TEMPORALITY & CHOICE FOR ANSWERING IS/OUGHT -QUESTION

Constructive Criticism of Saariluoma's Attempt to Overcome
Hume's guillotine

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Abstract
Pertti Saariluoma has contributed to the "is/ought" -discussion with three articles. His contribution is naturalistic: ethical arguments can be justified by facts alone. While criticizing Hume for his outdated view of the relationship between emotions and cognitions, Saariluoma proceeds in overcoming Hume's guillotine. This study provides constructive criticism through analytical arguments for Saariluoma's contribution. During more than 250 years old debate about the relationship between facts and values, many important contributions have been made to defending Hume's guillotine which states that values cannot be derived from facts alone. In my constructive criticism of Saariluoma's naturalistic contribution, I aim to face criticism made by Moore and Hare. According to Moore, the "is/ought" -question requires us to take time into account in the context of naturalistic reasoning. Also in Dewey's naturalistic contribution, the temporality of reasoning is a necessary part of understanding the relationship between facts and values. Hare demands we take choices into account. By analyzing temporality and choice together, this study aims to provide a new understanding of the "is/ought" -question and a new solution for it. A crucial part of the solution is Austin's and Searle's speech act theory. They did not recognize how (invalid) ethical arguments can by themselves produce speech acts that can be categorized as morally wrong. Ethics cannot be practiced if the practice itself includes acts that produce unnecessary pain. This is the reason for holding on to the distinction between facts and values, and since unnecessary pain by ethical practices can be avoided, there are no more reasons for holding on to Hume's guillotine.

Keywords is/ought -question, Hume's guillotine, naturalism, foundationalism, temporality, choice, ethics
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Tiivistelmä

Pertti Saariluoma on kolmessa artikkelissaan ottanut osaa tosiasioiden ja arvojen välistä suhdetta koskevaan keskusteluun. Hän kannattaa naturalismia, jonka mukaan eettiset argumentit on oikeutettavissa vain tosiasioihin vetoamalla. Kritisoidessaan Humea paikkaansa pitämättömiksi osoittautuneiden käsitysten kannattamisesta kognitioiden ja emootioiden välisen suhteen osalta, Saariluoma etenee Humen giljotiinin kumoamiseen. Tämä tutkimus tarjoaa rakentavaa kritiikkiä analyyttisilla argumenteilla Saariluoman panostusta koskien. Yli 250 vuoden mittaisen tosiasioiden ja arvojen välistä suhdetta käsittelevän väittelyn aikana, monia olennaisia puolustuspuheenvuoroja on esitetty Humen giljotiinille, jonka mukaan pelkistä tosiasioista ei voi johtaa arvoja. Esittäessäni rakentavaa kritiikkiä Saariluoman naturalistiseen panokseen, pyrin kohtaamaan Mooren ja Haren kritiikin. Mooren mukaan faktojen ja arvojen käsittely edellyttää meitä ottamaan aika huomioon naturalistisen järkeilyn yhteydessä. Myös Deweyn naturalistisessa panostuksessa edellytetään järkeilyn ajallisuuden huomioiminen tosiasioiden ja arvojen välisen suhteen ymmärtämiseksi. Hare vaatii meiltä valinnan huomioimista. Ajallisuuden ja valinnan analysoimisella yhdessä, tämä tutkimus tähtää tosiasioita ja arvoja koskevan kysymyksen ymmärtämiseen ja ratkaisemiseen uudella tavalla. Keskeinen osa ratkaisua on Austinin ja Searlen kehittämä puheakti teoria. He eivät tiedostaneet miten (epäpätevien) eettisten argumenttien esittäminen voi sellaisenaan olla moralisesti vääräksi kategorisoitavissa olevan puheaktin tekemistä. Etiikkaa ei voi harjoittaa siten, että sen harjoittaminen itsessään sisältää tekoja, jotka aiheuttavat tarpeetonta kärsimystä. Tämä selittää tosiasioiden ja arvojen jyrkän erottamisen toisistaan, ja koska tarpeeton kärsimys on vältettävissä etiikkaa harjoittaessa, ei jää muita syitä Humen giljotiinin kannattamiseen.

TABLE OF CONTENT

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 True Story

Humans can be scatterbrained. It was a cloudy autumn evening when I rode to the ski resort's yard by bike with a problem in mind. I didn't have convenient storage for my snowboarding stuff and right now they were here and there around resorts stock. Soon the season would begin, and workers of the resort would be annoyed to see my snowboard in the middle of all other mess. While my head was focusing to decide what should I do with my stuff, I unconsciously solved another problem. I had to lock my bike somewhere and there was an empty rack in the front of the resort. You don't want to get robbed so always lock your bike into something my unconscious mind reminded itself, and so I used the rack that way.

The first problem got solved smoothly thanks to my full attention, but when I came back to the rack, I immediately became conscious of my handling of the second problem. Rack was now full of climbing equipment. Somebody had tried to move the bike away from the front side of the rack, but there was not enough room. When I got closer, a worker asked if this is my bike. Her tone told me that I had made a mistake. After I confessed to being the owner, she explained how this isn't a place for bikes because they want to have a clear area for climbing groups to leave their stuff on the rack. Picture of frustrated and tired climbers trying to lean over my bike made me regret my behavior immediately. I agreed and apologized. The worker took another tone when she ended our conversation: "From now on, you ought to leave the bike elsewhere."

The irony of this story is how I ended up leaving my bike on the way of the workers while concentrating too much on how I could get my snowboarding stuff from their way. However, the point is that we had short conversation about the following question: "How ought the rack be used?" The worker stated that the rack ought not to be

used to lock bikes into it. Then she gave premises to this conclusion by referring to her experience on how it violates the function of the rack as a place for climbing equipment. I agreed and in addition, I expressed an experience of guilt that have raised in my mind by apologizing. Since we could agree on our experience about the right use of the rack and the experience of guilt in the cases where the rack is used in a wrong way, she concluded the moral claim: "*From now on*, you ought to leave the bike elsewhere."

The worker got a good sense of ethical reasoning. Why so? She wasn't interested in blaming my misbehavior. Instead, she was interested in improving my habits concerning the use of that rack and I turned out to be willing to learn. But how was my willingness improved exactly? She avoided making a general moral conclusion: "You ought not to leave your bike on this rack" and leave me with that. This claim would be blaming the behavior that I have already done. Expression: "From now on", moved the point from what I have done into what I will be doing. The difference between those two is the fact that it is impossible to change my behavior in the past but possible to change it in the present and future. I have been formulating ethical arguments[1] by making no difference between past- and present actions, but experiences like these have changed my understanding of valid argumentation in ethics.

When considering valid and invalid ways of reasoning in ethics, one of the crucial themes is the "is/ought" -question. It means to ask; how can one derive moral conclusions from factual statements – what is the rational relationship between facts and values? Can ethics be practiced by making sense of the right type of facts or is it always dependent on making claims about values separately from facts? According to a stance called Hume's guillotine, ethics cannot be practiced only as an investigation of certain facts. Naturalists have often attempted to find reasons for abandoning Hume's guillotine.

Many of these attempts must be criticized for not understanding the reasons behind Hume's guillotine. Correct reasons will be provided in this text. However, the major finding of this study is that by analyzing temporality and choice in contrast to reasoning from facts to values, naturalism turns out to be the correct answer for the "is/ought" -question.

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[1] Here and throughout "ethical argument" means any set of premises for inferring to a conclusion which states how one ought to act in a given situation.

1.2 Philosopher at your service: the relevance of "is/ought" -investigation

If I had a store selling products of philosophy and you were to walk in that store, my question would be: "How can I help you?" Such stores do not exist, but that is not because philosophy is useless. They do not exist, because philosophers' services are too abstract to be sold in stores. Some people are making the mistake of taking philosophy also as too abstract for asking the question: "How can I help you?" I will try to not be one of them.

The benefits of investigating the "is/ought" -question begin from a personal level. We have already gone through how a single member of ski-resorts staff can go through moral discussion so fluently that a customer is more than willing to understand the rules and follow them next time. Imagine all the difficult discussions where someone has broken a rule, but you are responsible for making them respect the rules again. To do that, you also might have to re-negotiate the rules. A parent must negotiate with his children (and with his spouse), a teacher must do it with her students (and with colleagues) and the CEO must do it with employers. One who has an understanding of the "is/ought" -question can face these difficulties skillfully and calmly.

Investigating the rationality of ethical discussions helps you, especially when emotions have been counted as part of how reason works. That is a sense of reason which does not only focus on rules and abstract principles but takes mental states like emotions as a significant part of how reason operates. Emotions can be taken just as an important part of the information processes of the mind than cognition (Saariluoma 2020a, 124). Ethics helps you to meet with your emotions. But isn't practices of therapy and psychological understanding most evident to take care of one's emotional health? They are for most emotions. Enormous stress from too much work or pain produced from violence should be treated with psychologists' practices. However, certain emotions are specific to morally significant situations. Guilt and empathy for example (Harris 2012, 71, 132). Pride too (Dewey 1930, 292). More generalizable emotions like well-being and happiness are also ethicists' specialness (Harris, 23; MacIntyre, 463). By "generalizable emotion", I mean emotions that stem from how life is generally experienced. Investigations of the "is/ought" -question introduces you to the effect and function of these emotions.

Beyond personal benefit, findings of the "is/ought" -investigation can contribute to greater cultural improvement. Social phenomena, like sexual relationships and households, national or global identity, and religious or secular worldviews, are

sources of major disagreements. Hot topics like these have been manifested by identity politics and cultural wars. The intellectual and scientific community have not been isolated from these influences, since the science wars are also taking place in universities. While political power will always have its role as a solution for these problems, rational solutions should also be offered, investigated, and improved. The scientific community seems to be in a state of pessimism for rational solutions to these conflicts (Harris, 15). Is this pessimism curable?

Most of the contributions to investigating the "is/ought" -question are rather abstract, catching only the attention of scholars. However, through culture wars, the issue has also been brought into wider public discussion. For instance, Sam Harris's (1967–) and Jordan Peterson's (1962–) debate over the issue have interested 5,5 million viewers since 2018.[2] Peterson took a stance for Hume's guillotine and Harris challenged this view by naturalism and positivism (Peterson 1999, 1; Harris, 23, 15). (Meaning of Hume's guillotine, naturalism, and positivism is provided later in the text.)

We will mainly focus on the theoretical analysis of the issue, though some practical comments have also been implemented in this text. As I said earlier, guilt plays a central role in ethical disputes, and it is a practical necessity to take that into account. Most of us have experienced moralizing, which means someone being overly judgmental over value differences. Most of us know also nihilistic people who lack the ability for judging even the evilest acts. Is there a solution for us to make rational moral judgments without moralizing? As mentioned, pessimism and skepticism are generally accepted states of ethical investigations (Harris, 15; Moore 17; MacIntyre, 461–462). Optimism and trust for ethical discussions could be found in practical solutions for problems like the inability to treat guilt or violently judgmental behavior.

The "is/ought" -investigation can help us partake in culture wars rationally and support both ends of identity politics with proper information.

The "is/ought" -investigation has also become necessary for the development of information technologies and artificial intelligence (AI). Trustworthy lie detectors would change behavior in the courtroom and political events dramatically (Harris, 174–175). Robots can make important decisions, like choosing the order of medical operations between children and middle-aged people (Saariluoma 2020b, 11). Traffic is already turning to be automatized by AI (Saariluoma 2020a, 125). The question remains: can AI applications make these decisions *ethically* for humans to use? Since AI relies only on factual information processes, Hume's guillotine denies the possibility of AI becoming ethical (Saariluoma, 125). Are humans needed in reasoning over ethical matters? Can we take ourselves to be special in this sense while the information processes of AI are increasingly outsmarting us?

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[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jey_CzIOfYE

Investigation of the "is/ought" -question helps you to communicate about rules and meet with your guilt and pride. It offers rational solutions for culture wars and tries to produce machinery, which could collect and process knowledge of what we take as valuable. For years, these attempts have been met with skepticism and rejection. Can we settle the conflict between pro- and contrapositions?

1.3 Task at hand

> Thus, Hume's guillotine is a pseudo problem that arises from a mistaken conceptualization of the mind and actions. (Saariluoma 2020a, 129)

Pertti Saariluoma's stance on the "is/ought" -question is straightforward: not only are the supporters of Hume's guillotine wrong but also, the problem should not be taken seriously anymore. Saariluoma's contribution lies on findings and theories of cognition science and sociology which makes it a fresh way to challenge Hume's guillotine, since in the field of philosophy most of the papers do not take empirical studies into account. In the field of philosophy, naturalistic takes on the issue have been presented by analytical arguments.

For example, Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (1929–) challenged Hume's guillotine by analyzing our understanding of inductive and deductive inferences in the context of the "is/ought" -question (MacIntyre 453–455, 461–463). MacIntyre is very aware of possible criticism of his views. While attempting to overcome Hume's guillotine he presents an opposing argument for every step he takes. The same holds for George Edward Moore (1873–1958), one of the proponents of "no ought from is" -principle.[3] On the other hand, Saariluoma aims to present his stance as coherently as possible. He aims his argument mainly against Hume – the one who started this 250-year-old dialogue and debate.

Through all those years, many other ways have been generated to support Hume's guillotine. As important figures (already in the year 1959), MacIntyre mentions Kant, Moore, and Richard Marvin Hare (1919–2002) (MacIntyre, 468).[4] The line

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[3] The "no ought from is" -principle has the same meaning as Hume's guillotine: moral conclusions cannot be inferred only from factual -statements. The reason for the two labels is that for example, Moore does not comment on Hume or any Hume scholars in any part of his contribution. Thus, it would be odd to call his stance by name Hume's guillotine.

[4] To be exact, MacIntyre refers to those who support the autonomy of ethics. The concept of "autonomy of ethics" means to deny an attempt to find a foundation for ethics that is not already moral. Hume's guillotine is an argument that supports the autonomy of ethics. (MacIntyre, 452, 468) Notice that there are major differences in the way in which Kant, Moore, and Hare argue for autonomy of ethics. For instance, Moore criticized Kant for making a naturalistic fallacy even though Kant supported the autonomy of ethics (Moore, 126). According to Moore, naturalistic fallacy eliminates those stances which make the connection between what is real and what is good – Kant's ethics being one of them (Moore, 113–114).

of arguments under this label is hardly even touched by referring to Hume. Still, one must begin somewhere and here Saariluoma's contribution can be seen as a new beginning. The next step will be guided by the example of MacIntyre and Moore: questioning philosophical problems requires facing all the important critics along the way. Our task is to provide this criticism.

Also support for Saariluoma's contribution appears in the philosophical literature. By presenting pro- and contrapositions for his views, this study aims to put them to a test. Which elements must we accept due to the philosophical debates and dialogues and which ones should we reconsider or deny? Due to the finite resources, we do not try to receive a complete understanding of the discussion under the "is/ought" -question. Instead, we try to take one step closer to contextualizing Saariluoma's contribution to the analytic field of philosophy.

During my time spent trying to make sense of other contributions to the "is/ought" -question, I was lucky to come up with an idea myself. My idea includes an argument for Saariluoma's stance, with an alternative understanding of the "is/ought" -question and with alternative premises from which we came to the same conclusion. The idea is to analyze factual and ethical reasoning in contrast to time and choice. Analyzing choice and temporality of reasoning helps us to understand both pro- and contra positions for Hume's guillotine.

Firstly, we will attempt to contextualize Saariluoma into the analytical discussion over the "is/ought" -question and restate what the problem is. Secondly, I will present an alternative way of trying to overcome Hume's guillotine. Philosophical literature may seem like an endless wormhole, so the most important question remains: where is the way out?

Contrary to Saariluoma's contribution, the task of this investigation is not to show how Hume's guillotine should be regarded as a pseudo problem. Instead, I have intended to challenge both pro- and contrapositions to the "no ought from is" -principle. Hume's guillotine will remain a problem, but if I have been successful, there is a new attempt to make sense of it. I have been working to ensure that naturalistic attempts will be guided by proper knowledge of what the "is/ought" -question is. Also, I propose solutions, but their validity must be announced after criticism, not before it. I have been working with my possible challengers in mind – trying to make the attempted solution as acceptable to critics as possible.

1.4 Method

One might be skeptical towards methodology in the context of philosophical investigations. What does it mean to have a method when even making a statement of the

used method requires just the same method to be used?[5] Practicing philosophy means thinking, discussing, reading, and writing. Is there anything to be added to the description of a philosophical method?

While the description and justification of the used method might be different in studies of empirical sciences, there is still a reason to do the same for philosophical ones. Philosophical investigations are different from each other. Philosophers make choices during the investigation process, and for a reader, the description and justification of these choices help to understand the whole process. It is useful to provide a synoptic view of the project and give a description of how a posed question can in principle be answered and criticized. This is what, for instance, John Roger Searle (1932–) does so well while contributing to the "is/ought" -debate (1964, 43–44).

Here, we will analyze what type of methodological choices have been made by other authors and present the choices made by me. Two themes will be addressed: 1) Difference between historical and philosophical problematizations. 2) Relation between "is/ought" -contributions and empirical evidence.

(1) My first choice for this project, is to provide constructive criticism for Saariluoma's contribution to the "is/ought" -discussion. This means that we will not only disagree with some of the arguments he has made, but we will also attempt to provide an alternative to those arguments.

Saariluoma's three articles aim to problematize the relationship between applications of AI and the "is/ought" -question and present an attempt to overcome Hume's guillotine. The articles in question are *Hume's Guillotine Resolved* (2020a), *Hume's Guillotine in Designing Intelligent Technologies* (2020b), and *Hume's Guillotine and Intelligent Technologies*. The constructive criticism, which has been provided in this text, applies also to most of the points presented in Sam Harris's (1967–) contribution labeled: *Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values* (2010). While I will point towards similarities between Harris's and Saariluoma's contributions, the focus of my presentation will be on Saariluoma's views. Many other contributions will be used and challenged along the way.

Saariluoma concludes that Hume's guillotine is fallen (Saariluoma 2020a, 130). The most important reason for this conclusion is provided by empirical studies on how cognition and emotion are dependent on each other. This finding is critical because

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[5] In the philosophy of science, the same problem is faced with naturalistic stances. "From the perspective of many other philosophical positions, to *use* scientific ideas when theorizing *about* science involves a vicious circularity. How can we assume, at the outset, the reliability of the scientific ideas that we are trying to investigate and assess? Surely we have to stand *outside* of science when we are trying to describe its most general features and assess the integrity of its methods." (Godfrey-Smith, 150)

the problem of from "is" to "ought" -derivations have been interpreted to require juxtaposition between cognition and emotion. (Saariluoma, 129)

I turned out to be skeptical towards interpretation which took reason to mean just the same as facts and cognition (Saariluoma 2020b, 13). However, even though he cites Hume while making this interpretation, Saariluoma is not trying to make a historical problematization over the "is/ought" -question. He problematized the "is/ought" -question *itself* and used Hume's, Moore's, and others' writings only for presenting the issue.

MacIntyre calls our attention to not making the mistake of mixing historical problematizations with actual problems of philosophy:

> Sometimes in the history of philosophy the defense of a particular philosophical position and the interpretation of a particular philosopher become closely identified. This has notoriously happened more than once in the case of Plato, and lately in the moral philosophy it seems to me to have happened in the case of Hume. (MacIntyre, 451)

There is consensus for accepting the demand to distance philosophy itself from the history of philosophy since it is respected both by critics (Hudson 1964, 246) and supporters of MacIntyre (Hunter 1962, 152). In philosophy, contributions can be made in three different ways in contrast to the history of the field. Hunter's contribution is an example of a contribution that problematizes only historical questions. Non-historical contributions can also be made. For instance, Zimmerman's (contribution (1962) aims to answer only the "is/ought" -question. In between there is a way to practice philosophy that uses philosophical contributions in the field – even from the distant past – for presenting the problem and challenging all the arguments which will be made while focusing on providing an answer to a philosophical question. Most of the contributions in analytical philosophy are like that.

This leads us to a philosophical method called doxology, which means that the author uses other authors' contributions to answer philosophical questions. Doxology can be distanced from the history of philosophy. While the history of philosophy studies past for its own sake, doxology aims to use past contributions for answering contemporary philosophical questions. The subject matter of doxology is issues, ideas, and arguments found in philosophical texts. (Normore, 2016, 34–35) To practice doxology, one cannot mix own ideas with other authors' contributions. If doxology has been done well, a reader has a clear picture of every author's message. In this project, I have been using doxology for presenting the issue and providing alternative arguments for my views.

The difference between historical and philosophical questions is best described by MacIntyre and William Donald Hudson (1920–2003):

> There are, of course, two distinct issues raised by this paper so far. There is the historical question of what Hume is actually asserting in the passage under discussion, and there is the philosophical question of whether what he does assert is true and important. (MacIntyre, 461)

> Two issues are involved here, of course: (i) what was Hume's opinion in this matter of *is* and *ought*?, and what is the correct view? I shall try not to confuse them. (Hudson 1964, 246)

Saariluoma's contribution answers both types of questions, though the philosophical one is the focus. At one point he happens to be making a historical interpretation of how Hume's sense of reason and values can be interpreted to mean a juxtaposition between cognition and emotion (Saariluoma 2020b, 13). Overall, his contribution is focused on trying to overcome Hume's guillotine (Saariluoma 2020a, 130), which means, trying to give the correct view on the "is/ought" -question.

It is unsound to see some of the contributions, which do not make difference between historical and contemporary problematizations in account while criticizing other contributions in the "is/ought" -discussion. For instance, Antony Flew (1923–2010) seems to notice the difference between historical and non-historical problematizations, while criticizing Searle, but proceeds to treat the problem as dependent on interpreting Hume:

> It is perhaps possible that Searle here, like so many others elsewhere, has been misled by Hume's irony; notwithstanding that Searle himself disclaims concern 'with Hume's treatment of the problem'. For Hume does indeed write as if… (Flew, 1963, 27)

Contrary to Flew's methodological choices, I take it as possible and reasonable to respect the requested terms of the given contribution, while criticizing them. In the context of Searle, the request is to leave interpretations of Hume elsewhere (Searle, 43).

The difference between historical and non-historical questions is important since I have chosen to narrow my criticism so that it does not problematize any possible historical errors, that Saariluoma may have made. A different approach would be possible, he would be criticized for misinterpreting Hume or others, but this will not be attempted here.[6] Saariluoma's contribution shines by taking an interdisciplinary approach to a philosophical problem. He uses studies of cognition science and sociology to tackle the "is/ought" -problem. This approach is mainly non-historical. Thus,

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[6] As one exception, I will comment on Saariluoma's interpretation of Moore's *Principia Ethica*. Also, I will give some attention to reformulating MacIntyre's interpretation of Hume. However, we will focus on non-historical criticism of Saariluoma's contribution, and we will not go into depth about re-interpreting Hume.

a reasonable critique of his views shares the same problematization and is also mainly non-historical.

We will attempt to treat the "is/ought" -question in the same manner in which Hume in the first place treated it – as a philosophical problem, which can be handled by analyzing contradictory stances. The source for different stances comes from philosophical literature, but a presentation of a stance will not include "historical founding." This means that we will not formulate arguments, which focus on proving given interpretations.[7] History of philosophy can be practiced separately. Here, we follow Saariluoma's doxological way of using references, the way which has been used in many analytical contributions for the "is/ought" -question.

(2) Second methodological question to be addressed here runs as follows. Which type of arguments must be provided for answering the "is/ought" -question? We must present a guideline for our argumentation in this project. And to do that, we must analyze, which type of guidelines have been followed by Saariluoma.

In principle, Saariluoma takes the "is/ought" -problem to be solvable by correct empirical studies. He frames the answer by treating argumentation and reasoning as information processes of the mind and social discourse. Also, he attempts to solve the problem by referring to a close connection between cognition and emotion. This makes his theory to be a naturalistic one (Godfrey-Smith, 149–150; Kornblith, 147).

Since proponents for Hume's guillotine are against naturalism, how has Saariluoma defended his stance against them? He has not mentioned other critics than Hume. Also, his argument is mainly founded on empirical evidence, the type of evidence, which is in question when naturalism is under criticism (Godfrey-Smith, 150; Hume, 2017, 18). Along with empirical reasoning, he has only provided skepticism, by calling the problem of Hume's guillotine a pseudo-problem (Saariluoma 2020a, 130). However, mere skepticism is not enough for treating the critics of his view. Since critics (like Moore) have been using logical and linguistic analysis for opposing naturalism (Kornblith, 50), it is reasonable to defend naturalism with the

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[7] I have been working with the "is/ought" -question for four years now, trying different styles of writing and different methods. I had a methodological ideal for both historically and philosophically justified contributions. One thing has become clear: it is impossible (at least for me) to produce sensible text, which includes both historically proven interpretations and criticism towards other authors' contributions. Over a hundred pages have been thrashed while trying this until I gave up with the ideal and left historical problematizations aside. Instead, I used only doxology to challenge my views. That is until I accepted to trust only my interpretation of other authors' contributions and did not write about other authors' *interpretations* to compare them with my ones. (The reason, which turned out to make the ideal to be impossible in practice, is that sifting from problematization of interpretation to problematization of a given stance made the text too abstract for a reader to follow. It took so long paragraphs to justify an interpretation, that the reader could not remember what has been done previously in the text while moving to consider the philosophical problem.)

same type of arguments. Along with empirical evidence for proving the offered solution, an analytic argument against the critics of naturalism must be provided.

I have tried to formulate analytical arguments for naturalism and against critics of naturalism. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I have also used empirically falsifiable claims for formulating my argument. In contrast to Saariluoma's use of empirical claims, I have not had the resources needed for providing empirical evidence for four of the supposed claims made. Indeed, Saariluoma's contribution has been helpful in this context, but other empirical studies could also have been used.

So far, these claims stem from my personal experience and should be treated as my suppositions or possible hypotheses for empirical studies. With better resources, these hypotheses should be confirmed or denied. I have marked these suppositions in the text and collected a list of these statements presented in the sub-chapter 4.3 labeled: "Critical glance in the mirror." Supposing empirically confirmable statements is common in philosophical investigations. I wish to make my suppositions as explicit for critics as possible.

We will try to provide an answer to the "is/ought" -question. The answer is constructed as constructive criticism of Saariluoma's contribution. To do that, we are leaving historical problematization aside. Instead, we try to collect the most crucial contributions by doxology and analyze them by asking, which type of improvements must be made so that they are not in contradiction with each other. My analytical arguments could be falsified (or verified) in the same manner that I have formulated them. Our method will also be naturalistic in the sense, that some of our statements could be falsified by empirical studies. Due to the finite resources, those falsifications will not be attempted here.

1.5 Questions, Hypotheses, and Overview

> It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer. (Moore, i)

Since the beginning of my criticism towards Saariluoma's contribution will be to offer an alternative understanding of the problem, it is necessary to follow what Moore suggests: express the questions you are about to answer. One can disagree over the proper and improper framing of the question, but this requires making the questions explicit.

Saariluoma formulates his question in the context of machinery and information processes: "Can machines that process facts do so ethically, and if so, how is this possible?" (Saariluoma 2020a, 125) Notice how Saariluoma does not focus on handling Hume's guillotine as a valid or invalid type of reasoning, but instead, he focuses to take the issue as ethical information processes which occur in the mind and social discourses (Saariluoma 2021, 245–247).

I will have to present the issue differently, since in ethics, Hume's guillotine has commonly been treated as an inferential rule. Saariluoma presents it as such as well: "Hume's guillotine claims that one cannot *derive* from how things are how they should be." (Saariluoma 2020b, 11.)[8] He does not present any inferential formula for this derivation, even though he claims it is possible. Such formulas have been presented in analytical debates over the issue (MacIntyre, 462; Searle, 44). We will go through these attempts and their critique to clarify our understanding of the "is/ought" -question. Thus, we will first pose a question:

What makes the relationship between facts and values problematic?

As an example of a possible answer to this question, we present Saariluoma's. He presents Hume's guillotine as; an "…insufficient analysis of the relationship between people's minds and actions (Saariluoma 2020a, 128)." It is also a mistaken view of the basic elements of the mind: cognition and emotion. "The very basic question of Hume's guillotine is mistaken since it is based on a psychologically incorrect conceptual discrimination." (Saariluoma 2021, 246) By understanding ethical processes analysis between mind and actions, and between cognition and emotion can be corrected making empirical (or practical) ethics possible. Thus, the relationship between facts and values is a problem of valid or invalid analysis between mind and actions and between cognition and emotion. Let's consider this as *hypothesis 1*.

To handle the matter critically, it is important to look for alternative ways to present the problem of Hume's guillotine. In Saariluoma's contribution, no alternative is presented explicitly. In analytical debates over the issue, two concepts have grabbed my attention: temporality and choice. For Moore, the "is/ought" -question is not an issue caused by a lack of empirical studies. The problem is the *limits* of empirical knowledge. Those who did not see the limits, he called naturalists. Also, he did add to the list all metaphysical stances which make a mistaken connection between what is real and what is good (Moore, 120–121). By naturalism, he means the subject matter of natural sciences and also of psychology. The subject matter of those fields is special in the sense that it is narrowed to apply to objects which exist in time. Time for Moore means the distinction between past, present and future events.

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[8] My italics.

(Moore, 40–41) For Moore, the problem of Hume's guillotine means analysis of the temporal and eternal matter. We take this as *hypothesis 2*.

Notice how Moore did not comment on Hume's thought, even though he attacked naturalists like those who supported Hume's guillotine. The naturalistic fallacy -argument is necessary for handling the relationship between is and ought -statements or between facts and values. Its influence can be seen in MacIntyre's and Searle's attempts to criticize Hume's guillotine since they both mention the naturalistic fallacy -argument as contradicting their stance (MacIntyre, 462; Searle, 48). I will argue that along with Saariluoma, also MacIntyre and Searle would have seen the limits of empirical studies better if they would have noticed the relationship between "is/ought" -relations, time, and choice.

MacIntyre asks us to compare factual reasoning in other sciences with ethical one. Hume has shown important problems with both, the first being labeled as "the problem of induction" and the second as "Hume's guillotine." Both problems are meant as skeptical presentations of those issues, but Hume did not mean to hold on to that skepticism. Instead, he showed the solutions for the problems he presented. (MacIntyre, 453–455, 461–463) This interpretation grabbed the attention of supporters (Hunter, 1962) and critics (Atkinson, 1961; Flew, 1963; Hudson, 1964). Though, we will not focus on the historical question of the matter.

What remained untouched by MacIntyre, Hunter, and their critics, is the temporal notion both in the problem of induction and in Hume's guillotine. Among MacIntyre, temporality is missed by Searle even though they referred to the naturalistic fallacy. If we are to look for Moore's definition of naturalism, temporality cannot be missed. Also, Hume's presentation of the problem of induction includes the notion of time in it (Hume, 64) Thus, it is necessary to remake MacIntyre's comparison between these two problems with the temporality of reasoning in mind.

My understanding of the "is/ought" -question is different from Saariluoma's and Moore's take. The problem is a valid or invalid analysis of temporality and choice in contrast to facts and values. Let's consider this as *hypothesis 3.* Together with hypotheses 1. (the problem is an insufficient analysis between mind and action and between cognition and emotion) and 2. (the problem is an insufficient analysis between temporal and eternal), we can proceed in answering what makes "is/ought" -relations problematic.

If we have been successful in understanding the problem, a new solution can be offered to the original "is/ought" -question:

How can one validly derive from is -statements to ought -conclusion?

Both supporters of the "no ought from is" -principle and critics of it have been trying to answer this question by providing the right type of premises, which tell what the correct criteria are for choosing one act over another. Naturalistic answers have been facts about well-being and happiness or emotional valence (MacIntyre, 463; Saariluoma 2020a, 125; Harris, 23) or institutional facts (Searle, 55). Let's label this as *hypothesis A*.

Supporters of the "no ought from is" -principle has been requiring evaluative statements already in the premises before concluding into moral judgment (Atkinson, 232; Hudson, 250)[9] and denying the possibility to define moral goodness of acts generally (Moore, 17). This we take as *hypothesis B*.

The "is/ought" -question has been attempted to be fixed by taking the concept of "action" and noting how it must be separated into physical and mental -action – into concrete acts and speech acts (Austin, 20, 40) (Searle, 58). While this distinction is important, it has not been noticed that morality (vice and virtue) accounts for both levels of action. This is a key finding to understanding the critics of ethical naturalism. By analyzing the "is/ought" -problem in contrast to time and choice, we can formulate a hypothesis, which does not argue about the correct criteria for choosing one act over another. Instead, it states that derivations from facts to what one ought to do can be made if the conclusion of ethical arguments has been narrowed only to acts in the present and future. Moral judgment cannot be made for acts, which have already taken place. This is our *hypothesis C*.

The answer to the first question will guide us into the critical path of trying to overcome Hume's guillotine. Before developing it further, we must notice the following. If we have fallen to misunderstand the problem, the solutions offered are invaluable to us. Firstly, we will attempt to restate what the "is/ought" -question means. Secondly, we will attempt to answer it. Alternative answers to both questions have been presented here as a set of hypotheses. We will go through different contributions supporting the different hypotheses and see if one turns out to be more reasonable than the others.

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[9] Hudson does not use the term evaluative statement, but he refers to the requirement to entail ought -conclusions by ought -statements, which means the same requirement that Atkinson has in mind while referring to evaluative statements.

2 ENTERING DEBATE

2.1 The meaning of the "is/ought" -question

> In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason. (Hume 2003, 334)

This is how Hume laid down his thoughts on the relationship between "is" and "ought" -statements. Later Max Black (1909–1988) labels a stance, which denies our ability to derive from facts into values, as "Hume's guillotine." Only a statement of fact can be derived from statements of facts. (1964, 165–166.)

During more than 250 years of discussion, Hume's guillotine has been dividing scholars into groups; some support it, others oppose it, and the rest are fighting over a historical issue: did Hume mean to propose that "one cannot infer ought from is"?[10] We mostly pass by the historical question and ask instead if the claim labeled Hume's guillotine is the valid answer for the "is/ought" -question.

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[10] MacIntyre has interpreted this passage as Hume raising a question about the "no ought from is" -principle but not arguing for it (MacIntyre, 1959; Black, 166).

Recently, Saariluoma has taken it to be invalid. An alternative answer for Hume's guillotine is to show how ought -statements can be derived solely from is -statements. Not from is -statements in general (facts about the orbits of planets have certainly nothing to do with ethics), but from is -statements that refer to morally relevant phenomena. Saariluoma names this alternative negatively as "the fall of Hume's guillotine" (Saariluoma 2020a, 130). The stance against Hume's guillotine is also labeled positively as "naturalism" (Foot 1958–1959, 83; Zinnerman, 1962, 83; Moore 1959, 39–40).[11]

The most general definition of naturalism refers to the problematic relationship between philosophy and other sciences. According to naturalism, philosophers can use the results of other sciences while solving problems in the field of philosophy. This applies even to the problems of the philosophy of science. Naturalists deny the possibility to find foundations for scientific knowledge. Securing scientific knowledge from an external philosophical position is always doomed to fail. A stance, which requires the foundation for scientific knowledge, is labeled foundationalism. (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, 149–150; Kornblith, 2016, 147) In the context of ethics, Hume's guillotine is a stance for foundationalism (Moore, 114; MacIntyre, 1959, 452; Atkinson, 1961, 232). It aims to secure ethical reasoning by providing a foundation, which is separate from factual knowledge. (See also Harris's take on the relationship between philosophical foundations and scientific research (2012, 228–231))

For Moore, naturalism comes close to an empirical stance on knowledge. He defines naturalism as taking all valid knowledge as sensible. Also, an object which can be known naturalistically must exist in time. (Moore, 40–41) Popper uses the label "moral positivist" in the context of ethical naturalism:

> Thus—so argues… …moral positivist—we never have to transcend the realm of facts, if only we include in it social or political or historical facts: there is no dualism of facts and standards. (Popper, 1945, 548)

A naturalistic stance should not be confused with positivism. Since Auguste Comte's (1798–1857), positivistic stance has meant an attempt to replace other areas of society and culture with scientific practices. Comte tried to create a secular community called "The religion of humanity", which could replace religious communities with scientifically proven practices. (Wernick, 2001, 1) Harris has recently proposed a naturalistic solution for solving the conflict between the religious right and liberal left – two sides of the so-called cultural wars (2012, 15–16). Harris is also positivistic in the sense he aims to replace religious attempts to deal with morality with scientific ones:

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[11] Though, also the "unmorean" sense of naturalism appears in the philosophical literature, which takes Hume's guillotine as the correct answer to the "is/ought" -question (Flew 1963, 180).

> Just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, we will see that there is no such thing as Christian or Muslim morality. Indeed, I will argue that [ethics] should be considered as undeveloped branch of science. (Harris, 15)

Sociology produces social facts. According to naturalists, ethics produces ethical facts. Both can be taken as sub-class for factual statements in general (Harris, 14; Hudson, 1969, 12; Hunter, 1962, 149). On the other hand, Hume's guillotine requires us to find a secure foundation for the factual reasoning made in the context of ethics. Kant tried to provide the foundation, but his answer has been found dubious (Moore, 126–129). Since separate foundations can be provided with no certain reason to accept one over another, the plurality of different values must be accepted (Moore, 54; Harris, 11).

We have defined the rational relationship between facts and values. Either there is a "gap" which makes straight derivations impossible, or the gap has been bridged by a naturalistic solution to the "is/ought" -question (Hudson 1964, 251–252; Harris, 15).[12] The gap can be presented as follows:

Descriptive, sensible, inductively generalizable [is -statements]

Evaluative, prescriptive, normative, goodness, rightness [ought -statements]

In the context of this investigation, those who attempt to bridge this gap, we call naturalists. Those, who try to give reasons to accept the gap, are labeled foundationalists. These stances exclude each other. Many exceptions might be found for this distinction, for instance, many naturalists could have metaphysical stances, which would make them the foundation for their empirical reasoning. However, here we consider only those naturalistic stances which deny the possibility to find external foundations for scientific knowledge. Kant's contribution is an exception to the rule of foundationalism, since here we take foundationalists to hold on to value differences, and Kant thought to have founded ethics by metaphysical realism. This stance is against the "no ought from is" -principle as we will see. But Kant's contribution will be mentioned only as means to understand Moore's stance. In the context of this investigation, foundationalists take the gap between facts and values as remaining while naturalists try to show how it can be bridged.

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[12] We will count a stance called "supervenience" to be part of accepting the gap between facts and values. Supervenience admits that facts are part of reasoning over what we ought to do in a given situation, but one can never reason only by facts. (Hudson 1964, 76; Hare 1972, 153) To deny the use of facts completely in ethical reasoning is rather rare and it will not be discussed in this study.

Many names will appear while analyzing the pro- and contra positions to the "is/ought" -question. Here is the list of the stances taken by each author.

Naturalism:	Foundationalism:
Saariluoma[13]	Hume
Harris	Hare
MacIntyre	Atkinson
Searle	Moore
Black	Popper
Austin	Flew
Foot	Ross
Zimmerman	Hudson
Anscombe	Hanly
Dewey	Phillip & Mounce
(Räisänen)	

Let's elaborate on our definition of is- and ought- statements.

What does factual knowledge mean? Statements of fact are supportable or deniable by experience or senses. This means making experiments and checking if the results can be inductively generalized to the object in question (Godfrey-Smith, 40–41; Moore, 40). Statements of fact are also descriptions of an object (Searle, 1964, 43). They do not influence the changes of an object; facts only tell us what kind the object in question is. Naturalistic fallacy, which refers to the same supposed mistake that Hume's guillotine does, could be also labeled as "descriptive fallacy" (Austin, 2009, 71; Hare 1969, 240). The final criterion for a statement to be taken as factual is to take it as true or false (Harris, 13; Hudson 1969, 11; Saariluoma 2020a, 126).[14] (Though, I am not stating that other than factual statements cannot be true and false.) The sentence "An apple is red" is a factual statement and the sentence "The apple is red since I have seen it yesterday" is a factual argument. Factual knowledge is produced by making valid arguments about sensible objects. Factual knowledge is distinct from knowledge about the moral matter.

The "is/ought" -question means to ask if statements like "This action is right" can be supported or denied similarly to statements like "An apple is red" (Hudson, 11). Naturalists think they can be supported or denied similarly, but this should not be taken to mean that the sentences have a similar meaning. The sentence "This action is right" asks us to choose this act over others. It asks us to improve our habits.

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[13] Underlined ones are most relevant in the context of this investigation.
[14] Sentences such as "This is a fact" always imply that "This is true". But the validity of some proposed fact can be questioned by a sentence like: "This factual statement is false." Here, "factual" refers to other criteria of the statement in question, like that the statement is descriptive and confirmable by experience, but since it is not true, it is not a fact, but only a factual statement.

It also takes the act in question to be allowed instead of forbidden. (Saariluoma, 127; Hudson, 11–12) While the description of an apple does not tell us to act in a certain way, the statement "This action is right" does. "The apple ought not to be eaten" or "Instead of acting violently, you ought to be negotiating" are statements, which tell us what to do – not how things are. Supporters of Hume's guillotine deny the rational possibility to infer only from how things are into how they should be. Some would call it a logical impossibility (Hudson, 12). They agree with naturalists, that facts, in general, have different meanings than statements about morality. "Statements about morality" are also called "moral judgments" (Hudson 1969, 12)[15]

If naturalistic ethics is possible moral judgments can be supported or denied by reasoning about the factual matter. Thus, we can produce generalizable knowledge, which regulates and aims our actions (Saariluoma, 124; Harris, 13). Moral knowledge is moral judgment with rational justification. To justify moral judgments, the right type of evidence for taking an action to be good or evil must be offered and proven. This is a task for metaethical disputes. If ethicists find common trust and shared reasons in a certain type of evidence, the production of knowledge about which acts are good and which are bad can begin. With the help of correct evidence, we can determine how we ought to and ought not to live in each situation. (Moore, 1) Thus, moral knowledge can be produced.

The conceptualization of ought -statements as taking every action to be either right or wrong, good or bad, and allowed or forbidden, could be criticized. My reason for not making distinctions, between aesthetic-, political- and moral- values[16] is mainly due to the general agreement in ethical disputes over the "is/ought" -question – values and moral judgments are treated as generally than facts and factual statements.

The "is/ought" -question is a label for discussion of whether we should accept Hume's guillotine or naturalism in ethics – whether argumentation in ethics must be done by providing external foundations for factual reasoning or by factual reasoning itself.

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[15] Hudson presents the "is/ought" -question by taking it as disagreement over the precise meaning of is- and ought- statements. (Hudson, 12) Here, I interpret him as meaning that if there is a disagreement over the right type of derivations from facts to values, there must also be a disagreement over what a fact and what a value do mean. However, we take supporters and challengers of Hume's guillotine to agree on the meaning of is- and ought- statements. The controversy is in the correct way to make derivations from is -statements to ought -statements (Searle, 43–44).
[16] See also how Von Wright determines different meanings for the term good (Von Wright, 1963). Our task is to focus on the relationship between facts and values, not on the specifications of both categories like Wright did.

2.2 End of a quarter-millennium-old debate?

Hume's guillotine can be circumvented according to Saariluoma. To make sense of his contribution, we must go through the following steps: 1) Relevant facts in the context of ethical reasoning. 2) Hume's mistake. 3) Analyzing Saariluoma's contribution. Here our focus is on Saariluoma's texts, though we already contrast them with philosophical literature. Has he provided the final say on this matter?

(1) Naturalistic stance takes ethical reasoning to be similar to other empirical lines of reasoning. The problem in metaethics is to make sense of the right type of facts so that inferences about what one ought to do can be done correctly. For example, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919–2001) stated that moral philosophy should be laid aside until we have a coherent picture of the philosophy of psychology (1958, 175). By making sense of what is virtuous one must make sense of what human needs in a psychological sense. What one ought to do is analogous to what a plant need. While a plant needs water, light, and warmth, a man needs courage, honesty, loyalty, and other virtues. The needs of man are studied empirically. Thus, what one ought to do is equivalent to what one needs. There is no distinction between the moral sense of ought and the ought which can be investigated empirically.[17] (Anscombe; Phillips, Mounce 1965, 308)

Saariluoma's contribution begins with a similar approach to ethics. He is mainly concerned about the development of technology. In ethics, intelligent machines can be used in a weak or strong sense. Former (weak ethical AI) is dependent on humans giving information about their values to machines. In the latter case (strong ethical AI), machines can produce new ethical rules and principles by themselves – only by processing facts. (Saariluoma 2020b, 11–12)

As Saariluoma has noticed, Hume's guillotine has produced a conceptual barrier to strong ethical AI. After attempting to resolve Hume's guillotine, he concludes that strong ethical AI is possible. (Saariluoma, 14–15; Saariluoma 2021, 249) Thus, according to Saariluoma, arguments (or information processes) can be treated in ethics validly only as a factual matter. If machines can make practical inferences by themselves, strong ethical AI is possible. If they cannot, only weak ethical AI is possible.

To take problem-solving in the information processes of AI applications as superior to human discourse requires an understanding of the information processes which occur in the human mind and social discourses. Here is how Saariluoma proceeds to analyze possible future for ethics.

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[17] She poses this stance against the naturalistic fallacy – argument, which we will be analyzed later in the text (Anscombe, 176–177). The naturalistic fallacy -argument will be central for challenging naturalistic stances in this text.

To recognize a situation to be moral, one can start by checking whether it includes agents or not. Humans have needs and we set goals for satisfying them. Those goals are then pursued through different acts, practices, and the use of technological artifacts. People are also primarily social; we cooperate or end up in conflict while trying to reach each other's goals. Goals and different ways to reach them is referring to action. (Saariluoma 2020a, 123) We must be able to recognize the correct circumstances for morality to emerge: a phenomenon called action must be taken into account.

In the agent's mind action is represented by *cognition* and *emotion*. Former gives information about a situation where the agent happens to be, while the latter tells if the situation (or act that leads to a certain situation) is good or bad. (Saariluoma, 124) What connects emotions to the goodness and badness of acts? Emotions appear as positive or negative from the agent's point of view. This is conceptualized as emotional valence. Pleasure and pain, cold or warmth, and sorrow and joy are some examples of emotional valences. Information given from emotional valence is producing or preventing actions. (Saariluoma, 128; Harris, 12) Human cognition refers to how humans process information that is taken from their environment. The cognitive side of information processing includes registering thoughts and actions which have led people in particular situations. This information is then stored in memory, ready to be represented when action is taken into consideration. Cognition regulates people's actions. (Saariluoma, 126) Thus, the goodness and badness of acts are determined by the emotional outcome of given acts. If the outcome is positive, the act is good and if the outcome is negative, the act is bad.[18]

Cognition alone does not regulate human action to be good or bad. That happens only when emotion and cognition meet in the information processes of the mind. An individual can recognize situations cognitively positive (as leading towards good) from emotional states such as relaxation, happiness, humor, and benevolence. In the opposite case, when cognition appears as negative (as leading towards bad), danger-related emotions like excitement, fear, and courage appear. (Saariluoma, 127) (See also, "the good life and the bad life" (Harris, 26–27)) Linking emotion into certain cognitions is called appraisal. By using information given from appraisal, a certain type of action can be evaluated as allowed or forbidden.[19]

People learn from their experiences which type of action is good and which is bad. Rules to regulate action can be conducted from experience. (Saariluoma, 126) Ethics can be seen as the right type of information processing. When morally relevant information is analyzed correctly, no barrier between facts and values appears.

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[18] To make the process between emotion and cognition as criteria for moral goodness is one way to make a naturalistic stance in metaethics. As an alternative stance, which is also naturalistic, goodness and badness of action can be distanced by making sense of the agent's function in a given situation. Function in the sense of how a knife has a function to cut well (Foot 1961, 47).
[19] See critique towards this stance (Moore, 225).

Instead, new values get created to replace insufficient ones. This process leads to a correct opinion of good and bad acts in given circumstances. (Saariluoma, 127)

> When the association between smoking and lung cancer was found in the early 1960s, medical doctors in particular gave up smoking. Clearly, facts had a meaningful connection to how people decided to act. (Saariluoma 2021, 245)

We are recommended to view normative ethics as a real-life phenomenon (Saariluoma, 2020a, 124). If morally relevant matters – action, its circumstances, cognitions, and emotion – get studied carefully, a correct view on morality will emerge. However, there is a major block on the way to accepting this stance: Hume's guillotine and all the scholars who support it. How does Saariluoma face his opposition?

(2) Hume's guillotine means that one cannot determine how things ought to be based on how they are. Value creation is always narrowed in the sense that the distinction between an act that is morally good or a bad alternative, cannot be made solely on reason. Like Saariluoma, Hume sees ethics as human mental activity, not as a system of certain rules. (Hume, 334; Saariluoma, 126) However, Hume's sense of mental activity was a product of his time.

Hume understood emotion or passion as producing or preventing acts. On the other hand, reason dictates whether something is true or false. (Saariluoma, 126) Mental activity which can be categorized as emotional is different from mental states which can be categorized as reason or cognition based. Saariluoma agrees with those statements, but Hume's stance continues; because emotional and cognitive mental states are different, they are also opposite in the sense that one does not affect the other. That does not hold true with current research in mind. Since emotions get affected by cognitive activity, we must take reason to be capable of producing values. (Harris, 158–159, 164; Saariluoma 2020a, 128; Saariluoma 2020b, 13; Saariluoma 2021, 246)

> Cognitive and emotional aspects of situations are encoded in a parallel manner. This is why, the very question whether (cognitive) facts be used to define (emotional) values is senseless. Facts and values are two sides of one and the same mental event. (Saariluoma 2020b, 13)

Emotion and cognition are complementary in the sense that both faculties are necessary to produce ethical experiences. Those experiences can be generalized through social discourse so that rules and even laws can be inferred. Hume's guillotine is supported by the mistaken understanding of mental states and their connection to action. By correcting those flaws, we can circumvent Hume's guillotine and move on to investigate morality as a factual matter. (Saariluoma 2021, 247)

(3) Here is my short analysis of Saariluoma's contribution. He claims that conceptual barriers have been removed from the way of empirical ethics due to the fall of Hume's guillotine. Saariluoma highlights the importance of argument analysis for practicing normative ethics. (2021, 247) Argument analysis is necessary also for metaethical problems such as Hume's guillotine. So far Saariluoma has taken Hume's concepts about informational processes and mental states into account, but concepts and analysis on inferential rules remain untouched. He notices how Hume introduced the problem by referring to mistaken derivation and impossible deduction (Saariluoma 2020b, 11; Hume, 334), but leaves inferential rules out of his attempt to overcome Hume's guillotine. This is a mistake since those who support Hume's guillotine focus mainly on inferential analysis. Because of this, Saariluoma's contribution lacks commentary on the critics of his views.

We will see how Saariluoma has referred to some arguments which are contradictory in the debates between philosophers. For instance, he mentions foundational analysis in ethics (Saariluoma 2021, 247), even though it has been used for supporting Hume's guillotine (MacIntyre, 452; Atkinson, 232, 234) Foundationalism is also generally speaking contradictory to any form of naturalism (Godfrey-Smith, 149–150). This contradiction has not been mentioned in the way of resolving Hume's guillotine. Also, Moore's *Principia Ethica* is cited as an example of how emotions are needed for ethical reasoning (Saariluoma 2021, 245), while in that very work, Moore introduces his famous argument labeled naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 10). We will see how Moore's argument aims to show just what Hume's guillotine proposes: facts about emotions (or any fact) cannot be used as the valid reason for how people ought to act.

Harris was criticized for not engaging more directly with the academic literature of moral philosophy. His answer to the critics was first that, since he met with the "is/ought" -problem in the non-philosophical studies, he proceeded to focus on handling it with non-philosophical studies and secondly:

> …I am convinced that every appearance of terms like 'metaethics,' 'deontology,' 'noncognitivism,' 'antirealism,' 'emotivism,' etc., directly increases the amount of boredom in the universe. My goal, both in speaking at conferences like TED and in writing this book, is to start a conversation that a wider audience can engage with and find helpful. Few things would make this goal harder to achieve than for me to speak and write like an academic philosopher. (Harris, 252)

I happen to agree with the point made above, thus, by this investigation, I am guilty of increasing the boredom in the universe.[20] The abstract language of academic philosophy is hardly open to a wider audience, and it might also be difficult

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[20] This is also what John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) admits about his work and adds that the philosopher's burden of boredom is greater than those who only read philosophy: "Of course,

to connect with the language and practices of other sciences. However, Harris does add that of course some commentary on philosophical contributions is necessary (2012, 252). What I wish to point out to Saariluoma and Harris, is that both of their contributions lack the commentary of correct and incorrect formulas to make valid inferences in ethics. The little amount spent on philosophy while contributing to the "is/ought" -problem should include commentary on the right type of reasoning. The "no ought from is" -principle is always supported concerning correct reasoning and critique towards the support should provide the own version of correct reasoning. How else can ethical investigations begin, if not by proper framing of questions and formulations of arguments?

Saariluoma's contribution consists of analyzing the information processes of the mind, action, and social discourses. Saariluoma's contribution lacks analysis of the right type of inferential rules for ethical reasoning. This is what we seek to correct in the following chapters. Conceptual barriers to his ethical naturalism can be found.

2.3   Attempted inferences from "is" to "ought" -statements

For me the "no ought from is" -principle seems to twist ethics into political or artistic activity. In those activities value differences are often taken as given – not a matter of dispute. What makes ethics its discipline, is the fact that it allows value differences as starting point (as ethical disagreement), not as a result of ethical practices.

Take for instance a simple situation: "Smith did accidentally put his finger in the fire." Now consider two alternative acts; "Run to the freezer for some ice" or "Keep holding your finger in fire". What is the reason for choosing one act over another? My intuition has been clear: avoiding unnecessary suffering and increasing the well-being of humanity. Thus, what Smith ought to do in a given situation is the first act: He ought to run to the freezer.

Hume's guillotine is in contradiction with my stance above. Even with a compromise that Hare labeled "supervenience"[21] (Hare, 1972, 153; Hudson, 249), Hume's guillotine has not satisfied my reason. Yes, there are some matters which could be treated by referring to someone's taste rather than generalizable experience. For instance, Hare mentions a choice between good and bad cacti and argues that this choice must be made only by referring to one's values (Hare, 96–97). However, these types of examples, which Philippa Foot (1920–2010) called "complicated examples",

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this is bound to be a little boring and dry to listen and digest; not nearly as much to think and write." (Austin, 164)

[21] Supervenience means: one can partly reason by facts, but never only by them and there must always be evaluative statements included in the premises of an ethical argument. See also (Moore, 131).

do not tend to appear in serious ethical disputes about what humans ought to do (Foot, 46–47). Why value differences must be included in the reasoning over general phenomena such as physical safety? Physical safety is something that humans in general take as valuable and thus a general *need* for humankind. Basic human needs are central to ethical thinking (Saariluoma 2020a, 123). Value differences should be taken as something to be treated by politics or artistic activity, never by ethics which includes the look for generalizable knowledge.[22]

MacIntyre's article: *Hume on 'is' and 'ought'* (1959), is rooted in the naturalistic understanding of ethics. Value differences reduce ethical disagreements to the level of opinion. For instance, the sentence: "I prefer pizza for healthy food, and this is why you ought to let me eat it" refers to value differences. For MacIntyre, a central reason for opposing the "no ought from is" -principle, was the fact that acceptance of value differences makes moral knowledge something contingent. Even statements such as "one ought to commit occasional killing", could be proven as morally good due to Hume's guillotine. But ethics is and should be a discipline where statements like these can be denied reasonably. With the acceptance of Hume's guillotine, it seems impossible. If it is possible, an example ought to be served. (MacIntyre, 461–462)

To come clean about how MacIntyre tried to improve ethics from hopeless contingency (i.e. relativism), we must go through the following themes. 1) How the problem of induction can be treated. 2) Similarity between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine. 3) How arguments are formulated in ethics by those who support and those who reject Hume's guillotine and why the latter is the correct view.

(1) MacIntyre presented Hume's guillotine by referring to Hare's way of valid argumentation in ethics. Hare recommends always using the "principle of conduct" which must be placed into premises to make valid inferences in ethics (Hare 1972, 56).[23] This principle cannot be denied or accepted by any statement of fact (MacIntyre, 453). For criticizing this view, MacIntyre contrasts it to the problem of induction – another issue, which origin can be found in Hume's writings. The problem of

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[22] Throughout this study, I make some commentary on how ethics is different from other fields in society, like politics, art, therapy, religion, and so on. I have only provided my own sense of these fields and their practices and have not justified it with other authors' views. Such comparisons seem to be absent in those "is/ought" -contributions that I am familiar with. I have nevertheless found these comparisons useful to be added in studies of the "is/ought" -question, even though they mostly serve the role of rhetorics in this contribution. We should increase our understanding of how ethics is (and should be) positioned in our society and culture.

[23] An example of Hare's and MacIntyre's formulation of an ethical argument has been provided below. For now, the principle of conduct is a statement that makes the word "ought" appear already in the premises of an ethical argument and not only in the conclusion. Thus, ethical argument includes inference from values to "ought" -conclusion, not only from facts into "ought" -conclusion, like a naturalist, requires. (MacIntyre, 462)

induction problematizes the following questions. What reason do we have for expecting patterns observed in our past experience to hold also to the future? What justification do we have for using past observations as a basis for generalization about things we have not yet observed? (Godfrey-Smith, 39; Hume, 2017, 16)

The presentation of the problem of induction has been taken mistakenly as Hume being skeptical of *every* way of making valid inductive inferences. As underlying motivation for interpreting him as such, is a wish to show how induction can be taken as one type of deduction (Strawson, 1964, 250; MacIntyre, 453). Instead, Hume lays out two alternatives: "Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or of the imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by certain association and relation of perceptions." (Hume, 64) First alternative, is "means of the understanding" and "reason", while the second alternative is "imagination" and "certain association and relation of perceptions." Which one will give us reasons for expecting the patterns observed in our past experience to hold also to the future?

> Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. (Hume, 64)

The correct interpretation of Hume is to take him as a supporter of the second alternative. The reason for taking induction as valid is provided by imagination and associations and the relation of perceptions. Instead, of denying the use of inductive arguments, Hume is showing how there are no *demonstrative* (deductive) arguments to prove how induction is possible. Hume in fact is arguing that we cannot render inductive arguments deductive. (MacIntyre, 453–454) This is what "the problem of induction" means in the context of interpreting Hume, though other influences may make "the problem of induction" an unsolvable problem. Also, other interpretations have been given to Hume's stance on the matter. Here, we present only MacIntyres take on the issue.

As an example of inductive reasoning, we can pass from "The kettle has been on a fire for ten minutes" to "So it will be boiling by now." This inference is made by our experience with boiling water. However, those who want to render inductive arguments deductive have regarded extra premise for such inferences: "Whenever kettles have been on a fire for ten minutes, they boil." The use of such a premise is labeled entailment.[24] There is no use for entailing inductive arguments since whatever is questionable without it, remains just as questionable with the extra premise. Also,

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[24] According to *The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy 4th edition*, logical entailment means a relationship between statements that is only deductive. Entailment is introduced by Moore, and it holds between p and q when and only when q can be logically deduced from p. (Proudfoot, Lacey, 2010, 181)

if this argument is supported by an extra premise, this premise itself would require support and another premise would have to be generated for that. This way, the reasoning falls into infinite regress. (MacIntyre, 454) Thus, inductive inferences should be accepted the way they are, not completely certain like deductive ones, but the best which we have for refreshing and repairing our state of knowledge.

(2) From the problem of induction, MacIntyre moves to compare it with Hume's guillotine. Here, we go through MacIntyres analogy between these two problems.

If there are valid scientific inferences between is -statement and another is -statement, which do not have to be entailed by any extra premise including principle of conduct, why should there be such a principle in an ethical argument? While refusing to put any principle in his inferences from is -statements to ought -statements, Macintyre tries to show how those inferences are made instead by a certain type of experience. This sub-class of is -statements includes concepts such as: wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, happiness, health, and so on. Those are morally relevant concepts. The inference for bridging the gap between "is" and "ought" -statements, can be made by using one of those concepts in the premises of an ethical argument. (MacIntyre, 461–463) Here similarity with Saariluoma's contribution can be found, since for him, ethics aims to improve the quality of human life (Saariluoma 2020a, 125).

Thus, if we wish to make sense of how one ought to act in a given situation, it begins by analyzing experiences about happiness, health, pleasure, and so on. The source for these experiences is not subjective like some propose (Harris, 46–47). Instead, it is communicated from one person to another in private as well as public forums. Social discourse helps people to make up their minds about what will follow from the act in certain situations. Thus, rules and norms can be created. (Saariluoma 2021, 245–247)

MacIntyre presents social aspects of ethical reasoning by discussing Hume's investigation of justice. Without obedience to commonly accepted rules, societies fall into chaos which is infinitely worse than anything supposed to happen otherwise. Since consensus of interest is better for everybody in long term, there is no reason for denying it. (MacIntyre, 456–457) Let's consider consensus of interest in contrast to institutions.

Searle made the famous argument on how the use of institutional facts is necessary for ethical reasoning. If it is the case that Jones utters the words, which have the meaning of promising, he thus, is part of creating or maintaining an institution of

promising and there is nothing evaluative to infer from those descriptions in conclusion: Jones ought to keep what is promised. (Searle 1964, 43–47)[25]

In contrast to MacIntyre's general use of "consensus of interest", Searle points to rather a particular fact about the speech act of promising. Those acts constitute more general phenomena called institutions, which is a general phenomenon than MacIntyre's "consensus of interest." However, they serve a similar role in ethical arguments as social facts.

The problem of induction had been treated similarly to Hume's guillotine. Some propose that "induction can be shown to be really a kind of deduction" (MacIntyre, 453) and they have required to put extra premise for inductive inferences so that the argument in question becomes entailed and founded. The same requirement has been proposed for inductive inferences in the context of formulating an ethical argument. Among other reasons, these extra premises are useless, because they lead to an infinite regress. There is no formal solution for either inductive inference in general or inductive inferences in the context of ethics. The ethical argument is done by referring to the right type of facts including psychological and sociological matters about a given morally relevant situation.

(3) While morally relevant facts have now been provided, next we analyze how ethical arguments are formulated by those who support and those who reject Hume's guillotine.

Here is how MacIntyre presents inductive inference from factual premises into a conclusion about morality: "If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail; but I do not want to go to jail; so I ought not to (had better not) stick a knife in him." (MacIntyre, 462) The first premise refers to the sociological fact about the consensus of interest: stabbing is not allowed by others. It could also refer to some institutions like Searle would have pointed out. The second premise shows the psychological state of the agent in question: not wanting to take the consequences of a given act. Confirming these factual statements requires inductive inferences. The conclusion

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[25] While I have used many important points from Searle's contribution, we will not go through his argument step by step regardless of its influence in the "is/ought" -discussion. Briefly taken, Searle infers from facts to values through these steps:
  (1) Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars'.
  (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
  (3) Jones placed himself (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
  (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. (Searle, 44)
The idea is to begin from the utterance of certain words, move into speech act of promising, and then into obligation where "ought" can finally be derived. By beginning from purely descriptive meanings and showing how an "ought" -statement can be reached by deductive inferences, Searle attempts to show how any principle or evaluations are not needed along the way. (Flew 1964, 28)

follows deductively from these factual premises: the act in question is not (morally) allowed.

What would supporters of Hume's guillotine do differently? The practical argument above could be entailed by premise such as: "If it is both the case that if I do *x,* the outcome will be *y,* then if I don't want *y* to happen, I ought not to do *x.*" (MacIntyre, 462) This premise itself seems like an argument, but those who require ethical arguments to be entailed, treat this as a single premise (MacIntyre, 463) Addition of this premise is what Hare insists on when he requires the principle of conduct as the major premise for an ethical argument.[26] Thus, ethical arguments become founded like proponents of Hume's guillotine seek to attain.

Do we need such entailment? MacIntyre offers three reasons for denying the demand for the principle of conduct. Firstly, every inductive argument would be replaced by deductive ones, but as mentioned, there is no use for such a procedure in the case of fact-to-fact inferences so there should not be one in the case of fact-to-value -arguments. Secondly, by entailing our arguments in Hare's way, we have reproduced the argument in its non-entailment form as that premise. Anything questionable in the original argument remains just as questionable inside the major premise. Finally, there is a reasonable alternative for making fact-to-value inferences. They are made by the sub-class of is -statements, which refer to sociological and psychological facts (MacIntyre, 463).

By investigating psychological facts (health, happiness, and so on), and connecting them to the investigation of sociological facts (consensus of interest), MacIntyre proposes to be making valid inferences from is -statements into ought -statements. Searle attempts to overcome Hume's guillotine and naturalistic fallacy as well. He focuses strictly on institutional facts about promising. Saariluoma proposes that emotional valence and the strict connection between cognitions and emotions can be used as a factual reason to tell what one ought to do. These facts could be labeled as an attempt to define moral criteria for action.[27] Are we to take naturalism as a correct answer for the "is/ought" -question?

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[26] Notice how Moore formulates the same requirement: "…what is meant by saying that Ethics should be 'based' on Metaphysics. It is meant that some knowledge of supersensible reality is necessary *as a premise* for correct conclusions as to what ought to exist." (Moore, 114) For Moore though, metaphysical reality as the foundation to ethics does not exist (Moore, 112).

[27] In the context of this investigation, we will not try to argue if one naturalistic stance excludes another in the case of a right or wrong understanding of moral criteria for action. Later, I will argue that the problem of the relationship between is and ought, is in the right or wrong description of what counts as a moral phenomenon. One of those descriptions is the fact that action must be taken into account in the ethical argument as a requirement to take it as an ethical argument.

2.4 Against Naturalism

MacIntyre's critics elaborated on the need for entailing ethical inferences. Unfortunately, they did not make comments about the problem of induction. Also, they did not try to correct what MacIntyre missed, while making the analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine. This is what we will attempt to do in the third chapter. Still, going through the criticism of MacIntyre's and Searle's contributions, we understand the situation better and provide other ways to challenge naturalism. We also come clear with a theoretical narrative between opposite stances, which will be presented in this work.

We begin to challenge naturalism, by giving a reason for accepting evaluative statements as part of the premises of an argument about morality. 1) People's tendency to commit to things as a reason for evaluations. Next, we turn to naturalistic defense for criticism. 2) Why commitments must be handled by separate questions. This chapter includes both criticism and support of naturalism. In the next one, we go deeper into criticism.

(1) Ronald Field Atkinson (1928–2005) pointed out how there are evaluative matters, which can only be presented by evaluative statements (sub-class of ought -statements), and inferences from a set of is -statements are impossible without including evaluative statements into premises.[28] Thus, ethical reasoning must always include a transfer from an ought -statement into an ought -conclusion. Some values are foundational whereas others are not. And whether people stand for one foundational value or some other must be taken as an open question. (Atkinson, 234) Foundationalism is a stance against naturalism that takes it as a duty for philosophers to find a certain basis for empirical knowledge and scientific knowledge in general. Naturalists take often a skeptical stance toward the possibility to find such a basis. (Godfrey-Smith, 149–150) Let's postpone the meaning of open questions for the next chapter.

The requirement to use evaluations separately from facts becomes reasonable by taking foundational ought -statements as someone's *commitment* to a certain value (Hudson, 251). In the following, Hudson elaborates on the meaning of commitment.

In the case of Hume dealing with justice, MacIntyre interpreted him as using consensus of interest as one of the factual premises for ethical arguments (1959, 456–457). Hudson disagrees with that interpretation. He asks us to notice how agreement or convention must be taken as logically distinct from the circumstances in which it

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[28] See also the distinction between consequential and constitutive attributes (Ross, 2009, 121) and the supervenient character of moral terms (Hare, 1972, 153). (Hudson, 249) Supervenience means: one can partly reason by facts, but never only by them and there must always be evaluative statements included into the premises of an ethical argument.

is made. To find agreement or convention is to expect others to do the same. This commitment of others cannot be inferred from inducements that can be found in circumstances of a given situation. Hume distances inducements such as motives to find agreement, from the agreement itself. (Hudson, 251) By inducements, Hudson refers to those psychological and sociological facts which MacIntyre pointed out to be moral criteria for action. Hudson claims that if a person is not committed to the same underlying values as others are, any inducement – even commonly accepted ones – will not count for that person.

To elaborate on the requirement for distancing factual inducements from evaluative commitments, Hudson makes an analogy between the rules of football and every motive around people who play or watch football. To play, one must commit to the rules of the game which is distinct from every motive to score in that game. Those motives describe the circumstances of football, which is not the same as a commitment to the rules of football. (Hudson, 251) Thus, value differences are like differences between games we commit or do not commit to playing.

For example, it has generally been taken that biological sex is divided into two: male and female. What a man ought to do in a given situation, has been derived from what a male is, and which roles males generally partake in in human relationships across cultures. This is naturalistic reasoning over the roles of man and Hudson's stance criticizes its validity. By making a case of how value differences are like different games we commit or do not commit to playing, he becomes close to what Judith Butler (1956–) argued about human gender. Sex is distinct from gender and different genders are like performing different roles in a theater (Butler 1990, 270–271).[29] Making a performance and committing to a game are taken as analogous to accepting value differences in ethics. This stance aims to narrow the generalizability of moral knowledge over norms that are specific to gender: what a male or what a female ought to do in certain situations.

Hudson finishes his contribution by mentioning how ethical reasoning must be taken as something which is logically distinct from practical inferences (Hudson, 252). However correct one might be on practical issues, it does not seal the deal for not making a fallacy in ethics. This is because ethics does not seek only practical solutions, but also valid reasons for them (Moore, 20).[30] As the opposite stance with MacIntyre's one, valid reasoning in ethics is tied into acceptance of values as a sub-

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[29] Butler discusses "performative assertions" or "speech acts" in contrast to gender roles. This concept is coined by Austin, whose contribution to the "is/ought" -question will be analyzed later in this text.

[30] What Hudson and Moore separate from practical ethics, is metaethics. And there are practical stances in metaethics, MacIntyre's naturalism being one of them. But in this context, Hudson implies that MacIntyre has been mixing those two. Similarly, Moore implies that for instance, Bentham has been mixing those two (Moore, 18). Instead of just facing the metaethical disagreement, they seem to be elbowing naturalists into another field of study, so that they can take care of metaethics. This is sneaky since metaethics dictates practical ethics – reasoning in practice is dependent on reasoning at the meta-level.

class of ought -statements, which does not convert into sub-class of is -statements. These values must be taken as the foundation for practical reasoning in ethics.

(2) For the rest of this chapter, we will turn to hear naturalistic answers for the given critique. This allows us to move fluently into the naturalistic fallacy -argument which is presented in the next chapter.

While Hudson's argument for accepting value differences as part of ethical argumentation leaves me suspicious, there certainly are ought -statements only for those who are committed to playing for example soccer. If one is not committed to playing, statements like: "As a field player you ought not to touch the ball with your hands" would not apply to him and he could reasonably disagree with reason: "But, I am not committed to playing soccer like you entail me to be." However, is this an evaluative or factual premise? One could as reasonably mention just that: "But, I am not playing soccer" or "I do not want to play soccer," which are statements of fact, and which as well would serve as a reason to disagree. The fact that relationship between statements is entailment does not imply that both statements cannot be factual ones.

Even if one were using the term "commitment" for disagreeing in this case, it does not seem to be paraphrasing what one ought to do. Consider if it were. Phrase: "But I ought not to play soccer" begs a reason: "Why you ought not?", and since this question also requires justification, it cannot be answered by: "Because I ought not", which would make the line of reasoning tautological. Instead, the question must be answered by: "Because I am not committed," and what commitment means, remains untouched. Thus, I do not see how there must be an inference from ought -statement to ought -statement to derive from facts into values.

Here, I am mimicking what Searle had to say about possible objections to his naturalistic stance. The problem of those who support Hume's guillotine and naturalistic fallacy is the failure to distinguish external questions about the institution of promise from internal questions asked within the framework of the institution (Searle, 50–51).

1) Ought we to have such institutionalized forms of obligation as promising?[31]
2) Ought one to keep one's promises?

Questions in the first section are external questions. They are asked about and not within the institution of promise (Searle, 50–51). Consider Hudson's example about soccer: "Ought we institutionalize rules to soccer?" To use this as an analogy

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[31] Searle includes a question: "Why do we have such an institution as promising?" into the first category of the question as another example (50–51). For simplicity, we use one question as an example for each category.

to every type of ethical discussion, this is like an invitation to have an ethical discussion. If someone refuses to participate in an ethical discussion or stops participating during the ethical discussion, whether he should refuse to participate (or stop participating) is certainly a different question than the actual topic of that ethical discussion. And, since the question is different, it should not be attempted to answer at the same time.

The question in the second section is internal to the institution of promising (Searle, 50). For example, one could ask: "Ought you to touch the ball by hand as a field player of soccer?" Here, we wonder if the field player's actions are restricted in the way that hands cannot be used for touching the ball. While arguing for and against this rule, there is no use in presupposing those arguments with the premise which entails them in the context of soccer. This information is already provided in the question. Also, the information makes it clear to everyone that these arguments are not meant to restrict anything outside of soccer. Thus, questions that are external to an institution can be problematized and answered *separately* from questions that are internal to an institution. The logical distinction can be made at the level of posing questions, not necessarily at the level of formulating arguments.

There is an unwanted consequence for making the logical distinction in the level of argumentation, like required by supporters of the "no ought from is" -principle. Remember the principle of conduct[32] which would have entailed MacIntyre's example of Smith stabbing someone. Searle's example could be entailed by a similar premise so that "ought" would appear already in the premises of an ethical argument. A premise such as: "One ought to keep one's promises," would make the argument in question infer from "ought" to "ought" as well as from "is" to "ought." However, it does not support our argument in any way since ought -statement to ought -conclusion inferences are tautological. In this case, they have derived from two tautologies; "All promises are (create, are undertakings of, are acceptances of) obligations." and "One ought to keep (fulfill) one's obligations." (Searle, 50–51) While MacIntyre showed the fall into infinite regress (1959, 454, 462), Searle pointed to the same outcome by analyzing how extra premises required by supporters of the "no ought from is" -principle lead to a tautology.

By separating external questions about the institutions from internal ones, tautologies, and infinite regress can be avoided.

We have gone through some of the reasons for denying the naturalistic stance in the "is/ought" -debate. Firstly, foundationalism is a stance generally opposed to naturalism. It seeks to provide a basis for knowledge in ethics (and generally in science).

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[32] Principle of conduct: "If it is both the case that if I do x, the outcome will be y, then if I don't want y to happen, I ought not to do x." (MacIntyre, 462)

Atkinson made a case for requiring foundational values to be presented in the premises of an ethical argument. Hudson added a reason for that. Since value differences are analogous to different games we commit or do not commit to playing, it is not reasonable to try overcoming these value differences in ethical disputes. Searle's naturalistic answer to this critique is that no entailment of evaluations is needed because if one is or is not playing a game, questions about it must be treated separately from questions that ask what one ought to do while playing the game. Thus, evaluative entailment is not required in the level of formulating arguments, but carefulness of which questions one pose is. By failing to distance external questions about institutions from intrinsic ones, one falls into a tautology. With these pro- and contrapositions for naturalism in mind, we are more than ready to dive into the deep end of criticizing the naturalistic stance in metaethics.

3 TEMPORALITY & CHOICE

3.1 Deeper into criticism: the naturalistic fallacy

From ought -statement to ought -conclusion inferences are tautological according to Searle and they lead into infinite regress like MacIntyre analyzed. However, they missed the crucial part of how supporters of the "no ought from is" -principle understands the reasoning. Searle got criticized for following. No tautology appears, since the inference is made from a *substantial* ought -statement into a practical ought -conclusion (Flew, 1964, 29). Practical reasoning is supported by a naturalistic stance in this case since naturalistic thinkers do take practical (instrumental) reasoning as the preferred type of reasoning (Godfrey-Smith, 152–153).

To support the "no ought from is" -principle, one must make a distinction between metaphysical and empirical reasoning (Moore, 39, 110). Naturalistic arguments must be entailed by metaphysical (foundational) premises, and they cannot be entailed another way around[33] (Moore, 33; Atkinson, 232). No doubt, Searle and MacIntyre would have been able to proceed into criticism of the attempt to separate reasoning into empirical and metaphysical, but it is surprising how the subject was left implicit in their contributions. They do not use concepts metaphysical or substantial in their texts, which has led some room for criticism.

Both MacIntyre and Searle mentioned the naturalistic fallacy as contradicting their views (MacIntyre, 462; Searle, 48). This is a label for an metaethical argument,

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[33] Moore discusses the distinction between naturalistic and metaphysical by concepts of "parts" and "a whole." Naturalistic thinkers take the whole to be the sum of its parts, while those who require an answer to metaphysical questions, take a whole to be always more than its parts. This "more" must be understood as a thing in itself – a substance – and while inferences are possible from a substance into facts (i.e. from whole to its parts), inferences are impossible from facts into substance (i.e. from parts to its whole). (Moore, 31–33)

which shares the same conclusion with Hume's guillotine: from facts to value inferences cannot be made. The naturalistic fallacy is originally formulated by G. E. Moore in *Principia Ethica* (1903).

To understand what is meant by naturalistic fallacy, we must go through the following themes. 1) Searle's pair of questions compared to Moore's ones. 2) Meaning of naturalism. 3) How metaphysics goes beyond time. 4) Distinction between good as means and good as an end. 5) Meaning of open question. The conclusion which can be drawn from these themes is that the good, which ethics is dependent on, is indefinable. Still, all of us are aware of the simple quality of goodness. (Moore, 17, 38) To be aware of something does not have to mean it can be defined. Thus, good in itself must be narrowed outside of disputes.

(1) In the beginning of *Principia Ethica*, Moore formulates two type of questions, which ethicists should take into consideration (1959, viii). These classifications are more than useful to contrast with Searle's ones.

1) What kind of things ought to exist for their own sake?
2) What kind of actions ought we to perform?

The second question here, is a general version of Searle's singular one: "Ought one to keep one's promises?", and they would have agreed over these types of questions. Let's label these as ground-level questions. The difference with Searle lies in the first question: "Ought we to have such institutionalized forms of obligation as promising?" Moore asks a metaphysical question about things that ought to exist, while Searle asks whether an institution ought to be constituted to regulate certain behavior. Let's name these as meta-questions. While ethics is distanced into metaethics and practical ethics and practical ethics answers to questions which I labeled "ground level" -questions, by "meta-question" I mean questions concerning metaethics. That means questions concerning the basic principles and ideas which dictate practical ethics.

The separation between metaphysical and empirical reasoning, and the requirement to take metaphysical knowledge as the foundation for empirical knowledge, twists Searle's critique another way around. If we accept the separation and foundationalism, it is a naturalist who ends up in tautology in ethical reasoning (Moore, 38).[34] Searle must have been familiar with Moore's work since he labeled his attempt to show how naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy (Searle, 48).

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[34] But not only naturalists. Those who make the connection between what is real and what is good – even if stating this metaphysically – also end up in naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 38–39, 123–124). Moore notices that labeling the fallacy in question "naturalistic" might lead to misinter-

(2) How does Moore define naturalism? We have a notion of a natural object because it appears to our senses – it is part of our experience. In contrast to a natural object, we can make inferences about objects which are taken to exist in a supersensible world. The human experience is intuitively felt to extend over the sensible world. For instance, time is a phenomenon that is likely to be categorized as something which is separate from what can be sensed. Supersensible objects are narrowed into the subject matter of metaphysics. What makes an object natural, is our ability to see, feel, touch, taste or smell it. Also, being conscious of it could be taken as part of experiencing an object. For instance, memories are part of our experience, and we can be only conscious of them. Memories are not supersensible objects. If ethics were naturalistic, the reasoning in ethics would be made by observation and inductive inferences. It would make ethics to be an empirical science. (Moore, 38–39)

A natural object is also something that exists in time. This means that the object must have existed, exists now, or will exist. And even though a thought existed yesterday, but does not exist anymore, it must be treated as a natural object. So, if some object must be categorized as natural, it must be put to a test. Is it sensible? Does it exist in time? If one can answer yes to these questions, the object must be taken as a natural one. (Moore, 40–41)

> Whether good be defined as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired or felt: whichever of these or of any other object in the world, good may be held to *mean*, the theory, which holds it to mean them, will be a naturalistic theory. (Moore, 40)

Saariluoma's theory about how we can make sense of morality by making sense of ethical information processes is a naturalistic theory. Information processes of the mind, emotional valence, and action are naturalistic objects which must be taken as existing in time. Harris, MacIntyre, and Searle fall into the same category.

(3) While we become aware of naturalistic objects by our senses, our reasoning is not narrowed only to sensible. Instead, reasoning can be taken to reach objects which cannot be sensed but still exists. Now, naturalistic objects have been taken as existing in time, but what about time itself? Is it a natural object? Many would argue it exists separately from sensible objects. The subject matter of metaphysics includes also those things which are not natural, but do neither exist. Numbers are certainly something that we can refer to by terms ("Two" or "2"), but according to Moore, numbers do not exist. To expand our reasoning from a narrow empirical type, we

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pretations (Moore, 14). Maybe the label "descriptive fallacy" would have served us better (Austin, 2009, 71; Hare, 1963, 240), but let's not make things complicated since the label "naturalistic fallacy" has become the standard in the context of Moore's stance.

must take objects like time in itself and numbers as part of the subject matter of our studies. Thus, metaphysics must be taken into account. (Moore, 110–111)

Supersensible reality consists of things that exist and are not sensible, and of things that do not exist at all. Now we approach to most important characteristics which define Moore's thinking. I interpret it to be metaphysical skepticism. (Notice that Moore never used such a label for his stance.)

Metaphysicians have made the mistake of simply accepting that if some object does not exist in time and is not sensible, it must exist as a supersensible reality. In contrast to religion, metaphysicians have thought that they have succeeded to point towards reasons why supersensible objects exist while religious beliefs have been held without any reasons (Moore, 112). Supersensible objects as a whole, refer to supersensible reality. But what about objects which do not exist? Isn't it a possibility that if some object has been recognized as supersensible and not natural, it also can be something that does not exist at all?

Moore goes far with his skepticism. He takes every attempt of metaphysicians to have failed of giving proof of supersensible objects which does exist. The only thing where metaphysicians have succeeded is to show objects which are not natural but also do not exist at all. Good in itself is one of those non-existing objects. (Moore, 110–112) Thus, the reasoning for Moore is distanced between the temporal and what goes beyond it. No existence of an object has been proved that goes beyond time – goodness being one of those objects. Good has no foundation in metaphysics and yet, good in itself must be taken as a supersensible object.

> I define 'metaphysical,' therefore, by a reference to supersensible *reality*; although I think that the only non-natural objects, about which it has *succeeded* in obtaining truth, are objects which do not exist at all. (Moore, 112)

(4) Let's come back to naturalistic thought. What are they really thinking while making arguments such as "If act X is most suitable for alternative acts for increasing happiness for every person involved in the situation, act X ought to be chosen instead of alternatives?" First, the sentence "Act X ought to be chosen instead of alternatives" can be taken as paraphrasing a sentence "Act X is good." (Moore, 1–2) Second, their reasoning mixes good as means into good in itself. Latter would serve as the foundation for ethics if it could be proven. But as long as such foundation remains unproven, making sense of good as means can only tell us how to get from point A to point B as efficiently as possible. Statements such as "act like this and you become happier" only show a causal link between less happy and more happy states, and how the transition from the first state into the second state is made in a good way. (Moore, 18–23)[35]

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[35] Compare Moore's idea about causal links to "instrumental reasoning" (Godfrey-Smith, 152–153)

Good in this sense, means how things and goals (whether they were happiness, pleasure, health, evolutionarily evolved, and so on) can be attained (Moore, 42, 54–55, 61). Good as means does not tell which goals ought to be attained instead of other goals. For this, we need another concept, which Moore labels good as an end or good in itself (Moore, 17–18). Those who fail to see the difference between means and ends are mistaken to see ethics as a study of human conduct – as a practical study. Ethics must be taken as a field of study where we seek to find valid reasons for goodness – valid reasons for accepting one goal instead of another. (Moore, 18, 20, 115)

How the difference between good as means and good as an end can be explained? For instance, Saariluoma mentioned how a change in factual understanding about the effects of smoking changed people's understanding of does one ought to smoke or not (Saariluoma 2021, 245). If Moore is right, the only thing that happened was that people got a better understanding of how to get from an unhealthy state into a healthier state, but this is not what ethics is about. No change in what people took as a good end to be acting towards was changed because of the new fact. People took health as a good end before facts about the connection between cancer and smoking and they took health as a good end after these facts. What changed after the fact, was people's practical understanding of how to get a healthier life. The primary question for ethics is to give reasons for denying or approving health as a good end and this did not change at all, even though new empirical knowledge emerged about the relationship between smoking and cancer. Alternatively, the good in itself could be excellence and not health, and providing reasons for this is the primary task for ethicists (Moore, 43).

Those who look for a metaphysical basis for ethics instead of a naturalistic one have failed as well (Moore, 114–115). They make a strict connection between what is real and what is good (Moore, 124–125). But one cannot infer from how things are to how things ought to be, even if the understanding of how things are (what is described) is produced by metaphysics. To prove this, Moore recommends that we ask if the following phrases have the same meaning; "This is good in all cases" and "This happens in all cases." The sentences are not paraphrasing each other. If one attempts to make the connection between what is real and what is good, one only reaches the meaning of the latter sentence. What is good in all cases remains untouched. (Moore, 126)

(5) Finally, we are recommended to approach good in itself as an open question.[36]

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[36] Notice that the concept of "open question" appears only in a few places in *Principia Ethica* (Moore, 21, 43–44). Nevertheless, Moore's argument against naturalism has been remembered as "the open question" -argument (Altman, 2004, 395–396). Moore does not offer a definition for this concept, but he uses it in the way which can be interpreted as questions that cannot be answered reasonably. Compare this interpretation to the phrase "good then is indefinable" (Moore, 17).

While the "naturalistic fallacy" -argument shows how reasoning does not work, the "open question" -argument defines how good in itself must be treated. If we try to provide reasons why a statement: "healthy is good," is true, and a statement: "excellence is good," is false (or vice versa), we are unable to give valid reasons for that. This is because healthy must be defined as normal in comparison to abnormal, and many things which are abnormal are also good. For instance, the excellence of Socrates or Shakespeare was not at all normal, but we do define it as good. Thus, whether the good is healthy instead of excellence, should be taken as an open question. (Moore, 42–44)

Moore asks us to consider the question "What *sort of* things are good, what are the things which whether they *are* real or not, ought to be real?" We do not ask only what exists and what is real. This would lead to an endless catalog of all the good things in the universe. (Moore, 118–119) Moore takes us to be able to decide, what out of endless possibilities for existing things, should we choose as ends for our actions. Not only how we act, but also what ought to be our criterion for those actions.

"What is good in itself?" reminds an open question. The right answer cannot be provided. But how we are even aware of the good as an object if it does not exist and is not sensible? Moore's positive account of indefinable goodness runs as follows.

> Whenever he thinks of 'intrinsic value,' or 'intrinsic worth,' or says that a thing 'ought to exist,' he has before his mind the unique object – the unique property of things – which I mean by 'good.' Everybody is constantly aware of this notion, although he may never become aware at all that it is different from other notions of he is also aware. But, for correct ethical reasoning, it is extremely important that he should become aware of this fact… (Moore, 17)

Sections (1–4) include different ways in which ethical reasoning can fall into a naturalistic fallacy. The fallacy occurs if the connection between a natural object and goodness has been made, if the connection between what is real and what is good has been made, if what is good as means is misunderstood as good in itself, and if the question about goodness is taken as answerable. What is general between those sections?

> The naturalistic fallacy always implies that when we think 'This is good,' what we are thinking is that the thing in question bears a definite relation to some one other thing. But this one thing, by reference to which good is defined, may be either what I may call a natural object – something of which existence is admittedly an object of experience – or else it may be an object which is only inferred to exist in a supersensible real world. (Moore, 38–39)

We are recommended to leave our attempts to capture the good in itself and avoid confusing good as means to the foundational basis of ethics. If we face someone with practical inferences, the basis for those inferences should be taken as open questions. Otherwise, we fall into fallacious reasoning.

Searle made the fully opposite claim about falling into fallacy and making a tautology. According to Searle, tautology appears if an evaluative premise has been placed in an ethical argument (Searle, 50–51). This extra premise is what Moore required (Moore, 114). Which one is right, and which one is falling into a fallacy? An unsatisfactory answer is that if one is a naturalist, it is foundational thinking which ends up in tautology and if one is a foundationalist, it is the naturalist who makes one. For reasons provided so far, I take naturalistic and foundationalist stances to be in a tie regarding making a tautology. However, Moore's way to present naturalism with temporality and with failure to distance good as means (causally closed reality) from good in itself (morality) challenges naturalism and calls for a missing counter-argument about these themes. What is the naturalistic stance towards temporality in the context of the "is/ought" -question? We will see if the balance between these two stances can be reasoned in the favor of naturalism.

3.2   The problem of induction in contrast to Hume's guillotine

The temporality of reasoning does not appear in MacIntyre's or Searle's contribution and neither in the critique of it. Saariluoma's contribution was different in the sense that it approached the issue as a problem of information processes, but it did not provide reasons for understanding criticism of naturalism. Understanding the underlying problem is dependent on understanding both naturalistic and unnaturalistic answers to it.

How are the inferences connected to our sense of time? In Moore's contribution time is noticed as a central part of analyzing the "is/ought" -problem. He provided the most reasonable insight into the temporality of reasoning. On the other hand, while making the analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine, MacIntyre did not mention temporality at all. Also, in other naturalistic contributions, which we have gone through, temporality remains untouched. We define temporality similarly to what Moore writes about time (Moore, 40–41):

> Temporality: the distinction between past, present, and future. Temporal matter can be sensed, and temporality is also external to eternal and supersensible.

How can the "is/ought" -question be answered both by mentioning time and not mentioning it? Could it be that to understand the question correctly, it *requires*

taking temporality into account? I will argue that it does. Also, Moore from the foundationalist side and John Dewey (1859–1952) from the naturalistic side take it as important for understanding the "is/ought" -question (Moore, 40–41; Dewey 1930, 258, 276). The problem of making inferences from is -statements to ought -statement, becomes understandable by investigating the temporality of reasoning. While arguing about naturalistic fallacy, Moore has taken it as such, though he focused on showing how metaphysical reasoning is distinct from naturalistic one by stating how the latter is narrowed as temporal. He made only some remarks about the differences between the past, present, and future.[37] In order to pave way for naturalistic solutions to the problem, we must make sense of how naturalistic reasoning relates to temporality. I will argue that the problem is not between naturalistic- and supersensible objects as Moore insisted. Instead, the problem emerges by reflecting on how reasoning functions in contrast to the past, present, and future.

I use "temporality of reasoning" for referring to Moore's stance (among others), since while he takes only the objects of reasoning to be temporal in the context of naturalism, the narrowness of objects also narrows the sphere where the reason operates. In the case of Hume, the connection between temporality and reason appears more clearly. He takes inductive inferences to be problematic because of the distinction between past and future as we will see in the following.

We will proceed by criticizing MacIntyre's analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine. Atkinson, Flew, and Hudson criticized it without mentioning the temporality of reasoning. In order to fix this, the following steps must be taken. 1) Restating what MacIntyre argued about the problem of induction. 2) How time is part of the problem of induction. 3) Temporality and Hume's guillotine. After going through these themes, we have reached an understanding of the problem behind the "no ought from is" -principle. The temporality of reasoning is indispensable in understanding what is meant by the "is/ought" -question.

(1) The meaning of "problem of induction" can be presented in the following way. What reason do we have for expecting patterns observed in our past experience to hold also to the future? What justification do we have for using past observations as a basis for generalization about things we have not yet observed? We can try to rely on the fact that the past has proven to be predictable for the future, but here we would be using "past to past" -experience for proving "past to future" -inferences. (Godfrey-Smith, 39–40) For Hume cause is founded on past experience. The problem

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[37] For instance, Moore argues that action holds only to the present and future, but it never refers to the past (Moore, 115). He is right. However, he should have taken the "is/ought" -question as a problem between past and future, not as a problem between temporal and eternal.

is, how can we make the transition from past causes into future effects through our thinking?

Like we have gone through previously in the context of MacIntyre, Hume asks us to consider two alternative ways. The transition is made either by A) "means of the understanding" and "reason." Or by B) "imagination" and "certain association and relation of perceptions." In *Treatise*[38] Hume lays the following condition for the first option.

> If the reason determin'd us, it wou'd proceed upon the principle, that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. (Hume, 64)

(A) Hume argues that if the transition is made by reason, it would mean that there is no change in course of phenomena. Everything flows in direct continuity with causes and effects, and no change between the past and future occurs. Hume concludes that there are no demonstrative ways to prove that the future follows the experiences of the past. This excludes the first alternative A. We are left to believe in alternative B, the reasoning between past experience and future phenomena lies on imagination, certain associations, and relations of perceptions. (Hume, 64)

In *Enquiry*, Hume gives the following reason to deny the first alternative.

> Our inferences from experience all boil down to this: From causes that appear similar we expect similar effects. If this were based on reason, we could draw the conclusion as well after a single instance as after a long course of experience. But that isn't in fact how things stand. (Hume, 2017, 17)

However, in *Enquiry* we might get confused by the fact that Hume aims to give only a negative answer to the issue in the chapter where he presents the problem of induction (Hume, 15). Thus, he remains skeptical throughout this chapter. What is included in his skepticism is the attempt to validate experience by making a tautology between general and specific parts of experience (Hume, 18).

> So if there are arguments to justify us in trusting past experience and making it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments can only be probable; i.e. they must be of the kind (2) that concern matters of fact and real existence, to put it in terms of the classification I have given. But probable reasoning, if I have described it accurately, can't provide us with the argument we are looking for. According to my account, all arguments about existence are based on the relation of cause and effect; our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and in drawing conclusions from experience we assume that the future will be like the past. So if we try to prove this assumption by probable arguments,

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[38] By *Treatise* I refer to Hume's first philosophical publishing: *Treatise of human nature* (1739–1740) and by *Enquiry* I refer to his second work, which aims to present some of the themes in *Treatise* in a more simplistic form: *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748).

i.e. arguments regarding existence, we shall obviously be going in a circle, taking for granted the very point that is in question. (Hume, 18)

Now, we must understand that *making tautologies* is part of demonstrative (deductive) reasoning, which is alternative A. What is shown here is the denial of demonstrative reasoning, *not a denial* of option B, which means relying on experience in general because of the specific parts of experience (i.e. specific parts of experience such as imagination and associations, as they are presented in *Treatise*.) While option A. would require that "the course of nature continue always uniformly the same," alternative option B. takes the course of nature to be *probably* the same.

Probability means that even though inference from past experience into future effects is not absolutely certain, it is still supported by some evidence (Godfrey-Smith, 42). The question is not how we can find absolute certainty or foundation, but how can we make statements which are better supported than alternative statements.

Hume argued for accepting probability in inferences from past experiences into phenomena in the future. While the "problem of induction" means only a skeptical stance towards our attempts to make valid transitions between the past and future, the attempt to solve the problem is also made by Hume (MacIntye, 37). The solution is to lay our trust in option B, which takes a certain part of the experience to be justification for the experience as a whole. For instance, if a group of people has memories that fly agarics are poisonous, it can be concluded for every experience that will be had with eating the mushroom. Here, memories as a certain part of the experience is used as justification for all the possible experiences.

(2) In contemporary terms, Hume presents a problem with the naturalistic stance, but he also gives naturalistic solutions for it.[39] In Moore's terms, Hume is naturalistic because he takes reasoning to rely only on our senses (experience) and only on objects which are temporal (objects found from past, present and future). In the following, we will contrast Moore's take on temporality with Hume's one.

Moore discusses the distinction between naturalistic and metaphysical by using the concepts of "parts" and "a whole." Naturalistic thinkers take the whole to be the sum of its parts, while those who require an answer to metaphysical questions, take a whole to be always more than its parts. This "more" must be understood as the thing in itself – a substance. While inferences are possible from a substance into facts (i.e. from whole to its parts), inferences are impossible from facts into a substance

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[39] Here, naturalism could be replaced with empiricism, if we wanted to be historically exact, but while we understand the possibility of anachronistic errors, I wish we see the connection between empirical and naturalistic stances, only by referring to Moore and without further analysis.

(i.e. from parts to its whole). This is because the relationship between a part and another part is causal. In order to break causal links, one must admit that the relationship between part and whole is more than the sum of its parts. (Moore, 31–33)

While the whole refers to supersensible, we must remember that for Moore, no positive statements about supersensible have been proven (Moore, 112). Thus, the whole which he is arguing for is a negative object – it only tells what does not exist. According to Moore, we can ask what ought to exist for their own sake (Moore, viii). While nature continues with its causal links, it is construed from parts and relationships between parts. Parts are always separate from wholes, which refers to eternal emptiness to be fulfilled by our wishes about what ought to exist.

Hume's argument is similar to Moore's one in the sense, that if we tried to find foundations for causal links only by reason and understanding, our attempts would be doomed. This is because of the skepticism towards demonstrative (deductive) inferences and "pure" reason in general. The difference between their views lies in the fact, that Hume is also skeptical of the very attempt to find such a foundation, while Moore takes the foundation as the necessary condition for valid reasoning.

For Moore, the foundation is a lack of existence that is in our hands to be filled with something. This lack of existence is also a gap between the otherwise continuous flow of nature. It is a gap in the line of causal links. For Hume, parts are a sum of the whole. The question is how parts of experience (for instance: memories) can be linked with someone's prediction of the future. Here, Hume's answer is: "by imagination and association." The limit of rooting one's inferences from the past into the future is that no absolute certainty can be provided. Only probable knowledge can be generated.

Moore handles the temporality of reasoning by contrasting sensible objects in time into supersensible and conditional objects. Hume handles the temporality of reasoning as a problem of making inferences from the past into the future. The latter approach is how naturalists must treat the problem. However, naturalism leads to difficulties when our object turns out to be morality.

The connection between temporality and factual reasoning is important because one of the most crucial functions of factual knowledge is our ability to predict phenomena by knowing the right facts (Dewey, 237–238). In order to elaborate on this, let's compare inductive inferences to projections.

Projections are types of reasoning which are closely linked with induction. To make a projection about something, one uses past cases for inferring what the next case will be. The difference with induction is that one does not generalize with projections. The inference runs only to the one case which will probably appear. (Godfrey-Smith, 42) One of the famous projections in science is Halley's Comet. He did

not live to see it, but he observed the trajectory correctly and calculated the appearance just right.

Projection and induction both require prediction from the past into the future. Inductive predictions are different in the sense, that they are probable generalizations for every possible case. To use an easy example, since all swans observed so far have been white, all swans which will be observed are probably white. (There are black swans in Australia, so this argument is not true. But it is an example of inductive argument.) And to include inductive inference to prediction in the case of Halley's comet, one can generalize that celestial bodies follow their trajectories (other things being equal).

MacIntyre did not mention temporality while analyzing inductive inferences. However, temporality can be pointed out from the example he made. If we observe: "the kettle has been on a fire for ten minutes," we can, due to our experience with boiling water, infer inductively: "So it *will* be boiling by now." (MacIntyre, 454)[40] Notice how this inference includes a prediction of what will be happening.

The problem of induction can be taken as Hume intended it, as the problem of inferring from past experience into the future. In other words, the problem means our ability to predict phenomena. Since we attempt to predict by induction, and not only by projection, the generalization to every possible case, must also be made. And these inferences can only be taken as probable. No absolute foundation can be found. Yet, the inference is still valid or invalid by the criteria of successful or failed predictions. With this in mind, we proceed in making our analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine.

(3) How can the temporality of reasoning help us to understand the "is/ought" -problem? In the following, we criticize MacIntyre's analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine. Our guideline for fixing the analogy becomes from Moore.

> But since it is very natural to suppose… …that the assertion 'This is good in all cases' is equivalent to the assertion 'This happens in all cases'… …it may be useful briefly to point out that they are *not* equivalent. (Moore, 126)[41]

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[40] My italics.
[41] I want us to focus on the comparison between what happens and what is good. However, Moore handles also the third sentence in this case. A sentence referring to the law in a legal sense states: "It is commanded that this be done, or be left undone, *in all cases*." This sentence cannot be taken as equivalent for a natural law: "This happens, *in all cases*" or for a moral law: "This is good *in all cases*." (Moore, 126) There are similarities between law in the legal sense and institutional facts, though, I interpret Searle to have meant something more generalizable than legal institutions.

If "what happens in all cases" would be equivalent to "what is good in all cases," inferences into these conclusions, could be drawn from the same set of premises. Since they are not equivalent, the set of premises must be different. In other words, if one is to make an inference from facts into what one ought to do, that should also be the only conclusion that can be drawn from those facts. Logically two conclusions cannot be drawn from the same set of premises. This is in the mind of Moore while making the case of how two statements not being equivalent is a reason to not take them as conductive from one to another (Moore, 126). The requirement: "Two conclusions cannot be *logically* made from the same set of premises," is also what Hudson had in mind when he criticized MacIntyre for not seeing the logical relationship between is and ought -statements, even though he made sense of the practical relationship between them (Hudson, 252).

In the following, we will give reasons why what happens cannot be mixed with what is good and how the same premises which have been given for inferring naturalistically into what one ought to do, does also lead to a prediction of what will be happening.

MacIntyre compares the question "What will happen to the kettle?" to the question "Ought I stick a knife in Smith?" In both cases, there are some necessary observations to be made. In the case of kettles, we need to have our past experience handling kettles, water, and heat in mind. From these facts, we can make inferences about what will be probably happening: "The kettle must be boiling by now." As we have gone through, this inference is a prediction of phenomena in the future.

In the moral case, past experience can be used as well, if it is the right type of experience (MacIntyre, 463; Dewey, 258–259). For instance, if my past experience tells me that those who commit attacks by knife end up in jail and also that I do not want to go to jail, inductive inference can be made to the conclusion: I ought not to attack anyone by knife. Also, more generally taken: If we have past experience of how people find health worth pursuing and this experience is collected from many people, we can infer that this is what people ought to keep doing in the future.

In the case of kettles, only one conclusion can be drawn from the premises. From experience with handling a kettle, water, and heat, we can only tell what will be happening. But, if we get one premise which states what an agent wants, and the second premise which states how the agent can reach what he wants, these premises can be used for prediction of what the agent will be doing. They will not only tell what ought to be done as MacIntyre proposes. What one wants and how is wanted thing reached, can be used for inferring what will probably happen. So, if the same premises can be used for making predictions about what will be happening and for a

statement of what one ought to do, which one is the conclusion going to be? It certainly cannot be both of them, because they have different meanings. Compare the following inferences.

> If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail; but I do not want to go to jail; so I *ought not to* (had better not) stick a knife in him. (MacIntyre, 462)[42]

> If I stick a knife in Smith, they *will* send me to jail; but I do not want to go to jail; so *I will not* stick a knife in him.

It is for this reason that Hare and other critics of MacIyntyre's stance, would have him entailing the inference with the extra premise. This premise labeled the principle of conduct, states: "If it is both the case that if I do *x,* the outcome will be *y,* then if I don't want *y* to happen, I ought not to do *x.*" (MacIntyre, 462). Principle of conduct would have made sure, that the inference in question is aiming for one and only one conclusion: "I *ought not to* (had better not) stick a knife in him." MacIntyre does not mention the temporality of reasoning in any way, though it can be pointed out from the example he used. Also, the received critique by Atkinson, Flew, and Hudson, did not take into account the temporality of reasoning, and thus the fact that by factual statements we can predict phenomena could not be understood.

When Searle made his famous contribution to the issue, it got criticized by Flew and Hare, they did not notice how Searle uses facts in a way that produces a prediction of what will be happening. Jones's promise for paying back Smith can be used as evidence for predicting that Jones will pay back. If some other evidence is used such as someone's experience with him: "Jones is a loyal person," this inference can be supported further. Or if some evidence hints about the lack of Jones's loyalty: "Jones has broken all promises with someone," the inference into conclusion: "Jones will pay back," becomes less probable. However, the fact that Jones himself promises to pay back is part of all the other possible evidence for making the inference into a *descriptive* conclusion: "Jones will pay to Smith five dollars."

While Searle argues how the conclusion: "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars," is reached from descriptive premises, it is not the only conclusion that can be drawn from exactly the same premises. This begs the question: "What is wrong with the premises?" Searle got criticized by Flew and Hare, but just like in the case with critics of MacIntyre, no temporality of reasoning was mentioned, and thus predictions of what will be happening based on the set of premises were not noticed (Flew, 1964; Hare, 1964).

Is this what Hume had in mind when he presented Hume's guillotine in words: "…the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason. (Hume, 334)"? Did he think that from a set of is -

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[42] My italics.

statements to ought -statements inferences are invalid because is -statements always predict what will happen and thus the distinction between vice and virtue must be made by something else? As we have shown, he definitely thought that predictions from the past into the future are necessary characteristics of factual reasoning. And if he later thought about factual reasoning in the case of ethics, he might have had temporality in mind also in this case. But in the context of this investigation, the historical question about Hume's contribution will not be investigated further.

MacIntyre's analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine is incorrect. This is because inductive inferences in general include a prediction of future events and they cannot be used as means to infer any other type of conclusions. If one attempts to use purely factual statements in ethics, the same set of premises can be used for inferring two types of conclusions. To separate predictions of "what will happen" from "what ought to be done", some extra premise is required. The analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine extends only so far, that both become understandable by making sense of the relationship between past and future. By analyzing the temporality of reasoning, it has become clear that from a set of is -statements to ought -statement inferences remain impossible in the face of naturalistic attempts presented so far.

3.3   Attempt to find the solution: Temporality & Choice

Most important points about our understanding of what is problematic about the "is/ought" -question have been presented. Next, we will attempt to give guidelines for solving the problem naturalistically. The following phases will be analyzed. 1) Two senses of the term "will". 2) Choice and morality 3) Temporality of choice. 4) Guilt, pride, and call for tolerance. Here we go through the basic elements of my alternative solution for the "is/ought" -problem.

(1) What ought to be done? Due to the analysis which we have gone through, this question turned out to be confused with asking what will be done. Moore also talks about *will* in the context of comparing phrases: "This happens in all cases," "This is commanded to be done, or left undone, in all cases" and "This is good in all cases." (Moore, 126) But even though he made sense of the issue by pointing how what happens descriptively cannot be equivalent with what is good in the moral sense, he nevertheless fails to talk about *will* in two different senses.

Moore notices the first sense which takes term *will* to be someone's ability or inability to reach something. Along with choice, humans will enable us to make a difference in the otherwise deterministic flow of nature. Maximized will conduct to the

ability to make a major impact by acting in ones surrounding. Lack of will conduct behavior which is dictated by causes and effects of the surrounding.[43] Against Kant, Moore shows how mastering one's will, does not mean mastering one's goodness (Moore, 126–127). Even if someone has no lack of will at all – the person has maximized his ability to reach things he aims for –willpower can still be used for evil as well as for good. Since ethical reasoning seeks to answer the question of which is good and which is evil, making sense of someone's state of will, does not provide an answer to the question of what one ought to do.

This is also how the term *will* have been used in naturalistic contribution in the "is/ought" -question by Foot. Though, she happens to mention two senses of this term, without analyzing the difference further.

> When a man uses a word such as 'good' in an 'evaluative' and not in an 'inverted comma' sense, he is supposed to commit his will. From this it has seemed to follow inevitably that there is an logical gap between fact and value; for is it one thing to say that a thing is so, and another to have a particular attitude towards its being so; one thing to see that certain effects will follow from a given action, and another to care? Whatever account was offered of the essential feature of evaluation – whether in terms of feelings, attitudes, the acceptance of imperatives or what not – the fact remained that with an evaluation there was a committal in new dimension, and this was not guaranteed with any acceptance of facts. (Foot 1958–1959, 95)

A first sense of the term *will* appear at the beginning of the direct quotation above (commit his will)[44] and a second sense in the middle (certain effects will follow from given action). It is necessary to make clear how both *will* in the sense of prediction and *will* in the sense of willpower are required to make sense of the "is/ought" -question.

Dewey notices the predictive meaning of the term *will* while analyzing satisfaction as a goodness of an object: "To declare something satis*factory*… …It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future in which the thing will continue to serve; it *will* do." (Dewey, 248) To state some matter to be satisfying is to make a statement of fact. And to say something is satisfactory is to make a judgment. That means advocating certain things instead of other things. No crucial gap emerges between statements of fact and judgment. (Dewey, 248)

The term *will* in the sense of prediction is not handled by Moore[45] and neither by Foot. The prediction that certain actions with certain effects will follow is not

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[43] Will in the sense of willpower is used by this definition in this study. Here, I will not investigate the concept further.

[44] Notice how *committing one's will* have been used here similarly to Hudson did while criticizing MacIntyre's contribution (Hudson 1964, 251–252). See also Austin's category of "commissives" (2009, 157).

[45] He uses it in a few places, like while discussing the temporality of naturalistic law: "This has accompanied, does now and will accompany that in these particular instances." (Moore, 124) However, he does not analyze the importance of the term *will* in a predictive sense further.

equivalent to the fact that someone has committed his will to some action. Using the two senses of this term makes it easier to grasp the difference between descriptive and moral phenomena.

(2) Will in the sense of being able to grasp what is attempted, is somewhat close to what is understood by choice. The difference lies in the fact, that choice means picking from alternative courses of action, while willpower means the ability to fulfill chosen action. Both willpower and choices can be taken as a requirement for defining certain phenomena as moral ones – as the subject matter of ethics, though we focus on choice. The choice is a crucial part of Hare's reasoning about the relationship between facts and values (1972, 127). Choice can be defined as the following:

> Choice: an agent picking one from a set of alternative acts.[46]

Foot presents an attempt to distance descriptive reasoning from ethical reasoning to be often supported by making the close connection between calling a course of action good and choosing it. As a naturalist, she formulates a counterargument for this view. What is good cannot be a mere matter of decision. (Foot, 1961, 214–216) We have gone through how the idea of making morality a matter of decision is supported by Moore. Even though he never uses explicit terms of *choice* or *decision*, by leaving moral goodness as an open question (Moore, 21, 43–44), I interpret him as leaving it as a matter of decision. To make moral goodness a matter of decision or choice is equivalent to accepting evaluative statements partly as separate from factual reasoning. The separation between facts and evaluations leads to the contingency of moral statements. Even statements such as "One ought to do occasional killing", could be proven (MacIntyre, 462–462).

Accepting choice and decision as part of ethical reasoning seems to have disastrous outcomes. Foot presents two assumptions, which become allowed in ethical disputes if separate evaluations are accepted.

> Assumption (1) is that some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving any evidence at all. Assumption (2) is that, given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw a conclusion because *this* does not count as evidence for *him.* (Foot 1958–1959, 84)

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[46] Decision is a choice about future choices, and in contrast to just making choices, decisions can be made with other people. However, the distinction is not necessary for the context of this investigation.

By accepting these assumptions, ethics is in danger to be mixed with political or artistic activity. It makes ethical stances come down as taking pro-attitudes for a certain type of action (Foot, 84). But isn't this rather what is done in politics? In practices of politics, one looks for advocates for a certain value. In ethics, one looks for reasons to allow one value over some other.

While making a case against these assumptions as a naturalist, Foot remains skeptical about accepting choice as part of ethical reasoning. However, could it be that naturalism does not pose an obstacle to accepting choice as a requirement for reasoning in the context of ethics? For instance, Saariluoma handles action by mentioning alternative courses of action and the decisions behind them (Saariluoma 2020a, 125). Also, Moore mentions choice and an alternative set of acts while commenting on practical ethics (Moore, 151–152), though he is not rooting for naturalism. To formulate arguments about morality, action must be taken into account. Is *choice* a similar requirement? Is *choice* the missing piece of breaking the causal links between phenomena?

In order to talk about an agent, who can choose between a certain set of alternative acts, one cannot make predictions about which act will be chosen. Dewey recognizes this, though he only uses the term "freedom" (1930, 238). (I take the concept of freedom to be presupposed by choice just as the concept of action is.) Of course, some facts may hint in a certain direction, such as the phrase "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars" which hints that Jones will be paying Smith five dollars, but promises can be broken. Jones is always able to choose between either being loyal or breaking his promise. To take this description as fact about moral phenomena, does not take us out of a naturalistic framework. Choice and decision are often entailed in psychological, sociological, and economical reasoning, which is descriptive, sensible, and temporal. In this way, ethical reasoning could also be taken as entailed by choice and decision, which breaks the causal continuity of nature. The requirement for descriptive knowledge is to take parts of nature (or parts of reality) to be connected with each other by unbreakable causal links – the reason for Hume's skepticism about inductive inferences and most importantly, the reason for Moore's skepticism about generalizable moral knowledge. Dewey recognizes how this skepticism is an outdated way of understanding nature scientifically. If contingency would have been included in scientific papers, it would be self-evident to abandon concerns about nature with unbreakable causal links. (1930, 237–238) Moore's skeptical stance loses proper reasons once we see how entailing arguments in ethics by choice breaks the causal continuity of nature and thus provides a reason to trust arguments about general moral goodness.

The concept of action has been taken as an evident criterion for ethical reasoning (Saariluoma 2020a, 123; MacIntyre, 462; Moore, viii). Taking choice just as a necessary part of ethical reasoning as action has been taken, is an attempt to formulate a naturalistic stance towards the concept's choice in ethics. Critics of naturalism took the causally closed world of naturalistic thought as disastrous for naturalistic ethics.

In order to find room between causal links, they turned to advocate the necessity of metaphysics for ethics (For example Kant. (MacIntyre, 467–468; Moore, 114, 126–127)). After accepting metaphysical reasoning as the foundation for ethics, it was found that just as it is problematic to assume how ethics can be practiced empirically in a causally closed world, it is as problematic to assume it to be studied in a metaphysically closed world (Moore, 114–115). Latter had been done by making the assumption that what is not sensible must at least exist, and what exists as supersensible, is foundational reality, a basis for what exists as sensible (Moore, 112, 117).

Thus, by making the close connection between what is real and what is good in the moral sense, one is also making the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 124–125). Also, if one is connecting the description of will, however pure the will is, into moral goodness, one's reasoning is falling into a fallacy (Moore, 127). Another way of labeling naturalistic fallacy is to talk about descriptive fallacy (Austin 2009, 71; Hare 1963, 240). Since the fallacy must have been avoided, skepticism towards anything real in the supersensible sphere took place.

The metaphysical stance took a form of imagination and the negative freedom to make anything out of goodness in the moral sense. Moore's stance: "good then is indefinable" is paraphrasing what Lion King is told by his peers in the wilderness: "Hakuna Matata!" This phrase means: "Do as you please." This is the opposite end in contrast to the naturalistic wish to find generalizable knowledge in ethics. The Lion King can grow above peer pressure which is a perfect analogy for what should happen to every ethicist after the necessary reasons provided for abandoning Hume's guillotine.

How does the term choice fit in Moore's theory? He does not mention the term, but from the fact that he takes two levels of ought questions possible (Moore, viii), I interpret him to take two levels of choice to be possible. For him, there is a metalevel (supersensible) and practical level (sensible) of choice. The choice is applied both in deciding or choosing moral criteria and for choosing and deciding if one acts according to those criteria or not. Choosing moral criteria can be seen from his questions for ethics: "What ought to exist for their own sakes?" and choosing if one acts according to the moral criteria or against it can be seen by the question: "What actions ought we to perform?" (Moore, viii)

Criticism for Moore, which stays inside naturalistic boundaries, can be formulated as the following. If the problem for naturalistic ethics, is that there is an unbreakable

chain of causes and effects, doesn't this chain already get broken with the possibility to make choices in the first level? It does since everybody fails to make absolute certain predictions of a situation where certain agents are making choices. This is what is supposed to happen with morality since every moral agent must be taken as able to choose good as well as being able to choose evil. No unbreakable chain of causal links can be found where choices are happening. Yet, we remain to be arguing inside of naturalistic boundaries, accepting only those objects which are temporal and sensible. The choice is such an object if we treat it only on one level – to be the sum of its parts and nothing substantial. Moore postulated metalevel of choice (which means that he treated choice as a substance) and ground level of choice (which means our everyday use of the term) by his two distinct questions. This forced him to deny a naturalistic stance on the issue, but we will see that this is not inevitable – reasons will be provided to stay within naturalistic boundaries with a proper take on how choice must be treated.

We have analyzed how the problem of induction is similar to Hume's guillotine in some respect. Both become sensible for a naturalist by analyzing the relationship between the past and the future. The difference between these problems lies in the fact that when we try to make inductive arguments in general, we suppose the outcome is deterministic with constant links of causes and effects. If inductive inferences are used in ethics, as they should be, the inference requires a premise that makes a valid description of the situation in question.[47] The premise for critics of naturalism, is an abstract foundational statement such as "If it is both the case that if I do *x,* the outcome will be *y,* then if I don't want *y* to happen, I ought not to do *x.*" (MacIntyre, 462). What is the naturalistic alternative? Since we must provide a correct view about what makes a situation to be moral, the ability to make choices must be taken into account in an argument about what one ought to do. Thus, the ethical argument requires a statement about action (alternative acts and goals to be reached) which is entailed by the possibility to make choices.

(3) The core of my idea is to analyze temporality and choice in contrast to reasoning. These terms appear here and there in the "is/ought" -relevant literature, but the analysis remains undone. For example, Harris discusses choices, decisions, and just the same notion of temporality on the very same page (2012, 234).

How is temporality related to choices? We get close to answering this question by referring to what Moore had to say about the relationship between action and temporality while analyzing the Christian doctrine of eternal reality: "For it is certain that our *actions can only affect the future*; and if nothing can be real in future, we can

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[47] For example, the descriptions MacIntyre and Searle gave about situations where Smith was about to stab someone, and Jones was wondering if he ought to pay or not (MacIntyre, 462; Searle, 44).

certainly not hope ever to make any good thing real." (1959, 115)[48] Dewey have been pointing towards same fact about actions connection to future, but for him, this fact is a reason to exclude entailed evaluations:

> Change from forming ideas and judgments of value on the basis of conformity to antecedent objects, to constructing enjoyable objects directed by knowledge of consequences, is a change from looking to the past to looking to the future. (Dewey, 258)

Action entails a choice between possible alternatives. Choices can only affect the future and choices can only be made in present. What about choices and history? Every action which has already happened has been cemented in the flow of history – it cannot be chosen to be otherwise anymore.

Let's proceed in analyzing temporality and choice in contrast to morality. I take it as impossible to talk about the moral responsibility of an agent, if the agent in question cannot choose from an alternative set of acts. This is intuitively clear to me, but when analyzed with temporality, some surprising results appear. Since all the actions in past cannot be chosen to be otherwise anymore and moral responsibility entails the possibility of choice, we must conclude that moral responsibility does not hold on to past actions. Past actions can be studied descriptively. For instance, contra-factual claims about the historical agent's possible alternatives to act can be made. Every agent's choice in past can be blamed for: "She should not have lied!" But to make an argument about what one ought to do, it can be applied only to what has not yet been done – only to present and future action: "She should not lie, because it increases the level of discomfort for everyone involved."

If we try to present an argument: "She should not have lied, because it increased the level of discomfort for everyone involved" we are misusing the term "should". With it, we are interpreting morality to be something that is open for only an imaginary world of options and scenarios to be judged and applied for their own sake. But the subject matter of ethics is not any imaginary world, it is strictly the reality we happen to share. And in this reality, agents' choices are constantly closing into the unchangeable flow of history. To make it "open" again, one can speculate about alternative ways of how the agent would have acted, but this imaginary state of being as an agent is not the same as the real state of being as an agent. The subject–matter of ethics extends only to the latter because ethics is a tool for giving rational justification for our real choices.

This is where the necessity to remake MacInyre's analogy between the problem of induction and Hume's guillotine lies. He did not see the temporality in Hume's handling of the problem of induction and even though he referred to Moore's natu-

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ralistic fallacy, he did not see the temporality in Hume's guillotine either. By analyzing temporality and choice we can find how also Hume's guillotine is about the problematic relationship between past and future. MacIntyre, and so many other naturalists, missed that the very problem with trying to make inferences from "how things are" to "how they ought to be" becomes solvable by narrowing what "ought to be" into present and future action. Only by doing that, we can both save the stance that we can make moral conclusions only from certain facts[49] and hold on to the statement that moral responsibility requires the possibility to choose from a set of alternative acts.

(4) Let's move to consider some morally significant emotions. The underlying motive for taking ethical reasoning partly with supersensible premises was an inability to come clean with the relationship between temporality, choice, and reasoning. This is not only cognitive confusion. It is not only a fallacy caused by tautology as Searle argued (1964, 50–51). Instead, to understand reasons for supporting the "no ought from is" -principle, we will need to take the underlying problem as emotionally significant.

In the field of cognition science, there is the factually most valid view about what cognition and emotion are and how they appear in the mind and in relation to the action. I have no resources to make sense of the contemporary understanding of this issue in the field of cognition science. However, I will take a sidestep from the field of philosophy for making a few remarks on how Saariluoma takes sentiments in ethical reasoning and how emotions appear in analytical writings over the issue. This way, we can formulate a naturalistic alternative for Moore's supersensible met-alevel of ethical discourse.

For Saariluoma, all emotions appear as positive or negative from the agent's point of view. This can be called emotional valence. In ethical reasoning, this fact is used as a guide for deciding if the act in question leads to a good or bad end. (Saariluoma 2020a, 126) Saariluoma's consideration of emotions focuses on the action guiding element of emotions and temporal elements have not been analyzed. How does our understanding of emotions improve when analyzed with the temporality of reasoning?

Many types of emotions[50] are categorizable by temporality. For instance, hope refers to future events and not to the past. Sadness is more likely to be felt because of something which happened, and fear is more likely to be felt when something is happening or will be happening.

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[49] In this study, "certain facts" is presented by Saariluoma (ethical information processes), MacIntyre (happiness, health, etc., and consensus of interest), and Searle (institutional facts). In the context of this investigation, I will not try to argue if some of their arguments exclude others.
[50] In this study, there is no difference between "emotion" and "feelings."

Let's consider two emotions that refer to past events and are necessary in understanding morality: pride and guilt. Due to my introspection pride cannot be felt because of the actions which have not yet been done. The same holds for guilt.[51] Obviously every emotion is felt in the present since our experience occurs in present, but what I mean by narrowing pride and guilt to the past, is to give the reason why those emotions appeared. And the reason why they appear seems to be always connected to action which has been done. "Presumption of innocence" is a legal principle, which entails proof for taking someone to be guilty. Along with proof, it entails that someone has done an illegal act in the past in order to take him as guilty. Latter holds for all the guiltiness in life, not just for guiltiness in the jurisdiction. It is just that emotions and temporality of their source can get mixed in the head. This might happen especially when some act has already been done in the past and now the agent considers doing it again. Here sentiment of guilt can arise, and it might get mixed with the act, which is considered, while the source of guiltiness is really the act that has been done in past.

Both emotions are also connected to norms. Guilt is connected to past actions which are taken as forbidden and pride is connected to past actions which are taken as virtuous. After breaking norms through certain acts, a sentiment of guilt arises when the agent is faced with a moral judgment. Also, if one has been successful in fulfilling a norm, one can feel pride during the ethical discussion where the norm is favored.[52]

Pride should not be confused with feeling proud about one's successful actions. In the Christian ethical paradigm, being prideful is considered forbidden, as a sin, but being proud with a good reason is acceptable. Consider a phrase: "Son, I am proud of you." Pride turns out to be a sin if it is enjoyed at expense of others. For instance, if I am moralizing others – if I shed light on my virtues by pointing towards vices in others – I am prideful and I am doing what is forbidden. However, this does not mean that we should not argue about morality with others and judge other people's acts as forbidden. It just should not be a source of satisfaction. If it turns out to be enjoyable at expense of others' feelings, ethics have been practiced in the wrong way.

For example, Christian and conservative ethical views take practices of hetero monogamy as allowed and practices of other forms of sexual relationships as forbidden (Harris, 5, 86).[53] In 2009, 80% of American conservatives held a stance that same-sex marriages should not be recognized by the law as valid, by political ideology.

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[51] *Supposition 1.* (In the following, four suppositions, which could be proven empirically, will be made and marked, while analyzing temporality and choice in contrast to emotional valence.)
[52] *Supposition 2.*
[53] Exceptions could be found from contemporary tents of Christians and conservatives, but if we look at the history of these paradigms, and if we look at the majority of the supporters of these paradigms, an exclusive stance for hetero monogamy is the correct view of the paradigm under these labels.

Also, the majority of Americans think that way (Jones, 2009). A sentiment of guilt can be generated by making moral judgments inclusively and exclusively of a conservative ethical paradigm. Beginning in 1960, liberal political movements have aimed to change this norm by using rhetoric that includes identifying as feeling pride after actions, which falls out of the paradigm of hetero monogamy. Often phrases such as: "being overly judgmental," are used to describe those who hold on to Christian and conservative stances in ethics and in politics.

In opposition to "being judgmental," one is encouraged to be tolerant towards different values and lifestyles. Normative tolerance and intolerance appear in Karl Popper's (1902–1994) liberalistic contribution to social philosophy labeled *Open Society and its Enemies* (1945)[54][55] In the same work Popper turns out to be a supporter of the "no ought from is" -principle (Popper, 59–60). According to him the "no ought from is" -principle is one of the basic blocks of liberal tradition (Popper, 506), which contradicts it with the conservative paradigm. Popper discusses rather passionately how intolerance should not be allowed (Popper, 442) and how it is absurd to even think about making a moral judgment towards another person's actions:

> But it is clear that moral judgements are absolutely irrelevant. Only a scandal-monger is interested in judging people or their actions; 'judge not' appears to some of us one of the fundamental and much too little appreciated laws of humanitarian ethics. (Popper, 551)

In analytical contributions for the "no ought from is" -principle, framing the opposite view as intolerant can be found, though only implicitly and only as rhetorical remarks. Zimmerman argued for the redundancy of "is-ought" -dualism (Zimmerman, 1962). He got criticized by Kenneth Hanly, who labeled his contributions as *Zinnerman's 'is-is': A schizophrenic monism* (Hanly, 1964). Why the naturalistic stance is "schizophrenic"? Hanly does not elaborate and neither use this adjective in his actual writing, but I interpret him to have meant that if we accept Zimmerman's stance and leave the "is-ought" -gap aside, ethical discussions become intolerable for the minds of those who practice it. The emotional pressure produced by naturalistic reasoning in ethics makes us "schizophrenic."

Also, Flew mocks those who say: "This is wrong…" as someone who is only: "…giving vent to feelings," rather than making an adequate ethical assertion (Flew, 1963, 181).[56] It seems that according to him, naturalists fail to be stable emotionally and thus fail to face rationality calmly as it is. Instead, they make emotional spurts through their ethical arguments. In contemporary politics, the term: "hate speech," becomes to mind from Flew's rhetoric.

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[54] For instance, see Popper, 320, 442, 443, and so on.
[55] Notice the label "*Open* society" and contrast it to the label which Moore held for his stance: "*Open* question argument."
[56] See also Austin's categorization of "behabitives" (2009, 160).

Both Hanly and Flew reject their opponents by making it seem that they cause emotional pressure on fellow participants in ethical discourse. This is also how Popper's demand for tolerance must be taken. It is for protecting another individual from emotional pressure created by moral judgments.

We have gone through some basic elements of my idea to solve the "is/ought" -problem by analyzing temporality and choice in contrast to reasoning. While the action is generally taken as an evident part of ethical reasoning, I argued that also choice must be taken as such – moral action must be entailed by choice. Once we analyze this in contrast to temporality, we find that choices are open only for present and future action. Still, it is intuitively clear to me that in order to talk about moral responsibility, the agent must be able to choose from an alternative set of acts. Thus, historical action must be excluded from ethical reasoning. Naturalistic contributions, which we have gone through, have rejected (Foot) or dismissed (others) the necessity of choice in ethical reasoning. (Only Dewey has referred to choice indirectly by the concept of freedom.) Naturalists also have failed to take the issue of making moral judgments as emotionally significant. The problem will not be solved without taking the concerns of critics into account and explaining them. In the following, we proceed to formulate our alternative by elaborating how analysis between temporality and choice helps us to recognize and cope with morally relevant emotions.

3.4 Recognizing and coping with morally relevant emotions: Unjust judgments and "no ought for past acts" -principle

An explanation should be provided for the following. Why did Moore, and so many other critics of naturalism, take it that we must hold to the distinction between naturalistic objects and supersensible objects in order to talk about ethics validly? Is the supersensible metalevel really needed and is there some naturalistic alternative metalevel that could be pointed out? The last steps for the contribution in question are as follows. 1) Naturalistic meta- and ground level. 2) Analyzing unjust judgments in contrast to temporality and choice. 3) Naturalistic reasoning and practical necessities. 4) Descriptive knowledge in contrast to moral one. Through these steps, we finalize our take on the relationship between descriptive- and moral- knowledge.

(1) Popper's demand for tolerance in the context of ethical discussion gives a reason to pose a question: "Is it possible to do morally bad things in ethical discourse itself?" My answer is yes, and I admit that this is what naturalists have failed to focus

on while making generalizable moral judgments. Popper's answer is also affirmative: "Thus an ethics of moral judgments would be not only irrelevant but indeed an immoral affair." (Popper, 551)

But before going deeper into that claim, two different levels of action must be analyzed, since we must elaborate on what it means to *act* viciously or virtuously while practicing ethics. There is the ground level of ethical judgments such as "Ought one to smoke cigarettes," "Ought I to stab Smith," and "Ought Jones pay back to Smith." (Saariluoma 2021, 245; MacIntyre, 462; Searle, 44) These judgments refer to concrete physical action. But as metalevel, there are practices of every ethical discussion which deal with ground-level problems. These practices could be singled out as speech acts (Austin, 20, 40) (Searle, 58). Speech acts can be distinguished from concrete and physical acts like an act of killing someone (Austin, 6).

> …a great many of the acts which fall within the province of Ethics are *not*, as philosophers are too prone to assume, simply in the last resort *physical movements*: very many of them have the general character, in whole or part, of conventional or ritual acts… [i.e. speech acts] (Austin, 19–20)

Speech acts can be performed linguistically. It expresses mental states and mental activity to another person. By asking "May I use your pen?" I have acted already in my mind by planning a physical action, which will be done only if I have been given an affirmative sign from another agent. By that question, I have shared my plan with another person. An answer, "You may," expresses a speech act, which tells that another person has thought my plan through and is affirmative towards the planned action. (Austin, 5)[57] Just as curses, like "Damn!", express emotions from the agent's mental states, speech acts, like "You may borrow my pen," express mental activity (cognitions) connected to decisions and choices. Austin categorized these types of speech acts as "exercitives" (2009, 155).

Searle noticed these two levels of action.[58] By also referring to Austin's work *How to Do Things whit Words* (1962)[59], he argued that those who have been supporting the "no ought from is" -principle have not understood the difference between speech acts and concrete (physical) action (Searle, 58). The requirement of entailing ethical arguments with evaluative statements can be corrected by the requirement of using speech acts, like "Jones promised…," in ethical discussion. In Austin's categorization, this speech act refers to "comissives" (2009, 157). However, both Austin and

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[57] Austin's examples of speech acts are "I do" in the marriage ceremony, naming the ship, giving a present to another person, and making a bet.

[58] Moore did not notice the distinction between speech acts and concrete acts, which due to my understanding, encouraged Searle to challenge naturalistic fallacy. Moore came closest to making this distinction by making a distinction between real and imaginary action while analyzing the rightness of an act (1959, 218).

[59] Austin concluded that the gap between facts and values can be bridged (2009, 149).

Searle did not notice that if there is action in two levels, and morality (vice and virtue) accounts for *all* action, there must also be vicious and virtuous speech acts. We will focus on vicious ones since they provide an understanding of the motives for advocating Hume's guillotine.

A simple example of a morally wrong speech act is insulting another person. No physical action has been taken, but the other person is clearly hurt for no good reason. Performing a lie is also a vicious speech act. This was recognized already in the ten commandments: "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." Also, performing a joke in the wrong circumstances (at a funeral) is disrespectful and bad. The list could go on. However, the point is that performing an (invalid) ethical argument can be also categorized as performing a speech act that is morally bad. While I am aiming toward a naturalistic conclusion, I recognize that naturalistic ethics have led to morally bad speech acts so far. In order to justify this claim, I will show how previous types of naturalistic arguments do produce unnecessary pain just as insulting does.

To make an assertion and support it in ethical discourse can be made rationally or irrationally, it can be made skillfully or poorly, but also, it can be made in a morally wrong and a morally right way. That is because action extends from concrete acts to acts performed by the mind (thinking) and expressed by speaking. All action is morally relevant. Thus, there are ways of reasoning about morality which *in itself* turns out to be morally bad.[60] Let's label them "unjust judgments." Popper's call for more tolerance, was a call to avoid unjust judgments.

Obviously, concrete acts can take place without the involvement of speech acts. For instance, observation of a snake makes us take rapid steps back without thinking it through. And even if thinking a decision through, it must not be announced to others by speech, so it is not a speech act then. But every ethical disagreement must be handled by speech acts since communication is the only way of sharing the disagreement and possible solutions. Thus, speech acts play a crucial role in understanding metaethical problems.

Two types of questions can be presented as an alternative to Searle's and Moore's:

1) Which kind of speech acts ought we to perform while participating in the ethical discussion?

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[60] It is surprising how close Harris became to stating this fact: "If morality is a system of thinking about (and maximizing) the well-being of conscious creatures like ourselves, many people's moral concerns must be immoral." (2012, 117) (See also page 119.) Notice how he writes *moral concerns must be immoral* and not *moral concerns must be untrue.* However, the context makes it clear that he is comparing the truth and falsehood of statements made in other sciences to statements made in the context of ethics, and thus we must interpret him to have meant *untrue* by *immoral* in this context.

2) Which kind of concrete acts ought we to perform?[61]

Here, ground-level action is similar than in Moore's and Searle's contributions. The meta-level which I am proposing as the alternative is not supersensible nor institutional matter which transcends action. Instead, we split the action in half: there are speech acts and concrete acts. An agent can act viciously or virtuously on both levels since action refers to both speech acts and physical acts. Just as one could argue how cursing as a speech act is forbidden behavior, some ways of formulating an ethical argument and presenting it to others can be taken as a forbidden speech act. Even though Austin and Searle distinguished action in half, they nevertheless took only concrete action to be morally relevant. This is a mistake, which will be corrected in the following. Critics' reasons for fact-value distinction will become understandable in this way. And only through understanding the critics, solutions can be generated.

(2) For Moore, the problems produced by the naturalistic stance in metaethics, were solved by allowing supersensible – with no positive account of what it is – as a met-alevel of ethical reasoning. Is there a way to deal with unjust judgments without abandoning naturalism? In order to answer this question, we must pose a more technical one: What can make an act of making a moral assertion to be morally bad?

By analyzing the temporality of ethical reasoning, we have already found the primary characteristic of unjust judgments. There is a category for every act which have already taken place, and which cannot be chosen to be otherwise anymore. If someone's history is full of forbidden acts, it creates a massive baggage of guilt inside them. This guilt becomes intolerable when unjust judgment requires someone to do the impossible – to change the past which cannot be changed. It is morally wrong to not take that into account while practicing ethics.

In practice, we ought not to treat participants with signs of guilt similarly in ethical discourse than one with no baggage at all. Why it is wrong? This question can be answered naturalistically, even though it poses an ethical problem at the meta-level – the level of action which refers to speech acts. Treating a participant with guilt similarly to a participant who got no guilt at all can be shown to produce unnecessary pain. Avoidance of unnecessary pain is a criterion that is close to Saariluoma's one since his contribution is highly dependent on emotions (2020a, 126).[62]

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[61] Contrast the first question with Searle's one: "Ought we to have such institutional forms of obligation as promising?" (Searle, 50–51) and Moore's one: "What ought to exist for their own sakes?" (Moore, viii) There should not be quarrels with the second questions, like there weren't between Searle's and Moore's ones (see above).
[62] As another author who uses avoidance of needless pain as a significant reason to infer from is - statements to ough -conclusion, I shortly refer to Max Black. His formula for a valid ethical argument is as follows.
        Premise 1. Doing A will produce pain.

Imagine an ethical discussion over the use of alcohol, an example made by Saariluoma (2021, 245). One of the participants has a major problem with it, he has a history of being an alcoholic. Other ones have no such problem and one of them has always been absolutist. If the way of rationalizing through the ethical question: "Ought one to drink excessively?" does not take these different backgrounds into account, the following outcome can be *experienced*. Either an alcoholic begins to form clear signs of guilt or then he is likely to get angry or overly quiet because of the guilt. Also, and this is important, participants with no addiction to alcohol are likely to have signs of pride. It can be sensed that their ego is supported, and we become aware of different levels of status between participants. There is nothing wrong with feeling proud over one's past decisions with the use of alcohol, but there is everything wrong with enjoying the feeling of pride about them at expense of others – a fact about valid ethical discussions which we are in debt to Christianity. (Dewey blames Christian institutions for prideful attitudes, because he was frustrated with the dogmatic authorities (1930, 292), but isn't it ironical that the Christian dogma is at least supposed to uproot pride from people's attitudes.)

Popper seems to be agreeing with this: "…'Judge not' appears to some of us one of the fundamental and much too little appreciated laws of humanitarian ethics." (Popper, 551) However, he forgets to mention that the origin of this virtue is in Christianity. Popper's mistake is also the overwhelming skepticism towards making any ethical judgment towards others which he produced from the possibility of unjust judgments: "Only a scandal-monger is interested in judging people or their actions." (Popper, 551) Here Christian paradigm of ethics is partly in contradiction with his views. The phrase, "judge not," is followed with a moral assertion: "Sin no more."[63] To sin means to "make a mistake", "miss a mark" or "go wrong" (Anscombe, 180). In connection to action, sin can be conceptualized as choosing morally wrong acts instead of morally right alternatives. Even with the possibility to fall into the sin of making an unjust judgment and enjoying the pride produced from it, as Pharisees do (Popper, 551), we are not supposed to forget discussions about what is sinful and what is the moral law.

Premise 2. Apart from producing the pain resulting from A, doing A will have the same consequence that not doing A would have had.
Conclusion: A ought not to be done. (Black, 1964, 180)
See criticism of this attempt to overcome the "no ought from is" -principle (Mounce, Phillips, 1965).

[63] Consider how this theme appears in The Bible:" They say unto him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act. Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned: but what sayest thou?... … So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground. And they which heard [it,] being convicted by [their own] conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, [even] unto the last: and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst. When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more." (King James Bible, John 8:3–8:11)

What is the reason for also judging and not judging oneself and other people? Analysis of temporality and choice can make this question answerable. It is only the past actions that we must leave in peace while making moral judgments. Past actions should be treated religiously with forgiveness.[64] Insofar practices of health care, like therapy, can heal the influence of forbidden past acts, people should also be treated with them. And, since people must also be forced into the right type of action, past acts must be treated with political power (there just cannot be only ethical treatments for regulating actions in a given society, even if this could be someone's utopia).

But for present and future actions, our hearts demand the ethical help of others. We can take the responsibility to act morally right and we long for doing so. It just requires that we extend the responsibility only for acts which we can still choose to be otherwise – it requires avoiding unjust judgment in practices of ethical discourse and focusing on attempting to *sin no more* on ground-level actions.

By improving our ethical practices with temporality and choice in mind, we reach the benefits of ethics. We rescue the possibility to improve our ability to support and challenge each other's moral character through ethical discussions. We should be encouraged to take naturalistic ethics as possible and necessary for improving our cultures – especially when the possibility to make unjust judgments has been noticed and ethical practices can be improved so that we do not fall for making it. Thus, the production of unnecessary pain by speech acts is avoided.

(3) Moore became so skeptical of ethics that all which could have been said rationally about moral good, was that it is indefinable – one can make anything from it (Moore, 17). In *Principia Ethica,* he ended rationalizing problems of metaethics by metaphysical assertions about supersensible (which is not founded on anything real) and logical principles such as naturalistic fallacy. I have attempted to provide a reasonable alternative for this stance naturalistically – even the reference to The Holy Bible does not narrow the fact that the alternative solution made, requires only descriptive, sensible, and temporal knowledge. The Bible has not been used as the foundation for my reasoning here.[65] I recommend the reader consider the possible experiences of unnecessary pain produced by someone making an unjust judgment. I also think that we can find how the ability to move beyond unjust judgment, happens by focusing on moral judgments which only deal with present and future action.

A naturalistic stance towards scientific reasoning takes it that scientific methods can be used even when solving epistemological problems (Godfrey-Smith, 149–

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[64] See also Austin's category of "behabitives" (2009, 160).
[65] Even though my understanding of the issue may have unconsciously been a product of these verses: John 8:3–8:11, I came up with the idea of choice, temporality, and judging long before analyzing the issue in the context of these verses. It was fascinating to first come up with the idea and later notice the meaning of these verses, which as far as I have interpreted them correctly, propose the same thing about unjust judgments.

150). To be exact, for normative naturalists[66] this includes justifying a stance of how reasoning works by making observations about it (Godfrey-Smith, 152–153). Thus, the most important experience for naturalists to understand the "is/ought" -question, is the experience of ethical discussions which get ended by a participant before agreement over the norms in question. Discussion is usually sifted to political stances or other areas of our culture, or then the discussion is just ended before making conclusions together. For naturalists, this must be taken as evidence for a failed ethical method – a method that must be improved for being able to grasp conclusions together. Production of unnecessary pain, through poking carelessly someone's load of guilt, can be taken as a major failure to the ethical method in use – it is a failure both practically and morally. Due to my experience, it ends discussions before making them rationally valid ones.[67]

We do not have to be skeptical if we learn to avoid unjust judgments and if our sense of rationality is improved so that making unjust judgments is understood as fallacious. Understanding unjust judgments creates regulations for practices in ethical discourse. Since past acts are the source of unnecessary feelings of guilt, we can regulate ethical discussion by the "no ought for past acts" -principle. This principle narrows ethical conclusions to refer only to acts of the present and future – only to acts that can still be chosen to be otherwise. In ethical discourse, this would produce practices where the point of ethical reasoning is in its action-guiding function. Thus, ethical discussions would be finished rationally, with all participants, regardless of their baggage of guilt or pride towards the act in question.[68]

The "no ought for past acts" -principle does not narrow people's ability to institutionalize others by political reasons because of their past acts. Neither it narrows down people's ability for blaming other people for what they have done. Blame for past acts can always be provided, it is just that if someone tries to give justification for the blame, it is impossible by the type of justification we use in ethical arguments. The blame for past acts must be treated only as opinion among others, while ethical arguments can be treated as valid or invalid. Ethics is not about blaming or making people feel miserable for their sins, it is about analyzing each situation of an agent and deciding rationally which goal must be pursued instead of other goals and how is that made most efficiently.

If someone is loaded with massive baggage of guilt, services of psychology and religion can be seen as more suitable for removing the baggage and healing the

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[66] In contrast to the most skeptical phase of Quine's naturalism, "normative naturalist" is not skeptical towards philosophical problems. It is not reasonable to replace philosophy with other sciences such as psychology. Instead, there are philosophically relevant questions to be solved philosophically, even though results of other sciences can help solve them. (Godfrey-Smith, 150–152)

[67] *Supposition 3.*

[68] *Supposition 4.*

wounds. Rational discourse over the moral goodness of those acts should be made in other contexts. We should learn to separate ethics from other practices.

Here, we have focused on negative accounts over temporality and choice of ethical reasoning. We have analyzed guilt and unjust judgments and left positive accounts, like making "just judgments," untouched ("just judgment" is my label for the fact that just as there are moral reasons to avoid moral judgments there are moral responsibilities to make them – to help others by ethical discussions.) Focus on unjust judgments, the negative side of the issue becomes from our subject matter. We only try to treat the negative assertion: the "no ought from is" -principle, in this study.

(4) We are yet to make final remarks on what remains constant and what is liable for arbitrary change while formulating an ethical argument. A rational answer to a descriptive question tells how things have been in past and *because of that*, will probably be so in the future. A rational answer to a moral question cannot connect the past and future this way. People's actions may have been vicious in past, and it cannot be inferred that they ought to remain vicious in the future also. Things such as occasional killing may have occurred in past, but since the agent who committed these crimes can become virtuous, such evil acts do not possibly occur anymore. In the case of ethical reasoning, the connection between past and future must be different than in some cases of factual reasoning.

As an example, factual knowledge about celestial bodies is a type of knowledge, which tells us how these things are regardless of *when* they are. If the earth is inferred to go around the sun and no other way around, it means that the earth has been going around the sun, it is going around the sun and it will be going around the sun. Morality is something we can seek to understand objectively and if something is found to be wrong, it has always been wrong and will be so in the future. (Complete defense for objective moral knowledge and against relativists has not been provided here.) However, when making arguments about morality, we happen to be making (explicitly or implicitly)[69] recommendations for choosing virtuous acts instead of vicious ones – we happen to be making speech acts – and these recommendations must be narrowed for present and future acts only where choices are still open. Instead of foundational "open questions," I advocate the necessity to describe moral subject matter as an open situation in the sense that the choice for acts in question has not yet been made.

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[69] Contrast this with Hare's demand to see the implicit principle of conduct behind the naturalistic argument that MacIntyre formulated (MacIntyre, 462). Similarly, Atkinson requires making evaluative statements explicit to infer validly into an ought -conclusion so that the gap between values and facts remained (Atkinson, 232). Here, I have attempted to bridge the gap by circumventing formal tautology (naturalistic fallacy) into practical terms (making unjust judgments produces unnecessary pain – a premise that is tried to be fulfilled by making that judgment).

When we have been making moral judgments such as "occasional killing is wrong"[70] we have been judging both acts which have been made in past, acts that are occurring, and acts that could occur. But the statement: "occasional killing is wrong," does not hold true for killing made in the past. We can blame people for having to kill someone, but we cannot make a rational argument to support that claim in ethics.

This stance might strike as unintuitive for some, so I wish to clarify what the "no ought for past acts" -principle means in practice. Imagine a situation where someone has just killed a person. Ethicist has brought to the killer for having an ethical discussion. But ethicists cannot argue against the murder which was just performed. Is this not tragic? Or, what the reader might be thinking: is this not an invalid way of thinking about what ethicists can and cannot do? But I do not intend to deny that the murder does not pose a serious reason for having the ethical discussion. The proverb "Once a thief always a thief" could be applied to a murderer as well. Once one has committed a murder, the possibility that this person might commit another one is higher than with those who have never killed anyone. Thus, there is a good reason for talking ethically about murder with this person.

However, the motive for having a discussion is not straightforwardly the point of discussion. It is much more important – I mean, it is the only important thing for ethicists – for discussing the possible killing which could be made in the future by the murderer, since those acts are still avoidable by correct reasoning. What use there is to argue against an unchangeable piece of history? And what use is there to speculate "rationally" against "if" -scenarios of that piece of history? I think the only use is either our indirect preparation for the future action or bloodthirsty for making judgments and our willingness to have vendetta. We just want to place ourselves on a moral high ground – we are tempted to feel pride even if it is vice. This is why we fail to think that all the tools in our rational toolbox are meant to deal with past actions. We can have our judgment politically, but since we are morally imperfect that is not enough for us, we are thirsty for making the judgment ethically as well! And thus, we confuse tools of ethics for dealing with unchangeable history while the real worry for ethics is in the possible acts which still can be affected to be virtuous instead of vicious.

Past acts can be known descriptively, and they do not change arbitrarily. In contrast, present and future acts fall into the sphere of choices. When criteria for right and wrong acts are used, while analyzing present and future actions, the object

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[70] MacIntyre demanded an example where the statement "occasional killing is wrong" is proven wrong by those who support Hume's guillotine (MacIntyre, 461–462) He never got an argument for this by his critics: Atkinson, Flew, and Hudson, but here I can provide one. Occasional killings, which have occurred in the past, cannot be judged with moral reasons, since morality requires an agent's ability to choose from alternative acts, and past acts cannot be chosen to be otherwise anymore. Past acts can be blamed for, and a person can be institutionalized by a political decision because of his past, but ethical arguments are meant for present and future acts only.

in question is the subject matter of ethics. The criterion for right and wrong acts, were it happiness, health, emotional valence, institutions, and promising or any other factual matter (maybe all of them), do not change arbitrarily. For instance, what are happiness and health in the past can be inferred to remain (probably) so in the future. It is only that we cannot infer us to be acting according to moral criteria in the future, even though we have done so in the past. To believe so, would be prideful, it would deny the most important lesson of ethics: all of us are always able for both good and evil acts.

> If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart? (Solzhenitsyn, 1973, 168)

We have gone through four phases for analyzing morally relevant emotions in contrast to the "is/ought" -question. A summary of this chapter will be provided by the following line of questions and answers.

Why did Moore, and so many others, make the distinction between supersensible and naturalistic reasoning in ethics? Along with naturalists, they failed to see that there is also a naturalistic metalevel for good and bad: practices in ethical discourse itself, which can be taken as a reasonable alternative for supersensible good in itself.

Why did Popper, Atkinson, and other critics of naturalism, require the use of evaluations separately from facts? They recognized (better than naturalists) that there is a great danger to hurt someone and thus make morally bad acts while practicing ethics in the wrong way. Since the distinction between past and future action had not been made, it was necessary to support the distinction between values and facts. Acceptance for value differences was required, because past acts cannot be chosen to be otherwise, and thus, anything which has been done must potentially be accepted as it is. The reason for taking value differences as part of ethical disputes disappears, once moral judgments are formed in a way that they do not refer to past acts.

How can naturalists learn to avoid unjust judgments without making evaluations separately from facts? By narrowing their moral conclusions to referring only to present or future acts.

And finally, how can critics of naturalism find optimism for generalizable knowledge in ethics? By healing people's baggage of guilt in practices of art, religion, psychology, and so on. They can learn to separate these practices from the ethical discussion. Also, they can protect themselves by referring to the "no ought for past acts" -principle in cases where unjust judgments appear in ethical discourse.

This is the naturalistic alternative for the "no ought from is" -principle, which due to my experience, has already been functioning as protection from unjust judgments. The problem is that the reasons for supporting the principle have been rather abstract. Metaphysical assertions and principles for principles' sake have been required leaving especially naturalists and common folk to scratch their heads for valid reasons. I wish the practical reasons and guidance for valid ethical practices have now been provided. Thus, we have reasons to take the "is/ought" -question seriously.

4 CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Proper understanding of the "is/ought" -question

How things are? What actions people do? These are descriptive questions and answers are provided by "is" -statements. Examples of moral questions can be for instance: How things ought to be? What ought people to do? Answers can be provided by "ought" -statements. The "is/ought" -question means to ask, how can one make the rational transition between these two types of answers – from facts to values? However, it is debatable what makes this transition problematic.

We considered Saariluoma's understanding of what is problematic in the relationship between facts and morality (Hypothesis 1). Another understanding of the issue is Moore's (Hypothesis 2.) We contrasted these with my alternative understanding of the issue (Hypothesis 3).

Hypothesis 1: The relationship between facts and values is a problem of analysis between mind and actions and between cognition and emotion.

Hypothesis 2: The problem is insufficient analysis of temporal and eternal matter in contrast to reasoning between facts and values.

Hypothesis 3: The problem is insufficient analysis of temporality and choice in contrast to reasoning between facts and values.

Saariluoma's understanding includes the hope for the development of other sciences to deal with this problem. In principle, it could have been possible that the

"is/ought" -question was misunderstood more than 250 years because of an incoherent scientific understanding of mind and action. However, it does not take into account the temporality of reasoning. Since in the field of philosophy, the foundationalistic contribution made by Moore and the naturalistic contribution by Dewey, both include the requirement to understand the issue with temporal elements in mind, hypothesis 1. can be denied. It is reasonable to take the most influential critics of naturalism into account while making a naturalistic attempt to overcome the "no ought from is" -principle.

For Moore, the problem was understood as an analysis of temporal and eternal objects. This take is understandable since religious practices have always used eternal things, such as God and divine interventions, to justify morality. But he does not analyze temporality in contrast to choices, which is the reason why he ended in skepticism and took the "is/ought" -problem as unsolvable.

Skepticism for generalizable knowledge can be cured, by understanding the problem in a new way. The problem emerges from insufficient analysis of the most important elements of moral phenomena. Answers can be provided when these elements have been recognized and made explicit. The choice is such an element. Temporality is too. The "is/ought" -question must be understood as the sufficient or insufficient analysis between these two phenomena and rationality. The sufficient way of looking at "is/ought" -relations, is to notice how "ought" entails action and action entails real choices, but real choices do not extend to action in past.

4.2   Valid inference from is -statements to ought -statement

Given answers to the "is/ought" -question follows from each one's understanding of what makes the relationship between facts and values problematic. Saariluoma took it as a pseudo problem, which emerges from an incoherent picture of mind and action. He did not provide an argument analysis of the correct ethical reasoning. However, he supported the use of facts like well-being and emotional valence, which makes him a naturalist. The formula for the right type of ethical inferences is provided by other naturalists, like MacIntyre's, Searle's, and Black's examples (see above). We focus on MacIntyre's one, which proposes to bridge the gap between facts and values (Hypothesis A). Atkinson, Hudson, and Moore (among others) took the "no ought from is" -principle as the correct answer to the "is/ought" -question. They required an evaluative statement as a premise of an ethical argument, to make the inference in question founded. Thus, they argued that the gap cannot be bridged (Hypothesis B). After facing these alternatives and analyzing the question with temporality and choice in mind, I came to the conclusion that the gap between facts and

values can be bridged by narrowing the meaning of given statements into present and future acts (Hypothesis C).

How can we make valid derivations from is -statements to ought -statements?

Hypothesis A: Right type of psychological and sociological is -statements must be used in the premises of an ethical argument.

Hypothesis B: Is -statements must always be accompanied by evaluative -statements in the premises of an ethical argument. Ought -conclusion cannot be drawn only from is -statements.

Hypothesis C: Is -statements, which will be used as premises for ethical argument, must be narrowed to refer only to present and future acts, and thus the ought -conclusion is narrowed similarly.

Formulas for proposed derivations:
Hypothesis A:

Premise 1: If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail (Sociological fact)
Premise 2: I do not want to go to jail (Psychological fact)
Conclusion: I ought not to (had better not) stick a knife in him (Moral judgment)

Hypothesis B:

Premise 1: If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail (Sociological fact)
Premise 2: I do not want to go to jail (Psychological fact)
Premise 3: If it is both the case that if I do x, the outcome will be y, then if I don't want y to happen, I ought not to do x. (Principle of conduct or Evaluative statement)
Conclusion: I ought not to (had better not) stick a knife in him (Moral judgment)

Hypothesis C:

Premise 1: If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail (Sociological fact)
Premise 2: *From now on*, I do not want to go to jail (Psychological fact)
Conclusion: *From now on*, I ought not to (had better not) stick a knife in him (Moral judgment)

The reason for denying the formula for Hypothesis A is the fact that it becomes self-contradictory *in practice*. Notice how Moore argues for this to become self-contradictory *in principle* (i.e. tautological reasoning), but we have found that naturalistic reasons can be provided for fixing this formula. Moral responsibility applies not only to concrete acts like killing someone but also to speech acts in the context of ethical discussion. If there are speech acts, which seek to provide a valid moral argument, but which produce unnecessary pain, those speech acts are morally wrong. Those speech acts have been labeled unjust judgments. And if unnecessary pain has been treated by unjust judgment, the attempt *itself* produces unnecessary pain, and thus, is self-contradictory in its aim. Using unjust judgments to end morally questionable acts is like throwing fuel on a fire and expecting it to be extinguished.

The reason for denying the formula for Hypothesis B is the fact that rational acceptance of value differences destroys the possibility to formulate generalizable arguments about morality. If this formula is accepted, any participant in an ethical discussion can formulate rational counterarguments only by supposing that there is a value difference in question. This is a skeptical stance towards any possibility to find agreement over good and evil acts rationally. While this is acceptable in the practices of politics, art, and therapy, ethical practices are special in the way that it attempts to solve value differences. What reason there is to separate ethics from politics, if both are run by acceptance of value differences? The usage of more complex language in the case of ethics does not count as a crucial difference here.

In more technical terms, the formula for Hypothesis B also ends in tautology by trying to answer two different types of questions with the same argument. By assuming that every ethical argument must be founded metaphysically and that there is no objective substance to rely on in metaphysics, it opens a possibility to decide what the substance is going to be for every one of us and can be changed at any moment of our lives. However, the meta-question about common criteria for moral acts can be treated separately from primary questions, which ask if a certain act falls in the line with that criterion or not. This separation is possible after we understand that the reason for attempting to distinguish the metaphysical sphere from the natural sphere, is our attempt to find a rational cover for unjust judgments. Thus, the separation between temporal and eternal (natural and metaphysical) can be replaced with the separation between speech acts in ethical discussion and first-stage action. Both can be investigated naturalistically.

The reason for accepting Hypothesis C is the fact that it provides an explanation for denying both of the other alternatives considered here. It narrows our rational attempts to grasp morality correctly. It is a stance for replacing Hume's guillotine and "no ought from is" -principles, with "no ought from past acts" -principle

(and practice). This replacement respects the reasons for supporting Hume's guillotine, but it also respects those who have been opposing it. By adding the phrase "*From now on*" into our ethical arguments, optimism for ethics as a naturalistic discipline emerges.

4.3   Critical Glance in the Mirror

A new attempt to understand and find the solution to the "is/ought" -question has been presented. Before closing this presentation of my contribution, it is necessary to go through the possible limits of it, which I try to recognize myself.

The first possible limit is the way in which I have been grouping naturalists and foundationalists in the same category. I have interpreted naturalists to believe that the gap between is- and ought- statements can be bridged and foundationalists to take it as an unbridgeable gulf. Even though there are major differences between different contributions under these two labels, I have not gone in-depth to analyze these differences in the context of this study. Further studies to analyze the difference could be made.

Someone might question my choices for analyzing literature. Saariluoma and Harris have been writing as recently as 2018, 2020, and 2021. There is a long way back in history to MacIntyre's, Atkinson's, Hudson's, Foot's, etc. contributions. I have been guided by an article collection called *The Is/Ought Question* (1969), which includes contributions between 1958. and 1965.[71] Two other gaps in time occur, when we take two of the most influential contributions of the "no ought from is" -principle into account. Moore's *Principia Ethica* was published in 1903. and Hume's *Treatise* in 1739–1740. I have not analyzed – or I am not even aware of – contributions published between these gaps. By going through unnoticed contributions, something contradictory to my claims might emerge.

While interpreting Moore's contribution, I have focused on the first half of the *Principia Ethica* (and I have not mentioned comments in the other works by Moore). The first half focuses on naturalistic fallacy while the latter half aims to give a positive stance for both metaethics and practical ethics. The second half of the book includes commentary on cognitions in relation to emotions (Moore, 136, 225), which could have been useful to contrast with Saariluoma's stance on the issue (even though it is possible that Moore's views have turned out to be outdated in the field of cognition science). Also, I have commented on Popper's take on "judging others" by contrasting it to Christian thought. Moore has also made comments on this same

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[71] For instance, *The Is/Ought problem* (1997) by Gerhard Schurz is an investigation, which could be reasonable to go through for increasing amount of pro- and contrapositions for possibly challenging and supporting my treatment of the issue.

theme (Moore, 177–178), but for now, it will have to be left unnoticed. These choices to interpret Moore's contribution can be seen as a limitation of my study.

My focus has been on providing constructive criticism for Saariluoma's (and other naturalists') attempt to overcome Hume's guillotine. This means that I have tried to give reasonable alternatives for Saariluoma's stance on the issue. There might be some weaknesses in the formulation of my critique.

Saariluoma formulated his stance naturalistically, which means that results of empirical sciences have been used to answer a philosophical problem. My answer has been formulated similarly, though I have also faced the opposite stance with analytical arguments, and I have not proven my empirical claims in the context of this investigation. The former difference is beneficiary while the latter is a limit of this study. Naturalism states that it is possible to solve philosophical problems partly by empirical investigation of facts (Godfrey-Smith, 149–150). Here, the lack of proof is made explicit by a list of those empirical statements that will remain subjective in the context of this study. Those empirical suppositions (hypotheses) appear only in sections 4.3 and 4.4. They should be confirmed with studies in psychology and sociology. In my philosophical argument, they are only supposed to be valid ones.

Supposition 1: guilt and pride emerge as emotions (and cognitions), which stem only from past actions.

Supposition 2: guilt and pride are connected to speech acts about norms (i.e. moral judgments).

Supposition 3: In ethical discussions, where the difference between participants' level of guiltiness towards the moral judgment in question *is not noticed*, a participant who has greater baggage of guilt towards the regulated act in question, is likely to react by getting overly quiet, angry, stop participating and changing discussion into politics or other types of discussions. A participant with no baggage of guilt at all is likely to show signs of pride.

Supposition 4: In ethical discussions, where the difference between participants' level of guiltiness towards the moral judgment in question *is noticed,* a participant who has greater baggage of guilt towards the regulated act in question, is as likely to end the conversation rationally than a participant who has no baggage of guilt at all. Also, signs of pride do not appear in these cases.

Another possible limit of my study is the fact that I have been arguing about such themes as temporality and choice as if they were objects, which can be known

completely within the naturalistic framework. Even though physicists might have been able to operationalize an objective or physical sense of time, I have been using psychological sense – the sense, which takes time as experienced as past, present, and future from the human point of view. Temporality plays a crucial role for example in theoretical sociology (Giddens, 1984, 35).[72] Also, the choice is a concept far from operationalized. Maybe the science of consciousness is furthest in trying to do so. Here, my stance remains to be supported further. Insofar, as objects like time and choice can be understood without making foundational statements, I have been working within the proper framework here. The limit of this study is that I have not provided a defense against possible criticism from foundationalists about the use of temporality and choice. I have neither commented on metaphysical naturalism here.

While presenting my stance to others, one common reply has been: "So are you stating that we cannot make ethical arguments against Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao?" My answer is: "We cannot." To make valid ethical arguments against the actions of any of those dictators is in principle just as impossible as to argue ethically against what you did yesterday (or a minute back (or just a second ago)). This is because while one is posing such an argument, he is simultaneously making a speech act that produces unnecessary pain. Surely, your past actions or actions of these dictators can be blamed, and their actions can be provided as examples of forbidden ways to act. Often people make an implicit connection with arguments against one of these dictator's acts and possible actions which could be done by someone in present or in the future. Insofar, as this connection remains implicit, the presented argument in question is invalid. The point of ethics is to redirect our action, which remains to be made, not to poke into possible feelings of guilt or to cherish the feeling of pride generated from past acts.

Since the rejection of being able to make valid ethical arguments against those dictators might appear as an unintuitive stance for ethics and morality, it also might turn out to be a weakness of my investigation. This and all other possible limits of this study, I leave for my critics to be considered.

4.4 From now on

After coming up with the idea, that analysis of temporality and choice plays a crucial role in understanding the "is/ought" -question, I happened to experience an ethical discussion, where the other participant used the words *from now on* before making a moral judgment. By using this speech act, she did not poke my guilt for an act that

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[72] "But the fundamental question to social theory, as I see it… …is to explicate how the limitations of individual 'presence' are transcended by the 'stretching' of social relations across time and space." (Giddens, 35)

was forbidden and that I had just witnessed. Thus, I felt willing to agree and improve my habits. This experience encouraged me to study temporality and choice further in the context of the "is/ought" -question. At the end of this contribution, so many themes and ideas remain to be studied. Here are some practical implications of the contribution in question and new beginnings to proceed in the "is/ought" -investigation.

Investigating factual -statements in relation to moral judgments can serve people, with a better understanding of morally relevant emotions, such as guilt and pride. It also enables us to handle those sentiments. Imagine the difference, if your closest people began to change their behavior, by avoiding unjust judgments in discussions where norms must be created or cherished. Imagine also, how this could make us more and more willing to have ethical discussions over the actions, which we do every day of our lives. There are reasons for becoming pessimistic about generalizable knowledge in the context of ethics. I hope the reasons for optimism have been provided here.

Benefits (and problems) of the "no ought for past acts" -principle can be found in private relations by trying to improve our habits with it. We could also try practical applications for improving the state of our public discussion. Especially in the context of specialists in human sciences and philosophy. Identity and cultural conflict between liberals and conservatives could also be improved by offering rational formula for posing moral judgments correctly. Here, I mean cultural improvements only in the context of public discussion practiced by specialists. Like, Harris proposed, rational handling of "culture wars" and "science wars" could help us to settle those conflicts (Harris, 15). Though, I take it as harmful to democratic decision-making processes, if we continue restricting public self-expression by political power.

Saariluoma's main concern for opposing Hume's guillotine was that since applications of AI process only facts if Hume's guillotine is true, applications of AI cannot ever produce moral knowledge. If the gap between facts and values could be bridged, strong ethical AI would be possible. Strong ethical AI means that robots could produce moral knowledge for humans by themselves. (Saariluoma 2020b, 11–12)

So far, I hold the same conclusion as Saariluoma does: Hume's guillotine or "no ought from is" -principle, is not the correct view for the "is/ought" -question. Instead, we can infer from facts into values, if the correct type of facts has been used. For now, we have a different answer regarding how the facts must be narrowed. Saariluoma focuses on the right type of moral criteria (emotional valence) for allowing one type of action over another and social discourse for sharing information about emotional valence between individuals (Saariluoma 2020a, 126; Saariluoma 2021, 245–257). I have focused on unnecessary suffering, which is produced in the

social discourses themselves. I require to narrow the reference point in the context of ethical judgments by narrowing the reference points of used facts. Restriction, which I have referred to by the "no ought for past acts" -principle.

However, since I have provided factual reasons for this restriction (unnecessary pain), strong ethical AI would detect unjust judgment automatically. Insofar, as fully automatized robots would make ethical judgments about humans, they would present them with speech acts, which do not fall for unjust judgments. It is only the weaker version of ethical AI that I am concerned with. Weak ethical AI is the current version, where humans implement their values into automatized fact processors. Harris believes that the scientific community is mainly liberal and if scientific ethics were to be developed, issues like gay marriage would instantly be solved rationally (Harris, 16–17). If ethicists are to choose only those facts, which liberals take as evidence for deciding some of the main issues of culture wars, those studies would be politically biased. As long as automatized robots have not been developed for doing the ethicists' job neutrally, we must provide information for ethical studies, which is collected by specialists from both ends of the culture wars.

Uncertainties for developing scientific ethics and both private and public benefits (or problems) of the "no ought from past acts" -principle should be studied further.

The process of attempting to answer the "is/ought" -question has sparked many ideas for possible problematizations. Most of them include an interdisciplinary approach, like in Saariluoma's contribution. While he focused to challenge our take on cognitions' relation to emotion by findings of cognition science, I have reflected analysis of temporality and choice in contrast to sociological theories. Especially the difference between action- and structure- theory has been bothering me. Those matters have been studied in contrast to temporality already (Giddens, 35). I wish to be able to study this matter further and connect the results to philosophical literature about speech acts. Also, temporality and choice could be analyzed in contrast to these theories to re-examine the difference between them.

The theoretical background should be found for the idea of guilt and pride in the field of cognition science, psychology, and sociology. These concepts could also be attempted to be operationalized. It would also be interesting to investigate guilt and pride through literature analysis. I have often thought of *Stranger,* by Albert Camus, while reflecting on this issue. In this work, he expresses a perfect example of a character who has pathology for morally relevant emotions like guilt. Also, Fyodor Dostojevsky's *Crime and Punishment* has been in my mind. This work presents one beautiful story of how a person can overcome and heal his pathology toward guilt. Literary analysis in contrast to how subject guilt is handled in this investigation could be helpful for elucidating the most technical points made here.

The role of questions in the context of the "is/ought" -question, could be re-examined. Moore's stance has been remembered as an "open question" -argument. This side of theorizing around the "is/ought" -issue, could be challenged by a "closed question" -argument, and an investigation about the difference between those could be made.

As Harris proposes, many of those who support Hume's guillotine, do it because they hold a stance that ethical reasoning depends on having faith in God. Since believing in God is different from stating a fact and arguing for it, there is a gap between is -statements and ought -statements. (Harris, 15) On the other hand, some take statements about God as the reason for inferring what we ought to do (MacIntyre, 453). Also, Moore announced that conducting statements about God into conclusions about goodness makes the argument in question fall into naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 113–114). Since, faith in God and statements about God have been taken either to support or deny the "no ought from is" -principle, and here an alternative to this principle is offered, also stances about God in connection to moral goodness could be re-examined.

Saariluoma used Mose's law as an example of ethical rules (Saariluoma 2020a, 126). The founding of the moral law for the people of Israel is a crucial theme in The Old Testament. I have been pointing toward how Jesus challenged our practices of making moral judgments according to Mose's law. In some way, the difference between Saariluoma's take on the "is/ought" -question and my take on it, is like the difference between The Old- and The New Testament. Theologically supported investigation of the "is/ought" -question would be relevant.

So many solutions have already been provided and rejected during more than 250 years old "is/ought" -debate. Here, a solution is offered, not for ending the investigation but for embracing it. The challenge is to decide whether the problem is understandable and solvable by analyzing reasoning in contrast to temporality and choice. I have tried to turn a new page for investigations of the "is/ought" -question. Though, on the religious front, the page has already been turned with the phrase:

> Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more. (John 8:11)

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