# INSPIRING ELITE ACTION FOR A MORE JUST SOCIETY?

**Media Framing of Elite Social Responsibility in an Unequal, Unconsolidated Democracy**

**A Case Study from Namibia**

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MA Thesis in Journalism

Spring 2017

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

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Communication Studies

University of Jyväskylä

**JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO**

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| Työn nimi – Title<br>INSPIRING ELITE ACTION FOR A MORE JUST SOCIETY? Media Framing of Elite Social Responsibility in an Unequal, Unconsolidated Democracy. A Case Study From Namibia. | |
| Oppiaine – Subject<br>Journalism | Työn laji – Level<br>Master's thesis |
| Aika – Month and year<br>January 2017 | Sivumäärä – Number of pages<br>160 pages + Annex 27 pages |


Tiivistelmä – Abstract

With a focus on Namibia, one of the most unequal countries in the world, this thesis set out to develop a frame analysis tool for studying what kinds of social roles elite newspapers suggest for their well-off readers. The interest was based on the conviction that media texts mirror and mould broader discourses in the society.

The tool uses a theoretical construct of *elite social responsibility*, which is an action-orientated concept founded on William Gamson's collective action frames (1992) and a sociological model by Abram de Swaan (1988). It measures elite social responsibility using the frame package approach developed by Gamson and colleagues. This involved the development of a set of variables and clear coding instructions for these. As such, the thesis makes a methodological contribution to transparent analysis of inequality and active citizenship issues in media texts.

The study tested the new tool on a purposive sample of 135 newspaper texts. This test found that roughly 70 percent of the items were framed using the Minding My Own or Good Samaritan frames, which suggest that the well-off should do either nothing or do charity. A little under 30 percent used the Active Citizen frame, which implies that the elites should take collective action for policy change. The results further suggested that media is most likely to use the Active Citizen framing in issues, which have direct consequences for the well-off themselves. Moreover, the analysis identified several media routines, which contributed to the downplaying of the importance of solidarity through policy action. As such, the analysis suggested that elite newspapers in Namibia participate in a largely unintentional reproduction of discourses, which maintain the status quo. This supports earlier observations regarding political culture and inequality in post-independence Namibia.



Asiasanat – Keywords Journalism, frame analysis, elites, middle classes, solidarity, active citizenship, Namibia

Säilytyspaikka – Depository University of Jyväskylä

Muita tietoja – Additional information

**JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO**

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| Tiedekunta – Faculty<br>HUMANISTIS-YHTEISKUNTATIETEELLINEN | Laitos – Department<br>KIELTEN JA VIESTINTÄTIETEIDEN LAITOS |
| Tekijä – Author<br>Veera Virmasalo | |
| Työn nimi – Title<br>INSPIRING ELITE ACTION FOR A MORE JUST SOCIETY? Media Framing of Elite Social Responsibility in an Unequal, Unconsolidated Democracy. A Case Study From Namibia. | |
| Oppiaine – Subject<br>Journalistiikka | Työn laji – Level<br>Maisterintyö |
| Aika – Month and year<br>Tammikuu 2017 | Sivumäärä – Number of pages<br>160 + 27 liitesivua |


Tiivistelmä – Abstract

Tutkimus keskittyi Namibiaan, joka on yksi maailman epätasa-arvoisimmista maista. Tarkoituksena oli kehittää kehysanalyysityökalu, jonka avulla voidaan selvittää millaisia yhteiskunnallisia rooleja niin kutsutut eliittisanomalehdet ehdottavat lukijoilleen, jotka edustavat epätasa-arvoisen yhteiskunnan hyväosaisia – käytännössä eliittejä ja keskiluokkia, joita tutkimus kutsui yhteisellä nimellä eliitit. Tarkastelu nojasi näkemykseen mediateksteistä laajempien yhteiskunnallisten diskurssien peileinä ja muokkaajina.

Kehitetty työkalu perustuu käsitteeseen, jonka tutkimus nimeää *eliittien yhteiskunnalliseksi vastuuksi.* Käsite korostaa toiminnan merkitystä ja perustuu William Gamsonin kollektiivisen toiminnan kehyksiin (1992) sekä Abram de Swaanin sosiologiseen malliin (1988). Gamsonin mediapaketti-mallin mukaisesti työkalua varten määriteltiin joukko muuttujia ja selkeät koodausohjeet. Työkalu parantaa mediatutkimuksen metodologisia valmiuksia analysoida, miten mediatekstit viestivät epätasa-arvosta ja hyväosaisten aktiivisesta kansalaisuudesta.

Tutkimus sisältää analyysin 135 sanomalehtitekstistä, jotka oli valittu harkintaan perustuvalla otannalla. Noin 70 prosenttia teksteistä käytti kehyksiä, joita kehysanalyysityökalu kutsui nimellä *keskity omiin asioihisi* ja *laupias samarialainen.* Näiden mukaan hyväosaisten ei pidä tehdä mitään, tai korkeintaan hyväntekeväisyyttä. Hieman alle 30 prosenttia teksteistä käytti *aktiivinen kansalainen* -kehystä, joka kannustaa eliittejä politiikkamuutoksia vaativaan yhteistoimintaan. Analyysi myös osoitti, että lehdet käyttävät aktiivinen kansalainen -kehystä todennäköisimmin uutisoidessaan eliiteille tärkeistä aiheista. Lisäksi analyysi tunnisti useita mediarutiineja, jotka johtivat siihen, etteivät lehdet kannustaneet lukijoitaan laajempaan solidaarisuuteen. Analyysin tulokset voidaan tulkita niin, että tutkimuksessa mukana olleet lehdet toisinsivat paljolti tarkoittamattaan epätasa-arvoa ylläpitäviä diskursseja. Tämä johtopäätös tukee aiempia havaintoja itsenäisen Namibian poliittisesta kulttuurista.



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| Asiasanat – Keywords Journalismi, kehysanalyysi, eliitti, keskiluokka, solidaarisuus, aktiivinen kansalaisuus, Namibia | |
| Säilytyspaikka – Depository University of Jyväskylä | |
| Muita tietoja – Additional information | |

# CONTENT

# 1. INTRODUCTION

'What is happening to us as a nation?' asked Bishop Zephania Kameeta of the ELCRN[1] Church in August 2011, when a journalist inquired what should be done about a group of approximately one hundred people, who had been living off a large dumpsite some 15 kilometres west of the Namibian capital, Windhoek. The long-term advocate for social justice continued by saying that the time to talk about poverty was over. 'It's a question of life and death, which should be addressed now,' he concluded – presumably talking not just about the hundred, but about the roughly 700 000 living under the poverty line in his country, which is one of the most unequal societies in the world.

This thesis sets out to give a partial answer to Kameeta's question by asking what the well-off Namibians think about their role in the society. More precisely, I develop and test a frame analysis tool for studying whether Namibian elite newspapers suggest that their well-off readers should act for social justice. Frame analysis is a method used in text analysis. It is based on a theoretical construct called framing, which posits that the media inadvertently foreground specific interpretations of the world and of people's roles in the world. This way, frame analysis is also considered as a tool for analysing discourses.

Elites in the context of this study is a descriptive category lumping together the elites and middle classes. I conceptualise their ideal role in the society as *elite social responsibility*, suggesting that the people who are well off should see a role for themselves in building a more just society. The concept further suggests that this should not happen through charity but through elite activism for pro-poor public policies.

Focus on the well-off is significant and timely: As the African economies are growing, it is being implied that the new, 'rising' middle classes will lift the poor with them. Some scholars have however pointed out that nobody knows enough about the values held by the well-off to be able to predict, whether they will be concerned with lifting anybody else but themselves. One way of getting an idea is to look at the discourses, which circulate in the media, and frame analysis is one way of looking at the discourses.

The study is based on existing global theory, contemporary commentary and academic research on Namibia and other African countries – especially in Southern Africa – as well as a case study on newspaper coverage on three specific news events in two Namibian newspapers. The news events are: 1) the aforementioned 'media exposé' of people getting their food from a dumpsite in August 2011; 2) a civil society land conference held in Windhoek in November 2011, and; 3) proposed electricity price increase in April 2010. The newspapers studied are The Namibian – a private

[1] Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia

newspaper – and the New Era – a government paper. The frame analysis was conducted on a purposefully sampled corpus, which spans two weeks of coverage on each event by both papers, a total of 135 items.

The study makes a contribution to methodological development of media studies in the context of highly unequal, unconsolidated democracies. As no theoretical framework exists for frame analysis of elite social responsibility in like contexts, the study develops a new tool based on existing theoretical frameworks, which were developed to address similar issues in different contexts. The new tool may be adaptable to studies of media content in other societies with high inequalities.

A major strength of the frame analysis tool developed in this thesis is that it is transparent and flexible. Numerous framing studies – even leading ones – are criticised for being unclear on how they identify frames and extract these from texts. Such cloudiness decreases the argumentative power of their results, which is an unnecessary loss in under-researched contexts, such as in the fields of discourse and media in Namibia. The tool therefore lays out a clear coding scheme. At the same time, it leaves room for interpreting hidden meanings in texts, as the ability to read between the lines is one of the basic tenets of frame analysis as a method.

The thesis is structured in a manner, which is slightly unconventional, but not unheard of in qualitative studies in social sciences.[2] This is due to the dual objective of the study. Because I aim to both develop and test a tool for frame analysis, theory and results must be discussed hand in hand. The theoretical framework is built in layers, like an onion. I start from the general context (Chapter 2), then introduce frame analysis in general (Chapter 3), and finally turn to the core – those elements of theory that I use to build the frame analysis tool to analyse elite social responsibility discourses (Chapter 4). Chapter 4 also introduces the frame analysis tool itself, and this can be considered as one of the results of the study. Chapter 5 familiarises the reader with the corpus and the three news events covered by it. Chapter 6 describes the results of the frame analysis, which was performed on the corpus using the new tool. The chapter also connects the results with specific media practices. This chapter already entails a fair amount of reflection on the results, while the final discussion is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 also includes a critical evaluation of the results and the new tool and provides some thoughts for further research.

I am aware that this thesis tries to cover a ground that is in many respects wider than what the depth of a MA thesis allows. The topics covered are prime examples of broad and complex *wicked*

[2] For example, Hirsjärvi, Remes and Sajavaara (2000, 245) suggest that a documentation of a qualitative study should be seen as a more or less chronological story covering the research process. In the same vein, Alasuutari (1998) writes about qualitative research as solving a riddle. To do this, it is important to define what to look for, where to look and which tools to use.

*problems*[3], each of which would warrant a study of their own. Tools to analyse non-issue specific frames are, however, wide by nature. Their value lies in their ability to capture the essential of a many-faceted phenomena as it appears across issues. As Chapter 3 illustrates, it makes no sense to develop a tool for analysing half a frame, if the frame is what one wants to learn about. Following from the large ground covered, the thesis is also longer than what is usual. The need to introduce the Namibian context for the Finnish reader further extends the number of pages, and so do the lengthy text extracts in Chapter 6, where the results of the frame analysis are being discussed.

I am also cognisant of the fact that while being a relative outsider helps in keeping a distance between one's personal thinking patterns and the subject matter, the risk for not understanding and misunderstanding is severe. The frame analysis tool developed in this thesis should therefore be seen as a prototype and I hope that it would be tested and developed further by people who are insiders in Namibia or similar societies.

My motives are personal and arise from a wish to understand the society where I live in and to understand it through the profession I used to practice. I am Finnish, but I have lived in southern Africa since 2004, first Zambia and then Namibia from 2007. I was away for three years, but I am now moving back as a wife of a Namibian man and a mother of a Finnish-Namibian daughter. Journalism was my first profession before I derailed to communication work with organisations working with international development, and it is also the major subject in the MA degree, which this thesis forms the last part of.[4]

To briefly position myself in relation to the research setting[5], I further disclose that I am white, and so is my Namibian husband, whose first language is English. I did not plan to end up any side of the local colour bar, but I have spent enough alcohol-filled evenings on all sides to understand that prejudice and compassion have no race. Undeniably, such social encounters have mostly occurred within my

[3] A wicked problem is defined as a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of complex cause-and-effect relationships and because it involves diverse stakeholders who do not always agree on how to define the problem and the most desirable solution for it (Rittel &Webber 1973).

[4] I have never worked in a media organisation in Southern Africa, and during my time in Namibia my contact with people working in the local media has been quite limited. My own work in the country has been with the a bilateral development agency (the Finnish Support for the Namibian Decentralisation Process programme, a bilateral programme funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland), and as an independent consultant. For learning, the most valuable assignments have been those where I have worked within the daily realities of a local workplace. In particular I would like to thank the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development of Namibia, Directorate Decentralisation Coordination, for the two years I got to spend with them, and the staff of the Department of Development and Social Services at the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia for the endless hours sat together over various publications (this work was funded by Helsinki Deaconess Institute and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).

[5] Such disclosure is considered pertinent for research ethics. See for example McDowell 1992; Merriam, Johnson-Bailey, Lee, Kee, Ntseane & Muhamad 2001.

own group of reference – urban, well-educated, well-earning middle classes – and I understand little about the lived realities of the poor majority, by whom I profess to stand in this thesis.

Class-wise, my Namibian family falls within the broad definition of the elites used in this study. Seen with my Nordic eyes, we are modestly comfortable. The same converts to opulence, if compared with the living standards and opportunities available for those living in poverty or just above it. Yet we are far from the political and economic power of the local top elites. When my husband is asked, he defines himself as lower middle class within the local white community. What that makes me in this context, I am not sure of.

What I feel I am, is a product of a Nordic welfare society. Two of my grandparents rose to middle class from very modest beginnings, the third from a notch above them, and the fourth was an heiress from the nobility (she married one of the first two, a postal worker). I trust that their lives – as well as those of my parents and us the children – would have been rather different, had it not been for a culture and a system, which made the general population put value on equality and redistribution.

After years in southern Africa, I still harbour traces of a 'welfare state of mind'[6], often unable to base my thinking on local realities. In many ways, my mental landscape is stuck somewhere in the 1990s Finland, and I am quick to dish out opinions based on that reality. Some call it idealism, others call it being an idiot. In this thesis I have tried to keep myself under check, although the concept of elite social responsibility itself comes from the depths of my welfare state of mind. Whether the somewhat naïve conceptualisation holds any value for the Namibian realities, is for the reader to decide.

The aim of this thesis is not to criticise the Namibian media. My main interest lies in the discourses, which are a form of power to which we all are more or less susceptible. The study does however trace links between journalistic routines and specific discourses. As far as the routines of journalism are global, so are these links, and hence they should not be seen as a shortcoming of the Namibian media in particular. I believe journalism is one of the most difficult professions in the world. It is always difficult to publicly chronicle and interpret a wide variety of events and processes as they unfold in front of you, and it must be even more so in a small society where everybody tends to know everybody and access to information is an ongoing, daily challenge.

[6] The expression *welfare state of mind* was coined by Vickers (1952) to denote an inability to think other alternatives as a possibility.

# 2. ELITES, ELITE MEDIA AND ELITE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NAMIBIA

The purpose of this chapter is to present the broad theoretical orientation behind the current thesis and, at the same time, furnish the reader with the necessary background on Namibia. I start with rooting my interest in elites in recent discussions in the field of development studies and African studies and summarise what this study has to offer for this discussion. After this, I proceed to introduce the broad media theoretical framework on which I draw on. The remainder of the chapter is devoted for background on Namibia and Namibian elite media.

## 2.1 Elite social responsibility and elite discourses

In the past five years a great deal has been written about the growth of the middle classes in Africa. Initiated by economists and market researchers and further fuelled by powerful think tanks and the popular press, among others, the idea of strong middle classes quickly become associated with high hopes on the transformative power of these people. Many imply that an economically strong middle will near-automatically bring about better governance and social justice for all. More recently, attention has been drawn to impediments to such development, and a more realistic picture is emerging. (For an authoritative summary, see Melber 2016.)

For example, Lise Giesberg and Simone Schotte (2016) remark that the middle classes will be a powerful force for change only to the extent to which they manage to form a shared identity, and to embark on the type of political activism, which combines self-interest with democratic values and the needs of the broader population.[7] These conditions roughly correspond to the characteristics normally assigned to *civic culture* (Almond & Verba 1963), *active citizenship* (UNDP 2006) or *deepening democracy* (Gaventa 2006). In the field of development studies and communication for development, research around these themes has, for the past thirty some years, been dominated by active citizenship by the poor (for a summary see Ellerman 2007; Hintjens 1999), although such dispositions among the non-poor may be equally important for social development (Amsden, DiCaprio & Robinson 2012; Booth 2009; Hickey 2012; Hellsten 2016; Hickey & Bracking 2005). For example, Giesberg and Schotte further contend that it will not be sufficient if political activism arises

[7] Another important factor is an increased economic independence of the middle classes from the state, as the state currently is a significant employer and source of business for the middle classes (Giesberg & Schotte 2016. & Southall 2016). At the most basic level, the power wielded by the middle classes depends on their size. Several authors have recently pointed out that middle class growth looks more modest than what has been suggested by, for example the African Development Bank and various market research institutions (Melber 2016).

from the lower middle classes only, as meaningful change is currently being blocked 'by the political lethargy and bias towards the status quo' by the upper middle class (*ibid.,* 1).

While not taking a normative position to whether change should ideally happen from below or from above, this thesis focuses on those who are not poor. I lump the middle classes – the lower and the upper – together with the classes above them, and call them all with a descriptive term *the elites*. I am interested in how these people understand their role in the society. Do they see an active role for themselves, one that would go beyond voting in regular elections? If such a role exists, does it entail a vision of a more just society?

In other words, the normative ideals of this study are active citizenship and social justice. The first I define tentatively as attempts to influence political decision-making outside elections. The second I define after Rawls (1971) as support to the idea that everyone should have equal access to liberties, rights, and opportunities, and the least advantaged members of society should be cared for. As such, the quest for social justice is a continuously evolving attempt to balance the benefits and burdens of the polity in such a way that they are shared equitably.

For the ease of reference, I combine active citizenship by the elites and the quest for social justice in one concept, *the elite social responsibility.* I use this normative concept to describe the extent to which the well-off people in an extremely unequal society see a role for themselves in building a more just society. Central to elite social responsibility, like to social justice, is that 'it is not possible without strong and coherent redistributive policies conceived and implemented by public agencies' (UNDESA 2006, 16). The concept should therefore not be confused with charity, good will, philanthropy, or similar actions based on an individual's considerations on what they are willing to do as individuals at a given moment. Neither is elite social responsibility about helping one's family, ethnic group or place of business. Instead, it refers to elite advocacy for the adoption and implementation of pro-poor public policies. Pro-poor policies can be defined as 'public policies, which influence both the process of generation and distribution of income in such a way as to disproportionately benefit the poor' (Pasha 2002). Public means that these policies are binding agreements between the state and the people.

This thesis does not ask questions from representatives of the elites in person. Instead, I look at media texts. Following Foucault (1972; Rabinow 1991) these can be conceptualised as manifestations of broader discourses, which reflect the elites' self-understanding and, through inter-elite competition, mould it (for empirical proof on inter-elite competition in African press, see Lugalambi 2006). My specific interest lies in what could be called the elite media, the media produced by people who are well off, and serving and covering predominantly those who are well off (Davis 2007;

Kivikuru 2009).[8] Such are the well-established, older newspapers in Namibia (Fesmedia 2011; Kivikuru 2009; Namrights 2011), the home of the case study I present in this thesis. They may be conceptualised as an elite *public sphere* (Habermas 1989), which reflects and shapes the elites' perceptions of the society, the others in the society and their own role in relation to these others. Although media impact on general public may be minimal, the impact of elite media on elites may be significant (Davis 2003; 2007). In the Namibian case, I presume[9] that the elite media is likely to have a moderate impact on whether the broad collection of people I call the elites ever comes to form a collective identity as the well-off people of Namibia with some shared interest – even responsibility – for the development of a more just society. While news media is not the only actor in this process, before the emergence of social media[10], there were no other discursive platforms on sight which could, to similar extent, bring together the fractured elites inhabiting the vast country.

## 2.2 This study on the field of media research

The bulk of studies on news media and civic engagement in new democracies foregrounds the role of media as a transmitter of factual information and a platform for rational dialogue, which enables citizens to make informed decisions and hold elected leaders accountable, as directed by values of liberal pluralist democracy (for a bibliography, see Jebril, Stetka & Loveless 2013). These studies are accompanied by another body of research guided by a more participatory ideal of democracy, and having a focus on community media as an empowerment tool for the poor (Huesca 2008). The same two major strands can be found in media development interventions that are run by development funding from a variety of bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental donors and focus largely on the development of media institutions and legal frameworks in order to foster a free, pluralistic and participatory media sector with high ethical standards and access to information (Casserly, Elias & Fortune 2014; Fesmedia undated; Mcloughlin & Scott 2011; Myers 2009 – and specifically on Namibia Lush & Urgoiti 2011; SIDA 2013; UNESCO / IPCD undated). This thesis takes a different viewpoint by focusing on elites and foregrounding media's role as a mirror and a moulder of their perceptions and identities. My epistemological starting point is social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann 1967) combined with James W. Carey's (1989 & 2009) ritual view on communication and a

[8] Chomsky (1997) defines elite media as the media which sets the framework where all other media outlets operate. This study does not take a stand to whether this is true or not.

[9] No research exists on the Namibian elite media impact on local elite audiences. Moreover, even the most basic-level audience research in Namibia is scarce (Keulder 2010b, 289; Keulder 2006; Anshelm 2011).

[10] Although both newspapers featured in this study were online during the sampling period, online comments were not yet supported. Overall, commentary on news on public social media platforms was rare at the time. For example, the Politics Watch Namibia Facebook group was established in 2009 but in 2011 it had less than 1 200 members in (Lindeke 2012, 37), compared with the more than 48 000 members in 2017.

critical interest in the distribution of power in the society. In this view, meaning is created and recreated in social interaction, media is an important platform for and actor in such interaction, and the main research interest are the meanings emerging from the interaction of the media content and the environment where it is produced and consumed.

Conceptualisation of communication as a ritual rather than a thoroughly rational activity may be best illustrated by describing newspaper-reading as an activity: Instead of closely studying the newspaper content, we tend to skim[11] and skip and might finally concentrate on reading something that is already of our interest or confirms our existing beliefs. For most people, on most days, the final takeaway from newspaper-reading is not a change in our fundamental beliefs due to some heavy background material or of an opinion piece written by somebody with whom we disagree already before having read a word. What stays with us instead is a confirmation of the world still being out there, the important issues and the people to reckon with being more or less the same as they were yesterday and the day before. In other words, what is often most important from the media effect point of view, is our impression of the way the world is and our role in that world. Or, as Carey himself puts it (2009, 16), newspaper-reading is like attending mass 'a situation in which nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed.'

The current thesis therefore asks: What kind of an impression of the elite's role in the society does the Namibian elite media leave in their elite readers? What I call an impression here is the result of competing elite discourses balanced with whatever interpretive power and interest the reader possesses that allows them to interpret media texts differently from these discourses. This conceptualisation carries multiple connections to critical theory in its different phases[12]. Firstly, I conceptualise discourses in Foucauldian sense as ways of thinking and understanding that are manifested in language and are a form of power, born and reproduced in social interactions, which can be characterised as unequal power struggles (Foucault 1990, 94). Secondly, I claim that discourses in the elite media are essentially elite discourses, but not a conscious product of any specific power elite. This is due to the unequal power struggles and the nature of elite media's production process. Power pervades society, the 'truth' based on it is being constantly negotiated, and media is an arena for competition by various elite discourses (Foucault 1998). Thirdly, due to

[11] For example, Fox (2012, 129) notes that the young Namibians participating in his study typically described their newspaper-reading as 'skimming'.

[12] While critical theory is traditionally seen as an offspring of Marxism, and within media studies the critical interest used to be associated solely with class struggle, current strands of critical theory draw on the dispersed notion of power and call attention to a broader scale of inequalities related, for example, to gender and ethnicity (Couldry 2004). McQuail (2000, 52) notes that the division to dominant and critical paradigms is somewhat outdated. His current interpretation of critical orientation in media studies is that it: 'seeks to expose underlying problems and faults of media practice and ad to relate them in a comprehensive way to social issues, guided by certain values.'

institutionalised media practices and the nature of discourses as portraying a seemingly objective 'truth' media is largely unintentional in its reproduction of elite discourses, and from this it follows that while the media may harbour real sympathies for the poor, they are to a large extent captives of the elite discourses and play a significant role in reproducing these (Fairclough 2003; Glasgow University Media Group 1976, 1980, 1982; Herman & Chomsky 1994; Van Dijk 1998). Fourthly, while the audience does possess some power to resist elite discourses, this power is suggested to be weak compared to that of the origin of the discourses (Morley 1992, 3) and such alternative readings are also subject to an interest to see things differently, which may not be great in inter-elite communication (Davis 2003; 2007)[13]. As a conclusion it may be stated that elite media presents their elite readers with a specific impression of reality, which narrows their understanding of what is preferable, and – even more importantly – of what is possible.

From the discussion above it follows that media texts are a relevant object for study in several fields: they contribute to our understanding of a specific society at a specific point of time, and they also contribute to our understanding of the media's role in that society.

On the one hand, the current thesis contributes to the calls that have been voiced in development studies and African studies for the production of knowledge on the values, norms and identities held by the well-off people of the global South. (For elites, see Amsden, DiCaprio & Robinson 2012; Booth 2009, 12; Hickey 2012; Hickey & Bracking 2005; Orrnert & Hewitt 2007. For middle classes, see Dasandi 2015; Hellsten 2016, 105; Southall 2016.) On the other hand, the thesis contributes to media studies on framing (for a summary, see d'Angelo & Kuypers 2010) and on media's democratic roles (for a summary see Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng & White 2009 and for a more South-centred view Rao & Wasserman 2013). Finally, the thesis contributes to media studies on Namibia, which is an under-researched field (Fox 2012, 20). It adds to the small body of systematic content analysis on various issues (Engelbrecht 2014; Genderlinks 2014; IPPR 2004a & 2004b; Kivikuru 2009; Landqvist & Swedberg 2006; Magadza 2016; Mchombu 2000; Nzuma 2015; Strand 2011). Together with other studies on news values, production and ethics (Heneborn & Melin 2012; Rothe 2010, Wasserman 2010a), media environment (Buch Larsen 2007; Fesmedia 2005, 2011, 2015; Links 2006; Tyson 2010 & 2008), media uses (Fox 2012; Kabongo 2007; Keulder 2006; Namupala 2007) and effects (Chanda, Chombu & Nengomasha 2008)[14] it paves way for further research analysing the

[13] Studying media use by young Namibians, Fox (2012, 252–254) found that his interviewees were generally quick to recognise and challenge power narratives they encountered in the media. The study does not however tell if the well-off participants had an ability to critically assess such power narratives, which justified their privilege.

[14] The reader should note that most of these studies are by students at Master's or Bachelor's levels. Exceptions are Wasserman, Kivikuru, Chombu, and Fox, who are established academics; Strand who is a post-doc researcher, and; Tyson, who is a lecturer at the University of Namibia. IPPR and Genderlinks are local non-

inter-relationships between power, production, content and effect in the Namibian context. Such research ideally needs to be backed by systematic content analysis, as claims on links between media production and effect are incomplete without a reliable description of the content (McQuail 2000, 305; Van Dijk 2009, 202).

None of the Namibian studies cited above has a focus on media's role in elite social responsibility, active citizenship by the elites, or any other like topic, and such studies are few also in the broader Southern African context.[15] The idea of media being socially responsible to incite 'a greater understanding and compassionate action' (Wasserman 2015, 230) is however a recurring theme in the explorations of media ethics in the region (e.g., Berger 2009; Geertsema 2007; Lewis 2004; Namrights 2012; Wasserman 2013, 2015a, 2015b). To my knowledge this is yet to be turned into a coherent research-backed theory that could be directly applied to a frame analysis tool, which would help tracing how elite media either blocks or promotes precisely elite social responsibility. In the absence of such theory, the current study builds on 'northern' theories from sociology and social movements and operationalises these through – also northern – theories of the effects specific type of media content may have on general audiences (see Chapter 4). These are complemented by local studies and other studies from the wider (Southern) African region. Based on this combination of North and South, the upcoming chapters suggest elite media to have an influence on elite social responsibility because it is vested with a potential to influence elite perceptions of four issues, which are: 1) collective identity 2) the type of solutions they prefer 3) the nature of social problems and the nature of other members of the society 4) government efficacy.

## 2.3 Namibian elites

This section starts with a brief introductory paragraph on Namibia, which is followed by a justification for why it makes sense for a study focusing on Namibian elite media to lump together the middle classes and the elites. After giving four reasons to such conceptualisation, I outline the specific elite characteristics that should be looked at when studying elite social responsibility. The bulk of this section then focuses on acquainting the reader with the Namibian elites and the kinds of pro-poor policy proposals that they may need to take a stand on.

governmental organisations and their research is conducted by academics. Fesmedia's African Media Barometer is based on an assessment by a stakeholder panel including the academia.

[15] My literature review on Southern African media studies focused on post-independence studies in three English-speaking countries in the Southern Africa region, namely Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. These countries share similar experiences due to the history of settler colonialism, protracted independence struggles resulting in dominant party states governed by the former liberation movement and – in the case of Namibia and South Africa – apartheid (Jensen 2001).The review was limited to time after independence, as the pre-independence era alternative press was operating in a very different context (see Heuva 2001).

Namibia is a Southern African country with a population of 2.2 million. It is one of the most unequal countries in the world (Levine & Roberts 2012). The wealthiest Namibians live a life with living standards comparable to those in Finland (UNDP 2007, 20), while at least eighty per cent of the population lives either in poverty[16] or is in constant risk of falling back to poverty (AfDB 2013, World Bank 2016).[17] The base for the situation lies in the history of the area, mainly colonialism, which culminated in *apartheid*, racial segregation as an official government policy. The poverty head count has decreased by roughly 40 per cent since independence in 1990 (GRN 2012b) but statistics show that post-independence policies have not resulted in significant changes in inequality, although education has replaced ethnicity as the main determinant of inequality between groups (Levine & Roberts 2012).

In other words, if one divides Namibians into 'haves' and 'have-nots', the haves are a small group compared to the have-nots, and the difference of opportunities prevailing between these groups is enormous. This is one of the reasons for why it makes sense to speak about the elites and the rest in the Namibian context. Similar conceptualisations of elites are frequently found in African studies (Lentz 2015, for an example of research on Namibia see Kangas 2008), although elite research on other parts of the world typically conceptualises elites as comprising only 'the very small number of people who control the key material and political resources within a country . . . probably a number smaller than half of 1 per cent of any national population' (Hossain & Moore 2002).

Secondly, the vast differences of opportunities can be thought to have a bearing not only on the concrete aspects of life – such as living conditions, health, schooling, work, participation in civic life, leisure and consumption – but also on the influence people have on the object of this study, the discourses, which mould perceptions of what the society should be like and who should take part in developing it (for Namibia, see Friedman 2011, 220). A broad definition of the elites is a good match for a Foucauldian conceptualisation of power, where power is everywhere but where unequal power relationships result in a situation where the very poor are not likely to have a great influence on

[16] The national poverty line is 377.96 Nambian Dollars per month. This translates to roughly 13 NAD or 1 USD/Euro per day. According to the most recent national statistics, roughly 30 % of Namibians are living under this line (GRN 2015b). Many of them as poor as the poor people in the least developed countries (UNDP 2007, 20)

[17] I have difficulty establishing how big a percentage of the Namibian population may currently fall into my broad definition of the elites. Statistics readily provide numbers on those falling under the poverty line, but I do not have the skills to further interpret the statistics to conclude the size of the current floating class (people struggling just above the poverty line and consuming between 2 and 4 USD per day). I therefore use the African Development Bank estimate (2013), although it is based on 2005 figures and the soundness the categories used has been questioned (Hellsten 2016; Kingombe 2014). Albeit old, these figures may still be about right, if one considers that according to the World Bank (2016) roughly 45 % of Namibians were living on under 3.1 USD / day in 2011.

discourses, which the well-off tend to use to justify the status quo (for a Namibian example, see Sullivan 2001).

It is important to understand that the elites, – even if broken down into elites proper and middle classes, are not a permanent, homogenous group with shared interests and a collective identity, which would take preference in all situations and areas of life. These 'groups' of people can, however, be conceptualised as forming one power block in relation to the poor, and this is the third justification for why it makes sense to lump together the elites and the middle classes: The elites proper are people who have the economic and political power to decide how and to whose benefit the country is run while the middle classes are people who have considerable power to influence the elites proper and who share a variety of interests with them (Abbink & Salverda 2013). The middle classes can use their power to press the elites proper for decisions that are in the middle class interest rather than in the interest of the poor (Resnick 2015, see Mhlambi 2014 for an example of how this scenario is not realising in South Africa). It follows then that any group of people within the broad conceptualisation of elites can choose to use their relative power to press the government to develop and implement pro-poor policies – be it out of self-interest or for other reasons. When this happens, a collective identity as the well-off Namibians with shared interests or responsibilities towards others in the society may be activated, and this should enable the group pressing for change to get the necessary backing from other elite groups.

Fourthly, a broad conceptualisation of elites makes sense when the object of the study are the so-called elite newspapers, which are produced and consumed mainly by and for a group of people who comprise the elites and the middle classes. (More about this in section 3.1 below.)

I am now turning to the second point of interest of the current section: What are the characteristics and actions that matter for elite social responsibility? In section 2.1, I defined elite social responsibility as the extent to which the well-off people see a role for themselves in improving the society for the common good, including for the benefit of the poor. I also said that elite social responsibility does not refer to charity or help to one's family or kin. Instead, it is about elite initiatives, which aim to influence the government to develop and implement pro-poor public policies. Thus, elite social responsibility is comprised of two characteristics that are equally important: 1) active citizenship among the elites, and 2) the use the elites are putting their active citizenship in – is it being used to create a more just society? Below, I will briefly elaborate, what I mean by active citizenship and the pro-poor use of it.

The first characteristic of elite social responsibility, active citizenship, is about conceiving oneself and one's group of reference as active citizens, committed to influence decision-making thorough the elections and in between them. In a dominant-party state like Namibia, activism outside the elections

should be all the more important, as voting in the elections does not bear a significant influence on policy decisions (Blaauw 2012; Kaapama, Blaauw, Kaakunga & Zaaruka 2007; Tötemeyr 2007b). Examples of inter-electoral citizen activity include discussing policy options among family, friends and associates, expressing one's opinions through the media, contacting elected leaders, signing petitions, participating in protest actions and being a leading force behind such actions.

The second characteristic of elite social responsibility, pro-poor use of active citizenship, is a more complicated issue. Elites can effect pro-poor changes based on altruistic motivations, but also based on self-interest. For example, a comprehensive study on early welfare reforms in the global North (De Swaan 1988) has demonstrated that elite self-interest was more important than altruism. The author of the study, Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan, holds that the type of motivation was not significant for the end result. What was more decisive in defining the course of action were the perceptions the elites had regarding poor people and poverty (more about this in Chapter 4.1). In line with De Swaan, this study accepts that elite social responsibility does not need to be based on altruistic motivations. Pro-poor use of active citizenship can thus be based on either altruistic or self-interest motives. What matters is the change these motives lead to: is the change such that it is likely to alter structures, which reproduce inequality? Can it be conceptualised as affecting all poor people, regardless of their ethnic origin, place of residence, political partisanship, spiritual practices, and so on?[18] Typically, such change can only be affected through state-coordinated and managed public policies (see for example Seekings & Nattrass 2002 for one such vision for South Africa).

From the above, it follows that several rather common types of elite action fall outside the concept of elite social responsibility, as much as they may help people in times of need. Three pertinent examples are charity, family support, and patronage. I define charity as unconditional help targeting strangers, family support as unconditional help targeting one's nuclear or extended family, and patronage as support of individuals or groups who are expected to return the favour later on, for example in the form of political support, business opportunities or sexual favours.[19]

The explicit exclusion of family support and patronage from the definition of elite social responsibility is connected to Namibia being what is called an unconsolidated democracy (Sims & Koep 2012). The

[18] Several scholars also assert that change will be sustainable only if the support from the upper strata is, to a significant extent , based on the values of social justice (e.g., Borras & Franco 2010; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler 2007; Sen 1997)

[19] Charity, family support, or patronage are not necessarily detrimental to social justice, instead they are often underpinned with values, moral systems and motivations that are supportive of social justice (De Swaan 1988; Kellsal 2008; Lentz 2015). For example Fumanti (2002, 169–172) describes the black elites in Rundu in positive terms as 'redistributors and patrons deeply rooted in a system of reciprocity', whose power is based on the values and expectations attached to the status of the Big Man. They are supposed to be wealthy, provide support for their kinsfolk, to mediate relationships with the state authority and to possess both knowledge and formal education. Julia Pauli (2010), also an anthropologist, demonstrates similar redistributive patronage between married men and their girlfriends in Northwest Namibia.

country is in a situation, where formal political institutions and processes work rather well, but democratic or *civic culture* (Almond & Verba 1963) is not fully established (see footnote 25 on page 17). The extreme inequality has been deemed a significant factor in slowing down the consolidation process (Kangas 2008). While it is not likely that democracy as a mode of governance will be overthrown (Afrobarometer 2014/2015), the longer the consolidation process draws out, the longer the relationship between the elites and the poor is likely to remain being based personal or ethnic connections instead of the kind of generalised, social justice-based solidarity towards fellow citizens, which is meant by elite social responsibility.

Finally, a brief definition of an additional type of elite action, which also does not qualify as elite social responsibility: *Segregationism* may be defined as any action based on the thought that Namibia should continue implementing a dual public system with one set of rules applying to the well-off and another to those who are not. This is a post-apartheid version of segregation, where the dividing line is increasingly wealth, not colour. Such reasoning is based on the denial of the principle that all citizens are endowed with the same human rights.

I will now turn to the third point of interest in this section, which is to introduce the reader to what is known about the Namibian elites. The characterisation takes a starting point in economic indicators and literature on class and inequality in Namibia. These are used to establish a rough profile regarding the size and demographic characteristics of the groups of people who are of interest to this study. The description is then expanded to look specifically at the two characteristics, which were defined as crucial for elite social responsibility, namely active citizenship and the use of it for the benefit of the poor. The latter entails elite perceptions of poverty.

My starting point is a statistic by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2011), which suggests that as much as 20 per cent of the Namibian population[20] might be non-poor, and thus likely to fall within my definition of 'the elites'. While economic indicators on their own are not sufficient for defining elite position, and the AfDB definitions may be debatable, it is possible to use the AfDB estimate as an aide in starting to visualise the population that is of interest in this thesis (see Figure 1 on page 15). Of the 20 per cent that fall within the elites measured by consumption figures, half are elite proper and half are middle classes. The remaining 80 per cent of Namibians are poor, belonging either to those who live in poverty or in constant risk of falling into poverty. It may be suggested that, unlike the elites, this 80 per cent is too busy to make the ends meet and too powerless to participate in activities in the public sphere and thereby they are also largely left out of the processes which

[20] This would have been 360 000 people, if calculated based on Namibia's population of 1.8 million in 2005, the time when the estimate figures were drawn. The newest census puts the total population at 2.1 million.

mould discourses (Drèze & Sen 2013, 266; Isaksson 2010, 14. Also Du Pisani 2010, 12 makes a similar point with regard to Namibia).




**FIGURE 1 Elites and the poor in Namibia**

Since race is a prominent factor in inequality and elite experience in Namibia, one may try to take the AfDB pyramid illustration further and calculate which racial group gets what share of the top of the pyramid. The result would be something like this: 82 percent of the people falling within the broad definition of elites are black or coloured[21] and 18 percent are white.[22] This signifies an over-representation of whites within the economical elites considering that their share of the total Namibian population is approximately 3.5–5 per cent. This racial stratification is due to Namibia's history as a settler colony and subsequently an apartheid state. The black majority was denied all political and economic rights for a century before it attained political power at Independence in 1990.[23] Although some de-racialisation of the economy has taken place, the history of colonialism

[21] A note on terminology: Following the convention established in the Southern African liberation struggle, from this point forward I will be using the term 'black' synonymously with 'people of color,' to inclusively refer to all groups not defined as 'white' by apartheid legislation (Whitehead 2013).

[22] No recent official figures on the number of people of European descent in Namibia exists as census information differentiates between languages spoken, not ethnic origin. At Independence, whites were approximately 5 per cent or 75 000 of the population of 1.4 million, and this is the absolute number most often quoted today (for example the City of Windhoek website). In the meanwhile, total population has grown to 2.1 million. The 18 % is a calculation based on these figures and an assumption that extremely few – if any of the roughly 3.5–5 per cent of Namibian population of European descent are living for less than 4 USD / day.

[23] Within the current black elites and middle classes, there are those who have risen to the elite after Independence in 1990, as well as those whose elite position dates to the time before independence, when the South African government saw the development of a tiny black elite of traders, farmers, clergy, teachers and

manifests itself in deep structural inequalities. (Levine & Roberts 2012; Jauch et al 2009.) It is safe to state that extremely few – if any – white Namibians are living on less than 4 USD / day. However, contrary to the impression sometimes given in the media (e.g., Jabbar 2011), the economic elite in Namibia is not exclusively white. Even if the entire white population fell within the consumption bracket AfDB conceptualises for the top elite, they would only make up half of this top elite, while the other half would be black.[24]

I will now leave the AfDB estimate and proceed to describe the Namibian elites based on research and analysis on elites and elite formation in Namibia. As stated above, elites are not a homogenous group, even if one breaks them down into smaller groups according to income, language, colour or education. While keeping this in mind, I will however start with a generalisation. To stereotype the members of the Namibian elite, we may assume that an overwhelming majority live in urban areas, are reasonably well-educated, and work in the formal sector, or are running their own companies (GRN 2012a).[25] As a group, they differ from a comparable group in Finland at least in two respects: Firstly, the majority of the people who fall within the broad conceptualisation of elites are characterised by relative vulnerability. In a society where the level of income from state-provided social safety nets is low compared to Europe, considerable wealth is needed to secure basic needs in prolonged crises that may hit personal life and economy. Secondly, the elite population, like the general Namibian population, comprises different ethnic and language groups and sub-groups of such groups. People's ethnic identity is likely to be at least as strong as their national identity, although most would toggle between the two depending on the situation (Kjært & Stokke 2003; Stell & Fox 2015; Prah 1993).

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nurses as a necessary guard against the 'growing militancy of the masses' (Tapscott 1995). In addition to these professional groups, traditional leaders with their families is another significant black elite group predating independence.

[24] Note that this conceptualisation of economic elite is based on consumption figures, not wealth. No reliable figures are available on the distribution of wealth in Namibia, or at least such are not publicly available online or referred to in literature on inequality. The Namibia Demographic and Health survey uses a wealth-based categorisation (GRN 2014) and the census (GRN 2011) and household surveys (GRN 2014) record household assets but these focus at low levels of wealth, not exceeding of 'owning a vehicle' or 'owning [an unquantified expanse of] land'. A recent study on South Africa found wealth to be even more concentrated in the hands of a few than what labour income is, stating that '10% of the population own at least 90% to 95% of all wealth, in contrast to their earning 'only' about 55% to 60% of all income'. The wealthy 10% included representatives of all racial groups. Whites and Indians were found to be 'still much wealthier on average than African and coloured households' but the study also reported a wealth inequality among black households that was much higher than the nation-wide wealth inequality and noted that this in-group inequality is growing (Orthofer 2016).

[25] A similarly rough stereotype of a poor person is a poorly educated rural dweller who makes a living from subsistence agriculture and lives in a traditional communal setting, a village. His urban counterpart is equally poorly educated but lives in a shanty town in the outskirts of an urban area and makes a living in the informal sector. (GRN 2012a.)

In addition to ethnic divisions, race is a salient factor in identity in Namibia (Fox & Stell 2015) and, due to the racialized history of the country, majority of white and black elites differ from each other at least in two respects that are important in the context of the current study. These are their relationships with poverty and political power. Unlike the white and, to some extent, the coloured members of the elite, most black elite individuals would have personal connections, mostly extended family, to people who are poor – some of them personal memories of growing up poor. Compared to the whites, this makes them less dependent on media and other forms of peer discourse when forming perceptions of poor people and poverty. The second dividing line, relationship with political power, is less straight-forward. In short, whites are more likely to feel politically disengaged than the blacks. Where the blacks had no political rights prior to independence, political power is now almost exclusively commanded by black elites, and although no research exists on this, it seems plausible to note down the following personal observation regarding white Namibians: on average, they are politically disengaged. How much of this is due to disinterest and how much due to a feeling of not being welcome in political debates, is difficult to say.[26]

Turning to the elite characteristics that are particularly important for elite social responsibility, I will now try to characterise the Namibian elites in terms of active citizenship, the use they make of such citizenship, and their perceptions of poor people and poverty. The task is difficult due to the scarcity of research around such topics.

Based on the evidence available, Namibians in general are not particularly active citizens in the sense of critical engagement.[27] This is explained in part by national history and in part by the political system that formed after independence. Pre-independence political culture[28] – neither in the context

[26] The foregoing should not be taken as an absolute: not all black members of the elite are politically engaged or have political power at the level of direct influence on decision-makers. Neither are black members of the elites necessarily more understanding towards the poor than white member of the elites.

[27] Namibia has been called 'a democracy without democrats' (Keulder & Wiese 2005), 'the only African country to lean towards delegative democracy' (Logan and Bratton 2006, 6) and 'one of the three most uncritical countries in Africa' (Chaligha et al 2002). The foregoing are conclusions made based on Afrobarometer opinion studies, but similar concerns have been voiced by local academics (Blaauw 2007; du Pisani 2006; Kaapama 2008; Kamwanyah 2011) as well. Civil society, which was recently cited to be more influential than the opposition parties (BTI 2016) is mostly 'caught up in service delivery mode … filling the gaps left by Government' instead of 'developing people that claim, defend, and stand in advocacy of their rights' (the chairperson of the Namibia Non-Governmental Organisation Forum Trust, Ronnie Dempers quoted in The Namibian 29.5.2009) and only few organisations are strong in advocacy for equality (Lombardt & Nakuta, 2014; du Pisani & Lindeke 2009, 16; Hopwood 2008, 27; Hopwood 2007, 97; GRN 2005, 1-5; Kaapama 2004, 9). Trade unions and churches, which before independence used to stand for social justice, are now to a large extent mum on social issues (du Pisani & Lindeke 2009, 16; Hopwood 2007, 101; Jauch 2007, 63; du Pisani 2006).

[28] Political culture is defined after the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as "the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the

of the apartheid government, nor in the context of the liberation struggle – did not encourage participation (Diescho 2010; Leys and Saul 1995; 20; Mattes 2011, 12; Peltola 1995; Williams 2009). Since independence Namibia has, despite being a multi-party democracy, been a dominant party state, governed by the former liberation movement, the Swapo party. The prevailing political culture largely restricts people's political role into voting in periodic elections (Blaauw 2012; Tötemeyer 2007b) – despite the fact that such voting is not likely to make a difference in government policies in a dominant party state.

On shaky empirical grounds, but nevertheless, it could be claimed that a discourse is being fostered in which not only decision-making, but the broader policy development process is reserved for Swapo only. While national policies welcome citizen participation through official channels (GRN 2012c; 2004; 1996) and in some quarters of the ruling party there seems to be real political will to increase participation (Kaapama et al 2007) this is yet to realise. The official channels for participation are largely defunct (Blaauw 2012; UNDEF & IMTL undated) and in much of the public discussion it is being implied that liberation struggle credentials are required for full participation in the polity (Du Pisani 2010). Moreover, criticism is not taken lightly (Tötemeyr 2007a). The same ethos is reflected, by example, in the civic education curriculum for Namibian schools (GRN 2008; New Era, 19.5.2006). The ideal citizen portrayed is a dutiful nationalist, who lives by the rules and respects and helps others. This stands in a stark contrast to the kinds of civic curricula, which could be imagined had Namibia chosen to take the path advocated by civic education stands, which focus on educating critical democratic citizens (Westheimer & Kahne 2004; Swalwell 2014 – see more about this in section 2.4 below).

The following quote from the Swapo party website is telling:

> Arguably, the public hearings were also meant to give members of the public a chance to air their views on the [Namibia Communications] Bill – a commendable move indeed. But Namibians understand the importance of the Bill and trust that their representatives in Parliament would not let them down. Thus, only a few individuals attended the public hearings, leaving only an assortment of uppity whites and embedded leaders of some nongovernmental organizations, NGOs, to make noise before the Committee. The notable absence of many members of the public irked Gwen Lister, Editor of The Namibian, to the bone. She was quick, as she always is anyway, to conclude that the 'public hearings were not properly advertised' to allow for more public participation. She missed the point completely. After more than 24 years of 'Telling It Like It Is,' Gwen still dismally fails to understand the psychological behaviour of the people of Namibia. Members of the public … did not attend the public hearings because they understood and appreciated the importance of the Bill, and

psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences."

> certainly not because the 'public hearings were not widely advertised in order for more public participation to be possible.' (Ntinda 2009)[29]

The discussion above concerns Namibians in general, not elites in specific. There is no substantial evidence available regarding active citizenship by them, so I am tempted to suggest the evident: It is a mixed bag. Most people who are active, are likely to fall under the broad definition of elites used in this study, but not all elites are likely to be active.

For those members of the elites who can be characterised as active citizens, what do they use this potential for – for the betterment of the society for themselves and their kind, or for social justice? Again, scant evidence exists.

It could be argued that Namibia as a society is being built for elite interests. For example Dr Henning Melber, the former director of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit and one of the leading Namibia scholars advocates this view in his books (2007; 2014). Following Dobell (1998), he documents how the political settlement made at independence was an elite pact between old and new elites. New elites were co-opted into the old socio-economic structures, the government has not demonstrated a serious political will to serve the poor and the 'have lots' are largely content with the status quo. (Melber 2014, 23 & 143–159.) Like most others in the handful of academics who have written about Namibian elites, Melber focuses on the top elite at the national level. Using political analysis and socio-economic indicators he emphasises the rent-seeking nature of the elites and their disengagement from the problematics of being a good citizen. (See also Jauch, Braam & Cupido 2009; Tapscott 1995 & 2001.)

Dr André du Pisani, another leading Namibia scholar and long-time political science professor with the University of Namibia, extends the analysis to middle classes (2006) and writes:

> For the majority of middle-class Namibians, citizenship generally involves a disengagement from the public sphere and a limited participation in national political life . . . the mental lassitude and 'intellectual anorexia'. . . that seem to be widespread in politics, business, academe, the church and organised labour . . . the human impulses of social justice, equity, love, honesty and caring have seemingly decayed . . . [Government] decisions and their economic, environmental, political and social implications are often not debated . . . we rarely dialogue and audit policy . . . We need to (re)discover what it means to live and work in a citizen-based democracy. . .

A more hopeful view based on participant observation is provided by anthropologist Mattia Fumanti (2016; 2007; 2002) whose work in Namibia focuses on elite formation in the small regional capital town of Rundu. Fumanti's research emphasises that the local elites make a fundamental contribution to the society by 'promoting the public good and civility, both through a civic discourse and through

[29] At the time of writing the commentary cited here, Ntinda was the editor in chief for Namibia Today, the official Swapo party newspaper.

actual practice in public life' (2003). Much of his analysis is based on Vilfredo Pareto's concept of *sentimento*, the values, ideals and moral reasoning behind elite actions (1901, referred to in Fumanti 2007, 471). Fumanti highlights that the local elites are motivated by a deep feeling of duty to serve and to excel in all areas of life, notably in education and in official public life. In a later interview, he however notes that there seems to be a new trend where an emphasis on 'business, prosperity and conspicuous consumption' are sidelining education as the gate to upward mobility among young elites (NAI 16.4.2016).

What are the Namibian elites' perceptions of the poor and poverty, then? Again, the scant evidence is scattered on the sidelines of studies addressing something else. One cross-cutting discoursive theme seems to be the masses, especially the youth, as something that must be controlled and contained (Fumanti 2007; Metsola 2007; Devreux 2007; Haugh 2009). Lalli Metsola, a Finnish historian with a focus on Namibia asserts that 'this discourse is driven by elite security concerns' (2007, 144). We do not, however, actually know how deep such concerns run. This is a pertinent question seen against the elite perceptions of poverty studies in Malawi (Kalebe-Nyamago 2012) and Brazil[30] (Reis 2005 & 2010). Both concluded that the local elites did not perceive the poor as a threat to their welfare, and hence 'did not feel the need to take collective action to address the problem of poverty' (Kalebe-Nyamago 2012, abstract – no paging). I will demonstrate in the upcoming chapters that security concerns did not play a significant role in the corpus of this study, either.

What did feature somewhat more in the corpus of the current study were references to 'undeserving poor' (see Chapter 6.2.3 on page 72). This is a term used to imply that poverty is, in one way or another, the fault of the poor themselves (Hossain & Moore 2005). As an avid reader of the Namibian newspapers, I have observed an example of such reasoning in much of the discussion around the Basic Income Grant (BIG), which was proposed for Namibia in 2002 and rejected by the government in 2010, one of the main arguments being that the proposal was unfair on those who work for living and pay tax. Despite the official rejection, references to BIG have kept appearing in the media, and when an Afrobarometer study in 2014 enquired to people's perceptions of the grant, it turned out that nearly 80 percent of the population was in support of it, the well-off possibly slightly less than others.[31]

[30] Brazil is a relevant reference point for Namibia, as it is another upper middle income country with extreme inequalities.

[31] Afrobarometer round 2014/2015, question NAM_Q83 'Government should adopt Basic Income Grant, even if it means increases taxes'. When filtered with the variable on internet use, those who used the internet every day or a few times per week were slightly less likely to support the grant than others. The variable recording internet use might be the most reliable Afrobarometer proxy of elite position in a society where educational attainment is not necessarily connected with economic and social opportunities. For consumption, income and

Melber (2014, 153) interprets the BIG discussion as follows:

> Seemingly pragmatic concerns [source of funds and affordability in general] objecting to the BIG initiative are fiddling with figures and thereby create a smokescreen, which misleads what a BIG debate is really about: which is how social justice and solidarity should be guiding principles for a caring society in which the better off share a responsibility to ensure that minimum standards of living are provided to all members of society to give them the opportunities they are denied.

The picture that forms regarding the Namibian elites' perceptions of poverty, poor people and social justice is inconclusive. I suppose there must be those who vehemently advocate social justice, those who are inclined to lend their support to it, and then those who vehemently oppose it or simply do not care about it. It is the balance between these groups that is unknown. If the current state of social justice is to be used as a measuring stick, the weight is probably on the two latter groups. In any case, it is tempting to draw a parallel between the current Namibian situation and that in the western countries at the dawn of the welfare policies, which they adopted starting from the end of the 1800s. Elite support for such policies was not great, but a handful of ideologically motivated activists played a significant role in mobilising the public opinion for the reforms. In the end, the broader elite acceptance of these policies was mainly driven by self-interest[32], but the western experience suggests, nevertheless, that it is possible to advance social justice goals from an elite position despite an initial reluctance by majority of one's peers. (De Swaan 1988.) Even a small base of well-connected domestic activists may be able to start a successful movement for social justice. The situation is of course vastly different from the late 19th and early 20th century United States and Western Europe (Ballard 2012, Friedman 2002, Abrahamsen 2000), but it should not be entirely impossible to implement pro-poor public policies under the neoliberal circumstances where the Southern African countries find themselves today (Ferguson 2011, 399–402).

I am now about to turn to the fourth and the last point of interest in the current section, which is to briefly characterise the kinds of pro-poor policies that the Namibian elites may have to take a stand on. I am doing this to bring the above discussion to a concrete level, which should help to connect the idea of elite social responsibility with specific policy measures. Table 1 on page 23 provides a list

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wealth, the barometer uses subjective evaluations, which can be difficult for comparability (see for example Alexander et al. 2013, cited in Melber 2016, 3–4) or objective measures, which cannot be used to differentiate between the floating class and what is called 'the elites' in the current study. (Afrobarometer 2014/2015.)

[32] Some scholars assert that changes are sustainable only if they are based on social justice values. (e.g., Borras & Franco 2010; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler 2007; Sen 1997).

of possible pro-poor policies that have been suggested for Namibia.[33] What follows is a short discussion regarding the policy proposals listed in the table.

The point to consider is that the elites, globally, tend to support poverty reduction measures that are not targeted to the poor, but have wide benefits to the entire society (Kalebe Nyamago & Marquette 2014, 14). Examples of the latter include improvements on education and healthcare and, above all, overall economic growth, which is expected to trickle down to the poor. However, growth-based approaches to development – unless coupled with decisive, realistic and robust measures to channel the growth to the poor – are an unlikely path to social justice (World Bank 2001; 2005). When the elites are favourable for policies specifically targeting the poor, they prefer initiatives which direct the support to the 'active poor, for example micro finance and public works programmes and fertiliser subsidies (Kalebe Nyamago & Marquette, *ibid.*).

Preferences for the trickle-down effect, investments in education and health, and initiatives targeting the deserving poor have been found in Malawi and South Africa, the two African countries with elite perceptions of poverty studies (Kalebe-Nyamongo 2012; Kalati & Manor 2005). In Namibia, hints of similar inclinations may be read in the Namibian Government's new Harambee Prosperity Plan (GRN 2016). The Harambee plan advocates for economic growth as the motor of equitable development, but is vague about the strategies that should be used to redistribute growth. The only concrete measure mentioned is the establishment of a food bank, which would serve a double duty of improving food security and providing grants for able-bodied unemployed youths working for the bank (Jauch 2016; Melber 2016).

In other words, the reader should consider that the policies listed in Table 1 present a wide array of different kinds pro-poor policy measures. Some of them are more targeted than others, and could possibly produce quicker improvements in social justice.

[33] To combat the tendency to focus on the negative, I include this footnote as a brief summary of the pro-poor policies that have already been adopted: Such policies may be divided into public investments – for example, roads, electricity, schools and hospitals – and to social protection. Namibia's social protection system is one of the most comprehensive in Africa. It comprises a number of contributory pension schemes for those in employment as well as wholly publicly funded cash transfer programmes, the latter of which have significantly reduced poverty, particularly among the poorest of the poor (Levine, Van Den Berg & You 2009).Namibia's social protection system comprises a number of formal and wholly publicly funded programmes, as well as contributory pension schemes for those in employment. The publicly funded social grants include a universal and non-contributory old-age pension for those aged 60 years and above; disability grant for persons above the age of 16 years who are disabled, blind or suffering from HIV and AIDS; child maintenance grant for single parents or spouse pensioner or people serving prison terms who have children below the age of 18 years in school attendance; special maintenance grant for people who are disabled, blind or infected by HIV and AIDS having children below the age of 16 years; foster care grant for those in custody and having children below the age of 18 years in school attendance; place of safety allowance for people below the age of 21 years in places of safety; and war veterans subvention for ex-combatants who are unemployed' (Odhiambo 2015).

**TABLE 1 Some pro-poor measures suggested for Namibia**

**Government of the Republic of Namibia, National Development Plan 4 (2012)**

- Increase access to quality education
- Establish a school feeding programme to reduce malnutrition in children
- Increase access to quality health services and address malnutrition
- Provide affordable infrastructure in order to attract non-farm income generating activities to rural areas
- Create jobs and income
- Improve access to quality public services
- Increase household food security
- Strengthen and expand the social protection system

**Odhiambo, Comparative Research Programme on Poverty. University of Bergen, Norway (2015)**

- Expand the social protection system to achieve universal coverage, especially in areas with a high incidence of poverty or where poverty headcount is on the increase.
- Target public and private investments to geographic areas which have a higher incidence of severe poverty and/or those areas in which the incidence of severe poverty is on the rise, such as Caprivi and Khomas. Examples of such interventions include the construction of road networks, agricultural development, power supply, hospitals and schools. These ought to be coupled with private investment in commercial infrastructure such as banking, cottage industries, especially agro-based ones and eco-tourism.

**Lombart & Nakuta, Namibia Non-Governmental Organisations Forum (2014)**

- Introduce a basic income grant
- Embark on participatory budgeting in favour of the poor
- Implement rights-based approaches for the provision of housing, water, sanitation, healthcare, education and land, and for employment creation.

**Levine & Roberts, UN Development Programme International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (2012)**

- Accelerate land reform and invest in productivity enhancement among small-scale farmers.
- Expand social protection in ways that promote both equity and efficiency (for example, reform of the cash transfer system and experimentation with labour guarantee programmes) and are targeted more effectively towards previously excluded groups, especially in the northern and rural areas.
- Strengthen employment creation, particularly among the youth and especially in labour-intensive sectors such as tourism, transportation and industry.

**Jauch, Edwards & Cupido, Labour Relations Research Institute, Namibia (2009)**

- Use funds from natural resources to provide quality services for all.
- Finance social grants through taxation of natural resources and companies.
- Job creation.
- Rural development.
- Empower black women.
- Establish participatory democratic structures.
- Establish worker-run factories.

## 2.4 Elite media in Namibia

This section starts with an introduction to The Namibian and the New Era, the two newspapers from which the corpus of the current study is drawn. I briefly describe the ownership, reach and content of the two papers and explain why they can be called elite papers. After this, I discuss how elite media may best advance social justice, when the society they serve is an unconsolidated democracy with high inequalities and deep divisions among the elites. The section closes of with an attempt to assess the two papers in light of the preceding discussion.

Elite media was defined above as media produced by people who are well off, and serving and covering predominantly those who are well off (Davis 2007; Kivikuru 2009). Ulla-Maija Kivikuru, a Finnish media scholar with a long-term research interest in Namibia, places Namibia's older[34] national dailies in this category in her overview of the development of journalistic culture in Africa (2009), and so do the consecutive African Media Barometer panels on Namibia (Fesmedia 2011 & 2015). Elite newspapers are also read by people who are not well-off, but my interest in this thesis is in those readers who can be described as such. More specifically, I am interested in how elite media, in serving this audience, reflects, reproduces, and perhaps also moulds discourses, which concern the role of the elites in the society.

In particular, my focus is on two national dailies, The Namibian and the New Era. They were the two newspapers with the largest reported readership figures at the time when the corpus of this thesis was published. [35] Both papers are English-language dailies. They are delivered to several rural centres, but most of the readers are in urban areas. Their key characteristics are summarised in Table 1 and discussed below.

The Namibian is an independent paper owned by a trust (Fesmedia 2011). Originally established to promote Namibian independence from South Africa, it has long since shaken off its reputation as 'the SWAPO mouthpiece' (Rothe 2010, 30). It is read by 19 per cent of Namibians (MediaMetrics 2010,

[34] The prefix *older* stands to differentiate the older dailies from the newer generation of self-proclaimed tabloids, The Sun and The Informante (see also Buch Larsen 2007, 104; Rothe 2010, 33-37).

[35] Some elite readership is undoubtedly reverted to two other national dailies, which may be considered as elite media, the Afrikaans language title Die Republikein and the German language title Algemaine Zeitung. It should also be noted that there seems to be a section of the elites not following any national news media (own observation, supported by Kabongo 2008, 14; du Pisani 2006; Keulder & Spilker 2001). This shattering of readership is to be seen partially against the multiplicity of languages spoken in Namibia, partially against the history of apartheid. For long time, the public spheres of the current Namibian elites were partly separate, as were their life spheres. These separate public spheres may be expected to have conditioned the current elites in their 30s and older to different discourses of poverty and people's role in the society. (Heuva 1990). The apartheid era state and private media was different from the alternative press of the time. At the most concrete level, the differences lay in the variety of topics that were covered. The state and private media did not cover issues that were of concern to the black majority, neither did they give the majority a voice (Heuva 1990, Tinjagaite 2006/1997). At a more profound level, the differences lay in discourses and frames used.

quoted by Anshelm 2011). The New Era is a public paper owned by the government, practically by the ruling Swapo party, and it is read by 6 per cent of Namibians (*ibid.*). Despite being owned by the government, the New Era has been able to be critical of it, sometimes to the point of an open conflict with Swapo (e.g., New Era 16.4.2012), and studies have not found major differences in the content and style of reporting of the two papers; for example their use of sources and selection of themes are quite similar (Kivikuru 2009, Landqvist & Swedberg 2006, and the current study).

Nowadays, both papers allow reader comments on their online editions, and their content is regularly shared, commented on and discussed in social media. Such interaction was not present in 2010 –2011, when the corpus of this study was published. Instead, audience input was restricted to reader's letters and The Namibian's SMS page, which allows – now as well as then – readers to address topics of their own choice by SMSing the editor, who publishes a daily selection of these SMS contributions in the printed paper, which is also published online.

Both papers try to serve a cross-section of audiences (The Namibian undated; Rothe 2010), but their elite-orientation has been visible in the topics that are covered, as well as in who gets to speak (Engelbrecht 2014, Kivikuru 2009; Landqvist & Swedberg 2006; Rothe 2010). This is probably connected to the political economy of the media, which is similar to that in the neighbouring South Africa, where research has pointed out that even if media ownership shifts to the previously disadvantaged groups, the poor majority is not an economically viable audience for commercial media (Friedman 2011, Sparks 2009; Chuma 2008; Steenveld 2002). In part, the elite-orientation could also be a consequence of a journalistic culture where the role of the media is seen first and foremost as a watchdog of the powerful (see for example Links 2006; Rothe 2010; Wasserman 2010). While watchdogism is absolutely necessary[36] and being practiced for the public good, the priority given to it means that little of the scarce resources seem to be invested in other types of content, which may be equally important for a new democracy in a divided society.

[36] Berger (2002, 91) points out that African countries depend on the media for a watchdog at a level that may be difficult to understand in the global North; if the local media will not be the watchdog, nobody else will.

**TABLE 2: The Namibian and the New Era**

| | The Namibian | New Era |
|---|---|---|
| **Founded** | 1985 | 1992 |
| **Ownership** | Free Press of Namibia Trust | State (New Era Publication Corporation) |
| **Location** | Windhoek | Windhoek |
| **Language** | English (Oshiwambo) | English (once a week, pages in Ojtiherero (Ombuze), Oshiwambo (Oonkundana), Damara/Nama, Silozi, as well as in the San-Language Khwedam) |
| **Frequency** | daily, Monday to Friday | daily, Monday to Friday |
| **Distribution** | in all major, medium and small towns | in all major, medium and some small towns |
| **Circulation** | 32,000-35,000 copies (Friday 42,000 – 45,000 copies) | 9,000 copies (Friday 11,000 copies) |
| **Sections** | National News, International, Entertainment Now!, Opinion, SMSes Sport and, economics | National, Finance, Africa, Education and Sport, Letters, Opinions, Column and Editorial |
| **Online edition** | Yes, free | Yes, free |

*Adapted from Rothe 2010*




*Source: MediaMetrics 2010 in Anshelm 2011*

**FIGURE 2 Daily listeners, readers and viewers in per cent of the population (16 years +)**

I will now turn to a brief normative discussion concerning elite media's role in an unconsolidated democracy with high inequalities. The discussion is based on two basic premises: Firstly, media performance in a democratic society should be evaluated against the type of democracy that is considered ideal for that society (Jackson 2008). Secondly, media should be seen as a media system comprising several different types of media serving different audiences (Christians et al 2009). From this it follows that elite media does not necessarily need to strive to serve an omnibus audience. Instead, its democratic responsibility lies on serving its specific audiences in a way, which is beneficial for the type of democracy that is being held as the ideal.

Democracy was imported to Africa in its liberal form, where people's role is largely restricted to periodic elections. In such settings, the role of the media is typically conceptualised as a combination of four elements: source of reliable information, watchdog of the powerful, platform for citizens' voices, and a provider of opinion that is clearly separated from factual information (McNair 2009). Many political philosophers from the continent have argued that neither liberalism, nor the media functions following from it, are ideal for African societies (Ake 2000: 184; Obi 2008: 25; Fayemi 2008: 121, Nnaemeka 2009, Nyamjoh 2005; Rukuni 2009: 60-64). Most of these scholars have emphasised the need for grassroots participation, dialogue and consensus-building as the cornerstone of a democratic model suitable for African countries. These calls have been responded in the establishment of community media, which mainly targets marginalised communities (Milan 2009)[37], but there has been less discussion and action around elite media response to the same ideals. In short, the debate concerning the role of the media in Southern Africa has typically been caught in a crossfire between those arguing for watchdogism and those arguing for a soft-spoken developmental role, which retains from criticising elected leaders (Wasserman 2015). What should the role of the elite media be in a country striving for social justice, which is an oft-stated goal for the Namibian nation (e.g. Amukugo 2013; Diescho 2010; Jauch & Kaapama 2011; Swapo 1998)?

As I could not find any writings focusing specifically on the role of the elite media towards the elites, I take a starting point in the field of civic education, where American educationalist Cathy Swalwell talks about educating elites to serve as *activist allies* (Swalwell 2013, 2014, 2015) for the advancement of social justice. In this thinking, elite privilege is 'a set of resources to be mobilized in concert with the oppressed for the purposes of mutual transformation and societal improvement' (Swalwell 2013, p. 6). Central to the activist ally thinking is relationship-building over time with people from marginalized groups, carefully listening to them, learning to critically observe unjust structures and practices, to start reflecting on one's role in these viscous circles, and to cultivate readiness to act – not as a person who assumes a leadership role and starts speaking and acting for the Other but, as somebody who genuinely empathises and uses their resources to provide structural support where asked, and also works for change within one's elite lifeworld. In respect to the last point, the argumentation resembles that of Steve Biko, the founder of the South African Black Consciousness Movement, who held that the only way white liberals can advance justice is to fight for it within their own society. Biko wrote, in 1970:

> The liberal must apply himself with absolute dedication to the idea of educating his white brothers that the history of the country may have to be rewritten at some stage and that we may live in 'a country where colour will not serve to put a man in a box'. The blacks have heard enough of this. In other words, the Liberal must serve as a lubricating material so that

[37] For various reasons, community media has never really taken off in Namibia (Lush & Urgoiti 2011; Kivikuru 2006).

> as we change gears in trying to find a better direction for South Africa, there should be no grinding noises of metal against metal but a free and easy flowing movement which will be characteristic of a well-looked -after vehicle.' (Biko 1978.)

The activist ally perspective is based on earlier theorisation on *critical citizenship* (Johnson & Morris 2010) or *justice-oriented citizenship* (Westheimer & Kahne 2004). Scholars working on these traditions base their work on the Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire's writings on critical pedagogy (1970) and assert that social justice goals are best served by citizens who: critically assess social, political and economic structures; seek out and address areas of injustice and; know how to effect systemic change through democratic collective action (Westheimer & Kahne 2004, 240, see also a more detailed presentation of critical citizenship in Table 3 below).[38]

**TABLE 3 Framework for critical citizenship education**

| | Politics/ideology | Social/collective | Self/subjectivity | Praxis/engagement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knowledge | Knowledge and understanding of histories, societies, systems, oppressions and injustices, power structures and macrostructural relationships | Knowledge of interconnections between culture, power and transformation; non-mainstream writings and ideas in addition to dominant discourses | Knowledge of own position, cultures and context; sense of identity | Knowledge of how collectively to effect systematic change; how knowledge itself is power; how behaviour influences society and injustice |
| Skills | Skills of critical and structural social analysis; capacity to politicise notions of culture, knowledge and power; capacity to investigate deeper causalities | Skills in dialogue, cooperation and interaction; skills in critical interpretation of others' viewpoints; capacity to think holistically | Capacity to reflect critically on one's 'status' within communities and society; independent critical thinking; speaking with one's own voice | Skills of critical thinking and active participation; skills in acting collectively to challenge the status quo; ability to imagine a better world |
| Values | Commitment to values against injustice and oppression | Inclusive dialogical relationship with others' identities and values | Concern for social justice and consideration of self-worth | Informed, responsible and ethical action and reflection |
| Dispositions | Actively questioning; critical interest in society and public affairs; seeks out and acts against injustice and oppression | Socially aware; cooperative; responsible towards self and others; willing to learn with others | Critical perspective; autonomous; responsible in thought, emotion and action; forward thinking; in touch with reality | Commitment and motivation to change society; civic courage; responsibility for decisions and actions |

*Johnson & Morris 2010, 90*

The question is then: How can media serving the elites support their elite audiences to recognize the structures and practices, which are entrenching injustice, to empathise with the oppressed, and to act for structural change?[39] Moreover, what difference does it make that in this case the said media is operating in an unconsolidated democracy in a divided and an extremely unequal society?

[38] These thoughts have also been brought up in Namibia and South Africa (see Constandius et al 2015 for a summary), but not meaningfully implemented (Ardense 2014; Mathebula 2009); for example the Namibian civic education curricula rather focuses on educating what is sometimes termed adapting citizens (Seroto 2004), responsible, law-abiding citizens with good manners (see for example GRN 2008; New Era, 19.5.2006).
[39] One could also ask if this realistic, the same audiences being the very people who benefit from such structures and practices.

The Southern African discussion around omnibus media has emphasised on the media's duty to facilitate 'listening across difference' in order to build compassion (Wasserman 2013 & 2015; for Namibia see Brown 2009; Namrights 2013). The lead figure in this conversation, the media studies professor Herman Wasserman of University of Cape Town, highlights that compassion should not grounded on a 'spectatorship of suffering', which manifests itself in the feeling of pity, but on an understanding that dignity belongs to all human beings (Chouliaraki 2006). He suggests that in practice the new orientation would mean an emphasis being put on 'good, contextual stories that open up possibilities for greater understanding and compassionate action' (Wasserman 2015, 230). The first step towards this would be to ensure that poverty gains renewed legitimacy as 'the story' (Panos 2007). This is necessary, considering that structural causes of injustice fare badly with the local news criteria, which are largely the same as in the northern elite media (Rothe 2010), and have been observed to cause a considerable middle-class bias in South African (Chiumbu, Reddy, Bohler-Mulle, Gumede, Mtshengu 2016; Friedman 2011) and probably also Namibian (Kivikuru 2009; Namrights 2013) media.

Wasserman (2015, 220) also warns that an exclusively adversarial journalism aimed at a legitimate government may widen the gulf between the historical supporters of liberation movements and other sectors of society, or between ethnic groups.' A possible solution, which would also enhance the critical capacity of the audiences, would be to move away from simply reporting incidents that have gone wrong. Instead, more emphasis should be placed on analysis and information on policies and structures. One South African media student gives the following practical examples in her MA thesis, which focuses on media coverage of health services:

> Instead of framing the report to speculate about Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi receiving special treatment when he was admitted to Steve Biko Academic Hospital for a cardiac procedure, journalists would investigate the feasibility of government hospitals housing facilities for private patients. … (Levine 2014, 110.)
>
> …a report on nurses' negligence would be followed up with reports showing solutions taken and resolution of crisis. Simple reporting of events and incidents would no longer be considered good journalistic practice. (Levine 2014, 111.)

A greater contextualisation in reporting on corruption, negligence and mismanagement may also help the audience to consider themselves as part of the problem and its solution, which could in tur prevent the media from spreading political cynicism (Ibelema 2008). I will cover these viewpoints on responsibility and watchdogism in more detail under chapters 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 on motivation and efficacy, which are two of the four elements in the action-orientated conceptualisation I propose for the analysis of elite social responsibility.

A crucial viewpoint arising from the said action-orientated conceptualisation, which will be introduced later, is a recognition of the fact that the Namibian elites are heterogeneous and, in many

respects, deeply divided. To encourage collective elite action on any issue, the media should therefore build a shared elite identity, which cuts across dividing lines and encourages people to see that, together, they form a powerful section of citizenry, which can choose to start making a difference for social justice. The risk entailed in such identity-engineering is that the identity being created could foreground not social justice-oriented citizenship but an alternative, which is detrimental to social justice. Among such alternatives, one that has received considerable attention is that of a consumer. For example, Justin Lewis, Sanna Inthorn and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen (2005) make a clear distinction between people presented as citizens and people presented as consumers. They write:

> We have seen the concept of the citizen replaced by the more limited idea of the consumer. Citizens are actively engaged in the shaping of the society and the making of history; consumers simply choose between the products on display (ibid, p. 6).

Lewis and his colleagues write in a British context, but it is feasible to argue that the differentiation between citizens and consumers is even more crucial to keep in mind when looking at media systems, which serve developing countries. Significant proportions of the population in these countries do not easily fit any descriptions of a consumer. If citizens are increasingly framed as consumers, what happens to the citizens that cannot afford to consume?

In sum, this section has outlined the following points for elite media to consider for advancing social justice: 1) Build collective identity among readers to encourage them to see that, together, they form a powerful section of citizenry, which can choose to start making a difference for social justice. 2) Draw attention to injustice and its structural foundations. 3) Do this in ways, which a) give a voice to the oppressed to speak in their own terms, b) build empathy among the well-off, and c) point out what the well-off can do to effect structural changes. 4) When performing the watchdog function, always contextualise this information with analysis and information on policies and structures.[40]

A brief assessment of Namibia's elite media in the light of the above suggests that there is room for improvement. Existing research and commentary points to a lack of voices of the poor (Brown 2009, Fesmedia 2011, 56–58; Fesmedia 2015, 38 & 54; Namrights 2013) and a lack of background and investigative journalism (Fesmedia 2011, 56–58; Fesmedia 2015, 38 & 54; Lister 2014, 98; Rothe 2010; Tyson 2006). There is little issue-driven reporting and analysis (Fesmedia 2015; Rothe 2010, 159, 177; also evident in the corpus of the current study) and political news is typically event and

[40] To adopt such principles would require the elite media to partially forsake the liberal ideal of an impartial watchdog for a more activist agenda. This comes close to what the grand old men of media and communication, Clifford Christians, Theodore Glasser, Denis McQuail, Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Robert A. White in 2009 termed the radical role of the media. They do mention that such a role is sometimes played by individual journalists within the conventional media (ibid. p. 190).

personality-driven. To a reader who is not an insider to the game of internal party politics, political news often appear as chronicles of who-said-what about an issue that seems to have little bearing to the life in the polis (e.g., comment form 'John' reported by Fox 2012, 237). Also reporting on corruption focuses on personalities and episodic events, and the volume of corruption reporting is rather large considering that corruption indicators are not that alarming (Suomela 2013[41]).

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter defined the main concepts used in the current thesis and familiarised the reader with the context of the study.

*Elites* – also called *the well-off* – were conceptualised broadly, comprising both the elites and the middle classes. Although far from being a unified group, they can be seen as forming one power block in relation to the poor. They are also the primary target audience for *elite media*, which was defined as media produced by the well-off, mainly serving and covering the well-off.

*Elite social responsibility* was defined as the extent to which the elites see a role for themselves in improving the society for the common good, including for the benefit of the poor. It is manifested in elite initiatives, which aim to influence the government to develop and implement pro-poor public policies. Thus, elite social responsibility is comprised of two characteristics that are equally important: 1) Active citizenship among the elites. This emphasises inter-electoral participation, for example discussing policy issues among peers, contacting elected leaders or media, joining protest movements, etc. Such action is particularly critical in a dominant party state, like Namibia. 2) The pro-poor use of the active citizenship. This refers to all actions that may lead to changes in unjust structures, regardless whether such action is based on altruism or self-interest. It was also noted that this conceptualisation of elite social responsibility comes close to civic education traditions building on the idea of critical citizenship.

It was further explained that the study assumes the following connection to exist between the elites, the elite media, and elite social responsibility: Media, together with other institutions in the society, reproduce and shape *discourses* that have an influence on how people see their role in the society. Discourses were defined as s ways of thinking and understanding that are manifested in language and are a form of power, born and reproduced in unequal social interactions. They present specific impressions of reality, which narrow people's understanding of what is preferable and possible. The more the discourses circulated in the elite media suggest that it is not the role of the elites outside

[41] Master's thesis

the government to concern themselves with the way the country is run, the less action the elites are likely to take, and the fewer social justice action supported by the elites the country is likely to see.

It was concluded that research on elites in and elite media in Namibia is scant. It is not known whether the elites identify themselves as active citizens and whether they see social justice as a cause they should care for. What little evidence there is suggests that the majority of elites are not active and the elite media's main focus is on being a watchdog of the powerful, not on supporting active citizenship.

The chapter concluded with a brief normative discussion regarding the role of elite media in supporting social justice-oriented citizenship by the elites. This was done to demonstrate that the ideal advocated in this thesis is relevant in the local context. In particular, it was suggested that in a society like Namibia, the elite media would do well to: 1) Build collective identity among readers to encourage them to see that, together, they form a powerful section of citizenry, which can choose to start making a difference for social justice. 2) Draw attention to injustice and its structural foundations. 3) Do this in ways, which a) give a voice to the oppressed to speak in their own terms, b) build empathy among the well-off, and c) point out what the well-off can do to effect structural changes. 4) When performing the watchdog function, always contextualise this information with analysis and information on policies and structures.

# 3. STUDYING DISCOURSE THROUGH FRAMES

The broad media theoretical orientation behind the current thesis was provided in the previous chapter. The purpose of the current chapter is to familiarise the reader with *frame analysis*, which is a more specific approach I use to analyse Namibian discourses on elite social responsibility and media's role in them. The chapter provides a theoretical and methodological framework to explain what framing and frames are and why this particular approach is a good fit for the purposes of the current thesis. It also furnishes the reader with the necessary background for assessing the methodological soundness of the frame analysis tool introduced in this thesis and the frame analysis that was conducted using the new tool.

## 3.1 Framing, frames, and research questions

This section will start by defining the concepts of framing and frames as applied in the current study. It will then expand to explain why framing is an appropriate approach for my purposes. This includes the formulation of three research questions. The section ends with a summary listing the weaknesses of frame analysis as an approach.

Framing is a widely used concept within social and cognitive sciences, as well as within political science (Druckman 2001, 226). The brief introduction given in this section is based on the framing scholarship within media studies, where framing is often conceptualised as a means for understanding discourses in the context of the media (Entman 2003; Pan & Kosicki 1993; Tannen 1993). Also within this limited field of study, framing is a 'fractured paradigm'[42] (Entman 1993; D'Angelo 2002) I focus on introducing the line of thought, which is central to the conceptualisation of framing I use in the current study. This is the social constructionist approach with an added emphasis on power relationships.

Framing first emerged in media studies in 1974 when Erwin Goffmann launched the concept in his text 'Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience' (1974). Despite the many forms framing research has taken since then, it is possible to define some common ground regarding the basics. Framing is a phenomena observed in the construction and interpretation of texts, texts being any kind of communication. It 'refers to the way events and issues are organized and made sense of' (Reese 2001, 7). Through framing, some aspects of a perceived reality are selected and made more salient in the message, '*in such a way* as to promote a particular problem definition, causal

[42] Framing research within media studies draw from several, partly contradictory theories from several academic fields, and therefore it has been suggested that framing itself should not be called a theory, but rather a research programme encompassing several paradigms drawing from different types of theories (D'Angelo 2002).

interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (Gamson 1993, 52). The concept of framing refers to both framing as an action and frames as constructs. As action, framing refers to the mainly unconscious act of selection by the journalist and the reader interpreting the text. The end product of framing is a frame, which is a largely latent, explanatory construct. It encourages the reader to interpret the issue at hand in a specific way, and in this sense framing and frames are a parallel concept to discourse (Karvonen 2000). They too, function to advance a specific impression of reality, which narrows our understanding of what is preferable and possible (see p. 9). While the audience does possess certain power to recognize frames and to resist the interpretations advocated by them, a strong likelihood exists that the audience interpretation is in line with the frame the journalist used to make sense of the issue when writing the story. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, frames are based on shared cultural concepts, which as such have a strong resonance with the individuals in that specific cultural context (Van Gorp 2007; 2010). Secondly, the frames most often used are those that have established themselves as 'the truth' in the unequal power struggles fought in the course of a long history, and although resistance is possible, it requires substantially more resources than the reproduction of dominant frames by media institutions (Foucault in Bess 1988, 1; Morley 1992, 3).

The 'cultural stock of frames'[43] encompasses frames at various levels of explanation, ranging from those that apply on specific issues to those that explain broader phenomena, and finally those that concern the nature of the society and the roles of people within the society. A single newspaper text can thus make use of several frames operating at different levels and concerning different issues. The frames concerning the same issue at the same level are however seen as mutually exclusive, each proposing an interpretation, which makes other interpretations void. Consequently, frames are typically conceptualised as sets of mutually exclusive alternatives. For example, Van Gorp (2005) identified two frames used to frame asylum seekers in the Belgian press. These were the Victim frame and the Intruder frame. Following the same principle, I hypothesise it is possible to use Namibian newspaper texts to identify a set of alternative frames, which concern elite social responsibility – each proposing a different interpretation on whether the elites should bear some responsibility in the society.

The conceptualisation of framing used in this thesis asserts that while media outlets may practice intentional framing, in most cases framing by the news media is unintentional. As such, it happens as a mix of journalistic practices, the availability of frames in the local context, preference for certain frames, and active inputs from frame sponsors. Explained in more practical terms: Frames, or

[43] This is an expression by Baldwin Van Gorp, a framing scholar introduced in more detail in section 3.2. Culture in this sense refers 'to an organized set of beliefs, codes, myths, stereotypes, values, norms, frames, and so forth that are shared in the collective memory of a group or society' (Van Gorp 2007, 62)

explanatory schemas, exist in the culture within which we live. We all use them to make sense of the world around us and to explain the world to others. A journalist, who typically works under time pressure, and whose expression is restricted by journalistic conventions regarding genre and format, relies on frames to interpret events and to rely his interpretation further to his readers. Which particular frame he ends up using, depends on the general availability of frames in the culture and his perception of their validity regarding the issue at hand. This perception again depends on the historical and current power relations within the society, as well as on who is available to contribute with information and commentary that is perceived as authoritative. (Bacchi 2009; Reese 2001; Van Gorp 2010.)

While framing by news media is mainly unintentional, the media are influenced by *frame sponsors,* who often practice intentional framing, consciously presenting issues in a specific light. Frame sponsors are individuals and organisations availing themselves as sources and producers of reference material. While media may be aware of their conscious framing strategies, in many cases they are not, and in any case they are dependent on the frame sponsors for information and opinion. News journalism as a genre and convention necessitates information that can be portrayed as factual and authenticated with quotations. The significance of frame sponsors for media framing has been proven in studies of first world media (for a summary of relevant research, see Carragee & Roefs 2004) and it may be assumed to be even greater in a media environment with scarce resources. The less time and other resources available for independent investigation, the more reliable the media is on external sources. (Van Gorp 2007 & 2010; Benford & Snow 2000; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Reese 2001.)

At the unconscious level, both the journalist and the frame sponsor are largely dependent on the dominant frames. Although alternative frames do exist and are being constructed, they are less likely to be widely circulated. It may be argued that dominant frames are particularly persistent when they concern not specific issues but the nature of the society and the roles of people within the society. Framing scholars contend, however, that even relatively rapid changes in preference for frames are possible. The chances for a change are strongest, when something out of the ordinary takes place. A surprising situation may lead to a framing contest in which different frame sponsors will try to define the event in terms that best serve their interests (Boin, Hart &McConnell 2009, 81; Scheufele 2004; Brosius & Eps 1995; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). A Namibian example may be the changes experienced in the state-sponsored discourse of nationalism (Akuupa & Kornes 2013), although there are no studies documenting the impact of this change on media framing.

The discussion above reflects the possibilities of framing research to shed light on the impact the various frame sponsors and journalistic practices have on frames. Critically orientated frame analysis

draws attention on this, or – more generally – sets to find out which are the frames that dominate media coverage and why (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Van Gorp 2010; Reese 2001; Tuchman 1978). Due to time constraints and lack of personal insight, my work stops short of this goal in many ways. I do, however, try to point out connections between frames and journalistic routines as they arise in the corpus. Journalistic routines are defined as 'repeated practices and forms that make it easier for journalists to accomplish tasks and ensure immediacy in an uncertain world while working within production constraints' (Lowrey 2008). They cover a wide range of practices, such as the fairly standardised understanding of what constitutes news, what constitutes a reliable source, what constitutes objectivity, and what is a suitable content format or expression for covering a specific topic or a specific aspect of a specific topic (ibid.).

The current section has so far concentrated on describing framing as a process. I will now turn to a more detailed description of the end product, the frame. This text functions as a crucial introduction for understanding how the concept of frames is operationalised in the current study. The account may sound unnecessarily complicated but it should be read against a background where framing 6 research is criticised for a lack of transparency and conceptual inconsistency in this regard (Matthes & Kohring 2008; Van Gorp 2010).

Frame is a largely latent construct. It proposes a certain interpretation of an issue, but this interpretation in its entirety is usually not spelled out in the text. Instead, texts contain clues of the frames, which they refer to (Reese 2001, 14). Such clues invite the reader to interpret the facts narrated in the text in a certain light. While many framing researchers do not elaborate on how the frame works to advance the interpretation suggested by them, some have adopted a systematic approach to describing how they operationalise their concept of frames (e.g., Van Gorp 2007 & 2010; Gamson & Lasch 1983; Gamson & Modigliani 1989). They suggest frames should be understood as a *frame package* comprising two types of *frame elements:*

1. *Reasoning devices*: These are aspects on which the frame proposes specific interpretations or conclusions. They are connected to the functions of framing, which Entman (1993) lists as: defining a problem, assigning responsibility, passing a moral judgement and reaching possible solutions (Entman, 1993). Reasoning devices advocated by the frame may or may not be explicitly stated in a text.

2. *Framing devices*: These are the clues mentioned earlier. Framing devices are present in the text. The function of these devices is to direct the reader to interpret the text so that they reach the conclusion advocated for by the reasoning devices even if the reasoning devices are not present in the text. Framing devices may be metaphors, catchphrases, visual images,

lexical choices, selection of sources, graphics, stereotypes, dramatic characters, etc. (Gamson and Lash, 1983; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Tankard, 2001). The broader the explanatory power of a frame is (the more widely applicable the frame is across different issues) the less dependent it will be on specific metaphors etc. as framing devices and the bigger role is played by journalistic conventions (de Vreese 2005).

A frame (also called a frame package) is identified when a substantial number of texts are found to advocate for the same combination of conclusions regarding the same reasoning devices. This combination points to one overarching conclusion, which brings together everything that is essential about the specific frame – the entire chain of reasoning and conclusions proposed by the frame. A frame analyst tries to capture this conclusion of conclusions in the name of that specific frame.

These researchers typically visualise the above conceptualisation in a frame matrix. The central idea is to present the reasoning and framing devices and define how the different frames identified in texts differ from each other in regard to these. Table 4 below presents a fictive example.

**TABLE 4 Fictive frame matrix with two frame packages**

| | | **FRAME ELEMENTS** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **REASONING DEVICES** | | | | **FRAMING DEVICES** |
| | | **Problem definition** | **Causal interpretation** | **Moral evaluation** | **Treatment / recommendation** | |
| **FRAMES (also known as Frame Packages)** | **FRAME 1: KILLLER CAT** | The cat is killing mice | If the cat is deported, the mice will survive | All lives are equally important | Deport the cat | • Photos from the mice graveyard<br>• Mice liberation front as the only source<br>• Mice portrayed as having human feelings |
| | **FRAME 2: HERO CAT** | The mice are spreading diseases | If the cat is killed, diseases will increase | Human lives are the most important | Give the cat a medal | • Likening the cat with other heroes, such as Jesus, or cartoon super heroes<br>• Emphasis on the hardships endured by the cat |

*Based on Van Gorp 2005*

The uniqueness of framing as a phenomenon lies in the two types of frame elements: A frame carries a multifaceted interpretation of an issue (the reasoning devices), but it could be that none of the constituent pieces of this interpretation are manifest in the text. Instead, the text contains clues (the framing devices), which suggest the reader should interpret the text in line with the specific frame. Much like the blocks in a game of domino the clues evoke a series of interpretations in the reader, suggesting how a particular problem should be defined, who is responsible for causing it and / or fixing it and what the possible solutions are (Entman 1993).

In this way, framing is a more complex concept than most other concepts and methods applied in text analysis. Frames should therefore not be confused with news topics or issue positions, and frames should not be attempted to read in the core news facts, as is done in some studies (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Reese 2007; Van Gorp 2007 & 2010). Such conceptualisations negate the fundamental principles of framing, which concern its function in organising and structuring meaning (Reese, *ibid.* & 2001) and the nature of frames as partially latent constructs (Van Gorp 2010).

As a complex concept, frame analysis enables the researcher to analyse complex issues in and contextualise them. It enables the researcher to bring together diverse elements of content, production process, and sociocultural or political context and analyse them as an interconnected whole, which is more than the sum of its parts (Karvonen 2000; Reese 2007; Van Gorp 2010). This was one of the three main reasons for why frame analysis was identified as a suitable method of inquiry for the purposes of the current study. The purposes have been outlined in earlier chapters. The list below formulates them as four precise research questions:

1. What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?
2. What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?
3. What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture the above? In other words: What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture a) the social responsibility roles the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers, and b) what journalistic routines the elite media uses to (re)construct discourses regarding such roles?

Elite social responsibility is defined as the extent to which the well-off people in Namibia see a role for themselves in improving the society for the common good, including for the benefit of the poor (see pages 12–14 for a more extensive definition). As will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, it is a complex topic and calls attention to several issues, such as collective identity, perceptions of social issues and government capacity. Traditional content analysis (McQuail 2000, 362) would not have been able to capture some of the relevant interplay between frame elements. It

does not hold the kind of in-built explanatory potential frame analysis holds and would have, in places, suggested quite a different interpretation of the media content compared to the interpretation enabled by the frame analysis tool.[44] The same regards corpus linguistics and other computer-assisted methods of analysis operating with large bodies of data and predefined keywords (e.g., ESRC undated; University of Bergen). While these certainly hold potential for research groups with large resources, I would not have been able to apply them in any depth.

My second justification for choosing frame analysis is that the method is well-geared for taking into account the largely unintentional nature of the journalistic processes through which media is reproducing elite discourses. Within the theoretical framework guiding this study, it enables a more relevant description of the corpus than rhetorical analysis, which is based on Austin's speech act theory (1962) and foregrounds intentionality (Trappes Lomax 2004, 143; Love 2013). Based on these criteria – an ability to capture hidden meanings and to consider these as largely unintentional – discourse analysis was another possible choice of method. In its critical form, discourse analysis focuses on the role of discourse 'in the '(re)production of and challenge of dominance' and wants to find out 'what structures, strategies, or other properties' in media texts and other communicative acts play a role in such reproduction (Van Dijk 1993, 249–250). Discourse analysis, however, focuses on the micro level and generally shuns quantitative conceptualisations (Wodak & Busch 2004), whereas I felt both I and the topic needed the security of numbers. Research on media and discourses in Namibia is relatively scant and therefore I felt that the field would benefit from the argumentative power brought about by numbers. I also felt a need to include a quantitative element in the study to keep check on any temptation to draw conclusions based on inadequate evidence. These arguments form the third and final reason for choosing a mixed-methods frame analysis as the method of study. Frame analysis is able to cope with relatively large corpuses and encourages mixing qualitative and quantitative solutions (Karvonen 2000).

Turning to the potential pitfalls of frame analysis as a method, one set of concerns dominates. The very real ability of frame analysis to capture complex issues also leads to several weaknesses. While it is likely that a phenomenon defined as framing exists, it is debatable whether it is ever possible to capture frames as such. Especially when frames are identified through a deductive process, there is no guarantee that they capture what is relevant in the particular time and place. While the use of an inductive method on the side partially addresses this problem, any set of frames is wisest to be taken as one possible interpretation of the issue, one possible categorisation drawn for the purpose of

[44] For example, a recurring feature of traditional content analysis and analyses of news values is the categorisation of news sources. In such contexts, it is often suggested, implicitly or explicitly, that the more civil society organisations feature as sources, the more beneficial the content is for democracy and by extension for active citizenship (e.g., Landqvist & Swedberg 2006; FES 2005). The current study suggests this is not necessarily the case (see page 114).

research. Any frame analysis is then only as relevant as the frame elements defined by it. At another level of concern, an obsession with identifying an overarching interpretive framework and analysing texts in this context easily leads to conceptual and methodological superficiality regarding the constituent elements of the frame. For example, the frame analysis produced in the current thesis fails to make a comprehensive account of methods readily available in discourse analysis and thereby only uses a fraction of the interpretive power vested in this long tradition.

## 3.2 Frame analysis as a method

The function of the current section is to introduce frame analysis as a method in text analysis. The section starts with establishing a quality criteria for the frame analysis tool that was developed in this study. After that, I walk the reader through the process that was followed to develop and test the tool.

**Quality criteria for frame analysis**

No standard method or procedure exists for doing frame analysis. Instead, the field is characterised by a 'huge variety' of methodological approaches (Matthes 2009; see also DeVreese 2005, 53; Scheufele 1999, 118). The choice of approach should be informed by the research paradigm and the research questions – in this by a social constructionist understanding of reality and the following research question:

1. What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?
2. What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?
3. What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture the above?

Form this it follows that the research methodology must be tailored to serve two purposes, descriptive and analytical. On the one hand my interest lies in media frames as reflections of discourses in the society at large. For this purpose, all the study needs to do is to identify elite social responsibility frames and produce rich descriptions of these frames on their context. On the other hand, I want to be able to use the findings regarding the frames to infer something about the role of the media in the (re)production of such discourses. This means that attention must also be paid on how frames actually work to organise thinking and meaning.

The methodology applied in the current study thus needs to be able to identify frames, to produce rich descriptions of them, and to shed light on how they operate. In addition to these instrumental objectives, the methodology and its application should be such that the research conforms to the

quality standards generally set for academic research, namely reliability, validity and objectivity – or where applicable with their equivalents identified specifically for constructivist research, namely dependability, credibility, transferability and confirmability (Greener 2011).

What follows is a brief discussion on these quality objectives and their bearing on methodological choices. The same discussion is summarised in Table 5 on page 42.

The first quality objective aims to ensure that what is being attempted is a study of frames and not a study of some more narrow quality of content. Any framing research, which wants to adhere to the strict conceptualisation of framing, should take a starting point in clearly defining the concept of frame and translating this to concrete, operational steps, which stipulate how frames are identified in texts. Only this way will the resulting analysis be able to demonstrate how the frame organises and structures thinking and meaning and how it manages to speak between the lines. This will entail a capacity to draw attention to how power plays itself in frames – most crucially, how journalistic conventions and routines, and thereby frame sponsors, affect frames. A prime example of such oprationalisation is the conceptualisation of frames as frame packages with different elements linking to the different functions of framing (see pages 37–38). In the current chapter, I assume this is the conceptualisation used. This is for the ease of reference, not to deny the possibility of other equally valid conceptualisations. (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Matthes 2009; Reese 2007; Van Gorp 2005, 2007, 2010.)

The second fundamental challenge in framing research is validity; does the frame construct really capture what is essential about the issue at hand? Literature suggests that the most effective measure for ensuring validity is to identify frames inductively, based on the corpus of the study, and to verify their existence with a computer-based cluster method (Van Gorp 2005 & 2010; Koenig 2006). The inductive phase calls for a qualitative approach, whereby the researcher immerses himself in the corpus, repeatedly re-reading texts in search of recurring patterns and possible categorisations. On the other hand, a completely inductive approach to frame identification is challenging for two reasons. Firstly, it is extremely time-consuming, and this often results in small corpus size, which in turn affects reliability. Secondly, inductive coding may result in categories of knowledge, which are not comparable with other studies. A common alternative for initial frame identification is therefore a mixed method, which relies on identifying possible frames as a combination of existing theory and the corpus of the study. (Greener 2011; Tankard 2001, 98; Van Gorp 2010.)

## TABLE 5 Quality criteria

| QUALITY OBJECTIVE AND THE TERMS USED FOR IT | DEFINITION | STRATEGIS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE* |
|---|---|---|
| 1a. Contribution to framing theory | Are the findings able to demonstrate how frame organises thinking? | • Translate your definition of framing to concrete, operational steps and make this transparent in the text ✓ |
| 1b. Attention to power | Are the findings able to demonstrate connections between journalistic conventions & routines and frames? | • Pay attention to journalistic conventions and routines in your deep reading of the corpus and when devising the codebook ✓ |
| 2a Truth value<br><br>Positivistic term: Internal validity<br>Constructivist term: Credibility & authenticity | Are the identified frames relevant for elite social responsibility in the Namibian context? | • Immerse yourself in the corpus: read, reread and try out different coding schemes ✓<br>• Induce frames from the corpus ✗<br>• If deduction is used to define frames, use corpus to verify ✓✓<br>• Use statistical methods to verify existence of frames ✗<br>• Use mixed methods ✓<br>• In the coding instrument, leave room for interpretation ✓✓<br>• Present rich descriptions of frames ✓<br>• Work as a team of cultural insiders and outsiders ✗ |
| 2b Applicability<br><br>Positivistic term: External validity<br><br>Constructivist term: Transferability | Would the findings be useful in another, similar setting? | • Present rich descriptions of frames ✓<br>• Give detailed description of the research context ✓ |
| 3. Consistency<br><br>Positivistic term: Reliability<br><br>Constructivist term: Dependability | Can the findings be repeated by others? | • Clearly define concepts and rigorously document the research process and your chains of reasoning ✓✓<br>• Document anomalies and doubts about how these should be treated ✗<br>• Develop a clear and detailed coding instrument and adhere to it ✓✓<br>• Limit the number of frames to be coded ✓<br>• In the coding instrument, focus mainly on devices that are directly observable in texts ✓<br>• Use multiple independent coders and train them well ✗ |
| 4. Neutrality<br>Positivistic tern: Objectivity<br>Constructivist term: Confirmability / Positionality | Do findings arise from the corpus or from the assumptions, biases, or interests of the researcher? | • Reflect on your position and account for it in the text ✓<br>• Develop clear and detailed coding instructions and adhere to them ✓✓<br>• Record research notes and make them available for inspection ✗ |
| 5. Contribution to understanding on discourses regarding the specific topic | Do findings allow rich descriptions of frames in their context? | • Present rich descriptions of frames ✓✓ |
| 6. Comparability | Is it possible to compare findings with those by other studies on the same subject matter? | • Use existing frame definitions and frame analysis tools ✗<br>• Use established terminology and definitions from fields of academic inquiry concerning your subject matter ✓ |

* Symbols indicate whether these were made use of in the current study: ✓✓ = strong ✓ = to a degree ✗ = not at all

Sources: Greener 2013; Kuckartz 2013; Lincoln & Guba 1989; Matthes 2009; McDowell 1992; Van Gorp 2010;

Additional validity challenges arise when the set of possible frames has been identified and individual texts are being categorised under these. Either quantitative coding or qualitative methods may be applied. Whatever the method, the researcher should use this process to continuously enrich the frame skeletons with interpretations of qualitative or quantitative data in order to produce rich descriptions of the frames. Misinterpretations, omissions and misplaced emphasis at this stage will result in distorted images, which may not have much to do with the lived reality even if the leading idea behind the frame package and its constituent elements were valid. Means for increasing validity at this stage include a continued immersion in the corpus, working in teams with cultural insiders and outsiders, and the use of mixed methods in a combination that leaves room for interpretation. The rich descriptions themselves are also means towards achieving validity – the richer the description, the more likely it is that the frame exists. The description also provides a display against which those embedded in the local context will be able to assess whether the frame that is being described is relevant in the local issue context. Moreover, rich descriptions together with a detailed description of the research context play a central role in judgements concerning whether the frame construct and the analysis tool may be transferable to another, similar context. (Greener 2011; Van Gorp 2010.)

The third quality objective is consistency, also known as the reliability of findings. This is an issue for a great part of research that is published in peer-reviewed journals as framing research (Matthes 2009). The problem concerns a specific variety of qualitative studies in particular. These do not give any detail about the procedures of frame identification beyond a passing remark to a term like ‘deep reading of the corpus’. Although some qualitative research paradigms may not consider reliability relevant, reliability – or *dependability* – is not an impossibility in qualitative research. It calls for rigorous documentation of the research process taken and the definitions applied to operationalise concepts. Ideally these should be documented in a codebook with clear instructions for coders. The same requirements concern quantitative coding of texts. Additional advice for achieving greater reliability include limiting the number of frames to be coded and focusing the coding instrument mainly on devices that are directly observable in texts. Particular attention should be made to documenting anomalies and doubts about how these should be treated. Finally a recommendation unfeasible for most studies at the MA thesis level is the use of multiple independent coders. (Greener 2011; Matthes 2009; Matthes & Kohring 2008.)

Fourth quality objective is neutrality, which aims to minimise bias or distortion of results based on the researcher’s assumptions, biases and interests. Similar strategies are recommended as with improving reliability (Greener 2011). The researcher should also consider reflexive positioning, which means becoming aware of one’s own position in relation to the research setting; how one’s position in the field of power and associated unconscious expectations and motives may affect the research (McDowell 199).

Fifth quality objective is the extent to which the method is able to contribute to the understanding on the discourses regarding the specific topic. This objective sees rich descriptions of the frames as valuable on their own right. It is justified by the interest to find out what discourses exist on a particular issue and what these discourses are like. As has been already mentioned, the researcher is able to produce truly rich descriptions only if they are immersed in the data. Methods range from reading and re-reading to more systematic methods in qualitative data analysis, and they may be supported by quantitative coding. The key is to provide a holistic description of the frame in its context.[45]

The sixth and final quality objective applied in the current study is comparability. It draws attention to the value that exists in the ability to compare research findings with other studies on the same subject matter. One of the identified pitfalls of framing research in general is a tendency to reinvent the wheel (D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010: 46) as each researcher rushes to develop their own concepts and tools for identifying frames. This is a defect for the theoretical and methodological development of the field, and it also limits the explanatory power of the individual studies, as well as the uptake of these studies by other researchers.

**Method in the current study**

The current study uses a mixed method of frame analysis whereby: 1) A selection of mutually exclusive frames and frame elements associated with them is identified iteratively based on literature and a purposefully sampled corpus. 2) The corpus is coded quantitatively, while making notes for qualitative analysis. 3) Results are described both quantitatively and qualitatively. The process is an adaptation of the method recommended by Baldwin Van Gorp (2010), a Belgian media researcher whose text *Strategies to Take Subjectivity out of Framing Analysis* forms the core of methodological guidance given in the leading academic textbook on frame analysis in English (D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010).

Following is a summary of the research process undertaken in this study. More detailed descriptions of the process are provided in chapters 4 and 5.

***Phase 1: Iterative process to identify frames and to operationalise them through the development of a frame analysis tool.*** As recommended by Van Gorp, the research started with the identification and study of relevant literature (see chapters 2 and 4), including the identification of the corpus of

[45] Some writers use the term thick description, while some advise against using it, holding that the anthropological concept (Geertz 1973) should be reserved for its initial meaning, which involves 'digging through the layers of cultural meaning' while a rich description is simply a detailed description taking place at the surface level of culture (Svensson 2014, 178).

newspaper texts to be analysed (see Chapters 2 and 5). Once the corpus was available, I set on an iterative process to identify relevant frame packages. This entailed repeated deep reading of the corpus in the light of relevant literature. The literature comprised theory and empirical studies within sociology, communication / media studies and civic participation, existing framing studies and other types of content and text analyses, as well as research and commentary on Namibia and Southern Africa.

The iterative phase allows a researcher to build on existing knowledge while accounting for the peculiarities of the specific time and place. In the current study it had three specific goals: 1) to identify reasoning devices that are central in schemas explaining whether the elites should carry some kind of a social responsibility or not 2) to identify framing devices the media may use to evoke an interpretation along these lines even if the reasoning devices are not spelled out in the text, and 3) to use these devices to justify or challenge the existence of a tentative set of frames, which were thought possible. As suggested by Van Gorp (*ibid.*), the frames were defined so that they are mutually exclusive.

In this case, the issue of interest (elite social responsibility) was formulated in such a way that possible alternative frames were identified before anything else was done. I simply expected that there would be one frame advocating for elite social responsibility and another frame, which would be either against it or indifferent about it. As the method literature suggests keeping the number of frames to the minimum (Van Gorp 2010), these two may have sufficed, but the corpus quickly suggested a third frame had to be added to cover charity.[46] At this stage, the possible frames identified were nothing more than a list of issue positions. To 'become' frames they would need to be backed by packages of reasoning and framing devices, which would be at least partially observable in the corpus and capable of evoking strings of reasoning pointing to one of the three conclusions – that the elite should try to get the state to implement pro-poor policies, that they themselves should do charity, or that they should simply do nothing.

The main task then become to figure out what was the set of reasoning devices these frames built on. In other words, what are some of the central factors that could play a role in mobilising the local elites to believe that their position in the society comes with a social responsibility? After a long process of trial and error, I identified four such devises: Identity, Preferred Solution, Motivation and Efficacy. These were based on two existing theories, which explain collective action by people in general and pro-poor action by elites (see Chapter 4), and which – based on the corpus and the analysis that was available – seemed capable of explaining similar action and the lack of it in the

[46] Interestingly, there were no items which would have warranted adding family support or patronage.

Namibian context. By the time I found the two theories, I had already thoroughly immersed myself in the corpus and tried to code it in several ways, but failed to demonstrate consistent patterns.

The next step was to define more clearly how the reasoning devices could manifest themselves in texts – either at the level of reasoning devices or framing devices that could be used as clues pointing to the reasoning devices. This, too, was based on the supporting literature and the corpus. Below, I will describe the general method and give one concrete example. A detailed discussion on all framing devices is included in sections 4.3.2 – 4.3.5.

Van Gorp recommends developing a codebook, which documents clear rules for frame identification. The book is instrumental for demonstrating how frames were identified in texts, and for keeping the analyst from straying the frame definitions when coding texts, but these are not the only benefits of it. The book development process is a great thinking aide for the analyst, as it concretises the task at hand. Developing a tool for frame analysis can be confusing because capturing a complex issue of interest from multiple angles allows for a seemingly indefinite list of possible variables to be coded. Codebook development helps the analyst to judge which variables may be the most relevant to the frame and what is the exact role played by them. In my case, the codebook development was when the jumble of observations regarding the corpus started to make sense.

The codebook is best understood by looking at an example, like the one developed for this study and included as Annex I on page 161. The book is based on the reasoning devices that were identified as crucial for the set of frames under study. Under each reasoning device, the book gives a couple of questions. When an analyst is coding a text, these questions help him to judge what is the stand taken by that particular text on that particular reasoning device. Framing devices in turn help the analyst to answer the questions.

Van Gorp recommends that the questions regarding the reasoning devices should be simple, and preferably require *yes* or *no* as an answer. They should however not be so simple that they stop the coder from interpreting hidden meanings. As an example of such question Van Gorp gives the following: 'Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the issue/problem?' Responsibility s is a typical *reasoning device*, and it may be that the answer is explicitly stated in the text. For example, a text could state: 'The government should assume full responsibility for taking care of the people living on the dumpsite'. If the text does not contain an explicit answer, the answer may be written 'between the lines' because the text contains a *framing device* that points to the government responsibility. Based on my research I suggest that a typical framing device used to imply government responsibility is having the government as the only actor referred to in the text. To continue with the same example, the text would not openly say that the people are the sole responsibility of the government, but the government would be the only actor it

refers to when looking for potential solutions and the only actor who is asked to comment on the issue.

As the example above, many of the framing devices are based on journalistic conventions and their influence on how the world is being represented and understood: who is allowed to feature as a consequential actor, how broadly are they allowed to speak, how much is being told and from which angles (Broesma 2007). These types of framing devices keep with Van Gorp's recommendation on simplicity. They can be observed in the text. At a deeper level, the same framing devices may require interpretation, cultural understanding, and knowledge of techniques used in discourse analysis. For example, in the case of the Namibian government certain lexical choices referring to the independence struggle may contribute to an understanding where full trust and responsibility are allocated to the government (Du Pisani 2010). The frame analysis tool cannot guarantee that such interpretation will be made, and neither can it give detailed instructions on when a specific interpretation should apply and when not. Because the elite social responsibility frames operate at a level, which is not issue-dependent, the tool cannot operate at the level of specific metaphors and catchphrases. Instead, the tool aims to give the analyst a freedom to detect and interpret hidden meanings within the general structure provided by the frame. (D'Angelo 2002, 881; Pan & Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999.)

In other words, the tool does not 'take subjectivity out' of the frame analysis, but it goes a long way to ensuring that subjectivity is practiced in a transparent manner. For example, the analyst would quite often need to make a subjective judgement on whether some element in the text should be given more weight than some others – for example a text could clearly state that readers should do something, but at the same time the overall tone could be so gloomy that the end result could hardly be encouraging, as illustrated by the example given on page 108. Van Gorp himself, too (2010) highlights that if the core idea of framing is hidden meanings, and reducing the method into counting what is quantifiable will compromise the ability to capture and describe those hidden meanings and the way framing works (see also Reese 2007).

This study did not use a computerised cluster analysis to verify the existence of frames, although such procedure is recommended by Van Gorp. I did not consider this a necessary requirement at a MA thesis level, considering that it is not done in a great majority of framing studies published in peer-reviewed journals (Matthes 2009) Moreover, the coding results –included as Annex III on page 173 – demonstrated clear enough patterns which could be observed without a computerised analysis. Validity and reliability were more of a concern at the more fundamental levels of analysis: Were the reasoning devices really the most relevant for the subject matter? Was I able to interpret the texts correctly – or did some potentially important framing devices skip my eye? Or was I too

obsessed by some framing devices, giving them too much weight? These questions are partially related to the question of cultural understanding. Frames being to such a large extent products of a specific cultural context, it is feasible to ask whether one needs to be an insider of that specific culture to be able to conduct a reliable frame analysis. Van Gorp (*ibid.*) suggests that while a 'level of familiarity with the cultural heritage' is good, it is important to be able to 'maintain some distance from the personal thinking patterns in order to grasp the striking and natural characteristics of a (sub)culture.' He suggests that ideally frame analysis should be conducted in a team where both insiders and outsiders are represented. This was however not possible within the final time frame and the nature of the MA thesis as an individual piece of work. I did however try to solicit advice from Namibians when devising the tool.

***Phase 2: Coding.*** Phase 1 included repeated coding of the corpus and adjustments and additions to the variables and coding instructions. Compared with this, the actual final coding of the corpus took a very short time. Each corpus item was coded based on the final coding instructions, and categorised under one of the predefined frames.

The coding process was individual, which means that all corpus texts were coded for all questions. While holistic coding – allocating texts to frames without separately answering the questions[47] – was a possibility, it would not have provided the quantitative detail I wanted to support the argumentation regarding the existence of specific frames, the relevancy of the framing devices, and to shed light on the relationship between frames and specific journalistic practices.

***Phase 3: Analysis.*** The analysis phase aimed to analyse results in view of the research questions, which have been defined as:

1. What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?
2. What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?
3. What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture the above?

To answer the first question, rich descriptions of the frames had to be developed. Such descriptions are the analyst's interpretation of what is characteristic about each frame.

[47] Holistic coding requires deep familiarity with the coding tool and the corpus – or if not with the actual corpus, then the type of texts included in the corpus, in this case Namibian newspaper texts. The benefit of holistic coding is that it saves time. When coding items individually, one spends a lot of time pondering a question which in the may prove to be rather irrelevant because the specific text contains something else, which immediately tells it must be placed under a specific frame. (Van Gorp 2010.)

Answering the second question called for a description with a greater focus on explaining how the different framing devices were reflected in specific frames.

The third question was partially answered in phase 2. At the analysis phase, the essential task was to evaluate the suitability of the tool for answering the research questions, but also at a more fundamental level according to the framework developed for evaluation earlier in this section (see Table 5 on page 42).

## 3.3 Conclusion

This chapter described a social constructionist approach to framing as a theoretical viewpoint and a method and explained why it is a good fit for the purpose of the current study. The chapter also charted criteria for a successful frame analysis tool and walked the reader through the frame analysis process taken in this study.

The research questions were defined as:

1. What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?
2. What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?
3. What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture the above?

The object of the study was defined as frames that regard elite social responsibility. These were defined as a set of mutually exclusive frames providing alternative interpretations on the role of elites in the society and it was hypothesised such frames wold be identifiable in media texts regardless the issue being covered. It was explained that the three elite social responsibility frames proposed by the current thesis are based on a set of frame elements, which was defined using existing theory (deductively) and the corpus under study (inductively).

The choice of frame analysis as a method was justified by its ability tackle complex issues and to capture hidden meanings while considering these as largely unintentional results of power relationships embedded in the journalistic practices and, more broadly, discourses. A third argument for choosing frame analysis was its ability to deal with relatively large corpuses and to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to inquiry and interpretation. It was further noted that the ability to capture complex issues was also the main weakness of frame analysis as a method, as complexity combined with deduction leads to a heavy reliance on theoretical assumptions regarding what is relevant for the topic at hand. The method adopted in this thesis tries to address this problem by using both deductive and inductive approaches to frame identification. It does not,

however, address the second pitfall arising from the breadth of the subject matter, namely a certain superficiality regarding details.

The quality criteria outlined in the chapter were: 1a Contribution to framing theory; 1b Attention to power; 2a Internal validity; 2b External validity; 3 Reliability; 4. Neutrality 5. Ability to produce rich descriptions of frames, 6. Comparability.

# 4. FRAME ANALYSIS TOOL FOR ELITE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

This long chapter serves a triple purpose. It introduces the frame analysis tool developed in this thesis. At the same time, it presents the theoretical basis for the tool and discusses the relevancy of the tool in response to research question 3, which was defined as: 'What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture a) the social responsibility roles the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers, and b) the journalistic routines the elite media uses to (re)construct discourses regarding such roles?'

The chapter starts with an introduction to two existing theoretical frameworks, which form the basis of the tool, then proceeds to explain how these were adapted for the current purpose. This results in a brief summary of the central elements of the tool. The bulk of the chapter then focuses on introducing the tool in more detail. The purpose is to explain and justify the tool in more depth than what is feasible in the tool itself (attached as Annex I on page 161).

## 4.1 Base: Elites and collective action

Based on my research, frame analysis has not been applied to elite social responsibility or a like concept before. Hence there were no frame typologies or frame analysis tools that could have been applied in this study, and therefore such had to be developed specifically for this purpose. This section serves to introduce the two existing theoretical frameworks, which form the basis of the new frame analysis tool. These theories are William Gamson's collective action frames (1992) and the elite social consciousness model by Abram De Swaan (1988). Both propose a set of building blocks essential for mobilising a specific group of people to act on something.

While Gamson comes within the field of media studies, de Swaan's model has not been applied to media studies before. The marriage of the two aims to produce a frame typology that is relevant for studying how elite media in a highly unequal society frames elite social responsibility. This theoretical framework is complemented by relevant studies on Namibia, Southern Africa and media's role in democracy.

Gamson is an American media sociologist known for his studies on how media encourages or discourages collective action, but in his studies the media is talking to the general public in relatively equal societies, while understanding the Namibian situation requires a framework where media is seen to be talking to divided elites in a highly unequal society. Such a framework is provided by De Swaan, whose elite social consciousness model details the circumstances under which elites in Western Europe and the United States came to support welfare policies in the end of the 1800s. The model has been applied in several developing country contexts, including South Africa (Kalati &

Manor 2005), Malawi (Kalebe-Nyamago 2012) and Brazil (Reis 2011). I assert that, in the absence of recent empirical studies on elite's role in Namibia, it can be deemed as a good starting point as long as it is read together with relevant research and commentary on Namibia.

Gamson is one of the forerunners of the media framing research. One of his main interests is collective action. He posits that media can either encourage or discourage such action – depending on how it frames people and events. Gamson's conceptualisation of a collective action frame is based on earlier work by Snow and Benford (1992) and it comprises three components:

1) **Identity.** This component refers to the media assigning its audience a collective identity as *we,* a potential community of action. This would normally require that the media at least implies an existence of others, them. *They* are the people whose policies or practices must be changed and *we* are the ones who will help to bring about the change. Gamson notes that mobilisation for collective action is difficult if there is no they or if the ones whose policies or practices must be changed is we. For example if peace, hunger and poverty are identified as problems and the cause of the problems is defined – explicitly or implicitly – as we, all of us, then these problems become the individual's personal responsibility, instead of something to be changed through collective action. (Gamson 2009, pp. 283–294; 2001, p. 58.)

2) **Injustice.** For Gamson, the moral and emotive base of collective action frame is injustice. It is the perception of injustice by somebody (a person or a group of people) against someone (a person or a group of people) that ignites action. It does not matter, whether the perception is based on information that is factual or not. If the injured party is an individual, the adoption of collective action frames by media typically transform the injured party from an individual to a collective (Gamson 1992, 31—58). Even if an individual does not consider themselves part of the collective that is being wronged, they may sympathise with such a collective (Gamson 2013). Although Gamson does not explicitly make this point, I assume this would typically be linked to a collective identity, which guides people to view the described treatment as a wrongdoing against their values.

3) **Agency.** Once the audience has come to understand itself as *us* who should act together for a justified cause, they must believe in their possibilities to alter the specific conditions or policies through collective action. Gamson writes that collective action frames 'deny the immutability of some undesirable situation' (Gamson 2009, 283). He continues:

> Collective action frames … empower people as defining them as potential agents of their own history. A consciousness of collective agency is not simply a matter of believing that something can be done but *we* can do something. It cannot happen unless there is some

sense of who *we* are, thereby linking agency to the identity component.

As explained, Gamson's focus is not on mobilising elites, rather on mobilising against the elites. I therefore look at De Swaan's work for cues on what might work when mobilising elites.

De Swaan argues that a central prerequisite for the development of welfare systems in Europe and the USA was *elite social consciousness*. This he defines as a set of perceptions by the elites that is conducive to the adoption of measures to reduce poverty through collective and public arrangements (Reis, 2010; Hossain, 1999). Like Gamson's collective action frames, de Swaan's framework comprises three components (De Swaan 2005&1988; Hossain 1999):

1) **Interdependence.** The elites must recognize that the different groups in the society are interconnected and poverty may have an effect on their welfare to such an extent that they are not able to insulate themselves from this effect. They may also come to realise that the reduction of poverty may benefit them.

2) **Responsibility.** Responsibility is a moral dimension that involves elites feeling a sense of responsibility for the existence of poverty and for tackling poverty. Not all members of the elite need to feel this way for pro-poor collective action to get hold. Some may be lending their support solely based on self-interest. An important ingredient in the responsibility component is how the elite sees the poor. They are more inclined to support pro-poor policies if they conceptualise the poor as *deserving*, hard-working individuals who are poor due to the circumstances they were born into. The opposite view is to hold that the poor are *underserving*, unable to lift themselves from poverty because they are lazy and suspect to moral vices.

3) **Efficacy.** Lastly, the elites must believe that effective collective solutions are available to tackle the problems of poverty. This requires that the elites must be able to trust each other and the collective agency, to which the work is allocated.

Both theories introduced above – that of Gamson and that of De Swaan – clearly are mobilisation theories, explaining how a specific group of people may be mobilised to act on something (for a summary of such theories and their applications, see Darnton 2008). If citizen engagement is seen as a process, action is the ambitious end result. It only actualises in exceptional circumstances and generally requires the existence of a whole array of democratic values, attitudes and capabilities (Dahlgren 2009).

In other words, a conceptualisation foregrounding action is but one of the many, which may be applied on elite social responsibility. Possible alternatives included focusing on one of the conditions that must be met before action can materialise. For example, such is the focus adopted in the elite perceptions of poverty studies, which are also based on De Swaan's theory. Another alternative would have been trying to capture the elements of social justice-oriented citizenship / critical democratic citizenship as outlined by civic education theorists (see pages 27–28). I chose the action-focused conceptualisation due to its abilities to capture a potential for action and media influence through impressions rather than rational reasoning. To look at elite perceptions of poverty only would not have told much about the potential for action or about appeals to cross-sectional elite identity, which is central in a divided society. A focus on the elements of social justice-oriented citizenship on the other hand would have required assessing the factuality of content at a much more profound level than what is required by the current choice of framework.

## 4.2 The tool in brief

This brief section explains how I adapted Gamson's and De Swaan's theories (see section 4.1 above) for the study of elite social responsibility in Namibia. The two theories form the basis for the reasoning devices I use this study (the concept of reasoning devices and the entire frame package approach were explained on pages 37–38). I first outline these reasoning devices, then present three mutually exclusive frame packages, which are based on these reasoning devices. The same is illustrated in the frame matrix available as Table 6 on page 57 and in the flow chart provided as Figure 3 on page 58.

***Reasoning devices.*** Reasoning devices are aspects on which a frame advocates specific interpretations or conclusions. I suggest that if one wants to identify a frame advocating for elite social responsibility, one should look at the aspects proposed by Gamson's and De Swaan's theories. Despite small discrepancies in terminology, both theories are based on three elements, which are partially intertwined: identity, motivation, and efficacy. Literature on Namibia (see Chapter 2.3) suggests that these apply to elite mobilisation in the local situation, too. I therefore adopt Identity, Motivation and Efficacy as reasoning devices to be used in identifying a frame that advocates for elite social responsibility and competing frames, which suggest elite social responsibility is not required. Below is a short summary of each reasoning device:

- **Identity** refers to whether or not the elites have a self-understanding of themselves as a group, which is a potential force for change in the society on an on-going basis, and not just at the time of elections. If elites do not possess such an identity, they are likely to think that somebody else, mainly the government, should take full control of social issues.

- **Motivation** refers to reasons elites have to act or not to act. This is essentially a mix of emotions and reasoning having to do with how they see the world and their role and interests in it, and what they think about the others in the society. As it would be impossible to give a conclusive listing or description of motivational factors that apply to social responsibility across wildly different issues and divided elite groups, the reasoning device Motivation therefore guides the analyst to investigate whether a text advocates for an interpretation which explains away any need for elite action.

- **Efficacy** refers to whether or not the elites think that a collective agency exists, which has the capacity to implement, if they start pushing through changes. Such collective agency does not have to be the government, but in today's political and administrative arrangements it is practically the only alternative.

If one wants to rule out the kind of elite mobilisation which is not likely to contribute to lasting, structural improvements, an additional reasoning device needs to be introduced. This is because the three first devices do not say anything about the preferred solution elites are being mobilised for. I therefore add a fourth reasoning device:

- **Preferred Solution** refers to the type of action readers are called to embark on. It allows for a differentiation between action that advocates changes in public policy and action that is envisaged to bypass the state and result in changes that are temporary and not universal. Examples of the second type of action are charity and other forms of informal support. Moreover, the device also differentiates between solutions, which are based on equality of all people and solutions, which are clearly based on segregationist ideas (see page 14).

It should be noted that like De Swaan's and Gamson's theories, neither do the suggested reasoning devices emphasise the role of factual information. This is good match for constructive framing theory, which concerns itself not with *how the world really is* but how it is *represented*. The Preferred Solution is the only check on the moral of the proposed action. Other than this, the argumentation entailed in the text can be true or false and the frame analysis tool will not be able to capture it.

***The three frames based on the reasoning devices.*** As mentioned in section 3.2, I hypothesised the existence of certain frames before defining the reasoning devices. This was possible because elite social responsibility was formulated in such a way that it could be simply expected that there would be one frame advocating for it and another frame, which would be either against it or indifferent about it. In response to the corpus, a third frame was added to cover charity, which is a form of

action by elites, but does not fall under my definition of elite social responsibility as it bypasses the state and is not a permanent, binding contract between the elites and the society.

The three frames are briefly described below and summarised in the Frame Matrix given as Table 6 on page 57. I have also included a slightly more detailed flow-chart type summary as Figure 3 on page 58. The chart is an attempt to provide a quick overview of the three frames in terms of how they relate to the reasoning devices.

Depending on the position a text takes with regard to the reasoning devices, three different frames on elite social responsibility can be identified. These are:

- **The Active Citizen frame** identifies elites as a potential community of action and it does not give them any serious reason to believe that their collective action would not have real potential for changing things.
- **The Good Samaritan frame** is similar to the elite social responsibility frame but it differs from it in two respects: The preferred solution called for does not involve public policy and the elites are not necessarily being appealed to as a community.
- **The Minding My Own** frame suggests elites should not do anything in excess to periodic voting. It may build a collective identity with the elites and it may describe an issue as in need of change but it releases the elites from all responsibility to act on this issue by implying it should be left to the government or by suggesting that even if the elites tried to do something, it would not yield results.

**TABLE 6 Frame matrix on elite social responsibility frames**

| | | FRAME ELEMENTS | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | REASONING DEVICES | | | | EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE FRAMING DEVICES (see the Codebook included as Annex I on page 161 for a complete list) |
| | | Identity | Preferred Solution | Motivation | Efficacy | |
| FRAMES | ACTIVE CITIZEN | We are a community of action and we should act to change the behaviour or policies of those people who are not doing what they should. The issue is not only between the government and those directly and immediately involved or working with the issue. | Systematic, collective and targeted at public policy. | Any combination of motives leading to policy action, as long as the need to act is not explained away | The government will have to implement what we push for | • Boundary work to build collective identity as elites in contrast with the 'have-nots'<br>• Direct references to a collective entity such as *we, Namibians, tax payers. consumers*<br>• Peers contributing with policy proposals<br>• Implicit references to an out-group whose policies or behaviours should be changed<br>• Unpacking and contextualising of issues and use of precise language with clear attribution of roles and responsibilities to human actors |
| | GOOD SAMARITAN | I am / we are responsible to help those who suffer due to unfortunate circumstances. | Not systematic, targeted at individuals, not at public poiicy. | Any combination of motives, which may lead to charity | I / we can make a difference in the lives of individuals independently of the government | • Presenting the individuals to be helped as deserving poor in contrast with a mass of undeserving poor<br>• Biblical examples of charity, such as *good Samaritan*<br>• Lexical choices, such as *the needy, the poorest of the poor*<br>• On-site reportage featuring vivid descriptions of poverty and / or soundbites from the poor but not giving the necessary context regarding structural causes for poverty and |
| | MINDING MY OWN | I and most people like me have no role besides voting in periodic elections. This issue should be left to the government. | None – or based on running two parallel systems, one for the haves and another for the have-nots | For various reasons, it would not make sense to try do something | The government is incapable or unwilling to effect change even if we push for it | • Government the only actor – or if peers are featured, they only speak to the government<br>• Issue implied to be unproblematic (for example covered by chronicling type of presentation through the basic news format, entertainment items…)<br>• Issue presented as insurmountable (for example non-human actors, unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities, chronicling type news presentation)<br>• Implicit accusations of others being the cause of the problem (often this would be underserving poor or a small group within the elites)<br>• Lexical choices implying the government is totally incapable / disinterested (for example repeated references to *the rape of our resources*) |




**FIGURE 3 Elite social responsibility frames explained**

## 4.3 Using the tool to identify frames in texts

### 4.3.1 *General instructions*

The purpose of the frame analysis tool introduced in this section is to identify elite social responsibility frames in media texts. There are three mutually exclusive frames: Active Citizen, Good Samaritan and Minding My Own. Each frame is essentially a different interpretation of the role of the elites in the society.

The tool is attached in its entirety as Annex I on page 161. It comprises a Codebook and a Coding Matrix. To undertake an analysis, the analyst uses these to code their corpus text by text. Based on the results, each text is categorised under one of the three frames.

The Codebook builds on the idea of frames as frame packages comprising reasoning and framing devices. A Frame Matrix is included in the tool for quick reference. It shows that each frame comprises four reasoning devices and several potential framing devices.

The tool is based on the four reasoning devices, and this section follows the same structure in explaining the tool. Most reasoning devices are further broken down in several constituent elements. This is done to render the devices observable in a transparent manner. The book lists yes/no questions concerning each element and stipulates how answers to these questions correspond with a specific frame. I also describe some of the key framing devices, which texts may use as clues to point to these.

While this section reads as an instruction to using the tool, it is at the same time an account on how the tool was used to identify frames in the current corpus.

### 4.3.2 *Identity*

Identity is the first of the four reasoning devices, which frames use to suggest conclusions on the role of elites in the society. Texts using the Active Citizen frame are building a sense of collective identity in their elite readers. Such texts are also making the readers to think of themselves as a potential community of action, which should not think the issue at stake is only between the government and those who are directly and immediately affected or working with the issue. I also accept Gamson's observation that mobilisation does not tend to realise unless those called to action can imagine a distinct group of others whose policies or behaviour needs to be changed.

To make all this observable in a transparent manner, I break Identity down into four constituent elements, which the frame analyst should check for each media text that forms part of their corpus.

These four elements are expressed as binaries, and they are: 1) Collective identity / No collective identity 2) Community of action / No community of action 3) Human target for action / No human target for action 4) Responsibility to get engaged / to leave in care of the government.

Below is a description of each element and some of the central framing devices texts may use to refer to these.

**Elements of identity**

***1. Collective identity / No collective identity.*** Collective identity refers to people identifying with a collective identity of 'the well-off Namibians'. Such an identity does not have to be constant, and it does not have to be the only, or the primary, identity the elites draw on. What is important from the point of view of collective responsibility is whether such an identity exists as an option, which may be activated. As highlighted in Chapter 2, it should not be taken for granted that this is the case. In the absence of research-based evidence at a national level, a plausible guess would seem to be that what little exists in terms of such an identity, it is being built and shattered on a daily basis by different actors. Media would be one of these. Fairclough (2003, 145) writes that media uses representational strategies to draw attention to certain aspects of identity and thereby place people in certain social positions. If Namibian newspapers were promoting elite social responsibility, they would be providing the elites with opportunities to identify themselves with this all-Namibian collective identity, to get a sense of *we*, of *us* being in this together. Preferably this would extend to being here together as Namibians who have some wider responsibility due to our privileged position in the society – but De Swaan's framework of elite social responsibility reminds us that such a moral does not have to be present.

To build the sense of *us*, media may use three different strategies: explicit naming in positive light, boundary work, and references to threats to elites as a group. Translated into the jargon of frame analysis, such strategies are *framing devices.* Below is a brief description of each:

- ***Explicit naming in positive light*** is straight-forward. All references to elite individuals or groups, portrayed in positive light, constitute an instance of this practice. Such featuring by the media suggests the elite reader that people like them are important in the society, and is likely to encourage them to identify with this collective group (Gamson 2001, 61).

  When explicit naming concerns a specific group or individual (as opposed to more generic terms, such as 'the well-off') it can be conceptualised as a *peer example*. Peers are people in possession of sufficient financial, political, social *or* symbolic resources to participate in the creation and maintenance of the discourses through which social order is constructed. A

person may be poor in financial terms, but if they have the capacity to produce a text that is so compelling that it is published as a reader's letter in a newspaper, they are elite. Leaders of non-governmental organisations and churches are also peers, even if they are speaking for the poor. So are representatives of other professions in a managerial role. The only elite individual who is not a peer is a government representative, even if they are professing to be speaking as citizens.

The analyst should consider that peer examples must have a reasonably broad resonance among the elites to bear effect. A reference to one specific, small elite group is not likely to resonate with many readers – especially if it is negative or requires concrete, specific effort. Interview studies with elites suggest that there is a tendency to pass blame and not associate oneself and one's immediate reference group with anything negative or burdensome (Verba, Kelma, Orren, Miyake, Matakuki, Kabashima & Ferree 1987, 264; Kalati & Manor 2005; Boersema, 2013). However, a narrow point of reference may resonate with broader populations if the reference being made is rather positive or general. For example, a statement 'businessmen should act responsibly' is non-committal enough to resonate with all kinds of elites as 'we should act responsibly' whereas 'politically connected elite should stop illegal fencing' is not likely to produce a similar response.

- ***Boundary work*** refers to implicit building of boundaries differentiating the elites from the rest (Lamont 1992; Lentz 2015). The concept offers a wide range of possibilities for analysing how texts build elite identities. At its simplest boundary work may be observed in elite media texts which provide descriptions of the poor and their surroundings. Even a mere reference to the existence of the poor may be interpreted as boundary work as it reminds an elite reader that the society is not composed of his kind only.

- ***References to threats*** imply that elites as a group are in some kind of a danger.
  It should be noted that not all references to threats are references to collective threats and not all collective threats focus on elites as a generalised group. In De Swaan's original conceptualisation (1988) typical threats included riots, revolts, and contagious diseases. In her study on Brazilian elites, Reis (2010, 10) found out that such collective threats did not feature strongly among the local elites. Instead, emphasis was on lack of personal security due crime. The fear was not for *us* as a group but for *me and my family* as individuals.

  A kind of a collective threat is also when the elites as a group are accused of something. This, too, has the potential to consolidate their identity as a group. The general point made about

peer examples above applies: the group being referred to should clearly have a broad resonance among elites. If there is any possibility to reason that one's in-group, or one personally, falls outside the group of accused, this will most probably be done.

**2.** ***Community of action / No community of action.*** Community of action refers to the collective identity entailing a sense of us, the well-off Namibians, as a community of action. Simplified, such a sense would roughly mean people having internalised an attitude of *together we can make change happen.* This is important because a collective identity on its own is not enough to inspire action. (Gamson 1992.)

How can media contribute to building such an attitude with their elite readers? At least two different strategies may be identified: Explicit calls for action and examples of peers taking action.

- ***Explicit calls for action*** simply mean a text makes an outright call for the readers in position to do something to do so.

- ***Examples of peers taking action.*** Peer examples was already mentioned under collective identity. Here the idea is taken further by noting that some peer examples weigh more than others. What is essential is the type of activity that is represented. In short: is the peer or group of peers being featured in the media coverage making concrete policy proposals on how things could be improved (Lewis et al 2005, 42–43)? Such proposals may appear in readers' letters and other opinion pieces written by the readers themselves, or they may be cited in interviews or other texts produced by newspaper staff. To simply criticise does not constitute a policy proposal.

**3.** ***Human target for action / No human target for action.*** Human target for action refers to our need for a clearly identified 'other'. We need a specific person or group of people to put the blame on, before we are likely to be propelled to action. Texts using the Active Citizen frame therefore suggest the existence of a person or a group of people whose behaviour or policies should be changed. (Gamson 1992.) Literature, together with the corpus of the current study suggests three central strategies:

- ***Explicit naming***. This means a text explicitly states that somebody is doing something they should not be doing.

- ***Implicit naming.*** This strategy entails a range of textual hints, which are typically culture- and context-specific. A Namibian example could be a reference to company names such as *Ramatex,*

*Avid* or *Teko* to call attention to well-known corruption cases and thereby imply responsibility on government and greedy businessmen.

- ***Them as a polar to us.*** The identification of 'them' may be made implicitly in two stages: the text addresses a community of imagined readers, which becomes *us.* It is then implied that there exists a *them* which is a group defined by being different to us, people who do not behave or would not behave like us.

It should be noted that the inclusion of this specific element in the coding tool associates the Active Citizen frame with potential ethical challenges. The 'need' to identify a human target for action calls for a certain antagonism, which is necessarily not good in divided societies, especially considering that the personification of problems may cause people to 'exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets' (Gamson 1992 , 33). Moreover, it may 'have the effect of blurring broader power relations and the structural causes of a bad situation' (Gamson 1995, 92). Two separate issues are at stake here: Firstly, people being unjustly implied with guilt and, secondly, the frame not being effective in bringing about change. As far as the latter is concerned, Gamson (1995, 92) suggests that 'the targets identified by the frame must successfully bridge the abstract and the concrete. By connecting broader sociocultural forces with human agents who are appropriate targets of collective action, one can get the heat into the cognition. By making sure that the concrete targets are linked to and can affect the broader forces, one can make sure that the heat is not misdirected in ways that will leave the underlying source of injustice untouched.' If an analyst wants to capture whether such bridging is present, they would have to evaluate any allocation of guilt against factual information. This would be time consuming, prone to differences in interpretation, and it would also undermine the conceptualisation of framing as a meaning-maker. For these reasons, the coding tool does not call for attention to anything beyond the identification of human target for action. The analyst should, however, keep the above ethical considerations in mind when interpreting the results.

4. ***Responsibility to get engaged / to leave in care of the government.*** This component captures whether the text suggests whether the elites have a responsibility to engage themselves with an issue or whether their responsibility lies in leaving the issue in care of the government. The entry point to the analysis is through the latter, an examination of whether or not the text suggests an issue is best left in care of the government.

The strategies used to imply that an issue belongs to the government only are quite straight-forward to recognize. They revolve around the actors featured in the text. While some texts identify the government as the only actor, others would include actors outside the government but do it in such a

way which implies that the issue should be left between the government and the other, narrowly defined, constituency of people. Three specific combinations of actors are common:

- ***Government and the professionals.*** Sometimes an issue is framed as being between the government and a dedicated group of people or institutions, who can be conceptualised as 'the professionals' working with the specific issue, thereby releasing the others from responsibility. While a broader constituency could be called to discuss and contribute, this is not being done. Sometimes such a framing may be a consequence of a non-participatory attitude of the professionals involved, as has been proposed regarding the Namibian Basic Income Grant (BIG) coalition (Palomäki 2010)[48], which features in many of the corpus items that entail portrayals of formal civil society organisations (see tables V m and V n on pages 186 and 187).

- ***Government and the poor.*** An interpretation highlighting government responsibility is suggested also when a text identifies the only actors as the government and the poor. If such a text makes no reference, implicit or explicit, to the role the well-off could play, it invites the reader to assume the issue belongs to the care of the government exclusively.

- ***Government and the villains / government and the wronged.*** Even if a text features elite individuals or groups as actors – either in the role of the villain or the party that has been wronged – it may advocate an interpretation suggesting that the issue should be left in care of government. This depends on how broad or narrow the resonance with the specific elite group is within the elites. The general logic presented under *explicit naming* on page 60 applies: Does the wronged party have broad resonance among elites? If the elites are cast in the role of the villain, or if they are called to do something unpleasant, is the description such that the reader will find it very difficult to come up with a reason for why they do not belong to this group of people?

**How do the above elements relate to the three frames?**

In this section I have suggested that Identity comprises four elements. These elements are expressed as binaries and they are: 1) Collective identity / no collective identity 2) Community of action / no community of action 3) Human target for action / no human target for action and 4) Responsibility to

[48] This is a well-graded MA thesis based on an organizational analysis of a range of interviews, newspaper articles and other background materials. The author concludes that, within the coalition was not open to discussing alternatives to their grant proposal, but only welcomed commentary accepting the proposal as it was.

get engaged / to leave in care of the government. The way the frame analysis tool conceptualises the relationship between these elements and the three elite social responsibility frames is as follows:

- Categorisation under the **Active Citizen** frame requires that the text advocates for collective identity as a community of action and identifies a human target for such action. Moreover, such text may not advocate for the issue to be left in care of the government.

- **Good Samaritan** framing may also build collective identity and suggest the elites have a collective responsibility to do charity, but unlike the Active Citizen frame, it does not *have* to imply any collective identity or an existence of a group of people whose policies or actions should be changed.

- The **Minding My Own** frame may well imply that a collective identity exists – and such identity may even be as a community of action against human targets. However, instead of suggesting the elites should make use of this potential, a text framed with this frame works to convince the reader that the issue is best left in care of the government.

### 4.3.3 *Preferred Solution*

Preferred Solution is the second of the four reasoning devices, which frames use to suggest conclusions on the role of elites in the society. I included this device to be able to set minimal requirements for the types of actions that can be considered as manifestations of elite social responsibility.[49] The two restrictions I consider crucial are that elite social responsibility cannot be charity or another form of informal support bypassing the state, and neither can it be based on segregationism, which corresponds to the apartheid idea of using public resources for building two separate Namibias, one for those who are being conceptualised as deserving more and another for those who are being conceptualised as deserving less.

**How does a text advocate for charity?**

Explicit strategies are straight-forward as always: The media may explicitly invite their readers to do charity. They can do this either in their own voice or they can transmit an explicit call for help by a peer or by a person who wants help.

[49] Additional requirements should be introduced only after careful consideration. Elite social responsibility frames are not a set of issue frames suggesting specific remedies for specific issues. Neither is the purpose of the tool to assign value to solutions, for example between social transfers and improvements on education. Its interest lies in whether the elites are called on to do something systematic in the interest of the wider society.

The call for charity can also be implicit, for example:

- ***Peer examples.*** Any portrayal of peers in charitable activities constitutes an implicit call for charity. This could also come through a reference to biblical or other culturally available archetypes, such as the Good Samaritan

- ***Descriptions of 'deserving poor'.*** A mere description of or reference to poor people or poverty may imply that the elites should assume a role of a Good Samaritan, even if no direct call for action is voiced and no action is described. The description of the poor needs to be of a specific type to carry a call for action. It needs to imply that the specific poor people to be assisted are worthy of the assistance. Poor people in general may be prone to laziness and dubious morals, but the specific people to be assisted are not. I will elaborate more on this towards the end of the next section, which focuses on motivation and especially on the strategies used to explain away any responsibility to act.

- ***Lexical choices describing neediness combined with an absence of references to unjust structures.*** A lexical choice positioning the poor as somebody to be helped (such as *needy*, the *poorest of the poor*) in a text that does not give any reference to need of structural action

**How does a text advocate for segregationism?**

It is challenging to draw a line between what constitutes an argument in advocacy for segregation and what doesn't. In a way all policy proposals without an immediate effect on the status quo should be lumped into this category and placed under the Minding My Own frame. I however tried to stick to the principle of not making value judgements beyond what was absolutely necessary for identifying the obvious cases of segregationism. There was only one such item in the corpus. This was a reader's letter which advocated for poor black Namibians to be contained in communal lands (NAP11), presumably without the author realising that this was the implication of his proposal.

A very basic guideline for discerning implicit segregationism in texts could be whether a text uses socioeconomic differences following from historical injustices as a base for policy proposals which would maintain or aggravate such differences for the detriment of the poor.

**How do charity and segregationism relate to the three frames?**

In this short section I have argued for a reasoning device that will allow ruling out types of collective action that cannot be conceptualised as being structural and for the benefit of the common good,

including the poor. The device 'Preferred Solution' therefore identifies texts that advocate for charity or segregationism.

The way the frame analysis tool conceptualises the relationship between Preferred Solution and the three elite social responsibility frames is as follows:

- Any item identifying charity as the solution – implicitly or explicitly – is to be categorised under the **Good Samaritan** frame.

- Any item advocating for segregationism – implicitly or explicitly – should be categorised under the **Minding My Own** frame.

### 4.3.4 *Motivation*

Motivation is the third of the four reasoning devices, which frames use to suggest conclusions on the role of elites in the society. Motivation answers the question *why should we do something?* It is the combination of reasoning, emotion, norms and attitudes making people favourable for action and for the people on whose behalf the action would be taken. In most cases, emotions and norms having to do with people's inherent need to feel a sense of control over their lives would play a bigger role than reasoning (Kuper & Kuper 2009; Redlawsk, Civettini & Emmerson 2010). What is important to understand is that it is impossible to give a conclusive listing or description of motivational factors that apply to social responsibility across issues and elite groups. In our example, different elite groups would be reading a paper from different starting points – each depending on their historic and current social experience and expectations (for an example from South Africa, see Kuper & Kuper, *ibid.*). This is why it is difficult to identify motivational elements that would resonate with all groups in any given issue. In a way, however, such a list would be irrelevant; as De Swaan's theory shows, a variety of very different motives – and most of them not altruistic – may lead to support for pro-poor policies. To take a specific example from the current corpus, Julius Malema, the former ANC Youth League head in South Africa, may be one reader's hero blowing away norms regarding how to speak to power, while in another reader he may ignite fear.

What seems to be more important to capture than the exact motivational argumentation is to keep on the lookout for whether a text contains cues that work to release the reader from thinking that something could be done. Van Dijk, one of the most prominent characters in Critical Discourse Analysis, uses the concept of *explaining away* (1993). What is being explained away in his example is racism, but the principle applies to other issues as well.

**Strategies used to explain motivation away**

In short, literature suggests six kinds of explanations elite papers may use to release their readers from thinking that they could do something about an issue. The list below gives a short summary of each:

1. ***This is not a problem, really.*** An issue can be presented as something, which is not really an issue, not a problem.

2. ***No human can do anything about this problem.*** Even if an issue is presented as something problematic, people could be made to think that it cannot be changed by any human action.

3. ***We cannot do anything about this problem because it is being caused by the poor.*** Again, the issue is identified as problematic, and it is implied that change can be brought about by human action, but not by action by the elites because

4. ***We cannot do anything about this problem because it is being caused by elite people other than us.*** The issue is identified as problematic, and it is implied that change can be brought about by human action, but not by action by the general elites because the problem is being caused by a small group of people within the elites (see section 4.3.2 on Identity, page 61).

5. ***We should not mess with this because it's being taken care of by the government and the professionals.*** Again, the issue is identified as problematic, and it is implied that change can be brought about by human action, but it is also implied that the elites at large should leave the issue to the government and the professionals, who are taking care of it (see section 4.3.2 on Identity, page 64).

6. ***Even if we tried to do something about this, the government would not be capable to implement the changes required.*** The issue is identified as problematic, and as something the elites could potentially have an influence on. At the same time, however, it is implied that the government is uninterested or incapable of effecting any changes even if the elites pushed for them (see more under section 4.3.5 on Efficacy, pages 75–77).

**An in-depth description of some of the strategies through examples on poverty**

I will now provide an in-depth discussion concerning some of the strategies listed above. Because strategies of type 4, 5 and 6 are covered elsewhere, the current section will focus on strategies of type 1, 2 and 3. It will do so through examples on poverty and inequality. The same principles apply

to other issues as well, and this is reflected in the Codebook, which features the same set of questions twice: one set is for coding references to poor people and poverty and other set for coding references to other issues.

A considerable body of research-based guidance exists to guide an analyst on poverty and inequality content, albeit mostly from a non-African context (Ott & Mack 2014; Radu, Morwe & Bird 2012; Van Gorp & al. 2005; Lister 2004; Mantsios 1995; Iyengar 1991; Gamson & Lasch 1983). What follows is essentially a synthesis of this research. Where possible, I refer to research and commentary on Southern Africa. This is done to suggest that the same strategies may resonate with the Namibian elites, too.

I start with a general observation, which is not directly captured by the coding tool[50], but an important point to keep in mind. This is the tendency of the media to keep silent about poverty and inequality. Media dedicates relatively little space to poor people and issues important specifically to them (for a summary of empirical research on western media, see Bullock et al 2001, on African media see Adebanwi 2012; Chiumbu et al 2016; Friedman 2011, Panos 2007, and specifically on Namibian media Namrights 2012; du Pisani 2006; Landqvist & Swedberg 2006) [51]. Moreover, when poverty-related topics are covered, there is a tendency to shift the attention away from poverty and from the ethics behind the prevailing situation. For example, studies on the coverage of industrial strikes and the land issue in the Southern Africa region suggest that if a story entails a possibility for covering it from the point of view of the local economy, this angle will be used, thereby delegitimising even the legitimate attempts by citizens to take action on very real grievances (Chari 2013, Duncan 2013; Werner & Kruger 2007). The point made by Melber (2014) regarding the Namibian Basic Income Grant (BIG) is also relevant here (see page 21).

After this brief general background, I will now turn to an in-depth discussion concerning some of the specific strategies which are used to explain away the need to do something about poverty and inequality when they *are* being covered.

[50] It would be a tall order to expect that media serving predominantly those who are well off should angle all their content to look at the world from the poor's point of view. A more reasonable expectation is to look at whether items adopting other angles succeed to inspire the elites to act for the common good..

[51] It should be noted that the references on Africa and Namibia are not to empirical studies, save for Landqvist & Swedberg's bachelor thesis. In the absence of data on Africa, reference may be made to an empirical stud on Latin America, which found that less than one percent of the content in the dominant press covered issues of poverty (Kitzberger & Pérez 2008, 10).

1. ***Poverty is really not that bad for the poor.*** This strategy relies mainly on the idealisation of poverty and on the othering of the poor, as described below.

- ***Idealisation of poverty*** is particularly common in coverage of indigenous groups, many of whom are still practising nomadic or hunter-gatherer lifestyles. For example, the San of Southern Africa are often represented in crude hunter-gatherer stereotypes, living in harmony with nature and each other. When their circumstances are presented in a negative light, they are depicted as incapable of maintaining a rich and meaningful lives, due to the loss of their idealised hunter-gatherer 'culture' instead of their socio-economic position (Magadza 2016; Francis & Francis 2010). This way, structures of inequality are hidden behind a façade of diversity (Ott and Mack 2014) and it is suggested poverty is in fact essential to the identity of the San.

- ***Othering*** is a process through which a group of people are assigned characteristics which make them seem fundamentally different from the norm. This creates two social categories, 'us' and 'them', and because they seem to be so different from us, it seems acceptable to apply a different moral code to the out-group than the code that is applied to the in-group. Philosopher Julia Kristeva (1991) writes: 'We' are perceived as subjects who own emotions, rationality, capabilities, experiences, knowledge and will. The Others are perceived as objects who lack complexity, motivation, rationality and capabilities. Othering may also work through indirect characterisation where attributes of the poor people's surroundings come to describe the people (Culpeper & Fernandez-Quintanilla, in press).

2. ***Poverty is something that cannot be changed by human action.*** When poor people and their issues are being covered, this may be done in a way that gives an impression that no human can do anything about poverty. The strategies are varied, but all take a starting point in the same idea, which will be introduced below.

   In his book *The African Press, Civic Cynicism, and Democracy* (2008) Nigerian media scholar Minabere Ibelema writes: 'A major obstacle to the reform of African societies is the general conviction that societies' problems are beyond individual agency. A major responsibility of the press is to try to change this mindset' (p. 252). This is by no means a particularly African problem (e.g., Bennett 2001; Cappella, Jamieson & Hall 1997; Putnam 2000) but it is important to keep in mind that such tendency is 'locally' observed. Some of the strategies used to imply the non-actionable nature of poverty include:

- ***Non-human actors.*** A good example of an implicit technique for denying human agency is Fairclough's findings concerning the neoliberal discourse (2010, 247). Typical for the discourse is to stay mum about the human or social agents behind the changes and the logical or causal connections between the supposedly inevitable changes. For example, the agents may be stated as 'the global economy' or 'the modern world'. The discourse uses metaphors which let the reader understand that the processes are inexorable and cannot be resisted by human agents. A Namibian example of this would be a tendency to blame the state of the affairs on the global economy (Kaure 2005).

- ***Unclear attribution of roles and responsibilities.*** Even if human actors are mentioned, the language used may be imprecise, avoiding any direct and clear statements on who did what or who should do what. Policy discourse that uses precise naming of actors and active language with clear attribution of roles – who should do what – arguably implies that things can and should be changed. The obvious is to categorically state that participation is welcome and desirable and likely to yield results. Sometimes this is accompanied by *mobilising information,* information that lets people know precisely where to go and what to do in order to participate (Stanfield & Lemert 1987). Other techniques exist, too. One of them was already discussed above; when media portrays members of the elites participating in policy discussions, it comes to imply that this is an issue that concerns them. Another technique is to make the issue at hand easier to understand by explaining, linking abstract concepts with concrete examples, providing contextual information, and information about alternatives. This is the type of reporting regularly called for by African media scholars writing about media's role in democracy beyond the watchdog function (Banda 2007). Such reporting is often referred to as 'unpacking', and this is the term used in the current study. [52] Unpacking is not prominent in the Namibian press, and this has – to an extent – been proven by research (Fox 2012, 237; Engelbrecht 2014; Rothe 2010, 177).

- ***Blame on bad luck:*** Blame may be put on unlucky circumstances that cannot be influenced. This may be expressed explicitly or through lexical choices, such as a *poverty trap*, which suggests the

[52] This comes close to Gamson's concept of 'bridging experiential knowledge and public discourse, helping people to integrate the language of the lifeworld with policy discourse' (2001, 61–62). He writes this as a theorist whose primary interest lies on people who are kept out of the policy discourse although they are the ones the policy is about. Our focus is slightly different, as our interest is on those who can press a policy to benefit others. Experiential knowledge is needed by our subjects to understand and feel the situation of the objects and to understand what the policy is about. In Gamson's original frame of reference bridging also serves the goal of valuing experience as expertise.

existence of a magical structure that came out of nowhere and cannot be dismantled. (Bullock et al 2001.)

- ***Blame on history:*** Poverty may also be blamed on historical circumstances. While such conclusions may be factual, they can also serve a purpose by suggesting that not much can be done about the current situation. Melber (2007) argues that some within the postcolonial elite tend to blame apartheid for poverty, thus masking the significance of the lack of political will to serve the poor or to redistribute wealth in postcolonial Namibia. In an interview study with South African elites shortly after independence Kalati and Manor (2005) found out that the apartheid explanation was widely used by white elite respondents, too, and none of them felt personally responsible for apartheid. Similar results are also available from other parts of the world: elites tend to consistently deny their own influence in the state of the affairs (Clarke & Sison 2005; Verba et al 1987). This is often accompanied by a certain reasoning pattern, which suggests that the root of the problem lies in a wrongdoing that happened in the past, and if this is undone, economic growth is incited and poverty will go away (Kalati & Manor 2005). Unlike redistribution, economic growth does not require 'any fresh sacrifices from elites' (*ibid.*)

***3. Poverty is the fault of the poor.*** Central to elite perceptions of poverty is whether poverty is seen as self-inflicted or not and, by extension, whether the poor are seen as deserving or undeserving. The more deserving the poor are seen, the more likely it is that policy solutions will be suggested that deem it appropriate to assist the poor (Gamson & Lasch 1983).

Below is a list of some main strategies the media can use to imply poverty is the poor's fault:

- ***Blame on behaviours and morals of the poor:*** Media texts may explicitly or implicitly assign qualities to poor people, which suggest poverty is the fault of the poor. When these are repeated often enough, they form stereotypes (McQuail 1992, 234), such as lazy, uneducated, mentally inept, prone to follow their instincts and thereby engaging in risky and immoral sexual behaviours and substance abuse, as well as incapable of long-term planning, and constantly on lookout for somebody else to pay their bills (Bullock et al 2001). When the stereotypes are extended to explain protest action by poor people – a topic somewhat dominant in the media coverage of poor people (Van Dijk 1995, 25) – they tend to insinuate that the poor are also unreasonable and inherently violent (for South African studies see for example Radu et al 2012; Robins 2014; Friedman 2011). I have already referred to a Namibian example of this in connection with the Basic Income Grant (see page 20). Another local example is evident in the ideological shift, which has been observed in connection with the government's stand on old-age pension; whereas the Swapo Government in the early years used to emphasise their

responsibility for the welfare of Namibians, nowadays they emphasises their control over the welfare and the people receiving pensions (Devreux 2001).

- ***Focus on individuals:*** Even if blame is not openly stated, it may lay hidden in media texts. This is the central finding in what is perhaps the most classical framing study on poverty, Shanto Iyengar's 1990 study on US television news on poverty. Iyengar discerned between two frames: an *episodic frame* where poverty and poor people are portrayed through stories of individuals and individual events without placing these stories in any broader context, and a *thematic* frame focusing on the context. The study found that the episodic frame, which was more common, functioned to shift audience attention away from poverty as a structural, actionable issue and towards an interpretation where poverty was the individual's fault. Similar findings have been repeated in later framing studies, such as in Van Gorp and colleagues' (2005) study analysing Belgian television news focusing on poverty.[53]

- ***Poor as helpless victims:*** The second othering mechanism central to this study is to render the poor to helpless victims. Paradoxically, this sometimes results from an emphasis on the structural causes of poverty (Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin 2010, 698–9). If 'the pain, frustration and humanity of those living in poverty' are disregarded, the poor may be seen as mere victims of their situations, which in turn reinforces the image of passivity.

- ***Emphasis on poor people's capacities and industriousness:*** Sometimes media texts put emphasis on the skills, wits, industriousness, activity and potential vested in poor people. Such approach may be taken consciously to protect the dignity of the poor, to open up opportunities for them and to make the elites more favourable for helping the poor. However, if such agency is described without recognizing that these are people who have been excluded from access to social rights, a perception may form that suggests that avoiding poverty is up to the poor themselves (Lister 2004). Sofia Littmarck found some support to this claim in her Master's thesis (2007) on poverty discourses in Namibia.

- ***Emphasis on similarities between poor and the non-poor.*** When similarities between the poor and the non-poor are emphasised, this may result in an impression which suggests that both have the same possibilities to make a success out of their lives, thereby again making it seem like avoiding poverty is up to the poor themselves (Ott & Mack 2014). An example could be an

[53] Van Gorp et al, however, found that Belgian reporters seemed to promote the frame where context was provided.

elite/middle-class typical (Van Wolputte 2016; Becker 2007) emphasis on poor people harbouring the exact same tender feelings for their families as the well-off.

The strategies listed above may make it sound like any description of the poor – negative or positive – will automatically lead to framing, which will make it seem poverty is the fault of the poor. The two examples below illustrate that this is not the case.

The first example is oft-cited. It is the rapid shift in poverty frames, which took place in the 1900th century England. Until the publication of an 1889 book by Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London, the dominant poverty frame was that of pauperism. Pauperism saw poverty either as self-inflicted 'by those who chose to wander, to idle, to drink, or to engage in crime and prostitution rather than in a regular, settled existence and employment' (Hossain and Moore 2002) , or as an individual misfortune due to, for example, death of the breadwinner. Booth's book and the activism that accompanied it introduced people to a different frame where the poor were 'not lazy or undeserving folks but 'hard-working, struggling people, not worse morally than any other class' (Booth, cited in Himmelfarn 1991: 11). The new frame portrayed 'fellow Britons' who were struggling against the threat of descent into pauperism and implied that both government and wealthy people should do something to alleviate this threat. The emphasis was not on poverty as material deprivation but on notions of class and respectability, which resonated well with the values of the Victorian elites. This frame-shift is generally seen as a crucial factor in the initiation of European welfare policies. (Hossain and Moore 2002.)

The second example comes from post-apartheid South Africa. Based on psychometric studies, Andrew and Jocelyn Kuper (2001, 369) conclude that If the objective is to spark a moral evaluation that suggests something ought to be done, those members of the elite who have no personal experience of lived poverty and no personal relationships with people who are poor, may prove to be more emphatic if the depredations suffered by historically disadvantaged people are conveyed by content that humanises and personalises issues, than if the content focuses on guilt and redress.

What becomes central is that media texts portraying poor people should be adequately contextualised. Writing from a western perspective, Lister (2004) suggests that media texts portraying poor people should explicitly recognize that these are people who have been excluded from access to social rights. She further proposes that such texts should make a point of explaining how their poverty is a consequence of concrete actions by specific, powerful people or groups of people, who have initiated these actions to increase their own advantages (Lister 2004). Writing from a South African perspective Wasserman (2015) calls for 'good, contextual stories that open up possibilities for greater understanding and compassionate action'. Similar calls have also been voiced

by Namibian media scholars and commentators (New Era 22.10.2009: 'Media only focus on politicians'[54]).

Differentiating between 'good' and 'bad' poverty descriptions can be surprisingly difficult. What is enough context and what is mere lip service – a near-compulsory cursory nod to some kind of an official poverty reduction discourse? Should one take into consideration that the same story might be read differently by different elites? There are no standard answers. Everything depends on everything else, and the researcher must justify their choices based on the local circumstances. Chapter 7 gives some practical examples of such dilemmas encountered with the corpus of this study. In the end, however, the tool and the corpus interacted in a way that made these questions less important for the final categorisation than I originally envisaged. Most often the decisive question was the one regarding identity and government responsibility – was the issue seen as something that should be left in care of the government?

**How do the strategies defined above relate to the three frames?**

The way my frame analysis tool is conceptualised suggests that Active Citizen framing does not make any attempt at explaining away. By retaining from doing that, it keeps up the motivation to act, whatever this motivation is. The items which work to release the reader from any responsibility shall be categorised under the Mining My Own frame – or under the Good Samaritan frame, if they propose that charity could be a way forward in a situation where any policy action is likely to be in vain.

### 4.3.5 *Efficacy*

Efficacy is the last of the four reasoning devices, which are used to suggest conclusions on the role of elite readers in the society. In my interpretation this device is focused on the elites' faith and trust on government[55]: does the media encourage an interpretation where the government is willing to listen

[54] The article focused on reporting on elections. People interviewed were the Polytechnic of Namibia Media technology department head Emily Brown, The University of Namibia lecturer Robin Tyson and the Media Institute for Southern Africa's acting director for Namibia, Marbeline Mwashekele.

[55] Traditional conceptualisations of political efficacy also consider whether people believe they can understand political affairs and have the skills to influence them. Such trust in self is already reflected under Responsibility: the idea of a community of action involves a perception that this community is skilled and resourceful. Another potentially important point to be analysed is the relationships between different elites. For example, media may imply that any action would be in vain because other elite groups cannot be trusted to do their share. This is a significant issue in a divided society. A recent research programme on governance in Africa concluded that development is about resolving collective action problems between elites (Booth 2012). Such problems exists where elites agree on what should be done about an issue but nevertheless fail to cooperate on it because no group within the elites wants to be the first to take action. No elite group is prepared to take costs or risks while they have no assurance that other groups will compensate them instead of opting to free-ride (ibid., 11).

to the elites and capable of implementing the changes they press for? An item does not have to praise the government in order to achieve such an impression, but it may be argued that an item which bears a heavy focus on how incapable or corrupt the government does not encourage such interpretation. Hence an item not making an active effort to portray the government as incapable would be categorized under the Active Citizen category if other frame elements were not against this interpretation. Conversely, an active effort to portray government as incapable would result in an item to be categorized under the Minding My Own or Good Samaritan frames, depending on whether or not charity was suggested to be a solution. The more specific justification for this is provided below, accompanied by contextual information regarding the discussion on media ethics in Namibia.

Media's portrayal of the government has for long been the central point of arguments around media ethics in Africa. To crudely summarise: the liberal camp contends that media is first and foremost a watchdog and reporting on government failures is its core business. Others point out that emphasis on the watchdog role tends to be at the expense of democratic participation and people's trust in government (Banda 2008; Ibelema 2008). Their concern is supported by research in established democracies, which suggests that focus on bad governance and politics as a game of individuals may lead to political cynicism and passivity (Valentino, Beckmann & Buhr, 2001; Putnam 2000; Capella and Jamieson 1997; Rhee, 1997; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995, for a summary see Jackson 2008). To my knowledge there is no empirical research on this in the context of a young democracy that is a former settler colony and a de-facto one party state[56] but it seems feasible to argue that constant negative reporting on the government's ability to govern the country does not inspire elite citizens to advocate for pro-poor policies spearheaded by the government. The elites' position is comfortable as it is, and many already seem to harbor deep-seated suspicions about the motives and abilities of those in power. Against this background it feels that the elites will not call on government for any action unless they feel deeply threatened for their own well-being.

One may argue that justified critique of government is important for active citizenship: If enough people care enough about the state of the affairs, the sitting government will be voted out. However, in the case of Namibia this is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. It is a dominant party state where the dominant party carries a strong legacy from the liberation struggle, where the

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I am however following Van Gorp's (2010) advice to keep the number of questions manageable. In a way the frame analysis tool addresses relationships between different elites under the questions regarding Responsibility. Are significant divisions implied, the analyst would probably say the item suggests that elites together are a potential force for collective action. Moreover, Booth also defines a strong developmental state as a key solution to collective action problems (ibid. 11), and hence the question about the government also goes some way to address the question of trust between elite groups.

[56] Karin Voltmer and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck (2006) have undertaken a study on media and new democracies, but the countries covered were rather different from Namibia, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Chile and Uruguay.

demographics and the voting patterns are in favor of the dominant party, and where the opposition is weak. This should not be read as an excuse for the media not being allowed to criticize the government and the ruling party. It is however feasible to point out that emphasis on criticism and politics as a dirty game is likely to further alienate citizens from politics and thereby from seeing a role for themselves in taking action to influence issues.

**How do the above elements relate to the three frames?**

The reasoning device 4, Efficacy, comprises one question only: 4. Is the government portrayed as incapable of or fundamentally disinterested in delivering change? If the answer to this question is yes, the item should be categorised under the Minding My Own frame or under the Good Samaritan frame, depending on the answer to question 2.1.

## 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the frame analysis tool developed in the current thesis and also laid out the theoretical justification for the tool.

I explained that the tool is based on two existing theoretical frameworks, William Gamson's work on collective action frames and Abram De Swaan's work on elite social consciousness. These are essentially mobilisation theories, and therefore the tool, too, has a strong focus on action. It gauges whether elite media encourages its audiences for collective action, which would advance social justice. The action-orientation is a choice among several possible alternatives, and thereby another conceptualisation would be likely to produce different kinds of results.

Based on Gamson and De Swaan's theories, I defined four reasoning devices, which are deemed as central factors in mobilising the local elites to believe that their position in the society comes with a social responsibility. These four reasoning devices are Identity, Preferred Solution, Motivation and Efficacy. I then briefly summarised the positions media texts can take in relation to the reasoning devices and explained that this results in three mutually exclusive frames: the Active Citizen, the Good Samaritan and the Minding My Own.

The bulk of the chapter was used to describe how the reasoning devices may be identified in media texts. This included a presentation of several possible framing devices for each reasoning device. The frames and the different devices associated to them are summarised in the frame matrix on page 57.

The content of this chapter is summarised in the codebook, which is attached as Annex I on page 161.

# 5. CORPUS AND NEWS EVENTS

The function of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the corpus of the current thesis and the three news events which form the basis of the corpus. The chapter starts with a justification for why precisely these news events were selected. It then proceeds to lay out the sampling strategy and to give a brief background on each of the three events. Finally the corpus is described in some detail. This should assist the reader in judging what added value frame analysis brings compared to traditional content analysis.

The background given for the three news events and wider issues connected to them is restricted to an absolute minimum. The purpose is to allow a reader not acquainted with Namibia to form a basic idea of the types of issues that media could be expected to report in connection with them.

Throughout this chapter, individual corpus items are referenced to by the coding system adopted for the current study. For example, The Namibian's article *City's dirty secret*, published on the 5th of August 2011, is referred to as NAP1. This code tells it is the first item included in The Namibian's poverty corpus. A complete list of the corpus items with their codes, headlines, publishing dates and URLs is included as Annex II on page and a quick reference is provided as Annex II on pages 166–172.

## 5.1 Selection of corpus

The corpus of this study is based on purposive sampling. This is the sampling strategy recommended by Van Gorp (2010, 99) for ensuring that the body of text under investigation is meaningful in the context of the research questions. An additional justification for purposive sampling can be found in the concept of *critical events*, which are defined as contextually dramatic happenings that 'invite the collective definition or redefinition of a social problem' (Pride 1995, 5). Such events may lead to a relatively sudden change in which frames are preferred by the media (Brosius & Eps 1995; Scheufele 2004; Gamson & Modigliani 1989) – either simply due to the need to provide an interpretation which fits the new situation or due to a *framing contest* in which different interest groups will try to define the event in terms that best serve their goals (Boin, Hart & McConnell 2009, 81).

An effort was therefore made to identify a manageable selection of news events, which would exemplify wider, on-going social issues in Namibia. These events should have a bearing to the poor but also entail possibilities for elite intervention. Finally the events had to be clearly time-bound, with an identifiable starting point. A conscious decision was made to rule out elections and corruption scandals, as they tend to result in the kind of reporting, which focuses on procedural democracy and the watchdog role of the media, whereas my specific interest lays in participatory democracy.

Three news events were selected. These were the 1) a 'media exposé'[57] of people getting their food from a dump in the Namibian capital Windhoek in August 2011; 2) a civil society land conference in November 2011, and; 3) proposed electricity price increase in April 2010. These events are connected to the following social issues: The Kupferberg case to poverty and food security, the land conference to the land question, and the electricity price hike to consumer prices in general. A slightly more detailed description of the events and the issues is provided in Section 5.2. As a summary at this stage it may be concluded that although all three events are relevant in the context of social justice, each represents slightly different elite interests. Ethics left aside, the people eating from the dump were not an immediate practical concern to anybody but the political office holders who may be held responsible. The land conference was a potential threat for wealthy farmers, a considerably small group of people. A significant electricity price increase, on the other hand, was something that threatened to inconvenience broad sections of the elites with an immediate effect.

The sample was drawn from the online archives of the two English-language national dailies, which had the biggest readership figures at the time. These were The Namibian, a private paper, and the New Era, a government paper. A more complete justification for the selection of these two papers is available in Chapter 2.4. Each event was allocated a sampling period of fifteen newspaper issues[58] in each newspaper, starting from the date when the story first broke in any of the two papers.

The sampling was based on predefined key words describing the news events and the social issues connected to them (see Table 7 on page 80). The primary sampling units were articles. An article would be selected for a provisional analysis if it contained one of the defined search words. The article would then be inspected more closely and approved in the final sample, if it was directly linked to the event or the broader issue. This resulted in a corpus of 165 items, described in more detail in Section 5.3. To simplify referencing, each corpus item was given an identifying code. The running code indicates which paper the item was published in, and which one of the three sampling criteria was used. Due to the nature of the online archives of the two papers the corpus consists of text only.

[57] *Media exposé* is a term New Era used to describe the case. The media chose to expose the story, but the story was not 'found' by the media. Instead, some of the people getting their food from the dump called the papers and asked for their story to be covered (Jason, personal correspondence 25.6.2013).

[58] As a general remark regarding the 15-day sample period it may be said that I was worried about making the period of analysis too short at the expense of leaving out relevant content. Compared to Europe, Namibian media and public sphere are rather slow. People's reactions to a case could be submitted to the media and published long after the actual case took place. Namibian media also suffers from a lack of resources; and one of the consequences seems to be that when something is happening, reporting focuses on the facts and the main players (elite sources) in the case. People's perspective might be thought of in the newsroom but it will have to be put on hold until the journalists have time to go and ask what the people have to say about the issue.

Following from the sampling logic, the corpus contains two kinds of items. One type makes explicit reference to one of the three specified news events. The other type makes no explicit mention of the events but refers to (at least) one of the broader social issues behind them. With this dual sampling strategy, I wanted to be able to describe the news coverage in its context. For example, did the exposé of people getting their food from the dumpsite have a significant impact on the way poverty in general was covered by the media in the immediate aftermath of the exposé? Did the civil society land conference spark additional reporting on the broader land issue? Did the proposed electricity price increase inspire debate about consumer prices in general? In other words: now that a 'situation was on', did the media use it to cover the issue from the point of view of social justice and what the elites could do about it – or were poverty, land and electricity covered mostly from other points of view?

**TABLE 7 Sampling criteria used in the current study**

| EVENT | SOCIAL ISSUE | SAMPLING DATES | KEY WORDS USED IN SAMPLING | CORPUS NAME & CODES |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Stampede for rotten food** | Poverty and food security | 5.-29.8.2011 | *Kupferberg, dump*, poverty*, *poor*, *food, hungry, hunger*<br><br>All key words as something to do with people's survival – hits such as *poor roads, hungry for love,* or *food for thoughts* excluded. | **Poverty corpus**<br>The Namibian: NAP<br>New Era NEP |
| **Civil society land conference** | Land question | 10.11.-1.12.2011 | *land* a*s something that can be owned or otherwise benefited from – hits such as *the land of the brave* or *landed a job* excluded. | **Land corpus**<br>The Namibian: NAL<br>New Era: NEL |
| **Electricity price hike** | Consumer prices | 31.3.-22.4.2010 | *electricity, power*[59]<br>Power with reference to electricity – hits such as *power to change things* excluded. | **Electricity corpus**<br>The Namibian: NAE<br>New Era: NEE |

[59] Broader search terms were attempted to cover a wider range of consumer items, but these resulted in a large number of hits of which most were irrelevant to discussion on consumer prices. It was therefore concluded that any reporting with focus on consumer prices at the time would have mentioned electricity as an example.

## 5.2 The three news events and broader issues connected to them

### 5.2.1 *The dumpsite 'scavengers' – poverty*

On Friday 5th August 2010, both The Namibian and New Era reported that 100–150 adults and several children were making their living at the Kupferberg dumpsite, 15 kilometres out of Windhoek. The dumpsite was being used by the supermarkets and meat producers to dump expired foodstuffs and other items, which the people would either eat with their families or sell to others in their neighbourhoods. Despite Kupferberg and dumpsites in other Namibian towns and cities having been in this use for several years (NAP68; NEP10) the media reports created a public outcry. The government, after having described the reports as 'an eye-opener' convened an urgent cabinet meeting to deal with the situation (NEP10).

This event is connected to wider social problems of poverty and food security. In this particular case their context is urban, although the majority of Namibia's poor live in rural areas.[60] Urban poverty and food security are in turn retraceable to other problems, including: 1) Widespread un- and underemployment resulting in part from a mismatch between skills and demands in the labour market – hence a question of the quality of education – and in part from insufficient job creation. 2) Salaries inadequate for living 3) Inadequate social protection measures by the government, including the omission of food security concerns in urban policies. (Nickanor 2013; Pendleton, Nickanor & Pomuti 2012; Sem 2010).

An issue that could be expected to gain coverage in connection with poverty reporting at the time was the proposed Basic Income Grant scheme (BIG), which was recommended by a government-sponsored commission in 2002 and piloted with good results by a coalition of civil society organisations between 2008 and 2009. The concept was rejected by the government in 2010, the argument being that the proposal was unrealistic and unfair on those who work for living and pay tax, but it was still in fresh memory at the time of the Kupferberg 'exposé' in 2011. While the BIG with its relatively small monthly grant sum was not meant to be 'the ultimate answer to the challenges of structurally rooted inequality and destitution' (Melber 2014, 155) it is an example of the kind of redistributive measures that are likely to be unavoidable if the current levels of inequality are to be addressed (Levine & Roberts 2012; Jauch et al 2009).

[60] While only 9 per cent of Namibia's urban population are classified as 'poor' (GRN 2012a), there are huge differences within the urban areas. Windhoek's urban areas consist of both formal and informal settlements. In 2013 it was estimated that roughly 30 percent of Windhoek's population lives in informal settlements (New Era 28.11.2013: '30% of Windhoekers live in informal settlements') and 76 per cent of the households in the informal settlements are estimated to be severely food insecure and the situation is worse than in any other city in Southern Africa (Pendleton et al., 2012).

In related international developments, it should be remembered that 2010 was the beginning of the Arab spring, popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. The events were widely publicised in Namibia, and it is feasible to expect the Namibian media would have made connections between the Namibian poverty situation and the uprisings in Middle East and North Africa.

### 5.2.2 *Civil society land conference – the land question*

Land is an enormously complex issue in Namibia, bringing together questions of poverty reduction, national economy and historical injustices. In short: it is estimated that 5 300 of the 6 000 commercial farms remain under white ownership (Amoo 2014, 226) while 70 percent of the indigenous population, most of them poor, gets their living from subsistence farming they practice in government-owned communal lands, which are characterized by overgrazing and lack of infrastructure important for agriculture. While land ownership was a significant motive in the liberation struggle, and land policy did have a significant role in poverty reduction policies right after independence, the government has since given up on the idea that land policy could bring about significant gains in poverty reduction (Werner & Odendaal 2010, 11—13). Consequently, the only aspect of land reform, which has been significantly advanced is a loan scheme meant to enable previously disadvantaged Namibians with considerable wealth to buy large-scale commercial farms through subsidised loans provided by the state. The other two strategies, buying of commercial farmland and allocating it to poor Namibians in small parcels, and the development of communal lands have been moving 'on a snail's pace' (New Era 13.11.2007). One of the reasons given for the side-tracking of the poor in this process is the lack of organization of the landless people (Werner & Odendaal *ibid.*, 17).

Against this background, the civil society land conference in November 2011 was a significant event, and could have sparked diverse reporting on the land issue. From a social justice point of view, such reporting would have ideally entailed broader perspectives than the concerns about production, economic output and the viability of small scale farming, which have dominated public debate on land redistribution in Namibia. Such focus creates a significant bias, which suggests that the land question is only about national economic viability. In this interpretation it does not really seem to matter that many people want to live off the land instead of, for example, becoming factory workers in cities. (Engelbrect 2014; Hongslo & Benjaminsen 2002; Werner & Kruger 2007.)

The conference was organised by a coalition of civil society organisations headed by the Evangelic Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN). Many of the conference recommendations

concerned communal lands[61], and as such can be seen as non-threatening to the large-scale commercial farming sector – save for increased budget allocations towards the development of communal lands and support for those farming on communal land, but the conference also called attention to issues that, if implemented, would bear consequences for the elites. Of concern for those owning commercial farmland were the call for 'a mechanism to identify unutilized or underutilized commercial farms for expropriation'[62] and the resolution 'to explore all legal, political and social options to ensure that ancestral land rights are considered as part of the land reform program'[63]. Relevant for some elites farming on communal land was the conference resolution to put an end to illegal fencing in communal areas. This concerns who have fenced off large tracts of land in communal areas for their own use, putting pressure on small scale communal farmers and in many cases denying them access to not only the land that has been fenced off but also to water and other resources for farming. (Werner 2011.)

In addition to purely elite interests, reporting on land could be expected to be influenced by genuine concerns for wider national security (see for example Werner 2001, 12) in the light of Zimbabwe's recent history (see for example Freeman 2016), although it is not easy to discern between legitimate fears and political motivations (see for example Melber 2014, 181[64]).

### 5.2.3 *The proposed electricity price increase – consumer prices*

On the 30th of March 2010, the Electricity Control Board of Namibia published a newspaper advertorial[65] announcing that Namibia's power utility, NamPower had applied for a 35.16 per cent tariff increase and invited all electricity consumers to send comments on the proposed increase. The

[61] These recommendations included: tenure security, development of viable commercial farming units and improvement of infrastructure including water, bordering fencing and roads, and development of communal areas; investigation on illegal fencing on communal areas to put an end to the practice, which puts pressure on small scale communal farmers and denies them access to land, water and other resources for farming.
[62]This call was made 'in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Commercial Agricultural Land Reform Act of 1995'. The conference statement further says that farms of absentee landlords must be prioritised and Government must be pressured to expropriate those farms as already agreed at the 1991 National Land Conference and the 1994 Mariental Peoples Land Conference.
[63] The restitution of ancestral land rights was ruled out in the national land conference of 1991. According to Werner (2015) this was a consensus resolution, which was was 'relatively easy to achieve given the overlapping claims to ancestral land made by different communities.'
[64] Melber writes: 'The future land policy and closely intertwined the policy of national reconciliation with regard to the privileged white minority are at stake and it is difficult to predict which turns they may take. As suggested, an anticipated eroding legitimacy might create temptations to look for scapegoats, and both commercial farmers as well as the white minority are suitable targets.' Another political motivation would be to emphasise the national security aspect in order to maintain the status quo.
[65] 'In a local daily', Probably the New Era, no copy as adverts are not included in the electronic archives.

increase would be used to boost Nampower's finances for the completion of several energy projects that were needed to guarantee future supply of electricity.

This should be seen against a background where Namibia used to enjoy stable, relatively cheap electricity prices for a long period of time but then at the beginning of the 2000s prices had started increasing every year to accommodate response to several challenges, including the security of electricity supplies in a situation where demand was outstripping supply faster than NamPower could afford to finance new infrastructure. The overarching problem seemed to be the lack of a long-term strategic plan, an energy policy and subsequent dependency on imports from neighbouring countries, which were in similar problems with their own energy production. (KAS 2012).[66]

In sum, while NamPower had a real need for cash, the reasons for getting into trouble as well as who should finance the required investments were debatable. This called for questions regarding several wider issues, such as: 1) Public accountability of Namibia's parastatals, many of which have been found to harbour various ethically dubious aspects ranging from the lack of long-term planning to overly generous management benefits and outright fraud. 2) Should the consumer be expected to pay for the consequences of mismanagement? 3) Consequences of high electricity prices to poor people many of whom do not buy electricity per se but are disproportionally affected by the rising prices of basic items, as well as job losses. (KAS 2012, 1 and 11–12.)[67]

The proposed electricity price hike was included in the corpus because of its significance for the urban middle classes, a prominent audience group of both newspapers under scrutiny. While the other two cases bear consequences predominantly to the very poor, this case allows us to look at an issue where also the elites – or at least the middle class section of it – has a lot to lose.

## 5.3 Corpus described

This section describes the corpus in terms of traditional content analysis based on some of the main characteristics that are explicit in the texts. The purpose is to familiarise the reader with the corpus, and to lay the basis for demonstrating what added value frame analysis brings compared to the type of content analysis, which focuses on the explicit. I will start by describing the corpus as a whole,

[66] Most notably, Namibia had in 2007 concluded a four-year, US$40 million loan and supply agreement with the Zimbabwean government whose Hwange power plant was facing major problems by the first quarter of 2010 and it was unclear whether electricity was being delivered to Namibia as agreed (NAE49).

[67] Domestic consumption is 37.5 % of the total electricity use in Namibia (KAS 2012). Most of it is consumed in urban areas as much of the countryside is still without electricity, Namibia's overall electrification rate being 34 per cent (World Bank 2010). However, not everybody in urban areas uses electricity. There are sizeable informal settlements in urban and peri-urban areas that are not connected to the grid. In short, people living in poverty are less dependent on electricity for cooking, lighting and heating than the well-off. (GRN 2008, 27; KAS 2012, 34; DRFN 2011.).

then focus on the three specific news events. The section is illustrated by multiple figures. The data entailed in these figures is documented in detail in Annex II and III on pages 166–172 and 173–179. When the data cannot be found in these Annex, a note on a separate Annex is included.

The corpus consists of a total of 165 items. Of these, 112 were published in The Namibian and 53 in the New Era (see Figure 4c on page 87). The difference in the number of items is considerable but New Era's overall content volume is approximately a third smaller than that of The Namibian's (Kivikuru 2009, 7). Another factor that has a bearing on The Namibian's higher figures is their SMS page, which is a selection of SMSes sent in by the readers. The page typically attracts enthusiastic commentary on any hot news topic. This type of content did not exist in the New Era. An additional content type not featured in the New Era is The Namibian's Notable Quotes, which is an extract of 2—5 quotes from yesterday's news. Altogether, the corpus entails 69 SMSes and seven notable quotes. These were not calculated as individual units. Instead, all SMSes published on the same day are seen to constitute one item, and so are all the notable quotes published on any one day. This principle applied, the corpus contains 25 SMS pages and five notable quote items. Because these types of content are not easily comparable with the content in New Era, I will be describing the corpus both with the SMSes and the notable quotes and without them. With the SMSes and notable quotes excluded, the corpus size is 135 items and the New Era's share of corpus is slightly (see Figure 3b). The actual frame analysis, as reported in Chapter 6, was conducted on this smaller corpus.

As explained in the previous section, the corpus contains two kinds of items, those that make explicit reference to one of the three news events, and those that refer to the broader social issues connected to the three news events. The ratio between corpus items referring to the specified news events and those referring to the broader issues is approximately 40 percent specified news events and 60 percent the broader issues (see figures 4e and 4f on page 87).

I had expected the papers to use the three news events to expand coverage on the broader social issues connected to them, but this did not seem to have taken place. The items referring to the events had a tight, episodic focus on the events. They either told what had just happened or what somebody thought about what had just happened. Save for some readers' letters, there was no background or analysis to really discuss the events in the context of the broader social issues and to learn about solutions (see below under the specific news events). Some items, which referred to the social issues but not to the specified news events, were more explanatory in nature, but most of this content, too, was episodic, focusing on events and personalities instead of processes and structures.

The majority of the items in the corpus originates from the Kupferberg dumpsite case and the broader issues of poverty and food security. The size of this poverty corpus is 77 items, roughly 50 percent of all corpus items. The second largest theme is land, roughly 30 percent. This covers the

archive search on the civil society land conference and the broader land question. The smallest theme is electricity, roughly 20 percent covering both the proposed electricity price increase and other items referring to electricity. (See Figures 3a, 3b, 3e & 3f.)

As illustrated by Figure 3f, the New Era gave less attention to the specified news events compared to The Namibian. The most striking feature of the corpus is The Namibian's voluminous coverage of the proposed electricity price increase. I will demonstrate in Chapter 6 that this represents a conscious choice to advocate for action among the readers. Another notable feature is the scant attention rewarded to the civil society land conference by both papers. The Namibian covered the conference in four items, the New Era in three.

When broken down into content types, the corpus is dominated by news. Roughly 50–60 percent of the corpus is news, constructed after the *who, what, when, where, why* model of Five Ws. Altogether, the New Era made more use of the news format than The Namibian, which published more opinion items compared to the New Era. Opinion was the second most common content type in the corpus, roughly 30 percent of the corpus in The Namibian and 15 percent in the New Era. With the SMS pages included in the calculation, The Namibian's opinion content comes close to 50 percent. (See Figure 4.)

Opinion items include opinion pieces written by the staff, by commissioned contributors, and by the readers. When The Namibian's SMSes are excluded, the most common opinion item was a reader's letter. The Namibian published 16 of these and the New Era four. Staff-written pieces were in the minority, perhaps because both papers run editorials only on Fridays.[68] There were five staff-written opinion pieces published in the Namibian and one in the New Era. Opinion pieces by commissioned contributors were seven and four, respectively. Some of them were written by people who are regular contributors to the papers, others seem to have been once-off commissions.

[68] Kivikuru (2009) writes that in the absence of in house-commentary clearly outlining the paper's editorial line, selection of themes, sources and perspectives becomes a central vehicle in the expression of opinions.




**FIGURE 4 The corpus**




**FIGURE 5 Corpus by content type**

The Namibian's regular commentators under the sampling period were political scientists Alexactus Kaure and Alfredo Hengari, and Chris Smith, a retired civil servant who used to work for the Prime Minister's Office. The period also coincided with a series of articles written by the Namibian Prime Minister Nahas Angula[69]. His titles included in the corpus are: 'Lessons from African Development Experiences' (NAP30) and 'Macro-Economic fundamentals' (NAP59). Finally, the Namibian published once-off pieces by the CEO of Operations at Old Mutual Namibia, Sakaria H. Nghikembua (NAP44, about affirmative action) and by the CEO of the Development Bank of Namibia, David Nuyoma (NAP59, about corporate social responsibility). The New Era's regular opinion contributors under the sampling period were the pseudonym Kamati kaTate[70] known for his polemic texts criticising the government and the economic elites (NEP6; NEP14), and a Swapo party activist Paul T. Shipale (NEP19).

The news was strongly defined by those who have the capacity to do media relations. Close to 90 percent of the news is based on one source. These included interviews, press releases, and stories by international news agencies, but also staged events, such as a press briefings, conferences and meetings, where statements from several stakeholders could be reported. This means that only about 10 percent of the news, about ten items, entailed the journalist sourcing information from several sources. (See Figure 6 below) The kind of reporting where news is unearthed by the media, rather than served to the media, seemed to be inexistent in the corpus.




**FIGURE 6 Use of sources in news items**
see Annex V Table V a on page 182 for data

In addition to the roughly 80 ordinary news items, there were 13 items, which were classified as 'news with on-site reportage'. The function of these items was to present a piece of news or to

[69] Angula signed his texts as 'Citizen Angula'. However, it is unreasonable to expect the lengthy articles would have been published were they written by just any citizen.
[70] Later revealed to be Job Amupanda, see page 116.

illustrate an on-going news event. They may or may not be written in a news format, but all of them included on-site reporting, which often featured some description of the milieu and short interview snippets with the people present on the site. As such, these items came close to what could be called *feature* format (Kuutti 2006, 40; Steensen 2011) but I opt for the longer term, which makes it clear that these items are fairly short and strongly connected to specific news events.

If one looks at both types of news items together, and the types of sources featured in them, the most common source is the government or the Swapo party. Roughly 40 percent of the sources specified in the corpus fell into this category. The second most common type of source was the civil society, roughly 30 percent of the sources. This was followed by ordinary people and churches, 12 and 6 percent, respectively. The New Era was more likely to use government sources than The Namibian. Interestingly, the majority of the ordinary people used as sources fell within the definition of 'the poor' used in this study. This could be because the elite individuals used as sources were referred to in their professional or organisational capacity. (See Figure 7 on page 91.)




**FIGURE 7 Types of sources used**
See Annex V, Table V b on page 182 for data

### Coverage of the three news events

As illustrated in Figure 4f on page 87, the three news events were covered at varying volumes. The Kupferberg case was covered in rather many items by both papers. The Namibian gave similar attention to the proposed electricity price increase, while the New Era wrote much less about it. Neither of the two papers gave a lot of attention to the civil society land conference. What follows is a short description of the coverage received by each of the three news events.

**The Kupferberg exposé.** The Namibian carried 18 items and eight SMS pages about the Kupferberg case. New Era carried 10 items mentioning the case. If the SMSes are excluded and The Namibian's

larger overall volume is taken into consideration, the two papers covered the case in a very similar manner both in terms of volume and angles adopted.

Most items were news or on-site reportage: what was happening at the dumpsite and what was being done about it. Both papers started with an on-site reportage describing the situation at the dump (NAP1, NEP1): Somewhere between 100 and 200 people had gathered at the Kupferberg dumpsite to wait for trucks to come and dispose of food items. The employers and guards of the dump called them 'scavengers', and this term stuck throughout the sampling period. After a week of silence, the papers reported that the City of Windhoek had decided to stop dumping food items and that the decision had left the scavengers without food and a source of income (NAP10, NEP7). When a citizen's charity group was formed to assist the scavengers with food, clothing and blankets, both papers reported this (NAP21, NEP9). Both papers also run a story of the government response plans (NAP20, NEP10) and a separate item with focus on what the government was planning to do about the children on the dumpsite (NAP53, NEP29). The curtain falls over the sampling period in a situation where the children's situation seems to have been addressed[71] but 'hundreds of shack dwellers . . . are now worried that . . . no one has come with an alternative plan to give them a dignified meal' (NEP7). The coverage does not entail references to long-term structural response (see for example NAP70).

Editorial opinion, analysis and background explicitly linked to the Kupferberg case were scant. Each paper published one staff-written opinion editorial (NAP54, NEP18) and one item that could be called an analysis but was published in a format of a round of interviews with a selection of commentators (NEP2, NAP20).

Throughout the sampling period people were contacting the media to air their opinions. Many expressed their sympathy for the people at Kupferberg. (For example NAP36; NEP20). Many also criticised the Government for not having 'made a difference' (NAP23). However, most make a point saying that the food should not go to waste (for example NAP32). This is echoed in many of the interview fragments cited in the news items (for example NAP10).

**Civil society land conference.** Only four corpus items deal specifically with the conference and another three mention it. Four of these items were published in The Namibian and three in the New Era. The angles adopted by the two papers were very similar.

The land corpus starts with the Namibian's 'Civil society to hold land indaba' published just before the meeting started (NAL1). This news item describes the aims of the conference. After the meeting

[71] The Ministry of Gender and Child Welfare conducted an investigation to the situation of 17 children who spend regularly spend time at the Kupferberg rubbish dump. Their report found that 'a majority of children come from stable homes where their basic daily needs are met by parents and guardians but visit the dumpsite due to peer pressure.' (NEP29.)

had finished, the Namibian published another piece of news telling that the conference had resolved that 'the resolutions of the 1991 land conference must be revisited as a matter of urgency' (NAL4). The item quoted Bishop Kameeta bringing up the plight of the poor Namibians in rural areas and appealing to the audience to accelerate the reform 'in order to maintain peace and stability'. The Minister of Lands Alpheus !Naruseb was quoted assuring that the government was taking land reform seriously. The day after The Namibian added emphasis on the Bishop's speech by reprinting the appeal for 'peace and security' in their Notable Quotes section (NAL5). The last of the Namibian's items referring to the conference was a more detailed summary of the conference resolutions. It also revealed that 37 farming units intended for resettlement purposes in the Karas region were laying idle. (NAL14.)

New Era's reaction to the conference was late compared to The Namibian's. Their main story was published several days after the conference closed on Sunday the 10th of November, on Thursday 17th of November (NEL5). The first item was followed by a story reacting to the claim about the 37 idle farming units (NEL12). In this item, the government's side of the story was heard in some length. While they admitted that the farming units indeed were lying unoccupied, the problem was explained with 'bureaucratic procedures' that needed to be followed and the need to install functioning water infrastructure on the farms, the Karas region being very dry. [72]

Both papers covered the aims and the resolutions of the event, quoting the organizers' criticism of the government for the slow implementation of the process and the government response to this but did not bring any analysis or commentary. The factual content covered by the two papers was by and large the same. However it was the New Era's delays in reporting that gave an impression that it did not give the conference even the kind of standard national workshop attention The Namibian did. There were no SMSes, no readers' letters or other opinion pieces mentioning the conference.

Of the items referring to land but not to the civil society conference, many deal with topics, which were central on the civil society conference agenda, and may well have ended in the limelight because the conference.[73] These included coverage on communal land and evictions of poor communities from the commercial land they were staying on.[74] The most frequent topic was communal land. The Namibian carried nine items (including six SMS pages) containing references to

[72] New Era also carried one further item about the issue of idle farms, but this did not mention the civil society land conference (NEL15).
[73] Save in one item, where a short reference to the conference was made (NEL4).
[74] Six items altogether. The Namibian reported about the /Khomanin community taken to the court by the City of Windhoek because they had settled on land owned by the City of Windhoek (NAL2) and about the Audabib farm on the former Rehoboth gebiet (NAL22, NAL28, NAL35). New Era reported about the uncertain fate of 20 families staying at the Farm Hochfeld 131 situated in the Omatako constituency in the Otjozondjupa Region (NEL8, NEL11).

this topic and New Era three items. One of the civil society land conference recommendations was that the government should take action on illegal fencing in communal areas, and President Pohamba and other high-ranking officials did bring the topic up at the annual meeting of the Council of Traditional Leaders, which took place in Northern Namibia just a couple of days after the land conference (NAL7; NAL8; NEL4; NEL7). This was followed by a statement issued by the Ministry of Lands (NEL16; NAL32). The Namibian also run a piece about two high-ranking Swapo officials who had fenced off large tracts of communal land (NAL21). This piece included an interview with two land experts, illustrating the complexity of communal land issues.

Although the land corpus does not include any items distinguishable as in-depth analysis, it provides a more comprehensive picture of the land issue than the poverty corpus provides on poverty or the staff-produced items provide on electricity. Most of the in-depth information on land seems to come directly from the 30-page conference report and the document listing the land conference resolutions and plan of action (ELCRN 2011a & 2011b). This suggests that documenting and clearly articulating and communicating their claims and the background information for the claims is a viable strategy for the civil society for informing the national elites about an issue.

**The proposed electricity price hike.** There were considerable differences in the way the proposed electricity price increase was reported in the two papers. These were visible in the volume and pace of reporting as well as in the angles chosen. The Namibian published 27 items mentioning the increase (including 9 SMS pages), New Era six, of which only two had a focus on the increase. The Namibian's tone was clearly an advocate for protest, critic of government and a platform for protest and debate, while New Era remained largely mute, did not criticise the government and steered away from the public debate.

The Namibian's coverage started with a news item reporting the proposed price hike and the possibility to comment, the justification given by NamPower as well as potential consequences for national economy and low-income households (NAE1) .This item was followed by a mix of items urging the readers to protest (NAE3, NAE37, NAE36) and describing the on-going protest action (NAE8, NAE29, NAE38, NAE39, NAE40, NAE45, NAE43, NAE53). In terms of background to the situation, the editorial team focused on the Zimbabwe deal (NAE3, NAE53, NAE28, NAE49). All analytical content, such as possible solutions for the energy sector, were provided by three reader's letters (NAE7, NAE34, NAE35) and Chris Smith's regular column (NAE2).

SMSes poured in throughout the sampling period. Altogether there were 21 SMSes, published in eight daily SMS pages. Most of them are one-sentence pleas for the government not to allow the price increase or to have the decency to curb on ministerial and state enterprise spending

The two-item coverage on the electricity price hike in New Era stands in significant contrast to the Namibian's coverage. The first New Era item about the proposed increase was published two weeks after the ECB announcement and a week after the deadline given for the submission of comments. (NEE2) and the second item a week from the first. The headline of the second item tells much about New Era's attitude to the case. It read: 'Consumers have to bite the bullet' (NEE4). Comments had been invited and were being processed but there was no need for further action by citizens. They would be informed of the result in due course and all there was to do in the meanwhile was to contact three economists for scenarios regarding the effects of the price increase. All predicted a bleak future for the consumers and one managed to get in a couple of sentences proposing that the country should look into renewable energy solutions and liberate the energy sector. In addition to the economists, there were two other voices in the corpus: They were the Rehoboth Rate Payers Association (RRPA) representing consumers and NamPower together with ECB representing the energy sector.

**Initial observations regarding the usefulness of frame analysis**

How does the foregoing help in demonstrating the added value of frame analysis compared with the kind of traditional content analysis, which focuses on the explicit? This was not an extensive content analysis, but it contains some points, which can be contrasted with the results of the frame analysis presented in the next chapter.

Firstly, the section talked about sources. Source diversity is considered crucial for media performance. In Denis McQuail's words, the media should give a 'sufficient reflection of the varied experience of reality in society' (2010, 354). In particular, the use of 'ordinary citizens' as sources is deemed important for citizen engagement (McQuail 2003, 60–61). Based on the quantitative breakdown of sources, the two papers do not seem to be doing too badly with source diversity. Although the government is the most oft-cited source by far, the civil society gets to speak, and so do even some poor individuals. Moreover, readers' letters seem to add to this diversity of voices. Secondly, the section found that the papers wrote rather much about poverty. Hence it can be concluded that the papers do make poverty the story. In a hasty interpretation, the two points in this paragraphs could be taken as a sign that the papers did encourage their elite readers to think about poverty, to discuss it, and also to reflect on it from the poor people's point of view.

A third point to make is that the section observed a general lack of background and analysis. This starts suggesting that the encouragement could be rather shallow, but the only proof provided by this quantitative method is the near total lack of content that could be defined as background. While

a more diverse categorisation could unearth more specific information, it would be difficult to detect patterns without developing composite indicators, like is done in the type of frame analysis used in this thesis. The results of the frame analysis further suggest that a closer, interpretive reading is needed in order to understand the kinds of overall, shorthand-interpretations suggested by the items regardless of what exactly is being said.

## 5.4 Conclusion

The function of this chapter was to familiarise the reader with the corpus of the current thesis and with the three news events which form the basis of the corpus. The chapter also justified why the corpus is what it is and documented the sampling procedure applied.

I explained that the corpus relies on a purposive sampling based on three so-called critical events, which could be expected to invite a degree of redefinition of the wider social problems behind these events. The three events were 1) a 'media exposé' of people getting their food from a dump just outside the Namibian capital Windhoek in August 2011; 2) a civil society land conference in November 2011, and; 3) proposed electricity price increase in April 2010.

Based on pre-defined search-criteria, newspaper content was drawn from the electronic archives of the two elite newspapers with the largest readership figures. These were The Namibian – a private newspaper – and the New Era – a government paper. The corpus covers two weeks of coverage on each event by both papers, a total of 165 items. Because 30 of these items were very short and not comparable with other content types, only 135 items will be subjected to content analysis.

The chapter also described the corpus in some detail. It was concluded that the papers covered two of the events – the Kupferberg case and the land conference – in a very similar manner. The only real difference was in the coverage of the proposed electricity price increase, where The Namibian took on a role of a vehement advocate for citizen action and the New Era's coverage was minimal and neutral. Overall, the corpus lacked background and analysis, while events were chronicled effectively and relatively much space was given for opinion, especially in The Namibian. The government was the most often used source in news items, but civil society organisations, ordinary people and churches also featured in many items.

Finally, the chapter presented some initial observations comparing traditional content analysis and frame analysis as methods. I concluded that while simple categorisations of types of sources used and themes covered seem to suggest commitment to diversity and an elite social responsibility orientation, a more agile method is needed to point out patterns and to understand the interpretations suggested by the items regardless of what exactly is being said.

# 6. FRAME ANALYSIS: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the results of the frame analysis, which was conducted using the tool developed in Chapter 4. In so doing, I start answering research questions 1 and 2: 'What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?', and: 'What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?' The chapter starts with a quantitative overview to establish how widely the different frames were used to frame different themes and news events. This is followed by a section attempting to provide rich descriptions of the frames. The last section focuses on elite media's role in the formation of discourses that describe the role of the elites in the society.

## 6.1 Quantitative overview

The purpose of this brief section is to give a quantitative overview of the corpus in terms of the three frames. A detailed list of the corpus items categorised under the frames is given as Annex III on pages 173–179 and a complete numerical breakdown of the corpus into frames as Annex IV on pages 180–181. In this section, the same is explained and illustrated with figures comparing the use of frames by themes, events and papers.

The corpus was described in some detail in Chapter 5. A total of 135 corpus items – the entire corpus except The Namibian's SMS pages and notable quotes – were subjected to frame analysis. The SMSes and the quotes were omitted for three reasons: the first was brevity, the second their proneness to contradictory content, and the third the difficulty of comparison between the two papers. A further limitation of the corpus is that it was drawn from online archives of the two papers and thus does not entail photographs or captions.

The number of corpus items analysed, 135, is relatively small. The results are statistically significant when operating with the total number of items divided between the three frames and the two papers. When the corpus is divided further into themes and news events, the N values are as small as 2. These results are not statistically significant but they do illustrate choices made by the two papers and the journalistic routines guiding such choices.

The most frequently used frame was Minding My Own, the frame which suggests that it is not necessary for ordinary well-off people to take action for a better society. 58 percent of the corpus items were framed using this frame. The second most common frame was the Active Citizen, the ideal of the current study. 27 percent of the items were framed using this frame. The least frequent frame was the Good Samaritan, which suggests that the role of the elites is to help individuals in need. 15 percent of the corpus were framed using this frame. (See Figure 8 a on next page.)




**FIGURE 8 Frames in the corpus**

If one looks at the specified news events only, they are framed in a very similar way as the broader corpus. Approximately half of the news items mentioning the Kupferberg case, the civil society land conference, or the proposed electricity price increase are framed using the Minding My Own frame, 30 percent using the  Active Citizen frame and 20 percent using the Good Samaritan frame (see Figure 8b above).

A notable feature of the corpus is that the only significant use of the Active Citizen frame is found in The Namibian's coverage of the proposed electricity price increase. 16 of the 36 Active Citizen items were part of The Namibian's coverage of the price hike. This – together with the details provoded in the following sections – suggests that the paper took a conscious decision to encourage its readers to protest against the increase. It therefore makes sense to check what the corpus looks like without the electricity items. This may give a better idea of what the balance between the frames may look

like when the media is not taking an active advocacy role in a specific news evet. When all electricity items are excluded from the corpus the use of the Active Citizen frame decreases significantly (see Figure 8c on page 98), and even more so, if one looks only at the coverage of the specified news events (see Figure 8d on page 98). These scenarios suggest that the elites' role in the questions of poverty and land is rather unlikely to be described as something that requires policy action.

Figure 9 below illustrates how the frame use was divided between papers and themes. The Namibian's special treatment of the proposed electricity price increase is clearly visible (compare Figure 9d with Figures 9a–c, see also Annex V, Table V f on page 184). Another striking feature is that the land question is framed ovewhelmingly as something that does not concern the elites. This applied especially on the land conference. Poverty received a more varied framing in both papers. (See Figures 9a–9d below.)




**FIGURE 9 Frames by themes, news events and papers**

If one compares the frame use between the two papers, a lot depends on whether The Namibian's electricity coverage is included or excluded. Figure 10 below illustrates that when the electricity coverage is included, The Namibian makes much more use of the Active Citizen frame than the New Era, and correspondingly less use of the Good Samaritan frame. If all electricity items are excluded the papers are rather similar in their use of frames.




**FIGURE 10 Frames and papers**

## 6.2 Elite social responsibility roles

The purpose in the upcoming sections is to provide rich descriptions of the three frames. Summaries have been given earlier, but these were based on general descriptions of the frame elements. Here the focus is on describing each frame as it appeared in the corpus. The details given should function as examples, which illustrate the kinds of ways the frames may might manifest themselves. This should help the reader in recognising the frames in other contexts.

The structure of the sections is as follows: I start with repeating the frame summary provided earlier, then provide a brief quantitative overview outlining which topics were associated with the frame. After this comes the descriptive part, where I illustrate how the various frame elements were represented in the corpus.

### 6.2.1 *Active Citizen*

Earlier, I summarised the Active Citizen as the frame, which builds the readers' collective identity as a Namibian elite and further suggests that together the elites could well form a community of action on a public policy issue. The frame retains from suggesting that such action could be futile, or that the issue at hand should as a starting point be left to the government. Neither does the frame emphasise the government's inability or disinterest in implementing initiatives pushed by the elites.

A total of 36 items, or approximately 27 percent of the corpus were categorised under this frame. The Namibian covered the proposed electricity increase almost exclusively through this frame. The two other news events did not inspire a similar framing from either of the papers. Of all the Active Citizen items in the corpus, about 40 percent deal with the proposed increase. About 60 percent deal with poverty and land, but not specifically with the Kupferberg case, or with the civil society land conference. The poverty and land items using active citizen framing can be divided into four broad clusters of topics: 1) Need for a deeper democracy with more inquisitive and active citizens (seven items). 2) Radical redistribution to correct the wrongs of colonialism and apartheid (four items, only present in the New Era). 3) Moral issues (three items, all readers' letters). 4) Specific policy proposals for how national resources could be directed for the benefit of the society, including the poor (two items, both reader's letters) 4) Corporate social responsibility (two items, both commissioned items in The Namibian). (See Annex V, Table V c on page 183.)

What follows is a description of the Active Citizen frame in the corpus, grouped under the relevant reasoning devices as defined in the frame analysis tool (see Chapter 4).

***Collective identity as a community of action.*** The frame analysis tool conceptualised collective identity as a sense of 'together we can change things'. Most of the items using the Active Citizen

frame were explicit in suggesting that the readers constitute a group, which is a potential community of action. Out of the 36 items, 30 addressed the readers directly as *us, Namibians, taxpayers* or *consumers* (see Annex V, Table V d on page 183.) The extract below is an example of how the words *Namibians* and *we* are used to evoke collective identity.

> . . . Namibians should begin to debate the oil wealth of the country. This wealth should not only benefit the multi-nationals and the Swapo-connected upstarts. . . . / Nevertheless, this wealth does not belong to the Swapo elite, but to the entire Namibian people and future generations. It is high time to resist the looting. We should perhaps remind ourselves that the concentration of wealth creates the foundations of social discontent. This country will explode one day if we do not address the tremendous social inequality as a matter of urgency. (NAP5, reader's letter with the headline 'Socialise our oil')

Additional categorisation reveals that direct address was often combined with a portrayal of a peer acting as a socially responsible member of the elite. The majority of such peers were non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics, like in the example above. Others included business leaders and business coalitions, consumers and consumer interest groups, youth leaders outside the ruling party structures, representatives of black consciousness movements addressing social and economic inequalities, and well-established opposition politicians (see Annex V, Table V e on page 183).

The two most typical actions the peers were engaged in were writing opinion items and participating in protest action around the proposed electricity price increase (see Annex V, Table V e on page 183). The protest action manifested in statements against the proposed increase and, in case of one person (NAE8, NAE29, NAE43) in the preparations for a protest march.[75]

The extract below comprises the typical peer examples set by The Namibian's coverage on electricity increase:

> More than 350 Namibians have already signed a petition posted on the site, titled 'We don't accept the 35 per cent electricity increase from NamPower', in the last 36 hours. / 'And it is doubling in number every 12 hours,' Jade McClune, one of the site administrators, told The Namibian yesterday. / 'People have posted the petition to their notes and profile pages and have invited their friends to sign up,' he said. / . . . / 'The ECB as a regulator has a moral obligation to aid Namibia in its efforts to curb and reduce poverty, especially since its action or inaction is having a direct impact on the already burdened consumer,' NCT Executive Director Michael Gawaseb said. (NAE8, news item headlined 'Power hikes facing stiff opposition')

The Namibian's coverage of the proposed electricity price increase exemplifies a very straight-forward way to build collective identity as a community of action. The paper explicitly stated that collective action can change things (NAE3, NAE29), made explicit calls for readers to protest (NAE1,

[75] The march eventually turned out a flop. This item describing the flop (NAE43) was nevertheless categorised as an active citizen item. Gamson (2001, 61) writes that even coverage that is largely unfavourable implies that social movements are taken seriously by power holders.

NAE3, NAE29, NAE36 & NAE37), and gave exact information on how and where to participate in the protest (NAE3, NAE8, NAE29). The extracts below illustrate this coverage:

> 'Namibians cannot relax this Easter weekend after hearing about the huge hike in electricity tariffs. / Instead they must spend the weekend drafting their views about the 35 per cent electricity increase proposed by NamPower in order to submit their objections by the deadline of Tuesday morning to the Electricity Control Board. . . . The public needs to get itself into gear to protest these increases. It is time for consumers not just to complain, but to do something about it. We urge Namibians to make the time this long weekend to send their protests to manyame@ecb.org.na, or fax (061) 37 4304/5. Let us not take this lying down. (NAE3, a front-page opinion piece[76] by the paper, headlined 'Consumers must mobilise to stop the electricity hike')

> THE proposed huge electricity price hike of 35 per cent by NamPower provides Namibians with an opportunity to flex their muscles as consumers and protest this move. / Namibian civil society is not very organised or mobilised for that matter, and while people complain a great deal of the time about many things that adversely affect their lives, they are usually not prepared to take time out to actually do something about it. (NAE36, a front-page opinion piece by the paper, headlined 'Namibians mobilise against price hike')

> Irate consumers are planning a 'quick-flash demonstration' at NamPower's head office … during lunchtime today . . . / According to the Facebook website spearheading the action, consumers should arm themselves with pots and pans, whistles, rattles, drums and car hooters to 'boo' NamPower for 15 minutes, starting at 13h10. (NAE37, news item headlined 'Go make some noise at Nampower')

> 'Everyone who is prepared to fight back against the price hikes is asked to get ready for action – if you are serious about stopping this robbery, set aside lunchtime on Friday. People who have signed the petition will know where to go and what to do,' McClune said. (NAE29, news item headlined 'Power hike resistance grows')

In other topics, the papers used less explicit strategies to build collective identity as a community of action. These provided the reader with an opportunity to imagine themselves as part of a community of people who are resourceful, motivated and determined. All elite individuals featuring in the Active Citizen category make specific policy proposals. Some of these are introduced in the upcoming paragraphs, while exemplifying other aspects of the frame.

All Active Citizen items explicitly identified *them* as a group, and many referred to several groups of people. Additional categorisation reveals that the adversaries fell into four broad categories: 70 percent of the items named the government. 20 percent drew attention to those who were seen to be the cronies of the government, mainly business people enriching themselves. 10 percent of the items named the white people of Namibia as a group, which is benefiting from the Government's policies and holds an attitude of not respecting the black people. 5 percent of the items condemned racists of any colour. (See Annex V, Table V g on page 184.)

[76] Although the frame analysis tool is not able to capture the positioning of the items in the papers, these items specifically stated that they were published on the first page. The Namibian does not normally publish first-page opinion items.

Table 8 below gives some practical examples of how the texts were building identity by differentiating between *us* and *them*.

**TABLE 8 Us and Them**

| Who *they* are | Why *they* are crooks | Who *we* are |
|---|---|---|
| Swapo | They are using the poor to 'enrich those already rich' (NAP52) and have become 'fake socialists' (NAP4) or 'cowboy politicians', 'bouncers of white supremacy' (NEP14, NEL14), initiators of 'so-called public-private partnerships' (NAP5) | Those who stand for deeper democracy (NAP4, NAP5, NEP17), people who are 'fed up with empty rhetoric' (NAP37) – who know what is actually going on and have the capacity to act (NAP52, NEP12). People who are not 'self-serving counter revolutionary and opportunists' but 'patriotic techno-centric skilled people' (NAL3) who are put class-consciousness and the nation-building project ahead of 'Eurocentric ideological prisons' embodied in insisting on tribal divisions (NAL11). |
| Cronies of Swapo | 'greedy individuals are squandering our national resources with impunity' (NEP12) instead of conducting their business in a socially responsible manner 'with commitment, dedication, hard work and discipline' (NAP60) | As above |
| Whites | Due to the colonial history and the neo-colonial and racist attitudes they still harbour (NEP14, NEP19, NEL6, NEL14). | The 'black nation', politically aware 'pure blacks' who have 'woken up from their slumber to be proactive' (NEP14). |

A notable feature of the Active Citizen frame in the current corpus is that the elite readers and the peers representing them were equally likely to be portrayed in roles typical for consumers or taxpayers as they were being portrayed in roles typical for citizens (see Annex V, Table V d on page 183). The following extracts describe the qualitative difference, where a citizenship portrayal clearly implies a concern for everybody in the society and a consumer/taxpayer portrayal restricts the concern to those who can afford to pay.

> **[Portrayal of citizen concerns]** As pensioners, we find both the personal and national implications most alarming. . . . / . . . Stop messing our people around, political and industry bosses. You get paid monstrous salaries to provide affordable services to ALL Namibians. Wake up and do it. (NAE7, a reader's letter outlining several policy options, headlined 'Dismay at 37% power hike')

> **[Portrayal of citizen concerns]** The party during its contribution to the budget debate, currently ongoing in the National Assembly, said that the fact that 80 percent of income in poor households is spent on consumables such as food and electricity is an indication that the budget of last year was not as 'pro-poor' as was touted by government. (NAE33 reporting on the opposition party Nudo's contribution to the budget debate, headlined 'Budget lined with sweet words')

> **[Portrayal of taxpayer / consumer concerns.]** . . . maybe granting the request will result in exorbitantly high municipal accounts which already hard-pressed consumers can ill afford. (NAE3, to be read against the background where many poor households – especially rural – are not covered by the electricity grid or any municipal residential services.)

> **[Portrayal of taxpayer / consumer concerns.]** 'Is this how they deal with public complaints? Is this what we pay for?' he wanted to know. (NAE29 quoting activist Jade McClune)

All the four extracts above were categorised as Active Citizen items. I am treating the portrayal of consumer / taxpayer concerns the same way as citizen concerns because: 1) in a context where collective action is scant, consumer activism can be thought to form a bridge to action with broader goals. For example, Gamson (1992, 11) writes that 'media-amplified images of successful citizen action on one issue can generalise and transfer to other issues'. 2) The conceptual model applied in this thesis (see Chapter 4) does not differentiate between 'right' and 'wrong' motives for collective action. Instead, the interest lies in results. 3) In many cases, the texts themselves implied that consumers and taxpayers should think about the poor. Nine items in the Namibian's electricity coverage mentioned the consequences of the hike to 'the poor' or 'low-income households', albeit in passing, and four addressed people not just as consumers but also as Namibians (see Annex V, Table V h on page 184).

A similar point can be made regarding those items that brought forward individuals and organisations representing business interests. These, too, were categorised under the Active Citizen frame, other frame elements permitting. This makes sense for several reasons in the Namibian context: Business is an elite profession, and as often as business people are criticised, they are also being looked up to. Often it feels like an issue gets more weight if it is seen to be considered relevant by the business sector. A business leader preaching about ethics then constitutes a powerful role model, which should not be ignored when looking at what media can do to encourage elite social responsibility. The following example is from an opinion piece written by the CEO of Operations at Old Mutual Namibia, Sakaria H. Nghikembua (NAP44, titled 'Who is Responsible for Economic Empowerment?')

> For me, empowerment must first and foremost address current inequalities and obviate future ones, irrespective of race or creed. . . . We need to be clear that economic empowerment is not the enrichment of a select few, who were formerly poor. / . . . / So, who is responsible for economic empowerment? I say 'All of us'. Can we be successful at it? I answer: 'Failure is not an option.'

Two other groups of people, partially overlapping, appear often enough in the Active Citizen items to warrant a more detailed description. These are youth leaders outside the ruling party structures and representatives of black consciousness movements addressing social and economic inequalities. The agency availed for these groups, particularly by the New Era, can be considered strong; they were being portrayed in long questions and answers (Q&A) format interviews (NEP17, NEL14), allocated a role as a regular columnist (NEP6, NEP14) or otherwise given an opportunity to elaborate their views at exceptional lengths (NEP19, NEL6). What is interesting about the individuals featured in these items is that they succeed where elite individuals representing more established civil society

organisations do not: their appearance is associated with Active Citizen framing. This is mainly because they appeal directly to the readers, not to the government, and portray active citizenship as a goal (see more in Section 6.2.3). Following extracts illustrate these characteristics:

> Before ordinary observers start ululating, it is the responsibility of critical observers to ask fundamental questions . . . / . . . the question must be, what after we avoid deficits and increase revenue? What programme is the State going to run to benefit thousands griddling in poverty and those that have given up hope on any prospect of benefiting from the provisions of Article 95 of the Namibian Constitution (find out what it provides)! (NEP6, commissioned opinion piece by the pseudonym Kamati kaTate, titled 'Tax increase for what and for who?')

> 'We discuss issues openly with our elders. It is normal to differ on issues and agree on others, that is what you call democracy in action.' (NEP17, an interview with the RDP [opposition party] youth league leader Sibuku Malumbano, titled ''Say no to nationalisation'')

> Staying too long in power appears to serve to prevent generational development and the opportunity to showcase what Africans within their time can collectively do . . . (NEL6, 'Stopping progressive leadership in Africa?')

***Motivation.*** The frame analysis tool looked at motivation not as the reasons given for action but as reasons given for *not acting.* In case of the Active Citizen framing, it was important that no such reasons were implied. Hence, the Active Citizen items did not explain the need to act away by insinuating that there was after all very little the well-off could or should do. For example, when poor people were talked about, it was not implied their poverty was self-inflicted or they were so different from the non-poor that poverty was not an issue. The prevailing format was a text which would make a short reference to poor people and / or poverty and inequality, then devote the rest of the story for proposing solutions to the problem. The same counted for items with a focus in other issues than poverty.[77]

[77] Although it does not make sense to try capture the moral and emotional base given for action because different justifications would work differently on different elites, the bases given were noted for information: Most of the Active Citizen items were using a moral and emotional base where mismanagement was suggested to be the lead motive (33 items). The existing poverty and inequality were contrasted with the capacity of the elite to act (22 items). A reasoning was given where national resources were being misused because of greed or incompetency, and us having the capacity to stop that through watchdog function, demanding for deeper democracy or deliberating on pro-poor policy solutions. In 6 items the injustice was identified as apartheid and / or colonialism and reader was called for action in order to not to behave like the 'liberals, mbwitis (people born and bred in urban areas) and the people in leadership positions' (NEL14) who betray their own. In the electricity items that were categorised under the Active Citizen frame the emotional base was often rage on having less for household spending, although poverty was referred to in half of the 22 of electricity items that were categorised under the social responsibility frame. In three items the central appeal was to morals through the concepts of social justice and non-discrimination (NEP12, NEL3, NAL24). Only two items used a reasoning / emotion based on fear. One said: 'This country will explode one day if we do not address the tremendous social inequality as a matter of urgency' (NAP5) and the other one warned against 'stoking tribalism and civil war' (NAL11). The latter was however not something that the writer saw arising from inequality, but from purposefully engineered disputes based on argumentation appealing to tribal sentiments. One item (NAP37) referred to the Arab Spring, but as something the political top elite should worry about, not as something of concern for the broader elites.

Although the corpus was void of what could be called in-depth analysis, many items categorised under the Active Citizen frame entailed some degree of unpacking – concretisation and demystification – of an issue or a policy process, some in more than one respects. The three pairs of examples in Table 9 below illustrate the difference between unpacking and veiling the issue with unclarity.

**TABLE 9 Unpacking illustrated**

| ACTIVE CITIZEN FRAMING | MINDING MY OWN FRAMING |
|---|---|
| **Clear articulation of who should do what and why** | **Being unclear about who should do what and why** |
| For too long now Namibians have simply accepted all the increases that come their way, whether it is fuel, foodstuffs or water or electricity hikes without protest. / . . . It is time for consumers to galvanise protest into action, preferably under neutral and non-political organisations which have public interest at heart rather than simply own agendas. / . . . The right to protest and to demonstrate is guaranteed by our Constitution and so Namibians should not let up in demanding of both NamPower and Government, accountability and consultation on this issue before going ahead with any planned increase. (NAE36.) | Schlettwein on Friday said that although Namibia has the resources, and there 'are possibilities to immediately address' the issue of a social grant is 'not the one and only solution'. (NAP20) |
| **Specific policy solution with a clear attribution of roles** | **Unclear policy solution with an unclear attribution of roles** |
| If one looks elsewhere, oil is primarily nationalised in the rest of the world (e.g. Norway, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) . . . / . . . The example of Alaska is instructive in this regard. In the case of the Alaskan Permanent Fund (APF), twenty-five (25) per cent of all oil and gas wealth go into the fund. . . . / . . . Such a fund can be used to subsidise public transportation, to have free education, to develop the infrastructure, etc. This undoubtedly would lead to the fair distribution of the country's wealth. In order to prevent greed and corruption, the fund could be kept under public control and greater accountability. (NAP5, reader's letter.) | Reform is needed in the agricultural sector to help Namibians create wealth, a director of Agribank has said. . . . / . . . there is an urgent need for collective efforts from all stakeholders to find a lasting solution to bush encroachment in order to improve rangeland management. (NAL17. The article was titled 'Reform of agricultural sector needed, says Agribank'. The article made no reference to what such reform should contain.) |
| **Background to the prevailing situation explained in terms that are easy to understand** | **Background to the prevailing situation explained in terms that have little immediate explanatory value** |
| The white man comes, kills and takes the land; fights against nationalists seeking self-determination and gets defeated; independence arrives, he still holds on to that stolen land. How does a white man do it? . . . / . . . The white man made sure that after independence, leaders herein referred to as cowboys, behave in ways that do not change the property relations in independent nation states. (NEP14, commissioned opinion piece.) | The civil organisations concluded that there is a 'complete lack of vision' for the resettlement programme', adding that the land reform programme has been divorced from agricultural production. (NAL14, news item on the resolutions of the Civil Society Land Conference. The text did not go into further detail about the meaning of this statement.) |

***Efficacy.*** The frame analysis tool conceptualised efficacy as the extent to which the government was implied to be reliable, efficient and appreciative of elite participation. The items categorised under

the Active Citizen frame could be critical of the government and, as illustrated above, they often were, but they did not suggest the government was so incapable or disinterested that it would not pay off to try do anything. All items expanded their criticism to cover solutions on what could be done about the issue at stake. For example:

> A week dominated by sell-by dates and geriatric liberation organisations full of 60-year-old thinking, who, since colonialism was finally kicked off the African continent 20 years ago, have dragged Africa into poverty, inequality, criminality and massive corruption. / . . . / As our own SecGen of our liberation movement says 'collective muscle' should be used to reverse the rape of our continent. / . . . / Hopefully behind the scenes old ideals are being revived, accepting our world is changing, that people power is emerging dangerously and that violent responses don't work! As the AU SecGen Ping says violent political change only expands the violence. The alternative is obvious. A new 'Wind of Change' and maybe political 'sell-by' dates? (NAP37, commissioned opinion piece titled 'Obituary, the winds of change')[78]

> During all the national elections since independence the poor have been used as a tool to enrich those already rich. /After the elections everything remains the same, they have forgotten the poor and they go back to their rich neighbourhoods and farms. The poor continue to face dire consequences with the local authorities by being evicted from their houses . . . / . . . there are a lot of private companies and parastatals. The government could come up with a strategy of enforcing a law for these companies to share their profit with locals. Every company with a turnover of N$1 million a year should at least build three one bedroom houses per year for the locals. / If 20 companies build 15 houses a year for ghetto living Namibians, 300 houses will be built for 300 families. This means in five years 1 500 families will be owning houses. / Now the government came up with a strategy of increasing the tax for mining industries. How will the high tax benefit the poor? Please reverse the high tax strategy and let us concentrate on our homeless Namibians. (NAP52, a reader's letter titled 'Drop taxes and let companies build houses')

> Leaders and all who are guilty of pursuing personal agendas at all levels should realise that they have to be accountable and principled. / . . . / . . . Issues that are critical and that leaders should address remain moral degeneration and prioritising scarce resources to address the nation's needs through a pro-poor service delivery integrated budget framework. It is all about the poor and their welfare. / . . . / Leaders . . . should be held accountable and removable in an orderly, transparent and procedural manner if they dice with the future of the vulnerable and needy. / In terms of consultants and consultancy work the nation is over-consulted. . . Africa has a vast pool of patriotic techno-centric skilled people both abroad and at home. We need to tap into the skills and knowledge of our people whilst taking into consideration that knowledge is universal in order not to downplay the gaps that others can fill. / . . . / Last, but not least, it will be desirable for government to be modest in its consumption of luxury goods in order to promote fiscal prudence and the sustainable management of the country's reserves which in return are required to sustain the country during an economic crisis.(NAL3, a reader's letter titled 'It's all about the poor')

[78] This item was close to being categorised as Minding My Own due to its vagueness about solutions.

### 6.2.2 *Good Samaritan*

This section describes how the current corpus portrayed the Good Samaritan frame. Earlier, I summarised the frame as a deviation from the Active Citizen frame. The Good Samaritan, too, identifies elites as an active force for good in the society, but unlike in the Active Citizen framing the preferred solution is charity, not policy change. Another difference compared to the Active Citizen frame is that in Good Samaritan framing the elites are not necessarily being appealed to as a community.

A total of twenty-one items, or approximately 16 percent of the corpus, were categorised under the Good Samaritan frame. The frame was used when reporting on issues having to do with poverty and land. About 26 percent of the items dealing with poverty and 12 percent of the items dealing with land used this frame. There were no major differences in the use of the frame between the two papers. Just over half of the Good Samaritan items, twelve items in total, deal with the Kupferberg case. Additional categorisation reveals that four of these describe the situation at the dump while four focus on charitable activities by citizens and three on the government response. Besides the Kupferberg case, there is another clear thematic cluster in the Good Samaritan category, and that is the forced removals of poor people staying illegally on land they do not own (four items). In addition to these, there are six news reports with a reference to various charitable activities. (See Annex V, Table V i on page 184.)

What follows is a description of the Good Samaritan frame in the corpus, grouped under the relevant reasoning devices.

***Identity.*** The frame analysis tool conceptualised collective identity as a sense of 'together we can change things'. For this to realise, the item had to give the elite readers a sense of themselves as elites compared to the poor, and all Good Samaritan items did this. In most items, the sense of 'eliteness' was created implicitly, through descriptions of the poor and their surroundings.[79] Some combined this boundary work with portrayals of elites in charitable activities. These two strategies are exemplified in the following excerpts:

> **[Boundary work]** Martha Gereseb pointed out a pile of cattle heads lying on a heap close to her family's shack. / . . . / Immanuel Gereseb, the father of the family, said he is 'afraid to stay here' [Havanna, Katutura]. According to him, the violence and substance abuse mixed with the gangs has created a dangerous neighbourhood. (NAP8, a news item with on-site reportage, titled 'Gangsters take over Windhoek Neighbourhoods')

> **[Boundary work]** Koue showed this journalist his feet, which were filthy and ribbed with cuts. He said he cannot afford even the cheapest pair of shoes. He walks barefoot through the

[79] Boundary work on its own is not enough to evoke a sense of being called to action. This is demonstrated by the fact that many of the items categorised under the Minding My Own frame are making use of similar boundary work.

> treacherous landscape. (NEP1, a news item with on-site reportage, titled 'Stampede for rotten food')
>
> **[Boundary work]** At the moment the two boys, including other many despondent children, sleep in a wrecked car at Goreangab with barely any blankets to keep them warm when temperatures dip at night. (NEP16, a news item with on-site reportage, titled 'The poor's cry for help')
>
> **[Elites in charitable activities]** The Walvis Bay Mayoral Relief Fund received over N$200 000 [approximately EUR20 000 at the time] from businesses and prominent people here at the weekend. / The money came from pledges, an auction and proceeds from a fund raising dinner. The aim was to get money for the mayoral relief fund established to assist charitable causes. / The fundraising dinner attracted more than 350 prominent local business people and community leaders. (NEP5, news item titled 'Fund receives cash injection')

Other items that combined their descriptive appeal with explicit calls for charity included: citizens' Facebook group taking food and blankets to the dump (NAP21, NEP9) reader's letter suggesting that a soup kitchen should be established and run by elite volunteers (NAP50), a single mother appealing to readers to donate money (NEP16) and two children's charities appealing for donations (NEP15, NEP21). Three set an example with reporting on charitable acts that had taken place (NAP8, NEP5, NAL35).

Some items addressed the elites as a potential community of charitable action, but most indicated that such action could be taken individually. The two extracts below illustrate the difference between calling on elites to act as a community and as individuals:

> **[Calling the elites to act as a community]** Mwashekele founded the group after she was inspired to take action following reports from media outlets on the people and children of the dump during the past two weeks. … She kicked off the campaign on Facebook, which quickly drew the attention of many. 'I started the campaign in order to instil a sense of social responsibility', Mwashekele said. Soon, she was inundated with requests to receive donations and the trip to the Kupferberg dumps began to take shape. (NAP21, news item titled 'Citizens respond to crisis, question role of state')

> **[Calling the elites to act as individuals]** The single mother of four appealed to government and any Good Samaritans to help her pay for her child's school fees. She said anyone willing to assist her should contact her on mobile numbers: 0816103261/0812314678. (NEP16 – a news item with on-site reportage, including an interview with the mother of one of the children frequenting the Kupferberg dumpsite, titled 'The poor's cry for help').

***Preferred type of action.*** The most decisive characteristic of the items categorised under the Good Samaritan frame was the foregrounding of non-structural solutions. The spirit of the frame is captured in the following quotation:

> She [Margaret Mensah-Williams, a Swapo party MP] noted that since Independence, Namibians have come far. She said that it is time everyone supports the poor, emphasising that it is important 'that we now have the power, we have the money, we get the tenders so

> let us make a difference. I challenge each and everyone of you to come out and make a difference in an underprivileged person's life'. (NAP21)

Another example of the same is a piece of news reporting what happened to a group of people who were evicted from a piece of land where they were staying illegally.

> So far, he said, many have been taken up by good Samaritans, commercial farmers living along the main arterial road that connects farms in the area. (NAL35, a news item featuring on-site reporting, titled 'Audabib evictees scattered all over')

In this example, like in the previous one, the suggested solution is to help individuals in need as need arises. Private individuals are called to 'come out' and 'make a difference in an underprivileged person's life', or 'come up with an alternative plan to give them [the people finding their food at the damp] a dignified meal' (NEP7), or – in the case of the Government – 'the preparation of food relief items, to be availed through the food-for-work programme' (NEP10). Such foregrounding of non-structural solutions and silence regarding the structural causes of the problems and potential solutions to them, make poverty as a phenomenon seem insurmountable. This stands in stark contrast with structural approaches, which would entail investigating why certain problems keep repeating time after time, discussing potential structural solutions and values reflected in them, and outlining what readers can do to support a change towards social justice.

***Motivation.*** The frame analysis tool looked at motivation not as the reasons given for action but as reasons given for *not acting.* The description of the poor needs to be of a specific type to carry a call for action. It needs to imply that the specific poor people to be assisted are deserving, worthy of the assistance. Some items made a point of portraying the poor as industrious and hard-working (NAP1; NEP1; NEP7; NEP10). The extracts below illustrate such portrayals:

> 'We get everything here, from meat to tinned food, toothpaste and soap,' said Rosa Eises, who has been scavenging for food and other resalable trash for the past five years at the dumpsite. / . . . / Silvanus Sneiders, who is usually taken care of by his brother who is a prisoner now, said, 'My brother is in jail because he robbed people but me, I don't want to steal thus I am here.' (NEP7, a news item with on-site reporting, titled 'Cops block carbage trucks')

> 'My appeal to government is to give me a job. I work in construction and I have expertise in roofing,' Swartz, who worked as security guard in the early 90s, said. / . . . / Stealing is not in my plans. I would rather live on garbage food than going to jail,' he added. (NEP10, a news item wit on-site reporting, titled 'Govt acts on poverty')

> 'I came here (dumpsite) at 08h00 and leave in the afternoon out of necessity due to unemployment and poverty,' said 20 year-old Quinton Swartbooi who, since 2005, is a regular visitor to the dumpsite. / 'It's better for me to scavenge for food and valuables instead of committing crimes such as robbery and rape,' he added. (NAP68, a news item with on-site reporting, titled 'Keetmans residents eking out a living at the dump')

The Good Samaritan items also offered hooks for recognising shared humanity through portrayals of caring and love. The following quotes from a loving husband and mourning mother illustrate this point:

> Once most of the food was gathered, people joined on top of the hill next to the dump and began bartering and swapping their items. 'My wife loves tea. I need to swap some bully beef for tea,' Goliath Eigab (47) said. He said that fact that the food is past its sell-by date doesn't bother anyone. 'I need the food. I will eat most of it with my family. Some I will sell,' he says. (NAP1)

> Martha Gereses said last week that her son Emmanuel, who was a homebody and a gifted craftsman who regularly fixed up the shack and carved sculptures, died at the shack on the night of his death. She says that after he was stabbed he stumbled back to his home and died on the ground in front of her. / I still cry every day. It is difficult to eat. Emmanuel was always at home. More than any of the other children. I am very sad.' (NAP8)

Descriptions of poverty in the Good Samaritan items could also imply that poverty is accidental, and thus non-structural, like in the following example:

> While many people eat fresh bread every day, some unfortunate members of the community survive from the dumpsite. (NEP1)

Four of the Good Samaritan items focused on government activities (NAP10, NAP69, NEP10, NEP28). They all used lexical choices, which positioned the poor as somebody to be helped in a manner that does not address structural causes of poverty. The two headlines below are an example of this:

> Government hands out food to rural vulnerable (NAP69, news item)

> Government to feed the needy (NEP28, news item)

Such textual strategies suggest that also elites, not just the government, should adopt a similar role towards those poor who are deserving of help – be it due to a specific circumstance, such as being particularly vulnerable or due to a demonstrated work-loving attitude.

### 6.2.3 *Minding My Own*

This section describes how the current corpus portrayed the Minding My Own frame. Earlier, I summarised Minding My Own as a frame, which suggests the elites should not do anything in excess to periodic voting. While the frame may build a collective identity among the elites and describe an issue as something that is in need of change, it releases the elites from all responsibility to act.

Roughly 60 percent of the corpus items, 78 items, were categorised under this frame. The frame was used especially in the coverage of the land issue, and even more in the land items with a direct reference to the Civil Society Land Conference. New Era covered electricity solely with this frame.

It is challenging to provide a meaningful summary of all the topics covered with the frame, as there is a great variety of them – more than in the case of the two other frames. Issues included macroeconomics, moral questions entailed in actions by the government and the citizens, the Basic Income Grant and other social safety nets, communal land, and general electricity and energy topics. (See Annex V, Table V j on page 185.)

Giving a general description of the frame in the corpus is similarly challenging, because the frame analysis tool defines the Minding My Own as a kind of a leftover category for items that are neither Active Citizen, nor Good Samaritan. In the following I will focus on the patterns that were clear.

What follows is a description of the Active Citizen frame in the corpus, grouped under the relevant reasoning devices.

***Identity.*** The frame analysis tool conceptualised collective identity as a sense of 'together we can change things'. Such sense was not present in the Minding My Own framing. Most of the corpus items using this frame were lacking urgency and emotion. Unlike in the Active Citizen framing, the elite readers were not encouraged to think that they are a potential community for change. Also lacking from most of the items were *them*, any references to the existence of people whose behaviour should be changed.

A typical example is the following short piece of news on South African energy sector development (NAE17):

> Eskom picks banks to help raise funds
>
> JOHANNESBURG – South African state power firm Eskom has appointed JP Morgan Chase and Swiss bank Credit Suisse to help raise funds for expansion, the Business Report newspaper said yesterday.
>
> Eskom plans to raise more than US$60 billion to address a chronic electricity shortage in Africa's largest economy. 'JP Morgan Chase ...was appointed on Thursday to come up with an overall fund plan for Eskom.Credit Suisse... was selected as transaction advisor for the sale of an equity stake in the Kusile coal-fired plant,' the paper said. Business Report quoted Eskom's finance director Paul O'Flaherty as saying JP Morgan would examine 50 proposals to help the power utility raise funds from the bond markets to refinance existing plants.
>
> The World Bank on Thursday approved a controversial US$3,75 billion loan for Eskom to develop a coal-fired power plant in South Africa.

A total of 60 of the 78 Minding My Own items (roughly 70 percent) implied in one way or another that the issue at hand should be left to the government. The government was the only actor in a third of these items and played a prominent role in the rest (See Annex V, table V o on page 187). Such items were chronicling what the government had done or what it was going to do. Some dealt with policy action on major issues related to poverty, while most covered activities best described as

piecemeal solutions to poverty issues big and small. In all cases, the focus on the government as the lead actor in relation to poverty sent a strong message that matters like these should be left to the government, which would either take care of them, or fail taking care of them (See Annex V, Table V p on page 187.)

A similar effect was created by those 17 items (22 percent of the Minding My Own items), which portrayed established, formal civil society organisations or churches – often together with the government (see Annex V, Table V m on page 186). The peer examples featuring these civic action professionals did not leave the reader with an impression that the elites in general should do something about the issue at hand. Instead, it seemed like things were being taken care of between the government and the professionals. The organisations and the government were the only actors in the texts, and nobody – not the organisations, nor the journalist or the government representative; neither implicitly, nor explicitly – was referring to the readers as a community of action who should play some kind of a role in the issue.

It is difficult to illustrate with examples what is missing. Below is an attempt to do so with an extract of a story headlined 'Congo Boys', which focused on what should be done about the children who were found living on the dumpsite or frequenting it on those days when food was being dumped. The extract is a quote from a Swapo MP:

> 'Those children who are under the age of sixteen are Government's responsibility – as much as their parent's responsibility. But if there are no parents, then Government has to enforce the law to ensure these children are taken care of'. / She said that civil society and churches should also take responsibility. 'It's a social issue. Faith based organisations must stop preaching from the comfort of the pulpit and reach out to these people'. (NAP14)

In this quote, faith-based organisations and other civil society organisations are being referred to in their role as service provides, providing a type of an extension for government services. Neither the readers in general, nor these organisations or people volunteering for them are being invited to take part in a dialogue about a better society. The same was repeated in four other items, where the Council of the Churches and the Red Cross were reported to have been identified to assist the government in registering the 'scavengers' and distributing food for them (NAP17, NAP28, NAP70, NEP10). The main impression left by these items was that the elites need not to bother – the problem of poverty would be taken care of between these organisations and the government:

> Government yesterday conceded the harsh realities of poverty and hunger in the country and immediately rolled out emergency plans to curtail the escalating situation. / . . . The Minister of Information and Communication Technology Joel Kaapanda, yesterday revealed that Cabinet had tasked Prime Minister Nahas Angula to engage relevant stakeholders with a view to finding an immediate solution to the problem of those scavenging for food. / Angula, acting on Cabinet's instruction, convened a meeting where he engaged officials from the City of Windhoek as well as the ministries of local government as well as lands and resettlement. / It was resolved at the meeting that the Directorate of Emergency Management Unit in the

> Office of the Prime Minister would prepare food relief items, to be availed through the food-for-work programme. / 'The meeting also resolved to engage the Red Cross and the Council of Churches in Namibia to investigate the possibility of establishing a common soup kitchen,' Kaapanda said./ The situation . . . underlines two key dynamics: the problems facing the country's authorities in mitigating the problem of urbanisation, as well as general poverty and homelessness that many people endure. (NEP10.)

A telling expression used in the extract above is that of *the relevant stakeholders*. This staple phrase in the jargon of government institutions and development projects implies that people in general do not need to be concerned. All relevant stakeholders would be consulted – so you may go on minding your own business, we will consult you if we find you relevant to this issue.

***Motivation.*** The frame analysis tool looked at motivation not as the reasons given for action but as reasons given for *not acting*. I had originally envisaged that this would be a central feature in the Minding My Own frame, but in the end it was not as strong as the omnipotence given to the government and the formal civil society organisations (see above under Identity).[80] Nevertheless, 27 of the 78 Minding My Own items combined the focus on government role with strategies, which further worked to explain away the need to act and another 8 used such strategies without implying that the issue should be left to the government. Mainly three strategies were used to explain away the need to act: 1) Poverty and inequality are insurmountable 2) Poverty is the fault of the poor. 3) Elites at large cannot do anything about the issue at hand, because the problem is being caused by a very small part of the elites, and these are the ones who should do something.

A third of the items talking about poverty or inequality implied that these are unsurmountable problems. This impression was achieved mainly through a combination of the lack of context and analysis and unclear quotes, which made it sound like nobody had an idea what the problems were and what could be done about them. I will not give any examples of this at this point, because the combination will be richly illustrated in section 6.3.3. Instead, I will illustrate insurmountability through another example, reference to natural forces. Below is a powerful headline:

> BIG debate rages on (NEP11)

Here the discussion about the Basic Income Grant is being likened to a storm. Seasons change and years pass but the 'debate' about the Basic Income Grant can be granted to be 'raging on'. This show of natural forces is being put on by those whose business it is to care about poverty: the government and the BIG coalition. The audience is not called in to participate, neither do the papers bring forth a meaningful unpacking of the root causes of poverty, the grant as a minimum measure to restore

[80] This is good news, if one considers Van Gorp's advice to focus on the explicit for the sake of reliability. Many of the strategies of explaining away are implicit and could be interpreted differently depending on the coder.

human dignity, or any alternatives to it. They also do not illuminate, much less analyse, the underlying values connected to the discussion around the grant.

Another strategy to explain away the need to act was to imply that poverty is the fault of the poor themselves. This was done in one third of the items talking about poverty, all of them items, which earmarked the poor as the government's business. It was almost always the government itself, which insinuated that the poor are undeserving, and the media carried these arguments on in print without questions.

The following extracts show how items implied that poor are inherently lazy and irrational and need to be guided by the government.

> Kamwi [Minister of Health], however, is not in favour of a social grant. He said that 'we should instil a culture of hard work'. He said even if food is distributed 'I would propose food for work. Not just for free ... for those able bodied men and women'. (NAP20, a news item featuring short commentary by several people, titled 'High-level talks on poverty'.)

> 'Child mortality is primarily a consequence of wrong feeding of babies. This wrong feeding produces malnutrition.' . . . malnutrition is not typically an issue of food access, but of caring practices and disease. (NAP29 a news item quoting the Prime Minister, titled 'Malnutrition halters economic development'.)

> He [Minister of Housing] said beneficiaries of the programme are also to blame as once they qualify for a loan they tend to design dwellings that are beyond their means. (NEP26, a news item titled ''No more handouts for build together'')

Finally, the third most common strategy to explain away the need to act was to imply that elites at large cannot do anything about the issue at hand, because the problem is being caused by a very small part of the elites, and these are the ones who should do something. There were 9 such items, represented here by another extract from the Kupferberg coverage. The story was headlined 'Abject poverty amidst plenty, that's the story of Namibia' (NEP2). The text starts with contending that:

> The bombshell revelations concerning groups of Namibians scrambling for rotten food at a dumpsite outside Windhoek has brought into question the wisdom with which the country's abundant resources are being distributed. / There is general sentiment that only a few elite continue to benefit from the country's natural resources and they have access to tenders and other beneficiation schemes while the majority suffer in poverty. / For a country of an estimated two million people rich in gold, uranium, diamond, copper and a huge marine resource, the weekly stampedes for rotten and expired food at the Kupferberg Dumping Site, is unacceptable, say commentators.

The article goes on quoting the National Union of Namibian Workers Secretary General Evilastus Kaaronda, the Secretary General of Swapo Youth League, Dr Elijah Ngurare, and 'the Stellenbosch-based social and political commentator' Job Amupanda. All three are reported to have, more or less openly 'placed the blame on the doorsteps of the country's authorities'. The article closes with a poetic paragraph:

> For basic survival an army of poor people and orphans scramble for stale chips, expired tins of beef, discarded packets of butter and even rotten food dumped at the site on the outskirts of the city.

What is it in this article that made it to be categorised under the Minding My Own frame instead of the Active Citizen frame? After all, Amupanda's presence in three other corpus items – being introduced with his proper name (NEL14) and writing from behind the pseudonym of Kamati kaTate (NEP6, NEP14) – contributed towards categorisation of the item under the Active Citizen frame. It is the combination of the government's omnipotence with the reference to 'only a few elite'. The corpus is rife with expressions like this, which suggest that the problem is in a few elite individuals. Such references contain an implication that if only these few individuals would change their ways, the problem would cease existing.

Put together, the reporting on land implied that the land problem is primarily a problem with communal land and a consequence of the actions of a small amount of elite individuals who illegally buy, sell, and fence off communal land. These practices were attributed to two specific groups of individuals: traditional leaders and politically well-connected individuals. Although there are as many items focusing on commercial land as on communal land, the topics and angles are such that they don't present commercial land as a potential solution to the land question[81]. Hence the end of illegal selling, buying and fencing of communal land is implicitly presented as *the* solution to the land problem and it is implied that this will happen if the perpetrators identified in the coverage change their ways. At the same time, the coverage stays silent about several other aspects of the land question, such as the need for a broader national dialogue on potential solutions other than access to communal land, and on the values these solutions are based on.

The extracts below illustrate how responsibility is allocated to traditional leaders and few powerful individuals, releasing other readers of responsibility to do anything, for example encourage public dialogue about the values behind land reform and possible policy alternatives to land reform.

> It has been realised that some traditional leaders are under a mistaken view that they own communal land. I must state that this is a mistaken impression,' he said. / Pohamba said he needed to address the issue 'for the sake of peace, security and stability' in Namibia. (NAL7, a news item titled 'Pohamba warns traditional leaders over land')

> Pohamba said the country has experienced an increased number of disputes among and between traditional authorities over communal land in recent years. / 'I regard this matter to be very important,' Pohamba said, 'therefore, it needs to be addressed for the sake of peace, security and stability in our country.' / 'The issue of land is highly sensitive. For this reason, I expect that due recognition should be given to the role of communal farming and communal land in Namibia's socio-economic life,' he said. 'This is important because the majority of our

[81] Six of the items focus on the forced evictions of poor people staying on land owned by others, two criticise the government's inefficiency in allocating resettlement land that is already purchased.

> people derive their livelihood from land.' (NEL4, a news item titled 'Proliferation of chiefs worries President')
>
> They [the civil society conference] further said Government's inability to deal with illegal fencing, particularly in northern Namibia, has led to a scenario where those squeezed off land compete with others for resettlement further south. (NAL14 a news item titled 'Govt drags feet on land reform – civil society')
>
> [Headline] Political elite 'capturing' communal land [Text extract starts] a number of politically well-connected individuals have fenced off large tracts of land in communal areas / The repercussions of the illegal fencing … is that the majority of subsistence farmers who depend on the natural resources are pushed off land, thus accelerating poverty among many. (NAL21, a news item titled 'Political elite capturing communal land')
>
> The public relations officer of the ministry --- on Friday said fencing of land in communal areas is a 'big problem', a practice that is particularly prevalent in the north-central regions where 'well-off farmers fence off communal land, denying the poor access' to a livelihood. (NAL34, a news item titled 'Ministry warns over fencing in communal areas')
>
> Farmers in communal areas have until February next year to dismantle all illegally erected fences. This stern warning was given by the Minister of Presidential Affairs, Albert Kawana, who also doubles as the Attorney General./ Kawana said although it is stipulated in the laws of the country that nobody has the right to fence off large areas in communal lands, some traditional authorities have allowed some of their people to engage in the practice (NAL8, a news item titled Deadline set for dismantling illegal fencing in communal lands')
>
> In addition, the government is accused of completely failing to address illegal fencing in communal areas, especially in the northern communal areas, where powerful, well-connected individuals are accused of land grabbing. (NEL5, a news item titled 'Land reform not GRN priority – workshop')

***Efficacy.*** The frame analysis tool conceptualised efficacy as the extent to which the government was implied to be reliable, efficient and appreciative of elite participation. There were no items which had efficacy as the sole explaining factor for being placed under the Minding My Own frame. Those items, which did suggest that the government was incapable or completely disinterested to implement changes, featured also other Minding My Own elements. The total number of such items was ten. Four were readers' letters and four opinion items produced by staff. Eight were published in The Namibian and two in the New Era.

The following abridged version of a Political Perspective in The Namibian (NAP3) is a good example of an item, which suggests that the government is incapable or completely disinterested. It is also an example on a text which directly calls for action by the people but ends up to painting such a hopeless picture that I contend the effect is more passifying than anything else.

> In respect to crimes of violence, our women and children are being abused and even killed on a daily basis. With regard to the country itself, the rape of our resources continues without respite. We are in a sorry state and there is little evidence that these societal scourges are diminishing in any way, shape or form. In fact they are escalating. This is our reality, and the real tragedy is that our people have become numb to both atrocities, and I use the word deliberately.
>
> / . . . /

> When I read about the case this week in which a man allegedly beat and killed a two-and-a-half year-old girl, I felt sick to my stomach, not only because of the heinous nature of the crime itself, but also because of the absence of hundreds, if not thousands of Namibians, at the courts protesting these horrors against vulnerable and fragile infants and toddlers. It struck me forcibly that we have become immune to the sickness inherent in our own society.
>
> / . . . /
>
> Corruption too has skyrocketed in recent years. Strangely enough, getting worse even since public and political protestations about the 'evils' of graft manifested in the creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission and a Zero Tolerance Campaign. Instead of 'zero' its quite the opposite. There are simply few repercussions and consequences and it has clearly reached endemic proportions.
>
> Again, the headlines mirror increased incidences of the rape of our resources.
>
> / . . . /
>
> There are simply too many cases to recount here, but the disease of corruption, graft, theft and maladministration has truly got a hold on this nation.
>
> One doesn't quite know whether to laugh or cry when one learns about developments like 'Roads Authority, ACC, sign agreement to fight corruption'.
>
> Corruption cases range from those in elevated positions of power and influence and authority in the political and business spheres to the ordinary man or woman employee also trying to get a piece of the action and emulate the 'get-rich-quick' schemes that have become an inherent part of most so-called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) deals through tenders and other kickbacks and schemes. Seldom do the benefits trickle down to those who need it most. But the rich are visibly getting richer, while honest members of the middle class battle to pay their bills, and the poor can't pay them even if they wanted to.
>
> Sometimes I wonder if the political and business elite don't wonder what the currently disadvantaged think of them when they see them in their flashy cars with tinted windows, designer clothes and boastful lifestyles of parties and excess.
>
> / . . . /
>
> How sad it is that we cannot seem to get a grip on either violent crime or corruption. The best of intentions aren't good enough. There has to be concrete, concerted and sustained action to change Namibia for the better and stop the backwards slide down the moral abyss.

The readers' letters categorised under the Minding My Own frame were similar to this staff-produced opinion item. They differed from the Active Citizen opinion pieces in that they focused on criticising the government instead of discussing policy alternatives and painted an overwhelmingly bleak picture of the chances of positive changes ever taking place.[82]

[82] Exceptions on this were NAP2 (categorised as MMO for its lack of *them* and overtly academic style, which seemed to suggest that albeit democracy was to be the answer, this should be discussed only among the top intelligentsia), NAP11 (a reader's letter containing a policy proposal but categorised as MMO and not as AC, for implying that poor black people should be contained in communal lands), and NAP54 (categorised as MMO for being a staff-produced item focusing on media's role).

## 6.3 Media role in discourse formation

The function of the upcoming sections is to use the corpus to pave the way for the final conclusions concerning the elite media's role in discourse formation. I start with pointing out a connection between the Active Citizen frame and elite concerns, then summarise connections between journalistic routines and frames. The section closes off with an example illustrating how these manifested in the coverage of poor people and poverty.

### 6.3.1 *Active citizenship for elite concerns*

The frame analysis conducted in this study suggests that the elite media can strengthen discourses on the importance of elite participation, but they are much more likely to do this if the issue at hand bears a direct connection to elite interests.

The Namibian's coverage of the proposed electricity price increase clearly demonstrates that news media may choose to play an important role in advocating for interpretations where citizen action is seen valuable in the daily life of the polis (see Figures 9a and 9b on page 99).

In this corpus, The Namibian's treatment of the electricity price hike presents a unique decision to foster audience agency in order to encourage them to take action on a specific topic. The staff produced 10 items which described the collective action elite individuals or groups took to protest against the increase. Five of these made explicit calls for readers to protest, and three gave exact information on how and where to participate in the protest. The staff-produced coverage relied on a strategy where action by an individual or group was described, and the same people were also quoted in the item. Some of the quotes were amplified by giving them space in the paper's regular 'Notable quotes' column. All these items presented non-governmental actors taking collective action on the issue and justifying this action. The paper also published three readers' letters and one commissioned column making proposals on energy policy directly in connection with the proposed hike. Although not part of the frame analysis, a total of 24 SMSes protesting against the hike were also published by The Namibian. (See Annex V, Table V f on page 184.)

The results of the frame analysis suggest that the Active Citizen framing around the proposed price increase contributed to a discourse, where the citizens are expected to keep informed about policy processes, express their views, and take action, if they feel the government is not acting for the common good.

The Kupferberg case and the civil society land conference did not receive a similar treatment from either of the papers.[83] There were no items suggesting that it was the responsibility of the readers 'not to relax' but 'spend the weekend drafting their views' on social justice (compare with NAE3AC[84], quoted on page 103). Instead, the coverage on poverty and land suggests that big structural problems causing little daily inconvenience for the well-off are not very likely to be portrayed as something that the elites should concern themselves with.

The Kupferberg coverage was large in volume, yet the two papers did nothing to suggest that the elites should see themselves a role in pressing for structural solutions for poverty reduction.[85] Instead, they portrayed a picture of an unfathomable problem, which should be left to the government and the poverty professionals. If the elites wanted to do something, charity would be a good idea. The land conference coverage was small and restrained. The conference was a rare occasion of organised activity to support the landless, and the land question itself bears national significance, but the two papers did not portray it as something that warranted elite action, not even discussion. Instead, the coverage worked to enhance a discourse, in which the land question is seen as an issue relevant only for those who are directly affected.

### 6.3.2 *Journalistic routines and frames*

The frame analysis conducted in this study demonstrated clear patterns between certain journalistic routines[86] and frames. These were: 1) Each frame was dominated by a certain content format, which in turn was dominated by certain types of sources. 2) The two frames, which depart from the ideal of Active Citizen were rather heavily influenced by powerful frame sponsors. 3) Overall, the corpus was characterised by a lack of in-depth analysis, background and – apart from the opinion pieces – content, which would have given voice to individuals to elaborate on their thoughts at a meaningful

[83] To a large extent, this is probably because they did not ignite similar organised citizen action, which the media could have reported on. On the other hand, however, the Kupferberg case inspired a citizen's charity group and the civil society conference itself was an event of citizen action.
[84] Item codes in this section are extended to include a reference to the frame. NAE3AC means 'item NAE3, which was categorised under the Active Citizen frame'.
[85] The Namibian published a considerable number of readers' reactions to the case, almost all of them had a focus on criticising the government instead of discussing policy options. One item does provide a policy suggestion, which can be deemed segregational (NAP11MMO) another a suggestion for charity (NAP50GS).
[86] In chapter 3.1 (page 36), journalistic routines were defined as 'repeated practices and forms that make it easier for journalists to accomplish tasks and ensure immediacy in an uncertain world while working within production constraints' (Lowrey 2008). As such, routines cover also formats and techniques that have been developed to offer alternative viewpoints, which are thought to contribute to balance but do not necessarily function as intended. For example, comments from 'ordinary people' may be included in a story to signal that ordinary citizens have been heard, but the content of such quotes may be thin or purposively selected to reinforce the main point of the story (Lewis et al 2005).

length. Had there more of such content, the corpus might have been stronger in Active Citizen framing.

Figure 10 on page 100 demonstrates how certain content types and sources dominated the frames. The Active Citizen frame is dominated by opinion items. 66 percent of all items categorised under this ideal frame are opinion items, mostly readers' letters and commissioned opinion pieces (see Figure 10 a). The Good Samaritan frame is the only frame, which makes significant use of on-site reportage. 52 percent of the Good Samaritan items feature on-site reportage (see Figure 10 c). The third frame, Minding My Own, is dominated by news. 79 percent of all Minding My Own items are news (see Figure 10 e).

Looking at the sources, The Active Citizen frame is dominated by rather informal types of sources (see Figure 10 b). Roughly 60 percent of the sources are either activist groups or ordinary people. It is noteworthy that all ordinary people used as sources in this frame represent the elites, and there are no items featuring formal, well-established civil society organisations, but business leaders and business coalitions feature strongly. The Good Samaritan frame, too, is characterised by quite informal sources, but these comprise mostly poor people, who do not get to speak in other frames (see Figure 10 d). Unlike the Active Citizen frame, the Good Samaritan frame also makes considerable use of the government as a source. A third of the Good Samaritan items referred to the government. Finally, the Minding My Own is dominated by sources, which may be characterised as rather formal (see Figure 10 f). 42 percent of the Minding My Own items quote the government and roughly 30 percent quote formal, well-established civil society organisations.

The Minding My Own frame in this corpus relied so heavily on the government and well-established civil society organisations as sources that it is justified to claim that this frame was heavily influenced by powerful frame sponsors. These organisations have the capacity to organise events, produce reports, publish press releases, and to undertake media relations work in general. For instance, most of the in-depth information in the land conference coverage seems to come directly from the 30-page conference report and the document listing the land conference resolutions and plan of action (ELCRN 2011a & 2011b). The considerable use of the government as a source in Good Samaritan framing in the current corpus suggests that the government may have a similarly strong role in defining discourses around charity in Namibia.




**FIGURE 11 Formats and sources**

***See Annex V, tables V k – V m for data***

The content formats and the types of sources used were, to a degree, connected in the corpus. Three connections were notable. First, ordinary elite individuals featured as sources almost exclusively in the opinion pieces they wrote. Second, ordinary poor individuals featured as sources only in news items, which made use of on-site reportage. Third, elites featuring as experts were mostly heard in news items. While the opinion piece format gave their writers reasonable space to elaborate on their thoughts, the news format – both with and without on-site reportage – used short quotes, which did not allow the people interviewed to elaborate on their views in any meaningful length.

The observations listed above are illustrated with examples in the next section. A final conclusion regarding their role in discourse formation is presented in Chapter 7.

### 6.3.3 *Passifying routines: stereotyping on-site reportage and lack of depth*

The two previous sections laid out a series of observations on how journalistic choices and routines by The Namibian and the New Era influenced their framing of different topics. Several of these observations were concerned with the passifying coverage of poor people and poverty. The current section takes a closer look at these observations and illustrates them with examples.[87]

As we remember from the introductory chapters, both newspapers have stated that they side with the poor. Moreover, in the years building up to the coverage analysed in this study, the Southern African media fraternity had been discussing a need to increase the coverage on poverty and to give poor people a voice in order to help listening and understanding across difference. It is therefore likely that the poverty coverage was underpinned with good intentions. In the majority of cases these intentions did not, however, translate to the type of content, which would have implied that the well-off can or should use their power to demand for policies to change the status quo. Only about a quarter of the items, which made explicit reference to poverty or poor people used the active citizen framing (see Figure 12 to the left).




**FIGURE 12 Poverty items**
*See Annex V, table q for data*

[87] This section is based on the 103 corpus items, which made explicit reference to poverty or poor people (see Annex V, Table V q).

Quantitatively, the most significant journalistic routine associated with the Minding My Own and Good Samaritan frames was the heavy reliance on official sources, the government and a handful of well-established civil society organisations (see Figure 11 on page 123). When an item was based solely on information acquired from these actors, the reader was left with an impression that questions of poverty should be left to the professionals. This has been illustrated in some detail above (see pages 113–115), and therefore the current section will focus on discussing two other routines, which had an impact on poverty being framed as something that did not require policy action from the elites. These were the use of on-site reportage and the lack of depth.

On-site reportage was only present in 13 items, but they established a captivating backdrop, which coloured the entire corpus. With the exception of some of The Namibian's SMSes, on-site reportage was the only occasion where the poor themselves were given a voice, and therefore these items seemed to carry significant weight as interpretations suggested for poverty. This was augmented by their feature-like use of literary strategies, which established a feel of the milieu and intimacy with the people. Unfortunately, the expressions coined to add colour and quotes recorded to give voice to the voiceless resulted in an impression of the poor as a different species, which inhabits a separate world with its own rules. The examples below were chosen to illustrate this.

The poor were often likened to animals. The on-site reporting, which kicked off the Kupferberg coverage in both papers, painted a vivid picture of people *scavenging* for food at the dump like small rodents. Scavengers was a name given to them by the dumpsite guards, and this term stuck throughout the reporting period and far beyond, also in plain news items.[88] Its connotation to the animal kingdom was further strengthened by descriptions of the activity. The scavengers 'flocked' daily to the dump (NEP1GS), and initiated a 'food frenzy', 'scrambling for the food, pushing and pulling each other to get as much as possible' (NAP1GS[89]). The following extract contains two first paragraphs of the New Era's opening item for the Kupferberg coverage.

> Under the glittery lights of Windhoek and opulence of a few, impoverished residents of Windhoek's informal settlements flock daily to the dumpsite to scavenge for left-overs and expired food items in order to keep alive. / Yesterday, a news crew from this newspaper witnessed first-hand how scores of poor people, among them young children who should be at school, scavenge for discarded, rotten food often in a rush to be first at Kupperberg

[88] Scavengers was what the dumpsite guards called the people, and the name stuck throughout the reporting period and far beyond. It was used in 14 of the 26 Kupferberg items and extended to cover a similar case in the South of Namibia. Outside the corpus, but interestingly, a 2016 news report from the dump uses the same term, this time being upgraded from small rodents to something that more resembles big cats: 'rest of the 'scavengers' lie in wait in the bushes for the sun to go down before they descend on the forbidden site in search of food.' (The Namibian 15.3.2016)

[89] Item codes in this section have been amended to indicate the frame, as the section refers to items using Good Samaritan framing and Minding My Own framing. Good Samaritan = GS, Minding My Own = MMO.

> Dumping Site, some 15 km west of Windhoek. (NEP1GS, a piece of news with on-site reportage, titled 'Stampede for rotten food')

The term scavenger was exclusively used to refer to people finding their food at dumpsites, but the on-site reporting from forced evictions[90] carried similar associations to small, largely hapless animals.

> By yesterday afternoon the affected squatters made frantic calls and sent SMSes to alert the media and other organisations of their plight. (NAL22GS, piece of news featuring on-site reportage, titled 'Audabib eviction in full swing')

> According to Anna Ockhuizen (68), she had been living on the farm for 37 years. 'They want us to spend Christmas in the middle of nowhere and then they call themselves Christians.' / 'What will happen if it starts raining? Where will we go?' (NAL28GS piece of news featuring on-site reportage, titled 'Khomas Governonr to visit Audabib farm')

> Doëseb said there are three households remaining at Audabib. / 'But there is now no-one sitting along the main road,' said Doëseb yesterday. / 'This is very sad,' commented Doëseb, saying by yesterday afternoon there were still families who waited for a truck to remove their belongings from Audabib while the rain threatened to come down. (NAL35GS, piece of news featuring on-site reportage, titled 'Audabib evictees scattered all over')

On the other hand, the on-site reporting described the poor as industrious and loving (see section 6.2.2 on page 112). In theory, such portrayals can offer hooks for the reader to recognise the humanity shared by all people. This could lead to a framing, which suggests that all people have an equal right to live a life free from want, and the elites should use their influence to make this right realise for the poor. In this case, such framing did not take place. Instead, on-site reporting combined the descriptions of industriousness and humanity with elements, which suggested that, ultimately, the poor do not need the same security and comfort, because they are different from the well-off, hardened by the harsh conditions they live in. For example, the urban poor do not live in neighbourhoods but in informal settlements[91] (NAP1GS, NEP1GS, NEP7GS, NEL1MMO) dodging 'flying toilets'[92] (NEL1MMO) and fearing for their lives in the face of generalised violence (NAP8GS, NAP3MMO). Only the dump is a more violent place (NAP1GS, NEP1GS, NAP68MMO) so much so that the children going there actually call it 'The Congo – a country ravaged by war, poverty and human hardship' (NAP14MMO).

[90] The two evictions included in the corpus were Audabib close to Windhoek (covered by The Namibian) and Farm Hochfeld 131 in the Omatako constituency (covered by the New Era). The run-up to them was covered in news format focusing on the legal dispute (NAL2MMO) and on the legal dispute and regional council politics (NEL11MMO). The coverage on the actual eviction from Hochfeld 131 by The Namibian contains on-site reportage.

[91] Informal settlement is the formal term used in National Income and Expenditure Surveys and Demographic and Health Surveys (see GRN 2014 and 2012a). It means 'an unplanned and unregulated urban settlement erected on land not officially proclaimed as a residential area' (OED 2011). Yet, the media could choose to refer to these areas as neighbourhoods.

[92] Plastic bags used as toilets.

At the core of the on-site descriptions and associated quotes was the scavengers' resourcefulness. They were able to support themselves and their families by scavenging, like illustrated by the following extract from The Namibian:

> Many who spoke to The Namibian yesterday say that poverty and semi-literacy leave them with only two options: crime or 'scavenging'. / . . . / Frederick Gariseb (37) . . . splits his time between living at the dump and in Havana where his daughters and wife live. He supports them with the food collected at the rubbish dump and from money he makes selling scrap metals such as copper and tin. (NAP1, a news item with on-site reporting, titled 'City's dirty secret')

When such descriptions of resourcefulness are combined with lack of depth – the second routine[93], which had an impact on poverty being framed as something that did not require policy action from the elites – the reader is left with an impression that poverty is a personal problem and manageable if the individual is resourceful enough. The papers did not bring any meaningful analysis or background, which would have highlighted the structural dimensions of poverty and discussed available policy options with their pros and cons. Instead, the coverage is rather focused on what should be done with the food being dumped (NAP10GS) and with the particular individuals at the dumpsite (NAP53MMO; NEP29MMO). The explanations given to the situation are symptoms rather than root causes and many of them point a finger towards the poor: They include lack of jobs (NAP1GS, NEP1GS*),* 'poverty and semi-illiteracy' (NAP1GS*),* 'broken family units' (NAP14MMO), 'peer pressure', 'misuse of child welfare grants by guardians', 'hunger' and 'substance abuse' NAP53MMO; NEP29MMO).

When the broader problems and potential policy solutions were touched, the focus was on heavy criticism of government for mismanaging national resources and for acting as if they become aware of the problem only now (NAP51MMO; NEP18MMO; NEP2MMO; NAP20MMO). This treatment, too, lacked the depth for creating an understanding that improvements as a result of policy action are a real possibility and something the elite reader should push for. The following extract is from an opinion editorial published in The Namibian.

> it's no use having a bloated civil service which gobbles up much of the income in salaries, medical aid, travel and lodging as well as other pay packages instead of addressing developmental needs. Similarly, profit-making state-owned companies should be left to the vagaries of the markets they operate in rather than endlessly siphon-off public funds that are needed to put in place safety nets for vulnerable citizens. … Perhaps this latest announcement of emergency relief for the poorest of the poor is nothing but political rhetoric, which is bound to falsely raise the hopes of people who are desperate, destitute and despondent. Even the Swapo Youth League has raised its doubts about whether the Cabinet is serious with its latest announcement. … gaffes, such supposed 'mistakes' and oversights, do not inspire confidence in our leadership. People have elected leaders to solve their problems. (NAP51, opinion editorial titled 'Mind the Gaffe, please!'.)

[93] Lack of depth as such is not a routine, but a consequence of routines, which cause it.

The closing sentence of the excerpt, 'people have elected leaders to solve their problems', sounds indicative of a dominant discourse regarding elite social responsibility and active citizenship in general. It brings to mind Du Pisani's thoughts quoted in Chapter 2.3 (see page 19). He observed that middle class citizenship in Namibia seems to involve a 'disengagement from the public sphere and a limited participation in national political life' and noted that 'decisions and their economic, environmental, political and social implications are often not debated' and 'policy not dialogued or audited'.

The lack of depth contributed to an impression that nothing can be done about poverty. Many poverty stories were peppered with unclear quotes, which made it sound like nobody – neither the government, nor the poor themselves, or other 'concerned citizens' – had an idea what some of the actual causes were and what could be done about them. This is illustrated by the three quotes below:

> Although the issue is a complex one, the concerned community member said that the main force that pushes people to look for food and goods to sell at the rubbish dumps, despite the unhygienic and dangerous conditions, is 'poverty. If we address this, then it might not be a complete solution to the problem, but the problem will decrease'. (NAP14, piece of news with on-site reporting, titled 'Congo boys')

> According to Kameeta [Bishop of the ELCRN Church and head of the BIG coalition], the poverty situation in Namibia is such that it now requires an extraordinary intervention to reach Millennium Development Goal (MDG) number one, which is to reduce poverty and hunger in Namibia by 2015. (NAP15, piece of news titled 'Shangula argues BIG will only "alleviate poverty"' – the item made no further reference to any potential 'extraordinary intervention')

> The CCOPP also directed the Cabinet Committee on Lands and Social Issues (CCLSI) to launch an investigation countrywide on the underlying causes of people having to scavenge dumpsites for food. (NAP28, piece of news, titled 'Govt responds to dumpsite hunger')

In part, unclarity and superficiality were a result of a particular journalistic routine related to the construction of objectivity. Instead of background articles based on narration by the journalist, the papers relied on a news format, which quoted various sources who represented what is conceived as opposing interests. Each was let to say something, but no-one got to say enough to properly elaborate their views. This format comes close to sound bites used in TV reporting, often feared to weaken active citizenship due to their simplification of complex issues (see Vos 2008). In the current context, the format had an additional effect, which added on the impression that neither root causes of the problems, nor possible solutions are known – despite the existence of local and international data and research, which could have been used to develop the kind of background articles that present issues in perspective, draw attention to cause–effect chains and introduce potential solutions.

To further illustrate the points made above, I document a close reading of the full copy of an article headlined 'High level national talks on poverty' (NAP20). This text was the only corpus item that came close to an analysis of the Kupferberg case. The original copy runs on the left, while my comments are noted in italics on the right. The underlined words with numbering in subscript indicate the specific passage being commented on. If the comment refers to several passages, the relevant passages are indicated with arrows:

High level national talks on poverty

HIGH level meetings have been held in the past week in order to address the crisis of Namibians feeding themselves from rubbish dumps. 1

*1. The people eating from the dump are called a crisis. Nowhere does this article say people feeding from rubbish dumps is a symptom of something broader. Neither did the paper initiate such discussion or analysis elsewhere within two weeks of the story breaking out.*

The issue was described on Friday during interviews as 'an outright scandal', 'a national crisis' and a 'national shame' by various officials.

Calle Schlettwein, Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Finance, said on Friday the issue is 'a serious, an unacceptable situation ... which must be addressed immediately'. Schlettwein said that the fact that poor and hungry people have been living off rubbish dumps 'is not a new thing ... it has been happening all along'. 2 The rubbish dump feeding frenzies witnessed recently through extensive media coverage has again focused a spotlight on the debate of a basic income grant 3 as a measure to assist the poorest of the poor.

*2. & 4. The inclusion of these quotes in coverage, which does not entail a meaningful discussion of solutions that have been considered or attempted suggests that nothing has been done about the issue. This in turn suggests that:*
*a) nobody cared enough to do what should have been done (and, thus, neither do the current elites have to care), and/or*
*b) nobody knew what should have been done.*

*3. No in-depth coverage of such debate was featured in The Namibian or the New Era within the two weeks after the Kupferberg story broke out*

Bishop Zephania Kameeta Namibia's very poor have been eating food from rubbish dumps for 'many, many years'4 across Namibia.

The bishop said it's a sign that Namibia is 'in a crisis ... and this crisis needs to be addressed as urgently as possible'. He noted one of the immediate solutions at hand is a basic income grant (BIG). He emphasised that although a BIG is not the only solution to the problem5'it could have addressed the situation' of rubbish dump food frenzies 'without the bureaucracy' of meetings and discussions taking place currently.

*5. Nowhere did the paper initiate a discussion on other solutions, which could be considered. Neither did they encourage their readers to do so*

Another supporter of the BIG, labour expert Herbert Jauch, on Friday said the fact that the very poor are forced to eat food from rubbish dumps 'flies in the face of the critics who do not want to see a basic income grant in Namibia. With BIG this would not happen'.

Jauch said that 'the elite are so arrogant and dismissive of the idea of a basic income grant6 ... and the outcome is that poor people have to search for food on rubbish dumps'.

*6. The inclusion of this comment is a step towards Active Citizen framing, but it is not enough.*

Jauch said it's a 'a sign of failed policies[7] to look after the interest and livelihood of people in the country'. He furthermore said that compared to 'the resources we spend on elite projects and huge packages for management this is scandalous'.[8]

*7. What are some of these policies?*

*8. This is an oft-repeated argument and gives an impression that measures required for meaningful poverty reduction could be covered by cutting elite projects and management perks. Jauch probably did not want to suggest this but to encourage values-based thinking.*

Jauch and Kameeta agreed that BIG does not solve 'all of the country's problems'.[9] But Jauch emphasised the BIG 'would wipe out' the basic needs for food for the very poor in Namibia's communities. He said it's time for 'our political leaders to listen to our poor'.

*9. This is clear from previous paragraphs. Why are Kameeta and Jauch not asked to elaborate on the root causes of the problem and to discuss alternatives for BIG? If they are not willing to discuss alternatives, why does the media not ask others or invite broader discussion?*

Prime Minister Nahas Angula was reluctant to discuss the issue on Friday. He said that he has held talks with the City of Windhoek after the media broke the issue and would only say 'the thing is being addressed'. He said the solution would be a joint effort 'between the government and the municipality', not only in Windhoek, but country-wide.

He said the City Council who, last week, stopped wholesalers and meat processors from dumping expired foods and meat at the Kupferberg dump, have been given the 'chance to come up with a proposal'.[10] Angula cautioned, however, that the City of Windhoek is not solely responsible for a solution and said 'we should all find a solution. The blame game will not help us. But I assure you, something is being done'.

*10 & 11. These comments illustrate the emphasis on diverting the discussion from poverty to 'what should be done with the food that was being dumped?' Considering that this is the sole piece of analysis on the Kupferberg case, using this much space on this angle seems misplaced.*

Minister of Health Richard Kamwi on Friday criticised the slack response of the City of Windhoek, who have known about the people eating from the rubbish dumps for years. He said it was 'long overdue' to stop food being dumped where people could easily access it.[11] 'They should know better. They should put measures in place at the dumping sites ... I did not know that they have this type of thing, that it is not controlled,' the Minister said. 'No human being should be allowed to scavenge at a dumping site. There should be ways to address starvation'. He said that from a health professional's point of view, 'allowing human beings to eat from expired food has it's own consequences, which may be irreversible'.

Kamwi, however, is not in favour of a social grant. He said that 'we should instil a culture of hard work'.[12] He said even if food is distributed 'I would propose food for work. Not just for free ... for those able bodied men and women'.

*12. Reference to undeserving poor (see page 72) is further diverting the discussion away from the need of structural solutions.*

Schlettwein on Friday said that although Namibia has the resources, and there 'are possibilities to immediately address' the issue of a social grant is 'not the one and only solution'.[13]

*13. An example of unclear quote: Has the resources for what? Possibilities to immediately address what? What are the other solutions?*

He said that it is critical government and the private sector have to find a solution 'in a focused way'. He said that the most immediate issue 'which we realise aggravates the situation is that there is no cash in the pockets' of the poor rural and urban communities.

Bishop Kameeta said that whatever the solution, the problem itself reflects poorly on the country.

'What is happening to us as a nation?[14] And should we still continue to ask the question of where the money comes from? This is affecting all our dreams and visions'. He said the time to talk about the problem for 'years and years, and demanding debates' is over.

'It's a question of life and death, which should be addressed now'.[15]

*14 & 15. Such a powerful pair of statements, and yet the story fails to ignite a sense of urgency and direction (compare with the coverage of the proposed electricity hike (see page 103). Key reasons for this include:*

*- Several angles, all getting a superficial treatment*
*- No actionable solutions are identified*
*- No explicit or implicit suggestions calling for the issue should be debated by wider sections of the society*

Ombudsman Advocate John Walters on Friday said that the high numbers of unemployment is a 'notorious fact' in Namibia, which leads to poverty.[16] 'This drives them to the dumps to get something to eat'. He said Namibia is on the road to 'become a nation of beggars after we have fought so hard for our liberation'. However, he added that even if Namibia improves employment numbers, the 'attitude of entitlement must change[17] ... we need a mind shift in Namibia and an attitude and behaviour change'.

*16. Why not write an in-depth article about unemployment and possible solutions? This was not done.*

*17. Another reference to undeserving poor (see above and page 72).*

Both The Namibian and the New Era have been covering poverty issues for their entire existence, and this coverage must have entailed some excellent background pieces from various angles. It is however telling that the papers cover the story in 18 and 10 items, respectively, and the above is the most they provide in terms of analysis and background. Apart from superficial references to the BIG grant there is, for instance, no concrete examples of the kinds of policies that have been suggested. Instead, the solutions described in the corpus all deal with how to support the individuals on the dump, here and now: take blankets and food to them, send children back to school, appeal for private donations to the children, and finally come up with a system for distributing expired food in a controlled and orderly manner.

In the end, also the problems associated with on-site reportage were related to lack of depth. Had the poor people been given a chance to elaborate on their thoughts at a greater length – like in the long Q&A type interviews used by New Era to portray youth leaders – and had the on-site reporting been contextualised with in-depth information about the structural causes behind poverty, the overall framing could have implied that poverty is structural and actionable.

### 6.3.4 *Encouraging routines: prompting and peer examples*

While the previous sub-section illustrated journalistic routines, which were associated with the passifying coverage of poor people and poverty, this brief section summarises the routines which, in the light of the current corpus, may encourage the formation of a discourse, which values elite social responsibility.

The examples of poverty coverage presented above made a strong case for including more in-depth reporting in newspaper content to encourage elite social responsibility. The frame analysis conducted in the current study did not, however, include any items which were placed under the Active Citizen frame because they were particularly informative in terms of root causes of structural problems and potential solutions for such problems. Instead, these items were either very straight forward about elites having to participate outside elections or set an inspiring example of peers taking action.

The Namibian's reporting on the proposed electricity price increase testified that news format need not to be connected to discouragement. By opting to cover protest action in news and backing this coverage with opinion content, which directly encouraged all Namibians to participate in the protest, the paper gave their readers the impression that this action was not just welcome and important but their responsibility as citizens. (See pages 102–103.)

Explicit prompts and peer examples played a crucial role also in those Active Citizen items, which were not associated with the price hike. The frame analysis tool was conceptualised in a way that leads to a rather strong causal relationship between the Active Citizen frame and the types of content that are produced not by the newspaper staff but by 'peers'. That is, reader's letters and commissioned contributions. Typical for such items were explicit calls for action, which were not featured in news items outside the proposed electricity price hike.

Where on-site reportage seemed to easily trap journalists into recycling literary clichés, which point towards a dominant discourse that favours status quo and justifies this by suggesting that the poor are fundamentally different from the well-off, opinion content was different. The prevailing format was a text which would make a short reference to poor people and / or poverty and inequality, then devote the rest of the story for proposing solutions to the problem. In many cases the writer would also make an explicit call for action and address this directly to the readers. The same counted for items with a focus in other issues than poverty.

I do not wish to suggest that all feature and on-site reporting is detrimental to elite social responsibility. As proposed in the previous sub-section, anchoring on-site reportage into in-depth content highlighting the structural causes of the problem being portrayed would help. So would

allowing the interviewees more space to elaborate on their thoughts, and presumably also considering the potential implications of the representation evolving as a sum of the literary strategies applied.

A final issue to consider is sources. The current corpus suggests that the exclusive use of official sources contributes to an interpretation where others need not to bother. Conversely, hearing from ordinary elite citizens and activist movements seemed to have the potential to encourage action.

## 6.4 Conclusion

The function of this chapter was to present the results of the frame analysis conducted using the new tool and to start discussing these results as they related to research questions 1 and 2: 'What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?', and: 'What does this suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?'

The first section started with a quantitative summary of the frames. It was concluded that a bit less than two thirds of the texts were framed according to the Minding My Own frame, a bit less than one third the acccording the Active Citizen frame the rest according to the Good Samaritan frame. The share of the Active Citizen frame would have been reduced by half, had The Namibian not taken a partisan role on encouraging the readers for collective mobilisation against the proposed electricity price increase.

The second section gave rich descriptions of the three frames in the current corpus, trying to capture how these defined elite identity or left it undefined, what types of action were proposed, what kinds of strategies were used for explaining away the need to act, and what capacities and interests the government was alluded to have or not to have.

The third section focused on discussing elite media's role in discourse formation. The conclusions included: 1) The elite media can strengthen discourses on the importance of elite participation, but they are much more likely to do this if the issue at hand bears a direct connection to elite interests. 2) Specific journalistic content formats are prone to lead to specific framing. Independent opinion pieces seem to correlate highly with Active Citizen framing, while news format easily lends to framing, which suggests that the well-off do not have to do anything. An exception to this is news describing informal citizen activism by the elites. In this corpus, news items featuring well-established civil society oranisations were not likely to have a similar effect. Another content format, on-site reporting, may easily lead to framing, which re-enforces the status quo through stereotypes. The corpus also suggested that favouring multiple expert interviews over in-depth background articles contributes to framing, which suggests that nothing can be done about social issues. 3)

Following from the previous, the two frames, which depart from the ideal of active citizen, are typically rather heavily influenced by powerful frame sponsors. 4) Overall, lack of depth seems to contribute to an impression that elite social responsibility is not required.

# 7. IN CLOSING

This chapter reflects on the essence of the previous chapters. I start with an evaluation of the frame analysis tool that was developed. This includes an evaluation of the results of the analysis that I conducted on the corpus. Thereafter I summarise the main conclusions and reflect them against the issues discussed in the two introductory chapters (chapters 1 and 2). Finally, I outline some potentially interesting avenues for further research.

## 7.1 Evaluation

The function of this section is to evaluate the frame analysis tool that was developed in Chapter 4 and tested in Chapter 6. I will be evaluating the tool against the quality criteria outlined in section 3.2. The same discussion also reflects on the validity and reliability of the analysis performed in this study. Towards the end of the chapter I will expand the discussion to reflect on whether frame analysis in general is a suitable method for studying media's role on elite social responsibility.[94]

The evaluation criteria covers the following factors: 1a Contribution to framing theory; 1b Attention to power; 2a Internal validity; 2b External validity; 3 Reliability; 4. Neutrality 5. Ability to produce rich descriptions of frames, 6. Comparability. These are discussed below and the discussion is summarised in Table 10 on page 138.

***Contribution to framing theory.*** The tool and the frame analysis conducted add to the body of evidence, which suggests that the frame package approach (see pages 37–38) is a useful method for demonstrating how frames operate to create meaning. As called for by this approach, the tool comprises clearly identified reasoning and framing devices, and these explain how the frame is thought to evoke specific interpretations. The results also build confidence on the ability of the method to analyse complex issues in their context, and to analyse them as an interconnected whole, which is more than a sum of its parts. Finally, the frame construct itself – the devices that were identified – is a new tool that may be used in future framing research, which has a focus on elite social responsibility and similar concepts.

The experience gained in testing the tool supports the earlier recommendations for the use of mixed methods in frame analysis (Koenig 2006; Van Gorp 2005). I believe that the quantitative data provided in previous chapters adds to the credibility of the study while the openings left for interpretation add to the depth of frame descriptions.

[94] The reader should note that I am intentionally leaving out all references to images and layout. This is because the corpus is based on online archive content. I however do believe that the tool can be applied in research covering images and layout.

The contribution to framing theory could have been stronger, if the scope of the study was narrower. Now the tool fails to make other than the most superficial use of semiotics and other tools within critical discourse analysis. Overall, the study may be characterised by a certain crudeness. The trade-off with addressing several complex issues at once is loss of details.

***Attention to power.*** The tool and frame analysis conducted perform well in their ability to capture questions related to power. It draws attention to several journalistic practices, which contribute to the entrenchment of inequality. These include: episodic reporting; lack of contextualisation and attention to structural issues – in human interest stories, for example; reliance on conventional sources, such as government and established civil society organisations; reliance on dominant frames / discourses instead of actively seeking new angles. All the above contribute to framing that is something else than Active Citizen. The study also demonstrated that concerns important for elite audiences are more likely to be covered using the Active Citizen frame.

***Internal validity.*** Internal validity concerns whether the tool and the findings are relevant to elite social responsibility in the Namibian context. The most pressing issue in this regard is the strong focus the tool places on action. It is not clear if an action-orientated conceptualisation is the most relevant for the Namibian situation. If this is accepted, the relative ease in the use of the tool suggests that the frame elements are a good fit to the local situation, although they are based on theories that are not Namibian or African and partially stem form a completely different historical era.

Some questions however remain. In particular, the concept of a 'peer' is problematic when applied on representatives of organisations advocating structural changes for the benefit of the poor. Do portrayals of these people really invoke thinking in the line of *he is like me and he is speaking for the poor, why can't I do the same?* and *he says the government is not doing what they are supposed to do in order to improve the system for the poor?* Or would an average elite reader rather think that the poor being spoken for are the problem, the people whose behaviour should be changed for example by abolishing any plans for social transfers?[95]

Another issue is whether the tool is capable to differentiate between high-sounding phrases and sincere intentions. In a way this does not matter, if we think that impression is what counts. But it could be that the audience can actually differentiate between rhetoric and reality while the analyst cannot.

A third issue is that the tool conceptualises *identity* and *peers* in a way that allows for a very broad range of activities to be counted in active citizenship. This includes consumers, tax payers and the

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business community. For example, in the current study this had a significant impact on the results. The conceptualisation differs from the conventions of most theorising on active citizenship. The justification for this reasoning is presented on page 105.

***Applicability*** asks whether the tool and the finding would be useful in other settings, which are similar to Namibia. I believe this is true, but the number of possible contexts is very limited. The reasoning device concerning efficacy focuses on the state only. This is based on the thought that in a dominant party state people realistically have no other option than to work with the ruling party, which is locally often perceived as being The State. The situation would be different if a viable opposition existed and demographics and political culture made it possible that such opposition could stand a chance.

***Reliability*** concerns whether the tool produces findings, which can be repeated by others. And, by extension, can the results of this test run be repeated? I believe the tool to be as reliable as is possible for a tool, which leaves significant room for interpretation, like a frame analysis tool should. For example, most of the results are based on observations which can be read directly from the core facts in the text or by observing what type of content is excluded or included in the text. Moreover, the number of the frames is limited to three only. The results of the test run are not, however reliable. This is not a feature of the tool but of the one-coder approach. I believe a coding by several cultural insiders might provide a different result and lead to the codebook instructions being more specific.

***Neutrality*** asks whether findings arise from the corpus or from the assumptions, biases, or interests of the researcher. I believe the tool is well-geared for neutrality, because it gives clear and detailed coding instructions. As a researcher, I used the introduction of the study to briefly state my position and possible biases arising from it.

The quality criteria also asks, whether the tool has the ability to ***produce rich descriptions of frames***. This is true and is demonstrated in Chapter 6.1.

The final aspect of evaluation concerns ***comparability***: is it possible to compare the findings with those by other studies on the same subject matter? If the question is about frame analysis in general, the tool performs well because it uses the same concepts of frame package and reasoning and framing devices as other studies within the same tradition. If the question is more thematic, the tool fails miserably. Elite social responsibility as a concept was coined specifically for this study.

**Table 10: Evaluation summary**

| QUALITY OBJECTIVE AND THE TERMS USED FOR IT | DEFINITION | SELF-ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT* |
|---|---|---|
| 1a. Contribution to framing theory | Is the tool / are the findings able to demonstrate how frame organises thinking? | • The study adds to the body of evidence suggesting that the frame package approach can be used to demonstrate how frames operate to create meaning ✓✓<br>• Results build confidence on the ability of the method to analyse complex issues in their context and analyse them as an interconnected whole, which is more than the sum of its parts ✓✓<br>• The tool provides limited guidance for using discourse analysis tools ✗✗ |
| 1b. Attention to power | Is the tool / are the findings able to demonstrate connections between journalistic routines and frames? | • The study demonstrated several connections between journalistic routines and frames ✓✓<br>• The study demonstrated that concerns important for elite audiences are more likely to be covered using the Active Citizen frame ✓✓ |
| 2a Truth value<br>Positivistic term: Internal validity<br>Constructivist term: Credibility & authenticity | Are the identified frames relevant for elite social responsibility in the Namibian context? | • It is not clear if an action-oriented conceptualisation of elite social responsibility is the most relevant for the Namibian situation. ✗✗<br>• The frame elements identified are a good fit for the action-oriented conceptualisation (based on global theory and existing local research & commentary) ✓<br>• However, it is not clear if the tool adequately accounts for a) divisions that exist among elites b) differentiating between lip service and genuine social justice objectives ✗ |
| 2b Applicability<br>Positivistic term: External validity<br>Constructivist term: Transferability | Would the tool / findings be useful in another, similar setting? | • Yes, but applicability is restricted to dominant party states ✓ |
| 3. Consistency<br>Positivistic term: Reliability<br>Constructivist term: Dependability | Can the findings be repeated by others? | • The tool leaves considerable freedom for interpretations. I believe the results could be different if the texts were coded by a cultural insider. This is not a defect connected to the tool, but rather to the one-coder approach ✗✓ |
| 4. Neutrality<br>Positivistic tern: Objectivity<br>Constructivist term: Confirmability / Positionality | Do findings arise from the corpus or from the assumptions, biases, or interests of the researcher? | • I have reflected on my position, accounted for it in the text, developed clear and detailed coding instructions and adhered to them. Possible biases arise from misunderstandings and misplaced emphasis due to misunderstandings ✓ |
| 5. Contribution to understanding on discourses regarding the specific topic | Does the tool allow rich descriptions of frames in their context? | • The tool allowed an evidence-based rich description of frames regarding a theme, which is important in the Namibian context and has so far not been studied at a comparable level of detail by the means of text analysis ✓✓ |
| 6. Comparability | Is it possible to compare the findings achieved with the tool with those by other studies on the same subject matter? | • Frame analysis research based on the idea of frame packages with reasoning and framing devices. ✓✓<br>• Thematic (elite social responsibility / active citizenship / social justice-oriented citizenship…) ✗✗ |

* Meaning of symbols: ✓✓ = succeeded very well ✓ = succeeded satisfactorily ✗ = potential failure ✗✗ = clear failure

To move to a more fundamental level: Is frame analysis a suitable method for studying media's role in elite social responsibility? Frame analysis is very labour intensive. Is it worth the time when essential information can be discovered through simpler methods? My personal experience with the analysis portrayed in this thesis suggests that frame analysis is valuable in providing structure and methodological (quantifiable) weight on analysis. I could have said many of the same things about the corpus without having completed a frame analysis. My early notes on the page margins of the corpus printout however demonstrate that I had produced plenty of observations but had not much clue what they meant, even less idea of how to present them as a coherent entity.

There were also some things I was able to discover with frame analysis that I would not have been likely to discover without it. If one compares my initial observations on the usefulness of frame analysis (see pages 95–96) with the results presented in Chapter 6, it is clear that a simpler form of content analysis may not have been able to capture the importance of the formats the different actors were presented in and the subtler meanings implied by the lack of prompts and background to involve the reader and to provide him with the impression that collective action is a potential road for change. A chief example are those items featuring established civil society organisations, which regularly implied that an average John the elite citizen would not need to bother. Frame analysis also led me to realise that a text not explicitly advocating for charity could implicitly suggest that this was the way to go. Finally, frame analysis was helpful in demonstrating that voice given to the poor does not always result in portrayals, which would increase listening across difference.

A crucial downside of frame analysis as a tool for studying media's role in elite social responsibility in highly inequal societies is that frame analysis is not a good method for assessing the factuality of newspaper content. There are several instances in the corpus suggesting that the papers misquoted or misunderstood their sources. Also some of the non-staff produced items also include information that is incorrect. The only thing the method is able to capture is the end result – is what is printed such that it will encourage the elites to see themselves a role beyond voting in elections and doing charity? This is a crucial minus, considering that balanced and accurate content, which supports understanding by all readers is important in all societies and even more so in deeply divided societies, where quality of journalism and general educational levels may be low and democratic values in short supply (Larkin & Were 2014, pp. 8 – 19).

## 7.2 Summary of results and conclusions

This thesis set out to develop a frame analysis tool to find out what the well-off Namibians think about their role in the society. Or, more precisely, what do the newspaper serving them suggest they should think? The reasoning behind the pair of questions was the concept of discourses, asserting that media texts mirror and mould broader discourses in the society, which in turn are a sum of unequal power relations.

**Research questions**

***Research question 1: 'What kinds of social responsibility roles do the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers?'*** The frame analysis tool developed for the study of discourse differentiated between three frames, which describe three different elite social responsibility roles, roles suggested for the well-off. The Active Citizen frame implies that the well-off should act for a more just society, while the Good Samaritan frame proposes they should do charity, and the Minding My Own frame that they should do nothing. This is the very short answer to research question 1, elaborated on in abundant detail in Chapter 6.2.

***Research question 2: 'What does this [the suggested roles and their use] suggest regarding elite media's role in discourse formation?'*** The answer to this question is more complicated than the answer to question 1 and requires a summary repetition of the key results.

When the frame analysis tool was applied on a purposefully selected corpus of 135 newspaper texts, approximately 60 percent of the items were found to be suggesting that the well-off should do nothing, a little under 30 percent that they should act for a more just society, and 15 percent that they should do charity.

The relatively high importance allocated for elite social responsibility was connected to one particular news event, which bore direct consequences to the well-off. This event was a proposal for a 35 percent increase in electricity price, which The Namibian – one of the two papers under analysis – vehemently resisted.

The Namibian's electricity coverage clearly demonstrates that news media may choose to play an important role in advocating for interpretations where citizen action is seen valuable in the daily life of the polis. At the same time, the broader frame analysis conducted in this study suggests that the elite media is not very likely to choose to wield this power in issues that do not bear a direct connection to elite interests.

In addition to the proposed electricity price increase, the study analysed 107 newspaper texts, which dealt with poverty and land at a time when these issues could be expected to be making headlines. The coverage was much less militant, with roughly a fifth of the texts implying that elite action around these issues was desirable. A similar percentage suggested that elite action should be restricted to charity, while the rest – roughly 60 percent – of the texts implied that the elites should not do anything.

Although the results are specific for the current corpus and not generalizable, they support earlier observations regarding political culture in post-independence Namibia. Firstly, active and critical citizenship is not highly valued. Instead, citizens are encouraged not to question the status quo. Secondly, the fostering of active citizenship is not a strong characteristic with many of the well-established, formal civil society organisations. Thirdly, structural solutions to poverty and inequality are not political or policy priorities in Namibia.

As such, the results of the study suggest that elite newspapers in Namibia participate in the reproduction of discourses, which maintain the status quo. The results further suggest that this happens much as a result of journalistic routines, which make news gathering easier in a situation of limited resources, and have become part of the journalistic culture globally as well as locally.

In the current corpus heavy reliance on official sources – the government and well-established civil society organisations – led to the interpretation that these actors would take care of social issues without ordinary citizens needing to bother themselves. Another significant disincentive for participation was the impression that nothing can be done about problems related to poverty and land, which were covered as an incomprehensible but inevitable stream of episodic events. This impression was attributable to the lack of background and analysis. The content was dominated by the news format. Potential solutions were seldom discussed, and when they were, this was not done in adequate depth. Instead, sound bite-type serial interviews reported in the news format left the reader with an impression that nobody knew what can be done.

On the other hand, The Namibian's reporting on the proposed electricity price increase testified that news format need not to be connected to discouragement. By opting to cover protest action in news and backing this coverage with opinion content, which directly encouraged all Namibians to participate in the protest, the paper gave their readers the impression that this action was not just welcome and important but their responsibility as citizens.

***Research question 3: What kind of a frame analysis tool would be able to capture a) the social responsibility roles the Namibian elite newspapers suggest for their elite readers, and b) what journalistic routines the elite media uses to (re)construct discourses regarding such roles?*** The frame analysis tool developed for the study was introduced in Chapter 4 and its merits and limitations were further discussed in the evaluation section above. The tool is based on two existing theoretical models – William Gamson's collective action frames (1992) and a sociological model by Abram de Swaan (1988) – and an iterative reading of the corpus and other locally relevant texts. It adapts Gamson's and De Swaan's models to take into account that the Namibian elites are a relatively small but deeply divided group, which command life choices that are vastly different from those available for the poor. It also takes into consideration that Namibia is a young democracy, where civic culture is not yet fully established, and the political system is a dominant-party state. As such, the tool does expect that the elites readily identify as a community of action with shared motivational factors or that the possibility to influence decision-making through multi-party politics is strong. The tool also sets great weight on perceptions of poverty although its main focus is on trying to capture policy action.

To be able to capture the journalistic routines, which the media uses to (re)construct elite social responsibility roles, the coding instructions developed for the frame analysis tool highlighted the possible connections between different routines and impressions they may suggest.

**Conclusions**

***Implications for the media.*** One can rightly ask whether newspapers should care about any of this. The way the frame analysis tool developed in this thesis conceptualises elite social responsibility is not just action-orientated, but also advocacy orientated. Newspapers are primarily in the business of bringing news to people, not in the business of advocating for any specific causes or groups of people. Moreover, being perceived as doing so may put their credibility at risk in the eyes of their readers. This is a serious concern in particular for the private papers, whose lifeline depends on readers, who bring the advertisers with them.

Many newspapers, like The Namibian and the New Era analysed in this study, do however state that they are committed to social responsibility. It seems that their downplaying of the need for policy action on issues important for the poor was involuntary – a sum of lack of time, lack of resources and the routines developed to cope with these. While many of the explanatory factors are difficult to address, the results of this study point to some simple content strategies, which may leave the readers with a more profound impression suggesting that them and their kind are a potential

community of action, which could and should use their relative power to push through policies for social justice. Such strategies include:

1) Be explicit about the need for policy action and clearly point out what the well-off can do. As exemplified by The Namibian's coverage of the proposed electricity price increase, newspapers can be unequivocal about the need for action and this will make a world of difference for the impression forming with the readers.

2) Pay attention to the use of sources. Use of sources by the media should testify that public policy should be audited and dialogued by all Namibians. When possible and relevant, use non-official sources. When using official sources, ensure that your text implies that the issue is relevant for everyone, not just for the officials and the people directly involved or affected.

3) Foreground structural problems and their solutions. When possible, make a connection between a news event and the structural issues contributing to it. Check all copy to ensure that you do not give the impression that no solutions exist or possible solutions comprise piecemeal solutions only.

4) When performing the watchdog function, always contextualise this information with analysis and information on policies and structures.

5) Make time for depth. Readers need locally produced in-depth analysis and background in plain language. Such texts should give the necessary background without unnecessary complications. The ideal writer is a well-educated journalist or an academic, who is genuinely able to adapt their writing style for general audiences.

6) When producing content on poverty and poor people, ensure that such content will not end up reinforcing stereotypes, which imply that poverty is the fault of the poor people, or the poor do not need the same things in life as the well-off do.

7) Continue giving high priority to opinion content contributed by readers. Give privilege to contributions that focus on solutions and encourage elite social responsibility.

The points above could be considered by editors, adapted for staff training and monitored in regular editorial meetings. On the long-term, media could evaluate their performance against the chosen points using journalism students as researchers.

***Implications at the level of the society.*** So, is this study able to offer some kind of an answer to Bishop Kameeta's question – what is happening to Namibia as a nation? If we consider media texts being mirrors and moulders of broader discourses in the society, what does the frame analysis conducted in this study suggest about the Namibian society? I will approach this question guided by the discussion on the growth of middle classes (see the first paragraphs of Chapter 2 on page 5).

Based on this study it looks like the discoursive environment where the new Namibian middle classes are entering as contributors is one, which does not set a high value on elite social responsibility – active elite citizenship for social justice. Instead, the new entrants are being invited to use their influence on middle class concerns and to believe that the government will take care of the poor while it also guarantees elite and middle class interests. There is no great drive to encourage the well-off to become critical citizens who would recognise unjust structures and practices and effect systemic change through collective democratic action and work for value change in their day-to-day environments (see discussion on critical citizenship starting on page 27).

Alternative discourses on active citizenship do exist. These are manifest in media frames portraying resourceful representatives of the well-off publicly contributing to the daily life of the polis with opinions, policy proposals and protests against what they perceive to be wrong and unjust. As far as these issues overlap with the interests of the poor, such active elite citizenship advances social justice. A danger exists, however, that as the middle classes grow and secure their position, discourses justifying privilege grow stronger, cementing the fate of the very poor as a large, permanent pariah. It is therefore crucial for social actors, such as the state, the media, the churches, civil society organisations, donor agencies – and the citizens themselves – to critically consider what kinds of discourses they are contributing to.

## 7.3 What next

The events analysed in this study took place five to six years ago. Namibia may not have changed that much since then, but the media habits of well-off Namibians are likely to have experienced a significant shift due to increased social media use, examples of which I am observing daily in my own social networks and Facebook groups like Politics Watch Namibia and Crime in the City Namibia[96]. It would be unthinkable to launch a study about active citizenship and today's Namibian media without paying attention to what goes on in the social media. Studies on citizen engagement through digital, interactive media in Namibia are starting to appear (see for example Shihomeka 2015) but it is not clear whether these are going to address the issue of elite social responsibility. In general, it is

[96] Politics Watch Namibia: https://www.facebook.com/groups/politicswatch/
Crime in the City Namibia: https://www.facebook.com/groups/616819348371856/

difficult to find studies on new media, which would focus on the problematics revolving around the imbalance of discoursive powers in the developing countries from an angle other than empowerment of the poor through new media.[97] While hate speech and the like are much researched topics in the context of new media in the global North, writing on new media and democracy in Africa seems to be dominated by the same implicit expectation as writing on the growth of the middle classes in Africa (see Chapter 2.1), it must be good for the poor. But is it?[98]

Research focusing on the formation of elite social responsibility discourses in the context of new media – especially social media – should thus be an urgent priority for media studies focusing on Namibia, and extremely unequal societies in general. For example in South Africa, this concern is recognised but so far seems to have been covered only in commentary (e.g. Hkhize 2013; Jacobs & Wasserman 2011) or cursory remarks on middle class bubbles on the sidelines of studies focusing on media use more broadly (Malila & Oelofsen 2016, 201).

If further research would be conducted using the frame analysis tool developed in this thesis, the tool should be tested for relevancy. This would entail audience research to establish whether local well-off readers see the frames as the tool sees them. Such research should probably also try to establish whether significant differences in interpretation exist between the various social classes falling under the broad description of elites, and between racial groups.

Outside the social media and audience scenarios, the current study left hanging two loose threads, which would be interesting to follow up on with further research.

The first loose thread concerns poor people as a threat. In Chapter 2.3 (see page 20) I mentioned that some of the existing research touching on class relations in Namibia reckons that elite security concerns have contributed to discourses, which imply that the masses must be contained and controlled. The current corpus – save for one quote[99] – did not lend support to this argument. Rather, it seemed to confirm findings from Malawi and Brazil, which suggest that the local elites do not perceive the poor as a serious threat to their welfare, and this dampens their interest to take collective action to address poverty issues (Kalebe-Nyamago 2012; Reis 2005 & 2010). However, this might be due to the nature of the news events analysed in the current study. Other topics could

[97] The large multi-country research project New Media practices in a Changing Africa (Mediafrica) may fill some of these gaps (www.mediafrica.no).

[98] For example, the only Namibian petition on the global online petition website Change.org appeals to the Namibian president to 'Stop the introduction of Solidarity Tax in Namibia'. The petition was signed by 2,669 people. The Government's proposed solidarity tax would tax every income-generating citizen above a certain threshold to make a contribution towards a fund earmarked for poverty eradication. (Solidarity Tax Must Fall 2015.)

[99] Bishop Kameeta's "We need to accelerate land reform in order to maintain peace and stability in our country," said Evangelical Church of the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) Bishop Zephania Kameeta.

bring forth a much more security focused sample. A corpus focusing on crime, or on the 'struggle kids'[100], may give a very different perspective and shed more light to the question of whether or not the Namibian elites see the poor so powerless that they do not warrant security concerns other than ensuring that the fence around one's home is tall enough. If deep-running security concerns do exist among the Namibian elites, the missing link between concern and action could well be the lack of collective elite identity, like Reis seems to suggest for Brazil (see 4.3.2 on page 61).

The second loose thread is more complex. It concerns democratic culture, more specifically the relationship between elite social responsibility and patronage (see pages 13–14). If patronage really is so central in Africa (see for example Kelsall 2008), acts and values related to it are conspicuously invisible in the corpus of the current study. Does this mean that the established media constitutes part of what researchers call the façade of democracy, a frontage behind which actual practices at all levels of society run according to patrimonial logic (see de Sardan 2014 for a summary)? If this is so, does it even make sense to use media analysis to try capturing the logic of social or class relations? If it does make sense, should such attempts be different from the current tool in order to be able to find past the façade? How should the frame analysis tool be amended to respond such a need? To summarise this thought in very practical terms: Is it so that the well-off genuinely want to make things better but just do not see state-controlled redistribution as the way to go? If so, why not?

[100] Children of the liberation struggle veterans, who have, in the recent years, staged continuing protest actions to demand for compensation for their lost childhood.

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# Annex

## Annex I: Frame analysis tool

The purpose of this frame analysis tool is to analyse media texts to find out what kinds of social roles elite newspapers in unequal societies propose for their elite readers. The tool comprises a codebook and a coding matrix.

Each text item (a news story, for example) is analysed in respect to four elements: identity, preferred solution, motivation, and efficacy. Based on the results of the analysis, the item is categorised under one of the following frames:

> **Active Citizen** identifies elites as a potential community of action on a policy issue, uses argumentation that resonates with them and makes them believe that collective action has real potential for changing the status quo.
>
> **Good Samaritan** is similar to the elite social responsibility frame but it stays largely silent on structural causes of problems or obscures them. It calls for action, but unlike policy action charity does not result in binding, lasting commitments, and it does not change structures.
>
> **Minding My Own** frame suggests elites should not do anything in excess to periodic voting. It places the reader as a spectator and explains away any need to act by implying that others in the society are not worthy and / or there is no collective agent capable of delivering change on issues, which are often described as unsurmountable.

The instrument is capable of capturing whether media encourage or discourage their elite readers to see themselves as change agents. It may be applied to a randomly sampled corpus, as well as on a corpus that is purposively sampled to cover a specific issue.

The purpose is not to evaluate solutions implied. Neither is the instrument capable of capturing the various motives people may have for actions, which ultimately serve the public interest.

Only one frame per item may be coded. Sometimes the choice is obvious, but often not. When in doubt, make a note and put the item aside to come back to it later.

For more detailed guidance on the tool and justifications for the various reasoning and framing devices, refer to Chapter 4 in Virmasalo (2017) *INSPIRING ELITE ACTION FOR A MORE JUST SOCIETY?' Media framing of elite social responsibility in an unequal, unconsolidated democracy. A case study from Namibia.*

## CODEBOOK: Elements to be analysed for each item

| **Reasoning device 1: IDENTITY** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Questions to be answered** | | **Possible framing devices to look at, should the text not provide an explicit answer** |
| 1.1 | Does the text build a sense of collective identity in its elite readers? | • Elite individuals or groups portrayed in any type of a role<br>• Boundary work<br>• Scenarios that are threatening for the elites<br>• Lucrative opportunities for elites |
| 1.2 | Does the text suggest the elites are a potential community of action? | • The peer example presented should portray peers in action which can be conceptualised as a policy proposal. This should be a concrete proposal on how things could be improved. Peers voicing general complaints or speaking about personal experiences do not constitute a policy proposal. |
| 1.3 | Does the text suggest the existence of a specific group of human actors whose behaviours or policies should be changed? | a. References to culturally applicable archetypes, even if the text does not explicitly state how these should change their behaviour. A Namibian example: *Swapo and their cronies*<br><br>b. The distinction may be made explicitly in two stages: the text powerfully paints a picture of a community of imagined readers, which becomes *us.* This implies that there exists a *them*, people who do not behave or would not behave like us. |
| 1.4 | Does the text suggest the issue at stake should be left to the government or between the government and those who are directly and immediately affected or working with the issue? | c. Government is the only actor referred to in the item – or possibly the government and a non-elite group / individual<br><br>d. If peers are present in the item, they are portrayed as directing their words to the government only, not to a broad section of other elites |
| **Treatment:**<br><br>Yes to 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 + No to 1.4 > Active Citizen<br><br>Any other combination: Good Samaritan or Minding My Own, depending on answer to question 2.1 | | |

| **Reasoning device 2: PREFERRED SOLUTION** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Questions to be answered** | | **Possible framing devices to look at, should the text not provide an explicit answer** |
| 2.1 | If this item suggests elites should take action, can such action be defined as charity? | • Poor people are deserving, either all poor people or the specific people to be helped<br>o Presentation of poverty as incidental, not connected to structural issues. This might often appear with on-site reportage featuring vivid descriptions of poverty and / or soundbites from the poor but not giving the necessary context regarding structural causes for poverty<br>o Descriptions of perseverance / industriousness / humility in the face of hardship<br><br>• Role of the elites is to do charity<br>o Portrayal of peers in charitable activities<br>o Reference to biblical or other culturally available archetypes, such as the Good Samaritan |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | • A lexical choice positioning the poor as somebody to be helped (such as needy, the poorest of the poor) in a text that does not give any reference to need of structural action |
| 2.2 | If this item suggests elites should take action, is such action based on the idea of segregation? | • Item makes use of socioeconomic differences following from historical injustices as a base for policy proposals which would maintain or aggravate such differences for the detriment of the poor. |
| **Treatment:**<br><br>Yes to 2.1 > Good Samaritan<br><br>Yes to 2.2.> Minding My Own | | |

| **Reasoning device 3: MOTIVATION** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Questions to be answered** | | **Possible framing devices to look at, should the text not provide an explicit answer** |
| 3.1 | Does the item suggest that poverty is not that bad? | • Poverty is idealised<br>• Poor people are described as fundamentally different from elite / middle class norms (with the resulting impression that a different moral code applies to them.<br>• It is implied that poor people are so used to poverty that they do no not care, and might even be happy as they are. |
| 3.2i | Does the item suggest that the elites cannot do anything about poverty because no human can do anything about poverty? | • References to non-human actors or forces, such as coincidence<br>• Unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities<br>• Journalistic formats of presentation, which give an impression of an inevitable stream of events, which cannot be stopped: lack of background and context (basic news format)<br>• Journalistic formats of presentation, which give an impression that nobody knows what should be done (articles featuring soundbite-type commentary from several people) |
| 3.2ii | Does the item suggest that the elites cannot do anything about poverty because being poor is the fault of the poor? | • Implications to the effect that the poor are undeserving (such as lazy, passive, fatalistic, prone to misuse funds and behave in a manner detrimental to oneself and others) |
| 3.3 | Does the item suggest that the issue at stake (other than poverty) is not problematic? | • Journalistic formats of presentation, which give an impression of being non-problematic (entertainment) |
| 3.4i | Does the item suggest that the elites cannot do anything about the issue at stake (other than poverty, i) as no human can do anything about this issue? | • References to non-human actors or forces, such as coincidence<br>• Unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities<br>• Journalistic formats of presentation, which give an impression of an inevitable stream of events, which cannot be stopped: lack of background and context (basic news format)<br>• Journalistic formats of presentation, which give an impression that nobody knows what should be done (articles featuring soundbite-type commentary from several people) |
| 3.4ii | Does the item suggest that the elites cannot do anything about the issue at stake (other than poverty) because the | • Any implication suggesting that the problem is caused by a very small, distinct group of elite individuals and other members of the elite cannot influence them or should wait for the government to take action. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | problem is caused by other people than the elites (and other than the poor)? | • No inclusion of peers or peer examples in the item. |
| **Treatment:**<br><br>Yes to any of these questions > Good Samaritan or Minding My Own, depending on answer to question 2.1 | | |

| **Reasoning device 4: EFFICACY** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Questions to be answered** | | **Possible framing devices to look at, should the text not provide an explicit answer** |
| 4 | Is the government portrayed as incapable of or fundamentally disinterested in delivering change? | • Focus on the criticism of government without analysis and information providing background, context and alternatives to actions or policies. |
| **Treatment:**<br><br>Yes > Minding My Own or Good Samaritan, depending on answer to question 2.1 | | |

# CODING MATRIX

**LEGEND**
**1** = true **0** = false **empty** = question not applicable

| | | | BACKGROUND INFO | | | | | | | | | | FRAME ANALYSIS VARIABLES | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | TYPE | | | | ORIGIN | | | RELATIONSHIP TO THE CASE | | | 1. IDENTITY | | | | 2. PREF. SOL. | | 3. MOTIVATION | | | | | | 4. EFF |
| | | | News | Feature / news feat on-site | Commentary | Other | **Reader's letter** | **Commissioned** | **Staff** | Focus | Mentioned | Not mentioned | 1.1 No collect. Identity | 1.2 No comm. of action | 1.3 No them | 1.4 Leave to GRN | 2.1 Charity | 2.2 Segregation | 3.1 Poverty not bad | 3.2i Insurmountable | 3.2ii Fault of the poor | 3.3 Not an issue | 3.4i Insurmountable | 3.4ii Other people | 4. Incapable gov. |
| **Code** | **Headline** | **Date** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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# Annex II: Corpus

## 1) POVERTY 5.-29.8.2011

**The Namibian (poverty, 5.-29.8.2011)**

| Code | Headline | Date | URL |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NAP1** | City's dirty secret | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85427&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP2** | Africa Should Look At Its Democratic Resources For Salvation | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/columns/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/africa-should-look-at-its-democratic-resources-for-salvation/ |
| **NAP3** | Political Perspective | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85438&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP4** | Fake Socialists | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85442&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP5** | Socialise Our Oil | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85446&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP6** | SMS: WHY is there such a demand to help Somalia? | 5.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85501&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP7** | Kaaronda calls for social safety net for poor | 8.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/news-articles/national/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/kaaronda-calls-for-social-safety-net-for-poor/ |
| **NAP8** | Gangsters take over Windhoek neighbourhoods | 8.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85551&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP9** | Investment in roads creates economic opportunities | 8.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85513&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP10** | City stops food dumps | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85748&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP11** | Leading People To Scavenge | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/letters/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/leading-people-to-scavenge-1/ |
| **NAP12** | Leading People To Scavenge | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85774&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP13** | Leadership Vacuum In Namibia | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/letters/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/leadership-vacuum-in-namibia/ |
| **NAP14** | Congo boys | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85811&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP15** | Shangula argues BIG will only 'alleviate poverty' | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85806&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP16** | SMS: ALL talk. I am touched by the issue | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85814&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP17** | SMS: MY family and I love what MTC | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85814&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP18** | SMS: PRIME Minister please | 12.8.2012 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85814&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP19** | SMS: THE Chinese scholarships are just for rich | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85814&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP20** | High level national talks on poverty | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85866&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP21** | Citizens respond to crisis, question role of state | 12.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85870&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP22** | Apartheid's Damage impossible to escape: Tutu | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=83974&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=2113 |
| **NAP23** | SMS: MS Mensah Williams | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP24** | SMS: WHEN something embarrassing | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP25** | SMS: OPM and Ministry of Finance | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP26** | SMS: MINISTER of MRLGH | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP27** | SMS: IN light of the food dump debacle | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP28** | Govt responds to dumpsite hunger | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85931&no_cache=1 |

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|---|---|---|---|
| **NAP29** | Malnutrition halters economic development | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85928&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP30** | Lessons From African Development Experiences | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85946&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP31** | SMS: LAST week, representatives of the so-called | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP32** | SMS: IT is a total disgrace and even a much bigger sin | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP33** | SMS: I AM a Kenyan and love your beautiful country | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP34** | SMS: SUPERMARKETS could sell | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP35** | SMS: THE City of Windhoek should | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP36** | SMS: TO the person who does not understand | 16.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85944&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP37** | Chasing the dots ...Obituary, the Winds of Change | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=85998&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP38** | SMS: IT is unacceptable our country | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP39** | SMS: IT'S shameful for Minister Kamwi | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP40** | SMS: THE rich and well off people | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP41** | SMS: I WANT find out who benefits | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP42** | SMS: COULD the 'Friends against Poverty' | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP43** | SMS: I KNOW of a way how to deal with expired food | 17.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-wednesday-17-august-2011/ |
| **NAP44** | Who is responsible for Economic Empowerment? | 18.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86017&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP45** | SMS: WHY should Government act | 18.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-thursday-18-august-2011/ |
| **NAP46** | SMS: JUST like Zambia and Zimbabwe our Government | 18.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-thursday-18-august-2011/ |
| **NAP47** | SMS: OOPS! N$18 million donation to Cuba. | 18.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-thursday-18-august-2011/ |
| **NAP48** | SMS: OMATANDO residents near Ongwediva | 18.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/smses/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/smses-for-thursday-18-august-2011/ |
| **NAP50** | A Solution To The Dumps | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/letters/full-story/archive/2011/august/article/a-solution-to-the-dumps/ |
| **NAP51** | Mind the gaffe, please! | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86090&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP52** | Drop Taxes And Let Companies Build Houses | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86086&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP53** | Children of the dump get helping hand | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86128&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP54** | Political Perspective | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86095&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP55** | SMS: I HOPE the rush to the rubbish dumps | 19.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86187&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP56** | SMS: CONFERENCES, indabas, workshops, seminars etc | 22.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86187&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP57** | SMS: I love our President. | 22.8,2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86187&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP58** | SMS: I REFUSE to believe that not even a single | 22.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86187&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP59** | Macro-Economic fundamentals | 22.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86249&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP60** | Prosperity and good corporate citizenship | 23.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86208&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP61** | Socio-economic conditions fuel revolutions | 23.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86299&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP62** | Count Me Out Of All National Events | 24.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86342&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP63** | Lavish Birthday Wishes Vs Starvation | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86349&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP64** | SMS: I READ with tears your souvenir | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86390&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP65** | SMS: INSTEAD of dedicating time to solve issues | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86390&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP66** | SMS: MINISTER of Foreign Affairs | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86390&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP67** | SMS: THE Ovahimba man who says their children | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86390&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP68** | Keetmans residents eking out a living at the dump | 25.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86448&no_cache=1 |

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|---|---|---|---|
| **NAP69** | Government hands out food to rural vulnerable | 29.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86450&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP70** | City keeps close eye on dumpsite | 29.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86453&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP71** | SMS: PAHU Shuudi's letter | 29.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86456&no_cache=1 |
| **NAP72** | SMS: I hear you Gwen | 29.8.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86456&no_cache=1 |

**New Era (poverty, 5.-29.8.2011)**

| Code | Headline | Date | Url |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NEP1** | Stampede for rotten food | 5.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=39969 |
| **NEP2** | Abject poverty amidst plenty, that's the story of Namibia | 8.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40002&title=Namcor%20launches%20its%20own%20lubricant%20brands |
| **NEP3** | Namibia not competitive enough, say experts | 8.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40006&title=Namcor |
| **NEP4** | Social Security Commission launches mobile service | 8.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40013 |
| **NEP5** | Fund receives cash injection | 10.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/40039/Fund-receives-cash-injection |
| **NEP6** | Tax increase for what and for who? | 10.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40054 |
| **NEP7** | Cops block garbage trucks | 12.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40082 |
| **NEP8** | Diseases, unhygienic conditions to blame for child mortality | 12.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40099 |
| **NEP9** | Facebook rescue for dumpsite 'scavengers' | 15.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40131 |
| **NEP10** | Govt acts on poverty | 16.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40138 |
| **NEP11** | BIG debates rages on | 16.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40150&title=BIG%20debates%20rages%20on |
| **NEP12** | A struggle theme for 2011 onwards | 16.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40152 |
| **NEP13** | Stop blaming imperialists - youth leagues | 17.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40165 |
| **NEP14** | Of white usurpers and cowboy politicians | 17.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40168 |
| **NEP15** | Children's foundation beset by problems | 17.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40161 |
| **NEP16** | The poor's cry for help | 17.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40198 |
| **NEP17** | 'Say no to nationalisation' | 19.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40206 |
| **NEP18** | Does it mean our leaders can only read pictures? | 19.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40209 |
| **NEP19** | Prevue [discourse's-analysis] TRI-vium - The politics of adjectives | 19.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40211 |
| **NEP20** | NBC: A genuine public-oriented broadcaster | 19.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40214 |
| **NEP21** | Centre gives hope to orphans | 22.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40228 |
| **NEP22** | Act to boost investments | 22.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40232&title=Act%20to%20boost%20investments |
| **NEP23** | Hizetjitwa festival a success | 22.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40239&title=Hizetjitwa%20festival%20a%20success |
| **NEP24** | SADC wants protection from external forces | 23.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40255 |
| **NEP25** | President reads riot act | 24.8.2011 | http://allafrica.com/stories/201108241466.html |
| **NEP26** | 'No more handouts for build together' | 24.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40272 |
| **NEP27** | Learn budgeting at an early age! | 24.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40288 |
| **NEP28** | Government to feed the needy | 25.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40293&title=Government%20to%20feed%20the%20needy |
| **NEP29** | Child scavengers thrown lifeline | 25.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40301 |
| **NEP30** | BIG anger over taxes U-turn | 29.8.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=40338 |

## 2) LAND QUESTION 10.11.-1.12.2011

**The Namibian (land question 10.11.-1.12.2011)**

| Code | Headline | Date | Url |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NAL1** | Civil society to hold land indaba | 10.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=89852&no_cache= |
| **NAL2** | /Khomanin to hear fate later | 10.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=89857&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL3** | It Is All About The Poor | 11.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=89890&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL4** | Call for land reform review | 14.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=89977&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL5** | Quote: We need to accelerate land reform | 15.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90044&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL6** | We want land | 16.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90047&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL7** | Pohamba warns traditional leaders over land | 16.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90089&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL8** | Deadline set for dismantling of illegal fencing in communal areas | 17.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90166&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL9** | SMS: THANK you President Pohamba | 17.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90171&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL10** | Quote: Control and utilisation | 17.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90172&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL11** | Do Not Stoke Tribalism And Civil War | 18.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90195&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL12** | SMS: MINISTER Kazenambo has done it again | 21.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90295&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL13** | SMS: MINISTER Kazenambo you are a national leader | 21.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90295&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL14** | Govt drags feet on land reform – civil society | 21.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90290&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL15** | SMS: THANK you President Pohamba | 22.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90310&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL16** | Gov't donates goats, stoves to Ohangwena communities | 22.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90311&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL17** | Reform of agricultural sector needed, says Agribank | 22.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90312&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL18** | No land in central region, no house to call your own | 23.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90375&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL19** | SMS: I THINK Kozonguizi and Aluteni | 23.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90366&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL20** | SMS: I DON'T understand why illegal fencing | 23.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90366&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL21** | Political elite 'capturing' communal land | 24.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90305&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL22** | Audabib eviction in full swing | 25.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90470&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL23** | The Struggle For Restoration Is Not Tribalism | 25.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90497&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL24** | Name-calling Fuels Racist Ideology | 25.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90498&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL25** | To Recognise or Not: Ovazemba Quest For A Chief | 25.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90536&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL26** | SMS: I AM a neighbour of Tate Eddie Amkongo | 25.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90542&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL27** | Julius Malema admits he's politically 'finished' | 28.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90556&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL28** | Khomas governor to visit Audabib farm | 28.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90596&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL29** | 'Hidden agenda' criticised | 28.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90598&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL30** | sms: KOZONGUIZI and Aluteni argued against | 29.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90607&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL31** | Land tax returns key to farm valuation | 29.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90623&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL32** | Selling communal land is illegal | 29.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90620&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL33** | 6 000 NHE clients wait for houses in Windhoek | 29.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90448&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL34** | Ministry warns against fencing in communal areas | 29.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90654&no_cache=1 |

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| **NAL35** | Audabib evictees scattered all over | 30.11.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90707&no_cache=1 |
| **NAL36** | SMS: WHAT is the fuss about the fencing of communal | 1.12.2011 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=90750&no_cache=1 |

**New Era (land question 10.11.-1.12.2011)**

| Code | Headline | Date | URL |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NEL1** | Residents complain of lack of basic services | 11.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41629/Residents-complain-of-lack-of-basic-services |
| **NEL2** | Malema's suspension 'politically motivated' | 11.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41650/Malema-s-suspension--politically-motivated |
| **NEL3** | Bringing back apartheid through the back door | 15.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41673/Bringing-back-apartheid-through-the-back-door |
| **NEL4** | Proliferation of chiefs worries President | 16.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41683/Proliferation-of-chiefs-worries--President |
| **NEL5** | Land reform not GRN priority - workshop | 17.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41713/Land-reform-not-GRN-priority---workshop |
| **NEL6** | Stopping progressive leadership in Africa? | 18.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41743/Stopping-progressive-leadership-in-Africa- |
| **NEL7** | Land remains bone of contention | 21.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41759/Land-remains-bone-of-contention |
| **NEL8** | 20 families get eviction order | 21.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41761/20-families-get--eviction-order- |
| **NEL9** | Residents welcome new land proposal | 21.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41766/Residents-welcome-new-land-proposal |
| **NEL10** | Emerging farmer thrives | 23.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41802/Emerging-farmer-thrives |
| **NEL11** | Council meets over eviction notice | 24.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41821/Council-meets-over-eviction-notice |
| **NEL12** | 20 farms lie unoccupied | 24.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41826/20-farms-lie--unoccupied |
| **NEL13** | Environment ministry launches new project | 25.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41841/Environment-ministry-launches-new-project |
| **NEL14** | Introducing Namibia's Malcolm X | 25.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41849/Introducing-Namibia-s-Malcolm-X |
| **NEL15** | Opposition parties slam ministry over idle farms | 28.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41865/Opposition-parties-slam-ministry-over-idle-farms |
| **NEL16** | Illegal land sales a headache | 28.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41870/Illegal-land-sales-a-headache |
| **NEL17** | More farmland remains unutilised | 29.11.2011 | http://www.newera.com.na/articles/41887/More-farmland-remains-unutilised |

**The Namibian (electricity, 31.3.-22.4.2010)**

| Code | Headline | Date | Url |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NAE1** | NamPower demands 35% electricity hike | 31.3.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66301&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE2** | Chasing the dots ... People, Politics, Policies And Power Play | 31.3.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66263&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE3** | Consumers Must Mobilise To Stop The Electricity Hike | 1.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66329&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE4** | SMS: ELEVEN per cent increase for pensioners | 7.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66445&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE5** | SMS: NAMPOWER the majority of Namibians | 8.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66445&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE6** | SMS: Electricity price increases! | 9.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66554&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE7** | Dismay At 35% Power Hike | 9.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66526&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE8** | Power hikes facing stiff opposition | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66623&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE9** | SMS: NAMPOWER the 35 per cent electricity hike | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66606&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE10** | SMS: NAMPOWER'S 35 per cent increase | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66606&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE11** | SMS: PEOPLE staying in old age homes don't pay | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66606&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE12** | SMS: IF salaries and benefits of NamPower's | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66606&no_cache=1 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NAE13** | SMS: PLEASE get a serious message to Nampower | 12.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66606&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE14** | QUOTE: The Electricity Control Board (ECB) | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66690&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE15** | QUOTE: It's common knowledge | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66690&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE16** | Lower inflation spells rate relief | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66626&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE17** | Eskom picks banks to help raise funds | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66628&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE18** | SMS: I THINK it's absurd | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE19** | SMS: NAMPOWER wants to get blood out of a stone | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE20** | SMS: STOP the electricity rise please! | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE21** | SMS: NOT acceptable; far too high. | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE22** | SMS: THAT increase is too high! | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE23** | SMS: 35 PER cent is crazy. We can't afford it. | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE24** | SMS: WHICH Minister is looking for a new car | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE25** | SMS: WE Namibians are also struggling | 13.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66657&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE26** | SMS: I AM as shocked as you all are | 14.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66716&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE27** | Zambian megawatts for 'mini-bucks' | 14.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66694&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE28** | Zim faces more power cuts | 14.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66695&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE29** | Power hike resistance grows | 15.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66791&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE30** | SMS:WITH the 35 per cent hike looming | 15.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66770&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE31** | SMS: THE Namibian please root for Nampower | 15.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66770&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE32** | SMS: A 35 per cent increase in the electricity price | 15.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66770&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE33** | Budget lined with sweet words' | 15.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32631 |
| **NAE34** | Time To Make The Solar Switch | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66807&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE35** | Consumer Is An Easy Target | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66813&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE36** | Namibians Mobilise Against Price Hike | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66815&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE37** | Go make some noise at NamPower | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66849&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE38** | Councils, farmers to bear brunt of power hikes | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66854&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE39** | Quote: The economic growth of Namibia | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66857&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE40** | Quote: Is this how they deal with public complaints? | 16.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66857&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE42** | Swapo councillor denies involvement in new party | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66841&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE43** | Power increase protest fizzles out | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66891&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE44** | Driving down the path of success can be a bumpy ride | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66858&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE45** | Quote: It is important to have numbers | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66908&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE46** | SMS: If NAMPOWER increases electricity | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66887&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE47** | SMS: THE Namibian editorial of Friday | 19.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66887&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE48** | Employment creation vital to prevent social unrest: Muheua | 20.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66950&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE49** | Power supply from Zim remains: Katali | 20.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66992&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE50** | SMS: I HAVE to express my disappointment | 21.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66988&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE51** | SMS: I THINK it is understandable | 21.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66988&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE52** | SMS: AM wondering why we complain | 21.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=66988&no_cache=1 |
| **NAE53** | RDP slams 35% power hike | 22.4.2010 | http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=67046&no_cache=1 |

**New Era (electricity, 31.3.-22.4.2010)**

| Code | Headline | Date | Url |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NEE1** | Monthly inflation eases | 13.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32583 |
| **NEE2** | Anger over proposed electricity hike | 14.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32594 |
| **NEE3** | Swapo councillors want new mandate | 15.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32626 |
| **NEE4** | Consumers have to bite the bullet | 21.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32723 |
| **NEE5** | Interest rates unchanged for now | 22.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32729 |
| **NEE6** | Zesa will supply energy to NamPower ' Katali | 22.4.2010 | http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=32743 |

# Annex III: Corpus in frame analysis matrix

**LEGEND: 1** = true **0** = false **empty** = not applicable

## Active citizen N=36

| | | | TYPE | | | | ORIGIN | | | RELATIONS. TO THE CASE | | | 1. IDENTITY | | | | 2. PREF. SOL. | | 3. MOTIVATION | | | | | | 4. EFF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | News | Feature / news feat on-site | Commentary | Other | Reader's letter | Commissioned | Staff | Focus | Mentioned | Not mentioned | 1.1 No collect. Identity | 1.2 No comm. of action | 1.3 No them | 1.4 Leave to GRN | 2.1 Charity | 2.2 Segregation | 3.1 Poverty not bad | 3.2i Insurmountable | 3.2ii Fault of the poor | 3.3 Not an issue | 3.4i Insurmountable | 3.4ii Other people | 4. Incapable gov. |
| **Code** | **Headline** | **Date** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAP4** | Fake Socialists | 5.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP5** | Socialise Our Oil | 5.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP12** | Leading People To Scavenge | 12.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP37** | Chasing the dots ...Obituary, the Winds of Change | 17.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP44** | Who is responsible for Economic Empowerment? | 18.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP52** | Drop Taxes And Let Companies Build Houses | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP60** | Prosperity and good corporate citizenship | 23.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | 0 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP6** | Tax increase for what and for who? | 10.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP12** | A struggle theme for 2011 onwards | 16.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP13** | Stop blaming imperialists - youth leagues | 17.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP14** | Of white usurpers and cowboy politicians | 17.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP17** | 'Say no to nationalisation' | 19.8.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEP19** | Prevue [discourse's-analysis] TRI-vium - The politics of adjectives | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAL3** | It Is All About The Poor | 11.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAL11** | Do Not Stoke Tribalism And Civil War | 18.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAL23** | The Struggle For Restoration Is Not Tribalism | 25.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAL24** | Name-calling Fuels Racist Ideology | 25.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEL3** | Bringing back apartheid through the back door | 15.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEL6** | Stopping progressive leadership in Africa? | 18.11.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NEL14** | Introducing Namibia's Malcolm X | 25.11.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE1** | NamPower demands 35% electricity hike | 31.3.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE2** | Chasing the dots ... People, Politics, Policies And Power Play | 31.3.2010 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE3** | Consumers Must Mobilise To Stop The Electricity Hike | 1.4.2010 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE7** | Dismay At 35% Power Hike | 9.4.2010 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE8** | Power hikes facing stiff opposition | 12.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE29** | Power hike resistance grows | 15.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE33** | Budget lined with sweet words' | 15.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE34** | Time To Make The Solar Switch | 16.4.2010 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE35** | Consumer Is An Easy Target | 16.4.2010 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE36** | Namibians Mobilise Against Price Hike | 16.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE37** | Go make some noise at NamPower | 16.4.2010 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE38** | Councils, farmers to bear brunt of power hikes | 16.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE42** | Swapo councillor denies involvement in new party | 19.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE43** | Power increase protest fizzles out | 19.4.2010 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE44** | Driving down the path of success can be a bumpy ride | 19.4.2010 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAE53** | RDP slams 35% power hike | 22.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | **TOTAL** | **9** | **1** | **23** | **3** | **14** | **7** | **15** | **13** | **5** | **18** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | | | | | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** |

## Good Samaritan N=21

| | | | TYPE | | | | ORIGIN | | | RELATIONS. TO THE CASE | | | 1. IDENTITY | | | | 2. PREF. SOL. | | 3. MOTIVATION | | | | | | 4. EFF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | News | Feature / | Commentary | Other | **Reader's letter** | **Commissioned** | **Staff** | Focus | Mentioned | Not mentioned | 1.1 No collect. | 1.2 No comm. of | 1.3 No them | 1.4 Leave to GRN | 2.1 Charity | 2.2 Segregation | 3.1 Poverty not bad | 3.2i Insurmountable | 3.2ii Fault of the poor | 3.3 Not an issue | 3.4i Insurmountable | 3.4ii Other people | 4. Incapable gov. |
| **NAP1** | City's dirty secret | 5.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | |
| **NAP8** | Gangsters take over Windhoek neighbourhoods | 8.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NAP10** | City stops food dumps | 12.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP21** | Citizens respond to crisis, question role of state | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| **NAP50** | A Solution To The Dumps | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | 0 | | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP68** | Keetmans residents eking out a living at the dump | 25.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | |
| **NAP69** | Government hands out food to rural vulnerable | 29.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP1** | Stampede for rotten food | 5.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | |
| **NEP5** | Fund receives cash injection | 10.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | 0 |
| **NEP7** | Cops block garbage trucks | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 0 |
| **NEP9** | Facebook rescue for dumpsite 'scavengers' | 15.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | 0 |
| **NEP10** | Govt acts on poverty | 16.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | |
| **NEP15** | Children's foundation beset by problems | 17.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP16** | The poor's cry for help | 17.8.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 0 |
| **NEP20** | NBC: A genuine public-oriented broadcaster | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP21** | Centre gives hope to orphans | 22.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | 0 |
| **NEP28** | Government to feed the needy | 25.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL22** | Audabib eviction in full swing | 25.11.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAL28** | Khomas governor to visit Audabib farm | 28.11.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAL35** | Audabib evictees scattered all over | 30.11.2011 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL8** | 20 families get eviction order | 21.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| | | **TOTAL:** | **9** | **10** | **2** | **0** | **2** | | **19** | **10** | **3** | **8** | **0** | **12** | **16** | **9** | **21** | | **8** | **5** | **3** | **0** | **1** | **1** | **1** |

| | | | TYPE | | | | ORIGIN | | | RELATIONS. TO THE CASE | | | 1. IDENTITY | | | | 2. PREF SOL. | | 3. MOTIVATION | | | | | | 4. EFF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Minding My Own N=78** | | | News | Feature / [illegible] | Commentary | Other | **Reader's letter** | **Commissioned** | **Staff** | Focus | Mentioned | Not mentioned | 1.1 No collect. Identity | 1.2 No comm. of action | 1.3 No them | 1.4 Leave to GRN | 2.1 Charity | 2.2 Segregation | 3.1 Poverty not bad | 3.2i Insurmountable | 3.2ii Fault of the poor | 3.3 Not an issue | 3.4i Insurmountable | 3.4ii Other people | 4. Incapable gov. |
| **NAP2** | Africa Should Look At Its Democratic Resources For Salvation | 5.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP3** | Political Perspective | 5.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| **NAP7** | Kaaronda calls for social safety net for poor | 8.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| **NAP9** | Investment in roads creates economic opportunities | 8.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **NAP11** | Leading People To Scavenge | 12.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 1 | | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| **NAP13** | Leadership Vacuum In Namibia | 12.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | | | | | | | 0 | 0 | | 1 |
| **NAP14** | Congo boys | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 0 |
| **NAP15** | Shangula argues BIG will only 'alleviate poverty' | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | | | |
| **NAP20** | High level national talks on poverty | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NAP22** | Apartheid's Damage impossible to escape: Tutu | 16.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAP28** | Govt responds to dumpsite hunger | 16.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NAP29** | Malnutrition halters economic development | 16.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NAP30** | Lessons From African Development Experiences | 16.8.2011 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAP51** | Mind the gaffe, please! | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| **NAP53** | Children of the dump get helping hand | 19.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NAP54** | Political Perspective | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| **NAP59** | Macro-Economic fundamentals | 22.8.2011 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAP61** | Socio-economic conditions fuel revolutions | 23.8.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAP62** | Count Me Out Of All National Events | 24.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| **NAP63** | Lavish Birthday Wishes Vs Starvation | 25.8.2011 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAP70** | City keeps close eye on dumpsite | 29.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NEP2** | Abject poverty amidst plenty, that's the story of Namibia | 8.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NEP3** | Namibia not competitive enough, say experts | 8.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP4** | Social Security Commission launches mobile service | 8.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP8** | Diseases, unhygienic conditions to blame for child mortality | 12.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP11** | BIG debates rages on | 16.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NEP18** | Does it mean our leaders can only read pictures? | 19.8.2011 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| **NEP22** | Act to boost investments | 22.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP23** | Hizetjitwa festival a success | 22.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP24** | SADC wants protection from external forces | 23.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NEP25** | President reads riot act | 24.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEP26** | 'No more handouts for build together' | 24.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP27** | Learn budgeting at an early age! | 24.8.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP29** | Child scavengers thrown lifeline | 25.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NEP30** | BIG anger over taxes U-turn | 29.8.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL1** | Civil society to hold land indaba | 10.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL2** | /Khomanin to hear fate later | 10.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAL4** | Call for land reform review | 14.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL6** | We want land | 16.11.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL7** | Pohamba warns traditional leaders over land | 16.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NAL8** | Deadline set for dismantling of illegal fencing in communal areas | 17.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NAL14** | Govt drags feet on land reform – civil society | 21.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL16** | Gov't donates goats, stoves to Ohangwena communities | 22.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAL17** | Reform of agricultural sector needed, says Agribank | 22.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| **NAL18** | No land in central region, no house to call your own | 23.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL21** | Political elite capturing communal land | 24.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAL25** | To Recognise or Not: Ovazemba Quest For A Chief | 25.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL27** | Julius Malema admits he's politically 'finished' | 28.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| **NAL29** | 'Hidden agenda' criticised | 28.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL31** | Land tax returns key to farm valuation | 29.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL32** | Selling communal land is illegal | 29.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NAL33** | 6 000 NHE clients wait for houses in Windhoek | 29.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAL34** | Ministry warns against fencing in communal areas | 29.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NEL1** | Residents complain of lack of basic services | 11.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| **NEL2** | Malema's suspension 'politically motivated' | 11.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL4** | Proliferation of chiefs worries President | 16.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL5** | Land reform not GRN priority - workshop | 17.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL7** | Land remains bone of contention | 21.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL9** | Residents welcome new land proposal | 21.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL10** | Emerging farmer thrives | 23.11.2011 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL11** | Council meets over eviction notice | 24.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| **NEL12** | 20 farms lie unoccupied | 24.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL13** | Environment ministry launches new project | 25.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 0 | | | | | |
| **NEL15** | Opposition parties slam ministry over idle farms | 28.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEL16** | Illegal land sales a headache | 28.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| **NEL17** | More farmland remains unutilised | 29.11.2011 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAE16** | Lower inflation spells rate relief | 13.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| **NAE17** | Eskom picks banks to help raise funds | 13.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAE27** | Zambian megawatts for 'mini-bucks' | 14.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAE28** | Zim faces more power cuts | 14.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAE48** | Employment creation vital to prevent social unrest: Muheua | 20.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| **NAE49** | Power supply from Zim remains: Katali | 20.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NEE1** | Monthly inflation eases | 13.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| **NEE2** | Anger over proposed electricity hike | 14.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEE3** | Swapo councillors want new mandate | 15.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| **NEE4** | Consumers have to bite the bullet | 21.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| **NEE5** | Interest rates unchanged for now | 22.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| **NEE6** | Zesa will supply energy to NamPower ' Katali | 22.4.2010 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | **TOTAL** | **63** | **0** | **9** | **6** | **4** | **3** | **71** | **15** | **11** | **52** | **33** | **65** | **61** | **60** | **0** | **1** | **1** | **15** | **13** | **0** | **6** | **9** | **10** |

# ANNEX IV: Numerical breakdown of frame analysis

**Table IV a: Results, entire frame analysis corpus**

| | Minding my own | Active Citizen | Good Samaritan |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Entire corpus (N=135)** | **N=78** | **N=36** | **N=21** |
| | 58% | 27% | 15% |
| **By paper** | | | |
| The Namibian (N=82) | **N=45** | **N=27** | **N=10** |
| | 55% | 33% | 12% |
| New Era (N=53) | **N=33** | **N=9** | **N=11** |
| | 62% | 17% | 21% |
| **By theme** | | | |
| Poverty (N=65) | **N=35** | **N=13** | **N=17** |
| | 54% | 20% | 26% |
| Land (N=42) | **N=31** | **N=7** | **N=4** |
| | 74% | 17% | 9% |
| Electricity (N= 28) | **N=12** | **N=16** | **N=0** |
| | 43% | 57% | 0% |
| **By paper and theme** | | | |
| The Namibian poverty (N=35) | **N=21** | **N=7** | **N=7** |
| | 60% | 20% | 20% |
| The Namibian land (N=25) | **N=18** | **N=4** | **N=3** |
| | 72% | 16% | 12% |
| The Namibian electricity (N=22) | **N=6** | **N=16** | **N=0** |
| | 27% | 73% | 0% |
| New Era poverty (N=30) | **N=14** | **N=6** | **N=10** |
| | 47% | 20% | 33% |
| New Era land (N=17) | **N=13** | **N=3** | **N=1** |
| | 76% | 18% | 5% |
| New Era electricity (N=6) | **N=6** | **N=0** | **N=0** |
| | 100% | 0% | 0% |

**Table IV b: Results, electricity items excluded**

| | Minding my own | Active Citizen | Good Samaritan |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Electricity items excluded (N=107)** | **N=66** | **N=20** | **N=21** |
| | 62% | 19% | 19% |
| **Electricity items excluded, by paper** | | | |
| Namibian (N=60) | **N=39** | **N=11** | **N=10** |
| | 65% | 18% | 17% |
| New Era (N=47) | **N=27** | **N=9** | **N=11** |
| | 57% | 19% | 23% |

**Table IVc: Results, specified news events only**

| | Minding my own | Active Citizen | Good Samaritan |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Specified news events (N=57)** | **N=26** | **N=18** | **N=13** |
| | 45% | 32% | 23% |
| **Specified news events by paper** | | | |
| The Namibian (N=40) | **N=15** | **N=18** | **N=7** |
| | 37% | 45% | 18% |
| New Era (N=17) | **N=11** | **N=0** | **N=6** |
| | 65% | 0% | 35% |
| **Specified news events, by event** | | | |
| Poverty / Kupferberg (N=28) | **N=14** | **N=2** | **N=12** |
| | 50% | 7% | 43% |
| Land / Civil society conference (N=7) | **N=6** | **N=0** | **N=1** |
| | 86% | 0% | 14% |
| Electricity / Price increase (N=22 ) | **N=6** | **N=16** | **N=0** |
| | 27% | 73% | 0% |
| **Specified news events, by paper and event** | | | |
| The Namibian poverty / Kupferberg (N=18) | **N=10** | **N=2** | **N=6** |
| | 56% | 11% | 33% |
| The Namibian land / Civil society conference (N=4) | **N=3** | **N=0** | **N=1** |
| | 75% | 0% | 25% |
| The Namibian electricity / Price increase (N=18) | **N=2** | **N=16** | **N=0** |
| | 11% | 89% | 0% |
| New Era poverty / Kupferberg (N=10) | **N=4** | **N=0** | **N=6** |
| | 40% | 0% | 60% |
| New Era land / Civil society conference (N=3) | **N=3** | **N=0** | **N=0** |
| | 100% | 0% | 0% |
| New Era electricity / Price increase (N=4) | **N=4** | **N=0** | **N=0** |
| | 100% | 0% | 0% |

**Table IV d: Results, specified news events only - electricity price increase excluded**

| | Minding my own | Active Citizen | Good Samaritan |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Electricity price increase items excluded (N=35)** | **N=20** | **N=2** | **N=13** |
| | 57% | 6% | 37% |
| **Electricity price increase items excluded, by paper** | | | |
| Namibian (N=22) | **N=13** | **N=2** | **N=7** |
| | 59% | 9% | 32% |
| New Era (N=13) | **N=7** | **N=0** | **N=6** |
| | 54% | 0% | 46% |

# Annex V: Additional tables

**TABLE V a: Number of sources referred to in news items**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **One source** | **70** | |
| The Namibian | 35 | NAE1, NAE33, NAE42, NAE43, NAE53, NAP69, NAP7, NAP9, NAP15, NAP22, NAP28, NAP29, NAP53, NAL1, NAL2, NAL4, NAL7, NAL8, NAL14, NAL16, NAL17, NAL18, NAL2, NAL4, NAL7, NAL8, NAL14, NAL16, NAL17, NAL18, NAL25, NAL27, NAL29, NAL31, NAL32, NAL33, NAL34, NAE16, NAE17, NAE27, NAE28, NAE48, NAE49 |
| New Era | 35 | NEP13, NEP5, NEP9, NEP15, NEP21, NEP28, NEP5, NEP4, NEP8, NEP11, NEP22, NEP23, NEP24, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NEP30, NEL1, NEL2, NEL4, NEL5, NEL7, NEL9, NEL11, NEL12, NEL13, NEL15, NEL16, NEL17, NEE1, NEE2, NEE3, NEE4, NEE5, NEE6 |
| **More than one source** | **8** | |
| The Namibian | 6 | NAP20, NAP70, NAL21, NAE8, NAE29, NAE36, NAE38 |
| New Era | 2 | NEP2, NEP3 |

**TABLE V b: Sources used in news and news featuring on-site reportage**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Government / Swapo party** | **44** | |
| Government / Swapo party | 43 | NAP9, NAP53, NAP70, NAP29, NAP15, NAP20, NAP28, NEP22, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NEP4, NEP8, NEP2, NEP11, NAL7, NAL8, NAL21, NAL25, NAL32, NAL34, NEL7, NEL11, NEL12, NEL13, NEL15, NEL17, NEL1, NEL9, NEL4, NEL5, NAE48, NAE49, NEE2, NEE3, NEE6, NAE42, NAP10, NAP68, NAP69, NEP9, NEP10, NEP28 |
| Swapo youth league | 1 | NEP13 |
| **Civil society organisations** | **32** | |
| Well-established formal CSOs | 5 | NAP14, NAP28, NAP70, NEP10, NAL21 |
| BIG coalition | 4 | NAP15, NAP20, NEP11, NEP30 |
| Civil society land conference organisers | 5 | NAL1, NAL4, NAL14, NEL4, NEL5 |
| Informal activist groups and their activists | 4 | NAE29, NAE36, NAE43, NEP2 |
| Trade unions | 3 | NAP7, NEP2, NEL2 |
| Consumer interest groups | 4 | NAE29, NAE36, NEE2, NEE4 |
| Charity groups | 4 | NAP21, NEP5, NEP9, NEP15 |
| Ethnicity-based organisations | 3 | NEP23, NAL25, NAL29 |
| **Ordinary people** | **13** | |
| Elites | 2 | NAP 10, NAP14 |
| Poor | 11 | NAP1, NAP8, NAP14, NAP68, NEP1, NEP7, NEP10, NAL6, NAL22, NEL1, NEL9 |
| **Churches** | **7** | NAP14, NAP20, NAP22, NAP28, NAP70, NEP10, NEP11 |
| **Opposition** | **4** | NEP2, NAE33, NAE53, NEL15 |
| **Other** | **10** | |
| Academics | 2 | NAP2, NAP61 |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 4 | NEL10, NAE29, NAE36, NAE38 |
| Other | 4 | NAP8, NAE38, NAL27, NAP20 |

**Table V c: Active Citizen frame by topic**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Kupferberg case, The Namibian | 1 | NAP12 |
| Kupferberg case, New Era | 0 | |
| Civil Society Land Conference, The Namibian | 0 | |
| Civil Society Land Conference, New Era | 0 | |
| Electricity price increase, the Namibian | 16 | NAE1, NAE2, NAE3, NAE7, NAE8, NAE29, NAE33, NAE34, NAE35, NAE36, NAE37, NAE38, NAE42, NAE43, NAE44, NAE53 |
| Electricity price increase, New Era | 0 | |
| Need for a deeper democracy with more inquisitive and active citizens, The Namibian | 3 | NAP4, NAP37, NAL3 |
| Need for a deeper democracy with more inquisitive and active citizens, New Era | 3 | NEP14, NEP6, NEP17 |
| Radical redistribution to correct the wrongs of colonialism and apartheid, The Namibian | 0 | |
| Radical redistribution to correct the wrongs of colonialism and apartheid, New Era | 4 | NEP14, NEP19, NEL6, NEL14 |
| Corporate social responsibility, The Namibian | 2 | NAP44, NAP60 |
| Corporate social responsibility, New Era | 0 | |
| Moral, The Namibian | 1 | NAL24 |
| Moral, New Era | 2 | NEP12, NEL3 |
| Seeking restitution from Germany, The Namibian | 2 | NAL11, NAL23 |
| Seeking restitution from Germany, New Era | 0 | |
| Use of national resources for the benefit of the poor, The Namibian | 2 | NAP5, NAP52 |
| Use of national resources for the benefit of the poor, New Era | 0 | |

**Table V d: Types of people addressed in the Active Citizen category**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| We / we all / Namibians / All Namibians / citizens | 15 | NAP5, NAP12, NAP37, NAP52, NEP6. NEP12, NEP17, NAL3, NAL11, NAL23, NAL24, NEL14, NAE1, NAE7, NAE34 |
| Consumers | 10 | NAE1, NAE3, NAE8, NAE29, NAE35, NAE36, NAE37, NAE38, NAE42, NAE53 |
| Business | 4 | NAP44, NAP60, NAE38, NAE44 |
| We, black Namibians / black people | 3 | NEP14, NEP19, NEL6 |

**Table V e: Types of peers who were given agency in the Active Citizen category**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics | 13 | NAP4, NAP5, NAP52, NEP12, NAL3, NAL11, NAL23, NAL24, NEL3, NEL6, NAE7, NAE34, NAE35, |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 7 | NAP44, NAP60, NAE29, NAE36, NAE38, NAE44, NAE53 |
| Consumers and consumer interest groups | 6 | NAE29, NAE36, NAE37, NAE38, NAE43, NAE53 |
| Youth leaders outside the ruling party structures | 4 | NAP12, NEP14, NEP17, NEL14 |
| Representatives of black consciousness movements addressing social and economic inequalities | 4 | NEP14, NEP19, NEL6, NEL14 |
| Established politicians | 3 | NAE33, NAE42, NAE53<br>**2 opposition and 1 ruling party MP (representative of the ruling party going against a parastatal could inspire agency in other members of the elite* |

**Table V f: The Namibian's coverage of the proposed electricity price increase**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Staff-produced items describing the collective action elite individuals or groups took to protest on the increase. | 10 | NAE1, NAE3, NAE8, NAE29, NAE33, NAE36, NAE37, NAE38, NAE43, NAE53 |
| Staff-produced items which quoted consumer and business interest groups | 5 | NAE8, NAE29, NAE36, NAE38, NAE53 |
| Staff-produced items which entailed explicit calls to protest | 5 | NAE1, NAE3. NAE29, NAE36 & NAE37 |
| Staff-produced items which gave exact information on how and where to participate in the protest. | 3 | NAE3, NAE8, NAE29 |
| "Notable quotes" items repeating previously published statements by consumer and business interest groups | 5 | NAE14, NAE15, NAE39, NAE40, NAE45 |
| Items focusing on other issues but nevertheless mentioning the proposed increase | 2 | (NAE42, NAE44 |
| Reader's letters focusing on the proposed increase | 3 | NAE7, NAE34, NAE35 |
| Commissionned opinion piece | 1 | NAE1 |
| SMSes protesting the hike (24 in total) | | |

**Table V g: 'Them' in active citizen items (several may be coded for one item)**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| NamPower for lousy management and Govern | 16 | NAE1, NAE2, NAE3, NAE4, NAE7, NAE8, NAE29, NAE33, NAE34, NAE35, NAE36, NAE37, NAE38, NAE42, NAE43, NAE44. |
| Government / Swapo | 11 | NAP4, NAP5, NAP12, NAP37, NAP52, NEP6, NEP13, NEP14, NAL3, NEL6, NEL14 |
| Powerful individuals taking advantage of the status quo | 7 | NAP44, NAP60, NEP12, NEP14, NAL3, NEL14, NEP17 |
| White people | 4 | NEP14, NEP19, NEL6, NEL14 |
| Racists | 2 | NAL24, NEL3 |
| Other | 3 | NAL3, NAL11, NAL23 |

**Table V h: Consumers and citizens coming together in The Namibian's reporting on the proposed electricity price increase**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Consequences of the proposed price increase to "the poor" or "low-income households" mentioned | 9 | NAE1, NAE2, NAE3, NAE8, NAE33, NAE34, NAE35, NAE38, NAE53 |
| People addressed not only as consumers, but also as Namibians | 4 | NAE1, NAE2, NAE7, NAE34 |

**Table V i: Good Samaritan by topic**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kupferberg case** | **12** | NAP1, NAP10, NAP21, NAP50 |
| Description of situation | 4 | NAP1, NAP68, NEP1, NEP16 |
| Citizen response | 4 | NAP21, NAP50, NEP9, NEP15, |
| Government response | 3 | NAP10, NEP7, NEP10 |
| Other | 1 | NEP20 |
| **Other themes** | | |
| Forced eviction from commercial land | 4 | NAL22, NAL28, NAL35, NEL8 |
| Other charity initiatives by people | 3 | NAP8, NEP5, NEP21 |
| Other government initiatives | 3 | NAP69, NEP28, NAL16 |

**Table V j: Minding My Own by topic**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kupferberg case** | **8** | |
| Description | 2 | NAP14, NEP2 |
| Government response | 6 | NAP20, NAP28, NAP53, NAP70, NEP18, NEP29, |
| Other | | |
| **Other poverty topics** | **34** | |
| Macro economics | 11 | NAP9, NAP59, NAP30, NEP3, NEP22, NEP24, NAE16, NEE1, NEE5, NAP29, NAE48 |
| Moral and critique of government | 7 | NAP3. NAP13, NAP22, NAP51, NAP62, NAP63, NEP2 |
| Basic Income Grant and other social safety nets | 7 | NAP7, NAP15*, NEP4, NEP11*, NEP18*, NEP26, NEP30* |
| Health | | NAP29, NEP8 |
| Unemployment, poverty and social unrest | 3 | NAP61, NAE38, NEP25 |
| Government initiatives | 3 | NAP9, NEP4, NEP25, |
| **Land themes** | **23** | |
| Civil society land conference agenda and resolutions | 4 | NAL1, NAL4, NAL14, NEL5 |
| Communal land | 8 | NAP11, NAL7, NAL8, NAL21, NAL32, NAL34, NEL4, NEL7, NEL16, NEL17 |
| Forced eviction from commercial land | | NAL2, NEL11, |
| Commercial land | | |
| Urban land and housing | 3 | NAL6, NAL18, NAL33 |
| Other land topics | | |
| **Electricity and energy** | 7 | NAE17, NAE27, NAE28, NAE49, NEE2, NEE4, NEE6 |
| **Other** | | |

**Table V k: Active citizen sources**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Government** | **3** | |
| Government / Swapo party / parastatals | 3 | NAE1, NAE29, NAE42 |
| Swapo youth league | 0 | |
| **Civil society** | **14** | |
| Well-established formal civil society organisations (CSOs) | 0 | |
| BIG Coalition | 0 | |
| Civil society land conference organisers | 0 | |
| Informal activist organisations and their activists | 11 | NEP6, NEP14, NEP17, NEP19, NEL6, NEL14, NAE8, NAE29, NAE36, NAE37, NAE43 |
| Trade unions | 0 | |
| Consumer interest groups | 3 | NAE8, NAE29, NAE43 |
| Charity groups | 0 | |
| Ethnicity-based organisations | 0 | |
| **Ordinary people** | **12** | |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics | 12 | NAP4, NAP5, NAP52, NEP12, NAL3, NAL11, NAL23, NAL24, NEL3, NAE7, NAE34, NAE35 |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite interviewed by the media | 0 | |
| Poor interviewed by the media | 0 | |
| **Churches** | **0** | |
| **Opposition** | **4** | NAE33, NAE53, NAP12, NEP13 |
| **Other** | **10** | |
| Academics | 0 | |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 7 | NAP44, NAP60, NAE8, NAE29, NAE36, NAE38, NAE44 |
| Other | 3 | NAP37, NAE38 |

**Table V l: Good Samaritan sources**

| **Government** | **11** | |
|---|---|---|
| Government / Swapo party / parastatals | 11 | NAP10, NAP21, NAP68, NAP69, NEP5, NEP9, NEP10, NEP28, NAL22, NA35, NEL8 |
| Swapo youth league | 0 | |
| **Civil society** | **3** | |
| Well-established formal civil society organisations (CSOs) | 0 | |
| BIG Coalition | 0 | |
| Civil society land conference organisers | 0 | |
| Informal activist organisations and their activists | 0 | |
| Trade unions | 0 | |
| Consumer interest groups | 0 | |
| Charity groups | 3 | NAP21, NEP9, NEP15 |
| Ethnicity-based organisations | 0 | |
| **Ordinary people** | **13** | |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics | 2 | NAP50, NEP20 |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite interviewed by the media | 1 | NAP10 |
| Poor interviewed by the media | 10 | NAP1, NAP8, NAP68, NEP1, NEP7, NEP10, NEP16, NAL22, NAL28, NAL35 |
| **Churches** | **2** | NEP15, NAL28 |
| **Opposition** | 1 | NEL8 |
| **Other** | **2** | |
| Academics | 0 | |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 0 | |
| Other | 2 | NAP8, NEP7 |

**Table V m: Minding My Own sources**

| **Government** | **33** | |
|---|---|---|
| Government / Swapo party / parastatals | 33 | NAP9, NAP20, NAP28, NAP29, NAP53, NAP70, NEP4, NEP8, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NAL2, NAL8, NAL33, NEL11, NEL12, NEL17, NEE48, NAP30, NAP59, NEP22, NAL7, NAL25, NAL32, NAL34, NEL7, NEL13, NEL16, NAE49, NEE4, NEE6, NAL21, NEE2 |
| Swapo youth league | 1 | NEP2 |
| **Civil society** | **26** | |
| Well-established formal civil society organisations (CSOs) | 7 | NAP14, NAP28, NAP54, NAP70, NEP10, NEP11, NAL21 |
| BIG Coalition | 4 | NAP15, NAP20, NEP11, NEP30 |
| Civil society land conference organisers | 5 | NAL1, NAL4, NAL14, NEL4, NEL5 |
| Informal activist organisations and their activists | 1 | NEP2 |
| Trade unions | 3 | NAP7, NEP2, NEL2 |
| Consumer interest groups | 2 | NEE2, NEE4 |
| Charity groups | 1 | NEP2 |
| Ethnicity-based organisations | 3 | NEP23, NAL25, NAL29 |
| **Ordinary people** | **8** | |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics | 7 | NAP11, NAP13, NAP62, NAP63, NAL11, NAL23, NAL24 |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite interviewed by the media | 1 | NAP14 |
| Poor interviewed by the media | 0 | |
| **Churches** | **7** | NAP14, NAP20, NAP22, NAP28, NAP70, NEP10, NEP11 |
| **Opposition** | **1** | NEL15 |
| **Other** | **6** | |
| Academics | 2 | NAP2, NAP61 |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 1 | NEL10 |
| Other | 3 | NAP20, NAL27, NEL2 |

| * Red Cross, Namibia Institute for Democracy, Legal Assistance Centre |
|---|

**Table V n: Types of peers agency was assigned to in the Minding My Own category (used as sources or being referred to)**

| **Civil society organisations** | **14** | |
|---|---|---|
| Civil Society Organisations (Red Cross, NID, LAC) | 6 | NAP14, NAP28, NAP54, NAP70, NEP10, NEP11, NAL21 |
| BIG coalition | 4 | NAP15, NAP20, NEP11, NEP30 |
| Civil society land conference organisers | 4 | NAL1, NAL4, NAL14, NEL4, NEL5 |
| **Ordinary people** | **8** | |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite contributing with readers' letters on various social responsibility topics | 7 | NAP11, NAP13, NAP62, NAP63, NAL11, NAL23, NAL24 |
| Non-affiliated members of the elite interviewed by the media | 1 | NAP14 |
| Churches | 7 | NAP14, NAP20, NAP22, NAP28, NAP70, NEP10, NEP11 |
| Trade unions | 3 | NAP7, NEP2, NEL2 |
| Representatives of black consciousness movements addressing social and economic inequalities | 3 | NEP2, NAL27, NEL2 |
| Ethnicity-based organisations | 3 | NEP23, NAL25, NAL29 |
| Consumers and consumer interest groups | 2 | NEE2, NEE4 |
| Academics | 2 | NAP2, NAP61 |
| Citizen's charity groups | 1 | NEP2 |
| Ombudsman | 1 | NAP20 |
| Youth leaders outside the ruling party structures | 1 | NEP2 |
| Swapo Youth League | 1 | NEP2 |
| Established politicians outside the ruling party | 1 | NEL15 |
| Business leaders and business coalitions | 1 | NEL10 |

**Table V o: Actors in Minding My Own items**

| Government | 26 | NAP9, NAP30, NAP51, NAP53, NAP59, NAP70, NEP22, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NAL7, NAL8, NAL21, NAL25, NAL32, NAL34, NEL7, NEL11, NEL12, NEL13, NEL16, NEL17, NAE48, NAE49, NEE3, NEE6 |
|---|---|---|
| GRN + the poor | 7 | NAP29, NAP61, NEP4, NEP8, NAL6, NEL1, NEL9 |
| Government + formal civil society organisations | 14 | NAP7, NAP15, NAP20, NAP28, NAP54, NEP2, NEP11, NEP18, NEP30, NAL1, NAL14, NEL2, NEL4, NEL5 |
| GRN + non-affiliated representatives of the elites | 6 | NAP11, NAP13, NAP62, NAP63, NEP2, NEE2, |
| Other* | 22 | NAP2, NAP3, NAP22, NEP3, NEP23, NEP24, NEP27, NAL2, NAL17, NAL18, NAL27, NAL29, NAL31, NAL33, NEL10, NEL15, NEL16, NAE16, NAE17, NAE27, NAE28, NEE1, |

*All with less instances than 5

**Table V p: Minding My Own by angle**

| Descriptions of government activities specifically in reference with the poor | 18 | NAP9, NAP20, NAP28, NAP29, NAP53, NAP70, NEP4, NEP8, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NAL2, NAL8, NAL33, NEL11, NEL12, NEL17, NEE48 |
|---|---|---|
| Description of other government activities | 13 | NAP30, NAP59, NEP22, NAL7, NAL25, NAL32, NAL34, NEL7, NEL13, NEL16, NAE49, NEE4, NEE6 |
| Civil society organisations or individuals speaking for the poor | 13 | NAP7, NAP14, NAP15, NEP11, NEP30, NAL1, NAL4, NAL14, NAL27, NEL2, EP2, NEL4, NEL5 |
| Criticism of government | 12 | NAP3, NAP11, NAP13, NAP51, NAP62, NAP63, NEP18, NAL21, NEL15, NEE2, NAL6*, NEL1* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **News about economy** | 9 | NEP3, NEP24, NAL18, NAE16, NAE17, NAE27, NAE28, NEE1, NEE5 |
| **Appeals to people's morals** | 2 | NAP3, NAP22 |
| **Other** | 11 | NAP2, NAP54, NAP61, NEP23, NEP27, NAL17, NALL29, NAL31, NEL9, NEL10, NEE3, |

**Table V q: Items explicitly mentioning poverty or people who are poor**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Active Citizen | 29 | NAP4, NAP5, NAP12, NAP37, NAP44, NAP52, NAP60, NEP6, NEP12, NEP13, NEP14, NEP15, NEP17, NEP19, NAL3, NAL11, NAL23, NEL3, NEL6, NEL14, NAE1, NAE2, NAE3, NAE8, NAE33, NAE34, NAE35, NAE38, NAE53 |
| Good Samaritan | 19 | NAP1, NAP8, NAP10, NAP21, NAP50, NAP68, NEP1, NEP5, NEP7, NEP10, NEP15, NEP16, NEP20, NEP21, NEP28, NAL22, NAL28 NAL35, NEL8 |
| Minding My Own | 55 | NAP2, NAP3, NAP7, NAP9, NAP11, NAP13, NAP14, NAP15, NAP20, NAP22, NAP28, NAP29, NAP30, NAP51, NAP53, NAP54, NAP59, NAP61, NAP62, NAP63, NAP70, NEP2, NEP3, NEP4, NEP8, NEP11, NEP18, NEP19, NEP22, NEP23, NEP24, NEP25, NEP26, NEP29, NEP30, NAL1, NAL2, NAL4, NAL6, NAL8, NAL14, NAL16, NAL21, NAL27, NAL33, NAL34, NEL1, NEL2, NEL5, NEL9, NEL11, NEL12, NEL13, NEL15, NEL17 |