

Hanna-Mari Husu

Social Movements and Bourdieu

Class, Embodiment and the Politics of Identity



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Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston vanhassa juhlasalissa S212
joulukuun 18. päivänä 2013 kello 12.

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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2013

Social Movements and Bourdieu

Class, Embodiment and the Politics of Identity

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 488

Hanna-Mari Husu

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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2013

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Pekka Olsbo, Sini Tuikka

Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä

URN:ISBN:978-951-39-5528-1

ISBN 978-951-39-5528-1 (PDF)

ISBN 978-951-39-5527-4 (nid.)

ISSN 0075-4625

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Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2013

ABSTRACT

Husu, Hanna-Mari

Social Movements and Bourdieu: Class, Embodiment and the Politics of Identity

Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2013, 87 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research

ISSN 0075-4625; 488)

ISBN 978-951-39-5527-4 (nid.)

ISBN 978-951-39-5528-1 (PDF)

Diss.

Finnish summary

This dissertation links Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to social movement research and the study of social movements. Bourdieu's general sociological theory synthesizes different social movement approaches such as political process theory, resource mobilization theory, framing and the collective identity approach to a coherent framework overcoming dualisms in social movement research. More specifically, the study aspires to connect Bourdieu's central concepts, such as field, capital and habitus and his theory of power, to identity movements and identity politics. This approach draws attention to the importance of social class in terms of social movement practices, as Bourdieu emphasized the role of social position, the volume and composition of capital and habitus in his theory of practice. Class manifests itself in instrumental and expressive goals of identity movements, in its values, beliefs and protest activities. Class, can, therefore, function as a specific resource having impact on movement outcomes. In addition, as Bourdieu's idea of power refers to the effect of early socialization of individuals and groups in which power is interwoven and embodied in everyday relations and structures in the form of divisions, and ways of seeing, understanding, feeling and acting in everyday life, Bourdieu's work clarifies the idea of 'personal is political'. Power relations are reproduced in everyday life and practices. In this sense, social movements provide space for de- and re-socialization, implying how aspiration for personal transformation becomes a central target of identity movements. Movements, thus, have the capacity to transform the cognitive and emotional schemes of individuals creating possibilities for the reformulation of habitus as a form of political and social resistance.

Keywords: Bourdieu, social movements, identity movements

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sociology is a process. Therefore, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Martti Siisiäinen for giving me the time to the development of my sociological thought and for all the valuable comments, criticism and advice over for the past few years.

I would also like to thank the reviewers of this dissertation, Professor M'hammad Sabour and PhD, Assistant Professor Suvi Salmenniemi. Suvi Salmenniemi has also promised to be an opponent of this dissertation and I am grateful to her for the careful and thorough reading of my study and insightful comments that contributed to this doctoral thesis.

I am thankful to SOVAKO (the Finnish Doctoral Programme of Social Sciences), the Finnish Cultural Foundation and the University of Jyväskylä for financial support.

I also had the pleasure of visiting the University of Manchester in autumn 2011 and I am grateful to Professor Nick Crossley for reading and commenting on my work and for his helpful advice.

I would like to express my warm thanks to the best of colleagues and best of friends Päivi Kivelä and Sanna Vierimaa for making my process easier and always having time to listen to my inner thoughts and feelings. I have had such pleasure working with the best colleagues in the world and many of you have become my close friends. Thank you for the time spent together in and outside the office. I would especially like to thank Ilkka Kauppinen for the most remarkable conversations over the years.

Many of you, my dear colleagues, have also commented and helped me to improve my work in several seminars or in your own time - thank you for that. My thanks, too, to the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy for the past few years.

Thank you my long-time friends PhD Juha Järvelä and PhD Pasi Saarimäki for all the help and support and for always finding the right answers for everything.

Finally, thanks to my friends (kiitos Topille avusta). I would also like to thank my family, especially for all the fun with snowboarding, and warm thanks to my cousin for always having faith in me.

Jyväskylä 20.11.2013
Hanna-Mari Husu

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the Study

Social movements are about resistance and change. They represent opinions and values that aim to change and bring into question certain aspects of society. In sociology, they represent a social phenomenon that is most likely to be linked to agency and social transformation. Social movements are understood to change political, cultural, everyday and personal structures. How or why this takes place is the central focus of the different social movement approaches, all of which tend to share the assumption of social change, collective action, reflectivity and resistance.

Approaches such as political process theory and resource mobilization theory tend to draw attention to structural factors and outside processes of mobilization and collective action. On the other hand, approaches such as framing and the collective identity approach are more individualistic and agency-oriented, highlighting cognitive, emotional and constructive aspects of social movement actors. Each of these approaches focus on certain specific features of social movements contributing to our understanding of them. For instance, the emphasis may be on the outside context, which recognizes the role of a wider societal process that may enable or constrain collective action; or resources of actors, and how they influence mobilization. It is equally important to pay attention to those ways in which actors frame, analyse and solve social problems; or how actors create a collective sense of their shared traits and place, which creates a collective identity that is regarded as necessary for mobilization. None of these approaches alone are able to grasp the phenomenon of social movements completely. Each of them fulfils gaps that the other approaches have glossed over.

However, I argue that we need to construct a general frame that is able to capture the complementary elements of these approaches. This type of frame would allow us to draw together the specific insights of each approach into a coherent picture; improve certain formulations and problematic aspects in so-

cial movement research; and highlight the importance of certain issues that has not been paid sufficient attention in earlier research. I suggest that a necessary solution is to shift the study of social movements in the direction of general sociological theory. General sociological theories have the capacity to provide suggestions of how different ideas and elements of the social world are related to each other. This study brings together social movement studies and Pierre Bourdieu's sociology. Bourdieu's theory draws attention to several aspects that are important in terms of social movements. For instance, his effort to overcome dualisms in social sciences, his emphasis on social relations, the perspective on ongoing struggles taking place in social spaces, and his interest in symbolic power and domination are all relevant to social movement research.

For many, Bourdieu represents a reproductionist and determinist sociologist unable to describe social change. This raises a question: why should Bourdieu be used to explore a phenomenon such as social movements that is essentially related to social change? The study also aspires to develop an understanding of Bourdieu as a more change-friendly sociologist, understanding social actors to be able to make a difference in the social world. However, the value of Bourdieu's sociology is that it makes it possible to draw attention to the specific possibilities, preconditions, and restrictions concerning all efforts of influential resistance, collective action and social movements. One of the reasons that Bourdieu is useful in explaining social movements is that he does not provide an easy escape from the effects of power or the possibilities for change. Bourdieu may always remain more convincing in explaining social reproduction rather than change, but this does not mean that he is incapable of contributing to the richer and nuanced perspective of to our understanding of social change and social movements.

The study focuses especially on identity movements. Yet, many suggestions made in the study can be generalized to include all social movements. This study also places a historical emphasis on identity movements that emerged in Western countries in the 1960s excluding identity-motivated movements and mobilization elsewhere. Identity movements mean those various types of movements that are related to the emergence of identity politics in terms of gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation that fought for recognition and human rights. In this sense, mobilization is based on the shared sense of the specific characteristic and traits of specific groups that are articulated as public problems and become a motivating force for political or cultural protests. Identity movements differ from each other in their repertoires and goals. They can aspire to achieve new political or legal rights or they can challenge the established cultural meanings and values by constructing new codes, symbols and identities; sometimes they do both.

This study seeks to locate identity movements in Bourdieu's general sociology by creating an account, which takes into consideration the social positions that actors occupy, the subjective meanings they attach to their social circumstances, and those ways in which they construct new symbols through social movements. In other words, I emphasize the importance of transcending the

objectivist and subjective, structural and constructionist and material and ideational aspects in relation to identity movements. These dualisms remain a central problem in social movement research, as elsewhere in social sciences, but identity movements are especially prone to being contextualized in the expressive, performative and symbolic dimensions of social movements. My aim in the study is to argue on behalf of Bourdieu's general sociology as being capable of overcoming dualisms in terms of identity movements.

The idea of linking social movements to Bourdieu's sociology is not, of course, completely new. As illustrated by several other works Bourdieu provides fertile ground for social movement studies. Works by Crossley (2002a, 2003), Goldberg (2003), Emirbayer and Goldberg (2005), and Emirbayer and Johnson's (2008) work on organizations, although consistent with social movement research, aim explicitly to construct a synthesis between different social movement theories and/or to transcend dualisms in movement research. Other works include: Horton (2003); Haluza-DeLay (2008) on the concept of habitus in the environmental movement; Tuğal (2009) on movements' capacity to transform everyday practices; Erickson Nepstad and Bob (2006) on capital and leadership in movements; Crossley (1999a; 1999b) on mental health movements; Ibrahim (2013) on British anti-capitalist movement-field; as well as works by Eder (1993) on new social movements and class; and Walter (1990) on a radical Danish feminist movement.

This study further develops earlier suggestions in the context of identity movements, which have not been the focus of theoretical-orientated Bourdieu-inspired social movement research. This is carried out by using Bourdieu's concepts comprehensively. Thus, it is possible to illustrate how his concepts can explain different aspects related to social movements, such as the importance of class position in terms of movements, the nature of power and what types of limitations it may have on effective resistance, and the issue of movement outcomes and consequences. In short, the study is a matter of how identity movements resonate with Bourdieu's main concepts and his theory on power.

1.2 Aims and Structure of the Study

The study consists of three articles and this introductory section. This section can be understood as providing a backdrop for the topics dealt with in the three articles. The section introduces general features of the new social movements, social movement research and Bourdieu's sociology. The study raises three central concluding aspects that can be found in the three articles illustrating how Bourdieu's sociology gives new insights into social movement studies and the issue of social movements.

This study aims:

- To link class to the analysis of identity movements by indicating its importance to the practices and success of the identity movements.
- To link the analysis of identity movements to the Bourdieusian theory of power.
- To pay attention to the social movement outcomes and consequences on personal transformation and self-change.

First, Bourdieu suggests how class is important in terms of social movements. This is because Bourdieu places heavy emphasis on social position, volume and composition of capital and habitus, which can explain a great deal about the specific practices of movements. Second, as he understands power to be interwoven in everyday relations and structures in the form of divisions, and ways of seeing, understanding and acting in everyday life *his sociology is here linked to the idea of 'personal is political'*. Third, the new social movements are often viewed as aiming towards personal transformation and self-change as one of their ultimate goals. It is suggested Bourdieu's sociology enables us to consider how personal transformation and self-change are, in fact, social movement outcomes, because movements' efforts can be understood as the transformation of the habitus and embodied dispositions of actors. All of these three central aspects of the study are summarized and introduced in more detail in the following chapters.

1.3 The New Social Movements: The Issue of Identity and Class

Iris Marion Young (1990: 41) remarks that it was the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s that changed the meaning of the conception of oppression. The idea of oppression was now contextualized within everyday practices and understood as "normal process of everyday life" stemming from norms, habits, symbols and institutionalized practices. Thus, one of the central characteristics of the new social movements was the increasing focus on personal life reflecting a process in which private, personal issues became articulated as public and social problems.

This was illustrated, for instance, in Betty Friedan's bestseller *The Feminine Mystique* (published in 1963), a book that had enormous influence on hundreds of thousands of white, middle-class and well-educated women. Friedan, who has often been regarded as a founder of the women's movement of the sixties, described "the problem that has no name" referring to feelings of unarticulated dissatisfaction. She claimed that when women were defined from the outside as wives and mothers and trapped in suburbs, it prevented them from realizing their full human potential. Her book questioned the gender relations, representing a turning point in these relations, as it is considered to be an impetus to the feminist mobilization of the sixties. Later Friedan became one of the founders of the National Organization for Women (NOW) established in 1966, the largest of

the women's organizations of the era. This was also illustrated in perhaps the most famous phrase of the time: 'personal is political' stressing, as claimed by the radical feminists: "[t]here is no private domain of a person's life that is not political, and there is no political issue that is not ultimately personal" (Norton et al. 1998: 944).

According to Scott (1990: 13–14) the emergence of identity movements in their early state (women's movement, gay liberation etc.) is more typical to the mobilization in the United States, whereas in Western Europe, new social movements can be more related to movements such as the peace movement and anti-nuclear campaigns in the 1950s. Many of the identity movements of the 1960s in the West originated from the success of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and early 1960s. Three important events, *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka*, the Montgomery bus boycott and the lynching of Emmett Till are generally viewed as a stimulus for the emergence of the civil rights movement. The integration-friendly civil rights movement aimed most importantly to achieve political and legal rights in the South. For instance, it aimed to end segregation in public places and in education. The civil rights movement also introduced new innovative forms of political protest and strategies such as sit-ins. There were more nationalist and militant organizations, such as the Nation of Islam, influential as a consequence of Malcolm X in the urban north. Many of the integration-friendly civil rights organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) started to criticize the Christian tradition of non-violent protest and later escalated to the Black Power Movement. It was not necessarily the lack of political and legal rights that was now considered problematic by the movement, but human rights in terms of dignity and recognition. The Black Power Movement challenged established negative cultural meanings through the construction of new positive symbols. Other ethnic identity movements emerged due to the influence of the civil rights and Black Power such as the Chicano movement, the Asian American Movement and American Indian Movement.

In general, the civil rights movement had an enormous influence on the new-left, anti-war movements as well as other identity movements such as the feminist movement and the gay and lesbian movement. The feminist movement also entailed various forms of organizations. In 1963, Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* motivated women to join collective action. The biggest feminist organization National Organization for Women (NOW), founded in 1966, focused on overcoming legal barriers and driving equal treatment between genders. Some of the feminist organizations were more radical in their approach, calling into question everyday practices and marginalizing cultural meanings that were disadvantageous for white high-educated women. This represents different branches of the women's movement, which can be labelled as the women's right movement (reform) and the women's liberal movement (radical) (Freeman 1973).

Also, the emergence of the gay and lesbian movement in the early 1970s derived from the general protest wave of the sixties, although its origin lies in

the homophile movement of the 1950s (e.g. Stein 2012: 41–78). This movement included activist groups such as the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis founded in the early 1950s. Like the civil rights movement, the homophile movement supported integration in its emphasis on sameness as a strategy to promote human rights for the homosexual population. Yet, it was not until 1969 that the gay and lesbian liberation escalated to mass mobilization as an outcome of the Stonewall riots. Compared to the homophile movement the gay and lesbian liberation was more radical, performative, leftist and liberal, generally celebrating gay identity.

These identity movements can be understood to practise identity politics. By identity politics it is often meant the political or cultural mobilization in which identity in terms of gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation, for example, becomes a political point of departure (see, Woodward 1997: 24). The movements practising identity politics, such as feminist, gay and lesbian and civil rights and ethnic minority groups etc., advocate human rights, claiming recognition for themselves or the specific traits of the self that are considered marginalized or stigmatized by the wider public (see Lichterman 1999: 136). Although these movements can draw attention to different forms of inequalities in society, such as the denied access of economic, political or cultural resources or issues related to personal freedom, self-fulfilment and valuations of different groups, it is common to them all that identity can be viewed as something that is “externally imposed and forms part of the basis for grievances” (Bernstein 2005: 48).¹

Identity movements can be labelled as new social movements. However, all new social movements are not identity movements. Certain new social movements do not practice identity politics. These movements, such as environmental, peace and student movements, may seek to democratize the bureaucratic processes of decision-making of governments or other institutions that they see as unapproachable and rejecting open public debate. Identity movements and other types of new social movements may have common features in terms of their social base, tactics, repertoires and organization structures, and so on (see Offe 1985; Pichardo 1997). This is also what defines these movements as new, even though movements mobilized around issues such as ethnicity and women’s rights have existed long before the 1960s. For this reason, the distinctiveness of these new movements compared to earlier states has occasionally been called into question (D’Anieri, Ernst and Kier 1990; Calhoun 1994).

According to Bernstein (1997), there are three ways to consider identity in terms of collective action and social movements. The first refers to the importance of constructing collective identity. Collective identity translates individual interests to group interests, creating possibilities for collective action (Bernstein 1997: 536). It should be pointed out that collective identity is not typ-

1 There is a problem in earlier analyses with differentiating normative political evaluation of identity politics and the sociological approach that concerned the issue of identity and politics (Bernstein 2005). Works on normative political evaluations include, for instance, Young (1990) and Fraser (1997, 1998, 2001). The interest of this study is in movements, not identity as such.

ical to only identity movements, but to all movements including labour movements or environmental movements and so on. It is not uncommon to fail to recognize the difference between collective identity constructed by movement actors and more general issues of identity in terms of gender, sexuality and ethnicity. Collective identity is defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution” (Polletta and Jasper 2001). It is a shared identity of a particular movement that is possible to mobilize around those issues that actors find important. For identity movements, a sense of identity is the basis of collective identity. Identity is something externally imposed from the outside society, and “used as an official basis for categorization”, while for certain movements, such as environmental movements, “members are already integrated in society” meaning that identity is not a political point of departure in the same way as for identity movements (Bernstein 2005: 58).

Secondly, Bernstein (1997) argues that identity can be a specific goal for social movements. In this respect, the issues of identity are an end in itself for movements, as movements may, for instance, seek recognition for stigmatized identity. In earlier social movement theorizations, there was an oversimplified tendency (see, Bernstein 1997; Goldberg 2003) to view identity movements as expressive according to the logic of their action and general orientation (Pizzorno 1978; Touraine 1981; Cohen 1985; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). Expressive movements were viewed as ‘identity-orientated’, having internal orientation that is realized through expressive action and celebration of alternative identities. They were understood to seek the transformation of cultural patterns and attitudes rather than targeting political institutions. Alternatively, ‘old-movements’, such as labour movements, were viewed as instrumental and ‘strategy-orientated’ having external orientation in that they target the state or political institutions, having clearly calculated instrumental goals. The distinction partly derived from the assumption that identity movements did not necessarily aim to secure new political rights, but to resist devaluing and stigmatizing cultural meanings and values that marginalized women, ‘racial’, ethnic or sexual minorities in everyday practices. This often seemed to take place outside of the conventional political channels.

It has been suggested that political process theory and resource mobilization theory have paid little attention to identity, because these movements lack political goals and are located in the cultural dimension (Bernstein 1997; Hobson 2003). Identity movements have clearly articulated goals and can act in strategic manner just as instrumental movements have expressive features in their action and collective identity. Instrumental goals are important to the lesbian and gay movement, for example, (usually seen as expressive and having internal orientation), because the state and political institutions are central in terms of the issue of gay marriage. As official authorities, the state and institutions can claim monopoly of the legitimate use of symbolic violence, and guarantee, certificate and validate certain states of affairs, such as who has the right to marry (see Bourdieu 1992a: 121; 1996a: 376; 1998: 40). Thus, the lesbian and gay

movement represents not only the celebration of alternative identities, but clearly defined instrumental goals. As the movement to gain political rights, its efforts resemble interest-group politics (Bernstein 1997: 532). The state provides legal rights, but these legal rights also have the capacity to change cultural patterns, codes and values. Identity movements necessarily entail instrumental and interest-orientated as well as expressive and identity-related aspects.

The third way of thinking identity with regard to collective action and social movements is to understand it as a strategy (Bernstein 1997). Identity movements can be separated on the basis of their chosen strategy, whether they tend to emphasize sameness with the majority or the dominant individuals and groups (the civil rights movement, women's right movement, homophile movement), or difference from the majority or the dominant individuals and groups (black power, radical feminism, gay and lesbian liberation). The former movements tend to establish 'identity for education' as a strategy that calls into question the dominant view of the group or aims at legitimacy through moderate claims, while the latter construct 'identity for critique', denying the dominant values, categories and practices (Bernstein 1997: 538). In her study, Bernstein illustrates how the specific identity that emphasizes either sameness or difference, is related to outside social conditions, organization structure, and networks of movements. Movements with a strong organizational infrastructure generating firm collective identity and "access to the structure of political bargaining" (in terms of networks to polity members or support from elected official or state agencies) have a tendency to moderate claim-making, emphasizing sameness, and use identity for education (Bernstein 1997: 540, 539). On the other hand, if movements lack political access, organizational infrastructure and collective identity, they are more likely to support difference (Bernstein 1997: 541).

To clarify, identity movements need a collective identity, a shared sense of self, which motivates actors to join together in the movement action and helps actors to maintain a commitment to each other in their efforts. Identity is also a goal of the movement. Struggles over legitimate identity and all the benefits that the legitimacy provides make a difference to actors no matter whether they are political rights or cultural values. Finally, identity in terms of social movements also functions as a strategy. The shared sense of self may be constructed in a way which is viewed to be as the most effective in terms of mobilization and movement outcomes.

This illustrates that there are various ways to understand identity with regard to social movements. Another problematic aspect related to identity movements and identity politics is those ways in which they intersect with social class. There is a tendency to separate issues of identity from the economic aspects and the politics of class (e.g. Bernstein 2005). The idea in these views is that the actors of the new social movements and identity movements "are no longer social classes, that is, stable groups defined by a specific social condition and culture (as the working class was during capitalist industrialization)" (Melucci 1985: 796). For new social movement actors, collective identity is not

based on class background and they do not make claims on behalf of socioeconomic factors (Cohen 1985: 667).

However, there are relatively clear structural determinants for who are likely to be members of new social movements or otherwise support them (Offe 1985). Thus, class intersects with new social movements and identity movements. In general, the emergence of the new social movements is connected to the new type of political mobilization of the new middle class that derived from the growth of higher education and new professional, managerial, administrative and technical occupations (Gouldner 1979; Goldthorpe 1982; Brint 1984; Rootes 1995; Pichardo 1997). The new middle class did not have access to the means of production in a Marxist sense, but were skilled in knowledge production, which they tended to control to a certain extent. This also separated the new middle class from the working class (e.g. Kriesi 1989: 1080). Gouldner (1979) argues that what was distinct to the new class was that it originated from the growth of cultural capital and education. He (1979: 27) suggests a theory of “political economy of culture”. In other words, the actors of the new social movements tended to occupy the same type of structural position in social space and shared a similar type of characteristic typical to the position occupied. For instance, they tended to be highly educated and have occupations that referred to the non-market sector of the economy (Rootes 1995: 225–226).² As certain classes are more inclined to certain forms of social protest and specific social movements, this does imply the importance of class in terms of mobilization, despite the fact that collective identity is not formed around issues of class. Rather, it is the political significance of class that has declined in the West, than class as an empirical reality (Clark, Lipset and Rempel 1993; Eder 1995: 42).

The emergence of identity movements designates that class exploitation was no longer viewed as a main source of oppression by movement activists. According to Fraser (1997: 13) socio-economic injustice such as exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation stems from the political economic structure of society. Issues related to identities, on the other hand, stress cultural and symbolic injustice that derives from “social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication” (Fraser 1997: 14). Fraser (1997: 14) suggests that this type of cultural and symbolic misrecognition may appear as cultural domination, non-recognition and disrespect. Cultural domination means that dominated individuals and groups are “subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and alien and/or hostile to one’s own”. In non-recognition, individuals and groups are marginalized and made invisible “by means of the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretive practice of one’s culture”. Disrespected individuals and groups, on the other hand, are maligned and disparaged in cultural representations or everyday life practices. For instance, sexual minorities, women and ethnic minorities all suffer from cultural misrecognition, i.e. the authoritative construction of norms that privilege heterosexuality, male normativity or

2 For a critique of the New Middle Class thesis in terms of social movements, read (Cleveland 2003).

whiteness; as well as the cultural devaluation of homosexuality, or things coded as feminine or black, brown and yellow (Fraser 1997: 18, 20, 22).

For Fraser (1997: 15), the distinction between economic and cultural injustice is analytical, as they intersect in practice. It is often the case that individuals and groups suffer from both socio-economic maldistribution and cultural misrecognition (Fraser 1997: 19). Fraser (1997: 18) argues that issues of sexuality can be located in the sphere of cultural misrecognition, because homosexuals, for example, are not exploited as a class despite the fact that they suffer from economic injustices. Yet, the origin of their injustice is rooted in the cultural-valuation structure such as heterosexism and homophobia. Gender and race as collectivities, tend to be differentiated both in the political-economic structure and cultural-valuation structure of society, making women and ethnic minorities vulnerable to economic exploitation as well as cultural misrecognition (Fraser 1997: 19).

This is related to the idea of intersectionality (e.g. Collins 1986; hooks 1989; Browne and Misra 2003; McCall 2005), which draws attention to the interrelatedness of different categories such as gender, 'race', sexuality and class etc. In other words, intersectionality focuses on "the relationship among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations" (McCall 2005: 1771). The idea of intersectionality derived from multicultural feminism and black feminist theory that criticized the constitution of the experience of white feminists as a norm in gender studies, which did not represent the experience of black women. Gender and 'race' and other ethnic categories intersect, forming a ground for specific experience (of inequality) irreducible to either gender or 'race' alone (e.g. Collins 1986; hooks 1989; Glenn 1999). This means that individuals and groups are not dominated, oppressed or marginalized with regard to a single category, whether gender, ethnic background, sexuality, and class, but these aspects intersect with others forming different types of experiences and life chances as well as determining access to valuable resources. To link this idea of intersectionality to identity movements in which the central focus is on the issue of class does not mean that certain forms of domination such as class are stressed to be more relevant than others to individual experience and life chances. However, this pays attention to how class intertwines with identity movement practices, suggesting that the more individuals and groups occupy beneficial class-based positions in society or social fields, the better the chances to practice effective identity politics and receive cultural and symbolic recognition.

Identity politics and identity movements are the central vehicle in promoting rights and recognition. Fraser (1997: 15, 19) notes that cultural misrecognition can be resisted by cultural and symbolic change, i.e. change in the cultural valuations.³ This could mean "the wholesale transformation of societal patterns

3 Fraser (1997: 15) also points out that the means to resist economic injustice could concern redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, or affirming democratic decision-making. Fraser argues that justice requires both redistribution and recognition. In this sense, the feminist movement, for example, has made claims that concern both the attempts to transform division of labour and economic structures in

of representation, interpretation, and communication in ways that would change *everybody's* sense of self" (Fraser 1997: 15). The efforts of identity movements to celebrate alternative identities and construct new cultural meanings, symbols and codes can function as a transformational societal force for recognition. However, class is intertwined with this process in that class manifests itself in meaning and symbolic construction, i.e. in political expressions, values, beliefs and protest activities. In doing so, it can function as a resource for actors having impact on the outcomes of identity movements. Thus, attention should be paid to the question of the specific role class plays in social movement practices in general.

Identity movements may significantly differ from each other according to the distribution of economic, social, and cultural resources. As identity movements are often understood as new social movements, this entails the idea of identity movements as middle-classed. Identity politics and new social movements concern movements that can be labelled as progressive and leftist rather than populist, reactive and practising right-wing politics. This definition of the new social movements excludes nationalist movements, although the demand for recognition of identity can be viewed as "one of the driving forces behind" these movements, as pointed out by Taylor (1994: 25; see also Calhoun 1994: 22, 23). In other words, there are different types of identity movements, and not all of them are middle class.

For instance, Piven and Cloward (1979) understood the civil rights movement as a representative of a lower-class movement. While the civil rights movement may not have been distinctly consisted of highly educated middle-class individuals, it was nevertheless resourceful. Morris (1986) argues that urban black church was crucial to the emergence of the civil rights movement because it offered crucial networks as well as an organizational basis, not only in religious terms, but also in terms of economic, political, educational and spatial resources. However, certain populist African American organizations such as the Nation of Islam were characteristically more underclass. The Nation of Islam was the biggest and the most influential of the radical organizations of African Americans from the late 1950s and early 1960s. Its members were distinctly underclass living in the ghetto environment in the urban north. The Nation of Islam was reactive and hostile towards whites. Yet, it was an identity movement stressing economic, social and cultural harms that African Americans as a group suffered in the United States as much as did the civil rights movement. Yet, their strategies and interest were opposed to each other. The Nation of Islam was separatist, while the civil rights movement was integration-friendly. In order to understand the differences between different movements, it is important to draw attention to the positions occupied in society or different fields and the resources of movement members that have an effect on movement strategies.

general and cultural misrecognition in its effort to resist sexism or stereotypical representation of women.

It can be suggested that class may be in general one of the main factors that explains the differences in protest activities and repertoires between movements. In addition, a class-specific sense of powerlessness (economic, social and cultural defects) may be a reason why certain individuals and groups do not mobilize around the issue of identity, although they may represent ethnic minorities or other marginalized and dominated individuals and groups. Class may, therefore, provide a backdrop for a social opportunity structure for collective action (Eder 1995: 25). This refers to the social-structural processes such as occupational, educational, income and life-style differentiation that create a space for class differentiation and relations (Eder 1995: 35).

This enables us to link class to the analysis of identity movements, which may partly resolve the reluctance of new social movement research to take into account non-middle-class identity movements such as certain ethnic or nationalist movements. Class differentiates identity movements and the issues of identity in general. It should, thus, be integrated more firmly in the new social movement research. The emergence of new social movements and the growing interest in identity politics reflect a wider trend in social sciences related to cultural turn. Cultural turn shifted the focus away from the material aspects to the sphere of symbolic, culture and identity. Thus, it is hardly surprising that some have criticized the cultural turn for neglecting the structural and material aspects of the social world (Ray and Sayer 1999; O'Neil 2001; Crompton 2008). The critics point out that this tendency towards the ideational sphere has taken place at the expense of materialism and the politics of economy and economic aspects of social life. The next section pays closer attention to the different social movement approaches that emerged to explain the new type of social protest and social movements in the West.

1.4 New Social Movement Research Paradigms

As the new types of forms of social, political and cultural protest aroused, the paradigm in social movement research changed as well. This took place mainly in two ways. In the United States, collective behaviour and strain theories of social movements (Blumer 1951; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1987) highlighted the emotional, irrational and spontaneous crowd behind collective action as representing a potential danger to the established order. However, the collective behaviour and strain theories failed to capture the characteristics of the new protest, as these new social movement actors "hardly conformed to the image of anomic, fragmented, unprivileged, and irrational deviants" that the collective behaviour and strain theories emphasized (Cohen 1985: 672–773). In other words, as the new type of political mobilization emerged in the form of the new middle class from the 1960s, the idea of the spontaneous collective crowd that once explained the rise of Nazi Germany and the threat of socialism disappeared in social movement research. New social movement approaches share the assumption of rational and competent individuals, who collectively

drive their interest, seek change, articulate social problems, and raise consciousness.

In Europe, Marxism and class provided tools with which to consider social protest until the emergence of new social movements. As the new type of political protest was connected to the struggles over quality of everyday life rather than politics of class, there seemed to be an aspect in political protest and movements that the Marxist toolkit was incapable of explaining. It was characteristic of these new movements that their understanding of social problems did not derive from shared class interests. Movements were viewed to be representing something other than the class conflicts of the industrial society (Offe 1985; Brand 1990; Pichardo 1997). As a consequence, the role of class struggles in describing mobilization and collective action diminished. It was even suggested that this illustrates 'the crisis of class' representing the decoupling of class and collective action (Eder 1993). This drew attention to the theorization of new social movements (NSMs) in Europe (e.g. Habermas 1976; Touraine 1981, Melucci 1985, 1989; Offe 1985) that treated the emergence of new social movements as representing the transformation from industrial to knowledge-orientated post-industrial society (see Scott 1990: 15).

NSMs illustrated new forms of conflicts in society, implying the actors' growing capability to determine the conditions of their everyday life and promote new types of values and attitudes that matter to them through social movement activities outside of formal and institutionalized political channels. For Touraine (1981: 29) social movements lie "at the heart of social life" and "the central forces fighting one against the other to control the production of society". This gives social movements a central role for the shaping of historicity, i.e. in inventing society's norms, institutions and practices, which is guided by the cultural orientations (knowledge, investments etc.) of actors (Touraine 1981: 29). Also, Melucci (1989: 12) understands movements as organized systems with increasing individual and social capacity for self-reflection, the production of information and the development of communication. In general, the NSM approach highlighted the cultural and social domains of collective action rather than political. According to della Porta and Diani (2006: 9–10), NSMs had several advantages such as the revaluation of the nature of conflict in times when non-class conflicts were glossed over; placing actors at the centre of the analysis; and capturing the innovative characteristics of movements which "no longer defined themselves principally in relation to the system of production".

The new characteristics of social protest generated new social movement approaches. The most influential of these new approaches were the political process theory, resource mobilization theory, framing and the collective identity approach.⁴ They are all inclined to explain and emphasize certain aspects and characteristics of social movements. This leads to the construction of an ideal type in which some element, whether it be an outside context that enables mobilization or the collective identity of a movement, is seen as the most central

4 One of the influential social movement approaches of the present is the network analysis.

factor of a particular movement. Because each of these approaches pays attention to different elements of social movements, they are not mutually exclusive approaches, but rather complementary.

The different social movement approaches reflect the general dualisms in social sciences. These dualisms usually concern the relationship between structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism and material and ideal aspects of the social world. Each of the approaches tends to adopt a perspective that highlights either the role of outside structures and resources or the constructive actions and subjective views of actors as their main stance. Thus, these approaches can be identified according to what they think of social structures and individual action. As social movements are often self-evidently linked to agency, consciousness and resistance, it may be difficult to understand why certain movement approaches can be viewed to be more on the structural side. Structure usually implies something that is fixed and stable having the tendency to exclude the importance of actors, which makes it ill-suited to describe social movements (Goodwin, Jasper & Khattar 1999: 41).

This criticism concerns most of all political process theory (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978, 1995; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999) that highlights the role of outside structures and processes affecting the emergence, action and outcomes of social movements.⁵ Thus, its focus has been mainly on the outside context of social movements, which either enables or obstructs mobilization and its outcomes (see, Meyer 2004: 126). As a consequence of this emphasis on the outside processes, political process theory has difficulties in approaching the issue of agency, although it acknowledges the importance of the grievance interpretation and cognitive processes of actors. Changing political conditions can become manifested in 'cognitive cues' that may lead to 'cognitive liberation' (McAdam 1999: 49). Yet, the problem is that the different aspects that mediate between wider societal processes and cognitive aspects of actors are relatively poorly described.

Resource mobilization theory pays more attention to the internal aspect of the movement than political process theory, focusing on its organizational bases, resource accumulation, linkages between the movement and other actors, external support or resistance from the outside, mobilization infrastructure etc. that are nevertheless considered external to individuals (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1975; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977;

5 In the most classical example of political process theory, McAdam (1999) describes the historical processes that affect the mobilization of the civil rights movement within the years 1876-1954. These processes concern different aspects such as the decline in cotton farming in the South, the increased resources of African Americans, and mass migration to the northern cities from the rural South that shifted political structures and created, thus, opportunities for successful insurgent action. McAdam (1999: 79-81) illustrates that the migration of African Americans from the South was most likely to take place from those states in which the political participation (in terms of voting) of African Americans was most limited. The migration to the North, where blacks had the right to vote, was most likely to concern those states in which voting was strategically most important. This increased generally the significance of the black vote and created opportunities in political structures (McAdam 1999: 65-116).

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 15).⁶ Yet, even though resource mobilization theory is resource-centred in that the opportunities for successful mobilization is dependent on whatever resources actors may possess, it describes agency in a similar manner to rational choice theory. Because the earlier social movement paradigm viewed collective action as irrational and potentially causing a threat to the established order, new approaches of which resource mobilization theory was first, understood social movement actors as rational and goal-orientated and collective action as instrumental. To understand agency in any terms other than rationality and strategy is a central problem of resource mobilization theory. Especially in the early definitions, this led to an oversimplistic view of social movements in which “the centrality of deliberated strategic decisions” was exaggerated at the expense of “the contingency, emotionality, plasticity, and interactive character of movement politics” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 15).

In general, constructionist approaches such as framing and the collective identity approach draw more attention to the cognitive, emotional and ideational aspects of individual actors. Yet, they are often consistent with resource mobilization theory and political process theory, as these approaches may well involve a strategic dimension or emphasis on resources (e.g. Bernstein 1997; Barker and Lavalette 2002; Robnett 2002; Goldberg 2003). For instance, the process of framing is important in terms of a movement’s success, because different ways of framing have different outcomes; they can increase the movement’s resources or create new opportunities (see, Noakes and Johnston 2005: 20). As it is possible to interpret social problems in various ways, all of which have different effects and possible outcomes (Snow et al., 1986: 465; Barker and Lavalette 2002: 141), the specific ways of framing may give a movement’s strategies an independent role that determines its possible outcomes.⁷ Collective

6 Both political process theory and resource mobilization view elite support as important in terms of social movement success. Resource mobilizations theory acknowledges that the elite support was central to the success of the civil rights movement (Lipsky, 1968; Oberschall 1968). Movements must always “activate ‘third parties’ to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protestors” (Lipsky 1968: 1145).

7 For instance, the framing strategy of the civil rights movement appealed to the white elite in its moderate (rather than radical) grievance interpretation. It was typical for the civil rights movement to frame grievances according to the logic of the religious gospel that derived from the black church, stressing the sameness of all people and adapting the idea of non-violent protest. Thus, Martin Luther King’s efforts “to frame his actions in highly resonant and sympathetic ways” form a backdrop against which the success of the civil rights movement can be partly understood, which is further seen as a skillful and conscious tactical choice (McAdam 1996: 347). If so, would this mean that the civil rights movement’s framing that emphasized the brotherhood of all men and forgiveness was, in fact, a product of mere logical calculation? Some disagree, as this would mean that “King made a strategic choice to speak English, rather than seeing English as part of the culture shared by King and his audiences” (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattar 1999: 49). Strategic understanding of framing excludes “the possibility that King employed Christian themes because, as a Baptist minister with a doctorate in theology, he actually believed that those ‘themes’ were true or valuable for their own sake” (Jasper and Khattar 1999: 49).

identity of the movement also functions as a strategy having an influence on the movement's outcomes (Goldberg 2003).⁸

In general, framing, which has gained increasing attention since the 1980s in social movement research, stresses the constructive role of individuals or movement spokespersons in interpreting, selecting symbols and discourses (Gamson et al. 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). It stems from Goffman's concept of frame that is understood as an interpretation scheme. For Goffman, frames make it possible "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" numerous occurrences in an organized and meaningful form (Goffman 1974: 21; Snow et al., 1986). In terms of social movements, actors are understood to frame the specific social problem, which usually involves diagnosis of this problem, suggested solutions and strategies as well as motivational aspects that are central to social movements.

Resource mobilization theory and political process theory have difficulties explaining how important normative aspects such as values, feelings or ideas of justice are to social movements. These may be the ultimate motivator behind the process of framing. Successful strategies of framing must resonate with society's or its sections' ideas of justice and reason by creating new opportunities. By emphasizing this as a strategy, framing does not share the view of resource mobilization theory in which actors are self-interested and driven by calculative goals. Rather, actors are normatively orientated in that they take part in social movement action, because they find a movement's causes important to them, but they are also rationally evaluative in their aspiration to attract the widest attention or achieve the best outcomes possible.⁹

Whereas framing focuses on cognitive and constructive aspects in grievance interpretation, and mobilization is practical and pragmatic, the collective identity approach pays attention to a group's shared sense of self and locations and solidarities, commitments and values, ways of being and doing. In this sense, collective identity takes into account subjective experiences, identifications, feelings and motifs of actors behind the mobilization. The collective identity approach aims to explore how any type of movement is formed in an active meaning construction process, arguing that without collective identity, there is no mobilization or social movements.¹⁰ The collective identity approach can be

8 Goldberg (2003) synthesizes the strategic models and identity-oriented approaches of collective action in his research concerning the Workers Alliance and its opponents between the years 1935–1941 in the United States. He extends identity to the realm of strategy and interest by referring explicitly to Bourdieu's work. The strategy and struggles over the construction of a shared collective identity within the Workers Alliance and between its opponents affect the resources that are needed for the movement to mobilize.

9 This enables us to consider that these perspectives are not mutually exclusive. In the case of the civil rights movement, there is a possibility for a strategic calculation of how to use the non-violent religious gospel effectively. At the same time, this can be viewed as a religious value-orientated gospel generated by religious dispositions deriving from the familiar religious world, as the church formed an important background for the everyday lives of African Americans and the origin for the civil rights movement.

10 For instance, for the civil rights movement, religion and church were also important in forming the basis for collective identity as it provided symbolic resources (Morris

regarded as a constructionist approach interested in those ways in which meanings and identities are created. Subjective definitions of the self are constructed in movements having the capacity to create loyalty and commitment to the movement, which further have the power to induce transformative experiences to actors (McClurg Mueller 1992: 16; Friedman & McAdam 1992).

Both framing and the collective identity approach have the same problems. While they acknowledge the cognitive and constructivist principles that are crucial elements of the movement action, they fail to sufficiently take into account how they are related to social and cultural conditions and wider social processes. Framing focuses merely on the constructive role of actors in protest action, i.e. how social problems are framed in a political protest. This leads to the failure to describe the role of social conditions in which actors find themselves, as nothing meaningful exists outside of actors and their meaning-giving process. Collective identity concerns, most of all, the shared definition of the group. It tends to be of more interest in the actors' active meaning-construction processes. But, the problem is that it neglects the social conditions within which something takes place. In other words, these approaches gloss over the question of how social conditions and structural or cultural locations of actors may affect the construction of collective identity or the process of framing. Thus, the tendency to neglect the analysis of the influence of social conditions on actors' ways of perceiving, feeling and doing things leads into a position in which the emphasis on the cognitive and emotional aspects of actors is restricted to the process of meaning-construction.

Political process theory, resource mobilization theory, framing and the collective identity approach all make a valuable contribution to our understanding of social movement by explaining certain specific elements. Despite the different emphasis of different social movement approaches, the importance of synthesizing these views is generally agreed. Thus, it is understood that in order for mobilization to take place, advantageous social conditions and processes are needed as well as constructive processes of actors in interpreting, framing and forming collective identities. The problem in these aspirations is that this is often carried out by constructing a coherent narrative starting usually from the changing political opportunities and ending up with the emphasis on the constructive and cognitive processes of actors.

General sociological theory may better draw these different elements into a coherent framework. According to Crossley (2002a: 183), social movement theory cannot develop a general theoretical framework that takes into account the dualisms. Thus, he argues that social movement theory needs to draw from general sociological theory and specifically from Bourdieu's concepts of habi-

1986). Freedom songs, oratorios and prayers as a form of cultural heritage that derived from the black churches were crucial cultural symbols for the construction of collective identity. "The oratorical tradition of the southern black church was similarly adopted to function as a means of bringing people together, changing their personal and political awareness, and strengthening their resolve to engage in direct action" (Horton 2005: 144).

tus, capital and field that are the most convincing approach to the problem of structure and agency. Bourdieu is able to provide “a tidy and parsimonious framework, which is able to accommodate and locate many of the various scattered insights of movement analysis [...] in a cogent and economic fashion” (Crossley 2002a: 168). Crossley (2002a: 7–8) argues that the phenomenon of social movements is sociologically interesting, as social movements express something general in protest as well as representing and being key agents in bringing about change in linguistic and domestic habits in everyday life. Movements are directly related to the issue of agency and structure, as they raise a question of “the difference which social agents themselves can make to the various structural dimensions of life, a question about the form and distribution of power in society and the adequacy and limits of democracy” (Crossley 2002a: 8). Crossley sees movements as providing general sociological knowledge of the workings of society in general. These views are not new. Touraine (1981: 29–30), for example, understood the study of social movements to be the central interest of general sociological research, because movements are the most illustrative example of the sociology of action, which is something that all other branches of sociology, whether interested in the inability to act, crises, the issue of social order, or social change, need to take into account.

Crossley recognizes the advantage of Bourdieu’s work in explaining certain aspects such as class and the embeddedness of social actors in terms of social movements. As Bourdieu pays attention to the question of the aesthetic, lifestyle and political dispositions between classes and class fractions, his idea of class habitus implies that certain dispositions, schemes and styles are typical of certain groups rather than others (Crossley 2002a: 172, 173). This is also linked to the issue of the embeddedness, which would explain why middle classes seem to be more inclined to be involved in new social movements (Crossley 2002a: 174). According to Crossley (2002a: 175), the concept of habitus could explain the differences between the involvement in movements between working class and middle class, for example, and Bourdieu’s work “would lead us to predict such differences and enable us to frame a project exploring the genealogy of these particular dispositions”. Although Crossley sees Bourdieu’s sociology as being able to capture and bring new elements to the theory of social movements that are found to be important elsewhere in sociology, these aspects of class and embeddedness are left underdeveloped in his study and need to be taken more thoroughly into account. This focus could be linked to the study of identity movements. The Bourdieusian framework is convincing in illustrating how class is intertwined with identity movements. In addition, Bourdieu’s theory of power is especially central to identity movements, as it draws attention to the embodied aspect of human everyday practices, which, for Bourdieu, are always power-related. It could be stated that recent social movement research has failed to produce a comprehensive understanding of

the specific role and significance of class and the embodied aspect of everyday life.¹¹

Bourdieu's work enables us to suggest that also in social movement research the focus should be on those new ways in which class and collective action are intertwined with each other (Eder 1993). It is important to explore how various forms of capital are influential in social movements' practices. This draws attention to the resources that actors possess, and those various ways in which cultural capital and other capital influence the collective action of the identity movements. What should not be neglected are the social conditions of the production of expressive and discursive practices of social movements. Performativity and celebration of alternative identities and new codes, symbols, and discourses constructed by movements always reveal something of the structural position of actors, which further leaves traces of the class position of actors. In other words, social movement research has neglected to focus on the processes through which class position might affect the interest and goals of movements, ways of protesting, constructing discourses, as well as those pre-conditions for the success of identity movements to represent their concerns as legitimate political problems.

Another new element that should be integrated into social movement analysis is the issue of the embodied aspect of everyday practices. How can social movements change individuals, practices and social relations? As the identity movements are often linked to the idea of 'personal is political' and personal transformation (e.g. Kauffman 1990; Taylor and Whittier 1992), the focus on the embodied aspects of actors should be regarded as important in social movement research. The earlier emphasis on identity movements understand these movements as aiming for new political and legal rights or cultural change in values and symbols, but glosses over the issue of how their efforts are manifested in everyday practices and bodies of actors. Social movements are efforts to transform social relations between different actors, as all social movements, in general, wish to change or conserve certain elements of social structure.¹² The emergence of identity movements implies that to a certain extent it is possible to carry out social change through self-change and personal transformation, but the question of how remains problematic. Bourdieu's sociology provides insights into this issue. It could be suggested that eventually the success of identity movements is dependent partly on how they may generate change in the ac-

11 In recent social movement research, the focus on Marxism is most evident in the study of global justice movements (della Porta and Diani 2006: 10).

12 In general, movements are defined as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for changing some elements of social structure [...]" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217-1218). Doug McAdam (1999: 25) suggests that social movements can be defined as "those organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society [...]". In addition, social movements involve "idealistic and moralistic claims about human personal or group life" (Lofland 1996: 2-3). Also, to speak of social movements usually entails that they involve "collective or joint action", have "change-orientated goals and claims", are characterized by "extra- or non-institutional collective action", maintain "some degree of organization", and "a degree of temporal continuity" (Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2007: 6; see also Johnston et al. 1994: 6-9).

tors' way of being and feeling in the world, and how these may further generate shifts in social relations.

Bourdieu's work encourages social movement research to take into account aspects that are perhaps considered more important elsewhere in sociology at the moment, such as the analysis of class and power, but which nevertheless are central in the effort to understand collective action. It is possible to blur the boundaries between general sociological theory, the analysis of class and power and social movement research. On the other hand, social movements as an empirical phenomenon related to change facilitate forming a more empirically grounded approach to Bourdieu's understanding of change, which has been repeatedly accused of determinism and presenting power structures that give little possibilities for resistance and change.

1.5 Background of Bourdieu's Sociology: Main Ideas and Concepts

For Bourdieu, sociology can reveal, denaturalize and defatalize the social world, destroy self-evidences and taken-for-granted aspects, and have, thus, an emancipatory capacity (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 49). This is how social movements can be described and understood. They have a function in articulating inchoate experiences, revealing and denaturalizing taken-for-granted truths of the social world. If nothing else, this indicates that Bourdieu believes that the established structures and relations of power can be resisted much in the manner of what social movements do.

When thinking about the overall impression of Bourdieu's sociology with regard to social movements, his work is central in two ways. First, his work can be understood in its effort to overcome dualisms in the social sciences between structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism and material and ideal aspects of the social world through his theory of practice. These dualisms remain problematic in social movement research as well, and Bourdieu's work offers a frame through which it is possible to bring together the different elements related to social movements. Secondly, Bourdieu is interested in (symbolic) power and domination. Social movement research can take advantage of Bourdieu's systematic theory of power. One way or another, movements always resist or wish to preserve established power structures. To understand the nature of power is central to the analysis of social movements, because this draws attention to preconditions and restrictions for successful resistance, which also tend to determine the possibilities for emancipation. Without understanding how power relations function, it is impossible to establish an account of resistance and emancipation and the role of social movements in it.

Bourdieu stresses that sociological research should take into account both the objectivist and subjectivist scientific analysis. He sees that there are aspects in the social world that are independent of actors' representation of them. This

relates Bourdieu to the objectivist scientific analysis. The social world should be approached from the outside and empirically observed, measured and mapped out (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 8). In social movement research, political process theory is closest to this definition, as it is most interested in explaining the emergence of social movements with the reference of outside context and processes, which either create or obstruct possibilities for political mobilization. The role of social context and processes influencing social movements can be empirically perceived and analysed. It is also understood to be independent of actors' representations of them. Outside context exists and processes take place whether or not actors are aware of them or whether they consciously influence or control them. Vice versa, these outside factors have the capacity to influence or guide actors' practices (e.g. Bourdieu 1989: 14). However, a phenomenon such as social movements does not exist independent of actors' representations and points of views. This is because outside contexts and processes are also objects of perception. It is necessary, for the emergence of social movements, that the outside world is an object of actors' perception and interpretation, otherwise they would not exist.

Thus Bourdieu finds it is equally important that scientific analysis should also take into account the conscious and interpretative processes of actors as an important aspect of the social world. Individuals possess a practical knowledge and with this knowledge they carry out their ordinary activities (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 9). In particular, framing and the collective identity approach represent these types of subjective accounts in social movement research. How individuals perceive and interpret is related to what they do, and what individuals do has real consequences on the social world. If not, social movements would not be able to make any difference.¹³ For these reasons, the actors' subjective point of view is a central focus of scientific analysis. Yet, what is important to bear in mind, which is something that framing and the collective identity approach tend to gloss over, is that actors do not freely choose the cognitive schemes through which they construct their frames or collective identities (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 10).

In an effort to overcome dualisms concerning structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism, and materialism and idealism in social sciences, Bourdieu (1990a: 90) abandoned both the determinist structural explanations, in which the outside world is understood to mechanically and directly condition social actors, and the voluntarist vision of the social world, in which action is viewed to be carried out by conscious and rational actors. He was inspired by the insight that the behaviour of actors seemed regulated, but did not seem to be determined by norms and rules (Bourdieu 1990a: 65). This led him to adopt the concept of habitus, which designates that the practice of actors is not followed by an explicit norm or rational calculation, but other principles (Bour-

13 Touraine (1981: 59) argues that "human societies have the capacity not only to reproduce themselves or even adapt themselves through [the] mechanism of learning and political decision-making to a changing environment, but also - and especially - to develop their own orientations and to alter them: *to generate their objectives and their normativity*".

dieu 1990a: 76). Habitus is meant to overcome the central dualism in social sciences, which gives a lot of weight to the concept in his sociological thought.

The concept is based on the idea of a correspondence between social structures and the cognitive structure of social actors. According to Bourdieu, social reality exists twice, in things (the objective outside world) and in minds (mental schemes), outside and inside of actors, in field and in habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 126). Habitus designates that personal and subjective aspects in individuals' everyday lives have a social and collective nature, as Bourdieu defines it "socialized subjectivity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 126). Social actors are exposed to certain types of social conditions (norms, language, divisions of time and space, valuations, attitudes, ways of seeing, understanding and feeling etc.) in which certain types of corresponding cognitive, bodily and emotional dispositions are developed. Habitus is moulded against a backdrop of specific social conditions representing a system of dispositions that generate action and perception. Social order is being inscribed in bodies in the form of dispositions, as the unconscious inclinations and tendencies of actors to act, experience, feel, perceive, and understand in certain ways in certain specific conditions. What follows is that individuals and groups tend to adapt and carry out practices that are consistent with those types of social conditions to which they are themselves exposed due to their social locations.

This also means that practices are unconsciously adjusted to the divisions of social order often resulting in "the reconciliation of subjective demand and objective (i.e. collective) necessity" (Bourdieu 1977: 164).¹⁴ For Bourdieu, those practices that are not typical to one's social positions are considered unthinkable, and can manifest themselves as a sense of limits. Thus, this also represents submission to established social order leading to the rejection of that type of social reality that is denied in any case to certain individuals and groups (Bourdieu 1992b: 54, see also Sweetman 2003: 534). For Bourdieu, habitus "structures new experiences in accordance with the structures produced by the past experiences", which means that "early experiences have a particular weight because the *habitus* tends to ensure its own constancy and its defence against change" (Bourdieu 1992b: 60). Therefore, individuals tend to adapt to the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions according to their habitus and dispositions, which further explains why social relations and objective structures (of which habitus is understood to be a product) are reproduced (Bourdieu 1992b: 54).

To put it simply, Bourdieu's theory of power assumes that actors produce their own dominance through their practices and dispositions without the awareness of actors. While Bourdieu convincingly explains social practices as dispositional, drawing attention to the profound effects of power in everyday life, which implies how personal issues indeed have political importance, this may also easily be interpreted as determinism of which Bourdieu has repeated-

14 "Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most important and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the *sense of limits* (Bourdieu 1977: 164).

ly been accused (Jenkins 1982, 2002; Brubaker 1985; Alexander 1995; Evens 1999; Myles 2004; Sayer 2005; Archer 2007, Elder-Vass 2010). For many, he represents the caricature of a reproductionist and reductionist sociologist, who claims to aspire to break the firmly established dualisms in social sciences (between structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism and materialism and idealism), but in reality, denies agency, consciousness of actors, and does not provide tools to consider change and transformation of a structure.

Most often it is stated that the concept of habitus is incapable of overcoming these dualisms because it falls back on objectivism (King 2000; Nash 2003; Sewell 2005; Archer 2007). For Alexander (1995: 136, 140), habitus turns out to be a Trojan horse for determinism. Rather than creating an alternative to social structural explanation, habitus merely operationalizes it. It cannot be a mediated concept between the objective and subjective, because it does not possess any real independence. Jenkins (2002: 97) notes that the inability to cope with subjectivity is the central weakness in Bourdieu's theory. Actors know more about the social world than Bourdieu proposes. Secondly, Bourdieu undermines the role of deliberate, knowing, decision-making and informed actors. According to Sayer (2005: 29), the problem is that Bourdieu denies or marginalizes "the life of the mind in others." Archer (2007: 42), on the other hand, wonders at the paradox of Bourdieu being seen as "the champion of reflexive sociology". She sharply criticizes Bourdieu's concept of habitus for the denial of social change and lay reflexivity. However, some (e.g. McNay 1999; Crossley 2001) place less emphasis on determinism, stressing habitus as an active and generative principle. "Within certain objective limits (the *field*), it engenders a potentially infinite number of patterns of behaviour, thought and expression", which are unpredictable, but nevertheless, tend to be "limited in their diversity" (McNay 1999: 100). Actors are always active in constructing their social world, which should be understood in terms of "pragmatic adaptation and realism" (Crossley 2001: 91). Bourdieu also understands habitus as 'a feel for the game', which emphasizes more its creative and generative nature (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128, 98–99; Bourdieu 1990a: 63). In general, most criticism towards habitus tends to be ontological, conceptual, or theoretical (Evens 1999; Elder-Vass 2007).

The idea of Bourdieu as deterministic may raise a doubt as to whether he can be related to a social phenomenon that is distinctly linked to change, agency and resistance. If social movements are about change and resistance does this make Bourdieu unsuitable to explain them in the first place? The problem in these heavy charges of determinism is that there is a tendency to target habitus instead of systematically drawing attention to Bourdieu's concepts (see, Evens 1999: 8). Wacquant (1993: 238), for example, notes that Bourdieu's work has often "proceeded via fragmented and piecemeal appropriations that have hidden from view the systematic nature and main thrust of his endeavor". Bourdieu's concepts are originally meant to provide a comprehensive frame to explain empirical phenomena, which is the key to improving our understanding of social phenomena such as social movements.

In order to understand social movements' possibilities for resistance, refusal and rebellion of the social world Bourdieu's theoretical framework must be used systematically. Social movements represent change rejecting some aspects of social conditions of existence that are imposed on their members. At the same time, actors are socialized and exposed to a certain type of social conditions. Their ways of rejecting the social world that is imposed on them is, therefore, partly determined by their social positions, the capital they possess, habitus, strategies and interests.

For Bourdieu, individuals and groups do not only follow their practical sense in their everyday activities and routines, but they also produce effects in the social world. In this sense, practices are not fully deterministic. The specific influence that actors have is heavily dependent on the possession of capital. The possible impact on the social world does not usually take place without possessing "the set of actually usable resources and powers" that is Bourdieu's definition of the concept of capital (Bourdieu 1986a: 114). In other words, capital functions as a force or energy necessary in order to have an effect on the social world. Bourdieu defines four types of capital – economic, cultural, social and symbolic – which can be held in varying quantities and compositions, and which further determine the specific positions that individuals, groups or institutions occupy in social space.

Bourdieu (1986b) understands that economic capital in economic theory is not sufficient to describe the structure and functioning of the social world, as it neglects other forms of capital. He aims to expand economic exchange to "a wider anthropology of cultural exchanges and valuations" (Moore 2008: 102). The meaning of economic capital, similar to that of Marx, refers to material resources such as money, ownership etc. that indicate one's economic position in social space(s). In other words, it refers to material resources that social movements possess and mobilize in order to promote their agenda, which of course is one of the main focuses of the resource mobilization theory.

Economic capital is also linked to social class, but Bourdieu does not define class position in relation to modes of production as Marx does, but rather in terms of lifestyles, stances and consumption. In this respect, cultural capital is as important as economic capital in order to understand individual practice and those ways in which individuals live, make choices and present them in everyday life. It can be incorporated (e.g. taste and lifestyle), objectified (e.g. cultural goods) and institutionalized (e.g. education qualifications). As cultural capital can be embodied in the dispositions of actors, 'linked to the body', its accumulation refers to earlier socialization in which family background and investment in school and education are crucial. It gives its bearers a specific cultural competence and legitimacy. Bourdieu, thus, relates to New Class theorists in paying attention to "the growing importance of cultural capital in the distribution of power and privilege in the modern societies" (Swarz 1997: 77; see also Lamont and Lareau 1988). This parallels also with Gouldner's (1979: 27) view that sees the New Class as culture-privileged. The high amount of cultural capital tends to be distinctive to new social movements members. As new social movement

members are characterized by cultural capital, cultural capital, thus, can function as an energy having the capacity to impose “specific effects” in “specific conditions” (see, Bourdieu 1992b: 122; see also Swartz 1997: 78). To understand how this takes place would give explanatory capacity in terms of how social movement actors are able to produce an effect in social fields.

The third form of capital that is central to social movements is Bourdieu’s concept of social capital. It denotes more or less institutionalized networks and connections that can be used in order to aggregate other forms of capital such as economic and cultural capital or privileges and profits in general (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). Diani (1997) explores the possibility of understanding social capital as an outcome of social movements. He (1997: 129) suggests that social impact is linked to the position that actors occupy in the network of relations. Social capital is important to movements, as social linkages create new opportunities for exchange and communications among different social environments (Diani 1997: 135). Therefore, as an outcome of social movement action, social capital may increase movements’ mobilization capacity, create new movement subcultures and political opportunities, and be influential in cultural change. Also, different types of movements create different types of networks. Some of them may create ties to the political field, others the media field, for instance (see, Diani 1997: 142).

Bourdieu’s fourth species of capital is a distinct form of capital from economic, cultural and social capital, but has a function that is related to them. Symbolic capital gives credit and value to other forms of capital or general properties and attributes, whether economic, cultural, social or physical etc. Yet, its credit and value needs to be perceived and recognized through actors’ cognitive schemes (Bourdieu 1998: 47). In this sense, it only emerges as a consequence of certain specific social relations, existing mainly in actors’ heads, who are dispositioned to give value to the specific capital or some other properties and attributes (cf. Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 491). It is possible to perceive identity movements as struggling for symbolic capital. Recognition, valuation and legitimacy are something that identity movements find important, i.e. they aim to increase the worth of how the marginalized identities are perceived in society.

One of the main aspects in understanding capital is the logic through which it is converted or changed into another (see, Bourdieu 1986a). This enables us to take into account how the effects of social movements may be related to a process through which movements can transform different species of capital that they possess into other forms of capital. For instance, economic capital not only enables movements to have other material resources such as equipment, staff and events, but these can also increase social capital, for example, as economic capital makes it possible to attract more influential viewers of the movements’ agenda and campaigns. Or cultural capital can be transformed to symbolic capital in certain circumstances, if the middle-class position and higher education of marginalized actors that appear as technical and social compe-

tence, for example, are successfully converted to recognition of the creditability of the middle-class actors.

This all indicates the importance of various forms of capital as a weapon in the social world that actors mobilize when driving their interests through symbolic struggles. Bourdieu understands the social worlds as being a product of ongoing struggles. As cultural-meaning producers, social movements take part in symbolic struggle. This means that they compete over power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world. In order to do this, they aim to construct such schemes of perception and appreciation and the principles of social divisions as legitimate, serving their interest and making the social world favourable to their social being (Bourdieu 2000: 186–187).

To describe the social world as being a product of ongoing struggles taking place in different social realms, Bourdieu uses the concept of field. Bourdieu developed the concept relatively late and it represents a gradual shift from the earlier anthropological works to the analysis of more modern social spaces in 1970s and 1980s (Swartz 1997: 118). According to Bourdieu (2005a: 29), fields have explanatory power, especially in analysing phenomena of cultural production, as they are most of all meant to describe the ongoing struggles over legitimate definitions concerning some aspects of the social world. For instance, he dealt with the artistic field (1993; 1996b), the intellectual field (1971), and the educational field (1990b; 1998). He also refers to the journalistic (2005a), economic (2005b), and political (2005a) fields.

Each of these fields has their own logic and struggles, as well as the specific capital that tends to be the most influential in a particular field. For instance, identity movements as cultural producers, i.e. they take part in symbolic struggles in which new cultural meanings and values are fought for, are motivated less by economic rewards than cultural and symbolic advantages. Thus, the fields within which social movements are usually located, do not operate in terms of economic profit making, even though, in some cases, certain movements such as the gay and lesbian movements may co-operate with the economic field by forming ties to the sympathetic business enterprises. Whereas these businesses, on their part, eventually hope to achieve economic profit from these arrangements, the movement has its own stakes and interests and uses the businesses mainly in order to promote gay rights.

Fields are configurations of objective relations between positions. Different positions are structured by the volume and composition of the capital of actors. The concept views social spaces as arenas of specific relations, interactions, transactions and events (Thomson 2008: 67; Bourdieu 2005b: 148). This also implies that everything taking place in a specific field is to be understood with regard to the specific relationships between different positions (see, Bourdieu 2005b: 148). In other words, what the concept of field wishes to illustrate is that the practices of different actors in a field should not be understood in terms of interaction. This entails that the structure of these material and symbolic relations cause field effects and relations to be wired up in certain ways (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 100–101). In addition, Bourdieu sees fields as fields of

forces. It is only possible to think of a field when actors “produce effects upon each other” (Bourdieu 1996a: 132). In fields, each actor “responds and reacts to the actions of others (or the effects of those actions), generating, in turn, situations, opportunities, and provocations to which others must respond” (Crossley 2002b: 674).¹⁵

For instance, Engel (2001: 47–53) illustrates how AIDS has fundamentally changed the gay and lesbian movement since 1980s. The gay liberation in the early 1970s had transformed from the social movements groups that emphasized civil rights to the hedonist gay lifestyle subculture celebrating visibility and sexual freedom by the end of the decade. The AIDS movement differed from the gay and lesbian movement, as it was national, aiming for public policy debates rather than local and grassroots characterized by the gay and lesbian movement (Engel 2001: 48–49). This can be grasped with Bourdieu’s concept of field. To construct a field within which a specific social movement(s) operates, one needs to define the specific interest of the actors taking part in field struggles. In this case, the struggles concern legitimate definitions of sexuality. All actors who have invested their time and energy in the construction of definitions, i.e. are interested in playing the game, are part of the specific field. In Engel’s case, they are at least the gay and lesbian movement, government and media. In addition, countermovements are “an ongoing feature of contemporary social movements” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1628), as their reason for existing is directly related to the opposing of the goals and values of the specific movements. Here the New Right represents a force that exists in the same field with the gay and lesbian movement as they are motivated to take part in a struggle over legitimate definitions of sexuality. All the different actors in the field hold different definitions and opinions of what is going on (see, Crossley 2002b: 674).

AIDS represents an outside force or crisis. As something external to actors, it imposed an effect on them. Actors did not control it, but they needed to respond and react by giving meanings to it so that AIDS had the possibility to become comprehensive from their own perspective. In other words, it transformed the relationships, position-takings and strategies of the different actors in the field. The movement needed to react to the silence and ignorance of the Reagan and Bush governments by taking more active stances and responsibility for the fact that a great number of gay men died from AIDS. This created effective organizations at national and local levels, increased media visibility and attracted sympathizers for the cause of the movement. Yet, what also occurred was that AIDS changed the explicit strategies and tactics of the gay and lesbian movement due to the heavy attack by the New Right. If the earlier movement in the 1970s emphasized expressive values and sexual freedom, the open hostility

15 Ibrahim (2013) uses Bourdieu’s sociology in order to describe the symbolic struggles in British anti-capitalist movement understanding it as a field. These symbolic struggles took place between anarchists and socialists in 2001–2005. This indicates that even though both groups were anti-capitalist, there exist ideological differences between these two groups.

of the New Right forced the movement to change their strategy. Should AIDS be regarded by the public as something else than a mere 'gay disease', the movement felt that chances to fight against AIDS significantly improved if all people were potentially susceptible to the disease. Because AIDS made gay sexuality vulnerable adding strength to the New Right's claim that there was something wrong and unnatural in their sexuality from the beginning, this forced the movement to desexualize homosexuality. In other words, this changed the collective identity of the movement as a strategic response to the threat caused by opponents in the field.

Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, capital and field provide a new perspective to the thinking about identity movements that highlights these movements with regard to the social position occupied, the possession of capital and habitus of actors. In general, the systematic use of the Bourdieusian framework makes it possible to overcome dualisms between different social movement theories. The next section deals more specifically with Bourdieu's understanding of social relations and social conflict which are a central part of his sociological *oeuvre*.

1.6 Bourdieu and Relational Sociology

Bourdieu can be understood as a representative of relational sociology (see, Cassirer 1936; Elias 1978; Emirbayer 1997). Relational sociology aims to provide a better alternative to methodological individualism and methodological holism. Methodological individualism finds an individual action the main object of interest. In this view, collectivities do not act. They are merely a product of the social actions of individual persons (Weber 1978: 14). Thus, they "must be treated as *solely* the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons" (Weber 1978: 13). Methodological holism, on the other hand, represents an opposite mode of thinking to methodological individualism. Collectivities themselves are what count. Here the idea is that collectivities, entities, systems or social facts are something external to the individuals imposing on them modes of acting, thinking and feeling that they would not otherwise possess.

Some argue, as does Bourdieu, that a better alternative can be found in relational sociology, which highlights not the importance of things, beings, essences, and substances but processes and relations.¹⁶ Bourdieu is partly influenced by Norbert Elias, who stressed the centrality of "the logic of social interweaving" (Elias 1978: 72–73; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 15). For Elias (1978: 79), social interweaving designates the procedural nature of all things. But the problem is that language is not able to capture this procedural nature, implying

16 Bourdieu refers to Karl Marx who stated that society "does not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16). For an overview of how Bourdieu relates to classical sociologists Marx, Weber and Durkheim, read Swartz 1997: 38–51).

a reduction of processes to static conditions (Elias 1978: 112). Inherited structures of speech and thought better express things than relations, and states better than processes (Bourdieu and Wacquant: 1992: 15; see also Emirbayer 1997: 283). This guides us to think of individuals and groups, norms and values, structure and function, social class or social system, as if they were isolated objects, “not only static but uninvolved in relationships as well” (Elias 1978: 113). Relational sociology aims to bring a new perspective through which it is possible to consider the dynamics of social relations.

In Bourdieu’s work, relational sociology can be understood to refer to two aspects. First, the relational aspect refers to the relationship between a field or social space and habitus. Field positions are constructed according to powers and capital that are further embodied in actors’ cognitive schemes of perception, appreciation and action (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16). Individuals are imposed upon and socialized into a certain type of section of social reality. Because of this, the typical features of that specific social reality are deposited in their cognitive schemes, realizing them in their practices. Social position and social practice are always intertwined.

Why this is relevant in terms of social movements, is because through Bourdieu’s field, capital and habitus theorization it is possible to synthesize different social movement approaches into a coherent whole. For instance, how political opportunities and threats are perceived is position-dependent, but this also takes place through the practical logic of habitus in which it matters how skilful actors are to take part in a game. External or internal resources that actors’ possess need to be mobilized by practices generated by habitus. Also, the construction of frames or collective identities can be understood more thoroughly when actors are contextualized in social settings, i.e. when the role of social positions occupied in a specific field and social space is explored, and capital possessed by actors is related to the construction of frames and collective identities.

The second way of looking at the meaning of relational sociology in Bourdieu’s work is to emphasize the relationships between the different positions in a field, in which the struggles of a field represent themselves as games played by actors.¹⁷ Bourdieu uses the metaphor of the game in order to describe different struggles taking place in fields. The idea is that the practices of different actors in a field are being influenced by and intertwined with each other. In these struggles, each move that different players generate only makes sense “in terms of the imminent dynamics of their interdependence” (Elias 1978: 80). In every game, there is a special stake that is something highly valued by the actors and something to which they orient themselves, investing their time and energy in their efforts.

17 However, the way in which Bourdieu constructs the social space in general (according to the distribution of economic and cultural capital) does not indicate the actual workings of social relations, as he merely illustrates or compares the different structural positions of individuals and groups (Crossley 2011: 26).

This means that individuals always have “a personal *interest* in the outcome” of their practice (Grenfell 2008: 154). Struggles over the social world reflect the different interests of different groups that occupy different positions in society (Grenfell 2008: 157). Thus, interests, investments and strategies are related to specific locations in fields. For Bourdieu, it is the distribution of various forms of capital that sets up the social relations between different actors. As capital is unequally distributed, individuals and groups are, therefore, differently resourced to take part in a game, generate effects, and adapt a game to serve their interest. In other words, even though conscious or unconscious strategies are orientated towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interest”, they need to be adjusted to “a determinate set of economic and social conditions” (Bourdieu 1977: 36). Those actors possessing a great amount of whatever capital is needed in a specific game, control and influence a game more, but also actors with less capital are able to produce effects to a certain extent. If not, there would be no game (Elias 1978: 81; see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 102).

Social relations are highly relevant in terms of power. Power is not a possession or a thing, but a relation (Elias 1978: 74; Emirbayer 1997: 291). The imbalances of power or the cause of inequality, in this sense, can be understood not to be “located in the orientations and actions of entities such as groups or individuals”, but “in the unfolding relations among them” (Emirbayer 1997: 292). Everyday structures are relations, networks and configurations in which power is always present. Therefore, it can be viewed as “an outgrowth or effect of” these relations and networks (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 491). These types of social relations produce winners and losers, beneficiaries as well as those for whom the systems of relations are not as favourable.¹⁸

It is a central feature of the Bourdieusian theory of power that everyday practices are seen as power-related, but rather than being characterized by the threat of physical violence, they operate in a way that individuals and groups “need only go about their normal daily lives” (Schubert 2008: 184). Thus, these power-related networks are reproduced through everyday practices often unconsciously and unreflectively. For instance, in Bourdieu’s work *Masculine Domination*, which deals explicitly with gendered practices and relations, he describes the pre-modern Kabylia society, which for him represents a paradigmatic form of the androcentric vision. He believes that gender is linked to the most fundamental principles of vision and division. To describe the principles governing gender relations in Kabylia, Bourdieu (2001: 10–11; see also Bourdieu 1977: 87–95) claims that the social order is founded on the sexual division of

18 As Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 13) put this: “Incumbents are those actors who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant organization [or by other kinds of dominant actors] of the strategic action fields. Thus, the purposes and structures of the field are adapted to their interests, and the positions in the field are defined by their claim on the lion’s share of material and status rewards. In addition, the rules of the field tend to favor them, and shared meanings tend to legitimate and support their privileged position within the strategic action field.”

labour (activities assigned to each gender), the structure of space (market or house) and the structure of time. In other words, social order is organized according to the dualist oppositions of male and female, masculine and feminine. Bourdieu (2001: 104) stresses that the schemes of gender habitus are “historical and highly differentiated structures, arising from a social space that is itself highly differentiated, which reproduce themselves through learning processes linked to the experience that agents have of the structures of these spaces”. This forms a backdrop against which gendered practices reproducing gender relations are formed.

Gender is here approached through the dispositional theory of practice stressing the internalization of the social structure into dispositions of the body (see, Bourdieu 2001: 40). For this reason, Bourdieu finds gender relations settled and static through time. In this view, power structures in terms of gender are not in a state of flux, nor does there seem to be a field or game involved. If this is the case, this means that power structures are totalitarian, as Bourdieu also points out that “[t]here is history only as long as people revolt, resist, act” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 102). The perspective here in *Masculine Domination* is closer to Bourdieu’s early structuralist and anthropological works of the early 1960s than his idea of fields, and may represent too rigid a view to think of gender relations in modern society, as illustrated by gender theorists (e.g. Moi 1991; McNay 1999).

Social relations are reproduced through bodily dispositions on a daily basis. The practices, thoughts, and feelings that are adjusted to social order are crucial features of everyday life and experience and seen as self-evident and natural, which Bourdieu’s concept of doxa denotes (e.g. Bourdieu 1977: 159–171; Bourdieu 2000: 15). Bodily dispositions can also manifest themselves as feelings of love or respect that recognize the legitimacy of the dominant social order. Alternatively, they can appear as feelings such as shame, humiliation, anxiety, timidity and guilt that invoke self-imposed submission, subordination and limitation without the awareness of the actors of the social conditions of their emergence (e.g. Bourdieu 2000: 169). In this sense, the relationships between genders, ethnic groups etc., can be understood to be organized in ways which constrain and guide certain individuals and groups to produce practices, ways of perceiving and appreciation, feelings and experiences that can be disadvantageous to themselves, while some others benefits from this at the same time, or have the advantage of not being aware of these issues.

This is something that identity movements need to deal with. To stress the relational nature of power structures draws attention to the question of how they can be resisted and possibly overturned (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 493). In fact, the answer to this is relatively simple. Power relations change “when the distribution of power changes”, which shifts the established state of affairs (Elias 1978: 80, 90). There must be something that disturbs the reproduction of these relations. This may usually mean wider, outside processes and events having the capacity to shift the power relations or draw actors’ interest apart. In this sense, if these processes and events cause an increase in the capital

of the less powerful actors or a decrease in capital of the more powerful actors, this will tend to reduce the power imbalance. On the other hand, when it comes to the collective efforts of actors who consciously wish to transform the power relations because these relations no longer serve their interest (i.e. because of the discrepancy between the expectations and reality), and the actors have the resources to bring about an imbalance in the power relations, there are at least two options. Either they need to withdraw themselves from reproducing power relations, or to invent and bring about new elements to the established relations to such an extent that as a consequence shifts occur in the power relations.

In general, fields and relations can be settled and in a state of continuity, as in Bourdieu's understanding of gender relations. Bourdieu (1977: 166) asserts that stable conditions are most often in the state of doxa and taken for granted, as the actors' dispositions tend to directly correspond to the social conditions. In these types of fields, dominated actors tend to conform to the established order, while still trying to benefit from the system as much as they can (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 13).

In any state of relations, there is a possibility of crisis caused by outside events and processes which have the capacity to shift the power relations. The idea of crisis in Bourdieu's work seems to be referring to uncontrolled external forces, such as economic breakdowns, revolutions and complete system changes (see Bourdieu & Wacquant 1989: 45), but should rather be linked to destabilizing events and processes (see McAdam and Scott 2005: 18). In this view, social relations change due to wider, outside societal processes and events such as demographic changes, as in the case of urbanization, capitalization, the large increase in the number of certain age groups, the growth in education, and the entry of women into the labour markets etc. Bourdieu describes societal processes in his books such as *Algeria 1960* (1979), *Bachelors' Ball* (2008), and *Homo Academicus* (1990b). In his studies in Kabylia and Béarn in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Bourdieu refers to crisis occurring in post-war Algeria and France. He (1979) points out processes such as the invasion of Algeria by the French army, and the emergence of the capitalist economy (with the generalization of monetary exchange) to which the dispositions of the local people needed to be adjusted through transformative creation. Also, crises in Béarn, a district in south-western France (a world with which Bourdieu was familiar due to his background) are related to wider processes taking place in the countryside of France. This concerns growing influence of cities over the countryside, the exodus of women to cities, a changed value-system (for instance, from the collective rule to the logic of individual competition), the decline of authority of the elders, and so on (Wacquant 2004: 391–394; Bourdieu 2008: 44–50; Hardy 2008: 136–137). In *Homo Academicus*, Bourdieu describes a university crisis in which the devaluation of the academic diplomas that was caused by an increase in the number of pupils downgraded the value of education. This had an effect on a whole generation, creating a common experience of mismatch between objective opportunities and subjective expectations.

Outside processes have a different effect on different positions, and some positions may gain advantage from events and processes, as illustrated by McAdam (1999) in his research on the historical processes that influenced the emergence of the civil rights movement. The wider processes were viewed as enhancing a strategic position of a challenging group in relation to a dominant group (McAdam 1999: 41–42). As actors occupy different positions in the system of relations, they also interpret the social world and are motivated by these systems of relations differently (cf. Sewell 2005; 207; see also Sahlins 1981: 47–49). In a sense, it is a matter of how the established relations between the different positions lose their capacity to hold individual interest together in times of crisis (viewed as destabilizing processes and events), when the renegotiations of earlier arrangements are possible. It may also be that these destabilizing processes and events cause shifts in the value of specific capital by decreasing the power of certain capital to induce an effect on the social world to the advantage of the other capital. In particular, it is likely that there are significant transformations in symbolic capital. Some actors or aspects of the social world lose their symbolic capital, while others gain more symbolic capital. In general, political process theory and resource mobilization theory entail increased opportunities and resources that tend to increase expectations, which motivate collective action.

The specific preconditions for change and social movements lie in the types of objective structures that are “in a state of uncertainty and crisis that favours uncertainty about them and an awakening of critical consciousness of their arbitrariness and fragility” (Bourdieu 2000: 236). Yet, the increased opportunities need to be perceived and interpreted by actors. Potentially destabilizing events and processes need to be understood, as representing new opportunities for the realization of their interest (McAdam and Scott 2005: 18). In other words, the mismatch between expectations and the reality in some cases may lead to conscious and strategic collective efforts to transform relations and arrangements of everyday life through evaluation, calculation, and choices. As noted by Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 12): “if there are more unsettled conditions or the relative power of actors is equalized, then there is a possibility for a good deal of jockeying for advantage”.

Bourdieu (2000: 148) does recognize as well that some actors are able to take advantage of the new circumstances that appear to them as objective potentials, but states that this is due their possession of certain dispositions.¹⁹ He (2000: 149) argues that “one should not say that a historical event determined a behaviour but that it had this determining effect because a habitus capable of being affected by that event conferred that power upon it.” Habitus tends to play a role in how the effects of outside events are carried out and manifested in

19 Bourdieu (2000: 151) points out that “it is only established through the practical strategies of agents endowed with different habitus and quantities of specific capital, and therefore with unequal mastery of the specific forces of production bequeathed by all the previous generations and capable of perceiving the space of positions as more or less wide spaces of possibles in which the things that offer themselves to them as ‘to be done’ present themselves more or less compellingly”.

new practices, i.e. how these are interpreted or what types of strategies are formed. It is possible, even, to view the emergence of social movements as a strategy of actors to change present social conditions in times of uncertainty and unsettled conditions. The failure of political process and resource mobilization theories is that they do not take sufficiently into account what it is between social conditions and the cognitive process that encourages conscious efforts for change. In this respect, Bourdieu's concept of habitus provides insight into social movement research, acknowledging that earlier dispositions have influence in the processes through which unarticulated experiences and interpretations are transformed to political problems.

There is, however, a risk of reducing social change and the emergence of social movements to an outside crisis. This view would understand individuals as being mainly able to react to outside processes. Social movements transform social relations by the conscious efforts of actors. It can be suggested that the distribution of power may be transformed if actors consciously withhold themselves from reproducing a certain state of affairs (see Piven and Cloward 1979: 24–32). Alternatively, they may induce new elements into relations that actors wish to resist. Withholding oneself from reproducing power relations is to refuse to produce practices, and, therefore, to take part in specific social relations that are considered disadvantageous and not serving actors' interests. This strategy or move has the capacity to transform power relations or bring them into a crisis, because it forces beneficial dominant actors to respond and react. If actors are able to carry out this strategy to a certain extent, the power relations may be permanently shifted. However, as the established relations are often, but not always, characterized by some sort of interdependency in everyday life (see Elias 1978: 76–80), this increases the likelihood that withholding may function as an effective strategy, if there are not too many risks and sanctions involved for dominated actors. Withdrawal works best when actors are dependent on others.

Conscious efforts to transform social relations also induce new elements into the established relations of power, which necessarily produce an effect on these relations. For instance, gender relations are an example of interdependent social relations in everyday life. For this reason, the radical feminist may use strategies, which may be targeted against the relations of exchange such as gifts, attention, care, affection and so on that tend to one way or another cumulate capital or other types of benefits of the dominant (see, Bourdieu 1992b: 128; Walter 1990). In this respect, "the withdrawal of a crucial contribution on which others depend" makes it "a natural resource for exerting power over others" (Piven and Cloward 1979: 24). In another example, the civil right movement refused to follow the dominant orders by refusing to accept the rules determined by the dominant whites. In doing so, they induced a new element in 'race relations'. Segregation, which was widely practised in the South before the civil rights movement, guaranteed that black people and white people lived in different areas and used the everyday space differently. For instance, as an example, Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus to a white person in 1956

in Alabama, which escalated into a wide-scale bus-boycott organized by the African American civil rights activists. What occurs here is that actors “*cease to conform to accustomed institutional roles; they withhold their accustomed cooperation, and by doing so, cause institutional disruptions*” (Piven and Cloward 1979: 24). As the everyday world was structured according to the principles of differentiation in terms of separated space that guided practices, the event (also as an important stimulus for the civil rights movement) managed to transform the structured use of everyday space, at least when it came to public spaces. Eventually, the new ways of using the everyday space have the capacity to become habitual and taken for granted.

In general, relational sociological perspective, as in Bourdieu’s idea of fields or games or political process theory, implies that political or social relations are constructed as if they were scales. Even the smallest change in the weight of an object (an increase or decrease in capital possessed by actors, for example) shifts the balance, although not necessarily overturning power relations. In the social world, transformations in power relations seldom take place in such a way that they are completely overturned; the change is piecemeal rather than sudden. Despite struggles, shifts and reductions of power imbalances that provide new possibilities for dominated actors to enhance their position and modify the rules of the game, dominant actors are usually well positioned to respond to these challenges, because of their resource advantages (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 20).

Yet, struggles, shifts and reductions in power imbalances create what Bourdieu calls ‘a margin of freedom’ (Bourdieu 2000: 234–236). An emergent social space enables ‘the degree of play’ in which rules, valuations and orders can be called into question, new arrangements can be suggested and negotiated, and refusal and resistance can be carried out. This takes place in a way that is highly relevant in terms of social movements; that is, through symbolic action. ‘A margin of freedom’ represents the “belief that this or that future, either desired or feared, is possible, probable or inevitable can, in some historical conditions, mobilize a group around it and so help to favour or prevent the coming of that future” (Bourdieu 2000: 235).

Social movements have the capacity to change certain earlier relations and practices which would remain somewhat the same as before without their active effort. However, this study draws heavily upon Bourdieu in order to suggest that actors’ ways of doing this are affected by the social position they occupy, the volume and composition of capital they possess, and their habitus, dispositions and trajectories. As a result, this study represents an approach that pays attention to structural locations and embodied aspects of social movement members. This enables us to take into account how class is important with regard to identity movements.

2 BOURDIEU, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: WHY CLASS MATTERS

2.1 Social Movements Using Capital as a Weapon

Bourdieu proposes that each society has historically determined social problems “that are taken to be legitimate, worthy of being debated, of being made public and sometimes officiated and, in a sense, *guaranteed by the state*” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 236). This implies many different things, such as who produces social problems, how these social problems are related to their producers, what types of social problems are considered legitimate, and whose social problems count the most. The emergence of the new social movements and identity movements in the West managed to change the perspective on many social problems, illustrating alternative ways to understand them. For these movements, inequality between different groups was no longer viewed in terms of class and material redistribution, but more in terms of identity and status.

In general, social movements are a phenomenon related to social change and agency. On the other hand, Bourdieu’s sociology has been criticized for neglecting the issue of social change, giving dominated actors in particular little possibilities for resistance and conscious change. It has been pointed out that Bourdieu “had little or nothing to say about [...] how collective actors produced new identities and frames to form new fields or transform existing ones” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 26). Bourdieu puts an emphasis on power from the dominant point of view. It follows that Bourdieu’s “explanation leaves entirely open how it is that innovation, new forms of expression, and new public justifications are possible, all of which could challenge existing institutions, relations of power, and conjunctures of social forces” (Bohman 1999: 142) According to this view, as identity movements represent dominated and marginalized groups and individuals, they would not be able to have any capacity to challenge established power structures. At times, Bourdieu himself seems to recognize the problem. He (1985: 735) notes that it is unclear where the dominated

actors in dominated positions manage to achieve instruments of symbolic production, as they lack the possibilities to symbolically express their viewpoint of the social world. However, what Fligstein and McAdam, Bohman and Bourdieu offer here is a simplistic view for considering innovations, new identities, expressions and justifications of dominated actors within the Bourdieusian framework.

If social movements and agency are understood in such a way that enables actors to make a difference, these actors need to possess something in order to struggle for their interests. Bourdieu believes that “*the dominated in any social universe, can always exert a certain force*, inasmuch as belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 80). Elsewhere, he (2005a: 43) stresses: “As Einsteinian physics tells us, the more energy a body has, the more it distorts space around it, and a very powerful agent within a field can distort the whole space around it, cause the whole space to be organized in relation to itself”. On the other hand, Bourdieu (2001: 32) has also stated that “weapons of the weak are always weak weapons” referring explicitly to women who, according to him, are victims of symbolic violence and male domination.

For instance, the Bourdieusian framework allows us to think of gender in two specific ways. In *Distinction* (originally published in French in 1979), he acknowledges the positions of social actors in social space are being determined by many indicators such as origins of existence with regard to volume and the composition of capital (McCall 1992: 840). *Distinction* illustrates gender as a secondary property (subordinated to a class position). Bourdieu (1986a: 107) states that economic and social conditions give a form and value to the properties of gender, age and a place of residence. The most important capital (in this case the economic and cultural) affect how women occupy their positions in social space, i.e. capital has a role in creating different life chances, stances and presentations between actors within the same marginalized groups in different social conditions. In other words, the division of labour between genders takes different forms (in practices and representations) in different social classes (Bourdieu 1986a: 108). Bourdieu’s approach in *Distinction* takes into account the intersection of the different variables of class, race, ethnicity, age and so on.

Yet, Bourdieu emphasizes that these secondary properties often give specific capital (such as income) its social value such as prestige or discredit. In this case, marginalized actors suffer from the lack of symbolic capital related to the specific traits. This view regards gender, ethnicity, or sexuality as disvalued attributes functioning as negative symbolic capital. These actors may lack the symbolic capital to substantially make a difference in social spaces, as they “lack the capacity to force recognition, and therefore to exert a symbolic effect” (Bourdieu 1985: 732).

In *Masculine Domination* (2001), Bourdieu deals with gender differently to his earlier definition in *Distinction*. Here, he stresses women as victims of symbolic violence sharing similar traces in their habitus. In other words, women “carry with them the trait of femaleness by the existence of the perceived bio-

logical body" (McCall 1992: 859). In the case of gender, the lack of symbolic capital is related to two things. First, women have the negative privilege of being excluded from the games (of honour) in which privileges are fought for (Bourdieu 2001: 75, 47–49). Bourdieu seems to believe that women lack the disposition to participate in practices that accumulate symbolic capital. Secondly, Bourdieu refers to the economics of symbolic exchanges. When it comes to the relations of kinship and marriage alliance, women can be regarded "as objects of exchange defined in accordance with male interest to help to reproduce the symbolic capital of men" (Bourdieu 2001: 43–44). Bourdieu (2001: vii) remarks that in *Masculine Domination* he wanted to correct his previous arguments on gender, and draw attention to the question of whether the relationships between genders "have changed less than superficial observation would suggest". Bourdieu (2001: 93–94) acknowledges the changes in women's position in post-war society, but states that they "obey the logic of the traditional model of the division between male and female". This is carried out in gendered practices. There is a homology between the domestic economy with its divisions and power, and the various sectors of labour markets or fields (Bourdieu 2001: 106).

According to Bourdieu (2001: 6), to describe the principles governing gender relations in Kabylia reveals the origin of the andro-consciousness of modern society, as the present culture tradition derives from the Mediterranean societies. The feminist theorists (e.g. Moi 1991; McNay 1999; Mottier 2002; Witz 2004) have criticized Bourdieu's approach on gender, raising the question of how well gender relations of pre-modern, undifferentiated society fit to an analysis of today's society. Moi (1991: 1033) argues that the position of men and women with regard to power is "far more complex and contradictory" than Bourdieu believes. According to McNay (1999: 107), Bourdieu "underestimates the ambiguities and dissonances that exist in the way men and women occupy masculine and feminine positions". Bourdieu's approach on gender in *Masculine Domination* seems to lead to an oversimplification, which falsely highlights the complete correspondence between objective and subjective structures in terms of gender and female complicity. In this sense, Bourdieu underestimates the level of crisis in gender relations today (Moi 1991: 1034).

It is especially problematic that Bourdieu glosses over the issue of social relations and the concept of field when it comes to gender (Moi 1991: 1038; McNay 1999: 96). Bourdieu's "categories are always relational, always determined by their fluctuating relationship to other categories [...] we cannot assume that femaleness will carry equal amounts of negative capital throughout a woman's life in all social fields" (Moi 1991: 1038). In other words, gender induces socially variable effects in different social fields, and it is unlikely that femaleness must necessarily function as negative symbolic capital in all cases. It may also be that gender's role in certain fields may be relatively irrelevant. This is dependent on the specific field, possessed capital and strategy.

Another common criticism against Bourdieu's view on gender is that as women are viewed as being excluded from the games of honour and treated as objects of exchange in *Masculine Domination*, they are incapable of accruing cap-

ital in their own terms. As a result, Bourdieu underestimates women's status "as capital-accumulating subjects in social space" having "capital accumulating-strategies" (Lowell 2000: 20, 21). Bourdieu's idea of women as contributing to or increasing the accumulation of capital on behalf of men and their family, neglects women as independent game-playing actors in different fields. It is possible to regard the feminist movement, for instance, as a creative capital investment strategy formed by certain women, who consciously drive their interest aiming to overturn gender relations or at least moderate the effects of male privilege. Even though these women may suffer from the lack of symbolic capital due to their gender, they may well be resourceful enough to generate effects in gender relations (see Moi 1991: 1038). The emergence of the feminist movement implies that gender relations are not characterized by the correspondence between objective and subjective structures, but by the state of flux, and open for renegotiation. The movement implicated the changing nature of these relations, 'the lack of fit' between objective and subjective structures creating space "for critical reflection on previously habituated forms of action" (Adkins 2004: 197).

Altogether, the two perspectives on resistance in terms of identity movements intersect. When it comes to certain identity movements, there are certain contradictions in that actors, or at least the spokespersons of the movement, can be viewed as well-educated middle-class actors possessing high amounts of capital, such as material wealth especially related to the distance from everyday necessities, cultural competence, influential networks, and middle-class status and prestige. Alternatively, identity movements can be viewed as consisting of marginalized, misrecognized and stigmatized actors. There are possibilities, but also preconditions and limitations of practices and expressions of identity movements for effective resistance. In general, those stressing Bourdieu's incapability to understand social change and agency underestimate the role of symbolic struggle, intellectuals and spokespersons as cultural producers, and heterodoxy in his sociology. Social movements take part in symbolic struggles, are constructed by movement intellectuals and exist in order to provide an alternative view on social reality.

These symbolic struggles concern the legitimate ways of seeing and understanding the social world often in a way which calls into question the taken-for-granted assumptions and aspects that are considered natural and unchangeable. Identity movements are cultural producers creating a particular understanding concerning the specific social conditions of the group they claim to represent (see, Swartz 1997: 93). In doing so, they eventually aim to transform social relations, those ways in which relationships between the dominated and the dominant are organized, and those symbols and codes as well as practices that tend to maintain and reproduce these established relations.

Bourdieu's sociology does find symbols and codes important, as in those social movement theories that can be labelled as constructionist. But he acknowledges that is not sufficient to focus only on codes and symbols that challenge the earlier codes and symbols. These new symbols and codes need to

have a world-making capacity, which is dependent on the social conditions of the production of symbols and the specific position that actors occupy in the field of production (Bourdieu 1992a: 139). This raises the question of where the world-making capacity that social movements need to have in order to make a difference derives from. In this sense, Bourdieu pays more attention to the necessary preconditions and restrictions through which the reversion of the dominant codes and effective symbolic struggles can take place rather than social movement research in general.

New social movements are typically related to middle-class radicalism and the emergence of the 'new middle class'. It should be noted that this does not necessarily concern all identity movements, as they may significantly differ from each other based on the amount and volume of capital that they possess. To stress that identity movements generally are cultural producers with a relatively high amount and volume of capital, especially cultural capital, should be viewed more as an ideal type rather than an empirically grounded fact. Certain ethnic identity movements may possess little capital, while the feminist movement and the gay and lesbian movement may be more middle class. Yet, it is possible to suggest how capital may function as a specific force, providing a backdrop against which effective and influential social movement action takes place. One way or another, movements' world-making power is greatly dependent on the possession of various forms of capital.

One possible way to contextualize social movements in Bourdieu's sociology is to locate them in the field of cultural production. In this sense, Bourdieu is compatible with Touraine (1981: 30), who points out that the "sociology of social movements cannot be separated from a representation of society as a system of social forces competing for control of a cultural field". For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production refers to an arena in which legitimate cultural and symbolic meanings are produced and imposed (e.g. Bourdieu 1993; 2005a). These fields generally concern ongoing artistic, journalistic and scientific struggles, for example. Cultural producers possess symbolic power in showing things and making people believe in them or revealing things and calling them into question (Bourdieu 1990a: 146). For instance, Bourdieu (1987) refers to Weber's writing on religious specialists and religious labour. These specialists produce religious understanding that aims to influence practices and world views of lay people. This type of symbolic labour is viewed as functioning as a legitimizer of the division of social order by the dominant point of view (Bourdieu 1990a: 112;; Swartz 1997: 93). Social movements are also specialists of symbolic labour in that they call into question and denaturalize the established structures of power. Eventually, social movements may even gain a position in society as recognized authorities over issues they find important.

Yet, the field of cultural production and intellectuals are, according to Bourdieu a dominated fraction of the dominant class. They are dominant because of the high amount of cultural capital for which they have invested, but dominated with regard to political and economic power (Bourdieu 1990a: 145). They cannot necessarily translate their cultural capital to political or economic

power, as cultural capital is defined as dominated capital with regard to economic capital. However, as social movements construct new cultural meanings and symbols, they use all the resources they are able to mobilize in their effort to impose their views on reality as legitimate in symbolic struggles (see, Bourdieu 1990a: 140–149; Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu 2005a; Swartz 1997: 226). In this process, social class can function as a resource.

2.2 Three Dimensions of Class and Social Movements

Bourdieu's sociology allows us to consider how class might be a relevant factor to be related to social movement analysis. It has been seen as problematic that certain branches of social movement research do not refer sufficiently to the analysis of class (Eder 1993: 5). Class determines life chances, access to valued resources and valuations of things and people. This is central in terms of social movements because it can be suggested that class tends also to define the access to certain forms of political protests as well as the outcomes of these political protests.

In general, according to Crompton (2008: 15–16) there are three main ways to define class. Class can be understood in terms of the possession of various types of resources (economic, cultural), which draws attention to the "structured social and economic inequality". Individuals and groups are unequally rewarded and their access to valued resources differs according to their social locations. Class can also be linked to the cultural dimension. In this case, class is related to symbolic aspects and lifestyles representing itself as prestige and status, for example. Finally, class may refer to "actual or potential social and political actors". This implies that certain types of class consciousness and (collective) identity need to be recognized by actors themselves. As a result, when class is mobilized, it becomes a political and social force.

Bourdieu's definition of class takes into account all these three aspects. Class can be understood in terms of structural inequalities and differences in access to valuable resources. Social space is structured as multidimensional (Bourdieu 1985: 724). The first dimension designates the overall capital of actors (all the economic, cultural capital they possess). The second dimension refers to the composition of capital, i.e. how the capital are structured with regard to one another, what is the relationship between economic and cultural capital, and which capital is dominant. In more general terms, the volume and composition of capital are related to factors such as income and wealth, educational level and occupation (Eder 1993: 65). Yet, Bourdieu does not understand class simply in terms of access to capital, but in wider terms that also relate class to different everyday practices and cultural and symbolic aspects such as lifestyles, status and prestige. This is most evident in *Distinction* (1986a), which is an empirical research on different class positions and position-takings (practices such as tastes and preferences). Finally, social position, the volume and composition of capital, habitus and trajectories are crucial, if groups of individuals wish to

form an actual class that is “mobilized for struggle” in Marx’s sense. Bourdieu (1989: 17) argues that the formation of a political movement or association is easier if members come from the same social sector of social space possessing approximately the same amount and structure of capital.

All three accounts of class are central in understanding social movements. This raises certain questions, such as how does class possibly influence those ways in which social protest is carried out, how does class manifest itself in social protest and how does it function as a weapon. In this sense, the focus should be on the variations in the various forms of capital that can be held in varying quantities and compositions, and which further give actors different positions in social space or fields, and lead to different types of position-takings, i.e. political stances. As new social movement members tend to possess a high amount of cultural and educational capital, they are endowed with specific cultural competence, which can appear in various ways (see, Bourdieu 1986a, see also Crossley 2002a: 173–177). This can be understood as a central resource of identity movements.

First, since class can be viewed as being related to the possession of various forms of resources, this draws attention to the question of how the social position constructed in terms of volume and composition of capital tends to define the access to a specific type of social protest. In other words, Bourdieu (1986a: 399, 408) believes that different positions in the class relations determine political practices and political competence, which is unequally distributed. One of the most fundamental ideas in Bourdieu’s sociology is to stress that social position affects cognitive and emotional dispositions through the socialization of certain types of social conditions. This is related to those ways in which political problems are perceived and constructed as political, and, in this respect, Bourdieu finds educational capital important (Bourdieu 1986a: 399, 408). Actors always produce political stances from their own resources (Bourdieu 1986a: 435).

For instance, cultural capital may be institutionalized as in the case of the university degrees, but it can also be embodied in the form of dispositions. Cultural capital may manifest itself as competence and technical skills of argumentation and abstraction in actors, which affect those ways in which political stances are formed.²⁰ Cultural competence is related to the capacity to understand the political dimension of everyday experience, which also needs to be translated to collective political problems. In the Bourdieusian sense, the actors must possess the instruments of symbolic mastery designating verbalization and expression of experience, which also represents a crossing point in which professional producers of discourse come into play (Bourdieu 1986a: 418, 461). Cultural and technical competence that is related to social position, capital and

20 According to Bourdieu, individuals and groups lacking economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources are disadvantageously equipped and dispositioned to impose and legitimize their vision in the world. It seems that there is little chance for effective resistance by the dominated actors. It is noted that Bourdieu underestimates the capacity of non-specialists to form an appropriate understanding of power relations (Swartz 1997: 220).

habitus tends not only to determine the specific skills, abstraction level, and manners of forming a political stance needed in symbolic struggles, it also has an influence on emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions refer here to inclinations to feel in certain ways in certain specific conditions. Competence is, therefore, not only cognitive, as in the case of skills and the capacity for abstraction etc., it is also emotional. It is a feeling of being competent and a sense of being entitled to take part in symbolic struggles, as competent actors are “inclined and called upon to express an opinion”, which also determines “the propensity to use a political power (Bourdieu 1986a: 399, 400; 406). Competence as a feeling of easiness to participate does not take place without possessing capital. Thus, cultural capital that makes specific cultural and emotional competence and cognitive skills possible, functions as a weapon in producing effects in fields.

These can be taken advantage of in several ways, such as how political opportunities are perceived and acted upon. Cultural competence and cognitive dispositions have influence on how resources are mobilized in a struggle in order to achieve the most effective results possible. How movements frame their grievances, diagnose problems, propose solutions is also greatly dependent on the specific cognitive dispositions typical to one’s social position. Strategies chosen and invested by movements are position-takings often constructed in ways which predict outcomes, but rather than being fully calculated by rational and knowing actors, they are more likely to take place through a practical sense of habitus. Skilful players having a ‘feel for the game’ are central in terms of the success of the movement.

In addition to cognitive and emotional dispositions needed in social movements it can be suggested that status and prestige can also function as a weapon in symbolic struggles. In this sense, it is worth considering how the attributes of the specific actors contributing to the production of meaning and value of the new codes and symbols produced by social movements may be crucial in terms of movement outcomes (see, Bourdieu 1992a: 107–116). In order to be able to make a difference in the social world actors need to have the authority to utter words (Bourdieu 1992b: 111). For Bourdieu, a performative act fails, if not “pronounced by a person who has the ‘power to pronounce it’” (Bourdieu 1992a: 111). With regard to language and performativity, Bourdieu argues that the aspect of symbolic power is related to the positions and resources of actors. In general, positions and resources can be understood to be linked to class. For instance, Bourdieu (2001: 123) recognizes the importance of the middle-class position in terms of the gay and lesbian movement. These movements:

bring together individuals who, although stigmatized, are relatively privileged, especially in terms of cultural capital, which constitutes a considerable asset in their symbolic struggles. The objective of every movement committed to symbolic subversion is to perform a labour of symbolic destruction and construction aimed at

imposing new categories of perception and appreciation. (Bourdieu 2001: 123)

This enables us to consider that symbolic power and symbolic capital in terms of middle-class status and prestige can be important factors in identity-based recognition struggles.

Bourdieu (1992a: 72) points out that “the weight of different agents depends on the symbolic capital”. One of the main aspects in understanding the functioning of capital in general is the logic through which it can be converted or changed into different species of capital: for instance, economic capital can be translated to cultural or symbolic capital and vice versa (Bourdieu 1986a). Cognitive and emotional dispositions as a form of specific competence (skills, self-esteem etc.) can also function as symbolic power and symbolic capital implying legitimacy, authority and recognition that can be granted to middle-class-based social movement actors (see, Bourdieu 1986a). The Bourdieusian framework implies that in the symbolic struggle the power relations can be most efficiently resisted, when “agents put into action the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles” (Bourdieu 1989: 21). These actors already possess valued status-related attributes (middle-class position and high educational level) that are possible to transmute in order to legitimize other disvalued attributes. In other words, it may well be that symbolic capital in this respect buys legitimacy and sanctifies those disvalued traits of these actors for which they seek recognition through social movement activities.

Class is related to the access to certain forms of political and social protest. It also gives actors certain status and prestige that may help actors, as they aim to maximize the legitimacy of their claims. The third definition of class introduced in this section is related to the collective identity of actors. The collective identity approach claims that groups need to be made by constructing shared symbols and a sense of ‘we’. Otherwise, these groups of individuals are ‘classes on paper’. They are not an actual class that represents a group that is mobilized for struggle (Bourdieu 1985: 725). Collective identity is meant to explain the process of how collective actors “come into being when they do” (see, Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284).

Collective identity must be constructed in such a way that it appeals to the movement members – it must make sense. In addition to shared traits and grievances (ethnicity, gender etc.) around which collective identity is claimed to be mobilized in the case of identity movements, the collective identity approach neglects the fact that actors may also have the same types of class-related dispositions (see, Bourdieu 1985: 726). These dispositions tend to affect position-takings such as those different ways in which collective identity can be constructed. Thus, class habitus is related to “the probability of individuals constituting themselves as practical groups” such as social movements (see Bourdieu 1985: 725). Gender, ethnicity or sexuality intersects with the divisions of volume and composition of capital in society. It helps if actors have more in common than gender, ethnicity, or sexuality if the mobilization is about to take place.

This is related to Bourdieu's idea of class habitus, which he (1986a: 101) describes as:

the set of agents who are placed in homogenous conditions of existence imposing homogenous conditions and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices; who possess a set of common properties, objectified properties, sometimes legally guaranteed (as possession of goods and power) or properties embodied as class habitus (and, in particular, systems of classificatory schemes).

In other words, the same type of volume and structure of capital and living-conditions tend to mould the same type of habitus that is interested in same types of things, has the same types of opinions, chooses certain consumer products over another, likes doing certain things or likes certain types of people. Together all these everyday choices form a relatively coherent system of practices (see, Bourdieu 1986a: 173). Certain practices go together and are not only typical to a certain class or gender but also to certain types of social movements. The differences between groups in political action and political perceptions and views reflect the distribution of volume and composition of capital and different habitus (Bourdieu 1986a: 397–465).

To stress that positions in social space that are structured according to the volume and composition of capital are important, leads us to the conclusion that individuals and groups who are close to each other in a social space tend to share the same codes and conceptual systems through which to approach the issues of identity. If there is a distance between actors in a social space, political problems related to identity are not understood through the same types of categories of perception and appreciation. For instance, radical feminist organizations such as the Danish Redstocking movement consisted of young university students in the late 1970s to early 1980s who called into question the idea that women should be smiling, friendly soft and so on (Walter 1990). They created practices that proved the opposite, such as refusing to be friendly, and being heavy-handed and aggressive instead (see, Walter 1990: 108). The Bourdieusian approach suggests that whether one understands the political dimension of the practices of the Redstockings presupposes the possession of "the code, the classificatory schemes necessary to understand their social meanings", which refers to the social conditionings that produce them (see, Bourdieu 1989: 19). This explains why it is possible for someone to believe that being unfriendly is a form of political protest. This is related to the specific competence of actors for such thinking that is abstract and detached from everyday experience, which Bourdieu (1986a) links to the role of educational capital.

The position occupied in a field, the composition and volume of capital, habitus and the dispositions of actors and their trajectories (age, social background and how they become members of the movement) are likely to produce similar stances, attitudes, expressions and so on, which is further illustrated in movements' position-takings. This might be relevant in terms of whether movements call for the recognition of difference (from the dominant category) such as black power movements and radical feminists, or whether movements

emphasize sameness (similar features in relation to dominants) as in the case of the civil rights movements and certain feminist organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) in the 1960s. For instance, Freeman (1973) paid attention to these two different branches of women's movement, which she describes as women's rights movement (reform) and women's liberation (radical). While both of these branches shared similar features (white, middle class and high education level), women in the former branch were older, wealthier and trained in traditional forms of political action, whereas the radical feminists were trained in youth and student movements. Freeman (1973: 801–802) concluded that radical feminist “did not have the resources, or the desire, to form a national organization, but they knew how to utilize the infrastructure of the radical community, the underground press, and the free universities to disseminate ideas on women's liberation”. One way to approach these groups is to focus on their social positions, capital and habitus and trajectories in order to understand their position-takings, strategies, goals and repertoires. Even though whether movements emphasize difference or sameness can be a strategic choice partly dependent on outside political conditions, as illustrated by Bernstein (1997), positions, capital and habitus as the form of practical mastery have influence on how political conditions are perceived and acted upon by movement actors.²¹

In general, class is related to identity movements in various ways. Social positions based on the amount and composition of capital and cultural competence influence how social protest is or can be carried out and how a sense of ‘we’ and collective identity may be based on class-based factors even in the issues of identity. Class can have effect on whether identity movements members are not dominated actors in all respects. In many cases, Bourdieu (1986a;

21 It is further reasonable to suggest that similarities in habitus, volume and composition of capital, trajectories and position in a field are not only important to the probability of the formation of movements, but they may be a significant determinant of the tendency to support a specific movement goal by an outside actor. In social movement research, these types of actors are often labelled as movement adherents (McCarthy and Zald 1977) or potential supporters (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). This raises the question of whether the effect of a discourse constructed by identity movements is most likely to take place through the actors, who have similarities in habitus, relatively the same type of composition and volume of capital, and who occupy homologous positions in fields. It is not sufficient to focus only on social movements that produce discourses, but also on those actors who contribute to the production of meaning and value of the discourses in different fields such as the scientific, media or judicial fields and so on (cf. Bourdieu 1993: 37). If social movements are understood as cultural-meaning producers specialized to produce alternative and challenging discourses, there might be more or less homologies between producers of these cultural meanings and their receptive audience or consumers (see Bourdieu 1993: 95, 96). This draws attention to similarities in habitus and dispositions, such as the technical competence to understand identity-concerned political problems, the volume and composition of capital in which the role of education is especially important, other attributes which determine the position in fields such as age, generation, and gender. The efforts of identity movements most likely take place within these types of actors and these efforts may have a greater or lesser impact on different fields, which may appear as new legal rights or increased media visibility, for example.

2001) does seem to view women, for example, as marginalized and lacking resources, even though he admits that volume and composition affects the ways in which gender is presented and lived in everyday life. However, the feminist movement members may “hold the power and privileges conferred to the possession of cultural capital” (see, Bourdieu 1990a: 145) having relatively privileged social backgrounds and a high amount of educational capital. In this case, they can be seen as cultural-meaning producers having qualities typical to intellectuals. These actors have dispositions that derive from the specific class position affecting how they understand and articulate social problems. In addition, this influences not only political awareness, but social movement action and practices. The advantage of Bourdieu’s work compared to social movement research is that it recognizes individuals and groups as having a history that influences everything they do, i.e. beyond social movement practices.

This further implies that as new social movements are linked to middle-class activism, this may determine certain forms of protest as more legitimate and worthy of being debated, drawing attention to the question of whose social protest counts the most. Eder (1995: 25) raises the question of whether “the social movements produce practices and meanings of these practices that allow us to describe them as part of a new class cleavage in modern societies”. For Eder (1995: 34) there are two main aspects to considering class and collective action. The first is to consider how class and collective action are related; the second is the effect of collective action on class, and according to Eder (1995: 33, 36), social movements do create class relations, boundaries and conflicts by producing practices through which they constitute themselves as a class. These practices are related to the means of cultural expression, and communication. Middle class is here understood as having control over the means of cultural production. It may be possible that the middle class is able to make its cultural orientations as a new form of class conflict (Eder 1995: 34).

This means that middle-class-based social movements have the capacity to set the standards to the legitimate forms of political and social protest, making lower-class movements illegitimate, incompetent, and even vulgar in their political and social protest. This is because middle-class “habitus incorporates a ‘feel for the game’ that is already authorized” (Lawler 2004: 123). Lower-class groups, on the other hand, lack the control over the means of cultural production while lower-class habitus functions as a negative symbolic capital. These groups are always vulnerable to ‘middle-class disgust’, which “works to invalidate the protest and to pathologize the persons taking part precisely because it is the authority instantiated in a middle-class habitus that can make such judgement stick” (Lawler 2004: 119–120). It may be that the new social movements have redrawn not only the political but the social boundaries between different classes, creating an arena within which the principles of dividing classes of people are defined (Eder 2005: 36). However, this does not mean that these non-middle-class actors are always powerless in political and social protests, even if they lack various forms of capital, and therefore the access to legitimate forms of political and social protests. This is because struggles and strate-

gies over identity (in terms of gender, sexuality, multiculturalism etc.) need not to be legitimate from the middle-class perspective to be effective.

For instance, the counter-force for many identity movements derives from lower-class right-wing movements that are motivated to take part in struggles over legitimate identity. The Bourdieusian framework explains how the different class fractions “may be differentially disposed towards specific types of protest and movement on account of their cultural backgrounds and different historical and biographical trajectories” (Crossley 2002a: 36). Bourdieu (1986a: 435) sees that lower classes produce political discourses from their own resources, i.e. “from the practical principles of their class ethos”. The right-wing movements are mobilized around the valuations of masculinity, physical strength and moral ideas. This implies the necessity of political and social protest. Bourdieu (1986a: 372; see also Lowell 2000: 18) notes that necessity involves a form of adaptation to and “acceptance of the necessary, a resignation to the inevitable” which is characteristic of the working class. Bourdieu believes that reactionary or conservative political position-takings are in general linked to the declining of the group’s position in society. Political activity is not targeted against the worsening of the social position and conditions but translated into moral stances expressing concern over the worsening of morals (Bourdieu 1986a: 435; see also Stein 2001). As lower-class movements are excluded from the legitimate forms of political and social protest due to their class position, for these movements to be powerful players in these symbolic struggles in different fields, they must draw as much as they can upon the masculine body, physical strength and discipline. In this sense, they aspire to find channels for their protest characterized by the distance from the arenas of middle-class expertise and cultural competence. As game-playing actors aiming to cause an effect, the most effective strategies may involve the presentation of power, strength and omnipotence, which is illustrated in acts of appearing threatening and causing a threat of violence, forcing other actors in the field to respond.

In general, the basis of class conflict is formed by different classes occupying different sections in social space constructing their cultural and political repertoires and stances through different types of cognitive and emotional dispositions with different valuations and repertoires. Struggles over identity, i.e. the question of gender, gay rights, ethnic minorities and multiculturalism, may, to a certain extent, reflect the class divisions and class conflict of modern society. At the same time, however, these class divisions are rendered invisible, as struggles over identity are not understood in terms of class. How can individuals and groups “engage in acts recognized as classed contestation”, “when the very existence of class divisions is either ignored or explicitly denied” (Lawler 2004: 124)? Identity struggles are not merely about class, but it needs to be recognized that there are aspects in these symbolic struggles that, to a great extent, concern the cultural orientations, lifestyles, prestige and status of different individuals and groups, which can be related to class.

3 PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION AS A FORM OF POLITICAL RESISTANCE

3.1 From Symbolic Struggle to Practical Struggle

The new social movements are often seen as creating new public spaces in which issues of private life are discussed, power relations are made visible, and in which agents also aim to construct new norms and identities (Cohen 1985: 670, 700). Social movements do this by articulating new, alternative points of view that represent their own perspective and valuations of the social world. For instance, Melucci (1985: 801) views movements as challenging cultural codes representing “a symbolic challenge to the dominant patterns” in which a “different way of naming the world suddenly reverses the dominant codes”. In a similar manner, Bourdieu’s symbolic struggles are struggles “for control over a particular use of a particular category of signs and, thereby, over the way the natural and social world is envisaged” (Bourdieu 1990a: 144). This implies that it is possible to change the perspective on the social world and show it in a different light, which takes place through naming and meaning construction.

Social relations are not only carried out through unconscious dispositional practices in everyday life. They are also symbolic in a sense that certain positions occupied by actors in social space and fields tend to correspond to certain types of symbolic and discursive stances (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 105). This means the ideologies, stances, views, attitudes, values and valuations of actors that tend to make sense when analysed with regard to the specific positions that actors occupy in the system of relations. In Bourdieu’s sociology, these symbolic systems and discursive stances have an important role in reproducing and maintaining unequal social relations. For instance, symbolic order is constructed in such a way that the position-takings of actors (representations, codes, symbols, as well as stances, views, attitudes, values and valuations etc.) privilege traits associated with the dominant (middle class, male, white, heterosexual) and devalue, stigmatize and marginalize the dominated actors (see Fraser 1997; 1998). However, this does not take place in a calculative and conscious

manner, but through the workings of dispositions that recognize their value and legitimacy.

Social movements construct new meanings through which they first aim to transform symbolic order, i.e. codes, symbols and signs that once indicated the naturalness of the social relations, but which is now called into question. For Bourdieu, this is possible, because he believes in certain degree of independence of the symbolic order from the actual social positions of actors (see Bourdieu 2000: 234–236; Bourdieu 1989: 21). Otherwise, this would be a proof of a field reductionism leading relatively easily into a position in which the possible discursive stances are given only a little if no autonomy from the space of field positions. This would further mean that the stances of the dominated actors would necessarily lead to the submission of the established social and symbolic order, because the legitimacy of social order and its positions are recognized both through the dispositions of the body and the discursive stances of the actors. For Bourdieu, it is often the case that when actors construct a political representation of their social position it may be that the arbitrary power-related aspects of the social world are being seen as legitimate by social actors, because they are incapable of thinking otherwise (see Bourdieu 1986a: 454).

One of the most common accusations of determinism in Bourdieu's sociology lies in the assumption of the denial of critical consciousness (see, Bohman 1999; Jenkins 2002; Sayer 2005). Bourdieu tends to locate actors in the sphere of practical knowledge, especially when they are viewed, by him, as victims of symbolic violence. In many cases, this is an oversimplification. These views tend to underestimate the role of unarticulated emotional processes and feelings that encourage critical consciousness and agency.

In the case of hysteresis, individuals may lose the experience of the legitimacy of social order and their sense of place in it. When this occurs, emotions and feelings may have the capacity to undermine and disrupt the functioning of established earlier arrangements rather than reinforce them, unlike the concept of symbolic violence implies. In a sense, this is related to Raymond Williams' (1977) concept of 'structure of feeling' linked to "'emergent' forms of consciousness, ones which are struggling to break through but which have not yet attained the formalized nature of the belief systems they confront" (Eagleton 1991: 49). This is also essentially an affectual and emotional form of consciousness representing itself as "the uncertain and often confused present of lived experience" (McNay 2008: 175; Williams 1977: 132).

Yet, what is central here is that this implies that the consciousness of the actors comes to have autonomy and rebellion from the dominant social order. For Bourdieu, hysteresis refers to a process in which an individual's thoughts and feelings become parted from the practical sense characterized by doxa. Here Bourdieu adopts the stance that refers to the dichotomy between symbolic aspects and practice, representing, thus, the viewpoint in his work that makes it possible to consider the split between practices and the critical evaluation of them. The mismatch between structure and habitus generates tension and frustration (Bourdieu 2000: 234). As a consequence of hysteresis, actors likely come

to possess reflexive capacity.²² They are fully capable to reflect, call into question aspects that they find problematic in their everyday life such as disadvantageous practices that they themselves produce. Of course, their way of doing this is partly dependent on their social habitus, possessed capital and the position they occupy in social space. Yet, social movements and their spokesperson have a special function in translating experiences to a new articulated consciousness. Personal problems as unarticulated feelings and sensations are not self-evidently social problems and far less political problems unless actors manage to impose them as such through symbolic struggles.

Thus, it is suggested that social movements can be understood as creating a space for calling into question the *doxa* having, thus, the power to increase the reflective capacity of actors. Symbolic struggles that movements produce take place as a result of the breaking the *doxa*. The 'awakening of the awareness of consciousness' and formulating unarticulated private experiences into public discourses is a first step to considering agency in terms of social movements within a Bourdieusian framework (e.g. Bourdieu 1977: 170; Bourdieu 2000: 164–205). Movements illustrate that the discursive stances of actors can have independence with regard to positions occupied and dispositions of the body. Social movements produce new codes and symbols as their position-takings, implying the possibility of resistance, rebellion and refusal to adjust to the divisions of social order.

These new codes and symbols must be implemented in the system of relations as game-playing moves, which aim to defunctionalize and destroy the social positions on which the dominants' power rests (Elias 1978: 79). As social movements break the self-evidence of *doxa* that is based on symbolic and practical knowledge, suggesting that social order should and can be arranged differently, they force the dominants to form an orthodox discourse. Heterodoxy constructed by social movements makes possible critical discursive evaluations of the earlier taken-for-granted aspects of the social world against which the dominants need to create an orthodox discourse, which defends the social world as it is, because "the work of the guardians of the symbolic order, whose interests are bound up with common sense, consists in trying to restore the initial self-evidence of *doxa*" (Bourdieu 2000: 188). Movements aim to unbalance these symbolic and practical power relations.

This implies that the new game is set up by social movements, and there is a lot at stake in these games. As social movements take part in symbolic struggles they use codes and symbols not only to compete over valued capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) that is at stake in the struggles. Nor do

22 In a sense, social movement actors here resemble Bourdieu's idea of reflexivity. It is a methodological and epistemological concept aim to provide guidelines for researchers on how to deal with their own positions and preliminary understanding when constructing the research object, which is also the object of knowledge (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 39–41; Bourdieu 2004; Deer 2008: 199–212). For researchers, this is important as "they unconsciously attribute to the object of their observation characteristics that are inherently theirs and those of their own perception and comprehension of the world" (Deer 2008: 201).

they solely aim to receive legitimacy for the specific identity (whether gender, minority etc.). They also aim to change the specific rules of the game, setting the general rules for the discussion and understanding of identity. In other words, they also define how identity should be discussed and understood in the first place, i.e. rigid, given and essential or flexible, something that is constructed through social action and meanings, making identity therefore open to change. In this sense, movements do possess the capacity to bring about symbolic revolutions. They construct social problems worthy of discussion, and can “profoundly transform our world view, that is, the categories of perception and evaluation of the world, the principles of construction of the social world, the definition of what is important and what isn’t, of what deserves to be represented and what doesn’t” (Bourdieu 1990a: 149).

But this is not all of it. Symbolic struggle is more than a clash of world views and definitions. In order for it to be effective, it must not challenge the dominant ideas, but those social conditions of the production of dispositions that have a tendency to reproduce power relations in the everyday world.²³ Bourdieu’s theory on power and symbolic violence draws attention to the embodied aspects of the everyday practices in the everyday world. If social movements are understood to be challenging and transforming established structures, relations, norms, values and attitudes, it needs to be taken into account through what types of processes these may have an effect on the social world.

This is another crucial aspect in determining the success of identity movements, as it implies the importance of connecting the symbolic construction and representations of social movements to the practical and embodied aspects of individuals and groups in their everyday life. In other words, social movements need to manage to induce an effect or bring about a new element into established relations of power. This touches on the relationships between representations and the social conditions of the production of dispositions, and more particularly, between the transformation in representations and the transformation in the social conditions of the production of dispositions that remains relatively undeveloped in Bourdieu’s work. To a certain extent, Bourdieu (2001: 42) believes that symbolic domination can only be resisted when the social conditions of the production of dispositions are transformed. To which extent, under what conditions and through what type of mechanisms can new representations constructed by movements transform social conditions of dispositions? This means those differentiated structures and positions (structured with regard to possession of capital) that tend to generate unreflective practices through the internalization of specific dispositions typical to a certain type of social conditions. The representations of social movements should also have an influence on the highly differentiated social space that produces dispositions in the first place. Representations and consciousness-raising of identity move-

23 The idea presented here is applied from Joseph (2002: 11): “a hegemonic struggle is more than just a clash of world-views or group consciousness, it must challenge not just the dominant ideas within society, but the very structures that produce them.”

ments must have the capacity to unbalance established power relations in everyday life and to set them up differently. This can also be considered a game-playing move that brings about changes in the social relations of power.

There are two aspects to this. First, movements need to challenge the principles of objective differentiation, i.e. the reorganization of the structure of everyday life, which needs to bring a change in everyday practices. This means that the feminist movement, for example, would need to change the gendered division of labour, the functioning of certain institutions etc. and all other aspects that reproduce gender differentiation. In this sense, protest action in the political and judicial fields designates a central strategy of the movement in its effort to establish new divisions of social order. If social movements can challenge the principles of objective differentiation and reorganize the environment, this shifts the ways in which social relations are intertwined with a certain section in social space. This new structure, when stabilized, should generate different dispositions. Social conditions now mould dispositions differently from the earlier state, generating new practices. Or to put it differently, the practices of actors are adjusted to the new structures of the environment generating new dispositions.

Secondly, identity movements may consciously aim to transform certain aspects of the self as a form of political resistance.²⁴ Bourdieu relates to the idea of 'personal being political', as political and social order is inscribed in bodies and carried out in (everyday) practices. Seemingly personal thoughts, feelings and practices are generated by dispositions that are adjusted to the objective social divisions and relations that reproduce established relations. Learning and the acquisition of dispositions through socialization and the training of the body are central aspects of political order (Bourdieu 2000: 168). In general, this refers to the somatization of the social relations of domination, and for Bourdieu, social order rests upon the dispositions of the body and language (Bourdieu 2001: 23; 1992a: 69).

The Bourdieusian approach to social movements takes into account the issue of the embodiment and body. This is what separates Bourdieu from the constructionist social movement approaches. New codes and symbols do not only challenge and replace mainly earlier codes and symbols, but embodied dispositions. Once movements manage to raise consciousness of the problematic aspects in the everyday world, their visions need to be carried out in the everyday practices of the actors.

Providing an understanding of how actors themselves may contribute to the reproduction of certain social relations that are disadvantageous for them, Bourdieu's sociology implies that the effective resistance means targeting dispositions responsible for the reproduction of these specific power relations. This provides new insights into the issue of personal transformation that is linked to the emergence of the new social movements. It is possible to dismantle power relations by introducing alternative practices into the system of relations. In other words, is it possible to escape symbolic violence either by ceasing to carry

24 In this section, I concentrate on the subjective and cognitive transformation.

out earlier practices, and established ways of seeing, thinking, feeling and understanding and/or by inventing new practices? If this is the case, this also seems to indicate that in order to escape symbolic violence habitus must be transformed, as practices that contribute to the reproduction of social relations are dispositional and embodied.

But is habitus a closed and permanent system of dispositions that is resistant to desocialization rather than open to change? It is this question that draws attention to certain preconditions and restrictions that necessarily exist for effective resistance. Bourdieu avoids speaking of consciousness and ideology, which according to him refers to the world of representations, meaning that the effects of symbolic domination could thus be escaped through intellectual conversion such as 'the awakening of consciousness' (Bourdieu 2000: 177). In fact, Bourdieu (2000: 172) warns about a scholastic illusion that may follow when people relate resistance to the language of consciousness. Bourdieu directly criticizes some feminist theorists who tend to link political liberation to consciousness-raising, and as a result of neglecting a dispositional theory of practice, ignore "the extraordinary inertia which results from the inscription of social structures in bodies" (Bourdieu 2000: 172).

This means that a positive sense of self, or a new identity that is understood to be constructed through symbolic struggles or expressive and performative activity, must be internalized at the level of dispositions. The constructionist approaches in social movement research take for granted that codes, symbols and identities can be replaced by constructing new codes, symbols and identities, but they leave it entirely open as to whether new collective identities transform other aspects rather than merely ideational. If the effects of symbolic power are understood as dispositional, inscribed in the actors' tendencies to act, feel, perceive and think in ways which are disadvantageous to them (generating negative experiences and emotions, orientating action and perception, affecting the valuation of things etc.), then dispositional elements that have a role in reproducing the unbalanced power relations are something that movements need to deal with. If actors contribute their domination through their everyday practices, thoughts, and feelings that refer to the process of socialization, identity movements need to offer a space for re- and desocialization.

3.2 Social Movements as Collective Cognitive Therapy

If it is possible to illustrate how movements may manage to have influence on the dispositions of actors, it would give us new insight into the issue of how social movements as producers of new codes and symbols are related to the embodied aspects of actors. This would increase the explanatory capacity not only in terms of social movements and change, but also in terms of the effective resistance of power. As the central characteristic of the new social movements is the emphasis on psycho-social practices as consciousness-raising and group therapy and change is often understood to take place through the transfor-

mation of the self (Scott 1990: 18–19), the focus should be on the question of how these acts can be influential.

However, many current social movement approaches, even those dealing with the emotional aspects of protest, seem to neglect this issue. Emotional approaches to social movements (e.g. Jasper 1997; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001; Jasper 2011) tend to show interest in those ways in which emotions motivate actors to take part in collective action, create solidarity and bonds between individuals within movements, or how the movement leadership strategically use emotions in order to provoke moral outrage or sympathy to the movement cause, or how individuals express emotions in the movement's activities etc. Even though it is recognized that movements aim to transform certain emotions as a goal (see Jasper 2011: 408), social movement research seems to be incapable of explaining the processes through which this takes place. It is acknowledged that identity movements seek to transform negative emotions that characterize the everyday experience of the group to positive emotions. For instance, the gay and lesbian movement aims to transform feelings of shame to pride (e.g. Britt and Heise 2000; Gould 2001; Jasper 2011). Yet, this is merely pointed out as a goal and outcome of movements without the question of how this is possible. An account providing a better explanation for this issue can be created with a reference to Bourdieu's general sociology and his concept of habitus. The advantage of Bourdieu's work is in its capacity to indicate the role of emotions as being not merely important within the internal dynamics of movements, but also in illustrating that movements have the potential to shape the emotional structures of actors beyond social movement practices. These changes may live in individuals as new cognitive and emotional schemes long after the specific movement has lost its original appeal.

Social movements reveal the political nature of everyday structures, raise consciousness and aspire to personal transformation. Movements can provide a space for cognitive and emotional transformation, referring to shifts in ways of seeing, understanding and feeling. By changing an interpretation frame or political stance, it is to a certain extent possible to change thoughts, reactions and feelings to certain circumstances (Hochschild 1979: 577).

In a sense, Bourdieu's concept of habitus relates to cognitive psychology, as habitus resembles the idea of scheme.²⁵ This implies that the efforts of identity movements can be understood as collective cognitive therapy in that they aspire to construct new schemes, because earlier schemes are found dysfunctional by actors in everyday life. Social movement actors are forced to direct reflection towards "the unconscious and unthought categories of thought which

25 These similarities have not been fully recognized. Lizardo (2004: 376) traces Bourdieu's habitus deriving significantly from Jean Piaget's constructivist psychological structuralism. Lizardo understands habitus connecting the structural-anthropology of Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss with Piaget's work. He (2004: 380–381) argues that it was Piaget, who inspired Bourdieu "to think of a conception of structure at a cognitive-practical level, that could serve as a matrix to generate action, but which did not involve the postulation of an ineffable consciousness".

delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought" (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 40). The aim is not only to transcend the primary and fundamental categories of perception and appreciation, but to transform them through symbolic and political struggles. Bourdieu can be linked to cognitive sociology, as he pays attention to "the historical development of schemata of perception, classification and action" (Lizardo 2004: 180). To a certain extent, these schemata of perception, classification and action could consciously be transformed by social movements. Bourdieu (1992a: 127–128; 1989: 20–21) believes that "political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world". This can be carried out by new classifications, definitions and names through symbolic, cognitive and political struggles in which at stake is not only cognitive schemes but emotional ones as well.

Therefore, symbolic struggles carried out by social movements are not only about legitimate definitions over identity but also about legitimate feelings in terms of what and how these actors are justified to feel about themselves. This refers to a process in which earlier ways of feeling are aspired to be transformed through social movement action. Movements do 'emotion work' in this sense, as they try to change aspects of emotions and feelings, introducing new feeling rules understood as social guidelines concerning how we should feel in certain circumstances (Hochschild 1979: 561, 563–566). Identity movements create a space within which actors are entitled to feel differently than before – to feel moral outrage, injustice, anger, escape from shame – feelings that are then transmuted to everyday life circumstances as new feeling rules.

This is most evident in slogans such as 'black is beautiful' and 'gay pride', which refer to the aspiration to transform cognitive and emotional schemes through symbolic and political struggle. If the movement manages to change feelings such as shame leading to the withdrawal, submission and invisibility of actors in certain circumstances, for example, to anger, moral outrage, a more positive sense of self, and entitlement of visibility, it has succeeded in its goals when it comes to personal transformation. This also refers to a process in which the personal and the political are intertwined. The gay and lesbian movement made the personal process of coming out a public and political act in the 1970s (see, Engel 2001: 43). Thus, "coming out was the ultimate means to conflate the personal and political".

Nevertheless, Bourdieu seems to be skeptical in terms of slogans such as 'black is beautiful' to which he explicitly refers, because as a form of resistance this merely claims aloud the properties that mark domination (a colour of skin), which is not necessarily sufficient for emancipation in itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 23). Yet, if symbolic struggles produced by social movements have the capacity to transform emotional states and ways of feeling, are these not dispositional changes in themselves? Bourdieu glosses over this view, because he does not pay sufficient attention to the question of how these new challenging ideas may influence the embodied dimensions of habitus. In the aftermath of the social movements, actors perceive, appreciate and feel earlier taken-for-granted aspects of the social world differently.

Thus, it is important to take into account how transformations in representations may influence transformations in embodied dispositions. The idea of the importance of new codes, symbols and conceptual categories and the need to alter the language in order to promote change in society is emphasized especially in constructionist social movement approaches (see, Melucci 1989; Rochon 1998: 15–21). To focus on the embodied dimension of habitus clarifies the idea of personal transformation carried out by social movements that has been linked to identity movements' goals (Taylor and Whitter, 1992: 110; Kauffman, 1990; Walter, 1990). Personal transformation is often dealt with relatively loosely in social movement research, especially in the collective identity approach, which takes it for granted that collective identity constructed by movements is related to the personal transformation of actors in some unspecified way. If personal transformation is viewed as transformation of habitus, it gives new insights into the issue.

Social movements in their aspiration to escape symbolic violence must transform actors' habitus. As Crossley (2003: 55) puts it:

social movements creatively criticize aspects of habitus and doxa but in order for their creations to have an impact, to survive and partake in a cumulative project for change, they must achieve a degree of stability and durability within the behaviours of both their creators and the many others influenced by them. They must become an aspect of the agent's (and group's) habitus.

Here lies both the possibility and the challenge in terms of identity movements and change. As movements produce collective identities, new codes, meanings and discourses, they need to cause transformations and shifts in the unreflective tendencies and inclinations of actors to act, react, feel, believe and think in some specific way in certain specific conditions in order to be effective in terms of personal change.

The personal transformation understood as the transformation of habitus is possible because the social reality can be, to a certain extent, changed according to the perspective through which it is perceived (Bourdieu 1992a: 128, 134–136). This is because in a Bourdieusian sense, actors are capable of acting in a social world according to the knowledge they have acquired and use this knowledge in order to transform schemes and practices (see Bourdieu 1992a: 126). In other words, ideas have the capacity to influence practice. Thus, new knowledge introduced by social movements can have, to a greater or lesser degree, this type of 'world-making power'. Bourdieu (1992a: 128) argues that:

Heretical subversion exploits the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation of this world which contributes to its reality or, more precisely, by counterposing a *paradoxical pre-vision*, a utopia, a project or programme, to the ordinary vision which apprehends the social world as natural world: the *performative* utterance, the political pre-vision, is in itself a pre-diction which aims to bring about what it utters.

As symbolic systems contribute to the social world, and do not merely reflect them, Bourdieu believes that to a certain extent it is possible to transform the

social world by transforming its representations (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 14).

This is relevant in terms of social movement and the issue of change. Transforming a representation of the social world that social movements generate can have an actual effect on the social world. If so, this is possible inasmuch as movements have the capacity to create space for new meanings and new practices that are consistent with these new meanings (cf. Bourdieu 1992a: 133). With regard to Bourdieu, Haluza-DeLay (2008: 206) suggests that social movements may be understood as a field in which it is possible for this type of self-transformation to take place, thus, they can be “the field within which habituations consistent with the alternative reality prefigured by movement framing can form and be maintained”. This is because movements function as mediators from formulating earlier unconscious practices to reflective discourses, enabling these discourses to become new habits and experiences when (or if) internalized by social movement members.²⁶

Within this space that social movements offer to their members and supporters it is possible to create new dispositions or shut off, mould, and reformulate earlier dispositions.²⁷ This means conscious efforts to correct, relearn and repractice dispositions, conscious aspirations to understand, feel, think and act differently in a certain specific context. Thus, identity movements are an arena of repractice and de- and resocialization. Consciousness-raising introduced by movements may be a necessary precondition for an attitudinal change and repractice of dispositions for many individual actors.²⁸ This is further central because “[w]ays of thinking, feeling, perceiving and acting that are repeated often enough will assume a habitual form” (Crossley 2003: 55). This is how emancipation from certain types of dispositions that contribute to the reproduction of power relations takes place.

These efforts to shift social relations through dispositional personal transformation are effective to the degree that there is a correspondence between the

26 These types of formulations are common in terms of environmental movements for which everyday personal actions are also an important goal of the movements (e.g. Haluza-DeLay 2008; Pichardo Almanzar et al. 1998: 186). Pichardo Almanzar et al. (1998) draw attention to everyday forms of behaviour as expressions of movement participation. They argue that there are many activities and goals encouraged by social movements that are dependent on influencing actors’ everyday behaviour such as recycling or selective buying, which indicate that everyday behaviour can be carried out in an environmentally conscious manner. Haluza-Delay (2008) links Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to ecologically sound lifestyle practices. The environmental movement has influenced certain practices such as recycling that have the capacity to become a habitual and taken-for-granted aspect of everyday life.

27 According to Crossley (2003: 56) “What happens in ‘consciousness-raising’ and related social movement practices. The individual acquires specific reflexive schemes for inspecting and defining their actions, perception, thoughts and feelings, and elects to work upon them to bring them into line with their new ideals [...]. They seek social change, in part, through self-change”.

28 Even though wider societal process such as demographic changes, increase in wealth and income, changes in educational rate, technological innovations and so on, have the capacity to transform the dispositions of individuals without their conscious efforts, an aspiration to consciously and intentionally transform dispositions by actors is dependent on new representations and new set of ideas.

consciousness-raising of the movement that encourages actors to do what this new representation suggests and actual dispositional practice. But it may often be the case that there is a failure to carry out the movement's ideas through new practices. In environmental sociology and environmental movement research this is referred to as the attitude-behaviour split, meaning there is a discrepancy or mismatch between environmentally friendly attitudes and actual environmentally friendly behaviour. This is relatively analogous to the problem of the discrepancy between movements' consciousness-raising and habitual practices.

Bourdieu's sociology implies that the discrepancy is likely to occur if actors are attuned or wired up to act differently by their habitus than the consciousness-raising would predict and advice. Because of the possibility that habitus is relatively permanent, actual practices may never fully be consistent with the movements' consciousness-raising. This type of inconsistency may be related to several aspects, such as how thorough the transformation in habitus needs to be in order for the consciousness-raising of the movement to be successful, the possession by the actors of whatever capital is needed to make a difference, or the characteristics of the everyday environment in which the change is supposed to be taking place.

Habitus is often understood as a relatively comprehensive system containing numerous dispositions that tend to be homologically consistent with each other. In other words, there tend to be "the coherence of diverse behaviours, opinions, practices" (Lahire 2003: 342). However, the extent to which habitus is systematic and coherent or divided and contradictory is dependent on those social conditions in which it is formed and exercised (Bourdieu 2000: 64). The more agents are exposed to contradictory and non-homogeneous social conditions, "the more such individuals will show heritage of non-homogenous and non-unified dispositions, habits, and abilities" (Lahire 2003: 345). In this respect, social movements can be understood to increase contradiction in habitus. Habitus as a system of dispositions enables us to consider shifts in some of the dispositions, while recognizing the relatively persistent nature of others. It can be suggested that movements' efforts are targeted at dispositions, and thus, they have the capacity to change certain dispositions, but not all of them. This is because "social agents have developed a broad array of dispositions each of which owes its availability, composition, and force to the socialization process in which it was acquired" (Lahire 2003: 329). Certain dispositions may be transformed relatively effortless, while others may seem permanent.

Thus, these dispositions may reproduce certain aspects of power relations, while transformed dispositions bring about ambivalence, ambiguousness and rearrangements through increased power of negotiation to the power relations in everyday life. Transformed dispositions creating a larger area of personal freedom with regard to acting, feeling, believing and thinking can have an effect on the shifts in power relations, even though they may not be powerful enough to overturn everyday structures and power relations. This also enables us to regard personal transformation as a movement outcome from a new perspective. Personal transformation is any transformation in disposition(s) that

has taken place as a consequence of having take part in a social movement or being influenced by its consciousness-raising and representations. This means that movements have the power to invoke new ways of seeing and thinking and permanently change earlier inclinations to act, believe and feel. This does not mean that all dispositions contributing to the undesired aspects of social reality or existing power relations are altered, but this does not undo the possibility of personal transformation.

Changes in dispositions generate new practices that induce an effect in a system of relations forcing other dominant actors to respond, i.e. to adjust their stances and practices to the changed circumstances. As a result, a new set of relations is stabilized and routinized. For instance, changes in ways of feeling are dispositional. If actors interpret certain aspects of the social world or certain stances as racist or sexist, these new dispositions may generate the immediate response of anger instead of docile acceptance when the new dispositions become actualized in everyday life. Other actors need to take this dispositional change into account in various ways. They can moderate their use of language in everyday circumstances. Or they need to defend the social world as it is by constructing an orthodox discourse, but if they do that they themselves may be labelled as sexists or racists. Personal transformation has the capacity to shift social relations. If dispositions that generate practices are transformed as a consequence of having being involved in or inspired by social movements, this induces an effect on power relations.

The Bourdieusian approach to social movements assumes that norms, roles and institutions cannot be merely resisted with ideas, but also with dispositions. In this sense, Bourdieu offers a realistic and convincing approach to thinking of social movements as carriers of change and emancipation. To contextualize social movements in Bourdieu's idea of symbolic violence indicates the active role of actors contributing to the reproduction of everyday power relations. In this sense, 'personal is political' not only designates that the nature of everyday power structures is made visible by social movements, but that personal transformation becomes a form of political resistance. If social movement studies neglect the nature and characteristics of the power structures that affect the conditions and experiences of everyday life that Bourdieu describes, it may result in an inadequate understanding of the role of social movements in resisting established relations of power.

In general, the Bourdieusian approach to social movements sees social movements as providing a space for re- and desocialization. It is suggested that movements can provide a space for the awakening of consciousness, i.e. calling into question the doxa; movements can provide a space for new ways of seeing, understanding and feeling; and finally, they can provide a space for the reformulation of habitus. By constructing new representations and ideas, movements articulate private experiences to public and political concerns. They also change ways of seeing and understanding, thus creating new feeling rules. It was argued that movements have managed to change those ways in which the issue of identity is understood and discussed through symbolic struggles mak-

ing identities open to change by denying essentialist and naturalist interpretations, but movements also change those ways in which actors feel or try to feel. This is a change that takes place in the inclination or tendency to feel. Because of social movements, actors are allowed to feel differently than before compared to the state in which the social world was accepted and its legitimacy recognized. Finally, Bourdieu's sociology can provide insights into the question of how ideas and new values introduced by social movements may become embodied as new beliefs and practices, or how dispositions of actors can be shaped by conscious efforts. Consciousness-raising of social movements can introduce new ideas, which leads to the process of conscious activity by social agents in which certain habitus or at least certain dispositions are worked upon. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that at least some of the dispositions can be transformed when they are targeted with a reflexive and normative force so that certain tendencies and inclinations of agents to act, react, feel, believe and think in some specific way in certain specific conditions can be consciously transformed.

4 SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES

4.1 Bourdieu and Social Movements: Considering Identity Movements in Terms of Field, Capital and Habitus

The article uses Bourdieu's concepts of field, capital and habitus in order to synthesize the central aspects in political process theory, resource mobilization theory and framing into a coherent framework, at the same time, providing a new perspective that has been neglected in these earlier approaches. The article contextualizes social movements and their members according to the position occupied in social spaces and fields, the volume and composition of capital and their habitus and dispositions. This approach theoretically illustrates how the concept of field can be defined in terms of social movements and what type of explanatory capacity it may have in understanding social movements' stances and strategies and how social movements are related to each other or certain sections in society. Bourdieu's concept of capital can be viewed as a nuanced approach to the issue of social movements and the role of resources in protest in that it recognizes the importance of other sets of usable resources than merely materialistic ones. It also illustrates how the composition of different capital possessed by actors is central in terms of stances and discourses. In addition, the analysis stresses the cognitive dispositions of habitus in pointing out the limitations of the political process theory, resource mobilization and framing. Habitus plays an important role in perceiving, grasping, acting upon certain field opportunities; it plays a role in the skillful or less skillful process of mobilizing resources, strategizing, and in the construction of certain specific types of injustice frames.

Altogether, this leads us to conclude the importance of class in the context of identity movements. Social movement research lacks an analysis of how class and class position matter behind new social movements. Issues of identity tend also to be issues of class. This is the case when identity is mobilized in a protest. Class position in terms of cultural capital, especially in terms of education and habitus, influences how identity is understood and what one can do about the

issue of identity if stigmatization and marginalization are experienced. The understanding of issues of identity entails the ability to abstract and remove oneself from the everyday experience. Abstraction and detachment are characteristics of the middle-class actors due to the cultural capital they possess. The article also provides a background for a rather provocative claim that the Bourdieusian approach nevertheless makes it possible to consider that the middle-class position and status is a necessary precondition for the success of identity movements in their effort to promote recognition, whether with regard to legal decisions in the judicial and political fields, or cultural acceptance in the fields of cultural production.

4.2 The Nation of Islam and the Transformation of Everyday Life and Practices: Creating a 'Free Space' as a Means of Changing Habitus

This article deals with the aspirations of the Nation of Islam to transform everyday life and practices. The article regards social movements as constructing new collective identities and forming 'free spaces' for alternative everyday practices and self-change. In general, social movements are occasionally related to the idea of personal transformation understood as a means of seeking a more general societal change. The idea of 'free spaces' is combined with Pierre Bourdieu's theory of power and his concept of habitus. Bourdieu suggests how everyday life and practices are power-related and embodied, and how the efforts of social movements may be understood as aspirations to change habitus as a means of resisting domination. The article focuses on the Nation of Islam, the radical African American organization that thrived especially from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, in order to illustrate how it constructed a 'free space', which is both a physical and concrete space in which the reorganization of everyday practices is possible and an ideal construction that enables marginalized actors to redefine their collective identity. The construction of the physical and concrete space refers to the building of the independent economy and infrastructure within the Nation of Islam as well as religious practices that become to define everyday life and practices. The construction of the ideal space, on the other hand, refers to the construction of ideals and identities, which redefines the relationship with white society and white domination. The Bourdieusian framework enables us to take into account that movements and new collective identities do not change ideals and ideas alone, but have the capacity to transform and reformulate actors' embodied tendencies and inclinations to act, believe, feel, react, and think. Movements can form a backdrop against which it is possible to dismantle the effects of the earlier socialization that reproduced established power-related practices and modes of thought by providing actors with new experiences and practices.

4.3 The Nation of Islam's Efforts to Raise Black Consciousness from the late 1950s to the Early 1960s: An Application of Bourdieu's Doxa and Symbolic Violence

This article is a Bourdieusian analysis of how doxic power relations were perceived and understood by the Nation of Islam from the late 1950s to the 1960s. While not a middle-class actor, and thus an exception in the scope of a dissertation, the Nation of Islam is, nevertheless, essentially an identity movement in its effort to seek recognition and legitimacy for the stigmatized and marginalized black identity. The Nation of Islam was the largest and the most radical of the African American organizations from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. Many of its members were former convicts or drug addicts and lower-class African Americans living in the ghetto environment. It was a religious organization practising a self-invented version of Islam that was meant to solve the social defects of the urban black population. As the Nation of Islam aspired to a complete separation from the white society, it was extremely hostile towards white people and the more moderate integration-friendly civil rights movement.

Contextualizing the Nation of Islam in the Bourdieusian theory of power, the article illustrates that culturally and economically disadvantaged marginalized actors can relatively consistently recognize power relations and aim to change them. The aspiration for change can be carried out both in constructing a concrete material space as well as aiming to create an ideational space for a new positive self-image separated from the influence of white people. However, as these members lack all types of capital, making them disadvantageously positioned in the social space and different fields, the cognitive and emotional dispositions tend to generate clumsy, reactive, aggressive and subjective position-takings. This has a tendency to narrow their possible influence on society or different fields, as it blocks the possibilities for being taken seriously or represented in a positive manner in the media field, for example. Even though, the Nation of Islam was able to drive relatively effectively the interests of its members, providing them with a better standard of living, coping strategies and a more positive self-identity, it was forced to be influential merely among its members. The Nation of Islam, and especially Malcolm X, had a significant effect on the later black power movement of the 1960s.

This is consistent with the suggestion of the dissertation that class and identity are intertwined in many ways. Class position affects the position-takings and stances of movements, i.e. how the issues of identity are understood, how identity is constructed. In addition, class is linked to status and the symbolic capital of actors, making certain actors more capable and creditable in demanding recognition.

YHTEENVETO

Väitöskirja käsittelee uusia yhteiskunnallisia liikkeitä, erityisesti identiteettiliikkeitä, Pierre Bourdieun sosiologian kautta. Kansalaisoikeusliike ja muut ”ro-tuun” tai etnisyyteen perustuvat liikkeet, feministinen liike ja LGBT-liikkeet mobilisoivat yhteiskunnallisen protestin etnisyyden, sukupuolen tai seksuaali-suuden ympärille 1960-luvulta lähtien länsimaissa. Identiteettikysymyksistä tuli poliittisten kamppailujen kohde, jossa liikkeet kiinnittivät huomiota jokapäi-väisten käytäntöjen ja kulttuurillisten merkitysten epätasa-arvoistamaan ja sor-tavaan vaikutukseen ja joita liikkeet lähtivät purkamaan. Nämä liikkeet eivät aina pyrkinet vaikuttamaan muodollisia poliittisia kanavia pitkin, vaan protes-tin luonne kohdistui kulttuurillisten arvojen, normien ja uskomusten muutta-miseen ja korvaamiseen uusilla positiivisilla merkityksillä. Strategisesti identi-teettiliikkeet painottivat joko samankaltaisuutta tai erilaisuutta suhteessa vallit-sevaan ryhmään. Esimerkiksi kansalaisoikeusliike korosti samankaltaisuutta ja halua integroitua valkoiseen yhteiskuntaan, kun taas radikaalimpi black power -protesti korosti eroa ja ”juhli” omaksi katsottuja erityispiirteitä. Väitöskirjassa käsittelemäni identiteettiliikkeitä bourdieulaisittain erityisesti vallan ja vastarinnan sekä yhteiskunnallisen luokan näkökulmasta.

Bourdieun sosiologia on tunnettu pyrkimyksestä ylittää yhteiskuntatie-teissä vallitsevia dualismeja, joihin liittyvät kysymykset rakenteen ja toimijuu-den, objektivismin ja subjektivismin sekä materiaalisen ja ideaalisen välisistä suhteista. Esitän, että Bourdieun sosiologian avulla voidaan syntetisoida eri yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden tutkimuksen paradigmoja koherentiksi kokonaisuudeksi. Myös liiketutkimus jakautuu eri suuntauksiin, jotka korostavat joitakin keskeisiä tekijöitä muiden tekijöiden kustannuksella. Nämä tekijät yhteiskun-nallisten liikkeiden synnyn ja toiminnan taustalla koskevat joko objektiivisia, yksilön kokemusten tavoittamattomissa olevia tekijöitä tai toimijoiden subjektiivisia merkityksiä, motiiveja ja syitä. Jokainen liiketutkimuksen suuntaus tar-joaa perustellun näkökulman yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden toimintaan lisäten ymmärrystämme yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden synnystä, merkityksestä, tavoit-teista tai vaikutuksesta. Liiketutkimuksen suuntauksista poliittinen prosessiteo-ria ja resurssimobilisaatioteoria painottavat analyysissään ulkopuolisten olo-suhteiden merkitystä yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden toiminnalle. Sellaiset liike-tutkimuksen suuntauksiset, jotka asettavan toimijan analyysinsä keskiöön ja ko-rostavat toimijoiden aktiivista merkitysten ja symbolien rakentamista tai kollek-tiivista identiteettiä ovat usein subjektiivisuutta korostavia lähestymistapoja. Esitän, että liiketutkimuksen suuntauksiset eivät pyri tai pysty sellaiseen liikkei-den toiminnan kuvaukseen, jossa eri lähtökohdat olisi huomioitu kokonaisval-taisella tavalla.

Yleisempi sosiologinen lähestymistapa tarjoaa kehyksen kuvata liikkeitä kokonaisvaltaisesti. Bourdieulainen viitekehys on hyödyllinen liiketutkimuskel-le erityisesti kolmesta syystä, joista ensimmäinen koskee juuri yhteiskuntatie-teissä vallitsevien dualismien ylittämistä. Bourdieun mukaan yhteiskuntatie-teissä on huomioitava sekä objektiivinen että subjektiivinen ulottuvuus. Objek-

tiivisen ulottuvuuden huomioiminen tutkimuksessa tarkoittaa, että todellisuus on olemassa riippumatta toimijoiden tietoisuudesta ja siihen liittyvistä representaatioista, mutta jota voidaan tutkimuksessa observoida ja arvioida. Esimerkiksi poliittinen prosessiteoria on lähellä tällaista selittämisen tapaa, koska se huomioi toimijoista riippumattomien laajojen yhteiskunnallisten prosessien merkityksen yhteiskunnallisen protestin synnylle ja edellytyksille. Subjektiivisen ulottuvuuden huomioiminen puolestaan edellyttää, että toimijoiden kokemukset ja merkitykset nähdään olennaisena osana sosiaalista todellisuutta. Yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet eivät voi olla olemassa ilman toimijoiden kokemuksia ja representaatioita. Liikkeiden esille nostamat asiat ja ongelmat ovat toimijoiden havainnoiden kohteita. Se, miten toimijat jonkin asian kokevat, vaikuttaa siihen, mitä he tekevät ja sillä, miten he toimivat, on seurauksia sosiaaliseen todellisuuteen. Jos näin ei olisi, yhteiskunnallisilla liikkeillä ei olisi vaikutusta ympäröivään todellisuuteen.

Toiseksi bourdieulainen lähestymistapa kontekstualisoi yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet ja erityisesti identiteetti- ja liikkeitä sellaiseen vallanteoriaan, joka huomioi jokapäiväisen elämän käytännöt valtarakenteiden uusintamisessa. Habituksen käsite viittaa sosiaalistuneeseen subjektiiviseen, jossa yhteiskunta ja yhteiskunnalliset olosuhteet ja sosiaalisen tilan jaot sekä yhteiskunnan normit, arvostukset ja hahmottamisen ja ymmärtämisen tavat iskostuvat toimijoiden kognitiivisiin ja emotionaalisiin skeemoihin sekä toimijoiden dispositioihin. Dispositiot tarkoittavat välittömiä ja automatisoituja taipumuksia ja tendenssejä tietynkaltaiseen ajatteluun, näkemiseen, reagoimiseen, toimintaan ja tuntemiseen tietyissä tilanteissa. Bourdieulla yhteiskunta on ruumiillistuneena toimijoiden arkipäiväisissä käytännöissä. Samalla arkipäivän käytännöt ovat valtasidonnaisia. Bourdieun vallan teoriassa yksilöt ja ryhmät tuottavat valtarakenteet jokapäiväisissä ruumiillistuneissa käytännöissä heidän sitä tiedostamattaan. He voivat siten omaksua itselleen epäedullisia käytäntöjä, ajattelu- ja hahmottamisen tapoja sekä tuntemuksia, jotka ylläpitävät valtasuhteita. Jokapäiväisen elämän persoonallinen ulottuvuus on poliittista, mitä identiteetti- ja liikkeitä poliittisissa sloganeissaan toivat esille. Strategiana tähän sisältyi ajatus "itsen" muuttamisesta osana yhteiskunnallista ja kulttuurillista protestia.

Bourdieulaisittain ajatellen identiteetti- ja liikkeitä tehtävänä on purkaa jokapäiväisiä valtarakenteita. Koska toimijat osallistuvat omaan sortoonsa ruumiillistuneissa käytännöissä, identiteetti- ja liikkeitä täytyy emansipoituakseen tarjota tila desosialisaatiolle eli purkaa käytäntöjä generoivia rakenteita tai käytäntöjen taustalla olevia kognitiivisia ja emotionaalisia skeemoja. Liikkeet on mahdollista nähdä eräänlaisena kollektiivisena kognitiivisena terapiana, jossa kyseenalaistetaan dysfunktionaalisia skeemoja, jotka generoivat epätoivottavia käytäntöjä. Liikkeet myös rakentavat tilalle uusia, funktionaalisia tulkinta- ja tunnekehyksiä. Esimerkiksi homo- ja lesboliike on tunnettu tiettyjen negatiivisten tunnetilojen korvaamisesta positiivisiksi. Stigmaksi koettu ominaisuus, kuten seksuaalisuus ja siitä tunnettu häpeä, on pyritty korvaamaan gay pride -ajattelulla. Identiteetti- ja liikkeitä tuottamat uudet diskurssit ja symbolit voivat

muuttaa kognitiivisia ja emotionaalisia rakenteita ja ne mahdollistavat uudet näkemisen, hahmottamisen ja ymmärtämisen tavat.

Toisin sanoen identiteetti- ja liikkeet tarjoavat tilan habituksen muuttamiselle osana poliittista ja yhteiskunnallista protestia. Habitus on avointen dispositioiden joukko. Liikkeet luovat uusia representaatioita sosiaalisen todellisuuden luonteesta ja samalla pyrkivät luomaan käytäntöjä, jotka vastaavat näitä representaatioita. Uusia symboleja, koodeja ja diskursseja luomalla liikkeet voivat altistaa yksilöitä ja ryhmiä uusille kokemuksille, joilla on kyky muokata habitusta, luoda uusia dispositioita tai heikentää joidenkin dispositioiden haitallista vaikutusta.

Kolmanneksi Bourdieun yleisen sosiologian teorian merkitys on myös tavassa, jolla se pystyy tuomaan liiketutkimukseen sellaisia elementtejä jotka ovat tärkeitä kollektiivisen toiminnan ymmärtämisessä, mutta joita liiketutkimuksen suuntaukset eivät lähtökohtaisesti tällä hetkellä huomioi. Bourdieu esimerkiksi mahdollistaa yhteiskunnallisen luokan merkityksen tuomisen yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden analyysiin. Uusien yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden myötä noin 1960-luvulta lähtien marxilaisen tutkimustradition merkitys väheni kollektiivisen toiminnan selittämisessä. Tämä liittyy yleisemmin yhteiskuntatieteissä tapahtuneeseen kulttuurilliseen käänteeseen. Samalla yhteiskunnallinen luokka ja luokka-analyysi katosivat liikkeiden tutkimuksessa. Uudet yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet eivät ajaneet luokkaan liittyviä intressejä, vaan keskittyivät sellaiseen sosiaalisen protestin muotoon, joka politisoi jokapäiväisen elämän ja elämäntyyliin. Näiden liikkeiden synty merkitsi, että protestoijat eivät nähneet luokkaan liittyvää sortoa pääasiallisena yhteiskunnallisen epätasa-arvon lähteenä länsimaissa. Vaikka luokka-aspekti katosi yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden analyysistä, uudet yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet koostuivat pääosin keskiluokkaisista, korkeasti koulutetuista toimijoista. Nämä toimijat jakoivat tiettyjä yhteisiä luokkapositioon liittyviä tekijöitä. Luokka ei siis kadonnut empiirisenä, positioihin ja pääomiin liittyvänä lähtökohtana, vaan ainoastaan luokan merkitys poliittisessa protestissa väheni tai luokan merkityksen poliittinen tiedostaminen katosi.

Yleisesti sosiologiassa luokkaa voidaan ajatella kolmen tekijän kautta. Ensiksi luokka on yhteydessä taloudellisiin ja sosiaalisiin rakenteisiin, mikä synnyttää eriarvoisuutta eri positioissa olevien yksilöiden/ryhmien välillä. Toiseksi luokka voidaan liittää myös kulttuurillisiin lähtökohtiin kuten elämäntyyliin, makuun, arvovaltaan tai statukseen. Kolmanneksi luokka liittyy potentiaalsiin tai aktuaalsiin poliittisiin toimijoihin eli luokka ymmärrettynä mobilisoituneina poliittisina toimijoina. Väitöskirjassa kaikki nämä kolme lähtökohtaa osoittautuvat keskeisiksi bourdieulaisesta analyysistä käsin. Luokka ymmärrettynä pääsyyntä taloudellisiin, sosiaalisiin ja kulttuurillisiin resursseihin on tärkeä yhteiskunnallisten liikkeiden kannalta, koska resurssit/pääomat ovat olennaisia tekijöitä liikkeiden toiminnassa. Mitä enemmän liikkeillä on resursseja, sitä paremmat edellytykset niillä on ajaa tärkeiksi katsomiaan asioita ja tulla nähdyksi legitimeinä toimijoina. Tämä on eduksi keskiluokkaisille poliittisille toimijoille. Ajatus luokasta kulttuuriin, elämäntyyliin ja makuun liittyvänä tekijänä taas

kiinnittää huomiota liikkeiden tyyliin ja toimintatapoihin. Kulttuurillinen kompetenssi ja tekninen hallinta ovat tyypillisiä keskiluokkaisille liikkeille. Nämä mahdollistavat sulavan poliittisten ongelmien hahmottamisen ja artikuloimisen, bourdieulaisittain ajatellen poliittisten/sosiaalisten ongelmien symbolisen masteroinnin. Luokka poliittisena toimijana ilmenee siten, että vaikka liikkeet eivät muodostuisikaan luokkaintressien ympärille samalla tavoin kuten esimerkiksi työväenliikkeessä, pääomien kokonaisuus ja niiden keskinäinen suhde sekä luokkahabitus määrittävät liikkeen muodostumista. Toisin sanoen samankaltainen yhteiskunnallinen asema, pääomat sekä habitus mahdollistavat samankaltaisen yhteiskunnallisten ongelmien hahmottamisen, mikä on edellytys liikkeen syntymiselle. Yksinkertaisesti bourdieulainen lähestymistapa luokkaan ja liikkeisiin ehdottaa, että luokka vaikuttaa siihen, miten poliittinen tai sosiaalinen protesti hahmotetaan ja toteutetaan eli kuinka luokka manifestoituu liikkeiden toiminnassa ja miten luokkaa voidaan käyttää aseena omien eiluokkasidonnaisten intressien ajamiseen usein toimijoiden itse sitä tiedostamatta.

Esitän väitöskirjassa, miten bourdieulainen lähestymistapa on hyödyllinen identiteetti-liikkeiden tutkimukselle. Sukupuolentutkimuksessa on viime vuosina yleistynyt käsitys intersektionaalisuudesta eli siitä, miten tietynlaiset erot, kuten sukupuoli, etnisuus, seksuaalisuus ja luokka kietoutuvat yhteen. Tällainen erojen joukko tuottaa ryhmille erilaisia käytäntöjä ja mahdollisuuksia muodostaen edellytykset tasa- tai epätasa-arvolle. Bourdieun pääoman käsite on yhdenmukainen intersektionaalisuuden idean kanssa. Taloudellinen, kulttuurillinen, sosiaalinen ja symbolinen pääoma jakaantuu erilaisiin pääomien kokonaisvolyyymeihin ja keskinäisiin suhteisiin, jotka määrittävät käytäntöä. Taloudellinen tilanne, raha ja omaisuus; kulttuurilliset resurssit, kuten koulutus tai elämäntyyli sekä sosiaaliset verkostot luovat erilaisia käytäntöjä yksilöiden välille. Vaikka pääomien volyyymi ja kompositio synnyttävät erilaisia käytäntöjä esimerkiksi sukupuolen, ”rodun”, etnisyyden ja seksuaalisuuden sisällä, Bourdieun mukaan sukupuoli, etnisuus ja niin edelleen voivat toimia negatiivisena symbolisena pääomana eli arvostuksen, uskottavuuden ja kulttuurillisen tunnustamisen puutteena. Identiteetti-liikkeiden toiminta pyrkii lisäämään toimijoiden symbolista pääomaa, mutta millaisia mahdollisuuksia tälle muodostuu, on riippuvainen muista pääomista.

Bourdieu näkee sosiaalisen todellisuuden kamppailuna symbolisista merkityksistä, joita käydään eri kentillä (esimerkiksi talouden, politiikan, median ja kulttuurin kentät), jotka ovat omalakisista sosiaalisista tiloista. Kentät rakentuvat toimijoiden pääomien volyymin ja kompositioiden mukaan jakaen eri toimijat eri positiioihin. Jos kentällä haluaa vaikuttaa ja pelata eli saada sosiaalinen todellisuus vastaamaan omia intressejä, toimijoiden on omattava pääomia. Mitä enemmän toimijalla on pääomia, sitä suurempaa valtaa kentällä on mahdollista käyttää. Myös valtasuhteet ovat kenttiä ja relaatioita, jotka virittävät dominoivien ja dominoitujen väliset käytännöt ja dispositiot tietyllä tavalla. Eri toimijoiden keskinäisten suhteiden muuttaminen on liikkeiden keskeinen tavoite. Ne voivat luoda toiminnallaan efektejä näihin suhteisiin, mikä mahdollisesti virit-

tää (mutta ei välttämättä täysin kumoa) kentän positiot uudella tavalla. Onnistuakseen liikkeiden toimijoilla täytyy olla resursseja, joilla näitä valtasuhteita on mahdollista horjuttaa.

Ehdotan väitöskirjassa, että luokka tai pikemminkin keskiluokkaisuus on identiteettiliikkeille resurssi, joka vaikuttaa liikkeiden käytäntöihin, toimintaan, ongelmien jäsentämisen tapaan, mahdollisiin intresseihin ja strategioihin. Se vaikuttaa olennaisesti siihen, millaisia vaikutuksia protestilla on mahdollista saada aikaan yhteiskunnassa ja eri kentillä. Bourdieun kautta voidaan ajatella, että liikkeiden toimijat koostuvat yksilöistä ja ryhmistä, joilla on oma historiansa ja yhteiskunnallinen asemansa liikkeiden ulkopuolella, minkä he tuovat mukanaan liikkeen käytäntöihin. Yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet ja identiteettiliikkeet eroavat toisistaan suhteessa toimijoiden sosiaaliseen asemaan ja resursseihin, mikä heijastuu liikkeiden toiminnan edellytyksiin ja mahdollisuuksiin. Esimerkiksi feministinen liike ja homo- ja lesboliike voivat koostua jäsenistä, jotka ovat suhteellisen korkeasti koulutettuja ja yhteiskunnallisesti hyvässä asemassa, kun taas etniset identiteettiliikkeet voivat omata vähemmän resursseja, mikä määrittää liikkeiden toimintaa ja edellytyksiä. Myös nationalistisissa tai äärioikeistolaisissa liikkeissä on olennaisesti kyse identiteetistä. Näitä liikkeitä ei lueta uusiin yhteiskunnallisiin liikkeisiin eikä identiteettipolitiikan käsitteen alle, koska liikkeet ovat reaktiivisia ja populistisia. Nationalistiset ja äärioikeistolaiset liikkeet eivät myöskään hae legitimiyyttä johonkin heille tyypilliseen yhteiskunnallisesti tai kulttuurillisesti marginalisoituun ominaisuuteen, kuten ihonväriin tai seksuaalisuuteen, vaan osallistuvat yleisempään kamppailuun identiteettiin liittyvistä merkityksistä toimien identiteettiliikkeiden yhteiskunnallisena ja kulttuurillisena vastavoimana. Bourdieulaisittain ajatellen myös nämä kamppailut voivat reflektoida yhteiskunnallisia luokkajakoja, vaikka kamppailut käydään näennäisesti ei-luokkaan sidotuista identiteettiin liittyvistä merkityksistä.

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III

THE NATION OF ISLAM'S EFFORTS TO RAISE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE LATE 1950S TO THE EARLY 1960S: AN APPLICATION OF BOURDIEU'S DOXA AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

by

H.-M Husu 2013

International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 47(2): 325–347

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**THE NATION OF ISLAM'S EFFORTS TO RAISE
BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN 1950S AND 1960S
USA: AN APPLICATION OF BOURDIEU'S
SYMBOLIC DOMINATION AND DOXA**

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ABSTRACT

Pierre Bourdieu's work on symbolic domination lacks examinations of the capacity of the oppressed to recognize and resist symbolic domination. His approach implies a deterministic vision in which individuals accept and take for granted the existing social order. I suggest that Bourdieu can provide tools for analyzing active struggle and resistance. In order to do this, I focus on the rhetoric of the radical African American group the Nation of Islam, the biggest and most influential of the radical organizations of African Americans from the late 1950s to early 1960s, and examine whether symbolic domination was recognized. The analyzed rhetoric illustrates the recognition of symbolic domination concerning i) religion, ii) the educational system, and iii) the dominant cultural values. The article suggests that those who lack economic, cultural and social resources are capable of recognizing symbolic domination and forming strategies (both symbolic and practical) to reject and replace symbolic and material power relations.

INTRODUCTION

Pierre Bourdieu's work on symbolic domination lacks studies on recognition and resistance of symbolic domination from the perspective of oppressed groups. Critics (Alexander 1995; Jenkins 2002; Myles 2004; Sayer 2005; Archer 2007) often state that Bourdieu denies the consciousness of individuals. His theory seems to imply a deterministic vision in which individuals accept and take for granted the existing social order with its inequalities and arbitrary relations of power. An empirical investigation of this perspective is therefore needed. This article aims at integrating the phenomenon of recognition of symbolic power relations by an oppressed group with Pierre

Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic domination, doxa and symbolic struggle. I suggest that Bourdieu can provide tools for analyzing active struggle and resistance.

I focus on the rhetoric of the radical African American group the Nation of Islam in late 1950s and early 1960s USA (Lincoln 1994; Ogbar 2004; Curtis IV 2002; Lee 1988). I analyze how symbolic domination practiced by middle-class whites was recognized in the rhetoric of the Nation of Islam. Application of Bourdieu's concepts can provide new insights into the Nation of Islam to which little attention has been drawn, as the vast majority of interest from sociologists has been focused on the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982; Morris 1986; Blumberg 1991).¹ It is important to take into account how those who are economically, socially and culturally excluded and whose legitimacy of existence is denied by the dominants can be conscious and resist symbolic oppression and subordination.

I use the writings of Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the organization (Evanzz 1999; Glegg 1998), and the autobiography (co-written with Axel Haley) and an interview of Malcolm X, the most well-known member (Dyson 1996; Perry 1991; DeCaro 1996; Wolfenstein 1983; Goldman 1973). Rather than viewing Malcolm X as an independent thinker, he is positioned here within the framework of the Nation of Islam.

The quotations used in this article are characteristic of Nation of Islam rhetoric. However, as a criterion for quotation selection, it was preferred that the passages chosen illustrate the rhetoric representing the organization's ideas of white society, the role of institutions, and white people and whiteness. The selected quotations contain consistencies with Bourdieusian concepts. I analyze the rhetoric with respect to its illustration of recognition of symbolic domination concerning i) religion, ii) the educational system and iii) dominant cultural values. It should be noted that the ways in which symbolic domination is recognized and rejected in the rhetoric of the Nation of Islam should be understood in reference to a specific social reality.

From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the Nation of Islam (originally established by Wallace D. Fard in 1930 in Detroit) was the biggest and most influential of the radical organizations of African Americans. It was, essentially, a phenomenon of the big city. Harlem in New York, South Side in Chicago and Roxbury in Boston were especially favorable to its rhetoric. The radical message of the Nation of Islam was most readily adopted by young males often with criminal backgrounds living in ghetto environments. Instead of pursuing

conventional politics, the Nation of Islam aimed, without a cohesive political plan, to create its own separate independent space in which it could lift blacks out of their dire social and economic straits.

PIERRE BOURDIEU ON SYMBOLIC DOMINATION AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

Pierre Bourdieu's sociology is known for its significant contribution to the theory of power and for its emphasis of the symbolic aspect of power relations. In his work, symbolic power and domination are essential features of taken-for-granted, everyday-life. However, his theory implies a material basis for such domination. For Bourdieu, social spaces are hierarchical and stratified. The structure and positions of social spaces are constructed through the possession of certain resources (capital) such as economic, cultural and social. Social spaces are a configuration of objective relations between positions, and these positions tend to determine their occupants, agents or institutions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 97).

Symbolic domination is, thus, possible when there is control over economic, cultural and social capital, and when the existing inequalities (arbitrary division of power and wealth), established order, and justification of exercise of power are legitimated and naturalized. This takes place through symbolic capital, which is "nothing other than economic or cultural capital when it is known and recognized, when it is known through the categories of perception that it imposes" (Bourdieu 1989, p. 21). The arbitrariness of the possession and accumulation of symbolic capital is misrecognized because mental structures are objectively adjusted to social structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119; Bourdieu 1992, p. 168).

Bourdieu emphasizes the role of interconnected institutions such as the church, the state and the educational system in producing and establishing the division of domination and social order (Bourdieu 2001, p. viii). These types of institutions naturalize the conducts, values and attributes of the dominant group by means of a long-standing historical process. The dominant group has the power to impose the arbitrary instruments of knowledge and expression of social reality (Bourdieu 1992, p. 168). In this case, this led, for instance, to the "construction of norms that privileged traits associated with 'whiteness'" (cf. Fraser 1995). In addition, whites were able to impose and inculcate prevalent negative cultural connotations concerning blacks.

According to Bourdieu, the role of church and religion is one of the mechanisms that legitimates and asserts the established order

and thus helps to provide the dominants with privilege (see, Bourdieu 1977, p. 188). He refers to Weber's idea of the systems of religious interest. The privileged and 'negatively privileged' classes explain their respective positions within the social structure to themselves in different ways (Bourdieu 1987, p. 125). The dignity of the privileged is rooted in a conviction of their own excellence, whereas the underprivileged tend to give meaning to their present state by reference to what they are to become. Disadvantaged groups are often drawn to salvation religions. The self-same religions can also be used to legitimate existing inequalities. As an institution which has a monopoly on the administration of the rewards of salvation, the church has been implicated in this respect (Bourdieu 1987 pp. 125, 132).

Bourdieu also draws attention to the educational system within which the hierarchical mechanisms of social order are regulated and shaped (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Harker 1984; Swartz 1997 pp. 189–217; Dillabough 2004; Moore 2004; Naidoo 2004). The educational system reproduces inequality by reproducing and legitimating the cultural arbitrary of the dominants and, furthermore, contributes to the reproduction of the social structure itself.

The imposition of social order taking place in the objective world affects the cognitive structures (mental schemes) of agents. Conditions and arbitrary divisions of power are considered legitimate (Bourdieu 2001, p. 9) because there is:

"the set of fundamental, prereflexive, assumptions that social agents engage by the mere fact of taking the world for granted, of accepting the world as it is, and of finding it natural because *their mind is constructed according to cognitive structures that are issued out of the very structures of the world*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 p. 168).

This means that there is a correspondence between the mental or cognitive structures of the agent and the "objective world." Thus, symbolic violence is imperceptible and invisible even to its victims. When victims are socialized into the existing social order, "the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural" (Bourdieu 2001, p. 1).² Symbolic violence is "*the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 167).

Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) notes that even though the dominated contribute always to their own domination, it should be considered that "*the dispositions which incline them to this complicity are also the effect, embodied, of domination*" (p. 24). The

categories of perception are a product of actual domination. The thoughts and perceptions of the oppressed group "are structured in accordance with the very structures of the relation of domination that is imposed on them" (Bourdieu 2001, p. 13).

The correspondence between objective structures and mental structures explains why the social world is accepted and how those who are living within it take it for granted. The doxic experience is the experience of the social world as being self-evident (Bourdieu 1992, pp. 276–277). Thus, individuals might not question the social world as they are "unaware of the very question of legitimacy" (Bourdieu 1977, p. 168). The question is, then, how can this doxic experience, in which the world seems natural and self-evident because it is "the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness" (Bourdieu 1977, p. 168), be perceived and rejected by agents?

PRECONDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION, REJECTION AND REPLACEMENT OF IMPOSITION

Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence and doxa seem to imply a deterministic vision in which individuals accept and take for granted the existing social order with its inequalities and arbitrary relations of power without acknowledging it (see, Bourdieu 2001, p. 1). Thus, the ultimate criticism (Alexander 1995; Archer 2007; Jenkins 2002; McNay 2004; Myles 2004; Sayer 2005) towards Bourdieu has focused on his limited understanding of reflexivity and social change, leading to a determinist position whereby agents' minds reflect upon outside social structures without the possibility of awareness, thus resulting in reproduction of the power structure.

The idea that individuals and groups are never capable of recognizing unequal symbolic power relations is, clearly, too rigid. Possibilities for reflexivity do exist. Reflexivity can be understood as "the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) context and vice versa" (Archer 2007, p. 4). In other words, the power of reflexivity is the ability "to think about themselves in relation to society and come to different conclusions that lead to variable action outcomes" (Archer 2007, p. 13).

For Bourdieu, reflexivity is understood solely within the context of the sociologist's reflection upon their own activity, not as a general capacity of social actors (McNay 2004, p. 183; see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 36; Bourdieu 2004). Bourdieu does, however, refer to an "awakening of awareness of arbitrariness" of agents,

“which deprives the dominant of part of their symbolic strength by sweeping away misrecognition” (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 303). Bourdieu (2000, p. 181) links this to crisis in objective structures (economic, political, social and so on). When the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures is disrupted, individuals may become conscious (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1989, p. 45).

Bourdieu also refers to symbolic or classification struggle. He claims that through symbolic struggle (or cognitive struggle) categories of perception and appreciation of the social world can be transformed. This entails the use of new classifications, definitions and names to construct a new social reality and to negotiate a new identity (Bourdieu 1989, pp. 20–21). Bourdieu (1990b, p. 134) also suggests that symbolic struggle can take the form of acts of representation that are meant to ‘show up’ and ‘show off’ certain realities. It might be possible that “symbolic systems are social products that contribute to making the world, that they do not simply mirror social relations, but help *constitute* them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by transforming its representations” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 p. 14). However, this perspective entails at least two problematic aspects. Firstly, Bourdieu notes that symbolic domination can only be resisted when the social conditions of production of dispositions are transformed (Bourdieu 2001, p. 42). In other words, the social structure and mechanisms which generate symbolic violence must transform. He suggests that the dominated must have the material and symbolic means to reject the definition of reality that is imposed on them (Bourdieu 1977, p. 169). For instance, it should be taken into account what are the material and symbolic circumstances in which “groups with unequal discursive (and nondiscursive) resources compete to establish as hegemonic their respective interpretations of legitimate social needs” (Fraser 1989, p. 166). This refers, for instance, to those who have access to a representational system in order to diffuse and legitimate their perspective of the world.

In addition, it can be asserted that it takes more to escape the negative influence of symbolic violence than simply unveiling the dominance and proclaiming aloud a new identity (see, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 23). Bourdieu claims that it is, in fact, naïve to suggest that the deconstruction of gender or race in a purely performative celebration of resistance could lead to their elimination (Bourdieu 2000, p. 108). When it comes to identity construction, it must be noted that this is not only a matter of symbolic construction, but the internalization of this newly constructed identity into the mental schemes of agents. This internalization can be difficult if the structures reproducing social conditions and social practices are not

transformed. One could say that that the means of symbolic struggle should be distinguished from the actual results of the struggle. The understanding of the logic of symbolic violence by the victims does not automatically lead to the abolition of its effects.

Secondly, the oppressed, who are economically and socially vulnerable, may lack the cognitive resources needed to gain sufficient (intellectual) understanding of the oppression that they are subjected to. “Subjects do not and cannot know everything that is going on” (Archer 2007, p. 17). They do not necessarily have access to the core principles of their discontent and their malaise (Bourdieu et al. 1999, p. 620). Yet, it could be argued that they do have experience of their social conditions of existence.

Experiences of injustice, grievances and emotions are important mobilizing factors (Jasper 1997; Goodwin & Jasper and Polletta 2001). In some cases, the success of a movement to recruit members is dependent on “enemy creation” and “moral shock”. The leaders of organizations can intentionally encourage an emotive “attack mode” in their attempts to transform inchoate anxieties into moral outrage and anger (Jasper 1997, p. 107).

This can often be the case in populist movements such as the Nation of Islam. Emotional reactions, together with lack of economic, social and cultural resources (capital), are not understood as an indicator of social competence from the perspective of the wider (elite and middle-class) public. Individuals or groups that are prone to emotionally laden claims are not necessarily understood as legitimated speakers, as social competence is exercised through technical competence (Bourdieu 1992, p. 41). In other words, they are not those who are “authorized to speak” and able “to speak with authority”.

Crossley (2002, p. 36) reminds us that different groups have different resources for struggle, and not every struggle is possible for every group. Moreover, he continues “it is equally a matter of recognizing that they may be differentially disposed towards specific types of protest and movement on account of their cultural backgrounds and different historical and biographical trajectories”. This is especially evident in the case of the Nation of Islam.

THE NATION OF ISLAM IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

The 1960s are known as a period of intense social mobilization. After the Second World War, the United States entered an era of vigorous economic growth which benefited and expanded its white middle-class. While middle-class whites saw significant advances in standard of living and prosperity, the situation for the

African American remained bleak. Racial discrimination and segregation were still practiced through laws and customs in the South. In the black ghettos of the North, poverty, unemployment and other social defects were rife and social problems were escalating.

During this period, certain key transformative tendencies occurred in the objective structures which, by disrupting the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures, invoked reflexivity among African Americans. For instance, mass migration from the rural South to cities of the North during the first half of the twentieth century, together with industrialization and economic growth produced a black middle class and facilitated development of community institutions and organizations (see, Klarman 2004, p. 291; Blumberg 2002, p. 15). Despite new possibilities for blacks and some legal victories, expectations and demands were not fulfilled.³

As Flacks (1988, p. 62) notes, many Americans felt a deepening sense of exclusion, constraint, and disillusionment, which "set the stage for new forms of upheaval, protest, and conflict" in the sixties. New types of political participation were aroused during this period, such as boycotts, sits-ins and rallies arranged, for instance, by civil rights movement organizations (see, Tilly and Tarrow 2007, pp. 18–21).⁴

The Nation of Islam can also be understood in the context of the wider movement of identity-motivated collective action in 1950s and 1960s America. It was one of the organizations of African Americans of the time that aimed at changing the social conditions of existence of the black people. The underclass blacks in the ghettos of the Northern cities, which the organization appealed to were typically skeptical towards the ruling white elite and moderate black leaders, and had little to lose in terms of economic and social position (Lincoln 1994, p. 46).⁵ They were outside conventional political channels.

The Nation of Islam never participated in rallies or sit-ins. Its activities were based, instead, on religious practices, the instigation of social unrest, and the use of inflammatory rhetoric and accusation. This was not untypical. The organization drew on the traditions of earlier black nationalist organizations such as the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) of the 1920s led by Marcus Garvey, and the nationalist Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA), which practiced its version of Islam among African Americans and believed in the superiority of blacks (see, Evanzz 1999, pp. 57–60; Curtis IV 2002). The Nation of Islam was a religious sect with an authoritarian and hierarchical organizational structure (see, Robbins 1988, pp. 150–155).

It was also a separatist organization. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 218) suggest that the self-imposed isolation of a movement is often linked to the need for ideological substitutes for missing material incentives. Unlike the civil rights movement (which often co-operated with white politics), it had no powerful allies. Interestingly, when the Nation of Islam gained in popularity among blacks, the white press adopted a more positive approach to the civil rights movement (Ogbar 2004, p. 56).

The Nation of Islam focused its recruitment on low-income groups living in the ghettos. Members were typically young males. Criminal backgrounds were common, although members were not usually unemployed (Lincoln 1994, p. 23). Estimations of the actual total number of members remain vague. Jeffrey G. Ogbar (2004 p. 212) proposes 100,000–150,000 members in 1965. The Nation of Islam itself never announced its official membership and tended to exaggerate its figures.

The success of the movement from the mid 1950s to 1964 was largely dependent on the popularity of Malcolm X. It had enormous influence on the later radicalization of black power. Despite the achievements of the civil rights movement (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964), the radical message that promoted black self-esteem and pride gained increasing popularity among blacks. In 1966, the new, wide-scale Black Power protest was an offshoot of the tradition of the Nation of Islam and Malcolm X.

THE NATION OF ISLAM AND THE RECOGNITION OF SYMBOLIC DOMINATION

Elements of the rhetoric of the Nation of Islam in the late 1950s and early 1960s support the suggestion that the organization can be understood in terms of symbolic resistance and symbolic struggle in order to enhance self-determination and self-definition. Due to the empirical difficulties in linking mental states with action (Jasper 1997, p. 49), reflexivity can be observed in traces left by the acts of recognition, rejection and replacement, i.e. the empirical phenomena discernible in the rhetoric. The recognition of imposition in the rhetoric acts of the Nation of Islam here concerns i) religion, ii) the educational system, and iii) the dominant cultural values.

In the rhetoric of the Nation of Islam, i) Christianity was often understood in terms of "brainwashing" and therefore, it was the main instrument through which black subordination was created and maintained (Muhammad 2006, pp. 19–22). According to Malcolm X (1965/1999):

“And where the religion of every other people on earth taught its believers of a God with whom they could identify, a God who at least looked like one of their own kind, the slavemaster injected his Christian religion into this ‘Negro’. This ‘Negro’ was taught to worship an alien God having the same blond hair, pale skin, and blue eyes as the slavemaster. [...] It taught him to hate everything black, including himself. It taught him that everything white was good, to be admired, respected and loved. It brainwashed this ‘Negro’ to think he was superior if his complexion showed more of the white pollution of the slavemaster. This white man’s Christian religion further deceived and brainwashed this ‘Negro’ to always turn the other cheek, and grin, and scrape, and bow and be humble [...]” (p. 166).

First of all, this passage illustrates the perception of symbolic imposition. The Nation of Islam referred to a process in which whites “brainwashed” blacks into accepting white superiority and black subordination. This made blacks “love everything white” and “hate everything black” (Malcolm X 1965/1999, p. 166). The result: “a black body with a white brain” (Malcolm X 1963).⁶

Secondly, the passage refers to a church that taught not only of a blue-eyed Jesus, who was essentially different from blacks, but moreover, taught blacks to “turn the other cheek”. Christianity was thus not seen as a religion of the oppressed, but as denying blacks’ aspirations for justice and human rights. The Nation of Islam believed that blacks were “injected” with this type of religion in order to keep them oppressed and controlled. As Elijah Muhammad put it, “This religion of theirs gives you no desire or power to resist them” (Muhammad 2006, p. 56). Islam, or their interpretation of it, was not the reason for their angry rhetoric, but it offered something beyond “turn the other cheek” thinking.

Islam was also appealing because the Nation of Islam presented it as “the original religion of the black man”. Thus, Islam offered a way to reject white superiority in a symbolic struggle, particularly in the absence of a structured political program. Islam was the principle channel through which blacks could achieve self-empowerment, serving in many ways as a new type of “salvation religion”. The Nation of Islam replaced Christianity with a religion that would serve as an instrument of self-determination and self-definition.

The Nation of Islam targeted Christianity as the primary “deceiver” of black people, but other “systems” were also singled out, such as ii) the educational system, which was viewed as an instrument of white domination (see Muhammad 2006, p. 39). In the words of Malcolm X (1963), “the educational system perpetuates white supremacy”; or, as Bourdieu puts it, the education system reproduces the prevailing power structure. The educational system was one of the crucial mechanisms by which the historical structures of white order were reproduced “in the form of unconscious schemes of perception and appreciation” (Cf. Bourdieu 2001, p. 5).

The Nation of Islam emphasized that whatever black people were today, “whites made them that” (Muhammad 2006, p. 21). “The so-called Negroes are, as far as their education and training is concerned, the product of the white people” (2006, pp. 46–47). One failing of the education system was that it did not provide true self-knowledge, since schools, colleges and universities were the inheritance of the slavemasters (2006, p. 39). This, coupled with aspiration for a separate educational system, underpinned the desire among blacks for Afrocentric education “that involves locating students within the context of their own cultural reference” (Asente 1991).

Moreover, the Nation of Islam expressed an idea that ignorance concerning blacks themselves blocks capacity-building. As Muhammad said: “Because my people, the so-called Negroes, know so little about themselves [...], we suffer untold human indignities in order to obtain so-called ‘equality’ of opportunity in public accommodations, schools, churches, sports, etc.” (Muhammad 2006, p. 46). The organization believed such “human indignities” to be a key cause of suffering of the black people.

Thirdly, the passage indicates the perception of symbolic imposition with respect to dominant cultural values. It can be suggested that the Nation of Islam perceived the “internalization” of the idea of whiteness. This is noticeably reflected in conceptions of physical attractiveness, whereby the culturally oppressed adopt and internalize the standards of the dominant group, imitating the dominants and developing the qualities that dominants value (see, Miller 1983, p. 12). Many African Americans bleached their skin and straightened their hair in order to appear ‘whiter’. In other words, cultural ideas and values (such as that of “normal” appearance equating with Eurocentric appearance) are transmitted via the body (Banks 2000, p. 4).

In the Nation of Islam, Muhammad (2006) admitted that “the so-called Negroes are guilty of loving the white race and all that that race goes for” (p. 17, see also p. 57). Malcolm X (1965/1999, p. 2)

interestingly describes in his autobiography how he had benefited from his relatively light skin color, and had once viewed it as a status symbol. As many others, Malcolm X, too, wanted to look white. He remembers (1965/1999) the painful experience of trying to straighten his own hair, and also his later relationship with this issue of self-image.

“This was my first really big step toward self-degradation: when I endured all of that pain, literally burning my flesh to have it look like a white man’s hair. I had joined the multitude of Negro men and women in America who are brainwashed into believing that the black people are “inferior” — and white people “superior” — that they will even violate and mutilate their God-created bodies to try to look “pretty” by white standards” (p. 56–57).

Malcolm X seemed to be aware that through “brainwashing” certain prevailing ideas are internalized. He understood that beauty was defined by white standards. Malcolm X’s outlook was revolutionized while in prison, where he first heard about the Nation of Islam in 1948. He was later to argue that a black man wearing a conk (a Eurocentric hairstyle) is an emblem of his shame that he is black (Malcolm X 1965/1999).

The internalization of the dominant ideology (for instance by means of the church and the education system) was recognized, rejected and replaced in the Nation of Islam, at least at the rhetorical level. This implies that the internalization of the power structures and imposition of cultural arbitrariness were recognized and made visible.

FROM RECOGNITION TO ACTION

The unveiling of the symbolic domination by the Nation of Islam led to a “classification struggle”, a form of resistance that can occur once “inherited and pre-existing sets of sociocultural relations and conditions that are hierarchically framed” are questioned (Dillabough 2004, p. 493), and resistance of symbolic imposition of cultural arbitrariness becomes possible (even though it may not be successful). There can be “strategies aimed at transforming the present state of the material and symbolic power relations” between whites and blacks (cf. Bourdieu 2001, p. 4). This concerns both practices of everyday-life and symbolic strategies.

The Nation of Islam pursued efforts to create an independent religious, educational and economic system.⁷ Firstly, the Nation of Islam stressed Islam not only as a means of self-empowerment but also in relation to everyday social practices. For instance, it had 69 mosques and missions in 27 states in December 1960 (Lincoln 1994, p. 2), the largest mosque in New York had approximately 7,000 members in 1965 (Ogbar 2004, p. 212). Religious principles and doctrines played an extremely important role as a form of self-control and discipline in organizing the everyday environment (see, Curtis IV 2006).

The organization also aspired to an independent or alternative education system. Smallwood (2005, p. 249) states that African Americans were required “to go outside of the formal system of public education and seek nonformal educational opportunities provided by African American organizations”. The Nation of Islam ran its own schools, which it referred to as Universities (see, Lincoln 1994, pp. 120–123). This system strove to replace white-controlled schools with schools that would better meet the needs of the black underclass. In addition, the Nation of Islam published its own newspaper “Muhammad Speaks” aimed at promoting its ideas among the black community.

The Nation of Islam also tried to construct a black economy in which blacks had control over their own money and resources, with the ultimate aim of achieving complete withdrawal from the white economy. Muhammad strongly advised members to pool their resources and to establish their own schools, homes, factories and hospitals, which the Nation of Islam, in fact, did. It had farms, small businesses, other enterprises and housing projects (Lincoln 1994, pp. 85–90).

The real significance of the Nation of Islam does not, however, lie in tangible results; its transformative impact on the existing power structures was modest. Its success lay, rather, in its image.⁸ The identity-building process was of central importance to the Nation of Islam. The self-love and positive images of African Americans that were constructed through ideological-laden self-presentation can be interpreted as a means of changing the world by changing its representations.⁹

The blacks’ positive sense of self and refusal to adopt the dominant views were crucial aspects of the symbolic struggle. New, positive meanings such as “the original man” (Muhammad 2006, pp. 14–18) were now attached to definitions of the self in order to reconstruct the self-identity. This went hand-in-hand with negative representations of whites, for example through the use of demonizing rhetoric that presented whites as being inferior to blacks, and

metaphors representing whites as snakes or wolves (see, Muhammad 2006; Malcolm X 1963; 1965/1999, p. 245). This can be interpreted as a process by which the Nation of Islam strove to take possession of the self.

Yet, the constructed self was an idealized image, strong and omnipotent. An example of this type of self-presentation is provided in connection with the case of a police assault on one of the members of the Nation of Islam in 1957. Malcolm X described the event in his autobiography in the following way:

“The crowd was big, and angry, behind the Muslims in front of Harlem Hospital. Harlem’s black people were long since sick and tired of police brutality. And they never had seen any organization of black men take a firm stand as we were. A high police official came up to me, saying ‘Get those people out of there’. I told him that our brothers were standing peacefully, disciplined perfectly, and harming no one. He told me those others, behind them, weren’t disciplined. I politely told him those others were his problem” (1965/1999, p. 239).

In the passage, the ideas of physical power, discipline and control are emphasized. The members of the Nation of Islam in the crowd are held up as examples to other blacks. These factors can be interpreted as indicators of social competence.

As Bourdieu suggests, self-presentation strategies exist that are designed to manipulate the self-image and, especially, the image of one’s position in social space (Bourdieu 1990b, p. 134). Strategic self-presentation can provide emotional compensation for marginal social stranding (see, McNay 2004, p. 188). Beverley Skeggs (1997) shows how working class women invested in femininity because they lacked the opportunity to gain cultural or economic resources. She states that experiences of being positioned and classified produce different responses which have an effect on subjective constructions. Faced with limitations and constraints, these women are able to deploy numerous constructive and creative strategies to generate a sense of self-worth (1997, pp. 4, 102, 162).

This is central to the case of the Nation of Islam. The lack of economic resources (especially important in highly individualistic U.S. society) and cultural resources affect the ways in which the self is presented, together with experiences of being positioned, classified and devalued by the dominant white middle class. Thus, what is of particular interest here is not how the “self” is created through symbolic action, but rather how this symbolic action is linked to

symbolic domination and devaluation. It can be argued that the forms of self-presentation of the Nation of Islam indicate status-seeking.

CONCLUSION

Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic domination and his central concepts, such as symbolic violence and doxa, illustrate the ways in which power or oppression is inculcated into the embodied dispositions of agents. The result is a “paradox of doxa”; a situation in which the established order is taken for granted by those to whom it is perpetuated. However, Bourdieu’s work on symbolic domination lacks examination of recognition and resistance of domination.

The empirical focus on the rhetoric of the Nation of Islam offers insights into Bourdieu’s work from the point of view of the underprivileged and subordinated. The ideas expressed by the Nation of Islam correlate closely with Bourdieu’s theory. The great advantage of Bourdieu’s work is that it is often consistent with empirical reality, and thus it can be used (according to Bourdieu it always should be used) in relation to empirical investigation.

This article focuses on the Nation of Islam’s aspirations for recognition and resistance of symbolic domination of middle-class whites within a Bourdieusian framework. The article illustrates that even those who lack economic, cultural and social resources are capable of criticizing the social world and even form strategies (both symbolic and practical) with which they try to reject, resist and replace symbolic and material power relations. The organization questioned institutions such as religious organizations, the education system and dominant cultural values that it considered to be fostering white superiority and the oppression of the black minority. It also recognized and rejected the positive symbolic values that were attached to whites and whiteness and which blacks appeared to internalize.

At the same time, the Nation of Islam aimed at constructing a religious institution, education system and economy that are separate and independent of white society. It also strove to create and construct positive meanings of blackness. One reason for the success of the Nation of Islam was its ability to construct a new positive self-identity within the ghetto environment. It was also able to articulate the experiences of injustice and dissatisfaction felt by many underclass blacks. I argue that the Nation of Islam’s significance lay in its attempts to resist symbolic domination, and in its aspiration for symbolic struggle and, ultimately, a cognitive revolution.

Cognitive resistance is, nonetheless, no substitute for concrete results. The means by which oppressed groups can resist dominance

are limited. This is further compounded if the oppressed lack the necessary cognitive resources to engage credibly in the struggle, without which their argumentation can appear irrational or disproportionately forceful or emotional, causing their social competence to be brought into question by the dominant class. Thus, certain oppressed groups (typically the economically, culturally and socially most disadvantaged) may fall outside of the political system and the public debate.

In general, one can conclude that the awareness and recognition of symbolic domination and imposition of cultural arbitrariness played a key part in the mobilization of certain movements in the sixties. This has been the case not only for African Americans, but also for women and homosexuals. The second-wave feminism and gay and lesbian liberation movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s can be interpreted as rejections of the imposition of cultural arbitrariness. In this sense, Bourdieu is about more than mere structural determinism; his concepts also provide the tools for analyzing active struggle and resistance.

NOTES

1. Crossley (2002) argues that social movement theory needs to draw from general sociological theory and aims at overcoming dualism between structure and agency in social movement theory by using the concepts of habitus, capital and field.
2. Many scholars focusing on African American experience (Akbar 1996, Hall 1995, hooks 1992, Kardiner & Ovesey 1962, Rabinowitz 1978, Rooks 1996, Schiele 2005) have referred to an idea of "internalized oppression".
3. Karl-Werner Brand (1990, p. 21) suggests that phases of economic prosperity (such as the 1950s) often lead to a type of cultural criticism that spurs emancipatory, egalitarian and counter-cultural movements and idealistic reform enthusiasm. Flacks (1988, p. 78) points out that a cultural climate that fosters and promises equality of treatment and opportunity equated with a social structure that blocks certain groups from fulfilling these promises, might lead to the emergence of liberation movements.
4. Three important impetuses for a modern civil rights movement can be pointed out (Ogbar 2004, p. 38). *Brown vs. Board of Education* in 1954 ended legal segregation in public schools in the South, the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 (led by

Martin Luther King), and Emmett Till's murder in 1955 all fuelled the mobilization of African Americans. In August 1955, a fourteen-year-old boy, Emmett Till from Chicago, was kidnapped and brutally murdered in Mississippi on the grounds that he may have whistled at a white woman. His assaulters were arrested, but after a five-day trial (and despite a public outcry) they were acquitted of murder in front of an all-white Mississippi jury. The event instigated a mass protest and was regarded by many black freedom movement activists as a pivotal turning point for action (see, Ogbar 2004, pp. 38–39).

5. For more information, read C. Eric Lincoln's sociological research on The Nation of Islam originally published in 1961 *The Black Muslims in America*.
6. Bourdieu states that the "dominated are dominated in their brains too" (Bourdieu 1990b, p. 41).
7. Note that the focus here is not rhetorical or symbolic, but practical.
8. Note that the focus here is symbolic.
9. Here it should be noted that representations are linked to the oppressive social structures (for instance, degraded cultural meanings), but at the same time, the form of these representations cannot be fully deduced from these structures either, as they are discursive constructions. Thus, symbolic struggles entail illusion and arbitrariness.

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