Two Sides of the Coin

Trust Building as Positive Propaganda in the Finnish and French Euro Campaign

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This study analyses the Finnish and French euro campaigns realised during the years 1997-1998. The goal of the campaigns was to facilitate the changeover to the new currency. The starting point is the official objective of the European Union to build trust towards the euro and to avoid using any propaganda in the information campaigns. Since the national euro campaigns were designed freely by member states, they represent both national and cultural ways of approaching the issue.

The goal of this study is to analyse theoretically the concepts of "trust building" and "propaganda" in the context of governmental information campaign. The objective is to find out how the euro campaigns strived for to "build trust", what methods and themes of argumentation they used, and how trust building differs from propaganda. The theoretical background of the study consists of the analysis of propaganda from communicational and political perspectives, and the analysis of trust, its development and relationship with politics. In order to decrease the negative burden of the word "propaganda", the concept of positive propaganda is introduced as a central part of democratic society and its information management. In addition, a cultural analysis of the two national euro campaigns is included in the study. The differences of the Finnish and French euro campaigns are analysed on the basis of research conducted in the field of cross-cultural communication.

The data consists mainly of the Finnish and French campaign material including information brochures, newspaper advertisements and television commercials. Another part of the data are interviews conducted with the campaigners, aiming at finding out the objectives and the intentions preceding the actual information process. The research method is rhetorical content analysis. The data is interpreted on the basis of political categorisations, classifications and other argumentation relating to the euro. One part of the study is the analysis of the visual material based on the theory of photograph rhetoric.

The results imply that the notion of positive propaganda is a more relevant concept to be used in the context of the euro campaigns than that of trust building. The main argument is the unfulfilling match of politics and trust: the understanding of trust as a form of honesty and risk-taking. The specific cultural features connected to the Finnish and French campaigns are those of rationality and emotionality, manifested in the Finnish argumentation of economic policy and French keynote address style.

**Keywords**

Trust, propaganda, information campaign, culture, rhetoric, euro

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1 NATIONAL EURO CAMPAIGNS AS THE CROSSROADS OF POLITICS AND CULTURE

The information campaign of the euro was the most extensive governmental campaigning ever held in Finland. Aimed at facilitating the changeover to the new currency, this campaign was part of the information process realised by the European Union. Its official objective was to “build full trust” towards the common currency. All eleven member states of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which were to adopt the euro, designed their own national information campaigns. The countries were given liberty to plan their own campaigns with only some general guidelines established by the Union. As examples of these national euro campaigns, those of Finland and France are chosen to be studied. The main reasons for this is that both campaigns span an approximate same time period and utilise similar channels of communication making it easier for comparison purposes.

The Finnish campaign called “Euro – uusi raha” (Euro – New Money) was launched in 1998 amidst a climate of negative public opinion. Almost half of the population was opposed to the euro and the public generally felt uninformed about the issue. According to the campaigners, the main tasks of the campaign were to lessen doubts, fears and lack of information and make Finnish people more amenable to the euro. The official focus group was those people who were thought to have the highest level doubt: populations living in rural areas, the unemployed and uneducated. On the other hand, it was emphasised that the campaign was not going to be any “EMU propaganda”.

To the contrary, the public opinion in France was more positive towards the euro than it was in Finland: more than half of the people were in favour of the euro. Unlike Finland, the public was more concerned about the realisation of the EMU and whether one would succeed at it. The French campaigners had chosen young people as their target audience as they were seen to act as a link to the older generation. The campaign “Euro fait la force” (Euro Is Strong) was held during the years 1997 and 1998 with its primary objective to strengthen the feeling of belonging to the community of Europeans.

The starting point of this study is the examining of the official objectives of the euro campaigns, its aim in “building trust” and its avoidance in using so called
“propaganda”. The main interest lies in this separation: what does trust building actually mean and how does it differ from propaganda? In order to obtain insight to this issue, the notions of propaganda and trust are analysed. When it comes to propaganda, both communication and political aspects are brought up and related to one another. This is done from the perspective of information campaign studies, social marketing and public relations which each have a connection to propaganda. Due to the negative connotation of the word “propaganda”, the concept has been rendered “neutral” through the preferred usage of “positive propaganda”. In this way, the emphasis is laid on propaganda as politics of information and control over information flow in modern democratic society. As far as trust is concerned, its meaning and development are analysed. Since trust seems to be most of all an expectation of honesty, the discourse has also been related to the problematics of morality and politics as a combination. Finally, the relationship between propaganda and trust building is discussed.

Another goal of the study is a cross-cultural comparison between the Finnish and French euro campaigns. How are the cultural features of the two nations revealed in their respective campaigns and what implications does this have on their content? Do the cultural ways of reflecting the world oppose or support the political perspective? The theoretical background of this cultural analysis consists of cross-cultural studies and sociocultural research on both the Finnish and French cultures.

The main methodology employed for this study is rhetorical content analysis. Accordingly, as a way to approach the problematics of trust building and cultural differences, both Finnish and French euro campaigns have been compared based on their discursive practices: which were the main themes discussed, what kind of methods were used to “build trust” and which were the differences between the campaign discourses. As to the campaign images, research done in the field of photograph rhetoric has been applied. The data of this study consists of campaign material, including information brochures, newspaper advertisements and television commercials. Interviews with campaigners have also been conducted to gather additional information for the realisation of the campaigns.

As a subject of study, the comparative analysis of two national euro campaigns combines cultural and political perspectives in the context of a current social issue. The question about the new common currency of Europeans is a significant step in European integration manifested by the extensiveness of both campaigns. The study
of the information which different nations offer their citizens about the euro is also one way to look at the problematics of European identity as a common basis for integration: are the ways to perceive Europe, the EU and the euro similar among member states, or are there differences and in what respect?
2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE EURO: FROM UNION LEVEL TO NATIONAL MESSAGES

2.1 Objectives of the Study

2.1.1 Trust Building towards the Euro: Political and Cultural Analysis

The starting point of this study is to evaluate the aim of both national euro campaigns, as stated in the official objectives of the EU: building trust towards the euro and the EMU in the minds of its citizens. Both are governmental information campaigns and consequently borrow elements from campaign theories, social marketing and public relations. However, the study of a governmental campaign cannot only be reduced to communication. Politics also plays a role. Therefore, the political aspect of this study will be the notion of propaganda and its use in the context of governmental information. Since the word “propaganda” bears an historical negative connotation, the concept of positive propaganda will be utilised instead in an effort to render it “neutral” so that it may be linked to politics in modern society.

Another focus of this study is to analyse the relationship of trust and propaganda. The concept of trust and its development will be discussed and how it fits to politics will also be considered. Based on the content analysis of campaign material, the ways of “trust building” towards the new money and the membership of the EMU will be specified. The main issues and arguments relating to the euro and specific rhetorical features linked to this discussion, will also be elaborated. In addition, the position of the public and the roles this takes in relation to the campaign discourse will be explored. One part of the study is the analysis of the visual material which consists mainly of advertising photographs and television commercials. Based on the conclusions of the campaign material, the question about the interrelationship of trust and positive propaganda and the relevance of their use in the context of governmental information campaign will be reflected.

Another part of the study will consist of a cross-cultural comparison between the Finnish and French campaign materials analysing the cultural differences which emerge when informing citizens about the euro. Consequently, two national ways of talking about the same phenomenon, the common currency, will be studied. Answers
for the possible differences in the field of cross-cultural studies will be highlighted by exploring the main features of the Finnish and French culture.

2.1.2 Research Data

The main challenge regarding the gathering of material has been to include data which would provide the possibility for a reliable comparison between both campaigns. For example, the French campaign was a much larger effort than its Finnish counterpart, including a greater use of different communication tools and lasted for a longer period of time. Finally, the main objective for the gathering of material has been to get the pieces of information which were directed straight to the public, the so-called "ordinary" citizens of the two nations. This was regarded as a more important criterion than the precise correspondence of the specific amounts of text or channels. Since there were many different information brochures in both campaigns, those which held the same kind of position providing basic information and functioning as an introduction have been selected. Newspaper advertisements and television commercials from both campaigns have also been analysed. Internet pages and information services have been left out because they were considered as being too narrow-reaching when analysing information directed to an entire population and also too large a function to be studied along with the other material.

The Finnish campaign material chosen to be studied includes television commercials, newspapers advertisements, and the information brochure "Euro - uusi raha". On the other hand, the French campaign material chosen to be studied only includes some items of the entire communication effort: the brochure entitled "L'euro et moi" (Euro and I), the newspaper advertisement "Nous serons plus forts. Nous resterons nous-mêmes." (We Will Be Stronger. We Will Remain Ourselves), the television film "La fontaine" (Fountain), and the television commercials entitled "L'euro, mode d'emploi" (The Euro, User's Manual). This kind of combination will allow for better comparability with the Finnish material and also provide an entity consisting of different kinds of content diffused via different channels.

As a whole, the Finnish campaign consisted of newspaper advertisements and television commercials, two information brochures one of which mailed to every household, internet pages, a toll-free telephone number which citizens could call, and an information tour which travelled around Finland. The series of newspaper adver-
tisements included eight different pieces, of which seven were published during May 1998, and one advertisement on the first of January in 1999, after the final course of the euro was made public. The advertisements were published in the biggest national newspapers. The mailing of the information brochure “Euro - uusi raha” was initiated at the beginning of June 1998, just after the last newspaper advertisement of the seven-piece series had been published. Later in 1998, another brochure called “Ku-luttajan eurotietoa” (Euro Information for Consumer) was launched, covering practical information about the euro. The brochure was made available in public places.¹

Television commercials were aired on MTV3, the largest national commercial channel, during the months of May and June in 1998. The commercials, designed to answer practical questions about the euro, consisted of four different themes and all together, 63 spots were shown. The internet pages were launched in May 1998 and the information tour took place during the following summer. Moreover, citizens had the possibility to ask questions relating to the euro via telephone or the internet. This service was provided by the Finnish Foreign Ministry. In addition, there were communication efforts directed to special groups like young people, old people and the handicapped.²

The first part of the French campaign realised during 1997 was mainly based on the brochure entitled “L’euro et moi”, diffused in public places beginning in November 1997.³ “La fontaine” television commercial was shown on the national television channels. Also, a toll-free telephone and Minitel number which citizens could call were established and internet pages launched. The 1998 campaign was comprised of the brochure entitled “La lettre de l’euro” (The Letter about the Euro) mailed to French households. There were also commercials aired on the radio and one advertisement appeared in the regional daily press at the beginning of May in 1998 headlined “Nous serons plus forts. Nous resterons nous-mêmes.” In addition, the campaign in early 1998 contained the toll-free telephone and Minitel number and the internet pages of the euro.⁴

Another brochure entitled “Le guide pratique de l’euro” (The Practical Euro Guide) was delivered to every household in early 1998. Television commercials “L’euro, mode d’emploi” were diffused beginning in late 1998. The commercials han-

¹ von Haartman 1999.
² Ministry of Finance, Finland 1998b; von Haartman 1999.
³ Nicolas 1999.
dled the practical aspects of the euro and were shown on public television channels. There was a total of 30 broadcasts during November 1998 and April 1999. In that same year, there was also a campaign aimed at small and medium-size enterprises and communication efforts were directed to special groups, including school children and the elderly.⁵

In order to obtain in-depth information about the objectives of the campaigners and the actual process, interviews have been conducted with representatives of the campaign organisations. In the case of the Finnish campaign, Minna Aila, Head of Division in the European Commission Representation in Finland and Anita Sihvola, Head of Information in the Ministry of Finances were both interviewed. Moreover, Heidi von Haartman, Deputy Manager of Focus Business Communications, the advertising agency which produced the part of the Finnish campaign material herein studied was also interviewed.

The French campaign was mostly done by the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry. Unlike Finland, the local representation of the European Commission played a minor partner in the campaign process. In the case of the French campaign, Jean-Yves Nicolas, Head of the Information Office of the euro and other European Campaigns in the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, and Boris Durande, Head of the European Commission Representation in France were both interviewed.

The material gathered from both these interviews was used for completing the background information about the campaign designs and their realisation. Consequently, the interviews did not serve as a primary research method but acted as additional supportive material which could not have been known in any other way. Knowing what the intentions of the campaigners were in the first place, also provided for the possibility to draw conclusions about the success of achieving the set goals as far as the material production is concerned.

2.2 Euro, a Currency for Europe

The communication effort surrounding the euro was one of the information actions of the European Union, being part of the Information Programme for Europe's Citizens. The programme is realised in co-operation with the European Parliament and the European Commission. The practical work of the programme, implementation and organisation, is done by the Information Service of the Commission, which is also responsible for the areas of communication, culture and audiovisual media.  

The information campaign of the euro was realised in a highly decentralised manner. The member states created their own national campaigns and were given great freedom for designing the campaign in their own way. The role of the Commission was simply to guide, co-ordinate and facilitate the entire process. The official objectives of the campaign were “to inspire confidence and win the support of the general public”. The Union also wanted “to prepare all the citizens (…) for the changeover to a single currency.” The importance of building “full trust towards a common currency” was underlined by Jacques Santer, who was the residing President of the European Commission of that time.  

According to the European Commission, the communication effort was to cover the following themes: euro's favourable impact on economic growth, euro's necessary role in the building of a single market, daily advantages of all citizens, strengthening impact on the international economic position, monetary stability and the necessity of the rationalisation as an end in and of itself. As can be seen, all the themes presuppose euro's benefits in making only positive claims about the future. In general, the word “change” was not used, but instead replaced for example, with the word “advantage”. Also, the necessity of the euro, and there being no other option, was also highlighted in the objectives.  

The campaign targeted the media, economic operators, public administrations and the general public. Gérard Legris, the Head of the Unit for Priority Actions in the Information Service of the Commission, highlighted the significance of reaching ordinary people: women, young people, the elderly, consumers, immigrants, illiter-

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7 Ibid., 22.
8 Santer 1998; European Commission 1996.
10 Ibid., 26.
ates, workers, the handicapped and the unemployed. As far as the Commission was concerned, it was especially underlined that the campaigns should be adaptable to the specific economic and political situations in the member states. The national campaigners should be aware of the public opinion and practice democratic consultation.

The timetable of the communication activities was organised around two important dates: the 2nd of May 1998, when the Council designated the member states qualified to adopt the single currency, and the 1st of January 1999, when the euro appeared and the conversion rates were irrevocably fixed. The whole communication process is planned to be on going and will extend to the year 2002 when the euro will finally replace the national currencies in each member country.

2.3 Euro - uusi raha

The public opinion in Finland during the launching phase of the campaign was quite sensitive. An opinion poll taken in January 1998 revealed that 40 percent of the citizens opposed the euro and 17 percent did not yet have an opinion. Other surveys done in the beginning of May 1998, just after Finland's official decision to adopt the euro in the first group, revealed confusingly different numbers. In the Europinion survey, 72 percent of citizens supported the euro and 24 percent were against it. At the same time, Helsingin Sanomat, the largest nation-wide newspaper, reported that 40 percent of the Finnish people opposed the euro and another 40 percent supported it.

Generally, men seemed to be more in favour of the euro than women. As well, young and middle-aged people felt more positively about the common currency than older people did. The most common worries caused by the euro were the understanding of the prices, lack of information and price-setting by the retailers. Consequently, public opinion in Finland was contradictory and according to some surveys, even opposed the euro. Also, a significant part of the population did not have any

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13 Ibid., 40.
14 Ministry of Finance, Finland 1998a.
15 Helsingin Sanomat 1998, April 4.
opinion about the matter which can be explained, at least partly, by a lack of information and the nature of the EMU as an uncertain experiment. In general, it can be said that the reigning climate was not very favourable when considering the campaign.

The main argument of Finnish campaigners, the European Commission Representation and the Ministry of Finance, was that the campaign should not change people’s attitudes or practice any kind of manipulation. Johny Åkerholm, Assistant Secretary of the State in the Ministry of Finance, stated that “one should not have any doubts that the campaign tries to influence people’s attitudes”. 17 Also, the European Commission Representation underlined that the purpose of the campaign was to diffuse basic information about the euro to the public and not to make any EMU propaganda nor to try to change people’s attitudes to be more positive about the issue. 18

These kind of statements seem somewhat confusing when considering the public opinion and general uncertainty about the issue. They do not seem to be consistent or fit very well with the positive and clearly image-oriented themes of the campaign. If the campaigners did not want to change people’s attitudes, why would they then want the public to believe in the benefits of the euro? One reason which may possibly explain the careful comments on behalf of the campaigners was naturally the sensitivity of the issue itself and public opinion. They did not want to irritate people or turn them more against the euro by admitting that the campaign wanted to form opinions. Instead, they wanted to begin “from a clean table” and decrease the prejudices as much as possible.

Only general guidelines for the campaign design were given from the EU to the EMU countries. The countries were then free to decide on other elements including focus groups, main objectives, forms and channels of information. In each case, the purpose was to start from the base of the specific national opinion climate, special needs and the existing information culture. Consequently, the campaigns of other member states were not supposed to be taken into consideration in the design of one’s own campaign. Although the whole process was co-operative, the work of the others was meant to be used only as an example. The concrete production of the

16 European Commission 1999, 37, 46-49.
17 Helsingin Sanomat 1998, April 3.
18 Helsingin Sanomat 1998, April 4.
Finnish campaign material was done by Focus Business Communications, a private marketing communication agency chosen from several candidates.\textsuperscript{19}

The official goal of the campaign was to acquaint all Finns, over the age of 15, with the common currency. According to the Ministry of Finance, the campaign wanted to correct some misunderstandings by offering correct and objective information about the issue. One of the main messages was that the euro would not have any immediate impact on an average person's life. The campaigners hoped that the information would calm the public dialogue and make people more amenable to the euro.\textsuperscript{20}

The most visible part of the campaign was directed to the public in general, but there were also other communications directed and adapted to suit the needs of special audiences like old people, the handicapped and business enterprises.\textsuperscript{21} Although the campaign information was said to be directed to every Finnish citizen, people living in rural areas, older people, people with less education and the unemployed were especially stated as target groups. According to opinion polls and beliefs held by the campaigners, these groups shared greater fears and uncertainty concerning the euro. According to Heidi von Haartman, Deputy Manager of Focus Business Communications, the themes of the campaign were planned and systematically tested to meet the needs of these target groups. The main messages were chosen to cover areas of uncertainty, including questions pertaining to salary, social security and pension.\textsuperscript{22}

In the case of the Finnish campaign there seemed to be, in spite of the official objective, a division among the universal audience, as Chaim Perelman defines it. The universal audience, or the public, were the Finns aged 15 and over, but the particular audience of special interest were the persons with most doubts. According to Perelman, a discourse addressed to the specific audience aims to persuade, while a discourse addressed to the universal audience aims to convince.\textsuperscript{23} This leads to the assumption that the campaign was designed to be partly convincing and partly persuading. In this light, the sincerity of the official "non-persuasion" objective seems

\textsuperscript{19} Aila 1999.
\textsuperscript{20} Ministry of Finance, Finland 1998a.
\textsuperscript{21} Aila 1999.
\textsuperscript{22} von Haartman 1999.
\textsuperscript{23} Perelman 1982, 14-18.
even more questionable. Why would the campaign be directed at a particular audience, the people with the most doubts, if it was not to change attitudes?

The co-operation for the campaign between the Ministry of Finance and the European Commission Representation in Finland began in 1998. The information process will continue until the year 2001 covering the national transition period to common currency. The information campaign “Euro - uusi raha” mostly took place during the spring of 1998. With a general budget of 12 million marks, the campaign of the euro is the biggest social communication campaign ever held in Finland.

2.4 Euro fait la force

According to surveys, the attitude held by the French towards the single currency was generally more positive than in Finland. The majority of 68 percent was in favour of the euro in spring 1998, and only 25 percent expressed themselves to be against. The French felt to be the best informed of all the euro countries; 73 percent felt they had received enough information. In Finland, this figure was only at 52 percent. In France, the biggest worries held by the public were centred around the recognition of possibly counterfeited bills and coins, the value of the currency and the mixing currencies.

However, in many countries, the high support levels dropped after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 1998, when the final decision of the participating member states was made. This was also acknowledged by Jean-Yves Nicolas, Head of the Communication Department in the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry. According to him, “the first campaign in October 1997 was done in an atmosphere of strong scepticism, which concerned the timetable [of the euro’s introduction] and the amount of member states fulfilling the criteria of convergence.” In general, the opinion climates in both Finland and France seemed to be the same, sceptic, but about different aspects of the euro. While the French were more concerned with the actual success of the common currency in the international markets, the Finnish were more worried about

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24 Alla 1999.
26 European Commission 1999, 21-22, 37, 47.
27 Nicolas 1999.
everyday matters: how to learn to use the new money and receive the needed information.

For the French, the main responsibility for the communication aspects of the euro belonged to the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry also assisted by the local Representation of the European Commission and the information service of the French government. The concrete work was done by the international advertising agency DDB & Co., selected by tender procedure. The campaign entitled “Euro fait la force” began in November 1997 and will continue until the year 2002.28 The budget of the whole campaign process during the years 1997 and 1998 was 110 million francs.29

The French campaign for the euro was divided into two periods: the first part of the campaign was held during the year 1997 and the second part after the official decision taken on the 2nd of May 1998. The main objectives of the campaign in 1997 were to give basic information about the euro and determine the timetable of the process. As well, it was to inform about the benefits of the euro for all citizens. The second campaign in 1998 had the objectives of strengthening the citizens' “feelings of belonging to the community of European peoples”, and reassuring the people about the consequences of adopting the euro by making available all the practical information needed for a smooth transition period.30

The differences between the official objectives of the two national campaigns is evident and understandable when considering the different kinds of worries among these nations. The French campaign wanted to assure people about the strength of the new currency and the success in its realisation. The Finnish campaign wanted to calm the public debate by supplying concrete everyday facts about the use of the euro. One of the sharpest contradictions between the campaigns was the attitude toward the notion of change: while the French campaign wanted to emphasise the “big change”, the Finnish campaign wanted to underline that nothing was going to change.

One of the creators of the French campaign, Jacques Séguéla, characterised the campaign as “radically junior” and “anchored to the youth of Europe”. In his opinion, the campaign worked from a basis of free will and imagination. According to Sé-

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28 Ibid.
guêla, it is the young people who have to explain Europe to their parents. He also underlined that more than half of all Europeans will be over 50 years old in the year 2002 when the euro will be concretely in use. The other significant aspect taken into consideration are the different regional cultures in France. One had to combine “the issues of pragmatism” to the north, “the worries for the culture” to the south and “isolationism” to the east.³¹

Pierre Siquier, Manager of the agency DDB & Co., underlined more practical sides of the campaign contents. According to Siquier, one had to integrate the discourse of the currency, the providing of the information for the practical needs of the public and the effort of not laying too much stress on the political aspects of the issue. It was a question of accomplishing a popular communication which had to be serious and pedagogic.³²

The French campaign, like in Finland, was mostly directed to a universal audience, but there was again, a particular audience³³ deemed to be more important. The French campaign was especially directed at young people. The relationship between these two audiences was different when compared to Finland. The French campaigners wanted to reach the universal audience via a particular audience. The younger generation was supposed to serve as intermediary between the campaigner and the public.

3 STUDYING CAMPAIGNS

3.1 Analysis of Content

3.1.1 Search for Politics

According to Kari Palonen, the basic operations in interpreting a text can be called "exegesis", picking something up. The interesting meanings are taken apart from the rest of the text, and the entity of the text is interpreted in order to render the hidden significations visible. At least two perspectives are useful in finding the politically interesting aspects from a text. First, there is the perspective of conflict. In this case, one is looking for references to persons or issues: who is being opposed or allied with, which issues are supported or resisted. When the question is about an issue, one must further ask who is being opposed by resisting the given issue. Second, there is the perspective of time and space. In this case, one can look for the adverbs of time and place, the tenses of verbs used and the general notion of the past, present and future, and consider how they are interrelated. The "politicking space" where actions and operations are taken and its borders can also be analysed. For example, the politicking space in the EMU politics compared to party politics is different and extends itself to include the notion of time. However, while in EMU politics one talks about the transition from national to international finance politics, the governing time concept in party politics is the rhythm of election periods.34

Each text includes divisions, comparisons, oppositions and lists of options. Palonen argues that an ideology which forbids any kind of divisions and categorisations, is opposed to political thinking. Nevertheless, any categorisation is only one interpretation of the issue and as such, subjective and often also purposive. This notion of subjectivity opens a possibility to analyse the categorisations: which classes are made visible, which are neglected "a priori" and which are favoured at the other's expense. An example is a categorisation which makes an opinion being given sound like the only one possible. Classifications, on the other hand, are purposive; they are made in order to support one's own policy or to resist that of the others.35

34 Palonen 1988, 28-30.
35 Ibid., 30-33.
3.1.2 Rhetoric in Text

Aristotle defines rhetoric as the ability to perceive what is convincing in the context of a given issue. There are three types of ways one may be convinced: ethos, pathos and logos. Ethos means being convinced because of a speaker’s perceived character, pathos is based on the state of mind of a listener and logos is about the speech itself; convincing through the given arguments. Rhetoric deals with questions we consider which have no scientific answers. This consideration takes place in the presence of listeners who cannot comprehend complex connections between issues or follow long, drawn out reasonings. The object of consideration are questions which seem to have many alternate answers.\(^{36}\)

When one chooses rhetorical analysis as a research method, the basic assumption is that the material under study is persuasive in some respect. With rhetorical analysis, one can investigate how the material persuades its readers and viewers. In this study, for example, it is the evaluation of how the campaigns try to “build trust” and towards what or whom it builds it to.\(^{37}\)

One of the problems with the use of rhetorical analysis is the correct use of rhetorical principles in the study. The simple use of the lists of rhetorical principles does not guarantee a good or “correct” result. The danger of over-interpretation is present as a researcher may try to match all the principles from the material even if they are not there to be found. The other problem is determining whether rhetorical analysis is truly the most suitable method for the study at hand. There are other research methodologies available but if the material in question can be seen as being persuasive, then the rhetorical method should suit the present study.\(^{38}\)

According to Marja Keränen, the manner in which a rhetorical analysis functions is to make the given issue distant and see it as something that has been socially constructed. Rhetorical analysis offers the possibility to see politics in the text, to question any kind of necessities or obligations residing in the material: “to get off from obligations is to find political space and freedom to act”.\(^{39}\)

The analysis of the euro campaigns in this study stem from the material and analysing the choices of language use made in the texts. The intent is to not find any

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 67-68.
classical categories of rhetoric, but to make a more general content analysis. According to Krippendorff, content analysis may be characterised as a method of inquiry into the symbolic meaning of messages. Messages do not have a single meaning, but can be looked at from numerous perspectives.

The main guideline in this study is to look for classifications and evaluations related to the coming of the euro. The description of these elements will show how the campaigns argue for the euro and the EMU. The texts and the images have been analysed separately. With respect to the video material, the speech has been littered and the visual material evaluated as a separate entity. The first step consisted of searching for the different issues discussed relating to the euro. The next step was to look at the manner in which these issues were presented and how the statement of issues is at the same time using different means of rhetoric. To evaluate the ways of “trust building”, different themes and methods have been identified, partially overlapping each other in the two national campaigns.

3.2 Analysis of Images

3.2.1 Rhetoric of Visuality

A rhetorical analysis is usually done with written material but it can also be extended to include visual material and images. As such, the rhetoric of the text will be studied but the images in newspaper advertisements, information brochures and television commercials will also be included.

Kimmo Lehtonen has analysed the relation between visuality, especially photographs, and rhetoric. In Lehtonen’s view, rhetoric as a theoretical term leads one to the ontology of the image and semiotics. He sees two kinds of “gravities” in the rhetoric of visuality. First, the gravity inside an image, where sign structure and its means are concretised. According to Lehtonen, this can be called the rhetoric of the image. The other gravity refers to the possibilities and limitations that the image meets when it is published. These can be for example the type of publication, the association by

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40 Krippendorff 1980, 22.
publication and the manner, time and place of publishing. This second gravity is referred to as the contextuality of an image.  

Lehtonen argues that the rhetoric of visuality does not lie in the decoding process of an image, but between the decoding and the subjective interpretation. Uniqueness of the rhetoric in the visual materials is due to its distinct features, which are one-way communications in most cases, polysemic ways of representation and the connection with text when published.  

Television has its own specific relationship to rhetoric, different from that of static images. According to Silverstone, television has three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of look (how a camera is positioned and moved), the rhetoric of image (how what a camera sees is shaped, framed and arranged) and the rhetoric of voice (how the written and spoken words are constructed with tropes and figures of classical rhetoric). In addition, television has narratives, in other words the strategies of chronology.  

3.2.2 Political Rhetoric of Photograph

In general, the biggest difference between photography and other images is that photographs are usually treated as "real". They are thought to be a truthful representation of reality. The analyses of photographs from a political perspective should be seen as a discursive practice. Michael Shapiro argues that in order to discern the political rhetoric of photography, it is necessary to look at photographic statements on the basis of their tendency to either reproduce dominant forms of discourse or to provoke critical analysis, to denaturalise what is unproblematically accepted, and thereby politicise problematics.  

Shapiro further argues that "normalising effects of the photographic mode of representation remains naturalising in its effect". What is "real" in the case of a photograph is not invented by its viewers but forged over a period of time by the social, administrative, political and other processes. These processes make interpretive practices become "canonical, customary" and "entangled" with the viewing process.
so that they are no longer thought as practices. In the case of the euro campaigns, the images are "naturalised". In other words, the campaigners want them to be read as an unproblematic representation, to be taken as "real". Politically relevant questions in this case are, for example, who benefits from this naturalisation and why.

As to the practical analysis of the campaign images, the interpretation model of advertising photographs by Lehtonen has been applied. The basis for this model is the notion that a photographic image is iconographic in nature, but still, a much wider sign system than just iconic. The construction of different meanings is based on the contential reference created by several same-time signs. Photographs are polysemic: they have multiple signs occurring simultaneously. For this reason, the clarification of the meaning of a text is often anchored to the photograph. Lehtonen underlines that in order to abstract the "pure" ideological properties of a photograph, the text and the photograph should be separated from each other.

The model of the image analysis consists of several phases which concentrate on the different aspects of a photograph. The first phase is general description. This includes the observation of a photograph's attributes: black and white or colour, horizontal or vertical, borders, angle, the use of light, composition and background. The second phase is the description of the photograph: interior, theme, scenery, primary contents, other important contents, division of sexes and the roles and communication between actors. The third stage is the actual interpretation of the contents. When dealing with a series of advertisements, one can search for connecting elements. Also, a researcher can interpret the irritants like the smile or perceived sincerity of a person. At the fourth stage, one looks at the relationship between the viewer and the image: the information offered by the advertisement, identification by composition or celebrities, the model of action offered by the picture, and the relationship of the actual product and a sign reflecting to it. The last stage consists of semiotic speculation. Finally, one considers the objective of the image, the myths behind it, the type of image, the roles of the actors related to the background, the series of the pictures and the interrelations of single advertisements.

As explained above, Lehtonen's model has been applied to the analysis of both the campaign photographs and the video material. Since the model was origi-
nally created to study photographs, it has been simplified and used more as a guideline in the analysis of the video material in this research.
4 NATIONAL INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AS OPINION
MANAGEMENT – TRUST BUILDING OR POSITIVE PROPAGANDA?

4.1 From Communication to Politics: Social Control as a Way to Propaganda

4.1.1 Information Campaigns as Social Control

Within the field of communication studies, the nature of an information or communi-
cation campaign is usually defined by taking two other fields in consideration: social
marketing and public relations. The essential points of any campaign are the aspects
of the sender of the message and the desired results of the communication process.
Everett Rogers and Douglas Storey define a communication campaign having four
characteristic features. First, it is purposive, seeking to influence individuals. Second,
the campaign is targeted to a large audience. Third, the campaign has a more or less
set time limit. And fourth, the campaign is a process of organised communication ac-
tivities.\textsuperscript{49}

These researchers describe the objectives and the effects of a campaign as
three dimensional and continuums. The level of objectives is a continuum between
the objective of mobilisation and the objective of informing. Somewhere in the middle
of this line resides persuasion. The objective of informing seeks to increase the
amount of knowledge that an individual already possesses. It also aims at raising the
awareness of certain consequences or options and the salience of the campaign's
main idea. The objective of persuasion has the same goals as informing, but in addition,
wants to generate new attitudes or behaviours or change old ones. The object of
mobilisation seeks to promote or prevent a certain behaviour change. This kind of
change could be, for example, the target group's participation in some activity.\textsuperscript{50}

Communication theory sees the locus of change desired by a campaign as an-
other continuum between the change in the individual and the change in the whole
society. Intrapersonal effects are a route to institutional changes which implies that
campaigns have to build a bridge between an individual and the social level of objec-

\textsuperscript{49} The terms of communication campaign and information campaign are used as synonyms in research literature.
\textsuperscript{40} Rogers & Storey 1989, 818-821.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 822.
tives. The third dimension, the locus of benefit, concerns the party which benefits most from the campaign. It is a continuum between a receiver and a sender of a campaign communication.\textsuperscript{51}

The other way to define campaigns is to do it in terms of the methods employed. According to Charles Atkin, public communication campaigns use promotional messages which are in the public interest. The messages are diffused through mass media to reach the public.\textsuperscript{52} William Paisley adds that this definition is most relevant in situations where the methods used are innovative or controversial; one example being non-commercial advertising.\textsuperscript{53}

Although providing some useful tools for the analysis of campaigns, communication theory leaves basic concepts open. Firstly, what is the public which is to be persuaded by the campaign? According to Jürgen Habermas, we can call events "public" when they are open to all, as opposed to closed or exclusive affairs. Unlike the communicational sender-receiver models, Habermas sees public also the subject of the publicity. Public carries the public opinion and functions as a critical judge. This makes the public character of the society's proceedings meaningful. Public sphere might then be conceived as the sphere of private persons together, "people's use of their reason".\textsuperscript{54}

Habermas further defines the meaning of the public opinion. It can, on the one hand, be seen as a critical authority to which the exercise of political and social power is subjected. On the other hand, public opinion can be conceived as something which is subjected to manipulative propagation in the service of persons, institutions, consumer goods and programs.\textsuperscript{55} Communicational aspect often implies the latter notion, presuming that public opinion or people's minds can be systematically altered.

Another way to discuss the subject of the public are through the notions of universal and particular audience as demonstrated by Perelman. Universal audience refers to every one being reachable and able to comprehend a message. Particular audience, on the other hand, is a part of the universal audience with some common characteristics. In other words, the universal audience may consist of several par-

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 823-824.  
\textsuperscript{52} Atkin, 1981, according to Paisley 1989, 16.  
\textsuperscript{53} Paisley, 1989, 16.  
\textsuperscript{54} Habermas 1989, 1-2, 27.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 236.
tical audiences. The notions of universal and particular audience help to understand the difference of the rhetorical genre directed to these different populations. Perelman argues that discourse addressed to specific audience aims to persuade, while discourse directed to the universal audience aims to convince. A convincing discourse is one whose premises are universal, they can be accepted in principle by all members of a universal audience.\textsuperscript{56}

What is then the social function of information campaigns? Are they created in order to merely inform citizens for their own benefit? Both communication and political theories acknowledge the connection of information campaigns with social control. In the field of communication, Paisley provides this kind of basis for the analysis of public communication campaigns. He divides the definition attempts to objective and method oriented approaches. The objective-oriented approach defines the campaign in terms of its objectives. A public communication campaign is one group's attempt to influence another group's beliefs or behaviour. Methods used are most often communicated appeals. Paisley underlines that this kind of definition is especially relevant in a situation where the issue at stake is clearly controversial in the public opinion. Also, this definition points to the direction of defining public communication campaigns as social control.\textsuperscript{57}

Another way to define campaigns is to do it in terms of methods they use. According to Atkin, public communication campaigns use promotional messages which are in the public interest. The messages are diffused through mass media to reach the public.\textsuperscript{58} Paisley adds that this definition is most relevant in the situations where the used methods are innovative or controversial; one example would be non-commercial advertising.\textsuperscript{59}

In Paisley's view, campaigns which strive for clearly collective benefits can be defined as social control. The methods of practising this control are optional and include using means such as education, engineering and enforcement. Or, the control exercised may be linear in nature beginning with education, continuing to engineering and, if necessary, proceeding to enforcement. The education strategy is most effec-

\textsuperscript{56} Perelman 1982, 14.
\textsuperscript{57} Paisley 1989, 16.
\textsuperscript{58} Atkin 1981, according to Paisley 1989, 16.
\textsuperscript{59} Paisley 1989, 16.
tive in a situation where the values and perceptions of self-interest are generally shared among the public.60

Douglas Solomon also talks about public communication campaigns as social control. He views campaigns as a form of social intervention realised after a conclusion that some situation represents a problem demanding a change to the current state of affairs. A campaign then becomes the solution to a problem which has been defined by the change agency. This model shows the relativity of the social problems; they are defined, not recognised.61

From a political aspect, the discussion of campaigns as manifestation of social control should be widened to include the information flow of modern society. According to Kevin Robins, Frank Webster and Michael Pickering, information is becoming a determining social resource and phenomenon: "If a mass society is to be governed effectively and rationally, then control over the circuits of information is essential: whole process has now become a matter of scientific management, of social engineering."62

From this notion of social control, propaganda is not very far away. Generally, the word propaganda carries a very strong negative connotation, stemming from war propagandas, especially that of Nazis. However, if one acknowledges social control as a way of keeping society and its people in order and information campaigns as one of its method, what is then propaganda and, even more crucially, what is its place in this discussion?

Again, in contrast to a traditional communicational view, political theory generally recognises propaganda as an integral part of democratic society. Propaganda becomes a link between information and power in society. It is a matter of the politics of information: who has access to the flow of information within a nation-state and who is restricted. Propaganda and information management can be seen as normative aspects of modern democratic societies.63

According to Robins et al., propaganda is a constitutive aspect of democracy in mass society. The relevant audience of propaganda is the public, not the individual. In other words, in order to be an important social force, propaganda must function in relation to public and democratic public opinion. The propagandist articulates and

60 Ibid., 17.
orchestrates public opinion to ensure “rational” government. This means that the public ends up requesting that the government do exactly what it has already decided to do.64

4.1.2 Social Marketing – Selling Brotherhood like Soap

The idea of social marketing is crystallised in Wiebe’s question “Why can’t you sell brotherhood like soap?” Wiebe examined four social campaigns and found that their success was dependent on the extent they used marketing methods.65 According to Philip Kotler, social marketing is about planning, implementation and supervision of programs which aim at the promotion of the acceptance of a social issue, ideology, or practice among the target groups. In order to create a favourable reaction in its public, social marketing uses the generally known methods of marketing. Social marketing tries to realise four kinds of changes in its target group. The first one is an intellectual change; a change in knowledge or understanding. The second change involves action; an attempt to make the target group act in a certain way. Third is the change in behaviour. The objective is a change in the behaviour model held by the public. Fourth is the change in the values held by the target group. It aims at influencing the deep beliefs and values about the phenomenon in question.66

Charles Salmon presents commonly used change strategies in social marketing: power, persuasion, normative-reeducative, and facilitative strategies. Power strategy means that the change agency simply imposes the change on the public, usually through some form of legal mandate. Persuasion is manipulative but less-overtly repressive than power strategy, it relies on creating needs, motivation, and commitment in the public and anticipates resistance. Normative-reeducative strategy provides “relatively unbiased” information of the issue intending to create a rational justification for action. It is more freedom-enhancing than previous strategies and is most suitable in cases where individuals believe that there is a problem and lack the options for a solution. Moreover, this strategy suits cases where there is no need for quick change and long-term financial support is available. Consequently, for the most part, public information campaigns could be put into this category. The last

63 Ibid., 7-8.
64 Ibid., 8-9.
65 Wiebe 1952, according to Solomon 1989, 87.
strategy, facilitation, makes resources available to a system which is interested in changing but lacks the resources to do it. In this case, the public is made aware of the problem and wishes to do something about it.\textsuperscript{67}

Communicational theory differentiates social marketing from information campaigns based on the division information-persuasion. Information benefits the public, persuasion the authority who designs communication. In other words, Wiebe’s question seems to cover the basic idea of social marketing in the context of communication. However, the picture of the phenomenon is left quite technical and superficial if only one question is posed. Accordingly, from the political point of view, one should at the very least ask why one would sell brotherhood, who defines the situation as “lacking” in brotherhood and to whom brotherhood is actually being sold. Every question may have many different answers, the main idea is that the questions are acknowledged. In the campaign context, it could be most useful to begin with rendering the notion itself problematic, social marketing as persuasion, and looking for its connections to the area of interest, propaganda.

Leonard Doob argues against the division information-persuasion, which is one main reason for the separation of information campaigns and social marketing in the field of communication. According to Doob, the word “propaganda” became less used after the first World War and was replaced by words such as communication, information and persuasion because they implied no value judgement.\textsuperscript{68} In addition, Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell claim that propaganda may appear to be informative communication when ideas are shared, something is explained or instruction takes place. Propaganda is an attempt to control information flow and manage a certain public’s opinion. One basis for the separation of propaganda and persuasion could be the nature of the process: propaganda tends to be a general societal process, whereas persuasion is regarded as an individual psychological process.\textsuperscript{69}

Accordingly, political thinking does not see great differences among the concepts of information, communication and persuasion. These differences can however be found in their strategies if one employs communicational theories. The problem, from the political point of view, is that these kind of strict divisions can function only in a vacuum. Consequently, from the political perspective, the common denominator

\textsuperscript{67} Salmon 1989, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{68} Doob 1966, according to Jowett & O'Donnell 1992, 35.
\textsuperscript{69} Jowett & O'Donnell 1992, 17, 31-35.
may be the term "propaganda". Essential is that the word propaganda itself should not directly suggest anything particularly negative or positive. The value laid to it depends on the context of the propaganda and the interpreter.

What is the difference between good and bad propaganda, then? According to Heikki Luostarinen, the current concept of propaganda used in the context of democratic society does not correspond to the old negative ways the notion was perceived. Previously, one understood propaganda as something which was against people's own will. Nowadays, propaganda works in a way which makes the people themselves desire the raised issues and experience the situation like they were making an independent decision. Another characteristic of the "old" propaganda is the leading of people without their noticing it. Luostarinen argues that in modern society one cannot change people's minds only by the means of propaganda if the existing opinions are strongly held. Since information is currently available to everyone, changing people's minds demands more than just one interpretation of this information. Thirdly, propaganda cannot be labelled as lying like it was earlier. Propaganda is rarely lying in the word's literal sense, because one gets easily caught in it and that would cause the "believability" of any propaganda to decrease significantly.\textsuperscript{70}

However, the "neutralisation" of the word propaganda is not unproblematic. It suggests that one can define some forms of communication as propaganda in negative or totalitarian sense, while others in a positive and democratic sense. Where is the line drawn? According to Robins et al., democratic society can justify and legitimate propaganda and information management on the basis of the ends to which they are applied. This means that as long as propaganda serves the common and "good" purposes like the control over vast information flow, it can be labelled positive. On the other hand, example of negative propaganda are the manipulative practices of totalitarian regimes.\textsuperscript{71} Generally, it is thought that information and communication in modern democracies are fundamentally different than those in totalitarian states but, what is the final difference? Whatever the answer is, it seems that the adoption of propaganda to the democracies' information management narrows the gap between totalitarian and democratic government.

\textsuperscript{70} Luostarinen 2000.
\textsuperscript{71} Robins et al. 1987, 15.
4.1.3 Public Relations in the Public Sector

Communication theory defines public relations (PR) generally as "a communication function of management through which organisations adapt to, alter, or maintain their environment for the purpose of achieving organisational goals". PR can also be featured as a deliberate, planned performance which should mutually seek both the public's and practitioner's interests in a two-way communication process.

Governmental PR is a special case in the area of public relations. According to Dennis Wilcox, Phillip Ault and Warren Agee, its objectives are to inform the public about the matters which concern it, improve the effectiveness of a government's operations and provide feedback. Otis Baskin and Craig Aronoff also include the following objectives to governmental PR: to gain support for new laws or initiatives, to stimulate the public's interest and decrease confusion about new governmental agencies, processes and programs, to build support for governmental actions in order to reduce the possibility of conflicts, and to gain voluntary obedience with laws and regulations. All these objectives require a general atmosphere of "goodwill", which can be thought of as the common denominator of all the PR activities.

In addition to its objectives, governmental PR also has some other unique features when compared with public relations in the private sector. Firstly, it is financed by the citizens themselves. This results in the legitimacy and mission of governmental PR practice being constantly questioned. Also, the gap between the PR practitioner and its audience is wider than in the commercial area.

The word "PR" is not often used in a governmental context because of its negative connotation. Traditionally, one thinks that a government needs only to inform its citizens, not to sell or force one to accept its ideas with a propagandistic PR agenda. Again, the notion of propaganda is one reason for perceiving governmental PR negatively. However, if one neutralises propaganda and makes it open to different interpretations in a political sense, what is left as a difference between governmental PR and propaganda? According to Jowett and O'Donnell, one function of

72 Long & Hazelton, according to Wilcox, Ault & Agee 1998, 4.
73 Wilcox et al. 1998, 6.
74 Ibid., 333-334.
76 Ibid., 410.
propaganda is to facilitate communication, "to keep lines open and to maintain contact" and "to create a friendly atmosphere".77

Michael Kunczik, who has studied PR in an international context, sees no difference between PR and propaganda. According to him, the aim of international PR is the establishment of trust, which depends on the image received from a country. Often, the trust in international PR is understood as an economic term like trust in currency rates. PR and propaganda both seek to establish trust towards the issue at hand and can thus be treated as being synonymous.78

In Habermas’ view, public sphere has eroded by forces of commercialisation and consumerism and by political management and manipulation. In this process, propaganda and information management have become normative and integral aspects of social control.79 In this sense, a governmental PR’s purpose is not just to create goodwill or support, but also to produce new meanings and function as a maintainer of society. Therefore, it seems that from the three fields of communication theory in the area of campaign studies, it is governmental PR which comes closest to propaganda.

4.1.4 Governmental Campaigns as Positive Propaganda

The above dialogue of communication and politics sought to politicise and render the concepts of information campaign, social marketing and public relations problematic in the governmental context. To see propaganda as the headline for such phenomena is a useful way to question the subject of all these concepts often used as self-evident and a given in campaign studies. Moreover, it is the suggestion of this study that the negative burden of the word propaganda stemming from its historical connotations is lessened so that a better understanding of its value in modern information society may be gained.

More important than giving communication different labels and strategies would be to understand its function in modern society. The growing amount of information demands social control and propaganda can be seen as one tool of it. Consequently, the positive aspects of propaganda come from the positive goals achieved by it. While society becomes more complex, it is unrealistic to see citizens as omni-

78 Kunczik 2000.
competent and sovereign to govern and analyse all the information offered to them. This causes a problem for democracy which cannot be solved through democratic methods. Here propaganda holds a vital role as democratic opinion management and engineering of democratic consent.\textsuperscript{80}

The counterargument to positive propaganda is the location of the line separating totalitarian and democratic propaganda. Webster et al. provide one solution to this problem. They argue that information management in a nation-state of late capitalism is inherently totalitarian. In this case, the communication apparatus is not just occasionally misused, but opinion management has become authoritarian, routine and normative by the use of extensive information apparatus: propaganda, censorship, advertising, PR and so on. “Systematic, integrated and scientific” ambitions and tendencies give democratic information management its totalitarian aspect.\textsuperscript{81}

In this study governmental information campaign is considered one possible form of positive propaganda. The researcher in this study views the function of the euro campaigns to be in the field of information and public opinion management as one form of social control. The issue at hand was and still is clearly controversial and problematic from both the government’s perspective and that of the public opinion.

The objectives of the campaigns, whether they are collective or individual, depend on the amount an ordinary citizen can benefit from the campaign. Do the people receive useful information about the issue or does the campaign have merely an image function? Whatever the answer is, information campaign is an intervention in the public arena where people form their opinions. If collective benefits weigh more, one can talk about social control, the offering or imposing of a new suitable identity to citizens in order to facilitate governance thus, the changeover to a new currency.

\textsuperscript{79} Habermas 1989, 233.
\textsuperscript{80} Robins, Webster & Pickering 1987, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 16.
4.2 Trust

4.2.1 Definition of Trust

Economic theory, in general, views trust as a form of social capital\textsuperscript{82} which enables the creation of prosperity. This notion is favoured for example, by Francis Fukuyama, for whom trust is "the expectation which arises within a community of regular, honest and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community". Trust can be compared to a patient’s trust towards his doctor not to do him any harm, because the doctor is expected to keep his Hippocratic oath.\textsuperscript{83} Fukuyama’s definition is further elaborated by Adam Seligman, who views the social capital’s essence to be the forms of associative life, which is based on different forms of confidence in the system and its institutions.\textsuperscript{84}

Can it then be taken that trust and confidence be synonyms? According to Niklas Luhmann, we can have trust in persons and confidence in institutions. Trust is important in interpersonal relations, but participation in functional systems requires confidence, not trust.\textsuperscript{85} On the other hand, the theological concept of trust includes the element of uncertainty about other’s motives and future actions, we have no choice but to trust. As to confidence, it is based on our experiences and knowledge about another’s past behaviour, we can “check up on”, have confidence in other’s words.\textsuperscript{86}

According to Seligman, the term “faith” suits better than trust to the theological notion. Faith, in essence, is a theological concept. An important aspect in Christianity is to have faith in God without having any concrete proofs verifying his existence. To the other end of the continuum, Seligman places confidence as a functionalist notion. Trust is situated in the middle of confidence and faith. It can be defined as a form of belief in the goodwill of the other when the intentions of the other are not known. Trust is an aspect of social organisation, it emerges systematically when the other’s behaviour cannot be predicted. In other words, it involves risk-taking.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{82} Social capital means here people’s ability to work together for common purposes, either in groups or in organisations.
\textsuperscript{83} Fukuyama 1995, 26.
\textsuperscript{84} Seligman 1997, 80.
\textsuperscript{85} Luhmann, 1979, 39; 1988, 102.
\textsuperscript{86} Seligman 1997, 21.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 22, 43, 63-64.
According to Claes Gustafsson, trust should not be excluded from the context of institutions and society and be relegated to interpersonal relationships. Trust can be seen as a mirror image; it reflects the goodness of the other. One trusts the honesty and goodness of somebody. Trust is the belief in the possibility of goodness in the other or expectation of good acts. It forms the entity within which social credibility can function. Distrust, on the other hand, destroys the fabric of the society. Gustafsson also sees trust as a dynamic phenomenon, "a living pattern of intersubjective expectations".  

How do then honesty, as a form of morality and politics fit together? Can or should one trust in the honesty of politics? According to Immanuel Kant, there is no contradiction between morality and politics in the objective (theoretical) sense. In the subjective (practical) sense there will and should be a contradiction. In Kant's words moral politicians should follow the regime "Be clever as snakes and without dishonesty like pigeons". If these two phrases do not fit into the same rule, there is a contradiction between politics and morality.  

Considering the unfitting match of morality and politics, it seems irrational to trust politics or politicians. However, society cannot function without trust. Trudy Govier emphasises the slenderness of the basis for trust. When one cannot comprehend something, one has no choice but trust the other. This makes a person vulnerable. For example, one has to trust political figures who inform one about social issues, because one needs the information. In many cases, the issues are complex ones: there is no time to collect the information by oneself in order to understand the issues completely. Thus, society must rely on political leaders and trust that they are competent enough to make the right decisions. To trust an institution is, in Govier's terms, "to have fundamentally positive beliefs and expectations about the interactions with it".  

Govier further presents three different levels of trust: innocent trust, implicit (default) trust and reflective trust. Innocent trust refers to a situation where a person simply follows along, not questioning anything or having any doubts. Implicit trust refers to an automatic trust that is granted when there is no reason to believe otherwise. The third level of trust, reflective trust, refers to believing in the other after con-
sideration of his or her reliability. This consideration is further divided into three strands: the saying, competence and sincerity. Reflective trust is likely to be qualified, partial and dependent on context; it is not uncritical.\textsuperscript{91}

Kaj Ilmonen, Pertti Jokivuori, Hanna Liikanen, Kimmo Kevätsalo and Pauli Juutti have analysed trust in the context of Finnish labour organisations. They see trust as a social commodity or a resource, which cannot be bought, but its creation requiring long-term development. When trust exists between people and organisations, it provides flexibility in difficult situations. Trust involves goodwill towards the other, openness and honesty. To distrust somebody or something means underestimation of the other.\textsuperscript{92}

As a concept, trust seems to fit better than confidence into situations with uncertainty. Trust involves believing in somebody or something, while confidence is about being sure. Trust also includes the element of goodwill, having positive thoughts about the other which are based more on impressions than experiences. In this way, trusting somebody always means taking a risk.

Risk is also involved in the idea of trust linked to information gathering: in order to gain important knowledge, one has to trust political institutions and rely on their word. This leads to one’s vulnerability. Govier’s model of reflective trust is a way to cope with the situation: one does not trust blindly but only after critical consideration. This makes the development of trust more difficult.

Trust is an important part of society, making possible the functioning of organisations and institutions. Everything cannot be dealt with law, norms and rules unless there is also trust involved. In order to build a functioning entity, more compliance is required than fear of sanctions is able to provide. Here trust comes into the picture, as a way to legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 66-68.
\textsuperscript{92} Ilmonen et al. 1998, 44.
4.2.2 Development of Trust

In the study of Ilmonen et al., open communication is seen as one promoter of trust among Finnish labour organisations. Directness sets a basis for trust, which for its part, sets a basis for open communication. Also, trust was found to strengthen cooperation, which for its part, strengthened trust and predictability of the future. Accordingly, the process becomes a circle. This kind of view emphasises the emotional and cognitive elements of trust: impressions and experiences of the other. These elements, if positive, build trust, but also give the impression that the other trusts as well. Accordingly, trust can be seen as the reciprocity of expectations.\textsuperscript{93}

Ilmonen et al. discuss three circles of trust: the circle of threat or own benefit, the circle of knowledge and experience and the circle of emotional bid. The first circle, based on threat or one's own benefit, is created only when two groups have been interacting with each other for a long time. The groups then begin to count whether betraying the other or co-operation gives any benefit. This represents a minimal state of trust. It is fragile, but may be enough when the trust at hand is sufficient for any given purpose, or when the two parties are strongly dependent on each other, or even when there has previously been a lack of trust.

The second circle, that of knowledge and experience, exists in a situation where common rules and norms are known, and it is possible to predict the behaviour of the other so that this serves to strengthen the trust. Trust based on experience functions via identification: similarity leads to identification and the ignoring of any differences.\textsuperscript{94} The third circle, based on emotional bid, includes identification with the other's intentions. This kind of relationship can exist for example, between close friends.\textsuperscript{95}

Douglas Creed and Raymond Miles present another model of trust development. They identify three central mechanisms of trust production: process-based, characteristic-based, and institutional-based mode. In the process-based mode, trust is created by personal experience or expectations which are based on reputation. In the characteristic-based mode, trust is created by the perceived social similarity with the other. Lastly, the institutional-based mode ties trust to formal societal structures.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{94} Misztal 1996, 106.
\textsuperscript{95} Ilmonen et al. 1998, 46.
depending on individual-specific attributes.\textsuperscript{56} Apparently, the process-based mode overlaps the second circle of trust presented by Ilmonen et al. in the context of a governmental campaign. This study views the characteristic-based mode as being the most interesting.

4.2.3 Trust Building – New Name for Propaganda?

Trust building in the context of a governmental information campaign is as a concept problematic. First, there is a problem with the possibility to build genuine trust in politics in general. The lack of trust between people and their political representatives is more natural than full trust would be. Why is it then desirable to build trust? For one thing, trust makes the functioning of society more flexible. Constant questioning and doubting of governors by the majority of people makes social reforms impossible without the use of force which does not belong to the apparatus of democratic societies. To some extent, there must be some political trust in leaders which always seems to include a minority who do not trust.

In the case of the euro campaign, the decision about Finland’s membership to the EMU had already been made. Therefore, there was no need for any official approval. This seems to be one reason why the term “trust building” was used in general. The Union wanted to “inform” and “to build trust” in order to facilitate the upcoming changes. Here, one coincides again with the often stated methods of public relations: facilitative communication and friendly atmosphere building. But if a friendly atmosphere is to be built, the public opinion is also to be changed. In other words, PR turns out to be opinion management or propaganda in the positive sense.

Trust building does not seem to be a believable objective, as such, in the context of a governmental information campaign. The problem arises from the contradictory combination of politics and morality. We trust other persons because we believe in their honesty towards us. We can also have trust in institutions in the sense that people who work for these institutions do their job well. Individuals are said to be moral, and one may choose to believe in their morality or not, but do politics have morality? Is it not just the sum of the morality of the persons involved? In this light the stated objective of the Union, “to build full trust towards the common currency” seems artificial.

\textsuperscript{56} Creed & Miles 1996, 18-19.
The other way to render the notion of trust in the context of common currency problematic is to think about the concept of risk. To trust means taking a risk, believing without full evidence. In what way was risk involved in the euro campaigns? There was no actual choice to be made, so there was no risk to be taken. The risk had already been taken with the choice of becoming a EU member. Consequently, what is the actual nature of this kind of trust building and does it differ from positive propaganda? It is the hope of this study that the analysis of the campaign material will enlighten this point.

4.3 Agrarian Finn and Bourgeois Frenchman – Western Cultures in Different Degrees

4.3.1 Dimensions of National Cultures

When one studies two different cultures and compares their communication features, one talks about cross-cultural communication. On the other hand, the word "intercultural communication" is generally reserved for the studies where different cultures are analysed in real interaction. Consequently, when two national campaigns are analysed separately and comparisons made on the basis of their features of communication, it consists of a cross-cultural study.

One of the dangers which lie ahead in cultural studies is the over-interpretation of the material; seeing connections between communication features and the given culture when none exist. According to Geert Hofstede, "culture is a collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another". One should make a separation between culture on the one side, and human nature and an individual's personality on the other.97 Every individual is a complex entity whose action cannot be explained only by referring to cultural factors.

Culture can be conceived as containing different layers: national, regional or sub-culture, gender, social class and organisational. This study will focus on the national level of culture, in other words, national culture. Hofstede's dimensions of national culture provide a useful way to approach the issue. Based on his research of

97 Hofstede 1997, 5.
more than fifty countries, the following dimensions of national culture have been identified: power distance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity and uncertainty avoidance.\textsuperscript{98}

The first dimension, power distance, refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of the society accept their inequality and act accordingly. When placed on such a continuum with position 1 denoting the country with the largest power distance, France scored 15,5 while Finland scored 46.\textsuperscript{99} In France, the characteristics of a rather large power distance are, for example, the hierarchical relationships found in work place and in the family as well as the valuation of status and titles.\textsuperscript{100} In Finland, there is much less hierarchy in social relationships, one example is lack of hierarchy and formality in work places.

The second of Hofstede’s dimensions, individualism versus collectivism, is about whether the goals of an individual or a group are emphasised. In a collectivist culture the power resides with a group whereas in an individualistic society, the interest of the individual is valued over the interest of a group. When placed on this continuum, beginning from the most individualistic culture, France was ranked 10,5 and Finland 17. With respect to this dimension the differences are consequently not very significant.\textsuperscript{101}

The next dimension, masculinity versus femininity, measures the desirability of assertive/modest behaviour in the given culture. Masculinity is seen to emphasise recognition, advancement and challenge, while femininity is seen to value good relationships, co-operation and security. When placed on this continuum, with position 1 denoting the most masculine culture, France was ranked 35,5, “moderately feminine” and Finland 47, belonging to the group of the “most feminine” cultures.\textsuperscript{102} Again, the difference is not huge with one manifestation of “femininity” on behalf of both cultures being reflected in the social security provided to its citizens by the state.

The last of the four main dimensions, uncertainty avoidance, deals with the extent to which people of a specific culture feel threatened by uncertain situations. The feeling of threat is often expressed through stress and a need to predict the future. Generally, cultures with high uncertainty avoidance tend to be more expressive

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 10, 13-14, 135.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 24-25.
\textsuperscript{100} Kaurala 1998, 22-26.
\textsuperscript{101} Hofstede 1997, 50, 53.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 80-83.
and prefer experts and specialisation to common sense, while cultures with low uncertainty avoidance do not express aggression and emotions overtly and have belief in common sense and generalists. In this dimension, beginning with the country with the highest uncertainty avoidance ratio, France was ranked approximately 10,5 and Finland 31,5.\textsuperscript{103} This difference seems to manifest itself at least in the expressiveness of the French; the emphasis is laid more on the context than the actual words. In Finland it is quite the opposite.

Hofstede’s categories have received multiple criticism. Ron and Susan Scollon divide cultural studies into two groups, discursive studies and bridging cultural studies. Central to discursive studies is the notion that discourse, language in use, and social practice are mutually co-constructively constitutive. From this point of view, all a priori categories are problematic as they are in discursive practice. In bridging cultural studies, of which Hofstede’s research serves as an example, it is central to provide a contribution to non-specialists in the solution of any perceived problems of communication. Researchers take “essentialist and presupposed categories as foundational and engage in analysis not distant from the observations one finds in the opening pages of travel guides”. Because of the applied nature of this kind of work, the rhetorical role of the researcher is that of the “authority on culture” who produces the lists for learning and application of non-specialists.\textsuperscript{104}

Accordingly, the problem with using any categories is that classifications are always subjective products. In the area of cultural studies they are most of all products of a certain culture. In Hofstede’s case, the culture is anglo-american. Moreover, the research is done in an organisational context which lays a greater emphasis on matters of competition and achievement than if one would study interpersonal communication. On the other hand, benefits and the reasons explaining its extensive usage are the exceptionally extensive data collection and systematic measuring.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 113-115, 134.
\textsuperscript{104} Scollon & Scollon 1997.
4.3.2 “Doing Things Right” and “Doing the Right Things”

Hofstede’s dimensions show that the Finnish culture is said to be soft and caring, but still somewhat masculine. The power-distance is small and therefore individualism is strong. Finnish culture also belongs to one of the most feminist cultures of Hofstede’s study. In the dimension of uncertainty avoidance Finland is ranked in the middle.

The French culture instead has high power distance, which is the biggest difference between France and Finland according to Hofstede’s study. Individuality is also ranked a little higher in France than in Finland, but there is no significant difference. France is a “moderately feminine” society, somewhat less feminine than Finland, but in the dimension of the uncertainty avoidance France scores higher. Although Hofstede’s categories reveal something about the differences between the Finnish and French cultures, the problem is that they do not actually say anything about the cultures which reside “in the middle” of those category continuums. Only the extreme poles can be seen as providing some sort of guideline.

Jaakko Lehtonen has also studied Finnish culture, partly based on the work of Hofstede. According to Lehtonen, the basic notion of the Finnish culture lies in “making it on one’s own” inherent in society’s working ethics. He argues that Finnish culture is extremely individualistic; it is a culture of separate individuals: important is “I”, “getting along” and individuality.\textsuperscript{105} Kaarina Yli-Renko argues that the features of Finnish communication culture are shyness, quietness and distance.\textsuperscript{106} Jan-Åke Törnroos, Niclas Berg and Karin Bergman add to that the qualities of honesty, trustworthiness, withdrawal and laconity.\textsuperscript{107} Liisa Salo-Lee and David Marsh also talk about directness in speech. Generally, directness is connected to individualistic cultures and indirectness to collective cultures.\textsuperscript{108}

Individualism is also one of the main features of the French culture, which highlights the individuality of the persons and tolerance for differences. The features that differ from Finnish culture are the hierarchy found in social relations, bureaucratisation, disrespect for rules and laws and pride in one’s own culture.\textsuperscript{109} In general, formalities seem to be central in French culture: it is more important to “do the things right”, while in Finland more weight is given to “do the right things”. This has implica-

\textsuperscript{105} Lehtonen, J. 1994, 21-23.
\textsuperscript{106} Yli-Renko 1993.
\textsuperscript{107} Törnroos 1991, 131.
tions at the communication level: a Frenchman wanders in his speech and talks elaborately, while a Finn says directly and shortly what he has to say.\textsuperscript{110}

Risto Alapuro has analysed the differences in a less interpersonal context, comparing Finnish and French societies. He claims that in the French society, there is “a constant battle going on in order to defend one’s own position and to separate oneself from the others. For the fighters there is available an extremely rich and diverse, in many ways separating and classifying tradition of an elite culture, and especially such a tradition which is accepted as self-evident and seems to be natural and autonomous, and which is strong precisely because of this.”\textsuperscript{111}

Finland, on the other hand, is traditionally a peasant country. Although the surface of the economic structure is similar to that of other western countries, below there is a completely different basis than that evidenced in the United States, Germany and France.\textsuperscript{112} Matti Klinge talks about the bourgeois Frenchman and the agrarian Finn. The fact of being bourgeois appears in “the diversity and establishment of all relating to the cultivation of the life at home, the complex hierarchy of the sorts and the supply level”. This implicates richness, interest in one’s own milieu and the importance of how one wants to present himself. To be agrarian is about “investing money in summer cottages”.\textsuperscript{113}

In Alapuro’s view, the governing Finnish (high) culture is that of first degree, while the French is that of second degree\textsuperscript{114}. The Finnish first degree means honesty in the sense that everything is what it seems to be, the most clear and transparent reality of the interpretation community. “A word is a serious thing in Finland, it has a clear referent outside the language, one may have to account for it.” The relationship between experience and its expression manifests itself as unproblematic, like the proportion of one to one. On the other hand, the French second degree is about reflexivity, duplication and “unhappy consciousness”.\textsuperscript{115}

In this sense the difference between the Finns and the French is sharp: “The French may say they agree just to be able to deny everything afterwards.” The second degree is to relate consciously to one’s own position to the environment, to pre-

\textsuperscript{109} Kunnas 1994, 38-51.
\textsuperscript{110} Kaurala 1998, 45-46.
\textsuperscript{111} Alapuro 1997, 164.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{113} Klinge 1995, 36.
\textsuperscript{114} The concept of “second degree” is from Baudrillard (\textit{le second degré}).
\textsuperscript{115} Alapuro 1997, 165.
sent issues and oneself in relation to the "facts" of the first degree and, at the same time, play with them and exceed them. Context, the opaque dimension of the text, is emphasised and charged.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 186.
5 FINNISH CAMPAIGN

5.1 Countdown to the Euro

The Finnish newspaper advertisements consist of eight different one-page advertisements. The first and the last advertisements differ from the style of the others. The first one is an introductory page. Its main headline is the phrase “Euro on Euroopan uusi yhteinen raha” (*Euro Is the New Common Currency of Europe*). The second, smaller headline includes the statement “Euro on Suomessa vuonna 2002” (*Euro Will Be in Finland in 2002*). Timetable, value of the money and the outlooks of the euro are explained. On the page there are also the pictures of the different notes and coins.

This advertisement as the first piece of the campaign already expresses the lack of alternatives in the sense that the official decision toward accepting the euro had already been made. The sentence “Euro will be in Finland in the year 2002” places the euro to the position of subject (the euro comes to Finland) instead of that of object (Finland adopts the euro). The expression reminds one of the train metaphor taken from EU journalists: the euro zooms like a train across the EMU countries and will arrive in Finland in 2002. This kind of argumentation underlines the necessity of the euro, it is described as natural and inescapable.

The last advertisement, published around the change of the year, on the 31st of December 1998, has the function of reminding people of the change in currency. The advertisement has as it’s headline “Euro tuli tilirahaksi nyt... ja kukkaroon vuonna 2002.” (*Euro Became an Account Currency Now... And into the Coinpurse in the Year 2002.*) Two-thirds of the advertisement is filled with a picture of a big coin of one euro. The picture of the coin is unclear, like it would have dropped or rolled to the picture from the other corner of the advertisement. It again reminds one of a train coming into the station at high speed. Euro has finally arrived in Finland.

While the first and the last advertisement were different in their outlook, all the other advertisements were constructed in a similar way. First, there is an identified person asking a question about how the euro is related to his or her daily life situation. This is then followed with a paragraph answering the question and then readers are supplied with more information about the euro. At the bottom of the page there are
"signatures" of the European Union and the Ministry of Finance and a toll-free telephone number where people can call to obtain more answers. The text begins with the logo-like euro coin and also ends with it (see figure 1).

This kind of question-answer format reminds one of the "help" columns found in certain magazines where experts provide answers to ordinary people's questions and where other readers can benefit from the answers being given. The difference is that in magazines, there are usually all kinds of questions, including those which may be "unconventional" and are completely missing from these euro campaign advertisements. Instead, the advertisements present the inquirers through the use of large photographs. This raises questions to how representative this is of the characters: they seem to be a carefully chosen group, based on their outlook and questions.

The information brochure, labelled "Perustiedot uudesta rahasta" (Basic Information about the New Currency), published after the series of newspaper advertisements, deals with the same issues discussed in the advertisements. It is a conclusion made of the themes presented earlier. On the other hand, the brochure discusses the themes more deeply and also provides summaries on different topics.

The same persons that are in the advertisements, the created prototypes of the average Finnish persons, are also seen in the brochure but they are not anymore directly connected to the text. The pictures are still quite large, covering each one page and in all, half of the space in the brochure. Moreover, there are two additional persons which are not in the newspaper advertisements. All the characters of adopted prototypes are seen on the cover of the brochure (see figure 2).
However, are these characters representative of Finnish people? Can everyone find himself or herself on the cover of the brochure? The persons in the photographs represent a minor group of the Finnish population in the sense that they all seem to be in favour of the euro, smiling and not questioning the coming of this new currency. Also, they seem to only be interested in practical matters like prices and travelling, as if there were no other questions to be asked. It seems that the voice behind the advertisements is that of the campaigners and not the Finnish people.

The four television commercials in the Finnish campaign were all formed around the theme “we and the others”, presenting Finns in their jobs and then showing other European nationalities engaged in similar kinds of activities. The pairs presented are, for example, a Finnish and French restaurant manager and a Finnish and Irish construction worker. In the advertisements, the persons are expressing their practical ideas about the euro while working.

The structure of the commercials is characteristic of a dynamic interview, one where the interviewee has no time to stand still, but the questions have to be posed while he or she is constantly working and moving around. Such an impression is further strengthened because the names and home countries or cities of these persons appear at the bottom of the screen, just like in a television news broadcast or a documentary. Also, the language of these interviewees is translated into Finnish at the bottom of the screen.

**Figure 2. Cover of the Finnish brochure**
The commercials emphasise the similarity of the characters by showing them in similar environments and professions (see figures 3 and 4). The euro is the connecting factor between the Finnish and other Europeans. One way to see the commercials is that they show the euro as a bridge extending from Finland to the rest of Europe. Previously, Finland was not part of Europe, but now with the common currency, the Finnish people can rise and be among the people of the Europe. The euro is the previously missing key to Europeanism, a better and more appreciated lifestyle. The characters in the commercials are the role models for this development.

The narrative course of the Finnish campaign began with the newspaper advertisements published in May 1998, after the final decision was made about Finland's joining the EMU. This choice of timetable was purposive and made the realisation of the campaign easier because there no longer was uncertainty about such a future decision. The newspaper advertisements had the role of presentation: they introduced the seven different characters to the public and, at the same time, led readers to think about the main issue, the coming of the euro. The pictures held the primary role in the advertisements by emphasising the image of the new issue: the general impression received was light, modern and clear. This is opposed to the bureaucratic and difficult manner in which information is usually disseminated by the public sector.

After a few newspaper advertisements had been published, the television commercials began, offering a somewhat different outlook. While the newspapers had shown "truly Finnish" people, the television commercials presented Europeans, Finns and other nationalities, and highlighted the commonalities shared by all the inhabitants of the euro zone. They served as a link from national to international. Again, the actual amount of the information was little, the image value counted more also in the television commercials.
The Finnish campaign had two lines of communication: one general, more image-oriented and directed to the larger audience, and the other more specific, information-oriented and more narrow-reaching. The parts of the campaign which served the latter purpose were the internet pages, the information service and the tour. They were not as visible as the primary line of the campaign, but they offered more detailed information and attracted small and specific groups of the population.

The information brochure published in June 1998 was the continuation of the newspaper advertisements. It had the same characters and messages, but offered more details. Nevertheless, the images still had the main role. Readers had the chance to meet again the people they had met in May in the newspaper advertisements. At this time, they had the possibility to learn more about the characters and their opinions about the euro; to get to know them better. Consequently, the brochure can be seen as the focal point of the campaign. The last piece of the campaign published at the end of 1998 and into 1999, was an end to the countdown which had started in May 1998.

The campaign narrative is meant to show its readers what happens after the euro is accepted. It shows two types of characters, more traditional Finns who continue their lives as it was before and receive only the extra value of the euro. The other characters, the European Finns, understand the whole meaning of being European and assimilate with the rest of the Europeans to the point that it becomes difficult to separate a Finn from a Frenchman or a Dutch. The narrative offers two kinds of routes: one can be satisfied with the more traditional based and maybe later, give rise to the level of the second type, the European, or then adopt straightaway the European model.
5.2 From Issues to Themes

5.2.1 Facts for the Finns

The newspaper advertisements reveal three main themes relating to the coming of the euro. First, the value of the money is dealt with from different aspects. The value of the euro is stated, and the bargaining power, after the coming of the euro, is explained to remain as is. Also, the basic security is discussed in the context of the money value. Advertisements argue that the value of social security will remain the same and that the Finns will continue to have the right to make decisions about their social security, just like they have done until now. Generally, the main argument is that nothing will change and citizens will have a safe future with the euro. Second, the bringing of the euro into use is discussed. The timetable, meaning the changeover period and the diffusion of the new money, is one aspect mentioned in almost every advertisement. Other aspects are the use of the euro as an account currency and the price setting of the retailers. Also, travelling with the euro and the outlook of the new money are mentioned. Third, the position of the euro as the common currency of Europeans is frequently discussed. This issue relates more to the image value of the money than to practical aspects of everyday life. The euro is featured as being a strong, safe and common denominator for all Europeans.

In this kind of discussion, politics seems to be ousted. All possible questions are rejected by the argument of unchangeability. The text includes a irreconcilable contradiction: Finland is going to get a new currency, common with other European countries, but still nothing is going to change. If the issues mentioned in the advertisements are really not changing, where are the things that will be different after the euro? They have been excluded in order to create an artificial atmosphere of safety and stability.

As to the information brochure, the issues are mostly the same as those raised in the newspaper advertisements. However, all the aspects are explained in greater detail and there are some additional chapters: taxation, stocks and bonds, and the feedback function on the back cover with the toll-free telephone numbers and internet address. Moreover, the back cover includes a summary entitled "Euro lyhyesti" (Euro in Short).

Taxation returns are briefly discussed, and it is stated that the euro will not have any impact on the level of the taxation percent. Stocks and bonds are discussed more
elaborately. The main message is that the owners of stocks and bonds do not need to take any action because of the euro. It is also underlined that the euro will give new opportunities to investors because the markets will be extended to include the whole of Europe in the future.

In addition to the argument of the unchangeability, a new argument of economic benefit is introduced in the brochure. In general, the discussion is widely that of economic policy. The euro is featured positively from the perspective of economy and arguments relate to stock exchange and currency rates. In other words, while the argument of unchangeability wipes politics from the stage, the latter arguments reduce it to mere economic policy.

In the television commercials, the issues covered are the most common ones which appear in public discussion and therefore are well suited to their introducers, "the common people". These issues are, for example, worries about the loss of a national identity, the money exchange and the value of the money itself. Still, these aspects are only briefly mentioned and then dismissed as self-evident facts. It is important to notice that the amount of discussion in the television advertisements is very little compared to that of the newspaper advertisements or the brochure. This is due to the short duration of the commercials, which take the form of only three to four sentences.

The issues discussed in the campaign concentrate on the areas where the euro will not have any impact: different forms of social security, the value of the money, bargaining power, loans and bank accounts. Are these "no change" issues the only ones that concern the average citizen? The things which are going to change are left almost unmentioned: the loss of the national currency and at the same time, a part of one's national identity, the loss of Finland's possibility to make its own financial policies and clearly, a somewhat uncertain future in a process which no one has ever gone through before.

If the "bad" sides of the euro are not discussed, how about the "good" sides? There are some aspects brought up in the campaign: benefits for investors and enterprises, and the stability of the currency rates. This may be true but these issues do not concern the average citizen who would like to hear something more concrete, part of one's every day life. One such kind of opportunity is mentioned: travelling without having to change money. Still, people who travel constantly are a marginal group, while most Finns travel much less and some might even want to change money, as being part of the exotic experience in travelling.
The problem of the campaign is the fact that it does not address that the euro does not bring any significant advantages to average citizens of a small member state. Euro is a process which is estimated to benefit international trade, investors and other macro structures. The people are there just to adapt to the phenomenon. The only thing left for them is “to be part of the people of Europeans”, connected with the same currency. Still one can wonder if a currency is enough to build this kind of identity or feeling of belonging.

Although the issue that the euro benefits more macro structures than an individual is missing from the campaign discussion, it was discussed among the economists and other experts of the field with the joining of Finland the EMU was under consideration. The argumentation for and against the EMU was many-sided and abundant in the media: this kind of discourse seems to be completely missing from the campaign. One reason for this may be the presumption that the expert discourse is too difficult to be offered to citizens, thereby causing uncertainty and negative impressions. However, does the possibility of negative reflections grant the right to exclude part of the discussion from the campaign? Should not any reaction, negative or positive, be justified or allowed? From the democratic perspective, the citizens should have the possibility to take part in a “real” and many-sided discussion, not just a simulation of it.

5.2.2 Mark is Good, Euro even Better

Based on the issues discussed in the campaign material, three themes emerge which structure the talk about the euro: (1) no change, (2) easy to use and (3) better future. The first theme states that nothing is going to change when the euro comes. According to the campaign, people will be able to continue with their lives in the same manner, without no reason for worry or nervousness. However, there remains a reservation, that the change evidently lies ahead, but fortunately far ahead. The following phrases, taken from the text of the campaign material, illustrate the theme of unchangeability:

"Niin se vaan on, oon mäki niin suomalainen kun olla ja osaa. Ei euro sitä mikskään muuta." Euro - uusi raha 1998i.
(It’s just like that, I’m as Finn as I ever can be. The euro won’t change it.)

(You will still use the mark in cash many years, because Finland will move into the euro in peace.)
(The Bank of Finland will change marks to euros during ten years after the euro is brought to use. Consequently, the marks left in the sock leg will still keep their value for a long time.)

This kind of marketing maintaining the notion of unchangeability is in contradiction with the basic idea of information campaigns. Campaigns are usually realised because something is going to change and people must be told about it. If nothing is going to change, why to bother to make an extensive campaign? On the other hand, the euro is the new currency of all Europeans, which is going to replace the national currencies. Consequently, is it not evident that there will be profound changes? To the contrary, a situation without change would be one where the mark would be continued to use. If the replacement of the mark with the euro is a situation without change, it means understanding the coming of the euro as an evident and necessary thing, something that has to occur, like a law of nature.

The label of no change characterizes the issue as being somehow natural and unimportant, a statement of a fact, not a question or discussion. The coming of the euro is so self-evident that there is no need to talk about the other options. The choice has been made, and now, it is no longer a choice, but a fact. It is precisely in this lack of discussion that lies the unpolitisisation of the issue. It is made to look natural and self-evident, not even valuable enough to be discussed with citizens. Nonetheless, can the replacement of the national currency be an unimportant issue? Evidently not, which leads to the question about the reasons for this kind of unpolitisisation. Some of the euro’s aspects may be less easy to deal with, especially in an information campaign. One way to handle this problem is to deny their existence, to exclude them from the category of the "changing issues".

The second theme, easy to use, is a familiar mode used in commercial advertising. The advertisements and the brochure discuss many everyday life situations where the euro will be in use. The ease of usage and the claim that its emergence will provide no harm or extra trouble to the people is emphasised through concrete examples:

(You can easily distinguish the bills from each other based on size and colour.)
(Getting used to prices in euro format will of course demand some effort. However, if we think about going away for a summer vacation, for example, people have always had to change their money and they’ve managed that rather well.)

"Vähittäiskaupassa markkamääristen hintojen rinnalle tulevat hinnat euroina hyvissä ajoin ennen euron siirtymistä. Noin sinulla on aikaa totutella uuteen rahaan." Euro - uusi raha 1998g.
(In the retail industry, prices will be indicated in both marks and euros well ahead of the time before the euro becomes the official currency. In this way, you have time to get used to the new currency.)

This second theme of the campaign concentrates on the day when the euro arrives and people will have to begin to use it. The use of the euro is described as being very easy. The tone of the text is reassuring: no panic, everything is going to be nice and comfortable. However, this theme of ease somehow contradicts the previous theme of unchangeability. There will be no change, but still some actions should be taken. Citizens should learn to use this new money, to read the prices in euros and use their bank accounts in new currency. This evidently means that something is going to change. Reassurance is one way to suppress open discussion. Politics is about argumentation, different views and interpretations. To reassure is to prevent conflicts and disagreements, and at the same time, exclude politics from the stage.

The third theme of better future primarily refers to the claimed advantages resulting from the euro as presented in the advertisements. Like in any advertising, it is important to give reasons why one should accept the given idea or product. Changes always cause resistance, but less if there can be advantages pointed out to occur after the change. Different from the other two themes, most of the advantages mentioned in the newspaper advertisements and the brochure are abstract in nature:

(Because the euro will be used by 290 million people during the first phase, it is expected to rise and become one of the strongest currencies of world trade, alongside the American dollar and the Japanese yen. The strong currency of the large euro zone cannot be easily fluctuated by the market forces, either.)

"Rahaliiton odotetaan pitävän inflaation kurissa ja korkotason vakaana. Samalla euro tekee maanosameen taloudesta entistäkin tiiviimmän kokonaisuuden, kun viimeisetkin kaupankäynnin ja kilpailun esteet häviävät." Euro - uusi raha 1998d.
(The Monetary Union is expected to control for inflation and stabilise the level of interests. At the same time, the euro makes the economy of our continent even more of a tight entity, when the last obstacles of trade and concurrence will disappear.)
(And you will always have something in common with 290 million Europeans because the currency is the same, from the Canary Islands to Utsjoki.)

"Siksi euro on turvallinen raha, turvallisessa Euroopassa."
Euro - uusi raha 1998d.
(That is why the euro is a safe money, in the safe Europe.)

The idea of the euro as an obstacle for market forces seems to be somewhat exaggerated, but succeeds in building an image of enormous strength. The other benefits mentioned, the controlling of inflation and currency rates, and the resulting of a tight entity without any obstacles of trade or concurrence, could also be thought as a form of federalism. Still, the campaign does not use the word federalism due to its negative connotations: lack of independence in local decision-making caused by centralised governance. The benefits mentioned are vast generalisations which could not be successfully offered to any other group than to people who do not possess deeper knowledge concerning this kind of economic question and therefore lack the ability to criticise its accuracy.

The other benefit, "having something in common with other Europeans", tries to create a new symbolic connection via currency. This may succeed to some extent, if the people using the euro approve it and create an emotional bond to it. Still, one could ask if there should be something more in common than just currency. The euro as the only common denominator is a rather thin commonality. Another characteristic connected to the euro, "safe money in the safe Europe", is also a questionable notion. Can a currency in itself be safe, protecting the population from dangers or insecurity? And, even more crucially, is Europe safe and can euro make it safer?

The talk about safety could be understood, again, in financial and economic terms. The depression of the early 1990s is said to have created a feeling of unsafety in Finland. From this aspect, one could understand the "safety" of the euro opposed to the "unsafe" experience of the mark during the depression. In other words, the euro is claimed to be a device of control for strong market forces. This kind of argumentation claims economic advantage as its premise. Economics is seen as superior to politics or politics is considered to exist only to serve economics. However, the euro as a new international currency cannot be evaluated simply from an economic perspective as it is both a political decision and process. From the political perspective, one should also
reverse the attributes to their opposites, "unsafe" euro and "safe" mark. Apparently, there would be no difficulty in finding arguments to support these qualities, either. In the campaign's economic argumentation, the euro is "a safe unchange". On the other hand, would "unsafe change" sound just as reasonable, or may be even more so?

The abstractness and artificiality of the described advantages resulting from the adoption of the euro is somehow natural, when considering that the whole process of sharing a common currency is a first in its kind experiment. The examples used in the campaign text are the usual ways of describing the positive sides of the euro. Nevertheless, in a campaign where concreteness and practicality are underlined, this abstract approach does not support the argumentation very well. After the concrete examples of bank accounts and retail prices, the reader should also expect to hear about concrete benefits.

These every day benefits were given more consideration in the television commercials:

"Ja onhan se hankalaa, kun aina täytyy vaihtaa rahaa. Euro helpottaa elämää."  
Euro - uusi raha 1998j.  
(And it sure is difficult, when you always have to change money. The euro makes life easier.)

"Kun euro tulee, aina vaan parempi. Silloin helpompi hintojakin vertailta."  
Euro - uusi raha 1998k.  
(When the euro comes, all the better. Then it will be easier to compare prices, too.)

The more practical benefits of the euro center around the theme of travelling: easier to compare the prices and no need to change money. As already mentioned, the benefits that shall be experienced by travellers still seem less substantial when thinking about the majority of Finns. If these are the only concrete benefits an average person can receive, it seems like the euro does not give anything to people living in Finland, only for those leaving Finland. And is it that difficult to change money?
5.3 Means of Trust Building: Rational Appeals

5.3.1 Speaking Practically: “In Addition to Toothbrush…”

The proper understanding of any message is a precondition for successful communication. The level of difficulty in a text should be adjusted to the capabilities of the target audience. When speaking to “ordinary people”, like many of the public information campaigns are, one should use easy language so that as many people as possible will comprehend the campaign contents. Often, the misunderstandings arise through the the use of theoretical concepts including complicated reasoning and argumentation. If a campaigner wishes to get the attention and capture the interest of its audience, it should use the language of the audience and speak about things which are important and familiar to it. This is one of the principles also followed in the Finnish euro campaign:

“Kymmenellä eurolla saa saman verran kuin kuudella kypillä nykyistä rahaa.”
Euro - uusi raha 1998e.
(With ten euros one can get the same as with six tenspots of the current money.)

(Around the end of the year it will already be possible to use the euro as an account currency. This means, for example, that different fees can be paid in euros at the bank. You may also receive payments in euros into your account. In every case, your bank will manage the changes from euros to marks and vice versa. There will be no extra fees charged for this change.)

(What to take along for a trip? In addition to a toothbrush, you will also need money.)

The reverse side of this practicality is its oversimplification and self-evidence. The questions asked in the advertisements are simple, but are they too simple? Would not anyone who knows that one euro is six marks, know how many marks is ten euros? The campaign adopts an attitude of “teacher”, trying to ensure that every pupil gets the message right.

Another aspect of this practicality can be found in the structure of the information brochure, which reminds that of a textbook. The brochure contains headlines and their subtexts, summaries and lists, timetables and pictures. Like any current textbooks, it is
made to look interesting and ready to lead the “student” in a flexible and easy manner from beginning to end, where lies the possibility to obtain even more information by telephoning or visiting the web site.

Practicality is often preferred to theoretic discussion by most people. The saying “It’s just mere theory” implies distrust toward theoretical statements when there is no practical proof. This too has been realised in the advertisements through the answers given to the people’s questions about the euro. Practicality aims at decreasing the perceived gap between the government and its citizens, putting them on the same level, making them speak the same language.

The television commercials are in themselves practical examples of people using the euro in their lives: the Finnish truck driver thinking about the change of the currency while shipping goods through different countries, the French restaurant manager having to deal with the new money, concretely, in his job and the Irish construction worker, who decides to keep a few pounds as a memory. These characters may be real, they are similar types of people facing the same situation. The people on the screen stand as examples: “This is how we’ll deal with the euro, you should do the same”.

The commercials show a model of a citizen which is to be adopted by viewers, especially by those who are doubtful or do not accept the euro. This kind of tactic is familiar from campaign advertisements seen before elections. It tries to persuade viewers by claiming that “other people do the same or think in the same way”. The commercials wish for viewers to conform to the opinion of “the majority”. Conventionalism is one way to depoliticise an issue, to make only one aspect look as the acceptable one. Where are the people with unconventional ideas about the euro? They are certainly not seen in these commercials.
5.3.2 Directness as a Route to Familiarity

Directness is often connected to familiarity. If one knows someone well, they may be more likely to reveal their thoughts or feelings about something more directly. On the other hand, in more formal settings, one often speaks indirectly, since this is perceived as being polite. Directness was one of the ways chosen for the Finnish newspaper advertisements in order to establish a trusting relationship between the reader and the campaigner. On the other hand, the use of informal speech may also irritate some of readers, for example, older people who are used to formal address.

The form of the actual advertisements may be compared to a conversational model. The text addresses the reader directly, using “you”, instead of the passive form. It is characteristic of a conversation between two persons: one asks a question and the other answers explicitly. This is in clear contrast to political and expertise jargon, which often expresses ideas implicitly, uses difficult words and long sentences. The advertisements are made to be different from the language we hear daily on the television news, for example. The ads build a conversation between two buddies: the government presents itself as a person, talking at the same level with citizens. The following paragraphs illustrate examples of such conversation:

"Koska saan palkkani euroina? Viimeistään vuoden 2002 alussa. (...) Mutta saatat kohdata euron jo aiemmin. Jos olet työntäjä on kanssa erityisesti sopinut, voidaan palkkasi maksaa euromäärienä ensi vuoden alusta lähtien." Euro - uusi raha 1998c. (When will I get my salary in euros? At the latest, in the beginning of the year 2002. (...) But you might encounter the euro even before that. If you have made a deal with your employer, your salary can be paid in euros from the beginning of next year.)

"Ovatko säästöt turvassa? Kyllä. Säästöt ovat turvassa, sillä rahan arvo ei muutu. Säästösi ja pankkilit i ovat ensi vuoden alussa edelleen markoissa. Myös lainat ja niiden ehdot pysyvät euron myötä ennallaan." Euro - uusi raha 1998f. (Are savings safe? Yes. Savings are safe because the value of the money will not change. Your savings and bank accounts will still be in marks in the beginning of next year. Also, loans and their conditions will remain the same after the emergence of the euro.)

The answers are generally very short and explicit. They seek to first, give a short and clear answer and then, go into more detail. Those who only read the beginnings of paragraphs, capture at least, these explicit answers: “Yes. Your savings are safe.” The explicitness can also be compared to confidence and honesty. There is no need to avoid giving the exact answer by using complicated jargon, one can answer directly, because one is sure of it.
Personality is emphasised in the discussion of concrete issues like salary, savings and bank accounts. The campaign talks about the citizen's personal salary and bank account, not generally about salaries and accounts. This gives the impression that the person who has asked the question is personally considered in the answer. The person addressed in the advertisements seems to be more like a consumer than a citizen. One speaks about salaries, savings, buying and travelling. Pensions and basic security are also mentioned, but they play a minor role. The emphasis is on the consumer who earns money and consumes it, a person who is beneficial to society. People with questions are only interested in concrete money and what is going to happen to it. Nevertheless, the change of the national currency does not only impact the actual money flow, it may also impact the identity of the people or the independence of the nation. These sides of the issue are not addressed by the advertisements.

On the other hand, the consumer-oriented discourse of this kind of economic language is one factor which renders the advertisements so familiar-looking. The role of the citizen may not be as familiar to the people as that of the consumer. If the campaign would address people as citizens, belonging to a democratic system and decision-making society, the gap between the campaigner and the citizens would increase immediately. This is the kind of discourse one is not used to hearing except during speeches made by politicians at election time. Instead, one is familiar with being treated as a consumer in advertising, thinking about one's own money and how to spend it. Still, the euro has implications on the economy but also on the political life. In relation to the new European currency, both roles need to be played, the role of the citizen and that of the consumer.

The information brochure lacks the conversational model in the sense that there are no questions, but the answers are the same as those in the advertisements, addressing reader by using "you". The questions are replaced by headlines, but the presence of the characters familiar from the advertisements gives an impression that the person in the photograph has chosen the subject which is talked about. In this way, the conversation continues in the brochure.

The spoken language on the television commercials is altogether very direct, partly because the persons who are talking seem to be confident about their opinions and partly because they are "in a hurry": it seems like they want to make their point explicitly and in short, and then get on with their tasks. The element of confidence manifests itself through the clear opinions being expressed; only two persons seem to
be less confident. The first two examples illustrate the directness as confidence and explicitness, the third an example of a less direct answer:


(It doesn't matter if I pay in guldens, pounds or D-marks. When the euro comes, all the better.)

"Mullehan se euro on ainakin vaan kotiinpäin kun mä ajan tuolla ympäri Eurooppaa ja rahtaan näitä suomalaisiit tavaroita. Helsinmaksshan se menee, kun ei koko ajan tarvii mittään eri valuuttakursseja." Euro - uusi raha 1998k.

(At least for me it's only an advantage when I drive around Europe and ship these Finnish goods. It'll be easier when you don't have to think about currency rates all the time.)

"Kyllähän se aluks tuo euron tulo tuntu vähän ouvolle, mutta sit mie älysin et eihan sillä mitään erroo oo, esimerkiks halkat ja eläkkeet..." Euro - uusi raha 1998k.

(It sure did feel a bit strange at first, the coming of the euro, but then I realised that it makes no difference, for example on wages and pensions...)
5.3.3 Images of Identification: The Man Next Door

The most visible way of "trust building" in the Finnish campaign is that of identification. When it comes to the newspaper advertisements, this is exemplified through the photographs of the different persons and in the image texts including their personal questions relating to the euro. Their names, professions and hometowns are revealed in paragraphs situated next to the photographs. This kind of individualisation reminds one of testimonials, where people state their personal reasons for doing something, and as a guarantee of their honesty, are willing to disclose their real names. This is one of the features which gives the commercials their documentary feel.

The text accompanying each advertisement supports the identification target introduced by the photograph. For example, an advertisement including a photograph of a pensioner, includes a text with the headline “Onko eläke sama euroissa?” (Will the Pension Be the Same in Euros?), and the following paragraphs explain the influence of the euro on pensions. There are, in all, six different persons in the advertisements, each representing a different demographic and social class: factory worker, handicapped student, pensioner, nurse, father with his son and youngster. The following are examples of their identification with the image texts:

(Manager of printing press, Heikki Antila from the city of Kotka, wants to know when the euros can be seen on pay check.)

(Matti Lehto, a habitant of the city of Turku, thinks about the euro's impact on the bargaining power of families with children at home. Rasmus will be concerned with the euro only after a couple of years.)

Rovaniemeläinen Heidi Majava haluaa tietää, miten euro vaikuttaa matkasuunnitelmiani. Euro - uusi raha 1998h.
(Heidi Majava, a habitant of the city of Rovaniemi, wants to know how the euro will influence her travel plans.)

The questions posed by the persons in the photographs may again be too simplistic: Heikki Antila only wants to know the exact date when the euro will show up on his pay check, would he not want to know, for example, if the euro will have an influence on the labour markets or his personal possibilities for employment abroad? Heidi Majava is interested in travelling with the euro, which again represents a question of the mar-
ginal part of the population. The father’s question about the bargaining power is more significant, but the role of Rasmus is confusing. How is the euro going to affect the boy if it does not even concern his parents?

The images in the advertisements are colour photographs of persons, standing and looking straight at the reader. Although the entire body of these persons are seen in the pictures, only their faces are clear. The other parts have been deliberately left unclear. The faces have also been made to appear “lightened”, which draws more attention to them. The composition stresses the persons and their faces; the reader looks first at the bold headline, then the face of the person, and after that begins to read the text. The emphasis on the faces of these characters is similar to what occurs in an actual exchange between people: people tend to look at a person’s face and remember that better than what their body looks like or what clothes they were wearing. Therefore, the images give the impression of a “real” meeting of these people and talking to them.

The persons are clearly posing in the images, reminding one of models. Nevertheless, the clothing of the people, working clothes in most cases, renders the pictures dynamic. One can imagine they have been photographed in the middle of their busy work day. This aspect makes the images have a documentary-type look which is in contrast to the idealism of modelling. The theme behind the pictures is work or leisure (see figures 5 and 6). The action in the images focuses on the questions the persons ask about the euro. The situation reminds one of a Gallup poll, where people are asked questions and photographed during their normal activities. Other things emphasised in the pictures include professionalism and know-how of each person’s field, success and well-being in their personal lives. One of the main features illustrating the well-being of these individuals is the smiley faces they show.

Figure 5. Matti Lehto ponders about the situation of families with children.

Figure 6. “From Utsjoki to the Canary Islands”
Why does the campaign speak about the euro by showing readers different types of "real" persons? One explanation is that the characters are taken to represent some kind of role models of euro users. They show the readers a model indicating how to behave and what to ask. The authority comes from their "accepted" position in the national information campaign and the positive outlook which is a statement about their success and well-being. They are the tutors of all Finnish citizens concerning the euro issue.

The question-answer technique of the campaign is evidently made to remind one of a real dialogue, but it partly fails because actual dialogue is never as simple and clear. Where are the controversial and difficult questions? Would these people really be satisfied with such short answers if the questions would be important to them? In this sense, the smile is ironic: are the persons more focused on posing in front of the photographer than asking the questions? This aspect decreases the documentary style evidenced earlier.

The persons in the photographs look like "normal" people. Any one of them could be someone's neighbour or relative. Their professions and activities are familiar to people; it would be easy to believe that these persons exist in real life. Familiar situations can be associated to one's own life and accepted as a model of action. This way, the picture leads to the actual issue, the euro. Persons in the photographs have questions about the euro, they have had the courage to ask, and have received answers. The smile on their faces demonstrates that they are content with the answers and trust their future with the euro. In addressing the reader, they challenge him to do the same; to trust.

The effort of photographic naturalisation of campaign characters is at the same time an effort to naturalise the euro. According to the realisers of the campaign, the persons posing in the photographs were real people with their real names and locations. Therefore, when these persons are taken to represent the entire Finnish population, the effort of naturalisation appears. The simple questions and the positive and confident attitude are made to be characteristic of the Finnish citizens in general. What if there would have been negative attitudes or complex and controversial questions about the new currency? Would such inquirers have access to the campaign photographs? The problematics of the campaign characters and the need for their denaturalisation does not derive from who they are but whom they represent.
The same photographs can be seen in the pages of the information brochure, including two additional ones: a smiling boy flying a kite and an old woman probably standing beside her husband, the pensioner already familiar to readers from the newspaper advertisements (see figure 7). The woman is shown to be knitting, a feature often associated with grandmothers. The photograph of these pensioners occupies more space in the brochure than any other single character. In addition, the elderly, or pensioners, are the only group from which there are two representatives. Could the reason for this be that the older generation was found to be least in favour of the euro according to opinion polls? The campaign therefore wants to direct its persuasive message to the people who are regarded as being the most reluctant in accepting the euro.

The television commercials of the campaign form an own entity which differs from the uniform outlook found in the newspaper advertisements and the information brochure. Every commercial presents a person from some member state of the EMU in his or her job, and then a Finnish person engaging in a similar kind of activity. All the persons are identified, which is the common feature linking other campaign material. Their names, home towns or countries appear written on the screen. In other words, commercials wish to point out that all these people are just habitants of the same euro zone.

The commercials are shot in a documentary fashion: they seek to show "real" people in their natural environment. The comparison between the Finns and foreigners has the objective of emphasising the similarity between users of the euro. The commercials want to build a feeling of commonness while at the same time offering a new European identity to Finnish viewers. The appearance of foreigners reminds one of advertising in tourism; showing "the best sides" of a country and its people. Apparently, the objective is to decrease fears that Finns might have about the union with other Europeans. Consequently, the commercials are a mixture of similarity and difference dressed into exotism. This aspect is where the com-

Figure 7. "Will pension be the same in euros?"
mercials differ from the other campaign material which strictly avoids any references to identity and its intercultural aspects.

The transition from one scene to another in the commercials, for example from the Spanish singer to the Finnish truck driver, is realised by visual or aural transitions. In the case of the Spanish and the Finn, the song that the Spanish begins to sing at the end of his speech is then heard on the car radio of the Finnish driver. Another example is the advertisement where a Dutch woman is shown walking at a market place and finally buying flowers; exactly the same kind of flowers are being held by the elderly Finnish woman in her kitchen as she puts them into a vase (see figure 8).

The transitions emphasise the similarity in the lives of the people in Europe; as stated by the Spanish singer just before he begins his song: “Minulla ei ole enää rajoja, kuten ei musiikillakaan.” (I have no more boundaries, neither does music) While this kind of sentence refers to the concrete state boundaries, it also implies a common European identity, as commonly adopted as international music. What about national identities? Are they going to disappear, making room for one European identity? While some of the commercials suggest that this is what is going to happen, the others still insist on maintaining a national identity. For example, the Finnish restaurant manager claims that she is “as Finn as she ever can be” and that the euro will not change this. Should one talk about double identity then?

The identification of Finnish viewers to the persons in the commercials is further strengthened by the names and hometowns that appear to the top of the screen. The foreigners are identified indicating their name and home country. The following are the pairs presented in each film:
"Michel Arja, Ranska" and "Sanna Kekäläinen, Helsinki"

"Roberto Chamorro, Espanja" and "Jussi Mäkelä, Tampere"

"Murielle Kochman, Hollanti" and "Ilona Ilmanen, Seinäjoki"

"Kelly Ward, Irlanti" and "Markku Hirvonen, Järvenpää"

The different kind of identification of Finns and foreigners emphasises again the
difference between the two groups. To say that someone comes from France does not
say much about him or her. Why don’t the commercials reveal the foreigners’ home
towns? One reason might be that to leave them out makes the text easier to read and
comprehend. If the Frenchman would have been identified, for instance, as "Michel
Arja, Bordeaux", many people might not have known his nationality, while others who
might have known the nationality still could not locate Bordeaux in France, which would
have made the function of the name appearing quite useless. The unknown causes
anxiety and negative reaction and this possibility was not the purpose of the campaign.

The Finnish people in the commercials live in cities known to almost everybody.
This gives the viewer the possibility to develop a more familiar relationship with them.
However, the separation between the Finns and the other Europeans increases be-
cause of the different way of identification. It also strengthens cultural stereotypes:
Finnish people are, for instance, habitants of Seinäjoki and Tampere, but the rest of the
Europeans are just French, Spanish and so on. How does this kind of thinking fit into
the idea of a common European identity?

The main theme in the advertisements is the similarity of the jobs and the life of
the workers all around Europe. The primary message is that people of different nation-
alities all have to take the euro into consideration. They are professionals in their own
field and confident about what they are doing. In a similar way, they have thought about
the euro and concluded that it is a good thing and makes life better. The viewer is
supposed to see qualified people from different countries who have confidence in the
euro. They all are placed on the same level: the Irish construction worker and the
Finnish restaurant manager have the same worries and thus, the same solutions. The
commercials describe a form of new euro consumerism which is to be found all over
the Europe. The people on the screen belong to this group and trust the euro and its
positive effects. Then, should not one agree and trust the euro if these persons trust?
6 FRENCH CAMPAIGN

6.1 Puzzle of the Euro

The French euro campaign contained many different communication items and first began in 1997, even before the official decision was made about EMU membership. As previously mentioned, the Finnish campaign was realised during 1998, only after the official EMU decision had occurred. The first part of the French campaign under study is the brochure called “L’euro et moi”, published in November 1997. The pocket-sized brochure is colourful and dynamic in its appearance. The front page presents readers with five different characters which are then repeated through-out (see figure 9).

The French brochure is partly constructed along the same theme present in the Finnish campaign: personalisation of the euro via characters. The French campaign characters are not demonstrated as being distinct and governing as in the Finnish, but there still are similar features. However, one main difference between two campaigns is shown through the names of the brochures. While the label on the Finnish brochure was strictly based on the issue at hand (Euro - New Money), the French seeks to establish a connection between the people and the new currency (Euro and I).

In general, the text of the French brochure is well organised with titles and subtitles. There are also "example boxes" related to each issue. Another repeated element are pictures of the euro money: coins and bills are seen on every page of the brochure. In addition, there are many other images according to the themes, for example groceries when prices are discussed, and a piggy bank when savings are referred to. Issues handled in the brochure include the outlook of the euro, its value in francs, the timetable, the use of the euro in every-day life, the member states of the EMU and the basis for their selection, and the advantages resulting from the euro.

The general impression that the French brochure gives is that of an advertisement leaflet produced for a supermarket: lots of colours and little pictures. There is very little free space left on the pages, even the background of the text is decorated with the
yellow stars of the EU. The characters introduce each aspect by relating questions attached to the image. Otherwise, the persons are not linked to the text, but remain as separate entities. This is partly due to the small size of the images, comparably to that of a passport photograph only showing the head and chest. The images are placed at the upper left corner of the pages, thus isolating them from the other elements (see figure 10).

The division of gender according to the themes they raise is traditional in nature. The women ask about practical issues like shopping and men talk about globalisation and economics. Femininity is compared with practicality, masculinity with theory. In this way, the campaign reinforces traditional gender roles and restricts the possibility of the both genders equally participating in the discussion.

The television commercial "La Fontaine" was diffused in the same month as the brochure. It shows a fountain where people, coming from different EMU countries, throw their coins and make wishes in different languages. The commercial presents a strongly imaginative and romanticised view of the world filled with beautiful and happy people. The tempo is slowed down which makes the sequence appear dream-like in nature. The music in the background is classic choir singing. The wishes that people make concern happiness, love and friendship (see figure 11).

At the end, there is reference to the euro through the voice of a male narrator: "Imaginez ce que trois cent millions d'hommes et de femmes vont construire ensemble quand ils feront des voeux dans la même monnaie." (Imagine, what the
three hundred million men and women will build together when they make wishes in the same currency.) At the same time, the viewer sees the bottom of the fountain, where all the different coins lie.

There is also a shorter version of this "La Fontaine" commercial, a sort of a reminder, which lasts only a while, while the main commercial is longer. In the second commercial, there is a young boy and an old man sitting near the same fountain. Both characters are already familiar from the previous commercial. The old man is showing the information brochure, "L’euro, le Guide Pratique" to the boy and the narrator says that this brochure will be mailed to every household. In this commercial, the stated objective of making a generational link is realised in a very visible manner.

The newspaper advertisement entitled "Nous Serons Plus Fortes, Nous Resterons Nous-Mêmes" was published on the 4th of May in 1998, after France’s final decision to join the EMU was made (see figure 12). The advertisement is a whole-page print with its most dominating elements the two coins of the euro situated at the top. One coin is shown on the “heads” side, the other the “tails”. All the euro coins are similar to one another on the tail side, while the head sides highlight national themes. On the French euro coin, there is the abbreviation “RF”, Republique française (French Republic), and the words: “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” (freedom, equality, brotherhood), famous from the French Revolution.

This unity simultaneously paired with distinction is also manifested in the text appearing below the coins. On the tail side of the coins, there is the sentence “Nous serons plus forts” (We will be stronger) and on the head side of the coin, “Nous resterons nous-mêmes” (We will remain ourselves). Below the coins, a text paragraph mainly describing the advantages of the euro is also shown.

The last piece of the French campaign under study, the series of television commercials “L’euro, Mode d’Emploi”, were aired on television in late 1998. There was a total of three different commercials handling some practical aspects relating to the euro. The commercials were animations. The first one handles the timetable for

![Figure 12. French newspaper advertisement: two sides of the euro](image-url)
the process and the need for the different sectors of society to adapt to the euro. The second commercial informs about the different countries which are to adopt the euro and the possibility of travelling without having to exchange money. The third spot concentrates on the value of the euro in francs. The style of these commercials is generally humorous, like in comic strips (see figure 13). The music in the background, light jazz, also emphasises lightness and humour.

The course of the entire French campaign cannot naturally be featured by evaluating only one part of the campaign. The composition of the items to be studied contains the beginning and the end of the campaign. The information brochure, television commercial "La Fontaine" and the newspaper advertisement form the beginning, while the television commercials "L'Euro, Mode d'Emploi" are the end of the campaign.

The items of the French campaign are not a unified entity but more like pieces of a puzzle, different, but still linked together. The information brochure launched the campaign. It is quite massive in the amount of information it contains and independent from the other items: it would be quite successful on its own. The next two items, "La Fontaine" and the newspaper advertisement have more in common. They have the same "together but separate" theme and are visually simple and artistic. They appeal more to imagination than logic, unlike the brochure. They also function as attention drawers and reminders of the issue at hand. This approach may indeed function when there is something more "heavy" to rely on, that being the brochure in this case.

The last piece of the campaign, the commercials "L'Euro, Mode d'Emploi", are again a separate entity. They form their own animated world and show funny people doing their every-day tasks. They do not seem to take the euro seriously, but they still have their own message. Since this style is completely different from the other items, the campaign cannot be seen on a continuum. With respect to the French campaign, one cannot talk about narrative in its most common sense. Unlike its Finnish counterpart, the narrative in this case is postmodern, fractured and differentiated. The connecting factors are not clearly visible but depend on a viewer's interpretations.
6.2 From Issues to Themes

6.2.1 Facts for the French

One of the most discussed issues in the French campaign is the timetable of the euro, which is deeply explained in the brochure, in one of the television commercials and also mentioned in the newspaper advertisement. Another well explained aspect are the assumed benefits one may receive from the euro. These benefits include not having to exchange money or pay exchange fees, the euro as a strong currency strengthening both the European identity and international position. France would directly benefit from the euro because of its high level of exportation. It is also mentioned that the euro would increase the employment by liberating economy and reinforcing French sovereignty.

The benefits presented by the French campaigners are more abstract than the benefits mentioned in the Finnish campaign. While the French campaigners talk about identity and the country’s international position, the Finnish campaigners see the benefits to be in the area of money exchange and price comparison. Even though the advantages of the euro for smaller and larger EMU countries may somewhat differ, both campaigns still seem to talk in two different language, almost as if they are not talking about the same event. The Finnish campaigners did not want to include the themes of culture and identity in their campaign, since they were considered either irrelevant or too complicated for the audience. However, the French seem to be capable of understanding these kind of issues. The position of the citizens is clearly different in relation to the two campaigns. The French campaign seems to include a more democratic perspective than the Finnish one.

The benefits are considered as one subject in all three communication items of the French campaign. The euro’s value in francs and the member states of the EMU are also central themes. The value of the euro is explained in detail especially in the information brochure and is also the subject of one television commercial. Other subjects of the campaign are the outlook of the new money, pricing and currency rates, the situation of the French overseas territories, the stability of the prices and its supervision, and every-day bank affairs. It is explained that the change of the currency would not have any impact on the value of the money and there is some speculation about future steps
in European integration. However, these issues are not as frequently discussed as the timetable, the value of the euro and its benefits.

As to concrete information, the brochure is evidently the main channel. It contains a large amount of information, covering all the above mentioned topics. Although it also includes a lot of images, its main task still seems to be dissemination of basic information. The newspaper advertisement acts in an opposite manner. It only mentions the timetable and enlists the ensuing benefits. Almost all the benefits are somewhat abstract and unclear, like the phrase “Avec l’euro, nous renforcerons la place de la France dans le monde” (With the euro we will reinforce the position of France in the world). The television commercials deal with each one of the former topics, except “La Fontaine”, which is completely image-oriented, concentrating on the “feeling of belonging” and the commonness of Europeans.

In general, the French campaign focuses on issues which will change because of the euro; the opposite of the Finnish campaign. Although many of the benefits mentioned are left abstract and far away from an average person’s life, there are also some concrete advantages, like the implications of the euro on employment. Most of the discussion is, however, image-oriented. The campaign creates a picture of France as being a big and strong country which will not suffer in any way when the euro is ushered in. The potentially negative aspects of the euro are completely absent from the campaign discourse. The benefits to be gained may only be partly true if one only evaluates the hard values of economy and finances. However, what about the soft values of culture, for example? Will the French not miss their franc?
6.2.2 Strong Europe, Strong France

The three main themes on which the French campaign appears to be based on are (1) easy to use, (2) dynamic and strong Europe and (3) strong and independent France. The first theme is similar to that of the Finnish campaign: the easy, uncomplicated and trouble-free aspects of euro usage are emphasised. The two other themes emphasise the positive change which will occur due to the euro. The Finnish campaign did refer to concrete advantages of the euro to be felt in people’s every-day life but at the same time, highlighted the general unchanging nature of the phenomenon. At this point, there is a clear difference between the two national campaigns.

The following are some examples of the first theme in the French campaign, “easy to use”, including practical implications and how the euro relates to every-day activities:

"Les billets et les pièces seront suffisamment différenciés pour être facilement reconnaissables grâce notamment aux tailles et aux couleurs pour les billets et au tailles et aux matériaux pour les pièces." Euro fait la force 1997a.
(Bills and coins will be made different enough so they may be easily recognised. This will especially be so thanks to the size and the colour of the bills and the size and the material of the coins themselves.)

"Enfin, pour chacun, cette période de trois ans permettra de se préparer à l'utilisation de l'euro. Tout en utilisant nos francs, nous nous habituerons peu à peu à voir, à entendre des chiffres en euros." Euro fait la force 1997a.
(Finally, this period of three years will allow every one to get ready for the usage of the euro. While still using our francs, we will gradually get used to seeing and hearing numbers in euros.)

(You can do it without complicated calculation. Calculators [for example, in supermarkets] allow you to rapidly convert from euros to francs or from francs to euros.)

The French campaign also uses a reassuring tone: people will have plenty of time to get used to the euro. There will be no difficult details to be dealt with since all possible issues have been evaluated well in advance. The campaign talks about the euro as a familiar and well-known phenomenon containing no surprises. Still, as the first experiment of its kind, the euro will certainly cause trouble and confusion after its appearance. The three-year period may be successful in preparing one part of the French population, but not all. The over-simplification of the entire process neglects the aspects of any profound change which is always difficult.
Although this theme of easy usage is especially clear in the information brochure, the two other themes are still more distinct. The second theme, a dynamic and strong Europe, becomes visible in the newspaper advertisement and the information brochure:

"Avec l’euro, nous ferons jeu égal avec le dollar et le yen." Euro fait la force 1998a. 
(With the euro, we can be on an equal footing with the dollar and the yen.)

(The euro will be, with the dollar, one of the principal international currencies. It will strengthen the European identity in a concrete and everyday manner. The euro is Europe’s comeback as a major actor to the international stage.)

"La première amélioration concrète concernera ceux qui vivent et travaillent à proximité des frontières, ou ceux qui voyagent régulièrement en Europe: disparition des problèmes de change, et au passage des commissions de change. (...) il y aura dynamisation des échanges." Euro fait la force 1997a. 
(The first concrete improvement will concern those living and working near borders, or those travelling regularly in Europe: the problems of exchange will disappear, and along with it exchange commissions. (...) a revival of trade will take place.)

The second theme concentrates mainly on the benefits the euro will gain for all of Europe and its citizens. Europe’s biggest competitor is the United States with its dollar, and the euro will give the possibility for being on an “equal footing” with it. Europe as an actor seems to be as important as France in the French campaign. What is good for Europe, is also good for France. This assumption is somehow understandable when considering the major role of France in the European integration. France has been and will be one of the main architects of the EMU and will certainly also look after its own benefits.

The discussion of European identity and how the euro plays a role in such an effort is problematic. Like was already mentioned earlier, can currency build an identity? If it can, then the loss of a national currency, and especially one as old as the French franc, should weaken the French identity. Can the French easily forget their old identity and ease into a new European identity? It is not likely, and that may be precisely why the campaign wants to draw parallel between the French and the European. It draws attention to the European component of French identity and makes the coming of the euro look like a natural continuum for history. “The comeback of Europe” can be thought as the comeback of France, achieving its former position as one of the leading countries of the western world.
The third theme, a strong and independent France, continues the same dis-
cussion, but at a different level. While the previous theme has Europe as a starting point
ending with France, this theme instead begins the discussion with France and ends
with Europe. The examples of the third theme have been selected from the newspaper
advertisement and information brochure.

"Avec l’euro, nous renforcerons la place de la France dans le monde. En réussissant
l’euro ensemble, nous allons changer d’avenir tout en restant nous-mêmes.”
Euro fait la force 1998a.
(With the euro, we will reinforce the position of France in the world. When we succeed
together to make the euro real, we are going to change the future, while remaining true
to ourselves.)

"L’euro c’est au contraire le moyen de desserrer les contraintes et de renforcer notre
(To the opposite, the euro is a means to open up [economic] constraints and reinforce
our sovereignty.)

"L’Union Économique et Monétaire sera la garantie d’un environnement économique
favorable pour nos entreprises et donc pour l’emploi: faible inflation, taux d’intérêt modérés,
(The Economic and Monetary Union will be a guarantee of an economically favourable
environment for our enterprises and, consequently, for employment: weak inflation,
moderate level of interests, larger internal markets.)

The campaign points to several benefits which France will gain as a result of the
euro. The claimed advantages are more abstract in nature, like the reinforcement of
sovereignty. This kind of statement requires further elaboration: in what way will France
be more sovereign? Wouldn’t it be more logical to speak of Europe’s increasing sove-
eignty as a result of the euro, and not that of France alone?

Another statement left unclear is the repetition of the promise that the French
will remain the same as they have been, that the euro will not change their identity.
First, it is highly inconsistent to make this kind of promise when there is a profound
national change ahead. Second, there is a contradiction between the idea of the euro
building a European identity while leaving the French identity unchanged. Unless “Eu-
ropean” and “French” are taken to mean the same thing, this statement is problematic.
In other words, the French campaign argues change on the grounds of the
unchangeability. With respect to these second and the third themes, the argumentation
is similar to that of the Finnish campaign.

The mixing between the European and the French is a distinct feature through-
out the French campaign. The expected benefits for Europe also seem to be the ben-
benefits for France, and vice versa. This kind of discourse is very France-centred: if it is like this, how about the other member states? Are their benefits also the same as those of France and Europe? This leads to the central problem of the whole question of integration, how to melt together the interests of many different countries without making compromises. The French campaign has solved this problem by putting an equal sign between France and Europe and forgetting the existence of other member states.

6.3 Means of Trust Building: Emotional Appeals

6.3.1 From Practicality to Naivism

France's informational brochure adopts a very similar "conversational model" as seen in the Finnish counterpart. Every page consists of a main question posed by a character image and the rest of the text is divided into sections stating additional questions. The answers to the questions are short and explicit, avoiding unnecessary jargon. However, one difference is that the text does not address the reader directly and instead uses a passive form which decreases the impression of a "real" conversation to some extent.

"L'euro va-t-il remplacer le franc? Oui. Il remplacera les monnaies nationales des pays qui adopteront l'euro." Euro fait la force 1997a. (Will the euro replace the franc? Yes. It will replace the national currencies of the countries that will adopt the euro.)

"Et si je veux retrouver l'équivalent en francs d'un prix affiché en euros? On pourra le faire sans calcul compliqué. Des calculettes permettront d'obtenir rapidement la conversion euros en francs ou francs en euros." Euro fait la force 1997a. (And if I want to know the corresponding sum in francs of a price quoted in euros? It can be determined without complicated calculation. Thanks to the calculators, the conversion from euros to francs or from francs to euros will be done rapidly.)

The images in the brochure support the practical style of the text. There are pictures including euro coins, groceries and stamps. The use of the images accompanying the things being mentioned reminds one of school books, where this kind of repetition is made to facilitate the understanding of the text. There are also "summary boxes" on each page, drawing conclusions from what has been previously told. However, the large amount of images, most of them drawings, renders the brochure some-
what restless and naive in appearance. The aim was to achieve better readability and provide an interesting outlook, but too many pictures damage this intention (see figure 14). The campaign seems to forget that it is directed at adults and young people, not children. This kind of approach places citizens in the position of pupils and at the same time underestimates them by denying their status as equal participants in the discussion.

The practicality is also manifested in the television commercials of the French campaign. The animations describe every-day situations like a woman cooking dinner and a boy packing his suitcase. In addition to the spoken lines of the characters, there is a narrator whose thoughts also appear on the screen. This reaction of reading out loud what appears on the screen reminds one of the foreign language teaching programmes. The contents of the lines is also simple and somewhat naive:

"- Dans quels pays puis-je utiliser l'euro?

Euro fait la force 1998c.  
(In which countries can I use the euro? Oh yes, but where are you exactly? The euro is used in eleven countries. As a matter of fact, one can go to Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Ireland, but also to Italy, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. It is anyway simpler with the same money. Notice: to Germany, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland...)

"- Les prix en francs et en euros: trois ans pour s'habiter.
- Pourquoi attendre les pièces et les billets encore trois ans?
- Mais oui, pourquoi pas tout de suite?
- Mais parce que ça, c'est impossible, imaginez. Il y a tant de choses à mettre en place, les commerces doivent s'adapter, les systèmes informatiques aussi, et puis, il y a treize milliards de billets à fabriquer, soixante-dix milliards de pièces pour les onze pays. Pour la France, ça fait dix milliards de pièces et deux milliards et demi de billets. Ça ne fait pas du jour au lendemain.
- Oui?
- Maintenant je comprends que ça fait trois ans..."  

Euro fait la force 1998b.

(Prices in francs and in euros: three years to get used to it.  
- Why do we still have to wait three years for the coins and bills?)
- Yes, why not right away?
- Because it is impossible, imagine. There are many things which have to be taken care of, commerces have to adapt, information systems, too, and then thirteen milliard bills must be manufactured, seventy milliard coins for the eleven countries. For France, there will be ten milliard coins and two and a half milliard bills. It takes more than just a few days.
- Oh!
- Now I understand why it takes three years...

The examples found in the commercials adopt a childish tone. The coming of the euro is made to sound like impressive and exciting occurrence, making an endless list of the countries involved and emphasising the huge amounts of the coins and bills to be produced. Both of these methods would work with children who are interested in numbers and long lists which sound like a play upon words. The voice of the narrator gets enthusiastic by the end of the country list, repeating the same names over again and then fading into the background when the music begins.

Also, in the second example, the discussion is characteristic of a father-child discussion. The impatience for the coming of the euro may not be the case with many adults and reminds one more of a child’s impatience waiting for his or her birthday presents. As well, the reasons given as to why one has to wait are too simplistic and culminate with the explanation of money manufacturing. Huge amount of coins and bills require a “long” time to produce, as much as three years.

As mentioned previously, this kind of naive discourse creates an unequal setting between citizens and the campaigners. The campaign teaches its readers and viewers how to think and feel about the euro. If the audience makes “mistakes” or misunderstands, the campaign corrects it. As a practice this kind of discourse is undemocratic in nature as it imposes one single view of the matter while ignoring other approaches or labelling them to be wrong or inaccurate. Another question to ponder is whether information campaigns can, in general, be democratic. The educational aspect seems to be an integral part and it is further emphasised when a campaign deals with complicated issues.
6.3.2 Pathos and Poetry - Romanticising the Euro

The other way of “trust building” in the French campaign reminds one of Aristotle’s categories of classical rhetoric, pathos. It is the style used in keynote addresses, including high-flown ideas and talk appealing more to emotions than reason. This kind of method is used in all three campaign items: the information brochure, the newspaper advertisement and especially, the television commercial.


(Because of the euro, we will have a means to growth and employment. Because of the euro, we will benefit from stable prices and a money unreachable by speculations. Because of the euro, we can travel to 11 countries without ever loosing money in exchange. Because of the euro, we can be on an equal footing with the dollar and the yen. Because of the euro, we will strengthen the position of France in the world.)


(Because adopting the euro is a little bit like living under the same roof: one has to acquiesce to common rules.)


(I wish that you would come to me. I would like to be happy, forever! I wish us the greatest of all happiness! I would like you to be my loved one. Imagine, what three hundred million men and women will build together… I wish that… …when they make wishes in the same currency.)

In the first example, the most distinct feature of pathos is the repetition seen at the beginning of the phrases. This kind of way to emphasise a message is used in speeches, often at the end when the speaker wants to make the audience excited and strengthen a feeling of belonging. The keynote address style is rarely used in written form because it works better in spoken language. Pathos is used in order to appeal to an audience’s emotions and to make the occasion memorable and special. Still, the use of pathos in information campaign is rare, especially if the issue at hand is controversial. The controversial nature of the euro makes this a risky method, because resistant viewers may become more opposed due to the emotional weight of the message.

The adoption of a keynote address style in campaigns seems to belong to remote history, certainly not at the end of the twentieth century. This kind of campaigns
see citizens being put in the position of an audience in the true sense of the word, where people listen and exist only for ceremonial purposes. An audience rarely participates in the course of events, they just sit and clap their hands, making the occasion feel important and successful.

The second example includes another frequent method used in speeches, a metaphor. Metaphors are used in order to decrease the abstract elements of an issue by giving strange ideas familiar connotations. For example, the metaphor "living under the same roof" makes the audience think of home, family and close relationships. Like the members of a family, the members of the EMU should tolerate each other and obey common rules.

The third example calls upon pure images reminding one of commercials in general. First, it is difficult to see any connection between the phrases and the actual issue, the euro. The concrete money is being transformed into an abstract idea. It is romanticised with references to love, happiness and friendship; wishes made by people throwing coins into the fountain. Different coins represent the wishes of people from different countries, and the euro will unite these wishes into one, positive power.

This kind of emotional talk is, in part, not characteristic of pathos of keynote addresses. It is more representative of a poem than a speech. Poems create feelings, which is often more important than the message itself. The main object of the commercial is to create an image, a feeling of positivity, beauty and future happiness. This is a familiar style found in commercials for perfumes and soft drinks. The euro is now a product to be purchased by consumers watching the commercials. It has a greater image value than a value of usage itself.

From the political point of view, the emotionality decreases the possibility for argumentation. The romantic style of the French commercials likens the euro to a piece of insitutionalised art - holding an unquestionable position and having its own raison d'etre. It is raised to a level unreachable by any speculations. The euro is compared to universally accepted ideals like peace, love and family. It is associated with the positive aspects of humanity, even though it is a currency, money. This kind of comparison remotes the coming of the euro as a phenomenon to be evaluated in the traditional sphere of politics and relocates it to an area which is usually considered to be private and "unpolitical", like family life and human relationships. In this way the campaign denies the disputable position of the euro, denying the possibility of any polemic.
6.3.3 Cartoon Humour

Humour, as a method used in information campaigns, is not new. Nevertheless, its use in a governmental information campaign is not as familiar in Finland as it is elsewhere. The French campaign uses humour in the television commercials “L’Euro, Mode d’Emploi”. The spots are funny animations, reminding one of children’s programs. The main theme consists of how ordinary people will confront the euro in their lives: a married couple tries to attach a new sign above their shop telling about the euro and a housewife listens to the radio news where the value of the euro is being explained. The humour comes from the little amusing incidents which happen to these people during their every-day activities. For example, a boy tries to get his over-packed suitcase closed, but it opens again and again. It is a classic joke and a familiar situation for every one (see figures 15 and 16).

The animated spots are most of all, entertainment. The role of the actual message, the coming of the euro, is minor when compared to stories and music. The objective of entertainment versus information are intertwined and invariable, the information easily gets buried under the entertaining parts. This is what happens and is probably meant to happen in the French commercials. The television spots as entertainment features emphasise again the target population as the regular audience. When the task of this audience is, in the case of the keynote address, to clap their hands, it is now time to laugh at the show being given. The primary object in the campaign may have been to present the euro as a light and nice thing, not to be taken too seriously. This is understandable when considering the specific target group of the French campaign, young people. However, is not the change of the currency a serious matter? What is so funny about it? Behind the jokes there may be something which the campaign is not
ready or able to talk about. This lack of real discussion is compensated with entertain-
ment.

The political function of the humour can be seen as trivialising the issue and making it "less important". The reasoning is that if one can afford to be humouristic about an issue, it cannot be of high importance. Humour is a way to guide the public opinion to consider the euro as something which happens, but does not need to be argued for or considered very deeply. It is like a show, interesting and amusing, worth watching, but no more.
7 CAMPAIGNS OF THE EURO: 
TRUSTING POLITICS OR POLITICISING TRUST?

7.1 Finnish and French Euro Discourse – Rational and Emotional 
Argumentation

The starting point for this thesis was the stated objective of the euro campaigns “to 
build full trust towards the common currency”. The main goal was to analyse how the 
two national euro campaigns in Finland and France try to accomplish this objective. 
In other words, how do the campaigns in both these countries “build trust” towards 
the idea of a common currency. As well, what does this kind of trust building actually 
mean from a political point of view. Another task was cross-cultural analysis, deter-
mining whether there were any cultural features which might explain the differences 
between both campaigns. 

The material analysed in this study did not cover the entire campaign commu-
nication. The Finnish material was more representative than that of the French since 
taken all together, there were less data to be analysed in the Finnish case. Since the 
French campaign was more extensive, only its beginning and end could be studied. 
On the whole, the issue of informing citizens, the time period and the methods used 
were the same, and the universal audience was in both cases, ordinary citizens. In 
general, the data can be seen as reliable enough to draw conclusions about the 
characteristics of the campaigns and to compare them with one another. Content 
analysis was the research methodology so as to allow for qualitative analysis of the 
data. It is the belief of the researcher that political examination of an issue is better 
served by free subjective interpretation of data rather than employing quantitative 
measures that may only highlight specific parts at the cost of the whole. 

With respect to the realisation of both campaigns, there were differences re-
garding the official decision of the EMU and public opinion about the euro. The Fin-
nish euro campaign was held during 1998, after the decision about EMU membership 
was taken. In fact, the EMU’s actual decision was already taken at the referendum 
held in 1994. During that time citizens had their chance to influence the issue but the 
decision in 1998 was completely handled by parliament. The question revolved 
around whether Finland was to join the EMU and be among the first in the group of 
member states or to postpone making that decision to a later date. It was decided
that Finland would join the EMU and be among the first in the group and the information campaign was realised to support this process. Consequently, Finnish citizens were never in position to make a real choice.

One problem the Finnish campaign faced was the rather negative public opinion; almost half of its population had doubts about adopting the euro. According to campaigners, the dissemination of information was done in order to decrease such fears and doubts about the euro, and to make people more amenable to a new currency. The campaigners emphasised that they did not wish to run a "propaganda" style campaign but instead provide "correct and objective" information.

There were three main themes which emerged from the Finnish campaign: (1) the idea of no change, (2) easy to use and (3) a better future. These themes were built around the discussion about the euro, featuring it positively. The first theme, "no change", was the most distinct and explicit of the three. It aimed at naturalising the adoption of the euro into an issue which was not a choice but an eventual fact. This served to unpoliticise the euro and at the same time the possibility of other arguments - that something could change - were denied.

The second theme, "easy to use", was about providing concrete examples of the euro in use. These examples were meant to reassure people about every-day life with the euro: there would be no problems, everything would unfold nicely and easily. However, the second theme makes the first look somewhat problematic. Although there was not going to be any major change, something still had to be done differently than before.

The second theme emphasised the ease in carrying out the actions needed, meaning the usage of the euro in citizens’ daily life. The campaigners wished to calm public dissent by demonstrating how there would be no trouble caused by the euro. This kind of reassurance is anyhow, politically problematic: if the coming of an event requires reassurance it simultaneously creates the exclusion or unacceptability of these reflections in relation to another discourse.

The third theme of a "better future" concentrated on the advantages resulting from the adoption of the euro. However, most of the benefits described were abstract in nature and somewhat exaggerated. In general, the theme highlighting the benefits used the language of economic policy. The coming of the euro was argued to be positive through the use of economic arguments to justify the whole process. However, economic policy should not be considered superior to that of politics. Important
national decisions, like the adopting of the euro can certainly not be reduced to mere economic argumentation.

The means of "trust building" in the Finnish campaign could be put into three different categories: (1) practicality, (2) directness and (3) identification. Practicality was highlighted through providing everyday examples of euro usage with the structure of the text in advertisements being simple and short sentenced. However, the simplicity partly turned into over-simplification and self-evidence and reminded one of a textbook or a teacher-pupil conversation. The characters in the campaign were intended to serve as practical examples and role models for people to follow. The persons in the television commercials and the information brochure were to represent "the majority" of the Finnish population. They persuaded viewers to agree with them and to adopt the conventional positive view about the euro matter. On the other hand, unconventional or different opinions were not tolerated in the campaign and their representatives were not seen in the pages of the brochure. This too ensured that politics be excluded from any discourse.

Directness as a way to build trust, for its part, was concretised in the conversational model displayed throughout the campaign. The text addressed viewers directly using "you" and discussed the issue explicitly, as opposed to packaging the issue in political jargon while seeking to narrow the gap between the government and its citizens. Directness as a characteristic is usually connected to honesty, and this is apparently what the campaigners wished for viewers to experience. Another element aimed at with directness was personality. The campaigners wished to personally address citizens and create a feeling that each one of them was individually being considered. However, this personalisation was carried out through the language of economics and consumerism. Instead of being citizens the people were thought of as being rational consumers. From a political perspective it is however irrational that this rational consumer should only rely on one truth, that of the campaigner.

The third means of trust building, identification, was mainly realised via the images that were supplied in the campaign. The different characters were individualised by giving them names and locations. In general, the style of the images were documentary type; persons gave testimonials in favour of the euro in interview-like situations. The social roles of the characters were also clearly divided among demographic and social classes. While part of the material presented only Finnish people, the other part compared Finns to Europeans and emphasised the similarity of all
people who would eventually use the euro. Consequently, the elements of similarity but also difference formed the main themes behind the campaign images. Finnish people were offered a “European identity” but at the same time it was underlined that this new identity was not very different from the present one. The difference was manifested, somewhat inconsistently through the first theme in the way the characters were identified. The featured Finnish persons had their names and home towns appear while the foreigners had only their name and country appear. This made the foreigners seem more distant and different from the Finns. The theme of difference somehow opposed the idea of a “common European identity” as proposed by the theme of similarity.

The Finnish campaign’s wish to target those individuals with the highest doubts about the euro and the EMU influenced the methods used. The campaign talked about the euro in careful tones and stayed away from any contradictory or difficult subjects. Only the clear and self-evident aspects were handled while the others were ignored, as if they did not exist. Here lies the unpoliticisation: any real discussion should include many different aspects which only appeared in other media outlets. The one-sided content of the campaign material is characteristic of advertising for a product: only the positive sides are mentioned while the negative sides are nowhere to be found. Consequently, the campaign views its audience as being a rational consumer: thinking practically, appealing to reason and forgetting any emotional parts to the story.

The French campaign represents a partly different, partly similar discourse in comparison to that of the Finnish. In general, the French campaign was much more fragmented than its Finnish counterpart. One reason for this was its wider time frame lasting from 1997 to 1998. The communication efforts were realised in sequences making the campaign less uniform than the Finnish. Another reason for this may be due to the younger generation having been selected as the target audience. It may have been difficult to realise a campaign directed especially at the younger generation and other age groups at the same time. Another thing worth remembering is the rather different French regional cultures.

French public opinion was more favourable to the coming of the euro than it was in Finland; more than half of the population felt positively about adopting a new currency. Also, the position adopted by the campaign was different from that in Finland: in France the campaign had already begun prior to an official decision con-
cerning EMU membership. The French were informed about the euro both before and after their actual joining of EMU. This may have had an impact on public opinion: at least the citizens felt they could have had some kind of influence on the matter. One reason for the negative attitudes in Finland might very well have been due to the fact that the government informed the people about the decision only after it had already been made.

The themes which emerged in the French campaign were: (1) easy to use, (2) a dynamic and strong Europe and (3) a strong and independent France. The first theme was similar and corresponds to the Finnish theme: the campaign had a reassuring tone. It claimed that the change of currency would cause no trouble to citizens since everything had already been taken care of in advance. However, the euro cannot be perceived as a certain or known phenomenon. Above all it includes contingency, which campaigners were not ready to admit.

The second theme of a dynamic and strong Europe differs from the Finnish campaign. It highlighted the benefits the euro would bring to all Europeans, and placed the euro on the same level as the dollar and the yen. The coming of the euro was seen as an opportunity to strengthen European identity and make possible the “comeback” of Europe. In addition, whatever benefits the Europeans would enjoy, so would the French; what was good for Europe became good for France. One can draw a parallel between this kind of argumentation with the Finnish theme of “no change”; the French are already seen as being “so European” that the coming of the euro cannot make them much more European than they already are.

The third theme was the opposite of the second. The difference being that the argumentation began in France and ended in Europe. The euro was seen as an opportunity benefiting France, and what was good for France became good for Europe. The advantages for France were equated with those of Europe in general. While the second theme emphasised “the European” in every Frenchman, this third theme claimed that the French would remain French; superior to the rest of Europeans. Evidently, these two ways of argumentation do not go hand in hand. They are indicative of the identity question which seems to be constantly linked to the discussion about the EU in general: will national identities disappear in the course of the euro zone? People are afraid of this issue and its discussion has been avoided by instead focusing on a “common European identity”. In a way, the act of claiming common iden-
tity is just a means to prevent discussion and un politicise any identity problematics. In other words, to render it unproblematic.

The French campaign utilized three main methods to engage in "trust building" towards the euro: (1) practicality, (2) pathos and (3) humour. The first of these methods, practicality, reminds one once again of the Finnish campaign. However, the practicality in the French campaign had an even stronger tone, approaching naivism. This was partly due to the large amount of pictures repeating the message of the text which is a style characteristic of young children's textbooks. Also, the same kind of teacher-pupil discourse was built into the structure. The teaching style of the French campaign gave it an undemocratic feel: the campaigners took on for themselves the right to teach citizens how to feel or to think about the euro. They represented themselves as being an authority on the matter and the public the object of needed enlightenement. This kind of educational strategies seem to nevertheless be a central part of any information campaign and thus, it begs the question as to whether campaign can ever be truly democratic in nature.

The two other ways selected to build trust, pathos and humour, were special features of the French campaign. The use of pathos resembled a keynote address. Through the use of metaphors and poetry, an image of the euro based on abstract and romanticised notions which have no real connection to the actual issue took place. The campaigners appealed to emotions and placed citizens occupying the traditional role of an audience. The public therefore existed only for ceremonial purposes without having the real chance to participate. The reason for the ceremony, the coming of the euro, is at the same time raised to "an upper level" and made to look like a piece of classic art, indisputably valued and accepted. The euro symbolised the commonness of Europeans and all the positive effects for this community: happiness, peace and love. In this way the discussion about the euro was transformed from a public to a private issue and as such, became unpolitical. Emotionality was an effort to exclude politics from the arena of discussion.

The third means to strengthen trust towards the euro, humour, was achieved through the use of funny animations. The commercials showed people in every-day activities having little humorous accidents happening to them. The animations provided comic-like entertainment. Humour as a way of building trust emphasises again the passive and unpolitical role of the audience: the citizen is to be entertained by the performance so as to exclude the possibility of participation. Moreover, humour is
also a way to make the actual issue look "less important", and similar to an every-day routine. The coming of the euro is presented as a funny and somehow trivial event which will just happen without it requiring much attention. In reality, any decision concerning the euro cannot be considered as trivial. The humour used in the campaign is in fact, an effort to guide the opinion of people. Politically, it can be seen as an attempt to restrict any free debate about the matter.

The main difference between the Finnish and French campaigns is that while the French thought their audience to be emotional and interested in issues outside the sphere of economics, the Finnish assumed their audience to be rational consumers who only think in financial terms. The Finnish campaign saw the euro being described as one product in the line of others and it was advertised to be a rational choice. The choice of the euro was given a basis of unchangeability. As in advertising, discussion was limited: the elements that were going to change remained unmentioned. Any potentially negative aspects were not discussed. The final choice left to "consumers" was about choosing to either believe or not in the campaign message. Any doubts were decreased by showing "believers" in the ads: ordinary but successful Finns and other Europeans.

The French campaign had another strategy. It discussed more broadly different aspects of the euro as well as gave an over-positive picture of the issue. The French seemed to be the audience of an entertainment show which romanticised the euro. The proposed new currency is to be strong and beautiful, making the French successful Europeans and all Europeans as successful as the French. As a result, the facts became partly buried under fiction. The object towards which trust was being sought seemed to be as much about France as a nation as the adoption of the euro. This differs from the Finnish campaign which focused only on the concrete money aspect of the euro. In general, while the politics in the French campaign remained on the level of a keynote address, the Finnish campaign reduced it to mere economic policy.

The similarity of the two campaigns lie in the position of the audience. In both cases, audience was handed a passive role. In the Finnish campaign, citizens could either accept or reject the euro. In the French campaign, the audience could decide whether they liked the show or not. From a political point of view, the problem was that citizens could not participate in either one of the discussions or be allowed to decide about their content. Politics should always include more options than just pre-
sent a dichotomy; the possibility of making different choices should be as many as the persons choosing them.

One primary task of this study was to clarify the concepts of "trust building" and "positive propaganda" and their possible difference. Both euro campaigns claimed to be information campaigns seeking to build trust towards an eventual common currency. However, where does the difference between this kind of trust building and propaganda lie? First, one should pay attention to the social function of the campaigns. Were they realised to merely inform citizens? According to the stated objectives of the campaigns, there was, in both cases, a particular target audience and a larger, more universal audience. In the Finnish case, the campaign especially wanted to decrease doubts and fears about the euro. Whereas the French aimed at strengthening the young generation's feeling of belonging to a European community. Both these objectives transcend mere informing. Therefore, in order to realise these changes, one must change people's attitudes about the euro. The persuasive nature of both campaigns becomes evident based on the analysed material.

The benefits received from the campaigns were partly individual but mostly collective. There was useful information given to citizens, but its persuasive nature tried most of all to gain public approval for the euro. The issue at hand was controversial and problematic, and the somewhat one-sided way to approach the issue points to issues of social control. The campaigns can be seen as efforts to control the information flow within society: citizens needed information about the euro and governments decided upon which "suitable" information was to be distributed.

Propaganda, when considered to be an elementary part of any democratic society is most of all, politics of information: who has access to information and who is restricted. In a positive sense, it aims at sustaining democracy in a society. It functions as a control over the vast information flow and makes possible opinion formation. When citizens cannot any longer control the information themselves, the propaganda does it for them as a form of democratic opinion management. The problem with this kind of "positive propaganda" is where to draw the line between democratic and the totalitarian sides of the issue.

However, it must be especially said that the Finnish euro campaigners emphasised that they did not want to create any EMU propaganda, but to build trust. How should this kind of "trust building" be understood in a governmental context? Trust and politics do not seem to be a match. Trust includes the idea of honesty and it is
problematic to connect honesty as a form of morality to politics. It is better understood in the case of individuals. Also the question about the object of trust is not a simple one: were the people supposed to trust the euro, the campaigners, the EU, or politics in general? It seems that the campaigners wanted mostly to build trust towards the euro and the EMU. However, the task of building trust towards this kind of phenomena, which are most of all contingent, strange and highly abstract, may be impossible to succeed - at least when it comes to ordinary citizens. To have trust in a currency is more a matter of enterprises or states which do business based on this kind of "trust". To gain trust towards the national institutions which had already made the decision concerning the EMU, might have been a more realistic task in the case of the euro campaigns. Citizens could have been asked to trust the capabilities of these institutions to do their job well and in that sense, be reliable. These types of qualities cannot be simply linked to a currency but to institutions consisting of individuals.

Another aspect of the concept of trust is that of risk. Trust seems to always include a risk: to trust somebody or something means taking a risk. If one chooses not to trust, they can avoid the risk. In the case of the euro campaigns, there was no risk. The actual risk was taken by citizens when their respective countries held their referendums about EU membership. The decision of the adoption of the euro in the first group was not in the hands of the people. If the euro campaigns would indeed have been "building trust" there should have been an option offered to citizens. Consequently, based on the campaign contents, they would have chosen whether to take the risk or avoid taking it altogether. This kind of possibility was nevertheless supplied.

Accordingly, the concept of positive propaganda would be a more relevant notion than that of trust building in the context of the euro campaigns. The campaigners wanted to change people's attitudes to be more positive, in other words, to practice opinion management. Citizens however lacked the capability to collect information about the euro although there were vast amounts of it available. The campaigners served as controllers of this information: they only picked part of it and offered it to citizens as the "complete" picture. This kind of politics of information aims at forming a public opinion suitable to the purposes of the controller: the public will eventually end up demanding what the government has already decided it should demand.
The problem of any modern democratic society is that information flow cannot be controlled through democratic methods. Citizens cannot be considered to be omni-competent actors who can form their opinions based on the large amount of information by controlling it themselves. Positive propaganda, even though undemocratic, is a solution to this problem functioning as the engineering force behind democratic consent.

The adoption of propaganda as a “democratic” apparatus is not, however, an unproblematic option. In the case of the euro campaigns, the lack of genuine discussion was the most distinct negative consequence of the propagandistic nature of the distribution of information. An information campaign in general may not be the best way to deal with situations like the change of a national currency. People did need practical information, but in addition they might have wanted to hear “real” arguments for the euro and also be able to present their views about the matter. This would have increased their own desire to know more and have a greater chance to reflect on the issue. However, it seems that both campaign discourses did not create any fruitful discussions which may prove to be problematic in the long run. The lack of information and interest in the matter might increase frustration and negative attitudes at a later time and this may actually run counter to the real objectives of the campaigns.

This study has analysed both campaigns through the analysis of campaign material, campaigners’ objectives and intentions. The role of the public as the interpreter of these campaigns has not been here considered although it is as important as the role of the campaigner's themselves. The campaign contents have been designed by the government but this cannot decide how citizens will interpret the messages. Some intended meanings may be misunderstood when people watch television commercials or read an information brochure. The way the minds of people function cannot be fully predicted. Consequently, in order to form a more complete picture of the campaign process, a study of the audience would prove to be helpful. How did the people interpret the Finnish and French euro campaigns? Did they find them to be informing, persuading or propagandising? Did the assumptions of the campaigners match with the reality on the other side of the television screen? To find the answers to such questions would require further study, concentrating on the other actor of the campaign process, the public.
7.2 Culture in the Campaigns: Finnish Honesty and French Ambiguity

The cultural analysis of the campaigns is based on the idea that governmental information directed at the public reflects its cultural characteristics. Although these types of campaigns were not representative of a genuine two-way communication like, for example, a face-to-face exchange in an interpersonal context, one can still assume that information is formed to correspond to the cultural features and communicative habits of the given audience. One still cannot completely identify the cultural perceptions of the campaigner with their actual form among the public. Nevertheless, when the campaigner represents the same national culture as the public, these two concepts of culture can be thought as being quite similar to one another. Consequently, the analysis of governmental campaigns is one possibility to explore the cultural traits of the nations at hand.

Although both Finland and France are western countries sharing much commonality in their cultures, the national euro campaigns were still realised in partly different ways. One way to partly explain these differences may lie in the examining of cultural traits. Applying Hofstede's dimensions to the campaign contents may serve as a starting point for such an analysis.

The first of Hofstede's dimensions, power distance, seemed to manifest itself in the expressive style of both campaigns. The French campaign had more elaborate and implicit texts than did the Finnish, using longer sentences and symbolic language. In general, the manner of speech was indirect. In the Finnish campaign, the text directly addressed the reader, using "you" instead of a passive form. Sentences were short and explicit. The larger power distance in French society could be one explanation for this difference.

The difference in the style of speech could also be analysed from the aspect of uncertainty avoidance. According to Hofstede, France is a country of high uncertainty avoidance and its people use expressive language and may show emotions overtly. Finland, on the other hand, is a low uncertainty avoidance country and its people speak less expressively and avoid showing emotions overtly. This could be one reason behind the emotional campaigning of the euro in France, the talk of love and friendship. The Finnish campaign was purely rational, avoiding any pathos or emotional expressions.
Another of the cultural dimensions, masculinity versus femininity, also emerged in both campaigns. Although France and Finland can be regarded as being feminine societies when compared to for example Japan, according to Hofstede, Finland is still much more feminine than France. This seems to have its impact on the contents of the Finnish campaign: the theme of "no change" and "a safe future" was highlighted and one of the main issues discussed was social security. The French campaign was completely different in this respect. It highlighted the change and challenges to be brought by the coming of the euro. The euro was seen as an advancement, leading to a dynamic Europe and France.

One of the special features distinguishing the Finnish and French campaigns was the talk of one's own country and culture in the respective campaigns. The Finnish campaign lacked almost completely any discussion of its culture. Also, there was almost no mention about Finnish identity and how the euro would influence it. On the other hand, the talk of France and French identity occupied a big part of its campaign. Although the discussion was one-sided, the aspect of culture and cultural identity was still present. Where do these different attitudes towards one's own culture come from? The previously mentioned French pride about their own culture could be one factor. In France, it may be impossible to realise a national campaign without including its cultural aspect. Whereas in Finland, the question of culture and identity have generally not been considered to belong to the discussion about the euro.

One thing which highlights the different relationship with one's own culture in Finland and France are the notions of being agrarian or bourgeois, or those of "first" and "second degree". The pride in one's own culture and general interest are characteristics of a bourgeois culture. In Alapuro's terms one could also call these two cultural traits the first and second degree. The first cultural degree, which is said to exist in Finland, is most of all about honesty. It means that everything is what it seems to be and the interpretation community is clear and transparent. The relationship between experience and its expression is one to one. On the other hand, the French second degree refers to reflexivity and duplication. One relates the issues or oneself consciously to the environment or the "facts" of the first degree. These issues are then exceeded and played with. A given word is not regarded as being as serious a thing as it is in the first degree. Instead, the context is emphasised.
The first degree seemed to be clearly manifested in the Finnish campaign. The issues presented were taken to be factual and truthful representations of reality. The campaigners wanted to be considered "honest" in the eyes of the public. However, the campaign content was perhaps restricted precisely because of this "honesty": only the practical aspects of the euro were dealt with and the abstract and complicated questions were left out. The ensuing results are simplicity, self-evidence and one-sidedness. When the campaigners felt that a question could not have a simple or "honest" answer, it was ignored. As to the lack of cultural discussion, the campaigners seem to have considered it to be outside the euro discourse. The new currency was regarded as it "seemed to be": an economic issue which had to be dealt strictly with economic terms and measures.

The lack of pathos and humour in the Finnish campaign, included in the French campaign, can be partly understood in the light of the first degree discourse. Emotional and humorist ways of talk are not clear and transparent in the way that the first degree presupposes. Pathos and humour are often used to make things look different, to create unusual reflections and interpretations. They have more in common with the second degree by placing a greater emphasis on the context than the issue.

Consequently, the French campaign seems to have been realised mostly according to the second cultural degree. It used partly exceptional methods and, for example, played with words like "European" and "French". This kind of governmental campaign is possible to realise in a culture where words are not to be accounted for in their literal sense: one can argue and afterward, disagree about everything by presenting a "just as good" counter-argument. The French campaign can be seen more like an introduction to a discussion about the euro, while the Finnish tried to provide "facts" and "reality" to be adopted as such by the public.

In general, the French campaign saw the euro as a social phenomenon which was related to much more than just economic policy. Therefore, the political aspect was more present than in its Finnish counterpart. In general, politics seems to belong more to the second degree: it is about exceeding the "facts" and questioning the one that is seen. Words are not to be thought of as a representation of reality but a way to construct it.
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