

**NORTH-SOUTH POWER DYNAMICS IN UNITED NATIONS  
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GENDER EQUALITY DISCOURSE**

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<p>Abstract</p> <p>Based on Foucauldian theory on the relationship between knowledge and power, and Ferguson's theorizations on the development apparatus, and taking a critical approach to climate change, gender and development overall, the study examines, by means of Critical Discourse Analysis, how the discourses produced by the United Nations, in the context of climate change, gender equality and development intervention, reproduce the unequal North-South power dynamic.</p> <p>Three main discourses related to responsibility were found, namely (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility, (2) Taking Responsibility, and (3) Imposing Responsibility. (2) Taking Responsibility Discourse is comprised of two sub-discourses: the (2.1) Alarmist / Necessity Discourse, with a subject position for women as victims, and the (2.2) Obligation / Authority Discourse, with a subject position of protector / savior for the UN. Another subject position for women as change agents is also included in the (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse.</p> <p>The study found that the (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse serves to passively sustain the unequal North-South power dynamic by avoiding the issue of who and what causes climate change and by shifting attention away from the biggest culprit, while the (2) Taking Responsibility Discourse effectively reinforces the South's dependency on the North by imposing development intervention on the South. Lastly, the (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse perversely imposes the responsibility of climate change adaptation, and achieving development goals, onto the biggest sufferer, women in the South.</p> <p>The way the discourses reproduce the unequal North-South power dynamic is an example of how benevolent development action of the conceptual development apparatus, in the form of knowledge production, can have latent, unintended and adverse consequences of reproducing subordination and actually serving the interests of the powerful.</p>	
<p>Keywords</p> <p>Global inequality, global governance, power, knowledge, United Nations, climate change, gender equality, empowerment, critical discourse analysis</p>	
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Tiivistelmä <p>Pohjaten Foucault'laiseen tulkintaan tiedon ja vallan suhteesta sekä Fergusonin teoriaan kehityskoneistosta (development apparatus), ja suhtautuen kriittisesti niin ikään ilmastonmuutokseen, sukupuoleen kuin kehitykseen, tutkielma selvittää kriittisen diskurssianalyysin keinoin, kuinka YK:n tuottamat ilmastonmuutosta, sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa ja kehitysinterventiota koskevat diskurssit uusintavat globaalin pohjoisen ja etelän välistä epätasa-arvoista valtasuhdetta.</p> <p>Tutkimuksessa löytyi kolme vastuuseen liittyvää päädiskurssia: (1) Vastuun välttely / sivuuttaminen, (2) Vastuun ottaminen sekä (3) Vastuun langettaminen. (2) Vastuun ottamisen diskurssi koostuu kahdesta aladiskurssista: (2.1) Alarmistinen / Pakkodiskurssi, jossa naiset saavat uhrin subjektiposition, sekä (2.2) Velvollisuus / Auktoriteettidiskurssi, jossa YK saa suojelijan / pelastajan subjektiposition. (3) Vastuun langettamisen diskurssissa naiset saavat myös toisen, muutosvaikuttajan subjektiposition.</p> <p>Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että (1) Vastuun välttelyn / sivuuttamisen diskurssi ylläpitää passiivisesti pohjoisen ja etelän välistä epätasa-arvoista valtasuhdetta vältellen aiheita ilmastonmuutoksen syistä ja aiheuttajista, sekä siirtämällä huomiota pois suurimmasta syyllisestä, kun taas (2) Vastuun ottamisen diskurssi uusintaa tehokkaasti etelän riippuvuutta pohjoisesta tyrkyttämällä kehitysinterventiota etelään. (3) Vastuun langettamisen diskurssi, taas, nimensä mukaisesti, langetttaa kieroutuneesti vastuun ilmastonmuutokseen sopeutumisesta, sekä kehitystavoitteiden saavuttamisesta, suurimmalle kärsijälle, etelän naisille.</p> <p>Tapa, jolla diskurssit uusintavat globaalin pohjoisen ja etelän epätasa-arvoista valtdynamiikkaa, on esimerkki siitä, kuinka käsitteellisen kehityskoneiston (conceptual development apparatus) hyväntahtoisella kehitystyöllä, tiedon tuotannon muodossa, voi olla piileviä, tahattomia ja haitallisia seurauksia, jotka uusintavat alistussuhteita ja tosiasiasa palvelevat vallassa olevien etua.</p>	
Avainsanat Globaali epätasa-arvo, globaali hallinta, valta, tieto, Yhdistyneet kansakunnat, ilmastonmuutos, sukupuolten välinen tasa-arvo, valtaistaminen (empowerment), kriittinen diskurssianalyysi	
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# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

Progressing climate change is no doubt the most pressing issue of our time, threatening ecosystems, lives and development everywhere, but some more than others. Backed up by increasing volume of data and research today, testifying for the particular vulnerability of certain geographical areas and communities, the various organizations within the UN system were among the first to raise the issue of women in developing countries bearing the brunt of climate change due to gender inequality. However, at a time when academic research on the subject was still scarce, the UN produced a volume of literature on climate change and gender equality, hence becoming a key knowledge producer on the subject.

After becoming familiar with the UN material and its hegemonic discourses during my Bachelor's Thesis on the roles of women in developing countries in climate change in 2011, I wanted to further examine these discourses in this Thesis, now from a critical perspective. Realizing that the UN, from a position of power, produces authoritative knowledge, and with it, facilitates development interventions, which have real-life, and – according to scholars – often adverse, consequences on the lives of the least powerful, got me interested in the connection between knowledge and power, especially in the context of development and global governance. That is, the UN, being a major player in the global development system and business, hence, also has a significant role in the formation of the existing, unequal global North-South power dynamic, which is why its words and actions are of particular importance, and thus, the focus of this study – a critical analysis of UN discourses, from the perspective of global power relations and governance, in the context of development intervention and women's empowerment in climate change adaptation.

Based on the critical views of Wolfgang Sachs et al. (2010) and David Harvey (2008) among others (eg. Kääriäinen 2015; Eskelinen 2011; Peet & Hartwick 2015), this study takes an overall critical stance on the hegemony of both Western neoliberalism

and the current hegemonic development paradigm, seen as an extension of the former, thus upholding the status quo of global inequality, by means of international development agencies, like the UN. Indeed, building on the critical work of Michel Foucault on the connection of knowledge and power in global governance, James Ferguson (1990) theorizes on the 'conceptual development apparatus' of the 'anti-politics machine', referring to the depoliticizing and inequality increasing effects of international development agencies facilitating development interventions. The UN, as part of the conceptual development apparatus, global governance and the hegemonic paradigm of liberal development, is hence considered inescapably part of sustaining global inequality.

While the role of the UN in development, interventions and global power relations has been critically discussed by scholars in general (eg. de Waal 2013; Duffield 2013; Johansson 2013), there seems to be less critical research on the UN's role as a producer of knowledge and discourses, per se, in the context of gender, climate change and development. Feminist, postcolonial scholars, however, have criticized discourses of both international development policy and agents (which the UN is a major part of), as well as research, for essentializing developing countries and their people as vulnerable, helpless victims of climate change, as well as "feminizing" climate change and vulnerability, that is, firstly, essentializing both men and women of the global South along the gender binary, but more importantly, portraying the women as a homogenous group of either vulnerable, marginalized victims of climate change or, by contrast, as virtuous, caring, and active agents in adaptation with a special relationship with nature - othering, which often disregards and, hence, unintendedly reproduces and sustains existing unequal global relations of power and governance (Andreucci & Zografos 2022; de Wit 2021; Zaman 2021; Mikulewicz 2020; Djoudi et al. 2016; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013, Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011). Critical research on development and women's empowerment in the global South, in general, has also arrived at similar results of essentializing and othering women, and thus reproducing (gender and) global inequality (eg. Weidenstedt 2016; Cornwall and Rivas 2015; Mattila et al. 2007; Escobar 2012), while climate change governance has been criticized by scholars for its depoliticizing effects and, likewise, reproducing the unequal global North-South power dynamic (Andreucci and Zografos 2022; de Wit 2021; Mikulewicz 2020).



## 1.2 Research Question

To add to the work of the critical scholars of discourses on gender and climate change in the context of development and global power dynamics, and in efforts to question and add to the critical discussion on the current hegemonic development paradigm, this study examines, by means of critical discourse analysis, one document, by the UN, on mainstreaming gender in climate change adaptation interventions, and aims to answer the question:

*How do the discourses produced by the United Nations, in the context of development intervention, climate change and gender equality, reproduce unequal North-South power dynamics?*

The data, “A Guidebook for Designing and Implementing Gender-Sensitive Community-Based Adaptation Programmes and Projects”, was chosen because it is one-of-a-kind with its particular focus and function in **facilitating development intervention**, in the given context, and, consequently, also a manifestation and a tangible instrument of the conceptual development apparatus.

## 1.3 Structure of the Report

In what follows, Chapter 2 ‘Foucauldian Approach to North-South Power Dynamics in Development’ critically discusses North-South power dynamics, development, and the link between power and knowledge within this context. Chapter 3 ‘UN, Climate Change and Gender’ will give an overview on the context – the link between climate change and gender equality – and the role of the UN as a knowledge producer. Chapter 4 will introduce the data and methodology of this study, that is, critical discourse analysis, and its specific use in this study. Chapter 5 will present the results and analysis, and lastly, conclusions will be presented and discussed in Chapter 6.

## **2 FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO NORTH-SOUTH POWER DYNAMICS IN DEVELOPMENT**

The link between knowledge and power is at the core of this study, and more specifically, how power is exercised in knowledge production, or in other words, discursive practices. The theoretical framework along with the chosen methodology, critical discourse analysis, are both based on the theorizations of Michel Foucault. This chapter will, hence, first introduce its critical perspectives to the historical and current inequalities in the global North-South power relations, and the hegemonic development paradigm, after which it will offer a brief overview of Foucauldian approach to the link between knowledge and power, as well as that of Ferguson's theorization of the conceptual development apparatus, lastly, discussing the connection between the two theories and 'governing by development intervention'. This theoretical framework, next discussed, also forms a relevant part of the 'politicohistorical sociocultural' context of this study

### **2.1 North-South Power Dynamics, Development and Intervention**

This study takes an overall critical approach to the global North-South power dynamic, development and development intervention. This chapter critically, but briefly, discusses the overall historical and current inequalities in global power relations as well as the hegemonic economic and development paradigms. Based on literature, it is first argued that the development of the global North has been achieved, firstly, at the expense, and to the detriment, of the global South, by historically and currently depriving it through extractivism and exploitation, and secondly, historically based on fossil energy causing the current climate change now placing the heaviest burden on those least responsible for its causes. By critically overviewing the evolution of the real and specious efforts of the North to help the (hence impoverished) South to "develop", it is argued that the current hegemonic development paradigm, in fact, inevitably re-

produces and sustains the prevalent North-South power dynamic, by eventually serving the interests of the dominant North and the global elite while sustaining the dependency and subordination of the South.

### **2.1.1 History of Global Inequality and the Development Ideal**

The journey of the global North to its hegemonic position has been multifaceted, from the perspective of both the North itself as well as the South – concepts whose complexities will be elaborated on later, but which, in short, can be classified as follows: the global North includes the currently rich developed countries of Europe, North America, Australia, and North Asia, the global South then comprised of the rest, the poor “underdeveloped” countries of Africa, South America and South Asia – the vast majority of the countries in both North and South being former colonies of Europe (World Population Review 2023; Koponen 2009c, 29-30, 35-46). Despite the differences in experiences and effects for different areas and countries, the main trajectory in global power relations is clear – inequality has and keeps increasing, to the benefit of the global North, and especially the global elite (Koponen 2009d, 91, 95-97, 99-100, 106-109; Koponen 2009e, 129; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-9, 11; Lummis 2011, 47-48; Kääriäinen 2015, 21, 27, 65, 151-152, 155-156; Eskelinen 2011, 42; Douzinas 2013, 153; Chomsky 2016). The pivotal historical components in the making of global inequality are the expansion of Western Europe in the 1400’s into Africa, America and Asia, leading to the era of colonialism, and the revolution of modern industrial capitalism in Europe in the 1800’s, powered by the newly discovered fossil energy (Koponen 2009d, 95-96, 99-102; Gough 2017, 7-8; Klein 2014, 229-236; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 157-158). Both endeavors were driven by Europe’s economic ambitions and self-interest, ultimately leading to the first genuinely global system of an “integrated, Eurocentric world economy”, the growth of which, historically and still, benefits mostly the global capitalist elite especially in the global North (but also the often oppressive and corrupt local elites in the South), at the expense of the well-being and dignity of the rest, especially in the global South (Koponen 2009d, 99-100, 103-104, 106, 110-112; Eskelinen 2011, 54-56; Sachs 2010a, ix; Gronemeyer 2011, 60-61; Kääriäinen 2015, 27-28, 37, 43, 54, 65, 113, 115-116, 120, 131, 152). – While the global North, hence, took an unreachable leap ahead in economic and social development, its consequences to the global South have been devastating – from displacement and subordination, exploitation and plunder economy, forced labor and slavery, and death by the millions during colonialism, to the unescapable poverty trap amidst the “carboniferous capitalism” induced climate crisis today (Koponen 2009d, 97, 99-103, 107, 109- 110; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-9, 11, 117-118; Lummis 2011, 47-48; Gough 2017, 8 [Newell & Paterson 2010]; Sachs 2010a, x; Gough 2017, 31; Eskelinen 2011, 108).

In the colonial history of Europe lie also the ideological roots of the concept of ‘development’ (Koponen 2009a, 51, 54, 55, 60; Esteva 2010, 14; Eskelinen 2011, 24-26). In the era of colonialism, the concept of ‘development’ encompassing the European ideals of societal progress, civilization, modernization and capitalism, served to legitimize colonial power and the European’s active – often extractivist – developing “for exploitation” of their colonies, arguing they had the “right if not the obligation” to do

so, “for their [colonized] and everyone’s sake” – “taking up” the “white man’s burden”, as Kipling in his famous poem put it (Koponen 2009a, 51, 54, 55, 60, 64; Koponen 2009d, 110-111; Esteva 2010, 5-6; Eskelinen 2011, 18, 24-27, 54, 83, 102-103; Klein 2014, 228; Andreucci & Zografos 2022). The Second World War and the subsequent changes in global power relations and international institutions put the concept of development permanently at the center of international politics (Koponen 2009a, 60-62, 64). The dismantling of the colonial system and the USA and Russia replacing the former European colonial powers at the center of global politics during the Cold War demanded reorganizing global relations, and in efforts to include more countries in international cooperation, and to reform the relationship between the former colonies and colonizers, development and ‘developmentalism’ stepped in to offer an economic and ideological basis for the new world order (Koponen 2009a, 60-61, 64; Koponen 2009d, 111; Johansson 2013, 239; Escobar 2012, 64-65). During the same time, the United Nations was founded, becoming the top development institution, and President Truman coined the othering term “underdeveloped country”, hence, dividing the world into the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, and laying the cognitive basis for an collective experience and identity of underdevelopment (Koponen 2009a, 52, 61, 62, 64; Esteva 2010, 3, 6; Eskelinen 2011, 29-30; Sachs 2010b, xvi; Mikulewicz 2020, 1809-1810, 1812; Escobar 2012, 3).

Lacking a clear exhaustive definition, the concept of ‘development’ is constantly changing and ambiguous – something which is seen both as its virtue, as it is thus diversely applicable, and as its flaw, as critics argue that its deliberate vagueness offers legitimacy to any intervention carried out in its name, hence, serving as a “smokescreen” or a “political coverup” “functional” for the self-serving objectives of Western countries, “a weapon in the competition between political systems”. (Koponen 2009a, 50, 59-60, 64-65; Eskelinen 2011, 60-61; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 1-4; Sachs 2010a, x; Sachs 2010b, xvii-xix; Lummis 2011, 48; Kääriäinen 2015, 13; Johansson 2013, 242; de Waal 2013, 27-28.) For the same reason, critics also argue that the concept of development, along with that of sustainable development, in all their ambiguity have, ironically, ceased to mean anything (Eskelinen 2011, 7; Esteva 2010, 3, 5, 6; Kääriäinen 2015, 33; Sachs 2010b, xix). In spite of its contentiousness, the concept of development remains relevant, and its role, alongside globalization, essential to current global politics and power relations (Koponen 2009a, 49).

From the perspective of development studies, scholars perceive development as three-dimensional: as an ideal, an endogenous empirical societal process, and as intentional intervention (Koponen 2009a, 50). As an ideal and as a societal process, development is understood as a change for the better, whereas intervention as well-meaning, planned, and even necessary action to advance the achievement of the ideal (Koponen 2009a, 50-54, 59; Eskelinen 2011, 20; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 1-2). The concept, hence, is normative and positively charged, offering both motivation and justification for development intervention which, in turn, has a subject, ‘developer’, and an object, ‘developee’ – the afore presented historical events explaining why the direction of developing, historically and still, is from North to South, the “Western civilizations” as developers of the so called “underdeveloped” nations, to achieve the “societal model” of development through the “political program” of development, both based on European history and Western, or “Euro-Atlantic”, ideology, today most importantly

that of 'neoliberal economics' (Koponen 2009a, 51, 59; Esteva 2010, 6; Eskelinen 2011, 17, 22, 27-28, 118-119; Sachs 2010b, xx; Lummis 2011, 48; Kääriäinen 2015, 34).

### 2.1.2 The Global Hegemony of the Neoliberal Economic Paradigm

Historically, fossil energy, capitalism and the global elite diversely intertwine with development, especially with respect to the neoliberal turn of global economics in the 1970-80's (Peet & Hartwick 2015, 9-10, 98-100; Harvey 2008, 27; Eskelinen 2011, 56, 98; Gough 2017, 10). The political and economic practices of neoliberalism are based on the perception that "human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade", and where "the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices" (Harvey 2008, 2; Gough 2017, 11; Kääriäinen 2015, 34). Neoliberalism has since become the hegemonic discourse of both global economics as well as development, both of which claim to "advance the cause of individual freedoms" and idealize and emphasize personal responsibility and "self-reliance of households and communities" – in the case of development reducing political and structural causes of poverty to the level of individual "values", "attitudes," and "motivation" thus placing the burden of "underdevelopment" "on the shoulders of each and every individual", whereas the individual freedoms of neoliberalism, in fact, refer to the freedoms of the capitalist to make more money free of interference (Harvey 2008, 3, 40, 61; Ferguson 1990, 86; Koponen 2009a, 57-58; Koponen 2009b, 85-86; Esteva 2010, 8; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 17, 92, 114; Eskelinen 2011, 84-85; Gough 2017, 4-5; Kääriäinen 2015, 34, 56-57; Duffield 2013, 194, 201).

The propulsion and legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm stem from its conceptualizations of scarcity, prosperity and the human being. Firstly, the neoliberal paradigm is based on a distorted, reductive perception of human beings as rational and "egotistical" consumers, which effectively legitimizes greed (Peet & Hartwick 2015, 112, 117; Gough 2017, 1, 8, 38-40). Secondly, the concept of (imaginary) "scarcity", created by economists, produces continuous dissatisfaction, which together with marketing to the masses standardized "elitist desires", status and a lifestyle in which "mass consumption becomes the main source of pleasure", effectively makes economic growth a "necessity" and legitimizes over-consumption in both North and South, and thus ensures the continuous growth demanded by neoliberal capitalism (Esteva 2010, 14-16, 19; Eskelinen 2011, 46-47, 149; Gough 2017, 44-45; Lummis 2011, 49-50; Sachs 2010a, ix, xii; Sachs 2010b, xvii; Eskelinen 2011, 66). Lastly, the counterpart of scarcity is "prosperity" which is only understood in socially restricted monetary terms by the neoliberal paradigm, hence devaluing all other interpretations of it, but which actually refers to a power relation, that is, the 'rich by comparison' having "power over other people", 'the poor by comparison'. – Neoliberal monetary prosperity, thus, is an exercise of oppressive power over those living in produced and sustained scarcity without which it could not exist, making the consequent "problem" of inequality, not an economic but a political one, thus, unsolvable by the 'invisible hand' of neoliberal laissez faire economics 'in due time', contrary to the claims of the neoliberalists. (Peet

& Hartwick 2015, 116; Lummis 2011, 48-49, 51-52; Eskelinen 2011; Kääriäinen 2015, 56-57, 63-64, 127; Johansson 2013, 253.)

Today, these inequality imbued, distorted neoliberal values of consumerism also determine the hegemonic, homogenizing, standardized perception of ideal development and a developed society, and conversely, that of underdevelopment, a cognitively and tangibly created condition of constant, intervention legitimizing crises (self-reliance, security etc.), which the majority of the world's nations desperately try to escape at the expense of diversity and pluralism, revealing how effectively Euro-Atlantic neoliberalism has "colonized" the collective "imagination" in both North and South (Eskelinen 2011, 22, 46-47, 83; Esteva 2010, 2-3, 6; Sachs 2010a, vii, ix, xi-xiii; Sachs 2010b, xviii-xix; Duffield 2013, 194-195). The neoliberal colonization of the minds, hence, continues the legacy of the socialization of the colonies into industrial discipline and coercive, destructive and oppressive economic structures, in a word, the "Westernization of the world" with the help of the pervasive psychological grip of the alluring ideal of allegedly essential 'development' to achieve the only accepted form of 'prosperity' (Koponen 2009d, 111-112; Gronemeyer 2011, 60-61; Eskelinen 2011, 43, 82-83, 85-86, 136, 141- 142; Sachs 2010b, xviii-xix; Mikulewicz 2020, 1823-1824; Johansson 2013, 13, 252; Douzinas 2013, 153; Duffield 2013, 196).

Where the carboniferous industrial capitalism during colonialism created both new kinds of pressure as well as opportunities for Europe to expand economically in search for new resources, markets and targets for investment, the massively accumulating oil-money of New York investment banks in the 1970's similarly created a need of profitable outlets - the current developing countries, that is, former colonies, turning out attractive targets for investments in both cases. (Koponen 2009d, 103; Harvey 2008, 27.) The neoliberal "investment", however, came in the form of a loan whose terms entail that instead of the lender, the "borrowers are forced by state and international powers to take on board the cost of debt repayment", which eventually led to the implementation of the infamous 'structural adjustments programs' in developing countries, in which "in return for debt rescheduling, indebted countries were required to implement institutional reforms, such as cuts in welfare expenditures, more flexible labor market laws, and privatization" (Harvey 2008, 29; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 98-99; Koponen 2009c, 38; Kääriäinen 2015, 35, 37) - all to the benefit of the neoliberal economic system falsely promising to lift developing economies out of poverty (Koponen 2009e, 116, 118, 124-128; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 98; Eskelinen 2011, 102-103; Kääriäinen 2015, 35, 53-54; Harvey 2008). Hence, historically (since the early modern period) and still, wealth flows from poor countries to the rich, ever widening the economic and social gap between them (Koponen 2009e, 129; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-9, 11; Lummis 2011, 47-48; Kääriäinen 2015, 21, 31-32, 114, 127, 163; Eskelinen 2011, 42, 56-57, 66-67, 93-95, 100, 109; Sachs 2010b, xvii; Gough 2017, 11, 31-33). According to David Harvey (2008, 16, 29, 31; also Peet & Hartwick 2015, 114-117), these developments, however, are in fact "structural" to the whole "project" of neoliberalism, which ultimately aims to restore "class power" to the "economic elite or upper class in the US and elsewhere in the advanced capitalist countries". The hegemonic neoliberal economic and development paradigms, hence, not only produce but entail and sustain global inequality, to the benefit of the global North and the global elite, thus keeping the global

South poor, subordinated and in constant need of external help in their efforts to “develop” (Eskelinen 2011, 45-46, 87, 92, 101-102, 107, 111, 131-132, 141-142; Lummis 2011, 48-50; Esteva 2010, 7, 9-15, 18-19; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 9-10, 157-158; Kääriäinen 2015, 27, 56-57, 63-65, 151-152, 155-156; Duffield 2013, 196, 206, 211; Chomsky 2016; Escobar 2012, 176-177).

### 2.1.3 Developing Countries and Interventionist Developmentalism

The global South is a diverse group of ‘developing countries’, another concept lacking a straightforward definition (Koponen 2009c, 40). Generally speaking, countries are classified as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ based on their economic and social development, that is, taking into account the distribution of wealth and people’s well-being in addition to income levels – developing countries ranking at the bottom in all or most aspects (Koponen 2009c, 37). However, this division is complicated by the fact that the classification depends on the classifier and their method of classification, which is why some countries may rank in different categories depending on the indicators used, while there is also significant variation between countries within the categories (Koponen 2009c, 37, 40, 43). For example, where the World Bank (WB) ranks countries on purely economic terms, the UN takes also into account the social dimensions of development, while scholars further include historical and cultural aspects, and for ‘developmentalists’, a developing country is simply one which receives development aid from its counterparts, developed countries (Koponen 2009c, 30, 37, 39, 41). Hence, some countries, such as India and China, as receivers of Official Development Aid (ODA), are defined as developing countries, although they rank as Lower- and Upper Middle-Income Countries respectively, as defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD<sup>1</sup> (Koponen 2009c, 43; OECD 2023). Furthermore, the income difference between countries in the DAC category of developing countries might be a hundredfold, while the poorest donors might be poorer than the wealthiest receivers of aid (Koponen 2009c, 43). Also, most of the world’s poor might actually live in Low Income Countries (LIC’s), such as India, as defined by the WB, instead of Least Developed Countries (LDC’s), as defined by the UN (Koponen 2009c, 41-42; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 7-9).

International economy and politics, however, entail an “unequivocal definition for a developing country”, as the status determines whether a country is eligible for development aid as well as its loan terms and terms of trade, which are much cheaper – and, according to the UN, should be completely free of attachments, that is, gifted – for developing countries, which is why some countries still apply for, and seek to maintain, the status of a LDC, in hopes of (sustained) special treatment in the international economy (Koponen 2009c, 41-43). So, the status of a developing country, although an originally external and subjugating category, has also become useful and, hence, understandably, attractive for its possessors. The concept of ‘developing coun-

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<sup>1</sup> International forum for the G20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, South-Africa, South-Korea, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States and the EU.

try', thus, is most of all, an "instrument" of international politics, useful for, and utilized by, both the receivers and the developmentalist, interventionist donors of development aid (Koponen 2009c, 43, 45; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 5; Eskelinen 2011, 77-79; Kääriäinen 2015, 43, 74-75, 126).

'Developmentalism', then – also referred to as the 'development apparatus' or 'development industry' – is the uniting framework for the components of the so called "'developmentalist complex'", which includes the discussion, politics and study of development, the practices of development aid and cooperation, and the development institutions – the UN among others – implementing, facilitating and funding these practices (Koponen 2009a, 60). Although the ethos of developmentalism is solidarity, as opposed to the exploitative self-interest of the colonial practices of development, developmentalism is not charity, but rather, it is by definition supposed to benefit both the giver and receiver of aid (Koponen 2009a, 61-62; Gronemeyer 2011, 56-57; Kääriäinen 18, 19, 21, 46). This way, however, solidarity creates a strong moral justification, and even moral obligation, for self-interest as well as developmentalist intervention and exercise of power in the South, by both the North as well as local actors, in the name of "collective good" and "collective interest", where the global North stands as the self-proclaimed example of ideal economic and societal development – based on European ideologies and gained at the expense of the global South – for the so declared and created "developing" nations to follow economically, socially and psychologically, hence abridging space for alternative views and interpretations of development (Koponen 2009a, 51-52, 54-55, 61-64; Esteva 2010, 3, 6; Eskelinen 2011, 15-19, 64, 72, 79, 105, 107; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 3-4; Gronemeyer 2011, 56-57). So, as much as the concepts of development and underdevelopment are European constructs, developmentalism is an interventionist endeavor, and the UN, since its foundation, has been an integral part of the development apparatus formulating the definitions, indicators and instruments of development, today representing its highest authority (Koponen 2009a, 49, 60-62, 64; Esteva 2010, 8-14; Duffield 2013, 194).

#### **2.1.4 The Hegemonic Neoliberal Development Paradigm**

Although the development apparatus operates to impose Western development ideals onto the rest of the world, its aspirations, however, have diminished from complete societal transformation into only partial modernization and, most importantly, alleviating poverty (Koponen 2009a, 55-56; Esteva 2010, 1, 4-5, 7-8, 12; Eskelinen 2011, 24-25, 103; Kääriäinen 2015, 14; Johansson 2013, 13, 243). 'Poverty alleviation' is currently accepted as the main goal of all development institutions from the UN to grassroots actors (Koponen 2009a, 38, 56-57; Kääriäinen 2015, 14; Eskelinen 2011). The paradigm shift stems from the realization of planetary limits, which lead to the less ambitious objectives in developing the South as well as to the emerging of the concept of 'sustainable development' in the 1980's - "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" - which questioned Western consumption patterns and extending them to the developing world, but which has been criticized for only ostensibly reforming the idea of development yet still operating on neoliberal terms (Koponen 2009a, 56-57; Eskelinen



2011, 7-8, 59, 65, 98; Esteva 2010, 13; Lummis 2011, 48; IISD 2023; Sachs 2010a, x-xi; Kääriäinen 2015, 34; Escobar 2012, 199-200).

Indeed, despite this shift in focus the basic elements of development persist – the economy before anything else, the demand for its continuous growth, and imposing Western development ideals remain the cornerstones of the hegemonic development paradigm (Koponen 2009a, 57-58; Esteva 2010, 8; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 17; Eskelinen 2011, 26-27, 43, 56, 64, 99-100, 116, 128; Kääriäinen 2015, 13, 111-112, 147-148; Johansson 2013, 240). Globalization, that is, intense participation in the world economy, is considered a prerequisite for, and “the best option” for developing countries to achieve development, although practice proves otherwise (Koponen 2009b, 84-86; Koponen 2009e, 116, 118, 124-128; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 117; Duffield 2013, 200). The paradigm emphasizes the role of choosing the “right politics” that aims to strengthen the market economy which entails, in addition to globalization, investing in social capital and stable macroeconomics – the last one being a precondition for the other two, although not a guarantee for future development, according to the WB (Koponen 2009b, 84). The government’s job, then, is to create favorable political and institutional conditions for the operation of the market economy, and to invest in social capital – that is, the people, including the poor – in order to “increase economic productivity and efficiency”, by producing basic services (Koponen 2009b, 85-86). The faith in achieving development through determined interventions, based on such development politics and paradigm, is also central (Koponen 2009b, 88; Eskelinen 2011, 66, 91). – The hegemonic development paradigm, hence, perfectly aligns with the hegemonic neoliberal economic paradigm, although practice and history clearly refute its promises of development; the neoliberal global market system, with its terms, value chains, and organizations, like the seemingly egalitarian World Trade Organization (WTO), make it factually impossible for developing countries to genuinely compete with developed countries and their transnational companies, which still dictate the terms for their own benefit, not to mention the fact that neither free trade, nor neoliberal reforms, have produced desired outcomes in LDC’s, and that free trade alone was never responsible for the development of the global North (Koponen 2009e, 116, 118, 124-129, 131-147; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 105, 113; Eskelinen 2011, 59, 65, 68, 78-79, 91-92, 96, 110-111, 123-125, 145; Kääriäinen 2015, 14, 18, 21, 35, 63, 114, 117-118, 151-152; Duffield 2013, 200; Escobar 2015, 183).

The economic emphasis of the hegemonic development paradigm obviously manifests also in the indicators of development. Even today, development is still largely measured in Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, although it has been supplemented with the Human Development Index (HDI), established by the UN, in efforts to unify the economic and social dimensions of development, the HDI including factors such as life-expectancy, the level of education and income per capita (purchasing power parity - gross national income, PPP-GNI) - measures criticized for being defined by the “first world market economies”, leaving much uncounted, and being ultimately just another “instrument of power” for those ranking highest on the development “ladder”, setting an example of ideal development for the rest. (Koponen 2009c, 35, 37, 39; Esteva 2010, 8-9, 13-14; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 6–7, 11-14; Eskelinen 2011, 36, 86; Duffield 2013, 194; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 154). As rapid economic growth in developing countries did not generate the desired structural changes but

instead increased inequality, the “social obstacles” to development could no longer be ignored, and social development, thus, became both the precondition as well as the moral justification for economic development (Esteva 2010, 8-9; Koponen 2009a, 65). The effort to unify social and economic development, the “biopolitical turn”, however, only lead to dispersion, in which, instead of an integrated perspective, different aspects of social development were, and are still, placed at the center of attention and action at a time (UN development goals being an example of this), with different interest groups then, counterproductively, fighting for that attention and allocated resources (Esteva 2010, 11; Eskelinen 2011, 61-62; Kääriäinen 2015, 56; Duffield 2013, 193-194). So, today, instead of comprehensive change in societal structures, any progress in any of the isolated sectors of social development – for instance, democracy, literacy, freedoms, life-expectancy or equality – can be considered development (Koponen 2009a, 56-57; Eskelinen 2011, 11, 61-63). The goal of development today, hence, is simply making the living conditions of developing countries better than what they used to be, but not equivalent to those of developed countries, and keeping the world’s poorest part of the “global system” – or, as some critics argue, “barely alive” (Koponen 2009a, 56, 58; Eskelinen 2011, 60-61, 67, 104; Duffield 2013, 206).

### 2.1.5 Criticism of the Hegemonic Development Paradigm and Aid

Development as poverty alleviation has been criticized for the arbitrariness of poverty lines (1 or 2 dollars a day), and for being “superficial at best” and “ideological gaslighting at worst” (Koponen 2009a, 58; Eskelinen 2011, 104-105, 111). Indeed, in the face of planetary limits no one is no longer expecting, striving, or even hoping for the impossible, that is, *letting* developing countries to follow in the footsteps of, or “catching up” with, the developed countries, but yet “developing” in the usual neoliberal manner prevails, despite its perpetual failure and tragic consequences to the poor (Koponen 2009a, 56-57; Eskelinen 2011, 55-56, 105-107, 116, 133; Lummis 2011, 48-49; Kääriäinen 2015, 11, 14, 65, 95, 100-101). This becomes intelligible through the realization that the current hegemonic development paradigm is an extension of Euro-Atlantic, neoliberal ideals and politics, the development apparatus (in which the UN is a constitutive actor) expanding their reach and influence all over the world, as they are being imposed through development interventions and policy onto the so declared “developing countries” under the pretext of benevolence, effectively keeping them economically, politically and psychologically dependent and subordinate – development, hence, in all its constituents, amounting to a profitable exercise of oppressive, exploitative power, to the benefit of the global elite, currently through mechanisms of poverty alleviation, that is, practically just (unequally) allocating and shifting “benefits and burdens” from one group of people to another (Peet & Hartwick 2015, 9-10, 20, 110-112; Eskelinen 2011, 75, 79, 106-107, 123, 131-133, 135, 141-142; Esteva 2010, 4-5, 7-11; Lummis 2011, 48, 50; Kääriäinen 2015, 18, 19, 21-22, 27, 34, 46, 55-57, 63-65, 70, 74-75, 107-108, 111-112, 134, 149-152, 155-156; Johansson 2013, 13, 235; Koponen 2009a, 64; Douzinas 2013, 154; Duffield 2013, 192, 194, 196, 200-201, 211; Escobar 2012, 176-177; Chomsky 2016).

This claim is supported by critics of the hegemonic development paradigm, that is, post-development theorists, who consistently, and understandably, also tend to be

critics of the hegemonic neoliberal paradigm (eg. Peet & Hartwick 2015; Klein 2014, 228; Gough 2017; Harvey 2008; Sachs 2010; Gronemeyer 2010; Andreucci & Zografos 2022; Mikulewicz 2020, 1808, 1824-1825; Esteva 2010, 20; Eskelinen 2011, 89, 91, 94-97, 101, 108, 129; Koponen 2009a, 65-66; Duffield 2013, 211; Escobar 2012 etc.). In short, they point out the global historical and ongoing destruction caused by capitalism together with “development” to both nature and the poor, and how neoliberal capitalism and development utterly conflict with environmental protection, fighting climate change, the rights and well-being of indigenous and poor people as well as genuine – unpredictable and thus threatening – democracy (Eskelinen 2011, 106, 118-119, 136-139, 141, 145, 150; Klein 2014, 101-103, 105-106, 110-112, 133; Gough 2017; Kääriäinen 2015, 11-13, 108-111, 114; Chomsky 2016). They reveal how, paradoxically, neoliberal objectives conflict with the apparent objectives of the hegemonic development paradigm (poverty alleviation), while the means of development actually align with neoliberal values, and how development, hence, serves the interests of – and is a “business” between – the elites in both North and South. In the same vein, they argue that the concept of ‘sustainable development’ is based on the same, unequal economic values and, in fact, mainly functions to redeem the ‘idea of development’, as genuine sustainability would mean economic ruin of the elite. (Escobar 2012, 199-200; Eskelinen 2011, 78, 117, 135; Esteva 2010, 13; Kääriäinen 2015, 75, 96, 100-101, 134, 147; Johansson 2013, 11-12, 240; Ferguson 1990, 70; Duffield 2013, 206, 211.) Indeed, poverty cannot be alleviated, or basic necessities guaranteed for all, by relying on a “myth” of development, which follows the intrinsically unequal logic of neoliberal economics, in which the poverty, abjection, inferiority, dependency and humiliation of the subordinated majority is the prerequisite for the abundance, well-being, power, autonomy and pride of the dominating minority (Lummis 2011, 47-48, 50; Kääriäinen 2015, 104-108; Duffield 2013, 206, 211). The critics point out how the promises of the “trickle down” -effect (in which poverty alleviation depends on the rich getting richer) of the neoliberal project have failed in both South and North, and criticize the continuously “expanding, increasingly more official, hierarchical and institutionalized” aid based on this neoliberal logic, the consequent perpetual failure, harmfulness and counter-productivity of the technical and administrative top-down development projects, their systemic problems of, for instance, ownership, effectiveness, evaluation, accountability to donors over recipients, abridging freedom, autonomy and democracy, depoliticizing poverty by disregarding and distracting attention away from the structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment, and which eventually produce inequality, dependency, subordination and the (modern) deliberately sustained and progressive condition of poverty (Kääriäinen 2015, 11, 13-14, 16, 20, 22, 28, 31-32, 35-37, 39-41, 65, 74-75, 94, 96-97, 99-102, 105-107, 111-113, 124-125, 139, 141, 144, 162-163; Ferguson 1990; Eskelinen 2011, 31, 37, 55, 72, 74-75, 78, 87, 89, 108, 116, 119-123, 135-139, 143, 150; Johansson 2013, 11-12, 235, 238-240, 242-243; Esteva 2010, 9-15, 18-19; Lummis 2011, 48-50; Mikulewicz 2020, 1825; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-9, 11; Koponen 2009a, 66; de Waal 2013, 36-40, 56, 60-61; Duffield 2013, 192, 194-195, 198, 206; Escobar 2012, 176-177). They criticize the mainstream actors and their work in development, climate action and environmental protection for their urge to intervene ever more, their ineffectiveness, corruption and internal conflicts, along with the actors working actively

against them (global elite, transnational and oil companies etc.), and the adverse consequences of the actions of both to the indigenous and poor people in both global North and South – genocide by “slow violence” at worst (Eskelinen 2011, 34-35, 43, 46-47, 66, 68-69, 74-76, 82, 123, 136, 138; Kääriäinen 2015, 11, 13, 22, 28, 31, 35, 46, 54-57, 65, 74-75, 78-79, 94, 100, 107-108, 116-117, 132; Klein 2014, 101-103, 105-106, 110-112, 133, 335-350, 354, 361; Johansson 2013, 235; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 108, 110; Ferguson 1990; de Waal 2013, 19, 21, 24, 27-28, 37-40, 60-61; Douzinas 2013, 153-154; Duffield 2013, 198). Furthermore, they note that the benevolent act of ‘helping’ is intrinsically ambivalent and always problematic – an othering, patronizing, humiliating – and in worst cases – exploitative and oppressive process producing dependency, and which, in the form of ‘development aid’, is connected to the equally criticized self-proclaimed superiority and “cultural leadership” of the North, their idea of “being ahead”, as well as possessing “better knowledge by definition” which can be unproblematically distributed by their “experts” – in a word, helping is an “elegant exercise of power”, a “strategy” in which the helper (donor) defines the need for, the subject and form of, as well as the conditions of helping based on, and to serve, their own national interests, and in which the true needs of the recipients are secondary to the technical implementation of a project (eg. Eskelinen 2011, 37, 45, 71-76, 78, 89, 91, 107-108, 135, 137; Harvey 2005, 66; Gough 2017, 49; Gronemeyer 2011, 55-57, 59-60; Weidenstedt 2016; Holroyd 2021; Ferguson 1990; Kääriäinen 2015, 11, 13, 18, 22, 38, 41, 111-113; Johansson 2013, 12-13, 235, 239-241, 252; Lummis 2011, 48; Koponen 2009a, 64; de Waal 2013, 39-40; Cornwall & Rivas 2015). Indeed, humanitarian aid, or the “empire of humanity”, is criticized for being “patronizing caring” and “global governing” of the peripheries by “Western centers”, which “needs” and “pursues power”, has given up the ideological aim of “making itself redundant”, and is based on the “unspoken rule” of “not endangering”, that is, securing, the development of the North – hence, speaking of security, the othering, essentializing and homogenizing discourses of the hegemonic neoliberal and development paradigms not only abridge space for alternative worldviews and perspectives, and discursively produce the world’s poor as lacking, inferior, vulnerable, “passive and rightless”, and without voice or agency, but also effectively turn the questions of global poverty and vulnerability to climate change into questions of global security (and violence), in which poor and vulnerable areas and people are perceived as a security threat to (the lifestyle of) the North or as easily expendable “sacrifice zones” in the face of current and expected natural disasters and humanitarian crises (Klein 2014, 217-228, 249; Mikulewicz 2020; Andreucci & Zografos 2022, 1-5, 8; Eskelinen 2011, 75, 78-79, 138-139; Lummis 2011, 50-51; Kääriäinen 2015, 111-113, 125; Johansson 2013, 13, 238-241, 243; de Waal 2013, 39-40; Duffield 2013, 194-196, 201-203, 211; Escobar 2012, 7, 184; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 154-155, 157; de Wit 2021; Zaman 2021; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Djoudi et al. 2016; Arora-Jonsson 2011; Weidenstedt 2016; Collier 2007; Buxton & Hayes 2016). – Thus, the current hegemonic neoliberal development paradigm is judged as obsolete and in need of thorough reformation, for which the inevitable revolutionary physical and social impacts of climate change and resource scarcity, if nothing else, will offer some much needed and anticipated pressure (Eskelinen 2011; Koponen 2009a, 65-66, 81; Kääriäinen 2015, 126-127, 148, 162-163; Klein 2014; Kääriäinen 2015, 158, 167).

Indeed, noting that the impoverished state of the global South is an inevitable outcome and a deliberately sustained precondition for the neoliberal system and elite power, critics call for drastic changes in the global market system as well as economic and development policy in the form of; egalitarian global redistribution of resources, wealth and power as rights, not “gifts”, which the poor could demand with pride from their governments, not development agencies (Eskelinen 2011, 79, 116, 121, 135-136, 138, 140, 144-145; Gough 2017, 14; Kääriäinen 2015, 150, 165, 167); expanding genuine democracy (Eskelinen 2011, 135, 150; Kääriäinen 2015, 13); dismantling dependencies and increasing the economic, political and social autonomy of the poor at all levels (Eskelinen 2011, 79-80, 135, 138, 141-142, 144); giving up the cultural leadership of the North and its idea of “being ahead”, along with the role of “unbiased experts” and “heroes” in humanitarian aid (Eskelinen 2011, 117, 149; Kääriäinen 2015, 127; Johansson 2013, 253); self-awareness, self-criticism and responsibility in terms of power of development actors (de Waal 2013, 19, 21, 38; Johansson 2013, 252-253); acknowledging and fostering diversity and alternative worldviews, lifestyles and ideas (of prosperity, too) (pluriverse) (Escobar 2012, 7, 17, 23-28; Lummis 2011, 51); supporting (also financially) grassroots movements for social and climate justice and environmental protection (of especially indigenous peoples) (Eskelinen 2011, 139-140, 145-146; de Waal 2013, 44; Klein 2014); giving space for endogenous societal development and local solutions, based on the genuine problems and needs of the poor, not the solutions of the “helpers”, that is, less intervening and “developing” altogether (Eskelinen 2011, 71, 77, 89, 91, 117, 145-146, 150; Koponen 2009e, 148; Koponen 2009a, 66; Kääriäinen 2015, 11-12, 152-153; Escobar 2012, 185); psychologically detaching material consumption from well-being and the idea of prosperity from money, and detaching poverty alleviation from the “success” of and the increase of consumption levels in the North (Eskelinen 2011, 135, 147, 149; Lummis 2011, 51); “counter-developing” the North by “psychologically freeing” the rich from the “experience of scarcity”, decreasing consumption and changing consumption patterns to enable nature conservation and equitable distribution of natural resources (Eskelinen 2011, 112, 135, 148-149; Esteva 2010, 14-15; Gough 2017, 14; Lummis 2011, 51-52; Koponen 2009a, 66; Kääriäinen 2015, 127, 166); accepting and strengthening the public sector and increasing its services and shared use to decrease emissions and resource consumption, along with stricter governmental regulation of corporations (Eskelinen 2011, 147-149; Gough 2017, 14; Kääriäinen 2015, 150-153); and lastly, exchanging fossil energy and the blind faith in technology, neoliberal economics and neoliberal development for renewable energy, an egalitarian economic system, including complete debt relief for developing countries, genuinely democratic politics on all levels, and a new, different, yet unknown, form of development, preferably a pluriverse, ensuring the prerequisites for a meaningful life for all people – and actively advocating for these changes (Eskelinen 2011, 80, 89, 91, 115-117, 121, 130, 142, 144-145, 150; Klein 2014, 335-350; Andreucci & Zografos 2022, 8-9; Escobar 2012; Gough 2017, 15, 42-48, 50; Koponen 2009e, 148; Kääriäinen 2015, 12-13, 151-152).

## 2.2 Knowledge, Power and Governmentality

This chapter gives a brief overview of 'Foucauldian theory' and defines related key concepts of power and genealogy, power-knowledge, regime and politics of truth, governance and governmentality, based on the reviews of several Finnish scholars (Mörä et al. 2014, Jokinen et al. 2016, Kantola et al. 1998 etc.) which are considered sufficient to gain a basic understanding of what is relevant. The Foucauldian theory, in general, has an openly critical and emancipatory take on 'power' (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014; 225-226 [Husa 1995]), which Foucault defines as "productive" rather than "repressive", not a "property" of an individual or an institution, nor a "power externally defining discourses", but an "ability" and "domination", "omnipresent" and "exercised" in social relations and discursive action (Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 77; Kantola, Moring & Väliaverronen 1998, 104; O'Farrell 2007-2021). Foucault was interested in "how oppressive power relations" were produced in "different ways in social practices" and criticized "how 'enlightened' practices produce inequality and subordination and abridge freedom" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 208). The Foucauldian theory hence inextricably interconnects "power, knowledge, truth and the subject" and "societal relations of effect" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 208 [McNay 1994, 6], 219; Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 48; Kantola, Moring & Väliaverronen 1998, 103; O'Farrell 2007-2021).

In practice, the Foucauldian approach aims to question "prevailing truths" by means of analyzing and deconstructing the "intellectual basis of existing positions of power" and domination, examining "power saturated" texts as discourses, and doing research on subjects "pushed aside" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014; 225-226 [Husa 1995]). This study of the "field where power is exercised" is referred to as Foucault's "genealogy of power" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 218-219). 'Genealogy of power', hence, studies the "intertwining" of "regimes of truth" ("discursive practices") and "regimes of practice" ("non-discursive practices") that is, the possibilities of saying and doing, and more specifically, how language is "used in networks of power", that is, how "power is exercised" in practice (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 217 [Dean 1997, 64-65], 219; O'Farrell 2007-2021).

The relationship between 'truth' and power - or "power-knowledge" in Foucault's words - is "orbicular"; on the one hand, 'truth' produces 'practices' and 'regimes' which "produce and maintain power", and on the other hand, power has consequences and produces 'truths' to serve "its own needs" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 218-219 [Kaarre 1994]; O'Farrell 2007-2021; Helén 2004, 208).

According to Foucault, "modern Western societies" have a "shared politics of truth" which includes "certain discourses", "coequally valued techniques to achieve the truth", and the "status" or position of "those stating the truth". This 'politics of truth' "consists of five features"; 1. scientific knowledge is "the purest", 2. politics and economics continually use 'truth' as an "excuse" and make "demands in the name of truth", 3. 'truth' is utilized and distributed broadly (e.g. journalism, school system etc.), 4. 'truth' is "produced and transferred under control in few big economic and political systems" (e.g. media, universities, the army etc.), and 5. 'truth' is the "subject of polit-

ical debate and societal battle". These 'regimes of truth' in societies are effective because they are "elevated to an independent privileged position, above power", where "power can be criticized and questioned" unlike the "prevailing truth" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 219 [Foucault 1984b, 73; Sheridan 1980]; O'Farrell 2007-2021; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 230-232).

Lastly, Foucault emphasizes the "significance of the concept of governance in analyzing power relations" and different forms of exercising political power, in particular (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 223 [Foucault 2000a, 337-345], [Kantola 2002, 26]). The exercise of "governmentalized power" aims to "classify and govern" people by means of "political economic knowledge" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 223). "Governance is a question of political rationality, intellectual apparatuses" which "shape reality" to become suitable for a "political programme", the "calculated and rational" action to shape our "desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs" in order to "shape our conduct". The study of this 'governance', in practice, focuses on the "vocabulary and techniques of governance", the processes of 'reasoning' and the 'practices' based on that reasoning (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Kantola 2002, 31]; O'Farrell 2007-2021; Rahkonen 2004, 209 [Dean 1999, 11]). Another way to study 'governance' is to analyze "the way governance legitimizes and justifies its status and action" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Rose 1999, 28]; Ruostesaari 2014, 60). Foucault himself suggests that research on 'governance' and power analysis could focus, for instance, on "systems of segregation, subjects and instruments of power, institutionalization of power" and "rationalization techniques" which "maintain power" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Foucault 2000b, 342-345]; also Pietikäinen 2010, 104). Indeed, the "few on top" control and have power over the "masses", by maintaining control of the "institutionalized resources of the society", and as long as the subjects "acknowledge and approve" of, or in other words, give legitimacy to, this power (Ruostesaari 2014, 58-59 [Mann 1986, 7; Kunelius etc. 2009, 18-19]).

### **2.3 Ferguson's Conceptual Development Apparatus**

Building on Foucault's theorizations of 'governance' and the 'intellectual apparatuses', James Ferguson's (1990) theorization of the "development apparatus" and "anti-politics machine", provide the element of development into the theoretical framework. In his research, an elaborate case study of a development project in Lesotho, Ferguson critically discusses the reasons for the frequent failure of development projects in general, their continuing attraction and support despite being unsuccessful, along with their unexpected and unintended outcomes, and with respect to those, the instrumental role of the development apparatus.

Ferguson's (1990) theory of the "anti-politics machine" argues that while development projects fail to produce the intended outcomes and development, they do have other unexpected, "instrument-effects" in the target community; an "institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power" and a "conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticizing both poverty and the state" (1990, 256). More specifically, ignoring

the existing power relations in the target community, and perceiving the local government as an apolitical organization cooperating in a "neutral" project which reduces poverty into a technical problem, are the elements of depoliticizing essentially political problems. By doing this, the project sets itself an impossible task with unforeseen problems and effects, in the end leading to the failure of the project itself while instrumentally and unintentionally serving the interests of certain, already powerful parties. The "anti-politics machine", hence, refers to this process where development projects carried out in cooperation with local governments unintentionally expand the platform for political power struggle through the expansion of state bureaucratic power, supervision, and control, consequently abridging the possibilities of the target community to take part in that struggle by reducing the room for voices of political opposition. Furthermore, these unintended outcomes and instrumental use of development projects, Ferguson suggests, may in fact be the reason for the persisting attraction and support for failing development projects, but emphasizes that this is not a question of a conspiracy and that the process is only coherent and intelligible in retrospect (also Escobar 2012, 158) – a much less controversial perspective compared to some other critics of development.

In development cooperation and interventions, the development apparatus has a vital role. Ferguson (1990) distinguishes between conceptual and institutional development apparatuses, the first of which produces the target and justification for the development intervention to be implemented by the second one. In practice, the conceptual development apparatus includes high level international development agencies, such as the WB or the UN, which aim, firstly, to produce justification and legitimacy for a development intervention in order to put their allocated funds and resources into action, in other words, try to find, exaggerate, and even invent the "right kind of problems", reduced into technical ones, to fit their ready technical "solutions" on offer. Secondly, they aim to locate and produce a suitable target for the "export" of their "standardized development package", which they then try to "sell" to the, often resistant, recipients irrespective of their local or national objectives (also Kääriäinen 2015, 37, 40, 111-112; Escobar 2012, 181-182). Indeed, it is characteristic of the conceptual apparatus to oversimplify certain elements to serve their own goals, in Ferguson's research, for instance, by constructing the right kind of country profile to fit the category of a "less developed country" or perceiving "the people" as an undifferentiated mass with collective interests and the government as a unitary agent (also Kääriäinen 2015, 112). In turn, the institutional apparatus, that is, the development project, is eventually carried out by, for instance, a local NGO. In conclusion, the solution defines the problem, and it is this basis being backwards that is the root cause of the perpetually failing development projects. What is more, the discourses and "information" produced by the high level development agencies are considered authoritative in the development field, and the pick-and-choose discourse regrettably remains uniform, as throughout the process of carrying out projects, facts that do not "fit the picture" are actively ignored in evaluation, analysis, and reports, which not only feeds into the continuous failing of individual projects, but also hinders the development of the development "industry" on the whole. (Ferguson 1990, 30, 67-70, 87-88, 241-242, 280, 284-285; Pietikäinen 2010, 104; Kääriäinen 2015, 96-97, 99-102.)



## 2.4 Governing by Development Intervention

This section aims to discuss how Ferguson's theorizations on the anti-politics machine and development apparatus make use of Foucault's theorizations on knowledge, power and governmentality, and explain their relevance and application in this study. Like Foucault's power, producing 'truths' to serve its own needs, and 'enlightened practices' producing subordination and abridging freedom, Ferguson's anti-politics machine abridges the space for political opposition and power struggle. The 'anti-politics machine' with its 'conceptual development apparatus' producing suitable targets for development programs, again, is parallel to Foucault's 'governance' by 'intellectual apparatuses' shaping reality to fit political programs. Furthermore, where Ferguson's conceptual development apparatus produces justification and legitimacy for a development intervention, so does governance and its intellectual apparatuses aim to legitimize and justify their own status and action. Development interventions can thus be considered forms of governance. – Where Foucault's 'governmentalized power' aims to classify and govern people by means of political economic knowledge, and the Western 'politics of truth' relies on and makes demands in the name of especially scientific knowledge, produced and distributed in 'few big political and economic systems', Ferguson's conceptual development apparatus, too, produces and distributes authoritative knowledge through high level international development agencies, selectively appealing to science, making oversimplified classifications in the process of justifying development intervention and making demands, or governing, with the aim of changing people's behavior and achieving social change, in a word, exercises a form of governmentalized power.

Where Ferguson takes a neutral stance on the intentionality of governing by development intervention, some critics of development, including this study, however, clearly argue for it (Eskelinen 2011, 41-42; Harvey 2008, 29; Koponen 2009a, 65; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 4). Considering development intervention as a form of governance – intentional unsolicited action by one group, with the aim to influence and control the actions of another – begs the question of the inbuilt, inescapable imbalance in the power relations between such actors. This brings us to the existing inequality in the global North-South power dynamic, especially in the context of development, where the direction of development action from the powerful North to subordinate South is an unquestionable norm. Hence, in this study, development intervention as an exercise of governmentalized power is considered fundamentally unequal action, inevitably maintaining and reproducing the existing unequal North-South power dynamics, the already powerful position of the "developed" North compared to the subordinate "developing" or "underdeveloped" South. Likewise, development intervention related knowledge production – direction of action being from North to South – is considered to carry this same inbuilt burden of power imbalance, eventually making it only a question of exactly how subordination is produced in such linguistic action.

A major player in development related knowledge production is the United Nations – a powerful global organization exercising administrative power on the world's nations regarding development, having the power to define its standards, problems,

goals and solutions as well as to facilitate ensuing action. The UN, hence, plays a leading role in the global development system, but also – keeping in mind the intertwining of knowledge and power as well as the intrinsic problematic of development – a significant role in the global North-South power dynamic, all in all. By producing administrative development intervention related knowledge, the UN also plays a major role in ‘governing by development intervention’. Hence, in this study, the UN is considered an intellectual, conceptual development apparatus, producing development intervention related knowledge, and characteristically within it, legitimacy and justification for development intervention as well as its own action and status. How this knowledge produced by the UN reproduces existing global inequality, in the power saturated and inequality-stricken context of climate change, gender equality and development intervention in the form of ‘empowerment’, is under inspection in this study, and will be elaborated on in the following chapters.

### **3 UN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND GENDER**

Complementary to the theoretical framework, this Chapter critically discusses the remaining dimensions of the politicohistorical sociocultural context of this study, namely, the role of the UN as conceptual development apparatus in global policy and governance, in the context of climate change, gender equality and development intervention, the historical and current inequality related to the causes and politics of climate change, and the complex inequalities related to gender which, too, intertwine with global inequality.

#### **3.1 United Nations**

##### **3.1.1 UN Leading Global Climate and Gender Equality Policies**

Founded in 1945, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations has grown from its original 51 member states into the world's largest intergovernmental organization with 193 member states today (UN 2022; National Geographic 2022). The United Nations is a part of a larger 'UN system' which coordinates its work through "funds, programs and specialized agencies". As opposed to its original aim of preventing a future world war, the UN today works to maintain international peace and security, deliver humanitarian aid, protect human rights, uphold international law, and support sustainable development and climate action, the last two being significant from the perspective of this study. – According to the UN, the objectives of sustainable development and climate action are linked. There are goals, agreements, action plans and programs regarding both, starting from the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) set in 2000 to be met by 2015, followed by the Sustainable Development Agenda with the current 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) and 169 targets to be achieved by 2030, along with the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. (UN 2022.) Regarding the focus of this study on the context of climate change and gender equality, and the data dating back to 2010, that is, prior to the 2015 target date of the MDG's, I will briefly discuss how both the MDG's, and the current SDG's, have addressed the topic, along with the Paris agreement.

The MDG's aimed to 'promote gender equality and empower women' (Goal 3), by means of eliminating "gender disparity" in education (UN 2013a), and 'ensure environmental sustainability' (Goal 7), by promoting sustainable policies and human well-being along with reducing biodiversity loss, expressing a concern for future climate change and increasing emissions (UN 2013b). Both goals were only partially achieved (UN 2023a; UN 2023b). Where the MDG's hardly mention climate change as part of a larger environmental goal, the SDG's of the current 2030 Agenda, in contrast, explicitly list 'climate action' (Goal 13) as one of the 17 goals set, along with 'gender equality' (Goal 5) (UN 2022). Out of the five specific climate action targets mentioned, only one, 13.1, explicitly concerns "all countries", while two (13.A, 13.B) explicitly focus on "developing" and "least developed countries". Two targets (13.3, 13.A) are related to mitigation, one with no mention of target area, while the other appeals to "developed-country parties" to "implement" their "commitment" of "mobilizing" funds "to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions", but not adaptation. One target (13.B) promoting "mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries" explicitly mentions a focus on women among other groups. (UN 2023d.) As for gender equality, then, the SDG's list nine targets, two of which (5.1, 5.C) explicitly refer to "all women and girls", while none of them mention developed countries or climate change (UN 2023e). All in all, the emphasis of the MDG's on poverty, HIV/AIDS, and education (UN 2023c), has shifted to those of poverty, inequality and climate change of the SDG's, the "decade of action" 2020-2030 having a special emphasis on empowering women and girls (UN 2022). Regarding both climate change and gender equality, now at the forefront, the UN notes that the "world is not on track" to achieve goals related to either, gender equality, in fact, having "begun to reverse" (UN 2022; UN 2023d; UN 2023e).

While achieving the goals of Sustainable Development Agenda is a matter of voluntary planning, implementation and monitoring for member states, the Paris Climate Agreement is a "legally binding international treaty", but *only in terms of improving "national plans"*, not performance, "every five years" to "strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping the global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, or even below 1.5 degrees Celsius" and "to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change" (UNFCCC 2022; UN 2022; Gough 2017, 36). Legally binding international treaties related to gender, then, include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, adopted in 1979 (Mattila et al. 2007, 245), along with the transformational Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, leading to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action for women's empowerment, shifting "the focus from women to the concept of gender" and "bringing the cause of gender equality to the center of the global agenda", thus, becoming "the key global policy document on gender equality" (UN 2023f), which has since shaped the national gender equality work of member states, including development cooperation, in both North and South (Mattila et al. 2007, 246, 248). All in all, the significance of the UN in global policy and governance, throughout its history to this day, cannot be overstated, not least as a knowledge producer and facilitator of interventions, a position which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

### 3.1.2 A Critical Examination of UN as Conceptual Development Apparatus

Today, the UN is one of the most powerful organizations in the world and, in its own words, “uniquely positioned to address and solve global issues” (UN 2022). The organizations within the UN system produce a massive volume of authoritative knowledge on different issues, including climate change and gender equality, varying from research to policy guidelines and legally binding treaties, and have the mandate to implement designed policies and programs, too. Knowledge produced from such an existing position of power has special significance and authority and is therefore worth a close inspection from the perspective of power relations. Hence, under the inspection, in this study, is one of these UN documents on climate change and gender equality, a “guidebook” for “designing and implementing” a form of development intervention (introduced in more detail in Chapter 4.3 Data Selection and Description). How the UN operates as part of global governance and power relations as a producer of such knowledge, in general, is critically discussed next.

By producing a volume of ‘knowledge’ on climate change and gender equality (especially at a time when academic research on the link between the two was still scarce), for facilitating development intervention, from a pre-existing position of authority and credibility, the UN exercises governmentalized power, that is, governs by development intervention, by producing hegemonic discourses and versions of ‘the truth’ regarding the matter, and by so dominating the discussion, overshadows and abridges room for alternative discourses (and actors), especially regarding those on development, developing countries and their communities, and consequently reproduces the existing positions of power and subordination. Indeed, Duffield (2013, 193-194, 206) argues that the “liberal development” executed by the UN organizations among other actors, based on the principles of “sustainable development, meeting basic needs and human security”, in fact, “reproduces and sustains the general biopolitical gap between development and underdevelopment”.

As for governing by development intervention, the UN as the “highest level intergovernmental organization” (de Waal 2013, 28), and as part of “international governance” (Johansson 2013, 239), has been criticized for being a part of the “politico-humanitarian culture”, generated by the expansion of the “international aid elite”, constituting Western governments, aid organizations and the UN, between which experts rotate, and all champion for humanitarianism (de Waal 2013, 27-28). de Waal (2013, 27-28, 39) argues that Western governments “ruthlessly use humanitarianism as a smokescreen” behind which they “either promote certain political agenda or cover up the lack of one”, and that “aid operations” provide an excellent “excuse to refuse to address difficult political questions”, and furthermore, that the UN, along with its secretariat, specialized agencies, and aid organizations, is not only a “part of this development”, but by focusing on humanitarianism, in fact, “disguises” how it “tolerates injustice” caused by avoiding required political efforts. Indeed, the UN has also been criticized for disinterest for problems in the “field” as well as inefficiency of both its merely directive help to achieve the development goals and of its operation in general due to, for instance, internal power struggles between different interest and country groups (also Peet & Hartwick 2015, 108, 110; Kääriäinen 2015, 55-57, 65-67, 70-71; Johansson 2013, 242). Furthermore, according to Mikulewicz (2020, 1810-1811, 1812,

1821-1825), the UN exercises “discursive” or “epistemic violence” by victimizing both the “feminine subject” and the global South, and by reducing the “planetary crisis” of climate change into one only concerning the former in order to legitimize intervention, hence (re)producing subordination and dependency of the South. So, on the one hand, the UN seems to be guilty of “depoliticizing” development, but on the other hand, in some instances, different actors have ironically demanded the UN to become “more humanitarian” and “less political”, as in the case of a failed humanitarian operation in Somalia in 1993 (de Waal 2013, 36). Related to this debacle, the UN, along with the “unbreakable” “international humanitarian community”, has also been criticized, in general, for failing to analyze, or acknowledge, their own role in a “self-inflicted catastrophe”, thus lacking “accountability and reliability”, eventually evading public scrutiny and sanctions, too (de Waal 2013, 37). – Something which is also not uncommon in the context of gender equality work, as we shall see later on, but which also supports the focus of this study on the role of the UN in development and its implications on global power relations.

In addition to depoliticizing development, the UN is also a part of the change in the operation of NGO’s, where they, instead of their original bottom-up approach, now increasingly seem to be working with funding from a “donor government”, with the “UN’s mandate”, to “build the capacity of states, monitor their operation or to expand their governance into new areas” (Duffield 2013, 198) – that is, textbook Ferguson, the conceptual (UN) and institutional (NGO’s) development apparatuses expanding state bureaucratic power. In conclusion, the UN, as a conceptual development apparatus – producing hegemonic knowledge abridging space for alternative discourses – by governing by development intervention, depoliticizing development, expanding state bureaucratic power and abridging freedom, effectively operates as part of the “anti-politics machine”, consequently sustaining global inequality.

## **3.2 Climate Change**

### **3.2.1 IPCC and AR6**

Scientific knowledge on climate change in this study is based on IPCC sources and the 2023 Synthesis Report (Sixth Assessment Report, AR6) (also AR5 from 2014), which gives an overview of the latest scientific knowledge on climate change and its impacts on human and natural systems. However, since the emphasis of this study is on knowledge production and power relations, a few words on the IPCC and source criticism is in order here. Founded in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UN Environment) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), with 195 member countries today, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is defined on their website as a “United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change” (IPCC, 2020). They do not conduct their own research but work to identify “where there is agreement in the scientific community on topics related to climate change, and where further research is needed”. Furthermore, the assessment

process is said to guarantee “objectivity and transparency”, and their reports are described as “neutral, policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive”. (IPCC 2020) So, it is worth noting, firstly, that the IPCC is, in fact, a UN body, whose hegemonic role as a knowledge producer is precisely under scrutiny in this study. Secondly, the role of the IPCC as a leading source of reliable science-based knowledge on climate change, along with its responsible and decisive role in assessment and decision making regarding that knowledge, is acknowledged. In other words, the IPCC also exercises power, producing hegemonic knowledge under the leadership of an expert, elite, authoritative development agency, the UN. This apparent incongruity and the power dynamics related to the role of the IPCC have, thus, been taken into account, but – although related to the research topic – a more thorough examination of these issues in this particular study is not considered either essential or feasible. Hence, it is stated that an informed decision has been made to regard the IPCC reports as reliable and the most reasonable source for concise, up-to-date scientific knowledge on climate change at hand.

### **3.2.2 Climate Change, Mitigation and Adaptation**

In short, according to IPCC (2018), climate change refers to persistent and identifiable change in the climate, due to both natural (eg. “solar cycles”) as well as anthropogenic causes, whereas the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2023; IPCC 2018), in contrast, defines climate change as changes in the climate due to direct or indirect effects of human action only, stating that there is “no question” that the “abnormal changes” in the climate “result from *global warming* due to an increased *greenhouse effect* caused by the vast amounts of *greenhouse gases* added to the atmosphere by human activities” (italics in original). Mitigation, then, is defined as “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs)”, whereas adaptation refers to the “process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects”, which “seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” in human systems (IPCC 2018). The Sixth Synthesis Report (IPCC 2023a, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16), too, notes that global warming is “unequivocally” caused by human induced GHG emissions, continued emissions leading to increasingly high temperatures, risks and adverse impacts. Hence, “deep, rapid, and sustained” reduction of global emissions, that is, mitigation, is needed to slow down further warming and limit “unavoidable” and “irreversible” changes, along with “accelerated implementation of adaptation actions” – both measures currently lagging (IPCC 2023a, 8, 10, 18, 25).

### **3.2.3 Ecological and Social Climate Change Effects**

Climate change effects can be roughly divided into ecological and social effects, both of which are diverse, unevenly and unequally distributed geographically, socially, and economically, “disproportionately” affecting “vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change”. The observed ecological climate change effects vary from slowly progressing impacts, like ocean warming and acidification, sea level rise and permafrost thaw, to more abrupt and extreme effects, such as heavy precipitation and floods, tropical cyclones, heat waves and droughts,

causing “substantial” and “increasingly irreversible” damage and losses to ecosystems and biodiversity. (IPCC 2023a, 5, 6; Gough 2017, 24-25.)

The social impacts of climate change depend on the exposure and vulnerability of a community to a variety of ecological climate change effects, developing areas and poor communities globally being especially vulnerable to climate hazards. Diverse ecological climate change effects (eg. floods, droughts, storms, heatwaves etc.) threaten people’s food and water security, food production, livelihoods, homes, property, income, infrastructure, services, and culture in vulnerable areas, as well as their mental (eg. trauma) and physical health (eg. food-, water- and vector-borne diseases) and lives, as they are 15 times more likely to die in extreme weather events compared to people living in less vulnerable regions. Climate change also hinders “efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals” and has “adverse effects on gender and social equity”, also increasing the risk of displacement and conflict (IPCC 2023a, 5, 6, 15; Gough 2017, 24-25).

Future projections of climate change suggest that the global mean surface temperature will continue to rise, which will cause the observed climate change effects to intensify and become even more frequent, subsequently amplifying existing, and creating new, risks for ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as human systems, security, and wellbeing (IPCC 2023a, 12-15, 18, 24). What is more, as stated in the previous IPCC report AR5, despite a complete cessation of anthropogenic GHG emissions today, the global mean surface temperature will remain at an elevated level for centuries and, consequently, so will climate change and related impacts continue respectively (IPCC 2014, 73-74).

### **3.2.4 Power, Equity and Responsibility in Climate Change Policy**

Based on the scientific evidence provided by the volume of research the IPCC reports rely on, the urgent, unquestionable need for stronger global action against climate change becomes obvious. This action, that is, mitigation and adaptation, is guided by a complex of climate change policies on different levels, ranging from international legally binding agreements (Paris Agreement) and regional level regulations (e.g. EU directives) to national policy guidelines and local level solutions (municipal and sectoral decision making) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 2020, Ministry of the Environment 2020a; Ministry of the Environment 2020b; Ministry of the Environment 2020c). Understanding the magnitude and complexity of climate change policy is essential, but instead of micro-level details, this study focuses on the ethical perspective to climate change policy on a general level. Hence, I will give a brief overview of some arguments made on the questions of equity, responsibility, and global power relations regarding climate change policy.

Maybe the most striking and self-evident disparity in the climate change crisis is the fact that, by and large, those who pollute the least suffer the most, in other words, the bulk of GHG emissions is produced by rich developed countries, the global North, while climate change impacts hit the poorest regions and countries of the world, the global South, the hardest (Giddens 2019, 164, 177, 212; IPCC 2014, 76, 90; IPCC 2023a, 15, 19, 26, 31; Gough 2017, 26-27; Kääriäinen 2015, 33). However, the simplicity of these statements is slightly complicated by different ways of calculating the carbon footprint



/ emissions (e.g. historical, total, per capita and consumption-based emissions) and by the complexity of the roles of some countries on the list (level of development and vulnerability), but the main point of the argument still stands, unfortunately, and the inequality between the heavily polluting developed countries and the least polluting developing countries, in the context of climate change, remains grave (Gough 2017, 26-27).

Concerning emissions, the developed world not only carries a historical burden of being the biggest polluter since the industrial revolution, but it continues to be that today, with not much change in the distribution in sight (albeit the countries comprising the developed world has changed over time). – The USA (25%), the EU (17%), China (13%) and Russia (7%) are the biggest producers of historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (UNEP 2022, 9; Gough 2017, 26), while the top seven biggest polluters in total emissions today, in order of magnitude, include China, the USA, India, the EU, Indonesia, Russia and Brazil, producing about half of all GHG emissions globally (see Figure 1.; UNEP 2022, 7-8). The rank changes again in emissions per capita comparison, the USA now being the biggest polluter, followed by Russia, China, Brazil, Indonesia, the EU and India (see Figure 1; UNEP 2022, 8), the G20<sup>1</sup> members collectively producing 75% of total global GHG emissions currently (UNEP 2022, 7, 11). In comparison, LDC's have produced 0,5% of historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and still produce only a fraction (<5%) of total global GHG emissions today (UNEP 2022, 9; UNOCHA 2023; UNCTAD 2022). Furthermore, as Anthony Giddens (2009, 183-186) in “The Politics of Climate Change” argues, while per capita emissions in developing countries remains much lower compared to developed countries in general, the inclusion of “emissions from deforestation” (often excluded from “orthodox statistics”) changes the ranking of some countries (e.g. Indonesia and Brazil) radically. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the newest calculations do take into account “land use, land-use change and forestry emissions (LULUCF)” (UNEP 2022, 3-4).




FIGURE 1 Total and per capita GHG emissions of major emitters (UNEP 2022)

Other policies that distort emissions levels per country include, for instance, emissions trading and shifting heavily polluting production to developing countries (and their women), including the fact that emissions from international transport are excluded from country statistics (Giddens 2009, 188, 195; Ylhäisi & Koponen 2009, 265-266; Gough 2017, 26; Klein 2014, 113-114, 287-302; Eskelinen 2011, 130; Escobar 2015, 183). However, consumption-based emissions calculations (with “supply-chain emissions ... allocated to consumers”) rectify the statistics skewed by shifting production, and cause an increase in current total emissions of some high-income countries and regions, such as the USA (+6%) and the EU (+14%), while decreasing the total emissions for some net exporters, such as India (-9%) and China (-10%) correspondingly (UNEP 2022, 9).

The oversimplified statements of minor emitters or developing countries being the major sufferers of climate change effects and vice versa, are further complicated by the development status and vulnerability of certain countries. Out of the top seven biggest polluters, three are also considered developing countries (in terms of eg. HDI),

namely China (79/191), India (132/191) and Indonesia (114/191) (Suomen YK-liitto 2023; UNDP 2023; UNCTADstat 2023). Moreover, out of these significantly polluting developing countries, India (7<sup>th</sup>) was among the top ten and Indonesia (14<sup>th</sup>) in the top twenty countries most affected by climate change related extreme weather events in 2019, according to the Global Climate Risk Index. Out of the developed countries, Japan came in fourth. (Eckstein, Künzel, and Schäfer 2021, 3, 8, 40-41.) That is to say, not all major emitters are rich developed countries of the global North, and sometimes those who pollute the most might also be among those who suffer the most. – Nevertheless, generally speaking the North-South dynamic remains essentially the same in terms of the carbon footprint complex and climate change vulnerability – development and high income going hand in hand with higher emissions and lower vulnerability, and vice versa (Gough 2017, 26-27).

Indeed, while the developed countries in the global North produce a major share of the global GHG emissions, they are generally also located in areas geographically less vulnerable to severe climate change impacts and are thus, economically and otherwise, much more resilient and better prepared to face any effects of climate change. In contrast, the poor global South, especially LDC's, least responsible for the GHG emissions and consequent climate change, are not only geographically and environmentally more vulnerable to severe climate change effects, but have the least resources economically, politically and otherwise to tackle these effects. (Giddens 2009, 164, 177, 212; IPCC 2014, 76, 90; IPCC 2023b, 61-62; Gough 2017, 27; Eskelinen 2011, 115.) Thus, it is clear to see how climate change adds dramatically to the already existing imbalance in the North-South power relations, which is exactly why the questions of power, equity and responsibility are essentially relevant to – and should be at the heart of – discussing climate change policy, or in other words, who should do what, when and why.

In addition to the obvious reasons to fight climate change, that is the constantly accumulating environmental, economic and social risks and costs, there are also both ethical obligations as well as opportunities to consider. In terms of equity and justice, it would only seem fair that, firstly, the bulk of responsibility for mitigation falls on the biggest polluters, the “polluter pays principle” (Giddens 2009, 164), and secondly – being mainly and continually responsible for the emissions causing climate change, yet suffering the least of its consequences while being better equipped to deal with its impacts – that the developed world also took on the main *financial responsibility* for adaptation action in the developing world (IPCC 2023a, 23, 24, 26, 31, 33, 34). In the words of Giddens (2009, 164), “richer countries must shoulder the lion's share of responsibility”. That is, insofar as emissions are produced and climate change impacts suffered unevenly, there is no justification for demanding that the costs and action against climate change be distributed evenly either. Indeed, both efforts and costs of mitigation are actually “expected to vary across countries”, and it is likely that costs and actions will be differently distributed (IPCC 2014, 86; IPCC 2023a, 19, 23, 26, 31) – just as they should be, according to the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle, developed countries obligated to act first (Giddens 2009, 187, 189; UNFCCC 2021). Furthermore, “in globally cost-effective scenarios, the majority of mitigation efforts take place in countries with the highest future GHG emissions in baseline scenarios” (IPCC 2014, 86). In this disparity, though, lie also the possibilities of climate

change, as according to the IPCC (2014, 76; also IPCC 2023a, 19, 23, 26, 31, 33, 34), “both adaptation and mitigation can have distributional effects locally, nationally and internationally, depending on who pays and who benefits”. Taking on a greater responsibility would be an opportunity for the developed world to use their privileged position to even out the global power disparity and work for a more just and equitable world, utopian as it may sound. However, the fight against climate change does obligate all countries and regions globally, and requires international cooperation which the IPCC (2023, 24, 33, 34; also IPCC 2014, 2014, 76, 102) considers “a critical enabler” for ambitious climate action as well as climate resilient and sustainable development.

International cooperation as such, however, is an insufficient expression, as it already exists in many forms, such as “a wide array of multilateral, national and sub-national institutions focused on adaptation and mitigation”, and yet fails to generate tangible results, as “global GHG emissions continue to increase” (IPCC 2014, 94), despite at a slowing rate (UNEP 2022, 5), and “identified adaptation needs have not been adequately addressed” (IPCC 2014, 94; IPCC 2023a, 24, 26, 31, 33, 34). Therefore, if real progress is to be accomplished, future international cooperation needs to be, firstly, free from self-interest, as “effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently” (IPCC 2014, 76, 102), and secondly, a genuinely global effort, which means, as Giddens (2009, 195) well puts it in an example, that EU regulations, for instance, are no use if production only shifts to countries with an “emissions free-for-all”. Real progress, hence, calls for changes not only in the mindset and principles of global climate change action, but also in the global political and executive institutional structures. Indeed, in terms of international cooperation and interventions in practice, the IPCC (2023, 32) emphasizes inclusivity, transparency and equitable decision-making in “effective multilevel governance” in the context of both climate action as well as international cooperation, and in connection to this, calls for “locally appropriate and socially acceptable solutions” based on “diverse knowledges and cultural values”, including indigenous, local and scientific knowledge, and careful planning and implementation of interventions and other regulatory instruments, taking into consideration “context specific inequities”, such as gender.

There are, however, both opportunities and risks in more effective and comprehensive international cooperation. Firstly, the IPCC (2023 33,34) warns of “overdependence on foreign knowledge and providers” as a trade-off of “technological innovation”, nevertheless suggesting building trust in international cooperation as part of “scaling up mitigation in developing countries”. Secondly, as Giddens (2009, 229) puts it, on the one hand, “in spite of the divisions and power struggles that exist, coping with climate change could be a springboard for creating a more cooperative world”, which might, also, “be a means of reinvigorating the UN and other institutions of global governance”. On the other hand, however, Giddens (2009, 60) calls for caution regarding, for instance, biased risk assessments and other ways of exploiting risks by special interest groups, “using global warming as a way of surreptitiously legitimating other concerns” (Giddens 2009, 50), as well as the so called bandwagon effect, that is, “the tendency to claim climate change as a vehicle for what one wanted to achieve anyway” (Giddens 2009, 229), whatever that might be in a given situation. All in all, these concerns strongly resonate with Ferguson (1990) and other development critics’

aforementioned views on the risks embedded in development cooperation, namely, international development agencies – or agencies of global governance – creating suitable targets for development interventions, and the subsequent instrumental use of development projects actually serving the interests of the powerful.

### 3.3 Gender

In addition to development intervention and climate change, the third dimension of the context of this study is gender. Gender inequality offers the context, and rationale, for UN's development interventions in the South, in the name of climate change adaptation and promoting gender equality, by means of gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment. The knowledge produced by the UN, in this context, hence, is largely based on gender and related concepts, which, again, are based on Western feminism, whose ability to represent the women in the South has been criticized by Third World Feminists. Thus, this section briefly introduces this criticism and gender related concepts relevant for this study, namely those of gender system, dichotomy, representation, intersectionality, gender equality and inequality, as well as mainstreaming and empowerment.

Firstly, gender is traditionally, although not unproblematically, divided into concepts of biologically determined sex and socially learned and performed gender (Rossi 2010, 22, 27; Mattila et al. 2007, 235-236). 'Gender' refers to a social category and cultural phenomenon (Rossi 2010, 21), encompassing both "gender roles", that is, the expectations on "gender-appropriate" behavior, as well as the personal, "experienced gender identity" (Saaristo & Jokinen 2004, 151; Abbot 2006, 70; Lorber 2012, 9, 15). Gender, thus, is most of all "doing" and "acting", "a performance" (Abbot 2006, 70), which is socially and culturally learned, produced, reproduced, and even imposed on individuals as Lorber (2012, 9) argues, and, hence, constantly changing according to time, culture and location (Saaristo & Jokinen 2004, 151; Rossi 2010, 23). All in all, gender could be understood as a constantly changing, multilayered "meaning process" which is defined by mutually intertwined discourses, representations and self-representations, and whose varied, and at times ambivalent, definitions and norms are under constant political and cultural debate (Rossi 2010, 23; Saaristo & Jokinen 2004, 151; [de Lauretis 1987, 3-26] Saaristo & Jokinen 2004, 151).

The most important concept related to gender from the perspective of this study, however, is that of 'representation', which refers to the way different genders, groups and social relations are portrayed in different media and the consequences of these representations – that is, the meanings attached to the representations as well as those produced by them. Representations, hence, express, represent, produce, reproduce, maintain and market not only their objects but the "larger whole or category" they refer to, along with different "valuations, conceptions and definitions", "frames for understanding reality" and our "understandings of gender, ourselves and others" (Paasonen 2010, 40-41). Representations are always also inextricably intertwined with other pre-existing norms and conventions of representations, as well as the "lived ma-

terial reality" (Paasonen 2010, 41, 45). This means that representations, past and present, have consequences in the real world, more specifically, the power relations between different "'races', genders and classes" (Paasonen 2010, 45). Indeed, Dyer argues, as cited by Paasonen (2010, 45 [Dyer 1992, 1], 46-47), that "the way groups of people are treated in cultural representations is related to the way they are treated in life", that is, "how we treat others is based on how we see them" and ourselves. Representations thus, just like discourses, produce reality for their part and vice versa, and changes in one affect the other (Paasonen 2010, 45). As gender along with other social constructs is being produced in different cultural, institutional and everyday texts and contexts, having consequences to their objects and related valuations, norms and so on, it is essential to pay attention to representations embedded in societal frameworks, structures and institutions, their explicit and implicit valuations, the way they have been "constructed and selected" along with their possible "cultural consequences" (Paasonen 2010, 45-48; Abbot 2006, 65).

The theorizations on representation have much in common with those of discourses and subject positions, and the consequence producing nature of representations also speaks for the importance of the chosen research topic. – The way development, developing countries, their men and women, gender, and the UN itself are portrayed in the research material affects how the audience of the text perceives and understands the role of each actor and themselves, and consequently their attitudes, values and behavior towards them.

### **3.3.1 Gender Inequality – Theory and the Developing World**

As discussed earlier relating to Foucault, Ferguson and others' theorizations, power penetrates all social relationships, including gender. Indeed, historian Joan Scott, cited by Rossi (2010, 22), argues that gender is, in fact, the "primary form" of power relations in society. – The dichotomic (male-female) and other classifications regarding gender are related to the concepts of self-definition and subject, where becoming a subject, along with the freedom to define oneself, is defined by the possibilities and restrictions of agency, in other words, one's position of either having or being under power – this being yet another manifestation of the intertwining of knowledge, power and subject position discussed earlier. (Rossi 2010, 30-31). Hence, making social classifications, such as the dichotomic gender division in this case, is an exercise of power (Saaristo & Jokinen 2004) and a source of gender inequality; this classification offers the basis for the so called "gender system", to which the "complementary but unequal" dichotomic division into men and women, along with keeping them "horizontally" apart and "vertically" hierarchical, is central (Kuusela 2005, 153; Rossi 2010, 28; Lorber 2012, 9; Mattila et al. 2007, 237-238). In other words, a person's gender determines their "social status" in the gender system, which places men as the norm and their "traits and actions" more valuable (Lorber 2012, 15; Abbot 2006, 70 [Bradley 1996, 203]; Mattila et al. 2007, 238). Gender system operates the same way as gender, and is evident, for instance, in sex-aggregated statistics and gendered division of labor both at home and in the labor market (Abbot 2006, 70 [Bradley 1996, 203], Rossi 2010, 28; Saaristo & Jokinen 2004, 152; Mattila et al. 2007, 237-238). What is more, according to Lorber (2012,

9) the “legal, social, and personal status” of a person in the society, based on this dichotomic gender division, “overrides” intersectional (racial, ethnic, class, sexuality, religion, age) and individual differences – a system and dynamic which resonates with Foucault and Ferguson’s critique of classifying and categorizing people as a tool of governing – hence making the dichotomic gender division and the gender system also forms of oppression (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 223; Ferguson 1990).

Abbot (2006, 65-67, 69-75, 80, 84, 97) and Lorber (2012, 4-6) argue that gender inequality, while affecting all genders, mainly manifests as male domination or ‘patriarchy’, to the detriment of women throughout their lifespan – an approach shared by the UN (UN Women 2022) – and is present and persists as such in various, ever-changing forms, on all levels and dimensions of human life globally – from all the structures and systems of societies and culture to the abstract structures of language, discourses, politics, economics, behavior, attitudes, values and norms. However, there are many other factors which simultaneously produce and affect a person’s subject position and agency in social power relations, such as sexual orientation, “race”, ethnicity, class, age and religion. This intersecting of such differences, and its often oppressive effects, is referred to as “intersectionality”, which according to “standpoint theory”, produces a “special position of knowledge and knowing” to the most oppressed women. (Rossi 2010, 35-36.)

The developing world suffers from various forms of inequality both globally and internally, Rogers et al. (1988, 362) arguing that “perhaps the most extreme form of inequality in the Third World is based on gender”. The key issues of gender inequality in the developing world persist – due to structural and cultural restrictions, compared to men, women still work more hours both at home and in the labor market, get paid less, are mainly responsible for low-paid, unpaid and informal work such as food production and various forms of care work, suffer from gender based discrimination and violence, higher mortality rate (due to childbirth), illiteracy, lack of security, freedom, agency, reproductive and political rights, educational and economic opportunities as well as access to healthcare, information and other resources, to give a few examples (Rogers et al. 1988, 362-363; Lorber 2012, 4-6; Myllylä 2011, 304 [Grant 2006], 307, 309; Russu 2022; UNCTAD 2023).

### **3.3.2 Gender Equality – Empowerment and Mainstreaming**

Feminism then, in its various forms, is the political movement which – based on feminist theories of inequality – aims to promote legal, social and cultural gender equality through social change on the societal level (Lorber 2012, 4, 6). One of the ways to promote gender equality in practice, especially in the context of development intervention, is ‘empowerment’ (Kantola 2010, 84). According to scholars, empowerment aims to understand, make visible and dismantle unequal power structures and “improve people’s lives”, by means of conscious political action and “transferring power resources”, in the form of “support, ... recognition of identities, character traits, performances, and achievements” as well as “discussion and learning groups”, for instance, which aim to help the ‘empowerees’ to become “aware of” their situation and increase their independence, scope of subjectivity, “agential options”, and “sense of control

and self-efficacy" (Kuusela 2005, 156; Kantola 2010, 84; Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 419 [Parker & Burman 1993, 170]; Weidenstedt 2016, 1). The UN, then, defines empowerment as a "process of enabling people to increase control over their lives, to gain control over the factors and decisions that shape their lives, to increase their resources and qualities and to build capacities to gain access, partners, networks, a voice, in order to gain control" (UN DESA 2012), but says little about the actual means of doing this in practice, a usual problem regarding women's empowerment, according to Weidenstedt (2016 [Duflo 2012]). The way empowerment is actually exercised is, however, evident in the data, and will be discussed in the analysis.

Another practical level tool for enhancing gender equality is gender mainstreaming. According to UN Women (2023; also Mattila et al. 2007, 248-249), mainstreaming refers to the "critical and strategic approach for achieving gender equality commitments" previously agreed on by different UN bodies, by means of "assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels" and making "women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated."

### 3.3.3 Criticism of Western Feminism and Gender in Development

Western feminism has been criticized by third world post-colonial feminists for its hegemony, assumed universality, as well as regarding the question of representation. Firstly, so called "third world feminists" have criticized the ideological, historical, cultural and political hegemony of Western, or Anglo-American and Nordic, feminisms, and their affiliations to "racism, colonialism, heterosexuality and economic inequality", especially relevant in the context of development, yet so far much ignored, according to Mattila et al. (2007, 236-237, 239, 243). This hegemony in feminism manifests as "the West" as the "societal and cultural norm", along with the middle-class white woman from a developed Western country as a norm (Mattila et al. 2007, 236, 243). Secondly, the third world feminist criticism of the "feminism of privileged women" emphasizes, instead of gender inequality, the significance of the inequality, or power disparity, between women themselves in the context of development, and questions the universality of Western feminism and its views of a shared experience of womanhood and gender-based oppression. (Mattila et al. 2007, 236, 239, 243). Furthermore, the concept of gender itself is considered a "mechanism of oppression", along with "class, race, ethnic identity and nationality" (Mattila et al. 2007, 243). Thirdly, the third world feminists raise questions about representation, that is, who can or is allowed to speak for them, how they are spoken about and to what audience, and who decides the topics and their importance (Mattila et al. 2007, 243). As discussed by Mattila et al. (2007, 243-244), post-colonial theorists Chandra Talpade Mohanty along with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in their classic works, for instance, have criticized Western feminism and Western science for producing a non-Western "other" – by way of, according to Mohanty, as cited by Mattila et al. (2007, 243-244), portraying a commensurate, victimized, non-Western "third world woman" with completely dif-



ferent problems compared to their Western counterparts, especially that of being passive victims of “colonialism, their husbands, economic system, violence or religion” – while being unaware of their own use of power and role in “colonizing women of developing countries”.

Another relevant dimension of criticism is that of gender in development, which has been criticized for being an extension of neoliberal economics, instrumentalizing women as part of the development apparatus, and actually making their lives harder in developing countries. “Women in Development”, or WID, originally instigated by the UN, aimed to “integrate women into development”, but has been criticized for being a “global application of liberal feminism”, based on an assumed universality of being human, and an extension of “liberal, individualist, capitalist man and his rational economic thought” onto women in developing countries (Mattila et al. 2007, 240-241; Escobar 2012, 183). Women have, hence, been instrumentalized in development in general, but also in the specific context of “liberal empowerment”, by focusing on their productivity, beneficial role to development or eradicating poverty, treating them as a “practical resource” to be “harnessed in development” by “unleashing” their “potential”, to have them “working together in imagined harmony”, while ignoring the intrinsic value of women’s rights, gender equality and the promotion of these goals – an approach, unsurprisingly, especially “appealing to international donors and banks”, and increasing women’s workload (Mattila et al. 2007, 240, 242; Cornwall & Rivas 2015, 406-407; Escobar 2012, 183-187). Furthermore, Cornwall and Rivas (2015, 405, 407), arguing against the “‘business case’ of women’s ‘liberal’ empowerment”, point out that the “very nature” of empowerment is “more contingent and contextual, and ultimately far less predictable, than allowed for by development agencies’ quick fix solutions”, and call for reducing the role of “external actors and interventions” from ‘empowering’ to clearing away obstacles in the way of women doing “empowerment for themselves”.

Development interventions in the form of structural adjustment programs, then, with their cuts to social welfare services, have shown to hit the poorest people and especially women in developing countries the hardest, while some projects have had adverse effects on gender equality, for instance, through increasing men’s decision-making power over women’s traditional domains (Mattila et al. 2007, 242, 252; Escobar 2012, 180-184). Furthermore, feminist researchers have criticized “poverty eradication programs and new instruments of development aid”, along with empowerment, for ignoring the role of gender-based discrimination as a maintaining mechanism for structural poverty, insecurity, and injustice (Mattila et al. 2007, 241-242; Cornwall & Rivas 2015, 409-410; Escobar 2012, 180-183). What is more, Cornwall and Rivas (2015, 409-410), have criticized mainstream discourses on women’s empowerment for overlooking men and reducing them as “the ‘other half of gender’ or as those who need to be ‘brought in’ through ‘male involvement’”, and, hence, call for a paradigm shift, in the context of empowerment, from “aiding the other” and focusing on “poor communities” and women, to one with a focus on the “exclusionary practices” and the role of men in them, the “discourses of inclusion” of “the organizations that claim to be working in the name of the poor, at the local, national and international level”, as well as rights as a response to injustice at all levels, “local and global”. The “Women and Development” -school of thought, then, represented by women of a developing country

origin, have been more concerned with the direction of development as such, than with disregarding women in the current development process, calling for a more equitable global economic system to improve women's position in developing countries (Mattila et al. 2007, 241-242).

Although "Gender and Development" focuses on the gendered effects of development interventions, financial institutions giving guidance on "how women should be taken into account" in them, their instruments of "gender analysis" and gender mainstreaming have also been criticized (Mattila et al. 2007, 241-242, 248). Gender analysis, for instance, has been criticized for disregarding variability in time and place and making generalizations, again resonating with Foucault and Ferguson's theorizations on social categorizing, as well as for its technicality and instrumentality with its aim to make "a project more efficient and successful", again disregarding the intrinsic value of promoting gender equality (Mattila et al. 2007, 252; also Cornwall & Rivas 2015). As for mainstreaming, "especially women's organizations in the South" have criticized mainstreaming policies for neglecting thorough gender analyses due to taking a "mainstreamed" gender perspective in a project or organization for granted, while sometimes gender mainstreaming is simply treated as "a goal as such" (Mattila et al. 2007, 249, 253).

### **3.3.4 Paradox of Empowerment and Patronizing Oppressive Praise**

Empowerment, in general, irrespective of context, but offering invaluable insight regarding the specific focus of my study, has also been critically researched from a theoretical and communicative perspective. Weidenstedt's (2016, 1-2) analysis of the "paradox of empowerment", illuminates the ways in which empowerment can work in counterproductive ways, due to three main reasons: "power differentials, reciprocation, and paternalism". Firstly, top-down empowerment, "driven from the outside", in any circumstance, is perceived as a necessarily and inherently unequal act, entailing a power imbalance, significant enough, between the "empowerer" and the "empoweree" (Weidenstedt 2016, 2, 5). According to Weidenstedt (2016, 6 [Eylon 1998; Pease 2002]), "simply by offering to empower" another, the empowerer "will always underscore the high power differential" between them, portraying itself as superior and the empoweree as "needy", "inferior" and "less knowledgeable and/or resourceful", which, irrespective of intentionality or awareness, can damage the reputation of the empoweree, especially in the eyes of third party observers (also Johansson 2013, 242).

This power differential, then, leads to the second problem of reciprocation. The "selfless" act of empowerment differs from "trade" or "bargaining" in that it should only profit the empoweree, making the empowerer often to portray themselves, or be perceived, as "an altruistic or philanthropic benefactor" (Weidenstedt 2016, 6 [Rothstein 1995]; Eskelinen 2011, 138). However, empowerment cannot escape the "implicit reciprocity expectations" inherent in all social interactions, leaving the empoweree with essentially only one option to deal with the problem, that is, gratitude, which, however, is likely to make the empoweree "lose agential options" - counter to the objective of empowerment - "when having to perform gratefulness as reciprocation, in the form of diminished self-respect, reputation, and/or appointed future commitments", which might, in turn, "emphasize the subordinate role of the empoweree

while confirming the empowerer's dominance" (Weidenstedt 2016, 6-7 [Shore, Toyokawa & Anderson 2008, 26; Simmel [1908] 1950, 389ff; Mauss 1990; Simmel [1908] 1950, 387; Mauss 1990:65]; Eskelinen 2011, 138; Johansson 2013, 241).

Finally, the last two lead to the third problem of paternalism, referring to the powerful dominating the less powerful through benevolent action, in this case empowerment (Weidenstedt 2016, 7 [Archard 1990; Clarke 2002; Dworkin 1983; Gert and Culver 1976; Grill 2007; Mill [1859] 1991; Sartorius 1983; Sennett 1993]). The first problem with this is that the empowerer, not the empoweree, determines both the empoweree's need for, as well as the form of, empowerment, which implies that the empoweree is both less powerful and incompetent to "direct" their "own destiny", but also makes it "unfeasible" for the empoweree to reject the offered resource "'only' on the grounds of not having had a say", or to "challenge the social relationship" between the two in general (Weidenstedt 2016, 7 [Eylon 1998, 21]). On the other hand, accepting the resource, under such "patronizing and humiliating" paternalistic circumstances, might have "distressing psychosocial effects", by making the empoweree feel "subordinate", "dominated, disempowered, and looked down on", while feeling that the benevolence "demands gratefulness and, therewith, the acknowledgment of the empowerer's superiority as legitimate, a social situation of indebtedness that can never be balanced", which may also lead to persistent dependency between the two, despite efforts to reduce it (Weidenstedt 2016, 7 [Lindner 2006; Statman 2000]; also Johansson 2013, 241).

Related to the problematics of patronizing empowerment, especially when trying to *unleash women's potential* through *support*, are the concepts of 'oppressive' and 'patronizing' praise. For the purposes of this study, a conceptualization of "patronizing oppressive praise", based on the shared main components and arguments of Holroyd, Jeppsson and Brandenburg's theorizations, will suffice, which on a more detailed level, however, would both partly differ from my usage and offer more useful tools and support for my analysis. Jeppsson and Brandenburg's (2022) conceptualization of "patronizing praise", along with, and building on, the work of Holroyd (2021) on "oppressive praise", in short, examine the previously overlooked problematics of praise, showing how (eg. ethnicity and gender) stereotype-informed and biased, seemingly friendly and well-intended praise, irrespective of genuineness, can reflect and strengthen oppressive and discriminating structures, both deliberately and unintendedly, by subtly and insidiously devaluing the praisee, while placing the praiser and their self-interest superior.

Where the theorizations on patronizing and oppressive empowerment and praise have several similarities with Foucault and Ferguson's theorizations – the latent, counterproductive, unintended consequences of apparently well-meaning action – the critical perspectives on Western feminism and its applications and instruments, especially on behalf of TWF, overlap and resonate with the general criticism towards the hegemony of both Western neoliberalism and the current development paradigm, calling for change in perspectives, focus and paradigms, and most of all, in the level and form of involvement of the North in the development of the South, a change in the global power dynamic overall.

### 3.4 Climate Change as a Gender Equality Issue According to the UN

The UN has published several documents regarding the link between gender equality and climate change, since 2007, at a time when academic research on the subject was still scarce. The main arguments throughout the documents, in short, are that climate change hits developing countries and their women the hardest, that gender inequality exacerbates experienced climate change effects, and vice versa, climate change exacerbates gender inequality. In practice, this refers to the wide range of ecological and social climate change effects, described in section 3.2.3, taking a harder toll on women, both during and after the events, in the form of, for instance, increased workloads and higher mortality rates for women compared to men. According to the UN, this is mainly due to gendered division of labor and women's traditional roles and responsibilities of climate sensitive chores such as food production, water and firewood collection, as well as religious, cultural and societal restrictions on women's mobility and access to information and other resources in disasters, for example. All in all, the UN documents largely repeat the afore presented traditional, hegemonic, othering and subordinating Western perceptions of women in the South, gender, climate change and related constructs, including the solutions to the problems of gender inequality and climate change, that is, gender mainstreaming, empowerment, adaptation and mitigation - women, in the context of climate change, portrayed both as victims as well as potential or active change agents, due to their special relationship with nature and the community, and their role as managers of natural resources. (UNISDR 2007; UNISDR 2008; UNISDR, UNDP & IUCN 2009; UNFPA 2009; UNDP 2009; UNDP 2010; Nellesmann et al. 2011; IUCN, UNDP & GGCA 2009; ARROW & UN Women 2021; Mikulewicz 2020, 1811-1812, 1823-1825.) - The chosen document for research data, introduced in the next section (Chapter 4.2), reiterates the UN's hegemonic discourses on gender and climate change here described, but differs importantly from the rest of the documents in its focus on "designing and implementing" interventions, hence being ideal data for this study on the conceptual development apparatus.

## 4 METHODS

In this section, Chapter 4.1 first introduces the premises of all forms of Discourse Analysis, after which Chapter 4.2 discusses the special features and emphases of Critical Discourse Analysis – the actual research method of this study – including discursive techniques of producing power. Chapter 4.3 introduces the research data and discusses the rationale behind its selection, while Chapter 4.4 presents the analysis framework. Lastly, Chapter 4.5 discusses the questions of reliability, validity, generalizing and relevance regarding this study, and Chapter 4.6 concludes with discussing researcher positionality.

### 4.1 Discourse Analysis

The methodology of this study is mostly based on the theoretical perspectives of discourse analysis as presented by Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (2016, 17), whose theorization is, firstly, based on a social 'constructionist view', which considers language use as part of – not a "bridge to" – reality, as opposed to the 'realist perspective'. Secondly, their views stem from the "British orientation", rooted in (social) psychology, as well as from "critical research" based on Foucault's theories of power (Jokinen et al. 2016, 18). As this study is particularly interested in the link between power and knowledge production, critical discourse analysis (later CDA), being interested in the consequences of linguistic action in the context of power, seemed like the obvious choice for methodology. This section, however, first introduces some basic principles of discourse analysis, on which CDA, too, is based on.

Jokinen et al. (2016, 17) define discourse analysis as the "study of language use" and other communication action which "analyses in detail how social reality is produced in different social practices", and which, in all its different forms, is based on the following premises regarding the nature of language: 1) language use constructs social reality, 2) several parallel and competing systems of meaning exist, 3) meaningful action is context bound, 4) actors are connected to systems of meaning, and 5) language use produces consequences (Jokinen et al., 25-26). The first premise, language

use constructs social reality, is closely linked with two concepts: 'discourse' and 'reflexivity'. Jokinen et al. (2016, 26, 34) define 'discourse' as a "relatively intact regular system of meaning relations, constructed in social practices and simultaneously constructing social reality", that is, "language use ... not only describes the world, but gives meaning to, and simultaneously organizes and constructs, reproduces and transforms social reality". However, language is not a "natural representation" of the real world – although the two are inextricably connected – and the interest of discourse analysis is not in *what* is "beyond" the language used or in "discourses as such", but in the detailed examination of *how* discourses are "actualized in different social practices", that is, how "social reality is constructed and continually being constructed" through language use (Jokinen et al., 28-29, 35).

Social reality, thus, is "both the object as well as the product of analysis", and a researcher ought to reflect on their own relationship with power and the existing discourses the research is based on, as well as be sensitive about what kind of "conceptual constructs" they might inadvertently make possible and reproduce, and with what consequences (Jokinen et al. 2016, 31 [Dant 1991, 228], 32 [Parker 1992, 80], 50). These questions will be examined in sections 'Researcher Positionality' and 'Conclusions and Discussion'.

Discourses do not exist in isolation either – there are always parallel and competing discourses, and individual discourses are always defined in relation to each other (interdiscursivity, intertextuality) (Jokinen et al. 2016, 35-36). This second premise is the most important one in terms of this study, as it is at the heart of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is the actual research method of this study.

Premise number three, meaningful action is context bound, refers to the fact that discourses are not only "produced, reproduced and transformed" in social practices, but always at a certain time and place, with respect to which the discourses should always be analyzed (Jokinen et al., 36-37). The concept of 'context' regarding discourse analysis is practically infinitely diverse and flexible (Jokinen et al., 37), but for the purposes of this study, useful contexts include, what I call here, the 'politicohistorical sociocultural context', or what Jokinen et al. (2016, 39-40) refer to as the 'preconditions' relevant to producing the studied material. These contexts, along with interdiscursivity and intertextuality, are examined in chapters 2.1 North-South Power Dynamics, Development and Intervention, and 3 UN, Climate Change and Gender.

In terms of the actors connected to systems of meaning, that is, premise number four, discourse analysis is not interested in individual actors or their intentions, but social practices, that is, the way individual actors use language in different contexts, and the "larger systems of meaning" they produce through that language use (Jokinen et al. 2016, 43). The different "actor dimensions" in discourse analysis include identity, subject position and discursive agency (Jokinen et al. 2016, 45 [Peräkylä 1990, 22; Suoninen 1992, 40]). These dimensions – just as any subject of discourse analysis – are not pre-existing, but produced in social practices (Jokinen et al. 2016, 46 [Parker 1992; 96,93]). Differing from discourse analysis in general, the actual research method of critical discourse analysis in this study, interested in power relations, takes into account the intentions and pre-existing position of the knowledge producer, and so, in this study, an actor analysis is limited to the subject positions produced to the

knowledge producer and the target of development intervention, from the perspective of reproducing existing positions of power and subordination.

Lastly, the fifth premise, language use produces consequences, refers to the concepts of 'functionality', 'situationality', and 'ideological consequences'. Functionality refers to the fact that language use is not only "describing something", but always also "doing something", that is, it produces consequences for, and thus constructs, social reality through "opening and limiting possibilities" (Jokinen et al. 2016, 47-48). Hence, in terms of functionality and situationality, discourse analysis focuses on examining "what situational functions (linguistic) action has at a given time", what kind of "ideological consequences" those actions have beyond those situations, and what kind of "state of affairs" and interpretations an actor makes possible, "socially present" and "reflected" through those linguistic actions (Jokinen et al. 2016, 47 [Potter & Wetherell 1987, 32-33; Wooffitt 1992, 59], 48). Moreover, the focus is specifically on the consequences of these actions and how they are produced, regardless of whether they were intentional or not, although the inadvertently produced functions are "often analytically the most interesting" (Jokinen et al. 2016, 48). Ideological consequence is another key concept in this study, along with hegemonic discourse, and will be examined in more detail in the following section 'Critical Discourse Analysis'.

## 4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Critical discourse analysis is an orientation of discourse analysis inspired by the theorizations of power by Michel Foucault examined in Chapter 2.2 (Juhila 1999, 165 [Foucault 1982, 225]). The starting point of CDA is the intertwining of discourses, power, and ideology, and presuming the existence of subordination, which is where it differs from general discourse analysis which does not make this assumption (Jokinen & Juhila 1999, 86; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 48; Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 99, 103). Based also on the theorizations of Pierre Bourdieu, CDA considers power relations present in all communication and all communication to be about "giving meaning". According to Bourdieu, as cited by Kantola et al. (1998, 103-104 [Bourdieu 1989]), "naming" and "defining meaning" are a "form of symbolic power" and - much like Foucault's genealogy of power with its regimes of truth and practice - the "field of discourses" is limited by "social power relations" or "cultural censorship", as Bourdieu calls it. (also Helén 2004, 208.)

In practice, discourses and "communication relationships" actualize, maintain and legitimize power relations and subordination. (Jokinen & Juhila 1999, 86; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 48 [Potter & Wetherell 1987, 187]) Language use not only constructs reality and produces power, as discussed in previous chapters, but also produces and sustains "symbolic-material structures" and certain subject positions, whose continuity requires "approval and reproduction" (Suoninen 1999, 24; Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 99). Producing, reproducing and approving subordination, however, are not always obvious and easily detectable processes, let alone conscious or intentional action (Suoninen 1999, 24; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 49). Hence, the objective of CDA is, firstly, to "make visible", examine, analyze, comment

and criticize discursive practices and their “often latent consequences” of producing, reproducing, justifying and legitimizing power, subordination and certain subject positions, and secondly, to clear space for “diversity”, silenced and marginalized discourses and ‘truths’, and social change, by making “alternative interpretations” of prevailing truths and the “self-evident”, and “polemic” statements regarding the “prevailing social organization” (Jokinen & Juhila 1999, 86; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 49; Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 245; Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 103 [Fairclough 1989, 87]; Juhila 1999, 165; Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 99). In a word, CDA sets out to redistribute power by way of making visible and criticizing its processes (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 118).

Research, however, always becomes a part of, and produces for its own part, the very social reality it criticizes, and thus becomes “open for other’s interpretations” (Juhila 1999, 230). This is a question of reflexivity on the one hand, and a question of intertwining of “power and opposition” on the other (Juhila 1999, 165 [Foucault 1982, 225], 230). – Any given discourse, be it the object or product of the research, maintains the “conventional structures” it supports or opposes, and the discourses it “refers to” or uses to “persuade its audience” (Suoninen 1999, 22). Thus, even when ‘opposing’, that is, criticizing “ontologized truth discourses”, the researcher “reflects the continuity connected to institutions and power”, and can only either “reproduce the prevailing material-social organization or transform it” (Juhila 1999, 165). Hence, reflecting on the possible ideological consequences of one’s own research and role in the larger conversation is particularly important in CDA.

Another element important specifically for CDA is context, which includes intertextuality, situationality of the data, the historicalness of discourses and meanings, social structures, and culture, and in all of which power and subordination are considered omnipresent (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 97, 104 [Fairclough 1992, 9-10]; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 87). Just like the orbicular relationship between knowledge and power, so is that between discourse and context – all discourses are “shaped”, and in certain ways limited, by their sociohistorical context and embedded “ideological structures and power relations”, and all discourses “reform” their context either by reproduction or transformation (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 97, 107 [Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1993, 32; Silverman 1985, 37]; Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 104 [Fairclough 1992, 104]; Juhila 1999, 163, 165). CDA, hence, is particularly about locating and reflecting on historically bound meanings, which either advance or hinder social change (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 118).

Examining meanings in their multidimensional context, or ‘contextualizing’, is a basic element of CDA. In practice, contextualizing the research data as well as its findings, and the social problem under examination, entails looking beyond the “linguistic data”, examining it in its cultural, political and sociohistorical context and putting it into perspective with the “true nature” and extent of the problem, and comparing it with “people’s everyday reality”, statistics and “perspectives of structural interests” (Juhila 1999, 168; Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 114). Indeed, when social problems require action they become institutionalized and their ‘meanings’ a subject of debate by different interest groups, when especially ones with economic power can define these problems “in a way that does not reflect existing reality” to serve their own needs (Juhila 1999, 167 [Jokinen & Juhila & Pösö 1995b, 12-13]; Juhila 1999, 168;



also Ferguson 1990). This way, non-discursive power (e.g. economic) produces discursive power (e.g. symbolic), and vice versa, and contextualizing is a way to make visible this intertwining of powers.

Focusing on the actual linguistic data and discursive power, or in other words the power to 'define' and 'give meaning', CDA, then, aims to figure out exactly "how certain discourses" become 'truths', that is, how 'truth' is produced in discursive practices (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 105 [Fairclough 1992, 36]). This process, called 'power analysis', is concerned with the power relations between and inside discourses (hegemonic battle), how 'truths' are produced and "alternative truths" questioned, how discourses become 'hegemonic', or in other words dominant, how hegemonic discourses are reproduced and how non-hegemonic discourses "can be used to support meanings considered self-evident", and lastly, the ideological consequences of and the possibility of questioning 'hegemonic discourses' (Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 75; Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 103, 105 [e.g. Jokinen & Juhila 1991, 34 ja 1993, 96-97], 112 [e.g. Jokinen & al. 1993, 21]). In making "hegemony interpretations", however, the researcher ought to be careful not to overlook "anything essential to the diversity of the data" (Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 103).

Considering the "potential ideological consequences", then, refers to questions of "whether or not a hegemonic discourse lives", or is kept alive, "to legitimize" or maintain different forms of subordination, the question of simple "uniformity of an interpretation" and its consequent "preservation" hindering social change, and even in the absence of actual subordination, producing a version of "the only truth" according to a certain political stance, and "justifying different cultural" 'self-evidents' by "appealing to custom and culture". (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 105 [e.g. Jokinen & Juhila 1991, 34 & 1993, 96-97], 113 [e.g. Fairclough 1989, 1992 & 1995a; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1993; Palonen 1988; Pöntinen 1995; Thompson 1990], 117). – CDA is interested in both the intentional use of language to appeal to one's audience, techniques of which are explored in more detail in the next section, as well as the possible unintentional outcomes of that language use, that is, the potential ideological consequences, which are the main focus of this study.

#### **4.2.1 Techniques of Producing Power in Discursive Practices**

Power and power relations are being constructed and actively produced in social practices by means of producing 'truths' and 'subject positions' to social actors (Jokinen & Juhila 2016, 75 [Fairclough 1992, 12, 36]). This chapter briefly considers the practical techniques and aspects of producing these truths and subject positions, or in other words, discursively producing positions of both power and subordination.

The question of producing and maintaining different subject positions, both positions of power and subordination, in society, is about situationality, function, audience and institutions. From the perspective of situationality and function, CDA is concerned with "who speaks, about what, in what way" and with what objective, as well as where the speaker's perceptions of 'truth' stem from (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 97, 104). An equally important question is to whom the text is directed to, the presumptions made about the audience as well as the expected or desired reaction of the audience to the text (Suoninen 1999, 27).

Whatever the objective of the text it is typical to appeal to meanings which are “broadly supported” in order to convince or persuade one’s audience (Suoninen 1999, 27). Appealing to these “ontologized discourses”, however, supports certain societal institutions and maintains existing power relations related to, for instance, “classes, gender and race”. The institutional position of the knowledge producer as well as the consequences of the knowledge produced from this position are both relevant to and under examination in CDA. CDA, hence, asks “which institutions are strengthened” and which “silenced” by, who benefits from, and who promotes the discourses, how the text “classifies, analyzes and assigns value to” knowledge, what issues the text is used to “promote or justify”, how “problems, sufferings, their causes and effects” are “being talked and written about, whose side is taken and on what grounds”, and whether or not, and in what way, certain ways to define problems “move from text and speech to another” (Juhila 1999, 164, 165 [Parker 1992, 17-20], 170, 247; Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 104; Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 250).

By way of making language use “rhetorically appealing”, it can be intentionally used to both “straightforwardly justify, or protest against, the use of societal power” and to produce positions of power as well as “otherness” and subordination (Suoninen 1999, 24; Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 245). These rhetoric techniques of producing knowledge, hegemonic ‘truths’ and different subject positions include, for instance, ‘naturalizing’ knowledge or appealing to the “reality” of things, different ‘factualization’ strategies, ambivalence and omitting explanations. Firstly, discourses become hegemonic at a “certain societal situation” when certain ways to ‘give meaning’ get, or should I say win, “more room than others” in the “hegemonic battle”, producing ‘truths’ and ‘self-evidents’ coequally shared by members of the same culture, complicating the “expression of alternative truths” (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 103 [Jokinen & Juhila 1991 ja 1993]). This becoming “a part of common sense”, “natural” and “indisputable”, or ‘naturalization’, of the “ideological elements of discursive practices” makes them very effective, and hence a useful instrument for producing positions of power and maintaining subordination (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 103). A closely related technique and idea is referring, or appealing, to the “reality of things”, defined as “fixed meanings and petrified moral practices”. The more certain practices become a “reality”, the harder they are to oppose, which makes appealing to them “convincing” and, hence, an effective instrument for persuasion. (Suoninen 1999, 30). Factualization strategies, then, refer to the different ways a linguistic actor uses to convince their audience of the “truthfulness” of their produced knowledge. These ways include appealing to, for instance, “presence”, personal experience and observations, “experts” or one’s own expertise, numerical facts (e.g. charts, tables etc.), and uniformity. (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 111 [e.g. Jokinen & Juhila 1993, 157-186]). Lastly, producing ambivalent or contradictory knowledge can be intentionally used to create a disingenuous “impression of fairness and taking all perspectives into account”, which can work in favor of the “image” of the linguistic actor, especially in the case of an actor in, and pursuing to maintain, its position of power (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 112). Another, rather latent way of producing or maintaining a position of power is simply not explaining – or having to explain – one’s actions “to the same extent” as those in the subordinate or lower position in the ‘hierarchy’ (Suoninen 1999, 30).

However, even the most well-intended linguistic action can have unintended, undesirable consequences of producing and maintaining otherness and subordination, which is specifically the focus of this study, and of which, also, the afore-discussed adverse unintentional consequences of well-meaning praise, development intervention, and related knowledge production, are examples of (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 49 [Wetherell & Potter 1992]).

### 4.3 Data Selection and Description

The data selected for this study is a development intervention related guidebook on climate change adaptation and gender mainstreaming and empowerment, published by the United Nations Development Programme in 2010, called:

*Gender, Climate Change and Community Based Adaptation.*

*A Guidebook for Designing and Implementing Gender-Sensitive Community-Based Adaptation Programmes and Projects.*

As the focus of this study is particularly the intertwining of knowledge production and power, and the role of the conceptual development apparatus in producing power relations in development related knowledge production, choosing a development project guidebook, one of its kind in the context, by the powerful and authoritative institution of the UN, seemed not only reasonable, but the only, yet ideal, choice. Furthermore, the context of climate change and gender equality, and the UN discourses on the subject, were previously familiar to me from my Bachelor's Thesis, so it seemed natural and interesting to delve deeper into the subject, now from a different angle. The context in general remains relevant, and dare I say becomes even more so, as the climate crisis progresses. For the purposes of the chosen topic, and the extent of a Master's Thesis, focusing on just one document, too, was reasonable.

The document is 70 pages long altogether, the first 50 pages of which are under analysis, excluding the bibliography, references and annexes at the end. Overall, the document discusses, under subsequent headings, the "gender approach to development", "climate change and adaptation", "gender, vulnerability, climate change and disasters", "gender dimensions of climate change adaptation", and "preliminary lessons learned", which were examined verbatim along with the foreword, introduction and conclusion chapters (UNDP 2010, iii). In addition to content, the **form** of the data is of importance, as the "political preconditions" of the data are also a part of its politicohistorical context (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998, 114). The preconditions of this research data include the political and institutional guidelines of the UN for its own documents, as well as the formal, informative, assertive and authoritative language and tone of the data as a guidebook for action. Furthermore, both CDA, and the Third World Feminists in their critique of representation, emphasize the questions of who speaks, about what, where, to whom, and with what authority. In the case of this data, the UN speaks both about, and for, the global South and their women, in an

international, formal and authoritative medium, to “CBOs, NGOs, governments, development agencies and other community-based practitioners” (UNDP2010, ii), that is, the presumably uncritical and compliant “developers”, both within and outside of the global South, with the authority of the “global community”. This means that the audience of the data and its discourses is global, and yet it excludes the communities and their women whom the data, and intervention, concerns. That is to say, the target community does not have voice, or a say, in the, hence, provably unsolicited intervention. This exclusion of the community, along with the global reach of the data, serve to intensify the implications of the produced discourses.

#### 4.4 Analysis Framework

As elaborated in the previous Chapters, this study is particularly concerned with firstly, the powerful institutional position of the UN as a producer of authoritative expert knowledge, secondly, the power of the UN as a conceptual development apparatus to define and institutionalize social/development problems to the extent to administrate political and development programs, thirdly, the actual knowledge, hegemonic discourses and subject positions produced in the context of development intervention, climate change and gender equality in the selected research data, and most importantly, the unintended, undesired and latent consequences of this well-meaning intentional linguistic action of the UN.

In practice, I examine how, in the data, the UN, using for instance the aforementioned rhetorical techniques, aims to produce:

1. Legitimacy and justification for development intervention by...
  - Appealing to situational need for intervention
  - Appealing to obligation to intervene
2. A suitable target for “standardized development package” by...
  - Oversimplifying target community/group/interests
  - Oversimplifying development/developing countries
  - Oversimplifying problems and solutions
3. Legitimacy and justification for own status and role in development intervention by...
  - Appealing to right to intervene
  - Appealing to own expertise
  - Appealing to own authority

I will, then, further discuss – within its politicohistorical sociocultural context – the ideological, unintended and undesired consequences of this well-meaning linguistic action, that is, what kind of hegemonic discourses and subject positions for both the UN and the target for intervention are being produced, which reproduce, maintain and strengthen the unequal North-South power dynamic and positions of power and subordination therein.

## 4.5 Reliability, Validity, Generalizing and Relevance

The reliability of research, and its results, depends on the “compatibility of the research problem with the methods and theories used” (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 105 [Luostarinen ja Väli-verronen 1993]). Also, in order to produce justifiable argumentation, critically evaluate results, and avoid the research of becoming “implausible ‘knowing better’”, it is imperative that concepts are explicitly defined, and that the interpretations made of social reality, researcher positionality, and the “methodological and theoretical choices” and the rationale behind them, are adequately, thoroughly, clearly and coherently documented (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 105 [Luostarinen ja Väli-verronen 1993]; Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 252). Since I am interested in how language and knowledge produce power and subordination in the context of development intervention, Foucauldian theory on knowledge and power and Ferguson’s theorization on the conceptual development apparatus, along with CDA as method, seemed like sound choices, adding to the reliability of this study.

The question of validity, then, is particularly relevant to research with small data, just as this (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 117). CDA, however, is not concerned with generalizing per se, but rather the ‘possibility of generalization’ (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 106 [Peräkylä (1995, 48)]). – Data is considered a “sample of the language and culture” under examination, whose “cultural position” research aims to locate by means of contextualizing, that is, determining what kind of interpretations based on the data can be “proven possible or at least reasonable within its situational and cultural context” (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 106 [Alasuutari 1993, 68-71; also Mäkelä 1990, 48-50]). Thus, after the function and construction of a discursive practice in one context has been established, there are “grounds for claiming that the same model is possible” in other contexts as well (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 106 [Peräkylä (1995, 48)]). Furthermore, contextualizing the realities produced in these specific situations can reveal “institutional continuity” in the ways in which, for instance, “gender” (Juhila 1999, 175), or climate change and development, are talked about. The chosen data is one of the many documents produced by the UN on gender and climate change. Having become familiar with a variety of this literature previously, it is safe to say that the data is congruent with the hegemonic discourses of the UN, repeatedly produced in their documents regarding the subject. Hence, the interpretations made, based on the chosen sample and perspective, that is, the results and conclusions of this study, can be generalized to the extent that they represent the hegemonic discourses produced by the UN on the subject.

Lastly, the relevance of research done using CDA is considered to “go hand in hand” with the relevance of the selected data, for which reason it is recommended to select texts which have “observable consequences in society” (Kantola, Moring & Väli-verronen 1998, 117). Furthermore, “examining the ideological consequences of language use” also adds to the relevance of the research (Juhila & Suoninen 1999, 245). The chosen data, being a practical guidebook for development intervention practitioners, has especially tangible and observable consequences in society – it directly affects the material reality of the target communities, and, maybe even more importantly, the

perceptions of reality of both the target communities as well as the intervention practitioners. The way the data shapes the perceptions of its audience, that is, the unintentional ideological consequences of the data producing power and subordination, is the focus of this study.

## 4.6 Researcher Positionality

The theorizations on positionality stem from “poststructuralism” and aforementioned “Foucault’s genealogy of power”, according to which there is “no field of discussion free of power or innocent knowledge” (Juhila 2016, 418). The “use of linguistic power” should be examined, as it “reveals prevailing” and “untold truths” and voices of “opposition”, bearing in mind, however, that criticism is not justified without also taking into consideration the non-linguistic reality of “institutions, power and inequality” (Juhila 2016, 418, 442 [Parker 1992, 70-81; Parker & Burman 1993, 167-168]). At best, this examination of “relations of power and subordination” is a beginning of an “emancipatory project” “clearing space for silenced and marginalized voices”, including “practical political action” of “empowerment” (the problematics of which were discussed in Chapter 3.3.4 The Paradox of Empowerment and Patronizing Oppressive Praise) (Juhila 2016, 418, 419 [Parker & Burman 1993, 170]).

Hence, critical discourse analysis emphasizes the position of an “advocate” (Juhila 2016, 419 [Parker 1992; Parker & Burman 1993]), in which the researcher is “a critic of existing realities” and “prevailing meanings of Western culture”, and is “committed to change”. The ‘advocate’ is an advocate for, and aims to advance, a certain issue by asking how “discursive actors build their social reality” and how it “could be built differently”. By explicitly committing to certain values and siding with a certain “version of the truth” the researcher “also develops means for intervention and argumentation”. Thus, research done from the advocate position is “always politically committed”, an “intrinsically political act”, which predisposes the researcher to “purposefulness and sloppiness”, something which they should hence be especially mindful of in order to avoid. Research and scientific literature, also, always have consequences as they become a part of a broader discussion. (Juhila 2016, 418 [Parker 1992, 33; Parker & Burman 1993, 166-170; Fairclough 1992, 96-100], 419, 442; Juhila 1999, 228). Hence, a researcher ought to “think through” and clearly “articulate” their own values and “frames of reading” and “the ideological consequences of those” in the research (Juhila 1999, 228 [Parker & Burman 1993, 160-164; Morgan 1998]; Juhila 2016, 419).

My critical advocate position comes with three obvious concerns. Firstly, this study study is, indeed, set out to question, criticize and oppose both the current hegemonic development paradigm as well as the overall hegemony of the global North along with its neoliberal values and worldview, in efforts to expand the space for, and offer, alternative interpretations and discourses of the prevailing conceptions of global power relations, development and intervention, climate action as well as gender and empowerment within the context of expert knowledge production. Hence, taking a strongly critical approach, the study is specifically focused on the latent, inequality reproducing discourses – a perspective which could be interpreted as purposeful. The

data, however, is examined within its historicopolitical sociocultural context, which testifies for the hegemony of both the neoliberal global North as well as the current development paradigm along with its institutions, which, in turn, justifies the chosen critical perspective and lends credibility for the results. Secondly, my position as a privileged, Western white female, born and raised in the abundant global North, criticizing the treatment of, and advocating for the agency of the women in the South, is inevitably biased, and a position criticized by the Third World Feminists, although I am not trying to speak for the women in the South per se, but make visible and criticize the discourses reproducing global inequality, in a specific linguistic context related to, and having real life consequences for them. Lastly, my position of relative power as an academic knowledge producer is biased in a sense that it, too, produces possible, even adverse real-life consequences, through the discourses produced by this study, referring to the ironic problem of any critical research of inevitably and regrettably reproducing the very discourses it criticizes, simply by referring to them.

## 5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In analyzing the data from the perspective of unequal North-South power dynamics it all seems to boil down to responsibility; I found three main discourses of 1) Ignoring / Avoiding Responsibility, 2) Taking Responsibility, and 3) Imposing Responsibility. The Taking Responsibility Discourse is composed of two sub-discourses, Alarmist / Necessity Discourse and Obligation / Authority Discourse. The Alarmist / Necessity Discourse, then, includes a victimizing subject position for the women in developing countries, while the Obligation / Authority Discourse includes a subject position of a savior or protector for the UN. Women in developing countries also get another subject position of a change agent in the Imposing Responsibility discourse. In what follows, I will discuss each identified discourse in detail.

### 5.1 Ignoring / Avoiding Responsibility Discourse

The Ignoring / Avoiding Responsibility Discourse stems from how climate change, its causes, and needed action, is framed in terms of whose responsibility these are. The following quote is revealing:

While debate rages on regarding responsibility for past greenhouse gas emissions and how to reduce the man-made sources of those gases, the world is actually already committed to adapting to the climate changes that will continue to develop as a result of past emissions.<sup>2</sup>

This statement is followed by pointing out that although climate change is a “global phenomenon”, the “developing world will bear the heaviest burden of climate change, despite having contributed least to the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change, and women are particularly affected”, which is why the “need to adapt is urgent” and “required”, in order to reduce the “human and social costs” and to support “sustainable development and poverty alleviation” (UNDP 2010, 9, 11).

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<sup>2</sup> UNDP 2010, 9.



First of all, there is an interesting contradiction between first stating that “debate rages on regarding responsibility for past” GHG emissions, and yet, right after, explicating how the developing world has “contributed least” to the emissions responsible for climate change. As there is, factually, no doubt about who the biggest polluters have been in the past, disregarding this fact by simply stating there is “raging debate” about the responsibility, effectively distracts attention away from, and downplays, the role of the West, or global North, in causing climate change and, by extension, the enormous gains in economic, material and social development it has had, due to its heavily polluting, fossil-fuel driven economy since the industrial revolution, at the expense of the rest of the world. It is also telling that, after making this unavoidable reference to the causes of climate change and the party responsible for it, these are not present anywhere else in the document, except for as the elephant in the room.

This lack of criticism and avoiding responsibility is patched with referring to a shared responsibility for taking action; the data explicates that “the global community” recognizes that “we have a collective responsibility to help the most vulnerable developing countries to adapt to climate change” (UNDP 2010, 11), and that “the world is actually already committed to adapting to the climate changes that will continue to develop as a result of past emissions” (UNDP 2010, 9). Attention is, hence, shifted away from the responsibility for causing the continuously worsening climate change due to past, mostly West-made emissions, to a seemingly “shared responsibility” of the vague collectives of “the world” and “global community”. Although this might sound like the much called for ‘North taking responsibility for their past mistakes’, appealing to the “collective responsibility to help” along with victimizing the developing world and its women, actually function to produce both a target, as well as legitimacy and justification, for development intervention.

What is more, referring to the ‘raging debate’ on *how* “to reduce the man-made sources of” GHG’s, and emphasizing the urgency of *adaptation* in the global South, with the necessary help of the global North, as the “required” measure regarding climate change, distract attention away from, and downplay, also the obvious need for drastic mitigation in the global North, while reproducing the unequal structures of the hegemonic development paradigm – the direction of developing, including climate change action, remaining from North to South, and the need to change the status quo in terms of (sustainable) development mostly concerning the latter, while the former resolutely holds onto its own interests and achieved standard of living, refusing to jeopardize its own growth based development.

Void of criticism, ignoring and avoiding the role of the North as the main culprit in causing the perpetually progressive climate change, and by shifting attention towards the North heroically taking on the “collective responsibility” to help the victimized countries and communities, in the form of hence justified development intervention, the data absurdly produces the North as a virtuous and righteous actor, here for the rescue. Now, while a guidebook for adaptation is obviously not ought to delve deeper into mitigation or the complexities of the causes of climate change, I find it interesting how these discourses function to spin the role of the North from ‘villain in reality’ to ‘hero on paper’ in the big picture. Furthermore, in addition to underscoring the power differential between the heroic North and the victimized South, this dynamic is an example of paternalism, that is, the powerful dominating the less powerful

through benevolent action, which, irrespective of good intentions, can produce unintended adverse consequences, such as, diminishing and humiliating the beneficiary. – Hence, the Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse effectively reproduces the unequal North-South power dynamic of domination, subordination and dependency.

## 5.2 Taking Responsibility Discourse

The Taking Responsibility Discourse refers to the role of the author of the data, the UN, as they position themselves as the necessary saviors and protectors of the victimized women in developing countries, against the urgent and constantly increasing threat of climate change. The following sections on the Alarmist / Necessity and Obligation / Authority Discourses, along with their subject positions for women and the UN, discuss how these partly overlapping discourses are produced individually, and how they, in turn, produce the South's dependency on the North, consequently reproducing the unequal North-South power dynamic.

### 5.2.1 Alarmist / Necessity Discourse

The Alarmist / Necessity Discourse emphasizes the urgency and threat of climate change to the people, but more importantly, the women in developing countries, along with development in general, hence overlapping with the victimizing subject position for women and feminizing climate change and vulnerability. In efforts to produce legitimacy and justification for development intervention by appealing to the urgent threat of climate change, as argued also by Mikulewicz (2020, 1810, 1824), an interesting instrumental role for climate change action itself is produced. This rings a bell with Giddens' bandwagon effect along with other criticism of development, where the apparent reason for intervention is perceived as a vehicle for other latent objectives. The following quote is revealing:

The Human Development Report of 2007-08 highlighted the potential of climate change to undermine attainment of the Millenium Development Goals and, aware of this, UNDP strives to harmonize human development and the management of climate change by promoting mitigation and adaptation measures in order to hasten socio-economic progress.<sup>3</sup>

Climate change, here, is perceived as a threat to achieving the MDG's, and climate change action is reduced to an instrumental means to "hasten socio-economic progress". This implies that climate change as a problem is subordinate to socio-economic problems, and that the ultimate goals of climate change action might actually be economic ones, not protecting the environment and vulnerable communities from further climate change first and foremost for their intrinsic value. This kind of valuation strongly resonates with the hegemonic neoliberal economic and development paradigms, where economics exceeds and predominates everything else, and where the economic development of the South, for the sake of the economic success and security

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<sup>3</sup> UNDP 2010, 2.

of the North, are of paramount importance and concern. What is more, in this quote, and throughout the data, the concept of development is naturalized, that is, treated as something that does not require explanation and whose meaning and definition is expected to be known by everyone beforehand. The UN, as a conceptual apparatus, thus, effectively oversimplifies development, a concept deliberately so vague that it could mean anything and, hence, does not mean anything anymore. This absurdity, along with the fact that the MDG's and other development the UN appeals to are defined by the UN itself, produces a position of superiority for the UN as a knowledge definer compared to the target of their development action. This positioning, along with implicitly placing economics above the environment and vulnerable communities, for its own part, indirectly reproduces the position of superiority of the North, and its neoliberal values and ideals, over the oppressed South among everything else.

The impression of the urgency and threat of climate change to development and the people, and especially women, in developing countries, then, is produced by referring to climate change and its effects as “unavoidable” (UNDP 2010, 11) “incremental” (UNDP 2010, 4) and “harmful” (UNDP 2010, 11) “hazards” (UNDP 2010, 11) and “risks” (UNDP 2010, 10, 18), which “will harm human development” (UNDP 2010, 11). The impression of a continuing and progressive threat is further intensified by referring to “future change” (UNDP 2010, 11) and stating how climate change is “projected to change the frequency and magnitude of hazardous weather events” (UNDP 2010, 17), and how its effects are already “discernable, and indeed worsening” (UNDP 2010, 9). Furthermore, regarding women and gender inequality, the data assertively states that it is “clear” that climate change “will have a disproportionately greater effect on women”, that “women will be more vulnerable than men to the effects of climate change” (UNDP 2010, 14), that climate change is “likely only to magnify existing patterns of gender disadvantage” (UNDP 2010, 15-16), and that “several factors will exacerbate this [gender inequality]” (UNDP 2010, 16). These intimidating characterizations are also accompanied by factualizing statistics of the risks (UNDP 2010, 10, 18). While all of this is true and the threat of climate change is very real and urgent, the Alarmist Discourse, hence produced, also functions to create legitimacy and justification for continuous development interventions in the name of climate change and gender equality in the South – an agenda which is not entirely convincing, not to mention its means, which have proven to continuously fail and should rather be monetary, according to critics.

Another way in which the sense of threat is used in the data, to justify intervention, is appealing to the need and necessity of a particular type of adaptation and emphasizing the consequences of not doing so. This is done by referring to the gendered approach, along with the elements of its practical implementation, as “essential” (UNDP 2010, 28), “vital” (UNDP 2010, 36), “critical” (UNDP 2010, 43), and “imperative” (UNDP 2010, 40), and that they “must” and “need” to be “ensured” from the very beginning of, and throughout the project cycle (UNDP 2010, 20, 27, 30, 36, 39, 43, 46). Furthermore, the following quotes explicitly emphasize the “dangers” and “harmfulness” of dismissing the gender aspect, that is, “reinforcing” or “exacerbating” gender inequality. These choices of word intensify the sense of threat of not ‘doing things the

right way' in adapting to climate change, which along with implying that the gendered approach to adaptation cannot be done without the help of the author organization, UN, produce the Necessity Discourse.

If gender is not taken into account, there is also a danger that post-disaster recovery grants will favor men over women, thus reinforcing gender inequalities.<sup>4</sup>

The danger, of course, is that, if there is no gendered approach toward adaptation, these differences between men and women may be overlooked, inadvertently reinforcing gender inequality and women's vulnerability to climate change.<sup>5</sup>

It is clear that gender-blind adaptation programmes are potentially harmful to development, as they tend to exacerbate existing inequality.<sup>6</sup>

The sense of necessity of appropriate action, in time, and the threat of the lack thereof, is further established by statements arguing that if "gender is overlooked" (UNDP 2010, 20) "it is usually more difficult to effectively address its absence afterwards" (UNDP 2010, 27), adaptation "measures may not be appropriate or sustainable" (UNDP 2010, 20), and that they might have "unintended gender implications" (UNDP 2010, 39).

The elements of threat and necessity are also present in the following quotes which reveal an interesting internal contradiction as the data, suddenly, refers to a shared threat and responsibility in using the pronouns "us", "we" and "our", and calling for "collective" action, which seems to be an effort to create a sense of unity, but given the patronizing and othering approach of the rest of the document, however, lacks sincerity. This strategy functions to create credibility for the development actor, the UN, as well as legitimacy and justification for "taking responsibility" in the form of development intervention.

Climate change is upon us and adaptation is necessary to reduce vulnerability to its harmful effects. ... The gendered nature of vulnerability needs to be examined at the local level, ideally using gender analysis to yield sex-disaggregated data. Such analysis ensures that adaptation interventions take account of gender differences and thus do not inadvertently reproduce gender inequalities.<sup>7</sup>

Like other development interventions, successful CBA projects must address the underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability and wider disparities based on wealth, gender and location. ... gender equality can be brought about only if we collectively examine and rebuild our social and cultural constructions of gender and analyze the division of labor according to gender... Success with gender and CBA is a strong step in the right direction.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, while emphasizing the "need" for certain "ideal" ways of adapting, these quotes also show how, not only the problems, but their solutions are oversimplified, by the conceptual development apparatus, as part of paving the way for a "standardized development package", as these suggested ways are stated to "ensure"

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<sup>4</sup> UNDP 2010, 18.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP 2010, 20.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP 2010, 21.

<sup>7</sup> UNDP 2010, 45.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP 2010, 46.

the right way of action leading to “success” and simply “thus do not” worsen the situation. Another expressive example of oversimplifying problems and solutions is referring to “gender attitudes” as “barriers” to be simply “overcome” by finding the right kind of “harmless”, “somehow ‘depoliticized’”, “culturally respectful” “entry point” which “is not threatening to men” (UNDP 2010, 41), as if the complex construct of gender attitudes could be “overcome” just by finding the right “entry point”.

In the same vein, in addition to producing legitimacy and justification for a standardized development package, by oversimplifying development, its target countries and communities, as well as its problems and solutions, the data functions to produce legitimacy and justification for future projects as well. Firstly, outlining the objective of the guidebook, the data explicitly refers to “forthcoming CBA projects” and “simple tools” for a “gender sensitive approach” to planning them, “regardless of context” (UNDP 2010, 3), again also simplifying solutions to problems, and secondly, concerning monitoring, the data implicitly refers to package deals by asking whether the “given CBA project” has been “tailored to the cultural context” (UNDP 2010, 35), and whether gender issues “relevant to each project” and “in the appropriate country” (UNDP 2010, 33) have been taken into consideration.

Also, the imposing nature of these package deal projects, initially not asked for by the locals, onto developing countries and their communities, is well evident in referring to them as a “planned intervention” and “proposed project” (UNDP 2010, 32). These choices of words imply the obvious, that is, that the project has, indeed, been designed beforehand to be optimized for different circumstances, and *not* based on the needs of a certain target community who asked for it themselves. In fact, the locals, as discussed earlier, often do not want the projects they are being “proposed” with, and aware of this, the UN warns that “while essential”, carrying out the project may also be “challenging” for the practitioners in the face of locals’ “resistance to change” (UNDP 2010, 28). In relation to this, it is interestingly stated that these problems, including “attitudes, beliefs and practices”, are “often deeply rooted in cultural, social, political and religious norms” and should first be “assessed and understood in order to be overcome” (UNDP 2010, 28), again giving a contradictory picture of massive and complex problems which could, however, be overcome by just choosing the right methods and “simple tools” at offer.

However, even despite the resistance from the target communities, and as critics have shown, the projects are not designed to make themselves redundant. On the contrary, it is expected that they continue to be carried out and even “scaled up” (UNDP 2010, 38) in different locations. Furthermore, the talk about “lessons learned” (UNDP 2010, 3-4) from numerous previous projects so far, and even instrumentalizing gender mainstreaming into something that “ensures” that the “experiences of women and men alike become part of the knowledge generated and lessons learned from the project” (UNDP 2010, 4) which could “be of use in future projects” (UNDP 2010, 39), add to the impression of doing the projects for “project’s sake”, which is also what theory seems to point to.

In summary, the Alarmist / Necessity Discourse appeals to the urgent threat of climate change to the victimized, oppressed women in developing countries in particular, as well as to the necessity of gender-based adaptation in order to avoid any further harm, with which the UN is adept to help. Creating a sense of threat in these ways,

hence, seems to be a strategy for producing legitimacy and justification for continuous development interventions and credibility for the UN as a facilitator. The interventions, however, are a classic standardized package deal, needing to be “sold” to the possibly resistant recipients, who did not ask for it in the first place, and hence might not even want it. This begs a question of whose interests the imposed interventions actually serve, and whether the means of “helping” those who factually suffer disproportionately, are chosen in the best interest of the beneficiaries. The underlying, partly economic agenda of climate change and gender equality related development intervention explicit in the data, along with the ongoing “selling” of the necessary “package deal” under the pretext of the urgent threat of climate change, allude to the bandwagon theory, and actually erode the credibility of the UN sincerely taking on responsibility of a “shared” burden. Nevertheless, the Alarmist / Necessity Discourse, hence, consolidates the victim status of developing countries and their communities compared to their less vulnerable counterparts in the North, as well as the position of the UN as the definer and possessor of better, liberating knowledge, hence reproducing the unequal North-South power dynamic.

### 5.2.2 Women’s Subject Position as Victims

In the Alarmist / Necessity Discourse, the women in developing countries are produced as manifold victims of climate change, gender inequality, development and societal circumstances at large, hence feminizing climate change and vulnerability. The following statement, right under the heading “Women’s vulnerability to climate change”, implies women are victims to various other circumstances as well:

Climate change is not happening in isolation, but is coinciding with many other trends and stresses on livelihoods, including economic liberalization, globalization, population growth, geopolitical conflict, and unpredictable government policies.<sup>9</sup>

The manifold victim status is also expressed explicitly in the following:

In many communities, climate change will have disproportionately greater effect on women, since women are often poorer and less educated than men and often excluded from political and household decision-making processes that affect their lives. Additionally, women usually have fewer assets and depend more on natural resources for their livelihoods. These and other factors indicate that women will be more vulnerable than men to the effects of climate change.<sup>10</sup>

The use of assertive language in claiming how climate change “will” have a disproportionately negative effect on women compared to men creates and sustains a sense of threat towards women, which, along with the other claims about women’s poor status in developing societies, intensifies the victimizing effect.

Women are explicitly victimized in the context of development by statements, such as the following, portraying women in general, on the global scale, as lacking in resources and development compared to men, and directly pointing to women’s exclusion in development:

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<sup>9</sup> UNDP 2010, 15.

<sup>10</sup> UNDP 2010, 14.

... on aggregate at the global scale, women are the poorest and least educated and have the fewest resources...<sup>11</sup>

... unequal relations between women and men may contribute to the extent and forms of exclusion that women face in the development process.<sup>12</sup>

Women's victim status and particular vulnerability to climate change, then, is produced, for instance, by referring to women as "especially vulnerable" (UNDP 2010, 14) and explicitly stating they bear a "disproportionately high burden of the adverse effects of climate change" (UNDP 2010, 6). This victim status is prevalent and produced throughout the document by statistics and explicit claims, such as the following, covering their specific vulnerability in the daily life, as well as in disasters and post-disaster settings.

As the primary users of natural resources (being typically responsible for fetching water and wood and bringing it to the house, for example), women depend on the resources most at risk from climate change.<sup>13</sup>

A substantial body of literature on the gendered nature of vulnerability to past hazards and disasters illuminates how women and men are differently affected. When disasters occur, more women die than men, which reflects women's social exclusion...<sup>14</sup>

Women and girls are particularly vulnerable in post-disaster situations... ...there is also danger that post-disaster recovery grants will favor men over women, thus reinforcing gender inequalities.<sup>15</sup>

Men's vulnerability, however, is more of a sidenote mentioned here and there, for instance relating to disasters:

On the other hand, some post-disaster analysis has shown that men suffer higher mortality rates because they take more risks trying to save themselves and their families.<sup>16</sup>

Despite taking also men into account, the overall approach of the document in terms of gender inequality, is that of women's subordination to men. Women's victim status in the context of gender inequality is produced by, for instance, offering factualizing statistical "evidence for women's subordination relative to men" (UNDP 2010, 7), and explicitly stating that "discrimination against women is more common" (UNDP 2010, 8) compared to men. In addition to portraying women as principal victims of gender inequality, gender inequality in developing countries in general is portrayed as severe, deep-rooted and persistent, which further intensifies the victimizing effect on women in developing countries, and also produces an oversimplified, undifferentiated and negative picture of developing societies. This is well explicit in the following quotes:

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<sup>11</sup> UNDP 2010, 8.

<sup>12</sup> UNDP 2010, 7.

<sup>13</sup> UNDP 2010, 16.

<sup>14</sup> UNDP 2010, 17.

<sup>15</sup> UNDP 2010, 18.

<sup>16</sup> UNDP 2010, 18.

Given the severity of gender inequality, particularly in the developing world...<sup>17</sup>

In the developing world in particular, priority is still placed on boys' education rather than girls', and girls are thus likely to be the first ones pulled out of school when resources are short. ... Limited educational opportunities also make it more difficult for women to gain formal, paid employment, further reinforcing their subordination relative to men.<sup>18</sup>

Despite growing global awareness and literature around the topic of gender, women remain subordinate, particularly in many developing countries.<sup>19</sup>

The last quote also paints a patronizing picture of "poorly performing students" of the people in developing countries, who, despite all the knowledge on gender available in the world, have not yet been able to solve the problem of gender inequality, and further victimizes especially the women in developing countries, by, again, explicitly highlighting their subordination to men. Furthermore, the sense of threat towards, and the persistence of the victim status of women, is further intensified by emphasizing the exacerbating effect of gender inequality to climate change effects, by explicitly stating that gender inequality "perpetuates their [women's] vulnerability to the harmful effects of climate change" (UNDP 2010, 8).

Women in developing countries, hence, are not only produced as passive victims in desperate need of external help from development agencies, but also as passive objects of their patronizingly "empowering" development action, which is evident in, for example, the following:

But gender roles remain very distinct even within the developed world, necessitating affirmative action toward women to bring about gender equality.<sup>20</sup>

The patronizing claim of the "necessity" of "affirmative action toward women" especially in the developing world, while stating the "bringing about gender equality" as the objective of such action, something not achieved "even within the developed world", produces and enhances an impression of the passivity, incapability and general inferiority of the developing world, and especially their women, compared to the UN, conversely produced as an active, capable, and hence, overall superior actor. This kind of juxtaposition, along with victimizing the developing world and their people, present throughout the data in various forms, effectively reproduces and sustains the unequal North-South dependency and power dynamic, and what is more, as criticized by Third World Feminists, producing the manifold victim status for women especially, reiterates the way women in the South are typically presented by Western feminists.

### 5.2.3 Obligation / Authority Discourse

The Obligation/ Authority Discourse is produced by portraying developing countries, or the South, as unable to tackle their current and future problems regarding climate change without the expertise and external help from the UN, representing knowledge

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<sup>17</sup> UNDP 2010, 15.

<sup>18</sup> UNDP 2010, 16-17 [Kevane 2004; Appleton 1996].

<sup>19</sup> UNDP 2010, 8.

<sup>20</sup> UNDP 2010, 8.



and paradigms of the North, which thus offers a mandate and a moral obligation for the North to help the South, in the form of development intervention, for both of their sake. The Obligation/ Authority Discourse, hence, examines how the data produces North-South dependency in terms of obligation to help, along with legitimacy and justification for both development intervention in general, as well as for the UN as an authoritative expert knowledge producer and facilitator of such interventions.

The Obligation Discourse is produced by appealing to the right, that is, the “mandate”, and moral obligation of the UN to intervene in the development of the South, which is well explicit in the following quote:

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a dual mandate for working toward gender equality: gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment. Women’s empowerment is often necessary as an explicit form of affirmative action, since many women suffer inequality and require specific attention to enable them to participate fully in gender mainstreaming.<sup>21</sup>

Moral obligation, and dependency, are explicitly produced here by referring to women’s empowerment as “often necessary” and claiming that women “require specific attention” and “explicit”, “affirmative action” to be able to “fully” participate in gender mainstreaming. These claims, along with appealing to women “suffering inequality” and women’s general inability to manage their current situation, while overlapping with the victimizing and passivating subject position for women, are also a part of producing legitimacy and justification for development intervention. Appealing to the moral obligation of the UN to intervene is also well evident in the way

The global community recognizes that we have a collective responsibility to help the most vulnerable developing countries to adapt to climate change.<sup>22</sup>

where the UN, appealing to “collective responsibility”, positions itself as superior, with the power, means and mandate to help the, yet again, victimized, patronized, undifferentiated “most vulnerable developing countries”. What is more, the UN’s mandate to intervene is based on the concepts of, and conventions on, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment, while the data reiterates the dichotomic conceptualizations of gender and gendered division of labor, for instance, which are all rooted in Western feminism criticized by TWF’s, whereupon the data in question, along with ensuing interventions, can also be considered as inevitably imposing the allegedly “better”, Western “knowledge” regarding gender and gender equality on the developing world.

The Authority Discourse, then, is produced by producing legitimacy and justification for the UN as a credible and adept facilitator of development interventions, by appealing to their experience, competence, authority and expertise, and by naturalizing their authority and knowledge produced as “better by definition”. The UN’s previous experience and competence with similar projects is appealed to, for instance, by referring to the Community Based Adaptation (CBA) program as being “among many initiatives that UNDP supports with regard to climate change adaptation” (UNDP

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<sup>21</sup> UNDP 2010, 2.

<sup>22</sup> UNDP 2010, 11.

2010, 2), and which is “currently being implemented in various natural and socio-economic contexts in ten countries around the world” (UNDP 2010, 2). The UN is, hence, produced as a credible and capable development actor, who has the competence, authority and means to “support” climate action, globally, in varying contexts. Furthermore, in addition to the “many initiatives” “around the world”, referring to numerous projects and “up to 120 case study examples” of CBA “yielding evidence and lessons learned”, along with providing factualizing statistics of the finance and ongoing and future programs (UNDP 2010, 3), further intensify the impression of the UN as a competent expert in climate action. Also, appealing to the financiers (UNDP 2010, 2) as well as “grants” available for organizations for climate action “within the framework of each country’s CBA Country Programme Strategy” (UNDP 2010, 2-3) intensify the impression of the UN as a competent actor, along with its programmes, worthy of financing.

Appealing to the UN’s authority and expertise is also produced by naturalizing the UN’s power to define concepts, problems, solutions and binding agreements, as well as having better knowledge by definition, which further consolidates its authoritative position as an expert knowledge producer and facilitator of development interventions. This is well-evident in the data in statements, such as that regarding gender mainstreaming as having been “defined and adopted by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)” (UNDP 2010, 1) and how the “need to prevent discrimination against women has been outlined in the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)”, dictating “areas in which governments are obliged to take action” (UNDP 2010, 8), where referring to its own organizations, conventions and administrative power function to implicitly place itself, and consolidate its position, as the highest authority of the said matters.

Furthermore, explicitly and implicitly referring to the UN as a producer of authoritative, better knowledge by definition, is evident in how, throughout the guidebook, the UN authoritatively defines the need, and sets the standards, for action overall, by explicating how it, literally, “sets targets” and defines the “problems, assets, barriers and potential solutions”, “criteria”, “objectives, goals, outcomes, activities, indicators and baselines” (UNDP 2010, 22, 32) for action, and by stating that the “need to adapt is urgent” (UNDP 2010, 9), dictating what “successful projects require” (UNDP 2010, 3), what “adequate integration of a gender perspective” entails (UNDP 2010, 7) and what it would “ideally” bring about (UNDP 2010, 8), as well as assertively stating how adapting a gendered approach “ensures” wanted results (UNDP 2010, 3). Also, statements referring to the CBA program as a knowledge producer on “community based adaptation to climate change and other important fields” (UNDP 2010, 3), emphasizing the “importance” and “requirement” of “thorough understanding” of different aspects regarding gender and climate change for related action to be “successful” (UNDP 2010, 5, 6), explicating how the guidebook aims to provide “simple tools and practical advice ... to planning and implementing adaptation projects and programmes regardless of context” and that it hence “will be a useful reference for any development practitioners or policy makers working in this field” (UNDP 2010, 3), further intensify the image of the UN as the expert knowledge producer and authority, competent to define what knowledge is “important” and to provide simplified,

yet efficient technical solutions to complex problems, applicable in any given context and useful to any given actor in the field.

In efforts to produce legitimacy and justification for development intervention, as well as for itself as a facilitator, the UN as a conceptual development apparatus, appeals to its self-proclaimed authority and right to intervene, along with the morally more acceptable “collective responsibility” to “help”, and places itself with its superior knowledge and expertise, along with the global North, above the victimized and patronized South, ignorant and incapable of solving problems on their own, hence, not only consolidating the UN’s position as the highest authority, but also contributing to the persistence of the development intervention business, The Obligation / Authority Discourse thus, reproducing the unequal North-South power dynamic of dependency and subordination.

#### **5.2.4 UN’s Subject Position as Savior and Protector**

The impression of the UN positioning itself and acting as a savior and protector, is produced by contrasting itself with the beneficiaries, and the CBA approach and team with other development programs and actors. By positioning itself, along with its projects and knowledge produced, as superior compared the capability of other development actors and institutions, especially those of the South, the UN also effectively reproduces the inferiority of the South, and hence the South’s dependency of and subordination to the North.

Firstly, the UN is produced as a possessor and provider of better knowledge compared to the ignorant beneficiaries, who need to be made “aware of why local conditions are changing and what they are adapting to” (UNDP 2010, 13), and to whom the CBA team, in selling the project, needs to “explain, advocate and demonstrate that gender equality benefits the whole community” (UNDP 2010, 29). Secondly, the CBA project is said to have “emerged from the growing awareness that those most vulnerable ... are poor people” (UNDP 2010, 22), and, hence, “in response” to “pressing local adaptation needs” and gender inequality experienced by *women* (UNDP 2010, 6, 13). Interestingly, leaving inequality experienced by men almost completely out of the equation, apart from a few points here and there in the whole document (eg. UNDP 2010, 8), the data again oversimplifies problems, solutions and concepts, in this case, gender inequality, as well as the “use of a ‘gender lens’”, or “mainstreaming gender in CBA” (UNDP 2010, 21), as the proposed technical remedy, ambitiously offering an “opportunity to begin redefining” this complex, deep rooted “social and cultural construct” “more equitably”, simply by treating men and women as “equal actors in the development process” by taking into consideration the “rights, responsibilities ... opportunities ... priorities and needs” of both (UNDP 2010, 21), assertively “ensuring” that the approach offered “relieves some of the disproportionately high burden of the adverse effects of climate change that women bear” (UNDP 2010, 6). The subject position as savior is further intensified by implying that the UN is capable of “answering to” men and women’s “specific needs and ensuring that both benefit equally from the development process” (UNDP 2010, 20), the UN, thus, holding power which the ignorant, victimized beneficiaries lack, that is, better knowledge. Furthermore, “partner communities” and “collaborating NGOs and CBOs”, too,

might be ignorant, incompetent, and at times even reluctant to cooperate, whose “lack of gender awareness” the CBA team “may need to identify and to address”, and to whom, sometimes, a “gendered perspective did not come naturally”, but who “showed willingness to discuss the issues”, “thanks to the gender sensitivity of the CBA team” (UNDP 2010, 43). Where the UN, with its superior, “suffering relieving” knowledge, is portrayed as the savior and protector of the victims of climate change and gender inequality, as if heroically answering a “call for help” in their responding to “pressing needs”, the CBA team, respectively, with their better knowledge, is positioned above, and portrayed as a savior of the lacking partner organizations.

The impression of the superiority of the knowledge produced by the UN, and the power of the UN to succeed where others fail, is also produced by emphasizing the excellence of the CBA project compared to others, by referring to it as an “evolving”, “promising” approach with the ability to “inform local, regional, national and global policy” (UNDP 2010, 13), explicating how “the idea that adaptation ... should be planned, proactive and anticipatory is relatively new” but “an important element of CBA” (UNDP 2010, 12), and by explicitly stating the CBA approach “having emerged” to do what “top-down, scenario-driven approaches to adaptation” “may fail” to do, that is, “strengthen the resilience of communities and ecosystems” (UNDP 2010, 11). Furthermore, again with an alarmist ring to it, the CBA project is also patronizingly contrasted with national level development actors by stating that:

The danger is that such national initiatives may actually harm local or indigenous groups if they inadvertently do not take into account local practices.<sup>23</sup>

Many vulnerable groups ... have difficulty in accessing government support and services. In addition, many are marginalized by social and political structures, which affect their capacity to adapt ... CBA helps to directly address the needs of these poor and vulnerable communities.<sup>24</sup>

Firstly, the local government as a service provider, with its marginalizing structures, is portrayed as incapable of ensuring its “vulnerable groups” access to “support and services”, again portraying developing societies in an undifferentiated patronizing and negative light, producing an oversimplified target for development intervention. Secondly, in the same vein, the “national initiatives” are portrayed as less capable than the CBA project offered by the UN, to “take into account local practices” and, thus, even potentially harmful to “local or indigenous groups”. The UN, hence, is once again, with its superior knowledge, understanding and expertise, produced as the highest, advisory authority of development action, and, thus, the savior and protector of vulnerable local groups even against their own – again lacking and incapable – governments and national development actors.

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<sup>23</sup> UNDP 2010, 12 [Vincent et al. 2010].

<sup>24</sup> UNDP 2010, 12.

## 5.3 Imposing Responsibility Discourse

The Imposing Responsibility Discourse, in a way, is the other side of the same coin with the Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse, as both stem from the same rhetoric of “collective responsibility” regarding both climate change and development in the data, as well as the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” regarding climate change in general. – Where shared responsibility is appealed to with respect to the UN as the necessary facilitator, it also functions to extend the responsibility for action to include the people, and especially the women, of the South simultaneously. This is done by presenting women as potentially active change agents in adaptation (a subject position elaborated in the next section) and the success of the adaptation projects is explicitly stated to depend on harnessing women’s potential, and hence, also implied to hinge on women’s good will and compliant participation and cooperation in the project:

It is important to remember that women are powerful agents of change. Their local knowledge and particular experience of natural resource management and coping strategies during crisis are vitally important for the formulation of any adaptation strategies that hope to be successful.<sup>25</sup>

This effectively, and perversely, imposes the weight of moral responsibility for successful adaptation – and by extension, achieving development goals entailing that success – and taking action on climate change in general, on the shoulders of the biggest sufferers of its consequences with least to do with its causes, the women in the South, under the pretext of the noble goal of gender equality.

What is more, by focusing on solving problems regarding climate change, gender inequality and underdevelopment in the South on the microlevel, and emphasizing shared responsibility along with women’s change agent role, the Imposing Responsibility Discourse, similarly to the Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse, functions to shift attention away from the role and responsibility of the North in causing the macrolevel problems of both climate change and economic underdevelopment in the South – problems rooted in the long history of global inequality, complex global politics and power relations, and precisely in need of macrolevel solutions discussed earlier. This, once again, reinforces the subordinate and dependent role of the South as being the one in need of developing, instead of, and by the superior North who, in turn, refuses to compromise its status quo of power, privilege and economic prosperity – historically, and still, achieved at the expense of the currently subtly subjugated South – which is what the macrolevel solutions actually entail.

### 5.3.1 Women’s Subject Position as Change Agents

In the Imposing Responsibility Discourse, climate change is feminized also by producing another subject position to women in developing countries in addition to that of

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<sup>25</sup> UNDP 2010, 46.

victims, that is, women as potential change agents. This subject position is produced by patronizing, oppressive praise and essentializing women in developing countries because of their assumed, stereotypical characteristics as females, role in the community, “unique expertise and knowledge” (UNDP 2010, 20) and special relationship with the environment and natural resources, and emphasizing the importance of this potential for successful adaptation. In this context, women are treated not only as the object of development intervention, but as instrumental to the development intervention or adaptation project (including the process of empowerment). This is well evident in the following:

Women are not just victims of adverse climate effects due to their vulnerability; they are also key active agents of adaptation. This is due to their often deep understanding of their immediate environment, their experience in managing natural resources (water, forests, biodiversity and soil), and their involvement in climate-sensitive work such as farming, forestry and fisheries. ...women not only have roles as caregivers and nurturers, but also typically form strong social networks within their communities, thereby meeting a prerequisite for collective management of the risks posed by climate change.<sup>26</sup>

Women’s instrumental role and importance to the development intervention is produced by referring to them, for example, as “key partners for adaptation” (UNDP 2010, 20), “indispensable partners for cooperating and making things happen”, “important players in the CBA implementation team” (UNDP 2010, 21), and “female stakeholders” from whom “effectively gaining information from” is the aim of the project team (UNDP 2010, 34), and whose “talents and contributions” need to be “capitalized” (UNDP 2010, 22), all of which gives the impression of women not being the priority as such, but rather valuable assets in efforts to successfully complete an intervention project – a point made explicitly in the following:

It is important to remember that women are powerful agents of change. Their local knowledge and particular experience of natural resource management and coping strategies during crisis are vitally important for the formulation of any adaptation strategies that hope to be successful.<sup>27</sup>

An interesting contradiction is created between imposing responsibility by emphasizing agency, while producing dependency by implying that women are not able to be these valuable, instrumental assets without the help of outsiders, as the following quotes with patronizing oppressive praise suggest:

They thus have a great potential role to play in adaptation through their stewardship of natural resources and indigenous knowledge, but need support to be able to participate and have their voices heard in decision-making processes within the community.<sup>28</sup>

But in order to capitalize on this knowledge, there must be a gendered approach to adaptation that gives women a voice and the ability to participate within the development process.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> UNDP 2010, 19-20.

<sup>27</sup> UNDP 2010, 46.

<sup>28</sup> UNDP 2010, 20.

<sup>29</sup> UNDP 2010, 46.

When supported and empowered, women are confident and active participants, raising their voices, sharing their own perspectives and generously passing on their expertise, skills and time.<sup>30</sup>

A participatory process involves asking both women and men what they want and need to adapt to climate change... A similar process undertaken in Nepal shows that “they [the women who took part in the research] might not be aware of all the possible adaptation strategies, of all the ways to overcome constraints to the ones they are using, but they certainly know their present situation best and have an urgent list of priorities to secure a livelihood in the face of the new challenges.”<sup>31</sup>

The last quote contains another interesting contradiction, as on the one hand, it implies that the author organization possesses better or complete knowledge of adaptation techniques that the locals lack, but on the other hand, it emphasizes the need to ask the recipients what *they* “want and need to adapt”, while patronizingly reminding the reader that the locals still “certainly know their present situation best”. The same contradiction is also present in the following statement and guiding question regarding evaluation...

Women’s input can help make sure their needs are met.<sup>32</sup>

Has appreciation of both women’s and men’s knowledge and expertise improved the results of the CBA project? If so, how?<sup>33</sup>

where the wordings “can help” and “appreciation” suggest it is rather preferable than imperative to take into account the recipients’ input, knowledge and expertise in formulating the project.

Lastly, it is interesting that even when women are referred to as change agents, they are still produced as passive in a sense that they only possess the potential to be valuable informants or partners, but nevertheless require the “liberating” empowerment action to unlock their potential. Women are thus produced as, not only instrumental to, but passive objects of benevolent, yet oppressive development action, which again produces and sustains the subordinate position for women in developing countries, and hence upholds the North-South power imbalance.

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<sup>30</sup> UNDP 2010, 21.

<sup>31</sup> UNDP 2010, 28.

<sup>32</sup> UNDP 2010, 43.

<sup>33</sup> UNDP 2010, 36.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

As previous critical research shows, the interconnected themes of climate change, gender and development, along with knowledge, are penetrated by power and inequality. This study, by means of CDA, has made visible, in a context of a particular document, the unequal power structures relevant to these themes, that is, the utter hegemony and domination of the neoliberal economic paradigm of the global North and global elite, over the current interventionist, expansionist hegemonic development paradigm among everything else, and shows how this power dynamic is reflected and reproduced in discourses produced by the UN, as conceptual development apparatus, to justify benevolent, climate change and gender equality related intervention, and the latent, unintended adverse consequences of these discourses. In this final chapter, I will recap the main findings of this study and discuss their implications, along with connection and contribution to previous research, and conclude with a brief deliberation on ideal development in the future.

### 6.1 Three Discourses on Responsibility

In examining how the data, a UN guidebook for gender mainstreaming and empowerment in climate change adaptation projects, reproduces the unequal North-South power dynamic, three main discourses were found with the recurring theme of responsibility with regard to climate change: (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility, (2) Taking Responsibility, and (3) Imposing Responsibility. The (2) Taking Responsibility Discourse was composed of two sub-discourses, namely the (2.1) Alarmist / Necessity Discourse and its subject position for women as victims, as well as the (2.2) Obligation / Authority Discourse along with the subject position of protector and savior for the UN, while the (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse included another subject position for women as change agents.

The discourses and subject positions found are partly overlapping and share a lot of common elements, but while differing in perspective, they all tell their version of the same story of benevolent development action, by the conceptual development



apparatus, adversely reproducing and sustaining the unequal North-South power dynamic of dependency and subordination. This was done, firstly, by producing legitimacy and justification for development intervention, as theorized by Ferguson (1990), by means of producing an oversimplified and undifferentiated target for development intervention, and by oversimplifying concepts, problems and their solutions. Secondly, dependency and subordination were reproduced by producing legitimacy and justification for the UN as a development actor, according to Foucauldian theory (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Rose 1999, 28]; Ruostesaari 2014, 60). How these manifested in the individual discourses and subject positions will be briefly discussed next, in the context of previous research, along with their unintended, undesired consequences.

The (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse in this study referred to the way the data hardly mentioned the causes of climate change and refrained from criticizing or condemning any actors or their (past) actions, hence shifting attention away from the historical burden of the global North as the biggest polluter since the industrial revolution (UNEP 2022, 9; Gough 2017, 26), and the consequent, incomparable prosperity, and so-called development, of the North at the expense of the rest of the world – even more so now that the consequences of the progressing climate change are felt everywhere (Klein 2014, 229-236; Gough 2017, 7-8; Koponen 2009d, 95-96, 99-102; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 157-158). Instead, the issue is completely avoided by hiding behind alleged uncertainty on the causes of climate change, despite the fact that the scientific community, including the UN bodies of IPCC (2018) and UNFCCC (2023), acknowledges the substantial role of anthropogenic GHG's in causing global warming. What is more, attention is shifted to the UN heroically taking on the *shared* responsibility to help the biggest victims of climate change in the South, thus producing justification for development intervention (Ferguson 1990), and hence, alluding to de Waal's (2013, 27-28, 39) criticism of an "aid operation" serving as an excuse for the UN to avoid "difficult political questions". All in all, by ignoring, avoiding, belittling and shifting attention away from the question of responsibility regarding the causes of climate change, the UN effectively depoliticizes the essentially political question of climate change and related questions of intergenerational and global justice and equality, hence, operating as a part of the anti-politics machine, as theorized by Ferguson (1990). Unwilling to explicitly oppose or dispute the superior position of the North in the global power dynamic, in this context, the UN quietly and subtly reinforces it, consequently abridging the space for alternative, opposing discourses and, thus, the possibilities for achieving just and equitable climate policy and practice.

The (2) Taking Responsibility Discourse in this study referred to way the data produced the need for development intervention and the UN as its necessary facilitator. The (2.1) Alarmist / Necessity sub-discourse justified intervention, firstly, by appealing to the urgent threat of climate change – alarmism typical to climate change discourses (Mikulewicz 2020) – to the women in developing countries especially, hence feminizing climate change and vulnerability, as criticized by feminist post-colonial scholars (de Wit 2021; Djoudi et al. 2016; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011). Secondly, intervention was justified by appealing to the dangers of not incorporating a gendered perspective to adaptation measures, something the locals were perceived as incapable of doing without the help of the UN,

hence essentializing and victimizing developing countries and their people, as criticized by scholars (eg. Andreucci & Zografos 2022; Zaman 2021; Mikulewicz 2020; Weidenstedt 2016). In this context, a subject position for women in developing countries was produced, in which they were portrayed as manifold, passive victims – a common essentializing and othering representation of Third World women in Western feminism, criticized by Third World Feminists (Mohanty as cited by Mattila et al. 2007, 243-244; Cornwall and Rivas 2015, 409-410) – while being perceived as passive objects of desperately needed development action, a position argued against by critical scholars, who call for less intervening from external actors and more agency for women themselves, as well as developing societies in general (Cornwall and Rivas 2015, 405, 407; Eskelinen 2011, 149-150; Kääriäinen 2015, 127).

In the process of producing legitimacy and justification for intervention, the data also revealed the developers' expectations and aspirations regarding interventions – that is, how the provably unsolicited, standardized development intervention package deals (Ferguson 1990), might have to be “sold” to possibly resistant developpees (Kääriäinen 2015, 37, 40, 111-112; Escobar 2012, 181-182), in the hopes of scaled up and continuous interventions, as opposed to no longer being designed to become redundant (Eskelinen 2011, 75). This raises questions about possible latent intentions behind the interventions, as well as whose interests are actually being served. – Indeed, the data revealed some underlying (economic) agendas, producing a kind of instrumental role for climate change and gender equality action itself, while reinforcing the hegemonic neoliberal economic (eg. Harvey 2008), development (Koponen 2009b, 84-86, 88) and gender paradigms (Mattila et al. 2007, 236-237, 239, 243), alluding to both Giddens' (2009, 50, 60, 229) “bandwagon effect”, in which climate change is used as a vehicle to advance other interests, as well as to de Waal's (2013, 27-28, 39) criticism, of using “humanitarian” causes – such as advancing gender equality and adaptation – as a “smokescreen” for promoting a “political agenda” of, say “liberal development”, as Duffield (2013, 193-194, 206) argues. Hence, advocating for provably perpetually failing development interventions (Ferguson 1990), void of critical self-reflection, as criticized by de Waal (2013, 19, 37) and Johansson (2013, 253), not only functions as a mechanism to reproduce the South's dependency of, and subordination to the North, but makes it seem intentional, which is not surprising given the profitability of interventions for the North and the global elite (Koponen 2009e, 129; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-11, 157-158; Lummis 2011, 47-50; Kääriäinen 2015, 21, 27, 31-32, 56-57, 63-65, 114, 127, 151-152, 155-156, 163; Eskelinen 2011, 42, 45-46, 56-57, 66-67, 87, 92-95, 100-102, 107, 109, 111, 131-132, 141-142; Sachs 2010b, xvii; Gough 2017, 11, 31-33; Esteva 2010, 7, 9-15, 18-19; Duffield 2013, 196, 206, 211; Escobar 2012, 176-177). Thus, this knowledge produced by the UN, from the position of highest authority in development (de Waal 2013, 28; Johansson 2013, 239), seems to be self-serving for the North and the global elite, by offering ever new “excuses” (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 219 [Foucault 1984b, 73; Sheridan 1980]) – gender-based climate action in this case – to intervene in the matters of the societies and communities of the global South – in Foucauldian terms, “truths” produced from a position of power producing practices and regimes maintaining that power (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 218-219 [Kaarre 1994]; O'Farrell 2007-2021; Helén 2004, 208).

The (2.2) Obligation / Authority sub-discourse, then, produced legitimacy and justification not only for development intervention, but for the development actor, that is, the role and status of the UN in such interventions. Firstly, the data appealed to the moral obligation and right to intervene, by appealing to collective responsibility regarding climate change and the UN's mandate to promote gender equality – a concept rooted in Western feminism, the universality of which has been criticized by Third World Feminists, who also argue against imposing the hegemonic Western ideals and concepts related to gender, “mechanisms of oppression”, on the developing world, which the data effectively does by reiterating such hegemonic constructs (Mattiila et al. 2007, 236, 239, 243). Secondly, in this sub-discourse, the UN as a development actor, or a body of “governance”, was produced legitimacy and justification (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Rose 1999, 28]; Ruostesaari 2014, 60), by appealing to their overall superiority over all other institutions, especially those of the South, consequently reproducing the superiority of the developed world over the developing. Moreover, the UN, with its expert, better knowledge by definition, also criticized by scholars (eg. Eskelinen 2011; Harvey 2005; Gough 2017; Ferguson 1990 etc.), was produced a subject position as a protector and savior of the, yet again, essentialized and othered, ignorant victims of climate change in the South – a position of a heroic “philanthropic benefactor”, criticized by Weidenstedt (2016, 6 [Rothstein 1995]) and Eskelinen (2011, 138), the latter calling for development agencies to “give up the role of an unbiased expert, the role of a hero” to “make space for local politics” (Eskelinen 2011, 149-150). In conclusion, by reiterating the South's position as an inferior, incapable, passive victim as opposed to the UN – and the North by extension – as a superior actor, a producer of saving, better knowledge by default, as well as strongly appealing to the necessity of development intervention, and the UN as its necessary authoritative facilitator, the (2) Taking Responsibility Discourse, with its sub-discourses and subject positions, effectively, and adversely, serves to reproduce and reinforce both the unequal North-South power dynamic, and especially the South's dependency on the North. What is more, feminizing climate change and vulnerability adversely reproduces the subordination and dependency of especially the women in developing societies, thus limiting their agency and autonomy, along with those of developing societies in general, hence abridging both freedom and space for opposition, as criticized by scholars (eg. Eskelinen 2011, 79-80, 135, 138, 141-142, 144; Koponen 2009e, 148; Koponen 2009a, 66; Kääriäinen 2015, 11-12, 152-153; Escobar 2012, 185; Ferguson 1990 etc.).

Lastly, the (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse was closely linked with the (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse, similarly appealing to *shared* responsibility for adaptation, and getting its power from the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle of climate change policy (UNFCCC 2021), hence, extending the responsibility for climate action onto the women in the South. By focusing on dealing with microlevel local manifestations of global macrolevel problems, instead of their historical and political root causes, the (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse, again similarly to the (1) Avoiding / Ignoring Responsibility Discourse, shifts attention away from the causes of, and the biggest contributor, to both climate change and the underdevelopment of the South (Klein 2014; Gough 2017; Kääriäinen 2015; Eskelinen 2011; Peet & Hartwick 2015; Sachs 2010 etc.), thus depoliticizing essentially political

issues, as part of the anti-politics machine (Ferguson 1990), and hence limiting the possibilities for addressing these problems accordingly. Relatedly, climate change was yet again feminized (de Wit 2021; Djoudi et al. 2016; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011) as, by focusing on local level solutions, a contradictory, essentializing subject position as change agents (eg. Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011) was produced for the women. This instrumentalizing (Mattila et al. 2007, 240-241; Escobar 2012, 183) subject position emphasized, with patronizing oppressive praise (Holroyd 2021; Jeppsson & Brandenburg 2022), the women's key role in successful adaptation, which, however, remains mere potential without external, UN facilitated *empowerment*, which, paradoxically, reproduces inequality and subordination, as theorized by Weidenstedt (2016). What is more, emphasizing the success of adaptation being dependent on women's willingness to participate, perversely imposes the weight of moral responsibility for, not only successful adaptation, but consequently, achieving development goals overall (UNDP 2010, 2), on to the shoulders of the biggest victims of climate change, least responsible for its causes (UNEP 2022, 9), echoing the neoliberal ethos of "individual responsibility", as criticized by Ferguson (1990, 86), which, together with the liberal feminist perspectives, is a manifestation of imposing the neoliberal hegemonic development paradigm onto the developing world, criticized by post-colonial and TWF scholars (eg. Peet & Hartwick 2015; Sachs 2010; Eskelinen 2010; Escobar 2012 etc.). Hence, ironically, under the pretext of the noble cause of (gender) equality, the UN effectively shifts both attention, and responsibility, away from the North onto the South and their women, while depoliticizing climate change and global inequality. The (3) Imposing Responsibility Discourse, thus, effectively reinforces the global power dynamic of the South's dependency of, and subordination to the North and, yet again, abridges space for alternative, opposing discourses and, thus, the possibilities to focus on, and tackle, the structural root causes of global inequality and climate injustice.

Intended or not, the way these discourses reproduce the unequal North-South power dynamic is an example of how presumably benevolent development action of the conceptual development apparatus, in the form of knowledge production, can have latent, unintended, adverse effects (Ferguson 1990) – in this case, facilitating development intervention, with the alleged aim to better women's position in developing societies, in the face of climate change risks, through empowerment, but ending up discursively reproducing their – and the South's – subordination on the global scale, increasing their responsibilities and dependency on external parties, while actually serving the interests of the already powerful, by reinforcing their position and expanding the scope of their power to continuously intervene with the matters of – and thus govern – the South. As part of global governance, and as the highest authority on development issues, including climate change and gender equality, the UN has a unique and significant position of power in the North-South power dynamic, and with it, comes equally significant responsibility, especially regarding the kind of knowledge – and hence, reality – produced (Jokinen et al., 26, 28-29, 34-35). – The representations (or discourses) of ourselves and others produced shape our *inner reality*, our attitudes towards ourselves and others, and ultimately affect the way we treat each other, in the *real world* (Paasonen 2010, 40-41, 45-47; Paasonen 2010, 45 [Dyer 1992, 1]; Jokinen et al. 2016, 47-48). It is for this reason that the UN, in my opinion, as a powerful institution

(Paasonen 2010, 45-48; Abbot 2006, 65), should pay special attention to the questions of representation and power in their knowledge production, in order to avoid the kind of discursive reproduction of (global) inequality as demonstrated by this study. Furthermore, while there are grave problems with the current hegemonic development paradigm elaborated on earlier, the equally grave and real problems and needs of poor people in developing societies, and the need to do something about it, remain nonetheless – or rather because of them. While I believe development, along with its agencies, is in need of complete reform, if not revolution, I also think development is needed, in both South and North, and that the institution of the UN could, and should, be a part of a new kind of, more democratic and egalitarian development in the future. I also think it is of paramount importance to address the issues of gender equality and climate change, in both global South and North, and that the work of the UN regarding them, or any issue, is important and valuable whenever it brings about tangible, sustainable, *experienced* changes for the better in people’s lives anywhere, but “doing good”, however, should never come at the expense of the dignity, self-respect, agency and autonomy of the beneficiaries (Lummis 2011, 47-48, 50) – a reality the UN has special discursive power, and hence responsibility, to manifest.

## 6.2 Contribution to Previous Research

The politicohistorical sociocultural context of this study included critical perspectives to the North-South power dynamic and its history, the hegemonic economic and development paradigms, Foucauldian theory on power-knowledge and governance, Ferguson’s theorization on the conceptual development apparatus and the anti-politics machine, as well as the role of the UN in global power relations and development, questions of equality and justice in climate change policy, as well as criticism of the hegemony of Western and liberal feminism, and the problematics of empowerment in development. This section will discuss the contribution of this study to previous research regarding these issues.

Firstly, all the discourses and subject positions found in this study reproduced the unequal North-South power dynamic of dependency and subordination, by reiterating the much criticized, hegemonic neoliberal economic and development paradigms (eg. Harvey 2008; Sachs 2010; Peet & Hartwick 2015; Eskelinen 2011; Escobar 2012; Klein 2014 etc.), by naturalizing development and its direction from North to South, and by instrumentalizing both women in developing societies (Mattila et al. 2007, 240-241; Escobar 2012, 183-187; Cornwall & Rivas 2015, 406-407), as well as climate change and gender related development, in order to pursue Western development ideals in, or rather impose them onto, the developing world (eg. Esteva 2010, 3, 6; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 3-4; Koponen 2009a, 51, 54-55, 61-64; Escobar 2012, xlv etc.). Hence, the findings of this study corroborate those of previous post-colonial research on Western and neoliberal hegemony in development, but within a new context of climate change, gender and the UN.

As for the Foucauldian approach, this study is another manifestation of the orbicular nature of power and knowledge producing and reinforcing each other, produced 'truths', or "political economic knowledge", serving the needs of the powerful to govern the rest (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 218-219 [Kaarre 1994], 223; O'Farrell 2007-2021; Helén 2004, 208), as well as power producing legitimacy and justification for its own "status and action" (Mörä, Salovaara-Moring & Valtonen 2014, 224 [Rose 1999, 28]; Ruostesaari 2014, 60). – This study showed how the UN, from a previous position of power, reinforced its powerful position as a body of "governance" compared to the discursively subjugated South, and produced legitimacy and justification for its status and action in the context of development, climate change and gender, hence adding a new angle to previous critical Foucauldian research on knowledge and power.

Building on Foucault's theorizations on power-knowledge, Ferguson (1990) theorized on the conceptual development apparatus – high level international development agencies producing legitimacy and justification for development intervention – along with the institutional development apparatus carrying out the interventions, and their operation in the so-called anti-politics machine, in which the knowledge produced by the conceptual apparatus – by oversimplifying the targets of intervention, concepts, problems and their solutions, and, hence, depoliticizing essentially political questions – become unintendedly instrumental to serving the needs of the already powerful, by expanding their power and abridging space for opposition. This study is a classic example of the workings of the anti-politics machine, the UN as the high level international conceptual development apparatus, effectively depoliticizing the questions of global, intergenerational and other forms of inequality regarding development, climate change and gender, by means of oversimplifying, essentializing as well as ignoring, avoiding and shifting attention away from the root causes of, and complexities related to these issues. By producing authoritative knowledge on gender and climate change, from a position of power, the hegemonic discourses of the UN (UNISDR 2007; UNISDR 2008; UNISDR, UNDP & IUCN 2009; UNFPA 2009; UNDP 2009; UNDP 2010; Nellemann et al. 2011; IUCN, UNDP & GGCA 2009; ARROW & UN Women 2021) dominate the discussion on the subject and, thus, effectively abridge the space for alternative discourses, realities and opposition, while reinforcing and expanding the reach of the development apparatus, hence, ultimately serving the needs of the global North and the global elite who benefit, that is, profit, from the development industry (Koponen 2009e, 129; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 2, 7-11, 157-158; Lummis 2011, 47-50; Kääriäinen 2015, 21, 27, 31-32, 56-57, 63-65, 114, 127, 151-152, 155-156, 163; Eskelinen 2011, 42, 45-46, 56-57, 66-67, 87, 92-95, 100-102, 107, 109, 111, 131-132, 141-142; Sachs 2010b, xvii; Gough 2017, 11, 31-33; Esteva 2010, 7, 9-15, 18-19; Duffield 2013, 196, 206, 211; Escobar 2012, 176-177). While in line with Ferguson's main arguments, the critical approach of this study, however, differs from his, regarding the question of the intentionality of depoliticization – while Ferguson (1990) takes a neutral stance on the matter, this study, similarly to other critics of neoliberal development (Eskelinen 2011, 41-42; Harvey 2008, 29; Koponen 2009a, 65; Peet & Hartwick 2015, 4), suggests the possibility of deliberateness. Hence, this study offers both validation to, as well as a bolder interpretation of Ferguson's theorization on the conceptual development apparatus and the anti-politics machine.

In terms of critical research on the role of the UN in global power relations and development, the discourses and the subject position for the UN found in this study, reiterate the problems of a top-down, donor (Duffield 2013, 198), expert (Eskelinen 2011, 149-150), and project goal (eg. Eskelinen 2011, 76) driven approach to development, the lack of self-awareness and critical self-reflection of development institutions (de Waal 2013, 19, 37; Johansson 2013, 253), victimizing the global South and feminizing climate change and vulnerability (Mikulewicz 2020, 1810-1811, 1812, 1821-1825), as well as using humanitarianism as a “smokescreen” to cover up for a latent political agenda (de Waal 2013, 27-28, 39) of inequality sustaining ‘liberal development’ (Duffield 2013, 193-194, 206). Hence, with similar findings, this study validates and adds to the previous critical research on the UN and its interventions, now within the context of climate change and gender equality.

Regarding climate change, then, the findings of this study – similarly to de Waal’s (2013, 27-28, 39) “smokescreen” – allude to Giddens’ (2009, 229) theory on the “bandwagon effect”, which refers to pursuing other interests under the pretext of climate change (Giddens 2009, 50), the pretext in this case, however, including also development and gender equality. – While the IPCC (2023a, 23, 24, 26, 31, 33, 34) along with Giddens (2009, 164), for instance, call for more *monetary* responsibility from the biggest polluters and, along with other critics (Eskelinen 2011, 112, 135, 147-149; Lummis 2011, 51-52; Esteva 2010, 14-15; Gough 2017, 14; Koponen 2009a, 66; Kääriäinen 2015, 127, 166), for changes in consumer patterns and rethinking prosperity in the global North, and considering questions of global and intergenerational climate justice (Eskelinen 2011, 139-140, 145-146; de Waal 2013, 44; Klein 2014), the discourses found in this study, reiterating the UN’s hegemonic approach to climate change in the context of gender and development (UNISDR 2007; UNISDR 2008; UNISDR, UNDP & IUCN 2009; UNFPA 2009; UNDP 2009; UNDP 2010; Nellemann et al. 2011; IUCN, UNDP & GGCA 2009; ARROW & UN Women 2021), focus on – and shift attention to – the need for adaptive changes in the South, especially on the part of women, hence emphasizing those over the unwanted, avoided, but necessary changes in the North, while feminizing climate change and vulnerability (de Wit 2021; Djoudi et al. 2016; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011). Thus, together with other critical research on climate change policy and discourses, the findings of this study offer validation to Giddens’ (2009) bandwagon theory, in the context of UN facilitated gender-based climate action.

Lastly, the discourses and subject positions for women found in this study reiterate the previously researched problematics of hegemonic Western feminism (Mattila et al. 2007, 236, 237, 239, 243), including the othering, victimizing (Mattila et al. 2007, 243-244), and essentializing of Third World women in the context of (feminizing) climate change (de Wit 2021; Djoudi et al. 2016; Kaijser & Kronsell 2013; Tschakert & Machado 2012; Arora-Jonsson 2011), and the instrumentalizing approach of liberal feminism (Mattila et al. 2007, 240-241; Escobar 2012, 183-187; Cornwall & Rivas 2015, 406-407) to climate change adaptation in this case, as well as the paradoxical, inequality and subordination producing effects of empowerment (Weidenstedt 2016), by means of patronizing oppressive praise (Holroyd 2021; Jeppsson and Brandenburg 2022). With similar results, this study validates previous critical feminist research on

gender, in the context of development and climate change, but offers a new element to it with the UN as a conceptual development apparatus.

In conclusion, the findings of this study – boiling down to global inequality being reproduced by reiterating hegemonic discourses – both build on, as well as add to previous critical research on the hegemonic neoliberal and economic development paradigms and global power relations, their connection to knowledge production and institutional power in development, especially with regard to the UN, as well as on the problematics of global climate (in)justice, policy and action, the hegemony of Western feminism, and the interventionist efforts to enhance gender equality through empowerment. – In addition to corroborating and validating the findings of previous research, this study offers a unique perspective to hegemonic knowledge and North-South power relations in the context of development intervention, climate change, gender equality, and the UN. What is more, this study, together with, and supported by previous research, takes a more critical approach than Ferguson (1990) to the question of the intentionality of depoliticization by the conceptual development apparatus, and calls on the UN to debunk such suspicions with new, equality producing discourses – based on corresponding paradigms – in the future.

### **6.3 Limitations of the Study**

In terms of critical reflection, the limitations of this study include my researcher positionality as a representative of the white, privileged, Western woman of the powerful global North. I realize that although I am not trying to, nor could, speak on behalf of the women of the South, my position to criticize the way they are represented and portrayed in global development literature is biased by default. What is more, the results of this study, despite my efforts to criticize and question these discourses, inevitably and regrettably repeat and, hence, reproduce the discourses of superiority of the global North and the inferiority of the global South, including their women as victims and change agents in the context of climate change. To avoid or mitigate this problem with any critical research, or even trying to equalize the North-South power imbalance through research, might require a different kind of approach entirely, say rebellious research, and intentionally speaking differently about all parties involved. Hence, I recognize my position of power and responsibility as an academic knowledge producer, and, ironically, the possible adverse consequences to related parties of the knowledge here produced, regardless of my noble intentions to criticize the global power imbalance.

Moreover, this study could have benefited from more recent data than the selected, dating back to 2010, but would have thus required a different take, since the chosen data is one of its kind in form and perspective. The focus of this study could have also been narrowed down, for instance, to include only the gender perspective or the subject positions, and with a narrower focus and perspective, the data could have included several UN documents on gender and climate change, instead of just one. In general, I think it would be interesting to delve deeper into any of the issues of climate action and justice, gender equality and empowerment, and development



intervention from the perspective of knowledge, discourses and power, within the scope of UN publications on gender and climate change, or of those by any other development agency in position of administrative power. All in all, more critical research is needed regarding global power relations and knowledge production by the conceptual development apparatus within the separate contexts of climate change, gender equality and empowerment, as well as specifically on gender-based climate intervention, in order to make visible, question and protest against global inequality in this context and, thus, increase the indispensable space for alternative discourses and ways of life, thinking and knowing, needed to battle both progressing climate change and persistent inequalities globally.

## 6.4 Developing Ideals

Indeed, this study is strongly critical of, and is set out to oppose, the current economic, societal, cultural and discursive hegemony of the global North and its neoliberal worldview and values. Along with other critical scholars – whose previously presented perspectives I concur with – I support alternative ways of thinking about, and practicing, power, development and life altogether, in pursuit of global, social, inter-generational and interspecific equality and sustainable living on a life-sustaining planet. I believe the North's assistance to the South in climate change action or in any development related endeavor, including improving gender equality, should, first and foremost, be asked for by the community, not unsolicited selling of ready solutions to problems defined by outsiders. Secondly, in addition to solicited aid free of attachments, in the form of sharing knowledge and best practices for free, aid should also be monetary, in the form of donation, not loan – accompanied by complete debt relief – in order for the North to repay some of what it owes to the South for its own development and suffering caused. Lastly, North-South development cooperation, between nations, organizations and communities, should be bi-, or rather multidirectional, mutual exchange of knowledge and practices, guided by a shared, holistic understanding and concern for the planetary limits of the climate, ecosystems and resources, as well as the restrictions and possibilities of sustainable wellbeing of all life on Earth within those boundaries. That is to say, the North needs to look back, step back, stand back, and give back – to the planet and the South, on their terms, respecting the intrinsic value, dignity, agency and boundaries of both.

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