

Can we organize courage?

Implications of Foucault's parrhesia

Wim Vandekerckhove
Suzan Langenberg

Abstract

Ethics in organizations, raising concerns, and whistleblowing have been previously theorized through Foucault's work on the power/knowledge bond. However, approaching these issues through the work from Foucault's third period on parrhesia, or fearless speech remains an underdeveloped route. This paper contributes to this emerging research stream. Based on Foucault's work on parrhesia, and the importance of courage for fearless speech to occur, we theorize the possibility of critique within organizations as a moment of disorganizing, which requires a chain of parrhesia where not only the speaker but also the hearer requires courage. The paper examines the possibility and risks of organizing courage through three illustrations of ethical guidelines, whistleblowing, and open dialogue.

Keywords

Parrhesia, whistleblowing, business ethics, courage

1. Introduction

As the financial crisis unfolded, it became clear that many people inside the financial sector were aware of the risks they were taking. We also heard of the rare individual who tried to raise his concerns with the SEC about Madoff. But it was amazing how many people wilfully played along, and how the few individuals who raised concerns were blocked or overlooked.

Obviously, this is not the only cause of the crisis. Moreover, it is not an exclusive characteristic of the latest crisis. But the organizational dynamic which appears to silence internal strategic dissent, despite internal policies encouraging critique, is quite worrisome in terms of redesigning internal risk management procedures.

Why does it seem like employees do not stand up even when they have the formal power to do so? Why is it that attempts to raise concern frequently remain unheard? Is it possible to design procedures that lift the empowerment to stand up and raise concern beyond formal power?

A vast stream of research has developed that approaches these questions from the perspective of the organization as a site where the foucauldian knowledge/power bind operates (Burrell et al 1995; Calas and Smircich 1999; Carter et al 2002; Clegg 1990, 1994; Knights 2002; McKinlay and Starkey 1997). Foucault's analysis of the concept of critique, first in a lecture in 1978, followed by two in-depth analyses in 1984, moves away from the concept of the power/knowledge bind. In his so-called third period, Foucault moves to his original philosophical area of attention, namely the critical relation of truth with the subject and speech. The power/knowledge bind did not leave any room for the judging and speaking subject. However, Foucault re-acknowledged the subject in his work on parrhesia. There, the subject is the active rather than the passive element in an event. A first indication of such re-acknowledgement can be noted in his concept of pastoral power (Foucault 1994: 134-161), where Foucault describes pastoral power as a power that can only work when the shepherd risks his own life in

order to manage the cattle. A shepherd without self-criticism is not able to take care of his cattle. The strength of the cattle depends on the shepherd's attention for the smallest detail.

In this paper we approach the issue of 'standing up' and raising concerns from Foucault's third period – his writings on parrhesia, a concept of critique from ancient Greece which denotes the courage of speaking frankly and where the truth lies not necessarily in what is being said, but rather in the fact that someone is taking the courage to speak and express critique.

Whilst some authors argue that there is a clear consistency throughout Foucault's three periods, during the years before his sudden death in 1984, Foucault refocused his research away from the analysis of power towards what he saw as the kingpin of western culture, namely the obligation towards truth (Foucault 1984). We seem to care more about truth than about the self, and we seem to care about the self only as a concern about truth. Foucault clarified his position towards modern, western analyses of truth through an elaboration of the concept of critique. In practicing resistance towards a dominating truth, a personal truth emerges. Any utterance of critique is speaking a personal truth (hence the acknowledgement of the subject) but this is done in an organizational context which is a relational and communicative reality. Thus critique in organizations appears as an interactive truth. It will be heard or overheard, accepted or retaliated against, taken seriously or used against the person who spoke critique. In foucauldian parlance, an interactive truth appears through the critical judgements which are part of a power game embedded in the organizational praxis.

In this paper, we analyse the topic of raising a concern within organizations. Our focus is on the relational quality of interactions, rather than mere actions. Moreover, the aim of our analysis in this paper is to gain insight into the organizational structuring of those interactions.

The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, previous research on 'raising concerns' has mainly focused on actions rather than interactions. Research on

whistleblowing has focused on the person blowing the whistle (who blows the whistle and about what), rather than interactions between those who raise a concern and those with whom a concern is raised (Vandekerckhove 2010; Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012).

Second, although ethics in organizations, raising concerns, and whistleblowing have been previously theorized through Foucault's work on the power/knowledge bond (Alford 2001, Perry 1998, Teo and Caspersz 2011, Vandekerckhove 2006), this paper aims at creating an understanding of these issues through Foucault's work on parrhesia, an as yet rarely taken route into this issue (Barratt 2004, French 2007, Mansbach 2011, Skinner 2011). As Foucault has left his work on parrhesia underdeveloped, the analysis offered in this paper through conceptual work and illustrated by document analysis and interview-based research, points at a route to further develop Foucault's concept of parrhesia as a framework for research in the field of organization studies.

The paper develops these contributions as follows. The next section sets out our reading of Foucault on parrhesia. Section three presents our conceptual expansion of parrhesia. We argue that parrhesia (frankly speaking truth) not only requires courage from the parrhesiastes, but also from the hearer, who in turn becomes parrhesiastes. Section four offers three illustrations of our expanded parrhesia framework. We use the framework to discuss a document analysis of guidelines for the implementation of whistle-blowing policies (example 1), how the organization of free speech went on at a steel company (example 2), and the analysis of a case of sexual harassment (example 3). Section five concludes by returning to our main question, is it possible to design procedures so that the empowerment to stand up and raise concern goes beyond formal power? Drawing from previous sections and our expanded parrhesia framework, we conclude that organizing courage involves the courage to disorganize.

2. Foucault's take on parrhesia

Foucault is known mostly for his work on the knowledge/power bind, tracing how the locus of power came to be the organized cognitive boundaries of what qualifies as knowledge. Following that analysis, many scholars have analysed the organization as a site where the knowledge/power bind operates to neglect personal criticism. Less known is the foucauldian analysis of the parrhesiastic act that breaks up the power/knowledge bind. The parrhesiastes generates a critical dynamic when she 'speaks truth', but only when there is a public receptive for it. Hence, the parrhesiastes is the instance that exposes the knowledge/power bind. Her 'frankly speaking truth' takes the form of 'not this, without principle, without alternative'.

Foucault's work on power has been widely used in the field of organization studies. However, during the years before his sudden death in 1984 he returned to his original research questions, the question of truth relating to speech-acts and the techniques of the self. This third period in the work of Foucault is perhaps the one where his philosophical views on ethics are most clear.

Foucault points out that the whole of western culture turns around an obligation towards truth, but this 'truth' takes many forms. Foucault clarified his position with the concept of critique. The personal truth emerging from the resistance towards a dominating truth, is always embedded in the play of the discourses (Foucault 1984: 723). Hence, in an organizational context, critique must be analyzed as an interactional truth, embedded in the power play of organizational praxis.

Practicing critique is transgressive. It questions the primacy of objective truth. Critique has an unbounding effect on existing limits to knowledge. Hence critique connects power and truth to the subject. To the extent that power-knowledge binds shape the subject, the truth of those power-knowledge binds (objective truth) are inaccessible to that subject. Where the subject distances itself (de-subjectification or *désassujettissement*) from proclaimed personal truths-as-shaped-by-power-knowledge, power and objective truth become accessible. These moments are moments of critique. They are moments in which the subject gives itself the right to question knowledge through its power effects, and to question power through its knowledge discourses. In this sense, Foucault inserts critique as a moral attitude to acknowledge the subtle and vulnerable practices of power between truth and the subject (Foucault 1978).

The etymology of critique leads us back to the Greek between 200 B.C. and 400 A.D. *Krinein* means to separate, to distinguish and to decide. From *krinein* the word *krisis* was derived, which means in ancient Greek: decision, judgment, research, outcome. In the history of philosophy the concept of critique evolved along two separate lines: (1) the power of judgment and discernment of the human mind has been used by the Stoa in text-research and the allegorical explanation of text, and (2) a dialectic (opposed to rhetoric) doctrine of judgment or truth. Foucault's work on parrhesia tries to dig up a radical conceptualization of critique, undoing the alterations of the meaning of critique throughout history (for a more thorough historical analysis see Langenberg 2008). One such derivation might be the appearance of contractual parrhesia. For example, under the Hellenic monarchs, the king's advisor was required to use parrhesia not only to help the king make decisions, but also as a means of tempering his power (Mansbach 2011). The examples we provide of our notion of the parrhesiastic chain in organizations, which we develop in this paper, illustrate the risk contractual parrhesia entails with regard to the meaning of critique.

After more than a thousand years the word 'parrhesia' as directly related to the concept of critique, had disappeared. In the late Middle Ages it appeared again as text critique with the rise of humanism and its critical position towards the domination of Christianity and the origination of reason, science, discovery of new land, etc. The humanists wrestled themselves from the grasp of scholasticism and aimed at liberating the human being from traditional boundaries.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was one of the first humanists who wrote about the dignity of the human being (*De hominis dignitate* in 1486). Critique against ecclesiastical dogmas was inspired by a rediscovery of Aristotle's work and led to a revaluation of individual experiences: the human being perceived as the center of the world took the place of the divine *logos*. However this critique expressed itself mainly in text-critique. In the 16th-17th century the humanists were especially known for their text-critique as well as critique of historical sources (the writings of Aristotle). Apart from text-critique we know Kant for his (re-)discovery of the place of reason in relation to critique. There is the Kantian doctrine of judgment and critique set out in his three critiques. But the contextual interpretation of the place of critique can be found in his later political statements. In Modernity, since the Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century, we see the concept of critique is used as a purifying dialectic through distinction of opposites, competing theories, controversy, and parliamentary debate. Furthermore we see a revival of critique as self-critique in a highly developed sense in the questioning of the reasonableness of reason. It is here that

the development of the human sciences takes off.

Hence in the evolution of the meaning of critique three directions can be distinguished: (1) a negative one aimed towards improvement (Kant / 18th – 19th century), (2) critique of ideology aimed towards the analysis of explanatory worldviews (Frankfurter Schule / 19th – 20th century), and (3) a positive one aimed at the experience of ‘not that way... without principle, without alternative’. This third direction of critique entails a rupture with the prevailing order and leads to practices of freedom – Foucault’s parrhesia.

Parrhesia means ‘frankly speaking the truth’, and stems from a moral motivation of the speaker. In this specific act, the meaning of ethics is reduced to critique as an attitude. In this sense parrhesia is the localized manifestation of critique as an attitude. We can summarize Foucault’s analysis of the political meaning of parrhesia developed in his lectures 1981-1984 as follows (Foucault 2001, 2009; van Raalte 2004):

- Parrhesia is a necessary condition for democracy: ‘Frankly speaking truth’ is a necessity and is elicited by the dynamic of the agora;

- Parrhesia is done by someone who is inferior to those for whom the critical and moral motivated truth is intended;

- Parrhesia is a democratic right: as a citizen of Athens, citizens had the right and some even had a moral obligation to use parrhesia;

- Parrhesia is a necessary condition for care because caring for the self as a matter of telling yourself the truth is presupposed in order to be able to take care of others, of the polis;

- Parrhesia implies both having and displaying courage, because speaking truth in public presupposes the courage to contradict the prevailing discourse, the public, the sovereign. This could mean that the parrhesiastes might risk his/her life;

- Parrhesia presupposes self-critique as a precondition for a moral attitude.

In ‘frankly speaking the truth’ the connection between issue and person is found in the act itself. This act is described by Foucault as a practice of freedom. It is free from analysis, free from proof. It does not need any of that because the issue is ‘me saying this’ rather than ‘me’ or ‘this’. And once I have said it, there is no way back. However, from the moment that this personal moral activity is explained by means of a greater narrative (political, ethical, Christian), the effect of the act is formalized and removed from its original moral intention. The issue then ceases to be ‘me saying this’ and becomes either ‘this’ (and proof can be brought against it) or ‘me’ (was I saying this in the right forum, using the right procedure, and who am I to say this anyway).

In his last lectures at the Collège de France (1982-1984) Foucault frequently refers to the Kantian interpretation of Enlightenment (*sapere aude*) and connects this to the original, ancient relationship between attitude (*ethos*), critique, truth and speech. Foucault calls the Enlightenment a self-perpetuating, ever-changing critical activity which generates and surpasses its own context dependent norms. The positive significance of critique leads to practices of freedom: ‘not that way, without principle, without alternative’. The dynamic of critique, an attitude of de-framing and re-framing, creates practices of freedom in its transgressive act.

Thus critique becomes the ground itself in the name of which it works. There is no agenda or justifying principle. Critique becomes sovereign and the final agency without foundation. Nevertheless, critique can only exist through local events, topics, subjects in actuality. It has no fixed content yet is specific in its presentation. Critique can turn up everywhere; every indi-

vidual or group can use it unannounced and unprepared. In this sense critique is incomplete, restless and endless (Sonderregger 2006). Another characteristic of the presentation of critique is its radicalism towards the subject that is criticized. Critique as such is inescapable and at the same time it disrupts existing limits, conventions, norms and has a transgressive effect: parrhesia unbounds the existing but at the same time it starts creating new boundaries.

This insight brought Foucault to enlarge upon the relationship between critique, courage and the question of governability. With regard to the agent of critique (parrhesiastes) and the moral attitude that is required for the dynamic of critique to be discerned, the question is what activates the decisive will and what is the underlying engagement?

In the next paragraph we have a closer look at the working element in parrhesia: courage. Without a certain amount of courage there will be no frankly spoken words, no critique, no personal judgment. How is courage related to obligation, to the subject, to the context?

3. Courageous parrhesia – for whom?

The relationship between (the display of) courage and the effect on the context has been the topic of highly diverse explanations throughout history. The fact that it is essential in order to bring about change, to prevent injustice, to be self-critical, to recognise conflict, etc is emphasised by the authors we will briefly discuss here. However, in the analysis of the role courage can and must play in organizations (Harris 2003) we generally miss a focus on the relational and communicative context in which the courageous act takes place and receives its meaning. Foucault points out that the use of parrhesia requires courage. Whereas for Foucault this means that it is the parrhesiastes who shows courage, we assert that from an interactional perspective parrhesia can only occur when all interacting parties show courage. It does not only require courage to speak frankly, it also requires courage from the hearer for speech to be frank.

‘Me saying this’ is not about me or about this; the act itself is an event. But it is only an event when it is also acknowledged as such by the other participants. ‘Me saying this’ is an event when there has been frankly spoken and people have been listening to it, when participants acknowledge the fact that (cf. Foucault *que*) there has been frankly spoken and that they have listened. In the acknowledging act participants take place in the act, in the event of frankly and courageously spoken words. The importance is not in the name, or the person that has spoken his or her truth but in the fact that there has been spoken and what (Foucault *quoi*) has been said.

Our closer look at the various roles the subject can play in courageous acts, leads us to submit here that courage, namely the determined will to say ‘not this, without principle, without alternative’ is associated with both the speaking and listening instance. This brings us to the event itself, which is characterised on the one hand by an obligation to submit oneself to the fact that (*que*) there is an event, that someone has the courage and feels the obligation to speak, and on the other hand by a de-subjectification (the distancing of the subject objectifying power-knowledge bond through the critical capacity for judgment), to have the courage to want to hear what (*quoi*) is spoken. The context is the finite framework in which the boundaries are dissolved and re-constituted.

The ancient Greeks made a distinction between three different interpretations of courage: (1) the expression of courage exclusively by males in a militaristic way, (2) courage as an ex-

ample of heroism in a political sense, (3) courage as an example of craftsmanship to control personal feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. Every single level on which courage can take place still exists today. However, the cultural and societal meaning of each has changed under the influence of the ideological spirit of the age.

In the militaristic and heroic meanings of courage, intention can be defined as sticking to our deepest selves until the end. In the context of French resistance fighters during WWII, Mayer (1992) notes that were we asked whether we would stick to the truth even when this would have grave consequences for ourselves, we might not be so sure if we would have enough courage. However, in concrete situations, it is only after we know what needs to be done and once we have abandoned our behaviour that would leave undone what needs to be done, that we realise we have been courageous. Mayer inquires on what 'being courageous' means in the context of politics. He does so by examining a number of situations set within the partial giving-in of France to Hitler in 1940, led by Petain. Even though we would want to hold on to our ideals and our deepest beliefs, we are not quite sure as to how well we would be able to do so under torture.

But, asks Mayer, is courage synonymous to 'going to the end'? What about the soldier who is fully armed and ready to attack, but just as he is about to lash out, starts having doubts? Is he lacking courage? Or has he just come to realise that his deepest self is not his country but rather his love for life? We can make abstraction of the war context in which Mayer interrogates the notion of courage, in the following way. If courage is remaining steadfast in the face of difficulties, the statement becomes problematic on two accounts. The first relates to the difficulties a manager faces when hearing a critique by an employee. Is the difficulty the employee who is uttering critique, or is it the fact that there is a critique which must be looked in to? The second regards the requirement to be steadfast. To what? To the career? To the ongoing project? To the sunken costs? To the plan? Or rather to the purpose of the organization? Or is the object of our steadfastness the limitedness of any human undertaking, always carrying within itself the possibility of being misconceived?

Mayer (1992: 117) notes that becoming complicit in a crime was often caused by little more than a mistake in reasoning or in courage, rather than a firm conviction. But whatever the nature of the causes of one's crimes, to say that one can be courageous in crime seems to suggest that one is relieved from ethical considerations. Mayer vehemently opposes disconnecting courage from ethics. In politics, Mayer (1992: 119) writes that the expression of sincerity is part of one's conception of ethics. To act upon that might have unintended effects. For instance, it might imply going against the majority and even against one's own friends and party members. So what with politicians who adapt their stances to whichever consensus is growing? They stick to the mandate, which is important because they have been elected to represent people. Is that what we mean with 'it takes courage'? The answer is yes, if we regard obtaining an elected mandate as the result or the crowning of a career. The answer is a firm 'no' if we take it that the mandate has to be carried out in the benefit of the general interest and within the framework of engagements made earlier, where the election amounts to a contract between voters and the elected.

We can draw a parallel between Mayer's analysis of political mandates and Weber's account of *Kontor* (or 'holding office'). For Weber, a kind of vocation or 'calling' (*Beruf*) underlies the idealtype of *Kontor* (Weber 1968: 958). Holding *Kontor* is not to be regarded as ownership of a source of income, to be ex-

ploited in return for delivering services. Rather, taking up *Kontor* implies accepting a specific duty of loyalty to the goal of the *Kontor* (*Amtstreue*). Weber's analysis of office was written at the level of the organization as an institution, and it is possible to make abstraction of whether the organization is a governmental or a business organization. The pivotal point implicated by Weber's as well as Mayer's writings is that the distinction between one's organizational mandate and one's personal benefits from that mandate is at the core of what showing courage in an organizational setting means. In other words, it takes courage to keep the two separated. Mayer (1992: 119) writes: 'C'est la rareté du geste, plus que sa nature ou sa qualité, qui fait apparaître "courageuse", en politique, la reconnaissance d'une erreur.' More than the nature or the quality, it is the rareness of the act of acknowledging a mistake, which makes it appear as courageous. In other words, if the goal of one's organizational mandate requires you to do something, then you must, even if that implies personal suffering like losing face, foregoing a bonus, or getting yourself into any kind of trouble with your superior. Precisely this is often the case when ethical issues pop up in organizational settings. In these instances, the act of courage is an unexpected act.

Our account of Foucault's analysis of the citizen's right to use *parrhesia* and its effect on the polis, the sovereign and the position of the *parrhesiastes* offered some insight into the possibilities and limits of such a political, non-institutionalised right. After Socrates' *parrhesiastic* performance the political meaning and aim of *parrhesia* disappears. The political engagement of *parrhesia* becomes uncontrollable as the result of abuses of the right to use *parrhesia*. Consequently, the use of *parrhesia* was restricted and submitted to a number of general conditions. This 'institutionalisation' of individual moral courage to speak the truth leads to its individualisation and disappearance from the public vocabulary. In its individual meaning, *parrhesia* appears as 'L'art de n'être pas tellement gouverné' (Foucault 1978: 38), the art of not being governed that way. Critique then is equivalent to the art of knowing the governing power-knowledge game and the ability to question its power implications, as well as to reflect upon one's own position (self critique). *Parrhesia* becomes craftsmanship, or the art of navigation in being your own moral lawmaker on the other.

During the emergence of Christianity, Augustine deepened the meaning of courage as craftsmanship. He described courage as fighting evil in two different practices. First, the passive practice of martyrdom, showing patience and courage to sacrifice according to the will of God and second, courage as an impulsive act without hesitation breaking through a momentary blindness, like closing the eyes in order to effectively cross the Rubicon of the act (Berns et al 2010: 119).

The Machiavellistic interpretation of courage is opposed to the Augustinian idea of prudence and martyrdom. Machiavelli (and also Cicero) is focused on the courage that is needed to recognise the (political) conflicts (in those days in the city Rome). Here courage means to face the tense contemporary situation in order to act upon it instead of the Aristotelian ethical principle of courage looking for the right balance (*kairos*) between good and evil. We must not forget that courage in the Middle Ages was disconnected from the speech act itself. Courage both in the Augustinian and Machiavellistic sense was directly associated with the political and societal circumstances. Interesting however is the fact that courage as a virtue has remained in its two meanings: as a collective and political resistance towards the conflicts between states, and as an individual and philosophical maxim presupposed in balancing between good and evil in the

community.

In his article *What is enlightenment?* Kant (Kant 1984) brings voluntary obedience into the reflection on the meaning of courage. We need to break free from a self-caused immaturity, the incapacity to think autonomously, without the guidance of another. Kant hereby reduces courage to the courage to think, to know, to understand in the midst of the risks that are involved. At the same time it is both an exercise in liberation from voluntary obedience, and an experiment of reflexively judging oneself in relation to the maxim of reason and public opinion. Still, Kant, Augustine, and Machiavel do not involve communication (speech) as the medium through which taking courage can be translated into an event.

In the Greek version of courage (frankly speaking the truth) the connection between issue and person is found in the act of speaking itself. Truth is understood as a linguistic act driven by a moral impulse, elicited by a critical perception and formed into a personal judgment. The spoken truth opens up space for exchange, negotiation, and debate. It is an event that in and of itself constitutes information upon which action has to be taken. The act initially takes place self-sufficiently and independently. It is this meaning that Foucault refers to when he describes speaking the truth as a moment of freedom.

From the moment that the direct connection with the acting agent is interrupted, the coded use of parrhesia and the institutionalised immanent critique takes on a technical-instrumental role. It is important to note the difference between parrhesia on the one hand and institutionalised critique on the other. That difference lies in unintended effects of critique and the unexpected source of critique, which come with parrhesia but not with institutionalised critique. The parrhesiastes has no agenda. Her critique is sudden and is one of 'not this way, without alternatives, without foundation'.

We submit here that parrhesia not only implies courage to speak, but also to hear. In an organizational context, a critique or dissent can imply that an organizational plan, procedure, strategy, or even structure is 'off track' with regard to what is acceptable for direct and indirect stakeholders, and that speaking such a critique is not without risk and hence takes courage. From the notions of courage discussed in the previous paragraphs, we infer that not only speaking but also hearing is not without risk and hence requires courage. We see two reasons for this. The first is that because most organizations are layered hierarchically, critique might have to travel upwards. This implies that the disorganizing impact of parrhesia can require a number of steps in a speaker-hearer/speaker chain, where a middle management hearer will need to become a speaker to top management. The CEO or the president of the board might be the last hearer in that chain, but for the disorganization to lead to re-organization, that CEO or president must in turn become a speaker. Hence, with the exception of the first speaker, none of the others can become a parrhesiastes, a courageous speaker, unless they are able to hear the speaker. Now, every single cog in that parrhesiastic chain is a person with an organizational mandate. Disorganization requires every cog in the chain to become parrhesiastes themselves towards the next cog. The person lacking courage to become parrhesiastes will not risk whatever is clouding the goal of their mandate (Langenberg 2011: 104; Weick 1984: 109-110), and hence will not hear the call to become parrhesiastes. In the next section we will illustrate how this deafness is present in ethics management.

The second reason why parrhesia requires courage to hear apart from speaking, revolves around the notion argued earlier in this paper that parrhesia is 'me saying this' rather than 'me'

or 'this'. We wrote that a focus on 'this' tends to reduce the critique or truth to factual claims that can be right or wrong, or position statements that can be either in line or out of step with official policy. On the other hand, a focus on the person speaking – 'me' – leads to a total disregard of what has been critiqued and makes it either neglectable ('who are you to say this') or authoritarian ('the boss is always right'). Parrhesia, we wrote, is 'me saying this', where the truth value lies in the irreversible fact that someone has said this. There is no way to go back to the moment where nobody had spoken the critique.

Hence, whichever way a hearer takes up a spoken critique, someone has spoken the critique. One might argue that in order to take up a critique, surely the content (the factual claims) of the critique must be examined. That seems correct to us, but the point we make is that even when none of the factual claims in the critique hold, there remains the fact that someone has said it. This saying makes the critique irreversible (Beyers and Langenberg 2010: 41-42).

In that sense the parrhesiastes is a courageous truth speaker precisely because his speaking is risky. Her parrhesiastic speaking can be heard or not. However, the parrhesiastic speaking is not meant as a call upon the hearer to be courageous in turn facing the irreversible fact that critique has been spoken. Even when it is not heard, it remains spoken. That constitutes its irreversibility. For the hearer, to act as if the critique was not irreversible and could be totally neglected is to deny the event caused by the use of parrhesia, the fact that someone has spoken at risk.

Institutionalised critique is made present through organizational procedures. These expect critique to be channelled through procedures stipulating the circumstances in which critique may be uttered. Often these procedures (speak-up procedures, whistleblowing channels, grievance procedures, etc) will include stipulations with regard to aim and intent of critique (or grievances or concerns). Our submission that courage is also needed from the hearer of the critique in order for critique to exist, presupposes that the unexpected and unintentional character of critique is acknowledged. We will argue this presupposition later in this paper. Having elaborated on the connection between parrhesia, courage, and risk, we turn to the question of governability in the next section.

4. Can we organize courage?

We introduced this paper with three questions: Why does it seem like employees do not stand up even when they have the formal power to do so? Why is it that attempts to raise concern frequently remain unheard? And is it possible to design procedures so that the empowerment to stand up and raise concern goes beyond formal power?

A common response to the first question is that employees simply lack the courage to speak up due to organizationally induced fear. An obvious correction to that would be the design and implementation of speak-up or whistle blowing procedures, so that employees require less courage to raise concerns or express critique (Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove 2008). However, it might also be that employees do raise concerns but that those hearing those concerns fail to act on them. In the previous sections we have used Foucault's notion of parrhesia to develop an explanation for this. Namely, not only is courage required from the speaker, but also from the hearer. We further inferred that having a procedure makes critique expected and intended, whereas courage is required for the unexpected and unintended.

Ethics programs aim at articulating the ethical dimension of behaviour in organizations. In that sense they create a space for problematizing, questioning, and discussing behaviours. However, ethics programs do not necessarily leave an opening for parrhesia. On the contrary, ethics programs tend to fill up the space they create. Let us back up that assertion.

Quite often, the design and implementation of ethics programs are located in the compliance function. It is not so rare to find that the person in charge has the title of 'Ethics & Compliance Officer', and where that is the case we will find the ethics program to be compliance driven (Roberts 2009). Monitoring and correcting behaviour take priority, not the disagreement with rules, procedures, or positions which characterises parrhesia.

Another well-known way to manage ethics is through codes of conduct. These too are directive and leave ample opening for unfounded critique. But codes of conduct generally go hand in hand with ethics and dilemma training sessions. These will generally have the code of conduct as an agenda. This limits what one can discuss to what is covered by the code of conduct. Also, a side effect of ethics training sessions is that they allocate every critique or concern to a specific time and place – twice a year on a Friday afternoon.

A further point of critique is that ethics training sessions aim at a behavioural closure. Parrhesia is 'me saying this', not 'me', not 'this'. As we pointed out earlier in the paper, parrhesia is a practice of freedom rather than analysis or providing proof. An ethics or dilemma training on the other hand is geared at resolving dilemmas and not necessarily at taking note that there is a fundamental discontent. Explaining one's discontent, generating good reasons, blending it on principles, etc is encapsulating the discontent within a larger narrative. The dilemma is resolved when we can rationalise it into just requiring piecemeal change. The point we are trying to make here is that too much organizing of ethics can lead to remaining deaf to what really needs to be heard. It consolidates managements' isolation rather than tearing it down. The parrhesia chain we mentioned earlier in this section is broken right after the first speaker cog. The request that a courageous speaker, raising an issue or expressing an opinion which is not on the agenda of the

meeting or the training session, must turn it into an abstract principle serving the agenda of the session indicates the hearer's lack of courage who decides to stick with the agenda set out. This raises the issue of what the ethical profile of the human resources departments or the compliance departments who are in charge of organizing ethics training programs? Under which organizational pressure do they have to bring these programs to a success? Furthermore, does the HR or compliance manager have the courage to transfer a critical message, coming from dilemma-analysis on the work floor, to the board or the CEO? Implementing ethics is nothing less than making moral considerations on various levels in the organization explicit. As such it is a highly critical, risky and unpredictable process, both for those who speak up on the work floor as well as for those taking it further up the ladder.

In the remainder of this section, we offer three examples of where critique can only exist when both speaker and hearer, in their interaction, have the courage to acknowledge the unexpected and unintended of that interaction. These examples stem from research where at least one of the authors was involved.

To facilitate the illustration of the point we make in this paper, we present the parrhesiastic chain in figure 1. It indicates our reasoning that parrhesiastic truth-speaking is always unexpected in the sense that it is truth-speaking which falls outside of the receptive determinants or organizational deafness organized through procedures. For anything these procedures are able to capture, a planned response exists. For any truth-speaking outside of this procedural receptiveness, there is no planned response. Hence, parrhesia in organizations leads to a disorganization of the organizational dynamic, on the condition that others in the organization are prepared to hear the parrhesiastic truth-speaking

A final element is that if the organization is to continue to exist, disorganization is succeeded by a re-organization. Such a re-organizing involves creating new procedures, which in turn establish a receptive determinacy.

Figure 1 also indicates what the three anecdotal examples we offer here illustrate from the model.




Figure 1. Parrhesia in organizations

Example 1 – whistleblowing policies

One could argue that surely it must be possible to organize for ethics in a less directive way than what we perhaps in a caricature described in the previous section. Yes it is. Take whistleblowing for example. Whistleblowing is 'the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action' (Near and Miceli 1985: 4). Following the increased amount of legislation protecting whistleblowers (Vandekerckhove 2006) as well as research showing whistleblowers tend to raise concerns inside their organization before they disclose to an external agency (Miceli and Near 1992), a growing number of organizations are implementing internal whistleblowing schemes. Such policies specify who can raise a concern and how they should do that. In return, whistleblowing policies promise to keep the whistleblower free from retaliation.

The fact that these policies make these specifications makes it worthwhile to critically assess whether or not they fill the space they create for parrhesia. Of course, one might argue that they jeopardise the occurrence of parrhesia merely by specifying how concern or critique should be raised. We prefer to take a less rigid approach and take a closer look. The reason is that there are many ways to design and implement an internal whistleblowing scheme: in-house or outsourced, in writing or verbally, anonymous or confidential, number and level of possible recipients, availability of independent advice, etc. Because there are so many ways to design a scheme, and because more and more organizations are implementing such an internal scheme, a number of guidelines have been published by authoritative bodies such as Transparency International (TI), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the British Standards Institute (BSI), and the European Article 29 Data Protection Working Group (EU Art 29). These guidelines on how to design and implement an internal whistleblowing scheme are quite inconsistent. Hence depending on which guideline organizations use, they will end up with very different whistleblowing schemes (for a thorough comparison of these guidelines, see Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012). Thus, having a whistleblowing policy is not a guarantee that there is enough opening for parrhesia to occur. So when does it get risky? Let us give some examples.

Whereas the BSI, TI, and ICC guidelines advise to keep the categories of who can use the internal whistleblowing procedure and of what kind of concerns can be raised through them as wide as possible – including former employees and 'company policy' – the EU Art 29 guideline advises to be very restrictive with regard to who can blow the whistle, and also advises to limit the subject of the concern to financial wrongdoing. Within the framework of our parrhesia chain, this amounts to actively discouraging the speaking of truth.

Another example concerns the required motive of the whistleblower. All four guidelines agree that knowingly false reports should be met with disciplinary action. But they differ in terms of how they describe the 'good faith' requirement for whistle-blowers to be protected. ICC requires a whistle-blower to be bona fide while TI explicitly limits good faith to the honest belief that the information is true at the time of disclosure, regardless of the whistleblower's motive. EU Art 29 states the whistleblower's identity may be disclosed when a report is both false and maliciously made. Introducing these conditions make it impossible for the whistleblowing to be parrhesiastic because the 'me saying this' of parrhesia is broken up into either 'me' (malicious or not) or 'this' (false report). This is not mere analytical zealotry from our side. It is typical for whistleblowers

who claim to be retaliated against that the focus is drawn to whether or not the whistleblower followed the right procedure. It is this procedural rigour – an effect of institutionalising the expression of personal moral motives – that destroys the occurrence of parrhesia. In our parrhesia chain framework, this also amounts to actively discouraging the speaking of truth.

And what with anonymous hotlines? Those are the most basic and simplest whistleblowing procedures around. A telephone number is provided which anyone can dial, 24/7, free of charge. You do not have to say your name, and you can just say anything you want. No questions afterwards. Of course, it tells you parrhesia is now to be acted out on the phone, but why would that not qualify as an open space? Perhaps it is in theory, but what is the reality?

On the question whether or not whistleblowing ought to be confidential (you have to say your name but the recipient will then keep it confidential) rather than anonymous (no one knows your name), TI and ICC take no position and offer both options, with TI stating both must be available. BSI advises that concerns are best raised openly (hence not confidential or anonymous) however acknowledges that circumstances might not make that a feasible option. Therefore confidential channels must also be in place. Anonymous routes are not advised against, but policies should not actively encourage employees to do so. The EU Art 29 guideline is similar to BSI. Schemes should not advertise or encourage anonymous reports but these may be accepted. Even though BSI and EU Art 29 are against promoting anonymous whistleblowing, many corporations (especially big ones) operate anonymous hotlines and promote them to their employees. So can we conclude from this that big companies tend to leave opening for parrhesia? Not at all. Anonymous hotlines are the easiest and cheapest way for a big company to operate. All reports are immediately centralised and every call is allocated to a category. Hence the important question is which categories the organization applies for screening the incoming calls? What is passed on to management, and what is filtered out? We are quite sure that there is a category 'other', but we seriously doubt it whether anyone takes time to go back and see what these were saying. Thus, the same agenda setting is at play even with anonymous hotline whistleblowing schemes. In our parrhesia chain framework, anonymous hotlines facilitate the speaking of truth, but obstruction might occur where the hearer must become speaker. That is, when those screening and administrating the criticisms and concerns raised through the anonymous hotline need to pass on the critiques or concerns to management.

Example 2 – strong values in a steel company

In the course of 2007, one of the authors undertook qualitative research in a steel company, as part of a research project on disorganizing effects of critique (for a full account see Langenberg 2008: 161-204). She talked to eight employees in semi-structured interviews lasting one to one and a half hours: two blue color workers, one secretary, one factory director, one human resource director, one legal officer, one business development director and one corporate communication director.

In response to the risky context of steel production the management of this steel company had developed a model where speaking up openly was explicitly rewarded. This model had been in place for more than two decades. Under the model, every employee had the explicit responsibility to use what was called a 'rule free space'. Employees could take the courage to discuss issues, concerns, and questions with their foreman when necessary and had the opportunity to involve higher management

levels. Rather than an industrial relations agenda, the content of these discussions ranged from organizational purpose, planned investments, risk issues, function allocation, stakeholder management, holiday planning, car park usage, recycling policies, diversity, etc.

It struck the researcher that the structure of the organization seemed to contradict its culture. The structure resonated with what one would expect from a traditional, old-fashioned industry. After all, this was a steel company. At the heart the production process was a clear divide between blue- and white-collar workers. The work floor had very rigorous regulation on safety and environmental issues, and production output was meticulously measured.

Despite this, respondents emphasized that events on the work floor as well as on corporate level continuously required employees (from leader to foreman, from management to worker) to autonomously interpret what was happening. They saw their organization as having an open organizational dynamic, in which individual deviant or erratic behaviour both threatens the organization as well as offers new opportunities to the system. Because of the strict security measures that had to be obeyed these behaviours were a threat. Because deviancy or errors are in most cases an alarm, a rupture, a signal for change, they were also opportunities for improvement.

Respondents acknowledged that interruptions of the production process were seen as indispensable learning points in the survival strategy of the corporation. The 'rule-free space' was seen as facilitating such interruptions on every organizational level. According to the employees this 'free space' developed and maintained relational trust and shared responsibility.

Respondents talked proudly about 'their' organization. They said to be happy to work there and to contribute to the success of the company. Respondents also talked strikingly positive about critique. They associated critique with: feedback, self-determination, following one's own will, guts, transparency, initiative, and being a good neighbor. Most respondents said that giving critique was part of their culture, using the phrase 'it is our DNA, it is in our genes'.

The employees placed great value on the formal lines of communication, and there seemed to be very little circumvention of rules. Moreover, this organization had a rather difficult position in the public opinion due to the traditional image of heavy industry as being a highly polluting industry. That is why it is remarkable that at the corporate level, the will of the management to organize 'critique' even at the level of the business units remained functional.

There was a great sense of confidence in its effect as well. The point we want to make by bringing in this example relates to that sense of confidence. Perhaps they held too much confidence. The participants have read the transcripts of their interviews. The anonymized results have been presented to them so they could react and give their feedback. The researcher also presented her findings to the board, who initially reacted positively to the summary of the results. They saw their philosophy regarding the added value of critique from work floor to boardroom confirmed.

Remarkably, just one single critical feedback from one of the interviewed employees could not count on approval and was almost directly wiped from the table. The critique this employee had expressed to the researcher consisted of a concern about the absence of a free exchange of information between divisions and the delay this caused on the primary processes. The company board immediately wanted the name of that employee, something the researcher obviously refused to give.

Hence this example shows that an organizational policy for tolerating open critique can stifle such critique. The board did not have the courage to acknowledge that their 'rule-free space' could miss out on a concern of one of its employees. We do not know the reason why the employee chose to express their critique to the researcher rather than using their 'rule-free space' for speaking up against the board, but the point is that the board's attention immediately focused on the identity of the speaker rather than on the fact that someone had spoken critique. Obviously the employee lacked courage to speak their critique openly within the organization. Hence this was not an example of a parrhesiastic chain event. It was the researcher who was the hearer/speaker, raising the concern with the board. In the end, only the independence of the researcher could correct the board's lack of courage to acknowledge the critique rather than singling out the identity of the speaker. Related to our scheme (figure 1) we can conclude that regardless the implementation of 'rule-free space', our example 2 only accidentally reaches the level of using parrhesia as speaker (almost as a formalized procedure) but seemingly never gets to the level of the parrhesiastic hearer when the unexpected happens.

Example 3 – dealing with harassment

Early 2011, one of the authors of this paper was conducting exploratory non-structured interviews with managers in the context of managing whistleblowing policies. During an interview with an HR-manager of the London headquarters of a communication technology firm, the interviewee talked about her experiences surrounding a case of sexual harassment.

The interviewee was the sole HR person in the London office, and reported to the CFO. One of the employees had tried to talk to the CFO about the CEO sexually harassing her. The CFO had advised this employee to 'talk to HR'. When the employee talked to our interviewee (the HR person), she advised the employee to make a formal complaint through the grievance procedure. However, in following up this complaint our interviewee did the unexpected and destabilized the organization.

'certainly when we get lawyers involved, and more senior staff involved in determining what happened, they all questioned her credibility – to a large extent. I think my position was slightly different because right from the start I didn't need to do that, because what she was saying to me, I'd heard myself.

...

I understand HR needs to remain independent and also supportive of the business. But actually you are supporting the business ... This kind of behaviour is actually so fundamentally damaging to the business. Even though I was ... and it was very difficult for me because I didn't know how it was going to fall. Because we could have just paid her off and let her leave, and that is a common option. It's the normal option. I didn't know how it was going to play out. I did push the hand of what happened by speaking privately to the lawyers myself, repeating some of what he had said to me in public, which included ... I mean they are quite graphically sexual comments but ... you know, he talked about vibrators at a company dinner, you know, me and rabbits. What he said was really quite crude ... uhm I repeated it to the lawyers and said this wasn't the only situation, there's been these other times, and if you're not taking her seriously and you're not doing something about this problem, then I would push it ... and I'm actually going to ... uhm ... do something about this.'

She decides to take her colleague's issue up, partly because dealing with employee issues is part of her role as HR. Still, she goes beyond her role and becomes an advocate of the employee

vis-à-vis company lawyers and the usual way of dealing with these issues. In doing so, she takes a risk, as she does not know how this is going to turn out.

'And for me, that was a bit falling on my sword because if the company decided to pay her off, they were probably going to sack me as well. And I kinda took the gamble. But I also took the gamble that if the company was the kind of company that was going to just pay her off, and I was going to continue to tolerate his behaviour, then actually I didn't want to be there anyway.'

The HR person taking this issue further against the CEO was not something that was expected. Hence, the chairman and the small group of shareholders got involved. This shows that her taking this issue further – becoming parrhesiastes herself – amounted to a disorganizing. Nobody knew how to handle this.

'The people involved, it was quite a difficult situation. Because the chairman is pretty stern. And they were asked by me to come in and do an interview, as part of the process, which was done at our lawyer's offices. And yeah it was me asking but it was potentially the chairman asking because it supported him in what he wanted to happen? So they realised they were sort of trapped in a way. If they said the wrong thing, if they supported the CEO in any way ... that would be an issue. They weren't sure whether or not he was coming back, they weren't sure how much of what they'd say he would get to see. It was a really difficult time for all of them. So they kept quiet. I think they talked to each other but not outside of that.'

'... [the shareholders] were like 'one of them goes', and they said that right at the start. I was completely aware of that, so that made it very difficult –with me – with my discussion with her ... uhm ... and at one stage I said 'I will put in my complaint'. I said to the chairman 'look I'm going to complain about this, what happened to me, I think it's important, if it'll go to court it'll come out anyway.' You know, I can't be the independent HR.' 'Unfortunately the chairman sent a text about that to the CEO and said 'we have someone else that has raised a complaint against you for dadadada', so ... and that text was produced as part of their response, so ... and that didn't help. Because legal said '... that didn't help, you getting involved like this'. It would just ... I mean ... I can understand them saying that because they are protecting the company? It would have just doubled the amount of processes involved and so on. And I wasn't looking to get anything out of it. I was wanting to continue here at this company.'

This crisis at the CT firm eventually led to the CEO having to leave and the chairman now acting as interim CEO. Our interviewee is still the HR-person and continues to report to the CFO. An important change however is that the organization now seems to be committed to implementing a stronger formalization in the field of HR.

'Legal really wants us to [introduce these procedures]. We have changed our approach hugely in this organization, and bit by bit, drip feet by drip feet, we're introducing really good things ... Right now today, we're looking at a salary review process that is actually slightly transparent? (laughter)'

Referring back to our model (figure 1), parrhesia occurring at this CT firm led to a disorganization, which in turn seems to result in a re-organization. At the time of the interview, this

was still in its early stages. However, if the re-organization is successful, the CT firm might find itself in a couple of years in the same position as the steel company in example 2. Hence the point is that any re-organization risks becoming deaf to parrhesiastic events, even if the re-organization evolved from a disorganizing parrhesia.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we have tried to find answers on the following questions: why does it seem like employees do not stand up even when they have the formal power to do so? Why is it that attempts to raise concern frequently remain unheard? And is it possible to design procedures so that the empowerment to stand up and raise concern goes beyond formal power?

To start answering these questions we introduced the foucauldian analysis of the concepts parrhesia and critique, as two transformations of ethical praxis. Based on that reading we have made an attempt to critically analyse the meaning of courage in relation to truth telling and its role in organizations, more specific in ethics management. We developed a framework of a parrhesiastic chain to model the interactional truth-speaking which requires courage from both speaker and hearer (who then becomes a courageous speaker). Did we find an answer on our main question? Is it possible to design procedures so that the empowerment to stand up and raise concern goes beyond formal power? We think we did.

Drawing from previous sections and our expanded parrhesia framework, we conclude that organizing courage involves the courage to disorganize. Disorganization refers to the idea that the human being is a boundary and as such also shapes making the organization. Disorganization originates through this principle and goes far beyond formal power, procedures and rules. Any boundary becomes explicit in using parrhesia and practicing critique, both as speaker as well as hearer. Critique as such is inescapable and at the same time it disrupts existing limits, conventions, norms and has a transgressive effect: using parrhesia unbounds the existing but at the same time it starts creating new boundaries. This specific dynamic implicates the groundlessness of the organization, 'the very condition for the richly textured and interdependent world of human experience [...] The organization is not pre-given but continually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage' (Weick 2001). This thesis implies that we are the organization and the construction of reality. People involved in any kind of interaction whatsoever organize and disorganize sense, meaning and reality.

To make this dynamic happen in the benefit of organizations courage is required from the participants regardless their status in the organizational hierarchy. Having procedures in line makes critique expected and intended, whereas courage is required for the unexpected and unintended, anticipating the groundlessness of the organization.

Our three examples show that in every case where there is a rupture with the ongoing as a consequence of using parrhesia (showing courage in frankly telling truth and/or hearing the spoken truth) a disorganizing dynamic appears which goes far beyond formal power, institutionalised critique (rule-free space) or ethics policies (whistle blowing procedures).

References

- Alford, C.F. (2001). *Whistleblowers: broken lives and organizational power*. Ithaca, Cornell University.
- Barratt, E. (2004). 'Foucault and the art of critique in management studies' Paper presented at the Third European Conference on Research Methods in Business & Management, University of Reading, 29-30 April 2004.
- Berns, T., Blésin, L. and Jeanmart, G. (2010). *Du Courage*. St.-Just-la-Pendue, Encre Marine.
- Beyers, L. and Langenberg, S. (2010). 'Courageous stakeholder.' In Bouckaert L. and Arena, P. (eds) *Respect and Economic Democracy*. Antwerp, Garant: 37-55.
- Calas, M. and Linda Smircich, L. (1999). 'Past modernism? Reflections and tentative directions.' *Academy of Management Review* 24(4): 649-671.
- Carter, C., McKinley, A. and Rowlinson, M. (2002). 'Introduction: Foucault, Management and History.' *Organization* 9 (4): 515-526.
- Clegg, S.R. (1990). *Modern Organizations: Organization Studies in the Postmodern World*. London, Sage.
- Clegg, S.R. (1994). 'Weber and Foucault: Social Theory for the Study of Organizations.' *Organization* 1(1): 149-178.
- Daft, R. L. and Weick K. (1984) 'Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems.' In Weick, K. (2001) *Making Sense of Organizations*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing: 100-124.
- Foucault, M. (1978). 'Qu'est-ce que la critique?' *Bulletin de la Société française de la Philosophie* 84(2): 35-63.
- Foucault, M. (1984). 'L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté'. *Dits et écrits IV*, nr. 356. Paris, Gallimard.
- Foucault, M. (1994). 'Omnes et Singulatem : vers une critique de la raison politique'. *Dits et écrits IV*, nr. 291. Paris, Gallimard.
- Foucault, M. (2001). *Cours au Collège de France. 1981-1982. L'herméneutique du sujet*. Paris, Gallimard Seuil.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *Cours au Collège de France. 1982-1983. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*. Paris, Gallimard Seuil.
- Foucault, M. (2009). *Cours au Collège de France. 1984. Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II*. Paris, Gallimard Seuil.
- French, R. (2007). 'Friendship and organization: Learning from the western friendship tradition', *Management & Organizational History* 2(3), 255-272.
- Harris, H. (2003). 'Enhancing the independence of supervisory agencies: the development of courage'. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 12(4): 369-377.
- Kant, I. (1983). 'Beantwortung der Frage: was ist Aufklärung?' *Werke*. Band 9. *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*. Erster Teil. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: 53-62.
- Langenberg, S. (2008). *Kritiek als des-organisatie*. Antwerp, Garant.
- Langenberg, S. (2010). 'The model of critique in business.' In Nandram, S. and Borden, M. (eds) *Spirituality and Business*. Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Verlag: 219-233.
- Langenberg, S. (2011). 'Dis-organizing as an Act.' In Opdebeeck, H. and Zsolnai, L. (eds) *Spiritual Humanism and Economic Wisdom*. Antwerp, Garant: 99-111.
- Mansbach, A. (2011). 'Whistleblowing as fearless speech: The radical democratic effects of late-modern parrhesia' In D. Lewis and W. Vandekerckhove (eds) *Whistleblowing and democratic values*. London, The International Whistleblowing Research Network: 12-26.
- Mayer, D. (1992). 'La politique du vrai.' In Klein, P.M. (ed) *Le courage: En connaissance de causes*. Paris, Editions Autrement - Série Morales 6: 113-122.
- McKinley, A. and Starkey, K. (eds) (1997). *Foucault, Management and Organization Theory: From Panopticon to Technologies of Self*. London, Sage.
- Miceli, M. and Near, J.P. (1992). *Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees*. Lanham, Lexington Books.
- Near, J.P. and Miceli, M. (1985). 'Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-blowing.' *Journal of Business Ethics* 4(1): 1-16.
- Perry, N. (1998). 'Indecent exposures: Theorizing whistleblowing', *Organization Studies* 19(2), 235-57.
- Roberts, R. (2009). 'The rise of compliance-based ethics management. Implications for organizational ethics', *Public Integrity* 11(3): 261-278.
- Skinner, D. (2011). 'Fearless speech: Practising parrhesia in a self-managing community', *Ephemera* 11(2), 157-175.
- Sonderegger, R. (2006), 'Onzuivere kritiek.' *KRISIS* 7(2): 3-16.
- Teo, H. and Caspersz, D. (2011). 'Dissenting discourse: Exploring alternatives to the whistleblowing/silence dichotomy', *Journal of Business Ethics* 104(2): 237-249.
- Townley, B. (1995). *Reframing Human Resource Management*. London, Sage.
- Tsahuridu, E.E. and Vandekerckhove, W. (2008). 'Organisational Whistleblowing Policies: Making Employees Responsible or Liable?' *Journal of Business Ethics* 82(1): 107-118.
- Vandekerckhove, W. (2006). *Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility. A Global Assessment*. Aldershot, Ashgate.
- Vandekerckhove, W. (2010) 'Whistleblowing, Perennial Issues And Ethical Risks.' In G. Aras G. & D. Crowther (Eds.), *Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility*. Farnham, Gower.
- Vandekerckhove, W. and Lewis, D. (2012). 'The Content of Whistleblowing Procedures: A Critical Review of Recent Official Guidelines', *Journal of Business Ethics* 108(2), 253-264. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-011-1089-1.
- Weick, K. (2001). *Making Sense of the Organization*. Malden MA, USA, Blackwell Publishing.

Authors

Dr Wim Vandekerckhove, Senior Lecturer in Organisational Behaviour, University of Greenwich Business School, W.Vandekerckhove@greenwich.ac.uk. Wim holds a PhD in Applied Ethics from Ghent University, Belgium. At the University of Greenwich he teaches organisational behaviour and business ethics. Wim researches and publishes on business ethics, whistleblowing, responsible investment, and global ethics.

Dr Suzan Langenberg, Director at Diversity, S.Langenberg@diversity.be. Suzan studied philosophy, history and sexuality at the University of Amsterdam. Her focus is on the critical relationship between ethics and the organization. In this context, she regularly acts as an instructor in business ethics and dilemma-analysis. In 2008 she received her doctorate from Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen with a study entitled 'Kritiek als des-organisatie. Bedrijfsethiek en waarheidspreken' (Critique as disorganization. Business Ethics and Speaking the Truth) based on the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. She has edited various compilations on philosophical, socially critical and business ethics topics and her work is regularly published in national and international journals. She holds various management functions.