Trust predicts cooperation with conservation conflict interventions in a framed public-goods game

Abstract

Conservation conflicts are widespread, wicked problems, with damaging environmental and social consequences. Many different types of interventions have been designed and implemented to manage conservation conflicts. However, little attention has been paid as to whether who carries out these interventions is important. In this presentation, I describe how we used a novel experimental framed public goods game to test how stakeholder support for conservation conflict interventions varies with different intervening groups. I then show how we explored whether this variance was explained by differences in trust, since trust in conservation organisations has been identified as important in shaping stakeholder support for conservation. We conducted our experiment with villagers in a Community Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in northern Tanzania. In an adaptation of the classic public goods game, we framed as a public good the protection of village crops from elephants. Between treatments we changed the groups framed as responsible for carrying out the intervention. We found that cooperation with the conflict intervention was significantly higher when the intervening group is framed as local Maasai moran compared to a WMA group. We found this variation in cooperation to be best explained by differences in levels of trust in the intervening group. From this we can make two suggestions. Firstly, it matters which group carries out a conservation conflict intervention. For this reasons conservation conflict managers should think carefully about which actors are best suited to deliver interventions. Secondly, highly trusted actors are more likely to receive greater support. Conservation conflict managers should therefore consider a number of strategies to increase stakeholder trust.

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