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
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Moderation in the Scottish Enlightenment: the case of Robert Wallace

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ABSTRACT

Robert Wallace (1697–1771) was a leading minister of the Church of Scotland, but he remains a largely overlooked figure in the literature. Nevertheless, his participation in philosophical and theological debates offers a glimpse of the complex positions of the Scottish clergy – and of Scottish moderation on its own terms. Wallace’s moderation was evident, for example, in his opposition both to radical deism and orthodox dogmatism. Yet what makes Wallace’s case particularly interesting is that he described himself as a ‘moderate freethinker’ in a letter to David Hume, while distinguishing elsewhere the ‘moderate’ and ‘sober’ freethinkers from the dangerously sceptical ones. Exploring his consistent statements on this issue in various writings throughout his career, this article investigates the self-identified moderation of Wallace – in opposition, for example, to his rival freethinker William Dudgeon – and thus the clergy’s attempt to use this category in the shaping of their vision of the Scottish Enlightenment.

KEYWORDS

Robert Wallace; moderation; freethinking; Enlightenment; William Dudgeon

1. Introduction

In 1751, a letter was written to David Hume in response to his essay ‘Of National Characters’ from 1748. The essay included an elaborate footnote in which Hume attacked the character of the clerics, whose very profession, he argued, was motivated by hypocrisy, conceit, and ambition.¹ In the response letter, the author rejected Hume’s argument regarding the clergy as a whole and suggested that if there were such faults in certain priests, then they had to be attributed to their personal dispositions rather than to the clerical profession. The letter was entitled *A Letter from a Moderate Freethinker to David Hume ... Concerning the Profession of the Clergy*. The author, then, self-identified as a moderate freethinker – an intriguing phrase, given that by the mid-eighteenth century those who were identified by themselves or by others as freethinkers were usually seen as radical sceptics or deists if not atheists and thus not quite moderate.² The author of the letter suggested that a ‘freethinker ought to be of no particular party but the party of good sense, he ought to aim at nothing but truth peace & charity; a sincere Freethinker will have this chiefly in his view: he will not scruple to detect the Errors of a friend, & will deal generously with a foe’.³

What exactly did make this freethinker moderate? Even though the author of this letter described himself as a freethinker, a label which he also attributed to Hume, his position was far from previous freethinkers such as Anthony Collins or Matthew Tindal, or indeed Hume himself. In fact, the author of this letter was himself a clergyman coming to the defence of his own profession. This

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was Robert Wallace (1697–1771), a minister of the Church of Scotland and a leading figure in the kirk in the 1740s. Wallace is known primarily as a writer on the world’s population and as a friendly acquaintance of Hume, whom he defended on two different occasions, once when Hume was denied an academic chair at Edinburgh in 1745 and once when there was an attempt to censure Hume’s so-called infidel writings in 1756.⁴ Yet Wallace remains a hugely overlooked figure in the literature, and when he is mentioned, he is regarded consistently as a peripheral writer who is yet to receive full scholarly attention.⁵ In addition to his ecclesiastical work, Wallace was a philosopher in his own right, committed to free debate and inquiry, and a prominent member of vibrant intellectual circles such as the Rankenian Club and the Philosophical Society in Edinburgh alongside William Wishart, George Turnbull, and others.

The emphasis on moderation was arguably Wallace’s most important legacy for the Scottish Enlightenment. As scholars have shown, Wallace’s ecclesiastical conduct was characterised by ‘mildness and prudence’ and he belonged to a crucial strand of the Scottish Enlightenment – no less crucial than Hume’s and Smith’s – which promoted morality, tolerance, and gradual reform.⁶ Wallace and his fellow ‘heterodox Presbyterians’, argues Thomas Ahnert, believed that ‘the essence of true religion was charity, which was expressed in a practical holiness of life that set apart the genuinely faithful from hypocrites, whose observance of religious principles was superficial and insincere’.⁷ Others, however, have illuminated some more radical aspects of Wallace’s ideas, such as his inspiration by republican thought as well as his utopian and egalitarian vision of an agrarian reform, an abolition of private property, return to simplicity and to a lack of luxury, and even an easing of the conditions of forming and breaking marriages.⁸ What kind of moderation precisely did Wallace represent, then?

The clergyman’s moderation was evident, for example, in his opposition both to radical deism and orthodox dogmatism. In a broader sense, Wallace fits the image of the Scottish Enlightenment as moderate, perhaps even a case study of a conservative or clerical Enlightenment. He was certainly part of ‘the Scottish *literati*’ who, according to J. G. A. Pocock, ‘held high and legitimate office in church, law and university’, who ‘formed part of the group of elites who conducted Scottish affairs in the interests of the Kingdom of Great Britain’, and hence whose ‘philosophy was neither critical nor uncritical of established power, and was designed to support it’.⁹ Yet what makes Wallace’s case particularly interesting is his self-identification as a ‘moderate freethinker’ in the letter to Hume as well as the distinction that he made in other writings between the ‘moderate’ and ‘sober’ freethinkers on the one hand and the dangerously sceptical ones on the other. My focus here is therefore on the hitherto unexplored ways in which Wallace understood ‘moderation’ and hence on the ways in which he consciously promoted a moderate Scottish Enlightenment. Investigating Wallace’s moderation – in opposition, for example, to his rival freethinker William Dudgeon – will shed new light on the clergy’s attempt to use this category in the shaping of their vision of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Finally, it is important to note that moderation in the present discussion should not be confused with the ‘Moderates’ of the Scottish Church, a term that is associated primarily with the party of William Robertson which emerged in the 1750s and was opposed to the ‘Popular’ party. Even though Wallace was arguably an inspiration for the Moderate party, they did differ on some central issues of church administration and especially on the issue of patronage (‘the authority of certain lay patrons to nominate candidates for ministerial posts in parishes’), which Wallace, unlike the Moderates, did not fully support.¹⁰ Here, therefore, I discuss Wallace’s moderation in the context of his own use of the term and with an emphasis on what we might call his enlightened moderation rather than the Moderatism of the Scottish Church.

2. ‘Christianity has been made the occasion of much Mischief’: Tindal, Wallace, and Dudgeon in the 1730s

Matthew Tindal (1657–1733) was a Whig lawyer, a fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, and a notorious deist. He wrote in favour of the 1688 revolution, religious toleration, and the liberty of the press

in the 1690s, and in 1706 published *The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted*, wherein he attacked the independent power of the church in society.¹¹ In *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (1730), Tindal finally formulated his ideal of a religion of nature and reason, free of corrupt errors instilled by ‘priestcraft’ throughout history. Perhaps the most controversial principle that Tindal promoted in *Christianity as Old as the Creation* was that the role of revelation was to confirm what reason already shows us, which implied that revelation was unnecessary for happiness and salvation. God, Tindal added, does not need to interfere in His perfect creation arbitrarily, and hence reports of miracles should be thoroughly questioned and most probably dismissed as frauds. By deriving these conclusions against Anglican apologists such as Samuel Clarke, Tindal defended both deism and freethinking and thus this text has come to be known as the bible of English deism and one of its very last peaks.¹² Specifically with regard to freethinking, Tindal interestingly reappropriated what by then had served the critics mostly as a term of abuse: ‘give me Leave to add, that I shall not be surpris’d, if for so laudable an Attempt, as reconciling Reason and Revelation, which have been so long set at Variance, I shou’d be censur’d as a *Free-Thinker*; a Title, that, however invidious it may seem, I am far from being asham’d of.’¹³ Being a freethinker for Tindal was both subscribing to an idea – namely, the sufficiency of natural religion – and an anticlerical social identity. With this explicit statement, Tindal became one of the very few individuals who openly self-identified as freethinkers in early eighteenth-century Britain.¹⁴

Christianity as Old as the Creation provoked numerous responses in England by theologians such as Daniel Waterland who accused Tindal’s dangerous sect of becoming the new ‘Infidel, pagan Priests’.¹⁵ The Scottish response was provided by Robert Wallace. As a moderator of the provincial synod of Dumfries before becoming a minister in Edinburgh, Wallace preached a sermon in 1729, *The Regard due to Divine Revelation*, wherein he attacked deism and argued that revealed religion was still necessary. It was then published with a preface containing Wallace’s response to Tindal. Wallace agreed with Tindal that the truth that we need to know is founded on the nature of things, but he argued that it does not necessarily follow that we can know all the rules by which to live only by using our natural reason: some rules must be revealed by God Himself and by supernatural means.¹⁶ Furthermore, argued Wallace, Tindal was right to warn his readers about the possibility of deception and imposture in some reports of revelation, but this could be avoided.¹⁷ We could, for instance, examine testimonies of miracles by assessing the moral character of those testifying and whether or not they have an interest to deceive us. Thus, it is possible to decide whether to accept or reject such stories without rushing into discarding them categorically.¹⁸ Finally, Wallace even accepted Tindal’s harsh accusations against Christianity and the wars that it had caused, conceding that ‘Christianity has been made the occasion of much Mischief’ and that ‘it has been, and still continues to be abused to the vilest purposes’. At the same time, he emphasised that any such occurrence ‘is a manifest Abuse and Perversion of it; not only quite foreign, but grossly and obviously contrary, to its original Design and genuine Tendency: and is, therefore, only an Instance that the best things may be abused, and perverted to the very worst purposes’.¹⁹ We are starting to get an impression of how Wallace’s moderation manifested in both the content and the style of his response: rather than rejecting his opponent’s views altogether, he consistently emphasised the premises that he did share with Tindal in order to then show why they did not necessarily support Tindal’s conclusions.

Such an attack on English deism was quite characteristic of sermons preached to a synod at the time. Furthermore, Wallace’s line of argument was similar to the attacks of many clerical critics of English deism in previous decades, and especially those who were considered ‘latitudinarians’ and who were willing to accept some form of rational religion so long as it did not compromise on the status of revelation.²⁰ Yet unlike many other critics, Wallace embraced the identity of a freethinker and advocated what we can call a freethinking version of Presbyterianism.²¹ Thus, after making his case against the deists, he moved to attack the same orthodox practice that the deists themselves opposed, namely, that ‘Men not only do not examine in Matters of Religion, but discourage a free Trial and Examination in others’.²² Such conduct, for Wallace, was contrary to the original

spirit of Christianity as shown by both the Apostles and the Reformation. It was at this point that he offered his version of freethinking:

Free-thinking, therefore, in the true sense of the Word, is very noble and generous, being nothing else but this; The hearkening to the Voice of sound Reason, the examining impartially both sides of the Question, with a Disposition always to adhere to the strongest Side, and to imbrace the Truth wherever it appears, in spite of all Prejudices, of all the Opposition and Authority of Men.²³

Following natural reason in the face of prejudice and superstition, judging the truth of doctrines according to the strength of the evidence, and pursuing liberty rather than tyranny and authority of others were precisely the principles that the so-called radical freethinkers, and especially Anthony Collins (1676–1729), had started to formulate some twenty years earlier.²⁴ In this sense, Wallace’s ‘noble’ kind of freethinking might not have been all that different from the model that was promoted by his opponents. For him, however, it certainly was. Wallace’s freethinking aimed precisely to correct the kind of freethinking assumed by those radicals: ‘What I have in view, is of a different nature; That under the pretence of doing this, many think very unjustly and unreasonably, and seem fond of rejecting Christianity.’²⁵ What is more, Wallace perceived his own freethinking to have been located exactly in the middle between two equally risky extremes:

But then there are some on the other side, who, perhaps, out of a design of guarding against this abuse of Free-thinking and Examination in Matters of Religion, tho’ they will not openly assert, that men ought not to examine impartially ... yet by the strain of their Conversation, by their haughty and imperious Carriage, by their still putting us in mind of Authority and the Opinions and Determinations of Men, cannot even in Charity be considered otherwise than as Discouragers of due trial and examination in Matters of Religion.²⁶

Wallace’s innovation was to situate his version of freethinking in the middle of a well-defined spectrum. On one end of this spectrum were sceptics such as Tindal who outright rejected providence, revealed religion, and therefore Christianity as a whole. On the other end of this spectrum were those who were just as dangerous to religion, namely, the dogmatic fideist circles, and particularly the Orthodox Calvinists and evangelical enthusiasts.²⁷ Those, according to Wallace, attempted to eliminate critical thinking in themselves and in others, and, instead, asked people to follow authority blindly in all religious matters and to follow fixed and rigid doctrines without examination. Furthermore, while Wallace’s critique here was primarily aimed at conservative Presbyterianism, it could also be read by contemporaries as a hinted – and less usual – objection to the requirement of subscription to confessions of faith.²⁸ Despite this daring position that targeted large parts of his contemporary orthodoxy, the *Regard due to Divine Revelation* received wide support, including from Queen Caroline, and Wallace himself achieved promotion in the church following its success. His mission, then, started to bear fruit: if Tindal had sought to reappropriate the label of a freethinker from an insult to a proud identity, then Wallace reappropriated the same label once more, this time from an identity of a misguided believer to that of the true believer.

The debate on deism and freethinking continued to take place in Scotland. One of the interesting names in this context was another understudied writer, William Dudgeon (1705/6–1743). Dudgeon was a necessitarian deist or even pantheist, influenced by Spinoza, Collins, Tindal, and others, and who ‘has equal claim to be, prior to Hume, Scotland’s most active defender and proponent of radical freethinking doctrines.’²⁹ For Wallace, Dudgeon was to represent the first extreme, namely, those freethinkers whose views amounted to an utter rejection of Christianity. Indeed, Dudgeon refuted Wallace and defended Tindal in *The Necessity of Some of the Positive Institutions of Christianity Consider’d* (1731). There Dudgeon rejected Wallace’s defence of Christianity, stressing how inherent in Christianity were ‘all that bitter and implacable Hatred, Persecution, and Blood-shed, with which the differing Parties of Christians, inflamed with mad Zeal, for their several Opinions, have raged against each other’, as opposed to ‘the ancient Religions, in which, as there were no *cre-
denda* enjoin’d by Authority, there was no Ground of Strife and Discord’.³⁰ In other words, it was the orthodoxy itself that was the problem and not merely its perversion as Wallace suggested. Dudgeon continued to develop his radical views in the following year in *The State of the Moral World*

Consider'd (1732), wherein he suggested that there was no real evil in the world and questioned the idea of punishments in the next life. The reactions to Dudgeon were severe by some prominent Scottish figures, such as the philosopher Andrew Baxter, while for the English future bishop William Warburton, Dudgeon was the direct successor of Toland, Tindal, and Collins.³¹

Dudgeon continued to echo previous freethinkers in his advocacy of natural religion as well as in his militant anticlericalism. This was evident in another work from 1739, *A Catechism Founded upon Experience and Reason*, which included an epistle on natural religion. For Dudgeon, natural religion was an almost utopian model of religion in which people are not persecuted for holding different 'useless' beliefs but that rather stresses one's good and loving behaviour towards God and humankind.³² Dudgeon argued, as Tindal had done, that the clergy was solely responsible for the destruction of this pure religion of nature, which was the basis of all religions and societies, in the name of their own political interests. Therefore, priests opposed freethinkers 'for no other Reason that I can find, but because *Free-thinkers* do commonly expose the *licentious Writings* of the *Clergy*, who place the great stress of People's Salvation in a strong Belief of those *Opinions* upon which are *established* their Claims to *Wealth, Power* and *Reverence*'.³³ Even though some clergymen were indeed on the side of liberty, the vast majority was not: 'while our Clergy exclaim against the detestable Principles of *Popery*, they inconsistently retain the *wickedest Parts* of it, viz. its persecuting *Spirit*, and Claims to *Dominion* over the *Consciences* of Men'.³⁴ This led Dudgeon to conclude that his ideal kind of moral and natural religion – and not what one church or another advocated – was not only universal but sufficient for happiness, which of course meant that revelation was excluded.

From the point of view of the church, the threat of anticlerical freethinking was imminent, and Wallace's way of dealing with this problem remained sophisticated – and indeed moderate – in the following decades. As we will see in the next sections, Wallace continued in his effort to represent a middle-way between Tindal, Dudgeon, and their radical milieu on the one hand and the zealous dogmatists on the other, which eventually brought him back to defend freethinking, rightly understood.

3. 'Why cannot all the world entertain different opinions as amicably as we do': Wallace, Hume, and Moderate Conduct in the 1740s–50s

'Ignorance causes Violence and Perverseness, and these, in their Turn, produce and beget Ignorance', said Wallace in a sermon from 1746.³⁵ In the wake of the Forty-Five, Wallace attempted to demonstrate the advantages of knowledge – of the order of nature, of the principles and ends of society, and of true religion – for the common good and happiness. Ignorance and erroneous views, in contrast, result in selfish and seditious acts, such as that recent Jacobite rising.³⁶ Wallace's primary target here was Bernard Mandeville's suggestion in *The Fable of the Bees* (1714) that a certain degree of ignorance, especially among the poor, could be beneficial to society and his consequent objection to charity schools.³⁷ 'Clear and extensive Knowledge', Wallace stated in response, is nothing short of 'the Glory of Men, as rational Creatures', not just of some privileged subsets of society.³⁸ Much like this sermon, Wallace's mature project of moderate freethinking, to which we now turn, was aimed against ignorance and superstition – and against the disastrous cruelty that they generate. Nevertheless, unlike his freethinking opponents, Wallace sought to emphasise the role of a large part of the clergy in fostering, rather than suppressing, the spirit of learning and true knowledge in mid-eighteenth-century Britain.

It is against this background that we should read the letter that Wallace wrote to Hume some five years later. In 'Of National Characters', Hume argued: 'The Ambition of the Clergy can often be satisfy'd only by promoting Ignorance and Superstition and implicate Faith and pious Frauds'.³⁹ Wallace, too, emphasised the dangers of ignorance and superstition but he denied the part that Hume attributed to the clergy in the spreading of these evils. Wallace's letter to Hume, therefore, demonstrates his attempt to find a *via media* in this debate, and as with his answers to previous

freethinkers, his conduct was no less moderate than his position. The letter to Hume was one of several interactions between the two in which Wallace practiced exactly what he preached for, namely, an open yet respectful management of disagreement – although his decision not to publish it could also be considered a lost opportunity to display an enlightened discourse. In any case, the letter is a striking illustration of how nuanced the Scottish Enlightenment was, but since it remained unpublished until 2013 it has received very little scholarly attention to date.⁴⁰

Wallace opened the *Letter* by positioning himself ‘as a Freethinker’ but ‘among the most Moderate of the Fraternity’, who therefore agreed with Hume to some extent but differed from him on some important principles: ‘There is one subject in particular in which you have pushed things too far’, he explained, ‘I mean the influence of the Profession of the Clergy’.⁴¹ The first objection, then, was that Hume simply exaggerated in his assessment of the wickedness of the clergy and that he was mistaken to attribute the vices that he recognised in human nature to the very nature of this profession. Wallace’s aim was to vindicate the clerical profession following Hume’s attack after, to his surprise, no other member of the clergy undertook this task: perhaps, he suggested, because they ‘expected that some of the Freethinkers would do them justice as many of the Clergy have done signall service to the cause of freethinking’.⁴² This may have been a naïve expectation, to say the least, but it reveals the second layer of Wallace’s argument, which he would develop from this point onward, namely, that the British clergy had in fact supported the cause of freedom of thought.⁴³ He stated:

Have not we seen a great number of the Protestant Clergy take a great deal of trouble to promote knowledge and an impartial examination of all Doctrines & opinions, even the most sacred, and to banish implicit faith and pious frauds? In truth, we who are freethinkers have been greatly obliged to them. ‘Tis [a] pity that we should not be more gratefull.⁴⁴

For Wallace, it was the divines – more specifically, the Protestants and especially the latitudinarians – who encouraged the spirit of inquiry in Britain in the years leading to and following the Restoration, concerning both natural and moral philosophy. Furthermore, the clergy encouraged the laity to examine even religious doctrines, as evinced in the fact that they debated their own disagreements so much that some even felt ‘that the Clergy have gone too far in cherishing an Inquisitive humour, that they have raised unnecessary Doubts about things of importance’.⁴⁵ To drive his point home, Wallace concluded that ‘there is a high spirit in Brittain for inquiring unto all Doctrines & opinions whatsoever, & that this Spirit has been much promoted by the Clergy. Sceptics have been much obliged to them; without their assistance the freethinkers had never been able to do the mighty feats they have done’.⁴⁶ The point, then, was twofold: it was an argument about the state of liberty in Britain, which Wallace esteemed highly, and about the character of the British clergy, which Wallace portrayed as conducive to and even crucial for the maintenance of that liberty. Sceptics such as Hume, it followed, merely took a well-trodden path – but might have gone too far down that path.

This point was central to Wallace’s view, and he repeated it in other writings. In the *Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain* (1758), Wallace defended the British constitution after 1688 as a source of happiness and liberty against the French despotism. With regard to religion, he argued, in France there was an emphasis on outward ceremony and superstition, whereas in Britain, the emphasis was on inward piety and virtue. As opposed to the clerical tyranny in France, ‘the British, from the mild spirit of their government, and from the happy moderation of their clergy, enjoy so much religious freedom: that in order to determine the force of their religious principles, it is not safe ... to trust solely to *external appearances* of devotion’.⁴⁷ Just as he had suggested in his unpublished manuscript in 1751, Wallace stated now in print that there was a direct link between the moderation of the clergy and the liberty of the multitude and that for this reason the British people were able to enjoy considerable freedom of conscience. This of course was exactly the opposite from what freethinkers such as Collins, Toland, Tindal, and Dudgeon thought: for them, the church acted precisely in a tyrannical manner, having attempted to achieve control

over and enslavement of the minds of humankind.⁴⁸ To be sure, the British clergy was far from monolithic, which at least Wallace seems to have admitted; yet what he attempted to show – and this was by no means unoriginal – was that one could be a freethinker without being outright anticlerical.

This is not to say that Wallace did not have any criticism about his fellow clergy: in fact, his central position obliged him to communicate similar messages of compromise also to the other side. Remarkably, this was evident in another instance that involved Hume, only that this time it was Hume that Wallace defended. In 1755–6, a motion to censure Hume's infidel writings took place. Hume, argued the initiators, was not only subversive in his writings on morality and religion but also bold enough to claim these writings publicly. The matter was discussed as an overture, but eventually the committee decided not to transmit it to the general assembly. Wallace expressed his view on the case in *The Necessity or Expediency of the Churches Inquiring into the Writings of David Hume*. His intervention came already after the decision was made and Hume was spared, and perhaps because of that this manuscript, too, remained unpublished.⁴⁹

Wallace's plea not to persecute infidel writers such as Hume had two main justifications, neither of which betrayed an agreement with the content of Hume's views but a concern for the matter of expediency. First, Wallace argued that censoring and perhaps excommunicating someone like Hume would only grant an increased exposure to him and his writings; indeed, infidels like Toland had already been forgotten and would remain so 'unless care is taken to awaken the attention of the world and raise the curiosity of the great & small vulgar'.⁵⁰ What is more, it was simply unlikely that Hume would be convinced to change his mind following such a reaction, but rather by reasoning and conversing. Second, it was wrong of the clergy to invest their energies in persecuting Hume's beliefs, whereas so many other immoral behaviours – not mere theoretical views – were taking place and going unpunished: 'Are there not many criminalls in higher & lower life, vitious, immoral, and abandoned in their lives, Drunkards revellers, whoremongers adulterers contemnors of Christian worship, despisers of Christian Piety, open supporters of impious, lewd, and immoral principles in companies?'⁵¹ These immoral acts were harmful both to society and religion not only in theory but also in practice. It was therefore these common and well-known crimes that had to be dealt with and with much greater urgency than Hume's books. Furthermore, the church had to enforce discipline sensibly, that is, only insofar as the circumstances allowed and in a way that would not be damaging: 'if the Doctrines, & worship, & essential parts of the Government of a church are kept pure', Wallace explained, 'Discipline may be greatly relaxed att the same time that the Church may continue a happy instrument in the hands of Providence of comforting & confirming the Pious, reclaiming the wicked, & may serve as a mighty bulwark against vice, errors, & impiety'.⁵² Even if this were a prudential point, deriving from an understanding of the changing times and the limits of the power of the church, it was at the same time a normative statement that brings to mind Wallace's latitudinarian affinity or his self-identified freethinking: freedom of conscience in all matters beyond the essential creed of the church was to be allowed. In this sense, Wallace's position against censorship was twofold, consisting both of pragmatic considerations about how the church would be wise to act and moral considerations about the right of thought as well as expression in religious matters.⁵³

Finally, Wallace's view in the case of Hume had another layer which is especially intriguing in our context. Unlike the criminals that he mentioned, Hume was a polite, educated, sociable figure, even if his views challenged the church dramatically. Therefore, according to Wallace, the clergy should engage with the likes of Hume:

the Clergy need not be affraid to encounter Gentlemen of this sort, be they ever so scepticall or heterodox. If we suppose that they are rather wrongheaded than wrong hearted, that in their enquiries into nature & philosophy they have been led into mistakes by some unlucky train of thinking, [that] they are far from rejoicing in such mistakes ... if they are disposed to converse on these subjects with learned & ingenious men, 'twere pity to debarr them from the company of any of the Clergy with whom they would wish to converse.⁵⁴

This was Wallace's moderation at its best: alongside his attempts to convince the radical freethinkers that the British clergy was the preserver of peace and liberty, he attempted to convince the same clergy that most freethinkers actually aimed to have a conversation with the clergy and were worthy of being conversed with, even if their views were mistaken. In this case Wallace's advice was proved right, as John Robertson writes: 'For his part Hume repaid the moderate clergy by inviting them to suppers at his house, congenial occasions which rarely tested their faith, and by several more tangible expressions of literary solidarity'.⁵⁵

In other words, the model that Wallace offered was moderation in theory, namely, an attempt to find a middle way between church discipline and freedom of conscience, as well as moderation in practice, that is, mediation between the clergy and their freethinking opponents. As a clerical and so-called moderate freethinker, Wallace carefully positioned himself as part of both sides, which also allowed him to criticise each side on its own ground. His moderation, as the case of Hume shows, can be best summarised as an active commitment to a sincere and civil dialogue, the very conduct that he tried to promote and exercise.

Indeed, an ultimate example of moderate performance is the dispute between Wallace and Hume themselves on the issue of population that took place earlier that decade. Wallace's thesis, according to which the world's population was decreasing in modern times compared to the ancient, was in total disagreement with Hume.⁵⁶ He also held, as opposed to Hume, that slavery in ancient times had been positively conducive to the increase of the population.⁵⁷ Yet this affair was widely praised as a symbol of an enlightened debate between two polite men of letters. Rousseau, who was on Wallace's side, famously reported:

Wallace, who had written against Hume on the subject of the population of the ancients, was absent while his work was being printed. Hume took it upon himself to review the proofs and to oversee the edition. This conduct accorded to my turn of mind. In the same way I had sold copies of a song that had been written against me at six sous apiece.⁵⁸

Furthermore, Hume and Wallace themselves praised their own exchange on the differences in the population of the world in ancient and modern times, which they perceived as the most pressing question of their age. As Hume wondered in a letter to Wallace: 'Why cannot all the World entertain different Opinions about any Subject, as amicably as we do?'⁵⁹ If there ever was a self-identified moderate Enlightenment, this quote could very well be its motto.

4. 'Virtue, it is said, lies in the middle': Wallace and Moderate Freethinking in the 1760s

In the following decade, Wallace was no longer active in church politics and devoted his time instead to his intellectual pursuits. His most important work from this decade was *Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence* (1761). This work focused on several central themes of Wallace's thought. He developed his population calculus, which consequently influenced Thomas Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), and elaborated on his utopian vision, which was inspired primarily by Thomas More. Ironically, despite his concern about the decreasing population of the world, he also expressed his fear that too successful an implementation of his model would cause disastrous overpopulation, which, as has been noted recently, 'counseled political moderation'.⁶⁰ In addition to these topics, Wallace attempted to demonstrate the beauty and order of nature and the existence of a future state, positions which he held, among others, against necessitarian freethinkers such as Dudgeon. In addition, he defended providence on the grounds that it was compatible with both notions of liberty and necessity.⁶¹ Finally, the last of the twelve 'prospects' was entitled 'Advices to certain Freethinkers'. There Wallace returned to his critique of radical freethinking and to his vision of the moderate freethinker – a title which, as we have seen, he had embraced himself a decade earlier. This part of the work – itself considerably understudied – has not received attention in the scholarship, yet it reveals the mature version of Wallace's nuanced moderation which he formulated consistently throughout his career.

In this essay, Wallace identified moderation with virtue: ‘According to a common observation, mankind have seldom preserved a due mediocrity. Virtue, it is said, lies in the middle, but men have been apt to run into extremes’.⁶² Men, according to Wallace, tend to move from one extreme to another, whereas the truth is always in-between. This was true also in the case of religion: ‘Religion is certainly the best thing in the world. When it is kept pure and in a just proportion, it must produce excellent effects; but, unhappily, it has not escaped the common fate’.⁶³ The extreme sides posed a serious threat to religion and to the good that religion could do. He defined these sides, just as he had done some thirty years earlier: ‘The world has often been overrun either with superstition and enthusiasm, which may be called excesses in religion; or has suffered through the decay of piety, by inroads of scepticism and infidelity’.⁶⁴ While Wallace was equally troubled by both extremes, he thought that Britain of his time was witnessing the rise of the latter. Scepticism was reaching a historic peak, at least in part because of those he considered dangerous freethinkers: ‘It has, indeed, gone far enough, if not too far’.⁶⁵

It was at this point that he returned to distinguish true freethinking from the corrupted version thereof: ‘The term Freethinker, according to the original sense of the word, denotes a character which deserves to be applauded; but as many of those who have laid claim to the name, have been guilty of no small excesses, this innocent term has fallen into disrepute’.⁶⁶ We have seen this position in Wallace’s earlier writings, and he repeated his conviction that, as with any other behaviour, freethinking had to be carried out in a prudential and measured manner. Thus, it was the fault of those writers who went too far that freethinking became such an explosive territory subjected to sweeping political and religious condemnations. There was hope, however, and at least some freethinkers were not all too guilty, namely, those who ‘may well be called moderate and sober’.⁶⁷ Previously, Wallace hinted at the possibility of being a moderate freethinker – he did, after all, present himself to Hume as one – but only in this text did he undertake the task of outlining in full who the moderate freethinker was precisely. This is therefore both a reflective and a pedagogical essay as well as one of Wallace’s final and most important legacies.

According to Wallace, the creed of the moderate and sober freethinkers includes the following points. The first point is the right to examine any doctrine according to sufficient evidence, which also assumes the right to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence. Whereas one does not have to accept any doctrine without evidence, one could accept any doctrine when such evidence is available and should not be dissuaded from doing so. The second and closely related point is that ‘men ought to divest themselves of all prejudices, and never suffer the authority of any one man, or any body of men, to have an influence upon them in opposition to reason’.⁶⁸ The third point is the right to profess belief in any doctrine which is not harmful to religion, peace, and morality, thereby paving the way to wide toleration. Furthermore, in the absence of any such harm, ‘every member of society ... should be trusted and employed, both by private persons, and by the state, in proportion to his abilities and integrity, without enquiring more particularly into his religious principles and practice’.⁶⁹ Precisely because of these convictions, Wallace opposed even the sanctions that were aimed at those with whom he had profound disagreements.

Subsequently, Wallace’s advice was addressed to all those so-called freethinkers who in reality rejected both natural and revealed religion and who understood the world only in terms of chance and necessity, and religion only in terms of cynical and selfish interests. It seems evident that Wallace had his previous rivals in mind here and especially Dudgeon, Tindal, Mandeville, and to a lesser degree Hume. He advised such freethinkers simply to conceal their views, if not to renounce them altogether. Wallace took issue particularly with what he defined as the freethinkers’ denial of virtue. It was untrue and unwise to spread a theory that emphasised human (and especially clerical) vices at the expense of all the good that exists in the world: ‘instead of inspiring us with just and generous sentiments, they tend to kill every kind and worthy affection’.⁷⁰ Similarly, denying the doctrine of a future state and even the existence of God Himself would be disadvantageous, as these notions provide both comfort and an incentive to act justly in this world. ‘Are not the Freethinkers unkind to themselves’, he wondered, ‘in choosing to appear in so bad a light?’⁷¹

In conclusion, Wallace's self-identified moderation constituted genuine freethinking, that is, the practice of examining any doctrine before accepting it, adhering to reason before authority, and leaving enough room for a sincere debate in religious matters, while excluding two main elements that he saw as absolutely harmful to society and religion, namely, radical anticlericalism and the reduction of religion only to natural religion. This moderation entailed a strong support of religious toleration and an opposition to persecution, censorship, and coercion, as well as a preference of morality over strict doctrines. It is striking to see how far Wallace was willing to go in his quest for moderation: he tried to meet halfway even those who held the most despicable opinions, in his eyes, and to bring them, if not to change their mind, then to see why it would be useful to hold the essential religious truths, at least publicly. Conceding that some sceptics might have had good intentions, he stated: 'What pity is it ... that persons who meant so well to mankind, should have been so much mistaken about the method of doing them service'.⁷² Until the very end of his career, then, Wallace was committed to dialogue and determined to find common ground even with those he considered to be his greatest opponents.

5. Conclusion

Robert Wallace died in 1771. 'Memoirs of Dr Wallace of Edinburgh', published in the same year in the *Scots Magazine*, provided several interesting descriptions of his different pursuits. For example, the 'Memoirs' stated, Wallace's Rankenian Club aspired to create 'mutual improvement by liberal conversation and rational inquiry'.⁷³ This was a social project as much as it was an intellectual one: its members 'were highly instrumental in disseminating through Scotland, freedom of thought, boldness of disquisition, liberality of sentiment, accuracy of reason, correctness of taste, and attention to composition'.⁷⁴ Wallace evidently cherished these values. Having promoted them rigorously throughout his career, not only as an intellectual but also as a leading churchman, he arrived at his own position of moderation. As the 'Memoirs' continued, 'being ardently turned to contemplation', Wallace 'had early resolved to enter into the church; a profession which suited his speculative disposition, and which he thought would afford him leisure to indulge his natural inclination'.⁷⁵ His ecclesiastical career, therefore, was entirely compatible with his spirit of erudition – the same spirit that he constantly attempted to foster among his fellow clergymen and that he associated with his freethinking version of Presbyterianism. Finally, one additional detail that the 'Memoirs' provided sheds an interesting light on Wallace's intellectual affinity: 'His favourite modern was the Earl of Shaftesbury ... and he was deeply impressed with all that devout and rapturous admiration of the beauty and order, wisdom and beneficence of Nature, which this virtuous nobleman paints with a glowing pencil in his *Characteristics*'.⁷⁶ According to the writer – most probably Wallace's son, George – it was this admiration of nature that caused Wallace's death from an illness he developed after a walk in the snow. That biographical note aside, the fact that Wallace took inspiration from Shaftesbury despite their clear differences tells us something compelling about the way in which he perceived his own work and tradition. Furthermore, it is a good example of eighteenth-century Scottish 'intellectual pluralism' more broadly: remarkably, Shaftesbury influenced other figures in Wallace's circles who held competing sets of value, including William Wishart (Wallace's colleague) as well as William Dudgeon (Wallace's enemy).⁷⁷

In the *Various Prospects*, Wallace argued that 'Virtue does not depend upon fashion or education, but has as firm a foundation as the heavens of the earth', and he stated explicitly: 'witness the noble author of the *Characteristics*, who, with all his failing, has treated this subject with a peculiar elegance, as well as strength of genius'.⁷⁸ Wallace followed Shaftesbury's notion of the beauty of nature and the close relationship between nature and virtue. In this sense, he was a disciple of Shaftesbury's ethics and aesthetics, even if he was surely more hesitant about Shaftesbury's call to use ridicule and humour in matters of religion. There was another important link between the two writers: Shaftesbury advocated freedom of thought but at the same time distinguished himself from radical freethinkers such as Tindal, indeed precisely as Wallace did.⁷⁹ As a leading

proponent of Enlightenment politeness, Shaftesbury provided a model of a noble freethinker. It was precisely this model that Wallace promoted consistently in his intellectual as well as ecclesiastical debates and disagreements, and the ways in which he implemented it throughout his entire life present his ultimate moderate legacy.

Notes

1. David Hume, *Essays, Moral and Political*, 3rd ed. (London and Edinburgh, 1748), 270–2.
2. In the literature today, too, freethinkers such as John Toland, Anthony Collins, and Matthew Tindal are often associated specifically with the Radical Enlightenment, most famously by Jonathan Israel, even though the question of how radical exactly they were is still a subject of a scholarly debate. See Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 599–628, but for another view, see for example Jeffrey R. Wigelsworth, *Deism in Enlightenment England: Theology, Politics, and Newtonian Public Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
3. Robert Wallace, *A Letter from a Moderate Freethinker to David Hume Esquire Concerning the Profession of the Clergy*, transcribed by Miguel A. Badía Cabrera (Ann Arbor: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 2013), 55 [3].
4. Ernest C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257–71.
5. Yiftah Elazar, 'The Downfall of All Slavish Hierarchies: Richard Price on Emancipation, Improvement, and Republican Utopia', *Modern Intellectual History* 19, no. 1 (2022): 81–104, on 91, argues that 'Wallace is one of the most interesting and least studied of the Scottish intellectuals who were committed to common-wealth principles'.
6. H. R. Sefton, 'Rev. Robert Wallace: An Early Moderate', *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 16 (1966–8): 1–22, on 13; James A. Harris and Mikko Tolonen, 'Hume In and Out of Scottish Context', in *Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume I: Morals, Politics, Art, Religion*, ed. Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 163–95.
7. Thomas Ahnert, *The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment, 1690–1805* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 37.
8. Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 202–11, on 211, argues that 'Wallace's work provides evidence of the existence of radical thought in Scotland'. See also Norah Smith, 'Sexual Mores in the Eighteenth Century: Robert Wallace's "Of Venery"', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39, no. 3 (1978): 419–33; Robert B. Luehrs, 'Population and Utopia in the Thought of Robert Wallace', *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 20, no. 3 (1987): 313–35.
9. J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Volume One: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737–1764* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 300. See also Pocock, 'Post-Puritan England and the Problem of the Enlightenment', in *Culture and Politics from Puritanism to Enlightenment*, ed. Perez Zagorin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 91–111; Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Volume Two: Narratives of Civil Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a similar case in the English context, see William J. Bulman, *Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Alasdair Raffé, 'Intellectual Pluralism, the Enlightenment and Scottish Responses to Deism', in *Debating Enlightenment. Scholarship, Historiography and the Transmission of Books and Ideas*, ed. Marco Barducci (Woodbridge: Boydell, forthcoming), offers a helpful focus on intellectual pluralism as a defining feature of eighteenth-century Scotland (rather than, perhaps, an Enlightenment), in which Wallace played an important role.
10. Ahnert, *Moral Culture*, 66–93, on 67. Wallace is notably distinguished, as part of the 'Neu-Lights', from the church's 'Moderates' in Richard B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), especially 152–4. Yet it is noteworthy that 'Moderate' could also signify the willingness of parts of the church to work with the civil authorities to manage the church courts, a tendency which Wallace certainly shared and promoted, especially in the 1740s. See also Ian D. L. Clark, 'From Protest to Reaction: The Moderate Regime in the Church of Scotland, 1752–1805', in *Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 200–24; B. Barnett Cochran, 'Wallace, Robert (1697–1771), Church of Scotland Minister and Writer on Population', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004), available at: <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-28539>.
11. See for example Matthew Tindal, *An Essay Concerning Obedience to the Supreme Powers, and the Duty of Subjects in All Revolutions* (London, 1694); Tindal, *An Essay Concerning the Power of the Magistrate, and the*

- Rights of Mankind in Matters of Religion* (London, 1697); Tindal, *The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted, against the Romish, and All Other Priests Who Claim an Independent Power Over It* (London, 1706).
12. Philip Skelton, *Deism revealed. Or, The Attack on Christianity Candidly Reviewed*, 2nd ed. (London, 1751), vol. 2, 265.
 13. Tindal, *Christianity as Old as the Creation: or, the Gospel, a Republication of the Religion of Nature* (London, 1730), 180.
 14. Elad Carmel, *Anticlerical Legacies: The Deistic Reception of Thomas Hobbes, c. 1670–1740* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2024).
 15. Robert G. Ingram, *Reformation without End: Religion, Politics and the Past in Post-Revolutionary England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 64–81, cited on 72.
 16. Wallace, *The Regard due to Divine Revelation, and to Pretences to It, Considered*, 2nd ed. (London, 1733), e.g., v–ix.
 17. *Ibid.*, xvi.
 18. *Ibid.*, xviii–xxi.
 19. *Ibid.*, xxv–xxvii.
 20. See for example John Spurr, ‘“Latitudinarianism” and the Restoration Church’, *The Historical Journal* 31, no. 1 (1988): 61–82.
 21. It should be noted that this position, albeit intriguing, was not entirely unique to Wallace. His colleague George Turnbull (1698–1748), for instance, proclaimed as early as 1718 in a letter to none other than the notorious John Toland (1670–1722): ‘Sir I am a Freethinker, and I glory in the character. ... I neither regard custom, nor fashion, authority nor power; truth & reason are the only things that determine me’. George Turnbull, *Education for Life: Correspondence and Writings on Religion and Practical Philosophy*, ed. M. A. Stewart and Paul Wood (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2014), 3. Similar examples can be found even outside of Wallace’s circles. Such was the case of Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686–1743), the Scottish Catholic writer who lived mostly in France. A proponent of reason and liberty, Ramsay praised the idea of ‘true, noble, Christian freethinking’ and indeed was described as one who ‘hates bigotry and rather loves freethinking’. Gabriel Glickman, ‘Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686–1743): Catholic Freethinking and Enlightenment Mysticism’, in *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History*, ed. Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 391–410, on 391, 394, 407.
 22. Wallace, *Regard due to Divine Revelation*, 57.
 23. *Ibid.*, 58.
 24. See for example Anthony Collins, *A Discourse of Free-Thinking, Occasion’d by the Rise and Growth of a Sect Call’d Free-Thinkers* (London, 1713), 5.
 25. Wallace, *Regard due to Divine Revelation*, 58.
 26. *Ibid.*, 58–9.
 27. Ahnert, *Moral Culture*, 34–65.
 28. Wallace expressed a clear anti-subscriptionist position privately before 1720 in a manuscript entitled ‘A Little Treatise against Imposing Creeds or Confessions of Faith on Ministers or Private Christians as a Necessary Term of Laick or Ministeriall Communion’. He then endorsed it in 1764, thus revealing that he held this view rather consistently throughout his life: ‘tho the argument might be pursued further yet there are many just observations in this little treatise: which discover both an early genius & an aversion to be fettered by creeds & modern Confessions’. Edinburgh University Library, La.II.620/18. See also Colin Kidd, ‘Scotland’s Invisible Enlightenment: Subscription and Heterodoxy in the Eighteenth-Century Kirk’, *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 30 (2000): 28–59, on 41–4, 54–5.
 29. Paul Russell, ‘Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), Freethinker and Philosopher’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004), available at: <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-8140>; Russell, *The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 35–46, on 43.
 30. William Dudgeon, *The Necessity of Some of the Positive Institutions of Christianity Consider’d* (London, 1731), 7.
 31. William Warburton, *A Critical and Philosophical Commentary on Mr. Pope’s Essay on Man* (London, 1742), xix.
 32. Dudgeon, *A Catechism Founded upon Experience and Reason*, 2nd ed. (London, 1739), 4–5, 12.
 33. *Ibid.*, 13.
 34. *Ibid.*
 35. Wallace, *Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty* (Edinburgh, 1746), 3.
 36. *Ibid.*, e.g., 11–12.
 37. *Ibid.*, 17–19. Cf. Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, 3rd ed. (London, 1724), e.g., 328–30.
 38. Wallace, *Ignorance and Superstition*, 19.
 39. Hume, *Essays, Moral and Political*, 271.

40. It is discussed briefly in Luehrs, 'Population and Utopia', 316–18; Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 260–2.
41. Wallace, *Letter*, 52 [2].
42. *Ibid.*, 54 [3].
43. That the cause of freedom of thought was somewhat adopted by the clergy was indeed a plausible argument. See for example Peter N. Miller, "'Freethinking" and "Freedom of Thought" in Eighteenth-Century Britain', *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 3 (1993): 599–617.
44. Wallace, *Letter*, 68 [13].
45. *Ibid.*, 71 [15].
46. *Ibid.*
47. Wallace, *Characteristics of the Present Political State of Great Britain*, 2nd ed. (London, 1758), 178–9.
48. See for example Justin Champion, *Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696–1722* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Elad Carmel, 'Anthony Collins on Toleration, Liberty, and Authority', *History of European Ideas* 48, no. 7 (2022): 892–908.
49. Sefton, 'Wallace: An Early Moderate', 16–19; Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 348–52.
50. Robert Wallace, *The Necessity or Expediency of the Churches Inquiring into the Writings of David Hume Esquire and Calling the Author to Answer Before the Spiritual Courts (1756)*, transcribed by Miguel A. Badía Cabrera (Ann Arbor: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 2015), 28–9 [24–5].
51. *Ibid.*, 24 [20].
52. *Ibid.*, 50 [46].
53. Interestingly, this was not the first time that Wallace defended a colleague with dissenting views that he considered merely speculative: as early as 1730 he objected to the deposition of the minister John Glas who took a Congregationalist position. See Sefton, 'Wallace: An Early Moderate'; Alasdair Raffe, 'John Glas and the Development of Religious Pluralism in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 70, no. 3 (2019): 527–45.
54. Wallace, *Necessity or Expediency*, 60–1 [56–7].
55. John Robertson, 'Hume, David (1711–1776), Philosopher and Historian', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004), available at: <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-14141>.
56. Robert Wallace, *A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Antient and Modern Times* (Edinburgh, 1753).
57. Silvia Sebastiani, *The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits of Progress* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 38–41. Yet Wallace did oppose slavery profoundly: 'God forbid', he wrote, 'that I should ever be an advocate for slavery, ecclesiastic, civil, or domestic'. Wallace, *Dissertation on the Numbers*, 91.
58. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes*, ed. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman (Hanover and London: Dartmouth College Press, 1995), 528. Montesquieu wrote similarly: 'The public that admires these two works will not admire any less two friends who concede in such a noble fashion the small interests of the mind to the interests of friendship'. Cited in James A. Harris, *Hume: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 299. On the way in which both Wallace and Rousseau aimed 'to find, if possible, a place for ancient virtue in the modern world', see B. Barnett Cochran, 'Enlightenment and Its Discontents: Robert Wallace and Rousseau on the Republic of Virtue', in *Scotland and France in the Enlightenment*, ed. Deidre Dawson and Pierre Morère (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2004), 284–304, on 295.
59. Cited in Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 262–8, on 265.
60. Wallace, *Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence* (London, 1761), especially 109–25; Elazar, 'Downfall of All Slavish Hierarchies', 92. See also Barnett Cochran, 'Wallace, Robert'.
61. Wallace, *Various Prospects*, e.g., 331.
62. *Ibid.*, 387.
63. *Ibid.*, 387–8.
64. *Ibid.*, 388.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, 389.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*, 390.
70. *Ibid.*, 394–9, on 398.
71. *Ibid.*, 403.
72. *Ibid.*, 406.
73. [George Wallace], 'Memoirs of Dr Wallace of Edinburgh', in *The Scots Magazine*, vol. 33 (Edinburgh, 1771), 340.
74. *Ibid.*, 340–1.

75. Ibid., 341.
76. Ibid., 344. See Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 3 vols. (London, 1711).
77. Raffe, 'Intellectual Pluralism'. See also Paul Russell, 'Wishart, Baxter and Hume's *Letter from a Gentleman*', *Hume Studies* 23, no. 2 (1997): 245–76.
78. Wallace, *Various Prospects*, 397.
79. Lawrence E. Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially 154–74.

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