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Language Learning and Language Teaching

**SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF L2
ACQUISITION RESEARCH** Henning Wode

LANGUAGE TRANSFER: THE STATE OF THE ART
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Andrei Danchev

**TRANSFER AS A UNIVERSAL OF VERBAL
PERFORMANCE OF L2 LEARNERS IN SITUATIONS
OF COMMUNICATION IN TRANSLATED UTTERANCES**
Gideon Toury

CROSS-CULTURAL PRAGMATIC FAILURE
Jenny Thomas

**COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES: RELATING THEORY
AND PRACTICE** Anna Trosborg

**A REASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT APPROACH TO
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING WITH A SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE LATEST RESEARCH IN NEURO-
LINGUISTICS** Naum Dimitrijević

**A FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING COMMUNICATIVE
SKILLS** William Littlewood

COMPREHENSION-BASED TEACHING: AN OVERVIEW
Jadwiga Nawrocka-Fisiak

**THE ROLE OF JOKES IN THE SECOND LANGUAGE
ACQUISITION OF ECONOMISTS-TO-BE**
Agnes Syrányi

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PREFACE

The papers in the present volume have been chosen from among those that were presented at the Fifth International Conference on Contrastive Projects entitled "Cross-Language Analysis and Second Language Acquisition", which was held in Jyväskylä on June 1-5, 1982, or at the Sixth Finnish Summer School of Linguistics held in Jyväskylä on June 7-11, 1982. The rest of the conference papers will be published in Applied Linguistics, Vol. 4 (3), Autumn 1983, and in Jyväskylä Cross-Language Studies Vols. 9 and 10.

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K. Sajavaara

C O N T E N T S

Henning Wode: Some theoretical implications of L2 acquisition research	1
M.A. Sharwood Smith: Language transfer: The state of the art	27
Andrei Danchev: Transfer and translation	39
Gideon Toury: Transfer as a universal of verbal performance of L2 learners in situations of communication in translated utterances	63
Jenny Thomas: Cross-cultural pragmatic failure	79
Anna Trosborg: Communication strategies: Relating theory and practice	111
Naum Dimitrijević: A reassessment of the current approach to foreign language teaching with a special reference to the latest research in neurolinguistics	137
William Littlewood: A framework for teaching communicative skills	149
Jadwiga Nawrocka-Fisiak: Comprehension-based teaching: An overview	157
Agnes Syrányi: The role of jokes in the second language acquisition of economists-to-be	165

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SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF L2 ACQUISITION RESEARCH

0. Purpose

The past 10-12 years of L2 research have been extremely exciting and fruitful. Although many controversies and unresolved problems remain, there can be no doubt at all that great advances have been made in various areas, the most important probably being that the field of language acquisition is no longer regarded as restricted to young L1 children. It seems to be well accepted these days that for a proper understanding of how languages are learned, all types of language acquisition and all age ranges have to be included (Wode 1974, 1981a). This comprehensive approach has important implications. For one thing, foreign language teaching is no longer regarded as a type of language learning which is completely unrelated to the mastery of a language in non-teaching situations. The first attempts to characterize language learning from such a comprehensive point of view are quite encouraging. It appears from such studies that learners do not proceed in totally different and wholly unrelated ways. Rather, they seem to learn languages in much the same way, although there is a good deal of individual variation as a function of the acquisitional types and the individual speakers (cf. Wode 1979, 1981a; Felix 1982). Moreover, it seems to be accepted now that transfer is an integral part of how languages are learned (Wode 1977a, 1981a; Zobl 1980; Meisel 1982). Other areas in which L2 research has greatly advanced our overall understanding of how languages are learned include issues like the relevancy of age; general cognition; situational, pragmatic, and numerous other variables (see summary in McLaughlin 1978; Wode 1981a; Felix 1982).

However, it seems that this comprehensive perspective can be further enlarged in another way. The general insights summarized were all developed by focusing on various types of language acquisition, notably on L2 acquisition in natural settings. These insights need to be related to the general functioning of natural human languages. That is to say, we will not be able to fully understand their design and their functioning unless we know how they are learned; but the reverse also

holds, namely, that we will not be able to appreciate properly all the many facts and insights collected about language learning unless this is integrated with what is known about the functioning of natural human languages in non-learning domains.

The purpose of this paper is to raise some of those issues that have to be considered and to explore some of their implications. They extend into various disciplines: psychology, sociology, education, neurology, brain research, and, of course, linguistics. This paper will be limited to linguistics, because this discipline seems to be affected much more directly than any of the other disciplines mentioned above. Four questions appear to be central to the issue:

(1) How does language learning relate to language typology?

Most linguists currently seem to agree that natural human languages do not differ infinitely, but that there are universal constraints on the possible form natural human languages can take. Are learner languages constrained by the same restrictions? The empirical evidence presently available suggests that the answer should be affirmative.

(2) How does language learning relate to language change?

Recall that many researchers assume that children are chiefly responsible for diachronic changes of a language. Children are thought to recapitulate developmentally the diachronic development of a language. Another view is that children can only simplify a language or add low-level rules to it. Yet another view is that children are the chief propagators of language change. (See the recent survey of such ideas in Baron 1977).

It is argued below that all these views are inadequate for a number of reasons: such claims are based only on L1 acquisition; they disregard borrowing, which is essentially language learning via transfer; and the above views fail to consider the findings from sociolinguistic studies which show that it is chiefly the adolescent and adult age ranges which spread changes in a language. It will be suggested that the relationship between language learning and language change derives from the fact that both are constrained by the same, ie. universal, typological restrictions.

(3) To what extent will linguists be required to re-conceptualize one of the central assumptions underlying linguistic theorizing, namely, the learnability assumption?

Recall that natural human languages can be structured only in such a way that they are learnable by the human brain and the processing systems associated with it. Recall further that Chomsky made this a cornerstone of his theory, although for him learnability relates primarily to the L1 child. The best grammar is the one that mirrors how the L1 child learns a language (Chomsky 1965, 1973, 1976 and elsewhere). But do adults not learn languages? How about adolescents? It is argued that Chomsky's claim is completely arbitrary. The learnability assumption must be re-conceptualized in the sense that it cannot be based on a specific group; it must be related to the language learning capacity of people in general and irrespective of any arbitrary age restrictions.

(4) The fourth question is the crucial one: Can linguistic universals be explained psycholinguistically?

The issue is not to detect and describe universals and universal restrictions on natural human languages, as is traditionally done within language typology. The issue is to explain why these universals and the various typological constraints are as they are. If linguistic universals can be explained by recourse to some other domain, we will be in a position to state why natural human languages and their linguistic structures are structured the way they are; why languages change only the way they do; why learner languages take the form they do; and the re-conceptualization of the learnability assumption would follow naturally from such an argument.

Theoretically, the answer to the above issue is easy and obvious: natural human languages are as they are because they must be processible by the processing system(s) of the human brain. Linguistic universals, therefore, are determined by the functioning of the human brain. Languages can only change in such a way that they remain learnable. Language change, consequently, must stay within the limits set by the brain's processing system(s). Learner languages, as well as the structure of marginal languages, like pidgins, must be subject to the same restrictions irrespective of the age of speakers. And, lastly, language variation must

also follow the same constraints.

This would be a neat argument if only more was known about the functioning of the language processing system(s) of the human brain. Unfortunately, we are far from this goal. The best that can be done, at present, is to look for empirical evidence that would at least encourage researchers to pursue such questions without being dependent exclusively on speculation. This, it seems, can now be done, thanks primarily to the advances in L2 research.

In the next section empirical data on negation systems are examined with respect to the issues outlined above.

It would, of course, be presumptuous and premature to expect a fully satisfactory solution, particularly concerning psycholinguistic explanations of language universals. In the long run, all types of universals need to be explained, ie. substantive universals, formal universals, implicational universals, etc. Moreover, in a certain sense every detail of language structure can be regarded as being constrained by the functioning of the human brain. Therefore, in order to make the task manageable the whole problem can be thought of as involving two extremes. One end of the spectrum is marked by various "low-level" details; the other end constitutes the "upper bound", ie. the total range of options open to natural languages. The focus in this paper is on the "upper bound". The first step is to determine whether empirical evidence can be brought to bear on this issue. This is the aim of this paper. That is, the data on negation systems are reviewed as to whether the various types of language varieties lend support to the idea that the same set of constraints underly all of them. The starting point is the data on language acquisition, because this material provided the original challenge for the re-conceptualization proposed in this paper.

1. Some data

L1, L2 acquisition and language typology

Table 1 summarizes the major developmental structures and the developmental sequences for the L1 and L2 acquisition of German and English.¹ That is, L1 German is matched by L2 German acquired by speakers with English

¹ For the general framework used to discuss learner data, cf. Wode 1981a.

as L1; and L1 English is matched by L2 English acquired by speakers with German as L1. The material comes from children aged up to 10. The Roman numerals indicate the major developmental stages during the early phases of acquiring the particular language. The developmental structures characteristic of the various stages are listed under the respective Roman numerals.

Table 1. Some early stages in the L1 and L2 acquisition of the negations systems of German and English by children aged up to 10 (adapted from Wode 1977a).

L1-Deutsch		L2-Deutsch/L1-English	
I	nein 'no'	I-II	nein 'no'
II	nein, Milch 'no, (I would like some) milk'		nein, da 'no, (it is) there'
III	nein hauen 'no bang (on the table)'	III	nein helfen 'no help (me)'
IV	Heiko nich essen 'Heiko (is) not (to) eat (this)' die nicht kaputt 'these (are) not broken'	IV	Katze nein schlafen '(the) cat no sleep' Milch nicht da '(the) milk (is) not there'
L1-English		L2-English/L1-Deutsch	
I	no	I-II	no
II	no, Mom		no, you
III	no close	III	no play baseball
IV	Katherine no like celery	IV	that's no good Marilyn like no sleepy lunch is no ready me no close the window John go not to school me and Jennifer not play

The important points about Table 1 are: There is a regular progression from less complex to more complex structures in the development of the learner language. Some of the developmental structures cannot be related to the structure of the target language in any direct way. Note, in particular, stages III-IV. Utterances like no close 'don't shut (the door)', no play baseball '(we) don't (want to) play baseball' or the German structures of III tend not to be provided by the linguistic environment to

which children are normally exposed. Likewise, utterances like Katherine no like celery 'Katherine doesn't like celery', Marilyn like no sleepy 'Marilyn doesn't want to go to sleep', me no close the window 'I don't want to shut the window', John go not to the school 'John is not going to school', as well as the German structures of IV, are not regularly used in discourse directed to foreign learners nor in talk not directed at learners.¹ Where then do negation structures such as neg X, Subj neg VP, or Subj V neg (X) come from? If they are not taught and if they are not picked up directly from the input addressed to the learner, they can only be the learner's own contribution. More precisely, the morphological items can be traced to the respective target languages. But where do the word order patterns originate? They must be contributed by the learner. But then the question is, where does the learner's ability to produce such structures come from, and why do they show the kind of constraints that they do? Why, for example, is neg not simply inserted after the first, second or third word? It is suggested below that these peculiarities result from universal constraints governing the possible form of natural human languages.²

Another important point to note about Table 1 is the relationship of such learner data to language typology. Notice that all the developmental structures summarized in Table 1 are typologically possible. That is to say, one way or another the structural options utilized in these learner data are well evidenced in typological surveys of the negation systems of natural human languages (see, in particular, Dahl 1979). In fact, pre-verbal negation as in the structural type Subj neg VP of stage IV is one of the most frequent negation structures in the languages of the world. Pre-posed external placement of neg is also typologically possible, although it is less frequently attested than the type Subj neg VP. In addition, the post-verbal placement of neg is quite familiar from, for example, German and Norwegian.

¹ Except in child-child interaction, or in those cases where the respective languages employ such structures, as in Black English or in pidgins and creoles.

² A detailed account of how these (and other) developmental negation structures relate to the structure of the target language(s) is given in Wode 1977b for L1 acquisition and in Wode 1981a for L2 acquisition. These details are not immediately relevant to the discussion in the present paper.

Although the data reviewed so far came from children aged 4-10, such developmental structures are by no means restricted to these age ranges nor to the acquisitional types surveyed in Table 1. The same developmental structures also occur with adult L2 learners, and the same negation structures have also been found in foreign language classroom situations. Wode 1981a reports such data for adult migrants learning L2 German in a naturalistic environment and for 10-12-year-old German secondary school students who were taught English. Furthermore, Hyltenstam 1978 observed the same developmental negation structures with a large number of adult L2 learners of Swedish who spoke various immigrant languages from all over the world. And more data of this sort are presently being analysed by Hakuta for over 50 Spanish-speaking adults learning English (personal communication).

Individual variation in language learning and typology

The systematicity and the uniformity of the data summarized in Table 1 is misleading in that it suggests that all learners proceed exactly alike. This is not true. There is individual variation among learners in various respects, notably, in terms of speed of acquisition, ultimate level of achievement, differences in task-specific behaviour and, also, variation in the linguistic structure of the developmental learner structures. The last type of individual variation is important with respect to the basic question of this paper.

If the structure of learner utterances and learner languages is constrained by the universal constraints on the structure of natural human languages, then one would expect that the range of individual variation in learner languages should be finite and it should not go counter to the constraints familiar from typological surveys. Table 2 is intended to illustrate this point. The data is provided by the same children that were the subjects for L1 German and L2 English/L1 German in Table 1. Table 2 lists the majority of the developmental structures observed with these four children when they acquired English. The data of first occurrence of the respective developmental type is given on the right. Note that not all developmental structures occurred with every child. The nature of the relationship can be illustrated via the developmental structures Subj neg VP, Aux neg X and Subj V neg X. For Subj V neg X, each child had the variant with no or not as the morphological marker of negation. In the type

Table 2. Developmental negation structures in the naturalistic L2 acquisition of English by 4 German children. Optional elements in () (adapted from Wode 1981a).

Structural Type	Illustrative Example	Date of First Occurrence			
		Hei	Bi	La	Ig
anaphoric no	no	1;9	-	1;1	1;0
anaphoric no X	no, Tiff	1;18	0;10	1;18	2;6
non-anaphoric neg X					
no Adj	no cold	0;24	-	1;17	1;17
no V	no sleep	0;27	0;28	0;28	-
no N(P)	no bread	0;28	0;28	0;28	2;21
no VP	no catch it	0;27	1;13	2;1	3;4
X (be) neg Y					
... no Y	that's no right	1;9	-	(1;15)	3;12
				1;20	(1;22)
... not Y	you not dummy	1;13	1;13	2;3	1;24
Subj V neg X					
... V no X	everybody catch no the fish	1;24	3;29	1;23	3;18
... V not X	John go not to the school	1;13	2;5	1;26	4;6
Subj V Pron neg (X)					
... V Pron not	I catch that not	2;7	3;22	-	4;1
... V Pron not X	you got me not out	-	1;24	-	5;19
Subj V a neg N					
... a not N	you have a not fish	1;12	-	1;20	-
... a no N	you have a no snag	1;30	-	1;30	-
Subj neg VP					
... no VP	me no close the window	-	-	-	3;16
... not VP	you not shut up	1;13	3;1	1;18	4;20
Subj Aux neg X					
... can no VP	you can no have it	-	3;27	-	3;21
... cannot VP	he cannot hit the ball	2;2	2;19	1;24	4;3
... can't VP	I can't get him out	2;15	4;19	1;27	3;21
imperative don't VP	don't broke 'don't break it'	1;12	2;19	2;13	3;19
imperative V (Pron neg (X))					
... V Pron not (X)	hit it not over the fence	1;13	-	-	5;3
... V not (X)	shut not your mouth	2;0	2;3	-	-
elliptical not	not inside	1;22	1;25	1;24	2;6
pre-nominal no N	Birgit catch no fish	1;23	-	(1;26)	3;16
				4;0	
pronominal nothing	I see nothing	1;22	1;24	2;18	2;15
pre-nominal nothing N	I got nothing shoe	-	3;18	-	4;20
Subj don't know	I don't know	1;24	1;24	1;24	2;19
suppletive don't/didn't	no, don't no, you don't	1;25 1;30	- 3;11	2;0 2;21	3;21 3;30
Subj don't/didn't VP	I didn't see	(1;13) 2;12	3;11	2;18	(4;15) 5;8
Subj don't/didn't Aux VP	I didn't can closed it	2;12	5;15	2;20	-
negative any	I saw any wheels	3;14	4;26	3;4	-

Subj neg VP, three children used only not as a negative marker; whereas the youngest child had both no and not. For post-auxiliary negation the type can no VP occurs with two children; the types cannot VP and can't VP occur with all four of them.¹ Moreover, none of the developmental structures conflicts with negation structures familiar from typological surveys.

In summary then, from Table 1 and 2 it is clear that learner languages and the structure of learner utterances do not go counter to typological constraints on the structure of natural human languages as observable in full-fledged languages; and these restrictions also constrain the possible form that individual variation in learner languages can take.

Other acquisitional types

Table 3 is intended to broaden the empirical base. Whereas the previous discussion was confined to the L1 and L2 acquisition of English and German, Table 3 presents a survey of other languages and other acquisitional types, including pidgin and creole languages. Two negation structures are singled out for this survey, namely, neg X plus a much rarer variant X neg, and the pre-verbal type Subj neg VP. These two negation structures are well attested. Note, in particular, the L1 trilingual case of a boy acquiring German, Hungarian and French (Kadar-Hoffman 1977).²

¹ Individual variation in the linguistic structure of learner utterances is a well documented phenomenon for L1 acquisition. Studies on this type of structural variation are still few in number for the other acquisitional types, notably the non-simultaneous types of acquisition (cf. Fillmore 1976; Bahns 1976; Burmeister 1977; Clahsen 1980; Pienemann 1980; Ufert 1980; Allendorff 1980; Wode 1981a).

² There is much more evidence available than referred to in Table 3. This is particularly true with respect to the L1 acquisition of negation (overview in Wode 1977b). For more details on naturalistic L2 acquisition see Wode 1981a. In particular the L2 combinations involving English as a target can be extended further to include other L1's, like Japanese (Milon 1974), French (Tiphine in press), Taiwanese (Huang 1971), etc. The relearning of a language has been studied only very rarely. The only extensive data that seems to be presently available concerns L2 English/L1 German (Allendorff 1980).

Pidgins, Language acquisition and language typology

Pidgins are included in Table 3 for two reasons. First, in terms of origin, pidgins are a special case of naturalistic L2 acquisition (Bickerton 1981, Wode 1981b). From this point of view, it is not at all surprising to find that the kind of negation structures characteristic of early pidgin languages should parallel those observable in naturalistic L2 acquisition. Second, pidgins are included to show that such marginal languages also conform to the universal constraints on the structure of natural human languages. Of course, this conclusion already follows from the insight that pidginization is a variety of naturalistic L2 acquisition. In any event, the two negation structures are well attested in pidgins (and early creoles) all over the world. (See survey of some 30 pidgins and creoles in Hoffmann and Rudeloff 1981). That is to say, the two negation types occur not only in pidgins involving European or Indo-European languages, but also in cases where non-Indo-European languages are involved.

The above observations are extremely important, because they further support the previous insights, namely, that the two negation structures seem to be universal; that the relationship observed between learner languages proper and language typology carry over to pidginization; and that age must be ruled out as the variable that determines the structure of such utterances, because pidginization is not, in general, carried out by children, but by people from the adolescent and adult age ranges.

Language learning and language change


The relationship between language learning, pidginization, language typology, and language change is illustrated in Table 4. It summarizes the major developments in the history of the negation systems of French, German and English. At one time or another each of these three languages had pre-verbal negation, post-verbal negation, and double negation. Table 4 clearly suggests that there is no justification for those traditional claims concerning the relationship between child language and language change, pointed out in Section 0 above, namely, that language learning recapitulates the history of the respective language, that children are the chief innovators of language change, and that children propagate it.

It is obvious from the data of Table 4 that the developmental sequences of language learners do not necessarily recapitulate the diachronic development of a language. For example, in the course of its

Table 3. Negation structures neg X~X neg and Subj neg VP in several types of language acquisition, pidgins, and early creoles (adapted from Wode 1981a).

	non-anaphoric	Type of structure	
		<u>neg X~X neg</u>	<u>Subj neg VP</u>
L1 acquisition: unilingual			
English (Bloom 1970)	no close		I no want envelope
German	nein schaff ich	Kaffee nein	hier nicht wahren
Swedish (Lange/Larsson 1973)	nej kossa 'no cow'		Embla inte ha tacket
Latvian (Wode/Ruke-Dravina 1977)	nē minimi 'no pencil'	gib nē 'want no'	ipupu nē Ita 'bathroom no go'
L1 acquisition: trilingual (Kadar-Hoffman 1977)			
German	nein Hanno kann		das nein geht
Hungarian	nem jó 'no good'		itt em jön atró 'from here no metro come'
French	non Hanno aime 'no Johannes like'		après Daniel non ouvre 'afterwards Daniel no open'
Naturalistic L2 acquisition			
L2 English/L1 German	no play baseball		me no close the window
L2 English/L1 Spanish (Schumann 1975)	no like coffee		I no can see
L2 English/L1 Norwegian (Ravem 1974)	no like it		I not like that
L2 German/L1 English (Felix 1978)	nein meine 'I no mean'		ich nein hat eines 'I no have one'
L2 Relearning			
L2 English/L1 German	no sit here		I no want to play
Pidgins/Creoles			
Ewondo Populaire (Todd 1974)	ke boo 'don't do'		me ke bo 'I don't do'
Freetown Krio (Todd 1974)	no do 'don't do'		a no do 'I don't do'
Hawaiian Pidgin (Carr 1972)	my father, not take care of me 'my father, didn't take care of me'		baby name, me no like 'I don't like my baby name'
Chinese Pidgin (Bauer 1974)	can do? no can do? 'can't you do that'		he no belong handsome 'he isn't handsome'
Jamaican Creole (Bailey 1966)	no sliip pan da bed 'don't sleep on that bed'		nobody no gaan a puos yet 'nobody has gone to the postoffice yet'

Table 4. History of sentence negation of English, German and French
(adapted from Jespersen 1917, Behagel 1924).



history English once had post-verbal negation.¹ On the other hand, there is no L1 learner of English on record who went through a developmental stage

¹ Most handbooks give the impression that post-verbal negation occurred in English only in variation with the pre-verbal negation, as in early modern English (for example, Jespersen 1917, Traugott 1972). This does not seem to be fully correct. Schwarze (in press) reports that certain parts of the Wycliffe Bible have post-verbal negation only.

marked by post-verbal negation. Similarly, English once had a variation between post-verbal negation and pre-verbal negation as in the writings of Shakespeare. Again, no L1 learner of English is on record who went through a developmental stage characterized by a variation between post-verbal and pre-verbal negation. Lastly, L1 learners of English go through a stage of double negation where the two neg's may be morphophonologically the same. However, this developmental stage is not such as can be illustrated from Middle English where the two negative markers are different.

Perhaps the most conclusive evidence concerning the issue of whether children recapitulate the history of a language is available for the acquisition of inflectional systems. Such evidence can be related to the notion of the linguistic cycle (recently made popular again by Hodge 1970). Languages are said to go through diachronic cycles such that, for example, an analytic language changes into a synthetic one, then back into an analytical one, and so forth. Egyptian is said to be a language which can be documented as having gone through this cycle twice. On the other hand, there is no single learner on record who went through such cycles as often as the target language did during its history.

The question of who creates innovations cannot be decided at all. In the discussion on the various tables presented so far it has been amply demonstrated that age is not a crucial variable in determining the linguistic structure of learner utterances, including pidgin languages. If adults and children can be expected to produce the same type of developmental structures, then it is impossible, in principle, to determine whether a given change in a language is due to children or to adults. For various reasons children cannot be regarded as the main propagators of language change. As pointed out above, speakers from the non-child age ranges may create the same innovations as children. Second, detailed socio-linguistic investigations show that it is primarily the non-child age groups that propagate changes in the language, notably, middle-aged people (for example, Labov 1963, 1966; Trudgill 1974).

The above arguments concerning the re-assessment of the impact of children on language change were based on empirical observations. These conclusions can be strengthened by speculations relating to the survival and the evolution of the human species. Such speculations, it seems, lead to two points. First, it should be the adult population rather than children who are chiefly responsible for the propagation of linguistic

changes; second, age should not be a crucial variable in the sense that it causes the language learning abilities of children to deteriorate as assumed in the critical period hypothesis of language learning (notably, Lenneberg 1967) or in other views to the effect that adults lose the ability to learn a language like children do or that this ability deteriorates (for example, Krashen 1981). At the times when the early humans still roamed around in small bands rather than living in larger societies, let alone in the size familiar to modern-day man, it was essential that the adult, ie. the fighting population should be able to quickly learn at least the rudiments of the language of another band. Such groups would have quickly exterminated each other over quarrels concerning privileges to territories, which, in turn, implies privileges to hunt, to gather food, and so on. To prevent such fatal consequences, nature had to develop an ability in homo sapiens that allows for inter-band communication. This ability would have been useless if adults did not have it, if they lost it after puberty or even earlier, or if it allowed them to learn the language of other bands only after long troublesome periods of contact with the language. Moreover, those bands conquered by others would be doomed to perish and they could not be integrated into the new band unless they had the ability to - quickly - learn the language of the dominant band.

What, then, is the relationship between language learning and language change? It seems that both are constrained by the same set of restrictions. Moreover, since it has already been shown that such restrictions also hold between language learning, the structure of marginal languages like pidgins (and creoles), and language typology, it follows that the whole range of the manifestations of natural languages and language structures is constrained by the same set of restrictions. That is to say, they are truly universal. Parallels between language learning and language change, therefore, are due to the super-imposed universal constraints on the structure of natural languages. It is these constraints which seem to have misled previous scholars to - erroneously - propose that children innovate language change, propagate it, or even recapitulate the history of a language.¹

¹ The above conclusions are based on considerations relating to language structures not readily susceptible to being developmentally due to

2. Discussion

The data presented in Section 1 can be regarded as an empirical paradigm spanning central and less central manifestations of the design of natural languages and their functioning. The paradigm leads to the identification of parallels which cut across all these different areas and consequently unites the latter. What are the implications?

The most important point seems to be that it is extremely challenging and rewarding to take such a comprehensive perspective. So far linguists have analyzed languages, synchronically, diachronically, and in many other ways. But all this remains merely descriptive and preliminary in the sense that it does not tell us why what we describe is as it is. That is, linguists must go beyond descriptions and attempt to answer the most fundamental question, namely, why languages and their structures are structured the way they are¹ (note Givón 1979 and Bickerton 1981 for similar pleas).

This point of view contrasts sharply with the current division of labor among the various branches of linguistics. The comprehensive approach

transfer from another language or, diachronically, to borrowing. If the insights developed above are to be valid it would be necessary to show that transfer and borrowing are subject to the same universal constraints. The material on negation reviewed in the four tables above may not illustrate this point in sufficient detail. Note, however, that the post-verbal negation type has so far been observed only in those L2 combinations of English where the L1 learned previously has this structure, ie. L2 English/L1 German (Wode 1981a); L2 English/L1 Norwegian (Ravem 1974); post-verbal negation has not yet been found, for example, in L2 English/L1 Spanish (Schumann 1975, Fillmore 1976, overview in Wode 1981a). But post-verbal negation is typologically possible, as in German or Norwegian. To my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence available to contradict the suggestion that transfer is also constrained by the same constraints as govern language typology, language change, pidginization, as well as language learning with respect to the non-transfer regularities. (The case of transfer and its relationship to typology, language change and other manifestations of language functioning is examined in greater detail in Wode 1982a with respect to phonology).

¹ Although Chomsky introduced various levels of adequacy including explanatory adequacy (1964, 1965 and elsewhere), this notion of explanation is still essentially descriptive as I use the term here (following Givón 1979). Chomsky's notion of explanatory adequacy refers to the explanatory power of a linguistic theory, ie. its predictive capacity. It is not adequate to explain the nature of a range of phenomena from a domain X by recourse to a domain Y, like the psychology of vision/sight explained by the physiology and the bio-chemistry of the organs and the nervous apparatus involved.

taken in this paper, it is hoped, will eventually help to develop a unified view about natural languages. This will require a revision of a number of views concerning very basic assumptions about languages and linguistics, notably: language structure and cognition; the learnability assumption; synchronic mechanisms for language change; marginal languages; markedness theory; and contrastive analysis.

Language and cognition

What needs to be explained, first and foremost, are the parallels between the various manifestations of the design of natural languages and the origins of these parallels. In particular, where do the parallels with language learning and the developmental structures in learner languages originate?

The data reviewed in Section 1 clearly suggests that the respective negation structures cannot be taken directly from the input to which the learner is exposed. Factors external to the learner, such as differences in the cultural environment, technological changes in the world around us, etc. will not account for the parallel either. Neither will personality variables, like IQ, motivation, or the like. Such factors vary enormously over any given population, let alone across different societies and cultures. This means that these variables constitute a great range of variation. On the other hand, learner languages show a great amount of invariance. Obviously, invariance can not be explained by variation. So the explanation of the invariance can only be based on other types of factors.

The only option left, so it seems, is the functioning of the human brain and the cognitive processing system(s) associated with it. The crucial problem then is to determine the nature of these systems and whether they can be equated with general cognition. The kind of cognition required to be able to learn languages must be different from general cognition or those capacities underlying problem-solving or the kind of operations crucial in Piagetian types of developmental psychology. A number of arguments can be brought to bear on this issue.

Chomsky, for example, has developed a type of reasoning that is more theoretical in nature. It is based on speculations about language learning, primarily by L1 children. In essence, Chomsky's procedure is to develop principles of language structure and then to enquire whether they can be

learned from the input to which the child is exposed or whether the ability to detect such formal properties in the target language pre-supposes knowledge about the nature of these properties. Chomsky invariably opts for the latter solution. He argues that the input that the child is exposed to is so chaotic and unsystematic that principles of language structure(s), most of them being highly abstract, cannot possibly be extracted from such raw material. But since children do learn languages nonetheless they must have the requisite knowledge beforehand. This means, Chomsky suggests, that the formal principles of language structure must be genetically programmed and that they constitute a special type of cognitive capacities (Chomsky 1965, 1973, 1976, and elsewhere).

Three remarks are in order concerning Chomsky's proposals. First, the issue of what is genetically endowed can be separated from the question of whether the cognitive capacities prerequisite for the processing of language data are, or are not, of the same kind as general cognition. It may well be the case that the cognitive capacities needed for language processing are built up from other types of capacities not yet known. This issue needs much more research before a firm stand can be taken concerning this matter. Second, Chomsky's view about the chaotic nature of learner input is counterfactual.¹ Third, the idea that the processing of language data requires specific cognitive abilities different from general cognition need not be decided on by relying only on Chomskyan types of speculations. Other kinds or arguments derived from detailed empirical investigations of language learning can be brought to bear on this issue. This evidence strongly points into the same direction as Chomsky's conclusions.

Probably the most telling argument based on insights into language acquisition derives from a very simple observation. If it is claimed that general cognition determines the structure of learner languages, then it

¹ Detailed investigations of the speech used in various exposure situations, such as adult-child, adolescent-child, native-foreigner, clearly show that the more competent speaker can, and mostly does, adapt his speech in remarkable ways to the level of the addressee's. Such learner talk tends to be less marked by errors and other inconsistencies than normal discourse. For L1 acquisition see, for example, the articles in Snow and Ferguson 1977; for L2 acquisition note Hatch 1978a, Peck 1978, van der Geest and Heckhausen 1978 (summary in Wode 1981a). However, the effect that such adaptations have on the learning process is still very much an open question.

must also be explained why children as well as adults produce (much) the same developmental structures. If cognitive deficits are assumed to explain the non-targetlike nature of child L1 acquisition, this type of argument does not carry over to adult learners producing the same developmental structures. Adults and adolescents can be credited with having at their disposal concepts of cause, time, direction instrumentality, negatively, and so forth. If adult L2 learners and young L1 children produce the same developmental negation structures, this cannot be due to the fact that the adult has a full-fledged negativity concept whereas the child does not. It follows that the capacities which enable human beings to learn natural languages are of a different sort than those that underly man's ability to cognize his environment in terms of concepts and logical operations of whatever sort. This argument from language learning, then, leads to the same conclusion as Chomsky's argument, namely, that what is required to handle natural languages is a special type of cognition.¹ It is termed *linguo-cognition* (in Wode 1981a). Next to nothing is presently known about the nature and the functioning of these *linguo-cognitive* systems. Some such attempts are made in Wode 1979, 1981a (building on Slobin 1973). Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to enlarge on the original proposal and to suggest that, apparently, it is these *linguo-cognitive* processing systems that ultimately constrain the design and the functioning of all types of natural languages. These constraints constitute the "upper bound" of structural options.

A re-conceptualization of the learnability axiom

The above discussion concerning language learning and cognition clearly shows that it is impossible to continue to base the learnability assumption on L1 acquisition and on young children. Natural languages do not function exclusively in monolingual societies. Bilingualism and other

¹ Other types of observations from language learning can also be brought to bear on the issue of whether or not general cognition can be equated with *linguo-cognition*. An argument from the acquisition of L1 bilingualism is developed in Slobin 1973, for L1 monolingualism (Wode 1974, 1976a). A detailed review of the issue of language-specific cognition with particular reference to the inadequacy of Piagetian psychology to explain language learning and language structures in Felix 1982. However, the whole debate is focussed too much on cognitive schemata, representations and cognitive capacities underlying them. More attention needs to be given to the actual processing of speech.

types of contact situations are much more common throughout the world and they are not restricted to child populations. There is no need to go back to the contingencies of the evolution of the human species to be able to suggest that a re-conceptualization of the learnability assumption is required. The original restriction to L1 children was completely arbitrary. Why not have a different learnability assumption for every age group or every learning situation? Why not base the assumption on adults?

No restriction in terms of age ranges or acquisitional types and situations is warranted. The learnability assumption must be based on people's overall ability to learn languages. After all, the human brain is a powerful but finite mechanism. What would the biological basis be if numerous learnability assumptions were introduced, say, as a function of age, number of languages learned, learning situations, etc.? It makes very good sense, indeed, to find, upon careful empirical observation, all these many parallels across age groups and acquisitional types. These findings indicate that the brain is equipped with a single mechanism for learning languages. It has two vital properties: it is, apparently, flexible enough to cope with various differences in the external setting of the learning situation; and the mechanism does not change, let alone deteriorate (drastically) as a function of age, as implied in many preconceived views current not only among laymen. Linguistic theoreticians will have to adjust their thinking accordingly.

Moreover, it makes even better sense to find the sort of parallels between language learning and other areas of language structure and language functioning, namely, to see them all constrained in highly similar ways. What else would one expect, given the finite character of the human brain?

The notion of markedness

Over the past years the original Prague concept of markedness has been developed in such a way that it is becoming increasingly useful in conjunction with typology and universals. As for the linguistic aspects, it may still be difficult at the present state of affairs to identify, in each given instance, which item is to be marked, unmarked or more/less marked. It should be possible to resolve these difficulties in the long run. After all, the learner data reviewed in Section 1 and other material available elsewhere (for example, Clark 1970 for L1; Hylltenstam 1981 for L2)

are extremely uniform. Consequently; there must be a psycholinguistic basis to markedness. However, in line with the point of view adopted in this paper, markedness also needs to be explained. Why does it take the form it does? What constrains it? Obviously, markedness is one aspect of the universal restrictions governing natural languages. To be more precise, markedness seems to be a reflex of the linguo-cognitive processing constraints related not so much to the "upper bound" but to "lower-level" types of organization (in terms of the labels introduced in Section 0).

Linguistic theories and language transfer

Another area in which a re-conceptualization is urgently required is language transfer. One of the outstanding characteristics of natural languages is that they are quickly adaptable to changes in the world around us. This requires a built-in synchronic mechanism for language change. It is this mechanism that makes languages such a useful instrument for communication. One extremely important component within this flexibility mechanism relates to the ability to transfer from one language into the other. Consequently, any linguistic theory that does not adequately provide for transfer or that is not suitable for handling transfer cannot possibly qualify as an adequate description of a language or as a theoretical framework for describing natural languages. As far as can be made out, no presently available linguistic theory comes anywhere near to meeting this requirement. It seems, then, that linguists so far have failed to incorporate, and to give proper consideration to, one of the most important aspects of natural human languages.

Marginal languages

Further, it seems obvious that linguistics must give much more attention to marginal languages. Such varieties no longer belong in a linguistic curiosity shop. Learner languages, pidgins, creoles, bilingualism, and other marginal areas, are of central importance to linguistics and to theories provided by this discipline. In fact, it is these marginal areas of language functioning and language manifestations that provide the most challenging incentive for the kind of comprehensive view adopted here.

Contrastive analysis and language teaching

Contrastive analysis has recently been criticized heavily for being unable to handle learner data (for example, Wardaugh 1970, Richards 1971). Some scholars have suggested disregarding contrastive analysis in our dealings with L2 problems altogether (for example, Dulay and Burt 1973, 1974a-c). This view is certainly unjustified. Contrastive analysis basically deals with comparing languages or language systems. It is thus at the very heart of linguistic methodology. The major misunderstanding, it seems, relates to the implication that contrastive analysis should be a language learning theory. This is exactly what it is not.

Contrastive analysis describes different linguistic structures and, if handled well, this methodology allows linguists to relate different language systems to each other. As for language learning, such a comparison will not do. The data reviewed in Section 1 clearly show that clashes between two linguistic systems are resolved by learners not ad hoc or in completely random ways. Rather, different learners resolve such clashes in much the same way. The important point is that contrastive analysis does not allow for any kind of prediction on how the learner will resolve such a clash. That is why contrastive analysis is not a language learning theory. However, this does not mean that contrastive analysis is useless for L2 problems. On the contrary, it is an indispensable part of any attempt to devise a theory of language acquisition in general or of naturalistic L2 acquisition in particular. Contrastive analysis specifies the nature of the structural clash. It remains to add a language learning component to determine and predict how learners will resolve such clashes and it is this kind of information that is needed by language teachers (details in Wode 1982b).

As for linguistics, contrastive analysis is just as indispensable. The psycholinguistic approach basic to this paper might provide guide-lines as how to set up such a contrastive analysis. That is to say, in the various approaches to contrastive analysis the problem of the tertium comparationis is notoriously difficult to solve. Why not let psycholinguistic data decide such issues?

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LANGUAGE TRANSFER: THE STATE OF THE ART

TRANSFER AS A CONCEPT

The term 'transfer' is taken from psychology and is used to refer to the extension of knowledge or ability from one restricted area to a wider area of activity. The term 'language transfer' is used in a more limited sense to mean the carrying over of patterns from a previously learned language (usually but not necessarily the mother tongue) during performance in another language. This psychological, or more specifically psycholinguistic process shows up most clearly when the transfer is negative: that is to say, when there is a contrast between the first language and the second language (L1 and L2 respectively). In this case, people generally talk of interference. In the case of positive transfer, when the carrying over of an L1 pattern into L2 by the learner results in successful performance, people generally talk of facilitation.

The precise definition of transfer depends on the particular psychological theory used: behaviourist theories usually involve the word 'habit' in the definition; L1 habits facilitate or hinder performance in L2 and thereby speed up or slow down learning (the formation of L2 habits). Cognitivist theories also involve the notion of 'knowledge': new knowledge is built up against the background of already established knowledge.

The whole topic of language transfer has had a chequered history in the field of second language acquisition. The controversy may be said to revolve round two major questions:

- (1) Where can language transfer be established as having definitely occurred?
- (2) What is its theoretical status?

Some scholars have sought to account for most deviance from L2 norms as being due to transfer, other have tried to reinterpret the evidence so that transfer is shown to occur a great deal less often (Dulay, Burt, Krashen etc.). The first group of scholars not surprisingly claim a major role for transfer in the learning process and the second group find

it theoretically trivial. There is a third group, who find that transfer is theoretically relevant but not in the simple sense outlined above. To emphasize the difference between the first and third group, both assigning a non-trivial status to transfer, the third approach will be characterised as being concerned not with transfer per se but with cross-linguistic influence (CLI). The implications of this will be discussed in the final part of this survey.

THE CONTRASTIVE APPROACH

The first coherent approach to the problem of transfer was formulated by Robert Lado, following Charles Fries (and numerous other scholars who have made passing comments on the problems of second language learning). It has since come to be known as the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis although when it was first elaborated on (see Lado 1975, 1964) it looked much more like an assumption than a hypothesis put forward to be tested. Briefly, Lado thought that if one did a systematic comparison between the learner's target language (and culture) and the mother tongue (and native culture) one would be able to make a list of similarities and differences. These then could be reformulated as predictions about learner difficulty: what was similar would bring about facilitation and what was different would bring about interference and hence would form an obstacle to learning. The aim behind this proposal was to bring language teaching within the sphere of academic study, i.e. give it a scientific backing, by showing that rigorous linguistic analysis could have a very direct spin-off in terms of improving teaching efficiency.

The message was, in short, base teaching strategies (including materials preparation) on prior contrastive analysis (see Rusiecki 1976 for further discussion). Luckily, there was some research designed to see how many errors could be ascribed to L1 influence (cf. Arabski 1968, Dušková 1969) and the results showed that there was something seriously wrong with the assumption that systematic errors would always turn out to be mother tongue patterns imposing themselves on the attempted L2 utterances of the second language learner. In fact, roughly half of the errors in a given sample of writing could be ascribed to the L1. The rest seem to be overgeneralisations of L2 rules, that is excluding those inevitable random errors that could be attributed to inattention, slips of the pen, so to speak (cf. Corder 1967).

Not much was done on spoken errors, although it was assumed that L1 interference might be more in evidence in a linguistic operation that involved actual muscular activity. Even here there was some cause for doubt ever since Brière's experiment (Brière 1968) where he showed that American students asked to learn to pronounce a collection of specially chosen 'exotic' speech sounds would not necessarily succeed most where those sounds were close to their L1 and least where they were distant from the L1.¹ The Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis either needed to be rejected or else reformulated to take care of this awkward evidence.

PRODUCT VERSUS PROCESS

The end of the 'classic era' of transfer, that is, at the end of the sixties,² meant that a conflict had arisen between the apparently overwhelming impression of interference that language teachers have when listening to or reading their learners' attempts at L2 and, on the other hand, the results of error analyses. It is important in this regard to consider what is involved when examining a learner's production with a view to diagnosing errors. What it in fact amounts to is examining a product in order to make inference about the process of processes (in the learner's mind) that led to that product.

Patterns found in the product may suggest certain processes but do not in themselves provide incontrovertible evidence. For example, it may happen that a learner produces an utterance where the structure is identical to an equivalent structure³ in the L1. If that utterance is acceptable, i.e. conforms to L2 norms, it is easy to assume that the learner has shown

¹ Ian Catford claims that some apparently exotic sounds may after all have been familiar to these American subjects via knowledge of American dialects (personal communication); however, it is doubtful whether the subjects would have been able to manage all these sounds for this reason unless they were all, coincidentally, people who by nature happen to be sensitive to dialects of their own language.

² The Georgetown Round Table papers (Alatis 1968) provide a useful landmark signalling the end of this ('mini') era.

³ The establishment of equivalence between languages is actually no easy matter (cf. Krzeszowski 1976, Marton 1968).

knowledge of the L2: on the other hand, it is quite plausible to say that he or she 'got it right by mistake'. If one believes that language transfer was at work during the production of that utterance it should therefore imply that the learner had not in fact shown L2 knowledge but was simply lucky.

In practice most attention inevitably centres on utterances that violate L2 norms. In this case the emergence of an L1-like pattern may lead to two separate statements: the first, a product statement, which asserts that the incorrect L2 utterance is linguistically comparable to some utterance in the L1, and secondly, a process statement which asserts that it was in fact an L1 process that caused this L1-like utterance to occur.

The difference between the product and process statement becomes obvious if an argument develops over the second. Dulay and Burt pointed out that a number of Spanish-like errors committed by Spanish learners of English were in fact similar in kind to errors made by children acquiring English as their mother tongue (Dulay and Burt 1972). This led them to assert that transfer was not as common an occurrence as it first seemed to be and that the important processes in L2 acquisition were those shared with learners of mother tongue. Hence, if the same product can provoke two quite different interpretations, it becomes clear that choosing between the two will depend on theoretical preferences.

Appeals to logic and, in addition, the use of carefully designed tests, might lead to the demise of one of the two interpretations; however, one is also confronted with a third possibility, that both interpretations are valid and that the 'error' is a product of a combination of processes. This dilemma aptly illustrates how illusory the apparent simplicity of the task of deriving process from product really is. The product itself is observable but the processes are hidden and have to be inferred indirectly; this inevitably leads to controversy.

SOME 'EVIDENCE'

It is hardly ever the case that people make the claim that an L1 does not influence performance in L2: in fact, if one looks at the literature, the evidence for some kind of transfer is in great abundance: it exists in many different situations with many different kinds of learners. It exists in the performance of children and adults, in people acquiring and people

losing languages. It exists at all levels from phonetic aspects to pragmatic aspects of learner performance.

Its apparent ubiquity does not, of course, mean that it must be regarded as a central process (cf. Selinker 1972) in the building up of new L2 knowledge: one can still adhere to the view expressed by Newmark and Reibel that interference was a sign of ignorance and that the only cure for ignorance was learning (Newmark and Reibel 1968). The learner may simply be overambitious or put in a position where more is demanded of him or her than is reasonable (given his or her current L2 resources): in this case the learner simply falls back on L1 structures and uses them to maintain or increase the effectiveness of messages being conveyed in the L2 (either to or by the learner, that is).

Nevertheless it is useful to be reminded of the high frequency of structures in learner production which at least suggest, sometimes very strongly suggest, the influence of L1. The examples below should give an impression of the frequency or at least ubiquity of language transfer.

- (1) Il est trois ans (deviant use of est parallels L1 English is).
- (2) Le chien a manger les (deviant word order parallel to L1 English: the dog has eaten them; in L2 French the pronoun les should be preposed; (see Selinker, Swain and Dumas 1975).
- (3) The available to him information (deviant premodification of noun parallel to L1 Polish dostępne mu informacja).
- (4) Mentality of Englishman is quite incomprehensible to me (subject noun not preceded by determiner the possibly reflecting lack of determiners in L1 Polish, that is, definite and indefinite articles).
- (5) Now she's putting hers clothes on (possible reflection of plural marking of pronoun in L1 Spanish; (see Dulay and Burt 1972)).
- (6) They always want that I eat something (that complement possibly reflecting parallel structure in L1 Dutch).
- (7) I play by my friend (possible influence of L1 Dutch preposition bij; (see van Vlerken 1980).
- (8) You can tell the figures up (possible reflection of L1 Dutch tellen meaning count).
- (9) You show me dinner of Hans (deviant use of periphrastic genitive possibly reflecting parallel construction in L2 Dutch).
- (10) The author's first hint to the significance of the plant (deviant preposition possibly reflecting the parallel preposition in L1 Dutch: hint...naar).

These ten examples are taken from written and oral samples of data, from children apparently losing their L1 (6,7) from children acquiring an L2 in

natural circumstances and roughly simultaneously with the their L1 (8,9), from children attending bilingual immersion programmes (1,2), from students at university learning English as a foreign language in a formal context (3,4,10), from adults apparently losing their L1 (8), and from immigrant children acquiring, their L2 as a second language (5). All these examples abound in the data: they are typical.

At the same time, although it is counter-intuitive to argue doggedly in favour of non-transfer interpretations, in every case it is in principle possible to do so. Example (2) was in fact cited by the authors as a case of overgeneralisation, not transfer. It is a good instance of the situation discussed in the previous section, namely an utterance which could be transfer (word order in L1 carried over to L2), overgeneralisation (pronominal objects treated like L2 nominal objects and placed after the verb), or a combination of the two. The same goes for Example (5) which the authors wished to reinterpret as overgeneralisation (hers clothes like Mary's clothes).

TWO KINDS OF LANGUAGE TRANSFER

It is appropriate at this point to distinguish between two quite different kinds of way in which one linguistic system might influence another within the mind of a given bilingual (using bilingual in the relative sense of the word to include any level of proficiency).

Firstly the underlying knowledge or 'competence' (in the Chomskyan sense) may be affected. That is to say, the network of relationships and categories that make up the learner's current representation of the language: this knowledge may have been built up in part by using parts of the L1 system.

However, there is another kind of ability, that is, the set of mechanisms for activating underlying competence millisecond by millisecond. It may be for example that the learner already 'knows' in the first (competence) sense that, in L2 French, pronominal subjects must be placed in front of the verb. However in the course of producing utterances under conditions of stress, L1 processing habits interfere with the placement of certain items. The learner uses his or her more efficient, automatised L1 routines and the pronoun is placed after the verb. Usually in this case the learner is able to correct the error if required hence showing the researcher that his or her production does not always reflect underlying knowledge.

In this way one may speak of competence transfer and performance transfer (cf. Sharwood Smith forthc. b). A failure to see this distinction or appreciate that there may in fact be competence transfer as well as performance has led people to regard transfer as a superficial phenomenon (interference caused by competing performance habits) and as having nothing to do with the building up of L2-based knowledge. Still, what people believe to be correct in the target language may not always be reflected in their systematic performance: this is what is behind the kind of statement people make when they say 'I know it's wrong but I keep on saying it'. Usually it takes some time before their underlying new knowledge is reflected in their fluent performance in the target language.

The L1-based mechanism which places all objects after the verb (for the native speaker of English) provides a ready-made way of building sentences at speed: the learner can always rely on it even under conditions of stress and may use it in the L2 until that time when the appropriate mechanism for placing pronouns in front of the verb while still leaving nouns behind (i.e. after the verb) becomes part of that learner's skilled behaviour in the L2.

At the same time, what the learner believes to be part of the L2 may not in fact accord with the knowledge possessed by native speakers of that L2. Given a sentence in the L2 that is (a) incorrect and (b) parallels an L1 structure, the learner may be quite ready to say that it is a correct L2 sentence. It is not simply a matter of the learner misreading some grammar book or getting some textbook rule wrong, it may be that the learner genuinely 'feels' that sentence to be correct. This type of test of a learner's intuitions provides the researcher (or teacher) with insights about the learner's underlying competence and, in this case, about that part of competence that appears to be affected by L1 competence. On the other hand, getting learners to produce L2 utterances under conditions of stress will blur the picture, and it will not be possible without further testing to establish whether L1-like structures produced by the learner are in fact the result of underlying beliefs (competence)¹ or simply a lack of efficient processing mechanisms in the L2 (Sharwood Smith: in press).

¹ The learner's beliefs about the L2, if they are reflected in his or her systematic performance may be described as a sort of knowledge or competence. It is irrelevant here that this 'knowledge' does not totally accord with the knowledge a teacher might want the learner to have, namely native-speaker competence.

CROSS-LINGUISTIC INFLUENCE

Research either implicitly or explicitly focussed on competence transfer may be termed studies into cross-linguistic influence (in language acquisition). CLI is used here simply as a convenient way of disassociating transfer research from the 'bad old days' when transfer was thought of in simplistic terms.

There are a number of ways in which CLI research has looked at language acquisition and it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail. One interesting approach was developed by Kellerman and Jordens (cf. Jordens 1977, Kellerman 1971): this involved (paradoxically) looking at aspects of the L1 which were not generally transferred. A distinction was made between language-specific structures, i.e. parts of the L1 that were typically felt by learners to belong only to the L1, and language-neutral structures that were felt to be suitable candidates for transfer. For example, learners seem to be reluctant to transfer inflectional morphology (case endings, gender markers, etc.) or idioms (like kick the bucket, drink someone under the table); this does not mean that these are never transferred (see, for example, example 5 above, which might be transfer). Rather it describes a tendency, even a quite marked tendency to confine certain structures to the L1 while happily using others in the L2.

Again, there have been suggestions that certain structures in the L2 may be 'attractive' for reasons of semantic transparency (the structure reveals the meaning clearly, as in 'sitting-room' versus the less transparent lounge)¹ (see Kellerman, in press; for other possible factors, see Sharwood Smith, *forthc.*). Hence if L2 has a more transparent way of saying something than the L1, the learner will be quick to pick it up. Alternatively, if the learner has a better, more transparent equivalent in the L1, he or she may be more reluctant to pick up the L2 structure and tend to transfer the L1 equivalent.

¹ Lounge is of course somewhat more transparent if the learner knows the meaning of the verb 'to lounge about' although this might not convey the meaning of the noun so effectively (transparently) as 'sitting room'.

Other CLI approaches include suggestions that link linguistic universals and markedness to ease of learning. Eckman, for example, has proposed that if the L2 possesses a rule that is more typical of human languages than its L1 equivalent, transfer will be less likely.¹ If, on the other hand, the L1 has the more typical structure, the learner will tend to transfer it. An example from phonology will serve to illustrate this idea.

It may be claimed that final devoicing of stops is more typical of languages than the maintenance of the voicing distinction (as occurs in French and English, generally speaking). This explains why learners of the less typical languages (e.g. French and English) are very likely to persistently devoice final stops: they transfer their L1 rule. However, it is not such a persistent problem for learners of French and English to learn the devoicing rule and 'overcome' or avoid L1 transfer. Similarly, English learners have absolutely no problem with an initial voiced sound that does not occur in English, i.e. [ʒ] (as in French je). A simple contrastive approach would have predicted difficulty here. Eckman again explains this as a function of linguistic markedness: this initial sound is fairly typical (i.e. unmarked) and therefore is likely to be acquired easily. Put another way, L1 transfer is less likely.

Other approaches using universals in a different way include the approaches of scholars like Gass, Hakuta, Liceras and Zobl, for example, and will not be discussed further.

CONCLUSION

It may be concluded that language transfer or 'cross-linguistic influence' is a much more complex matter than was first realised. Despite its apparent ubiquity, it is almost always possible in principle to (a) reinterpret the phenomena as having nothing to do with the L1 (or other previously learned language, cf. Ringbom 1976) or (b) reinterpret the phenomenon as having to do 'merely' with overstretching L2 resources and falling back on L1, so to speak, in desperation, or (c) show that there are many cases where transfer should in principle occur but actually tends not to occur because it is blocked.

¹ See Eckman 1978 and discussion in Kellerman 1979.

It has been more or less suggested in this discussion that a more sophisticated framework is necessary to understand the phenomenon of cross-linguistic influence in language acquisition. That is, at the very least, one has to distinguish between competence transfer and transfer associated with processing the L2 in real time.¹ Put another way, we have to locate transfer either in those underlying beliefs² that the learner has about the L2 or in the learner's fluent command of the language.

It is appropriate to search for more sophisticated accounts of transfer which use findings and theories in sister disciplines like linguistics and psycholinguistics. Only then will the research be able to come to the language teacher with any degree of confidence and be able to make useful statements about how research may be applied in practical contexts. Until then, the only thing one can say in the light of research on transfer is that one should distrust both those who say that the main problem in learning is overcoming L1 influence and those who say that one should pay no attention at all to the relationships pertaining between the languages that the learner already knows and the language he or she is learning. Both extreme stances appear to be naive. This at least is the message that seems to be coming over from work carried out by the third group of researchers. Teachers should see transfer not simply as interference but as 'bridging knowledge' which may well be vital for further development in the learner's proficiency in the target language.

¹ That is, millisecond by millisecond, during language processing.

² By 'beliefs' is meant the feelings or intuitions the learner seems to have about the L2 as much as (if not more than) the conscious knowledge that he or she is able to formulate in words for the benefit of the teacher or investigator. In other words, beliefs, or 'knowledge' (see Footnote 4) do not depend on the learner being able to give the relevant textbook rule: this is an additional skill that is fostered in the more traditional foreign language course.

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TRANSFER AND TRANSLATION

This paper consists of two parts. The first deals with certain aspects of the relation between transfer and translation, and the second with some of the implications of that relation for the theory and practice of foreign language teaching.

I. THE RELATION BETWEEN 'TRANSFER' AND 'TRANSLATION'

1. The Issue. For obvious reasons, 'transfer' is one of the most frequently used terms in applied linguistics today and 'translation' undoubtedly holds pride of place too. This is hardly surprising, of course, as both terms evidently stand for key notions. But although a great deal has already been said and written about transfer and translation taken separately, less attention has so far been given to some interesting aspects of their relationship. Thus, for example, one of the things worth noting about these two terms is their frequently overlapping usage, although this is to be expected perhaps as a synchronic reflex of their one time synonymy.¹ Etymology apart, however, some kind of a conceptual difference seems to be taken implicitly for granted by the majority of people working in the various areas of applied (and theoretical) linguistics nowadays. And yet the said two terms are often used in similar contexts with reference to more or less identical lexical and grammatical phenomena. The instances of syntagmatic influence of one language upon another are particularly revealing.

Thus, sentences such as *I can't afford on marriage in the English interlanguage of Polish learners are explained as being due to native

¹Since both transfer and translation come from different forms of the same Latin verb (transferre 'carry' and its supine translatum), the original meaning is given prominence in some dictionaries. Thus, for example, in the 1933 edition of the Shorter English Dictionary we find that the first meaning of translation is 'transference, removal or conveyance from one person, place, or condition to another', that is, a definition that can apply equally well to transfer. It is only in some more recent dictionaries that the prevailing present-day 'linguistic' meaning of translation comes first.

language transfer (Arabski 1979:50), and, similarly, the phrase **by this manner*, produced by Czech learners of English, is attributed to interference (= 'negative transfer' in that paper) from the corresponding prepositional phrase in Czech (Duškova 1969:18). The evidence can easily be expanded to include all possible languages, but suffice it to refer to L. Selinker's generalizing statements that transfer (of one kind or another) is one of the major causes for the development of interlanguages (Selinker 1972).

On the other hand English phrases such as *at the request of* (which must have been 'incorrect' when first used) are explained as due to the influence of frequent translation from French into Middle English (Prins 1948:35). (The reverse process, from English into Canadian French, eg. in *au-delà de notre contrôle* from *beyond our control*, has been accounted for as being due to interference, cf. Darbelnet 1980:35.) To take another example, *attendre sur quelqu'un* in Swiss French is described as a 'loan translation' (calque) from German (Marouzeau 1951), and here too a wide variety of cases illustrating the lasting effect of translation can be adduced from many languages (cf. eg. the data and references in Workman 1940, Weinreich 1953, Haugen 1953, Zvegintsev 1962, Fehling 1980, Birnbaum 1982, Danchev 1982a).

The question arises then: if similar and sometimes even identical examples can be attributed alternatively to transfer and to translation, would that mean that these two terms (and the notions behind them) often boil down to the same thing, after all?

In fact, as early as 1954, Z. Harris wrote of an "inherent connection between transfer and translation" (Harris 1954:259), and L. Duskova admits that her examples of syntactic interference (including the one just mentioned above) are "word-for-word translations of the corresponding Czech expressions" (Duškova 1969:18). V. Ivir too has remarked that "many instances of interference in situations of natural and/or artificial language contact can be viewed in terms of partial or complete translation" (Ivir 1979:91). The issue has also been touched upon briefly in Danchev 1982a but, despite the observations of the above mentioned and some other authors, the connection between transfer and translation does not appear to have been sufficiently explored yet. An examination of the similarities and differences between the meanings and usage of these two terms could have some important implications for applied linguistics in general and more specifically for the theory and practice of foreign language teaching. Understandably,

limitations of time and space do not permit a more extensive survey of the problem here. Therefore only some of the more outstanding points will be considered and attention will be drawn to a number of facts which, though generally well known, so far do not seem to have been related to each other explicitly enough.

To begin with, let us take a quick look at the meanings of 'transfer' and 'translation', taken separately. As is the case with many terms nowadays, there has been a lot of loose, indeterminate, and even contradictory usage in recent years.

2. Transfer. Referring to 'transfer' and 'interference', some authors have spoken of 'terminological confusion' (eg. Debyser 1970; cf. also Rattunde 1974). It is therefore somewhat difficult to offer a single definition of interlingual transfer,¹ but many people will probably accept that it is "... a process in foreign language learning whereby learners carry over what they already know about their first language to their performance in their new language" (Crystal 1980). Others will want to add the proviso that transfer affects a person's first language too and that the process is not confined to situations of foreign language learning only (cf. the broader sense it is used with in the writings of, say, U. Weinreich and E. Haugen). Although there have been quite a few reformulations of 'transfer' in recent years (eg. in Rattunde 1974, Kellerman 1977, Ahunzjanov 1981), most authors continue to speak of 'negative' and 'positive' transfer, the former synonymous with 'interference'. 'Transference' is used occasionally as an alternative term to 'transfer' (cf. eg. Lewandowski 1976, Ahunzjanov 1981), the term 'transposition' can also be met with in a similar sense, and some authors speak also of 'structural carryover' (eg. Neubert 1981).

There are obviously two main types of evidence illustrating interlingual transfer of one kind or another: (1) learners' errors and (2) the results of historical language contacts.

Every language teacher can easily produce numerous examples of first language transfer in second language acquisition and use, although there will often arise contradictory claims over the nature and extent of the process (cf. eg. Richards 1974, Dulay and Burt 1974). But apart from a seemingly

¹As distinct from 'intra-lingual' and other types of transfer.

diminishing number of people who still tend to minimize or even to ignore its existence and effects, transfer is clearly recognized today as one of the basic factors that condition the process of second (third, etc.) language acquisition and use.

Concerning the second type of evidence, the question as to the relation between external and internal factors of language development and change is still controversial. Nevertheless there is a steadily increasing body of data illustrating and confirming A. Martinet's (1952) claim that language contact may turn out to be a major factor of (temporary or permanent) language change. In a considerable number of cases there can hardly exist any doubt indeed that certain changes in some languages are connected with similar changes in neighbouring or otherwise contiguous languages.

The not infrequent coincidence of learners' errors with historical language changes need hardly be elaborated upon here, except to draw additional attention to the fact that large-scale transfer may also occur from L2 to L1, this providing even stronger evidence of the impact and potential of interlingual transfer as a whole.¹ It may be recalled that numerous instances of such influence have been quoted in publications by H. Schuchardt, C. Bally, O. Jespersen and some other early scholars, and have been further documented extensively by U. Weinreich, E. Haugen, B. Havranek, A. Rosetti, V. Rosentzweig and numerous other authors (for additional references cf. Danchev 1982a), work along these lines continuing in recent years too. L2 → L1 transfer in conditions of artificial bilingualism (second language acquisition) has been described too. A great many instances of such transfer can be found in various translations from foreign into native languages. Copious evidence of L2 → L1 transfer has recently also been forthcoming from the numerous publications dealing with the influence of English on various languages all over the world (eg. Carstensen 1979, Darbelnet 1980, Sajavaara and Lehtonen 1981, Fillipović 1982, Danchev 1982b).

¹In Dulay and Burt 1974 it is stated that this kind of evidence is invalid. Within their framework there does not seem to be place for such evidence indeed. It should be noted, however, that they tend to identify transfer with the behaviouristic notion of transfer of habits, without apparently taking into account the fact that there may also exist transfer of (creative) rules from one language into another.

Altogether there exists nowadays an enormous corpus of L2 → L1 transfer evidence, the full significance of which still does not seem to have been sufficiently appreciated by either historical linguists and/or language teaching specialists. Thus, although nothing very new has been said here, an added emphasis may be placed on the fact that transfer is a universal feature of language contact (cf. also Toury 1982). What has been said so far obviously ties in with H. Wode's statements that "we shall have to change our thinking of transfer drastically" and "linguistic theories will have to be revised to incorporate transfer" (Wode 1982). The increasing amount of new evidence that has been forthcoming will naturally serve to reinforce the above claims.

The brief survey of the literature shows that, allowing for individual variations, there are two main types of transfer definitions, which may conveniently be described as the 'narrow' and the 'broad' ones. According to the 'narrow' definitions, transfer is mainly a negative phenomenon affecting the process of language learning in situations of artificial bilingualism. The broader definitions include any kind of transfer between any of the two (or more) languages of a person in conditions of both artificial and natural bilingualism (including historical language contacts).

3. Translation. It is an even more arduous task to offer a single definition of translation. The range of approaches to the problem is rather wide and a detailed review could run into many pages (for surveys and bibliographies of recent work cf. eg. Mounen 1976, Rado 1977, Komisarov 1980, Toury 1980, Newmark 1981). Despite the variety of definitions there are nevertheless certain points that most of them have in common, for example the consideration of translation in terms of interlingual transformations, variously described as 'operations' (Vinay and Darbelnet 1959), 'transformation' (Bolinger 1966), 'restructuring' (Nida 1969), etc. All transformations evidently presuppose invariant preservation of the basic information content,¹ the choice between the various possible functional equivalents depending on both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors. A full specification of all the possible interlingual transformations is still lacking, but the four basic types - substitution, addition, deletion

¹As is usually pointed out, there is naturally an inevitable loss of meaning, sometimes referred to as 'noises' or 'entropy'.

and transposition - often mentioned (sometimes with other names) in the literature will most certainly form the core of any more expanded descriptions.

From the point of view of the issue under consideration it is evidently necessary to outline at least tentatively the scope of the 'translation' notion. One of the main points here concerns the relation between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' translation. What has been referred to as the 'standard' theory of translation,¹ deals with conscious translation only and interlingual interference is considered merely insofar as it is the cause for poor translation. And while translation as a conscious activity has been envisaged in language change before, for example in showing the influence of the classical and other languages on the written languages of Europe and elsewhere (cf. the references in Danchev 1982a), the existence and study of unconscious translation are still largely neglected by most authors. And yet it has been shown in recent years that in situations of artificial bilingualism there occurs what has been described as 'uncontrollable' (Komisarov 1971), 'spontaneous' (Ljudskanov 1973), 'hidden' and 'unconscious' (Danchev 1978, 1980), 'internal' (Masliko and Popova 1980), etc., translation, irrespective of whether translation has been part of the teaching method or not. Adding to this the data of historical language contacts, there emerges strong evidence suggesting that unconscious translation may be a universal feature of most kinds of bilingualism.² It must be admitted, of course, that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between conscious and unconscious translation. On the whole it appears that while lexical and morphological translation (calquing) are often a conscious activity, the borrowing and translation of syntactic patterns is mostly unconscious (Darbelnet 1980, Danchev 1980).

¹This term has been used in Danchev 1980 and 1982a with reference to theories of translation concerned only with conscious translation from a synchronic point of view.

²The evidence showing that there is practically always some degree of interlingual interference, the distinction between 'co-ordinative' and 'sub-ordinative' bilingualism is not kept up here. As has been pointed out by J.D. Deseriev and I.F. Protchenko (quoted in Ahunzjanov 1981), bilingualism is a changing dynamic category. I return thus to H. Paul's broad concept of bilingualism, including both individual and collective bilingualism in conditions of both natural and artificial language contact, irrespective of the speaker's fluency in either of the two languages.

Calquing, which figures prominently in this discussion, is sometimes referred to as a certain 'kind' of translation. In fact, it is literal translation. Incidentally, its 'translational' nature comes out in its equivalents in certain languages, eg. 'loan translation' in English and 'Übersetzungslehnwort' in German. Although grammatical calquing has been considered too (eg. by U. Weinreich), lexical and compound word calquing seem to be more popular. Many authors associate calquing mainly with historical linguistics: thus, according to D. Crystal, calque is a term "used in comparative and historical linguistics to refer to a type of borrowing where the morphemic constituents of the borrowed word or phrase are translated item by item into equivalent morphemes in the new language" (Crystal 1980). But as has been pointed out by C. Mounen, the word-for-word rendering of poor translations amounts to calquing too (Mounen 1974), and at this point we may recall L. Duškova's admission that most of the instances of syntactic interference in her corpus are due to word-for-word (cf. Crystal's 'item by item') translation, that is, one may add here, to calquing. We are faced thus with one of those differences in terminological usage which conceal actual identity. If the term 'calque' should be used more frequently in the literature on foreign language acquisition, additional similarities between historical and applied linguistics will be thrown into relief, and a great deal of data relevant to both disciplines will become more readily available.

The notion of translation can thus be enlarged to include the various types of unconscious translation as well as lexical and grammatical calquing.

It is worth noting that some definitions of translation contain explicit references to transfer. Thus, E. Nida's well-known paper 'Science of Translation' begins with the assertion that translation is "a complex procedure involving analysis, transfer (emphasis provided), and restructuring" (Nida 1969:483). As a matter of fact, in several places in that paper 'transfer' and 'translation' are a bit difficult to distinguish.¹

¹For example in the passage, "when event nouns (...) are transferred (emphasis provided) from one language into another, they are generally back-transformed into verb expressions" (Nida 1968:485). In this and some other passages the verb transfer can be replaced by translate without any apparent change of meaning. But on the whole in Nida's usage transfer emerges as more or less equivalent to 'literal translation', i.e., to calquing.

According to A. Neubert, "translation amounts to the transfer of messages (emphasis provided) from one language to another" (Neubert 1981:130). The reference to 'message' is to be found in many definitions of translation, but since any speech act by both monolingual and bilingual individuals, even when erroneous in one way or another, is intended to convey some kind of a message, this is hardly to be regarded as specific to translation only.

The connection of transfer with translation is viewed from a somewhat different angle in G. Toury's insightful observation that "there is something in the nature of translating itself which encourages the occurrence of interference forms by realizing the potential language contact in the speaker's brain and triggering the transfer mechanism" (Toury 1982). Some of the implications of the above statement will be discussed at some length a little further on.

As with transfer, there emerge again two main types of definitions, 'narrow' and 'broader' ones. The narrow definitions deal with conscious translation only, whereas the broader ones include also various types of unconscious translation.

4. On Some Differences and Similarities between Transfer and Translation.

It is time now to take a somewhat closer look at the differences and similarities between the two notions, some of which have already emerged in the course of the foregoing discussion. The following possible distinctions can be considered.

(a) A conscious vs. an unconscious process. A quick survey of the available literature seems to suggest the possibility of regarding transfer as an unconscious process and translation (in its narrow definition) as a conscious activity. Indeed, in the majority of publications, transfer is described as an uncontrollable process, whereas translation is mostly controlled. However, a number of authors have pointed out that transfer can be intentional too, eg. as a communication strategy in various kinds of 'foreigner talk' (Ferguson 1975) and for other purposes as well (cf. eg. Kellerman 1977, Neubert 1981, Toury 1982). It might also be recalled that U. Weinreich has mentioned the 'conversion formulas' of bilingual speakers and that this kind of natural code switching has been exploited in the 'transfer grammar' of Z. Harris (1954), which may actually be viewed as an instruction of how to translate certain utterances from one language into another (Harris himself speaks of a "proceduralized system of translation"). On the other hand, as

was just pointed out, some authors have pointed to instances of 'uncontrollable', 'spontaneous', 'hidden', 'unconscious', 'internal' and other similar types of partial and complete translation. So on closer examination this distinction turns out to be one of prevailing usage rather than of actual substance.

(b) A 'natural' vs. an 'unnatural' process. This distinction is closely connected with the preceding one, but it will nevertheless be considered separately as this issue has turned out to be controversial. It has been claimed, for example, that "translation is unnatural in that it is not part of the 'natural' performance of a competent speaker or writer of a language" (Neubert 1981:142), that it is "a complex, artificial and unnatural process" (Newmark 1981:97) and that "learners hardly ever translate of their own initiative" (Toury 1982:14).

Empirical observation has shown, however, that learners tend to translate even when asked not to do so. Actually, it is a well-known fact of classroom reality that regardless of the teaching method learners resort to partial or complete translation in order to better understand difficult passages in the target language text. In fact, learners do not seem to feel reassured until they have translated the foreign language text into their own language, and if their teacher refuses to help them, they will do this by themselves. It has been pointed out indeed that "if one is taught a second language, (...) even by something approaching the 'direct method', one usually sets up patterns of translation equivalence" (Halliday et al 1964: 125), and also that "it is difficult to deny an element of translation in most forms of second language learning" (Lewis 1974:75), etc. One feels strongly tempted here to repeat once again L. Ščerba's well-known words that translation can be banned from the classroom, but not from the heads of the learners (Ščerba 1947).

The existence of both artificial and natural translation in a somewhat different setting has been described in a recent publication on multilingualism in Nigeria (Alaba 1981). The view that translation can be regarded as an "innate skill in bilinguals" (Harris and Sherwood 1977) thus has certainly got something to recommend it. The reference to the "notorious incapacity or awkwardness of certain bilinguals to translate from one to the other of their languages" in Newmark 1981 (cf. a similar brief statement in Rosetti 1966), holds true of conscious and correct translation, which certainly requires special training and experience. It may be added, of

course, that the effective use even of one's first language also requires special training and skill. An examination of the speech production of bilinguals who cannot translate properly is nevertheless likely to reveal many instances of partial and/or complete unconscious translation.

To sum up then, whereas transfer seems to be mostly 'natural', translation can be regarded as being both 'natural' and 'unnatural', depending on the scope of the translation notion one is operating with. Basically, however, the above distinction does not seem to be a fundamental one.

(c) Scope. Transfer and translation could also be distinguished by taking into consideration their scope. On the one hand it was seen that definitions of translation often include the notion of transfer as practically identical with literal translation (calquing), translation thus emerging as a broader notion than transfer. On the other hand, however, interlingual transfer affects all language levels, including phonetics and phonology, whereas translation is usually regarded as functioning on the sign levels of language only (although some authors have spoken of 'phonological' translation, cf. eg. Catford 1965). One way or another, it is obvious that within the framework of the broader notion of translation there does not exist any basic distinction between transfer and translation. What regards 'intra-lingual' transfer ('overgeneralization', 'analogy', etc.), this can be compared to intralingual translation (paraphrasing) and register-switching.

(d) A written vs. an oral activity.¹ It has been suggested that 'translation' is usually taken to refer to the written process in a historical context, whereas 'transfer' is used predominantly in connection with foreign language acquisition. Though undoubtedly true up to a point, this is obviously a distinction of usage and not of substance. Moreover, it is common knowledge that 'transfer' has also been used in connection with historical language contacts, whereas 'translating' (and 'interpreting') is naturally the subject of the essentially synchronically oriented (like language teaching) discipline of translation theory. So here too the distinction does not seem to go very deep.

¹It will be recalled that most languages do not have different words for written and oral translation, as eg. 'translation' and 'interpreting' in English.

In summary, it can be said that if translation is taken to consist mainly of interlingual transformation(s), transfer can then be regarded as isomorphous translation, where the obligatory transformations have not been carried out. What is often called 'negative' transfer normally amounts to partial translation only, distorting the structure of the second language and leading to erroneous utterances. Whereas transfer is often equivalent to calquing, translation usually involves more than one language level and requires a number of transformations. To put it otherwise, in the case of negative transfer the respective utterance has not been fully monitored. The instances of positive transfer are practically indistinguishable from translation, while negative transfer is more or less identical with poor translation. As a matter of fact, according to P. Newmark, "interference, however plausible, is always mistranslation" (Newmark 1981:12).

Transfer may thus be regarded as an incomplete translation process, arrested midway, as it were, where only the substitutions with the 'dominant functional equivalent'¹ have been carried out on the same language level, whereas a complete translation will require additional transformations which will usually cut across more than one language level. Transfer amounts to more or less literal translation and if that happens to be sufficient, then well and good.

Both transfer and translation (in the broad sense) are conscious and unconscious communication strategies on the part of bilingual speakers (including incipient bilinguals) in both naturalistic and tutored settings. What has been said so far seems to warrant the following conclusions:

(1) Both transfer and translation are universal features of any kind of language contact.

(2) There is a certain difference between the narrow definitions of transfer and translation, but there is no essential difference between their broader definitions as discussed above.

The fact that the strong affinity between transfer and translation has not received enough recognition is probably due partly to differences of terminological usage in different linguistic disciplines. The preference for 'transfer' may also be due to the somewhat dubious connotation that 'translation' has acquired over the years in the course of occasionally

¹This term is used in Danchev 1979 and corresponds to 'basic counterpart' in Arabski 1979.

heated arguments over the role of translation in language teaching and acquisition. Moreover, 'transfer' seems to have a more terminological and professional ring about it.

The failure to recognize more explicitly the connections between transfer and translation is very likely also due to the fact that no explicit theoretical connection between the problems of bilingualism and interlingual interference, on the one hand, and translation theory, on the other, would seem to have been established so far. This is probably due to the circumstance that by the time that the main aspects of bilingualism and interference had already been studied extensively, translation theory had still not developed sufficiently to attract wider attention. In fact, many linguists and language teaching specialists (actually most teachers) still do not seem to be aware of translation theory and its implications for both theoretical and applied linguistics.

If the above inferences are correct, one might perhaps rush to the conclusion that it does not matter very much which of the two terms will be used in the future. However, once we realize that most instances of transfer (excluding phonetics and phonology) can be identified with one kind of translation or another, this will inevitably determine one's teaching strategy. If we know that we are dealing with translation, we will look to translation theory to provide us with the appropriate concepts, methodology and terms. This will naturally imply a serious reconsideration of the role of translation in foreign language teaching. It will also become apparent that the relevance of translation theory (which has antedated some of the recent developments in contrastive linguistics, notably its widening of scope so as to include pragmatics, sociolinguistics, etc.) to foreign language teaching has still not been given sufficient attention. In the next section I shall take a brief look at some of the more practical issues arising in this connection.

II. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING

The arguments for and against the use of translation in foreign language teaching have been reviewed periodically over a long period of time (for references and details cf. eg. Beljaev 1965, Dodson 1967, Muskat-Tabakowska 1973, Benediktov 1974, Pasov 1978, Danchev 1978). So instead of repeating

all the points again I shall single out for reconsideration only two of them. The first is based on the consideration of translation as a universal feature of bilingualism, which can be subsumed under 'they do it anyway' formula, and the second concerns translation as an end in itself. It has long been recognized, of course, that as well as being a means to the learning of a foreign language, translation may also be the end towards which the study of the foreign language is directed (cf. eg. Halliday et al 1964, Beljaev 1965).

Once it has been accepted that there does not exist any fundamental difference between the broad notions of transfer and translation and, by common consensus transfer being considered as an important factor in second language acquisition, the same will obviously apply to translation as well. It turns out thus that the role of unconscious/hidden/internal/spontaneous translation in language learning is much greater than is usually assumed, not to mention the fact that many authors and teachers are apparently not even aware of its existence. The fact that translation can be viewed as a natural process stands out then as the central argument in favour of a thorough reconsideration of its use. And if translation is a process that cannot be checked, the obvious thing to do is to try to capture, channel and exploit it. It has been pointed out indeed that "teachers should devise their teaching materials and teaching methodology to accord with, and not to go counter to, the learner's natural abilities" (Wode 1982) and, more specifically, that "the teacher's translation is naturally to be preferred to the pupil's (Taylor 1972:56). Of the numerous similar statements on transfer one can quote A. Leontiev's, according to whom "the phenomenon of transferring skills and habits of the mother-tongue onto a second language takes place independently of our efforts to limit it by a special method and that this kind of transfer is deeply rooted in some general principles of the transfer of knowledge" (Leontiev 1970:19). This view is shared by W. Marton (1973) and others.

The second important argument in favour of translation stems from its constantly increasing social and public importance: it has even been said that we live in the century of translation. In fact, the amount of translation from one language into another is growing rapidly and an increasing number of bilingual people are faced almost daily with the necessity to translate various texts. Statistics and the results of an official inquiry held in France in 1972 indicate that "by the end of this century the demand

for translation will be three times (emphasis provided) as large as it is today" and that "the lack of translations - at the right time and place - will be one of the three main obstacles to the progress of science and technology, the other being the lack of raw materials and the shortage of specialized labour" (Hendrickx 1975:103-4). Bearing in mind all this it is obvious that while learning a foreign language students will only gain if they have also acquired some translation skills, as every bilingual speaker is also a potential translator.

It is important to note the marked difference between the translation needs of the speakers of what may be referred to as 'major' and 'minor' languages.¹ While the normal functioning of minor language societies is inconceivable today without a constant flow of translated information, this applies relatively less so to the major language countries. Thus, for instance, the English-speaking countries are obviously much more self-sufficient informationally,² than smaller countries, whose language is spoken only by several million people or so. This is why relatively less public and scholarly attention has been given to translation (and interpreting) in Britain than in a number of smaller European countries. As could well be expected, this is also reflected in the respective attitude to language teaching. And under the influence of most British and American publications on foreign language teaching, in which translation is usually touched upon fleetingly (often negatively) and is sometimes not even mentioned at all (one of the conspicuous exceptions here being Dodson 1967), translation has for a long time been neglected in some smaller countries too, where there has been a considerable and steadily mounting public demand for it. There are cases, of course, for example in English language courses in Britain where the teacher does not know the native language(s) of the learners, in which translation is ruled out for purely practical reasons. Yet such a practice need not be transferred to situations where translation can be performed. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in many quarters there is still scant awareness of the social importance of translation.

¹The distinction between 'major' and 'minor' languages is, of course, purely in terms of statistics (numbers of speakers).

²This is probably one of the reasons why many British and especially American authors often fail to quote publications from outside Britain or the United States and/or written in languages other than English.

In order to remedy this situation it is preferable that translation should be practiced both as a means and end of second (third, etc.) language study.

While under the pressure of circumstances and with the waning popularity of the various direct methods fewer teachers nowadays are likely to reject translation out of hand, most of them still do not seem to know exactly what to do with it. There is still not sufficient clarity concerning some of the temporal, qualitative and quantitative parameters of translation. To put it simply, it is still not quite clear WHAT, WHEN, HOW MUCH and HOW to translate. Since it would obviously be quite impossible to answer all these questions exhaustively here, only some of what would seem to be the more relevant points will be discussed briefly below, proceeding from some recent experience.¹

1. WHAT should be translated? Two types of texts, from and into the second language, come under consideration here. The L2 → L1 translation is naturally easier and should therefore precede the L1 → L2 translation. However, the latter must not be delayed too much, as two-way translation has come to be regarded as more effective than uni-directional translation (Barhudarov 1966). The two types of translation are used for the following purposes:

L2 → L1: for (1) comprehension control after the introductory text has been decoded in all possible ways - audio-visually, through contextual cues, etc. As has already been pointed out, the rationale behind this is 'they do it anyway, so it had better be under the teacher's control'.
(2) The second aim of translation at this stage is the gradual acquisition and training of translation skills.

L1 → L2: By proceeding from a L1 text the learner is induced to generate all the new grammatical and lexical material he is supposed to have internalized so far. By being confined to a specific text the learner is prevented from going into avoidance tactics of difficult constructions. It has been claimed that this kind of translation amounts to setting traps

¹My own observations on the use of translation are based on a six-term classroom testing period of An English Course for Bulgarians by A. Danchev, E. Nachkova, B. Vousheva, N. Stoilova, T. Kmetova, I. Angelova, P. Benatova, E. Todeva (under the supervision of A. Danchev) (publ. forthcoming, Sofia, 1983), which proved more effective than the British and American courses used at the Foreign Language Centre at the Institute for Foreign Students in Sofia.

and that it only reinforces interference. Observation has shown, however, that a learner is likely to fall into those 'traps' anyway and that, by teaching him how to switch languages/codes correctly, he can be shown how to avoid the traps, consciousness raising helping him to develop his inner self-control (cf. also Bouton 1974). Admittedly, L1 → L2 translation does invite interference indeed, but this is done in order to overcome it and to create anti-interference immunity and resistance, so to speak (cf. Bogin 1970). Translation is used to neutralize the incorrect transfer virus, to use figurative language.

Within each lesson or unit a TEXT to TEXT cycle is thus completed. The learner sets out from a L2 text which he gradually decodes and internalizes through appropriate drilling and exercising, in the course of which he is also able to use his first language, and the final text is designed to make him produce a second language text. Thus, whereas at the beginning of the teaching cycle the learner starts with L2 text analysis, at the end of the cycle he should be able to synthesize a similar target language text.

It goes without saying that the texts ought to be well selected and communicatively motivated from the very beginning, so as to sustain interest throughout the exercise. This is important, as it has been observed that "translation passages are usually poorly selected and graded" (Green 1970: 218). Learners must naturally translate only texts within their ability and fiction should be given only to very advanced students. Rather than using isolated sentences, it is advisable that the passages for translation should be communicatively complete.

2. WHEN should learners translate? Opinions vary here. Thus, for example, translation can and should be used during the initial stages (Taylor 1972), after the initial stages (Muskat-Tabakowska 1973), and towards the final stages (Bouton 1974). In fact, all possible views are to be met with. However, since transfer sets in with the very first instants of language contact, translation should begin at more or less the same time too, so as to capture and channel the transfer process. This is, of course, not to be taken to mean that a lesson should begin with translation. As has been indicated above, the L2 → L1 translation should come only after all the other procedures for text decoding and explicitation have been exhausted. Concerning the L1 → L2 translation, the optimal time seems to be at the end of a learning cycle.

3. HOW MUCH time should be given to translation? If the introductory text has been well written and has also been competently presented by means of both ostensive and contextual devices, its translation should not take up more than a few minutes of classroom time.

The L1 → L2 translation can be assigned for homework, and then its correction and discussion in class need not take up more than ten to fifteen minutes. The time devoted to translation thus does not take up more than five to ten percent of the overall teaching time.¹ In special translation classes the percentage will be much higher, of course.

4. HOW should learners translate? Two problems emerge here. The first consists of striking the right balance between literal (interlinear) and functional (adequate) translation. For obvious reasons, learners (and sometimes teachers, too) tend to translate literally. It is part of their intuitive search for 'one to one' identification, which leads to simplifications in their interlanguages. By means of functional translation, learners are made more keenly aware of the fact that certain elements in one language may have several equivalents in another language, often forming a whole 'fan' (Danchev 1979). The 'fan of correspondences', as the paradigm of translation equivalents may also be called, is headed by the dominant functional equivalent. This is usually recognized correctly, but is then overgeneralized as the sole equivalent of a given element in the language from which one translates.

Although literal translation is mostly rejected (cf. Green 1977:218), it may be used occasionally (cf. Mackey 1965, Rivers 1968, Rogova 1975) as a temporary explicitation device for the clarification of constructions specific to a certain language. For example, the English construction What was the weather like? is sometimes rendered by Bulgarian learners through a semi-literal translation Kato kakvo beše vremeto? where the initial element kato is used to make explicit the function of like. Learners usually demonstrate their awareness that such a construction is stylistically clumsy in Bulgarian and, after it has served its purpose, they discard it in favour of the correct one (Kakvo beše vremeto?). Similar translations have been

¹The average lesson in the above mentioned English Course for Bulgarians takes up ten to twelve classroom periods (of 45 minutes each).

recorded of English constructions with the prop word one. Such meta-linguistic practices have a reassuring effect as they help learners to internalize more speedily the structure of the second language. A contrastive analysis of the literal and functional translations may prove a useful teaching device (cf. also Mackey 1965), showing what further transformations must be performed. This can obviously be used as a consciousness-raising exercise in self-monitoring.

The second question here is whether translation theory should be given to learners in any explicit form. The answer to this question is usually negative, but the opposite case could be argued as well. The introduction of certain of the concepts and terms of translation theory can be helpful. To begin with, without using any terminology the process and result of translation cannot be described and discussed adequately, nor can they be related explicitly enough to what learners usually know about language in general. There is also the fact that as a whole people nowadays are more 'terminologically minded' than in the past and that this trend can be expected to continue. Indeed, it has been found that learners react favourably to the limited use of translation theory terminology as it enables them to rationalize about what they have been doing.

The following concepts and terms could be adopted for classroom use. First of all it is useful to introduce the universal translatability postulate, combined with the compensation principle, applied in the case of lexical, grammatical, stylistic, pragmatic and other gaps. This makes learners realize at an early stage that practically everything in their own language can be rendered into any other language, provided they go about it in the right way. Learners can also be made familiar with the notion of functional equivalent, which helps them to distinguish more clearly between literal and functional translation. The teacher may also describe and name the basic translation transformations, mentioned above. The fact that the output text may sometimes be shorter or longer than the input text tends to puzzle and disturb some learners. They can be told then that text compression and decompression are frequent concomitants of the translation process, etc.

The use of translation as outlined somewhat sketchily in this paper differs significantly from the traditional grammar-translation method, where translation is the basic teaching device. Translation should by no means be

central in the overall approach, although it must constitute one of its important ingredients. To administer translation is 'easy' (cf. Mackey 1965:153) at first sight only. The truth of the matter is that the competent handling of translation requires a sound knowledge of both its theory and practice.

The issues considered in this paper should not lead one to the conclusion that transfer and translation are complete synonyms, although they have more in common than is usually assumed. The closer identification of transfer with translation offers some new insights into the scope and importance of the latter. The obvious inference to be drawn from this is that translation theory is relevant not only to the study and teaching of translation as a utilitarian pursuit, but that it can also be useful to language teaching specialists. Every foreign language teacher will therefore be well advised to familiarize himself at least with the rudiments of translation theory. It is one of the disciplines that illustrate quite conspicuously the swing towards macrolinguistic as against microlinguistic models of language and language teaching.

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TRANSFER AS A UNIVERSAL OF VERBAL PERFORMANCE OF L2 LEARNERS IN SITUATIONS OF COMMUNICATION IN TRANSLATED UTTERANCES*

1. Transfer has long been recognized as a universal concomitant of language contact in bilingual individuals, in the sense that bilingualism entails a high probability of the non-deliberate emergence of primary (that is, non-habitualized, not to say: non-institutionalized) interference forms. This potential, inherent in the bilingual speaker's brain, can obviously be put to more or less deliberate use as well, namely, in various forms of imitated "interfered speech" and for various purposes, which entails lending the universal a strategic status.¹ A yet stronger suggestion, which has been put forward recently, even calls to examine the possibility of regarding "reliance on L1", which I take to include the speaker's capacity to produce both deliberate and non-deliberate interference forms without being actually reducible to that capacity, "as an integral part of man's natural ability to acquire L2" in the first place (Wode 1981:51). Such a claim may of course imply that (individual) inability to produce forms of this type - spontaneously, or at will - is to be regarded pathological.

As is well known, interference forms do not occur in any single act of the performance of bilinguals, not even of L2 learners. Therefore, it

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¹ Compare, for instance, the example of "a French language teacher who addresses his [Canadian] anglophone pupils, reproaching them for their scanty knowledge of grammar and poor articulation habits" cited by Neufeld (1987:16): "To demonstrate the notable differences between his speech and their's, he begins by speaking impeccable French with attention to style and articulation. He then underscores his point about their grossly inadequate command of the grammatical rules of French by mapping his knowledge of English syntax into his otherwise standard French. He concludes with speech which, while lexically French, resembles English in every other way". This is, no doubt, not only a deliberate use fo an innate mechanism, but also a strategy devised to solve a definite communicative problem in an economical and (supposedly) effective way.

seems reasonable, indeed almost necessary, to hypothesize that there are factors which trigger off, and factors which block, the activity of the transfer mechanism inherent in normal bilinguals. However, since we have no direct access to mental processes, there is very little way of finding out just how this mechanism actually functions. For us, the mental processes involved in language transfer are a kind of a "black box" whose internal structure can only be speculated upon on the basis of its end products, and with the aid of a set of anticipatory hypotheses like the ones we have just introduced. It means, in other words, that we should take the overt presence of interference forms in the verbal production of bilinguals as tentative evidence for the actual occurrence of language contact within their brains, accompanied by (or yielding) transfer processes which have not (or, at least, not completely) been blocked.

However, even this does not go without its complications. For, obviously, not all the forms, whose emergence in the verbal performance of a bilingual can be attributed to transfer, necessarily present themselves as interference forms in that they deviate from L2 rules (that is, those cases which have often been referred to - mainly for practical reasons and applied purposes - as entailing "negative transfer"). Interference forms may well totally resemble native L2 forms, to the extent that L1 and L2 are structurally similar, hence arouse no suspicion as to their reliance on the forms of another language (entailing, as it were, "positive transfer"). Sometimes it is only the higher frequency of their occurrence beyond the average in L2 which may serve as a clue to their being the product of transfer processes (that is, deviation in terms of norms of usage); sometimes it is the presence of the parallel L1 forms in the immediate neighbourhood, but often no such clue exists.

Conversely, phenomena which do look like interference forms - that is, utterances which do not merely deviate from the rules (and/or norms) of one language, but also reflect, on one level or another, forms or uses of another, which is also stored in the same speaker's brain - may also be (and, in fact, have often been) attributed to other mechanisms and/or strategies, in addition to, or even instead of those of language transfer (e.g. Dulay and Burt 1974 vs. Abbott 1980:122-123).

While acknowledging the possibility of assigning several - alternative or complementary - explanations to one and the same set of phenomena (cf. Abbott 1980:122), it should also be admitted that, as yet, we have too

little knowledge of the mechanisms which may be involved in their production, hence no foolproof means of preferring one type of explanation to another. For the exploratory purposes of the present paper I have therefore chosen to apply the label of "interference form" tentatively, hence necessarily in a somewhat loose manner, to any feature of the verbal performance of a bilingual of any type and degree, in any of his languages, which can be attributed to transfer from his other language, whether "positive" or "negative" with regard to its effects on the "affected" language, and whether the interference hypothesis is the only possible, the most likely, or just one of several equally possible descriptive-explanatory hypotheses. (Cf. Færch's similar but independent "boost" to the transfer hypothesis; Færch 1982.)

2. It is almost a commonplace that language is there for use, that it is used in communicative situations (which those who wish to regard the functions of language as transcending the immediate transmission of information should take as broader and more inclusive than the latter), and that these situations have an important role to play in the very formation of verbal utterances, as bundles of inter-dependent and mutually conditioning constraints. The important thing, however, is that L2 learners using their limited L2, or interlanguage, are no exception to this rule, notwithstanding the existence of certain types of communicative situation which may be specific to them. Moreover, languages are also learnt and acquired not only for, but usually also in communicative situations, whether natural or fabricated, which may well act as habit-forming, especially if not sufficiently balanced by situations of other types.

It follows that the immediate communicative situation in which the learner finds himself or in which he is put (not last, by researchers into foreign language acquisition), before and during the production of his intended L2 utterance, should also be taken as a crucial factor in any description, analysis and evaluation of his verbal performance, and at least as a substantial modifying factor for any generalization as to his competence in L2.

First observations have indeed revealed significant correlations between the frequency of the occurrence of interference forms and some of these communicative situations. Thus, for instance, it is easy to see the difference in that respect between spontaneous and elicited utterances of L2 learners. Compare, for example, one of many of Henning Wode's

observations in his recent book:

My experimental data are not isomorphic with the spontaneous material. [...] [The difference] is at least in part very likely due to the application of non-age dependent universal strategies. Their application of non-application seems to be favored by various factors inherent in the situation or task. (Wode 1981:181)

Indeed, in terms of this gross distinction there is hardly anything new to the "communicative situation constraints" hypothesis. However, its explanatory power well exceeds it, and is likely to explain as well, for instance, the difference in rates, if not in form, of interference forms in L2 utterances which have all been elicited, but in different techniques, while assigning different tasks to the learners. Thus, for example, researchers who applied the Bilingual Syntax Measure to L2 learners tended to report that their subjects had produced remarkably little evidence of language transfer (e.g. Dulay and Burt 1974, notwithstanding their reluctance to turn to the transfer hypothesis unless as a last resort), whereas those who (like Wode 1981) assigned translating tasks to their subjects were compelled to admit the relative prominence of interference forms in their corpora.

What we tend to hypothesize is, then, that there are types of communicative situation which are, in themselves, more and less prone to set the transfer mechanism in motion, probably in direct proportion to the type and extent of language contact which can be claimed to be inherently involved in them. In other words, that certain types of communication that a bilingual speaker, including an L2 learner, can engage in tend to bring his two linguistic systems (or parts thereof), wherever they may be stored, in close contact, hence - other things being equal - increase the probability of the occurrence of interference forms in his overt verbal performance.

3. Translating may serve as a particularly illuminating case in point. On the one hand, its boundaries and features as a type of cross-lingual activity are relatively easy to discern and capture, and, on the other hand, it probably provides that type of discourse where - again, other things being equal - the greatest rates and variety of interference forms can be traced, not lastly with the aid of the corresponding source utterances, which, by way of comparison, may shed light on the identity

and function of the resulting target forms.¹ Indeed, a translated utterance may be regarded as an "inter-utterance" by definition (Toury 1979), namely, with respect to that level where translational adequacy is most fully realized, that is, with the smallest number of allowances for the constraints of the recipient system.

Of course, it would come to nobody as too much of a surprise to find L1 → L2 translated utterances of second language learners imbued with interference forms, at (almost) all levels.² The learner's very insecurity in L2, superimposed on his factual lack of sufficient resources in that language, is usually quite enough to explain his resort to reliance on L1, if only as a communication strategy (cf. e.g. Færch and Kasper 1980); especially as, in this case, L1 is directly supplied to him in encoded chunks, far beyond the abstract system which is stored in his brain and available for activation and use anyway, so that he can lean heavily on his immediate linguistic input, whereas avoidance behaviour may be regarded undesirable, especially with subjects who have already been exposed to translating activities and have as a result acquired some translational habits.

However, even with learners, including the very beginners among them, non-deliberate language transfer occurs also in L2 → L1 translating. Compare, for instance, the following account of the exposed to English for a relatively short period of time:

I asked Lars once whether he knew the meaning of Heiko didn't catch a fish. His reply: Heiko hat nicht einen Fisch gefangen instead of Heiko hat keinen Fisch gefangen, which would have been the appropriate translation here. It may be that Lars' nicht einen reflects the article a of the L2 utterance to be translated. (Wode 1981:88)³

This type of evidence should be taken to reinforce the simplest of

¹ This "paradigmatic" status of translating was probably also one of the main reasons while scholars such as Di Pietro (1971) made the far-reaching, probably also far-fetching assumption that in foreign language production, translation is as good as inevitable. However, in what follows, only conscious translating will be considered.

² For the lexical level cf. Ringbom 1978.

³ Ms. Christiane von Stutterheim from the Max-Planck-Institut für Psycholinguistik in Nijmegen has also been able to establish clear traces of transfer from L2 in L1 utterances in the verbal performance of Turkish immigrant workers in West Berlin when asked to translate their highly defective German utterances into their mother tongue. (Personal communication.)

the possible explanatory hypotheses for the abundance of interference phenomena in cases of the first category, namely that which is capable of accounting for both L1→L2 and L2→L1 translating by L2 learners, and in the same terms. This is, namely, that there is something in the nature of translating itself which encourages the emergence of interference forms by realizing the potential language contact in the speaker's brain and triggering off the transfer mechanism, and that, therefore, these forms tend to reflect above all the activity of a psycholinguistic universal rather than a strategy devised to overcome certain definable communicational problems.

This explanation is further supported by the translational performance of near-bilinguals, that is, those who are no longer to be considered learners. These also have been found to produce interference forms, and in no small quantities, not only when translating into their secondary, but also when translating into their primary language. Here I have in mind, for instance, Katri Meriö's account of the translational performance of Finnish-Swedish near-bilinguals in their school-leaving examination (1978, esp. p. 43).

The assertion that there is something in the nature of translating itself which encourages language transfer finds further and more weighty verification in the findings of those students of translation and translating practices whose orientation is basically descriptive and explanatory as to the output of so-called professional translators. These scholars (e.g. Denison 1981; Toury 1979, 1980) have showed that these translations also abound in interference forms, not only on the macro-, but also on the micro- (that is, "lower" grammatical and lexical) levels, even when these professionals translate into their mother tongues. To cite one typical example, quoted by Denison (1981:267) from H.T. Lowe-Porter's English translation of Thomas Mann's "Tristan":

- G.: Sie kommt an seinem Arme daher, lehnt vielleicht sogar ihren Kopf an seine Schulter und blickt dabei verschlagen lächelnd um sich her, als wollte sie sagen: Ja, nun zerbrecht euch die Köpfe über diese Erscheinung! - Und wir zerbrechen sie uns.
 E.: Walks about his arm, even leans her head on his shoulder and looks round with an impish smile as if to say: 'Look on this, if you like, and break your heads over it'. And we break them.

It might be added that Lowe-Porter produced this, and similar interference forms in a cultural-linguistic context which did not favour them, and with

no seeming purpose in mind, that is to say: completely non-deliberately. (For similar examples from Hebrew translations of English and German prose fiction, cf. Toury 1977. A detailed analysis of one instance is found in Toury 1979, Section E.)

My claim is that it is unwarranted, if only on economical grounds, to look for different explanations for L1→L2 and L2→L1 translations, and for the production of amateur vs. professional translators, especially as one type of explanation, which is in a position to account for all these cases, suggests itself so readily.

To be sure, it is not even the case that professional translations into L2 necessarily contain a smaller number and/or more striking cases of interference forms (that is, those which reflect "negative transfer") than comparable translations into L1. Rather, the opposite often turns out to be the case, probably, among other things, due to the very consciousness of translators of the first category of their lack of complete command of L2, which may make them resort to avoidance strategies, especially in contexts where such a behaviour is favoured.

In addition, under certain "translational norms" (Toury 1977, 1978) there is a strong possibility that interference forms will not only be present in professionally translated utterances, as a mere evidence of the non-interrupted activity of language transfer, nor even simply tolerated, as unavoidable evil, but actually preferred to "pure" target-language forms; in other words, adopted as a cultural-linguistic strategy. An interesting, if extreme case in point is presented by literary translation from Russian and German - the two main culture-languages of Western Jews of the period - into Hebrew around the beginning of the twentieth century. Actually, these translations were prepared first of all for an audience which could have read the originals as well, but, for ideological reasons, preferred reading them in Hebrew translation. This led to a marked preference for calques to the respective source language, which made it possible for the bilingual reader to "see" the translational problem through its solution (for a discussion of this pair as descriptive notions, cf. Toury 1982, Section 5), and, as a result, his enjoyment from the "muscle demonstration" of the Hebrew target language was increased enormously. As this technique then crystalized as one of the leading translational norms in the newly emerging Hebrew culture, irrespective of the source language and of the prospective audience, even translations from,

let us say, English began to show traces of the Russian and (to a much lesser extent) German languages, as a sort of "second-order interference" (Toury 1979, Section F).

This very strategy can then be extended to non-translational types of language use as well, with an implied recognition and acknowledgement of the universal activity of the non-deliberate mechanism. And, sure enough, our assertions as to the position of interference in translated utterances find further corroboration in the formulation of pseudotranslations. Utterances of this type are deliberately designed so as to pass for genuine translations, and therefore the ways in which they are formulated are highly indicative of the notions shared by the members of the target-language community as to the most conspicuous characteristics of translations (or, rather, of translations from certain source languages) into their language, even if they do so in a simplified or exaggerated manner. And, indeed - as I have argued elsewhere (Toury 1980:45-46,48; 1981:20,22-23) - deliberate interference forms, especially at the lowest linguistic levels, turn out to be among the most prominent characteristics of these pseudotranslations.

4. So far we have treated translating - as customary - as a category of cross-lingual activities. However, a particular type of communicative situation is also to be associated with the products of this process, which, like every other type of situation of that kind, may have a lot to do with the very shaping of these products as verbal utterances, and, by extension, with the entire realization of the process itself.

To be sure, the implied opposition between "translational" and "non-translational" types of discourse can hardly be placed on the same plane with established classificatory categories and principles such as the "mode" and "field" of discourse (e.g. Spencer and Gregory 1964) and directly equated with them. Rather, it should be seen as intersecting these, and other similar distinctions, so as to give rise to "compound" types of discourse such as "written translated", "written non-translated", "spoken translated", "spoken non-translated", "translated (and non-translated) technical", and so forth. And if we take this opposition as our frame of reference, there seems to be ample justification for adopting the notion of COMMUNICATION IN TRANSLATED UTTERANCES as a cover-term for all those types of discourse that utilize utterances in one language which are the outcome of the submission of utterances in another language to

translating procedures.

Obviously, this involves a shift of focus, which seems crucial not only for translation studies as a scholarly branch (Toury 1980a), but also for various areas where translating may be applied or translations used, including foreign language teaching and testing as fields of application and foreign language studies as a scientific discipline. This shift is from the traditional focusing on the transference of an invariant over and across a linguistic border to focusing on the use of the resultant entity within the recipient linguistic-cultural context. After all, translated utterances, no matter what the exact process which yielded them, form facts of one system only: the target's. Even if they, as "inter-textual" facts, are found to constitute systems of their own, these systems will of necessity turn out to be more of the nature of subsystems of the target system than of the nature of autonomous systemic entities.¹ (For a more detailed justification of this claim, cf. Toury 1982, Section 2.)

Moreover, the prospective function(s) of the translated utterance in the communicative act in L2 also contribute to, if not govern its mode of production (that is, the actual process of translating), including its linguistic shape. Under this observation, interference in translated utterances is the expression of a reduction of the L2-like functions of the utterance in favour of the retention, or reconstruction, of greater parts of its L1-like functions (which is one way of defining translation adequacy).

Of course, in spite of the seeming paradox, it is the L1-like rather than the L2-like functions which are characteristic of translated utterances, because they serve to distinguish - from the point of view of the target system - between translations and non-translations. That is to say, translated utterances differ from non-translated ones in their ontological status, even when their surface realizations converge, in either direction. This is why, eventually, the more characteristic an

¹ In an analogical manner, the series of consecutive interlanguages of a foreign language learner represents a movement from L1 and to L2, that is, a process of approximation to L2 (Nemser 1971), which makes them more and more part of this language.

utterance of communication in translated utterances, the more it may be expected to show interference. And conversely: the smaller the rates of interference, the less characteristically translational the utterance.

5. What, then, is the status of transfer as a universal of translation, if it is not the case that every single act of communication in translated utterances, not even by L2 learners, exhibits overt interference forms, at least not on the micro-linguistic levels?

There seems to be no escape from the assumption that this type of communicative situation, with the processes associated with it, are merely strong enough to considerably increase the probability of the occurrence of interference forms, above and beyond any other type of communication of bilingual speakers, and that, on the other hand, the presence of more and/or stronger counter-factors is required in order to re-reduce this increased probability.

In other words, it should be assumed that there are several factors which act to "further" or "hinder" the activity of the transfer mechanism in translating situations. A tentative first list of these factors may include the following:

- structural similarities (vs. differences) between the two languages involved;
- the existence (vs. non-existence) of differences in the relative status of the two languages (primary vs. secondary), in the speaker-translator and/or in the addressee;
- the translating proceeding from the primary to the secondary language (or vice versa),
- the actual rate of the speaker-translator's command of TL (and/or SL) on every possible level;

¹ And compare, in this connection, a recent account of an ideal (and, to be sure, idealized as well) process of translating: "The translator begins his search for translation equivalence from formal correspondence, and it is only when the identical-meaning formal correspondent is either not available or not able to ensure equivalence that he resorts to formal correspondents with not-quite-identical meanings or to structural and semantic shifts which destroy formal correspondence altogether. But even in the latter case he makes use of formal correspondence as a check on meaning - to know what he is doing, so to speak" (Ivir 1981:58).

- the mode of the translated discourse (spoken vs. written);
- the difference between the original and translated utterances in terms of their mode (spoken → spoken, spoken → written, written → written, written → spoken);
- the interval between the production of the two utterances, especially in spoken → spoken translating, which may be so short as to force the L2 speaker to start producing the translated utterance when the original one has not yet come to its end. (It seems that it is mainly this factor that brings about the speaker's oscillation between the two codes, which tends to increase the rates of overt interference [Toury 1982a].)
- time pressure (that is, pressure exerted on the speaker-translator to finish the production of his translated utterance within a short and/or fixed period of time);
- other types of mental stress and fatigue;
- cultural-linguistic contexts which accept (vs. reject), if not prefer, interference to "pure" TL forms (cf. Section 3);
- previous experience in translating (in general, or of the type at hand), including previous reactions to translational output which included (or failed to include) interference forms.

The length and/or rate of complexity of the original utterance may also turn out to be contributing factors.

Of course, this list is far from exhaustive, not to say, systematically organized. Moreover, many of the factors listed have not really been studied yet. Therefore it would be premature to attempt the most important but most difficult thing of all: to state the hierarchical order of the various factors and their inter-dependencies. These will certainly have to wait until more research into translated utterances has been done, directed by these descriptive-explanatory objects. However, it is clear that the presence of any "furthering" factor requires greater efforts on the part of the speaker-translator, if the emergence of interference forms is to be prevented; that the presence of "hindering" factors may act as counter-factors and balance up to complete denial the effects of the "furthering" ones; and, finally, that a syncretic presence of the latter is almost impossible to overcome.

The last two sections, which dealt with communication in translated utterances as a specific type of communicative situation and with its possible effects on the formation and formulation of those utterances, can be tentatively summed up in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Communication in translated utterances.
For explanations, see the text.

6. Obviously, a second language learner finds himself in an inferior position with regard to any intended performance in L2, which, many scholars claim, may already lead him to draw on his L1. His introduction to situations which require communication in translated utterances into L2 adds one or more "furthering" factors, usually without a correspondingly sufficient number of counter-factors, which surely results in the abundance of overt interference forms in his intended translated production, far beyond the average in translation.

Let us conclude with a few remarks on some peculiarities of translating as performed by language learners.

a. Although, semiotically speaking, translation should be conceived of as initiated in and by the recipient pole (Toury 1980:16), learners hardly ever translate (consciously, that is) of their own initiative. As a rule, it is somebody else representing the receptor system - an interlocutor, or, more often, a teacher, an examiner or a researcher - who leads, even obliges them to indulge in this activity. The "translate!" instruction thus serves as a signal for a specific type of linguistic

manipulation. However, at the same time - along with the respective "task item" (as Wode 1981 has termed it) - it also sets up the framework for an instance of our type of communicative situation. This fact opens up a field of study, which, as far as I know, has never been touched upon, namely, the relationships between the translated performance and that signal. It is my hunch that at least the rate of explicitness and directness of the "translate!" instruction (e.g. "translate the following into..." vs. "how would you say X in..." vs. "what would your friend Y [a native speaker of L2] have said, had he wanted to...") may have its effects on the translated response, even to one and the same "task item". (Cf. further in Toury 1982a, Section 9.) The location of this instruction in the speech-chain, in relation to more inclusive contexts and communicative situations where the communication in translated utterances in question is embedded, and especially in relation to the "task item" (before, after, or within), may also prove significant.

b. One peculiarity of the communicative situation in translated utterances of L2 learners is that the translated utterance does not totally replace the "task item". In other words: that both are present within the boundaries of one and the same communicative situation and form parts of it. This may well be taken into account by the speaker-translator, who, as a result, may renounce the need for "total" and settle for "restricted" translation (in the sense that this pair of terms was introduced by Catford 1965). Obviously, any renouncement of "total" translation results in an increase of interference rates, namely, on the level(s) which have been exempt from the "adequacy" postulate. Such a case is even more extreme than the one described in Section 3, where the source utterance was made part of the communicative framework only by those who were in a position to reconstruct it from the target utterance by applying certain TL-SL formal relationships to the translated utterance in a reverse fashion.

c. Translation by L2 learners is usually restricted in yet another, and more peculiar respect, especially when it is used as a technique for the elicitation of certain L2 forms or structures rather than any L2 data. For here, the restrictedness is not limited to the TL (which has, after all, been acquired only in part), but may involve SL as well: very often, L1 underlying the "task items" is cut to the measures of the subjects' proficiency (actual, or - more likely - assumed) in L2, and is far from

representing the entire range of their competence in L1. (This is, of course, a clear indication of translation being governed by target system considerations even in cases of this type!)

Although, in this case, there is, in a sense, a pre-defined relationship between the underlying codes, the process which is performed by the learners can still be regarded as translating, since this relationship does not function as a necessary condition for their performance, and, in fact, does not even fully, not to say, automatically, determine its output (cf. Toury 1980:13), which may well deviate from the expected one, as has recently been shown by Wode, who included translating among his elicitation techniques:

in the session at 2;20 [two months and 20 days after the first exposure to English] Lars was asked to translate¹ das ist nicht falsch lit. 'that is not wrong'. The aim was to elicit a negated reply. Lars' translation: that's right. Similarly, Heiko hat keinen snag gefangen lit. 'Heiko has not caught a snag' is rendered by Lars as Heiko missed the snag. These renderings are situationally quite adequate. This was highlighted even more clearly in the following incident, again from Lars at 2;20. I asked him to translate du sollst nach Hause kommen 'you should come home'. It was the sort of phrase we employ to call the children home, even when they may be out of sight. Lars replies: you come home. Next I try for the negation of the German phrase above, namely, du sollst nicht nach Hause kommen. Lars replies: you can stay. (Wode 1981:88)

7. All in all, there can hardly be any doubt that the learner-translator's performance represents his competence in communication in translated utterances into L2. On the other hand, no translation can initially be taken as direct evidence of the speaker's competence in L2 as a whole, unless the factors which influence the regularities of translational performance as such are clarified and brought to bear on the analysis.

This does not, however, amount to blaming translating - not even as an elicitation technique - as necessarily producing artifacts. Translated utterances, even of second language learners, are no more artifacts in nature than any other type of verbal performance. They are simply

¹ Wode's regular signal seems to be "kannst du sagen (...) was heisst + 'task item'", with very few contextual variations such as "was heisst + 'task item'" and "und wenn du sagst + 'task item'" (e.g. Wode 1981:181, 182,186,190). However, the data which he supplies in this respect is too scanty to permit any real conclusion along the lines suggested in the text.

representative of a certain type of communication, and not of others. Therefore translating should not necessarily be abandoned, either as a means of practicing or testing L2 or even as a technique for data elicitation. They simply have to be taken for what they are, and to the extent that they differ from spontaneous utterances in L2, or from elicitation in other techniques, these differences should be tentatively attributed to the differences in task and in communicative purpose. True enough, the postponement, or total cancellation of translation exercises (as suggested e.g. by Voge 1982) may well result in a reduction of the total number of interference forms in the verbal performance of the learners, but: (a) this reduction is, in a sense, artificial, and (b) it has its price: a corresponding reduction of the communicative range that the learners are exposed to, which goes contrary to the main justification for those suggestions.

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CROSS-CULTURAL PRAGMATIC FAILURE*

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I discuss the nature of pragmatic failure and ways in which students may be helped to acquire pragmatic competence. I refer frequently to "cross-cultural" pragmatic failure, which may give the unfortunate impression that pragmatic failure is restricted primarily to interactions between native and non-native speakers, and which further implies that there exists in (for example) British society a single system of pragmatic values. This is by no means the case. Regional, ethnic, political and class differences are undoubtedly reflected as much by a diversity of pragmatic norms as they are by linguistic variations. I have made no attempt to make this variety explicit, since I am concerned here to make only the most general points. Whilst acknowledging that the norms I describe are by no means the norms of British society, but rather, those of the culturally dominant strata, I feel with Scollon and Scollon (1981:13) that:

... the patterns we are describing hold true in a general way and are the patterns on which people have developed ethnic stereotypes.

I use the term "cross-cultural", then, as a shorthand way of describing not just native - non-native interactions, but any communication between two people who, in any particular domain, do not share a common linguistic or cultural background. This might include workers and management, members of ethnic minorities and the police or (when the domain of discourse is academic writing) University lectures and new undergraduate students.

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I do not use the term "pragmatic competence" as a synonym for "communicative competence" as Candlin (1976:246) and Schmidt and Richards (1980:150) appear to do. I use it to refer to one of several levels of knowledge (cf. Hymes 1972:281) which might also include grammatical, psycholinguistic and what Bell (1976) calls "social" competences:

... communicative competence might be thought of as a kind of 'mixer' which performed the function of balancing available linguistic forms chosen by drawing on the linguistic competence of the user, against available social functions housed in some kind of social competence. (Bell 1976:210-211)

A speaker's "linguistic competence" would be made up of grammatical competence ("abstract" or decontextualised knowledge of intonation, phonology, syntax, semantics, etc.) and pragmatic competence (the ability to use language effectively in order to achieve a specific purpose and to understand language in context). This parallels Leech's (forthcoming) division of linguistics into "grammar" (by which he means the decontextualised formal system of language) and "pragmatics" ["the use of language in a goal-oriented speech situation in which S (the speaker) is using language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of H (the hearer)]. Leech (forthcoming) suggests that the semantics/pragmatics distinction can be equated, at least in part, with the distinction between "sentence meaning" and "speaker meaning" - a useful definition which unfortunately obscures the fact that there are several levels of "speaker meaning". This point has been well made and extensively discussed by, for example, Bach and Harnish (1979), Wilson and Sperber (1979 and 1981) and Akmaijian et al (1980), who all argue, rightly in my view, that whilst the range of possible senses and references of an utterance is explicitly provided by semantic rules, pragmatic principles are needed in order to:

- (a) assign sense and reference to the speaker's words (this I call "level 1 speaker meaning");
- (b) assign force or value to the speaker's words ("level 2 speaker meaning").

As Corder (1981:39) has pointed out, almost all sentences are ambiguous when taken out of context and examples of surface ambiguity ("biting flies can be troublesome", etc.) are legion and greatly beloved of linguists. However, instances of sentences being genuinely ambiguous in context are, I would argue, rather rare. Although one friend of mine insists that when told to write an essay on "euthanasia" she produced four sides on

the Red Guard, most stories of this kind are apocryphal. The unfortunate cricket commentator, for example, who is supposed to have enlivened an otherwise unremarkable Test match by announcing "the bowler's Holding, the batsman's Willey!" is likely to have amused rather than bemused the cricketering fraternity - particularly since the match was being televised.

It is one's grammatical (particularly semantic) knowledge which provides the range of possible meanings of multiply ambiguous sentences such as:

(1) she missed it

in which the verb miss has at least three senses and she and it an indefinite number of possible referents.

At level 1, pragmatic principles, particularly the Gricean maxim of relevance, allow one to assign sense and reference to the utterance in context. For example, if (1) were uttered in reply to:

(2) why didn't Elsie come on the earlier train?

pragmatic inferencing would allow one to determine that:

she referred to Elsie;

it referred to the earlier train;

and missed had the sense failed to catch;

whereas in reply to:

(3) How did Grandma manage without the car?

she would refer to Grandma;

it would refer to the car;

and missed would have the sense felt the lack of.

At level 2, pragmatic principles would allow one to assign force to the utterance, e.g. "criticism" or "disapproval" or "commiseration", or perhaps a combination of all three for, as Leech (1977) and Brown and Levinson (1978:216) point out, the pragmatic force of an utterance is frequently ambivalent, even in context, and often intentionally so. For reasons of politeness or expediency, both speaker and hearer may deliberately exploit ambivalence:

... the rhetoric of speech acts often encourages ambivalence:

'Would you like to come in and sit down?'

... depending on the situation could be an invitation, a request, or a directive. Or more important, it could be deliberately poised on the uncertain boundary between all three. It is often in the speaker's interest, and in the interests of politeness, to allow the precise force of a speech act to remain unclear."

(Leech 1977:99)

It follows, therefore, that H would fail to perceive S's communicative intent if:

(at level 1) from the range of possible senses and references the hearer chose that/those which the speaker had not intended; and/or:

(at level 2) the hearer failed to perceive the intended illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance. The following (authentic) examples may serve to illustrate my point:

Example 1

Misunderstanding at Level 1 (Failure to understand which proposition S has expressed)

A (to fellow passenger on a long-distance coach): Ask the driver what time we get to Birmingham.

B (to driver): Could you tell me when we get to Birmingham, please?

Driver: Don't worry, love, it's a big place - I don't think it's possible to miss it!

In this case, the driver understood that B's utterance was a request for information, but misunderstood the intended sense of when.

Example 2

Misunderstanding at Level 2 (Failure to understand the intended pragmatic force of S's utterance)

A Is this coffee sugared?

B I don't think so. Does it taste as if it is?

In this case, B interprets A's utterance as a genuine request for information rather than, as A intended, a complaint [Gloss: As usual, you've forgotten to sugar it!], the intended effect of which was to elicit an apology and an offer to fetch the sugar.

The two levels are, of course, closely linked and H's failure at level 1 to understand which proposition has been expressed may make it impossible for him/her to understand the intended illocutionary force:

Example 3

Lecturer (addressing me): Have you seen Leo?

I was not able, even in context, to decide whether he was using seen in the sense of:

(a) set eyes on, in which case the force of the utterance would

probably have been a request for information [Gloss: Which way did Leo go?/Where is Leo?];

(b) seen in the sense of spoken to, in which case the force would have been something between criticism and a reproach requiring an explanation or an apology [Gloss: Have you spoken to Leo as I told you to do, and if not, why not?].

Strictly speaking, it would be logical to apply the term "pragmatic failure" to misunderstandings which occur at either level one or level two, since both levels involve H in pragmatic inferencing, but I reserve the term exclusively for misunderstandings which arise, not from any inability on the part of H to understand the intended sense/reference of the speaker's words in the context in which they are uttered, but from an inability to recognise the force of the speaker's utterance when the speaker intended that this particular hearer should recognise it.

We can say, then, that pragmatic failure has occurred on any occasion on which H perceives the force of S's utterance as other than S intended s/he perceive it. For example, if:

H perceives the force of S's utterance as stronger or weaker than S intended s/he perceive it;

H perceives as an order an utterance which S intended s/he should perceive as a request;

H perceives S's utterances as ambivalent where S intended no ambivalence;

S expects H to be able to infer the force of his/her utterance, but is relying on a system of knowledge or beliefs which S and H do not, in fact, share. For instance, S says "Pigs might fly!" to an H unaware that they do not, or S says, "He's madder than Keith Joseph," to an H who believes Joseph to be perfectly sane.

I use the term "pragmatic failure" rather than "pragmatic error" advisedly [cf. House and Kasper (1981:158), Rintell (1979:101)]. It is legitimate, in my view, to speak of grammatical error, since grammaticality can be judged according to prescriptive rules (prescriptive for language-teaching purposes, at least), whereas pragmatic competence, as Candlin (1976:238) has observed, "entails probable rather than categorial rules". The nature of pragmatic ambivalence is such that it is not possible to say that the pragmatic force of an utterance is "wrong". All we can say is that it failed to achieve the speaker's goal. My interest lies in

revealing why it might fail.

Very often, of course, it is not pragmatic failure which causes non-native speakers to misinterpret or have misinterpreted the intended pragmatic force of an utterance, but an imperfect command of lower-level grammar. For the purposes of this paper, however, I am excluding from consideration "grammatical error" and "covert grammatical error" (but for a detailed discussion of these see Thomas 1981:16-20). I do not in any way underestimate the importance of these factors, but they have already been dealt with extensively in the literature of error analysis, of contrastive analysis and of language teaching generally. Nor do I believe that "grammatical" processing or "level 1 pragmatic" processing of information are necessarily prior to the interpretation of pragmatic force. Indeed, research into information-processing (e.g. Adams and Collins 1979), suggests that although (pragmatic) comprehension does depend on successful mastery of lower-level skills (from the ability to recognise sounds/letters to the assignment of meaning in context), different levels of processing are carried on simultaneously, constantly feeding into and reinforcing each other. It may often happen that one or more levels is bypassed completely. Separating the levels in this rather artificial manner, however, enables me to focus more sharply on pragmatic failure, a very important area of cross-cultural communication breakdown which has received very little attention.

For language-teaching purposes I also exclude from the bailiwick of pragmatic failure "blurts", "flouts" and "lects".

The "blurt" is the pragmatic equivalent of the grammatical slip of the tongue or pen, which Boomer and Laver (1973:123) define as:

... an involuntary deviation in performance from the student's current phonological, grammatical or lexical competence.

A blurt, like a slip of the tongue, represents a temporary lapse by a normally pragmatically competent person. Often it manifests itself in unfortunate intonation, when, for example, an utterance intended as a request comes out as an order. Often, as with slips of the tongue, a blurt is occasioned by strong emotion, such as fear, excitement or anger, which causes the speaker to be more direct than s/he intended. At other times it represents an inopportune lapse into truthfulness (the Freudian blurt). Blurts, like slips of the tongue/pen, are by no means the preserve of the non-native speaker and although they may have unwelcome consequences they

do not reflect the pragmatic competence of the speaker and should not, therefore, concern the language teacher. Indeed, in view of the number of blurts produced by apparently competent native speakers, one should be extremely cautious about ascribing pragmatic incompetence to non-native speakers on the basis of a few utterances produced under conditions egregiously unlike any they encounter outside the classroom (cf. Rintell 1979).

Pragmlects

Lakoff (1974:26) has pointed out that:

There may well be different idiolects of politeness: what is courteous behaviour to me might well be boorish to you, because we have slightly differently formulated rules, or because our hierarchy of acceptability is different.

There is something of the Humpty Dumpty in all of us and within a given language variety the individual does seem to be allowed a certain amount of latitude before being labelled as "blunt" or "impolite" (just how much latitude one allows a particular S probably depends on how much one likes him/her). Certainly, as people become better acquainted, they seem to become increasingly tolerant of each other's "pragmlects", just as they become more tolerant of other forms of idiosyncratic behaviour.

Nevertheless, I think that in order to be considered pragmatically competent, one must be able to behave linguistically in such a manner as to avoid being unintentionally offensive, for most of the time, to strangers who speak the same language or variety of language as oneself.

Flouts

Pragmatic principles are normative rather than prescriptive. Whereas a grammatical error puts one outside the grammatical system of English, one can, as Leech (1980:10) points out, flout pragmatic principles and yet remain within the pragmatic system of English. It is possible, in other words, to be extremely impolite, untruthful and uninformative and at the same time "speak perfect English". All too often, however, language teachers and linguists fail to admit the possibility of a foreign student's flouting conventions, in the same way as they fail to allow her/him to innovate linguistically. In fact, the foreign learner is usually expected to be "hypercorrect", both grammatically and pragmatically. Schmidt and

McCreary (1977:429) have pleaded the cause of the foreign learner, obliged to speak a "superstandard English" which native speakers rarely use:

Superstandard English, however admired and perhaps admirable, is simply not functional in all situations.

In none of the articles on "pragmatic competence" which I have read has the possibility of a flout been considered - all deviations from the expected norm are attributed to pragmatic failure (see, for example, Rintell 1979, Scarcella 1979, House and Kasper 1981 and Fraser et al. 1981). The non-native speaker who says anything other than what is expected often finds it difficult to get her/his views taken seriously. It is easier to explain away what s/he says as stemming from a lack of linguistic competence than to consider the possibility of her/his expressing divergent opinions.

Harder (1980:268) has discussed this severally circumscribed role which is assigned to "the foreigner":

Since people, through speaking with foreigners, have more or less the experience of them outlined above, according to a well-known psychological mechanism they adjust their own behaviour and their interpretation of the foreigner's contributions accordingly, so that even if you do succeed in finding words for your clever remarks, you are likely to be politely overheard (sic.) A foreigner is not permitted to go beyond a certain limited repertoire; if he starts swearing fluently, for instance, he is unlikely to achieve the conventional communicative effect, ie. underlining the serious objections he has against the situation in question.

My own observations concur with those of Harder, that learners are rarely permitted the luxury of a flout (of being either "overpolite" of "impolite"), but are condemned to the "reduced personality" outlined above, allowed only banal and conventional opinions. As one foreign colleague put it:

When I speak English, I feel I always have to occupy the middle ground.

It is not the responsibility of the language teacher qua linguist to enforce Anglo-Saxon standards of behaviour, linguistic or otherwise. Rather, it is the teacher's job to equip the student to express her/himself in exactly the way s/he chooses to do so - rudely, tactfully or in an elaborately polite manner. What we want to prevent is her/his being unintentionally rude or subservient. It may, of course, behove the teacher to point out the likely consequences of certain types of linguistic behaviour.

Having argued in favour of allowing foreign students of English the right to flout, it may seem perverse of me to confuse the issue by pointing out that it is probably more often the case, particularly outside the classroom, that what is perceived as a flout is in reality pragmatic failure. Grammatical errors may be irritating and impede communication, but at least, as a rule, they are apparent in the surface structure, so that H is aware that an error has occurred. Once alerted to the fact that S is not fully grammatically competent, native speakers seem to have little difficulty in making allowances for it. Pragmatic failure, on the other hand, is rarely recognised as such by non-linguists. If a non-native speaker appears to speak fluently (ie. is grammatically competent), a native speaker is likely to attribute his/her apparent impoliteness or unfriendliness, not to any linguistic deficiency, but to boorishness or ill-will. Whilst grammatical error may reveal a speaker to be a less than proficient language-user, pragmatic failure reflects badly on him/her as a person. Misunderstandings of this nature are almost certainly at the root of unhelpful and offensive national stereotyping: "the abrasive Russian/German", "the obsequious Indian/Japanese", "the insincere American" and "the standoffish Briton".

Pragmatic failure, then, is an important source of cross-cultural communication breakdown, but in spite of this, teachers and textbook writers alike have almost completely ignored it. It is not difficult to understand why this should be so, and why they should prefer to remain on the more solid ground of grammar. Firstly, as Widdowson (1979:13) has pointed out, pragmatic description has not yet reached the level of precision which grammar has attained in describing linguistic competence. Secondly, pragmatics - language in use - is a delicate area and it is not immediately obvious how it can be "taught". It is on these two problems that I shall concentrate.

THE TEACHING OF PRAGMATIC APPROPRIATENESS

Although I welcome the fact that pedagogical grammars such as the Communicative Grammar of English are beginning to spill over into pragmatics and to address themselves to questions of use as well as to problems of well-formedness, I do not think that judgements of appropriateness can ever be spelt out sufficiently to be incorporated in

grammars or textbooks as other than fairly crude rules of thumb.

Attempts have been made by, for example, Walters (1979a and 1979b) and by Fraser (1977, 1978) to determine the pragmatic force of an utterance relying solely on its surface grammatical form. Walters (1979a:289) defines his interest as being "to investigate how much politeness could be squeezed out of speech act strategies alone", and again (1979b), in a methodologically very rigorous experiment to investigate the perception of politeness by native and non-native speakers of English and Spanish, uses a "standard lexical context" in order to establish a "hierarchy of politeness", instructing his informants to ignore context as much as possible. In a somewhat similar experiment cited by Rintell, Fraser (1977) asked informants to rate for deference forms of request (would you ...?, could you ...?, can you ...?, do ...?, etc.) for which no context whatever was supplied.

The results of such experiments, whilst of great interest in, for example, writing a probabilistic grammar, have, in my opinion, neither validity nor relevance in the assessment of pragmatic failure.

Such hierarchies may indicate probabilistically which grammatical form is "more polite" all other factors being equal, but in natural language other factors rarely are equal, and it would be fatuous to suppose that there is any absolute "politeness quotient" which can be assigned unambivalently and out of context to a particular linguistic structure. It would be very easy to find a counterexample where an elaborately polite form of request is used, but where the propositional content remains unalterably impolite (I wonder if I might respectfully request you to stop picking your nose?) and vice versa (Do have another drink).

A further problem with hierarchies of the type developed by Walters, is that as one moves from "formal" to "informal" situations, one may need to invert the "politeness ranking". Thus, between wife and husband an utterance beginning I wonder if I might ask you ...? would be likely to be perceived as sarcastic or hostile rather than polite. The imperative form, rated by Walters's judges as extremely impolite (1979a:295), accounted for more than a third of my corpus of spontaneously-occurring requests within a peer group (Thomas 1981:61). It would not be accurate to say that within peer groups people are "less polite". Rather, they are appealing to different forms of politeness [cf. Brown and Levinson 1978, Leech (forthcoming:174-176)].

Scales of politeness and indicators of use such as "vulgar", "formal" or "rare" are all relative and can serve as only the most general guide to appropriateness. It would be of far greater benefit to the learner if teachers attempted to make explicit the types of choices which underlie pragmatic decision-making. It is at this point that we must turn for help to pragmatic theory.

Van Dijk (1977b:199) sees the goal of pragmatic theory as being to:

... formulate the general and particular conditions determining the full Intention-successfulness of illocutionary acts.

For an illocutionary act to succeed, the speaker must judge his/her position relative to his/her interlocutor by assessing:

- (i) positions (e.g. roles, status, etc.)
 - (ii) properties (e.g. sex, age, etc.)
 - (iii) relations (e.g. dominance, authority)
 - (iv) functions (e.g. 'father', 'waitress', 'judge', etc.)
- (van Dijk 1977a:221)

Brown and Levinson (1978:81-87) suggest that in order to compute the weightiness of an FTA (a face-threatening act), one must assess the social distance between S and H, the relative power of H over S and the degree to which X is rated an imposition in that culture. Leech (1977:24) proposes almost identical criteria for gauging the amount of tact required in a given situation:

- (i) the more power H holds over S,
- (ii) the more socially distant H is from S,
- (iii) the more costly X is to H,

the more tact is required by the situation.

Pragmatic failure, as I have already remarked, is not immediately apparent in the surface structure of utterances and can only be revealed by discussing with students what force they intended to convey. But first they must be given the tools to make such discussions possible. What I am proposing, then, is that teachers should develop a student's metapragmatic ability - the ability to analyse language use in a conscious manner - a process which Sharwood Smith (1981:162-163) terms "consciousness-raising". This might be achieved by discussing language use in the light of the pragmatic parameters outlined above, or by doing as Candlin (1976:251) has suggested and taking a leaf from the ethnomethodologists' book and using "glossing" as a teaching/learning procedure. Short (1981:200) proposes the discussion of drama to make pragmatic analysis explicit:

The discussion of what is meant, implied, etc. by characters in dramatic dialogues can also be used in class to make students explicitly aware of the communicative nature of discourse. Mastery of the Gricean maxims would seem to be essential if the foreign learner is going to be able to understand English well and fit in socially when using English himself. This factor is extremely important as without it the confidence so important for good linguistic performance is likely to be undermined.

For the language teacher, however, the descriptions offered by theoretical pragmaticists are inadequate. It is not enough simply to make explicit the parameters within which pragmatic choices are made. House and Kasper (1981:184) have indicated the need for teachers to alert their students to possible cross-cultural pragmatic differences:

It seems also to be advisable for the teacher to explicitly point out to the learner that politeness markers are an integral part of the foreign cultural system, and should neither be used nor interpreted by reference to the learner's native system. More effective teaching of the behavioural component may minimize native cultural interference and prevent impolite, ineffective, or otherwise inappropriate behaviour on the part of the learner.

In the second half of this paper, I shall argue that for those engaged in the teaching of English to people from other cultures, pragmatic failure raises issues which make it essential to distinguish two types of pragmatic failure:

(a) Pragmalinguistic failure, which occurs when the pragmatic force mapped by S onto a given utterance is systematically different from the force most frequently assigned to it by native speakers of the target language or when speech act strategies are inappropriately transferred from L1 to L2, and

(b) Sociopragmatic failure, a term I have appropriated from Leech (forthcoming:13), which I use to refer to the social conditions placed on language in use.

I shall argue that whilst pragmalinguistic failure is basically a linguistic problem, caused by differences in the linguistic encoding of pragmatic force, sociopragmatic failure stems from cross-culturally different perceptions of what constitutes appropriate linguistic behaviour.

THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH PRAGMALINGUISTIC FROM SOCIOPRAGMATIC FAILURE

As most linguists are at pains to point out, it is no part of their job to pass moral judgements on the way language is used, but simply to

record what they observe as objectively as possible:

Hopefully I will not get the advocates of human freedom and theological free-will upset. We're not, as everyone should know by now, setting up prescriptive rules for the way people are supposed to behave, any more than the rules in Syntactic Structures told people how to form nice sentences. We are describing what we see, reducing the apparent chaos of human interaction, linguistic and otherwise, to predictability ... We graciously leave you your autonomy.

(Lakoff 1974:15-16)

The language teacher, however, is in the less fortunate position of having to be prescriptive, at least to a degree, whether s/he likes it or not. Correcting errors of any sort - grammatical or pragmatic - demands care and tact on the part of the teacher, but some areas are particularly sensitive. Pragmatics, "language in use", is the place where a speaker's knowledge of grammar comes into contact with his/her knowledge of the world. But both systems of knowledge are filtered through systems of beliefs - beliefs about language and beliefs about the world (see Figure 1).

In order to interpret the force of an utterance in the way in which the speaker intended, the hearer must take into account both contextual and linguistic cues. Often, context alone will determine what force is assigned to an utterance. That Good luck! is interpreted as "I wish you well", whilst Bad luck! is assigned the force of "commiseration" rather than "malediction" has nothing to do with the linguistic form, but with what force is conventionally assigned to it and with what is a plausible interpretation in context. We live in a world in which it is unusual to ill-wish someone, or, at least, to do so openly. Consequently, if we want to curse someone in English we must make the illocutionary force more explicit: I hope you have bad luck! Though I would not wish to make more than a weak claim for this, it seems to me that the ability to determine what is "likely" in context is to some degree "universal", just as the "politeness principle" [see Leech (forthcoming:98)] is universal. It does not, on the whole, require explicit formalisation and need not concern the language teacher unduly.

The point at which the student does need help is in interpreting the linguistic pragmatics. The types of information conveyed by pragmatic include:

At level 1, the attitude of the speaker towards the information (relative newness of information, topicalisation and focussing of information,

'GRAMMAR'




Figure 1. Possible Causes of Communication Breakdown. The diagram is misleading, in that the dividing line between the different types of error is too clear-cut. It would be better if the different causes and types of error were seen as shading into each other.

connotation and presupposition);

At level.2, (a) the speech act or communicative intent of the utterance;
 (b) the attitude of the speaker towards the hearer (the degree of deference intended, perceptions of relative power, rights and duties, social distance, etc., existing between speaker and hearer).

As one moves from 2(a) to 2(b), one is moving from the pragmalinguistic to the sociopragmatic end of the continuum and at the same time from what is language-specific to what is culture-specific.

PRAGMALINGUISTIC FAILURE

Pragmalinguistic failure, as I have already stated, occurs when the pragmatic force mapped on to a linguistic token or structure is systematically different from that normally assigned to it by native speakers. Pragmalinguistic failure may arise from two identifiable sources: "teaching-induced errors" and "pragmalinguistic transfer" - the inappropriate transfer of speech act strategies from one language to another, or the transferring from the mother tongue to the target language of utterances which are semantically/syntactically equivalent, but which, because of different "interpretive bias", tend to convey a different pragmatic force in the target language.

Psycholinguistic research (see, for example, Kess and Hoppe 1981) has shown that in interpreting grammatical ambiguity there is almost always "bias" (by which they mean that one meaning is usually seen first by most people), and it seems to me that this is equally true in processing pragmatic ambiguity. It can be shown, for example, that native speakers fairly predictably assign certain pragmatic force to certain utterances. Thus can you X? is a highly conventionalised politeness form in British English, likely to be interpreted by native speakers as a request to do X, rather than a question as to one's ability to do X. In other languages, French and Russian, for example, the opposite is true. Similarly, the utterance X, would you like to read?, which in an English classroom would be a highly conventionalised polite request/directive to do so, in a Russian classroom often elicited the response no, I wouldn't (from students who had no intention of being cheeky, but who genuinely thought that their preferences were being consulted). Notice that theirs was not an impossible interpretation, but simply a less likely one.

Examples of the pragmatically inappropriate transfer of semantically/ syntactically equivalent structures would be:

- (i) In Russian konešno (of course) is often used instead of da (yes) to convey an enthusiastic affirmative (cf. yes, indeed, yes, certainly, in English). Of course can be used in this way in English:

A Are you coming to my party?

B Of course. [Gloss: Yes, indeed/it goes without saying/I wouldn't miss it for the world!]

Often, however, of course implies that the speaker has asked about something that is self-evident, so that konešno, transferred from Russian to English in answer to a "genuine" question, can sound at best peremptory and at worst insulting:

A Is it a good restaurant?

B Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is.
(for English H): What a stupid question!]

A Is it open on Sundays?

B Of course. [Gloss (for Russian S): Yes, (indeed) it is.
(for English H): Only an idiotic foreigner would ask!]]

- (ii) Po moemu (in my opinion) and kažetsja (it seems to me) are often used in Russian much as we use I think in English.

Normally, these expressions are used to deliver considered judgements ("St Sophia's is, in my opinion, the finest example of Byzantine architecture in the Soviet Union!"; "It seems to me you have misunderstood the situation"). Russian speakers of English tend to use them for rather less weighty opinions ("It seems to me there's someone at the door"; "In my opinion the film begins at eight").

The inappropriate transference of speech act strategies from L1 to L2 is a frequent cause of pragmalinguistic failure [e.g. using a direct speech act where a native speaker would use an indirect speech act or "off-record" politeness strategy (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978:216)]. Thus, polite usage in Russian permits many more direct imperatives than does English. The usual way to ask directions, for example, is simply to say (in Russian!), Tell me (please) how to get to ..., and to use a more elaborate strategy, such as Excuse me, please, could you tell me ...?, is completely

counterproductive, as it often means that your interlocutor is half way down the street before you finish speaking. Transferred into English, such direct imperatives seem brusque and discourteous.

Some teaching techniques may actually increase the likelihood of pragmalinguistic failure. Kasper (1981), in a most interesting and comprehensive survey, has identified many examples of what she terms "teaching-induced errors", some of which fall into my category of pragmalinguistic failure. Some she attributes to teaching materials (inappropriate use of modals), others to classroom discourse (lack of marking for modality, complete sentence responses and inappropriate propositional explicitness). Complete sentence responses violate the textual pragmatic "principle of economy" (see Leech, forthcoming: 3.3.3) and it is easy to see how they can create an unfortunate impression. To answer the question Have you brought your coat? with Yes, I have brought my coat!, sounds petulant or positively testy! The same is true of inappropriate propositional explicitness. To say:

I was sorry to hear about your Grandma,
sounds suitably sympathetic, whereas:

I was sorry to hear that your Grandma killed herself,
is rather less tactful, and:

I was very sorry to hear your Grandma tripped over the cat,
cartwheeled down the stairs and brained herself on the electricity
meter;
seems downright unfeeling.

Another source of teaching-induced pragmalinguistic failure has been indicated by many linguists. Candlin (1979), Rutherford (1980:14), Clyne (1981) and Sharwood Smith (1981:163), have all pointed out that it is a mistake to place too much emphasis on metalinguistic knowledge. It frequently leads the student to assume that there exists an isomorphism between the grammatical category "the imperative" and the speech act "ordering". As Ervin-Trip (1976) and Brown and Levinson (1978) have pointed out, imperatives are scarcely ever used to command or request in formal spoken English.

There are doubtlessly other sources of pragmalinguistic failure which I have not mentioned, and certainly there is a great deal of overlap between the categories I have defined. It is not possible, for example, to say whether "pragmatic overgeneralization" (Schmidt and Richards 1980:148)

stems from "teaching-induced error" or pragmalinguistic transfer. Pragmatic overgeneralization is particularly likely to occur where a narrow range of structures in the mother tongue has a wider range of possible "translations" in the target language.

A good example of this is the Russian možete or možet byt', which are invariably expressed in English by the semantically equivalent perhaps (you could) ... when often it would be more appropriate to use Do you think you could ...? or Could you possibly ...? In English, the expressions are not always pragmatically interchangeable. Thus, whilst it might be acceptable to say to one's students Perhaps you could read through this for Friday, it might be more politic to say to one's supervisor Could you possibly read through this by Friday? Native speakers seem to interpret perhaps you could as an impositive rather than a request and as either somewhat authoritarian or else sarcastic.

Similarly, foreign learners, bewildered by the large number of possible ways of expressing obligation in English (must, ought, should, have to, etc.), often select one which they then use in all contexts. For no very obvious reason, Russian speakers seem to favour to be to (you are to be here by eight), an unfortunate overgeneralization, since pragmatically to be to is largely restricted to very unequal power relationships, such as military commands, directives from parents to small children, etc. Computer corpora of English readily reveal these pragmatic restrictions, and should enable teachers and textbook writers to help students make more informed generalizations.

I do not think it is important to draw any clear distinctions between the categories of pragmalinguistic failure. I am more concerned to indicate possible sources of such failure. In any case, as Beniak and Mougeon (1981) have pointed out, it is difficult to attribute error to any one particular source and have shown that "where errors reflect L1 interference and L2 overgeneralization, they reinforce one another and are more difficult to overcome." In general, I would suggest that the foreign learner is not noticeably more sensitive about having pragmalinguistic failure pointed out to him/her, than about having grammatical errors corrected. Insofar as s/he is prepared to learn the language at all, s/he is usually willing, if not able, to try to conform to the pragmalinguistic norms of the target language.

SOCIOPRAGMATIC FAILURE

For an utterance to be pragmatically successful, I have suggested, involves two types of judgement. The basically grammatical ("pragmalinguistic") assessment of the pragmatic force of a linguistic token, and "sociopragmatic" judgements concerning the size of imposition, cost/benefit, social distance and relative rights and obligations.

Candlin (1981) reproaches Leech for being culturally biased and operating "within a specific cultural and ethnographic frame: his 'general principles of human cooperative behaviour' seem Western European, even Anglo-Saxon in their orientation." I would say that whilst it seems plausible to assume that Leech's axes are "universal" in that they do seem to capture the type of considerations likely to govern pragmatic choices in any language, the way in which they are applied varies considerably from culture to culture.

If pragmatic expectations and assessments are indeed culture-specific, it is likely that a foreign S will assess size of imposition, social-distance, etc. differently from a native-speaker. This is what leads me to suggest that correcting pragmatic failure stemming from sociopragmatic miscalculation is a far more delicate matter for the language teacher than correcting pragmalinguistic failure. Sociopragmatic decisions are social before they are linguistic, and whilst foreign learners are fairly amenable to corrections they regard as linguistic, they are justifiably sensitive about having their social (or even political, religious or moral) judgement called into question.

At this point I must interpolate a brief discussion as to whether linguistically inappropriate behaviour in an unfamiliar situation constitutes pragmatic failure (thereby bringing it within the purview of the linguist) or whether it is a manifestation of lack of "social competence". Fraser, Rintell and Walters (1981:79) have suggested that:

... although the inventory of speech acts and performing strategies may be basically the same across languages, two languages (ie. language-culture pairings) may differ significantly in terms of what you do, when and to whom.

For them, "what you do, when and to whom" is part of a speaker's pragmatic competence. For van Dijk (1977a:216) it is equally clearly not:

... when I congratulate somebody I should assume that something pleasant occurred to him, but our more general world knowledge will have to tell us what is pleasant, for whom in what circumstances. Pragmatics itself will not make explicit the latter conditions - which belong to a representation of our cognitive semantics.

In other words, whether the necessary conditions for the appropriateness of speech acts are actually satisfied must be decided by our knowledge of the world and its frame-like mental organization.

For the purposes of this paper, I shall take an intermediate position and argue that whilst the ability to make judgements according to the social scales of value is part of the speaker's "social competence", the ability to apply these judgements to linguistic utterances - knowing how, when and why to speak - comes within the field of pragmatics. It is cross-cultural mismatches in the assessment of social distance, of what constitutes an imposition, when an attempt at a "face-threatening act" should be abandoned and in evaluating relative power, rights and obligations, etc., which cause sociopragmatic failure.

Illustrations of sociopragmatic failure stemming from such cross-culturally different assessments are legion, and rather than multiply examples needlessly, let three suffice:

(i) Size of Imposition

Goffman's (1967) notion of "free" and "non-free" goods, provides a useful framework within which to discuss one cause of sociopragmatic failure. "Free goods" are those which, in a given situation, anyone can use without seeking permission, for example, salt in a restaurant (providing, of course, that you are having a meal in that restaurant and have not simply wandered in from the street with a bag of fish and chips). Generally speaking, what an individual regards as "free goods" varies according to relationships and situation. In one's own family or home, most things (food, drink, books, baths) are free goods. In a stranger's house they are not. Cross-culturally, too, perceptions of what constitutes "free" or "nearly free" goods differ. In Britain, matches are "nearly free", and so one would not use a particularly elaborate politeness strategy to request one, even of a total stranger. In the Soviet Union cigarettes are also virtually "free" and a request for them demands an equally minimal degree of politeness, such as Daite sigaretu [give (me) a cigarette]. A Russian requesting a cigarette in this country

and using a similar strategy would either have wrongly encoded the amount of politeness s/he intended (covert grammatical or pragmalinguistic failure) or seriously misjudged the size of imposition (sociopragmatic failure).

Lakoff (1974:27) has pointed out that "free" and "non-free" goods are not necessarily material - the concept can be extended to information:

Clearly there are some topics that one may ask about freely and others that are "none of your business" - that is, non-free goods.

Again, cultures differ greatly as to what is considered "freely available". The British bourgeois(e) considers it intrusive to inquire directly about a stranger's income, politics, religion, marital status, etc., whereas in other countries such information may be sought freely and without circumlocution.

(ii) Tabus

Closely related to the concept of "free" and "non-free" information are tabu topics. Typically sexual or religious, tabus are by no means universal, and a second source of serious sociopragmatic failure is making reference in L2 to something which is tabu in that culture, although it may be capable of being discussed perfectly politely in L1.

Consider, for example, the furore accompanying the recent royal wedding. It was noticeable that the only details the British press spared us were the time, place and manner of the actual consummation. It was not a question of the delicacy or otherwise of the language used (itself a pragmatic decision) - it would have been considered prurient and distasteful, a sociopragmatic miscalculation of gigantic proportions, to have alluded to it at all. Other cultures, in contrast, consider the ceremonial rupturing of the royal hymen a legitimate topic for public comment, providing, of course, that it is done in suitably reverential, deferential and pragmatically appropriate tones.

(iii) Cross-Culturally Different Assessments of Relative Power or Social Distance

One final illustration of sociopragmatic failure may be provided by the not infrequent phenomenon of a foreign speaker's judging relative power or social distance differently from a native speaker. In a student's own culture, for example, teachers may have a rather higher status than they do here (a social judgement), leading the student to behave more deferentially than would normally be expected (sociopragmatic failure).

It is important to remember, however, that:

Demeanor images ... pertain more ... to the way in which the individual handles his position than to the rank and place of that position relative to those possessed by others.

(Goffman, 1967:82-83)

As Glahn (1981) pointed out, an asymmetrical power relationship exists between native and non-native speakers (whether the native speaker is conscious of it or not). Non-native speakers may sometimes appear to be behaving in a pragmatically inappropriate manner (eg. by being unexpectedly deferential) because they (rightly) perceive themselves to be at a disadvantage.

SOCIOPRAGMATIC FAILURE AND VALUE JUDGEMENTS

Without doubt, the most difficult type of pragmatic failure the language teacher has to deal with occurs when pragmatic principles, such as politeness, conflict with other, deeply held values, such as truthfulness or sincerity.

But one thing that cannot be denied is that (pragmatic) principles introduce communicative values, such as truthfulness, into the study of language. Traditionally, linguists have avoided referring to such values, feeling that they undermine one's claim for objectivity. But so long as the values we consider are ones we observe directly rather than ones we impose on society, then there is no reason to exclude them from our enquiry.

(Leech, forthcoming)
(my brackets)

I would go further than Leech and say, not only is there no reason to exclude values, but in language-teaching in particular, there is also, unfortunately, no possibility of doing so. Even the descriptive pragmaticist cannot, in my opinion, objectively observe the values which operate in any given society; the language teacher is in the still less happy position of imposing, or appearing to impose, those of his/her own.

It is important to remember that in speaking of "values" we are not in any way dealing with moral absolutes such as "Truth" or "Justice". Presumably no-one would claim that any one nation or culture has a monopoly of such virtues or even that they are observed to a greater degree in one society than in another. I think it is equally fatuous to suggest that an entire people, the Japanese, for example, is actually "more polite" than another, say, the British, simply because they use more

elaborate linguistic formulae. We are not dealing with moral or spiritual qualities, only with the linguistic encoding of certain attitudes and values. What I want to suggest is that cross-culturally two things may occur which appear to involve a fundamental conflict of values, but in fact stem from sociopragmatic mismatches:

- (i) In different cultures, different pragmatic "ground rules" may be invoked;
- (ii) Relative values such as "politeness", "perspicuousness", may be ranked in a different order by different cultures.

A third possibility is that the conflict of values is real, in which case it is a problem for the moral philosopher, not the linguist.

(i) Cross-Culturally Different "Pragmatic Ground Rules"

Every competent native speaker knows that there are times when what is said cannot be taken at face value but must be interpreted according to different "ground rules". Thus, when S says, "Have you heard the one about...?", H knows that what follows must be interpreted as a joke. Just as children have to learn not to interpret everything as the literal truth, so people need to be taught that pragmatic ground rules do not necessarily operate in the same way in other languages.

Over the centuries, the British traveller or coloniser, tired of being told that the village was just over the hill, when it was really ten miles distant, or that work would be done mañana, when there was really no possibility of its being completed before the following week, has inveighed against the "untruthful", "unreliable" native. Yet it was surely not the case that the native people had any less regard for the truth, but rather that they were operating according to slightly differently formulated pragmatic principles; they no more expected to be taken literally than I, when I inquire solicitously how you are, want to hear about your hammer toes and haemorrhoids. Whilst, however, a speaker who is not operating according to the standard grammatical code is at worst condemned as "speaking badly", the person who operates according to differently formulated pragmatic principles may well be censured as behaving badly; as being an untruthful, deceitful or insincere person.

It is not always easy to distinguish between moral principles and pragmatic principles. What (for me) was a painful illustration of this fact came when I was teaching in Russia. At the end of each semester,

the Rector of the University called a meeting of each department to discuss how well the teaching staff had fulfilled its plan. This particular semester - my first - had started six weeks late because the students had been despatched to the state farms to help bring in the potato harvest. Nevertheless, the Rector criticised each teacher individually for having underfulfilled his/her norm and, ludicrous as the situation seemed to me, each teacher solemnly stood up, said that s/he accepted the criticism and would do better next time. I felt particularly aggrieved, since not only had I taught every class I had been scheduled to teach, but a number of others besides. I might, perhaps, have accepted in silence what I saw as totally unfair criticism, but to say I accepted it was more than I could bear. The anger I aroused, by saying quite politely that I did not think I was to blame, was quite appalling and the reverberations lasted many months. What offended my Soviet colleagues so deeply was that they felt I was being intolerably sanctimonious in taking seriously something which everyone involved knew to be purely a matter of form; behaving like the sort of po-faced prig who spoils a good story by pointing out that it is not strictly true. I, for my part, had felt obliged to sacrifice politeness in the greater cause of (overt) truthfulness!

This type of situation arose frequently, and all the British and Americans I knew in the Soviet Union reacted as I had, bristling with moral indignation. Yet, if it is inconceivable that an entire people is actually less truthful than another, we must look for different pragmatic principles in operation. In my view, every instance of national or ethnic stereotyping should be seen as a reason for calling in the pragmaticist and discourse analyst!

Candlin (1981) has pointed out that a surface level lack of cooperation may conceal a deeper level cooperation, and that is certainly what was happening in this case. However, even when we realised that we were simply witnessing another version of what Morris (1977:107) terms "the Cooperative Lie" (the "white lie" which plays such a major role in many social situations), a sort of Anglo-Saxon scrupulosity made us feel very uncomfortable about uttering a direct lie. The falseness of our position was, however, revealed by the consummate skill with which we executed the "indirect" or "oblique" lie (Carrell, 1979:229). A topical example: last year, asked directly the date by which my dissertation had

to be submitted, I replied, knowing perfectly well that it was the 1st September, that my supervisor was coming back on the 17th. Whilst I would have hesitated to have said directly that the deadline was the 17th, I had no qualms at all about implicating it. My justification would have been that my interlocutor knew the "rules of the game" as well as I did, and was quite capable of deducing that I was prevaricating.

That Anglo-Saxons seem, on the whole, to find indirect lies less scandalous, is a curious social fact and pragmatically interesting, but it does not indicate any moral superiority over those people who favour the direct variety!

One task of the pragmaticist, then, should be to make explicit the "deep level rules of the game". Wolfson (1979 and 1981) showed how this might be done when she identified "insincerity" on the part of Americans as a source of considerable irritation and frustrations to non-Americans. She gives examples of Americans using expressions such as We really must get together sometime. For an American, these are simply "polite, meaningless words", but the non-American often interprets them as genuine invitations and is hurt to find later that they were not intended as such. Of the hundreds of instances Wolfson recorded, less than a third were "genuine" invitations, but those which were were clearly marked by some mention of time, place or activity. Once the non-native speaker understands the "pragmatic ground rules", something which at first appeared to be a cross-cultural conflict of values, may be shown not to be so.

(ii) Cross-Culturally Different Assessments of the Relative Importance of Pragmatic Principles

Pragmatic principles, as Leech (1980:4) has observed, "can conflict with other co-existing principles". This is as much a reflection of the human condition as of language: just as we must sometimes make moral choices between justice and mercy, so we must navigate linguistically between the Scylla of tactlessness and the Charybdis of dishonesty. In general, when two maxims or principles conflict, circumstances (such as urgency, the vulnerability of H) and the personality of the speaker, dictate which principle prevails.

It may be, however, that in some cultures certain relative values ("relative" in the sense of how polite is "polite"? how prolix is "prolixity"?) may systematically prevail over others. Thus, in culture X "generosity" may be systematically valued above "succinctness"; in culture Y

"approbation" may outweigh "truthfulness".

Again, I would stress that we are not concerned here with spiritual or moral values, but with communicative values. When we speak of one society's observing the "generosity" principle to a greater degree than another, we are not suggesting that its members are necessarily in fact more open-handed than those of another. Thus, in the Ukraine, it may happen that a guest is pressed as many as seven or eight times to take more food, whereas in the U.K. it would be unusual to do so more than twice. For a Ukrainian, the "generosity" maxim systematically overrides the "quantity" maxim; for a British person it does not. Indeed, British recipients of such hospitality sometimes feel that their host is behaving impolitely by forcing them into a bind, since they run out of polite refusal strategies long before the Ukrainian host has exhausted his/her repertoire of polite insistence strategies.

SUMMARY

I have argued that in language teaching we have concentrated on "what is said" to the detriment of "what is meant". I have suggested that it is necessary for language teaching purposes to distinguish two sorts of pragmatic failure. Descriptive linguists have not found it necessary to make the distinction I am making, because, as they are at pains to point out, they are only interested in describing phenomena. Language teachers, however, cannot afford to be satisfied with simply recording the fact of pragmatic failure. Rather, they must concern themselves with investigating its cause and doing something about it. It is at this point that the pragmalinguistic/sociopragmatic distinction becomes necessary.

I would not, of course, wish to claim that any absolute distinction can be drawn between pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure. They form a continuum and there is certainly a grey area in the middle where it is not possible to separate the two with any degree of certainty. Schachter and Celce-Murcia (1977:443-445) have pointed out that it is unwise to try to attribute grammatical error to any one cause, and this applies equally to pragmatics. Only by discussing the matter with the student would it be possible to establish, for example, whether an English speaker's overuse of spasibo (thank you) in Russian stems from:

- (a) Ingrained habit - part of a "highly automatized system" inappropriately transferred from L1 to L2, and perhaps an example

of covert grammatical error.

- (b) S's not knowing the pragmatic force of spasibo in Russian, which might be an example of pragmalinguistic failure.
- (c) Cross-culturally different perceptions of when or for what goods or services it is appropriate to thank, which would be an example of sociopragmatic failure.

I would maintain, however, that at the extremes of the pragmatic failure continuum, there is a very clear difference between, for example, failing to understand that can you close the window? usually carries the pragmatic force of a request in English, and having a different opinion from most British people as to what questions it is proper to ask. The first stems from uncertainty as to the pragmatic force attached to a particular utterance (ie. it is basically a linguistic problem), whilst the second stems more from uncertainty as to what is socially appropriate linguistic behaviour (ie. it is as much a cultural as a linguistic problem).

For the observer, the effect of the two types of pragmatic failure may be the same and their causes difficult to distinguish. But for the language teacher the distinction is essential, since the foreign learner may well equate sociopragmatic decisions with value judgements, and the language teacher needs to tread softly in this potentially explosive area. Pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure reflect two fundamentally different types of pragmatic decision-making. The first is language-specific and it should be possible for the teacher to correct it quite straight-forwardly. The second is in part culture-specific, a reflection of the student's system of values and beliefs, and should not be "corrected", but only pointed out and discussed.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would suggest that we do a grave disservice, even to those who are studying in the country of the target language, if we expect students simply to "absorb" pragmatic norms without explicit formalization. Nor can we afford to regard the teaching of pragmatic appropriateness as the icing on the gingerbread - something best left until complete grammatical competence has been attained. Rintell (1979:104) has observed, and I would agree, that once a student is exposed to the target culture s/he rapidly begins to acquire pragmatic competence. However, I use the word

"begins" advisedly. My observations of adults who have come to Britain already speaking very fluent English, but who never attain a high degree of pragmatic competence even though they would like to, makes me think that pragmatic competence can never simply be "grafted" on to grammatical competence and leads me to wonder whether there is not a point beyond which it is very difficult to acquire different pragmatic norms ("pragmatic fossilization"?).

Much effort is expended in writing nugatory texts explaining low-level rules of grammar, such as third person singular -s (which, since it is readily observable in the surface structure, requires little explicit formalization). Pragmatic failure, meanwhile, like covert grammatical error, often passes unchecked by the teacher or, worse, it is attributed to some other cause, such as rudeness and the student is criticised accordingly. I have argued that this problem can only be overcome by giving the student the tools to make the processes of pragmatic decision-making explicit.

Sensitising learners to expect cross-cultural differences in the linguistic realisations of politeness, truthfulness, etc., takes the teaching of language beyond the realms of mere training and makes it truly educational. Helping students to understand the way pragmatic principles operate in other cultures, encouraging them to look for the different pragmatic or discursive norms which may underlie national and ethnic stereotyping, is to go some way towards eliminating simplistic and ungenerous interpretations of people whose linguistic behaviour is superficially different from their own. Such techniques, I would suggest, are desirable both pedagogically and politically. To give the learner the knowledge to make an informed choice and allowing her/him the freedom to flout pragmatic conventions, is to acknowledge her/his individuality and freedom of choice and to respect her/his system of values and beliefs. Students who feel that their view of the world is being dismissed out of hand or who feel unable to express themselves as they wish are scarcely likely to develop positive attitudes towards learning a foreign language. Forcing white, middle-class Britain down students' throats is probably not the most effective way of getting English out of their mouths!

Recognising the pragmalinguistic/sociopragmatic distinction means allowing the foreign student the right to flout in exactly the same way as the native-speaker does, and acknowledging that "speaking good English"

does not necessarily mean conforming to the norms of the culturally hegemonic strata. Our only concern as language teachers is to ensure that the learner knows what s/he is doing. I believe that making the distinction between pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure removes much that non-Western learners, in particular, find objectionable in contemporary "communicative" approaches to language teaching. Making EFL teachers and text-book writers sensitive to the distinction may prevent people who rightly wish to operate according to their own system of values from throwing out the English language baby with the British colonial bathwater!

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COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES: RELATING THEORY AND PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION

In recent research on communication strategies little importance has been attached to the interaction between the L2 learner and his interlocutor. Emphasis has been laid on the learner's performance, and communication strategies have been defined as his attempts (conscious or unconscious) to express or decode meaning in the target language in situations where the appropriate target language rules have not been formed. Thus a study of communication strategies has been restricted to a preoccupation with the learner. The interactional function of communication and the part played by the interlocutor, often a native speaker of the target language, to sustain communication have most often been neglected. The strategies he may use and their eventual contribution to shared meanings have not been given due attention.

Tarone (1981) points out that it is unfortunate that the interactional function of communication strategies has been overlooked to date in her own research and that of others. She stresses that language is a vital part of communication and therefore she regards language as "a living organism created by both speaker and hearer". In this connection Tarone mentions an exchange in which she communicated with a learner. She says:

Whereas before this point in our interpretation I had attempted to restrict my own responses to M.S.'s utterances, in this exchange I allowed myself to respond. The conversation which then occurred can be described as a negotiation of an agreement on meaning ... (Tarone 1981:288.)

PREVIOUS STUDIES

In most of the previous studies data derive mainly from elicited speech, eg. retelling of a story, interviews, or from studies where a communication gap has been created artificially by means of some material designed for

the purpose. Wagner (forthcoming) has this to say about the research to date:

The investigations to date have analyzed marginal, if not deficient cases of communication. Description exercises and translations which are not addressed to a specific recipient constitute text types which are fundamentally different from oral communication. The transferability of the results seem questionable. One of the first demands to be made on research into communication strategies must be to investigate genuine verbal interaction. (Wagner, forthcoming: 2)

That is not to say that I find studies like these unimportant; their aim has been to show how the learner is able to stretch his communicative potential in a situation where aspects of the target language have not yet been mastered. Still, I agree with Wagner that many of the situations in which the learner's use of communications strategies have been tested to date are very unlike those of actual communication. In written exercises, translations etc., there is of course no possibility of interaction with an interlocutor to reach communicative goals, but also in oral tasks, description of pictures, reports of stories, films etc., very little interaction may be going on. Take, for example, the picture reconstruction task carried out by Bialystok and Fröhlich (1980). In this study the subjects were asked to describe a picture so that a native speaker of French could reconstruct it accurately on a flannel board, and the reconstructor was instructed "to refrain from speaking as much as possible, and to neglect appeals from the learner". Feedback was provided by the items being put on a flannel board.

Thus many studies deal with the learner's performance exclusively, but in order to assess the communicative effect of a learner's utterances more precisely, they must be placed in an interactional perspective.

In order to repair the situation in question, Wagner (forthcoming) introduces two tasks: building a house of Lego blocks and making a clay pot. Two learners have to cooperate verbally to complete the task. In devising this method, Wagner managed to provide interactional data in order to obtain insight into the strategic devices used by the learners in their management of interlanguage communication, although his choice of situation can hardly be said to be typical of everyday communication.

The interview situation comes somewhat near to a natural communication situation, although there are differences. Philipsen (1980) in an analysis of the PIF (Projekt i fremmedsprogs pædagogik) spoken corpus states that the native speaker had more briefing and more experience in the interview

situation than the learners, and in many cases it was the interviewer who conducted the conversation. He had the responsibility for topic change, asked most of the questions, and thus kept the conversation going. There were few learners who voluntarily asked questions or did more than respond to leads from the natives. As a result the most frequent discourse structure of the interviews was one in which the interviewer elicits, the learner responds, mostly with an informing statement, whereafter interviewer follows up, and moves on to elicit more. (Philipsen 1980:3.)

Another factor to be considered is the aim of the discourse. If learning takes place in a formal situation, a foreign language classroom, for example, there may be few chances to be in a situation in which the main goal is communication. The communication which is likely to take place is often a kind of pseudo-communication in which the listener already possesses the information being transmitted by the speaker. The situation, therefore, is more like a test situation than a real communication situation. The teacher, or the interviewer/experimenter in a research situation, might refrain from participation. He may not cooperate, because the emphasis is on what the learner can produce on his own account. His use of communication strategies is analysed as an attempt to find out how and to what extent he is able to stretch his competence to solve communicative problems.

It is not unlikely, though, that the learning situation itself may influence the type and variety of communication strategy used. Situations in which interaction is not encouraged may lead to an underestimation of the importance of cooperative strategies, and formal classroom situations may encourage learning strategies but fail to encourage communication strategies. Furthermore, it is difficult to isolate a single utterance in the interaction without examining its relation to other utterances. Therefore, the research method suggested here is one that enables the researcher to examine both the input to the learner, his performance, and the response to what he says. Research designs which allow us to identify the second-language learner's intended meaning in a variety of discourse settings, in particular in situations in which the goal is communication, and which are as near to natural conversation as possible, are of great interest.

THE NOTION OF COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Over the last decade a growing body of material dealing with the learner's interlanguage and his use of communication strategies has accumulated. Special attention has been paid to the notion of communication strategy, and various definitions have been offered in an attempt to arrive at a clarification of this notion. When presenting an overview of past theories, Tarone (1981:287) points to two definitions:

First definition: "a systematic attempt by the learner to express or decode meaning in the target language (TL), in situations where the appropriate systematic TL rules have not been formed" (Tarone, Frauenfelder, and Selinker 1976; Tarone, Cohen, and Dumas 1976).

Second definition: "a conscious attempt to communicate the learner's thought when the interlanguage structures are inadequate to convey that thought" (Váradi 1973, Tarone 1978, Galván and Campbell 1979).

The notions "systematic" and "conscious" have been subject to discussion. The former because it is not at all clear what "a systematic attempt" is, nor is the distinction helpful when differentiating between a production strategy and a communication strategy. Whether a strategy has been used consciously or unconsciously can be difficult to decide and if consciousness is a matter of degree rather than an either/or, it is no longer a useful distinction. In any case, it is a distinction that is hard to verify, and it is probably better to leave the question open, as is done by Færch and Kasper (in press) when they propose their definition:

Communication strategies are potentially conscious plans for solving what to an individual presents itself as a problem in reaching a particular communicative goal.

In order to make clear that the interactional aspect of communication is of considerable significance for a discussion of communication strategies, Tarone (1981:288) broadens her definition of this notion:

... the term relates to a mutual attempt of two interlocutors to agree on a meaning in situations where requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared.

In my opinion, the emphasis on the interactional component of interaction is of great importance but, as shall appear from the analysis of my data below, strategies are not mutual in the sense that they can only be performed concomitantly. What is of importance is that both interlocutors often contribute to the solution of a communicative problem, though each

of them is responsible for his use of strategy as an individual. Thus, though attempts to solve communication problems may be performed on a cooperative basis, strategies as such are best seen as products of the individual performer.

Another problem is how to identify a communication strategy. Use of a communication strategy does not necessarily warrant a breakdown in interaction. Paraphrase, message adjustment and even foreignization may pass unnoticed. Thus there may be instances of the use of a "successful" strategy which never come to the awareness of either the interlocutor or the analyst. The best way to discover underlying mental processes in an attempt to identify and characterize communication strategies may therefore be to analyse deviant utterances, including hesitation phenomena and other signals of uncertainty. A satisfactory interpretation of these indicators often requires some introspective comments made by the learner on his own performance (see eg. Glahn 1980). Still, we shall only be concerned with what is observable from performance data, in that we acknowledge the danger of "trusting" such comments. For one thing, they may not always be reliable, for another, the learner's way of expressing himself, his points of view etc. may be based on presuppositions and ways of thinking entirely different from those of the interpreter. What has been of concern here has been the learner's pattern of use when he tries to communicate with a speaker of the target language. Our investigation is thus in agreement with the point of view taken by Sascha Felix (reported by Tarone 1981:287) when he argues that "the real issue with communication strategies is to determine how the learner utilizes his limited knowledge to cope with various communication situations".

For a distinction between communication strategies and production strategies as well as a distinction between communicative competence and sociolinguistic competence, we refer to Tarone (1980).

THE EXPERIMENT

Subjects, Aim and Procedure. - The data for the present study derive from spontaneous interaction between two adults, an Englishman learning Danish as a foreign language conversing with a Dane of intermediate knowledge of English. The conversation took place alternately in English and Danish.

Data have been collected regularly over six months in sessions of half an hour's duration. The subjects spent each session talking half the time in English, and half the time in Danish.

The aim of the study is

- (1) to study foreign language acquisition by an adult;
- (2) to study communication strategies in natural conversations between native speaker and non-native speaker; and
- (3) to analyse the performance of the same speaker in two different situations:
 - (a) as a learner speaking a foreign language
 - (b) as an interlocutor communicating in his native language with a learner of that language.

The task is one in which real communication takes place in that the hearer does not already know the information being transmitted by the speaker. Furthermore, it is supposed that both interlocutors have a personal interest in the communication. As pointed out by Aono and Hillis (1979) the learner's perception of the listener - how sympathetic, relaxed, or interested the listener is in what the learner is trying to say - is a factor likely to influence performance. The two subjects had the possibility of interacting as they pleased in order to share ideas and intentions. No instructions were given, apart from instructions about the duration and language of communication; not even a topic for discussion was proposed.

The sessions were audiotaped, and the utterances of both interlocutors were transcribed and analysed. As no videotapes were available, extra-linguistic behaviour could not be accounted for.

The focus in this paper will be on the use of communication strategies in order to solve problems in communication, and the emphasis is on joint interaction in order to negotiate an agreement of meaning. Thus the emphasis is not only on the learner's interlanguage, but also on the language used as input to the learner. Strategies used by the native speaker are also taken into consideration acknowledging the important part he plays in the interaction. Special attention is given to the parts of the interaction in which the conversation is about to break down, and the interest centres on how an agreement of meaning is reached in instances where communication becomes possible through the joint interaction of the two participants.

A communication disruption is said to occur when the learner (or the native speaker) is manifestly in trouble in putting across what he wants to say, and the learner will mark this difficulty by hesitation, non-verbal or

verbal signals. A disruption may also occur when mutual comprehension is impaired by one of the speakers misunderstanding the other, and the learner or the native speaker indicates the presence of a linguistic code problem. In both cases the speaker will generally have recourse to a communication strategy.

Breakdowns in understanding also occur frequently in conversations between native speakers of the same language. Anything that is said may be a potential trouble source. As second language learners are faced with an additional burden to interaction, ie. the imperfect command of the language of communication, disruptions can be expected to be of greater frequency in conversations in which a learner takes part.

DISCOURSE STRUCTURE

The corpus consisted of spontaneous interactional data near to natural conversation. No one participant directed the conversation, they both had their share in introducing topics for discussion, asking questions, providing information, etc. No instances were found of "global interaction", a type of discourse in which the interactional strategy of "handing over the verbalization to the linguistically more competent participant" (see Wagner, forthcoming) is used. Yet instances were observed in which the learner even interrupted the native speaker, when he had already guessed his intended meaning (see Ext(ract) 4 in the Appendix).

DATA OBSERVATIONS

Two aspects have been selected for consideration, namely the function of repetition or restatement and the cooperative strategy of "appealing". We want to show how one formal device (repetition) can serve a number of different functions, while, on the other hand, a wide range of strategies, including communication strategies, may serve the same function (as appeals).

Repetitions. - Generally, it has been found that communication disruptions are not very often caused by pronunciation or grammar, but the origin of these breakdowns lies almost entirely in the learner's lexical limitation

both in reception and production (eg. Haastруп and Phillipson, forthcoming). My data provides further evidence to support this finding, although instances of mispronunciation leading to disruptions were in fact found. In the following extract (see Ext. 1), which is a translation of a conversation in Danish, a slight mispronunciation caused trouble:

L So, have you a good Christmas?

NS A what?

L A good Christmas

NS Christmas?

L Christmas?

NS Ah, Christmas, yes

L Christmas, oh, sorry

The strategy the learner uses to repair his utterances seems to be a simple repetition. Notice that repetition also occurs on the part of the native speaker as a "request for clarification". We may wonder how the number of repetitions in which no change in pronunciation occurs lead to the native speaker's final understanding of the lexical item in question. Unlike native speakers, second language learners often have comprehension problems (Schwartz 1980). If the second language has been learned in a "foreign" setting, it is sometimes difficult for the learner to recognize words he "knows" at first "hearing" when these occur in ordinary conversation. He has to become familiarized, so to speak, with what is within his competence. In the example above, it is the native speaker who fails to "recognize" a familiar item.

We have seen how a simple repetition was used as a renewed attempt to communicate. Instances of "repetition with expansion" were also obtained. In Ext. 3 the discussion is about the game of handball, but the communication is disrupted, when the learner does not understand what is meant by the word advantages used in the native speaker's question:

NS Yea. Are there any other advantages?

L

NS to playing other people

L What?

NS Are there any other advantages erm to, to changing . the people?

L Yes, er, er, if the people and who's playing is tired,

NS Yes

L you can change them

In an attempt to make himself understood, the native speaker expands his utterance, and in varying his expansion he achieves success.

Restatements for the purpose of checking for understanding occurred on the part of the native speaker when he wanted to check the learner's intended meaning (see the example above) but they also occurred in cases in which the native speaker felt the need to make sure that the listener had understood his message. Special emphasis was given to a potential trouble source by means of rising intonation followed by a pause in instances in which the native speaker appealed to the learner to signal understanding before he completed his statement. Frequent were also instances in which the learner made use of the same device when he was uncertain of how to interpret a word or phrase, or he was unsure of the use/pronunciation, etc. of an item he had planned to use.

The following extract is an example of an utterance produced by the L2 learner of Danish, which has been translated into English. The conversation is about how to celebrate Christmas and the learner explains why he thinks that the Danes are more preoccupied with eating on that occasion than the English. The learner is uncertain about his use of the lexical item meal and repeats it in the form of a question. The rising intonation has the effect of asking the native speaker for confirmation:

L Yes, because we have only one large er meal, meal?

NS Yes

L er at Christmas, it's er on Christmas Day.

Furthermore, it was a favoured response by both participants to repeat the final part of an utterance which was not immediately understood as a kind of time-saving device.

Thus, there are clearly many occasions occurring in spontaneous conversation where repetitions, or restatements are made use of in order to secure successful communication of an intended message. In addition, repetition serving a number of pragmatic functions in discourse may occur. We can take the case of an utterance being carried out successfully in the first place, after which it is repeated by the other interlocutor to display, for example, understanding, agreement, surprise, disbelief, appreciation, enjoyment, etc. Instances conveying such intentions were found in the corpus, but they are not the subject of this paper.

Repetition can serve as a correction alone, but can also serve a dual function, partly corrective, and partly pragmatic. In fact, correction is

often modulated so that it has another function, as for example one of the pragmatic functions mentioned above.

However, instances of corrections were observed in which the emphasis was almost exclusively on either instruction or learning. Mispronunciations, incorrect use of grammar, etc., were repeated by the native speaker with a clear aim to teach. Similarly, the learner imitated the native speaker's corrections, and he also repeated "new" items provided by the native speaker. In Ext. 3 the learner is searching for the word equipment. After a negotiation between the two speakers, the native speaker eventually manages to infer the learner's intention and supplies the desired word. Then the learner repeats it, apparently in an attempt to remember it, before he uses it to complete his intended message. Hence we are concerned with an example of repetition used as a "learning strategy".

In contrast to communication strategies, the basic motivating force behind learning strategies is not the desire to communicate, but the desire to learn the target language. The present data point to the importance of distinguishing between these two different types of strategy, although in many instances they overlap.

Appeals. - When experiencing a communicative problem the learner may either try to solve his problem on his own account, or he may ask his interlocutor for help. If he decides to signal to his interlocutor that he has a problem, and that he needs assistance, he makes use of the cooperative strategy of "appealing".

In our discussion of the function of repetition we observed instances in which this device was used in order to appeal to the interlocutor to check understanding. The strategy of appealing was also frequently used when the learner was faced with a gap in his vocabulary. Appeals may be direct, as in the example below ('What do you call it?'), or they may be indirect and even unintentional on the part of the learner. A pause, use of an unsuccessful communication strategy, in fact any admission of ignorance or indicator of a trouble source, may function as an indirect appeal. Thus the use of an unsuccessful non-cooperative strategy may function as a problem indicator and consequently as an appeal, though this may be unintentional on the part of the learner.

In Ext. 3 the learner does not know the word court and stops in mid-sentence, thus having made use of the strategy referred to as "message

abandonment", which functions as an indirect appeal to the native speaker for assistance:

L No. At any time there is fourteen people playing ... one in each goal and six people by the -

NS on the, on the, on the court

In this case the native speaker was able to supply the missing word and thus fill in the blank in response to the learner's message abandonment. At the same time he corrects the learner's use of the preposition by to on. We may also notice that the native speaker has to restructure his utterance, before he is able to provide his response.

In the following extract (see Ext. 3), the learner signals in a number of ways that he has a communication problem. First he pauses, then he attempts a restructuring ('maybe the, the') and ends up with a direct appeal to his interlocutor ('what do you call it?'). Despite this direct appeal, he keeps his turn and switches to his native language, probably in an attempt to retrieve the missing item from memory, rather than as an attempt to communicate. At least, he rejects this solution and goes on to negotiate with himself in Danish, and the rest of his utterance signals his use of a retrieval strategy ('er wh, what is it now, er'). Notice that the direct appeal is not followed up by the interlocutor, probably because the learner does not give up his turn. Instead, he responds to the learner's attempt to retrieve the missing item. He makes the wrong guess, though, but is able to supply the missing item in response to the learner's paraphrase ('er, the thing you, thing you are playing with, er'):

NS Tennis, uhuh. Isn't that erm, isn't that an upper-class sport?

L No, I don't think so, because er . maybe the, the, what do you call it? Ketcher, nej øh . hvad er det nu? . øh .

NS The player?

L No, er, the thing you, thing you are playing with, er

NS The racket?

L The racket, yes, that's right.

A similar case of cooperation takes place in Ext. 3, where the learner is searching for the word equipment. After a number of restructurings, the learner gives up trying to solve the problem himself. Instead he appeals to the native speaker for assistance, this time in Danish, which does not solve the problem. The learner is more successful in his use of the strategy of circumlocution. Although his first attempt fails to elicit the desired

response, his expanded circumlocution enables the native speaker to make the correct inference and supply the desired lexical item.

Word searches nearly always lead to the production of the desired lexical item. However, we observed one instance in which this was not the case, namely when the native speaker of English wanted to find a Danish equivalent of the English word 'custard'. Despite negotiation between the two participants, in which the interactors made use of a wide range of strategies, including appeal for assistance, request for clarification, description and reformulation mutual understanding was not reached. The native speaker even initiated searches of his own, in that he asked for information relating eg. to colour, consistence and ingredients, and the learner ventured an instruction on how to cook custard. After 21 turn-takings the participants abandoned their search agreeing that maybe the problem could not be solved after all, as it was likely that 'custard' was an item culturally specific to English which could not be found in Danish.

Finally, we shall present an example in which "message abandonment" on the part of the learner functioned as an appeal to the native speaker (see Ext. 4):

L No, I don't know. they haven't found it er .

NS Necessary

L necessary to . make more ...

Notice that the learner stops in mid-sentence unable to complete his utterance. The native speaker, who has evidently been able to infer the learner's intention from the context in which the unfinished utterance is embedded, helps out, and when the missing link has been provided, the learner can proceed with his argument. A similar example of message abandonment followed by the native speaker's completion of the sentence occurs in the extract presented on p. 121 ('six people by the - on the, on the, on the court').

From the examples mentioned above it can be seen that appeals to the interlocutor may be both direct and indirect. A similar observation has been made by Raupach (forthcoming), and in a consideration of this finding he claims that the distinction between implicit signals like hesitations, intonation contours, non-verbal signs, etc., and explicitly verbalized signals or appeals loses its importance in that it depends on the interlocutor's reaction, whether the learner's communicative behaviour has functioned as an appeal or not. It is claimed here that there is a

difference between the two, although this difference may sometimes be of little practical importance.

The difference between direct and indirect appeals seems to be that in the case of the former, the interlocutor may feel obliged to respond, while in the case of an indirect appeal, the learner's uncertainty is signalled in such a way that the interlocutor may or may not feel the obligation of responding to it. Only in the latter case, then, does it depend on the interlocutor's reaction, whether the learner's communicative behaviour has functioned as an appeal or not.

Another factor to which we want to draw attention is our finding that not only the phenomena mentioned above (pauses, use of intonation, etc., as well as explicitly verbalized appeals), but also communication strategies, otherwise defined as strategies in their own right, functioned as appeals to the native speaker. Strategies as different as language switch, message abandonment, restructuring and circumlocution occurred in interactional patterns in which the two interlocutors attempted to solve a communication problem through joint efforts.

THE NATIVE SPEAKER

The method employed provided for an opportunity to analyse not only the L2 learner's performance, but also that of the native speaker. A comparison of the two revealed that many of the characteristics of the L2 learner's performance, such as false starts, self-corrections, use of question intonations and pauses, all indicative of underlying hypothesis testing and utterance planning strategies, were present in L1 speech performance.

A number of communication strategies thought to describe the learner's interlanguage, in particular, are also used by native speakers. Frequent occurrences of achievement strategies were found, as were also occurrence of message abandonment, whereas L1 based strategies were few.

Appeals occurred in the function of "checks for understanding", as when the native speaker wanted to make sure he was being understood. He would make use of utterances with rising intonation, just as the learner did when he was unsure of a word or of its pronunciation.

A number of restructurings on the part of the native speaker have already been mentioned, and we would like to add the following two extracts:

- NS Yes, and what - w-how long - what league is your team?
 NS Is - is that - are you talking - I seem to remember -
 I didn't do a- any economics, but for a short period of time -
 talking about "supply and demand", is that what you're talking
 about?

Just as the native speaker has performance problems which could hardly be ascribed to a limited linguistic capacity, so can the L2 learner for his part be faced with problems which do not stem from lack of linguistic competence. In this connection, Raupach (forthcoming) reports that when a group of learners were asked to retell a story, a number of their difficulties were caused by difficulties in recalling the plot of the story and in trying to meet certain stylistic standards. When dealing with learners we are likely to attribute the "flaws" in their performance to deficient competence, forgetting that free spontaneous conversational English is anything but fluent, if by fluency we mean "ideal speech delivery". However, learners have all the problems of speech planning, etc., that target language speakers are confronted with in addition to the burden of a limited linguistic capacity.

Still, if the data produced by the L2 learner are not in accordance with the native speaker's competence, there is a tendency to ascribe this phenomenon to lack of competence on the L2 learner, while in the case of the native speaker, similar performance data may be attributed to "slips of the tongue". Within the competence-performance distinction the phenomena which are considered performance errors in the case of L1 are often considered to be competence errors in the speech of the L2 learner.

Thus, in the case of the learner we must be wary not to ascribe all his problems to lack of linguistic competence; he has all the problems of speech planning a native speaker is generally faced with. Similarly, we should not overlook the fact that the native speaker may make use of strategies. Communication strategies are not confined to learners, native speakers also make use of these strategies in order to communicate more successfully. In particular, when a native speaker wants to make himself understood to someone with a limited knowledge of his language, he can make use of communication strategies in order to facilitate understanding on behalf of the learner.

It has also been pointed out by Bialystok (forthcoming) that the more advanced students used more advanced strategies in communication. She found that the best strategy users were those who had adequate formal proficiency in the target language and were able to modify their strategy selection to

account for the nature of the specific concept to be conveyed. It is possible that the native speaker's use of strategy follow the same pattern. His experience may be critical in assuring effective use of strategies likely to pass unnoticed in performance.

EVALUATION OF STRATEGY

A number of researchers group communication strategies into major categories. Thus Færch and Kasper (forthcoming) make an important distinction between "achievement strategies" and "reduction strategies". They describe the former as attempts by the learner "to solve problems in communication by expanding his communicative resources..., rather than by reducing his communicative goals". On the other hand, if the learner's communicative goal is reduced, they hold that we are concerned with a deduction strategy. Their overview of communication strategies is presented in Table 1. As the names of the two major categories imply, one category is thought more useful for solving problems in communication than the other. Thus the distinction suggests a qualitative division into strategies which are likely/unlikely to lead to communicative success.

Haastrup and Philipsen (forthcoming) make a distinction between "L1 based strategies", involving the strategies of "borrowing", "anglicizing" and "literal translation", and "interlanguage based strategies", involving the strategies of "generalization", "paraphrase", "word-coinage" and "restructuring" (see Table 2 for examples). Both categories in question are within the major category of achievement strategies, but a further qualitative classification is suggested in that interlanguage strategies are thought to be most effective, while strategies based on L1 are generally less effective.

It is suggested here that it is not always a straightforward matter to make these distinctions. Even when classifying strategies as interlanguage based or L1 based one must be careful.

In the analysis of the speech of Zoila, a Guatemalan woman acquiring English as a second language as an adult, Shapira (1978) classifies a number of instances as transfer from the learner's native language, Spanish. In an analysis of the learner's use of negation, the use of the negating word no, eg. no + verb instead of 'do'-support, is regarded as a lexical borrowing

Table 1. Overview of communication strategies (from Færch and Kasper, in press).

<p><u>Formal reduction strategies:</u> Learner communicates by means of a "reduced" system, in order to avoid producing non-fluent or incorrect utterances by realizing insufficiently automatized or hypothetical rules/items</p>	<p><u>Subtypes:</u> phonological morphological syntactic lexical</p>
<p><u>Functional reduction strategies:</u> Learner reduces his communicative goal in order to avoid a problem</p>	<p><u>Subtypes:</u> <u>actional and/or modal reduction</u> <u>reduction of the propositional content:</u> topic avoidance message abandonment meaning replacement</p>
<p><u>Achievement strategies:</u> Learner attempts to solve communicative problem by expanding his communicative resources</p>	<p><u>Subtypes:</u> <u>compensatory strategies:</u> (a) code switching (b) interlingual transfer (c) inter-/intralingual transfer (d) IL based strategies: (i) generalization (ii) paraphrase (iii) word-coinage (iv) restructuring (e) cooperative strategies (f) non-linguistic strategies</p> <p><u>retrieval strategies</u></p>

Table 2. Achievement strategies (from Haastrup and Philipsen, in press).

<u>Achievement strategies</u>	<u>Example from the corpus</u>
<u>L1 based strategies</u> (L1 = first language)	
borrowing ¹	"fagforening" (= trade union)
anglicizing ²	in the marine (= navy)
literal translation	meanings (= opinions)
<u>IL based strategies</u> (IL = interlanguage)	
generalization	people from all country (= all parts of the world)
paraphrase	we have - when we talk (= oral exam)
word-coinage	a funny (= fancy) dress ball
restructuring	if something is er doesn't work
<u>Cooperative strategies</u>	
appeals	what do you call it?
<u>Non-verbal strategies (NV)³</u>	
gesture	
<u>Strategies aimed at solving retrieval problems</u>	
er now I have to think	

from Spanish. However, this use of no is also found in an initial stage of the language development of children acquiring English as their mother tongue as well as in the speech of L2 learners with different L1 backgrounds (eg. Schumann 1978, Wode 1980) as a result of the application of a general rule. It is quite likely, therefore, that such instances are part of the learner's interlanguage, in that the L2 learner, as well as the L1 child learner, makes use of approximative systems in the acquisition of the target language.

We are faced with a similar problem in an example presented by Haastrup and Philipsen. They classify the use of the English word bring in the context 'I bring petrol' as an instance of borrowing. Bring is meant to convey the meaning of the English word deliver, and it is suggested that the use of this lexical item, instead of the correct word deliver, is due to a transportation of the Danish word bring into an English context. This solution is indeed possible, but we might just as well be confronted with an instance of "overuse" or generalization of the English word bring. It would be easy to imagine a language which does not have a lexical item which is phonetically similar to the English bring, and, in this eventuality, native speakers of that language might still be confused as to the distinctions to be made in English between bring, take and deliver. In that case we would be confronted with an interlanguage error and not an L1 based error.

Also many Danish learners of English who are well aware that both bring and take are lexical items of English do not always make the correct choice between these deictic terms (bring being used when the direction is towards the speaker, take when the direction is away from the speaker).

Interference from Danish may result in an incorrect use of the English bring, in that Danish learners of English may faultily believe that the extension of the English word is equivalent to that of the Danish word. This interpretation is different from claiming that bring is a Danish lexical item.

Whether a given strategy is successful or not may depend on a number of factors. A strategy, as for example language switch, may lead to success in interaction in which cooperation in order to agree on an intended meaning is possible, whereas in written communication where the possibility of negotiation is excluded, this strategy would be more likely to fail.

One decisive factor is the distance/similarity between the speaker's native language and his target language. Another factor of importance is the degree to which the "foreign" element is embedded in context. Some instances of borrowing (see extract 4) as, eg., the use of the Danish word komma instead of the English word point, and the use of the Danish stipendium instead of the English grant gave no communicative problems, as these words were sufficiently embedded in context to be understood.

In addition, a certain linguistic device may serve a number of functions, as we pointed out in our discussion of various uses of repetition. Similarly, language switch may occur for various reasons. Apart from borrowing -

a term which might well be reserved for the attempt to communicate by means of one's native tongue - language switch may also occur in instances where the learner makes recourse to his own language in order to establish his problem. He may even talk to himself about his own output or his problems in speech planning. In this respect his action is similar to that of the child who engages in a monologue (cf. Piaget's (1959) notion of "egocentric speech"), when he is confronted with a problem he finds difficult to solve. Finally, code switching has also been mentioned as an explicit indicator of a trouble source, likely to function as an appeal to the native speaker for assistance.

Perhaps we should not discourage learners from making principled guesses on the basis of their L1. In the case of languages as close as Danish and English, borrowing may sometimes be a useful communication strategy, although it is based on the learner's native language. Furthermore, as language switches are explicit indicators of the existence of a trouble source, they are likely to provoke the native speaker's assistance. In many instances in which mutual understanding is eventually reached, the negotiation of meaning was initiated by the learner making recourse to his L1, often as a means of establishing his problem.

This would further emphasize the importance of evaluating communication strategies in interaction and as part of discourse. Seen in isolation or in settings with no interlocutor, some strategies, such as message abandonment and maybe language switch, are likely to fail, but when viewed in interactional patterns, we find that these strategies often occur towards the beginning of a succession of strategies whose final result is communicative success.

The distinction between achievement strategies and reduction strategies is no doubt useful, as it has important pedagogical implications. Naturally, it is more valid to expand one's communicative resources than it is to reduce one's communicative goal. Still, it is not always possible to draw a precise distinction. If we consider the strategy of paraphrase, it is categorized as an achievement strategy (Færch and Kasper, forthcoming), and it is often reported as a very useful communication strategy (eg. Haastrup Philipsen, forthcoming), but it is also an instance of lexical reduction, in accordance with which it has indeed been classified by Tarone, Cohen and Dumas (1976) as an "avoidance strategy" (see Table 3).

When substituting a lexical item with a paraphrase or a circumlocution the speaker has in fact reduced his communicative goal, even though he may still retain his communicative intent. The attempted formulation may also be less precise, less effective, etc., than the intended lexical item. Færch and Kasper acknowledge this difficulty and consequently reject paraphrase as a potential learning strategy, even though it may be an effective communication strategy. The learner may be successful in conveying his intentions, but he will not enlarge his linguistic capacity. Theoretically, this seems to be a sound conclusion, but when we are concerned with interactional data where feedback is possible, evidence points to the contrary, too. Instances of paraphrase in the present data indicate that a large number of instances of paraphrase on the part of the learner were followed up by the native speaker. Having understood the learner's intention he frequently supplied the "correct" item, thus establishing the missing link to fill the gap in the learner's vocabulary.

In this way the native speaker provided the learner with useful linguistic "information" likely to function as a potential learning source, and the "new" item or expression was often picked up by the learner and used productively (later on) in the conversation.

Færch and Kasper define communication strategies as "plans for solving what to an individual presents itself as a problem in reaching a particular communicative goal". The expression "presents itself" may be wide enough to allow for an inclusion of the possibility that a communicative problem is not "discovered" by the learner himself, but presented to him by his interlocutor. Anyhow, in native speaker/non-native speaker conversation, the learner is not always aware that he has a communication problem, but this may be pointed out to him, either directly by his interlocutor, or indirectly by his lack of understanding, whereafter the learner may attempt to repair his utterance, often by making recourse to a communication strategy.

When concerned with a communicative problem the learner may act as his own feedback mechanism and adjust his speech accordingly. However, for the L2 learner, as well as for the L1 child learner, an additional powerful mechanism on the acceptability of the learner's utterance is the response of the interlocutor.

Table 3. Communication strategies (from Tarone, Cohen and Dumas, 1976).

	Phonological	Morphological	Syntactic	Lexical
TRANSFER FROM NL	/jɪp/for/ʃɪp/	"The book of Jack" for "Jack's book"	"Dio a elles" for "Les dio a ellos" in Spanish-L2	"Je sais Jean" for "Je connais Jean" in French-L2
OVERGENERALIZATION	"Et carro /karo/ es carro" (Flap r generalized to trill contexts--Span.-L2	"He goed" "Il a tombé" in French-L2	"I don't know what is it"	"He is pretty" (Unaware of the semantic limitations)
PREFABRICATED PATTERN	/hwat ar ʃudɔrɪ/ for /wɔtʃadɔrɪ/	"I would not have gone"	"I don't know how do you do that" "Yo quiero ir"--Span.-L2 "Buddy, that's my foot which you're standing on"	"The people next door are rather indigent"
OVERELABORATION	/səbre:/ for /stre:/	"Avoiding talking about what happened yesterday."	"Avoiding talk of a hypothetical nature & conditional clauses."	"Avoiding talk about one's work due to lack of technical vocabulary."
EPENTHESIS				
AVOIDANCE	(To avoid using certain sounds, like /l/ and /r/ in "pollution problems".)	"I like to swim" in response to "What happened yesterday?"	Q.: "¿Qué quieren los paparos que haga la mamá?" R.: "Quieren comer." (Spanish-L2)	"Il regarde et il veut boire" to avoid the word for "cupboard" in "Il ouvre l'armoire"
a) TOPIC AVOIDANCE				
1. Change topic				
2. No verbal response				
b) SEMANTIC AVOIDANCE	"It's hard to breathe" for "air pollution"			
c) APPEAL TO AUTHORITY	Q.: f...? R.: faut eu il (French-L2)	Q.: Je l'ai...? R.: prise. (French-L2)	Q.: El quiere...? R.: que te vayas. (Spanish-L2)	"How do you say "staple" in French?"
1. Ask for form				
2. Ask if correct				
3. Look it up				
d) PARAPHRASE	"Les garçons et les filles" for "Les enfants" (Thus avoiding liaison in French-L2)	"Il nous faut partir" for "Il faut que nous partions" (To avoid subjunctive in French-L2)	"J'ai trois pommes" for "J'en ai trois" (To avoid "en" in French-L2)	High coverage word: "tool" for "wrench" Low frequency word: "labor" for "work" Word coinage: "airball" Circumlocution: "a thing you dry your hands on"
e) MESSAGE ABANDONMENT	"Les oiseaux ga..." ("gazouillont dans les arbres" was intended in French-L2)	"Et queria que yo..." ("fuera a la tienda" was intended in Spanish-L2)	"What you...?"	"If only I had a ..."
f) LANGUAGE SWITCH	"I want a <u>couteau</u> " ³	"Le livre de Paul's" (French-L2)	"Ve ne pas go to school" (French-L2)	"We got this <u>hostie</u> from <u>le prétre</u> " (English-L2)

If the learner has not been understood, new strategies or a recursion of the strategy already made use of are desired. In addition, the native speaker's feedback may not only function as a check on the learner's performance, but his response also has the important function of providing the learner with new linguistic "input", as well as stimulating the (interest for) communication. Thus the interlocutor may not only encourage communication, but at the same time the learner can benefit from being exposed to "intake", i.e. language at a level of complexity suited for acquisition.

In conclusion, we would like to stress the importance of looking at communication strategies in interaction as part of discourse. If seen in isolation and in settings with no interlocutor, some strategies may fail on their own, but seen in interactional patterns they may instigate or be part of a negotiation towards shared meaning.

When naturally occurring conversations are examined, it becomes evident that negotiation plays an important role. The learner is seldom left alone to solve his problems, but is assisted by his interlocutor. Many of the problems are solved by the speaker himself, but with help from, and even on the initiative of the interlocutor. We have seen how in a number of cases the search for a missing word, etc., resulted in an interaction in which the learner conferred with the native speaker to come to terms about connecting the right word with his intended meaning. In this way the search became an active process in which the two participants collaborated in the completion of sentences.

Reconsidering Tarone's notion of communication strategy we would also like to emphasize the importance of viewing communication strategies in an interactional perspective. Problems in communication may be solved by the joint efforts of both interlocutors. However, it is the attempt to solve problems that is mutual, not the use of strategy. In collaboration, the strategies of the individual performer may result in the solution of a problem, and the contribution of both interlocutors is often necessary for mutual understanding to be reached.

Appendix. Extracts from native speaker - non-native speaker conversation

- (1) NS en hvad jul nå jul ja
L så har du en god jul en god jul jul jul ah undskyld
-
- (2) NS yes
L yes because we have only one large er meal-meal er at Christmas it's
NS
L er on Christmas Day
-
- (3) NS when you say there are twelve people in a team does that mean a-at any
L yes
NS time there are twenty-four people playing
L no - no at any time there is
NS
L fourteen people playing
NS yes - two or teen yea on the -
one in each er goal and six people by the -
NS on the-on the court or on the field do you
yes six people on each time and
NS always play indoors
L
...
NS yea are there any other advantages - - to playing other people
L what
NS are there any other advantages ehm to to changing - the people
L
NS yes
L yes er er if the the people and who's playing is tired you can
NS
L change them
...
NS mhm why do you think that
L I more think that golf is a - upper class - sport
NS
L because er the people who - it's rather expensive to - play golf when - to
NS udstyr er det
L have to have the - the playing - hvad kalder man udstyr ja
NS ved jeg ikke (laughs)
L if you have er - in tennis you sh- have rackets er
NS oh a golfclub the stick you use to
no - no-it-not that-if you in tennis
NS aha
L have - a racket er trousers or shirt or or all what do you call this
NS equipment yes
L altogether equipment yes because the er golf e-equipment is
NS
L rather expensive

- (4) NS is that because it's not so many people who want to study it
 L
 NS necessary
 L no I don't know- they haven't found it er necessary to - make
 NS mm but i-it does mean that
 L more deci- make more things for decision
 NS only those people with - academic qualifications with very strong
 L yes
 NS academic qualifications can get in
 L yes but if you have-if you
 NS when you have ended er when you have ended er highschool if you then
 L
 NS yea
 L go for a for a work and then you work about eight months then you
 NS one point eight
 L can - multiply your points by one komma eighteen one point - one point
 NS one point eight eighteen or eight
 L eighteen one point eighteen yea eighteen
 NS aha - aha so that means that
 L you can get higher points
 ...
 NS and then you can lend some people - from the State eller the State would lend
 NS some money
 L you some people some money yea-some money yes (laughs)
 ...
 NS aha but you have to pay that back
 L yes, ehr only er the money the State
 NS yea
 L lend you the money you have borrowed from the State you have to pay
 NS
 L them back - but not the stipendium
- (5) NS is-
 L it is supposed to show er to find - optimal allocation - of this good
 NS is that-are you talking-I seem to remember - I didn't do a-any economics
 L
 NS but just for a short period of time-talking about 'supply and demand' is
 L
 NS that what you're talking about
 L
- (6) NS yes and what w-how long wh-what league is your team
 L

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A REASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT APPROACH TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING
WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LATEST RESEARCH IN NEUROLINGUISTICS

In a paper which proposes a reassessment of the present approach to foreign language teaching it seems appropriate to start with the well known distinction made by Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens between methodics and methodology (1964:200). It is almost a platitude today to state that both the practical aspects of teaching, ie. methodology (the importance of which we fully recognize), and those of methodics must necessarily comply with underlying theoretical assumptions about the teaching process in general, and foreign language teaching in particular. This paper, however, is not concerned either with the different aspects of foreign language teaching methodology, or with methodics. Our aim is to raise the question of defining explicitly a general framework for an approach to language teaching. Or more precisely, is there a broad enough approach to language teaching, an approach which takes account of the interaction of all the major factors that play a part in the process of teaching and learning a foreign language and what does it consist of? If there is no such approach - why not?

An approach (a theory or a model) to foreign language teaching consists of a system of general rules scientifically established, by means of which the process of foreign language teaching, hence learning can be explained. It is obvious that by such a definition we do not have in mind solutions of practical problems such as the teaching of a particular tense or any other grammatical category. It is not synonymous with a teaching method either, however often method is mistaken for a theory of vice versa.¹ One of the aims of an approach to foreign language teaching is to describe and explain the processes of teaching and learning a foreign language.

¹ Method is a part of methodics and can and should be scientifically analysed and defined; it is, in a sense, a product of the underlying theory. Although a teaching method is not the same as a theory of, or approach to language teaching, it is highly complex; unfortunately, some take it simply as a label for a teaching procedure or even as one of its phases - that of presentation.

It should be broad enough to accommodate possible differences in the processes under discussion, which may be the result of a variety of factors, such as the age of the learner, sex, social background, the relationship between course content and certain psychological factors, etc. Thus, in a sense, an approach is over and above both methodology and methodics. From one and same approach different teaching techniques and methods may ensue.

Viewed in retrospect one can distinguish several fairly broad approaches to foreign language teaching. They vary as to scientific rigour and explicitness; actually, some would not qualify as being scientific, but for a time they were treated as a kind of general approach to foreign language teaching. Such, for example, was the oldest approach we shall mention here: the literary approach dominant at a time when foreign language teaching was based exclusively on literary texts, because they offered samples of "the best language".

This was followed by what could be called the methodological approach. The attention of teachers and theorists alike was concentrated exclusively on methodological aspects. This was the period when solutions to teaching problems were expected from The Method. There was more system in this approach; a tendency towards explicitness was evident and efforts were made to apply insights from disciplines other than methodology.

In more recent times, approaches with more precise definitions and principles have taken shape - the linguistic, and what could tentatively be called socio-psychological approaches. Obviously, the focal points in these approaches were insights from the three disciplines.

If these approaches to foreign language teaching (however general in scope) are different as regards coherence, scientific rigour, explicitness, etc., there is one connecting line between them: they are all unidisciplinary. First it was literature with complete disregard of numerous teaching and learning problems, some quite simple and basic. Then, The Method was seen as a kind of panacea. Everything was geared to methodology, disregarding some very basic principles of methodics. In the linguistic approach all the problems were seen from a linguistic point of view. At one point all hopes were pinned on the possibilities of contrastive analysis. In socio-psychological approach authors either deal with neatly phrased hypotheses which cannot be tested or with very small samples of subjects in specific and rare teaching/learning situations; the results thus obtained could not be generalized.

This kind of approach - unidisciplinary - was reflected in most aspects of the teaching process: the construction of the syllabus, textbooks, classroom techniques, testing etc. The syllabi were either structural or communicative, the textbooks had to be based on the results of contrastive analysis (although pedagogical materials have failed to appear in spite of vast research done in CA and numerous CA projects, the main aim of which is, or initially was, to prepare better teaching materials).

In all of these situations - textbook writing, the construction of tests and syllabi, the selection of teaching procedures or a teaching method - it was always a matter of "this or that", "right or wrong"; language learning is "habit formation" or "grammatical analysis"; linguistics has or has not something to offer to the language teacher, etc. Here one has only to think of the Skinnerian approach to language teaching/learning or the 'hard' contrastivists.

It is well known, however, that the major components of the language teaching process are far too complex to be resolved by applying only one principle, one rule, whichever it may be.

The answers to the question of what a modern approach to foreign language teaching should include seem obvious after these few introductory remarks: the nature of the subject we teach, the process of learning and teaching, and the interaction of the various factors involved in these processes are so complex that only a multidisciplinary approach covering all the disciplines relevant to the various and numerous problems of language learning and teaching, offers hope for the solution of at least some of the major problems.

The psychological aspect of the approach I am advocating (one that is general in nature, explicit, coherent and scientifically established, ie. testable) should certainly not be disregarded (or taken as synonymous with neurolinguistic); the limited scope of this paper, however, prevents us from dwelling further on it. The relationship of the two systems of meanings, as well as certain aspects of "languages in contact", the mother tongue and the foreign language, the cognitive processes of the foreign language learner, his motivation and attitudes towards the language and the nation whose language he is studying, these as well as other factors generally classified as psychological should be accommodated in a comprehensive approach to foreign language teaching. Student motivation has attracted a good deal of attention in more recent studies and quite

rightly, though some authors seem to be attributing too much importance to this factor, however important it may be (see Sorenson 1967).

Although some of these introductory remarks may be common knowledge they seemed pertinent for the following reasons:

A considerable amount of experimental research has been done in the field of foreign language teaching, and we do not lack theoretical studies. However, just as in other disciplines, it is always one problem, one aspect of a problem which is discussed, tested, subjected to experimentation. Some of the projects may be wider in scope but what we really need and still lack in spite of all the research projects is an effort to integrate the results from various disciplines and areas of foreign language teaching, an effort to formulate and test a comprehensive approach to foreign language teaching, one that would serve as a solid and adequate basis for all classroom procedures, regardless of who the students are, how old they may be, the reasons they are learning a particular language, etc.

Another reason we still lack a more reliable and comprehensive approach to foreign language teaching is the current awareness of the complexity of the problem of constructing such an approach, an awareness which is the result of accumulated knowledge about the processes at work in the teaching/learning of foreign languages. Such an awareness may be inhibitory.

One minor problem, in spite of the fact that we have specialized annotated bibliographies, some even on computer cards or discs, is that the amount of information coming in from all parts of the world is enormous, and it would require a whole organization or a regularly financed research team to collect all the relevant data, correlate the results from various scientific disciplines, define the approach on the basis of the data obtained and test it. A word of caution about the testing. With the growing need for testing teaching procedures, more and more researchers are undertaking objective measurements; knowing how difficult it is to test a hypothesis in the field of education in general, and particularly in connection with foreign languages, we should be careful when analysing testing procedures and the results obtained. First of all, testing should not be limited to a small "laboratory sample of population". Sometimes the results obtained for such a sample of population are valid only for that selected number of students. In other words, the model we are talking about would, among other requirements, have to be tested on a large territory and satisfy other rigorous requirements of objective testing.

If there is an agreement about the importance of having an explanatory approach to foreign language teaching, if it is clearly a vital part of most aspects of methodics and methodology, it is surprising that in most books on foreign language teaching little or no attention is paid to the notion of a basic approach to foreign language teaching. One would expect that an analysis of the teaching of various aspects of language, such as vocabulary, grammar, reading or writing, etc, would be preceded at least by a chapter in which the author would give the rationale of the teaching procedures. Our survey has included two types of books: (a) those with more general contents, books which could be called "textbooks of foreign language teaching methodology", covering all the major areas of practical language teaching, and (b) books whose authors deal with separate aspects of foreign language teaching, for instance various aspects of discourse analysis; communicative teaching; individualization of instruction; curriculum design; English, or any other foreign language, for special purposes; language testing; the use of the language laboratory, etc. This is no regardless of the size of the textbook. Comprehensive books on foreign language teaching lack a theoretical introduction to the analysis of more practical problems.

In view of the abundance of research being done nowadays on most questions and problems in our field, one cannot but wonder why even voluminous books lack at least a tentative outline of an approach to foreign language teaching. Is it because the authors assume that the teachers, to whom these books are intended, do not need a theoretical analysis of the basic issues? Or are the authors aware of the existing theoretical controversies as regards the processes under discussion and therefore prefer to stick to safer ground, a description of the procedures to be used in teaching language elements and skills? Should we not assign more responsibility and importance to the practicing teacher, first of all, and second, make him aware of at least some of the basic problems underlying his work in the classroom? It is difficult to believe, now in 1982, that textbook authors still think that foreign language teaching is only a matter of "exchange of experience gained in the classroom", something which has nothing to do with research.

One of the trends in foreign language teaching today is to let the student communicate in the foreign language teaching as freely as possible; the trend towards letting them use the language they study, regardless of the mistakes they make, is obvious in many teaching situations. Theoretical

explanations are given for such an attitude towards the student's free use of the foreign language and their mistakes, relegating teaching to the background. According to one such explanation, if a small child acquires its mother tongue without systematic teaching, ie. only through constant exposure to and use of the mother tongue, and if it manages to form abstract rules concerning its tongue, the foreign language student should be expected to do the same, the assumption being that, as an adult learner, he can use his learning skills and abilities. Actually, some theorists and language teachers look at the "communicative approach" to language teaching (and language learning, although without sufficient knowledge about the nature of the latter process) as an approach which will solve all the major problems in second language learning, much as the "hard" contrastivists used, wrongly, to believe. In such a situation the role of the teacher is mainly to stimulate the student to talk. This emphasis on the importance of learning, although without sufficient knowledge about the nature of that process, seems to be a kind of a reaction to too much teaching. It is true that in most books on foreign language teaching there is very little or nothing about the learning process. So a change was in order, and the learning process does require study. However, care should be taken that we do not go now to the other extreme, and overemphasize learning at the expense of teaching.

At this juncture it seems appropriate to quote Marton who "believe[s] in language teaching, being thus in opposition to the now very popular 'naturalistic' trends in glottodidactics... [whose representatives...] ... manifest their disbelief in the notion of language teaching and emphasize language learning" (Marton 1979:35-36). However, in order to be efficient and successful in "... steering the student's mental activities during its fulfilment of the learning task..." we should know much more about the students' mental processes and presumably about the nature of the brain mechanisms underlying these processes.

Of all the disciplines relevant to the conception of a broad and multidisciplinary approach we should like to stress neurolinguistics, because it has apparently escaped the attention of most language teaching theorists so far.¹

¹ As a matter of fact, linguists with some notable exceptions showed little interest in neurological studies of language until fifteen or twenty years ago.

Some language teaching problems have been studied from neurolinguistic point of view, and there are many neurolinguistic papers and projects (cf. Peuser, 1977, Dimitrijević and Djordjević 1980, Dingwall in prep.) primarily experimental, but to my knowledge there is as yet no model of foreign language teaching embracing a neurolinguistic component.

From the abundant literature on neurolinguistic studies of language, those which may be relevant to language teaching and the formulation of an approach such as defined at the beginning of this paper, only a few will be mentioned here.

The problem of a language teaching method has been in the focus of attention for both teachers and language theorists for many years. It has until quite recently been tackled mainly from the methodological point of view. Personal experience rather than research made us realize first that there is not just one teaching method suitable for all situations, teaching aims, and students. Nevertheless, the existence of dozens of different teaching methods, developed on the basis of a methodological and possibly linguistic approach does not make them adequate to students' individual needs. It was noticed some time ago that all students do not resort to the same learning strategies, do not follow the same principles of learning. Broadening the methodology of research so that the approach to foreign language teaching only in respect to the teaching method incorporates a neurolinguistic component, we are in a position today to modify our teaching according to the individual needs of the student and to have better and more reliable explanations of their varying behaviour. For a very long time the selection of a teaching method (for instance inductive or deductive) was made, not in accordance to students' personal needs but rather as "a question of fashion". It has been discovered, however, that success in foreign language learning depends primarily on the student's cognitive style and neurological mechanisms engaged in language learning. The "...students with left hemisphere preference (right movers) appeared to be better language learners... right movers improved more in deductive class, and left movers in the inductive class..." (Krashen 1975:441). In other words some students learn better when they are first given the rules followed by practice while others improve when the teaching procedure is in the reverse order. This kind of approach to the study of the old dilemma: deductive or inductive teaching was further developed

(cf. Seliger 1975, 1978).¹

Neurolinguistic insights such as these will, one hopes, encourage both theorists and classroom teachers to be less rigid as to the application of one teaching method or another, as was the case in the past.

Various aspects of neurolinguistic research in bilingualism may be relevant to foreign language teaching. One of them is the interpretation of different patterns of language restitution. According to some clinical observations, the visual factor is one of those which may affect restitution. The language in which a patient used to read, though it may be the patient's second language (that is the language which he did not speak so well as the other one) may come back first, and some authors attribute it to the fact that the patient used to read that language (cf. Paradis 1977, Albert and Obler 1978). If replicated studies of language restitution confirm these results, we shall have just another, this time neurolinguistic, reason to reintroduce reading into classroom which has been in the background for quite a while.

Research into the nature of lateralization, in spite of some inconsistencies of opinion, represents just another example of the modern approach to the study of second language learning. Authors do not agree as to when lateralization is complete: Lenneberg (1967) assumes that lateralization is completed during puberty, and Krashen (1973) is of the opinion that it ends when the child is much younger. To what degree does the completion of lateralization inhibit learning a foreign language, or some of its aspects, what are the biological (neurological) bases of differences in language learning, and to what degree does an adult learner differ from a small child learning a foreign language? These are only a few questions relevant to our problem of a general approach to language teaching, an approach scientifically explained, explanatory and adequately tested. There is certainly no time to go into these questions, but there are interesting and intriguing hypotheses concerning multiple critical periods for second language learning. According to Seliger (1978), "... it may be claimed that there are many different critical periods for different abilities which, in turn, will determine the degree of completeness with which some aspect of language will be acquirable" (cf. also Scovel 1969, Hill 1970, Krashen 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, Krashen and Harshman 1972).

¹ Other authors also studied the relationship between Broca's and Wernicke's areas or centers and the acquisition and use of the mother tongue and a foreign language (cf. Walsh and Diller 1978, and Diller 1975).

The limited scope of this paper prevents us from presenting other results obtained from purely neurolinguistic research which could have immediate relevance to the formulation of a more reliable, general and testable approach to foreign language teaching.

Stressing the importance of a possible contribution from neurolinguistics to the formulation of basic principles for an approach to foreign language teaching, I would not like to be misunderstood as claiming that neurolinguistics offers solutions for all the problems of foreign language teaching. That would be a mistake made repeatedly with some other disciplines in the not too distant past. The time when we operated with relatively simple unidisciplinary approaches to very complex problems, such as language learning and teaching, is gone forever. The statement that linguistic insights may be of great relevance to language teaching is axiomatic today, but as we all know it was not always like that. It took a long time for linguistics to be accepted (and not only linguistics) as a discipline which had something to offer to those who are concerned with language teaching.

Good teaching presupposes knowledge of the subject being taught - in our case, language. Whitaker's view of neurolinguistics seems both correct and relevant in this context: "One assumption in neurolinguistics is that a proper and adequate understanding of language depends upon correlating information from a variety of fields concerned with the structure and function of both language and brain, minimally neurology and linguistics" Whitaker (1971:139).

The mistake of ignoring all the possibilities that linguistics could offer to language teaching theorists as well as practitioners should not be repeated with neurolinguistics, although the latter may seem further from the classroom than was the case earlier with linguistics. The insights that neurolinguistics suggests concerning the subject we are trying to teach can help clarify and complete the picture which foreign language theorists and classroom teachers are trying to form.

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A FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS

INTRODUCTION

The recent history of foreign language teaching has been full of controversies about what constitutes the 'best' methodology. Teachers have been frequently urged to accept dogmatic views about what techniques are most effective or theoretically sound, even if these views have conflicted with their own practical experience. If teachers' instincts have made them diverge from the current orthodoxy, they have often been called old-fashioned or reactionary. A few years later, however, they have often found that a new dogma supports the very practices which they had been urged to abandon. Thus, for example, audio-lingual theorists condemned the explicit teaching of grammar (cf. Brooks 1960); later, grammar was reinstated by the proponents of a more cognitive approach (cf. Chastain 1971); now, the supporters of a 'natural' approach again suggest that grammar teaching does not help learners to acquire the new language, though it may perform other, less essential functions (cf. Krashen 1982). Other teaching practices which have undergone similar changes in fortune include the use of the mother tongue in the classroom, the memorisation of vocabulary lists, the early introduction of writing, and many others. In some parts of the language-teaching world, the 'communicative' approach has produced its own dogmatic standpoints, such as claims that teachers should never focus on a grammatical structure in isolation or that there can be no justification for an activity in which the learners are not 'communicating'.

As Strevens points out (1980: 42), there is good cause to be suspicious of any claim that a particular method is valid for all teachers, with all learners, in all situations. This suspicion is not only justified by looking back at the claims and counter-claims of recent decades. It is also justified by what we now know about the complexity of foreign language learning and the intricate way in which different factors affect each other. Since all teachers, learners and situations are so different, we should not expect the same set of techniques always to lead to the most effective learning.

Today more than before, then, teachers cannot base their approach on simple recommendations or prescriptions from outside. They have to shape their own approach, by making their own evaluation of the different possibilities and

selecting those which suit, as well as possible, themselves and their specific groups of learners. This does not mean that 'anything is all right'. On the contrary, it involves a much deeper exploration not only of the available techniques, but also of their potential role in helping a group of learners towards their goal.

In this article, I do not propose to make specific recommendations. Rather, I wish to discuss some more general principles which teachers might consider in developing their own methodology for teaching communicative skills. First, I will discuss briefly the nature of the goal: communicative ability. Next, I will compare two different (but complementary) approaches to teaching skills, whether in a foreign language or in some other domain. I will then suggest the minimum learning requirements which a methodology must try to satisfy. Finally, I will relate these considerations to a methodological framework consisting of two main components, 'pre-communicative' and 'communicative' learning activities.

Some of these principles provide the conceptual basis for Littlewood (1981), where the practical implications are explored in more detail.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATIVE ABILITY

Before the 1970s, communicative ability was usually assumed to depend simply on a person's mastery of the structures and vocabulary that make up the linguistic system. The most important controversy was between those who saw this mastery as being largely a matter of habits (best formed through techniques such as repetition and drills) and those who emphasised the cognitive factors involved in internalising the rules of the language system. In a well-known article, Carroll (1971) expressed the conclusion reached also by many other people: that both habits and internalised rules play an important role in language use. He pointed out that this conclusion confirmed the instinctive beliefs of most language teachers, who had always tried to ensure that their learners had opportunities both to understand and to practise the patterns of the language.

In the 1970s, however, it became clear through the work of various linguists that mastery of the linguistic system is not sufficient, in any case, to enable a person to communicate. He or she must also be capable of relating language forms to their communicative function. This relationship is not straightforward, since the same utterance can express several different communicative functions. For example, It's cold in here could be a simple statement of fact, a reproach to somebody for forgetting to turn on the heating,

a refusal to stay in a certain place, a request to close the window, and so on. In class, the interrogative Would you like to read now, John? is less likely to be a genuine enquiry about John's wishes than a request that he should read. Conversely, of course, the same communicative intention may be expressed by many alternative utterances. Thus the request that John should read could also be expressed by means such as Could you read now, please, John?, or I'd like to hear you read now, John, or even (if the class is already involved in reading) by simply naming John.

It is clear from this last example that speakers must not only be aware of the potential range of functions of different utterances. They must also be capable of judging the other's background assumptions, in order to predict whether the utterance will convey the meaning they intend (this skill is sometimes called 'role-taking'). Thus, the interpretation of the single word John as a request to read can only take place if John relates it to the fact that students are expected to read in sequence. Even then, John could take it to be, say, an invitation to answer a question put previously or a request to stop talking to a neighbour. If some such misunderstanding occurs, the speaker must be prepared to remedy it by expressing the same meaning in another way.

As well as the purely practical constraint of choosing forms which will convey the desired meanings, the speaker must also obey social constraints. Not all possible linguistic forms will be equally appropriate to the social situation, particularly to the social relationship between speaker and hearer. For example, It's cold in here may prove an effective way for a woman to ask her husband to close a window, but she would be unlikely to use the same phrase with a stranger on a train. Here, it would be more appropriate to use a conventional polite form such as Excuse me, would you mind closing the window, please? Between two friends, a less elaborate expression would be likely to occur, such as Can you close the window, please? An important part of communicative skill is the ability to express oneself in a way suited to the situation, at least to the extent of not seeming rude or distant.

We can thus distinguish four main domains of skill which constitute the goal of a communicative methodology. The learner needs:

- (a) to control the language system fluently and creatively;
- (b) to be aware of different ways in which communicative intentions may be expressed;
- (c) to be able to express (or interpret) meanings effectively in specific situations, remedying any failure that occurs;
- (d) to be conscious of the social implications of different forms.

In each of these domains, of course, learners will attain widely different levels of skill, depending on their aims, ability, stage, and so on.

We can regard these domains as a general description of the 'part-skills' of communication. For teaching purposes, they can be analysed, and dealt with separately. For example, we may devise exercises for individual structures; practise ways of expressing a certain communicative function; give students practice in 'getting their meaning across' in any way they can find; require them to evaluate the social meaning of different utterances, and so on. In addition, however, we must not neglect to give them practice in the 'total skill' of communication, in which the different parts become integrated. This may be through activities such as communication tasks, discussions or role-playing.

PART-SKILLS AND THE TOTAL SKILL

It does not follow necessarily, of course, that this division into part-skills should have direct methodological implications. We cannot be sure that such a division has any psychological validity during actual communication, in which, as I said, the integration of skills is crucial. Even if we were sure, this would not necessarily mean that part-skills should be dealt with separately during instruction. There is no separate treatment when people learn a language in the natural environment: from the outset, they engage in communicative interaction in which the structural, functional and social aspects of language use are all developed simultaneously. In other words, whereas the classroom learner usually receives training in the part-skills of communication before practising the total skill, the natural learner practises the total skill from the beginning.

The comparative effectiveness of training in part-skills and practice in the total skill (sometimes also called 'whole-task practice') is an issue of general importance in the psychology of skill-learning (cf. Welford 1976: 104, Wingfield 1979: 162). It is very relevant to foreign language teaching, where two models of learning point towards different conclusions. First, there is the 'formal-instruction' model of how knowledge and skills are generally learnt in classrooms. According to this model, we should break the learning task into its component parts and develop proficiency in these separate parts. Either concurrently or later, whole-task practice helps the learner to integrate the part-skills into communicative proficiency. Second, there is the 'natural-learning' model of how languages are generally learnt outside classrooms. According to this model, we should avoid breaking up the total skill, but try

to create natural learning situations in the classrooms, so that communicative skills will develop through whole-task practice.

Traditionally, language-teaching has been based on the first of these models, sometimes to the extent of neglecting whole-task practice almost completely. The trend today is to move the emphasis more towards whole-task practice by providing as many opportunities as possible for communicative activity, as early as possible in the course. Indeed, the conclusion which some researchers draw from studies of natural foreign language is that whole-task practice could provide the sole means for classroom learning. This will presumably only become possible, however, if we learn how to re-create, in the average classroom, whatever features there are in the natural environment that trigger off the learning processes. Meanwhile, one of the most important decision areas for the teacher is to try to find the most suitable balance between part-skill training and whole-task practice.

BASIC LEARNING REQUIREMENTS

In order to acquire any skill (or part-skill), there is evidence that there are these basic learning requirements (cf. Bandura 1977, Welford 1976, Wingfield 1979):

- (1) Learners should be aware of the significant features of the behaviour they are expected to produce (eg. they should perceive some pattern or rule that determines whether the behaviour is effective or acceptable).
- (2) Learners should have practice in producing the behaviour themselves (this could range from controlled practice of a part-skill to free practice of the total skill).
- (3) Learners should have feedback which indicates how successful their attempts to produce the behaviour have been.

In themselves, these requirements are very general and can be satisfied in many different ways. It is again useful to compare how they might be satisfied in part-skill training during formal instruction and in natural learning through whole-task practice in the real environment.

In many formal classroom activities, the 'significant features' are determined by the teacher in the light of his or her prior knowledge of the language system. They may include correct inflectional endings, verb forms, vocabulary usage, and so on. The 'practice', too, is often closely controlled by the teacher, eg. through drills or exercises. The 'feedback' probably relates largely to the form of the language produced, especially to its correctness.

In communicative activity outside the classroom, the natural learner is left to work out the 'significant features' for himself. These will usually be features which relate to the effective communication of meanings in the first instance, such as simple word-order relationships or basic transformations for forming interrogatives and questions. The 'practice' is controlled by the learner from the outset, involving the expression of personal meanings with a simplified global grammar. The 'feedback' relates primarily to the messages contained in the utterances rather than to their linguistic form.

Therefore, the same basic principles are realised in very different ways according to whether we are working within the formal-instruction (part-skill) model of learning or the natural-learning (whole-task) model. Similarly, they can be applied in different ways in different components of our overall teaching methodology, according to the purpose of a specific activity. In part-skill activities (which we may also call pre-communicative), the teacher may guide the learners' perceptions more precisely, control the practice and, in providing feedback, focus to a greater extent on formal aspects of language use (especially accuracy). In communicative activities, on the other hand, the learners can be given more freedom to process language in their own ways and to use it creatively even at the expense of formal accuracy, receiving feedback which relates to meaning rather than form. (This feedback may, of course, be from other learners as well as from the teacher, since it will often be between learners that the communication takes place.)

PRE-COMMUNICATIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITIES

The preceding discussion has envisaged a methodological framework in which there are two main components: pre-communicative and communicative learning activities. Typically, the first kind involves part-skill training, the teacher tries to guide the learning process, and the main focus is on the language itself. The second kind involves whole-task practice, the learner is left to employ his or her own processing mechanism, and the main focus is on the meanings which are being conveyed. In practice, of course, what I have just described are the two ends of a continuum: specific activities will lie at some point along it and be characterised by different degrees of teacher-control or focus on meaning. It will therefore not always be possible to assign a particular activity unambiguously to one component or the other. This does not matter, since activities from all parts of the continuum may serve a function in helping learning to take place. The pre-communicative/communicative distinction is intended mainly as a means of conceptual

orientation in selecting activities and considering their function in the methodology.

Examples of pre-communicative activities are pronunciation practice, oral drills, question-and-answer practice based on pictures, gap-filling exercises, and so on. Since some of these activities place more emphasis than others on the meaning of the language being practised, we can also make a sub-division between structural activities and quasi-communicative activities. The latter would include the contextualised drills which are found in most modern courses.

Examples of communicative activities are problem-solving tasks, discussion sessions, role-playing activities, and so on. To the extent that learners are asked to pay attention to the social appropriacy of the language they use as well as to its functional effectiveness, we can also make a sub-division between functional communication activities and social interaction activities. Problem-solving tasks would usually come into the former category and role-playing activities into the latter. (Further examples of communicative activities can be found in Byrne and Rixon 1979, Littlewood 1981, Rixon 1981, and in practically-oriented magazines such as Modern English Teacher or Practical English Teaching).

Whereas most of our familiar classroom activities are pre-communicative, the trend in discussions nowadays is to emphasise the role of communicative activities in the methodology. Certainly, it is important not to neglect the communicative component. Communicative activity is, after all, the ultimate objective, and the evidence also indicates that many aspects of language learning cannot take place without it. Communicative activity can also serve an important motivational function in maintaining a sense of achievement and making the classroom into a more fully human environment. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that because our learners' goal is to participate in communicative activity, every activity on the way to this goal must involve them in 'real communication' (see also Wilkins 1982). What is important is not to eliminate 'non-communicative' activities from our methodology but (in the light of a fuller understanding of the goal) to evaluate clearly how each activity contributes towards the learners' eventual communicative ability.

CONCLUSION

This article has suggested that a communicative methodology must take account of (a) the nature of communicative ability, (b) the distinction between training in the part-skills of communication and practice in the total

skill, and (c) certain basic learning requirements and the various ways in which they may be satisfied.

It may be that one day, if we learn how to structure the classroom appropriately, we shall be able to develop communicative skills almost entirely through whole-task practice. In the meantime, as I indicated above, it remains one of the most important parts of the teacher's decision-making role to seek a suitable balance between pre-communicative part-skill training and communicative whole-task practice.

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COMPREHENSION-BASED TEACHING: AN OVERVIEW

The major methods of teaching languages which have been developed at least since the beginning of the 20th century, such as the direct method, the audio-lingual method, the cognitive code learning approach and even the recently developing communicative language teaching, share one common feature. They all focus primarily on the active oral production of the language by the learner from the very start of the language instruction. Implicit in them is an assumption that one learns a second or a foreign language by using it productively as soon as possible; in other words, learning a language is equivalent to learning to talk.

In theory these methods claim that listening should precede speaking; in practice, however, both skills are utilized simultaneously. The learner is usually asked to produce what he has heard almost immediately after having heard it. The aim of listening exercises is rather to provide models for production (it is listening for speaking) than developing aural comprehension as an independent skill.

A similar situation exists with reading. The passages for reading, at least at the beginning stage of language instruction, but often also at the intermediate stage, serve as an illustration of the language used in the oral practice.

An alternative approach, referred to as comprehension-based teaching, has been developing since the beginning of the seventies. People like Postovsky, Asher, J.O. Gary and N. Gary who have contributed to the development of this new approach argue that oral production by beginning learners should be delayed until some considerable aural comprehension has been achieved. This shift of emphasis is necessary because learning a language is not just learning to talk but a "process of building a map of meaning in the mind of the learner" (Nord 1980: 17); a process of developing competence. Insistence on speaking in the early stages of language instruction is not the best way to develop linguistic competence. It distracts the learner from his main objective of trying to understand

the underlying system of language, causes task overload and in effect retards the whole process of language learning. On the other hand, the initial emphasis on receptive skills (aural and reading comprehension) facilitates the development of linguistic competence, which in turn forms a foundation for the development of good performance in a second or a foreign language.

The arguments in favour of this approach are many and have recently been summed up by Gary and Gary (1981: 1-14). Undoubtedly the most important is the cognitive one. This is connected with the fact that, contrary to many other approaches, the comprehension-based approach draws on psychological rather than linguistic research. The cognitive argument stresses the differences between comprehension and production, both acquisitional and operational.

As to the acquisitional arguments it is pointed out that children learning their mother tongue demonstrate comprehension of sentences long before they begin to speak. The lapse of time is between six to twelve months, and their first responses are usually non-verbal.¹ Besides, mutes and some types of aphasics develop only receptive skills. It is, thus, argued that receptive and productive skills do not develop simultaneously; the former are prior to the latter and subsequently form a foundation for the development of the latter.

Operationally, speech production requires a more complex set of subskills than speech perception. One set has to do with the motor movements required for speech production. The other one, even more crucial, is connected with the processing of information. As Postovsky put it, "the auditory receptive ability involves development of covert decoding processes which transform sequentially ordered vocal messages into meaning", while the expressive ability is the skill "of encoding thought into sequentially ordered vocal messages" (Postovsky 1967: 459).

... "we have reason to believe that the two skills - speech comprehension and speech production - although obviously reciprocally correlated, are not

¹ Another argument can be added here from child second language acquisition. Children acquiring a second language in natural conditions go through longer or shorter periods of silence during which they are most probably developing second language competence by listening and trying to understand others.

necessarily mutually reinforcing in the initial phase of instruction. This appears to be so because training in oral production requires development of total and automatic control of both lexical and structural elements presented in the program. The student's attention, therefore, is necessarily focused more on the structural details and less on the contextual meaning of the message. In comprehension training the total control of linguistic data is neither implied nor necessary. Consequently, the student's attentional focus is shifted from preoccupation with structural details to decoding of contextual meaning" (Postovsky 1967: 464).

Thus, the difference in the tasks which have to be performed in comprehension and production, and the fact that the development of expressive language depends on the development of receptive processes form a decisive argument in favour of comprehension-based teaching. It is argued that the problem with production-based methods lies in the fact that they force students to perform too early - before their receptive processes have a chance to develop. They also ask students to begin with tasks which are more complex linguistically and cognitively, leading thus to interference from the mother tongue.

Other arguments in favour of comprehension-based teaching, mentioned by Gary and Gary, stress the affective, efficiency, communicative, media compatibility and utility advantages.

As to the affective advantage it is argued that asking learners to produce language before they are ready cognitively and emotionally for this task may be traumatic for many of them. In a comprehension approach, this problem is overcome because students can make their mistakes privately and privately correct them.

This approach is also more efficient because in it students can receive more language than if asked to perform orally. Here, all the students can be listening and responding individually on their worksheets at the same time.

The communication advantage is connected with the statement that comprehension is inherently communicative and classroom techniques used in comprehension-oriented teaching have always high communicative potential whereas oral practice, at least as practised in the classroom, is manipulative rather than communicative.

As to the media compatibility advantage it is argued that listening-oriented materials are the most appropriate for use with aural media such as audio and video tapes. Also language laboratories can be used more

effectively with this kind of material.

The utility advantage has to do with the belief that learners exposed to a receptive approach are more prone to continue further language study on their own.

Some more arguments may be added to the list, ie. in many cases listening and reading comprehension may be more needed by the student than the productive skills (especially in foreign language learning conditions), also in a conversation the need to comprehend usually exceeds the need to express oneself. In speaking, one can use all kinds of devices to express his ideas but he has no control over the language of his interlocutor.

The number and the validity of the arguments is overwhelming and convincing. So is the amount of experimental research done by the advocates of this approach. The experiments have been conducted both with adults (Postovsky, Asher, Ingram et al., Winitz and Reeds) and children (Gary, Krakowian), with English and with other languages, such as Russian, Spanish, German and Japanese (Postovsky 1970, Ingram et al. 1974, Asher 1965, Kuniyama and Asher 1965, Gary 1974, Winitz and Reeds 1973, etc.). These experiments have, on the whole, demonstrated that learners who have not been forced to speak immediately made significant progress not only in listening comprehension but also in other skills. For example, in Postovsky's experiment (a course of Russian of 12 weeks, six hours a day) learners first concentrated on aural comprehension and transcription for the first six weeks (about 180 hours of instruction), next they were gradually engaging in speaking - at first no more than 25 minutes out of a six-hour day, finally up to 90 minutes. Test measures conducted after 6 weeks of instruction and at the end of the course on the experimental group and the control group which started speaking from the beginning showed the superiority of the experimental group in all four skills.

Asher, Kusudo and de la Torre (1974) report that their subjects who were learning Spanish through commands showed higher listening comprehension and reading scores after 45 hours of instruction than college students after 75 hours of conventional instruction and a higher level of listening skills than students after 150 hours of classroom instruction.

The key word and the cornerstone of the success of this approach is active listening. It means that the learner is to demonstrate in some way that he has understood the material presented to him orally. He is

usually asked to carry out some non-verbal tasks.

As to the techniques suggested for carrying out these tasks, there are three major types. Students may be required to make a pictorial-audio match, a graphic-audio match or a physical response-audio match (Gary 1978:166-7). Needless to say that any combination of the three is also possible. The first technique has been suggested by Winitz and Reeds (1973) as well as by Postovsky, and it requires that students should match one of a number of pictures (usually three or four) with an utterance (a sentence, a phrase, a word) with what they hear from the teacher or the tape. The second is an alternation on the first. Students are asked to match a written response with what they hear. Pictures or written responses may be presented either on a screen or in students' workbooks.

In both cases students first get familiar with the lexical items or the structures by means of pictorial or graphic presentation techniques.

The third technique is often referred to as the total physical response technique because it advocates the use of physical action. It has been worked out by J. Asher. Here, students silently act out commands given by the teacher, first together with him, later on their own. Asher begins with simple commands, like stand up, walk to the door, pick up the pencil, etc., and gradually extends them to longer stretches including a number of grammatical features, for example walk to the table, pick up the book and put it on the chair, Eugene, stand up, walk to Claudine and touch her or when Luke walks to the window, Mary will write Luke's name on the blackboard, etc. Abstractions such as love, government, justice, etc. are usually taught with the card technique. Students manipulate cards as objects. For example, the instructor could say, Luke, pick up "justice" and give it to Josephine. (See Asher 1965:293, Asher et al. 1974:26.) In his 1974 paper, Asher expresses a view that most linguistic features can be embedded into the imperative form and that this approach can maintain high interest in the students for a long time.

Krakowian (1981) shows that many other techniques used in conventional teaching may be adapted for the purpose of promoting active listening. For example, same/different or true/false techniques may be used. Also dictation may be highly useful if it is limited to numbers, dates, or telling the time.

The proponents of comprehension-based teaching favour an early introduction of reading. They argue that it may serve as a visual

reinforcement for the listening process. Two conditions have to be observed however. Learners should always have a chance to hear the material before its reading is assigned to them. Besides, "sufficient listening should be provided in order to 'imprint' the sound image before giving the learner a chance to make a faulty guess from the written form" (Gary 1981:10).

A successful programme combining these two comprehension skills has been worked out for English by Gary and Gary at Cairo University, Egypt. Students using these materials demonstrate substantial progress in learning English, even in speaking it, as was reported at the AILA Congress in Lund.

On reading about comprehension-based teaching one can easily notice that it incorporates the basic assumptions of present-day linguistics and psychology almost entirely. It is also in agreement with recent research on second language acquisition and learning, particularly with the writings of S. Krashen. In his Monitor model, Krashen hypothesizes that adults learning a second or a foreign language have two systems at their disposal - subconscious language acquisition, similar to the process children use in acquiring their mother tongue, also a second language, and conscious language learning, which results in conscious awareness of the grammatical rules. Out of the two, subconscious language acquisition is more important and should be encouraged wherever it is possible. "A good language learner is first and foremost an acquirer" (Krashen 1981:6). Language acquisition takes place in natural conditions, but it can also take place in the classroom if the classroom provides comprehensible input. By comprehensible input he means an input in which the focus is on the message, not on the form. The approach to language teaching discussed in this paper focuses primarily on the message, thus providing comprehensible input by Krashen's standards.

Comprehension-based teaching, although it is rather concerned with the initial stage of language instruction, is sometimes viewed as a new paradigm in language teaching. As Nord puts it, "the comprehension approach to foreign language teaching is more than a simple switch from an emphasis on speaking to an emphasis on listening. It is more than a shift from one language skill to another. Rather, it is a fundamental shift in the basic assumptions underlying the psychological and linguistic framework from which language teaching methodologies emerge. It is a shift in what is meant by the term "language" and a shift in what is meant by the term "learning". It involves a shift in our assumptions about the "nature of

man" and the "nature of mind"... The "comprehension approach" involves what Kuhn has termed a "paradigm shift", a "scientific revolution" (Nord 1980:1).

Indeed, for its followers this approach constitutes a major break in assumptions about the nature of language and language learning processes - they no longer believe that learning a language is just learning to talk - but, whether this approach is going to become a revolution in language teaching is rather doubtful or at least remains to be seen. According to some other predictions (Stevenson 1981:270), it is rather the communicative teaching movement that will become the paradigm of the eighties.

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THE ROLE OF JOKES IN THE SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION OF ECONOMISTS-TO-BE

INTRODUCTION

Every second observer of jokes would readily agree that "the appropriate introduction of a joke or anecdote in the course of a lesson can not only revive the student's flagging interest, but can contribute to his understanding and retention of the subject matter as well" (see Pocheptsov 1974:8).

Why is it then that jokes have been neglected both by practising teachers and theoreticians? That is one of the questions I am trying to give an answer to. I am convinced that jokes should have a greater role in the process of foreign language teaching than they have got so far. It is particularly true in connection with the teaching of English for Special Purposes (ESP), ie. the teaching of economists in our case. The teaching of ESP should not necessarily entail dullness. While the "young adults" are sometimes unwilling to take an active part in the English language-games, they are keen on understanding and reproducing jokes. At all levels jokes may serve as excellent illustrations of various linguistic and grammar points. Because of the limited time-span at our disposal, there is no time for dealing with lengthy literary short stories or anecdotes, and our students are not interested in them either. So jokes make up for the limited time-span and make the dry material more stimulating. Jokes also enable the students to become more conscious of their native language and the second language they are studying.

In analysing the jokes I tried to give a summary of the most relevant theoretical investigations and came to the conclusion that the approach of contrastive semantics would be most promising in this field. The scope of the present paper, however, does not permit more than just a few suggestions. The teacher should always know when and where to apply jokes. Students are not expected to laugh (it is an artificial joke-situation) but they may do so. Apart from developing comprehension, enlarging or activating vocabulary and improving conversation, the students acquire real living English and grasp some of the culture of Britain. The emergence of translation points may also be useful.

THE POSITION OF JOKES IN PRACTICE AND THEORY

First we should find the reason why many teachers dislike using jokes during their lessons. I am not referring to the traditional subject-matter, ie. literary anecdotes and short stories with humorous ending. In the majority of English and Russian text-books published in Hungary, humour is usually placed at the very end, just in front of the appendix, which is another proof of the inferior position of jokes. Most of the teachers do not make use of this material at all either because the humour selected is really bad, chosen at random and not linguistically based. It would not be of great help in learning anyway.

Jokes have meant a white spot for both international and Hungarian aesthetics. Jokes are evasive because they do not represent an aesthetic category in the traditional sense. This very reason accounts for the fact that literary theory has not paid as much attention to jokes as they deserve. I could not find but two important works with literary approach on the subject (see Jolles 1956: 206-217 and Röhrich 1977); the former work has been fiercely debated. Even Jolles could not find the place of jokes among the other simple forms as each of them is archaic, while the joke-form is a relatively recent development. Most of the other works on jokes are merely diverse collections of humour. There has not been made a clear distinction between anecdotes and jokes, and the solution of the task is almost impossible. However, anecdotes have a great interference with written literature, they are always longer, they always raise a claim of authenticity and are connected with well-known people. Anecdotes mean to teach morals, manners, history and cultural achievements. Jokes, according to the general belief, have none of these functions, they are just to make one laugh. I do not regard as anecdotes forms in which only the names of famous people are mentioned. Here is the one on G. B. Shaw:

Lady Astor to G. B. Shaw, "If you were my husband I should put poison in your coffee."
Shaw answers, "If you were my wife, I should drink it."

Jokes came into being in the second half of the 19th century, a significant part of them never find their way to the print. The science of folklore investigates the oral spread and reproduction of jokes, the circumstances of joke-telling. Psychology is interested in the personalities of the partners involved in the communicative activity of joke-telling, the physiology of laughter and the role of jokes in self-realization (let us think of Freud's interpretation of jokes and dreams). In 1980 a significant

Hungarian book was published in the field of sociology. Its author (see Katona 1980) dealt with 3000 jokes from the field of political and public life, their production, spread and variation. Sociology has on the whole been the most consequent in joke-research.

The commonly accepted theories define jokes as follows: A joke is a brief, compact narrative which ends with a point in most cases. The definition brings about several problems. The notion of shortness is relative. We can say a joke is longer than a one-sentence-long folklore form (e.g., a proverb) but shorter than a tale. Compactness takes us nearer the essence of jokes: a joke is restricted to telling us the most important things, it must be economic in its means. Every joke contains a point but a point can come into existence only on the basis of the relation with the other components. If it is true that "a narrative is made up solely of functions: everything in one way or another is significant" (Barthes 1975: 244), it is exceedingly valid in the case of jokes. The contential-formal variety, richness of jokes is boundless. There are jokes based on events and there are the ones based on dialogue. Jokes may contain one, two, three, rarely more episodes.

In distinguishing the two basic types of jokes I relied on the Bergsonian theory of humour: we know jokes where language is only the "medium" of humour and there are jokes brought to life by the "absentmindedness of the language" (see Bergson 1970:209-263). Jokes may belong to situational humour or linguistic humour. Formulaic jokes hardly contain more than a point. In jokes and riddles Jolles sees one common feature: their ideal sphere is "Schweigen", ie. keeping quiet. Jokes, according to him, are self-structuring forms that have come into existence without the compositional intention of the creators, as if by themselves. Keeping quiet does not involve, of course, the absence of language but the absence of information, therefore it is possible that jokes are well-formed on the surface-level but not in their deep structure.

At last but not least let us consider linguistics. It is evident that linguistics has also excluded jokes from its field of study. It is widely accepted that jokes violate certain logical, semantic and pragmatic rules. Their "incongruency", "deviancy" and "ambiguity" accounts for the problematic position occupied by jokes. If we regard jokes as "deviancies" form the set norms of the language, it is only too natural that they should be excluded from any systematic theory of the language, not to speak of pedagogical grammars. If we call jokes mere "deviances", we ignore their complexity. Although jokes do negate certain rules, they preserve them at the same time. Jokes compel the users of language to be conscious of their own communicative competence, makes

them revise and reinterpretate their knowledge of this world, the language and their way of thought. Jokes can be coded and decoded and obtain an additional communicative value namely through the violation of rules. Precisely this aspect of jokes ought to be made use of during the lessons of foreign languages. A growing awareness of one's native language develops consciousness in the usage of the semantic, syntactical and pragmatic rules of the second language too. In this relation, quite a few jokes might have other functions than just making one laugh.

Jokes are not so rich in stereotypes as other narrative texts. The sentence stating the aim and describing the circumstances is the set of such linguistic signs which tend to specify the expectations of the listener. More often than not these signs are misleading indexes enabling jokes to meet the requirements of unexpectedness and novelty.

The introductory sentence of joke-telling refers only to the fact that we shall hear a joke:

Eg.: Have you heard this joke?
Excuse me, if you have heard...
Heard the joke about...?
What/how about the man who...

This beginning, apart from creating two-way communication, is of no greater importance than the beginning sentence of a telephone-conversation. A telephone-conversation may also have numerous ends. Before treating jokes on the English lessons the students' attention should be called to the fact that while in Hungarian we should use Past Tense in this beginning sentence, the English use Present Perfect Tense or a form of ellipsis which is characteristic of colloquial English.

The jokes beginning with a question let us guess the structure to be expected. "What is the difference...?" or "Who is an optimist?" Questions of funny riddles are misleading on purpose:

Why are the Scots buried in the mountain-side?
Because the cemetery is there.

The names and number of characters in a joke also orient us. A Móricka joke (a piquant, disrespectful joke may be expected), Arisztid and Tasziló (a joke on the stupidity of aristocrats), an Englishman, a Frenchman and a Russian meet (we can be sure that an overbidding joke will be heard).

There is no doubt about the historical-social determination of jokes, at the same time it is still an open question why certain jokes are of such immense popularity in some countries eg.: what accounts for the great popularity of jokes on the Scots in Hungary?

The semantic relations of power and its linguistic realization in jokes might be of great interest. The change of sub- and superordination relations is often responsible for the humorous effect of jokes. The exchange of roles may be permanent (child's remarks), occasional (employer - employee) or alternating (jokes on lunatics).

The different types of jokes are classified traditionally as follows:

On the basis of the social, national, religious, sex and age belonging of the figures there are jokes on doctors, waiters, Scots, chairmen, Jews, mothers-in-law, children, aristocrats, spinsters, etc.

The scenes of jokes may be schools, barracks, the next world, or a desert island.

On the basis of their substantial relations there are political, religious, sex, scatological, economic, and dream jokes.

According to effect, jokes may be morbid, obscene, or shaggy-dog stories.

In tendency jokes may be aggressive, anticlerical or inoffensive.

Considering the different techniques, there are trickster jokes, puns, slogan and phrase jokes, definition jokes, overbidding jokes, point-killing, and gesture jokes or cartoons.

A final possibility of classification is to see who utters the point: child's remarks, medical jokes, etc.

Röhrich classifies jokes on the basis of a more unified approach, although he also regards jokes as deviancies from certain norms. In his opinion there are jokes representing clashes with the norms of language, logics, morals and manners, society, politics, religion and national minorities. Jokes are relevant if we keep in mind that in everyday life apart from creating communication, they serve as means of keeping up or sometimes replacing communication. Joke is an elastic form - the change of some of its elements may give a contrary sense to the whole. For the same reason jokes provide a suitable frame for making up good drills.

An analysis of jokes could be either structural or functional. An investigation of the sentence generating the point might be of interest.

THE APPLICABILITY OF JOKES ON LESSONS OF ENGLISH

The possibilities of the application of jokes on the lessons are, in fact, infinite. In the very beginning such short anecdotes or jokes may be used which are internationally well-known, eg., the ones about great businessmen. Here the student is required to be able to identify the joke with the one known

in his native language. At the next stage the application of jokes containing the lexicon of economic English is advisable; it is of great help in the retention and reinforcement of the newly learnt subject-matter. When studying the lesson "Jobs", the following jokes may be used:

A Scotsman was complaining to his boss, "I have been here for five years doing the work of three men for one man's wage, and I think it's time I had a rise."
"Well," said his boss, "I couldn't do that, but if you'll just tell me the names of the other two - I'll sack them."

or

A man applied for the job of a night security guard at the factory. The boss said, "The sort of person we need for this job is tough, fearless, aggressive, suspicious, distrustful, always on the lookout for trouble and constantly ready to flare into violence. Quite frankly, you don't seem to fit the bill."
"Oh, that's all right," explained the man. "I've only come to apply for the job on behalf of my mother-in-law."

Here important lexical items like boss, wage, to do work, rise, to sack, to apply for a job emerge in the course of a few minutes, the students have a chance to relax; nevertheless, they are practising the lexicon that is important from the point of view of the subject-matter. Their comprehension is, of course, checked. It is a motivating task if they remake the second joke as if the mother-in-law were applying for a job where just another sort of person is needed. Another task favoured by the students is the 'point-killing game' which involves the usage of opposites too.

Naturally several grammatical points may be drilled continually with the help of jokes. No doubt, each student will remember this joke in connection with the Future Perfect Tense:

Bill: "I hear your mother-in-law is in hospital."
Sam: "Yes, that's right."
Bill: "How long has she been there?"
Sam: "In 3 weeks time, with any luck, she'll have been there a full month."

After listening and understanding the jokes, the students may make up their versions about husband and wife, boss and employee, two enemies or anyone they choose. In the above-mentioned instances the jokes are based on situational humour.

The role of contrastive approach comes in at the next stage. Although it would have been ideal to make a comparative use of Hungarian and English jokes based on the same linguistic phenomenon, I found that the majority of Hungarian jokes are situational. Hungarian jokes are not so conscious of the language as the English jokes are. There are hardly any Hungarian

jokes based on homonymy. So the solution I found was to call the students' attention to the similar linguistic phenomena existing in L_1 trying in this way to lead them to a proper understanding in L_2 . The field of Hungarian puns needs further investigation and elaboration. Out of the 4000 jokes that have appeared in print in Hungary, a majority are based on the distortion of slogans, proverbs (there seems to be a definite dislike for "big words"), there are puns based on collocations and phrases, speech habits and misuses of the language. Definition jokes are rather popular.

So in the end I decided to provide the students with parallel linguistic phenomena from their first language. Even so this method has proved more useful than the mere translation of the English joke into the native language because the thrill of understanding is not lost and the reference to the students' knowledge of the first language gives them confidence. It is stimulating for the students and their awareness of the native language becomes more acute. They also become more conscious of the ways and means of the second language, realize the difference of semantic features between the two languages.

Linguists are well aware of the ambiguity of such units as homonyms and polysemantic words but ambiguity can also be found in seemingly unambiguous sentences of jokes; these are sentences with implications. This latter type of jokes should be applied, however, with great precaution.

Native speakers rarely misunderstand homonyms but misunderstanding of this type frequently occurs in English jokes. Eg.:

"Sir, I want to tender my resignation."
"Never mind making it tender - make it brief."

"The lexemes of the language are to be assigned to parts-of-speech (nouns, verbs, adjectives etc.) and to various sub-classes of the parts-of speech..." (see Lyon 1979:555). Hungarian homonymy is as a rule based on other word-classes than in English. I can think of but one example where homonymy has the relation of an adjective and a verb as its basis: ir, which may mean Irish or he writes. Homonymy is particularly characteristic of nouns and verbs in Hungarian: csap (tap and to hit), dob (drum and to throw), nyul (rabbit and to reach), fog (tooth and to catch), fűz (willow and to thread), etc.

And now let us see an example of false or partial homonymy characteristic both of English and Hungarian jokes:

Then there is the couple who works in iron and steel industry. She irons and he steals.

The homonymy of syntactic constructions is characteristic in advertisement columns. Although advertisements are far from being oral, they are also necessary in teaching economists. This is an example from an advertisement:

Bulldog for sale. Eats anything. Very fond of children.

For polysemy there is the Hungarian word nyelv, which means language and tongue, körte (pear and bulb), toll (pen and feather). An English joke provides for an example:

Boss - "Oh, Archibald, you are too slow."
Archibald - "I am afraid I don't grasp you."
Boss - "Yes, that's just it."

In the above joke the phenomenon of polysemy shows coincidence with Hungarian. I am not going to give examples of synonymy and antonymy. Their occurrence is highly frequent in jokes because of the nature of their structure and one word is more frequently associated with a word than another.

There is one more type of joke worth mentioning. In many jokes words or phrases may have two meanings, the literal and the metaphorical meaning. Interpreting a phrase word for word is often the source of humour. The following joke is to illustrate it:

My mother-in-law is a woman of rare gifts... She has hardly given anyone a present for the last 25 years.

When dealing with jokes based on literal vs. metaphorical meaning it may be useful if the students try to give full details of what was in the mind of the speaker. In a great proportion of jokes the absence of semantic continuity is responsible for misunderstanding. In them the possibility of normal communication is excluded by the fact that "the postulate of identity is violated, the object of discourse does not remain identical with itself" (see Rezvin 1973:415).

Complicated jokes or jokes containing the registers of occupation, regional belonging, or age difference and the ones using substandard language should be made use of only at the advanced level, if at all.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I do not claim to have exhausted the significance and richness of jokes in connection with second language teaching. Certainly further theoretical investigations are needed to render the complexity of the simple forms: jokes in particular. I emphasize the use of jokes, and not that of anecdotes, because it is jokes that enable students to hear utterances originally meant

for oral communication. Jokes are brief, but they may be discussed in such a way that even new information can be elicited from them. Students of economics are expected to get on with both oral and written English in the field of economics. The similarity of both jokes and special texts is in that they are purposeful and compact. Yet jokes are livelier and less abstract in nature than the texts we deal with during the lessons. Although it may be debated, I have found that excellent drills and stimulating tasks are provided by the repetition, inversion, substitution and exaggeration inherent in jokes.

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