A THEORY OF "DUPES"

Reflections on the Limits and Possibilities of Shoshana Felman's Transferential Theory of Narrative

Eriikka Käyhkö

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**TIIVISTELMÄ - ABSTRACT**


Tutkielmaa transferentiaalisen lukemistekorian erityiseksi avuksi nähdään kyseisen teorian kyky uudelleentulkita lukuprosesiin ja yleisemminkin taiteen vastaanottoon jo klassisesti liittyvää samastumisen käsittetä. Teorian mukaan lukevan subjektin ja luettavan objektin välillä ei ole olemassa sellaista radikaalia ontologiasta eroa, joka niiden välille kulttuurisisidonnaista syistä helposti oletetaan. Transferentiaalisen lukemisen teorian avulla pystytäänkin purkamaan niitä raja-aitoja, joita erityisesti narratologinen tutkimus on asettanut tekstin (tekstualisuuden) sekä aktuaalisen lukijan (lukijuuden) välille.

**Asiakirjat:**
- Fukemin, transferenssi, psykoanalyytiset teoriat ja kirjallisuustiede, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Barbara Johnson

**Säilytyspaikka:** KIRJALLISUUDEN LAITOS

**Muita tietoja**
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Introduction

In this study my purpose is to critically examine Shoshana Felman's suggestion of the transferenceal theory of narrative, which she proposes in her essay *Turning the Screw of Interpretation* (first published in 1977). Felman is the Thomas E. Donnelly Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Yale University. She is also a trained Lacanian psychoanalyst. In *Turning the Screw of Interpretation* Felman analyses narrative processes through close-readings of Henry James's novel *The Turn of the Screw* and its criticism. What emerges from this study is a theory of the reading effect as a *transference* effect.

Felman's main observation is, that in the act of reading *The Turn of the Screw* the critics appear to become trapped by the novel's rhetoric in quite an unexpected way. In their efforts to interpret their intratextual world, the characters offer models for interpreting the text. These positions are then enacted rather unwittingly by the actual readers, since their reading performances can be viewed as putting forth the drama described in the text.

What is remarkable is that this rather uncanny effect of a text "anticipating" its readings cannot be explained by any classical theory of identification, since the actual readers are not conscious of their positions' similarity to those of the characters': on the contrary, they attribute a considerable amount of autonomy to their readings. This can be seen in the fact that the critics often end up condemning the very character whose reading style they themselves embody. In a word, the readers are fooled. This kind of narrative exchange is, according to Felman, possible to explain by alluding to the logic of transference. In Felman's theory, the transference effect is an interpretation of what American logician C.S. Peirce has called the effect of *interpretant*. *Interpretant* means the position of an interpreter that any discourse
inevitably assumes. In addition, it signifies the necessity of interpretation: in order to understand a sign, a sign has to be interpreted into another sign, and so forth and so on, without any end.²

As is well known, transference is a psychoanalytic concept. It first emerged in the work of the founding father of the discipline, Freud, as simply another term for the displacement of affect from one idea to another.³ Later on, the concept came to refer to the relationship between the patient and the analyst during psychoanalytic treatment and it is still the concept's central meaning in psychoanalytic theory. However, Jacques Lacan insisted that the transference effect should be understood as signifying the general dynamics of communication. According to his structural definition, transference is caused by the desire to know. This desire is accompanied by the presumption, that the other party of communication is a self-governing, conscious subject who understands the meanings desired. Therefore, it can be argued that transference signifies the normative assumptions which any discourse has to make in order to communicate in the first place. Shoshana Felman, who is a remarkable Lacanian theorist herself, draws her theory from the broadest sense of the word.⁴

In literary criticism, the popularity of the conceptual tool of transference has grown with the shift of interest in the field of psychoanalytically oriented literary criticism. From the study of the assumed psychology of writers, characters or readers, the criticism has moved towards the study of textual dynamics. In addition to Felman's pioneering study, critic Peter Brooks has made interesting work on the subject.⁵ However, critics have used the concept of transference for the other purposes mentioned as well; the choice is strongly related to the psychoanalytic school preferred.⁶
Felman's transferential theory of narrative has been subject to some serious misunderstandings. For example, the concept of transference has been viewed as inevitably anthropomorphising "purely textual" communication. Also, it has been accused of introducing textual immanence, that is, of viewing the text as the source of meaning in the process of reading. Such inaccurate criticism is very likely due to the referential nature of her theoretical suggestion: the transferential theory of narrative has to be carefully interpreted on the basis of Felman's readings of James's novel and its criticism. When Felman cites Lacan, she is not very generous in stating her reasons for the use of the concept of transference. Often it appears that she uses Lacan's texts as a self-evident reference, without arguing what motivates her usage. However, Felman is quite aware of the indirect nature of her theory.

In this study, I will try, through contextualising her theory and making it more explicit, to point out the theory's apparent advantages and, thus, defend her suggestion of the transferential model of reading and writing. My argument is that despite the fact that Felman's theory of the narrative processes is conceptually a very requiring one, as it necessitates at least familiarity with psychoanalytic theory, literary criticism cannot afford to let go of her contribution to the theory of reading. This is, of course, with the reservation that literary criticism does not wish to take textual communication as commonplace. In addition to psychoanalytic theory, rare approaches of philosophically or literally oriented thinking can offer more of a thorough approach for the dynamics of reading and writing, than the psychoanalytic view to communication at its best puts forth. The advantage of psychoanalytic theory is that it offers a subtle explanation for the existence of human subjects and thus states how communication is possible without
admitting dishonest, harmonised views to the textuality of communication.

Perhaps an example would make the situation clear. The most recent and thus most famous example of the incapability to account for the actual side of narrative processes comes, of course, from narratology. In one of its rare efforts to explain the mystery of actual communication - usually the level of actual communication is bracketed, precisely in order to avoid the above mentioned anthropomorphisation of "purely textual" dynamics - critic Wayne C. Booth formulates reading and writing in terms of identification. According to Booth, the success in communication depends, in the case of the actual writer, how well he manages to separate from himself a structure, a kind of alter ego, of the implied author. Similarly, in the case of the actual reader, the question is how well he succeeds in identifying himself with the position of the implied reader. The implied author and reader exist in Booth's theory as textual constructions, which must be assumed on the basis of textual discourse. However, as Finnish narratologist, Erkki Vainikkala, has pointed out, Booth's way of conceptualising reading and writing is not satisfying. Booth leaves out one of the most common experiences in the effort of reading: that of becoming a mock-reader, kind of "mock-me".

Without a doubt, what makes Booth's suggestion slightly ridiculous is that he uses the term identification simply as synonymous with the beautiful themes of acceptance and harmony. This kind of view of identification as harmony is, of course, a classical idea, as is also the terming of identification as the primary tool of communication. Booth's vision shares - in the words of Elizabeth Freund - the dream of humanism of the self-evident communication. However, in its classical sense, the theory of identification cannot account for the
complicated phenomena of reading and writing, even with the narratological refinements suggested. Let it be noted now, that the purpose of this example is not to mock the achievements of narratology; the work made in the study of textual structures irreplaceable. The transferential explanation model is certainly at odds with the above mentioned issues of identification and theoretical constructions of implied readers and authors. For example, critic Peter Brooks has used Booth's and Seymour Chatman's hierarchical model of narrative levels in connection with his task of explaining textuality with transferential dynamics.\textsuperscript{12} However, psychoanalytically influenced way of viewing these subjects is different: Brooks tries to destabilise narratology's strictly structural view to textuality. Also the psychoanalytic view to the logic of identification has the effect of destabilisation, as will be seen later on in this study.

In order to understand the nature of Felman's theory, we will begin by examining Lacanian psychoanalysis: its world view and especially, the Lacanian view to language and its significance in the human experience. In Chapter two I will examine the concept of transference in its psychoanalytic context. It should be noted that Lacan has himself reminded that his concepts gain their significance in relation to his other psychoanalytic concepts.\textsuperscript{13} If one wishes to estimate the suitability of the transferential explanatory model in the field of literary criticism, quite comprehensive account of the Lacanian theory is needed. Nevertheless, this account will still remain somewhat fragmentary: in my view, this is the necessary destiny of any definition because at the end of the day, concepts can function as concepts only by means of their openness.

In Chapter three, I will study Felman's readings of James's novel
and its criticism. In order to discuss her theory, one first has to interpret her theory on the basis of the specificity of her readings. Characteristically, she refers to the transferential reading theory only in the introduction of her essay, where she states that such a theory will be put forth and lists some important characteristics of the forthcoming theory, most importantly the connection to the Peircean concept of interpretant. In addition to this, only one subtitle and, two questions on page 178 reveal the "ultimate" theoretical ambition of her study. Nevertheless, Felman's study rewards close-readings, and the fact that Felman suggests her theory through a particular reading of James's novel should not be underestimated. The transferential reading theory is a theory of a reading effect which is always particular, since any theory, in Felman's view, cannot account for all rhetorical effects at once and for all.

In Chapter four, I will briefly crystallise the concept interpretant. In Chapter five I will discuss her theory. Because Felman's theory is both a suggestion of a general logic of narrative and a particular reading, I will pay attention to both trends in her achievement. I will commit a critical examination of her particular readings of James's novel and its criticism, but also pay attention to the general possibilities of her theory.
1 LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

1.1 Psychoanalysis as a Field of Science

In order to view the possibilities of the adoption of the psychoanalytic concept of transference in the study of literature, we have to pay some attention to psychoanalysis as science because it cannot be viewed as a commonplace that psychoanalytic concepts originally developed for psychoanalytic treatment could simply be transferred to the study of literature. In the following I will examine the arguments on the basis of which such a transfer can be done.

Despite the fact that psychoanalysis is presumably the only field of science still dominated by the name of its founder, Freud, the field is divided by major disagreements concerning scientific principles. The division, essential for understanding the differences among the schools of literary criticism terming themselves "psychoanalytic", goes between the Anglo-American ego-psychologically oriented Freudianism and the French school of psychoanalysis. Ego-psychology abandons the latter part of Freud’s writings and confesses only to the force of the pleasure principle. This school, founded by Heinz Hartmann, tries to incorporate traditional psychological thinking into psychoanalysis, where they favour a natural science approach. Contrary to this, Jacques Lacan, the most famous representative of the psychoanalytic thinkers of the French school, held that Freud was moving away from the methodology of positivism. As Benvenuto and Kennedy write in Introduction to the Works of Jacques Lacan:
(...). Freud himself was uneasy about the move. Freud wanted to be scientific, yet he was also aware that his discoveries veered away from the assumptions of natural science. Lacan seems to be quite clear that Freud was moving into the area of what are now called the 'human sciences', those disciplines essentially concerned with human meaning.16

Remarkably enough, the French line of interpretation takes into account also the latter part of Freud's production, and, thus, confesses also the principle of the death drive, which functions as a contradictory force to the first principle of wish fulfilment. Against this background it can be understood why Lacan understood his own project as a return to Freud against the censoring ways of reading Freud practised in Lacan's view by ego-psychologists.

Lacan's work has been repeatedly characterised as an effort to formulate the "philosophy of psychoanalysis".17 However, it should be noted that Lacan's relationship to philosophy is ambiguous. He opposed the totalising systems of philosophy and linked such systems with the discourse of master.18 For Lacan, this discourse works on the basis of the illusionary assumption that a subject can have a metalingual position towards knowledge. Opposing the view of Lacan as a theorist of psychoanalysis, Shoshana Felman argues that Lacan is, first and foremost, a practical thinker, and that his thinking bears an inborn relationship, not to philosophy, but to literature. As is very well known, Lacan has reinterpreted Freudian psychoanalysis in linguistic terms; according to his famous slogan, "the unconscious is structured like language".19 Consequently, the interest in his work, on behalf of the literary critics, can hardly surprise anyone. For literary critics, his theory offers a way of explaining textual communication in a manner which does not anthropomorphisise texts, but textualises humans. In this sense psychoanalysis is a non-humanistic science: it opposes the traditional views humanism has of human beings as self-conscious,
self-present subjects.

If we now characterise some of the basic assumptions made by Lacanian psychoanalysis, one must first note the obvious fact that, according to Lacan, psychoanalysis is based on a non-empirical view of reality. This means that "reality" for human beings is viewed as irreversibly symbolised. There is no way to attain empirical reality as such because reality for us emerges in the system of signifying differences. This view of reality is the basis of the psychoanalytic assumption that the narrative cure of analysis can "make the difference". Importantly for literary research, it follows that psychoanalysis is a field related to literature since it is based on a narrative practise: the treatment is carried out through the medium of words, and this is what necessitates the knowledge of language and rhetoric for the analysts.

The view that reality is irreversibly symbolised makes it necessary that the view to truth as correspondent with objective reality must be changed into a more reasonable system of "truth" as correspondent with conceptions of the shared symbolised reality: truth is negotiated because the realm of language is common for all of us. This does not mean that there is no physical reality whatsoever. On the contrary, Lacan assumes such a "rough" reality - for him the reality as such is the Real. However, once a human child has entered the realm of language, this reality of things becomes inaccessible for him. As Heidegger explains it, for a human being everything is "given" more or less "understandingly". Even though we cannot reach the physical reality as such, we live continuously with it and of it, and continuously the Real can be read in its effects.
1.2 The Significance of the Lacanian Conception of Language

The world view suggesting that the "shared" field of language and the functions of discursive systems are the most important explanatory field of human reality is, of course, by no means, a psychoanalytic property. What then is the distinctively Lacanian view of language that we live by?

As is well known, Lacan reinterpreted unconscious in terms of Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics which views language as a system of differences. There are no positive terms: identities can emerge only as a result of negation.\textsuperscript{23} This is the basic assumption behind Lacan's linguistic way of conceptualising the development and existence of a human subject. Human reality is the world of difference and thus the unconscious, based on differential relationships, is not inside or in possession of an individual, but "outside."\textsuperscript{24}

It should be noted that due to this structuralistic trend in his thinking, it does not make sense to view the Lacanian theory of child development in terms of chronological development. What is essential is the outcome of the process, the structure of the human psyche which makes the human reality possible. For in Lacan's conception of time, more important than the "time of a clock" are the dynamics of retroaction and anticipation, "the logical time."\textsuperscript{25} The indisputable advantages of this conception of time are easier to understand if one thinks about the production of meaning in language: understanding happens often in retrospective. For example, the understanding of narratives is, as Peter Brooks has noted, continuous negotiation between different possibilities of meaning.\textsuperscript{26} Similarly, the way one views one's "reality" is always accessible to the effect of Freudian "nachträglichkeit" -
as a matter of fact, psychoanalytic treatment is the interpretation of the past interpretations, of the traumatic way of relating oneself to the conditions of reality.27

As to Freud to Lacan the human subject is "the subject of the unconscious"; it exists due to the existence of the unconscious.28 The birth of the unconscious can be explained in the following manner: to be able to enter the realm of language, a child has to be able to mean himself with the pronoun "I". This "I" at the level of statement, can then be logically separated from the subject of utterance, the part who means "I". It is this subject of utterance, "it", who speaks or, according to Felman, reads, which is the Lacanian unconscious.29 Similarly, in psychoanalytic treatment, it is crucial that the utterance level can be separated from the level of the uttered statement and the cognition it produces. When the logic falters in the interaction of the rhetorical and grammatical levels, the unconscious speaks - or in Felman's terms, reads - as textual distress.

These two "parts" of the human subject cannot, of course, be wholly conscious of each others' occupations. For what kind of subject could ever be in a position of mastering his discourse completely, seeing for example all of his mistakes or slips of tongue in advance?30 In Lacan's theory, there is the kind of blind spot between these two levels, on the basis of which the discourse functions. If there would not be any difference between the uttering part and the uttered "I", logically, they could not be identified: if they would be exactly the same, they could not respond to each other, that is, "mean" each other, as a human subject without a doubt means himself while speaking of an "I". If one accepts the Saussurean conception that identities can emerge only as a result of negation, it is clear that also self-conceptions are identities resulting
from negation. As a result, the uttering part and the "I" of utterance have, according to Lacan, "a metaphorical relationship". In Lacanian view there is no difference of principle between self-conceptions and other identities: that is, meanings emerging for us in language. As a result, the logic of language is in Lacan's view the logic of human lives. We live by language. Lacan confirms that "it is not a metaphor to say so".\textsuperscript{31}

There are two main axes of language that Lacan assumes.\textsuperscript{32} The first one is the axis of metaphor, which Lacan identifies with identification; secondly, he says that the desire is a metonymy. As is well known, Lacan takes from de Saussure the definition of a sign as consisting of the signifier and the signified, which are equalled to the phonological element and the conceptual element of a sign. In addition, he interprets the line de Saussure draws between the signifier and the signified in his diagram of a sign, S/s, as a bar which signifies lack, the effect of a censor.

According to Lacan, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is purely conventional, but also, unbreakable. This means that signifieds can be distinguished only on the basis of the signifier's materiality. This does not mean materiality as substance, but, as the effect that the formal "recognisability" makes. I think that French thinker Jacques Derrida has stated this "pseudo-material" condition of communication most explicitly.\textsuperscript{33} Derrida emphasises that in order to assume that a transfer of a sign is possible, we have to assume that there is ideality in the sign's form. Signs must have the form of "recognisability" so that they can function as signs; a radically new sign, something totally outside of our experience could not even come into view or be registered as existent because its transferral would be an impossibility in the absence of recognisable form. Consequently, the
formal recognisability makes it possible for signs to function in different, indeterminable contexts. This is the sign's force, the context-breaking force, but the rest - the way the sign is used and the way it is understood or not understood - depends on the particular case. So, as funny as it sounds, western culture has not been very eager to admit this: signs have been treated by philosophers as they could already carry a meaning, and since writing makes it visible, due to the delay in reception it causes, that meaning cannot securely follow a sign and that there is a necessary, inherent impropriety in the behaviour of a sign, writing has been despised as improper action. Only writing has been seen guilty of this logic which, however, functions in all language, and consequently, in "the totality of our experience".34

From this "material" condition of language, it follows that the signified element always functions in its turn as a signifier: new signifying relations are inevitably formed. We can now return to the main principles of language introduced by Lacan. First axis is the axis of the metaphor, which Lacan calls condensation. It should be noted that the metaphorical relationship between the signifier and the signified, that is, the principle of identification and signification is viewed by Lacan as a double-edged sword. Lacan calls this principle of signification a (mis)recognition since it always requires elimination of the other possibilities of signification. Secondly, Lacan calls the combinative axis of language the metonymical relationship. It is opposed to the metaphoric substitution; it is the movement of negation, of displacement. He equals the metonymy to desire.

What happens in signification is, therefore, that a signifier "takes" another signifier as signified. Lacan expresses this by saying that "a signifier presents a subject for another signifier".35 In this, the bar
between the signifier and signified is eliminated. It is a (mis)recognition because, as already noted, in language there are no positive terms: there is no position which would be somehow more original or which could be complete "in itself and for itself". Everything is subject to the play of signification. As Lacan puts it, there is no perfect, invulnerable Other. The Other exists only as lacking: it is the barred Other. What the metaphorical axis of language brackets is the lack in the Other, which is Lacan's concept for the language and for the subject of unconscious. The Other signifies the irreducible other-ness, of which only normative assumptions can be made. 36

This play of metonymy and metaphor is Lacan's linguistic explanation of the conditions of human reality. To understand the analogy, let it be stated that desire, which is always a desire of metaphor, is constituted as a result of need and demand becoming separated. This is a remarkable invention in Lacanian theory because the need is what is physical, for example, the need of food. Thus, the need can be satisfied. The demand for love and attention, however, is of such nature that they can never be completely satisfied. It always keeps insisting, as if demand would mix itself with the image of the need fulfilment and as a result a hallucination of a complete satisfaction would prevail at the level of the individual's emotional needs, too. The desire, then, is born out of the difference between the need which can be satisfied and the desire which cannot. The outcome is that desire exists because there is always something lacking, due to the fact that in reality, the demand stays unsatisfied. In short, the metonymic chain of signifiers "keeps moving" and the meaning "keeps insisting". 37

The fantasy of the perfect dual relationship of metaphor is linked by Lacan to the mother-child-relationship. 38 The mother, or whoever
the feeder and/or carer, is the first representative of the otherness for the child. The child's burning question is, of course, what the (m)Other wants: nothing else is so essential for the child than to be accepted by this Other. At this phase, called by Lacan the mirror phase, the child tries to respond the Other's requirements completely. What, however, makes the dual relationship impossible is the launching of the castration complex, since sooner or later the child of course realises that he cannot alone satisfy mother's needs and desires. There is a lack in the illusionary perfect Other, and for a child's theories, this seems to be a result of a punishment of the fantasy of a dual relationship. So, the child becomes to assume a third party, the law of the father, which is, according to Lacan, the order of language, which necessitates that one has to, in order to use language, be capable of identifying oneself with a signifier and, thus, meaning oneself when using the pronoun "I", for example: one has to learn to address oneself in language.

The failing of the dream of dual fulfilment is a disappointment, but due to the assumption of punishment, its cancellation has to be accepted. The child then assumes what is required: he substitutes the desire of the (m)Other with the law of the father. This means that he learns to objectify himself as another for himself, another than the subject of utterance, and to include himself in the chain of signifiers. Still, as the demand of love is consistent, one tries to be what the Other is assumed to desire, and has to make these presumptions of identification in order to communicate; simultaneously however, any identities cannot satisfy anymore since they are only momentary metaphors of the speaking subject. Metonymy continues its work as a desiring dimension of language and as such strives us towards the necessary, momentary identities of meaning.
To conclude this Chapter concerning Lacan's view of language as the logic of human reality, we will briefly state the reason why, in Lacanian view, the identification means also the effect of alienation.

In addition to unconscious, another important psychic structure is the structure of the ego. The ego is in Lacanian theory equalled to the uttered "I", that is, to the level of cognition. The structure is constituted when the subject is for the first time alienated from his original "stupid existence". This happens when the mirror stage is confronted. I will cite Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) again:

In Lacan's words, the 'helpless' infant, not yet objectively in control of his movements, jubilantly perceives in the mirror - in an imaginary plane - the mastery of his bodily unity, which objectively he lacks. The infant becomes aware, through seeing his image in the mirror, of his own body totality, as a total form or Gestalt. Lacan pointed out the difference between the infant's autonomous state of fragmentation and insufficiency, and the illusionary feeling of autonomy and unity experienced as a result of seeing his own image in the mirror. 39

This alienating identification is a crucial function in transference as well. Transference, argues Felman, is a rhetorical error par excellence because it concerns the assumed identities of the parties involved in communication. Due to the function of identification, the speaker brackets the lack in the Other. In next Chapter, the communicative situation of analysis will explicate the notion of transference.
2 TRANSFERENCE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

2.1 Transference and Freud

We will start by calling forth the difference that understanding the luring power of transference makes in the situation of analysis. The following anecdote comes from Peter Brooks; it tells of Freud, who in the beginning of his career did not fully realise the power of transference. In the pro-psychoanalytic era, he considered analysis as consisting of a kind of Sherlock Holmesian work and, according to Brooks, was also aware of this analogy.\textsuperscript{40} His work consisted of detecting missing memories and, thus, trying to find out what was missing from the picture the patient had formed of his past. The detection was based on the supreme knowledge the analyst had of a human psyche. At that time, Freud also believed in the cathartic effect which the finding of the missing piece of the puzzle would cause in the patient, as the unconscious would have been made conscious.\textsuperscript{41}

Freud's material consisted of information produced in free association and in what the patient told about his dreams. The analyst's relationship to this material, claims Brooks, was then one of trying to catch the unconscious in the act of delivering the missing pieces of the puzzle, pieces which were recognised by the analyst on the basis of his knowledge of the psychic structure of the patient.\textsuperscript{42}

The power of what he later came to call transference first struck Freud when he testified to one of his colleagues fleeing from treatment involvement because the colleague's patient had fallen in love with him.\textsuperscript{43} Freud was surprised by the force with which real feelings and
expectations were attached to this artificial treatment involvement; artificial in the sense that the treatment is paid for and is expected to produce benefits for the paying party. Freud's surprise, argues Brooks, reveals that Freud's own counter-transference must have been functioning efficiently since he did not fully recognise the comprehensive nature of the problem in his own prior treatment relationships.\textsuperscript{44}

Transference was, however, a regular guest of the psychoanalytic treatment. Due to the fact that this real-life drama surpassed all of the expectations in its force and striking regularity, Freud concluded that the occurrence could only be explained so that it alluded to some other scene, as Freud called the unconscious.\textsuperscript{45} Because the unconscious lacked exactly the verbalised status of cognition it was obvious that what could not be consciously recalled and verbalised was thus in transference acted out in relation to the analyst.\textsuperscript{46} The pathos of the analytic drama was thus the enactment of the unconscious conditions of "reality", which delivered far more important message of the unconscious conflict than any amount of detected memories could ever do. The view of analysis as an cognitive effort on the analyst's part turned into "analysis proper": Freud realised that essential for analytic treatment was not any knowledge external to the individual case of analysis. As Peter Brooks puts it, in order to do analysis, "one cannot read from outside".\textsuperscript{47}

According to Freud, transference occurs because it is the acting-out of the important relationships of past, namely the family relationships of early childhood which have made the patient the person he is, or at least the person he conceives himself to be.\textsuperscript{48} In the course of the analytic treatment, then, the analyst comes to reserve in the patient's mind the position of this significant other.
Remarkably enough, the emergence of transference does not have anything to do with the person of the analyst. This notion has important consequences, which can be characterised as the ethics of psychoanalysis. For example in *Observations on Transference Love* Freud states that the analyst must not take advantage of the position the patient endows to him. Otherwise the analyst would end up in doing suggestion, not psychoanalysis. The analytic way of dealing with transference means that the analyst has to be cautious with his own counter-transference. Only this offers the possibility to act, to intervene the patient’s situation. In the secure space of "transference neurosis", the marginal as-if space, the analyst can give the patient space to understand his problem.49

Although transference was the greatest tool of analysis, it should noted that it was also its greatest enemy.50 According to Freud, from positive transference it followed that the patient related himself cooperatively to the analyst. This was beneficial for the effort of the treatment. Therefore, it should not be, according to Freud, revealed to the patient. However, negative transference often threatened the carrying through of the intervention attempt of the analysis. When this was in view, Freud advised the transferential nature of the feeling to be revealed. This usually made the patient to realise that what was resisted was, as a matter of fact, the knowledge of the repressed other scene.

Despite of the fact that Freud held that transference could be interpreted, at the end of the day, the interpretations were necessary only in order to act in transference. The unconscious conflict could not be understood simply by means of telling the patient the interpretation of his problem. The patient had to interpret the situation himself, see through his own experience how this second occurrence of transference
differed from the first scene. This was the only way to achieve understanding and alteration in the patient's conceptions of his life-story and identity. Freud believed quite long, that the analysis was completed, when the transferential needs, in relation to the analyst, disappeared. Later on he made a reservation. The question was only of the most compulsive needs which disturbed the patient's everyday life.

2.2 Lacan of Transference

According to Felman, Jacques Lacan wanted to interpret transference in more explicit terms than Freud himself did. To avoid misunderstandings, Lacan insisted that the occurrence of transference was not in the first place an emotional reaction. Transference, according to Lacan's structural definition, is caused by the desire to know and the assumption, that there is a subject who has the knowledge desired. Naturally transference is also manifested emotionally; however, the reason for the emergence of transference is that there is "a subject presumed to know". Due to Lacan's linguistic interpretation of unconscious, this means, that the subject does not presume anything: it is presumed by the function of the speaking unconscious. The assumption is caused by the metaphorical axis of language and consequently, identification is a crucial dimension of transference. However, transference is not a structuring psychical process, but is "quite simply the speech act". In the following I will introduce how transference emerges in the analytic situation. This is done in order to point out that there is an ethical dimension to transference, too.

The reason why the patient attributes the status of knowledge to
the figure of the analyst is, of course, that he assumes that the analyst
knows the answer to his problems. The patient enters analysis in the
first place because he wants to understand, to get a better grip of his life.
The status of the knowledge which the patient then expects the analyst
to have is the meaning of his unconscious knowledge and, thus, not
more or less, states Lacan, than the "meaning of the signification as
such". According to Lacan, because the unconscious is structured like
language, it also can be viewed as knowledge: only the becoming aware
of these "incorporated signifiers" is actively resisted.\(^{56}\) Due to
transference the analyst reserves in the patient's mind the position of
his unconscious. Consequently, the patient acts out his unconscious
knowledge in relation to the figure of the analyst. It is precisely this
position, and nothing else, that makes the intervention in the patient's
unconscious knowledge possible.

The acting out of the patient's unconscious does not, however,
guarantee anything. The analyst must also be conscious of his "counter-
transference" to the patient. Otherwise he cannot act in the transference,
but makes everything absurd by putting his own transference into play.
In practice this effort of avoiding counter-transference consists of the
analyst listening to what position the patient's discourse is directed to,
but not reserving this position. If he started to play with the positions
suggested, the patient would be left in his state of alienation.\(^{57}\) As a
matter if fact, Lacan does not favour the concept of counter-transference
since in his view it alludes too much to what Lacan calls "imaginary"
view of analytical situation.\(^{58}\) Analysis, requires Lacan, is not a session of
two bodies containing knowledge which they then transparently endow
to each other like two mirrors. He opposes the ego-psychological
conception, that the analyst should "understand" the patient. If the
analyst starts to play the roles that the analysand suggests, responding to the requirements of love etc., the game is over. While the ego-psychologists see the aim of analysis to be the strengthening of the patient's ego by means of offering a new model of a "healthy ego" as a replacement for the old and twisted one, Lacan strictly opposes such conceptions. The unconscious must be the distinctive feature of the analytical discourse. It is knowledge which cannot be known by any subject. Thus, transferential exchange is not simple dialogue between two conscious subjects, like two bodies containing knowledge, but there is always a third party, "the reading unconscious", which must be allowed to do its work. The unconscious, claims Felman, is nothing which has to be found; it is what reads. It was in hysteric's discourse that Freud found his own reading unconscious. Therefore, the effort of analysis is to try to become aware of what has already taken place in reading - in reading one's own position into the world - by means of conceptualisation.

The analyst does not have more realistic conception of reality; his ego does not have anything to transfer to the patient which could make the patient, for example, happier. In addition to the universe of signifiers the subject has "incorporated", there is no reality to "help" the subject. All the psychoanalysis can do is to offer a possibility to work this universe through by means of transference.

Therefore, the aim of Lacanian analysis is to unravel too insisting identifications. They have made the patient's life a suffering. However, if the unconscious part of the subject does correspond to the conscious part, maintaining the ego "costs too much for the patient" - in other words, the act of keeping oneself unaware of the unconscious knowledge goes above the patient's capacities. The aim of analysis is,
therefore, to make the patient aware of the imaginary nature of these identifications - they are "only" interpretations of past situations.

The chance of understanding means that the pressing metaphor can be unravelled, through metonymic understanding, into another, more accurate metaphor. This means simply that "the new metaphor" takes better into account the unconscious knowledge. The possibility to plot one's way out of the blocking situation is not, however, easily attained. The unconscious knowledge is not, and cannot be known as such by any subject. It can be only heard - or read - as a textual distress.

We will continue our study with a detailed reading of Felman's interpretation of James's *The Turn of the Screw* and its criticism since this is the way Felman puts forth her suggestion of the transferential theory of narratives. It should be noted that much of Felman's suggestion about transferential theory seems to directly "arise" from Lacanian psychoanalysis, as she herself states by claiming that the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature is one of implication as opposed to application. According to Felman, application would imply a relationship of externality, which is not in Felman's view the case between these two fields of science. Psychoanalysis and literature affect in each other as otherness because, as we have seen, psychoanalysis as a discursive practice has to be aware of the most subtle rhetorical tricks of literature. Similarly psychoanalysis is based on Freud's insights of literature, the most important and famous case being of course the story of Oedipus. In a word, analysing is reading: according to Felman, the unconscious is a reader in both senses of the word. From this reason it is inaccurate to claim that the transferential theory of reading would suggest the source of meaning to be the text or the reading subject: in Felman's view the production of meaning happens
in the \textit{other scene} of unconscious, which is not a place but an effect. In
the following, Felman shows how literary history has read James's
novel \textit{The Turn of the Screw}. 
3 FELMAN'S TURNING THE SCREW OF INTERPRETATION

3.1 A Self-Reflective Novel

In order to theorise reading, Shoshana Felman has chosen to examine how the case of Henry James's novel *The Turn of the Screw* presents reading effect. She claims to have chosen the text because of its effectiveness "judging by the quantity and intensity of the echoes it has produced, of the critical literature to which it has given rise." Felman examines both how the effects of reading are put forth in James's text and how the novel has affected the "actual" readers of the story as far as the critics' readings of it are concerned. She proceeds by comparing these two since her hypothesis is that the novel might have something to say about its own readings.

Felman compares the actual critics' interpretations of the novel to the text itself, thus checking what the story has to say about the conclusions drawn of it, but not only at the level of statements made since she compares the reading tactics of the critics to the way they are put in perspective by the text's evaluation of interpretative efforts. This gesture of studying how the textual rhetoric is treated by its readers and how the rhetoric in turn treats them, is motivated not only by Felman's conviction of the nature of rhetoric that it often affects the readers in ways they could not have predicted, but also, by the fact that Felman sees that this particular James's novel is a novel about its own readings.

In my view, it seems like Felman grounds her argument of James's story as a story of its own readings to two main observations. First, states
Felman, the novel includes a narrative embedding which is of major importance to the whole character of James's novel. Before the actual narrative, that is, the governess's story, there is a short prologue which presents a group of people telling each other ghost stories and discussing the nature of the forthcoming, true tale written by its protagonist, the governess. The prologue, however, also makes "the governess's story" to appear more problematic. Most remarkably, instead of strengthening the status of one narrator (for example the governess) of the story, the prologue presents a chain of three narrators. This results in an uncertainty over the precise "origin" and status of the story in view for the actual reader of the story - in Felman's words, the governess's story is "a story of lost origins" since it is transferred and the novel's interpreters have to account for the air of uncertainty in story's original character the narrative chain puts forth. One of the narrators of the story is Douglas who is going to read the governess's manuscript aloud, endowed to Douglas by the protagonist herself on her deathbed. However, the first person narrator of the prologue just notes in passing that the following story is actually edited from the transcript he has made of the governess's original one since the governess's manuscript was given to him by Douglas at the time Douglas was dying. Thus, neither the governess's story nor the prologue take place in the story's present; the story's origin is lost.

Felman seems to suggest that any reading which does not pay attention to the prologue's disarming function, which makes the reader's position dependent on a narrative chain echoing non-present stories of "lost origins", might get lost itself. Remarkably enough, the governess's story does not even have enough authority to have a name before first person narrator enthusiastically declares in the prologue to
have one - albeit too late since Douglas has already started reading the
governess's story aloud. What thus follows however, offered to view, is
that the name of *The Turn of the Screw* is inspired most likely by
discussion where the characters contemplate the effect the forth-coming
story will make:

"I quite agree - in regard to Griffin's ghost, or whatever it was - that its
appearing first to the little boy, at so tender an age, adds a particular
touch. (...) If the child gives the effect another turn of the screw, what do
you say of two children?"
"We say, of course," somebody exclaimed, "that they give two turns! Also
that we want to hear about them." 69

I think that the metaphor of the turn of the screw as the effect the story
will make is one of the most important arguments which authorise
Felman's interpretation of *The Turn of the Screw* as a self-conscious
story of its own effect; the prologue in its entirety is the most apparent
statement of Felman's interpretation's importance because the prologue
is a kind of a praise of a narrative situation as such.

Felman's second reason for viewing James's novel as distinctively
conscious of its own resources, comes from the governess's story, and
this argument is the argument of the analogy between the governess's
enterprise and the enterprise of reading. *The Turn of the Screw* is a story
about a governess's struggle to find out the truth concerning the ghosts
haunting the house. 70 As a matter of fact, notes Felman, James's story
resembles a detective story, called by Peter Brooks the parade genre of
the Barthesian "hermeneutic code" because detective stories tell about
the struggle to understand - an issue certainly at stake in the enterprise
of reading. 71 In *The Turn of the Screw*, the crime is not, however,
committed before detection, as in traditional detective stories, but as a
result of the very detection: a child is killed.

So, as Felman in my view very justifiably believes that James's
story has much to say about its own readings, of the conclusions and the passions drawn out of it, Felman also examines the actual criticism that the novel has given rise to.\textsuperscript{72}

\subsection*{3.2 A Reading Adventure}

If we now have to consider how the text puts in perspective its own readings, we have to start by summarising the plot of James's novel.\textsuperscript{73} In \textit{The Turn of the Screw}, a young woman answers a wanted ad in a newspaper. She comes to meet the "perfect gentleman" behind the add and is hired by him: she is going to be the governess in full charge of the employer's nephew, Miles, and niece, Flora, orphans living in "the Master's" country house. The salary is good, but the governess hesitates whether to take the position offered or not because there is a strict condition to the employment: whatever happens, the governess is not allowed to contact the Master. The governess, alone, would be in full charge of the house. Nevertheless, due to the impression the Master makes on her, the governess agrees to the conditions and travels to the house of Bly, where she is to meet two of the sweetest and virtuous children on earth, and the helping hand and the loyal confidant of the governess - Mrs Grose, the old house-maid.

Shortly after the governess's arrival odd things begin to happen. First, a letter arrives telling that little Miles has been expelled from school. Surprisingly, any reason for this is not given. The announcement is at odds with the child's apparent innocence, and makes it seem suspect in the governess's eyes. What's more, the governess also finds out that the house is haunted. On the basis of her
description of these ghostly appearances, they are identified by Mrs Grose as former employees of the house, Peter Quint and Miss Jessel. The governess concludes from this that it is apparently the ghosts' shady intimacy that has "corrupted" the children who are only pretending to be of the sweetest kind in order to continue to keep their uncanny company. She becomes convinced that her task is, above all, to save the children: only the children's confession, their naming of the dreadful ghosts, can rescue the poor, little children from total moral depravity.

The results of the governess's struggle are, however, disastrous. Flora falls seriously ill under the governess's accusations, and the novel ends as little Miles who, according to the governess's interpretation, has finally "identified" the male ghost by observing them at a window, dies in the arms of the governess, as she, filled with the joy caused by her moral victory, embraces him.

It should be noted that the governess, as the first-person narrator of her own story, surely chooses the words to describe her adventure which identify her with the saviour and the children with Satan. Historically, the first interpretations see James's story as a ghost-story, telling of the metaphysical struggle between good and evil. There are, however, hints, rhetorical and thematic ones - as well as an important structural possibility - which make another interpretation of the story possible, namely the one terming itself "Freudian". These reading tactics are best described with the word "suspicion" since it brings an ironical dimension to the most directly suggested view of the governess, as a heroine, by stating that as a matter of fact, she is an madman who due to her sexual repression comes to ruin the lives of two children. The interpretation also demystifies the idea of ghosts, cherished by the metaphysical "school" of interpretation since, according to Freidians,
the ghosts are certainly not real, but hallucinations caused by the
governess’s repression - after all, nobody else is able to see them in the
situations where the governess claims them to be in full, open view.

Felman, who herself is not so interested in whether the ghosts are
real or not, points out, however, an interesting connection: where the
adherents of Freudian and metaphysical "schools" of interpretation
disagree violently over the meaning of James’s story, they do, however,
show an intimate understanding about the meaning of "Freud". In
"Wild' Psychoanalysis", Freud criticises certain practitioners of
"psychoanalysis" for declaring to their patients that the reason for their
problems is the repression of their natural need for sex. The lack and
repression, insists Freud, are, however, by no means accidental
occurrences in the area of sexuality, but constitutive for sexuality as
such. Sexuality is both "more and less" than is usually understood by it
and, thereby, diagnosing the lack of sex or sexual repression as the
reason for the patient's problems would be just as wise as to claim the
reason for the patient's problems to be the fulfilment of sexual desire or
the "presence" of sexuality.

What Wilson is doing by suggesting that the novel can be
summarised by the simple word "sex" and cancelling the whole issue
about ghosts simply as a ridiculous idea? Clearly, Felman claims, by
trying to pull the answer out of its hiding place Wilson makes the
typical assumption which still prevails in Anglo-American
psychoanalysis, that the answer can be reached on the basis of an
analyst's supreme knowledge of sex and sexuality by "catching" the
unconscious meaning "in the act". According to Felman, this can be seen from the way Wilson treats the rhetoric of James's novel. Wilson takes James's metaphors literally where they match the pattern he assumes to represent supreme knowledge. Felman points out that this difference in approaches is characteristic for the Lacanian and Anglo-American literary criticism: the latter looks for substantial meanings it knows in advance, while the former is interested in the way the signification works in some particular case.

After a subtle analysis of the metaphors which James's text puts forth and which Wilson in quite unsatisfying way ends up interpreting substantial terms, Felman argues that, according to The Turn of the Screw, any reading strategy which tries to take control over what is being read, ends up suffocating life, which in Felman's language equals to an effort to stop the displacement, the metonymical sliding of signifiers in the chain of signification.77 This occurs by giving an answer to the text's rhetoric which is considered to be primarily a puzzle to be solved. This is the ultimate reason why Felman equates the governess's reading strategy to Wilson's readings - which is quite an epistemological leap on Wilson's part since he conceives himself as the one precisely opposing the "mad" governess's interpretation of the events.78 Wilson behaves madly, just like the governess, whose entire aim is that the children confess and name the company they keep - the word "infans" meaning in Latin precisely the ones not capable of speaking. And indeed, what also seems to me to be very important, is Wilson's criticism of James for not speaking in clear language:

Henry James never seems aware of the amount of space he is wasting through the long abstract formulations that do duty for concrete details, the unnecessary circumlocutions and the gratuitous meaningless verbiage - the as it were's and as we may say's and all the rest - all the words with
which he pads out his sentences and which themselves are probably symptomatic of a tendency to stave off his main problems.79

The way in which Wilson thus deals with the object of his study, language, is then as repressive as is the way "the repressive and, therefore, mad" governess deals with the children. It is probably not an overestimation to state that Felman views Wilson's performance here as a case of negative transference. Felman goes on by pointing out a traditional assumption that Freudian literary criticism has made: as with Wilson, it has often equalled the poet to the creative madman whom the healthy critic analyses on the basis of his knowledge of mental life. There is the logic of exclusion functioning, a thinking model of either - or, which, remarkably enough, the governess also adopts as she apparently realises that it is either herself or the children who must be mad.80 And, I think, that it is worth immediately noting that it is this way of thinking that Felman wants to avoid by suggesting a transferential reading model: transference always implies counter-transference. Hence it should impossible to situate madness exclusively in the characters of analysand's or poet's. Even though Wilson seems to be able to judge who is mad and who is not, the issue for Freud was essentially more complex. Psycho-analysis is a case of reading unconscious, chain of signification which does not belong to any particular subject. To put it bluntly, if the others were not mad, then we would be - and this is not a simple statement of solidarity, but a fact of signifying practises.

It is also remarkable that the readings Wilson conducts cannot be termed simply naive: they aim especially at ironical cleverness, at the demystification of appearances.81 What is most distinctive of Freudian reading tactics is its suspicion. In James's story, according to Felman, it is
precisely the governess who is, nevertheless, the suspicious reader, because it is she who in the first place doubts her senses and suggests on many occasions another possibility: the suspicion of her own madness. Instead, Mrs. Grose is apparently quite a great believer. Only once does this loyal person deny the governess's interpretation of ghosts haunting the house, a scene where the governess directly points at the female ghost fixing on them. Mrs. Grose does not see the ghost, but still after a while, quite surprisingly returns to her conviction that the ghosts must be real, just as the governess insists they are. Thus, she proves, even by the act of her momentary suspicion, I think, her capacity to take everything again and again, despite any proofs of the opposite.

As a matter of fact, Mrs. Grose is said to be illiterate. So, in this story, argues Felman, the ability to read equals to be able to see ghosts since the governess is the one capable of reading and more importantly, writing. This is, of course, for a change, a flattering metaphor of the Freudian readings. It is true that "Freudians" have to use their skills to read rhetoric to prove their claims as compared to the rather straightforward interpretative task of the metaphysicians since the metaphysical meaning horizon is the most apparently suggested model of interpretation offered by the story. And as a matter of fact, the confirmation calling for the Freudian reading comes directly from the prologue where the governess's story is not only termed as a ghost story but also as "a love story", a revelation which, of course, greatly intrigues the listeners, and which is discussed at length. Importantly enough, for Felman, it is not that the Freudians, any more than metaphysicians, would have committed a remarkable reading mistake in their interpretations. It is more that James's text invites them and, consequently, seduces both of them only to resist them because it is
precisely the invitation which makes both readings necessary but simultaneously to lose their monopoly in relation to the text. So, accompanied by the welcome of the text, the reader can either-

believe the governess, and thus to behave like Mrs. Grose, or not to believe the governess, and thus behave precisely like the governess.\textsuperscript{83}

or try a "second-degree reading" which Felman claims to have done in her attempt to read the novel attempted.\textsuperscript{84}

How does this second-degree reading differ from the first-degree reading? The answer is exactly as described above: by trying to see in what way the text puts the readings in perspective on the first occasion it invites but, then, nevertheless, flees the readers' efforts to grasp and hold the movement of rhetoric. According to Felman, the story keeps itself moving due to precisely the fact that it first invites and then denies to be in response of the readers' desire for meaning. In order to maintain this view, Felman points out, for example, how the characterisations of the story as "a love story" and "a ghost story" are actually treated in the prologue:

(1) the possibility of the story being interpreted as a love story:

"Who was it she was in love with?"
"The story will tell", I took myself to reply. (...).
"The story won't tell," said Douglas; "not in any literal, vulgar way."\textsuperscript{85}

(2) and, as a ghost story:

"It's quite too horrible."(...) "It's beyond everything. Nothing at all that I know touches it."
"For sheer terror?" I remember asking. He seemed to say it was not so simple as that; to be really at loss how to qualify it.\textsuperscript{86}
This act of denial is interpreted by Felman as the only possible grounds for even an illusionary mastery because mastery, in her Lacanian interpretation, is always somewhat of a misunderstanding. Like the Master of the house whose condition for hiring the governess is that the governess must not contact him under any circumstances, James's rhetoric also produce the invitation as a discontinuity, as the repression of meaning which, in its turn, necessities interpretation, however, simultaneously deconstructing it by the very ambiguity which cannot be eliminated without giving a direction to the text, which in turn always amounts to taking the law into one's own hands by means of repressing the meaning's multiplicity.\textsuperscript{87} Importantly enough, I think that by speaking of "seeing amounting to reading" and this amounting on the basis of James's novel to a giving a direction to meaning, Felman maintains that this reading effect cannot be completely avoided by any readings because the repression of meaning is always an effect of reading.\textsuperscript{88} No reading can be done without interpretation, and readers who think that they can finally find their way out of the text's trapping rhetoric, are only doubly fooled due to their assumption of their mastery over rhetoric: a position which, on the basis of \textit{The Turn of the Screw}, is strongly an illusionary one. Actually, Felman comes to hold a view, already maintained by Plato, of the reason for the poet's mastery, as she claims that the effect of mastery is caused precisely by the denial of the responsibilities which the position of authority is assumed to have - the author explains nothing, denies his own knowledge and responsibility of the situation he has produced and, due to the effect of denial manages to trap the readers who believe that they can "master" better.\textsuperscript{89}
3.3 Suggested Explanation: Transference

Felman suggests that the effect of the necessity of becoming a dupe of rhetoric is produced by the transference effect. Transference is the rhetorical error *par excellence* because it is caused by the assumption that the Other has the knowledge desired and that he is a genuine subject. According to Felman, "the author" invests transference in "the reader" to the extent that the reader is the "ghost of his unconscious". This amounts, without a doubt, to the assumption that an addressee should be able to read "the address": that is, be able to relate himself to the text in the way that it anticipates him to do. Thus, what Felman means by speaking of a "ghostly effect" is, I think, by definition, an illusionary presumption of the *wish fulfilment*, of simply becoming understood, which is, however, a necessary assumption to make.

The way the message is then received in actuality depends on turn according to Felman's assessment of the addressee's attribution to the text the prestige of a subject presumed to have knowledge. Felman draws our attention to the fact that in James's story as well the governess assumed that the children had the knowledge she wanted to pull out of them. As already noted, if one is unaware of one's transference, it seems to result in acting out of the reality of the unconscious, as Felman interprets Wilson doing as he unwittingly comes to reserve the position of the governess. The result is, claims Felman, that the story comprehends Wilson rather than the other way around because "the writer" has intended such an effect to take place. This interpretative strategy can be best be adopted to texts which are particularly self-conscious about their resources, which have "drawn a frame of self-reflexivity", thus marking a decision to regard the
resources language has always had with a particular self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{94} In my view, the novel's self-reflexivity might be claimed essentially to contribute to the intense critical interest in this novel - in Felman's words, its "effectiveness" - regardless of whether this particular quality of the composition is registered or not. Obviously, the reason would be that the composition's self-reflexivity imitates the condition of the human consciousness, which cannot step out of the "stream of language", but is captured by the mirroring logic of the language. Self-reflexive narratives function a challenge: they show in clear and bright that one cannot hope to read "from outside". The logic of language tames any efforts into direction of metalingual position.

Felman most explicitly presents her theory of transferenceal reading in connection with the prologue. She shows that in order for the story to stay "alive" there has to be a transference effect between the narrators and narratees - otherwise, the story would not have been transformed, but would have died on the deathbeds of its adherents. Felman pays attention to the strong "imaginary" functioning of transference since the narrative couples of the story, Felman argues, are all related to each other by means of love - of appreciation, admiration, seduction and mutual understanding. The discussion carried out in the prologue reveals quite directly that Douglas has been in love with the governess, who in her turn has once been in love with the Master; also Douglas and the first person narrator of the prologue have a special relationship - it is as if the whole story would have been narrated by Douglas because of this understanding listener. As a result, the narrative chain in James's story interprets love through means of love.\textsuperscript{95}

However, the reason for such intimacy between the narrative couples, the "symbolic" nature of transference (= the assumption of the
position towards which the discourse is directed) comes, according to Felman, put forth in the prologue, as the I-narrator of the prologue comments in the following passage on Douglas's behaviour:

"It's quite too horrible."(...) "It's beyond everything. Nothing at all that I know touches it."
"For sheer terror?" I remember asking. He seemed to say it was not so simple as that; to be really at loss how to qualify it. He passed his hand over his eyes, made a little wincing grimace. "For dreadful dreadfulness!! "Oh, how delicious!" cried one of the women.
He took no notice of her; he looked at me, but as if, instead of me,
he saw what he spoke of; "For general uncanny ugliness and horror and pain."

In place of whom the discourse is directed to, the narrator sees "the story of his unconscious". Felman ends by asking if the acting out of the unconscious is always a narrative - a question which in my view has been carried forth by Peter Brooks, who in his analysis of narrative desire showed that there are strong reasons to assume so since narration seems to be an important way for us to view the reality: plotting is a hermeneutic means comparable to the metonymical movement in a signifying chain which turns one metaphor into another. As in an analysis where an attempt is made to loosen a pressing metaphor of one's identity "in a more accurate" and less pressing metaphor through unravelling the first one. Similarly, reading functions thus as a metaphor making action where the accuracy of the situation, a metaphor put forth at the beginning of the story, is revised continuously and unravelled through metonymical, narrative action. Most importantly, this does not happen only "towards future" and of the end of the story, but in retrospect as well. In this sense, Brooks shows that the acting out of the unconscious can be seen as a story if it is confronted by narrative desire, desire to understand.
4 THE NEVER-ENDING EFFECT OF THE INTERPRETANT

In order to consider Felman's conception of the transference effect as an interpretation of the place of the Peircean interpretant, we have to examine Felman's conception of the resources of language in more detail. For Peirce, the interpretant is the place of a rhetorical effect, the place where the interpretation becomes necessary. In order to understand a sign, it has to be interpreted, and this logically means that it has to be interpreted as another sign, and so on and so forth. Interpretation does not have any natural end: we cannot know at the end of the day how similar the understood sign is to the offered ("intended") sign. Logically, there must be a distinction between them. There is no way to transfer the same sign, the one and absolutely undivided.98

The uncertainty concerning the final similarity of the sign to the one "originally" sent goes, of course, for the rhetorical place of the interpretant itself. The discourse is addressed, but there is no way to know, as such, whether these two, the address and the addressee, equal each other. This means that one cannot predict what kind of effects rhetoric has in practise. However, there cannot be any hesitation concerning the functioning of the principle itself. Interpretant signifies the logic of reception and the actual reception is the way in which this logic emerges in the actual practise of reception.
5 TRANSFERENCE IN THE USE OF LITERARY STUDIES

In this conclusive Chapter, we will put Felman's challenge to a test, as she herself wishes in what she has written in the conclusion to her collection of essays: she "leaves her work for an interpretant to come". First, I will list, in my view, the most important points made by Felman's study of transferential reading since I think that such a crystallisation eases the discussion of her theoretical insight. These issues are: the self-reflexivity of language; attribution of knowledge to "the subject presumed to know" as the cause of the transferential effect; and transference as an interpretation of particular, significant readings.

We will start our discussion of the transferential theory of narratives by studying the worth of transferential jargon since, of course, a similar type of interpretative strategy could be, and has been, led through without the explanatory layer of transference as for example Barbara Johnson has done. Thus, we will start by opposing "purely textual" metaphors and psychoanalytic metaphors.

5.1 "Purely Textual" Metaphors vs. Transference

To begin with, Felman's study could surely be criticised there being a certain taste in her argumentation that James's story is, as a matter of fact, an allegory of Lacanian psychoanalysis. For example, when Felman views the stories of "lost origins" as unconscious, would not the phenomenon deserve a better "explanation" by a referral to the concept
of intertextuality? For a moment we will bracket the point that the concept of intertextuality is introduced by Julia Kristeva, who is also a trained psychoanalyst, and that the concept consequently carries perhaps some "inborn" consideration of the analytical view of the unconscious. However, terming the stories of lost origins as unconscious is only one point made in Felman's study. The main issue is that Felman's entire study testifies to the supremacy of Lacanian analysis over the Anglo-American psychoanalytically oriented literary research. Due to the fact that such testimony cannot be the end in itself, what then is the contribution that the transferential theory of narratives makes to the study of literature? Does not the suggested, psychoanalytic explanation model make the entire apparatus of criticism unnecessarily heavy - criticism which could perhaps be carried out by leaning on other types of conceptual metaphors as well, such as the self-reflexivity of language, self-reflexive novels, and the above-mentioned intertextuality?

Most importantly, this question concerns the issue about Wilson's readings being prestructured in the novel. The situation could be conceptualised by means other than transference as well. One possibility suggested by critic Mikko Keskinen, is the deManian term of "allegory of interpretation". In this way, the interpretation would focus on the self-reflective capacities of language. However, as we have seen, Felman's study claims to go further: transference is one possible explanation for this textual exchange. It shows how the textual dynamics and the actual reader's dynamic functioning "match", and how the effect of the actual critic, on the basis of his performance becoming "a sign of text", is not so uncanny as it appears to be, for example, on the basis of Johnson's readings. For Johnson just points out the fact that in the case Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*, the actual interpretative schools
are caught and "put in perspective" by the text, since the actual readers share the hermeneutic strategies presented by the characters of the novel. The emphasis in Felman's transferential theory of narratives is in the dynamics of narrating and reading, and not in any special feature of textuality alone. Felman shows how it is possible for the reader to be equalled with the character "in practise". The reader is "a dupe" of rhetoric to the extent that he agrees to reading and invests transferential feeling in the text; however, the reader is not a totally involuntary puppet since "second-degree readings", as Felman characterises her effort, are possible. This does not mean that Felman's explanation would offer means to avoid being fooled by rhetoric. It simply offers a possibility to understand the condition of being a dupe of rhetoric, a divided subject which cannot master rhetoric since he is himself driven by language. Especially in the case of self-conscious texts, which aim precisely at blocking the interpretation, the transferential model of reading offers, at least, an interesting way to conceptualise the situation.

If we now view the particular matter of intertextuality, the co-existence of the transferential model with the concepts of self-reflexivity and intertextuality, is apparent. I do not see any reason why this should be considered a defeat for either of the imagined "parties" of interpreters favouring "purely textual" metaphors or those who also consider the psychoanalytic ones. For example, Sean Hand interpreted intertextuality in transferential terms, and has suggested, on this basis, that the very pointing haunt of subtexts is comparable to the inability to deal with one's transference. And indeed, the transferential reading theory can be viewed as offering a kind of model for the ethics of the reader - even though such ethics can in no way, of course, be in possession of any
theory since the ethics it has to offer consists of commonplaces that any reader, at least a critic has to confront in his work. For what is at stake are the usual problems of reading - did he study thoroughly enough before rushing into a decision on the case, was he fair enough or did he overinterpret the text and so on. The advance of transferential view is that it makes us realise the comprehensives of the problem in human experience. Nevertheless, no ethic has a deal if one wants to maintain an indifference - taking into account one’s own transference is dependent on reserving the position of the interpretant in the first place. The hypothesis of the transferentiality of narrative processes can only account for the readings which are experienced at least to some extent as significant. However, total, proper indifference is not possible in the world of difference since maintaining such a view would be an impossibility for a subject who has entered the realm of language. But naturally, indifference is a choice in the world of possibilities as a choice exists only for creatures who live by language.

5.2 Derridean Critique

The gesture of criticising psychoanalysis for finding only allegories of itself from any text comes from Jacques Derrida, who accused Jacques Lacan of such self-sending in his critique of Lacan’s readings of Poe’s short-story *The Purloined Letter*. However, even if Felman’s analysis also functions as an allegory of psychoanalysis, one must wonder if this accusation in reality has any individual message to deliver. On the basis of Foucault, Felman claims that all of the discursive practises given predetermine the truths found. Nevertheless, the use of such a
preliminary power always necessitates the effect of resisting possible discourses. It could be stated that Felman actually claims that psychoanalysis has an inherent capacity of avoiding self-sending. In *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight*, Felman writes that a self-critical attitude is necessary to analysis since the unconscious precisely teaches "how to read beyond one's means". According to Felman, the reading effect of the unconscious cannot be avoided, only the a posterior effort to conceptualise its readings can be denied. At least in principle, it is the psychoanalysts who should know about the necessity of trying to avoid continuous self-censoring, the act of actively ignoring the reading effect of unconscious. As a defence of psychoanalytic theory, it could be maintained that perhaps the necessary capacity of psychoanalysis might have helped Freud to also find the principle which functioned contradictory to his first one.

To continue the critical examination of Felman's study, it could be wondered, in a Derridean spirit, was Felman's study, after all, only a theory of significant, proper readings - readings despising the materiality of language and therefore, the effect of *writing*? Certainly the way Felman conceptualised Wilson's criticism makes it look like the text's major achievement would be an omnipotent, addressing power which never fails since Felman also sees that it is "necessary for her readings to return to James's text". But, can any readings return to the same text if the place of an interpretant is noted to be a necessity; is not the text, thus, the same-but-different to the degree that it is ridiculous to claim to do a second-degree reading of the novel from the position of the all-seeing, elder sister? Also, is not the assumption that Felman makes concerning the role of the author's "illusionary" authority as based on the refusal to give an explanation, such an assumption of writer's foolproof success in
offering "holes" which interpreters irresistibly want to "fill"?

Jacques Derrida has criticised in *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (1987) the fatal addressing power that psychoanalysis, despite of some efforts in the other direction, seems to assume. According to him, the proper addressing power which is idealised by Western culture despises the fact of the power of the "ideality" of the materiality of a sign, which carries with it the context-breaking power: it is precisely that a sign can be misunderstood, that any illusion of proper understanding can take place in the first place - as already alluded to, otherwise the transferral of a sign would not be possible, since it would not be recognised as a sign. "The letter does not always to its destination", Derrida reminds, however by noting that this cannot be in practise proved, since such a proof when understood would only testify on the behalf of the opposite: the letter would had in the level of the utterance reached its destination. Derrida criticises Lacan's readings of Poe of being guilty of "reading unconscious" aggressively into "its effects". 109

It is true that Felman's analysis is the analysis of proper, significant readings since, in order for something to be invested transference, it has to be significant for the investor and it has to contain the assumption of knowledge and a subject. For the sake of transference, the narrative remains to be told, also recognises the necessity of the lack of addressing power - the story survives death only for the sake of love, as the manuscript is always forwarded at the moment of death. However, I find it slightly surprising that Felman does not pay attention to the fact that the "forwarding" does not take place between all of the people presented in the prologue since some of the listeners are not interested enough in the "forthcoming" story to stay - a fact which the
transferential couple seems to rejoice in since James describes the ones who go are described as a nuisance. Felman could be defended by saying that in this case as well, the letter arrives to its desired destination: consequently, no special mention of the case was necessary. Nevertheless, it could be justified to claim as well that this occurrence was "like a sign from heaven", produced by "chance". In Derrida's vocabulary, this means kind of effect of overdetermination in the possibilities of signification. Due to this effect, one must not haste to decide, if one wishes to avoid dogmatism.

5.3 Felman's "Puppet"

Felman's study has also been criticised due to the fact that despite Felman's explicitly stated purpose of returning her own readings to the text, she does not actually do so.\textsuperscript{110} In my view, Barbara Johnson's readings of Melville's Billy Budd and the novel's criticism can be interpreted as a gesture of critique towards Felman's effort.\textsuperscript{111} I claim this on the basis that Felman continuously emphasises the effect of undecidability, and, as a matter of fact, states that the aim of her study is to read the novel's interpretative undecidability "as such". "As such"-reading, Johnson argues in her essay, is, however, impossible. She proves this through analysing Billy Budd and argues, like Felman, that the novel comments on the possibilities of its reading through its characters. Unlike Felman, she also names a character who acts like Johnson herself in the reading of the novel. The character who allegorises Johnson's own reading effort is a character, who sees the ambiguity of the case which he has to judge, but still realises that he has
to decide about the sentence, because he is committed for such an office: he is the marital law.

In her interpretation, Johnson does not use the term transference; however, she uses the concept in her essay the following *Billy Budd* interpretation in Johnson's collection of essays, *The World of Difference*, and speaks about the "transferential structure of all reading". On these bases, I think it could be maintained that Johnson wants, by also showing the character which has prestructured her readings, to criticise Felman for not doing this and trying, therefore, to reserve a position that rejoices slightly too much about the undecidability at the cost of the final, ridiculous destiny of any readings of the misunderstanding nature - of being guilty of unfairness. A symptom of this could be taken in Felman's shutting her eyes to the fact that also her own position is also uncannily prestructured. I emphasise that this is my interpretation of the situation, and cannot be attributed to Johnson's failure, if my interpretation proves to be wrong.

If we now give more thought to the figures in *The Turn of the Screw*, there is indeed a character who in some respects could be said to "prefigure" Felman's readings. It is the character who is the last link in the narrative chain that James's novel puts forth, the unnamed first person narrator of the prologue, who titled the novel on the basis of seeing that the forthcoming story will be about reading-effect. He declares to be the editor of the copy now under study, that is, in the hands of the "actual reader": in the world of fiction, he was the one to attach the prologue to the story, which is crucial to Felman's argument. The basis for this attribution could thus be that like this character also Felman makes in her readings the self-reflective move and assumes that the story will tell about its own narration and reception.
This is without a doubt the democratising move which Felman could have taken. The fact that the character of the prologue's first person narrator is a narrating character, unlike any of the characters of *Billy Budd*, does not make enough difference to undo the fact that Felman does not see her readings characterised by the novel. The governess, the character which Felman identifies as a representative of Wilson's readings, is also a narrating character. This amounts to the fact that Felman shows that there is a narrative chain between these characters, but does not, in practise, want to directly identify herself with "the first person narrator". One could play with the thought that perhaps I and possibly Johnson and the other critics who have taken this position of wondering about the absence of Felman's dedication to her own "puppet" in the text, are then behaving like Douglas. Douglas is the intermitting character between the governess and "the first person narrator" since this pair does not love each other directly but only through the third party's delivery. He is also a character who due to the story of the governess, as the text of Wilson's, stays alive.

The advance of this suggestion is that it brings the never-endingness of the interpretative effort into the light. Interestingly enough, Douglas is the only one of these three characters who is not a writing character: he only reads aloud and transmits, and is thus "only" a reader. This can be seen as an indication of the fact that I do not offer "direct" analysis of James's novel, but rather commit a meta-critical effort of criticising the novel's criticism. Nevertheless, Felman in particular writes also meta-criticism; and as a matter of fact, in giving this interpretation of James's novel, I share with her the level which is usually viewed to be "the basic level of criticism". Can we learn anything from this discussion? Perhaps that it is inaccurate to speak of
levels in *stricto sensu*. The never-endingness of interpretation means, that it is impossible to draw a line, which could not be liquidated.

The fact that Felman does not pick up her own dupe, a character which would share Felman's interpretative position, is not totally harmless: the theme of the characters as metaphors of the reading efforts is too predominant in Felman's readings. Thus, it might be stated that Felman attributes too much prestige to her effort to read the novel's ambiguity as such. In turn, this should be noted when the worth of the transferential theory of narrative is discussed in the sense that its efficiency should not be overestimated.

Felman, in her part, seems to identify her readings with the position of the implied reader, since her way of speaking of a second-degree reading alludes, in my view, to the situation which Paul de Man has described as becoming as "rigorous a reader as the writer had to be in order to write a sentence in the first place".113 Felman, like de Man, speaks about the author and the reader with the reservation that they are signs of a text, that is, both are "actual" and, however, textual effects. Therefore, even if Felman does not place herself in the chain of the most explicit puppets of textuality, the narrators and narratees, to the extent that they are characters, it should be remembered that in any other respect, Felman cannot be accused of believing in any kind belief that she would be less fooled by the rhetoric. Felman commits to her "second-degree reading" only in order to show that all readings are at the end of the day, "mistaken" to the extent that there is no possibility "to read from outside", as Peter Brooks put well. And if one requires a proof of Felman's "good will", in my view, Felman's play between the fictional world and the actual world is one of the best. Compared, for example, to Peter Brooks, who in his *Reading for the Plot - Design and
Intention in Narratives reinterprets Booth's and Seymour Chatman's model of narratological levels in terms of transference, Felman is much more concrete in stating the impossibility of a metalingual position. Brooks develops the analogy between textual dynamics and the transferential dynamics of "real life" in somewhat of a more marginal sense since he most often uses transference as a tool for interpreting the dynamics of the plots of the fictional world and, thus, in the practise of his criticism, does not put forth the impossibility of metalanguage. However, this interpretation is also somewhat unfair since Brooks focuses on the way the plot works as a narrative, and such, would be rather a hard effort to attempt otherwise. Brooks makes the metaphorical implications of his theory clear, as efforts also to less strict intratextual direction are made: he introduces Freud as an unreliable narrator in the case of Dora. Still, the fact that Brooks also accounts for narrative embeddings and does not pay any attention to characters as allegorising the interpretative effort of the reading can be seen, as, Mikko Keskinen has noted, as a limitation. Characters in their hermeneutic efforts also offer an important analogy for the actual reader's interpretative efforts. If this narrowness of Brooks's tactic is compared to Felman's study, I think it is more an achievement of Felman to show how transferential exchange does not end anywhere as reinterpretation always twists the categories, levels, and characters into each other. Perhaps it is already her conceptualisation of the situation, more through the Peircean interpretant than the narratological, hierarchical model, which helps the purpose of the destabilisation of the mere study of narratives as structures - the implicit goal of both critics.
5.4 The Desire for Narrative

Transferential theory of narrative shows that we, as actual readers, are glamorous fooled by texts. However, a question arises about the reasons which justify Felman to call her theory a theory of narrative. Felman writes that she is "prompted to raise a question whether the acting-out of the unconscious is always in effect the acting-out of a story, of a narrative." Apparently, her question emerges on the basis of her interpretation of Wilson's performance as a repetition of the dramatic scenes inscribed by the narrative. As it was pointed out in the section concerning Lacan's structural conception of the human psyche, the desire for narrative is due to our "natural curiosity": in the psychic reality, the desire and the metonymical axis of language are one and the same thing. I believe that at this stage of our study, the corresponding case of the repetition as being caused by the metaphor making activity of language needs no further clarification. Thus, the case should be clear: we want to have our reading adventures despite of the fact that they effect on us through the double-edged sword of identification as simultaneous alienation. If the way of conceiving the reality by means of narrative dynamic is this kind of a structural necessity, what is then left for the actual practise of reading?

This is the point where the analytic session becomes a subject of interest. Felman argues, the function of the reading unconscious is similar in psychoanalysis and in reading literature. As already noted, this notion regards the effort of reading as being able to benefit from the ethic of trying to become aware conscious of one's own transference. Of course, there is also the possibility of doing criticism which gives up the effort of understanding and thus, simply lets itself to be conceived by the
text. For the sake of some balance in communication, however, I recommend strongly that the critics would agree to the challenge. To claim else would be to underestimate literature, since it regards the resources of language with particular self-consciousness.

In addition to Felman's analyses of Wilson's presentation, this idea can be found in Brooks's literary analyses. He interprets without exception stories where the transferential exchange does not succeed. According to Lacan, the failure is due to the subject's incapability to assume his lack, which is the lack in the Other, that is, in language and his unconscious and consequently, his possibilities of understanding the irreducible otherness. Thus, in the effort of being aware of one's transference, one can also err by going to extremes. Everything cannot be analysed by a referral to transferential attitudes: there is the real otherness outside the transferential assumptions of the Other.
Conclusion

In this study I have tried to point out the advantages Shoshana Felman’s suggestion of transferential theory of narrative has. On the basis of Henry James’s *The Turn of the Screw* and its criticism, Felman comes to suggest a way of conceptualising reading and, consequently, certain ethics of reading.

Felman’s suggestion of transferential theory of narrative presents kind of a general logic according to which narrative processes can be conceptualised. Due to the function of identification as a double-edged sword, it can be viewed as being capable of explaining, not only the seductiveness of the reading situation described by Roland Barthes, but also, the anxiety inherent in it emphasised by Harold Bloom. In addition, instead of being a theory about only subjective readings, it is able to explain something of the phenomena of the existence of interpretative schools. This is possible as for Felman the reading effect is transferential insofar as this effect is an interpretation of the position of the Peircean *interpretant* - of a reader not as a person, but as a sign of text. In my study I have tried to prove that precisely this is the advantage of the transferential theory of narrative. It is a theory which does not separate human reality and textual reality, but views human beings in general as "signs of the text" because human reality is irreversibly symbolised. Thus, this theory is able to take into account those cultural factors which criticism has proven to guide reading: the power of textual conventions, the issues of gender, class and ethnicity, to mention only a few. Transferential theory of narrative is at the same time a general model, which means that it cannot possibly hope to be adequate alone - it has only a form of "a logic" according to which individual narrative
processes are organised. Whatever its particular "looks" in individual cases, it cannot be known. Contrary to the claims that transferenceal theory would propose textual immanence, it has to be noted that one cannot predict with the transferenceal model the outcome and the destiny of individual communicative situations.

The theory functions also as an ethical model. It suggests, that one might benefit of being aware of one's own transference as a reader. This certainly does not mean that the reader cannot participate at all in the fantasy the text suggests. Contrary to this, participation is necessary: one has to reserve the position of the interpretant if one wants to find out what the text is about. However, because the aim of the literary criticism is to conceptualise what has taken place in reading, the challenge might be, especially in the case of self-conscious texts, to be able to show some resistance a posteriori. Transferential model does not, of course, offer any programme how this can be in practise done. Although it can offer some means to conceptualise the situation, this does not yet "guarantee" us anything concerning the practise. The only thing that is guaranteed is that, due to the effect of the reading unconscious, no individual recommendations are possible.
1 This essay, Turning the Screw of Interpretation, was first published by Yale French Studies in 1977. The edition I used here is a reprint of the chapter in Felman's essay collection Writing and Madness under the title of Henry James: Madness and the Risks of Practice (Turning the Screw of Interpretation) (Felman 1985, pp. 141 - 247). The essay is not a translation, but is originally written in English.

2 Felman 1985, p. 31.

3 Freud 1900, p. 562.


5 Brooks is Felman's colleague at Yale University. Surprisingly, he does not mention Felman's work on the subject of transferential theory of narrative in either of his own studies concerning the same subject. See Brooks 1984 and Brooks 1994.

6 For example Meredith Anne Skura offers an ego-psychologically oriented account of transference (See Skura, 1981). For critic Peter Brooks, Skura's study "has little to say" about transference (Brooks 1992, p. 349). Brooks himself studies the dynamics of narratives. Although his emphasis is not particularly Lacanian, he uses also Lacan in his transferential theory of narrative desire.

   Also critic Norman Holland has used the concept of transference. He has done this in order to defend his work against the accusations of solipsism (See Holland 1982). According to Holland's ego-psychological conviction, all the reader finds in reading is himself: interpretations are done on the basis of the readers identity themes and consequently, reading strengthens the reader's identity. It is hard to see, how the notion of transference could turn this kind of tautological model into less solipsistic way of viewing reading.

7 See Kekinen 1993, pp. 108 - 110.

8 See Felman 1985, p. 178. In the introduction to this essay-collection she is more explicit and makes it clear that her readings of James's The turn of the Screw is, as a matter of fact, a formulation of the transferential theory of narrative.

9 This account of Booth's theory is given on the basis of Vainikkala's description. See Vainikkala 1993, pp. 247 - 249.


Felman writes: "On the basis of the literary evidence we are analysing, and within the framework of a theory of narrative, we are here prompted to raise a question whether the acting-out of the unconscious is always in effect the acting out of a story, of a narrative; and whether, on the other hand, all stories and all narratives imply a transferential structure, that is, a love-relation that both organises and disguises, deciphers and enciphers them, turning them into their own substitute and their own repetition. The Turn of the Screw at any rate would seem to confirm such a hypothesis." (Felman 1985, p. 178.)

One possible way to put Felman's theory to the test would be to study it through "the specificity of literary text"; however, I will view Felman's study as such a text because without examining her theory quite closely, another tests cannot be done: the aim has to be, as Felman has put it elsewhere, to evaluate and put in perspective her readings, not for example but just mechanically adapting her reading strategy.


See for example Ragland-Sullivan, 1986.


There is, however, a slight reservation to this. In psychosis the unconscious does not function properly. Consequently, the impossible, unsymbolised reality "makes a hole" in the symbolic order of conceptualised reality. Because this reality is "impossible", psychotic structure is the one of malfunction. See Lacan 1993, p. 208.


This is Heidegger's term for the phenomenon. Heidegger states, that despite of momentary failures to understand something, it is still so that the understanding fails, and not other way round. This means that it would be only occasionally that we understand something, and at other times, we would just be in the world like, for example, juice is in a glass. We are not things but live in perspectives of meaningfulness, and cannot rid of this phenomenon from time to time just by pouring out our way of existence. See Heidegger 1962.

For a comprehensive account of Saussurean linguistics, see Jonathan Culler's Ferdinand de Saussure.

The unconscious is, therefore, "transindividual". Lacan 1977b, p. 49.

Of logical time as the intersubjective time of language see Lacan 1977a, p. 75.


Freud speaks of the phenomenon as "nachträglichkeit".


Felman 1987, p. 21 - 25.
30 Felman 1985, p. 121. According to Felman, Lacan raises this question in "Les Non-dupes errent" which is an unpublished seminar (April 23, 1974).


33 See Derrida 1991, p. 80 - 111. Derrida has accused Jacques Lacan and his followers of adopting this part of his work without recognising his academic ownership to the idea of the difference between signifier and signified as an effect. Derrida emphasises that the difference is not that of a substance, but the one of a function. As a matter of fact, he claims that Lacan quite often confuses the two. This is the basis of his criticism of Lacan’s readings of Poe’s short story The Purloined Letter (See Derrida, 1987, pp. 413 - 496).


37 Peter Brooks’s has made a vivid account of this issue. See Brooks, pp. 55 - 56.


40 Brooks 1984, p. 270.


42 Brooks 1994, p. 49.

43 Brooks 1994, p. 52. See also Freud 1915, p. 159.

44 Brooks 1984, p. 282. The case of Dora is the most famous example of Freud’s inability to recognise the force of transference and, most importantly, counter-transference on the analyst’s part.


46 Freud 1912, p. 108.

47 In Lacanian terms, the same idea can be expressed so that Freud realised the particular structure of psychoanalytic discourse. The idea is that psychoanalytic discourse does not leave the patient in a divided by offering identifications. For a comprehensive account of Lacan’s theory of four discourses, see Verhaeghe 1996.

48 Freud called the enactment of patient’s unconscious conditions of reality the "new editions" (Freud 1915, p. 168).

See for example Freud 1915, pp. 166 - 167.

Later on in his life Freud however held that analysis was, in the strict sense, interminable. Brooks 1984, p. 281.

Felman 1985, p. 29.


"The subject doesn't presume anything, he is presumed. Presumed, as we have taught, by the signifier which represents him to another signifier". Cited after Felman 1985, p. 132.


Felman 1987, p. 77.

Lacan 1977a, 236.


About the reading unconscious, see Felman 1985, p. 171.

Lacan reads de Saussure's formula of sign S/s so that the bar means the censor and lack.

Felman 1985. It is important to note that, according to Lacan, the subject is the subject of unconscious - there is no unified self-conscious subject of philosophy for Lacan, only the divided ones.

Kaplan has criticised Felman for being too literary-minded (See Kaplan 1990, pp. 5 - 6). In my view, this criticism is not justified. Even though there is no reason to assume that the presented transferential model could be suitable only for literary criticism, Felman's pathos must be understood as a confession of "transference love" of literature.

Felman 1985, p. 143.

See Felman 1985, p. 165 - 182.


Felman 1985, p. 169.

Felman 1985, p. 172.


Naturally, Felman is not the only one who has appreciated the "insolubility" of the story. Such recognition is made, for example, by Louis D. Rubin, Jr., and Virginia Wolf. (Felman 1985, p. 242.)

See James 1966.

See Felman 1985, pp. 162 - 165.

Felman 1985, p. 158.


As Felman notes, Wilson thinks that James, too, has missed out the status of normal sex. "Problems of sexual passion (...) were beginning to be subjects of burning interest. But this is probable that James had by this time (...) come to recognise his unfittedness for dealing with them and was far too honest to fake." (Wilson 1962, p. 125. Cited after Felman, 158.)


Felman 1985, p. 236.


Felman 1985, p. 231.

Felman 1985, p. 231.

Felman 1985, p. 149.


Felman 1985, p. 158.


Felman 1985, pp. 239 - 241.

Felman 1985, p. 240.

Felman 1985, p. 179.

Felman 1985, p. 179.


Felman 1985, p. 165. This is my modification of a definition of literature in general suggested by Stanley E. Fish.
95 Felman 1985, p. 179.

96 Felman 1985, p.158 and p. 179, combination of Felman's italics on these pages.


98 Felman 1985, p. 31.

99 "Such is, at the very least, the story of my reading, the narrative that, in its rhythm and its rhetoric, its theories and its resistances, I would like to offer as a question - as a sign - to an interpretant to come" (Felman 1985, p. 255).

100 Actually Stanley Fish was first to point out the phenomenon of "prestructured readings" in his readings of Milton's Paradise Lost (See Fish 1971).


103 I claim, on the very basis of my reading experience with Junichiro Tanizaki's self-reflective diary-novel The Key (The Kagi, 1956), that Felman's theory provides a blessed way of plotting one's way out from the state of total paralysation. Such a state of blocked interpretation is unbearable at least if one has to prepare a paper on the very novel. See Tanizaki 1983.

104 Hand 1990, pp. 79 - 82.

105 Alan Bass introduces the idea that the effort of acting in transference means, in the work of a translator, that one has to consult the dictionary even in cases of which one was sure of (Bass 1984, p. 83).

106 Felman 1987, p. 15.

107 Felman 1987, p. 22 and p. 142.

108 Felman's essay Beyond Oidipus: The Specimen Story of Psychoanalysis can be understood as suggesting this. See Felman 1987, pp. 99 - 159.

109 See Derrida 1984. Derrida has often accused readers of reading into "Lacan" (according to Derrida, Lacan is the first one to suggest such readings), Derrida's theoretical insights. For example, in Envoy, he directs his words against Johnson's study The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida, not however mentioning her name, and calls this in reading of Derrida's insight into Lacan "the logic of pregnancy": the reader has been, according to Derrida, pregnant by another man, and, therefore, gives birth in his name (Derrida 1987, pp. 150-151). This disagreement seems to be impossible to judge, despite the efforts to do so. (For Johnson's effort see Johnson 1982, pp. 110 - 146).


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