Two Sources of Knowledge: Origin and Generation of Knowledge in Maine de Biran and Henri Bergson
Julkaistu sarjassa
JYU dissertationsTekijät
Päivämäärä
2021Tekijänoikeudet
© The Author & University of Jyväskylä
It is important for the theory of knowledge to understand the factors involved in the generation of the capacities of knowledge. In the history of modern philosophy, knowledge is generally held to originate in either one or two sources, and the debates about these sources between philosophers have concerned their existence, or legitimacy. Furthermore, some philosophers have advocated scepticism about the human capacity to understand the origins of knowledge altogether. However, the developmental aspects of knowledge have received relatively little attention both by past philosophers and in current philosophical discussions. This dissertation provides a historical approach to this developmental problem of knowledge by interpreting the developmental theories of knowledge of Maine de Biran (1766–1824) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941) from the perspective of a theory of the ‘generative factors of knowledge.’ It first studies the philosophies of Maine de Biran and Bergson separately and then brings together and compares the metaphilosophical aims drawn from these philosophers. The dissertation’s novel analysis, provided by its theory and structure, has far-reaching consequences. From a wide point of view, it fills in considerable scholarly gaps and provides great opportunities for future research in the study of the history of philosophy. From more specific points of view, it provides its most decisive contributions in such metaphysical and epistemological topics as the nature of causality, self-generated activity, the role of effort in knowing and learning, the complementary relationship between philosophy and science, and the non-conceptual basis of knowledge. Keywords: Bergson, Henri (1859–1941), cognition, creativity, development, generation, history of philosophy, history of science, knowledge, learning, Maine de Biran (1766–1824), metaphilosophy, metaphysics, metascience
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Julkaisija
Jyväskylän yliopistoISBN
978-951-39-8952-1ISSN Hae Julkaisufoorumista
2489-9003Metadata
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- JYU Dissertations [748]
- Väitöskirjat [3411]
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