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dc.contributor.authorChang, Zheng
dc.contributor.authorGuo, Wenlong
dc.contributor.authorGuo, Xijuan
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Zhenyu
dc.contributor.authorRistaniemi, Tapani
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-03T05:43:09Z
dc.date.available2020-08-03T05:43:09Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationChang, Z., Guo, W., Guo, X., Zhou, Z., & Ristaniemi, T. (2020). Incentive Mechanism for Edge-Computing-Based Blockchain. <i>IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics</i>, <i>16</i>(11), 7105-7114. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2973248" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2973248</a>
dc.identifier.otherCONVID_34610140
dc.identifier.urihttps://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/71307
dc.description.abstractBlockchain has been gradually applied to different Internet of Things (IoT) platforms. As the efficiency of the blockchain mainly depends on the network computing capability, how to make sure the acquisition of the computational resources and participation of the devices would be the driving force. In this work, we focus on investigating incentive mechanism for rational miners to purchase the computational resources. A edge computing-based blockchain network is considered, where the edge service provider (ESP) can provide computational resources for the miners. Accordingly, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game between the miners and ESP. The aim is to investigate Stackelberg equilibrium of the optimal mining strategy under the two different mining schemes, in order to find the optimal incentive for the ESP and miners to choose auto-fit strategies. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we can demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on encouraging devices to participate the blockchain.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
dc.rightsIn Copyright
dc.subject.otherblockchain
dc.subject.otherhash power
dc.subject.othermining
dc.subject.othercomputing
dc.subject.otherreporting
dc.subject.otherreward
dc.subject.otherNash equilibrium
dc.subject.otheroptimal incentive
dc.titleIncentive Mechanism for Edge-Computing-Based Blockchain
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:fi:jyu-202008035455
dc.contributor.laitosInformaatioteknologian tiedekuntafi
dc.contributor.laitosFaculty of Information Technologyen
dc.contributor.oppiaineTietotekniikkafi
dc.contributor.oppiaineMathematical Information Technologyen
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.description.reviewstatuspeerReviewed
dc.format.pagerange7105-7114
dc.relation.issn1551-3203
dc.relation.numberinseries11
dc.relation.volume16
dc.type.versionacceptedVersion
dc.rights.copyright© 2020, IEEE
dc.rights.accesslevelopenAccessfi
dc.subject.ysopeliteoria
dc.subject.ysolohkoketjut
dc.subject.ysotiedonlouhinta
dc.subject.ysooptimointi
dc.format.contentfulltext
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p13476
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p38227
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p5520
jyx.subject.urihttp://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p13477
dc.rights.urlhttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en
dc.relation.doi10.1109/TII.2020.2973248
jyx.fundinginformationNSF of Hebei; Key Research and Development Project of Hebei
dc.type.okmA1


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