

COPENHAGEN FAILURE

A rhetorical treatise of how speeches unite and divide mankind

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Philosophy

Master's thesis

Faculty of Social Sciences & Philosophy

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Faculty advisor: Mikko Yrjönsuuri

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this treatise is to analyse five of the Copenhagen Climate Convention's main speeches to see how they supported or weakened the agreement possibilities in the convention. Particular focus will be on the elements that divide or unite negotiators and whether the summit's failing outcome is already built in the pre-planned speeches held at the main podium.

Theoretically, the study builds on Kenneth Burke's identification thesis and Elizabeth L. Malone's climate change debate analysis. I combine these in my analysis using a revised version of Malone's argument family classification tool putting it into Burke's theoretical framework. The central concept is Burke's identification, whose manifestations are searched from speeches. The analysis will cover five of the main speeches from Copenhagen summit negotiators (the United States, China, Zimbabwe, the African Union and the Climate Group).

Analysed speeches contain more elements that divide negotiators than elements with possibly uniting effect. The division between North and South is particularly distinct in most speeches. Another dividing issue is the major emitters' tendency to speak themselves out of more emission cut commitments instead of expressing willingness to engage in more ambitious accord. At the same time, less developed countries utter their mistrust which increases division and weakens the possibilities for negotiators to become consubstantial. Every participator agrees in public about seriousness of climate change, but this claim is supported only weakly by other arguments in their speeches. Copenhagen Climate Convention's failure can be foreseen in speeches that fail to build and recognise a common interest among negotiator countries.

Rhetorical analysis reveals that climate change as an environmental problem is not faced by a "global we" but from national perspectives, which weakens the possibilities for real action. The "global we" facing and reacting to climate change has not emerged. This is a challenge for further study discussing the ways in which the real identification could be achieved and action taken.

Key words: rhetoric, environmental rhetoric, environmental philosophy, Burke, identification, climate change, Copenhagen Climate Convention

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1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Climate change

Mankind has arrived at a new phase in its history, the phase coloured by a notion that we are not living in a world with unlimited resources or a nice, self-regulating atmosphere. Climate change is one of the most threatening challenges of this new era. It has provoked discussion in many levels, becoming now one of the hottest topics among media and researchers. There is by and large agreement that man-made rise in greenhouse gases is a major cause of the global warming and that something should be done to mitigate these emissions. In 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established as a first common action. After a couple of years, since 1995, the parties of UNFCCC have met annually to negotiate about actions to mitigate climate change.

In December 2009, the yearly United Nations Climate Change Conference was held for 15th time, this time in Copenhagen and accordingly known also as COP15. The outcomes of the summit were minor like they had been in many earlier conferences. No legally binding contract was made; the final outcome (Copenhagen Accord) recommends emission reduction, yet having no tools to ensure these reductions. Summit's delegates only "took note" of the accord instead of adopting it. Funding for the developing countries was pledged, but there is no guarantee how the sums would be collected or allocated. Many declared the COP15 meeting and its outcomes a disappointment: to mention, the EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso expressed clear disappointment in BBC's news and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace disapproved the outcomes strongly. The Copenhagen failure was broadly acknowledged.¹

There are enduring problems that seem to make a gap between the will to act and real actions. Unfortunately climate change is not waiting for this debate to finish: the emissions

¹ "Copenhagen failure" examples in media: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm> (read 20 September 2010) or <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal> (read 7 October 2010), <http://euobserver.com/880/29181> (read 7 October 2010)

in our atmosphere have continued rising, many of so-called carbon sinks (like rainforests) are diminishing, coast parts of great glaciers are melting and consequently the surface albedo is weakening. Acting becomes even more urgent. Therefore we are now in the moment where we should try to understand the reasons behind negotiation failures instead of just continuing the negotiations.

1.2 Subject definition and the research problem

The viewpoint in this study is one of environmental rhetoric researcher. To date, literature on environmental rhetoric has been rather scarce (Waddell 2008, xi). Rhetorical aspect can enhance environmental philosophers' understanding about how we conceptualise and build the world with our language, how this communicational tool changes the world and how it could be used for altering the world (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 220).

This study is a rhetorical-philosophical analysis of chosen Copenhagen Climate Convention's public speeches. Speeches are analysed from two rhetorical perspectives: identification viewpoint stemming from Burke's heritage and argumentation analysis that is linked to the previous question of identification. Most important speeches were chosen to cover different kind of participators from major to minor economies, from developed to developing countries and from statesmen to organization representatives. I believe chosen speeches contain all the relevant components that were to be found from Copenhagen speeches. A common principle is that material for an analysis is sufficient when no remarkable new information is found by adding material; this principle was used in the material choosing process.

The research question of this study is:

What sort of uniting and dividing rhetoric can be revealed from Copenhagen Climate Convention's speeches?

After narrowing the study's frame of reference into a research question in this chapter, the actual study begins by introducing theoretical backgrounds in chapter 2. Earlier works of environmental rhetoric are first explored shortly in general level. Methods of rhetoric

analysis are also discussed.

Next the attention is turned to two theories particularly relevant for this study. As environmental rhetoric is not a distinct theory field, theories are chosen from generic rhetorical frameworks. First one is philosopher Kenneth Burke's rhetoric study and its identification thesis found in *A Rhetoric of Motives*. It provides an interesting aspect for analysing rhetoric and especially the problems of negotiation situations where conflicting interests are present. Burke is often considered as one of the cornerstones in the philosophy of new rhetoric.

Another work forming this study's foundation comes from sociologist Elizabeth L. Malone. Her *Debating Climate Change: Pathways through Argument to Agreement* deals with climate change related argumentation and can be therefore counted as a work of environmental rhetoric. Malone has done a remarkable work by analysing public climate change debate and classifying its arguments to see out what the discussion usually concerns and how the speakers' backgrounds correlate with different argument types. Malone's argument family study is introduced, evaluated and revised to a version especially suitable for Copenhagen's context.

After describing the background theories and basic concepts I will turn to more practical part of this work. In chapter 3, I first explore Copenhagen Climate Change Conference's backgrounds and consider the special characteristics of negotiation and speech situations. The nucleus of this work, the speech analysis, will then follow. It will be made for every speech from two different aspects: Burke's identification thesis and Malone's (revised) argument classification. The speeches will be analysed also collectively, in their relations to each other to see the dynamics between speeches and their collision points.

1.3 Environmental rhetoric: earlier studies

Environmental philosophy and studies of new rhetoric have both gained increasing attention during the new millennium. Despite of growing interest for both, the combining study of environmental rhetoric has been marginal.

Some rhetoric treatises have taken environmental movement's rhetoric or more generally environmental speak as their analysis target. A good overview is provided by Myerson & Rydin (1996), as their *The language of environment: A new rhetoric* covers widely environmental rhetoric's different topics and features of the discourse. In *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric and the Environment* Waddell (2008) has collected writings that deal with environmental rhetoric, and especially the closing essay of Bruner and Oelschlaeger represents environmental philosopher's work in the fields of rhetoric. Also DeLuca's *Image Politics* (1999) deals with rhetorical issues, focusing on environmental activism and image rhetoric. The reference sections of these books give more picture about the situation of environmental rhetoric: there are only a few references to publications concerning both issues, while most reference works treat only either rhetoric or environmental issues.

Argumentative perspective combining the rhetoric and environmental issues is explored in Malone's *Debating Climate Change: Pathways Through Argument to Agreement* (2009), which is also among the newest works in this field. It will serve as the main environmental rhetoric source for my study.

In Finland Haila and Lähde have been the pioneers of environmental politics discussion with their book *Luonnon politiikka* ("Politics of Nature", 2003). However, even their book covers environmental philosophy and politics more widely and rhetoric dimension is touched only in passing. One of the first environmentally oriented rhetoric studies in Finland was probably Tiina Onkila's doctoral thesis *Environmental Rhetoric in Finnish Business* published in 2009.

Often the focus point of rhetorical analyses has been in the argumentation (see for example the classics of new rhetoric, *The New Rhetoric* and *The Uses of Argument*). The arguments surely have significance, but I contend their analysis alone is insufficient to give the bigger picture, even when the argument analysis covers broader aspect than only validity of the arguments. Especially in environmental field attention should be paid to other aspects: One thing to be learned by following political discussions is that the discussion is never purely, not even mainly, about the best argument. Bruner and Oelschlaeger observed that

environmentalist arguments are often cognitively plausible but according to them this is only one of the three criteria for successful rhetoric (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 215). For these reasons I consider it necessary and fruitful to pay attention more to other aspects than plain, isolated argumentation research.

1.4 New possibilities

Environmental problems have risen to public consciousness, environmental movement has gained at least stable if not voluminous place in media, and the general moral attitude has turned to favour more and more environmental responsibility (see Haila & Lähde 2003). Someone could already make a study of how big carbon footprint the numerous research papers about environmental conflicts have already produced. Still, these changes in public discussion and general attitudes have not changed the environmental situation much. The planet we inhabit is facing more human-caused environmental problems than ever.

My argument is that one reason for environmental movement's lack of success lies in its neglect of rhetorical aspect. Accordingly, this concerns many (although not all) of the environmental philosophers. This critique goes along with Bruner and Oelschlaeger: according to them, environmental movement has not caused any remarkable societal changes, it has not achieved a hearing of a large audience and its attendance to economic discussion has been weak. Moreover, this being maybe the worst problem for the environmental movement, it has been mislabeled as contest between people and nature; consequently environmentalism has been linked to job losses, decreasing quality of life and sacrifices and suffering. All of these problems are closely linked to questions of rhetoric. (Bruner and Oelschlaeger 2008, 210-218.)

Historically, environmental philosophy has often been theoretically focused. It can be seen clearly in its most discussed area, environmental ethics. Light's and Rolston III's *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology* is a comprehensive overview of today's environmental ethics discussion. The big issues dealt with are questions of moral sphere (who or what counts in ethics), intrinsic value, monism versus pluralism, anthropocentrism

versus other centrism, preservation or restoration issues and the connection to human social issues. (Light & Rolston, 2003.) The way these questions are discussed reflects theoretical nature of the discussion; applied handling of these themes is marginal in the book. Pondering the different centrism and their ontological basis or defining different versions of moral pluralism may increase philosophical understanding and have value as such, but probably it will not contribute much to solving the environmental problems. I am not saying that theoretical environmental philosophy should be forgotten; I am only wishing that applied philosophy and more practically oriented theorizing would get more space in this field.

As the critique has now been expressed, some constructive words should also be placed. I agree with Bruner and Oelschlaeger that "rhetoric offers resources to the ecophilosophical community that increase its potential to effect change in society" (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 220). Critical rhetoric techniques could help to reveal the closed discourses and to open them, persuasive rhetoric could help in reaching the larger audience, and deeper understanding of rhetoric could help to see the problems of public environmental discourse, giving also ideas how to enhance it. (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 216-221.) To put it simply, I believe study of environmental rhetoric can help environmental movement to change the world.

Anti-environmental speakers and politicians have been rhetorically skilled in environmental discussion's history. They have often had the power and ability to define the public debate and therefore turn it to their side: as Bruner and Oelschlaeger state, "whoever defines the terms of the public debate determines its outcomes. If environmental issues are conceptualized, for example, in terms of "owls versus people," then the owls (and the habitat that sustains them) do not have much of a future" (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 218). This kind of reductionism of environmental questions has also successfully mislabeled the environmental movement, making it a supporter of old forests instead of jobs, preservation instead of development and inconvenient ascetic lifestyle instead of satisfying life. The pro-environmental side has been so far the loser in this rhetorical battlefield. (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 210-211.)

There is no way to get rid of rhetoric: as Burke often states, rhetoric is everywhere in human communication (Burke 1969). Therefore, instead of neglecting the rhetorical aspect the environmental movement could increase its effect by enhancing its communication and directing it to larger audience instead of "social elite". With the help of environmental rhetoric, environmentalists can try to recognise the problematic points of environmental discussion, reveal and unravel false dichotomies, open closed discourses and learn to speak in front of the big audience. (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 215-217.) This is a demanding task but also an excellent inquiry field for environmental philosophers working with rhetoric, if they only existed in greater amounts.

Bruner and Oelschlaeger list in their essay three communication related criteria essential for ecophilosophical project's success and these criteria can also be applied to concern particularly environmental rhetoric. Firstly, the discourse should be cognitively credible; secondly, it should evoke sentiments; and thirdly, the majority of the people should be reached. From these three points, the cognitive plausibility has been well internalised. On the two latter points ecophilosophers cannot be praised. Rhetoric could give valuable resources to fix these problems. (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 215.)

Here I have also described the motivation and reasons for this study. I have followed the environmental discussion in many levels and noticed the problems mentioned. Climate change is a very topical environmental question and Copenhagen's meeting provides (at this moment) the freshest material reflecting the problems of the climate change related decision-making. I believe this study can help to reveal the rhetorical deadlocks of climate change discussion.

Particularly this analysis is trying to enlighten the question of reaching the wider audience's acceptance. Environmental movement has been criticized for reaching only a small audience, often the elite (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 2008, 215-216). On the rather opposite side, internationally well-known politicians speaking in Copenhagen conference are usually trained (or helped by their ghost writers) to reach the hearing of a bigger audience – and in the front of international media, they probably give their best rhetorical effort. Thus speakers in the Copenhagen provide an excellent study material of rhetoric.

What makes this material especially interesting is the fact that Copenhagen's negotiations were not unanimous neither very successful. Conflicting interests and disagreements did not merge into a compromise that would have been accepted by every participator. This gives an opportunity to discuss the ways in which audience's hearing was possibly gained and, on the other hand, how that connection eventually broke down. Burke's thoughts about identification and division give a theoretical starting point for this kind of analysis.

2: THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Identification by Burke

Kenneth Burke (1897-1993) published one of his main works, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, in 1950², following the earlier release *A Grammar of Motives*. In his study Burke analyses especially the concepts of persuasion and identification. Burke's main thesis is that instead of classically treated persuasion, the most important concept of rhetoric is identification and even persuasion is empty without this concept (Burke 1969, xiii). I will now explore the concept of identification and its possibilities for the climate change rhetoric analysis.

2.1.1 Identification as action

Identification is a term used in everyday language, but its meaning in that context is different from the meaning used in this work and further definition is therefore necessary. Burke defines the action of identification in the following way: "A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so." (Burke 1969, 20.) Another description of more abstract level goes: "To identify A with B is to make A "consubstantial" with B" (Burke 1969, 21).

We are still nearly in the bullpen, as the notion of consubstantiality needs now clarification. Merriam-Webster defines the word "consubstantial" as "of the same substance".³ Consubstantial ones are in some way considered to be of same substance although they are not identical. Burke mentions family relations as an example of this: the offspring both is one with its parents and yet also distinct from them (Burke 1969, 21). Becoming or being consubstantial does not then remove or deny person's own identity or uniqueness of

² I am using the version published in 1969, which explains the differing year in reference markings.

³ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consubstantial> (read 19 October 2010)

existence; the aspect of unification comes in addition to that.

I follow Wittgensteinian approach here: defining concept means describing the typical use of that concept. The concept of identification is closely related to action, as Burke enlightens when he once more describes the action of becoming consubstantial: "A doctrine of *consubstantiality*, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them *consubstantial*." (Burke 1969, 21.)

To put it briefly, becoming consubstantial means getting or realising common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, interests or attitudes between two or more persons. It is now easier to see why identification is so central and preliminary to persuasion according to Burke. Without anything in common it would be difficult to persuade a listener: "You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, *identifying* your ways with his" (Burke 1969, 55). Even Aristotle's persuasion techniques include elements that aim to produce consubstantiality with the hearers although Aristotle himself does not use the term identification (see for example *Rhetoric*).

Division is a necessary counterpart for identification, for it would be impossible to talk about identifying with someone if there was no division in the beginning. No matter how socially constructed our personalities may be, we conceive ourselves as separate individuals: division is then often the initial situation. (Burke 1969, 22-23.) There are also situations where we may consider identification as a default state, for example within family this may be correct (no doubt there are still moments when couples do not identify with each other: this may occur in a state of conflict or lead to such state).

Identification occurs between two or more people. In the case of more than two people, the relation exists either between a single speaker and audience or between certain groups. An example of speaker-audience situation is a speech for a crowd, a typical case of rhetorical studies and also central in my paper. Burke describes the speech situation's identification as

follows: "the audience feels as though it were not merely receiving, but were itself creatively participating in the poet's or speaker's assertion. Could we not say that, in such cases, the audience is exalted by the assertion because it has the feel of collaborating in the assertion?" (Burke 1969, 57-58.) The former passage also explains one reason why identification is so powerful and persuasive when it succeeds. The feeling of collaboration helps to constitute a new "we", feeling of identification.

In my treatise this theme of constructing a new "we" is very essential. Burke also pays attention to that word's power in evoking our collaborative expectancies (Burke 1969, 58). It is easily understood that climate negotiations can hardly be successful if the attendants feel strong division. Division is actually the probable starting situation in the negotiations, firstly because of the tensions between North and South and also because of some conflicts between major economies (especially China and the United States). Earlier negotiation failures and their controversial questions are causing divisiveness in the background. On the other hand, concern about climate change and its effects can form a foundation for the identification and this concern has increased when newer climate research proposes we are facing the warming in faster pace than was earlier acknowledged.

To sum up, identification during a speech is usually a state of attitude where the hearer(s) identifies oneself with the speaker (or a group) in such a way that the speaker can persuade hearer(s) to conceive of having common interests and/or attitudes with the speaker. There is still no guarantee that identification will last or certainly lead to agreement: the arguments can still be rejected or the identification itself may break for different reasons that lead to division.

2.1.2 Targets of rhetoric

There is no rhetoric without a target, rhetoric is always addressed by its very nature (Burke 1969, 45). (This does not mean that one's inner speech would not be rhetorical.) The speaker has always a certain audience in his mind, and he aims to modify and build the speech so that it takes effect on that particular audience. This does concern every rhetorical, to say communicational, situation: in everyday life many people speak very

differently to their best friends, employers, healthcare professionals or relatives.

The speaker has often selected a particular subaudience. Sometimes it can be the whole audience rhetoric is being addressed to, but often the target is only a subset of that audience. In the negotiation-like situations the best situation may be that hearers share so much in common that the speech can be held to all of them effectively. However, often this is not true but hearers have different backgrounds, worldviews and interests. The speaker must then choose a part of the audience to speak to. This is a consequence from the addressed nature of rhetoric.

This question of target choosing is crucial for my work. In Copenhagen there was a very large audience: the negotiating participants and other followers, some of them representing media while others attending for personal interest. It will be interesting to see if the speakers have had certain part-audience in their minds or if they are in some way trying to capture every hearer's attention. Also the possibilities of different attendants for becoming consubstantial become important.

My hypothesis for this study is that the failure of Copenhagen's negotiations becomes obvious already in the speeches that may first look compatible, constructive and discussing together. All the speakers probably name the climate change as a real threat, but the questions concerning responsibility sharing, contract's bindingness or fair compensation for developing nations will divide opinions. This hypothesis will be contested when I start the analysis of the speeches.

2.1.3 Climate change negotiations and identifications

Identification occurs inside each individual's own system of concepts and beliefs. Therefore one's own identity (image of oneself) is very central for possibilities of identification. Everyone has certain "mental borders" outside which identification is nearly impossible: many of these are based on our morals, for example identifying oneself with a cruel murderer is probably not possible for most of us in normal context.⁴ Most of the

⁴ However, this can vary in different contexts: for example, some movies are based on the idea that they make the "normal viewer" identify oneself with the murderer in the film.

borders are less dramatic: in politics, certain parties are ideologically so far from each other that true identification may be in some questions impossible. In the starting point of climate negotiations this border is probably present between North and South.

When analysing the speeches of Copenhagen, it must be kept in mind that the speakers represent their nations and/or organizations and accordingly they have a kind of double identity: one may consider himself as an individual negotiator or as a voice of the whole nation or union. The speaker can even consciously alternate between these positions. Personal pronouns reveal part of the position: if the speaker is "I", it refers to an individual whereas "we" refers to a larger entity, often a group speaker is representing but in some cases even the whole mankind (constituting a conception of "global we").

The question of negotiator identities is most widely discussed under the issues of climate (in)equality and (in)justice. The tension between North and South in the development issues is widely known and it has been a problem for climate negotiations handling the same questions. In *A Climate of Injustice* Roberts and Parks summarize this as follows:

"Climate negotiations, we must remember, take place in the context of an ongoing development crisis and what the global South perceives as a pattern of Northern callousness and opportunism in matters of international political economy." (Roberts & Parks 2006, 23.)

This tension can be then acknowledged as a starting point for Copenhagen negotiations. Roberts mentions many examples from earlier meetings, showing how this North-South-clash can be seen in different views about "real environmental issues" (see eg. Najam 1995), North building mistrust by changing the earlier agreed text parts (Dessai 2001) and fiery disputes about how the justice should be understood in climate negotiation context as there are so many possible interpretations for that concept. (Roberts & Parks 2006, 211-239.)

Following from earlier negotiation conflicts and tensions, it is very probable that the representatives of South and North have very different identities in the climate change

negotiation context and consequently they think the same of each others. The metaphor of two neighbouring but isolated islands is suitable here: both islands have something the other island does not have and they would both benefit in future from co-operation. However, as both islands feel the other island driving only its own benefit, they are not willing to build a bridge between these islands to make sure they don't lose more than has already been lost. One island has the plaster and others have the bricks, but they are not willing to mason together. Sakaranaho (2001) has suggested that Burke's thoughts are useful for analysing situations that contain conflicts between people, just like this one.

The speakers of Copenhagen can try building the bridge between these islands. However, they can also choose to continue the dispute from separate sides instead of being more constructive towards collaboration. Taking a new approach would mean for the representatives that they had to be ready to reform their identities and the conceived identities of the other side. There would be no more "suffering South being still colonialised" or "North that has to do all the sacrifices while South keeps on going and growing" (these pictures are intentionally aggravated to point out the differences). The motivation for my identification analysis is to see how these dynamics work in Copenhagen between the most important speakers, how they identify their own represented entity and in what kind of light they see the others. These issues will be analysed with the tool of argument family classification that will be introduced after describing general argumentation analysis methods first.

2.2 Argumentation analysis: general notions

This study's theoretical background is mostly clarified introducing Burke and supporting it with Malone's thoughts. Yet I feel there are some words to be said before Malone about the methodology of the argumentation study, as Malone leaves that topic mostly aside. It is necessary to clarify some choices made throughout the analysing process, especially the conception of argument itself and its components' relations to each other. I will now deal with these issues.

The phase of scrutinizing speeches and distinguishing the main arguments is faithful to a simple conception of argument and its structure as they are presented in Kakkuri-Knuuttila's *Argumentti ja kritiikki* ("Argument and Critique", 1998). Argument's parts are the claim (main propositions), its grounds (justification / side propositions) and premises. In the analysis of single sentences, this is rather unambiguous (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, 56). However, as I am analysing larger material, some further clarifications must be made.

First, the term *argument* can be used here in two slightly different meanings: 1) the whole argument containing its grounds and premises, or 2) only the actual claim (main proposition) of that whole. Even in the latter case the main proposition is not meant as isolated, and in both cases our focus will be anyway on the main proposition of the argument. Therefore I am confident this concept use does not cause problematic confusions, and if the risk is in some case evident, I will clarify my intentions. By the word *argumentation* I refer to a network of certain speaker's arguments in its entirety.

The focus of argumentation analysis lies in the speakers' main arguments. What makes the recognition process more challenging is the fact that so far clear and simple structure becomes rather complex in the real world of speeches. I try to enlighten this (and my analysis method) with a real example from Obama's Copenhagen speech, showing how its structure can be interpreted.

”Now, as the world's largest economy and as the world's second largest emitter, America bears our responsibility to address climate change, (A) and we intend to

meet that responsibility. That's why we've renewed our leadership within international climate change negotiations. (a.1) That's why we've worked with other nations to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. (a.2) That's why we've taken bold action at home -- by making historic investments in renewable energy; (a.3) by putting our people to work increasing efficiency in our homes and buildings; (a.4) and by pursuing comprehensive legislation to transform to a clean energy economy. (a.5)”
(Underlines and numbering mine)

It can be seen that Obama uses the statements a.1-a.5 to justify the claim A (about finding and recognising the arguments, see Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, 243-253). The supporting statements have their own unexpressed backing: there are for example statistics about investments made to renewal energy. It can be interpreted that statements a.1-a.5 are intended as grounds to the claim A. The passage would contain then one argument concluding that America bears its responsibility to address climate change, having five justification claims. I interpret the argument structure of the speeches in this way.

Distinguishing the arguments from speeches is mechanical work preliminary for the subject of my study, but it is not the subject of my study in itself. Therefore that work will be made in background; however, the process can be seen in the appendix, where I have marked the found main propositions and their supporting statements. This resembles Malone's method of introducing her process in *Debating Climate Change* (Malone 2009, 129-132). I will describe the marking system in the appendix that contains the speeches.

After the arguments are distinguished from the speeches, they will be classified to argument families according to the categorization I will introduce next. The categorization is built on the idea that some argument types support the consubstantiality (unification) of negotiators while others tend to have dividing effect (naturally some arguments may be neutral in these aspects). The categorization will reveal what kind of arguments the speaker has emphasized and what are left aside. Every speech's argumentation "tone" is accordingly revealed, and after analysing chosen speeches their argumentative dynamics and relations with each other will be discussed in the analysis summary.

2.3 Malone's argument family analysis

In *Debating Climate Change: Pathways through Argument to Agreement* Elizabeth L. Malone analyses climate change debate from the sociological framework. Her methodology consists of discourse and social network analyses, combined with the idea of argumentation analysis using argument family classification. (Malone 2009, 58-63.) Here I discuss Malone's thinking concerning argument families, pondering its potential for my own study and then reforming it to a more suitable form for Copenhagen analysis. Malone is approaching the subject from sociological framework, but as I have mentioned, it is futile to draw lines between academic fields as long as the interest is in rhetorical issues. *Debating Climate Change* offers an interesting viewpoint to environmental philosopher interested in rhetorical studies.

Malone's central idea is to recognise the differences and similarities between climate change debaters. This means differences and similarities in backgrounds, types of evidence used, worldviews and proposed actions. Participants are attending the debate from different frameworks, and to get the whole (or at least more complete) picture of the debate it is important to recognise the main features of each framework. Malone's approach is practical, aiming to enlighten what the debate is all about. After all, climate change debate is not a simple discussion about scientific facts but mostly everything else: a cobweb consisting of different attitudes to scientific facts and uncertainties, different value systems, different conceptions of nature and cultural beliefs, distinct views on the severity of climate change and whether we need to do something right now or wait for the future to bring the solutions. (Malone 2009, 2-9.)

A central notion to be made here is that Malone's intentions are linked to mine, not only in the general level of doing argument analysis but also in their kindred objectives: also Malone is dealing with the theme of differences and similarities – something very related to divisions and unities I will be searching. The difference in Malone's work to many earlier studies is her interest in the possibilities of agreement. Former classifications have usually been oriented to clarify people's views of nature or value attitudes in relation to demographic questions (Malone 2009, 58-59).

Malone pays attention to different backgrounds of the debaters, noticing their variation already inside a single field: even the scientists have different paradigms and interests. Scientific evidence forms the basis for climate change discussion, and this level is often fallaciously taken as a cluster of “neutral, non-social facts” that can be used to support own arguments. However, in the climate change debate the scientists take often more social and less neutral roles participating in the discussion about how to deal with the climate change; they are not only stating its existence or articulating scientific evidence. On the other hand, it should be also kept in mind that being a climate scientist does not necessarily involve having a broad view on the problem: many scientists are merely physicians, some economists, some ecologists and so on – experts of their own rather narrow field. Different scientific paradigms and the sociality of scientific community should be recognised along with the realisation of many other voices in the debate, from NGO activists to presidents. (Malone 2009, 28.) Social sciences have a special role in climate change issues, as they explore the questions of how the emissions emerge in our society and how these patterns could be adjusted or changed. They can also help to collect and control the multidisciplinary research and discussion about climate change.

Debates take place in a certain situational context. In Malone's work, this context is the whole entirety of public climate change discussion and accordingly she has tried to reach the study material very broadly, ending up with a hundred of different documents or statements (Malone 2009, 17-18). This is the most significant difference in comparison with my work: I have chosen to analyse the more limited context of Copenhagen climate conference, which will lead to exclusion of some questions Malone has to cope with. This issue will be more dealt in the renewal of argument family classification. My analysis material is also much narrower due to nature of this study.

A minor difference between a sociologist and a philosopher is that the former does not necessarily define the basic concepts as they are usually taken as given in the special sciences. Malone's concept of argument is compatible with generally acknowledged conceptions, like one used in *The New Rhetoric* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) and one I represented earlier from Kakkuri-Knuuttila. One thing that needs more clarification

here is that arguments ought not to be treated as truthbearers (simply true or false). Instead of truthfulness I prefer the term acceptability: when A accepts the premises and the stated conclusion is a coherent / plausible result from those premises, A should agree with the conclusion too (or give strong reasons for disagreement). This conception of argument's nature goes along with what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call *quasi-logical arguments* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 193-260).

Malone's representation of the elements of arguments is socially focused. She contends that arguments' acceptability could be classified in the following way, forming different levels crucial for resolution possibilities: 1) the varying authorities of the debaters, 2) the degree to which the content matters to participants, 3) acceptance of the evidence, 4) worldview and 5) acceptability of a proposal. To mention an example, in a negotiation of family holiday destination parents may have the highest authority, but the issue may matter not so much to them and for that reason they may give the final word to children in certain limits. (Malone 2009, 9-13.)

By analysing a hundred climate change related texts and speeches, Malone arrives at categorising eleven argument families that describe different attitudes towards climate change issue. The categorisation is based on comparative analysis of the arguments, using a structured approach. Each debater's statement (document) was dismantled into four primary rhetorical dimensions (the authority/identity of debater, evidence type, worldview, proposals – notice the similarity to elements of arguments presented earlier). Next, documents were clustered into families based on the similarity of the claims and evidence. (Malone 2009, 58-61.) As a result, Malone ends up with a categorization containing eleven argument families of different attitudes towards climate change:

- 1 Climate isn't changing; the science is incorrect or incomplete.
- 2 Climate is changing, but people needn't do anything. Either human beings are not to blame and/or they will find ways to adapt as it happens, just as they have in the past.
- 3 Climate change is a subject of scientific investigation, and further research will provide knowledge.

- 4 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly development and implementation of effective treaties, conventions, protocols and other policy mechanisms.
- 5 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly new technologies for the energy system.
- 6 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly reduction of emissions, from all sources.
- 7 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly preparation for adaptation that will be necessary.
- 8 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly creation of markets for environmental goods.
- 9 The world needs more of the tools of modernity to address climate change, particularly all feasible mitigation and adaptation actions.
- 10 Climate change is another instance of rich and powerful countries preserving their hegemonic positions.
- 11 Climate change reflects human beings' broken relationship with the natural world. (Malone 2009, xii.)

As can be seen, families 4-9 (“The world needs more of the tools of modernity...”) are rather similar in their belief in modernity's tools. Therefore Malone also develops upper level categorization that I name here by prefix *c* to keep these separate from the sublevel families. These categories are:

- c1 No problem!
 - c2 Climate change could be good for you
 - c3 Science provides knowledge about climate change
 - c4 More modernization is the cure
 - c5 Inequality is the problem
 - c6 Rift with nature
- (Malone 2009, 66.)

In conclusions, Malone describes her results in the level of sublevel categories mentioned

earlier. She found some connections between argument families and qualities of the arguer: especially certain worldviews were associated with certain argument families, but also sources of authority and types of used evidence were linked. The common agreement for different families' representatives was taking the climate change question somehow seriously. Commitment to science was also shared in general level. (Malone 2009, 118-119.) Modernization views were strongly represented by ecomodern and political worldviews (Malone 2009, 93).

In spite of these links and connections, the actions proposed were much less linked. Malone found only some minor clusters: firstly, family 1 (“climate isn't changing”) arguers proposed no action. Secondly, a majority of family 2 (“climate is changing, but adaptation ways will be found”) and family 5 (“new energy technologies are needed”) arguers proposed technological solutions. Thirdly, family 6 (“reduction of emissions is needed”) and 9 (“all feasible mitigation and adaptation actions are needed”) representatives proposed emission reductions in general. (Malone 2009, 93-94.)

Finally Malone discusses promising pathways to agreement and reasons for disagreement. The first possibility is a slow reformation of people's valueland and relationship with the natural world. Other suggestions come from political theorists, some of them proposing that the realization of mutual advantages could lead countries to agree. Others are optimistic about new emerging institutions that push countries towards acting. Many views are based on the idea of self-interest motivating every action, but Malone criticizes this by reminding how great part of our life is formed by social ties based on other principles than pure self-interest. (Malone 2009, 121-123.)

I do agree with Malone on certain level, but in climate negotiations I do not believe in the presence of individual altruism among the speakers: this is because the negotiators are representatives of their nations, facing (in democratic situations) certain expectations from those who mandated them to represent that nation. Therefore my claim is that unfortunately the statesman is usually expected to be guarding primarily his own nation's benefit in this kind of situation. Luckily there is still existing basis for mutual benefit to be recognised and accepted as a rational choice even for those acting selfishly: Stern's

economic report of climate change action suggests that acting now will be cheaper to everyone than acting later or neglecting action.⁵

In summary, Malone's study provides interesting epitome of climate change argumentation. It gives ideas about the uniting and dividing questions and assumptions in climate change discussion, therefore offering a good viewpoint to argumentation analysis of that debate. However, Malone's argument classification system is not the best tool as such for the Copenhagen context. Therefore my next step is to explain why and how Malone's system could be improved for my study's purposes; after this procedure I will end up with a new revised climate argument categorisation serving as an analysis tool to explore the Copenhagen speeches.

2.3.1 Revising Malone's classification to fit Copenhagen

Malone used samples from different debate contexts in her work. Therefore her analysis material differs remarkably from the COP15 material and for this reason I will alter Malone's classification system to suit better for my analysis. It has to be reminded that I find no great deficiencies in Malone's work in her context; the need for changing the classification emerges from our different analysis situations. I start by discussing how Malone's upper level categories could serve as a starting point for renewing the argument family classification.

In the general climate discussion (Malone's context) there is still much debate whether climate is even changing or not and whether there is need to react (Malone 2009, 65-67). These questions are pre-actional in the sense that their answer defines the framework for the action related discussion. COP15 meeting is a special context because its aim was to come into agreement about what should be done to mitigate climate change. Then the discussion in Copenhagen is not anymore about the existence of climate change: it is about action. I therefore assume that the first shared premise of summit participants is the existence of (human-caused) climate change. This constitutes the first major difference between debate contexts. Consequently, Malone's upper level categories c1 ("No

⁵ Stern: The Economics of Climate Change – The Stern Review. (Published 2007)

problem!”) and c2 (“Climate change could be good for you”) turn out to be irrelevant in Copenhagen negotiation context.

Malone's third category, c3 (“Science provides knowledge about climate change”) is also one where probably no one disagrees publicly in Copenhagen. Science related arguments are still used to open the speech: the science has shown how serious and dangerous a problem global warming is and the speakers want to ensure they are taken to acknowledge this. Probably the scientifically based acceptance of climate change's existence serves then as the starting point with which these speeches assume every participant to agree.

What is at stake then are the ways to mitigate the warming, support adaptation of the most vulnerable ones and question of how much and fast emissions should be cut (and by whom). This discussion falls mostly to category c4 (“More modernization is the cure”), but the subcategories differ much from Malone's. In general discussion, there is much debate about the different technologies and mechanisms, but the Copenhagen debate is not that detailed.

The North-South-tension and problems related to development issues are a political hot potato very present in Copenhagen. Upper category c5 (“Inequality is the problem”) is therefore a common area of argumentation. Instead, another inequality-related category of inequality between human and the nature (c6, “Rift with nature”) is surprisingly not present in the analysed summit speeches. The discussion is clearly framed to deal with mankind and its future in modern framework, not to touch the greater question of relationship between man and nature.

To summarise, it seems that some Malone's upper level categories are used in Copenhagen: c3 (“Science provides knowledge about climate change”), c4 (“More modernization is the cure”) and c5 (“Inequality is the problem”). This classification is yet way too general for deeper analysis and therefore I will now dismantle the upper categories into more detailed arguments used in Copenhagen. Before this phase I have explored the speeches and their argumentation to know the used arguments instead of just supposing them. This is also a good place to remind that the point of interest here is especially argumentation's uniting

and dividing nature.

Arguments about science are attached to the negotiation situation: it has been shown that climate change is a serious problem, it is a global problem, and therefore action is demanded now. Often the scientific evidence is an implicit premise. Argument examples run as follows:

“Climate change is a major global challenge. It is the common mission of the entire mankind to curb global warming” (Jiabao Wen)

“...there is a huge amount of scientific support for the view that the climate is changing and as a result of human activity. [...] Also the same science is telling us that time is running out. So action has to be now.” (Tony Blair)

Arguments admitting the seriousness and scientific existence of climate change are all agreeing with each other and their nature is uniting as every negotiator probably shares this as the main premise. It is unnecessary to sort out this group's arguments in a more detailed way. This category serves then as our first argument category: arguments concerning the seriousness and existence of climate change.

Arguments about modernization and inequality are often overlapping. This is natural: modernization has not been a globally equal process and modernization means that the nation is stepping out of the developing and poor status – this has not been in every nation's reach. A claim for compensating the experienced inequality often implies a wish to reach the modernization process in some way. Also, the “modernization tools” often can actually enhance the equality, and on the other hand, the tools for diminishing the inequality are often tools of modernization. For these reasons this categorical division between modernization and inequality needs to be forgotten. As the interest is on the uniting and divisive nature of different arguments, I classify the arguments according to their relation to this uniting/dividing question.

Copenhagen speech material reveals dichotomy in two argumentation themes present: the

speaker's view of his own nation's status in the climate change issue and the view about how other countries should share the burden or get compensation. These can be called simply arguments about represented country's relation to climate change and arguments about other countries' relation to climate change. Both argument types (but especially arguments about represented country) include often a great amount of warrants and backing; I will discuss this during the actual speech analysis. Arguments about own country seem to vary much, often depending on whether the country is developed or a developing one, as examples below show. Therefore I will divide this argument group in two: 1) Arguments that own country is an emitter and that it has born its responsibility, and 2) arguments that own country is one of the sufferers, not responsible for earlier emissions. These categories serve as our second and third argument families. The examples below illustrate the difference.

“Now, as the world's largest economy and as the world's second largest emitter, America bears our responsibility to address climate change.” (Barack Obama)

“We of the developing world are drowning, we are the burning, indeed we are the tragedy that climate changes have turned out to be for the larger half of mankind. Yet we never caused that crisis.” (Mugabe)

Arguments about other countries have same kind of dichotomical nature. In arguments concerning developed North as “others”, the burden taking (in emission cuts and financing the poor countries) is demanded. In the arguments referring to developing countries, the need for sustainability in growth process is emphasized and criteria for financial support are mentioned.

“Developed countries must take the lead in making deep quantified emission cuts and provide financial and technological support to developing countries.” (Jiabao Wen)

”...if Europe and the United States take action to cut emissions, we must work to ensure that the rise in emissions from China, India and other developing nations

does not eclipse that effort and leave the net effect on the climate as it is today or worse.” (Tony Blair)

I have now represented four argument categories relating closely to countries attending the negotiation (and one category related to climate change's existence). There are left four more argument types that are not so clearly connected to certain countries: they may be interesting as well, so they ought to be classified next. As the previous four groups can be (to put it simply) called arguments about countries, following groups contain arguments about the accord's content.

While the first level of agreement is that climate change is happening and emissions should be cut, the important question following is whether this emission mitigation should be controlled and how. Arguments commenting on this question can be categorized to arguments about review mechanism. An example follows.

“The pathways can be adjusted – it might be we have 2025 and 2030 targets as well as 2020. There can be a regular review process – in fact, on any sensible basis there has to be.” (Tony Blair)

From the agreement that something should be done follows also the question of timing: how quickly we should act? Should the accord focus on short-term or long-term targets? This is also naturally related to earlier negotiations and they are often mentioned in this type of arguments. It is describing to call this category arguments about continuation strategy (resolving the climate change challenge). The former argument about review mechanism can also be classified into this category.

“The outcome of this conference must stick to rather than obscure the basic principles enshrined in the Convention and the Protocol. It must follow rather than deviate from the mandate of the "Bali Roadmap". It should lock up rather than deny the consensus and progress already achieved in the negotiations.” (Jiabao Wen)

There is, in addition to these categories, yet maybe the hottest debate topic of the

negotiations, namely the financing. Economic questions become emphasized in the form of North-South-clash. After all, this tension emerges from the great difference in monetary wealth of the nations. As the emission-causing activity should be reduced, North sometimes complains that it is economically unjust to restrict their actions while South is allowed to continue growing without restrictions. On the other hand, as the poor South is already facing the consequences of climate change (dryness, floods, problems in food production and so on) caused by North, it often demands the North to support its adaptation. Also the support for more sustainable growth is demanded.

Arguments about financing are more complex from the viewpoint of unification and division. The starting point is divisive in itself: North and South are set against each other as they are on the different sides on this money allocation question. In most cases of financial aid, some criteria for giving money are set; therefore it would be rather sloppy to consider an argument as dividing on this basis only. Same can be said about the arguments of South demanding funding, as it is the already acknowledged starting point. Unfortunately funding debate is practically discussed behind the curtain and only some aspects get expressed in the public speeches. For this reason, I suggest the approach for categorizing the financial arguments should be here mainly something else than the problematic unifying / dividing aspect.

It is a (mostly, at least) shared premise that if money is given, it should be given from developed countries to poor developing countries for adaptation to climate change related problems and/or to support their development's sustainability. More contested issues are the fund size, principles for sharing the fund's money and administrative principles. These questions concern the details of funding. A comprehensive analysis of these detailed arguments would be a very arduous task, because evaluating their effect on the accord would need a huge amount of background information. It would be necessary to know the earlier fund size proposals, administrative opinions of both North and South representatives and the earlier debates about the funding criteria. This kind of discussion takes its place by large behind the veils, so both accessing and evaluating it would exceed the extent of my study; as my aim is to analyse the public speeches, the idea of thorough fund rhetoric analysis must be dropped out here.

Public funding argumentation seems to take two main forms. Some arguments concern the details I mentioned: they propose a certain sum by certain year, give ideas of how the money should be earmarked or suggest the share of administration seats between North and South. They can be called arguments about fund details. Other funding related arguments in the speeches are of more general nature. They either demand money, promise money or state generally that some money should be reallocated from the developed to developing countries. General funding arguments like these form their own group.

This dualization of funding arguments is plausible for the first analysis phase, and it serves as the basis for the second and more informative phase. After the speeches are analysed one-by-one and the funding arguments compiled, different speakers' arguments can be compared to each other and see whether their promises and demands meet or not. This will then hopefully reveal something more about the dynamics between funding arguments and next emerges the possibility to say more about the unifying or dividing effect behind these arguments. It will also be interesting to see which representatives use most the detailed argumentation.

This revised collection of argument families serves my study sufficiently, producing interesting information but avoiding too detailed level to fragment that information. The final revised classification of arguments looks now as follows:

1. Arguments concerning the seriousness and scientific existence of climate change
2. Arguments that own country is an emitter and has born its responsibility
3. Arguments that own country is one of the sufferers, not responsible for earlier emissions
4. Arguments about “others” (developed countries): demand for action
5. Arguments about “others” (developing countries): demand for sustainability
6. Arguments about continuation strategy: timing and mitigation mechanisms
7. Arguments about the fund details and
8. Arguments about the fund in general.

One possible rejection must now be answered. It can be easily remarked that the argument families look partly biased: for example, group 4 means only arguments that demand action from the developed countries: what if someone praises them for earlier actions? My answer is twofold. Firstly, the situation simply is that the other kinds of arguments are very scarce if there are any. Secondly, this classification of argument families reflects the impression the speeches give with brief look; the classification reflects the deep distinction between North and South.

2.4 Characteristics of speeches

2.4.1 Speech versus text

Rhetorical analysis touches usually text, speech or discussion. Speech and discussion are both oral situations, but actually speeches seem to remind more of a text than a discussion when it comes to their rhetorical nature. I will discuss this nature of speeches now shortly, suggesting text-oriented rhetorical analysis methods as more suitable for speech studies than methods that deal especially with discussions.

The main similarity between a political text and speech is that text can be prepared carefully, re-examined for many rounds and polished as much as the speaker or writer wants. Palonen calls this *a writer sovereignty thesis* in his political rhetoric handling book *Tekstistä politiikkaan* ("From text to politics"). On the other hand, the piece of text or speech receives certain autonomy after this point and it can be interpreted separately from its creator; the text seems to attain some kind of *autonomy of text*. These both qualities are true to some extent, although not an explicit characterization. (Palonen 1988, 78.)

What makes speeches different from texts is that speeches often start to "live at two levels" during this century of technology: the original speech has been held live and this situation can be reached later through the video, repeating speaker's gestures and tones. On the other hand, very often speeches get another life in purely textual form, then becoming what Palonen means by political text (Palonen 1988, 78-79). This study can therefore be

considered also as a political text study, as I have chosen to handle the material in textual form.

2.4.2 Role of the speeches: limits of the analysis

Copenhagen summit was a political situation inheriting many properties from typical western and international (read: United Nations oriented) policymaking culture. Public speeches have an important role, but naturally much of the negotiation process has happened behind a curtain, out of media's straight reach. These private situations are the stage for most difficult conflicts and their solutions; it would be very interesting therefore to see those discussions and analyse them, but unfortunately it is impossible without straight participation to those negotiations.

This dichotomical (both public and private) nature of the negotiations has several consequences to philosophical-rhetorical studies. As we can be only partly informed about contents of Copenhagen's discourses, the causal connections of the summit cannot be fully elaborated. It would be inappropriate to claim that everything causally remarkable has been expressed in public speeches, even in the case I analysed all of the speeches (which I am neither going to do). Accordingly, it would be rather futile to declare who has been the most guilty for the failure of Copenhagen summit. Surely one can express doubts and thoughts about these issues, but there is a great risk for mistakes. Therefore I will avoid the causality questions in my analysis and settle for comparing the analysed speeches' speaker-specific effort for success or failure. Someone could contend I had then nothing to say about the reasons of Copenhagen failure; however, I strongly oppose that criticism. Actually I think that the fresh approach within the frames of identification can give new ideas and answers to these questions despite the lack of causal analyses.

Furthermore, public speeches themselves have certain special qualities that should be recognised. The bigger the country, the more polite it usually tries to be (towards other participants) in its speeches to avoid confrontations because of the growing risks (see for example Palonen & Summa 1996, 98-99). Possibly existing tensions and disagreements are

expressed subtly and indirectly. This is not a major problem for rhetorical study however. When any sign of disagreement or discontent towards other negotiators is found from a speech, it can be safely considered to be serious instead of mere verbal play.

Another special feature of public speech is the relationship between speaker and the audience. There is usually no real interaction between the speaker and the listeners. By "real" I mean here that the speaker has possibilities to make audience shout something like "yes!" or "no!" and the audience can always cheer or boo to speaker, but there is no place for actual discussion. This decreases speaker's possibility to alter his words in a way that would ensure the audience to get correct interpretation. On the other hand this gives the speaker good possibilities to plan the whole speech beforehand. Minor alterations may be made in the last minute, but words and style can be refined carefully.

This prepared nature of the speeches leads to another question, namely one of ghost writers. Nichols has discussed this topic extensively in her book *Rhetoric and Criticism* (Nichols 1963, 35-48). Also Palonen mentions problems of ghost writing issue when writer's relation to his writing is discussed. Ghost writing has been common for centuries and it is still, although the precise extent of this phenomenon is impossible to tell. It is very probable that every major nation uses some ghost writers or other kind of assistance for statesmen. Speeches cannot be therefore attached to the speaker's own personal identity without problems arising. (Palonen 1988, 78-80.)

For the reasons mentioned, I am rather sceptic for analyses that try to tell something about the speaker's character basing the analysis on the public speeches. However, this is not what I am aiming to do in my work. It can be supposed that ghost writers are on the same side as the speaker, representatives of the same themes and arguments, only putting them in better words. I am analysing rhetoric of different participators of Copenhagen, those participators being large entities such as nations, confederations or organizations. Possible ghost writers are then not problematic for this kind of analysis.

One (already mentioned but not discussed) issue following from the nature of speaker-audience-relationship is that there is greater risk for uncorrectable misunderstandings than in normal discussions. Speaker has certain intentions in his mind but it varies greatly how well and precisely these intentions are comprehended by hearers. Naturally also hearer's own prejudices affect the comprehension: the speech is interpreted by its receiver (Palonen 1988, 71-74). It is very rare that hearer would reach precisely speaker's original intentions: this relates to philosophical problem of other minds, stating we have access only to our own mind. We cannot then reliably say anything sure about *speaker's own intentions* and they are better left outside the analysis. Luckily that question is actually not a very interesting one as the public speaker is not trying to assure himself but the audience. Instead, the relevant question is audience's possible comprehensions of the speech. Of course I cannot still place myself inside Obama's mind to catch his precise comprehensions of China's speech, but as there are hundreds of ears in the audience, I can relate myself as one of them, a kind of mediocre listener.

2.4.3 Interpretation as a method

Philosophical-rhetorical analysis of the text provides a great variety of different approaches for speech analysis. The school of new rhetoric is very heterogeneous and as Onkila suggests, it could be seen more as a loose theoretical framework leaving much space to researcher's own method choices and theoretical commitments (Onkila 2009, 75).

Palonen describes one rhetorical approach as interpretation or reading. According to Palonen, this approach sees the research process producing better understanding (from mere understanding) instead of knowledge (as opposed to lack of knowledge). The research is then not claiming to be absolute nor timeless. Every interpretation can be denied and counterarguments can be found. The answers and results of the analysis are never exhaustive. Their purpose is to challenge and change the preconceptions and earlier understanding. Reading as a method leaves space for philosophical ideas and method combinations. On the other hand it requires adhering to certain philosophical principles.

Essentialism must be rejected; in Palonen's words, we have to let go the presumption that things "are in a certain way", that there is only one adequate and exhausting description of those things. (Palonen 1988, 14-16.)

The mentioned view is supported in this study by constructivist approach. It assumes we construct and comprehend our world with language. We also use it as the most crucial medium of social interaction. (Hall 1997.) Language is still not a neutral tool used for construction, but it is also socially and historically conditioned and built; it both reflects and constructs the world (Palonen & Summa 1996, 103).

Method of constructivist interpretation describes my method choice for analysing the signs of identification and division. It is a standpoint for reading texts through the framework of Burke. As a method, it leaves space for philosophical questioning and does not take any strict methodological commitments as given or unquestionable. I contend this slight "looseness" can be well defended. Climate change, the big question behind my study, cannot be fully comprehended from any single scientific faculty, nor a single theoretical framework. Same concerns studies that try to give us more understanding about the discussion and policies concerning climate change.

3: THE ANALYSIS

3.1 Climate negotiations: the background

It is crucial for my study to understand the Copenhagen summit's nature as a negotiation event and its historical perspectives. Therefore I will explore these issues briefly before starting the analysis of summit's speeches.

United Nations Climate Change Conference of Copenhagen, also known shortly as COP15, was held between December 7th and 19th in 2009. There were totally around 15 000 participants according to newspapers. This meeting was 15th to UNFCCC (Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). So, the climate negotiations are not as new events as it could be supposed on the basis of their media attention: the first "climate summit", shortly COP1, was held already in 1995. Two years later the meeting was held in Kyoto and produced the well-known Kyoto Protocol defining reduction mechanisms and obligations for countries listed in Annex I (developed countries). Since Kyoto, meetings have been held at least once every year. The Montreal meeting in 2005 was also considered as the first official Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol since 1997.⁶

The amount of meetings indicates the complexity and arduousness of negotiating process. This challenge is not unique to climate negotiations but exists in many political situations where different interests collide. Resulting contracts are often tradeoffs from these conflicting opinions and the more precise contract text, the harder it is to get accepted by every participator. Consequently the negotiations take often rather long time.

This problem of conflicting interests has many levels in climate negotiation history. Roberts (2007) has summarised justice and equality related questions in his book. Already

⁶ For the history, see for example UNFCCC's own website: <http://unfccc.int/>

during the 1970s there was debate whether Southern population growth or Northern profligate consumption was the greatest threat for the environment (Roberts & Parks 2007, 36-37). Global inequality issue and the problems it has reflected on the negotiations is dealt throughout the book. International economic issues are inevitably linked with the environmental ones. According to Roberts, "the root of the problem [...] is the spill over of economic development issues into environmental diplomacy; for example, unkept aid promises and the onerous requirements of participating in Western-dominated international economic institutions like the IMF and the WTO" (Roberts & Parks 2006, 213).

The historical nature of conflicts between nations is also present in climate change negotiations. Speakers may change but the national entities remain much the same: their earlier history is nailed to the nation's flag and usually every country's physical size and relation to other countries remains quite the same. As with individuals, historical experiences and events have effects on the identity of a certain country. History of colonization is still present for most of the developing countries and is reflected in their attitudes for colonisers. Unkept aid promises (mentioned by Roberts) widen this gap of bitterness and make it harder to achieve collaborative attitudes. Earlier conflicts stay in nations' "memories" in the form of tensions and lack of trust.

3.2 Tony Blair (The Climate Group), 14 December

Blair's role in Copenhagen climate summit is a little bit confusing. Blair was introducing results of The Climate Group that is working with The Office of Tony Blair. The group was especially trying to discuss the conflict points of Copenhagen summit to increase the possibility of an accord. In a way this group can be therefore considered as a non-governmental organisation and Blair representative of it.

What makes the situation more difficult however, in the Copenhagen news Blair was usually referred as "former Prime Minister" (for example in The Guardian, and Telegraph). It is rather probable that many participants saw Blair more in this status instead of

representing an impartial climate organization.

Identification analysis

Blair starts very clearly and strongly stressing that Copenhagen summit can and should result an accord even though it may be not what he calls the best accord. "We should not make the best the enemy of the good" is the first occurrence of Blair's negotiator identification attempt and it goes straightforward to call the negotiator group as one. He does not question the unity of negotiators but rhetorically assumes it.

Blair makes a reference to earlier weeks' skepticism about the necessity of Copenhagen negotiations. This is an implicit division of the world to climate sceptics and "us". The division of sceptics to "others" is itself an unnecessary division in front of the summit, but in a parallel way it is actually serving as an identification of the negotiators and most of the world as one.

Blair keeps the usage of his "negotiator we" rather coherent throughout his speech. He recognises in the speech the interests of both developed and developing nations. Then Blair turns to mention China and India by their name, because their population is multiple compared to Europe and America together and their development status makes them special challenges. The expression Blair has chosen is that in industrialization these nations "need in partnership with us to find the ways they can do it sustainably". This is a place where a division among the audience may have occurred because of the us-them-language. Blair continues pondering the difficulty of burden sharing in today and in future: here again "China, India and other developing nations" are the difficult case. This point is undoubtedly valid but may cause feelings of division as a reaction. Surely China and India are not hooraying and feeling very collaborative attitudes and interests with Blair, which would be the prerequisite for identifying themselves together as one.

Next Blair returns back to the accord issue in general level. He reminds that in Copenhagen

”we need to make policy”, referring again to all the negotiators. Blair goes on to sketch some analysis results of The Climate Group he has been working with. He identifies himself with that group and explores the emission cut techniques and possibilities the group considered important. This can be considered a division – it may be hard for someone to identify himself with a group he is not member of. However, more important than actual membership may be the image and identity of that group: non-members can still feel to have same interests with the group. In this case Blair makes it clear that the Climate Group is an impartial organization established for fighting climate change. Every negotiator is capable of identifying oneself with this kind of goal, as the same goal is also Copenhagen convention's target. For these reasons I propose that when Blair identifies himself to his organization, this division (of members and non-members) is not as strong as it would be in the case of identification with certain nationality.

When the issue turns to funding the developing world, Blair seems to place himself again in the group of all the negotiating countries. This identification is carried along very clearly as can be seen in his appeals to action: ”And that really is the objective for Copenhagen: to get us moving. To be the signal set that makes us switch track to a low carbon future.” A subtle reference to challenging participators is made: Blair wants the Copenhagen ”make sure that everyone is on the train, going in the same direction”. I suggest this is yet not a division as it is rhetorically built on the plead for staying together. According to Blair, we are together on this board, heading for new global economy and low carbon future.

The rest of the speech keeps the ”we” referring to negotiators and their countries. It is our negotiating group that has come far since Kyoto and the agreement is within our grasp, Blair reminds. Blair identifies himself with one big group of negotiating rather coherently throughout the rest of his speech. The difference compared to many other speakers is that the second ”we” present in parts of the speech does not refer to a single country or union of the countries but an NGO organisation. Following from the earlier arguments I made, I suggest Blair's speech is much less dividing than most other speeches of my analysis.

Argumentation analysis

Argumentatively Blair offers a little different argumentation from other speakers, as he is actually not representing any particular country (although people probably associate him to Great Britain). The beginning of the speech emphasizes the possibilities and importance of the deal: this is an argument answering to question of continuation strategy (argument family 6) and it is repeated both in shorter and longer forms. Blair also argues about the climate change, not claiming it as certainly proved phenomenon but having a huge scientific support, which in itself is a reason to act from a precautionist point of view.

”My simple message today is this: there can be a deal at Copenhagen. There should be a deal.” (Arg. 6)

”We should take the most ambitious level of commitment to cutting emissions, from both developed and developing nations, that is on the table now, accumulate it, make it the basis of the agreement, add to it in ways that we know can make a difference within the next ten or fifteen years, especially in areas like deforestation, and get moving [...] As our understanding of the science and technology then increases, precisely under the impetus of such an accord, we can review progress and accelerate. The first review would start at the halfway point to 2020.” (Arg. 6)

”What is beyond debate, however, is that there is a huge amount of scientific support for the view that the climate is changing and as a result of human activity.

Therefore, even purely as a matter of precaution, given the seriousness of the consequences if such a view is correct, and the time it will take for action to take effect, we should act.” (Arg. 1)

Next the attention is turned to largest and fast-growing developing economies, China and India. Their industrialisation is recognised and accordingly its sustainability is demanded, although Blair does it indirectly by insisting developed countries' support to make that

growth sustainable.

”China will be a country with a population double that of Europe and America combined. India has over one billion people. As they industrialise, they need in partnership with us to find the ways they can do it sustainably.” (Arg. 5)

This argument is repeated in another form, concentrating on the whole developing world and its growth. It is argumentatively interesting that here Blair actually presupposes emission cutting actions of Europe and the United States to be probable. In other words, Blair either takes their action as granted or (more probably, in my opinion) wants to rhetorically choose the words that imply this level of action as normatively self-evident.

”...even if Europe and the United States take action to cut emissions, we must work to ensure that the rise in emissions from China, India and other developing nations does not eclipse that effort and leave the net effect on the climate as it is today or worse.” (Arg. 5)

As mentioned, Blair is not representing any certain nation but an organisation he is working in. This organisation's analysis of the earlier commitments and their foundations is described rather extensively, and the main proposition of these passages must be sought for a while. First Blair starts by reminding that many countries have set at least two different programmes for climate actions: a ”basic action” and an ”ambitious” programme, the latter being chosen if the rest of the world is also choosing to be ambitious enough. The more exact promises are then described as backing data for this argument. Next Blair concentrates on assuring that these ambitious programmes together constitute a major policy shift and as the future will bring us more ways to cut emissions, these commitments can produce a great difference. To back up this proposition, Blair goes to more detailed level listing the emission mitigation possibilities of the future. This passage contains Blair's (or his organisation's) argument about continuation strategy: most important is to make at least some commitments for early years now, which will in turn increase the possibilities

that in some years countries will move from basic to ambitious programmes. Joined with this argument goes Blair's general suggestion for need of funding. According to him, it concerns also funding that something must be started now and more details and greater sums can be sought later.

”Of course, the issue of funding for accelerated progress in the developing world arises. We may need, as we outline very large funding streams by 2020 and thereafter. But again, let us begin with a straightforward starting commitment for the early years and get going.”

(Arg. 8)

”And that really is the objective for Copenhagen: to get us moving. To be the signal set that makes us switch track to a low carbon future. And to make sure that everyone is on the train, going in the same direction.” (Arg. 6)

Going towards the closure passages, Blair reminds once again that world is changing fast and now it is relevant to set the framework for the fast changing future. The details are less important than switching the track and getting everyone on the same train. This is backed up by a trustful notion that business will also start changing itself as soon as it has the clarity of the new direction.

”The moment global business knows the direction, it will start to behave accordingly. But it needs that clarity of direction and it needs it now. The pathways can be adjusted – it might be we have 2025 and 2030 targets as well as 2020. There can be a regular review process – in fact, on any sensible basis there has to be. But rather than fixate on this precise percentage reduction or that, get the realistic best we can now, which could still be radical, and spend our time and thought then on practical programmes of change: on technology transfer, effective mechanisms of funding, deforestation, and collaboration. Design the instruments that make it happen effectively.” (Arg. 6)

In summary, Blair's argumentation contains as main points arguments from families 1, 5, 6 and 8. As Blair is representing an organisation instead of his nation, absence of argument families 2 and 3 (arguments concerning speaker's own country) was expectable. More remarkable is avoidance of family 4, demand for developed countries to act. My suggestion is that this is a carefully made, intentional choice regarding Blair's history as Great Britain's prime minister. Blair might be in risk of losing some appreciation from developed countries if he demanded action from "them", as from the developed countries' viewpoint Blair is still an insider and should speak developed countries as "us". It seems that argumentatively Blair can keep himself mostly outside from both sides of the developed-developing-duality, representing a "neutral" organization (neutral considering these terms; in other measures the neutrality may naturally be questioned).

Half of Blair's argumentation is concentrated on the argument family 6, arguments about the continuation strategy. He emphasizes the importance of some commitment being made now by everyone, therefore focusing on short-term targets now and considering long-term targets later. Arguments from family 5 (demand for sustainability in developing countries' growth) and 8 (general funding argument) are intended to express the possible problems of longer-term process. To characterize this ensemble of arguments, I would encapsulate Blair's argumentation as an **emphasis on the accord's urgency, spoken without a nation's mouth.**

3.3 Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), 16 December

Zimbabwe is a nation in southern Africa. It is ranked among the world's most undeveloped countries and its Human Development Index is also one of the worst. Therefore it is a good example of the most vulnerable and weak countries. Zimbabwe's representative, president Robert Mugabe, has lead the country since 1987. The country has struggled lately with hyperinflation and its own currency Zimbabwe dollar is now mostly rejected. Amnesty International has also criticized Zimbabwe's human right situation in its reports.⁷

⁷ See Amnesty International report 2010: The state of the world's human rights

Identification analysis

Mugabe's speech style differs very much from the speakers of major Western countries, already from the beginning. There are no separated themes but the whole speech follows one aspect. Mugabe starts by greeting many representatives and institutions mentioning their name and "your excellency/excellencies". This politeness may be just a cultural detail, but it may also reflect the relationship between these instances: the leading institutions do not call the other participators "your excellencies" while the minor representatives are more likely to use submissive greetings.

After greeting Mugabe starts speaking clearly as a representative of his own country: he refers to "my delegation" that "felt encouraged by what we saw as a commitment by all countries towards a successful outcome of the Copenhagen Conference" (in September's pre-meeting).

Essential contents start rather similarly with other speeches by admitting the severity of situation and agreeing that our planet really needs actions. What differs from other speakers, Mugabe is not subtle in labeling the "guilty ones": according to him, the planet is in danger "because of the planet unfriendly model of development pursued by some of us in the so-called highly-industrialised developed world, all to our collective detriment." Here the "us" refers to the negotiating countries. Mugabe sets up a clear division to those with dangerous and unfriendly development models (to say, developed countries) and to those without. Mugabe also expresses clearly his scepticism of the developed and industrialised nature of that polluting part of the world. It is here irrelevant how true this criticism may actually be: the problem for the negotiating situation is its strong division: if the problem of COP15 was metaphorically expressed the lack of bridge between North and South, then Mugabe is here throwing his bricks straight to the depths of the sea.

Mugabe's identification is next expanded to cover the developing world but division to "suffering us" and "destroying, ignorant them" stays strong: he even calls possibly

doubting Thomases to visit "our part of the world". An interesting question here is whether Mugabe actually identifies the unfriendly developed countries with doubting Thomases. His intention cannot be read reliably here but can be understood in many ways. The division to developing and developed ones is sticky in Mugabe's speech as he continues. "We are the tragedy", "we never caused that crisis" and "we thus come here hoping for justice and fairness" are clear expressions of that division. However, this hope for justice and fairness is here in a place where it probably fell on deaf ears: a call for help after condemning the possible helpers (developed countries) and dividing them to "the others" may look like a bad joke for the hearers.

Next, Mugabe goes on to criticize the "well intentioned rhetoric on climate change". According to him, aspirations to global dominance lie under this rhetoric. This is a strong division with which Mugabe refers again to dominant economies. He also then refers straightly to the North-South division that has been apparent during the whole speech. The language used is again rather straight and hard as an example illustrates: "Why is the guilty north not showing the same fundamentalist spirit it exhibits in our developing countries on human rights matters on this more menacing question of climate change?" Furthermore, he asks whether *spitting at Kyoto protocol* (what he says major economies are doing) is not a gross human right violation.

When Mugabe returns to use the pronoun "we" that raised these divisions, he refers to developing nations that he calls "the lesser mortals" compared to the "capitalist gods" (these word choices were really made by him). The division is exacerbated and locked with the strong word choices: there is no call for opening this discussion connection and collaborative identification anymore.

In the speech's summary, Zimbabwe represents itself as one of Africa and Africa as one, "we". Mugabe demands the developed world to take more effective emission cuts and support the developing countries to adapt climate change. He sees Africa as a poor steward of Earth's badly needed lungs, deserving better funding and technology transfer. Any denials of their right to development are unfair, basing only on the guilty of the North.

Africa has sacrificed already a lot and Zimbabwe itself is suffering from illegal sanctions by the west (these are Mugabe's points; I am not here to judge whether these sanctions towards Zimbabwe are righteous or not).

In his closure, Mugabe refers to issues that affect *our* planet. Actually the three expressions about "our planet" are the only places where Mugabe refers to whole mankind as one. Therefore Mugabe's speech cannot be considered to include nearly any attempts for global identification. Instead it is strikingly full of divisions to "us" and "them", the innocent suffering South and guilty North, the world domination aspiring major gods and less immortal poor countries tending the lungs of the Earth.

The main message of the speech should be familiar to anyone who has read about the general attitude and argument differences between North and South in climate debate. What is striking then is the way Zimbabwe's speaker expresses these issues. As mentioned earlier, rhetoric is not so often about what is said but *how* it is said. There are doubtlessly a bunch of different ways to express the guiltiness of North and vulnerability of South. Why has Mugabe chosen this sharp-tempered words, expressions and tropes?

Argumentation analysis

Zimbabwe's representative starts argumentation by taking the audience back to United Nations General Assembly held on 22nd September same year. He reminds there was a commitment towards a successful outcome in Copenhagen and gives that meeting a special credit in assuring how great a danger climate change is for the planet. In earlier analysis section I paid attention to Mugabe's choice of words and colourful language use. The same element is present here.

"We were assured by what appeared a palpable global realisation that indeed our planet was in great danger because of the planet unfriendly model of development"
(Arg. 1)

This argument of the seriousness of climate change is supported by warrants that refer to the real situation of small island states sinking unavoidably and of Africa facing drought. From this overview the speaker identifies himself with the whole suffering world, and therefore argumentation about "own country" contains a reference to the whole developing world. It states clearly a claim from argument family 3: own country is suffering and not responsible for earlier emissions. This also leads naturally to an argument about other countries: a demand for developed countries to act.

"We of the developing world are drowning, we are the burning, indeed we are the tragedy that climate changes have turned out to be for the larger half of mankind. Yet we never caused that crisis." (Arg. 3)

"We thus come here hoping for justice and fairness, indeed for decisions that recognise the urgency of our situation, that recognise the undeserved climatic endgame that stares us in the face." (Arg. 4)

Argumentation goes on with critic of hegemonic development paradigm, directed towards developed world and especially the major economies. This supporting argumentation finally arrives at its main point: a statement expressing very suspicious attitude about North's intentions and ability to be a part of a fair global accord. If I had an argument family of general suspiciousness about the accord, this would fall in it; in the classification now used it is more an indirect demand for developed world to change this old course and act in a different manner. This demand for action of North is repeated several times indirectly, dressed in a form of questions. The last example here includes also the argument related to funding (demand for support for developing countries).

"The dominant north-south divide that has been the bane of so many international initiatives once again rears its ugly head on this very question, at this very conference. We are split along the same old north-south dichotomy." (Arg. 4)

”Why is the guilty north not showing the same fundamentalist spirit it exhibits in our developing countries on human rights matters on this more menacing question of climate change?” (Arg. 4)

”It simply has become imperative that the developed world, itself the leading sinner on climate offences takes serious and effective measures to cut emissions on the one hand, while supporting developing countries to adapt to and mitigate the effects of this man-made planetary, if not cosmic disaster.” (Arg. 4, Arg. 8)

Funding for the developing world is strongly demanded in Zimbabwe's speech. It is rationalized by the facts that developing world owns ”the world's lungs” that are very important for the planet as they are carbon sinks.

”We who tend the forest so badly needed to heal the ecosystem deserve better funding, and improved access to green technology transfer. We need to have our national capacities augmented so we are able to pursue the clean development paradigm underpinned by clean technologies to build a brave new world where humanity lives in greater harmony with nature.” (Arg. 8)

”We deserve better support than we have had to date.” (Arg. 8)

Zimbabwe's speech gives a rather clear picture of its argumentative focus. Argument families 1, 3, 4 and 8 are present in the main claims of the speech. From nine main points quoted here, four falls in the family 4 (Arguments about other, developed countries: demand for action) and three fall in the category 8 (Arguments about the fund in general) demanding the financial support. Hence, the speech is very clearly directed towards the North, first announcing its guiltiness and then demanding for reallocation of the money through the fund. To encapsulate the argumentative impression Mugabe gives in this

speech, I call this entirety **the sufferer's demand of retributive justice**.

3.4 Meles Zenawi (the African Union), 16 December

Meles Zenawi is the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. In Copenhagen Zenawi spoke on behalf of the African group AU, the African Union (formerly organization was known as OAU, the Organization of African Unity). The African Union consists of 53 African states which makes it a representative of nearly every African country. It was established in 2002, but its predecessor OAU was founded in 1963, so the organization has history far beyond the climate talk.⁸

Zenawi himself has been the leading characters of Ethiopia since 1991, first as the President and since 1995 as the Prime Minister. He is known for many structural reforms, receiving both appraisal and critique. It would require deeper investigation to say something more about Zenawi himself, but I have to settle for stating that he is a controversial leader and spokesperson. Although he is not a straight representative of his own country only, Ethiopia's situation surely affects his attitudes and speech. Ethiopia has been ranked as one of the world's most vulnerable countries for climate disasters (Roberts & Parks 2007, 77-80). It is also one of Africa's most populated countries and its HDI (Human Development Index) is among the lowest of the world making it clearly a developing country.

Identification analysis

In the beginning Zenawi admits the climate change is a severe, catastrophic problem. He names Copenhagen's summit "our best and perhaps our last chance to save our planet from destructive and unpredictable change". This is a call for identification of all the negotiators and the whole mankind sharing this planet.

⁸ See <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm> (read 20 October 2010)

The same style of speech continues as Zenawi names straightly "we" as a global community. He also predicts the world will actually be more as one in political and economic matters. There is even a reference to a world government that may become the topic of "our new century" – this expression Zenawi repeats later and it seems to be part of the attempt to build a strong common identification. However it can be asked how a hearer with disbelief in world government would react to this kind of global identification.

After this groundwork building Zenawi turns to speak about Africa. He introduces African Union's decision to speak with one voice, "we", and work with one negotiating team. It is reminded many times that the voice now speaking is on behalf of the whole Africa. Zenawi brings out that Africa is not the cause but it suffers most from climate change. He describes how the climate change is already present, sowing misery and death caused by the carbon intensive development in the developed countries. A division of the guilty ones and sufferers is here present.

What makes a difference next is that Zenawi attempts to detach from this division built earlier and replace it with an identification. "But we are not here as victims nursing our wounds of injustice of the past [...] but as stakeholders of the future reaching out across the continents, so that together we can build a better and fairer future for all of us." This is identificationally a fresh movement: an attempt to call people away from their foxholes to build a new bridge between the islands of North and South.

Throughout the speech Zenawi tries to emphasize that Africa has not and probably will neither in future be a significant greenhouse emission contributor. As an example he mentions Ethiopia's own goal to keep growing but at the same time become carbon neutral by 2025, when it is predicted to be a middle income country. Expressions such as "our ambitions as Africans" try to retain the identification to Africa as a whole. The speaker also gives appraisal to high African morality towards protecting environment and valuing nature. After these words he however takes a rhetoric step backwards reminding that Africa is here not to declare its glory and morality but to negotiate.

Zenawi uses a couple of collecting "negotiator we" expressions before he turns to declare the proposals of African delegation. The proposals concern funding in shorter and longer term and the administration of the fund. In each proposal's introductory words Zenawi uses the expression "I propose", which has been a more rare choice in the representatives' speeches. This "I" refers to African Union, but leaves the possibility to keep to word "we" reserved more coherently for references to negotiating community or global mankind.

After expressing the fund related proposals, Zenawi takes identificationally an interesting move: "I know my proposal today will disappoint those Africans who from the point of justice have asked for full compensation of the damage done to our development prospects." Next Zenawi explains why the proposals scale back from expectations: to increase negotiations' possibility to succeed, to lose only something instead of losing everything (as would be a result of no contract). I find two rather different interpretations for the intentions of this rhetorical move. First possibility is that this is "genuine speech": that African Union and consequently Africa has really forgone many of its requirements with good will for common contract and Zenawi tries here to diminish the feelings that African Union has therefore actually disidentified itself from African people. On the other hand it is possible that this is no more than very tactical rhetoric: by this expression Zenawi may try to increase the developed countries' feeling about how flexible, cooperative and supple Africa has been while the fact may be other. To say reliably which interpretation is closer is unfortunately out of this study's reach as it would require deeper studying of Africa's proposals history in climate negotiations in the last 15 years. It is also naturally possible and rather probable that the answer lies in some combination of these interpretations.

In the closures of his speech Zenawi gives mixed messages. In some sentences he refers with "we" clearly to Africa. Some sentences are still confusing, especially the sentence quoted here: "We are determined to make sure that in Copenhagen we will have an agreement that all of us, Africa included, are happy with or there will be no agreement for anyone." It seems that he speaks on behalf of Africa, but the expression of "all of us" refers

also to other participators. Zenawi himself calls this expression a "solemn promise" instead of an idle threat. Identificationally it is a sign of some division: this is present in the form expressing also the negative possibility (no agreement for anyone) instead of expressing only belief in the agreement that everyone would be happy with.

Argumentation analysis

Zenawi starts argumentation by stating clearly the shared premise: admitting existence and seriousness of the climate change caused by man. This is followed by a conjecture that Copenhagen summit may be the best if not even the last chance to change the course of human action threatening our planet.

Global warming is happening. The rise of catastrophic climate change is very real. The science is as clear as it could ever be as to what the causes of such change are. (Arg. 1)

Next, Zenawi denotes his view about climate change's causes and consequences in relation to his own continent. The argument is most clearly of family 3; that his own continent is one of the sufferers but not responsible for what has happened. In the repetition of the same argument, the complementary argument is implied: the claim that developed countries have caused the problem and the situation being fundamentally unjust, which consequently implies one more argument demanding action from the developed countries (family 4).

Every one of us knows that Africa has contributed virtually nothing to global warming but has been hit first and hardest. The fragility of our eco-system has meant that for Africans the damage of climate change is not something that could happen in the future. (Arg. 3)

Africa is indeed paying with the misery and death of its people for the wealth and

wellbeing that was created in the developed countries through carbon intensive development. That is fundamentally unjust. (Arg. 3, Arg. 4)

More arguments emerge, some of them being implicit at first look. Zenawi continues discussing Africa's relation to climate change, but now in the future aspect: Africa is unlikely to become any significant polluter. The main point of this statement can be found by asking why Zenawi has chosen to express this kind of fact in the climate change negotiations. The answer lies rather surely in the development questions: this is a statement that the right to development should not be denied from Africa and it should not face emission restrictions now, because according to the speaker they will be irrelevant in Africa's case anyway. This is argument about continuation strategy: a contention that emission mitigation issues should not concern Africa.

Not only has Africa contributed virtually nothing to the current level of carbon emissions, but is unlikely under any scenario to be a significant polluter in the future. Africa is a green field that can and wants to chart a different course of development, one that is not carbon intensive. (Arg. 6)

Zenawi's speech is intended to focus on the funding arguments that are expressed in the most detailed way (compared to other speeches of my analysis). This is a natural consequence from the speech here being the "united will" of the African Union. Argumentation about financial issues is split into three sections. Firstly, Zenawi deals with the start-up funding, its sums and how the money should be allocated. Next section concerns long-term financing, its sums and allocation and in addition financing mechanisms. Third point concerns the administrative issues. Argumentation is here so detailed that every sentence is an independent proposition and I see it futile to repeat everything here, as it will be more relevant in the later summarizing fund argument analysis. It is sufficient to conclude that Zenawi puts out three different types of main arguments about fund details, and the examples below show their nature.

[On start-up funding I propose:] Support the establishment of a start-up fund of 10 billion dollars per annum for the three years of 2010-2012 to be used to address urgent adaptation and mitigation tasks including forestry and to prepare plans for more ambitious programs in the future. (Arg. 7)

[On long-term finance I propose:] That funding for adaptation and mitigation start by 2013 to reach up to 50 billion dollars per annum by 2015 and 100 billion per annum by 2020. (Arg. 7)

[On the administration of the fund I propose:] That a fund for adaptation, and a fund for mitigation be established under the authority of the conference of the parties which should determine such things as access criteria, broad parameters for allocation of the fund etc. (Arg. 7)

In the concluding parts of the speech Zenawi tries to make clear to audience that Africa is here being flexible from its original expectations, now asking for much less than earlier. This part of speech is meant to give a positive impression about Africa's attitudes towards negotiation outcomes and it does not include more relevant arguments.

In conclusion, the African Union's speech uses argument families 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 but it is emphasizing and focusing clearly on the family 7 (arguments about fund details). It is notable that contrary to Zimbabwe's speech, rather large part of the argumentation revolves around the practical questions, not earlier injustices. It also seems that the African group has weakened its demands from earlier ones according to this speech. Despite of some mixed messages, argumentation is practical and focused on how to make an accord possible. Zenawi's argumentation seems to be by its nature **politely flexible, yet detailed demand for funding Africa.**

3.5 Jiabao Wen (China), 18 December

China has been one of the "burdensome" partners in the history of climate negotiations, demanding others to take the responsibilities and refusing to adopt earlier climate treaties. China is also a very special nation in the climate change puzzle: its economy has grown explosively during the last 15 years (the time scale of climate negotiations also) and it has become from developing country to a newly industrialized country whose total GDP is among the greatest in the world. As the climate negotiators find themselves often divided to "developed North" and "developing South" with the tension between, this newly industrialized country group has somewhat special place in between. Therefore it is especially interesting to see, how China places itself in this classification. Wen himself has been China's Prime Minister since 2003 and is often considered as one of the most powerful statesmen in the world.

Identification analysis

In the opening chapter, Wen takes a stand as one of the negotiators: his "we" refers to the people that attend the summit in order to achieve a contract. He then expands the sphere to touch the whole mankind and our planet: "It is the common mission of the entire mankind to curb global warming and save our planet. It is incumbent upon all of us, each and every country, nation, enterprise and individual to act, and act now in response to this challenge." However, this identification seems weaker than in other speeches as Wen could have chosen to use less naming or divisions that are somehow disjunctive by definition: countries, nations, enterprises and individuals are concepts that divide people to "me or you" and "us or them". No one is a member of every country, there is no such (meaningful) concept as a global common enterprise and so on. Therefore I interpret the beginning of Wen's speech as a weak attempt to identify himself and China with the other world, still reminding of the many existing divisions. As nearly every speaker, also Wen expresses the worry about severity of climate change.

The speech has two rather different main sections: first part is about China and the second

part names certain principles Wen wishes the contract to have. The first part consists of examples supporting Wen's main argument that "China has taken climate change very seriously in the course of its development" (straight quote from the speech). This is an identification not only with the nation but with the certain concept of the climate change mitigation project: the concept is that China is one of the most-striven countries in this planet saving endeavour.

Wen reminds the hearers about China's poverty problem. This makes China's case of identification very complex. It wants to stand out from developing countries and show itself as one of the leaders in the climate and economy growth projects of the world; on the other hand, it wants to be separated from the rich and developed countries that don't have to face "the arduous task of developing the economy and improving people's livelihood". Both developing and developed countries are called "them". Metaphorically it seems China wants to be a lonely island between the continents of developing and developed nations.

The second main part of the speech deals with Copenhagen's contract. As Wen expresses, he wishes to emphasize the contract makers (that become the new "we") must adhere to certain principles: consistency of outcomes, upholding the fair principles, paying attention to targets' practicality and ensuring the effectiveness of different institutions or emission mitigation mechanisms.

Consistency of outcomes means here that earlier contracts and Bali roadmap must be respected. It is left unclear what Wen here actually wants to emphasize as consistency: is it China's status as a developing country in the times of Kyoto, keeping the future contracts as vague and non-obligatory as earlier contracts are or something else?

The principle of fairness puts the responsibility of emission mitigation to developed countries because of their larger historical share of emissions. Developed countries should also give financial support to developing countries.

Wen's third point about practicality of targets is a demand for shorter-term targets and honouring the earlier commitments. This is a repetition of the argument "developed

countries should have the responsibility in the first hand” (and here China should not be considered as one of them, according to Wen). The same theme continues in the last principle, asking for the international community to urge developed countries to honour their commitments. Here Wen also mentions financial support to developing countries (again) and importance of transferring the climate-friendly technologies.

In the closure of his speech, Wen returns to stand in the podium clearly as a representative of China. The argumentation concludes (in Wen's words even underlines) China's responsibility in these issues and states that China will be ”fully committed to achieving and even exceeding the target [it has set to itself]” no matter what the outcome of Copenhagen negotiations is.

According to many international press agencies (Reuters to mention), Wen's speech was received with great international criticism and called a negotiation obstructor.⁹ Although it is sad to mention, reasons for these critical considerations can be seen rather clearly already in this identification analysis. China is not standing with the people of our planet or even with the negotiators of the COP15 summit. Despite of a few identifications as ”we negotiators”, China tries to stand as an independent island, world's fastest growing economy that came to prove how much it has already done to fight climate change. There was probably no moment of true identification effect of Wen and China with the audience or other world.

Argumentation analysis

Wen starts argumentation with an agreement of shared premise.

Climate change is a major global challenge. It is the common mission of the entire mankind to curb global warming and save our planet. (Arg. 1)

Attention is next turned to China's own situation. It is an interesting case, as China is one of the countries having strong development and modernization course at the moment,

⁹ See for example <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BO0C320091225> (read 7 October 7 2010)

moving its status from developing to developed nation category. On the other hand, contrary to most of the other less rich countries, China's enormous size has caused it to become already the world's largest emitter measured in total emissions.¹⁰ This gives it a push to argue for its own emission reduction (and admit that it is one of the most significant emitters). The argumentation is started from this point, although China's rank in emission list is not mentioned. The main argument "China has born its responsibility in emission reduction" is warranted with plentiful examples. As the argumentation takes very much space in Wen's speech, I have here cut the repetition and some more general examples away from the quotes, leaving the most relevant statements.

"China has taken climate change very seriously in the course of its development. [...] China has made the most intensive efforts in energy conservation and pollution reduction in recent years. [...] We have introduced 10 major energy conservation projects and launched an energy conservation campaign involving 1,000 enterprises, bringing energy-saving action to industry, transportation, construction and other key sectors. [...] By the end of the first half of this year, China's energy consumption per unit of GDP had dropped by 13 percent from the 2005 level, equivalent to reducing 800 million tons of carbon dioxide." (Arg. 2)

"China has enjoyed the fastest growth of new energy and renewable energy. [...] China ranked first in the world in terms of installed hydro power capacity, nuclear power capacity under construction, the coverage of solar water heating panels and photovoltaic power capacity. China has the largest area of man-made forests in the world." (Arg. 2)

Although I have no aim to analyse the arguments thoroughly in their validity or assertiveness, some points are to be remarked here. Wen lists many examples showing China's responsibility bearing efforts: the fastest growth of renewable energy, world's greatest amount of hydropower and largest man-made forests in the world. These facts are related to numbers (which makes them sound very exact and convincing), and most of

¹⁰ United Nations / Millennium Development Goals Indicators
<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749> (read 24 August 2010)

them refer to absolute (not relative) amounts of certain matters. This is a very biased argumentation: smaller countries could hardly ever build as much hydropower or man-made forests as China with its huge area, no matter how green the others were. And the greener the country already is, the harder it is to achieve world's fastest growth of renewable energy anymore, so this growth of 51 % indicates maybe more a poor starting point than a great improvement. In summary, this argumentation is rather feeble although it succeeds in relying numbers and may sound therefore convincing.

The speaker turns next to the other face of China, namely its developing-status related qualities. As before, the exact numbers are again used; with a total population of around 1 300 million people, the poverty of 150 million means around 11 % of China's population. This argument is intended to picture China as a still poor land in need of development.

”China has a 1.3 billion population and its per capita GDP has only exceeded 3,000 U.S. dollars. According to the U.N. standards, we still have 150 million people living below the poverty line and we therefore face the arduous task of developing the economy and improving people's livelihood.” (Arg. 3)

China's emission reduction targets implying its responsibility are brought forth. Wen talks about emissions per unit of GDP; this can be considered rather dubious for two reasons. Firstly, it guarantees no quantified emission cuts; in case GDP per capita rises 100 % (and even then China would not be among the 50 richest GDP/capita nations), 40-45 % emission cut per GDP would still lead to rising in quantified emissions. Secondly, when speaking about other countries, Wen talks about these quantified emissions, which reminds of ”comparing oranges and apples” argumentation fallacy.

”Between 1990 and 2005, China's carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP were reduced by 46 percent. Building on that, we have set the new target of cutting carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent by 2020 from the 2005 level.” (Arg. 2)

After national passages Wen turns to discuss the Copenhagen accord principles. He

mentions four different principles that accord should follow. These constitute four different main arguments. First of them concerns how the outcomes of COP15 should relate to earlier negotiations: Wen demands that they must stick to earlier negotiation principles, especially the Bali Roadmap and Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was established in 1997, which means that China's economy was much smaller back then than in 2009; at those times, China was more clearly seen as a developing nation. As this context is acknowledged, there appears to be dual argumentation. In the first level this argument is about continuation strategy (argument family 6), while on the other hand its historical nature reveals it also being argument for considering China as a developing country.

”The outcome of this conference must stick to rather than obscure the basic principles enshrined in the Convention and the [Kyoto] Protocol. It must follow rather than deviate from the mandate of the "Bali Roadmap".” (Arg. 3, Arg. 6)

Next argument concerns the burden sharing in cutting the emissions. Developed countries are required to take the main responsibility for emission cut actions and to support developing countries. Wen also mentions about developing countries' responsibilities, but as they are expressed vaguely and with reservations (“do what they can”, “in the light of their national conditions”), I do not consider it as a real demand for sustainability (that would be argument family 5). The demand for financial support from developed countries is also expressed, constituting an argument about the fund in general level.

”Developed countries must take the lead in making deep quantified emission cuts and provide financial and technological support to developing countries. [...] Developing countries should, with the financial and technological support of developed countries, do what they can to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change in the light of their national conditions.” (Arg. 4, Arg. 8)

Burden sharing comments are followed by timing and focus related arguments, concerning the continuation strategy. As in the case of first accord principle mentioned, the short-term targets are emphasized. This can be interpreted as favouring China's situation again, as it

will be rather surely considered as a developed (and most-emitting) country in the longer term.

”It is necessary to set a direction for our long-term efforts, but it is even more important to focus on achieving near-term and mid-term reduction targets, honoring the commitments already made and taking real action.” (Arg. 6)

The fourth main principle Wen brings out about the accord concerns ensuring that action is taken. This is argument about continuation strategy and the emphasis is on developed countries' obligations. Urging the developed countries to act is again present, but it is now expressed as the goal of the main argument (demanding institutional arrangements).

”The international community should make concrete and effective institutional arrangements under the Convention and urge developed countries to honor their commitments, provide sustained and sufficient financial support to developing countries, speed up the transfer of climate-friendly technologies and effectively help developing countries” (Arg. 6)

In the concluding passage Wen states once more the argument that China has born its responsibility in facing the challenge of climate change.

”I wish to conclude by underlining that it is with a sense of responsibility to the Chinese people and the whole mankind that the Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.” (Arg. 2)

Concluding, China's speech contains a broad variety of arguments, covering argument families 1-4, 6 and 8. This means that only arguments about the fund details and sustainability-demanding arguments towards developing countries are not present in the speech. The most commonly used argument family is 2, arguments admitting own country has been an emitter but also born its responsibility. Also the arguments of family 3 stating that China is a developing country are laid several times; using both these families gives a mixed message of China's status. In arguments about continuation strategy, speaker

emphasizes the short-term achievements' importance at this moment. The argumentation as a whole paints picture of **poor but growing country that emphasizes it has born its responsibilities and is waiting for the rich countries to act.**

3.6 Barack Obama (the United States), 18 December

Obama's speech on behalf of the United States was held in the final official summit day of the COP15 meeting, 18 December. At that moment, the meeting was seen to be in crisis and it was unclear whether any deal would really come out. Much pressure was put on Obama's arrival and his speech and acts; as the director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) put it: "Only the heads of state can bring this summit to a successful conclusion."¹¹

Barack Obama does not need much introduction. As the president of the United States, his authority and media power is one of the greatest. Therefore Obama's acts could have turned the crisis into success. However, it never seemed to happen. What can be read out from the speech about the possible reasons of failure – or were there still rays of hope? I will start by searching how Obama identifies himself and the United States in this meeting.

Identification analysis

Obama starts by clear and transparent identification that tries to summon every participator: "We come together here in Copenhagen because climate change poses a grave and growing danger to our people." He does not leave the global identification idea to this point but expands by expressing the assumption about common thoughts: "All of you would not be here unless you – like me – were convinced that this danger is real." The speech beginning is strongly intended to remind that negotiators share certain basic premises about the problem and its severity; this means there is a possibility for agreement.

Obama defines the problem as our capacity to take collective action. As the speech was held in the ending days of the summit during a crisis, it confessed the risk of failure subtly:

¹¹ BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8420016.stm> (read 27 March 2010)

"I have to be honest, as the world watches us today, I think our ability to take collective action is in doubt right now, and it hangs in the balance." Here Obama also makes an interesting division of the negotiators and the other world. Many negotiators spoke as if they took the negotiating group to be the whole world (as consisting of its representatives), but Obama keeps the division here more clear. He denotes his belief that negotiators as "we" can act decisively and adds that he came to Copenhagen not to talk but to act.

Next Obama changes the style and identification remarkably. After speaking of "negotiator we", Obama turns the attention to United States and at the same time his "we" changes to refer to the United States. He remarks: "As the world's largest economy and the world's second largest emitter, America bears our share of responsibility in addressing climate change, and we intend to meet that responsibility." Obama starts listing examples demonstrating what the United States has already done. This move is divisionally twofold. Firstly, as the speaker is now only the representative of United States, there is a division of him and other negotiators. Secondly, as Obama earlier said he came (not to talk but) to *act*, this quick move for declaring what his country has already done is a division – division of those who came to act and those who came to speak what they have already done. Here Obama belongs to the latter category.

This is a good example of rhetoric where the speaker's intention and hearer's comprehension may clash dangerously. Many journals (The Guardian to mention) remarked that audience was disappointed in this place, as they had not seen any real evidence of these actions of the United States.

The same kind of problem can be seen later in contradiction between Obama's concept of responsibility and IPCC's recommendations. IPCC states the quantified greenhouse emissions should be cut in developed countries 25-40 % by 2020 (baseline year 1990), but the United States has made a commitment to around 17 % by 2020 (baseline year 2005). So, even if the United States bore its responsibility more evidently than has been seen, it would not meet IPCC's recommendations. For these reasons, I consider that the United States appraisal part is Obama's most remarkable flaw in his speech. It is problematic both identificationally and argumentatively. The identification is broken in two levels and

probably the demonstration part raised many negative reactions that make reidentification with Obama harder.

In the closure of this theme Obama uses confusing style when he mentions the reasons for emission mitigation. "We think it is good for us, as well as good for the world. But we also believe that we will all be stronger, all be safer, all be more secure if we act together." It is clear that in the first sentence "we" refers to United States as it is paralleled to the world. But how about the second sentence's third pronouns – has Obama meant all them to refer to the United States still? The expression of "we all" would refer more to the world according to my understanding, whereas the first "we" (that is believing these things) would mean Obama's own nation. Probably this does not produce division neither identification, but I find this kind of obscurity strange from a representative that comes from the largest natively English-speaking nation.

When the speech continues, Obama talks about accord's main requirements. In the first point he identifies the United States (and himself) with major economies: "First, all major economies must put forward decisive national actions that will reduce their emissions [...] I'm pleased that many of us have already done so." The expression "many of us" (meaning also "not all of us") is a clear spindle to especially China. The division of major and minor economies is a very common one, but it can be asked whether it had positive or negative effects in Obama's context. Definitely it divided the minor economies away at this point, emphasizing the United State's power and size.

Mentioning the second requirement, Obama speaks for every participator and his "we" is negotiatorwide. This style continues in the third argument about financing the developing countries until Obama speaks about his nation's contribution to funding by 2020. Obama expresses a reservation that this longer-term financing must be a part of Copenhagen's accord. This is not clear identification neither division, but as the speech has included very dividing United States appraisals, this setting of prerequisites may weaken the possible identification of other negotiators with Obama.

In the closing parts of the speech, Obama returns to identification of the whole global

community as one. He reminds the question is whether we are acting together or splitting apart and whether everyone understands that the accord cannot give everyone everything. This is followed by more precise examples of "developing countries that want aid with no strings attached" and developed nations thinking that "the world's fastest-growing emitters should bear a greater share of the burden". These are clear divisions of the negotiating group. Even though Obama still continues referring to negotiatorwide "we", this division produces a strong gap between some participators. The continuation consists of many nearly figurative expressions like embracing the accord, building upon its foundation and being part of a historic endeavour. This imaginative rhetoric may work for certain public, but identificationally it may have here hollow results because of the earlier divisions Obama made.

Argumentation analysis

Argumentatively looked, Obama starts by acknowledging the existence and seriousness of climate change. The same argument is expressed later, as Obama emphasizes (with a juxtaposition) the need to act now and not later. These claims fall under the first argument family.

"We come here in Copenhagen because climate change poses a grave and growing danger to our people. All of you would not be here unless you -- like me -- were convinced that this danger is real. This is not fiction, it is science." (Arg. 1)

"We can embrace this accord, take a substantial step forward, continue to refine it and build upon its foundation. [...] Or we can choose delay [...] month after month, year after year, perhaps decade after decade, all while the danger of climate change grows until it is irreversible." (Arg. 1)

The United States is one of the world's largest emitters, holding that status ever since climate change discussion about national emission levels started. This status is expressed

and immediately followed by the statement that the nation is meeting its responsibility in this place.

”Now, as the world's largest economy and as the world's second largest emitter, America bears our responsibility to address climate change, and we intend to meet that responsibility.” (Arg. 2)

It is worth a notice that Obama takes rhetorical advantage of exact numbers here: at the time of Copenhagen, United States was not anymore considered as the world's largest emitter but placed second, while it still maintained its place as the world's largest economy. The expression of ”world's largest economy and second largest emitter” implies that the world's largest emitter has done things clearly worse as it causes more emissions with less economic activity. Obama also backs up this argument with a great amount of warrants: he lists the investments, energy efficiency work and legislation made in the United States. What makes this argument problematic is the fact that the commitment of emission cuts Obama mentions (17 percent by 2020, baseline being 2005 and *not* 1990 as recommended)¹² is far from the IPCC recommendations. However, unfortunately this argumentative issue goes beyond my study and cannot be further discussed.

One more point to note on the backing of the argument ”the United States bears its responsibility” is that Obama not only points out the chosen mechanisms of emission mitigation; he also uses rather much space for listing other motives for these actions. He states these actions will be beneficial for the nation's economic future. This line of argument is transferred to defend also the global action: according to Obama, ”we will all be stronger, all be safer, all be more secure if we act together”. This is probably meant to give the countries self-interest-based reasons to reduce emissions. However, the possible unifying and accord-supporting value of this argument is diminished by the fact that it first emphasizes in particular the advantages for the United States' economy. As it is earlier mentioned to be already the world's largest economy, this reasoning begins to sound

¹² <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-climate-talks> The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, published for immediate release on November 25, 2009. Read 18 August 2010.

unavoidably hegemonic in a way.

After arguing on behalf of his own country's achievements, Obama turns to discuss the accord and its principles. This ensemble consists of three different main arguments. Firstly, Obama calls for decisive national emission reduction actions every major economy should make. Next he argues for need of a review mechanism to measure these emission cut actions. These statements are both arguments about how we should continue on the route of fighting climate change.

”First, all major economies must put forward decisive national actions that will reduce their emissions, and begin to turn the corner on climate change.” (Arg. 6)

”Second, we must have a mechanism to review whether we are keeping our commitments, and exchange this information in a transparent manner.” (Arg. 6)

Interestingly, these arguments are rather neutral in this level, but more can be found when looked at their background. When demanding major economies to act on national level, Obama continues by saying ”I'm pleased that many of us have already done so.” This implies that there are some that have not. I interpreted this as a spike towards China. Therefore this argument is of dividing nature. Mentioning the national level action making may imply an attempt to avoid legally binding global commitments. The other argument about review mechanism is neutral, it has neither dividing nor unifying elements.

Third argument Obama makes about the accord concerns financing. First part of it states that the United States is ready to attend fast-start funding of certain amount, so it is mostly argument about the (short-term) fund sum. The second part is more complex: it expresses readiness to be part of a global \$100 billion fund by 2020 – so far the argument sounds positive for fund. However, next Obama mentions the precondition for this fund to be part of a broader accord he just described. This ”accord just described” refers to Obama's three

accord-related main criteria. Accordingly, the promise of more funding seems to be rather conditioned and therefore this argument is not as positive as it first seemed. The argumentation belongs to the category of detailed funding arguments.

”Number three, we must have financing that helps developing countries adapt, particularly the least developed and most vulnerable countries to climate change. America will be a part of fast-start funding that will ramp up to \$10 billion by 2012. And yesterday, Secretary Hillary Clinton, my Secretary of State, made it clear that we will engage in a global effort to mobilize \$100 billion in financing by 2020, if -- and only if -- it is part of a broader accord that I have just described.” (Arg. 7, Arg. 8)

In summary, Obama uses argument families 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8. It is notable that he does not make statements about other countries' relation to climate change; there are only small side references like the spike to China when the major economies commitments are discussed. Much of the space is used to warrant the argumentation about the United States' effort in facing the climate challenge. Obama also prefers the national level action principles in arguments concerning the accord. As a result, the argumentation is rather biased to look inward: every major economy should focus on its national actions, and exactly this process and its benefits (regarding the United States) is largely described in the speech. There are also arguments reminding how great challenge climate change is and demanding the whole planet to act now together, but if the argumentation of the United States here should be characterized in a couple of words, I would call it **inward-looking economy of hegemony**.

3.7 Analysis summary

After the speech-specific analysis I turn my attention to discuss briefly how the speeches seem to discuss with each other and how the big picture looks. Although the speeches analysed are not sequential parts of a single discussion, they can be seen as speaking to each other and accordingly it is important to look at the whole. I will discuss here both

argumentative and identificational issues at the same time.

Every speaker expressed adherence to argument family 1, taking the climate change seriously and admitting its scientific basis. This forms the possible basis for collaborative identification of all negotiators. This was the basic level of agreement also in Malone's study (Malone 2009, 118-119), with the exception that in my study every speaker also agreed that we must react to climate change and cut the emissions.

Some agreement existed in a very general level also about the question of who should do and what: developed countries should mitigate the emissions and give some support to developing countries that already face the negative consequences of climate change (argument families 4 and 5). There was however a strong disagreement about sufficient level of these actions; developed countries argued they have already done enough (argument family 2), although their targets and promises did not reach IPCC's recommendations; on the other hand, developing countries emphasized their innocence for earlier emissions and brought out how they suffer for mistakes made by others (argument 3). China was an exception that used both of these argument families, wanting to be conceived as a still developing and poor country but yet doing already very much to mitigate the emissions.

Nations identified themselves strongly with rather stereotypical developed and developing nation identities: developed nation admits its responsibility for earlier emissions, but argues it is already bearing its responsibilities related to that issue. Developing nations consider themselves as unjustly suffering for what rich nations have done, needing financial compensation for adaptation – but not only for that; it seems rather clear that for developing countries climate change issue is strongly linked to general development and inequality questions. This view was also strongly present in Roberts's *A Climate of Injustice* (2006).

These stereotypical identities of nations are divisive in their nature, which weakens the possibilities for consubstantialization and collaboration. North and South form strong borders that nations seem to maintain in their rhetoric. Some possibilities for new

conceptions emerged: Blair tried to build collaboration and a common negotiator-we in his speech, acknowledging the differences between nations and giving them differing obligations. Also Zenawi's speech on behalf of the African Union used much global community rhetoric and although it reminded of the suffering South, Zenawi made an attempt to turn the division into identification as he expressed that African nations were in Copenhagen "not as victims of the past but as stakeholders of the future reaching out across the continents, so that together we can build a better and fairer future for all of us". These were the highlights of the identificational possibilities in Copenhagen speeches.

While Blair and Zenawi were examples of building the bridge of agreement, three other speeches of this analysis were more divisive in their nature. Zimbabwe's speech was strongest example of division, as it emphasized North's guiltiness and lack of action with colourful word choices. It may yet be that this speech was not very divisive in its actual consequences, because Zimbabwe is a rather small negotiator in itself and its actual advocate, the African Union, spoke differently aiming to identify with other participants. I suggest that more significant division was then caused by China and the United States. As mentioned, China isolated itself rhetorically. Wen also used large part of the speech to declare China's efforts on tackling climate change, and transition from this "national we" to "contract makers we" was rather temporal – I am very doubtful if this speech generated any identification. The United States used partly different rhetoric, and Obama seemingly tried to build identification in some passages speaking of global collaboration and acting together. However, this effect was weakened by other parts that focused on declaring how much America has done to fight climate change and how it will benefit from these actions also financially. These appraisals were very contradictory, as I discussed. Obama also directed some spikes in his speech towards China, which makes it doubtful whether this kind of leadership in climate negotiations leads to identification and collaboration or division.

One issue for the analysis of the whole is funding argumentation. As I mentioned, there is public agreement that North should support South's adaptation to climate change related problems. Possible identification or division lies then deeper. Zimbabwe kept its funding argumentation on general level: it demanded developed world to fund developing countries

and increase the amount of support. The African Union's representative focused on more detailed requirements on behalf of the African continent, stating the following demands:

1. A start-up fund for three years (2010-2012) should be 10 billion dollars per annum; it should be administered by a board that has equal number of donor and recipient representatives. 40 % of the funding must be earmarked for Africa; and a committee of experts should be established to work out the details.
2. A long-term fund should reach 50 billion dollars per annum by 2013 and 100 billion dollars by 2020; at least 50 % of it should be given to most vulnerable and poor parties involved, like Africa and the small island states. Financing must be done through creative financing mechanisms; UNFCCC mandates a commission to review these mechanisms and submit a report.
3. The funds should be established under the authority of the COP that sets detailed criteria of the funds; board of trustees should compose equally of developed and developing country representatives. In Africa's case, the fund should be administered by the African Development Bank.

Analysed developed countries (and Blair from the Climate Group) agreed that South must have some kind of financial support. The interesting part can be then found in more detailed arguments, and those were placed by the United States. It stated next main points about financing (these are straight quotes from Obama's speech):

1. "America will be a part of fast-start funding that will ramp up to \$10 billion by 2012."
2. "[...] we will engage in a global effort to mobilize \$100 billion in financing by 2020, if -- and only if -- it is part of a broader accord that I have just described."

A minor problem for evaluating these arguments is that Obama does not state explicitly whether the sums mentioned are per annum or not. I do suppose now (reading positively) that they are per annum. It can be seen that the sums for 2012 and 2020 do actually meet the African Union's demands, although the years mentioned are the "deadlines" for particular periods in Zenawi's speech. The intermediate phase mentioned by the African

Union, 50 billion dollars by 2013, is here dismissed. I assert the sums mentioned actually could form a potential for different parties to identify themselves with each other. Obama's argumentation has however an important passage concerning the funding after start-up: there is a prerequisite that the accord has to be broader and equate Obama's description about other accord principles. This is a rather strict prerequisite and leads to division instead of identification.

The last issue to analyse from argumentative perspective is how different speakers agree or disagree about continuation strategy (argument family 6). Blair emphasized especially this argument family. He stated that the agreement should be done even if the longer-term questions stay unclear. For him, the main point was then in the shorter-term issues: to get the action started. Obama did not talk about the timescales, but mentioned national actions that major economies should put forward and that some review mechanism for following the achievements must be established. These arguments must be considered with the earlier arguments of the United States: it can be seen that this suggested strategy does not guarantee reaching IPCC's recommendations (to limit the warming to two degrees celsius). In addition it must be kept in mind that Obama tried to demonstrate his nation is already bearing its responsibility to mitigate its emissions. Therefore Obama's arguments do not much to ensure a common accord, but instead focus on the national level.

China's speaker emphasized continuing on Kyoto Protocol's tracks and focusing on short-term efforts now – this follows Blair's argumentation lines, but in China's case the divisive element lies in China's economic growth and the fact that other major economies (especially the United States) are waiting for China to engage in action; sticking to older protocols would let China get off the hook. Another speaker demanding action from others as a continuation strategy was the African Union's Zenawi, but he left this issue rather aside in his speech only mentioning that emission cuts should not be required from Africa.

Concluding, the analysed speeches support clearly more division than identification. Copenhagen failure was present already in the main public speeches. Success can be found in the level of considering climate change as a serious problem and understanding that some emission mitigation is necessary. After this baseline, potential for identification is

minor. Nations focus on expressing their own status and achievements instead of discussing bases for the common agreement. Most expectations were set on the United States as it declared to be the negotiation leader, but on the grounds of this analysis Obama's speech actions did not live up to these expectations.

4: FINAL WORDS

The main question of this study was whether Copenhagen Climate Convention's speeches contain more uniting or dividing rhetoric. My analysis showed that both elements were present, but there was more division than identification. This was a sign of probable failure in the collaborative level – Copenhagen failure could have been foreseen from these speeches. It was also seen that although every speaker in my analysis emphasized they are taking the issue of climate change seriously, the arguments used to support that claim were varying in their plausibility. This was very clear in the example of the United States, where numerical emission cut targets were far from what is considered as necessary by IPCC.

Rhetorical and argumentation analysis in the framework of Burke's identification thesis proved to be a useful tool for searching the possibilities and challenges for successful collaboration. It helped to see how the "we" was constructed and used with very different meanings; in some cases it referred to the whole mankind or all the negotiators, but often it was used to refer to speaker's own nation (or union of nations). Argument analysis accompanied this identificational aspect, enhancing the information analysis produced: for major economies, it became apparent that while they accepted that the developed world must react climate change and mitigate emissions, they used much of their argumentation to prove how their own nation has actually already done enough and no more binding demands should be set. On the other hand, developing countries emphasized injustice they experienced and need for financial compensation. The division and tension between North and South was evident.

What this analysis did not reveal was the question whether Copenhagen's arguments and speeches made any difference to earlier conventions' speeches and how nations have possibly changed their own attitudes. It could be interesting to analyse and discuss in a historical light for example the United States's or China's speeches in the climate negotiations. Another possible deficiency in the study was the range of material to be analysed, although I consider its extent was now suitable and sufficient for this kind of study. In the case of more extensive work, I would have chosen in addition some speeches

from European Union and the small island states.

Language is used to reflect and construct the world, and especially words construct the world in political situations like this convention. Environmental movement could learn much from these examples. Plausibility of the arguments is not enough for the speech to become accepted by people that feel differing interests with the speaker; the identification has to be built in addition. Speaker has to find the ways in which audience could feel having the same interests and attitudes, something in common with the speaker. An interesting example for this was Zimbabwe's speech: undoubtedly its argumentation was valid and plausible in itself, but as the speech contained strongly dividing expressions instead of trying to build an identification, it failed to reach the ears of the North.

Rhetorical studies on environmental issues could provide information to environmental philosophers and researchers of social studies. This concerns the information about what factors advance or prevent agreement and action in political situations. It also helps to build the picture about the nature of disagreements present and discuss the ways in which these could be diminished. Climate change is a multidisciplinary challenge, and should stay as such; in its whole, studies of rhetoric can be an important tool helping to build the bridge over the gap between public opinion about urgency of action and the real situation lacking that action.

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Appendix I

SPEECHES WITH ARGUMENT MARKINGS

Note

I have used a simple marking system to clarify here, which parts of the speeches I have considered as main claims and what are the grounds for these claims. In the earlier analysis, I have brought out the main propositions found. These propositions are marked in each speech with capital letters and underlined so that the argument quoted in analysis section can be found easily.

Grounds for a particular claim are marked with smaller letters and numbered accordingly, but not underlined. For example, the first main claim in every speech will be underlined and marked with A. Its first supporting proposition will be marked a.1, next a.2 and so on. In some cases, the grounds for different claims are in mixed order: a.1 can be followed by b.1 and then the a.2 proposition may follow; this is not a mistake.

Sometimes the sequential main propositions belong to the same argument family. In this case, the grounds before second claim are considered as linked to the first claim. In some other cases, there can also be found grounding propositions that are manifested before the actual main proposition; the marking system will help to distinguish the grounds and the main claim also in these cases.

Tony Blair / the Climate Group

My simple message today is this: there can be a deal at Copenhagen. There should be a deal. (A) It will not be all that everyone wants. But it was never going to be.

We should not make the best the enemy of the good. We should take the most ambitious

level of commitment to cutting emissions, from both developed and developing nations, that is on the table now, accumulate it, make it the basis of the agreement, add to it in ways that we know can make a difference within the next ten or fifteen years, especially in areas like deforestation, and get moving. (B)

The truth is such an accord would itself set the world on a new path to a low carbon future.
(b.1)

As our understanding of the science and technology then increases, precisely under the impetus of such an accord, we can review progress and accelerate. The first review would start at the halfway point to 2020. (B)

Let me re-state the reason for this negotiation since in recent weeks there has been a concerted fight back against the notion that such a negotiation is even necessary. It is said that the science around climate change is not as certain as its proponents allege. It doesn't need to be. What is beyond debate, however, is that there is a huge amount of scientific support for the view that the climate is changing and as a result of human activity.

Therefore, even purely as a matter of precaution, given the seriousness of the consequences if such a view is correct, and the time it will take for action to take effect, we should act. (C) Not to do so would be grossly irresponsible. Also the same science is telling us that time is running out. So action has to be now. (c.1)

In addition, just remember \$100 a barrel oil. Look at where we get our energy. Then reflect. There are reasons of energy security alone which make changing the nature of our economies sensible, prudent and wise.

Most nations and people now agree. The question for Copenhagen is: how do we translate this acceptance of the need for action, into practical measures that are fair for developed nations that have industrialised and created the problem; and fair for developing nations that must now industrialise to lift their people out of poverty. (d.1)

China will be a country with a population double that of Europe and America combined. India has over one billion people. As they industrialise, they need in partnership with us to find the ways they can do it sustainably. (D)

How we spread the burden is a matter of equity. Where the emissions originate, is not. So the danger is very obvious: (e.1) even if Europe and the United States take action to cut

emissions, we must work to ensure that the rise in emissions from China, India and other developing nations does not eclipse that effort and leave the net effect on the climate as it is today or worse. (E)

People say it's all a matter of political will. It isn't. By and large the political will exists. And if it's true that where there's a will, there's a way; it is also correct, at least in politics, that where there is a way, it is easier to summon up the will.

Kyoto was a Treaty to make a point. It was less successful at making a policy. Copenhagen is where we need to make a policy. It is time to lift this issue out of the realms of a campaign and put it firmly within the framework of a credible, achievable policy for change.

In the last two years since leaving office, I have been working with The Climate Group – the international business NGO – and other stakeholders to devise a set of principles and proposals that could serve as the basis for a deal that is both radical and realistic.

Today we publish a further paper setting out an analysis of the different commitments already made by key economies and how they can be built upon.

This analysis shows two things. First, that many countries – including the whole EU block – have targets for 2020 that vary in ambition depending on whether the rest of the world is also going for more ambitious goals i.e. many nations have a "basic action" programme; and an "ambitious" programme.

Our analysis shows that if each went for their ambitious programme, the cumulative impact on cutting emissions would represent a major shift in policy. (g.1) For industrialised nations, it would amount to cuts of just under 20 per cent on 1990 levels. For the United States, whose 2020 commitment still means a significant cut at least on 2005 levels, there is an increased ambition after 2020 with a big leap in progress up to 2030, when emissions would be over 40 per cent down.

It will be argued that these commitments fall short of what the science tells us is necessary.

That is true, at least on some calculations. But it is also true that the accumulated impact implies a radical change in economic production and growth. In other words, they would mean a big change in policy that would itself have a highly incentivising effect on the future development of technology and the propensity of business to invest in clean energy

and use it. (g.2)

However, secondly, up to 2020 – usually taken as the proper date for an interim target – there are ways that we can further accelerate the cut in emissions. (g.3)

Deforestation is one area. A plan – costed and monitored – could yield major benefits; given deforestation is 20 per cent of the entire problem. The practical challenge of such a plan may be large; but there is no doubt what works. The forestry sector could have a potential saving of six giga-tonnes in 2020. It would require help with financing, in aggregate, of €15-25bn over an extended period. But Brazil has shown what can be done. This is an achievable objective and its big and rapid impact makes it one of the key issues for immediate negotiation and action. Included in this should be trans-border efforts to end exploitation of rainforests. (g.4)

Energy efficiency, especially if applied more rapidly in the developing world, saves massively on emissions. Things like the substitution of inefficient industrial motors, building insulation, reduced leaks from pipelines, may not sound exciting as the things at the frontier of technological discovery, but they bring big rewards and quickly. (g.5)

We set out in our report how this could make up at least some of the gap in meeting any 2020 target. Of course, the issue of funding for accelerated progress in the developing world arises. We may need, as we outline very large funding streams by 2020 and thereafter. But again, let us begin with a straightforward starting commitment for the early years and get going. (F) Countries will inevitably be reluctant to commit large sums well into the future until they see how the mechanisms for using such initial funds are working. There is also potentially a major role for private capital in this process.

But let us get it underway. And that really is the objective for Copenhagen: to get us moving. To be the signal set that makes us switch track to a low carbon future. And to make sure that everyone is on the train, going in the same direction. (G)

Some will be at the front, some at the back. Some will pay more than others. But together we are on board for a new destination for the global economy.

Naturally, there will be those who say we are not moving fast enough or that the switch now is not sufficiently radical. But here is what it is vital to understand. The world of 2015, never mind 2020 or still less 2030, is going to look so very different to the world of today.

The technologies of the future are, in many instances, in their infancy: electric vehicles; the new generation of nuclear; smart grids; new bio fuels and energy-saving equipment. But they are on the way. And there will be technologies as yet undiscovered whose identity we cannot predict, but whose advent, in one form or another, we can. The world is changing fast.

The purpose of Copenhagen is to set a framework for that future that makes the changes happen faster. (h.1) The moment global business knows the direction, it will start to behave accordingly. But it needs that clarity of direction and it needs it now. The pathways can be adjusted – it might be we have 2025 and 2030 targets as well as 2020. There can be a regular review process – in fact, on any sensible basis there has to be. But rather than fixate on this precise per centage reduction or that, get the realistic best we can now, which could still be radical, and spend our time and thought then on practical programmes of change: on technology transfer, effective mechanisms of funding, deforestation, and collaboration. Design the instruments that make it happen effectively. (H)

One final word. Think how far we have come since Kyoto. Think how far since the Gleneagles Summit of 2005 when we struggled to get climate change on the agenda. Now the debate is how and how much and how fast. That in itself shows the world is responding.

Agreement at Copenhagen, in this area of policy which is so complex, politically sensitive and immense in its ramifications, would be an extraordinary achievement for multilateral negotiation.

Yet it is within our grasp. That alone should surely give us hope for the future.

Robert Mugabe / Zimbabwe

Your Excellency, Mr Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, The Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Excellencies, Heads of State and Government, Honourable Ministers, Distinguished Guests, Distinguished Delegates, Invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

As my delegation left the United Nations General Assembly hall on the 22nd September this year, we felt encouraged by what we saw as a commitment by all countries towards a successful outcome of the Copenhagen Conference.

We were assured by what appeared a palpable global realisation that indeed our planet was in great danger because of the planet unfriendly model of development (A) pursued by some of us in the so-called highly-industrialised developed world, all to our collective detriment.

The consequences of that development model on our planet have become all too abundant to be denied or ignored, they become more poignant each day that passes, that includes today. (a.1)

If we still have any more doubting Thomases, let them visit sinking island member states whose communities today face dim prospects of inexorable collective extinctive drowning.

Let them visit our part of the world where rains fail, where the searing sun scorches everything brown, and lifeless, including our ever diminishing livelihoods. (b.1) The prospects of meeting our MDGs or other welfare targets agreed to nationally, regionally and internationally grow dimmer everyday. (b.2)

We of the developing world are drowning, we are the burning, indeed we are the tragedy that climate changes have turned out to be for the larger half of mankind. Yet we never caused that crisis. (B) We thus come here hoping for justice and fairness, indeed for decisions that recognise the urgency of our situation, that recognise the undeserved climatic endgame that stares us in the face. (C)

But we are under no illusions about the enormity of the task that lies ahead. Negotiations on climate change have never been easy in the past, beginning with Real Earth Summit in Brazil, they have always been fraught. They will not be any easier today in this environment of the global financial crisis, again brought upon us by the same world that has corrupted environment. The little progress made so far at this convention bears this fact out.

For beneath the tip of well intentioned rhetoric on climate change lies the iceberg of power and aspirations to global dominance. We are dealing with vested interests. We are dealing here with dominant economies resting on a faulty, eco-unfriendly development paradigm,

aspiring to misrule the world. (d.1) In those circumstances, progress is bound to be glacier.

Climate change, the latest and by far the most encompassing and insistent crisis spawned by this hegemonic development paradigm, yet again reveals the interconnectedness issues of global imbalances by way of uneven development, by way of unfair trade, by way of unclean politics, by way of hegemonic values and by way of arbitrary power and governance systems. (d.2)

The dominant north-south divide that has been the bane of so many international initiatives once again rears its ugly head on this very question, at this very conference. We are split along the same old north-south dichotomy. (D)

Why is the guilty north not showing the same fundamentalist spirit it exhibits in our developing countries on human rights matters on this more menacing question of climate change? (E) Where is its commitment to retributive justice which we see it applying on other issues? (e.1) Where is sanctions for climate change offenders? (e.2)

When a country spits at Kyoto Protocol, by seeking to retreat from its dictates, or simply by refusing to accede to it, is it not undermining the rule of global law? (e.3) When countries spew hazardous emissions for selfish consumptionist ends, in the process threatening land masses and atmospheric space of smaller and weaker nations are they not guilty of gross human rights violations? (e.4)

We raise these questions not out of spite or vindictiveness, but out of concern for our very endangered livelihoods. When these capitalist gods of carbon burp and belch their dangerous emissions, (e.5) it is we, the lesser mortals of the developing sphere who gasp, starve, sink and eventually die. (b.3)

Your Excellencies,

We of Africa aligned with our other brothers in the developing world have made proposals predicated on principles of historical responsibility, common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities of parties.

We stand by the Kyoto Protocol with its full set of commitments which to this day cry for fulfilment. Late believers and late comers cannot be dictators at this conference, besides they happen to be among the guiltiest on this matter.

It simply has become imperative that the developed world, itself the leading sinner on climate offences takes serious and effective measures to cut emissions on the one hand, while supporting developing countries to adapt to and mitigate the effects of this man-made planetary, if not cosmic disaster. (F)

May I say the developing world, itself the least offending on climate crimes, owns bio-carbon resources and carries in a sense the world's lungs now solely needed for cleaning the world. (g.1) Let that fact be recognised as our comparative advantage in world affairs.

The present global regime where resources are disproportionately allocated in terms of the degree to which a country endangers the climate is a skewed one. But surely, we cannot reward sinners, we cannot punish the righteous, we who bear the burden of healing the gasping earth must draw the most from the global pursue for remedial action.

We who tend the forest so badly needed to heal the ecosystem deserve better funding, and improved access to green technology transfer. We need to have our national capacities augmented so we are able to pursue the clean development paradigm underpinned by clean technologies to build a brave new world where humanity lives in greater harmony with nature. (G)

We oppose climatic recovery paradigms predicated on denial of our right to development for the sake of cleaning the mess created by selfish countries of the north. (g.2)

We have sacrificed a lot already. Zimbabwe continues to suffer from illegal sanctions unilaterally imposed on her by the west. Because of these undeserved sanctions, we have only been able to draw a mere US\$1 million in the last three years from the Global Environment Fund. (h.1) The situation is likely to grow worse in the wake of new changes to the operationalisation of this Fund.

Self interest and vindictiveness have apparently defeated the lofty goals of saving the planet. We deserve better support than we have had to date. (H)

Your Excellencies,

My delegation remains hopeful that this convention will reach some consensus on this very important subject affecting our planet.

Let me conclude, Your Excellencies, my remarks by expressing my delegation's appreciation for the arrangements that the government of Denmark put it place to make our stay here comfortable. We will cherish memories of our stay here.

I thank you.

H.E. Meles Zenawi / the African Union

Allow me to first of all thank our gracious hosts, the people and government of Denmark for the warm reception we have enjoyed since our arrival and for the excellent facilities put at our disposal. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our overworked and under appreciated experts and ministers who have, through their dedication and hard work, kept the hope of a global treaty on climate change alive.

Your Excellencies.

Global warming is happening. The rise of catastrophic climate change is very real. The science is as clear as it could ever be as to what the causes of such change are. (A) It is no exaggeration to say that this is our best and perhaps our last chance to save our planet from destructive and unpredictable change.

This is a test as to whether we as a global community are able to rise over our parochial interests to protect our common destiny. In a way the climate change negotiations are about a lot more than merely addressing climate change issues. They are test cases as to how humanity is likely to face the emerging challenges of the 21st century. As globalization transforms the world into a single and tightly integrated economic space, how we manage global public goods such as the environment without a world government is likely to become a defining issue of our new century. If through foresight, dialogue and compromise we succeed in addressing the threat of climate change, it would be reasonable to assume that we can manage similar challenges of our new century through collective effort. If we fail to rise above the current challenge of climate change, we will then have proved that global economic progress is based on a fundamentally dysfunctional political

system. Sooner or later the economic edifice we have built will have to come crashing down.

It is therefore true that in more ways than one what is at stake here is the future of our species, the future of human civilization as we have come to know it. Africa is keenly aware of the significance of climate change negotiations, and the Copenhagen Summit. That is why, for the first time since the establishment of the OAU, Africa has decided to speak with one voice and to field a single negotiating team mandated to negotiate on behalf of all the member states of the African Union. That is why all the delegations of African countries participating in the summit are here to support and reinforce the common negotiating team rather than negotiate on behalf of their individual countries.

Ethiopia is deeply honored to have been chosen to be the spokesman of Africa on climate change and to lead the common negotiating team. I am immensely proud to be able to speak today not on behalf of my country Ethiopia, but on behalf of mother Africa as a whole.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Every one of us knows that Africa has contributed virtually nothing to global warming but has been hit first and hardest. The fragility of our eco-system has meant that for Africans the damage of climate change is not something that could happen in the future. (B) It is already here with us sowing misery and death across the land. (b.1) Africa is indeed paying with the misery and death of its people for the wealth and wellbeing that was created in the developed countries through carbon intensive development. That is fundamentally unjust. (C)

But we are not here as victims nursing our wounds of injustice of the past. Africa is a continent of the future; it is destined to be a growth pole of the 21st century. We are therefore here not as victims of the past but as stakeholders of the future reaching out across the continents, so that together we can build a better and fairer future for all of us.

Not only has Africa contributed virtually nothing to the current level of carbon emissions, but is unlikely under any scenario to be a significant polluter in the future. Africa is a green

field that can and wants to chart a different course of development, one that is not carbon intensive. (D) To give an example of my own country, Ethiopia, we plan to sustain our current double digit rates of growth for the next 15 years so that by 2025 we become a middle income country. We plan to do so in a manner that would allow us to have zero net-carbon emissions by 2025. (d.1) Our ambitions as Africans are the same throughout the continent. (d.2) When it comes to taking care of the environment, we occupy the moral high ground and are proud of it.

But we are not here to bask in the glory of our high moral standards and pristine principles. We are not here to preach or to grandstand. We are here to negotiate, to give and take and seal a fair deal however messy such a deal might be. It is with this in mind that I wish to appeal to everyone to fill the limited gap we have in terms of carbon emission so that we will all have the chance to adapt to the new circumstances. It is also with this in mind that I wish to make the following specific proposals on finance on behalf of the African delegation.

I On-start up funding I propose:

(a) Support the establishment of a start-up fund of 10 billion dollars per annum for the three years of 2010-2012 to be used to address urgent adaptation and mitigation tasks including forestry and to prepare plans for more ambitious programs in the future. (E)

(b) Propose that the start-up funding money should be put in a trust fund to be administered by a board of trustees composed of equal number of donor and recipient countries. (e.1)

(c) Demand that 40% of the start-up fund be earmarked for Africa and request that the fund allocated for Africa be administered by the African Development Bank under the board of trustees mentioned above. (e.2)

(d) Ask for the establishment of a committee of experts to work out the details of the points I have outlined above with the view to launching the fund by the time of the next G-20 summit and ensuring quick disbursement thereafter. (e.3)

II On long-term finance I propose:

(a) That funding for adaptation and mitigation start by 2013 to reach up to 50 billion dollars per annum by 2015 and 100 billion per annum by 2020. (F)

(b) That no less than 50% of the fund should be allocated for adaptation to vulnerable and poor countries and regions such as Africa, and the small island states. (f.1)

(c) That the fund be financed through creative financing mechanisms. No such mechanism from assessed contributions to creative use of SDR from taxes on financial transactions, to global auction of emission rights from carbon taxes to taxes on bunker oil and aviation should be excluded. (f.2)

(d) That the UNFCCC mandate a commission of political leaders and experts to review all such funding mechanisms and come up with a reliable system of funding to achieve our targets and to submit its report within six months. (f.3)

III On the administration of the fund I propose:

(a) That a fund for adaptation, and a fund for mitigation be established under the authority of the conference of the parties which should determine such things as access criteria, broad parameters for allocation of the fund etc. (G)

(b) That a board of trustees composed of equal number of representatives from the developed and developing countries be established to oversee the day to day management of the fund. (g.1)

(c) That the fund be administered in the case of Africa by the African Development Bank. (g.2)

Your Excellencies.

I know my proposal today will disappoint those Africans who from the point of justice have asked for full compensation of the damage done to our development prospects. My proposal dramatically scales back our expectation with regards to the level of funding in return for more reliable funding and a seat at the table in the management of such fund.

I believe there is an important underlying principle here. Africa loses more than most if

there is no agreement on climate change. We lose more not only because our ecology is more fragile but also because our best days are ahead and lack of agreement here could murder our future even before it is borne.

Because we have more to lose than others, we have to be prepared to be flexible and be prepared to go the extra-mile to accommodate others. That is exactly what my proposal is intended to achieve.

There should not be any doubt about our eagerness to compromise and cut a deal. But such flexibility on our part should not be confused with desperation. Africa is not prepared to accept empty words and agreements that undermine its fundamental interest. We are determined to make sure that in Copenhagen we will have an agreement that all of us, Africa included, are happy with or there will be no agreement for anyone.

I hasten to assure everyone that this is not meant to be an idle threat. It is meant to be a solemn promise by Africa that we will strive for a fair and just deal, and nothing more or less than that.

May I ask, Mr. Chairman, that my proposal be considered with the view to incorporating it in some final document that the leadership of our summit might submit to us all for final consideration?

I thank you for your kind attention.

Jiabao Wen / China

Prime Minister Rasmussen, Dear Colleagues,

At this very moment, billions of people across the world are following closely what is happening here in Copenhagen. The will that we express and the commitments that we make here should help push forward mankind's historical process of combating climate change. Standing at this podium, I am deeply aware of the heavy responsibility. Climate change is a major global challenge. It is the common mission of the entire mankind to curb global warming and save our planet. (A) It is incumbent upon all of us, each and every country, nation, enterprise and individual to act, and act now in response to

this challenge.

The past 30 years have seen remarkable progress in China's modernization drive. Let me share with you here that China has taken climate change very seriously in the course of its development. (B) Bearing in mind the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and mankind's long-term development, we have exerted unremitting effort and made positive contribution to the fight against climate change.

China was the first developing country to adopt and implement a National Climate Change Program. (b.1) We have formulated or revised the Energy Conservation Law, Renewable Energy Law, Circular Economy Promotion Law, Clean Production Promotion Law, Forest Law, Grassland Law and Regulations on Civil Building Efficiency. (b.2) Laws and regulations have been an important means for us to address climate change.

China has made the most intensive efforts in energy conservation and pollution reduction in recent years. (b.3) We have improved the taxation system and advanced the pricing reform of resource products with a view to putting in place at an early date a pricing mechanism that is responsive to market supply and demand, resource scarcity level and the cost of environmental damage. (b.4) We have introduced 10 major energy conservation projects and launched an energy conservation campaign involving 1,000 enterprises, bringing energy-saving action to industry, transportation, construction and other key sectors. (b.5) We have implemented pilot projects on circular economy, promoted energy-saving and environment-friendly vehicles and supported the use of energy-saving products by ordinary households with government subsidies. (b.6) We have worked hard to phase out backward production facilities that are energy intensive and heavily polluting. (b.7) The inefficient production capacity that China eliminated between 2006 and 2008 stood at 60.59 million tons for iron, 43.47 million tons of steel, 140 million tons for cement and 64.45 million tons for coke. By the end of the first half of this year, China's energy consumption per unit of GDP had dropped by 13 percent from the 2005 level, equivalent to reducing 800 million tons of carbon dioxide. (b.8)

-- China has enjoyed the fastest growth of new energy and renewable energy. (C) (c.1) On the basis of protecting the eco-environment, we have developed hydro power in an orderly way, actively developed nuclear power, and encouraged and supported the development of renewable energy including biomass, solar and geothermal energy and wind power in the countryside, remote areas and other places with the proper conditions. (c.2) Between 2005

and 2008, renewable energy increased by 51 percent, representing an annual growth rate of 14.7 percent. (c.3) In 2008, the use of renewable energy reached an equivalent of 250 million tons of standard coal. A total of 30.5 million rural households gained access to bio-gas, equivalent to a reduction of 49 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions. China ranked first in the world in terms of installed hydro power capacity, nuclear power capacity under construction, the coverage of solar water heating panels and photovoltaic power capacity. (c.4)

-- China has the largest area of man-made forests in the world. (c.5) We have continued with the large-scale endeavor to return to farmland to forest and expand a forestation, and made vigorous effort to increase forest carbon sink. (c.6) Between 2003 and 2008, China's forest coverage registered a net increase of 20.54 million hectares and forest stock volume rose by 1.123 billion cubic meters. The total area of man-made forests in China has reached 45 million hectares, the largest in the world.

China has a 1.3 billion population and its per capita GDP has only exceeded 3,000 U.S. dollars. According to the U.N. standards, we still have 150 million people living below the poverty line and we therefore face the arduous task of developing the economy and improving people's livelihood. (D) China is now at an important stage of accelerated industrialization and urbanization, (d.1) and, given the predominant role of coal in our energy mix, we are confronted with special difficulty in emission reduction. However, we have always regarded addressing climate change as an important strategic task. (e.1) Between 1990 and 2005, China's carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP were reduced by 46 percent. Building on that, we have set the new target of cutting carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent by 2020 from the 2005 level. (E) To reduce carbon dioxide emissions on such a large scale and over such an extended period of time will require tremendous efforts on our part. Our target will be incorporated into China's mid-and-long term plan for national economic and social development as a mandatory one to ensure that its implementation is subject to the supervision by the law and public opinions. We will further enhance the domestic-statistical, monitoring and evaluation methods, improve the way for releasing emission reduction information, increase transparency and actively engage in international exchange, dialogue and cooperation.

Dear Colleagues,

To meet the climate challenge, the international community must strengthen confidence, build consensus, make vigorous effort and enhance cooperation. And we must always adhere to the following three principles:

First, maintaining the consistency of outcomes:

The campaign against climate change has not just started. In fact, the international community has been engaged in this endeavor for decades. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol are the outcomes of long and hard work by all countries. They reflect the broad consensus among all parties and serve as the legal basis and guide for international cooperation on climate change. And as such, they must be highly valued and further strengthened and developed. (f.1) The outcome of this conference must stick to rather than obscure the basic principles enshrined in the Convention and the Protocol. It must follow rather than deviate from the mandate of the "Bali Roadmap". (F) It should lock up rather than deny the consensus and progress already achieved in the negotiations. (f.2)

Second, upholding the fairness of rules:

The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" represents the core and bedrock of international cooperation on climate change and it must never be compromised. Developed countries account for 80 percent of the total global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago. (g.1) If we all agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the direct cause for climate change, then it is all too clear who should take the primary responsibility.(g.2) Developing countries only started industrialization a few decades ago and many of their people still live in abject poverty today. (g.3) It is totally unjustified to ask them to undertake emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development. Developed countries, which are already leading an affluent life, still maintain a level of per capita emissions that is far higher than that of developing countries, and most of their emissions are attributed to consumption. (g.4) In comparison, emissions from developing countries are primarily survival emissions and international transfer emissions. (g.5) Today, 2.4 billion people in the world still rely on coal, charcoal, and stalks as main fuels, and 1.6 billion people have no access to electricity.

Action on climate change must be taken within the framework of sustainable development and should by no means compromise the efforts of developing countries to get rid of poverty and backwardness. (g.6) Developed countries must take the lead in making deep quantified emission cuts and provide financial and technological support to developing countries. (G) This is an unshirkable moral responsibility as well as a legal obligation that they must fulfill. Developing countries should, with the financial and technological support of developed countries, do what they can to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change in the light of their national conditions. (G)

And third, paying attention to the practicality of the targets:

There is a Chinese proverb which goes, "A one-thousand-mile journey starts with the first step." Similarly, there is a saying in the West which reads, "Rome was not built in one day." In tackling climate change, we need to take a long-term perspective, but more importantly, we should focus on the present. (h.1) The Kyoto Protocol has clearly set out the emission reduction targets for developed countries in the first commitment period by 2012. However, a review of implementation shows that the emissions from many developed countries have increased rather than decreased. And the mid-term reduction targets recently announced by developed countries fall considerably short of the requirements of the Convention and the expectations of the international community. (h.2) It is necessary to set a direction for our long-term efforts, but it is even more important to focus on achieving near-term and mid-term reduction targets, honoring the commitments already made and taking real action. (H) One action is more useful than a dozen programs. (h.3) We should give people hope by taking credible actions.

Fourth, ensure the effectiveness of institutions and mechanisms:

Concrete actions and institutional guarantee are essential to our effort on tackling climate change. The international community should make concrete and effective institutional arrangements under the Convention and urge developed countries to honor their commitments, provide sustained and sufficient financial support to developing countries, speed up the transfer of climate-friendly technologies and effectively help developing countries, (I) especially small island states, least developed countries, landlocked countries and African countries, strengthen their capacity in combating climate change.

I wish to conclude by underlining that it is with a sense of responsibility to the Chinese people and the whole mankind that the Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. (J) This is a voluntary action China has taken in the light of its national circumstances. We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other country. We will honor our word with real action. Whatever outcome this conference may produce, we will be fully committed to achieving and even exceeding the target.

Thank you.

Barack Obama / the United States

Good morning.

It is an honor for me to join this distinguished group of leaders from nations around the world. We come here in Copenhagen because climate change poses a grave and growing danger to our people. All of you would not be here unless you -- like me -- were convinced that this danger is real. (A) This is not fiction, it is science. (a.1) Unchecked, climate change will pose unacceptable risks to our security, our economies, and our planet. (a.2) This much we know.

The question, then, before us is no longer the nature of the challenge -- the question is our capacity to meet it. For while the reality of climate change is not in doubt, I have to be honest, as the world watches us today, I think our ability to take collective action is in doubt right now, and it hangs in the balance.

I believe we can act boldly, and decisively, in the face of a common threat. That's why I come here today -- not to talk, but to act.

Now, as the world's largest economy and as the world's second largest emitter, America bears our responsibility to address climate change, and we intend to meet that responsibility. (B) That's why we've renewed our leadership within international climate change negotiations. (b.1) That's why we've worked with other nations to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. (b.2) That's why we've taken bold action at home -- by making historic

investments in renewable energy; (b.3) by putting our people to work increasing efficiency in our homes and buildings; (b.4) and by pursuing comprehensive legislation to transform to a clean energy economy. (b.5)

These mitigation actions are ambitious, and we are taking them not simply to meet global responsibilities. We are convinced, as some of you may be convinced, that changing the way we produce and use energy is essential to America's economic future -- that it will create millions of new jobs, power new industries, keep us competitive, and spark new innovation. We're convinced, for our own self-interest, that the way we use energy, changing it to a more efficient fashion, is essential to our national security, because it helps to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, and helps us deal with some of the dangers posed by climate change.

So I want this plenary session to understand, America is going to continue on this course of action to mitigate our emissions and to move towards a clean energy economy, no matter what happens here in Copenhagen. (b.6) We think it is good for us, as well as good for the world. But we also believe that we will all be stronger, all be safer, all be more secure if we act together. That's why it is in our mutual interest to achieve a global accord in which we agree to certain steps, and to hold each other accountable to certain commitments.

After months of talk, after two weeks of negotiations, after innumerable side meetings, bilateral meetings, endless hours of discussion among negotiators, I believe that the pieces of that accord should now be clear.

First, all major economies must put forward decisive national actions that will reduce their emissions, and begin to turn the corner on climate change. (C) I'm pleased that many of us have already done so. Almost all the major economies have put forward legitimate targets, significant targets, ambitious targets. And I'm confident that America will fulfill the commitments that we have made: cutting our emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020, and by more than 80 percent by 2050 in line with final legislation.

Second, we must have a mechanism to review whether we are keeping our commitments, and exchange this information in a transparent manner. (D) These measures need not be intrusive, or infringe upon sovereignty. (d.1) They must, however, ensure that an accord is credible, and that we're living up to our obligations. (d.2) Without such accountability, any agreement would be empty words on a page. (d.3)

I don't know how you have an international agreement where we all are not sharing information and ensuring that we are meeting our commitments. (d.4) That doesn't make sense. It would be a hollow victory.

Number three, we must have financing that helps developing countries adapt, particularly the least developed and most vulnerable countries to climate change. America will be a part of fast-start funding that will ramp up to \$10 billion by 2012. And yesterday, Secretary Hillary Clinton, my Secretary of State, made it clear that we will engage in a global effort to mobilize \$100 billion in financing by 2020, if -- and only if -- it is part of a broader accord that I have just described. (E)

Mitigation. Transparency. Financing. It's a clear formula -- one that embraces the principle of common but differentiated responses and respective capabilities. And it adds up to a significant accord -- one that takes us farther than we have ever gone before as an international community.

I just want to say to this plenary session that we are running short on time. And at this point, the question is whether we will move forward together or split apart, whether we prefer posturing to action. I'm sure that many consider this an imperfect framework that I just described. No country will get everything that it wants. There are those developing countries that want aid with no strings attached, and no obligations with respect to transparency. They think that the most advanced nations should pay a higher price; I understand that. There are those advanced nations who think that developing countries either cannot absorb this assistance, or that will not be held accountable effectively, and that the world's fastest-growing emitters should bear a greater share of the burden.

We know the fault lines because we've been imprisoned by them for years. These international discussions have essentially taken place now for almost two decades, and we have very little to show for it other than an increased acceleration of the climate change phenomenon. The time for talk is over. This is the bottom line: We can embrace this accord, take a substantial step forward, continue to refine it and build upon its foundation.

(F) We can do that, and everyone who is in this room will be part of a historic endeavor -- one that makes life better for our children and our grandchildren.

Or we can choose delay, (F) falling back into the same divisions that have stood in the way of action for years. And we will be back having the same stale arguments month after

month, year after year, perhaps decade after decade, all while the danger of climate change grows until it is irreversible. (F)

Ladies and gentlemen, there is no time to waste. America has made our choice. We have charted our course. We have made our commitments. We will do what we say. Now I believe it's the time for the nations and the people of the world to come together behind a common purpose.

We are ready to get this done today -- but there has to be movement on all sides to recognise that it is better for us to act than to talk; it's better for us to choose action over inaction; the future over the past -- and with courage and faith, I believe that we can meet our responsibility to our people, and the future of our planet. Thank you very much.