better system in theory, and that elements of it should be introduced where possible to modify and improve the representative system.

In fact this reading of the proportionalists' appeal to a descriptive concept of representation is misleading. They did not, for example, set out to make elections more plebiscitary in character, but instead insistently distinguished between *representative* votes (in which the proportional principle should apply) and *deliberative* or *decisive* votes on the other (in which the majority principle had to prevail). Their insight here was that where a decision had to be made about a course of action (a piece of legislation, for instance) it was quite right that the majority should decide; but this principle was just only on condition that all points of view were fully articulated in the process of deliberation leading to the decision. So these advocates of propor-

tional representation were loyal to one of the most fundamental assumptions of the canonical exponents of representative government from Burke through Sieyes and Hegel to Mill: all held that it was for the representative assembly, through its deliberative procedures, to articulate a national will, and not for the electorate itself to do so through elections.[23] Proportionalists maintained that the parliamentary regime was quintessentially a regime founded on *discussion*. Elections were not intended to produce a decision about who should govern, still less about any of the determinate issues of the day; but instead to generate an assembly within which discussion could occur so as to produce an authoritative and legitimate decision.[24] A representative assembly must not exclude any large currents of opinion or any important social interests: they must all participate in the discussion. The proportional representation of minorities was 'one of the essential conditions of liberal democracy'. This was because among these conditions was the involvement of all the important strands in public opinion in the process of deliberation leading to the making of laws. Only on that condition was decision-making by majority vote legitimate.[25] The descriptive model of representation was not, then, invented as a second-best alternative to direct democracy: it might indeed be truer to say that it was invented to rescue something like the classical concept of representative government.

'Mimetic' Representation

Contemporary theorists of representation, from Hanna Pitkin to Frank Ankersmit, have repeatedly noted the inadequacy of the descriptive (for Ankersmit, 'mimetic') concept. Pitkin, taking her point of departure from an analysis of how the term is used in ordinary language, suggests that 'representation seems to require a certain distance or difference as well as resemblance or correspondence'.[26] We would not say, for example, that a photographic portrait 'represents' its subject; nor would I say that my image in a mirror 'represents' me – which makes it difficult to understand why writers on proportional representation should have taken it for granted that true representation should be photographic or reflexive.

Pitkin continues:

> In politics … representation as 'standing for' by resemblance, as being a copy of the original, is always a question of which characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction. … [T]he history of representative government and the expansion of the suffrage is one long record of changing demands for representation based on changing concepts of what are politically relevant features to be represented. The nation is not like a geographic area to be mapped – solidly there, more or less unchanging, certainly not changed by the map-making process.[27]

If we provisionally accept this view – which is, after all, only a modified version of the descriptive concept of representation, and does not go anywhere near as far as, for example, Ankersmit goes in his exposition of an 'aesthetic' concept of representation – new questions about the proportional representation debates arise. At one level the case for proportional representation rested on a simple assertion that representation must properly mean descriptive representation, so that the representative assembly should replicate as closely as possible the characteristics of the nation as a whole. But which characteristics? After all, it could be argued that proportional representation does not necessarily follow from an acceptance of the descriptive concept. For someone who thought that the essence of France – the qualities in her that had to be represented politically – lay in the particularities of her forty thousand communes, a proportional representation system based on large multi-member constituencies might well yield a very poor description of the nation. Voting behaviour, after all, is not a simple given, and the purpose of an electoral system cannot just be to translate those votes into seats. Instead, the electoral system determines the choices presented to electors, and hence helps shape how electors vote. The question we therefore need to go on to ask is whether the simple assertion of a descriptive model of representation was supplemented by arguments about how the nation could best be 'described' politically. My argument will be that the case for proportional representation did indeed depend quite heavily upon precisely this: an argument about nationhood grafted on to an argument about representation.

Nation and Representation

Reformers had two different kinds of critique of the image of the nation described by the existing electoral system. One line of criticism was that the system constructed national opinion in a way that was politically damaging, whether by overrepresenting the extremes and squeezing the centre, or by elevating petty local interests and so fragmenting national opinion. The other, which was not peculiar to proportionalists, but was endorsed by a wide range of electoral reformers, held that the majoritarian system did not institute an authentic representation of the nation, because it represented numbers only, or individuals only, and ignored groups, or interests, or social importance. The electoral system was, in other words, sociologically naïve: it amounted to 'inorganic' universal suffrage, or 'individualistic' or 'unorganized' democracy. I want now to examine these two lines of argument in turn.

The argument that the single-member majoritarian system served to polarize national opinion seems curious: on the face of things, it applies better to the British plurality system than to the French two-round system, which tends (like the alternative vote system) to display a centrist bias. The political life of the Third Republic was characterized not by the 'swing of the pendulum' from Left to Right and back, but by long periods of centrist rule. This was the feature of the regime that aroused the fury of plebiscitarian and revisionist critics, who typically argued that the fusion of republican and parliamentary traditions had created a 'democracy without the people': there was no effective popular voice in the choice of government. So why did proportionalists argue that the system was confrontational rather than consensual, while the regime's critics diagnosed the problem in diametrically opposite terms, arguing that it was too consensual and hence not democratic enough?

Paradoxical though it may seem, proportionalists did make extensive use of this argument, and from the outset. The Swiss pioneer of PR, Ernest Naville, writing as early as 1871, argued that the majority system opened the way to '[le] désaccord possible du pays légal et du pays vrai'. Its application led to 'divisions factices, passions mauvaises gratuitement excitées'.[28] Four decades or more later,

we find the Ligue pour la Représentation Proportionnelle making an essentially similar case for PR: 'au lieu d'être un scrutin de division, elle est un scrutin de fusion entre des hommes'.[29] This argument that the *scrutin d'arrondissement* polarized opinion and exacerbated political divisions whereas a proportional system would act as a force for moderation was such a recurrent theme in proportionalist rhetoric that it is worth examining it in more detail. It is prominent in the writings of one of the earliest advocates of proportional representation, Charles Pernolet, who as a moderate republican deputy for the Seine in the 1870s tabled a bill to institute a proportional system for legislative elections. Having lost his seat, he carried on his campaign outside parliament, notably in a pamphlet reprinting a series of letters he published in *Le Soir* in 1883-4. Pernolet's basic argument was that the majoritarian system rewarded political partisanship and exacerbated party differences, whereas proportional representation would serve as an instrument of reconciliation. Writing in the aftermath of the Republic's first anticlerical campaign under Jules Ferry, Pernolet depicted the majoritarian system as 'a blind instrument of combat' which was damaging 'to public security, to the pacification of minds and to the recovery of the French fatherland'.[30] Pernolet's underlying assumption was that ideological conflicts were of little interest to the silent majority, who found themselves squeezed by a system that forced people to choose between two extremes. Every election entailed 'an outbreak of civil war', and constructed an image of France as a nation of militants, whereas in reality the majority of inhabitants wanted only to live in peace.[31] The injustice, he suggested, did not consist merely in the underrepresentation of a numerical majority. Rather, it was that the unpolitical majority, who by their industry contributed so much to the respectability and prosperity of the nation, formed 'the solid foundation of the material and even moral existence of the country'. They were *more* deserving of representation than the rootless extremists and adventurers privileged by the existing system.[32] It was wrong that the representative system should benefit 'men living off politics' rather than 'men living off their work'. Pernolet was effectively locating 'true France'[33] in 'honest workers, absorbed by their business and the maintenance of their families, thoughtful, experienced men, no doubt friends of order, but not at all enemies of liberty or progress'.[34] Proportional rep-

resentation would make them the fixed point of the government machine, and they would thus play the role formerly attributed to the king in a constitutional monarchy. They would provide the Republic with its guarantee of survival.[35]

Pernolet invested his hopes in proportional representation because he expected it to erode the plebiscitary character of elections. Elections would cease to be battles in which one side won and the other lost; instead they would become a simple 'census of public opinion'. Parliament would shed its partisan quality and would become 'the exact, perfect image of the Nation itself condensed into the elite of its active citizens'.[36] And this would reinforce the authority of parliament and the legitimacy of its decisions – considerations which lay at the heart of Pernolet's argument.[37] Efficacious decision-making depended upon genuine prior discussion, and hence on a range of opinions in the assembly; and the legitimacy of the decision depended upon the minority's sense that its voice had been heard in the process of reaching the decision. 'In short, if a majority is sufficient for a decision, it is essential that the whole should be involved in the deliberation. This principle seems to me elementary, incontestable; it is generally ignored in politics.'[38]

Pernolet's argument was echoed, in some respects, by one of the most interesting writers on electoral reform, the political journalist Paul Laffitte (1839-1909). A liberal and parliamentary republican who was also deeply influenced by Saint-Simonian doctrines,[39] Laffitte wrote a whole sequence of books on the operation of universal suffrage and the case for electoral reform.

Laffitte was a self-conscious defender of the coherence of the parliamentary republic, at a time when that regime, under attack from Radical, Boulangist, and then Socialist critics, was short of *theoretical* defenders. He denounced Socialist critics of the parliamentary regime who sought to replace it with 'the direct government of the nation by referendum and plebiscite'. This, he thought, amounted to 'the reign of incompetence and the triumph of brute force'.[40] So when we find Laffitte reiterating the trope that parliament must be 'as exact an image as possible of the country', we can be sure that for him the parliament-mirror was no mere second-best proxy for direct democracy. It was rooted in a wholly different conception of government.

There were two central features of Laffitte's argument which are worth attention here. The first is that he slips easily from the claim that parliament should be an image of the country to the claim that in a parliamentary regime government should rest with the party which represents as accurately as possible 'the average opinion of the country, and not the extremes'.[41] Again, 'it seems to us that the Republic, as we imagine it, corresponds to the average opinion of the country, neither radical, nor clerical'. In Laffitte's view, then, the majoritarian electoral system tended to give a false image of the opinion of the country by over-representing the extremes and so polarizing conflicts. Proportional representation, by contrast, would bring parties together and thus act as 'an instrument of pacification and of political stability'.[42] Here we have at least an implicit acknowledgement that the real question was not which electoral system most accurately represented the objective reality of 'national opinion', but rather, given that different electoral systems constructed different images of the country, which of those images should be favoured over the rest. In other words, the argument about proportional representation did not turn simply on technical questions about electoral mechanisms, or even on rival conceptions of representation, but also and more fundamentally on disputed conceptions of the nation. Should the electoral system be so constructed as to offer the country a clear-cut choice between Right and Left, even at the risk of polarizing the alternatives; or should it be designed to channel opinion towards a centrist consensus? The latter was Laffitte's view, and it rested on an understanding of where 'true France' was to be found.

But Laffitte was also an exponent of the 'sociological' critique of the majoritarian system. We can see this when we turn to his discussion of the mode of election of the second chamber. He argued that proportional representation, because it allowed the effective representation of minorities, could produce a more accurate representation of the electorate considered as individuals. But that was not the same as an accurate representation of the life of the nation, for society was not reducible to the individuals composing it. True to his Saint-Simonian formation, Laffitte was a critic of the individualistic conception of society, and repudiated the revolutionaries' antagonism towards corporations. He openly applauded the 'more or less conscious effort to reconstitute the organs of social life', and the 'ren-

aissance of the corporative spirit which seemed extinguished for ever'. A comprehensive system of representation should therefore represent citizens as members of groups as well as representing them as individuals. This was the rationale for a bicameral legislature: it would ensure the representation of 'the two different aspects of social life: the individual point of view and the collective point of view'.[43] For 'if we want Parliament to be truly the image of the nation, let us allow a certain number of members, selected by universal suffrage, to represent social forces'.[44] The Senate, he suggested, might be elected indirectly: perhaps one-third by municipal councils, one-third by the *corps constitués*, and one-third by the Senate itself.

Here again, however, we should note that while Laffitte's argument was mainly aimed at establishing the fact of the organic character of society, he was also concerned to establish the superiority of group life over mere individualism. Thus he argued that individualism, being incapable of instituting a moral power, tended to produce social anarchy; by contrast, the spirit of association would sustain social cohesion, for 'whoever says association, says solidarity and discipline'.[45]

An intellectually weightier writer making an essentially similar case for electoral reform was the neo-Kantian philosopher Alfred Fouillée. Like his younger contemporary Durkheim, Fouillée set out to show that individualism and collectivism were not necessarily in conflict, but could reinforce one another: in modern society 'increase of individual life' went hand in hand with 'increase of social life', and just as society could not exist without the individual, so the individual could not exist without society.[46] The dissolution of antitheses stood at the heart of his method as a philosopher and social theorist: idealism and naturalism, individual and society, contract and organism, causality and teleology – these were no longer to be regarded as pairs of irreconcilable opposites, but as, in each case, two aspects of the same reality. Thus he denounced the belief that the ideas of the natural organism and of the voluntary contract were mutually exclusive, and argued that they could be brought into harmony by means of his concept of the *contractual organism*: society was neither wholly organic nor wholly contractual (individualistic) in character, but a synthesis of the two. He applied this concept to questions of political institutions in *La Démocratie politique et sociale*

en France (1910). Because society was partly organic and partly contractual, democracy, properly conceived, must give due scope to both these aspects. If parliament were to be truly representative in character, therefore, it should be bicameral, and each chamber should represent one of the two aspects of society.[47] The lower house would represent the social contract, the upper house the social organism. The present system did not achieve this, for it allowed the organic aspects of society to be wholly absorbed by the inorganic. So while the Chamber of Deputies represented the wills of individuals alive today, the Senate ought to represent permanent interests. The former would be elected by proportional representation, so as to ensure 'a truer expression of the facts'. But on its own, electoral reform for the Chamber would not be sufficient, for proportional representation was only numerically proportional, and paid no regard to qualitative worth. It could not remedy the one-sidedness of contemporary institutions. The remedy for that lay in reform of the Senate so as to base it on the idea of organic worth: the Senate would represent the interests of the essential organs of the state in their relations with each other and with individuals. The different organs of social life – army, education, magistrature, commerce – would propose lists of candidates which would then be put to the popular vote. Underpinning Fouillée's proposals was his repudiation of the 'false egalitarianism' which spawned a 'love of uniformity'. Progress, he insisted, was complex.[48]

Charles Benoist

Perhaps the most important critic of the abstract and individualistic concept of representation was the journalist and centre-right politician, Charles Benoist. For Benoist not only published a comprehensive and theoretically informed analysis of *La Crise de l'Etat moderne*, which he attributed to the unorganized state of universal suffrage, but, following his election as deputy in 1902, he also served as spokesman for the Commission on Universal Suffrage and thus became the foremost parliamentary advocate of electoral reform. His position was complex, however, for in his book he was a critic of propor-

tional representation, which he thought tended to entrench rather than overturn the individualistic model of representation; but once elected to parliament he came to regard it as the best practical hope of electoral reform. Here I want to focus on the case for the representation of social interests that he developed in *La Crise de l'Etat moderne*, a book which rapidly came to be acknowledged as a classic.[49]

Benoist was a critic of the concept of national sovereignty, which he thought an unnecessary mystification. But like Fouillée his main strategy was to argue that a proper system of national representation had to be rooted in a much more sociologically informed conception of the nation. The modern state, he thought, was in crisis because its authority, resting as it did on 'inorganic' universal suffrage, lacked deep roots in the real life of society. Like Durkheim, he thought that, paradoxically enough, the state would only be able to exercise genuine authority if it could be brought closer to the real interests of society. He made a by now familiar distinction between real and artificial France. The country that was represented under the system of inorganic universal suffrage was not 'the living country', but 'an artificial country, veneered on the other, which it stifles; a false, politicking country, represented whereas the true one is not'. 'Inorganic' universal suffrage thus 'adulterates the nation, deforms the representative regime, and inaugurates the reign of *politiciens*'.[50]

The reason why the electoral system adulterated the nation was that it treated the nation as if it consisted merely of a sum of identical and interchangeable individuals.[51] It overlooked the fact that the individual was not the sole living reality in the nation, and that, indeed, social reality consisted chiefly of 'a multitude of small-scale collective lives'. In modern society the group constituted the social location of the individual, and there was no reason why the individual should have to find his political existence outside the real groups in which he lives socially.[52] Benoist therefore proposed to replace the existing electoral system not with proportional representation, which was inevitably the 'proportional representation of opinions', but with the representation of interests; for interests were stable, tangible, and rooted, whereas opinions were fugitive, changeable, and difficult to classify. This could be achieved by replacing existing constituencies, based essentially on population, with a dual system in which each elector would belong both to a territorial con-

stituency and to one of a small number of 'social constituencies', determined by occupation. The Chamber of Deputies would thus still represent individuals, for it would be elected directly, but they would be represented through their occupational groups. The Senate, meanwhile, would directly represent the organized interests themselves. This system would thus plug the gap that had emerged between individual and state; henceforth they would be bound together by their natural intermediaries.[53]

Conclusions

In this article I have tried to trace ways in which debates on electoral systems turned on rival constructions of nationhood, rival constructions of 'true' and 'false' France. I hope this helps explain why the apparently esoteric question of electoral reform could arouse such passionate interest in the years of Radical dominance in the Republic after 1899. The case for proportional representation seemed at its strongest when political life was at its most polarized – as it was when Pernolet was writing in the late 1870s and early 80s, and as it was again in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair. Bipolar political antagonism, it was argued, distorted the reality of social life and national opinion. So electoral systems, I want to suggest, should not be thought of as straightforward technical instruments, but as means of constructing the political expression of the nation. In France debates on electoral reform turned on fundamental questions about citizenship and nationhood; about what kind of nation was to be represented. At the same time, the concept of representation underwent some important transformations, and the concept of representation as reflection of diversity was now deployed to shore up the parliamentary regime which, a century or more before, had fed on an almost directly opposite understanding of representation.

Notes

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2 Robert Wokler, 'The Enlightenment project as betrayed by modernity', *History of European Ideas* 24 (1998), pp. 301-13.

3 There is a good discussion of this transformation of representative government in Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, ch 6.

4 Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Peuple introuvable. Histoire de la représentation démocratique en France* (1998), p. 62.

5 F. R. Ankersmit, *Aesthetic Politics: Political philosophy beyond fact and value* (1996), p. 28.

6 Ankersmit, *Aesthetic Politics*, p. 48.

7 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (1967), pp. 61 ff.

8 Some examples include: Th. Furet, 'Statistique politique. Majorités et minorités. Réforme du suffrage universel', *Journal des Economistes* 3rd series 14 (Apr-June 1869), p. 412 (legislative assemblies ought to be 'la représentation de la nation, son image, sa photographie'); Maurice Vernes, 'Des principes de la représentation proportionnelle, des procédés proposés pour l'assurer et de leur application à la France', in *La Représentation proportionnelle. Etudes de législation et de statistique comparées publiées sous les auspices de la Société pour l'étude de la représentation proportionnelle* (1888), p. 5 (arguing that a political body can only be said to be 'representative' of a commune or a country if it is in some sense 'la photographie de cette commune ou de ce pays'); Georges Picot, 'L'Organisation du suffrage: rapport sur l'ouvrage de M. Charles Benoist, intitulé La Crise de l'Etat moderne', and discussion, in *Compte Rendu de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, N.S. 49 (Jan-June 1898), p. 431 ('Nous avions été séduits par la promesse de trouver un Parlement qui fût la représentation de la vie nationale et voilà qu'on nous présente, non une image véridique, mais une photographie dans laquelle toutes les proportions sont troublées.'); Emile Macquart, *La Moralité des élections et la représentation proportionnelle* (1904), pp. 17-18 (on the need for 'une assemblée qui serait le plus exactement possible l'image de la France, la miniature du pays'). The list could be endless.

9 Thus the Marquis de Castellane, *Essai sur l'organisation du suffrage universel en France* (1872), p. 251: 'La meilleure définition que nous ayons entendu donner du gouvernement représentatif est celle-ci: "C'est le miroir de la nation."' Cf also J Guadet, *Du Suffrage universel et de son application d'après un mode nouveau* (1871), p. 6: 'Le corps représentatif ne sera une réalité que s'il résume la société tout entière, que s'il en est l'image fidèle, que s'il en reproduit en abrégé tous les éléments.'

10 P-G La Chesnais, *La Représentation proportionnelle* (n.d. [1908]), p. 3: '[le] veritable vote de representation dont la caractéristique essentielle est que tout groupe d'électeurs assez nombreux soit représenté par les élus qu'il choisit et que les diverses opinions aient dans la representation du corps electoral la même force relative que dans le corps electoral lui-même.'

11 *Débats parlementaires* 29 May 1911, p. 2185.

12 Take, for example, the analysis of the 1902 elections given in P-G La Chesnais, *La Représentation proportionnelle et les partis politiques* (1904), pp. 56-8. Likewise, P-G La Chesnais and Georges Lachapelle, *Tableau des élections législatives des 24 avril et 8 mai 1910, suivi d'une application de la représentation proportionnelle, système rationnel et système d'Hondt* (1910), passim, show that the results in 1910 were much more 'proportional' than those of 1906.

13 *Pour la R.P. Discours de A. Lefas, député d'Ille-et-Vilaine. Allocution de Marc Sangnier* (1914), p. 41.

14 Thus Rœderer wrote in 1797: 'La Constitution reconnaît des représentants qui, tous ensemble, représentent le peuple; mais elle ne reconnaît pas le représentant un tel. Il y a des représentants, et pas *un représentant*.' Quoted by Rosanvallon, *Le Peuple introuvable*, p. 43.

15 See Flandin's evidence to the (UK) Royal Commission on Systems of Election (1910), Cd 5352, p. 96. Cf also Léon Donnat, *La Politique expérimentale* (1885), p. 429: 'La representation proportionnelle a précisément pour but de corriger les erreurs que signalent les lignes precedents, en ramenant, autant que possible, la souveraineté du people à la souveraineté de l'individu.'

16 Pitkin, p. 89.

17 Henri Avenel, *Comment vote la France. Dix-huit ans de suffrage universel – 1876-1893* (1894), p. 39.

18 J Courcelle-Seneuil, 'De la théorie du mandat législatif', *Séances et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 131 (n.s. 31) (Jan-June 1889), pp. 297-304 (& discussion 305-16). Courcelle-Seneuil pointed out that the concept of the legislative mandate derived some of its plausibility in France from the fact that the deputies to the Estates-General had indeed been mandatories who were contractually bound to present

to the king the grievances formulated by their mandators in the form of the *cahiers*. But, crucially, these deputies were not legislators.

19 Raoul de la Grasserie, *Systèmes électoraux des différents peuples. Etude comparative, scientifique et politique* (1911), p. 7: 'On lui donne mission surtout de tenir droit notre drapeau politique, celui de nos idées, ou notre drapeau économique, celui de notre profession, ou celui de nos idées religieuses, ou enfin de notre terroir, c'est encore notre drapeau, et on demande surtout qu'il ne lâche pas.'

20 Raoul de la Grasserie, *Systèmes électoraux*, pp. 7-8.

21 Esmein I, p. 330. 'Elles statuent et exercent par là un attribut de la souveraineté'.

22 Adhémar Esmein, 'Deux formes de gouvernement', *Revue du droit public et de la science politique* I (Jan-June 1894), 15-41.

23 The French revolutionaries' hostility towards declared candidatures was rooted in an aversion towards the idea that elections should consist in a choice between rival programmes: see Rosanvallon, *Le Peuple introuvable*, p. 45.

24 This was the position taken by, for example, H.C. Mailfer, *De la Démocratie en Europe. Questions religieuses et juridiques. Droit public interne* (1874). He distinguished (p. 282) between 'democracy', which accepts the importance of the distinction between the legislative body and the electorate, and 'demagogy', which blurs the distinction.

25 Th Ferneuil, 'La réforme électorale et le parti progressiste', *RPP* LX (1904), 507-18

26 Pitkin, p. 68.

27 Pitkin, p. 87.

28 Ernest Naville, *La Réforme électorale en France* (1871), pp. 27, 35-6.

29 *La Représentation proportionnelle expliquée* (1904), p. 24.

30 Pernolet, *Petite réforme capable de grands résultats par la substitution, dans la loi électorale, du principe de la représentation de tous au principe en vigueur de la représentation exclusive de la moitié plus un, cette moitié ne fut-elle que le quart des inscrits* (1884), p. 17.

31 Pernolet, *Petite réforme*, p. 22.

32 Pernolet, *Petite réforme*, p. 23.

33 He referred to 'the true French people', '[le] vrai peuple français': Pernolet, *Petite réforme*, p. 47. The deployment of the rhetoric of 'true France' was a favourite trope in this kind of proportionalist discourse. So, for instance, we find a follower of Sangnier declaring that 'la véritable France étouffe sous le manteau de la vieille politique': François Lespinat, *Au lendemain des élections. Partis politiques et mouvements sociaux en 1906* (n.d. 1906?), p. 54.

34 Pernolet, *Petite réforme*, p. 36.

35 Pernolet, *Petite réforme*, pp. 37, 47.

36 Pernolet, *La Représentation proportionnelle. Lettre à Mr de Marcère, président du Centre gauche* (1877), pp. 29-30.

37 See, for example, his last work, *Le Suffrage Universel. La République et l'Autorité. De la nécessité et des moyens d'en faire une triple vérité* (1888)

38 Pernolet, *La Représentation proportionnelle*, p. 5.

39 He came into contact with Saint-Simonian ideas through the agency of Gustave d'Eichthal and Edouard Charton, whose daughter he married.

40 Laffitte, *Lettres d'un parlementaire* (2nd edn 1894), p. 82.

41 Laffitte, *Lettres d'un parlementaire*, pp. 32-3.

42 Laffitte, *La Réforme électorale. La représentation proportionnelle* (1897), p. 107.

43 Laffitte, *Le Paradoxe d'égalité et la représentation proportionnelle. Deux essais de politique positive* (1910), p. 35.

44 Laffitte, *Paradoxe*, p. 30.

45 Laffitte, *Paradoxe*, p. 137.

46 Alfred Fouillée, *La Science sociale contemporaine*, pp. v-vi.

47 Fouillée, *La Démocratie politique et sociale en France* (1910), pp. 39

48 Fouillée, *La Démocratie politique et sociale en France*, pp. 59-66.

49 M Ajam, 'Essai de psychologie parlementaire: à propos du scrutin de liste et de la représentation proportionnelle', *Revue politique et parlementaire* L (1906), p. 458 n. 1.

50 Charles Benoist, *La Crise de l'Etat moderne. De l'organisation du suffrage universel* (c. 1896), p. 23.

51 Benoist, *La Crise*, p. 196.

52 Benoist, *La Crise*, pp. 31-2, 198.

53 Benoist, *La Crise*, pp. 155-6.

F.R. Ankersmit

COMMENTS TO JONES

Professor Jones begins by pointing out how misleading it may be to restrict the investigation of the origins of our political concepts to what Koselleck called the '*Sattelzeit*'. And his essay admirably makes clear what we may miss if we commit this mistake. For he convincingly demonstrates the profundity and the originality of the discussion of the notion of political representation in late nineteenth century France. Moreover, Professor Jones is surely right when arguing that the political realities of the late nineteenth century were substantially different from those of the France of Sieyès and Roederer and that therefore decisive adaptations of the concepts of representation were inevitable. He thus writes: 'but what happens to the classical concept of representation in a world of direct and quasi-plebiscitary elections and organized political parties?'

However, after having read Professor Jones's erudite and penetrating essay one will have to conclude that this most sensible and urgent question is never really addressed by the participants in the discussions investigated by him. The role of political parties in the mechanisms of representation was never really recognized by the authors whose opinions he so competently expounds in his paper. Admittedly, there is one (telling) exception. Discussing Laffitte Professor Jones writes about him:

'he [Laffitte (F.A.)] slips easily from the claim that Parliament should be an image of the country to the claim that in a parliamentary regime

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government should rest with the party which represents as accurately as possible 'the average opinion of the country, not the extreme.'

And we may infer from Professor Jones's observation that Laffitte had a tendency to (mistakingly) require of the party what we may rightfully demand of Parliament (as a whole): namely to represent as adequately as possible the electorate. Apparently, Laffitte tended to confuse the task and functions of Parliament with those of the political party. And it follows 1) that Laffite was unable to discern what new elements were introduced into the mechanisms of political representation because of the coming into being of political parties and 2) that we cannot expect him to say anything of interest about how the 'classical concept of representation' should have to be adapted in order to account for 'a world of direct and quasi-plebiscitary elections and organized political parties'.

I should emphasize that this is, in fact, truly amazing. For the discussion analyzed by Professor Jones mainly focussed on whether one should adopt in France a system of proportional representation or preserve the majority system (or 'first past the pole' system, as it is called sometimes). Now, one can imagine a majority system without political parties, albeit with some difficulty. For even though the candidates at an election have no party affiliations, their views can become sufficiently well-known to their electors. But proportional representation in the absence of political parties makes no sense at all. How could the voters in the absence of political parties possibly make up their minds about probably several hundreds of candidates, having no special ties to the elector's own world, and having only some notoriety at the national level (if at all)? How could these candidates make their views sufficiently well-known to the electorate if there are only the media to expound them to the public? And what could the media do when having to fulfil the impossible task of expounding the political views of hundreds of individual candidates? The media would see themselves confronted with the unpalatable choice between either gross distortion or a ridiculous catalogue of political opinions that could only result in their reader's utter despair and exasperation. The voter would turn away from politics in disgust – and there would be nothing else that he could sensibly do. Hence, proportional representation with-

out political parties is a program for political disaster: it can only result in chaos and anarchy.

Recognizing how absolutely crucial the existence of political parties is for the system of proportional representation, it may surprise us that the authors discussed by Professor Jones were so little interested in the political party and in how the political party might complicate their debate. And this faces us with the question why these authors, by no means stupid or narrow-minded people, could fail to see such an obvious thing.

Selfevidently, it will be hard, if not impossible to state with certainty whether any such explanation is the correct one. But on the basis of Professor Jones' own exposition the following explanation does suggest itself. Professor Jones points out that there is one assumption that is being shared by both the adherents of the majority system and those of proportional representation. The assumption in question is the idea that there is, or should be an 'electoral bond' between the elector and his representative. The proponents of proportional representation accused their majoritarian opponents of acquiescing in the absence of this bond for the voters whose candidates lost in a majoritarian election. And the majoritarians riposted that this bond simply should not exist under such circumstances and that those who believed otherwise – as their proportionalist detractors – were the victims of Rousseauist delusions. For them the demand of the electoral bond ought to be satisfied only for those voters whose candidates had won the election.

So, to the extent that the debate between the majoritarians and the proportionalists made sense (and was not merely a *dialogue des sourds*), it rested on a common embrace of this notion of the electoral bond. They only differed with regard to the scope to be allotted to the notion (i.e. whether this bond should exist for *all* voters, or *only* for those voters whose candidate(s) had won the elections).

Admittedly, this notion of the electoral bond may well have its meaning – and even its *raison d'être* – when in a majoritarian system the voter choses an elector by whose arguments he had been particularly impressed. The electoral bond will then guarantee that the voter truly experiences himself as an integral part of the body politick. And at a time when the politicization of the masses had only just begun, this surely was no small prize and one had every reason to

cherish it. This certainly is why the notion of the electoral bond was a most sensible one at the time.

But the notion can no longer have any function in a party system. For then the voters primarily vote for a political party and only in the second place for a certain candidate. This is also why it is considered indecent for a representative to keep his seat in Parliament if he moves over to another party. A seat in Parliament is the party's seat and not of the representative. So the electoral bond is cut through as soon as parties take over. From the perspective of political representation the political party then has a logical priority to the person(s) representing a party in Parliament. And that automatically implies the end of the kind of electoral bond that both parties in the debate depicted by Professor Jones believed in.

But, it might now be objected, in that case the electoral bond will tie citizens no longer to candidates but to parties, while remaining, for the rest, as necessary as it had been under a previous dispensation. True, of course, but it should be recognized that this is a quite different electoral bond than the one we had before. More specifically, the debate between the proportionalists and the majoritarians would no longer makes any sense in terms of *this* electoral bond. For how could the majoritarian argue his case in terms of *this* electoral bond? The losers in an election (either majoritarian or proportionalist) are no less represented than the winners in term of this electoral bond. So either they have to give up their majoritarianism or this specific version of the electoral bond (or both). And the same is true for the proportionalists (who always argued that the voter in a majoritarian system is not represented if his candidate loses). But as long as his party is present in Parliament the voter is represented within a party system, even if his own particular candidate lost his constituency in a majoritarian election.

Having established as much, it is time to come to a conclusion. I began with the observation that late nineteenth century debate on political representation remained indifferent to the changes effected by the introduction of political parties into the political system and that this meant a severe restriction upon the practical value of the whole debate. It then became clear that both parties in the debate still believed in an electoral bond between the elector and the representative. It was this belief which, on the one hand, made their de-

bate into a meaningful one. But on the other hand it also prevented them to see, and to discuss the real challenges of their time, i.e. the new challenge posed by the political party. This may, perhaps, explain why the proportionalist could remain so strangely blind to the fact that the introduction of the political party made their case into a so much stronger one than that of their opponents. For as soon as we vote for parties and not for individual representatives, it is not longer easy to see where the advantages of a majoritarian over a proportionalist system could possibly lie. Misrepresentation will then be the rule rather than the exception – as the British social-democrats know so very well.

Hannu Nurmi

COMMENTS TO JONES

The Ambiguity of Proportional Representation

Introduction

In the preceding, H. S. Jones discusses one of the perennial themes in democratic theory, *viz.* the concept of representation. Jones pays particular attention to arguments for and against proportional representation (PR, for short) in the late 19th and early 20th century debates. Rather than comment on the arguments or Jones's analysis thereof, I concentrate on some assumptions that the proponents and opponents of PR apparently shared. To wit, it seems that the participants of the debates had a common view of what it means for an assembly to be composed in a proportional manner: it should be a miniature model of the electorate at large. In this brief note I shall take issue of the above common view by arguing that some fundamental conceptual problems remain unresolved in the very notion of PR.

The debate discussed by Jones seems to be based on following assumptions:

1. For any group of voters, it is always better to have more representation than less thereof.
2. The degree to which perfect proportionality has been achieved can be determined in a way that is independent of the voting procedure.
3. If the share of parliamentary seats assigned to a party corresponds

to its share of popular vote, then perfectly proportional representation has been achieved.

I shall endeavor to show that, although *prima facie* plausible, each one of these claims can be shown is erroneous. We shall begin with the first claim.

Schwartz's Paradox

Regardless of whether one considers parliaments as venues of public debate or of voting according to predetermined agendas, it intuitively seems that the parties are better off with more seats than less seats. The influence over the voting outcomes seems to increase – or at least not decrease – with additional seats. Similarly, the views of larger representative groups can be expected to be heard better than those of smaller ones. And yet, Schwartz (1996) has shown this to be an erroneous assumption. Consider the following situation involving three parties in a 100-member parliament.

Party 1	*Party 2*	*Party 3*
(30 seats)	(45 seats)	(25 seats)
status quo	nuclear power	coal power
coal power	status quo	nuclear power
nuclear power	coal power	status quo

The issue to be decided is the building of a large power plant. The government proposes the building of a nuclear power plant. Its second preference is the status quo (i.e. postponing the decision with the hope that some new energy saving innovations or new energy sources will be found) and the third the building of a coal power plant. Its views are supported by party 2. The preferences of other groups are listed above.

If the parliamentary amendment procedure is used, the "natural" agenda is to vote first on the coal vs. nuclear plant and confront then the winner of this vote with status quo. Since coal is preferred to nuclear power by parties 1 and 3, coal wins the first ballot. In the

second ballot it is defeated by status quo since parties 1 and 2 prefer status quo to coal power. Thus, status quo would seem to prevail. This is the worst outcome from party 3's view-point.

Suppose now that this party had somewhat less representation in the parliament. To be specific, assume that it had 13 instead of 25 seats and that the 12 seats it loses would be evenly distributed between parties 1 and 2. Thus parties 1 and 2 would now have 36 and 51 seats, respectively. This would make the nuclear plant the Condorcet winner, *i.e.* an alternative that defeats all its competitors by a majority of votes. *Eo ipso* the nuclear plant would be the outcome ensuing from the parliamentary vote. This outcome is preferred to the status quo by party 3. This, in turn, means that party 3 would be better off with less representation than with more representation. It is easy to see that all seat distributions that result from party 3 losing 12 or more seats to be equally divided between the other two parties give party 3 a better outcome (nuclear plant) than the original situation where status quo is the result. Thus, less representation is beneficial to party 3. Indeed, in this example party 3 is better off having no representation at all than having a quarter of seats of the parliament. Surely, this observation runs counter the conventional wisdom underlying the debate reported by Jones.

The phenomenon observed in the above table comes pretty close the no-show paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983; Nurmi 1999). The paradox occurs whenever a group of voters gets a better outcome by not voting at all than by voting according to their preferences. In Schwartz's paradox the abstainers' ballots are redistributed evenly among the competitors. Thus, although not every instance of the no-show paradox is an instance of Schwartz's paradox, they are pretty close to each other. It has been shown by Moulin (1988) that vulnerability to the no-show paradox is fairly common among voting systems. All systems that necessarily elect a Condorcet winner when one exists, may result in a no-show paradox. On the other hand, there are also systems which are bad on both counts, i.e. may result in a no-show paradox and fail to elect a Condorcet winner. Two such systems are widely used: the plurality runoff and alternative vote[1]. We now turn to the meaning of proportionality or rather the profound ambiguity of the concept.

Proportionality of Opinions

The intuitive concept of proportionality connects the views of the members of the representative body with those of the electorate at large. According to this intuitive conception, the views of the electorate are determined by election results. But in typical elections, each voter can reveal very little of his/her opinions regarding candidates and/or parties. More often than not, he/she can only pick one alternative (party list or candidate) as his/her favorite. Sure, there are elections, notably of STV or AV variety, that allow for a richer expression of opinions. My point, however, is that assuming that the voters have opinions regarding all candidates or at least several of them, the notion of proportionality underlying current electoral systems becomes ambiguous. Consider an example.

30% of voters	35% of voters	25% of voters	10% of voters
A	C	D	B
B	B	B	C
C	A	A	D
D	D	C	A

Here we have four candidates competing for three seats in a constituency. Systems based on plurality or one person – one vote idea as well as STV would elect A, C and D. Yet, B is ranked first or second by all voters, while D is ranked last by 75% of them. The exclusion of B would seem unreasonable.

By a slight modification of the above table one may create a situation where plurality and STV systems end up with different outcomes. By assigning 35% of the voters to the leftmost group, 40% to the next one, 15 % to the next one and 10% to the rightmost group, we get different results with plurality based systems and STV. The former ends up with A,C and D, while STV results in A,B and C. It is not difficult to see that our notion of proportionality is crucially dependent on the voting system. This – along with voter preferences – determines what kind of seat distributions we consider proportional (see Nurmi 1985 and Baker 1996, for further discussion). Thus, it seems that the second assumption referred to

above poses problems of rather profound nature. It turns out that the very meaning of proportionality hinges on an implicit assumption of the social choice procedure to be used. Consequently, it may well happen that, given a preference profile, we may have several proportional outcomes (*e.g.* allocations of parliamentary seats to parties) depending on the underlying choice procedures (*e.g.* STV, Borda[2] count, plurality).

Proportionality of What?

Suppose now that nearly perfect proportionality has been achieved in the sense that there is an agreement as to what voting procedure is used in defining proportionality and, moreover, the seat distribution of parties corresponds closely to the distribution of support in the electorate. In other words, let us assume that the problem of the preceding section has been solved in a satisfactory manner. The voting body is then assumed to be a miniature model of the electorate at large in relevant respects. Surely our assumption is very strong, but nevertheless it can easily be seen that crucial problems remain open even if the proportionality of seat distribution were our sole *desideratum*.

Consider a voting body – say, a parliament – with 100 seats. Suppose, moreover, that on the basis of elections held, the perfectly proportional seat distribution would give party A 55 seats, party B 25 seats and party C 20 seats. The main role of parliaments is to enact laws and other norms. In passing legislation, the parliaments resort to collective decision making procedures. Very often the majority rule is being applied. In other words, one looks at decision alternatives in a binary fashion and at any given stage of the procedure chooses that alternative which is supported by a majority in a contest with another alternative (or set of alternatives).[3] It is clear that when the number of seats of a party exceeds that of the majority, it determines the winners in every pairwise contest. Thus, the influence of such a party over the legislative outcomes is decisive. In our example, party A clearly determines the outcome of every pairwise vote. Hence its control over the legislation is complete. With 55% of

the seats – and, by assumption, of the popular support – it controls 100% of the legislation.

On the basis of examples like the one just discussed one could argue that what one should distribute proportionally is not seats but voting power, *i.e.* influence over legislative outcomes. This, however, poses the question of measuring the latter. What the above example suggests is that the seat distribution is at times a poor proxy of voting power distribution. In particular under circumstances where one party is capable of dictating the voting outcomes, the distribution of seats to others is largely irrelevant. But is the negative conclusion valid in general, that is, are we in general entitled to the conclusion that the seat distribution gives a distorted picture of the voting power distribution?

The answer to this question depends on one's measure of voting power. There is a rich literature on different measures of *a priori* voting power. These measures equate voting power with the importance of a party when voting coalitions are assumed to form in specific ways. For example, perhaps the most widely used *a priori* voting power measure, the (normalized) Banzhaf index makes the simplifying – and often empirically false – assumption that all winning coalition are equally likely to form. Under this assumption and taking into account the seat distribution and the required number of votes to pass legislation it counts the number of winning coalitions in which a party is non-redundant. These coalitions are called swings of the party (*i.e.* the party swings a non-winning coalition into a winning one by joining it). Dividing the number of swings of a party with the total number of swings of all parties gives the Banzhaf index value of the party.

Banzhaf index is but one of many measures of *a priori* voting power. Its advantages and disadvantages *vis-à-vis* other similar measures has been a subject of debate for some time (see Felsenthal and Machover 1998, for a relatively recent over-view and analysis). Whatever its shortcomings, it is certainly more informative and useful measure of voting power than the practice of distributing seats to parties in proportion to their popular support. What this practice ignores is the fact that decisions in collective bodies are always made in accordance with decision rules. Typically these state the vote thresholds that have to be exceeded in order to pass new legislation. That a

measure which takes these thresholds into account is superior to the common practice, seems pretty obvious. What remains an open question – and a subject of an amazingly hot debate – is whether one should include more institutional detail into power measures. One such detail could be the existence of a spatial continuum along which the parties occupy more or less fixed positions. The traditional left-right continuum is an obvious candidate for such a spatial dimension. Whether it still binds the parties in their coalition behavior is, however, somewhat questionable.

Concluding Remarks

We have discussed three implicit assumptions underlying the 19th century debate on PR. Each one of them turns out to be either false or highly problematic. The first states that it is always better to have more representation than less is simply false as shown by Schwartz's paradox. The second assumption states that we can recognize a proportionally composed voting body when we see it. Our preceding discussion shows, however, that the notion of proportionality is highly procedure-dependent. What is a proportional distribution in the sense of one procedure may not be that in the sense of another method. The third assumption equates voting power distribution with seat distribution. It seems to be false in a wide variety of cases.

Notes

1 Alternative vote (AV) is simply the application of single transferable vote system to single-member constituency, whereupon the quota needed for election is 50%.

2 Borda count is a voting system based on similar ballots as STV. With k alternatives, each first rank gives an alternative k-1 points, each second rank k-2 points etc. The Borda winner is the alternative with the largest sum of points.

3 We have no space here for a discussion on variants of parliamentary voting procedures. The amendment procedure used *e.g.* in Finland, Sweden and the United States is binary in the sense of confronting

alternatives with other alternatives. The binariness of the successive procedure – which is used most widely in parliaments of our time – is based on comparing one alternative with all the other remaining alternatives. The reader is refereed to Riker (1982) and Rasch (1995) for discussion on parliamentary voting procedures.

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Topic 2:
Enlightenment Thought

Ludwig Siep

ROUSSEAU'S NORMATIVE IDEA OF NATURE[1]

I

The concept of nature in modern science is, to put it very simply, that of a universe of facts, events or items governed by laws – in Kant's phrase: "das Dasein der Dinge, so fern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist".[2] This is not a normative idea of nature. Norms are not laws which "govern" a series of events, they are rules that can be followed or violated. Such is the case only with rules for the behavior of beings which have or at least believe to have some freedom of choice. These beings put values in the outcome of a course of events. They wish that some state of events may come into existence rather than another and try to influence this by their own behavior.

Throughout the history of modern philosophy and science, an ontological and epistemological gap has opened and continuously widened between the realm of nature governed by laws and the realm of value- and norm-guided activity. The steps of this process are well-known: Hume's criticism of inferences from is to ought, Kant's separation between the realms of nature and of freedom, G. E. Moore's concept of the non-natural character of moral values, Max Weber's postulate of value-free science etc. Today nature is conceived as completely value free and as the subject of purely objective science. Norms and values on the other hand originate by peoples' private wishes

and valuations and the necessity to regulate conflicting attempts to realize them. Preference utilitarianism, rational choice theories, contractarianism and most forms of modern Kantianism subscribe to this division between valueless nature and the rational coordination of value-realizing activities.

Among the main reasons for this historical development are, as is well-known, the refutation of teleological explanation in the sciences and the liberation of individual conscience from the moral authority of church and state. Rousseau plays an important role at least in the second process: he figures among the staunchest supporters of the freedom and holiness of conscience. And despite the possibility of totalitarian consequences implied in the *Social Contract*, Rousseau's concept of autonomy – as co-legislation and voluntary subordination to the general will – is among the most influential in the history of liberal political philosophy.

As to the other side, Rousseau's concept of nature, the picture is less clear. On the one hand, Rousseau conceives of nature, natural history and natural man in terms of modern empirical science. The history of nature and of man's cultural development, as reconstructed in the *Discourse on the origins of inequality*, is void of any teleological or purposive structure. It is full of contingent facts, accidents and surprising turns, which do not follow a rational design. Man himself in his state of nature is an animal devoid of almost all traditional attributes characterizing the image of god in his creation.

On the other hand, in his letter to Voltaire of 1756, the confession of faith of the Savoyan vicar in his *Émile* and in other texts Rousseau subscribes to a teleological picture of nature as designed by an almighty, omniscient and benevolent divine will. In this nature there seems to be no room for chance, accidents and catastrophes which have been brought about only by the abuse of man's free will. The evolutionary concept of natural history which seemed so close in the Second Discourse is almost unimaginable in these texts. Here Rousseau's conception is much closer to Leibniz than to Darwin.

This second concept of nature is, of course, evaluative and normative. If man had managed to preserve his position on the top of the natural order, he would have followed God's intention and by doing so he would have attained happiness. As to the first, the concept of the Discourse, many have considered it to be evaluative and normative as

well. "Back to nature" seemed to be the message of this attack on the *ancien régime's* and the Enlightenment's pride in the achievements of cultural progress. Voltaire himself set the tone of this interpretation and it has been echoed by many followers ever since.

But as Rousseau maintained and clarified in several later texts, natural man in his original condition, the "homme sauvage" which may still survive among the primates in some corners of the tropical forests, although goodhearted, is morally neither good nor bad and he is not aware of his own happiness. His specifically human traits, which according to the profession of the Savoyan vicar make him the king of nature and the image of god – intelligence, free will and conscience in this ascending sequence – are still lacking. The only natural "norm" which man can learn from this happy past seems to be the correspondence between needs and means to fulfill them. But in order to become a human form of happiness and self-reconciliation, this correspondence has to be transformed and regained on a completely different level.

What I attempt to do in the following is to clarify the different concepts of nature in Rousseau's writings between 1755 and 1763. My guiding question is, how this concept is situated in relation to the traditional evaluative and dominantly teleological concepts of nature on the on hand, and the modern, value-free concept of nature on the other.

After a provisional classification of meanings of nature (II) I discuss Rousseau's concept of nature in his *Second Discourse* (III). Then I turn to the teleological and physico-theological concept of nature in the *Confession of the Savoyan vicar* and the Letters to Voltaire and Beaumont (IV). In the following part I discuss the thesis that the legal and moral norms in Rousseau's the *Social Contract* aim at de-naturalizing man (V). In the final section (VI) I draw some conclusions for the contemporary debate about nature and morality.

II

In order to clarify Rousseau's different concepts of nature, let us first consider some uses of the concept which he shares with everyday

and philosophical language.[3] They can be classified under three headings:

First one might distinguish concepts of nature which are defined by their *extension* or their *intension*. Extensionally defined concepts of nature refer to a realm or sector of objects. In contrast I call "intensional" concepts of nature referring to certain aspects or properties of objects. Whereas extensional concepts of nature do not allow that one object at the same time belongs to nature and to another sector of objects, such a crossing of borders is perfectly possible for "natural" objects defined by intensional concepts. Thus a highly artificial (or cultural) object like a movement of a ballet dancer can be quite adequately called "natural".

These two concepts of nature and natural can be distinguished into further subdivisions.

(1) The following concepts are *extensional* by demarcating different realms of "natural objects":

(1.1) Nature in the broadest extensional sense is the universe of things, events and processes to which human life belongs as long as it is incorporated in man's mortal body

(1.2) There are some aspects or divisions of this whole which we are used to call nature in particular: the realm of material things, and more specific the realm of living things.

(1.3) Even more particular demarcations of the realm of nature are gained by using contrasting terms or oppositions. We distinguish nature as that part of reality which in his existence and his change is not subject to human will or intention. At least part of the human body belong to this sphere. By focussing on different activities of this will we derive more specific pairs of opposites: namely the natural and the cultural, the natural and the artificial or the technical etc.

(2) Besides these extensionally defined concepts there are some *intensionally* defined concepts of nature which cross the lines of the realms drawn by the extensional ones:

(2.1) Nature can mean the essence of things, both natural and artificial like the state or friendship.

(2.2) In essentialistic and teleological conceptions this sense gets an "evaluative touch". Nature and natural is understood as original, authentic, not yet spoiled, corrupted or alienated. These evaluative prop-

erties, too, cut across the nature-culture distinction: a smile or a gesture, for instance, can be natural.

(3) There is a third group of concepts of nature consisting of models, metaphors and ideals of nature. Elements of the above mentioned concepts – especially the concept of nature as essence – are contained in theses concepts but the latter cannot be reduced to them. What I have in mind are especially two models of nature prominent in the 17th and 18th century:

(3.1) First, that of the order of nature, the laws, organizing principles and basic structures which can figure as a model for man´s behavior or the order of his society.

(3.2) Second, the concept or metaphor of nature as a subject with human or superhuman traits. Its most concrete and certainly metaphorical form is that of "mother nature". It can have pantheistic and theistic connotations. In the 17th and 18th century it is used both by "materialists" in the tradition of Lukrez, who conceived of nature as the eternal creative power and by Christian "creationists" who tried to prove the immanence of the creator's will in his uncorrupted creation.[4] This meaning of nature caring for human welfare and, if undisturbed, providing for human happiness, left its traces even in modern everyday language. It played an important role in 18th century thinking about man´s relation to nature and to his creator.[5]

In the following, I do not intend to relate Rousseau's uses of the concept of nature precisely to these different meanings. I use them only as a background to avoid confusion and ambiguity in dealing with his texts.

III

The concept of nature which Rousseau employs in the *Second Discourse* contains all the meanings mentioned above. It combines traditional and rather modern tendencies. On the one hand, nature is a teleological order, on the other it is a process governed by contingent facts and their consequences.

As to the first, Rousseau clearly conceives of the natural order of things as harmonious and beneficent. Nature has provided animals

and human beings with faculties and impulses which, properly used, make them flourish and enjoy happiness, even if they have little consciousness of this happiness. Man in the state of nature is a strong, healthy animal, which can easily meet his needs and has little to fear. Man and the other animals are no "natural" enemies, since they do not need each other for food. Ample space for a small number of human beings with a low rate of reproduction allows for a solitary existence and makes conflict among humans unlikely. Moreover, the natural antipathy to see a sentient being suffer, above all a member of one's own species, keeps him from violence – except for some *"coup de poings"* over a meal.

There are, however, two problems with this harmonious and purposive conception of nature. Different from traditional teleological concepts, it seems to be indeterminate and incomplete in two respects: firstly, it is indeterminate in a historical dimension, because natural history and cultural progress are not directed towards a good end. And secondly it is indeterminate and unstable regarding man as a species, which by following his perfectibility may lose – and in fact has lost – his natural place. This loss (or "fall") destroyed his emotional balance and the balance of nature as a whole.

In this process, the two ways of indeterminacy worked together: the accidental events in the history of nature – among them the outbreaks of volcanoes and the origin of islands or other pieces of land separated by natural barriers – gave rise to more densely populated areas. This in turn forced or at least favored man to live socially and thereby to develop all his social and technical skills – but at the same time lead to the depravation of his natural harmony and harmlessness.

As to the specific difference of man, Rousseau characterizes it both in a natural (or biological) and a metaphysical way. The natural difference is the perfectibility, the faculty to learn and develop his faculties which by far exceeds the rest of the animal world. The metaphysical difference is marked by free will, which enables man to actions beyond the limits of natural (or instinctive) impulses. But even this metaphysical faculty, which Rousseau connects with the Cartesian immaterial soul, presupposes for his employment the contingent history of man´s cultivation. Man in his original animal existence is unable to imagine his future, to make plans or to reflect on reasons for different ways to act.

If nature, then, develops and thereby changes the conditions for the existence of living beings, can it still be considered to be a teleological and harmonious order?

In order to study Rousseau´s answer to this question, we will have to look into the passages which expose and defend his teleological concept of nature. The can be found in his *Letter to Voltaire* of 1756, the *Confession of Faith of the Savoyan Vicar* in the *Émile* (1762) and his *Letter to Christophe de Beaumont* (1763).

IV

The ambivalence between a beneficent *and* destructive nature is closely related to the problem of the theodicy, namely how an almighty, omniscient and beneficent creator can allow for destruction, evil and suffering in history. Rousseau gives his own "proof" of such a god in the confession of the Savoyan vicar in the *Émile* (1762). It may be doubted, however, that the vicar really presents Rousseau´s position. But its main content – if not the form and the claim of a proof – can be confirmed by Rousseau's letters to Voltaire (1756) and Beaumont (1763).

In his *Confession of Faith* the vicar gives his commonsensical, antiacademic version of the cosmologial and physiotheological proofs of god´s existence. He criticizes the contemporary materialistic and deterministic conceptions with a traditional dualistic argument, namely that matter cannot move itself. His view of matter is mechanistic and in this respect Rousseau does not follow his mentor in the field of natural philosophy, Buffon.[6] Though he agrees in general with the classical conception of the great chain of beings, living beings do not belong to a higher level with its own sources and laws of motion. Instead he allows for only two ways of motion. Matter is by nature inert, it can be moved only from outside and finally from the only conceivable spontaneity, that of a will, be it the finite human or the infinite will of god, the first mover of the universe.

The laws, the order, and especially the purposive, teleological organization of the material world demands that the divine will is intelligent and loves order. Whether the generation of order is an act of

creation remains, according to this text, beyond man's understanding. In his letter to Beaumont Rousseau indicates that matter may be eternal and only set in motion by a spiritual god. What man *can* understand is the effect of God's will on the world, not God's essence in itself. Here again he comes close to Buffon, but remains a bit more cautious. While Buffon calls the vivifying power of nature divine, the vicar, instead, conceives of the divine motion rather like that of the deistic clockmaker who gives the first push to the pendulum.

In the letters, moreover, Rousseau doubts that we can know the perfection of nature without already presupposing a god with this attribute. The purposefulness of nature can be experienced and is a hint to the existence of such a god, but the real proof is the immediate feeling of the believer. Though Rousseau agrees with Leibniz that every evil in the world will in the end contribute to the perfection of the whole, he doubts whether this can be proved. Such a proof would require complete knowledge of nature and history which transcends the limits of the human mind.[7]

Despite these differences Rousseau agrees with the content of Leibnizian "optimism" at least with regard to nature. For the evil and suffering he suggests three different explanations: 1) First and above all, man himself is the origin of both the *malum morale* and the greatest part of the *malum physicum.* 2) There is a "contradiction" between the laws of "impermeable" matter and those of the sentient beings. This leads to unavoidable suffering on the level of bodily pain.[8] 3) The rest of the physical evil not explicable by these two arguments must be understood as a contribute to the best of the whole or cosmos.

The last argument presupposes the goodness of the whole, which according to Rousseau cannot be proved independent of the belief in god. Therefore it is of very limited value. Rousseau himself in his *Letter to Philopolis* argues against a universal "quietism" which may follow if everything is good because it contributes to a perfect universe. He refutes this consequence at least for the social world.[9] But he holds that all the disturbances in this world do not seriously touch the goodness of nature in general. To be sure, the cultural depravation of modern man destroys the natural balance *for him* – but not, as is assured in the "confession", for the universe. This order he cannot touch and even his preservation as a species is not seriously

endangered by his cultural self-alienation. Man may destroy his own happiness and morality, but he is bound by natural law to preserve his existence as a biological species.[10]

More interesting are the second and the first argument. However, in the second argument one has to replace the concept of contradiction, because a perfect world in the Leibnizian sense cannot contain any logical contradictions. And moreover, the argument that the negative consequences of this incongruity are compensated by the goodness of the whole is again based on an unproved presupposition.

As to the first point, one must distinguish different aspects. As to the moral evil, Rousseau follows the Leibnizian argument that freedom of the will is man's highest perfection and his utmost similarity to god, even if he abuses it. As to man's responsibility for the physical evil, Rousseau uses again different arguments: first, man's feelings, consciousness and imagination in his original state are so undeveloped, that he has very little consciousness of pain. For his cultural development which leads to this consciousness, he is himself at least partly responsible. Second, only the extension and refinement of his needs and wishes make him vulnerable for hardship and suffering. And third, in his process of civilization he loses the knowledge, the interest and the modesty to accommodate himself to the natural environment. Voltaire, as is well known, based his attack against the theodicy of Leibniz on the evidence of natural catastrophes like the earthquake of Lisbon. Rousseau counters that no one is forced to build seven-floor buildings in earthquake areas.

Although the argument has some plausibility especially in view of modern civilization – take for instance the big floods and forest fires of today which are at least partly caused by damages to the environment – one may doubt whether it can be carried through for all damage man suffers from natural events. And even if Rousseau were successful in blaming man as the sole source of his physical and moral evil, he would have to deal with the question, whether *animals and plants* can be damaged by natural events up to the degree of large scale extinction of species.

To be sure, for Rousseau as a substance dualist the "whole material universe" is of less value than "one thinking and feeling being" (*Letter to Voltaire*, *OCP IV*, 1067). But "sentient" includes at least higher animals. In a passage of the *Confession of Faith* Rousseau even argues,

that every "being in the universe" can in some respect be regarded as an end to which "all others" serve as means (*OCP IV*, 578). Besides this ambiguity regarding pathocentrism or physiocentrism, not every destruction of matter and life in natural history serves the interests of "higher" beings.

Rousseau's attempt to reconcile a concept of natural history influenced by chance, including accidents and catastrophes, with a perfect and beneficent nature, fails to be completely convincing. And the problem becomes even more complicated if one regards Rousseau's "metaphysical anthropology".

How does man fit into the natural teleological order? As an animal, he belongs to it and would be happy if he remained in his natural or animal state. Rousseau explicitly advises the surviving wild nations or groups to remain in, or go back to their uncivilized state.[11] On the other hand, the development of truly human faculties requires leaving this state. Among these faculties is the perfectibility of bodily and technical skills as well as the development of man's spiritual substance, his free will, his conscience, his spontaneous judgements and so on.

By his technical skills and his insight in the natural order and its divine origin he ranges far beyond the realm of the animals. He is indeed modeled after God's image – but by the mistakes of his god-like free will he has turned the human world into a chaos in the middle of the harmonious and balanced order of nature: "The animals are happy, only their king is miserable" (*Émile, OCP IV*, 583).

The indeterminacy of his free will and the contingency of natural processes has led man to leave his natural position. In a clearly negative sense he remarks to Beaumont that "our social order is in every respect against nature, which cannot be destroyed" and therefore "permanently demands its rights" against his "tyrant" (*OCP IV*, 966 f.). On the other hand, the *Emile* and the *Social Contract* characterize a true social order as unnatural and even against man's nature. This sounds like a radical split between natural and social, including moral and legal order. I will try to show in the next section that this is not the case: even the rational and artificial state of the *Social Contract* remains a part of the teleological universe.

But before leaving the *Émile* and the *Letters* I still have to clarify how man as a spiritual and moral being belongs to the normative concept of nature.

Following metaphysical dualism especially in his Cartesian form, Rousseau conceives of man as a "composed being" – composed of a physical and a spiritual substance.[12] He agrees with Plato and Descartes, that matter or the realm of extension is separated from spontaneity and spirituality by an ontological gap. On the other hand, he regards man's spiritual faculties as a gift of nature. Nature, then, is not only the material substance but comprises both substances. Since this concept includes the idea of a possible natural harmony between man's physical and spiritual nature, it certainly is a *normative* idea.

In the famous passages on conscience in the *Émile*, which had so much impact on philosophy and literature throughout the age of *"Empfindsamkeit"* and romanticism, Rousseau (or the vicar) argues for a perfect harmony between man's uncorrupted feelings and inclinations on the one hand, and conscience as his "moral instinct" on the other. Conscience as "the voice of the soul" (*OCP IV*, 594) and the "divine instinct" (600) perfects his nature and moralizes his actions (ibid.).

Since man consists of two substances, his self-concern has two objects, the intelligent and the sensitive being, each of which has a different sort of welfare.[13] The sensitive impulse longs for the well-being of the body, the intelligent impulse is the love of order aiming at the well-being of the soul. If it is developed, it is named conscience. Conscience, on the one hand, is a feeling prior to the use of reason which may distort it. But on the other hand it is more than natural compassion, it belongs to his spiritual substance. According to Rousseau conscience is neither a product of education nor of cultural influences. Against all sceptical arguments in favor of moral relativism – especially against Montaigne – he takes great pains to show that at bottom the concepts of human goodness – based on the voice of conscience – are the same in all cultures.

Conscience feels, loves and is aware of order. The love of order can, in Rousseau's view, be developed by observing and feeling the order of nature and its purposefulness. But the order of nature outside the human being and its society does not contain the model of the social order. Man's animal nature has not equipped him with special social impulses or faculties. Nevertheless, the goal of a true social order remains the harmony between man's physical and spir-

itual faculties. And it can be brought about only by men and women who are still in some basic congruence with their natural impulses, needs and interests.

Rousseau's conceptual classifications differ from the Post-Humean and Post-Kantian divisions dominant up to the present day: Conscience, freedom and moral action do not belong to a realm completely different from that of nature. To act according to one's conscience is to follow one's own nature and at the same time nature as a whole. There is one all-encompassing natural order to which man's immaterial substance belongs.

Rousseau's dualism is a transformation of Christian doctrines as well. In some respect, man's history is his fall and at the same time his perfection. His "redemption" requires to some extent a break of the human will with man's nature. But this has to be distinguished both from the Biblical dogma of the fall or the original sin *and* from the Platonic dualism and his Gnostic and Christian successors. From the Biblical dogma, since it is not nature which is corrupted, neither man's inner nature nor the creation as a whole. Nature remains a perfect order and it has stopped to be a paradise only for human beings.

To which extent the social redemption in a rational state belongs to the order of nature or breaks with it must be discussed by turning to the *Social Contract.*

V

Rousseau's concept of nature and morality as exposed in the *Second Discourse*, the *Confession of the Savoyan Vicar* in the *Émile* and in his letters to Voltaire and Beaumont are based on a teleological concept of nature and a "natural" view of morality and religion. "Natural" not in the sense, that morality and religion are properties of natural man, the *homme sauvage*. Instead, they are a product of culture, developing man's intellectual and emotional faculties. But conscience and natural religion are independent of cultural differences and rooted in man´s essence and his unspoiled faculties. In developing and exercising these faculties man remains in harmony with himself and nature, he loves the order designed by his creator.

However, man is by his original condition a solitary being and concerned only for himself. In his cultural development he loses this condition and his natural independence. He becomes a social being dependent on his fellow beings for satisfying his natural and cultural needs and wishes. This sociality normally remains on the surface: by fulfilling his social functions he still tries to serve his own interests.[14] This hidden self-interest becomes the source of the social system of competition and mutual domination which deprives man of his identity and harmony.

The *Émile* designs two ways out of this dilemma: either to live as much in distance and independence from society as possible, or to give up man's individualistic nature. The necessary condition for the first way is the "natural" education which is the main subject of this book. The other way demands social institutions and an institutional education which is directed against this self-centered nature of man. In the opening pages of the *Émile* Rousseau marks this opposition as radical as possible: "The good social institutions are those which know best how to denaturalize man, to take away his absolute existence for himself in order to give him a relative one and to transport the I into a common unity."[15]

Regarding man's solitary and self-centered nature, the social institutions, the laws and morals of a good state are anti-natural. The *Social Contract*, Rousseau's conception of a "good" state in which civilized man can maintain his freedom and regain a form of authentic existence, follows this device. Thus it seems that nature has lost all normative significance for man as a social and moral being. This interpretation is, indeed, well-spread among Rousseau scholars.[16]

Nevertheless, I think it is at least one-sided. My thesis is, that the social order of the *Social Contract* is anti-natural only in two respects: it is directed firstly against man's natural "individualism" and secondly against the "second nature" of his egoistic habits in most developed societies. But the normative conception of nature which Rousseau exposed in his writings discussed above, remains valid in two respects: firstly, the anti-individualistic social community remains part of an all-encompassing nature of a purposive and teleological character; and secondly the essence and final end of man's nature remains a life of harmony between his corporal, emotional and intellectual faculties. Together with just laws conscience remains the di-

recting instance for actions leading to that goal. And conscience belongs to man's true nature.

As to the "denaturalizing" of man, Rousseau states it in his famous chapter on the legislator in almost the same words as in the *Émile*. The legislator has "so to speak" (*pour ainsi dire*) to change man's nature in order to establish the artificial unity of a people. By nature man as an individual is a solitary and perfect whole (*"tout parfait et solitaire" OCP III*, 381). His independent physical existence, which he "received from nature" must be replaced by a "partial and moral existence" within the political body. By entering this "moral existence" he exchanges his "natural freedom", which is only limited by his physical forces, against his "civil freedom" guaranteed by the laws. These laws are not the laws of nature, they are created by acts of the general will, and in this sense "artificial".

The concepts of "nature" and "natural" which Rousseau uses in these passages are in general related to the "state of nature" in opposition to the civil state. This state has to be overcome like in Hobbes' or Spinoza's political philosophies (*exeundum e statu naturae*). In the *Social Contract* it does not serve as a model for man's culture – especially since man in his development has already reached a stage of mutual dependence and domination. The concept of nature in the sense of physis or essence is only touched in one respect: regarding the solitary nature of man. As a social and political being, above all as living in a just social order, man is an artificial creation. But even this creation is in line with the perfection outlined in his teleological nature or essence. His faculties develop, his sentiments are ennobled and his soul rises, as Rousseau formulates in the first chapter (section 8) of the *Social Contract*, according to a measure inherent in both his physical and spiritual substance. Man as a social being is no arbitrary creation.

That this development is not against the purposive order of nature in general and not against or independent of man's inner nature is proved by the frequency with which Rousseau uses the concepts nature and natural for the rules and rights within the artificial political body. They are not "natural" in the sense that they could be found outside this order. But they have to be "natural" in the sense of corresponding to man's nature and the purposes of the creator. In this sense he can maintain that man although not social in his "natural state" is "created for society" (*Letter to Beaumont, OCP IV*, 969).

Rousseau is no advocate of a legal positivism or a procedural justice according to which every law is just if legislated in "due process" and with the consent of the majority. Just laws have their limits in the rights and the welfare of the citizens and the autonomy of the republic. To be sure, in order to defend the life and the autonomy of the republic, the general will can oblige the citizen to offer his life. In this respect, his life is no more "only a benefit of nature but a conditional gift of the state" (*OCP III*, 376). But at the same time the state has to defend *every* citizen's life, property and welfare with equal force – and Rousseau calls this a "natural right" of citizens as human beings (373).

I cannot go into the details of the debate about the liberalism or totalitarianism of the *Social Contract*. My aim is only to argue that its "anti-naturalism" is limited to the original individualism and to the egoism of human beings in "normal" societies. This egoism is natural in that it is supported by man's self-concern, his *amour de soi*. But as *amour propre* it is already a perversion of his harmless natural instincts. The change of nature, which the rational community of the *Social Contract* has to bring about, is a paradoxical way of de-naturalizing man in order to realize his true nature. The aim of this perfection is still the harmony between the faculties of man's two substances, his uncorrupted physical nature and the spiritual substance of his will, his sentiments and his intelligence. Given the stage of cultural development he can reach this aim only as a particle of the spiritual substance of the general will.

In this stage his moral duties are not simply found by his conscience. They are laid down in the laws of his community. The "voice of duty" (364) is the command to obey the law. This obligation can and must be legally enforced by the state. But this does not mean that "the essence of politics (and morality) in Rousseau's view, is force".[17] Rather, the common sense judgement of every citizen must be able to find and to obey the laws expressing and serving the public good. Given a good moral education, an equal distribution of property and no opportunities for the formation of factions, the citizens of small communities – or the "peasants gathered under an oak tree" (*OCP III*, 437) like in a Swiss canton – can rule a country by just laws.

The voice which each one has to listen to in questions of law-giving is his unspoiled individual judgement which will tell him "what

everybody had been feeling all along" (ibid.). The inner voice which loves order and general rules is nothing other than – in the terms of the *Émile* – conscience. And this voice rather than a forced subordination also tells him to obey the existing laws – as long as neither his own nor the general will are corrupted. In this respect the moral guidance within a good state is nothing else but conscience. And conscience also remains a divine voice of nature (cf. *Émile OCP IV*, 597). This is why in a republic according to the rules of the *Social Contract* the sentence *"vox populi vox dei"* is valid.

In my view, even the ominous concluding chapter on the civil religion fits with the *Confession of the Savoyan vicar*. The civil religion which Rousseau considers necessary for a rational republic is limited to the belief in god and a future life and to the "negative dogma" condemning religious intolerance. The divine attributes are the same as those formulated by the Savoyan vicar. This civil religion allows for the vicar's true natural religion and prevents any exclusive claims for dogmas and priests. At the same time, however, it overcomes the political neutrality of undogmatic Christianity by engaging the citizens for the laws and the defense of their country. This guarantee of the holiness of the social contract and the legal order is, of course, the primary function of the civil religion.

Again, I am not pretending to discuss all the ambiguities and possible abuses of the rules and institutions formulated in the *Social Contract.* But I do not consider this "artificial state" as irreconcilable with Rousseau's normative idea of nature as expressed in his writings discussed above. This becomes clear if one distinguishes between the different meanings of nature which Rousseau employs: nature as the original state of man, nature as his already culturally determined physical habits and emotional passions, the state of nature (*status naturalis*) outside the artificial civil state (*status civilis*), the essence (*physis, telos*) of man – and the order of nature independent of his will.

VII

In what sense, then, is nature the origin of moral and legal norms for Rousseau? Not in the sense, that the teleological order of the surrounding nature could be copied by man. The order of the rational

will, which Rousseau characterizes in the *Social Contract*, and the virtues which he describes in the *Nouvelle Héloise* and in other texts, are in no way an imitation of any model in the realm of non-human creatures. Man is far above these beings in the order of nature and of God´s will.

Neither is man's own state of nature such a model – at least not in his first, completely undeveloped stage. In this state man lacks all cognitive faculties required for intentional action according to the voice of his conscience. The development of his social existence is a precondition for human virtues and just laws (cf. *Letter to Beaumont*).

On the other hand, Rousseau's concept of nature is not that of a neutral realm of facts and laws determining causally connected chains of events. Even less does he conceive of man as projecting his wishes and values on a value-free nature or "reality". There *is* a natural order figuring as the source of values and as a norm for human action. It has two aspects: first, the order of the external nature, which cannot be disturbed by revolutions and catastrophes in the history of the earth. And second the development of man´s faculties and inclinations, both sensitive and spiritual, which can be harmonious. Rousseau's picture is that of a parallel between uncorrupted natural inclinations and moral judgements of conscience.

But in fact, this harmony has been lost. The history of mankind has been a process both of self-perfection and of self-corruption and denaturation. As is well known, Rousseau is very ambivalent as to a possible redemption. In the *Social Contract* he advocates a total reversal of man's perverted mental and social order. It requires the almost supernatural forces of a quasi-divine legislator and a conversion of man's soul by the "baptism" of the contract, which generates the "state of grace" of the general will.

In the *Émile* and other writings the possibility remains open, that some individuals and some nations – like the Corsicans or the citizens of Geneva – can be kept on the way of natural development and protected against total cultural corruption.

However that may be, Rousseau's concept of nature obviously crosses the traditional and the modern lines: it combines monistic and dualistic conceptions, mechanistic concepts of matter – as in

itself motionless – and the idea of a purposive order of nature in general. It is evaluative in assigning to nature the highest attributes of goodness and order. And it includes man's moral faculties, not only self-concern and compassion, but also conscience. But it does not conceive of non-human nature as a model for man's behavior. And there is no law of nature which could serve as the basis for the laws of a just society.

In modern debates in the field of metaethics, virtue ethics and bioethics some have argued for an evaluative conception of nature, too. The dualism between a value-free conception of nature and a moral world of rational beings has been questioned. A concept of nature as it appears to sentient and evaluative beings has been defended by moral realists like John McDowell.[18] In bioethics many have argued for a polycentric view which allows to regard living beings on grounds of their purposive organization as "ends in themselves".[19] I think that even the pre-modern idea of the *"scala naturae"* deserves some cautious transformations.[20] We can regard the manifold cosmos of species and individuals being able to develop and to flourish not as a given order of nature but a goal of man´s interaction with nature.

In this respect, at least some traces of Rousseau's concept of nature may figure as a model for transformations of the traditional normative idea of nature in pre-modern teleology. Beyond Rousseau, substance dualism and the concept of nature as conceived by a divine intelligence may be given up without reducing nature to a value-free "battlefield" for the arbitrary interests of autonomous individuals.

In order to justify (or criticize) the international conventions for the protection of the environment, the manifold of species and of forms of organic and inorganic nature, two ways of argumentation are open. The first is to start from man's rights, interests and wishes – in that case, the protection of nature depends on a temporary political consensus of interests of human beings, be it for reasons of survival, wellbeing or aesthetic values. The second way is to learn from traditional concepts of nature as a well-ordered cosmos including a scale from the most simple to the most complex and organized beings, the *"scala naturae"*. However, this conception cannot serve as a theoretical explanation of natural processes or natural order any

more. Moreover, this order does not exist as a fact or even a necessity, as it was conceived by traditional metaphysics. But if we can defend and develop an evaluative conception of nature, we might argue that some sort of "cosmos" is a possible and to some extent already realized goal for man's action.

Human beings, to a higher degree than other animals, are constantly changing their environment – with ever growing consequences for the earth as a whole. Modern biotechnology, especially genetic engineering, is a new step in this process which opens the possibility to fit nature more and more to all sorts of human wishes. In my view, the ethics of personal rights and interpersonal cooperation cannot afford us with sufficient moral standards or directions regarding man's biotechnical possibilities. Even less can the sciences themselves answer theses normative questions. We need a normative idea of nature and we can go back to our everyday evaluations of natural beings and processes in order to develop it. We can also profit from the different evaluative concepts of nature imbedded in our cultural discourses. It is an important task of contemporary philosophy to clarify and discuss them. In this attempt we can learn from ideas of nature which go beyond the typical fact-value split like the one Rousseau develops in his writings.

Notes

1 A first version of this paper was presented at a meeting of the European Science Foundation on *The unity of nature in the 18th century*, organized by K.-M. Meyer-Abich in Essen (July 1998). I am grateful to the participants for discussions.

2 I. Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, § 14 (Kants *Werke*, Akademie Textausgabe, Berlin 1968, Bd IV, S. 294).

3 I am grateful to Michael Quante for useful suggestions regarding this section of my paper.

4 Cf. P.M. Masson: *La religion des Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Paris 1916, Reprint Geneva 1970, p. 259ff. (especially 267) and G. R. Hocke, *Lukrez in Frankreich*. Köln 1935, p. 175f.

5 Cf. R. Lenoble: L'Évolution de l'Idée de "Nature" du XVI au XVIII Siècle. *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale*, vol. 58. 1953, p. 108-129.

6 Cf. G. Gusdorf: *Dieu, La Nature, L'Homme au Siècle des Lumières.* Paris 1972. For Gusdorf, "le matérialisme du XVIIIe siècle est un vitalisme" (p. 12, 325ff.); cf. also M. Beretta: *The impact of Lucretius'* De rerum natura *on 18th century science* (paper presented to the ESF meeting, see above FN 1) p.14.

7 Letter to Voltaire (18. 8. 1756), In *Oeuvres Complètes de J.J. Rousseau.* Ed. sous la direction de B. Gagnebin et M. Raymond, Bibiothèque de la Pléiade, vol. IV, Paris 1969, p.1068 (In the following text I abbreviate the "*Oeuvres*" as *OCP*)

8 Letter to Voltaire, *OCP IV* 1061

9 Letter to Philopolis, *OCP III*, 234

10 "Le mal que l'homme fait retombe sur lui, sans rien changer au systeme du monde, sans empecher que l'espèce humaine ne se conserve malgré qu'elle en ait." Rousseau: *Èmile OCP IV*, 587.

11 "Back to nature" is Rousseau's advice solely for the part of humanity still close to its "wild" origins.

12 Regarding the Cartesianism of the *Confession* cf. H. Gouhier, Ce que le Vicaire doit à Descartes. In *Annales J.J. Rousseau*, vol. XXXV, 1959-62, S. 140-160.

13 *Letter to Christoph de Beaumont OCP IV*, 936, cf. *Émile OCP IV*, 595

14 In the first version of the *Émile* (the "Manuscript Favre") Rousseau writes: "Tous ce que nous faisons semble se rapporter aux autres et se rapporte toujours à nous" (OCP IV, 57).

15 "Les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme, lui ôter son existence absolue pour lui donner une relative, et transporter le moi dans l'unité commune." (OCP IV, 249).

16 For discussions of this point I am grateful to Jean-Fabien Spitz who presented a paper on *Political Naturalism in XVIIIth Century France: D´Holbach vs. Rousseau* at the ESF meeting mentioned above (FN 1). Spitz argues for the "artificialism" of the political order in the *Contrat Social*.

17 A. Melzer: *The Natural Goodness of Man. On the system of Rousseaus´s Thought.* Chicago 1990, p. 96.

18 J. McDowell: *Mind and World.* Cambridge: Mass. and London (Harvard UP)1996; McDowell: *Mind, Value and Reality.* Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard UP 1998.

19 For instance P. Taylor: *Respect for Nature.* Princeton 1986.

20 Cf. L. Siep: Eine Skizze zur Grundlegung der Bioethik. *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,* Bd. 50, H.1/2, 1996. p. 236-253; and Siep, Bioethik. In A. Pieper, U. Thurnherr (eds.): *Angewandte Ethik. Eine Einführung.* München 1998, p. 16-36

Markku Mäki

MODES OF RECIPROCITY IN ROUSSEAU'S THINKING

Introduction

On Recognition in Hegel's Philosophy of Right

In this article I will attempt to study the thematic field in Rousseau's thinking associated with Hegel's concept of recognition (Anerkennung). I shall be rather brief with the Hegelian background. As concerns Rousseau, I can in general take only his most central works, the *Essay on inequality*, *Émile* and *Social Contract*, into consideration.

The concept of recognition is found in *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* in a seemingly modest role. One mention is in remark to § 57 and another in § 192. The latter is from the section *System of needs*. This is in turn a subsection of *Civil Society*[1] which can, among other things, be read as Hegel's main account of modern society. The most central issue in the *Philosophy of Right* is the contribution (*PR* § 187, 194) and the insufficiency (*PR* §,195) of civil society in realising freedom, the essence of right (*PR* § 4). That insufficiency implies the necessity of the state both as that realisation (*PR* § 256) and as an instance controlling the functioning of that society.

§ 192 claims that both the needs and the means of satisfying them belong to a system of mutual dependence between the agents of civil

society. Since this dependence is the effect of an ever-intensifying division of labour, the needs and the means will have *abstraction* as their basic quality. This abstraction means increasing distance from the way of life where an actual need of an agent, the means of satisfying it and satisfaction itself do not fall apart in the temporary perspective of that agent. Even the needs themselves will have that quality of abstraction and become divided (*PR* § 191).

The abstraction also means *universality*. Every agent has to get his manner of proceeding into congruence with the others, which is possible only by assuming *universal* manner of proceeding. Thus the abstraction is a quality of the mutual relationships of the agents within the system. Both the theoretical and practical culture (*Bildung*) of modernity are based on this feature of labour (*PR* § 197).

The *form of universality* is the *second* of the two principles of civil society. The *first* is *the concrete person,* the egocentric agency of civil society, "bourgeois" in a pejorative meaning (*PR* § 182). According to Hegel this agency would destroy the ground of its own existence if left on its own (*PR* § 185). In part this fault indicates the state. But even from the point of view of civil society that agency is controlled by the form of universality. As an inner force of civil society, this determines certain conditions for the concrete person. If an agent does not respect them he in general will not prosper.

Universality has the more specific meaning of *recognition* (*Anerkanntsein*[2]) through which the agent, his needs, his ways of action and satisfaction, are accepted in the system (*PR* § 192). Recognition has to be conceived as the most central characteristic of *any* modern institution, or rather, as the very institutionality of modernity.

The mention in remark to § 57 has even more far-reaching implications.[3] Recognition turns out to be the very basis of right because it is a basis of freedom, which as free will in turn is a basis of right (cf. *PR* § 6, 7).

> The position of the free will, with which right ... begins, is already in advance of the false position at which man, as a natural entity and only the concept implicit, is for that reason capable of being enslaved ... The dialectic of the concept and of the purely immediate consciousness of freedom brings about at that point the fight for recognition and the relationship of master and slave. But that objective mind, the content of

right, should no longer be apprehended in its subjective concept alone, and consequently that man's absolute unfitness for slavery should no longer be apprehended as a mere "ought to be", is something which does not come home to our minds until we recognise that the Idea of freedom is genuinely actual only as the state (Knox, 48).

Thus recognition is an important background to Hegel's concepts of freedom and right. Furthermore, it is constitutive to Hegel's concept of *self-consciousness*. The concept of recognition is thus a basis of unity of the theoretical and practical perspectives in Hegel's philosophy. Moreover, for Hegel the concept of recognition is basic to his teleology (cf. Williams, 309ff, 318ff). The latter in turn makes it possible for Hegel to use and rehabilitate much from the conceptual fund of Plato and Aristotle.

I give here only one or two of the most important features concerning the concept of recognition in the phenomenology of subjective spirit[4]. *Firstly*, the concepts of universality and reason are constituted by the completed process of recognition[5]. *Secondly*, both the "theoretical" concept of self-consciousness (reason, universality) and the "practical" concept of freedom are constituted in the process of recognition by *otherness,* the bearer of which will be recognised at the same time and in a structurally identical way (basis of universality)[6].

Thirdly, the complete process of recognition involves its opposite, the relationship of master and slave which is a process of alienation, losing of one's self, of the slave as well. In this process, however, the *labour of the slave* for the master turns the tables because through this very labour of the slave's universality arises[7]. Therefore the slave is after all the active part of the process of recognition and the master the passive, or adapting part.

From the systematic point of view of Hegel's philosophy, it is unfortunate that the undoubtedly important theme of the master and slave has so much dominated the discussions. Even after the pioneering works of Ludwig Siep concerning the concept of recognition in Hegel's Jena writings, the significance of this latter concept for Hegel's system and especially for his *Philosophy of Right* has not been given the consideration it deserves[8].

Recognition does not cancel the individuality of the other or of myself[9]. What it means is that any *authentic* individuality is not so

much constituted by protecting one's alleged "original" (innate etc.) treasures against "foreign", e. g. societal influences (cf. § 6, 7) than by transforming the stimuli received from others into authentic parts of one's own individuality.

Rousseau and Hegel

Hegel's relationship to Rousseau is complex. On the one hand he respected Rousseau as a pioneer in issues 1) and 2) on the list below. On the other hand he had reasons to be critical of Rousseau's political philosophy. Quite evidently his distance was partly motivated by the fact that Rousseau was an important source of inspiration to such men as Saint-Juste.[10]

There is an impressive amount of essential congruencies between the political philosophies of Rousseau and Hegel. I list some of the most significant ones:

1) The *Philosophy of Right* and *Social Contract* are both theories of a normative legitimacy.

2) a) The highest criterion of political legitimacy is the same, i.e. freedom. b) Freedom is of the same type for both, it implies e. g. strictly[11] autonomy and the concept of freedom *contains* the concept of law. c) For both the political version of freedom is substantially and terminologically the same, i.e. the *general will.*

3) Both *criticise* modern society from very similar points of view. For both theories of modern society are at the same time closely parallel analyses of the modern subject. For both these parallel analyses determine the critical problem which the politics has to solve as its essential task.

4) Although the question of freedom remains primary, both are at pains to stress the first rate significance of the problem of common good for the question of legitimacy. For both the common good should do justice to everyone's particular interests, on condition, of course, that such an interest would not contradict with the general will.

5) Political society is not an instrument, compromise or resultant of particular wills or interests. They have an identity of their own[12]. For both the general will is represented as a direction of will of an

individual to an extent that the latter can be called a *citizen*. The will expressing individual or particular interests is one's *"bourgeois"* will which is likely sooner or later to contradict with the general will.

6) The themes of freedom and of the common good (in accordance with the former) revive the conception of the classical eudaimonia (Plato, Aristotle) in Rousseau's and Hegel's political theory. True enough, in the modern variation reason is replaced by freedom. But since Rousseau's and Hegel's freedom is of the strictly autonomous kind, e. g. constituted by commitment to laws, it necessarily implies universality and reason. For Rousseau this connection is natural and operational, while for Hegel it is fully thematic and systematic.

In Rousseau the autonomous freedom is identical with morality. Cassirer can therefore describe his view as follows:

> For him the goodness of man ... is not grounded in some instinctive inclination of sympathy but in man's capacity of self-determination ... Thus it is not by allowing our instincts to flow freely but by restraining and mastering them that we can secure the highest happiness – the happiness of the free personality.[13]

Cassirer reveals at the same time the common motivation suggesting autonomy as a basic concept quality of freedom. It is indeed the intuition that only creatures possessing personality can be called free.

Modern Subject and Its Conditions

The Essay on Inequality (1756)

The full story of recognition involves an original standpoint of *failed* or *rejected* recognition, such as the dialectic of master and slave in Hegel. From the point of view of Rousseau's *Essay on Inequality*, the fulfilment of recognition seems hardly possible in a modern society. The developing monetary system is likely to destroy its necessary conditions.

Domination and subjection, the relationship of "master" and "slave", is a central theme in the *Essay*. The intensification of this rela-

tionship is connected with the intensification of the division of labour towards and in the monetary economy.[14] Rousseau regards it as evident that the mental dispositions of master and slave have one and the same essence[15]. This one basic structure corresponds in every respect to the social structure of the monetary economy.

The failing encounter in respect to self-consciousness can be described as *alienation*[16]. The "bourgeois" has only himself in his mind in his material relations with others, but when he evaluates himself he only tries to anticipate others' opinions. Rousseau does not describe modern man as a creature favourably tempered by the looks of others as does Adam Smith, but as a being-outside-of-itself whose identity tends to lose more and more its authentically distinctive traits. There is no significant difference between a Londoner and a Parisian for him.

A being-outside-of-itself is for Rousseau an aggravation of an originally innocuous human trait. As soon as some coexistence arises between human beings they begin to *compare* things with other things and themselves with their neighbours. This is a first innocent stepping out by the human beings from their absolute oneness of *amour de soi-même* and the beginning of their turn into *relative* beings with *relative* passions of amour propre. Again, the intensification of the division of labour carries the development further and in the monetary economy alienation grows into a full pathology.

In a note to the *Essay on Inequality,* Rousseau says:

> "*Amour propre* and *amour de soi-même* ... are very different passions ... *Amour de soi-même* is a natural sentiment bringing every animal to care for its own preservation and which, guided in man by reason and softened by pity, brings about humanity and virtue. Amour propre is only a relative and artificial sentiment born in society and leading each individual to place greater value on himself than on anyone else. This brings about all the evils that men do to each other ..." (*PIII*, 219; cf. *R&B*, 27)

In *Émile* (1762) he remarks that amour de soi-même is satisfied if the *true* needs are satisfied, but that amour propre which "*compares*" is never satisfied. This is because it demands everyone to affirm that every other is better than everyone else, which is obviously impossible (*PIV*, 493). In his dialogue *Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques* (1776), he

says that the original passions principled by amour de soi-même directly concern our happiness and its immediate objects. The development from this paradise towards more and more corrupted amour propre involves substituting for these immediate objects the obstacles between needs and satisfaction, e.g. the development of arts and division of labour. "Its delights are purely negative and it seeks not so much our own welfare than to satisfy itself with seeing the others to miss their luck" (*PI*, 669). This development changes passions not only into relative, but into hostile passions as well.

Fetscher interprets[17] the above passages as follows. With amour propre arises a new psychic need, recognition, a need to have assurance of one's own identity or self-esteem. Since in the modern condition the self is ever more uncertain of it, one is dependent in this respect on one's fellow beings.

At the same time the development of wealth, or what amounts to the same, *domination,* over others intensifies. The desire for wealth and the desire for might are both *insatiable.* Thus the modern condition produces personalities which, at least by disposition, would like to have anything there is as their property and to be at the same time absolute rulers, e. g. they would like to be recognised by all the others as their superior[18].

Whatever one succeeds in realising such an aim, even in a relative manner, is deemed to remain mere illusion. To see around oneself only misery, wretched people and slaves, amounts to being preferred to nothings *by nothings.* Towards the end of book four of *Émile* Rousseau says: "The rich want to be master everywhere, but he feels good only there where he is not. He always has to flee himself" (*PIV*, 690). Here Rousseau describes himself as an "other", as an imaginary kind of rich man, who understands that enjoyments are real enjoyments only when shared with others on an equal basis.

The real fulfilment of recognition, therefore, transcends the modern cultural condition. But it is interesting to note, as Fetscher's interpretation shows, that Rousseau has intertwined both aspects of failed recognition, alienated self-consciousness and the master-slave-relation in one and the same corrupt process[19]. As indicated in the first section of this article, Hegel did the same for the positive counterparts in his process of recognition (Hegel 10, § 430, p. 219).

Since the above quotations are from very different periods of time, it may seem that Rousseau's thoughts about relative passions were fixed very early. We shall see in the next section that this is really not the case. The *Essay*, to be sure, maintains its negative stand towards relative passions throughout, but even it displays on taking a closer look some indication of their future reappraisal: the favourable assessments of natural man or of savages are paralleled with an anthropological and moral conception based on traits which belong to a rather sophisticated societal condition of man, *rationality, morality and truthfulness.*

The bond of civil society is now *holy* for him, as it is in *Social Contract*[20]. Thus one may say that the human being is after all not that which natural man is made out to be in the beginning of the essay[21]. Rather it is this being tied to the holy bond of society capable of much more than natural man, of rationality and irrationality, of truth and lie, but above all, of morality and immorality. Therefore the train of argument is not in fact *projective* but rather *reconstructive.*

This is confirmed to certain extent by what Rousseau says about the revolutionary transitions from one way of life to another in the development of humanity[22]. One can say that the former way of life develops (at least) *necessary* conditions for transition to the next but that at least some of the *sufficient* conditions are radically contingent in relation to systematic explication. I would like to say that the train of thought in the Essay is in fact *teleological* in that (in my view) proper sense in which it is purified from any connotation of causal determinism.

Émile

I regard the *Essay on Inequality* and *Émile* above all else as two complementary versions of Rousseau's *anthropology*. The *Essay* describes a "conjectural" genesis beginning with the man of nature, but its real purpose is to throw light on the condition of modern man. *Émile* outlines a fictional genesis of a man brought up outside the corrupting condition of modern urbanity. It might be possible to transpose the reconstruction of the process of materialisation of the mod-

ern condition described in the *Essay*, into the conduct and character of the modern man, as an alternative to Émile's story.

The most general aim *Émile* sets for upbringing is *naturalness,* which can be described quite precisely by means of the antique word *autarchy,* although, to my knowledge, Rousseau did not use the word. Natural man can be said to have this trait only trivially, as a necessity of his way of life. For civilised man, on the contrary, it is either an achievement or an ideal norm with which one has to comply, struggling in general against the conditions of life. *Naturalness* is hardly a proper constituent of the common essence of natural and modern man, if there is such a thing at all.

There is as such nothing wrong in the common practice of calling Émile's education *negative.* Thus as a rule Émile is allowed to proceed in concrete situations without any compulsion by his tutor. But the latter does not let these situations arise casually. Due to of the favourable condition of rural life and manipulations of the tutor Émile's world is very much planned in advance. The tutor keeps Émile's human relationships as far as possible on the level of (frugal) needs, things, possessions, safety, utility and preventing as far as possible further ethical and personal concerns. If possible, Émile should avoid even paying attention to all stronger passions of mutual intercourse.

To understand these principles one has only to remind oneself about Rousseau's assessment of the modern condition as a background for education to autarchy and liberty. It compels a child to meet impulses, objects and sentiments which he or she has no proper powers to deal with before the maturing of his or her reason. In this way it alienates and suppresses both the body and the mind of the child.

Rousseau wants to circumvent, as far as possible, all relationships involving the *contest of will,* because he thinks that just such contacts probably give rise to personal structures of dominion and subjection[23]. Secondly, Rousseau wishes that Émile would already be able to use his own autonomous reason in both moral and religious matters before having anything to do with them. He believes that moral reason reaches its maturity approximately as his sexuality begins to tell. This is convenient enough as sexuality is Émile's first strong passion impossible to circumvent because of its inner origin. Thus Émile's education respects his right to articulate the world from the point of view of his

own developing self-consciousness and the powers it has at each particular time. It is therefore education to autarchy and freedom.

But really remarkable is the *point of reflection* in Émile's upbringing. As indicated above, Émile's sexuality and his self-conscious reason are maturing at the same approximate time. This implies a radical change, a *crisis*. Hitherto Émile's tutor has controlled his education by exploiting his ignorance. Now it is both *necessary* (sexuality) and *possible* (autonomy) that Émile should himself take full responsibility for the conduct of his life and do so in the light of his own knowledge. At that point of reflection the tutor lets Émile to take a retrospective look at the past. The whole previous network of manipulation will be made totally transparent.

We may conclude that Émile's story is based on fully equal or symmetrical recognition. Its major difference to Hegel's conception of recognition is that it involves no element of struggle, as the contest of wills is explicitly eliminated. Can we explain this difference entirely by the fact that Hegel viewed the process of recognition as historical, involving a stylised genesis of the modern world through labour? For him the struggle belonged mainly to the past and its results were firmly ingrained the modern society.

Rousseau saw the modern condition as an on-going struggle between the mighty and rich against the weak and poor. He could see nothing positive in that struggle. Besides, even universality which Hegel considers as a great gain from the struggle, is in Rousseau's view for the most part just an impoverishing process of homogenisation. There is nothing but danger for the process of education in the modern condition.

According to Hegel civil society is a "tremendous power which draws men into itself"[24]. Thus, a member of the "bourgeois" estate proper (*Stand des Gewerbes*) is wrenched from the nest of the family and "thrown back to itself"[25]. It seems likely that this creature, being spirit itself, must therefore reproduce on a smaller scale something of the historical struggle of the modern spirit where he, like it, "has so overcome the antithesis that it maintains itself in it and integrates it in itself"[26].

Recognition on the basis of the civil society is for Hegel, too, far from easily guaranteed. In fact the concession Hegel makes to Rousseau concerning the bourgeois is remarkable:

"Unless he is a member of an authorised corporation ... an individual is without rank or dignity, his isolation reduces his business to mere self-love ... Consequently, he has to gain recognition for himself by giving external proofs of success in his business, and to these proofs no limit can be set" (*PR* § 253, remark, Knox, 153ff; translation slightly amended).

On the one hand Rousseau is not aware of the struggle won, but on the other hand the struggle won is not sufficient as such but has to be reinforced by special institutions, such as corporation and state. Notwithstanding, there is a fair question to be asked of Rousseau, from Hegel's perspective: does not the self-consciousness of a spiritual creature lack something important if he lacks the *struggle* for recognition?

The oddest idea in Émile's education is surely the suspension of moral upbringing up to the point of reflection. It loses a little of its oddity when we take into account that the word "moral" means here full autonomous practical self-consciousness and moral responsibility. Rousseau makes it clear that there has to be *some* concern for Émile's conduct much earlier. He gives us in *Émile* a very illuminating lesson about this (*PIV*, 329ff). Through a highly contrived incident Émile has to learn to respect *reciprocity* in relationships with other persons.

The substance of the lesson is property or rather, in this case, possession. Émile learns that his claims to it will be respected to the same extent he himself respects the ownership of others. Rousseau takes property to be a category of right and freedom. Elsewhere he holds that property is politically in the first place not a means of living but a foothold of freedom (*PIII*, 262; R&B, 75).

Before the "point of reflection" the tutor extends by and by his Émile's perspective of society to comprise the division of labour and even money as the "true nexus" of the latter and of society in general. But even then the perspective remains in the confines of utility, not taking into account such ethical considerations as patriotic love let alone morality in the strict sense mentioned above. Considerations of morality, religion and the fundamental principles of *Social Contract* are pushed beyond the "point of reflection". Roughly speaking, *Émile* remains in the confines of "abstract right" before the point of reflection and only thereafter has to confront issues of "ethicality" (*Sittlichkeit*), using Hegel's terminology.

Rousseau analyses reciprocity in greater detail. He considers the promises of a child and agreements (contracts) with a child. These categories can in principle be applied advantageously as soon as the child really understands their meanings and "has a relevant kind of future". Furthermore, Rousseau mentions the reciprocity of services as a favourable instrument in the education of the child, having the effect that the child comes to regard himself as "something". But he also has a more sceptical remark: "something" might begin to play a domineering role in the life of the child. This would leave the door ajar for relative and egocentric emotions, e. g. amour propre (*PIV*, 421)

Earlier Rousseau had said: "now we have entered the field of virtues and the door is open to vice as well" (*PIV*, 334ff). To my mind, this tension or ambiguity is typical of Rousseau. The positive and the negative are intertwined under the modern condition in an incurable way. But how could the situation be otherwise? Is not virtue for Rousseau, as it is for Kant, not so much right conduct but the praiseworthy overcoming of vice, the more praiseworthy or virtuous the mightier the real temptation was? Modern man is thus *to the extent* morally virtuous, truthful or rational as he also has developed evil, deceitful and irrational dispositions. According to Rousseau, none of those correlative contraries can be applied to natural man or savages. And they apply to barbarians in a much weaker sense than to modern people.

I already noted that in the *Essay on Inequality* Rousseau's opinion about modern society was not merely negative. In *Social Contract* he says:

> "Although in this state he denies himself several of the advantages he owes to nature, he gains others so great - his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are extended, his feelings are ennobled, his whole soul is so uplifted - that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him beneath the condition from which he emerged, he would constantly have to bless the happy moment that tore him away from it forever, and made a stupid and shortsighted animal into an intelligent being and a man " (*PIII*, 364; R&B, 95).

Here the advantages are stressed and corruption made into a subordinate clause, but this is for the most part due to the political aim

of *Social Contract.* As in the *Essay* and in *Émile,* the underlying view is *tragic:* what is holy in the fundamental human constitution, and hence holy as a possibility of man, is incurably intertwined with an equal or likely possibility of the deepest evil and corruption.

In my view, Rousseau is also in two minds about the modern condition. The assessment of it implies a question which is significant both to Rousseau and to Hegel: what kind of *political solution,* if any, is possible to this corruptible modern condition? For both this question concerns political legitimacy, right and freedom.

For Hegel the constitutions of modern reason, self-consciousness, society etc. all have, in his view, recognition as their substantial constituent. As we have seen, however, for him the reality of recognition was still unaccomplished on most levels, especially on the political one. It was a claim or idea to be vindicated in future. On the other hand it was an idea which Hegel considered to have a firm basis in many material and argumentative practices of modern society, *a substantial* idea instead of being mere obligation (*Sollen*).

For Hegel European development was some sixty years older than for Rousseau. Therefore its dynamics were in his eyes inevitable and irreversible. Rousseau was no more aware of such dynamics than he was aware of "commercial" society. His anticipation of "a century of revolutions" after intensified corruption of the great European countries has nothing to do with these dynamics.

In the *Essay on Inequality* Rousseau has nothing positive to say about relative passions. However, step by step he comes to realise that not all relative passions can be considered corrupt. In *Émile* he has to admit that a passion can be restrained only by another passion. Since in civilised society the original restraining emotion, commiseration or pity is no longer effective, the restraining passion must be a relative or comparing passion. Some passions have to be both relative *and* good.

Above all *love* is a good and relative passion which can restrain bad passions, particularly excesses of sexuality. It is already a small victory that it concentrates this strong passion on only one person. Besides, love is not blind but has reasons behind its selectivity, if only subconscious reasons. Its beginning is usually physical but as in Plato's *Symposion*, it also can become attached to more spiritual and virtuous qualities. If this happens, which is far from necessary,

love becomes an ethical passion and a ground for ethical life on the whole.

The love between wife and husband has an interesting parallel with patriotic love, another relative passion which can become ethical. Patriotic love might lead a person to prefer the common good and general will to his personal one. It comes close to what Rousseau regards as virtuous in general, the "love of order": you shall not make yourself the centre of all things, but remain content on the "periphery" and with having only one's due. Rousseau allows the possibility of transformation of amour propre into a virtue by extending it to other people. (*PIV*, 547)

Rousseau believes that even a rather poorly governed country or an "illusion" of law can present some image of order and that no one who was not a good citizen before can be a good man. It is however important to understand that the ethicality of patriotic love is not morality in a strictly autonomous sense. It is quite in order to see in Rousseau one of those Machiavellian republicans who think that the principle of a political community is virtue. However it is not correct to think that the basal virtue of a political community should be anything more than it is in this tradition in general: patriotic love or as Rousseau also likes to call it: the love of laws.

Rousseau claims that authentic love and friendship presuppose reciprocity and respect (*PIV*, 520ff, 798). Ludwig Siep has established that in Hegel's Jena manuscripts the concepts of recognition and freedom have four central constituents[27]. Recently Robert R. Williams has argued vigorously that these features also belong to Hegel's later conception[28]. It may not be surprising[29], but perhaps worth noticing, that Rousseau's account of love displays more or less those four features, *autonomy, union, self-overcoming, Freigabe*.

Of these union and self-overcoming are trivially constitutive to love. For Rousseau authentic love, like all good passions, is autonomous because it is "subordinated to laws"[30]. The fourth feature, given by Williams only in German, is *Freigabe*. It means giving up any possessive or dominating stand in the mutual relationship. Indeed, for Rousseau domination spoils authentic love:

> "Bonds tied too tight will break. So it is with the bonds of matrimony as well if one wants to bind them stronger than they should be. Fidelity

obliging both spouses in matrimony is holiest of all rights, but the power it acknowledges for each over the other is too much. Compulsion and love match poorly each other." (*PIV*, 862)[31]

The change of attitude towards relative passions is paralleled by a new evaluation of modern society in general. This change is in turn necessary to pave the way for his political treatise, *Social Contract*.

Social Contract

Presuppositions of the Social Contract

Rousseau begins *Social Contract* by informing us that he is setting out to study whether there can be a social order with a *legitimate* and *stable* constitution. He promises to unite that which *justice* allows with that which *utility* (interest) necessitates.[32] He declares that the social order does not derive from nature but rests on conventions and then tries to demonstrate this, basing his argument on the thesis that freedom is an inalienable quality of human nature. Any rightful contract in turn supposes *reciprocity* as well as *equality*[33] between the contracting parties. A legitimate constitution has thus to be founded on reciprocal and equal conventions.

The fundamental problem of a political community "is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before". To this problem the social contract provides a solution based on a *political* concept of strict autonomy (*PIII*, 363; *R&B*, 92).

All conditions of the social contract are contained in a single condition, e. g. "that every associate alienates himself totally and with all his rights to the whole community. Namely because firstly everyone submits totally the position equal to everyone and as it is equal to everyone none has reason to burdensome to the others". Everyone's submission to all amounts to submission to none (*PIII*, 360-1, cf. *R&B*, 93).

Therefore the essence of the social contract is: "Each of us puts his person and all his power under the supreme control of the general will, and, as a body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole" (*PIII*, 361; *R&B*, 93). The corporate so arisen is a public and *moral* person, the common I, containing as many votes as members and having from this act onwards its unity, life and power. In a word, it makes this public person capable of activity in a complete analogy to an individual person.

The social contract is, in its full generality, no real act. Tacit consent is perfectly sufficient for the reality of it (*PIII*, 369; cf. *R&B*, 99).[34] This together the part of general will plays in the essentialities of the social contract strongly suggests that the reality of a social contract is in the end nothing beyond the actual rule of general will. General will limits particular wills as soon as these enter the sphere of its comprehensive object, *the common good.* This contains the vital ends of political society and, contrary to a very common misunderstanding, nothing else, according to Rousseau's explicit statements (*PIII*, 373, 375; cf. *R&B*, 101-102). *As a corporate* (common I etc.) the people is the declarer of the general will, *the sovereign,* whose only capacity and exclusive right is to make *the* laws[35].

Rousseau stresses that the sovereign should have no executive or jurisdictional power or any other authority to intervene in private affairs of people. But his main reason is not that of liberal checks and balances but to prevent the contamination of the general will by particular concerns and thus from missing the common good. In its perspective every citizen should be perfectly equal.

Clearly the general will (or the social contract) is based on *a fully symmetrical and reciprocal recognition of the members by each other.* This recognition comprises freedom and the common good which is no sum or aggregate of individual interests but has vital ends formed purely by the general point of view. This is correlative to a famous statement of Rousseau: "There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will (*PIII*, 371; *R&B*, 100). In the common good particular interests are maintained. This is even a necessary condition of the contract:

"Why is the general will always in the right, and why do all constantly will the happiness of each person, unless it is because there is no one

who does not apply this word *each* to himself and who does not think of himself when voting for all" (*PIII*, 373; *R&B*, 102).

Pondering conditions which make a people fit for legislation, Rousseau indicated something significant of the common good. Of such conditions, one of the most important is that a people already has to be bound together by some "common origin, interest, or agreement" (*PIII*, 390; cf. *R&B*, 115). Thus such a people already has common interests that may become transformed into substantial constituents of the common good. This transformation Rousseau entrusted to the half-mythical character of legislator. In my view, this character has to be regarded as a wise and powerful *hermeneut* who interprets the existing way of life, wisely, far-sightedly and, to a certain extent, selectively. He should not exclude anything really substantial or introduce too many alien elements. Adopting Hegel's language, he should help a people *in itself* to transform itself into a people *for itself*.

This ethical stand can be more reflected or emotional. In each case it is a different version of patriotism (cf. II. 2). Patriotism may be brutal and prejudiced but there is no path to universal humanity which does not go through love of a social *lawful* order, even if this order is quite illusory from the point of view of right, e. g. symmetrical and reciprocal recognition.

Rousseau's Two Minds

"In two minds", "ambiguous", "tragic" were the words I used to describe Rousseau's position towards the modern condition. As a matter of fact, this tragic or double-edged structure is expressed mostly clearly not in the opposition between morality and immorality, rationality and irrationality etc., but in the very relation of the fact of recognition to its failed versions, alienation, the relationship of master and slave or the insatiable monster produced by their intertwining (cf. II. 1).

It is not easy to have optimism in the modern condition, especially for one who cannot accept as its source either any combination of "innate sympathy" and "enlightened understanding" or corruption

as a "fair price" for commercial prosperity, as Mandeville and Montesquieu do. This may seem to amount to believing that the evil things produced by the modern condition turn into good things when pushed far enough. Hegel certainly did something like that after becoming convinced with the aid of political economists the dynamics of the monetary economy with its less welcome consequences can at best be controlled but not suppressed.

Evil things do not turn into good things by themselves. For Hegel this is done by the power of universality, a *necessitating* one in civil society (cf. *PR.*, § 186, § 187, remark) and a *free* one in the state (cf. *PR.* § 194, § 195, § 258, remark). It (and freedom) has to be as certainly a product of the culture (*Bildung*) of civil society as corruption is.

> "The development of particularity to self-subsistence is the moment which appeared in the ancient world as an invasion of ethical corruption and as the ultimate cause of that world's downfall. Some of these ancient states were built on the patriarchal and religious principle, others on the principle of an ethical order which was more explicitly intellectual, though still comparatively simple ... Hence they could not withstand the disruption of this state of mind when self-consciousness was infinitely reflected into itself; when this reflection began to emerge, they succumbed to it, first in spirit and then in substance, because the simple principle underlying them lacked the truly infinite power to be found only in that unity which allows both sides of the antithesis of reason to develop themselves separately in all their strength and which has so overcome the antithesis that it maintains itself in it and integrates it in itself." (*PR* §185, remark; Knox, 124)

This *antithesis* is the culture of the system of needs modern society which lets the "particularity" develop into and as ("bourgeois") dynamics of its own, and at the same time lets the power of universality develop in an ostensibly separate manner and therefore appear as an outside constraining power for the particularity. The power itself is the *real* power of universality underlying both ostensible universality and particularity. This power is the general self-conscious and ethical will of the state which at the same time controls civil society and realises freedom (cf. *PR* § 257). But this power is *in the last instance* also a concrete manifestation of (the outcome of the process of) recognition.

It is more than understandable that Rousseau could not be adequately aware of this quite elusive kind of outcome (cf. II. 2). Thus he could not have much confidence in what he could see of the modes of reciprocity and recognition in the modern condition. They were for him much more a hope and ideal norm than even a weakly ingrained reality. In *Social Contract* he seems to have found the possible sources for recognition not in modern but in the traditional agrarian society with an at most rudimentary monetary system. The case of the very traditional society of Corsica confirms this. On the one hand, the principles of *Social Contract* are remarkably literally manifested in Rousseau's sketch for constitution of Corsica. On the other hand he regarded in *Social Contract* Corsicans as the only fit people in Europe for legislation (cf. *PIII*, 391; *R&B*, 115).

As Fetscher has showed, Rousseau was in *Social Contract* not a revolutionary or reformer "raising a new mission to society, a new future to humanity" but a conservative[36]. The diametrically contrary thesis by Ernst Cassirer in his classical article cannot therefore be maintained[37].

But even more Rousseau was, as again Fetscher pointed out, "a thinker between the ages, as anyone ever was"[38] and therefore a thinker "in two minds". As a possible illustration of this, let us take a look at the surviving manuscript of *Social Contract*. There he presents us with a figure of an *independent man* who can see no sense in not pursuing solely his own interests because there is obviously no guarantee of other people doing likewise.

This man is for Rousseau a typical modern enlightened man and it is clear that Rousseau thinks that there is no simple argument to refute his reasoning and that he is much more convincing than those who shallowly think that "in the state of independence, reason leads us to co-operate for the common good out of a perception of our own interests" (*PIII*, 284; *M&M*, 160). We already know that in Rousseau's view a good response to him cannot be based on merely private interests. Rousseau indicates his answer to the independent man in an interesting passage:

"But ... although men become unhappy and wicked in becoming sociable, although the laws of justice and equality mean nothing to those

who live in the freedom of the state of nature and subject to the needs of the social state ... *let us attempt to draw from the ill itself the remedy that should cure it.* Let us use new associations to correct ... the defect of the general association. Let our violent interlocutor himself judge its success. Let us show him in perfected art the reparation of the ills that the beginnings of art caused to nature .... Let him see the value of good actions, the punishment of bad ones, and the sweet harmony of justice and happiness in a better constituted order of things ... *let us not doubt that with strong soul and an upright mind,* this enemy of the human race will at last abjure his hate along with his errors; that reason which led him astray will bring him back to humanity; that he will learn to prefer his interest properly understood to his apparent interest; that he will become good, virtuous, sympathetic, and finally ... the most solid support of a well-ordered society [all italics mine]." (*PIII*, 286; *M&M*, 162ff).

Thus the whole book Rousseau then planned should be the response. My impression is that Rousseau aims at identifying enlightened readers of his book with the independent man, in this way removing him from the position of a cynical spectator into exploration of his own heart.

There should be a remedy for the ill coming from the ill itself, a true miracle not second to Hegel's recognition. But what is the ill? It is, as far I can see, the *natural* and *egocentric independence* of "bourgeois" reflected from the observer's (philosopher's?) perspective which contains no image of unselfish goodness. However, aided by an image of a well-ordered political community his "strong soul" and "upright mind", *being independent* of prejudices of the age, church, feudalism, "bourgeois", monarchy and particularly of undue scepticism of *philosophes*[39], the independent man would perhaps find in his *own* heart something less cynical. Would he not find there the willingness to recognise and be recognised? Would not that willingness be a potential general will based not only on patriotic love but on a enlightened intellectual position?

Since the independent man is obviously a modern man it is not impossible that Rousseau earlier had more confidence in modern society than he had by finishing *Social Contract*. Cassirer's reform program which he, from the point of view of *Social Contract*, erroneously projected onto Rousseau's aspirations, would not have been, on such a condition, too far from truth. But although Rousseau used

much from the manuscript version in *Social Contract*, often word for word, he wiped the independent man completely out of *Social Contract*. Thus he left us to speculate whether he was really more optimistic sometime between 1756 and 1762 about modern society and what in this case might have made him come to second thoughts. Had he perhaps lost faith in *philosophes,* or indeed in one of them, Diderot, his "significant other" with whom he broke in 1759?

Notes

1 There are good reasons to claim that the right title is rather "Bourgeois Society" of the two possibilities German "*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*" allows. For instance the relationship between that society and the state is in a precise analogy with the relationship between the bourgeois and the citizen. I shall, however, follow here the commonly accepted use of "Civil Society".

2 The accurate rendering of *Anerkanntsein* is "quality of being recognised". As far as I can see, the difference from *Anerkennung* (recognition) only stresses the difference between a process and its result.

3 In fact, recognition is the nodal concept mediating the thematic perspective of the part of Hegel's system under consideration, "objective spirit" (Knox: objective mind) with the whole system of his philosophy, cf. HW 10, 219ff (§ 430ff), Petry, 70ff.

4 Encyclopedia § 430ff.

5 HW 10 § 435, 437.

6 HW 10 § 436.

7 HW 10, § 435.

8 Up to Williams, 1997. Siep's major contribution is *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie*. Freiburg and München, 1979.

9 Cf. Williams, 84ff.

10 Hegel's criticism is of no substantial value as a commentary on Rousseau.

11 For A to be free in a "strictly" autonomous sense the following must be true: if there is a law which A obeys, A has made that law. But in addition to that, it is required that it is not true in such an empty way, that there is no law at all. It is required that there really are *particular* law(s) determining As personal commitments. Cf. *PR* § 6.

12 Hegel is in this respect more radical. For him the true sense of political activity is identical with the Aristotelian *praxis*. This is implied in the

statement that the state is the actuality of the concrete freedom (*PR* §
260). This diametrically opposed to "instrument theory" of the state.

13 Cassirer, 104, 116; cf. *PIII*, 365 and *R&B*, 96.

14 His description of this condition is very close to Hegel's description of
the system of needs within the civil society partly considered above.

15 PIII, 174ff, *R&B*, 42; cf. *PIII*, 351 and *R&B*, 85.

16 PIII, 189, *R&B*, 54; cf. *PIII*, 193 and *R&B*, 56.

17 Fetscher, 58-9.

18 *PIII*, 203, *R&B*, 17; cf. *PIII* 188; 53ff.

19 cf. *PIII*, 189; *R&B*, 53ff.

20 *PIII*, 207; *R&B*, 18; cf. *PIII*, 352 and *R&B*, 85.

21 Natural man has four essential features: 1) self-preservation (*amour de
soi-même*), 2) the capability for commiseration and, distinguishing him
from animals, 3) capability for free will and 4) perfectibility. At the same
time that creature is outside the dimensions of rationality, morality and
truth (and thus *not* capable of *irrationality, immorality* and *lie).*

22 As far as I can see, there are three of them altogether, excluding the
highly "conjectural" state of nature. They are: period of savages, that of
nomads and that of agriculture. Thus there is interestingly not yet
anything like the "commercial" state which was already outlined in
Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* and was becoming customary in con-
temporary (with the *Essay*) Scottish enlightenment.

23 Rousseau thinks that the struggle for power may begin already in the
first communication between mother and baby. Its results are as fatal for
the dominating child as they are for the submissive or suppressed. His
ideas are amazingly reminiscent of Freud's conception of distortions of
the objectivity of the baby (omnipotence etc.) (*PIV*, 311, 314).

24 *PR* §, 238, addition, Knox, 277.

25 *PR* § 204, addition, Knox, 270.

26 *PR* § 185, remark, Knox 124; the passage is quoted fully in chapter IV.

27 Siep, 159ff.

28 Williams, 80ff, 87ff.

29 Indeed, the concept of love as a uniting power in general is an old
perspective and an important paradigm for recognition in Hegel's Jena
writings (cf. Siep, 166).

30 *PIV*, 816; *PIII*, 365; *R&B*, 96.

31 We have to distinguish the domination he has in mind here from his
thoroughly patriarchal conception of matrimony.

32 The italics are mine. "Constitution" has to be taken in its widest meaning
involving the "unwritten" laws and institutions as well.

33 Concerning the capacity and conditions of the contract.

34 There is, however, no reason why it could not be a real act occasionally. Rousseau's sketch for the constitution of Corsica is an instance, albeit a fictive one, of that (*PIII*, 919).

35 We have to keep in mind that social contract, sovereign and law are in their strictest meaning concepts of legitimacy, hence *normative* concepts.

36 Fetscher, 259ff.

37 Cassirer, 71.

38 Fetscher, 260.

39 Cf. *R&B*, 110 (note 5), 178.

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Sisko Haikala

DENOUNCING THE ENLIGHTENMENT BY MEANS OF A CONSPIRACY THESIS

Göchhausen's Enthüllung der Weltbürgerrepublik

I

Ernst August Anton von Göchhausen's initially anonymous *Enthüllung der Weltbürgerrepublik* (*Exposure of the Cosmopolitan Republic*, 1786), with its theses on a "cosmopolitan conspiracy" which threatened the established political and religious order, is a noteworthy illustration of the rise of conspiracy thinking in the political culture of the late Enlightenment. Conspiracy theories generally emerge in times of crisis when scapegoats and monocausal explanations for problems and disasters at hand are searched for. They belong to irrational elements in the history of thought and do not seem to fit into the picture of the 'Age of Reason'. However, signs of a crisis within the Enlightenment and illustrations of a growing awareness of the existence of such a crisis were visible in late eighteenth-century Europe well before the outbreak of the French Revolution. This crisis followed from conflicts between traditional and novel norms and

from disappointment at progress in the Enlightenment which was sometimes seen as excessively slow, sometimes as excessively fast, sometimes as going astray. Divisions among the Enlighteners into various radical and moderate groups emerged, and a considerable rise in Counter-Enlightenment thought occurred. Such developments were reflections of accelerating processes of politicization. Unlike stereotypical interpretations of the German Enlightenment as an essentially non-political movement suggest, an ideological polarization and a connected rivalry for dominance of public opinion was also taking place within German public discourse well before the beginning of the French Revolution.[1]

Background for the rise of conspiracy theses is also provided by the extraordinary coexistence of the public and the secret within the Enlightenment. While Enlightenment culture appreciated the principle of publicity, it also had a special interest in secrecy and secret societies. This interest in secrecy could be seen in the exceptional popularity of Freemasonry. Yet Freemasonry was also drifting into a crisis, as esoteric and irrational trends gained increasing support in the movement. The Masonic crisis provided a starting point for a public campaign against secret societies which began in the 1780s. This debate has long been considered a sign of politicization and also of the rise of conservative political thought in Germany (Valjavec 1951, 271-302).

The *Enthüllung*, the content, intentions and discursive connections of which are discussed in more detail in what follows, is an interesting contribution both to the debate on secret societies and to the great question of the time on "what is Enlightenment?" Göchhausen belonged to the critics of the Enlightenment, and his *Enthüllung* was one of the first publications to start a debate on what the character of the proper, the false and the dangerous type of Enlightenment was. The debate would continue in public for several decades to come. Like a number of other conservatives, he characterised himself as an advocate of the 'true' Enlightenment. Yet his political thinking contained such deeply traditionalist and reactionary views that his place among Counter-Enlightenment thinkers can hardly be questioned. A number of his contemporaries shared the view of him being an obscurantist, a most passionate enemy of the Enlightenment.[2]

Göchhausen's political thought has not been widely studied thus far, and his main work has not been analyzed from all relevant perspectives.[3] Scholars have paid attention to Göchhausen mainly because his conspiracy theory evidently shares some features with counter-revolutionary conspiracy theories which flourished after 1789. In conspiracy myths which emerged during the French Revolution, Enlighteners and secret societies of the Enlightenment were accused of the outbreak of the Revolution. The threat of the expansion of the revolution was claimed to be present everywhere. The later effects of these conspiracy theses have been seen as considerable. It is obvious that the theses already provided a basic model for anti-modernist conspiracy theories which were to reoccur in new versions with changing scapegoats throughout the nineteenth century. Their latest major renaissance occurred together with National Socialist propaganda against an alleged universal Jewish conspiracy (Rogalla von Bieberstein 1976).

In Germany, the major organs of this counter-revolutionary propaganda included the *Eudämonia* (1795-98), an ultra-conservative periodical. Göchhausen himself belonged to the founders of the paper. It was due to the Eudämonists that paranoid suggestions of the German Illuminati as promoters of the French Revolution, as founders of the Jacobin ideology and as an underground organisation advocating a universal revolution began to occur in international discourse (cf. Braubach 1927, Epstein 1966, 555-46). Through their correspondence, the editors of the *Eudämonia* are known to have had an influence on the contents of the ex-Jesuit Augustin Barruel's famous *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du Jacobinism* (1797/8) (Schaeper-Wimmer 1985, 181-2; 384-401; Rogalla von Bieberstein 1976, 97; Haaser 1997, 312).

The Illuminati order, founded by Professor Adam Weishaupt in 1776 with the purpose of promoting the victory of the Enlightenment, reason and morality among its members and in the whole of society, was abolished and forbidden as an anti-state organisation in Bavaria in 1784-5 as a consequence of a campaign of reports and libels. According to recent studies on the Illuminati, however, this suspected secret society did not promote any political revolution or concrete political reforms. Instead, the Illuminati were an elitist and esoteric-utopian para-Masonic organisation, the activities of which

declined throughout the Empire within a few years after they had been made objects of persecution in Bavaria. Repeated claims in conspiracy myths about the revolutionary character of the Illuminati were primarily based on two features of the thought and action of their leaders. Firstly, in their thoughts concerning the philosophy of history, the Illuminati held radically utopian views on the disappearance of the princes, nations and churches from the earth. Secondly, the society aimed at promoting the Enlightened cause by supporting the advancement of its members to positions of influence in court and government. In Bavaria, these efforts to gain places led to some concrete results as well.[4]

As Göchhausen's theory presented the Freemasons and Enlighteners as members of a cosmopolitan conspiracy threatening society, Göchhausen can be regarded as one of the "founding fathers" of the tradition of anti-modernist conspiracy theses. His *Enthüllung* has with good reason been considered a major illustration of the fact that it is simplistic to see the rise of the conspiracy myths as mere reactions to the French Revolution. It is not clear, however, whether the *Enthüllung* really was a predecessor of the conspiracy hysteria advocated by the *Eudämonia* in the 1790s as far as the defamation of the Illuminati is concerned. Interpretations of some eighteenth-century readers and a narrow point of view in research emphasizing continuity also explain a deep-rooted tendency among scholars to see the *Enthüllung* as a part of the persecution of the Illuminati. However, this interpretation appears as questionable and deserves critical attention. The contents of the book and Göchhausen's later statements need to be taken into serious consideration (see Ch.V).

In this article, Göchhausen's conspiracy construction will be discussed in the context of the contemporary discourse of the 1780s, as it is obvious that the prevalent approach emphasizing continuity has produced a one-sided and slightly too modern a conception of Göchhausen's conspiracy theory and its propagandistic meanings. Scholars have either ignored or paid only secondary attention to certain essential differences between the conspiracy theories of the *Enthüllung* and those of the editors of the *Eudämonia* in the 1790s. One of the most interesting differences is that Enlighteners and Freemasons were by no means the only scapegoats in Göchhausen's theory of a cosmopolitan conspiracy. A major role was also played by ex-

Jesuits, members of the Society of Jesus, which had been abolished in 1773. With only a few exceptions, the ex-Jesuits belonged to the Counter-Enlightenment forces in Germany.[5] Göchhausen's suggestions about a common front between Jesuits and Enlighteners against society were amazing to many contemporaries. In later historical research, in particular, they have tended either to puzzle scholars or to give rise to comments in which Göchhausen's theory appears absurd (cf. esp. Epstein 1966, 98-100.).

All conspiracy theories are, of course, absurd if taken as descriptions of reality. Due to irrational elements, which are always a natural part of conspiracy thinking, Göchhausen's construction of conspiracy cannot completely be made an object of rational analysis. It is impossible to fully understand the strange logic with which Göchhausen was able to connect facts, prejudices and mere beliefs in his theory. Yet through contextualization and text analysis, a modern scholar can attempt to reveal the propagandistic purpose of the book and to make the process of writing it slightly more understandable. The structure and meanings of the ambiguous conspiracy theory presented in the *Enthüllung* cannot be understood if separated from contemporary discourse to which the text was originally intended to contribute.

Göchhausen took a stand, firstly and most importantly, on a controversy concerning theses of a Crypto-Catholic threat in Protestant Germany. According to these suggestions, which were distributed in public from the mid-1780s onwards, ex-Jesuits and Catholic emissaries were, in secret, successfully converting subjects of Protestant countries and plotting in a number of ways to destroy Protestantism. Above all, they were claimed to have achieved, without ordinary members being aware of this, anonymous leadership in secret societies such as the Gold- und Rosenkreuzer and the Scottish Freemasonry. They were argued to be cunningly making use of growing religious tolerance and distributing religious mysticism, beliefs in wonders and other *Schwärmerei*s in order to gradually destroy true Protestantism and to bring the Protestants finally back to the Church of the Pope. Quite surprisingly, the advocates of this imaginary propaganda were neither Protestant enthusiasts nor Orthodox Lutherans but very well-known Enlighteners from Berlin: Johann Erich Biester and Friedrich Gedike, editors of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, and Friedrich Nicolai, famous author and publisher.[6] The conspiracy

theses of this group of Berliners became a major sensation of the time and gave rise to a long-lasting and widespread public debate. Yet studies on the Enlightenment have failed to pay this debate the attention it deserves. A primary reason for this negligence seems to have been a traditionally established yet increasingly criticized understanding of the Enlightenment as an over-rationalized phenomenon. Scholars have tended to categorise the frequently occurring features of irrationality, traditionality, esotericism and occultism within Enlightened thought as irrelevant curiosities or as signs of early Romanticism. For long, it was a common custom to choose such elements of the Enlightenment as objects of research which were in line with the traditional understanding of the Enlightenment as a rational and modernizing movement. In analyses of Göchhausen's conspiracy theory as well, attention paid to the debate on Crypto-Catholicism has been negligent.[7] Due to this failing in previous research, the debate on Crypto-Catholicism will be considered as a major context in the following analysis of the *Enthüllung*.

II

At the time of the publication of the *Enthüllung*, Ernst August Anton von Göchhausen (1740-1824) was *Geheimer Kammerrat* in Eisenach in the Duchy of Saxony-Weimar.[8] Göchhausen had a modest noble background and he had made a career as an officer. In 1769 he retired from the Prussian army with the rank of lieutenant. His move to a career in the civil service obviously did not improve his economic status sufficiently, as it has been suggested that a need for extra earnings made him into an author. Between 1776 and 1796, he published a number of anonymous pamphlets and articles. Distinct features in all of these writings include the ethos of an officer, the loyalty of a civil servant towards authority, and a willingness to appear as a mere honest man in the character of the uneducated *Biedermann* (Albrecht 1997, 156). Furthermore, ever since his youth, Göchhausen had been deeply religious and considered himself an Orthodox Lutheran. As early as the 1770s, he seems to have rejected the alleged irreligion of the Enlightenment

and its neological and partly deistical trends. Such trends were advocated by Friedrich Nicolai in Berlin and his theological associates all over Germany in Nicolai's *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*, one of the most notable organs of the Enlightenment.[9] His lack of university education and his introvert nature explain the fact that Göchhausen had few contacts with the circles of the learned and the authors of the time. Therefore, even contemporaries knew little about the background and intentions of his literary activities. For the very same reason, his contemporaries were unable to identify many of his anonymous writings as having been written by Göchhausen. The *Enthüllung* was an exception, however. Even though Göchhausen publicly admitted his authorship only in 1799, contemporary correspondence demonstrates that Göchhausen's authorship became a well-known fact within the republic of letters soon after the publication of the book.[10]

Information on Göchhausen's connections to Freemasonry, the dangers of which were so eagerly demonstrated in the *Enthüllung*, are based on his own accounts. In the early 1760s, when living in Halle, Göchhausen had joined the Scottish masons belonging to the Rosaic system, and he finally became a member of the *Strikte Observanz* (Göchhausen 1799, 295-297), the greatest Masonic organisation of the high degrees on the European continent in 1760-80. Baron Karl Gottfried von Hund und Altengrotkau imported it from France in the early 1740s and developed it further in Germany. One of the secrets of the hierarchical order was the myth of Unknown Superiors who managed it. Another secret was a belief in a Templar legend according to which the organisation was a successor of the Order of Templars which had been destroyed in the beginning of the fourteenth century. In addition to more or less Enlightened elements, the ideas of the organisation had been affected by ambiguous new religiosity, mysticism, belief in wonders and promises of hidden knowledge. This eclectic combination of ideas made the Strict Observance an easy target for frequent charlatans who took the role of its unknown superiors or possessors of occult knowledge. A growing uncertainty about the origin and leaders of the order, scandals caused by cheats and the emergence of competing systems all contributed to a deep crisis within the Strict Observance after the death of Hund. This crisis finally led to the

rejection of the Templar legend and to the abolition of the organisation at the international Masonic congress in Wilhelmsbad in 1782. In the long run, the decisions of the congress contributed to the victory of more rational trends within Freemasonry. Yet, throughout the 1780s, there were disagreements about the inheritance of the Strict Observance, and destructive conflicts between irrational and rational Freemasonry occurred.[11] According to Göchhausen, he never rose above the lower degrees of the Strict Observance. The crises of the organisation destroyed his Masonic ideals and caused him to reject the Masonic labor after the congress of Wilhelmsbad. His disappointment in Freemasonry was, according to him, one of the reasons why he decided to write the *Enthüllung* (Göchhausen 1799, 298-9).

In the 1790s, Göchhausen's contemporaries regarded him as one of the anonymous editors of the *Eudämonia*. In the 1930s, Gustav Krüger made an archival finding which seemed to confirm this interpretation. Krüger's finding demonstrated that Göchhausen indeed belonged to the group of ultra-conservative authors who wished to produce propaganda against revolutionary ideas by founding a periodical of their own. In 1794, they had taken concrete action to start a paper and contacted princes in order to gain subsidies for its publication (Krüger 1931, esp. 486, 479-81). Later research has shown, however, that Göchhausen's relationship to the *Eudämonia* was not so unproblematic. The letters found by Krüger already reveal that Göchhausen and the other founders of the periodical disagreed about princely influence on the content of the paper. As no article in the *Eudämonia* has been identified with certainty as the work of Göchhausen, and as one of his letters from 1797 suggests that he had nothing to do with the periodical, it seems quite possible that he did not belong to the editors or contributors of the paper at all (Höfer 1970, 135, 150 n. 109; Albrecht 1997, 191 n. 95, 192 n. 98). Therefore, Göchhausen's reactionary conspiracy theses and the theses expressed in the *Eudämonia* cannot be considered identical. His pamphlets and political satire demonstrate that he belonged to the advocates of reactionary conspiracy theses and ultra-conservatives also in the 1790s. Yet Göchenhausen's writings do not provide more detailed information on the development of his political thought. Fur-

thermore, in the mid-1790s, he seems to have lost his belief in the utility of political propaganda, and rejected publicity.[12]

III

The *Enthüllung* (EH) can be considered a *roman à clef* in which the author pretends to be describing reality through fiction. The book is supposed to be based on the correspondence of a late relative of its editor. It is argued that, before his death, the relative, an officer and a well-informed Mason, had urged the editor to make his papers public so that both the authorities and the audience would be warned about a threatening danger (EH 449-51). The main theme of the book focuses on the life of Wilhelm, a well-educated man with a proper Lutheran background. As a young lieutenant, with a character not unlike that of Göchhausen himself, Wilhelm becomes enthusiastically interested in the ideas of Freemasonry and, in spite of warnings from his father, joins a lodge of the *Strikte Observanz*. Before long, however, he starts to ask questions about the objectives of the unknown leaders and about the fundamental secrets of the organisation. Long discussions with the master of the lodge finally reveal to Wilhelm the horrid truth: The entire Masonic movement with its enlightened ideals appears as a mere construction aimed at covering what is going on behind the scenes. It is designed to hide a "cosmopolitan" political conspiracy which runs the organisation. After hearing this revelation, Wilhelm resigned his membership in the Freemasons. The rest of the book consists of long letters from a friend and tutor of Wilhelm, *Kriegsrat* 'v. N', including accounts of religion, society and the origin and character of political power, all based on biblical references. Furthermore, the latter part of the book provides statements on the existing trends in Freemasonry, the Rosi-crucians and the Illuminati.

The genre of the *Enthüllung* was hardly surprising to contemporaries, as the use of fiction by anonymous writers was no exception among publications providing revelations on secret societies. Such secrecy was by no means always a result of fear of intervention by the censors. Neither were the authors necessarily afraid of fierce public criticism nor revenge from Masonic brothers. It was rather a way of provoking interest among the public and promoting sales to suggest

that the author possessed authentic and dangerous information gained from the inner circle (Agethen 1984, 130-2). Göchhausen knew this strategy well, as can be seen in his confession from 1798. Göchhausen then admitted that he had adopted the character of an experienced Mason in order to make his message appear urgent in the eyes of the public (Göchhausen 1799, 229-300). This untrue statement had been made possible by the cover of anonymity. The choice of a fictional genre created a favourable position for the author. He could fail to provide evidence for his statements, and yet the genre enabled him to freely declare the truth. Göchhausen made use of his chosen strategy as early as in 1787 when endeavouring to refute fierce criticism the book had provoked. In his anonymous *Aufschluß and Verteidigung der Enthüllung des Systems der Weltbürgerrepublik*, he emphasized the fact that not all the arguments of a "philosophical novel" were intended to be taken as literal truths (Aufschluß 1787, 46-8).

Even though contemporaries generally had no major difficulties in distinguishing between fact and fiction in literature exposing Masonic secrets, the *Enthüllung* was at first received with considerable amazement and uncertainty about the real purpose of the book.[13] It appears quite evident to the reader that the master of the lodge is the villain of the book, whereas Wilhelm's father, *Kriegsrat* N and the increasingly informed hero of the book were advocates of the right values. The problem with the *Enthüllung* was that its conspiracy construction was ambiguous, containing either intentional or unintentional obscurity.

A detailed reading of the *Enthüllung* reveals a presentation of two intertwined conspiracies. Firstly, the book provides a broad description of a Masonic conspiracy advocating the Enlightenment. Secondly, it depicts a "cosmopolitan-Jesuitical" conspiracy. In his first revelations on the secrets of Freemasonry, the master interprets the history of mankind for the young adept in conspiratorial terms. He tells how, at all times, there have been small groups of wise thinkers, "cosmopolitans", in action and how these groups have aimed at the liberation of mankind by fighting against prejudices and by promoting the cause of human rights and human perfection. Even though despotic rulers and the clergy had made it necessary for these groups to work in secret, they had actively contributed to all the revolutions and progressive turns of mankind. It was only with the growth of Enlightened

thought and the protection provided by Freemasonry that the work of the cosmopolitans was about to reach its goals (EH 211-220).

At its early stage, the description of the lodge master seems to be based on an idea of "the conspiracy of the good" that had been able to direct the course of history as a type of secular providence. Such ideas were commonplace in a number of Masonic legends. Yet Wilhelm finds it hard to approve of the revelation that Freemasonry hides an inner circle which appears to be a proponent of an ultra-radical Enlightenment and an enemy of Christianity. The master argues that the major obstacles to human liberty included the religion, princes, and states with their national conflicts of interests (EH, 234-6). He holds the utopian ideal of a community of cosmopolitans, the only professed religion of which was "the religion of reason" (deism). Such a community would no longer have priests, princes, estates, armies or states. It would allow its citizens broad rights, and would be governed by "philosopher kings" who had been initiated into the conspiracy (EH 228-38, 245-7). In the course of the description, it becomes increasingly evident that the cosmopolitan Enlightenment is revolutionary "universal republicanism", the methods of which are based on the unscrupulous manipulation of human minds.

By emphasizing the ethically questionable features of the cosmopolitan conspiracy, Göchhausen gives his readers hints of a final surprising, though not necessarily convincing, revelation. The readers are told that the preceding description of an enlightened conspiracy hidden within Freemasonry did not however contain the entire truth. The master goes on to argue that a further conspiracy exists. This conspiracy reaches for goals quite different from the Enlightenment and the emancipation of humankind. The real secret leaders of this conspiracy were in Rome. "Cosmopolitanism" was in fact "Jesuitism", as the master states (EH 276):

> Jesuiten sind Weltbürger der ersten Klasse, Freymaurer der Letzten. Jesuitism können sie getrost für Kosmopolitism annehmen.

Göchhausen made ambiguous use of the term "Jesuitism". First of all he insists that the terms 'Jesuits' and 'Jesuitism' are kept separate (EH 265, 431). The synonyms of Jesuitism included both "cosmopolitanism" and "universalism". In the *Aufschluß* (1787,14), he gave

a further definition, according to which "Jesuitism is nothing else but practical atheism" advocating arbitrary government, the suppression of human understanding and the status of an infallible authority. In a sense Jesuitism was a general concept for Göchhausen, referring to Jesuiticality that was not restricted to the organisation founded by Loyola. It was rather based on evil human nature inclined to cunning and unscrupulous greed for power.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Göchhausen did not refer at all to the Society of Jesus when writing about Jesuitism. Jesuitism was not mere "republican and deistical principles" of the late eighteenth century.[14] Göchhausen did not always systematically use the abstract concept of Jesuitism which could have made the conspiracy construction of the *Enthüllung* slightly more logical. Göchhausen merely used the concept for the purpose of showing how Jesuiticality in the meaning of cunning and greed for power could occur anywhere and among all human groups, including the Enlighteners. Yet Göchhausen's theory also concerns the real ex-Jesuits and sees them as the major collaborators of the cosmopolitan conspiracy.[14] Even though the *Enthüllung* never clearly states who exactly the cosmopolitan superiors in Rome are, the reader can draw no other conclusion than that the unknown superiors of the conspiracy must have been persons holding leading positions in the Catholic Church or in the former Society of Jesus.

IV

Göchhausen's theory of a Jesuitical-cosmopolitan conspiracy was basically a Counter-Enlightenment version of the Jesuit theories of the Berlin Enlighteners in Berlin. Göchhausen referred frequently for the writings of the Berliners and expressed his support to most of their claims about continuous activities among the Jesuits after 1773. He considered it self-evident that secret Catholic missionary work was continuing in Protestant countries. He also believed that ex-Jesuits had entered secret societies and were distributing superstition and irrationalism with evil intentions in mind. Even when he goes much further than the Berliners, he only sharpens their claims

about Jesuitical greed for power and the tendency of the Jesuits to appear with thousands of different masks, including that of an advocate of religious tolerance and the Enlightenment.[16] Göchhausen's seeming support for the conspiracy arguments of the Berliners was so extensive that the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (VIII 1986, 563) considered it necessary to warn the public about the book and to emphasize the fact that its author belonged to a hostile group of writers.

In Göchhausen's exaggerations, the Jesuits, after the dissolution of the organisation in 1773, were not at all an order promoting spiritual goals (EH 268-71). The conversion of Europe back to Catholicism, which, according to the Berlin Enlighteners, was a major goal of the Crypto-Catholic conspiracy, appeared a mere half-way target. In Göchhausen's view, the Jesuitical-cosmopolitan conspiracy aimed at nothing less than gaining universal political power. The only way Göchhausen troubled to prove his thesis was to provide obscure references to history, as seen in the master's words to Wilhelm (EH, 271):

> Machen Sie nicht eine Albernheit! legen Sie den theologischen Confessionsbegrif von Kirche ab. Dencken Sie sich bey der Kirche allzeit Rom; bey Rom den Sitz der Cäsarn, und die Universalmonarchie, bey Catholicism, Cosmopolitism; bey Jesuiten Cosmopoliten, und bey Freymaurerey Jesuiterey. Das ist der rechte Schlüssel.

The most important point in which Göchhausen rejects the Jesuit theories of the Berliners and starts to use their theories against them and the entire Enlightenment concerns the double strategy of the conspiracy. Göchhausen argued that in order to gain power the conspiracy promotes both superstition and irreligion. In Catholic countries, it concentrates on the propagation of ignorance and superstition. But as this strategy was unlikely to be successful in the more developed Protestant countries, the conspiracy had had to adopt the Enlightenment as its major instrument. Its strategy in the Protestant countries was to provoke the Enlightenment to utter irreligion and radicalism without the promoters of the Enlightenment themselves realising what the plot was all about. Göchhausen attempts to demonstrate the simultaneous use of contradictory strategies as logical by a thought construction that occurred in nearly the same form in other conspiracy theories as well. In the late nineteenth century, the

construction occurred in the *Protocols of the Elders in Zion* when the actions of the members of a Jewish conspiracy in the world of the *goyim* were described. According to the construction, the purpose of the conspiracy was to cause complete anarchy, mental and material distress, in which people would start to look for leaders and order. Such anarchy would open up an easy way for cunning men, who wish to gain hegemony in the world, to subordinate mankind to their rule.[17](EH, 263-4, 272-3)

Unlike the Berlin Enlighteners, who attempted to prove their conspiracy theories empirically by referring to known facts and sources of varying relevance, Göchhausen did not point to any concrete examples of the actions of the cosmopolitan conspirators or to their influence on the course of events. The rhetoric he employs is mainly based on creating visions. The *Enthüllung* constructs horrifying images of a vile abuse of people. "The evil" can gain influence anywhere. One of the areas which the conspiracy has turned into its instrument was publicity, as the master reveals to Wilhelm (EH, 249):

> Im Reich der Wissenschaften und der Litteratur geben wir Ton an, folglich haben wir die besten Köpfe jedes Volcks, jeder Confession, (auch der Ihrigen, mein lieber lutherscher Bruder,) in unserer Gewalt, ohne daß sie es wissen...

Göchhausen's book also reflects his opposition to modernity, his rejection of commercialization, monetary economy and development in industries. It is the "cosmopolitan spirit" which is to be blamed for the economic change and the corruption of manners as well (EH 286-7):

> Er [=the spirit of cosmopolitism] spannt alle Hirne zu Industrie, und Speculation in jedem Sinn; er nährt und lenckt, unbemerckt [...] den Nervenfressenden Luxus; er hebt Fabriken und raffinirten Handlungsgeist; zeddelt Jalousien unter den handelnden Völckern an; alle trachten nach Uebergewicht; die Staatsschulden vermehren sich vom Jahr zu Jahr, und Köpfe und Herzen gerathen in ewigen Wirbeln.

Göchhausen's intention, when constructing a conspiracy theory based on cooperation between two completely opposite groups, the Jesuits and Enlighteners, was to counter the political and

propagandistic goals which the theses on Crypto-Catholicism, developed by the Enlighteners of Berlin, were designed to promote.

In the theses of the Berliners, the Jesuits and Crypto-Catholics appeared as visible enemies to Protestants, and the entire debate tended to reactivate old confessional prejudices and animosities. However, the Jesuit-hunt was not initially intended to defend the inherited religion but the Enlightenment which was felt to be threatened. The concepts of Protestantism and Catholicism, when used by the Berliners, were secularised to a high degree. They saw "Protestantism" not merely as a right to religious liberty. Protestantism also entailed a liberty of political conscience and freedom of speech, of independent rational and critical thinking, and of a liberal way of thinking.[18] "Catholicism", as understood by the Berliners, was a counter-concept which did not merely refer to the Catholic Church and its doctrines but also to a number of patterns of thinking criticized by the Enlighteners, including subjection to authorities, traditionalism, irrationality and superstition. A central intention of the Berliners, when accusing someone of concealed Catholicism and when repeatedly suggesting that people could serve as instruments of Jesuitical plotting without knowing it, was to make the religious and political ways of thinking among opponents of the Enlightenment, who were gaining increasing support in Protestant Germany, appear suspect (Haikala 1996,62-3).

Starting from the same premises as the Berliners, Göchhausen's intention was to demonstrate that they were mistaken when supposing that the Jesuits only had influence in ideologies opposed to the Enlightenment. No matter how unconvincing a compilation in many respects, Göchhausen's conspiracy theory demonstrated a fundamental weakness in the argumentation of the Berliners. Starting from the premises of the Berliners, it was completely possible and even logical to draw the conclusion that the Jesuits, due to their abilities in plotting, could use even the Enlightenment as an instrument. Referring to the Berliners, Göchhausen stated that he considered it ridiculous that the Protestant "Abderites" and "guard of Zion" were warning people about Crypto-Catholicism and making a noise about the missionary work of some secret emissaries or the dangers of theological "superstition" while not realising that the Enlightenment was also having undesired consequences and that they were themselves being used as

instruments of "Rome" (EH 272-3, 282-3). His purpose was to demonstrate the "Jesuitical" character of the Enlighteners and to show that the hidden threat of the Enlightenment to Protestantism was much greater than those anti-Enlightenment phenomena which the Berliners claimed were serving the Catholic cause. Göchhausen's claim that the cosmopolitan Jesuits were attempting to gain purely secular universal dominance played a central role in his endeavour to denounce the Enlightenment as a political threat to the state.

Göchhausen's construction is so imaginary and lacks evidence to such an extent that there is reason to wonder whether the theory was meant to be taken seriously at all. Göchhausen's way of supporting some of the arguments of the Berliners yet using the same arguments against their original advocates appeared so comical that a contemporary pamphleteer, who pretended to be the author of the *Enthüllung*, ironically argued that the book was a mere libel. According to this pamphleteer, the purpose of the book was to turn the logic of the Jesuit-hunters into parody and to illustrate how, following their theories, anyone could be demonstrated to be a participant in Crypto-Catholic plotting.[19]

Göchhausen's intentions were, however, far from humourous. No particular fact gives reason to suppose that he did not honestly believe in the existence of the trends which he summarised in his conspiracy theory. According to his own understanding, he had based his conclusions on generally known and recognized facts. This understanding can be seen in his insistence, "daß es hier gar nicht aufs glauben noch nie erhörter oder gesagter, sondern nur allein aufs anordnen und zusammenstellen der allebekanntesten Dinge, und aufs entwickeln derselben, aufs herausheben ihrer innern Wahrheit, ankommt." (EH, 454). It is, of course, impossible to reveal what different types of sources and hearsay Göchhausen had used for the construction of his conspiracy theory. It is noteworthy, however, that, both in the *Enthüllung* and the *Aufschluß*, he mentioned a number of sources and authors which enable us to draw conclusions about the connections of the *Enthüllung* to contemporary discourse. Some of Göchhausen's literary references concern literature which warned the public of religious and political dangers linked to the radical Enlightenment. Yet they also show that Göchhausen's beliefs in the activities of the Jesuits did not originate merely from the *Berlinische*

Monatschrift's and Nicolai's writings on the threat of Crypto-Catholicism but also from earlier debates among the Freemasons. Confusion among the Masons of the high degrees and uncertainty about the real objectives of the order and about its leaders had given rise to suspicions within the organisation. Some Freemasons suspected that Jesuits had indeed secretly entered their organisation. Such suspicions were fomented by ancient anti-Jesuitical prejudices which had become widely known as a result of a long-lasting campaign against the Society of Jesus in Catholic countries. They gained further force from some potentially Catholic and quasi-monastic features inherent in the legends, rituals and hierarchical organisation of the Templar Masonry. The question of the possible influence of Jesuits within the leadership of the Strict Observance had already been debated in the Masonic congress of Wilhelmsbad, to the protocols of which Göchhausen had referred in the introduction of the *Enthüllung*.[20]

V

A longish research tradition from Rossberg to Albrecht places Göchhausen's *Enthüllung* in the context of the persecution of the Illuminati which started in the mid-1780s. Its description of a cosmopolitan conspiracy has been seen as an attack against the Illuminati.[21] However, Göchhausen does not give any direct hints supporting such an interpretation. Indeed, he has rather constructed his work in a way that supports the opposite conclusion. Scholars reading Göchhausen have not usually paid attention to the fact that, in the end of his work, Göchhausen briefly takes a stand not only on the Strict Observance and the Rosicrucians but also on the Illuminati.[22] His description of the Illuminati is surprisingly moderate given the fact that he was well aware that this Enlightenment organisation had been banned. Göchhausen's text shows that he knew the Electoral mandate published in Munich on 16 August 1785 in which the Illuminati had been presented as a political threat because of their members having so successfully gained high positions in the courts of law and within the administration of the state.[23] In the *Enthüllung*, Göchhausen sees the goals of the organisation as double-edged. However, it is noteworthy

that he draws a clear distinction between the Illuminati and what he has described as a Jesuitical-cosmopolitan secret society. The Illuminati appear merely as one of those several German Masonic and para-Masonic organisations which may have become instruments of secret plotting by the ex-Jesuits and Jesuitism in general without their members being aware of what was going on. Göchhausen's conspiracy suspicions are much more cautious in relation to the Illuminati than to other Masonic organisations. His caution is due to the fact that the Illuminati were known to consider the Jesuits as their main opponents and that the Jesuits were generally held responsible for the persecution of the Illuminati in Bavaria. Still in his *Aufschluß* (154, cf.158), published in early 1787, Göchhausen, referring to the lack of information, avoided taking a distinct stand on the supposed dangerousness of the organisation. Neither do his later works provide any detailed information on his conception of the Illuminati as an ideology or as an organisation, even though they do demonstrate that he held a negative view of the order. As early as in the late 1780s, Göchhausen published satires mocking the Illuminati.[24] In the 1790s, a number of his writings supported conspiracy propaganda attacking the Illuminati (Albrecht 1997, 174).

The prevalent interpretation among scholars of the *Enthüllung* as presenting the Illuminati and cosmopolitans as identical has been based on its publication in the middle of persecutions of the Illuminati and on contemporary beliefs in the parallel nature of the Illuminati and the secret society of master X. Such speculations gained further force from the Bavarian authorities who, in 1787, published authentic yet intentionally selected documents recently confiscated from the Illuminati to prove how dangerous the organisation was to the established political order (Agethen 1984, 83). It was only the publication of these documents that, for the first time, revealed to the general public and even to many of the Illuminati themselves certain detailed information on the programme and goals of the organisation. It turned the question of the Illuminati into a major sensation all over Germany. The documents included Weishaupt's famous and frequently misinterpreted speech to the new members of the degree of *Illuminates dirigentes* held in 1782. In his speech, Weishaupt introduced his well-known utopian philosophy according to which princes and nations were due to disappear in the course of history as a con-

sequence of moral progress. This disappearance would take place without violence being necessary.[25] Many have seen Weishaupt's views as nearly identical to the views of the master in the *Enthüllung* which depicted an ideal society lacking priests, princes, estates and armies.

The parallel character of the master's thoughts and Weishaupt's speech made the *Enthüllung* particularly useful for ultra-conservative propaganda after the outbreak of the French Revolution. It was their propaganda about conspirators with Illuminate and Jacobin connections which created the established interpretation according to which Göchhausen had revealed "the disgusting system of the Illuminati" – as the *Eudämonia* (II 1796, 20) put it – well before the Bavarian authorities came out with their documents on the Illuminati.[26] Importantly, however, the views presented in the *Eudämonia* were not necessarily the views of Göchhausen. The question of how Göchhausen – who is not known to have ever joined the Illuminati[27] – could have received such information on the activities and secrets of the organisation before 1787, remains unanswered. It is only known that such confidential information was not accessible even to the brothers of the lower degrees and that some of the revelations seem to have come as a shocking surprise even to many leading Illuminati outside Bavaria (cf. Agethen 1984, 11).

The reactions of J.J.C. Bode (1787/1994, 201-202), one of the leading Illuminati, have been considered most convincing evidence for the interpretation which links the *Enthüllung* to the persecution of the Illuminati. In his journal notes dating from the time of his journey to Paris in 1787 (during which, the writers of the *Eudämonia* claimed, the Illuminati imported their revolutionary ideas to France!), Bode considered the *Enthüllung* an attack against the Illuminati organisation. He explained the attack as having resulted from Göchhausen's antipathy towards Adolf von Knigge, a leading Illuminati, as a person. Bode had seen the emergence of this antipathy with his own eyes during a meeting in Eisenach in 1782. Furthermore, he claimed that Knigge's papers contained some written documents by Göchhausen in which this hatred was expressed. Bode assumed that the animosity had started as Knigge had attempted to recruit Göchhausen to the Illuminati order. According to Bode, this supposed recruitment had been done employing unskilful methods, including Knigge's suggestion that he was himself one of the un-

known leaders of the organisation. Some historians have suggested that Knigge had then revealed to Göchhausen some further secrets of the inner circle of the Illuminati, but such a hypothesis is not entirely supported by Bode's description. Bode argued that Göchhausen, without knowing the Illuminati and merely out of personal animosity, had condemned the entire organisation. Due to the broad character of the Illuminati order, however, contemporaries could have a number of potential private sources of information on the affairs of the Illuminati.[27] It has been pointed out that Göchhausen could also have borrowed ideas for his book from Bavarian anti-illuminati publications in which the order had been accused of a conspiracy against the state and religion well before 1787.[29]

An important counter-argument against this Illuminati interpretation of Göchhausen's work can be found in a letter written by Göchhausen in Eisenach dated 12 July 1798 and published by the *Taschenbuch für Freimaurer* in 1799 (p. 293-306). Only from the late 1980s onwards has this document received serious attention from scholars. The obvious purpose of Göchhausen's letter was to counter previous accusations of his obscurantism and to distance himself from the militant propaganda of the *Eudämonia*. He was asking the interpreters of his book to end their constant attacks against his person. According to Göchhausen, these unfounded attacks had followed from an excessive attention to his book and from numerous misinterpretations of it. Above all, he denied having meant the Illuminati with his references to cosmopolitans:

> "Einige Ausleger waren gar so schlau, in meinen Weltbürgern die *Illuminaten* zu finden. Lieber Gott! als ich die Enthüllung schrieb (im Jahre 1785) wußte ich noch kein Wort von Illuminaten..." (p.303).

 Furthermore, he denied all claims that he had been in profession of some particular inner circle information on the Illuminati or some other secret societies at the time of writing the book in 1785. Although the text of the *Enthüllung* shows that Göchhausen was exaggerating when claiming that he had heard no word of the Illuminati by the time of writing, his principal argument about the irrelevance of the Illuminati to the contents of the book is not necessarily untrue. Neither do we have any particular reason to doubt his argu-

ment that the *Enthüllung* was a "result of abstraction", in other words, a product of contemplations and conclusions following from reading and hearing. In fact, Göchhausen had already put forward the same argument in the *Enthüllung* itself.

No sufficient evidence exists thus far to support the assumption that Göchhausen was referring to the Illuminati when writing about the cosmopolitans. Indeed, the helpfulness of the entire hypotheses on the secret intention of the book is questionable. The meanings of the *Enthüllung* can well be understood without such a hypothesis. The reader of the book should pay attention to Göchhausen's explicit statements and hints contained in the text itself.

VI

The conspiracy construction in the *Enthüllung* provides the framework and starting point for Göchhausen's fierce criticism of the Enlightenment and for his objective to prove that the "new" Enlightenment was an ideology opposed to both Christianity and the state.

One of the dimensions of criticism against the Enlightenment in Göchhausen's book is the condemnation of Freemasonry. Although Göchhausen did not wish to condemn the majority of the Freemasons who had good intentions, he pointed out that Masonic lodges, as supranational organisations lacking state control, were in constant danger of being taken over by cunning men and being turned into sources of "political and moral plague" (EH xii). As far as the ideology of Freemasonry was concerned, he saw cosmopolitanism and religious tolerance, both generally shared ideals among the advocates of the Enlightenment, as giving rise to danger. Unlike most Enlighteners, who understood cosmopolitanism as the love of humanity and the will to promote the welfare of mankind as a whole, Göchhausen saw cosmopolitanism as the opposite of patriotism and, therefore, as a threat to the state: "Du bist Staatsbürger oder du bist Rebell. Kein Drittes giebt es nicht" (EH 177).[30] Religious tolerance, as advocated by the Freemasons, appeared to Göchhausen as a source of opposition to Christianity, of deism and of religious indifference (EH 176-7; 185, 189-90, 199).

Göchhausen's understanding of the Enlightenment builds on stereotypes which were commonplace in religiously motivated late eighteenth-century anti-Enlightenment thought. He criticized the Enlightenment for its intellectualism, for its sinful promotion of reason as the highest authority and for its aspirations to play down imagination, heart and feelings, which he saw as aspirations rejecting human nature (cf. EH 257-8, 307). On the basis of the Bible, Göchhausen condemns the anthropological optimism and individualism of the Enlightenment and denounces its secular efforts to distinguish between religion and morality (EH 315-6). In his view, *falsche Aufklärung* is connected to deism which, in turn, is likely to lead to moral relativism tending to disintegrate society. He finds deists among any thinkers expressing doubts with relation to revealed religion, no matter whether naturalists or Neologians (EH 260-1; cf. 377). For Göchhausen himself, the scriptures were the only source of all intellectual and moral truth. He was actively calling for a return from a religion of reason to Luther's *Bibelreligion* (EH 359ff.).

Göchhausen's patriarchal and monistic political theory, with which he opposed the Enlightened ideals of liberty, equality and natural law, was biblical as well. The Old Testament provided him with the legitimation for monarchical power and the authority of the sovereign. According to Göchhausen, the monarch was "lebendiger Abdruck des Gottes" and "Stellvertreter des Unsichtbaren" (EH 322-34; 351-8; the citations p. 303). In accordance with traditionalist Lutheran cesaropapistical thought, he considered it necessary that spiritual and political power were united in the person of the monarch, the highest bishop and protector of the church (cf.EH 341-2). He defended biblical monarchy with a religious fervour, arguing that Christianity and Orthodox Lutheranism in particular were an essential condition for the preservation of society and the monarchy (EH 357-8; 377-8 et passim.). Such a dedication to monarchical power gave rise to accusations of an awkward flattery of princes and poor knowledge of theology (ALZ 1786, II, 402).

The common interests of religion and monarchy became visible in Göchhausen's criticism of the freedom of printing, for instance. Like most anti-Enlightenment thinkers, Göchhausen considered the liberty of the press had been corrupted to a dangerous licentiousness of the press. He dared to criticize princes for making conces-

sions to the Enlightenment and allowing authors to publicly attack religion and the political order. In Göchhausen's view, the princes underestimated the dangers of free publishing (EH 248-51). Even mere criticism of religion was dangerous to the rulers, as the persuasion of public opinion against the church and religion was the first and essential step in the plans of the advocates of the Enlightenment to destroy the authority of rulers in the eyes of their subjects. The same way of thinking was central to Barruel and to the conspiracy propaganda of the writers of the *Eudämonia*.[31] In the *Enthüllung*, it occurred in the master's statement on the strategy of the cosmopolitan conspirators (EH 248):

"Wir machen vorerst sie Pfaffen verdächtig, lächerlich... Ist Pfaffenkredit dahin, so ist es auch um den Aberglauben, geoffenbarte Religion genannt, die an Pfaffenexistenz und Einfluß gebunden ist, geschehen. Sind Fürsten, die auf ihre Würde halten, in den Augen des Volcks nichts als Despoten, Fürsten aber und ihre Trabanten, der Adel, überhaupt nichts weiter, als – Menschen, so ist – ihr Nimbus dahin!"

With his *Enthüllung*, Göchhausen was evidently trying to gain the attention of not only the general public but also the princes. He wished that the princes would take concrete measures against Freemasons and other secret societies. He also wished that they would set restrictions on free printing (EH 387-9; 440).

With all its religious fervour, irrational contents and aspirations to denounce the advocates of the Enlightenment as enemies of religion and the state, the *Enthüllung* represented an extreme reaction against the Enlightenment. However, the fact that Göchhausen's conspiracy theory was primarily a reaction to a Crypto-Catholic threat propagated by the advocates of the Enlightenment suggests that the tendency to conspiracy thinking, and to denouncing opponents in a rude manner, was a rather general phenomenon in the political culture of the period. Still in the 1780s, both Protestant advocates of the Enlightenment and the "obscurantists" could claim that Catholic and Jesuit plotting were the cause of the problems they were experiencing. This early modern way of thinking illustrates that contemporary political thought was still closely linked to religious prejudices and traditionalist models of identifying political problems. In

Germany, the preservation of this confessional tradition as an essential part of political argumentation had been promoted by the development of a bicultural realm after the Reformation. In this bicultural realm, the contrasts between Protestant and Catholic Germany survived and were reflected in considerable differences in the progress of the Enlightenment. Yet both Göchhausen's and his opponents' declaration that religion was in danger – when approached through the study of propaganda and the history of concepts – can be considered a sign of secularization typical of the transition to modernity. After all, both were writing secular political polemic by using religious language for the purpose.

TRANSLATED BY PASI IHALAINEN

Notes

1 For politicization of the German Enlightenment, see e.g. Valjavec 1951; Vierhaus 1967; Aufklärung als Politisierung 1987; Klippel 1990; Stuke 1972, 278-80.

2 See esp. Obscuranten-Almanach 1798, 178-85.

3 There is no monography on Göchhausen. Höfer (1970) and Albrecht (1997) have written two important articles on his production and career.

4 For recent studies on the Illuminati, see esp. Dülmen 1975; Agethen 1984 and 1987; Neugebauer-Wölk 1995, 25-59; Neugebauer-Wölk 1996; Reinalter (Hg) 1998; Mulsow 1999.

5 For contrasts of the enlightened thinkers and Jesuits, see van Dülmen 1969; Müller 1993.

6 For more details about the debate on Crypto-Catholicism, see Haikala 1996.

7 A significant exception to this trend is Voges (1987, 133-36). He recognises the principal value of Berliners' thesis for the book. As a literary historian his focus is quite different to that in this article.

8 We do not know so many details about Göchausens's life. This is based on the works of Höfer (1970), and Albrecht (1997).

9 Albrecht 1997, 157; cf. Göchhausen 1776, 204, 35-37. On the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*, see: Schneider 1995, 8, 138-9.

10 See e.g. K.G. Reinhold to Friedrich Nicolai 26 January 1787, published in: *Reinhold* 1983, 184.

11 On the history of Strict Observance and the crises of the Freemasonry, see e.g. Le Forestier 1970, esp. livre 1 (83-270), 3 (553-706); Hammermayer 1980; Schüttler 1996.

12 The proof of the change of his opinion was the pamphlet *Ohnmasgebliche Vorschläge zum allgemeinen literarischen Frieden* (1796), wherein he tried to persuade authors and journalists to leave all political campaigns to princes and give up anonymous publishing. Of course, these opinions could not be supported by the publishers of Eudämonia; see Albrecht 1997, 179-80, 182.

13 One clear indication was that the notable review journal of the Enlightenment, *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, published two reviews of the book. In the first (ALZ 1786 II Nr. 143, 524-8) an anonymous contributor gave the book at a very high rating. Therefore, the editors decided it necessary to publish later another and larger review, in which the content of the book was totally crushed due to the anti-Enlightenment hostility contained in the text (ALZ 1786 IV Nr. 282, 385-392; Nr 284, 401-03).

14 Graßl (1968, 266) has expressed this kind of interpretation.

15 This is said very clearly: EH 268-71, 275-6; 370-1.

16 Cf. EH 291-93, 407-8; xi; Aufschluß 52-6, 125, 160, 235.

17 EH, 263-4; 272-3; cf. Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion, 10. Protocol. There are also other similarities to *Enthüllung*, for example in the thesis concerning the question of how to win the public opinion over and what kind of economic changes were going on; see ibid. 5., 6. and 24. protocols.

18 See, for example, Biester's notes in: BM VII 1786, 63-4, and Nicolai, Beschreibung einer Reise. Bd.7, Anhang, 101.

19 Vollendeter Aufschluß des Jesuitismus 1787, 149-51. The contemporaries seem to have been aware the pamphlet was not written by Göchhausen (see e.g. reviews in: ALZ 1786 III, 473-78; Neueste Religionsbegenheiten 1787 St.9, 697). – Even recently Luckert (1993, 278, 279-80) was misled by this pamphlet into assuming *Enthüllung* was a satire.

20 EH xf.; Aufschluß 211-271; 278-9. For the increase of Jesuit suspicion in Freemasons' own circles, see Voges 1987, 130-1; Taute 1909, 35, 68-71, 85; Hammermayer 1980, 25.

21 Rossberg 1942, 38; Koselleck 1973,113-4; Graßl 1968, 226-7; Epstein 1966,98; Rogalla von Bieberstein 1976, 85-6; Schüttler in: Bode 1787/1994, 201 notes 556,557,558, p. 203 note 562; Albrecht 1997, 158-9.

22 For example Albrecht has no doubt when he comments on the notes in the letter dated 20 February 1786, written by G.J. Göschen, the publisher, to F.J. Bertuch. For Albrecht the notes on the Illuminati are futher evidence that *Enthüllung* was a delicate attack against them. He does not pay

attention to the possibility that Göschen merely commented on the words Göchhausen explicitly stated in *Enthüllung* on the potential influence of the Jesuits on the Illuminati order: 'Diese Freyheit des Denkens und die Freyheit seine Gedanken andern ehrlichen Menschen mitzutheilen um sich zu beruhigen und zu unterrichten scheint mir durch die Ent.d.W. [=Enthüllung der Weltbürgerrepublik. SH] zu verdächtig gemacht zu werden. Auch scheint mir der Verfaßer noch zu algemein zu reden. Ich *halte* einige Menschen für Illuminaten die würklich nichts anders unter Aufklährung suchen als Glückseeligkeit der Menschen und Befreyung von Aberglauben und Vorurtheilen. Diese redlichen Menschen werden den Credit verliehren. Ich glaube daß diese Männer, welche ich für Illuminaten halte, die eifrigsten Kämpfer gegen Jesuiterey sind...' (Albrecht 1997, 184-5 note 17).

23 EH 428; The Edict of Munich is published in: Dülmen 1975, 390-1.

24 Albrecht 1997, 165-8, 174, 185 note 19. – The Illuminati and Weishaupt are subjects of a sharp attack for example in his satire Thorheit steckt an.. (1788). It describes sadly unsuccessful attempts by the Enlighteners to carry cosmopolitan ideas to a country village.

25 Weishaupt, *Andere an die neu aufzunehmenden Illuminates dirigentes* in 1782, quoted in Dülmen 1975, 166-194, see esp. 179.

26 See also Nachrichten 1795, 4. Beleg, 12-14.

27 Dülmen does not even mention Göchhausen as a possible member of the order, but Hermann Schüttler (1991, 63) referring to Bode's diary, has put him on the list of Illuminati as an uncertain member. In no way does the diary provide evidence that Göchhausen really joined the Illuminati (see the next paragraph in the text).

28 Obviously, Koselleck (1973, 209, note 24) is the first to express this hypothesis. Anyway, cf. Bode 1787/1994, 202: "*von Göchhausen* spricht sehr keck über die *Illuminaten* sein Verdammungsurtheil und er kennt sie wahrhaftig nicht. Er würde das aber vermuthlich nicht thun, wenn sich Philo [=Knigge.SH] nicht als einer ihrer unbekannten Obern bey ihn gerirt und sich ein wenig andringlich um *von Göchhausen* beworben hätte."

29 Grassl 1968, 226-7; Schüttler in: Bode 1787/1994,159; Albrecht 1997,t. All of them assume the pamphlet *Ueber Freymaurerey* composed by J.M. Babo and printed in 1784 would have been a sufficient source of information for Göchhausen's book. The pamphlet denounced the Illuminati as enemies of the state: Babo 1784, esp. 30-50.

30 As yet in German usage the rare term 'Staatsbürger' (citizen) could take distance to term 'Untertan' (subject). Naturally, Göchhausen did not use the term 'Staatsbürger' in any emancipated meaning. He only employed

the term in order to contrast the word 'Weltbürger' with 'Staatsbürger'. On these concepts see: Riedel 1972, 683-6, 689-92 and Koselleck 1975, 52-8; 660-2.

31 Cf. Barruel esp. II 1798, 32-35 and I 1798, xxi-xxii; Eudämonia V 1797, 522-3.

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Topic 3:
History of Finnish Concepts

Tuija Pulkkinen

VALTIO

– *On the Conceptual History of the Finnish 'State'*

In 1809, the Finnish estates were convened by the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, in the town of Porvoo to confirm the result of the Napoleonic Wars in North-Eastern Europe, the handing over of Finland from Sweden to the Russian Empire. In Swedish, the meeting was referred to as *Landtag*, there was no mention of the Swedish word *stat* in connection to it, and the Finnish word *valtio* (the state), had not even been created, yet the conception of the Porvoo meeting as the birth place of the "Finnish state" is firmly rooted. Osmo Jussila has argued that this conception is a case of the misuse of words, which is historically the result of conscious political maneuvering on the part of successful 19th century political players (such as Israel Hwasser, Johan Jacob Nordström, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, Robert Castrén and Leo Mechelin)[1]. Nonetheless, other prominent Finnish historians, such as Matti Klinge, find a sufficient number of reasons to continue referring to the Porvoo meeting as founding place of the Finnish state.[2]

Analysis of separate concepts of state has not been absent in the historians' debate on this issue, rather, quite the opposite is true. Jussila argues that "*stat*" was used in early 19th century documents in the old meaning of a budgetary unit (finance state), but was twisted into the modern concept of state by those who later put forward the

idea of Finland as a contract party in Porvoo. He also holds that the concept of nation in the Porvoo documents was the old notion by which all provinces of the Swedish empire had been considered as nations. Contrarily, Klinge argues that when taking his oath in Porvoo, the Russian Emperor used the term "nation of Finland" in the new meaning informed by the French Revolution.[3] These conceptual distinctions are not insignificant, yet, considering the centrality of the dispute about the birth of the Finnish state, there has been surprisingly little systematic study and analysis of actual usage of words *stat* and *valtio* informed by the methods of conceptual history.

A common view is expressed by Päiviö Tommila, who writes about the beginning of 19th century Finland that: "Finns who wanted to emphasize the new position of Finland used the word state more often [than Russians]". Referring to professor of law, J. J. Nordström's lectures, which in the 1840's established the view of the Finnish state as a contracting party at the Porvoo meeting, he adds that: "from the same time period also derives the word *valtio*."[4] The implication in this statement is that the birth of the Finnish term for the state, '*valtio*', is a direct consequence of the political activity in favor of the separate position of Finland within the Russian Empire, and is closely connected to the conception of Finland as a contracting party in the meaning of international law, on which Jussila's argument also centers. With respect to these accounts, it is surprising to go back to the texts dating from the 1840s and apply a conceptual history approach. According to my findings, it seems to be that the very first mentions of *valtio* in Finnish in the 1840's had little to do with the relation of Finland to Russia. Even more interesting, however, is that the early use of the word does not even seem to be in accordance with that standard usage of 'the state' in which it may function as a subject in sentences, and in which it is understood as an entity that may contract, that is, as a sovereign power, authority or agency. Instead, *valtio* seems to have been adopted, as I will show, very much as a means to linguistically express either the structure of a polity or the political nature of action by individuals. Especially the latter usage, which renders 'politics' and 'the state' conceptually exceptionally close to each other is of particular interest to a political theorist and points to distinguishable local features of political culture.

In this paper I am concerned with such local features of Finnish political culture which can be discerned by analyzing the conceptual scene of the concept and word state (*valtio*) during the first half of the 19th century in Finland with the means of approach that has lately been named as "conceptual history". In the beginning of my article I will specify what I understand by conceptual history, as well as define my position in terms of particular antagonisms within this field of study. I will then exercise the approach in the context of the Finnish 'state' by looking closely at the beginning phases of the Finnish word *valtio* after which I will conclude with remarks on the distinguishable features of Finnish political culture that are connected with the usage of 'state'. What I present here is a work in progress, related to my contribution to the Finnish project of the history of political concepts.[5]

Conceptual History

'Conceptual history' refers today to a variety of philosophically informed linguistic-historical work on chiefly political concepts, the prime examples being Reinhart Koselleck's work in the context of the German *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* project and Quentin Skinner's and John Pocock's work in the Anglophone world. The common denominator for any work in conceptual history is undoubtedly an interest in language, as well as in the changes in concepts. As Melvin Richter, a well known advocate of conceptual history in United States, remarks, the German *Begriffsgeschichte* addresses many issues which English speaking readers identify with "the linguistic turn", and this matches the growing concern with language, which within historical research results from dissatisfaction with earlier methods in intellectual history, the history of ideas and the history of political and social thought.[6]

The *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* project is based on an original interest in social history and far-reaching social changes, and Koselleck's thinking involves adherence to a notion of pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic "experience" as a foundation for conceptual change. Quentin Skinner's thinking, on the contrary, is focused on the linguistic acts of those who change political language, since his, as well as Pocock's

thought derives initial inspiration in J. L. Austin's speech act theory. Despite their differences, both these approaches, and conceptual history in general, can be seen as differing from the traditional history of ideas approach predominantly in terms of their interest in language and by their tendency to take language seriously.

Among the particular areas of dispute within the practicing conceptual historians lie a number of philosophical and methodological positions, concerning issues such as the relation of a word to a concept, or whether to study a wide array of textual sources or, rather, texts by particular influencal language users. In the following I will consider my approach to the most significant of these areas of dispute. In addition, I will provide a particular reflection of these points of view in respect to my topic here, the early history of the concept of state in Finland.

The first area of complex issues is the relationship of words, concepts, meanings and ideas. At the one end of the spectrum there are those whose interest lies in words, who work on a detailed philological analysis of frequencies and grammatical forms of words in texts, and who tend to identify the concept with the word. At the other end there are those who insist on the analysis of meanings instead of words. They tend to identify the concept with a meaning, and consider concepts as detached from words. I think the latter view is hard to maintain without falling back on the history of ideas, but in respect to the antagonism between the two views, my position lies in emphasizing the need to pay attention to both words and ideas. In fact, the entire point of conceptual history lies precisely in this combination. The changes of concepts do not merely occur as changes in words, nor do they occur as changes without words. A mere philological analysis does not constitute a conceptual analysis, however, there is also no sense in having "concepts" with no textual mark. The first principle of any conceptual history, I think, is that there is adequate attention paid to both concepts and words, not merely to one or the other.

This implies a great deal of significance in terms of in what language and in what particular signs a specific tai given idea is present. When analyzing the concept of state in last century Finland this is particularly challenging, because there were two languages present on the same stage. The political vocabulary of the Finnish language experienced a hectic "boiling point" during the period of the 1840s

and 1850s, when a large percentage of the present vocabulary was purposefully coined by the fennomanian language reformers promoting the use of Finnish instead of Swedish in public life. Analyzing the usage of key political concepts in Finnish thus always involves investigating the usage of words both in Finnish and Swedish.

A second area of dispute, connected with the previous one, is the issue of the possible presence of a concept despite there not being a word available in the language to express it. One could say that this was the case in Finnish when the word *valtio* was coined to express something that needed expression. I take it for granted that within a conceptual history approach this kind of "need" must be taken into consideration. There are certain concepts that "seek" expression, that is, that "are" prior to the existence of words to express them. Still, I think that they "are" there, in waiting, not necessarily as a result of new "experiences" or specific "intentions" that are independent of conceptual frameworks, but rather as the result of clashes, of meeting with other languages, and they always exist in an inescapable connection to existing conceptual frameworks in the form of a chain of negations. Simultaneously, the new unprecedented consequences of conceptual moves always occur as a result of both clashes of languages and as a consequence of deliberate action.

The third question of key concepts is related to this. It is convenient to start from an a-priori that, for example, the state is such a key concept in political thought that sooner or later it must find expression in the vocabulary of all languages. It is crucial, though, not to fall too easily for universalizing assumptions which undoubtedly are made on the basis of hegemonic political cultures. In principle, there are no key-concepts that a-priori would constitute a political system. One needs to keep one's mind open to possibilities of different conceptualizations. Instead of simply following the settling of the old European notion of 'the state' in Finnish vocabulary, it is crucial to keep in mind that, it could also not have settled, and indeed, when an "equivalent" was created in language it did by no means directly correspond its counterparts in other languages. It is precisely the subtle and less subtle differences in this respect that are of interest to a student of political culture.

My fourth remark concerns the methods of conceptual history. A very good starting point for an analysis is, I think, to focus on the

semantic field surrounding a given concept, as is done in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* project. This includes examining the concept in terms of its synonyms, antonyms and other associated terms; including onomasiological analysis, the study of different terms which refer to a similar thing or concept, and semasiological analysis, which attempts to cover the different meanings of a particular term. I have sought to apply this kind of analysis to the concept of state and the word *valtio* in Finnish around the time when it was taken into use, in 1848. I have paid specific attention to counter-concepts, and when analyzing the usage of words, the grammatical form in which the term appears in texts, its grammatical function in sentences and the typical compounds it is encountered in have proved to be of great interest.

There are those who view a broad analysis of the prevalent use of words as opposed to an approach which takes seriously the linguistic acts of particular language users. I think it is essential to pay considerably attention to both, and I see no difficulty in combining both aspects. I think a conceptual history approach involves paying attention to specific acts and moves, efforts by particular language users to influence the formation of a concept and alter the established meanings in the form of a Skinnerian type of analysis of speech-acts. The successes and failures of such attempts are of interest. My study has taken a particular interest in the concept producing action by Johan Vilhelm Snellman, the philosopher and political leader whose influence, I think, has in a peculiar way been both over- and underestimated by historians when considering the fight over the conceptual hegemony of the terms 'state' and 'nation' in Finland.[7]

Following these initial remarks, I will proceed by exploring the concept of state in the period of its linguistic formation in Finnish in the late 1840s.

Valtio

The word *valtio* in Finnish is one of the young words purposely coined in order to translate a word from other languages or, perhaps, to correspond to a certain concept or several concepts that did not find expression in the existing vocabulary. According to the linguist, Martti

Rapola, who has extensively studied the first occurrences of words in Finnish, the word *valtio* was first used in place of the Swedish word *stat* by Paavo Tikkanen in the year 1847 in a publication entitled *Lukemisia Suomen kansalle Hyödyksi*, which was published by one of the regional student clubs (*Pohjalainen osakunta*) [8]. The interest in constructing a word that would be equivalent to the Swedish word *stat* was clearly shown in the rich array of coinages that preceded *valtio* in mid 19th century Finnish. It was suggested that *stat* be translated as *walde*, and the words *valdelma*, *wallasto*. The more Finnish sounding *valle* as well as the adjective *valteinen* are also encountered in literature of that period.[9]

Apparently, *valtio* was about to acquire a stable status. In the Swedish-Finnish dictionary published in 1853 by D.E.D. Europaeus, there is an entry *stat (rike)*, which is translated as *Walta-kunta, waltio, walta*. Europaeus mentions 57 Swedish words beginning with *stat*, and eight of them are translated with the word *waltio* as a component.[10] Others he translates with the words *walta-kunta* [realm], *hallitus* [government], *maa-kunta* [land, county] and *walta* [power].[11] Only twelve years later, Ahlman, in his Swedish-Finnish dictionary (1865), presents 80 words beginning with *stat* and struggles to express nearly all of them with the term *waltio*[12]. Not all of these translations survived much further.[13]

Valtio is an expression intentionally created by the fennomanian language reformers in a situation in which the existing vocabulary for one reason or another was felt not to be sufficient or satisfactory. There were expressions in Finnish which were conceptually very close to *valtio*, such as *valtakunta* [realm, kingdom; Sw. *Rike*, Ger. *Reich*], *valta* [power. Sw. *Makt*, Ger. *Macht*], and *hallitus* [government; Sw. *Regering*, Ger. *Regierung*], but *valtio* was intended to be at exact equivalent to the Swedish *stat* or to specific aspects of it. *Stat* had been used in the Swedish language since the 16th century, and it merges with the European tradition of the concept of the state (*status* > *stato*, *l'état*, *Staat*, state, *stat*).

One could, of course, ask why the differentiation now sought after, had not occurred before and was not linguistically present in Finnish, and also why it occurred at this particular moment. In order to examine what exactly happened, one needs to link the Finnish conceptual history with the studies on the European history of

concepts, and examine which exact aspect of the concept that is present in other languages and particularly which exact meaning of the Swedish word *stat valtio* was originally intended to express. In other words, what was the purpose for which the fennomanian linguistic architects most acutely needed the new word *valtio*? In order to get closer to answering this question, I will briefly examine the European history of the concept of state, as well as the Swedish usage of the word *stat*.

The European Concept of State

The concept of state and the words *stat*, *Staat*, state, *état*, *stato*, deriving from the Latin *status*, have gone through various transformations, which have been analyzed in various studies on the European history of concepts. In his article entitled *The State* (1989) Quentin Skinner follows the conceptual development up until what he calls the "modern concept of state". The modern concept of state, according to him, is characterized by a double abstraction: the state is understood as separate from both the rulers and the ruled.

The Latin term *status* (and its equivalents *état*, *stato* and state) was already in use in a variety of political contexts as early as the 14th century. During this formative period, these terms were employed predominantly to refer to the state or the standing of rulers themselves, to a certain condition of stateliness that belonged to kings, and was rarely used alone without a qualification. Later, during the slow process of change, it was used to designate an area, the lands or territories of a prince. Another transformation took place when the term state was no longer used only to designate the idea of a prevailing regime, but also to refer to the institution of government. Thus, according to Skinner, in the oldest history of the concept, the state was predominantly not separated from those who rule.

According to Skinner, we initially encounter a vindication of the idea that there is a distinct form of "civil" or "political" authority which is wholly autonomous in quattrocento Florentine thought, and in the works of the classical republican theorists. Skinner connects this thought to the later popular sovereignty theorists, who speak of civil

or political authority, or as Locke refers to it, of "true original extent and end of civil government". However, Skinner notes that republican theorists (as well as Locke) embrace only one half of the doubly abstract notion of the state. They insist with full self-awareness upon a categorical distinction between the state and those who have control of it, but on the other hand, they make no comparable distinction between the power of the state and that of its citizens.

According to Skinner, the idea of the state as being distinct from both the power of the people and of their magistrates emerged as a byproduct of those writers who were critical of the theses of popular sovereignty. From the texts of Hobbes, Bodin, Suarez, and Marsilius, there emerges an expression for a power which has been completely transferred from the sovereignty of the people, which is alienated and not just delegated. The power thereby installed, as Hobbes states, has authority that has its own rights and properties, which neither any one citizen, nor all of them together possess. In this way, a single and supreme sovereign authority is established which is distinct from the people who originally instituted it, but also from all possible office-holders who, for a designated period of time have the right to wield its power.

 Skinner does not refer to Hegel in this article, but as far as I can see, it would not be incorrect to refer to Hegel's concept of state as "modern" in the context of Skinner's analysis. Hegel's *Staat* which was relevant in the context of the political thought in Finland in the beginning of the 19th century, is, of course, a German concept. Reinhart Koselleck, in his short article included in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, describes the history of the concept "die Staat" in Germany.

According to Koselleck, the Latin term *status* had already been translated into German as *Staat* in the 15th century, but did not become a theoretical concept in German until in the end of the 18th century. According to Koselleck, this was due to the political reality in Germany: the German nobility (*Fürste*), together, the *Reichstag* and the *Kaiser*, never formed a single agency. The *Reich* never became a state in the French sense of the word. That is why up until the end of the 18th century the term *Staat* was used exclusively to refer to the status of the estate, especially its high status and the status of power, often in combinations such as *Fürstenstaat*. While

the combination "sovereign state" was already introduced in French in the 17th century, it only began to be used in German in the 19th century. After the French Revolution, the word *Staat* became more frequently used in Germany, while in France "*l'état*" was replaced by the terms *republique* and *empire*.

Koselleck describes the conceptual history of the German term *Staat* through the metaphor of an hourglass. Before the beginning of the 19th century, the word had several scattered meanings. Around the year 1800, the meanings became condensed: *Staat* began to be monopolized by one meaning. It became crystallized as something that Koselleck, like Skinner, calls a "modern state". According to Koselleck, during this period the state became an agency (*Handlungs-subjekt*) with a will of its own, "a grand person", an organism and organization. According to Koselleck, the state became, in a word, a collective individual, a *persona moralis*. After going through the narrow waist of the hourglass, the concept of the state once again began to appear in plural meanings. Such concepts as *Rechtsstaat*, *Kulturstaat* and *Sozialstaat* began to surface.

As in opposition to the old status-connotations and the connection to estates, the modern concept of state appears in the accounts of Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck either as an abstract power clearly separated from the ruler/s and the ruled or as a *Handlungs-subjekt*, an agency. As is well known, the modern state has also been characterized as the agency within society which possesses a monopoly on legitimate violence. It is also often characterized as the institution or set of institutions concerned with the enforcement of order.[14] All these conceptions seem to unanimously refer to the state in terms of a power or agency.

As I will later argue more precisely, an interesting feature in the early, and also quite late, use of the Finnish term *valtio* is that it does not predominantly adhere to the aspect of the power and agency of the state, and that it is not because of the dominance of the older European status-connotation. To clarify this peculiarity, it would be wise to begin by closely considering the Swedish use of the word *stat*, and by examining which aspects of it the Finnish language reformers had in mind and emphasized when they created the Finnish word.

The Swedish Word *Stat*

In the most extensive dictionary of the Swedish language, *Svenska Akademins Ordbok*, the word *stat* is given three basic meanings, the last two of which are marginal.[15] The first is divided into five relevant meanings, which I list here in abbreviated form:

1) I: the status, state or state of affairs of somebody, particularly the social status, estate, or style of living according to the estate, or style of living that shows the status, or grandiose style of living.

II: servants in a country house, manor, home or guards at a court, the group of people following a person of influence, a court; the personnel in a civil or military organization, a guard.

III: a table or instructions of how a certain affair should be conducted, a report of financial situation; a budget; personnel and the pay-list; a contract.

IV: A payment in goods and services or in cash for a court; supporting, maintaining non-rulers (in a court), supporting the poor and the sick, a compensation in goods and serv

ices or in cash, wage, salary, income; a certain number of personnel, servants; taxes

V: Realm, kingdom, country, public power, office; republic

Inside meaning V: 1); organized society

a) state (the state Germany etc.; b) small states that belonged to Sweden before the time of the nation-state (as 1802: "Swea, Göta, Norrland, Finland, Lappland, Pommern, Rügen and; c) states as parts of a state (as the states of the United States); d) "the Scandinavian state" of Norway-Sweden e) in the expression *makter och stater* f) (vanished meaning) a republic, esp. In contrast to *rik* in the meaning monarchy; g) together with the word *fri* [free] in the 18th and 19th century for. ex. about Holland; h) in particular expressions connected with a name of an institution, such as *statens järnvägar* [The State Railways]; i) in the expression *Man i staten*, [Man in state] (a civil servant or more generally a "regular person"); j) state in contrast to church; k) in the expression *stat i* or *inom staten* [the state in a the state]; l) metaphorically of something that resembles a state for ex. of a community of insects or of the "God's state".

It is quite evident that at the time when the term *valtio* was introduced into the Finnish vocabulary, meanings 2), 3) or meanings I-IV

of the meaning 1) of the word *stat* were of no interest to the inventors. It was exclusively meaning V that *valtio* was intended to convey.

This observation makes it possible to precipitate some primary contours in the peculiarity of the conceptual field of *valtio* in Finnish. It is very interesting to note that because of the concentration on meaning V, the rest of the connotations of *stat* (I-IV), many of which it shares with the stat-vocabulary of other European languages, are not carried over into the Finnish term *valtio*. As a word, *valtio* is not at all reminiscent of the status or state of something, and it does not bring to mind everyday concerns on a large land-owner's estate or court life.

There are some other words in Finnish that carry the rest of the connotations of *stat*. The word *tila* [estate, farm] with its derivations: for example, statistics is *tilasto*, and state of affairs is *asiantila*. The word *sääty* [estate, class] also has some connotations; the adjective *säädyllinen* means proper (behavior) or (behavior) according to one's status. One could say that in comparison to an attempt to express *stat* with a word connected to either *tila* or *sääty*, the choice *valtio* clearly shows that the concept in question is not the pre-modern European concept. It is not someone's (the prince's) state, nor is it in a concrete relation to land, and it is clearly a post French Revolution concept with a negative relation to the idea of division into estates or classes.

Svenska Akademins Ordbok, with its purely linguistic ambition, does not, however, enable a conceptual analysis beyond this point. It does not differentiate between diverse uses within meaning V of *stat*, and this is the point at which the interest of a political theorist awakens. In order to come closer to an answer to the question of the specific need for the word *valtio* in Finnish at the time of the introduction of the term, one has to distinguish diverse uses of *stat* within meaning V in a content sensitive way. I will return to this commitment later with an analysis of the terms available for expressing things close to the state in Finnish, and with a suggestion for a differentiation between the diverse discourses of state, which according to my reading have a specific hierarchy among them with regard to the invention of a new word *valtio* in Finnish[16].

Before that, however, it is proper to examine a particular language user who greatly influenced the conceptual realm of Finnish politics in its formation years.

J. V. Snellman, a philosopher, publicist, professor and later a senator, although himself writing in Swedish, held a special position in the minds of the fennomanian language reformers. It seems probable that traces of the specific concept of state in the writings of Snellman, who was evidently one of the most influential thinkers of the fennomanian movement, are present in the subsequent political thought and remain in the consequent political language. Indeed, studying Snellman's use of the word *stat* and the position of the state in his philosophical system seems to shed light to the particularities of the Finnish *valtio*.

J. V. Snellman

As a philosopher, Snellman developed a system that very closely follows Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's, and deviates from it only in particular, although often significant, points. Snellman's concept *stat* is very close to Hegel's *Staat*, but there is simultaneously an intriguing dissimilarity, which is significant for the term *valtio*.[17]

In Snellman's system of concepts, as in Hegel's, the Hegelian concept of *Sittlichkeit*, in Swedish *sedlighet*, is extremely central to the concept of state. The English translation of *Sittlichkeit*, 'ethical life', does not carry over the crucial element of *Sitten* [mores, habits, customs] as does the Swedish *sedlighet*, deriving from *sed*, which has the same meaning as *die Sitte*.

Sittlichkeit/Sedlighet, which in a Hegelian system is differentiated from 'the natural right' and 'morality', unites the points of view of abstract law and personal morality, transforming them into a view of social life with a special emphasis on the element of traditions carried over from former generations in the form of habits and customs. *Sittlichkeit/sedlighet*, in other words, joins formal law and inner morality as aspects of social life, and adds to it the ideal of a social change which respects the "inner" development of communal feelings of right and wrong. The state in both Hegel's and Snellman's system is *Sittlichkeit/sedlighet* in its purest form.

Snellman's emphasis when considering *sedlighet*, and consequently 'the state', is slightly different from Hegel's. In order to understand

Snellman's thought it is crucial to realize that for him, the concept of *sedlighet* represents a specific kind of action. In Snellman's use it combines legality and morality as attributes of action, meaning the quality of acting law-abiding and observing the existing habits on the one hand, and on the basis of one's own conscience and decision on the other. For Snellman, who sees himself as revising Hegel's thought, this combination, with a special emphasis on the component of morality, is of exceptional significance.

If action is normally conceived of as either following external rules or as autonomous, then Snellman can be seen as striving in political thought to overcome this dichotomy and to achieve a vocabulary in which it would not function. If, for example, in present day Swedish or Finnish one was able to say that a person "acted *siveellisesti*[18] [sedlig, sittlich]" or "acted in *valtio*", in a way which would immediately convey the thought of a person who in his/her acting accepts and is conscious of his/her cultural tradition, norms and laws and simultaneously relates to his/her culture in a creative way, then one could say that Snellman's political vocabulary is still alive today. However, it is impossible to express all of this in one word in present day Swedish or Finnish – in this respect, the Snellmanian terminology was not victorious in the long run. The term *sedlighet/siveellisyys* did not survive to the present in terms of its possessing a political meaning closely connected to the state. Still, I would argue – and I will show this later – some aspects of this meaning were preserved in the Finnish use of the concept of state.

The main counter-concept of 'the state' in Snellman's system is 'civil society', [Sw. *medborgerligt samhälle*],[19] and Snellman distinguishes the two as distinct types of action. Within civil society, the attitude connected to action is law-abiding, whereas within the state there is an additional attitude of creating something new: the agent positions him/herself as law-creating. In other words, 'action within civil society' (*verksamheten i medborgerliga samhället*) is a name for such an action in which the agent follows external rules, and 'action within the state' (*verksamheten i staten*) is the name for such an action in which the agent creates new rules. In Snellman's thought, these concepts are not differentiated according to specific areas of action, one can act as a school-teacher either 'within civil society' or 'within the state'. In the former case, one follows the existing norms of a school-teacher, in the

latter, one aims at reforming the existing norms according to one's own moral reflection concerning the common good. Consequently, action within civil society does not fully correspond the notion of *Sittlichkeit/sedlighet*, as it lacks the element of morality, whereas action within the state includes both legality and morality.

The concept of the state is also closely connected to the idea of the general will in the Hegelian vein. In Snellman's thought the general will is very clearly constructed by and visible in the action of political agents. The 'action within the state' corresponds to action with intention to approximate the general will by aiming at the common good. When 'acting within civil society' an agent strives to satisfy his[20] own interest, when 'acting within the state' an agent acts with the common good in mind. Consequently, the function of the general will – a construction embedded in the concept of the state in Snellman's thought – is that it serves as a horizon of the right and the criterion for good judgement in politics. A typical Snellmanian phrase about the state is: "Ethical life [*Sedlighet]* is in the state in a form that completely corresponds to its concept: in short an individual should act as the community acts, but there is nobody to tell him how it would act. He himself must decide what the will of the community is." The Snellmanian state concept thus designates a special kind of action – action that is characterized by *sedlighet*, which means that the individual positions himself as an independent interpreter of the community's will, designating its future based on its tradition.

The aforementioned philosophically defined concept of state in the system of concept does not cover all the uses of 'the state' by Snellman in his various texts. Snellman took part in contemporary discussions in non-philosophical terms, and *stat* most often appears in his texts in other than philosophical meanings.[21] But, if we pick up and pay attention to his peculiar phrase '*verksamheten i staten*' [action within state], something very interesting appears. In comparison to standard definitions of state as a power, an agent etc., and in contrast to either Skinner's or Koselleck's portrayals of the modern concept of the state, Snellman's concept of state does not invite its use as a subject in sentences, but instead in *verksamheten i staten*, *stat* strives to define a specific kind of *verksamhet*. An interesting feature of the Snellmanian conceptual framework, therefore, is that

with this state-concept of his one could not say that the state acts, owns or wills something, or even that the state aims at something, because the state is not an agent, a subject of action, but is rather an attribute of action.

Particularly interesting is that a similar action-oriented dimension of the state concept seems to be present in the use of language during the process of the fennomanian translation of the word *stat* in the 1840's. Let us now take a closer look at the linguistic needs at that time. This means determining the linguistic possibilities in the conceptual field of 'the state' prior to the introduction of the word *valtio*, and looking at how distinct words were used, in order to see what was lacking.

Linguistic Possibilities prior to *Valtio* and the Discourses of 'the State'

Before *valtio*, the words most commonly used to refer to a state and or other states in meaning V:1 of *Svenska Akademins Ordbok*, were *valta* [power], *ulkovallat* [literally "outside powers"] *valtakunta* [realm, kingdom], *kruunu* [the crown], *maa* [country, land], *maakunta* [land, county, region, province], *Suomi*, *Ruotsi* etc. [Finland, Sweden etc.], *Suomenmaa* [Suomiland], *isänmaa* [fatherland], *me* [us], *meillä* [at home]. Most of these words remain in use today. With the new position within the Russian Empire, the expressions *suuriruhtinaanmaa* [The land of the Grand Duke] and *suuriruhtinaskunta* [Grand Duchy] came into use.

For example, the official documents of the transitional period from the Swedish to the Russian Empire, which at the time were translated into Finnish, used various combinations of the aforementioned terms as well as *Suomen-maa* [Land of Finland], *maakunta* [land, province] *maa* [land], *Suuren ruhtinaan-maa*, [Land of the Grand Duke], *Suomi* [Finland]. Extracts of two documents from this period, (1) the 23.12.1808 circular letter of G.M. Sprengtporten after having been nominated as the general governor of Finland and (2) The Emperor's oath at Porvoo 29.3.1809, as well as a third document from a later time, (3) an appeal by the peasants of the Mikkeli region

to annul the language regulations in 1854, written by Antti Manninen, are attached to the end of this article in order to illustrate the word use in translations into Finnish and in written Finnish.

In analyzing the initial coining situation of *valtio* it is useful to examine which concepts functioned as counter-concepts for the state. It is equally interesting to examine which expressions were used nearly synonymously, and exactly how the usage of these nearly synonymous words differs from the usage of *valtio*; in what grammatical form and in what grammatical position the word is used within a sentence – for example, when is it used as a subject ("the state takes care"), when as an adjective (*valtiollinen*, [stately] like "stately matters, occupations, calling" or when in specific compounds, such as "*valtiomuoto*" [constitution, "the form of the state"], "*valtiopäivät*" [diet, assembly, "state- days"] "*valtiollis-yhteiskunnallinen*" [social-political, "stately-societal"], "*valtio ja kunta*" ["the state and the commune"].

In the first volume of the leading fennomanian newspaper, *Suometar*, published in 1847,[22] the word *valtio* occurs in various forms 13 times. Once as a synonym for *valtakunta* [Ger. *Reich*, Sw. *Rike*][23], 6 other times as an adjective[24], 6 times in the compound of *valtiopäivät* and once in the form of *valtio-neuvos*.[Sw. *Stats-råd*]. *Valtakunta* [realm] is used 22 times, several times in expressions like *valtakunnan asiat* [affairs of the state], which soon after is more frequently expressed as *valtiolliset asiat* ["*stately*" *affairs*][25]. When used in the economic meaning, the Swedish *stat* did not seem to require a translation in terms of *valtio*.[26]

The 1848 volume of *Suometar* was filled with news of the European political upheavals and constitutional meetings. The word *valtiopäivät* [diet, literally state-days in pl.], or *valtiopäivä* [diet, literally state-day, in sing.] occurs frequently and clearly stabilizes itself; there are 60 occurrences in the 1848 Suometar. In the meaning connected with international law, *valtio* appears 6-7 times, in a political (interior political, administrative apparatus) meaning 11 times, of which the polity tone is present in 4 occurrences. The adjective *valtiollinen* appears 5 times, and in addition there some occurrences of *valtio* in particular compounds, such as *yksivaltio*, *liittovaltio*, *kirkkovaltio valtiovarain (ministeri)* [single state, federal state, church state, minister of state finances].

On the basis of leafing through various texts from different periods of time[27], it seems to me that the *valtio*-vocabulary can be ex-

amined as divided into a few clearly separate areas of use, or discourses, some of which had already established themselves by the time the word valtio was taken into use, and some of which were established at that time. These are: 1) "international" or "international law" usage (states in war, relations between states, the interest of a state, foreign states, other states (often used in plural form "states"). 2) The economical use (state economy, ruled by the state, taken in the control of the state, was bought by the state, is realized by the state means, a state company, is in the service of the state, is employed by the state, the state feeds, the state pays etc.) 3) The administrative use (the state organs, the state administration, a state servant *[Gr. Beamter]*) 4) The juridical use (*valtiosääntö)* [constitution, literally "the rule of state", Sw. *Statsordning*, Gr. *Staatsordnung*], *valtiojärjestys* [constitution, literally "order of state", Sw *statsordning*, *författning* Gr. *Verfassung*], *valtion järjestysmuoto* [the regulated form of the state], *oikeusvaltio* [the rule of law, Ger. *Rechtstaat*]. 5) The political use in the meaning of 'polity' and 'political' (to form a state; the adjective use in many expressions such as 'political parties' *valtiolliset puolueet* [stately parties], 'political principles' *valtiolliset periaatteet* [stately principles], 'political democracy' *valtiollinen kansanvalta*, [stately democracy] (literally stately power of the people), 'political life' *valtiollinen elämä* [stately life], 'political issues' *valtiolliset kysymykset* [stately issues], 'political unity' *valtiollinen eheys* [stately unity]).

Before the word *valtio* was created, the words most frequently used to refer to states in the meaning of international law (1) were *vallat* [powers] and *ulkovallat* [foreign powers] or *valtakunta.* [realm, Ger. *Reich*, Sw. *rik*]. In the economic area (2), the word *kruunu* [the crown] was used quite frequently prior to the existence of the word *valtio.* [Also very clearly as a subject in sentences – first metonymically of a king]. In the area of administration the words *hallitus* [government], *kruunu* [crown] or *valtakunta* [Ger. *Reich*, Sw. *rike*] were used earlier.

When one pays attention to the usage of the older expressions available (*valtakunta, valta, kruunu*), they clearly indicate that the need for the new word during the 1840's was not felt in all of the later state-discourse areas, although it was very clearly felt in some. The older expression were used un-problematically in the areas of international law (1), in economic use (2) and in administration (3),

but not in the other two areas differentiated above, the juridical and the political. It may be concluded that it was precisely in the areas of juridical and genuinely political discourse that the need for a new word was originally felt. The word was created to express juridical forms of political life, as well as to describe the specifically political nature of activity.

This analysis alone is adequate to indicate a curious feature which persists as a factor that has shaped the Finnish language political culture for at least a century following this initial stage: there is an uncommon proximity between the elsewhere conceptually separated areas of 'the political' and 'the state'.[28] The curious proximity appears most vividly in the two most common expressions in the first years of the use of *valtio*: *valtiopäivät* and the adjective form *valtiollinen*.

Valtiopäivät [Diet]

In the beginning of the history of *valtio*, through the 1840's, 50's and 60's, valtio was most frequently used in the compound *valtiopäivät* [the diet session, literally state days] and in combinations based on it, such as *valtiopäivämies* [a representative, member of parliament, literally state-day-man]. *Valtiopäivät* established itself very rapidly and began to be used formally, for example, in the printed documents of the 1863 diet, when the Swedish documents referred to *Landtag*. *Valtiopäivät* and its combinations have retained their meaning from the times of the estate diet to their use in present day parliamentary language in which *valtiopäivät* refers to a session of the parliament (*eduskunta*).

Valtiopäivät is one separate word and its use need not necessarily be connected to any other usage of *valtio* or any particular concept of state. However, together with *Valtiosääntö* [constitution, literally rule or regulation of state] and *valtiomuoto* [constitution, literally form of state], as similar compounds connected with constitutional forms of political life, it joins the word *valtio* emphatically with legal forms of political life in well established formulations. In other languages, words such as "Parliament" and "constitution" do not have such a direct, positive and intimate connection to the "the state". Together

with *valtiosääntö* and *valtiomuoto* [regime], *valtiopäivät* creates in Finnish an exceptional tie between the state and the parliament, and the state and the constitution. This is a feature that could and should be taken into consideration when analyzing Finnish political culture – is clearly related to the fact that there is no automatic oppositional position between the parliament and the state in Finland, as in those systems in which the parliament has evolved as a counterpart of the monarchy, and has retained some aspects of that oppositional position in respect to the state apparatus or government. The notorious "weak parliamentarism" in the Finnish political system is connected to this conceptual development.

Valtiollinen ["Stately"]

The most interesting form of *valtio* for the analysis of the Finnish political vocabulary is its adjective form, *valtiollinen*, has been used with extreme frequency since the beginning. The adjective *valtiollinen*, used more or less in the present meaning of political is a very local feature. *Valtiollinen* appears from early on in such combinations as "*valtiolliset pyrinnöt*" [stately endeavors], "*valtiolliset tavoitteet*" [stately pursuits], "*valtiolliset harrastukset*" [stately occupations] etc., which are all indicative of a character of action.

Valtiollinen implies a concept of state that has very little to do with either the Skinnerian, Koselleckian or other "modern" concepts of state: it does not specifically involve a power that is detached from both the rulers and the ruled, and it does not involve an agent, the state as a grand persona. Indeed, it does not involve any concept of state as a power or agency. Instead, it does have a strong connection to the Snellmanian usage of *stat* as a characteristic of action. Although the Snellmanian concept of *sedlighet* and expressions such as *verksamheten i staten* [action within the state] did not remain as expressions of a special public character of orientation in the consequent political language, this aspect still seems to have been preserved in expressions such as *valtiollinen toiminta* [stately action], 'stately occupations' and 'stately pursuits', which all indicate the specifically political nature of action and which were, indeed, later re-

placed by the expressions *poliittinen toiminta* [political action], 'political occupations' and 'political pursuits', etc.

A shift from Snellmanian thought may well have occurred here through the fennomanian construction of the Finnish political language and the incorporation of the Snellmanian content of *stat* into the very word used in Finnish. While Snellman and other Swedish speakers, also made use of the Swedish adjective *politisk* [political], the word *poliittinen* [political] did not appear in Finnish until much later.[29] For more than a century *valtiollinen* remained characteristic of action, and was only replaced definitively by *poliittinen* [political] in the 1950s. One of the common phrases in the transition period was the compound *valtiollis-yhteiskunnallinen* [stately-societal], which then became merely *yhteiskunnallinen*[30] or *poliittinen*, and today *valtiollinen* is only rarely encountered in the meaning "political".

The special connection of the word valtio to expressions of political action may also have given a characteristic flavor to Finnish political culture. If all that is political is immediately connected with the state, it should not be surprising that, as is well known, there has been a tendency to turn all political movements into state-committees within the polity. The concept of political interests that are separate from the interests of the state has remained a fairly foreign concept. This feature is related to "weak parliamentarism", that is to very little structural opposition between the government, on the one hand and parliament and parties, on the other. Indeed, for a long time all the parties in parliament were, and sometimes still are, referred to as *valtiolliset puolueet* [stately parties], when the expression "political parties" might just as well be used.

Since *poliittinen* began its overtaking over the term *valtiollinen*, the use of the later has steadily declined. It is notable, however, that valtiollinen remains in use today, and my observation is that it is currently frequently applied in cases when a speaker wishes to "upgrade" his/her political message from a mere party dispute to the category of "above quarrel, generally agreeable, of great importance". In this context, it is noticeable that the word has also regained some of the old European meanings of 'the state', in that the status-aspect appears in the foreground of its use. Also, at times the ritual and the festive is particularly connected to the use of *valtiollinen*. In the context of the recent presidential inauguration, for example, media com-

mentators repeatedly referred to the ceremony as a "*valtiollinen tapahtuma*" [stately event], and the historian Matti Klinge specifically referred in his commentary to the very ceremony itself as a "*valtioteko*" [state act].

To return to the starting point and to the historians who have been arguing over the significance of the Porvoo meeting for the Finnish state, it seems to me that the question of the status of the Finnish state within the Russian Empire was less crucial for the formation of the word *valtio* in Finnish than is suggested by some historians. The word-formation seems to have more to do with the formation of the polity, with the form of political life and with the expression of political action. For an analyst of political culture, the fact that politics so forcefully came to be verbally associated with the state might well be one of the most interesting features of Finnish political vocabulary. At the moment of its birth, the Finnish 'state' had an intense meaning as a polity, an autonomously organized political field, and was less intended to refer to an agent in the international field among other states, and this contributed to the specific conflation of 'the state' and 'politics'. The vocabulary and usage that came to existence have lingered, and consequently 'the state' has continued to have a different area of use in Finnish in comparison to its use in many other political cultures.

Extracts of Documents

(1) The 23.12.1808 circular letter of G.M. Sprengtporten after having been nominated as the general governor of Finland:
"Kauvan on Suomen-Maa ollut yxi riidan ja kunnia-ahneuden aine. Turvattomuus ja pelko yhden heikon Hallitus-Wallan alla on tupehduttanut monen viriän Maanviljelijän toimen, on estänyt usiamman kuin yhden niistä asianhaaroista, jotka maan paremmaxi ylösauttamiseksi olisit mahdolliset olleet, on johdattanut Maakunnan heikoon tilaan ja pojes poistanut elatuskeinoista heidän luonnollisen enääntymisen. Tainkaltainen tila, tämä turvattomuus on nyt lakannut, ja Jumalan edeskatzomus on vihdoin, meidän onnexemme niin päättynyt, että Suomen-Maan tulevainen vakuus ja menestys... Suomen-Maan parhaxi."[31]

[Suomen-Maa [Suomi's Land] has long been an object of contention and greedy ambition. Insecurity and fear under a weak Government [literally Government-power] has frustrated many an industrious peasant's action, has obstructed more than one of those efforts that would have been possible to uplift the country, has led the province to a weak state and emptied the trades/professions/means of living of their natural increase. This kind of state, this insecurity, has now ended, and the Gods providence has at last, for our happiness so decided, that the future stability and success of Suomi-Land...for the best of Suomi-Land...]

(2) The Emperor's oath at Porvoo 29.3.1809:

"Teemme tiettäväksi: Että sitte kuin Me Sen Korkeimman edeskatzo-misesta olemma ottaneet Suuren Ruhtinaan-maan Suomen hallituxemme ala, olemma Me tämän kautta tahtoneet wahwistaa ja kiinnittää Maasa olewan Christillisen Opin ja perustuslait niin myös niitä vapauxia ja oikeuxia, kuin kukin sääty nimetysä Suuresa Ruhtinan-maasa erinomattain, ja kaikki sen Asuwaiset yhteisesti, niin ylhäiset kuin alhaiset tähän sakka Constitutionin eli säättämisen jälkeen owat natineet: Lupaaamme myös pitää kaikkia niitä etuja ja asetuxia wahwana ja järkähtämättömänä heidän täydellisessä woimasansa..."[32]

[We let it be known: that after we of the providence of the highest have taken the Grand-Duchy Suomi under our government, have we through this wished to strengthen and fasten the country's Christian doctrine and the constitutional laws and well as the freedoms and rights, such as each estate in this Grand Duchy separately and all its inhabitants in common, as well the noble as the humble up till now, following the constitution or a decree, have been enjoying. We also promise to keep all these privileges and decrees strong and immovable in their full power...]

(3) In an appeal by the peasants of the Mikkeli region to annul the language regulations in1854, Antti Manninen (1831-1866) wrote:

" ..., että Teidän Majesteettinne Armossa tahtoisi säättää määrätyn ajan kuluttua Suomenkielen yleiseksi pääkieleksi Ruotsinkielen siaan, sekä opetuslaitoksessa että hallitus-asioissa, niissä maakunnissa, joissa meitä Suomalaisia asuu, jonka kautta Suomalainen kansa voittaisi monta sanomattoman suurta ja hyödyllistä etua."[33]

[...that your majesty in his mercy would will to decree after a certain period of time the Finnish language to be the common main language instead of the Swedish language, as well in institutions of tuition as in governmental issues, in those provinces where we Finns live, through which the Finnish folk would win many an immense and beneficial advantage]

Notes

1 Jussila (1987), (1989) 88-90, (1995) 65.

2 Matti Klinge, in his latest presentation of the 19th century Finnish History *Keisarin Suomi* [The Emperor's Finland] states "Convening of the diet in Porvoo and hailing Alexander I the Grand Duke of Finland on the 29th of March 1809 made Finland a special state, the Grand Duchy of Finland." Klinge (1997), 12. (translation mine).

3 Klinge writes: "Nation, expressed in French by the Emperor in his speech should be understood more than anything as a reference to political nation, a state, in the same meaning as it appears in the French 1789 epression assemblée nationale, "national assembly". (Translation mine) Klinge's point seems to be that the conception of the Finnish state being born at Porvoo is accurate because, in fact, at that point, Finland started to function as an separate polity.

4 Tommila (1984) 74.

5 "The History of Political Concepts in Finland" is the joint project bringing together a group of Finnish historians, political scientists and philosophers in order to publish an anthology on the history of key concepts of political life in Finnish. In this context a series of comparative seminars with similar projects in other countries has been arranged in the late 1990's. The project is funded by the Academy of Finland and led by Matti Hyvärinen.

6 Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and social Concepts. A Critical Introduction* (Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1995.). Richter includes in *Begriffsgeschicte* three large German projects: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (GG), the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, and the *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820*. See Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds.) *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change.*

7 There is an abundance of literature on Snellman that repeats the clichees about the leading figure of fennomania, but there is surprisingly little original research on his thought.

8 Rapola 1960, 65.

9 Paavilainen 1983, 88-95. Paavilainen who studies the political language Finland in the 1850's bases her generalizations here partly on Rapola's earlier studies. For example Volmari Kilpinen writes in Suometar:. "Suomi on sentään eri maa, eri valle kuin Venäjä." [Finland is, after all, another country, another valle, than Russia.] and Rietrikki Polén in1861 in Mehiläinen "Suomalaisilla on tässä Suuriruhtinaskunnassa yhtä suuret wallastolliset oikeudet kuin ruotsia puhuvillakin ...". [The Finns have in this Gand-Duchy as large wallastolliset rights as those who speak

Swedish...] "Rauhanliitto (1809) oli wallasto-oikeudellinen teko". [The peace treaty (1809) was an act in the realm of wallasto-law.] The last formulation referring clearly to the German Staats-Recht, Swedish Stats Rätt.]

10 *Stat*: *Waltio* [the state]; *statsärende*: *waltiollinen (l. hallituksellinen asia)*, [state {adj.}, (E.I. governmental affair)]; *statsändamål*: *waltiollinen l. hallituksellinen päätarkoitus* [state {adj.} E.I. governmental end; *statskunst*: *waltio-taito* [state- know-how, Ger. *Staatskunst*]; *statslära*: *waltio-oppi* [state doctrine, Ger, *Staatslehre*]; *statsvetenskap*: *waltio-tiede* [state science, Ger. *Staatswissenschaft*] and *statskunskap*: *waltio-tieto* [state knowledge, Ger. *Staatskunde*].

11 For example:
   statsafsigt: *walta-kunnallinen l. hallituksellinen tarkoitus*
   statsangelägenhet: *walta-kunnallinen l. hallituksellinen l waltiollinen asia*
   Statsborgare: *maa-kuntalainen*
   Statsförfattning: *hallitus-muoto; (grundlag) perustus-laki*
   Statsförvaltning: *walta-kunnan hallitus*

12 The order of presentation also priviledges *valtio*. For example: *stat (rike)*: *waltio, wallasto, walta-kunta*; *till staten hörande*: *waltiollinen, wallastollinen, waltio-, waltion, wallaston*

13 For example:.
   Statsangelägenhet: *waltio-toimi, waltio-asia, waltiollinen asia l. toimi*
   statsborgare: *waltiolainen, waltion-jäsen*
   statsembete: *waltio- l. walta-wirka, waltiollinen wirka*
   statsfånge: *waltio-wanki, waltarikos-wanki*
   statsförbrytare: *waltio-rikollinen, walta-rikoksen teki jä*
   statsförvalttning: *waltion-hoito l. -hallinto*
   statshvälfning: *waltio-mulkkaus, wallan-kumous*

14 For example: Gellner (1983), pp.3-4.

15 These are: 2) translation of the Latin *respublica*, common course, common, community (1681 *Vinterstat*, a translation of (*respublica glacialis*), a text about Swedish tradition of winter fishing groups *fiskestaten* and 3) (vanished meaning) geography ("The Lapps do not know much about geography (*uti staterne sträcker sig kunskap inte långt*), they just know these specific regions close to their own.")

16 Another interesting aspect would be to see how the usage of *stat* differs between Swedish spoken in Sweden and Swedish spoken in Finland - the political vocabularies of the "*rikssvenska*", and "*finlandssvenska*" begin to divert some very soon after the separation of the political systems in 1809, but this is beyond the scope of this study.

17 The presentation on Snellman's thought here is based on my previous work on the subject. Pulkkinen (1989), (1997 - 1999), (1999).

18 *Siveellisyys* is how *sedlighet (Sittlichkeit)* was translated into Finnish, and the present meaning does not have any political connotation. It refers to morality in sexual matters. For.ex. a *siveellisyyspoliisi* [siveellisyys-police] raids prostitutes. The thinning down of the thick moral meaning of the notion of *siveellisyys* into a very limited usage within sexual domain would be an interesting topic of study of conceptual history in itself.

19 The concept of civil society did not survive in the Finnish realm of concepts in its Hegelian and Snellmanian as a counter concept of state and defined as a-political, merely law-following, type of action. Neither did it keep its Hegelian meaning referring to a system of necessity. Rather, today, civil society [*kansalaisyhteiskunta*] refers in Finnish as in many other languages to non-institutional political sphere in contrast to the state as institution.

20 It is clear that 'acting in the state' is reserved to men in Snellman's thought.

21 Snellman's concept *stat* has other dimensions, too, the state also is an abstract subject, a "grand persona" in a Koselleckian meaning. But in Snellmanian use this persona, as an abstract will, is primarily a consciousness, not an agent. Only individuals act, as Snellman often emphasizes. Snellman also uses the word *stat* in his texts in a more conventional meaning when referring, for example, to various constitutions constitutions as forms of state, or of the state as an institution.

22 The writers of the volume are A.E. Ahlqvist, D.E.D. Europaeus, P. Tikkanen and A. Warelius.

23 This is in a printed story telling about kings and realms, in the same story *valtakunta* is used more frequently. "*Sillä lienee jo aika meidänki kerran käydä omaa valtioammeki taasen katsomassa, niin arvelivat kumpasetki veljet: Pengo myöntyi, kuningas antoi kummalleki rykmentin sotamiehiä, he läksivät.*" [It should be time for us to go and inspect our valtio too, pondered both brothers: Pengo accepted, the king gave both a regiment of solders, and they left...] SMTR1847-23-2

24 I *Itsekunki kansan edestys ja pysähdys on kolminainen: tiedollinen (intellectuell), ruumiillinen (materiell), valtioinen (administrativ).* SMTR1847-2-1 [For each people's progress and stagnation consists of three components: intellectual (*intellectuell*), material (*materiell*), stately (*administrativ*).

II Rinnatusten ja yhteydessä kulkevat kansojen tiedolliset , ruumiilliset ja valtiolliset toimet ja niiden katsastaminen on yleisessä Historiassa luonnollisin , jos muka mielit täydellisesti päästä tuntemaan nykysen aikasi tilaa. [Side by side and together do the knowing, bodily, and stately activities of peoples move, so to examine them in general History is most natural way if you aspire to completely know the condition of the

present time. SMTR1847-2-1

III Kanava näytti jo ensikerran ilmautuessaan olevansa vapauden ja valon rakas ystävä ja sen seureeksi myös Suomenkin sekä kielellisen että valtiollisen edistymisen vahva puolustaja , ja koko aikansa on sitten näihin asti yhtä riivakkana ja vilkkaana pysynyt .[*Kanava* showed already at its first appearance that it was a dear friend of liberty and light and as a result also a strong defendant of Finlands both linguistic and stately progress, and the rest of its time it has remained just as striving and active.] SMTR1847-16-2

25 For exmple: Preussissa ovat yleiset Säädyt katsotut sopiviksi ja otetut Valtakunnan yhteisiä asioita valvomaan. SMTR1847-18-4 [In Prussia the general estates have been seen capable and given the position of governing the common affairs of the land.].

26 Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seurat olisivat myös tieten mieluiset tässä tekemään mitä varansa myöden antavat , ja armollinen Esivalta , jonka juur näinäkin päivinä ei ole' nähty säästävän Maan yhteisiä varoja (Finska Statsmedel)[Finnish state funds] toimittaissa mitä Se katsoo tarpeelliseksi SMTR1847-17-3

27 My texts have included excerpts of *Suomen Kuvalehti*, *Helsingin Sanomat*, parlamentary documents and party manifestoes from various periods of time and various literary and academic work. I am greatful for the Conceptual history project: especially Eeva Aarnio, Matti Hyvärinen, Susanna Noki and Ismo Pohjantammi for crucial help in processing the textual material.

28 A thorough comparative analysis of the Swedish used in Finland and Finnish language would be an interesting task. Also a comparison between the Swedish used in Sweden and the Swedish used in Finland in this area is lacking. There is, however, no doubt of a clear difference in the early use between Swedish and Finnish in that the adjective *politisk* is in use in Swedish and that there is no adjective form derived form *stat* commonly in use for 'political' in Swedish as there is in Finnish.

29 According to Kari Palonen who has studied the concept of politics in Finland *poliittinen* was in use in the language of politicians and journalists from the 1920's on, but only in the pejorative meaning of tactics and game. Only from the 1950's on it started to take the position of *valtiollinen* in the academic and official langauge in description of political events and action. More precisely of this transition in Palonen 1999.

30 More precisely on *yhteiskunta* (society) in Pauli Kettunen 2000. Printed in this volume.

31 *Suomen historian dokumentteja*, pp. 12-13. (printed originally in Finnish)

32 Ibid. p. 14.

33 Ibid. p. 51-52. Compare also the Emperor's letter 24.4.1861 in which translation into Finnish one *valtio*-word, more or less in a meaning "administratively", appears in the middle of several expression of *Suomenmaa*, *maakunta* and *suuriruhtinaanmaa*:

"… tarpeelliseksi noudattamiseksenne, ja että keskustelemukset valiomiehille esiin tulevissa asioissa kaikin puolin täyttäisivät mitä niillä olemme tarkoittaneet, tahdomme.. että kaikkea, Suomenmaan hyväksi tulevata…

… ja alamaisuudessa lausua, miten ne, maakunnan tarpeille lähinnä vastaavalla tavalla, …

Tällä olemme tarkoittaneet, mainittuin valiomiesten kautta siitä saada tarkan ja luotettavan tiedon, mitä oikeastansa tarvitaan suuriruhtinaanmaan edistymiseksi hengellisessä tointumisessa ja varallisesa nenestyksessä, sekä mitkä toimet, joko sittenkuin maakunnan säätyjä niistä on kuullustettu, taikka valtio-hoinnolisesti, voisivat edesauttaa tätä sydämellemme alati kallista tarkoitusta…

Aleksander

Ministeri-valta-Sihteeri, kreivi Armfelt" [Tammikuun valiokunnan päytäkirjat, s. 6-8] , Suomen historian dokumentteja s. 104-105.

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Pauli Kettunen

YHTEISKUNTA

– 'Society' in Finnish

It has been argued in debates on postmodernity and globalization that the modern concept of society is somehow too strong and too limited to sustain. It is too strong while referring to "an integrated holistic entity" (Featherstone 1995, 134) and too limited due to its ties with the nation-state. However, at the same time "civil society" has achieved the status of a highly desirable objective, as it has been confronted with the figure of the patronizing state. Furthermore, "community" has been put forward as the means of diagnosis and cure for a wide array of troubles in society caused by the activities of markets and the state. These topics of Western academic and political debates indicate that the meanings of 'society' are established in various contexts, and different 'societies' may appear in the same discourse and in the speech of the same actor. However, these debates also imply that the ambiguity of 'society' is less than it used to be mantled by its being taken for granted (cf. Beck 1997, 49-55). In what follows, I will contribute to this dismantling through historical examination of 'society' in the Finnish political context.

Yhteiskunta is the Finnish word for 'society'. It was introduced in the formative phase of the Fennomanian nationalism during which the Finnish political vocabulary was consciously "invented by the people whose educational and cultural language (together with Latin and German) was Swedish" (Klinge 1993, 70). According to the Finn-

ish etymological dictionary, *yhteiskunta* appeared for the first time in 1847, and its earliest recorded use in the "current meaning" was in 1865. Indeed, even though *yhteiskunta* is one of the neologisms from the late1840s, it was, initially, not a translation of the Latin *societas*, German *Gesellschaft* or Swedish *samhälle*. For this purpose, there were some other candidates which only later were replaced by *yhteiskunta*. This observation, as such, implies questions on the establishing of the "current meaning" of *yhteiskunta*.

By means of various conceptual distinctions, such as those elaborated by Quentin Skinner with support of the speech act theory (see especially his texts in Tully ed.1988), it is possible to argue that the meaning of "current meaning" is, in itself, ambiguous. The meanings of a word are constituted in the act of using the word and, moreover, it is crucial to take into account the meanings for this act itself, including its preconditions, intentions, outcomes and responses. In both dimensions, the meanings are constituted in contexts that change and vary. Meanings are shaped through the modes by which the concept operates in the (re)structuration of linguistic and non-linguistic practices, in opening and widening, closing and limiting the horizons of action and in struggles to define an agenda. Historical analysis of a contemporary concept is not simply a problem of *how* or *why* the "current meaning" has become as it is. It is equally important to ask *what* it is that it has become.

Here, this means an effort to take reflexive distance from those notions of the "current meaning" of *yhteiskunta* which I have learnt within Finnish cultural contexts as a Finnish-speaking researcher in political and social history. In accomplishing this, one point of reference lies in current debates in which 'society' is questioned and 'civil society' and/or 'community' are advocated. Whilst I relate my argumentation to these debates, texts produced in them are also included in the source material the historical interpretation of which forms the other aspect of problematizing the "current meaning" of *yhteiskunta*.

The source material, in general, consists of newspapers and journals, pamphlets, party programmes, administrative documents, scholarly studies, handbooks, dictionaries, etc.[1] These texts not only differ due to the specific historical contexts which have to be reconstructed for making sense of them, but also represent different levels

of reflexivity in their dealing with 'society'. I do not focus on the history of theoretical reflections on society nor on the discourses of social sciences. These practices are included in the study as just more or less effective parts in the (trans)formations and tensions of what can be, somewhat vaguely, called political languages or discourses. It is crucial to trace variations and changes in the level of reflexivity in the usage of 'society'. Admittedly, in this paper, texts expressing a reflexive attitude for this concept are "over-represented". Nevertheless, even in reading these texts, my main interest is in the history of the taken-for-granted 'society'.

By reflecting on pre-understanding of the "present meaning" of *yhteiskunta*, some guiding problems and hypotheses can be raised. They concern traits especially pointed out as unsustainable aspects of the modern "idea of society" (Touraine 1995, 144-145): the ties of society to the nation-state; the notion of society as an integrated holistic entity; and the notion of progress and rationalization as inherent powers and qualities of society. However, I will not just show the specific modes in which these traits might have appeared in Finland, but also oppose, by means of the Finnish case, any monolithic and unquestioned view on the meanings of 'society'.

There are grounds for the hypothesis that, indeed, something particular can be found in the ways that the Finnish concept of society has been fixed to the nation-state, referred to an integrated entity with its own subjectivity, and included progress as an inherent code in society itself. However, several particular features seem to be common to the Nordic political languages. In the Nordic context, then, we can find some Finnish peculiarities, probably partly common to the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking Finns and partly specific to the Finnish language or political cultures among Finnish-speaking Finns.

Finnish Society in the Nordic Context

By examining the case of Finland, it is possible to question some Swedish assumptions of the national uniqueness of Sweden. This concerns, most obviously, the relationships between 'society' and 'state'.

In Sweden, the right-wing critique of the "patronizing" welfare state in the 1980s made use of conceptual historical evidence. Critics observed that in the Swedish political language no clear distinction existed between 'state' (*stat*) and 'society' (*samhälle*). Not infrequently, 'society' appears where one might expect 'state', 'public power' or even 'government'. Critics concluded that this, supposedly, unique conceptual confusion indicated a weakness of liberalism and a kind of Social Democratic totalitarianism. To overcome these defects, "civil society" (*civilt samhälle*) had to be created or revitalized (for this debate, see Boréus 1994, 269-274, 325-326, 334; Trägårdh ed. 1995).

One cannot deny that the Swedes, indeed, tend to confuse 'state' and 'society'. It is 'society' that has to carry the responsibilities for social security instead of private and voluntary actors, or, in the opposing view, should leave many of its previous functions to private and voluntary sectors. However, the confusion had begun much earlier than the era of the welfare state, wide public sector, and corporatism, i.e. those practices that are sometimes mentioned as major links between state and society and as basis for the tendency "to unify or even identify 'state', 'society,' and 'people'" (Knudsen & Rothstein 1994, 218). Furthermore, this conceptual phenomenon does not only appear in "Social Democratic" Sweden, but also in Finland where Social Democracy has been much weaker. *Yhteiskunta* often refers to the state (*valtio*; this term, as such, is obviously, in accordance with its Scandinavian and continental European correlates, much more commonly used than 'state' in English). The conflation of 'state' and 'society' is, in fact, common to Nordic political languages, even though differences may exist in the frequency of referring to state (and municipalities) as 'society'.

To be sure, 'society' as an actor is not a specifically Nordic phenomenon. Sociology provided its modern society with the capacity for acting as subject: society used to set the norms, distribute the roles and teach the values. In less theoretical discourses, statements in which society expects, requires or condemns something are familiar outside of *Norden*, as well (cf. Bowers & Iwi 1993). I cannot exclude that 'society' even in non-Nordic contexts may sometimes refer to public authorities or, at least, to public funds and tax-payers as their creators. Nevertheless, it would not be difficult to find examples of such "governmental" uses of *samhälle* (Swedish), *samfund*

(Danish), *samfunn* (Norwegian), *samfélag* (Icelandic) or *yhteiskunta* (Finnish), in which *society*, *société* or *Gesellschaft* could not serve as translations.

One line of interpreting this "confusion" might argue that Nordic political languages have, for some reasons, conserved elements from the time when society was not conceptually separated from the state. *Societas civilis et politica*, 'civil society' or 'political society', could refer to fulfilling the human nature of the *zoon politikon* above domestic society; to the association distinguished from religious society; or to the opposite of the state of nature, i.e. the civil state achieved on a contractual basis (Riedel 1975a; Bobbio 1989). Pointing out this long continuity in the history of political ideas, Mats Dahlkvist (1995) opposes those Swedish discussants who see the intertwining of 'state' and 'society' as a Swedish peculiarity and as evidence of a weak liberal tradition.

Peter Aronsson as well as Lars Trägårdh approve the view on Swedish (or Nordic) specificity, but their interpretations are different from those of the initiators of this debate. Aronsson (1995a, 1995b) suggests that a major impetus for *samhälle* becoming a term for state stemmed from the tradition of the local self-government of freehold peasants. In the middle of the 18th century, *samhälle* was introduced as the concept through which Enlightenment ideas and ideals were attached to local practices. The references of the term were then extended to larger political units, notably those to which the concept of nation would be applied. Trägårdh (1995, 1997), in turn, concludes that in *Norden* the notion of a separate (civil) society could not develop because, on the basis of peasant egalitarianism, liberation of the individual was not targeted against excessive state power but against the privileges and patriarchal powers of those between the state and the people. Another important factor preventing the conceptual separation of state and society was the absence of conflict between state and (the Lutheran) church.

All these interpretations leave some questions unanswered. It is easy to find that, in Nordic political languages, a 'society' also appears over which a separate 'state' uses power as well as a 'society' that in some sense is outside of the power sphere of the 'state'. Furthermore, one can recognize a 'society' that is not defined through state/society distinctions. It is a sociological entity in a sense criti-

cized in debates on postmodernity and globalization as the modern idea of society. This 'society' is in another way related to the state: through its being self-evidently limited by the borders of the nation-state and the population within them. This 'society' may, then, include within itself the state or, rather, "the political institutions" or "the political system".

The Nordic society-as-state itself bears different historical strata of meanings as well as meanings stemming from different discourses. These meanings can be actualized and modified in various ways, by various combinations and hybridizations in different contexts. Moreover, different intersections may occur between these meanings of 'society' and those in which the term does not refer to the state. In so far as 'society' comes to replace 'state', it may not only be a matter of actualizing meanings of the term from "before" state/society distinction, but this may imply that 'state' is provided with properties associated with the non-state society. Correspondingly, there are grounds for assuming that 'society' referring to the state may have been transported, as particular rhetorical charges, into those uses of 'society' where the term as such is no synonym of 'state'.

From this direction, we may approach differences between Finland and Sweden. It is reasonable to suggest that 'society' in referring to the state has been a conceptualization for different modes of action and thought in Finland and Sweden. Arguably, the notion of politics as a non-political fulfilling of externally determined national necessities, which are mediated through the nation-state, has been stronger in Finland than in Sweden, due to diverging political experiences and hegemonic settings (Kettunen 1997, 122). There are also remarkable historical differences between Sweden and Finland concerning the ways in which some important practices linking the "state" and "society" were developed in the 20th century. In Sweden, much higher status was addressed to the principle of regulating industrial labour relations through mutual agreements between the strongly organized collective parties, instead of direct legislative interventions. My hypothetical conclusion is that in Sweden, the primary aspect of the society-as-state has been the conception of state in terms of "society", whereas in Finland, the society-as-state has, rather, meant the providing of "society" with the normative contents of the state.

This hypothesis derives some further support from the lexical observation that, in an international and even Nordic comparison, the Finnish word for society, *yhteiskunta*, is at present exceptionally exclusive in relation to anything smaller (or larger) than the nation-state. This exclusion is paradoxical as the word itself appears to be, in a double sense, very "communitarian", combining the adjective *yhteinen* (common) and the noun *kunta* (commune).

In differentiating from '*société*' or 'society', *yhteiskunta* does not have, and has seldom had, the meaning of the distinguished social intercourse of the upper classes (*seurapiiri* in Finnish). Neither can *yhteiskunta* be applied to a voluntary association or an economic enterprise as can be '*société*', 'society' and '*Gesellschaft*'. In these respects, *yhteiskunta* resembles the Swedish *samhälle*, which, however, used to have such meanings (Aronsson 1995a). In the Nordic context, the most remarkable current peculiarity of *yhteiskunta* is its lack of applicability to local communities. For example, in Swedish (in Sweden as well as in Finland), *samhälle* can be applied to the local community, the term for 'local community' being *lokalsamhälle*. In Finnish the corresponding usage of *yhteiskunta* is no longer appropriate – although it used to be at least until the 1930s. The current translation of the Swedish *lokalsamhälle* would not be *paikallis-yhteiskunta* but *paikallisyhteisö*. Finnish *yhteiskunta* is more unambiguously than the Swedish *samhälle* fixed to the borders of the nation-state.[2]

The range of the meanings of *yhteiskunta* has been limited in such a way that, more clearly than most of its correlates in other languages, this term seems to manifest the appearance of the "second nature" – a Marxian characterization of bourgeois society. *Yhteiskunta* is, at the same time, both impersonal and natural. Despite the elements of the word itself, the explicit meanings of either personal community or intentional voluntary association and agreement have disappeared. This does not exclude the fact that such connotations might exist in the Finnish concept of society. One of the paradoxes with this concept is that this type of connotations may be found, in the first place, in the use of *yhteiskunta* as a term for the state. It is reasonable to presume, however, that these connotations are weaker than in the corresponding use of *samhälle*. While the state in both cases is provided with the legitimizing notion of common interest, *yhteiskunta* seems to present

this common interest to a larger extent as being something pre-given and inherent within the state. The establishing of this meaning of *yhteiskunta* is the first topic in the following historical interpretation based on a still preliminary and partial reading of the source material.

The Invention of Yhteiskunta

The introduction and translation of *societas civilis* in 18th century Sweden (e.g. *borgerlig sam(man)lefnad, borgerligt sällskap, borgerligt samhälle*) is beyond the scope of my study (cf. Saastamoinen 1999). Still, it must be kept in mind that in the political philosophy of natural law with its contract theory, the concept of civil or political society did not refer to any sphere distinct from the state, but expressed a particular understanding of the state. This is true, for instance, for the meanings of *samhälle* and *samfund* in the works of the Ostrobothnian reformer-clergyman Anders Chydenius (1888 [1778] § 11).

Some of the first attempts to translate *societas civilis* into the language of the common people in the Finnish provinces of Sweden seem to have occurred within the confrontation between natural law and contract theory, and the Pietist interpretations of Luther's two regiments (spiritual and temporal) and the Lutheran order of *hustavlan* (Swedish) or *huoneentaulu* (Finnish) with its three estates (the spiritual estate, the secular authority, and the household). Thus, in the sermon book by the Pietist clergyman Johan Wegelius, from the mid-18th century, the expression *maailmallinen cansakäyminen* (worldly intercourse) was, obviously, a translation for *societas civilis* and, at the same time, a target for heavy criticism (Kauppinen 1977, 64). However, *maailmallinen cans(s)akäyminen* appeared in affirmative use as well. In the Swedish Law of 1734, the field to be protected by the law was named as *det borgerliga sällskapet*. In the Finnish translation of the law, published in 1759, the corresponding expression was *yhteinen maailmallinen canssakäyminen*. This was, obviously, compatible with the Lutheran division of two regiments, yet the presentation of the temporal regiment with the terms for *societas civilis* indicates the influence of another political language, that of modern natural law (Saastamoinen 1999).

Let us, however, turn to the decades during which the Finnish political vocabulary was actually invented, beginning from the 1840s, about forty years after Finland had been connected to the Russian Empire. Both *valtio* (state) and *yhteiskunta* appeared in public use in 1847, and both were neologisms, although the latter was more directly composed of previous elements. However, the collective referred to by *yhteiskunta* was not the civil or political society, neither in contractarian nor Hegelian senses. To apply a distinction by Reinhart Koselleck (1979, 121), the semasiological perspective on the word *yhteiskunta* is as important as the onomasiological perspective on the activities and relationships that were later conceptualized by this word.

Yhteiskunta was introduced as a juridical term for the whole consisting of the landed properties in a single village. It provided a substitute for various provincially used Finnish words (*jakokunta*, *lohkokunta*) and the corresponding Swedish terms *skifteslag* or *samfällighet*. The entity referred to as *yhteiskunta* in the mid-19th century was a target for or a result of an administrative act from above: the execution of the Enclosure (*isojako*) that had been initiated by the Crown of Sweden in the 18th century.

Pietari Hannikainen has been given the honour of introducing *yhteiskunta*, notably in his translation of a juridical guide in 1847. He was a Fennomanian author but earned his living as a surveyor (*maanmittari*), a civil servant who concretely dealt with the entities he chose to call *yhteiskunta*. At the end of the book he had translated, he felt himself obliged to add a terminological correction: in the chapter dealing with the Enclosure, there appeared the word *yhteyskunta* although the right term was *yhteiskunta* (R. Trapp, *Asianajaja,* 1847, according to Rapola Database, Kktk). As a topic for speculation, the causes of the error are less interesting than the motives for the correction, i.e. Hannikainen's willingness to distinguish between *yhteiskunta* and *yhteyskunta*.

The latter element in both these compounds, *kunta*, would later (since the 1860s) become the word for the secular local (self-governing) units (municipalities), but even after then, this word sustained its old popularity as the latter part in various compound words. In a dictionary from the 1820s (Renvall 1826), the Latin equivalents for *kunta* were *complexus* and *collectio*. For Hannikainen, the meaning of the combination of *yhteys* and *kunta* was different from that connecting

yhteinen (yhteis-) to *kunta*. *Yhteys*, meaning connection, provided *yhteyskunta* with a notion of an association through mutual connections of its members. Hannikainen himself had used this term for voluntary association in the newspaper *Kanava*, which he edited and published in Viborg in 1845-1847 (e.g. *Kanava* 1846:6, Rapola Database, Kktk). Obviously, this was not a proper connotation in a word to be used for a collective that was a target for or a result from an administrative act.[3] Instead, *yhteiskunta* in which the adjective *yhteinen* (with its roots in the word *yksi*, one) referred to a more fixed, possessive collectivity could better serve as a concept for such an order.

Yhteyskunta – but only later *yhteiskunta* – was one of the candidate translations of *societas*, *Gesellschaft* and *samhälle*. It could be applied to the state (*Suometar* February 16,1848) as well as to the village as a unit of popular education and moral self-control within a local parish (cf. Honkanen 1999, 106). There were some other candidates that still more than *yhteyskunta* implied mutuality, reciprocity and association (*keskuuskunta, seuruuskunta, liittokunta, kan(s)sa-kunta(isuus), kansallisyhteys, yhteyselämä*). However, since the mid-1860s, these terms were more and more replaced by the word that had referred to a local collective of landed properties (cf. Europeaus 1853, 503; Ahlman 1865, 622). Perhaps this change was not entirely accidental.

Thus far, I can only suggest hypothetically that this was a part of the same change in which the meanings or, at least, connotations of the terms with the beginning *kans(s)a-* became altered. In these terms, the meaning of *kans(s)a* corresponding to the preposition 'with' (in Swedish: *med*) was no longer actualized; instead, the meaning of *kansa* corresponding the noun 'people' (in Swedish: *folk*) was. Thus, *kansalainen* became associated with membership in the *kansa*, *folk*, a given collective entity, while it lost those meanings of mutuality and of membership in civil society which remained evident in the corresponding Swedish term *medborgare*.[4] It seems to have been in line with this change that *yhteiskunta* was substituted for *yhteyskunta*, *keskuuskunta* and *seuruuskunta* – these three terms all disappearing from the Finnish language during the late 19th century. At the same time, distinct terms were adopted for voluntary association, be it the company form of economic enterprise or the organized unit of popular movement. In the late 19th century, these words, *yhtiö* and *yhdistys*, were still partly used synonymously – *yhtiö* had not yet been delimited for an eco-

nomic company as it later was – but it was no longer possible to use them in connection with state or society as it had been.

The adjective *yhteinen*, included in *yhteiskunta*, deserves further attention. In many contexts, *yhteinen* was, in the Finnish of the19th century, used as a synonym to *yleinen* (general). It is reasonable to assume that this (later weakened) synonymity of *yhteinen* and *yleinen* contributed to the conceiving of 'society' in terms of the state (rather than the conceiving of 'state' in terms of society). True, *yhteiskunta* was occasionally used, even without any attribute, as the term for the contractarian civil or political society, or for Hegelian civil society (Perander 1866). Nevertheless, any idea that *yhteiskunta* would be a sphere for promoting private interests got in trouble with the conventions of language. Instead, the thought according to which *yhteiskunta* represented the general and public was excellently compatible with those conventions. *Yhteiskunta* could easily combine the (already intertwined) meanings of the Swedish terms *samhälle* and *det allmänna*, the literal translation of the latter being 'the general' and its reference being the state. Moreover, these connotations of *yhteiskunta* contributed to intertwining of the notions of the autonomous public sphere and public authorities. *Yhteisö* that later became the word for 'community' could, in the late 19th century, be used not only as a synonym for *yhteiskunta* but also for *yleisö*, public audience, *allmänhet* in Swedish.

However, the direction in which the meanings of *yhteiskunta* were shaped was not only an intra-language problem. It was not only a matter of translating words, but also of making sense of something and creating conceptual resources.

Hegelian Tradition without Civil Society

Romanticism, Hegelianism and the natural law with its contract theory landed in Finland simultaneously and were, intertwined and simultaneously, applied to the Acts of 1809. All of them also worked in the same direction, united the nation and the state in one organism and projected to the past, to the year 1809, the act and moment of the birth of the consolidated nation-state.

The historian Osmo Jussila (1987, 64) refers in this quote to the Finnish nationalist interpretation of what had occurred between the Emperor Alexander I and the Estates of Finland in Porvoo 1809, after the occupation of Finland by Russia. The quotation includes a concise characterization of the theoretical and political contexts and intentions through which 'society' was shifted from political philosophy into the language of political practices and struggles.

Yhteiskunta became a term for the united nation and state. It reflected a particular way of looking at this "organism" rather than any notion of a distinctive sphere or a particular type of relationships or activities within it.

This is not the whole story. As we shall later see, popular ways of using *yhteiskunta* appeared in more limited or differentiated senses – not only as a term for society in contrast to the state but also as a term for the state in contrast to something that might be reasonably called society. An *yhteiskunta* also developed that defined the main target of social knowledge, concerned about the "social question" through which 'society' was connected with the concept of class (*luokka*).

However, even these meanings of *yhteiskunta* were inflected by its ties to the nation-state. The political potential of the concept would lie in its being both taken for granted and ambiguous. The concept achieved such status in political discourse at the same time as it became obvious that the theoretical reflections making a distinction between state and civil society quite rarely turned into conceptualizations of political practices. A question of special importance concerns the role of Hegelian tradition in Finland. Arguably, this tradition became influential in Finland, but in a way that pushed off the concept of civil society.

The Hegelian distinction between state and civil society was in Finland most systematically presented by J. V. Snellman, with some original modifications. The term *samhälle,* as such, did not even in the Hegelian context turn to express something of a specific sphere separate from the state. According to *Läran om staten* by Snellman (1993 [1842], 333-335), state (*stat*), civil society (*medborgerligt samhälle*) and family (*familj*) were all societies, each of them a particular type of *samhälle.* At the same time, both civil society and family were "necessary moments in the state". In this sense, civil society and family were included in the particular society constituted by the state, yet Snellman

certainly did not suggest anything like the later sector or level divisions within an all-embracing society.

As to its extent and the number of its members, civil society was identical with the state; their difference was not the one between the smaller and larger societies. Civil society was a particular mode of moral action and consciousness of individual, defined on the one hand by the need, will and education of the individual, and on the other hand by the particular social institutions (laws) that govern the action of the individual in the way that all other members of the society can act equally freely. The individual was a member of the civil society (*medborgare*) in so far as he tried to promote his own private interests without hurting the freedom of the rest of its members, whereas as a member of the state (*statsborgare*), he oriented his action to the general, the preservation of the state itself, without remaining a non-free instrument in the service of the state.

After Snellman, the distinction between state, civil society (*kansalaisyhteiskunta*)[5] and family preserved the status of being occasionally referred to as a disposition of the "human common life" (e.g. Rosenqvist 1923, 5). However, the way Snellman himself defined the relationship between civil society and the state made possible a political reception in which the concept of civil society would vanish.

Medborgerligt samhälle by Snellman did not refer to economies in the sense Hegel's *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* did. For Snellman, the distinction between state and civil society was based, as Tuija Pulkkinen (1989, 128-131) notes, on the difference between various acts of the individual or even between the ethical orientations of visibly similar acts. As *medborgare*, the individual acted law-abidingly, while as *statsborgare* his action was ethical in a deeper sense expressed in the national spirit. The action in the state was more valuable than the action in civil society, yet even the latter was necessary and useful. However, by taking a step forward from this position, a possibility for a further modification was opened, which indeed seems to have happened within Fennomania. The mode of acting that Snellman associated with the state was not only conceived of as the higher mode, but was also expected to overcome and replace the lower mode of acting, that associated by Snellman with civil society. However, *samhälle* and, still less, *yhteiskunta* were not appropriate terms to be used for the latter type of action. *Yhteiskunta* itself represented the

general in contrast to the acts motivated by private and particular interests.

Thus, one of the most prominent Fennomanian leaders, Yrjö Koskinen, wrote in 1874 in his series of articles which established the "labour question" on the political agenda:

> The society (*yhteiskunta*), the state (*valtio*), is the basis on which all historical progress is grounded, and it is the task of the society (*yhteiskunta*) to watch that the selfish interests and efforts are in no field of the society (*yhteis-elämä*), including the economy, allowed to influence with such a freedom that the happiness of the weaker would be lost in this struggle or that the progress of society (*yhteiskunta*) itself would be damaged (Koskinen 1874, 4).

No longer was the state categorized as one particular type of society as it had been in the study of Snellman in 1842 as well as in the newspaper *Suometar* on 16 February 1848 where a particular "society (*yhteyskunta*) called state (*valtio*)" had been discussed. For Koskinen, the state was not *a* but *the* society. Yet there can be seen two meanings of society in the quoted text. In addition to the explicit identification of society with the state, there was another level, referred to by the word *yhteis-elämä* that literally means 'common life'. It corresponded to the Swedish word *sammanlefnad* that had been used for *societas*, e.g. in the 18th century translations of Locke and Pufendorf (Saastamoinen 1999). In the above passage of Koskinen's text, *yhteis-elämä* bore the meaning of the Hegelian *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (as had *yhteyselämä* in the article in *Suometar* in1848). However, there was little analytical power in this distinction between two 'societies'. In this article of Koskinen, the ambiguity of *yhteiskunta* was already evident. *Yhteiskunta* was supposed to regulate *yhteiskunta* to solve the *yhteiskunnallinen* (social) question. *Yhteiskunta* appeared as the synonym of state, as the practices to be regulated by the state, as the order created by this regulation, and as the totality within which even the state was situated. Obviously, many ingredients of the "current meaning" of *yhteiskunta* were included in this text.

The *yhteiskunta* of Koskinen got its meaning in a political context in which "the will of the people" was made by the Fennomanians to a crucial political argument and criterion of legitimate power

(Liikanen 1995), but in which, at the same time, the people and their will were experienced as a "problem" needing definition and governance. *Yhteiskunta* expressed the demand for the moral relationship between the state and the people. There were, implicitly, two normative 'societies', the one referring to the state that fulfilled the good (and, hence, the will) of the people, the other meaning the people living in the order that was established by the state.

The political context was international, in various ways. One of the most striking aspects in Koskinen's article on labour question was what might be called a strategy of the educated elite for a peripheral country. The strategy presumed that "problems" were anticipated by keeping an eye on the more highly developed countries and learning about their solutions and mistakes. The domestic circumstances had to be observed, as Koskinen urged, "from the European point of view". Koskinen talked in plural about "European societies", but also in singular about the "European society" that had got into turmoil due to social conflicts. Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, applied to Finland, the attribute 'European society', in itself, included the idea of immanent temporal criteria by which Finnish conditions and the prospects for change could be accounted. Secondly, even when Koskinen discussed conflicts leading the society into a state of turmoil, he did not conceive the conflicts as an inherent property of *yhteiskunta*, but as the major threat to society and its "health". As a normative concept, *yhteiskunta* offered the means of defining what type of actions represented the real and true will of the people or, respectively, a rebel generated by the labour question.

It seems to me that in the usage of *yhteiskunta* and *valtio* in the late 19th century, these terms tended to turn upside down with respect to the concepts of Hegel. Not infrequently, *yhteiskunta* referred to the state in the contexts in which the moral aspect was emphasized, whereas *valtio* might often be the term for those legal institutions which in Hegelian logic belonged to civil society, the sphere of necessities and force. This was a matter for the reception of Snellman rather than a change at the level of political philosophy. The problem of reception, in turn, was actualized in the context of the opening of space for modern politics.

Many of the controversies between the Fennomanians and (Swedish-speaking) Liberals in the late 19th century Finland could after-

wards be conceptualized as having concerned the relationship between the state and civil society (Pulkkinen 1989). However, this was not the way the parties of these controversies themselves conceptualized their positions. At the time characterized by later research as the birth of civil society, the concept of civil society seems to have largely disappeared. It can be questioned whether the Liberals articulated any distinctive concept of civil society which they would have contrasted with the state and with Hegelian civil society. *On Liberty* by John Stuart Mill, published in 1859 and translated soon into Swedish, was influential even in Finland but did little to contribute to the discussion in terms of the distinction between the state and civil society. The 'society' of Mill referred to a combination of legal authorities and public opinion, and his main concern was the principles according to which this society had the right to set limits to the life of the individual.

In the first Finnish "party programme", that of the Liberal Party of 1880, 'society' appeared as an appreciating concept but without having any reference to a sphere free or separate from the state. The programme, published in both Swedish and Finnish, declared that each generation had the duty, in accordance with its own needs and ideas, to extend, strengthen and beautify the "building of society" (*samhällsbyggnad; yhteiskunnallis-rakennus*) that it had inherited from previous generations. If this reform work was neglected there was a risk for destruction of this building (Borg 1965, 12-20, 389-396). The metaphor had appeared, for instance, in Koskinen's articles on the labour question. A spatial metaphor was used in a sense that indicates, with the terms of Koselleck, the temporalization (*Verzeitlichung*) of a concept, yet it is clear that 'society' here did not, as such, indicate any novel, modern phenomenon.

A remarkable part of those controversies between the Fenno-manians and Liberals, which in a later view could be and have been conceptualized by means of the state – civil society distinction, were articulated by using the concepts of society, individual, people, and national. In the Fennomanian view, the relationship between society and individual was supposed to be mediated by national solidarity which, in turn, would constitute in the encounter of the "will of the people" and the activities of those fulfilling the mission of "national awakening". Bridging the concepts of people and nation, the noun *kansa* (people, but also

nation, *kansakunta*) and the adjective *kansallinen* (national rather than popular) were crucial in the conceptual construction of the harmony between society and the individual.

Sometimes, this construction was associated with the conditions peculiar to Finland by making use of comparison between Finland and Sweden. This was the way Thiodolf Rein, professor of philosophy, put the question in *Valvoja* in 1881. In his review on Finnish translations of some texts of Snellman, Rein concluded that, in a sheltered country such as Sweden, it might be appropriate to adopt the view that the state (*valtio*) was simply an institution for serving the pursuit of private interests, and the individual had the right to try as much as possible to rid himself of its obligations. In a country such as Finland, which had to struggle to survive, however, the relationship between individual and society (*yhteiskunta*) had to be of a different quality, "i.e. more determined by the common good than in the countries which were not exposed to any danger" (Rein 1881). It is worth noting that although using *valtio* and *yhteiskunta* synonymously, Rein chose to use *yhteiskunta* when he discussed what he conceived as the higher moral level of the state–individual relationship, the level defined by the general instead of private and particular.

I do not want to claim that this was the only way of discussing 'society'. Perhaps the most interesting representative of a diverging way among the Fennomanians was J.J. F. Perander (cf. Liikanen 1995). In his article *Yhteis-kunta uutena aikana* (Society in Modern Times) in *Kirjallinen Kuukauslehti* in 1866, Perander used the word *yhteis-kunta* (or *yhteiselämä*, common life) in the meaning of civil society that in the Hegelian and Snellmanian sense was distinguished from state (*valtio*) and family (*perhe*). He noted that the French Revolution had given impetus to the autonomous logic of civil society which was characterized by the consciousness of rights and the struggles between the members of civil society. It is noteworthy that Perander did not mention Hegel or Snellman, although he widely introduced and commented on political and moral philosophers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Smith, Saint-Simon and Proudhon. Perander's *yhteis-kunta* differed from Snellman's *medborgerligt samhälle* through emphasis on the conflicts of interests, even those between capital and labour (Perander 1866).

Fifteen years later, in 1881, Perander examined the conflicts of industrializing society from a perspective that resembles the later critiques of both the "dialectics of Enlightenment" and "globalization". Among the authors he now referred to were Sismondi, Mill and the French scholar in economics Leroy-Beaulieu. In Perander's view, technological progress and development of the world economy had resulted in what he called the "Sisyphean work in the national economy". A distinction between state and civil society played no role in this argumentation nor did Perander include any explicit reflection of *yhteiskunta* in this text. Nevertheless, his *yhteiskunta* was not even now synonymous with the state. It rather referred to national economy (*kansallis-talous* by Perander, later *kansantalous*), seen from the point of view of the conflicting and common interests of different classes and the corresponding factors of production (land, capital and labour). This was the 'social' (*yhteiskunnallinen*) point of view.

Perander contributed to the shift of *yhteiskunta* from the context of political philosophy into that of social research in which it was viewed at as a target for empirical knowledge. This change was parallel to the shift of *yhteiskunta* from political philosophy into the language of political practices and struggles in which *yhteiskunta* was discussed as an actor or subject, the representative of the general interest. Later, these discourses were intertwined in the programmes of the labour movement. The characterization of prevailing circumstances as "class society" (*luokkayhteiskunta*) was included in the first explicitly socialist party programme of the Finnish labour party, the so-called Forssa programme of 1903. At the same time, the programme formulated the goal according to which "society" should possess the means of production.

For the construction of society as an object of empirical and practical knowledge, the adjective *yhteiskunnallinen* is crucial. In the last decades of the 19th century, this adjective was provided with the charge stemming from the close connection between the building of the nation-state and the formation of particular social knowledge (cf. Wagner & Wittrock 1996; Hall 1998). This connection was expressed by the term 'social question' (*yhteiskunnallinen kysymys*).

Society and Social

Social -> Yhteiskunnallinen, Political -> Valtiollinen

A striking difference appeared in the relationships between the nouns *valtio* and *yhteiskunta*, respectively the corresponding adjectives *valtiollinen* and *yhteiskunnallinen* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While *yhteiskunta* was to a high degree identified with *valtio* (state), *yhteiskunnallinen* and *valtiollinen* were often used as a dichotomy. This was most obvious when these adjectives appeared as attributes to different "questions". The *yhteiskunnallinen* question referred to the problem of class divisions and conflicts (both urban and rural), and it still did in the 1920s. The *valtiollinen* question, again, might concern, e.g. for Koskinen in 1874, the principles and organization of political representation, but since the turn of the century it would mostly refer to the relationship of Finland to the Russian Empire.

To understand this discrepancy between the nouns and adjectives, it has to be noticed that *yhteiskunnallinen* was, primarily, not a derivative from *yhteiskunta*, but the result from the attempt to find a Finnish word for 'social', a word, due to its domestic origin, better than *sosia(a)linen*. Correspondingly, *valtiollinen* was adopted as the Finnish word for 'political', in the spirit of preferring the purely Finnish translations to those of foreign origin, in this case, to *poliittinen*.

Again, being the translation of 'social' with a strong concern for class relationships was not the only way of using *yhteiskunnallinen*. This adjective could refer to something that was thought to concern the society as a totality, thus meaning nearly the same as *kansallinen* (national). *Yhteiskunnallinen* was also applied – as it seems to me, more frequently before the real actualizing of the "labour question" – to what in current popular terms might be called acting in civil society, i.e. in voluntary associations and publicity (e.g. Palmén 1884, 124, 132; Järnefelt 1994 [1893], 127). Furthermore, *yhteiskunnallinen* might be used for *civilis* in the sense this had been included in *societas civilis* of the natural law and contract theoreticians. Thus, *Tankar om borgerliga friheten* (*De libertate civili*, On Civil Liberty, 1759) by Peter Forsskål, a scholar of the Swedish Age of Freedom, was in 1910 published in Finnish under the title *Yhteiskunnallisesta vapau-desta* (Forsskål 1910).

To add still one particular usage, *yhteiskunnallinen* could – and can – be contrasted with *yksityinen* (private) in such a mode that even this adjective referred to the state. For the socialist labour movement, the state was the nearest reference of *yhteiskunnallinen* in the goal of transferring the means of production from private ownership into the *yhteiskunnallinen* property. After the First World War, the foreign terms for this act, *Sozialisierung* and *socialisering*, were translated by constructions on the basis of this adjective, *yhteiskun-nallisttuttaminen* (socialization, 'making social'). Its synonyms were *sosialisointi* that soon proved to be more competitive (Kettunen 1986, 269-276) and later, after World War II, *kansallistaminen* (nationalization), the internationally adopted expression that indicated the strengthened notion of national societies as functional wholes. In juridical discourse, however, *yhteiskunnallistuminen* (socialization, 'becoming social') had a diametrically opposite meaning, the delegation of administrative functions from public authorities to private actors (Tarjanne 1937, 510).

For my argument here, however, the observation of primary interest is that the Finnish words for 'social' and 'political' were in the late 19th century constructed on the basis of *yhteiskunta* and *valtio*. There were particular prerequisites for as well as particular outcomes from these operations. Being worried about the *yhteiskunnallinen* problem would actually imply, in a very direct way, a concern about that entity of state and society that was referred to by *yhteiskunta*. There were corresponding benefits in *valtiollinen*, in comparison to *poliittinen*, as an attribute for "problems". Above all, it could include both internal affairs and external (or rather, in the Grand Duchy of the Russian Emperor, half-external) relationships of the state. These translations were, arguably, effective in the sense of defining and delimiting horizons of political action.

The regulative activities of the state in the area of "social question" were, in the first decades of the 20th century, called *yhteiskunta-politiikka*, a translation of *Sozialpolitik* and *socialpolitik* (e.g. Ehrnrooth 1913). In this compound word, *yhteiskunta* referred to a specific target field of policies (social relations, especially the conditions of the working class), but was also strongly present in some further connotations: being the authority that shaped and executed this policy (state) and being the entity to be preserved, reinforced and promoted by means of this policy (the social order within and through the nation-state). It is also to be noted that the word *politiikka* mostly

appeared as the latter part in this type of compound words, meaning 'policy', i.e. the results of political actions and processes, and expressing, schematically speaking, the direction from the state to society. Politics, political action, the struggles and compromises preceding the policies, were, however, until the 1920s, quite rarely called *politiikka*. The most usual expression for them was *valtiollinen toiminta* (action in or towards the state).

However, even the merely linguistic troubles could hardly be avoided, since *valtiollinen toiminta* was expected to result in the interfering of *yhteiskunta* with its public authority into the different problems of *yhteiskunta*, such as those called the *yhteiskunnallinen* and *valtiollinen* questions. In addition, signs emerged in the 1920s and 1930s of a view that something that should be conceptualized was ignored by this usage of terms. It is possible to recognize a search for 'political' that would not be reduced to the state and for 'social' that would not be reduced to society. Through this search the meanings of *valtiollinen* and *yhteiskunnallinen* were changed, as well. This was also the change in which the limits of *yhteiskunta* towards anything smaller than the nation-state were gradually established.

Separation of *Yhteiskunnallinen* (Societal) and *Sosiaalinen* (Social)

Until the 1920s, the synonymity between *sosia(a)linen* (in compound terms: *sosia(a)li-*) and *yhteiskunnallinen* (in compound terms: *yhteiskunnallis-* or, more frequently, *yhteiskunta-*) seems to have been undisputed.[6] The first text in which I have, thus far, found an explicit distinction between *yhteiskunnallinen* and *sosia(a)linen* is the massive and very influential presentation of social policies by Eino Kuusi, published in two volumes in 1931. Instead of *yhteiskunta-politiikka*, Kuusi had decided to use the term *sosialipolitiikka*, which was also the title of the book. For Kuusi, a difference existed between *yhteiskunnallinen* and *sosialinen*, the former lacking the warm ingredients of mutual solidarity and aid which were included in the latter word that had its background in the Latin word *socius*. Yet Kuusi found it necessary to warn the reader of mixing the words

sosialinen and *sosiaalipolitiikka* with *sosialistinen* (socialist) and *sosialismi* (socialism) which meant "something completely different" (Kuusi 1931, 13-14).

However, Kuusi certainly did not abandon society, *yhteiskunta*. The motives of social policy in his presentation were full of interests, needs, demands, obligations and acts of 'society'. In his argument, *sosialinen* was associated, not only with warm mutuality among the people, but primarily with class conflicts that threatened the social cohesion or, rather, society itself. I would suggest that, in Kuusi's view, the words *yhteiskunta* and *yhteiskunnallinen* should be reserved for the essential national, political as well as economic unity that had been fatally threatened by the Civil War and abortive proletarian revolution of 1918.

Social policy was but one context for the idea of the society defending itself against those who acted against the society. Actually, this topic was much more accentuated in the discussion on practices with more explicit intentions of control. The experiences and conclusions of the Civil War resulted, among the White winners, in new emphases on society. In more concrete terms than before, *yhteiskunta* was seen as an actor in the struggle against those whose ideologies and actions were labelled as being "anti-societal" (*yhteiskunnan-vastainen*). Society must be provided with various types of weapons and be ready to use them in this struggle; this was the mission of the "pro-societal" (*yhteiskuntaasäilyttävä*) people. This topic was most obvious in right-wing party programmes and pamphlets, but far from absent even among those non-socialists who argued for parliamentary democracy (e.g. Aho 1961 [1918-1919]; Alkio 1919).

In any case, the reification of society contributed to the fact that the synonymity of *yhteiskunnallinen* and *sosia(a)linen* became problematic. This reification was, however, not only a matter of political but also of economic history. For the distinction between *yhteiskunnallinen* and *sosia(a)linen*, the conceptual constructions of 'economy' (*talous*) are important.

Koskinen distinguished, in 1874, between two extreme views to be opposed: "economism" that was based on the truths discovered by Adam Smith but neglected "the moral (*siveydellinen*) aspect, or society", and "socialism" which claimed to be social but in a wrong

and threatening fashion. Somewhat later, 'social' and 'economic' were connected in the noun *yhteiskuntatalous* (social economy) and the adjective *yhteiskuntataloudellinen* that were used synonymously with *kansantalous* (national economy) and *kansantaloudellinen*. The approaches of *yhteiskuntatalous/kansantalous* and *yhteiskuntapolitiikka* were at the turn of the century largely intertwined. In both cases, economy was to a high degree dealt with from the point of view of the 'social question', *Kansantaloudellinen yhdistys* (The National Economic Society) being a major forum for discussion on this question.

The national economic and social political approaches had become more differentiated until the time of Kuusi's *Sosialipolitiikka* in the early 1930s.[7] As an attribute for economic life, *yhteiskunnallinen* would increasingly be associated with the principles of "planned economy" that under the economic depression of the 1930s became, internationally, a popular objective, with various political colours (e.g. SDP 1933). In the 1940s, during and after World War II, the adjective *yhteiskunnallinen* was in many texts still more explicitly associated with the regulation and governance in the name of real economic rationality and rationalization (e.g. Railo 1942). *Sosiaalinen*, again, had a quite different meaning in this context of economic rationalization. It was associated with the delimiting or compensating of those outcomes of the (capitalist) economic rationalization that endangered the welfare of those involved and threatened the cohesion of society.[8]

An order was even created between *yhteiskuntapolitiikka* and *sosiaalipolitiikka*. In his academic textbook, Armas Nieminen in 1955 defined *yhteiskuntapolitiikka* (societal policy) as the general concept for "the efforts and measures intended to arrange the circumstances in the society (*yhteiskunnan olot*) in a way seen appropriate and right". *Sosiaalipolitiikka* (social policy) was a subconcept. It included "the efforts and measures intended to guarantee the standard of living seen reasonable, social security and satisfaction to the different social groups, families and individuals" (Nieminen 1955, 43, 95). Thus, the manifest motivation of social policy was no more based on class conflicts.

In his *60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka* (The Social Policy of the 60s, 1961), a book often regarded as the plan for the Finnish welfare state, Pekka Kuusi adopted the corresponding conceptual hierarchy between *yhteiskuntapolitiikka* and *sosiaalipolitiikka*. Kuusi, however, program-

matically treated social policy as a part of the general societal policy, the goals of which even those who shaped the social policies had to clarify for themselves. Furthermore, Kuusi manifested, in the spirit of Gunnar Myrdal and others, his strong confidence in virtuous circles within modern society: "In contemporary society, democracy, social equality and economic growth seem to be interdependent in a fortunate way" (Kuusi 1961, 8; cf. Kettunen 1997). It was within this society of virtuous circles that social policy had to play its crucial role. The 'social' no longer represented a counterprinciple to the 'economic'. Kuusi's favourite expression was "growth-oriented society" (*kasvuhakuinen yhteiskunta*). In his strong programmatic pathos, this society, being simultaneously the subject, object and framework of the growth-oriented action, was "our" society.

The specific concept of *sosiaalinen* had implications for the concept of *yhteiskunta*. In this respect, the expansion, differentiation and re-orientation of social sciences after World War II had an ambivalent impact.

Society, Social Sphere, and Individual

The turn towards American sociology after World War II meant, for one thing, an adoption of conceptual tools that included little reminding of the distinction between *sosiaalinen* and *yhteiskunnallinen*. A former tradition, named in the history of Finnish sociology as "the concrete social research", had been oriented towards Germany and influenced by the German language, as had been the Finnish scholarship more generally, with the remarkable exception of anthropological sociology in the footsteps of Edward Westermarck, which had been Anglo-Saxon and French in orientation. In their attempts to avoid words of foreign origin, Finnish scholars had preferred *yhteiskunnallinen* to *sosiaalinen* as the translation of *sozial*, yet the different meanings of the German words *sozial* and *gesellschaftlich* may have contributed to the distinction between the corresponding Finnish words, for instance, in Eino Kuusi's thought.

The English word 'social', instead, could easily be given wide meaning and status as the basic concept for all 'social sciences'. By reading the Finnish Handbook of Social Sciences, *Yhteiskuntatieteiden käsikirja*,

published in 1963-1964, one might draw the conclusion that *yhteiskunta* had mostly disappeared, especially when one compares this publication with the corresponding previous handbook *Valtiotieteiden käsikirja* from the early 1920s. The latter included a long chapter on *yhteiskunta*, written by Rudolf Holsti, a politically active sociologist in the Westermarckian tradition, and in addition several chapters under various compound terms beginning with *yhteiskunta-*. In the handbook of the 1960s, however, the concept was just shortly tackled in the chapter on "Social Community" (*sosiaalinen yhteisö*) by Knut Pipping. According to him, 'social community' was a wider concept than 'society' that "usually means temporally and spatially defined communities (e.g. the Finnish society)" (Pipping 1964, 642). In his chapter on "Social System" (*sosiaalinen järjestelmä*), Yrjö Littunen, in turn, provided this term with the status of the general concept and defined it by means of Talcott Parsons' theory on the basic functions of social systems (Littunen 1964, 622-625).

The sociological widening of *sosiaalinen* or inclusion of 'society' into 'social community' remained, however, rather distant from the processes of conventional language. For example, the distinction between *yhteiskunta* and *yhteisö* developed after World War II in a way that *yhteiskunta* could no longer be applied to local communities as it could in the 1930s; *yhteisö* was now the appropriate term for them.[9] When the sociologists suggested that 'community' and 'social' were the wide basic concepts, this was contrary to the tendencies in the less reflexive usage of these words.

In fact, the rise of 'social sciences' after World War II, and especially in the 1960s, greatly contributed to the popularity of 'society'. This was already implied by the Finnish term for 'social sciences', *yhteiskunta-tieteet* (sciences of society), having a structure similar to the Swedish *samhällsvetenskaper* and *Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, the German term parallel to *Sozialwissenschaften* (although the old concept *valtiotieteet*, i.e. *Staatswissenschaften, statsvetenskaper*, was only slowly and partially replaced). The 1960s was a decade during which sociologists with stronger involvement and better success than before influenced political discourse on "the Finnish society". The social sciences had a remarkable impact on party programmes as well as on official committee reports, the type of document crucial to Finnish and, more generally, Nordic policymaking. Most notably,

this was to be seen in the increased frequency of the term 'society' in these documents (Honkanen 1999). Applied in administrative and political discourses, the concept of *yhteiskunta* had the important capacity of providing the idea of "systemic integration" (economy, administration) with the connotation of "social integration" (culture), stemming from the ties of this concept to the nation and nation-state.

One of the questions most discussed for which sociologists offered both definitions and solutions in the 1960s was that of national integration, thus following the long great line of the close connection between the academy and the nation-state. A major problem of national integration was seen in the strong support for Communism and the weak integrated-ness of the Communists in society. The diagnosis made by Erik Allardt in the Durkheimian framework with inspiration from Ralf Dahrendorf, concluded that to strengthen organic solidarity, the high degree achieved in the division of labour had to be combined with a lower degree of pressure for conformity. The latter meant that social conflicts had to be recognized and institutionalized. The title of Allardt's theoretical presentation on this problem, *Yhteiskunnan rakenne ja sosiaalinen paine* (The Structure of Society and Social Pressure, 1964) expressed the setting in which the "social pressure" mediated between the "structure of society" and the individual and collective behaviour of people.

There is something in this setting that can be traced back to the problem definitions that had been shaped during World War II. These problem definitions implied a construction of social reality in which there were three levels: the society, the social sphere and the individual. This three-level disposition had diverging predecessors.

There had been the Hegelian disposition by Snellman, consisting of three societies: state, civil society and family. Another conceptual construction can be read in those late 19th and early 20th century texts that dealt with *valtiollinen kysymys* (political question), meaning the relationship between the Finnish nation-state and the Russian Empire, and *yhteiskunnallinen kysymys* (social question), meaning the problem of class divisions and conflicts. Even in the context of this discussion, the construction of social reality included three levels: nation, class and citizen, i.e. society as the entity identified with the state and nation, society as the sphere for social question,

characterized by the concept of class, and the level of citizenship, *kansalaisuus*, the membership of the nation.

During World War II, practical necessities appeared that created prerequisites for distinction between society, social sphere and individual. Firstly, the notion of society as a functional whole that must and can be steered and planned was reinforced. This mode of thought was to be seen especially in national economic 'postwar planning' done during the war. Secondly, adjusting of the individuals into the tasks of this whole became, in a new way, an urgent problem. Thirdly, war-time experiences contributed to a new notion of a social sphere that was located between society as a functional whole and the individuals fulfilling its tasks. This was thematized in some postwar scholarly and literary interpretations (Pipping 1947; Linna 1954; Koli 1955; Seppänen 1958) as the discrepancy between official and unofficial norms and as the autonomous nature of the laws of group dynamics. It was assumed that such tensions between the sets of norms as well as conflicts within an organization might have positive outcomes for functioning of the organization.

This line of argumentation gained more impetus in the sociological and sociologically informed political discourse of the 1960s which assumed that conflicts, if recognized and institutionalized, could improve the effectiveness and integration of society. Obvious friction existed between this emphasis and the influential tradition of conceiving politics as the fulfilling of national necessities in the name of the general interest of society. However, one solution was offered by the conception of society as a functional whole that was kept in movement, change or progress through various inter- and intrasocietal powers. In this understanding, society as an entity was not identical with the state; yet it could function as an actor that was even able to anticipate its further development and possessed the criterion of self-criticism.

Society Capable of Anticipating and Criticizing Itself

An evolutionist reflection on society as a functional whole was offered in the previously mentioned handbook article on *yhteiskunta* by Rudolf

Holsti in 1924. A representative of anthropological and historical sociology, Holsti was sensitive to the relationship between the universal and particular in societies, and he did not identify or even attach 'society' to the nation-state. In his Darwinist view, societies like all other organisms contested with each other, the economic competition being the most important external factor that shaped the fates of societies. In accordance with Comté, Holsti distinguished between the "social static" that concerned the preservation of society and the "social dynamic" that concerned the development of society. Referring to Spencer, he noted that the direction of evolution was from the vague, similar and diffuse to the definite, dissimilar and solid. According to Holsti, simple and unorganized work will be replaced by developed and highly organized work in all fields of human activity, whereby the support of science will become more and more unavoidable. In the future, he concluded, "the scientific method in the management of societies will be necessary; the organized representation of class and party opinions will not be sufficient" (Holsti 1924, 626).

The vision of Holsti is interesting, not least because it was connected with the discussion on political democracy, scientific expertise on society and the representation of different economic interests or functions in the political process. In the Finnish history of political thought, Yrjö Ruutu, with his organistic and energetic reflections on state, society and "economic democracy", is perhaps the most famous innovator in this discussion of the 1920s and 1930s. Here, however, I must bypass this discussion and focus on the notion of a kind of self-anticipating society in Holsti's text.

Holsti's vision of society in the process of coming was an evolutionist variant of what Yrjö Koskinen in 1874 had pondered from the perspective of the centre–periphery relationship. For Koskinen, the code of the social future in Finland was to be found by gazing towards those countries that had further proceeded along the road of "European society". In this sense, it is possible to draw a line from Koskinen via Holsti to the "new" American-oriented social sciences after World War II. The problems of the modernizing society were recognized by importing theoretical and conceptual tools from the milieu in which the centre of modernization now was found, from America. Arguably, the image of "the Finnish society" was modernized more rapidly than the social circumstances themselves. In any

case, the future change of society following this approach was inherent in the society itself and, still more, the society had a reflexive capacity for gaining knowledge of this code.

In the post-World War II decades, 'society' was provided with various attributes that have a mixed character of expressing the anticipated future in the present and claiming something about the society's "own" normative standards. Many of these attributes have been explicitly temporalizing, such as the "industrializing society", "modernizing society", "changing society", "dynamic society" and "growth-oriented society". Since the 1950s, party programmes and official committee reports have been a treasury of such expressions.

One of the most interesting is "the Finnish society" (*suomalainen yhteiskunta*). This very popular expression seems to have gained wider use only after World War II. "The Finnish society" bridged the division between the new social sciences, which were interested in the problems of (the national) modernizing society, and the academic history writing that was seriously concerned about the preserving of national continuity. In this sense, the book *Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan rakenne* (The Structure of Finnish Society, 1948) by Heikki Waris, a professor of social policy, was illuminating. The very concept of *suomalainen yhteiskunta* was given a charge in which the essential national continuity and the profound, accelerating transformation towards growing equality, democracy and wealth were intertwined. Generally, there were varying modes of combining these two sides in "the Finnish society"; e.g. in the name of the organization *Suomalaisen Yhteiskunnan Tuki* (Support for Finnish Society, founded in 1952) this expression bore the charge from the anti-Communist aims of the organization.

Attributes such as 'Finnish' or 'growth-oriented' have been applied in the contexts where 'society' has not been identical with 'state', but a sociological construction. However, even this 'society' has appeared as an actor; 'growth-oriented', 'dynamic' or 'pluralist' imply, themselves, a subjectivity of 'society'. Moreover, this 'society' has been defined and limited by the nation-state. The same has been true of the 'society' with transnational attributes as 'European' or 'Nordic'. Such attributes indicate the importance of international comparison as a practice for shaping national institutions and discourses. However, 'European' or 'Nordic' have not only referred to international

contexts of a national society. Rather, they have been intended to express something inherent in the national society, often something that includes either the future code or the normative standards of the society and, thus, the means by which the society was supposed to anticipate or criticize itself. The end of this idea of society is one theme in the debates on postmodernity and globalization.

Unsustainable Society?

The British sociologists Scott Lash and Johns Urry note that the central feature of Western social science has been the study of 'societies', each of which is seen as deriving its specific character from the particular relationship of nation and state. It was believed that the members of a society share a particular community of fate, that they are governed by a state to which duties and responsibilities are owed and by which certain rights are guaranteed. In the analysis of such 'societies' it is presumed that most aspects of the lives of its members are determined by factors endogenous to the society; and that a fairly clear distinction can be drawn between these endogenous factors and those which are external (Lash & Urry 1994, 320).

Not surprisingly, Las and Urry are of the opinion that due to the processes called globalization this concept of society will lose and has already lost much of its analytical and political power.

It is possible to argue against Lash and Urry by directing attention to those big names in the history of social sciences to whom (in particular, Weber and Simmel) society as an entity largely was an "absent concept" (Frisby & Sayer 1986, 54-74). It is also possible to find cases in which 'society' has been explicitly detached from its ties to the nation-state. Such examples can be found even in the history of the Finnish *yhteiskunta*. The tradition of Marxist social theory and research has been thin in Finland, yet there have been some Marxist attempts to think of the very concept of society in an unconventional fashion. Thus, J. W. Keto, in his textbook on "the sociology of Marx" from the 1940s, rejected the territorial identity of state and society and noted that "the capitalist society extends over the territories of numerous states" (Keto 1946, 22-23). As the consciousness of worldwide threats

and interdependencies in the 1960s and 1970s was reinforced, the idea of a society that was more extensive than the nation-state and even covered "the entire globe", could be read in the official committee report on school reform (Honkanen 1999, 120).

The conclusions of Lash and Urry can be questioned from the opposite direction, as well. In the end, conventional 'society' seems to be very persistent. Even in the time of EU citizenship and globalized finance markets, use of 'society' in a meaning that extends over the borders of nation-state is more probably a conscious provocation than an indicator of a gradually eroding old concept.

While Lash and Urry presume that the modern concept of society is becoming unsustainable due to its ties to the nation-state, the French sociologist Alain Touraine, in turn, argues that 'society' will be questioned due to its being the replacement for God:

> The idea of modernity replaced God with society. Durkheim is quite explicit about this – more so than anyone else. The crisis of modernity is now leading to the disappearance of the idea of *society*. That idea was once a unifying principle, and even the principle of good, whereas evil was defined as anything that hindered social integration. We had to play our parts, fulfil our functions, and we also had to know how to welcome newcomers and re-educate deviants. The idea of modernity has always been associated with this construction of society: mechanical society was transformed in to an organism, in to a social body whose every organ contributes to its smooth working (Touraine 1995, 144).

In Touraine's view, such a society "still colours official discourses, but it has lost its power". He concludes that "we" have learned "to defend individuals against citizens and society, and to refer what we once called integration as control or manipulation" (ibid., 145).

One may find conceptual evidence for this change, e.g. in the new introduction of the parole of 'civil society' in the 1980s. This 'civil society' was entirely different from the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* of Hegel that had referred to necessities and compulsions: the system of needs, the administration of justice and the wide spectrum of practices called police. 'Civil society' was vitalized, internationally, with references to Tocqueville's idea of democracy based on free association and local self-government – his account of the American lessons for Europe. The new confidence in the possibility and curing capacity of

'communities' has been an aspect of the same change, although there have been diverging points of departure for the reliance in community (cf. Rose 1999, 176).

My preliminary conclusion is that in Finland, 'civil society' was not raised as the critique of the welfare state to the same degree as in Sweden (cf. Trägårdh ed. 1995). However, corresponding to the Swedish right-wing critique against the identification of state and society, the party programme of the Finnish Centre of 1996 particularly pointed out that for the Party, "state and society are two different things". Nevertheless, the concept of 'civil society' (*kansalaisyhteiskunta*) did not appear in the programme. A still "warmer" and more decentralizing concept was introduced: 'civil communities' (*kansalaisyhteisöt*).

A more symptomatic change of the political vocabulary may be, however, that 'welfare state' (*hyvinvointivaltio*) is being replaced by 'welfare society' (*hyvinvointiyhteiskunta*); e.g. in the party programme of the Social Democratic Party of 1999, only the latter concept is used. In its ambiguity, 'welfare society' is a very serviceable concept. Firstly, it can be provided with a meaning that includes the critique of the "patronizing" welfare state; 'society' associated with 'civil society' and the emphasis on private and voluntary actors. Secondly, 'welfare society' can, however, be used with the intention of strengthening the legitimacy of the welfare state; with 'society' acquiring its meaning in the long Nordic tradition in which 'society' represents the general and public against the particular and private. Thirdly, 'welfare society' can be used by analogy in such expressions as 'industrial society', 'service society', or 'information society', as a description of prevailing circumstances or developments. Thus, in a remarkable way, controversies concerning the welfare state can be concealed by making use of 'welfare society'.

Even in other ways, 'society' shows, after all, a surprising vitality. In the 1994 party programme of a short-lived neoliberalist party, the Young Finns, no suspicions concerning the existence of society could be seen (in contrast to the famous statement of Margaret Thatcher on the non-existence of society), and the first slogan of the program was "The Activating Welfare Society" (*kannustava hyvinvointiyhteiskunta*). In its program of 1998, the Left Alliance that has its historical roots in the Communist movement formulated its goal as

"the good society". This society is very much an actor that, among other things, "treats animals with respect" and "endeavours to secure the living conditions for natural species".

A critical study has been made of the 'society' of the largest newspaper in Finland, *Helsingin Sanomat* (Pietilä & Sondermann 1994). The study seems to have had very little impact on the way *yhteiskunta* appears in the editorials. *Yhteiskunta* demands, intends, feels, hopes, holds its breath and does not want to be brought to its knees (e.g. the editorial on the firemen strike, Helsingin Sanomat January 10,1998).

However, there are grounds for arguing that something in the concept of society has become questioned. Many such elements of meaning that had been adopted after World War II have become problematic. This is true of the ideas of *yhteiskunta* as a target of rational knowledge and planning or as the actor that from above distributes the roles, teaches the values and provides its members with rights and duties. Conflicts are, arguably, less than previously defined in a way in which 'society' would be the self-evident frame of reference. This means, however, not just a dissolution of a previous image of entity. As former issues on the political agenda of national 'society' are transformed into external imperative conditions of global market, the notion of the national "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) may be strengthened, and the national competitive community may reshape or replace the concept of society.

Notes

1 A remarkable part of the source material consists of the common corpus collected in the project Concepts in Motion. The Conceptual History of Finnish Political Culture, in which my study on 'society' in Finland is involved.

2 *Yhteiskunta* may refer to entities not yet defined by the nation-state – one can discuss the primitive or feudal *yhteiskunta* – but within the contemporary *yhteiskunta* there are no smaller units to be referred to as the *yhteiskunta*. The municipalities are included in the *yhteiskunta* but no single municipality (*kunta*) is the *yhteiskunta*.

3 True, *yhteyskunta* was still in 1848 provided with this meaning in a list of

some recommended novel words in the Finnish newspaper Suometar (March 25, 1848). It is possible that the writer had read the above-mentioned translation of Hannikainen but had failed to notice the correction concerning this term.

4 These changes are far from unambiguous; e.g. as the Finnish equivalents of *medborgare*, both *kansalainen* and *yhteiskuntalainen* (member of society, a term unfamiliar in contemporary Finnish) were mentioned in a dictionary in 1883 (Ahlman 1883). In another dictionary (Ahlman 1865, 1872) *borgerligt samhälle* was translated *kansallinen l. kansa-kunnallinen yhteys l. yhteisö.* In his translation of a juridical handbook (Palmén 1863), Elias Lönnrot translated *borgerligt samhälle* into *kansakunta.* His terms for *samhälle* were *yhteisö* and *yhteis-elämä,* while *yhteiskunta* appeared as a translation of *kommun* (commune, municipality). *Det borgerliga sällskapet* in the Swedish Law of 1734 was in 1865 translated *yhteinen kansakunnallinen elämä* (Ruotsin Waltakunnan Laki), instead of *yhteinen maailmallinen canssakäyminen* in the previous Finnish translation of 1759.

5 This Finnish term appeared in 1883 in a dictionary as the translation of *medborgerligt samhälle* (Ahlman 1883). The philosophical works in which Snellman presented this conceptual distinction were only later translated into Finnish.

6 There had been cases in which it had been difficult to translate 'social' in any way other than *sosia(a)linen*, e.g. in the compound words for 'social democracy' (*sosialidemokratia*) and 'the Ministry of Social Affairs' (*sosialiministeriö*). Even some authors on 'social question' chose to use *sosia(a)linen* (e.g. Rosenqvist 1923). However, *yhteiskunnallinen* was preferred to *sosialinen*, e.g. as the attribute for the local educational activities of the university students among the working class people (e.g. K.E.P.H. 1920a, 1920b, 1924). As the Finnish word for 'social ethics', *yhteiskunnallinen siveysoppi* (Pietilä 1925) was, probably, much more popular than *sosia(a)lietiikka* (Rosenqvist 1923).

7 Nevertheless, Kuusi's book was published in the series *Kansantaloudellinen käsikirjasto* (National Economic Handbooks Library). Ernst Nevanlinna, in turn, entitled his presentation of national economy, published in 1932 in the same series, as *Yhteiskunnallisen talouselämän pääpiirteet* (Main Outlines of Social Economic Life). At that time, Nevanlinna's terminology already tended to be outdated. At first sight, a reader might have thought that this conservative scholar was describing principles of socialist economic system or advocating a "planned economy".

8 At least in part, this was also the meaning of 'social' in the slogan of "social market economy" which the German Christian Democrats, on the basis of the critique of planned economy ideas, developed in the 1950s; the slogan that was soon adopted in the party programme of the

Finnish conservative party, the National Coalition Party (*sosiaalinen markkinatalous*).

9 In his doctoral thesis on the working class community in Helsinki, Heikki Waris (1932, 1934) used the term *työläisyhteiskunta* for this community. At the time when *Yhteiskuntatieteiden käsikirja* was published (1963-1964), this would probably no longer been the appropriate term; it would instead have been *työläisyhteisö*.

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Other Articles

Mark Bevir

THE TEXT AS
A HISTORICAL OBJECT

Historians attempt to understand the past through studying and reflecting on the relevant evidence. Although the evidence takes many forms, including paintings, the landscape, tools and utensils, and items of clothing, the dominant form is the text, the text as, for example, government record, newspaper, company report, diary, scientific treatise, poetry and prose, letter, and liturgy. The text occupies a place of unique importance in historical scholarship. Almost all historical claims rely on textual scholarship. Historians work with texts; they hold them, read them, contemplate them; they interact with them with different degrees of methodological sophistication and imaginative flair; they attempt to take from them, or to get them to yield-up, their secrets, their meanings; they interrogate them for the information they contain about the past. The text is the object we confront most often in our historical research. But what is a text? and how does a text possess meaning?

Perhaps there was a time when it seemed obvious how we should conceive of a text and its meaning. A text was a written document with an author whose intention in writing it fixed its single correct meaning.[1] Yet even if there once was such a time, post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory have undermined any such obvious resolution of our questions. Roland Barthes dramatically

breaks the link between authorial intention and the meaning of the text, saying that "the very being of writing (the meaning of the labor that constitutes it) is to keep the question 'who is speaking?' from being answered."[2] Michel Foucault dismisses the author as "a function" that emerged among literary critics following the Renaissance.[3] Jacques Derrida argues, moreover, that once we thus sever the link between text and author, then "the text is cut off from all absolute responsibility"; the text is a site of multiple, ambiguous meanings, able "to communicate only its own inability to communicate."[4] Today, one might say, the text often appears in the guise of a fluid, boundless entity lacking both author and stable meaning.

Positivists and presentists might suggest that how we conceive of a text and its meaning makes little difference to our historical practice. A belief in either brute facts or the immanence of meaning within the text might encourage them to argue that texts present the past to us irrespective of any abstract analysis of textuality. Surely though we should see positivism and presentation not as neutral meta-theories but instead as particular analyses of textuality that characteristically inform certain types of historical practice. Surely we can not doubt that different concepts of the text often inspire different types of historical practice. We might point, for example, to theoretically-inspired readings of John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* as diverse as Leo Strauss's emphasis on its place within the canon, C. B. Macpherson's deployment of economic determinism, and John Dunn's rigorous contextualism.[5]

The questions of what a text is and of how a text possesses meaning are worth asking both for their intrinsic philosophical interest and for their relevance to historical practice. Historians necessarily idealise texts and textual meanings in that they in part construct them through their explicit or implicit theories of textuality. It is important, therefore, that the relevant theories be adequate ones. To ensure such adequacy we need to grasp a number of conceptual distinctions. We must distinguish between a physical object, a meaningful object, a work, and a text. More particularly, we will find that all meanings are either meanings for specific people or abstractions based on such meanings. This implies that we should renounce the metaphysical concept of the text as an object that possesses an innate meaning. Physical objects become meaningful objects only be-

cause specific individuals intend or understand them to possess a meaning. The only viable analysis of the text, therefore, is of an object that acts as the site of various works: the text is an object to which various individuals have attached, probably different, meanings. This analysis of the text enables us to resolve various difficulties about the stability of texts and the relation between authorial intention and textual meaning.

On Meaning

Think of a text; think, for example, of Locke's *Two Treatises*, more specifically, think of the 1978 paperback Everyman's Library edition introduced by W. S. Carpenter. This text is physical object: it has a yellow dust jacket with a picture of Locke on it; it has 258 pages; and it is covered with black printed marks. Sometimes we can not provide such clear accounts of the physical nature of a text because it is one we postulate. We do not have, for example, a single manuscript or book that we would describe without equivocation as Locke's own text of the *Two Treatises*. Instead we postulate Locke's own version of the text, and, through bibliographic and textual scholarship, we then try to improve our knowledge of this postulated object.[6] When we postulate texts, however, we characteristically give them a physical form. We would be unhappy with the idea that Locke's own text of the *Two Treatises* existed only in his head; if it did, we would not want to call it a text.

Think now of a physical object that most of us would regard as devoid of meaning at least in itself; think, for example, of a cloud. Straightaway we will realise that texts are never just physical objects; they are meaningful ones. Indeed, some scholars define the concept of a text broadly to cover every physical object that bears meaning, including, paintings, actions, and even tools produced by human activity. Whether we accept this broad definition or restrict the concept of a text to those objects that include words will make no real difference to what follows. The ensuing arguments will focus on written documents, but they could be extended to apply to other meaningful objects. For the moment, therefore, let us say that a text is an object that possesses meaning. What though is a meaning?

Meanings only exist for individuals. To accept this statement of procedural individualism is not necessarily to tie the meaning of a text irrevocably to the intention of its author; after all, the meaning a text has for a reader is still a meaning for that reader as an individual even if it differs from that intended by the author. The challenge to procedural individualism does not come from the diverse ways in which a text might be read. It comes, rather, from the existence of social meanings. Principal among such social meanings are semantic meanings, defined in terms of the truth-conditions of an abstract proposition, and linguistic meanings, defined in terms of the conventions that govern usage within a community. A defence of procedural individualism might begin by reducing these forms of meaning to meanings for specific individuals.

The semantic meaning of an utterance comes from what would have to be the case for it to be true. Assuming that there are no pure perceptions, what would have to be the case for an utterance to be true must be relative to a conceptual framework. Thus, because conceptual frameworks are held only by individuals, semantic meanings can not exist apart from for individuals. Utterances can acquire a semantic meaning only within a set of concepts held by one or more individual. Semantic meanings are abstractions based on meanings for individuals. When we say that an utterance has a semantic meaning X, we imply that a group of individuals, usually including ourselves, share a conceptual framework within which they would accept the utterance as true if X is the case.

The linguistic meaning of a word comes from the concept to which it conventionally refers: thus, the linguistic meaning of "bachelor" is an unmarried man. The bond between a word and the concept that constitutes its linguistic meaning is, moreover, a purely conventional one without any natural foundation: thus, social convention could decree that the word "bac" rather than "bachelor" refer to an unmarried man.[7] Although some words seem to be a peculiarly apt expression for a given concept, as in cases of onomatopoeia, even here there could be a convention that bound a different word to the relevant concept. Because linguistic meanings are thus purely conventional, they are given simply by what individuals do and do not accept as a convention. They exist because a number of individuals take certain words to refer to certain concepts.[8] Linguistic meanings

are abstractions based on meanings for individuals. When we say that an utterance has a linguistic meaning X, we imply that a group of individuals accept certain conventions under which they understand it to refer to X.

Although we can reduce semantic and linguistic meanings to meanings for individuals, critics might suggest that there is another form of meaning that we can not so reduce. In considering this possibility, we can contrast an intentional meaning, defined as the meaning an utterance has for a particular individual, with any structural or innate meaning a text might possess that we could not reduce to intentional ones. We can approach utterances in one of two ways depending on which sort of meaning interests us, or better whether or not we believe in structural or innate meanings.[9] If we want to know about an intentional meaning or an abstraction based on intentional meanings, we will consider an utterance as a historical work, that is, as a set of words written, or spoken, or understood in a particular way on a particular occasion. If we want to postulate structural or innate meanings, we will consider an utterance as a reified text, that is, as a set of words that possess a meaning given independently of all people. A defence of procedural individualism might continue, therefore, by showing that structural and innate meanings, and so reified texts, are atemporal, other-worldly objects of which we in this world can not have knowledge. In effect, there are no structural or innate meanings; we should not reify texts.[10]

Imagine that someone in the eighteenth century wrote an essay containing a section entitled "hallelujah lass". If we try to study the essay as a reified text, we will abstract the words and phrases in it from the occasion of its appearance. When we do so, moreover, we presumably must allow for the fact that the phrase "hallelujah lass" can refer to a female member of the Salvation Army. The structural or innate meaning of the reified text refers to a female member of the Salvation Army. Clearly, therefore, the text does not exist in time – it must be outside of our world. After all, if we try to ascribe a temporal existence to the reified text, we will find that an essay written in the eighteenth century referred to an organisation that was not established until the late nineteenth century. We will be stuck with an unacceptable anachronism.

In order to locate a reified text in time, we would have to appeal to something outside of it, but as soon as we do this, we switch our attention from the reified text and its structural or innate meaning to a work and its intentional meaning. Imagine that we have two essays, one written in the eighteenth century and one written in the twentieth century, that contain exactly the same words and punctuation in exactly the same order. Any fact that enabled us to distinguish between the meaning of the two essays would have to refer to the particular occasion of the appearance of one or other of them. It would have to be a fact about the essays as works, not reified texts. Because the two essays are identical, moreover, they must share any structural or innate meaning they possess. Thus, if the twentieth century essay contains a section headed "hallelujah lass" so that "a female member of the Salvation Army" is part of its supposedly structural or innate meaning, the reified text of the eighteenth century essay also must include mention of the Salvation Army. Once again, therefore, we can not ascribe a temporal existence to reified texts without falling into anachronism. We can not do so because reified texts do not have a historical existence. As soon as we consider an utterance as a historical object, we necessarily focus our attention on its intentional meaning as a work. The obvious way to fix an utterance in history is to consider the meaning it had for certain people. We might say, for example, that our two identical essays have different meanings because the words they contain meant different things to people in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. To ask about the meaning an utterance had for a particular group of people, however, is to ask about the meaning of various works. To ask what the essay meant to people in the eighteenth century is to ask how they understood the essay. We can conclude, therefore, that only intentional meanings and works have a real or temporal existence.

Meanings only exist for individuals. There is only one way to avoid procedural individualism without postulating some sort of divine or supernatural realm of which we allegedly can acquire knowledge; that is, one must identify a language-x with a meaning-x that exists in history, as do intentional meanings, but that exists independently of particular individuals, as would structural or innate meanings. Although some scholars have tried to defend something akin to language-x, their endeavours seem doomed to fail.[11] Consider what is involved in aban-

doning the idea that temporal meanings exist only for individuals. When we talk of a social language, we typically have in mind a set of inter-subjective meanings shared by various people. For example, when two people talk of a female friend who is a member of the Salvation Army by saying "Jane is a Hallelujah Lass," they share a set of meanings that constitute the language they use to communicate. Although we might describe their shared language as a social structure, we would not thereby commit ourselves to the claim that it exists independently of particular individuals. On the contrary, it exists only because they, as individuals, share certain meanings. Because language-x does not embody this sort of inter-subjectivity, its ontological status remains extremely vague. It can not be a concrete entity; nor can it be an emergent entity, since if it were it would have to emerge from facts about individuals. Language-x must exist independently of human thought, since our thoughts are facts about us as individuals. Language-x must be a Platonic form; it must be an abstract entity with a real and independent existence. Although Platonic forms have had an honoured place in the history of philosophy, a postfoundational suspicion of the very possibility of self-evident truths makes a belief in them hard to defend. Besides, the opponents of procedural individualism would face special difficulties since their need to defend a language-x that exists in time would require them to ascribe a temporal existence to a Platonic form. They would have to explain how a Platonic form can exist for some time and then wither. How can a Platonic form be subject to natural processes such as those of growth and decay? Surely any theory of meaning that found itself having to answer this question would have gone wildly astray.

All temporal meanings are either meanings for individuals or abstractions derived from such meanings. This procedural individualism provides us with the beginnings of an analysis of meaning. It implies that individuals associate meanings with statements, books, films, events, and the like: statements, books, films, events, and the like, do not of themselves embody meanings. Objects come to mean something only because someone understands them so to do. Perhaps this idea of meanings being human constructs will seem uncontroversial, but even if it does, this uncontroversial idea has controversial corollaries. It implies that we can not reify texts. We can not ascribe a meaning to a text in itself.

The Stability of the Text

Earlier we found that a text is a physical object that possesses meaning. Now we have found that meanings only exist for specific individuals so texts do not possess meanings in themselves. How are we to bring these two insights together? Crucially because meanings only exist for individuals, we can not identify a single, definitive meaning, or even set of meanings, that is immanent within, or intrinsic to, a text. Texts are meaningful objects, rather than simply physical ones, solely because particular individuals attach meanings to them. We can define a text, therefore, as a physical object that acts as a site on to which individuals project various works. To define the text as a site for meanings is to accept, in the words of J. Hillis Miller, that "a text never has a single meaning, but is the crossroads of multiple ambiguous meanings."[12] Recently several scholars, including Miller, have tied the ambiguity of texts to the instability of meaning. They argue, usually influenced by deconstruction, that texts are unstable because there are no fixed meanings. Yet we have no reason as yet to accept this argument. We have found only that texts are ambiguous because they are the sites of various works, not that works too are ambiguous because meanings are unstable.

Derrida argues that texts are unstable because signification presupposes that "each so-called 'present' element . . . is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element."[13] The rhetoric of post-structuralism and deconstruction tends to slide unnoticed, however, between a weak claim that is true and a strong claim that is false.[14] The weak claim is that texts are ambiguous; they do not have innate meanings, so we can understand them in different ways. Few people would disagree. We are at liberty to understand a text as we wish rather than as the author intended. It is just that we obviously will not be doing history unless we identify the way we understand a text with the view a past figure took of it. The weak claim of the post-structuralists establishes only that we can approach texts in ahistorical ways. It does not establish that we can not approach them in historical ways. Thus, because few historians want to insist that everyone who

reads a text must do so with a historical eye, few historians need feel threatened by this weak claim. Nonetheless, the drama of the post-structuralist view of the text arises from an equivocation whereby a strong position can seem to be asserted but only this weak position appears to be defended. The strong claim is that texts are unknowable because we can not hope to identify works understood as intentional meanings. Clearly this strong claim does not follow from the fact that texts do not have fixed meanings. There is no obvious reason why historians should not be able to understand how a particular individual understood a text just because other people have understood it differently. In order to sustain their strong claim, post-structuralists would have to show that historians can not recover intentional meanings from the past. Generally they try to do this by defending at least one of the following three positions: meanings or intentions are not stable entities, we can not climb out of language, and we can not have knowledge of other minds.

Post-structuralists sometimes argue that we can not have knowledge of texts because intentional meanings are unstable. "Suppose," they say, "I ask what an author's intention means, and then what the meaning of the author's intention means, and so on."[15] They argue that all meanings are unstable because any attempt to fix them runs into an infinite regress. We can undermine this argument by asking what exactly the post-structuralists refer to when they talk about the meaning of an intention. Intentions are behavioural or mental states that do not have meanings in the sense utterances have meanings. Intentions do not possess or instantiate meanings; rather, they establish the meanings possessed or instantiated in other objects. Thus, although we can ask what a particular description of an intention means, we can not ask what an intention itself means. If we adopt the behaviourist view of psychological states, to ask about the meaning of an agent's intention is to ask about the meaning of an agent's action; but behaviourists deny we can ask about the meaning of an action as though there were something behind it when there is not.[16] Thus, behaviourism implies that meanings are fixed by intentions that do not themselves have meanings. If we adopt the mentalist view of psychological states, then when people describe a mental state they make an utterance and we can ask what they mean by this utterance, but asking about the meaning of an utterance describing a

mental state is not the same thing as asking about the meaning of the mental state itself. Imagine that passers-by overhear Peter saying "hallelujah lass" to Jane and ask him what he means at which point Peter explains that he intended to praise her suggestion. Although the passers-by can ask Peter what he means by this latter statement about his intention, they can not ask him what he means by his intention. Thus, mentalism too implies that meanings are fixed by intentions that do not themselves have meanings. Intentions seem to be unstable only because we must use language to describe them and we always can ask about the meaning of the words we so use. Although we can use various combinations of words to describe an intention, however, it remains the same whatever words we use to describe it.

Post-structuralists sometimes argue that we can not have knowledge of intentions precisely because they exist outside of language whereas we always remain within language. As Derrida puts it, there is only writing, "there is no 'outside' to the text."[17] Here too, however, the rhetoric of post-structuralism has an unfortunate tendency to slide from arguments for a weak claim that is true to a defence of a strong claim that is false. Few people would deny the weak claim that we must use language, conceived as a set of signs, if we are to refer to anything at all. But this weak claim does not establish the strong claim that we can not penetrate the linguistic fog to acquire knowledge of the things to which our signs refer. On the contrary, if our signs refer to reality, presumably we can have knowledge of reality. The real issue, therefore, is whether or not our signs refer to reality. The post-structuralists who argue that we can not have knowledge of anything outside of language must do so on the grounds that our language does not refer to reality. But this seems highly implausible. After all, even if we accept that our concepts do not have a one to one correspondence with reality, we still could argue that they can refer to reality within a theoretical context.[18]

As a last resort, post-structuralists sometimes accept that we can penetrate the linguistic fog engulfing reality only to deny that we thereby can acquire knowledge of intentional meanings. Derrida, for example, occasionally suggests that intentions are "in principle inaccessible" because we can not know anything about other people's minds.[19] Behaviourists can rebut this argument easily. Given that we

define psychological concepts by reference to actual or possible be-
haviour, we can have knowledge of intentions simply because we
can observe behaviour. The fact that we can not know other minds is
irrelevant because intentions are not mental states. Mentalists too
can rebut this argument provided only that they reject logical em-
piricism. The post-structuralists' position derives from the twin as-
sertions that we can know things only if we perceive them directly
and that we can not perceive other minds directly. Yet the logical
empiricism contained in these assertions does scant justice to our
everyday notion of experience. When we say that we have experi-
enced something, we imply that it exists and that we have had sen-
sations we could not have had if it did not exist, but we do not
necessarily imply that we have perceived it in itself. For instance, if
we say that we have experienced radio waves, we imply that they
exist and that we have listened to the radio, but we do not imply that
we have perceived radio waves directly. We imply that we have heard
the sounds the radio waves produce in our ear, not the radio waves
themselves. Thus, provided mentalists accept our everyday, realist
understanding of experience, they too can argue that we can have
knowledge of other people's minds. They can say that we have knowl-
edge of other people's minds because we encounter their minds in-
directly in their behaviour. So, we can accept that a text is ambigu-
ous, being the site of various works, without thereby concluding
that it is unknowable.

Reception theorists suggest that the ambiguous nature of texts
renders them unstable in the sense of being indeterminate rather
than unknowable. Yet we have no reason as yet to accept this argu-
ment either. We have found only that texts are ambiguous because
they are sites of various works, not that they are indeterminate be-
cause we can not identify the works of which they are composed.
Reception theorists argue that we can not determine the content of a
text because the historicity of our being precludes our escaping from
our particular historical horizon. Many reception theorists refer us
here to Hans-Georg Gadamer's analysis of historical knowledge as
dependent on "the inner historicity that belongs to experience it-
self," an analysis that itself points back to Wilhelm Dilthey's belief
that a historical event "gains meaning from its relationship with the
whole, from the connection between past and future."[20] However,

whereas Gadamer's followers often take him to have proven the ir-
relevance and futility of any attempt to fix a text, he himself focused
on the implications of human ontology for understanding as such.
His concern lay less with the specific methodological problems we
face in acquiring knowledge of texts than in general issues about the
nature of all our understanding.[21] Anyway, reception theorists argue
that later historical events or works alter the context of earlier events
or texts so we always understand history from a wider perspective
than our ancestors but a narrower one than our heirs. When Locke
wrote the *Two Treatises*, for example, he and his contemporaries did
not have our modern concept of liberalism in terms of which to
understand his ideas, but today we recognise his text as one found-
ing such liberalism. Reception theorists argue that the current mean-
ing of a historical event or text depends on a grasp of history as a
unity culminating in the present. Thus, because the nature of the
present constantly changes, to determine the content of a text, we
would have to see history as a whole, which we can not do.

Reception theory confuses two aspects of indeterminacy. On the
one hand, reception theorists correctly recognise that the future fate
of a text remains unknown and open-ended: we can not say what
works individuals will attach to that site in the future. On the other
hand, reception theorists wrongly imply that the open-ended nature
of a text's fate means we can not determine its current historical con-
tent. The current historical content of a text consists of all those
works that individuals have attached to it as a site, where because
the meaning of a work does not depend on its later significance,
historians can determine the content of these works and thus the
text. We can fix the current content of texts because the meanings
they had for specific individuals in the past will not alter with later
events. Historians can determine, for example, what the *Two Trea-
tises* meant to Locke, and what it has meant to other people in the
past, without knowing anything about its future fate, let alone its
final significance. We can not predict the future, so we can not know
how our heirs will react to texts. But we can discover what an author
meant by a text, what another person has taken a text to mean, and
what particular consequences a reading of a text has had.

The open-ended nature of a text's future in no way makes it a
peculiarly indeterminate object. We do not know who will form fu-

ture governments of the UK, but we can write histories of previous governments. We might not know when a volcano will erupt in the future, but we can write a natural history dating its previous eruptions. The inability of historians to predict the future does not prevent their knowing the past. Once we distinguish the future significance of a text from its current content, we no longer have any reason to deny that texts are determinate historical objects. There is a fixed historical reality: an author did mean such and such by a text and others have understood it in this and that ways. Of course, future events might lead historians to revise their view of this fixed historical reality: new evidence or a new climate of opinion might prompt historians to adopt a new understanding of a work. But then in all areas of knowledge, the future might cast new light on objects, encouraging further reflection, and leading us to revise our beliefs. In no area of human knowledge does the likelihood of our thus revising our beliefs imply that the objects we currently postulate are unstable. A text is a physical object that acts as a site at which one or more individual locates a work. So defined, a text is an ambiguous but stable entity with, at any given moment, a determinate content available for historical study.

Texts and Authors

Our definition of a text also enables us to resolve difficulties in the concept of an author and the relationship of authorial intention to textual meaning. Alongside post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory, there has arisen an increasing awareness of the difficulties of postulating, let alone identifying, authors for texts such as the *Iliad* or a "keep off the grass" sign. In our view, a text is a physical object that people transform into a meaningful one by attaching works to it. This analysis of the text points to distinctions between the creator of the text as a physical object – that which causes it to come into being - the author of the text as an utterance – the person who first ascribes meaning to the relevant physical object – and readers of the text – those people other than the author who come to ascribe meanings to the relevant object. Once we grasp these

distinctions, we surely will conclude that although any text will have a creator and an author, the two need not be the same.

Our definition of the text, with its implicit distinction between creator and author, enables us to postulate authors for problematic texts such as the *Iliad* or a "keep off the grass" sign. Consider texts with a composite author or multiple authors. In these cases, we can distinguish the creators of the individual bits of the text from the author who first collected these bits together in a single text. We can distinguish the numerous people we suppose played an active role in the oral tradition out of which the *Iliad* emerged from the author or authors who first wrote down and attached a meaning to the particular version of concern to us. Of course, if we are interested in a component part of a text, we might turn our attention to an author other than the author of the whole. No doubt, for example, the author of St John's Gospel was not also the author of the *Bible*. Similarly, although we standardly ascribe the meaning of a co-authored text to all the authors, we might focus on a component part that we ascribe to just one of them.

Consider next simple texts that recur as, for instance, with common public notices. Some scholars have argued that signs such as "keep off the grass" do not have authors.[22] We might allow that public notices often are created by machines: after all, there is something odd about the idea that they could be created by someone who never sees them nor touches them, such as the person who first put up a sign saying "keep off the grass" or the person who programmes a machine to produce a hundred such signs. Because printing machines can not ascribe meanings to objects, moreover, we might allow also that the creators of public notices often are not their authors. Nonetheless, we still need not conclude that such notices do not have authors. We can say instead that the author of such a notice is the person who first ascribes meaning to it, even when this implies that the notice existed as a physical object for sometime before its author constituted it as a meaningful text. The case of apparently accidental texts, such as the imagined example of the monkey who types *Hamlet*, closely resembles that of public notices.[23] We have the monkey who creates the *Hamlet* manuscript as a physical object and Shakespeare who first made any such utterance, but neither seems suitable as the author of the manuscript.

Rather, we can say that the author is the person who first ascribes meaning to it.

In many cases, the author of a text is also its creator. Sometimes, however, the creator does not ascribe any meaning to the creation and so can not be the author of a meaningful text. The author of the text in these cases is the person who first ascribes meaning to it. This separation of author and creator would seem paradoxical only if we wrongly reduced the meaning of a text to the conscious, prior purposes of its author. If we did this, we would set up a rigid distinction between author and reader in a way which would encourage us to equate authorship with creation. In contrast, once we recognise that a text is just a site at which various individuals locate diverse meanings, we can allow that authors and readers ascribe meanings to texts in similar processes. Doing this, moreover, encourages us to distinguish the ascription of meaning from the act of creation. There is nothing paradoxical, therefore, in the idea that the author of an utterance might be, not its creator, but rather the first reader to ascribe meaning to it.

In our view, texts do no possess innate meanings but rather are given meanings by authors and readers alike. This pragmatic theory of the text resembles that of the reception theorists. Although the author first assigns meaning to the text, its meaning is not restricted to that its author intended or even could have intended. Rather, its future meaning is established in the act of its being read. The author locates the first work at the site of the text, but later readers can locate entirely different works at the same site. The text comes to bear various meanings as a result of being read by different people in different places and at different times. Thus, we can talk of the meaning of a text going beyond the intentions of its author or of the author having little control over its meaning. Similarly, because every time people read a text, they ascribe meaning to it, we can talk of each reading being a creative act; we can talk of the gradual unfolding of a text's significance, the constant proliferation of its meanings, and the impossibility of pinning down every meaning it might bear.[24]

Some historians have long been interested in how a text has been read or how a thinker's reputation has waxed and waned. A pragmatic theory of the text clarifies our conceptualisation of such issues. It provides the historian with helpful heuristic hints based on a

greater methodological sophistication.[25] More particularly, a pragmatic theory of the text draws our attention to the processes through which beliefs and texts acquire authority. Historians might examine how beliefs and texts are established, neglected, and promoted within public discourses and social practices. By doing so, moreover, they might undertake a genealogical critique of a received canon of texts or a social ideology.

Consider first how a pragmatic theory of the text encourages historians to explore the changing horizon of expectations within which people placed various works at the site of a text. Any received canon or dominant ideology probably will appear here as one gradually established and modified through changing readings inspired by diverse interests, concerns, and criteria of excellence. Canons and ideologies are not natural, self-evident, or given phenomena, but rather created objects open to contestation.

Consider next how a pragmatic theory of the text encourages historians to explore the synchronic and diachronic relationships between works. Texts, traditions, and even social practices are composed in part of works that draw on, mimic, and contest one another in a variety of ways. Often received canons and social ideologies can be shown to rest on grotesque over-simplifications of the relationships between various works. In political thought, for example, the canon suggests that Locke intended the *Two Treatises* as a response to Hobbes in a way he simply did not.[26]

Consider finally how a pragmatic theory of the text encourages historians to explore the social contexts in which works and texts are produced and distributed. Intellectual historians have not paid sufficient attention to questions of format, pricing, and other publishing and retail practices all of which effect who reads, what, how, and why. Equally important here are cultural and social institutions, including reviews, advertising, universities, churches, and political parties, all of which promote or hide certain works from various audiences. Historians who explored such matters might show us how received canons and social ideologies are given authority and institutionalised not solely in reasoned debate but also in political struggles characterised by unequal relations of power.

Although our pragmatic theory of the text resembles that of the reception theorists, there are important differences here. Reception

theorists often divorce the meaning of a text entirely from the intentions of its author. Sometimes they draw on a phenomenological scepticism to suggest that historians understand the past only in a dialogue with it and that this precludes a focus on authorial intentions.[27] According to phenomenological sceptics, the way in which readers understand a text reflects their presuppositions.[28] Reception theorists imply that this phenomenological scepticism shows that we can never recover the authorial intention behind a text, so we should concentrate on the meaning of the text as it has been produced by a continuous stream of creative readings. Yet phenomenological scepticism can not do the job reception theorists here ask it to. If we could not have access to past meanings, we could not recover the ways in which readers responded to texts any more than we could authorial intentions. There are only two viable responses to phenomenological scepticism. The first is: if we believe that the limitations of human understanding make history impossible, we will focus solely on what texts mean to us, knowing full well that we can not recover either the intentions of the authors of these texts or the meanings these texts have had for past readers.[29] The second is: if we think that the limits of human understanding make history difficult but not impossible, we will try to recover the meaning of texts to authors and readers alike.

Reception theory seems to be on firmer ground when it relies solely on the suggestion that the study of texts can not just be a study of authorial intentions. Even here, however, reception-theory is lopsided. Imagine that historians want to write a study of the various ways in which readers have understood Locke's *Two Treatises* through the ages. When historians want to know what someone took the *Two Treatises* to mean, they will study the writings, or possibly the actions, of that person. They still will focus on authorial intentions; it is just the relevant authorial intentions now will lie in the texts in which the readers of the *Two Treatises* expressed their understanding of it. In this way, whenever we shift our focus away from the author, we turn our attention to another work, and presumably another text, so we can talk of the meaning of a work being bound by the intentions of its author. Again, because every time people read a text, they create a new meaning, we can talk about every reading of a text producing a new work with a meaning composed of the intention of

the reader. Reception theorists are far too ardent in their attacks on the author.

Even if our pragmatic theory of the text does not quite restrict the role of the historian to the recovery of authorial intentions, it definitely allows us to declare some ways of approaching texts to be ahistorical. Procedural individualism requires a historian who wants to ascribe a meaning to a text to specify for whom it had that meaning. Because texts do not have structural or innate meanings, any claim that a text had a meaning must entail a claim that it did so for one or more individual who at least in principle could be specified. Thus, the ascription of a meaning to a text is ahistorical if the individual for whom it had that meaning is not a historical person. There is nothing wrong with scholars saying that a text means something to them or their contemporaries: it is just that these meanings are not properly historical. There is nothing wrong with scholars finding interesting ideas in a text and writing about these ideas: it is just that unless they give evidence to suggest a historical person understood the utterance to convey these ideas, these meanings too will not be properly historical. As historians, we must study meanings that actually existed in the past; we must study works even if we do so to uncover the diverse meanings that a text has been made to bear.

Conclusion

Texts are the main source of our knowledge of the past. Yet recent debates, inspired by post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory have shown the concept of a text to be highly complex and contentious. Against the background of these debates, we have defended an analysis of the text as a site at which individuals locate diverse meanings. Texts are meaningful objects, not purely physical ones. Objects are never intrinsically meaningful, however; rather, they become meaningful by virtue of individuals attaching meanings to them. Every time people attach a meaning to an object, they create a work, that is, a meaningful object they associate with the relevant physical one. The text is the site at which the individuals locate their works.

Our pragmatic theory of the text overlaps with, but also differs from, those associated with post-structuralism, deconstruction, and reception theory. Consider first the question of the stability of the text. Here we accepted that the text is ambiguous while denying that it is unknowable or indeterminate. Because the text can be the site of very different works, it has no single correct meaning or even set of meanings. Yet at any moment the text consists of a given set of works the meanings of which are fixed by the intentions of their authors. Consider next the question of the relationship of textual meaning to authorial intention. Here we echoed several insights reception theory derives from a recognition of the creative nature of the reading process. We encouraged the exploration of the changing horizon of expectations surrounding texts, the synchronic and diachronic relationships between works, and the social and cultural processes through which works and texts are produced, distributed, and accorded authority. Nonetheless, we did not follow reception theory, or post-structuralism and deconstruction, in preaching "the death of the author."[30] Because the content of a work is given by the mental activity of its author, the content of a text at any moment in time is defined by the mental activity of those individuals who have associated works with it. In a sense, therefore, to study the historical meaning of a text is always to study authorial intentions.

Notes

1 Such a view has been defended, though with a degree of textual indeterminacy, by E. Hirsch (1967): *Validity in Interpretation*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

2 R. Barthes (1975): *S/Z*. Trans. R. Miller. London, J. Cape, , p. 140.

3 M. Foucault (1977): "What is an Author?" In *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.* Trans. D. Bouchard & S. Simon. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 121.

4 J. Derrida (1977) "Signature Event Context", *Glyph* 1, 181.

5 L. Strauss (1953): *Natural Right and History*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press; C. Macpherson (1962): *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.* Oxford, Oxford University Press; and J. Dunn (1969): *The Political Thought of John Locke.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

6 A noteworthy example of such scholarship is the critical edition P. Laslett (1960): *John Locke's Two Treatises of Government.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

7 The classic exposition of this point is F. de Saussure (1966): *Course in General Linguistics.* Eds. C. Bally & A. Sechehaye. Trans. W. Baskin. New York, McGraw-Hill .

8 That linguistic conventions are the products of individuals adopting them has been emphasised by, among others, J. Searle (1969): *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, partic. pp. 16-24.

9 A similar, but not identical, distinction between works and texts is drawn by W. Iser (1974): "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach". In R. Cohen (ed.): *New Directions in Literary History.* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 125-45. For a very different use of these two terms - one which ascribes an undue agency to texts and identifies works solely with authorial meanings - see R. Barthes (1977): "From Work to Text". In *Image, Music, Text.* Trans. S. Heath. London, Fontana, pp. 155-64.

10 Contextualists rightly complain of the dangers of assuming otherwise. See, most famously, Q. Skinner (1988): "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas". In J. Tully (ed.): *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics.* Cambridge, Polity Press, pp. 29-67.

11 For something very like a language-x, see Foucault's account of epistemes as "historical aprioris" that exist in time in a world free of subjectivity. M. Foucault (1989): *The Order of Things.* London, Routledge, partic. pp. xx-xxii.

12 J. Miller (1972): "Tradition and Difference". *Diacritics* 2, 12.

13 J. Derrida: "Differance". In *Margins of Philosophy.* Trans. A. Bass. Brighton, Harvester Press, p. 13. Examples of reception theory inspired in part by post-structuralism, include S. Fish (1980): *Is There a Text in this Class?* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; and D. LaCapra (1983): *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

14 So, interpreters of Derrida, for example, fall into two main camps. Either we take him literally, in which case he seems to make strong but arguably implausible claims, which, if correct, would dramatically undercut all philosophy. Or we take him metaphorically, in which case he seems to make weak, but arguably bland, claims that entail little that had not already been suggested by philosophers such as the pragmatists and Wittgenstein. For favourable and hostile literal interpretations see respectively J. Culler: *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (London: Routledge, 1983); and J. Ellis, *Against*

Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For a metaphorical one see B. Harrison, "White Mythology Revisited: Derrida and His Critics on Reason and Rhetoric", *Critical Inquiry* 25 (1999), 505-34.

15 T. Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 69. On the instability of intentions also see Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context".

16 Compare W. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), partic. pp. 26-79.

17 J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 158.

18 For a detailed defence of this suggestion, see M. Bevir, "Meaning, Truth and Phenomenology", *Teorema* 16 (1997), 61-76.

19 See, for example, J. Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. B. Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 125.

20 H-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. W. Glen-Doepel (London: Sheed & Ward, 1979), p. 195; W. Dilthey, *Selected Writings*, ed. & trans. H. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 235-36. Examples of reception theory inspired in part by phenomenological scepticism include J. Gunnell, *Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1979), partic. pp. 110-26; and P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), partic. pp. 89-95.

21 See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 267-68. A similar distinction is suggested by R. Palmer*, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), partic. p. 46. Moreover, Gadamer himself explicitly drew on Heidegger in order to shift the hermeneutic tradition from an epistemological orientation to an ontological one. See Gadamer*, Truth and Method*, partic. pp. 214-34.

22 For the claim that texts have authors only if they can be interpreted in numerous ways, see A. Nehamas, "What an Author Is", *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986), 685.

23 Accidental utterances also would include the computer-generated ones invoked against intentionalism by G. Dickie, *Aesthetics: An Introduction* (Indianopolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), partic. p. 112.

24 See LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History*; and Ricoeur*, Interpretation Theory*.

25 A pragmatic theory of the text inspires, for example, the seven heuristic theses listed in H. Jauss: "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory". In Cohen (ed.): *New Directions*, pp. 11-41.

26 See Dunn: *Political Thought of John Locke*. More generally, see Skinner: "Meaning and Understanding".

27 Critiques of intentionalism based on this argument, include LaCapra: *Rethinking Intellectual History*; and J. Keane: "More Theses on the Philosophy of History". In Tully (ed.): *Meaning and Context*, pp. 204-17.

28 Gadamer: *Truth and Method*.

29 See Fish: *Is There a Text in this Class?*

30 Contrast R. Barthes: "The Death of the Author". In *Image, Music, Text*, pp. 142-48; and Foucault, "What is an Author?".

Tuija Parvikko

POSITIVISTS
VERSUS MORALISTS

The Eichmann Trial and International Law

"This is only one example among many to demonstrate the inadequacy of the prevailing legal system and of current juridical concepts to deal with the facts of administrative massacres organized by the state apparatus. If we look more closely into the matter we will observe without much difficulty that the judges in all these trials really passed judgment solely on the basis of the monstrous deeds. In other words, they judged freely, as it were, and did not really lean on the standards and legal precedents with which they more or less convincingly sought to justify their decisions." (Arendt 1963/1965, 294.)

This is how Hannah Arendt characterized the war crime trials of World War II in the *Postscript* to *Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963/1965). It is easy to read her account as an expression of a view according to which the judges at these trials did not really apply any established standards or criteria whatsoever but rather ruled arbitrarily without respecting legal precedents. However, this would be a misreading. What Arendt really wanted to say was that the Nazi crimes in general and Eichmann's crimes in particular posed a serious problem to the entire Western judicial system and its legal practice. This problem stemmed from the nature of these

crimes. Since they were partly unprecedented, the Western judicial system lacked standards and criteria on the basis of which to judge them. On the other hand, the unbelievably enormous scale of the crimes did not correspond to any conventional punishment and expiation. In other words, the existing Western legislature simply turned out to be totally unprepared to deal with these kinds of crimes. This unpreparedness is well reflected in the debate caused first by the Nuremberg trials and then by the Eichmann trial. What was at stake in these debates were basic foundations of the Western judicial system and their capacity to respond, punish, and reconcile extreme and unprecedented crimes.

In this article I deal with the debate caused by the Eichmann trial among lawyers[1]. My aim is to show how the metatheoretical nature of the debate shaped different accounts. I will argue that the basic controversy was between legal positivists who attempted to keep the Eichmann case in the realm of the rule of law and "moralists" who challenged the former, arguing for moral and ethical justification of the case. Consequently, I will argue that there is a thematical link between the debate over the Eichmann case and contemporary discussion of the significance of international law. Legal, ethical, and political problems revealed by the Eichmann case speak for a need to establish supranational law shared and ratified by all the political communities of the world. However, the Eichmann case shows that the problem of crimes against humankind[2] cannot be resolved simply by international legislation as far as these kinds of crimes are political by their nature. Even less can the problem be resolved by "new cosmopolitanism"[3] in the meaning of world government. The political nature of Eichmann's crimes shows that what is at stake in this issue is not so much the question of how to rule and punish but rather how to share the world with other people. In other words, what is at stake is the question of how are we supposed to belong to the world in such a way that this belonging is not based on sovereign rule but rather sharing the world in freedom, equality, and respect for other people.

The juridical problems of the Eichmann case concerned both his capture[4] and a number of aspects of the trial itself. Given the highly controversial nature of the case it is no surprise that it aroused a lively discussion among jurists. However, it is conspicuous that most

of the lawyers who approached the case seemed to be somehow embarrassed about it: from the viewpoint of the existing legal order there seemed to be something equivocal in every possible phase and aspect of it.

The general embarrassment and the controversial nature of the trial was reflected in the fact that the number of accounts of it was considerable. (For the accounts see e.g. Braham 1969) In addition to all kinds of formal problems with the trial the jurists were puzzled by two main problems. On the one hand, and more importantly, they considered what the meaning of the Eichmann trial and its impact on world consciousness was. On the other they asked what its effects were on international law and the role of law in the world in general.

It is also conspicuous that right from the beginning much of the discussion was concerned with metatheoretical justifications of the trial. In my view this reflects the fact that the Eichmann case never really fitted the world of the existing legal order. In other words, it was impossible to discuss it in a sensible way keeping strictly inside the fence of the normal discourse of law. Although the Eichmann trial was an important case in the development of international law it was difficult to simply locate it among the growing number of precedents for future cases. Regardless of the personal opinion of the contributor, metatheoretical justifications were needed to discuss the case at all.

In the following I will start by taking a look at the development of international criminal law before the Eichmann trial. I do not give an exhaustive history of it but rather pick out a few relevant points in its development as the legal background to the Eichmann case. Correspondingly, the subsequent chapter over Israeli Jurisdiction is meant to shed light on the political background of the case in order to be able to approach the Eichmann case in context. Against this background I will then show that what was really in court in Jerusalem were the principles of international law on the one hand and the nature of Jewish identity on the other: it was in this thematical framework that the debate over the case was shaped into a controversy between legal positivists and moralists. I will deal with this controversy by dint of a few representative contributions which encapsulate the most important arguments presented in the course of it. Fi-

nally, I will argue that the debate suffered from an omission of political approach. Had the discussants understood how deeply political the Eichmann case was by character the entire debate might have taken shape in another way which would have brought political aspects more openly to the fore. The unhappy result of this omission was that the Eichmann case did not really manage to improve and accelerate the development of international criminal law but it rather deliberately retarded political discussion of the question of how crimes against humankind should be dealt with.

International Criminal Law before the Eichmann Trial

Although Eichmann's crimes, just like the crimes of the other Nazi criminals, have been claimed to be without precedent because of their extraordinary nature and enormity, his trial did have a clear legal precedent. This precedent was, of course, constituted by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in 1945-46 and complemented by twelve subsequent Nuremberg trials in 1946-1949. The purpose of this enormous and extraordinary trial, conducted by the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and the U.S.S.R., was to try and punish the military, political and economic leaders of the vanquished Nazi Reich. Despite its controversial nature, it constituted an important milestone in the development of international law. Had this trial not taken place, the legal precedents for the Eichmann trial would have remained much weaker.

It is not an exaggeration to maintain that the Nuremberg trials opened a new chapter in the development of international law which could no longer lean solely on a simple ideal of the rule of law but inevitably had to be intertwined with ethical and political aspects of human conduct as well. From the Nuremberg trials on, the debate over international criminal law has expanded to concern also fundamental metatheoretical questions of the grounds of law: who is allowed and justified to try whom. In this respect, the Nazi crimes challenged one of the most important principles of international law. Ordinarily, it was maintained that the state can exercise its right to

punish only in respect of persons or acts which concern it more than any other country. Obviously, in the case of the Nazi crimes it was not always so easy to decide which country was most concerned. In this context, the Eichmann trial constitutes one of the most important cases in the history of international criminal law. It was reflected already in the conduct of the trial itself. During the trial, international law was constantly invoked both by the defence and the prosecution as the ethical basis of the trial and of the law under which it took place. This position was also adopted indirectly by the court of Jerusalem as far as in its decision it referred at length to international theory and practice (cf. Papadatos 1964, 43).

Until the IMT and other war crime trials after World War II the development of international criminal law had been slow and painful, hindered by the desire of the leading Western powers to maintain and cherish their absolute sovereignty.[5] In other words, they were unwilling to surrender their absolute power to an external authority provided by international treaties and codification: it was believed that the essence of sovereignty consisted in the fact that it was not responsible to any foreign sovereignty or the international community at large (cf. Woetzel 1962, 29; Zolo 1995; Ferrajoli 1997).

It was only after the second world war that the field of application of universal jurisdiction was further enlarged to include crimes against humanity in general. In Papadatos' view this resulted from the fact that the conscience of the civilized world reached the point of conceiving fundamental human rights not as an internal question of each state but as an imperious postulate of the international community (Papadatos 1964, 46). This postulate was consecrated in international law by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and by a number of conventions after World War II.

One of the great advances of Nuremberg was the recognition of individual criminal responsibility combined with the rejection of the doctrine of the "act of state" in international penal law. The most striking aspect of this advance was that it presupposed the limitation of the principle of sovereignty. In the present-day world sovereignty is no longer accepted in its absolute form and it no longer corresponds to reality either on the national or international plane. (Papadatos 1964, 73; Zolo 1995)

Several authors (e.g. Papadatos 1964, 73-74; Zolo 1995; Ferrajoli 1997) have argued that according to the modern concept, the sovereign state is no longer an absolute power which bears within itself its limits and its end. The rights of a state have limits and end at the point where their exercise might endanger the peace and security of other states. Each state merely has a sphere of competence which is set by international law. In the international community, international law then becomes the supreme regulator which grants rights and sets the responsibilities of the states who are members of that community. Law at the mercy of states has given way to that of law above states.[6]

Israeli Jurisdiction

Adolf Eichmann was neither tried *in absentia* by the IMT or any of the subsequent Nuremberg Trials nor by an international criminal court later established but was tried by a national court in Jerusalem. However, Israel was by no means unprepared for his case. Although it did not exist at the time the Nazi crimes were committed, the State of Israel did not hesitate to grant itself the right to judge the perpetrators under the principle of the universality of the punishment of these crimes. In its claim to have the right to try Eichmann it leaned both on certain principles of international law and national jurisdiction.

The national legal basis for the trial of Eichmann or any other Nazi criminal in Israel had been laid ten years earlier in the Law against Genocide and the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law which was among the first laws enacted in Israel. This law was partly derived from then existing international criminal law and especially from the practices followed in the war crime trials after World War II. It set out the factual element of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes specifying them in identical fashion with the London Agreement.[7]

On the other hand, it contained national characteristics which differed from the basic principles of international law. It was an exceptional law even in national terms in the sense that it reintroduced

the death penalty earlier abolished in Israel for the punishment of Nazi criminals and their collaborators. According to Israeli understanding, the Nazi crimes were so extraordinary that the only conceivable punishment for them was the death sentence. It also provided for the punishment of certain acts already made punishable by the Israeli Penal Code when these were committed in enemy territory, during the period of the Nazi régime and against a persecuted person. It was intended to ensure the punishment of the criminal acts by means of which the criminal persecution by the Nazis of their political and racial enemies was mainly carried out (Papadatos 1964, 34-35).

However, in general terms the Israeli law did not dramatically go against earlier international practice. The earlier Nazi criminal and war crime tribunals also had to resolve the problem of retroactive legislation and other questions of more or less the same character as the Israeli law. The main difference lay, perhaps, in the fact that the latter lacked a statute of limitations unlike, for example, the German war crime and Nazi criminal laws which expired in the mid-60s because they contained a statute of limitation of twenty years.

Nevertheless, the Israeli legislation could not lean on an anonymously established set of international norms, not to mention international laws, simply because such were still lacking at the beginning of the 60s. The earlier Nazi war crime trials provided only a precedent which was continuously contested by a number of lawyers especially those representing the German school of legal thought. Although the League of Nations had already expressed an urgent need for establishing a permanent international criminal tribunal, such a tribunal had never been founded. All the tribunals for trying Nazi criminals had been occasional and had been suppressed immediately after the trials.

Thus, the formal legal basis for trying Eichmann had to be built by combining retroactive national legislation with a set of precedents provided by earlier Nazi war criminal trials. The available set of precedents and international jurisdiction were defective, leaving room for different interpretations. No wonder then that the debate over the legal basis and justification for the trial burst out almost immediately after Eichmann's capture and soon spread from the pages of daily newspapers to periodicals and journals of law.

The Eichmann Trial in International Law

Right from the beginning professional debate over the Eichmann case was intertwined with two other ongoing debates. One of these was concerned with Jewish identity and the fate of Judaism and Zionism after the establishment of the state of Israel. The second was concerned with the moral and ethical justification for the capture and trial of Eichmann. Since most writers did not satisfy themselves with dealing only with one of these aspects, it is virtually impossible to classify the contributions as belonging only and exclusively to one of these debates. Especially the moral and juridical debates were intertwined in such a way that they may be read as contributions to one and the same metadebate. As I pointed out above, this metadebate was concerned with the foundations and principles of the Western judicial system and its criteria for doing justice: the Western conception of justice and the rule of law turned out to be totally unprepared and insufficient in the face of Nazi crimes which went beyond any conventional conception of crime. Correspondingly, moral and judirical arguments may be read as two different types of answer to the same basic questions.

In other words, in the debate, there were two metathemes under scrutiny which went beyond ordinary judicial practice and which shaped the debate in a decisive way. On the one hand, the trial was approached as a test case of the then existing principles of international law. On the other hand, what was at stake was the nature of Jewish identity and the future of Israel as a Jewish state. If these two issues are situated on a more metatheoretical level they can be seen as contributions to one and the same great debate which was that between legal positivists and "moralists" concerning fundamental justifications of the Western judicial system.

The Principles of International Law in Court

One of the sceptics as to the impact of the Eichmann trial on international law was D. Lasok, who considered it extraordinary in two ways. He predicted that it would go down in history not only as a

trial without precedent because of the enormity of the charges but also because it was likely to perpetuate and deepen the controversy provoked by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal (Lasok 1962, 355).

One of the problems provoked by the Nuremberg trials was the validity of the principle *nullum crimen sine lege* generally respected in the Western judicial system. Lasok pointed out that ordinarily, in the province of municipal law, the principle *nullum crimen sine lege* was enshrined as a guarantee against the abuse of power through retrospective legislation. In other words, its purpose was to protect individuals against arbitrary treatment by the state. On the other hand, it should operate to ensure a fair trial and protect those who come to court with clean hands and a clear conscience. (Lasok 1962, 365-366.)

However, the case of the Nazi war criminals was different. They did not come to court with clean hands but rather pleading that their deeds should be considered as acts of state as far as they had acted under the orders of the Third Reich. Thus, in their mind not only the *nullum crimen sine lege* principle should have been considered as valid but also the act of state principle which ruled out personal responsibility.

Faced with these kinds of criminals the Nuremberg Tribunal decided to rule out both the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege* and the act of state. In so doing it paved the way for the idea that states are not organic personalities but merely forms of organisation and that crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities. Thus it is only by punishing individuals that the law can be vindicated. (Lasok 1962, 366.)

Nevertheless, in Lasok's view, the real problem with the Eichmann trial was not with these developments in international law. He argued that the trial constituted a very dangerous precedent in another sense: "When a man is spirited away from the protection of a sovereign State and put on trial by his captors for crimes which he allegedly committed in some other country or countries, against people who were related only by bonds of race or religion to the country in which he is tried, such country not even having been in existence when the crimes were committed, all formal barriers separating arbitrariness from administration of justice appear to be broken." (Lasok 1962, 372-373.) In other words, the major problem with the

Eichmann case lay in the way Eichmann was brought to trial. This undeniably illegal way would provide international law with a dangerous precedent for corresponding cases in the future if abused by criminal states.

The Eichmann trial constituted a dangerous precedent also in another sense. As far as it rested on a synthesis of international and national precedents it also constituted a precedent for arbitrary combinations in the future. More precisely, the Eichmann case might encourage general principles of international law and a fair trial to be neglected and pave the way for the practice of organizing trials of international criminals on an *ad hoc* -basis also in the future. Thus, in Lasok's view the fundamental problem with the trial was that it "exposed one of the chief defects of the [existing] system of international law, namely, the absence of an International Criminal Tribunal, and has reminded the world that something must be done in order to avoid international justice remaining in the hands of victorious nations or individual States acting like international 'vigilantes'." (Lasok 1962, 373-374.)

Unfortunately, although the Eichmann trial plainly exposed these defects it did not manage to precipitate the development of international law. On the contrary, Lozier (1963, 75) had good reason to complain that efforts commenced in a spirit of post-war *élan* to develop an effective international criminal code embodying the principle of individual responsibility had foundered. They had foundered not because of Israel's exceptional conduct in the international community but because sovereign states had been reluctant to commit themselves to international projects of such far-reaching consequences. They had turned out to be hopelessly reluctant to develop international codes against extreme crimes, jealously guarding their own irreducible sovereignty.

The Nature of Jewish Identity in Court

If the legal aspects of the Eichmann case aroused considerable controversy, even more so did its significance for the fate of Jews and the state of Israel. In one of the first and most powerful contributions in this debate Yosal Rogat pointed out that the explicitly admitted mo-

tive of Israel for organizing the trial was to teach rather than to punish: although it is normally maintained that using the law for ulterior purposes immediately endangers its dignity, it has to be admitted that ideally, law should also be a teacher. More precisely, the relationship between law and moral attitudes is a reciprocal one: legal rules do not always follow in the wake of moral attitudes but it is also the case that moral attitudes are changed by what is legally permitted or forbidden. Thus, in Rogat's view it was essential to ask whether Israeli authorities managed to do what they wanted to. (Rogat 1961, 4.)

In order to answer this question one needs to determine who was on trial. In Rogat's view it was precisely here that Israeli authorities failed to teach the world. Their strategy was to depict the profile of an arch-slaughterer, an inhuman monster, a psychotic whose evil went beyond normal human understanding. This was a serious mistake. It did not teach anything because it did not force people to rethink anything or involve anybody personally:

> "It is psychologically easy for us to relate these terrible events to an inhuman automaton; such a perception leaves us relatively comfortable by placing the greatest distance between us and responsibility for evil. Since by 'monster' we really mean 'inhuman', it is easy to see little or nothing of ourselves in him. On the other hand, we could be touched and changed only if we were forced to realize what countless ordinary men, because of weaknesses, deficiencies, and susceptibilities like our own, were led to do. We all resist learning about the ways in which we contribute to injustice and cruelty; and in order to affect our sense of responsibility so that we can more effectively guard against dangers like anti-Semitism the trial had to confront us with hard knowledge rather than with easy lessons." (Rogat 1961, 8.)

In other words, instead of doing its best to show how extraordinary Eichmann's crimes were in their inhuman monstrosity, Israel should have done the opposite. It should have tried to show that despite his plain ordinariness Eichmann was able to commit awful crimes and that he was far from being irreplaceable. If he had not been there, somebody else would have committed the same crimes. This would have invited others to consider their responsibility and complicity. It would have suggested that it is not enough to stare at

Eichmann's individual deeds without relating them to what others did in the mean time. More precisely, Eichmann's individual deeds ought to have been considered in connection with the structures of evil in operation. This kind of approach would have shown that neither the structures of evil nor individual deeds needed to be monstruous in order to produce a nightmarish result. (Rogat 1961, 9-10.)

Further, Rogat argued that in this connection the problem with the law is that it is not able to retain ambiguities. A trial is a process in which individual deeds are judged. It inevitably simplifies relations and structures of responsibility. A trial is structurally composed in such a way that by convicting somebody it absolves all others. Thus, against all Israel's attempts and desires, the Eichmann trial absolved the rest of the mankind from all responsibility for the Nazi horrors. It did not encourage anybody to consider how to prevent similar atrocities in future. (Rogat 1961, 11.)

Moreover, Rogat points to the fact that the Eichmann trial could not really lean on the normal ideal of trial and punishment as a process by which certain deeds are reconciled. If there was ever agreement about anything it was that Eichmann's crimes were irreconcilable and unforgivable. The Eichmann case simply breaks the principle of a normal trial that the punishment fits the crime. In other words, Eichmann's punishment could not possibly follow from what he did. This leads to the breaking of another principle of the normal law process. As far as Eichmann's crimes were incommensurable and as such irreconcilable, his punishment could not be justified either by the ideal of reform of the criminal or deterrence of others. (Rogat 1961, 11.)

Nevertheless, Israel preferred to deal with Eichmann as a normal criminal case and this caused a number of serious problems. By trying Eichmann for a crime, Israel suggested an analogy to ordinary legal phenomena. The problem here was that reducing the unique historical events at issue in the trial to legally manageable proportions risked leaving out too much that was vital. In other words, what is at stake here is the capability of a normal legal process to deal with all kinds of problems. Is there really any sense to try to reduce all kinds of problems to legal processes or criminal cases?

Rogat's reply is that legal processes are not necessarily appropriate for the solution of all problems. He suggests that perhaps events that transcend all of our categories of judgment should not be thrust into categories of law. (Rogat 1961, 13-14.)

After all these reservations placed on the Eichmann case as a normal legal process Rogat linked its ultimate justification elsewhere to Jews, Jewishness, and Israel. In his view the consequences of the trial for Jews constituted a basic part of the trial's significance for Israel. In this connection the strategy chosen by the prosecution was of vital importance. It did not only try to tell the world what Israel did to the Jews, but also to tell the Jews what the world did to them. Its message was that the Jews were better never to trust the gentile world which had proved to be intrinsically hostile towards them. Consequently, the Jews could find relative security only by banding together in Israel. (Rogat 1961, 16.)

It is important to see that what was at stake here was not a simple political tactic to deal with the case but rather an integral part of Israel's self-understanding. Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion by no means wanted to convince the world that the Jews wanted to share the world on equal terms with other people, being a nation among nations, rather he attempted to show and demonstrate the specificity of the Jews above the other nations. This is why Israel took for granted its leadership of world Jewry and its right to speak for all Jews without giving much weight to the fact that this assumption contained within itself a set of propositions about Jewishness and about the very nature of the personal identity of modern Jewry. (see Ben-Gurion 1960; Segev 1993.)

Thus, Rogat argues, the trial may be seen as part of Ben-Gurion's constant effort to galvanize all Jews into tense self-consciousness of their heroic destiny and as part of his desperate attempt to prevent Israel from becoming like other nations. (Rogat 1961, 18.) In other words, for Ben-Gurion Jewishness was not a product of individual choice but of belonging. The individual can no more completely determine the way in which he is a Jew than he can dissociate himself and cease to be a Jew. In this context the trial presented for Rogat a daring attempt to exert communal authority by utilizing all the primitive symbols and resources of a tribal community:

"to conform Jewish identity by the traditional device of relating the story of their persecution, as in the Passover retelling of Pharoah's cruelty; to link Jews of the present and future to those of the past and to Israel through a unique and demonic historical event; to assert that because of their extraordinary experience and history Jews cannot escape their extraordinary role (destiny?); to hold, in fact, that they cannot themselves choose because they were chosen." (Rogat 1961, 19.)

Ben-Gurion fought desperately against the view according to which the self, too, is an artifact. He denied that personal identity can be created by individual action and freedom and asserted that it can only be discovered by understanding one's own tradition. (c.f. Ben-Gurion 1960.) In Rogat's understanding, what is important in all this is that it creates the greatest irony of the trial, which was that its two antagonistic forces – Israel and the Nazis – had both asserted the older view of membership and identity. They were at one in their opposition to the rootless, cosmopolitan, and atomized individual. (Rogat 1961, 21-22.)

Hence, what was at stake during the trial was no more and no less than the nature of Jewish identity. Ben-Gurion and his henchmen defended an archaic, tribal way of looking at the world against those who preferred to think of it only in personal terms. In Rogat's view, it is important to see this stratum of weighty feelings and sentiments brooding beneath the urban, Western, progressive, and scientific atmosphere of modern Israel in order to appreciate the full historical significance of the trial. It would be a serious mistake, however, to assimilate them to contemporary conservatism. They rather antedate all modern patterns of thought, stressing traditional authority and commandments against individual conscience, group bonds against personal commitments, and social duties rather than individual rights. (Rogat 1961, 20.)

It is precisely in this context that certain aspects of the way the trial was conducted were, in Rogat's view, highly questionable. First and foremost, there was Israel's failure to consider the importance of the judge's perspectives, and to distinguish the roles of prosecutor, judge, and victim. More precisely, Israel's very act of establishing a unique right as a victim to prosecute put into question its right to judge. One of the cornerstones of the Western judicial system is the

impartiality of the court. In the spirit of this principle the victim cannot prosecute because the tribunal needs to be structurally established in such a way that it does not allow the possibility of doubts about impartiality. In other words, the trial does not need to be fair only in practice but it also needs to appear fair. The Israeli court went against this principle in every possible respect not least because it explicitly argued that in this case the victim was the best possible judge. (Rogat 1961, 36-38.)

Secondly, Israel totally failed to understand its role as a member of the international community. It did not understand that if it really wanted to contribute to the development of international law, it could not use an internationally significant case for its national purposes. The fact that existing international law was partly insufficient did not give any excuse for not respecting the norms of the international community. Rogat stresses the fact that international law can develop only as far as the members of international community respect and cherish its principles and bring those to justice who do not. (Rogat 1961, 41-43.) The Eichmann case was one proof more that Israel did not really want to belong to the international community as an equal member but wanted to be regarded as a special case or exception.

The Case of Moralists versus Legal Positivists

As I pointed out above, there were, among the lawyers, also those who enthusiastically supported the trial. It was characteristic of these supporters that they did not focus only on the legal issues of the case but also emphasized the moral aspects. For the defenders of the trial it was not a normal case at all but rather a heroic episode in humankind's brave fight against superhuman evil and antisemitism. Unlike for instance Rogat, they focused on Eichmann's evil as something extraordinary:

> "Neither the cult of obedience nor the daily preoccupation with the technical tasks of extermination will explain the phenomenon presented by the career of Eichmann. Some more active, dynamic, positive force is required to explain such a unique happening." (Draper 1962, 490.)

The understanding of Eichmann's evil as superhuman and extraordinary also shaped the defenders' understanding of the ultimate justification of the trial. For instance Draper argued that the Eichmann trial was first and foremost a case against antisemitism and as such it should not be seen as a case of international law but rather as a case of Jewish law. He praised the contribution of the judges as a feat of high judicial integrity. As a result, "out of the great Catastrophe in the history of the Jewish race a judicial precedent has been forged that can stand without fear as a lasting tribute to Jewish justice, and as an event of which the State of Israel may justifiably be proud." (Draper 1962, 493.)

Perhaps the most powerful and influential contribution of the moralists was presented by Helen Silving who attempted to make a case in Jewish law without totally refusing general principles of international law. On the contrary, she tried to construct the Eichmann case as an extreme situation in which conventional legal norms were not sufficient to do justice. From this standpoint she argued against the maintenance of a purely positivistic legal system and wanted to replace it with a kind of ethical viewpoint which would mix and combine positive law with natural law. She identified three principles on which international law should be based:

> "(1) international law must guard itself against indiscriminate claims to 'government by natural law'; (2) its basic approach should be 'positivistic', that is, aimed at preservation of the principle of 'the rule of law'; but that (3) in exceptional situations in which positivism leads to sacrifice of the spirit of justice to its letter, international law should not disregard the relativity of 'positive' and 'natural law' and should have the political courage to relax rule by 'positive law' in order to avoid flagrant injustice. This implies a 'minimum measure of natural law' which might, in case of conflict with 'positive law', override the latter." (Silving 1961, 309)

What is of interest here is obviously the third point. How is international law supposed to avoid flagrant injustice by relaxing rule by positive law, i.e. by having recourse to natural law or to extra-legal measures and principles? Further, who is supposed to decide where the point at which to relax the rule of positive law is? Silving's answer is that it should be decided case by case by the civilized nations

of the world. They should determine whether a concrete situation evinces such disproportion in strength between the natural-law interest and the positive-law claim as to make sacrifice of the former to the latter appear a surrender of the spirit of justice to its letter, evoking in the conscience of a majority of average people a sense of injustice. (Silving 1961, 310.)

In Silving's view the Eichmann trial fulfilled this basic criterion in three respects by combining the elements of "(1) a conflict of a positive-law claim based on a tangible thinghood-interest, territorial inviolability, with a natural-law humanistic interest; (2) a clash of the positive-law claim with a minimum natural-law demand based on a human interest which has been unanimously recognised by all nations, including the claimant, to be justified both in quality and in intensity; (3) a disproportion between the concrete value deprivation of the positive-law interest and the value of the natural-law interest in the issue." (Silving 1961, 331.)

Given these three elements, attention should be focused on the symbolic meaning of the trial as its utmost justification. In Silving's view, this symbolic meaning was constituted by Israel's unique task to present the Eichmann trial as a warning against future aggression. Israel's special fitness to try Eichmann resulted from her mission as a haven for survivors of the National Socialist regime and as a country created for the very purpose that crimes against "Jews" as a group may never be repeated. (Silving 1961, 332.)

This argument alone would suffice to render Silving's reasoning highly peculiar as far as it awarded Israel an entirely exceptional and morally higher status among nations. What makes it even more extraordinary is the meta-juridical basis introduced by it. Namely, it does not hesitate to switch from secular systems of thought to sacred texts as unquestionably higher moral authorities than anything ever produced by human beings:

> "No legal treaty, statute, judicial decision, custom or doctrinal treatise could give Israel's claim to try Eichmann more persuasive support than does the legal ethics symbolized in the Roll of Esther. The lesson taught by this most legalistic book of the Bible fits the facts of the Eichmann case with stupendous accuracy. The crime recorded in the book was 'genocide', the attempted destruction of 'a people'. This destruction was

decreed in the then form of law, i.e., in writing sealed with the king's ring, a 'people' being given to one man 'to do with them as it seemeth good to [him].' Once sealed, the decree became final and irreversible. To meet the social necessity of the situation, a legal device was invented – a device which has since become part of every known legal system as the principle or institution of 'self-defence'. Significantly, the latter was decreed in the form of law, as a 'legal right of self-defence'." (Silving 1961, 332.)

On the basis of this reasoning Silving concludes that the utmost ethical and judicial value of the Roll of Esther lies in the fact that it transforms a natural human reaction, self-defence, into a positive natural right. Consequently, faced with such analogical extreme crimes as those of Eichmann the international community may have recourse to this ethical principle as a justification for a certain legal procedure. In Israel's and Eichmann's case this meant that no one could more effectively document the Biblical 'right of self-defence' of the people whom Eichmann sought to destroy than a new nation created and dedicated to the proposition of serving as a haven for that people, regardless of whether or not Israel was otherwise entitled to represent all Jewish people of the world. (Silving 1961, 333.)

There are two conspicuous problems in this reasoning as far as it is supposed to be an ethical argument based on natural law. First and foremost, it does not tell the whole story of the Roll of Esther. Had Silving also told the rest of it, she would have been in difficulties with morally justifying a procedure which did not only introduce a politically highly valuable and morally easily defensible principle of self-defence but rather a profoundly peculiar version of self-defence. The genocide planned by Haman never took place because the Jews were warned in advance and defended themselves in time. What took place instead was a kind of preventive revenge: the Jews hurried to destroy their enemies before these had started to act. If this part of the story is taken into account it is very questionable whether it really provides an unambiguous ethical precedent or criterion for later cases of rendering justice. Applied to the case of Eichmann and other Nazis it would suggest that these could and should have been destroyed without trial already during the 30s on the basis of their evil intentions.

Secondly, Silving's reasoning raises the question as to which the generally recognized and commonly shared ethical authorities in the international community are. She treats the Bible as a universally shared religious and moral authority without taking into account that it is such only for Jews and Christians. It is legitimate to ask why the rest of humankind should accept these old stories as authoritative books of law.

It might, indeed, be suggested that the Roll of Esther should not be read as a book of ethics and even less as a book of law but rather ought to be seen as the political manifesto of an oppressed group of people. It is valuable in its claim of self-defence and its encouragement to resistance, but this claim clearly belongs to the realm of politics, not of ethics or morals. It might even be argued that during the 30s European Jews did not remember the message of the Roll of Esther as far as they refused to believe stories of Nazi atrocities and waited for too long to organize a mass escape.

Silving's unhesitating recourse to Jewish law is rendered even more unfortunate by the fact that she fully understood and recognized the novelty of the situation of the Eichmann trial and the problems posed by such a situation to international law. She correctly pointed out that the Eichmann case raised the issue of rule-making *contra legem*, of the progress of law through recognition of the norm-creating power of facts or the morality emanating from them, where they clash with positive law. (Silving 1961, 339.)

However, from here it does not necessarily follow, as she believes, that in the case of conflict between positive and natural law the latter should win. She does not take into account the fact that despite its name natural law is not natural in the sense of being universally and eternally valid supra-human law but is as human and human-made as positive law.

As far as I can see, there are two fundamental problems in Silving's reasoning. Firstly, she regards natural law as morally and ethically superior to positive law and as such necessarily a higher authority. More precisely, she surrenders in the face of extreme crimes, believing that people are not really able to deal with them without some kind of suprahuman authority taking at the same time for granted that the morality of, say, the Bible, is of a higher nature than later

secular modes of thought. In the final analysis one may suggest that this is a reasoning which needs a god in order to justify itself: human beings are not able to create a firm enough jurisdiction. Therefore there must be a higher justification and authority behind everything human-made. From this it inevitably follows that "in certain extreme situations even in international law the need for the admission of a minimum measure of 'natural law' may be so great as to call for re-laxation of 'positivistic' rule." (Silving 1961, 346.)

Secondly, her reasoning postulates for Israel a morally extraordi-nary position among the world's nations which cannot but gnaw away at the principle according to which international law, if it is really supposed to equally bind all humankind, should be based on the idea of equality of all the nations and people of the earth which includes the idea that also the duties and rights of the nations are equal to each other.

This emphasis of the extraordinary position of Israel stems from Silving's conviction that the holocaust was not so much an event which obliges all humankind but is rather a catastrophe of the Jew-ish people and should also juridically be dealt with as such. This conviction leads her to make a causal connection between the anni-hilation of European Jews and the birth of Israel which rises as an authoritative inheritor and moral legislator of the catastrophe (cf. Friedländer 1987).

From Ethics to Politics

As we saw above, there was no general agreement either on the legal basis of the Eichmann trial itself or its significance for international law although most writers did not condemn it as being entirely wrong-ful but rather considered it as a unique case in the development of international law. This is no surprise given that even the debate over its legal precedents – the Nuremberg trials – was not over but rather divided lawyers into different views and schools of thought.

Despite all the disagreements the lawyers did agree on one funda-mental point. This was a shared understanding that the Eichmann trial should not have been approached simply as a single case in the

long list of Nazi trials but should rather have been dealt with on a higher metatheoretical level. More precisely, the Eichmann trial was not only the culminating point and end of the Nazi trials but it also brought to the fore the question of the basic foundations of the Western judicial system. In a dramatic manner it awakened the question of what kind of criteria international criminal law should be based on: from what kind of law it should draw its legitimation.

In this dispute, there were two main lines of argument. On the one hand there were legal positivists who maintained that law and jurisdiction should be self-sufficient in the sense that they should not be based on an external justification of any kind. In other words, the legal positivists firmly maintained that also in the Eichmann case the existing legal order should be respected. Subsequently, the Eichmann trial should have been seen as a case in international law instead of defining it as an extreme or otherwise extra-legal case to be treated exceptionally. In the legal positivists' understanding, as a case of international law, the Eichmann case spoke powerfully for a need to develop the international legislature to such a point that it would equally bind and commit all the nations of the world.

On the other hand there were "moralists" who believed that in extreme and unprecedented cases such as Nazi crimes it was legitimate to search for a moral justification outside the realm of positive law. They believed that this supra-legal justification could be provided by natural law which they saw as an indisputable suprahuman authority above human-made laws and norms. In the legal positivists' view jurisdiction should not be confused with ethics and morality even though the ultimate purpose of law is always ethical as far it aims at doing justice. In the moralists' view positive law could not do without ethical systems and moral laws because in the final analysis only they could provide law with firm moral justification.

 From this standpoint they challenged the legal positivists by exposing the Eichmann case as an entirely unprecedented and extraordinary case which could not be approached and treated as a normal criminal case. As far as Eichmann's evil was extraordinary and superhuman his case was ethical rather than criminal. Subsequently, it could not be treated using the tools of positive law, rather fundamental principles of natural law were needed to deal with this case at all. By dint of the natural law argument it was also possible to

justify Israel's task as the organiser of the trial. As far as the Jewish state was a natural inheritor of European Jews and a living witness of their sufferings it was not only Israel's right but also her duty to take care of this case.

With hindsight it is easy to see that both the legal positivists' and moralists' arguments were to some extent inadequate. This is not because they failed to make their case convincingly or argued badly but rather because their case was partly mistaken. They did not see that Eichmann's crimes were not simply ordinary crimes or ethical failures but rather political by their nature. It is precisely because of their political nature that any judicial or ethical system fails to deal with these kinds of crimes in a satisfactory way.[8]

One of the very few who understood this came from outside the ranks of lawyers. She was Hannah Arendt who attended the Eichmann trial as a reporter for *The New Yorker*. In the epilogue of her report she pointed to Eichmann's basic crime:

> "… there still remains the fact that you have carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder. For politics is not like nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same. And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations – as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world – we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang." (Arendt 1963/1965, 279)

This argument was based on Karl Jaspers' distinction between crimes against humanity and crimes against humankind (see note number one above). The former may be awful, enormous and go beyond human understanding but still remain in the realm of ordinary violence and destruction meant to defeat the enemy whereas the latter constitute a violation of a basic and unrenounceable human right to exist and share the earth with other people. This right goes beyond all the legal standards and ethical principles and subsequently its violation is political by nature.

By this Arendt did not want to say that Eichmann should not have been punished at all but rather that in the face of Eichmann's crimes

any legal procedures inevitably remained insufficient. Eichmann had to hang because nothing else could be done but the real problem and challenge lay in the question of how unprecedented, extreme political crimes should be dealt with in the future.

Arendt pointed out two things. Firstly, she maintained that as far as crimes committed by individuals are concerned they cannot but be treated by normal legal procedure without escaping behind arguments of collective guilt or acts of state. The Eichmann case had rather showed, once again, that people were far too willing to deny their personal share of responsibility in politically extreme situations.

Secondly, however, she suggested that individual and political responsibility are the same:

> "This, of course, is not to deny that there is such a thing as political responsibility which, however, exists quite apart from what the individual member of the group has done and therefore can neither be judged in moral terms nor be brought before a criminal court. Every government assumes political responsibility for the deeds and misdeeds of its predecessor and every nation for the deeds and misdeeds of the past … It is quite conceivable that certain political responsibilities among nations might some day be adjudicated in an international court; what is inconceivable is that such a court would be a criminal tribunal which pronounces on the guilt or innocence of individuals." (Arendt 1963/1965, 298)

Alas, this is precisely what has been done since the days of the Eichmann trial. There have been attempts to resolve the problem of totalitarian governments and their criminal policy by establishing the Criminal Court of The Hague which is supposed to punish entire nations by punishing individuals. This is not to say that these criminals should be allowed to go free. It is rather to say that until today the difference between juridical, ethical and political aspects of human conduct has not been understood. It is to say that the problem of crimes against humankind which during the 20th century became a recurrent phenomenon on the earth cannot be resolved by juridical means in a satisfactory manner.

After World War II the insufficiency of juridical means has been admitted and recognized by a significant number of theoreticians who speak for the establishment of a world government as a new

form of cosmopolitanism. This idea is linked to the by now inevitable globalization of the economy, politics and culture.[9] The basic idea promoted by these authors is that in the entirely globalized world of the 21st century, the interaction of people can no longer be based on national states which have lost their status as principal actors in world politics (see e.g. Zolo 1995). Roughly speaking, theories of world government and globalization can be divided into two groups. On the one hand there are those who speak for "strong" cosmopolitanism (e.g. Held 1993) suggesting that what we need is a generally authorized world government which really has authority over national and local governments. On the other hand there are authors who speak for "weak" pacifism (e.g. Zolo 1995) suggesting that we should rather develop a mechanism of political negotiation composed of different types of actors such as international organizations made up of national states and voluntary organizations such as Amnesty International.

The latter theories are based on political realism according to which conflict is the hard core of politics and will remain such. From this follows that the idea of world government is and will be unrealistic as far as political actors on different levels will never be willing to "surrender unconditionally" to any global authority. It might be possible, instead, to establish a mechanism of political negotiation by dint of which political conflicts could be negotiated and settled case by case. The guiding principle of this idea is that this kind of mechanism for political negotiation requires a certain amount of involvement and commitment in advance but it does not unconditionally subordinate its members.

I consider this scheme to be highly valuable and worth advancing. However, it is my argument that it needs to be complemented by Arendtian and Weberian ethics of responsibility in order to really understand what kind of involvement is at stake:

> "… the maxim of the ethic of responsibility, which means that one must answer for the (foreseeable) *consequences* of one's actions … If evil consequences flow from an action done out of pure conviction, this type of person holds the world, not the doer, responsible, or the stupidity of others, or the will of God who made them thus. A man who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility, by contrast, will make allowances for pre-

cisely these everyday shortcomings in people. He has no right, as Fichte correctly observed, to presuppose goodness and perfection in human beings. He does not feel that he can shuffle off the consequences of his own actions, as far as he could foresee them, and place the burden on the shoulders of others. He will say, 'These consequences are to be attributed to my actions.'" (Weber 1919, 359-360)

Applied to the contemporary politics of weak pacifism this maxim means that the participants engage in and commit themselves in advance to partly unforeseeable consequences of decisions and agreements made together with others involved in these actions. More precisely, distinct from a world government in which the participants engage in a certain structure of action, the ethic and politics of responsibility commit the persons involved to certain decisions made and deeds done together. In other words, engagement and involvement are negotiated case by case. Thus, it does not require permanent engagement in an established structure of government and authority.

In my view, this kind of scheme for global interaction is not only more realistic than the idea of world government but is also more equal and democratic as far as it is based on recurrent negotiation of conditions of cooperation. In this scheme it can never be taken for granted that the participants silently consent to decisions made by a government above them. It renders impossible a situation which Hannah Arendt saw behind every form of totalitarian or despotic government cited above, one in which support and obedience are the same.[10] On the contrary, a situation in which the support of every participant has to be won by negotiation case by case is radically democratic.

Notes

1 I have dealt with the Eichmann trial from the perspective of political judgment in Parvikko 1998. Both this and the present article are parts of my research project on political judgment after the collapse of European tradition of political thought. In the present article I deal with political aspects of international law from a deliberately narrow perspective of

criminal law leaving a more exhaustive discussion of the political nature of international law to my forthcoming book on Hannah Arendt's conception of political judgment as a theoretically untamed human activity.

2 Ordinarily, in international law, one speaks of crimes against humanity. However, here I follow a distinction suggested by Karl Jaspers according to which we ought to distinguish between crimes against humanity and crimes against humankind. The former, or crimes against humanity (*Menschlichkeit*) are all those atrocities which are perpetrated against the enemy whereas the latter, crimes against humankind are all the atrocities committed against the unrenouncable right of everybody to live on the earth. In other words they are concerned with the question of which groups of people are permitted or not permitted to live on earth (see Jaspers 1966, 35). I will come back to this distinction in the Conclusion.

3 For historical background of new cosmopolitanism see Zolo 1998 which also gives a good picture of contemporary discussion on the theme. The most important predecessors of the advocates of new cosmopolitanism were pacifists of the League of Nations who spoke for elevating international conflicts above politics by dint of international jurisdiction.

4 Adolf Eichmann was captured by the Israeli intelligence service in 1960 in Argentina and smuggled to Israel for trial. The kidnapping caused objections in the United Nations and among people at large but it did not lead to any sanctions against Israel. Eichmann was interrogated and kept in prison in Israel until his trial in 1961. The trial lasted over four months and was passionately followed and heatedly discussed all over the world. Eichmann was hung in spring 1962.

5 The doctrine of sovereignty had been the most important principle in the interaction of European states from the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648 on (see e.g. Zolo 1995; Ferrajoli 1997).

6 This view may seem too optimistic. We have repeatedly seen that there are a number of states in the world which simply do not respect international law but mistreat their nationals and break and offend against international treaties as they please without regard to international norms and standards. One of the latest and most striking examples of this is the policy carried out by Russia in Chechnya.

7 The London Agreement was subscribed to by nineteen nations in August 1945. It was one of the most important treaties made by the allied powers during and after World War II.

8 Generally speaking, it is characteristic of lawyers to reduce political questions to special or exceptional juridical cases. In other words, they prefer to define political problems in terms of jurisdiction.

9 For discussion about globalization see e.g. Beck 1997 which gives a summary of what has been said and suggested so far.

10 However, it is worth remembering that the idea of world government does not, as such, presuppose legal imperialism or any other sort of totalitarian government if it is admitted that it is only a government in which there always are different parties, groups, relics of states, persons and other actors who dispute with each other as in any other government.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Wolf-Dieter Narr

NOW-TIME IS NOT
THE SAME AS NOW-TIME

Kia Lindroos (1998): Now-Time/Image Space. Temporalization of Politics in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of History and Art. Jyväskylä, SoPhi. 303 pages.

Human beings exist in 'the' time. They had since 'primeval times' difficulties with 'the' time and its significance. The topic 'time' is as old as the humankind, and it remains as well in the present as in the future of a human being. This is guaranteed already through the existential conditions. The beginning and the end of human beings are chucked between birth and death. *"Mitten wir im Leben sind, sind wir vom Tod umfangen,"* composes Paul Gerhardt in the baroque era, and this song is still being sung in churches.

Time is, however, not only to be understood in this existential and banal sense as an always-present-problem of human beings, as a problem they confront directly and indirectly 'during the time' that is given for them on earth. The question of what does time "mean" becomes a social event only through the way in which people understand their time. The social question is connected to the meaning and sense people attach to time, and to the ways they individually and collectively use their time in such a network of meaning. In other words, time is a social and a political figure. It becomes materialised in institutions, in

production circumstances and in this way it becomes 'objective'. Individual time exists always in the midst of the time concept and in the midst of general organisation of time of a society and 'its' time.

For this reason, different epochs of the history of mankind are distinguished according to their concept of time, according to the meaning given to it, and correspondingly, how the epochs dealt with time socio-politically. Yet, already the concept of history, if it is expressed in such a distinction, shows a specifically 'modern' understanding of time. The specificity of the modern age goes even deeper. Modernity is almost emphatically fixed in time. Past and present times are directed forward. Progress becomes the faith in time, as "the process of civilisation". This progress is arranged in every possible way. It is especially expressed through the modern form of politics, the national state; through the modern form of the profit-oriented economics and competition disciplined growth; and through the modern form of culture, of orientation towards this progress. Because of this fixation upon time of its corresponding, but not to each other reducible forms of production and socialisation, the modernity itself starts gasping. The future oriented time does not only replace the space orientation aligned to tradition and stability. This time, propelled by innovation and growth-orientated competition, eats even its own children. It speeds up and the institutions and the habitus that it created are its drive, motivated by the insatiable "greed for possessing and dominating" (Kant). In the economic jargon this is called "productive destruction" (Joseph A. Schumpeter). There is a double effect due to the expanding acceleration, which from the beginning aimed economically but also politically and culturally at the globalisation, and we face at present one of its strong growth struggles. On the one hand, the always-precarious balance of the modern production forms falls into an unambiguously crooked situation. Economics, dynamically penetrating everything, hastens away from the politics that rather slows down and is statically oriented. This orientation fractures individually, it turns to the actuality or it is, as a counter-move, in the danger to succumb to all sorts of centrism of the "identity politics". On the other hand, the speed that overtakes itself produces a new contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneity, of which social costs and normal disasters are nearly impossible to estimate or to master organisationally and responsibly.

That is, considered from today's perspective, from the year 2000, roughly the general 'time background' which gives Kia Lindroos' work on Walter Benjamin and his particular 'concept' of time its relief and its significance that reaches deeply into the 21st century – at least according to the way in which Kia Lindroos reads Benjamin. She shows in her original interpretation, that Walter Benjamin's work was not only concerned with the time that Benjamin interpreted against the dominating stroke of the modern age. He was not only concerned with the allegedly linear progress, with the breaking-off of its costs, which show its enormous dark-rooms. "That everything just goes on, that is the catastrophe." Walter Benjamin's notion of time can be seen in the *kairos*, the right moment, the interruption of continuity in a dense present time. Now-Time constitutes the opposite of the abstractly indifferent time-god *Chronos*. And when the 'kairological' view roams into the past, it discovers it in a new way: the losers of the history gain a leading and obliged presence. (That is one of many aspects that Richard Wolin's interpretation can absolutely not see. Benjamin has a different and far sharper insight into constellations of danger; cf. Wolin, 2000).

Kia Lindroos begins with the hypothesis that Benjamin's work might be best comprehensible if it is understood as a permanent attempt to conceive history and time adequately, that is, in a qualitatively different way than progress. And – Benjamin-appropriate – she understands his concepts of history and time as being eminently political. His maxims are called interruption, standing still, breaking through, awaking or acting. Benjamin's whole dictionary is 'programmed' in this way, for example in concepts from the moment to the aura, the state of emergency, the authenticity, the break, the dialectic image, the experience, the awakening, the presence of mind, the now-time, the catastrophe, the immediacy and the suppressed. 60 years after his death, in time that was transferred by many non-Benjaminian fractures, is more than ever progress oriented. Hence, it is already for the sake of Benjamin's political intentions and ideas worth to remember and to save Benjamin's '*Zeit-Geist*' in immanent criticism. (60 years ago, at the 27th September 1940, Walter Benjamin, born 1892, committed suicide at the flight from Nazi bloodhounds and their collaborators).

That is exactly the way in which Kia Lindroos proceeds in the three main parts of her work dedicated to Benjamin and Benjamin's *kairos*, followed by a summarising and cautiously outlining final part. She presents first Benjamin's Historico-philosophical theses, the quintessence of Benjamin's world experience as a time experience – if it is at all possible to construct them in this way. Namely, Benjamin never wanted a "synthesis". After this part, Benjamin's presumably most well-known essay, *"Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit"*, becomes the core of Kia Lindroos' discussion. In the final part, she turns to Benjamin's *Zeit-Bilder*, his *Bild-Räume* and *Raum-Bilder*, to the characteristics of his dialectical image, in which she proceeds with mimetic strength of language. Benjamin's concepts and insights are then demonstrated with the example of the text-writer and filmmaker Chris Marker, with his image-/film-/textwork *La Jetée*, shedding light upon Benjamin, Marker and all readers in a well educated manner rich of imagination.

The art of interpretation is always difficult. It is never understandable without clarification. Its devices and perspectives should be made sincerely transparent. Otherwise the interpreter's 'own spirit' takes over far too immediately and the reader is not able to recognise which is the interpreted and which is the original work. These general and minimal requirements of any work of the other person matters particularly for Walter Benjamin's torso-rich writings. (Cf. some important remarks made lately in George Steiner 2000. Steiner calls Benjamin "a genius of incompletion"). Being anything else than a "system" thinker, anything else than the one attempting to identify complex states of facts and social conditions within one concept, Benjamin's investigating back-and-forth-thinking style is distinguished through the way in which he sees – almost simultaneously and notifying the relations between – many dimensions of what "is the case", "was the case". Yet, he does not 'clearly' distinguish these dimensions from the theological-messianic up to the materialistic side of the phenomena (and vice versa).

Reality and times become 'fluid'. All his texts (and everything becomes potentially text), receive a socio-genetic depth room, and they become temporally multidimensional. Then, Here and Now and in the possible *kairos* of the future as future's presence and future's past. Subject and object loose their unambiguous definitions. Their one-

sidedly subject-oriented relation of domination is broken up. In this way all the life, the life of the identifying method, which usually calls itself scientific and serves the linear god *Chronos*, diminishes and moves away. Now, all is thoroughly ambivalent, and all what is thoroughly ambivalent in social reality, comes forth.

> *Die Wahrheit, vergegenwärtigt im Reigen der dargestellten Ideen, entgeht wie immer gearteter Projektion in den Erkenntnisbereich. Erkenntnis ist ein Haben (…). Ihm bleibt der Besitzcharacter. Diesem Besitztum ist Darstellung sekundär. Es existiert nicht als ein Sich-Darstellendes. Gerade aber dies gilt von der Wahrheit.* (Benjamin 1925, in Kia Lindroos p. 64).

> "Benjamin's Image-space (*Bildraum*) does not offer an answer to this complex question of text and images. Yet, it does offer a perspective on a broader reflection of images, as the distinctive limits between signified, signifier and aesthetic object/subject seen to break down both in the intellectual reflection and action. Where the concept of the dialectical image remains on a theoretical level, and also on the level of the surface/configuration in approaching epistemological questions in deciphering of the present, the function of the image-space introduces the perspective of conceptualising the subjectivity and perception. The interplay between subject and object becomes a reflective relationship, in which the spatial and temporal borders between the aesthetic object and subject are neither visible nor simply distinguishable. …" (Kia Lindroos p.205).

Due to the characteristics of his methodological non-method, which is also about to emancipate the readers as their own interpreters, Benjamin's texts are not easy to read. This methodological non-method explains, for instance, Benjamin's love for the presentation of details, for image, architecture and word quotations and for hardly explained montages. The difficulty remains in spite of their strictly anti-hermetic make and intention. The texts require from the readers less the *"Anstrengung des Begriffs"* (Hegel), than the strenuous art of the self-discovering, yet also modest, simultaneously listening art of reading.

Especially in this art Kia Lindroos' Benjamin book is convincing. She is able to consider the several aspects of Benjamin's time-concept in Benjamin's own expressions in detail. However, she also succeeds in this in other's remarks on Benjamin and in the already men-

tioned "practical application" to Chris Marker. She presents the time concept without reducing Benjamin in an "anti-Benjaminian" way into only one line or aspect, and also without any 'deep murmur' or the move into fashionable glitter of strained interpretations, which for their part lose their subject as well as their object from the sight within the pretentious gesture of reflection. In the best parts of her almost thrillingly written book Kia Lindroos succeeds in playing the role of a critic in a way that was familiar to Benjamin himself (cf. e.g. pp 18). She enters into Benjamin's texts without being too encumbered. She skilfully draws also from other texts of Benjamin texts as she convincingly interprets the Benjaminian oeuvre with its transformations, without compressing it in one form – such a procedure would in the case of Benjamin be misleading – but as persistent attempts, sometimes even confessions, to confront the dominating understanding of time. These are attempts to detect, to save and to actively remind the peoples of their own time that appears like a rupture in time and in their 'politics'. Kia Lindroos proceeds also immanently developing the themes and consequently, she presents simultaneously cautious and self-certain, stimulating interpretation of Benjamin's 'kairology' and through this, its meaning that she has both newly and re-discovered.

With Benjamin's help Kia Lindroos touches several topics and problems. She raises questions and continues them a step further independently and in her experimental closeness to Benjamin. On the track of Walter Benjamin and Kia Lindroos I only can present a few of these topics, by sharpening them politically. Despite a few carping critical adiaphora, this context includes my only criticism to Lindroos' excellent illumination of Benjamin's work.

Kia Lindroos asks Benjamin here or there certainly correct and important questions. However, she does not further develop these questions to Benjamin and beyond Benjamin. She proceeds too cautiously, too much remaining in the approach. Above all the final part is characterised by this almost too outsized caution. And as a minor remark: the political science as a discipline with gigantic 'time lacks' gets off too lightly. Lindroos' small, but altogether certainly not inappropriate art to refuse the work of coming to a head can be demonstrated as the first problem that I would like to take up with Benjamin/Lindroos, and see the problem of the *kairos* as almost the *ens politicum.*

"If the temporal question in Benjamin' s thought is discussed in historico-philosophical terms", formulates Kia Lindroos in introduction remarks of part III, ("Images as Passage to Time"), "the temporal limit-space does not, at first sight, go any further than this. Benjamin seems to be ignorant to the modern request to speculate on the coming time. He does not raise questions as *what* is the consequence of the emphasised moment of action? *How* is it possible to interrupt the linear course of events in concrete terms? – Or – *what* does the Now-time have to offer in a broader context, if it is thought as a cornerstone of thinking in 'political categories'? The future, conceived of as an ordinary horizon of actions or spheres of expectations, is dimmed in Benjamin's work. The future exists only as a seed in the present, in the process of creation. The realisation of *Kairos* remains within the frames of the capability of the subject to turn the moments of recognition into action."

In other words, problems occur, if we pose questions following a discourse that is e x t e r n a l from the problem of temporality itself. There are no sufficient answers to such questions in Benjamin's work, since the remainder of the interpretation, and the decision as to *how* we might act 'after' the recognition of the moment of the Now or the achievement of the sovereignty of action, is left up to the questioner him- or herself. This 'answer' leaves the subject with the idea of the radical freedom of action. "However", Kia Lindroos continues, after asking such in terms of the work and politics essential questions in two short paragraphs, "instead of pursuing this idea further, I turn back to Benjamin's own concepts and further question, how we might find the disruption and chaos a way out of linearity in terms of images" (p.192).

But the *kairos* is a hard nut to crack. Isn't it, considering the virtually dominating capitalistic-etatistic chrono-logic, at best a *spem contra spem*? And how could the disruption with the time, the 'invasion' of another time, be organised? What would its political preparation be? And above all: How could it be of some reliable duration? If it should not only stop the logic of the modern *Chronos* for a moment, such as the Paris Commune and similar events? The political problem of the *kairos* is not only related to the difficulties Max Weber faced with the requirements of the "*Veralltäglichung des Charisma*"; the political (radical-) democratic problem rather lies in the ques-

tion how – beyond break, exception and other kairos-logic occur-
rences – some reliable, some accountable, some responsible dura-
tion formed by participation, by decisions, by actions could be pos-
sible. Here one finds, if one likes, Benjamin's failure. It lies in the
ignorance of institutional-material considerations, and not in his
untimely messianic anarchic thinking and aspiration. Richard Wolin,
himself settling manifestly in the middle of the contemporary chrono-
logic, obviously stumbled over the latter and laments with false pa-
thos (Wolin 2000, p.41 f. with a wrong association of Weber's dis-
tinction between '*Gesinnungsethik*' and '*Verantwortungsethik*'. Well, if
the eye is not "sunny", how could it see the "sun")?

Especially, if one does not (only) make fun of Benjamin's 'Coper-
nican turn' –"Politics attains primacy over history" – (see again Wolin
2000, p.35), becomes important the question about his consequently
manifold and multidimensional notion of politics that departs from
the active subject. It is evident that with this concept of politics you
can not have daydreams of the "delight of commonness". The Now-
Time is filled by action and therefore almost radically opposed to the
linear lack of perspective. Now-time is without horizon and future
and because of this it includes the catastrophe and its recognition.
There is (not surprisingly) an analogy to Hannah Arendt's concept of
natality and the ability to begin new and '*Neuanfangenmüssen*' of all
politics. Nevertheless, the question raises again: how could such a –
likeable – anarchy be institutionalised? Benjamin is familiar with the
problem of 'masses' – negatively (by the National Socialism) and
positively (by proletarian masses). But he only 'resolves' it in politi-
cal aesthetics – in spite of all non-progress oriented and qualitatively
extended materialism.

For that reason, and not only rather incidentally as by Kia Lindroos,
arises the question of the elective affinities (*Wahlverwandtschaften*)
between Benjamin's *kairos* and his state of emergency (*Ausnahme-
zustand*) and that of Carl Schmitt. This elective affinity is not dubi-
ous primarily, because anti-liberal Carl Schmitt used his powerful
expressions to serve national socialists – "The Führer sets the law"
(Schmitt after the Röhm coup); and not because he later presented
in his Hobbes book (in 1938) anti-Semitic tirades – although both
slips do not just represent peccadilloes as many of the contemporary
recipients see it. Such an elective affinity, which could have been

supported by their contemporanity, would be dubious, because Schmitt's friend-enemy "concept of the political" and his "*okkasioneller Dezisionismus*" (Karl Löwith excellently on Schmitt) would – at least partly – unhinge Walter Benjamin's own view of history, which is directed against the ("linear") victors and which speaks for the suppressed, for the "*Verdammten der Erde*".

Here is not the place to enter into the Schmitt-Benjamin relationship (cf. the summarising and newly opening excellent essay of Horst Bredekamp 1999). Overmuch abridged, only a few words should be said: Benjamin was undoubtedly fascinated by the state of emergency – from the baroque book until his historico-philosophical theses. And therefore he was in the same way fascinated by the disruption of the wretched routine, by independence, by decision and action. From the absence all these issues in National Socialism he suffered with more than one good reason. Simultaneously it is true, that in Benjamin the relation between the state of emergency and 'normality' remains unclear. However, Benjamin undoubtedly did not share Schmitt's concept of politics and he opposed the Schmittian state of emergency that is useful for domination and the 'occasional decisionism' free of criteria.

Stronger than the problem of the Schmitt-Benjamin '*Wahlverwandtschaft*', recurs Benjamin's conceptions (to my opinion, in Schmitt's the qualitatively different conception as well) of the aestheticisation of politics in opposite to the politicisation of aesthetics. Kia Lindroos discusses their contrasts and their proximity and distance, above all in second main part of her book, in which the '*Kunstwerk*' essay is in the centre of interest. The differences between both kinds of politics become clearly visible, if one takes Leni Riefenstahl's party congress film "*Triumpf des Willens*" as an example of the aestheticisation of politics in the sense of pseudo-ritual, pseudo-original mass stagings and matches it with Benjamin's rather expecting interpretation of the communist approach to proletarian masses. The qualitative differences between nazi and communist masses remain at the end vague and aesthetics-trusting, although the differences could be found in Benjamin's important concepts. (Who in the early 60's walked around the at that time almost unchanged "*Märzfeld*" in Nürnberg, was him or herself able to gain a vivid impression of leader-masses performance). What Horst Bredekamp calls

Benjamin's "shifting at will between political theory and theory of art", an ability which allowed Benjamin brilliantly start a technique/media sociology in the *'Kunstwerk'* essay, drives him in the aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of aesthetics if not into a catastrophe, still into far too art-trusting assumptions. Also Kia Lindroos' summary shows rather the boundaries than the way in which politicisation of aesthetics, a central task of the present time, could look like and would be possible. How much more or less sublimated military thinking and its *"Stahlgewitter"*, it is embedded in a good deal of the concepts of politics and in other political terms. How strong are social scientific concepts and thinking styles characterised by political aestheticisation, since they begin with dichotomous construction of categories (and reified reality) and reach until economic model-Platonism?

> "The potential counter-movement, the politicisation of aesthetics that Benjamin expected from Communists, intended to emphasise the significance of the power included in arts. The consciousness of the mass, which following Benjamin's idea would have been constructed through aesthetic means, would have led to the general revolutionary action, and not to the destruction of war. In combination with the earlier discussed elements, the power of art appeared in the seed that awaited actualisation throughout the disrupted era. Benjamin's belief in the power of art is expressed in the unpublished fragment of the last chapter, in which Benjamin notes that art not only to be thought of in terms of the of the matter of a single *Dasein* and its conflict, but should also be thought of in the more intense context of the social level (…). At this point, the art and artists seemed to be more important and powerful actors in social change than politics and politicians. The politicisation of aesthetics implied action through and with arts" (172).

Topics over topics. I should mention Benjamin's understanding of the media, and that, what one could call Benjamin's theory of knowledge, more correctly his cognition and experience practice to which there exist several observations and statements in Kia Lindroos' book. It is not necessary, as Richard Wolin writes, to be caught in a "Benjaminian trance" in order to differently interpret a clause in a letter Benjamin sent 1931 to a friend: "I have never been able to do research and think in any sense other than, if you will, a *theological*

one: namely, in accord with the Talmudic teaching about the *forty-nine levels of meaning in every Torah-passage.*" (Wolin, 2000, p.40. Would Wolin have tried to understand this clause and therefor developed more insight, he would never have drawn the almost grotesque conclusions, which he suggests already in the title of his essay).

To rescue Walter Benjamin and his works in a Benjaminian sense for us, also for those political scientists among us, who can and want to hear how the contemporary chrono-logic hour has beaten, and who therefore wish to outline other times and detect and act in a different kairological 'reality' – to these questions (and more) Kia Lindroos adds excellently written, translucent and convincing contribution. Surely, one should not remain with Walter Benjamin's insights. Who would like to do that anyway? Yet, the Benjaminian constellation of danger remains, possibly – *mutates mutandis* – it has even increased. Who is not able to gain and pass over a little glow from the fire of Benjamin's insights and experiences, will be overcome by the global capitalistic, all penetrating Power of Now, even in completely uncritical science. Who does not want this, has today – as in other and still near times – to accept good deal of marginality. Walter Benjamin's *kairos* remains a hard assignment. It is not a cheap bargain. And it is not a propelling charge for an academic career.

TRANSLATED BY KLAUS SONDERMANN

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Tim Harris

IT TAKES A FINN TO WRITE A CONCEPT HISTORY FOR THE ENGLISH

Pasi Ihalainen (1999): The Discourse of Political Pluralism in Early Eighteenth-Century England: A Conceptual Study with Special Reference to Terminology of Religious Origin. Helsinki, Finnish Historical Society. 375 pages.

The specific aim of this book is to shed light on how members of the political elite in early eighteenth-century England understood the growth of political pluralism. At a more general level, however, it is a contribution to the debate over the secularisation of early modern English society: was secularisation largely complete by 1700, as C. John Sommerville has maintained, or did England remain a 'confessional state' well into the nineteenth century, as Jonathan Clark has claimed – or does the true answer lie somewhere in between? Ihalainen has written a concept history, or *Begriffsgeschichte*, for the years 1700-1750 (from the height of party conflict and religious strife under Queen Anne through to the gradual decline of party during the latter years of the Whig ascendancy), focusing on those concepts that traditionally had religious associations and analysing how their meanings came to be modified or altered during this crucial period of political, religious and intellectual change. The result is an excel-

lent study, one that is admirably well-researched and which offers a number of telling insights into the conceptual world of early eighteenth-century England, not just with regard to when the existence of political pluralism came to be recognised and accepted, but also about the broader issues of secularisation and the rise of the modernity.

It is revealing that it takes a Finn, appropriating a German methodology, to write a concept history for the English. Anglophone scholars have tended to be sceptical about the value of concept histories, preferring instead closely contextualised studies of the history of political ideas which explore the interrelationship between language, thought and action. Thus Quentin Skinner has stated that 'there can be no histories of concepts as such; there can only be histories of their uses in argument'. (p. 39)[1] The absence of suitable concept histories, however, means that the main work of reference for scholars who need to know the meanings attached to a particular word in the past is the *Oxford English Dictionary*, though as Ihalainen points out, this is a flawed source, since it relies heavily on literary sources and there was often a considerable time lapse between the coining of political neologisms in newspapers and tracts and their entry into literary texts. We clearly need something that is better than the *OED*; yet at the same time we need a way of avoiding the pitfalls associated with traditional *Begriffsgeschichte*. Ihalainen's study uses several hundred early eighteenth-century texts to examine the language of political pluralism – from contemporary dictionaries, political treatises and pamphlets, periodical literature and sermons, to minor genres of political writing and popular literature and edited manuscript sources such as diaries and correspondence. And rather than studying the history of one concept or a few crucial core concepts, he seeks both to reconstruct entire networks of concepts related to the language of diversity and also to explore how such concepts were used in combination with other words, in order to provide an appropriate contextualisation and to enable him to investigate which concepts remained unchanged, which disappeared, and which replaced those that were displaced. Thus the book examines not only the language of politics, party, and religious heterodoxy, but also associated euphemisms and qualifiers. One can turn to it if one wants to know what meaning the word 'Whig', say, or 'Tory' (or whatever –

the range of concepts examined is remarkably extensive), had at a given time for particular individuals; one can also find out when word combinations such as 'party-man', 'party-strife', or 'party-champion' (an appendix lists some 104 such combinations) came to be coined. There is a fascinating discussion of the meanings of 'atheism', a term commonly used by polemicists who feared it was on the rise, even though most historians seem convinced that atheism, as such, did not exist at this time. There are also precious insights offered into the changing resonances of words like 'moderation', 'zeal', and 'toleration'.

This book is more than just a dictionary of keywords, however. Ihalainen convincingly shows that Sommerville is wrong to see secularisation as largely complete by 1700. In the early eighteenth century, political pluralism was generally conceptualised through terminology derived from the traditionally dominant religious discourse. However, *pace* Clark, there are marked signs of the secularisation of political vocabulary from the 1720s, and by the 1730s politics and religion tended to be seen as separate (if still interconnected) areas of life. Nevertheless, religious terminology did not lose all its relevance in political argumentation over night (there was no conceptual watershed in this sense) but continued to supply political discourse with useable idioms, even if the context was now more noticeably secular.

There is a great deal to admire about this study. Having said that, the approach is a little heavy-handed (though maybe this is just the impression of a reviewer who has to read the book from cover to cover; most readers will probably dip into it to look for the meanings of particular concepts in which they are interested), and the careful laying of the historiographical and methodological groundwork means that it takes a long time for the book to get going. Moreover, the basic conclusion – that the political world of George II's England was more secular than that of Queen Anne's, and that the 1720s was a crucial decade of transition – will not come as a surprise to many (with the possible exception of Sommerville and Clark, whose views have never been widely accepted). It is perhaps unfortunate that the author chose to start in 1700, rather than with the rise of party conflict in the 1670s and 1680s. Ihalainen does his best to provide the earlier context for his readers by drawing on pre-

existing scholarship, but sometimes he makes erroneous claims about changes in political terminology because of a lack of familiarity with late seventeenth-century sources. Thus he is wrong to state that the 'belittling sense of a statesman belonging to the lower orders was a temporary early eighteenth-century innovation' (pp. 99-100). It dates back at least to the Exclusion Crisis of Charles II's reign: for example, one Tory poem from the early 1680s, bemoaning the rabble-rousing tactics of the Whigs, complained how 'Each Cobler's Statesman grown'.[2] Nor is it true to say that the terms 'Whig and Tory remained rarely used nicknames' prior to the Revolution of 1688 (p. 229). The nicknames were given wide currency by Roger L'Estrange's highly influential periodical, *The Observator*, which ran from 1681 to 1687, and which in its early years was written as a dialogue between Whig and Tory.

Despite Ihalainen's efforts to develop a methodology that can avoid the types of problems traditionally associated with *Begriffsgeschichte*, he remains vulnerable to the charge that his approach prevents him from paying the type of close attention to historical context that is necessary to understand why particular concepts were attached specific meanings by certain individuals at particular times. Thus to identify that the 1733 edition of Bailey's dictionary defined Tories as those who 'pretended to defend the Anglican Church yet actually wished for the return of a French-supported Catholic monarch' (p. 234) is not by itself enough. Most Tories did not, in fact, wish for the return of a French-supported Catholic monarch. Moreover, most Whig polemicists who claimed they did were fully aware that most Tories were not Jacobites; rather, they were seeking to discredit their political opponents by deliberately misrepresenting the truth. We have to distinguish between meaning and polemic, between a definition and a political argument; simply identifying the meanings attached to various concepts in a variety of different texts does not easily enable us to do that. In other words, scepticism of *Begriffsgeschichte* derives not simply from an Anglophone suspicion of all things foreign (and especially German); there is genuine cause for concern about the problems inherent in the methodology. Having said this, there is no doubt in my mind that Ihalainen's work will be well-received by English historians. It evinces the very highest standards scholarship, makes a significant contribution to historical un-

derstanding, and will provide an essential building block for anyone interested in probing the depths of the political, religious, intellectual and cultural history of the later-Stuart and early-Hanoverian era.

Notes

1 Cf. now, however, Skinner's self-characterization *in Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought* vol, 3, 60-73.
2 Cited in Tim Harris, *London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration to the Exclusion Crisis* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 137.

Michael Quante

ON THE VERY IDEA
OF 'MODERN'
MORAL THINKING

Marjaana Kopperi (1998): Right Actions and Good Persons. Controversies between Eudaimonistic and Deontic Moral Theories. Academic Dissertation, Helsinki. Ashgate, Aldershot. 131+vii pages.

Marjaana Kopperi's small book deals with a large topic – the relation and "controversies between eudaimonistic and deontic moral theories". At the heart of this debate lies the question whether right actions or good persons should be the centre of our ethical thinking – at least this is what Kopperi tells us. Throughout the book the reader is told an old and familiar story: the myth of the battle between ancient and modern ethics (1 ff.). The modern approach is described as having two characteristic features: "its action-guiding nature and its universalistic justification" (2). The ancient one is characterised as an "agent-centered approach" (ibid.), its main feature being that "the agent's concern for her life as a whole is regarded as the starting point for all moral inquiry" (ibid.).

The defenders of ancient ethics should be dead and gone, but – as Kopperi says – modern moral theory has come under attack by some philosophers who criticise the main features of modern moral thinking and try to develop a "consistent and acceptable alternative" (ibid.).

Kopperi's task is not a historical one. She does not ask whether the parties present a correct interpretation of the ancient philosophers' ethical thinking. Her "aim is rather to examine the crucial distinguishing features between these forms of moral reasoning *as seen by contemporary critics of modern ethics*" (3 – my emphasis). This is the first main feature of Kopperi's strategy. The second one is that she takes the crucial features of modern moral theory (universalistic justification and act-centredness) and the main outfit of ethical thinking under these presuppositions as given. From this perspective she formulates some questions which deliver the adequacy-conditions for ethical theory: "It can be asked, for instance, what it actually means to begin ethical reflection from the point of view of the agent and her good life. What is the good life that the critics of modern ethics want to place at the centre of moral theory? Is it even possible to offer a specific account of the good human life? And if so, how can such an account be justified? Is it based on culturally and historically developed interpretations or on universalistic assumptions of some kind? One can also ask how people are to be motivated to accept and adopt such a view?" (2).

According to Kopperi answering these questions "cannot be avoided" (ibid.) if we want to determine whether the agent-centered approach really is an alternative to modern moral thinking. So her strategy is to "examine how the promoters of agent-based ethical views deal with these questions" (3). And her "central thesis is that critics of modern forms of ethics do not succeed in answering these questions" (ibid.). In Kopperi's eyes these critics "fail to provide an *appropriate* account of the good human life and to define ethical theory in agent-centered terms. In other words, they fail to formulate an ethical view that would clearly give priority to the notion of the good life in moral theory. Moreover, *attempts to justify morality by binding it to a historical, social or cultural context also faces serious problems*" (ibid. – my emphasis).

Kopperi's book is written in a clear style and her argumentation is straightforward. In the second chapter she elaborates the differences between ancient ethics as understood by their present defenders and 'modern' moral thinking. In the third chapter different attempts to give a foundation of morality based on the notion of the good life are discussed – Kopperi deals with the theories of Robert Louden, Martha

Nussbaum, William Galston and Charles Taylor. In the fourth chapter the focus of her arguments lies on the concept of justification. The later Rawl's political thinking is taken as target in examining the question whether we can "tie the justification of moral and political norms to history and culture" (ibid.). In the final chapter of her book Kopperi explicates why "the modernist way of moral thought is still worth defending" (4) and – at the end of her book in a stronger tone – "still the best possible way to think about morality" (120).

Kopperi presents her diagnosis and her arguments in a clear, concise and non-pretentious way. Although there are neither subtle details of analysis nor any new arguments, nor a thesis which could surprise anybody, to be found in it, Kopperi's book is interesting in two respects. Her diagnosis and her way of argumentation is a diagnosis of a philosophical misunderstanding on the one hand and a misdiagnosis of ethical thinking on the other hand. Kopperi's way of thinking is part of the philosophical main-stream and her unpretentiouness and the clearness and plainness of her arguments makes visible the main features of current 'modern' moral thinking. Kopperi's argumentation is of philosophical importance because her mistakes exemplify a type. In the following I will try to discuss briefly the main problems one could or should have with her defence of 'modern' moral thinking.

(1.) First of all, Kopperi is right in showing that some contemporary philosophers who try to restore eudaimonistic theories are impressed by the main features of modern moral thinking she has identified. With respect to Louden or Rawls this comes as no surprise since both belong to the other camp and want to add aspects of ancient ethics to the modern approach trying to overcome some defects in modern moral thinking. But for sure Nussbaum's and Taylor's motivation may be different, at least in those texts of the former Kopperi takes into account. This fact is important for the way Kopperi starts her misdiagnosis, because she finds some aspects in the accounts of the critics of modern moral thinking she can work with in a characteristic way. Since she has not asked whether the present defenders of ancient ethical thinking have a correct understanding of the historical positions, Kopperi has not seen that these contemporary accounts are infected by features which stem from modern moral thinking. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that she can show aspects of these theo-

ries which are open to objections coming from a defender of modern moral thinking. But this is only so because these runs a dialectic between modern moral thinking and modern eudaimonistic accounts. Kopperi has not taken into account positions which are free from such modern influences. Since she evades this conflict, one of the main problems with her argument as a whole does not come into view. Her standard of justification is absolute universalisation, which can only be given in a context free manner. But this standard simply is out of reach for ancient ethics. Eudaimonistic ethical theory is measured by an incommensurable set of conditions of adequacy – no surprise that it cannot fulfil them. Most of the objections Kopperi presents have one of the following structures:

- standards of a cultural tradition are confronted with ethical standards of other cultures
- members of a culture who are in disagreement are forced to accept the standards of their culture (these standards are doubtful from the point of view of another tradition)
- members of a culture, who cannot decide for themselves, are treated paternalistically according to the standards of their culture and these standards are problematic for members of other cultures

For sure, these conflicts raise serious questions for present ethical thinking. But it is doubtful whether these kinds of conflict should be the prime cases on which we base our ethical theory. As nearly everybody knows, 'hard cases make bad laws', and focussing on these extreme cases leads to the idea that only pure practical reason can deliver universal justifications which can handle these problems. But it is one of the central insights of Aristotelian ethics that practical reason has a different structure than theoretical reason. Practical reason cannot start from nowhere and develop an account of the good life for 'moral strangers' but has to start from within a shared culture. This shared praxis is open to critical reflexion and to revision but there must be a common ground. If it comes to these hard cases, listed above, there either is a common practice in form of social or political relations, or the question simply is whether we are allowed – according to our own standards – to intervene. This is a hard question, for sure. But a contextualist conception does not exclude the possibility of intervention, although it denies that the other party

has made something wrong in an objective sense, where objectivity is understood as being free form any context.

(2.) Secondly, Kopperi's way of arguing is not fair in two respects. On the one hand she seems to presuppose that modern moral theory has been successful in dealing with those hard cases which ancient ethics and their current defenders are confronted with. But here one should be skeptical. There is a difference between claiming to have a foundation of universal human rights and giving a foundation for them. Therefore we should be aware that an ethical or political argument which simply takes universal human rights for granted without having such a justification at hand is in no better situation that those defenders of eudaimonistic approaches who accept the context-boundedness of their ethical claims but decide to intervene into another context nevertheless. One could even say that the latter are doing consciously what the former are doing in an ideological or self-deceiving way. There is no philosophical account at hand which would be able to justify the strong theoretical and material claims modern ethics has formulated. Thus it is simply not convincing to presuppose that modern moral theory has been successful in giving a philosophical foundation for itself.

On the other hand Kopperi has not asked why there is this comeback of eudaimonistic approaches. If she had done that she would have found a lot of hard cases for modern moral theory which come from bioethics or politics. In these areas there a problems which cannot be answered adequately by relying on a purely formal account of autonomy or a subjectivistic account of the good (e.g. in form of preferences). There are hard cases for eudaimonistic theories, too. Nobody will deny this. But there are hard cases for modern moral theory as well. And these are missing in Kopperi's book. So her comparison cannot be convincing because Kopperi's philosophical thinking suffers from a one-sided diet here. But there is a deeper problem in Kopperi's way of posing the questions. She compares ancient ethics and modern moral thinking on the level of validity claims – universal justification versus contextual boundedness. By doing this she cannot see where the real differences and conflicts are.

(3.) There is a deeper motive for defending ancient ethical thinking against modern moral theory than the success in dealing with hard cases. This deeper motive lies in the implicit or explicit analysis

of the nature of practical reason and justification in ethics. Kopperi herself analyses in the second chapter of her book the main differences between both approaches and concludes: "what is crucial, as already stated above, is not the *scope* of the concern but the way people are supposed to reason in moral matters" (21). But in the next sentence she forgets this insight and comes back to the material claim that ancient ethical theories are "based on the notion of the good life" (ibid.). This is true, but not the decisive point. The important point is, that practical reason is, according to ancient ethical theory, an internal affair. Justifications are given always from within an ethical praxis. Modern moral theory, on the other side, is dazzled by the methodology of natural sciences. They try to reach an objective, context-free justification for morality itself which allows for absolute universal claims. The success of the natural sciences has impressed modern philosophers in two ways. On the one hand they hoped that this method of gaining knowledge would be able to replace religious justifications without limiting claims of validity. On the other hand the rise of modern science has led to a new understanding of (human) nature which seemed to destroy one central element in the ancient ethics' basis.

(4.) As Kopperi says: "With the progress of natural science the teleological approach as an explanation for the natural world lost its intelligibility" (27). But this implies a misdiagnosis of ancient ethics, projecting the modern needs of justification backwards. In Aristotelian ethics, human nature is not – as McDowell has shown – something which is outside of the ethical and which gives our ethical claims an external foundation. The internalistic account simply has no need for such an externalistic basis. Only if we presuppose scientistic naturalism we have to think that human nature, detached from conceptions of the good life, has to have an independent justification. But this is so only in the framework of modern ethical theory which needs justification from outside the ethical. Therefore it comes as no surprise that Kopperi herself tries to show that we can have a conception of "basic interests common to all human beings" (111) which are independent from any conceptions of the good life and can be defined in purely descriptive ways. Her way of avoiding a purely subjectivistic or formal account is a clear example of the way modern moral theory understands ethical

thinking and universal justification in general. "General facts about the needs and interests of human beings" (113) which can be grasped from sideways on, to use McDowell's phrase, have to be the basis for modern moral theory. But this is illusionary: On the one hand, "necessities of life" (ibid.) themselves, without being connected to a conception of a good life, cannot be justifications for ethical claims. And on the other hand our ethical thinking simply does not need such an external justification. There is an irreducible "arbitrariness of all moral norms" (119), but we have to acknowledge this fact. It simply shows that our ethical worldview is *ours* and is in permanent need of critical reflection from within. Understanding this as arbitrariness only shows that our ethical praxis is described from an external point of view. But from there ethics does not come into view at all.

Kopperi's book is helpful in two ways. Firstly, she criticises correctly some modern defenders of ancient ethics who try to give justifications which are impressed by the demands of modern moral theory on the one hand and incompatible with ancient ethics on the other hand. This hidden influence poses a dilemma for many theories: either they try to give strong justifications which cannot be given within the framework of ancient ethics at all. Or they acknowledge that such strict universal justifications are out of reach and overemphasise the relativistic and internal structures. Both reactions are implicit acknowledgements of the basic needs of modern moral thinking – the former in trying to fulfil them, the latter in emphasising the difference and ignoring the potential for critical reflection an internalistic account can and should have. This impact of modern moral thinking on current defenders of eudaimonistic ethics leads to theories which are either inconsistent or ethically weaker than necessary (or acceptable). In both cases it results in ethical theories which are – as Kopperi shows – proper targets for defenders of modern moral thinking.

Secondly, Kopperi's own thinking is a clear example of the basic features of 'modern' moral theory and makes visible the differences between modern and ancient ethics on the one hand. On the other hand it is a fine example of modern moral thinking itself, its misunderstandings of ancient ethics and its misconception of practical reason. Demonstrating all this makes Kopperi's book an interesting and helpful contribution to current ethical philosophy.

Kari Palonen

THE LATEST RETURN OF SARTRE

Arriving in Paris in February 2000, I was surprised by a boom of Sartre books, published in anticipation of the twentieth anniversary of his death on 15 April, 1980. Although considering myself more as a former Sartre scholar, I could not resist the temptation to go through the main contributions to the latest French Sartre boom.

In terms of academic Sartre scholarship, two crucial points should be noted. First of all, there are hardly any "sartrians" left. Instead there are a number of "sartrologists" scattered around the world who meet regularly at conferences and who now have their own publications, such *Sartre Studies International* and *Etudes sartriennes*. All this has improved the quality of Sartre scholarship, although it contains the dangers of hagiography and academic minimalism. Secondly, the country in which the academization of Sartre scholarship has proved to be most difficult is France. This is not the case with Sartre's literary work, and a remarkable distance from his life is increasingly allowing the examination of his philosophy in a new light. When, however, Sartre's political thought and political activity is in question, it seems that it is only beyond the borders of the *Hexagon* that we can find fresh and unconventional approaches, which do not worry so much about the conventional public image of Sartre.

Biography is, understandably, a field in which novel projects have been taken up following Sartre's death and after the publication of some of his uncompleted works. Three major works, Annie Cohen-Solal's, *Sartre. Une vie* (1985), Ronald Hayman's *Writing Against. Sartre. A Biography* (1987) and John Gerassi's *Sartre. The Hated Conscience of a Century* (1991), are indispensable for Sartre scholars. Each of them have clearly distinct aims, each with its own advantages and dead ends

Cohen-Solal's biography, in typical anglophone style, has invested a great deal of time in basic research in interviewing, looking through archives, etc., thus enabling us to correct some factual mistakes in the self-interpretations of Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Sartre's thinking, however, hardly appears at all in the book. Hayman's biography, rather, concentrates on Sartre's work and should be read in the light of a specific thesis, indicated in the title. He presents a kind of coherent perspective, but tends to absolutize his own interpretation. Gerassi is the son of old friends of Sartre and Beauvoir, and he offers a personal perspective to his work. In addition, he presents material from unpublished interviews with Sartre in the early seventies. Unlike the two others, politics is the primary subject in Gerassi's work, spanning, however, only to 1939. But just this closeness to the object, as well as the tendency to write about himself prevent him from obtaining a distance to the received view on Sartre.

As the first full-length French *post mortem* biography, Denis Bertholet's *Sartre* (Paris: Plon 2000, 594 p.) is, of course, a welcome addition to the works on Sartre. In comparison with the three previous biographies, Bertholet's style is closest to Cohen- Solal, concentrating on the life rather than the works of Sartre. Unlike Cohen-Solal, Bertholet does not present anything new in his use of the primary sources, although he does make use of some newly published literature, such as Beauvoir's *Letters to Nelson Algren*. Thus, I cannot find much new factual insights in this book, beyond information such as the loss of some of Sartre's important unpublished manuscripts in 1962 attentat on his *rue Bonaparte* apartment (p. 441).

In general, I have difficulty locating a point of novelty, a moment of *Umschreibung* of history in the Koselleckian sense, in Bertholet's book. I have not the slightest interest in "proof" of Sartre's bourgeois anchoring of life or in his shifting relations with young women,

around which Bertholet's story is largely written. The book does, however, almost make me envious of the enormous amount of travelling that Sartre did – although I wonder why he never did the Transsiberian? The author, however, never interrupts the tales of his voyages by asking what Sartre's and Beauvoir's *project* of travelling was. He all too easily subsumes, for example, his trips in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to the figure of a "fellow-traveller" of the worst kind. Why does he not consider the possibility that paying lip-service to the Communist authorities was considered to be a means of enabling them to see strange ways of life and visit places, such as Lithuania, which normal tourists were forbidden from entering at that time

Bertholet probably assumes that regardless of their aims, Beauvoir and Sartre were "objectively" fellow-travellers. Such a description, however, already signifies a commitment to an anachronistic interpretation of the most obvious variant, mixing the project and its *ex post* historical significance. In this respect Bertholet's perspective is arch-Hegelian, resembling the critique of Bucharin as an "objective traitor" in the Moscow processes, as analyzed by Merleau-Ponty in *Humanisme et terror*, and parodied by Sartre in *Les mains sales* and elsewhere.

Many French scholars are hopeless when facing Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique*. Bertholet is perhaps the most extreme case, making the *Critique* into a work of legitimating Marxism and Communism as well as of a pathos of the future of the worst kind. For Sartre the work was, on the contrary, a radical critique of Communism and futurism, and in an interview from 1975 (published in the Sartre volume of Schilpp's *Library of Living Philosophers* and now in the Sartre issue of *Magazine littéraire*, February 2000) he strongly insists that he wrongly characterized it as a Marxist work. For closer readers of the *Critique* it has always been clear that Marxism must be bracketed in order to understand the character of the work. Bertholet's lecture of the *Critique* is based on conventional commentators, such as Raymond Aron. For example, Sartre never saw the *groupe-en-fusion* as a political ideal, but viewed it analytically as a conceptual turning point, fragile and passing, but indispensable for the constitution of the "group praxis".

To take just one point in the few pages that Bertholet dedicates to the discussion of the *Critique*, he claims that Sartre "poursuivit le rêve d'un monde plein, dont toute la contingence serait bannie. … Mais c'est une chimère et il le sait" (p. 410). Of course, he knows that a world without contingency is a "chimera", but he insists that this is clearly an argument against the utopian tendencies in Marxism and Communism. Sartre himself plays with the liberating possibilities of contingency, included in such 'negative' figures as *l'échec*, *contre-finalité* and *rareté*. In this sense, he takes a stand for politics against the philosophy of history and favours a kind of negativistic dialectics of playing (cf. my *Politik als Vereitelung*, Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot 1992).

Bernard-Henry Lévy's (not to be confused with Sartre's last secretary Benny Lévy) is best known as a "New Philosopher" of the late seventies. His *Le siècle de Sartre* (Paris: Grasset 2000, 663 p.) is the most propagated of the new Sartre books. It is written in the French essayist style. It is sometimes difficult to judge, even more so than in the case of Gerassi, whether the author's own life and former views are the main subject and Sartre merely a background of their profiling. The title indicates an ambitious perspective of French and European intellectual history, and the book contains long *Auseinandersetzungen* with all kinds of thinkers, especially with Spinoza, Gide and Heidegger. Still, Lévy's book is, in part at least, worth a close reading to Sartre scholars, too.

In strictly philosophical matters Lévy remains an Althusserian, a "Materialist" with a capital M, and a programmatic Anti-Humanist, who attempts to include Sartre in this camp. What is so unconventional about this attempt is that it is the early Sartre, especially that of L*a nausée,* who is best suited to this project of inclusion, that of the *Critique* is regarded with suspicion.

Perhaps most sympathetic to me is Lévy's discussion of the Sartrean "philosophy of life", which is by no means unrelated to his "philosophy proper". He has aptly detected the Sophistic and especially the Nietzschean elements in Sartre's thought, militantly denied by some Sartre fans and scholars. Lévy emphasizes Sartre as a "*philosophe urbain*" (p. 330), who denies the values of nature, childhood, family and other instances of nostalgia and community in favour of a playful and subversive attitude. Although some aspects in this Sartrean

revolt, such as his denial of vegetarian food, appears quite naive, Lévy makes an excellent point with his accentuation of Sartre's self-exclusion from the world of those who were in search of a good order. In this respect I find Lévy's book superior to the numerous volumes on "Sartre and morals", which almost without exception tend to ultimately "save" Sartre and regard him as a defendant of consensus and all the other "good" things of the moralists. In the latest Sartre boom, the study done by the Swiss scholar Yvan Salzmann, *Sartre et l'autenticité* (Genève, Labor et fides 2000, 346 p.) once again repeats this salvation story.

Sartre scholars have rightly emphasized a tension in his temporal orientations: Sartre emphatically advocates both the primacy of the present over the future as well as the opposite. This ambivalence has deep philosophical and political grounds and requires a more nuanced discussion of time and temporality in Sartre's work. For Lévy, the questions are far more simple: he takes a stand for the Sartre who after the war wrote the the programmatic present-oriented article *Ecrice pour son époche* . Although this, roughly speaking, corresponds to my own critique of Sartre's "progressist" tendencies, I think Lévy is entirely mistaken to interpret the *Critique* as a futurist apology of progress. For Sartre, the futurist temptation was stronger in the late forties, in the uncompleted morals of *Cahiers pour un morale* and in such writings as *Qu'est-ce que la littérature*. In *Saint Genet* , written in the early fifties, Sartre renounces the attempt to found morals, and does not return to it either in the *Critique* or in the as yet only fragmentarily published writings on morals of the mid-sixties. In them, rather, morals are dealt with from a kind of rhetorical point of view (most explicitly in the "election study" *Kennedy and West Virginia*, published in the volume *Sartre alive*, 1991).

For Levy, too, the denunciation of the *Critique* as a futurist and communitarian work serves to characterize Sartre as a fellow- traveller of the Communists, and later of the extreme left, "*un Kojève gauchiste*" (p. 579ff). Lévy misses the point that Sartre always uses the concepts in a specified and singularized sense. What Sartre claims, for example, to be a "truth" in an historical situation does not at all mean that he himself subscribes to the view in question, but rather he treats "truth" as a strong facticity for the agents in the situation, which must first be accepted in order to be overcome. Without un-

derstanding this point, the Sartrean an¿alysis of the Soviet Union under Stalin in the second volume of the *Critique* does not make sense. Sartre's dialectical variant of "methodological individualism" is noted in passing by Lévy (p. 574-575) but explained away, despite the fact that it should be regarded as a decisive element in Sartre's continuous resistance towards all kinds of progressivism and "communitarianism".

The lack of a historical sense and of the knowledge of the conditions of practical politics is an obvious source of Lévy's misunderstandings. In particular, it renders him to be unable to comprehend the purely instrumental character of common action as a condition of effective changes in the world. When Sartre took this as given, he only took seriously some conditions of the political action of his own time, sometimes using extreme, such as *fraternité-terreur*, to describe these conditions, as well as the radical fragility of the common action in all its forms. Today we do not accept these conditions as given, we are suspicious of mass movements as such, etc. A book that appeared in the year of Sartre's death, 1980, and was written in the Sartrean spirit, signalled the chances of conditions of politics. I am referring, of course, to André Gorz' *Adieux au prolétariat*.

Another biographical work of a more personal kind is Claudine Monteil's *Les amants* de *la liberté. L'aventure de Jean-Paul Sartre et Simone de Beauvoir dans le siècle*. (Paris Edition 1, 1999, 323 p). The point of the work is to discuss paralell lives of Sartre and Beauvoir. The author, a feminist historian, stresses, rightly in my opinion, the mutual dependency of Sartre and Beauvoir with regard to intellectual discussions and the critical process of the completion of their works. A personal point is brought by the author's own memoirs from the early days days of the neo-feminist movement, of the participation of Beauvoir in it, and on the quarrel between the feminists and Sartre's then Maoist secretary Pierre Victor-Benny Lévy. What I expected by the title, namely a discussion of the concept of the liberty in the work and life of Beauvoir and Sartre is, however, not taken up at all. The key Sartrean idea that human beings are condemned to freedom, and that Sartre and Beauvoir are people who realized this in their own lives better than many others, seems to guide Monteil's book, but a more specified discussion of the modes of actualizing

freedom (amidst the lack of it) is unfortunately missing from the book.

A further volume which closely juxtaposes life and work, although not from a strictly biographical perspective, is Olivier Wickers' *Trois aventures extraordinaires de Jean-Paul Sartre* (Paris: Gallimard 2000, 241 p). The author aims at discussing Sartre's life-project based on three texts: the war-diaries of 1939-1940, the childhood "autobiography" *Les mots* (1964), and *L'idiot de la famille* (1971-1972). The author is especially intrigued by Sartre's mania of constantly writing everywhere he went. He manages to illustrate the strangeness of this life-style, as well as the fact that it, at least in its Sartrean form, is no longer possible. I would, however, have liked to see some discussion as to what kinds of losses are involved with the vanishing possibilities of such a life-styl*e*.

Philippe Petit's *La cause de Sartre* (Paris: PUF 2000, 249 p.) is slightly more academic than the aforementioned works. Unlike Wickers, he utilizes Sartre's biographic program in the understanding of his work. The book is partly a commentary of Sartre's monumental Flaubert-biography, *L'idiot de la famille*, but at the same time the Flaubert-study is turned into an understanding of Sartre's "cause" (cf. esp. p. 107). This cause is characterized by a famous formula, used by Sartre in the early seventies in his Flaubert volumes, *un roman vrai*, implying an overcoming of the novels by critical and historical studies making use of imagination.

As opposed to Bertholet and Lévy, Petit clearly understands the value of "dialectics" for Sartre, as something which relativizes the standpoints and facilitates sudden turns, reversions and totalisations *en cours*. In a sense, his book is a Sartrean defence of the ideal of the "total intellectual", mixing the genres of philosophy, literature, politics, as well as life and work with each other, against the current fashion of the denial of this possibility. Sartre's *L'idiot* is an interesting book in this respect, although, as some critics have said, perhaps not in terms of the series of specialist studies on Flaubert, but on many other things, including French politics in the nineteenth century.

Philosophically, Petit's point of departure is Sartre's radicalization of Husserl's "egology" in his early work. Especially the key idea of *La transcendence de l'ego*, the overcoming of a philosophy of subject by the philosophy of consciousness through the denaturalization and

desubstantivation of the idea of consciousness, is, according to Petit, "la base né vrotique de son programme de vie" (48). This is also the starting point of Sartre's "biographies", especially of his work on Flaubert, which lasted over decades.

Petit's interpretation of Sartre's intellectual project through his Flaubert study remains all too implicit. Especially against books such as Lévy's and Bertholet's, a closer discussion of the political significance by means of analyzing, how the "engaged" twentieth century intellectual Sartre studied the "unengaged" nineteenth century writer Flaubert, would have been highly valuable. However, if all intellectuals are specialists now, can such a study ever be written?

Sartre: Trois lectures. Philosophie, linguistique, littérature, sous la direction de Geneviève Idt (Université Paris X, Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur les Textes Modernes, 18, Paris 1999, 203 p.) is the seventh volume of *Etudes Sartriennes*. It illustrates the academic sartrologists' perspectives and differs, thus, in style and ambition from the works discussed above. Concentrating on the philosophical section of the volume, I appreciate the professionalism which is marked by the analysis of the specific content of the Sartrean concepts in their important nuances.

The authors present a detailed criticism of other interpreters for failing to understand the point of Sartrean concepts. This is by no means an apology, but is rather an attempt to explicate the strangeness of the Sartrean conceptual world. For example, Juliette Simont's article *La conception sartrienne du néant est-elle "classique"* contains an interesting comparison between Sartre's and Kant's concepts of "nothingness", illustrating that in a certain sense, Kant has already overcome the "classical" concept and and that Sartre's "internal negation" signifies a "relativization of simultaneity", which manifests freedom against an inclusion into the totality (p. 47-49).

Another Belgian sartrologist, Vincent de Coorebyter, critically discusses the fashionable "psycholecture de Sartre". Without denying the value of such types of studies – a category to which Bertholet and Wickers also must be included – he rightly insists on the complementary character of these kinds of studies in the understanding of the conceptual mutations in Sartre's philosophy. He claims that these types of studies have reached a dead end. This could also be expressed differently. There are few people in the twentieth century

whose lives are as well-known as Sartre's. However, his apparatus still remains strange and only superficially explicated, and its personal colour remains clearly underrated.

* * *

Can we thus speak of a "return" or "renaissance" of Sartre in the French intellectual and political debate? I think these figures are too closely bound to the academic fashions and the media culture: on the academic level, Sartre is "doing well" in the sense of the institutionalization of the study of a "modern classic" of philosophy, literature and even political thought in a manner appropriate to it. In several respects, however, the world of today is already so different from that of Sartre's life-time that it is better to treat him as a historical figure of his own time than try to "apply" his work to contemporary questions.

Still, the massive and monstrous work of Sartre is one which contains insights that are also worth being taken up today, for other purposes and in other forms than those which he himself intended. I will accentuate the possibility of re-contextualizing just one idea of Sartre, namely his distinction between *concepts* and *notions*. What is currently done in the history of concepts corresponds in certain important respects to Sartre's insistence on the temporal and historical character of *notions*. I think that for those of us who are interested in the analysis of conceptual changes, a fresh look at some writings, such as the third volume of the *L'idiot de la famille*, could illustrate a specific Sartrean variant of the study of the changes in political concepts.

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