JYU DISSERTATIONS 707

Risto-Matti Matero

From Companionship with Nature to Green Growth

Competing Conceptualisations of Well-being and the Environment in Finnish and German Green Parties, 1980-2002

UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES

JYU DISSERTATIONS 707

Risto-Matti Matero

From Companionship with Nature to Green Growth

Competing Conceptualisations of Well-Being and the Environment in Finnish and German Green Parties, 1980–2002

Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston vanhassa juhlasalissa S212
lokakuun 27. päivänä 2023 kello 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä,
in building Seminarium, Old Festival Hall S212, on October 27, 2023, at 12 o'clock.

JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2023

Editors
Pasi Ihalainen
Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä
Päivi Vuorio
Open Science Centre, University of Jyväskylä

ISBN 978-951-39-9786-1 (PDF)
URN:ISBN:978-951-39-9786-1
ISSN 2489-9003

Permanent link to this publication: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-9786-1

ABSTRACT

Matero, Risto-Matti
From Companionship with Nature to Green Growth: Competing Conceptualisations of Well-being and the Environment in Finnish and German Green Parties, 1980-2002.
Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2023, 261 p.
(JYU Dissertations
ISSN 2489-9003; 707)
ISBN 978-951-39-9786-1 (PDF)

This dissertation engages in studying the development of environmental ideas using Finnish and German Green Parties as case studies. These parties were established as representatives of the 1970s radical environmental movements and their ideals. Their political thinking was marked by the intention to question the basic presuppositions of Western thought, including materialism, anthropocentrism and hierarchic domination of nature. Subordinating nature to the needs of economic growth and competitiveness was perceived as a continuation of these basic presuppositions, leading not only to environmental degradation but also to various social problems. The Greens questioned the practices and institutions drawn from these presuppositions, including the attainment of economic growth as the basis of politics.

During the 1990s, the parties changed their ideological direction. No longer drawing ideas from the tradition of radical eco-philosophy, the Greens relied now on the moderate tradition of (and political concepts provided by) environmental economics. This turn, causing the disappearance of the earlier critique of basic Western presuppositions, was conducted by employing such moderate environmental concepts as *sustainable development* and *ecological modernisation* to political use. Earlier growth criticism, which had injured the green parties' ability to function effectively in party politics, disappeared.

My study demonstrates that this turn was caused by the collision of radical environmental thought stemming from grassroots movements and the political and economic realities of the established power structures. Although it was initially caused by the internal strives and conflicts within the studied green parties, the turn also represents a larger change in environmental thinking. The moderate turn popularised the ideal of 'green consumption', which, however, turns out to be only one of many different forms of environmentalism, all of which have varying political and often even economic interests underlying them. Meanwhile, mapping different environmental concepts helps better understand the public environmental discussions today.

Keywords: The Greens, Vihreä liitto, Die Grünen, Finland, Germany, environmental politics, human–nature relationships, twentieth century, conceptual history

TIIVISTELMÄ (ABSTRACT IN FINNISH)

Matero, Risto-Matti
Ihmisen ja luonnon kumppanuudesta vihreään kasvuun: hyvinvointia ja ympäristöä koskevat käsitteet Suomen ja Saksan vihreissä puolueissa 1980-2002.
Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2023, 261 2.
(JYU Dissertations
ISSN 2489-9003; 707)
ISBN 978-951-39-9786-1 (PDF)

Väitöskirjassani tutkin ympäristöaatteiden kehitystä 1980-luvulta 2000-luvun alkuun käyttäen tapausesimerkkeinä Suomen ja Saksan vihreitä puolueita. Saksan ja Suomen vihreät puolueet nousivat 1970-luvun ympäristöliikkeen pohjalta edustamaan ympäristöliikkeen arvoja ja ajatuksia puoluepoliittisella areenalla. Niiden poliittinen ydinajattelu oli johdettu suoraan radikaalin ympäristöliikehdinnän vaihtoehtoajattelusta, johon kuului pyrkimys kyseenalaistaa länsimaisen ajattelun perusolettamukset, kuten materialistinen ja ihmiskeskeinen maailmankuva sekä luntosuhde. Luonnon ja ihmisten alistaminen voitontavoittelun ja talouskasvun sekä kilpailukyvyn tarpeisiin nähtiin tämän oletusmaailman seurauksena, ja ympäristöongelmien lisäksi myös monet sosiaaliset ongelmat nähtiin juontuvan tästä peruslähtökohdasta. Vihreät pyrkivät kyseenalaistamaan näistä perusolettamuksista syntyneitä käytäntöjä ja instituutioita, mukaan lukien talouskasvukeskeisyyden politiikan ylimpänä ohjenuorana.

1990-luvun kuluessa vihreät puolueet muuttivat aatteellista suuntaansa. Vaikutteita ei enää haettu ympäristöliikkeen radikaalista ekofilosofiasta, vaan maltillisen ympäristötaloudellisen ajattelun tarjoamista käsitteistä. Samalla pyrkimys kyseenalaistaa länsimaisen ajattelun perusolettamuksia katosi vihreästä ajattelusta ja politiikasta. Tämä käänne toteutettiin lanseeraamalla *kestävän kehityksen, ekotehokkuuden* ja *ekologisen modernisaation* kaltaisia maltillista ympäristöajattelua edustavia käsitteitä poliittiseen käyttöön. Niiden avulla ympäristöajattelua voitiin edistää ilman aiempaa talouskasvukriittisyyttä.

Tutkimukseni osoittaa, että tässä käänteessä oli ennen kaikkea kyse radikaalin ympäristöajattelun ja vakiintuneiden poliittisten sekä taloudellisten valtarakenteiden yhteentörmäyksestä. Toisaalta se kertoo puolueiden sisäisistä valtataisteluista eri sisäisten ryhmittymien välillä, toisaalta laajemmasta ympäristöaatteiden muutoksesta: globalisaation myötä maltillisemmat ympäristökäsitteet yleistyivät ja osin syrjäyttivät radikaalin talouskasvukritiikin myös esimerkiksi YK:n ja EU:n tasolla.

Tämän seurauksena kulutusvalintojen ohjaaminen nousi ympäristöpolitiikan ytimeen. Sittemmin hegemonisen aseman julkisessa keskustelussa saavuttanut ’vihreän kuluttajuuden’ ideaali osoittautuukin yhdeksi monesta keskenään usein ristiriitaisesta ympäristöajattelun muodosta, joiden taustalta löytyy erilaisia poliittisia ja usein taloudellisiakin intressejä. Eri ympäristöaatteiden aatteellisten taustojen kartoittaminen auttaa ymmärtämään myös tämän päivän ympäristökeskustelua paremmin.

Asiasanat: vihreät, Vihreä liitto, Die Grünen, Suomi, Saksa, ympäristöpolitiikka, luontosuhde, 1900-luku, käsitehistoria

Author

Risto-Matti Matero
Department of History and Ethnology
University of Jyväskylä

Supervisors

Professor Pasi Ihalainen
Department of History and Ethnology
University of Jyväskylä

Professor Pertti Ahonen
Department of History and Ethnology
University of Jyväskylä

Docent Miina Kaarkoski
Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy
National Defence University

Docent Anssi Halmesvirta
Department of History and Ethnology
University of Jyväskylä

Reviewers

Assistant Professor Stephen Milder
Faculty of Arts
University of Groningen

Docent Jenni Karimäki
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Helsinki

Opponent

Assistant Professor Stephen Milder
Faculty of Arts
University of Groningen

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisors Pasi Ihalainen, Pertti Ahonen, Miina Kaarkoski and Anssi Halmesvirta. Pasi's influence on this project is practically impossible to overestimate. Ever since I first entered his office, he has been nothing but supportive of my ambitions in overcoming the boundaries between environmental history, intellectual history and conceptual political history. Furthermore, Pasi has helped me tremendously in establishing a necessary theoretical and methodological toolcase to engage in such an endeavour. Pertti, meanwhile, has provided me with invaluable support in helping me to clarify my focus and also to bring down the sometimes overwhelming level of abstraction in my thinking, while his practical tips and insights, particularly regarding the use of German context and sources, were essential for this study. Miina and Anssi have provided this work with the kind of comments, ideas, support and constructive criticism that I would not have been able to think of on my own. I am grateful to you all.

I wish to thank the reviewers of this study, Stephen Milder and Jenni Karimäki. Their comments have helped me better observe not only the strenghts but also the shortcomings of the manuscript draft, and were instrumental for the finishing process of this work.

I wish to thank my colleagues and co-workers who have contributed to the writing of this study one way or another. There are too many of you to mention everyone separately, but I wish to name a few who have provided the kind of support and exchange of ideas that goes far beyond what can be reasonably expected from a colleague. The enthusiasm of Atte Arffman regarding environmental history has often left me flabbergasted. Our long talks regarding a wide variety of topics, including history, philosophy, politics and sports, have influenced my thinking tremendously, while our two-man reading circle of environmental history classics was one of the most intellectually satisfying experiences during my time in Jyväskylä. Zachris Haaparinne has provided me not only with intellectually stimulating discussions over questions regarding theory and practice of writing political and conceptual history, but also with practical help, particularly during the overwhelming finishing stages of the writing process. Viktor Pál has helped me better understand what is essential from an environmental history perspective, and when in doubt, he has managed to convince me of the fruitfulness of my research setting. Juuso Kuivila has provided me with technical assistance, helping me access digitised newspaper source materials that I would not have been able to access on my own. In addition to this, I have received invaluable comments for my work from Emilia Lakka, Pekka Pietilä, Kenneth Partti, Teemu Häkkinen, Konsta Kajander, Sara Ala-Hynnilä, Joonas Tammela, Hannah Yoken, Heikki Kämäräinen, Juho Pekkarinen, Antero Holmila, Jari Ojala, Juho Saksholm, and many others. I thank you all.

I wish to thank everyone who has worked in the room H123 in the Historica building in the University of Jyväskylä during the years 2019-2023. I have always felt welcome there.

I wish to thank the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Jyväskylä for believing in this project enough to grant it a four-year funding.

Most of all, I wish to thank my closest friends and family members who have stood by me for the past years. From you I have learned that there is no better motivator and no greater joy in life than to be seen and appreciated unconditionally for who you are. I hope to be able to pass that experience forward.

Tampere, 29 September 2023
Risto-Matti Matero.

TABLES

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research setting

1.1.1 Why green environmental discourses matter

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of understanding different discourses surrounding environmental issues in public discussions. In the 2020s, the *Fridays for Future* and *Extinction Rebellion* social movements ignited a more wide-spread public environmental political discussion than ever before. There is now, without a doubt, more media focus than ever on issues related to the environment, although some could claim (and indeed have claimed[1]) that while climate change is at the forefront of environmental discussion, other equally important environmental issues are still relegated to the margins of public and media discussions. These issues include mass species extinction, ocean acidity, ever-increasing overconsumption of natural resources, and desertification of large parts of the developing world – all of which are challenges that have immediate global consequences, and are likely to become even more relevant in the upcoming decades.

Furthermore, the strong focus on the need for an immediate reaction to the climate crisis may distort the reality that public discussion on how environmental problems ought to be tackled is filled with competing and often contradictory standpoints. For example, issues of climate justice are still very rarely discussed in the media, which can easily lead to overlooking the fact that the price for tackling climate change is distributed unevenly both between societies and within them and is predominantly undertaken with economic rather than ecological interests in mind. To use a somewhat provocative example that is sometimes raised in public and academic discussions, the rich and powerful fly their private planes to climate conferences while the

[1] Baker 2007, 60.

individual consumer is often expected to act as the agent of change, thrust with a near-impossible mission of saving the planet from overconsumption while having very limited agency on issues concerning emissions of production or the unsustainability of the global trade infrastructure.[2] Moreover, while such discussions are often legitimised by 'science', what science says regarding methods to tackle these issues tends to remain somewhat unclear.[3]

Indeed, when one takes a closer look at media discussions, there tends to be more noise than clarity underlying the sense of emergency and importance. The goals and presuppositions of these public discourses are often contradictory for a very clear reason: different forms of environmentalism stem from different intellectual traditions and are used to promote different political goals. For example, environmentalism revolving around nature preservation has developed from a very different intellectual tradition (and with a very different understanding of human–nature relationships) than environmentalism promoting the sustainability of markets and consumption.[4]

It is against this backdrop that the development of environmental political thought among green parties is a subject that has intrigued the world today. Drawing on this context, this study focuses on the development of environmental ideas in the Finnish and German Green Parties during 1980–2002. I particularly focus on competing ideas concerning well-being and the environment in these parties in different political contexts and by different actors, as well as how these ideas have changed over time and how they have been used in politics. This provides access to understand – and empirically study – how the abstract themes of beliefs and presuppositions concerning nature and human–nature relationships became visible in used political language among environmental political actors. As environmental ideas have spread transnationally, the subject has scalability outside the studied parties and countries.

Since political ideas and goals are constructed by means of language, meaning that politics can be understood as a discursive activity,[5] the subject is approached using methods offered by conceptual history. This implies that this study analyses key concepts to identify the political acts that they are used for, the traditions of thought they stem from and the presuppositions subscribed to regarding well-being and the environment with their use. Such an approach raises intriguing research questions related to understanding the different forms of environmentalism(s) and their perspectives on different kinds of environmental political thinking, goals and priorities, which consequentially have a deep impact on political discourse.

---

[2] The problematic sides of such environmental discourses have been addressed by Lewis Akenji 2019 and Jeremy L. Caradonna 2018 among others.

[3] For example, while science is often used to defend the sustainable cutting of forests, it is this very science that supposedly demands more forest conservation at other times. See Pekurinen 1997(a), 53–56, for this debate.

[4] The different environmental discourses and traditions are outlined in Dryzek 2005.

[5] As discussed e.g. by Palonen 2019, 197–198.

Since both the Finnish and German Greens started out in the 1980s as small protest organisations and had spent at least one full term in government by 2002, this time frame is considered suitable for detecting the development of environmental political thought in different contexts and estimating the political significance and influence of the parties in question.[6] This time era is also appropriate for studying the further parliamentarisation of an extra-parliamentary movement, which offers perspectives on the need for adaption to political and economic realities as a significant factor in environmental thought. Moreover, this time frame is situated in an era characterised by widespread changes in global politics (end of the Cold War, rise of UN-led global environmental governance) and political ideology (increasing hegemonic position of the competitiveness framework[7]), which contributed to establishing frameworks for changing environmental thinking in green parties. In the German case, these changes transformed the party itself: the studied German party *Die Grünen* represented only the West German Greens until 1993, when it merged with the East German *Bündnis* as a consequence of the German unification process. For the purposes of simplicity, whenever German Greens are discussed in this study without a clear differentiation between the East and the West, such notions refer to the West German *Die Grünen* (1980-1993) and later the Pan-German *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (1993-2000) throughout this study.

Understanding the backgrounds of different environmentalist discourses, their different uses in politics and the different presuppositions that guide their political utility are necessary interpretative exercises. In particular, this study observes the collision of (often radical) ideas stemming from environmental grassroots movements and the world of established party politics. In this context, investigating the methods and presuppositions based on which different environmental discourses are reconstructed in green political language can help us intellectually separate the different forms of environmentalisms that have operated in the past. Moreover, this approach can help us better understand the rather wide spectrum of environmental discourses prevalent today, thus bringing clarity to understanding both the involved actors and their intentions as well as the overarching intellectual backgrounds behind these discourses.

1.1.2 Focus of the study and research questions

Understanding the intellectual and discursive practices that have constructed human–nature relationships at different times represents one of the three big branches of environmental historical research, and the only one stepping away

[6] The Finnish Greens were not a party until 1988 however, despite having two MPs already in 1983, and municipal representatives even earlier. The parties themselves have published rough outlines of these different stages from protest movements to government parties, although need to be read with caution and source criticism. See Die Grünen 2019, Remes & Sohlstén, eds. 2007.

[7] Meaning that economic competitiveness and productivity became increasingly important as political values over this time period; the issue is discussed in European environmental political context e.g. by Collier 1998; Knill & Liefferink 2007.

from the realist epistemology[8] of ecologically oriented scholarship to adopt a constructivist framework that is more suitable for the study of discourses.[9] More precisely, a study of human–nature relationships attempts to grasp the mental models, thoughts, beliefs and presuppositions about how humans have valued nature, used nature and related their identity with nature. Studying human–nature relationships typically involves dealing with questions such as whether humans have understood themselves as part of the natural world or separate from it, whether the natural world is understood to have intrinsic value or is it merely a resource storage for human well-being, and whether human well-being in general is dependent or independent of the well-being of the natural world. I follow in the footsteps of such scholars as Marvin E. Olsen, Dora G. Lodwick and Riley E. Dunlap, for whom our socially shared beliefs and cognitions form a mental 'lense' as an entranched way of perceiving the world and ourselves in it. Our conception of human–nature relationships forms an important part of such a lense, making it an important study subject. While we tend to take such beliefs and presuppositions for granted, they are, just like the lenses of eyeglasses, essentially constructed, although with language and social conventions instead of glass.[10]

Analysing how such 'lenses' as human–nature relationships have been constructed historically is an intriguing question for environmental historians. In earlier research concerning human–nature –relationships, there has been significant interest in the philosophical (or grassroots environmentalist) discussion. However, there has been increasing discussion among environmental historians to bring this interest closer to practical contexts while also overcoming the boundaries among different fields.[11] While studying the subject as a cultural phenomenon through literature and philosophy has utility, there have been calls to link this perspective with 'contexts of action', such as economy and politics, over the past years. These calls are grounded on the notion that beliefs concerning human–nature –relationships directly affect the practical spheres of economic and political activities 'from individual choices of ethical consumption to international treaties'.[12] The field of political history has developed trends encouraging the study of abstract ideas, such as human–nature –relationships, to also include the study of a more practical level of day-to-day political discourse, where these ideas are actually implemented. An

[8] This standpoint claims that reality exists more or less independent of human understanding of it and can be studied along with the natural sciences, as opposed to a more constructivist view according to which reality exists, or at least can primarily be understood, through the use of language. See Miller 2019.
[9] The two other themes – more closely linked with the natural sciences – are the impact of environment on human culture (for example, diseases) and the impact of human culture on the environment (for example, climate change). Hughes 2016, 4–9.
[10] Olsen, Lodwick & Dunlap 1992, 1–3.
[11] Demands for understanding environmental history in the context of action has been promoted by Kari Väyrynen 2009 and Joakim Radkau 2005 for example.
[12] Väyrynen 2009, 71–77. Moreover, it should be noted that Väyrynen, among others, speaks of mentalities and thought patterns.

increasing need to understand discourses beyond the so-called leading thinkers[13] has emerged, particularly in the field of conceptual history.[14]

The goal of this study is to contribute to this evolving new field of environmental historical research. Exploring the ways in which some of the core presuppositions of environmental thought have been brought into the field of party-political discussions offers an example of how abstract ideals of environmental political philosophy can be studied in the aforementioned contexts of action. Doing so brings these ideals down from the abstract world to the level of practical implementation, where ideas and concepts concerning the environment often evolve depending on how and for what purposes they are used politically. The practical use of an idea might either differ greatly or might be used for very different purposes than the thinker who developed it would have ever anticipated and, therefore, is worth investigating. The pages of this study show that almost all key concepts, from *companionship movement* to *sustainable development* to *eco-efficiency,* had their meanings and presuppositions somewhat modified by the actors using them to better fit their political thinking and local and temporal contexts. Such changes should by no means be understood as ruptures from some predetermined right or normal way to use the concepts but should be regarded as normal political activity, since the meanings of concepts are constantly being contested and redefined. [15] Furthermore, this study demonstrates how a turn from using one concept (such as *companionship with nature)* to using another (such as *green growth)* also tends to indicate a shift in presuppositions concerning humans' relationship with the environment.

Furthermore, a conceptual historical approach can offer new interpretations to explore collisions of different contextual levels, thus deepening our understanding of both the political and environmental factors related to the topic. Both politics and nature (as analytical concepts) can be seen as omnipresent phenomena throughout human history, and the connection between the two – be it the distribution of scarce natural resources or the protection of endangered or sanctified land areas – has always been the subject of political contestation, as famously pointed out by Frank Zelko.[16]

This study focuses on green parties as its subject because they have sprung out of the world of alternative citizens' grassroots movements, or 'new social movements' (*neue soziale Bewegungen*) that have often represented environmental ideas in public discussion in a radical manner, even if they currently represent established party structures in the European political

[13] In the case of environmental thinking, these notable names include the forerunners of environmentalism, such as Racher Carson, or environmental philosophers such as Arne Naess, Murray Bookchin, Riane Eisler, Friedrich Schmidt–Bleek and Joseph Huber, all of whom were references by the Greens at one point or another, as is present in the pages of this study.
[14] The attempt to widen the intellectual context of actors using concepts is observed in many recent works of conceptual history, see, e.g., Skinner 2002, 42, 57–58; Ihalainen 2010, 1; Haaparinne 2021, 25–26.
[15] Skinner 2002; more details on this have been provided in Chapter 1.2.
[16] Zelko 2014, 716.

system in many countries.[17] This study will focus on the extent to which these radical ideas (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) were sustained in the party-political world and the extent to which the green parties could or even wanted to maintain their position as the representative of the alternative grassroots movements.

Furthermore, as different forms of environmentalist discourses drawn from diverse traditions started to emerge among the green parties by the late 1980s, competing understandings of environmentalism and human–nature relationships turned out to be an intriguing subject to analyse. Therefore, the parties represent case studies to inspect the larger development of environmental ideas that are transnationally connected to European and global contexts, where a more moderate market-friendlier turn towards *greenness* was emerging. Comparing the studied countries and identifying the transfers of ideas in larger contexts, such as environmental movements or international conferences, helps keep track of the larger development patterns of which green thinking was a part of. Locating contradictions between competing forms of political environmentalisms raises new intriguing questions: how did these competing conceptualisations of greenness emerge in the studied parties? Why did the Greens find it difficult to maintain their radical ideas in the field of politics? What political intentions did the actors portray when such changes were aimed at, or fought against? And, perhaps the most intriguing question of all, why do we so often understand environmentalism as a single discourse, when there are sulphurous arguments and walk-outs even among green parties over the question of what *greenness* really means? These questions are inspected more closely in Chapter 4, where I examine the rise of the competing, moderate and market-friendlier forms of *greenness* from the margins of the parties to the mainstream.

The question regarding the place of environmentalist thinking in the field of politics is not new. For example, as pointed out by the environmental sociologist William Connolly in his 2017 book *Facing the Planetary*, the environmental conceptualisation of well-being has often included the goal of the radical redefinition of an anthropocentric understanding of well-being. Connolly argued that these radical environmentalist eco-centric conceptualisations of well-being tend to get 'dragged down' to a state of cultural anthropocentric and sociocentric normality due to the emphasis on the economic growth of human societies over the well-being of the non-human world.[18] Though influential in recent environmental discussions, Connolly was not the first to notice this. Andrew Dobson pointed out that Herman Daly, one of the first developers of environmental economics, had already noted in 1977 that the demands made by environmentalists for frugality in human

[17] This development has been more thoroughly analysed in Lucardie & Frankland 2008. To know more about the grassroots background of the German Green party, see Poguntke 1993 and Milder 2017. To know more about the grassroots background of the Finnish Green party see Paastela 1987, Aalto 2018 and Karimäki 2022.
[18] Connolly 2017, 15–16.

consumption could very well be 'unrealistic' to implement in social and political systems that are hard-wired for maintaining growth.[19]

Investigating the actors and their choices can help us understand if and why such a draw-back to growth-orientation really took place in green politics, and why the actors participated in such an endeavor. Is it a question of 'greenwashing'[20] or 'consumer scapegoatism'[21], as some scholars have claimed, or are there other more profound reasons embedded in the party-political structures, as other have claimed,[22] reasons that can help comprehend such discursive draw-backs? A detailed historical analysis of the actors can provide this heated discussion with some cool-headed explanations drawn from the actors' own arguments and possible intentions. Broaching such questions requires a careful scrutiny of the subject and the actors participating in it. The job of the historian is to understand why such ideological turns take place while avoiding value judgments in hindsight, regardless of whether their choices at that time seem 'right' to us from our contemporary perspective. The reasons for the actors re-directing the Greens' political development in a more moderate, market-friendly direction is one of the key issues explored in Chapter 4. I demonstrate that understanding such a turn dichotomically, either as 'greenwashing' or as a sign of new-found 'maturity', overlooks the political intentions of the actors and their temporal contexts that required adapting.

Finally, narrowing the focus of analysis particularly to presuppositions concerning well-being and the environment was chosen for this study for several reasons. First, such as an approach helps bring the study of human–nature relationships down into the practical world of politics and political language, as indicated above. Second, the research questions chosen in this study were also politically relevant questions that the Greens had to tackle as part of their environmental political programme of reconceptualising how and on what premises the environment should be dealt with in politics, consequentially redefining well-being in the process.[23] I approach the conceptions of well-being empirically, meaning that I analyse the different meanings given to well-being, how human well-being relates to the well-being of the non-human world, and to whom the right to well-being is attributed. I demonstrate that questions related to the conseptualisations of these presuppositions were at the core of controversy when different ideological factions within the green parties were competing for political influence and the right to determine what *greenness* meant. The ways in which the new moderate market-friendlier forms of environmental thought altered the vocabulary and the core presuppositions of what *greenness* meant are discussed in Chapter 5.

[19] Dobson 2000, 112; Daly 1977.
[20] Caradonna 2018, 154–158.
[21] Akenji 2019.
[22] The often-repeated argument of increasing 'maturity' as an explanation for such changes can be found for example in Lucardie & Frankland 2008, 3.
[23] A need which naturally arose from the grassroots background of the parties. See Lucardie & Frankland 2008.

The overview of green ideological development traced in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 exhibits the promptness with which the very foundation of what it meant to be *green* was turned around. As older conceptualisations of well-being and the environment that aimed at restructuring the entire Western value system faded from discussion, they were replaced by goals of green growth and green consumption, as political environmentalism became more adaptable to the demands of contemporary cultural and political value bases. Many found the need for such reshaping of *greenness* as a practical and vital necessity, while others perceived such a turn as an abandonment of grassroots environmentalist ideals. These opposing interpretations were based on differing conceptions of the goals of political environmentalism: restructuring the Western political and economic system or bringing about efficient positive change within the current system without looking for a larger paradigm shift.

Analysing the presuppositions behind different forms of political environmentalism using the methods of conceptual history reveals that the conceptual strife did not merely take place at the level of political goals, but consisted of deeper controversies related to the methods and the extent to which the Western presuppositions regarding well-being and the environment could be questioned while still acting efficiently within the institutions subscribing to these beliefs. The research questions presented above are thus empirically founded, and their analysis can deepen our understanding of the role played by ideological presuppositions in determining an efficient way to conduct politics when environmental ideas are used in contexts of action and the reasons why more moderate stands have tended to prevail, as different groups within green movements competed not just for political influence within the parties but also for the power to define what greenness means.

Although these competing groups have often been referred to as *Fundis* (the more radical greens) and *Realos* (describing the more moderate position particularly in Germany), I have opted to use different concepts to describe these positions since the aforementioned terms can be emotionally loaded.[24] The moderates tended to refer to their position as 'reformism', both in Finland and in Germany, meaning that they aimed to reform the system from within rather than restructuring it entirely. Hence, I chose to describe the so-called *realo* position of real political consideration and supporting a more moderate market-adaptable programme as *reformism.* Meanwhile, as the members of the environmental movements tend to perceive their stands as radical – a term which, when referring to the group, has primarily had positive connotations in the party literature[25] – I have opted to use the term *radicalism* to describe their position. I could have used other terms as well – the radicals sometimes refer to themselves as *anti-modernists,* as opposed to the *ecological modernisation*

[24] A more detailed analysis on the terms and how I am using them can be found in Chapter 4.1.
[25] Referring to programmes, documents, conference minutes, interviews and other political texts used as source material in this study.

ideology [26] of the reformists. However, even though the terms *ecological modernism* and *anti-modernism* are occasionally present in the source material and have been used when there has been an empirical need for them, I have opted not to use them as analytical concepts, because the radical and reformist positions deal with questions that go beyond issues dealing with modernisation alone.[27]

Therefore, the primary focus of this study is on the many forms of environmentalism that converged and collided against each other in the field of party politics, where political actors used these discourses to influence political decisions, advance their agendas and compete for power. Employing the toolbox of conceptual history (see the next section) opened an entirely new level of understanding of the environmental history of ideas as it enabled the study of the ways in which these ideas have been used politically by actors participating in related discourses. Furthermore, this study applied the methods of transnational and comparative history to understand the differences, similarities, and transfers of thought. [28] Indeed, a comparison of the two countries – Germany and Finland – reveals what was particular and what was transnational in the development of environmental political ideas.

Moreover, studying a subject that has traditionally belonged to the sphere of environmental history but became visible in political discourses over time can help grasp the more practical aspects of human–nature –relationships. As a result, this study participates in the ongoing theoretical and methodological discussion and development of analysing the discursive, political and environmental layers of reality as interconnected, while also building bridges between different methodological approaches. Furthermore, this approach has the potential to improve our understanding of the political structures and political and economic path dependencies in which the actors participate in, as we start understanding the historical reasons why attempts to create pathways for a new paradigm have had the tendency to become drawn back to within the framework of established political and economic realities.

---

[26] *Ecological modernisation* refers to a moderate environmental political ideal that underlines cooperation with the prevailing Western system, including political, economic and scientific institutions, to create environmentally friendlier modes of production and consumption without questioning the core premises or the institutions of modernisation. Environmentalism within this framework attempts to maintain the achievements of modernisation such as well-being through economic growth, and to advance them in more ecological terms. Meanwhile, anti-modernists have underlined the break from modernisation entirely, questioning political priorities and presuppositions of modernity that are related to economic growth. See Dryzek 2005, 162–180; Järvikoski 2009, 94–99; Huber 1982.

[27] The real-political question of dealing with disarmament or NATO membership, for example, were divisive issues among the Greens, reflecting the peace movements' involvement in the parties.

[28] These themes are more thoroughly discussed in the next section.

1.2 Theoretical framework and methods

1.2.1 Studying environmental ideas: focus, potential and challenges

From the late 1960s onwards, environmental historians have continued to be interested in the interconnections between human cultures and the non-human natural world.[29] One branch of this research has been aimed at understanding the history behind 'Western'[30] (or sometimes 'Judeo-Christian')[31] extractive and oppressive relationship towards nature. Meanwhile, another tradition has been more inclined to approachinng the history of human–nature relationships from a more neutral position, studying either the ways in which such a cultural critique has been conceptualised by the actors involved in ecophilosophical or grassroots activists' fields or researching the development of human–nature relationships either as a philosophical idea[32] or a structural practice.[33] This study bears the same interest in human understanding of the environment – and how and to what extent well-being is understood in relation to that. It is studied in the context of political discourses and concepts. This research subscribes to the latter rather than the former tradition of studying the history of environmental ideas, since my goal is not merely to understand how we have come to where we are now but rather to seek an understanding of the actors and their use of the environmental concepts from their (rather than our) perspectives. Studying human–nature relationships is understood as a study of thinking patterns that are constructed linguistically, shared socially, expressed individually and visible in political discussions and decision-making.

When discussing issues such as presuppositions in green politics, we are thus inadvertently discussing the interconnected layers between political discourses, environmental ideas and presuppositions regarding issues of well-being and relationship with nature – themes that are also deeply interconnected with the functions and reactions of the natural systems in which all human life is embedded and intertwined, whether we are aware of it or not. Some environmental historians have attempted to create a theoretical framework around this sense of interconnectedness, for example, by studying how cognitions of nature have justified environmentally damaging production in economic life, which has in turn led to the overconsumption of natural resources.[34] As for questions related to well-being and the environment, the contention of whether well-being is attributed to humans or to plants and animals affects political discourse, legislation and consumer choices and is interconnected with the ecological spheres of life that react to human decision-

[29] Hughes 2016, 4–9.
[30] Resulting from the feminist interpretation of environmental history, Carolyn Merchant being the most well-known scholar of the field. See Merchant 1980.
[31] As mentioned in Lynn White Jr's classic critique from 1967.
[32] Coates 1998.
[33] Cronon 1983 being one of the most well-known classics in this field.
[34] McEvoy 1989.

making.[35] At the same time, human decision-making also reacts to the ecological spheres of life.

Understanding such interconnections can help us theoretically approach the most fundamental questions faced by humanity today: On what premises are we fighting climate change and biodiversity loss? To what extent are compromises between economic growth and environmental protection possible? How should human well-being be understood in the first place? To whom is environmental responsibility attributed? To what extent does nature have implicit value? Each of these questions pertains to human–nature relationships, the answers to which may lead to very different kinds of political outcomes when applied to a political context, which in turn affects the organic world of nature in different ways.

Therefore, it is vital to account for this perspective of interconnectedness to understand the political consequences of conceptual choices. For this purpose, I apply the theoretical standpoint of *entanglements*, which studies discourses, presuppositions and beliefs not as entities that are separate from other systems but as an interconnected part of reciprocal environmental, political and societal development. Although I have opted to use the term *entanglement* here, a similar standpoint has often been discussed using different names by various environmental historians. *The theory of complex systems* also studies such connectivity between different fields to locate interconnected links between macro-level phenomena and local contexts, such as identity groups. In this model, macro-level phenomena (such as global climate change) exist as an emergent result of several systems interacting with each other at the micro level (for example, politics, economics, attitudes, etc.), and therefore are studied as such.[36] Similar to system theoretical thinking, environmental historian Arthur McEvoy proposed the 'interactive theory of nature and culture', which empirically points out how institutions, cognitions and ecologies 'evolve in tandem'.[37] Furthermore, in the environmental history classic *Changes in the Land* published in 1983, William Cronon studied how conceptualisations of *ownership* partially explains why settlers did a much worse job at upkeeping their surrounding ecological conditions in seventeenth-century New England than Native Americans.[38] He was one of the first to implement the ongoing linguistic turn to environmental history research with his interest in these conceptualisations and their relationship with ecological development.[39] In all these studies, human cognitions, discourses regarding nature and its resources, and the actual ecological outcome of human cultural, political and economic behaviour are found to be deeply intertwined and thus cannot be understood separately from one another.

---

[35] Väyrynen 2009, 71–77; questions regarding animal liberation on utilitarian grounds were first discussed by Peter Singer; for a wider discussion on animal philosophy, see Aaltola 2013, Singer 2013.
[36] Toikka 2009, 315–323; Fält 2009, 316–320, 327–328; Sanderson & Hall 1995, 201–204; Bar-Yam 1997.
[37] McEvoy 1989, 229.
[38] Cronon (1983) 2003.
[39] As pointed out by Väyrynen & Ruuskanen 2009.

Although I have opted to use a different concept to express this standpoint of interconnectedness, I wish to underline that I intend my approach to be a contribution to (rather than a rupture from) this tradition of scholarship. Basing this study on the foundation of *entanglements* provides a perspective, a way of asking questions. This standpoint has led the focus of this study to be on understanding the presuppositions of political discourse as a central element of human societies' relationship with nature, which significantly affects the ecological well-being of our environment and thus is worth studying.

However, asking research questions that arise from this tradition includes potentially problematic notions. The first problem is the risk of using an anachronistic framework of interpretation. Environmental history has suffered from the risk of understanding past forms of human–nature relationships from the perspective of 'what went wrong' instead of trying to understand the actors from the perspective of their times and cultures.[40] This risk, while present in all historical research, has been particularly problematic in terms of the environmental history of ideas and the academic debate around it – not least because many of the first historians in this subject of study were activists themselves, and were often accused of mixing up their roles as researchers and as activists.[41]

The typical critique of this of this line of thought is quite straightforward: if we assume that past actors should have known where their understanding of human–nature relationships would lead, we are placing a lot of unnecessary judgement on them and, consequently, failing at understanding the actors and the reasons for their thinking from their own perspective. After all, even the energy revolution that led to the transition from wood to coal in the nineteenth century was partially considered a method to preserve natural resources, particularly the forests that faced potential destruction due to increasing industrial use, without any idea of the destruction that coal-based energy systems could potentially create over upcoming centuries.[42]

In this regard, when we look at the actors making what now seem like mistakes, we engage ourselves in two misleading thought patterns simultaneously: first, we portray a mistaken understanding of *their* conception of human–nature relationships, which may not necessarily and automatically be extractive and anthropocentric, even though it might seem that way from a more modern perspective. Second, we mistakenly assume that *our* understanding of human–nature relationships is better updated and suited to the demands of our environment – that we have *a priori* knowledge about the right kind of relationship with nature. Similar to the actors of the nineteenth century who chose to preserve their forests by increasing the use of coal, we too do not know whether our choices pertaining to natural resource preservation or

[40] Such a critique has been presented by Anna Bramwell 1989 among others. Attempts to overcome this critique have been widespread and various, with attempts to historicise the basic environmental concepts being one of them.
[41] For a broader analysis of this debate, see Asdal 2003, 60–74.
[42] Grewe 2010, 48–49, 54. However, it must be noted that some environmental historians such as Joakim Radkau 2005, 149, have questioned this interpretation.

climate change mitigation will lead to unforeseen horrible consequences hundreds of years from now.[43] There is also the danger of a teleological interpretation of history with a predetermined outcome where it ought to lead us to, and the actors of the past are then judged either as supporters of this direction or (as is more often the case) as misguided fools who steered history in the wrong direction.

Under such circumstances, how can we tackle the difficult and politically loaded issue of environmental thought so as to avoid the aforementioned problems without denying the importance and relevance of the subject at hand? Luckily, these problems become slightly less relevant when discussing recent history pertaining to the late twentieth and very early twenty-first centuries, which are close enough to the contemporary era to share a largely similar worldview as we have today. Nevertheless, we must remember that the actors of the 1980s were not aware of the inefficiency of their radical ways of doing politics in encountering globalisation and the collapse of the Easter Block that would turn the whole Western political paradigm towards economic competitiveness. The reformist greens of the 1990s meanwhile did not know that their ideals of increased information technology (IT) as a method to save energy while maintaining economic competitiveness would soon lead to a rampant increase in energy consumption. However, considering the instances where the actors had the necessary information available – for example, the problems of energy efficiency, which were widely recognised in academic discussions in the 1990s (including in the sources that the greens themselves cited[44]) – I seek to analyse the potential intentions of the actors in bypassing such vitally important information.

One way to mitigate the dangers of anachronism is to adopt the methods of conceptual history, which are more often used in the study of political cultures in general than in the study of environmental ideas. By examining the environmental concepts used and the meanings given to them by the actors, we can orient ourselves towards understanding the actors' intentions and presuppositions while considering them in the context of their own times and cultural settings instead of projecting such meanings onto their actions that could not have existed in their sphere of activity. This is also part of the reason why issues related to climate change that would nowadays likely be placed at the core of environmental political thought are left in such a small role in my analysis: while relevant in the early 2020s, these questions played in fact only a minor role among the Greens until the late 1990s. Even then, these issues were mostly discussed in the context of a larger cultural critique.

Approaching the subject of this study from the above-mentioned perspective can contribute to the field of studying the history of environmental ideas with regard to the ways in which methods from political conceptual history can be applied to this field. It is an attempt to overcome the problems of

[43] In fact, Peter Hulme 2014 made a compelling case that it might do just that in his book *Can Science Fix Climate Change?*

[44] One notable example being Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek's book on eco-efficiency ([1993] 2000), discussed in Chapter 5 of this study.

anachronism without having to deny the relevance of the addressed issue – on the contrary, the relevance of the issue is the very reason to seek understanding of how and why the actors wanted to or felt compelled to act the way they did. That being said, this study raises larger philosophical questions that, I believe, are relevant and interesting beyond the field of environmentalism. These include: How do our presuppositions guide our political thinking? How are our cognitions, political thinking, discourses and physical realities interconnected? While applying methods of political history to search for new directions in the study of environmentalism, environmental history can also provide new directions to the study of political cultures through the deeper understanding of *entanglements* between presuppositions, political discourse, and the physical world around us. Conceptual history can be a particularly fruitful area for this discussion, as the field has been open to overcome problems associated with 'mono-causal' analytical frameworks, to quote conceptual historian Jörn Leonhard. In conceptual history, human experience can be understood to occur as interaction between one's linguistic meaning-making and one's political, socio-economic and cultural environments or structures.[45] It does not seem far-fetched to add the interconnectedness with *physical* environments into this equation as well. These methodological approaches are inspected more thoroughly in the next section by demonstrating the complementary sets of methods applied in this research.

1.2.2 Methodological toolcase: conceptual history, transnational history and the study of presuppositions

This study examines green party conceptualisations of well-being and the environment using methods offered by conceptual history. In the Koselleckian-inspired understanding of conceptual history (where most scholars – myself included – usually start), meanings of concepts are not considered stable but are rather fought over in social and political contexts, thus changing over time. In the field of environmental politics, it becomes relevant to enquire what meanings concepts are given and why. Therefore, an investigation into the social and political deployment of these concepts helps detect the layers of time in them. To use Reinhart Koselleck's example, the meaning of the concept *revolution* altered significantly to attain a more positive direction over time when it was expected to create better social conditions for the future. Therefore, the meaning of the concept changed across time, based on social and political changes and the contemporary experiences of these changes. For Koselleck, a concept represents a unit where action, ideas and structures meet. One could also add socially structured beliefs to this list, thus making concept the natural unit of analysis when studying presuppositions about well-being and the environment that underlie political discourses.[46] As an example of the changing meanings of environmental concepts, a study by Klaus Weber and Sara

[45] Leonhard 2017, 179.
[46] Koselleck 2004, 44–51.

Soderstrom concerning the meanings given to *sustainable development* is worth mentioning. While this concept was mostly discussed mostly with an emphasis on local environments and their sustainability in the 1980s, it had largely become a concept associated with macro-level problems, such as climate change, that were to be dealt with macro-level governance by the turn of the millennium. This occurred as an outcome of political strife between different member countries and ideologies in the United Nations (UN), with references to local environments existing mostly in developing countries. Therefore, the meanings given to concepts such as *sustainable development* have not only changed both temporally and spatially, but attempts to define them (and the environmental problems that these concepts have been developed to help tackle) have also turned out to be as much a political endeavour as a scientific one.[47]

In addition to the Koselleckian-inspired approach to long-term change in the meanings of concepts resulting from such political strife, the so-called Cambridge School –particularly Quentin Skinner and his speech act theory – is considered in this study to complement the Koselleckian diachronic approach. This enables a more synchronic level of analysis, enabling a closer look at the actors who actually used and (re)defined the concepts for their purposes. Choosing one discourse over another is always meant to promote some goal or is directed at some specific end. In these terms, the use of a concept may be understood as a political act – a 'speech act'. It thus becomes relevant to identify the goals that the actor intended to accomplish by using a concept.[48] After all, such acts are meant to lead to some political end result, which changes the meanings of concepts in the process.

The use of environmental concepts in green party politics may also be regarded as political acts, as the language of, for example, green party-political programmes was used with the intention of influencing political decision-making.[49] The supposedly 'correct' concepts to describe green goals, as well as the exact meanings given to these concepts, have often been a source of contestation among green actors. However, analysing only the synchronic political intentions of the actors may not be sufficient to understand long-term change in environmental ideas, because actors do not merely use concepts to promote their political aims but also participate in and reproduce their respective traditions of thought while doing so. From a more diachronic perspective, all such acts can also be understood as attempts to either embrace, modify, or reject the tradition of thought that the ideas and concepts stem from, due to which the diachronic development of political concepts also becomes an important factor to consider.[50] Following in the footsteps of many other

[47] Weber & Soderstrom 2015, 231–235.
[48] Skinner 2002, 112–119.
[49] Aarnio 1998, 21–25.
[50] In fact, the so-called Cambridge School has been criticised among some historians of ideas, as pointed out by Havu & Tolonen 2022, 104–110. Analysing the intentions behind speech acts through contextualisation easily reduces history to a study of local contexts and individual actors, thus leaving out long-term conceptual change, structural realities and reception from sight. Moreover, analysing different contradictory contexts can lead to differing interpretation of intentions. I have nevertheless opted to use it as a

scholars, both diachronic and synchronic analyses of concepts are used as complementary rather than exclusive methods in this study. This way, we can detect the development of the meanings given to concepts while also focusing on the actors and their reasons for embracing, redefining or (as was the case with the moderate greens in the early 1990s) entirely rejecting earlier concepts and replacing them with new ones.

To supplement this point, I have found Michael Freeden's perspective of understanding flexible 'conceptual clusters' as the basis of ideologies empirically useful. This approach helps map out the different traditions of thought behind the key concepts, for the purposes of demonstrating the backgrounds of the larger conceptual clusters and semantic fields to help better understand the reasons and premises based on which they are applied to political use. Freeden describes a tradition of thought (or an 'ideology') not as a singular unchanging set of concepts but as a changing and flexible cluster of ideas that usually share a roughly similar background and language (and, might I add for the purposes of this study, somewhat similar presuppositions as well). For example, mapping the conceptual cluster of the radical Greens' key concept of *the companionship movement* makes it evident that it stems from a very different conceptual cluster – typically used by a correspondingly different group of actors – than, say, the key concept of *eco-efficiency*, which was subscribed to by a more moderate tradition and was typically used to promote more moderate political thinking. In this sense, Freeden's theory is suitable for analysing the connections and differences between key concepts.[51]

Although I focus on conceptual clusters and the traditions of the concepts in this study, I do not intent to subscribe to any form of social determinism. Individuals are not mere vessels for the traditions they subscribe to, but are active participants in modifying them. Traditions change as individuals change them, typically as intentional acts. They can be understood as emergent qualities, meaning we do not learn ideas (or listen to lectures, read books or watch television programmes) created by social traditions, as Mark Bevir has noted. Traditions and paradigms are thus emergent qualities formed by individuals who express ideas, often through repetition. As agents, we may also choose not to repeat them.[52] We can thus avoid the dangers of both atomistic individualism, which denies the importance of social traditions, and social determinism, which downplays the role of the individual actor, by studying actors' speech acts on the one hand and the traditions from where the concepts stem from on the other. The process of human understanding itself becomes a process of cyclical interaction between the socially determined framework and the individual reaction to it, as one either accepts, modifies or rejects the ideas, concepts or presuppositions emerging from one's social traditions. For example, the presupposition of attributing well-being primarily to humans has been

---

methodological tool as it emerged useful for the purposes of this research. Maintaining the diachronic long-term cultural contexts, traditions and presuppositions in sight should be sufficient to avoid reducing the history of ideas into a mere individual political goals.

[51] Freeden 2006.

[52] Bevir 1999, 197–199, 214.

intentionally questioned by deep ecological thinkers, many of whom have served as inspirations for green radical politicians and their political endeavours.[53] Therefore, the focus of this study is to analyse not only the key empirical discourses and concepts that the Greens have used in their speech acts, but also the discourses with a long-standing history, tradition and presuppositions that they subscribed to or possibly altered when using, defining and redefining the concepts in question.

The importance of studying clusters of concepts as the focal point between individual perspectives and collective narratives has also been addressed by Jörn Leonhard, who proposed that the interpretation of experience is conveyed through participation in the linguistic and performative codes that we share socially.[54] Hence, to understand the meaning of utterances, both the traditions and clusters that one participates in, as well as the personal intentions and ambitions that one aims to accomplish with one's utterances, need to be accounted for, not as opposite forces but as interconnected elements of meaning-making. Simply put, while concepts are formed through social traditions, individuals actively participate in embracing, altering, rejecting, or developing them.[55]

This agency is visible not only in the concepts used by the actors, but also in the presuppositions attached to them. Presuppositions are a particularly meaningful subject of study when exploring discourses aimed at intentionally restructuring the core beliefs of surrounding cultures, as is the case with many radical eco-philosophies. As will be demonstrated later in this study, the change in the greens' conceptual cluster also meant a change in the presuppositions regarding questions such as to whom was well-being attributed (whether it was attributed to the present humans, future generations or plants and animals), how was it defined (whether it referred to, for example, material growth or increasing consumption) and how was society to relate to the non-human nature (whether it was considered within the framework of providing resources for human subjects or as a subject on its own). In the case of environmental ideas, such questions were notably important for the greens in the early stages of their development when these inquiries were an explicitly expressed part of the environmentalist tradition of thought. Concepts such as the *companionship movement,* which stemmed from the 1970s eco-philosophical thought, inherently

---

[53] Finnish Green magazine *Vihreä lanka* for example referenced to such eco-philosophers as Murray Bookchin (*VL* 13/1988) and Sigmund Kvaløy (*VL* 10/1988) among others.
[54] Leonhard 2017, 180.
[55] Bevir 1999, 187–195. In this context, it is noteworthy that I am dealing with presuppositions as compatible with the Skinnerian approach, where concepts are understood as intentional political acts, while Bevir and many of his followers would rather see the study of beliefs and presuppositions primarily as a separate, even contradictory, approach to this kind of Skinnerian intentionalism. Although I have no intention to participate in this strife, I must point out that studying presuppositions does not automatically need to be in conflict with Skinnerian intentionalism especially because, as Taina Saarinen has pointed out, presuppositions are often used as argumentative tools in politics. Such an approach to overcome this strife between the Bevirian and Skinnerian approaches has also been endorsed by Markku Hyrkkänen. See Saarinen 2008, 355; Hyrkkänen 2002, 174–175.

contained a critique of presupposing well-being as aligned with the growth of material consumption and competition. In contrast, this tradition of thought associated well-being with spiritual and/or communal companionship, as noted in Chapter 3 of this study. In this sense, reconceptualisation of the core Western presuppositions would thus come to mean a deliberate attempt to escape the presuppositions of growth and anthropocentric values that were at the core of political decision making.

As pointed out by William Connolly, an anthropocentric understanding of well-being has typically marked capitalist, socialist and nationalist forms of Western political thought,[56] the exact tradition that the Greens had explicitly set out to question in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the turn away from such criticism and the sudden acceptance of the aforementioned presuppositions in the 1990s also meant a deflection from the core premises of earlier radicalism, as the Greens sought their ideas from a very different conceptual cluster than before. In the words of German green thinker Hubert Kleinert, the greens needed to become more 'efficient'. This would lead them to accept some of the more commonplace presuppositions concerning well-being that were subscribed to by other parties.[57]

In this study, presuppositions are not approached merely as premises of environmental ideas but also as parts of the 'speech acts' that political actors conduct. They can be understood as semantically structured, complex cognitive assumptions that form a network of beliefs, indicating a map of reality that can be expressed linguistically. Thus, the study of concepts can provide us with the methodological key to empirically analyse presuppositions from the source material. In the words of Mark Bevir, they are 'embodied in the relevant utterances' and thus can be understood as part of the discursive process.[58] It is obvious that we cannot glimpse inside the actors' minds to know their beliefs or presuppositions or whether they sincerely expressed them. However, whether the actors using the language had sincerely subscribed to the beliefs and presuppositions presented in their utterances becomes an unimportant question when these beliefs are understood as semantically structured parts of language, since presupposition is linguistically attached to the speech act in which the actor engages, regardless of what they internally and sincerely believe.

There is a strong basis to understand presuppositions as parts of speech acts. As noted by Taina Saarinen, while presuppositions are an interesting element in the development of environmental ideas, they are often also deployed as argumentative tools in political debates. When actors either reject the assumptions of what 'well-being' or 'the environment' means or discuss the ways and the values based on which humans should relate to them, they participate in altering what is or should be presupposed in politics – what can and should be taken for granted. Such presuppositions can be used as 'an

[56] Connolly 2017, 121.
[57] Discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5.
[58] Bevir talks of beliefs instead of presuppositions, but as the historian of ideas Markku Hyrkkänen has pointed out, these concepts can be used interchangeably for empirical purposes. See Bevir 1999, 128 and Hyrkkänen 2002, 174–175.

instrument for conveying or offering ideologically loaded information as common ground', thus indicating the political nature of presuppositions.[59] Therefore, presuppositions not only provide meaning to the used concepts and discourses, but also attach them to conceptual clusters from where similar presuppositions emerge, thus enabling the users of concepts to also use the presuppositions for political purposes.

Understanding presuppositions as an integral part of political speech acts forms the basis of the framework of interpretation deployed in this study. Our presuppositions are merged together, on the one hand, by our cultural traditions and the conceptual clusters we subscribe to and, on the other hand, by individual reactions to these traditions as we embrace, reject or modify them. Hence, these are the fields we ought to analyse to understand presuppositions concerning well-being and the environment in historical texts.[60] Therefore, to understand the Greens' turn in favor of very different kinds of presuppositions concerning well-being and society's relationship with nature, we must investigate the development of the conceptual clusters of radical greenness and moderate green growth ideologies, the presuppositions contained in these two traditions, and the reasons and ways in which the individual actors decided to use, redefine or possibly reject them. Doing so provides us with a toolcase to interpret the relationship of the actors with these paradigms and traditions, as well as possible intentional departures from them. Such departures are particularly interesting to study, as they point to agents rejecting or altering the presuppositions of their socially shared traditions and conceptual clusters at an individual level.[61]

Finally, these traditions and conceptual clusters are often transnational in nature, although the concepts arising from them are used in ways suitable for the local political climate. For example, *eco-efficiency* – a concept stemming from the moderate tradition of environmental economics that often contains presuppositions of material growth and continuous natural resource consumption being inherent to societies – had already been discussed in Germany in the early 1990s[62] before it started appearing among the Finnish Greens a few years later, who attached a strong emphasis on the development of IT with it, which had not been emphasised in the German discussion.[63] This example points to the usefulness of comparing the concepts used in Finland and Germany and the possible transfer of ideas either between these countries or (as was more often the case) in transnational arenas, such as international Green conferences where actors from both countries participated, thus widening the focus of this analysis beyond the national boundaries. This study adopted the standpoint of transnational on recognising that the nation-state, often taken for granted as the basic unit of analysis in history, cannot be fully understood as an entity that is separate from the rest of the world. Ideas move across national as

[59] Saarinen 2008, 355.
[60] Bevir 1999, 226–235.
[61] Leonhard 2017, 180; Bevir 1999, 187–189, 220.
[62] Schmidt-Bleek (1993) 2000.
[63] Addressed in the Finnish Greens' *'Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja'* 1996.

well as other kinds of borders, sometimes literally along with the actors and sometimes through translations of texts, books, articles and such. In this sense, the goal of transnational history is not merely to enrich the methodological field of history, but also to provide a more reliable picture of the past, since ideas and actors have constantly travelled across borders throughout human history.[64]

This study explores the ideals of transnational history through a comparative historical analysis of Finnish and German Greens while also deepening this perspective by analysing the transfers of ideas between and across the boundaries of these two countries. Finland and Germany have been selected as the units for comparison, since they exhibit a long history of political conceptual transfers and connections.[65] In the context of European conceptual history, Germany has often served as the centre of ideas, while countries such as Finland have been more peripheral, meaning that ideas have been more likely to flow from the centre to the periphery than vice versa. As conceptual historian Henrik Stenius pointed out, there is an 'asymmetry' between the centre and the periphery, which challenges the interpretation of a comparison between the two.[66] In the case of greenness, it is not entirely clear whether the term *periphery* is applicable to Finland, since the Finnish Green Party actors have been eager participants in international forums, often organising conferences and participating in the formulation of new ideas, and Finland has been considered a textbook example of being a forerunner in the category of environmental politics.[67] Nevertheless, the empirical discoveries made in this study reveal that the Finns were following the German Greens' discussion rather than the other way around. Moreover, even when disagreeing with their German counterparts, the Finns typically based their thinking against the background of the German Greens' political activities at the time. In contrast, there has been no indication that the German Greens followed the Finnish conversation with similar or necessarily any interest, thus clearly indicating the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the centre and the periphery.[68]

This asymmetrical position of the countries indicates a *relation* that must be acknowledged. Any notable difference in the environmental thoughts of the two countries is more likely to be an intentional decision made by the Finnish actors, meaning that it would have a different kind of meaning in Finland than in Germany, where the concerned actors are not necessarily aware of such differences or similarities.[69] In addition, the Finnish interpretation of the German discussion can be significantly different from the German one. For

[64] Issues of methodological nationalism have been addressed by Marjanen 2017.
[65] Ideas concerning social democracy, for example, had earlier transferred between Germany, Sweden and Finland. See Ihalainen 2017, 526.
[66] Stenius 2017, 264–265.
[67] As listed by Dryzek 2005, who however also included Germany in the same category of forerunner countries.
[68] Though Petra Kelly was eager to visit other European countries such as Finland, her eagerness to maintain international connections and discussions could be ridiculed among other German Greens, as discussed in Chapter 4.
[69] Stenius 2017, 264–265.

example, while Petra Kelly was the most commonly quoted German green personality in Finland in 1987-88, perhaps even understood as an embodiment of German greenness to an extent, her influence had already declined in the German Green Party by then. One also needs to be careful not to assume that all ideas arising from Germany were derived from the German context and transferred to the Finnish one, as both countries have also been affected by influences from elsewhere, such as the USA, where many of the key concepts of modern radical grassroots environmentalism developed. Petra Kelly, referenced in the aforementioned example, had also studied in the US, where she obtained some of her ideas that were later adopted by the German Greens as transnational transfers.[70]

Comparative history, in general, analyses nation-level developments in relation to other nation states to discover what is actually particular and nation-specific in the used concepts and what is commonly shared. However, it does not answer the question of how, why and in which way ideas travel, so to speak, because a comparison only reveals the outcome. Addressing this gap, the history of transfers attempts to locate how, why and through whom concepts move across borders, be it geographical or linguistic.[71] The aforementioned asymmetries between countries become more noticeable when looking at the transfers of ideas between actors. In the case of the greens, a large number of environmental conferences, direct contacts, mutually read books and translations help explain this flow of ideas.

In this context, it must be noted that comparative and transnational approaches are sometimes presented as mutually exclusive, particularly if the study of transfers is understood as a method to overcome nation-based categories of analysis altogether. While a comparative outlook separates the studied categories (usually based on the level of the nation states, as is the case in this study), the study of transfers attempts to do the exact opposite by seeking connections between the categories in question with the purpose of overcoming them. Nevertheless, arguments have been made that they can also supplement each other as long as their contrasting logic is accounted for. After all, the study of transfers helps us understand how actors transfer concepts and ideas across borders, while the comparative approach helps us identify the nation-level outcomes and local adaptations of such transfers. Transfers, therefore, are better understood in terms of the differing contexts of the actors, which can be explored using comparative analysis.[72] As noted by Philipp Ther,[73] if transfers are not taken into account, comparisons tend to leave agency out of the picture while artificially isolating national cases, in turn causing, in the words of Michael Miller, a 'containerisation' of history.[74]

---

[70] Radkau 2011, 202–207.
[71] The aspects and theoretical foundations of transnational and comparative history are widely approached, e.g., in Steinmetz, Freeden & Fernández-Sebastián (eds) 2017; Haupt & Kocka eds. 2012; Cohen & O'Connor eds. 2004.
[72] Kocka & Haupt 2012, 19–21; Ther 2012, 207; see also Miller 2004.
[73] Ther 2012, 204–205.
[74] Miller 2004, 130.

In this study, comparisons and the study of transfers are therefore used as supplementive rather than exclusive approaches to transnational history, following the footsteps of many other scholars who have adopted a similar methodology.[75] In doing so, it is observed that in the case of the Finnish and German Green Parties, the party actors were not the only or even the primary catalysts for change in environmental political thought, but were in fact often reacting to transnational, even global political, economic and cultural changes that created transnational flows of ideas, which they then adapted to their respective contexts. Such connections and a cross-national flow of ideas contribute to the idea of looking at green parties as case studies of larger developments in the history of environmental thought. Notably, the nation-state cannot be removed from this equation because many processes become visible only at this level when studying actors in nation-level political parties, thus justifying the comparison being located at this level. Moreover, the national parties ought to be contextualised with other green parties, actors and environmental thought. For this study, comparison represents the structure of analysis, while transfers are analysed whenever they are detected in the source material. However, the causality in transfers needs to be confirmed with a grain of salt, for the simple reason that there could be multiple potential sources of the transfers. A simple environmental political idea may be visible in newspapers, books and international party conference reports, making it practically impossible to detect one clear source of the transfer, especially after the emergence of the Internet in the 1990s. Therefore, instead of guessing where actors may have looked for ideas, this study considers a wide spectrum of potential transfers to reveal the constant flux of conceptual movements that have shaped environmental concepts across borders.

While the standpoint of transnational history can very well be applied to most studies on conceptual history, it becomes a particularly necessary standpoint when examining the development of the environmental political concepts of the late twentieth century, which need to be fundamentally understood as transnational concepts. The environmental movement was already transnational during the first wave of early environmentalism in the 1800s, when the natural conservation movement used a roughly similar language across the globe,[76] naturally coupled with local differences. Later, in the 1970s, not only did the environmental movement emerge transnationally, but institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), also raised environmental governance above the level of nation-state decision-making, leading many green parties to adapt to this development.[77] To use the example already mentioned before, conceptual strife between the Global North and the Global South had often taken place in the UN regarding the meaning of *sustainable development,* since the increasing concentration on global governance

[75] E.g. Kocka & Haupt 2012; Ther 2012; Ihalainen 2017.
[76] Often due to European colonists though. See Richard Grove's 1995 book *Green Imperialism* for more, also Sörlin & Warde 2009, 6.
[77] The international background of the green movement is discussed more closely in Chapter 2.

and control has turned out to be very problematic for the Global South.[78] Obviously, most environmental problems are also transnational in nature, which partly explains the need to tackle them through international institutions, such as the UN, in the first place. This has resulted in similarities between the environmental political concepts prevalent across the world, even in the face of the emergence of local differences in meaning. This study analyses the extent to which political goals were similar among national green parties and their actors, while identifying possible nation-specific differences among countries.

1.3 Sources and literature

1.3.1 Sources

This study analyses a wide variety of source materials to examine how party politics affected environmental ideas concerning well-being and the environment, how and why the traditions for environmental ideas changed, and how and why the political actors argued their views on such ideological questions. The primary sources considered in this study include party programmes, party conference minutes, party parliament group session minutes and other party documents containing information on both the development and the outcome of Green Party programmatic works.

While using party documents and programmes as sources has benefits, it is not bereft of potential challenges. Party programmes, in general, are not only used to formulate and communicate shared goals and party ideology, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to illustrate a picture of the party lines to the rest of the world. They provide generalised outlines that party members are expected to roughly agree with collectively. Therefore, changes in party programmes may be understood as meaningful with regard to the kind of politics that the party actors are expected to support in parliamentary work. However, intra-party ideological factions and differences of opinion among party actors are rarely visible in party programmes. The apparent cohesion that is subscribed to by party members often hides intra-party discussions from view, meaning that the wider spectrum of party ideology is not reflected in them, merely the consensus outcome of the rough outlines. Furthermore, contests among individual party actors over the meaning and use of political concepts and ideas are rarely visible in party programmes, although they provide access to key concepts used by the party at different times. As such, changes in party programme conceptualisations regarding well-being and the environment are given meaningful analytical focus in this study to seek

[78] Baker 2017, 60.

answers to the research questions presented above, while also accounting for the aforementioned limitations.[79]

In this regard, approaching the individual agency behind collective party lines becomes a key question here. For this purpose, party documents such as programmes must be studied along with a set of supplementary sources that can assist in this endeavour. This includes newspaper sources such as *Vihreä Lanka* and *Helsingin Sanomat* in Finland. Although *Vihreä Lanka* served as the Green Party's official newspaper in Finland, it was nevertheless run independent of party control, making it the perfect forum for intra-party debates that often found voice in the newspaper's pages. The newspaper constantly featured political debates and was often very critical of the official lines of the party, thus making dissident voices within the party heard. Meanwhile, *Helsingin Sanomat*, the most widely circulated newspaper in Finland, has provided more general commentary and space for Finnish green actors to communicate their views to a larger audience.

As for the German Greens, valuable debates have been featured in *Der Spiegel,* the most widely circulated German weekly magazine, which gave room for green intra-party debates and presented them to the wider German audience, including articles and opinion pieces written by the party actors themselves, which makes it a useful source to track some of the key arguments and concepts in the green debate. However, *Der Spiegel* often sided with more moderate opinions. Therefore, this study also uses green-leaning newspapers such as *Schwarzer Faden* and *Die Tageszeitung* as representatives of the German alternative movements' often more radical perspectives on green ideological debates. *Der Spiegel* and *Helsingin Sanomat* reflected the discussions visible for the larger public, while *Vihreä Lanka* and *Die Tageszeitung* provide a more insider perspective from within the alternative movements. Therefore, these sources are bound to be somewhat asymmetrical, both in substance (meaning that journalistic contexts are different in each newspaper in both countries) and in quantity (meaning that this study gives more emphasis to *Der Spiegel* than its corresponding Finnish counterpart *Helsingin Sanomat,* while the Finnish *Vihreä Lanka* is emphasised more than its corresponding German counterparts such as *Die Tageszeitung)*. Despite these challenges, I maintain that the sources are symmetrical enough to provide an adequately cohesive and reliable picture of intra-party debates in both countries.

Furthermore, these newspaper sources are accompanied by a variety of articles and interviews published in smaller magazines or websites, as well as books written by the actors participating in the debates. For example, Joschka Fischer challenged the radical German Green Party line and programme in his 1989 book *Der Umbau der Industriegesellschaft.* Meanwhile, the Finnish Greens published two versions of the *Vihreä ABC-kirja* (*Green ABC Books),* demonstrating their early radical and later moderate stands towards *greenness,* illustrating conceptual changes among party actors over time. The minutes of

[79] The uses and challenges with regard to party programmes as sources have been discussed by Aarnio 1998, 10–11, and Poguntke 1993, 109–111.

the German Greens' parliament group debates also contained further intra-party debates and arguments. Taken together, these sources provide in-depth insights into the kinds of debates, discussions and opinions that clashed against each other within the parties, thus drawing a detailed picture of the political struggle of defining and re-defining green conceptualisations of well-being and the environment. Interestingly, when we notice a seemingly fast-paced change taking place at the programmatic level in the party lines, it is often found to be preceded by years of political debates and clashing political goals and concepts.

1.3.2 Literature

Studying the cultural aspects of humans' interaction with the non-human world has been an integral part of environmental history ever since Clarence Glacken's book *Traces on the Rhodian Shore* was published in 1967.[80] Later, Peter Coates' 1998 book *Nature: Western Attitudes Since Ancient Times* has become another modern classic in this field.[81] These books, along with many others following this tradition, have thoroughly analysed the long-term development of Western attitudes towards and ideas concerning nature, typically starting from antiquity, moving on the Judeo-Christian theological tradition, then to the philosophers and scientists of modernity and finally to the environmentalist thinkers, all of whom kept reproducing or sometimes redefining the society's relationship with nature over time.[82]

While such a history of environmental ideas has become an established tradition, connections between conceptual history and environmental history have started gaining attention only more recently. Conceptualising the environment has been studied, for example, by environmental historians Paul Warde, Libby Robin and Sverker Sörlin in their 2018 book *The Environment: A History of the Idea*. They point out how *the environment* as an over-arching umbrella concept, referring to global intertwined bio-, water- and climate systems, did not emerge until after the Second World War. The environment behind your own door became part of the same global environment behind every other door on Earth only after the Second World War. The Earth became connected through a 'biophysical web' that holds everything together, in the words of William Vogt, the first known person to coin the concept of *environment* for such a purpose in 1948. Before that, the word had merely referred to local environment(s) that were always tied to some spatial and temporal location.[83]

These notions of *environment* (or *the environment* as a global umbrella concept in more recent times) provide understanding on how concepts related

[80] Glacken 1967.
[81] Coates 1998.
[82] In Finland, a similar developmental path is also reproduced by Väyrynen 2009 in his Finnish account of the history of environmental philosophy. For more on this tradition of environmental historical research, see Hughes 2016.
[83] This way to describe the environment first became visible in literature in William Vogt's 1948 book *Road to Survival.* Warde, Robin & Sörlin 2018, 2, 9–14; see also Warde 2009.

to nature have changed over time based on the needs and cognitions of the temporal contexts where humans try to make sense of the nature surrounding them. Aiming to understand how environment was perceived and what attributes were given to it – potentially as a source of resources or as an interconnected whole that humans are a part of – is integral for this study as well.

While the aforementioned works analysed the cultural, discursive and the conceptual aspects of environmental development one way or another, they did not attempt to demonstrate the practical use of these ideas and conceptualisations in the field of economics or politics. Consequentially, some historians of environmentalism have been critical of the way how the development of environmental ideas has been presented in this tradition. For example, Frank Uekötter, in his 2014 book *The Greenest Nation?*, makes a strong case against the kind of teleological determinism that a long-arching environmental historical analysis has often lead to. Particularly, he opposes the interpretation where environmental thinking, environmental movements and environmental parties emerged out of a mass awakening that, like a 'reverse tomato', would naturally turn green in due time. Instead, he calls for a history that is less clear-cut, that studies the underlying reasons, interests and even the surprising consequences that made the less-than-likely outcome of green parties become a reality. For him, 'environmentalism grew out of specific constellation of actors, out of interests, and out of political conditions that deserve careful scrutiny'. Such reasons and contexts could not be merely reduced to deteriorating environmental conditions.[84] These political interests and conditions tend to become overlooked when studying the long-arching development of the abstract subject of human–nature relationships.

However, notable works on environmental politics have been published in the field of political history, the aforementioned Uekötter 2014 included. The green parties have in fact also been widely studied in this context. For example, the Finnish Green Party history has been analysed by political historian Jenni Karimäki in her 2022 book *Protestista Puolueeksi*. She illustrated how the Green Party developed from a protest movement to a government party, using the Greens as an example of how political parties have typically followed a trajectory from early radicalism to later insitutionalism.[85] Her analysis thus follows a very different line of thought than that of the aforementioned Uekötter's: instead of explaining party history with the particular underlying reasons and contexts, Karimäki considers the Greens a prime example of a typical party development trajectory regardless of other contextual elements than political logic itself which creates strong incentives for adaptation and institutionalisation, calling it a political 'law'. My contribution to this discussion is primarily in demonstrating what ideas and conceptual clusters were used to create this turn from radicalism to institutionalism. Doing so, attention is also paid to contextual reasons. While not denying the existence of underlying path

[84] Uekötter 2014, 100–102.
[85] Karimäki 2022.

dependencies that certainly make it luring for all parties to institutionalise over time, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of the new 'competitiveness' framework (discussed further in Chapter 5) offered important contextual factors for the Greens' turn towards adaptation. Without such contextual factors, the development of green parties might have turned out very different.

Meanwhile, German Green Party developed in the pressures of left-wing radicalism, peace movement, the anti-nuclear movement and other new social movements. Paul Hockenos, in his thorough political biography of Joschka Fischer, analysed the German Green Party development through the eyes of Fischer.[86] Frank Uekötter's aforementioned *The Greenest Nation?* is an analysis of German environmentalism from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, with notable attention paid to political governance. The early stages of environmental political movements' development towards political parties has been analysed by Stephen Milder in regards of German Greens.[87] For Milder, the emergence of the Green Party in West Germany was closely linked with the world of grassroots activists' movements, particularly the anti-nuclear movement. As for the Finnish case, Sari Aalto[88] meanwhile has studied the early shifts of the Finnish Greens, which also rose from a loosely connected web of grassroots movements but had its origin story located less in anti-nuclear activities and more in traditional natural protection. Milder's and Aalto's studies help reveal some similarities and differences in the respective parties' backgrounds while helping to understand the strong grassroots foundation of the 1980s radical green party thinking. Many of their ideals and concepts came directly from grassroots environmentalism, which the green parties were in many ways a continuation of – concepts which the reformists later redefined, as this study demonstrates.

Meanwhile, Paul Lucardie and E. Gene Frankland have edited a thorough take on the greens' transnational political development in their book *Green parties in transition: the end of grassroots democracy?*[89] This book includes chapters on both the German Greens' development by E. Gene Frankland and the Finnish Greens' development by Jukka Paastela. They discuss whether the greens belong to the category of 'amateur-activist' or 'professional-electoral' parties, coming to the conclusion that being formerly amateur-activists, the parties had moved notably towards the direction of professional-electoral parties by the turn of the millennium.[90] Analysing this turn in a larger European context contextualises the ideological turn from radicalism to reformism against a transnational background. Furthermore, transnational environmental political concepts and discourses have been thoroughly analysed on a more general level by John Dryzek in his book *Politics of the Earth.*[91]

---

[86] Hockenos 2008.
[87] Milder 2017.
[88] Aalto 2018.
[89] Lucardie & Frankland 2008
[90] Frankland 2008, 19–41; Paastela 2008, 61–73.
[91] Dryzek 2005.

These works have contributed to contextualising the discourses and concepts of the green turn towards moderate, market-friendlier directions. For the most part, as opposed to approaching environmental ideas as such, these works primarily analyse environmental politics and political discourse within the framework of political history, illuminating such issues as political goals and activities of the actors. As a result, questions concerning human–nature relationships were not widely addressed, or they were easily buried under the day-to-day political debates and goals when brought within the framework of political history. Therefore, while typologising green parties politically might be an intriguing endeavour, it does not – nor does it attempt to – shed light on human–nature relationships or their connections to broader environmental ideologies. If indeed the green parties had turned from amateur-activist to professional-electoral parties, what does it say about the use of environmental ideas? Does it signify a different relationship with nature, a differing conceptualisation of what *the environment* now stands for? As my research indeed reveals a turn towards parlamentarisation that happened in the green parties in the 1990s, one which Lucardie and Frankland also discuss, it is my contribution to this ongoing discussion to analyse this turn in light of such questions. Earlier, these questions have primarily belonged to the field of environmental history of ideas rather than political history.

Conceptual history provides useful tools to access the ideas behind environmental politics. In fact, perspectives proposed by conceptual political history have started to appear in the study of environmentalism over the past few years. To mention a few examples, in 2016 Miina Kaarkoski studied the debates behind the German *Energiewende,* a concept used to describe the phasing out of nuclear power. She demonstrated how fears of losing democracy were, along with environmental concerns, equally present in the anti-nuclear camp of the German parliamentary debates – an issue that re-emerges in my analysis as well.[92] In 2021, Kimmo Elo and Jenni Karimäki studied the transformation of environmental political concepts and vocabulary in Finnish parliamentary debates 1960-2020, pointing out qualitative and quantitative changes: while the volume and intensity of environmental political debates increased steadily, the debates shifted from nature-focused to climate-focused vocabulary. Eventually, climate change -related concepts became umbrella concepts under which all environmental issues were discussed.[93] The relative lateness of the emergence of climate terminology in their data also helps partially explain why climate-related vocabulary turned out to be in a smaller role than expected in the current research as well. In 2021, Anna Friberg investigated the concepts used by more recent environmental and climate movements such as the *Extinction Rebellion*. She discovered how they based their argumentation on a sense of urgency, directed at avoiding an unwanted future.[94] This kind of 'survivalist' argumentation could link the newer

[92] Kaarkoski 2016.
[93] Elo & Karimäki 2021.
[94] Friberg 2021.

environmentalist movements to the older conceptual clusters deployed also by many green actors.[95]

This indicates that a new generation of scholars has started to adopt the conceptual historical approach towards studying themes related to environmental politics. Adapting the study of presuppositions concerning nature to the analysis of environmental political language will contribute to the ongoing project of bridging the gap between the political and the environmental segments of historical research while also applying the study of long-arching environmental ideas to more practical contexts of action. Moreover, combining the political focus of this research with the framework and research questions stemming from environmental history can, on the one hand, deepen our understanding of how environmental ideas are implemented politically, and, on the other hand, can help identify the effect of presuppositions on political language. Therefore, my current research may be seen as a continuation of and a further contribution to the rising and already lively tradition of conceptual environmental history.

[95] Dryzek 2005 discusses the 'survivalist' tradition underlying radical environmental discourses already in the 1970s.

2 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GREEN POLITICAL MOVEMENT

2.1 Before the Greens: the first wave of environmentalism

Both the Finnish and the German Green political organisations were founded at the turn of the 1980s on top of an already-existing network of new social and environmental movements. The new environmentalism of the 1970s that served as the founding platform for the Greens was preceded by the earlier natural conservationism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is worth taking a short look at the earlier forms of natural conservationism since it potentially affected the form and development of later environmentalism.

The Indian environmental historian Ramachandra Guha detected three different forms in which the first wave of (what can now be called) environmentalism appeared. Starting from the late nineteenth century and focusing on nature conservation, these forms of first-wave environmentalism were transnational from the beginning, appearing in roughly similar ways in most Western countries and spreading globally through colonialism. [96] Concerning the first romantic form of the conservation movement, the emerging industrialisation was destroying the beauty of nature all around, leading to a fight against the threat of 'dark satanic mills' producing pollution, accompanied by a back-to-the-nature -kind of sentiment among the romantics. As for the second form, the increasing industrial exploitation of natural resources also led to a need for more efficiency and sustainability in resource use (economic sustainability, meaning the preservation of economic resources). This gave birth to early forms of discourses on scientific conservationism and sustainability. Germany/Prussia in particular had a long history of moderately sustainable forestry (once again from the point of view of sustainable economy)

[96] Radkau 2011, 58; Guha 2000, 5–7.

dating back to the late eighteenth century. The concept of sustainability (*Nachhaltigkeit*), also visible in this study, originates from that discussion, with German forester Georg Ludwig Hartig being the first known person to use the concept.[97] Within the third form, the conservationist movement contained the 'wilderness'-discourse, an ideal that the supposedly untouched nature was worth preserving.[98] This form of conservationism also inspired the founding of national parks, starting from Yellowstone (1872) in the United States.[99]

It should be pointed out that the rise of this first-wave environmentalism happened simultaneously with an enormous shift in the economic system of European rural communities: the turn from an ages-old 'agroforestal' system of common ownership by local small communities to privately owned industrialised use of the land took place for the most part during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Land would thus become privately owned, used for profit and regulated by the state instead of local communities, which partially enhanced the rise of environmentalism.[100]

This classic nature conservationism was often connected to nationalism – something that the greens would often be very aware of and distance themselves from.[101] While the 'nature nationalists' of the late nineteenth century intelligentsia wanted to preserve the nature of the nation and its people, the more widely-spread ideals of 'industrial nationalism' in the meantime emphasised creating wealth and freedom through the use of those very same natural resources. Despite these seemingly contradictory discourses around nationalism, a strong political conflict between these two forms of nationalisms never emerged at least in Finland, as pointed out by Mika Pekurinen.[102] Both ideals were held by the conservative right, and nature conservationists rarely challenged the industrial use of land outside the realm of local beautiful or nationally significant sceneries. Environmental protection was thus typically localised into protection of certain area-specific environments, not *the environment* in any broader sense.[103] A similar contradiction between right-wing conservationism and right-wing developmentalism later emerged in national socialist Germany in the 1930s. Though supportive of the protection of forests and sceneries in principle, the Nazi regime paid little attention to the damage done to air and water by hard industries.[104] The conflict between the protection and the economic use of nature would emerge only later.

---

[97] Radkau 2005, 215–218; Pekurinen 1997(b), 131.
[98] The idea of nature being 'untouched' despite being inhabited and used by indigenous peoples for centuries has been discussed in recent environmental historical literature. See, e.g., Jacoby 2001.
[99] Pekurinen 1997(b), 131.
[100] This turn is discussed by Radkau 2005, 39–40, and Grewe 2010, 48–52.
[101] The influence of 'nature nationalism' is debated, however: Joachim Radkau 2005, 232, claims that nationalism played a smaller role in many European countries compared to the United States, which most research has focused on. Nevertheless, as Mika Pekurinen (1997[b]) points out, nationalism played a major role in early conservationism at least in Finland.
[102] Pekurinen 1997(b), 140–141.
[103] Pekurinen 1997(b), 140–141, 150–151; Warde & al. 2018, 14.
[104] Radkau 2005, 260–264.

The first wave of environmentalism lost its political momentum around the Second World War and its aftermath. At that time, the post-war reconstruction as well as the creation of the welfare state took center stage in European politics.[105] In the 1960s, the environmental movement underwent through a paradigm shift, as the older nature protection transformed from being a conservative attempt to preserve local natural areas and important landscapes to being indicative of a broader understanding of the environment as intertwined eco-, bio- and geosystems, understanding the environment as an interconnected whole.[106] The more disruptive conflict between growth and natural protection emerged because of this 'second wave' of environmentalism starting from the 1960s, as the new environmental movements harshly criticised the cooperation between earlier nature protectionists and the profit-seeking economic life. The idea of using natural resources primarily for the purposes of profit emerged as a threat to environmental wellbeing when perceived through the new conceptualisation of the environment as the interconnected web of life that needed protecting in its entirety.[107]

This new environmentalism had very different political inclinations than earlier: influences were taken from the emerging ecological sciences but also from the counter-culture of the 1960s, including student radicalism and the hippie movement. The new movements were generally associated with the political left rather than the right – although many also wanted to remain neutral on the left-right scale – and would include such adjacent movements as the peace movement, the feminist movement and the anti-nuclear movement.[108] The *new social movements (neue soziale Bewegungen)* were a loose collection of grassroots activists aimed at creating a new form of culture as a bottom-up process, based largely on the sense of disappointment with the post-war materialistic culture that had emphasised growth, social status and consumption. The actors participating in such movements were seeking for new alternative ways of finding meaning in their lives.[109] In this sense, the second wave of environmentalism seems quite different from the first.

However, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which the new environmentalism was indeed 'new' and to which it was a continuation of the old conservationist movement. Ramachandra Guha, for example, claimed that the 'second wave' environmentalism mostly originated from such ideals as back-to-the-land romanticism, proposed by the old conservationist movement and aimed at opposing the aforementioned 'satanic mills' of industrialisation. Furthermore, early scientific conservationism was influenced by the same ecological sciences that later influenced second-wave environmentalism as well.[110] Many thinkers that inspired the first wave had already in the 1800s expressed ideals that would later become familiar to the later 1970s

[105] Guha 2000, 63–68.
[106] Warde & al. 2018, 14.
[107] Nienstedt 1997, 3, 17–22; Warde & al. 2018; Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 187–190.
[108] Dryzek 2005, 208.
[109] Poguntke 1993, 9; Hockenos 2008, 39.
[110] Guha 2000, 5–7.

environmentalists: John Ruskin, for example, had frowned upon 'desacrilisation' of nature by the modern man, causing nature to turn merely into 'raw materials to be exploited'. Similar critiques of nature's instrumentalisation for human benefit by an exploitative economy will be seen in Chapter 3 of this study.[111] Even the background of the romanticised 'mother Earth' religiousness, later held by some of the supporters of new environmentalism, can be traced back to the romanticism of the late nineteenth century natural protectionists.[112] Joachim Radkau dates the nature mysticism of the hippie movement back to the romantic thinkers of the nineteenth century, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau and Aldo Leopold, while the scientific ecological worry about an interconnected Earth being in jeopardy has its origin in the ecological sciences, first visible in the 1860s.[113]

Furthermore, second wave environmentalist protests could still emerge due to localised concerns over the well-being of local environments despite discourses focusing on global awareness. According to Stephen Milder, the second wave of environmentalism in West Germany evolved as a local nature protection movement due to plans to create a chain of nuclear reactors through the Rhine valley. These plans had raised the locals' concerns about their crops, their living environments in case of a meltdown, and the consequences of overly centralised decision-making processes. While the common narrative of the new wave of environmentalism has focused on global environmental awareness, spread by such international events as the 1972 Stockholm conference, the development of grassroots movements was often still ignited by localised needs and worries.[114]

So, the two waves of environmentalism, with a couple of decades of war and reconstruction in between them, were perhaps not so far apart as might appear at first glance. In Finland, the still-existing old conservationist movement in fact decided to join forces with the new environmentalists due to similar-enough interests, merging the two traditions together.[115] Despite obvious similarities, such ecologist sentiments as the ones presented by John Ruskin were, nevertheless, back then the exception rather than the rule. As a political movement, the conservationists relied mostly on ideals that in many ways also differed from what the later radical environmentalists aimed at achieving. Polluting industries, for example, might have been frowned upon, but in political implementation, the conservationist movement never really challenged the 'industrial nationalism'. In fact, the conservationists had often ended up cooperating with the industrialists.[116] Furthermore, and most importantly for the purposes of this study, the conceptualisations of the object of preservation – meaning the environment itself – differed greatly: the idea of nature as a unified whole that had intrinsic value in itself was rare among the

[111] Guha 2000, 13.
[112] Radkau 2005, 85.
[113] Radkau 2005, 275–277.
[114] Milder 2017, 8–9.
[115] Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 187, 190.
[116] As pointed out e.g. by Pekurinen 1997(b).

first wave conservationists but quite common among the second wave environmentalists. The widely shared environmentalist discourses of a fragile Earth, a lonely blue marble in space that as a whole needed preserving from the extractive greed of human economic activities, would probably not have been well understood or received a hundred years earlier.[117] Milder frames this difference as a conceptual change from *Naturschutz* to *Umweltschutz* in Germany;[118] in Finland, there was a similar discursive turn from *luonnonsuojelu* to *ympäristönsuojelu*. Both terminological shifts indicate a shift from nature protection to environmental protection while simultaneously indicating a shift from local and singular to global and interconnected objects of protection. The environment had become an umbrella concept under which even local natural protection was conducted.[119] Even though there are traces of undeniable continuity between first and second wave environmentalism, discursively, the two can be understood as separate traditions when it comes to conceptualising environmental issues and humans' relationship with nature.

2.2 From second wave environmentalism to green parties

As this study demonstrates, the studied parties in both countries were founded on and took their first steps in politics under the framework of radical concepts stemming from the conceptual cluster of new (or 'second wave') environmentalism and the activism and eco-philosophical thinking of the new grassroots movements. In order to understand this ideological starting point, a closer look needs to be taken at how the environmental movements developed into green parties.

Just like a century earlier, the initial influences for second-wave environmentalism came primarily from the USA. Beginning in the early 1960s, international bestsellers from the English-speaking world, such as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, provided the emerging movements with concepts and discourses, thus making them transnationally similar – including in Finland and Germany – although local contexts also generated notable differences.[120] The new environmentalism was first perceived as a 'new peculiar movement' arising from the USA (*merkwürdige neue Bewegung)* in the West German newspapers in 1970. This new science of ecology replaced the radical left-wing 'ideology' as the guiding principle of youth movements during the upcoming years. Many of the German actors had visited or even studied in the United States. The environmentalist movement distanced itself from the earlier nature conservation movement, but also from the militant measures occasionally supported by some factions of the radical left of the 1960s, becoming more

[117] Warde & al. 2018 describe this new conceptualisation of *the environment* in detail.
[118] Milder 2017, 9.
[119] Leino-Kaukiainen 1997, 187, 190; Elo & Karimäki 2021, 374.
[120] Haila 2001, 28–31.

inclined towards pacifism.[121] Contrary to the American model, however, in West Germany this new wave of environmentalism took the form of citizens' local grassroots BIs, or *Bürgerinitiativen.* Ramachandra Guha, having studied the development of environmental movements, argued that the pre-existing 1960s student movement BIs were not so much 'resurrected' by the environmental movement(s). Instead, the students' movements of 1968 faded away, but the culture of *Bürgerinitiativen* began to diversify in new directions. Organisationally, the new grassroots environmentalism might have been a continuation of the radical student movements of the 1960s, but it was now located in a new environmentalist framework.[122]

The development in Finland seems similar in this sense. For example, even though the older Natural Protection Association (*Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys,* an association which enhanced the more traditional goal of protecting local natural areas) had started to cooperate with the new social movements, their actors had very little to do with the 1979 Koijärvi events that would spark the Finnish green movement, as discussed below. The Finnish green movement was instead set up by alternative social movements conducted by the young actors and activists, who defined the environment in a new way based on a novel ecology-based interpretation of natural life.[123]

The new environmentalism was comprised of a wide variety of movements with differing goals and ideological backgrounds, all sharing the ideal of creating new alternative forms of culture as a bottom-up process, with a new conception of humans' place in the larger web of life guiding these activities. In Finland, these movements were led by fair trade advocates, anti-nuclear groups, vegetarians, and supporters of the rights of women and disabled people, all seeking alternatives to the prevailing materialistic, paternalistic or growth-oriented system and way of life.[124] Feminism was also present from the beginning.[125] The actual politicisation of the Finnish Greens began with the Koijärvi movement in 1979, when members of the aforementioned groups gathered together to prevent the shrinking of the Koijärvi lake that jeopardised the endangered bird population. Under the leadership of such organisational masters as future green MP Ville Komsi, who personally contacted the different activist organisations to work together for a common goal, the Koijärvi initiative tied together the various forms and actors of the new social movements.[126] This event was a *Bürgerinitiative,* modeled on the German-style grassroots citizens' movement, which became a symbol of the new environmental thinking in Finland. Even though its ideological framework was drawn from the Anglo-American world, grounding this political activity on grassroots movements (instead of e.g. high-level lobbying, as was typical in

121 Jung 1995, 620, 627–629; Hockenos 2008, 61–63.
122 Guha 2000, 90.
123 Paastela 1987, 56–60; Tammilehto 1982, 34–35.
124 Mickelsson 2007, 250–251; Haila 2001, 10–11.
125 Paastela 1987, 15.
126 Aalto 2018, 106–108.

the USA[127]) followed the Western European and particularly German model of environmental activity.[128] Influences also came from Sweden, regarding networking, and Norway, regarding ecophilosophical ideas. Notably, Nordic countries and Germany have provided influences to the Finnish political discussion throughout history due to geographical and cultural closeness, and that seems to have been the case with environmentalism as well.[129]

A roughly similar set of groups and interests to those in Finland contributed to the West German environmental movements as well. These groups subscribed to the 'new social movements' that materialised from the 1970s youth culture, such as the peace movement, the women's movement, the anti-nuclear movement, third world supporters and the ecological movement, and were united again by their mutual values and grassroots-level activism as a tool to create a new kind of political culture as a bottom-up process.[130] Interestingly, there were some notable differences that were not visible in Finland: organic farmers were an important part of the German Greens, and both the peace movement and the anti-nuclear movement played a bigger role in popularising environmental discourses and laying the foundations of the Green Party in West Germany. The catalyst for the rise of the German green movement was located in the Wyhl village in Southern Germany in 1975, where representatives of the new environmental and anti-nuclear movements as well as the traditionally more conservative wine growers mutually opposed the construction of a new nuclear plant. Since then, ecological and organic farmers were a notable part of the green movement in West Germany. As a result, the German Greens (unlike their Finnish counterparts) have garnered support not only in big cities but also in rural areas. Meanwhile, the West German new environmentalism became particularly marked by the anti-nuclear grassroots-level activity, much more so than in Finland, where the anti-nuclear groups were but a minor part of the environmentalist movement.[131]

Furthermore, nuclear power was also the issue that led to the formation of the federal Green Party. Green actors Petra Kelly and Ronald Vogt had already coined the idea of bringing the 'decisive battle against nuclear reactors' to the federal level in 1976. By then, the alternative movements had become active at a local, decentralised level throughout West Germany. While many environmental and social issues could be dealt with quite well at the local grassroots level, the nuclear power question required a more centralised federal movement, as many relevant decisions (including deciding the construction sites for processing plants) were being made at the federal rather than the local level. Green history scholar Stephen Milder even called the newly established party a 'national embodiment of grassroots anti-nuclear protest campaigns', founded despite initial suspicion against nation-level politics. The creation of a

[127] As pointed out by Radkau 2011, 142–143.
[128] Paastela 1987, 22–24, 56–60.
[129] Aalto 2018, 86–87, 118–124. Older connections between Finland and the aforementioned countries are illustrated in Ihalainen 2017.
[130] Mende 2012, 275.
[131] Poguntke 1993, 3, 58.

federal-level movement became especially relevant after 1979, with were plans to build a nuclear processing plant in the small village of Gorleben attracting the Greens' attention. This grassroots fight started small, but as the widely-reported partial meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in the USA occurred at the same time, the protest gained traction, uniting 150,000 anti-nuclear protestors within a week, thus giving the final push to the formation of the party, led by Kelly and Vogt.[132]

In Finland, the focus was more strongly located in traditional natural protection campaigns, such as Koijärvi, even though the anti-nuclear sentiment existed in Finland as well. Despite the aforementioned differences, the German model served as an example for Finland, where the new environmental activism was associated with and marked by alternative lifestyles, such as the establishment of anti-capitalist communes.[133] In Finland, the 1979 Koijärvi natural protection campaign united the grassroots movements, marking the foundation of a new national level political movement both practically and symbolically. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear successes in Wyhl and Gorleben seem to have similarly marked a starting point of federal level political environmentalism in West Germany both symbolically and in practice.

As a consequence of these events, the West German Green Party a.k.a. *Die Grünen* was founded in Karlsruhe in 1980. They got their first MPs to the West German *Bundestag* in 1983.[134] The German Greens were the fourth party in *Bundestag* at the time and the first new one to enter the federal parliament in decades. That same year, the Finnish Greens also got their first two national MPs to the parliament from the independent green list, despite not yet having a party. Trying to avoid adaptation into prevailing political structures, the Finnish Greens used the green movement merely as label for a loose network of grassroots activists, instead of creating a party structure. It was not until 1987 that the Greens formally established the *Vihreä liitto*, or the 'Green Alliance', a political umbrella organisation for the grassroots movements. One year later, five years into nation-level parliamentary work, *Vihreä liitto* transformed into a party. In the Finnish parliament, there were notably more parties than in West Germany, including a party to the left of the Social Democrats. This perhaps explains why the Finnish Greens did not want to profile themselves as leftist as their German counterparts, particularly after the center-right Liberal Party disappeared from the Finnish parliament, giving them room in the center of the political spectrum. The slogan 'neither left nor right but forward', used in both countries, originated with the German Greens. The German Greens have been often understood as a left-wing party, with some notable greens such as Petra Kelly even calling themselves socialist, although some greens opposed the left-

[132] Milder 2017, 11–12, 199–201, 209–214; Die Grünen 2019, 3–5; Mende 2012, 156; Jung 1995, 620, 627–629.
[133] Paastela 1987, 22–24, 56–60.
[134] Mende 2012, 273–274.

right division altogether.[135] The Finnish Greens meanwhile refrained from placing themselves along the left-right axis.[136]

A general distrust towards the parliamentary system became quickly visible in the legislative work of the new parties: the Finnish Greens' MPs were at first mostly passive on issues related to something else than the environment. Ville Komsi, one of the first two Finnish Green MPs and the organiser of the 1979 Koijärvi movement, was known for appearing in parliament sessions with forest clothing and a backpack, opposing to the conservative clothing etiquette of the parliament.[137] The German Greens also provided examples of such stunts, bringing plants to parliamentary sessions and knitting during them. The opposition towards the parliamentary system was again modeled on the German example, as the German Greens called themselves the 'antiparty-party' (*Anti-Parteien-Partei).*[138]

Despite starting off as protest parties, both the Finnish and German Greens nevertheless made it to national governments during the mid-to-late 1990s and stayed there for the remainder of the time period covered in this study: until 2002 in Finland and until 2005 in Germany. Before this, both parties had faced an unprecedented world historical change that had affected them differently: in West Germany, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War meant the unification of East and West Germanys, as well as the East and West German Green Parties. Meanwhile in Finland, the collapse of trade relations with the Soviet Union caused an unforeseen economic depression. In both countries, these events sped up the process towards green reformism, but for different reasons, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. The green parties were able to join their respective national governments due to this reformism, but at the cost of giving up the grassroots movements' radicalism that had inspired them to join politics in the first place. For many, this cost was too high, while for others, it was a mandatory price if one was to be effective in the field of politics.

Finally, something needs to be said about the general political climate of late twentieth century Europe before the fall of the Eastern Bloc. As the Finnish political scientist Rauli Mickelsson noted, the big parties turned away from representing collective subjects such as the working class during the 1970s and 1980s, representing individuals and individual values instead. This reflected a broader fragmentation of traditional values and hierarchies: the people who were represented had abandoned their collective group- and class identities, particularly among the younger generation, which incentivised the parties to react accordingly. Hartmut Kaelble has studied such a turn towards individual values which took place throughout Western Europe, including West Germany, particularly among the urban youth. This trend created room for new

[135] Hubert Kleinert for example would in 1987 explicitly underline that the Greens were 'not socialist'. Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 28 April 1987: Fraktionssitzung.
[136] Mende 2012, 278; Riukulehto 2007, 20–21.
[137] Paastela 1987, 24–25.
[138] Solsten 1995, 384; Mende 2012, 273, 288.

movements to emerge.[139] In Germany, there has also been discussion of 'postmaterial' values behind these movements, whereby value questions regarding equality, for example, have been discussed alongside environmental questions as part of a general critique of the materialist way of life.[140]

This change in values and identities drove the older parties to an identity crisis: as the old collective group identities that the parties supposedly represented got more or less dismantled, the parties tried to restructure themselves as catch-all parties. In 1977, the Finnish Social Democrats committed themselves programmatically to market-based economic policies directed by the goal of maintaining international competitiveness.[141] The West German Social Democrats had accepted the capitalist market economy as a political reality already at the Bad Godesberg party conference in 1959, giving up Marxist rhetoric and causing a need for new radical social movements among the 'homeless left', in the words of Paul Hockenos.[142] Values were changing in other political segments too, though. In Finland, a lack of environmental concern in the center-right Liberal Party drove young liberals, such as the future prominent reformist Osmo Soininvaara and future MP Ville Komsi, to join the Greens. In Germany, the early movements avoided strict associations with the left even though the party later became left-leaning. Keen to disassociate themselves altogether from traditional federal-level party politics, placing oneself within the left-right spectrum seemed detrimental for many. Often, interest to join the movement arose from the locals' desire to be heard in decision-making processes and from a critique of democratic processes that failed to do listen, rather than from party political alignments.[143]

Based on the rough outlines of the histories of the environmental movements and their respective parties in both countries, it would be easy to assume that Finnish and German Greens would also have a similar ideological foundation and similar presuppositions behind their thinking. However, the Finnish Greens have also explicitly wanted to differentiate themselves from their German counterparts. According to Jukka Paastela, green romanticism, Eastern mysticism and astrology, for example, were visible among the Finnish Greens in the early years – dating back to the hippie movement of the 1960s, which inspired many of the first environmental alternative movements. Similar discussion was not as visible in Germany, where green mysticism was associated with the National Socialists' mystical environmentalism[144]. In a 1985 speech, Osmo Soininvaara, one of the most notable reformist greens in Finland, explicitly emphasised how the Finnish Green movement was not copied from Germany.[145] Furthermore, although the question of nuclear power was included in the Finnish Greens' agenda from the get-go, it was not the issue that

[139] Mickelsson 2007, 245, 310–311, 359–360; Kaelble 2013, 82–84, 92–96, 101.
[140] Rohrschneider & Wolf 2004, 23.
[141] Aalto 2018, 57.
[142] Hockenos 2008, 45–47.
[143] Aalto 2018, 204; Milder 2017, 8-9, 13-14.
[144] As pointed out by Dryzek 2005, 208.
[145] Paastela 1987, 15–16.

ignited or symbolised the movement, unlike in Germany. In Finland, the spark came from a more general concern about the state of the environment and the consequent intention to search for alternatives to the current lifestyle.[146]

Nevertheless, the similarities were also notable, particularly regarding the background groups and the rift into roughly similar factions within the parties. Furthermore, the parties cooperated across similar international forums (such as the EU, which Finland joined in 1995, or the European Green Federation, with which the Finnish Greens cooperated already in the 1980s). To attain a comprehensive understanding of the transnational connections between the countries, a comparative analysis of their environmental thinking can help identify similarities and differences, while explanations for their potential similarities can be estimated by analysing the interactions of the actors in for example green conferences and party discussions.

[146] Mickelsson 2007, 250–251.

3 RADICAL GREEN CONCEPTS: COMPANIONSHIP WITH NATURE AND LIMITS TO GROWTH

This chapter provides an overview of the early development of the Finnish and German Green Parties, focusing on their early programmes and discussions on ideological questions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Sections 3.1. and 3.2. present the key concepts explicitly aimed at reconceptualising some key Western presuppositions. This chapter shows that despite differences, the green concepts in both countries were primarily derived from the grassroots environmentalist or radical eco-philosophical conceptual cluster, with a sense of holistic interconnectedness as the foundation of a renewed relationship with nature. This standpoint would lead to a reconceptualisation of well-being and the environment and also a more participatory understanding of democracy – issues that were in direct conflict with the values and presuppositions of the established representative party-political system. Much in the spirit of the alternative social movements of the 1970s, parliamentary democracy was seen merely as a tool for growth-based politics that supported the free market system, which was in turn considered oppressive towards both humans and non-human nature and detrimental to the well-being of both. Consequentially the Greens conceptualised themselves as a protest movement: 'antiparty-parties' representing grassroots movements, future generations and the plant and animal world at the political level. In addition, their agenda included a broader cultural criticism of the Western mindset of the hierarchical domination, as sense of mastery of other humans and nature alike, which was to be replaced with a more compassionate value system of companionship. These ideals also emerged from the conceptual cluster of radical grassroots environmentalism and eco-feminism.

As such, the Greens' goal was not so much to efficiently participate in legislation, but rather to maintain these ideals at the national political level. It was evident that a cultural change was taking place from the bottom-up, since the grassroots movements – particularly the ecological movement, the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement – were thriving and creating a new cultural mindset in the early 1980s, although with varying emphasis in different

countries. The growth-critical green political environmentalism that ensued has sometimes been described as a technical solution that lacked the cultural criticism of the degrowth-movement that succeeded it.[147] However, I argue that radical greenness was explicitly directed at participating in such a cultural (rather than merely technical) critique. The Greens expanded the *limits to growth* –discussion of the 1970s to include a critique and the consequent reconceptualisation of not just the Western free market economic system but also the hierarchical mindset of domination on which they thought the system was based.

Section 3.3. maps some of the transnational transferences, thus deepening the analysis of the conceptual cluster from where the green ideas originated. Personal connections were of key importance in expanding the reach of green radical ideas, as were international conferences. Books concerning environmental ideas were also translated, which also served to transfer ideas. The greens in both countries, not yet tied down by the limitations that active government participation would impose on their thinking, wanted to establish what they considered an entirely new and novel culture in the level of ideas and concepts, but also at the level of political organisation. The consequential lack of legislative efficiency and limited opportunities for political cooperation with other parties that followed such an unusual position did not seem to bother the Greens at the surface level, but would soon become an issue for many greens. In this chapter, I argue that early green radicalism and the indifference to immediate political efficiency liberated the Greens to attempt creating a kind of 'utopia': a term which the German Greens used to describe their goals in 1986. In Finland, a 'utopian' approach was also explicitly supported by some actors at the time, for example Pekka Sauri, as a positive alternative to the survivalist 'ecological collapse' -approach.[148]

Despite these findings on inspecting green discussions, the concept of 'utopia' is here used as an analytical term (although an empirically justifiable one) to describe the attempt to create something new as a positive rupture from (rather than a reformed version of) modernity that intends to create a supposedly better future for humans and nature alike. This utopia was created through a political movement that lived up to the new culture sprung from the world of alternative social movements rather than adapted to the prevailing parliamentary system and customs. On the other hand, the lack of political efficiency would come to haunt the Greens later, as will be discussed in Chapter Four. In this sense, the high-flying ideals of this utopia also contained the very seeds for its downfall.

[147] For example Flipo 2008, Demaria & al. 2013 and Parrique 2020, as discussed below.
[148] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 3; Sauri, Pekka 1986. 'Manifestin jäljillä.' *VL* 1/1986.

3.1 Creating a grassroots utopia: early radicalism of the German Greens

3.1.1 The Greens as the 'antiparty-party'

After years of struggling to get their voices heard in local and state-level legislation, the West German network of alternative activist grassroots movements formed a loose party structure to represent their ideals on a federal level in 1980, naming themselves the Greens, *Die Grünen*. The name *Grünen* had been in use since 1978, creating a colour association that environmentalists all across the world could connect to almost immediately (although it took a longer time for this colour association to become steadily used in Finland). The party was established around a network of BI-groups (*Bürgerinitiativen*-groups), a network that had been at the centre of West German alternative grassroots movement activities at least since 1972, when it was formed as an umbrella association for diverse alternative and grassroots activists. Since then, the BIs had largely been focused on environmental issues and particularly on acting against the increasing use of nuclear power. It was this network that started guiding green operations towards a more federal level in the late 1970s, by, for example, participating in the European Parliament election of 1979 with a 'green' list and finally formulating the party itself in 1980, naming it after the colour that had been used to describe the movement for the past couple of years.[149]

The German Greens' radical era lasted from 1980, when the party was established, to 1991, when the party declared itself an ecological reform party. This era was marked by utopian attempts of establishing an entirely new political grassroots culture in Germany, founded on a more participatory concept of democracy. The first Green Party programme was published when the party was established in 1980. A goal to reconceptualise key Western presuppositions and create a new culture to replace them was present among the key concepts from the very beginning. The Greens set out to create a 'dynamic circulation economy' (*dynamische Kreislaufwirtschaft)* – an economic system that opposed the possibilities for economic elites to dictate work conditions to the majority of people.[150] This key concept represented a utopian attempt to create an alternative future, not just in terms of the better treatment of the environment, but also in a larger sense, modifying the values and premises on which society operated. 'It is about a society, where there is an increasing awareness of people's relationships as well as human's relationship with nature', the Greens described their alternative vision for society. As opposed to the perceptions of political decision-making at the time, the Greens proposed that humans needed to be understood as a part of the natural processes instead of being separate from them. They stressed that humans also

[149] Guha 2000, 89–90; Hockenos 2008, 150–151.
[150] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 15–16.

lived in tandem with the cycles and processes of the natural world, and this needed to be better recognised.[151]

More than anything, this reformulation of human relationships with nature was considered a 'crisis of the current economic system'. Hence, the programme explicitly expressed the need to reconceptualise this relationship among all living beings, humans and non-humans alike. The 'short-sighted search for profit' was causing unforeseen problems not only for the environment but also for humans' social and psychological well-being. However, these problems were not addressed by the established system of thought.[152] The German Greens were critical of all the consequences of such a culture, including the political orientation towards economic growth and the devastating effect that such a competitive mindset would have on individual lives if such presuppositions were not questioned and restructured. This was followed by a criticism of economic growth, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. This section focuses more on the cultural critique of the mindset of control, competition and materialistic anthropocentrism.

Extending this line of thought, the Greens wanted to search for an entirely new way of conceptualising human–nature relationships – one recognising the *connectedness (Beziehungen)* between humans and nature.[153] Thus a 'fundamental reorientation' (*eine grundsätzliche Neuorientierung*) of both ecological and social well-being was required.[154] Therefore, the Greens set out to reconceptualise both human relationships with nature and society's understanding of well-being as something separate from the well-being of natural processes. Focusing on their new concept of the *circulation economy,* the Greens directed a lot of criticism on the current economic system in particular, and consequently, many of their political solutions were aimed at restructuring the economy in a radical manner. The aforementioned 'fundamental reorientation' of well-being meant bringing about a change not only in mindset but also in practices. This was to be politically established by creating a system based on decentralised, small and alternative companies that would replace the larger ones – decentralising production was thus one of the key goals of this 'reorientation'. Politically and legislatively, the Greens hoped to achieve these radical goals using regulation that would be particularly aimed at the producers. While the consumers would be supported for public transportation through improved infrastructure and public funding for train travel, car producers would have to face strict emission controls.[155]

---

[151] *'Es geht um eine Gesellschaft, in der die Beziehungen der Menschen untereinander und zur Natur zunehmend bewußt gemacht werden, in der die Beachtung ökologischer Kreisläufe, die Entwicklung und der Einsatz der Technologie, die Beziehung zwischen Produktion und Verbrauch zu einer Angelegenheit aller Betroffenen wird.*' Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen 1980, 7.

[152] *'Sie werden aus kurzfristigen Profitinteressen in Kauf genommen'; 'Das ökologische Gleichgewicht wird dem Wachstumsstreben der Wirtschaft ... geopfert'*. Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 6.

[153] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 5.

[154] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 7.

[155] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 7.

Charging forward with this grassroots-level idealism on all fronts, the Greens used a variety of images to spread awareness. The Green Party sunflower was painted by renowned artist Joseph Beuys, whose art symbolised sympathy instead of power over nature and was soon utilised as a political statement. An image of the problem – a polluting factory – was inserted into the party programme to represent the current system's relationship with nature: one of selfish profit-seeking causing destruction.[156] What really caught people's attention, however, was the 1980 European Parliament election poster, drawn by children. [157] Such pictures represented polar opposites of humans' relationship with nature as the Greens perceived it: the destruction and pollution caused by the growth-oriented free market system, marked by centralised large production facilities on the one end; and bright colours representing empathy towards the environment instead of control over it, with children's artwork used as a symbol of overcoming the established patriarchal modes of power on the other end. While these pictures were clearly meant to have an emotional effect, they may also be understood as part of the analytical criticism that the Greens were directing at established power structures.

Considering the party's background in a network of alternative movements, many of these ideas had in fact been present in the radical environmentalism of the 1970s. The requirement of perceiving humans and human well-being as essentially interconnected with the totality of natural processes, Earth systems and eco-systems (as opposed to implicitly assuming that human society exists merely as 'internal to itself', in the words of William Connolly describing the anthropocentric belief system[158]) had been highlighted in environmental discussions at least for a decade before the first green programme. As noticed by many scholars,[159] the goal of understanding human well-being as intertwined with the well-being of ecological systems was a discussion that originated in the environmental and ecological sciences after the Second World War and had been integrated into the environmentalist grassroots movements by the early 1970s.

However, despite the eco-centric basis of this thinking, the argumentation with which the Greens approached questions of well-being was sometimes explicitly anthropocentric. Ecological perspectives (i.e. standpoints that perceive human reality as interconnected with a variety of Earth systems and eco-systems) also upraised the question of what really *was* well-being for humans. The capitalist system of production – which did not attribute any agency or intrinsic meaning to nature or to the population of human workers, but perceived both as mere resources for a profit-gaining economic system – was considered a threat both to nature and to humans – ignoring even 'the

156 '*Die Krise des heutigen Wirtschaftssystems*'. Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 6.
157 Die Grünen 2019, 6–9
158 Connolly 2017, 155–157.
159 e.g. Taylor 2010, Guha 2000, Warde & al. 2018, Radkau 2011.

ergonomy of the workers'.[160] Therefore, work needed to be more limited, people needed to have more vacation time, and there also needed to be limitations on advertisements.[161]

The idea that humans could no longer base their well-being on the overconsumption of natural resources meant that the concept of human well-being was also undergoing a constant process of reconceptualisation. Strong emphasis was laid on the need to restructure not just the humans' relationship with nature but consequentially human societies' internal relationships as well, including the economic and work life, which formed the basis of the new holistic understanding of well-being. This emphasis on 'eco-social' thinking, as John Dryzek has categorised this holistic standpoint,[162] may seem even a bit surprising, since the radically anti-anthropocentric deep ecologists were still involved in the party. However, this might explain why the conservative ecologists also marched out from the party soon after the programme, in 1982, when conservative nature protectionist Herbert Gruhl and most conservative deep ecologists, disappointed with the social emphasis of the programme, left the party to create the competing Ecological-Democratic Party (*Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei)* – ÖDP, which never fared well in elections.[163] Concentrated on social as well as ecological issues, such eco-social discourses have typically emphasised the need to understand the failure in human–nature relationships caused by the same socially shared patterns of conduct and thinking that were also hurting human societies internally, often through malfunctioning and hierarchical power structures.[164]

It is notable that even though the Greens made radical demands to change society through legislation, their political goals were not intended to be necessarily implemented at the legislative level – at least, it was not a primary goal for the Greens. One key ideologist for the programme of the new-found party, Petra Kelly, emphasised this on several occasions. The parliamentary system itself was, in fact, a part of the human-centered, materialism-oriented way of living that was destructive to both nature and humans. One of the founders of the party and the first party chair, Kelly uttered what became known as the green slogan (or for opponents, slander) throughout the 1980s – the Greens were an 'antiparty-party' (*Antipartei-Partei).* For Kelly, the point of having the Greens in the Bundestag was not to conduct efficient politics in the established party-political system, but to oppose it and postulate visions of an alternative culture from within. Her goal was a 'truly democratised society' (*eine wirklich demokratisierte Gesellschaft*) – one that could only be built by supporting civil rights movements, even civil disobedience and, on an even more radical note, supporting local decentralised governance and economy, just

[160] *'Den Menschen nur noch eine sinnentleerte Teilfunktion überlassen bleibt. Die Arbeitsplätze genügen in der Regel nicht den geringsten ergonomischen Ansprüchen.'* Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm Die Grünen, 8.
[161] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm Die Grünen, 7–8.
[162] Dryzek 2005.
[163] Bukow 2016.
[164] Bookchin 2005, 385, 388, 398.

as the programme sought to achieve through the application of *Kreislaufwirtschaft*. The point of participating in federal politics, thus, was to raise this discussion and represent these ideals at the national level at a time when the entire parliamentary system was perceived as an opponent of these ideals. As Petra Kelly noted:

> From the bottom up, I feel very strongly that one needs a fundamental opposition in the Bundestag that takes uncompromising action against the armaments and growth industries, against the matted apparatus and against this policy of deterrence.[165]

Furthermore, she stated 'ecological self-governing emancipatory socialism' (*ökologisch-selbstverwalteter emanzipative Sozialismus*) as the final green goal. For Kelly, the danger was not in remaining unsuccessful in the *Bundestag*, which was just another forum to continue the discussion anyway, and seemingly not even a very important one. The danger was rather in becoming compromised in a way that would thwart this fundamental opposition. 'If one day the Greens start sending ministers to Bonn, then it will no longer be the Greens that I wanted to help build', she claimed. In fact, she claimed that it would be better for the Greens to not become too successful, underscoring that 13% support might put too much pressure on the party to join coalition governments, which would then jeopardise their ideals. Finally, she presented her own ideal for a proper green parliamentarian – when radiation-damaged toads were brought in to the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg, the green MPs stood up and claimed to be the representatives of those toads. For Kelly, the point of being green was to represent 'those without a voice',[166] be it plants, animals or people.[167]

Instead of maintaining strong influence within the representative parliamentary system that they scorned, the Greens' goal was to build a non-violent protest movement (one that was already visible in the world of grassroots movements) within the parliament. Their primary focus needed to remain on building a new, alternative culture on the streets, at the grassroots level – building eco-houses, solar panels, self-help centers and work for women, among other things – instead of changing society from the top down. It was this grassroots-level thinking that Kelly emphasised that would lead to the formulation of the Greens' 'imperative mandates' to guide the internal organisation of the Green Party: to demand MP rotation every two years, to limit MP salary to 2000 marks, and to never allow party leaders to take up positions in the parliament (a rule which the Finnish Greens also adopted for a while).[168] This represented a utopia that was already being created as a bottom-up process and was now merely brought to the level of the parliamentary

---

[165] *'Ich spüre von der Basis her ganz stark, daß man eine fundamentale Opposition im Bundestag braucht, die gegen die Rüstungs- und Wachstumsindustrie, gegen den verfilzten Apparat und gegen diese Abschreckungspolitik kompromißlos vorgeht.'*

[166] '*Die überhaupt keine Stimme haben.*'

[167] Mettke, Jörg R. 1982 'Wir sind die Antipartei-partei.' *Der Spiegel*, 24/1982.

[168] Mettke, Jörg R. 1982 'Wir sind die Antipartei-partei.' *Der Spiegel*, 24/1982. '*Wenn die Grünen eines Tages anfangen, Minister nach Bonn zu schicken, dann sind es nicht mehr die Grünen, die ich mit aufbauen wollte.*'

system. Later, future green MP Thomas Ebermann would describe this goal as that of changing consciousness rather than active creation of politics.[169]

On this basis, the purpose of the party was to question established political and economic power structures, reconceptualising the Western industrialised way of life and mentalities and representing the voices of grassroots movements in the parliament. This opposition was visible not only in discourse but also in practice, as it meant for example bringing houseplants to parliamentary sessions, knitting during discussions, and refusing to wear appropriate clothing ('long beards and knitted sweaters').[170] It also meant the promotion of the aforementioned key concept of *Kreislaufswirtschaft,* a type of economy built on growth criticism, conservation of natural resources, and, most importantly, de-centralisation of industries into smaller units, which would promote economic democracy within the Green Party programme as well.[171]

The Greens' ideals were thus based on a different conception of *democracy* than that of representative parliamentarism, that of *Basisdemokratie*. At a global level, the grassroots democratic (*basisdemokratisch*) goal can be interpreted as participating in what Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey refers to as the 'participatory' conceptualisation of democracy which was formulated and had been transnationally visible in the 1960s student movement and was later 'resurrected' by the new social movements of the 1970s. The new movements had inherited the goal of decentralisation and the goal of increased citizens' autonomy through grassroots democracy, where individual fulfilment would stem from collective action for equality, human rights and (later) environmental well-being. The problem however was 'changing the world without taking political power', as phrased by Gilcher-Holtey.[172] This new form of democracy was particularly visible in the culture of local citizens' initiative movements, or BIs (*Bürgerinitiativen).* Participatory forms of democracy had been visible in the student movement BIs already in the late 1960s, as discussed already in Chapter 2. Back then, the BIs might have been primarily associated with the radical left, but after 1972, with the creation of a more centralised network of BIs in West Germany, this new participatory democracy found its predominant form in ecology. The different BIs already consisted of 300,000 individual members in West Germany in the early 1970s, so it can be argued that it was not so much the environmental movement that resurrected the BIs, but rather the existing network of BIs provided a steady platform for the growth of the environmental movement in Germany according to Guha.[173] Either way, this growth of BI networks that laid the foundation of the Green Party established the ideological basis for a more participatory conception of democracy, focusing on citizens' decentralised autonomy, political initiatives and local grassroots activity (more than the representative and parliamentary forms of government). The German Greens would come to serve as an example to Finland, with the term

[169] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990. 5 May 1987: Fraktionssitzung.
[170] Solsten 1995, 384; Mende 2012, 273, 288; Die Grünen 2019, 16–17.
[171] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm Die Grünen, 7.
[172] Gilcher–Holtey 2018, 268, 273.
[173] Guha 2000, 90.

Basisdemokratie even being discussed in Finland as *baasis-demokratia,* a concept adopted directly from the German discussion that has not stabilised in the Finnish language.[174]

Abiding by these ideals, the Greens started their political careers by using their public image to support grassroots causes (often perceived to be more important than legislative work). A good example of this is the creation of 'The Free Republic of Wendland' (*Republik Freies Wendland*), a grassroots movement supported and joined by key Green Party members. In 1980, the Greens set up a hut camp in Gorleben to oppose the building of the aforementioned nuclear waste facilities. Although the BI had connotations in protecting the local environment, it had wider political implications as well. Since the facility would have provided storage space for nuclear waste in other sectors as well, it soon became a symbol of the continuation of future nuclear power plant production. Stephen Milder pointed out that the Gorleben protests turned the attention of grassroots movements from a local to a more federal direction.[175] Furthermore, Gorleben became not only a protest site for environmentalists, but also marked a new way of living that was being promoted at all levels of society. The hut camp, consisting of shabbily built wooden constructs where the activists lived, was eventually shut down by the police.[176]

Kelly's ideals found support among the electorate during this atmosphere of increasing environmental alarm.[177] As one of the first three chairpersons of the party, Kelly was also a leading candidate and the face of the party, helping the Greens climb over the 5% threshold needed to enter the *Bundestag* in 1983. By this time, the Greens had already made it to the local *Landstag* of five states.[178] Petra Kelly was such an important character in formulating and conceptualising this radical green thinking that, even 10 years later, the opponents of this radical line would still be naming Petra Kelly as their chief ideological nemesis, despite the fact that her political influence in the party had virtually disappeared by then.[179]

The Greens' parliament group minutes reveal that ideals similar to those presented by Kelly were listened to in the *Bundestag* as well. The rotation principle, for example, was accepted by the parliament group on the premise that it would represent the ideals of grassroots democracy to the federal decision-making process (as well as keep the MPs closer to the party's rank and file).[180] In fact, in 1983, the Green parliament group expressed belief in its ability to eventually change the operating models of the Bonn parliament towards a more positive, democratic and transparent direction. Although the ways in which this would be accomplish were not addressed, speculatively speaking,

---

[174] Hautala, Heidi 1986. 'Prosessi vai pysähdys.' *VL* 2/1986.
[175] Milder 2017, 210–215.
[176] Die Grünen 2019, 8–9.
[177] Dryzek (2005) for example talks of the rise of 'survivalist' discourses among environmentalists at this time.
[178] Weichold 2005; Die Grünen 2019, 3, 14–15, 18–19.
[179] Hubert Kleinert arguing against Petra Kelly's visions in 1991 see e.g. *Der Spiegel* 23/1991. This is also addressed in Chapter 4 of this study.
[180] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 16 January 1983.

the idea could have been that introducing a new culture to replace old structures would cause a sort of chain reaction by setting an example for other parties. Be that as it may, the Greens emphasised two specific missions regarding their role in the Bundestag:

a) Being the 'mouth and ear of the social movements' (*Mund und Ohr sozialer Bewegungen)*
b) Being a 'multiplier and verifier of the social movements' *(Multiplikator und Verstärker für die sozialen Bewegungen.)*

It thus seems that at its very early stages, the parliament group had embraced the ideals of ideologists such as Petra Kelly, the same ideals that were also expressed in the Green Party programme. The theme of promoting human–nature interconnectedness was emphasised in the parliament group's early political plans. For example, when discussing a political 'detoxification programme' (*Entgiftungsprogramm)* in the spring of 1985, the Greens' primary political goal was to increase of awareness of 'ecological connections' (*ökologische Zusammenhänge)* in the population.[181] In practice, macro-level detoxification requirements would be directed at social infrastructure such as the transportation infrastructure, housing construction etc., while micro-level detoxification plans were directed at individual chemical companies. These macro- and micro-level activities were not separate, but interconnected with one another and with the ecological system.[182] Even the practical solutions were adapted to the radical ideals of raising awareness and creating new ways to understand human–nature relationships in a more holistic way.

It is descriptive how the early green MPs kept referring to themselves as representatives of the 'social movements' (*sozialen Bewegungen),* sometimes also as the 'parliamentary arm' of the grassroots movements.[183] They dichotomised their status as the representatives of social movements, as opposed to being members of 'the machinery' (*Apparate),* which in turn referred to the Bonn institutions – despite the fact that, as MPs, they were technically also a part of this so-called machinery.[184] Green concepts were thus systematically constructed in an oppositionary manner in regards to the parliamentary system, which was discursively excluded from their ideal of a more participatory form of democracy.

Petra Kelly continued to be a key figure at this time, directing the work of the parliament group towards representing 'peace-, women's-, and ecological movements' (*Friedens-, Frauen- und Ökologiebewegung),* all of which were issues to be addressed in the parliament.[185] It seems almost surprising how little power Kelly actually had in the party after 1983. While she was one of the three party chairs when the party was founded, she became sidelined when the

[181] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 23 April 1985: Fraktionssitzung.
[182] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 23 April 1985: Fraktionssitzung.
[183] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 5–6 September 1984: Klausursitzung der Fraktion, zweiter und dritter Tag.
[184] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 11–13 February 1983.
[185] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 28 April 1983.

Green parliament group started their legislative work in 1983, not least because parliamentary politics 'meant nothing to her', as German environmental historian Joakim Radkau pointed out. She was no longer a part of the female leadership group of the party in 1984 when its six-headed women's council was established.[186] By early 1984 – just one year into parliamentary work – some members of the parliament group had become strikingly aware of the little actual effect they had through their fundamental oppositionist stand on parliamentary politics. The discussion on the need for a more moderate stand would become visible in the parliament group as early as January 1984, led now by Joschka Fischer (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).[187]

Kelly meanwhile started concentrating on spreading her alternative visions beyond Germany, helping to transfer the ideals of West German greenness to other European countries. It is evident from the Green parliament group meeting minutes that, by the late 1980s, Petra Kelly was mostly assigned duties concerning international networking. For example, in early 1987, it was her responsibility to travel to a peace conference in Moscow (a key political issue that was close to her heart) and hand out a letter to Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner inviting them to visit the Greens in Germany.[188] Such endeavours indeed contributed to the spread of green ideals transnationally among the European greens.[189] Coupled with her reputation, the international speeches she delivered popularised and normalised the form of greenness that, to an extent, had already existed in other countries. In Finland, her thoughts were often published in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, which also included translations of complete speeches.[190] Jutta Ditfurth would later reminiscent how she and Rainer Trampert used to make fun of how Kelly flew around the world, but admitted that many of the radicals themselves had been ignorant to the importance of international networks of cooperation, with Kelly being the exception.[191]

Although Kelly disappeared from the limelight in her home country, her radical thought was carried forward by people like Jutta Ditfurth. Throughout the 1980s, the environmentalist grassroots ideals of reconceptualising the meaning of well-being for both humans and nature were at the top of the Greens' agenda. This was accompanied by a redefinition of democracy as well as a growth critical analysis, which will be scrutinised in the next section.

3.1.2 *Wachstumsgrenzen:* growth-critical discourses in German green radicalism

Along with criticism of human–nature relationships of a profit-seeking economic system, there was a more traditional form of growth criticism

[186] Radkau 2011, 203–206; Die Grünen 2019, 20–21.
[187] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 10 January 1984.
[188] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 5 March 1987: Fraktionvorstandssitzung,
[189] European Greens 1984.
[190] Välimäki, Pauli 1987. 'Vihreä Tukholma.' *VL* 15/1987.
[191] Die Grünen 2019, 30–31; Left Green Perspectives #25, 1991. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.'

involved in German green thinking as well. This growth criticism paid attention to the boundaries of ecological systems, demonstrating how the growth of material consumption in human economies exceeded their carrying capacity, all in the spirit of the *limits to growth* –discussion of the 1970s. In this section, I map out the concepts as well as the background of such discourses, and argue that this form of growth criticism was not separate from or exclusive to the larger cultural criticism that the Greens engaged in but was rather intertwined with it and may even be considered an integral part of it.

The German green goal of *Kreislaufswirtschaft* meant the 'complete abandoning' of exploitative economic systems.[192] Individuals' right to gather economic profit needed to be replaced by ecological balance, emphasising the need to recognise humans' status as living in an interconnected relationship (*Beziehungen*) with nature as well as with one another, which the current economic and political systems have refused to comply with in their growth orientation. [193] The Greens' demand for strict regulations and the decentralisation of production, among others, would require limiting the current growth-oriented economic system by establishing ecological boundaries. The Greens claimed that 'infinite growth was not possible in a finite system'. In effect, '*limits to growth*' (*Wachstumsgrenzen*) – a term originating from the conceptual cluster of radical environmentalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s – formed the basis for this economical reorientation. [194] Furthermore, the German greens also used of the term 'growth-independent policy' in 1986 (*eine wachstumsunabhängige Politik*) as an example of a more holistic (*ganzheitlichen*) approach to conceptualising the environment and the economy, one that takes ecological and social consequences better into account.[195]

It is worth taking a closer look at the diachronic development of the *limits to growth* –concept to understand the conceptual cluster from where it originated. Growth criticism itself is a concept as old as 'growth', which became associated with the concept of 'development' around the Second World War, - during the late 1930s to the late 1940s – when mechanisms for calculating the gross national product were developed. Both of these concepts were, in turn, conceptually linked to the idea of 'modernisation', as analysed by Stephen J. Macekura. (The conceptual development of the term 'development' is discussed in Chapter 4, in relation to the concept of *sustainable development,* which would later dominate environmental discourses in a hegemonic fashion, but which was still a marginal concept in the early-to-mid-80s.)[196]

In the late 1950s, when growth orientation had become somewhat hegemonic in Western liberal democracies, thinkers like John Kenneth Galbraith and his followers were already pointing out how unregulated growth had led to rampant consumerism and alienation, as well as uncontrollable

---

[192] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm Die Grünen, 7.
[193] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm Die Grünen, 4–5.
[194] *'In einem begrenzten System kein unbegrenztes Wachstum möglich ist'*. Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 4.
[195] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 3.
[196] Macekura 2018, 110–113.

waste. Soon after, environmentally aligned economic thinkers like Kenneth E. Boulding started talking about 'spaceship Earth' that contained finite resources. When the greens spoke of infinite growth being 'not possible in a finite system', they were practically repeating almost word to word the aforementioned famous phrase coined by Kenneth E. Boulding in 1966, which has often been considered the ideological catalyst of the whole *limits to growth* –movement. From this point on, social and environmental criticism of growth started spreading and becoming mainstream simultaneously with the rise of modern grassroots environmentalism, which adopted these ideals from environmentally-aligned academic discussions.[197] Simultaneously, criticism of 'development' and the entire modernisation theory in general (based largely on increasing consumption) was strongly questioned by the American hippie movement, which later affected the environmentalists and was closely connected to the growth critique of the new social movements.[198] A similar movement was also taking place in West Germany, with many who had grown up in the 1950s being highly critical of the emptiness of consumerism and the pursuit of social status, overwhelming all curiosity and meaning from life. Many of the future greens would later remember the economic wonder of the 1950s as a bleak time to live in.[199]

It was against this backdrop that growth-critical discourse would ring a bell. In his thorough depiction of the degrowth-movement, Timothée Parrique explains how further fuel was added to the growth-critical fire by the academic discussions of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971 – creating what he called 'bioeconomics', a conception of economics that needed to take biology into account), Andre Gorz (1972 – the first to use the term degrowth, or *décroissance*), and of course the 1972 Club of Rome report *Limits to Growth*. Parrique mostly associated these discussions with the search for technical ways to reduce emissions.[200] The 1972 Club of Rome report calculations were indeed conducted by a technical computer simulation created by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The report conducted a technical analysis of the limitations of natural resources that would eventually slow down economic growth, thereby leading to a systematic collapse – a claim that had been discussed for quite some time by then, although without similar calculations. Therefore, on the one hand, the report merely popularised the idea of infinite growth as unattainable in a finite system – an idea that was already present in most environmental discussions by then – using fashionable computer modeling. This indicates that the simulations, running a hundred years into the future studying different path dependencies, simply 'stated the obvious' in the end, as

[197] Macekura 2018, 121; Boulding 1966. This is not to say that criticism towards unregulated accumulation of wealth would not have been around for much longer. However, criticism of a growth-based economic system with the GNP (or later GDP) at its centre first required the existence of these concepts, discourses and institutions, which had become embedded in the economic and political culture by the late 1950s when their criticism started to manifest itself.
[198] Macekura 2018, 122
[199] Hockenos 2008, 29–31.
[200] Parrique 2020, 173–174; Meadows & al. 1972.

pointed out by John Dryzek. On the other hand, it was precisely because the report had provided calculations for something that most environmentalists already considered a fact in the first place that made it so popular. It appeared at just the right time – with environmental consciousness emerging as a new global mass movement at the turn of the decade, the report gave this movement trustworthy calculations to rely on in support of its already-existing argumentation.[201] Economic growth became a source of discontent due to the 'social and environmental limits' that were being approached. As a result, the latter part of the 1970s saw the emergence of growth-critical literature in the English, French and German language spheres.[202]

According to John Dryzek, political concepts pertaining to *limits to growth* have typically been located in radical environmentalist discourses originating from the transnational environmental movements of the 1970s. Though diversified, these forms of environmental thought usually positioned themselves against the kind of economic liberal individualism that promoted economic liberties to produce and consume resources without limitations, as well as the core premise (real or perceived) of an economically oriented individual, *homo economicus,* as the key agent at the centre of all economic and political life. These 'survivalist' discourses, visible in public discourse particularly after the Club of Rome report, stemmed from the idea that infinite growth was not obtainable in a finite system, just as the German Greens thought. Moreover, the 1972 report merely made the discourse public; it did not define it.[203]

Taken into account the background of this discourse in the *limits to growth* discussion and the 1972 MIT report, it is understandable that the discourse has been labeled as a particularly technical analysis on the sufficiency of natural resources. Drawing on its association with radical grassroots environmentalism, this new conceptual cluster quickly developed a thread in which criticism could be directed at the entire socio-cultural paradigm that prioritised growth, however.[204] Barbara Muraca & Matthias Schmeltzer pointed out in 2018 that French writers such as Andre Gorz and Ivan Illich were involved in spreading these ideas across Germany during the 1970s through their translated works and transnational connections, making the subject of degrowth (or *Postwachstum* in German) a widely and publicly debated subject in Germany. There was even a series of books published from 1974 to 1985, titled '*Technologie und Politik: Das Magazin zur Wachstumskrise',* that discussed the issue.[205]

The German Greens maintained this line of thought in their 1986 programme aimed at restructuring the economy (*Umbau der Industriegesellschaft*), calling world markets the 'sacred cow' that all were expected to bow to: economic growth and exportation had become more important than environmental protection or a healthy work life (*Der Weltmarkt ist die Heilige*

[201] Meadows & al. 1972; Dryzek 2005, 30–34; Radkau 2011, 105–108
[202] Parrique 2020, 178–179.
[203] Dryzek 2005, 29–35, 40–41.
[204] Muraca & Schmeltzer 2018, 176–180.
[205] Muraca & Schmeltzer 2018, 185.

Kuh, dessen Zwängen wir uns alle zu beugen haben). For them, a growth economy had negative social and ecological consequences. The Greens claimed that a drastic increase in wealth and private profit was observable at a time when the fringes of society were experiencing increasing unemployment and deterioration in living and working conditions. Such circumstances caused people to fall sick, while nature continued to be more and more exploited, causing destruction of entire forests coupled with poisoning of the air, the soil, the water and the food. This also created problems for the third world, which became even more indebted because of this growth orientation. It was the private capitalist mode of production, with its demands for ever-increasing profits, that was causing these unwanted social and ecological consequences.[206] In contrast to growth-oriented thinking, 'growth-critical politics' (*wachstumskritische Politik*) was 'holistic' (*ganzheitlich*) in nature and aimed at prioritising social and ecological well-being instead of material well-being. In the spirit of being an antiparty-party, the Greens themselves later admitted that this was a 'Utopia' that would take a long time to implement as the 'changes needed for this are fundamental, radical'.[207]

The outcome of following the above ideals would be an 'ecological, social and grassroots economy' (*eine ökologische, soziale und basisdemokratische Wirtschaft)*. Therefore, along with accounting for social and ecological needs, the needs of grassroots democracy also needed to be considered in the place of private or state economic control (as in capitalist and socialist systems), since a grassroots democratic economy would help loosen outside control and ensure self-sufficiency (*Selbstbestimmung*) for citizens.[208] Here, the Greens opted not to use the previous concept of *Kreislaufswirtschaft*, though, instead using either *ökologische Wirtschaft (*'ecological economy') or *basisdemokratische Wirtschaft* ('grassroots democratic economy'). They explained what this *ecological economy* would accomplish as follows:

> Production processes and goods are inserted into natural cycles without hurting the natural basis of life for humans and other living beings. Long-lasting consumer goods replace disposable products. Growth as the highest possible output of goods is no longer considered an economic goal; for the prevailing industrial system destroys its natural foundations the more it expands.[209]

Most importantly, this meant a shift from large and centralised hard industries towards more decentralised modes of production, that would also benefit the environment. Meanwhile, the *grassroots democratic economy* – a different side of

---

[206] '*Verantwortlich für diesen Umgang mit der Natur ist die privatwirtschaftliche, kapitalistische Produktionsweise, die sich der Gewinne und Konkurrenz wegen um ihre gesellschaftlichen und ökologischen Folgen nicht kümmert*'. Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 1.
[207] '*Eine Utopie, weil sich der Umbau der Wirtschaft an langfristigen Perspektiven orientiert, dienotwendigen Veränderungen dazu sind grundlegend, radikal*'. Die Grünen 1986, Präamble, 3.
[208] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 4.
[209] '*Das bedeutet, daß sich Produktionsverfahren und Produkte in die Naturkreisläufe einfügen, ohne die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen der Menschen und der anderen Lebewesen zu beeinträchtigen. Langlebige Gebrauchsgüter treten an die Stelle von Wegwerf-Produkten. Wachstum als möglichst hoher Warenausstoß gilt nicht länger als wirtschaftliches Ziel; denn das herrschende Industriesystem zerstört seine natürlichen Grundlagen, je mehr es sich ausdehnt*.' Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 4.

the same economic model –underlined the importance of giving workers autonomy to make decisions on all kinds of issues encountered by corporations in the short run, while also advocating decentralisation of the corporate world into smaller units in the long run, promoting well-being to humans through autonomy and liberation from centralised power systems. Despite its earlier socialist connotations, the nationalisation of companies was openly criticised, with grassroots democratic control of production underlined instead.[210] In substance, therefore, it repeated the earlier goals of *Kreislaufswirtschaft* even though the defining concept itself had changed. Notably, the German Greens particularly identified nuclear power and automobile industries as forms of economy that needed to be changed.[211]

Opposing nuclear power (a capital-intensive form of energy) with the demands of decentralisation of the industries, the growth-critical movement is an interesting element of the German anti-nuclear campaign. Its goal was to enhance the possibilities for smaller citizens' energy production facilities to compete in the market, while disallowing the economic elites and big companies from dictating the terms for such activities. Opposing nuclear energy was thus associated with defending the grassroots democratic ideals of citizens' autonomy, as opposed to the interests of centralised economic life and of the elites.[212] As a result, nuclear power was considered a danger to democracy and citizens' liberties, as it would give rise to a monopoly controlled by large, centralised production facilities in energy production.[213] Silke Mende understood this issue as a debate on the relationship between the state and its citizens: for the Greens, the state represented a giant uncontrollable 'mega-machine' (*unkontrollierbare Megamaschine*) attempting to limit its citizens, with one such form of limitation being the nuclear-friendly centralised energy politics.[214] Moreover, Milder noted that the anti-nuclear protests of the 1970s already contained the element of the locals needing to have more autonomy in relation to the federal-level decision-making, which often left their needs unaccounted for.[215] Grassroots environmentalism thus signified a protest movement for more – or for different kind of – democracy for citizens.

Further understanding of how the *limits to growth* –discourse was associated with grassroots understanding of democracy can be found from the 1989 green radicals' 'paper of fundamentals' (*das Grundlagen-Papier)*, reported by *Die Tageszeitung.* In this paper, criticism of growth-based capitalism was associated with grassroots democracy and a refusal to cooperate with parliamentary institutions. In April 1989, the radical lefts of *Die Grünen,* led by Thomas Ebermann and Rainer Trampert, gathered together in Hamburg to formulate a statement on radical green ideals. The increasing debate inside the Greens concerning possible political cooperation with the SPD sparked the need

[210] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 2.
[211] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, 4.
[212] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 7.
[213] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 10.
[214] Mende 2012, 295.
[215] Milder 2017, 14.

for such a paper. (This debate is inspected more closely in Chapter 4.) The paper claimed that in order to create the kind of 'political utopias' that the Greens were seeking (*politische Utopien*), a 'break with capitalism and patriarchy' (*einen Bruch mit Kapitalismus und Patriarchat)* needed to be focused on politically. All attempts to modernise capitalism instead of breaking free from its constraints were bound to fail from the perspective of environmental well-being, but also from the perspective of women's rights. As the Greens' mission was the preservation of the counterculture and its ideals and structures (*Gegenkultur),* they now wanted to intervene against the state loyalty and the temptations of the 'state left' (*Staatslinken*), as this would undermine the radical greens' ideal of representing the structures of counter-culture. The party-political functions of parliamentary democracy were discussed in exclusively negative terms here, as the representative democratic system was associated with 'state loyalty', which in turn was associated with attainment of power. The (radical) Greens were implicitly assumed to represent a more authentic form of democracy, that of the grassroots-level counterculture.[216]

The *limits to growth* -discussion was thus associated with the reformulation of what democracy meant for the Greens. Associating the 'state' as a threat to democracy was part of a larger debate on security in Germany. The 1970s had already seen the emergence of fears of an 'atomic state', a police state that was not very different from the one already experienced under national socialism, where citizens' rights would be limited by a centralised state power and/or economic life, as pointed out by Matthias Jung.[217] Meanwhile, Paul Hockenos has noted how the ecological movement concurred with the anti-nuclear movement's assumption that the state had surpassed its limits with regard to its control and antiterrorist legislation in the 1970s. The discourse caught on partly due to the harsh ways the state had dealt with alternative social movements of the 1970s, when peaceful protesters were often associated with violent militant movements such as the RAF, and then dealt with accordingly, often with 'bloody results', thus creating implicit distrust of the state among environmental protestors. This distrust later became visible in the anti-state and anti-party attitude according to Hockenos.[218] This fear of the '*Atomstaat'* found its way to the 1980 Green Party programme, where it was associated with growth criticism: for the Greens, the *Atomstaat* was a consequence of trying to attain infinite growth in a finite world.[219] Miina Kaarkoski pointed out that similar premises would continue to be visible in the 1990s parliamentary debates, which preceded the decision to run down nuclear power.[220] It is therefore evident that such a form of argumentation bears a long-drawn history among the Greens.

---

[216] *TAZ* 1990. 'Gegen die rot-grüne Modernisierung des Kapitalismus.' *TAZ* 23 January 1990.
[217] Jung 1995, 644.
[218] Hockenos 2008, 144–145, 147–148.
[219] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 4.
[220] Kaarkoski 2016, 148, 154, 173–176.

In this discourse, the Greens often seem to have used the term 'machine' or 'apparatus' as metaphors representing the threat of both a centralised economy, which would overcome citizens' autonomy, and a pseudo-democratic state machine, which hid its fascist face behind the façade of parliamentary representation – one that might have provided citizens with the right to vote, but nevertheless stripped them of their right to determine their own lives in their own living environments. In the Greens' 1986 programme, the government 'apparatus' (a term that Petra Kelly had used earlier, as seen above) was associated with a machine-like expert bureaucracy that cared little for the well-being of its subjects or nature. The Greens further claimed that even the parliaments 'only act as approval bodies for the decisions of the overpowering expert and government apparatus', giving the 'society as a machine' –metaphor a very negative connotation.[221] The medicine of the machinery (*Apparatemedizin)* was profit-based aftercare instead of prevention of diseases, in response to which the use of alternative forms of medicine should be enhanced, the Greens thought.[222] The symbol of the 'machine' (*Maschine)* was also used as a constant reminder of the negative direction in which the society was headed, thus lending the term a metaphor-like status: large machines were destroying closer-to-nature –forms of forestry, while agricultural machines were killing soil micro-organisms. Furthermore, machines were taking over low-skilled jobs particularly from women, and the development of machine card readers was placed in the same category as nuclear power, described as counterproductive technologies eating up research funds from more useful research.[223] The machine was everywhere in the parliamentary system, and it was malicious.

In Green parliament group discussions, the fear of this state power was sometimes explicitly connected to the country's national socialist past. The representative parliamentarism of the 1980s was sometimes seen as a continuation of the same overuse of state power. In a 1985 Green parliament group discussion, the attitude of the seemingly-democratic state machinery had the same value basis of dominance (*Herrschaft)* that, in its extreme form, had led to the creation of Auschwitz a few decades earlier, Hans Verhayen claimed. Furthermore, this state dominance existed not only in attitudes but in structures as well: Walter Sauermilch continued on this line of thought by pointing out that the institutions of the Federal Republic were primarily created by people who had been national socialists.[224] In 1988, while planning for statements for the Federal Republic's 40th anniversary, the Green parliament group called attention to how a 'denazification' (*Entnazifisierung*) had never taken place in the Republic. The Greens particularly perceived continuities in fields of medicine, economy and jurisdiction.[225] The Nazi era in general and Auschwitz in particular were deployed as symbols of the continuity of the domination

[221] '*Parlamente fungieren nur noch als Absegnungsinstanzen für die Entscheidungen des übermächtigen Experten- und Regierungsapparates'*. Die Grünen 1986, II, 9.
[222] Die Grünen 1986, II, 3.
[223] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel; I, 3–4; II, 6, 9; III, 4.
[224] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 29–30 January 1985: Klausursitzung der Fraktion.
[225] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990. 2–3 September 1988: Fraktionsklausur.

mindset tracing from the national socialist era to the 1980s West German Federal Republic. This partially helps explain the Greens' reluctance of cooperating with the detested 'machinery' of the parliamentary state, as well as the fear of an *Atomstaat* as a key argument against nuclear power. While the same reluctance of accepting state control was visible in some Finnish discussions, as will be seen in the following section, they were notably less emphasised than in the German Green discussion.

Metaphors, such as that of society 'as a machine', might have originated from the *limits to growth* –discussion, but the discourse was applied to the German context of the *Atomstaat*-discussion, and partially served as means for the German Greens to make amends with the country's national socialist past. Sometimes, the fear of state control, on the one hand, and environmental responsibilities, on the other, would create contradictionary political goals. In Green parliament group meeting minutes, this contradiction became visible in September 1984, when members of the Green parliament group started arguing against the party line of banning all animal testing. While all sides participating in the debate supported idea that all animal testing should stop at least in principle, the 'ban' proposed by the Green Party nevertheless raised controversy over what role the state should have in controlling people's behavior. Such a ban would, after all, mean further state monitoring and control over its citizens. Some green parliamentarians even claimed that they would not want to live in a country where the state would hold that kind of power.[226]

The fear of *Atomstaat* seemed to fit quite well with the fears expressed by the larger transnational environmental discussion that underlined the gloom-and-doom visions of an ecological collapse resulting from the growth-based centralised control system. Modern Western growth-based society as *a machinery* was a metaphor already presented by the aforementioned growth-critical thinker Ivan Illich in the early 1970s. Illich himself had escaped his native Austria in fear of nazi persecution as a young boy and had become situated in France by the early 1970s, being part of the French *décroissance*-discussion that soon found foothold in Germany. Illich's *society as a machine* -metaphor[227] became a notable metaphor in both Finnish and German Green Parties. Illich had also already criticised the Western logic of growth for making people so dependent on a centralised economy that they had lost their sense of autonomy 'to the systemic and technical forces of the development machine'.[228] His criticism thus maintained the notion that autonomy or self-sufficiency, a key component of human well-being, was lost. This idea was visibly present in the German green discussion either in the formulation of decentralisation or the concept of *Selbstbestimmung.* The demand to reorganise economic structures based on growth had thus become associated with the explicit demand for

[226] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 5–6 September 1984: Klausursitzung der Fraktion, zweiter und dritter Tag.
[227] It needs to be noted here that the term *megamachine* was also more than a metaphor for Illich: it also meant the literal mechanisation of the society that undermined autonomy for humans. Illich 1973.
[228] Muraca & Schmeltzer 2018, 176–180; see also Illich 1973.

questioning this larger socio-cultural paradigm – in other words society's understanding of itself and its relationship with nature.

Moreover, ideas drawn from these conceptualisations were not restricted to metaphors of pejorative machinery. In fact, the 1970s environmentalist growth-critical conceptual cluster included many other concepts that the German Greens would use in the 1980s. In tracing the history of the German concept of *Postwachstum* (*post-growth*, conceptually close to the Greens' *Wachstumsgrenzen),* Schmeltzer & Vetter have pointed out how *Selbtsbestimmung* had been conceptually linked to the ideals of degrowth as a form of cultural critique in an attempt to redefine human well-being in terms of a more localised autonomy, emphasising that human well-being ought to be built not merely around the passive reception of material goods, as the free market system of growth would have one believe, but rather around the goal of autonomy in one's immediate living environment. Moreover, this localised autonomy was to be established as an integral part of an ecological circular economy titled *Kreislaufswirtschaft* in the German degrowth discussion,[229] which once again points at the decentralisation of ownership, especially with regard to renewable energy production – an area where new sources of energy would also create new possibilities for autonomous localised energy production (instead of using, say, nuclear power). This in turn would lead to a localisation and further democratisation of the economy.[230]

Both the abovementioned concepts and the meanings attributed to them may have been adopted directly from German Green Party programmes. *Kreislaufwirtschaft* was a key concept for the Greens in 1980, while *Selbstbestimmung* was the basis of their growth criticism in 1986, as already noted.[231] Therefore, both conceptually and substantially, it seems that the German Greens actively participated in the growth-critical thread of radical environmentalist discourse since the concepts of *Selbstbestimmung* and *Kreislaufwirtschaft* – self-sufficiency and circulation economy – were derived from earlier radical and growth-critical discourses of the 1970s. Both concepts were characterised by the notion of a technical need to reduce emissions for the purpose of sustaining ecological well-being and the requirement for a broader cultural critique and reconceptualisation of what it meant to be a human in a healthy relationship with nature – factors that are closely associated with the *limits to growth* discourse. Achieving this end would include redefining both democracy and well-being as factors that require autonomy and active grassroots participation, both economically and politically, instead of being measured by the passive reception of (and dependence on) material goods offered by the free market system or participation in representative democratic processes supporting and legitimising such a system. After all, the dependence

[229] The term 'degrowth' is used analytically in this context. Empirically, the French term *décroissance* was translated into *Postwachstum,* as mentioned before. However, the English term *degrowth,* which is often used in Germany nowadays, has a newer origin and was not used by the actors of the 1980s.
[230] Schmeltzer & Vetter 2019, 19–20, 25–26.
[231] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel, Kurzer Überblick.

on state, along with ecological destruction and economic inequality, was considered one of the failures of the current system from the mid-1970s onwards according to Paul Hockenos. The issue of liberating citizens from the control of the state became a part of the Green Party agenda in the 1980s through the use of these concepts.[232]

In the 1970s, many actors, who would go on to become prominent Green Party members in the future, had participated in a discussion that questioned the entire 'socio-cultural paradigm' prioritising growth. Many German Greens, among whom Rudolf Bahro eventually became the most notable, had actively engaged in conceptualising this tradition in its early stages in the 1970s and were personally bringing these ideas to Germany through transnational connections with France.[233] Bahro, who was categorised as belonging to the '*wahre Ökologen*' faction of the Greens (*true ecologists)* by *Der Spiegel* in 1982, had also actively participated in the formation of the Green Party. He became one of the most vocal spokespersons of the 'fundamental opposition' (*fundamentalopposition*) stand that Petra Kelly promoted in the early 1980s as the Greens' political strategy. This stand was integrated into his personal political agenda of creating a party that was 'decoupled from world markets' (*vom Weltmarkt abkoppeln*), thus separating the Greens from the social democractic SPD party according to *Der Spiegel*.[234] Bahro's defence of his radical positions, although considered too radical by many of the more moderate Greens, resonated with the green conference participants, who elected him as the assessor of the party board (*Beisitzer in den Vorstand*) in that same meeting. Therefore, although not all Greens shared his views, even the radical positions on *limits to growth* thus seemed to have had great influence on the party during its early stages.[235]

As a sidenote, it is worth mentioning how the upcoming strife between the moderate reformists and the radicals was also already present in the aforementioned Bahro's comments, as a rising tension between the fundamental-oppositionist position and reformist cooperation was already emerging in 1982. Bahro followed in footsteps of Petra Kelly as he was afraid of a 'doglike' rapproachment towards the SPD (*hündischer SPD-Bezug)* in search for political influence that would destroy the very reason for the party's existence. There was a moderate minority in the party that would have wanted more cooperation with the SPD, an issue that is returned to in Chapter 4.[236]

For the majority of the party, though, the Social Democrats served as a constant reminder how not to do things, as they formulated their views on how to deal with parliamentarism and the state machinery. When the Green parliament group discussed their 'rotation principle' (i.e. the rule according to which MP positions must rotate every two years) in 1984, it was precisely the fate of the SPD that served as the primary argument in support of maintaining

[232] Hockenos 2008, 147–148.
[233] On Bahro's role in the 1970s discussion, see Muraca & Schmelzer 2018, 176–180.
[234] *Der Spiegel* 1982. 'In die Arme.' 47/1982.
[235] *Der Spiegel* 1982. 'In die Arme.' 47/1982.
[236] *Der Spiegel* 1982. 'In die Arme.' 47/1982.

such organisational practices, as inconvenient as they might be for parliamentary work. For the Greens, the SPD had 'institutionalised' and turned into a 'Superparty' (*Superpartei*), a completely institutionalised party of professionals whose goal was primarily to stay in power. The Greens needed to keep carefully in mind what the relationship between the party and the new social movements was, because 'the historical model of SPD – workers' movement has failed'.[237] It was thus precisely in order to maintain its position as the grassroots' movements parliamentary arm and in order to uphold the ideals of the grassroots' movements – meaning cultural growth criticism, a new conception of humans' relationship with nature, and a more participatory conception of democracy – why the Greens needed to refrain from adopting standard political practices. As the SPD had done just that, they had consequently become part of that machinery.

Like many other aspects green thinking, their growth-critical goals were closely intertwined in an attempt to establish a more holistic approach towards dealing with politics. In this context, it is particularly important to pay attention to the relationship between the technical need to decrease emissions and growth and the broader cultural criticism, since earlier research on the history of the degrowth movement sometimes assumed these two sides of growth-critical thinking to be separate and exclusive. This has particularly been the trend of analysis in recent studies on degrowth-thinking, one originating from the 1970s and 1980s *limits to growth* –discussion but with a presumably more cultural than technical emphasis in the later (post-2000) decades. Presumably, the computer simulation conducted in the Club of Rome 1972 technical analysis imparted a veru technical ring to this discourse which was followed by the environmentalists and later the green parties until it was corrected by the emergence of the *degrowth*-movement of the 1990s.

Several notable works of scholarship on the history of degrowth thinking have followed this line of analysis, such as those by Fabrice Flibo, Demaria & al, and the aforementioned Timothée Parrique.[238] In their histories of degrowth, these scholars noted that the cultural aspects of growth criticism had not yet properly taken place in environmental parties, since green discourses consisted mainly of a technical analysis of the relationship between growth and resource sustainability. According to Fabrice Flipo, who re-ignited the academic discussion on degrowth with a 2008 conference paper, the Greens failed to offer a proper restructuring of the economic representations of the world, except for recommending a mere 'degrowth of the ecological footprint'.[239] Meanwhile, Demaria et al. claimed in an influential 2013 article that while the environmental movement discussed *limits to growth* as an economic contraction, it was only in the new millennium that a demand for 'disentangling' the culture 'from the social imaginary' of development and growth was observed, thus promoting a 'new imaginary' of human identity that is not tied to economic

[237] '*Das historische Vorbild SPD – Arbeiterbewegung ist gescheitert*'. Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 21 February 1984: Fraktionssitzung.
[238] Flibo 2008; Demaria & al. 2013; Parrique 2020.
[239] Flibo 2008.

representations. They also associate a more 'participatory' understanding of democracy with this new formulation of degrowth.[240] In 2020, Timothée Parrique published one of the most thorough studies on the history, theory and practices of degrowth. He discussed the development of the French *décroissance* and German *Postwachstum* concepts in the 1970s, covered the 1980s environmentalist and green political movement in half a sentence in his history of the degrowth-movement, categorising it as 'prehistory' that lacked the cultural criticism of the later degrowth-movement, repeating the arguments earlier presented by Flipo (while also referring to him).[241]

Others, such as Muraca & Schmeltzer, however, have been skeptical if these interpretations can be applied to the environmentalism of the Greens.[242] Overall, the case of the German Greens demonstrates that an assumption of their exclusion from the cultural critique of society can indeed be questioned: the Greens' relationship with nuclear power provides an interesting example of their 1980s growth criticism, which evolved from a technical analysis of nature's carrying capacity to becoming intertwined with the larger criticism of viewing representative democracy as a centralised form of control, characterised by a centralised free-market economy, and a lack of interconnectedness. This also helps better understand the symbolic nature of nuclear power in the German discussion. As will be demonstrated in Section 3.2., most of these arguments also apply to Finnish green growth-critical thinking, although with less emphasis on nuclear power.

A final notion regarding the connection between German green feminism and the *limits to growth* –discourse must also be considered in this discussion. Although the ideals of eco-feminism are more thoroughly discussed in Section 3.2., the ecofeminist movement needs to be mentioned here as part of the German growth-critical conceptual cluster from which ideas were taken. The connection between feminism and environmentalism originated from new social movements. As noted by Solveig Bergman, feminists in Germany had started cooperating with the peace-, nuclear- and ecological movements by the 1980s, making the Green Party a logical representative of the women's movement – although not all feminists supported the Greens.[243] Their participation in the Green Party led to the appearance of a large chunk of ecofeminist ideals in Green Party thinking, some of which were linked to the aforementioned growth criticism. Questioning a hierarchically built system of beliefs was first considered part of an ecofeminist ideology in France in the works of Françoise d'Eaubonne, who first coined the term *eco-feminism* in 1974. From France, these ideals spread to the United States and from there to the rest

[240] Demaria & al. 2013, 192, 195, 199.
[241] Parrique 2020, 171–179.
[242] Muraca & Schmelzer 2018, 176–180.
[243] Bergman 2002, 123–124. Feminist threads in the Green Party were not limited only to ecological questions, but also expanded to the peace movement, which was extended to address questions related to violence between the sexes, for example, according to Bergman.

of the world, including Germany, where young radical environmentalists, including one Petra Kelly, became interested in this line of thinking.[244]

Eco-feminists – d'Eaubonne in particular – were critical of the growth mentality that was a part of the Western masculine hierarchical values of competition and domination over nature. She believed that these mindsets needed to be replaced with a more feminine, compassionate attitude of companionship. Having affected people like Petra Kelly, these ecofeminist ideals became visible in the 1980 German Green Party programme, where a renewed human–nature relationship was formulated under the concept of *Partnerschaft,* or companionship, a concept directly derived from the eco-feminist discourse – which highlighted the necessity to become more aware of the interconnectedness (*Beziehungen,* sometimes *Zusammenhänge*) with nature.[245] The German Greens were thus openly feminist at a programmatic level (unlike their Finnish counterparts) to start with. For the German Greens, society needed to participate in fundamentally rejecting the power hierarchy created by hostile competition that guided it.[246] The route to get there was the ideal of a subsistence economy, a model uniting ecofeminist and *décroissance*-discourses. In 1986, the German Greens wrote about the need for a pay-compensated work hour reduction to enhance non-growth forms of the economy, such as housework and education. This was explicitly designed to increase equality between men and women. Since the work of housewives for example was not considered work in the current value and economic system, it had become subordinate to paid work, consequently leading women to become more dependent on men in a growth-based economy at a structural level.[247]

The goal of *limits to growth* or *Wachstumsgrenzen,* as it had been formulated in the German Green programme, was therefore amended to refer to a larger cultural critique of growth-based mentalities. The critique of hierarchical competition, conquest and mastery over nature – abundantly present in ecofeminist discourses – were used to support economic growth criticism, which also placed both the Finnish and the German Green Parties discursively very close to each other, as will be further discussed in Section 3.2.[248] Muraca & Schmelzer supported this interpretation, pointing out that the Greens' demand for strong legislative measures, such as 'ecologically and socially friendly development' to replace economic growth, must be understood precisely as part of this larger ecofeminist critique.[249] According to Muraca and Schmelzer, it was indeed the German ecofeminists of the 1970s who took the discussion of value hierarchies and associated it with another discussion that had originated in France in the 1970s: the *décroissance-* or degrowth-discourse, as it is known nowadays. German thinkers such as Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen 'demonstrated how powerfully the growth paradigm devalues

[244] Dryzek 2005, 186; Radkau 2011, 205–206.
[245] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 4–5.
[246] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 5.
[247] Die Grünen 1986, III.1, 2–3.
[248] Donovan 2013, 199–204.
[249] Muraca & Schmelzer 2018, 185–187.

(monetarily and in terms of human values) all non-market forms of work', especially 'the activities that are most essential to sustain life itself (those directly related to human needs, most importantly care work) at the centre of economics and society'. The ideals of a subsistence economy presented by the German Greens in their programme follow similar lines of thought. These ecofeminist ideals merged with the new critique of growth culture thus associating it with a sort of subsistence economy where 'care work' for the environment or human culture ought not to be overlooked, contrary to the ideals sustained by the more masculine value system.[250] For the German Greens, feminism also meant practical measures, such as forming an all-women parliamentary faction, the *Grünen Feminats,* which discussed abortion laws and violence in marriages, for example.[251] In their legislative work as well, the Greens participated in endeavors such as opposing 'Paragraph 218' – a law forbidding abortion.[252] In the same spirit, such parlamentarians as Waltraud Schoppe were explicitly demanding the position of a housewife to be a paid job.[253] Feminist ideals were thus notably visible in the radically aligned political discourses of the German Greens.

As is evident from their association with this discussion, the early German Greens were in fact more openly supportive of feminism than their Finnish counterparts, who never mentioned 'feminism' as part of their official party line formations until the new millennium. Despite these differences, there were striking similarities in the conceptualisations of the Finnish and the German Greens regarding their economic goals, growth criticism and even some eco-feminist ideals of replacing dominance and competition with cooperation and companionship, as will be discussed in the next section.

3.2 Re-evaluating the foundations of Western culture: early Finnish green radicalism

In the following two sections, I analyse the development of the radical era discourses of the Finnish Green Party, lasting roughly from 1983 to 1994. Similar to their German counterparts, the Finnish Greens started off as a political umbrella organisation representing social movements at the highest political level, drawing their ideas and concepts from radical grassroots environmental discussions and eco-philosophical discourses, while also attempting to reconceptualise some key 'Western' presuppositions to establish a more holistic and growth-critical perspective. Through key concepts such as *tasapainotalous (balance economy)* and *kumppanuusliike (companionship movement),* the Finnish Greens formulated political programmes that attempted to liberate nature from exploitation and the individual from hierarchical dependencies on

[250] Muraca & Schmelzer 2018, 185–187.
[251] Die Grünen 2019, 20–21.
[252] Hockenos 2008, 145.
[253] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 12 January 1987: Fraktionssitzung.

destructive political and economic power systems. While these systems had seemingly brought well-being and liberty to the individual through representative democracy and material consumption, they had in reality tied citizens down to a hierarchical mode of being, robbing them of a true connection with both other humans and the non-human world and turning them into mere tools for the market forces instead. *Greenness* thus became a political representation of the larger project of new social movements attempting to establish a new culture based on companionship with nature and the autonomous self-control of the individual.

While this project is conceptually similar to that of the German Greens in many ways, there are differences based on local contexts. The Finns, for example, avoided the formation of a party structure for a much longer time than their German counterparts, who had already done so in 1980. As for the Finns, although they had had parliamentary members since 1983, just as the German Greens did, the Green Alliance (*Vihreä liitto)* did not register as a party until 1988 with the purpose of maintaining their association with the grassroots movement.[254] Notably, the road to becoming a party was not without drama. In 1987, when the Greens formed the *Vihreä liitto (Green Alliance)* organisation to represent environmental and alternative movements at a political level as an umbrella organisation, radical ecologists walked out of the Finnish Greens due to their excessive emphasis on social greenness. Many of them, however, later returned to the organisation / party. It was not until 1988 that the Green Alliance published their first party programme as a short declaration of principles. A more thorough programme appeared only in 1990, seven years after the first green MPs were elected to parliament, presenting a radical set of goals based on an anti-modernity sentiment which the Greens had in practice already been following for years.

3.2.1 Liberating citizens through deeper interconnectedness with nature

The first programme in 1988 started with an almost apocalyptical description of the ecological and social problems that jeopardised the future of the Earth. Ecological crises, nuclear armament, poverty, deforestation and desertification were all noted as part of humanity's dramatic near future, caused by humanity having 'crowned itself the master of nature' (*kruunannut itsensä luonnon herraksi)*. In other words, these problems would ultimately be caused by a failed relationship with nature. The Green Alliance offered its own solution to these problems in the form of correcting the relationship with nature through deeper *interaction* (*vuorovaikutus)* with natural systems: 'we want to find starting points for the balanced interaction of humans, societies, and the whole natural system', they claimed. [255] Furthermore, this *vuorovaikutus* was frequently used as a concept describing a new sense of interconnectedness between humans and

[254] Välimäki 1991, 33. In *Green ABC–Book;* Sohlstén 2007, 41–47, 53–55.
[255] '*Tahdomme löytää lähtökohtia ihmisten, yhteiskuntien ja koko luonnonjärjestelmän tasapainoiselle vuorovaikutukselle'* Vihreä liitto 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma.

nature in the future as, closely resembling the German vocabulary of *beziehungen* and *zusammenhänge,* referring to a more holistic relationship with nature.[256]

Once again, these phrasings closely resemble what Dryzek has called 'survivalist' modes of radical environmental discourses emanating from the discussions of the 1970s. The theme of interconnectedness contained a critique of Western modernity, with growth-based economy and consumerism-based identity perceived as obstacles to reaching a new formulation of human–nature relationships. In particular, in the first two Finnish Green programmes, the Greens claimed that creating a culture that emphasised deeper interconnectedness with nature would also mean restructuring the entire economic and social life. Therefore, 'the foundations of Western culture' – and with them, the habits and structures of 'our economy, our society and our civilised life that we have grown accustomed to' – would have to be 'fundamentally re-evaluated'.[257] The Greens were critical of the ideal of 'mastery' of nature (*herruusajattelu*) that had guided and governed the Western way of life. Since the dawn of industrialisation, it has become 'self-evident that the mission of science and technology was to help humans become masters of nature'. However, while controlling nature was expected to lead humans to paradise, it was instead leading to environmental destruction – along with all sorts of human misery – and therefore must be replaced with the 'peaceful co-existence and interaction of man and nature'.[258] In practice, this change was to be implemented through strict emission control and limitations to advertisements, similar to what the German Greens had planned. The Finnish Greens also supported high adverse taxes on traffic, so that either consumers would stop consuming or manufacturers would feel compelled to develop fewer polluting ways of production.[259]

This alternative meant recognising the interdependence between humans and nature, which would consequently reorganise Western economic life. In Finland, this economic reorganisation named a *balance economy* (*tasapainotalous*), as opposed to the growth economy propounded by the capitalist and socialist systems.[260] They claimed that in an ecologically balanced economy, markets should function freely only within the limits of ecological boundaries. In practice, this meant ecological farming, closed flow of resources (in the sense that 'no waste would be allowed back into nature'), energy price control,

---

[256] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Esipuhe; Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 7.

[257] *'Jotta muutos kävisi ajoissa mahdolliseksi, länsimaisen kulttuurin perusteet - ja niiden myötä taloutemme, yhteiskuntamme ja sivistyselämämme totutut toimintatavat ja rakenteet - on arvioitava perinpohjaisesti uudelleen.'* [Underlining present in the source.] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

[258] *'Alettiin pitää itsestään selvänä, että tieteen ja tekniikan tehtävä on auttaa ihmistä pääsemään luonnon herraksi. Edistys samastettiin luonnon hallitsemiseen, jonka avulla ihmiskunnan uskottiin pääsevän uuteen paratiisiin. ... Me haluamme asettaa tieteelle ja tekniikalle saman päämäärän kuin elämällekin. ihmisen ja luonnon rauhanomaisen rinnakkainelon ja vuorovaikutuksen.'* Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

[259] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1, 3.

[260] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Esipuhe, 1, 2.

emission norms and strict regulation of advertising, among other things. Finally, the demand for ecological sustainability meant setting boundaries for individual ownership. When in conflict, protection of nature needed to be placed above the protection of individual property.[261] Thus, the Greens reconceptualised the relationship between humans and nature to an extent that environmental responsibilities ought to restrict some core economic liberties.[262]

Though the Finnish Greens' first programme came relatively late, the discourses discussed above were visible even in their pre-party years, as well as in, for example, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. The magazine summed up the key philosophical principles that seemed to thematically unify the different approaches to greenness. Already in 1984, a human being was perceived to be an active, autonomous, self-reflective being with, first and foremost, creative and self-actualising qualities, as opposed to being passive, self-centered consumers, as in the current political and economic systems. The substance of human well-being thus included working for something greater than oneself, since everyone's happiness was perceived to be interconnected with one another – another demonstration of the theme of holistic *interconnectedness*, which was at the centre of green thinking throughout the 1980s. Furthermore, nature had the right to existence in itself and it ought not be measured through its utility for human societies, the magazine described the new greener value system that was being established.[263]

This theme seemed to have been agreed upon as the standpoint for all different forms of *greenness*. This is not to say that there were no differing opinions regarding how these themes should be dealt with. Although the so-called reformist or market-friendlier moderate positions were rarely mentioned at this stage of green development,[264] but even with the lack of what would soon become the most vocal inner opposition to green radicalism (see Chapter 4), there were differences in emphasis among the radical ecologists and radical social greens. In fact, they engaged in long debates on the question of how well-being should be defined in a potential party programme in the pages of the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, as demands for a new understanding of what well-being means – what it even means to be 'human' in relationship with the rest of the living world – kept popping up throughout the 1980s.

One such debate took place in the fall of 1984, when Mika Mannermaa, an active green member and writer throughout the 1980s, wrote that our (materialistic) misconception of well-being affects the political understanding of work as the sole creator of well-being. 'It is not rare that humans are doing jobs which in no way increase well-being', he claimed.[265] When well-being is measured in terms of GNP and is guided by an 'economic rationality, which

---

[261] *'Ristiriitatilanteissa luonnonsuoja astuu omaisuudensuojan edelle'*. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2–5.
[262] The Green ideal of citizenship has often emphasised responsibilities over economic rights. See Woods 2010 for analysis of this discussion.
[263] *VL* 1984. 'Arvot muuttuvat.' *VL* 11/1984.
[264] On some rare occasions Osmo Soininvaara or Pekka Sauri might bring market-friendlier stands for in the name of pragmatism.
[265] *'Ei ole harvinaista, että ihmiset tekevät työtä, joka ei millään tavoin lisää hyvinvointia'*

typically attempts to maximise efficiency in material production', people's well-being actually suffers.[266] Questions were raised regarding whether the conceptual boundaries between the 'wanted' (working) and the 'unwanted' people (unemployed) would diminish if this rationale of well-being would be replaced with a 'social rationale' that considers equality, self-fulfilment and ecological living as its qualities. Mannermaa believed that this would significantly improve the actual well-being of humans.[267] Jukka Sommerharju added to this conversation by pointing out how the Greens were divided about whether it was worthwhile to ponder questions about humans' perception of nature (and other philosophical issues) or whether it would be better just to concentrate on direct action. Furthermore, Sommerharju found it interesting to ponder 'the understanding of human nature, on which the demand for constant economic growth is based on'. This growth was called 'the totem pole, around which everyone is jumping around' (*toteemipaaluksi, jonka ympärillä kaikki hilluvat).*[268]

This worry for human well-being was too anthropocentric for some greens, despite the general consensus regarding the problems of growth- and market-based systems. Harry Frilund, for example, responded to these discussions by asking that if it was indeed a question of *human* protection and *human* well-being, why then should the environment and nature be protected. He enquired if the Greens did not perceive humans to be a part of nature rather than separate from it; the interconnectedness was thus part of human–nature relationships as well. However, this debate based on ideological premises soon took a banal turn, when it resulted in an argument on whether sausages should be available in the Greens' conferences if humans were indeed deeply interconnected with animals as well. Offering the last comment on this long-lasting debate, Osmo Soininvaara, who would later become one of the most notable reformists in the otherwise radical green movement, responded by pointing out that the Greens were such an open-minded organisation that they tolerated even sausage eaters, although there were so few of them that sausages usually had to be sold half-price in green conferences anyway.[269]

As can be understood from the party programmes and the Green Party newspaper discussions, the need to conceptualise human life through *interconnections* was agreed upon by virtually all of the Greens at the time. However, this theme contained the challenge of deciding whether it should be related to a biocentric understanding of interconnectedness – of how all human life was built on the well-being of broader ecosystems – or if this reconceptualisation was to be understood more sociocentrically, referring to both human societies and to human–nature relationships. Nevertheless, ecological understanding of interconnections with natural systems was the basis of redefining well-being for all participants in the discussion.

---

[266] *'Taloudellinen rationaalisuus, jolle on tyypillistä pyrkimys maksimoida tehokkuutta aineellisessa tuotannossa'*
[267] Mannermaa, Mika 1984. 'Hyvinvoinnin ja työn käsitteet uusiksi.' *VL* 8/1984.
[268] Mannermaa, Mika 1984. 'Hyvinvoinnin ja työn käsitteet uusiksi.' *VL* 8/1984.
[269] Soininvaara 1984. 'Vihreät ja elämänsuojelu.' *VL* 9/1984.

The debate was thus on the extent to where and to whom well-being was extended.[270] This tension between the ecological and social approaches to environmentalism was not new to the history of the environmental movement. John Dryzek claimed that radical eco-social discursive traditions have considered both social inequality and exploitation of nature as parts of the same problem of mastery over nature, where the ideals of competition, conquest and exploitation are emphasised in society's relationship both with human and with natural resources. Considering that both humans and ecological systems have suffered from such exploitation, a systemic understanding of interconnectedness was required to grapple this widespread problem embedded in our culture, values and presuppositions. As opposed to this, the most radical deep ecologists considered anthropocentrism altogether to be the root cause for ecological problems – for them, widening the environmental discussion to include such social problems as human inequalities was, in fact, one of the problems of anthropocentrism that intruded even into environmental ideals.[271]

Dryzek's division of radical greenness successfully demonstrates how even the comparatively loose conceptual cluster of radical environmentalism, with its loosely connected conceptualisations of cultural criticism and demands for renewing the understanding of well-being, also contained different approaches and emphases. This division also seems to be well-suited to help comprehend the debate among the various divisions of thought within the Finnish Greens. These debates took place mainly between 1984 and 1987 and peaked in the pages of *Vihreä Lanka* in 1986, when these differences were recognised in the debate on the formulation of a potential political programme. Themes such as the disappearance of 500,000 species and other eco-catastrophes were placed at the top of the green priority list by the 1986 'pre-programme' draft writers, who largely belonged to the ecologist camp of the Greens. Although these catastrophes indicate all sorts of human misery (such as threats to clean drinking water and food production) as the basis for human well-being was being destroyed, nature was still to be protected for its own sake and not merely as a reserve meant for humans, as proposed by ecological-minded Greens, such as Eero Paloheimo, Erkki Pulliainen and Mika Mannermaa, in their pre-programme draft.[272] However, this programme draft never materialised in its original form, and when the more official party programmes of 1988 and 1990 were finally released, these ideals were merged with social themes. Nevertheless, the programme draft debate demonstrated the green understanding of well-being as based on an ecological foundation – an idea repeated when discussing the theme interconnectedness in the final programmes as well.

---

[270] Some scholars have noted, though, that even the more anthropocentric argumentation of the radical environmentalists contained notably ecocentric premises, which seems to be the case here too. See, e.g., Martell 1994 for more.
[271] Dryzek (2005) 2013, 189.
[272] *VL* 1986. 'Esiohjelman alustava luonnos'. 1/1986.

This debate, in general, was closely connected to the pre-party era discussion on how the Greens should become organised (as a party like in Germany or as a loose umbrella organisation) and what kind of a political programme, if any, there ought to be. Generally speaking, the Social greens often argued in favor of the perspective of radically reshaping society in the direction of a participatory democracy, which would also nullify the need for overconsumption. Meanwhile, the radical ecologists' camp underlined the dangers posed to human well-being by ecological destruction regardless of the way social relations were negotiated, thus making social issues completely trivial unless the ecological threat was addressed first.

However, most greens agreed that these divisions were not necessarily exclusive from one another. Pekka Sauri, as a self-appointed 'real politician' who would later become one of the leading reformists and party chair, was already at that time worried about marketing the green manifesto to voters. Sauri analysed this debate as one between 'builders of a civil society' (*kansalaisyhteiskunan rakentajat)* and 'counterers of an eco-catastrophe' (*ekokatastrofin torjujat)* – a division that other greens soon started citing as well. For Sauri, this division entailed a difference between a 'social' and a 'biological' way of understanding the world (*'"sosiaalinen" ja "biologinen" maailmanjäsennys'*), both of which saw the other as inadequate.[273] Sauri wanted to include social and even 'utopian' themes in the discussion, so that the Greens could perhaps portray a more positive image (*'imitsi')* to voters than the more dystopian images of an upcoming ecological catastrophe.[274]

For future Green Party chair Heidi Hautala, who joined in on the discussion, all ideological statements needed to nevertheless be made within a framework that allowed Greens to represent different forms of alternative lifestyles, different shades of *greenness*. Therefore, radicalism was more present in the 'heterarchic' acceptance of different views rather than in the 'hierarchic' written-down ideologies. In other words, creating an alternative form of everyday living (which the green organization had to represent) was considered more important than the correct 'dogma' (*oppi*). This pluralism of ideas in itself represented a new more open-minded culture for her.[275] Even Eero Paloheimo, one of the leaders of the radical ecological wing and a soon-to-be green MP who wanted to underline the priority of ecosystems' well-being over social issues, admitted that there was room for social concern. However, he pointed out that just like a small ping-pong ball might visibly seem as big as the sun because it is much closer to the viewer, similarly, building a civil society might seem as big a project as countering an ecological catastrophe because it is closer to view, even though the ecocatastrophe issue is far more significant in reality. He did, however, agree that these goals were not necessarily exclusive to one another and that both could be accomplished together.[276]

---

[273] '*Edellisille näyttää olevan tyypillistä biologinen, jälkimmäisille taas yhteiskunnallinen maailmanjäsennys.'* Sauri, Pekka 1986. 'Manifestin jäljillä.' *VL* 1/1986.
[274] Sauri, Pekka 1986. 'Manifestin jäljillä.' *VL* 1/1986.
[275] Hautala, Heidi 1986. 'Esiohjelman alustava luonnos.' *VL* 1/1986.
[276] Paloheimo, Eero 1986. 'Paloheimo Soininvaaralle.' *VL* 4/1986.

Nevertheless, political scientist Rauli Mickelsson claimed that one of the reasons for the departure of the radical deep ecologists from the Green Alliance in 1987 was due to the social green emphasis of them being 'builders of the civic society' (*kansalaisyhteiskunnan rakentajat)*, a term originally coined by Pekka Sauri. Political historian Sari Aalto concurred that there were two separate radical fractions in Finland, something that holds true for the German Greens as well in their early years.[277] In the two programmes that were finally published at the turn of the decade, the Finnish Greens would include the advancement of alternative grassroots culture, local ('mid-level') economy and grassroots democracy in this equation with the aim of supporting society's liberation from the growth economy and its hierarchical mindset, which was destroying both environmental and human well-being. This sociocentric emphasis indicates that the social green standpoints, although tied together with ecological concerns, had become more visible in their final programmes. When writing the programmes, the scale seems to have tilted towards social green radicalism from the ecologism of the first programme drafts.

This shift can be partly explained by the radical ecologists leaving the party in 1987, although many (the aforementioned Eero Paloheimo included) would later come back. Although such a social green emphasis is not explicitly underlined in the programmes, it is clearly present in the perception of human–nature relationships through the discourse of *interconnectedness* that permeated both the social and ecological spheres, uniting them under the umbrella concept of a *balance economy* that aimed to ensure well-being for both humans and the ecosystem alike.

Similarities with the German Greens were notable in this aspect. For the German Greens, the problems of economic production, for example, were also societal problems concerning the quality of human life and environmental well-being. The real reasons for environmental degradation were thus embedded in the same problems that also caused human inequality and misery.[278] Since the German Greens encountered the outwalk of conservative ecologists from their party as early as 1982, discussions among the different forms of radical greenness after the Green Party entered the parliament seem to have been more highlighted among Finnish Greens. In addition, the fact that many of the radical and even conservative ecologists also came back to the Finnish Greens gave the Finnish green discussion different kinds of shades, as natural protection issues would continue to be emphasised. This was particularly obvious in the party newspaper *Vihreä Lanka,* which emphasised natural protection themes until the early 1990s. In Finland, natural protection issues also had symbolic value, with the Koijärvi lake protection campaign in 1979 still remembered as the founding narrative of the Greens, just as anti-nuclear protests served as a similar founding narrative for the German Greens.[279]

[277] Mickelsson 2007, 256, 284; Aalto 2018, 294.
[278] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 6.
[279] As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. See also Välimäki 1991. *Vihreä ABC-kirja.*

Both the German and Finnish Greens were critical of a liberalism-oriented approach to economic rights of production, consumption and free use of natural resources. Instead, their understanding of citizenship was similar to the idea of citizenship contained in the tradition of participatory democracy, which understood citizenship not only through responsibilities rising from the sense of interconnectedness on the one hand, but also in terms of possibilities for more local autonomy and communal action on the other. As human well-being was based on the ecological boundaries of life, 'protection of nature' (*luonnonsuoja*) needed to be prioritised over 'protection of property' (*omaisuudensuoja*).[280] This formulation of citizens' rights was considered more liberating for the individual than the more traditional rights revolving around economic rights, separatedness and mastery over nature.[281]

The Greens' critique of Western ideals was linked to a different conception of what citizens' rights – or being a citizen in a participatory democracy in a first place – meant. It would be easy to frame this discussion in terms of surrendering liberties in favor of ecological responsibilities and restrictions. In fact, some scholars have done precisely that: in her book *Human rights and environmental sustainability,* Kerri Woods noted how some thinkers (such as William Ophuls, for example) have questioned if the green ideal of citizenship, based on communal sense of responsibility, could ever be adaptable with liberty-based conception of citizenship.[282] For the Greens, however, this a discussion was not framed in these terms, but in terms of increased citizens' liberties – indicating to an increased sense of autonomy that, in fact, liberated the citizens from capitalist and socialist systems of dependence. The Greens' conception of participatory democracy could be understood in terms of liberating the citizen from the control of centralised power systems. It was initially drawn from a different understanding of well-being: while the citizen might receive material benefits by becoming subjugated to the control of market forces, it would, nevertheless, diminish one's autonomy and create a sense of separation and dependence. In the Greens' 1990 party programme, the 'self-governance of everyday life' (*arkielämän itsehallinta*) emancipated the citizen from the control of the political and economic 'centralised power systems' (*keskitetyt valtajärjestelmät)* and replaced these dependencies with direct possibilities to affect one's own life and living environment more, regardless of background or ethnicity.[283] Despite restrictions that sometimes surpassed individual economic liberties, the focus of green citizenship was on liberty.

Occasionally, the green concept of citizenship could also be understood as a statement against an even older, ethnocentric understanding of citizenship. It needs to be noted here that while the scholarly literature has often reflected green citizenship against the Anglo-American ideal of citizenship as political

[280] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3.
[281] Woods 2010 analyses the contradictions between these different conceptions of democracy and citizenship.
[282] Woods 2010, 98–99, 128–130; Newell & al. 2015, 537–538; see also Heater 1999.
[283] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3, 4.

and economic freedom between autonomic individuals,[284] the Finnish and German conceptualisations of citizenship have historically included other layers of meaning as well, such as the more conservative ideal of citizenship based on ethnicity, or belonging to a people.[285] Citizens' movements overcame national boundaries, the Greens pointed out, while focusing on the 'short-sighed interests of the nation state' (*kansallisvaltioiden lyhytnäköiset edut)* was detrimental to them.[286] The German Greens went further than this, explicitly demanding a citizen's status to foreign workers already in 1980, calling foreigners 'co-citizens' (*Mitbürger)*.[287] The green citizenship was based on very transnational grounds.

Differing conceptualisations of democracy also meant varying understandings of citizenship and liberty. In both their radical-era programmes, the Finnish Greens particularly and explicitly condemned the idea of looking at people as consumers instead of active citizens. Under the current system, 'citizens have become governed subjects', and, consequentially, consumer responsibilities (presumably towards 'multinational corporations' that were hoarding power) had replaced human rights as society's political emphasis. Intriguingly, in the Greens' conception of liberty, freedom of consumption was perceived not as a right but as a responsibility, enforced by the markets' demand for infinite growth.[288]

This argument against consumerism and particularly consumer-citizenship has been repeated elsewhere as well. The first two 1983–87 Green MPs Kalle Könkkölä and particularly Ville Komsi – known best as the instigator of the 1979 Koijärvi movement – were prolific in questioning the prevailing beliefs within this system in the early-to-mid 1980s. In the parliament, they openly criticised consumer culture generally and the idea of consumer-citizenship particularly, and, in an interview with Yleisradio (Yle is the Finnish state-led National Broadcasting Company), Komsi questioned the individualism that was at the core of environmental problems, provocatively claiming that even the poor would attempt to solve their problems 'by individually winning the lottery'.[289]

By undertaking such an approach, the Finnish Greens were also participating in the German ideal of establishing more participatory grassroots democracy, although they were not quite as vocal in their criticism of the parliamentary representative democracy despite offering their decentralised alternative. Kalle Könkkölä, one of the first two green MPs, wrote in 1983 that

---

[284] E.g. Woods 2010; Heater 1999.
[285] Murray 1994 has addresses the difference to liberal rights-based conceptualisations of citizenship with that of a more conservative, ethnocentric citizenship that was visible in the German discussion until the 1980s. Such a view of ethnic citizenship has also been visible in the Finnish history of *kansalaisuus,* as pointed out by Henrik Stenius 2003.
[286] Vihreä liitto 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma; Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[287] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 38.
[288] *'Kansalaisista on tullut hallintoalamaisia'.* Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2–4.
[289] Aalto 2018, 225, 227; *Junamatkalla pehmeämpään Suomeen* 1980.

'the entire parliamentary work can only represent a small fraction of the activity of the green movement. It is vitally important, that grassroots activity develops and expands, as that is the route through which real changes appear'.[290] The Greens also demanded a 'self-sufficient mid-level economy' (*omaehtoinen välitalous*) that would offer more autonomy to citizens, while the self-governance of everyday life included the idea of the desentralisation of both political and economic power, although the issue did not quite gain the same emphasis as with the German Greens.[291] Therefore, whenever centralisation was discussed (five times in the 1990 programme), it was always done in a critical manner, referring either to the state planning of the Eastern socialist states, the economic centralisation of money and power in private corporations of the Western capitalist world, or the social-democratic centralised decision-making and 'corporatist group selfishness' (*korporatistinen ryhmäitsekkyys).* All these centralised 'power systems' needed to be replaced with a decentralised (*hajautettu)* decision-making and a strong civil society (*kansalaisyhteiskunta)*, which would replace market forces as the guiding principle of society.[292]

The discussion on the Greens' relationship with the Western centralised 'power systems' also transpired outside the party programmes. These power systems were an imminent threat to citizens and their liberties, with centralised forms of control making people more passive and severing their sense of interconnectedness with other humans and the natural world. The Greens' use of the terms 'the system' or 'power systems' could refer to the political decision-making apparatus or to a wider understanding of Western socio-cultural and economic systems that either way limited individual autonomy and 'devalued' the individual citizen into a mere 'consumer'.[293] Either way, this 'system' was not to be trusted. Addressing the Greens' supporters, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine plead them to act for themselves, as 'the system' would not act on their behalf.[294] It is worth noting that the 'opposed-to-system' –attitude was already visible in the 1960s alternative cultures such as the hippies and the student movements, from which these ideals transferred to the new environmental movements in the 1970s.[295]

Supporting 'citizens' democracy' was one of four Finnish green political goals (the others being 'ecologically balanced economy', 'companionship', and 'non-violence')[296], formulated to turn Finland from a 'gross-national society' (*kansantuoteyhteiskunta)* into a 'civil society' (*kansalaisyhteiskunta).* This shift was marked by increased citizens' power, freedoms, and possibilities to affect one's own everyday life by creating 'mid-level' infrastructure and economy.[297] In the

---

[290] '*Koko eduskuntatyö voi olla vain pieni osa vihreän liikkeen toimintaa. On erinomaisen tärkeää, että ruohonjuuritoiminta kehittyy ja laajenee, sillä sitä kautta todelliset muutokset tulevat.*' Könkkölä, Kalle 1983. 'Mitä kansanedustajalla voi tehdä?' *VL* 1/1983.
[291] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.
[292] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2, 3.
[293] As phrased in the Green Party programme (1990, Johdanto).
[294] *VL* 1983. 'Vihreä eduskuntaryhmä.' *VL* 1/1983.
[295] Guha 2000, 89–90.
[296] '*Kansalaisdemokratia, ekologinen tasapainotalous, kumppanuus, väkivallattomuus.*'
[297] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Johdanto, 4.

current system, political power was becoming increasingly intertwined with economic power, which in turn was becoming more and more centralised. For the Finnish Greens, this connection in particular made the parliamentary political system problematic for decentralised grassroots democracy. It was, however, only the upcoming ecological collapse that would provide the true danger and challenge for 'democracy and citizens' liberties' (*demokratialle ja kansalaisvapauksille).*[298]

In both countries, the new reconceptualisation of basic Western premises also contained the notion of the desentralisation of political and economic power and, with it, a more participatory form of democracy marked by a distinct understanding of citizenship. In Germany, this form of democracy was often referred to as *grassroots democracy;* in Finland, it was framed in terms of *citizens' democracy,* indicating an ideal of citizenship that was separated from its economically-oriented conceptualisation as a citizen-consumer. Demands for participatory democracy were directed against 'the establishment' in Finland as well, although not with as wide criticism of the parliamentary system as in Germany. Both studied Green Parties demanded the recognition of the 'boundaries of natural sustainability' and 'ecological boundaries' (*ekologiset reunaehdot* in Finland */ Rahmen ökologischer Notwendigkeiten* in Germany*)* that ought to limit human economic activities, which meant strict limitations on production, advertisement, etc.[299]

The detrimental 'Westerness', which was used as an antagonistic reference point against which the Greens reflected their thinking, was perceived as the root cause of many of the above-mentioned problems. 'The West' was associated particularly with capitalism in Finland, although the Finnish Greens also discussed socialism in a critical light. They were in fact avoiding to use the concept of socialism to describe themselves – unlike many of the German Greens had done. 'Capitalism is in a crisis', the Greens claimed (*kapitalismi on kriisissä)*, as it had failed to account for the increasing strain on both humans and the environment while turning them into mere 'instruments to create profit' (*liikevoiton tuottamisen välineiksi)*. Furthermore, the Finnish Greens perceived socialism as a different side of the same materialistic and industrialistic coin, emphasising that 'socialism and capitalism are rather similar from a green perspective. The splurge celebration of capitalism has been the ideal that state socialism has also pursued. Both are industrial growth economies. Their action has been based on means of production where nature has been perceived as an inexhaustible storage of raw material and waste.'[300]

The Greens continued to argue that 'in the east, people are cogwheels for the bureaucratic machine, in the west meanwhile tradable commodities for the

---

[298] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.
[299] Vihreä liitto 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma; Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2; Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprgoramm die Grünen, 22.
[300] *'Sosialismi ja kapitalismi ovat vihreästä näkökulmasta varsin samanlaisia. Kapitalismin tuhlausjuhla on ollut se ihanne, johon valtiososialismi on pyrkinyt. Molemmat ovat teollisia kasvutalouksia. Niiden toiminta on perustunut tuotantotapaan, jossa luonto on ollut ehtymättömänä pidetty raaka-aine- ja jätevarasto.'* Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.

market game' (*idässä ihmiset ovat olleet byrokratiakoneiston rattaita, lännessä taas markkinapelin vaihtotavaraa).* In the global 'technosystem' (*teknosysteemi)* created by these industrial economies (which had now become mostly capitalist, since state socialism had already started to crumble), the citizen was made entirely dependent on market forces, while the ecological foundation of industrial growth economies was being destroyed simultaneously. The Greens claimed that 'a gross-national society trusting in continuous material growth centralises its decision power and devalues citizens into mere consumers of goods and services, whose passivity we have accustomed to call a consensus'. Therefore, in the dystopian global technosystem that humans inhabited, nature was dealt merely as an inexhaustible 'storage of resource and waste' (*raaka-aine- ja jätevarasto*) that the industrial growth economies had exploited to the point of a total breakdown of the ecosystem. Meanwhile, citizens were made entirely dependent on the system as passive consumers, in turn losing their autonomy and possibilities for self-fulfilment regardless of potential material benefits.[301] Notably, although climate change was discussed under the title of the 'greenhouse effect' (*kasvihuoneilmiö)* as an outcome of such destructive behaviour towards nature, it had a relatively small role and was emphasised notably less than the looming collapse of the ecosystem, of which forest deaths caused by acid rains were a cautionary example.[302]

The Green Party chair, Heidi Hautala, phrased similar thoughts about the Western economic and political power system by speaking against 'modernity' (*modernismi)* and the 'capitalist system' (*kapitalistinen järjestelmä).* For her, the 'progress believers' (*kehitysuskovaiset)* were naïve to think that the Western system could ever produce environmentally sustainable development, thus calling the green movement an 'anti-capitalist' movement.[303] When asked whether she was familiar with the opinions of Joscha Fischer – the market-friendly influencer of the German Green Party (see Chapter 4) – Hautala claimed not to be willing to join the celebration of market economy, calling it a good servant but a bad master and stating that society needed no growth of gross-national product, but growth of political imagination. She also claimed that the question of dealing with issues of modernity – 'or what progress really is all about' – would soon become a key ideological issue for both the green and red parties. For her, the reason for the existence of the entire green movement was to raise new questions to the social discussion, change comprehensions of good life, and create new political culture – which could only be accomplished as part of the alternative citizens' movement.[304]

This discussion was constantly framed against the backdrop of 'Western' power systems and their conceptions of said issues, such as a conception of well-being founded on the ideals of growth. One could say that Westernness

---

[301] *'Jatkuvaan aineelliseen kasvuun luottava kansantuoteyhteiskunta keskittää päätösvaltaa ja devalvoi kansalaiset pelkiksi tavaroiden ja palveluiden kuluttajiksi, joiden passiivisuutta on totuttu kutsumaan konsensukseksi.'* Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1–2.
[302] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3.
[303] Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Vihreä liitto on antikapitalistinen puolue.' *VL* 37/1989.
[304] Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Vihreä liitto on antikapitalistinen puolue.' *VL* 37/1989.

was conceptually used as an antagonistic reference point against which the green agenda was constructed as an answer to the mistakes (real or perceived) that 'the West' had made. Along with implicitly criticising the Western liberal conception of citizenship, the Finnish Greens were often explicitly critical of the 'West' in general. Typically, whenever the Finnish Greens criticised industrial and capitalist development and the growth-based power systems on which they relied, they largely referred to 'Western' or 'European' culture and ways of thinking, as well as the economic and political institutions associated with them. In their 1990 programme, the Greens associated the concept of *Western* (*länsi* or *länsimainen*) with European industrialism, growth and expansion, with the 'great narrative' (underlining is included in the source) of Western culture being the 'heroic tale of rich white man conquering the world'. The Greens claimed that, 'mother Earth' had been a living creature in Europe in the medieval times, with Finland partaking in this tradition by representing its divinities as natural powers.[305] However, beginning at the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 'progress' (*kehitys)* was associated with controlling nature. After conquering colonies, Europeans were now interested in conquering nature itself. However, with nature now protesting this development, the industrial culture that started in Europe was finally waking up to realise that 'the path of conquering is now over' (*valloittamisen tie on nyt käyty loppuun)*, that humas' existence on Earth was in fact dependent on the very nature that was being conquered, and that 'as human beings we are also dependent on one another'.[306]

Therefore, the fault of modernisation was attributed to Western (meaning European) industrialism and European ways of thinking that concentrated on individual separateness, hierarchies and conquering, with Finland being unproblematically associated as a part of this continuum. However, not everything was criticised: 'although we criticise Western industrial culture heavily, we also acknowledge its accomplishments. ... The European state of law is without doubt a remarkable achievement', the Greens admitted. Science and technology were tolerable and even necessary as long as they were used with for the aim of peaceful co-existence and interaction between humans and nature. Furthermore, the Greens claimed that the 'companionship movement' (*kumppanuusliike),* which proposed establishing a deeper interconnection with nature, was an answer to overcoming Western patterns of thought, replacing

[305] '*Länsimaisen kulttuurin suuri tarina on ollut sankarikertomus rikkaan valkoisen miehen maailmanvalloituksesta. Meidät on totutettu pitämään länsimaista ajattelu- ja elämäntapaa ainoana tai ainakin parhaana mahdollisena. Maapallolla on kuitenkin aina ollut toisenlaisiakin elämänkäsityksiä. Vielä keskiajan Euroopassa "Äiti Maata" pidettiin elävänä olentona, jota tuli kohdella kunnioittavasti ja jonka hyväksikäyttöä säätelivät ankarat rajoitukset. Luonnon kunnioitus on kuulunut myös suomalaiseen perinteeseen: siitä kertovat pyhät lehdot ja pihapuut, luonnonhaltiat ja luonnonvoimia edustaneet jumaluudet.*' Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

[306] 'Myös *ihmisinä olemme riippuvaisia toisistamme'*. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

the aforementioned modes of 'conquering' and 'mastery' with companionship and compassion to all forms of life.[307]

The same line of thinking continued in the (otherwise already more moderate) 1994 programme, where 'the West' was still adjudged the source of most problems: the exploitation of both nature and humans were parts of the same short-sighted thinking that has dominated the actions of Western industrialised countries thus far. Furthermore, the Greens once again presented the ideal of *companionship* as an answer to the values of 'conquering and preying' (*valloittamisen ja saalistamisen arvot*) that had guided Western culture.[308] Later, the West was once again directly associated with both Finland and Western Europe, with references made to the need for better environmental and climate politics to secure living possibilities 'even for our Western culture' (*oman länsimaisenkin kulttuurimme)*, with Finland and other West European countries being in charge of creating better-functioning political structures from then on.[309]

Therefore, in the Greens' programmes, 'Western' was associated with 'European', which was in turn largely linked to the industrial growth-economy of modernity and the thought patterns of *mastery, conquering* and other hierarchically loaded concepts, while terms such as *companionship* or *interaction* were seen as revolutionising Western ways of thinking.[310] The Greens thus tried to not only define modernisation in the West, but also point out to what it was not and where it should be headed in their opinion. Notably, although the Soviet Union or the Warsaw pact satellites were not considered a part of 'the West', they were nevertheless deemed equally detrimental, as state-led socialism had both 'diminished the living standards of citizens' and 'destroyed the environment' more thoroughly 'than in countries with market economy'.[311] Only when talking about foreign policies did the Greens include both 'West Europe' and 'East Europe' under the European category while emphasising the need for mutual co-operation. The need for a detrimental growth economy was considered a particularly West European trait.[312] Later in the programme, Finland is explicitly stated as belong to Western Europe, with the basic problem of politics both in Finland and in other Western democracies noted to be the detachment of everyday life and political institutions. Belonging to West Europe, of course, was not a positive statement, since it naturally made Finland responsible not only for dissolving the detrimental institutions of the growth economy and pollutive industries, but also for recalibrating the more general

---

307 '*Vaikka arvostelemme länsimaista teollisuuskulttuuria ankarasti, tunnustamme myös sen saavutukset … eurooppalainen oikeusvaltio on eittämättömän arvokas saavutus'*. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1; the concept of the *companionship movement* is further discussed in Chapter 3.2.2 of this study.

308 Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

309 Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3, 5.

310 '*Valtiososialismi ... päinvastoin sekä alensi kansalaisten elintasoa että tuhosi ympäristöä vielä rankemmin kuin tehtiin markkinatalousmaissa*.' Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.

311 Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2

312 Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 5

culture and modes of thought towards a more holistic, interconnected and less hierarchical direction.[313]

In their article *'Näkökulmia länteen' (perspectives to the west),* Henna-Riikka Pennanen & Jukka Jouhki asserted that the West is a plural discourse containing the idea of the West as both an actor and as a story – a narrative about development. The West was indeed present in Green Party discussions, as it, on the one hand, was finally 'waking up' from a modernist sleep, and, on the other hand, was a sad story of increasing growth-oriented industrialism and the detrimental and hierarchical thought patterns of *mastery* and *conquering*. Politically, it was a story that could be used to determine the need for a re-evaluation of the values and institutions in Finland and, more generally, in Europe.[314] This political need might explain why criticism of industrialism, growth-orientation or the sense of separateness between nature and people (that was an essential part of the *mastery* mindset) was considered particularly Western and European phenomena – as if these elements did not exist outside of Europe. Neither the USA nor China, for example, were even mentioned in this regard. Furthermore, it is possibly for this reason that the West remained a unified entity in the Greens' discourses, be it while talking about it as a growth-oriented, industrialised, ever-conquering collective or as a unit that was waking up from this growth-oriented nightmare. Local differences within Europe, for example, were not considered in this discussion except when discussing foreign politics.

The positive other to this Westernness was not socialism but peoples who had withdrawn from the Western growth mindset – which would refer to, for example, indigenous peoples whose well-being was often sought after but also implicit to the Greens themselves. Naturally, questioning the prevailing Western models of thought meant stepping out of the perceived continuum of hierarchy, mastery, sense of separateness, and material orientation. References to notions of 'mother Earth' and natural divinities may be interpreted as what John Dryzek calls *green romanticism* – a critique of Western rationalism which, ironically, has been a strongly European/American (i.e. notably Western) way of thinking.[315] This discourse too was closely associated with criticism of 'Western' institutions, particularly the power system built around market economy, and the demands and restrains it placed on its subjects.

By adopting key concepts such as *tasapainotalous* and *kumppanuus* as critiques of Western power systems that demanded a reconceptualisation of the core premises of Western thought, the Greens associated themselves not with socialism but with a *limits to growth* discourse that had been prevalent in environmental discourses for many years. For them, it was also strongly associated with an implicit form of eco-feminism that was visible at a conceptual level in Green Party programmes. These threads of green radicalism,

[313] Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 6.
[314] Pennanen & Jouhki 2016, 16.
[315] Pennanen & Jouhki 2016, 21–22; Dryzek 2005.

roughly similar to those observed among the German Greens, are further inspected in the next section.

3.2.2 'Companionship movement': the Finnish Greens' response to a growth-based culture

For the Finnish Greens, the resurrection of human–nature interconnectedness meant countering the detrimental effects of Western modernisation, as was the case with the Germans.[316] This section shows how the growth-critical conceptual cluster of radical environmentalism once again helped serve this purpose, offering concepts stemming from ecofeminism and environmental philosophy that were intertwined with a growth-critical discourse. In 1986, the German Greens considered the world market as the 'sacred cow' of Western society, referring to the German political prioritisation of growth and export. The same year, Ville Komsi used the term 'sacred cow' (*pyhä lehmä)* in Finland to describe the economic competitiveness that ensured continued export and growth as the unquestioned priority of Finnish politics.[317]

The ideal of 'companionship' (*kumppanuus*), both between human societies and with nature, served as the green alternative for this 'sacred cow'. Materialistic growth had become the culmination point of environmental and social problems: the 'storytellers of old huts' had been removed to retirement houses and 'replaced with televisions', which inspired the Greens to question whether human well-being had actually grown at all despite the increase in gross-national product. Thus, 'quantitative growth thinking' needed to be 'replaced with the respect of natural resources and natural values'.[318] The Finnish green system criticism built around *kumppanuusliike (companionship movement)* contained a strong *limits to growth* –type of emphasis, where 'the constant growth of material production will become unnecessary', consequently liberate the individual from the control of market forces (as seen in the previous section). Human well-being would instead comprise issues such as 'satisfaction to life' (*elämän antoisuus)* and 'spiritual growth' (*henkinen kasvu)*[319], since 'raising economic growth as the highest value does not make humans happy. Along with ecological distress, a spiritual distress is also advancing.' The Greens claimed that despite increasing material growth, 'the indicators for a spiritual crisis are turning red', leading not only to suicides and violence, but also to 'symptoms of tension, alienation, and hopelessness.' If these issues were included in the GNP, it would have already been on the decline.[320] Considering

316 Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Esipuhe, 1.
317 Komsi, Ville 1986. 'Kilpailukyky – budjetin pyhä lehmä.' *VL* 19/1986.
318 Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma; Vihreä liitto 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma, 1988.
319 Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma.
320 *'Talouskasvun kohottaminen ylimmäksi arvoksi ei tee ihmistä onnelliseksi. Ekologisen ahdingon rinnalla etenee myös henkinen ahdinko. Vaikka aineellinen hyvinvointi Suomessa muuttuu yhä useamman kohdalla yltäkylläisyydeksi, henkisen kriisin mittarit alkavat näyttää punaista. Itsemurhat ja kanssaihmisiin kohdistuva väkivalta yleistyvät, puhumattakaan lievemmistä kireyden, vieraantumisen ja toivottomuuden oireista*.' Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3, 4.

that economic growth had traditionally been associated with well-being due to its provision of better material living conditions, the Greens decided to flip this idea around by associating both nature's and humans' well-being with an opposite, growth-critical approach. Their concept of *tasapainotalous* would act without a demand for constant growth, thus promoting not only the well-being of the environment, but also human well-being through more autonomy as well as social and spiritual connections.

Although the Greens' critique of growth and centralisation was primarily directed at capitalist market economy, it also contained a critique of the Finnish welfare state. The Greens outspokenly rejected the materialistic and growth- and consumption-based conception of well-being that was inherently present in social democratic ideal of a welfare state. The ever-increasing material consumption that marked 'our so-called welfare state' only satisfied the material desires of our culture but left real needs, such as communal and spiritual needs, unfulfilled. For the Greens, the centralised bureaucratic state machine should not suppress human life with top-down patronising. Therefore, not only economic life but also public care facilities would need to be relocated to the proximity of citizens, i.e. to 'mid-level'.[321]

The Finnish Greens considered *basic income* to be a political route out of this growth-orientation. For them, increasing self-reliance in everyday life (*arkielämän itsehallinta)* was primarily a premise for basic income – a Finnish green goal that had been present in their discussions since the early 1980s and one that could also help desentralise the economy by making people less dependent on global market forces. This idea was adopted from European green discussions that the Finns followed closely. The issue was widely discussed, for example, at the European green 1987 Stockholm Conference, which many of the Finnish Greens attended. [322] Most intriguingly, the philosophical father of this concept, Philippe van Parijs, presented his thoughts at this conference, pointing out how basic income should be 'the hard nucleus of a green economy', thus separating green economics from liberalist and socialist models. Evidently, the Finnish Greens who attended this conference (this list included such greens as Osmo Soininvaara, a known supporter of basic income) listened carefully, since van Parjis' ideas were widely circulated in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine soon after. For Van Parijs, basic income would indeed make citizens 'independent from both capital and the bureaucracy of the state', while also promoting alternative forms of employment.

Therefore, basic income symbolised something more than just a change in social security – it was conceptualised as a tool to restructure work markets by compelling them to adapt to an understanding of work that is separate from capitalist markets. After all, 'our life is still based largely on unpaid work, despite factories and bureau jungles'[323]. This aspect of human lives had been particularly forgotten with the harnessing of politics that singularly contributed

---

[321] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2, 4.
[322] Välimäki, Pauli 1987. 'Vihreä Tukholma.' *VL* 15/1987.
[323] *'Elämämme tehtaista ja virastoviidakoista huolimatta on edelleen paljolti palkatta tehtävän työn varassa'*. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.

to the construction of a 'national product society' (*kansantuoteyhteiskunta).* As a result, human relationships as a part of well-being were forgotten, as our everyday life was divided into factions of work, travel, taking care of others and free time coupled with technical innovations, together contributing to the downfall of social relationships. Local shops had disappeared because of cars, common laundry rooms had disappeared because of washing machines, and talking to people at the corners of streets had disappeared because of televisions. Consequently,

> Our life has more stuff, but less human relationships ... This situation creates pressure to increase consumption. As families get smaller and separated from each other, everyone has to purchase even that kind of necessary items that are rarely used. Even more important is the paucity and superficiality of human relationships: there are very few other ways to upkeep personal validity and self-respect than acquiring things.[324]

The Finnish Greens went on to demand a more communal future with localised production, similar to the German Greens' demand for the decentralisation and localisation of both the economy and the democratic processes, although using slightly differing argumentation and methods as the basis for such a change.

Evidently, the Greens' assessment of 'self-reliance of everyday life' included more aspects than simply demanding basic income to allow more possibilities within the current system. The Greens also participated in the criticism of over-valuing market transactions and the success of work markets when measuring well-being. As such, the concept of *itsehallinta* (*self-governance)* may be understood as belonging to the same conceptual cluster as the German *Selbstbestimmung (self-sufficiency)* – a concept meant to help reorganise societal relations to assume a less individualistic, materialistic and consumeristic direction, with basic income serving as merely a political tool to promote this wider cultural change. From the very beginning, these ideals aimed at promoting the kind of autonomous green citizenship associated with a participatory conception of democracy that allowed citizens freedom from the centralised control of both state bureaucracy and global market forces.

Once again, a wide spectrum of cultural criticism is observed to be associated with growth-criticism, starting from the question of well-being in a consumeristic society where humans are separated from one another and have a 'lowered sense of affecting their own everyday lives' as a result of an economic understanding of human well-being. Notably, the degrowth-literature often uses the terms 'self-sufficiency' and 'self-reliance'. Early degrowth thinkers (André Gorz and Ivan Illich, for example) associated these terms with the goal of 'autonomy', as in being emancipated from external norms, beliefs, and institutions ('the machine') once they became constraints.[325]

---

[324] *'Elämässämme on enemmän tavaraa, mutta vähemmän ihmissuhteita. ... Tämä tilanne luo painetta kulutuksen kasvattamiseen. Kun perheet pienenevät ja eristyvät toisistaan, jokainen joutuu ostamaan itselleen sellaisetkin tarvekalut, joita käytetään harvoin. Vielä suurempi merkitys on ihmissuhteiden vähäisyydellä ja pinnallisuudella. henkilökohtaiseen pätemiseen ja omanarvontunnon ylläpitämiseen ei jää juuri muita keinoja kuin tavaran haaliminen.'* Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[325] Parrique 2020, 253.

In this sense, the Finnish term *itsehallinta* could easily be translated into *autonomy,* with the meaning given to it being quite similar to that of the 1970s growth-critical thinkers. It was the economic representation of human identity (as either consuming or profit-seeking individuals) that came under fire in Green Party thinking.[326] In Finland, this criticism took the form of questioning the representation of human agency through *consumption.*

Such an understanding was particularly unfair to women, who performed a large part of unpaid work in society – a feminist thread in green thinking that is more closely inspected below.[327] As in the case of the German Greens, one explanation for the strong cultural criticism associated with the Finnish Greens' discussion on growth can be found from the early Greens' ideological association with ecofeminism. Questions regarding human–nature interconnectedness, the 'companionship movement' and criticism of the 'mastery' mindset all point in this direction. It is indeed possible that the *limits to growth* discourse attained its cultural criticism aspect from an ideological vein drawn from the ecofeminist discourses of the 1970s. The concept of *companionship* (*kumppanuus / Partnerschaft),* which both Green Parties used in their programmes and which the Finnish Greens named one of their four key political themes in 1990, particularly refers to this discourse. This concept was devised from the ecofeminist discourses of the 1970s and 1980s, particularly from the works of Françoise d'Eaubonne and Riane Eisler, both of whom participated in the growth-critical environmental discussion by offering an ecofeminist perspective. This vocabulary was used to construct criticism towards the *status quo* socio-cultural paradigm that was associated with a mindset of mastery and hierarchy (leading to uncontrolled growth, economic representations of human identity, and conquest of nature) instead of equality. Moreover, replacing this paradigm with human–nature interconnections would lead to companionship, equality and nurturing values.

In 1990, the Finnish Greens' new programme noted that 'the exploitation of nature and other people are part of the mastery thinking, which has led to the current crisis of humanity'. More precisely, this mastery (*herruus)* thinking led to a situation where 'the gross-national product society relying on constant material growth is centralising its decision power and devaluing its citizens into mere consumers of goods and services.' To replace this system based on a mindset of mastery, a companionship movement (*kumppanuusliike)* was required to lay a foundation of a new balance economy.[328] The Finnish word *herruus* particularly refers to masculine mastery (with the word *herra* referring to a male master). The German concept of *herrschaft* has a similar layer of meaning to it. Hans Verhayen spoke of '*herrschaft*' in parliament group minutes, as discussed above,[329] while the German Greens' 1986 programme criticised the '*herrschaft*' of experts who would dominate people's right for self-determination

[326] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[327] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[328] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Esipuhe.
[329] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 19–30 January 1985: Klausursitzung der Fraktion.

in e.g. medical issues.[330] Evidently, the Greens' vocabulary indicated a critique of patriarchic models of thought where the mastery mindset was associated with masculine values of dominance, control and conquering.

The notion of the *companionship movement* as a replacement to such modes of 'mastery' has been discussed by several eco-feminist thinkers, including the American-Austrian Riane Eisler. Notably, the similarity in the phrasing of her text *The Chalice and the Blade* with the Finnish Green Party programme is striking. According to Eisler, while most of human history have been based on companionship with nature, modern society has based its belief system on the ideal of 'mastery'. Eisler not only termed this concept but also formulated a defining dichotomy around it. As Green Party active Satu Hassi later pointed out in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, companionship meant existing in interaction with nature and other humans, while mastery meant existing in a hierarchical structure of society where humans strive for mastery over one another and over nature.[331] There is, therefore, a visible similarity between Eisler and the Finnish Greens in their critique of mastery-based hierarchies and the promotion of a companionship ideal.

One very likely reason for these striking conceptual similarities between Eisler's book and the Green Party programme can be found in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. On June 16th, 1989, an article about *the companionship movement* appeared in the magazine. Green Party active Satu Hassi wrote a piece about Eisler's companionship movement, which had manifested itself in the USA. Hassi, who translated Eisler's book *The Chalice and the Blade* (*Malja ja miekka)* in Finnish, wanted to explain some key ideas in the book that should 'belong in the basic readings of every green'.[332] Hassi claimed that Eisler's narrative traced the origins of the ideal of companionship. Eisler demanded a return to a companionship society that rejects hierarchical structures that diminish humans' natural relationships with the non-human world. In 'mastery' societies like ours, nature had become a resource storage to be used for human needs, while humans themselves lived hierarchically. A year later, Hassi would become one of three draft writers of the 1990 programme, where these concepts appeared almost word to word. Therefore, it seems likely that the abovementioned concepts appeared in the Green Party programme through Eisler's work.[333]

However, there were some differences of emphasis between the two texts. The Finnish Green Party referenced the connection between the companionship movement and women's liberation only slightly. For the Greens, however, dismantling hierarchies were tied to women's possibilities for gaining more social influence, wherein an income shift from capital-incentive industries to the people also meant an income shift from men to women.[334] Eisler herself had repeatedly pointed out that both environmental and social problems, including

---

[330] Die Grünen 1986, IV, 1:1.
[331] Eisler 1988; Hassi, Satu 1989. *VL* 16 June 1989.
[332] Hassi, Satu 1989. *VL* 16 June 1989.
[333] Hassi, Satu 1989. *VL* 16 June 1989; Eisler 1988.
[334] *'Haluamme purkaa sosiaalisia ja taloudellisia hierarkioita ja erityisesti laajentaa naisten yhteiskunnallisia vaikutusmahdollisuuksia'*. Vihreä liitto 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma.

war, pollution and poverty, were the results of masculinity reigning over feminine ideals in an 'androcratic' political and economic system. For her, the 'manly' conquest of nature and 'masculine' political priorities that ignore the 'economic caretaking of the environment' were the root of the problem. Therefore, uplifting the feminine side of the equation to reach an equal status with the masculine would solve these problems almost automatically, enabling society to reject the hierarchical use of power to create new goals and institutions and generate new models of conduct based on 'gentle, philanthropic and caring behaviour'.[335] It is also worth noting that Eisler's chapter discussing the issue of *mastery thinking*, which deals with themes of conquest and hierarchical control that the Finnish Greens were keen to talk about, was predominantly not associated with ecological problems, which are scarcely mentioned, but with poverty and social inequality, which were found to be the most significant problems faced by women on global perspective.[336]

In Eisler's thinking, the problem for women is not the male sex itself, but 'the way men and women turn out in a mastery-based society'. Correcting these mistakes would involve withdrawal from the kind of masculine virtues, such as conquering nature, that the Greens also discussed. Eisler called for new myths, images and virtues as the basis for a companionship society, describing it as a 'revolution of consciousness' where the basic needs for protection are replaced with the more advanced needs for [personal] growth, requiring companionship instead of competition and embracing conflicts and differences rather than forcefully suppressing them.[337] Occasionally, Eisler also dealt with environmental questions: in mastery society, humans lack 'satisfactory emotional relationships', resulting in overconsumption as compensation for the lack of emotional well-being – which they consequently replace with ownership of material objects.[338] The patriarchal domination inherent in the model of *mastery* makes people automatically consider the masculine as more valuable than the feminine. The goal of the companionship movement for Eisler was the creation of a society in which 'difference is not automatically associated with superiority or inferiority'.[339]

In the same vein as Eisler, the Finnish Greens devised a historical explanation suitable for the political goals enumerated in their programme. They began by noting that in the eighteenth century, 'mother Earth became a machine and human became nature's machinist. ... Progress was identified with controlling nature.' As a result, the interaction between humans and nature became skewed, with humans no longer seeking out nature. It was taken for granted that the mission of science and technology was to help humans become the masters of nature. Progress was identified with controlling nature, and such foundations of Western thinking and culture needed to be 'fundamentally re-

[335] Eisler 1988, 256–258.
[336] Eisler 1988, Chapter 12.
[337] Eisler 1988, 240–249.
[338] Eisler 1988, 253–254.
[339] Eisler 1988, 17–18.

evaluated'.[340] This claim made the *limits to growth* ideal a cultural, social and feminist project as much as it was an ecological project, even though the word 'feminism' itself was peculiarly lacking in the party programmes of the era.[341] The Finnish Green Party programme stated that 'the path of conquering is now finished'. After colonies, Western countries were now 'conquering nature', but with the planet protesting, human societies had no other alternative than to accept a new paradigm. The era of 'controlling nature' for human benefit – which had allegedly started in the eighteenth century – had now come to an end. The Finnish Greens also explicitly addressed the masculinity ingrained in the values of conquest, as people in power were typically wealthy men who shared these values.

> Users of power both in public governance and the economic life, labor unions and elsewhere are mostly middle-aged or old wealthy men and represent the typical worldview and value system of this group. This worldview excludes such issues as the rights of children and future generations for a livable world as well as human spiritual well-being or misery. The use of power is guided by values that belong in the role of being a man, the attempt to subordinate both nature as well as other groups of humans … Activity based on such values they like to call rational, reason-based, which is a coarse demeaning of the human intellect.

On many occasions, the conceptualisations contained in the green programmes seemed to be adopted directly from the ideas of Riane Eisler, particularly the vocabulary and the presumed history concerning 'mastery', 'control' or 'conquest' over nature and the hierarchies associated with them, as well as the recommendation of 'companionship' as the alternative, although she is not referred to at all in the programme drafted by Hassi, thus finding mention only in the green magazine article. Paradoxically, a few years later, Satu Hassi herself would eagerly start writing about the importance of economic market guidance and other market-friendly measures to promote environmentalism in a less radical way, but that is another story altogether.[342] However, it was not Hassi alone who was responsible for bringing forth these ideals. Eisler's ideas were discussed in the *Vihreä Lanka* and were likely shared by many eco-feminists.

It is worth mentioning that most of the general eco-feminist ideals mentioned by Riane Eisler were no longer new in 1989. Many of them had been widely discussed in the environmental movement for at least a decade. The idea of gender piercing through all levels of society, including human relationships with nature, as well as the idea of nature representing underappreciated femininity had been presented before most notably by Carolyn Merchant. As an environmental historian who criticised the early science-based environmental history movement for not considering the cultural phenomenon (such as gender roles) underlying natural degradation, Carolyn Merchant also developed the idea of the historical oppression of women and nature aligning together in a patriarchal world. In her widely popular book *Death of Nature* (1980), the

[340] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.
[341] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.
[342] Hassi was vocal about the issue in *Vihreä ABC-kirja 2*, 1995, for example.

turning point of this development was in the era of enlightenment when Western culture started perceiving nature as a machine that could be exploited rather than an organism.[343] As a sidenote, it is intriguing how the Greens were shifting this metaphor of a machine around, defining it as opposite of nature.

Eisler herself participated in this long line of ecofeminist thinking that considered Western value hierarchies as promoting the masculine over the feminine, culture over nature, reason over emotion, human over animal, etc., with the goal of the ecofeminist movement being to strip this value system from its hierarchical position and re-establish its more egalitarian roots.[344] The existence of plausible connections among ecofeminist thinkers partially explains the similarities between German and Finnish green thinking. Françoise d'Eaubonne whose work had become familiar among German ecofeminists and Petra Kelly, among others (as seen in the previous section),[345] was a key influence on Riane Eisler, who, in turn, inspired the Finnish Greens. When Riane Eisler criticised the 'mythic fabric of images' of masculine virtues and urged the re-imagination of this fabric of imaginaries in culture to to steer it in a healthier direction, she directly referred to ideas presented by d'Eaubonne in her book *Le Feminism ou La Mort.* Furthermore, she warned about the effects of the masculine 'conquest' of nature leading to a lack of care for the environment, once again making a reference to d'Eaubonne.[346] Since both Petra Kelly and Satu Hassi had acquainted themselves with similar discourses and both played notable roles in drafting the programmes of their respective parties, it was no surprise that the ideals presented by both parties turned out to be similar.

However, it was not until in 2006 that the Finnish Greens decided to adopt the term 'feminism' to describe their political goals.[347] Although the ideals emanating from eco-feminist philosophy were listened to and adopted into green thinking, the term itself was considered too pejorative at the time. One possible reason for this is that more traditional natural conservationists might not have wanted to indulge in such a discourse. Another intriguing explanation is offered by Solveig Bergman, who spoke of the 'Finnish Paradox' to describe a country where gender equality was typically viewed positively but feminism was viewed negatively, even 'fiercly rejected'. According to her, since gender equality issues were mainly driven by the state machinery instead of autonomous feminist movements, as in many other countries, the feminist discourse gradually faded from sight as public discourse on issues related to gender equality was driven forward by the state machinery.[348] Moreover, feminists were not necessarily among the most active actors in the new Green Party. Rauli Mickelsson pointed out that the Green Feminists' association did not join the Green Alliance when it was formed in 1987, which also may help

[343] Merchant 1980. See also Ruuskanen & Väyrynen 2016, 249.
[344] Aaltola 2013, 180; Martusewicz & al. 1995, 35–36.; Donovan 2013, 199–204.
[345] Radkau 2011, 205–206.
[346] Eisler 1988, 234, 257; d'Eaubonne 1974.
[347] Vihreä liitto 2006. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma, *Vihreät arvot.*
[348] Bergman 2002, 190–191.

explain the lack of explicit feminism in early green programmes.[349] Nonetheless, feminism seemed to have become something that the Finnish Greens wanted to avoid explicitly mentioning, even though the concepts stemming from ecofeminist discourses were clearly present in the radical green context.

The Green Parties did not simply adopt and repeat the ecofeminist ideals as they were; rather, they adapted them based on their own political and more environmentally aligned goals. In Finland, this meant emphasising the (originally rather minor) role of human–nature relationships in *mastery* thinking while forgoing many of the feminist issues that Eisler emphasised. Not accounting for women's care work in GDP calculations was a choice that would be detrimental not only to the environment but also to democracy and civic rights in the form of 'increased dependence on economic outside forces', as well as to basic human well-being, since considering this line of work as part of the economy would increase the 'self-sufficiency of everyday life' (*arkielämän itsehallinta*).[350] When talking of the *companionship movement,* the Finnish Greens seemed to have participated in (or at least indulged in coining concepts from) eco-feminist philosophy, but left much of the feminism to be expressed only in an implicit way. For example, the project to embrace a more feminine value system was present, but scarcely emphasised. Conceptually it was more closely linked to the cultural criticism of radical environmentalism, which held that both nature's and humans' well-being were being threatened by hierarchical (masculine) systems of economic domination and competition.

Before the 1990 programme, the women in the party noticed the lack of visibility of feminist discussions. Feminists in the party wondered if the seemingly progressive-minded greens had simply altered the role of women from coffee makers into herbal tea makers.[351] By 1986, the lack of feminist discussion had become a concern for some green women, as seen in the pages of the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. In February 1986, 'the women's workgroup of capital area' (*pääkaupunkiseudun naistyöryhmä)* – led by Ulla Anttila, Eevali Kontio, Maiju Kaajakari and Anu Karlsson – published a text about the invisibility of women's issues in the green political movement, despite the women's movement being one of the key groups involved in green action. Women were not present at a personal level either: despite half of green members in town councils being women, they were hardly represented at all in media discussions concerning the Greens. The Greens' support for women's democratic and parliamentary participation could perhaps be understood as 'grassroots activity' and 'counter-culture' if they had created a separate women's list for the next elections (which, in the end, they did not do). It is notable here that the green women used the term 'feminists' to refer to radical members of the women's movement who had been part of the counterculture from which the green political movement had originated.[352] During the 1986 discussion of how the Greens should organise themselves and whether there

[349] Mickelsson 2007, 256.
[350] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän Liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[351] Aalto 2018, 208.
[352] Anttila, Ulla 1986. 'Minne menevät naiset.' *VL* 4/1986.

should be a party programme, Raija Eriksson-Vuori expressed her fears that neglecting feminist themes in the potential programme would make room for green chauvinism and eco-fascism.[353] The feminists were also responsible for much of the criticism directed at green male leaders who wanted to integrate into the 'political power apparatus'. As Solveig Bergman pointed out, feminist Greens had formed their own organisation within the Green Party that same year, instigating further discussion.[354] Although it is debatable whether these attempts were successful or not, it is certain that concepts stemming from ecofeminist discourses became more visible as a consequence.

The absence of the concept of 'feminism' separated the Finnish Greens from their German counterparts. Nevertheless, in both countries, ecofeminist discourse was connected with the growth-critical discussion, since both concepts were associated with questioning hierarchies and developing a more holistic relationship with nature. One difference between the countries remained, however: there was a notable surge of spirituality associated with growth criticism, eco-feminism and green radicalism in Finland. The need to reconceptualise materialistic, hierarchical ways of thinking occasionally led to surprising activities among the Greens. For example, during the Green Alliance yearly meeting in Lapland (the same which Petra Kelly also attended) in 1988, and while discussing political issues such as a need for increased emission control, shamanistic rituals were taking place as a practice to restore a more appropriate relationship with nature. Talking about this event, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine wrote how 'several Greens went on a journey to search for the power of the spirit'. This may be considered a practical example of the intention to question competitive rational hierarchies and search for alternative ways to redefine beliefs regarding humans' relationships with nature.[355] According to Dryzek, withdrawal from Christianity in favor of 'paganistic' forms of religion, based on emblems such as 'divinity located on this Earth' and the 'goddess imaginary', had also been a part of the radical ecofeminist and eco-social movements.[356] Sari Aalto noted how a group of green activists emerged from the circles of *Kasvis* – a vegetarian restaurant in Helsinki that had served as the melting pot for the spiritualistic ideals of the hippie movement in the 1970s. Environmental protection issues and alternative lifestyles had merged with heightening consciousness, thus turning into a more holistic perception of human nature either through Eastern philosophies or as part of the so-called 'New Age' shift towards the age of Aquarius – transfers of thought that were spread far and wide through inter-rail trips across the big cities of Europe. Young Heidi Hautala, for example, is associated with this circle of people.[357] Furthermore, Jukka Paastela pointed out that the Finnish green movement drew inspiration from the earlier hippie movement, which involved some level of what he calls 'anti-intellectualism', so mixing ecofeminism with shamanistic

[353] Eriksson–Vuori, Raija 1986. 'Julkisuus, patriarkaatti ja vihreä liike.' *VL* 4/1986.
[354] Bergman 2002, 177.
[355] *VL* 1988. 'Ekofilosofiaa, ilmansaasteita ja shamanismia.' *VL* 13/1988.
[356] Dryzek 2005, 186.
[357] Aalto 2018, 38.

rituals might not have been considered a far-fetched idea by the Greens in the 1980s.[358]

It is also notable how gender was associated with this eco-spiritual discussion in Green Party programmes: the belief in the sacredness of Mother Earth served as a counterpoint to the more masculine story of the industrialised 'Western' culture that embodied the 'heroic tale of rich white man conquering the world' (*Sankarikertomus rikkaan valkoisen miehen maailmanvalloituksesta*). As a result, the sacredness of Mother Earth became associated with feminist values and ideals of 'respecting nature', dismantling the masculine value system of conquest and control.[359] The Finnish Greens themselves claimed that 'still in the Europe of the middle ages, "Mother Earth" was considered a living creature, who needed to be dealt with respectfully.' [360] However, these beliefs had changed with the advent of modernity and industrialisation. In contrast to the Finnish Greens talking about 'mother Earth' and the 'holy groves' of the Middle Ages in their programmes, the German Greens refrained from using such language, possibly due to the fear of being associated with the nature mysticism of the 1930s national socialists.[361] Joni Seager pointed out how the ecofeminist movement of the 1980s 'put spirituality, earth goddesses, nature/culture identities ... on the feminist front burner'. Nevertheless, she also stated that back then, ecofeminism was already a multi-faceted field of ideas that included very different kinds of motives and intentions. The academic and politically active feminists often rejected the movement's association to spirituality.[362] This difference from the German movement may be partly explained by the association of the Finnish Green Party with the hippie movement dating back to the early 1970s.[363]

Soon after the 1988 Greens' meeting in Lapland, the shaman was interviewed separately for another issue of *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. The shaman presented his shamanism as an alternative to the modern materialistic culture that was disconnecting people from nature, thus representing a 'truer' form of well-being. Shamanism was presented as a way to reconnect with nature – not as 'art' but as 'culture'. According to the shaman, the fight against the 'power of money' required the 'power of UKKO!', thus turning shamanism into a political statement. [364] 'Ukko Ylijumala', or 'Ukko the highest god' to which the shaman referred, was the name of one of the most well-known Finnish gods during the pre-Christian era.[365]

In this sense, green spirituality seems to have appeared as one (but not necessarily the primary) way to establish a sense of reconnection and companionship with nature, one that society had lost because of secular

---

[358] Paastela 1987, 15–16.
[359] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 1.
[360] *'Vielä keskiajan Euroopassa 'Äiti Maata' pidettiin elävänä olentona, jota tuli kohdella kunnioittavasti.'*
[361] Dryzek 2005, 186.
[362] Seager 2003, 948.
[363] Paastela 1987, 15–16; Mickelsson 2007, 250.
[364] Pirtola, Erkki 1988. 'Jatkuva näyttely linnuille ja luonnonhengille?' *VL* 17/1988.
[365] The Finnish pre-Christian religion is discussed by, e.g., Pulkkinen 2014.

modernity and industrialisation. The presentation of shamanism and green spirituality needs to be understood in the context of the search for different ways of questioning the contemporary cultural modes of thought associated with economic and masculine ideas, thereby reconnecting with nature. Bron Taylor, who has extensively studied religion and spirituality in environmental ideologies, pointed out that the green religion emphasising the sanctity of nature can be understood either metaphorically or as a form of personal spirituality.[366] In its more supernatural form, the Gaian hypothesis considers the biosphere (possibly even the universe itself) to 'be alive or conscious', while in its more secular form, it uses 'metaphor and analogy to resemble organisms with their many inderdependent parts'. However, since the Finnish Greens did not explicitly subscribe to supernatural assumptions in their discussions, whether their belief in the 'Gaian hypothesis' or in shamanism was based on supernatural assumptions or more secular metaphors is left open to interpretation. Nevertheless, it seemed to promote, as Bron Taylor calls it, a 'metaphysics of interconnectedness', a function typical of environmental spirituality, that also fits the radical green political discourses.[367] Therefore, references to green spirituality can be understood as a method of detachment from materialistic culture, thus representing a curios example of the different possibilities of questioning Western masculine domination and mastery over nature. This outlook was connected with the idea of an 'organic' world, which is typical of the counter-cultures of first the beat (1950s) and then the hippie (1960s-1970s) generations.[368]

Around the time of the formation of the party and the publication of its first programme in 1988, more ecophilosophical discussions that further expanded the Greens' ideological sources took place. The likes of Arne Naess, Sigmund Kvaløy, Murray Bookchin and Georg Henrik von Wright had their ideas presented or books discussed among the Finnish Greens.[369] This provides a good example of how deep ecological philosophical questions arising from academic discussion were also highly valued along with green spirituality.

Particularly significant with regards to the upcoming party programmes was the Norwegian eco-philosopher Sigmund Kvaløy, possibly because he personally joined the 1988 green meeting in Lapland. There, he talked of complex societies, such as the culture of the Sherpas in the Himalayas, where people lived in accordance with 'organic time', which referred to the time that appeared concretely in the 'material-spiritual' reality. He contrasted these societies with complicated societies (such as ours) that lived in accordance with 'mechanical time' – the intellectually manufactured rhythm that helped coordinate culture and eventually dominate it so that people lost their sense of organic time. Just like the earlier mentioned critics of mastery, such as Eisler, Sigmund Kvaløy saw the modern society as a pyramid that is based on competition where only those at the top have power. Satu Hassi (who also

[366] Taylor 2010, 10, 3.
[367] Taylor 2010, 13, 26.
[368] Taylor 2010, 17–18.
[369] *VL* 1988. Issues 12–13/1988.

translated and wrote about Eisler's ideals, as mentioned before) also participated in this conversation, pointing out how 'the dominant scientific thinking has an implicit system of hierarchy, violence and suppression of women', causing humans to look at nature with an overemphasis on masculine tendencies, such as violence, while undervaluing feminine phenomena, such as symbiosis. Interestingly, Sigmund Kvaløy's ideas became thus associated with ecofeminist ideals in *Vihreä Lanka* magazine by Hassi.[370]

Evidently, academic ecophilosophical thinkers such as Kvaløy (and others such as Arne Naess and Murray Bookchin to a more minor extent) were also a source of ideas for the Green Party. Some of these ideals can also be detected in their party programmes: the Greens were critical towards a 'mechanical' worldview where 'Mother Earth became a machine and human the machinist' – an idea stemming from the era of industrialisation from the 1700s onwards according to the Greens.[371] Hierarchies were criticised, as the Greens wanted to restructure, for example, 'job organisation' away from hierarchical models to offer more possibilities for workers to affect their own worklife.[372] Based on these notions, the Greens demanded more autonomy for citizens, demographics-based representation (and not merely party-based representation) to ensure proper representation for different gender-, age- and labour groups and a restructuring of proportional representation in a direction in which smaller parties or political groups would no longer be discriminated against.[373]

It is worth pointing out that these ideas were not new in the green circles, because the German Greens had been particularly keen to use the metaphor of a 'machine' to describe modern Western institutions, with 'apparat' often coming under criticism. It seems believable that such ideas presented by renowned eco-philosophers provided not only sources but also legitimacy and intellectual coherence to the ideas already present in the Greens' discussions – just as the *limits to growth* –discussion in 1972 had brought legitimacy to the growth-critical environmentalism some 15 years earlier.

Be that as it may, the years 1987–1988 were intellectually and philosophically stimulating for radical green discussions, which are particularly found in the pages of the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. The Finnish Greens started formulating their first party programmes these years, leading them to discuss the ideas of several important eco-philosophers – something they had not done to a similar degree in the movement's earlier years. The way in which these discourses were used in the green political context (e.g. the way in which the use of Kvaløy's ideas were intertwined with concepts rising from ecofeminism) portrays that ideas are rarely adopted as they originally are, but are rather placed in local political contexts and conceptualised in accordance to the needs that they are meant to address.

---

[370] Reuter, Martina 1988. 'Ekofilosofia etsii tietä monimuotoiseen yhteiskuntaan.' *VL* 13/1988
[371] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.
[372] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 4.
[373] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 6.

As a result, the ideas of eco-philosophers were often slightly altered or at least reframed in a more suitable framework for the Greens, as in the case of Sigmund Kvaløy. However, whether the magazine painted a reliable picture of their ideas is a moot point. From the perspective of the history of ideas, the interesting aspect lies in the way in which the Greens used such ideas in their own political discussions. Bookchin, for example, was associated with similar ideas as ideas presented by Eisler (an eco-feminist for whom dissolving hierarchies was linked to women's liberation from patriarchies) and Sigmund Kvaløy (a supporter of indigenous people living in 'organic time'). In other words, he was also presented primarily as a critic of hierarchies and the mastery mindset on which Western society and growth economy were built. In addition, he was also presented as a supporter of a more interconnected paradigm in social relationships, as well as the relationship between society and the non-human world, just as the other thinkers. All these articles not only demonstrate the (often transnational) flows of ideas that affected the Greens but also the ways in which they wanted to use these thinkers to validate the political goals of green radicalism, which were social as well as ecological in nature. Eisler's ideas, for example, were interpreted in a more ecological framework than she herself had presented them to be.

As mentioned before, Satu Hassi was one of the three writers of the 1990 programme draft. Therefore, detecting her at the centre of transferences of ecophilosophical and eco-feminist ideals clarifies how some of these ideals found their way into Green Party programmes – although naturally the other draft writers, Pekka Sauri and Pauli Välimäki, have been involved in this as well. Notably, these actors also actively participated in choosing the topics of discussion for the magazine. Hassi seems to have been particularly active in initiating the philosophical discussion of environmentalist ideas at the time. Sauri was an active commentator, while Välimäki was the Chief Editor of the magazine. Their sources for ideas seemed to be derived from a roughly similar conceptual cluster that can be traced back either to eco-feminism or to radical ecological philosophy, each corresponding with the basic green goals of reconceptualising human–nature relationships and what the meaning of well-being for both humans and non-human nature. Despite occasional spiritual explorations, these ideas largely stemmed from radical eco-philosophical and academic discussions, which were then applied to the political world – often with some alterations to better suit their political goals.

3.3 Presuppositions, transfers and comparisons between Finnish and German green radicalism

Painting a bigger picture of the radical green discourses as a whole may be crucial in understanding the larger trends, transfers of thought and conceptual clusters that the Greens engaged in, even though such an analysis is always

accompanied by some simplifications and generalisations of the different individual perspectives of *greenness*. In their radical programmes, the Greens in both countries altered, even rejected some of the core beliefs associated with what they considered the Western way of thinking. The discussion above has already shown how the Finnish Greens described upcoming ecological problems using apocalyptic images of events to come, but their demand for a radical eco-social green utopia did not stop at countering an ecological catastrophe by limiting excessive material growth and consumption. This radical ecologist standpoint was of course present in both Germany and Finland, as both countries subscribed to the 'survivalist' discourse of avoiding an eco-catastrophe,[374] but this standpoint was also accompanied by a larger social green critique of social conditions and even belief systems that were causing such scenarios to develop in the first place. The German Greens also began their programme with a similar description of horrifying scenarios for the future as the Finns did – the ecological crisis was getting worse, democratic rights were getting weaker, and the polluting economy was destroying the environment. In Finland, the economy was ripping off everything worth selling from nature, while in Germany, the waste economy *(Verschwendungswirtschaft)* was giving birth to a disposable society *(Wegwerfgesellschaft),* that removed meaning from life.[375]

The phrasings mentioned above already include social critique, as they asked questions related to losing meaning (of human well-being) and maintaining democracy (or the participatory version of it). Moreover, the reliance on key concepts such as *Kreislaufswirtschaft* and *Wachstumsgrenzen* (in Germany) as well as *tasapainotalous* and *kumppanuusliike* (in Finland) indicate that the radical greens in both countries wanted to get rid of the growth- and competition-based mentalities of the free market system altogether and replace them with new models of thought accompanied by a participatory grassroots-level version of democracy and decentralised local communal economies that would serve both human and natural well-being better. The eco-centric survivalist standpoint was thus accompanied by radical social greenness.

The ideological core of the agendas of both Green Parties was based on a very different set of assumptions regarding human–nature relationships than what they perceived the parliamentary and economic power systems to represent. Their ideals were based on presuppositions that: 1) both humans and the environment were being exploited by the political and economic hierarchical systems of domination; 2) the environment, to be understood as an interconnected whole that humans were dependent on, was responding negatively to being treated merely as a resource storage by these systems; and 3) the human self, human well-being and human–nature relationships ought to be redefined to attain a less hierarchical direction that would enhance interaction and companionship both between humans and nature and within human societies.

---

[374] As Dryzek (2005) has named it.
[375] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 4.

Consequently, growth of consumption and use of natural resources no longer measured well-being. Instead, well-being was marked by liberation of citizens from the control of such centralised power systems as the state or the global free market machinery. Taking concepts from the *limits to growth* -discussion, a similar understanding of well-being has been typical for the degrowth movement, as pointed out by Burkhard & al. According to them, the degrowth-movment has conceptualised the idea of a 'good life' (*guten Leben)* through time prosperity, conviviality, and liberation from 'Western development paradigm' to enable a culture of self-determination.[376] It was this realignment of the premises of Western thought that would propel criticism of such institutionalised practices as economic competitiveness and growth as well as centralised political decision-making systems. Instead, the Greens aimed at establishing a more environmentally friendly culture of autonomous participatory democracy that was conceptually linked to a more communal, even spiritual understanding of well-being. The Greens did not necessarily present (or even agree on) a precise picture of what their utopian future would look like. Instead, they attempted to formulate following which society should move forward. Moreover, since this change would have to occur from the bottom up anyway, the precise form of the outcome was less important for the Greens than the freedom to pursue it.

The Greens in both countries, being founded on social grassroots movements such as the anti-nuclear, peace and natural protection movements, drew their concepts for conducting their radical politics mainly from radical environmentalist discourses. These included the *limits to growth* -discourse and eco-philosophical discussions – discourses that were also visible in the new social movements of the 1970s. However, the Greens modified these ideas, associating them with eco-feminist ideas and concepts stemming from the 1970s and – in the case of Finnish Greens – even green spirituality. While the *limits to growth*– or *Wachstumsgrenzen* discourse was initiated in the 1970s as a technical calculation of the amount of human economic activity that nature could bear, it soon became a part of the radical ecologist and ecofeminist ideal of reconceptualising Western culture at a deeper level in the hands of green political actors. In this sense, both countries took their ideas from a very similar conceptual cluster, considering that all the aforementioned discourses originated from radical environmentalist grassroots movements in some way or the other. Since the Greens typically identified themselves as representators of these movements, it is understandable that their political concepts also largely stemmed from such a background.

The search for connections and transfers of ideas between the Finnish and German Greens is an interesting task. The three most notable forms of transfer that could be identified in the source material are book translations, personal connections and international green conferences. Although the aforementioned translations, such as Eisler's *Malja ja miekka,* are relevant, these ideas were transferred through personal connections as well. For example, Petra Kelly

[376] Burkhard & al. 2017, 110.

visited the Finnish Greens' conference in Lapland in 1988 – the same year when the first Finnish Green Party programme was formulated.[377] It is worth noting that although Kelly was not the only (and by the late 1980s, not even the most influential) ecofeminist in the party, with Jutta Ditfurth becoming the spokesperson of the German radical ecologist and ecofeminist wing at that time, she undoubtedly was the most notable one abroad, and clearly the most listened to in Finland.

Furthermore, the speech Kelly presented at a pan-European green conference in Stockholm in 1987 was translated to Finnish and published in *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. In this speech, Kelly underlined the problems of 'patriarchical' structures that were 'hierarchical' and thus oppressive towards both women and nature as part of its 'domination pattern'.[378] Petra Kelly's 'frantic visions' (*vimmatut visiot)* received roughly as much exposure in Finland as all other foreign speakers in the conference put together, with the newspaper later releasing a one page-long abridgement of her speech at the conference. In her speech, the German green radical compressed green ideology into five themes: feminism, pacifism, holistic spiritualism, ecologism, and international solidarity. All these themes could be found in both Finnish and German Green Party programmes. Kelly warned the Greens of becoming a part of the power establishment at the expense of their own goals and visions. Underlining freedom as a key value for all Greens, Kelly associated it with the decentralisation of the economy and production (which was a traditional German green goal that was soon to be mentioned in Finnish party programmes), as well as with finding peace by letting go of domination, patriarchy, and hierarchical power structures. In practice, this meant enhanced autonomy and citizens' grassroots movements – a strong theme both in Finnish and German Green Party discussions. Specifically, Kelly spoke against NATO membership and cooperation, as NATO represented the epitome of the very values and institutions that the Greens sought to change.[379]

Vihreä Lanka saw this as criticism of the famous *realo green* politician Joscha Fischer, who was ready to promote cooperation with NATO and the established system of institutions.[380] While this speculation might be true, Kelly's statement may also be seen as part of the ideological tradition of eco-feminist thought, considering that criticisms of patriarchal 'domination' and 'hierarchy' are quite similar to the criticism of 'mastery' that evolved among Finnish Greens, who also explicitly brought forth eco-feminist ideals. Clearly, Kelly was considered the same kind of celebrity in Finland as she was elsewhere in Europe, and, as a result, her words were closely listened to.

Green conferences, such as the one in Stockholm, can particularly be considered nexuses for international discursive transfers, as Greens from a wide

---

377 *VL* 1988. 'Ekofilosofiaa, ilmansaasteita ja shamanismia.' *VL* 13/1988.
378 Välimäki, Pauli 1987. 'Vihreä Tukholma.' *VL* 15/1987; Kelly, Petra 1987. 'Ei kompromisseja elämän ja kuoleman kysymyksissä!' *VL* 16/1987.
379 Välimäki, Pauli 1987. 'Vihreä Tukholma.' *VL* 15/1987; Kelly, Petra 1987. 'Ei kompromisseja elämän ja kuoleman kysymyksissä!' *VL* 16/1987.
380 Välimäki, Pauli 1987. 'Vihreä Tukholma.' *VL* 15/1987.

variety of countries attended them, shared their ideas and reported such ideas back to their countries. While German politicians such as Petra Kelly were most quoted in Finland, the pages of *Vihreä Lanka* reveal a variety of speakers from other countries as well, for example, the Belgian basic income thinker van Parjis, mentioned above. Conference reports also revealed that the German Greens were dealt with in a very critical light by other European greens. The environmentalist magazine *Suomi* mentioned that West German green socialism was particularly detested at European green conferences (which the Finnish Greens had been attending since 1984, despite not officially belonging to the organisation). In the 1988 Brussels European green conference, West German Greens in general, with Jürgen Maier as their representative in particular, were criticised for their refusal to cooperate even with other European greens due to their strict socialist connections, with Meier expressing his concern over the 'bourgeoisie ideology' (*porvarillinen aatemaailma)* of the other green delegates. Evidently, European green cooperation had become difficult to establish, since the German Green Party had chosen to cooperate mostly with socialist parties in other countries instead of their green sister parties, such as in Norway or Denmark, where the Greens were not socialist. Meanwhile, at the 1987 Stockholm conference, members of the Italian and Austrian Green Parties walked out of a European green cooperation workshop due to similar problems.[381] The need for explicit ideological detachment from far-left green socialism that the German Greens presented in international conferences is clearly noticeable. The Finnish Greens never associated themselves with either left- or right-wing politics.[382]

It seems that despite all conceptual similarities, the Finnish Greens were wary of accepting German influences in their original form, and often acted with caution with regard to the ideas of their German counterparts, potentially to avoid the kind of internal conflicts between the reformists and the radicals that the German Greens had already been experiencing by the late 1980s – an issue that was only looming in the future for the Finns at that time. The idea of the Finnish Greens being a kind of ideological copy of their German sister party was openly detested by Osmo Soininvaara, who had made a speech where he particularly underlined the lack of influences from Germany [383] and also pejoratively spoke of the German Greens' 'fundamental opposition' attitude,[384] referring to Petra Kelly's well-known phrase, an attitude the German Greens had embraced since the early 1980s.

Although it would be easy to over-estimate the German influence on the Finnish Greens, it would be equally easy to underestimate it when listening to such comments. While the German ideas of greenness were always considered with a grain of salt, it was nevertheless these very ideas that were constantly discussed by the Finnish Greens, who often reflected on their own position by

[381] *Suomi* 1988. *Suomi* 1/1988, 45–47.
[382] Riukulehto 2007, 20–21; Mickelsson 2007.
[383] Paastela 1987, 15–16. It is nevertheless notable that the very name itself stems from the German–based color connotation.
[384] Soininvaara, Osmo 1986. 'Ahdas rajaus kaventaa liikettä.' *VL* 3/1986.

posing it against that of Germany's even when disagreeing with them. As such, other countries did not serve as mirrors sufficient to reflect the position of the Finnish Greens. The discussions held at conferences make a fine point of this, as even when *greenness* was formulated differently from Germany, it was still done in relation to or in comparison to the German green position. Like an older sibling, *Die Grünen* was thus both an important example that the Finnish Greens followed in their development, as well as something that they needed to be differentiated from to form their own identity.

Indeed, a comparison between the countries revealed differences in political thought that were largely based on a difference of contexts. For example, emphasis on the responsibility of the consumer is a considerable difference between the parties, possibly associated with Finnish Greens avoiding conceptual association with left-wing socialism which the German Greens embraced. After all, the 1990 Finnish Green Party programme particularly underlined the problems of the socialist along with the capitalist way of thinking on several occasion, particularly mocking the idea of putting nature in an instrumental role.[385] Although there are many possible reasons for such a difference, national party-political contexts may provide some clue to finding the reason behind the parties positioning themselves differently in the political map. In the political field, Finland already had a party located left to the Social Democrats in Finland (SKDL, *Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto,* Finnish People's Democratic Alliance, which later became the Left Alliance) – while the downfall of the Liberal Party in the early 1980s left space for the emergence of a liberal centre party. In fact many of the early green influencers, including Osmo Soininvaara and Ville Komsi, originated from the former Liberal Party youth organisation.[386]

Meanwhile, Germany already had a Liberal party (FDP, the *Freie Demokratische Partei* or the Free Democratic Party), while a left-wing party left from the SPD did not appear on the political map until after the unification of the two Germanys, leaving room for the Greens in the left. As noted by Paul Hockenos, after the SPD had given up their Marxist rhetoric (as well as their Marxist party programme altogether) in the 1959 Bad Godesberg party conference in an attempt to gain more votes and eventually engage in governmental participation, many of the left-wing grassroots movements started calling themselves the 'homeless left'. They became more radical after their mother party cut the funding of the now-estranged radical grassroots movements, which turned out to be a catalyst for the ideal of participatory democracy (a criticism of parliamentary democracy that the Greens later accepted as a given), thus further radicalising many of the movements and creating more implicit distrust towards the party-political system in the process.[387] There was thus reasonable need for left-wing representation in Germany – a situation that did not exist in Finland, where the SDP's

[385] The section titled '*Towards a green economy*' started with the words 'neither socialism nor capitalism' (*ei sosialismi, ei kapitalismi)*. Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.
[386] Aalto 2018, 46–48.
[387] Hockenos 2008, 47–48, 61–63.

programme could still (until 1987) be understood in either the Marxist or the Keynesian way, and there was also a party more left from even the Social Democrats.[388]

The fear of state centralisation of political power through the system of parliamentary representation was also much less explicitly underlined in Finland than in Germany, where the fear of the *Atomstaat* loomed much larger. In fact, nuclear power was hardly criticised for this particular reason at all in Finland. Instead, it was criticised for being a part of the growth economy and for slowing down the transformation from coal to renewable energy sources, which would presumably be easier to produce under a more decentralised system, although the Finnish Greens did not explicitly explain this reasoning. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Greens were worried about the physical safety of building new nuclear power plants. They pointed out the usefulness of decentralising energy production as a method for increasing local economic autonomy, activity and democracy, although it did not appear to be as vital a part of the Finnish political programme as it was for the German Greens.[389]

Despite these differences, the key concepts and discourses propounded by the Green Parties from the two countries were essentially obtained from a very similar cluster of concepts, thus promoting similar (although not necessarily identical) goals in both countries. A comparison of the two countries may be suitably demonstrated using the metaphor of a family relationship: despite all the intentional need for differentiation from its German sister party, the Finnish Greens conceptually remained in the same family, so to speak. As in Germany, the reconceptualisation of Western premises in Finland was based on ideals of deeper interconnectedness within human societies regarding questions of equality and with natural systems on which human well-being was built on.[390] Just like the German Greens, the starting point for the Finns too was to question the one-sided relationship maintained by humans with the non-human world. Again, similar to the German Greens, the Finns, too, used the new understanding of interconnectedness as a premise to redefine their understanding of well-being and human–nature relationships at a programmatic level, while attempting to question the materialistic conception of well-being and redefine it in a more holistic direction. In Finland too, the project of re-evaluating the premises of Western culture included a process of liberation for the individual from the seemingly free but in fact extremely paralysing representative economic and political power systems.

In both countries, the Greens rose to the party-political level from alternative grassroots movements, which they sought to represent at the top level. It is notable that the green actors were very aware of the presumed

---

388 Mickelsson 2007, 223.

389 Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3. *'Pienvoimaloiden rakentaminen edistäisi myös hajautetun energiantuotannonjärjestelmän kehittämistä, mikä on suotavaa niin ekologisesti, aluepoliittisesti kuin energia-alan päätöksenteon demokratisointia ajatellen.'*

390 Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, Esipuhe; Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 7.

naivety that they would later be accused of by the reformists – of not being able to efficiently cooperate with the system they were participating in. In Germany in particular, this issue was addressed in terms of becoming an anti-party party that placed itself in fundamental opposition to the prevailing system. In Finland, this fundamental oppositionist position was not vocalised as clearly. There were more discussions on possible cooperation with the parliamentary system too, although opposing views were also constantly put forward. Such differences may be explained by the differing contexts of the new social movements from which the parties originated. In Finland, the new social movements had actively cooperated with the official state actors and institutions, and it was not until the 1979 Koijärvi movement that the radical environmentalist grassroots movement started acting separately from the state on a mass scale, as Solveig Bergman has noted.[391] Meanwhile, the German new social movements had not only been more actively engaged, more separate and more alienated from the decision-making system, but also more negatively reacted against by the state and the police, partly due to confusions arising from some of the militant grassroots movements of the 1970s.[392]

Finally, in both countries, this radical era of greenness can be understood as a utopian attempt to bring grassroots-level environmentalist ideas, concepts, cultural critique, and new organisational forms into traditional forms of politics. Meanwhile, since green identity was formulated through a dichotomist separation from the 'Western' presuppositions that the parliamentary system represented, the green oppositionist identity was created and strengthened by associating other parties with the position of detrimental Westernness, which in turn made cooperation more difficult. In an intriguing comparison to this notion, Rauli Mickelsson claimed that since the early 1980s, there had been discussion (if not necessarily programmatic declarations) also in other parties regarding the unsustainability of the Western way of life. Whether there could have been more room for cooperation even while holding a radical position remains an intriguing question – but one that cannot be answered due to the lack of empirical data.[393]

Be that as it may, the unwillingness to cooperate with the so-called 'system' or 'machine' was starting to breed problems within the Greens themselves. The radical era did not last long into the 1990s, as both Green Parties soon took a direction towards becoming more aligned to the presuppositions of the very political culture that they had set out to question, including the adoption of more market-friendly measures, while erasing the questioning of Western belief- and value systems from their agenda.[394] Shamanistic rituals would no longer be present in Green Party meetings either. This change would come to represent an intriguing example of altering and even partly rejecting a paradigm of presuppositions to which the parties had already subscribed, consequentially also loosening their ties to the grassroots movements in the

[391] Bergman 2002, 162.
[392] Hockenos 2008, 144–148.
[393] Mickelsson 2007, 281.
[394] The hegemonic nature of consumeristic politics is thoroughly analysed by Olsen 2019.

process. While these changes would take place in the 1990s, the debate on moderate reformism had been present at the margins of the parties since the early 1980s. This debate will be further analysed in the next chapter.

4 CHALLENGING RADICALISM: THE RISE OF GREEN REFORMISTS

The previous chapter presented the discussions and programmatic conceptualisations of the radical greens in the 1980s and early 1990s. It must be remembered, however, that parties do not act as unified collective units with unified ideologies that all individual actors were subjected to. While party members are usually expected to somewhat adapt to the general programmatic lines of the parties and conduct politics within their ideological guidelines, the seemingly unified programmes are usually the outcomes of compromises and struggles over defining the meaning of the party ideology and key concepts, which are constantly challenged.[395] Nowhere was this notion as visible as within the Green Parties. In a typical fashion, party conceptualisations and political goals were the outcome of strife, compromises and power struggles between different actors and factions of the parties.

An ideological discussion did, in fact, permeate the Green Parties throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Power struggles associated with different ideological factions eventually led to a major shift in the Green Parties' ideological positions in the early 1990s in both countries. While a more thorough conceptual analysis of the reformist programmes is presented in Chapter 5, this chapter analyses how the actors within the parties promoted different conceptualisations of greenness in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many of them became marginalised from the seemingly unified party line represented in the radically-aligned party programmes.

From the very beginning, the Green Parties consisted of actors and factions from different backgrounds, who consequently held very different understandings and conceptualisations of well-being, democracy and humans' relationship with nature. In Germany, the Greens were composed of a large number of factions, as explained in detail in Section 4.1. As will be presented later, the Greens comprised a conservative ecologist faction led by Herbert

[395] Poguntke 1993, 106; Aarnio 1998, 10–11.

Grühl, which left the party in 1982; a radical-socialist faction led first by Petra Kelly and later by Jutta Ditfurth; a moderate eco-socialist faction called *Linke Forum* led in the early 1990s by Ludger Volmer; the reformist moderates (often called *Realos)* led by Joschka Fischer and Hubert Kleinert and the market-oriented liberal faction *Aufbruch* ('New Direction') led by Antje Vollmer. As if this fragmentation were not enough, the East German civil rights movement called *Bündnis 90* joined the Greens in 1993, whose actors were typically located in the centre-right and were often regarded as value conservatives.[396]

In Finland, Sari Aalto identified three different factions of the Finnish Greens in her study of the early development of the Greens – eco-feminists, social greens and radical ecologists, who formed their own associations after 1987, when the Greens formed their first alliance.[397] Furthermore, the green concepts and ideas can be roughly grouped into the (radical) social green, (moderate) liberal reformist and radical ecologist clusters. Despite some similarities, overlaps and less divisive infighting between the groups as compared to Germany, the ideological debate of the Finnish Greens followed a roughly similar route as the German Greens, although they were adapted to the local Finnish context where socialism played a notably smaller role. Finnish green discussions and debates between the reformists and the radicals also started at a slightly later stage and were not in full swing until the late 1980s. These discussions are further analysed in Section 4.2. Indeed, since there were also individual differences and overlaps within all these ideological groups, outlining the groups into ideological factions is always a somewhat arbitrary but nevertheless necessary endeavour in order to properly analyse the different environmental political discourses in the party.

Regardless of the number of ideological groups involved, by the early 1990s, the division between the moderates, who supported environmentalism within a free market economy based on growth and competitiveness, and the radicals, who wanted to reconceptualise such a basis for politics altogether, had become a contentious issue within the green movement in both countries. Despite the aforementioned difference in party fragmentation between the two parties, there was a similar ideological turn in the party line during the early-to-mid 90s in both countries, as the formerly radical eco-socialists joined forces with the reformists to swing the parties towards a more market-friendly and pragmatic direction by subscribing to concepts such as *sustainable development*.

In this chapter, I analyse how the ideological discussion between the different factions progressed, how different sides of the party conceptualised their positions in this debate, and how discussions within the parties led to a significant change in party leadership and ideology during the first half of the 1990s. Furthermore, the significant role played by the leftist moderates in both countries (and in Germany, also the East German *Bündnis* newcomers) in bringing about the power shift towards reformism in both parties is also

[396] Makoto Nishida has found altogether six separate factions within *Die Grünen*, the most important of which are mentioned above. Nishida 2005, 7.
[397] Aalto 2018, 294.

demonstrated. This chapter points out that such a turn did not take place in a vacuum but had a long-standing reformist tradition contributing to it. While the Greens had come into the public limelight by representing alternative grassroots movements and their radical goals and ideals, both parties nevertheless comprised a more moderate *realpolitik* faction from the very beginning, albeit a marginal one at first. Section 4.1. focuses on early reformists, led by Joschka Fischer, one of the earliest public promoters of moderate greenness, and their radical opposition to Petra Kelly and the other radicals. Fischer's ideas were also discussed in Finland, where Osmo Soininvaara became the most notable spokesperson in favour of a more moderate approach to greenness and environmental questions. Soininvaara was later supported by actors such as Pekka Haavisto and Pekka Sauri, and eventually even the formerly anti-modernist party chair Heidi Hautala, as further illustrated in Section 4.2.

In earlier research, the green turn towards reformism has often been understood either as a growth process – the party's intention to grow into more responsible adult-like cooperation and acceptance of realities[398] – or has been framed in terms of greenwashing or selling out of the environmentalist ideals that the party was built on.[399] In Section 4.3., I take a closer look at the key arguments and premises presented by different sides in the green debate. I argue that the reformist actors based their argumentation on pragmatism as a response to the ineffectiveness of earlier radicalism and the radicals' refusal to cooperate with the established party-political system. The reformists framed the turn as a coming-of-age story of sorts, emphasising that giving up radicalism was a necessary sacrifice for making an actual difference in the political field. Notably, this shift towards reformism had little ideological argumentation behind it, as the reformists set out to convince their fellow greens of their ideals on practical grounds.

In many instances, the discussion on the necessary sacrifices that needed to be made may also be understood as an argumentative tool – after all, since the reformists who had supported market-friendlier greenness from the get-go would certainly not have to sacrifice their vision of greenness, the sacrifice would have to be made by the radicals. Meanwhile, many radicals opposed this line of thought on more ideological grounds, with emotionally loaded opposition and even walk-outs occurring due to the parties turning into something else than what it had been. A proper analysis of the dynamics of this discussion requires an investigation into the argumentation and its premises presented by both sides of the debate. This way, we can also avoid the kind of teleological interpretation of history where environmentalism automatically

[398] E.g. Lucardie & Frankland 2008; Uekötter 2014; Aalto 2018; Karimäki 2022. In many of these cases, the parlamentarisation of the parties have been discussed as a more or less natural turn of events, even an unavoidable law of politics. The radical ideas are then analysed and reflected against this perspective, possibly as a necessary challenge in the growing-up process of the parties.

[399] The green association with the 'sustainability' discourse in particular has been labeled as 'greenwashing' by, e.g., Jeremy L. Caradonna 2018; Lewis Akenji 2019 meanwhile has discussed green consumerism in terms of 'consumer scapegoatism'.

refers to a certain kind of greenness, thus ignoring the parts played by actors, interests and contextual political intentions in the development.[400]

I argue that the differences in the presuppositions of the two factions can, in fact, be associated with the differences in their expectations regarding what Green Party environmentalism should be expected to achieve. If the goal of the party was to affect environmental legislation in a positive manner, moderate reformism would be an appropriate way to pursue such a goal. In such a case, it makes perfect sense to call the change a process of 'maturity' – of taking responsibility. However, if the goal was to raise awareness and facilitate discussions of radical grassroots ideals and the new culture associated with it, cooperation with the established party-political world would be a failure in fulfilling the ultimate green goal, even if it would lead to more positive environmental legislation in the short run. For the radicals, such a legislation would still be taking place within the framework of exploitative power systems and their continuous growth. From the viewpoint of this framework, claims of 'selling out' and even 'greenwashing' start to make sense.

However, neither of these explanations – the 'coming of age' story or the 'selling out' story – have tried to examine the debate as a whole, since they both reflect the perspective of only one side of the debate. Limiting the perspective to such a narrow window tends to disregard the power struggles and intra-party dynamics that were at play, while also not recognising the intentions and motivations behind the different approaches to the issue. Addressing this gap, a broader perspective regarding the moderate shift of the Green Parties is inspected more closely in the last section of this chapter.

4.1 'Reformism within the framework of capitalism': The German reformist debate

4.1.1 Against fundamental-oppositionism: early reformism of the Greens' parliament group

Just two years after the formation of *Die Grünen,* a two-sided party opposition had emerged among the German Greens. This was a result of the umbrella nature of the party, which was designed to include the entire variety of actors involved at the grassroots level – 'an assembly point for divergent political currents', as Frank Uekötter phrased it.[401] A lack of coherent ideology was not considered a problem in a party that was designed to initiate discussions and represent the grassroots ideal of basic democracy instead of, for example,

[400] In terms of Frank Uekötter (2014, 101–102), there is the danger of a 'reverse tomato' interpretation where environmentalism will turn into political greenness in what is an automatic process, as if alternative pathways of development would not be possible. Looking at the actors' argumentation and debate hopefully avoids the 'reverse tomato' interpretation regarding the Green turn to reformism.
[401] Uekötter 2014, 116.

affecting legislation through parliamentary representation. Their environmental standpoint was based on the science of ecology while cherishing the icon of an endangered blue planet. This ideal was not entirely compatible with the older conservative method of natural protection that chose to protect specific natural reserves rather than focus on larger questions concerning global bio- and climate systems. However, these conservative ecologists, many of whom had earlier belonged to the conservative Christian Democratic CDU/CSU party, left the new Green Party in 1982. This exit was led by Herbert Gruhl, who had previously been a promoter of natural conservation in the *Bundestag* as a dissident member of the CDU/CSU. He was also one of the first to envision a federal Green Party (Green Action Future, or *GAZ)* as well as a key founding member of *Die Grünen*. However, Gruhl was disappointed with the social emphasis that the eco-socialist majority of the party supported. A small group of conservatives followed his lead to establish their own Green Party – the Ekological-Democratic Party (ÖDP, *Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei)* – that did not achieve much prominence in the political field.[402]

Even after the conservatives' departure, a wide spectrum of groups remained within the party. According to Frank Uekötter, the German Green Party still contained 'eco-socialists and bourgeois ecologists, radical ecologists and eco-libertarians influenced by the anthroposophy movement, urban alternative types and eco-farmers, feminists and gay activists, peaceniks and animal welfare activists, religious-spiritual currents and communist cadres.' Therefore, even after the conservatives left, the party was far from being unified ideologically; neither did it attempt to do so. Most of these aforementioned groups were working together to formulate alternative visions for society under the conception of an 'interconnected ecological thinking'. This thinking would address all the aforementioned diverse issues by replacing the narrow focus on anthropocentric and materialistic perspectives with an ideal of interconnections with larger systems of life, as seen in the previous chapter.[403]

This standpoint would soon be challenged. Although the starting point of moderate reformist greenness is often dated to 1985,[404] an analysis of party discussions reveals that a more moderate opposition, which hoped to steer the party discussion towards a more accessible market-oriented direction, was already emerging within the party around the same time as the conservative opposition made their departure. Some actors particularly in the Green parliament group no longer wished to align their thinking with the holistic themes of ecologism in an attempt to escape market-oriented and consumeristic language. These actors have sometimes been commonly described as the *Realos,* although not until the mid-1980s.

In this context, it should be noted that this dissertation uses the term 'reformist' to describe the moderate green ideological position for several reasons. First, the term 'reformist' was used all across Europe, including in

[402] Milder 2017, 195–196; Hockenos 2008, 150–151, 157–158.
[403] Uekötter 2014, 116.
[404] As noted in the Greens' own *historik,* see Die Grünen 2019, 22–23.

Finland, while the more commonly known term *Realo* (which was being widely used in Germany by 1986) was mostly limited to the German context, although with some exceptions. Second, the term *Realo* has two separate meanings in the source material and the literature. These meanings are not usually used separately from each other – the term at times refers to a wider green reformist ideology in general, while at other times it refers to the very exact and small(ish) group of party actors who called themselves the *Realos* as opposed to, for example, the *Aufbruch* Greens who also supported reformist politics but belonged to a different faction within the party. In such a case, a question arises as to whether the *Aufbruch* leader and reformist politics supporter Antje Vollmer should be considered a *Realo.* Third, and perhaps the most important reason, the terms *Realo* and *Fundis* (which was often used to describe the radical position) have, over time, started to carry the weight of containing an implicit statement in support of political realism and against ideological fundamentalism, and can thus be easily understood as value-charged terms.

To avoid turning this analysis into a history of the winners – where the concepts of the winning side of the debate are anachronistically used to analyse the debate as a whole – I have used the term *Realos* to describe one specific group of individuals within the party who referred to themselves as such rather than using it as a defining term for the larger reformist ideology, which is referred to as green 'reformism' in this study. Nonetheless, some emphasis is placed on tracing the ways and conditions in which the term '*Realo*' was used in the sources. Furthermore, since the radical left-wing greens rarely used the term *Fundis* to refer to themselves, I have decided to refrain from using this term altogether, except when quoting a source using it. Both in Germany and in Finland, the so-called 'fundamentalists' have typically called themselves the 'radical' greens, while also attaching a variety of attributes to this radicalism (e.g. feminism, ecologism, etc.), or have at least considered 'radicalism' as a positive attribute in relation to their ideals, as will become apparent in the course of this chapter. Hence, this study uses the concepts of reformism and radicalism both as empirical (which the actors themselves often used) and analytical concepts (describing the position and incentives of the actors on both sides as concepts that they themselves could hopefully accept) – despite the fact that the reformists occasionally referred to themselves as 'radical' reformists.[405] This probably demonstrates the prestigious position that the Greens endowed to the concept of radicalism.

Although the starting point of reformist greenness is often dated to 1985,[406] the drift between the real political and radical greens was detectable in media reports as early as the 1982 Hagen party conference. While Petra Kelly, standing down as the first party chair, warned the Greens of cooperating with the SPD (expressing her fears of sinking into the arms of 'old charmer Willy Brandt' [407]), her successor Rainer Trampert wanted to discuss possible

[405] E.g. Joschka Fischer in Germany, who either called himself a radical reformist or a radical pragmatist. See Fischer 1989, 55–56.
[406] Including in the Greens' own *historik,* see Die Grünen 2019, 22–23.
[407] *'Dem alten Charmeur Willy Brandt in die Arme sinken'*

cooperation with the SPD as well as a reconciliation of the demands of economy and ecology – which, as seen in Chapter 3, was clearly directed against the radical ideals of greenness that the party programme was based on. This indicates that the party consisted of what *Der Spiegel* referred to as 'pragmatists and reform politicians' (*Pragmatiker und Reformpolitiker*) who wanted to challenge the radical course of the party even before it had entered the *Bundestag*.[408]

Although the deep contradiction between the two sides slowly began to emerge at the 1982 party conference, their debates were not yet particularly heated. In reality, the question of cooperating with the SPD at the federal level was considered a moot point at the time, as green threshold questions for such cooperation (including forest protection, immediate shutdown of nuclear power facilities and removal of all nuclear and chemical weapons from Germany) were considered unapproachable by the still very industry-oriented SPD. Furthermore, the majority of the Green party objected to this moderate reformism for ideological reasons. Replying to Trampert's demands for 'economic reforms within the framework of capitalism',[409] Rudolf Bahro emphasised that true ecologists should 'decouple' themselves from the world market (*vom Weltmarkt abkoppeln*).[410]

Furthermore, when *Der Spiegel* interviewed the leaders of the first Green parliament group – Otto Schily and Joschka Fischer – in the summer of 1983, it presented moderate green ideals alongside radical ones, despite the former's marginal position in the party at the time. Schily presented the idea of 'ecology as a human right' and portrayed himself as an advocate of human rights more than anything else. Schily thus expressed a significantly more anthropocentric standpoint in his argumentation compared to how the other actors in the environmental movement usually phrased their ambitions. It is worth noting that the terms *Realos* and *Fundis* were not mentioned even once at this time, with Schily referring to himself as a 'liberal socialist' (*liberaler Sozialist*) and Fischer calling himself an 'ecological radical reformist' (*ökologischer Radikalreformist)*, as opposed to the 'fundamental-oppositionists' (*Fundamental-Oppositionelle*) who refused to cooperate with the established system. Furthermore, Otto Schily directly attacked Petra Kelly's ideas by claiming, 'I think, that the overwhelming majority does not see the parliament as a forum for the Fundamental-Opposition'.[411] As pointed out by Hockenos, 'fundamental oppositionism' was a concept that dominated green thinking in the early 1980s, marking a clear distinction between Fischer's thoughts and those of Petra Kelly.[412]

Both Fischer's and Schily's statements can thus be understood as a critique of the Kellyan foundations of green political thinking. Fischer even went so far

---

[408] *Der Spiegel* 1982. 'In die Arme.' 47/1982.
[409] *'Ökonomische Reformen im Rahmen des Kapitalismus'*
[410] *Der Spiegel* 1982. 'In die Arme.' 47/1982; Hockenos 2008, 166–168.
[411] *'Ich denke schon, daß die überwiegende Mehrheit das Parlament nicht als Forum für die Fundamental-Opposition ansieht'*
[412] Hockenos 2008, 167.

as to prophesise (quite accurately, as it later turned out) that both the radical and the reformist perspectives could not simultaneously survive within the Greens. Nevertheless, at this point, the discussion was mostly about the means, not the outcome – both Schily and Fischer supported the important green themes, such as anti-nuclear stands, pacifist peace policies and radical action against ongoing deforestation. In addition, the fear of a repetition of Auschwitz was present in Joschka Fischer's and Otto Schily's support of radical anti-militarism – a constantly present issue in green argumentation. Fischer claimed that it was precisely after Auschwitz that preparations for mass extermination (referring to nuclear armament) should have been made a 'taboo'. In accordance with the anti-modernity notion of radical environmentalist thought, Fischer even associated such preparations with the 'system logic of modernity' (*Systemlogik der Moderne*), with Schily emphasising the possible danger of a 'nuclear Auschwitz' (*ein atomares Auschwitz*). [413] It is worth noting that references to Germany's national-socialist past often played a significant role in such argumentation, especially when discussing liberal policies. Moreover, the reformists were not alone in this trend and, one might add, neither were the Greens.[414] Furthermore, Fischer, the future supporter of *ecological modernisation,* still presented his ideas in an anti-modernist fashion.

Green ideology was widely debated in the pages of *Der Spiegel* magazine even before the party had become a major player at the federal level. Though *Der Spiegel* was not an ecologist magazine (its founder Rudolf Augsberg was a well-known liberal and an MP of the liberal FDP party), the magazine saw the new party in a positive light and was invested in giving room to their discussions. [415] Perhaps this is why the magazine also published several interviews and open discussions about the ideas presented by green politicians over the upcoming years. The magazine itself would occasionally side with the reformists, though, as will be seen when discussing the 1991 Neumünster party conference in the next section. Nevertheless, the magazine did present both sides of the discussion in the form of interviews, making it a worthwhile source for understanding green discourses at the time.

These discussions were also taking place in the Green parliament group. As seen in the previous chapter, the initial goal of representing the alternative movement and its voices in the *Bundestag* was also present in the parliament group in 1983. However, the parliament group minutes reveal that it took less than a year for the group to start discussing alternative, more realpolitical modes of conduct. These started to emerge in parliament group discussions as early as January 1984. In particular, Joschka Fischer initiated conversations on whether the parliament group should maintain a 'relative distance from their

[413]Paul Lersch 1983. 'Wir sind ein schöner Unkrautgarten.' *Der Spiegel* 24/1983.
[414] E.g. on liberal immigration laws and fears of ethnicity-based citizenship, see Murray 1994, 44–46; on the nuclear question and fears of *Atomstaat*, see Jung 1995, 644 and Kaarkoski 2016, 173–176.
[415] The immediate positive reaction is mentioned by Hockenos 2008, 172–173.

political base'.[416] In addition to this, Fischer initiated reflections on calling industry representatives to discuss cooperation for the development of new greener sources of energy and with other parties – ideas that were alien to the radicals and scorned upon by the group just a year earlier.[417] Although no specific decision on such new directions was made, it was this separation of the parliament group and its thought process from the party leadership that would drive the Greens to a state of internal conflict by the end of the 1980s.

That same month, *Der Spiegel* featured discussions among green actors regarding the inefficiency of the rotation principle, which sought to change all green MPs midway through the parliamentary term. In this same article, another reformist green parliamentarian, Otto Schily, demanded cooperation with the SPD, hinting at the possibility of joining the government as SPD's side party as soon as 1987.[418] Statements such as these were not well received by the party radicals. Paul Hockenos noted that reformism was almost immediately associated with moral corruption and careerism, hinting at the advancement of personal gain and power for such reformists.[419] Later, after the radicals lost control of the party in 1991, Jutta Ditfurth continued this line of thought, accusing reformists such as Fischer of pursuing their own career opportunities.[420]

Although Joschka Fischer had been a moderate green from the very beginning of the party, the fact that his moderate positions had begun to appear in parliament group discussions in 1984, bypassing the ideological boundaries drawn just a year earlier, already signified a change in the discourses of the group. 'Cooperation' was constantly brought up in discussions instead of the earlier 'antiparty-party' ideal from then on. In fact, in 1984, the Green parliament group had, rather heretically, started participating in some environmental legislative work in cooperation with other parties. That year, the *Bundestag* passed a law that made it mandatory for new cars produced in Germany to have catalytic converters, thus removing the most harmful emissions. Notably, the green parliamentarians were deeply involved in this process.[421]

Consequently, in March 1984, the parliament group expressed fears of growing ideological contradictions inside the party for the first time. The parliament group made a statement against defamation, marginalisation and disparagement of minority opinions within the party, maintaining that the failure to find such a rationality would lead to the Greens 'destroying themselves'.[422] In September 1984, the group continued discussing this subject, identifying an intra-party ideological contradiction between the 'fundamental

---

[416] *'Dies erfordet aber eine für Parlamentarische Arbeit typische Fähigkeit, nämlich zur relativen Distanz von der eigenen politischen Basis.'*
[417] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 10 January 1984: Klausursitzung der Fraktion.
[418] *Der Spiegel* 1984. 'Liebe Freunde.' *Der Spiegel* 3/1984.
[419] Hockenos 2008, 169.
[420] Left Green Perspectives 1991. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.' LGP #25.
[421] Die Grünen 2019, 20–21.
[422] *'Werden wir uns selbst kaputtmachen'*. Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. March 1984: Bericht zur Lage der Fraktion.

opposition' and 'realpolitical' attitudes. They linked this conflict to a difference between the party's Federal Main Committee and the Green parliament group. The first of the two represented the environmental movements and were thus inclined to adopt direct movement politics (*Bewegungspolitik),* while the latter represented the parliamentary arm of this movement, which was more distanced from the immediate action and needed different strategies to operate. The parliament group claimed that failing to understand this difference was at the core of the intra-party ideological conflict. More precisely, in their perspective, the radical party leadership failed to understand that the parliament group needed a more moderate strategy to function.[423]

The very same parliament group had still subscribed to radical ideals when they started their work in 1983. In March 1984, they noted an intra-party conflict but spoke of it in very vague terms, while six months later, in September 1984, they could already identify and express the core ideological difference of the conflict as well as the participants in it. Evidently, some of the parliamentarians changed their attitudes on how to approach politics after just one year of parliamentary work. In their own words, the radical strategy simply did not work and it had turned the parliament group to a mere discussion group.

Nevertheless, temporal political contexts might play a role in this change as well: the aforementioned discussions were preceded by what the German political historian Paul Hockenos called the 'Hot Autumn' or the 'Autumn of the Euromissles' of 1983. With the *Bundestag* set to vote on allowing more US nuclear weapons to be placed on German soil, peace protests in the country spread wider than ever before, with over one million Germans protesting against the further nuclear armament of the country. As mentioned already, the Greens considered themselves the representatives of precisely these kinds of extra-parliamentary movements, of which the peace movement was the biggest. They were now joined by the left-leaning Social Democrats in these protests as well.[424]

The harsh reality struck in November, when the *Bundestag* voted to welcome missiles into Germany despite widespread protests. In the words of Paul Hockenos, 'three years of mass demonstrations and untold thousands of antimissile events had not slowed the delivery of the new weaponary by even a day.' This incident turned out to give reformist thinking a notable boost. Fischer, his Hessean reformist companion Hubert Kleinert, and Otto Schily, among others, felt that the Greens ought to use their position in the parliament to prevent such decisions in the future instead of merely becoming a part of a weak extra-parliamentary movement that could only protest but could ultimately not affect the decision-making process.[425] However, according to Hockenos, the gloomy estimates of the 'weakness' of the peace movement were somewhat misplaced. A 1984 poll revealed that a clear majority (61%) of the

[423] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 5–6 September 1984: Klausursitzung der Fraktion, zweiter und dritter Tag.
[424] Hockenos 2008, 193–194.
[425] Hockenos 2008, 193–194, 199–200.

CDU/CSU voters had started to oppose the extension of nuclear arms in Germany due to the media visibility of the peace movement, causing the Kohl government to become more careful in the future and even decreasing their defence budget.[426]

As evidenced by the source material, Joseph 'Joschka' Fischer (b. 1948) was not only leading the charge for reformism from inside the party but was also constantly popularising these ideals in public discussion and in newspapers, thus becoming a spokesperson for reformist green goals. It is therefore worthwhile to look at his background in more detail. According to Fischer's biographer Paul Hockenos, as a former street fighter of the often violent far-left Spontis and Red Army Faction (RAF) groups that had terrorised Frankfurt in the early-to-mid 1970s, Fischer had become one of the leaders and organisers of militant factions in the mid-1970s. In keeping with his reputation of knowing where the wind is about to blow next, Fischer got out of the militant left just in time before the RAF multiplied their militant activity in 1977. Having left the Marxist organisations, Fischer's personal beliefs underwent a reverse pendulum swing in the direction of pragmatic moderation in the late 1970s, which saw him leave behind the aforementioned groups ideologically as well.[427] According to Hockenos, he was finally inspired to join the Green Party in the summer of 1981 because the 'older statesman' of the SPD, Willy Brandt, hinted at the possibility of governmental cooperation with the Greens. Fischer was recorded explaining to his friend how there would soon be a leftist majority in the *Bundestag* if the SPD combined forces with a growing green movement, and this would make real 'reform' happen. In the election year of 1983, together with his ex-Spontis and Frankfurt associates, Fischer made these reformist ideals public through a 'pragmatic' manifesto – a reformist vision for the party – stating that, 'parliament is not the place for an ecology seminar'. Such an endeavour was not always easy to conduct – while trying to have an open discussion in Frankfurt, Fischer and his associates were, at least on one occasion, met with rotten tomatoes and paint-filled balloons.[428]

Therefore, the radical greens had hardly gotten the chance to break into the national consciousness when a reformist intra-party opposition had already emerged. In 1985, *Der Spiegel* pointed out how visions of 'real-political possibility' (*realpolitische Möglichkeit*) and demands for taking 'responsibility' (*Verantwortung*) had, in fact, already been in Fischer's vocabulary in 1981 when the Greens achieved their first victory in the Hessean local elections, urging for cooperation with the prevailing political and economic system. Making his way into the federal parliament in 1983, Fischer networked with important SPD and CDU/CSU politicians during his 2-year tenure as a green MP and subsequently became more influential than the other greens in terms of actual parliamentary work simply by being interested in it. With the image of a 'rascal' on his side, he seemed to have been forgiven a surprising amount of verbal mischief, such as

[426] Hockenos 2008, 195–196.
[427] Hockenos 2008, 111–114, 119–121, 125.
[428] Hockenos 2008, 165–169.

describing the *Bundestag* as a 'meeting of schnaps-smelling alcoholics' and publicly calling the *Bundestag* vice president Richard Stücklen an 'asshole' (*Arschloch*). On being accused of wanting to waste so much money on ecological reforms that someone would have to print him more, Fischer claimed to have such good relations with the underworld that he would have no trouble finding such a money printer if necessary. Despite his questionable reputation, Fischer constantly expressed willingness to cooperate with the prevailing system rather than fight against it. According to a fellow reformist green, Hubert Kleinert, Fischer's influence among the moderate liberals grew significantly after a tragic case when immigrant Turk Kemal Altun committed suicide to avoid deportation in 1983. After a 'stirring' speech in parliament, Fischer became a spokesperson and a symbol for all liberal intellectuals demanding human rights and improved asylum laws – a goal that aligned with Otto Schily's aforementioned vision of a 'human rights party'. The possibility of new voters from the liberal side of the political spectrum seemed to have manifested itself already by this time, resulting in the influx of moderate liberal ideals within the party.[429]

Soon, other greens became interested in reformist ideals particularly within the increasingly frustrated parliament group. Joakim Radkau has pointed out how group spokesperson Michael Vesper had started publicly demanding green MPs to become 'full-blooded parliamentarians' in order to affect legislation rather than just protest to it.[430] *Der Spiegel* also reported how the Greens held a closed party conference in 1984 to discuss the possibility of reform politics. The majority of green parliamentarians still voted against possible government cooperation with SPD at this time, leaving the reformists in the marginal. According to right-wing green Antje Vollmer, the Greens were afraid of losing their political 'innocence' (*Unschuld*). [431] The reference to political innocence here is intriguing, as similar vocabulary had been earlier adopted by Joseph Huber, a spokesman for the *ecological modernisation* movement that starting from the early 1980s developed new concepts in the academia to promote environmentalism in a manner less radical than that of the Greens' – and one adaptable with the current socio-economic system.[432] So far, such ideals were met with rejection among the Greens.

Finally, it was Joschka Fischer's selection as the first state-level green minister in 1985 that drove the Greens to an internal crisis. Many sources (including the Greens' own *Grüene Chronik* from 2019)[433] remember the year 1985 as the year when the debate between the so-called *Realos* and the *Fundis* started. Looking through both the Green parliament group minutes as well as the discussion in *Der Spiegel,* it is easy to dispute this claim, as this discussion had already started by 1982 – although with different names – and was on full swing soon after the first parliament group came together. The debate did,

[429] *Der Spiegel* 1985. 'Hessen koalition: "Wie Willy wollte"'. *Der Spiegel* 45/1985.
[430] Radkau 2011, 206.
[431] *Der Spiegel* 1984. 'Wir wollten nicht die Männer entmachten'. *Der Spiegel* 17/1984
[432] Järvikoski 2009, 95; see also Huber 1982.
[433] Die Grünen 2019, 22–23.

however, become more public and more fierce in 1985, as the Greens started cooperating with SPD in Hesse under Fischer's leadership, proving that it was theoretically possible to formulate such a coalition. The Greens had won the Hessean state elections with a programme that was – in a very non-Green manner – full of compromises, and their 8% electorate support was higher than in any other state. In *Der Spiegel,* Fischer admitted planning to promote ecological reforms only as long as he would be able to achieve them 'in consensus with the economy' instead of harder environmental responsibilities and regulation on industries.[434] After this concession, SPD seems to have been ready to work with him.[435] Fischer's vocabulary is revealing: while based on consistent demands of 'responsibility' and 'cooperation' for the pragmatic purpose of affecting legislation, his argumentation used a very economy-oriented language, something the radicals consistently avoided. (The differences in reformist and radical argumentation is inspected more closely in Section 4.3.)

Others saw the Hessean experiment as a reason not to cooperate with the SPD, though. Nuclear power was a threshold question for the SPD and no commitment was made to shut the two plants of the area down. Paul Hockenos portrays the green reformist problems as Fischer took the oath of office: 'Greens' fundies in the Hesse *Landtag* voted against him; most of the Bundestag greens opposed red-green coalitions in principle; the SPD leadership was bent on discrediting the "Hessian model"; Börner [the social democratic prime minister of Hesse] and his cabinet ministers aimed to keep the new ministry down and weak; the civil servants in Fischer's own office, skeptical of a greens boss, were uncooperative; and then, of course, there were the opposition conservatives, the state's hostile industry, and the trade unions, too.' In addition to this, the new ministry was short on money, expertise, legal staff, and on top of it all, the telephones in the ministry building did not work, causing Fischer to call his job a 'joke' in his personal diary after a few unsuccessful phone call attempts. Even modest reforms had started to seem entirely impossible.[436] In 1987, *Der Spiegel* reported how Fischer's post was creating more controversy, as his state government kept dumping toxic waste to GDR, causing anger in the radical environmentalist camp.[437] Nevertheless, the big industries stopped dumping their untreated liquids into the River Main during Fischer's tenure as environmental minister.[438]

As the reformists were increasingly vocal of the need for moderation in politics, a counter-reaction over green direction was immediately taking place in radical left-wing newspapers such as the anarchistic *Schwarzer Faden,* as well as the *Grünes Info,* a green newspaper that served as a mouthpiece for radical

---

[434] *'Auch mit der Wirtschaft so viel wie möglich im Konsens erreichen'*
[435] *Der Spiegel* 1985. 'Hessen koalition: "Wie Willy wollte"'. *Der Spiegel* 45/1985; Die Grünen 2019, 14–15.
[436] Hockenos 2008, 202–208.
[437] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Avanti spumanti'. *Der Spiegel* 40/1987.
[438] Hockenos 2008, 202–208.

green perspectives.[439] These magazines, claiming to represent the grassroots movements and the BI *(Bürgerinitiativen)* wing of the Greens, started claiming around 1985 how 'many greens no longer represent the basic demands of the Bl movement, but take refuge in questionable compromises with the rulers'. The *Grünes Info* magazine pointed out how the party no longer participated in organising the BIs as they had done just a few years earlier, and how 'energetic resistance from the independent Bl movement is to be expected.'[440] It is notable that just two years earlier, the same magazines had endorsed members of BIs and citizens' groups to cooperate with the party particularly because of its 'antiparty-party' –stance.[441] However, as German political historian Herbert Kitschelt has noted, the Greens had a much larger percentage of their people in local and municipal political offices due to the small party size than most parties. In mid-1980s, 12,5 % of Green Party members served in elected offices, mostly in local towns. In some states, this number reached 20 %.[442] It was particularly this tendency towards official positions and the consequential decrease of non-parliamentary action that seemed to anger the BIs and their representatives, as well as inspire the Greens to seek alternative, more moderate ways of acting and conceptualising their politics.[443]

Though the reformists were still in the margins of the party, their position was was soon rising to the green mainstream. As the Greens were set to write a new political programme in 1986 to conceptualise their concrete political goals for the 1987 federal elections, compromises were already taking place behind the radical scenes.

4.1.2 The two faces of 'Restructuring the Industrial Society'

It was in this increasingly heated atmosphere that *Die Grünen* released a programme on 'Restructuring of Industrial Society' (*Umbau der Industriegeselleschaft)* in September 1986. Though seemingly radical in its goals on the surface (as seen in the previous chapter), the outcome was preceded by debates and compromises, with the more reform-oriented parliament group challenging the radical control of the party during the year-long planning of the programme. According to green politician Manfred Busch, one of the initiators of this programme, the development process leading to the new 1986 programme was closely connected with the increasing credibility of the SPD among environmentally and socially aligned voters. While the programme of green principles from 1980 would remain intact, the goal of this new programme was to create 'concrete green concepts' (*konkrete grüne Konzepte)* that could be used to underline 'the seriousness of green politics by

---

[439] *Grünes Info* 1986. GI 5–6/1986.
[440] '*Viele Grüne vertreten die Grundforderungen der Bl-Bewegung nicht mehr, sondern nehmen Zuflucht zu fragwürdigen Kompromissen mit den Herrschenden ... Energischer Widerstand von der unabhängigen Bl-Bewegung ist zu erwarten*.' Grünes Info 1985. GI August/July 1985.
[441] As is notable in, e.g., *Schwarzer Faden* 1983. SF 2/1983, 11.
[442] Kitschelt 1989, 156.
[443] As expressed e.g. in *Grünes Info* 1985. GI August/July 1985.

demonstrating the fundamental feasibility' of the party according to Busch.[444] Many actors, newspapers, green radicals and the reformists all associated this programme with approaching SPD's 'reform-pragmatic discourse' that, in the words of reformist green Helmut Wiesenthal, could be practised 'without waiting for a fundamentally different system'.[445]

The programme was preceded by a Green parliament group discussion that emphasised the increased need for such concrete concepts. In May 1985, after a failure to reach the 5% threshold in the 'NRW elections' (North Rhein – Westphalia state elections), the parliament group in Bonn claimed that the positive effect of 'being new' in the political field had clearly worn off. Therefore, it was necessary to create new strategies to compete for voters with the SPD.[446] The party's radical goals (which, at this point, the reformists still mostly agreed with, at least in principle) needed to be accompanied by concrete programmatic steps that would help avoid the 'ideologisation' (*Ideologisierung*) of political questions. [447] Therefore, the parliament group demanded the formation of a concrete political programme. Despite ideological differences and conflicts, the parliament group wanted to plan the programme in cooperation with the radically-aligned party leadership. Evidently, the two poles of the green ideological strife could still, at this time, work together, as the programme was put together within a year.[448] Since the new programme was partially an attempt to challenge the SPD for middle-class environmentally-aligned voters, it is worth taking a closer look at how the Green Party political ideals were conceptualised in the programme as attempts to answer that challenge.

The programme focused on the ideal of *restructuring* (*Umbau),* a concept used to glue together mostly radical principles with a few reformist goals. Notably, the concept of *restructuring* would only work if the Greens worked together with the diverse movements on which it was founded, such as 'the trade union movement, women's movement, anti-nuclear resistance, environmental and consumer initiatives, etc.'. The programme was thus based on a demand for cooperation within the umbrella of the different green ideological groups in a situation where the different factions were becoming increasingly competitive.[449]

As a result, the programme can be best understood as a compromise between the competing factions. Some goals were quite straightforward – the

---

[444] '*Die Ernsthaftigkeit grüner Politik dadurch unterstreichen, daß die grundsätzliche Umsetzbarkeit unserer Forderungen.*' Grünes Info 1986. GI 4/1986. See also Schwarer Faden 1986. SF 3/1986, 22.

[445] '*Ohne auf ein fundamental anderes System zu warten*'. *Schwarzer Faden* 1986. SF 3/1986, 22. A similar line of thought was advocated by actors such as Jo Müller in *die Zeit* (25.4.2986) and the *Kommune* (5/1986), as pointed out by *Schwarzer Faden*.

[446] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 13 May 1985: Fraktionssitzung.

[447] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 31 January – 1 February 1986: Klausursitzung der Fraktion.

[448] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1987. 2 July 1985: Gemeinsame Sitzung des Frantionsvorstands und des Bundesvorstands der Partei.

[449] '*Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Frauenbewegung, Anti-Atom-Widerstand, Umwelt- und Verbraucherinitiativen etc.*' Die Grünen 1986, I.3–4.

Greens demanded speed limits in the short run while 're-communalising of the energy industry' (*die Rekommunalisierung der Energiewirtschaft*) in the long run, in accordance with their principles of increased de-centralisation of economic and political power.[450] However, the difficulty seems to have been in overcoming the division between the radical and reformist understandings of the free market economy and its relationship with environmental needs, with regard to their goal of an overarching 'ecological, social and grassroots democratic economy' (*ökologische, sozialie und basisdemokratische Wirtschaft*). While the programme noted that the Greens did not necessarily support the free market as a regulatory instrument, they did not reject it either, thus leaving the question of market orientation wide open – a compromise that left room for reformist interpretations of the concept. Furthermore, while demanding detachment from 'world market orientation', they accounted for the possibility of market orientation to develop within decentralised regional areas. Some traditional radical goals were still associated with the 'ecological, social and democratic economy', such as the decentralisation of production units, imposing different forms of regulations on industries, ensuring equality between men and women in job markets, nature protection, establishing equality between the global north and the global south and even seeking the financial sector to be 'democratised'.[451]

Nevertheless, the new ecological economy was now also associated with 'consumer politics' (*Verbraucherpolitik*), which aimed to guide consumers within the free market, thus pointing at the possibility for market-based incentives within the current economic paradigm. It is in this context that the idea of eco-labels to label organic products was mentioned for the first time.[452] Furthermore, while objection to material growth was the key goal of the Greens' politics, this aim now became 'independent' (*unabhängig)* of the goal of growth, which could be let to either shrink or continue depending on ecological needs. In addition, the aspect of democracy in this concept meant not just the decentralisation of the economy into smaller local units but also implementing a 'co-determined' model (*Mitbestimmung*) for the governance of industries and companies that would allow workers to participate in the decision-making processes of their workplaces.[453] Despite the ongoing discussion on *ecological modernisation* in Germany,[454] this key concept of the future reformists that aimed to create environmental policies within the current paradigm was only briefly mentioned in the programme, as it was considered too growth-oriented for green use. Instead, modernisation was largely still talked about with negative connotations and associated either with continued growth and industry rationalisation or with the increasing emissions of luxury housing.[455]

---

[450] Die Grünen 1986, I.3–4.
[451] Die Grünen 1986, III. 8.
[452] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel. 3–4.
[453] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel. 4, II.3.
[454] This discussion was started in Germany by environmental sociologist Joseph Huber, who was also a member of the SPD in 1982, and was later joined in by another social democratic academic, Martin Jänicke, in 1985. See Järvikoski 2009.
[455] Die Grünen 1986, III. 1, 4; Zusammenfassung, 1.

While the programme was meant to create 'concrete concepts' for green politics, it mostly seemed to have created confusion among different green commentators, as it vaguely merged the radical and reformist goals while simultaneously opposing and supporting market-based environmental politics. The aforementioned anarchist and radical green-leaning newspapers were particularly critical of the new direction to 'appease middle-class voters' adopted by the reformists, who were called the *Realos* for the first time in these magazines in 1986. According to these magazines, the Greens were depriving 'grassroots initiatives of the opportunity to convey their concerns in their own way' under the reformist moderate leadership of the Green parliament group.[456] As a result, the actors of the grassroots movements and BIs seemed to have started feeling that the Green Party was already cutting ties with them, as opposed to having attempted to primarily represent them at a political level as an 'antiparty-party' early in the 1980s. Conceptually as well, these statements continued to rely on the ideals of participatory democracy and propagating the *autonomy* and *self-determination* of local and small activists groups as ends in themselves – similar concepts as the Greens had used in 1980. In other words, the Greens' goal for the grassroots initiatives was to 'present themselves authentically and organise themselves in a self-determined [*selbstbestimmt*] way'.[457]

The criticism directed at the programme can seem rather harsh from a contemporary perspective, considering that, despite all the compromises, the grassroots democratic ideals were nevertheless sufficiently adapted into the programme. After all, despite the aforementioned compromises, the programme was still mostly critical of a free market economy – it began in a typical fashion by pointing out the flaws of the modern economic growth taking place in Germany at the time. While 50,000 chemical substances were being allowed into nature, the world market was still the 'holy cow' to whom everyone in society had to bow, leading to the massive profit for industrial giants, backed by banks, while workers, women and nature suffered.[458] Capitalist oppression was still to be overcome by the 'democratisation and decentralisation' (*Demokratizierung und Dezentralisierung*) of multinational corporations.[459] Having earlier demanded the removal of left-right divisions, the Greens were now clearly turning towards radical left-wing social ecology along with ecofeminism – defending workers and women along with nature. In this context, it is telling that the reformists would also eventually object to this programme, as evident from Joschka Fischer's reaction to it in 1989.

It is clear that although the ideals of reformism were present in party discussions by 1986, they still held a marginalised position. The new programme, however, included the concession of radically altering the

---

[456] *'Den Basisinitiativen zunehmend die Möglichkeit genommen, ihr Anliegen auf ihre Weise.'* Schwarzer Faden 1986. SF 1/1986, 20.
[457] *'Basisinitiativen authentisch darstellen und selbstbestimmt organisieren können'*. Schwarzer Schwarzer Faden 1986. SF 1/1986, 20.
[458] Die Grünen 1986, Präambel. 1.
[459] Die Grünen 1986, II. 8.

capitalist and industrial economic system rather than exiting it completely.[460] Still officially tied to their 1980 programme of principles, the Greens proposed radical aims to entirely restructure industrial society by means of decentralising and democratising economic and political life, among other issues. It is thus clear that although the ideals of reformism were largely present in party discussions and had to be accounted for by 1986, radicalism remained the mainstream.[461]

The fact that this programme, despite its radical leanings, was considered a moderate compromise back in 1986 seems retrospectively surprising, as it still repeated many of the radical ideas that would soon disappear from the green discussion almost entirely. To avoid an anachronistic interpretation of history, one must remember that in 1986, nobody knew what the reformist green would eventually end up looking like, how dominant the reformist green ideology would become among the Greens in the 1990s and how the Greens would end up accepting normal parliamentary practices, such as government participation. While the 1986 programme seemed extremely radical compared to what the Greens eventually became, it must have appeared very reformist when compared to what the Greens still were at the time – a protest movement and an antiparty-party representing the voice of BIs and grassroots movements that laid far more emphasis on the ideals of basis democracy than contributing to the practices of parliamentary representative democracy.

It is also worth noting that despite the aforementioned debates, most party members were content with ideological pluralism by this time. Many, such as Petra Kelly, had in fact worked hard to keep the party that way ever since the 1980 Karlsruhe conference, during which the party was established.[462] The key green themes, such as anti-nuclear stands or fighting against domestic violence, persistently appeared on the Greens' agenda for all sides. Reformists and radicals, such as Joschka Fischer and Thomas Ebermann, would still work along with each other in the 1987 election campaign. *Der Spiegel* even declared, 'Together, realpoliticians and fundamentalists dream of another green republic: freedom and socialism'.[463]

However, if there ever was a stable balance between the reformists and the radicals in the party, it came to an abrupt end in 1987. As the Greens performed unusually well in the federal elections that year by garnering 8.3 % support, the division between the parliament group and the party leadership increased tremendously over the year. The party ruled to separate mandate and office (forcing party leaders out of parliamentary positions and vice versa), which led the party office to be held by the radical wing of the party while the parliament group almost entirely consisted of either reformists or moderate leftists.

---

[460] As pointed out by Eichold 2005.
[461] Die Grünen 1986, 4–5, 9–10; Eichold 2005.
[462] According to Hockenos, Kelly had 'bent over backwards' to keep the party pluralist and unattached to ideologies in Karlsruhe, when the radical left and ecological conservatives would have rather smoked each other out. Hockenos 2008, 157.
[463] '*Vereint träumen Realpolitiker und Fundamentalisten von einer anderen grünen Republik. Freiheit und Sozialismus.*' *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Grüne. Man wählt das Abenteuer'. *Der Spiegel* 3/1987

However, since electoral success was largely attributed to a campaign programme emphasising radical themes, more influence was given to the radicals within the party.[464]

This division between the reformists and the radicals was amplified when the party assembly chose all three party chairs from the radical left wing (Jutta Ditfurth, Christian Schmidt and Regina Michalik). Party leadership and key green parliamentarians were now caught in a fight for influence over the party. When Jutta Ditfurth, who became the radical figurehead and the clear leader and spokesperson of the radical wing of the party, assured the press of mutual cooperation and a shared basis for greenness that went beyond the differences between the ideological factions, others disagreed. MP Waltraud Schoppe (known best for her fight against domestic violence)[465] claimed that real change would result not from changing the consciousness of the people but through political alliances, thus opposing the traditional ideal of a green change arising from the grassroots level. Meanwhile, the fate of the party itself was in jeopardy (*das Schicksal der Partei selbst gefährdet*), with fellow reformist green parliamentarian Otto Schily particularly expressing his fears that with the current green leadership, they would not be able to entertain the possibility of an alliance with the SPD.[466] By September, even Ditfurth described the party being in a 'doomsday mood' (*Untergangstimmung*). Meanwhile, Antje Vollmer wanted to keep the party united despite her realpolitical tendencies, saying that she had gone into depression over the state of the party, while Hubert Kleinert described how 'one goes at the other with a knife' in the party (*doch mal einer mit dem Messer auf den anderen losgeht*). It seemed that the collective movement that sought to unify different forms of new social movements could seemingly only agree on one thing – that everyone was deeply tired of such infighting.[467]

Further brouhaha broke out when former RAF terrorists from the 1970s were invited to green meetings later that year to discuss how the state should deal with terrorists, after which the Parliamentary Society (where Bonn politicians met for drinks) reportedly denied access to the green MPs into their facilities due to their support of terrorism. Jutta Ditfurth provocatively responded by publically saying that the state benefitted from terrorism in terms of enhancing its laws.[468] Responding to this, parliamentary faction leader Hubert Kleinert stated, 'she does not speak for me', adding that 'it is no longer possible to work with them' while referring to all green radicals.[469] The discussion between the camps quickly spiralled out of control (or at least out of all sensible political debate) when Ditfurth openly accused the reformists of being 'green bourgeoisie' (*grünen Bürgerlichen*), hinting that they were not

[464] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Avanti spumanti'. *Der Spiegel* 40/1987. See also Radkau 2011, Die Grünen 2019, 29.
[465] Die Grünen 2019, 16–17.
[466] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Jutta ist jetzt die Kaiserin'. *Der Spiegel* 20/1987.
[467] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Avanti spumanti'. *Der Spiegel* 40/1987.
[468] '*Dieser Staat brauchte und braucht wieder fast nichts so sehnsüchtig wie den 'Terror' den Schrecken*'
[469] '*Für mich spricht die nicht. ... Es geht nicht mehr mit denen.*' *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Total heavy'. Der Spiegel 44/1987.

authentic greens while those representing the alternative movements particularly in the left were.[470] Meanwhile, Marxist Green parliament group spokesman Thomas Ebermann (whom reformist Hubert Kleinert also dubbed *not his spokesman)* used the term *Spießbürger* or 'philistines' to refer to the reformists. The use of the term *bourgeois*, of course, pertains to socialist vocabulary and was meant to divide the party actors into the real, in other words radical and socialist, greens and the bourgeois greens. In this context, it is interesting to reiterate that reformist Otto Schily had also called himself a 'socialist', although with a clearly more moderate ideal of socialism in mind, while Fischer liked to refer to himself as a 'radical'. Throughout the 1980s, it is especially notable how *socialism* and *radicalism* were underlined both by the reformists and the radicals, while the terms 'liberal' and 'reformist' were not commonly used by the radical camp. In this sense, bourgeois was certainly considered a negative term by all sides of the Greens, making it a useful label to berate the opponent.

Although the environmental movement was largely associated with non-violence (or 'violence against things, not people'), many Green Party members had, in fact, been participating in movements such as Spontis – a left-wing radical movement based in Frankfurt – or even the RAF. Therefore, the controversy above seems to have surfaced due to the background of the environmental movement, particularly stemming from the left-wing radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s in West Germany. Stephen Milder noted that many of the Frankfurt Spontis members had early green associations, such as the GLH (*Grüne Liste Hessen,* which was also the home of such left-green radicals as Jutta Ditfurth), although such connections were quite loose and were often based on the possibility for Spontis to raise discussions. Furthermore, due to its national socialist past, struggles against the government in West Germany became easily associated with violent revolutionary activity. As a result, in the 1970s, the non-violent radical environmentalists were already having a hard time differentiating themselves from violent groups, such as the RAF, in the eyes of the state.[471] To avoid inflaming the difficult situation, even some radicals started to distance themselves from Ditfurth's statements, with Petra Kelly noting that despite similarities in their thinking, she did not support Ditfurth's understanding of the state in this matter.[472]

Although the radicals took credit for the success in the 1987 elections, the extent to which the radical election programme actually contributed to green success remains questionable. One could also make the claim that the '86 Chernobyl catastrophe and discussions surrounding it could have significantly increased green support in the elections, regardless of their programmatic approach. The Chernobyl incident created serious fears about radioactive fallout in Germany and by the summer of 1986, the discussion on the dangers of nuclear power grew rapidly.[473]

---

[470] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Total heavy'. *Der Spiegel* 44/1987.
[471] Milder 2017, 99, 196; Hockenos 2008, 61–63.
[472] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Total heavy'. *Der Spiegel* 44/1987.
[473] Hockenos 2008, 61–63.

The Chernobyl incident had several consequences in German political life that affected the Greens and the 1987 elections. First, green anti-nuclear ideals were discussed more seriously in the media than ever before. While the Kohl administration took no proper stand on the events other than downplaying the threat that the fallout possessed, reformist Joschka Fischer was on television on a daily basis, giving the Greens (and the reformists, in particular) a strong boost as a credible party in media discussions. Second, the turn in public opinion against nuclear power was extremely quick. While it had already been considered a major achievement for the Greens and the anti-nuclear grassroots movement that nuclear power had become a publicly debated issue in the first place in the early 1980s, conversations around it had nevertheless remained marginal. In fact, the peace movement had gathered more media spotlight than nuclear power issues before 1986, as it was widely supported by not only a majority of the Greens but also by leftist circles and even some prominent social democrats, such as former chancellor Willy Brandt. Meanwhile, nuclear power issues were considered a singularly green theme at least in media discussions, with the SPD remaining – despite some dissident voices within the party – mostly supportive of the industry that brought jobs to so many workers. Suddenly, the alarmist views that the Greens had been presenting gathered immense credibility in the eyes of the press in the aftermath of Chernobyl. Consequently, public opinion shifted drastically in favour of the more radical positions regarding the use of nuclear power. In a poll conducted in June 1986, over 80% of Germans suddenly opposed the construction of new nuclear plants and 72% supported the shutdown of existing ones, either immediately or over time. Simultaneously, the Greens' support in the polls grew drastically.[474]

The Chernobyl event and the rise of green support had a paradoxical effect. On the one hand, people like Fischer suddenly received immense credible media attention. On the other hand, Fischer's nuclear compromise with the SPD in Hesse suddenly seemed irresponsible. With the Hessean social democratic prime minister Hölger refusing to cooperate in bringing about nuclear power shutdown in the state (despite the fact that many leading social democrats were now rethinking their position towards nuclear power), the alliance in Hesse was dissolved. Green radicals took advantage of this situation by demanding radical changes regarding nuclear power, NATO cooperation and security politics in general. Despite the immediate media attention given to Fischer at a personal level, the Chernobyl events in fact strengthened the radical positions more than the reformists in the short term, with the radical Jutta Ditfurth receiving more media space than the reformist Fischer. While presenting her face on the front cover of *Der Spiegel* instead of Fischer's, the magazine declared, 'Jutta is now the empress' (with the term 'empress' or *Kaiserin* uttered by Fischer). Ditfurth emphasised that the Greens would continue to work together despite their differences. However, many of the reformists, whom *Der Spiegel* largely associated with the parliament group, were afraid of losing all possibilities of political influence. The aforementioned

[474] Hockenos 2008, 209–213.

separation of mandate and office – referring to the division between party leaders and party parliamentarians – to prevent the centralisation of power in the hands of few had caused an unexpected division of power blocks, one to be found in the party office and the other in the parliament group. Meanwhile, the Greens improved their representation in the *Bundestag* from 28 to 44 seats, as the 1987 elections took place while this debate was still going on.[475]

In May 1987, the Green parliament group concluded that the party was in a state of 'crisis' (*Krise*). The often reform-oriented parliamentarians seem to have feared that the SPD-Green coalition ending in Hesse would further destabilise their position and strengthen that of the radicals' in such a way that the reformist ideals might be entirely driven out from the party. Reformist Hubert Kleinert called for the creation of 'minimal consensus' (*Minimalkonsens)* between the different sides, which was at the time non-existent. Kleinert was worried if the 'realo' stand would be taken seriously anymore, as the Hesse experiment had ended. Waltraud Schoppe was worried how the increasing tension reminded of the disunity of the left before the fascist takeover. Once again, references to Germany's national socialist past served as an argument point for the Greens, this time in order to promote party pluralism. Even the known radical Thomas Ebermann joined in on these reformist fears, speaking in favor of ideological pluralism within the party.[476] The Green Federal Committee meanwhile claimed that the so-called 'crisis' of the Greens was exaggerated, blown out of proportions by the media, and that the social movements in particular which the party represented were doing better than ever.[477] The parliament group's message was very different than that of the party's Federal Committee: they expressed notable fears of the disappearance of pluralism and minority opinions within the party.

In the long term, Chernobyl transformed the political landscape for other parties a well, which would, in fact, eventually strengthen the reformist position even though it might not have appeared that way in 1987. The SPD began to acknowledge its anti-nuclear dissidents more favourably, causing the Greens further anxiety over losing their moderate middle-class voters to the SPD. Meanwhile, as noted by Frank Uekötter, the pro-nuclear government of the CDU/CSU and FDP found itself under immense pressure and finally established a new cabinet seat for 'The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety', while also shifting their position towards dealing with environmental and nuclear safety issues more favourably than before.[478] From September 1988, the Green parliament group started consistently paying attention to the SPD suddenly using and redefining Greens' environmental concepts as their own in the aftermath of Chernobyl. Their initial reaction was that of deep worry over the matter.[479]

---

[475] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Jutta ist jetzt die Kaiserin'. *Der Spiegel* 20/1987; Hockenos 2008, 214–215.
[476] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990. 5 May 1987: Fraktionssitzung.
[477] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990. 5 May 1987: Fraktionssitzung. Anlage A.
[478] Uekötter 2014, 122.
[479] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990. 2–3 September: Fraktionsklausur.

An interesting transfer of thought between the German and Finnish Greens took place around the same time, in January 1988, when Green Party radical Jürgen Meier was interviewed by Finnish green-leaning newspaper *Suomi*. Representing the party line as a member of the party executive board,[480] Meier claimed that the reformists – or 'conservatives', as he called them – should not 'say their personal opinions out loud publicly, as they must represent the party in their statements'. He particularly named Joschka Fischer and Otto Schily as problematic people from the party's perspective.[481] The Finnish newspaper did not realise that the term *conservative* was not typically used to reference the reformists and that it could be understood as a pejorative concept used to berate the opposition from a radical eco-socialist perspective.[482] The word *conservative* was thus used in a similar way as *bourgeois* by the radicals – a concept that excluded people from what was perceived to be the real form of eco-socialist greenness around which the official party line was built. It is also notable that once again, Meier framed the division as one between the party leadership (representing the official party line) and the parliament group that was going rogue in their parliamentary work in Bonn. The tension between reformism and radicalism can thus once again be framed as the tension between the (radical) party leadership and the (reformist) parliament group, although this is of course a simplification of the green ideological division lines.[483]

For some time now, many German Greens had complained that the general atmosphere of the party had become intolerable. Some believed that the dispute needed to be resolved by one side winning over the other, while others (such as Antje Vollmer) kept hoping for all sides to reconcile so that all ecological voices could be heard while also enabling the party to function in a real-political manner.[484] This difficult situation persisted for a few more years. Ditfurth and other radicals were riding high on the election outcome, while the reformists started taking even more moderate positions. Prominent reformist green Otto Schily left the party in 1989 and joined the SPD, claiming structural weaknesses as the reason why the Greens did not function well enough, and adding the disrespect towards the rule of law that had come up during the recent violence debate (possibly referring to the debate regarding the RAF terrorists) as reasons for his departure, as reported by *Die Tageszeitung*.[485] Other reformists decided to put up a fight: Joschka Fischer, in particular, publicly and openly challenged the radical ideals and programmes of the party in his book

---

[480] *Vorstand* – the 11–person executive board that held the power to make party decisions and was controlled by a majority of the radical Greens.
[481] Kokko, Pasi 1988. 'Vihreä ekososialisti istuu rahakasan päällä ja hamuaa lisää valtaa.' *Suomi* 1/1988.
[482] Paul Hockenos 2008, 153, has even noted that Fischer himself used the term 'conservative' as a pejorative concept.
[483] In fact, the parliament group itself was deeply divided. Hockenos 2008, 177, described the Green parliament group as a battleground for Green debate, which included shouting, walk-outs, etc., rather than peaceful political debate.
[484] *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Total heavy'. *Der Spiegel* 44/1987; *Der Spiegel* 1987. 'Avanti spumanti'. *Der Spiegel* 40/1987.
[485] *TAZ* 1989. 'Otto Schily redet – und genießt.' *TAZ* 3 November 1989.

The Restructuring of Industrial Society in 1989 (*Der Umbau der Industriegesellschaft).* As observed before, radical magazines representing the BIs had not been happy with the 1986 compromise. However, it now appeared that the leading reformist figure of the Green Party also had a very different and a far more moderate vision for restructuring industrial society in mind.

Similar to the Greens' 1986 programme, Fischer's book was named *Der Umbau der Industriegesellschaft,* which gives the impression that it was a counter-argument against the programme. Hence, it is worth taking a closer look at the conceptualisations of green politics as presented in his book. The book began with phrasings similar to those of the Green Party programmes – a list of environmental problems and visions of looming horrors if they were not addressed. Fischer mentioned acid rains, forest destruction, destruction of ecosystems, climate catastrophe and the hole in the ozone layer among other problems that needed to be tackled urgently. It appeared that he was sticking to a 'survivalist' form of argumentation, which John Dryzek identified as a rather typical mode of argumentation that became common discourse among the radical environmentalists of the 1970s – painting pictures of looming doom as the starting point for framing environmental questions and the consequential need for radical action.[486] Fischer proceeded to criticise the 1983 'clean air' politics of the Bonn Republic, as emissions had increased by 7% and traffic emissions by 16% during the 1980s, acid rains had continued, forest destruction had advanced rapidly and the approaching 'climate catastrophe' (which was not yet widely addressed in green discussions) was unaccounted for. He even blamed politics for its extreme dependence on 'economic interests' *(ökonomische Interessen)*, which came in the way of environmental protection. All of these issues were traditional green themes, with Fischer framing environmental issues with imminent problems using concepts such as 'climate catastrophe', 'ecosystem destruction' and 'environmental crisis'.[487]

However, after these concessions to radical environmentalist goals and discourses, Fischer took recourse to very different concepts to tackle the environmental problems from a more moderate perspective. He discussed the pragmatic utilities of focusing on restructuring society, for example, by noting how 'the first countries to tackle the indispensable ecological restructuring' in the upcoming environmental crisis (*Umweltkrise*) of the 1990s would benefit from being the preferred location for 'an ecologically oriented international division of labor'.[488] The idea of acquiring benefits from being the first country to tackle a moderate restructuring of the economy was later repeated by the Finnish Greens in their 1994 party programme. Like the radical ecologists, Fischer wanted his ideas to be associated with 'radicalism'. However, for him, it meant the radical refusal of 'dogmatism', which had made any pragmatic

---

[486] Fischer 1989, 9; Dryzek 2005, 29–35, 40–41.
[487] Fischer 1989, 15–16, 19, 53.
[488] *'Die Umweltkrise wird in den 1990er Jahren zur Politikfrage, und jene Länder, die den unabdingbaren ökologischen Umbau als erste anpacken und erfolgreich meistern, werden auch die bevorzugten Orte einer ökologisch orientierten internationalen Arbeitsteilung sein.*' Fischer 1989, 53–54.

alliances to tackle these ecological problems impossible. Fischer conceptualised his radically non-dogmatic position as 'radical ecological pragmatism' *(radikaler ökologischer Pragmatismus).* It is easy to perceive this redefinition of 'radicalism' as a not-so-subtle swing at the radical greens' position of refusing to cooperate by imbuing the language used by them with new meaning.[489]

Even more noteworthy than his ideal of giving up 'dogmatic' non-cooperation with other parties and industries was his proposition to achieve the aforementioned radical pragmatism through free market mechanisms – an idea that the 1986 compromise programme had not dared to articulate. However, Fischer's pragmatic argumentation in 1989 was based on a simple three-word summary of the outcome of the last 10 years: 'capitalism has won' (*Kapitalismus hat gewonnen)*. This meant that all radical left-wing ideals of exiting the capitalist industrial society would lead to a political dead end. He referred to the ongoing collapse of the Eastern Bloc as well as the sorry plight of state-socialist countries in dealing with their environments and placed them in comparison to the performance of the capitalist countries in this regard. Furthermore, Fischer claimed that the victory of Western capitalism was based on adopting 'reform socialism' *(Reformsozialismus)*, which created the welfare state, thus offering a historical reason for the Greens to also adopt a reformist position.[490]

Although he does not mention the SPD directly, he clearly referred to the reformist standpoint adopted by social democrats all across Europe to develop the welfare state. In Germany, the SPD had taken a reformist stand in the 1959 Bad Godesberg party conference, as mentioned earlier.[491] Thirty years after Bad Godesberg, this clear analogy with the SPD's development – one between radical Marxist socialism even at the expense of political influence and reformist acceptance of the framework of free market capitalism – did not go unnoticed by the green reformist.

Finally, Fischer proposed a variety of market-oriented measures to tackle the upcoming ecological crisis, which could be solved only 'within the frames and with the instruments of capitalist market economy' (*im Ramen und mit den Instrumenten der kapitalistischen Marketwirtschaften)*. He wrote that the Greens would now need to lean on the middle class and environmentally-thinking entrepreneurs to develop instruments that would help them profit from ecological thinking. Furthermore, he proposed adopting an 'efficiency strategy' (*Effizienzstrategie)* in energy politics, which would mean phasing out nuclear power and using as little coal as possible, along with financing (presumably state-led) for the development of renewable energy sources.[492] Moreover, Fischer listed a number of other political actions that needed to be taken, such as strengthening the public transportation system.[493]

However, the key focus of his book was not so much on implementing the exact measures as it was on the argumentation justifying the need for a

[489] Fischer 1989, 55–56.
[490] Fischer 1989, 58–59.
[491] Hockenos 2008, 45–47.
[492] Fischer 1989, 60–61, 79–81.
[493] Fischer 1989, 84.

reorientation in green thinking. Fischer's argumentation was strongly pragmatic, beginning with a real-political analysis of global political and economic realities, which used ecological argumentation to point out that market-based instruments were the only 'realistically' (*realistischerweise)* obtainable options for achieving the green goals. [494] Demanding environmentalism from legislators was not much of a new position – it was a radical demand often heard among the radical greens in the public political discussion of the 1980s. However, as Hockenos pointed out, Fischer's point of departure even from the other reformists of the time was precisely his idea that an environmentally sustainable society would and should be achieved within the framework of free market mechanisms. Notably, Hockenos was only partially right in this case, because market-based instruments that served as consumer guidance, such as ecolabels, had already been referred to in the 1986 programme. However, Fischer was the first to explicitly vocalise the need to act within the free market paradigm. He used a similar structure of argumentation as the radical greens and even used a similar name for his book as the Green Party programme, but then he framed the key problems in a completely different manner by claiming that they were solvable only within the free market paradigm. Using the same name as the programme can hardly be considered an accident. Instead, it seems to be a deliberate and vocal departure from the kind of radical green thinking that was meant to be understood as a reframing of the radical green concepts presented in the programme a couple of years earlier. Hockenos claims that Fischer's book was a discussion-starter even among the reformists, who until then had spoken of civil rights and cooperation with the SPD but had not openly demanded the use of free market mechanisms.[495]

This discussion soon spilled over to the parliament group. In June 1989, Dietrich Wetzel made a recommendation to the parliament group, stating that, regardless of party leadership, the parliament group itself should turn towards 'ecological reform politics' (*ökologische Reformpolitik)* heading to the upcoming elections. He claimed that 'ecological market economy' could be one of the possible reformist conceptual themes - along with eco-socialism and circulation economy. Environmental policy needed to be discussed in terms of developing environmentally friendly technologies, industries and products instead of focusing on largel moral and socio-political issues.[496] Notably, this message was directed to the parliament group instead of the whole party. The parliament group minutes even note how negotiations for SPD – Green cooperation on Federal started that same month, June of 1989. Provocatively, the group claimed that anyone objecting to these ongoing negotiations with SPD needed to have their 'understanding of democracy' (*Demokratieverständnis*) checked. Again, the discussion went back to differing conceptualisations of democracy, particularly to the question whether representative party parliamentarism really was a

[494] Fischer 1989, 61.
[495] Hockenos 2008, 343–344.
[496] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990**.** 20 June 1989: Fraktionssitzung.

worthwhile form of democracy.[497] The party leadership, meanwhile, constantly and consistently objected to such discussions of alliances. Jutta Ditfurth, for example, claimed that all state government cooperation with SPD would turn the state-level Greens to 'domesticated parties' (*domestizierte Partei*).[498]

The parliament group seems to have been planning their own election programme that would under no circumstances be approved by the party office. One can only wonder how Green Party history would have evolved, had they gone through with mutiny. This discussion ended abruptly, however, because of unforeseeable events: the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall taking place in November, the whole nation's attention turned to the question of unification of the two Germanys. These events turned the parliament group's focus away from internal questions, focusing on the 'German question' instead when heading to the 1990 elections.

Nevertheless, by the 1990 elections, reformism had emerged as a notable challenger to the radical Green Party line, with actors like Joschka Fischer developing ideas and concepts that could be used to better cooperate with the SPD and therefore gain political influence. Fischer outlined new key conceptualisations for the reformists, in which he was supported by many notable green parliamentarians (for example, Otto Schily and Hubert Kleinert). However, the Green Party leadership was still under radical control, with tensions between the party leadership and the parliament group continuously increasing. Since the radicals and reformists could hardly even communicate with each other at this stage, there was not an end in sight to this ideological strife between the different positions. It was not until the 1990 election loss that the Green Party would change its ideological position in favour of a more moderate direction.

4.1.3 Towards an 'ecological civil rights reform party': the Neumünster party conference and its aftermath

In 1990, the Green Party support in the *Bundestag* elections collapsed. Finishing with 4.8% support, the Greens failed to reach the 5% federal threshold, consequently losing all their 44 seats in the parliament. The shock was particularly big since the Greens had polled well just before the elections. The East German Greens, having now united with the Republic, were the only greens who could manage some representation by making it to the new 656-seated *Bundestag*, where eight seats were attained by the Eastern Bündnis-Green – the civil rights advocates who got 5.6% of the votes in the east.[499]

To this day, there have been endless discussions trying to identify the reason for this loss, from which at least three theories have been formulated in public and/or academic discussion. The first one, presented by scholars such as Wolfgang Rüdig, pertains to the SPD leaning more towards the Greens. In the

[497] Die Grünen im Bundestag 1987–1990**.** 19–20 September 1989: Fraktionsklausur.
[498] Fehre, Brigitte 1989. 'Grüne Polemik gegen Rot-Grün.' *TAZ* 4 March 1989.
[499] Hockenos 2008, 227–228.

aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe, many former nuclear-friendly social democrats shifted their perspectives and started supporting the gradual run-down of nuclear energy. Suddenly, the Greens had a strong moderate rival attracting its anti-nuclear voters in the form of the SPD. With a radical programme and Jutta Ditfurth as a very controversial figurehead, moderate anti-nuclear supporters might have started to lean towards social democracy.[500] Furthermore, Hockenos pointed out how other parties were also getting involved in environmental issues. In addition to the changing positions of the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats also joined the trend to establish the environment ministry soon after Chernobyl.[501]

Second, some (mostly supporters of the reformist side) blamed the green 'struggle against capitalism', as *Der Spiegel* phrased it, that occurred immediately after the elections for the election loss, as this standpoint was no longer compatible with the new political and social order after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In just a couple of years, the *Zeitgeist* had changed – capitalism had emerged the winner in the Cold War.[502] The reformist side also blamed the rules of the radical party that aimed at decentralisation of power, the rotation principle and a limit to terms, which meant that the Greens' election roster was constantly filled with new and unfamiliar faces while those who had made a name for themselves could no longer represent the party. The pragmatists, of course, had their own agenda behind this criticism – Paul Hockenos pointed out that the rules 'were there to prevent someone like Joschka Fischer and the Frankfurt [reformist] gang from taking over the party'. Nevertheless, the constant public strife between the reformists and the radicals likely cost the Greens votes. Changes in the party chart support this hypothesis, as a new left-leaning party – the former communist party PDS (Party for Democratic Socialism) – emerged, which meant that the Greens were not only competing for moderate votes but also for the radical left ones. The public strife between reformism and radicalism likely cost the Greens votes as well.[503]

Third, many of the Greens themselves would later blame a particularly bad campaign slogan for their loss. With the collapse of the iron curtain and unification of the two Germanys, a jubilant spirit swept across the country. The Greens, however, decided to maintain a less joyful outlook towards rediscovered German nationalism in their election campaign, emphasising climate issues instead. The Greens distributed bleak-coloured election posters all over Germany with a text saying 'Everyone talks about Germany, we talk about the weather' (*Alle reden von Deutschland. Wir reden vom Wetter)*, which was a play on the famous 1960s alternative socialist movements' slogan 'everyone talks about the weather, we do not' (*Alle reden vom Wetter, wir nicht*). This reflected badly on the party because this anti-nationalistic message could not have been timed any worse, despite the fact that climate issues had started to

[500] Rüdig 2002, 78–82; Poguntge 1993, 48–50; Kaarkoski 2016, 16.
[501] Hockenos 2008, 228–230.
[502] *Der Spiegel* 1990. 'Dagobert vorm Fleischerladen.' *Der Spiegel* 50/1990.
[503] Hockenos 2008, 228.

emerge as an important environmental theme at this time.[504] Apparently, viewing the unification with East Germany in nationalistic pan-German terms was thoroughly and immediately off the table for the Greens, considering that they constantly and coherently framed the problems of nationalism in the context of Germany's national socialist past. In this context, Joschka Fischer was reported as saying, 'forty-five years after Auschwitz, there is no reason to be ashamed about being alarmed by German nationalism'.[505] Karitas Hensel and Jutta Oesterle-Schwerin spoke against the nationalist sense of German unification in the Green parliament group, opposing a sense of nationalism (*Nationalgefühl)* and pointing out to Hitler as the reason why a nationalistic right to self-determination (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht)* should be revoked.[506]

The East German Greens, however, originating from a more value-conservative Christian civil rights movement background, were not similarly restrained from using such nationalistic language, which helped them break through to the parliament.[507] Along similar lines, Jochen Eichold claimed that climate issues in general seemed to be an out-of-place theme at the time of German unification – as in fact also did *Die Tageszeitung* magazine a few months after the elections.[508]

Notwithstanding the reason, 600,000 former green voters shifted their support to the SPD's bandwagon in 1990.[509] The discussion about the next steps started almost immediately in the reformist camp. The right-wing leaders of the party – mainly Joschka Fischer, Hubert Kleinert and Antje Vollmer – demanded a turn towards an 'ecological civil rights party' (*ökologische Bürgerrechtspartei*), returning to the anthropocentric theme of conceptualising ecological themes as civil (human) rights. This demand was not new to the *Realos* and *Aufbruch* factions.[510] Meanwhile, on a more interesting note, the moderate-left *Linke Forum* faction within the party also demanded a shift towards what they called a 'social-ecological-emancipatory alternative' (*sozial-ökologisch-emanzipatorische Alternative*), in the words of their leader Ludger Volmer. Intriguingly, Volmer used almost the exact same words as Petra Kelly had used in the early 1980s to describe the more radical position, when she called her position socialist and emancipatory. These concepts were thus used to justify many positions that were imbued with different meanings. It is also worth noting that while most of the internal struggle within the party has been attributed to the fight between the reformists and radicals, it was often the eco-socialists situated in between the two who held a decisive position in determining the direction of the party. Using words familiar to the left-aligned greens, Volmer was directing the Left Forum towards a more moderate direction. Unlike Kelly, Volmer's

[504] Grünen Chronik 2019, 40–41.
[505] Hockenos 2008, 216–223.
[506] Die Grünen im Bundestag, 1987–1990. 24 October 1989: Fraktionssitzung.
[507] Hockenos 2008, 216–223.
[508] Eichold 2005; Matthias Geis 1991. '"Ausländer" in der eigenen grünen Partei?' *TAZ* 27 April 1991.
[509] Eichold 2005.
[510] A small right-wing green faction known as 'New Direction' that often collaborated with the *Realos* camp.

understanding of emancipatory socialism would include a tighter party structure and a clearly defined leadership – practically meaning a turn towards a more traditional party – and increased focus on civil rights issues.[511]

At the same time, public pressure through the media mounted. In 1991, *Der Spiegel* noted that the Greens had been more successful in states such as Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate, where the local greens had already adopted a more moderate strategy and worked in cooperation with the SPD, thus hinting at the need for wider reformist-influenced change.[512] Meanwhile, Hubert Kleinert noted a need for efficiency as the basis for the need for change. 'Efficiency' (*Effizienz*) once again emerged as a key concept in favour of reformism. This argumentation is more thoroughly discussed in Section 4.3.[513]

It was against this backdrop that the Greens gathered at the 1991 party conference in Neumünster. The different factions – the center-right group *Realos* and the more right-wing *Aufbruch* or 'New Direction' – campaigned for a more parliamentarian approach after the 1990 election disaster, with the right-wing actors of the party pushing the issue harder than before. Already before the conference, three moderate reformist party leader candidates – Antje Vollmer of *Aufbruch*, Hubert Kleinert of the *Realos* and Vera Wollenburger of the East German *Bündnis* – had issued a joint press release demanding a more realist approach to ensure that they do not lose the electorate's support. They claimed that 'we received the order from our former voters to initiate a new beginning … that will make us a party capable of action with a clear profile.' The Left Forum was drawn into this debate and ended up supporting the *Realos'* demands for reforms.[514] The importance of the Left Forum's position cannot be understated in this regard, as it was likely the deciding factor in the Green Party re-orientation towards reformism. In fact, former party chairwoman and radical ecologist spokesperson Jutta Ditfurth would later claim (in an August 1991 interview) that for the radical ecologists, the Left Forum was just as moderate as the *Realos* faction. Ditfurth accused the Left Forum, saying that their job was to actually be moderate but still say, 'we are the left'. Ditfurth consistently associated leftness and socialism with radical positions, while moderate socialism seemed to her to have been an illusory trick to shift attention away from the actors' true (supposedly often more bourgeois) intentions.

Sally Low, reporter for an Australian-based Green Left magazine, travelled to Neumünster to write an interesting eye-witness take on all the strange events that led to radicals' walk-out. Reporting from a journalistic perspective, Low's eyewitness perspective is useful to understand the sequence of events that compose the framework for interpreting the debates and discussions among the green actors.[515] In the very first evening of the

[511] *Der Spiegel* 1990. 'Dagobert vorm Fleischerladen', *Der Spiegel* 50/1990.
[512] *Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Mühselige Wurstelei'. *Der Spiegel* 19/1991.
[513] Kleinert, Hubert 1991.'Ein Anfall von Todessehnsucht'. *Der Spiegel* 23/1991.
[514] '*Positiv betrachtet haben wir von unseren Nicht-mehr-Wählerinnen den Auftrag erhalten, einen inhaltlichen und strukturellen Neu-beginn einzuleiten, der uns zu einer handlungs-fähigen Partei mit einem klaren Profil macht.*" Die Grünen 2019, 44–47; Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.
[515] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.

conference, the Greens voted on a controversial 'Political Declaration of Neumünster',[516] by which the Greens declared themselves an 'ecological reform party' that was nevertheless outspokenly leftist – 'if left means that the major social and ecological questions should be solved in solidarity', they clarified.[517] This declaration, written by Left Forum member Ludger Volmer and *Realos'* Fritz Kuhn, was meant to be a compromise between the center-right *Realos* faction and the center-left Left Forum faction. Although outspoken criticism sprang up from some of the more radical Left Forum members, Volmer claimed that 'the compromise had retained the most important elements of the left's original statement … it specifically referred to the Greens as a left-wing party'.[518]

After the declaration, radical ecologist and former party chairwoman Jutta Ditfurth ascended the stage and pleaded that 'the Greens must return to their origins as a grassroots party with close links to the mass movements' and referred to the members of the radical alternative movement in saying 'this is no longer our party'.[519] According to Ditfurth, the radical group was not a single unit but consisted of actors associated with left-wing trade unionists, feminists and radical ecologists, among others. In her speech, she called this group the 'feminist, ecological, grassroots left' (*feministische, ökologische, basisdemokratische Linke*), who now no longer had a party.[520] The green delegates wondered if her speech had ultimately affected the outcome of the conference, since the *Realos* faction failed to manage a sweeping takeover of party leadership in the upcoming days, contrary to what they (and the media) had expected.[521]

After Ditfurth's speech, she and 40 other radicals walked out of the party conference.[522] Geoffrey Roberts pointed out, however, that the significance of this walkout was no longer politically remarkable. Jutta Ditfurth did not tempt away any more party members than the conservative Herbert Gruhl had done in the early 1980s.[523] Thomas Poguntke meanwhile has noted how the attempted *Ecological Left* -party failed to lure either green members or voters to the new radical party.[524] One could say that the biggest significance of this walkout was the way in which it revealed the shift in the ideology of the Greens within a rather short time span, causing many of its key advocates to walk away from their own party. After all, Ditfurth had served as the chair of the party just recently and her departure merely four years after *Der Spiegel* had

[516] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.
[517] *'Ökologische Reformpartei' (im linken Lager) – 'sofern links bedeutet, dass die großen sozialen und ökologischen Fragen solidarisch ... gelöstwerden sollen'.*
[518] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991; Die Grünen 2019, 44–47.
[519] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.
[520] Dithfurth 1991.
[521] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.
[522] Ditfurth 1991; Die Grünen 2015: Auszüge aus der Grünen Chronik.
[523] Roberts 2013.
[524] Poguntke 1993, 168.

dubbed her the 'Empress' (*Kaiserin)* of the party marked a major symbolic event in green ideological development.[525]

Rule changes to the party were made on the second day of the conference – the number of chairpersons were decreased from three to two and the rotation rule (that demanded the rotation of parliamentary offices) was abolished. In contrast, the separation between the party office and the political mandate was retained, despite reformist demands to abolish it. This was somewhat unexpected, as the typically conservative East German *Bündnis* delegates surprisingly voted in favour of retaining the rule in fear of professional politicians rising from within the party ranks. Jutta Ditfurth, of course, claimed that the party rules had been changed in the conference to appease the needs of the party elite in their quest to become more influential in politics. Specifically naming Joschka Fischer and Ludger Volmer, she added, 'we did not underestimate people's opportunism, but we did underestimate the time it would take for their minds to become completely transformed.' According to her, the radical ecologists had been 'too naïve', in the sense that they had made room for people like Joschka Fischer 'to take over the Green project for his own purposes'.[526]

Jutta Ditfurth was often the spokeswoman representing the radical 'ecological left' side of the debate. In *Die Tageszeitung,* she warned that turning the Greens into an 'ecological civil rights party' (*ein ökologische BürgerRechtspartei*), as Antje Vollmer and other reformists had intented, would mean turning the Greens into 'the eurocentric project of a right-wing, dogmatic cadre party'. Civil rights had a negative connotation for Ditfurth, seemingly because it was used as a conceptual tool to promote reformism. The notion of 'eurocentricity' as a negative description of right-wing greenness is also intriguing.[527]

A few months later, in an August 1991 interview for the British Institute for Social Ecology's Left Green Perspectives publication, Ditfurth explained the radical anger at the Neumünster Declaration, which had been a compromise between the *Realos* and the *Linke Forum* factions. She claimed that the original, uncompromised version of the Left Forum declaration of principles could have been 'used to establish a compromise with our [radical] position'. Ditfurth believed that the original leftist version of the Neumünster Declaration (written by Ludger Volmer) would have received over a 50% majority if it had been voted on. Instead, a reformist compromise between the *Linke Forum* and *Realos* factions was merged together to 'avoid a real debate', was decided upon without proper discussion 'in the back of the congress' and then put on display to be voted on. Consequently, for Ditfurth:

> The party gave up any position on the necessity of radical change … Up until now, the Green Party had always been an alliance of tendencies ranging from reformist to revolutionary. But with this statement of principles, all revolutionary positions and radical positions have been given up. That means that most politics for radical or

[525] Die Grünen 2019, 3.
[526] Left Green Perspectives 1991. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.' LGP #25.
[527] Oetting, Jürgen 1991. 'Dirfurth: Drei Gründe auszusteigen.' *TAZ* 20 April 1991.

> revolutionary change have no place in this party anymore. There had even been different left tendencies within the Green Party – there was an anti-capitalist tendency that opposed growth and social injustice and the destruction of nature, and then there was also a left in the more radical sense. And all of these tendencies have been jettisoned.[528]

Ditfurth argued with similar premises as the parliamentarian reformists had done a few years earlier when Ditfurth was in charge of the party and they feared for the loss of their reformist ideals: that ideological pluralism needed to be preserved. As a leading member of the radical ecologist camp, Jutta Ditfurth's August 1991 interview is particularly worth paying attention to when trying to understand the radical faction's conceptualisation of their position at the time. Conceptually, Ditfurth leaned on terms such as *radical* and *revolutionary* to describe the radical green position. Once again, the interesting phenomenon regarding the use of the term 'radical' by the Greens is encountered, where it is perceived as a positive description of being an authentic green member – indicating (mostly implicitly but sometimes explicitly) that the *Realos* and *Aufsbruch* camps, and now even the *Linke Forum* supporters, had sold out their principles and were mostly looking for personal gain. Furthermore, Ditfurth repeatedly used terms such as 'opportunism' and 'careerism' to describe her political opponents, particularly Joschka Fischer and Ludger Volmer.

For the reformists, the decisions made in the conference were more likely to be about the practical management of the party. In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Joschka Fischer pointed out his goals: 'We need a party … which wants to govern this country'.[529] Nevertheless, Ditfurth was not the only one who noticed the growing influence of Fischer. Immediately after the 1991 conference, fellow reformist and *Realo* faction strategist Udo Knapp was reported to be celebrating using the following words: 'The most powerful man in the party … is now Mr. Fischer.'[530]

Low described the immediate reactions to these decisions as emotionally loaded. When discussing the possibility of abolishing the 'separate mandate' rule, the members of the *Linke Forum* faction felt that they had already entered into too many compromises with the right-wing reformists of *Realos* and *Aufbruch* factions. Then, a 'pandemonium' broke out on the conference floor as the remaining left-wing delegates started to object the decisions. Describing the evening of the second day of the conference, Low wrote, 'even before the vote had been taken, two Fundis fired water pistols at Realo delegates, who responded by emptying beer bottles over Fundis' heads. Fundis stormed the presidium and continued to speak through megaphones after the microphone was switched off'. While journalistic and possibly exaggeratory in style, Low's description nevertheless portrays the sense of urgency and importance that the

---

[528] Left Green Perspectives 1991. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.' LGP #25.
[529] '*Wir brauchen eine Partei ... die dieses Land regieren will, von den Kommunen bis zur Bundesebene.*'
[530] '*Der mächtigste Mann in der Partei ... 'ist jetzt Herr Fischer.' Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Mühselige Wurstelei', *Der Spiegel* 19/1991.

green actors also exhibited in their interviews regarding the strife.[531] *Die Tageszeitung* also described people fighting for the microphone with 'loaded waterpistols'.[532]

On the third day, the new party leadership was voted on. The *Realos* camp suffered a surprising defeat as GDR-based underdog Christine Weiske (suddenly supported by the Left Forum) was elected as the female party chair against the right-wing *Aufbruch* leader Antje Vollmer. This election was pervaded by the lack of radical ecologist support, as former party chair Petra Kelly received just 39 votes out of over 500 cast. As for men, Left Forum's Ludger Volmer won against the *Realos*' Hubert Kleinert by a tight margin – placing two Left Forum sympathisers as party leads instead of the more right-wing reformists from the *Realos* or *Aufbruch* camps. Despite the surprising loss for the reformists, the radicals – who had already announced their intentions to leave the party, as noted before – stormed onto the stage after the election and raised a banner saying 'Welcome the new green man — capitalist, hierarchical, statist'.[533]

It is interesting to note that along with the accusations of being capitalist and hierarchical, *statist* was also used as an insult against the reformists. This choice of words presumably refers to older discussions about *Atomstaat* and the Green understanding of democracy as something separate from the state and its representative institutions, as explained in the previous chapter. The radical left was therefore not only anti-capitalist and anti-hierarchical but also closely associated with the grassroots movements and the BIs that they supposedly represented. This also reflects the tenuous relationship between the grassroots movements and the state.

Finally, the importance of the democratic, anti-Marxist and often conservative greens from Alliance 90 (*Bündnis 90),* i.e. the East German Greens, need to be particularly emphasised when addressing the reasons for the outcome of the 1991 Neumünster conference. Along with the moderate lefts, they were the group that potentially held a decisive position in the ideological strife. The effects of German unification were strongly felt in Neumünster, where the East German environmental civil rights movement had delegates representing the Eastern Greens, who also had voting rights at the Neumünster conference for the first time despite having not yet merged with the West German party – something that earlier research has often overlooked. They were indeed performing better than *Die Grünen* at a federal level, as they were the only greens in the parliament at the time. Less than two weeks before the Green Party conference, *Der Spiegel* published an interview of two major *Bündnis* leaders and MPs, Vera Wollenberger and Konrad Weiß, where they spoke their minds about the fighting within the West German Greens, particularly the radical Ecological Left. Both demanded political reform within the West German Greens if they wanted to merge with the Eastern Greens (and,

[531] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.
[532] Rasche, Joachim. 'Was war neu an Neumünster?' *TAZ* 31 May 1991.
[533] Low 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off', Green Left May 22 1991.

as Wollenberger added, survive as a party). Having formerly fought for civil rights in the GDR, both condemned the radicalism and Marxism within the party, hoping for either a 'truly value conservative party' (*eine wirklich wertkonservative Partei,* Weiß) or an 'ecological human rights party' (*eine ökologische Menschenrechtspartei,* Wollenberger) that was neither left nor right.[534]

Weiß also highlighted that he would like the party to develop into 'a human rights party' that deals with ecological questions belonging to the realm of human rights, thus subscribing to the very anthropocentric social-green argumentation that was similar to that of the reformist politicians in the west. In fact, the similarity was almost verbatim, as Antje Vollmer had demanded the creation of an 'ecological human rights party' after the 1990 election loss, while another (former) green reformist Otto Schily had uttered similar phrasings already in the early 1980s. The East German representatives also reminded that their movement was founded on a Christian conservative basis, did not have a feminist background and was in favour of only gradually shutting down nuclear power once an alternative was found. Nevertheless, both hoped for the Greens to remain a citizens' movement.[535]

Finally, it is worth noting that the timing of these statements was very conveniently placed less than two weeks before the Neumünster party conference. Both Weiß and Wollenberger expressed their readiness to establish an entirely new all-German green conservative party around *Bündnis 90* if the merge with *Die Grünen* would turn out to be impossible – a statement that is easy to be read as a threat to the West German Greens in case they failed to deliver the reforms that the Eastern movement demanded. Furthermore, *Die Tageszeitung* reported that during the conference, East German Konrad Weiß had in fact started demanding negotiations for a new party, one that would function without the West German Greens, as the West German Greens were an 'adolescent club' (*Pubertären Verein)* – using age-related metaphors once again.[536] *Die Tageszeitung* in fact reported during the conference that the Greens would now have to agree that 'socialist utopies for society are now passe (*sozialistische Gesellschaftsutopien sind passé*) precisely because they would need to convince the Eastern Greens to tag along.[537]

This factor has been somewhat overlooked in scholarly discussions about the German Green development. Having no MPs and in desperate need to merge the two parties, it should come as no surprise that reformist leaders like Hubert Kleinert would talk about 'the death of the party' if the demanded reforms failed to pass. On the other hand, the *Bündnis* MPs chose similar words as the reformist West German Greens when talking of an 'ecological civil rights party'. Effectively, it seems easy enough to read this statement as a suggestion of their support for the reformist wing represented by Kleinert and Fischer, among others. 'Civil rights' thus became a political weapon to alter the ideological emphasis of the party away from the radical Marxist, ecological and

534 *Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Nicht alle Linken aussperren.' *Der Spiegel* 16/1991.
535 *Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Nicht alle Linken aussperren.' *Der Spiegel* 16/1991.
536 *TAZ* 1991. 'Grüne sind "pubertären Verein".' *TAZ* 3 May 1991.
537 Geis, Matthias 1991. '"Ausländer" in der eigenen grünen Partei?' *TAZ* 27 April 1991.

anti-capitalist direction. It seems that the moderatisation of party ideology in the Neumünster conference – and the new emphasis on civil rights – was not only about acquiring more influence and new voters but was equally, and perhaps even more importantly, about getting the East German Greens to tag along with them – which they did in 1993 after the aforementioned reforms were accounted for. Subsequently, all plans for a separate Eastern Green Party based on the Eastern value-conservative civil rights movement were soon forgotten.[538] Discursively, this turn was based on a pragmatic real-political perception of politics and ideologically legitimised with civil rights vocabulary.

During one single weekend, the Greens had transformed from a radical oppositionist party into an 'Ecological Reform Party', as claimed by the Neumünster Declaration. The need for moderate stands, reformism and parliamentarisation had been in the reformist agenda at least since the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, the need for such a change seemed to have caused the Greens' devastating loss in the December 1990 elections. Jochen Weichold phrased this turn as one from ecological anti-capitalism to an ecological reformist and civil rights ideology. The losers in this struggle were the members of 'the Ecological Left' (*Ökologische Linke*), which consisted radical ecologists, eco-anarchists, eco-socialists and ecofeminists.[539] However, some Left Forum representatives, such as Roland Scherer, pointed out in *Die Tageszeitung* that the outcome should not be understood merely in terms of right-wing reformism. The Neumünster declaration had been a joint compromise between the different factions, and the left-wingers of the party remained in power, not the *Realos*.[540] Be that as it may, the moderates (in the *Realos, Aufbruch* and now even the *Linke Forum* factions) were now in charge, while the most important members of the radical ecologists had walked out of the party either immediately or over the next two years – Jutta Ditfurth included.[541] To quote Geoffrey Roberts, at Neumünster, 'the center of gravity of the party had moved towards the more moderate wing'.[542]

Petra Kelly would also be gone within a year. In October 1992, 45-year-old Kelly and her husband Gert Bastian were found shot dead in their bedroom, most likely by Bastian himself but for unknown motives. Due to her untimely death, she managed to avoid seeing the Greens 'sending ministers to Bonn' – something that she had hoped never to witness and something that became a reality six years after her death as a consequence of the reformist conceptualisations made in the Neumünster party conference, as discussed in Chapter 5.[543] A deeper, more thorough analysis of the arguments present in the debate can meanwhile be found in section 4.3. To compare such argumentation

[538] *Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Nicht alle Linken aussperren.' *Der Spiegel* 16/1991.
[539] Weichold 2005.
[540] Scherer, Roland 1991. 'Grüne: Wir kommen wieder!' *TAZ* 3 May 1991.
[541] Die Grüne 2019. *'Ökologische Reformpartei ... sofern links bedeutet, dass die großen sozialen und ökologischen Fragen solidarisch ... gelöstwerden sollen'*.
[542] Roberts 2013.
[543] Hockenos 2008, 231–232.

with the Finnish Greens' debate, I will first look at the development of Finnish green reformism in the next section.

4.2 'Firming up the organisation': the Finnish reformist debate

Just like in Germany, reformist environmentalism remained in the margins for the most part of the 1980s in Finland, even though some market-friendly conceptualisations for environmental politics started appearing in the green discussion.[544] Although moderate views were occasionally discussed in the pages of *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, a wider discussion regarding reformism started taking place only from 1989 onwards. Slowly but steadily, more market-oriented language started to appear alongside environmentally-oriented language and the more radical social greenness to finally overcome them entirely, first in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine and then at a programmatic level.

In Finland, this outcome – though reflecting similar development patterns as in Germany – was nevertheless slightly more unexpected, in the sense that the entire Finnish debate was dominated by the strife between the ecologists (Paloheimo and supporters) and the social greens (represented by both the radical grassroots movement and reformists such as Osmo Soininvaara) until 1988. In this context, the discussion on the meaning of *greenness* was closely connected to the discussion of how the Greens should organise itself. This discussion, and its connection to the reformist discussion, is inspected in Section 4.2.1.

It was only after 1988, when the party was formed, that the focus of the debates took the new direction of radical idealism against reformist practicality – analysed further in Section 4.2.2. In this sense, one may wonder if and the extent to which the formation of the party (first conducted as a necessary evil) contributed to this turn, since this event would later be observed as the starting point of the larger parliamentarisation of the party and its programmatic lines.

4.2.1 From a network of movements to a party

Although the reformist turn would happen far into in the future when the first Finnish green MPs would enter the parliament in 1983, discussions on alternative forms of greenness as opposed to the radical line started soon after. In Finland, such discussions were particularly lively as there was no party organisation or any programmatic party line at the time, which theoretically allowed a lot of scope for manoeuvring.[545]

As seen in Chapter 2, green parties throughout Europe situated themselves around the environmental grassroots activist groups of the 1970s, which had emerged as a very heterogeneous group including environmentalists,

[544] Aalto 2018, 217–219.
[545] Aalto 2018, 217–219.

fair trade supporters, peace groups, anti-nuclear activists, eco-feminists and other groups that were mostly united by their willingness to promote alternatives to the prevailing (social, economic and/or political) systems. This was also the case in Finland, where the 1979 Koijärvi activism politicised the very heterogeneous movement. The early Finnish environmentalists (not yet commonly referred to as the 'greens') thus typically thought of themselves as representatives of the citizens' movement or 'alternative culture'[546] rather than as party-political actors. As such, they were more eager to question and protest against the prevailing 'Western' institutions and beliefs rather than embrace them, thus conceptualising their ideological positions with language derived largely from the tradition of radical environmentalism as well as ecological and ecofeminist philosophy, as presented in Chapter 3.[547]

Just like their German counterparts, the Finnish Greens had a strong center-liberal opposition, particularly represented by the youth organisation of the Liberal Party. Since they were not yet a party and considered themselves an umbrella organisation for different forms of environmental and alternative movements, the wide variety of political views within the Greens was not deemed a problem.

The Finnish Greens first entered the parliament in 1983 and were dubbed as 'the Greens' by the media – a name which the Finnish political movement hesitantly accepted. By 1984, some discussions on reformism had already emerged in Finland. MPs Kalle Könkkölä and Osmo Soininvaara (who had not yet become an MP but nevertheless worked with the parliament group at the time) wrote a speech reflecting on the economic politics of the current SDP - Center Party government, in which they claimed: 'if economic growth is based on improving quality, increasing intelligence in production and conserving natural resources, it is perfectly in harmony with ecological goals.' However, purely material growth that caused the depletion of natural resources was condemnable, as was dependency on exportation and free global trade. Moreover, even back then, improving technology was considered one possible solution – an issue that later became a key part of moderate green ideology in Finland, as will be observable in Chapter 5.[548]

Osmo Soininvaara, a former member of the Liberal Party with a center-liberal background, had already often been considered as a proponent of such thinking in the early 1980s, although it is easy to overestimate his emphasis on moderate reformism due to his later thinking.[549] While he was the most notable member to present liberal and reformist ideas in the early 1980s, he still emphasised the importance of and the need for cooperation with grassroots movements (rather than with the established system) in the pages of *Vihreä Lanka* magazine:

---

[546] Aalto 2018, 84–86.
[547] Mickelsson 2007, 250–251; Paastela 1987, 15, 22–24, 56–60.
[548] *'Jos taloudellinen kasvu perustuu laadun paranemiseen, älykkyyden lisäämiseen tuotannossa ja luonnonvarojen säästöön, se on täysin sopusoinnussa ekologisten tavoitteiden kanssa.*' Könkkölä, Kalle & Soininvaara, Osmo 1984. *'Talouspolitiikassa pitäisi katsoa pitemmälle.*' VL 7/1984.
[549] Aalto 2018, 46–48, 204.

> These days politicians are the captives of public opinion; they cannot execute reforms even if they considered them necessary, if the general opinion does not approve of them. ... The most important issue is to affect the general opinion. It is precisely for this reason why civil society activity is more important and perhaps more suitable for the alternative movements than the solemn rituals with political decision-makers.[550]

Despite his reformism, Osmo Soininvaara was nevertheless located in a more radical ideological space (as most reformist greens in Finland were) in the mid-1980s than he would later be. In fact, considering the lack of programmatic lines and the heterogeneous background of the various groups behind the green movement, a notable lack of disagreement could be observed regarding questions such as *opposing the system* or representing the alternative culture of the grassroots movements. Historian Sari Aalto pointed out that the term *alternative* had become a catchphrase by 1977, with the idea of the Greens representing *alternative movements* very much present in even the more reformist party programmes of the 1990s. In fact, the notion of the Greens representing alternative citizens' movements continued to appear in their programme of principles until 2002. Until then, the Greens identified themselves with the grassroots movements.[551] Even in the early 1980s, Soininvaara objected to the idea of forming a party in the pages of *Vihreä Lanka*, since this would mean participating in the very system that was out of order. For him, 'the party institution functions wretchedly. And as the parties do not function, we ought not form a Green Party, so that similar outcome would not happen to us. ... An ideological group party cannot be harnessed for pragmatic politicking.'[552]

However, even then, Soininvaara was already aware of the conflict between ideological legitimacy and pragmatic efficiency (an issue discussed further in Section 4.3.). For Soininvaara, too much ideology jeopardised the outcome of politics, even though a mass movement, such as that of the Greens, would inadvertently be more focused on the ideological rather than the pragmatic aspects of politics. According to him, the challenge for the Greens was to look for a way to combine:

a) The ideological basis of decisions (*päätösten aatteellisuus)*
b) The technical functionality of decisions (*päätösten tekninen hyvyys)*
c) The possibility for 'grand' solutions (*mahdollisuus 'suuriin' ratkaisuihin)*
d) The interaction between decision-makers and people (*päättäjien ja ihmisten vuorovaikutus)*

---

[550] *'Nykyaikana poliitikot ovat yleisen mielipiteen vankeja; he eivät voi toteuttaa uudistuksia, vaikka kokisivat ne tarpeellisiksi, jos yleinen mielipide ei niitä hyväksy. ... Tärkeintä on vaikuttaa yleiseen mielipiteeseen. Juuri sen vuoksi toiminta kansalaisyhteiskunnan tasolla on tärkeämpää ja se on ehkä enemmän omiaan vaihtoehtoliikkeille kuin juhlalliset rituaalit poliittisten päättäjien kanssa.*' Osmo Soininvaara 1984. 'Pieleen meni.' VL 3/1984.

[551] Aalto 2018, 84–86; Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 6; Vihreä liitto 1998. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma, 5; Vihreä liitto 2002. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma.

[552] *'Puoluelaitos toimii surkeasti. Ja kun puolueet eivät toimi, ei tule perustaa vihreätä puoluetta, jotta meille ei kävisi samalla tavalla. ... Aatteellista joukkopuoluetta ei voi valjastaa pragmaattiseen politikointiin.'*

He declared that 'maximising one objective jeopardises the rest', which is why he wanted to separate everyday politics from long-term ideological goals.[553] Hence, Soininvaara called for a strategy that many movements reach for during their earlier decades – the capability to pragmatically compromise on short-term governance while retaining the ideological goals as long-term goals. While these notions were still closer to the radical end of the green ideological spectrum than the actual turn towards reformism would be in the 1990s, the discussion on reformism had nevertheless started. In Soininvaara's greenness, long-term radical goals, indeed even the basic premises of the green movement, were altered to better fit the new political goals of pragmatic politics.

The discussion on reformism had a solid base in Finland, particularly since the Soininvaara-led former Liberals kept it sufficiently active. However, the Finnish Greens also followed the German discussion closely and reflected on their position with regard to their German counterparts, as observed in the pages of *Vihreä Lanka* magazine where German transfers of ideas were constantly presented. It is safe to estimate that the German ideological discussion was present in the pages of the party magazine roughly as much as the discussions of all other European greens combined, with perhaps the sole exception of the Russian Greens who occasionally received a lot of attention.

A particularly interesting piece was published in *Vihreä Lanka* magazine in 1985 about a meeting between Finnish politician Osmo Soininvaara and two German greens – Egbert Nitsch, a 'politician-level green' (*poliitikkotason vihreä* – meaning a politician and not an activist) who was an MEP elect at the time, and Hans Rudolf (Ötte) Oellig, a 'basic-level' ('*basis*-tason') green. They informed Soininvaara and a few other greens about the increasingly fierce debate between the 'realos' (called *reaalot* in the magazine, using two a's – a phrase that did not pick up in Finnish green discussion) and the 'fundamentalists'. For the 'fundamentalists', the SPD had turned into a 'slightly better CDU' in 1969 after it made compromises with the Greens' ideology and joined the government along with the liberals, leading to further distrust of the entire 'bourgeois' (*porvarillinen*) parliamentary system as the Greens consequently became merely a part of the vague power machinery (*osa epämääräistä valtakoneistoa*) instead of an active agent that is capable of changing things. Intriguingly, the date for this point of departure was considered 1969, the year the SPD joined the government, and not 1959, when the programmatic changes to enable such political activities were implemented. As will be seen later, the Finnish Greens' reformist turn was criticised in similar terms as in Germany, with its starting point considered as the beginning from their governmental term rather than the programmatic change that had preceded it. At the same time, the German Greens acknowledged that the division in the party was a rough cut, as most party members did not necessarily represent any far end of the spectrum, since

[553] Osmo Soininvaara 1985. 'Miksi puolueet eivät toimi?' *VL* 33, *VL* 10/1985, 10 May 1985. (Note: A separate magazine *VL* 32 was also published as 10/1985, but on a different date.)

the party also comprised radically-aligned reformists a well as more real-politically aligned radicals.[554]

The German Greens proceeded to justify their radical positions saying that 'if we would join the politics of compromises, we would have to carry responsibility of these compromises, and our electorate and our basis-members would not approve of it.' This is a particularly interesting statement, as it uses the same premise to defend the so-called radical position which would later be used to defend the reformist position – the premise of electorate support and credibility. As seen above, 'responsibility' was particularly a reformist concept used to argue in favour of more moderate ideological positions. MEP Nitsch pointed out how the Social Democrats had started to turn greener, but only due to the pressure created by the Green Party. Meanwhile, Soininvaara stated that this fundamentalism had been more useful for the German Greens than it would be for the Finnish Greens, as the left-minded greens in Germany were more likely to impose enough pressure on other parties to start formulating changes. In Finland, where there were more parties and where the Greens had not pressured the Social Democrats into a competition for environmental votes, a more useful direction would be a combination of immediate small reforms in the short run *and* radical reorganisation of the society, which would change the pejorative course of society, in the long run. Meanwhile, establishing a party structure (which the Finns still did not have) was more important for the Germans because of the need to reach a 5% threshold, which would be unachievable without a party. Finally, the German Greens had pointed out how wonderful it was to have left-wingers, right-wingers and ecologists within the same party – a statement that soon came under fire, as already detailed above.[555]

There seems to have been wide consensus in Finnish Green public discussions on avoiding the German debate between reformism and radicalism to rather concentrate on making all sides of the debate heard within the structure of the green association. This concept seemed to have sat well with the ideal of the Greens representing a wide umbrella association covering all environmentalist movements. In this sense, the relationship between the Finnish Greens and their German counterparts seemed somewhat controversial. Soininvaara himself articulated that the German Greens were not an influence on the Finnish Green Party.[556] However, while the Finnish Greens might not have acquired their ideas directly from the German Greens, they nevertheless formulated their ideological identity by constantly and consistently reflecting it against the background of German Green Party discussions, as apparent in the example above. This was also visible in their reflections on identifying the parts of German thinking that were not adaptable to the Finnish context. A few years later, a number of green politicians would reminisce (in 1993, as part of the 10-

[554] Osmo Soininvaara 1985. 'Reaalot, fundamentalistit…. Saksan vihreä kirjo.' *VL* 12/1985.
[555] Osmo Soininvaara 1985. 'Reaalot, fundamentalistit…. Saksan vihreä kirjo.' *VL* 12/1985.
[556] Paastela 1987, 15–16.

year-anniversary of *Vihreä Lanka* magazine) that the 'trademark Greens was scrounged from Die Grünen' *(Tavaramerkki Vihreät pummattiin Die Grüneniltä).*[557]

The Finnish Greens closely inspected the German developments over the following years. In 1987, it was noted how 'the time for red-green cooperation is coming closer in West Germany'. The SPD was closing in on the Greens in terms of their environmental thinking, while the 'real-political wing' within the German Green Party was getting stronger. *Vihreä Lanka* magazine was blatantly supportive of this development, noting that this represented a positive cultural change in politics through which the Greens were making the established system even greener (rather than the Greens becoming similar to the establishment). Moreover, the SPD closing in on the Greens was considered a particularly respectable accomplishment. While no direct opinion was expressed on the pressure this might cause on the Finnish Greens to follow similar lines of thought, the German Greens nevertheless were considered a positive example.[558]

Despite all this, the political statements made by the Finnish Greens usually leaned towards the radical side, particularly with regard to the relationship between the economy and the environment. 'International competitiveness' – a word that had become the new catchphrase of 1980s politics in Finland, even among the Social Democrats – was a particularly deplorable political goal from the perspective of the Finnish Greens. In this context, MP Kalle Könkkölä made a speech in the parliament claiming that the economy had allowed 'international market economy to rumble also in our front yard'[559]. According to the Greens, the solution to this was 'old-style greenness' (*vanhanajan vihreys)* and solidarity.[560] Könkkölä thus associated the market criticism conceptualised by the environmental movements as old-style – and presumably more authentic – greenness, originating from the 1970s. Notably, the market-friendlier conceptualisations of environmentalism had been originally also developed around the same time, primarily as an immediate response to the *limits to growth* discussion. Unlike the 'old-time' greenness, though, it was primarily used by environmentally-minded industrialists rather than the environmental movements.[561]

Interestingly, the West German discussion between the reformists and the radicals preceded the discussion that would occur in Finland only a couple of years later. In 1985, the biggest issue in Finland was still the question of radical 'social' greenness versus conservative ecologism – an argument led by Pentti Linkola. This issue was apparent in the Turku party conference in 1985, where Linkola gave his stirring speech on turning greenness towards a less anthropocentric direction, which began as a debate between radical social-

[557] Harakka, Timo 1993. 'Vihreitä kohtaloita.' *VL* 33/1993.
[558] Hulkkonen, Risto. 'Punavihreän yhteistyön aika lähestyy Länsi-Saksassa.' *VL* 7/1987. (Note: both 7/1987 and 8/1987 are counted as 7/1987, propably due to an error).
[559] *'Taloutemme on … päästänyt kansainvälisen markkinatalouden mellastamaan myös etupihallemme'*
[560] *VL* 1987. *VL* 1/1987.
[561] Warde & al. 2018, 69–70.

greenness ('builders of civil society') and conservative ecologism ('preventers of an ecocatastrophe').[562] Pentti Linkola, called in by Eero Paloheimo (who would become an MP for the Greens in 1987), demanded that the Greens 'purge' (*puhdistaa)* their party from 'mysticians, feminists and vegetarians' and give up 'the fear for responsibilities of spoiled children' (*hemmoteltujen lasten kammosta velvoituksia kohtaan)* to fight the looming ecological catastrophe.[563] Linkola's phrasing here is notable, as the idea of fighting against naïve ideological childishness would keep reappearing in the argumentation of the Greens, even among the reformists.

Once again, the Finnish Greens were following in the footsteps of the Germans, who had encountered a similar situation in the early 1980s with the conservative ecologists, leading to a walk-out in 1982. A similar walkout would take place among the Finnish Greens much later in 1987.[564] Conceptually, the most intriguing notion was mentioned by social green David Pemberton, for whom the 1987 split was about the 'radical youth' (*radikaali nuoriso)* fighting against 'middle-aged' ecologists. In this instance, radicalism and youth were celebrated, regardless of the fact that the ecologists themselves were quite radical in most aspects and that the moderate reformists were associated with the 'radical' youth. Just like in Germany, the term *radicalism* was conferred with positive meanings in green argumentation, while questions of youth and maturity would keep popping up in the argumentation.[565]

The Finnish 1986 'pre-programme' proposal, which has already been explored in the previous chapter, was an attempt to propose ideals of greenness associated with ecocentrism, according to which well-being belonged to all species, not just humans.[566] Pekka Sauri commented the aforementioned programme draft, hoping for the combination of a biologically-based and socially-based world views to be the foundation of a new green manifest – if one unifying manifest would be needed altogether. Heidi Hautala supported the process of creating a common ideological standpoint, since 'basis democracy' ('*Baasisdemokratia*' – once again, a word derived from the term *Basisdemokratie* in the German discussion) could never be truly achieved. Finally, MP Ville Komsi emphasised how the Greens had decided to use representative activity and 'infiltration of public administration' (*julkishallinnon soluttaminen)* as their methods to change the world, and thus would need to create a directive election programme to guide Finnish green political thinking, but not one that would try to define green ideology entirely. In other words, the idea was to define *greenness* in a way that would include both political representation and a larger alternative movement, i.e. both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary

[562] Välimäki, Pauli 1988. 'Vihreän liikkeen vaiheet.' *VL* 7/1988.
[563] Harakka, Timo 1993. 'Vihreitä kohtaloita.' *VL* 33/1993.
[564] Such as the 1985 discussion on Pentti Linkola's demands for more ecologism. *VL* 1985. *VL* 13/1985, 6–7.
[565] Harakka, Timo 1993. 'Vihreitä kohtaloita.' *VL* 33/1993.
[566] *VL* 1986. 'Esiohjelman alustava luonnos.' *VL* 1/1986.

measures.[567] Furthermore, Osmo Soininvaara continued to publish his plea to 'firm up the organisation of the movement'.[568]

As the 1987 election approached, more discussions took place regarding the exact structure for organising the non-party movement that would involve a 'network' of actors rather than 'a hierarchy' with a clearly definined leadership and unified ideology.[569] An interesting sidenote to this ongoing debate in 1986 was the Chernobyl incident in the spring of 1986 that emerged as an anti-nuclear premise for the Greens only in September, before which nuclear issues in general had only occasionally been discussed by them. Since the foundation of the Finnish movement had not been based on nuclear power as it had in West Germany, issues related to it were not quite as urgently and consistently addressed in Finnish green ideological debates as they seemingly were in Germany.[570]

The Green Alliance was formed as an official umbrella association in 1987, after which it was turned into a political party in 1988. A few years later, the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine identified Pekka Haavisto as the key actor wanting to register the Green Alliance as a party. He had been reported as saying that the establishment of the party was required 'against those political pressures that can form for example when Taavi Tuppurainen from Rysänperä threatens to form a Green Party'. The immediate reactions from the ecological Greens, who feared that the party would change from an umbrella association for all environmentalists into a political tool of the social greens, was swift. Eero Paloheimo and Erkki Pulliainen (half of the green MPs) formed their own radical-ecological party that followed in the footsteps of Pentti Linkola's radical ideology. However, the first Green Party chair Heidi Hautala met with Paloheimo several times, later calling him 'civilised' and 'charming' in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, after which both MPs soon returned to the party. Meanwhile, the new ecologist Green Party prevailed for some time, but without their two figureheads. Consequently, the new '*Ecological Greens*' never amounted to much politically (although they would have one MP for a short period in the 1990s).[571]

The formation of a party structure in 1988 seems to have been the key event that turned the discussion towards a more reformist direction. The relationship between the economy and the environment had occasionally been discussed even before this, but not as a serious question about the political objectives of the green movement. In fact, in 1987, the Greens were so unanimous about their radical relationship with the growth economy that they used it to justify the need for such a movement. When the Greens were accused of 'diluting their ideology' (*aatteen laimentaminen*) due to increased focus on

---

567 Sauri, Pekka & al. 1986. *VL* 2/1986, 4–5.
568 Soininvaara, Osmo. 'Organisaation selkiytymättömyys estää liikettä toimimasta.' *VL* 11/1986.
569 Savander, Juha 1986. 'Verkosto hierarkian sijaan.'' *VL* 15–16/1986.
570 ***VL*** 1986. 'Hiilivoimaa, turvekuumetta, koskisotaa ja säästöä. Energiapoliittinen katsaus jälkeen Tshernobylin.' *VL* 18/1986.
571 Harakka, Timo 1993. 'Vihreitä kohtaloita.' *VL* 33/1993.

using more established forms of organisation, such as the new party structure, Marja-Liisa Ponsila responded, 'at the time when Greens join the choir for controlled structural change, shift into talking about securing the conditions for international competitiveness, start emphasising their worry about gross-national product not growing enough, at that point the ideology will be lost. At this point it is alive and well.' This ideology, she emphasised, was about creating an improved balance in the relationship between humans and nature.[572]

Revealingly, in January 1988, Anne Brax wondered in seemingly reformist terms if the eco labels discussed widely in Europe and particularly in Germany could be used as a means to direct consumer behaviour. However, unlike later reformists, Brax was hoping that such labels would eventually lead to the disappearance of all non-ecological products from markets due to the decline in consumer demand for such products.[573] Even when discussing political methods typically associated with moderate environmental economics, such as eco lables, the Greens thus linked such discussions to their radical goals.

Notably, creating the party in 1988 did not immediately translate into the requirement for either a moderate political ideology or reformism. In fact, a widely-used notion was using the party only 'as a tool' (*vain väline*) – a concept that was consistently present in the argumentation of those supporting the formation of a party. For example, Osmo Soininvaara kept reiterating that grassroots activity would be at the center of greenness despite the party formation.[574]

As will be seen later, this aspect of green self-understanding would be entirely rewritten in just a few years, when *Green ABC Book II* would claim in 1995 that the formation of the party structure in 1988 must be considered a first and crucial step towards 'maturity', with the concept of responsibility being finally understood in the years after naïve radicalism. The need for such re-organisation of green self-consciousness would be based on the more parliamentary needs of the mid-1990s, since discussions on the 'maturity' and 'responsibility' perspectives were entirely absent back in 1988 even among those reformists who supported the party structure. Instead, they were merely defended as practical necessities that could be used to further enhance the Greens' radical goals. Therefore, the need for reformism, though later attributed to the 1988 formation of the party, did not appear in green discussions widely until 1989, and the starting point of such debates was, in fact, not only the green internal debate but also the conceptual revolution of *sustainable development.*

---

572 *'Siinä vaiheessa, kun vihreät yhtyvät hallitun rakennemuutoksen kuoroon, siirtyvät puhumaan kansainvälisen kilpailukyvyn ehtojen turvaamisesta, alkavat korostaa huolestumistaan siitä että kansantulo ei kasva riittävästi, siinä vaiheessa aate on hukassa. Nyt se on hyvin selvästi olemassa ja hengissä.*' Ponsila Marja-Liisa 1987. 'Aate on tallella.' VL 12/1987.
573 Brax, Anne 1988. 'Ekotunnukset käyttöön Suomessakin?' *VL* 2/1988.
574 Ponsila, Marja-Liisa. 'Airot saatiin, tappi puuttuu.' *VL* 3/1988.

4.2.2 'All-or-nothing politics result in the outcome of nothing'

Apart from developing a party structure and working towards parliamentarisation, other, more transnational reasons may also have contributed to the increasing popularity of the reformist viewpoint. The concept of *sustainable development,* coined by the UN in 1987, placed international emphasis on environmental goals and established a political philosophy that had originated outside environmental movements but was influential in framing and conceptualising environmental questions in public discussion.

That being said, moderate environmental concepts stemming from notions outside the environmental movements was not a new thing in the late 1980s. In academic discussions, *ecological modernisation* had already been discussed widely, beginning in Germany at least from 1982 onwards. By the late 1980s, there was widespread political pressure to start discussing environmentalism from perspectives that were less damaging to industry competitiveness. In the European Community (EC), Margaret Thatcher particularly promoted the ideal of consumer citizenship and its application in EC level environmental politics. The crux for this concept was that if pressure to create more environmentally sustainable production was applied by the consumers from below rather than by government regulation from above, the hit on competitiveness would be smaller while environmental goals could, nevertheless, be pursued.[575]

Finally, the 1987 Brundtland Commission began the discussion on *sustainable development* in the UN – a term that soon became a globally used (although sometimes vaguely-defined) catch-all phrase. This new global environmental ideal sought to promote environmental sustainability, meaning the preservation of natural resources for current and future generations. In addition to this, the *development* part of the term underlined the need for economic growth and social equality not just in individual countries but also globally. The older concept of *sustainability* was thus accompanied by the attainment of growth while battling environmental degradation. As noted by Jeremy L. Caradonna, *sustainable development* soon became a conceptual tool to develop environmental policies that were adaptable in a growth economy framework. This discourse of growth-friendly environmentalism was rooted in an attempt to address the *limits to growth* discussion (that had already started in the early 1970s) in a growth-friendly but environmentally sustainable manner. *Sustainable development* was one of these answers – one that became perhaps the most famous, used and globally accepted answer.[576] Gro Harlem Brundtland, whose name was attached to the Commission, was herself a social democratic prime minister of Norway. This political affiliation with social democracy may partly explain the emphasis on the promotion of merging economic growth with the development of equality through a global perspective, while also

[575] Knill & Liefferink 2007, 36–39, 129–130; Collier 1998.
[576] Caradonna 2018, 154–156.

adding the sustainability of the environment into this traditional social democratic equation.[577]

Naturally, the Greens would have to react to these internationally notable discussions that, on the one hand, embraced the detested growth paradigm as a necessity and, on the other hand, popularised environmental thinking far beyond the radicalism of the alternative movements. The Green Alliance parliament group issued an aggressive counter-attack on the Brundtland Commission report in May 1988, headlining their statement with a critical title: 'economic growth is not necessary for Finland' (*Taloudellinen kasvu ei ole Suomelle tarpeen)*. They claimed that the Brundtland report was contradictory and full of compromises, and that the suggested measures would not suffice to veer the world away from 'the road leading to destruction' (*tuhoon johtavalta tieltä),* thus once again using the notably gloomy argumentation that was typical of the 'survivalist' discourse. The report was considered especially detrimental due to its claim that solving global problems required economic growth also in industrialised countries. In Finland, the parliament group held that increased economic growth would only lead to bigger ecological problems, because 'even the current level of living is not produced in a sustainable way'. Nevertheless, the global perspective of the Brundtland Commission was applauded, as was the goal of resource efficiency ('get more with less' principle). Based on these principles, the Greens demanded eco-taxation for energy and pollution emissions, as well as new filters for industrial facilities, among other things. The four-seated Green Alliance parliament group – Eero Paloheimo, Erkki Pulliainen, Pekka Haavisto and Osmo Soininvaara – were once again openly critical of market-friendly moderate environmentalism as a group, despite the fact that some (especially Osmo Soininvaara) occasionally presented alternative views in their thinking as well.[578]

Osmo Soininvaara wrote a separate piece about the Brundtland Commission's report in May 1988. For him, the report was 'not the best thing ever written about the issue, but it is the most significant. It is backed by the prestige of the UN and its ideas are known throughout the world. For years to come, it will be the vantage point of global environmental discussion'. However, he argued against the demand for an economic growth that was not accompanied by ecologically friendly measures. *Development* had not been explained, though, but was suggested to refer to economic growth, just as the term was typically understood. While Soininvaara applauded the demand for reducing energy production in half and attaining more well-being with less use of resources and energy, he once again vocalised his concern about the framework of free market capitalism not having the means to achieve these goals. In this context, it is worth pointing out that even Soininvaara was not explicitly supportive of green market capitalism *per se* at this point – although he, along with many other green reformists, would change his mind later.[579]

---

[577] Dryzek & Scholsberg 2005, 257–258; Dryzek 2005, 145–148.
[578] *VL* 1988. 'Taloudellinen kasvu ei ole Suomelle tarpeen.' *VL* 10/1988.
[579] *VL* 1988. 'Brundtland-raportti: Vihreä raamattu vai kehno kompromissi?' *VL* 9/1988; Osmo Soininvaara 1988. 'Brundtland-raportti ei ole vihreä raamattu.' *VL* 9/1988.

Despite this harsh criticism, the focus on debating *greenness* seemed to have changed due to the international emphasis on sustainable development. As Soininvaara immediately noticed, *sustainable development* became the vantage point for environmental discussions in the years to come, with a constantly changing meaning attributed to it – including one presented in the Finnish Green Party programme in 1994 when the Greens took a more growth-friendly position towards the concept by emphasising consumer behaviour guidance as an environmental policy tool (more on this in the next chapter).

In the pages of the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, the year 1989 marked the year when green consumerism became a notable idea that emerged as worth discussing more seriously. This was perhaps because the Greens had organised themselves into a party a year earlier and now needed to discuss ways to actually utilise their status in the parliament. However, it is also possible that the political *zeitgeist* was changing, as the German Greens had discussed. In this context, Knill and Liefferink noted that at a European level, a more market-friendly form of environmentalism was being advocated for application by the EC due to increased global competition – a trend that could be negatively affected by strict environmental regulation, as witnessed after expensive car catalysts became mandatory in the EC area in 1989.[580]

However, in 1989, the Greens' magazine claimed that a debate on political ideology was suddenly necessary, particularly because the newfound party had started working towards creating a coherent political programme – one which would still remain quite radical in 1990 when it was published.[581] In 1989, Editor-in-Chief Pauli Välimäki wondered whether the Greens ought to approach politics more pragmatically on several occasions in his editorial. Once again, the German Green Party discussions served as a vantage point for the Finnish. The German Reformist leader Joscha Fischer, who was recognised as the spokesperson of reformism, was quoted saying that the Greens needed to start working within the market system instead of opposing it so as to garner more appeal among middle-class people with environmental concerns: 'It is the yuppies who in the end determine, whether the West Germany of the future is an environmentally friendly or a brutal society.'[582]

Even more controversy arose when the Helsinki School of Economics organised a public seminar on green consumerism. *Vihreä Lanka* reported the idea presented in the seminar that the only environmental problem with the free market economy was that environmental consequences were not being reflected in product prices. They claimed that if this flaw in market mechanisms could be addressed, the markets would correct themselves by reducing high-emission consumption through price control. While this idea was admittedly detested by environmentalists, some reformist Greens supported this thought.[583] Furthermore, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine noted that 1989 was the year

[580] Knill & Liefferink 2007, 8–11, 122, 129–131.
[581] *VL* 1989. *VL* 37/1989, 1.
[582] *VL* 1989. 'Älymystö on aina oikeassa.' *VL* 5/1989.
[583] Kalanti, Jarmo & Louekari, Kimmo 1989. '"Ympäristöpolitiikkaa ja taloutta ei saa eristää"'. *VL* 7/1989.

when adverse tax discussions – referring to the taxation of environmentally harmful products – broke into the green discourse, as reformists – Osmo Soininvaara leading the charge – demanded an environmentalism that utilised 'the power of the market forces'. Meanwhile, the green actors were prescribed the role of acting as mediators between those who believed in the market economy and those who were worried of its consequences.[584] As mentioned before, while these ideas were not new, they were being seriously and widely discussed within the political environmental movement for the first time, with spokespeople for reformism now endorsing a market-friendlier approach more openly.

This mode of discussion did not please everybody. For instance, green movement activist Olli Tammilehto expressed his contention with the 'stuff ideology' (*kamaideologia)*, which he referred to as the ideology of our 'system', that was starting to take over green language. For him, well-being was to be found in interaction between humans and other humans, not in interaction between humans and stuff. Instead, the 'powerful ideological machinery of our economy' made citizens falsely imagine that 'a good life will be found from within piles of stuff'.[585] Now this ideolology of our system was starting to succumb even moderate greens, 'blinding them from the political nature of the economy' (*tehneet heidät sokeiksi talouden poliittisuudelle)*.[586] In this context, the metaphor of 'machinery' was not used to describe the state, as was often done in Germany, but the free market economy. The market machinery had caused humans to lose some inherently natural way of being, which had led humans to overconsume.

Later in 1989, Tammilehto further claimed that there now new tensions between the party and the environmental movement that had not existed before because of the reformist debate. This tension had been caused by newfound concrete parliamentary goals that the reformists were aiming at, which were directed towards 'shutting out the citizens' movement from the map' entirely. Tammilehto reminded other greens that 'radical reforms' did not mean moderate parliamentary action for the environmental movement; it meant renewing the society entirely, which had originally been the goal of the environmental movement. He believed that there was a shift of meaning happening within the Greens regarding how these issues were understood.[587]

Other writers also took a stand. Teuvo Suominen pointed out how catalytic converters in cars had helped reduce emissions 'just enough so that more cars can be manufactured', further emphasising that even with lesser emissions, green consumerism would still be detrimental due to the increased growth of consumption. This ideal had also led other parties, even the right-wing Coalition Party, to embrace moderate environmental stands, causing

---

584 *VL* 1989. 'Kriittisen kansalaisen paluu.' *VL* 8/1989.
585 '*Taloutemme voimakas idologinen koneisto saa heidät [kansalaiset] kuvittelemaan hyvän elämän löytyvän kamakasojen keskeltä.'*
586 Tammilehto, Olli 1989. 'Lama lamauttaa myös kamaideologiaa.' *VL* 2/1989.
587 Tammilehto, Olli 1989.'Vihreä liike puoluekielen kourissa?' *VL* 27/1989.

further need for the Greens to distance themselves from such thinking.[588] Even *Vihreä Lanka* magazine itself – despite giving a lot of room to consumerist viewpoints during Pauli Välimäki's tenure as the chief editor – pointed out some of the unfortunate implications of market-friendly environmentalism and economic guidance in the US, particularly referring to dirty firms that simply bought emission rights and continued to pollute.[589] The magazine even mocked the new ideals of green consumerism saying that every green 'yuppie' should purchase an environmentally friendly 'catalyst Porsche'. These narratives speak a lot about the change in green ideals, considering that such a joke could pass as everyday semantics in the 2000s.[590]

These ideals were reflected on by Pauli Välimäki, who wondered about the disappearance of the 'revolution of values' – about the reason behind the new generation being more individualistic and consumeristic than before, and the lack of any possible reason for this trend to be reversed in the 1990s. For Välimäki, post-material, spiritual and social values (*postmateriaaliset, henkisest ja sosiaaliset arvot)* had been everywhere ten years ago, but had suddenly disappeared. While the 1970s had promoted 'post-individualistic' (*yliyksilöllisiä)* values, the 1980s had retracted back to self-centeredness.[591]

This discussion was taking place inside party structures as well. In the 1989 Green Party spring conference, Soininvaara noted that incompetence (*osaamattomuus,* which he apparently associated with radicalism) should no longer be tolerated, which was why the party needed to move towards a reformist direction, indicating that too much ideology and refusal to accept political and economic realities would result in incompetent politics. Pekka Sauri agreed to this proposal, having expressed his fears regarding the party reputation among 'enlightened citizens' (*valistuneet kansalaiset)*.[592]

In addition, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine followed this line of thought when reporting on the Turku spring conference, claiming (perhaps a bit ahead of time, as no official goals or programmatic decisions to such a direction had yet been made) that the Greens were now transforming into a 'reform party'. The shift from unanimous ideological radicalism was amazingly quick, considering that almost nobody had demanded such ideological changes just a year earlier, with the formation of the party argued to be merely a practical measure that would have little to no effect on the conceptualisation of radical green goals. After the conference, this debate heated up to the point where the magazine pointed out a new division in the party between the reformist and 'anti-modernist' sides.

At this point, Green Party chairman Heidi Hautala entered the discussion, taking a strongly anti-modernist stand. For her, the 'progress believers' were naïve to think that a 'system such as this could ever produce ... environmentally sustainable development', subsequently calling the green movement an 'anti-

---

588 *VL* 1989. 'Valtiojohtajat hereillä.' *VL* 11/1989.
589 *VL* 1989. 'On aika noteerata ympäristön arvo pörssissä.' *VL* 18/1989.
590 *VL* 1989. 'Älymystö on aina oikeassa.' *VL* 5/1989.
591 Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Minne hukkui arvojen hiljainen vallankumous?' *VL* 7/1989.
592 Vihreä liitto 1989, party conference minutes, §5.

capitalist movement'.[593] When asked whether she was familiar with the opinions of Joschka Fischer, the market-friendly influencer of the German Green Party, Hautala claimed not to be willing to join the celebration of market economy, calling it a 'good servant but a bad master' and stating that the society needed 'no growth of gross-national product, but growth of political imagination'. She also claimed that the question of dealing with issues of modernity – 'or what progress really is all about' – would soon become a key ideological issue for both the green and red parties. For her, the reason for the existence of the green movement was to 'raise new questions to the social discussion, change apprehensions of good life, and create new political culture' – and that could only be accomplished as a part of the alternative citizens' movement.[594] Hautala reiterated that the Finnish Greens did not support socialism either.[595] Instead, they perceived socialism as a different side of the same materialist and industrialist coin. For them, 'no socialism, no capitalism' was a slogan that was built around the notion of all growth economies being destructive to the environment.[596] In this sense, they somewhat differed from German Greens.

Vihreä Lanka chief editor Välimäki acknowledged the importance of having all sides present in the debate that had suddenly heated up. This line of thought led to some controversial stands – while Välimäki himself claimed that the Green Party was 'the strongest and most representative organ' of the alternative environmental citizens' movement, the magazine criticised chairman Heidi Hautala for 'leaning towards the alternative movement' and for not willing to actively seek a position in the government. The magazine even hypothesised that this could cause a change in party leadership, with members like Erkki Pulliainen and Pekka Haavisto considered as ideological bridge-builders located at the center of the ideological spectrum within the party (An assessment that is a bit too difficult to understand in the case of Haavisto, as he was one of the most prominent reformists in the party, albeit perhaps not quite as vocal as Osmo Soininvaara). As it turned out, the magazine did not agree with the opinions of the party rank-and-file who had re-elected Hautala for another two-year term in 1989. Later, Välimäki underlined that he had wanted to emphasise the possibilities of transformation from alternative antiparty-politics to (what he considered to nevertheless still be 'radical') reformpolitics, which he believed was about to happen among the Finnish Greens anyway.[597]

In 1990, this debate faded out from the pages of *Vihreä Lanka*, as green consumption started to appear as a normal form of environmental thinking – a concept that was taken for granted rather than debated about. The magazine had published a series of articles about 'responsible consumption' and, in the

[593] *VL* 1989. Vihreä liitto pesee kasvoja. *VL* 22/1989.
[594] *VL* 1989. 'Vihreä liitto pesee kasvoja. *VL* 22/1989; Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Vihreä liitto on antikapitalistinen puolue.' *VL* 37/1989.
[595] Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Vihreä liitto on antikapitalistinen puolue.' *VL* 37/1989.
[596] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.
[597] *Vihreä lanka* 1989. *VL* 22/1989, 2; *VL* 44/1989. Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Kommentteja Sepolle.' *VL* 25/1989.

words of former editor Pauli Välimäki, presented the ideals of consumers affecting markets as historical. The focus of environmental discussion was clearly and visibly shifting from criticism of the system towards individualistically and economically oriented models of thought. This development occurred along with a general turn towards a market-friendlier approach.[598]

While this debate was disappearing from the Greens' magazine, the political debate inside the party was starting to heat up. In the 1990 Jyväskylä party conference, a long discussion was held on dealing with the issues of modernity, such as economic growth. While most greens would still position themselves radically against the paradigmatic change of abandoning anti-modernity and their demands of redefining the Western understanding of well-being, some were strongly in favour of individualistically oriented market-friendly environmentalism as a pragmatic method to affect decision-making. Lasse Raunio, for example, demanded that the new Green Alliance programme be handed over to a neutrally positioned economist for assessing the 'realism' (*realistisuus)* of the economic goals of the party programme that were still rather radical.[599]

This marked the beginning of a change in party strategy. By 1990, many prominent greens were beginning to ponder if they should indeed attempt to make a difference at the parliamentary legislation level, which would require a more – as Lasse Raunio phrased it – 'realistically' oriented programme. Former magazine editor Pauli Välimäki, who was now the party vice chairman and was also among the programme draft writers, pointed out that the Greens had a growing number of 'reformists' among themselves (as opposed to the radical ecologists and left-greens with their anti-modernity sentiment) at this point, mostly stemming from the political and ideological tradition of the late Liberal Party. These reformists were willing to seek compromises in the prevailing culture, beliefs and institutions, instead of using the parliamentary framework as a means to conduct discussions and propose ideas, as they had mostly been doing until then. The goal of the reformists was, in the words of Pauli Välimäki, to turn the Greens into a 'normal party'.[600] Even ecologically oriented characters, such as MP Erkki Pulliainen, pointed out that while the carrying capacity of nature had exceeded and a collapse of Western society was imminent, there was still a need for an actual pragmatic approach that was socially acceptable for the masses and that would help cooperate with other parties – which Pulliainen recognised as a difficult paradox.[601]

Välimäki had already called the 1990 party programme a 'compromise' between these different factions, even though it clearly leaned towards the more radical direction by still laying emphasis on *companionship* ideals and related attempts to reconceptualise the 'Western' modes of conducts entirely.

---

[598] *VL* 1990. *VL* 15/1990; 35/1990: 46/1990.
[599] Vihreä liitto 1990, party conference minutes.
[600] Välimäki 1995, 73, in *Green ABC Book 2*; see also Aalto 2018, 377–381.
[601] Välimäki, Pauli 1989. 'Vihreät ovat politiikan kolmas ulottuvuus.' *VL* 38/1989; *VL* 1990. *VL* 11/1990, 2.

Meanwhile, the moderate greens were afraid of the 'flight of industries' along with 'the collapse of national economy' that the programmatic green ideals might lead to, while the deep ecologists on the other end of the green ideological spectrum thought that the Greens had not gone far enough to place the capitalist system of production and over-consumption under ecological control. *Vihreä Lanka* chief editor Pauli Välimäki, who was also leading the party programme work, observed the draft becoming more radical than he had planned when the party rank-and-file, with their roots still deep in the grassroots movement, voted in favour of adding the notion of limits to growth being 'exceeded' in the Western culture to the programme. When the moderate programme draft, coined by Välimäki, Pekka Sauri and Satu Hassi, was presented to the party conference, over 130 change requests were debated over. Reformist attempts to formulate a more moderate programme turned out to be only partly successful, but Sauri defended the outcome by pointing out that different environmentalist views from all factions within the party needed to be represented in the programme.[602]

In addition, the question of who would lead the programme work also attracted some controversy. Sari Aalto, who studied the early development of the Green Alliance, pointed out that although the radical ecologist Eero Paloheimo had demanded the programme-writing leadership for himself, he was played out by Pekka Haavisto and Heidi Hautala.[603]

This is particularly interesting to observe, considering that both Hautala and Paloheimo were self-proclaimed anti-modernists. In this context, it is worth noting that the up-and-coming strife between the 'reformists' and 'anti-modernists' was completely different from the one between the 'ecologists' and 'social greens' – one that was virtually over by the turn of the decade. Perhaps one of the reasons for the eventual triumph of reformist ideals within the party was that many of the anti-modernist left-wing social greens chose to side with the reformist greens rather than with the deep ecologists. Politically, this might not be an easy alliance to comprehend. However, on accounting for the personal relationships of the actors involved, the reason (or at least one of the many possible explanations) might be surprisingly simple. These people were roughly the same age, came from the same geographical location, knew each other personally from decades past and were quite accustomed to working with each other despite their ideological differences. After all, Hautala had been an integral part of the environmental movement since the early 1970s and had known people like Pekka Haavisto long before the Greens were founded. Meanwhile, Osmo Soininvaara and Ville Komsi had known each other since 1968 when they were teenagers and had worked together in students' organisations before becoming the environmentalist wing leaders of the Liberal Party youth organisation. In contrast, the deep ecologists, such as Paloheimo and Pulliainen, represented an older generation and ideals stemming less from

[602] Välimäki 1995, in *Green ABC Book 2*. Välimäki, Pauli 1990. *VL* 25 May 1990; *VL* 1 June 1990.
[603] Aalto 2018, 359.

the southern Finnish liberal alternative movement and more from the northern Finnish areas and the more conservative natural protection circles.[604]

Later, the leadership of the programme work would be handed over to the moderate reformists, with Pauli Välimäki in charge in 1990 and Pekka Sauri in 1994. Consequently, signs of a pro-modernity standpoint were already present in the programme as early as in 1990, although to a minor extent. The goal of eco-taxes, for example, was a part of the programme shaped by the moderate reformers, who were hoping to find common ground with other parties. Often considered a novel idea at that time, the origin of the eco-tax ideal (as well as many ideas of the more moderate environmentalism) can actually be traced to the early 1970s, when moderate industrialists and economists sought to conceptualise a market-friendly counter-narrative to the then-prevalent *limits to growth* discussion.[605] Nevertheless, at this point, the Greens talked about eco-taxes (as well as other political goals) mainly in the context of their radical 'balanced economy' concept, which still aimed at restructuring (or at least reconceptualising) the economic and political goals of the Western world.

The next notable change in party dynamics occurred in 1991, when Heidi Hautala stepped down from her two terms as party chair, since Green Party rules prohibited anyone for staying on longer. When pro-reformist chair Pekka Sauri took control of party leadership in 1991, he and party secretary David Pemberton focused on developing strategies to transform the Greens from a radical alternative party into an internationally oriented general party that would bring about change from within the system in which it operated. The party leadership even contacted prime minister Esko Aho to discuss their possibilities of joining the government – something that Heidi Hautala had been weary of doing due to her fear of green ideology becoming watered down and compromised by economic demands. In retrospect, the growth-critical Greens' run for the 1991–95 government during an era of economic depression has been described a fairly fantastic attempt.[606] However, contemporary reports published by *Helsingin Sanomat* indicated that for roughly a week, it seemed likely that the Greens would indeed join the center-right government. This was due to the fact that the liberal right parties, such as the Coalition Party and particularly the Swedish People's Party (RKP, *Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue)*, wanted a liberal party to balance the scales with the more conservative Center Party that would be running the new government.[607] After a week of negotiations, the Greens were the last party to leave the negotiations before the new government was put together. Later, the green radical ideal of anti-growth was blamed for their dismissal.[608] However, back in 1991, it was their demands for highly increased energy taxation that were considered too detrimental for the economy of the country, with the leader of the Center Party and future

[604] *VL* 1993. *VL* 33/1993; See also Aalto 2018, 95, 106–108.
[605] Warde et al. 2018, 68–70.
[606] Remes 2007, 91, 104–105.
[607] Hämäläinen, Unto. 'Kokoomus ja RKP tarvitsevat kipeästi vihreiden tukea.' *HS* 11 April 1991.
[608] Remes 2007, 91, 104–105; Isotalo 2007(a), 131–132.

Prime Minister Esko Aho calling the Greens' energy policies a 'jump into the unknown'.[609]

Nevertheless, coming so close to entering the government was another milestone for the Green Party leadership, who started to promote more moderate views with the aim of better cooperation within the established structures of politics. Coincidental or not, after the failure of the Greens' governmental negotiations, intra-party discussions on reformism seemed to take an immediate leap forward.

As a consequence of the reformist development, the Greens started renegotiating their stands on European integration, among other issues – something they had been strongly opposed to earlier. As the discussion on Finland joining the EC (from 1993 the European Union, or the EU) heated up across the country with the Cold War approaching its end, the Greens' stand on European integration became a subject of interest even to the *Helsingin Sanomat* newspaper, which had generally not been particulary interested in the Greens' intra-party ideological strife. In the summer of 1991, just a few months after the Greens had officially renounced their support for European Community negotiations, party chair Heidi Hautala said that the Greens were going through a 'Jacob's wrestle' (*jaakobinpaini*) regarding the issue, adding that joining the European Community was not an impossible vision for the future if believable environmental policies could be promoted by doing so.[610]

These events were taking place in an era of looming economic depression and international turmoil, at a time when the Cold War era Eastern Bloc was breaking apart and, as mentioned when analysing the German case, the *zeitgeist* of the time was turning towards a more market-liberal direction throughout the world. Thus, in 1991, discussions regarding a market-friendlier approach spread widely among party actives as well as in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. Osmo Soininvaara publicly demanded a kind of politics 'without dreams' (*haaveetonta politiikkaa)* because 'all-or-nothing –politics would result in the outcome of nothing'.[611] Furthermore, Soininvaara demanded that the Greens should attempt to join the government even if it would mean giving up such principles as opposing nuclear power as long as practical solutions could be altered to secure a better direction (for instance, ensuring safer nuclear power with the Greens involved, which was still better than unsafe nuclear power without the Greens). This marked a major change in Soininvaara's personal argumentation, which had earlier endorsed a more pluralist view of environmentalism by promoting the green movement as an umbrella of alternative movements despite personally supporting market-friendly measures. He now wanted to take the party towards the same reformist direction that aligned with his personal thinking.[612]

---

[609] Hämäläinen, Unto. Vihreät eivät jatka enää hallitusneuvotteluissa. HS 16 April 1991
[610] Sippola, Anna-Riitta. 'Vihreät tarkistamassa Eurooppa-kantojaan.' *HS* 20 June 1991.
[611] Soininvaara, Osmo 1991. 'Kaikki-tai-ei-mitään –politiikka johtaa lopputulokseen ei-mitään.' *VL* 21 March 1991.
[612] Soininvaara, Osmo 1991. 'Kaikki-tai-ei-mitään –politiikka johtaa lopputulokseen ei-mitään.' *VL* 21 March 1991.

Meanwhile, questions concerning economic growth were becoming increasingly difficult for the Greens to tackle. For instance, *Helsingin Sanomat* reported an anecdote from the 1991 televised election debates, taking place at a time when the worst depression to hit Finland in decades was restricting growth and increasing unemployment rates, when journalists asked the Greens if they were happy with the decline in economic growth. The Greens, as noted by the newspaper, did not give a straight answer to the question, instead dodging it by saying that issues important for the Greens could not be measured in terms of the gross national product one way or the other.[613]

Along with the aforementioned Pauli Välimäki and Osmo Soininvaara, several other key party figures participated in demanding a moderate turn at around the elections of 1991. As chair of the party (1991–1993), Pekka Sauri was a strong supporter of this development of moderation, having reached the conclusion that sticking to the old principles would mean giving up political influence entirely and that a small parliament group, such as the Greens, could only affect change through compromises. Pekka Haavisto, who became party chair in 1993 (and later the first minister of the Greens), would later reminiscent how nothing would have been accomplished if the Greens had done what the grassroots NGOs wanted.[614]

While the green political movement was hoping to become more popular, the party's *Vihreä Lanka* magazine was also renewing itself. Under the leadership of the new chief editor Timo Harakka, their outspoken goal was to attract 10,000 new readers. To achieve this, the magazine decided to approach environmental issues at the everyday level and, most importantly, from the 'consumer's viewpoint' – very much in alignment with the increasing consumeristic political goals in the green movement, as depicted above. The magazine even developed an advertisement campaign calling for a change of perspective 'from primeval forests to night cafés' (*aarniometsistä yökahviloihin)* – clearly indicating that the age of associating environmentalism with natural protection was very much a thing of the past by then.[615] This change was illustrated in an undated 1992 'special issue' magazine of *Vihreä Lanka* (obviously meant as an advertisement piece for the newspaper), which included a picture of a hippie-looking long-haired man ridiculously tied to a shrub with the title 'image' (*mielikuva).* Meanwhile, the second page pictured a woman – likely a mother – with a young child stepping out of a car with some groceries, titled 'reality' (*todellisuus*). The point, of course, was that people have mistakenly assumed that environmental issues are about a small group of radicals tying themselves to trees (or protecting nature in some other ways that now suddenly seemed more silly than heroic), while environmentalism in reality was and should be about everyday consumer choices of the regular individual with regular everyday work- and family-related worries.

---

613 Vuoristo, Pekka. 'Taivaanrannan maalareita.' HS 27 February 1991.
614 Isotalo 2007(b), 162, 179.
615 Harakka, Timo 1991. 'Lehti uteliaille ihmisille.' *VL* 48/1991.

Furthermore, this issue of the magazine listed a variety of consumeristic ways to affect the world positively, using the phrase 'one consumer choice at a time' (*yksi kulutusvalinta kerrallaan*). The magazine presented articles meant for workplaces, discussing how to recycle computer parts and cleaning the office in an environmentally friendly manner. Nature protection themes were entirely excluded from the special issue, instead demonstrating different varieties of greenness to potential new readers of the magazine, with the sole exception being the picture of the man ridiciliously tied to a bush. Instead, the central pages promoted 'green conspicuous consumption' (*vihreä kerskakulutus*), claiming that consumption needed to change 'from consuming concrete things to purchasing symbolic values' (*konkreettisten tavaroiden kulutuksesta symboliarvojen ostamiseen).*[616]

Same line continued throughout Harakka's tenure as chief editor, raising issues such as what kinds of ecological products are there available for the consumer, and how does the consumer know if the raw materials are also extracted in an ecological way.[617] Climate change – or the 'greenhouse effect', as it was called at this time by the Greens – also became front page news around the same time. The dangers of the greenhouse effect, though occasionally discussed earlier, were first presented as front-page news in late 1991, after which debating the issue became more commonplace. Instead of protecting old forests, the dangers of climate change now called for more silviculture as a measure to increase wood output and consequently improve the forest capability to bind carbon.[618] This is a particularly interesting statement, considering that a heated debate had erupted just a few years earlier between Finnish forest protectionists and supporters of sustainable silviculture about whether there were enough 'real' forests (*kunnon metsiä*) in Finland to support a wide biodiversity. Considering this context, it does not seem like a coincidence that the magazine abruptly abandoned forest protection themes almost entirely and started advocating for sustainable forestry, thus taking a more moderate and mainstream stand in the ongoing debate.[619]

This change of circumstances may be summarised by tracing the decline of the *alternative culture* discourse from its respectable avant-garde heroism of 1983–1988 to being considered equal with (but not perhaps preferable over) the other more moderate forms of environmentalism (1989–1991) and finally being marginalised to the point of becoming a target of ridicule among the Greens themselves (1991 onwards). This is also evident from the type of issues underlined in the magazine. While the German Greens viewed the nuclear and peace activist as representative of the ideal green, the Finnish version of such a character was that of a natural (particularly forest) protection activist. In 1987 alone, forest cutting and forest protection had been front page news in *Vihreä Lanka* magazine on five separate occasions,[620] while nuclear power was

[616] *VL* 1992. *VL* Special Issue 1992.
[617] *VL* 1992. *VL* 41C/1992.
[618] *VL* 1991. *VL* 46/1991.
[619] Pekurinen 1997, 53–56.
[620] *VL* 7/1987, 9/1987, 10/1987, 13/1987, 21/1987

discussed rarely and climate change (or 'greenhouse effect', *kasvihuoneilmiö)* was mentioned only in passing a couple of times before 1991 and never on the front page, despite the ongoing scientific discussion on the subject in the late 1980s.[621] This development can be partly explained by the notion proposed by Libby, Sörlin and Warde, who stated that although scientific discourse on climate change had already existed, it gradually began emerging along with ongoing discourses on the environment only in the late 1980s.

After 1989, the discussion on forest protection disappeared almost entirely and was replaced by the topic of greener consumption. Analysing these discourses, one could roughly approximate a change from a *natural protector* type of discourse into a *green urban consumer* type of discourse, meaning that while the magazine had earlier advocated an understanding of environmentalism as natural protection and written about the subject constantly, it had now changed its perspective and redefined environmental identity into that of an urban consumer making choices in the free market.[622]

Therefore, the magazine had laid the outlines to shape the new environmentalism that was to come. The turn towards environmental reformism took place at a more official level in 1993, when the Finnish Green Party action report stated the need to develop solutions where 'environmental, economic and labour interests are merged together' as the most important project of the party, in contrast to the claims of the prevailing anti-modernistic party programme at the time.[623] Intriguingly, the party action report noted the merging of economic and environmental needs together as a 'new idea'. However, Joschka Fischer had already emerged as a well-known figure all over Europe for quite some time and was very often discussed in *Vihreä Lanka* as the embodiment of market-friendly environmentalism, while Osmo Soininvaara had presented similar ideas in Finland at least since the mid-1980s, although in a milder form. Moreover, public debates on this issue had been conducted among the Finnish Greens at least since 1989. Even before that, issues related to *ecological modernisation (*and *sustainable development*, from 1987 forward*)* had been widely discussed throughout Europe in the 1980s. Therefore, when the Finnish Greens formally changed their party programme in 1994 to focus on market-friendlier environmentalism that sought to affect consumer behaviour, they had not invented a new ideological tradition, but had rather joined an already-existing one than was, nevertheless, different from the one they had been participating in for so long.

The argumentation surrounding reformism was closely connected to another issue that divided the Greens throughout the early 1990s, and therefore must be addressed – the question of *internationalisation* was a key reason behind

---

621 *VL* 1987. 'Tätä Suomi haluaa, tätä se myös saa.' *VL* 6/1987. There was one exception to this: in 1987, the Finnish Greens counted the consequences of the new government programme of the Social Democrats and the Coalition Party, noting that there would be an increase of seven degrees Celsius in the Arctic areas over a time span of 50 years with the measures of such a programme, among other issues. This was an unusually early mention of the 'greenhouse effect', as it was then called.

622 Warde & al. 2018, Chapter 4.

623 Vihreä liitto 1993. Green Alliance Activity Report 1993.

the reformists increasing their demands for moderation over time. After the Cold War, the Greens encountered increasing international pressure to adapt to the new international political and economic order. Finland, having attempted to stay neutral in the Cold War era global politics, was now considering turning towards the West and, consequentially, joining the European Union. Among the Greens, many of the arguments presented in favour of reformism were equally valid as the arguments for joining the EU, since it was increased international pressure that had boosted reformist argumentation and created pressure on prevailing systems to adapt to the new rules of globalisation and the deregulative practices that followed with it. As discussed earlier, increasing international debate on the need for improved industry competitiveness caused by globalisation led to the realisation of a path-dependent need for individual countries within the EU to engage in a 'race to the bottom' regarding industry regulation. This included (but was not limited to) environmental regulation, which incentivised top-level politicians to search for market-friendlier alternatives that would not contradict the needs of global competitiveness.[624] Such an alternative was to be found in concepts such as *sustainable development,* as promoted by the European Commission in 1993.[625]

At the level of individual actors, the aforementioned Finnish reformists exhibited an explicitly strong internationalist emphasis, especially with regard to connections with the European Union, and were likely well aware of the new tendencies of transnational political discourses emphasising industry competitiveness even in environmental politics. Many of them had developed strong contacts with greens all over Europe by the late 1980s, met them regularly and attended European green conferences, despite technically not belonging to the European Green Parties' Federation. Most notably, Pekka Haavisto, who was in charge of green internationalisation development, spoke in the 1989 party conference about the 'brisk internationalisation' (*ripeä kansainvälistyminen)* that had been developing.[626] The party leaders constantly communicated with people abroad who were openly supportive of a more pragmatic approach, such as Joschka Fischer, who had been criticising green radicals for their idealism and was quoted saying pro-pragmatic one-liners to Finnish green politicians, such as 'I don't have visions, I have goals'.[627]

The most noteworthy of these internationally-oriented meetings took place in Kirkkonummi in June 1993, in the aftermath of the 1993 Green Alliance conference, where green politicians from 21 countries gathered to formulate the foundation of the Federation of European Greens. All European green delegates were present in this meeting, except for the one from Iceland. The same reformists who had supported the moderate turn were also the main actors forging these international connections. Pekka Haavisto organised the

---

[624] See, e.g., Knill & Liefferink 2007, 103.
[625] European Commission 1993.
[626] Vihreä liitto 1989, party conference minutes, §5.
[627] This discussion was documented by organisation secretary (*järjestösihteeri*) Riikka Kämppi in *Green ABC Book 2* from 1995. She was also a steady participant in the International Workgroup of the Green Alliance, led by Pekka Haavisto.

Kirkkonummi event and was also the chairman of the International Workgroup of the Green Alliance, while Pekka Sauri represented the Finnish green politicians along with Susanna Mattila in the event. Sauri would later be chosen as one of the spokespersons of the European Green Federation. Meanwhile, Heidi Hautala was one of the writers of the European greens' programme draft. All these greens belonged to the International Workgroup of the party, which seemed to be aimed at connecting like-minded individuals. In most cases (except for Hautala), these individuals were also reformers rather than anti-modernists when it came to conceptualising green ideological stands (with Heidi Hautala being the exception, although she would eventually come to terms with reformist ideology).

The Kirkkonummi events had a strong connection with the pragmatic market-friendly approach spreading across European greens. According to Elizabeth Bomberg, who studied the history of the green parties in Europe, the formation of the European Federation in Kirkkonummi turned out to be a dividing point in the larger Inter-European green debate. Not only was the formation of the Federation a clear sign of the European green parties' willingness to work together for achieving common goals within the EU framework, but it also (starting from the 1994 European Parliament elections) began promoting 'pragmatic policy alternatives' at the EU level, such as 'specific eco-taxes', to replace their earlier more radical demands to reconceptualise and reorganise Western beliefs and institutions. However, according to Bomberg, the European greens were unable (or, one might wonder, perhaps unwilling) to formulate a common vision on how Europe should be guided towards a green systemic change, instead guiding the national parties to resort to pragmatic goals that would be acceptable to everyone, thus focusing on cooperation with other environmentally-aligned parties – usually referring to the Social Democrats, who had increasingly started to embrace moderate environmental perspectives throughout Europe. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the green parties that had helped ignite the environmental debate at the political level had now become followers rather than determiners of the direction of EU environmental policy, since the European Commission had already set up somewhat similar pragmatical consumeristic goals as the common European environmental goals in the 5th Environmental Action Plan in 1993.[628]

This turn of events naturally gave a strong boost to the prestige of the reformist argument. By 1994, it was this internationally-oriented liberal side of the party which was increasingly embracing a more pragmatic direction. Nowhere was the connection between reformist pragmatism and internationally oriented cooperation with global actors as evident as in the 1994 Finnish Green Alliance conference, where their new programmatic conceptualisations were decided. The question of internationalisation had a surprising effect on green debates regarding the larger turn to reformism. Unlike in Neumünster in 1991, the Finnish 1994 debates on the turn to

[628] Bomberg 1998, 75–76; European Commission 1993, 5th EAP.

reformism were not particularly fierce. Notably, the actual debate on the reformist ideological turn would become fierce only later. The lack of debate on this issue was partly because there was a fiercer debate going on – the question of whether Finland should join the European Union, which deeply divided the Finnish Greens at the time.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Finland started re-aligning its international political position in favour of the West. Consequentially, the decision to join the EU had become a timely question. It is worth noting that EU membership was either advocated or opposed using roughly the same arguments and largely by the same actors who analogically either advocated or opposed reformism. Therefore, it seems that the larger debate on green ideology was not so much lacking in the 1994 party conference as it might seem at first glance. However, the EU question served as a lightning rod (so to speak) for the ideological tensions in the party, focusing attention to this one symbolically important question and leaving the other questions, such as their relationship with the growth-based economy, relatively unattended. Perhaps the rank-and-file members of the party did not quite realise the magnitude of the programmatic decisions being simultaneously made regarding, for example, the green position on economic growth and consumerist ideals, since the opposition to this change would be observed in 1995 when the Greens joined the government and the magnitude of their ideological compromises became visible to everyone. Unfortunately, for the radical side, decisions on the party direction had already been made by then.

The debate on the EU question is worth taking a closer look at, as it drew arguments for or against it that were constantly used in discussion on other ideological issues, thus serving as a symbolic battle for a much larger ideological strife. Practically all major reformists wanted the Greens to take a pro-EU stand in the ongoing membership negotiations, mostly based on pragmatic premises, such as possibilities for international cooperation in the union. Pekka Haavisto pointed out that efficiently functioning international cooperation was necessary to develop environmental politics, and the European parliament was a power structure that could be used for this purpose along with the help of international connections with other green parties. Furthermore, Satu Hassi pointed out the importance of having 'supranational political decision-making', advocating the idea that the union could be developed into a more environmental-friendly organisation. Jukka Kanerva – yet another publicly outspoken reformist – wondered if this was an ongoing debate between a realistic tolerable option and the best imaginable but pragmatically impossible one – employing similar words as he had used to describe the ongoing debate around reformism. Therefore, pro-EU advocates stuck to pragmatic reasons, such as participating in *supranational decision-making, cooperation* with other green parties, and in general affecting the environmentally un-friendly union from within, while remaining effective and well-networked within the political system in which the Greens operated.[629]

[629] Vihreä liitto 1994, party conference minutes, §9.

Meanwhile, the anti-EU advocates offered equally familiar-sounding premises that concentrated primarily on ecological reasons. Kauko Savola claimed that the monetary union would rely on the premise that economic activity would have to be maximised. Therefore, it would not be compatible with the ideals of the ecological movement, despite the fact that the Greens had ironically (and with much fewer objections) decided to give up their criticism of economic growth at a conceptual and programmatic level just in the previous instalment of the conference. Jouko Hämäläinen also shared this line of thought by pointing out that since the Union was primarily an economic system, it would be in a problematic relationship with nature. Overall, the main objection seems to have been the Union's premise of market economy and growth, which was emphasised in typical anti-modernistic fashion by repeating pejoratively loaded concepts such as *monetary union* and *maximised economic activity* and their relation to environmental issues. Meanwhile, Pekka Elonheimo opposed the idea of taking a stand on the issue even though he personally advocated EU membership, as he was afraid this decision would 'dismantle the party'. Later, the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine claimed that some anti-EU ecologists had started to plan the foundations for a new party. Timo Juurikkala and Nina Maskulin also made statements in favour of promoting discussion rather than making an absolute decision regarding joining the union. Even this stand attracted strong backlash. Both Juha Helminen and Ahti Ruoppila demanded the party conference to take a stand, 'otherwise this highest deciding body has no significance', while criticising 'indecision' and 'shirking responsibility'.[630]

In the end, fears of the party dismantling took over and no specific decision was made on its official stand on EU membership. However, before this outcome was settled, even the *Helsingin Sanomat* newspaper had started to pay attention to the green divide regarding this question. Unlike *Der Spiegel* in Germany, the biggest newspaper in Finland had not paid much attention to the intra-party ideological debates of the Greens, instead only reporting some of the outcomes. However, the debate over the EU question leaked beyond the pages of the Greens' own newspaper due to national interest – the public referendum on EU membership was only 10 days away and different sides of the pro- and anti-EU stands were consequentially presented, this time with an environmental emphasis provided by debating green members.

On October 5th, 1994, *Helsingin Sanomat* reported a debate over the EU question between Erkki 'the Wolf' Pulliainen (a known wolf researcher and a radical natural conservationist) and Paavo Nikula, who had defended the reformist and moderate positions in the media before. While presenting their arguments, the newspaper simultaneously ended up presenting arguments on other issues that had been repeated among the Greens for a while by then. While the reformists usually considered growth as a reality that simply had to be dealt with, Nikula agreed that the EU's key focus on economic growth was detrimental to the environment in this debate. While the more radically oriented Pulliainen claimed that positive impact through the EU was impossible

[630] Vihreä liitto 1994, party conference minutes, §9.

since 'environmental protection has been subordinated entirely to growth' in the EU (*ympäristönsuojelu on täysin alistettu kasvulle*), Nikula pragmatically argued that one should choose the best of many bad possibilities. He further claimed that despite all its problems, the 'EU is nevertheless the only possibility to get improvements on a European scale' (*EU on joka tapauksessa ainoa mahdollisuus saada aikaan parannusta Euroopan laajuisesti*).[631] Furthermore, the debate presented different notions of growth – while both saw the prioritisation of economic growth as an obstacle, the radical side was notably more critical of obtaining *any* meaningful outcome from a growth-based platform, which was therefore not worth participating in, while the reformists believed in carrying out environmental protection within this framework of growth.

Around the time of this debate, a long-standing tradition of European green cooperation had been developing, with the Finnish Greens participating in this development from 1993. Joining the EU seemed to be a part of the reformist plan to cooperate with other green parties to set the standards for global cooperation associated with *sustainable development*, which would become the Greens' defining ideological concept in 1994, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

This is not to say that the radical/ecologist side of the party would not have drawn their ideas from international discourses or did not have international connections from where their ideas were transferred. On the contrary, as seen in Chapter 3, the anti-modernist radical green tradition originated from a deeply transnational environmental idealism of questioning and re-structuring some basic (presumably 'Western') beliefs and institutions that were globally present in the environmental movement at least since the early 1970s. However, for the radical greens, strengthened international connections and cooperation within the frameworks of prevailing institutions – such as those of the European Community or later the EU – were understandably not an important goal, since they laid less emphasis on gathering actual parliamentary influence than the reformists. Meanwhile, in Germany, Jutta Ditfurth explicitly admitted in 1991 that the other radical greens had been sorely mistaken in laughing at Petra Kelly's tendency to form international connections.[632]

Furthermore, *sustainable development* or *ecological modernisation* were not just ideas that had been spread transnationally – they were transnational practices that by definition needed to be conducted in constant cooperation with other countries. For example, the Rio 1992 Declaration, which the Finnish Greens would refer to in their 1994 party programme, underlined the importance of global free trade and its continuity within the framework of increased environmental governance. Meanwhile, *sustainable development* was used by the European Commission as a conceptual tool to offer common ground for facilitating Europe-wide market-friendlier environmental politics. In

631 Väisänen, Pekka. 'EU – ympäristön uhka vai pelastaja?' *HS* 5 October 1994.
632 Die Grünen 2019, 30–31; Left Green Perspectives 1991. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.' LGP #25.

this sense, if the reformist greens were to gain more political influence as they hoped, these developments would need to be addressed.[633] Consequentially, as anti-modernist concepts disappeared from green political and ideological discourse, so did the anti-liberal or anti-internationalist discourses. Furthermore, explicit discussions on questions such as the negative impact of immigration on the environment also disappeared from public discussion after 1994.[634]

Although Germany often provided the vantage point from where such ideals were conceptualised, the transfer of ideas once again occurred through a larger sphere of sources, including green conferences. This time, the Finnish Greens were active participants in formulating the European-level needs and political plans for the reformists, as in the 1993 Kirkkonummi conference. Over time, such international connections became increasingly vital. In the case of Finland, it seems that the entire discussion on changing the party ideology revolved around the question of internationalism in the years 1993-1994 when these decisions were made. As mentioned earlier, the debate about the problematic nature of market-friendly green concepts would only begin to appear in wider discussions after the Greens joined the government in 1995, when the question of EU membership as well as the new reformist green direction had already been settled. This issue as well as a more thorough analysis of the moderate Green Party programme of 1994 are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

After 1994, the Finnish Green Party programmatic conceptualisations followed the ideals of moderate market-friendly environmentalism, with their key concepts promoting green consumerism and sustainable development. From this time on, their ideas were drawn from the tradition of *environmental economics* rather than the ecological and ecophilosophical ideals of radical environmental movements. These conceptual changes in the party programmes are analysed more thoroughly in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. The next section outlines the key arguments for and against this turn.

4.3 Reaching maturity or selling out?

This section explores the arguments and their presuppositions made for and against the turn to reformism on both sides of the debate and in both countries – Germany and Finland. Since the different actors based their arguments on different presuppositions in their premises, they failed to engage in any constructive dialogue, thus ending up talking past each other, as will be demonstrated in this section.

I argue that understanding the differing presuppositions is vital in order to avoid a teleological interpretation of the Greens' development, where the

[633] European Commission 1993; Knill & Liefferink 2007, 103–108; Collier 1998, 10–15.
[634] Such statements had earlier been made by radical (ecologist) Green parliamentarians such as Eero Paloheimo. *Ylen vaalitentti* 1991.

premises of the winning reformist side of the debate become elevated into an explanatory framework for party history under which the radical argumentation is also analysed. This interpretation easily reduces the radical environmentalist tradition to a mere prelude to later reformism. Therefore, both traditions need to be analysed in their own right and in their own temporal, ideological and political context, instead of being reflected against later party history. In this section, I engage in the endeavor of mapping the key arguments of both sides while inspecting the argumentation of each side by analysing their presuppositions and premises.

4.3.1 Towards 'maturity': the reformist arguments

Some arguments either supporting or opposing the turn to reformism have already been presented in the earlier sections. Both in Germany and in Finland, the reformists had fully embraced the pragmatic approach by the early 1990s. Notably, Joschka Fischer was constantly referred to in Finland, starting in the mid-1980s and lasting until 1995, when the reformist turn was argued over using Fischer's terminology as having 'goals', not 'visions' in *Green ABC Book II*.[635] Since Fischer was mentioned almost every time the German reformist discussion was presented, one could make the argument that the whole set of ideas and concepts associated with reformism in the Finnish discussion was embodied in Joschka Fischer. However, this does not mean that the Finnish ideas were directly adopted from the German discussion; it rather indicates that the German discussion in general and Joschka Fischer in particular were referred to for presenting and legitimising the reformist point of view. Moreover, the Finnish Greens argued for change in a similar fashion as the Germans – as noted earlier, the need for acquiring political influence and being capable of pragmatically functioning within the established political system was argued about using almost the exact same terms as used in Germany.

However, the debate did not follow an entirely similar pattern in both countries. The (West) German discussion saw a harsh debate between the reformists and the radicals almost as soon as the reformist argumentation was formed. While a similar alternative radical case was also presented by the opposing side of the debate in Finland, the sharpest edge of this radical argument against the turn to reformism was presented in party discussions only after 1994, meaning that the reformist turn happened a lot more subtly and with less debate when the decision was being made, possibly because the radicals did not have strong and vocal figureheads in Finland (like Jutta Ditfurth in Germany). After examining the aforementioned discussion within the party, a few key arguments emerged for both sides, which can be analysed to identify the reasons behind some advocating such a change and others opposing it.

In both countries, the supporters of reformist change used mainly three arguments. The first was the idea of separating the party, or at least its

[635] As discussed in Section 4.2.2.

parliamentary wing, from BIs and NGOs to have more parliamentary influence. After becoming a party in 1988, many Finnish Greens (such as the aforementioned Olli Tammilehto) started to observe a rupture between the party, which was beginning to take parliamentary actions, and the grassroots movements and NGOs from which it originated. Many reformists, however, attributed the need to form a party structure to be a mere pragmatic necessity that would change very little, if anything at all, in green political thinking. According to Sari Aalto, Osmo Soininvaara had claimed from early on that the party structure and the NGOs should work separately with separate goals as their fields of activity were quite different, but had not wanted to underline this difference until the Green Alliance developed into an actual party.[636]

The logic behind separating the two so strongly was, of course, the idea that the party – unlike the grassroots movement – could affect actual legislative work through government. Therefore, the reformists argued that reformist conceptual change was necessary to enter the government and actually make a difference. In Finland, this was argued by, for example, Pekka Haavisto (who claimed that 'nothing would have been accomplished' otherwise), Osmo Soininvaara ('all-or-nothing –politics will lead to the outcome of nothing') and Pekka Sauri (for whom 'a small party could only make a difference through compromises'). In contrast, some greens, such as Paavo Nikula in his article titled 'Towards minister's briefcases? Or why the Greens need to be ready for government responsibility' in *Green ABC Book 2*, explicitly merged this pragmatism with the general development from a '*green movement*' to a '*green party*', stating that the Greens had become more parliamentarian and thus the logical step was to make compromises that most greens 'are not going to be happy about'.[637]

Intriguingly, this discussion had taken place in a very different light back in 1988 when the Greens had organised themselves into a party. Back then, the Greens had considered the decision merely a necessary evil – one that would not change the core reason for the existence of the movement, which was to serve as an umbrella organisation for different pluralist environmental ideologies and movements. Clearly, the reformist greens no longer wanted to be the political wing of the environmental grassroots movements. Instead, they aspired to be a party among other parties doing actual parliamentary legislative work. The Greens even started rewriting their own recent history to better fit their understanding of this new, better parliamentarised Green Alliance. The formation of a party structure turned from a necessary evil of sorts to the first of many steps towards reformism. This theme was also visible in the aforementioned debate over EU membership as well as in the question of becoming more moderate in domestic politics.

The need to efficiently affect legislation was the most important argument in favour of the moderate turn in Finland, to the extent that it would not be a

[636] Aalto 2018, 219.
[637] In addition to discussing these arguments in the previous sections in more detail, many of them are also present in Välimäki & Brax, eds. 1995. *Vihreä ABC-kirja II.*

mistake to say that the turn to reformism was actually a turn towards parliamentarism. Nevertheless, this was not the only argument in favour of the change. As their second argument, the reformists reiterated (once again, quite pragmatically) that the Greens ought to become more of a general party to appeal to a wider spectrum of voters, as it would create 'credibility among regular voters', as Välimäki claimed in 1995. For him, the Green Party was also the voice of 'the internationalised urban youth, who hover in the middle ground between green and independence.' The goal for him was to acquire the support of the citizens at a larger scale, which could not be achieved with a radical standpoint.[638] The Greens had been talking about this logic at least since 1989, when Pekka Sauri raised the issue of 'identification eligibility' (*samaistumiskelpoisuus)* with 'enlightened citizens'. In the same context, Välimäki demanded more 'positive vibes' (*positiivisia viboja)* instead of accusations, hinting that the voting public might not appreciate the gloomy and accusatory approach of the radicals.[639]

Overall, the implicit idea seemed to be that green popularity remained low because they were associated with the wrong kind of greenness or a wrong group of people – the radical natural protectionists and alternative grassroots activists, who were not many in number but who upheld the environmental debate in public very vocally, and often with the kind of accusatory connotations that did not draw moderate voters. The fact that the Greens more than doubled their support in the 1991 parliamentary elections in Finland (from 4 to 10 MPs) with a more or less radical programme did not disturb the increasing popularity of this argumentation. In the 2002 analysis of the history of the party in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, it was emphasised how radicalism had turned into a 'realism' that promoted real 'substance issues' and concrete political goals instead of engaging in system criticism. By this time, the magazine had ceased to act as a critic of the reformist turn and had instead adopted the reformist argument (describing party parlamentarisation as the natural course of things) as a seemingly neutral description of the party history.[640] In addition, the ideological position of the radicals was drifting too far away from collectively shared models of belief of the society, which was increasingly seen as a sign of isolation and stubbornness that would alienate voters rather than as a sign of being a forerunner in environmental issues.[641]

As stated earlier, this development occurred in alignment with the new youth culture of the 1980s and the 1990s that emphasised individuality and consumer citizenship – the idea that individual consumption should be seen as political action.[642] Therefore, the changing youth culture incentivised the turn to reformism further, as this increasingly popular ideal of affecting the environment through consumer choice was more easily applicable within the market-friendly reformist framework. This can also be understood as a larger

---

638 Välimäki 1995. Välimäki & Brax, eds. *Vihreä ABC-kirja II,* 73–79.
639 Vihreä liitto 1989. Party conference minutes 1989, §5.
640 *VL* 2002. 'Radikaaleista realisteiksi.' *VL* 24 May 2002.
641 *VL* 2002. 'Radikaaleista realisteiksi.' *VL* 24 May 2002.
642 Hellsten & Martikainen 2001, 86–90.

change in how politics was perceived at the time, as civil action was no longer merely resorted to political institutions, such as the parliament, but was increasingly becoming a question of individual lifestyle, such as ecological consumption or diet.[643] Since the Finnish Greens had been explicitly aware, at least since 1991, that their main electorate was not the older generation of nature conservationists but the well-educated young adults from big cities, they were certainly incentivised to closely follow the development of youth culture. By 1995, the Greens were intentionally planning their election advertisements around young urban women voters.[644]

Furthermore, *Vihreä Liitto* was most likely challenging a new center-liberal party *Nuorsuomalaiset* for young urban liberal votes in Finland. The *Nuorsuomalaiset* party, though right-wing in their economic policies, was also advocating natural protection and a non-formal party organisation, which the Greens were now giving up. In 1996, Risto Penttilä, the chairperson of the new *Nuorsuomalaiset* party, responded to the Greens' development by accusing them of becoming a typical 'state caretaker party' (*valtionhoitajapuolue).* The change they had set out to create was left undone because of this, Penttilä accused. Although such a conclusion was not stated directly, Penttilä seems to have been referring here to the same kind of selling out -story that the radical greens had advocated over the recent years, utilising this narrative as a political weapon for the *Nuorsuomalaiset* party.[645]

A similar two-sided pragmatic argumentation had been present in the German discussion. Most of the German Greens' arguments particularly emphasised the 1991 Neumünster party conference, where the reformist turn was confirmed at a programmatic level after harsh debates. Immediately after the party conference, reformist Hubert Kleinert wrote a long piece about the events in *Der Spiegel*, beginning with a historical outlook. In his analysis, the Greens had been a strange group ever since the 1980s, with their political discussion consisting of fascinating and media attention-grabbing strife between ecologists and leftist radicals – *Realos* and *Fundis* – a well as the reform policy and system opposition advocates. As long as this was interesting to voters and the media, there was nothing wrong in their way of functioning. At this point in his article, Kleinert turned his argumentation towards a pragmatic direction, noting that after this interest had started to fade away, the Greens realised they were not proper actors in the political scene:

> On the one hand, many greens would like to turn the whole world upside down. At least all kinds of drastic changes should be implemented. On the other hand, they are not prepared to allow themselves even a minimum of agency and creative ability.[646]

---

[643] Hellsten & Martikainen 2001, 86–90.
[644] Remes 2007, 91–92; Isotalo 2007(a), 143; Ylikahri 2007, 186–188.
[645] Sippola, Anna-Riitta 1996. 'Risto Penttilä: Vihreät ovat varoittava esimerkki nuorsuomalaisille.' *HS* 1 September 1996.
[646] '*Auf der einen Seite möchten viele Grüne am liebsten die ganze Welt auf den Kopf stellen. Mindestens sollen allerhand einschneidende Veränderungen durchgesetzt werden. Auf der anderen Seite sind sie nicht bereit, sich selbst auch nur ein Minimum an Handlungs- und Gestaltungsfähigkeit zu gestatten.*'

According to Kleinert, the main obstacle had been the ideal of being a grassroots party, thus criticising Petra Kelly's ideal of having an 'antiparty-party' that the German Greens was founded on. As a consequence of Kelly's visions, the Greens had developed a contradiction between legitimacy and efficiency (*Legitimität und Effizienz*), due to which efficient ways to practise politics were not considered legitimate. It is worth noting that as a reformist, Kleinert naturally assumed that the party *should* be efficient within the established political system – most radicals and ecologists would probably oppose this premise altogether. What Kleinert perceived as a weakness that made the Greens less of an efficient party, the radicals considered as a strength. The latter had already called the Greens 'more than a party' in 1980.[647] Kleinert's analysis of the situation displays the notable difference not only in the political goals of the reformists and the radicals, but also in the premises based on which the Greens entered the world of politics in the first place.

A similar analysis was made just prior to the Neumünster conference by another prominent reformist, Michael Vesper, in *Die Tageszeitung* magazine. Just like Kleinert, Vesper discussed the Greens' situation in terms of *efficiency*, repeating the idea how efficiency – a necessary element of political participation – was not legitimate from a radical green perspective. He explained this by further pointing out how party structures such as the separation of mandate and office and the rotation principle were obstacles to efficient political activities. Furthermore, he discussed the necessary 'professionalisation' of the party – another concept that would have been perceived negatively by the radicals but was now given positive meaning, associated with efficiency.[648] Vesper's and Kleinert's analysis of the situation displays the notable difference not only in political goals between reformists and the radicals, but also in premises on why the Greens were in the world of politics in the first place. 'Efficiency' (*Effizienz*) was once again a key concept in favor of reformism, just as it had been for Fischer a few years earlier: for the radicals, efficient ways to make politics were not seen as legitimate, causing a frustrating contradiction that needed to be overcome with a more traditional hierarchical party structure and professanionalism.[649]

According to Kleinert, the majority of the Greens finally realised this limitation in their party after it lost the 1990 federal elections but succeeded in those state (*Landtag)* elections (such as in Kleinert's and Fischer's home province of Hesse), where reform politics and compromises (*Reformpolitik und Kompromiß*) had been aimed at. The departure of Jutta Ditfurth and her followers would, in Kleinert's opinion, only help the party with their new direction. Kleinert called his polemic text an 'attack of longing for death' (*ein Anfall von Todessehnsucht)*, hinting at a potentially very gloomy future for the Greens had they not followed the pragmatic direction. [650] Kleinert's

[647] Die Grünen 2019, 8–9.
[648] Vesper, Michael. 'Nach dem Winterschlaf: Ein neuer Frühling für die Grünen?' *TAZ* 17 April 1991.
[649] Kleinert, Hubert 1991.'Ein Anfall von Todessehnsucht', *Der Spiegel* 23/1991.
[650] Kleinert, Hubert 1991.'Ein Anfall von Todessehnsucht', *Der Spiegel* 23/1991.

argumentation was thus notably pragmatic, associated with fears of total annihilation for the party that loomed ahead if quick changes were not implemented. For the Germans, the key focus of the argument was particularly on getting more voters and consequentially saving the party that, after the 1990 election loss, was facing a very difficult future. Therefore, in using voter popularity as their second argument, the German green argumentation resembles the Finnish green structure and vice versa, but in the German case, there was a real sense of desparation after the 1990 election loss and the party was facing a very difficult-seeming future. This argument was nevertheless adapted in the Finnish discussion in a very similar form despite the notably different contexts.

These two sides of the 'more efficient pragmatism' argument were the most significant factors behind the change that took place in both countries. In a way, one could say that the Finnish Greens took the argument even further towards a pragmatic direction that the Germans did, as they had left out ecological questions entirely. This is particularly interesting to note in an era characterised by environmental problems, such as harsh environmental degradation, ozone layer depletion, acid rains, forest biodiversity loss, as well as expansive climate change, which was also becoming increasingly significant in these discussions. Even Fischer, despite his real-political reputation, had always based his pragmatic ideals on explicit worries about the environment in his argumentation. In his book *Der Umbau die Industriegesellschaft (*1989), he clearly listed all the environmental problems mentioned above as the environmental ground for his reformist argumentation. In contrast, the Finnish reformists largely did not address these issues publicly, while ecological reasoning was typically used by their opponents. In this case, one may speculate whether their worry for the environment was meant to be understood implicitly, considering that Haavisto's 'nothing would have been accomplished' argument surely refers to securing environmental protection, which the reformist Finnish Greens did in fact promote while in the government – although not to the extent that the NGOs were expecting.

It is also too simplistic to allocate all criticism of reformism to the NGOs and the radical grassroots movements, which were now being left out of the party decision-making. Many prominent party members – some of them ranking quite high in the party hierarchy – continued to criticise the new pragmatic stand through their ecologically-oriented arguments. For example, Eero Paloheimo, who was a party MP, would eventually withdraw from the party entirely and was in notoriously bad terms with reformist leader Osmo Soininvaara. He had warned about the dangers of green reformism by pointing out that the most important issue for the green movement should be to save 'the last shreds of nature'. For him, the alternative simply meant benefitting from economic interests, which therefore should be excluded from green politics. This was also a key reason for his opposition to European integration.[651] Furthermore, former party vice chair Ulla Klötzer was also

[651] Kangasniemi, Jaakko 1989. 'Vihreät voittivat EY:n vaaroista.' *VL* 47/1989.

among the harsh critics of the newfound green reformism, who also ended up leaving the party.

Finally, as the third form of argumentation, some commentators applauded this reformist pragmatism as a new level of *maturity*, almost like a coming-of-age story. Jukka Kanerva, for example, noted that the movement had 'reached maturity' by setting practical (instead of principled) political goals, while Välimäki himself called the whole debate a 'children's disease' which was now overcome with pragmatic maturity.[652] Both applauded the loss of naïve 'innocence' – a term which German thinker Joseph Huber had used to pejoratively describe the green movement in 1982 while developing market-friendlier environmental strategies around the concept of *ecological modernisation*.[653] As for reaching *maturity,* the term had been in catchphrase-like use among the Finnish Greens as well, at least since David Pemberton used it in the spring conference of 1989 where he claimed that the Greens had, in his opinion, now 'matured' to the point where they could present 'a concrete reform programme'.[654] The *Vihreä Lanka* magazine picked up Pemberton's idea, claiming that the Greens were now developing into a 'reform party', as it had 'matured' from the movement of 'apocalypse fearers and doomsday preachers' into a presenter of 'concrete utopias'.[655] Effective parliamentary action was thus perceived mature, while the radical demand to re-conceptualise basic Western presuppositions was portrayed as naïve childishness by the reformists.

Just like in Finland, the German green argumentation was also often associated with age. While the opponents of this change had fears of becoming 'adults' (*erwachsen*), East German green representative Konrad Weiß was quoted being afraid that the fighting greens (particularly the radicals) were nothing but an 'adolescent club' (*Ein pubertärer Verein*). [656] At the level of argumentation, the German Greens often coupled their pragmatism with the ideological standpoint of civil rights. In particular, the East German *Bündnis* MPs often used more ideological (anti-Marxist, pro civil rights) premises, with an added discussion on maturity as a further premise. People like Jutta Ditfurth were to blame for the Greens turning into a 'kindergarten' (and, according to Weiß, she should also draw her own conclusions and retire from the party if the two Green parties were to be merged – which she soon did). For Vera Wollenberger, a political party was not a substitute for parents or a home, it was simply 'a practical instrument for achieving political goals' (*praktisches Instrument zur Durchsetzung politischer Ziele*). [657] Meanwhile, the radicals

[652] Kanerva 1995, 117–118; Välimäki 1995, 69–71. Both in: Välimäki & Braz, eds. *Vihreä ABC-kirja II*.
[653] In his pamphlet 'The Lost Innocence of Ecology' (*'Die verlorene Unschuld der Ökologie')* from 1982. Huber 1982; see also Järvikoski 2009, 95.
[654] Vihreä liitto 1989. Party conference minutes, §9.
[655] *VL* 1989. 'Vihreä liitto pesee kasvoja. *VL* 22/1989.
[656] '*Der mächtigste Mann in der Partei … 'ist jetzt Herr Fischer.' Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Mühselige Wurstelei'. *Der Spiegel* 19/1991
[657] *Der Spiegel* 1991. 'Mühselige Wurstelei'. *Der Spiegel* 19/1991

portrayed the reformist need for maturity as fearing 'the graying of the Greens', as Hockenos has noted.[658]

Polls would soon reveal a reformist turn not just within German Green Party but also among their voters. A higher percentage of green voters now expressed their satisfaction with the democracy of the Federal Republic than ever before, while the Greens had more of its members participating in representative work either at the federal, state or municipal level than any other parliament party, which made it difficult for them to stick to the image and identity of an outsider. Thus, the *maturity* argument seemed to be timely with regard to the changing values of the green electorate as well.[659] Even *Die Tageszeitung* magazine, often serving as the mouthpiece of the grassroots movement, was highly critical of the radicals and Jutta Ditfurth, claiming that they represented merely five percent of the party despite getting 40 percent of the media attention. When reporting of the Neumünster conference, the magazine called the radicals pointlessly fighting for microphones a 'Jutta Ditfurth's children commune' (*die Kinderkommune um Jutta Ditfurth),* demonstrating once again how metaphors related to age were important to the Greens' debates.[660]

Therefore, the reformist turn signified more than mere pragmatism for the reformists. It was an endeavour to create a new kind of identity, one that was based on taking responsibility instead of merely protesting. Pragmatism, professionalisation and the consequent political efficiency were all associated with taking this kind of responsibility and becoming more mature. This narrative had thus turned the reformist endeavour of pragmatically adapting to the prevailing social, economic and political framework into a story of reaching maturity.

4.3.2 Against 'selling out': the radical arguments

The radicals, of course, disagreed with the arguments offered by the reformists. As mentioned earlier, the radical fight against the moderate turn remained surprisingly peaceful in Finland in 1994, with the reformists controlling the air space of the debate. Occasionally, however, heated debates would surface, if only momentarily and under the guise of a unified albeit an ideologically pluralistic party discussion. In the spring of 1992, *Helsingin Sanomat* reported how a debate had broken out between the more traditional natural conservationists among the Greens – particularly Erkki Pulliainen and Eero Paloheimo – and reformists Pekka Sauri and Osmo Soininvaara in the Green Party conference. The radicals claimed that the 'basic idea' (*perusidea)* of the Greens was being lost due to increased interest in day-to-day politics and all the compromises that this participation required, and that the Greens 'needed to return to their roots' (*palata juurilleen).* However, even at this time, both sides of

[658] Hockenos 2008, 239.
[659] Hockenos 2008, 239.
[660] Rasche, Joachim 1991. 'Was war neu an Neumünster?' *TAZ* 31 May 1991.

the debate still agreed that economic growth cannot continue in the way it had thus far, thus finding common ground despite their differences.[661]

The reformists' argument again emphasised that turning to reformism was not such a gigantic leap away from green origins as the radicals claimed, while the radicals were afraid that such a leap was already happening – maybe had even happened. In the case of the radicals, the terminology of 'returning' was being increasingly used to describe the need to revert to some (real or imagined) form of green originality that the party was drifting away from. This argument also seems to have often included a rigid perception of how environmental questions ought to be tackled. There seems to have been an assumption of some sort of original, pristine greenness that ought not be changed. Deviations from grassroots ideals and compromises in order to become more functional within the established system were met with demands to 'return to roots'.

This debate intensified in 1995 when the Finnish Greens joined the SDP-led rainbow coalition government of five parties, with Pekka Haavisto becoming the first nation-level green minister in Europe. When joining the government and wholeheartedly embracing the new moderate market-friendly reformism in practice, arguments against the reformist change started heating up. Therefore, the key arguments made by the Finnish radicals against the change to reformism took place primarily *after* the change to reformism, roughly between 1994 and 1998.

Notably, some of these arguments did take place before the moderate turn and government participation. As mentioned earlier, Olli Tammilehto had already expressed his fears about the direction in which the reformists were taking the party back in the 1980s. Furthermore, ecological argumentation took center stage even when discussing the EU, particularly its problems with growth politics, during which similar ecological arguments were also presented against growth-orientation in general by the radical opposition of the party. An interesting anecdote regarding this internal opposition within the party is the case of Martti Lundén, a farmer from Pirkanmaa province of Southern Finland. During the 1993 Green Party conference in Kirkkonummi (the same where the European greens gathered), Lundén walked out of the conference room as he was 'uninterested' in the discussions regarding mere social policies, as he would later reminisce. He described that the main emphasis in the Green Party had suddenly been placed on anthropocentric social issues, which was taking both time and energy away from preventing the destruction of life on Earth. To his surprise, some others had also walked out of the conference room for the same reason. These dissidents would be in contact with each other and, in 1995, gather in Tillikka pub in Tampere to form the *Ecogreens Association* (*Ekovihreät),* with the aim of acting as an ecological opposition within the Green Party and of returning to dealing with ecological issues that were at the core of green politics. Lundén would later write in a letter that 'compared to the unspeakable desperation that has always taken over me after Green Alliance meetings, this

[661] Sippola, Anna-Riitta 1992. 'Vihreät kinastelivat talouskasvun termeistä.' *HS* 24 May 1992.

was like a small sign of life in the valley of the dead'.[662] The letter (along with Lundén's description of these events) was partially published on the Ecogreens Association website.

Clearly, many greens found the new reformism ecologically questionable. Later, Marketta Horn, the chairperson of the *Ecogreens*, wrote about the goals of the association in the *Helginsin Sanomat* newspaper: 'The association is attempting to affect the Green Alliance so that ecological sustainability would be placed at the foundation of its decision-making and self-sufficient models for life would be developed' (*Yhdistys yrittää vaikuttaa Liittoon niin, että se ottaisi ekologisen kestävyyden päätöksentekonsa perustaksi, kehittäisi malleja omavaraisesta elämästä.*) In this context, the term *sustainability* is used in a very different manner than in the *sustainable development* discussion – as a term connected to self-sustaining ways of life and grassroots level change. Notably, the Greens' radical discussion seems to be visible in this interpretation.[663]

The second argument presented by those who opposed the change was the selling-out story, which was presented as a counter-narrative to the coming-of-age story of the reformists. This story gained popularity especially after the Greens joined the government in 1995. According to the ecologists, such as Ulla Klötzer, the Greens had neither grown up nor become more responsible as they had given up their core principles and sold their supporters short. Although Klötzer was not as well known as Eero Paloheimo, she might have been an even more prestigious actor in the green political movement at the time as she had acted as the vice-chairman of the party for several years (1991–1995). She later withdrew from party politics entirely, believing that the Greens had sold themselves out by accepting this change. In 1998, she wrote: 'no traces of the principles of these parties [Green Alliance and the Left Alliance] can be found in the current government policy' and therefore, for these parties, staying in the government 'has meant and will mean the selling out of their own principles and ideological values as well as betraying their voters'. She continued by forecasting that the lack of alternatives regarding the kind of economic policies that increasingly excluded citizens from society would eventually lead to the rise of the political far-right.[664]

Even the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine – earlier an advocate of the reformist turn – started questioning the Greens' integrity in the government, with Päivi Sihvola having replaced Timo Harakka (who had in many ways backed green reformism) as the chief editor by then. Already in 1995, the compromise-driven

---

[662] Lundén 1993. *Alkuvaiheet*.

[663] Horn, Marketta & Jussila, Anneli 1996. 'Pentti Linkola ei kuulu ekovihreisiin.' *HS* 20 May 1996. This opinion piece was written as a statement against the way newspaper journalists associated the eco-greens association with the Ecological Greens Party, now known as the Ecological Party. The discussion was about Pentti Linkola getting thrown out of the Ecological Greens Party, but it also turned into a discussion about the meaning and the position of the ecogreens association within the Green Alliance.

[664] *'Mitään jälkiä näiden puolueiden periaatteista ei nykyisen hallituksen politiikassa voi havaita.' … Hallituksessa olemisen muuttuminen itseisarvoksi 'on merkinnyt ja merkitsee omien periaatteiden ja aatteellisten arvojen myymistä ja kannattajien pettämistä'*. Sippola, Anna-Riitta 1998. 'Ulla Klötzer haukkuu vihreät ja vasemmistoliiton.' HS 28 May 1998.

policy of the Greens caused the magazine to call Robin Hood 'the last real green', as he took from the rich and gave to the poor. The current greens had opted for the other way around and for particularly pejorative reasons – for growth- and competitiveness-oriented purposes – thus sacrificing some core radical green principles. This criticism was further heightened by the fact that the Greens were not forcing even the issues of ecological taxation (which the Social Democrats had now started to object to) and other moderate green goals that were designed to reform the system from within. Their forest and natural protection programmes also fell short of what was expected as the Coalition Party strongly opposed to it, with the then-minister-of-finance Sauli Niinistö infamously quoted saying that the environmental policies of the new government meant turning 'forests into impenetrable tangles' for 'beetles and cockroaches to have a diverse and happy life'.[665] Overall, according to the radical argument, the Greens had not so much matured but rather sold their principles short for a seat in the government, and this frustration was further fostered by their lack of success in the most relevant issues that the Greens were striving for.[666]

In Germany, where the debate had been notably fiercer even before the party's participation in the government (which occurred in 1998, slightly later than in Finland), the reformists had been accused of careerism and opportunism since the early 1980s, as described above. The German green radical position was most vocally expressed by Jutta Ditfurth. In her 1991 Neumünster speech, she listed everything that had changed in the party due to the sudden turn to reformism. Demands for the immediate shutdown of nuclear facilities had turned into support for a 'transition period'. Furthermore, the Greens had given up on feminist positions in support of more conservative family views. In one single strike, the Greens had suddenly turned against the 'ecological, social, grassroots and feminist democratic changes' that they had been fighting for over a decade, forgetting everyone 'who combine the social question with the ecological one' as well as all those who 'know that real ecological politics have to deal with production'.[667] Ditfurth referred to a pact between Joschka Fischer and Antje Vollmer that would ensure a programmatic overturn of green ideals in the years to come, while people around left-wing leader Ludger Volmer would pretend to the public and the media that left-wing ideals were still present in the party, which in reality would have disappeared by then.[668]

In her speech, she particularly attacked two concepts featured in the new Neumünster Declaration. One was 'political responsibility' (*politische*

---

[665] *'Jotta jokainen tupajumi ja torakka saisi viettää monimiuotoista ja onnellista elämää.* Isomäki, Jaakko 1997. 'Niinistö haukkui Natura 2000 –ohjelman.' HS 18 May 1997.
[666] Isotalo 2007(a), 149; Isotalo 2007(b), 153, 162; Ylikahri 2007, 189–195.
[667] '*Die soziale Frage mit der ökologischen verbinden und wissen, dass wirkliche ökologische Politik ran an die Produktion muss'.*
[668] '*Ihre objektive Funktion ist es, Aufbruch und Realos zu helfen, den Medien vorzuspielen, es gäbe noch ein paar Linke*.' Dithfurth 1991.

Werartworthnung)[669] – a term used by Fischer since the early 1980s – which, to Ditfurth, did not mean responsibility for nature and people but for the political system or, more precisely, for the 'social democratic cabinets' (*Responsibility* and themes of *maturity* also appeared in Finnish party discussions). The second concept was the will to reform (*Reformbereitschaft*), which she believed had nothing to do with real reforms and instead meant adaptation to a system that would, at best, provide some greens with good pensions – thus linking the argument back to the age-old association between reformism and careerism. For Ditfurth, just like for the Finnish radicals, the reformists had sold out.

The theme of 'maturity' was also present in texts that opposed the moderate turn. While the reformists argued about *maturity* as a sort of coming-of-age story, radical stands were defended in terms of the fear of 'becoming middle-aged' – an argument used to warn the Greens to not sacrifice too much of their radicalism. In Finland, this discussion had begun around the same time as the reformist maturity debate – in the late 1980s. In 1988, Satu Hassi wrote that the Greens were running the risk of becoming 'middle-aged and middle-angry' (a play on words that sound somewhat similar in Finnish, *keski-ikäinen* and *keski-äkäinen)* as they faced the prospect of becoming a horrible creature called '*homo cunnallispoliticus*' (*homo localpoliticus)*. She ended by asking, 'how can we reject stagnation, support each other's … joy and spark, keep up crazy creativity' in an atmosphere of briefcases and never-ending committee meetings.[670]

It is worth noting that over time, Hassi would become an advocate of a more market-friendly approach as long as green ideals were advocated along with market-friendliness.[671] In this sense, it is evident that the division lines in the strife between the two factions were not clear-cut, with several green thinkers (most notably Satu Hassi and Pauli Välimäki, as we will later see) placing themselves somewhere in the middle, demanding ideological greenness instead of too much pragmatism but nevertheless willing to make some compromises within that framework. As a result, these thinkers would sometimes defend the moderate stand of working within the framework of *status quo* and, at other times, demand changes in favour of a more ideological stand, as Satu Hassi did in 1988 and as she and Välimäki would do again in 1997, as described below.

'Middle age' as a metaphor for stagnation appeared several times throughout these green discussions, as was the case in 1997 when the Finnish Greens discussed sacrificing too much of their ideology in the government. Participating in the discussion on the need to restore more ideology to green politics, Päivi Salminen wrote an opinion piece in *Vihreä Lanka* magazine, expressing her fears that the most radical thinkers had already moved forward

---

669 'Reponsibility' had been a key argument for the Realos since the early 1980s, as seen before.

670 *'Miten voimme torjua näivettymisen, tukea toinen toistemme terveyttä ja tuoreutta, iloa ja räiskettä, pitää yllä luovaa hulluutta?*' Hassi, Satu 1988. 'Luovan hulluuden puolesta.' VL 11/1988.

671 E.g. in Välimäki & Brax, eds. 1995. *Vihreä ABC-kirja II.*

from the party and were now elsewhere: 'why do we who have been left behind seem so middle aged?'[672] She expressed regret for the lack of ideological debate at all levels of green politics, claiming that the situation was the same regardless of whether she attended green meetings in the north or in the south, with the only key difference being that 'in the south the Greens favor wines more'.[673]

Age-related metaphors – one way or another – thus played a vital part in the political development of the times, with the theme of maturity involved in it from the very early stages of argumentation. The debate on losing one's identity exploded in March 1997, almost two years into the Finnish Greens' first government term, when 21 green influencers released a public statement claiming that the Greens needed more ideology in their political activity and that the chair of the party (a post filled by Tuija Brax, since Haavisto could not serve as both party chair and cabinet minister according to the party rules) needed to be changed because of this. The 21 in question contained many important green names, including MP Ulla Anttila, Green Alliance Delegation chair (*valtuuskunnan puheenjohtaja*) Mika Mannermaa, vice chair of the party Erkki Pulliainen and, perhaps a bit surprisingly, Pauli Välimäki, who was the former editor of the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine and an early spokesperson for green consumerism.[674] The new pragmatic approach contained in the ideals of reformism was soon dubbed 'braxmatic' politics after party chair Tuija Brax, perhaps a bit unfairly because decisions regarding reformism and the governmental programme had been made long before Brax's tenure as party chair began. Brax herself certainly considered it 'unfair' in a 1998 interview, claiming that the only way to 'survive' in the world of day-to-day governmental politics was to adapt to new rules and that she could not be held responsible for such realities. In the same interview, Osmo Soininvaara added that the alternative to adopting the moderate turn would have been acting as part of the opposition in the parliament, where the Greens' influence would have been near zero.[675]

Notwithstanding the fairness of her situation, Brax got into more trouble when she tried to shrug off the departure of Jorma Kuistio from the party as a 'misunderstanding of some sort', causing Kuistio to write a detailed description of the reasons he had left the party. He explained how the Green Alliance had simply adapted to a situation where neither had the ecological tax reform to increase fossil fuel taxes been passed nor were renewable energy investments taking place, despite them having being threshold questions for the Greens to join the government in the first place. In addition, in February 1997, Pekka Haavisto declared that Finland would aim to lower its carbon dioxide levels only if energy tax levels were decided at the EU level, so that 'industry competitiveness will not be jeopardised'. Soon after Kuistio's letter, Pauli

---

672 *'miksi me jäljelle jääneet näytämme niin keski-ikäisiltä ja –oloisilta?'*
673 Salminen, Päivi 1997. 'Etsimmekö Messiasta?' *VL* 16/1997.
674 *VL* 1997. 'Satu Hassi puheenjohtajaksi.' *VL* 12/1997.
675 *'Koen edelleen aika epäreiluna ja loukkaavana arvostelun, jossa päivänpolitiikkaan keskittyminen koettiinkin periaatteiden unohtamisena. Miten muuten me olisimme voineet alusta selvitä kuin opettelemalla uudet käytännöt?'* Tyynelä, Jari 1998. 'Vihreän vallan oppivuodet.' VL 46/1998.

Välimäki continued the attack with one of his own, where he associated the new 'braxmatism' with neoliberalism:

> Green politics in action have for a long time been very pragmatic and definitive statements are carefully avoided. Politics is seen as a game, not as an ideological struggle. The ideological project does not exist, staying in the game has become essential. And one can stay in the game only by playing by the rules. Therefore, the Greens need to be inoffensive. This pragmatism is well-suited … for neoliberalism, which is the uniting ideological framework of the government. Individual green ideas serve nively to soften this rough frame. To me, politics is a struggle of ideas and interests. A party is not a gaming office or a discussion club. In my recollection, the Green Alliance was founded as a tool for ecological and just politics. It ought to appear as an ideological collision against the neoliberal growth thinking and down with the poor –mentality that governs our age.[676]

For many of the radicals and even some moderates, the Greens had sold out. The reformists, of course, also participated in this discussion in many noticeable ways. Many key reformists, including Sallamaari Muhonen, Paavo Nikula, Osmo Soininvaara and former party chair Pekka Sauri, defended both Tuija Brax and the reformist position of pragmatism, claiming that pragmatism was not the outcome of the party chair personnel but was a result of the new governmental position that the Greens had been thrust into. Furthermore, they noted that many of the Greens in the group of 21 had not objected to governmental participation when that decision was being made. To this, Timo Krogerus, one of the 21, replied that he, along with many others, *had* objected to it.[677] However, the reformist response was not entirely without basis. In this context, it is worth noting that the ideological positions of many of the actors seemed to have been in flux, as many who were attacking the party leadership for excessive pragmatism (such as Satu Hassi and Pauli Välimäki) had earlier accepted or, at the very least, been curious about the reformist approach to greenness.

This discussion ended with Tuija Brax being replaced by Satu Hassi as the new Green Alliance chair. Hassi as the choice for the party chair was an interesting one, as she had profiled herself as a reformist who supported the market-friendlier forms of environmentalism since 1995. Nevertheless, she had a reputation of being more ideological and seems to have appealed to a wider spectrum of greens than Brax. However, whether the Greens' ideological position within the government had changed due to her selection remains questionable, considering that the eco-tax reforms, for example, did not move forward any faster. (The Greens did eventually walk out of the government in

---

[676] '*Vihreiden käytännön politiikka on jo pitkään ollut hyvin pragmaattista ja ehdottomia kannanottoja varotaan tarkkaan. Politiikka nähdään pelinä, ei aatteellisena kamppailuna. Aateprojektia ei ole, olennaista on pelissä pysyminen. Ja pelissä voi pysyä vain noudattamalla pelin sääntöjä. Siksi vihreiden on oltava kilttejä. Tämä pragmatismi sopii hyvin … myös uusliberalismiin, joka on hallitusta yhdistävä suuri ideologinen kehys. Vihreiden yksittäiset ideat kelpaavat mukavasti pehmentämään tätä kovakouraista kehystä. En tiedä, haluanko olla mukana tällaisessa. Minulle politiikka on aatteiden ja etujen kamppailua. Puolue ei ole pelitoimisto eikä keskustelukerho. Muistaakseni Vihreä liitto perustettiin ekologisen ja oikeudenmukaisen politiikan välineeksi. Sen tulisi näkyä ideologisena törmäyksenä aikakauttamme hallitsevaa uusliberalistista kasvuajattelua ja köyhät kyykkyyn -mentaliteettia vastaan.*' Välimäki, Pauli 1997. VL 16/1997.

[677] *VL* 1997. *VL* 13/1997, 2, 11–12.

2002 due to issues related to nuclear power, however, but Hassi's tenure as chair had already ended by then.) Nevertheless, the debate over green ideology ended almost entirely after Hassi's selection, with a few dissident voices, particularly the younger generation of Greens, still being heard in 1998 until the discussion disappeared completely. Oras Tynkkynen, for example, called market-friendly environmentalism a 'mistake the size of the Himalayas' (*Himalajan kokoinen virhe)*. This time, the party leadership did not initiate a strong debate to negate such claims, perhaps because the sharpest edge of the debate seemed to have disappeared after the change in party leadership. Haavisto and Hassi responded to this criticism by pointing out that the Greens had not 'unconditionally surrendered' to globalisation and market forces, but admitted that it was easy to lose sight of 'vegetarian beef' (*kasvispihvi)* in the field of realpolitics, and welcomed the dissident views as important reminders.[678] After 1998, practically no dissident discussions were raised. However, in a 2001 interview, Osmo Soininvaara, now the new chair of the party, noted the amount of radical ideological debate visible in the email lists of the Greens.[679] This begs the question as to whether such dissident voices simply retreated to new forums, such as the newly-founded email lists.

As an interesting note, the *maturity* argument was once again raised in the discussion of 'braxmatic' politics. Marjo Hämäläinen noted that the same people who had earlier been radical were now 10–15 years older and had gone through 'their own maturing- and aging processes. And when one matures, one joins in on carrying the responsibility of everyday life'.[680] Once again, maturity and pragmatic everyday responsibility were seen as existing in tandem with each other, although this conception of political *responsibility* (a word that Joschka Fischer had used in Germany) excluded other, more radical conceptualisations entirely. Hämäläinen's argument ignored the fact that roughly the same actors had already debated the reformist side 10–15 years earlier, while many radical greens had not so much changed their minds as they grew older but had rather left the party, become silent or found some other way to maintain their opposition within the party, such as through the Eco-Green Association of Martti Lundén and other dissidents. The party might have changed its ideological position and presuppositions, but only some greens (mainly the leftist greens in between the debating sides) had undergone a process of changing their *personal* presuppositions as they grew older, despite the narrative of personal growth that the reformist 'coming-of-age –story' presented occasionally.

If these actors on both sides did change their position on any aspect of the debate, it was their willingness to cooperate with a plurality of opinions. On examining the arguments behind the ideological change, one can clearly observe a widening rift in the party over time, consequentially leading to a

---

[678] Lahdensivu, Mika 1998. 'Haastajat nousivat kehään.' *VL* 44/1998.
[679] Räikkä, Jyrki 2001. 'Vaalivaltit käsissä.' *VL* 20/2001.
[680] *Jokainen on käynyt läpi oman aikuistumis- ja vanhenemisprosessinsa. Ja aikuistuessaan ihminen lähtee mukaan arjen vastuun kantoon*. Romppainen, Katariina 1997. 'Kymmenen vuotta parantaa traumat.' VL 10/1997.

conflict with the earlier ideal of green pluralism. As an example of this, when the first International Conference of Green Parties was held in Stockholm in 1987, *Vihreä Lanka* magazine applauded how 'social, ecological, feminist, pacifistic, and spiritualistic dimensions of green ideology met each other' and how, in an almost Hegelian manner, 'from the sparks of antithesis, many picked up igniting synthesis'.[681] The difference of this claim from the early 1990s discourses is striking, when this same plurality of ideological voices would be considered a form of childishness. While this ideal of plurality was already discussed nostalgically as an important but disappearing ideal in Germany by the late 1980s (for example by the reformist Antje Vollmer, who had hoped for different views to coexist in her party despite her reformism, as seen above), the Finnish Greens had still held on to this pluralism in practice until the mid-1990s.

4.3.3 Mapping the presuppositions of the arguments

In some ways, this widening rift seemed almost inevitable, since the premises for practising politics were so different for the different sides that they failed to engage in meaningful dialogue with each other. In other words, this represented a rift in not just political goals but also the premises and presuppositions of environmental politics – even regarding presuppositions about human agency and the perceived relationship with nature. All explicit demands to reconceptualise some core Western beliefs and presuppositions (which the radical ecologists kept demanding) seem to have disappeared from green language in reformist argumentation, and the emphasis on ecological wellbeing also somewhat faded out, particularly among Finnish reformists. For the reformists, it would have been difficult to subscribe to a commonly shared political paradigm without accepting the implicit beliefs and premises ascribed to such a paradigm. The anti-modernists, who had in a sense lost the debate by the early 1990s in Germany and the end of the 1990s in Finland, pushed for visions to re-structure Western beliefs and institutions regardless of the practical outcome, including core conceptions of well-being and human–nature relationships. This discussion had disappeared from sight by the late 1990s in both countries.

The table below maps out the key arguments for and against the moderate change that were prevalent both in Finland and Germany. From the perspective of the reformists, parliamentary politics could perhaps be best understood using the metaphor of a game: you would have to play it properly to get things done, hence sacrifices of idealism had to be made (and, according to some reformists, seemed to have been the proper thing to do as a sign of maturity). Therefore, success was measured through the effectiveness of practical policy-making. For the ecologists, parliamentary politics was rather a forum to be used for advancing the agenda of grassroots civil movements and spreading novel environmental ideals and concepts rather than something to be actively participated in. As a result, the visions of the party being too far out to affect

[681] *VL* 1987. 'Kohti Vihreää Internatsionaalia.' *VL* 15/1987.

legislation was not a problem. In addition, giving up on these ideals was considered incomprehensibly wrong – a 'betrayal', as Ulla Klötzer called it. For the radicals, the purpose of politics was to reconceptualise some basic Western presuppositions regarding the well-being of both humans and nature and success was measured accordingly – not as efficient participation but in the form of efficiently continuing these discussions on all levels of society, including the political level. Mapping these arguments also reveals the very different priorities that guided the political thinking of the various green politicians. The aforementioned arguments can be summed up in the following way:

TABLE 1. Reformist and radical arguments

Faction	Key argument	Grand narrative	Priorities
Reformist	Pragmatic. Influencing legislation, preferably in government. Affecting voters and achieving general approval.	A coming-of-age story. Losing innocence, gaining maturity.	Paradigmatic conformity. Uniting the needs of the economy with environmental goals. Efficiency within the established parliamentary system.
Radical/Anti-modernist	Principled. Placing ecological well-being above economic and political needs, even if it means political isolation and a protest party status.	Selling-out story. Giving up fundamental green principles for political and economic gains, becoming middle-aged, selling out.	Paradigmatic change. Placing ecological needs above the priorities of contemporary Western paradigm. Establishing new culture, affecting public discussion and awareness through parliamentary work.

The differences between the Finnish and German cases have not been presented in the above mapping. In the German case, the argument of environment *as a civil right* could also be added as an ideological reason for the turn under the reformist argumentation. Meanwhile, the Finnish reformists, in some ways, extended pragmatism even further than the Germans did, as their explicit argumentation was practically stripped of all ideological premises. For the Finnish Greens, transfers of ideas came not only from Germany, with Joschka Fischer being particularly relevant, but also from the European Green Federation, European green conferences that were discussed in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine and attended by party leaders, and from wider transnational

discussions in the EU and the UN. However, it must be remembered that the Finnish reformists had an existing background in old Liberal Party actors, meaning that the party consisted of people already accustomed to the realities of the political world who did not necessarily require the example set by the German Greens to formulate reformist ideas. Therefore, the Finnish engagement with Fischer's thoughts can be equally understood as a justification of their own reformist thinking rather than as a representation of ideals that were entirely new to the Finnish Greens. Indeed, in some cases, such as formulating the European green reformist goals, the Finnish Greens played a strong role as instigators of change at a European level.

Presuppositions regarding the meaning of greenness in reformism and radicalism (and the political goals built around them) proved incompatible, as neither side was willing to account for the standpoints and presuppositions of the other. This made it almost impossible for the different sides to understand each other's viewpoints and goals, even despite their occasional attempts to root for pluralism, thus making the reformists appear as sell-outs and the radicals as immature fundamentalists. Under the surface level of pluralistic tolerance, this harsh vocabulary was, in fact, causally linked to power struggles within the party factions. As the radicals' inability to make an efficient difference in the world of party politics increased reformist support as well as the credibility of their pragmatic argumentation, their possibilities to gain influence in determining future party ideology also received a boost, particularly after the moderate leftists located in the middle of the two factions sided with the reformists. In this sense, the reformist concepts and arguments, such as the 'maturity' argument, were also political tools to achieve this potential. The clash between the two very different worlds thus revealed some of the prevalent political structures and their effects on the individual actors' thinking. Radical presuppositions became increasingly difficult to maintain in a world of political realities, as support for the Greens grew faster than their actual political influence.

History writing generally suffers from the danger of presenting the history of the Greens teleologically as a story of growing up, perceiving reformist concepts such as 'professionalisation' or 'responsibility' as descriptive accounts of the green ideological development rather than as normative premises for it (as they were originally presented). Such an approach contains the danger of bypassing the temporal and ideological setting where radical greenness was presented and dealt with by the actors themselves, not merely as a prelude to green reformism, but as a party-political continuation of the long-arching tradition of grassroots environmentalism. Furhtermore, it easily bypasses the fact that such a perception of green history was originally used as a politically loaded tool in intra-party power struggles. On the other side of the ideological spectrum, accounts that have understood growth-compatible forms of environmentalism as greenwashing of sorts, thus subscribing to the 'selling-out' story presented by radical greens, may just as easily bypass the reformist premises for adopting such forms of thinking in the first place.

As a final note on the aforementioned debates, the change in conceptualising greenness can, more than anything, be understood within the framework of radical ideals clashing with established political realities. As the Greens saw their respective parties' popularity and media visibility expand without simultaneous growth in political influence, the reformist perspective started to gain more prestige. The Skinnerian approach[682] to conceptual history helped detect the potential political intentions behind the use of such discourses, thus providing a deeper understanding of the meaning of the concepts and arguments. The parliament group in Germany and the party elite in Finland were particularly frustrated at the lack of practical efficiency caused by the aforementioned contradiction between legitimacy and efficiency, thus creating an incentive to start developing political concepts drawn from an entirely different conceptual cluster. The new programmatic conceptualisations that originated from these incentives and consequent changes are analysed more closely in the next chapter.

[682] Referring here primarily to the methodological perspective of analysing political concepts as 'speech acts' in their synchronic political and intellectual contexts, as discussed in Chapter 1.2.

5 GREEN GROWTH AND CONSUMER POWER: THE REFORMIST GREENS IN GOVERNMENT

As 'speech acts', the meaning of concepts needs to be understood in relation to how and for what political purpose they are used in their local and temporal setting. The previous chapter traced the development of reformism and reformist ideas stemming from the internal opposition within the Green Parties. Since the reformist movement and its concepts had not been manifested into party programmes (except as compromises to restrict the most radical phrasings in radical era discussions) during this time, reformist green concepts have not been analysed very deeply. However, the long-term development of used concepts and their respective 'conceptual clusters' (in the words of Michael Freeden) needs to be analysed to grasp what traditions the actors subscribed with their chosen concepts. This chapter delves into the reformist concepts mentioned in Green Party programmes and some of the discussions surrounding these concepts after the reformist turn of the early 1990s, as the Greens transformed from protest movements first into fairly normal parties operating within the parliamentary system and later into government parties in both countries.

The Finnish *Vihreä liitto* served in Paavo Lipponen's multi-party 'rainbow government' during 1995–2002, while *Die Grünen* was the smaller unit of Gerhard Schröder's red-green government coalition during 1998–2005. In many ways, the moderate turn meant a return to normalcy in terms of ideology for the Green Parties. Having questioned the key presuppositions of modernity in politics and the economy earlier, the Greens now used an economically-oriented cluster of concepts derived from a more moderate tradition of thought that preserved rather than questioned these presuppositions and beliefs of modernity. In practice, this meant a rather notable shift not just in political goals but also in the ideological background of green thinking. Subscribing to an entirely different tradition of thought also meant turning towards a different set of beliefs regarding, for example, human well-being and perceptions towards the non-human environment. Once again, well-being referred to a

fairly materialistic definition of prosperity, while non-human nature was characterised as that which provided resources necessary for the human economy to grow, albeit these natural resources needed to be treated sustainably now and left for future generations to enjoy as well. The goal of these changes was to adapt to the free-market paradigm of globalisation that had, by the early 1990s, become a hegemonic requirement for full parliamentary participation in liberal representative democracies – participation that the Green Parties had become more invested in after the reformists took over the party control in both countries.

The first section of this chapter explores the development of German Greens' ideas after the 1991 turn towards reformism. Three specific party programmes are analysed – the 1993 programme that was written after the East German *Bündnis* joined the Greens, when it was still uncertain if the Greens would eventually become a government party; the 1998 election programme that was written with the idea of a red-green government coalition in mind; and finally the new programme of principles of 2002, written four years into government work. Particular attention is paid to the concepts used in the 2002 programme, which included concepts that were adapted not only to the reformist ideology but also to the green governmental work that the party had been engaged in for four years at that time. The second section analyses three Finnish green programmes and their vocabulary regarding environmental politics. Among the 1994, 1998 and 2002 programmes, the first was written with government participation in mind and the last two were written while participating in the government of social democratic prime minister Paavo Lipponen. Once again, the emphasis of this analysis is on environmental ideas, although other (such as social and economic) political questions that are relevant to the development of environmental ideas are also attended to. In both cases, the development of party discussions are also traced through, for example, newspapers. Although the party lines had dramatically changed in favour of a reformist orientation, some opposition within the parties still existed.

The analysis reveals that the pragmatic need for parliamentarisation that led to the rise and popularity of the reformist green movement was founded on concepts stemming from an entirely different tradition of thought and contained an entirely different set of premises and presuppositions regarding modernity, the meaning of well-being and the environment and its needs in relation to those of human societies, among others. In many ways, one could call this turn a return to normalcy, or (from a radical environmentalist perspective) even a 'dragging down' [683] of eco-centric ideals back to anthropocentric needs of human societies. Considering that the environmental movement had, since the early 1970s, attempted to reconceptualise some basic Western presuppositions – a line of thought followed by green radicalism – the new reformist greenness may be observed as a rupture rather than a continuation of this earlier tradition. In an attempt to reconcile the contradiction between modernisation and political environmentalism, green reformist

[683] In the words of environmental sociologist William Connolly 2017.

concepts accepted globalisation, free market capitalism, competitiveness and economic growth as realities that needed to be adapted to for ensuring effectiveness in the political world. Instead of addressing environmental issues as contradictory to (or even separate from) economic questions, they relied on this very economic framework when formulating their environmental concepts.

Conceptually, these changes were driven by the ambitious idea of turning environmental politics towards a 'techno-green' direction, as direct protection of the environment turned into reforming the political, economic and industrious system towards a more sustainable direction without having to sacrifice economic growth. In practice, this led the Greens to emphasise development of greener technology, eco-efficiency and greener consumption in their programmes. While this change was aimed to take place in production, the related political measures were primarily directed at consumer behaviour, since consumption choices would help steer production towards a greener direction without jeopardising growth-based national economies or their global competitiveness.

This chapter demonstrates the development of green vocabulary towards a market-friendlier direction, replacing the green ideas stemming from the radical environmentalism of the 1970s with one originating from a completely different tradition of ideas – the moderate discourses of what could be dubbed the *environmental economics* tradition. Paradoxically, the Greens became the very thing that they had set out to fight against in the 1980s – a party using economic vocabulary to frame environmental questions, turning citizens into consumers and environmental protection into a question of consumption choices in the free market. The reward for such a turn was increased political influence, just as the reformist actors had hoped for, not least because such changes offered new possibilities for governmental cooperation, which finally made many green goals practically achievable. From a reformist perspective, such a turn was a notable success that the new reformism helped achieve. In contrast, from a radical environmentalist perspective, the Greens had failed to accomplish the very thing that they had set out to do.

5.1 Attaining efficiency through *ecological modernisation:* reformist green concepts in Germany

5.1.1 'The renaissance of self-sufficiency'

Since the German Greens had changed their party identity in the Neumünster conference into a civil rights reform party, the East German *Bündnis* Greens were ready to join them, and a merge of the two Green Parties officially took place in 1993. Surprisingly, the development towards reformism was not strongly visible in the 1993 political programme constructed by the newly merged party as discussions of economic issues were avoided altogether. Meanwhile, the right-wing market-oriented reformists and the moderate leftist

greens supporting the concept of welfare state were going through an ongoing strife at that time. These new tensions might partially explain why the most contentious issue was avoided altogether in the programme. However, a simpler explanation could be that the programme was hastily formulated by merging the existing political programmes of the two parties, as there might not have even been much intention to renew it thoroughly.[684] When the new merged programme did deal with economic issues, it did so mostly from an older growth-critical perspective.[685]

It is notable that the ideological debates over *greenness* did not end in Neumünster. However, neither these tensions nor the new programme could stop reformist thinking from advancing as the new ideological guideline for green politics. By the 1994 elections, Fischer and Kleinert had started calling the Greens a '*Volkspartei*' – a people's party that was meant for all classes and groups of people – which upset many of the leftists who had remained in the party as the term was more popular (and historically more associated) among right-wing parties.[686] In a *Die Tageszeitung* interview in 1994, Fischer declared that the Greens were ready to form a government alliance with SPD if these two parties would gain seat majority in the *Bundestag*. He claimed that the Greens would focus on 'ecological-social reform politics' (*ökologische-soziale Reformpolitik),* meaning the rundown of nuclear power, ecological taxation for oil and acting against 'eavesdropping' (*Lauschangriffs*), which supposedly refers to state surveillance.[687]

The new reformist ideology seems to have struck chord among voters. Social scientist Joachim Rasche noted in *Der Spiegel* how interest in radical green issues had decreased among voters, and now the Greens were polling notably higher than before, usually close to ten percent.[688] They did not do quite that well on election day but did nevertheless gather a respectable 7,3 % of total votes, a notable improvement to their horrific 1990 result, and were granted access back to the *Bundestag* with 49 seats (+41 seats when the eight already-existing *Bündnis*-Green seats were noted). However, the Kohl-led Christian Democrat and Liberal party government coalition continued in power, but the Greens declared in 1995 that their goal was now plain and simply to join the federal government – something that Fischer had already stated in 1994 in the aforementioned interviews, hoping for governmental cooperation with the SPD.[689] Green-SPD alliances were being tested in those states where the two formed state parliament majorities.

Without a reformist programme in place, many commentators formulated their opinions on the new reform-oriented ideals based on these state-level experiments. Some, such as Peter Milberg, were not pleased. Milberg wrote in *Die Tageszeitung* in March 1995 how the Hessean SPD-Green government

---

[684] Mende 2012, 290–293, 312–313.
[685] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1993. Politische Gründsätze, 16.
[686] *Der Spiegel* 1994. 'Wind des Wandels.' *Der Spiegel* 6/1994.
[687] Tenhagen, Hermann-Josef 1994. '"Die SPD ist endlich aufgewacht"'. *TAZ* 24 June 1994.
[688] *Der Spiegel* 1994. 'Wind des Wandels.' *Der Spiegel* 6/1994.
[689] Die Grünen 2019, 56–57; *Der Spiegel* 1994. 'Wind des Wandels.' *Der Spiegel* 6/1994.

coalition was marked by deficient natural conservation policy, greedy economic policies and an approval of racism among others. Milberg wrote how the Greens had 'subordinated the moral and social dimension of politics to the tactical strategy of maintaining power.' People like Jutta Ditfurth, 'who predicted that this realpolitik would turn political morality into a disposable commodity, were sadly right.'[690]

New challengers to Kleinert's and Fischer's reformism began to appear in the upcoming years, especially after both of them started leaning towards the fashionable third-way economic politics supported by actors such as the SPD's Gerhard Schröder, who called it the 'new center' or *die neue Mitte*.[691] For example, when Joschka Fischer expressed his enthusiasm about the deregulation of electricity markets, some green MPs raised their concerns, calling him a 'populist' for his support of the new third-way politics.[692] In 1997, the Greens' Hubert Kleinert wrote (together with social democrat Siegmar Mosdorf) a long article about the need for the left to renew itself towards a direction that accounted for the political realities of globalisation and competitive markets. Otherwise, they feared, there would be job losses and loss of votes.[693]

Once again, the argumentation presented was strongly pragmatic, focusing specifically on economic questions and party electoral success. Interestingly, the fear of job losses was rather untypical even for green growth-based discourses, which typically based their arguments on decoupling thinking, i.e. on the possibility of decoupling economic growth from emissions altogether. It might be surprising that this kind of an argumentation was entirely avoided, considering that the moderate *sustainable development*- and *ecological modernisation*–based conceptualisations of environmentalism would typically aim for this goal.[694] In a somewhat right-wing manner, Kleinert – titled 'thought leader' of his party by the magazine – pointed out the new harsh realities of the welfare state, which the Greens would have to adapt to. He called this '*the renaissance of self-sufficiency*' (*Renaissance der Selbständigkeit*), a more limited social security that would lead to social security benefiters becoming more active in the work markets.[695] This positive goal of personal self-sufficiency in a 'freedom-oriented market system' also made it to the party programme in 2002, with green innovation markets consequently becoming a

---

[690] '*Die Landtagsgruppe der Grünen im Hessischen Landtag hat die moralische und soziale Dimension von Politik der taktischen Macht- und Pfründeerhaltungsstrategie untergeordnet. Kassandren wie Jutta Ditfurth, die prophezeiten, daß diese Realpolitik politische Moral zur disponiblen Handels- oder Kungelware verkommen lassen würde, haben auf traurige Art und Weise recht behalten*.' Millberg, Peter 1995. 'Der Staat als Beute.' TAZ 30 March 1995.
[691] Paxton & Hessler 2012, 670.
[692] Niejahr, Elisabet 1998. 'Grüner Weltökonom.' *Der Spiegel* 4/1998.
[693] Kleinert, Hubert & Mosdorf, Siegmar 1997. 'Renaissance der Selbständigkeit'. *Der Spiegel* 13/1997.
[694] Antal, Miklós 2014, 277–279; See also Dryzek 2005, 148, 173.
[695] Kleinert, Hubert & Mosdorf, Siegmar 1997. 'Renaissance der Selbständigkeit'. *Der Spiegel* 13/1997.

key feature for the advancement of green production and in turn the economy.[696]

As discussed in the previous chapter (and as Wolfgang Rüdig[697] pointed out), the immediate reason for the ideological turn was the Greens' explicitly-stated attempt to join the government in the near future. The next step towards joining the government took place prior to the 1998 elections, as the Greens entered election debates with a reformist position. This was followed by a long internal debate, which resulted in the strongly market-oriented 2002 party programme, analysed more thoroughly in the following section. For the reformists, the explicit goal in this discussion was not only to make a 'paradigmatic change' towards becoming a practical party that could possibly join the government with the SPD after 1998, but also to get rid of the last traces of the so-called 'fundamentalism' that supposedly still remained in the party margins. Joschka Fischer led this ideological charge from an unofficial position, ensuring that all claims of the 'unpredictable and destabilising effect' that the Greens were feared to have on government would be without any basis.[698]

Environmental groups and NGOs had been protesting this development from the very beginning.[699] In addition, the realignment towards these moderate market-friendly ideals angered many particularly in the party's left-wing *Linke Forum* faction, who started challenging this direction. Jürgen Trittin, for example, warned against a turn towards 'neo-liberalism' and demanded higher taxation for the wealthy, especially through ecological taxation. When Trittin was asked whether the Greens would undergo what the SPD did in their 1959 Godesberg conference – reverse the party ideology towards a moderate direction to become fit for government – Trittin called this shift a 'mistake' made by the SPD that the Greens should not repeat, thus directly challenging Fischer's claims and demands.[700]

A rather strange party power dynamic was playing out in this situation, as Trittin was in fact the party chair at the time, while *Realos* leaders Fischer and Kleinert held no official positions in the party structure, thus demonstrating the influence that these men had on the party even from behind the scenes. This irony did not go unnoticed by *Der Spiegel,* which called Fischer a 'nightmare' (*Alptraum*) for the party because his ideals on foreign policy or green economic policy were more widely listened to than 'any press release from Trittin's pen from the party headquarters'. Indeed, there seemed to be a lot of confusion within the Greens themselves, leading a Bremen party assembly to direct their outtakes (on the foreign policy situation in Bosnia) to 'Trittin or Fischer, whoever now owns the shop'.[701] Divisions between the parliament group (run by the reformists) and party headquarters (earlier run by the radicals, now run

[696] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 45–48.
[697] Rüdig 2002.
[698] Rüdig 2002, 78–80.
[699] Rüdig 2002, 78–84.
[700] Ihlau, Olaf 1997. 'Neoliberale Rezepte sind falsch.' *Der Spiegel* 43/1997.
[701] '*Um Trittin oder Fischer*'; '*wem der Laden nun gehört*'.

by the *Left Forum*) once again became visible and, once again, the party headquarters seemed to be on the losing side of the ideological battle.[702]

Notwithstanding whoever was in charge, leftist ideals were becoming increasingly marginalised as the 1998 elections closed in. With polls indicating the possibility of an SPD-Green–led coalition government at the federal level, the Greens made further reforms in favour of de-radicalisation in the 1998 Magdeburg party conference. Seeing the possibility to finally become a government party, the Greens modified their already rather moderate goals, including issues of foreign and peace policy that affected the 'core of their identity', as historian Jochen Weichold would later put it. Their relationship with the market economy was also altered as they adopted market-friendlier approaches at a programmatic level.[703] In their new election programme, the Greens claimed that a more sustainable economy would help with the unemployment problem and that export possibilities would be achieved by investing in 'future-proof' production – one that the Kohl government had failed to move towards. One of the key slogans for the Greens now was 'good for the environment, good for the economy'. It is also worth noting that, unlike in their personal argumentation, the election programme used the well-being of the environment as a premise to argue for environmental policies that would not contradict with economic needs.[704]

Although the Greens lost a few seats in the 1998 elections, they had gained over 50% of the parliament seats along with the SPD, whose popularity had increased, making it possible for them to join the government in cooperation with the Social Democrats. Cooperation with the new chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, led to both positive and negative political outcomes during the Greens' first-ever term in government (1998–2002). They managed to advance some of their key goals, including a new citizenship law that made dual citizenship possible to some extent, ecological taxation, a law recognizing the relationships of sexual minorities, as well as a decision to gradually replace nuclear power with wind- and solar energy. Ecological taxation was meant to encourage consumer behaviour without imposing strict regulations or paradigmatic change – a prime example of *ecological modernisation* ideals put to practice. This solution was considered a success, in the sense that it had an immediate positive impact on carbon emissions without hurting employment.[705]

On the other hand, the Greens were criticised for entering into an enormous number of compromises. Attempts to ease the process for refuge applicants were apprehended by the social democratic minister of the interior, nuclear power rundown was not immediate but taking place over a long time period and the Greens ended up approving the NATO-led Kosovo operations without UN approval, which ultimately drove off the peace movements from the party, who now inched closer to the new Left Party, thus challenging the

[702] *Der Spiegel* 1996. 'Apltraum Joschka.' 5/1996.
[703] Weichold 2005.
[704] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998. Die Grünen Programm zur Bundestagwahl, 10, 13–17.
[705] Rüdig 2002, 93–99.

Greens for radical left votes. According to Rüdig, almost all long-term activists who were still rooted in the NGOs left the party during their first governmental term, as both the peace movement and the anti-nuclear movement NGOs felt that their ideals would be better represented elsewhere.[706]

Furthermore, Jochen Weichold has noted how practically all environmental politics during the red-green reign were conducted under the framework of neoliberalism (*Neoliberalismus),* meaning that the Greens had to give in not only to the SPD, but also to the demands of industries and their competitiveness. For example, limitations on CO2 emissions were designed in a way that would not require important industry sectors such as steel industries to make expensive adjustments, directing them at transportation and private households. The red-green government placed the concept of 'international competitiveness' (*internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit*) as the guiding principle for such decisions, Weichold notes, adding that environmental protection had become subordinated by economics in what he calls the 'era of neoliberal environmental politics'.[707]

The reconsideration on one of the party's last radical stands – their anti-NATO and anti-militaristic stand – was led by Germany's new foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. Therefore, it is worth taking a closer look at the discussions leading to these changes, which may further demonstrate the changing ideals of the party. Already in 1995, many reformist greens had started questioning the peace movements' pacifist stands towards the Srebrenica massacre. Serbian forces had captured the Bosnian Muslim-populated city of Srebrenica. Over the next three days, a massacre took place with 7000 Muslim men and boys murdered. Hockenos pointed out that this was a slap in the face of the UN and its efforts to end the war peacefully, as this incident took place in a UN-protected 'safe zone'. Joschka Fischer wrote a letter to the party, in which he pointed out that the Greens – defenders of human rights – could not let such an ethnically directed massacre to take place without retaliation. This, according to Hockenos, caused a firestorm in the party. The chairperson of the party, Left Forum's Ludger Volmer, was reported saying, 'Take a gun and go to Sarajevo yourself!'[708] Many other left-wing greens followed suit.

Nevertheless, the issue was debated among the Greens, during which most of them ended up supporting the reformist camp, even before the 1998 elections and government negotiations had taken place. Having earlier turned their backs on the radical ecologists and socialists, the Greens were now also turning their backs on one of their largest support group in the grassroots world – the peace movement.[709] Although Hockenos called this decision a 'turning point', it seems to be a logical continuation of (rather than a rupture from) the Greens' recent relationship with the grassroots movements when contextualised against the larger development of German green ideas and concepts, as the party had already been distancing itself from the new social

[706] Rüdig 2002, 84, 94–97.
[707] Weichold 2004, 523–525.
[708] Hockenos 2008, 247.
[709] Hockenos 2008, 247–248.

movements and their alternative thinking and moving closer to the moderate and pragmatic stands that accompanied their further parliamentarisation.

The 1999 Bielefeld party conference not only marked the party's complete transformation into a normal party at the level of foreign policy but, in similar fashion as many earlier conferences, also turned into a spectacle of strange events. When Fischer was getting ready to make a speech about German intervention with NATO in Kosovo, an unknown person stormed onto the stage and blew up a paint bag near Fischer's right ear. Fischer suffered a ripped eardrum but refused to go to the hospital and skip his planned speech. Consequently, he ended up making a famous speech, themed 'No more war, no more Auschwitz', providing an emotional explanation for his support of the NATO bombings while in pain and having half of his face painted red. The conference went on to support the NATO attacks. As noted previously, roughly 16 years earlier, Fischer had used the same Auschwitz card to defend pacifism against the same kind of interventionism that he was now advocating.[710] In this sense, greens such as Joschka Fischer (although such a claim could be made of other green actors as well) seem to have wanted to formulate and conceptualise their identities around Germany's national socialist past, regularly using concepts such as the fear of Auschwitz to defend changing green positions, consequentially giving new meanings to these frequently-used arguments.

Der Spiegel pointed out this notable shift from a pacifist party into one supporting military intervention, calling this contradiction between the two lines as one between human rights and pacifism. The magazine paid specific attention to the non-reformist members of the Greens, particularly Left Forum leaders such as Ludger Volmer and environmental minister Jürgen Trittin, both of whom had strongly objected to military intervention in the name of human rights in the Balkans in 1995 (after the Srebrenica massacre), unlike their reformist contemporaries. By 1999, they had started to support Joschka Fischer's foreign policy line. In fact, Volmer had participated in a public debate *against* Hubert Kleinert in 1995 defending this pacifist line of thought, where he claimed that human rights – as important a subject as it was – were no reason to act against one's own principles. Just like in Neumünster in 1991, it was Volmer's Left Forum that cast the decisive delegate votes to support Fischer's line of thought against their own earlier stands – although, as *Der Spiegel* claimed, not so much in support of the intervention as in fear of the collapse of the coalition government.[711] As late as in 1997, Left Forum party leader Jürgen Trittin had identified disarmament and the removal of German troops from all NATO operations as 'party consensus' (*Partei Konsensus).* This 'consensus' had apparently disappeared into thin air in two years, as Trittin also was now in support of interventionist foreign policy.[712]

Along with *Der Spiegel, Die Tageszeitung* was another forum in which this debate took place: often giving room to the grassroots movements such as the

[710] *Der Spiegel* 1999. 'D-Day in Bielefeld.' *Der Spiegel*, 20/1999.
[711] *Der Spiegel* 1999. 'D-Day in Bielefeld.' *Der Spiegel*, 20/1999; Lersch, Paul 1995. 'Den Menschen helfen.' *Der Spiegel* 48/1995.
[712] Ihlau, Olaf 1997. 'Neoliberale Rezepte sind falsch.' *Der Spiegel* 43/1997.

peace movement, the magazine paid particular attention to the 'abstract, intangible concepts' (*abstraken, nicht greifbaren Begriffen*) that the defenders of the military intervention used, causing the radicals to consider reformists 'disgusting political professionals' (*ekligen Polit-Profis*).[713] Such terms again reflect the very different understanding of what green politics aimed to accomplish: the reformist goal of efficiency and professionalisation was in itself a failure for those with a more radically-aligned perception.

While such foreign policy was seen as problematic by the members of the peace movement, the economic policies were considered equally problematic among the moderate left-wing greens, many of whom had supported the turn to reformism in the Neumünster conference in 1991. The government favoured the private sector in its politics, thus widening the gap in favour of the wealthy and the corporations with the aim of increasing employment, but ended up driving the state budget into a deficit as a result of significant tax cuts that were mistakenly expected to be compensated by increasing economic growth that never took place.[714] The increasing importance of national economic interests in political decision-making was also difficult to accept for many greens. On studying the first green governmental term, Werner Reitter pointed out the irony of having many of the radicals of the 1970s – who had fought against the politics of center-left Helmut Schmidt back then – promoting similar politics that they had fiercely objected to 25 years earlier.[715] Many saw the Greens as a mere support party for the SPD-led coalition, as the chancellor (Gerhard 'car-man' Schröder, as he liked to be called) had rebutted all green attempts to create a more ecological traffic policy.[716] In the most famous case, Jürgen Trittin – now environment minister – vetoed the upcoming EU directive for used car recycling, causing even more anger within the left-wing greens who had earlier sided with Trittin. Later, it turned out that chancellor Schröder had received several 'interventions' from the German car industry to stop the bill from advancing.[717]

Among all their compromises, Paul Hockenos found the shift in foreign policy to be the most remarkable. Just a few years earlier, only a couple of thinkers in marginal positions among the reformist greens had thought of participating in NATO operations. This changed entirely once the Greens entered the government. Meanwhile, by the early 2000s, the Left Party had provided a new political home for the peace movement, one of the last of the big grassroots movements that had continued to associate themselves with the Greens.[718]

However, there was indeed a limit to the extent to which the Greens would bend when it came to their most important ideological question –

---

[713] *TAZ* 1995. 'Im Sog militärischer Denkprozesse' *TAZ* 9 June 1995; *TAZ* 1995. 'Die Folgen der Eigenen Position bedenken!' *TAZ* 30 June 1995.
[714] Hübner 2004, 112–114.
[715] Reutter 2004, 6–10.
[716] Called as such by Reutter 2003, 144–145.
[717] Rüdig 2002, 84–85, 93–99; Hübner 2004, 112–114.
[718] Hockenos 2008, 330.

nuclear power. After they had given in to Schröder's demands regarding many foreign, political, economic and environmental issues, Schröder had now started stalling the Greens' demand to get rid of nuclear power by the summer of 1999, instead planning to give permits to two new nuclear reactors. This time, Joschka Fischer and parliament group leader Rezzo Sclauch approached Schröder, demanding that the chancellor give in to the pragmatic understanding of the real-political situation within the Green Party. The Greens had already sacrificed many of their demands, and now environment minister Jürgen Trittin was threating to call a special party conference to discuss issues of identity and possibly even shy away from the coalition. *Der Spiegel* called this situation a 'Green self-discovery crisis' (*Grünen-Selbstfindungskrise*) caused by their submission to Schröder's many demands, although this development may rather seem to be yet another ideological strife between the Greens' real-political and radical-ideological goals if looked at from a long-term perspective. The situation was undoubtedly serious, with even the typically right-wing green Antje Vollmer complaining that the green 'identity had disappeared'. Fischer and Slauch asked Schröder to reconsider his push for more nuclear power – the one issue that united practically all green actors regardless of party factions – as this development was already tearing down Green Party support for the coalition government and would possibly cause the coalition to dissolve. This pragmatic argumentation used by Fischer and Slauch worked well with the real-political Schröder, who agreed to find 'a consensus the Greens can live with' (*einen Konsens zu finden, mit dem die Grünen leben können*).[719]

During this time, two significant factors emerged that would determine the party direction – a (moderate) left and a '*Realo*' concept paper. While the radical left had left the party, the more moderate 'pragmatic lefts' were afraid that the Greens were turning into a new Liberal Party (FDP), with its only policy goal being to lure young voters to the Greens instead of concentrating on, for example, social justice issues or sustainable labour markets. Meanwhile, the so-called *Realo* paper concentrated on advocating minority and human rights, direct democracy and 'ecological control with market-compliant means' (*Ökologische Steuerung mit marketkonformen Mitteln*). The debate thus continued, even though the Green Party had officially chosen (and clearly stuck with) a line that was adaptable to the ideological demands of *ecological modernisation.*[720]

Although green reformism had become a practical reality in all aspects of politics by the turn of the millennium, it was still not visible at a programmatic level. Despite the reformist turn of 1991, the 1993 programme remained vague on larger ideological questions. It was not until the 1998 election programme that the Greens started to conceptualise the turn that had already taken place at a programmatic level. Later, as they joined Schröder's two-party coalition government that same year, many green reformist political goals were only decided once they were being put to practice in the government. During their first term in the government, the Greens relied on the ideals of green

[719] *Der Spiegel* 1999. 'Gefährlicher als der Krieg'. *Der Spiegel* 27/1999.
[720] *Der Spiegel* 1999. 'Gefährlicher als der Krieg'. *Der Spiegel* 27/1999.

consumerism, *ecological modernisation* and other forms of compromises forged to establish a line that would please the reformists, the left-wing opposition and Schröder's *third way* politics alike. This sum of compromises surrounding market-friendly ideals for dealing with the environment also made its way to the principles of the Green Party programme in 2002, in which traces of both the moderate left and reformist forms of green thought could be observed, although the notable emphasis was on *Realo* reformism underlining market-friendlier green consumerism and civil rights, which are analysed more closely in the next section.

The Greens had undergone a complete ideological makeover in eight years, starting from the Neumünster Declaration by which they adopted moderate system-friendly environmentalism into their argumentation, backed by pragmatic premises. In particular, the ideals of green consumption as a key environmental approach belonged to an ideological background that the traditional greens (not to mention environmental activists) were far from being content with.[721] The grassroots movement especially felt it was left without representation in the party, the peace movement felt betrayed by German participation in the Kosovo bombings and even the anti-nuclear activists were angry at the slow pace of nuclear shutdown.[722] Despite this vocal opposition from the grassroots movement as well as from within the left-wing party opposition, *Die Grünen* declared itself the representative of the ecological movement in 2002 – a claim that many activists most likely did not agree with.[723]

As for the success of this green pragmatism, the turn to reformism had not restored the Greens' support immediately. The Greens had made it back to the *Bundestag*, but failed to reach their 1980s level of support until the 2002 elections. However, their immediate political influence did grow – in comparison to the past decade during which the Greens had made it into only two state governments, they had joined the state governments in five new states by 1997 (Sachsen-Anhalt, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg, Schleswig-Hostein and Hamburg), always in coalition with the SPD.[724] Therefore, even if the pragmatic expectation of increased popularity might have been without empirical support, they certainly achieved success in increasing party influence politically. This line of arguing also had consistency. According to Weichold, even in the 2001 party conference, the turn to reformism was argued in conjunction with the need of the party to remain successful (rather than, say, ecological argumentation).[725]

While many grassroots environmentalists had left the green movement by now, new voters were indeed being lured in by the moderate stands. Fischer's new pro-NATO stand that shocked so many German greens did not happen in a vacuum – it took place in a climate where the party electorate itself was

[721] Dryzek 2005.
[722] Rüdig 2002, 78–84.
[723] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 16.
[724] Die Grünen 2019, 58–59.
[725] Weichold 2005.

changing. Jochen Weichold noted that in 2005, 'well over half' of the members of the party had joined *after* the 1991 reformist turn, bringing in different value orientations and even 'neoliberal' ideals to the formerly radical party. The green electorate had changed from alternative movement supporters to well-to-do liberals, as the title of 'the Party of high earners' among liberal voters had 'ceded to the Greens' from the FDP.[726]

The Greens were well aware of this development. In 1998, former party chairman and Left Forum leader Ludger Volmer published a dissertation on the development of green voter behaviour where he identified a change within the green electorate regarding their relationship with security policy. Even the radicals, he claimed, had started approving military interventions when civil rights were endangered. According to Volmer, while both the fundamental 'radical pacifists', who opposed all kinds of military action, and the 'nuclear pacifists', who were mostly against nuclear weapons and belonged to the *Realos* camp, were still present when the green governmental reign began, a third group that demanded slow and controlled disarmament had gradually shifted from the *Fundis* to the *Realos* camp. Undoubtedly, the Green electorate's awareness of this change made it easier to implement the reforms required to reach the federal government.[727]

In 2002, the strategy to gain more moderate votes paid off – the Greens got 8.6% of the votes in the federal elections, their best result yet. The pragmatic goal to turn the Greens into a more general *Volkspartei* to acquire more support from the general public by emerging as a party that could actually govern seemed to have worked, at least from the perspective of efficiency, to use Kleinert's standard of measurement.[728]

5.1.2 Towards 'resource efficiency'

The aforementioned adaptation to the political mainstream was reflected in the 2002 *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* programme of principles in terms of emphasising economic questions, particularly questions of consumership. The new programme was released while the Greens were in the middle of their two-term (1998-2005) governmental participation. As a result, the programme consisted guidelines and concepts for the work that they were already doing in the government, having earlier conceptualised their positions as the opposition.[729]

The introduction to the 2002 programme described the new key concepts to be used, as listed below, guiding the Greens' ideology to a market-friendlier direction. The ideological umbrella concept that the Germans used to describe their political measures was that of *sustainable development* (*nachhaltige*

[726] Weichold 2005.
[727] Volmer 1998, 494–495; also discussed thoroughly in Riedel 2021.
[728] However, a word of caution is needed in this context. According to Rohrscheider & Dieter 2003, 89–92, many voters based their votes on green stands against helping the USA in their upcoming military campaign in Iraq, which might have affected voting behaviour more than the long-term ideological development of the Greens.
[729] Mende 2012, 314.

Entwicklung), or simply *sustainability (Nachhaltigkeit),* claiming that 'ecology is sustainability' (*Ökologie heißt Nachhaltigkeit)* – something that many radical grassroots movements would have detested, at least if sustainability was understood in its market-friendly form, that is, as sustainability of natural resources for economic use.[730] This term had been in use among environmental groups even before the 1980s, but it carried a very different meaning from how it later became globally known. After being used in the nineteenth century to reference conservation of natural resources,[731] the concept of *sustainability* had later been redefined by the radical environmental movements to search for environmentally sustainable alternatives to growth economics and politics.[732] However, in this case, 'sustainability' was conceptualised in a manner that was very similar to the 1987 Brundtland Commission's use of the term, with very little resemblance to (or affected by) grassroots environmentalist thinking. The Greens claimed, 'sustainability means the sustainable combination of ecological, social and economic development', (*die zukunftsfähige Verbindung von ökologischer, sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung*)[733].

Under this overarching concept, the Germans included other notable concepts, most importantly *ecological modernisation (ökologische Modernisierung),* which refers to the continuation of the modernisation of society but within an ecological framework. The methods to reach this goal were conceptualised around the goals of *eco-* or *resource efficiency (Ressourceneffizienz),* emphasising limitations to the extraction and consumption of natural resources despite increased financial activity and growth. These key concepts are analysed more closely in the following pages, with particular attention to the concepts of *ecological modernisation* and *eco-efficiency,* while *sustainable development* is discussed in more detail in the next section. It is observed that all these concepts were employed to turn the German green political language towards a more moderate direction, acknowledging (rather than questioning) the need for economic growth and subsequently removing systemic criticism from green political discussion. This was consistent with the reformist greens' ideals of parliamentarisation and more effective political participation, which had *de facto* already enabled their attendance in the federal government four years earlier, but was only now being conceptualised at a programmatic level. Meanwhile, the Greens' understanding of Western history and their place in it became rewritten. Earlier, environmentalism had represented a rupture from the story of modernity. Now, environmentalism was explicitly described as the next part of the story of modernity, i.e. as a continuation of the same tradition as enlightenment, industrialisation and free market capitalism rather than a rupture from it. From the reformist greens' perspective, entering the age of

730 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 10; See also Rüdig 2002.
731 As discussed in Chapter 2.
732 Dryzek 2005, 148.
733 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 10.

ecology was the next logical step in this trajectory that perhaps could be analytically described as the success story of Western ideas.[734]

These measures were meant to create a sustainable (*nachhaltig)* market economy – an ecologically reformed version of the prevailing profit-oriented free market economy. In other words, this referred to an economy where 'environmental protection, social security and dynamic markets are in a balance' – once again, a description similar to the goals of the *sustainable development* discourse stated by the Brundtland Commission in 1987.[735] Thus, the market's needs for increased profits were included in the Greens' ecological thinking, but within a framework based on the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. Therefore, maximising profits could no longer serve as the main priority of politics.[736] This also meant an emphasis on reforming the economy and the industrial society within the basic presuppositions of Western modernity instead of focusing on questioning its basic premises, as the Greens did before. This new green position, a notable departure from their earlier radical thinking, is well described in the following passage from the 2002 party programme:

> In the past, natural protection was at the center of sustainable environmental politics … but now the future belongs to production and product-integrated environmental protection. Eliminating environmental destruction is not necessarily our goal anymore, but prevention of environmental problems through resource-efficient and pollution-free products and technologies.[737]

The Greens had thus shifted from criticism of production and growth towards a line emphasising the reformation of production and technology towards a greener direction. In contrast to earlier being explicitly anti-modernistic and critical of the outcomes of modernity and the so-called 'progress' of increased material consumption, the Greens now conceptualised their relationship with modernity in an entirely new way through the concept of *ecological modernisation* (*ökologische Modernisierung)*, with the economic policy section of their 2002 party programme proclaiming, 'We support the ecological modernisation of the economy. Ecology opens up important growth areas'.[738]

According to John Dryzek, the *ecological modernisation* discourse has typically emphasised a viewpoint where the link between economic well-being and increasing environmental encumbrance are detached from one another, thus enabling economic growth to continue while still promoting

---

[734] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 43–44.
[735] '*Nachhaltig ist eine Marktwirtschaft, die Umweltschutz, soziale Sicherheit und wirtschaftliche Dynamik in ein Gleichgewicht bringt*'. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 43–44.
[736] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 43–44.
[737] '*In der Vergangenheit hat vor allem der nachsorgende Umweltschutz im Mittelpunkt der Umweltpolitik gestanden. ... Die Zukunft gehört jedoch dem produktions- und produktintegrierten Umweltschutz. Nicht die nachträgliche Beseitigung von Umweltschäden kann unser Ziel sein, sondern vielmehr die Vermeidung von Umweltproblemen durch schadstofffreie und ressourcensparende Technologien und Produkte*'. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen 2002, 28.
[738] *'Wir stehen für die ökologische Modernisierung der Wirtschaft. Ökologie eröffnet ein wichtiges Wachstumsfeld'*. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 45.

environmental well-being. While the more radical ecological models of greenness had attempted to question the basic beliefs and premises of modernity, ecological modernisation is typically used more as a technical term that is indifferent to the discussion surrounding presuppositions, beliefs, worldviews or societies' relationship with nature. Instead, it propounds a conscious long-term strategy of getting government(s), industries, academics and moderate environmentalists to work together towards enabling more eco-efficient modes of production and providing consumers with environmentally friendlier products for purchase in markets.[739] In simple terms, it may be understood as emission-neutral economic growth, enabling the Greens to use phrases such as 'important growth areas' that could suddenly be opened with ecology.

Due to its association with embracing rather than questioning modernity and its basic assumptions, *ecological modernisation* aligned seemingly well with the green formulations of developing greener technologies as part of their political programme. With consumers (instead of, for example, political decision-makers or industries) responsible for making the push towards better sustainability, it would also mean that the key institutions of modernity, such as the free market growth economy, and the presuppositions aligned with them would not be questioned anymore. Of course, the downside of this concept, especially for the former grassroots environmentalists, was a lack of vocabulary to criticise and redefine some of the basic Western beliefs surrounding growth that the Greens had wanted to reconceptualise at the very beginning. Nature, for example, had again become an object for the use of human growth economies, rather than a subject (or a network of subjects) that needed to have its voice heard, as in the tradition of Petra Kelly and other early radical greens. It also meant that the idea of human well-being as connected to nature (or as something separate from extracting material growth from the natural environment) was no longer explicitly questioned. The big questions of the Greens' early days were thus left out of the discussion. This is consistent with the tradition of the concept of *ecological modernisation*, as stated by Dryzek, who noted that it was primarily developed to enhance cooperation between environmentalists and institutions within the society, consequently turning the status of nature back to serving human and societal needs (although in an ecological way) instead of having relevance on its own or, as Dryzek calls it, turning nature into a 'waste management plant'. In other words, as the name of the concept itself suggests, it was developed to help facilitate cooperation with the institutions of modernity but in an ecological way, consequentially subscribing to its presuppositions as well. This factor is quite visible in the way the German Greens used the concept.[740]

However, this does not mean that *ecological modernisation* has always been a homogenic discourse. Dryzek pointed out that there have indeed been weak and strong versions of it, with the 'weak' versions often driving for technocratic

[739] Dryzek 2005, 167–171.
[740] Dryzek 2005, 172–174.

management of engineering solutions for free markets and the 'strong' version calling for a wide restructuring of many of the social institutions in question.[741] Nevertheless, new technologies and eco-efficient innovations were relevant to both versions of the ecological modernisation discourse, with the debate within this discourse being largely cantered around questions of the attainability of such a change.[742] In their programme, the German green version of *ecological modernisation* seemed to fall somewhere in between its weak and strong versions.

The origins of *ecological modernisation* can be traced back to Germany, which perhaps explains the popularity of the concept in German-speaking countries. As will be presented below, the Finnish Greens were equally fond of the concepts of *sustainable development* and *eco-efficiency,* but not so much *ecological modernisation,* which was scarcely mentioned in the Finnish context. The concept was developed by two Berlin-based academics: Martin Jänicke, an early pro-environmental dissident within the Social Democrats – a party that had been developing their own environmental programme in the early 1980s – and Joseph Huber, who had abandoned the radical environmental movement of the 1970s once he realised that radicalism was a political dead end. They developed the term around 1982–1985, during a time when only few greens were interested in the moderate environmentalist discussion.[743]

In contrast to the radical environmentalists, who questioned the premises of Western modernisation (i.e. individualism, materialism and anthropocentrism, among others) that needed to be dismantled and recreated from a more eco-centric and communal but a less materialistic perspective, the ecological modernists accepted these premises and institutions of modernity (industrialisation and the constant growth of consumption, for example) as necessary and even useful resources that could be used to create a more environmentally friendly reality. Therefore, the decoupling of emissions from growth and the creation of new technological green innovations should take place entirely within the system and the tradition of thought that the Greens had earlier been eager to question. In this context, Huber pointed out that ecology cannot be realised as separate from industries or as conflicting with it. Therefore, an ecological modernisation model was developed as a counter-tradition to 'survivalist' environmental thinking, which saw the constant demand for a growth- and consumption-based definition of well-being as cause for an environmental catastrophe (the so-called 'treadmill of production' argument). This, of course, drew criticism from the more traditional environmentalists, who felt that the *ecological modernisation* model was inadequate to address the strain on the environment caused by, for example, the free trade of globalisation and growth economics.[744] Notably, while this concept had become widely used in the 1980s, it was either absent or criticised (as in the 1986 programme) until the Greens joined the government. It can thus

[741] Dryzek 2005, 172–174.
[742] Järvikoski 2009, 94–95.
[743] Järvikoski 2009, 94–95.
[744] Järvikoski 2009, 94–98; see also Huber 1982.

also be understood as a conceptual tool to parliamentarise the Green Party ideology and create possibilities for cooperation with other parties for the purpose of enhancing ecological goals within the system as well as within the framework of premises based on which most parties operated.

The Greens' practical measures to drive these ideas forward had also changed. In addition to green technological innovations, the party programme mentioned decreasing emissions and waste, both of which are perceived as signs of economically inefficient production in *ecological modernisation* models that traditionally align closely with ideals of *resource efficiency*.[745] For the Greens, it was the methods offered by resource-efficient thinking that would help modernise society in an ecological manner in practice. This would be achievable through the enhancement of ecological (but still economically profitable) businesses, ecological taxation on production and the old radical goal of decentralised energy production, which, however, had a very different purpose than before: it was now being considered within the framework of creating more jobs than the centralised use of nuclear power. Competition was applauded, although within the limits of the ecological and social framework.[746]

Since resource efficiency was a key concept for the German Greens, it is worth taking a closer look at it. If *ecological modernisation* was the goal of the Greens, the concept of *eco-efficiency* or an 'efficiency revolution' (*Effizienzrevolution*) – referring to resource efficiency[747] – served as the means to get there. The Greens claimed that 'with the focus on ... eco-efficiency (*Ökoeffizienz),* we concentrate on what ecological modernisation needs most urgently: new production and management processes ... that allow the need for energy, raw materials and space to be reduced'.[748] Furthermore, the traditional goal of decoupling was conceptually attached to eco-efficiency, with the Greens speaking of significantly reducing both resource consumption and emissions.[749] Moreover, the Greens considered decoupling a necessity for economic well-being, coining the catchphrase 'ecology is long-term economy' (*Ökologie ist Langzeit-Ökonomie*). [750] All these ideas were discussed under the umbrella concept of *ecological modernisation*. Overall, the concept of eco-efficiency seems to have belonged to the same ideological and conceptual cluster as the other conceptualisations of market-friendly and technically oriented environmentalism, and was used as a measuring unit for the effectiveness of these market-friendly measures. As already mentioned, the idea of creating environmentally-sound alternatives within the systems and premises of modernisation instead of outside it had been developed as a counter-narrative to radical environmentalism since the early 1970s. However, the concept of eco-efficiency particularly started to gain momentum only in the early 1990s and was largely a German concept. Notably, professor Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek

[745] Dryzek 2005, 167–168.
[746] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 45–46.
[747] *'Ökologischer Spielräume durch erhöhte Ressourceneffizienz'*
[748] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 28.
[749] *'Eine deutliche Minderung des Ressourcenverbrauchs und der Emissionen erreicht wird.'*
[750] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 27.

developed methods of measuring eco-efficiency – an issue that was closely followed by the Finnish Greens as well, as demonstrated in the next section.[751]

The Germans tied their ideals of ecologically modernising society to a techno-green discourse of sorts – an 'ecological innovation' program (*Ökologische Innovation)* to develop 'environmentally friendly technologies, products and services' (*umweltfreundlicher Technologien, Produkte und Dienstleistungen*). The development of products and technologies was itself a part of a greener economy, and with *knowledge* (*Wissen)* becoming the most important 'raw material' of modern economies of the new millennium, the shift from an industrial to a knowledge society would also help the German national economy (*Volkswirtschaft)* while emissions would be decreased.[752] Resource efficiency, which largely refers to this development of technologies as well as environmentally friendlier production and consumption, also meant new possibilities for the economy (*eröffnen wir der Wirtschaft neue Möglichkeiten*), instead of being opposed to economic interests like before.[753]

In reality, this meant reallocating environmental responsibility to individual consumers. Therefore, the Greens' political goals were to be achieved through consumer action that would alter the markets positively.[754] The new reformist political stand was based on the ideal that consumer guidance would automatically lead consumers to make better purchase choices in the market, thus incentivising producers to make more environmentally-aligned products.[755] Moreover, for this green market economy to work, it would require a complete 'freedom of choice for consumers' (*die Wahlfreiheit der Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher*) to make the correct choices in the free market. This would be achievable, for example, through eco-labels that would help guide 'enlightened' (*aufgeklärte)* consumers towards making better and more ecological purchases in markets, particularly regarding 'food purchases'. The Greens explained that it was through consumer demand that producers would have a reason to produce more ecologically.[756] It is notable that the term 'enlightened' was used in Finland as well (*valistunut kansalainen)* to refer to a potential Green Party voter, as seen in the previous chapter. The Greens seemed to have had the idea of an ideal citizen in mind – one more keen to practice one's citizenship in the marketplace as a consumer rather than at the grassroots level – when addressing these issues.

With the reissuance of a material understanding of well-being (as consumption) as the basis of politics, the Greens projected 'prosperity'

---

751 Schmidt-Bleek (1993) 2000. See also Dryzek 2005, 170, for the association between *factor four* eco-efficiency measurement and the ecological modernisation discourse, which attempted to push the *limits to growth* discourse to the background.
752 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 91.
753 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 27.
754 '*Sie müssen jedoch verstärkt dazu beitragen, dass Menschen im Sinne einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung verantwortlich handeln lernen*'
755 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 29.
756'*Wir wollen die Informations- und Kennzeichnungspflichten so verbessern, dass die Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher durch ihr Kauf- und Nachfrageverhalten Einfluss auf die Produktion gesunder, qualitativ hochwertiger und ethisch vertretbarer Produkte nehmen können*.' Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 51.

(*Wohlstand)* as the outcome of this approach. Material prosperity was now accessible to green thinking as well, since the ecological reformist movement would make it possible to detach the overconsumption of resources from growth by using more greener technology than before. This would also expand the possibilities of environmental politics, thus tying green ideals once again to the need for efficiency within the political paradigm. [757] As the green understanding of the environment turned towards a more moderate direction – in other words, the environment was once again the object of human society's needs for 'prosperity' instead of being a subject that humans were interconnected to – environmental responsibility was reallocated to the consumers, who were now thrust with the responsibility to make this change happen. This reallocation of responsibility from market forces and industries to individual consumers was encapsulated in the consumer of 'consumer power' (*Verbrauchermacht).*[758]

In many ways, the reformist greens recycled old radical green concepts to fit a new framework, giving them new meaning within the context of a more moderate, market-oriented and consumerist environmental political discussion. For example, although the old goal of establishing a circulation economy (*Kreislaufswirtschaft)* was once again present, it conveyed meanings that were very different from before, as it now supported eco-efficiency instead of supporting a detachment from market capitalism. The goal of using regionally-produced goods instead of global supply chains (the old goal of 'decentralisation') was still present, but it was now to be achieved using the political tool of 'consumer power' (*Verbrauchermacht),* thus turning the focus towards market-friendlier political regulatory tools.[759] The way in which the German Greens reconceptualised their own key concepts, such as the *circulation economy*, is a prime example of the contested nature of political concepts, as their meanings are constantly being fought over in the political field. The Greens succeeded in redefining these concepts within a framework where ecological goals needed to be adapted to economic needs and vice versa (i.e. within the *sustainable development* and *ecological modernisation* discourses). Moreover, this combination could only be achieved through consumer market guidance and greener innovation technology, which would lead to better eco- or resource efficiency.

The extent to which the Greens' perception on well-being shifted towards an anthropocentric direction is quite notable, marked by the disappearance of explicit demands for deeper interconnectedness and an inclusion of ideals of enhanced economic liberties that directed the turn towards ecological modernisation. The concept of *freedom of movement* serves as an example of this trend. Free movement had by 2002 become the basic prerequisite for individual self-development and economic life for the Greens, essentially becoming a part of a free society that could not be limited. Resource efficiency in collaboration

[757] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 24–25.
[758] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 27.
[759] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 27.

with better planning and logistics as well as technology development would help decrease traffic emissions rather than, say, regulating automobile emissions. In accordance with the ideals of the *ecological modernisation* model, issues of traffic and movement seemed to have turned into merely technical rather than systemic problems that could be solved through technical solutions.[760] At the same time, environment-related responsibilities for both the producers of cars and their individual drivers were absent, nor were they being created by a growth-oriented economic system that needed to be restricted or even dismantled like before.[761] This disappearance of ecological responsibilities regarding traffic emissions in green discourses, with solutions ascribed to better product development, provides an example of the visibility of the *ecological modernisation* discourse in practice.

When talking of old green concepts used in a new context, the way in which the key concept of *self-determination (selbstbestimmt)* was turned around is particularly notable. As observed before, the 1980s discussion on *self-determination* was entirely based on the context of enhanced grassroots democracy, decentralised local mid-level economy and citizens' autonomy. At that time, the concept referred to the self-determined organisation of local grassroots groups and BIs as well as democratisation of the (presumably non-democratic) representative parliamentary system by giving more political autonomy to the grassroots movements, which served as a link to direct democratic activity. By 2002, the meaning of this concept still included some autonomy at the grassroots level, but it was also widened to include consumeristic perspectives, such as the right of consumers to have necessary information about the ecology of a product in order to make more enlightened purchases in the free market. In addition, this included, for example, minority rights.[762]

Furthermore, the Greens now understood *self-determination* as a concept with roots in the 'liberal' and 'libertarian' traditions of thought, meaning freedom 'from paternalism' (*frei von Bevormundung).* Such a freedom could not simply mean the freedom of the markets. However, it did serve as a conceptual tool to justify the shifting of ecological and social responsibility (*Veranwortung)* to the individual, with the notion of not limiting the freedom of other individuals as the only guiding moral principle – a well-known maxim of classical liberal thinking, once again associating the model of *ecological modernisation* to presuppositions present in earlier Western thought. The Greens emphasised that this concept applied especially to the liberties of different minorities.[763] While minority rights had been in the German green political agenda from the beginning, the meaning that was now being attached to *self-determination* shifted the concept towards a direction that paid more emphasis on individual consumerism and less emphasis on the alternative understanding of democracy or the demands of the environment. The concept of *self-*

[760] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 35–36.
[761] Die Grünen 1980. Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen, 26.
[762] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 11.
[763] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 11.

determination was now attached to the paradigm of representative democracy and the perception of nature as being an object for anthropocentric growth economies operating within free markets. In other words, the concept was used as a tool to enhance the simplified regulatory practices of moderate economically-oriented environmentalism that the reformists were promoting while enhancing also civil rights. This is yet another example of how the tradition of thought that the Greens' environmental thinking relied on had changed. Not only were new key concepts adopted from the tradition of moderate environmental economics (*ecological modernisation, eco-efficiency, etc.),* but the old ones that had defined their thinking, such as *self-determination,* were now being redefined as concepts supporting this new paradigm.

Since the prevailing Western system of thoughts, presuppositions and institutions were now accepted as the basis for green environmental political thinking, the perception of Western democracy also started to be seen in a more positive light. According to the Greens, democracy needed to be 'reformed', just like other aspects of the society. This not only meant increased measures for citizens' participation but also meant strengthening the 'liberal rule of law' of constitutional democracy within the federal state, which would continue to enhance liberties and civil rights. [764] Therefore, German representative democracy and the party system on which it operated, which had earlier been criticised, was now applauded. Nevertheless, a 'modern civil rights party' such as the Greens would still protect its citizens both from the state and economic powers as before. Effectively, the Greens' conception of democracy turned out to be an ambivalent one, possibly indicating a compromise between the old grassroots understanding of direct democracy and the new system-friendlier representative approach. [765] As explained in the previous section, this understanding of the story of Western modernity as a story of 'democratisation' had by then already affected green thinking regarding, for example, their foreign policy. This also explains the massive change in the position of the grassroots movements and NGOs within the party – since the parliamentary democracy based on representation no longer came under criticism, the promotion of grassroots democracy or a more direct form of democracy became a less significant issue, one that was discussed separately from ecological questions (although they had been part of the same line of criticism earlier) and only advanced in cooperation with the prevailing system rather than as separate from it.

These changing ideals in green thought also became visible in their perception of their own historical development. In 2002, the Greens saw their history as analogous to the social movements that had spawned as a counter-reaction to the social problems of nineteenth century industrialism with aims of 'social taming of industrial capitalism' (*die soziale Bändigung des Industriekapitalismus*). From this standpoint, the Greens concluded that the

[764] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 115.
[765] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 115–116.

ideals of *reformism* should be considered as a form of such taming, presumably referring to the reformist directions that the socialist movements eventually took as a form of social democracy. The Greens then presented a challenge that seems to have applied both to the parliamentary system around them as well as to the radical opposition inside the party, claiming that 'anyone who wants to preserve the natural foundation of life must be willing to reform the economy and the society' – a statement that seems to defy both laissez-faire capitalism and the radical greens' refusal to cooperate with the prevailing system alike ('*Wer die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen bewahren will, muss bereit sein, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft zu reformieren*.').[766]

This analogy with the development of the social democratic movement is extremely interesting, considering that the Greens had earlier detested this comparison. In the 80s, the radical greens had sometimes expressed their fear of becoming like the Social Democrats – formerly radical but currently working entirely as a part of the political system. This new understanding of historical similarity seems to imply that just as the social democratic movement had started off radical before becoming tamer when working within the parliamentary system (and within its rules of governance) to create a welfare state, the Greens too were following a similar path. The results of this conceptual turn were already in and, from the perspective of a government party, the green story had been a story of success. From the 1970s onwards, the Greens had made popularised the discussion on environmentalism throughout society until it finally reached a point where 'industry and trade have developed new, environmentally friendly technologies and products'. [767] Therefore, the entire green movement, starting from the radical 1970s, was teleologically presented as leading to the successful reformation of industry, trade and technological production. The German green environmental discourses were thus completely aligned with their new pragmatic reformist goals. As seen in the next section, the Finnish Greens also embarked on a similar path with a roughly similar programme, although with differences and distinct wordings due to differing local contexts.

[766] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 24.
[767] *'Es ist das Verdienst der internationalen Ökologiebewegung und der Grünen, dass Umweltbewusstsein und Umweltverantwortung seit den 70er-Jahren zu einem zentralen gesellschaftlichen und politischen Wert geworden sind. Eine umfassende nationale und europäische Umweltgesetzgebung wurde auf den Weg gebracht. Auch auf globaler Ebene gibt es Fortschritte in Gestalt von Umweltabkommen, Programmen und Institutionen.'*

5.2 De-radicalising the Finnish Greens with 'sustainable development'

5.2.1 'Affecting millions of consumer choices'

The Finnish Greens were preparing themselves for possible government participation in the 1995 elections by releasing a new reformist party programme in 1994 that focused on the concept of *sustainable development*. While still a compromise between different factions, the new programme took notable steps towards a reformist direction – enough to provide programmatic basis for the compromises that serving in the government would require. While the 1990 programme pointed out how the limits of growth had been crossed, the 1994 programme emphasised that this growth 'cannot continue in a similar way as it used to'.[768] While the Greens made three separate arguments against growth in 1990,[769] the 1994 programme simply pointed out that growth alone was not enough to create happiness. Despite the critical tone, growth was, nevertheless, no longer something to get rid of, instead it was time for a 'green market economy' (*vihreä markkinatalous)* where a forerunner, such as Finland, could ensure better 'competing positions' (*paremmat kilpailuasetelmat)* in the future. The alternative, which the Greens were now explicitly afraid of, was a 'decline of gross-national product'. The goal of sustainability was now to create green technology that could be turned into an export product (*viennin valittkortti*).[770] In a mere four years, growth criticism had evolved into the cautious acceptance of green growth that was associated with language emphasising competition and export, thus linking the Greens to the very competitiveness discourse that they had earlier criticised.

Conceptually, this market-friendly change was accomplished in Finland by adopting the new key concept of *sustainable development* (*kestävä kehitys*), which would be developed upon further in their upcoming programmes.[771] The concept itself was not new, nor were the Greens the first party in Finland to adopt it (The Left Alliance had already done it in 1990).[772] In its contemporary form, the concept was coined by Norwegian social-democratic prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1987 to describe the simultaneous development of economic growth, social equality and environmental well-being, all of which suited moderate leftist goals quite well. Therefore, the ideological background of this concept was located in moderate attempts to address environmental and social problems within the social democratic political paradigm. As a result, it is

---

[768] *'Aineellisen tuotannon ja kulutuksen kasvu ei enää voi jatkua entiseen tapaan'*. Vihreä liitto 1990 & 1994. Vihreän Liiton puolueohjelmat, Johdannot.
[769] These arguments claimed that unlimited economic growth was A) detrimental for the environment, B) wearing out human well-being and C) causing the centralisation of power and wealth and in turn inequality.
[770] Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2.
[771] Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3.
[772] Vasemmistoliitto 1990. Vasemmistoliiton Kestävän kehityksen energiapolitiikka – ohjelma.

no surprise that the Left Alliance used it before the radically-positioned Green Alliance did.[773] As mentioned before, the Green Alliance had actually opposed to the concept back in 1988 due to its emphasis on growth economies. In this sense, their use of the concept also marked a notable turn-around in green environmentalism.[774]

The definition of sustainable development as outlined by the Brundtland Commission has been so univocally accepted that the contested nature of the concept often falls out of focus, as Susan Baker noted.[775] The Brundtland Commission coined the concept to add a global perspective to the ongoing environmental discussion by focusing on the needs of the Global South while also promoting greener growth as well as the ecological modernisation of industries so that more could be produced with less (drawing on the traditional definition of eco-efficiency, even though such a concept was not explicitly used). In other words, this concept identifies connections between economic, social and environmental problems and attempts to link these issues on a global scale.[776] Nonetheless, *sustainable development* has been a politically contested concept from the very beginning. Baker listed four very different meanings that the concept has been given in different political contexts since its inception, all of which draw on the (rather vague) phrasings provided by the Brundtland Commission report but emphasise different aspects of it. In its most anthropocentric version, sustainable development is reduced to pragmatic pollution control within a market-led system of exponential growth in an ever-globalising capital-intensive economy. On moving towards a more eco-centric direction, the definitions of 'weak' and 'strong' versions of 'sustainable development' emerge. In the 'weak' version, the concept is still used within the paradigm of growth, but is accompanied by the implementation of more top-down measures to enable a move towards decoupling, substitution of natural capital with human capital and market-led policy tools. Meanwhile, the 'strong' version includes the creation and maintenance of ecological trade as well as local economic self-sufficiency within world markets while also guiding production towards the direction of ecological modernisation, with non-material aspects of development emphasised instead of growth. Finally, accounting for nature as having intrinsic value in human decision-making has been the most eco-centric way in which this concept has been used politically, thus prioritising limits to resource use over economic needs while decentralising both human economies and political decision-making.[777]

It is evident that the final use of the concept comes very close to the old 1980s radical Greens' conceptualisations of environmentalism, although they rarely used the term *sustainable development* to describe their position as it was associated with market-friendlier (and thus pejorative) thinking. The 'strong' version of the concept, described above, is also quite similar to its pre-1980s

[773] Laine & Jokinen 2001, 64–65; Dryzek & Scholsberg 2005, 257–258; Dryzek 2005, 145–148.
[774] *VL* 1988. 'Vihreä raamattu vai kehno kompromissi?' *VL* 9/1988.
[775] Baker 2007, 17.
[776] Baker 2007, 23–24.
[777] Baker 2007, 30–31.

definition used by early environmentalists, before it went through a host of redefinitions conducted by political actors on an international stage and by the UN (leading to even lesser connections with the actual environmentalist movements). Since the concept was being used both in Finland and in Germany as a tool to veer green thinking towards a more moderate direction, the meanings given to the concept kept oscillating somewhere in between the 'weak' and the 'strong' version of sustainable development.

For the Finnish reformist greens, *sustainable development* meant more than just sustainability and social justice within the current paradigm of the economy. In 1994, the newly-reformed party programme placed emphasis on and allocated responsibility to the individual consumer. Therefore, instead of imposing strict regulations, ensuring natural protection and applying limitations to economic activities, ecological problems had now been averted by ambitiously focusing on 'millions of consuming choices' (*miljooniin kulutusvalintoihin)* that would now be affected by green politics. This would be accomplished through adverse taxes for ecologically unsustainable production, eco-labels to help guide consumer behaviour and voluntary market guidance for corporations, among other things – all aimed at turning the markets around with the help of consumer demands that the producers would be forces to respond to.[778]

Over the years, this market-based standpoint would be strengthened even further. In 2002, all of environmentalism was being talked about under the label of *sustainable development.* The Greens – who had been a government party for seven years by then – started calling for 'growing markets' for environmentally friendly production. Technological development – particularly the development of IT – had, by then, become a key method for greening the growth economy as well. However, the growth of IT was not entirely related to only the economy. At this time, the Greens were engaged in creating either a 'democratic information society' (*demokraattinen tietoyhteiskunta)* or a 'citizens' information society' (*kansalaisten tietoyhteiskunta).* Communication through the internet would create a new majority of 'global awareness and responsibility' while enhancing democracy through increased possibilities for acquiring information and participating. This would include popular voting on issues concerning both the local and national levels.[779]

Considering such circumstances, IT was associated with a notable amount of expectations – it served both as a route to know about market-friendlier ways to cut emissions as well as a link to the older ideals of a more direct democracy. Nevertheless, this form of democracy was more about expanding the parliamentary system and bring its decision-making closer to the citizens than about entirely redefining democracy as something taking place at the grassroots level, as the participatory ideal of democracy had considered it to be.

---

[778] Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2

[779] Vihreä liitto 2002. Vihreän Liiton periaateohjelma, *Kestävä kehitys todeksi*; Vihreä liitto 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 2; Vihreä liitto 1998. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma, 4.

The Green Party programme's emphasis on consumer behaviour and the allocation of environmental responsibility to consumers comes closer to be identified as the 'weak' version of sustainability, which is the more anthropocentric conceptualisation of the term, with a focus to 'integrate capitalist growth with environmental concern' according to Baker. In other words, although this version of the concept would treat the natural world as a resource for human economies, it would also attach a value to it that would have to be accounted for through a cost-benefit analysis – a stand that is often criticised for continuing to perceive nature as mere resource storage for human use, albeit one that now has at least some extrinsic value as well.[780] However, it must be noted that on other occasions, this concept had been given a more ecocentric emphasis in green programmes. Nevertheless, Baker's list of different political uses for the concept confirms the extent to which it was being used by the Greens to establish a turn towards a more market-oriented, anthropocentric and system-friendly direction.

Furthermore, reallocating responsibility to the consumer was a particularly notable shift, since the Greens had until then been very critical of the idea of the consumer-citizen who votes with one's wallet as the key agent of politics. In particular, Ville Komsi openly criticised the idea of consumer-citizenship in the parliament, as mentioned above. Now, a turn had taken place, where economic language and economic goals were suddenly placed at the center stage of environmental politics while environmental responsibility was reallocated to the individual consumer. Furthermore, while the Finnish Greens explicitly associated their definition of *sustainable development* to the 1992 UN Rio convention, calling it an 'international statement of intent for new environmental thinking', [781] it is nevertheless noteworthy that the Rio Convention did not promote the overturning of environmental responsibilities to the consumer. The Convention's principles underlined international trade and economic growth at the center of environmental cooperation to finance more sustainable production, though, but without the political project of reallocating environmental responsibility to consumers that the Finnish Greens undertook while referencing Rio.[782] Instead, the Finnish Greens seem to have defined the concept in similar terms as the EU Commission did in 1993 in their 5th Environmental Action Plan (EAP). With their conceptualisation of the concept, the 5th EAP had, in fact, explicitly aimed to turn political environmentalism towards a more consumer-oriented direction in view of the needs of global competitiveness.[783]

---

[780] Baker 2007, 32.

[781] *'Uuden ympäristöajattelun ensimmäisiä kansainvälisiä tahdonilmauksia'*. Vihreä liitto 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma, 3.

[782] Most notably principle 12, which stated, '*States should co-operate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation.*' United Nations 1993, §12.

[783] The 5th EAP aimed at simplifying regulation by creating 'economic instruments to encourage the production and use of environmentally friendly products and processes' and 'financial support measures' to promote environmentally friendly production. These ideals

As a consequence of this, debates on the environment were now more concentrated on what and how each person ought to consume rather than where and to what extent should old forests be protected. The Finnish Greens had thus effectively reallocated environmental responsibilities to individual consumers in the free market, similar to their German counterparts, by emphasising that both ecological protection and economy dynamism would develop through the choices of enlightened consumers.[784]

Through the implementation of these turns, the Green Parties were participating in a larger ideological political shift that had been taking place since the 1980s. In *History of the Future of Economic Growth,* Jeremy L. Caradonna explored this larger shift that was taking place in environmental thinking since the 1980s: while environmentalist circles demanded a degrowth economy, political leaders were looking for a concept based on 'neoclassical economics and old-style Westernised development'. The expansion of the gross domestic product (GDP) and increased material consumption were still considered vital, but would now have to be dealt with in an ecologically sensitive way. Caradonna claimed that this standpoint was quickly accepted in public discourse in the milieu of the 1980s and early 1990s as a suitable solution for difficult environmentalist demands, thus accepting that environmental problems as something that had to be tackled but detaching from the radical environmentalist solutions to these problems.[785]

Moreover, these standpoints were also adopted at the EU level. Having lost industry competitiveness to the USA and Japan partly due to stricter environmental regulations (e.g. expensive catalysts), the European Commission was looking for ways to endorse environmental politics in ways more friendly to European industries by the early 1990s – a purpose for which the concept of *sustainable development* was deployed. This created a Europe-wide atmosphere of 'simplifying' environmental regulation. Consequently, environmental responsibility was thrust onto the consumer to facilitate the creation of more market-friendly measures of politics, while industries were given the opportunity to voluntarily adapt to the needs of the markets, as a result of which the damage done to competitiveness was believed to become smaller. Concepts such as *sustainable development* and *ecological modernisation* were thus given new meanings within this paradigm, even if they were originally coined with a somewhat different emphasis in mind.[786]

---

originated from the kind of political discourse advocating markets would solve environmental problems through changing consumer behaviour (instead of top-down regulations commanded by the state) as long as the former was given proper voluntary instruments, such as eco-stamps for ecologically sustainable products, etc.[783] The purpose of environmental deregulation was to create a new kind of voluntary regulation that would allow market-friendly and growth-oriented instruments for environmental regulation. See European Commission 1993; Collier 1998, 4–9; Knill & Liefferink 2007, 157.

[784] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 10, 27–28, 43–50.

[785] Caradonna 2018, 154.

[786] See, e.g., Collier 1998 and Knill & Liefferink 2007 for discussion. See also European Commission's 1995 comments on the Molitor Report, where *sustainable development* was explicitly reconceptualised as a tool for industry competitiveness, with many of the

Some have even accused the use of such concepts to mean participation in 'neo-liberal hegemony', due to the de-regulative emphasis brought about by the ideal of consumer-citizen sovereignty. However, it should be noted that none of the green actors using these terms would have considered their ideology 'neoliberal'.[787] Conceptual historian Niklas Olsen noted that since its beginning, neo-liberalism has been justified with the idea of a consumer as a 'sovereign', whose right to make free choices in the market needed to be protected from government regulation. This idea was of course very different from earlier, more left-wing ideal of consumer protection precisely through the kind of corporate regulation that was now being removed. While 'competitiveness' kept emerging as the practical reason for dismantling regulative practices of industries, it was this emphasis on consumer rights that was used as the legitimisation to decrease regulation. Doing so also redefined democracy as the right to consumer choice, which became hegemonic in European politics by the early 1990s, when even left-wing parties throughout Europe adopted similar views, if not by intentionally promoting such a stand, then at least by becoming 'bearers of neoliberal ethics'.[788]

Olsen did not state whether and the extent to which the Greens subscribed to such a hegemony, but it seems that, at least in Finland and Germany, the pull towards such a hegemony was unavoidable when the parties sought to become more efficient at the level of politics. While the green reformist actors certainly cannot be understood as intentionally or explicitly subscribing to 'neoliberal' ideals, they definitely adapted to this new hegemonic framework rather than resisting it, thus becoming the 'bearers' of such neoliberal ethics. Adapting to such a framework was the prerequisite for the kind of political efficiency that the Greens in both studied countries sought: due to this new hegemony, it was practically impossible to efficiently participate in politics without a consumerist emphasis in a free trade area such as the EU. This is because the aforementioned Europe-wide turn soon led to a 'race to the bottom' regarding environmental regulation, in the words of Knill and Liefferink, who studied the development of environmental regulation at the EU level. Since deregulated production was cheaper and thus led to a better competitive position, each nation state within the free trade area soon found themselves competing to find ways to 'simplify' environmental regulation, making the shift to reallocating regulative responsibility to the consumer all the more tempting, regardless of whether 'neoliberalism' in itself was on the actors' agenda.[789]

As seen above, a similar turn to consumerism also occurred in the German discussion. The goal of eco- or resource efficiency as a method to achieve

---

measures directed at guiding consumer behaviour to affect the markets. It is notable that while the Finnish Greens referenced the UN conceptualisation of the term, the meanings given to the concept seem to be much closer to those of the 5th EAP and the Molitor Report, which emphasise on affecting consumer behaviour.

[787] See, e.g., Olsen 2019 regarding the 'neoliberal' background of consumer-based political discourse.

[788] Olsen 2019, 229–230, 255.

[789] Knill & Liefferink 2007, 103–104. The theme is further analysed by Matero & Arffman 2023.

ecological modernisation of the industrial society is conceptually linked to the same consumerist turn described by Olsen, with an emphasis on freeing the market from state regulation to allow the individual consumer to freely affect production using one's purchasing power. A consumer thus became a consumer-citizen: the act of choosing different products was now democratic participation, as opposed to the earlier model where consumption was a private affair while the actual democratic participation took place on public political forums.[790] While right-wing parties throughout Europe had largely adopted this ideal throughout the 1970s, the Social Democrats had done so by the early 1990s and the Greens were next in line to step into this 'hegemony' of thought, as Olsen called it, to better adapt to the surrounding political atmosphere and value framework aimed at enhancing competitiveness.

Although this discussion gained momentum from the late 1980s onwards, the moderate ideas behind this economically oriented language had, in fact, originated from an earlier decade. These newer economically aligned concepts drew inspiration from the language of 'environmental economics', which had been developed as an alternative (and partially as a counter-narrative) to the more radical *limits to growth* discussion of the 1970s. Although not stemming from environmental movements, the 'environmental economics' discourse had been seeking solutions to environmental problems from within the current socio-economic paradigm. The Greens seem to have used similar kinds of economic terminology as conceptual tools to turn their political ideology in a moderate direction. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the language of environmental economics could, in fact, often contain radical goals that have simply been presented using economic language.[791] Herman Daly, for example, endorsed a version of the *sustainability* discourse in which the overall goal of growth was completely rejected.[792]

However, in political parliamentary discussions about environmental politics, *sustainable development* has rarely been used along the lines of this definition. Susan Baker pointed out how the outlines made in the Rio 1992 convention attracted criticism, particularly from the radical environmentalist movement. Baker describes that when asked *how* the environment should be managed, the Summit ignored the question of *who* gets to determine environmental problems in the first place. Issues such as climate change and biodiversity loss were counted as global problems, while desertification or ocean acidity were merely understood as local problems, thus making them less relevant for funding. Baker appropriately summed up the radical green argument as follows: 'Powerful states use institutions such as the UN to transform their own state interests into international agreed-upon, environmental norms and governance systems'.[793]

---

[790] Olsen 2019, 222–228.
[791] Warde et al. 2018. See also, e.g., Daly (1977) 1993 as one of the first thinkers to promote the language of 'ecological economics' as a method to overcome (rather than endorse) a growth-based economic system.
[792] Baker 2007, 34.
[793] Baker 2007, 60.

With the new reformist ideas being implemented in the party programme as well as presented in televised debates (as will be presented below), the Greens' support faltered but only by a little in the 1995 elections, as their total number of seats dropped from 10 to nine – and total electorate support from 6.8% to 6.5%. However, their political influence expanded as planned, as they made it to Lipponen's coalition government and started implementing their now-reformist goals, achieving some successes but also making major compromises in many of the areas that they were attempting to reform, as discussed in the previous chapter. Pekka Haavisto served as the first green environmental minister from 1995 to 1999. In the 1999 elections, the five-party rainbow government managed to successfully sustain the robust backing of the electorate, who strongly supported the reformist approach of the new Green Alliance, as depicted by their performance in the elections where they achieved an all-time high of 11 seats and 7.27% of all votes. During the Lipponen's government's second term, the Greens secured 1,5 minister seats, meaning that Satu Hassi – the new chair of the party – served the term as the environmental minister while Osmo Soininvaara served half a term as the minister of basic services. However, in 2002, the Greens walked out of the government and back into the opposition, with one year left of the term when the government decided to add a fifth nuclear power plant, which the Greens fiercely opposed.[794] While their conceptualisations of *greenness* largely remained the same during their seven-year governmental term, the Greens nevertheless advanced their reformist goals further through new concepts associated with the *techno-green* and *eco-efficiency* discourses during this era.

5.2.2 'Techno-Greens' in government

Similar to the German Greens, consumer guidance through eco-labels and ecological taxation alone were not sufficient to offer the Finnish society more sustainable patterns of production within a qualitative growth economy that was to be detached from growing emissions. Notably, the emphasis in moderate green economics discourse has typically been on improving technology to help reach the sustainable use of resources, along with the application of modifications and reforms within the current structure of economic and social institutions. The Finnish Greens followed these ideals closely. It seems that their turn towards a market-friendly green discourse surprised political journalists and commentators alike regarding both the disappearance of growth criticism and the appearance of techno-green discourses. Prior to the 1995 parliamentary elections, a journalist who interviewed two Green Alliance candidates – Paavo Nikula and Janina Anderson – was surprised to find the Greens supporting IT-based growth markets, as demonstrated by the following discussion.[795]

[794] Bolin 2016, 161–164, 170.
[795] *Puolueet A-studion tentittävänä* 1995.

Janina Andersson claimed that the gross national product 'can also be qualitative growth', which would not be problematic in terms of environmental well-being. Paavo Nikula continued this line of thought, pointing out that the environmentally acceptable growth can be 'as high as five percent', as long as energy consumption declined. On being asked to give examples of such growth, Nikula replied, 'the growth of information technology is the kind that does not consume energy like wood industry and does not pollute the environment'.[796] Both Nikula and Anderson defended the new moderate green position, which caused the bewildered reporter to specifically ask what was going on and whether the Greens had suddenly changed their mind about economic growth. Following in Nikula's footsteps, Andersson replied that growth could indeed continue if energy-wasting consumption was taxed sufficiently high, so that this extra consumption could be used in less polluting services, for example, in 'facial treatments instead of a new vacuum cleaner', thus underlining that consuming meaningless stuff (*krääsä)* was the problem, not growth. With proper energy taxation, five percent growth might be possible without surpassing 'sustainable limits' (*kestävät rajat)*. Nikula's answers, in particular, demonstrate that the ways in which the new 1994 programme ideals were to be put to practice was by extending support to IT industries. The entire 'technogreen' discourse (a term coined by Pekka Haavisto, as will be discussed below) was closely aligned with the larger discursive (but so far unattained) goal of ecological economics that had been prevalent since the 1970s [797] – to decouple economic growth from emissions. While it may seem naïve for a reader of the twenty-first century to believe that IT could boost non-material economic growth, it must be remembered that, for example, the exact amount of electricity that would be required to supplement the needs of ever-growing Internet use was not well known back in the 1990s, and was certainly not under public discussion. Therefore, it seems plausible that the idea of paper-free IT could have been considered as a route to decoupling growth from emissions at that time.

Throughout their seven-year government term, the Greens steadily increased this emphasis on the development of IT while being politically focused on issues like eco-taxation (which failed) or the Natura 2000 nature protection programme (which succeeded, although not without criticism). Pekka Haavisto gave a particularly notable interview in the spring of 1998, in which he divided the Greens into the 'eco-greens' (*ekovihreät),* who were labelled as 'turning the wheel of progress backwards' (*on lyöty leima kehityksen pyörän taaksepäin kääntämisestä)*, and the 'techno-greens' (*teknovihreät*), for whom 'the wheel of progress has alarmingly stuck about' (*kehityksen pyörä on huolestuttavasti juuttunut paikoilleen*) since greener technology was developing too slowly. However, although he sided with 'techno-green' thinking, Haavisto

[796] *'Tietotekniikan kasvu on sellainen joka ei kuluta energiaa sillä tavalla kuin puuteollisuus eikä saastuta ympäristöä.' Puolueet A-studion tentittävänä* 1995.
[797] Borowy & Schmeltzer 2018 address this issue.

was nevertheless wary of the excessive focus on production and consumption, which often accompanied the techno-green territory.[798] He continued:

> I directly confess that I trust in the victory march of eco-technology. … However, it is not self-evident that environmentally friendly technology becomes more common. It requires a strong political opinion and the increasing awareness of the consumers to support it. Politicians will decide on the norms, with which the introduction of new techniques can be sped up. Consumers will vote with their wallets and in the elections.[799]

Therefore, Haavisto associated 'techno-greenness' with a strong version of green consumerism in which the consumer 'votes' for a proper kind of production through purchasing power. His words also revealed a consumerist understanding of democracy, one that Niklas Olsen labelled as the defining feature of neoliberalism – the extension of democratic processes into markets as economic choices become part of democratic freedom that ought not be restricted by the state through, for example, strong environmental regulation. Furthermore, the focus on creating state-led incentives for greener innovations and production sounds very similar to Martin Jänicke's goals regarding the *ecological modernisation* discourse, based on which he had proposed similar goals already in the 1980s.[800] One may thus wonder if the Finnish Greens had adopted ideas from that discourse, despite the fact that they rarely, if ever, spoke directly about ecological modernisation. At the very least, they were participating in the same conceptual cluster as the German ecological modernisationists, even though they phrased their goals differently.

Interestingly, the Green Party programme did not explicitly conceptualise democracy the same way as Haavisto did, although one may wonder whether the idea of 'voting with one's wallet' was intrinsically implied in the goal of affecting 'millions of consumer choices'. The lack of explicit discussion on this subject could be a result of the problematic nature of this kind of consumer democracy and consumer citizenship, which, as seen earlier, the Greens had fiercely opposed.

To sum up the typical critique of consumer democracy, it first presupposes a real choice in the marketplace (i.e. someone must have already made a truly environmentally friendly alternative) and then presupposes that greener consumption would actually change non-ecological patterns of production instead of simply adding something new *on top of* the already existing non-ecological production (which has almost always been the case in reality). Finally, it perceives democracy as a system where a person with more purchasing power and wealth also has more political decision-making power –

---

[798] Haavisto, Pekka 1998. 'Insinöörikö pelastaa mailman?' *VL* 10/1998.
[799] '*Tunnustan suoraan, että luotan ekoteknologian voittokulkuun. ... Ympäristömyönteisen tekniikan yleistyminen ei kuitenkaan ole itsestäänselvyys. Se vaatii tuekseen voimakasta poliittista mielipidettä ja kuluttajien kasvavaa tietoisuutta. Poliitikot päättävät normeista, joilla uusien tekniikoiden käyttöönottoa voidaan nopeuttaa. Kuluttajat äänestävät kukkaroillaan ja vaaleissa*'.
[800] Järvikoski 2009, 94–95.

an ideal that many would detest for its inherent inequality.[801] It is therefore no surprise that the problems with such a viewpoint were occasionally discussed in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine. For example, the magazine highlighted that eco-labels had turned out to be a massive failure in helping consumers choose more ecological products, as these labels were implemented before the production of real ecologically sustainable alternatives for the markets had even begun. Instead of waiting for such a type of production to emerge, eco-labels were attached to products that were the most ecological ones available, not to those that would have been sufficiently ecological because such products were not even available at the time. Consequentially, since the eco-labelling system would have been rendered useless when considering such standards, a weaker version of the system was implemented.[802] Furthermore, as the labels were created with the conditions set by the industries, they always contained possibilities for greenwashing: corporations could use eco-labels on just a few products in order to enhance an ethical profile while still sticking to more conventional production regarding most of their products.[803]

Although the eco-labeling system was discussed mostly in a critical light in *Vihreä Lanka*, the Green Party mostly supported the eco-labelling system as a positive way to help people 'vote with their wallets'. This understanding of democracy was once again associated with satisfying the needs of the markets, industry competitiveness and exportation: Haavisto mentioned that 'in Finland too, ecological exportation is selling well' (*Suomessakin ekovienti vetää hyvin).* This exportable green technology referred to, for example, technology to produce renewable energy, low-emission motors and 'the possibilities created by information technology' (*Tietotekniikan luomat mahdollisuudet)*. Conceptually, Haavisto sought to connect market-friendly competition-based ideals linked to the *sustainable development* discourse in green thinking with the consumerist approach of democracy as consumption and the development of greener technologies, such as IT.[804]

Haavisto was not the only notable green who supported this transition towards a greener future through the development of environmentally friendlier technology. In 1996, the Greens released an 'information society document' (*tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja),* in which they expressed that the development of information and technology could help save the Earth, as noted by Pekka Sauri (another former Green Party chair), Mika Mannermaa, Taina Boström and Veera Mustonen. The Greens defined information society as a transformation from 'the production and consumption of things' to 'immaterial production and consumption … where knowledge and information technology make up an instrument and a resource'.[805] This turn towards an information

[801] These issues only touch the surface level of the large bulk of criticism present in the academic discussion. See, e.g., Massa 2009; Blühdorn & Welsh 2007; Hinton & Goodman 2010; Hayden 2014; Akenji 2019; Borowy & Schmeltzer 2014.
[802] E.g. *VL* 1991. 43/1991, 11; *VL* 1998. 48/1998, 13.
[803] E.g. *VL* 1991. 43/1991, 11; *VL* 1998. 48/1998, 13.
[804] Haavisto, Pekka 1998. 'Insinöörikö pelastaa mailman?' *VL* 10/1998.
[805] '*tavaroiden tuotannosta ja kulutuksesta aineettomaan tuotantoon ja kulutukseen … jossa tieto ja tietotekniikka ovat yksi väline ja voimavara*'

society was already a fact rather than something to be debated on – the shift was already in full swing. In other words, the country had undergone a shift from an industrial society marked by mass-scale production into a society where enormous flows of information (from news cycles to the use of personal computers) played a key role in the economy, in infrastructure and in the entire society as a whole. This meant, among other things, the prevalence of more individualistic values, with each individual ascribing to a personalised value system and different identities (in plural, instead of having just one pre-set group identity) that were openly accessible to everyone. This also meant the expansion of globalisation – not just economically but also through globalised information sharing by means of mass media. The document further claimed that the Greens needed to be 'non-prejudiced' towards questions of globalisation and decrease in the power of national governments. Therefore, by 1996, the question of (economic) globalisation had become a potentially positive phenomenon for the Greens as a part of their techno-green discourse – something that had not been visible in relation to the Greens before the mid-1990s.[806]

This development of IT was not automatically assumed to be a good thing from an environmental perspective. However, when accompanied with a green value system, it could perhaps create a path that pursues an environmental future – the 'Green Information Society' (*Vihreä Tietoyhteiskunta).* Notably, this did not mean that economic values would not guide this transition; rather, they would support it. Furthermore, 'the idea of development' would have to be re-aligned from 'material growth' to the increase in non-material goods. Moreover, this non-material growth would become easily accessible through not only the development of non-material production of information (and IT) but also through a better understanding of the ways in which the growth of goods and services can create well-being in its non-material form. Supporting this line of thought, the Greens highlighted, 'A lecture from a professor does not strain the environment much, and neither does hugging a senior citizen'.[807]

Through the adoption of environmental economical discourses, such as *ecological modernisation*, the vision of the future within the current paradigm had now become very positive. Not only was the development of an information society and technology within the current socio-economic system acceptable, it was indeed the most promising pathway towards a greener future when managed appropriately, providing 'amazing' possibilities. As a result, the biggest threats of this information society were no longer connected with ecological problems but with social justice: would the information and connections offered by the Internet be accessible to everyone?

While pondering these questions, the Greens further realigned their relationship with the increasing globalisation of markets. While not particularly nationalistic before, the Greens now did not particularly object to nationalism

[806] Vihreä liitto 1996. Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja, 1.
[807] *'Professorin luento ei paljon ympäristöä rasita, ei myöskään vanhuksen halaaminen'*. Vihreä liitto 1996. Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja, 1, 2.

but rather considered it so out-dated that it was not really worth even addressing, as a globalised information society and globalised market economy were already replacing out-dated nation-level institutions. They emphasised, 'it well may be that the time for over-emphasising national sovereignty has passed. The development of an information society, the development of globalisation, and the solving of environmental problems walk hand in hand.'[808]

Furthermore, the Greens believed that, since growth-oriented institutions of the industrial society were mostly nation-based, growth-orientation would automatically have less meaning in the future due to globalisation. They noted that 'the value revolution of the established institutions' would be based on globalisation, and a green information society would help create this global value revolution a just way. As a result, nation-level growth-based institutions would be mourned only by 'some people with nation-level influence' (*eräät kansallisen tason vaikuttajat),* considering that the Finnish people needed to 'steadily understand that they are a natural part of a larger whole, Europe and the world. Let the identity of "being a European" and "being a citizen of the world" be commonplace on top of a local and a national identity'.[809] Notably, 'national' institutions referred to those institutions that were most aligned with growth mentalities – an intriguing statement, considering that it contained no explanation about how exactly, for example, the European Union was not growth-oriented. The Greens themselves had scorned the EU precisely for its growth orientation just a few years earlier while objecting integration with the free market area.

This discursive turn from a survivalist discourse emphasising gloom-and-doom visions of a threatening future towards a positive vision of embracing green technological development was quite notable, as it took place within the span of just a few years. The key argument and premise was once again the well-being of future generations and their economic lives, which was also associated with human rights: 'future generations represent groups with human rights as much as present generations. The carrying capacity of the environment will not be exceeded, and bills will not be left for future generations to pay.'[810] The needs of future generations had continued to be a crucial part of the *sustainable development* discourse since the Brundtland Commission report, although the radical greens had also used the phrase when expanding the right to be represented politically both to future generations as well as to the non-human world. The latter, however, was now being left out of the equation (with the exception of animal rights discussion that also became

---

[808] *'Voi hyvin olla, että kansallisen suvereniteetin ylikorostamisen aika on ohi. Tietoyhteiskunnan kehittyminen, globalisoitumiskehitys ja ympäristöongelmien ratkaiseminen kulkevat käsi kädessä.'* Vihreä liitto 1996. Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja, 3.4.–3.5.

[809] *'Vähitellen ymmärtää olevansa luonnollinen osa suurempaa kokonaisuutta, Eurooppaa ja maailmaa. Paikallisen ja kansallisen identiteetin lisäksi myös identiteetti "olla eurooppalainen" ja "olla maailmankansalainen" olkoon arkipäivää'*. Vihreä liitto 1996. Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja, 3.4.–3.5.

[810] *'Tulevat sukupolvet edustavat ihmisoikeuksin varustettujen ryhmää siinä kuin nykypolvetkin. Ympäristön kantokykyä ei ylitetä, eikä laskuja jätetä tulevien sukupolvien maksettaviksi'*. Vihreä liitto 1996. Vihreä tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja.

visible around the mid-1990s) as the idea of environmental sustainability stepped closer to the ideal of *sustainable yield* – a concept emphasising attempts to sustain resources for future use. For the Greens, this goal was to be achieved through the means provided by green IT – clean technology-based growth decoupled from emissions. Interestingly, the ecological effect resulting from the production of IT was not addressed at all in the mid-1990s.

It is worth pointing out that by the 1990s, the idea of using technology to advance environmental sustainability was not entirely new to the Greens, although these ideals were not pushed to the foreground in party programmes before the reformist turn. As early as in 1985, Mika Mannermaa delivered a speech in the green convention (technically not yet a 'party' convention back then) about the possible use of computers as a means to advance environmental protection. To his surprise, only few people were interested in the subject back then. Mannermaa wrote, 'The computer will become the most dominant machine of our life' (*Tietokoneesta tulee elämämme hallitsevin kone*). Furthermore, he quoted financial thinker Gunnulf Mårtenson, emphasising, 'Information technology is expected to provide us with cheaper and better products, better and steadier quality, faster product development, smaller consumption of raw materials and energy, smaller environmental load', etc.[811] Later, he pointed out that through the use of IT, environmental load would decline 'per produced unit' (*tuotettua yksikköä kohti)* – a line of thought that reflects the *ecoefficiency* discourse, which would come to dominate the environmental political discussion in the 1990s (as discussed below), almost verbatim. In this sense, Mannermaa had already offered the key arguments supporting techno-green thinking in 1985, but he had to unfortunately conclude that computers were a 'boogieman' (*mörkö)* for the other greens.[812] Clearly, this was no longer the case in the late 1990s, with Mannermaa's ideas clearly present in the 1996 information society document and the 1998 Green Party programme of principles.

In terms of the larger picture, this environmental political discourse was also a part of the turn from the critique of radical systems towards a more problem-solving approach, with environmental questions framed as technical and economic problems that could be solved using technical solutions. As noted by John Dryzek, these problem-solving models (typically associated with *sustainable development* and *ecological modernisation* – concepts that the Greens in the two studied countries adopted) accepted the 'structural status quo of liberal capitalism as a given', while 'ignoring alternatives' when it came to the more radical stands of system critique.[813] The pace of change becomes more evident when comparing these discourses with the ones that the Greens entertained only a decade earlier. As discussed before, a 'machine' had been considered as a metaphor for the destruction of human–nature interconnectedness by the

---

811 *'Tietotekniikan odotetaan antavan meille halvempia ja parempia tuotteita, parempaa ja tasaisempaa laatua, nopeampaa tuotekehittelyä, pienempää raaka-aineen ja energian kulutusta, pienempää ympäristökuormitusta'*
812 Mannermaa, Mika 1985. 'Onko tietokone "vihreille" mörkö?' *VL* 23/1985.
813 Dryzek 2005, 86.

radicals, and it was believed that technology itself would suffice only if used properly within a framework where constant growth was no longer an objective associated with the production of technology. It is thus fair to say that Mannermaa's assessment of computers as 'boogeyman' was not farfetched in terms of the more radical eco-green discourse.

As already hinted above, the techno-green discourse was strongly associated with ideals of *eco-efficiency*, as both sought to decrease the consumption of resources and emissions of pollution per produced unit, thus making production more economically efficient and ecologically sustainable. Effectively, eco-efficiency (*ekotehokkuus*) became a key concept in the Finnish Greens' 2002 programme as a practical tool to achieve sustainable development. For them, it meant constructing new buildings in an eco-efficient way, researching and funding eco-efficient technologies for energy production, and producing eco-efficient products that consumed less resources as part of qualitative growth. Most importantly, this indicated a shift to an eco-efficient economy and an 'ecological structural change' that aimed to save natural resources and strengthen services while also pursuing greener growth and consumption. Furthermore, eco-efficiency was associated with other economically aligned concepts, such as innovation and consumption, and considered as a method to reach sustainable development.[814]

These phrasings in the 2002 programme were preceded by a discussion in the *Vihreä Lanka* magazine about the usefulness of German professor Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek's ideas to operationalise and measure eco-efficiency. According to the magazine, Schmidt-Bleek had noted in the early 1990s that enormous material flows in economic life were the primary cause for most environmental problems. For him, the solution was to 'dematerialise' the economy – in other words, decouple growth from the use of natural resources using technical solutions that would allow organisations to improve their efficiency. In such a way, he believed, eco-efficient production would help create an economy that is not dependent on material flows.[815]

Along the same lines, when conceptualising *eco-efficiency,* the Greens placed emphasis on technological innovation, paying particular attention to the possibilities of developing IT, which was supposedly cleaner than traditional technologies. Presented in this form, Schmidt-Bleek's ideas naturally fit in perfectly with the Green Alliance's programme of a more market-friendly environmentalism. Moreover, similarities with the German discussion are once again notable – both parties used the concept of *eco-efficiency* as a tool to turn to greener technology production that would save natural resources while still facilitating growth. Although the Finnish Greens did not emphasise the use of this concept quite as much as the Germans did, it nevertheless pointed at greener consumption to guide markets (as opposed to harsh industry regulation) as part of the broader cluster of concepts that the Greens in both

[814] Vihreä liitto 2002. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma, *Maailma muuttuu koska sitä muutetaan; Kestävä kehitys todeksi.*
[815] Tyynelä, Jyri 2000. *Ekotehokkuus talouden kulmakiveksi*. VL 44/2000.

countries subscribed to. Therefore, it can be associated with the line of thought that conceptualised environmental problems and solutions from within the current socio-economic paradigm using economic language.

Professor Schmidt-Bleek's book on the issue of *eco-efficiency* was translated into Finnish in 2000, slightly before the concept started appearing in Green Party discourses, supported by *Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto* and the Finnish Ministry of the Environment (run by the Green Party at the time).[816] The Greens used the terminology of the environmental economics conceptual cluster as it provided them with the conceptual tools to turn their political ideology towards a moderate direction. It needs to remembered, however, that although the Greens did not use this conceptual cluster in such a way, the terminology of *ecological economics* could often contain radical goals that had simply been presented using economic language.[817]

While talking about an 'eco-efficiency' revolution (which was also referred to in the German Green 2002 programme), Schmidt-Bleek in fact defined these concepts very differently than the Green Parties. Unlike the Greens, Schmidt-Bleek's ideals contained harsh cultural criticism that was needed to accompany the more eco-efficient structures of production and consumption. He stated that 'the new quality of technical efficiency' would only work if it was developed 'hand in hand with humanity's rediscovered temperance' (*kohtuullisuus*). The obstacle to this temperance, which he associated with a larger cultural change in thinking, was growth orientation, which had ontologically and even 'barbarically' become more important than life itself. Apparently, Schmidt-Bleek was also aware of the academic discussion surrounding 'Jevon's Paradox', which believed that the steady increase in overall consumption would eat away the utility of resource efficiency – something the Greens still did not seem eager to discuss.[818] This seems rather surprising because not only was the issue of 'Jevon's Paradox' – since then reframed as the 'rebound effect' – already a well-known and often addressed problem in the 1990s, but it was also mentioned by Schmidt-Bleek himself in the very source that the Finnish Greens were using.[819]

The concept of *eco-efficiency* has been widely criticised precisely because of these standpoints, as it came to be used as politically detached from the boundary conditions mentioned by Schmidt-Bleek. For instance, Lewis Akenji pointed out the problems of associating eco-efficiency with the technological advancement of greener production and consumer guidance through, say, eco-labels instead of systemic criticism – just as the Greens had conceptualised the term – writing that, 'while technology in theory can reduce the intensity of individual environmental impact, in practice technological improvements have coupled with unsustainable production and consumption patterns to result in higher total consumption of natural resources ... This is attributed to the so-called rebound effect' (which, as mentioned above, is also often referred to as

[816] Lettenmeier 2010, 15.
[817] Warde et al. 2018.
[818] Schmidt-Bleek (1993) 2000, 110–111.
[819] The rebound effect is discussed, e.g., by Borowy & Schmeltzer 2018, 5–6; see also Akenji 2019, 1–2.

Jevon's Paradox). He proceeded to explain that technological processes can increase the efficiency of using any given resource, but as the price of the resource declines due to more efficient use, 'the rate of consumption of that resource rises because of increasing demand, thus cancelling out the efficiency gains'. For Akenji, the political outcome of this eco-efficiency standpoint is 'consumer scapegoatism', which occurs 'when ecological imbalance is examined primarily through an economic-growth lens, and the critical role of addressing these systemic flaws is ascribed to the consumer without proper regard for whether he or she has the power to influence other more salient actors in the system'. [820] These problems were already a part of public discussions of the 1990s, as Akenji noted. [821]

Simply put, there would not be much use of decreasing emissions per produced unit if the total amount of produced units nevertheless kept growing infinitely. The notion of 'Jevon's paradox' would of course have not sat well with the Greens' newfound green growth reformism and the concepts associated with enhanced green consumerism, which might simply be the reason why the issue was ignored. The eco-efficiency discourse, similar to most political discourses, was originally formulated to achieve a very different goal than how it actually came to be used in politics. In fact, many other developers of environmental economic concepts had also warned against using these concepts for the purpose of promoting growth-oriented economic models.[822] In this context, economic historian Jeremy L. Caradonna claimed that the original goal of ecological economists was the creation of 'steady-state economy' rather than a 'business as usual' model for lowering emissions, even though the economically oriented environmental discourse was soon turned towards the latter direction.[823]

It is evident that when these concepts were drawn from their corresponding conceptual clusters to be applied in party politics, their meanings were altered to meet the political needs, intentions and local contexts of the actors. As a contrast, Herman Daly's conception of sustainability as free from growth orientation has already been mentioned above. Even Joseph Huber, the developer of the *ecological modernisation* concept, was not impressed with German green reformism, despite the fact that his terminology was constantly used in connection to both the *ecological modernisation* discourse and the *maturity* argument by the reformists. Having been particularly impressed with the attempt to forego state-led interventionism (which, in fact, coincided quite well with his ideals of *ecological modernisation*), Huber had claimed in 1986 that the new green orientation towards reformism was a step towards the wrong direction, since a green reformist programme would increase the importance of state control. For him, the seemingly anti-government greens were already aiming too much for governmental positions. Joining in on the critique of *statism* that the radical greens presented against the reformists, he claimed in

[820] Akenji 2019, 1–2.
[821] Akenji 2019, 1–2.
[822] Daly (1977) 1993; Andersen & Massa 2000.
[823] Caradonna 2018, 156–157.

Die Zeit that this development was 'downright frighteningly state-grabbing' and involved questionable plotting towards state interventions.[824] However, the other developer of this concept, Martin Jänicke – the dissident social democrat, was less critical and proceeded to change parties and join the Greens in the 1990s after their reformist turn.[825]

These objections by Huber, as well as the way in which concepts such as *sustainable development* or *eco-efficiency* were formulated by people such as Schmidt-Bleek, clearly demonstrate the adoption of the ideas of certain thinkers for political use in ways that the thinker himself might not have agreed with. This is not to claim that the Greens were using these concepts in an inauthentic way, but this rather demonstrates that the meanings of concepts are constantly in flux, since they are employed by political actors in service of political interests and intentions that go beyond the original intentions of these concepts. The ways in which these meanings keep transforming can be considered an example of how political cultures typically operate: the meaning(s) of concepts are fought over and intentionally redefined when used politically. In this case, the radical cultural criticism built into these concepts was either forgotten or ignored as they were employed to replace radical thinking with a line of thought that was more adaptable to the current paradigm. As noted by Michael Freeden,[826] ideologies are not fixed entities – they consist of loosely connected conceptual clusters that are always in a state of flux, with their meanings constantly contested and redefined. This was certainly the case in the Green use of the conceptual cluster of environmental economics, from which they adopted their core concepts but then redefined them to better fit their political intentions.

While examining the concepts employed by the Green Parties, it is important to also identify all that was not said. In the process of turning towards a more moderate direction, explicit criticism of the themes of Western growth orientation, 'mastery over nature', materialism as the basis of declining well-being, as well as notions of deeper interconnectedness with nature all but disappeared in both studied countries. This turn can be understood as a shift from one conceptual cluster to another – a transformation from subscribing to a cluster stemming from the radical ecological discourses of environmental movements to one stemming from environmental economics. Although these clusters were not necessarily as different from each other as it might seem (as the case of eco-efficiency demonstrates), they were nevertheless *used* to promote radically different political visions of environmentalism, and thus ended up representing very different versions of *greenness*.

---

[824] *'Geradezu beängstigende Weise staatsergreifend und Staatseingriffe ausheckend'*. This discussion was repeated in *Schwarzer Faden* 3/1986, 22.
[825] Järvikoski 2009, 94–95.
[826] Freeden 2006.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The history of green environmental political thought is also as a story of competing conceptualisations regarding how well-being and humans' relationship with nature was defined. In the chapters above, I have analysed the Greens' turn from radical environmental political concepts towards reformist market-oriented vocabulary, tracing this transformation from the 1990s onwards. Chapters 3 and 5 concentrate more on the diachronic long-term development of the concepts, including their backgrounds and presuppositions, in their respective conceptual clusters, with Chapter 3 focusing on the earlier radical and Chapter 5 the newer reformist concepts. Radical environmentalist concepts, such as the *companionship movement*, were employed by the Greens in their political thinking in an attempt to liberate the meanings given to environmental and human well-being from the paradigm of growth, while also reconceptualising some key premises of Western culture, including the foundations of how well-being is generated and measured by society. The Greens in both countries joined in on this tradition of radical environmental thinking by following the footsteps of eco-philosophers such as William Boulding, Murray Bookchin and Sigmund Kvaløy and eco-feminists such as Riane Eisler and Francois d'Eaubonne. These political concepts arose from a tradition of radical environmentalism that characterised social movements.

In both countries, this background of radical environmentalism became visible in the Greens through many of their key concepts and presuppositions until the early-to-mid 1990s. *Companionship* and *interconnectedness* signified a more holistic way of understanding human–nature relationships and measuring well-being in ways that were supposedly stripped from the earlier hierarchical domination and exploitation of nature and humans. The green alternative vision for Western culture included either an *ecologically balanced* or a *circulation economy*, which were to replace growth orientation with self-sufficiency and local economies, while also removing humans from the seemingly enriching but essentially suffocating control of global market forces. This liberation from materialistic and hierarchical modes of thought also included a redefinition of democracy in favour of a more participatory direction,

as the aforementioned holistic well-being for humans and nature also required breaking free from governmental as well as corporate control, meaning that people would become more autonomous, participate in more direct forms of grassroots-level democracy and create more decentralised and localised forms of 'mid-level' economy separate from the growth markets.

Well-being was measured in terms of communal cooperation and autonomy rather than consumption, which in turn was understood as a form of subordination to hierarchical forms of thinking and control of the 'machinery' of statist and economic institutions. Particularly in Germany, this machinery or *apparatus* included the state as well. In Finland, the Greens were notably more oriented towards cooperation with the state, although the materialistic conception of well-being in the welfare state ideology was criticised, to be replaced with a mid-level economy that emphasised a decenstralised mid-level care economy instead of centralised and state-controlled creation of well-being. Both Green Parties thus intended to shift their thinking from the model of *wellbeing through consumption* (being controlled by state and market forces from above and based on growth of consumption) to the model of *wellbeing through autonomy* (controlled by the individuals themselves in a decentralised mid-level economy, not based on growth).

These instrumental and hierarchical models of thought were thus considered detrimental not only to nature but also to humans, who would lose their sense of companionship with both the natural world and with each other through the adaptation of such hierarchical forms of thinking. The radical greens had subscribed to a sort of naturalistic understanding of *companionship* (both with nature and with other humans) as the basis of human well-being, considering it as something that would occur naturally to humans once the detrimental thought models of growth and hierarchy were out of the picture. Growth-orientation was understood as a symptom of the aforementioned hierarchical values of conquest and domination that led both to to the instriumentalisation of nature (instead of understanding it as a web of life in which humans were also embedded) and lack of human well-being.

Moreover, the ideals of participatory democracy not only directed the Greens' thinking but also affected their practical organisation, as they attempted to represent the new lifestyles and cultures of the grassroots movements in organisational forms as well. In Germany, this attempt was visible in the form of strict self-imposed rules pertaining to the rotation of MPs and in the separation of the party office from party politicians. In Finland, the Greens first operated without an official organisation until the Green Alliance was founded as an umbrella organisation, which did not turn into a political party until 1988, five years after their first MPs entered the parliament.

Meanwhile, the reformists no longer found it necessary to speak of well-being, the environment or the growth economy in such radical terms. In contrast, in the early 2000s, the merging of environmental politics and economic language closely tied environmental politics with economic goals in both Green Parties, making them inseparable from each other. Both the Green Parties had

begun advocating market-friendly consumer-based environmentalism, excluding the radical discourses of the earlier decades and consequentially cutting ties not only with the presuppositions of environmentalist thought but also with the environmentalist grassroots movements themselves.

Prior to these conceptual changes, both parties had undergone a decade-long and often fierce debate over greenness. As the parties shifted from radicalism to reformism, it also marked the abandonment of radical growth-critical ecophilosophical and ecofeminist ideology that was expected to redefine many key Western presuppositions – primarily, a more holistic perception of human nature as interconnected with other humans and the non-human world. These radical conceptualisations of greenness had stemmed from the conceptual cluster of ecologically oriented environmentalism, as observed in the *limits to growth* movement, deep ecology and the ecofeminist movement.

Consequently, the moderate change marked the acceptance of prevailing models of thought, presuppositions and institutions that consider humans as individual consumers, while the Western value hierarchy revolving around the ideals of growth started being considered as a given rather than as something to be dismantled. These ideals were drawn from a conceptual cluster of economically oriented environmental ideas that associated sustainable development and ecological modernisation with 'qualitative growth', 'eco-efficiency', 'consumer power', 'affecting consumer choices' and, particularly in Finland, also 'green exportation'.

Although this new conceptual cluster was far from being a unified ideology and also deployed some of the earlier radical green concepts (although now with a more moderate meaning) to its use, it nevertheless marked a significant shift in the perception of the relationship between well-being and the environment, in turn moving the Green Parties towards a more materialistic, consumeristic and anthropocentric understanding of well-being. Nature and the environment were discussed in this abovementioned context, thus turning environmental protection into economic utility through, for example, green exportation. Furthermore, natural protection was conceptualised as a question of protecting the sustainability of (economic) resources, which required greener production and consumption, thus redefining the environment in a more instrumental way than the radical greens did. Nature was instrumentalised, that is to say, discussed in terms of being a source of resources for humans, as opposed to existing in companionship with humans.

Moreover, questions about redefining well-being were not as explicitly addressed as before. The need to question well-being based on (human) material needs diminished after the reformist turn as the Greens prepared themselves for market-friendly politics in national governments. Consequently, economic language was merged with green environmental political discourses, although with somewhat different political goals.

Although mapping the key conceptual clusters is vitally important to understanding the traditions of thought that the environmental ideas and presuppositions were aligned with, it does not help comprehend the actors'

particular contexts and political intentions in relation to which these different traditions and presuppositions were used. Addressing this gap, Chapter 4 conducts a more synchronic analysis by outlining some key green arguments to better understand how and with what political intentions these concepts were used. As seen above, the reformist turn had a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, it marked the pragmatic adaptation of green politics into the new framework of post-Cold War neoliberalism[827] for the purpose of increasing political efficiency. On the other hand, it marked the victory of one ideological party faction over another in both countries.

From a political perspective, the turn towards reformist market-friendly ideals should perhaps be understood not as a turn towards something new (such as the economically oriented understanding of greenness) but rather as a turn *away* from the old – the kind of radicalism that was keeping green political influence at bay. In fact, the concepts employed by the parties might have had the sole purpose of being efficiently adaptable, considering that despite all the talk about green growth and green exportation, there were very few arguments that seemed truly concerned about the state of the economy and exportation; instead, they were more worried about whether greenness as a political phenomenon would be taken seriously enough by other parties and the wider electorate. Indeed, not many greens specifically argued in favour of the new economically-oriented concepts and ideals *per se*. Rather, some German Greens, such as Hubert Kleinert, pointed out the possibility of the party dying out entirely without such an adaptation, possibly making the turn not so much a question of choice for some of the reformists but rather a question of survival within the new framework of competitiveness in the post-Cold War political world. In Germany, the new reformist paradigm was ideologically (rather than pragmatically) defended primarily by the Eastern German Bündnis Greens. Meanwhile, in Finland, almost all reformist argumentation was conducted in the pragmatic rather than the ideological framework. The new presuppositions, which focused on competitiveness and exportation as the basis for well-being and environmental protection, were thus not necessarily the ones that most of the actors involved would have personally endorsed or would have particularly been eager to defend on their own terms.

I began this study by asking what happened to environmentalist thought when it collided with the world of party politics. The tension between ideology and adaptation to practical political realities is present in the history of most if not all parties,[828] but the Greens' conceptual background being located in the

[827] The term 'neoliberalism' is a very contested concept, as already discussed above. Here, the concept is used as an umbrella term to denote the turn of the European political climate towards a framework of competitiveness and consumerism as guiding values for political decision-making in a globalising world where national governments became increasingly dependent on the competitiveness of their industries and the benevolence of investors, whose interests needed to be accounted for as part of the new political realism. Given their hegemonic position, the presuppositions of such stands are often repeated even by those who would not consider themselves as 'neoliberal' per se, as noted by Niklas Olsen in 2019.
[828] As pointed out by Jenni Karimäki in her analysis of the Finnish Green party, Karimäki 2022, 65, 253–54.

environmentalist movements and ecophilosophical conceptual cluster made this tension particularly difficult and visible for them. After all, the Green Parties were established with the aim of bringing alternative and new ways of living to the realm of politics. As environmentalist thought collided with the realpolitical demands of established institutions, a strife between their contradictory goals was bound to take place. It remains an interesting – although probably an unanswerable – question whether it would have been possible for the Greens to maintain the goals and ideals of the environmentalist grassroots movements in the long term and still survive in the political climate of the 1990s, or if some sort of a middle road between the ideological factions would have been reachable.

Be that as it may, this conceptual and discursive turn meant a victory for one competing conceptualisation of *greenness* over another, with a very different set of new premises regarding well-being and society's relationship with the non-human world replacing the old ones. Some have even accused this standpoint of representing economic goals disguised as environmentalism, although most green reformists did not perceive the situation this way, emphasising that it was more a question of political efficiency and pragmatism, which eventually would also manifest itself as more natural protection through governmental participation. It did mark, however, subscribing to the vocabulary of competitiveness and consumer citizenship, coming conceptually very close to what Niklas Olsen has described the hegemony of neoliberalism, as discussed in Chapter 5.

In addition to presenting pragmatic arguments, the green reformists also argued that their position was a sign of 'maturity' – a strong argument, as it indicated that the opposing side represented adolescence and thus could be – and indeed was – eventually excluded from adult-like dialogue. The earlier goal of ideological pluralism indeed disappeared soon after the turn to reformism.

While using this coming-of-age story as a political argument is understandable from a reformist point of view, it seems troublesome that this turn towards 'maturity' has been considered an explanatory framework to analyse green development in some recent academic works, as discussed in Chapter 4.3. Meanwhile, further conceptual analysis of reformist concepts, analysed in Chapter 5, revealed that discursively, reformism did not so much mark a logical continuation of green radicalism, but rather an entirely different conceptual cluster that originated from entirely different sources. After all, most radical greens did not change their position as they simply lost the political strife surrounding greenness. Notably, radical environmentalist thought continued to exist in one form or another, either inside the parties as an intra-party opposition or retreated to the social movements that had largely continued to maintain the older discourses on environmentalism despite the changing political atmosphere. This also indicates that analysing the radical position merely as a prelude to later reformism does not do justice to the historical trajectories of either of those traditions. Furthermore, understanding

the turn as 'selling out', as the radical side of the debate did, also poses its own specific problems, particularly as it left the question of efficiency unanswered.

Instead of these simplified and lopsided explanations, the reformist turn is better understood as a collision of extra-parliamentary thinking with the expectations and stabilised modes of thought of the established political power system. On appropriately examining the standpoints and presuppositions of both sides, both forms of explanations can perhaps be understood as what they really are – differing forms of environmentalism based on differing presuppositions and goals, consequentially leading to differing visions regarding expected political outcomes. Moreover, while the ideological and even philosophical struggle presented in this dissertation occurred between two differing sets of political goals, it also represents two very different ways of understanding the purpose of environmentalism, as demonstrated by the diachronic analysis of conceptual traditions. In this sense, sensitivity to conceptual history can help comprehend the political inclinations of such concepts and, hopefully, avoid a whiggish way of writing history, where the perspective of the winning side explaining their position is elevated to denote an analytical explanation for the turn.

It is also worth noting that this turn, while examined in this dissertation in terms of two Green Parties, did not merely occur at a party-political or even at a national level. Rather, it took place at the level of larger international discussions – the *sustainable development* discourse was ignited by the United Nations, which the European Union used along with other moderate environmentalist concepts to shift Europe-wide environmental political thinking towards a more competition-friendly direction. These larger developments, which took place separately from the development of environmentalist or other social movements, significantly contributed to enhancing the reformist position, as the Green Parties found themselves in a deadlock representing grassroots-level ideals in a world that was becoming increasingly hostile towards such forms of radical thinking. It should therefore come as no surprise that many of the reformist ideals spread through international and particularly EU-level cooperation, most notably through European Greens' meetings and conferences.

While the exact sources of these transfer of ideas are difficult to identify, international cooperation and conferences were undoubtedly important spaces for their dissemination. Furthermore, in Finland, the green MPs and the green newspaper *Vihreä Lanka* closely followed the German green development. However, the Finnish Greens had reformist members from its very beginning and were not necessarily entirely dependent on the Germans as a source of ideas, but were rather reliant on the larger European context. Meanwhile, the Germans paid little attention to Finland, indicating that despite its reputation as a forerunner in environmentalism, Finland was situated more in the periphery, while Germany was largely at the centre of the flow of green ideas and transfers, causing a situation where Finnish Greens constantly reflected their ideological

positions against the backdrop provided by the German discussion, even when disagreeing with their German couterparts.

The choice of the most believable form of environmentalism is of course dependent on the environmental discourse that one has subscribed to and the way in which one measures success accordingly – whether by conducting efficient politics from within contemporary political institutions or by questioning the core premises of Western thinking and putting forward alternative visions of society. Nonetheless, one thing is certain – the debate between the different forms of environmentalism is far from over. While consumer behaviour might currently appear to be the most discussed indicator of environmentalism in the public discourse and the media, a return to more radical models has been observed in academic discussions in this millennium. For example, Borowy and Schmeltzer [829] noted that till 2018, the wide adaptation of eco-efficiency programmes had not led to an actual decoupling of growth and emissions in any country in the world. Questioning presuppositions and beliefs concerning well-being and human–nature interconnectedness have reappeared in public discourse, not least because of the emergence of new radical environmental movements.

When analysed through the lens of *entanglements*, as discussed in Chapter 1, the use of presuppositions regarding well-being and the environment can be observed to exist in tandem with changing environmental political concepts and goals. Presuppositions affect political activities, which in turn affect our physical environment. Although it would be too reductive to claim that certain kinds of presuppositions would lead to certain kinds of outcomes in the physical world, it is by no means a trivial connection in terms of how human–nature relationships are perceived, whose well-being is sought after and what kind of political goals are associated with such presuppositions. As Arthur McEvoy's *Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture* (see Chapter 1) suggests, presuppositions (as cognitions) evolve in tandem with political goals and institutional realities.

Indeed, there is a visible connection between presuppositions concerning the environment and politics aimed at affecting the environment in the source material of this study, and these themes ought to be understood as embedded in each other. No doubt such forms of embeddedness are visible in the world of the twentyfirst century as well: with more emphasis on the impact of climate change and biodiversity loss appearing in media discussions, radical forms of environmentalism are once again being discussed more openly in politics after a couple of decades of consumerist hegemony. In Green Parties, this internal discussion also still exists, although not necessarily at a programmatic level. Therefore, it does not seem likely that this debate between ideology and pragmatism will fade out of sight since there seems to be some universal quality in it. Understanding the different ways of conceptualising environmentalism in view of differing goals can help to better map out the

[829] Borowy & Schmeltzer 2018, 5–6.

discourses, concepts and goals visible in environmental political discussions today.

Overall, the development of this ideological strife certainly reveals the plurality of ideas involved in environmental political thinking. There is no one form of environmentalism but many environmentalisms whose basic ideas stem from diverse ideological backgrounds as well as very different political and even economic interests. In fact, many of the environmentalist concepts and ideas presented in the pages of this study are still quite relevant and present in twenty-first century public discussions. To understand today's environmental discussion and concepts, such as the different forms of green consumerism, it is crucial to understand the discourses that these ideas have replaced, the ideological backgrounds they originate from and the reason for them becoming dominant ideas and concepts in the public eye over time.

The development of environmental thought in the studied Green Parties reveals the clashes between different forms of environmentalism over the past decades, with some discourses rising from the margins and others fading out. Considering that this is still an ongoing discussion, understanding the ideological backgrounds of different forms of environmentalism is now more important than ever. Merging the environmental history of ideas with conceptual history can help to attain a better grasp of the ways in which these different ideas have been developed and fought over in different political contexts.

SUMMARY IN FINNISH

Poliittisen ympäristöliikkeen historia on myös ympäristöä koskevien aatteiden historiaa. Erilaisten ympäristöaatteiden ytimestä löytyy erilaisia, keskenään usein ristiriitaisiakin tapoja käsitteellistää ihmisen suhdetta luontoon. Yllä olevissa luvuissa olen analysoinut 1990-luvulla tapahtunutta Suomen ja Saksan Vihreiden puolueiden käännettä radikaalista vaihtoehtoliikkeiden ympäristöajattelusta reformistiseen, markkinamyönteiseen talouskäsitteistöön, mikä muutti merkittävästi näiden puolueiden tapaa hahmottaa ihmisen suhdetta luontoon.

Luvussa kolme olen käsitellyt ruohonjuuritason ympäristö- ja vaihtoehtoliikkeiden ajattelusta kumpuavaa radikaalia ympäristöajattelua, joka korostui aineistossa eritoten 1980-luvulla. Ympäristöfilosofiasta nousevat käsitteet, kuten *kumppanuusliike, tasapainotalous* ja taloudellisen sekä poliittisen vallan *desentralaatio* toimivat välineinä vapauttaa ympäristön ja ihmisen hyvinvointia koskevat käsitykset talouskasvuparadigman kahleista. Samalla länsimaisen ajattelun perusoletukset, kuten hierarkkinen ajattelu jossa sekä luonto että ihminen voitiin nähdä talouskasvua varten hyödynnettävänä resurssina, kyseealaistettiin. Taloudelliseen kuluttamiseen perustuvan hyvinvoinnin sijaan vihreät määrittivät hyvinvoinnin tarkoittamaan autonomista paikallista sosiaalista, poliittista ja taloudellista elämää joka oli irrotettu kasvun ja globaalin markkintalouden tarpeista. Tätä ajattelua voi pitää radikaalin ympäristöajattelun traditioon pohjaavana liikkeenä sekä 1970-luvun ruohonjuuritason vaihtoehtokulttuurin poliittisena johdannaisena, missä kokonaan uudenlaisen vaihtoehtoajattelun ja –kulttuurin rakentaminen ulotettiin ruohonjuuritasolta myös poliittisten puolueiden tasolle.

Luvussa viisi olen analysoinut myöhemmän maltillisemman 'reformistisen' vihreän ajattelun käsitteitä. Luonnon ja ihmisen kumppanuutta sekä holistista, immateriaalista hyvinvointikäsitystä kuvaavat käsitteet vaihtuivat 'vihreää kasvua', 'vihreää kuluttajuutta' ja 'ekotehokkuutta' korostavaksi käsitteistöksi. Vihreä ajattelu tehtiin yhteensopivaksi talouskasvu- ja kilpailukykyparadigman kanssa siten, että ympäristöajattelua toteutettiin kulutuskäyttäytymistä ohjaamalla, mikä tuottaisi vihreää kasvua. Tämä käsitteellinen käänne toteutettiin *kestävän kehityksen* ja *ekologisen modernisaation* käsitteitä hyödyntämällä uusina reformistisen ajattelun tukipilaireina. Nämä käsitteet nousivat kokonaan eri aatteellisesta traditiosta, *ympäristötalousajattelun* perinteestä, eikä se sisältänyt enää vaatimuksia ihmisen ja luonnon välisen suhteen tai länsimaisen talouskeskeisen hyvinvointikäsityksen kyseenalaistamisesta. Vihreän ajattelun maltillistumisen historia on siis samalla tarina siitä, kuinka talouskäsitteistö nousi ympäristöpolitiikan keskeiseksi kuvaajaksi.

Käsitteiden taustojen ja traditioiden tarkastelu ei vielä avaa syitä sille, miksi toimijat halusivat tällaisen käänteen toteuttaa ja mitä mahdollisia intentioita käänteen taustalla oli. Tätä tarkoitusta varten olen tarkastellut reformistivihreiden nousua puolueiden marginaaleista vallan keskiöön sekä analysoinut tästä syntynyttä poliittista debattia luvussa neljä. Reformismia kannattavat vih-

reät olivat turhautuneita radikaalin ajattelun heikkeneviin vaikutusmahdollisuuksiin kylmän sodan jälkeisellä globalisaation aikakaudella. Varsinkin tehokasta vaikuttamista sekä äänestäjien tuen saamista mutta myös 'aikuistumista' käytettiin perusteina ajattelun ja käsitteistön maltillistamiselle. Joskus myös radikaali vihreys on historiankirjoituksessa ymmärretty tästä viitekehyksestä käsin, ikään kuin esipuheena myöhemmälle, aikuisemmalle ja maltillistuneemmalle ympäristöajattelulle. Tällaisessa tulkinnassa on vaaransa, sillä se jättää huomiotta radikaalin vihreyden omat taustat sekä täysin erilaisen aatteellisen tradition: sitä ei siis voi yksiselitteisesti sijoittaa samalle aatteelliselle kehityskaarelle ympäristötalousajattelun kanssa. Lisäksi kaikki radikaalit vihreät eivät reformistikieltä käyttäen 'aikuistuneet' (ts. muuttaneet ajatteluaan reformistiseen suuntaan), vaan monet joko jättivät puolueensa tai perustivat puolueiden sisään omia toisinajattelijoiden klikkejään. Tarina aikuistumisesta tuleekin nähdä poliittisesti latautuneena argumenttina kahden aatteellisen tahon välisessä kiistassa eikä niinkään neutraalina kuvauksena vihreiden historiasta.

Näin vihreä ajattelu saatiin yhteensopivammaksi vallitsevan poliittisen kulttuurin kanssa, mikä mahdollisti tehokkaamman toimimman lainsäädännön kentällä. Vihreät puolueet myös pääsivät hallituksiin ennen vuosituhannen vaihdetta niin Suomessa kuin Saksassakin. Reformistien näkökulmasta ajatellen kyse oli onnistuneesta käänteestä; radikaalien näkökulmasta taas kyse oli aatteen myymisestä taloudellisten ja poliittisten intressien alttarille. Taustalla vaikutti erilaiset käsitykset siitä, mikä oli poliittisen ajattelun ja toiminnan tehtävä: toimia tehokkaasti vallitsevien rakenteiden ja uskomusjärjestelmän sisällä, vai luoda uudenlaista kulttuuria ja tietoisuutta myös poliittiselta tasolta käsin. Poliittista menestystä mitattiin siis täysin eri lähtökohdista, eivätkä eri ideologiset tahot kyenneet käymään rakentavaa dialogia näin eri lähtökohdista käsin jonkinlaisen yhteisymmärryksen tai pluralistisen moniäänisyyden saavuttamiseksi. Syvien aatteellisten ristiriitojen hahmottaminen paljastaa myös syvästi erilaiset ennakko-oletukset ja uskomusjärjestelmät, mihin eri traditioista nousevat ajattelutavat perustuvat. Tämä korostaa tarvetta ennakko-oletusten tutkimiselle osana aatehistoriallista tutkimusta.

Tutkimuksen pohjalla on ollut kysymys siitä, mitä tapahtuu ympäristöaatteille kun ne tuodaan poliittisten ja taloudellisten realiteettien maailmaan. Vihreiden tarina vuosituhannen kahden viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana kertoo, kuinka vaikeaa uusia radikaaleja ideoita on tuoda vakiintuneisiin järjestelmiin ja ajattelutapohin. Samalla se paljastaa ympäristöajatteluun kätkeytyvien ennakko-oletusten moninaisuuden. Ei ole pelkästään yhtä ainoaa ympäristöajattelun muotoa, vaan monia ympäristöaatteita, joiden taustalla vaikuttaa erilaiset poliittiset ja taloudelliset intressit. Näiden hahmottaminen edesauttaa myös tämän päivän ympäristökeskustelujen ymmärtämistä.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Party programmes

Die Grünen. 1980. 'Das Bundesprogramm die Grünen.'
Die Grünen. 1986. 'Umbau der Industriegesellschaft.'
Die Grünen. 1993. 'Politische Grundsätze Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.'
Die Grünen. 1998. 'Die Grünen Programm zur Bundestagwahl.'
Die Grünen. 2002. 'Grundsätzprogramm Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.'
European Greens. 1984.' Think Globally - Act Locally: Towards a Green Europe. The Programme of the European Greens.'
Vasemmistoliitto. 1990. Kestävän kehityksen energiapolitiikka –ohjelma.
Vihreä liitto. 1988. Vihreän liiton yleisohjelma.
Vihreä liitto. 1990. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma.
Vihreä liitto. 1994. Vihreän liiton puolueohjelma.
Vihreä liitto. 1996. Vihreän liiton tietoyhteiskunta-asiakirja.
Vihreä liitto. 1998. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma.
Vihreä liitto. 2002. Vihreän liiton periaateohjelma.

Party documents and other political documents

Die Grünen Im Bundestag 1983-1987. Sitzungsprotokolle und Anlagen 1983-1987. Boyer, Josef, Heidermeyer, Helge & Peters, Tim B., eds. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
Die Grünen Im Bundestag 1987-1990. Sitzungsprotokolle und Anlagen 1987-1990. Boyer, Josef, Heidermeyer, Helge & Peters, Tim B., eds. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
European Commission. 1993. '"Towards Sustainability": The European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development.' *Official Journal of the European Communities*: C138.
European Commission. 1995. 'Comments of the Commission on the Report of the Independent Experts Group on legislative and administrative simplification.' Document: SEC95 2121 Final.
United Nations. 1993. 'Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.' In: United Nations. *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Volume I: Resolutions Adopted by the Conference.* Annex 1. New York: United Nations.
Vihreä liitto. 1989. Party Conference Minutes. Turku: 27–28 May 1989.
Vihreä liitto. 1990. Party Conference Minutes. Jyväskylä: 26–27 May 1990.
Vihreä liitto. 1994. Party Conference Minutes. Pori: 11–12 June 1994.

Vihreä liitto. 1993. Green Alliance Activity Report 1993.

Newspaper sources

Der Spiegel
Die Tageszeitung (Taz)
Grünes Info
Helsingin Sanomat (HS)
Schwarzer Faden
Suomi
Vihreä Lanka (VL)

Televised debates and interviews

Puolueet A-studion tentittävänä. 1995. Televised debate. Aired 3 March 1995. Collection: Yle Media. RITVA database.

Ylen vaalitentti. 1991. Televised debate. Aired 26 February 1991. Collection: Yle Media. RITVA database.

*Junamatkalla pehmeämpään Suomeen.*1980. Televised interviews. Aired 13 November 1980. TV1/Yhteiskuntaohjelmatoimitus. YLE Elävä arkisto. Accessed: 3 October 2022. https://areena.yle.fi/1-50116395.

Internet sources

Auszüge aus der Grünen Chronik 2015. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Accessed: 15 October 2020. https.//www.boell.de/de/2015/09/22/auszuege-aus-der-gruenen-chronik.

Dithfurth, Jutta 1991. 'Es ist vorbei: Die Grünen sind nicht mehr unsere Partei.' Rede auf der Bundesversammlung der Grünen, 26-28 April 1991. Accessed: 15 October 2020. Https://www.juttaditfurth.de.

Low, Sally. 1991. 'German Greens Conference Ends in Stand-Off.' Green Left 13, May 22 1991. Accessed: 20 September 2020. Https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/german-greens-conference-ends-stand.

Left Green Perspectives #25. 1992. 'Radical Ecology After the German Greens.' Institute for Social Ecology. Accessed: 20 September 2020. Https://social-ecology.org/wp/1992/01/left-green-perspectives-25/.

Lundén, Martti.'Alkuvaiheet.' Accessed: 22 September 2019. Https://www.ekovihreat.fi/yhdistys/alkuvaiheet.

Books

Fischer, Joschka. 1989. *Der Umbau der Industriegeselleschaft: Plädoyer wider die herrschende Umweltlüge.* Frankfurt: Goldmann Verlag.
Välimäki, Pauli & Brax, Anne, eds. 1991. *Vihreä ABC-Kirja.* Helsinki: Vihreä liitto.
Välimäki, Pauli, ed. 1995. *Vihreä ABC-Kirja II*. Helsinki: Vihreä liitto.

Literature

Aalto, Sari. 2018. *Vaihtoehtopuolue: Vihreän liikkeen tie puolueeksi.* Helsinki: Into.
Aaltola, Elisa ed. 2013. *Johdatus eläinfilosofiaan.* Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Aarnio, Eeva. 1998. *Päämäärät liikkeessä.* Jyväskylä: SoPhi.
Akenji, Lewis. 2019. *Avoiding Consumer Scapegoatism: Towards a Political Economy of Sustainable Living.* PhD Diss. University of Helsinki.
Andersen, Mikael Skou & Massa, Ilmo. 2000. 'Ecological Modernization: Origins, Dilemmas, and future Directions.' *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 2, no 4: 337–345.
Antal, Miklós. 2014. 'Green Goals and Full Employment: Are They Compatible?' *Ecological Economics* 107: 276–286.
Asdal, Kristin. 2003. 'The Problematic Nature of Nature: The Post-Constructivist Challenge to Environmental History.' *History and Theory* 42, no. 4: 60–74.
Baker, Susan. 2007. *Sustainable Development*. London: Routledge.
Bar-Yam, Yaneer. 1997. *Dynamics of Complex Systems*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Bergman, Solveig. 2002. *The Politics of Feminism: Autonomous Feminist Movements in Finland and West Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.
Bevir, Mark. 1999: *The Logic of the History of Ideas*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Blühdorn, Ingolfur & Welsh, Ian. 2007. 'Eco-politics beyond the Paradigm of Sustainability: A Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda.' *Environmental politics* 16, no. 2: 185–205.
Bolin, Niklas. 2016. 'Green Parties in Finland and Sweden: Succesful Cases of the North?' In: Van Haute, Emilie, ed. *Green Parties in Europe.* London; New York: Routledge.
Bomberg, Elizabeth. 1998. *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union*. London; New York: Routledge.
Bookchin, Murray. 2005. Society and Ecology. In: Dryzek, John & Schlosberg, David, eds. *Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borowy, Iris & Schmelzer, Matthias, eds. 2018. *History of the Future of Economic Growth: Historical Roots of Current Debates on Sustainable Degrowth*. London: Routledge.

Boulding, Kenneth E. 1966. 'The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth'. In: Jarret, H., ed. *Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy,* 3–14. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bramwell, Anna. 1989. *Ecology in the 20th Century: A History*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
Bukow, Sebastian. 2016. 'The Green Party in Germany.' In: Van Haute, Emilie, ed. *Green Parties in Europe.* London; New York: Routledge.
Burkhart, Corinna, Eversberg, Dennis, Schmeltzer, Matthias & Treu, Nina. 2017. 'Degrowth: In Bewegung, um Alternativen zu stärken und Wachstum, Wettbewerb und Profit zu überwinden.' In: Burkhart, Corinna, Schmeltzer, Matthias & Treu, Nina, eds. *Degrowth in Bewegung(en): 32 alternative Wege zur social-ökologischen Transformation,* 108–117. München: Oekon.
Buttel, Frederick. 2010. 'Social institutions and environmental change.' In: Redclift, Michael R. & Woodgate, Graham, eds. *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology: Second Edition,* 33–47. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Bütikofer, Reinhard. 2001. 'Die Politischen Grundsätze von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. 1993 party programme commentary'. In: Die Grünen. *Politische Gründsätze.* Berlin: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.
Caradonna, Jeremy L. 2018. 'An incompatible couple: a critical history of economic growth and sustainable development.' In: Borowy, Iris & Schmelzer, Matthias, eds. *History of the Future of Economic Growth. Historical Roots of Current Debates on Sustainable Degrowth.* London: Routledge.
Coates, Peter. 1998. *Nature: Western Attitudes Since Ancient Times*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cohen, Deborah & O'Connor, Maura. 2004. 'Introduction: Comparative History, Cross-National History, Transnational History – Definitions.' In: Cohen, Deborah & O'Connor, Maura, eds. *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective.* New York: Routledge.
Collier, Ute. 1998. 'The Environmental Dimension of Deregulation: An Introduction.' In: Collier, Ute, ed. *Deregulation in the European Union: Environmental Perspectives,* 3–22. London: Routledge.
Connolly, William. 2017. *Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Cronon, William. (1983) 2003. *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*. New York: Hill and Wang.
Daly, Herman. (1977) 1990. *Steady-State Economics: 2nd Edition*. London: Earthscan.
Demaria, Frederico, Schneider, Francois, Sekulova, Filka & Martinez-Alier, Joan 2013. 'What is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement.' *Environmental Values* 22, no. 2*:* 191–215. Cambridgeshire: White Horse Press.
D'Eaubonne, Françoise. (1974) 2020. *Le Féminisme ou la Mort*. Calvados & Vendée: Le Passager Clandestin.

Die Grünen. 2019. *Zeiten ändern sich. Wir ändern sie mitt.* Grüne Chronik 1979–2019. Grünen Versand. Https://www.gruene.de/unsere-gruene-geschichte. Accessed: 24 August 2020.
Dobson, Andrew. 2000. *Green Political Thought: An Introduction*. London; New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
Dobson, Andrew. 2005. 'Environmental Citizenship.' In: Dryzek, John & Schlosberg, David, eds. *Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader,* 596-607. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Donovan, Josephine. 2013. 'Eläinten oikeudet ja feministinen teoria.' In: Aaltola, Elisa, ed. *Johdatus eläinfilosofiaan,* 182–205. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Dryzek, John. (2005) 2013. *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, John & Schlosberg, David, eds. 2005. *Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eisler, Riane. 1988. *Malja ja miekka: historiamme ja tulevaisuutemme*. Porvoo; Helsinki; Juva: WSOY.
Elo, Kimmo & Karimäki, Jenni. 2021. 'Luonnonsuojelusta ilmastopolitiikkaan: Ympäristöpoliittisen käsitteistön muutos parlamenttipuheessa 1960-2020.' *Politiikka* 63, no. 4: 373–402.
Flipo, Fabrice. 2008. 'Conceptual Roots of Degrowth.' First International Conference on Economic Degrowth for Environmental Sustainability and Social Equity, April 2008, Paris, France, 24–28. Https://hal.science/hal-02510344. Accessed: 24 September 2021.
Frankland, E. Gene. 2008. 'The Evolution of the Greens in Germany: From Amateurism to Professionalism.' In: Lucardie, Paul & Frankland, E. Gene, eds. *Green Parties in Transition: The End of Grass-roots Democracy?* Farnham ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Freeden, Michael. 2006. 'Ideology and Political Theory.' *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 1: 3–22.
Friberg, Anna. 2021. 'On the Need for (Con)temporary Utopias: Temporal Reflections on the Climate Rhetoric of Environmental Youth Movements.' *Time & Society* 31, no. 1: 48–68.
Fält, Olavi. 2016. 'Termodynamiikka, verkostoteoria ja kognitiivinen psykologia historiaa tulkitsemassa.' In: Väyrynen, Kari & Pulkkinen, Jarmo, eds. *Historian teoria: Lingvistisestä käänteestä mahdolliseen historiaan,* 312–332. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Gilcher-Holtey, Ingrid. 2018. 'Political Participation and Democratization in the 1960s: The Concept of Participatory Democracy and its Reprecussions.' In: Kurunmäki, Jussi, Nevers, Jeppe & Velde, Henk te, eds. *Democracy in Modern Europe: A Conceptual History*, 257–280. New York: Berghahn Books.
Glacken, Clarence. 1967. *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Glaessner, Gert-Joachim. 2005. *German Democracy: From Post World War II to the Present Day.* Oxford: Berg.

Grewe, Bernd-Stefan. 2010. 'Forest History.' In: Uekötter, Frank, ed. *The Turning Points of Environmental History,* 44–55. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Grove, Richard. 1995. *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guha, Ramachandra. 2000. *Environmentalism: A Global History.* New York: Longman.
Haaparinne, Zachris. 2021. 'Voice of the People or Raving of the Rabble? Petitions and Disputes on Political Representation in Britain, 1721–1776.' PhD Diss. Jyväskylän yliopisto.
Haila, Yrjö. 2001. 'Ympäristöherätys.' In: Haila, Yrjö & Jokinen, Pekka, eds. *Ympäristöpolitiikka: mikä ympäristö, kenen politiikka,* 9–46. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard & Kocka, Jürgen, eds. 2012. *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives.* New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Havu, Kaarlo & Tolonen, Mikko. 2022. 'Kielellinen kontekstualismi ja aatehistoria.' In: Ihalainen, Pasi & Valtonen, Heli, eds. *Sanat siltana menneeseen: kielelliset lähestymistavat historiantutkimuksessa.* Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Hayden, Anders. 2014. *When Green Growth is Not Enough: Climate Change, Ecological Modernization, and Sufficiency*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Heater, Derek. 1999. *What is Citizenship?* Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, Blackwell.
Hellsten, Villiina & Martikainen, Tuomo. 2001. *Nuoret ja uusi politiikka. Tutkimus pääkaupunkiseudun nuorten poliittisista suuntauksista.* Helsinki: Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus.
Hinton, Emma D. & Goodman, Michael K. 2010. 'Sustainable Consumption: Development, Considerations and New Directions.' In: Redclift, Michael R. & Woodgate, Graham, eds. *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology, Second Edition,* 245–261. Cheltenham & Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Hockenos, Paul. 2008. *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huber, Jospeh. 1982/1986. *Die verlorene Unschuld der Ökologie: neue Technologien und superindustrielle Entwicklung*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
Hughes, J. Donald. 2016. *What is Environmental History?* Cambridge: Polity.
Hulme, Peter. 2014. *Can Science Fix Climate Change? A Case Against Climate Engineering.* Cambridge: Polity.
Humphrey, Mathew. 2007. *Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory*. London: Routledge.

Hübner, Kurt. 2004. 'Policy Failure. The Economic Record of the Red-Green Coalition in Germany, 1998–2002.' In: Reutter, Werner, ed. *Germany on the Road to 'Normalcy'*, 107–122. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hyrkkänen, Markku. 2002. *Aatehistorian mieli.* Tampere: Vastapaino.
Ihalainen, Pasi. 2010. *Agents of the People: Democracy and Popular Sovereignty in British and Swedish Parliamentary and Public Debates, 1734–1800.* Leiden: Brill.
Ihalainen, Pasi. 2017. *The Springs of Democracy: National and Transnational Debates on Constitutional Reform in the British, German, Swedish and Finnish Parliaments, 1917–1919.* Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
Ihalainen, Pasi & Saarinen, Taina. 2022. 'Kielentutkimuksen käsitteet historiantutkimuksessa.' In: Ihalainen, Pasi & Valtonen, Heli, eds. *Sanat siltana menneeseen: kielelliset lähestymistavat historiantutkimuksessa.* Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Illich, Ivan. (1973) 2009. *Tools for Conviviality*. London: Marion Boyars.
Isotalo, Merja. 2007(a). 'Hallituspuolueeksi EU-maahan.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 131–150. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Isotalo, Merja. 2007(b). 'Vihreät vallan kahvassa.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 151–182. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Jacoby, Karl. 2001. *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jamieson, Dale. 2013. 'Eläinten vapautus on ympäristöetiikkaa.' In: Aaltola, Elisa, ed. *Johdatus eläinfilosofiaan,* 232–250. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Jung, Matthias. 1995. 'Umweltstörfälle Fachsprache und Expertentum in der Öffentlichen Diskussion.' In: Stötzel, Georg & Wengeler, Martin, eds. *Kontroverse Begriffe: Geschichte des öffentlichen Sprachgebrauchs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* 619–678. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Järvikoski, Timo. 2009. 'Ympäristösosiologian teoriakamppailuja.' In: Massa, Ilmo, ed. *Vihreä teoria: Ympäristö yhteiskuntateorioissa,* 78–101. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Kaarkoski, Miina. 2016. '"Energiemix" versus "Energiewende": Competing Conceptualisations of Nuclear Energy Policy in the German Parliamentary Debates of 1991–2001.' PhD Diss. Jyväskylän yliopisto.
Kaelble, Hartmut. 2013. *A Social History of Europe 1945–2000: Recovery and Transformation After Two World Wars.* New York: Berghahn Books.
Karimäki, Jenni. 2022. *Protestista Puolueeksi: Vihreiden vakiintuminen vaihtoehdosta vallankahvaan 1990-luvulla*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Kern, Kristine, Koenen, Stephanie & Löffelsend, Tina. 2004. 'Red-Green Environmental Policy in Germany: Strategies and Performance Patterns.' In: Reutter, Werner, ed. *Germany on the Road to 'Normalcy'*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Knill, Chritoph & Liefferink, Duncan. 2007. *Environmental Politics in the European Union: Policy-making, Implementation and Patterns of Multi-Level Governance.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Kocka, Jürgen & Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard. 2012. 'Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History.' In: Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard & Kocka, Jürgen, eds. *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives,* 1–30. New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Koselleck, Reinhard. 2004. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time.* New York: Columbia University Press.
Laine, Markus & Jokinen Pekka. 2001. 'Politiikan ulottuvuudet.' In: Haila, Yrjö & Jokinen, Pekka, eds. *Ympäristöpolitiikka: mikä ympäristö, kenen politiikka?* 47–65. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Leino-Kaukiainen, Pirkko. 1997. 'Fontainebleausta Rioon: luonnonsuojeluaate ja metsäluonto.' In: Roiko-Jokela, Heikki, ed. *Luonnon ehdoilla vai ihmisen arvoilla? Polemiikkia metsien suojelusta 1850-luvulta 1990-luvulle,* 167–122. Jyväskylä: Atena.
Leonhard, Jörn. 2017. 'Conceptual History: The Comparative Dimension.' In: Steinmetz, Willibald, Freeden, Michael & Fernández-Sebastán, Javier, eds. *Conceptual History in the European Space,* 175–196. New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Lucardie, Paul & Frankland, E. Gene, eds. 2008. *Green Parties in Transition: The End of Grass-roots Democracy?* Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Macekura, Stephen J. 2018. **'**Development and Economic Growth: An Intellectual History.' In: Borowy, Iris & Schmelzer, Matthias, eds. *History of the Future of Economic Growth: Historical Roots of Current Debates on Sustainable Degrowth,* 110–128. London: Routledge.
Marjanen, Jani. 2017. 'Transnational Conceptual History, Methodologial Nationalism and Europe.' In: Steinmetz, Willibald, Freeden, Michael & Fernández-Sebastán, Javier, eds. *Conceptual History in the European Space,* 175–196. New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Martell, Luke. 1994. *Ecology and Society: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Martusewicz, Rebecca A., Edmundson, Jeff & Lupinacci, John. 2011. *EcoJustice Education: Towards Diverse, Democratic, and Sustainable Communities.* London; New York: Routledge.
Massa, Ilmo. 2009. 'Yhteiskuntatieteellisen ympäristötutkimuksen paradigmat ja keskeisimmät suuntaukset.' In: Massa, Ilmo, ed. *Vihreä teoria: ympäristö yhteiskuntateorioissa,* 9–46. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Matero, Risto-Matti & Arffman, Atte. 2023. 'An Economic Tail Wagging an Ecological Dog? Well-being and Sustainable Development from the Perspective of Entangled History.' In: Elo, Merja, Hytönen, Jonne, Karkulehto, Sanna, Kortetmäki, Teea, Kotiaho, Janne S., Puurtinen, Mikael & Salo, Miikka, eds. *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Planetary Well-Being,* 99–112. London; New York: Routledge.
McEvoy, Arthur. 1989: 'Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture: Ecology, Production and Cognition in the California Fishing Industry.' In:

Worster, Donald, ed. *The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Meadows, Donella H. & Dennis L., Randers, Jørgen, Behrens, William W. III. 1972. *The Limits to Growth: A Report for The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Universe Books.
Mende, Silke 2012. Von der 'Anti-Parteien-Partei' zur 'ökologischen Reformpartei' die Grünen und der Wandel des Politischen. *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 52: 273–315.
Merchant, Carolyn. (1980) 1990. *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Mickelsson, Rauli. 2007. *Suomen puolueet: historia, muutos ja nykypäivä*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Milder, Stephen. 2017. *Greening Democracy: The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968–1983*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, Alexander. 2019. 'Realism.' In: Zalta, Edward N., ed. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Winter 2021 edition*). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/realism. Accessed: 15 November 2022.
Miller, Michael. 2004. 'Comparative and Cross-National History: Approaches, Differences, and Problems.' In: Cohen, Deborah & O'Connor, Maura, eds. *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, 115–132.
Muraca, Barbara & Schmeltzer, Matthias. 2018. 'Sustainable Degrowth: Historical Roots of the Search for Alternatives to Growth in Three Regions.' In: Borowy, Iris & Schmelzer, Matthias, eds. *History of the Future of Economic Growth: Historical Roots of Current Debates on Sustainable Degrowth*, 174–197. London: Routledge.
Murray, Laura M. 1994. 'Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland? Explaining the Evolving Positions of German Political Parties on Citizenship Policy.' *German Politics and Society* 33: 23–56.
Naess, Arne. 1997. 'Pinnallinen ja syvällinen, pitkän aikavälin ekologialiike.' In: Oksanen, Markku & Rauhala-Hayes, Marjo, eds. *Ympäristöfilosofia: kirjoituksia ympäristönsuojelun eettisistä perusteista*, 138–144. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Newell, Peter, Bulkeley, Harriet, Turner, Karen, Shaw, Christopher, Caney, Simon, Shove, Elizabeth & Pidgeon, Nicholas. 2015. 'Governance traps in climate change politics: Re-framing the Debate in Terms of Responsibilities and Rights.' *WIREs Climate Change* 6: 535–540.
Nienstedt, Sirje. 1997. *Ympäristöpolitiikan alku: Ympäristönsuojelun tulo Suomen valtakunnalliseen politiikkaan 1960- ja 1970-lukujen vaihteessa*. Turku: Turun yliopisto.
Nishida, Makoto. 2005. *Strömungen in den Grünen (1980–2003): Eine Analyse über informell-organisierte Gruppen innerhalb der Grünen*. Münster: LIT Verlag.
Olsen, Marvin E., Lodwick, Dora G. & Dunlap, Riley E. 1992. *Viewing the World Ecologically*. Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press.

Olsen, Niklas. 2019. *The Sovereign Consumer: A New Intellectual History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Paastela, Jukka. 1987. *Finland's New Social Movements.* Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto.
Paastela, Jukka. 2008. 'The Finnish Greens: From 'Alternative' Grass-roots Movement(s) to Governmental Party'. In: Lucardie, Paul & Frankland, E. Gene, eds. *Green Parties in Transition: The End of Grass-roots Democracy?* 61–74. Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Palonen, Kari. 2019. 'Kaksi politiikan käsitettä: Tulkinta historiasta ja nykytilanteesta.' In: Korvela, Paul-Erik & Lindroos, Kia, eds. *Avauksia poliittiseen ajatteluun,* 195–220. Jyväskylä: Minerva.
Parrique, Timothée. 2020. 'The Political Economy of Degrowth.' PhD Diss. Université Clermont Auvergne; Stockholms Universitet.
Paxton, Robert O. & Hessler, Julie. 2012. *Europe in the Twentieth Century.* Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
Pekurinen, Mika. 1997(a). 'Elämää metsässä ja metsästä: Metsäkonfliktien kahdet kasvot.' In: Roiko-Jokela, Heikki, ed. *Luonnon ehdoilla vai ihmisen arvoilla? Polemiikkia metsien suojelusta 1850-luvulta 1990-luvulle,* 45–98. Jyväskylä: Atena.
Pekurinen, Mika. 1997(b). 'Sivistys velvoittaa: klassinen luonnonsuojelu Suomessa.' In: Roiko-Jokela, Heikki, ed. *Luonnon ehdoilla vai ihmisen arvoilla? Polemiikkia metsien suojelusta 1850-luvulta 1990-luvulle,* 129–166. Jyväskylä: Atena.
Pennanen, Henna-Riikka & Jouhki, Jukka. 2016. 'Näkökulmia länteen.' In: Jouhki, Jukka & Pennanen, Henna-Riikka, eds. *Länsi: käsite, kertomus ja maailmankuva,* 12–40. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.
Poguntke, Thomas. 1993. *Alternative Politics: The German Green Party.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Poguntke, Thomas. 2005. 'Green Parties in National Governments.' In: Dryzek, John & Schlosberg, David, eds. *Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader,* 573–583. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pulkkinen, Risto. 2014. *Suomalainen kansanusko: samaaneista saunatonttuihin*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Radkau, Joachim. 2005. *Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment*. Washington D.C.; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Radkau, Joachim. 2011. *Die Ära der Ökologie: Eine Weltgeschichte*. München: Verlag C.H.Beck.
Ratinen, Mari & Lund, Peter. 2015. 'Policy Inclusiveness and Niche Development: Examples from Wind Energy and Photovoltaics in Denmark, Germany, Finland, and Spain.' In: *Energy Research & Social Science* 6: 136–145.
Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. 2007. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta.* Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.

Remes, Tanja. 2007. 'Kohti "tavallista puoluetta"?' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 91–130. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Reutter, Werner. 2003. 'A New Start and "Renewal" for Germany? Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Government, 1998–2002.' *German Politics & Society* 21, no. 1: 138–160.
Reutter, Werner, ed. 2004. *Germany on the Road to 'Normalcy'*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Riedel, Myriam Corinna. 2021. 'Die Positionierung von SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und PDS zu Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr in den Konflikten in Bosnien, Kosovo und Afghanistan.' PhD Diss. Der Universität Bremen.
Robbins, Paul, Hintz, John & Moore, Sarah A. 2014. *Environment and Society: A Critical Introduction.* Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Roberts, Geoffrey K. 2013: 'Superwahljahr 1994 and its Effects on the German Party System.' In: Roberts, Geoffrey K., ed. *Superwahljahr: The German Elections 1994,* 4–25. London; New York: Routledge.
Rohrschneider, Robert & Fuchs, Dieter. 2003. 'It Used to Be the Economy: Issues and Party Support in the 2002 Election.' *German Politics & Society* 21, no. 1: 76–94.
Rohrschneider, Robert & Wolf, Michael R. 2004. 'One Electorate? Social Policy Views and Voters' Choice in Unified Germany Since 1990.' In: Reutter, Werner, ed. *Germany on the Road to 'Normalcy',* 21–46. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Riukulehto, Sulevi. 2007. 'Vihreät puoluekartalla ja puoluejärjestelmän osana.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 9–26. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Ruuskanen, Esa & Väyrynen, Kari. 2016. 'Ympäristöhistorian historiakäsityksestä.' In: Väyrynen, Kari & Pulkkinen, Jarmo, eds. *Historian teoria: Lingvistisestä käänteestä mahdolliseen historiaan,* 332–365. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Rüdig, Wolfgang. 2002. 'Germany.' *Environmental Politics* 11, no. 1: 78-111.
Saarinen, Taina. 2008. 'Persuasive Presupposition in OECD and EU Higher Education Policy Documents.' In: *Discourse Studies* 10, no. 3: 341–359.
Salo, Miikka. 2015. *Energiakäänne: Saksan ja Suomen energiapoliittiset valinnat.* Helsinki: Visio.
Sanderson, Stephen K. & Hall, Thomas D. 1995. 'World System Approaches to World-Historical Change.' In: Sanderson, Stephen K., ed. *Civilizations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change.* Walnut Creek; London; New Delhi: Altamira Press.
Seager, Joni. 2003. 'Rachel Carson Died of Breast Cancer: The Coming of Age of Feminist Environmentalism.' *Signs* 28, No. 3: 945–972.
Singer, Peter. 2013. 'Kaikki eläimet ovat tasavertaisia.' In: Aaltola, Elisa, ed. *Johdatus eläinfilosofiaan*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Skinner, Quentin. 2002. *Visions of Politics I: Regarding Method.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schmeltzer, Matthias. 2016. *The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth Paradigm.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schmelzer, Matthias & Vetter, Andrea. 2019. *Degrowth / Postwachstum zur Einführung.* Hamburg: Junius.
Schmidt-Bleek, Friedrich. (1993) 2000. *Luonnon uusi laskuoppi.* Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Sohlstén, Jemina. 2007. 'Liikkeen voima.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 27-90. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Solsten, Eric. 1995, ed. *Germany: A Country Study.* Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
Steinmetz, Willibald, Freeden, Michael & Fernández-Sebastián, Javier, eds. 2017. *Conceptual History in the European Space.* New York; Oxford: Berghahn.
Stenius, Henrik. 2003. Kansalainen. In: Hyvärinen, Matti, Saastamoinen, Kari, Pekonen, Kyösti, Kettunen, Pauli, Pulkkinen, Tuija, Liikanen, Ilkka, Stenius, Henrik, Pohjantammi, Ismo, Aarnio, Eeva, Palonen, Kari, Alapuro, Risto, eds. *Käsitteet liikkeessä: Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria,* 309–362. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Stenius, Henrik. 2017. 'Concepts in a Nordic Periphery.' In: Steinmetz, Willibald, Freeden, Michael & Fernández-Sebastán, Javier, eds. *Conceptual History in the European Space,* 263–280. New York; Oxford: Berghahn.
Sörlin, Sverker & Warde, Paul, eds. 2009. *Nature's End: History and the Environment.* London: Palgrave McMillan.
Tammilehto, Olli. 1982. *Ekofilosofia, vaihtoehtoliike ja ydinvoima*. Helsinki: Ympäristökeskus.
Taylor, Bron. 2010. *Dark Green Religion: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ther, Philipp. 2012. 'Comparisons, Cultural Transfers, and the Study of Networks: Toward a Transnational History of Europe.' In: Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard & Kocka, Jürgen, eds. *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives.* New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Toikka, Arho. 2009. 'Monimutkaiset sopeutuvat järjestelmät ja ympäristöongelmien synty.' In: Ilmo, Massa, ed. *Vihreä teoria. Ympäristö yhteiskuntateorioissa,* 315–337. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Tontti, Jarkko. 2007. 'Ode-ilmiöstä oppositioon.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 215–246. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
Uekötter, Frank. 2014. *The Greenest Nation? A New History of German Environmentalism.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Warde, Paul, Libby, Robin & Sörlin, Sverker. 2018. *The Environment: A History of the Idea.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Warde, Paul. 2009. 'The Environmental History of Pre-Industrial Agriculture in Europe.' In: Sörlin, Sverker & Warde, Paul, eds. *Nature's End: History and the Environment*, 70–92. London: Palgrave McMillan.
Wayland, Sarah V. 1997. 'Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada.' *International Journal on Group Rights* 5: 33–58.
Weber, Klaus & Soderstrom, Sara. 2015. 'Sustainability Discourse and Capitalist Variety: A Comparative Institutional Analysis.' In: Tsutsui, Kiyoteru & Lim, Alwyn, eds. *Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World,* 218–248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weichold, Jochen. 2004. 'Umweltpolitik in den Zeiten des Neoliberalismus.' *UTOPIE kreativ* 164: 519–529. Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.
Weichold, Jochen. 2005. 'Die Grünen – Aufbruch in die Anpassung.' *UTOPIE kreativ* 171: 34–41. Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.
White, Lynn. 1967. 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.' *Science* 155, no. 10: 1203–1207.
Vogt, William. 1948. *Road to Survival*. New York: William Sloane.
Volmer, Ludger. 1998. 'Die Grünen und die außenpolitik: ein schvieriges Verhältnis.' PhD Diss., Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
Woods, Kerri. 2010. *Human Rights and Environmental Sustainability*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Väyrynen, Kari. 2006. *Ympäristöfilosofian historia maamyytistä Marxiin*. Tampere: Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura ry.
Väyrynen, Kari. 2009**.** 'Yhteiskuntatieteellisen ympäristötutkimuksen tieteenteoreettisia ongelmia ja rajanylityksiä.' In: Massa, Ilmo, ed. *Vihreä teoria: ympäristö yhteiskuntateorioissa,* 47–77. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Ylikahri, Ville. 2007. 'Kioto, Natura ja uusi radikalismi.' In: Remes, Tanja & Sohlstén, Jemina, eds. *Edellä! Vihreä liitto 20 vuotta,* 183–214. Helsinki: Vihreä sivistysliitto.
York, Richard, Rosa, Eugene A. & Dietz, Thomas. 2010. 'Ecological Modernisation Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges.' In: Redclift, Michael R. & Woodgate, Graham, eds. *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology: Second Eedition,* 77–90. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Zelko, Frank. 2014. 'The Politics of Nature.' In: Isenberg, Andrew C., ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Environmental History,* 716–742. New York: Oxford University Press.