Pirkkoliisa Ahponen & Anita Kangas (eds)

Construction of Cultural Policy

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Pirkkoliisa Ahponen and Anita Kangas

Introduction

The construction of cultural politics as a concept of action begins with creative ideas, developed by means of material and discursive practices, resulting in complete qualified products. Cultural discourses have a specific status in the symbolic interpretation of practical activities. Rhetorical devices are used to define how meaningful experiences are inscribed in cultural activities to become represented in creative practices of individuals, in social interactions, and in political discourses which are based on how politics of culture as a specific subject is defined. Because research results cannot be presented without a well-defined conceptual framework, conceptual definitions are of utmost importance for framing and keying (see Goffman 1986) the relevant research subject. Framing refers to a process which both influences and is influenced by the participants of cultural activities, whereas keying can be understood as tuning, setting, or even rooting of a concept in the context of a certain theoretical view.

Politics of culture can indeed not be imagined as a research subject without first taking into consideration the defining of the very concept in question when dealing with the here and now. This is to be done specifically enough to be focused, and must, simultaneously, be scientifically constructed in a generally competent manner. It is difficult to satisfy the demands of a well-thought-out, watertight and logical definition of this subject without falling into the trap of essentialism. An all-encompassing definition would easily lead straight into the trap, whereas with a more loose a definition the risk of eclecticism would be lurking behind the corner.

There have been, however, numerous efforts to solve this problem of definition in cultural policy, cultural politics and politics of culture. Yet afterwards – and in hindsight – it can be seen that the definitions are always based on a specific aspect within a certain context. The efforts to define these concepts

aim to cover the subject in question from a situated perspective, which allows only a specific framework for interpretation – the subject as such then becoming an agent representing a certain restricted cultural understanding. Definitions reflect the actual times of the defining agents and social situations of the representatives of different cultural schools, mirroring also the way the responsibility of cultural expertise is structured in this field of action. In his historical conceptual analyses, Palonen (1993, 8–10) interprets the difference between politics and policy. Policy is an action, which is planned in advance, a reflected line of action. Politics is an action more or less following the line of thought set by a policy in advance. When understood as such, politics is confronted with unpredictable situations and with opposed policies, and it cannot prematurely be reflected in the policy. For politics, some distance to policy is always required in order not to appear too rigid or too predictable to the adversaries. Related to politics is the concept of politicisation, which means re-interpreting a phenomenon from a political point of view. Politicisation is interpretative action opening new playgrounds and showing that there are spaces and times for action.

To continue discussion on this subject, it is reasonable to point out the political character of social and cultural conceptualisations. Social agencies have inclusive and exclusive intentions: they progress a view aiming either at integration and consensus, or at conflict, differentiation and fragmentation. This dynamic can be seen as inscribed in different answers: definitions are, on the one hand, complementary and, on the other hand, distinctively related to one another. Developments of certain scientific schools are represented in approaches dealing with social, cultural and, especially, with political issues.

According to the realistic and constructivist view, a competent and strictly exclusive definition of the very concept of politics of culture is unachievable. When trying to avoid the problem of cliquish thinking, the researcher is confronted with empty definitions only – those purified meaningless because of their too general and therefore too abstract character. The problem of definition cannot be solved by pronouncing of the openness of the theoretical perspective and of the transparency of the conceptual starting point. Anti-foundationalism, a principle called also anti-representationalism (Rorty 1991, see also Barker 2000, 374), adopted as a philosophical position within postmodern neopragmatism, contains problematic and questionable qualities if it is used as a base for the scientific contents of politics of culture. When taking our constructive effort further, we have to accept the restrictive principles of the historical rooting of conceptual definitions as well as the relativity of scientific discourses. We have to admit to be subjected to the situational character of our research subject.

Politicisation of culture activates citizens and agencies, therefore producing social actors. This occurs specifically in processes, which question the conventional boundaries between the cultivated arts and non-artistic practices. Lines of segregation between high and low culture or artistic culture and popular and folk culture become blurred; multicultural happenings do not respect self-evident boundaries between different branches of arts. Art tends to become mixed with entertainment and advertisement and therefore entangled in commercial purposes. When politicised, art can be used as an ideological instrument, even when reasoned by socially well-intended arguments. Being politicised, culture can no longer be, at least without being questioned, compartmented into a well-structured, hierarchical system of symbolic values. Then other interpretations about what culture is – for example a state of mind, a way of life or signifying practices – become increasingly present in cultural discourses as expressions of everyday activities. As a state of mind, culture is interpreted as expressions and cognitive attitudes, such as the emancipation from correct and false consciousness, which are ideologically produced. As a way of life, culture is characterised as a classification connected to social categories, often even relying on certain anthropological standard assumptions which are seen as typical for certain socially reasoned lifestyles (see e.g. Jenks 1993, Thompson 1994). In more postmodern applications of the way of life perspective, the interpretation of culture begins with anti-essentialist identity constructions, expressed in everyday activities and mediated discourses (see e.g. Hall and duGay 1996; Barker 2000). Culture is decreasingly sublimated and closely comes to resemble "ordinariness" (Barker 2000, 15) in happenings which are, as Stuart Hall (Hall and duGay 1996, 1–4) formulates it, strategic and positional arenas for the "politics of location", producing signifying practices on the basis of creativity of people. Therapeutic meaningfulness of arts increasingly renders culture blurred with the social in the sense of obtaining relief from pain and gaining joyful vitality through artistic experiences.

As far as politics is understood as saturated by culture, or in other words cultured, the term *policy* cannot as such be used, without being questioned, because the cultural contents and meanings of political activities do not fit the administrative boundaries to which policy has conventionally been restricted. Politics is constructed in everyday activities in the public sphere, which encompasses most of life in general. Politics, unlike policy, cannot be understood as an instrument of administration with a specific function or compartment – the main function being to keep the prevailing system balanced. Instead of maintaining and stabilising the society, politics is characterised by activities, brought about by creative individuals, participants and active citizens who aim at occupying more space for social changes by organising continuous cultural movements. Instead of being affirmative in its orientation toward

the prevailing social order, politics is oriented critically towards the society, tending to oppose the policy-system order, and therefore being characterised by a culture of alternatives and resistance. On the contrary, within the sphere of policy, only a culture of affirmation is possible. Culture is thus determinately subjected to the ideological domination of the political power structure, reasoned by being an instrument of economic steering mechanisms.

Consideration of the relation between economy and culture has become increasingly important in the field of cultural policy, as well as in that of politics of culture. The thesis of economic determinism – the subordination of culture to the ideological dominance of the economic sphere in the functional division of labour (between economic, political, social and cultural sectors) in the society – has been questioned, resisted and opposed. This kind of antireductionism is specifically assumed to be common both to critical theory and to cultural studies, which as approaches to culture share a political view that emphasizes the importance, for defining of culture, of seeing how power is gained by active participants and structured in the public arenas of culture. The value of cultural products is assessed, by taking this social aspect into consideration. This way symbolic values or signifying practices are appreciated in publicity, their practical value realised through activities fulfilled within political institutions, commercial markets, or even associations representing civil society (the so-called third sector). This further implies that the ideological aspect cannot be avoided in the politics of culture. Ideology has, indeed, been an important theme of discussion both in critical theory and in cultural studies, especially during certain historical phases. Currently, it seems that ideological discourses have been replaced by other kinds of rhetoric, in accordance with the increasingly polyphonic cultural political atmosphere.

In the speech on cultural policy, the sphere of culture has conventionally been restricted to the arts, just as the political sphere has been limited to the institutional policy system. The function of this system, as far as cultural policy is concerned, is the organisation of public administration and maintenance of balance of the system-based order in the field of the arts. The history of cultural policy can well be read in this light; in other words, it concerns how the functioning of art institutions can be understood in the context of public power. But as an intelligent, observant reader may already remark, one cannot honestly stay within this definition, having brought the alternative perspective into light. We could of course, due to practical reasons, continue by operating within the institutionally defined cultural policy. However, it is not credible to stay within this affirmative perspective without questioning the relevance of its frame, since the possibility of the critical position of the author has already been taken into consideration.

The situation outlined above was the starting point for the research project, results of which are presented in this book. The project was titled ”The institutionalization of culture and the mechanisms of art management”. It aimed both at realising and at finding a way out of the situation in which the institutionalization of cultural activities field had been strengthened, together with the enlargement of the field of responsibilities within the cultural administration. Institutional cultural policy had developed in the shadow of cultural administration, while institutionalization and its promotion had also been the principal interest in the research on cultural policy.

The cultural political strategy has mostly been inclusive in the sense that the field of institutional cultural policy has been widened by including new kinds of activities and areas in the domain of publicly subsidized and therefore officially appreciated art. Simultaneously, the boundaries between arts, representing high culture, and other kinds of culture, like popular culture, folk culture, or entertainment culture, have been blurred. So far, activities in each field of art, especially by means of art education and professional artistic work, have been defined as legitimised when taking place in their designated, distinct cultural domains. The newest artistic production, however, does not lend itself readily to these definitions because it has to fulfil its promise by proving itself produced skilfully enough. New arts are developed by combining different art forms, by creating new ingredients, by utilizing innovative technologies, and by producing entirely new innovations.

Strategies in the field of cultural policy have been dominated by attempts to maintain a balance between exclusive and inclusive strategies. By exclusive strategies we mean definitions that use qualitative criteria to establish what kind of ”art” or ”culture” does not deserve public support and is therefore left without the esteem conferred by expertise. Inclusive strategies, by contrast, are used to take newer ”species” into the cultural domain. In the current situation we can see multiple sub-fields with different intentions within the area concerning politics of culture. We can say that culture is now clothed with functions, which used to be defined as principally non-cultural. It becomes, however, impossible to separate the cultural core from its ”non-cultural” clothing. The idea is discussed here by asking whether politics of culture is using *new clothes* and what the ”new” in this case covers and contains.

Dealing with this problem, *Anita Kangas* refers to displacement, which takes place in the field of cultural policy, as well as to the contradictory rhetorical repertoires, which can be found in the current cultural political discourses. Does it however still hold, as it traditionally has, that cultural contributions in the society are reasoned by culture’s ability to make people’s life better, or, when pronounced from the point of view of an individual, to live more. Cultural creativity always contains an intention toward improving qualifications. The

social point of view is taken into consideration by saying that together we are more than when being alone. The aspects of closeness, social cohesion, and cultural principles for forming communities are reasoned by these means. This way, however, culture can be made into a medium for ideological goals, and even economic utilisation of culture is intermingled with culture as a social activity. Culture can be utilised in service of sustainable development or other kinds of soft development principles. Production of creativity is then strategically promoted also as the cultural principle for progressing marketing, media publicity and commodification in general. Culture can be seen as a useful vehicle for legitimising incompatible aims, which need to be cemented softly to progress institutional integration.

Cultural democracy can be advanced and enhanced only by participators being present – in other words, by active involvement of individuals. Cultural impact studies, as *Inga Kalvina* points out, in general aim at legitimising the effects and benefits of cultural participation for the society, basically from the economic or the social perspective. Calculated in purely economical terms, cultural impacts are purely instrumental and therefore not purposeful in themselves. As it has been concluded, profitability of cultural investments cannot be guaranteed in economic terms, at least not in the short run. Social impacts have been more fruitfully evaluated in terms of social inclusion, social cohesion and social capital, as well as in terms of finding remedies for social problems or decreasing tendencies towards social exclusion. Carrying innovative initiatives through the processes of their realisation can increase the involvement of cultural ”stakeholders”, so that the participants become devoted and committed to the results of these processes, which adds to the cultural value in terms of better life.

The impact studies differ, as Kalvina analyses, in the sense of framing and keying the focus on the impact of cultural participation. An external expert perspective aims at objectively evaluating the impacts within a given framework, the results being instrumental, whereas from an internal perspective a subjective understanding of the experiences is emphasised. While the external perspective is reasoned as policy-oriented within the existing frames, the internal participatory perspective is seen by Kalvina as empowering, because, as she points out, involvement of people enriches the policy-relevant knowledge and further enhances the policy-relevancy of cultural impacts in a democratic way.

The discussion continues with a chapter by *Anita Kangas,* which deals with the role of the third sector in cultural policy. The social aspect is inevitably included in cultural politics, as cultural activities cannot be connected to the society without being mediated by associations, organisations and institutions. Cultural associations have been important agencies in organising the ways of

handling cultural activities by public means. They have had a mediatory role between individual creativity and institutional resources. When members of associations launch voluntary activities, they represent the vitality of the civil society in its different forums, bringing out solidarity, communality and trust. The role of the third sector agencies has been, as Kangas shows, distinctive in different phases of cultural politics in the society – in the nation building process, in the formation of the welfare state, and currently in the companionship with marketing. This aspect is currently of interest because activation of citizens from on voluntary basis has gained a new significance. There is a new demand for the principle of cultural partnership. Cultural associations have had a distinctive role in maintaining the expertise in their field and therefore the right to speak for their members has been a specific reason for their existence. They have promoted their own cultural identity when working as nation-builders. This way they have also contributed to national integration mechanisms and further to the powers of the state. Their position now has to be defined anew because the concept of civil society cannot be limited to the nation state only, but it must aim to cover joint-European organisations in the name of European unification and European cultural identity.

Cultural politics, in the context of the EU, is concerned with whether the European citizenship is cultural enough. As *Katja Mäkinen,* in discussing how culture, identity and the sense of togetherness are represented in the documents of European Union, states, this means that belonging and togetherness have their basis in ethnos, which makes the right to participate – and therefore demos – sensible. Culture is an important vehicle for integrating citizens into political membership inside the European boundaries, so that the support for economic advance can be guaranteed. When proceeding in this direction, we have to consider the importance of utilising cultural diversity, which is included in the production of the sense of togetherness and processed towards supra-national integration of European citizens.

The more civilized the society, the more certain cultural groups are socially controlled by culturally qualified means. If social inequalities are on the increase in a society where cultural choices are multiplying, well-off people have more opportunities to make choices but badly off people must be content with an insufficient quality of living. Distinct categories of culturally valued differences mark boundaries between the included and the excluded. Here, as *Pirkkoliisa Ahponen* states, we have a basic problem of cultural democracy. The principal question is whether there are strategies with which the barriers formed by socially discriminating processes can be overcome by means of the politics of culture. Elements in a new participation strategy include increasing the interplay between cultural policies and other social and educational sectors. Ahponen, from another point of view, makes a remark on the problem

of cultural populism: if culture is used as an instrument only, it is threatened by a tendency to become emptied of its content.

Democracy and the protection of minorities are important elements of discussion, and Ahponen emphasises the integrative elements of democracy. A more theoretical question is how the concepts of social equality and cultural inequality become defined in different inclusion and exclusion processes in which social identities of minorities are portrayed. This problem is connected to positive political tendencies, which have seemingly become more crucial and acute in solving discrepancies of late modern social inequalities. It is possible that social inequalities are in increasing amounts expressed by cultural means, because social differentiation is more culturally justified than it was before. Therefore, as Ahponen states, an increasing demand to extend the boundaries of the culturally valued social space will strategically express tolerance towards all diverse interests that are politically represented.

Making things is giving way to making meanings in the production of culture society. This is *Jim McGuigan*'s starting point in his cultural analysis pertaining to policy in the information age. Aestheticisation of everyday life means that we meet the daily realities as signified. It is in this sense that the aspect that "life itself becomes art" is interesting. This slogan can be interpreted as referring to an increase of creativity. McGuigan, however, also emphasises another aspect when dealing with culture as a signifying practice. He sees that the circuit of production, representation and consumption of social identities contains increasing possibilities for cultural regulation. The concept of governmentality is worth of taking into consideration, because disciplinary power, the promoter of internalised civilisation, has such impact that technologies of the self - in the foucaultian sense – are adopted to be our culturalised nature as such. New information technology brings with it virtuality, which affects phenomena like mobile privatisation, but technological innovations too can be seen as socially and therefore intentionally produced and so affected by deeper social and cultural changes**.** It can be seen, like in Castells, that culture is 'real virtuality' in the symbolic environment with its structure as "inclusive, flexible, diversified hypertext". It seems to be left open where exactly "imagined communities", produced by these means, can contain possibilities for alternative movements to resist power structure, tending to convey itself as one-dimensionality.

All products, both symbolically and materially constructed, are grounded in creative ideas. This is the basic argument of *Raija-Leena Loisa* who understands the term cultural industries to refer to a set of activities, put into practice in the entire field of arts. The principal aspect here concerns the use of the term industry - compared with refinement - to describe how the processes of production, reproduction, distribution and consumption are connected together

in the creative work. These processes are seen as rooted in the construction of a prototype, the reproduction of which provides the return of what was invested, if only the product is received by audience with attraction and satisfaction. Reproducibility of a product depends on whether a creative act can be multiplied by technological means. One aspect made relevant in the light of industrial view on culture is that the profitable outcomes of cultural products are difficult to predict, even if receptivity of audience is to be tested before launching the product to the markets. This issue however, can be resolved by calculating that the repertoire of cultural commodities contains hits and flops, and that one product can cover the costs of ten others. In any case, the aspect pointed out is that the value of cultural products is assessed at the markets according to their attractiveness to the audience. To have a possibility to be economically profitable, not only the work of creative artists needs to be appreciated but products too must be intermediated by marketable means so that possible receivers can reach them. Formatting, publishing, advertisement and programming aim at facilitating the distribution so that products are made obtainable enough.

An industrious attitude is demanded from the makers of products based on the creative work. However, an appreciation of qualifications cannot be guaranteed according to the success of cultural products among a large audience only, because profitable values at commercial markets can be filled with inflationary contents. Besides, there is still place for some alternative products, which remain a specific property for a specific minor audience or are valued by marginalities. Subjectively experiences are still testimonies of the meaningfulness of creativity.

In the context of new technologies, questions concerning who is an artist and what is the source of subjective creativity become increasingly burning issues, difficult to solve. Artistic works can be virtually constructed from pieces, reproduced as copies and simulations, and they can be manipulated so that the products are entirely new even when old materials are utilised and circulated by technological means in the context of technospace. *Niina Simanainen* does not only construct her view on cultural technology as framed by techno-economic discourse. In the cyber-metaphoric discourse new virtual technology is seen as embedded in culture, fostering the art work innovatively on a specific playground, which is characterised by interactive networking of the participants of cultural processes. Designers, script writers, and sound recorders as well as other kinds of art constructors work as co-producers, often in a team processing the artistic expression, articulation and representation, influencing also the content creation. Digital and virtual presence of artists in electronic performances can be addressed against the stability of institutional field of arts, also blurring boundaries between artists and their audience, or, in

other words, between production and reception. One can therefore ask where the processing of art begins and whether it can ever be completed as far as we believe in the innovativeness of communication as such and in the effectiveness of conceptual interpretations. A point here is whether the access of audiences on the internet transforms the concept of democracy, because it allows for more voices to be transmitted everywhere, provided the channel is open.

Culture, currently, is rather proliferated as a ubiquitous concept. In her theoretical-historical review, *Kia Lindroos* wants to clarify this situation by articulating a distinction between the concepts of *culture* and *cultural*. Culture is seen here as a discursive formation containing temporal and transformative characters. A glance through the conceptual history of culture can contribute to an understanding of what is happening now, especially when technology and culture overlap.

Paying attention to the viewpoints of three representatives of cultural studies, Tony Bennett, Donna Haraway and Homi Bhabha, *Lindroos* considers how the term culture is attributed in cultural studies. She claims that Bennett considers 'culture' in a purely instrumental sense as a discursive practice, which is embedded in governmental policies. But what is the *praxis* for which culture is used as an instrumental object? Donna Haraway's answer is science as culture, or more specifically, science studies as cultural studies. Furthermore, she here refers to the distinction between culture and nature and to how 'nature' can no longer be understood otherwise but as a rhetorical construction, and therefore as culturalised *topos*, or, along the same lines, as *a tropos*, always an artefact displaced from its originality. This way both nature and culture, and science as well, become textual constructions, only catchwords, continuously processed anew for actual intentions. Therefore, as Lindroos claims, awareness of culture as a historical formation in its materiality is more fruitful than striving to progress by detaching culture from its historical connotations. Lindroos continues by reading Bhabha's way of interpreting the current ambiguity of this concept through historically produced dichotomies, included in the discourses concerning cultural practices and the substance of culture – should there be any - in its temporality and the momentarily presence.

Identity politics have become fashionable within cultural studies by articulating subject positions of suppressed, marginalised or excluded "others". *Petra Ragnerstam* argues that although an idea of autonomous subject is criticised as being oppressive and exclusive, the "others" are identified following the same essentialist ideology. When seeing subjects as discursively constructed and thus enmeshed in ideology, the problem of relativism is faced. According to Donna Haraway, this is "a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally", and is therefore a denial of responsibility. Ragnerstam introduces Adorno's idea on how the constant critique of the subject must

be addressed to the self as relational to other, and must reflect both of these constructions as socially situated. This way it can be seen how the definitions of the other also constitute demarcation lines for the self. When something is defined with help of the demarcation lines, it connotes also what it is not. This is the core idea of the non-identity logic, so important for the understanding of Adorno's negative dialectics. Ragnerstam exemplifies the category of "women" as a unitary identity construction as far as it is based on the principle of sameness. Instead of this, we have to see identity groups like "women" to be self-reflectively both subjects and objects of certain historical situations. To see how politics is embedded in critical thought, we need to both deconstruct and reconstruct identities, by participating in practices, referred to by Butler as "subversive repetitions".

Pirkkoliisa Ahponen identifies "*cultivation"* as a key aspect in the conceptual understanding of politics of culture, which means that both ways of life and human civilisation are important clues for understanding the meaning of culture and interpreting how culture is related to society. How cultivation can be progressed is seen as a dilemma from the cultural political point of view. Ahponen analyses the ways of politics of culture, and perspectives of cultivation by taking into account conceptual approaches from critical theory and cultural studies. The distinction is seen as follows: if the cultural view of critical theory is characteristically cultivated, and therefore labelled elitism, then cultural studies are saturated by populism but also aim at the cultivation of the subject. When arts are appreciated in critical theory and "mass culture" is devalued, cultural studies start with an opposite perspective when seeing everyday expressions as the most significant material for cultural practices, which are materialised in different forms of popular culture. The relationship between culture and power implies the cultural political vision of both critical theory and cultural studies.

The openness of the cultural democracy is an interesting question. Cultural studies mean the need to overturn barriers between high and low cultures so that arts are no longer appreciated as the specific property of elites. Popular culture is meaningful and valuable for people's life. The term culturalism refers to expression of culture as the way of life of ordinary people who make their own life meaningful with their creative practices, learning by doing culture. However, when the organisation of the field of activities is established and the process continued toward institutionalisation, only those participants who have committed themselves to be situated in a specified space are allowed to be present with their legitimised activities. As Ahponen states, borders between "us" and "them" are marked using inclusion and exclusion as democratic signifiers. When dealing with the core of the problem of politics of culture,

we cannot avoid the basic question of how social participants are connected to the structure of society.

This book aims at contributing to cultural political construction in a polyphonic way, without containing a tendency toward a total consensus about the concept of cultural policy. Cultural policy is here not attempted to be advanced by any purposeful ideological means. The articles do, however, discuss and take part in defining the relevance of the current issues in the politics of culture. A red line consists of how the social and political aspects are included and how they exert influence in the context and contents of culture. Following this core idea, the articles contain different thoughtfully constructed conceptual discourses for framing and keying the politics of culture, and specifically, for increasing the meaningfulness of the cultural political issues.

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Anita Kangas

New clothes for cultural policy

”The emperor walked in the procession under his crimson canopy. And all the people of the town, who had lined the streets or were looking down from the windows, said that the emperor's new clothes were beautiful. 'What a magnificent robe! And the train! How well the emperor's clothes suit him!' None of them were willing to admit that they hadn't seen a thing; for if anyone did, then he was either stupid or unfit for the job he held. Never before had the emperor's clothes been such s success.”(Andersen 1985, 122).

”The Emperor's New Clothes” is a well-known H.C. Andersen's fairy tale the theme of which is anchored in the relationship between clothes and power. The continuation of the story generates a decisive turn and the question of whether the emperor has clothes on or not. Andersen himself had two alternatives to choose from for the end of the story. Upon its publication, the story ended with a clause: ”He has nothing on!”. The other alternative however, states that the emperor in fact does have grand clothes. (H.C. Andersen Centret. Manuskripter: Kejserens nye klaeder). In the story power is concealed in clothes.

The core of power presents itself in the emperor's enthusiasm to wear the clothes that were offered to him by the rascals, who promised that only the able workers would be able to see his clothes. Power is manifest also in the discussions between the rascals and the officials concerning the fabrics and it finally reveals itself in the emperor's grand parade. The situation filled with admiration is disrupted by an innocent child cry out, from which point onwards, the message spreads very fast. The situation becomes frightening for the emperor who thinks that the spectators are right in that he indeed does not have any clothes on. The play however continues with the emperor walking on even more lordly and the chamberlains carrying the non-existent trail.

As researchers of cultural policy, we too from time to time consider cultural policy's new clothes, how are they created and on whose terms. The question

contains an impression of there occurring a change, or displacement. But we could, in the same vein, consider if there indeed is any trace of new cloths, or if they at all exist. Barthes (1993, 55) claims new not to be a fashion, but rather a value, the basis of all criticism; our evaluation of the world no longer depends on the opposition between noble and base, but on that between old and new.

The discourses of cultural policy

Cultural policy, as a field of research and as a subject, is interdisciplinary and is attached to different research traditions as well as to different concepts. For example, researchers of aesthetics, social scientists, cultural historians, ethnologists, economists, political scientists and environmental scientists give, as an intellectual field, linguistic expressions of things, to be connected with cultural policy as conceptual and practical outlines. Interpreting Barthes (1993, 40 - 45), we can look upon language as a tool in the hegemony struggle - if power is on its side, it spreads everywhere in the general and daily occurrences of social life. The language becomes ”a second nature”.

In the same way new concepts occupy an important position within the system of cultural policy, in taking and getting the power, and in creating and defending the field. It is a question of the language of politicians, the special language of officials thought to be apolitical, the language of the media, the language of the experts, the language of discussion or the language of those outside the sphere of power. According to Barthes (1993, 32) ”the text needs its shadow: this shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary clouds: subversion must produce its own chiaroscuro”. Cultural political texts form parts of the fields of aesthetics, culture and society, where battles are fought regarding expertise, artistic talent, or genuineness of art, and where the rules of the game and the paradigms change along with the change in artistic generations (avantgarde/ - -) or along with the moving of the power to define art and non-art from one expert group to another political power. But the texts do not function without their shadow. A pattern of thinking, according to which culture is a qualitative hierarchy lies very deep inside the cultural political system and it can be found in the thoughts of both radicals and conservatives. The starting point here is that quality is definable and so is the good and the bad art. The rules that define the borders of art are unambiguous when the fields adopt them; they remain unchanged and universal in their own time. Institutions, professions, and cultural capital are needed to build and to maintain this consensus.

The field of cultural policy, together with its systems of teaching, research, critique, administration, institutions, professions and organizations, audiences and communication, is in a transitional stage. Transition means the necessity to alter the place of cultural policy and to specify its position when the identity politics gain more weight in the frames of multiculturalism and rainbow society (Rose 1998, 16). Italian author and literature scientist Italo Calvino, in his book "Six memos for the next millennium" (1988) analyses certain values, qualities, or peculiarities of literature, which are crucial in all human activity and which in an interesting way challenge cultural policy, too. His writing concerns lightness, quickness, exactitude, visibility and multiplicity and their opposites. The sixth lecture –consistency remains unfinished.

Calvino considers literature a search for knowledge, a source of the tribute to lightness, a reaction to the weight of living. He feels the entire world is turning into stone: a slow petrifaction advanced more or less depending on people and places but one that spares no aspect of life. The weight of living consists in the dense net of public and private constrictions that enfold us more and more closely. The lightness of living challenges us to look at life from another angle.

In practical life, time is a form of wealth with which we are stingy. In an age when extremely fast and widely affecting media threatens to make all our communication uniform shell, the function of art is communication between different things, channel for the tolerance of difference and vivification of the atmosphere. Calvino believes that a pestilence has struck the human race in the use of words. It is a plague afflicting language, revealing itself as a loss of cognition and immediacy, an automatism that tends to level out all expression into the most generic, anonymous, and abstract formula. This lack of substance is not to be found in language alone, but in visual images also. We live in an unending rainfall of images and much of this cloud of visual images fades at once and leaves no trace in the memory. The disease of mankind, reflected in Calvino with the loss of exactitude, is presented together with the loss of the power of information and spontaneity, and excessive automatization, causing the language to become shallow and the tops of expression even. According to Calvino, the causes of this epidemic arise from politics, bureaucratic uniformity, and media's levelling influence. Thinking about visibility makes Calvino emphasize the necessity of thinking by means of mental pictures. In the time of pictorial culture we are slaves of such a quantity of pictures that we cannot separate our direct experiences from those we have, for a few seconds, seen on the television. This is the threat of losing our fundamental human ability to think by pictures.

Among the ideas, which tend to emerge from the great novels of the twentieth century, Calvino discusses an open encyclopedia, which etymologically

implies an attempt to exhaust knowledge of the world by enclosing it in a circle. However, today we can no longer think in terms of a totality that is not potential, conjectural, and manifold. Knowledge as multiplicity is the thread that binds together the major works of both that called modernism or that referred to as postmodern. The concept of multiplicity as a variety is one of the values to be saved for the next millennium. "Each life is an encyclopaedia, a library, an inventory of objects, a series of styles, and everything can be constantly shuffled and reordered in every way conceivable." (Calvino 1998, 124). Calvino, in an interesting way, elaborates on the features of new literature and on new ideas of knowledge. He is in the front line of analysing phenomena of the present day and he reacts in a critical manner against certain trends of cultural development. In guiding these values much is expected from cultural policy too.

The long lines of cultural policy

The largest area of the research tradition of cultural policy is studies outlining the long lines of cultural policy, or typologies with international comparisons. In Finland, Heiskanen (1994), Ahponen (1994), Alasuutari (1997), Luttinen (1997), Ilmonen (1998), Hurri (1993) and Kangas (1992, 1998, 2003) have analysed the lines of cultural policy. Viewpoints emerged concern development/changes in the systems of cultural policy, in the ways of governing, in the roles of the consumers of culture, or in the frame and development of financing culture. In other countries too, the analysis of the lines of cultural policy, or typologies, has been attempted (Henry 1993, Mangset 1992, Bakke 1990, Duelund 1993, 2003, Mulcahy 1998, Looselye 1995, etc.).

All these studies emphasise especially the development phase, which after the Second World War signified a clear change in the formation of cultural policy and in the ways to function. With the concepts of the democratisation of culture and cultural democracy new cultural policy was formed. (Pankoke 1982, 386-397). Democratisation of culture denotes efforts to spread to wider sections of the population knowledge and enjoyment of the good things, which constitute "culture" (high culture). Cultural democracy implies the idea, that policies should not be formulated in relation to extraneous aesthetic standards, but rather in relation to the cultural needs of the population in their everyday lives – arts according to the people's own conception. The framework of critical theory concerned with the building of connections between practice and theory, and with strengthening of political consciousness was adopted as one base for the new emphasis of cultural policy. As Jay (1973, 216) points out, in the writings of the critical theorists there exist many problems in arguing

the concepts. The concepts pervaded via international conferences organised by Unesco and Council of Europe.

Göran Therborn (1995, passim) uses the concept of peripetia to outline the social transitions. Peripetia´s original meaning is a great fateful turn. In Therborn's opinion this kind of turn took place in Europe after the Second World War. Continuous minor turns express the multiplication of modernization, which hasn't meant the growth of fragmentation, but has implied even stronger commitment of different action circles and phenomena to one another. The forms of governing and the professionalisation of work and expertise, created along with the development of social policy, were included in both social and health care, in youth and in cultural sector. Cultural policy, like other policies, also took part in the developing of social life. A service system, rationalized and regionally subsidised, and working for the benefit of both the professional artists and consumers, was defined as ideal in cultural policy too, especially in the Nordic countries.

The emphasis on the welfare state era's cultural policy has been common to all studies analysing the long lines of cultural policy. It has also been common to first see the welfare model as desirable and later as a governing programme, which produces and reproduces a gap between the prevailing and new practices. The typologizations of policies are always problematic, and especially the finding of so-called pure types of the classification is problematic. However, the researches testify many attempts to encapsulate the "Nordic Model" and discuss its features, its similarities and dissimilarities. (Esping-Andersen 1990, Kangas 1994, Kosonen 1998, Duelund 2003). Anyway, an undisputed list of traits regarding what constitutes the model remains elusive. Some characteristics can still identify the Nordic countries as a group. The scope of the public policy is large. It encompasses social security, social and health services, education, housing, employment, leisure etc. with the aim of meeting most basic needs via public measures. The state's involvement has been strong in all policy areas, with efforts to co-ordinate policies. Emphases on full employment, accompanied by active labour market policies have been regarded as essential Nordic traits. The Nordic welfare system is based on a high degree of universalism. Many services, such as social, health, education, libraries etc. are financed mainly through taxation without high user fees. They are provided at the local level by local authorities and are also mostly produced by them, therefore resulting in a large share of public employment. In many comparisons of policy implementation the fact is established that Finland was a late comer to the Nordic group. It achieved the criteria of Nordic welfare model later, but still more rapidly, than the other Nordic countries.

The Finnish cultural policy in transition

Finland's tradition of state involvement in the arts and heritage is inseparable from the idea of a national culture and national state, which started about 1850 onwards. Finland then, was a state within a state, having its own Senate and its own Diet, its own local officials, legislation, army, money, and postage stamps. Public subsidies and subsidy system for the arts were being established at that time too. With respect to the concept of cultural policy, the 'cultural' meant the widening areas of state responsibility: (1) granting artists, enabling their training abroad, improving their living and working conditions, (2) maintaining and adding to the heritage, (3) dissemination, art institutions, touring companies, (4) training for professionals and amateurs (5) cooperation with the cultural associations, which represented expertise (professional artists associations) or citizenship (cultural democracy).

With the creation of welfare state in 1960s, numerous new tasks were assigned to the state in the areas of cultural policy. During three decades between 1960 and 1990 specifically defined tasks were formulated and confined to the area of Finnish cultural policy. These were so narrow that they could be monitored and regulated, or at least so that desired consequences of them could be discussed. There existed a group of tasks waiting to be carried out as well as a group of problems to be solved. In the transmission processes a group of experts was involved, that attempted to empower the clients. Habits and tools were created for each task. In this way, cultural policy, cultural administration, and cultural work also took, and is taking, part in the modernity project. Cultural life was "put in order" by seeking rationality - quality and form of action. From a critical point of view, it can be argued that public cultural policy, with its grants and support actions, attempted to control and tame cultural life, to subordinate it, and to produce high quality culture, but which pleased it itself. At the same time, the institutionalization and autonomisation of art allowed, if not forced, the art world to disengage from various connections. Even if art was to be seen as one sector of the society, the actors in its field emphasized its self-regulation. It was not appropriate to define tasks of art from outside; art carried out its social task by being art.

Artistic action was tied up with welfare cultural politics in a complicated way. To become a target of public support, certain area of art, for example photography, had to prove itself financially unprofitable, or become so by the choice of forms of expression. The need for public support meant legitimisation of the area as art. On the other hand, the interpretation would state that "in practical cultural policy the area changes to non-commercial and non-entertainment when it is elevated to the sphere of public support" (Liikkanen 1994, 13). Among the traditional parts of cultural industry some parts as subjects of

cultural policy's strategies accepted for example, film, photography, comics, rock music, and art industry and they became so by some parts defined as art**.** The art that was included in cultural services was to accomplish two goals: to be of high quality and to be available to everyone to enjoy. Art as a hobby too, was a part of cultural services, and it conveyed creative action that was available to everyone in the area of arts and was the result of this action.

The adherence to this welfare-state cultural policy is still rather strong, although in Gallup polls and in various studies the local governments and citizens often express that municipal savings should be handled with shifting of a great deal of the responsibility for cultural activities to the third sector or to the market. (Kansalaismielipide 1997). The frequent consumers of the cultural activities, women, upper social classes, and artists - in other words those art communities, which have a position in defining the contents of the activities, are satisfied clients of the cultural activities (Kaipainen 1999) and support the ideology of welfare-state cultural policy (Ilmonen 1998). Middle-aged, highly educated women have been and still are important intermediaries of the values of good life that are linked to culture from one generation to another.

It has been assumed that changes will take place along the two lines of art audiences (Liikkanen 1997, 449 - 455), which may result in various audiences and practices breaking the speech hierarchy. Firstly, more people have professional or amateur art education as a result of which proficient and specialized amateurs and audiences are being developed. Secondly, as there is a new middle class, more people's work has something to do with the production of symbols, and more people use the code of art and popular culture in their work, which makes boundaries and hierarchies between different forms of culture questionable. (Betz 1992, 93 - 114).

Under a new social ideology, neoliberalism, which naturally is not a uniform phenomenon, but is justified as a theme that represents the transition, will be argued a critical period of cultural policy, and in search for new concepts and constellations. As objects of criticism are deep interventions, they enclose, with their widely reaching and massive governing mechanism, the Nordic welfare states too. Administrative and political actors have not succeeded in controlling the changes in social life by using social planning and social policy. The view, that a state has to offer its citizens welfare services and livelihood, is thought to be morally detrimental, because it is said to have produced a situation, which is often described by the concept of a "dependence culture". A counter-strategy offered for such byrocratic administration has been the introduction of markets for varied sectors. The ways of doing this include changes in ownership, financial control, separating political decision-making and execution, attempts to create techniques to evaluate quality and mana-

ging, and enlarging the power of the consumers by producing complaining procedures and substitutive services (new public management).

Another angle, which brings elements to the definition of the new phase of cultural policy, is post-modern. Rather than exceedingly elaborating on the definition of the concept or on its relationship to the concept of modern, it is more useful to highlight certain features, with which institutions have been analysed from the point of view of post-modern. The institutions of the modern are then associated with the struggle for universalism, uniformity, monotonous, and univalent on the one hand or on the other hand with inventiveness, since post-modern is defined by the pluralism, multiplicity, contingency, and ambivalence. The new line of cultural policy sees the individual as an independent subject, which differs from the welfare ideology's emphasis on the view of an individual being raised to collective responsibility. This new view has been present already at the beginning of 1990s, for example in the Finnish reports on cultural policy, their introduction and basic clarifications. The documents, affected by international influences, include also emphasis on classical liberalism.

This point of view could be expanded with thoughts of Zygmunt Bauman, a sociologist who analysed post-modern. Bauman discusses consumer attitude, which privatizes things so that they are no longer thought to be common, and which individualizes duties so that these are no longer thought to be social. The consumer attitude makes life individual. "It now becomes my duty to improve myself and my life, to culture and refine, to overcome my own shortcomings and the other vexing drawbacks to the way I live", claims Bauman (1990, 204). Different models of what I can make of myself are offered on the market. The desirability of the models varies with time, they become fashionable and they go out of date. They also differ in different temptations they can contain. When choosing a model, it can be decisive, for example, how much appreciation the group that already has chosen the model can offer to a newcomer.

In the period of the welfare state, the regulating of needs and their satisfaction, which the state realizes, was, with its openness, very different from the activities by the market forces. All consumer goods can be bought with money. According to Bauman (1990, 206) we are living in an epoch when persons "make themselves", when lifestyle-tribes flourish and people segregate along with their consumption-style. The equality of the consumers becomes emphasized in their possibilities to choose the life style they want. Currently, people strongly oppose every kind of discrimination, e.g. that on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or gender. It is understandable that, due to the purchasing power being the only code acknowledged by the market, original cultural or economic capital cannot have any meaning. The functioning of the market is usually based on that when people participate in it they prioritize their own

personal advantages. Some people however are more free in their choices than the others, and some have much more power than others do, which raises the possibilities of making real choices. Therefore, the inequality of the consumers is a fact in the market.

Cultural policy becomes more and more instrumental, but to all intents and purposes the main targets of cultural policy are still the promotion of artistic creativity and making it easier for people to access art activities, making the participants noble, and defining art by means of art world and competent audiences. However, it is very complicated for the system to take into consideration the unequal division of power and privileges. It is easier to create models that reproduce themselves and interpretations of artistic quality that follow the conventional basic lines of western culture. On the other hand, because the value systems have weathered, there are no clear criteria for the notions that e.g. high culture is automatically good and popular culture worse. The questions of values are not disappearing from the agenda of cultural policy; they will be emphasized because they must be negotiated over and over again. The negotiations take place in greater variety of groups than before, in imagined and real societies at the same time. The media offers us images of ourselves, and comparisons that make the building of imaginary societies possible for us. The practices of cultural policy carry with them cultural memory, practices of thinking and evaluation, and they link the future to the past (see also Liikkanen 1997, 452).

Culture and policy

The new position of cultural policy and the new models for operating in the field of cultural policy are taking place at the moment. The concepts of ”policy” and ”culture”, have both received new aspects, which naturally poses a threat to the conventional cultural policy, the challenge being how to make societies creative and productive by means of individual entrepreneurship. In the planning and making programmes of political machinery too, this model of thinking is accepted at all levels.

Nation-states have come to a new situation along with the globalization of economy. Three cornerstones of nation-state - economy, politics and culture - have moved, which does not mean they have become weaker. Bauman (1992) claims that in addition to these forms of politics, new, post-modern forms emerge that gradually colonize the core areas of political process. Also, the policy of kinship, the policy of desire, the policy of fear, and the policy of certainty are challenging the new lines of cultural policy.

The policy of kinship pertains to practices aiming at the attempts to compile self in communities. Tribes are thought to be imaginary societies, existing only because their members have expressed their engagement symbolically, and not by leaning on the executive organs. The policy of desire includes duties, aiming at strengthening of the importance of certain type of behaviour (tribal symbols) for the compiling of the actors´ selves and for raising the appeal of choosing precisely these objectives. The thought of not being able to rely on the fragments of advice the policy of desire gives, produces the policy of fear. There is doubt with respect to the desire pursuing actors' concern for the ill effects of their action. The policy of certainty contains the search for social verification of the multiplicity of the offered alternatives. The producing and sharing of certainty is a typical duty of the experts, in which they acquire the power. In all the four arenas of the political play, an enterprising actor finds offers thought to be beyond compare. The basis of incomparability is the amount of public attention. Publicity is an even more central arena for the defining power.

Culture as a concept now emphasises multiplicity, verticality, lowering of the barriers, and also quality. What has changed? At the earlier phases of cultural policy international analyses was available to the systems of the cultural life, when these were considering their new position. The World Decade for Cultural Development launched by the United Nations and the Unesco produced myriad of projects and a final report "Our Creative Diversity" (1995). Its European contribution was created by an expert group of the Council of Europe, under the name of "In From the Margins" (1997). The central demand of both reports is not only cultural democracy or democratisation of culture, but also that culture is a basis of development and is to be taken into consideration in development of the societies at all levels. Because of this, the very notion of expanding the concept of cultural policy is necessary.

How do these reports define 'cultural' in cultural policy? The starting point is highly traditional; the multiplicity of the concept of culture is first being explicated by anthropology. The notion of culture as a whole human life acquires concrete ingredients with Unesco´s World Conference´s statement: "Culture includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs". The authors of "In From the Margins" agree with this definition, but they give culture a political meaning too: "Culture is not simply the expression of ideas about the world, but also the will to maintain or change it - or, even, dominate it" (1998, 28). In the report "Our Creative Diversity" the new role of culture is outlined: "Culture shapes all our thinking, imagining and behaviour. It is the transmission of behaviour as well as a dynamic source for change, creativity, freedom and the awakening of innovative opportunities. For groups and so-

cieties, culture is energy, inspiration and empowerment, the knowledge and acknowledgment of diversity" (1995, 11). This means that the efforts of the state need to move away from monolithic notions of a 'national culture' and move towards accepting diversity, ethnic diversity, and diversity in individual choices and in group practices. The central strategic concept is empowerment. Thus, we reach a concept notably wide in its scope, and are entitled to ask if any 'cultural' exists, when nothing has a special, unique value.

The key issues of the new (global) cultural policy concentrate on discussions of pluralism (multi-language policy, multi-ethnic-policy, implications for public broadcasting policy and cultural tourism), the economic importance of cultural sector (cultural industries and creative industries, entrepreneurship), culture sector as a dimension in the strategies of development, art and creativity, technological benefits and nightmares, new alliances, and partnership.

Commodification of culture – five discourses

The new pursuits and practices of cultural policy can be described with the concept of the commodification of culture. In the concept of cultural policy the term 'cultural' is highly reflexive. It is a relation-based concept, and its contents differ in various contexts. 'Cultural' - narrowly art with new art forms and heritage, denotes the promoter of economic or social development, and the saviour of values in the cities and regions. It has absorbed new techniques of expression and distribution and has become commonplace.

"In From the Margins" report highlights culture as a social, but also a hard, factor in the community planning and development processes; in other words, as a factor of production that is clearly definable, and as a resource of human development that is measurable. As Ahponen (1994, 113 - 114) claims, cultural activities are currently thought of as processes, and the necessity of the projects that are carried out is measured by their usefulness - how many innovations that can be seen as financial success, social activity, entrepreneurial atmosphere, jobs, and also images on cultural scenes and cultural areas, are cultural impulses able to create. The radiating influences are sold as image packages containing marked values for certain audiences. In the future vision, cultural institutions turn to fundraising, to calculating the profitability of the actions and to propagandising - lobbying. Culture is seen as an important asset, which, when struggling for the positions of social action, works as a diversifier of infrastructure.

The discussion of the economic importance of the cultural sector already has its traditional forms, which refer to cultural economics, concrete studies (impact studies), wide practical projects, and their evaluations. Economic

impacts have been studied mostly by inquiring into the economic benefits of festivals of cities and regions. The decision-makers have also reflected on the economic benefit produced by the cultural institutions of the cities and the regions. Researches in different countries have demonstrated the profits, and for example, the study of five Finnish towns ascertains that visitors are interested in cultural institutions and that a tourist contributes on the average 21 euros to the region. The amount of capital that a tourist affords the region with differs from institution to institution. The visitors of art museums contribute 30 euros, those of theatre 23 euros, of cultural history museums 13 euros, and of orchestras 11 euros (Kaipainen 1999). Without interfering with the choice of the towns of the study and the qualitative differences of institutions by means of which these are explained, we can say that the study demonstrates, provided such demonstration is required, that cultural institutions are of economic benefits to towns and regions. The cultural institutions service users demonstrated their satisfaction with the quality of the service and were of the opinion that ticket prices were agreeable. In addition, every third would agree to a price slightly higher.

Usually, these studies indicate the inner satisfaction with one of the fields of culture, legitimate the profitability of public funding, and attest the extending of private funding to the institutions as essentially desirable. Although own fundraising of the institutions is generally thought to be healthy and customer-based according to these studies, it plays a minor role in the costs of Nordic cultural institutions as a whole (Mäkinen 1999).

The studies regarding the measurable (in euros) impacts of cultural activities have on their side the use the language, which the management and the decision-making require, or are thought to require. In other words, they discuss money and material benefits. Their problem however lies in extensive simplification. Even the financial decisions of the municipalities are not only adjusting to the necessary, but to value bounded solutions that ought to be based on pluralistic knowledge. The examining of certain field's inner opinions does not provide one with wide enough a perspective, and nor does the solemn economic measurement of cultural activities. The promoting of cultural activities based on public funding is a political value choice, where the starting point of the policy is acting as a counterbalance of the uniforming market economy. As a whole, it is then a question of policy, which benefits are difficult to measure. The measurement becomes even more difficult if pursued on financial terms only. (The Value of Culture 1996, Kangas 2003).

The second discussion of cultural policy concerns the local and regional development strategies. Lively and international cultural life has been named a part of the marketing strategy of the towns and is as such also supported by the European Union politics. Culture gains more emphasis when considered

a part of economic and environmental reform in regions and towns. Plenty examples can be found of projects where declining industry towns, towns scattered by their structure, the centres of impoverishing regions etc. were attempted to be revived by joined forces of cultural symbols and enterprise capital. (Bianchini 1993, Myerscough 1988, Valpola 1998, 71 - 106). In these projects art/culture sector is being indicated as an important employer and vital for, to give an example, the image of the town. It is also seen as a main theme of the reforming programmes of old industrial towns, as attraction of the tourist industry, and even as a factor that increases export in different fields. Political consensus and public-private partnership form a solid base for the consumption of culture, and for the growth of the line of business connected to it in these projects.

The concept of gentrification reflects the social and physical change, which is taking place in the towns' core areas. It is used to refer to processes that rest on groups, which, because of their socio-economic (e.g. relatively modest or unstable income), or socio-demographic (e.g. family with children) profile, cannot be portrayed as the 'new urban elite' of yuppies. Gentrification strictly speaking consists of the transformation of deprived inner city neighbourhoods initially inhabited by poor residents or former non-residential brown fields into new socio-economically homogeneous wealthy areas that rests on population change, that is, on moving in of well-to-do newcomers and, if the need arises, on displacement of the initial population, and on improvements to the built environment. The change, for instance, takes place with well-off residents moving to the core area of the town, and then slowly reorganizing its building structure and displacing the residents belonging to lower social classes. This phenomenon can be recognized also in the cultural projects of the towns that are intended to raise the image of the regions with cultural projects. Local governments benefit from the successfully realized cultural projects; the image of the suburb alters, wealthy consumers and tax payers may move there, and the value of the land and the estates and services increases. The area becomes expensive to live in, and lower social classes are been forced to move away. In such projects, the experts of culture maintain a strong role as directors of the economic development too.

Third, socially more equal area development is the opposite development aspiration, which can be examined and analysed as a part of the relationship between cultural policy and empowerment, or cultural policy and sustainable development. Karisto (1996) and Bardy (1998, 51 - 56), for example, under the concept of preventive social work, discuss culturally emphasized strategies in communities. When art, social work, and social policy are linked, we obtain strategies that realize the aim of cultural democracy, and produce communicative and healing communities and environments. This strategy, which is separate

from art therapy, seeks its basis in the movement called Community art. In the methods, it is central to have professional artists work with the people and with other professionals (social workers etc.) in the suburbs, or other communities. The movement developed and is still very strong in the Great Britain (Kelly 1984). It has been criticized for its too paternalistic measures.

Cultural diversity and equality are, when discussing empowerment, important elements of cultural policy. The cultural geography is being reshuffled. The increasing cultural and demographic exchange and internationalization in the 1990s have led to recognition of cultural heterogeneity. There has been a notable upsurge of new policies towards both the old and the new minorities at the national, regional, and local levels. Particular foci have been the cultural and linguistic rights of the neglected 'old' minority groups, immigration and refugee policy. A cultural policy which believes in cultural diversity is therefore not a question of categorising, refining and labelling them and us, but rather the realisation that we can all of us contribute and all of us learn in a cultural space which is being redefined.

Fourth, cultural policy has been willingly linked to the thought of sustainable development, and it has been maintained that considering culture automatically results in "soft development thinking". In addition, the discussion has been said to raise, along with the sole economic growth, such qualities as life safety, equality, human rights, and the movement of general value systems and relationships of persons in a positive or negative direction. Discussion pertaining to the relationship between sustainable development and cultural policy is in many ways problematic, and no analysis of it exists to present date. If cultural policy represents only "soft", it may result in a position where it legitimates, or softens economic, environmental, and social policy decisions, which when guided wrongly work as cement for incompatible aims. The instrumental character of culture becomes emphasized in these situations, and culture does not work as a definer of policy. We do not have adequate indicators of sustainability, and the analyses between environmental indicators and human, social, and cultural development would be valuable.

If we still are taking the first steps towards the relationship between sustainable development and cultural policy, both in research and political formulations, we are not doing so in relation to cultural industry. The *fifth* cultural political discussion again implies the emphasis of the economic importance of the cultural sector. As a profit-making, entertainment and commercial cultural industry is production based on meanings, which are changeable in the market. The commodification of culture is evident in those concrete contents that are produced under the concept of cultural industry to justify cultural policies. In such connections with cultural policy things are promoted that have to do with the position and effects of technology in the field of arts, co-

pyright questions, the emphasis on the viewpoint of cultural production and entrepreneurship, co-production treaties, the calculating of the values cultural industry contributes to the surrounding community, and the strong increase of cultural tourism. With the concept of cultural industry there is a want to combine the support organizations of entrepreneurship with public support systems, in order to produce new practices and arguments for cultural policy. Close to these discussions are discussion on creative industry, creative cities and creative classes. According to Florida (2002) cultural vitality of regions attracts creative people there. Culture plays role as an innovation creating, and as a growth base for creativity. Many projects have build with the theme of promoting creativity in contemporary culture. It has been said that creativity is as valuable in retail, education, health, government and business as in culture. The idea is that cultural sectors should become the national dynamos of the creative impulse that can serve all these areas.

New clothes?

The aim of this article was to analyse the argumentations and phases of cultural policy, and to ask whether cultural policy has new clothes and whether we can see them. Linked to this analysis is the question of power, which obtains interpretations in the way power either produces or suppresses**.** It has been characteristic of modern state to unify in the area defined by the state borders. By means of unifying, and the development of the national economy the state becomes an organization that could be used to level the social differences between regional and social groups by producing services and livelihood. In Finland for example, the role of the state has been central since Finland's independence, because to small people, own country has not been self-evident at any phase. In this setting the state developed into a centre of social activities. When the actors in the cultural life sought certain improvements, they had to ally with the state and express to it their wishes. The associations of civil society began applying for state funding, which sow an increase in their role as political actors and as fulfilling expert tasks, and which in turn provided them with a link to the politics of the state. Artist associations, as well as many other associations of cultural life for example, held such role when the systems of cultural policy developed.

In the era of the welfare state, the state was given additional new duties, in the face of the citizens' and civil society's responsibility losing some of its meaning. Public forms of cultural life's organizations were being created whose job was to support the professional forms of art, art education, and to activate the citizens towards cultural activities. National cultural policy was

the power of national and public decision-making machinery, which made decisions regarding the way the resources in cultural life were divided.

Finland has witnessed progress from nation- and welfare state projects to international integration, as well as the constant pursuit within the cultural policy system to extend the way of perceiving the contents of culture, and to find economic and production couplings**.** Cultural policy no longer refers to the national decision-makers´ power over resource division only, but also to international systems and actors on the market producing new fields of power and multiplying cultural policy.

In the 1990´s, the long line of national policy has once again come under formulation. The question is not that of a peripeteia-phase, but rather stands for a gradual change in language and vocabulary. This change can clearly be seen in the studies of Luttinen (1997), Ilmonen (1998) and Talja (1998) for instance, in which the authors analyse the cultural political speech space utilizing wide variety of empirical material including the speeches of the Ministers of culture, different document materials, the speeches of the consumers and those of cultural expert. These studies first manifest very few changes in the field of cultural policy: those active in the field were found still committed to the tradition of public enlightenment – civilization, and uniform culture. They considered art to be a value in itself and were likewise to further signify cultural policy through it. It was also clear that "conceptual maps" were under transition in both cultural policy and politics: new figures of speech and new meanings were being produced by the obscuring of familiar classifications and cultural fields, as well as by the viewpoints of economy and by internationalization (cultural industries, creative industries, creative strategies etc.). The clearest result of empirical studies such as those mentioned above, refers to the dissipating of the common and shared vision of cultural policy and its grounds.

The cultural policy's new clothes can be located in the co-existence of contradictory repertoires. This is understandable in the context of a wider social transition. The reality of the society has become more fluid, more elastic and more playful than that of the prior societies (Vattimo 1988, 66 - 68). The displacement of cultural policy is not a one-time transition followed by a static phase, but "the rascals" by means of new conceptual maps and viewpoints produce new arguments for cultural policy and so use power in the battles that take place in cultural policy, dividing the members of the fields into the able and the unable.

If new consensus on the national cultural policy's arguments were to be sought, in the face of the big story of the welfare state cultural policy, it would probably be based on the emphasis on sustainable development and civil society. Discussions of such type however, are still taking shape and are speculative.

There seem to exist no reference points in the reality, and the system does not have new tools to grapple with the challenges that accompany these changes in viewpoint and in emphasis.

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Inga Kalvina

Searching for the Impacts of Cultural Participation

Introduction

"Promoting cultural participation and enhancing cultural democratization" has been articulated by the group of cultural policy experts authoring the prominent cultural policy report *In from the Margins* as one of the four key-objectives of current cultural policy in Europe (IFM 1997). In view of this objective, the authors of the report argue that "the state has a duty to ensure that everybody has a real opportunity to benefit from cultural activity through being actively involved in the creative process and the distribution of cultural goods and services" (IFM 1997, 39).

The current appeals to promote cultural participation are rooted in international political rhetoric on sustainable development[1], which recognizes the importance of "cultural dimension" of development and has been actively advocated by the UNESCO for more than two decades now (Girard 1983, UNESCO, 1995, 1998, 2000). In sustainable development, culture is acknowledged to contain significant resources with potential for improving human well-being and quality of life (see, e.g. OCD 1996, Knutsson 1997, Kleberg 1998 and 2000). Cultural participation, in this context, is viewed as essential policy instrument for enabling every individual to access, to create and to use this developmental potential[2].

With the objective of substantiating the political claims concerning the impacts of cultural participation on development of society, several studies have been undertaken over the last decade. This article attempts to outline the main patterns of thought in the political discourse and current cultural policy research with regard to the impacts of cultural participation. The essential

premise of the argument I develop here is that the debate on how to define and measure the ”impacts” is coupled with discussion on the meaning of ”cultural participation” and assessment of this social phenomenon. Trying to glance beyond the well recognized ambiguity of cultural participation concept and the associated theoretical, as well as empirical difficulties encountered in defining and measuring this social phenomenon, in this article I concentrate my attention on the existent approaches to studying the ”impacts” of cultural participation, reviewing them and developing a framework within which these approaches can be discussed.

In the first section of this article, I review the evolution of the cultural participation concept from a policy perspective. In the subsequent section, I analyze existing research producing rationale to sustain the current cultural policy claims about the economic and non-economic impacts of cultural participation. In the final section of the article, I discuss the drawbacks of the current mainstream perspective in conceptualizing ”cultural participation” and its ”impacts”, and propose a general research framework for more comprehensive analysis of the impacts of cultural participation.

”Cultural participation” in a policy perspective

Defining a concept is not an innocent naming of a phenomenon or a simple act of ascribing meaning to a term. A concept is usually defined with a particular purpose in mind and its meaning should by no means be taken for granted. The concept of ”cultural participation” is no exception.

The common meaning of the term ”cultural participation” suggests that it refers to certain type of social behavior, namely, ”involvement”, ”engagement” or ”taking part” in particular social practices which in a particular social context are considered ”cultural”. There is no clear theoretical definition according to which the distinction between ”cultural” and ”non-cultural” practices could be ascertained (Eurostat 2000, 167). The meaning of cultural participation concept, as well as the behavior of people in ”cultural” domain is shaped by the dominant value system, which is a product of particular historical development of a country or a society - its economic, social and cultural history. Hence, the activities and forms of participation considered ”cultural” vary somewhat among the countries (ibid.).

The so-called official definitions of cultural participation concept used in cultural policy discussions on national and international level, and underlying the process of collection of cultural statistics, not only reflect the implicit cultural model of a society by setting the boundaries of ”cultural domain”, but also play an essential role in implementation and reproduction of the hierarchy of

cultural values and in shaping the identities of individuals. According to Tony Bennett, "the fields of cultural activity [...] are constructed as vehicles for [...] bringing about a reformation of habits, beliefs, values – in short, of ways of life" (Bennett 1998, 91) and therefore "the management of cultural resources in ways intended to reform ways of life remains very much a part of the active politics and policy of culture in contemporary societies" (ibid., 104).

Establishing specific policy priorities with regard to cultural participation hinges on the definition of culture and objectives of development. The political imperative of "promoting cultural participation and enhancing cultural democratization", currently set as one of the key-objectives of cultural policy in Europe (IFM 1997), is not a new concern. In fact, it has for long been an important part of democratization process in Western societies (see, e.g., Girard 1983, Kangas and Onsér-Franzén 1996) and of reforming endeavor of cultural policy-makers (see Bauman 1987, Bennett 1998, 92-106, Volkerling 1996). In cultural theory, the cultural participation and the historical evolution of the concept since the 19th century is also viewed in light of a struggle between dominant and dominated social groups over the legitimate right to appropriation, distribution and use of cultural resources. For Pierre Bourdieu (1989), cultural participation is an important vehicle in the process of social distinction, inclusion and exclusion, or what he calls *symbolic violence*. Appropriation of economic, social and cultural capital by social elites, in his theory of distinction is considered the main source of reproduction of class-hierarchies, inequality and domination in society. Zygmunt Bauman (1987, 1999), in his discussion on culture, sees it as a part of the "gardening project" of intellectuals, an enlightening project of elites aiming at maintenance and perfection of the social order and its subjects. Also, Tony Bennett regards the art and culture as resources in service of government. He describes the political concern about distribution of culture - "the concern to multiply culture's utility" - as an instrument of "reforming administrative programs" (Bennett 1998, 110) that, associated with the development of liberal forms of social management and regulation, helps "to cultivate a capacity for voluntary self-regulation in the general population" in order to achieve specific social ends (ibid.).

In cultural policy, promoting cultural participation is closely linked to such political objectives as "democratization of culture"[3] that became a part of political vocabulary in the mid-1960s, and "cultural democracy"[4], an alternative principle adopted a decade later, which replaced "the desire to ensure the widest possible dissemination of works of art and of the mind which *a minority of cultivated people* considers to be of capital importance" by "the ambition to promote the greatest possible diversity of forms of cultural expression *which are not necessarily of interest to cultivated people*" (Guy 1994, 6, original emphasis). The UNESCO conference report on cultural policy in Helsinki

in 1974 ascertained that "in the course of European history, the pursuit of a better quality of life first results in political democracy, then leads to social democracy and now expresses itself in the demand for cultural democracy" (quoted in Zuzanek 1979, 53) and, consequently, adopted a resolution on action "to insure that people at large have free, democratic access to culture and participate actively in the cultural life of society" (ibid.).

The major tension in evolution of democratic approach to cultural participation historically lies between *structural normativism* (see Bennet, 1998) - a normative approach to culture, characteristic of traditionally homogeneous European societies with patron state approach in cultural administration and the hierarchical concept of "culture" narrowly defined as referring to intellectual, creative artistic and expressive activities - on one extreme; and on the other - the egalitarian *cultural relativism* ideology of pluralistic multicultural post-modern societies (see Bauman, 1992, 1999) with *laissez faire* approach in state cultural policy and non-hierarchical, value-neutral understanding of "culture". Hence, finding a reasonable balance between those two opposites has been a major task of cultural policy rhetoric over the last century, which has required gradual rejection of paternalistic imposition of single value hierarchy and canonical cultural, artistic or aesthetic standard by one group of individuals (social-intellectual elite or a class of cultural experts) upon another (the public or masses) without, at the same time, falling into cultural anomie or nihilism, proclaiming "everything is culture" and "anything goes". This task is becoming increasingly complex in today's individualistic and fast changing social contexts.

Within the current frame of political discourse and action in the field of culture set by a broadened, more anthropological and seemingly value-neutral definition of culture[5], the appeal for "enhancing cultural democracy" provides legitimate ground to argue also in favor of an extended definition of "cultural participation", which requires recognition of an increasing variety of cultural practices and new forms of engagement (McGuigan 2001). With regard to the four key-objectives of the current cultural policy[6] (IFM 1997, 35-40), the extended concept of culture invites reconsideration of the role of the state in guaranteeing respect for the diversity of the ways in which individuals choose to exercise their cultural rights (Niec 1998), and in developing mechanisms which allow individuals' active involvement in cultural decision-making process (Parekh 1998, Bennett and Mercer 1998, Watanabe 1998).

Over two centuries long history and political importance of cultural participation explain the existence of considerable body of literature concerning people's engagement with culture. Depending on the objectives and focus of the studies, a number of other terms, such as "arts participation", "involvement in arts and culture", "participation in cultural activities", "participation in

cultural life" or "attendance and cultural consumption" have been employed to refer to this social phenomenon currently termed "cultural participation". Modifications in the "outfit" of the phenomenon both in theoretical studies and policy documents are, to a great extent, reflection of changing cultural policy rhetoric regarding the notion of culture and function of cultural participation. Yet, in a quick glance at the relevant literature, it becomes evident that the interest in people's involvement with culture, in most studies, still concerns rather narrow range of institutionalized cultural practices. Even in the sources where the concept of "cultural participation" is used, its meaning remains limited to traditional notion of fine- and performing arts, attendance at cultural establishments, consumption of so-called cultural products and use of cultural services.

Research on the "Impacts" of cultural participation

The research dealing with phenomenon of cultural participation can roughly be split into three study types: descriptive, motivational, and impact studies. The descriptive type of literature comprises a steadily growing body of cultural statistics, comprising mainly survey and attendance data gathered by the ministries responsible for cultural affairs, national and international statistical offices and arts institutions[7]. The motivational type of literature encompasses both theoretical and empirical studies dealing with economic, social and psychological factors affecting individuals' involvement in cultural life, and focuses on finding the explanations of the individual behavior[8]. The impact studies, instead, essentially aim at ascertaining and measuring different social-economic effects, impacts and benefits produced by cultural participation[9].

It is in the research on the impacts of cultural participation that the political arguments for recognition of the role of culture in development are most commonly sought. The interest in ascertaining the impacts of cultural participation are tightly bound to a political concern about the effective use of public resources in the cultural field. The criteria for both the resource allocation and the assessment of outcomes associated with use of those resources are bound to specific cultural policy priorities shaped by political rhetoric concerning broad developmental objectives. Unsurprisingly, the studies on the impacts of cultural participation often contain considerable political bias and strong aspirations to generate policy-relevant empirical knowledge within the framework set by claims of the major cultural policy texts (see OCD 1996, IFM 1997, UNESCO 1998).

The Council of Europe report *In from the Margins* was the international cultural policy document openly recognizing that "arts and culture add to the

sum of human knowledge and understanding; produce certain economic and social outcomes; and are sources of human capital and empowerment and entitlement" (IFM 1997, 217). In this report, an attempt was made to present a host of potential impacts, classifying them as direct and indirect economic, social and ideological/political. In this classification the "economic impacts", were thought of as arising from the "commercial *merchandising of works of art*"; "social impacts" were seen in "the *different ways people orient themselves to, and consume, cultural products*"; and "ideological and political impacts" appear as "*specific positive or negative interpretations of the "human condition" which are attached to the arts and culture or extracted from them*" (ibid., original emphasis). The "impacts" in this report were defined not merely as "final and definitive outcomes", but rather as "general contexts which give opportunities to individuals and groups and help to shape their capacities" (ibid.). Since this fairly general distinction and first tentative definition of "impacts", other interested agencies have undertaken the task of ascertaining the significant difference made by cultural field, in general, and cultural participation, in particular, to overall development of contemporary society.

Although recently attracting more and more attention of researchers and policy-makers, the current interest in "impacts" can be recognized as natural continuation of the "fighting back" project, started in the 1980s, in defense of the cultural field against crude economic rationalism and cuts in state funding for the arts. For more than two decades now, the cost-effectiveness of the cultural field, i.e., the positive impacts that the arts and culture produces on the economic and/or social level has dominated cultural policy debate, giving birth to so-called *instrumental cultural policy* perspective[10] (Vestheim 1994, see also Towse and Khakee 1992, Bianchini and Parkinson 1993, O'Hagan 1998, Throsby 2001). This perspective founds justification for public and private investment in cultural field on the argument that it improves the economic performance on local and national level and/or provides the unique means for urban regeneration and alleviation of significant social problems by fighting social disadvantage, social exclusion and fragmentation of identities.

The assessment of the politically-relevant impacts (with explicit emphasis on those considered "positive") has, thus, become an important part in the political process of legitimization of cultural field. The instrumental perspective receives criticisms for regarding culture merely as a tool for social-economic development, while neglecting the aesthetic value and intrinsic role of culture as an end in itself (see, e.g., Vestheim 1994, Bennett 1995, Cantell 1998, McGuigan 2001, Mitchell 2003). In case of failing to provide the arguments regarding the cost-effectiveness of cultural sector in society, such perspective risks to endanger the public support for culture (see, Bennett 1995). Moreover, "if policy making and planning in the cultural sector become dominated by

purposive rationality alone, there is a real danger that politics in this field loses its creative and critical dimension" (Vestheim 1994, 69). In spite of that, the instrumental approach in search of the efficiency-based criteria in settling about the priorities for resource allocation in the field of culture appears becoming a widespread characteristic of current cultural policy (see Kangas 1999). The search for empirical evidence that would not only prove the resource allocation for culture to be effective and beneficial for the society, but would also increase legitimacy of the established policy objectives and provide assistance in further decision-making, has currently become an issue of special interest.

From the cultural policy perspective, there are two broad types of outcomes or impacts associated with individuals' engagement in culture - the economic and the non-economic. This dichotomous division is to a large extent arbitrary and, as noted by Patricia Wise, is due to the tension between two dominant cultural policy directions that "frequently sit together" but in an uneasy relationship: one is "cultural policy for economic development", related to questions of economic globalization, postindustrial urban redevelopment and fostering the role of the creative industries; and the other is "cultural policy for social development" primarily interested in the "human" uses of culture, globalization of culture and promotion of national, regional and local cultures understood as part of identity formation (Wise 2002, 572).

In accordance with the two narratives of the instrumental cultural policy perspective, the impacts for further discussion in this article are also classified as economic and non-economic. Although in the literature regarding social and individual outcomes produced by the field of culture, the impacts are discussed in variety of terms, in this article I use the "impacts of cultural participation" as an umbrella notion, embracing the variety of studies engaged in assertion of the role and value of the cultural field in society.

Economic Impacts

Due to the situation of growing uncertainty about future levels of public expenditure over the last couple of decades, the cultural sector has been searching for solid arguments against further reductions in funding. In the 1980s and 1990s, emphasizing the economic returns of culture was seen as the opportunity for more convincing arguments in favor of allocation of public resources in the field (Belfiore 2002, 95, see also Cantell 1998, 98, Throsby 2001, Mitchell 2003, 446). "Economic impact" is an indicator of enduring interest, bound to attempt to imply that the value added by the cultural sector would have not been created in the economy if the cultural sector was not there (Stanley 2002, 9).

The first attempt in ascertaining the instrumental value of cultural field was made by cultural economics that regarded arts and culture as a factor of production. The cultural sector thus was increasingly perceived as a sub-sector of economy and its economic potential gained increasing consideration in the debates on regional development and urban regeneration, tourism promotion, service industry development, business investment and increase of employment (see, e.g., Myerscough 1988, Rodgers 1989, Bianchini and Parkinson 1993, Towse and Khakee 1992, Throsby 1994, Peacock and Rizzo 1994, Dziembowska-Kowalska and Funck 1999, Bryan and Hill 2000).

In an enlightening discussion on measuring the value of the arts in economic terms, Trine Bille Hansen distinguishes between three methods in evaluating economic importance of culture: a short-term economic analysis, in which the arts' contribution to consumption, income, employment and balance of payments is calculated; a long-term economic analysis, in which the creative processes are viewed as a long-term investment in the growth of society; and an analysis in which public's willingness to pay is used to try to evaluate the visible positive impacts on the arts (Hansen 1995, 318). The critics of the purely economic perspective on culture (see, e.g., Vogel 1986, Hughes 1989, Griffiths 1993, Hansen 1995, Klamer 1996, Throsby 2001), however, point out that cultural economic approaches are limited to a rather narrow financial perspective on impacts (Coalter 2001, Frey 2000). They argue that using the GDP accounted for by the cultural sector as a measure of the benefit created by the sector is therefore incorrect and that "it distracts attention from the true benefits" created by the sector (Stanley 2002, 9). The "economic frameworks are unable to measure the dollar value of social cohesion, count the monetary returns from people realizing their potential or the productivity gains associated with self determination" (Williams 1997, 22). Such economic impacts of cultural field as increasing cultural consumption, creating jobs, increasing income or attracting tourists, should be seen as "extra gains", not the real aim of cultural activities (Hansen 1995, 318). In fact, the arts are subsidized mainly for cultural and social reasons and the instrumental attitude to the arts promoted by economic evaluation, fails to take into account *the purpose* of the cultural activities which, as Hansen argues, is other than producing economic returns (see also Hutchinson 1990). Thus, analyzing the impacts of arts in relation to the side-effects, a notably incorrect picture of the role of culture in development of a society is obtained: "if one wants to promote economic development, there is nothing that says one must invest in the arts" (Hansen 1995, 316). Consequently, he argues, it is necessary to develop a different perspective that would concern the long-term contributions of arts to development, for instance, the impact of the arts on innovation and creativity; and the impact of the arts on the population's quality of life: "the quality of

life, identity and creativity of the population are values that benefit not only individual consumer of the arts, but the whole society" (ibid.).

Non-Economic Impacts

Despite the range of sound criticisms, studies on the economic impacts of arts carried out in the 1980s and 1990s have lasting influence over cultural policy debates. However, the presently growing interest in "non-economic impacts" produced by the cultural field represents a shift of the focus towards social rather than economic considerations in cultural policy. The direct and indirect contributions of the cultural participation to tackling social problems and improving people's quality of life are currently identified as an alternative source of arguments to justify the public investment in the field. The non-economic, otherwise named "social" impacts or benefits are discussed in the light of quality of life concept understood as "a combination of personal, economic, environmental and social life options" (Mercer 2002, 13), and from the instrumental cultural policy perspective, are viewed as a new basis for assertion of the role of culture in development and in promoting social change (see Cantell 1998, Hall and Robertson 2001).

The non-economic impacts of cultural participation are currently complying with the widespread "philosophy of social inclusion" (Belfiore 2002). According to this philosophy, arts organizations and the subsidized providers of cultural goods and services in particular, are increasingly viewed as agents of social change. The new focus of cultural policy in assessment of the impacts now lies on the cultural and social dynamics of inclusion, with the emphasis on the positive role that cultural participation can play in alleviating the symptoms of exclusion (ibid.) and regarding it as a "path of engagement" to other forms of civic participation (Walker et. al. 2002).

Although research on the non-economic impacts of individuals' involvement with culture is relatively recent (Coalter 2001, 1-2), it is claimed that the widespread nature of cultural participation indicates its potential to contribute to a range of social issues. Cultural participation is believed to enhance the community development (see, Jermyn 2001) and provide a remedy for some social ills by developing sense of community and civic identity (Hall and Robertson 2001). It is said to provide a vehicle for socially marginal groups to articulate their concerns, facilitating social interaction and, thus, having potential to reduce social isolation. It is believed to strengthen social cohesion and integration, and to permit the development of both individual and collective organizational capacities (Coalter 2001, Jermyn 2001, see also Kay and Watt 2000, Jeannotte 2002, Walker et al. 2002).

The present shift in social and urban policy - from the focus on merely economic issues and investment in infrastructures to a concern with people, their social and psychological well-being - raises new objectives for definition and assessment of the impacts of cultural participation. ”Building communities”, ”increasing social and cultural capital”, ”developing human capital”, ”activating social change” and ”enhancing well-being” (Williams 1997) are some of the broad non-economic outcomes claimed resulting from individuals' involvement with culture (Mercer 2002). The claims that cultural activities ”help to enrich the quality of people's lives”, ”bring people together”, ”give sense of national identity”, and ”enable individuals to express themselves creatively” are becoming increasingly accepted (see Ministry of Cultural Affairs of New Zealand 1997 a, b, c) and are slowly, but steadily rising the interest of researchers.

”There is a huge amount of empirical evidence which shows the difference the arts make to individuals and communities. And yet there is little serious evaluation [...] because these social impacts are often long-term and difficult to quantify” (Galloway 1995 quoted in Coalter 2001, 2). It has also been acknowledged that because the non-economic outcomes of engagement with culture on the community and the individual levels are not necessarily direct and are mainly long-term, it is not easy at all to identify indicators that would enable researchers to capture these specific impacts as related to cultural participation. Just because a particular arts project was carried out with success from the point of view of the institution in charge, having had high attendance rates or good critiques in the local newspaper, yet it can not be said with certainty that the project has yielded any social or individual benefits. Yet, the provision of a certain kind of cultural products and services *per se* does not necessarily imply positive social and individual outcomes and it is especially difficult to determine the particular positive impacts produced by a given project or activity.

”Although the *theoretical potential* of the contribution of the arts to a range of social and community issues is clear, there is an urgent need for clearer statements of desired *outcomes* and more systematic monitoring of processes and outcomes” (Coalter 2001, vii, original emphasis). Recently, a number of interested agencies have undertaken the efforts of developing framework for research focusing on assessment of, I would like to emphasise, the *desired* strategic outcomes of people's involvement with culture (e.g. Matarasso 1997, Williams 1997, Matarasso 2001, Mercer 2002)

One such empirical research project of recognized political importance frequently cited and referred to as a source of reliable evidence concerning social impacts of cultural participation was carried out in 1995-97 by the independent research organization *Comedia*, coordinated by François Matarasso. It is the

first - and so far the only - politically important attempt to develop methodology for the assessment of social impacts of participatory arts programs (Merli 2002). Recognizing that cultural participation is the area of cultural field most widely claimed to support personal and community development (Matarasso 1997, iii), this study was undertaken with the aim to add dimension to existing economic and aesthetic rationales for the arts.

In the report on the results of the study - *Use or Ornament* - the list of 50 social impacts of participation in the arts was presented with suggestion that it may further serve as a menu from which the social benefits can be selected for an assessment of the impacts of participation in particular cultural activities and projects (ibid., 91). Personal development, social cohesion, community empowerment and self-determination, local image and identity, imagination and vision, as well as health and well-being are the broad categories into which assessed impacts of participation were divided. Noteworthy, the project spelt out the need for "a more balanced understanding of the role and worth of the arts in our society – one which simultaneously embraces their aesthetic, cultural, economic and social values, and allows for the different judgments inevitable in a pluralist society" (Matarasso 1997, 3).

The most important contribution of this study, with regard to the main purpose of this article, is that it aimed at encouraging the use of a participant-oriented perspective on the impacts of people's involvement in cultural initiatives. The study argued for the need to involve all "stakeholders" in the definition and measurement of outcomes (Matarasso 1996 in Coalter 2001), with ownership of the measurement process residing "with those for whom the activity exists" (Lingayah et al. 1996 in Coalter 2001). However, Matarasso's research project did not succeed in achieving this objective and has been criticized for being flawed in its design, execution and conceptual basis (see, Merli 2002).

It is worth noting that, although the promoters of the recent research initiatives regarding the social impacts of cultural participation express the rhetorical interest in how cultural participation "directly adds value to" or "creates meaning in people's life" (Matarasso 1997), as well as how cultural resources are actually used in the construction of values, identities and *functionings*[11] in individuals' lives (Mercer 2002) and recognize that the views of participants about how their own lives have changed are pre-eminent for assessing impacts of cultural participation (Matarasso 1997), the work on establishing reliable indicators for assessment of these outcomes remains to be done. Moreover, one of the major problems of research into the social impact of participation in arts activities is that, as yet, it has no strong theoretical grounding (Merli 2002). Indeed, the rhetoric of cultural policy abundantly proclaims "the fact" that "culture contributes to the creation of values and social cohesion" and is, therefore, a sector of policy interest beyond its mere economic contribution

(Stanley 2002, 8). Yet, as Paola Merli has pointed out, the argument that cultural participation "not only *can,* but indeed *does"* have social effects (which therefore just need to be measured) is far from being substantiated. Besides, it cannot be taken for granted that any kind of participatory arts activity in any kind of community and culture should have identical social impacts. Differences are expected to exist and more knowledge is needed (Merli 2002, 115).

Towards a Framework for Research on Cultural Participation and its Impacts

The research producing rationale with regard to economic and non-economic impacts of cultural participation discussed in the previous section of this article presents limitations on two levels: first one concerning the type of phenomena taken as an indicator of people's engagement with culture, and second one regarding the definitional vantage point adopted[12]. In this section of the article I address these limitations and propose a framework for more comprehensive discussion on cultural participation and its impacts.

Cultural Participation

With regard to the type of phenomena taken as an indicator of people's engagement with culture, the existing studies, although differing in their aims and perspectives, have an important characteristic in common: they study "cultural participation" via *objective* phenomena, that is, by analyzing individuals' engagement in particular types of activities that are taking place in certain settings. This conceptualization of cultural participation is more or less explicitly expressed in the official definitions underlying cultural policy discourse and, to a large extent, is taken for granted. However, people's involvement with culture could also be studied via *subjective* phenomena, such as the occurrence of certain psychological states or meaningful experiences. While the former approach may well succeed in providing a descriptive knowledge with regard to observable aspects of people's engagement with culture, the latter could contribute to the currently limited understanding of the meaning of such engagement.

Another limitation of the existing studies has to do with the *definitional vantage point*, i.e., the perspective adopted by the researcher when studying the phenomenon of cultural participation. The definitional vantage point can be *external* or *internal* to the individual being studied. Hence, regardless of the

type of phenomena considered ”cultural participation”, the distinction between ”cultural” and ”non-cultural” can be based on the viewpoint of the researcher (*external* vantage point) or on that of the person being studied (*internal* vantage point). The essential difference between these two perspectives, thus, lies with the position they favor in answering the polemic question of who is entitled to make the distinction between ”cultural” and ”non-cultural” activities and forms of participation. Does the legitimate right in setting the framework for the assessment of cultural participation lies with the class of cultural ”experts” - researchers, professionals of arts institutions, public bodies, and policy-makers advocating for the existence and role of public cultural policy, or does it rather lies with the ”participants” - individuals actually engaged in their cultural practices and experiences on daily bases.

The various research approaches to studying cultural participation could, thus, be summarized in the following table (Table 1):

In the current research, carried out exclusively from an *external* vantage point, the definition of ”cultural” is not entirely impartial, but is believed to reflect a socially shared notion of ”cultural participation” that is independent from a variety of notions eventually held by the individuals studied. However,

		Definitional Vantage Point	
		External	**Internal**
Type of Phenomena	**Objective**	What activities and forms of participation are considered “cultural” is determined by the researcher.	What activities and forms of participation are considered “cultural” is determined by the participant.
	Subjective	What psychological states or experiences are regarded to as “cultural” is determined by the researcher.	What psychological states or experiences are regarded to as “cultural” is determined by the participant.

Table 1 Research Approaches to Studying ”Cultural Participation”

taking into consideration the fact that conceptualization of "cultural participation" bears significant influence on how empirical assessment and gathering of policy-relevant knowledge regarding people's involvement with culture is carried out, it makes sense to problematize the limitations of the mainstream policy-focused perspective. Although the notion of "cultural participation" held by a participant may, to a certain extent, overlap with the socially constructed meaning of the concept, there is yet no reason to take it for granted that these meanings, even for members of the same culture, would fully coincide. Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that "people define their own participation in arts and culture more broadly than arts and cultural institutions traditionally have" (Walker et. al. 2002, 60) and that what counts as "cultural participation" for the participants may reflect, but may not necessarily be a product of institutional or statistical classification (Mercer 2002). Yet, despite the broadened definition of culture and rhetoric claims to free the concept from traditional value hierarchies, the mainstream approach to gathering policy-relevant data not only remains fundamentally conservative and paternalistic, but also provides an incomplete picture of the phenomenon. The exclusive use of an *external* perspective in defining "cultural participation" leads to even more problematic results, when it comes to the assessment of its impacts.

Impacts of Cultural Participation

Disregarding the type of phenomena used in conceptualizing "cultural participation", the impacts of people's involvement with culture can also be studied from the two distinct definitional vantage points. From the *external* definitional perspective, the impacts of cultural participation are determined by the researcher who, according to the established political goals, decides what the relevant impacts of cultural participation could and should be. As revealed by the analysis in the previous sections, the *external* perspective on impacts, widely used in the existing studies, aims at sustaining the claims of instrumental cultural policy concerning the role and value of culture. Yet, the impacts of people's involvement with culture could also be studied from an *internal* perspective.

The *internal* definitional perspective aims at understanding the role of cultural participation from the point of view of participants, i.e., leaving it with the people studied to decide what the impacts of their involvement with culture are. Regardless of whether cultural participation is seen as a set of *objective* or *subjective* phenomena, a study adopting the *internal* perspective, thus, would attribute the central role in defining the "index" of both economic and non-economic impacts of cultural participation to the individuals actually

engaged in cultural practices. The central question involved in conceptualizing and measuring "impacts" of cultural participation is, hence, similar to that of conceptualizing "cultural participation": who is entitled to define the outcomes of people's involvement with culture – a cultural policy expert or a participant?

Despite the methodological difficulties involved, the use of the *internal* definitional vantage point regarding the impacts would not only offer much needed empirically grounded evidence for sustaining the current political claims, but also, and not less importantly, would allow the researchers to obtain a deeper understanding regarding the positive impacts and the eventually relevant yet not studied negative consequences or side effects of cultural participation.

A Framework

Without neglecting the fact that the current policy-relevant studies are important initiatives and demonstrate rhetorical concern about those involved in the arts projects under investigation, the impacts of cultural participation in these studies are assessed only from an *external* vantage point and only with regard to cultural participation as an *objective* phenomenon. These studies analyze participation in officially recognized cultural activities and forms of participation and assess their impacts on both the individual and the community level by validating an index of potential benefits established *a priori* by the researcher.

From the *external* vantage point, cultural participation in these studies is viewed as an important means for achieving such political goals as increasing human, social and cultural capital, promoting social cohesion and community development, fostering economic growth and urban re-generation – in short, as a means for producing a variety of impacts that benefit all the society (Jermyn 2001). At the individual level, in particular, the engagement with culture is believed to produce such impacts as opening the opportunities for self discovery, providing educational advantages that over the time may promote professional growth, encouraging creative ways of expressing one's existence, reducing stress and giving pleasure, providing sense of fulfillment, increasing confidence and self-esteem, as well as developing intrinsic motivation and producing positive changes in self-efficacy and skill attainment (Riley 2000). Yet, how much do we actually know about the meaning of all these (allegedly) positive impacts in the life of an individual? What is the relative importance that the individual attributes to them? Are these benefits exclusive to involvement in cultural activities? If not, why then an individual chooses to engage with culture although opportunities for taking part in other leisure activities abound?

What is it about the cultural activities that attracts and incites the individual to participate, and what is the function of these activities in people's lives? What are the individual experiences regarding the capabilities and resources enhanced by cultural participation and how are they further employed by individuals in their everyday life? These and many other questions with regard to how cultural participation is experienced and its impacts assessed by the participant remain unanswered by the existing policy-relevant studies.

In addition to being inadequate for providing explanations with regard to the questions referred above, the critical problem in using the *external* definitional vantage point in defining and assessing the impacts of cultural participation for cultural policy purposes is that it undemocratically imposes certain (dominant) value structures, thus, contradicting another key-objective of cultural policy – to promote cultural diversity – grounded on appreciation of and respect for diversity of values and practices in cultural field. Thus, using *external* perspective with regard to the impacts of cultural participation the researchers grant themselves the legitimacy to be the ones to know the best "what is good for people", what their "deep sources of enjoyment" (Matarasso 1997 68) should be, and how such sources should be provided. They know what levels of "personal development" and "confidence" (Matarasso 1997, 14) people should possess and what should be done in order to raise

		Definitional Vantage Point Regarding Impacts	
		External	**Internal**
Definitional Vantage Point Regarding Cultural Participation	**External**	What constitutes cultural participation and what are its impacts is determined by the researcher	What constitutes cultural participation is defined by the researcher, while its impacts are determined by the participant
	Internal	What constitutes cultural participation is defined by the participant while its impacts are determined by the researcher	What constitutes cultural participation and what are its impacts is determined by the participant

them. They even claim that people should ”widen their horizons” (Matarasso 1997, 16) and explain how this should be accomplished. Such a commitment to changing people’s ideas and behavior does not solve problems because it leaves the structural conditions of deprivation untouched” (Merli 2002, 113). Therefore, in the table below (see Table 2), I suggest four distinct research approaches worth considering, if the currently limited mainstream perspective is to be replaced with a more truthful and comprehensive understanding of the impacts of cultural participation. The framework presented here is obtained by cross-tabulation of the *external*, policy-focused and the *internal*, participant-focused perspectives with regard to conceptualization of ”cultural participation” and its ”impacts”.

Evidently, since the approaches are based on two contrasting logics of argumentation – deductive logic when the *external* definitional vantage point is favored and inductive when the *internal* one is preferred - the distinct types of knowledge are obtained. Whereas from the *external* perspective, the assessment of impacts implies the use of indicators selected by the researcher to represent the ”positive outcomes”, ”benefits” or ”impacts” produced by cultural participation officially defined, from the *internal* one, the appraisal of the ”impacts” related to individuals’ engagement with culture is instead rooted in participants’ cognitive perspective, i.e., individuals’ perceptions and judgments regarding both what counts as ”cultural” participation, and the outcomes of this engagement.

The approaches adopting the *internal* perspective on both cultural participation and its impacts would, thus, enrich policy-relevant knowledge and make more sensible the assessment of social and personal consequences of peoples’ involvement with culture. It would, at the same time, add the currently lacking democratic dimension to the process of collection and selection of policy-relevant empirical information.

FINAL REMARKS

The core purpose of the analysis in this article was to discuss the need to broaden the framework for research and political discussion on the impacts of cultural participation. Sketching some clearly observable discrepancies between the current cultural policy discourse and the main assumptions sustaining methodological tools actually employed in assessment of the impacts of cultural participation, the article proposes a classification of the already existent and the potential research approaches to conceptualizing and assessing cultural participation and its impacts.

The analysis in this article reveals that, despite the rhetorical recognition granted to the importance of including into the empirical assessment of the impacts of cultural participation the perspectives and experiences of participants – the individuals actually engaged in cultural practices studied, the *internal*, participant-focused perspective remains largely neglected by the studies aiming at providing policy-relevant empirical assessment. Likewise, the acknowledgment of the need to extend the concept of cultural participation so that it would embrace the entire scope of social practices regarded "cultural" by its participants, has not so far taken shape of consequent stance in gathering empirical knowledge concerning this social phenomenon.

Moreover, in the face of the political discourse on cultural democratization, cultural citizenship, and the role of culture in improving quality of life, the research aiming at policy-relevance, has not as yet bothered to grant the participants a genuine opportunity to partake in defining "cultural participation" or in determining its social and individual "impacts". The participants are thus denied any involvement in the decision-making process as regards cultural practices deserving public support, since the approaches using the *internal* definitional vantage point have not hitherto been integrated in developing policy arguments and decision criteria.

Even if we admit, for a while, that the new criteria for resource allocation in cultural field should be based on efficiency in promoting broad objectives of sustainable development, the case that investment in the arts actually *does* produce positive social impacts still has to be proved convincingly. It remains to be empirically demonstrated that investment in arts can make a *significant* contribution to the quality of life, in fact, more so than investment in other areas of public and social policy (Belfiore 2002, 104). Yet, in order to legitimately declare that cultural participation does have positive impacts on the life of its participants, it is necessary to inquire, first of all, about the meaning of cultural practices from the perspective of the participants: what individuals aspire when they participate in "cultural" rather than any other social practices, what are the outcomes of this involvement and what is the relative weight that individuals attribute to these outcomes in tackling important issues of their quality of life.

For the time being, however, it appears that "the interests of researcher are far from compatible with the interests of the researched. On the contrary, in these circumstances the development of certain types of knowledge may (and often does) have the effect of reinforcing domination and subordination and hence opposing a general emancipation" (Sayer 1992 quoted in Merli 2002, 113).

Until the knowledge generated by the studies using an *internal* definitional vantage point becomes rightfully integrated in construction of political argu-

ments and, more importantly, in policy decision-making - thus correcting the currently one-sided picture on the impacts of cultural participation - the claims for the role and the need to promote cultural participation based on the impacts it produces remain, at their best, a self-fulfilling prophecy rather distortedly reflecting the reality. ”Without knowing what the real, specific effects of the arts are, and in which circumstances they occur, the researchers are only going to measure what they would like to be there…” (Merli 2002, 115).

Notes

[1] The term *sustainable development*, adopted into international political discourse by the UNESCO during the Decade of Culture and the deliberations of the World Commission on Culture and Development, embraces ”an interpretation of ”economic development” that supersedes former notions of economic growth measured only in terms of increases in per capital GDP, and replaces it with the wider concept of ”human development”, focused on the individual as both the instrument and the object of development, and measured by a variety of indicators of quality of life and standards of living that go well beyond measuring simply material progress” (Throsby 1997, 8). With regard to culture, development is understood as a process of ”enlarging human choices” (see also Sen 1990). Culture both as an instrument and as a constituent element of the process of human development is to be considered central to constructions of human welfare.

[2] In the context of development, where *physical, human* and *natural capital* play an important part in construction of human welfare, a distinct role of *cultural capital* is recognized. Therefore, the equity of access to cultural capital is considered ”just as important as equity in the integrational distribution of benefits from any other sort of capital” (Throsby 1997, 15).

[3] ”Democratization of culture” usually involves ”broadening of the public’s access to the arts and culture; elimination of social and economic barriers which make it difficult for certain groups in society to participate in culture; establishment of people’s *right* to culture as one of the basic human rights; more democratic organization of cultural life; and perhaps provision of education for the arts” (Zuzanek 1979, 54). It involves a lessening of the distance between intellectual elite groups and the other sectors of society and is based on assumption that culture, particularly the traditional ”high” culture in realms of literature, drama, music and fine arts is beneficial to everyone and that it constitutes common good, ”needed” by the whole society, whether or not the majority of the people are aware of it. Democratization of culture is, thus, a policy of *popularization*, ”the label applied to the attempts made over many years by local national and international agencies to spread to increasingly

wider sections of the population knowledge and enjoyment of the good things which constitute "culture"" (Mennell 1979, p. 15-16).

4 "Cultural democracy" is a policy of *populism* (Mennell 1979, 16); an alternative principle which became a part of political vocabulary in the early 1970s as a substitute for the political label of "democratization of culture". It implies as a broad aim of policy "the promotion among the mass of the people of active use and development of their native culture, of experience and practice of the arts according to their own conception, and the evolution of life-styles of their own choice" (Simpson 1976 cited in Mennell 1979, 16). It is a label associated with the ideology of decentralization defending the need to mobilize people and increase their participation in the cultural life of the region and local community (Vestheim 1994, 65).

5 "In its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters but also modes of life, the fundamentals of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs…" (UNESCO 1998, 1). This broadened definition of culture proposed by the UNESCO, was ratified at the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in Stockholm, Sweden, 30 March – 2 April, 1998.

6 The four key-objectives of cultural policy are: promoting cultural identity; promoting cultural diversity; promoting creativity; and promoting participation (IFM 1997, 37-40)

7 For representative examples of *descriptive* type of literature see, for instance, Council of Europe (Country Reports of the European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews); National Endowment for the Arts (e.g., Research Division Repots No. 26, 27, 31, 32, 35, 39); Ministry of Cultural Affairs of New Zealand 1997; Eurostat 2002. For discussion on classification of descriptive studies and methodological problems involved see, e.g., McCarthy and Jinnett 2001, Eurostat 2000.

8 To *motivational* type of literature belong economic approaches explaining cultural participation within the framework of general theory of consumer behavior, highlighting the role that practical factors, such as price, income, information and leisure alternatives play in individuals participation decisions (see, e.g., Heilbrun and Gray 1993, Pine and Gilmore 1999) and sociological approaches focusing on (re)distribution of cultural resources in society and on the influence of leisure constrains and access, as well as that of socio-demographic correlates, such as education, family background, gender or ethnicity on participation (see, e.g., Bourdeu et al. 1991, DiMaggio and Ostrower 1990, Putnam 2000, Stebbins 1992). Interdisciplinary work in leisure studies, which regards cultural participation as one of the many types of leisure pursuits and offers some important conceptual insights into the social, economic and psychological factors that influence individuals' motivations and participation

decisions (see, e.g., Iso-Ahola 1980, Mannell and Kleiber 1997, Pronovost 1998, Driver et al. 1999), as well as what McCarthy and Jinnett (2001) name *practitioner's literature*, the policy-relevant studies addressing the concerns of arts institutions in audience-development - broadening, deepening and diversifying the audiences (see also Yoshitomi 2000, Connolly and Caddy 2001, Walker et al. 2002) may be said to belong to this type of literature.

[9] The *impact* literature comprises variety of studies that aim at evaluating the outcomes of the particular arts projects and community initiatives, mainly on local and regional level (see, e.g., McArthur et al. 1996, Stone et al. 1997, 1998, Matarasso 1997, Stevens 1998, Cantell 1998, Walker et al. 2002). Some research in the field of health and education also is interested in ascertaining variety of positive effects that arise from people's engagement in arts, for instance, in health-care environments (HDA 1999; Campbell et al., 1999, Staricoff et al. 2001) or in school curricula (Randson 1996, Riley 2000 and 2002, Dumais 2002)

[10] "Instrumental cultural policy can be said to mean *to use cultural venues and cultural investments as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas*. [..] The instrumental aspect lies in emphasizing culture and cultural venture as a means, not an end in itself." (Vestheim 1994, 65, original emphasis) The basic problem with instrumental cultural policy is that intentionally or unintentionally, it forces from above a standardized picture of "the good life" (ibid.,66).

[11] "Functioning" is a category developed by Amartya Sen in order to take a distance from *utilitarian*, GDP or commodity-based views and systems of calculation of quality of life (Mercer 2002, 32). A "functioning" according to Sen is "an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be [..] For example, bicycling has to be distinguished from possessing a bike. It has to be distinguished also from the happiness generated by the functioning, for example, actual cycling around must not be identified with the pleasure obtained from that act" (Sen 1999,7 quoted in Mercer 2002, 32).

[12] The classification of the approaches to studying cultural participation and its impacts proposed hereafter was developed adapting the typology of research approaches to defining leisure elaborated by Roger C. Mannell and Douglas A. Kleiber (1997, 53-59).

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Anita Kangas

The Third Sector and Cultural Policy

The third sector, as a concept, has numerous meanings. It developed in the field between the state, the market and the civil society, wherein different contents have been attributed to it. Variety of movements and associations, officials and administrative organs of the state, production alternatives, ideas struggles, etc. have participated in the development of the third sector and in the struggle regarding the principles of its formation. Thus, as a concept, the third sector is an agreement - a construction produced by politicians, planners and researchers. It situates itself between the public and the private sector, and it includes activities of associations, cooperative societies, communities, networks and the grass roots level. Researchers have based their definitions thereof on the idea of an alternative and have emphasized the elasticity of the concept. Anttonen and Sipilä (1992, 448) speak of the third sector as of an intermediate or, when concerning social work, as of an alternative social work charged with the various expectations of the 1980s and 1990s. The third sector is intertwined with the informal sector - family members, relatives, neighbours, self-help groups, projects, etc. – as well as with the associations and volunteer work. It can be seen as an independent sector with new innovations and modes of action.

Siisiäinen (2000, 7-36) criticises the attempts of constructing a clearly conceptual definition of the third sector, claiming that the concept of the third sector is useful both for nominating and methodological approaches and that the boundaries and relations between the State, the Market and Production Sectors, and the Civil Society can be analysed as changeable and conditional creations. The third sector, as a homogeneous sector and as an actor, can not be allocated a distinct position, although it subsumes various groups of agents with rationalities of their own. In outlining the common features of the actors, a so-called remainder definition can be applied. According to Heiskanen (2002, 141-185), ”the third sector includes all economic activity that is not

profit-seeking business activity created or maintained by the public sector, free entrepreneurship or household activity". With these further definitions in mind, the economic basis of the third sector - denoting the principles and judicial form of activities rather than mere income - can be either non-profit business activity or volunteer work, with the actors judicially organised into associations, foundations or cooperatives.

The development of the third sector is often characterized as a realization of qualities such as altruism, solidarity, communality and volunteering. It can, however, also be seen as an interest-bound processes of exchange. Within social subsystems, such processes occur both horizontally, in interactions between 'equal' actors and vertically, in an interchange between actors at different levels of the hierarchy. The interchange also takes place between different parts of systems or sectors, e.g. between the political system and economy, or between the political system and civil society. The third sector emphasis on trust, volunteering, solidarity and communality and on nonprofit actions can be discussed in variety of ways. The main question, however, deals with the struggle regarding the third sector and the question of who or what defines the rules and concepts that give meaning to it, and thus fill it as an 'empty signifier'. In this process, all three subsystems that shape the third sector - market/production, state and civil society - function as fields or combinations of fields. As far as the third sector is concerned, the interesting question deals with the relationship between it and the reproduction of power in society.

The third sector uses every-day life as its starting point and its expertise is strongly based on people's own experience-based knowledge. Its impact on political, economic, social and cultural development in society at large has been of great importance. The third sector has played a crucial and distinct role in nation-building processes, in the composition of modern welfare societies and in the new situation where the market society demands more volunteer work, associations' activities, and an increasing role by the third sector.

As Anheier notes, John Hopkins Project (http://www.jhu.edu/~ccss/research.html) data show that the third sector has grown significantly in all the European countries in which the sector's share of total employment could be compared in 1990 and 1995. It has been demonstrated that, in some countries, the above-average growth of the third sector could be observed as far back as in the early 1970s (Anheier & Seibel 2001.) The reasons behind this growth are different and Anheier discusses the general expansion of the service economy reinforced by demographic developments. The generation of baby boomers has brought and will bring long-lasting capacity expansions, from child care facilities in the 1950s and schools in the 1960s to universities in the 1970s and homes for the elderly in the coming decades. The significant growth of the middle class over the last decades has also led to an increase in self-organisation. Because

of the changing situation, there has been and there will be a greater demand for the third sector services. In addition, the demand for these particular services is higher in the growing area of leisure activities.

Anheier also points out a variety of political and ideological changes that have played a significant role in the increased importance of the third sector. The role of the state has changed. A working partnership between government and nonprofit organisations designates that the nonprofit organisations deliver services with the help of government funds, and typically as a part of complex contracting schemes. The political currents of neo-liberalism, combined with the realm of New Public Management, have emphasized the privatisation of public agencies. In addition, the political and institutional consensus of the late industrial society is tearing up. An economic, political and social space is widening to include the third sector, which has been seen as creating institutional diversity and preventing monopolistic structures, as well as a field of experimentation and as that increasing the problem-solving capacity in modern societies.

The third sector developed in different ways across Europe. The role of the state or that of the church in the social, health or leisure service field, formulating the activities of the third sector, has been different in different countries of Europe. In Finland, like in the other Nordic countries, the third sector has many connections with the state and with the politics as it initiates affairs and provides some of the experts needed by the state. Civic action has often led to an extension of the state's tasks (see Jaakkola et al. 1994, Alapuro 1988), and often there has existed a complex relationship between public and third sector organizations due to a division of tasks in which they cooperate, each delivering their services to the same person. Traditionally, third sector organizations have played the role of pressure groups in relation to the political and administrative system. They also have been co-opted into state and policy-making processes, for the reasons of intensive lobbying, professional and personal networking and binding activities. Historically, many a third sector organization has collaborated with and received financial support from public authorities. Pestoff (2002) describes the position of the third sector in the welfare triangle. The division between the public and the private, profit and nonprofit or formal and informal is not universally identical nor is it fixed once and for all, but rather, it varies in both political and societal as well as in temporal terms. What is seen as an appropriate role of the state in one country or in one period may not be seen as such in another country or in another period. Finland, as a universal welfare state, attributes more responsibilities to public sector. Nevertheless, the discussions is present regarding the issues of what the state should do, what the market should and what is to be left to the third sector. Figure 1 demonstrates the variations in the welfare mix, the instruments

to define the paths to privatization and analyses the resulting consequences for society, for various social groups and for citizenship**.**



Figure 1. The position of the third sector (Pestoff 2002, 4).

In this article the target of investigation is a special unit substantively associated with the third sector, namely, that of registered associations. The objective here is to (1) analyze the relations between cultural policy and cultural associations in Finland from a historical viewpoint utilizing existing research and document material, and to ask (2) what is the current operational status of associations within cultural policy and (3) what are the different forms of partnership that cultural associations in Jyväskylä, which are the special target group of this article, have outlined for their activities.

Associations and the First Line of Finnish Cultural Policy

The relationship between the state and the associational activity is an interesting research target in the field of culture. Finland, as a Nordic welfare state,

has been a highly state-centred governmental service state. Accordingly, the status of associations as well as that of the third sector in Finland, has differed from that in many other European countries where, for example, charity organisations associated with the Catholic Church play a significant role in providing welfare services. Direct financial support to associational activities and legislative guidance by the state also vary a great deal in different European countries.

Analysing the developing relationship between the Finnish state and cultural associations - the number of which has been and still is significant in Finland - in a historical context, shows how associational status and space has taken shape over time. A central element in the formation of this relationship is trust between the state and the associations, manifested in giving space and exerting control, and in joint formulation of the rules and the agreements. In Finland, early establishments in the field of cultural policy were outlined in the 1860s (Tuomikoski-Leskelä 1977, 20-21), a time when the Senate earmarked in its budget an appropriation for supporting the fine arts. The appropriation was presented to the Finnish Art Society, which was in charge of its further distribution. This act, in many ways, also formulated and described later practices in cultural policy; the Senate reserved an appropriation for supporting arts and handed the distribution authority over to the Art Society. By means of this delegation, the authority to evaluate the substance and the quality of arts was passed to the field of arts itself.

This initiated the first long line of Finnish cultural policy, during which several significant cultural associations were founded, e.g. Finnish Literature Society 1831, Finnish Art Society 1846 and Finnish Artist Association 1864. Whilst all first associations had rather powerful role in formulating an establishment of cultural policy, different associations built Finnish-nationalist culture also from their own bases and aimed differently towards the goal of building a nation-state. The state favoured associations according their usability to the prevailing administrations view of the Finnish nation-state. Their role in formulating an establishment of cultural policy was accordingly rather powerful. As Tuomikoski-Leskelä (1977, 90-122) demonstrates, the central actors of state administration participated at least nominally in the activities of the art and cultural associations that were loyal to state functions. This, in turn, established the informational contact between art associations and decision-makers in state administration. Furthermore, it resulted in a practice where associations carried out innovations associated with advancing the field of arts, because state administration and management of finances were rather inflexible in reacting to change. This practice, in several ways, further activated the associational field. Firstly, new associations were formed to produce the framework for developing different art forms. Secondly, the

associations were active in their expert and lobbying functions and they had a central role in, for example, drafting motions to the Parliament regarding the advancement of arts and culture. This is how the associations gradually moved closer to state administration and were allocated further new expert functions by the ministries.

An interesting question within the first line of cultural policy is that of just which associations obtained the right to represent the art community/public that defines the substance and quality of arts? Just who had the right to speak up for, or on behalf of, the interest groups of the art community or the public? Initially, the selection occurred according to language-political and later also according to party-political trends. The people, culture and state formed a system that gave the impression of cultural unity and external isolation.

The strong division of the cultural field that took place after the Civil War (1918) could be seen in associations being both discontinued and formed, as well as in their general activities. The birth of a stronger-than-before public establishment in the cultural field was also associated with this time period. The state justified the need to create a public cultural policy establishment on different levels of administration with the idea that it would balance the operating opportunities of citizens who were caught between different political fields. This however, at least indirectly, was also state's way of sustaining the already achieved power.

Gradually, the state took more responsibility for the tasks that had previously belonged to cultural associations. Despite of this, the associations maintained a central role of expertise within the administration. For example, they had the right to nominate members to art administration agencies and they were asked to give statements when new project proposals were being prepared.

Siisiäinen (2002b, 292-295) describes the cultural associations of those times noting that in the late 1800s, there was a large popular movement in Finland, in which liberals and in particular Fennomans became interested in popular movements as a means of directing the social and cultural aspirations of the common people. The mass movement was on the spread until the general strike of 1905 and it became political around the turn of the century. Tensions between the two language groups also hastened the foundation of nationwide associations for both groups. Societies for popular education, housewives' associations, temperance societies, volunteer fire brigades, youth associations, the labour movement as well as political and social movements of the peasantry spread the national culture to wider circles of people, despite of certain level of upper-class control. Models of high culture guided the operational form of associations, typically structured in three levels: national, regional and local.

According to Siisiäinen (2002b, 295), the share of cultural associations in all of the registered associations in Finland has stayed at the level of ap-

proximately 10% in the period of time between 1919 and 1999, with the largest individual share being constituted by art associations. Both between and after the wars cultural associations were eagerly founded, expanding Finnish cultural life in varieties of directions. Siisiäinen sees the effect of the protest periods as standing behind this trend; forming associations and changing the associational activities to be more radical or conservative are manifestations of the protest movements



Figure 2. Cultural associations registered in Finland in 1919 – 2000 /Siisiäinen 2002b, 294).

Figure 2 comprises of associations in the areas of science, arts, folklore and museums, environment, locality and region, cultural support, education and culture education, nature and animal protection, genealogy, and since the 1990s, immigrant issues. Almost 20 000 associations between the years of 1919 and 1999 – 244 associations per year – were registered in categories outlined. Between the wars, new cultural associations were born at the rate of about 100 per year. In the 1930s, approximately 200 left-wing cultural associations, mostly study associations, were discontinued. Some of these and many new ones as well, were reborn in the post-war boom period. The emphasis of organisational activity during the war was on the area of national defence and military (see Siisiäinen 2000). The boom in the late 1940s was associated with the general left-wing ideological trend, but Finnish cultural life expanded in many other ways too. The next peak of quantitative development can be seen

in the mid-1970s and even more so in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, cultural associations were registered at a record rate, with the peak of over 1000 per year recorded in 1997-1998. On average, almost 700 cultural associations were registered per year in the 1990s. It is interesting to notice that in the late 1990s and in 2000-2001, many of the new associations were registered under English names.

As Klausen and Selle (1996, 99-122) point out, throughout Scandinavia, Finland included, the same organisations at local, regional and national levels can be located. These are not necessarily doing the same things, but are all integrated into a hierarchical and nationwide organisational structure, in which the local branch has historically been the core of the organisation. In this way, volunteer organisations are important mechanisms for both horizontal and vertical integration. They are community-based organisations and are of great importance in building local identity and civic connectedness. At the same time, and via their organisational links to the national level, they are also important nation-builders, which make them major political actors at both local and central levels. They promote political, social and cultural identity at the local level, but are also decisive in integrating people of different social classes and regions into an overall national context - in national integration.

Expansion of the Welfare State and Associational Activity

By the 1970s, the associational arts field had become strongly party-politicised. The criticism associated with the cultural hegemony of the right wing prompted, for example, many culture-political statements in articles that dealt with the arts field. (Tuomikoski-Leskelä 1977, Hurri 1993). This was a favourable time period for developing art- and culture-political measures because the state, and the public sector in general, was taking a stronger role in promoting arts and cultural activities. State and provincial art administration was formed during this period, one of its tasks being to distribute artist grants and government subsidies to associations and groups. The society believed that artists had the right to receive state or provincial arts grants, to be awarded by art committees. Members of these had been chosen on the basis of the nominations made by cultural associations, which meant that the qualitative evaluations associated with grant politics remained an internal battle of the arts field.

A municipal cultural service system was also created in the 1970s according to a typical formula of establishing public services in Finland: legislation determined the form of cultural service, the municipal body in charge of it, the professional skill for carrying out the service and the state's financial responsibility for the service, to be provided by the municipality.

The Law on Municipal Cultural Activity (1981), as well as the Sports Law (1979) and the Youth Employment Law (1972) regulated the functions that had diverse but clear connections to the associational field. The establishment of a municipal operational field also strengthened associational activities. According to Siisiäinen (2002a 32, 2002b, 295) differentiated development inside the institution of associations began in the 1980s and climaxed in the 1990s. The share of cultural associations in all of the registered associations stayed at approximately 10% until the 1980s, after which it increased to 18% and up to 26% in the 1990s. The number of art associations increased particularly much, and within them, especially musical groups (choirs, orchestras, school support groups) established themselves in the form of associations. A partial reason for this was probably the established operation of cultural boards, and the possibilities of them, and of provincial art committees, to support associational cultural activities. This prompted many professional and recreational groups in the field of arts to form associations.

During the period in question, associational activity in the cultural field isolated itself to become its own area, formulated by the public sector and operating at the local level. Municipalities and specifically the sectors of culture and leisure were actively looking for collaboration with associations in their own area, shaping their functional solutions via grant policies and informational guidance.

Associations maintained and strengthened their position of expertise in the 1970s and 1980s with

1) the right to nominate state and provincial art committee members,
2) representation, which was officially or unofficially carried out at different levels of government when committees, boards, district councils, national/regional/local working groups, etc. were named,
3) statements that they were asked to give regarding the proposals of committees and working groups, and promotional projects of the arts and cultural field in general,
4) negotiations conducted with municipalities on service contracts, and cooperation and division of labour in general to agree, for example, on providing a particular service with the help of state or municipal funding (welfare-mix).

Cultural Associations in Jyväskylä

Next, I take look at the developmental trends of associations in a medium-sized city in Finland, with the population of 80 000. Siisiäinen (2002a) shows that, to a large extent, the quantitative development of associations in Jyväs-

kylä followed the general trend of development of associations in Finland. Associational registrations were on the increase in Finland, and in Jyväskylä, during the turning points in cultural policy. The increase in the year 1920 can be explained specifically with improved administration of registrations. In Jyväskylä, associational registrations were particularly active in the early 1970s, the late 1980s and even more so in the year of 1997. Cultural and art associations have been the third largest group of associations registered, and their share has been on the increase relative to that of the other associations. For example, the number of cultural association registrations almost doubled in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s. When compared to other cities of equivalent size, the associational profile in Jyväskylä has shown and keeps showing relatively more cultural and art associations as well as associations in the area of social and health care, which can be explained by the city's traditional position as a national education centre in many fields.

In 2001, a study was conducted in Jyväskylä, the purpose of which was to analyse the activities and resources of the registered associations in the city, their cooperation with different municipal actors and the innovative nature of their activities.[1] Utilising data from this study, this article focuses on analysing the activities of cultural associations. Cultural associations have been classified according to their traditional sphere of activities: (1) art associations concentrate on professional or recreational artistic activity, (2) education and culture education associations have an educational role, (3) resident, home district and genealogical associations attempt to strengthen local cultural identities and communality, which is also the goal of (4) international and ethnic associations, whose starting point is to define the place of multiculturalism. Almost all cultural associations considered the protection of cultural heritage to be one of their most important tasks.

More than half of the education and culture education associations, as well as of the art associations had been registered before the 1990s. New associations were found most frequently among international and ethnic, as well as in resident, home district and genealogical associations. Memberships had increased in slightly over half of the new associations (registered in the 1990s), whereas one third of the old associations had lost members. Of the types of associations, memberships had increased particularly in resident, home district and genealogical associations.

In addition to membership development, the amount of hired staff also speaks of the establishment of the activity. More than half of the cultural associations had no salary costs in 2000. The biggest salary costs were registered with art associations and the smallest with education and culture education associations. Of the researched associations, art associations had a larger than average budget, education and culture education associations were at the av-

erage level, and resident, home district and genealogical associations had a smaller than average budget.

Operational profiles of associations

Distinct profiles were evident in the operations of cultural associations. The operations could be classified to cover general societal (political) activities, activities related to the association's own interests, the organising of arts events, publicity-orientated work, expert functions, service activities and business activities. Cultural associations seemed to emphasize publicity-orientated work, looking after one's own interests, expert functions and the organising of arts events. There was some variation between different types of associations: art associations were the most orientated at publicity; international and ethnic associations also emphasized expert functions; education and culture education associations focused on expert functions and looking after their own interests; and resident, home district and genealogical associations emphasized public orientation and looking after their own interests. Service and business activities were important to only few associations, mainly in the arts field.

The attitude of the cultural associations in Jyväskylä towards business-like operations was still doubtful. Almost half of them did not consider it at all important to make a profit or have an active annual balance, to provide services with the purchase concept, or to market their services. Art associations were an exception in this regard; about half of them regarded providing services and marketing as important, and they also considered cooperation with businesses to be somewhat important. However, the biggest emphasis was on cooperation with the public sector in order to get public funding.

More than half of the old associations felt that providing services and marketing was not at all important, but of the new associations, over half felt that it was important or very important. The same trend was seen in cooperation with businesses and the public sector; the new associations found it to be more important than the old associations. Receiving public financial support was crucial especially for the new associations, and therefore, networking with the public sector and receiving public funding seemed to be central motives of activity early on in an association's life.

Types of partnership

Cooperation between the public sector and associations, like cooperation between the public sector and businesses, is a goal that has been introduced

in research and political texts with concepts such as 'partnership' and 'new partnership'. The topic has been studied in the framework of decentralisation and a bottom-up directed administrative approach. (New) partnership, if actualised, seems to need deformalisation of the state, but at the same time also formalisation of partnerships.

In the Jyväskylä data, the cooperation pattern with the city seemed to take many forms: there was 'general' contact and contractual provision of services with the idea of substituting or complementing the city's services, and occasionally, city employees and elected officials belonged to associational boards. Communication with the organisations of elected officials concentrated on the cultural board, which almost half of the cultural associations had been in contact with. The direction of communication was considerably one-sided; there were much fewer contacts from the boards to the associations, and only 18% of the associations felt that the contacts had been reciprocal. The same result is evident in a question that attempted to find the most important information sources for the association's activities. These sources were association members and private people who were close to the association, as well as association´s central and regional organisations. Only resident, home district and genealogical associations named municipal authorities or elected officials as their most important sources of information.

There was more regular contact with authorities than with elected officials. Different types of cultural associations with different emphasis areas had been in regular contact with numerous municipal authorities. Cultural office was the most frequent target of their contact, but they had also had regular interaction with several other municipal administrative units. The most contacts were made by the resident, home district and genealogical associations. Their relatively lively interaction with municipal administrative units can be explained with the width and diversity of their operational field and forms. International and ethnic associations had the most interaction with the cultural office, education office, office for alien affairs and library. These interaction relationships reflect the operational profiles of the associations. Education and culture education associations had the least frequent contacts with municipal authorities. Art associations had close interaction with the cultural office and also with the education office.

In general, it can be stated that cultural associations handled themselves the possible contacts with municipal authorities. In almost all cases, the contact was initiated by the association. In a few cases, the contact was primarily reciprocal, for example in the interaction between resident, home district and genealogical associations and the technical service or environmental office, as well as between international and ethnic associations and the central admi-

nistration, office for alien affairs and sport services office. The direction of the contact implies the operational emphasis area of the association.

Tight cooperation between associations and the city is reflected in their relationships, which can be seen in how the city authorities or elected officials participate in associational activities as members of their boards or executive committees. According to this study, elected officials are active in resident, home district and genealogical associations, whereas city authorities are active in art associations and education and culture education associations.

It seems that each municipal administrative unit has its own interests regarding cultural associations. For example, central administration is most likely to contact international and ethnic associations; the library resident, home district and genealogical associations, the education office education and culture education associations, the cultural office art associations, etc. However, in general, contacts made by the administrative units were scarce when compared to contacts made by the associations.

The associations found the interaction with the different city units to be sufficient. For example, the biggest hurdle for developing new activities was quite typically mentioned to be lack of financial resources and operational restrictions within the association, and very seldom was it mentioned to be public decision making or problems caused by the authorities or officials.

Service contract with the cultural office

One form of economic and judicial partnership in the junction between associations and the public sector is the service contract. Of the studied cultural associations, service contracts had been formed by very few associations and many of them did not even regard these kinds of contracts as important for their operational goals. It was believed to be more important to concentrate on activities that were either traditionally outside the municipal sphere of activities or had for one reason or another switched outside of it.

The basic preconditions and situational problems regarding activities in the junction of associations and the public sector, with the aim of forming partnerships, become concrete in the interviews with cultural association *Väristys* and resident association *Kaunisto*. Forming partnerships is a question of how much the public actor can and wants to yield in its regulations. In both cases, registered association as a formal framework of partnership was found to be the best and most functional option. The interviews mention that trust in institutions is important for all parties; however, an internal paradox related to trust is evident in both interviews.

Representatives of cultural association *Väristys* explained the early stages of their activity:

"We were both project workers at the Jyväskylä Art Museum in a 'Youth Art Exhibit Project' that was like a multiartistic operational space for young people for five weeks……We noticed that there were people who were about 20 years of age, plus or minus a few years, and on the last day of the exhibit; they decided to invite culture and youth people from the city and associations. People were mentioning their wishes: space, activities and the idea of a culture club... …. My job was ending, and then the secretary of culture and youth work called and told me that this space was empty and asked if I was interested in planning a project based on a youth initiative… … And then it just happened that we had no other choice than to form an association if we wanted to function somehow, get funding, etc. I was then employed by the city. But the idea was that we would make the whole concept self-funding, that we would find salaries and that kind of stuff in half a year… …This was not necessarily a primary goal of those young people, to start an association - they just wanted to be active. And because of that, our board consists of professionals from the fields of culture, arts and youth services, and we don't have to bother these others with our problems… ... About our relationship to the city, it has been kind of unclear and it depends on how you look at it… Yes, we are an independent association! Activities from cultural youth work were kind of dumped on us. And when you have an association, they think that you can get things done with volunteer work. We are supposed to sit here for 8 hours voluntarily - and I actually came here as an employee of the city. I can't even look for other work because I am kind of stuck here. We do services for the city, sit on the board of the association, are financially responsible……But it didn't pass as such. The current cultural board actually became interested in our activities and initiated an apprenticeship program, together with the association, that guaranteed the activities of Culture Club Siberia. It was the first contract for us and for the cultural board, and the type of activity that it supports is new. Our salaries, rents, computer connections, copies, etc. are part of the deal. The operating money has to be raised from elsewhere... …Then the culture unit has to cut its budget and it affects us and we have to determine some percent figure in the service contract regarding how much the city plans to buy next year……..As an association, we are employers and we have to cut our work hours… …There are many of us who have been involved since the beginning, and this has really become our 'thing' and we feel that this kind of activity is cool…..…The problem is lack of funding, and attitudes. There are some other main interests in the cultural field than cultural activities for the youth. We are in the margin of the margin. If we were for example a centre for drug users, where culture and arts were the tools, it might be easier to get money. But we will also fight because cultural activities for youth have absolute value."

Forming the resident association *Kaunisto* was also in the interest of the city:

> *"Planning for the only renters' community in Finland that is completely owned by a municipality started around 1993 and 1994 and the city invited planners who were interested in communal living. This original group had decided to form an association. The association had some say about the interior design, planning the common areas and building a small shop, where people could paint and do small wood projects. Now there are less than 10 people left from the original group. The turnover has meant that it is pretty difficult for the people to understand that when we work in today's world, we make traditions... …This kind of community can support people. According to the rules, the goal of the association is to improve the social circumstances of the residents and members, and to improve well-being……Since the association is the operator, it can own property and apply for municipal funding, collect money and membership fees, and then organise some programs… …Some residents have wondered whether we need the association. It keeps us awake and active; it is not automatic that everyone pays the membership fee. There should also be some benefits… In a free country people have the right to belong to associations, but it is not a duty; it cannot be compulsory. But is there any harm from it, and then there is the question of 'stowaways'. If 19 people pay the fee, does the one who doesn't pay get the same benefits...or do we come up with dual pricing, so that e.g. the parties are free for those who have paid. The goal is that as many people as possible would do something concrete…"*

These two associations are examples of partnerships in which city's administrative sectors persuaded, with funding and initiative, grass roots people to become actors in activities that were considered important by the city, and the city ended up in a service contract with them. In the background of both cases was also active and enterprising work by the city's residents, young people or people interested in communal living, in order to create change. The interviews show that the activities of these associations were also in the interest of the city. Initiating and supporting the activities of cultural association *Väristys* seemed to be a budget-cutting act by the city and the case brought out the problems of a cross-administrative operation. The interview also points out certain prejudices about the activities of the cultural policy sector and about the attempts to preserve the established hierarchy of beneficiaries when the high quality of arts is used as a criterion. Resident association *Kaunisto* committed people to the residential community; the association represented the community as an umbrella and could be heard by the city in different contexts.

Discussion

As Siisiäinen (2002b, 294-295) shows, numerous associations in the field of culture formed in Finland at the turn of the century. The notion that cultural movements and volunteer organisations help a person develop into an actor who is capable of participating in battles about the models of future development is important for cultural policy. In cultural policy field, volunteer organisations are considered to have a very central role in pursuing a lively civil society. Article 128 of European Union's Maastricht contract supports the principle of subsidiarity and attempts to guarantee that European cultural policy does not develop at the cost of national cultural politicians. EU recommendations and conference agendas consider it important to establish an extensive network of free civic associations and foundations. It is also believed that the development of a civil society need not be limited to a national level. Instead, creating of joint-European volunteer organisations and networks is desirable. Critical opinions have also been voiced because some people feel that joint associations signify the deepening of the European unification process and are worried about this development.

The third sector increased its profile in Finland in the 1990s, especially in social and health policy. Associations also provide a large share of private social services. In the area of culture, similar examples can be seen in the municipal cultural activities provided by different associations that the municipalities support financially and that function under the program oriented activity or in the activities provided by associations that complement the municipal sector, such as cultural association *Väristys*. Numerous festivals are made possible by associations, and likewise, behind many art institutes and art schools, choirs and theatre groups are support groups or parent councils.

On the basis of this article, we can conclude that the relationship between associations and the public sector in Finland has, up to the present moment, been quite tight. Associations have initiated functions that have later been transferred to the municipal sector, or associations have been responsible for organising activities that have been financially supported by the state or the municipality. The state and municipalities have also expressed the need for new activities or the desire to form new cooperation organisations, and the actors that have become involved have then formed a new association.

In Finnish cultural policy, a so-called double bond between the associational field and the public sector is actualised in many ways. Firstly, the associations have a role in statutory activities, as when making nominations for state and regional art committee members or, they have a role in different reforms via representation as when associational representatives are selected to committees or working groups, or when they are being heard in them, and in addition,

when associations make statements about proposals or projects. Secondly, the state gives government subsidies to associations, and furthermore, officials of the Ministry of Education can belong to their administrative organs. The status of the associations can be considered very strong in these examples. Some associations have this kind of partnership status or form. They are interest groups and their existence is also in the interest of the public sector. Forming associations in new areas of arts and culture and achieving the above-mentioned status signifies the legitimacy of the sphere of activities of associations in the field of cultural policy.

Through internationalisation, the associational field has gained new substantive and operational enrichments: immigrant associations, Finnish sub-branches of European expertise networks, European thematic associations and global single-issue associations have been formed. The European Union supports with funding programs projects that emphasize civil activities, and different cooperatives, working groups, production groups, centres, etc. have established their activities as registered associations and have in this way become eligible to apply for grants. (Kangas & Hirvonen 2001)

Like the Scandinavian (Klausen & Selle 1996, 99-122) in general, the Finnish voluntary sector has developed in many ways in the last two decades. The traditional organisational form of social movement has become increasingly institutionalised, professionalised and orientated towards the state and the market. It has become more dependent on public grants while cooperating more closely than ever with governmental bodies. Furthermore, it has increasingly started to look for private donors in trying to develop closer relations with private businesses, while at the same time adapting to a new leadership-oriented 'management ideology'.[2] New groups have organised themselves in one of three forms: the old-fashioned forms as associations, non-profit institutions and cooperatives; the more network-like 'grass-roots' forms; or the semiautonomous, publicly financed and initiated local initiatives. Both 'old' and new organisations have tended to become less ideological and more pragmatic and narrowly or functionally focused: they do not want to change things more dramatically, and they do not (necessarily) believe in expanding their ideas to the public at large.

Historically, many associations have from the start collaborated with and received financial support from public authorities. This is why it makes no sense to talk about the state colonising the third sector. Politicians recognise that voluntary organisations are capable of dealing with their activities in the same way as public organisations. The organisations have also been directly co-opted into the state and into policy-making processes: intensive lobbying, professional networking, preparatory work in public decision making and implementation of these decisions. Nowadays, new trends challenge the

third sector in Finland. Looking at the third sector as a unit that has settled between the public and private sectors and that is a labour intensive, changing and flexible actor, was documented in the 1980s and 1990s as a content area in international documents and reports, and it also became a point of focus in Finnish dialogue. This article shows that many new associations formed and were registered in the late 1990s. Even when looking from the viewpoint of cultural change and individualisation, organised groups retain their place and their form. Tradition has not been hampered.

Notes

[1] The study questionnaire was sent to 1079 associations found in the association register, and approximately one third of them returned the questionnaire. Of the returned forms, 28% came from cultural associations[5], 20% from vocational and economic associations, 15% from social and health care associations and 10% from sport associations. Political (6%), leisure (9%), national defence, war or peace -related (4%) and other (8%) associations held smaller shares. The research also included interviews with ten associations that were registered in the late 1990s.

[2] Pekka Oesch's (2000) report, dealing with cultural and art associations supported by the Ministry of Education or art commissions, shows, in an interesting way, the change in the economic structure of associations. When in 1990 the public (state and municipal) grants of associations constituted about 42% of all income, in 1997 they constituted 34% only. The "privatisation" of associations brings new viewpoints into the relationship between associations and the economic life and between associations and the public sector. The changing nature of the funding environment of the third sector has caused fear about whether the third sector is forced to compete in the market or submit to greater controls by the government departments that partly fund it. In a more competitive funding environment, and fearing cuts in funding, the third sector is allegedly driven to operationalise its mission through more politically neutral programmes that deliver direct services and more professional activities. It is moving away from traditional democratic models of governance, where the boards are made up of target populations and communities, aiming toward a more professional model where specialists over-see management, and various monitoring, reporting and evaluation requirements increase the accountability to produce more effective services.

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Katja Mäkinen

Citizenship, Culture and Sense of Togetherness

Introduction

The citizenship of the European Union was launched with the treaty of Maastricht, and it was formulated further in the treaty of Amsterdam. Since then, more and more discussion has occurred in the European Union pertaining to the importance of citizens and to taking them into consideration in the integration, which themes were introduced already in the 1970's. The EU-citizenship and the status of citizens in the integration relate to the changes which citizenship has met not only in the European integration process but also in regionalism and separatism, migration and multiculturalisation of societies, as well as in transformation of nation states.

In this article, I examine citizenship in the communications of the European Commission and the opinions of the Committee of the Regions.[1] I ask *how citizenship and the sense of togetherness among citizens are constructed in the documents and how culture is connected with these constructions*. I examine only the documents' explicit mentions of citizenship[2] but I complement the analysis with few such passages, in which the concept itself is not mentioned. I pay attention to what kinds of differences and similarities exist between Commission's communications and the opinions of the Committee of the Regions, although my aim in this article is not to analyse what kind of dialogue is constructed between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions through their documents.

Among the documents of the Committee of the Regions I analyse the opinions given by the commission number seven. This commission is responsible for the issues related to education, vocational training, culture, youth, sport, and citizens' rights. I chose to include in the material twelve opinions, one of

which pertains to citizenship, seven to culture, three to information society, and one to education. Among the European Commission's documents, I chose for the research subject those nine communications, which the opinions of the Committee of the Regions involved in the research material comment. Five of the communications relate to culture, three to information society, and one to education. Themes of the documents overlap so that one document may deal with several themes, one of which is emphasised. All the documents have been published in the 1990's.

In the communications of the European Commission, the author is said to be the Commission of the European Communities. Also the opinions of the Committee of the Regions are, according to their titles, explicitly opinions of the Committee of the Regions, even though the organ responsible for opinions' preparation, i.e. commission number seven, is marked on the cover page too. Thus, the explicit authors of the documents are the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, and therefore I interpret the texts as the views and attitudes of these organs, even though the preparation process of the text may have involved many debaters with their contradictory arguments.

According to the cover page, most of the Commission's communications are directed to the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and some of them additionally to the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. Ten of the opinions of the Committee of the Regions have been written as an answer to a Commission's communication. Commission's communications are instruments through which proposals for Union programmes are made and Union's activities are formulated. The opinions are channels through which the Committee of the Regions comments the proposals made by the Commission or other institutions.

The European Commission and the Committee of the Regions differ as organs. The European Commission was founded in the treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and it is active in all the areas of integration. The Committee of the Regions was founded in the treaty of Maastricht, and its work started in 1994. First, economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health, education, and culture were defined as its fields of action. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Committee of the Region's field of action was expanded to further include employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational training, and transport. European Commission's main duties are making proposals for legislation and other Community's policy issues, defining EU's aims and monitoring the implementation of the treaties and legislation, managing Union's budget and Structural Funds, as well as negotiating agreements with non-EU-countries. Commission thus leads the Union policy and it has much more power than the Committee of the Regions, which is a consultative body. The power of the Committee of the Regions is

confined to that Commission, as well as the Council, and the European Parliament has to consult with it in preparing legislation and action programmes. The point of departure in the Commission's action is paying attention to the "general interest of the European Union" (Role of the European Commission 2001, 2) whereas the Committee of the Regions acts from the regional and local point of view. Committee of the Regions expresses its views in opinions and studies, and sometimes in resolutions on important political issues. Commission produces — in addition to communications — green papers and white papers. (Committee of the Regions 2001, European Commission 2001, Role of the European Commission 2001.)

Both the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions portray themselves on their website as citizens' representatives. Commission's "main concern is to defend the interests of Europe's citizens" (Role of the European Commission 2001, 2). The aim of the Committee of the Regions is "to bring the Union closer to ordinary people" (Committee of the Regions 2001, 2) by distributing information from the EU-institutions to towns and regions, and by bringing regional and local voices to be heard in the EU's decision making.

The concepts of citizen and citizenship are not much defined in the documents included in the research material. In some places it looks as if these concepts are not given clear contents and meanings, not even there where the citizenship is discussed particularly as a concept. For example, in the context of cultural participation and everyday cultures, concept of citizen is used in the documents in a general way, and there does not appear to be any particular reason for using the concept, as it could, for instance, be replaced with the word people. One of the purposes of using the concept citizen might be to refer to the citizens of the EU-countries in general, or to make a difference between the EU-citizens and other inhabitants of the member states and of Europe. However, even though the concept of citizen is not always well defined in the documents, its use may still sometimes have a clear function; in other words, the concept is used precisely in order to refer to citizenship. For example, in talking about cultural heritage, the question explicitly pertains to the construction of citizenship.

From the point of view of the speech act theory and rhetoric, it can be said that also when the meaning or purpose of using a concept is not expressed, concept and its use are not insignificant. According to the speech act theory, there are such words and speech situations, in which saying the word produces the existence of a thing, i.e. something is called into existence by speaking about it (Austin 1973, 5-7, 56-95, 147-149). In the EU-documents this would mean that by using the concept of citizen, citizenship is being created. Because I perceive the language of the documents from the rhetoric point of view as convincing, by which means things are being named, given meaning

and created, it is deeds that I examine in words. The document talk aims at influence on receiver: the reader is persuaded to agree and to act in a desired way. (Pekonen 1991, 46-47.) I read the documents' discourse on citizenship as linguistic construction of citizenship.

Typical to all citizenship discourse in the documents is that citizenship is connected with the frame of the integration process. This is the point of departure of my study and the focus of the second chapter. In the third chapter, I will map out the connections between citizenship and culture. One of the basic dimensions of citizenship is a sense of togetherness, and culture may have a close relation to this dimension. In the fourth chapter I examine the observations through the idea of togetherness, when it is possible to trace how citizens and citizenship are connected in the integration as a whole in the documents. Common to all these themes are the questions concerning us and others, unity and diversity. This tension is the uniting theme in my reading. I discuss this, as well as other tensions of the documents' citizenship-discourse in the last chapter.

Citizen as Cornerstone of Integration

Citizenship, in the documents of both European Commission and Committee of the Regions, is closely connected with the integration process, and citizens are seen as elementary factors of the Union.

> *"The desire is to make the citizen once again the centre of the European enterprise and here is a privileged field of action" (European Commission 1996a, 93.)*

> *"Knowledge of other regions and peoples increases citizens' interest in European issues and is conducive to the creation of the kind of "cultural citizenship" which can serve as a basis for the building of the new Europe." (Committee of the Regions 1998c, 13.)*

> *"The EU should also review its own cultural values and apply a wider concept of culture in Community action. Only by strengthening "cultural citizenship" will it be possible to consolidate the Union and build external relations on a lasting basis." (Committee of the Regions 1998c, 14.)*

In these extracts, citizen is seen as the centre and basis of "the European enterprise", "the building of the new Europe" and the "consolidation the Union". The same idea appears also in the Commission's first communication (1994a,

2) published after the launching of the EU-citizenship: ”The determination of the signatories to create an ”ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe”, notably through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, is given substance through the conferment of specific powers in sectors such as culture.” Here, EU-citizenship is a means by which the founding treaties' goal of the ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe can be realised. Culture is mentioned in the extract as an area through which the union, which is the goal, gains substance. The Committee of Regions (1998c, 13-14) too discusses cultural citizenship, as seen in the extracts above. The purpose of both citizenship and EU's cultural activities is thus to promote the integration.

The launching of the European citizenship, according to a Commission's communication (1996a, 1 in the introduction), links to an attempt to bring integration closer to people: ”This asserted wish to associate the peoples of Europe more closely with the process of European integration is reflected, in particular, in the creation of European citizenship”. Also the Committee of the Regions (2000, 7) sees the EU-citizenship as a way of bringing the EU-politics closer to citizens: ”Union citizenship can involve those specific policy areas – such as culture – which are particularly suited to promoting close relations between the EU and the public.” EU-citizenship means to the Committee of the Regions (ibid.) also ”that part of European integration policy which embraces all EU policies having a direct bearing on the individual citizen”. As means for rapprochement of citizens and integration, the Committee of the Regions (1995c, 5; 2000, 2) proposes action in the area of education, culture and audiovisual media, as well as measures of regional and local authorities. In addition to those, integration can be brought close to the citizens through information technologies, which for an ISPO-programme is planned in the documents (Committee of the Regions 1995c, 7).[3]

Seeing citizenship as a cornerstone of the integration and bringing integration closer to citizens are part of the same process: the legitimation of the European Union. Citizenship is not seen in the documents as a value in itself, but rather as an instrument to promote the integration and to legitimise the European Union. The idea of bringing integration closer to people was brought up in the 1970's. ”Citizens' Europe” is drafted in the Tindemans-report (Die Europäische Union 1976). Means for rapprochement integration to Community citizens are searched in the reports of the Committee on a People's Europe (1985). In these reports, the concept Community citizen is presented, which is later used in the Commission's cultural communications (European Commission 1992, 5; European Commission 1998, 19). Already in the 1970's and 1980's, discourse about citizenship was used as a way to achieve the unification. At that time too, the strategy was to construct citizenship by cultural factors.

The idea that, in the documents, citizens and the construction of citizenship are placed rhetorically – but not necessary in practical measures – as the foundation and core of the integration, and that the goal of these rhetorical means is to legitimise the Union, forms the background against which I, in the next chapter, analyse the concept of citizen and the meanings given to it in the context of culture in the documents of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions.

Cultural Heritage, Cultural Participation, Everyday Cultures

The Committee of the Regions uses in its opinions the concept cultural citizenship. Forming the cultural citizenship requires, according to the Committee (1998c, 11,13) that ”Citizens must be aware of their own cultural identity” and that they have knowledge about other regions and peoples and interest in European issues. In the activities of the European Union, cultural citizenship can be promoted by emphasising cultural values, which according to the Committee (1998c, 14) should be based on a wider view on culture. Also a European Commission’s (1997c, 9) document states that ”knowledge of languages and cultures is an essential part of the exercise of European citizenship”.

In this chapter, I focus the analysis to what this cultural citizenship might include, i.e. which dimensions of culture are linked with citizenship in the documents. I do not examine all the discourse about culture, but take into consideration only those passages of the documents, in which citizenship is mentioned in connection with cultural issues. I first analyse citizenship’s link to cultural heritage, then that to cultural participation and finally that to everyday life and to the quality of life.

Cultural heritage is used in the documents of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions as a foundation for construction the EU-citizenship. ”Community action in the field of cultural heritage can thus help to forge a European citizenship, based on a better understanding of both national culture and the culture of the other Union states.” (European Commission 1995a, 1, see also 5, 13.) Cultural heritage ”helps to increase mutual understanding and respect between the citizens of Europe” (Committee of the Regions 1995d, 2). Raphaël, EU’s programme for cultural heritage, intends ”to raise the awareness of EU citizens with regard to their cultural heritage, thereby enabling them to recognise this heritage as their own and to adopt the European spirit.” (Committee of the Regions 1995d, 10). Cultural heritage -based citizenship can be strengthened through education (European Commission 1996a, 48).

Cultural heritage includes according to the documents European, national, regional and local elements (Committee of the Regions 1995d, 2, 3, European Commission 1995a, 1). In the documents, some tension can be detected between unity and diversity of cultural heritage. Documents' formulations balance between common European cultural heritage and the heritage formed by member states and regions. According to Commission's communications (1996a, 48, 14), European citizenship leans on cultural heritage of each member state on the one hand, but on the other, it is also necessary to strengthen "common cultural heritage and the latter's role in providing a sense of Union citizenship". According to the Committee of the Regions (1995d, 10), a programme for cultural heritage is needed to promote interaction between local, regional and national cultures "on which European citizenship can be based". "It is Europe's cultural heritage which makes us Europeans" declares tht Committee of the Regions (1998c, 2).

Another point of convergence between citizenship and culture in the EU-documents is discourse concerning citizens' *participation in culture*. Both the European Commission (1994a, 15) and the Committee of the Regions (1995a, 2) state that it is important "to encourage all citizens to become more involved in culture so as to promote greater mutual respect and understanding". Commission (1994a, 11) emphasises citizens' access to both own and others' cultures. The Committee of the Regions (1998a, 4) suggests the safeguarding of "the direct involvement of the citizens" in cultural activities. The role of the Committee of the Regions as a defender of regional and local view points arises when it (1997a, 7) states that "All culture is essentially a local phenomenon" and that "The most important right from the point of view of local culture is the right to participate in cultural activities and produce cultural goods and services".

As means for facilitating citizens' cultural participation documents mention translation of literature, cultural tourism and information technologies. In the Ariane-programme it is emphasised that in a multilingual community translation of literature is a necessary condition "for direct access by the mass of Europe's citizens to the richness and diversity of our national and regional cultures" (European Commission 1994a, 34). The aim of the Ariane- programme is to promote translation "with a view to engendering greater familiarity and a better understanding among Europe's citizens and highlighting their common heritage" (ibid., see also page 37). Citizens' possibilities to cultural tourism must be increased, and cultural tourism is seen as a facilitator of European citizenship (European Commission 1996a, 57, 70). In the documents there is a belief in information technologies' possibilities to promote cooperation and exchange between cultures and to open channels for citizens to develop their own cultural patterns and networks (Committee of the Regions 1998a, 4;

Committee of the Regions 1998c, 10). The Committee of the Regions (1997a, 19) brings forth still more personal cultural participation of citizens by saying that ”culture must be regarded as a goal of Community policy rather than an instrument, in other words as an opportunity for each citizen to give effect to humanity in their own lives in the truest and most profound way.”

In dealing with cultural participation, too, a tension between unity and diversity of culture can be seen in the documents. To the question regarding what citizens should have an opportunity to participate in, documents reply that on the one hand citizens should have access ”to the richness and diversity of our national and regional cultures” (European Commission 1994a, 34), and on the other hand, the action in the cultural field should emphasise citizens' ”common heritage” (ibid.).

A contradiction can be seen between the goals and the means of cultural participation too: do translation of literature, cultural tourism and information technologies suffice real participation. How can those who do not read, travel, or surf on the net participate in culture?

In the documents of the Committee of the Regions, citizen and culture are interconnected through *everyday life and quality of life*. According to the opinions (1997c, 8), ”culture is a basic element of a community's make-up and identity which pervades the daily life of citizens”. One significant reason for preserving the cultural heritage is in ”improving the quality of the daily life of Europe's citizens” (Committee of the Regions 1995d, 2). Committee of the Regions (1997a, 7) suggests that — based on the cultural article of the Maastricht Treaty[4] — community, in all working areas, must pay more attention to how its measures affect people's everyday culture. Quality of life and everyday environment can be promoted for example through architecture, design, town planning, and planning of buildings (Committee of the Regions 1997a, 16). The quality of everyday life, according to the Committee of the Regions (ibid.), includes regional, national, and European traditions in aesthetics, history, and art. The Committee (1997a, 10) emphasises the diversity of citizens' everyday cultures also in construction of ”citizens' Europe”: ”the Community should take account of the cultural diversity of everyday life in seeking to create a citizens' Europe and a Europe of the regions”. The emphasis of the Committee of the Regions concerning the significance of everyday culture and environment can be seen in conjunction to Committee's task to bring out local and regional viewpoints. It suggests preserving precisely locally and regionally significant everyday culture (ibid.).

In the context of everyday culture, a tension between diversity and economy arises in the opinions of the Committee of the Regions. On the one hand, the opinions (1997a, 10) warn about economy's instrumentalising or standardising effects on everyday cultures and cultural diversity, and on the other,

they (1997c, 6) recommend that citizens be alerted about the social-economic dimension of cultural heritage. Culture is seen in the opinions (1997c, 4-8) also as an economic factor enhancing regions' attractiveness, employment, and business life, as well as their overall development.

Economy's relation to culture and cultural diversity appears tense otherwise too, in the documents of both the Committee of the Regions and the European Commission. According to the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 3-4; 1998c, 4), economy — which was supposed to be a means for integration — is becoming a goal of its own, and culture is needed to balance the overweight of economy in the integration as a whole. According to it, attention must be paid to whether the demands of economic integration can lead to the unification of ways of life and suffering, or even of disappearing of the cultural diversity (Committee of the Regions 1997a, 4) and whether high cultural quality and commercial competitiveness can be reconciled (Committee of the Regions 1997a, 15). The Committee of the Regions (1997c, 5) warns also against the threat of economic exploitation of culture endangering culture's free expression, and its autonomy from the market forces.[5]

Everyday cultures are not discussed in Commission's communications but only in the opinions of Committee of the Regions. In this sense the Committee of the Regions seems to comprise a broader conception on culture. Perhaps by talking about everyday life it is easier to create the intended impression that the European Union is not somewhere far away but close and present in citizens' lives. The idea that integration should have direct and tangible influence on people's everyday life was developed already in the reports of the Committee on a People's Europe (1985).

In this chapter I have examined how EU-citizenship is constructed in the documents of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions on the basis, and with the help of cultural heritage, cultural participation, and everyday cultures. The significance of the cultural issues for the European Union and integration is, otherwise too, underlined in the documents (Committee of the Regions 1998c, 3): "The European Union cannot exist, let alone be understood as a concept, without the culture of its peoples. That is the foundation and connecting fabric of the Union". Therefore the Union has to aim at "strengthening the cultural dimension as a basis for integration" (Committee of the Regions 1998c, 15). Cultural citizenship produced through cultural issues is part of this legitimation of the European Union and integration.

Culture and Citizens' Sense of Togetherness

I now discuss citizenship's usage and links with culture in the documents of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions in the light of

one dimension of citizenship – sense of togetherness, because all the documents' discourse on citizenship connects with this.[6] Since citizenship means membership in a community, it, to some extent, inevitably regards belonging together. Citizenship can be used to constitute and maintain the community (Heater 1990, 161-164, 167-170). Turner (1994, 159) defines citizenship as practices which constitute individuals to competent members of the community. A reference to community's cohesion and maintenance can be seen also in definitions of citizenship presented by Marshall in 1949. Especially the social rights defined by him include 'the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing the society' (Marshall 1996, 8).

Citizenship's dimension of belonging together is clear when one pays attention to citizenship's connections to culture. It can be seen that the documents of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions too use culture as a constructor of citizens' sense of togetherness. For instance, according to the documents, it is important to know both the cultural diversity of Europe and its shared heritage, in order for the sense of togetherness among citizens to evolve.

> *"investing more in education programmes will (---) help build a real "Citizens' Europe" by strengthening understanding of cultural diversity and solidarity across the EU" (Committee of the Regions 1998b, 3.)*

> *"It must encourage a broader-based understanding of citizenship, founded on active solidarity and on mutual understanding of the cultural diversities that constitute Europe's originality and richness." (European Commission 1997c, 7.)*

> *"The COR would also underline the need for interregional cooperation in the cultural sphere so as to ensure that the cultural diversity that characterises present-day Europe does not become a source of conflict and discord but a means to further development and closer European integration. Cultural cooperation must help people to learn to know and appreciate other ways of life, as this will help create a real basis for social cohesion between peoples and citizens. It is in this context that Europe's shared cultural heritage assumes growing importance." (Committee of the Regions 1997c, 9.)*

It can be seen in the extracts above that cultural issues, such as education, cultural diversity, cultural cooperation, and cultural heritage are needed for building of the sense of togetherness among citizens and for finally advancing the integration. The concepts of solidarity, integration and cohesion are linked

with citizenship: ”active solidarity” should be seen as a basis of citizenship, a ”Citizens’ Europe” must be built by strengthening ”solidarity across the EU” and ”a real basis for social cohesion between peoples and citizens” must be created. A sense of togetherness is emphasised in all the activities: ”Community action (---) must allow strengthening of citizens’ feeling of belonging to one and the same Community” (European Commission 1996a, 92; see also page 1 in the introduction).

As seen in the previous chapter, cultural heritage, cultural participation and everyday cultures remain rather unspecified in contents. However, a function in the use of them can be seen: by discussing these cultural issues, and by placing them as citizenship’s foundation, citizens’ sense of togetherness, and feeling of being members of the same community is intended to be increased. Creation of the sense of togetherness by cultural factors is explicitly mentioned in the documents’ discourse on cultural heritage and cultural participation. Instead, in the context of everyday cultures, the Committee of the Regions does not discuss togetherness, but rather emphasises cultural diversity of everyday life. Despite of this, the everyday discussion too can be interpreted as continuing the legitimation thinking of the 1970’s and 1980’s, according to which integration must be brought closer to people’s everyday life in order for them to give their support for the European Union (Committee on a People’s Europe 1985, 21-22, 29-30).

In addition to these cultural issues, values are mentioned in the documents as a means of producing citizenship, identity, and sense of togetherness. According to the Commission (1997c, 7), citizenship can be strengthened ”through the sharing of common values, and the development of a sense of belonging to a common social and cultural area”. Also the Committee of the Regions (1998b, 6) links citizens’ solidarity and awareness of belonging to Europe with the member states’ common values, which can, according to the Committee, be promoted by intercultural education and promotion of mobility.

Towards Legitimation: Construction of Citizenship and its Tensions

Although citizenship vocabulary in the documents of the Committee of the Regions, and in those of the European Commission is inaccurate in meanings, contents, and functions, certain citizen figures can be detected in it. The citizen sketched in the second chapter of this article can be described as a promoter or a supporter of the integration. The citizen described in the chapter number three knows cultural heritage and participates in culture. In the third chapter,

a citizen also appears who lives everyday life, discussed in the opinions of the Committee of the Regions but not in the communications of the European Commission. It can be said that in the documents, an ideal type of a *European cultural citizenship* is produced, since citizenship is constructed on the foundation of cultural issues, and since a European dimension in citizenship and culture is emphasised. Characteristic to this 'European cultural citizen' is a sense of togetherness towards the European Union and other EU-citizens.

Documents' various ways of speech concerning citizens and citizenship can be parallel, alternative, or contradictory. Based on previous chapters I now sum them up as tightly intertwined tensions.

The first tension refers to the point of departure of formulating citizenship: *can citizenship be created from above or is it always constructed from below*, by citizens' initiatives. This question is not explicit in the documents, but the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 6) poses the same question about identity reminding that "cultural identity cannot be given to or forced on people from above". Correspondingly, it can be asked whether it is possible to produce culture from above as a foundation of citizenship. It is also possible to wonder if the aim to legitimise integration can be achieved by citizenship which is constructed from above.

The second tension forms itself in *whether citizenship is regarded as an end in itself or as an instrument* in aiming at the economic and political goals of integration. Same question involves also the debate about culture's and cultural activity's position in the European Union. Concerning identity, the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 6) suspects that building the identity for the EU-citizens might serve as an instrument to promote economic or political issues, remarking that "looked at from the cultural point of view, the creation and accentuation of "European identity" seem somewhat questionable — a commercial and/or power politics phenomenon". Support for this suspicion can be found in the documents of both organisations examined here, because discourse about culture, identity, or citizenship in them often relates to intentions to promote common market or to legitimise European Union. Again, an interesting question is whether an instrumental or intrinsic conception of citizenship, culture, or identity would better serve the legitimation of integration.

The third tension too refers to culture's position in the integration. It involves the question of *whether economy or culture is prioritised* in the integration. If economy is overemphasised, cultural issues, and cultural diversity in particular, may suffer. The Committee of the Regions (1997a, 8) argues that if economic life is prioritised to the extent that cultural diversity can not be protected, the consequence may be the birth of some kind of European identity – "at the expense of diversity and individuality".

The fourth tension is that between *unity and diversity*, which is connected to all the other tensions mentioned above. It arises in the documents' discourses concerning cultural heritage, cultural participation, everyday cultures, and identities. For instance, the Committee of the Regions (1995d, 3; 1997a, 6) expresses the worry that cultural diversity may decrease and citizens' regional and local identities may weaken if European dimension is emphasised too much. As a solution of the unity – diversity problem, the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 8) announces to support such EU-measures on the cultural field, which are based on respect and preserve cultural diversity, and which "do not touch upon the subsidiarity principle but are gradually helping to build a positive sense of European identity".

Expressions of unity and diversity intertwine in the documents. On one hand, 'Europeanness' has been chosen as the main characteristic of identity. On the other hand, national, regional and local cultural diversity too, is emphasised. Unified Europeanness, prioritising economic aspects and instrumentalisation of culture, as well as activities oriented from above, place themselves as opposites or threats to diversity. Principle of subsidiarity, regional and local authorities, and citizens' action in organisations and everyday life, are seen as defenders of diversity. The Committee of the Regions in particular, makes, in agreement with its very task, local and regional cultures visible in its opinions. According to the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 4), culture in general and also Europe's cultural diversity and common identity "are being moulded in localities and regions, in particular". Thus, cultural citizenship too must, in its view, be constructed on knowledge about other regions and peoples (Committee of the Regions 1998c, 13).[7]

The tension between unity and diversity is significant for the citizenship, because it makes a difference whether EU-citizenship is constructed on the basis of unity – or unifying rhetoric, or on the basis of diversity – or diversifying rhetoric. This tension may express itself in solutions concerning inclusion and exclusion, i.e. concerning who is a citizen and who is excluded from citizenship, culture, or identity. The tension also involves citizens' equality: does the EU-citizenship formulated in the documents place people in an equal position. According to Marshall (1996, 7) "the citizenship itself has become, in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social inequality", and in this sense it can be asked whether the EU-citizenship has been launched in order to conceal inequalities. The tension between unity and diversity raises an important question with respect to the legitimation of integration: is it easier for the citizens to support the Union which aims at unified Europeannes or that which aims at diversity.

These tensions can be found in the documents of both the Committee of the Regions and the European Commission. Most often they are implicit in the

documents of both, but the Committee of the Regions conveys the tensions also more explicitly. This is the largest difference between the documents of the two institutions, and it may be partly caused by a difference in the natures of the documents of the two. The opinions of the Committee of the Regions are more critical and speculative, because their purpose is to comment on European Commission's communications. Commission's communications, in their part, aim at making proposals for concrete action lines, and they therefore have to be more straightforward with little room for speculations.

Common to both European Commission's communications and the opinions of the Committee of the Regions is that in both of them, citizen is rhetorically brought into the centre of integration. With the use of the concept of citizen, *EU-citizenship is produced* in them. In both documents, discourse on cultural issues is used as means and foundation for this construction. By connecting citizenship and culture to one another, the documents aim at producing among citizens a sense of a share in their own, as well as others' cultural heritage, and a feeling that the European Union is close to their everyday life. Both communications' and opinions' goal is thus to construct and assure receivers about *a sense of togetherness*.

When the European Commission (1997c, 7) argues that "a sense of belonging to a common social and cultural area" or "citizens' feeling of belonging to one and the same Community" (European Commission 1996a, 92) must be promoted and when the Committee of the Regions (1997c, 9) states that cultural diversity and cooperation are "a means to further development and closer European integration" and "a real basis for social cohesion between peoples and citizens", the question, according to my interpretation, regards *legitimation of integration*. The point is that through European citizenship and citizens' sense of togetherness, people's support for integration is intended to be achieved, and a feeling that the European Union is legitimate is intended to be created.

Awakening of action, or, in other words, making citizens support integration and the European Union, can be seen as the aim of the documents' rhetoric. The rhetoric effect of the document language is indirect (see Pekonen 1991, 48) in the sense that the goal is to make the receiver appreciate documents' goals, and agree on citizenship's and cohesion's significance. This, in its turn, is a condition for achieving other goals, i.e. for citizens to support integration, and regard the European Union as legitimate.

Notes

[1] The communications and opinions are listed in the end of the article. I have used the documents in English language.

[2] Construction of citizenship could be examined interestingly also by paying attention to which other names are used in the documents for those who EU-citizenship involves, and to which other actors are mentioned in them.

[3] Information Society Promotion Office -project informs about issues related to information technologies and it can be found at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO.

[4] Action on the cultural field is not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, but with the article 128 in the Treaty of Maastricht culture as a field of action achieved an official status in the European Communities.

[5] The tension between economy and culture is part of a larger question of whether culture has an intrinsic status in the EU or whether it is used as an instrument in order to attain other goals. This important question is taken up in the opinions of the Committee of the Regions (1997a, 5, 10, 19; 1997c, 8), and it can be read also in Commission's communications, but I do not deal with it in this article.

[6] Other central dimensions of citizenship are rights and participation. Rights are not often mentioned explicitly in the documents examined here. Instead, the documents use the concepts like opportunity and access, which may be more appropriate concepts than rights in these documents, which are not legally binding. (For more on cultural rights in the Commission's cultural communications, see Möttönen 2000.) Participation is discussed in the Committee of the Regions in particular, but it is, with an exception of cultural participation, out of the scope of this article.

[7] The tension between unified European identity and diversity is explicit in the opinions of the Committee of the Regions, but it is visible in the Commission's documents too. I do not examine it here any closer because it is not explicitly linked with citizenship in these communications. For more on the tension between cultural unity and diversity in the construction of the European identity in the Commission's cultural communications, see Möttönen 1998, 63-90.

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Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

Allegoric Encounters

The strategy of the weaker in the cultural political power field

Introduction

From a cultural political perspective it is interesting to discuss power structure in cultural terms by asking how symbolic values are used as means for legitimating power in the modern society, which is politically structured according to democratic representations. Citizen rights are hierarchically structured in every society according to power relations. Those members of society who hold strong power positions are seen as situated in the centre while those in the social margin are seen as weak partners. Ideal denominators of Enlightenment: liberty, equality, and fraternity promise progress for the majority of citizens under the legal democratic rule, which is the key element in the Western civilization. Modern political power cannot be structured according to the physical strength of violence, because this kind of dominance is so clearly inhuman. When moral interdependence between the dominant, hegemonic majority and the subordinated, powerless minorities is assumed, power can be practised only by civilised means. What are the possibilities of poor and weak people of overcoming their discriminated and marginalised positions? What are the strategies for incipient heroes or prosperous heroines (see Ahponen 1997a, 107-118) to act for their empowerment? These are the aspects that the present article focuses on.

Marginal interests are possible to be represented inside the hierarchical power system when rights to be present are legitimised for minorities. The legitimacy principles follow the rules of majority democracy. Acceptance of

validity of democratic discourses, according to which political representations are ordered, means that violence is substituted for negotiations. Cultural discourses can be effected meaningfully only under conditions of mutual understanding and interdependence. The specific qualities of others, even when being representatives of small and poor, almost invisible minorities, must be respected. It is only then that their voices can be heard.

Inclusiveness is a strategy for enlarging democracy by reflecting on civil rights as social rights through the conditions of cultural membership in a certain society (e.g. Lister 2003, 16-19). According to this strategy of depoliticisation, (Yuval-Davis 2000, 83-85) women too have been invited to mobilise their involvement in civil duties as *active citizens*. The ideal of a global sisterhood, if understood in terms of universalism (ibid. 125), can be seen as constructed on the basis of this communitarian ideology.

The ideal of heroism in present society

Heroic properties of cultural participants are discussed here as related to the principles of democracy. Aspects emphasised include power structure, political citizen rights, the moral self-development of individuals, and the caring attitude towards one's nearests. The starting point is that the modern political field of power is structured, and citizen rights defined, by taking the principle of equal opportunities into consideration when structuring the civil society. This is an important aspect of the 'double democratisation' which, according to David Held (1990, 2, 282-283), contains the interdependent transformation of the state power and civil rights. Both kratos (referring to rule), and demos (referring to people) define the possibilities of those being present to participate, and to be represented inside the political society.

The culturally constructed problem of democracy can be illustrated with a prototypical heroic story.

In other words, once upon a time there was a hero.

> *A hero ventures from the everyday world to the sphere of supernatural miracles. He encounters mythical powers there and gains the decisive victory. When the hero returns from his mysterious adventure he has become filled with force which will bring blessing to his nearest.* (See Campbell 1990.)

There are various versions of this narration, the length of their existence equalling that of the mankind itself. As understood according to this structure, society is a playground where the fortunate players stand out from the rest. Heroes are not only the luckiest among their fellow competitors, but they are also

prototypes of winners and antithesis of losers in the life space battles. Heroes surmount all obstacles on the way to their success; they are lifted above their equals and celebrated as idols by their audience. Reflecting the ideal requirements of society, they mirror the hopes of everyman.

These hopes contain an utopia that those situated in low positions, representing discriminated at the social margin of society, and in some cases being almost outsiders, can have a possibility to improve their situation, and in this sense to be everyday heroes. The other side of this utopia is that society in question is based on a hierarchical structure, where the social status or class is significant for political representation, and not all the citizens can equally obtain power positions.

The social atmosphere seems to be changed so that competitiveness and efficiency are emphasised as principal political values to be progressed. Activities producing social inequalities seem to be accepted more publicly in the late-modern era of individualism than they were in the golden period of solidarity, when communitarian values were largely respected, if not favoured, as the democratic principles of welfare societies. Now, people tend to "bowl" more and more alone as Robert Putnam (2000) exemplifies. Admiration of heroes seems to be of specific value for the present society of competition, where individuals engaged in making choices so passionately attempt to achieve success. The importance of a social barrier between successful and discriminated competitors is pronounced by propagating attitudes containing the valuation of distinctive cultural capacities, expected to accumulate during the people's entire life career. As far as the idea of the incomparable value of the inherited cultural capital is accepted, in the sense in which that concept was introduced by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), the possibilities of becoming a heroic possessor of valuable treasures are always more limited for those having fewer and fewer opportunities to be among the competent competitors, and, especially among inheritors having even better starting positions than their fellow men.

It is essential in the heroic discourse to see heroes as exceptional individuals standing above their equals due to their individual capacities being, in a certain sense, superior when compared to others'. Heroic life is marked by excitement and extraordinary deeds. To become a hero, according to Mike Featherstone (1992, 160, 164), one must respond to extraordinary challenges, take risks, and struggle in order to achieve a victory. Virtuosity and courage are demanded as heroic qualifications and so is endurance in difficult efforts, where grandiosity and superiority of real heroes are tested.

In a society of individual choices there are multiple options for possible heroes. This does not, however, mean that it is easy to reach goals reserved for superior persons, perhaps not any easier than it was in a society based on estates. Important for the idea of heroism is whether social equality is respected

as an ideal starting point or a goal for a democratic society. If principles of equal opportunities are valued highly, then, on the same continuum, cultural differences are ranked according to their uncontested classification as valuable for achieving a socially respected position. Then cultural distinctions are usable tools for legitimising the power strategies in a democratic society.

If social inequalities are on the increase in a society where cultural choices multiply, well-to-do people have more opportunities to make choices whereas badly off people must be content with scanty living and scarcity. Distinct categories of culturally valued differences are useful for social identification strategies. They are a means for separating winners from losers, a way of showing everyone his or her place at the centre, or at the margin of the socially categorized space they occupy. They mark boundaries between included and excluded. In this system, culture has a specific stabilising function in the service of the other domains of society.

Traverses of democracy

A basic question when democracy is considered concerns the cultural assumptions about uncontested dominations. A generally accepted starting point in feminist debates has been white male domination, self-sufficiently included in the concept of man. More recently, the ethnocentric character of womanhood has also been noted. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1993, 105) summarize this by saying that when an essential opposition between the interests of men and women is assumed, a hegemony of the concerns of white, middle-class women is produced. Then, the position of women is clearly constructed as socially subordinated by men. In this way, it is supposed that both men and women are politically unable to either surmount or resolve the universal gender barrier.

As Anthias and Yuval-Davis continue (ibid. 106), the cross-sections of forms of subordination have been difficult to grasp. Racialized, gendered and class-based divisions between the dominant, hegemonic majorities and subordinated, powerless minorities have been stubbornly maintained in the hierarchical divisions of society. Now different goings beyond, boundary-crossings and building of bridges between two assumed opposites are frequently discussed. Therefore, when we try to understand the political character of the male-dominated power structure, it is important to recognize how socially marginalised groups like women or so-called ethnic minorities and other types of lower classes can actively affect, both individually and collectively, their own subordination and how they can struggle against their subjection and become enabling citizens (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davis ibid, 108). The

limits of political democracy must be, time and time again, renewed to be meaningful for the social discourses, which concern the structuring of power. In this sense we must recognize boundaries as localizing places "from which something begins its presencing" as Homi K. Bhabha (1994) describes the locations of culture.

Perhaps the most ambitious effort inscribed in the modern conception of democracy was projected onto realizing democracy in the field of culture. From my point of view, it is reasonable to discuss how the paradoxical character of cultural democracy is manifested in the margin of cultural power. This problem deals with the political interests of citizens, and with how they are introduced and represented in the democratic power field organized according to the political majority principles. If the social margin, which allows new representative interests to *begin their presencing* in the cultural power-field, is extending and stretching, the problems of minorities may increasingly be taken into consideration in the *politics of presence* (Phillips 1995). However, it is precisely the hierarchical system of representative democracy, which defines the possibilities of marginal interests to become present and visible. A public space is demanded for the articulation of the interests so that the representatives can take a place in and be placed at the social power structure. Represented interests tend to extend the space of presence by means justified and legitimized by following the principles of legitimate democracy. This mechanism operates so to enlarge the circle in which agents of the political interests function. Furthermore, the progress of democracy is measured according to the dimensions of social rights.

Political interests always emerge as socially acute issues in the public sphere, where modern democracy is progressed. Characteristic for the modern way to progress social activities is to master communicative skills: discursive competencies, rhetorical argumentation, and convincing articulation of interest-based demands. When political decisions are made, based on negotiations between different parties, communicative competency, demanded from the political agents, is a politically useful powerful method. A skilful capacity for argumentation and efficient mastery of convincing discourse are the rhetorical instruments for the deliberative democracy. By means of rhetoric, social problems are introduced as political demands in the publicity, the aim being to legalise them inside the institutional political structure of society.

Globalizing world structure is, in social terms, increasingly uncertain. Concepts of welfare and equality, as generally accepted principles to promote the better off democracies, are often questioned. Social competition between groups of prosperous winners and unsuccessful losers seems to be fiercer and more intense than ever in the present global circumstances of so-called risk societies and network connections. Zygmunt Bauman (1997, 14) argues that a

split between the resourceful and powerful actors of the political scene and the useless poor is widening in a world in which the previous unity/dependency circle has been broken. Disorder, ambivalence and displacement are now reflected as formations of postmodern social space where rhetorical instruments are increasingly used for assuring the conceptual meaningfulness of new innovatively emerged political demands. In this situation it is, however, difficult to justify the principle that all social questions are possible to be handled as politically legitimated interests within a proper institutional structure.

As is known, the affirmative strategy of inclusion has been largely accepted by alternative movements. After entering from the outsider's position, and then representing marginal interests, certain groups try to legitimise their political demands as socially and culturally valid, taking the principles of social equality into the primary consideration when arguing their right to have a voice. After appearing in the publicity and becoming democratically represented according to the majority principles, they, however, lose that kind of political effectiveness which characterises the position of an opposition. They no longer represent counter movements standing against power structure.

Now, as Niklas Luhmann (1993, 71-72) demonstrates, high-modern societies encounter the hidden ideology for adjusting themselves to increase of techno-social risk complexes. The more risks are anticipated, the more new syndromes of uncertainties are produced. Dangers are unexpected, but risks are predicted. Their probability is prognosticated by calculations based on the best possible security, and the worst threatening danger in a certain situation. As Luhmann among others (see e.g. Ahponen 1997b) emphasizes, risks are produced by the dynamics of the modern society itself. Defined in this way, risks can no longer be believed to be avoidable, as social questions, such as problems of class, gender and race, were in the golden period of modern representative democracy (see eg. Held 1987). In this respect, it is adequate to say, like Steve Best and Douglas Kellner (1991, 261) have, that we are living within a borderline region in a transitional era, which will, perhaps, bring us into quite a new social situation. A change can also be noted in the strategies of how to conceptualize societies and the ways of constructing their transactions. Bauman propagates this *transmodern* turn by suggesting that the key terms for interpreting societies must be changed. His proposal is (see Bauman 1992, 191) that the terms of sociality, habitat, self-constitution, and self-assembly should "occupy in the sociological theory of postmodernity the central place that the orthodoxy of modern social theory had reserved for the categories of society, normative group (say the interest group, PA), (or) socialization on control". This means that people are expected to construct both themselves and their ways of sociality. It means also that social relations seem to become more uncertain and less confident than they traditionally used to be.

Trust in democracy is based on the political representation of different interest groups. Institutional (social and cultural) policy has been reasoned by the plea that the progress of the welfare state is guaranteed by the expansion of the circle inside which representation is possible. Spheres of the institutional presence of marginal interests have been extended and stretched by using policies in which demands for the citizen rights of different minorities (the poor, women, invalids, deviates, ethnic groups, the elderly, children) have been increasingly taken into consideration The field of democratic representation is rendered larger, in general, when previously oppressed *voices* have earned possibilities to express their demands publicly. It can be said that interests of minorities have been justified as culturally relevant needs and socially valid demands. In this way, minority groups have become visible, audible and discursively present in the power field of representative democracy. But when subjected to the majority principles of the representative democracy, the minority groups remain continuously in the margin of the political society and its establishments.

When marginal groups succeed in gaining a foothold in the field of social rights, they start to use more and more cultural strategies for legitimizing their demands. They use heroic figures to characterize their opportunities as adequately as possible, to conjure up their strivings, to give more meaning to their interests. When previously underprivileged discriminated or excluded groups, such as wage workers, women, racially discriminated ethnic minorities or sexual minorities, successfully demand their political rights to gain membership in the political presence, they more and more tend to reserve and strengthen their position inside the same power structure by adopting inclusive strategies of integration for their own use. Brotherhood becomes stronger in the networks of familiarity. This way, sisterhood too, is presupposed to be global.

Here I attempt to sketch how the ideal aspirations for social equality, and the inevitable tendencies of cultural inequality, form a complex in the ideology of modern politics of presence. I see that the problem of cultural democracy is connected to positive political tendencies, which have seemingly become more and more crucial for solving discrepancies of late modern social inequalities: the integration of diversity or the universalism of diversities under the umbrella of Western humanity. Minorities strive to articulate their demands as legitimated interests. Marginal discourses are demanded to be more and more visible and audible. When the rules of representative democracy are followed affirmatively, representatives of social movements gain a strategic place within the margin (cf. Shields 1991). It seems that the borderline between the margin and the power centre is steered by new complicated methods, let us say risk strategies, needed for adaptation to a more conservative, because of being protective, hierarchical structure of the modern way to rule democratically

the power system. Therefore, more and more discursively negotiated practices and, perhaps, manipulative lobbyists' strategies are used in the present policies. Anne Phillips (1995, 145-165) among others calls precisely this tendency *deliberative democracy*. Nothing in the late-modern commitments is self-evident if even kinship connections are worked out and organized through negotiated commitments (see Giddens 1992, 96). Greatest heroes are those who have the best communicative competency in carrying their demands through by means of rhetoric.

Referring to negotiated representation, I emphasize the integrative and inclusive elements of democracy. Although social demands are weighted as political interests according to the majority principles, demands of minorities too, have to be taken into consideration after they become articulated publicly and represented institutionally. Unquestionably, proper communicative competences and other kinds of persuasive abilities are beneficial in social intercourses. But how far does the power of rhetoric reach, in the modern context? Where is the borderline between rhetorical power and violence?

On the banks of the power stream: an encounter between a wolf and a sheep

When presented discursively, marginal social interests also reflect the political power relations in society. Serres (see Kroker and Cook 1988, 196-197) contemplates the illusive character of persuasive rhetoric and the significance of the power aspect in discursive politics by telling us an allegoric fable about an encounter between a wolf and a sheep:

> *A sheep moves to live on the riverside in the neighbourhood of a wolf. When they meet, the wolf blames the sheep for spoiling his water. The sheep remarks she is living down the river. The wolf continues by saying that then one of the sheep's relatives must be guilty of the injurious disorder. The sheep answers that she has no relatives. Next, the wolf blames the sheep's parents, but she says that they are already dead. At last the wolf has had enough of this quarrel, he can no longer tolerate the situation, and he gulps the sheep down, directly into his stomach.*

The interpretation of this allegory can start with the aspect that the use of power is a politically legal right for the members of a democratic community. Both participants, although not having equal voice - one is howling, the other baaing - can progress their interests by means of voting. Discursively, or seemly, proved presence is a precondition for participation. Virtually no

real communication is demanded on the wolf's part in the case in question, because the field is inherited from his ancestors, and he can also defend it by means of physical strength. In practice, the sheep is only a squatter who threatens the balance of the wolf's system. But she is present visibly and audibly. She can also hear his voice and see his gesture. As far as the wolf represents a modern cultivated person he will give the impression that the possibility of deliberative democracy, therefore the principle of rights, is available for solving the quarrel. Violence is a sign of insufficient mastery of a conflict by civilized means.

When thinking structurally, the dynamic intervention of the sheep demands that the situation is interpreted in a new way, because the equilibrium of this functional system has been changed. All the arguments of the sheep are discursively qualified, but this is not the most significant aspect of the process. The equivalence system is hierarchical and ruled by the wolf's representative power structure in this "gate-keeping encounter" (see Fairclough 2001, 40). It is not a pure *we-relationship* (see Schutz 1967, 170-171), which should be lived through together, and experienced face-to-face as identical for both the participants in the same undivided and common environment. The power system, defined by the wolf, restricts the sheep's discursive presence into powerlessness as a recipient and an observer. It is important to consider this formative moment of interest in the representative cultural democracy (compare Jonasdottir 1987, 182-183). It is possible for the wolf's discursive system to be flexible enough to extend the system's borders according to the stretch of the sheep's mind.

After the discursive interpretation of the situation, the action is continued within the borders of the hierarchical power system. As a solution to the disturbance, the squatter has to be driven away or she has to be tamed, stunned or "swallowed", in other words included by means of positive or negative sanctions. If tolerated, she will be integrated into the hierarchical structure to serve the mastery. She will be adopted by her master by means of acculturation. In any case, assimilating strategies are used to keep the power in balance inside the system's order.

The usefulness of this allegory lies in its metaphoric efficiency to allow the reader to understand the meanings of political ideologies based on the social contract theories of modernism - including, and specifically noticing the gender contract. During the course of discursive communication, individuals are free to constitute their democratic demands for authority in a role of a discursive hero or a heroine. In practice, they are still kept in order by being forced to follow the functional rules of hierarchical domination. In the political field in which the social contracts are established and constituted, individuals become institutionalized into citizens. They are ruled by social norms, the legitimacy

of which is based on status hierarchies. When the interests of citizens occupy a place inside the institutional system, they can be taken into account in public discourses, because the political representation allows interests to be visible and audible enough. The ideological power of cultural representations lies here. This way, alternative movements become integrated into the hierarchical power structure, and the counter-political interests, such as anarchism, and other kinds of extremities are rendered inefficient.

When Michael Ryan (1989, 116-126) discusses politics and culture in the epoch of the *post-revolutionary* society, he points out how ideological cultural representations work in compliance with the social system in which power and rewards are unequally distributed. Ryan (ibid.) argues that because metaphors are ideal rather than real, they are troublesome for counter-hegemonic cultural argumentation. Metonyms, according to Ryan, are needed to complement metaphors, because they indicate realities in desires. *Vertical* use of metaphors means that ideals substitute real needs in political rhetoric, while *horizontal* use of rhetoric is progressively associated with metonymy, displacement and mimicry. Without forming fixed opinions on the conservative or radical (transformative) character of either metonymy or metaphor, it is meaningful to ascertain this dialectic of rhetorical power.

Opposing interests might also be made invisible and inaudible by means of metonymical policies of exaggerating publicity, by strategies of the "implosion of the social in the media" (Baudrillard 1988, 207-219). An excess of opinion polls refers to the ironical use of the public opinions for purposes, which are controversial to those seriously expected. Jean Baudrillard (1986, 130-132) points this aspect out by saying that saturated by sensational stimuli, opposing opinions can be made extremely public and in this way transparent. This strategy of displacements is also risky. Alternatively, an attempt can be made to render the opposition inefficient by clearly labelling it to represent a certain insignificant category. Opposite voices can even be loud. However, when segregated into a reservation, or even restricted to an encapsulated sphere, they are deprived of a possibility of anybody penetrating in, as well as of that of their exiting this restricted area.

In contrast to the majority, the opposing minority is in this case left without equal recognition of civil rights. If representatives of this kind of a minority are identified as a group, they are stigmatized by a negative identity as deviants or aliens. Those situated in the liminal area of presence are *non-persons* in the meaning given by Erving Goffman to servants and slaves, as well as to patients when they are treated only as objects of certain operations. Non-persons are, as Goffman (1974, 150-151) says, without an individual identity "present during the interaction but do not take the role either of performer or of audience".

Is there any peaceful, however effective strategy for opposing the dominating power hierarchies in the field of democracy without being excluded from the power circle or affirmed to the prevailing hierarchical structure? Is the real world of democracy only a utopia below the horizon?

A trial of finding a balance: the interdependence of a lion and a mouse

It is a specific cultural moment, included in the social contract of modernism, which allows individuals to express their free opinions publicly in the course of discursive communication. As customers of the social system they have a right to demand that their affairs are correctly handled by the public authorities. But when the strategy of the hierarchical social order is followed in the play of defining status positions of the institutionalized citizens, these demands are subjected to rules of how priorities are formed in the decision-making process. Demands become accepted as socially valid interests under the rule of majority principles in the political power field based on the consensus between members. Demands are appreciated as culturally relevant values when they are expressed by the subjects of a certain culture and qualified by experts in a qualitatively specified field of expertise. Cultural contributions become valuable under the rule of commonly appreciated criteria. Those who are positioned to be non-contributors in the welfare society are controlled and marginalised, as Anna Yeatman (1994, 112) notes when she discusses the postmodern revisions of the modern political representations. Possibilities of non-contributors to become beneficial, thus real heroes in social terms are restricted, if not denied. They remain outsiders, and even if members of society, discriminated by the better-off people.

The more civilized the society, the more culturally qualified means are used for the social control of discriminated groups. Here we come to a basic problem of cultural democracy. Handling of social problems by cultural means is a more civilised political strategy than the use of non-cultural mechanisms like force or violence. If culture is, however, mainly used as an instrument for solving social problems, as well as for progressing economy, it is threatened by utilitarian tendencies. If its utility is celebrated in the price of the meaningfulness of its contents as such, culture may even become empty as an authentic value. This aspect is included in the dilemma between cultural elitism and populism. The problem of cultural populism is, indeed, included in the fact that if any aspect of everyday life is seen culturally as being as valid as another aspect, ”the dictatorship of publicity”, in other words the culture

of consumers, provides the criteria for cultural appreciation in the world of commercialised culture. From this perspective the significance of culture is judged, not only by terms of pure commercialism, but also by its usefulness as an instrument for social management or as a good *alibi* for reasoning the contents of exchange values as qualified. But it is noteworthy that culture is nothing in itself when it is evaluated in this way. In this respect, popular heroes of entertainment can be used as significant figures for promoting affirmative life-management strategies. Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss how the present tendencies of social discrimination and cultural estrangement can be understood, overcome and worked on creatively. This is the reasoning of presenting the following fable:

> *When a mouse disturbed a sleeping lion by running over him, the lion was awakened and took her in his big paw. The mouse begged him saying: "Forgive my carelessness. Give me a gift by allowing me to live, and I'll always be grateful to you. Believe me; I never wanted to disturb you." The lion wanted to be noble-minded and allowed the mouse to live. He smiled when he thought to himself how the poor mouse could express her gratitude to the powerful lion. A moment later the tiny mouse heard the awful voice of the roaring lion. She ran, bravely and curiously, in that direction and found her benefactor entangled in a net. The mouse hurried to release the lion by gnawing through some knots. Thus the lion could unravel the net and was released. The mouse could, indeed, repay the lion for his mercy.* (According to Aesop 1907, 67-68).

The lesson given in this fable is that in some situations the assumed balance of power is turned upside-down. Therefore, in the field of democracy, it is useful to take into consideration a strategy of reciprocity. This kind of opportunities for noble-minded heroic deeds can be interpreted as deeds of courage. It is important, however, to notice the aspect of confidence, because the need for reciprocal help is assumed. This means that neither rhetorical persuasion nor physical strength is enough when the balance of power is structured in terms of mutual care-giving. The characters of the mouse and the lion illustrate the fact that a circle of sameness is not necessarily required as a precondition for mutual help. Not even a horizontally equal relationship was calculated beforehand, nor was brotherhood; in this case, the motivating factor was a mutually understood striving for liberty. Aesop also seems to say that mutual help is a question of moral proximity. It means, as Bauman (1993, 130) in his *Postmodern Ethics* claims, the nearness of the Face, based on shared feelings like a smile. The moral feeling of nearness is shared, according to Bauman, before it has been articulated and spelled out. Therefore, it is neither based on rational arguments nor on agreements on sociality.

In the course of everyday life, when following routines and getting through the normal daily duties, most people fail to behave like moral beings comparable to the mouse in this fable. On some exceptional occasions, when acute decisions are demanded to determine how to manage a threatening situation, everyday heroism is judged.

Studying the cultural barriers of togetherness

It may also be contemplated that the fate of the other – as far as his or her personal liberty or my responsibility of him or her is considered – becomes meaningful to me in the moment when he or she is met face-to-face and is identified as *you*. *We* belong to the same circle in terms of social identification. Meanings of terms of discrimination, alienation and exclusion are defined as related to this circle. Perhaps this is the most significant aspect to point out when social determinants of membership are constructed in the hierarchical continuum of inclusion. Identification is the strategy for being included in the categories of togetherness, and to be accepted is to have membership in a certain group of familiarity. Those who are totally excluded are not identified at all. They are either left without a name or are stigmatized by a negative identity of aliens. Relative strangers are defined as deviants among members or as representing different minorities who have a place in the social margin of society.

Thoughts presented in this article are related to my long-term study, the topic dealing with boundary crossings between social and cultural domains. The intention is to construct strategies for overcoming social exclusion of poor minorities. During recent years I have discussed the theme of social and cultural border-crossings by starting from an illustrative example of the changing life-situation in the nearness of a geopolitical border (see Ahponen 1996a). The aim is to connect cultural boundaries to the socially constructed problems of marginal positions, habitation, liminal situations, and displacements of identities. It is emphasised here that the questions of otherness and alienation are necessarily met when life-conditions are changed. Therefore, cultural boundary-crossings are inscribed in changing categories of social membership (Ahponen 1996b). Hybrid identities, displacements of identities, or diaspora identities are more and more spoken about. Also the shifting boundaries in the inner life of individuals – e.g. between publicity and privacy - have to be taken into consideration when trying to conceptualize how boundaries or obstacles are met by people during the life course. This aspect is connected to heroic attitudes in the sense how troubles and misfortunes are experienced and whether social and cultural membership categories are interpreted as fixed

determinants or constructive *challenges* which may change our placements. In this sense I see the marginal placement of *the other* as inevitably inscribed onto the hierarchical construction of the cultural power field. With deepening understanding of how togetherness, membership, and the exclusion - otherness are related, discriminative tendencies of human alienation can be comprehended as rooted in the fixed social representations and in the functionally structured social conditions.

The theme in question is focused on how social and cultural principles are intertwined in individual identity classifications and in the definitions of group membership categories. What kinds of social and cultural properties are demanded as resources for overcoming alienation? Are there certain strategies by which processes of social exclusion can be avoided? How can one's own life be mastered well enough by recognising the social rights of the other? The basic question, a more theoretical one, concerns how concepts of social equality and cultural inequality become expressed, articulated and defined in different inclusion and exclusion processes when social identities of *minorities* or *deviates* are formed, labelled and stabilized. An opposite question, also important to be presented, concerns needs, demands and interests of minorities. How are these aspects propagated and manipulated when presented in the publicity?

Towards conclusions

Social life in a civilized society is a jungle of cultural barriers, which have to be overcome, broken or melted away before we can feel togetherness and trust each other to be in touch more than just momentarily and for utilitarian purposes. On the other hand, moral principles of social care-taking are increasingly challenging. Even ethical demands tend to be characterised by instrumentalism in the late modern risk-societies, where processes of privatization, managerialism and competitiveness are forwarded and individualization is promoted in institutionalized life-political means. The principal issue discussed here concerns democratic strategies for overcoming or discharging social barriers formed by means of humiliation, marginalisation and discrimination. What is the role of politics of culture in this respect? The meaningfulness of specific cultural practices and membership properties in maintaining symbolic values of dominant groups in certain societies are important aspects to take into consideration in so far as discriminating, even alienating processes are concerned. It is crucial to understand how the inferiority of certain minority cultures is produced, maintained and legitimised by the power elites. Those cultural elements which are represented by negatively identified minorities

are disapproved, therefore seen meaningless if not dangerous, and bearers of the inferior symbolic values are socially marginalised, isolated, and excluded from the members' circle of togetherness.

Is it possible for the representatives of discriminated minorities, and if so by what means, to overcome or to avoid processes of isolation and alienation without being put into a deviant positions? Is adoption of the cultural values of the majority the only positive strategy for those aiming at equal citizenship, therefore at inclusive social membership in the real world of democracy (see e.g. Lister 2003, 199-202)? What about post-structural, in other words neo-liberal ways to celebrate cultural differences? Does this strategy of celebration mean that it becomes possible even for discriminated people to be heroes of their own lives just because the extraordinary, distinctive aspect which brought difficulties in to be experienced by them? We know that difficult experiences can be worked out creatively, therefore in culturally productive ways. This aspect is interesting to contemplate in the current multicultural world where sensation-like cultural distinctions are produced, performed, celebrated and promoted. It is possible that social inequalities are increasingly justified as culturally valid differentiations. It is also possible to cover problems of racism by terms of ethnicity which are designed further to be distinctive identity-positions, all having a minority status, however, without equal citizen rights as compared to the power majority. The more there are culturally distinctive minority groups demanding citizen rights inside certain member communities, the more also needs for discursively negotiated, continuously renewed legitimacy strategies for identification of equality deficiencies are increasing.

Postmodern cultural politics can be understood as being formed of simulative plays, played in order to reconstruct and signify anew cultural signs of modern subjectivity. In the spheres of discursive practices the need for new interpretative models of cultural identities will be expressed through "struggles of naming", which means articulation of identification demands and, further, new discursive terrain for sociality as a continuously reformed field of contestation (see Barker 2000, 355-357). Even when being hopeful it is always contingent whether these kinds of political strategies, let us say new kinds of politics, are satisfactory (and to whom). A popularized signal strategy might be successful for some political actors who represent some social margin in the modern society. Their cultural interests are hoped to be strengthened by being identified publicly and then supported by larger groups of citizens, and at last by majorities. The inclusive, therefore affirmative use of new concepts which start to live their own conceptual life even as separated from the meanings of their inventors, like sociality (Bauman 1992), neo-tribalism (Maffesoli 1996) or life-politics (Giddens 1991), includes tendencies to generate the ideal values of democracy, which are useful for forming singular communities of

multicultural individuals. An increasing demand to extend the boundaries of culturally valued social space will strategically express tolerance towards all diverse interests which are politically represented. This way, politics of minorities can be turned to serve affirmative interests of political majorities, if the minorities are not conscious enough of their demands to be represented in the cultural political power field.

But let us be convinced that even those who are small and weak, therefore always representing only minorities, can have meaningful experiences of brave necessity of their presence in specific situations, even for their own count. Think metaphorically about Piglet in *Winnie-the-Pooh* by A. A. Milne. Piglet does a Very Grand Thing because she is the only one who can go through the post hatch out of a house which was blown down, and because she wants to save her friends even though she is quite afraid of the demands of the task:

> *"It won't break", whispered Pooh comfortingly, "because you're a Small animal, and I'll stand underneath, and if you save us all, it will be Very Grand Thing to talk about afterwards, and perhaps I'll make up a song, and people will say: "It was so grand what Piglet did that a Respectful Pooh song was made about it!"* (Milne 1986, 285).

A sense of belonging to the same circle of interdependence can strategically improve the possibilities of the weaker partner to obtain equal placement in the field of democracy.

The principal question is whether the field of action is shared by all participants. Furthermore, we must ask whether the participants acknowledge the legality of each other's demands, having a sense of community concerning their fate. These preconditions were not assumed in a discourse between the mastering wolf and the subordinated sheep. Trustfulness is the basis for mutual help when the needs of both partners are felt to be in concordance. However, feelings of sameness and equality are not necessarily preconditions for mutual help. According to another lesson, given by Aesop, a significant aspect is the expression of gratitude by a helpful mouse towards a benevolent lion. It is noteworthy that the smile of the lion is a sign of emotion and a source of the feeling of moral proximity, felt before a sense of togetherness is possible.

In certain risky situations, when the trustful life-conditions of all participants are threatened, even the smallest and weakest can be the strongest. The third lesson, taken from Winnie–the-Pooh regards how tiny but brave Piglet saves her friends in a chaotic situation. Piglet is just a heroine among her equals, having courage enough when supported by her nearest fellow-fighters. This is a human strategy, metaphorically forwarded by a small animal.

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Jim McGuigan

Cultural Analysis and Policys in the Information Age

Introduction

What I have to say is in two parts. First, I want to consider the theoretical relations between cultural analysis and cultural policy. Second, in light of developments concerning information and communication technologies (ICTs), I want to reconsider the problem of technological determinism and remark upon the global dynamics of capitalism and the preponderance of branding culture.

Consideration of such issues should be seen as connected to the general sociological task of making sense of change in culture and society at the present time, which relates to a host of characterisations of what has been going on lately: for instance, 'the postmodern condition' (Lyotard 1984 [1979]), 'postmodernization' (Crook et al 1992), 'runaway world' (Giddens 1999), 'global risk society' (Beck 1999), 'network society' and 'the information age' (Castells 1996, 1997a & 1998).

My thoughts are prompted especially by Manuel Castells's trilogy, *The Information Age*, specifically with regard to clarifying the principles of cultural analysis and formulating urgent problems of cultural policy in what is said to be a dramatically transformed socio-economic condition. There are theoretical, practical and empirical issues to do with the objects of cultural analysis, the role of public policy, technological forces and global relations.

Cultural Analysis

It is a truism that use of the term 'culture' has proliferated to such an extent that it has become virtually meaningless. Everything is culture, so we are told. Here, we are not just talking about the arts and leisure but, literally, everything. Apparently, there is such a phenomenon as 'management culture' and 'culture change' in business (Anthony 1994). There are cultures of everything: 'body culture', 'consumer culture', 'work culture', 'dependency culture', 'black culture', 'white culture', 'Western culture', etc., etc., etc.

It has even been declared that we live in 'the culture society'. What does this mean? In the early 1990s, Hermann Schwengel (1991) compared the 'enterprise culture' promoted by late-Thatcherism in Britain with West Germany's *Kulturgesellschaft*. Both responded to changing economic conditions, the shift from a 'Fordist' industrial economy to a 'post-Fordist' informational economy in which making things was giving way to making meanings. While manual work, actually making the stuff, was being shuffled off to cheap labour markets in poor parts of the world, rich countries, with their voracious consumerism and great metropolitan centres, were the coordinating nodes for distribution and valorisation on a global scale. Research, development, design and marketing were also becoming increasingly prominent features of economic activity in the affluent world.

Thatcherism had sought to overthrow British social democracy in order to create a thoroughly Americanised culture and society driven by free-market imperatives: the objective and, indeed, subjective reality of 'enterprise culture'. At the same time, European continental states like the Federal Republic of Germany were still seeking a 'middle way'. In some sense, *Kulturgesellschaft* was supposed to ameliorate the harsh realities of a rapidly changing economy. In contrast, 'enterprise culture' was supposed to intensify those harsh realities, making everyone a risk-taking capitalist, sovereign consumer and flexible subject.

The concept of *Kulturgesellschaft* was casually adopted by Angela McRobbie (1999) to name what she believed was the socio-cultural reality of Britain a few years later. What does she mean by 'the culture society'? Something more like *Kunstgesellschaft* or, in Mike Featherstone's (1991, 65) much over-used phrase, 'the aestheticization of everyday life', which he says is to do with 'the effacement of the boundary between art and everyday life'. In this insoucient formulation, life itself has become art, not just for Oscar Wilde but for everyone. We're all dandies now, so that line of reasoning goes. 'The aestheticization of everyday life' depicts the semiosis of consumption whereby commodities are said to be sought more for their sign value, in a Baudrillardian move, than for

their use value, which conveniently neglects the question of exchange value, that is, paying for the goodies.

It is difficult to comment upon McRobbie's particular use of 'the culture society' since it is so hard to figure out exactly what she means by it. It seems to have something to do with cultural work, its growth and the policy problems arising due to a shift from state subsidy to market survival in the cultural field. There has to be a necessary scepticism, however, about the novelty of such developments. Problems of making and sustaining creative careers under conditions of fierce competition, exploitation and public indifference are not new. McRobbie's foray into cultural policy, then, manifests a typically postmodernist amnesia in which anything longer than short-term memory is collapsed into the present and elided in mainstream political discourse and policy discussion about 'modernisation', with no consideration whatsoever of its significance in a time scale greater than a term of governmental office. Governments are always 'modernising' and cultural analysts who wish to be relevant are forever caught in the slipstream of day-to-day politics. Cultural workers in general, however, have never had it easy. Even under conditions of the modern state's patronage at its height, only the select few benefited substantially from public *largesse* (see, for instance, McGuigan 1981).

As McRobbie says, 'There has to be some way of being an artist and making a living' (1999, 8). This is her apology for the marketing ploys of young British art, the loose grouping of 'yBas' such as Damien Hirst and Tracey Emin in the 1990s, much of which McRobbie otherwise finds deplorable. Her comments on this 'movement' are fierce: 'cynical, apolitical individualism, as well as the weary, not to say, tawdry, disengagement'; 'casual, promiscuous, populist art, which wishes to be repositioned inside the chat show world of celebrity culture, alongside sponsorship deals, in the restaurants and at the very heart of consumer culture' (6). This was a generation of artists, tutored in Marxism and feminism, who cocked a snook at their Leftist elders and took Charles Saatchi's money to concoct 'Sensation' just for the hell of it (see Hatton & Walker 2000). McRobbie asks wryly, 'Given the "Nikeification" of culture, are the artists... literally "Just doing it"?' She implies there is nothing else to do. On the other hand, the *demi-monde* of black dance music, drum'n'base, and DJing, a subversive aesthetic, in McRobbie's estimation, compares favorably with degenerate high art. But, like young British fashion designers trained in aesthetics rather than cutting and sewing, yet feeding mostly off street culture for inspiration, 'the economies underpinning their activities are more apparent, indeed virtual, than real' (19). The last Conservative government's start-up schemes for small business were more useful to all these currents of cultural production than any judgemental arts policy or waffle about 'rebranding' Bri-

tain (Leonard 1997), according to McRobbie. Get real, get an MBA, seems to be the message for seriously ambitious cultural workers.

Although stated with some remnant of critical distance, McRobbie's arguments are not so very different from the economic realism of the New Labour think tank, Demos, which recommended 'governing by cultures' (Perri 1995, 6), 'the new enterprise culture' (Mulgan & Perri 1996,6), and 'the creative age' (Seltzer & Bentley 1999); and, applauded Britain's new cultural entrepreneurs' enthusiastically (Leadbeater & Oakley 1999). McRobbie herself, likewise, is concerned with the coalescence of art and business, the connections between culture and economy, which is an interesting switch of attention for such an epitome of anti-economistic cultural studies. What McRobbie does not comment upon is that the proliferating use of 'culture' to obliterate distinctions between quite different practices and to be caught up in the empty abstraction of 'the culture society' might have something to do with the impact of cultural studies itself. Or, perhaps, the academic *enfant terrible* of cultural studies is not so radically alternative to mainstream thought as is usually made out.

Earlier cultural studies challenged the exclusivity of Culture with a capital C. This was a spectacularly successful populist move in the academic/political game (McGuigan 1992 & 1997). Its critical intervention became muted, however, as belief in the possibility of socialism diminished and as the micro-politics of mundane consumption, resistance and identity rose to the ascendancy. The guru of neo-Gramscian hegemony theory, Stuart Hall went down the identity route, still, however, with a critical edge (Hall & du Gay 1996). Others, most notably Tony Bennett (1992), went down the route of managerial usefulness.

Earlier cultural studies had also sought to relate expressive culture in general to culture in the anthropological sense, the customs and routines of everyday life. Raymond Williams (1961) established the holistic perspective of cultural analysis as 'the study of relations in a whole way of life'. Recent commentators (such as Couldry 2000) have identified holism as the problem rather than the solution. We are supposed, instead, to study flows of meaning and interaction, differentiating and intersecting *cultures* in any space, not *culture* as a unitary whole in one space.

There is a danger here, however, of forgetting some of the original questions that connected expressive form to everyday life: for instance, what would analysing television flow and television-viewing tell us about the social world we live in? Williams's (1974, 26) answer focused upon *mobile privatisation*, 'an at once mobile and home-centred way of living'. The ordinary person is simultaneously cut off physically from the outside world, turned inwards, while transported outwards to other worlds through screened images. This 'unique modern condition' has formed much of the texture of everyday life in older

industrial states for some time and is becoming increasingly globalised. It has reached its nadir in the United States, where the automobile, the emblematic companion to the television set and, now, the on-line computer and mobile phone as well, protects its passengers from terrifying public space. As Williams (1985 [1983], 188) was to comment: 'What it [mobile privatisation] means is that at most active social levels people are increasingly living as private small-family units, or, disrupting even that, as private and deliberately self-enclosed individuals, while at the same time there is a quite unprecedented mobility of such restricted privacies' (see McGuigan 1993, for further comment).

Now and again a stock-taking of cultural studies occurs (Ferguson & Golding 1997, for example). This happened yet again at the turn of the Millennium when cultural studies returned nostalgically to its ostensible yet mystified place of origin, the University of Birmingham in the English Midlands, for the third international Crossroads conference. There was also a flood of actuarial books (for instance Couldry 2000, Eagleton 2000, Garnham 2000a, Mulhern 2000, Tudor 1999, Wilson 2000). One of the most interesting of these stock-takings is Terry Eagleton's *The Idea of Culture*, not least because it is written by Williams's most famous student in the field.

Retracing Williams's steps and going a little further, Eagleton explores the history of discourses around 'culture', particularly stressing the Romantic opposition to capitalist 'civilization' which had resurfaced, by the end of the second Christian Millennium, in the vitalism and particularism of postmodernism. Nicholas Garnham (2000a), incidentally, holds a similar view, that the postmodernists are simply rerunning a series of counter-Enlightenment themes, familiar from the work of Nietszche and others. Eagleton, however, does not offer an unqualified defence of the Enlightenment legacy or its Romantic complement (see McGuigan 1999). Culture and Civilization, with their capital Cs, are rightly challenged by lower-case cultures and, indeed, civilizations, especially when it comes to the Rest's revenge on the West. Post-colonialism, identity politics and various oppositional movements all make perfectly legitimate claims to challenge the Reason and Romance of Modernity.

Most incisively, however, Eagleton questions the ubiquity of cultural discourse: 'The primary problems which we confront in the new millennium – war, famine, poverty, disease, debt, drugs, environmental pollution, the displacement of peoples – are not especially cultural at all' (2000, 130). According to Eagleton, 'culture' needs to be 'put back in its place' (131). The difficulty is that the term 'culture' is, on the one hand, too broad and, on the other hand, too narrow. For reining in culture, Eagleton rejects Williams's mature solution to the problem. Williams had moved from 'the analysis of culture' as 'the study of relations in a whole way of life' of *The Long Revolution* - which is really a general sociology - to the more precisely focused

study of culture as 'signifying practice', a communicational definition of the concept, in his book of 1981, *Culture*. Eagleton describes this solution as 'a semiotic definition of culture which was ephemerally popular in the 1970s' (33). In Eagleton's opinion, it merely restates 'the traditional aesthetic/utility dichotomy' (34). While simple dichotomies and binary thinking in general are to be avoided, nevertheless, Eagleton's own normative view of culture as in some sense transcendent and not utilitarian rather contradicts his objection to defining culture as 'signifying practice'.

Garnham (2000a & 2000b) similarly objects to this definition of culture as 'signifying practice' but on slightly different grounds from Eagleton. First, for him, it is associated with the 'linguistic turn' of structuralism and post-structuralism, reiterated in Hall's (1997) irreducible meaningfulness of all social practices. The trouble is that in this theoretical framework everything becomes language or discourse with no material outside of signification. Second, Garnham (2000b) has argued, it is impossible to distinguish between signifying and non-signifying practices if every practice is treated as of equally symbolic weight and, therefore, cultural.

There is, however, a solution to the problem implicit in Williams's formulation of culture as a '*realized signifying system*' (1981a, 207). Some systems are not first and foremost about signification and symbolic exchange, for instance, economic and social systems. As Williams observes, 'This distinction is not made to separate and disjoin these areas, but to make room for analysis of their interrelations' (207). Exactly. It is analytically useful to be able to distinguish between that which is primarily cultural, in the sense of signifying practice, from that which is not. For example, 'business culture' is not cultural in the precise and restricted sense of signifying practice as its *raison d'etre*. 'Business culture' is not first and foremost about the exchange of meanings. It is principally about the exchange of commodities and services. A feature film may be a commodity and the cinematic institution provides a service in the cultural marketplace but, nevertheless, it is principally about the exchange of meanings, communication and pleasure. In this sense, 'cinematic culture' is different from 'business culture', however meaningful that may be, and should, therefore, be distinguished from it on analytical grounds and probably ontological grounds as well.

It makes sense to focus upon those practices, forms and products that are primarily about signification and symbolic exchange as the special objects of cultural analysis, yet it would be mistaken to isolate them from their actual and material conditions of social production and circulation (see Williams 1981b). Cultural analysis should draw upon a range of perspectives in order to open up the multidimensionality of culture. Douglas Kellner (1997, 34) identifies three dimensions of cultural analysis: '(1) the production and political

economy of culture; (2) textual analysis and critique of its artefacts; (3) study of audience reception and the use of media and cultural products.' Kellner's model begins from production and is critical in intent. It has affinities with the Open University's 'circuit of culture' model, which adds, however, two further dimensions - identity and regulation - to production, representation and consumption (du Gay et al 1997). Although questionably disposed to begin with consumption rather than production, the Open University model usefully connects cultural analysis to cultural policy by inserting issues of identity and regulation into the circuit. A cultural circuit model of analysis in some form is the most satisfactory means of framing research on practices that are first and foremost about signification. While the general framework needs to be kept in mind, this does not mean that particular studies should always and necessarily complete the circuit. In many and perhaps most cases this analytical protocol would be far too demanding. None the less, commitment to the study of culture in circulation, on ontological and methodological grounds, is a vital check on the deficiencies of various kinds of partiality.

The analytical issues are to do with methodological scope and self-imposed limitation. The position outlined here makes sense but there is no way of enforcing it. Cultural analysts are by no means obliged to confine their studies to practices that are first and foremost about signification, symbolic exchange and pleasure. In fact, cultural studies has been characterised by what might be deemed profligacy in this respect. It should, arguably, have been yet more profligate and looked closely, for instance, at the cultural aspects of business if it were really serious about unpicking the relations between culture and power. Paul du Gay's (1996) work in this area is a notable exception, though curiously uncritical in its approach to the 'making up' of workers. Its use of 'culture' is closer to a managerial paradigm than critical cultural analysis.

There is absolutely no point, however, in trying to prohibit, by definitional fiat, use of the term 'culture' to refer to the significatory features of any practice, including practices that are not principally about making meanings, like making money. Still, the term 'culture' is over-used, possibly to the point of meaninglessness; and, this raises all sorts of problems, not only methodological but also political.

Cultural Policy

The problem of the scope and limitation of cultural discourse is particularly manifest in the project of 'putting policy into cultural studies' (Bennett 1992). While it is generally agreed that a focal concern of cultural studies – and, perhaps, its defining feature – is the interrelation of culture and power, Tony

Bennett was right to suggest that cultural studies, as normally practiced, was largely detached from the real world of politics, in the sense of policy-making and administration. For a field of study that prides itself on being 'political', this was a damning indictment. Bennett argued, controversially, that education in cultural studies should aim to turn out 'technicians' who engage with what actually happens on the field of play instead of 'critics' shouting or muttering from the sidelines. This argument was justified according to Michel Foucault's (1991 [1978]) theory of governmentality and supplemented by that theorist's interest in 'technologies of the self' (Foucault 2000 [1982]).

Foucault's concept of governmentality refers very generally to the administrative apparatus of modernity, the emergence of the modern state and its powers of social regulation. This opens up a much larger space of power than the modern state's role in cultural policy, that is, if 'culture' is restricted to practices that are first and foremost about signification. The state's economic and penal policies may be meaningful but they are not first and foremost about signification; they are about wealth creation and incarceration. The twentieth-century idea of 'cultural policy' was focused upon a comparatively narrow conception of culture - referring to practices that are principally about communication, meaningful exchange and pleasure. States intervened in the cultural field, subsidised 'the arts' and so forth, for various purposes: nationalistic, propagandistic, and redistributive; in general, regulating the production and circulation of symbolic forms.

The Foucault-Bennett position has been criticised for its instrumentalism, excessive pragmatism, managerialism and lack of critical responsibility (McGuigan 1996). In addition to these criticisms, there are two further issue clusters to consider regarding cultural policy studies. The first cluster of issues is historical and conceptual; the second, sociological and empirical.

The Foucauldian notion of governmentality quite deliberately obscures historical distinctions between state and market, politics and economics. This derives from a theoreticism which treats the empirical phenomenon of government, state rule, as a naive object. Moreover, government and capitalism, which is hardly mentioned as such, are treated as undifferentiated elements of disciplinary power. From this perspective, disciplinary power is the driving force of modernity, a view which is as reductive in its own way as an economistic Marxism that would reduce everything to capital accumulation and the logic of capital so that actual differences of government are rendered irrelevant. For the Foucauldian, it is the imposition of disciplinary power and resistance to it that counts, subjective enslavement and micro-political manoeurvres. Such a position makes it very difficult to grasp the nuances of the historical record: for instance, the broad political difference made by social democracy to the capital/labour struggle and distribution of rights and rewards during the

twentieth century (Sassoon 1997 [1996], Lipset & Marks 2000), not to mention its specific impact on cultural policy. Which is not to say you cannot have Left or Right Foucauldianism. Left Foucauldianism is anarchistic resistance to the system in general, Foucault's own political position. Right Foucauldianism is accommodation to the prevailing powers of social management, implicit in Bennett's position on cultural policy studies.

Although Foucauldianism plays down the politics of actual government, it is, nevertheless, in practice, trapped within a nation-state framework, which becomes particularly problematical for addressing globalisation. In effect, it repeats the elementary sociological fallacy of treating society as a nation-state. This is not unrelated to the conflation of state and capital in 'governmentality'. It is symptomatic of such philosophical obscurantism, in terms of apparently innocent research, curiously enough, that Tony Bennett has tended to promote a mainly nationalistic concern with culture and cultural policy. He did so as Director of the Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy's work in connection to the Australian Labour Government's 'Creative Nation' agenda in the 1990s. More recently, in the Open University's 'National Everyday Cultures' program, endorsed by New Labour's minister of culture, Chris Smith, at a conference in May 2000, Bennett's agenda is yet again framed by the nation-state.

Quite simply, such a theoretical position, whilst privileging certain important issues from a nation-state perspective, provides no conceptual grounds for formulating and addressing empirical questions of culture and power internationally, except, for example, under the auspices of formal inter-state collaboration as in the European Union and Council of Europe. Capital operates, indeed, in alliance with nation-states and inter-state arrangements, such as represented by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, but it is not formed by these alliances and arrangements. Global capitalism is in an important sense stateless; so is much of cultural flow, in addition to financial flow, in the contemporary world.

The trouble is that the Foucault-Bennett perspective provides no account of how the world may be changing and the balance of power between nation-states and economic forces beyond their control, which is exactly the kind of problem that Manuel Castells has made such strenuous efforts to explain in his thesis on 'the information age'. This connects up with a fundamental political issue of the present: how does democratically representative power – as inscribed in actual governments, not just governmentality in the abstract – promote and/or resist the powers of global capital? The problem turns on the question of regulation in general and, for our purposes here, cultural regulation in particular.

Like so many terms in cultural discourse, 'regulation' has several meanings. In the first instance, it is useful to distinguish between theoretical and empirical

problems, roughly, of control. In contemporary theory, several versions of regulation may be identified: the Althusserian theory of ideology and ideological state apparatuses (the ISAs); Gramscian hegemony theory, concerned with 'moral regulation', and its economistic offshoot in 'regulation theory', which makes a crucial distinction between 'regime of accumulation' (capitalism) and 'mode of regulation' (social life); and, Foucauldian 'discursive formation' theory (Thompson 1997). Such theories may be seen as radically incommensurate or, alternatively, available for synthesis. The general point to make, though, is that, in one way or another, they all assume that social relations and cultural practices are regulated. Theoretical debate in this area often turns on which regulatory determination predominates - economic, political, ideological/discursive - or whether there is some multicausal determination of the rules and regulations of culture and society.

Whatever way round, social and cultural theories of regulation operate typically in a different discursive field from public debates concerning 're-gulation, de-regulation and re-regulation', in effect, at a completely different level of abstraction. For instance, cultural and media industries previously owned by the state may be privatised. It might commonly be assumed that they have thus been 'de-regulated'. It is more accurate, however, to see them as having been 're-regulated'. Most obviously, regulation has moved, in this case, from the preserve of the state to the operation of market forces, from manifestly political to economic regulation. However, state power, in the empirical sense of government, and law will still play a role in regulating the market, lightly or otherwise. This may take national and international forms. At the extreme, for governments not to set ground rules at all is, in effect, a regulatory policy. This is where theory and practice might just about meet. The question then becomes: what kind of regulation, under what conditions and with what effects? As with social process in general, it is reasonable to expect a complex interplay between agency and structure, resulting in unintended as well as intended consequences, which is an elementary sociological proposition (Giddens 1984).

Much less concerned with theory than with the 'real world' of politics, Richard Collins and Christina Murroni (1996) have set out an imaginative framework for media and communications policy in Britain. This is situated in reference to, first, their dissatisfaction with both 'Old Left' and 'New Right' policies and, second, the opportunities and problems arising from technological change in the media, digitalisation, convergence and so forth. According to Collins and Murroni:

> *The assumptions of the new right and the old left are fundamentally opposed. The new right starts from consumer sovereignty, the old left from a desire to*

protect the public from itself - correcting consumer tastes, or at least the results of consumer choice. The new right's solution, competition, is the old left's problem. The new right's problem, corporatism, is the old left's solution. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the media reform debate has resembled a dialogue of the deaf. This would have been of limited concern if one of the sides had proved its case. However, media policy on both sides has been restricted by different, but equally flawed assumptions. We need to abandon such tribalism to allow a new, radical, synthesis of these approaches. (1996, 10)

Collins and Murroni concede a great deal to the New Right by, for example, pointing to the beneficial cultural and economic effects of marketisation in broadcasting (especially, the introduction of commercial television in the 1950s) and the privatisation of telecommunications in the 1990s. However, they do not accept free-market fundamentalism. In many cases, market forces have to be restrained in the public interest. Inspired by the 1994 Borrie commission on *Social Justice*, Collins and Murroni identify four principles to be applied not only in social policy but also in media policy: security, opportunity, democracy and fairness. These principles, according to Collins and Murroni, need to be applied case by case in recognition of the variable benefits and deficiencies of both state and market regulation. For instance, in the case of the BBC, it should remain the flagship for public service broadcasting, become more accountable to producer and, in particular, consumer/citizen interests, whilst also competing commercially in international markets. In order to achieve these different aims successfully, organizational change at the BBC is necessary, going beyond the new managerialism of the 1990s, particularly in order to stop the corporation subsidising its commercial operation from the public interest budget. The fact that the BBC went on doing exactly that in order to develop its digital services, in the late-1990s and into the twenty-first century, demonstrates that even Collins and Murroni's carefully thought out technical solutions, in this case, to the problem of reconfiguring public service broadcasting in a dramatically changed media environment, did not readily translate into sympathetic governmental policy. Their book, *New Media, New Policies*, like the *Social Justice* report, was produced under the auspices of the New Labout think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).

Identifying problems in a realistic manner and offering practical solutions to governments and other agencies are indeed proper tasks for applied cultural and media studies. In this respect, the positions of both Bennett, from a Foucauldian perspective, and Collins and Murroni, from a political economy perspective, are strikingly similar. Such engagement is necessary and vital but, in the short term and quite possibly the longer term as well, it may frequently lead to frustration with the 'real world' of politics. Paradoxically, a critical

independence in cultural policy studies is less frustrating since its expectations of governmental enlightenment and reason are more sceptical, albeit at the risk of practical irrelevance. Critical cultural policy analysis is permitted, however, to ask awkward questions about the conditions of culture and society in the world at large that go beyond the self-imposed limitations of management consultancy and policy-wonking (McGuigan 1995).

Technological Determinism

The title of Collins and Murroni's book, *New Media, New Policies*, quite reasonably implies the need for policy responses to the emergence of newer communications media. Although Collins and Murroni themselves are not technological determinists, the title of their book lends itself to such a misinterpretation of their position. Also, it has to be said, whether new media technologies are met with obstinate suspicion or inordinate enthusiasm, pessimism or optimism, it is too frequently the case that the determinate power of technology over culture and society is just taken for granted.

Technological determinism assumes a simple unilinear process of scientific discovery applied to technical invention, diffusion and eventual social transformation. It is not just a simplistic model of socio-technical change; it is a dominant ideology. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) – satellites, microchips, desktop and laptop computers, the Internet, the World Wide Web, mobile phones, digitalisation, convergence – are said to be changing our world by experts, such as Nicholas Negroponte (1995) of the Massachussetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Media Lab, and by politicians, most famously, in Al Gore's 1994 declaration of the 'Information Super Highway'. The Americans were anxious about the Japanese getting ahead in these matters. The Europeans were worried that the Americans had the edge over them (Bangemann 1995). There is a rhetoric of 'catching up' and of not being 'left behind'. The British, for instance, typically see themselves simultaneously ahead of the game *and*, somehow, behind it, as both inventive and commercially inept. Hence, the mad rush into the Klondyke of 'e.commerce' during 2000 to make amends (New Statesman 10-7-00).

On technological determinism and its hype – expert, political and commonsensical – there are two general questions to ask. First, how do new media technologies come about? Second, what is the relationship of new technology to social and cultural change? With regard to both questions, it is worth recalling what Raymond Williams had to say.

Williams's (1974) critique of technological determinism, with reference to the invention and social use of television, is well known but the comple-

xity of his position is not always fully appreciated. As well as contesting the 'orthodox' view that the relationship between technology and social organization is unicausal and unilinear, moving unimpeded from the former to the latter, Williams also challenged the opposite viewpoint, that of 'symptomatic technology', which assumes that technological innovation is only the effect of deeper social change. Instead of seeing technology as all-determining, characteristic of 'post-industrial' theory and politics, or as merely symptomatic of, say, the processes of capital accumulation, Williams insisted on *intentionality*. Scientific discovery occurs in determinate social and cultural conditions and is applied quite deliberately to produce technical solutions to problems that are identified and selected in an active process of transformation.

Thus, television is the combination of inventive developments in electricity, telegraphy, photography, cinematography and radio from the late nineteenth century, installed in the 1930s as the result of specific economic and political decisions that varied from one nation to another: in Britain, centralised transmission by a public corporation for domestic reception; in the USA, a federalised system based on advertising revenue; in Germany, reception in public rather than private spaces. There was nothing inevitable about the advent of television, nor is there anything strictly inevitable about its future. The technological possibilities associated with cable and satellite transmission, video-cassette recording, large-screen receivers and the rest, already on the agenda when Williams was writing about television in the early 1970s, are open to differential deployment according to alternative ideologies and investment strategies.

The argument about television connects up with Williams's general position on *determination*, enunciated against both economic and technological *determinism*: 'the reality of determination is the setting of limits and the exertion of pressures, within which variable social practices are profoundly affected but never necessarily controlled' (Williams 1974, 130). New media technologies might trigger further democratic cultural expansion, but that would depend upon the prevailing balance of forces, particularly resistance to the limits and pressures exerted by capital. Williams concluded *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* on a prophetic note:

> *Over a wide range from general television through commercial advertising to centralised information and date-processing systems, the technology that is now or is becoming available can be used to affect, to alter, and in some cases to control our whole social process. And it is ironic that the uses offer such extreme social choices. We could have inexpensive, locally based yet internationally extended television systems, making possible communication and information-sharing on a scale that not long ago would have seemed utopian.*

These are the contemporary tools of the long revolution towards an educated and participatory democracy, and of the recovery of effective communication in complex urban and industrial societies. But they are also tools of what would be, in context, a short and successful counter-revolution, in which under the cover of talk about choice and competition, a few para-national corporations, with their attendant states and agencies, could reach farther into our lives, at every level from news to psycho-drama, until individual and collective response in many different kinds of experience and problem became almost limited to choice between their programmed possibilities. (1974, 151)

Leaving aside the epochal question for the moment, Brian Winston (1995 [1990] & 1996) has refined Williams's basic ideas concerning the development of television into a sophisticated model of 'how media are born'. Winston (1996, 3) follows 'Williams's fundamental insight as to the primacy of the social sphere.' Also, following Braudel, he identifies a dialectic of 'accelerators' and 'brakes' in the application of scientific knowledge to technological development and diffusion. Through detailed historical case studies - including the advent of cinema, the racism of colour film chemistry, the marginalisation of 16mm as 'amateur' until its eventual deployment in television news, the dead end of analogue high-definition television (HDTV), and the limbo status of holography - Winston demonstrates the historical contingencies of 'new media' emergence.

There always has to be a 'supervening social necessity' behind the emergence of a new medium. In the case of cinema, the formation of a mass entertainment market and the sociality of theatre in an urban-industrial society, were at least as important determinants, if not more so, than the inventiveness of 'great men', the myth of orthodox cinematic history. As well as supervening social necessities, accelerating the development of a medium at a particular moment in time, there is the brake on development, what Winston calls 'the "law" of the suppression of radical potential' (9). In the case of the denigration of 16mm film, its use thereby confined for decades to 'amateurs' and 'subversives', classic Hollywood's expensive 'standard' of 35mm was a means of controlling entry to the industry.

The answer, then, to the first question - how do new media technologies come about?: through a complex interplay of largely social factors in specific historical circumstances. The production of scientific knowledge is itself socially conditioned in terms of resource facilitation and institutional context. There is, however, no guarantee that new knowledge will be applied to technological development, certainly not in the short term. Technological development often deploys knowledges that have been around for a while but hitherto not used to create a new product or medium of communication. There are cultural,

economic and political brakes on technological development. The acceleration of technological development, on the other hand, typically occurs when there are social forces in play that make such development compelling.

We can now address the second question - what is the relationship of new technology to social and cultural change? Like the narrower question of how new media are born, the broader question concerning epochal change can only be answered by general propositions supported by the evidence of historical research. It is said that we are currently entering a new epoch, 'the information age', which is connected to dramatic technological developments. The greatest account of this epochal transformation is Manuel Castells's three-volume study, *The Information Age* (see Castells 1987b, McGuigan 1999, ch. 5, for detailed summaries of the thesis). Castells is much less concerned with explaining the historical causes of this transformation than with identifying its contours, at the centre of which is networking, facilitated by ICTs but of more general significance for social relations and symbolic exchange throughout the whole wide world. Nevertheless, Castells is still obliged to provide a sketch of the emergence of 'network sociey' before describing its characteristics. In the opening pages of *The Rise of the Network Society*, Castells says:

> *Toward the end of the second millennium of the Christian Era several events of historical significance have transformed the social landscape of human life. A technological revolution, centered around information technologies, is reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of society. Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state, and society, in a system of variable geometry. The collapse of Soviet statism, and the subsequent demise of the international communist movement, has undermined for the time being the historical challenge to capitalism, rescued the political left (and Marxian theory) from the fatal attraction of Marxism-Leninism, brought the Cold War to an end, reduced the risk of nuclear holocaust, and fundamentally altered global geopolitics. Capitalism itself has undergone a process of profound restructuring, characterized by greater flexibility in management; decentralization and networking of firms both internally and in their relationships to other firms; considerable empowering of capital vis-a-vis labor, with the concomitant decline of the labor movement; increasing individualization and diversification of working relationships; massive incorporation of women into the paid labor force, usually under discriminatory conditions; intervention of the state to deregulate markets selectively, and to undo the welfare state...* (1996, 1-2)

This is a big picture, setting the scene for contemporary globalisation processes, including geographical shifts in manufacturing from the old industrialism of

Europe and North America to other labour markets, the rise of the Pacific Rim economy and the integration of finance and distribution across the globe. In his 'Introduction to the Information Age', Castells isolates the three 'independent processes' that have brought about this new world:

> *- The Information Technology Revolution, constituted as a paradigm in the 1970s.*
> *- The restructuring of capitalism and statism in the 1980s, aiming at superseding their contradictions, with sharply different outcomes.*
> *- The cultural social movements of the 1960s, and their 1970s aftermath (particularly feminism and ecologism).* (1997b, 7)

It is evident that, for Castells, capitalism's defeat of communism is not entirely separate from 'the information technology revolution'. In fact, his account of the collapse of Soviet statism stresses its failure to keep up with 'the informational mode of development' (Castells 1998). Opposition persists, however, in social movements of one kind or another.

Before discussing whether or not Castells is a technological determinist, it would be appropriate to consider what he actually has to say about the specifically cultural effects – that is, with regard to culture as first and foremost about signification – of 'the revolution'.

According to Castells, a 'culture of real virtuality' is emerging. This is both consistent with the general transformation and has its own peculiar consequences. First, 'Shifting to the cultural realm, we see the emergence of a similar pattern [to economics and politics] of networking, flexibility, and ephemeral symbolic communication, in a culture organized around electronic media, including in this communication system the computer-mediated communication networks' (1997b, 10). Second, 'the culture of real virtuality' should not simply be conflated with the head-set phenomenon of 'virtual reality' or, at least, not reduced to it. Castells says, 'when our symbolic environment is, by and large, structured in this inclusive, flexible, diversified hypertext, in which we navigate every day, the virtuality of this text is in fact our reality, the symbols from which we live and communicate' (1997b, 11).

For Castells, when it comes to culture, the medium really is the message. He explicitly acknowledges the influence of Marshall McLuhan (1964). Castells goes further than McLuhan and in a Baudrillardian direction, however, in claiming that computer-mediated communications are of greater significance than the advent and diffusion of television itself: 'The potential integration of text, images and sounds in the same system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen time (real or delayed) along a global network, in conditions of open and affordable access, does fundamentally change the character of communi-

cations' (1996, 328). Interactivity, picking and mixing, the potential capacity to download text from any cultural archive anywhere at any time, these are the characteristics of Castells's culture of real virtuality: it's all there on screen. Castells's rhetoric here is much closer to the extravagant hype of new media and Internet entrepreneurs than to a cool assessment of what is really going on in the cultural field. He has little to say about the commodification of art, entertainment and information or the intensification of mobile privatisation in home-based services, processes facilitated by ICTs but not exclusively engendered by them. It is not at all surprising, then, that Castells has been accused of technological determinism.

However, Castells astutely preempts the accusation of technological determinism. Right at the outset of the trilogy, he declares:

> *Of course technology does not determine society. Neither does society script the course of technological change, since many factors, including individual inventiveness and entrepreneurialism, intervene in the process of scientific discovery, technological innovation, and social applications, so that the final outcome depends on a complex process of interaction. Indeed, the dilemma of technological determinism is probably a false problem, since technology is society, and society cannot be understood or represented without its technological tools*. (1996, 5)

Castells stresses the importance of the Californian context of Silicon Valley – its bold entrepreneurialism and free-wheeling individualism left over from the Sixties' counter-culture – and state intervention, to whit, the US federal government's funding of ICT development for military reasons in the first instance. Unlike in the Soviet Union, it was permissible for such development to be exploited for academic, business, commercial and cultural purposes. Still, to equate society with technology rather contradicts Castells's own defence against the accusation of technological determinism.

One of his fiercest critics, Nicholas Garnham (1998) argues that Castells's information age thesis is a sophisticated up-dating of Daniel Bell's (1973) post-industrial/information society thesis; and, just as unconvincing. As with Bell's original claims concerning a wholesale shift from manufacturing to service and knowledge work, there are doubts over the sheer novelty of the present trends identified by Castells. Networking itself is hardly new. For instance, market capitalism has always been a complex network. Frank Webster (1999) argues similarly that 'the information age' is not so much a fresh epoch as, in many respects, a continuation of business as usual. Such critics point to how the enduring features of capitalism have become accentuated since the collapse of

European communism, the apparent eclipse of the 'socialist' alternative, and are, in effect, facilitated rather than altered by ICT development.

To clarify what is at stake, Peter Golding makes a valuable distinction between 'Technology One' and 'Technology Two':

> *Technology may be construed as the mechanisms by which human agency manipulates the material world. We can conceive of two forms of technological innovation. Technology One allows existing social action and process to occur more speedily, more efficiently, or conveniently (though equally possibly with negative consequences, such as pollution or risk). Technology Two enables wholly new forms of activity previously impracticable or even inconceivable. In essence many new ICTs are more obviously Technology One than Technology Two*. (2000, 171)

As Golding observes, the invention of telephony was vastly more consequential than the invention of email. Email may have distinctive communicative properties, as a hybrid of telephone conversation and letter-writing, yet it is very much in the business of facilitating speed, efficiency and convenience instead of bringing about something completely different. The really stunning developments in technology are not occurring so much in communications media as in biology, particularly genetic engineering. With the capability to decode and manipulate genes, modern science has acquired enormous power over life itself. In this situation, 'sociology finds itself disconcerted by the novelty that it may be easier to change human genetics than social or cultural context' (Golding 2000, 172).

The critique of technological determinism - which easily wins the intellectual debate if not the economic and political arguments - and scholarly questioning of its traces in Castells's information age thesis, whether in part or in total, are not inherently technophobic. Those successive technologies of one kind or another, historically, enable the conduct of social life and cultural expression in general is not by any means in doubt. The development and use of ICTs in the recent period, with their enormous capacities for symbolic manipulation and expanded communication, are key and, in many repects, liberating features of the late-modern world. However, excessive claims for the technological determination of culture and society are reasonably called into question for their explanatory inadequacies and ideological functions.

Although critics of techno-boosterism emphasise continuity over change – such as persistent and, indeed, worsening forms of domination, exclusion and inequality – it is probably wisest to assume that there is dialectic of continuity and change. For instance, Douglas Kellner (1999) has said that contemporary capitalism is best understood as 'technocapitalism'. The accumulative ends of

capital are served by rapid technological innovation and turnover, intensifying prevailing market and power relations. It does not follow, however, that newer media technologies are reducible to a capitalist logic in the range of their possible uses, though, to a large extent, they do indeed aid in the practical operation of such a logic. ICTs are also used actually and potentially for different ends, as Kellner notes: for criticism, education and resistance.

Moreover, it is vital that taken-for-granted assumptions and ideological claims about the inevitably globalising trends and outcomes of socio-technical transformation are challenged on grounds of human agency and democratic decision-making. On urban regeneration and telecommunications, Stephen Graham (1999) insists upon the scope for local agency, very much in line with Raymond Willams's stress on intentionality. And, John Downey (1999), surveying debate and policy within the European Union (EU), points to Manuel Castells's own personal contribution to the High Level Group of Experts' (HLEG) critique of Martin Bangemann's (1995) report, *Europe and the Global Information Society*. The Bangemann report displayed an all-too-familiar technological determinism, the usual bland inevitabilism and the catch-up anxiety at Europe's 'core'. The HLEG refused to support an uncritical business agenda and called, instead, for continental-wide policies to counter the socio-technical exclusion and marginalisation of peripheral, or, in EU discourse, 'cohesion' regions and, also, within deeply divided and unequal cities at the very core of European technocapitalism.

Branding Culture

Castells's general account of a transformed world – the arrival of 'the information age' – refers to three 'independent processes' unfolding over the past thirty to forty years: the information technology revolution; the restructuring of capitalism; and, the cultural struggles of oppositional movements. ICT development is intimately connected to the restructuring of capitalism and its victory over communism, resulting in global dominance – economically, politically and culturally – on a scale and with a scope that have never previously been witnessed in history. It has even been hailed as 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1989). That is not a view shared by Castells, who stresses human agency, struggle and perpetual change, albeit fundamentally mediated by ICTs whether for dominant forces or oppositional forces. However, his accent on technology to some extent distracts attention from economic and cultural processes that are anterior to ICT development yet, evidently, facilitated by it.

In her astonishing book, *No Logo*, Naomi Klein (2000a) places much greater emphasis on the restructuring of capitalism, the enhanced power of transnatio-

nal corporations and the ubiquity of branding culture than does Castells. She concentrates her attention particularly upon American-based corporations like McDonald's, Microsoft and Nike, though she also considers other nationally based corporations, for instance, Shell Klein (2000b, 25) points to 'a profound shift in corporate priorities... [which] centres on the idea of corporate branding and the quest to build the most powerful brand image'.

Nike, of course, is the epitome of the brand-led corporation and has been widely celebrated and criticised as such (see Goldman & Papson 1998). Based in the USA, Nike is a marketing outfit at its core. The swoosh logo is market leader worldwide in the construction of youthful uniformity, inscribed upon its sneakers and sweatshirts, and in defining the very meaning of sporting activity. Nike evinces an ideology of 'Just Do It', which is at the heart of the American Dream and has a transcendental resonance for fun-loving youth, individual aspiration and style consciousness across the globe.

Identifying with Nike - wearing the swoosh like a swastika - is supposed to transcend the commodity itself, that is, the use value of an expensively acquired pair of trainers. This is the intention of the post-Fordist corporation and it is realised in millions of acts of consumption. It is meant to be pure meaning, sign value over and above anything else. The brand is about signification first and foremost. It is culture in the comparatively narrow but not very narrow definition that was discussed earlier. Branding culture, then, is a legitimate object of critical cultural policy analysis.

Moreover, branding culture needs to be understood within its material conditions of existence as well as regarding its ideological effects. A pair of Air Jordans retailing at, say, $150 in the USA, cheaper than in Europe, will have cost around $5 to make by out-sourced workers on about a dollar or two a day in so-called 'export processing zones' (EPZs) or 'free-trade zones' in what used to be dubbed 'the Third World'.

Castells himself is very much concerned about processes of inclusion and exclusion. Some are released into 'the space of flows' by access to the most advanced means of communication while others are stuck in their places, left behind and, topographically speaking, outside the loop of 'the information age'. Castells's Weberian model of inequality, focusing upon the market dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, is clearly relevant to understanding geo-politics, economics and culture in the world today. However, there is another way of conceptualising inequality, which is more directly relevant to considering the relation between branding culture and the production of branded commodities in EPZs: this is *exploitation*; and, on a grand scale. Those who actually make the trainers are not so much excluded as, instead, included, but in a diabolically subordinate role, a veritable hell. As the evidence documented by Klein in *No Logo* demonstrates, the global rate of exploitation now being

conducted on behalf of branding culture would probably have made a nineteenth-century capitalist seeking Calvinist election experience a severe pang of Catholic guilt.

There is, of course, resistance, when oppositional forces - including trades unions, ecology groups, students and others - come together in what has been named an 'anti-capitalist' movement, some aspects of which are distinctly anarchistic and, indeed, theatrical (see St. Clair 1999, on the Seattle protest against the World Trade Organization). Acting out against big government and transnational capital is one thing; changing the power relations is another. Although Klein (2000c) herself admires the spontaneity and disordiliness of this international movement, coordinating its actions over the Internet, 'ad-busting' and 'culture-jamming', she has her own reservations as well about its ultimate effectivity (Klein 2000a). Court battles, like the McLibel trial (Vidal 1997), and a negotiated relationship to mainstream and governmental politics are necessary features of struggle. Moreover, forcing corporations on the defensive to produce ethical codes of practice, paper resolutions rather than genuine concessions, a typical outcome of apparently 'successful' campaigning, is not enough. Klein says: 'Political solutions - accountable to people and enforceable by their elected representatives - deserve another shot before we throw in the towel and settle for corporate codes, independent monitors and the privatization of our collective rights as citizens' (2000a, 442). In this respect, Klein's position is consistent with Jurgen Habermas's (1996 [1992]) latterday 'sluicegate' model of the public sphere in which oppositional social and cultural movements are the agents forcing issues onto governmental agendas that would not otherwise be there.

The general position is reminiscent of Steven Lukes's (1974) three-dimensional view of power. Political scientists were apt to study decision-making processes in isolation until it became evident that power is as much about not making decisions as making them. Both the one-dimensional view and the improved two-dimensional view, however, are behavouristic and too limited for making sense of how power works in general. The ideological capacity to prevent potential issues from even appearing on agendas where decisions are made or not made is a greater power. That which is almost impossible to enunciate is the object of the three-dimensional view of power. The structural power of transnational corporations and branding culture fits into this more complex model since it has become so overweening as to be safe virtually from any observable process of democratic decision-making or, for that matter, non-decision-making. Hence, the desperate actions of oppositional forces in order to get fundamental issues aired at all.

As Naomi Klein has shown and Raymond Williams (1974, 151) put it, the branding or 'para-national' corporations are 'reach[ing] farther into our lives...

until individual and collective response in many different kinds of experience and problem became almost limited to choice between their programmed possibilities'. In addition to extreme exploitation of factory workers abroad, casualisation of work at home and generalised psychic interference everywhere, the branding corporations of technocapitalism are literally privatising public space and imposing corporate speech on every practice. Should policy-oriented cultural analysts, then, adapt themselves exclusively to a world where it is said 'there is no alternative', the TINA philosophy, or ask the kind of awkward questions that the powers-that-be would prefer not to be asked?

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Raija-Leena Loisa

Cultural Industry as Paradox or Synergy

Cultural industry is a theme and a concept that creates strong passions among various audiences depending on the tone with which one is employing it. At the very first sight a layman might be wondering as to where may be the sense in combining such different spheres of life or whether culture is something that cannot be industry and vice versa. In contemporary Finnish political rhetoric, the idea and the concept of cultural industry, as well as the economic world-view it contains, has by now become a truly common sense matter. It is a basis of thought and of vocabulary that everyone, both politicians and civil servants, should use automatically. Cultural industry is a phenomenon in which technology, economic processes, political assumptions and convictions concerning aesthetic excellence converge. One could trace its historical origins to the invention of printing technique. However, variety of systematic activities creating symbolic meaning, age-old gift-giving traditions included, are types of 'industries' operating within intellectual ideas and visions.

The clue to understanding its range is first culture as the sphere of values and ideas - human intellectual constructions of the world, or, in German, *das Geist*. Second, industry represents the material side of this phenomenon; the technological inventions that make something possible and economic resources that make these possibilities materialise.

In this article I intend to present two contradictory views on the cultural industry. The first is the view of the Frankfurt School, proposed in the first half of the 20th century. Since the 1960s writers from Anglo-Saxon world as well as those from French speaking countries have challenged the critical tone of the Frankfurt School. In some cases this challenge has been intentional, as in Bernard Miège's texts. At times however, it simply represented a different orientation towards doing research, a different discipline. These various disciplines are different perspectives to the issue in question.

First, I present the critical conception of the cultural industry posed by the Frankfurt School. Second, I present the late 20th century French and Anglo-Saxon ideas with a more constructive and empirical understanding of this contradictory phenomenon. I respond to those with my own understanding of German critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and in particular of Theodor W. Adorno's ideas.

I understand these ideas as rhetorical descriptions. This phenomenon offers plenty of resources for analysing it from various angles. I do not assess which of the authors comes closest to the truth. I rather intend to provide possibilities of assessment of their strengths and assets in the 'discursive battlefields'. I do not propose a holistic vision because, with Max Weber (1949) in the background, one never can acquire one. All endeavours to understand the world are more or less simplified descriptions depending on the data and on the point of view selected. Thus, all segments of knowledge are perspectives to begin with.

A group of scientists known as the Frankfurt School, consisting of German Jews mostly, formed during the 1920s and 1930s in Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. The Institute was based on a multidisciplinary program of studies (including economics, philosophy, sociology, social psychology, aesthetics, literature studies and musicology) that were intended to enhance social development and were leftist in orientation. During the 1930s, the Institute emigrated to the USA and continued its program there. Theodor W. Adorno was one of the members that emigrated, continuing in the USA his special activities on modern art, music and literature. The most prominent elements of his personal profile are convictions on aesthetic modernism and the experience in USA of the media and cultural work, first the unhappy occurrences in Princeton Radio Research Project and then the move to Los Angeles, the home of the culture industry. One also cannot avoid a feeling of conservative tone in his writings. Mostly, he does not welcome the new era of commercial world and has certain nostalgia for the bourgeois era of high culture, with heavy, leather-coated books and personal music making in bourgeois homes. His convictions on modern art, too, sound obstinate to contemporary readers. Sometimes he is condemned prematurely, with not much concentration on his actual, and indeed difficult, sentences. In media theories and studies one can recognize attitude in which his ideas are presented with few references to his obsoleteness and complete inability to understand the world he lived in, not to mention ours. The story often has it, that he is the figure of the past, whereas for today, a better theory and understanding of our world is needed.

I do not give an overview of media studies orientated towards the approaches of the post-structuralism or the cultural studies. Instead, I concentrate on ideas representing new tradition in understanding of the actual phenomenon of the cultural industry. My focus is strictly on this concept and phenomenon and

not on general ideas regarding media or popular culture. I believe that from this point of view my choice is justified.

Since the 1970s, in the European discourse on cultural industry, the employment of the word itself and the understanding of the phenomenon it refers to, has differed from that of the Frankfurt School. France was the location of the formulation of a more descriptive way of analysing this phenomenon. The publication of *Les industries culturelles* (1979, Chantal Lacroix, Marc Petit and François Rouet) was an introduction to the line of enquiry that was pursued in France in the 1970s. It had certain influences on Unesco's work and on the French Ministry of Culture and its research department, which translated the concept into usage that since then has gained influence. In France, Bernard Miège and his colleagues (e.g. Patrice Flichy) of the Grenoble School conducted research into the technical and economical structures of the media and cultural production. The most important emphasis in these was on the audiovisual sector. Nicholas Garnham wrote on the issue in Britain, emphasizing media and telecommunication sector. David Throsby, as an Australian economist, has been writing since the 1970s on arts institutions from industrial economic point of view. Later on, e.g. Scott Lash, John Urry and Richard Caves formulated their ideas reflecting the situation of transformation of economic organization and emphasizing the creativity and sign value in all economic activity. Caves emphasized especially the economic and juridical factors around the creative arts.

Critical analysis

The critical idea pertaining to the culture industry, shared by the Frankfurt School members, stems from variety of sources. The Marxian notions on qualities turning into quantities, commodity fetishism or monopoly are all applied in the cultural sector. Continuing Marxian tradition, Georg Lukács' writings offer the idea of reification that permeates all spheres of life, inclusive of the cultural. Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis provides a frame of reference with which to analyse the situation of authority, family and society in the 1930s. These ideas are kind of moments in their critique, which cannot be reduced to anyone of them. On the other hand, their writings carry forward the Western philosophical tradition and, in their own ways, contribute to the German Idealist tradition.

Adorno's work in particular, is dialectical in a manner that cannot be halted with a single position or truth over time. The truth does not lie in the eternal Beethoven or Schönberg. No political program, or any kind of political activism or group either, possesses a criterion of truth. In a way, Adorno denies taking a

firm position in arguing. Rather, one is to realise the illusions of any arguments. Their own work was civilisation critique (e.g. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*). It aims at revealing the reverse sides of civilisatory process of the modern.

The cultural production is a special sphere of this civilisatory process. The artistic creativity or the production of aesthetic symbols is strongly emphasized by the logic of mass culture. Economy or markets as such are not referred to. Rather, it is a question of dynamics of capital concentration or that of a drive to increase capital or secure the success of an investment. My analysis of the main argument of the logic of mass culture contains several peculiar arguments found in Adorno's writings on the culture industry.

Industrialization does not refer only to technological inventions, like the record or the film. Rather, it refers to an effective mode of production. This is imperative in a novel condition of competition, in which only the economically strongest survive. It forces production on a mass scale in order to reduce the costs. An attempt must be made to pre-calculate the demand in order to avoid investment loss. One possibility is to, for example, make a melody as effortless as possible to sing to. Second might be one of fading out of contrasts, as in musical melodies where there must exist certain instantly exciting elements, while the novel elements are not to be too eccentric. Relying on past musical traditions, and especially on Classicism and Romanticism, bears with it certain security, because these are the most known and most recognizable musical traditions in creating both popular music and the concert programs of orchestras. Production on a mass scale and pre-calculation of the demand are means to avoid the loss and maximise the demand for maximized amount of production. (Adorno 1932, 374-375)

Fetishization is the consequence of economically efficient system of production. In the following quotation Adorno points out that the problem is not only one of popular music or entertainment but rather it concerns the entire art-world: 'The world of that musical life, the composition business which extends peacefully from Irving Berlin and Walter Donaldson – 'the world's best composer' – by way of Gershwin, Sibelius and Tchaikowsky to Schubert's B Minor Symphony, labelled *The Unifinshed*, is one of fetishes' (Adorno 1991a, 31-32). The quantity is perhaps the best indicator of fetish, a person or a piece that is most frequently presented and played. The frequency of presenting does not as such indicate aesthetic quality. The point in Adorno's critique is that in programming policies it is considered to indicate quality, or, the reflex of commensuration is not realised. The following passage exemplifies this notion most clearly: 'Famous people are not the only stars. Works begin to take on the same role. A pantheon of bestsellers builds up. The programme shrink, and the shrinking process not only removes the moderately good, but the accepted classics themselves undergo a selection that has nothing to do

with quality. In America, Beethoven's Fourth Symphony is among the rarities. This selection reproduces itself in a fatal circle: the most familiar is the most successful and is therefore played again and again and made still more familiar.' (Adorno 1991a, 31-32). Fetishisation is a phenomenon in which the most known is made even more known and the others – possibly as qualified or even better – are excluded or not noticed and realised. This concerns the certain pieces by certain artists (while the oevre in its completeness is not known). Some artists are hypostatised whereas others, equally qualified, are omitted in the presentations of the art-world. Some periods in the art history may be overstated whereas other are less known etc.

Regression of hearing is, as a consequence of this fetishization, perhaps one of Adorno's most provocative arguments. In a sense, it seems to insult the taste and the will of the music listener. A critical point in this idea is that it does not mock the listener, or even the producers that made it possible in the first place. It is instead, an analysis of modern world based on exchange. It only points at a certain dynamic in our culture that may take place anonymously without any one in particular to account for its occurrence. The idea of regression is that of the listener capturing the most exciting and beautiful or 'cool' sequences in musical piece: 'The counterpart to the fetishism of music is a regression of listening… They fluctuate between comprehensive forgetting and sudden dives into recognition. They listen atomistically and dissociate what they hear, but precisely in this dissociation they develop certain capacities which accord less with the concepts of traditional aesthetics than with those of football and motoring' (Adorno 1991a, 40-41). This extends to the whole art-world and its phenomena in a similar way the phenomenon of fetishization does. The question is not that of *knowing* the work or the artist or the tradition, but rather that of *liking or not liking*.

A 'populist' way of describing this is using the term democracy. A piece or an artist is widely known and one can be acquainted with his or her presentations where ever, even globally. It is art for all, for anyone, for people. According to Adorno, this idea mocks the 'true' notion of democracy, since it is rather the dictatorship of the few, as indicated in the Über Jazz (Adorno 1936, 240) essay. A more accurate idea of democracy would be a situation of diversity with a low threshold for entering the market and with competitive situation of markets. The aspects described above however, indicate monopoly. The artworks that might well be successful are excluded on the basis of containing the *risk* of not being successful.

Standardization and individuality are phenomena that intermingle and interact in both human life and works of art: interplay of striking novelties (*einprägsam*) and well-known banalities *(allbekannt-banal*) (Adorno 1962, 46). Any creative text – a novel, a poem, a theory, or commentary – has certain

aspects of familiarity and strangeness just as do musical pieces. What is familiar and what strange is a matter of subjective judgment. However, a favourable combination of these characteristics is exciting for the reader or listener. It increases interest in the piece and creates a climate in which to keep it up.

Adorno seems to think that in an ingenious artwork these reverse aspects are possessed by that specific work and cannot be transferred onto others. The striking novelties cannot be used as stereotypical clichés in other works: this at least is transparent to the interpreter. However, that is exactly what takes place systematically in popular music: 'The beginning of the chorus is replaceable by the beginning of innumerable other choruses. The interrelationship among the elements or the relationship of the elements to the whole would be unaffected… Every detail is substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in a machine'. (Adorno 1941, 23) An individual creative idea was once novel, but is transformed into stereotype and standard. A whole piece and not only the effects may be a prototype for several others: 'The musical standards of popular music were originally developed by a competitive process. As one particular song scored a great success, hundreds of others sprang up imitating the successful one. The most successful hits, types, and 'ratios' between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards.' However, there are artists that cannot be imitated and they may still exist. This, in Adorno's opinion, is 'the breath of free competition'. (Adorno 1941, 23) In British radical rock scene from the 1970s onward, there existed elements that found their way into the house major record labels. The markets exploded in the 1990s with myriad of musicians recording. Still, some did not find their way. They were individual enough in order not to be imitated.

These ideas indicate that individual effects or accents on music or on any kind of commodities provide us with a false idea of individuality. They may turn out to be labels or marks of stereotypical association with a 'certain kind of social group'. It is not individual or original in a strict sense but identification with something pre-existing.

A passage in the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* illuminates the unintentional and anonymous process of mass culture. It is not conspiration or intentional manipulation by someone, but rather something we all take part in, in our daily routines and social networks: 'Under the private culture monopoly it is a fact that 'tyranny leaves the body free and directs its attack at the soul. The ruler no longer says: You must think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property, everything shall remain yours, but from this day on you are a stranger among us'. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 133) This quotation, from Alexis de Tocqueville's work *De la démocratie en Amérique* (1835/1840), provides us with an idea that the most efficient driving force of mass culture is a fear of social exclusion: it is safer to assimilate and do or

buy as others do. If there is a way out of this fatal circle, it might be found in Kantian notion of Enlightenment: an ability to think for himself or herself and not to be led by authorities or peers. (Adorno 1977, 345)

Structural analysis

The Anglo-Saxon and the French writers represent a completely different kind of discipline and ethos to doing human sciences. They are not entirely comparable with the Frankfurt School writers, as they point out issues that can be used as a novel description of the whole phenomenon of cultural industry, familiar from the critique of it in the thought of the Frankfurt School and especially in that of Adorno. The novelties of the description could be listed as following: the connotation of the word industry, culture in adjective form cultur*al*, industry in plural form industr*ies* – all being aspects that transform the whole idea of the cultural industry. The plural form 'industries' points at three aspects. First is the complexity in these cultural industries, in the mode of capital scale, i.e. small, medium and large scale. Second is the variety of logics in these sectors of industry in capital valorisation and business models, i.e. publishing and flow logics. Also, there exists a whole chain of various kinds of entrepreneurs taking care of single phases of production of cultural commodities or services, i.e. intermediaries, vertical and horizontal dis/integration. And third, the actual success either in business terms or in aesthetic ones is never secured beforehand. One cannot predict the amount of cash flow or explain it afterwards using for example 'social demand' or 'individual demand'. Hits and flops are mysterious like the wind; one does not know where it comes from and where it goes. This uncertainty is perhaps the most powerful argument against the deterministic visions of economic considerations producing success and phenomena of 'mass'. One cannot predict or pre-calculate the success: no attempt will determine it.

The word industry can be employed in English language completely neutrally and descriptively to denote some 'set of activities' in any sphere of life. It does not necessarily hold an economic efficiency criterion; it is simply an activity. An industry is a certain set of activities within a certain sphere of life. Thus, music industry can be comprised of creative composing (art or popular music), performing of music (art or popular in various types of ensembles and institutions, private or public financed), program organizers and agencies, publishing of music (scores, recording), journalism and education. (see Throsby & Withers 1979, Garnham 1990, O'Connor 1999, Throsby 2001) Cultural industry refers to the wholeness of the arts and popular culture 'sector' in social and economic system. Sometimes, the emphasis has been on the word

cultural, describing complex technical and resource demanding sector, such as media and film - more fine and respectful than other 'ordinary' industries. Since the late 1980s, the word industry has been used as a rhetorical device to describe the arts and culture as a fresh economic potential. Some authors describe these as kinds of tricks in the justification of public financing and regulation in which economists have been taking part. (Cunningham 2002, Flew 2002)

For most of these authors the word industry does not connote manufacturing overpower of certain industrial giants. Even a 'micro size' one-man's enterprise can count as one, with limited-edition handicrafts or specialization in limited selection of items with long series. There is lot of variation in scales and scopes of economies in the industrial system. The multinational media conglomeration might be described as representing the opposing end of the continuum of economies of scale and scope in cultural industries, operating in various countries and across the entire chain of media sector.

The French media researchers Bernard Miège (1989) and Augustin Girard (1982) construct an overview of the logics of capital valorisation and types of products in cultural industries. Miège regards the differing *processes in the various media types* in following manner. The criteria for distinctions are based on the possibility of reproducibility and the nature of the contribution of artists and technicians. The relative shares of these give an implication of the conditions of the capital valorisation of the sector. The construction of a prototype by an artist is the most expensive phase, whereas selling the reproduction of prototype provides the return of the investment. Miège outlines three competitive logics: the logic of publishing (such as books, records, prints), the logic of flow (broadcasting media), and the logic of the written press (printed media). The logic of publishing reproduces the prototype and sells the copies directly to consumers. The logic of flow requires the constant creation of audience, which in commercial broadcasting takes place by attracting viewers for the advertisers, who are the financiers of the broadcasting firms. In public service broadcasting, the broadcaster must somehow legitimate the institutional fund or licence fee payments gathered from the receivers. The logic of the written press combines these logics. (Miège 1989, 12)

The logic of the valorisation of capital is different in the differing types of processes. In the publishing industry one has to create a repertoire of products in order to attract as large a population as possible. In the flow of audiovisual media the task is to construct a programming policy in order to create loyalty to the channel in question. In the written press one has to combine strategies mentioned above with the publishers of newspapers and magazines. The crucial asset of the press is the fact that a newspaper and magazine obsoletes rapidly and one is forced to purchase a new one regularly. The situation is the same in

audiovisual broadcasting, in terms of what constitutes news and documentary. Entertainment programming must use tricks to entice viewers and maintain loyalty to the channel. The media critics imply that the whole mode of production of television, its technical medium and its financial base, forces news, reportage and documentary to assimilate the values of entertainment. The requirement of real time, speed and competition in entertainment programming and commercial channels decreases the relevance and depth of analysis of news reporting, not to mention its ability to increase the civilized understanding of the world among the public. (Bourdieu 1999, Ramonet 1999).

Miège also differentiates between various *types of products*. This typology in Miège's opinion is essential in order to distinguish between industrialized capitalist production and small-scale commercial production. The first type includes reproducible products, not directly integrating the work of artists (such as sound and visual reproduction equipment). The second type includes products that are reproducible and require the participation of cultural workers. They are the 'heart' of cultural commodities, and of the sectors I later term 'classical' in cultural industries (i.e. published products, film and television programmes). They are also the battlefield of governmental and commercial strategies with no clear answers on which would provide better enhancement. The third type includes semi-reproducible products such as prints, art handicrafts or limited-edition books. In this type, some amount of reproducibility is required, but it may be limited due to technical considerations (as in the case of lithography) or cultural reasons (to increase the use and prestige value and with it the future economic value) (Miège 1989, 42-43). Here, the criterion for the differentiation of various types is reproducibility, which increases as creative input decreases. The crossing point is reflected in the second type of products, which can be classified as the core of both cultural commodities and industries. The processes of publishing, flow and the press are included in the second type.

Girard outlines a similar 'logic' in differentiating the sectors. He terms the production of books, art reproductions and records *publishing industries*. In these cases, a small-scale creative activity is subsequently reproduced in a large number of copies, by means of industrial processes. In *programming industries* the actual act of creating something implies from the outset a substantial industrial input (film, television). Photograph is an object produced with technological apparatus to begin with and has a possibility to be reproduced infinitely. (Girard 1982, 32) The logic is three-phased, starting with the creative act, which is then multiplied in reproduction and finally ends in the sector in which technology is the first and the dominant factor.

These ideas are examples of *structural analysis* of cultural industries as a whole sector in economic system. One crucial indicator of structural differen-

ces of various sectors is the capital demanded to start a business. A firm in the sector of publishing industries is far easier to establish than one in the sector of programming industries. The latter ones usually require more expensive technological apparatus and a wider crew than the first ones, even with the digital technology transforming the situation. Thus, the so-called entry costs are higher in programming industries than they are in publishing industries.

The concept of cultural production, as well as that of cultural industries, can be differentiated from the creation of an artwork, as in the arts and culture there is much more at stake than the single work. There are plenty of professionals more or less specialized in aesthetic matters, other than those concerning artists. They take care of the route of the creative idea to the audience and consumers. The words 'production' and 'industry' denote this collaboration and intermediating, rather than 'commercialisation of the art' in the sense of intellectually making it more easily digestible. Even an esoteric author needs his or hers co-worker professionals in order to make his or her living with the art. Making film for broadcasting or theatre, as well as musical work into recorded form, are forms of art that necessarily require teamwork involving a crew of professionals. Miège even believes that the members of the crew are also essential in the creation, in that they intervene and their fingerprints are visible in the final product. He terms them 'coordinating agents'. They may be technical coordinators, such as sound engineers, record pressers, film cutting professionals or printers. The economic coordinators include, for example, marketing personnel, producers, accountants. Between the author and industries there are also several artistic coordinators including film directors, artists and repertoire professionals, layout artists, producers of lists, artistic directors, and music arrangers. In Miège's opinion, they are not simply intermediaries but they 'intervene in the very conception of the product'. (Miège 1989, 28-29)

The idea of teamwork has to be differentiated from the idea of intermediaries. The working team or the crew takes responsibility for the processing of a single project. Intermediaries can include specialized institutions, firms, or freelance professionals, who together cater for several projects and different productions, for example, undertaking the marketing, promotion, distribution, contract forming, agenting and accounting. They are links between the production team and the audience. Caves' (2000) point is that these procedures take place in every sector of the creative industries. Even if the painter works alone in his or her atelier he or she may need a gallerist, or the services of an accountant or a lawyer. During the 1990s, this idea has been referred to as 'flexible specialization', as a kind of 'post-Fordist' way of organizing production with outsourced collaborators. It increased the markets for small intermediating or team-working firms. (see Lash & Urry 1994, Caves 2000)

'Vertical disintegration' denotes the market situation, as it exists especially in the film industry. The term encompasses film production and its intermediaries: distributors and exhibitors. Vertical integration, in this context, concerns one firm owning the whole value chain, from production to exhibition. It owns different procedures vertically. In contrast, horizontal integration would be a monopoly or oligopoly situation in which one firm owns, for example, a chain of theatres. Caves attributes the origin of the disintegration process to the *Paramount* decision in the 1940s in the USA, in which an antitrust case against seven major studios in 1948 ended the studios' ownership of theatres and changed the terms under which distributors could market films to exhibitors. The studios' ownership of theatres had brought about an effective barrier to the entry of new studios or independent producer into the making of quality films. This decision thus opened the market for new entrants – especially independent producers and filmmakers. However, studios' entrenched distribution systems survived unchanged. A counter-force to this is that competing distributors could emerge, too, distributing 'small' films in limited geographic markets. (Caves 2000, 93, 96)

Vertical disintegration causes flexible specialization: most inputs required to produce a film come together only in a one-shot deal. These inputs are selected by an entrepreneurial coordinator, usually the producer, for their suitability for the project's needs and their availability at the right time. The producer seems to be the sole person 'in-house' who employs and retains the crew using his or her contacts in the market. This opens market to a variety of service firms, such as rental studios, properties firms, editing, lighting, recording/sound, film processing, market research and artists' representatives (agencies). (Caves 2000, 95-97)

Lash and Urry (1994, 116-120) describe this transformation of organization in media, publishing and recording industries. In book publishing, the outsourcing takes place merely in the downstream activities: retailing, design and copy-editing. In the television industry's 'flow model', the actual programming takes place in-house, whereas programmes tend to be created by several independent production firms. In this, it actually starts to resemble the 'publishing model' in commissioning production companies. They regard the British Channel Four a fine example of this. The recording industry as such, is a kind of publishing process. In this industry, outsourcing includes almost all creative work. Artists and 'crew workers' earn their incomes as royalties from different firms.

In the structural analysis of cultural industries there also exists a phenomenon I term 'majors versus independents'. In the studies on recording industries, this has been a long tradition of dispute (see Muikku 2001). Richard Peterson and David Berger (1974) studied the structures of these industries

and identified a cyclical model of concentration and diversification of capital and output of recording industries system. Later on, several authors identified that this model has lost its validity in the 1980s. After that, the situation has been one of a two- or three-level system in which there are a few large scale operators, larger amount of medium scale operators and a myriad of small scale 'satellites'. The character of this system is an issue of dispute: is it one of symbiosis or antagonism. In the decades after the World War II the latter one was more dominating, representing thoughts faintly parallel to Adorno. The capital concentration of majors was regarded as a hindrance for entrepreneurs of smaller scale with more esoteric material. According to the symbiosis thesis, the 'smalls' are creativity pool for majors and 'majors' are source of financing for smalls. Thus, they form a kind of net of mutual benefit for each other.

The fundamental character of the cultural industries, the arts and popular cultures both included, is that their outcomes in monetary terms are difficult or rather impossible to predict. This is classically explained by their character as 'unnecessary' and 'luxury' items in relation to commodities of necessity, like clothes and food. Even branding, which is of help in the latter ones, does not guarantee the demand of cultural artefacts. (Miège 1989, 43-33, Girard 1982, 37) There must be other devices to *'manage the risk'*. One possibility is to study carefully beforehand the receptivity of audiences and to test a motion picture, for example, with a sample audience before a firm invests its money in an overly risky enterprise. However, Caves claims that a creative product's success can seldom be explained even ex post by the satisfaction of some pre-existing need, not to speak about predicting it. (Caves 2000, 3) Sometimes, it is the big budget films intended to be blockbusters that flop tremendously. Sometimes, a single manuscript passes by several publishers, with no one seeing future in it. It may happen that someone nevertheless decides to take the risk and the outcome may be a huge success. Caves names this 'nobody knows property' in all creative industries. 'Segmenting' and 'grouping' audiences and trying to match these, is not necessarily helpful.

Perhaps the only helpful way to manage the risk is to spread it across the repertoire of commodities. (Miège 1989, Garnham 1990) This is the age-old wisdom in publishing industries. It has prompted studies on the probability of relation of hits and flops. The rule of the thumb has been 1/10: 10 percent of products are usually financing the rest. The conglomeration and vertical integration, which has been a tendency again in the 1990s, is possibly a secure way to manage the parameters of supply and demand. If one owns the whole value chain, one can be in a rather safe position to at least manage one's product's channel of advertising and delivery.

Responding with the help of 'Adorno-reflex'

For Adorno, *Kulturindustrie* was certainly a sector of economic activity using intellectual ideas as a source of added value. The emphasis is actually on the latter part of the word. It is a question of values and world-views, but the point however, is to make money with them. It is a question of dynamic interplay of supply and demand, i.e. the market situation. However, it is not 'ideal' or 'free' situation. The lack of freedom is not necessarily due to some kind of concentration of capital. It is rather 'social compulsion' or 'obsession' that brings about illusionary freedom of choice described by the Tocqueville quotation. If not to be excluded by one's peers, one has to behave according to the norms of the neighbourhood.

Supporting the thesis of freedom of choice by arguments, such as adjusting to the demand (marketing research bringing fourth typologies of consumer groups), does not help. According to a trivial claim, asking one's audience what they want will give one only lists of ideas they have been acquainted with earlier on. If one wishes to offer personal and individual 'type' of items to one's customers, one ends up with delusive idea of personality. The choices are made beforehand for them. Their only task is to latch on to the most suitable consumer segment.

It is not that this fear of social exclusion would make the process of producing and selling cultural artefacts a secure business, even in the thought of Adorno. In the Résumé über Kulturindustrie (1962) essay, he states that despite all, there still exists relatively high amount of failures in investments. However, to make claims of the anarchistic character or non-deterministic character of the culture industry, on the basis of this argument, is a delusion. In the Über Jazz (1936, 241) essay, he describes the irrationality of success that cannot be forecasted. In Adorno's view, these contingencies do no tell about creativity but about society. They are like justifications of rational organization and calculation in social world. They do not transform in any way the world, but rather sustain it bearable to us and thus strengthen its position.

Miège criticizes Adorno directly for not realizing this uncertainty of economic success in cultural business. It seems like Horkheimer's and Adorno's descriptions of streamlining and banalising of cultural works have been taken to be a description of the whole issue. That was the vision of the world they lived in, and would remain even more in the future. I would like to think that their description of the dynamic of the culture industry was a description of the 'risk management': managing the uncertainty precisely by banalising the contents to the extent that it would attract as large an audience as possible and offend or disturb as few as possible.

From the Frankfurt School point of view in general, one could offend the idea of risk in economics. From classical economics point of view, absolutely all investments contain risk of failure. The shortcoming of this economic approach, as with the European analysts referred to earlier on, is that risk is limited to purely monetary loss or gain. It ignores the potential human risks, which the 'development' of economic freedom *may (or may not)* bring about. The warning of the Frankfurt School was that economic, technological or scientific (or combination of these) success might bring about, as its reverse side, human suffering. In most of the cases in economics, the rise of material welfare is connected to social and human welfare. From this point of view, interdisciplinary program might be highly recommendable.

The French authors, such as Miège and Girard, challenge Adorno for using the word industry in singular form. It is for Adorno a certain conviction that, despite the various branches even in cultural production, they do not differ from one another fundamentally. He states this in his Résumé essay: 'In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to a plan. The individual branches are similar in structure or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap.'(Adorno 1962/1991,85) There is the same kind of fundamental logic, which might be described as the force to secure one's position with streamlining and banalising the contents so that it offends as few as possible, i.e. according to plan and a structure, which is of same kind in all. This is very clear in the presentation of e.g. Miège's and Girard's ideas above. Even if there are different logics in capital valorisation, the common denominator is to *attract the audience*.

In general, claims of risk, the so-called 10 % rule or the situation of majors and minors, are more or less built-in assumptions of the site of creativity. Because entertainment is risky business it must sometimes also bring about controversies, at least with one's catalogue of potential best sellers and marginalities. Thus, the 10 % that is to make living is 'standard', 'streamlined' or 'banal' and the 90 % (!) is more 'creative', 'esoteric' and 'original'. Very general and iterated assumption has been that the artists in the minor labels are more 'creative' and 'non-commercial' than the ones working with major recording firms. These are theses of which the persons working in the industries may have personal feeling and hunch. Without further testing, they remain only assumptions. These ideas may also be obsolete in the sense that publishing industries try to organize a profiled publishing programme of e.g. various categories of literature. In these categories they publish literature that in their view is the best. Historical examples after the World War II are the programmes of Finnish major publishing houses in the category of novel.

Tammi had profiled programme of translated literature and Otava profiled with programme of Finnish modernists. These proved to be successes also in economic terms.

The creative idea as a generator of economic activity

Throsby's model of cultural industries as concentric circles, is a visualisation of the issue of these industr*ies* as several branches of production (figure 1). The delineation of the word industry in English language, denoting set of activities in certain branch, may justify the creative arts as a sector of cultural industries. The branches in the middle are, however, the 'classical sectors'. Publishing, recording, film and media are branches that use the creativity as a source or prototype for their further elaboration into 'copies'. They need certain amount of capital, technical equipment and professional workers in order to make the creative ideas available to large amount of buying customers.



Figure 1. The branches of cultural industries.

These industries are justified for their ability to develop, package and deliver the creative ideas to vast amount of people. As indicated in the beginning, creative artists generate activities, professional and economic, around their work. Even if the work itself is not a potential best-seller, it, at least to some extent, creates dynamic processes in economies. One cannot deny that this dynamic is of help for us all, creative artists included, whether working with commissions or as free artists. This dynamic creates recourses for private and public economy. A creative artist could be understood as a person that throws his or her piece of thought to the world like rain drops to the water, managing to create orbits radiating outwards from the drop.

In Throsby's writing in particular, there is no requirement for high profits. He suggests some kind of solid base and balance in the economy of a firm or an art institution or an artist trying to make his or her living. An institution can work as non-profit organisation and still create economic activity to some extent. There is not necessarily an idea that intellectual ideas and cultural work would be the next 'megatrend' to offer a source of profit that is in its hugeness in no relation to its actual endeavour. Rather, it contains an idea that cultural work may offer a meaningful way of organising one's profession and livelihood. It also gives an idea that an artist must not necessarily be 'dependent' on the future processes. He or she can create and think in his or her solitude only on aesthetic and intellectual basis. He or she does not need to calculate and develop his or her ideas according to the potentially most selling item, if he or she does not want to do so. Perhaps the character of uncertainty of economic success might give him or her justification for that. And still, if one desires to be a best seller in economic terms and manages in it, he or she is not 'stealing' anything from others but is improving their position as well. In the last instance, what is aesthetically valuable or intellectually original is a judgement depending on one's personal inclination and initiation. Aesthetic values are subjective. Professional reviewers give only suggestions of what is valuable and what not. What one regards rewarding in one's profession is highly subjective as well.

Conclusion

Adorno's idea on *Kulturindustrie* is one of paradox. Two mutually opposing spheres of life are forced together. They are like fire and water, making symbiotic life with one another impossible. Adorno's idea may be his perspective on a Hollywood life, of which an author Donald Rawley once said: 'If you want to go to Hollywood, forget the art. It is all about money'. In Adorno's idea of cultural industry, the word industry is the key. Even today, it is the

experience of the persons that have ambitions in aesthetic issues: songwriters, screenwriters, directors, actors, and musicians. They may be empirical evidence for the fact that emphasis on material life, the industry, is debasing life. For people who feel intellectual challenges most rewarding in their profession, this emphasis dries out their abilities to create further. (see Rawley 1999, Thall 2002, Engel 2002)

On the other hand, intellectual creativity may unearth under the material profit motive or at least ridiculing it. Counter movements of any kind may respond to materialism, creating something that simply cannot be sold. Andy Warhol was perhaps a most original figure in his ability to confuse and ridicule both the business world and the art world with his pieces and his comments on his working. Most curious of all is that he has turned into both trademark and an artist in avant-garde canon. (Hautamäki 2003, Warhol 1975)

Throsby and other authors on cultural industries emphasise rather the possibility of economy and the arts to benefit each other. Artists and the industries around work in a synergy-like situation or symbiosis, providing each other with resources. Artists throw intellectual and aesthetic resources in the business world and the business world provides them with assistance and monetary security to proceed with their careers.

The power of the Frankfurt School and critical theory is to make one lose his or her naivety. Even if at times paranoid, they make one realise something that is not so evident. What kind of traps do there lie beneath the beautiful words? The French and the Anglo-Saxon authors represent more positive and empirical attitude. Their power is to lead one to analyse the phenomenon empirically into pieces in order to grasp the idea more concretely and not only theoretically and philosophically.

They represent two kinds of 'reflexes' or rhetorical devices. The representatives of the *cultural industries* point of view take a look at the 'concrete' world to 'proof or falsify' the validity of more philosophical theses. They function as a learning process for persons trying to examine the phenomenon in its concreteness. The representatives of *Kulturindustrie* point of view consider the philosophical assumptions of the empirical 'facts'. They ask what kind of structures of thought there are beneath the descriptions of structures of the 'real' world. This is like a generalised hermeneutic process I would like to delineate on the basis of the texts and thoughts presented in this article.

I would not like to proceed with a kind of 'cult of novelty' line of thought. I do not claim here that the thought of the Frankfurt School in general and Adorno in particular is old theory that does not apply to the novel world and that we need novel theory like the French and Anglo-Saxon thoughts presented here. I would also like to avoid a kind of 'anachronism', according to which theories are classics that apply to all times – at least when read metaphori-

cally. Theories and thoughts – old and new – should always be read also in their concrete historical contexts and battles. They can offer also patterns of thought to apply as rhetorical models in analysis. They contain certain modes of arguments that can be of help in understanding our world.

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Niina Simanainen

Artists and New Technologies – Questions on the New Playground

Technologies themselves are mute until they become invested with narratives and enmeshed in culture.
- Simon Penny

Introduction

In this article I explore artists in the context of new technologies[1]. The conceptions of art keep evolving along with the development of digital technologies, and new forms of artistic practice and expression have been taking place. Artistic work and artistic practices have been facing various changes. On the whole, the question of who can be considered an artist has become a burning issue. How should an artist be re/defined in the context of new technologies? What kind of new attributes may be included in the concept of artist?

Due to the expansion of new technologies, artistic practices have expanded into new dimensions and new spaces. The *technological space* is often addressed as the new site of artistic work. Various metaphors, such as the cyberspace, virtual community and information superhighway, are used to depict the technological (or 'machinic') space. My focus in this article is on exploring how the phenomenon called new technologies is discussed in relation to the field of art and artists. It is also important to reflect the discourses upon the broader socio-cultural developments, and to consider how the changing role of artists relates to the field of art in general. According to Schwarz, this

broader examination is crucial, because "particularly in the domain of digital media, the social understanding of 'culture' and of 'art' is itself subject to change (2000,7)".

New technologies have been rapidly changing the (Western) society. Various analyses of contemporary society have been grounded on the expansion of new technologies and changes caused by technological development. It is, indeed, a compelling narrative. According to Manuel Castells (1996) we live in a *network society,* which has developed as a result of the spread of information and communication technologies. We have entered a new technological (or techno-economical) paradigm (Castells 1996, 60-65). New technologies are also closely bound with globalisation processes, and they have increasingly become part of the everyday life. Michiel Schwarz (2000, 7-8) uses the term *technological culture*. Technology is no longer seen as a force separate from culture; rather, it is embedded in it and is an integral part of it. Technology is seen as a major force in fostering progress, innovation, well-being, democratisation, free access and so on. As John Pickering (1999, 168) formulates it, the question is first and foremost that of "the story of cultural progress that people in the technologised societies tell themselves". This same narrative is transforming the field of art.

In the field of art, new technologies are seen as providing opportunities for new artistic innovations. The close network between art, technology and economics and the prevailing techno-economical discourse calls for reconsideration of what it means to be an artist in this new context. Co-existing with what might be called technological determinism[2], there are, however, also many critical views towards the technological development. Some artists working with new technologies are highly critical towards the technologies they use. This tension between technological determinism and criticism also lies in the undercurrent of the present article.

First, I briefly explore the way artists have been discussed. When discussing contemporary (new media) artists, attention should be paid to the institutionalised field of art, its institutions – and its prevalent discourses. How can new forms of art or artists deploying new technologies be located in the larger institutionalised system or construction? What kind of conception of artists is relevant or possible in the contemporary context? Second, I explore the new (digital) working environment which artists "inhabit". This technological space has been defined as the *new playground* for artists (see e.g. In from the Margins 1997, Schwarz 2000). How does this new playground then relate to the institutional art field? In other words, it is fascinating to see what happens in the field of art when we look at it through the eyes of technology. Finally, I bring a specific topic into discussion, that is, networking within artistic practice. I suggest that at this very moment networking is a major force transforming

conceptions of artists. It seems that on the new (digital) playground, networking is, indeed, the ”name of the game”. With these issues, I wish to pave the way for discussing the changing role of artists in the present context.

Contemporary Artists – the Quest for New Definitions

Whereas the role of art has historically been understood as the re-presentation of reality, contemporary digital art has the ability to simulate reality and ”in doing so create embodied meanings inside autonomously interactive systems (Schwarz and Shaw 1996, 120-121). Furthermore, if we regard art as a field in which ”images, models and roles can be experimented and tested (Kaitavuori 1999, 14)”, digital art further extends these possibilities. Not only artistic creativity is at stake here but digital technologies also enable the transmission of art to wider audiences with ever quickening speed. In this complex network of art, technology and economy, it is no longer clear who is an artist or author or what meanings or functions should be associated with the artistic profession[3].

What has been regarded as (proper) art has traditionally been defined from within the field of art (eg. Mitchell 1985, Sederholm 2000, Sevänen 1998). By debating the borders – or rules – of art (art/non-art, high/low culture, commercial/non-commercial art), the actors in the field of art also produce conceptions of artists. The institutional recognition or acceptance most often comes in the form of subsidies and grants[4]. The institutional power to distinguish art and artists from that or those regarded as marginal or outside the field of art becomes visible when the rules are not clear. Sevänen (1998, 265-266) argues that this is exactly the case in much of the contemporary art. Artists cannot be certain what kind of textual or external qualities a work of art should include. Even more so, the audience is confused about the content and form of contemporary works of art. In this situation institutions working in the field of art are influential, because they have the power to define, include or exclude something as art (Sevänen 1998, 265-266.) Accordingly, the distribution of culture, and art, presumes a certain level of uniformity and standardisation of its products - works of art (see Hurri 1993, 39). In order to reach sufficient uniformity and at least some shared criteria, new institutions, professions and cultural capital are needed (Hurri 1993,39). In this sense, new forms of art may also challenge traditional institutions. In electronic art, one of the challenges lies in the appearance of new actors who are increasingly involved in artistic projects and productions, e.g. programmers, engineers, graphic designers, and script writers.

Different categorisations and definitions that are given to art, artists and artistic work, "control" who may or may not have access to the field of art (see Hurri 1993, 40). This puts forward the question of the actors involved in these meaning-giving or naming processes. One might, for instance, ask to what extent artists themselves are able to define what the concept of artist should include. In her research, Vappu Lepistö (1991) distinguishes between various types, and stereotypes, of artists in the Western societies from the 18th century onwards. She makes distinctions between the *romantic*, the *modern* and the *postmodern* type, all co-existing in our time[5].

It is often addressed that postmodern thinking in many ways challenges and transforms old views on art and artists. That is, contemporary artists work with different materials, genres and ways of expression (Sederholm 2000, 190). In digital environment, texts, images and sounds are freely mixed, coined and transformed. On the institutional level, the postmodern criticism is usually directed at the "rigid" institutional structures and there is a demand for the recognition of pluralism, contingency and ambivalence (see also Kangas 1999, 166). On the other hand, one could argue that, historically, there has always been resistance to the established field of art. It is not something astonishingly new - and certainly not an invention of postmodern theorising. As Sevänen (1998,265) claims, the art as a system tolerates well non-conventional and deviant behaviour. This flexibility enables the continuous experimenting, renewal and innovations.

The change in the work of artists becomes most visible when we take a look at the processual nature of creating and producing art. Rather than working alone (hermit), contemporary artists often work in teams or networks consisting of artists (co-production artist) and other professionals. Artists too, must seek "strategic alliances" (cf. Schwarz 2000, 33) in the present network society - be the motive artistic expression, publicity, technical training, marketing or distribution of artworks. Artists are thus in a situation where they face new demands and expectations. They have to be able to perform in various scenes or fields simultaneously. In addition to having artistic talent, it is necessary to have a good technical know-how as well as the capability to market or "brand" oneself to the audience, sponsors and so on (product-designer). This requires that artists continually re/train and upgrade their skills in order to keep up with the latest technical development.

The collaboration with technical specialists (e.g. engineers, programmers) is often required. Indeed, there is need for teamwork that consists of various professionals, because many artists do not necessarily have the technical knowledge to operate alone. When we further engage in the discussion regarding "content production", to be discussed later, more than pure artistic creativity is at stake. Furthermore, contemporary art often consists of highly theoretical,

philosophical and political - especially micropolitical- ingredients, which undoubtedly, at least partly, result from various academic involvements that many artists have. As Sederholm (2000, 172) states, artists of today are researchers, who explore and analyse the borders of human experience[6]. Moreover, since these new forms of art are often located in virtual or technological space, the role of artists in the process of making their art too has changed. I will now discuss this change of place - displacement - and its challenges pertaining to artistic work.

New Playground in the Field of Art

The (cultural political) discussion on the concept of culture has been extremely vivid during the late 1990's (see e.g. In From the Margins 1997, Kangas and Virkki 1999). Due to the "extended concept of culture", the field of cultural policy has also been going through a rupture. Especially during the 1990s it has become clear that shared understandings of cultural policy have been broken (see Kangas 1999). New technologies have, in part, been challenging the traditional institutional structures in the field of art. Traditional art institutions, as well as individual artists, have had to take this development into account. The increasing popularity of using new technologies in producing art has introduced questions regarding artists' access to and competence in using technology in their artistic work. The Internet has, in part, been "displacing" art from galleries and museums and this has created new, more segmented audiences[7]. Moreover, it has lead to a development where art is more closely associated with the cultural industries. Digital art has been weaving this relationship even more tightly together. Along with this development, new genres, such as computer games, that may be regarded as art or at least containing various artistic/aesthetic dimensions have come to exist.

All this development can be traced in the language and discourses on technology and art. There are at least two influential discourses that have entered the field of art increasingly during the 1990s, namely, *techno-economic discourse* and *cyber-metaphorics*. In many instances these two come together. As Schwarz (2000, 10) points out "new expressions and words are needed to come to terms with the information age". We talk about the *digitisation of society* or the arrival of the *cyber age*, the *knowledge society*. Considerably common is the view that we have experienced a transition from an industrial - the first phase of technology, to an information or knowledge society - the second phase of technology.

In *In from the Margins* (1997, 89-102), terms such as the *digital revolution* and *new playground* are addressed (see also e.g. Schwarz 2000). The techno-

logical development is seen in close connection with the economic development. In fact, according to the document (ibid. 101-102) "the management of technological advance" is organised "according to commercial imperatives". Thus, electronic modes of communication provide "new creative opportunities to artists and other cultural producers, but their commercial exploitation may be at the expense of innovation." This kind of opportunity/threat dualism can be found in various texts that explore the relationship of art and new technologies. Simon Penny is a good example of an artist who uses technology in producing art, but who is also very critical towards new technologies. He seems to object the connection between new technologies and economics, but at the same time acknowledges the fact that "an artist cannot engage technology without engaging consumer commodity economics (Penny 1995, 47)." Penny is afraid of the possibility of the technological system somehow prohibiting critical art practice. If an artist feels compelled to continuously upgrade and retrain, in order to use the technical equipment, there is less time to concentrate on the actual making of art, which Penny (ibid.50) sees as being "the creative analysis and questioning of the relationship between these technologies and culture[8]."

As one result of the techno-economic discourse, artists and other cultural producers have been regarded as *content producers*. This is a highly controversial discussion, since not all artists prefer to see themselves as such nor do they support this line of thought[9]. It could well be argued that this kind of "naming" tells more about the extension of the aesthetic to new areas than it does about artists; there is probably much less resistance when a graphic designer (in an IT firm) is called a content producer.

How is the field of art reformulated in the context of new technologies? Art is usually discussed as a field, a system or an institution. As such, it is a highly complex entity, or rather, a web of different discourses. These discourses come from various directions: artists, art and cultural institutions, cultural politicians, art critics, art historians, to name but a few. Erkki Sevänen (1998) discusses art as an institution and system by analysing the writings of various theorists, including Luhmann, Parsons, Schmidt, Münch, Habermas, Lash and Urry. Despite various differences, the common denominator among these theorists is the idea that during modernity art has had a largely autonomous position in the (Western) society. Functional differentiation has been regarded as the first and foremost structure of the modern society (ibid.201). According to the postmodern interpretation, art, as a system, has become less autonomous. According to theorists, such as Lash and Urry, this is a result of a process of dedifferentiation. In other words, art has become increasingly engaged with, and dependent on other systems of the society, such as the political or economical (Sevänen 1998, 214).

Whereas modernism has been accused of being largely grounded on polarities (e.g. tradition/innovation, mass culture/high culture, left/right, avant-garde/kitsch), contemporary – also referred to as postmodern – art aims at dissolving these polarities. The either/or contrast has become less meaningful, since there is no absolute value, which would be the standard of measure (Sederholm 1994:189-190). Rather than searching for shared values, there has been an enormous *pluralization of values*[10]. The new roles of artists reflect this general pluralization of values, since there seems to be no "correct" way to define an artist. (Maunuksela 2001, B9.) This pluralization of values and the broad conception of culture has led to the discussion on the aesthetisation of everyday life. This aesthetisation of life has been erasing the gap between art, in the sense of 'high culture', and life (see e.g. Ratzenböck 1998, 72-72; Sederholm 1994, 193). This, of course, complicates the question of authorship in art, since it is no longer obvious, especially so in interactive artworks, that the artist is the author of a work of art.

The (postmodern) process of dedifferentiation can be seen in the increasing transparency of the boundaries between art, popular culture, mass communication, advertising and the market (see e.g. Sevänen 1998, 221). This transparency is a major force in the expansion of artistic practice to new places - or spaces. In a situation where everything is relatively new and unstable, what seems to be clear is that there is a call for new cultural policies that would further promote and support the technological development within the field of the arts and culture. In cultural policy documents, digital technologies are addressed as highly influential in the formation of artistic practices (In From the Margins 1997, Schwarz 2000). However, digital art is not seen as separate from the institutionalised field of art, nor from "pre-technological views" on art and art making. New media art has gradually gained more publicity and become more accepted, or "established", within the field of art. Various artists have taken interest in using technology in producing artworks. As this technological turn seems to be utterly holistic, new technologies also play an ever bigger role in art sciences and education. Simon Penny (1997) states that "few artists, and fewer art departments and academies have escaped the imperative to reconcile their practice with 'the digital'". There is a call for going digital.

Digital art and its "place" in the institutional field of art is still somewhat an open question. There seem to be tendencies of institutionalisation, since new media art has been accepted as a distinctive genre among the more traditional genres, especially so during the 1990s. In Finland, the Artist Association Muu ry has been representing and supporting experimental art forms such as new media and net art already since its foundation in 1987 (see http://www.kaapeli.fi/~muu/). M-cult, an organisation for media culture, has a large network consisting of artists and various professionals in related fields. It comprises,

under the term media culture, media art, research, and digital content production (see http://www.m-cult.org). Since the year 2000 Finland has also been taking part in Prix Möbius International[11], an annual competition for new media productions. The national equivalent, Prix Möbius Finlande aims at supporting Finnish new media content production, improving its quality and providing an opportunity to enhance the international distribution of art works or productions.

However, all digital artists do not necessarily need the traditional forums or artists' associations - or do they? Among artists, there is always resistance to that which *is* - the old, traditional and institutional. A British multimedia artist, Ju Gosling comments on the traditional institutions in following way:

What always strikes me is that they are run by non-artists, or at least by failed artists! And that these people control arts funding, as opposed to funding going directly to artists, so effectively control of what is being produced. I know some great, committed people working in these institutions and have a great deal of respect to them, but I still feel it is wrong that arts funding and arts institutions are not in the hands of the artists themselves[12].

This remark suggests an example of the ongoing discussion among contemporary artists concerning the place or status of traditional institutions. Again, we could ask if there is anything truly new in artists criticising the prevalent institutions, as this is rather a historical fact. What is, however, fascinating, and so far not widely discussed, are the new networks, as well as those discussion forums on the Internet where artists "get together" in order to discuss various issues pertaining to digital art. In doing so, they also produce meanings and definitions of what it means to be an artist. There might even be such artists that exist only "electronically" or such that communicate according to new, non-conventional "rules"[13] Are these networks then located entirely "outside" the institutional field of art? I do not believe so. Rather, they are connected to the field of art, even if it appears as an expression of a counter-discourse against institutionalisation. Furthermore, according to Juha Huuskonen (2001), there are many interesting non-profit experimental projects on the Net that are, however, ignored by the art community "simply because the creators of these projects do not promote themselves in the context of art". As Huuskonen continues, these creators do not necessarily realise that their work could be considered as art, and thus do not apply for support from art institutions. Thus, it seems that the place, the content, and the rules of the new playground are in need of a deeper exploration.

New forms of art do not neatly fit into already existing categories and models of thought. As Richard Wright (1995) states, there is no properly identified "high culture" for computer art. Rather, he continues, there is a "continuation of forms of popular culture extended in various ways (ibid. 92)". By this he

means for instance digital sampling and recording in music, or forms of independent publishing. Furthermore, new technologies have given birth to novel forms, such as networking. (Wright 1995, 92.) Next, I elaborate more on the networking and interactivity. As suggested earlier, networking can be regarded as an important - if not the most important - source of transformation, as far as artists and their work is concerned.

Networking Artists

Along with new technologies, the whole culture of communication has "electrified". The role of artistic communication too, has been growing in all sectors of life (Khakee 1999, 101). As an example, Khakee (ibid, 101) states that the skills of acting and rhetoric become crucial in (electronic) political communication, displacing other forms. Artists, too, use computers not only for creating artworks, but also for communicational purposes. New technologies enable the creation of large networks, with fellow artists, other cultural producers/ actors, and the audience. Accordingly, an enormous processialization has been taking place in the work of contemporary artists (see also Eerikäinen 1992, 59). Works of art are often created in teams consisting of professionals in various fields. An excellent Finnish example of this is katastro.fi, a media art group which mainly concentrates on art processes and works in which the Internet plays a crucial role. The katastrofians, like many other young artists, work on projects, move freely between different media arts, and prefer not to make strong differentiation between commercialism and autonomous artistic work (Rastas 2001). This is not only a beautiful example of the techno-economical discourse explaining the nature of (new) media art, but it also suggests that networks or collaborative groups are relatively informal (and project-based) in their structure. Perttu Rastas argues that in Finland "some young artists shun the organisational activities so common in the sixties, seventies and eighties, which sought political living space for new forms of art and explored their relationship with institutions". This kind of loose coalition might thus be seen as the solution for some artists. Information designers, programmers, graphic designers, musicians, and script writers all come together in a collective process. Through this co-operative process works of art are created, and participation and communication are at the very core of this activity (Rastas 2001).

Networking is seen as having such powerful consequences that some might even regard it as the primary function of electronic art. Namely, McKenzie Wark (1995, 9) states that "electronic artists negotiate between the dead hand of traditional, institutionalized aesthetic discourses and the organic, emergent forms of social communication. Electronic art is an experimental laboratory, not

so much for new technologies as for new social relations of communication." Wark's statement emphasises the message over the medium. To some extent, I agree with this line of thought, although I think the medium too does matter. That is, the medium, particularly computer, and the possibilities it provides for artists to communicate with the audience, in many ways contests the whole idea of authorship, not to mention the question of copy-rights.

In contemporary art, a work of art is thus often seen as a process, not a static entity. Digital technologies have increased the possibilities for interactivity between the artist, his/her work and the audience. Interactivity may stress either the social interaction between media users (e.g. between the artist and the audience), the technical interaction between users and machines, or the cultural interaction between users and texts (Fornäs 1998, 7). Therefore, the boundary between the artist and the audience - production and reception - can become somewhat blurred. According to the most extreme views, works of art can be completed only in co-operation with the audience. Artists are not regarded as the creators of their works: they only start a process that might actually never be finished. I think that in most cases this view is somewhat exaggerated. Moreover, it could be claimed that every medium is to some extent both technically and culturally 'interactive' (Fornäs 1998, 7). A digital work of art (CD-ROM or web art) usually consists of a limited amount of possibilities from which the user can choose and navigate. However, the options available are after all, created by the artist (also Eskelinen 2001). The power of the user over the actual work of art is more of an illusion than it is reality. In fact, it could rather be thought that the user is either "experiencing art" through participation, or, as some would say, playing an entertaining game[14]. However, it may well be that the interactive character of the artwork receives much more radical and user-oriented qualities in the future. This remains yet to be seen.

What is noteworthy is that with all this emphasis on the interactivity and the *form* of artworks, the content of the messages should not be forgotten. Although it could be provocatively argued that with digital technologies the work of art has increasingly become the art of work (see Eerikäinen 1992, 57), most often artists still wish to express something through their works. As McKenzie Wark (1995, 21-22) states, both art and critique are to a great extent *communicational interventions*. We only need to think of, for example, female artists who have been pioneering in the field of video and installation art (see eg. Shohat and Stam 1997). Autobiographical and body art are common also in the digital environment. For example, artists such as Stelarc and ju90, are engaged in their art with their own bodies[15]. Whereas micropolitical concerns (identities, individual lifestyles) are an integral part of contemporary art, there is also interest in more general issues. Merja Puustinen and Any Best for

example, have had a concern for the environment. Thus, the message should not be neglected over the medium - no matter what fascinating things artists are able to achieve with new technologies. Finally, relating to the networking among artists and the whole field of art, there is an urge for increasing co-operation between the arts and sciences, between artistic innovators, technologists, and scientists (see In from the Margins 1997, 100). Although this seems to be articulated most often by non-artists, it is as important to artists, as it is to other cultural producers. New technologies seem to form a rich base for developing this kind of collaborative activities, or, in Michiel Schwarz's (2000, 33) words, strategic alliances or strategic partnership. Schwarz further argues that the opportunities and possibilities of the digital media in the culture and the arts should be sought first and foremost in the overlaps with other sectors and developments. As I discussed in the chapter 2, this kind of message is coming from the artists' side as well. Interesting alliances between artists, technologists, and scientists, such as the V2_Organisation (Institution for the Unstable Media) in Rotterdam (Schwarz 2000, 29), already exist. As stated on their website (http://www.v2.nl), V2_Organisation "maintains a wide international network of artists, theorists and researchers working in the field of electronic art, media, science and technology and collaborates closely with related media art centres". Who said cross-overs do not already exist?

Concluding Remarks

In the present article I have mapped out contemporary discussions regarding artists in the context of new technologies. Due to the spread of new technologies, there is an ongoing change and extension of the conceptional and institutional within the field of art. This also relates to our conceptions of artists. Artists using digital technologies in their art may have various reasons and motives to be involved in the digital. Some may be interested in technology *per se*. Most artists are keen on exploring new ways of artistic and aesthetic expression, and the seemingly limitless possibilities of communication and networking. There may even be those who only wish to distribute their art via new technologies (e.g. in virtual art galleries). Whatever the case, the technological space, or the new working environment, demands new qualities and many-sidedness from artists – and does so in a way that goes far beyond mere artistic creativity.

When digital artists are explored, the traditional views and stereotypes of artists no longer apply. In order to depict the change in the nature of artistic work, new vocabulary and new meanings are required. It could be argued that due to the spread of new technologies, entirely new rules for playing are

necessary. If we talk about the new technological paradigm in the Western society, the changes in the field of art would be seen as artistic, aesthetic, and journalistic changes of paradigms (see Hurri 1993, 41). This change of paradigm also includes new articulations of artists. In this light, contemporary artists bear greater resemblance to team workers and product-designers than they do to hermits, working alone in their studios. The use of computers enables the existence of an artist electronically (world wide). This possibility also creates new possibilities of working and communicating with others: artists, other professionals, and audience. Networking and processualization of artistic work are the catchwords of today.

I have touched upon two currently powerful discourses in the field of art: techno-economical discourse and cyber-metaphorics. Whereas the former is connected with the neoliberalist ideology, the latter is fashionably postmodern, and theoretical. In some of the cyber-metaphorics, technology, especially the Internet, is seen as increasing access and democracy for all. Although this can be criticised as being a techno-utopia, the Internet has, however, created new audiences who follow artistic works and productions on the Net.

On the institutional level, the situation is but taking a shape. New media art has gradually been accepted as a genre in its own right. Additionally, there is a reason to expect that new forms of institutional structures will develop - both in and out of the new technological space. It will be fascinating to see what kind of relationship new groupings of artists, such as katasrofians, and other professionals construct with the larger, institutional field of art. Will it be inevitable that this ”unstable media” and these non-institutional forms - more informal networks – paradoxically, and despite the resistance, become part of the institutional? In the beginning of this article Simon Penny (1996) states that ”technology itself is mute until it is invested with narratives and enmeshed in culture”. Thus, at the end of the day, the question concerns what kind of meanings new technologies will receive in the field of art, and in connection with artists who deploy these technologies. These voices and discourses come from various directions, but digital artists themselves too, participate in this process of meaning giving or naming. They do so actively, through their own forums, and in increasing amounts, in the public media.

Notes

[1] When discussing artists deploying new technologies, there are various terms that may be used: new media artists, digital artists, electronic artists, web artists, multimedia artists, CD-ROM artists - and in some cases even (digital) content producers.

Some of the terms may be used as synonyms (eg. digital and electronic artists) whereas some have more specific references (eg. CD-ROM artists). The various terms that are used to describe artists working with new technologies (and art, for that matter) depict the relative newness of the whole phenomenon. So far there seems to exist no commonly shared or fixed terms and concepts for discussing artists in the context of new technologies.

[2] On technological determinism see, for example, Downey and McGuigan (eds.) 1999; Niiniluoto in Lemola (2000, 29-30).

[3] This is, of course, not a new matter to be considered. Artists have been challenging the conventional borders of art for instance in the avantgarde. Avantgarde artists concentrated on the renewal of artistic forms, materials and expression. Radical avantgardist movements like futurism, dada, Fluxus and surrealism focused on the relationship between art and (everyday) life (Sederholm 2000, 185). In futurism and dada, for example, machine-aesthetics was central already in the beginning of the 20th century (Sederholm 2000, 12-13).

[4] The (cultural political) research on artists often tends to focus mainly on the status as artists (as an occupational group) and the institutional support or constraint on artists' activities, especially in terms of subsidies, see e.g. Karttunen 2000.

[5] Stereotypes of artists are strongly influenced by the old, romantic myths. These mythical types include the *hermit*, the *Christ figure* and the *"dweller"* who dedicates his/her whole life to art. Lepistö (1991) further divides the romantic, modern and postmodern artist and has found different artist types within these three categories. The two modern types - an expert and an artist who consciously constructs her/his identity through art - create counter-strategies against the mythical views on artist. The postmodern types, in turn, aim at synthesizing and deconstructing the romantic myth. Postmodern artist types include a *product designer* who constructs a single product of him/herself and his/her art, an artist (or *"artist-dweller"*) who creates an artwork of her/himself and her/his life and a *co-production artist* who works in collaboration with other artists. Lepistö's postmodern types offer a fruitful ground for further discussing contemporary artists.

[6] According to Eerikäinen (1992, 59), art became theorised with conceptualism. The radical critique that conceptual art aimed at modernism changed the ontology of art: it became based on theoretical discourse.

[7] A similar kind of displacement has happened also for instance in graffiti, environmental art, performance art. On the other hand, new forms of art have also been increasingly accepted into galleries and museums. A good example in Finland is, of course, Kiasma (Museum of Contemporary Art). In this sense it could be thought that new forms of art have also gradually become more and more institutionalised, part of the "established" field of art.

[8] This criticism towards new technologies (or the tools of making art) acts as a meta-artistic practice. At the same time it is self-reflexive, because the artist engages in a project in which s/he criticises his/her own actions though his/her own work of

art. More discussion on this in Penny's article Virtualisation of Artistic Practice (1997). Another example is Tuomo Tammenpää, a Finnish artist who has parodied branding (and cultural industries) in his work *Need*.

[9] It is interesting to see how cultural industries can be seen as vacuuming everything inside of its gaping mouth. Individual artists may construct counter-discourses by, for example, looking for identification from the past. Tuomo Tammenpää (according to Maunuksela, HS, 30 Aug 2001, B9) argues that new media workers should rather be seen as craftsmen than part of the cultural industries machinery.

[10] Also Sevänen (1998, 387) states that during the last decades a more extensive and plural conception of art has been adopted in Finland, Great Britain and the other Western European countries.

[11] The Möbius award for new media was launched in 1992 as an initiative by the University of Paris 8 (Université de Vincennes). Since the year 1998 the competition has been international, see http://www.mcult.org/mobius/fin/2001/mobius.html.

[12] Personal communication via e-mail, 13 Sept. 2000.

[13] My personal example of this is jodi (see http://www.jodi.org), a team of two artists. When I asked them for an e-mail interview, they answered me by adding various codes and symbols to my own e-mail so that I could hardly recognize it as my own. I took it as a definite "no" answer.

[14] This relates to new constellations of authorship and the new hybrid genres that are appearing as a result: edutainment, faction or infotainment. Johan Fornäs (1998:6) calls this a process of "aestheticising the serious while making pleasure more serious".

[15] see http://www.stelarc.va.com.au and http://users.netmatters.co.uk/ju90.

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Kia Lindroos

The Concept of 'Culture' in the 'era of cultural studies'

The concept of culture has, during the last decades and at an enormous speed, spread into popular and academic discussions. One reason behind this 'culturalism' is evidently the wildly expanding academic field of cultural studies, which includes studies of an astounding variety of issues, including cultural identity, colonialism, ethnic culture, visual culture, media culture, politics and technology. As Jim McGuigan reflects in his Finnish summer school on cultural policy presentation, "the term 'culture' has proliferated to such an extent that it has become virtually meaningless" (McGuigan 2000). Does this convey new imperialism of culture or does it lead towards the inflation of the culture in the beginning of 2000´s?

When the British cultural studies were being 'established' in Birmingham in 1964, Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall aspired to create both large and general enough a research field. It became important, for the two, to initiate a new field without threatening the already existing academic disciplines within human and social sciences. Their intention was to reflect on the society and on the idea of culture that societies were producing in a self-reflecting manner (Hall 1992, 11). The idea of self-reflection between culture and society is still present within the field of cultural studies. However, the extent of the studies pertaining to it is not likely to threaten the already existing disciplines. On the contrary, the likelihood is greater for this research field itself, to become one of the problems of cultural studies. The contemporary studies on 'culture' seem to find culture everywhere and nowhere, a fact exemplified in Terry Eagleton's esseistic book *"The Idea of Culture"* (2000).

Despite the ways in which the 'culture' is used nowadays, the concept does have its specific history. Taking into account some of the features of this historical background helps locate and differentiate contexts in which culture

in general, and the idea of *cultural* in particular, are used nowadays. One of the distinguishing features in the conceptual level might in fact be indicated by the difference in which the research of culture has turned towards the studies on the cultural. The latter signifies the contemporary position in which the idea of the cultural is increasingly constructed and textually produced in terms that relate more to the actual context and future orientation than to that of the past. Although the shift is grammatical, from noun towards adjective, it also highlights the change from a substantial concept towards a ubiquitous phenomenon. The problem here is that this phenomenon is in danger of becoming meaningless.

The core idea of this article is to follow the use of 'culture' in both its historical and contemporary context. I do not ask, what a culture 'really' is, I do not define it in an anthropological way, and I do not attempt to specify differences between ideas of cultural, racial, national, sexual etc. Instead, I am interested in the variety of use of the concept and in transformation occurring within it. The forms within the transformations, in which the culture or cultural are used, construct here the specific temporality of the concept. I claim that the 'culture', similarly to other central concepts, is defined not only by its content but also by its temporal and spatial contexts. Accordingly, we should pay attention to what these contexts are. Although I am sceptic, as to whether it is possible to specify the contemporary discussion in its dazzling plurality, I find it reasonable to categorise some of the contexts in which the 'culture' has different meanings. Although I am especially interested in characterising those features that are valid for the contemporary use of 'cultural', I first examine that, which was included in or excluded from the definitions of 'culture' in the past. This brings forth its close concepts that create tensions and contradictions in 'culture' and also affect the ways in which the 'cultural', as a phenomenon, is created today.

Stuart Hall considers cultural studies to, in Foucault's sense, be a "discursive formation" (Hall 1992, 278). This notion is important, since it provides an intellectual and academic starting point. Generally, the idea of 'culture' acquires its contents from diverse cultural practices, e.g. art, religion, civilisation, or spirituality, which are distinguishable from the mere textual level. In this sense, the 'culture' is always more than its mere textual/conceptual expression, and this is not always easy to recognise. Despite the fact that most of the cultural studies scholars do use 'culture' or 'cultural' as a textual construction, I am interested in ways, in which this textual level appears in their writings and in the meanings ascribed to it. If the 'cultural' has become *a textual and discursively formed* subject matter, constantly produced and reproduced in textual level, text authors should, at some point at least, be aware of the directions towards which the 'culture' is headed. We cannot take for granted, what 'cul-

ture' actually means. Understanding and dealing with 'culture' is a 'cultural' phenomenon itself. In order to avoid circular reasoning regarding 'cultural', or that for or against 'culture', I confront the past with the present. This helps indicate and perhaps also understand some of the tensions, contents or context, in which 'culture' is textually produced today.

Reading the 'culture'

As mentioned above, I first pay attention to the historical meaning of 'culture' in the European context. I then observe how certain authors, namely Tony Bennett, Donna Haraway and Homi Bhabha, use the 'culture' concept in their articles, gathered under *"Cultural Studies"* collection volume (1992). This volume is based on the major conference organised at the University of Illinois. Questions pointed out at the conference also provide a background against which to ask, whether the field needs some common 'philosophy' or common strategies concerning the use of the 'culture' both as the object and/or as the subject of study.

The conceptual method of my study is based on German *Begriffsgeschichte*, the historical method that explicitly focuses on concepts and their changes. The departure to investigate the concept of culture is constructed by German historians mainly, and it is the German concept that was transferred into the English speaking academic world (White 1973, 17). The origin of the conceptual history was created during the era of Enlightenment, when the importance of studying formations of historical and social concepts was acknowledged. During the end of 18th and beginning of 19th century, a 'struggle' surrounding the so-called leading concepts, such as *history, progress, state, revolution, civilisation* or *culture* emerged. These concepts gained new meanings due to the fact that their use became connected to philological and philosophical research and to the corresponding academic fields. Otto Brunner in particular discovered the historicity of concepts, whereas Reinhart Koselleck emphasised the conceptual character of transformation and movement (Dipper 2000, 283-84). In this historical context, many of the central social and political concepts were also defined and were related to differentiation and to development of academic disciplines.

With this background in mind, it is not far fetched to claim that the culture concept gains new meanings on account of its use as part of relatively new academic discipline. In this sense, it is relevant to compare these newly emerged meanings with the historically established ones. Further, when we pay attention to the history of a specific concept, we do not only study its history and development, but we also study various shifts in the use and in the meaning

of the concept. For instance, Koselleck describes a shift, occurring between 1760 and 1780, in the meaning of 'history' (*die Geschichte*) in German, as it moves from a discipline concept to something that is the primary "object" of the discipline, and still further to "that what happens" (Koselleck 1967). The shift was accompanied by a grammatical shift, as the concept of history was transferred from plural into a singular noun. It is precisely the collective singular form *die Geschichte* that makes the horizon shift visible. Equally, various changes occurred in the meaning and in the grammatical shift from 'culture' to 'cultural'. These differences are also related to transformations in construction of their opposition concepts.

Koselleck's view highlights the changes in meaning from one concept to another, despite the fact that the general vocabulary may remain the same (cf. Koselleck 1983, 14-15). The primary interest of the conceptual historian is to study the formation of a new concept, and not its modification through reception (Koselleck 1983, 45). In my case, I am mainly interested in changes that occur in the contemporary use and formations of 'culture'. Despite the fact that the vocabulary of culture has not changed, its historical meaning seems to have altered. Thus, I first look at the ways in which 'culture' develops historically, beginning as a concept that refers to a certain process (of civilisation) or development (to cultivate). This forms an important background for understanding the ways in which the idea of 'cultural' gains its form as a textual construction.

It is notable, that the concept does not change independently of its close textual surrounding. The shifts that I point out constitute differences in meanings of 'culture' in its temporal contexts. In addition to the changes in the cultural practices, the 'culture' and its changes is to be understood in relation to changes in other concepts in its close surroundings, such as progress, civilisation or politics (cf. Koselleck 1967, 196-219). In this sense, the dynamics of 'culture' also contribute to understanding of or, alternatively, cause confusion in the meaning of other concepts. The conceptual shift happens as a temporal shift that is here described as a move from development concept (to cultivate, a process) towards a concept that, in addition to linear, includes also disjunctive and disruptive temporalities. As 'culture' nowadays seems to exist as a part of textual construction, it is also interesting to notice how mediations between different temporal and spatial, textual and conceptual elements are handled in the selected texts.

A conceptual shift appears also to be related to certain geographical spaces and to the language (cf. White 1973, 19-20). Unfortunately, it is impossible, within the limits of this article, to study the national and linguistic differences in using 'culture'. Instead, what combines the different approaches here is a shift that occurs in *temporality* that is attached to the 'culture'. This shift in

temporality also highlights the difference between studying the phenomena of culture and analysing and constructing cultural phenomena.

Towards the end of this essay I note the ambivalence of the question of whether the 'non-historical' use that appears to have occurred in the textualisation of 'culture' during the 20th *fin de siècle*, leads to a new static of the concept of culture. The disappearing historicity within cultural studies affect the 'cultural', turning it into a 'sponge' absorbing most of the new and earlier non-thematised or conceptualised phenomena from its surrounding. On the other hand, there also exists the possibility that 'culture' is becoming a part of new dynamics never discussed before, since it is now conceptualised in terms of virtual, digital and post-technological.

Boundaries between culture and civilisation

It is rather common to start a political and historical study with a reference to the ancient Greeks, as a temporal and spatial complex that signifies the history of 'civilised mankind'. For this reason, it might be surprising to find out that the Greeks did not possess a specific concept of culture[1]. The closest concept to culture, among the Greeks, is that of *'Bildung'* (edification/ education). The lack of 'culture' and its mixture with *'Bildung'* is not always noted in, for instance, the discussion of the classic *Bildungideal* during 19th and 20th century. Especially Werner Jäger claims that the highest consciousness of culture existed among the Greeks. Jäger identifies the concept of culture with that of *Bildung* (Fisch 1992, 782), which is, in fact, rather common a characteristic of the present understanding of culture as well. This conception of 'culture' has less to do with artistic or life forms than with the educational practices and science.

Another interesting feature is the lack of the concept of 'civilisation' in the ancient Greek. The concept 'civilisation' originates in the Latin *civis, civitas* and *civilis* all of which refer to public and civil matters. The Greek equivalents regarding the discussion of the public sphere are the concepts of *politeia* and *politikos*, which form the origins for the Western concept of politics[2]. The mixture of the concepts of politics and those of public/civil matters has made it difficult to differentiate between politics understood as public matters and politics understood as action concept. In the Greek context, the political activity was a way to build up something we today might call a 'political community' in the specified time and place of the Greek *Polis*.

The Roman use of *civilis* and *civitas*, however, forms a basis for contemporary understanding of 'civil society'. In connection to this, the spatial aspect is of importance too, as the Roman conceptualisation of the civil society refers to

a specific town and thus, to a specific nationality as a condition for the *civitates* inhabiting the space in question. The Romans also formed the origins of the concept of culture, since the Latin verb *colere* that has a double meaning "to move itself' or "to find itself at" leads to the later use of *cultura* in certain spatial terms. The dynamic ambiguity, the simultaneous motion and statics, has characterised the concept from its beginning. The result of this dynamic, later to be combined with the idea of Western 'progress', is already present in one of the first formations of this concept. In addition, *colere* contains the meanings of 'to live' and 'to take care of'. From these connotations emerge two substantives, *cultus* and *cultura*, of which *cultus* refers to the aspect of doing (activity) whereas *cultura* also denotes preparation of something (Fisch 1992, 683-88).

The early use of *colere* includes both movement and the result; it also includes its active and passive substances. It is an open concept, that is used both in human and agricultural connotations, meaning 'to cultivate'. *Cultura* and *cultus* also began to absorb ideas of education, moral habits and ways of life, and slowly their meaning began to cover various aspects of life style, such as fashion or jewellery. Pierre Bourdieu, in his *"Outline of a Theory of Practice"* (1977), describes culture as *habitus* and it is in this way that the early forms of 'culture' are already present in the Romans. Later however, the meanings between *cultura* and *cultus* become further differentiated, for instance in Augustus and also in Thomas Hobbes, cultus acquires the meaning of a religious cult[3].

Similarly to the concept of culture, the idea of progress described 'proceeding' (*procectus, proficere/progressio, progressus*) towards a direction that is primarily value neutral. The ancient concept of progress does not connect closely to the idea of progress in science or to that in history, but rather, it signifies growth. In this sense, the cultivation and agriculture and the growth and preparation are closely connected. The Romans however, were the first to begin to differentiate between culture and barbarism / wildness. These were not general but spatially based oppositions, as culture and barbarism were used to describe militarist purposes in which Romans saw themselves as the defendants of culture against barbarism.

The emerging Christianity during the early Middle Ages transfers both the idea of culture and that of the progress. St. Augustine expresses a connection between the ideas of progress and those of Christianity. As a contrast to the earlier and less differentiated idea of process in ancient Greek, Augustine outlines the idea of progress as a line from the birth of Christ towards the Kingdom of God (see St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*. 10, 14). Here, the progress means roughly moving towards perfection in leading the Christian life. The linearity of time and history leading towards progress is also constructed as an opposing

idea to the 'pagan' ideas, such as those of the temporal circle in Asian religion or, especially that of rebirth. In this sense, the meanings of culture are adopted within linearity of history, with the course of time acting as a separating instance from the pagan/barbarian. In this context, the cultus too gains a new meaning as separating the cult between the 'right' and 'wrong' gods.

For Augustine, *cultura* characterises ways in which people's actions are separated from the nature and from the animals. Together with the linearity of the course of history, it also describes a progressive move towards 'cultivation' of human mind. Now human minds too, and not only nature, are considered to have a capacity for cultivation and progression. In this manner, the earlier agricultural meanings of growth and of the cultivation of land, are transferred into the context of humankind.

During the Middle Ages, the idea of culture is partly replaced with that of civilisation. As mentioned above, the Latin concepts of *civis* and *civilitas* include explicitly collective and political aspects. The concept *civilis* is from the beginning more differentiated than the concept of culture, since it already describes its difference from barbarism and wildness. The concepts relating to civilisation are also more positively valued than are the *cultus* and *cultura*. Due to its explicitly political content, *civilis* refers to the collective matters, whereas *colere* includes more individualistic components of life in a community. However, this difference is later buried and, in contemporary context in particular, culture is, more often than civilisation, understood in connection with political.

The difference between *vita civilis* and *vita naturalis* (also referred to as *vita bestialis*) is made roughly during the scholastic era. This however, is not an exclusive distinction, and later, especially in the political theory, the distinction is transformed into the difference between *vita activa* describing the political life and *vita contemplativa* indicating the theoretical life as discussed in detail especially in Hannah Arendt's *"The Human Condition"* (1956). Vita civilis connotes the active life, whereas *vita spiritualis* signifies the contemplative approach to life and describes the spiritual aspect of human existence (Fisch 1992, 694-95). In connection to the *vita civilis*, Dante, for instance, uses the concept of *civilitas humana* to refer to the whole of the mankind without being restricted by spatial aspects considered conditions for a 'civilisation', such as specific Western cities or nationalities. In *"Monarchy"*, for instance, Dante notices that the universal peace is a final destination of human civilisation cf. Dante *"Monarchy"*, (*De Monarchia* 1313) 1996, 1,2,4,5). Dante considers the human collective to be signified by civilisation that is here thought as opposed to the isolated life of single individuals. In the French use of the concept during the 14th century, civilisation refers to collective life of 'citizens' and in this sense, it retains its earlier connection to the *politeia* as a public activity.

Men of Culture

During the 17th Century, civilisation is more specifically used as a counter concept to barbarism. Francis Bacon, for instance, uses *cultura animi* as one of his central concepts and he understands the culture to be a part of ethical life. Here, the *cultura animi* is closely related to the development of personality[4]. Bacon also gives the idea of human progress a more dynamic scientific direction, as he claims that sciences progress positively through experience and experimentation. In this, he builds a more explicit bridge between concepts of culture and progress, and leaves an impact on the idea of progress used scientifically and mechanistically especially after the Enlightenment period. Bacon emphasises the causality of natural phenomena and he regards mathematics as a science that progresses without mistakes. However, although he also emphasises a certain 'progressivity' of human mind and human culture, he does not consider humankind to be able to progress in a way that is characteristic of sciences.

Thomas Hobbes is among the first philosophers to distinguish between religious cult and culture. Hobbes regards the act of 'culture' to be practised by two sorts of men. The first sort comprises of those who nourish and order the seeds of culture by means of their own invention. In this way he appropriates the early agricultural meaning to suit the social context. The other 'sort of men' consists of those who act by God's commandment and direction. According to Hobbes, both sorts of men are practising culture with a purpose to make people more apt to obedience, law, peace, charity and civil society (Hobbes 1651/1982, 173). He names culture a "labour which a man bestows on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Those things, whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us (…). Or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills" (Hobbes 1651/1982, 399). Shortly, Hobbes makes a distinction between two meanings of culture. On the one hand, culture signifies "the labour bestowed on the Earth" and on the other hand, it denotes culture of minds, especially the education of children. Cult refers to religious idea and praxis, such as worshipping. In this sense, *cultus Dei* means the worship of God (1651/1982, 400).

It is Samuel Pufendorf who emphasises that the development of the human being from the natural state towards more 'civilised' way of living occurs via culture (Pufendorf, (1995) *"On the duty of man and citizen according to natural law"* 2,4, 160, 171). Thus, he finds the culture to be a connection between the development and the civilised being. The nature here is not simply understood as an opposition to culture, but it is rather considered to be the starting point, from which human development and progress towards more 'civilised' being begins. Culture now becomes a more dynamic concept, including a process

of promotion that takes place in phases. This leads to the dynamics and redefinition of 'culture' during the period of Enlightenment, when many key concepts form so to closely resemble their contemporary use. The cultural history would, in Irwing's wording for instance, be the real history of humankind (Irwing, *"Erfahrungen"* Bd. 3, 310 § 204 in Fisch 1992, 708). It is in the form in which the idea of culture becomes one of the leading principles of the 'Western civilisation', that the same idea is discussed in accordance with that of its infinite progress. The idea of the progressive culture includes the education and development of the rational and 'enlighted' people. The French revolution is often understood as the cornerstone in the 'progress' of human beings, and the revolutionary ideas it produced, reflect on changes of concepts of culture, civilisation and history.

Directly after the experiences of the French revolution, Immanuel Kant combines culture and civilisation in one paragraph: "Wir sind im hohem Grade durch Kunst und Wissenschaft kultiviert. Wir sind civilisiert, bis zum Überlästigen, zu allerlei gesellschaftiger Artigkeit und Anständigkeit. Aber, uns für schon moralisiert zu halten, daran fehlt noch sehr viel" (Kant, 1784/1968, 26). Kant's remark makes an end to the attempt to characterise the progressive civilisation in infinite terms. Kant, although in certain terms of his own, also combines 'culture' with 'civilisation'. Namely, he combines the Latin idea of culture with that of *Bildung*, especially in the Greek sense. Kant's concept of culture presents an antithesis to that idea of 'nature', in which nature is understood as a sphere of pure instinct. On the other hand, culture is a way out of the natural and intuitive state. Only when the state of morality has been achieved, is the humankind completely 'civilised'. From Kant's viewpoint the humankind has already achieved a great deal in its state of culture and civilisation, but it is still far from the state of morality. The final goal (*Endzweck*) is a man (Mensch) with the necessary cultural, civilisational and moral education. The idea of morality becomes something still lacking and essential for the increase in the value of the civilised society, as it is distinguished from the uncivilised, barbarian state (see also Kant, *"Anthropologie"* GS XII: 672 ff. or *"Über Pädagogik: Einleitung"*, GS XII: 706-707).

Culture in progress

As the progress and infinite cultivation became ideals of the cultural development, its scientific formations inhabited also features of the theory of cultural evolution that culminated in George Darwin's thought. Although the dynamic and positively valued combination between ideas of progress and culture accelerated throughout the 19th century, the Western idea of progress, culture

and civilisation as parts of historical evolution faced a deep crisis during and due to the World Wars. One of the central documents describing this crisis is Oswald Spengler's *"Der Untergang des Abendlandes"* (1922). In the beginning of the 20th Century, the critique of progress was also a part of critique of civilisation and culture that was further disputed in the critical social theory, such as the Frankfurt school. The Enlightenment ideals of the humankind reaching a necessary state of education/cultivation of mind, civilisation and moral values were confronted with the barbarism of the wars.

In his book *"The Idea of Culture"*, Terry Eagleton names the distinction between culture and barbarism as something that 'today' is signified by the "defense of a certain 'civility' against fresh forms of so-called barbarism" (Eagleton 2000, 52-53). According Eagleton, this notion introduces dynamics and tension into the 'culture', although it, in fact, claims nothing new. By giving a new form to the collision between culture and barbarism in 1930s, it was Walter Benjamin who claimed the concept of 'barbarism' to be already included in Western culture. He notices that the two do not stand in opposition to one another, but are instead inseparable, like two sides of the same coin. This suggests a cultural critique that discards the ancient opposition between culture and barbarism and points out that the face of the barbarism appears in the Western civilisation itself (e.g. Benjamin 1940: VII). Benjamin creates the concept of positive barbarism as a critique of cultural barbarism. This positive barbarism implores us to recognise a new space in cultural thinking, which is detached from earlier experiences. This space is crystallised especially in artistic movements, such as cubism and surrealism, that intend to detach themselves from the historical canon of aesthetic expression (Benjamin 1983, 292, 593). This means, that the cultivation as progress is no longer to be understood as 'one' or as homogeneous course towards the aims of the civilised society. Instead, as the cultural differences are recognised, the new frontiers can be produced by means of both individuals and of movements, emerging form national or individual aims.

Thus, the real changes that happen in the concept in the beginning of the 20th century are those that blur the differentiation between progress and decadence - or that between culture and barbarism. Benjamin's escape from the idea of historical dialectics, means a re-evaluation of the culture without the fear of its enemy, cultural decadence. However, the increasing secularisation process during the 19th century, accompanied with industrialisation and world capitalisation has led to the state of societies in which the ideal of universal cultivation and its progress towards 'civilisation of the mind' was scattered. This was also the beginning of the so-called *Kulturpessimismus* that expanded from the critical to cultural theory and praxis for instance via Max Horkheimer, George Steiner or Ortega Y Gasset. Especially among the

post-war political Left, culture pessimism was indicating the post-war critique of capitalism, critique of mass culture and culture industry until 1970´s and beginning of 1980's.

Now we might ask, what happens to 'culture', as it becomes a concept that does not only reflect the cultural practises (artistic, political, academic, religious etc.) or cultivation of mind, but is also an object, subject and praxis of cultural studies. Are we, after all, still talking about the same matter? As the culture is not an 'object' of study, theory or discussion, it seems to spread out everywhere within cultural studies. Yet, there have been different ways of reasoning, why the concept has actually 'proliferated'. McGuigan, for instance, offers an explanation that is based on the claim of the changing economic conditions, both in Britain during the era of later Thatcherism and in West Germany with its *Kulturgesellschaft* (the 'culture society', see McGuigan 2000 and Hermann Schwengel 1991). The changes reflect the transformation from information towards so-called post-information age, characterised by virtual and digital communications and ways towards 'post-modern' culture. In these terms, enterprise, technology and culture have gained new characteristics that are distinctively different from the premodern idea of culture, and the meanings of which begin to overlap. There can be no 'return' to the premodern or modern ideas of culture, nor are the distinctions between high and low culture any longer valid. The question remains how, then, is it possible to differentiate between the concept of culture, its use, and understanding in the contemporary world? Do we need any restrictions or definitions on what is and what is not culture?

Although I cannot provide a straight answer to these questions, I next pay attention to some of the differences in the use of the 'culture' within the cultural studies in 1990's. In doing this, I refer to three articles, authored by Tony Bennett, Donna Haraway and Homi Bhabha respectively. As the point of view shifts from historical towards contemporary texts, I utilize a textual analysis that intends to point out ways in which 'culture' is used. Since my proceeding cannot avoid some collision with the past concept, the meaning of producing the confrontations is to find out, where the collision takes us in an attempt to understand the role of culture in the contemporary position where the 'culture' is increasingly constructed and textually produced.

Bennett on culture and power

I start my brief semantic analysis by first looking at Tony Bennett's conference volume article in which he intends to place 'policy' into cultural studies (Bennett 1992). Bennett pays specific attention to the concept of 'power' and

to ways in which cultural practices emerge together with their relations to power. In other words, he outlines a field of cultural policy studies that draws upon both cultural and political questions.

Bennett's views seems to function well as an attempt to combine political studies with social policy and cultural studies in the ways practised by the Australian Institute for Cultural Policy Studies since 1987. He outlines four questions important for understanding the role of culture and its connection to policy. He first observes 'culture' as a particular field of government and he then calls for the need to distinguish between different regions of culture in terms of specific objects, targets and techniques of government. In addition, he sees a need to identify the political relations specific to different regions of culture and he also pays attention to the need for intellectual work, possibly considered to influence or to serve the conduct of identifiable agents within regions of different cultures (Bennett 1992, 23[5]). In other words, the concept of culture in Bennett's text is related to power, government and its policies. Further, by outlining culture from within its policy-aspect, Bennett intends to separate the concept from its past definitions, having it bear an explicit reference to the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

I do not argue here as to what the 'cultural studies' is or what it should be, nor do I evaluate Bennett's ambiguous attachment and detachment from the British Birmingham School (e.g. Bennett 1992, 23-4, 29-32). As pointed out previously, I pay attention to the use and transformation of 'culture'. It is in this sense that Bennett's intention to detach culture from its past connections is interesting. However, the way he then deals with the historical problematic of the issue causes the detachment to remain mainly instrumental, as the connections or disconnections to the historical 'culture' have not been specified. Bennett does not lay out any specific contents of 'culture', but he does seem to use it as an instrument; here almost identical to governmental 'policy'. Doing so - although Bennett himself criticises the idea of 'culture' due to its elasticity - he nevertheless understands the culture with reference to elastic practices, seemingly more closely connected to the modern idea of 'power' than to that of historical 'culture'. This is how he gains an access to cultural politics, associated with the cultural studies.

Consequently, 'culture' appears to become more of a catchword, than a concept with its extensive history. This kind of historical detachment seems to be quite a common strategy within the cultural studies. It also makes it easier to connect the 'culture' to any phenomena examined, although the historical exclusions and inclusions of the concept are lost through this praxis and, as already mentioned, 'culture' becomes proliferated or elastic as a concept.

Nevertheless, Bennett understands power to be embedded in a construction of cultural 'texts'. Political practises are distinguished on the basis "in which

they aim to equip or empower the reader culturally" (Bennett 1992, 24). The 'texts' appear to be spaces, in which the power and cultural manipulation occur. Consequently, the ways in which the power or ideology is practised vary according to relations between culture and power. The way in which these relations are viewed, affects the cultural politics. Hence, the 'culture' here denotes *a discursive practice* embedded in different policies. Bennett discusses textual relations that can, if so desired, be institutionalised through studying and critiquing these textual practices. This is not a novel idea, and it seems that Bennett has placed his thoughts into Foucauldian setting of the relations between power and discourse. In this case, the Foucauldian concept of power is strongly paralleled and partly exchanged with 'culture'. However, referring to Raymond Williams, Bennett makes a distinction between the textual and instrumental practices of power as producing culture and the ways of life, such as intellectual and artistic activities. Despite acknowledging this difference, the 'culture', in the article, remains articulated mainly as an instrument of government (cf. Williams 1976: 80, Bennett 1992, 25).

From my point of view, the problem of understanding culture and the way in which one produces circles in which the culture concept is rotated becomes a part of a proliferation of the culture. If we understand 'culture' to signify a way of life (as a subculture, popular culture), then the 'culture' as praxis or instrument of government constructs almost an opposite position to this way of life. Hence, the 'culture' that institutionalises or governs is both distinctive and non-distinctive to the subcultures. The different *forms* of culture, whether these are conceived as aesthetic, political or institutional, do not clearly make a difference in a textual level to the 'way of life' culture that still seems to have its historical and non-textual meanings and connotation. Although this difference might seem simple and clear in common understanding, it does not always appear in textual practices.

From my point of view, the way in which Bennett intends to emphasise the organisational and instrumental aspects of 'culture' is in itself not a problem. What does seem to be problematic here is a lack of a more carefully differentiated clarification of how, then, the idea of culture functions as textual and discursive construction and what are the connections and disconnections to the historical concept. The enforcement of the power of 'policy' into textual governing of cultures is a praxis, in which 'culture' is used simultaneously as its object and its instrument. Form a perspective of the conceptual study however, it is necessary to ask almost too simple a question; namely, whether and why is it necessary to 'translate' the governing praxis as such, including aspect of power and instrumentality, as *culture*? The social management is outlined as specific techniques, programs and operative procedures of government that also lead specific cultural 'technologies' into these studies. Yet,

how much is this basic distinction between the way of life and the forms of culture taken in account here? Is it truly as self-evident as Bennett indicates, that management of policy is now understood as culture as such? Would this issue need further clarification, pertaining to the object and aiming to define whether further universalizing of the concept is necessary or whether it would also be interesting to consider the varying contents of 'culture'?

Haraway: Cultural Technologies

The combination of culture and technology is something that is truly unique to the contemporary idea of culture. The cultural technologies, in their broad meaning, extend 'culture' to broadcasting, entertainment and market economy. To a certain extent, we could, provided we so desire, consider the whole 'capitalist' space of production one form of cultural technology. I noted above, how the 'cultural power' is said to be embedded in texts and in textual practices. Colin Mercer, for instance, supports this idea in a statement that "reading is the product of a specific cultural technology" (1988, 63). Thus, reading here should be understood as praxis that encodes specific cultural 'subtexts' as much as it produces cultural texts, be they literary, academic or popular. The way 'reading' here is produced as a cultural technology depends on specific academic practices that have not necessarily much to do with a common understanding of the idea of 'reading' outside of these practices.

Now, where do the different cultural technologies take our examined idea of 'culture'? Various forms of cultural production and reproduction, for instance, are largely criticised by feminists, through the critique of capitalist and post-technological practices. This critique seems to be a part of a cultural praxis as much as it is part of cultural construction within certain subcultures. Continuing my crusade, I next examine Donna Haraway's *The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others* (1992).

Haraway begins her critique by looking at the production of various monstrous beings, for instance in science fiction films. She refers to those as to "theorists of mind, bodies and planets who insist effectively- (…) -that sight is sense made to realise the fantasies of phallocrats", as to 'technopornographers' (1992, 295). Haraway restates that "science is culture" [6], and that the discourse of science studies is the same as that of cultural studies, although she simultaneously points out that it is not self evident, what culture, science or they studies mean (1992, 296). Haraway here poses an interesting dilemma. She claims the heterogeneous concept of culture to have become closely connected with post-modern idea of 'science' - a claim which is also historically appropriate, considering the background of 'culture' and its development during the end of

the 18th century, which saw the culture progressing synchronically along with the scientific development and its acceleration. However, departing from her feminist critique position, Haraway clearly criticises the ideas of progressivity in human (male) ratio and the social and technological development that emerged especially during the Enlightenment era. From my point of view, Haraway's article constructs a paradox. Namely, she does not distinguish between historical contents that necessarily contribute to the modern understanding of culture and the cultural as textual production, in which 'culture' can be used as a catchword, arguing pro or contra social and technological development. This leads me to suspect, as I have previously with Bennett's article, that despite the difference in thematic, Haraway's use of the concept of culture too appears to be a non-historical and after-modern catchword.

Focusing further on the detachment from the historical content, Haraway's article claims interesting facts with respect to 'nature'. 'Nature' appears here as something "we cannot not desire", an idea derived from Spivak (Haraway 1992, 296). In the contemporary society other kinds of relationships to nature should emerge, in addition to its reification and possession. Haraway takes examples from the possession praxis, such as describing a tourist travelling 'into nature' or the efforts to 'preserve nature' in parks, or the projects of representing or enforcing human 'nature'. She outlines a post-modern transformation within the idea of 'nature', detaching from the idea of 'nature' as a physical place, a treasure to secure in bank, or as something to be saved or violated. Nature rather becomes a topos, a place or a *topic* in the rhetorician's sense, for consideration under common themes. Hence, nature is strictly a commonplace. In addition, nature is understood as a *tropos*, a *trope*; it is figure, construction, artefact, movement and displacement.

If we confront Haraway's ideas with the historical perspective of the conception of nature, the concepts do not transfer independently, but also in relation one another. Thus, the 'culture' and 'nature' pair is interesting in ways in which the meanings of its components resemble one another. The culture, in the Kantian context, is the idea that leads the 'humankind' out of the nature and natural state. In Haraway's use nature, although with its different and new connotations, is a 'commonplace' without an exit. Now, if the 'nature' is used in other discourse, as a rhetoric figure as Haraway notes, then the contemporary culture too is signified by its exhaustive textuality that pierces right through the ideas of culture and nature. There are no limits, no transformations or exclusions between culture and nature, as long as they are conceived of as textual constructions. Culture loses its historical substance, as much as nature loses its reference to a physical place. If this assumption is correct, the problem that is not clearly demarcated in this article is that of the differences between conceptions, provided these are produced merely as textual. Hence, how are

we to understand the difference and the transformation within ‘nature‘ from a historical to a post-modern concept, if its historical connotation is wiped away by means of textual strategy?

Haraway does make distinctions within the idea of nature, portraying the rhetorical move within the concept. Yet, is there a way to avoid producing a never-ending circle, if meanings and objects of conceptions are produced by means of the same textual strategies? This problem is partly present in Haraway’s own critique of artifactualism that states nature to be both a fiction and a fact. Pace Haraway, the post-modern world and global technology (and culture?) seem to *denature everything* (1992, 297). Or, as Haraway specifies, this is not as denaturing as is the question of the production of nature. Haraway suggests that ‘we’ ”unblind ourselves from the sun-worshipping stories about the history of science and technology as paradigms of rationality”. She further suggests that we refigure actors in construction of the ethno-specific categories of nature and culture, rightly declaring the problem of the post-modern culture and its technological decease, the denaturalisation, idealisation of ration, culture of reproduction and simulacra. However, as she attacks the ”enlightenment-derived modern and post-modern premises about nature and culture” (1992, 297) she does not make a move toward non-enlightenment premises regarding nature and culture.

Haraway falls into a non-historical gap of understanding and specifying her object of study. If ‘culture’ is not understood only as ”production, progress technical production etc.” (Haraway 1992, 297) but also as a historical concept that includes a variety of contents and possibilities of interpretation, then, along with the very same idea of ‘culture’ there might in fact exist some ways out of the ‘phallocentric’ culture. Taking a closer look at the past, we see culture and technology not to be synonyms. Considering them as such is therefore stepping into the discourse that is only produced within the specific and restricted era of cultural technologies. I do see that lengthy examples in Haraway’s articles are constructed on the basis of her own criticism of the idea of ‘nature’ emphasizing cyborg or science fiction elements. The critique of the Enlightenment tradition gave a creative energy to her work, leading her to exotic paths towards thematising the most recent phenomena and also towards rethinking the idea of monsters, along with the rethinking of nature in the post-technological era. Through the examples, she in fact contributes importantly to the underscoring of the contemporary culture. Yet unfortunately, being completely disinterested with its history beyond that of enlightenment, she restricts herself, thus breaking the circle of scientific ‘progress-loaded’ idea of culture.

The circle of textual construction exerts its effects also in a way as not to allow Haraway to completely escape the ‘denaturalisation or idealisation of

ratio'. With the critique of production and also with the denaturalisation of 'cultural' phenomena, Haraway also reproduces these terms of production in her article. There are other connotations to 'culture' to be found, contributing to critical views on the culture, beyond and besides scientifically constructed concept that strives to denature everything.

The Time of Culture

Before drawing certain conclusions from the readings above, I shortly point out some basic ideas pertaining to Homi Bhabha's *"Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern Guilt"* (1992). Bhabha explicitly departs from Roland Barthes, as well as from the issue of the 'cultural difference', considering the latter to be beneficial also to the discussion regarding the concept of 'culture'. Namely, Bhabha makes an effort to use 'culture' in the specified spatial and temporal context and as it is related to issues, such as identity, difference and time. He also defines the temporal frame of 'culture', by outlining the *moment of culture* as his focus. This moment is in its "aporetic, contingent position, in-between a plurality of practices that are different and yet must occupy the same space of adjudication and articulation" (Bhabha 1992, 57).

Bhabha's writings also deal more generally with the issue of difference, for instance his writings on nation and narration (Bhabha 1990). In the discussion on narrative constructions of a nation, he makes a connection between the issues of temporality and those of difference in a manner similar to that outlined in his discussion on culture. The 'culture' here is defined as specific discourse in the Foucauldian sense. In other words, the cultural discourse itself represents the idea of culture that is specific to its discursive surrounding. In addition, the distinctions made are exclusive, leaving out the idea of any non-discursive forms of culture.

Bhabha's work provides an example of explicitly proceeding towards and explains the post-modern manner of textual construction. He does not ignore the historical connotations, but instead notices ways in which the earlier dichotomies, such as those of between savage and the civil, contribute to a contemporary possibility of reading cultural differences (1992, 58). The statement proceeds with oppositions regarded as prejudices, bearing though in mind their similarity to the historical oppositions, which later came to account for some of the ambiguity of the concept. In the context, in which the contemporary use of 'culture' looks generalised and all absorbing, Bhabha's use of 'culture' makes an important exception in outlining of the differences between the historical concept and the contemporary one. In these terms, the textual construction of culture is differentiated from the historical use,

as the meaning of the concept becomes the 'other' within the concept itself. The differentiating process occurs procedurally, without strong statements. However, the cultural studies still proceed without specifying the variety of ways in understanding 'culture', or without examining the variety of cultural discourse, cultural practices, and cultural substance.

Following Bhabha's argumentation, I suggest that the contemporary use of the concept of culture appears as *momentaneous*. As such, it causes a disruption in the historical canon of 'culture', with its exclusions and counter-concepts - a feature emerged already in the cultural theories in the beginning of the 20th century. The contemporary 'culture' is also temporally and spatially more focused than is its historical use, yet its objects have grown tremendously. Arguing for the specific temporality of 'culture' Bhabha states, that "there is a continual tension between the incommensurability of the articulation of cultural differences and the temporal non-synchronicity of signification as they attempt to speak, quite literally, in terms of each other" (1992, 58). The tension here could be understood as something productive and creative, as it is, according to Bhabha, a movement of contingency as well as of ambivalence of positioning of cultural and political identity; the positioning taking place in the end of 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, coupled with the production of the cultural studies scholars.

Bhabha's specific example is taken from his reading of Toni Morrison's novel *"Beloved"* (1987) that he claims is a "reinscription as the Death of culture as continuum, historicism, linear narration, discursive generality premised on the synchronous symbolic structure of the Social Imaginary" (Bhabha 1992, 60). 'Cultural temporality' here is posed against the totalisation of the moment, the moment here being experienced in the present and not beyond it. These disjunctive temporalities might be the idea, which formulates our 'cultural time'. Indeed, the issue of temporality here is appropriate, as it contributes to differentiating between the meaning of culture, appearing, to give rough chronological outline, from the ancient Rome towards the 19th century Europe and that appearing in its more pointillist characterisation in the late 20th century.

Following the short comparison between the development and current use of the concept, it becomes evident that the 'culture' should, even if used as a textual strategy, be located in its present context and transformations, in order to avoid the decline of the meaning and significance of 'culture'. From textual to visual, from digital to virtual, the use of 'culture' is omnipresent and ubiquitous. Yet, culture has its specific focus too, elaborated not only in terms of the difference to the historical studies but with respect to exactly 'which' differences are the ones to be stated by scholars wishing to study 'culture'

more precisely. This focus implies thematising and conceptualising especially those phenomena that are taking place in present time.

Transformation towards 'the cultural'

Since there can be no common 'culture', there can be no common studies thereof either. In my brief textual analysis, I do not criticise the authors of cultural studies, be it due to the heterogeneity of the views or due to the differences of the contexts and strategies in using and understanding 'culture'. Instead, I attempt to understand some of 'culture's' meanings, taking into account the danger of the proliferation of culture towards it 'virtual meaningless' (cf. Mc Guigan 2000). Making apparent some of the differences between historical and contemporary understanding of culture, I use two ways of reading historical and contemporary texts. In essence, I look for possibilities to make distinctions within use of the 'culture' in a way more differentiating than is generally practiced in the cultural studies.

Confronting contemporary with the past meanings of 'culture' leads me to my main arguments. First, the contemporary 'culture' is most often used as a catchword or as a textual construction that is attached to an enormous variety of phenomena, from ethnological or national issues to mail-order or science fiction culture. In addition to this rather general notion, I notice another phenomenon that I argue to be a conceptual transformation within 'culture' - a transformation from 'culture' as an object or a substance to the 'cultural' as a signification for contemporary late-capitalistic and post-technological phenomena.

Following Homi Bhabha's arguments, I claim there to be a need to make the tensions in the incommensurability of the articulation of cultural differences more apparent, and to pay attention to different *temporalities of culture*. The ways in which the expression of 'culture' is transforming towards object, subject and praxis of the 'studies' might be a starting point from which to construct more *extensive an idea of 'cultural'*, as it is related most extensively to the late-capitalistic phenomena. I do not regard the shift from 'culture' to 'cultural' as a grammatical shift only, as in from noun to adjective, but I also claim there to exists a temporal shift towards a larger, elastic, actual and a future oriented concept. In this sense, the idea of the cultural might interestingly follow the ways, which the idea of 'history' followed when it changed during the end 18th century (see Koselleck 1967). In addition, the transformations are in a constant process of formation, as the cultural is increasingly produced in forms of textual strategies.

In the contemporary use, 'the cultural' seems to appear pontillist, non-synchronic idea attached to the newest phenomena in aesthetic, technological or political fields. Scholars, for instance, do not discuss the culture of technology, but cultural technologies (cf. Berland 1992), not politics of culture but cultural politics (Bennet 1992), or, instead of theory of culture there exists plenty of cultural theory, cultural analysis and cultural studies (cf. Mani 1992, 392-394). Although these notions might still appear fragmentary, the meanings of 'cultural' are less and less bound to the historical practices. The new differentiations of the cultural that are related more to textual than to artistic, academic, etc. practices, become increasingly detached from the culture as 'way of life', as art (relating to the concrete artistic work) or as behaviour.

Hence, 'the cultural' increasingly draws upon the contemporaneous issues. This means that the discussion on culture has transferred from distinguishing between culture and civilisation, or cult and barbarism towards announcing culturally produced sexuality, technology or psychology. I do not regard the new terminology as new 'names' only, but also as a change form the anthropological or philosophical meaning of culture towards producing practices of power, management, policy, technology in the after modern capitalist societies.

Finally, I claim that the shift from 'culture' to 'cultural' is not exclusive and that it is detectable in temporal terms. As the cultural is used momentaneously rather than historically, its dynamics are contemporaneous and future oriented. It is no more possible to 'institutionalise' the culture than it is to universalise it. The institutionalisation mechanisms work only in particular terms that corresponds to the cultural time. As it is attached to any newest technological phenomena, 'culture' is thrown into sporadic dynamics in terms of virtual, digital and post-technological. The disjunctive temporalities and spatialities of culture that Bhabha mentions (1992) could still be taken under scrutiny in order to make explicit just what cultural is and how it functions in its different textual and also non-textual surroundings. It is yet still unclear and it remains to be seen, whether the 'non-historical' use that occurs in the textualisation of 'culture' in the 20th *fin de siècle* leads towards new static or dynamics of the ideas of culture. In historical terms it appears the culture has become temporally static in its omnipresence. Yet, this might also be a sign of the transformation towards proper conceptualising of the cultural in the 21st century.

Notes

[1] See Friedrich Carus' research *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit* 1809/1904: 51.

[2] On history and transformations within the concept of politics, especially Palonen 1985.

[3] Terry Eagleton is in these terms writing rather carelessly, as he claims no differences between *cultus* and *colere* and claims that Latin *colere* means "*everything from cultivating and inhabiting to worshipping and protecting*" (Eagleton 2000: 2).

[4] On *cultura animi*, see e.g. Bacon, Works, Vol 1 (1623/1872): 711-715.

[5] I refer to Bennet as the author, since the article is written under his name. However, as he states in the article, the ideas presented have as their background a collaboration project at the Griffith university (1992: 24).

[6] Haraway refers here to the publication *Science as Culture*. Free Association Books 26, Freegrove Rd. London N7 9RQ, UK.

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Petra Ragnerstam

The /M/use of Adorno in Cultural Studies

The splinter in your eye
is the best magnifying-glass

—Theodor Adorno,
Minima Moralia

* * *

Concepts alone can achieve what the concepts prevent
—Theodor Adorno
Negative Dialectics

* * *

iden·ti·fi·ca·tion *2a: a mental mechanism wherein the individual gains gratification, emotional support, or relief from anxiety by attributing to himself consciously or unconsciously the characteristics of another person or group.*

—Webster's Third New International Dictionary

In contemporary forms of culture criticism, Theodor Adorno has for too long been construed as an old-fashioned, reactionary Marxist that any serious radical analyst of modern culture—modern consumer culture more specifically—has to take on and dismiss. This antagonistic response to Adorno's theories is mainly grounded on his rather elitist approach to popular, or mass culture. In cultural studies today, he is generally understood as being unduly hostile to popular culture and in favour of higher forms of art. However, rather than

dismissing his analysis of mass culture – which he argues to be complicit in consumer culture – it might be fruitful to incorporate high culture into his cultural critique and thus broaden his theories of mass culture to include all aspects of culture, also high culture. The fact that all forms of culture today are increasingly complicit in, rather than critical of, dominant social ideologies, is a matter that warrants discussion. The inability to criticise contemporary society because all criticism seems to be appropriated by consumer culture, is a social and philosophical problem where Adorno's theories can in fact become constructive.

Consequently, there is another, useful part of Adorno's work that current cultural theory would benefit from, in order not to be stranded on its own shores of washed-up, secluded radicalism. In Both *Negative Dialectics* and *Minima Moralia*, Adorno problematizes the function of the critic in a society where criticism, to a great extent, is co-opted into hegemonic culture production. In his social philosophy, concepts such as transgression, subversion, opposition, critique and agency do not have an a priori status, but rather function as workable processes of investigation. In this sense, Adorno's philosophy can be described as a self-critique of criticism itself, where the relation between the individual and society, or ideology, is the main subject of dissension. In this article, I focus on some of Adorno's theories in order to bring to the fore the problem concerning criticism and identity.

The Collapse of the Subject and the Possibility of Cultural Critique

Since ideology is no longer considered positioned above us, and represented as an external oppressor, but rather around us, and even within us - imprinted in our very bodies, the question concerns what a critic can say that resists the influences of dominant ideology. Contrary to Karl Marx's idea, the critic is no longer seen as a simple bridge between two layers representing superficiality - Marx's notion of ideology 'in the bad sense', and depth - the Real or Truth, since the two are intricately entwined. When the idea of the subject as an autonomous authority thus becomes destabilised, the gap between the 'I' and ideology collapses. As a consequence, the idea of cultural criticism becomes increasingly difficult. Important questions following this predicament are: where is individual agency in this structure? Can we rid us of the humanist belief in the individual as the origin of critical thought, without ridding us of critical thought altogether in the process? Is a uniform subject position necessary for agency, and if so, is there a subject without its own constitutive

outsides and 'others', set apart from dominant ideology or hegemonic repressive structures—a subject that is not oppressive in itself?

Once the subject is enmeshed in ideology or discourses of power, it becomes a problematic concept as such. Echoing Marx's claim in *Grundrisse* that even the most concrete concepts are complex, the notion of a uniform subject, from where one can depart in critical analysis, is questioned. As a consequence, the idea of a coherent identity constituting an individual is not merely a form of ideology. According to Adorno, "[i]dentity is the primal form of ideology" (1973, 148). In Adorno's theories, the notion of identity itself becomes a concept under erasure, where commonsense ideas of uniqueness, distinction, and personality are traded for dejected images of adjustment, correction, suitability and adequacy—all forms of conformity:

> *We relish [identity] as adequacy to the thing it suppresses; adequacy has always been subjection to dominant purposes and, in that sense, its own contradiction. After the unspeakable effort it must have cost our species to produce the primacy of identity even against itself, man rejoices and basks in his conquest by turning it into the definition of the conquered thing: what has happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as its "in –itself". (1973, 148)*

It is in this shape that the individual is created - not as a unique subject, but rather as a compromised and compromising concept. Because identity formation requires a process of demarcation, containment, and suppression, without making these operations discernible, individualism is the primary way for dominant ideology to prevail. The idea of the individual thus becomes a handy solution to the problem of identity, in the same way the phrase 'I am what I am' becomes an adequate and gratifying definition of the self. However, individualistic ideology entails that the self is defined against what not-self is, without critical reflection on this exclusion. As a consequence, critical awareness of the subject's entanglement in ideological power structures is crucial for critical thinking, since an absolute belief in the autonomous subject makes its actual operations transparent to us.

The realization that the subject is not an innocent construction of personality, but rather a site of demarcation and exclusion, has created a number of theories and disciplines that attempt to reinvent a productive site from which to speak and act. Such disciplines are Queer studies, Women's studies, Chicano studies, African American studies, Asian studies, Disability studies, to mention few. These disciplines take as their starting point the idea that the traditional humanist subject is an oppressive institution, the ontological status of which has created a view of objective history that has, on the basis of class, race, and gender among other things, excluded other subjects from history. However,

as these theories show, objectivity is not a way of circumventing subjectivity. Rather, objectivity is most insidious form of subjectivity, since one particular subject is universalized. In this operation, the normative subject is invisible as a construct, and becomes a universal given. The subjects excluded from this universalised construct, however, are marked as 'other' and are therefore also visible to the discerning, critical eye of the subject. Consequently, the objectivity axiom is based on the transparency of an ideology, founded on the exclusionary notion of the uniform subject. This is why it has become highly important for cultural studies to both disseminate the idea of the subject as a universal given, and acknowledge subjects marked as 'other.' What these theories, by focusing on excluded others of history as a sites of opposition to hegemonic culture, do, is attempt to reformulate the function of the subject in critical thinking, in order to visualize a new form of radical critique.

Still, regardless of how important these theories are to discussions on minority groups in society, I question their reliance upon the idea of exclusion itself as a site of opposition. There are two problems facing these reinterpretations of subjectivity. The first concerns the idea of exclusion, which becomes a guarantee for the nonexistence of oppressive power structures and hierarchies. The second problem concerns the status and function of the other. Because of its excluded status, 'the other' is construed as a limitless and boundless concept. Therefore, it is also open, hybrid and multiple – the opposite to traditional definitions of the humanist subject. In its status as plural and inclusive, it presumably does not reproduce the oppressive operations constituting the humanist subject. The point however is that, the moment such categorization of the other is made, it becomes a clearly defined identity—and a powerful one too. In critical theory, such a subject position is not only theorized as the opposite to traditional conceptualisations of subjectivity, but it also becomes a desirable position to uphold. However, rather than offering an alternative to the humanist subject, the notion of the other as a liberated identity position actually reproduces the problematic a priori status of the subject. No matter how critical of dominant discourse, all these disciplines, such as Women's Studies, African American studies and Queer Studies, are nevertheless based on a relation between the self – the critic, and the "other," even if the critic happens to be a woman, a gay person or an African American. The operations of domination and exclusion cannot be avoided. The danger lies in making these operations once again invisible.

In *A History of Sexuality*, Foucault points the finger on why this form of criticism has gained so much ground in academia today, by analysing what he calls the "repressive hypothesis." Traditionally, he argues, we consider the Victorian era to be repressive with regard to sexuality. This repression allegedly works through silence. Such a view of how power functioned during the 19th

century is founded on the idea that today we are more open to sexuality, since our view of sexuality is grounded on an infinite discussion and analysis of the subject, and not silence. Hence, we appear to have transgressed the power structures of repression today. However, it is this gratifying position of the subject, or the critic, that Foucault criticizes in his analysis of the "speaker's benefit:"

> *If sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom. This explains the solemnity with which one speaks of sex nowadays. (1990, 6)*

As Foucault indicates, we cannot assume that a speech act, or an identity position per se, involves a severing of dominant power-structures. The mere act of speaking about, or inhabiting an excluded position, such as that of a woman, a gay or an African American, does not imply that that position is free from entanglement in the power-discourses of dominant ideologies. The danger of constructing certain positions as excluded from a dominant discourse or a hegemonic law, lies "in making the articulation of subject-position into *the* political task" (Butler 1993, 112), that is, in once again creating an unequivocal ground from which to speak and act. To reproduce the unity of the subject, even though this unity is characterized as a form of proliferation because of its radical differentiation from the humanist subject, would still be grounded on exclusionary functions. It is faulty logic for cultural criticism to criticise the idea of the autonomous subject as oppressive and exclusive, and at the same time to reconstruct the other into a similar ontology. Rather than being a critique of the identitarian function of the subject, such theories, in a circumspect way, reproduce the very same oppressive structures. With the hybrid, multiple, free-floating, disseminating and monadic subject, we return to an ideology of individualism, where a subject can be constructed as free from entanglement in ideological power structures.

The Return of the Subject as a Process of Critical Demarcation

The difficulty is to navigate between a critique of the subject, and, at the same time, hold on to the subject as a point of departure in critical thinking. In the end, we have two critical positions to deal with: the essentialist, arguing for

the a priori status of the subject, and the constructivist, seeing the subject as a social construct that is entangled in discourses of power. A belief in the autonomous subject creates an individualist ideology that hides its involvement in ideological power structures, as well as its continuous operations of exclusion. However, if we assume that the subject is not autonomous, but is rather constructed and thus enmeshed in ideology, we are confronted with another problem. Donna Haraway, in her analysis of the demise of objectivity in "Situated Knowledges", is genuinely concerned that the loss of positioning might lead to relativism: "For political people, social constructionism cannot be allowed to decay into the radiant emanations of cynicism" (1990, 184). Relativism, she claims, is "a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally. The 'equality' of positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry" (1990, 191). Consequently, we need a theory that balances between and theorizes these positions. Donna Haraway proposes a theory that implies neither transcendence of self-and-other, nor utopian self-split, or static view of the subject, but a

> *"commitment to mobile positioning and to passionate detachment [. . .] dependent on the impossibility of innocent 'identity' politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated in order to see well. One cannot 'be' either a cell or a molecule—or a woman, colonized person, labourer, and so on—if one intends to see and see from these positions critically. 'Being' is much more problematic and contingent. Also, one cannot relocate in any possible vantage point without being accountable for that movement." (1990, 192)*

Adorno's analysis of how the notion of the other should work in critical theory connects directly to Haraway's theory of "situated knowledges." A critical investigation, according to Adorno, should not focus on the object of observation only. The self too, as Adorno sees it, should be a target for criticism. The critic cannot merely promote an excluded other and assume to produce a counter-discourse. By identifying with the other without taking his or her own subject position in society into consideration in their relation, the critic is given a dubious function. Such a study risks ending up praising and glorifying the achievement of the self, that is the critic, rather than analysing interesting structures of oppression and domination. The other is then used to ratify the self. The idea of the other does not provide the critic with an unobstructed road to freedom from dominant ideology. That idea would foster a romantic view of the critic as being positioned apart from, or above ideology, which in fact is a naïve position. In accordance with this belief, Adorno claims that "freedom can come to be real only through coercive civilization, not by way

of any 'Back to nature'" (1973, 147). The idea of the other must always be relational to the self; it is only by a constant critique of the subject through self-reflection that critical thought can function.

The problem of critical thought, according to Adorno, is consequently directly connected to the process of defining concepts. The process of identifying cultural positions of certain agents, or actors, by means of conceptually defining their social relations to each other, is directly connected to the process of naming. Therefore, definitions are social constructions implicated in the ideological operations of such naming. When we talk about self and other, we have to realise that it is definitions we are using. These definitions are always limiting per se. Or, as Haraway puts it: "Human beings use names to point to themselves and other actors and easily mistake the names for the things" (1992, 313). When this becomes clear, it is easy to see that those definitions are not universal givens, but are constructions that become sensible only in a social situation. Those constructions consequently have no meaning outside their social and ideological context. In a society grounded on an ideology of the autonomous subject, this fact is hidden. Therefore, our belief in the subject must always be oppressive, since it relies on the notion that the borders defining the concepts are natural. However, Adorno's theories provide a way to denaturalize that belief:

> *The individual is both more and less than his general definition. But because the particular, the definite, would come to itself only by voiding that contradiction—in other words, by achieving an identity of the particular with its concept— the individual's concern is not only to hold on to that of which the general concept robs him; he is equally concerned with that 'more' of the concept compared with his need. To this day, he will experience this 'more' as his own negativity. The substance of the contradiction between universal and particular is that individuality is not yet—and that, therefore, it is bad whenever established. (1973, 151)*

The constructed definition of the other is thus used to constitute the demarcation lines of the self. Both self and other, as socially constructed definitions, are limiting per se. But even if we thus can see through the identity principle, the presumption of a coherent identity, or the belief in a uniform subject, and see it as limiting and necessarily excluding, our capacity to think, and think critically, is nevertheless dependent upon the (always limiting) construction of definitions. Seyla Benhabib, in *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, claims that in Adorno's theory, this paradox is left without further consideration: "Adorno criticises reflection based upon identity logic, while leaving it ambiguous whether there ever can be any other mode of reflection that does not presup-

pose identity thinking" (1986, 210). It is, however, this very contradiction that brings us to the heart of the matter. The contradiction is not left unqualified by Adorno, who sees the way out of the dilemma in the dilemma itself. The awareness that there is a dilemma in the first place, is the initial step towards critical thinking:

> *It is one thing for our thought to close itself under compulsion of the form which nothing can escape from, to comply in principle, so as immanently to deny the conclusive structure claimed by traditional philosophy; and it is quite another thing for thought to urge that conclusive form on its own, with the intent of making itself "the first". (1973, 147)*

The very point of Adorno's discussion is that identity is not the goal. Rather, the goal is hidden in the contradiction that arises out of the limitations of the concept. The very act of contradicting the concept with its "more" is the only instance in which something can be said: "Dialectics is a protest lodged by our thinking against the archaisms of its conceptuality. The concept in itself, previous to any content, hypostatizes its own form against the content" (1973, 153-154). Here, the relation between concept and content implies a dichotomy, which at first seems difficult to accept. However, the dichotomy is, in a sense, illusory, since the content is unapproachable to us: "Because entity is not immediate, because it is only through the concept, we should begin with the concept" (1973, 153). Therefore, even if the content is there, it is the concept that is of interest for critical analysis.

Adorno's argument also leads to a term that is perhaps the most convoluted and controversial part of his philosophy – the idea of the non-identical[1]: "[A concept] is defined by that which is outside it, because on its own it does not exhaust iself. As itself it is not alone" (1973, 157). The crucial point for critical analysis, according to Adorno, is in fact the non-identical: "[D]efinition also approaches that which the object itself is as nonidentical [. . .]. Nonidentity is the secret *telos* of identification. It is the part that can be salvaged" (1973, 149). In order to show how Adorno escapes becoming entirely metaphysical, the function of the non-identical has to be analyzed.

Inherent in a concept is also what is not the concept. What is not the concept is actually necessary for the function of the concept: "The concept's immanent claim is its order-creating invariance as against the change in what it covers" (1973, 153). A concept necessarily has to delineate its borders. Since concepts, such as subject and object, are necessarily limiting, Adorno suggests that a subject needs an other in order to be free to criticise: "There is no remedy but steadfast diagnosis of oneself and others, the attempt, through awareness, if not to escape doom, at least to rob it of its dreadful violence, that of blindness"

(1974, 33). Non-identity logic is consequently an inevitable presupposition for criticism according to Adorno. As said above, the other always has to be relative to the subject in a dialectical movement of self-reflection. Therefore, even if we use limiting concepts in order to think, these concepts can be creative because of their limits. This construction enables a subject to be political and critical within the frames of culture and society. This, however, can only be achieved through constant consideration of these concepts and their imposed limits:

> *Our categories are meaningful insofar as they are also categories of self-interpretation and -understanding, and insofar as they can be contested by both parties in terms of their own plausibility, adequacy, and authenticity. The utopia of the 'non-sacrificial non-identity of the other' must be searched for in this sphere in which identity can only be attained via difference, and where it is sustained via the continuous redefinition of the boundaries between self and other. (Benhabib 1986, 222)*

In this sense Adorno refutes synthesis. To him, synthesis is the moment of identification, the moment when the necessary contradiction for constructive and critical thought is resolved: "It is as philosophy's self-criticism that the dialectical motion stays philosophical" (1973, 153). The critical possibilities of thought lie in the dialectical movement bereft of synthesis, a *negative dialectics*. A synthesis is always a construction that is covering up contradictions that are always there. A synthesis is consequently a will towards identity, which is always limiting. At the same time, the idea of synthesis is necessary in order to avoid synthesizing. It is in this realization that Adorno moves out of a metaphysical stance:

> *Even the self-critical turn of unitarian thinking depends on concepts, on congealed syntheses. The tendency of synthesizing acts is reversible by reflection upon what they do to the Many. Unity alone transcends unity. (1973, 158)*

Negative dialectics does not surpass or move away from social reality. It is a critical discourse that tries to navigate between traditional philosophy and a productive cultural practice. Therefore, although it seems to be an abstract theoretical idea, it is meant to produce philosophical concreteness. Arguing with Walter Benjamin that one has to "cross the frozen waste of abstraction to arrive at concise, concrete philosophising," Adorno states about *Negative Dialectics* that, "this largely abstract text seeks no less to serve authentic concretion than to explain the author's concrete procedure" (1973, xix). *Negative dialectics* produces a practical way of looking at concepts and their function

within a culture. As Adorno argues, it ”bids us purely observe each concept until it starts moving, until it becomes unidentical with itself by virtue of its own meaning—in other words, of its identity. This is a commandment to analyze, not to synthesize” (1973, 156).

The Subject: a Necessary Construct for Cultural Critique

Identitarian syntheses are in fact becoming increasingly prevalent in cultural theory today, and are to be found on diametrically opposite sides of the field. The way feminists like Irigaray and Cixous, and their followers, use the concept of woman in an uncomplicated positive way, is a way to solidify other into sameness, to once again solidify and naturalize the function of concepts rather than working with a non-identitarian logic. Woman, or femininity, is seen as the other of patriarchal culture. In this oppositional construct masculinity is seen as unitary and rational. As its binary opposite, femininity is considered to be pluralistic and libidinous. However, the use of pluralism only serves to produce another clear-cut gratifying definition. To produce unity, even if that unity is defined as plural, multiple and different, is still a way to reinforce humanist versions of subjectivity and power. Such a subject exists within ideological power structures of dominance and exclusion, yet this fact is hidden in a guise of inclusion, liberation and acceptance. Woman is thus not a ”floating signifier” or a non-exclusionary concept, but is at best a *re*defined concept. Another important aspect concerning non-exclusionary definitions, is that abstract denial of unity does not benefit thinking at all: ”The illusion of taking direct hold of the Many would be a mimetic regression, as much a recoil into mythology, into the horror of the diffuse, as the thinking of the One” (1973, 158). There is no (critical) salvation to be found in the substitution of the idea of the One with a naïve idea of pluralism. It is rather the tension between such concepts that makes them unfamiliar to us and exposes them to critical thought.

Thus we reach the conclusion that critical thinking is not helped by abstract denial of the demarcation lines constituting all definitions. Such a denial only hides the demarcations that are always there. The notion of a limitless, plural subjectivity is therefore only another way to reinforce the structures of the humanist subject.

On the other side of the feminist spectrum, there are women who seem to believe that there can be no feminist struggle without fixed identities for women:

"Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes "problematic." (Hartsock 1994, 233)

What these feminists tend to do is to reinforce the oppressive system that they think they are fighting, by accepting the definitions given to them. Women have always been both subjects and objects of history. They have been victims of certain power structures, but also complicit in other. By not questioning the concept of woman, its definition and its imposed demarcation lines, the ideological implications of its function in a social situation are not questioned. In any critical investigation of subject positions, we have to navigate between a naïve belief in the a priori status of the subject and a complete disavowal of its existence. Judith Butler is one feminist who tries to construct a new way of formulating the idea of woman, which is based neither on static identitarian notions of self and other, nor on postmodern ideas of transgression of subjectivity:

The critical task of feminism is not to establish a point of view outside of constructed identities [. . .]. The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participation in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them. (Butler 1993, 147)

Butler's "subversive repetition" resonates with Adorno's *negative dialectics* in its deconstruction of categories, or identities, and the antithetical move that this entails. A celebration of an identity is not a counterdiscourse in its own right. As Adorno puts it, "[i]n the end, glorification of splendid underdogs is nothing other than glorification of the splendid system that makes them so" (1974, 28).

Without the positive comfort that identity politics provide, the critics find themselves in a battle with the very foundations of thought, namely, the instability of concepts. With this instability, the critic is left without firm ground, without the critical space that the autonomous subject provided. However, it is only in this constant motion of self-reflection that critical thought can emerge. Thus, any subject position construed as other is always also a subject, with its operations of exclusion and domination. With this formulation of subjectivity there is no way to envision a subject that is totally and absolutely excluded from history, its ideological formations and power structures. Exclusion too is a relative concept and on the margins of the excluded other, *its* significant

other is always visible. The socially excluded other consequently has to be related to power structures operating within hi or her. Once the idea of the other has become a warranty for the absence of power structures and structures of domination, the other is always something else. Consequently, rather than getting rid of the subject as a ground for critical theory, Adorno argues that the admittance of the constructedness of the subject, and the other, as limiting concepts in knowledge, allows for critical thought to work.

I want to finish this article with a quote from *Minima Moralia*, which reflects the experience of the holocaust, but also functions as a reminder to all critics and academics of their privileged position in society and, as a consequence, of the need for a *negative dialectics* in order for the critic to stay critical:

> *There is no way out of entanglement. The only responsible course is to deny oneself the ideological misuse of one's own existence, and for the rest to conduct oneself in private as modestly, unobtrusively and unpretentiously as is required, no longer by good upbringing, but by the shame of still having air to breathe, in hell. (1974, 27-28)*

Note

[1] During my presentation at the Crossroads in Cultural Studies conference in Tampere in 1998, I was informed that poet and writer John Higgins wrote a funny but dismissive pun about Adorno's theory of the non-idenitcal: "When is a door not a door? When it is Ador-no".

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Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

Dilemma of Cultivation: Cultural Politics between Critical Theory and Cultural Studies

Focus on cultivation

The viewpoint of this article is consistent with *cultivation* as the key aspect in the conceptual understanding of politics of culture. Taking this aspect as a starting point, one adopts a certain attitude towards cultural political approaches; in other words, one is oriented towards seeing both *ways of life* and *human civilisation* as important clues for understanding the meaning of culture and for interpreting how culture is related to society (see e.g. Williams 1987, 42-52, Thompson 1988, 361-364; also Ahponen 1991, 28-32).

To further reason cultivation as the core of cultural political understanding, I refer to Williams, according to whom culture as a process is compared to the way seeds are planted into and grow from a fertile ground yielding a good crop. Stated differently, products of culture represent the best that can be imagined, thought, said and done (see e.g. Barker 2000, 35-36).

To further develop the conceptual understanding concerning cultivation, I take into consideration the distinction between traditional and critical theory, as characterised by Max Horkheimer in the time of the grounding of the basis of the Frankfurt School orientation. According to Horkheimer (1977, 522-523, 529-530), representatives of traditional theory see the manner of things to exist in reality as a prognosis of the manner of things in the future. In traditional theory, series of facts are ordered in forms utilisable as knowledge from the point of prevailing power relations in the society. One of the basic tasks of the traditional theory is to apply existing information to observed facts. This way, theory presents a scientific abstraction as an activity, which closely suits the division of labour in the society, as it is itself one of the societal functional sectors. The principal task of the theory is to make future predictions. In this

sense, traditional theory adopts a positive task in its relation to the society. Guaranteeing development it is always current in its demand, implying therefore progress and utilising the intellectual-technological results of inventions. Factual situations are evaluated by calculating their impact on the better future as related to the prevailing system. Indicators of development have been measured in terms of useful, purposeful, productive, profitable and valuable. In critical theory however, these categories of evaluating ways of formulating prognoses for the better future are seen as controversial and questionable. We know only that which is already *cultivated*. From a critical point of view, cultural political predictions regarding the cultivation progress are seen as normatively structured, therefore ideologically biased.

The politics of culture, the culture of politics

Constructive way of considering politics of culture is a valid starting point to argue here, as constructivism is included in both critical theory and cultural studies, on the basis of which I here approach the subject matter. Both of the approaches concentrate on questions pertaining to how culture is politicised and how politics are cultured, and in doing so emphasise cultural society as a continuously changing entity. In this sense, the approaches can be seen as complementary, contributing towards increasing understanding of how politics of culture is constructed. On the other hand, in both critical theory and in cultural studies, there exist remarkable differences in ways to politicise culture and to make politics cultural, although both approaches can be seen as constructive theoretical views. It is evident that when constructing ideal typical theoretical models like ”critical theory” and ”cultural studies”, the conceptual set is easily simplified and the trap of abstraction is lurking behind the corner. The concepts representing especially the differences between these approaches as oppositional can be deceptive.

A question as such is whether it is possible to make room for politics of culture in the intermediate terrain possibly opening in the discursive placement of the conceptual basic arguments included in these cultural approaches. This is why the perspective of cultivation is specifically taken into consideration by both of the views.

If the cultural view of critical theory is characteristically cultivated and therefore labelled *elitism*, then, correspondingly, cultural studies are saturated by *populism* (see eg. McGuigan 1996a, 1996b), though they both aim towards a cultivated subject. If arts in critical theory are appreciated and ”mass culture” is devalued, cultural studies then start with an opposite perspective when seeing everyday expressions and pleasure, even when received via entertain-

ment, as the most significant material for cultural practices materialised in different forms of popular culture. The distinctions like high and low culture, or cultural depth and surface are rejected and the ”mandarinism” of critical theory is seen as its bias in the frame of cultural studies. According to cultural theorists, the cultural (anthropological) ensemble is formed by the continuum of expressions through which people *learn* their meaningful habits, identities and values (see Agger 1992, 78-80). This way they become increasingly civilized in their own social circles.

In critical theory, the relation between culture and society is seen as important to explicate. When challenging the bourgeois sociology of culture, the critical theorists consider it their political task to reflect art in the light of the *great refusal*; in other words, art should express and represent a capacity to oppose the social power and, especially, to resist the governance in society. In cultural studies however, a controversial view prevails: culture is seen as located in the society, used as a practical tool for shaping and organising human conduct and social life (e.g. T. Bennett 1998). Most pragmatic reformists, and even revisionist versions of cultural studies, support clearly the politics of cultural affirmation, seeing resistance as a conservative practice, so articulated by Tony Bennett (1998, 171). From this perspective, culture is expressed as a matter of ”institutional practices, administrative routines and spatial arrangements” at least, as well as a concern of symbolic representations and discursive consciousness since cultural power is seen to take place ”in relation to the processes of government” (see Barker 2000, 368, T. Bennett 1998, 178). Therefore, it can be argued that cultural studies itself become ”an arm of reforming and regulatory government” as Chris Barker (2000, 368), when referring to Bennett’s view, points out. It is interesting to see this view include the categories of ”better, useful, purposeful, productive, profitable and valuable” in the same way Horkheimer criticized the ”sins” of traditional theory (see above). When actors are related to the society, two opposite versions of politics of culture - *exclusive* and *inclusive* - can be located in views taken into consideration here.

The politics of negation in critical theory: arts as refusal of society

The basic task of a critical theorist, in the spirit of the Frankfurt school, is to observe critically the social situation and to progress the cultural freedom of people. This critical perspective is conceptualised as *negative dialectics*, a term especially favoured by Theodor W. Adorno (see especially Adorno

1975). The aesthetic criticism focuses on the affirmative and therefore regressive production of popular culture, labelled mass culture (e.g. Adorno 1991, 53-84). During the publication of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* Adorno turns to the use of the term *cultural industry*, characterised by him as the technique of distribution and mechanical reproduction of culture. Adorno contrasts the principally entertaining function of technically mediated instrumental processes with the creation of artworks, seeing that technique of cultural industry in the service of commodity production remains external to its objects and therefore alienating, while in art works it concerns the inner logic of art itself (Adorno 1991, 87-88, c.f. Loisa 2003, 71-77). An essential aspect of critical *avant garde* art, namely estrangement from conventionality, is neglected in mass culture. Avant garde modernism does not only create completely new forms and contents of art, but it also modifies conventional expressions and sees ordinary situations in exceptional ways. This kind of cultivation is an important part of critical creativity, as can be seen in certain products of modern literature (especially in works of Kafka, Joyce or Beckett), music (e.g. Schonberg or Gage), paintings (e.g. Picasso or Miró) and film (e.g. Godard). This means that the reception of art demands active interpretation – or, in Adorno's terms, a contemplative attitude – as a process, which tends to increase the critical potential of the audience.

It is characteristic of critical modernists as creative artists, to deny expressions describing things to be adopted as such, in either realistic or superficial ways. They aim at creating abstractions in which the human image becomes *refracted* in society. According to Adorno (1977, 159-160), only when art goes against its own nature can it duplicate the existence and make aesthetic dimension constituted. By distancing itself from the immediate reality art becomes a critical mirror thereof. This is the way it can produce negative knowledge of the actual world and reveal that which is veiled (Adorno 1977, 162). This is the image, which, as stated in Adorno's tone when referring to his discussion on the commitment of modern art, stands "as a beacon of hope and a symbol of non-accommodation" (see Barker 2000, 139).

Essential for critical modernists is that descriptions, images and all other expressions are unique products. This means that they can be identified as resembling their creator, and that they cannot be repeated, or let alone standardised.

The problem of alienation

The representatives of critical theory point out that the industrial production of culture is increasing as a characteristic of capitalism and its logic of demand

for more and more copies, imitations and simulations slightly distinguishable from original pieces of art. This kind of production implies that cultural atmosphere becomes adaptive to instrumentalism, commercialism, reification and human alienation. Critical thinkers, however, do not unanimously share this view. Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht – designated members of the outer circle or adjacent to critical theory – for example, represent a different view on technically mediated communication. When Benjamin speaks of mechanical reproduction of art, he understands aural sublimation to be inclined towards decrease or even loss; when products are reformed as copies, maintaining of the uniqueness of art is handicapped. According to Benjamin (1980, 438-439, 477-478), along with the adoption of the mechanism of reproduction, the products become separated from their originality, as do copies (replications, imitations, simulations) from their connection to tradition. Most significant aspect with respect to aura is that when no certainty of the authenticity of art works can be guaranteed, the cultural value of products is nullified. When imitations and simulations increase, even products presented as new remind of earlier versions and borrow fragmented features from one another. New simulative versions of classic art works especially, tend to secularise the artistic atmosphere by making new versions of products more commonplace, if not even banal. The shine of aura is taken away and the sublime character of tradition is trivialized.

On the other hand, technical mediation is used to facilitate the reception of art works. Benjamin ascribes positive social meanings to the development of reproduction technique of art, as by means of such techniques products of culture can be processed in democratic, user-friendly ways. He discusses film in particular, as an art form, which implies an aspect of aesthetic democratisation. To Brecht, correspondingly, radio as a cultural channel improves possibilities of interactive communication significantly. This aspect relates to how Brecht understands the meaning of estrangement. In his terminology, as well in his own art, estrangement denotes cultural form of expression, the purpose of which is to activate audience in its relation to performances. He speaks of ”alienation devices” which help the audience to form a reflective attitude towards the performance (or other kind of expression), which leads to processes of signification and creative production of meanings on the part of receivers (see McGuigan 1996a, 180-181, Barker 2000, 139). This dialectical idea is similarly expressed also by other researchers, who see that alienation, provided so that it is not extreme and totally inhuman, can promote the use of productive capacity of cultural participants. Those willing to turn an alienating situation towards possibilities which allow them the use of creative energy start to participate in the struggle of cultural meaningfulness (see Ahponen 1998, 35).

Cultural criticism in critical theory focuses on the relation between alienation and meaningfulness. The point is that during the process of instrumental intermediation of cultural products both production and reception of culture become subordinated by technologically organised governance under the general logic of production of goods, which as such is increasingly commercial. When adapted to the domain of cultural production this logic subdues meanings of creativity under instrumentality, conventionality and regularity. The deeper these aspects are culturally brought, the more the meaningfulness struggle reaches the sphere of morality.

When practicing the culture of consumption people become seduced by commercial publicity, the specific instrument being advertisement but the crucial point being the general tendency towards affirmation. Affirmative people cannot make responsible choices independently, notwithstanding the manipulative power of instruments of socialisation. The principal motor of socialisation in the rule of commercialism is, as Zygmunt Bauman describes it (see Cantell and Pedersen 1992, 141-142), "velvet-dependency", produced by means of persuasion and seduction. It exerts its effects in directing people to seek expert advice for the problems of their inner life and to lose their self-confidence, all the while not being certain of the rightness of the advice they receive. Sinking into this "velvet-repression" does not mean passivity but rather a tendency to be driven to seek instinct-based pleasures in activities suggested by counsellors. It means performing as-if-activities with help of entertainment, which, as critical theorists believe, drives people to practice instrumental one-dimensionality in their way of life. Herbert Marcuse (1964) especially, used the above term to speak of the superpower of consumption society and its influence on how pleasure is internalised and expressed by people. According to the interpretation of Marcuse (1974, 89-105), the human freedom becomes subordinated by the performance principle in processes, which demand that instinctive energy be used repressively, to serve the forces of "repressive culture".

Devotion and cultivation

The representatives of critical theory were concerned for the people's alienation from nature, even from their own nature, when they seek their happiness by surrendering themselves to the public manipulation of their own instinct energy. Eventually, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1979, 138) pronounce in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they enjoy only "promises" that tend to reduce their pleasure to simplicities like monotonic repetition of sexual symbolism. Balance between

nature and culture, instead of amusement and repressive happiness, is pointed out by the two, as the source of meaning in life.

The principal point in this critic is that instrumental means of manipulation tend to entice people into passivity, therefore alienating them so that they are less and less able to think clearly and to find authentic expressions of life. But people are not always living as subjugated by an alienating situation but just unbearable conditions can enable them to struggle for meaningful life. Critical theorists insist on the idea that cultural experiences cannot be adopted as natural observations, nor as distractedly received expressions - to refer to Adorno's well-known conception - but they must be internalised in processes which demand contemplation and hard intellectual exertion, in order to achieve purification and sublimation of mind. This way, even alienating situations can lead to creative processes which increase meaningfulness and awareness of those involved in these experiences – therefore an aspect of cultivation is included in this promise of Enlightenment. But it is worth of remarking, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1979, 44-46) point out, that disenchantment of the Man can happen only by attaining self-realisation through self-consciousness and personal independency. But a serious question was whether this promise was possible to realise.

In a radio discussion, in 1969[1] – the last year of his life – Adorno makes an interesting remark pertaining to the use of time, which is relevant in the light of the discussion above. He states he has no interest in hobbies because his stimulating work is enjoyable enough, and also because all his doings, like reading, listening to music and making social observations presuppose serious orientation and contemplation. Hobbies are characterised by Adorno as amusing, like amateur practices reasoned by saying that lightness of the life is needed to counterweight the stress of work. Instead of demanding devotion, the lightness of hobbies implies distracted attitudes, which turn thoughts away from serious work and practices resembling it.

This remark is exposed to many counterarguments – many amateurs are devoted seriously to their interests and, on the other hand, attitudes of professionals toward their work can be purely instrumental – as in working for wages – and therefore contents of work can be approached distractively or indifferently. Besides, most people see it necessary to relax after stressful duties and to rest for a while without attending carefully to every matter. Adorno's opinion, however, well exemplifies the cultural political vision of critical theory, containing the idea that the promise of enlightenment as the fulfilment of modern civilisation can be accomplished only by self-exercise and self-criticism. Cultivation is reachable through devotion, which demands serious contemplation; aesthetic sublimation being most civilising mark of qualifications of the disciplined self.

The cultural criticism of Adorno implies arrogance as an attitude characteristic to mandarinism. Elitism is supported by aesthetic sublimation and legitimised by requiring devotion on the part of the creators of art. Different art forms are appreciated differently as classified according to hierarchical categories based on and legitimised by cultivated qualifications. All researchers and commentators in the circle of critical theory do not, however, share this view unanimously. Benjamin (1980, 504) is of an opinion that it is banal to assert distractive hobbies as mass-amusement as well as, on the contrary, to see that the appreciation of real art demands concentrated contemplation. He sees visual arts, architecture in particular, as received by means of enjoyment of new, sometimes surprising expressions as well as by means of trust in habitual ways of seeing them. According to Benjamin, to understand a film the receiver needs to combine critical attitude with that of enjoyment. He (ibid., 505) foresees the current tendency to receive experiences in increasingly distracted ways, seemly taking place in all domains of arts. He remarks this to be an implication of deep changes in how culture is comprehended and our awareness formed. This idea can be expanded, by taking into consideration the implication of pleasure being the basis of becoming interested in arts. Benjamin (ibid., 497), however, cleverly remarks that people tend to enjoy habitual things and conventional expressions without critic, taking them as given, while authentically new and surprising creativity is often first resisted and only then reluctantly adopted.

Receivers of inventions make evaluative choices when testing new attempts and possible alternatives with old, already guaranteed products. Only curiosity can tempt forerunners to become acquainted with moves and modes, which comprise the risks of making participants disappointed in due time, when finding the cultural contents of artistic products as meaningless, boring or even empty, without any aspect of sublimation.

Negative dialectics – the concave and convex in cultural pessimism

It is well-known that critical theory was driven into cultural pessimism, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* being a good example of this line of thought as an elementary aspect of cultural modernism, as discussed in a larger context by Oliver Bennett (2001). The latest production of Adorno tends to be increasingly esoteric. This problem is implicated in negative dialectic. Although the non-identity –logic saves a person engaged in dialectical thinking from affirmation to conventional social commitments, it is difficult if not even impossible to be

located as a social subject (actor or agent) when taking the role of an outsider. This aspect has been observed in practice by many lonely ”wolfs” or ”riders” but also by many political groups, first represented in the margins of society among underground circles, alternative movements or minority groups.

Critical resistance, in daily politics, is a dilemma of oppositional power because the executive power is understood as practiced by those represented in the government. Opposition can only resist power by making critical arguments or support it by presenting constructive suggestions. Being participatory, politics is inclusive of, and reasoned by arguments on how the presence allows agents to use power when being situated in and having a place on the table of the legal representation of social power. Participants resonate optimism when present in the power field. They see that their activism influences the power structure and makes it possible to carry out changes, even by accompanying the structural strategies. This way, the politics of affirmation takes place at the expense of resistance. The strategy of democratisation of modernity is based on and oriented towards the enlargement of the presence of participants in the political power field.

Is cultural pessimism then a fate of intellectual outsiders who do not want to adopt an affirmative tendency of political democratisation as their strategy to act? Cultural pessimism is powered by intellectual attitude, referred to by Oliver Bennett (2001, 180-181) as negative consciousness, which aims to rationalise future threats and fears. An essential theme in critical theory is the threat that the very central term of modernisation, Enlightenment, had betrayed its promise. Enlightenment held a promise of human enlightenment of all people and social groups in accordance with the practice of reason; the main tool being increasing education. Civilisation was to be improved by means of knowledge and critical practise of reason was to lead to emancipation, or, in other words to liberation from the false consciousness if not unconsciousness. This message is included, as reformed, in the theoretical view of Jürgen Habermas - a representative of the second generation of critical theory. Many a representative of critical pedagogy too, has followed the same path and developed the idea further. Habermas (e.g. 1976) speaks of ”pathologies” as produced by the crisis of cultural reproduction; meaninglessness being evident feature of this crisis. Diagnosis of deficiencies is still a critical strategy for Habermas, just as disclosing the defects of the prevailing system was the starting point of the negative dialectics. Habermas however, results in defending the communicative competency of the representatives of life-world to produce solidarity inside the ”project”. As a reformist, seeing the analysis of meaninglessness fruitless, he starts to seek the remedy for the pathological symptom by using the same medicine already doomed to cause the sickness in question (see also Ahponen 2001, 174-178).

The critical message, included in the betrayal of the promise of Enlightenment, is that culture comes to lose its meaningfulness when performed as entertainment only. It is experienced as a background stir or as giving rise to side effects, needed to set more significant systemic processes - economic and political – into motion. An interesting aspect of this interpretation is that arts have a special demand in giving add-value to economy because of the qualification of products. In any case, artistic processes and products are used to feed the sensations or to provide a momentarily sense of happiness. The psychic capacity of individuals is seen as serving such culture, which in its part, is in the service of advertisement and commercialism. Its special task then is to intermediate seductive promises of pleasure and happiness. If advertisements cannot be differentiated from real (authentic) products of culture, who can then believe that such culture opens way to intellectual enlightenment as the special hope of humankind? It is most plausible that this kind of culture is used to appeal to instinctive energy, to feed ”false consciousness”.

But the relevant question here regards the meaning of the false consciousness? Who can rightly solve the problem of ideological correctness? Both positive and negative illusions are false. Imagination is an important element of the contents of culture but realism is necessary when the relation between politics of culture and society is discussed. When O. Bennett (2001) concludes his review on the cultural narratives of decline he refers to views according to which ”mild depression” can promote the espousal of critical attitudes among those who cannot only stay as discussants (outsiders) but are ”loaded” or ”keyed” as participants (insiders) to positions which demand that their own possibilities to act must be seen in realistic ways. And those who make the history of the humankind cannot in praxis be reserved enough with realism, or at least not so too much. In other words, as one of the central poets of modernism, T. S. Eliot expresses it in his *Four Quartettos*: ”… humankind – Cannot bear very much reality” (see O. Bennett 2001, 194). To be realist, we all live as individuals with the certainty that after our birth we grow and we age and step-by-step, we degenerate and wither away. Eventually, when we die, this unique life ends. Most of us, however, do transfer our hopes and fears, knowledge and ideals in ever lasting forms, to be carried further by the future generations. Cultural political participation is especially reasoned by taking this moment of utopia into consideration. When an optimistic aspect towards the presence and participation of people is adopted, the use of positive strategies is emphasised, and reformism as a cultural political strategy takes place instead of resistance. Dialectically, it is inevitable to counterbalance the perspective of critical outsiders by seeing the meaningfulness of inclusive participation in everyday culture.

Politics of culture as everyday activity in cultural studies

Characteristic to cultural studies is optimistic attitude towards the everyday creativity. Cultural studies were started positively by familiarising cultural meanings with everyday life. Cultural studies contain the need to overturn barriers between high and low culture so that arts are no more appreciated as the specific qualified property of elites. Popular culture is seen as rich in contents and therefore meaningful and valuable for people's lives. The term *culturalism* refers to the expression of culture as the way of life of ordinary people who make their lives meaningful through their creative practices and through solving of their everyday problems and, therefore, learn by doing culture. The principal task, when researching culture, is to find ways people conduct their meaningful practices through lived experiences. The forerunners of cultural studies, like Edward P. Thompson (1980), already sought lived practices in the everyday history of people. Thompson emphasised this aspect when studying the "making" of working class through discovering how everyday practices of ordinary people used to be ordered**.**

Cultural studies concentrate on detecting how people produce meanings as signifying practices. This comprises the articulation of products as representations, such as texts, performances or other kinds of interpretations. Products are interpreted in situations in which they are either produced or received. Meanings are formed and reformed in social interactions as processes, aiming at articulation of certain groups, in order for them to be identified, distinguished and empowered. An essential point here is that cultural meanings are understood discursively as formed in processes and by social relations. Meanings are activated when identities are experienced alike for certain membership groups which are recognised as distinguished from other groups.

Cultural studies have been labelled focused on experiences and having a tentative, grounding and open attitude toward theories. Theories are seen as constructions developed through the research process. This aspect is connected to the interest in popular culture and its currency; the mission being to legitimate popular culture as the people's way towards culture. An emphasis in this approach is placed on how meanings are produced by interpreting experiences. This way the cultural contents of everyday life are valued. Activity of audience is seen as important because it is pointed out how participants, on their part, produce culture through the reception of happenings, performances and even ready-made products. Culture's creative consumption regards the production of cultural meanings in discursive processes, which start with creative ideas and are expanded by means of the interpretation through the reception of cultural expressions. As seen from this perspective it seems sensible to assert, against the elitism of critical theory, how even such "instrumental mass

products" like advertisements, entertainment-aimed TV-series and pop songs – in particular those designed to be "hits" – produce meaningful experiences, relating to certain life-situations and emotionally "deep" moments for people. This way any "soap opera" can be seen to enrich the aesthetical life whenever it is "touching" enough to affect personally of its receiver.

It is evident, however, that aesthetical appreciations become fully relational when only the taste of the receiver is valid criterion for assessing the artistic value of cultural products. This influences the way politics of culture is progressed in the public sphere. Certain cultural expressions and products are seen worth of supporting more than the others. When these are classified following certain subcategories, it is possible to see those subcategories, which used to be categorised as representing conventional high culture (like certain kind of classical music, ballet or opera), as politically connected to bourgeois taste and conservatism, even as useful tools to progress upper-class power. Other kinds of political elites can be identified with jazz, certain films, songs or theatre. This kind of sub-cultural categorising is recognisable in the way Pierre Bourdieu (1992) sees the formation of cultural capital through the taste of the avant-garde –elites. This kind of representative view is not aimed at in cultural studies but it is evident, in accordance with the perspective of Bourdieu, that aesthetic qualifications, based on taste and subjective meanings, are always used to legitimate the "highness" and "lowness" of culture. How could this kind of basis of quality be questioned as a real value? This is just *the* question for cultural studies and it cannot be solved by categorising conventional high culture to represent certain subcultural capital among other subcultures (see Barker 2000, 339-340).

Personal experiences guarantee the meaningfulness of aesthetics, but who can deny the meaningfulness of the experience of some other person only on the basis of the contents of his or her own experience. Preferences must be assessed with an appeal to the cultivation of the taste. The design of any product can be seen as cultivated due to qualifications of the producer to make a proper form into which the aesthetic contents are fitted. Criteria for preferences must be made objective enough – at least when democratic principles are followed in the public field of cultural power. These principles tend to shift the emphasis in evaluation towards the way the products are performed, designed and marketed. It is not felt very necessary to make distinctions between "purely aesthetic" products (a la Adorno) and products serving other social and even commercial purposes - instrumental interests. Representatives of cultural studies have not dealt with these kinds of distinctions – although they are interested in cultural differentiations as such – because "pure aesthetics" no longer has space or confident representatives. All participants in

the cultural field are seen according to their subspecies, identity positions and contextual placements.

The progress of – and in – cultural studies

The history of cultural studies is long enough for it to be seen as existing through phases. The beginning took place in Birmingham with the adoption of the cultural way of life in Raymond Williams' view. The discussion continued with the taking of sub-cultural perspective into special use in locating of different styles as signalling adolescence cultures. Counter-cultural styles of young people were interpreted as representing, in their distinctive meanings, the symbolic resistance. Further, the political, class-based context of culture was made understandable and visible in a neo-marxist way with the adopting of Louis Althusser's relative-autonomy thesis as it concerns ideology, and with borrowing from Antonio Gramsci the perspective toward cultural hegemony. In defining identity positions through everyday practices in particular, the focus sifted to the formation of hegemonic blocs as sites of ideological struggles (see e.g. Agger 1992, 90-91, Barker 2000, 56-60). Cultural studies were advanced by turning from the structuralism phase toward that of poststructuralism, which stands for the deconstruction of the "metaphysic of presence" and for processing of relational meanings inside intertextuality. The viewpoint became more explicitly cultural political when identity positions were deconstructed by specifying the processes of identification, seeing subjectivity in discursive ways, and discussing empowerment, productive power and activity of the receptive audience. This way cultural understanding opened towards more personal "micropolitics". The other side of this, in cultural studies highly popular post-modern turn, so popular in culture, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (2001, 62; see also the footnote 7 in p. 94) see it, is the drifting of interest away from "bigger" political issues.

These phases of cultural studies have well been in accordance with more general sociological trends and theoretical modes, the substance being adopted from the current cultural issues.

A conscious starting point for cultural studies has been the technical progress of the means of production and mediation of cultural forms. This way it is remarkable that extended possibilities of reception of culture are identified and that culture as such is seen as intermediary. The concepts of the critical theory, as far as the mechanical reproduction of culture and increasing significance of entertainment are considered, are utilised as background material for this perspective, without accepting the critical tone of the Frankfurt school. Instead of paying critical attention to how instrumentalism is increasingly included in

the technical transmitting of cultural products, cultural studies describe how the message-like mediation is increasingly characteristic to human culture. Contemporary culture is seen as saturated by media-discourses.

This aspect was present already in the perspective of Williams - the grounding father of cultural studies. According to Williams (e.g. 1984), culture expresses meanings in the structures of feeling and in those symbolic representations, which are materialised in cultural products. Meanings are formed, articulated and represented as discourses, like narratives and other descriptions. They are preserved in selective traditions, having their dawning, prevailing and relic forms. Culture is materialised as products, and is by these means also reified since crystallised into certain forms. So far, language has to be understood as the signifying form of social interaction as well as the material practice of sociality, actualised in speech and crystallised in texts. Crystallised significations demand interpretation, or else the meanings of producers, can not be understood by the receivers.

Cultural products reflect, in their materiality, the time and place of their production. They also reflect the social order of a particular point in time. By appreciation of cultural products, the hegemonic organisation of social relations too is represented. Discussing hegemony, Gramsci identifies popular culture as the arena for hegemonic struggles of social groups. Here the question concerns which products are legitimised and selected in publicity in order to be performed, presented, kept safe, filed and conserved in the museum. Williams intends to communicate that in these practices not only the understanding and acceptance of the aesthetic quality of products is evaluated. Cultural meanings are materialised as representing ways of life of certain social groups as well as their hegemonic power. In the same vein as signifying systems, certain cultural institutions too possess the power of legitimising the special sublime function of culture in society. This is seen when the importance of preserving national, ethnic or other kinds of identity-based cultural symbols relates to the defence of universal human values. In this sense, culture is an arena for hegemonic consent as well that for resistance. Some representatives of cultural studies, like Tony Bennett (1998), conclude that the possibility of empowerment can be opened in such qualifying practices, which make space for the institutional legitimisation of one's own values; open pedagogy being a special tool for subordinated people.

This aspect, emphasised already by the forerunners of cultural studies, like Matthew Arnold and F. R. Leavis, contains reformism as well as cultivation. When the Birmingham School of cultural studies launched its programme, separation from the conservatism and elitism of these cultural figures was considered important. Accepting the organic principle in the production of culture, it was Arnold and Leavis, who fertilised soil for studying folk cul-

ture and appreciating popular culture. From the two Williams borrowed a thought regarding how cultural learning leads to social changes. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration that our knowledge is processed as *positional* (whose knowledge is in question), *contextual* (in connection to what is it produced) and *intentional* (with what purpose). *Organic intellectuals*, in Gramsci's terms, have a special task to represent ordinary people in hegemonic processes. By distinctly observing current happenings they can uncover and interpret further cultural meanings, and doing so they help distinguish insignificances and trivialities from significant constituents of culture.

Inclusiveness in cultural studies

Although cultural studies are characterised by the use of the democratic principle of openness toward the value of popular culture, when dealing with cultural expressions and products, it is evident, that certain choices are always made by consumers, and that certain products are preferred at the expense of others. The viewpoint of the politics of participants is not as open as it presents itself to be. The openness of the cultural democracy is an interesting issue. It is propagated in the service of the oppressed because the democratic principle of opinion freedom is a valuable tool in legitimising the possibilities for enlarged use of power. When the participants are identified, and their membership is recognised, the organisation of the field of activities can begin. When the process is continued towards institutionalisation, the possibilities to act are restricted to occur within the specified space, and the doors of the democratic room are closed so that only those participants who committed themselves to the activities are allowed to be present. Borderlines between "us" and "them" are marked, using inclusion and exclusion as "democratic" signifiers.

The politics of cultural studies is exposed to critics from another direction too, as far as the view on democracy is concerned. When seeing reception as an important cultural production phase, a tendency to celebrate the dictatorship of audience appears. In addition, the marketing principle is accepted. Audience at the markets of cultural production equals customers and consumers. In accordance with the acceptance of an idea regarding making or producing of cultural meanings through mechanisms of commercial markets, in the field of democracy, the policy of consumption is considered valid. When the commercial markets form the arena for democratic publicity, the value of all products, cultural as well as 'non-cultural' is assessed, in principle, as qualitatively equal, and only by calculating the supply of and the demand for products.

This kind on orientation toward equality may result from the unresponsive attitude toward cultural elitism. Another aspect however, is that even

when dealing with cultural democracy, cultural studies do not articulate social political issues, or at least do not do so very sensitively, as Jim McGuigan (1996b) remarks. McGuigan points out that, although cultural studies concern cultural differentiations and distinctions, social power structures influencing inequalities are neglected and therefore, as Best and Kellner (2001) remark, "macropolitical" issues are not taken into consideration. The start of cultural studies was inspired by an aspect of discovering how working-class was created (Thompson 1963), and furthered by interpreting how working-class children enter labour duties - the central problem of the much discussed book *Learning to Labou*r by Paul Willis (1977). Since then, the interest turned to more purely culturalist direction, and the analysis of sub-cultures, identity positions or discursive processes of identification was not often connected to labour markets, housing policy, social selection in education or other corresponding arenas of social activities. But when consumers of culture are spoken of, it must be taken into consideration that some of them are more equal than the others, because they have greater means as well as greater capacities to choose what to consume. Making the aspect of cultivation visible includes, when articulating an idea inherited from Pierre Bourdieu, recognising that most distinguished consumers of culture have the most resources to inherit or to learn conventions demanded by and internalised through the ownership of cultural capital.

The recognition of the nature of social political issues in connection to the politics of culture demands sensitivity to the ways in which the sectored structure of society is formed and, especially, to how boundaries between social and cultural fields of activities are structured. In this sense, it is important to pay attention to the organising practices, due to which social everyday activities tend to follow the institutional order. The remarkable role in the institutionalisation of everyday rules, or in the sequestration of experiences, to refer to a term used by Anthony Giddens (1991, 144-180), is given to experts who work with the reflexive organisation of the self. Even when acquiring knowledge from everyday experiences by using ethnographic strategies and understanding discursive methods, the reflective experts stand above the people *under* the study, because an inevitable part of their expertise is to be able to define the most meaningful aspects of life.

A policy-oriented viewpoint, focused on structures or institutionalisation of culture is advanced in the recent discussion in the field of cultural studies. The poststructural approach, from this point, is criticised as concentrating too much on discursive processes as signifying practices, or, in other words, as textual politics, the main concern being the discursive design of culture by means of articulation, representation, performances, constructions and deconstructions. Tony Bennett (1998), influenced by Foucault, adopts a pragmatic view, accor-

ding to which institutions and other kinds of social organisations used to produce and mediate culture in texts and in other forms of symbolic products, have specific effects on the cultural contents as the "material technology of power" (see Barker 2000, 366-367). The attitude of Best and Kellner (2001, 278) too is positive regarding the kind of "postmodern adventure", which provides active cultural participants, by means of "democratic reconstruction of education", and with necessary skills when progressing the new technoculture.

According to Bennett, cultural studies had to recognise that the production and reception of culture is always regularised by means of *governmentality*, or in other words, through interventions, which adjust cultural processes to structural order, produced by using certain technologies of governance. This idea agrees with the conception of Michel Foucault (e.g. 2000, 182-183) pertaining to the archaeology of knowledge, according to which knowledge as a space constructs agency and reserves the conditions for actions.

This is a specific aspect inside cultural studies and it may be disputed. However, if accepted, it implies a displacement in cultural studies as a discourse. As such, this contextual view can be interpreted as representing culture of reformism and affirmative attitude towards society, if not an example of articulating critical consciousness. In any case, institutionalisation is an essential part of cultural studies itself, because during its intellectual history, although characterised by multidisciplinarity and antiessentialism, it has become an appreciated academic subject. Even when emphasising popularity, everyday practices and the activity of audience, this way of interpreting culture can be seen as rather elitist and with many highly specific conceptualisations, charactering the articulation of culture in the language of cultural studies. Again, cultural studies cannot be identified without taking the process of cultivation into consideration, as a fate of an intellectual approach, devoted to qualification of life.

It may be impossible to discover a strategy for researching the place of culture in a politically innocent way, without touching upon social problems. This at least is the situation when the cultural nature of social political issues is recognised. An increasing consciousness of the significance of politics seems evident in cultural studies. It may also be articulated as representing policy-sensitive social democracy, propagated by underlining the activation and motivating of citizens (e.g. Cunningham 1992, see Barker 2000, 371-372; MGuigan 1996, 153). This aspect can lead cultural studies toward reformism when

a) modes of interaction are developed between two kinds of actors: those representing places in the marginal and minority groups, to whom it is important to identify themselves as political participants, and those who have already redeemed their institutional place in the cultural power field

b) challenge to analyse texts produced for political purposes, as social discourses is received without being questioned by cultural researchers

c) receivers of cultural products are seen as consuming customers or clients, and qualified criteria are used to interpret differences in their taste, styles and ways of life.

Conclusion: contemplating the possibility of critical participant

When attempting to determine how to act in the politics of culture, it must be admitted that one cannot remain an outsider, trusting the power of withdrawal from a society as an oppositional cultural strategy. Participants always have certain interests in their actions. This directs them towards reformism, instead of allowing them to remain only in the resistance. Reformism and affirmation, in principle, denote an acceptance of the power of the prevailing social structure and, as a cultural political strategy, a tendency to become adaptive in a way adopted in the traditional theory, as articulated by Horkheimer.

How, then, can critical and yet participative politics of culture be positioned? Is there a possibility for this kind of activism? To enable critical participants to realise the situation in which to act, one must become aware of how realistic consciousness can be developed within social practices. Intellectuals, who do not like to be situated in the promised land of Utopia or on the ivory tower reserved for critical elitist mandarins, must face this dilemma, hidden in the politics of culture. To work as a researcher, one must also realise that research, as a specific activity, distances itself from the everyday practices of ordinary people, as well as from institutional settings constructed to organise practices by using professional expertise. As an intellectual skill, which demands highly specific capacities, research is always an act of cultivation. It must be based on the accumulation of knowledge, the reliability of which is attempted to be ascertained using methodological qualifications. These rules cover also explorative, tentative or constructive approaches, which start by making ethnographic observations and interpreting descriptions from everyday life of ordinary people.

Studies on cultural minority groups are often reasoned as serving to improve their marginal power position. Even in this case, the researcher has to remember that her or his professional qualifications, included in the accumulation of knowledge, aim at giving supremacy to how the situation is interpreted.

The problem of the *politics of differences* is like the relation between concave and convex; it can be seen that the poststructuralist trend in cultural studies in

itself tends to represent an affirmative interpretation of the current fragmentary, still sector-based (in this case subcultural) development of society. The problem of the traditional theory is still valid because even views expressed in new and radical forms can contain the crux of it. This is an essential aspect when, for instance, a radical view on democracy is propagated, as in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1988) or in some representatives of postfeminism (see also Ahponen 2001, 276-279, 295). Politics of differences as an approach is not based on any essential truth like foundationalism or even representationalism (Barker 2000, 374). It takes only pragmatism, situationalism and continuous formation of identity-positions as its anti-epistemological 'stances'. Seen from this abysmal grounding, culture denotes a continuous acculturation process. Politics of difference produces more and more identities, which can be seen as opening possibilities for cultural groupings, prism-like alternatives and multiple chances for making choices. As connected to social order, this situation however, also implies that the social competition may be hardening. Minorities having only a place in the margin attempt to be differentiated so that their identity-positions are recognised as culturally valid enough.

How to advance from this situation, when discussing the dilemma of politics of culture? Insisting on the importance of the cultural meanings as related to the social actions, I see it relevant to politicise, as I have remarked even earlier (Ahponen 2001, 295), the tolerance towards others as related to self-realisation. The conflict between solidarity and egoism is present when dealing with the unsolvable problem of how the social and cultural aspects are connected together. More generally, when dealing with the core of the problems of politics of culture, we cannot avoid the basic questions of cultural sociology, concerning how social participants (actors) are connected to the structure of society.

Here I take the stance that to act in society we have to adopt an identity and this way be culturally placed inside the social structure and with some interests. It is tempting to, as an intellectual, think of having options regarding the choices of identities, which also increase possibilities of opening the perspective toward criticism. Democracy cannot be advanced without critics, but it has to be taken into consideration that there are boundaries between the resisting and affirming attitudes to be crossed at the 'grounding moments'. Phases of political boundary-crossings are situations where outsiders identify themselves as excluded and, further, where they, by representing critical alternatives, take a place in the field of action and become included into the institutional settings of society. They participate in the institutional struggle of power and try to occupy hegemonic power positions by reasoning their culture with interest represented by them. Along with these inclusive processes they become exposed to political criticism, launched by representing of the new

alternatives. This has been the fate of the representatives of critical theory as well as that of those speaking for cultural studies.

Therefore, I conclude that our conception of the politics of culture – as the contents of cultivation – is never complete. It thus needs to be continuously elaborated by taking part in the arena of discussion. The mutual understanding is inclusively progressed by elaborating controversies and imbalances in different opinions, and by correcting incompatibilities and reinterpreting misunderstandings. The aim is to find a common habitat of culture, which is very necessary and even inevitably demanded for acting in society. I repeat here the claim I made in my book (Ahponen 2001) in which the habitat of culture (Kulttuurin pesäpaikka) is discussed at greater extent. The power of knowledge can make its owner critical or affirmative toward the prevailing society. In any case, awareness of culture will help us better understand how to act in society and clearer see the possibilities and restrictions in our activities. Cultural knowledge is a tool for cultivation, inevitably needed to increase our consciousness as participants of the politics of culture.

Note

[1] It was published in Finnish in 1981, in a journal (Uuden ajan aura), launched by representatives of green, then current alternative movement.

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Conclusion

The 20th-century's idea of cultural policy focused on a comparatively narrow concept of culture, referring to practices principally pertaining to communication, meaningful exchange, and pleasure. State intervened in the arts and cultural field, subsidizing for various purposes including nationalistic, propagandistic, and redistributive, the art, artists, art institutions, art education, etc., and in general regulating the production and the circulation of symbolic forms. In the recent past, cultural policy underwent many changes. Weakening of the hegemonic position of the high-culture norms, of the 'elite' criteria in the definition of artistic excellence is notable, and so is the emphasis on cultural access and participation, promotion of multiculturalism and cultural diversity. One marker of the change is the greater recognition of local and community cultural values in defining the scope and objectives of cultural policy.

Although the opposition between the 'commercial' and the 'non-commercial' reappeared everywhere, its context shifted towards more flexible course. Commercial sponsorship and private patronage have become increasingly recognized due to reductions in government budgets. The cultural sector has been affected in number of ways by variety of processes, including deregulation, privatisation, desetatisation, and market liberalisation. The increasing mobility of capital, the communication revolution, the technological change and growing independence of national economies within a global market structure have had profound cultural ramification and are affecting the nature and the scope of cultural policy. Chartrand (see: http://culturaleconomics.atfreeweb.com 2002) speculates the position of the fine arts to have changed. The fine arts must first 'position' themselves within a more broadly defined arts industry composed of the amateur, applied, entertainment, and fine and heritage arts. To do so, the fine arts must articulate their contribution to the more politically acceptable, economically important and less controversial sectors of the in-

dustry, e.g. serving as the research and development sector as well as having to articulate why the arts industry as a whole is increasingly important to the economic and political competitiveness of nations.

Cultural creativity can contribute to the social and economic utilisation of innovations. It is, indeed, a highly interesting aspect in the current politics of culture just how production of creativity is progressed precisely by emphasising the demand for innovations in the society. Creativity adopts a specific meaning when connected to the industrial marketing of refined qualifications, further meaning with demands of management for processes in which multiple and multipliable products are distributed to and received by a large audience, and even further that with the governance of the virtual process of production, circulation, and reception of cultural articles by technological means. Seemingly, it can be argued that culture, as a pure artefact, is always more and more relational, regardless of its contents. As detached from its natural context, and therefore from its historical rootedness and social situatedness too, this kind of culture is subjected to continuous transformations, which concerns also conceptual alterations. This demand is progressed by producing different hybrid identities as artistically valuable.

Both social participation and cultivation are important aspects, when politics of culture is constructed. Participation contains enlargement of togetherness, and cultivation is based on the appreciation of increasing qualifications. The value of cultural creativity can be weighted by emphasising either sociality or culturality. In other words, the basic idea in this valuation is that culture allows us to live better than we would without its contribution, and that together we are more than when alone. Cultural policy is connected to all the major issues of our society: economic stratification, race relations, education, and community development. The choice of a family to educate their child in the language, traditions, and history of a particulate ethnic group is cultural policy, and so is grant maker's criterion for quality and excellence, as well as is a community development corporation's decision to focus on cultural tourism or historic preservation.

Our creative doings are subjected to social order when common interests are taken into consideration in the definition of cultural priorities. In the composition of politics of culture, individually meaningful experiences are gathered together, compared to one another, and assessed as symbolically valuable in allowing for priorities of certain cultural properties in common. Products of individual creativity must be publicly mediated as represented by associations and organisations to obtain a share of institutional resources in a democratic way.

Cultural citizenship is evaluated in terms of inclusiveness when devoted and committed participants are actively involved in creative work, which makes

them live better and longer. This way cultural democracy is reasoned in terms of how social cohesion, and, further, social capital, is contributed by those present in the constructive cultural work. However, the questions of who has the right to participate and become a full member of cultural community cannot be avoided in the democratic field of politics of culture. Exclusiveness is, therefore, the other side of cultural membership. Tendencies of social equality are counterbalanced when boundaries of identity-formations are reasoned by qualitative means. A crucial cultural political issue, forming a watershed between social and cultural domains, is the identification of cultural minorities in order for socially unequal placements of certain groups to be made visible. This problem is attempted to be solved by participatory strategies; by listening to the voices of minorities, by appreciating what they see valuable as their own cultural practices, and by enlargement of the legitimised field of cultural policies in terms of cultural democracy.

The concept of culture is increasingly approached beginning with the participation at the grassroot level, enjoying everyday experiences, and seeing popular culture present everywhere. A tendency for aestheticisation of everyday life renders life art all the while art itself is dissolving into daily realities. When everyday experiences are used as material for cultural transformations they are reproduced by means of signifying practices. To become definitively cultural products the results must be secured with certain symbolic designs to guarantee their appreciation as symbolically valuable. These kinds of processes demand, inherently, that distinctive signifying practices are reasoned by making qualitative distinctions between different arts. This way, cultivating processes are progressed.

Politics of culture, in its relation to society, contains both aspects of cohesion and those of differentiation. Cohesive and inclusive tendencies are needed for the implementation of social participation in community activities. These kinds of activities are aimed at strengthening citizen membership in complementary ways. Artistic cultivation, vice versa, is characterised by production of qualitative differences, exclusive improvements of skills, and well-elaborated views on how to measure the value of specified diversities in skilfully reasoned ways.

It no longer appears to greatly matter whether we confess to be supporters of cultural elitism or those of populism. What matters is that politics of culture cannot avoid the questions concerning its own placement. Do we see culture as art for the art's sake or do we see it as historically and socially situated practice in the society? Do we identify our conception of culture with a universal sublime value, a symbolic product constructed following the self-identifications of the cultural participants, or with a participatory strategy based on the active use of different materials and social discourses? This book contains efforts to

give answers without aiming, however, at more than a relative consensus on what kind of politics of culture is worth to be progressed. As evident from the above, we admit that politics of culture contains aspirations toward both social cohesion and cultural differentiations. Contentions between tendencies towards cementation of togetherness, production of multiplicity of hybrid identities, and fragmentation of new identity-groups must be continuously balanced when defining the contents of the politics of culture and constructing its context.