REPRESENTING THE PRACTICE OF TEACHERS' PEDAGOGICAL KNOWING

JUKKA HUSU

This study treats teachers' pedagogical knowing as a broad theoretical concept and as an extended practice. Pedagogical activity is not simply what happens in schools and classrooms, it is also found inside teachers and outside schooling institutions. This type of knowing is characterized as an active process by which individuals perform their duties in situations involving intense social interactions. The study consists of five international articles and an introductory background review. Theoretically oriented readers will benefit from its comprehensive review of a knowledge base for the teaching profession. Methodologically, three types of narrative analyses are used to explain the nature and structure of teachers' pedagogical knowing. Against the background of these analyses, five characteristics of teachers' practitioner knowledge are portrayed.

Kasvatusalan tutkimuksia

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Research in Educational Sciences

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REPRESENTING THE PRACTICE OF TEACHERS' PEDAGOGICAL KNOWING

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Representing the practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing

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Summary

Representing the practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing (235 pages)

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This study consists of five international articles and an introductory background review. Its focus is on the nature and structure of teachers' pedagogical knowing. Pedagogical knowing is characterized as an active process by which teachers perform their duties in situations involving intense social interactions. This study treats teachers' pedagogical knowing as a broad theoretical concept and as an extended practice. Patterns of teachers' narratives are analysed as reflecting the general nature of this type of knowing.

The theoretical background consists of three concepts. The idea of *phronesis* argues that teaching can be understood as an embodied judgement linking knowledge and virtue. The concept of relational knowing draws attention towards that which lies ahead of a teacher in a given situation. The pervasiveness of pedagogical knowing explores that situation more in depth. Together, the concepts extend the theoretical bases of the individual articles.

Based on a broad concept of teachers' pedagogical knowing, analyses of qualitative data are presented. Narrative interviews provide data for descriptions of teachers' justifications and their individual epistemologies. In comparative cross-case studies intersubjectivity is brought to the fore. The article studies investigate how teachers' knowing is related to others. An individual case study presents the complex practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing. In concert, three types of narrative analyses are used to explain the nature and structure of teachers pedagogical knowing. Against the background of these analyses, five characteristics of this type of knowing are portrayed.

The results show that the concept and practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing contains certain fundamental tensions inherent in teaching. Five stand out: care and respect for students, the compelling power of teachers' personal justifications, the absence of a shared code of practice, the struggles to balance teachers' public and private roles, and the basic uncertainty within the teaching profession.

To fully grasp the diverse nature of pedagogical knowing, its general social and cultural context should be taken into account. The general context is particularly significant in the ethical issues manifested in teachers' work.

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1) HUSU, J. (2000). HOW TEACHERS JUSTIFY THEIR PRACTICAL KNOWING? CONCEPTUALIZING GENERAL AND RELATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS. *ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT*, 3(1), 163–186.

2) HUSU, J. (2002). NAVIGATING THROUGH PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE: TEACHERS' EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANCE TOWARDS PUPILS. IN C. SUGRUE & C. DAY (EDS.), *DEVELOPING TEACHERS AND TEACHING PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES* (PP.58–72). LONDON/NEW YORK: ROUTLEDGEFALMER.

THE SECOND SET OF STUDIES (II)

1) TIRRI, K. & HUSU, J. (2002). CARE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN "THE BEST INTEREST OF A CHILD": RELATIONAL VOICES OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN TEACHING. *TEACHERS & TEACHING: THEORY AND PRACTICE*, 8(1), 65–80.

2) HUSU, J. & TIRRI, K. (2001). TEACHERS' ETHICAL CHOICES IN SOCIO-MORAL SETTINGS. *JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION*, 30(4), 361–375.

THE THIRD SET OF STUDIES (III)

1) HUSU, J. & TIRRI, K. (IN PRESS). A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO STUDY ONE TEACHER'S MORAL REFLECTION. *TEACHING AND TEACHER EDUCATION*.

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[1] In the text the publications are referred to by the number of the set of studies (I, II, III) to which they belong. Individual publications are referred to both by the number of the set and by the specific study number (e.g. study II/2).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

BACKGROUND REVIEW

INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A MINDFUL ORIENTATION IN TEACHERS' PEDAGOGICAL KNOWING

Coming to terms with the setting

The last decade has been an era of both individual and team-based pedagogical action – at least in the Scandinavian countries (Klette, 1997; Broadhead, 2001). In Finland specific curricular frames have been abandoned to a great extent, and they have been replaced by local and school-centered curricular guidelines. Teachers are at the center of this educational enterprise: it is their professional task, both individually and collectively as a school community, to shape the school-centered curricula according to their best professional understanding and capability. The task coveres the totality of the educational processes from classroom practices to general educational aims and goals and to the special characteristics the schools were aiming to develop.

The change taking place in the teaching profession can be viewed as a two-fold transformation. On one hand, a shift of administrative power is taking place from the general and bureaucratic (macro) level to the practical and local school level. This development in educational policy coincides with the second transformation, in which

the teacher's professional role is changing from that of an implementor of general curricular guidelines to that of an inventor of more personal and situation-specific approaches in education. Together these two transformations mean the empowerment of teachers in the sense that, from now on, teachers are more responsible for the totality of the instructional process taking place in schools. The situation can be seen as a sort of testing ground for teachers' pedagogical capabilities to become active curriculum makers instead of passive curriculum users (Clandinin & Connelly, 1992).

The situation can also be described as contextual and integrated. The situation is contextual in the sense that teachers work in their schools and classroom settings, where changes are taking place. Teachers' work is situated – that is, it takes place in institutions, cultural and social fields, and in response to individual and social pressures that are often unique. The prevailing situation can be regarded as integrated in the sense that teachers, both factually and now also officially, have to take account of the totality of the instructional process they intend to perform. As Whitehead (1995) has noted, teachers' simultaneously need both the practical capacities to engage in educational processes and the theoretical capacities to relate their educational actions to educational theories, or even to produce their own living educational theories.

Restructuring school curricula and pedagogical practices is of little value if it does not take teachers into account. Teachers do not merely deliver the curriculum. As mentioned, their professional tasks now also include developing and redefining the curriculum. It is what teachers think, what teachers believe and what teachers do in schools that ultimately shapes the kind of education young people get.

1.1 APPROACHING THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING
– AND BEYOND

A great deal of inservice training and formal teacher education is devoted to transmitting knowledge and various skills to teachers. When this is done well, teachers should be enlightened and more capable of performing their educational tasks. According to this "hard ground" agenda, the problem is getting teachers to see this. If the solution doesn't work, there is a tendency to suppose that something is wrong with the practioners. By practioners is meant not only teachers, but also teacher educators and other authoritative representatives of the educational sciences. It is their task to solve persistent pedagogical problems by possessing and acting on the adequate and accurate knowledge needed. Furthermore, these authoritative possessors of knowledge must also be able to transmit this knowledge to other users in such a form that it can be reinterpreted and used in an appropriate way. However, not too many users know how to use/implement their knowledge in the various practical contexts they face. (Handal & Lauvas, 1987; Sanders & McCutcheon, 1987; Marland, 1998)

In recent years, we have come to realize that teachers are the ultimate key to educational change and school improvement. All our efforts to restructure schools or to reshape the composition and the contents of curriculum are of little value if we do not take teachers into account. Teachers don't just teach at schools; more than anything else, it is the teachers – together with the students – that make the schools what they are. To a great extent, teachers define, develop, and (re)interpret schools (McGahey, 1997). Growing appreciation of this educational reality has placed working with teachers, and understanding teaching, at the top of many research and educational improvement agendas.

We have become aware that developing teachers and improving their teaching involves more than giving them practical advice and appropriate techniques. It is recognized that, for teachers, what goes on inside classrooms is closely related to what goes on inside and outside of schools, and to how all this gets interpreted in teachers' minds. Teachers' professional development is inseparable from what teachers are as persons and as professionals. As Sykes (1996) puts it:

teachers' professional development is closely tied to "a low-lying swamp of messy problems, persisting dilemmas, and perennial problems for which no evident technical knowledge exists" (p. 466).

According to the "soft ground" agenda of teachers' professional development, teaching acts are a complex of many issues, and are related to contexts and situations through the individuality of the teacher. Knowing them means understanding specific cases and unique situations. This kind of practice is mainly formulated in concrete and context-related terms. As a result, teachers' practical knowing deals with lived experiences, and its statements are essentially perceptual rather than conceptual. Their ultimate appeal is to perception, "What is perceived?", and to action, "What is done, and how?" As Gudmundsdottir (1991) emphasizes, "ways of seeing are ways of knowing." If so, how have we 'seen' teachers and 'known' their work, teaching.

Conceptions of teacher knowledge

Freeman (1996) has argued that throughout its development in the last century, educational research has generally focused on student learning and achievement, and teaching has been almost exclusively examined through that lens (Dunkin & Biddle, 1974; Clark & Peterson, 1986). Within the process-product paradigm, teaching was framed in terms of the learning outcomes it 'produced,' and its lived social complexity was therefore mostly overlooked. However, during the 1970's, the increased interest in the contexts of teaching and in the person of teachers (e.g. Jackson, 1968; Lortie, 1975), helped to formulate an area of inquiry into teacher thinking, or teacher knowledge. The aim of such research was stated by Halkes & Olson (1984), according to whom:

> [l]ooking from a teacher-thinking perspective at teaching and learning, one is not so much striving for the disclosure of *the* effective teacher, but for the explanation and understanding of teaching processes as they are. After all, it is the teacher's subjective school-related knowledge which determines for the most part what happens in the classroom, whether the teacher can articulate her/his knowledge or not. (p. 1, original emphasis)

Comparing this sort of approach to its antecedents in product-process research, Halkes & Olson (*ibid.*) concluded that instead of reducing the complexities of teaching into a few manageable research variables, one tries to find out how teachers cope with these complexities. Elbaz (1991) explained the aim of the approach in terms of 'voice.' According to her, the approach strived to "redress an imbalance" which had emphasized the knowledge of teaching "from the outside only" (p. 10). For this reason, she wanted to "return to teachers the right to speak for and about teaching" (*ibid.*).

According to Freeman (1996), this stance has significantly altered the area of educational research. This is because, now inquiries into teachers' knowledge "made a clear and convincing case for the need to include the perspectives and knowledge of teachers in understanding teaching" (p. 738). This has led education research to broaden and refocus the ways and means of understanding teachers and their work.

Clark (1986, pp. 8-9) has traced the past development of teacher thinking and teacher knowledge research and has found three interconnected and partly overlapping phases in its development:

i) The teacher as a decision-maker, in which the teacher's task was to diagnose needs and learning problems of students and to prescribe effective and appropriate instructional treatments for them. Decision-making was perceived as *the* basic teaching skill which provided a lens to analyze teaching (Shavelson, 1973). The teacher was seen as a sort of physician who operated 'in a bounded rational world of education' by defining problems and seeking satisfactory solutions to them. The stance referred to medical diagnosis and clinical decision-making. (cf. Kagan, 1988)

ii) The teacher as a sense-maker, in which decision-making was seen as one among several activities teachers performed in order to create meaning for themselves and their students. The teacher was seen as a reflective professional (Schön, 1983). Within this stance, teachers' primarily a diagnostic-prescriptive way of thinking was accomplished by a more general view of teaching that called for a more extensive type of knowing. The stance assumed that reflectively a professional teacher

interpreted and skillfully applied his/her knowledge to particular situations in which she/he performed.

iii) The teacher as a constructivist, who continually builds and elaborates her/his personal theory of teaching and education. This third phase meant the widening of teachers' problem space: no more was it believed that teachers solely could define and resolve problems they encountered in their work by themselves. Powerful influences – also beyond the control of individual teachers – create problems teachers have solve or to live by.

During the 1990's teacher knowledge – in the moral and ethical sense – became of major interest (Goodlad *et al.*, 1990; Jackson *et al.*, 1993; Sockett 1993; Strike & Ternasky, 1993; Oser 1994; Hansen, 1993a, 1993b, 1995; Hostetler, 1997). Accordingly, the concept of virtue reappeared both in philosophical investigations (MacIntyre, 1981, Crisp, 1996; Crisp & Slote, 1997) and educational writings (Buchmann, 1990; Fenstermacher, 1990; Elbaz, 1993; Hansen, 1994; van Manen, 1994; Carr & Steutel, 1999) – and found its critics, as well (Fenstermacher, 1994a). Perhaps this can be seen as a fourth phase of conceptions of the teacher in the research on teacher knowledge. According to this stance, the teacher is seen as a meaning-maker who aims at shaping and influencing what students become as persons when living through pedagogical situations in schools and classrooms.

In sum, in teacher thinking/knowledge research we have moved away from internally consistent and mechanical paradigms towards more inconsistent, imperfect and incomplete ways of perceiving and analyzing teacher thinking/knowledge (cf. Kansanen *et al.*, 2000). We are moving towards an understanding that what goes on inside classroom walls (and inside teachers' heads) is closely related to what goes on outside those walls (and outside teachers' heads). We are also recognizing that teachers' professional knowledge cannot be described solely from cognitive perspectives.

Conceptions of Context

Side by side with this conceptual development in the research on teacher thinking/knowledge, the context of teaching has also been broadened. At first, the unit of the research was the instructional process in which teachers made decisions in order to help students learn. The situation and the tasks were seen as largely predetermined and fixed. Gradually, the notion of context became more dynamic and collectively defined: it was seen to be based on a mutually-negotiated understanding between teachers and students (Clark, 1986; Erickson, 1986). The conception of the school classroom, and the teacher in it, as the unit of analysis, was shattered e.g. by Jackson (1966, 1968). Those complexities that are nowadays being regarded as some sort of basic knowledge in the field were eloquently presented by him: *the way teaching is* in the school context.

Consequently, as Clark (1986, p. 12) has stated, we have moved away from a rather impoverished and fragmented notion of context as a collection of background variables to a richer, more dynamic, and collectively defined understanding of the concept. Nowadays, context is no more regarded as a variable, or as a collection of more or less mechanical components that lie outside of the object of interest. Rather, teachers and teaching are seen to be embedded in the surrounding world and also affected by it.

Constructivistic notions of student learning and action paved the way to more extended views of context. Instead of "outside/inside" metaphors, context was seen both as actual and symbolic: it was a field for action and the medium within which individuals constructed their understandings of the situations. For pedagogical practices this extended view of contextuality was worth noting. This stance emphasized that both the actions taken and the symbolic constructs made inform each other, comprising a larger whole. Indeed, the term context comes from latin *contextus*, which means "a joining together" (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992, p. 4). Thus, teachers and students interact with their contexts and create multiple and mutual understandings which, in turn, inform their actions and understandings.

Seddon (1994, pp. 36-37) speaks of "practice-based" contextualism. There, the relationship between the context and its objects is

understood as a kind of ongoing, immensely complex cultural encounter. According to her,

> there is nothing essential about context or its objects. We 'chunk' up the world as a basis for research and everyday practice. But this chunking is a methodological procedure shaped by distinctive frames of explanation, both formal and informal. There is no such thing as an unproblematic phenomenon such as 'education,' 'school,' or 'individual' that can be simply observed and understood. (Seddon 1995, p. 401)

When context is understood as the place of interpretative and discursive practices that constitute the real and relevant, what emerges is the fluidity of context. Context appears subjective – reality is defined according to the perspective of participants in any setting. This kind of interpretative approach makes an ontological claim first. It infers that our being and acting in our contexts is interpersonal and that it involves sharing our cultural manners. Also, this perspective implies that our ways of relating to the world are primarily not ways of thinking and knowing, but ways of being, as well.

However, these personal features of individually-experienced contexts should not be overstated. This is because even if individual teachers are each differently situated, they also act within commonly-experienced institutional settings. These settings have a long history and have relatively stable social effects that are rooted in their contemporary practices. Consequently, while there are changes and emerging challenges, there are also continuities that structure teachers' actions and understanding.

In sum, if context is understood as practice-based, the challenge is not to identify a tiny piece of reality to study by choosing a small topic. Rather, as Seddon (1995, p. 403) argues, the challenge is to construct frames for analyses and explanations that enable us to grasp significant aspects of phenomena and to make explicit the ways of seeing and interpreting them.

2.2 General aims of the studies

Characteristics of teacher knowledge are usually hidden or veiled. Therefore, as van Manen (1990, p. 181) argues, what we need are descriptions and interpretations that are adequate enough to reveal those experiential or textual meanings. As a result, if we succeed, we will get a description or interpretation that we can rely on. We can recognize it as a kind of description or interpretation that helps us to understand the thoughts and experiences of others, as well as our own. van Manen (1990) speaks about a "phenomenological nod," which means that a good description or interpretation is "collected by lived experience, and helps to recollect lived experience" (p. 27). In order to be able to outline this type of knowing, I needed to define teacher knowledge much in terms of teachers' personal experiences and their reported activities and results. With the purpose of coping with this challenge, three sets of studies (I, II, III) were undertaken.

The first set of studies (I) consisted of two individual analyses of the nature of teachers' pedagogical knowing. The first study (I/1) investigated how justifications were presented in and could be interpreted from teachers' knowledge. The second study (I/2) used an epistemological framework to describe that pedagogical knowledge in use. Both studies examined the ways teachers perceived and understood the issues they dealt within their work. The first set of studies (I) aimed to uncover certain patterns for interpreting and understanding the practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing. Both studies (I/1 & 2) were mainly guided by two research questions: i) how teachers perceived pedagogical issues and events and acted upon them?, and ii) what kind of 'design' or 'formulation' could possibly be outlined to describe teachers' pedagogical justifications and epistemologies?

The second set of studies (II) broadened the scope. In addition to personal meaning making, intersubjectivity was now brought to the fore. The two studies (II/1 & 2) investigated how teachers' knowing was related to others. This was done by examining how teachers dealt with pedagogical dilemmas they faced in their work. The second set of studies (II) consisted of two analyses, which used the same data but different interpretative frameworks. The first study (II/1)

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used teachers' relational care ethics; the second study (II/2) relied on socio-moral interpretations of pedagogical dilemmas. Within the both studies, our approaches viewed teachers' knowing and action mainly as processes and products of social interaction.

The third study set (III) included one study (III/1) which aimed to bring together the findings and experiences of the previous stages. Here, the purpose was to explore three different, but simultaneously interrelated representations and interpretations of a teacher's pedagogical knowing. We aimed to interpret and translate teachers' knowledge from the language they used, and to give concrete expressions to these interpretations through their daily actions. Our goal was to interpret and present the complex practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing.

The purpose of using these three interrelated sets of studies (I, II, III) was to avoid pedagogical split vision (Fritzell, 1996). According to this notion, there has been a tendency to use either the internal or external perspective exclusively, as if the other did not exist. However, according to my basic premise, understanding teachers' knowing required me to study their pedagogical practices in terms of concrete relationships between teachers and the contexts in which those practices were embedded.

LINKING VARIOUS THEORETICAL APPROACHES WITH TEACHERS' PEDAGOGICAL KNOWING

Coming to terms with the idea of practice

Before going into a more detailed description of the theoretical issues, a clarification of what I mean by 'practice' is helpful. This is because the concept is little understood (van Manen, 1977; Reid 1979, 1999; Waks, 2000), despite the fact that we tend to think that what people do is simply practice. However, as Reid (1999) demonstrates by using Schwab's (1969, 1971, 1973) account of practice, the concept includes more than (practically!) meets the eye. Here, I focus on three characteristics of practice (Reid, 1999) that all relate to fundamental differences between commonsense notions of what practice is, and the conception of practice as it is understood and applied in this study.

The first difficulty is that usually conceptions of practice are determined by conceptions of theory. Reid (1999, p. 9) notes that in educational sciences theory is often seen as abstract and refined in nature. The more theory is characterized in this way, the more practice is considered as concrete and mundane: it is what teachers do every day in schools and classrooms. This common notion was challenged

by Schwab's argument that both theoretical and practical are justified forms of inquiry to treat different kinds of problems. Therefore, the distinction is not between theory, which treats problems in a philosphically grounded way, and practice, which deals them in a rule-of-thumb fashion. Rather, as Reid (1999, p. 10) argues, it is a division between two kinds of inquiry, both philosophically grounded, but adapted to the investigation of different kinds of problems.

The second difficulty arises from the situation that practice is usually viewed as involving the utilization of resources and the application of skills. For example, if we discuss how practices of teaching are to be improved, we would most likely engage in thinking of needed resources of all kinds (professional skills, materials, fundings, buildings etc.). However, according to the 'Schwabian' tradition and perspective, practice depends primarily not on resources and skills, but on tradition and character. Therefore, as Reid (1999) interprets, discussions of the improvement of practice needs primarily to be discussions of how tradition is to be shaped and how character is to be formed. This is because the ability to exercise deliberation depends on the traits of character.

The third difficulty deals with our tendency to see practice as value-free, the idea that practicing as teachers consists simply of discovering 'what works.' In this view, what teachers do (i.e. their practices) is simply a matter of technical know-how. According to this short-sighted stance, there are various means of achieving certain ends – e.g. making teaching more caring – and the choice between them is just a matter of which methods are most effective in producing the desired results. But if tradition and character are considered as important factors in achieving caring relations between teachers and students, then we have to accept the notion that tradition and character are more than the product of experiences of what works. As Reid (1999) states, tradition and character also "support and sympathize with certain kinds of practice on the basis of what communities and individuals value" (p. 13). Therefore, practices are deeply influenced by social and cultural considerations. In turn, this implies that as we confront problems of practice, we also face with problems of moral choice.

All and all, a teacher's practices emerge from "a vision of a particular kind of moral world" (Reid, 1999, p. 14). This perspective

has deep implications for teachers themselves, students, and the school communities. It is worth noting that its strengths and weaknesses lie in that broad vision. If we acknowledge that vision, we may find that many technical problems involved in the work of teachers are not very crucial (after all). If we fail to see the worth of this kind of perspective, we are not able to see the point of particular actions and their embeddedness in larger interpretative frameworks. As Reid (1999) urges us, we have to make our choice: "[i]s practice more than what works?" (p. 15). And here, my answer is positive. Therefore, the task is to explicate what kind of knowing should it reflect.

In the next sections of this chapter I extend the theoretical backgrounds of the three sets of studies (I, II, III). First, I focus on knowing as *phronesis* and argue that it can be understood as embodied judgement linking teachers' knowledge and their virtue. Then, the concept of relational knowing is presented together with its intersecting perspectives. Finally, teachers' daily encounters are explored in order to see what the pervasiveness of teaching means for pedagogical knowing. Above all, the broad theoretical approaches aim to extend the theoretical bases of the particular study sets. This is because the article format does not permit lengthy discussions. In the text, the theory presentations are marked by the particular study sets (I, II, III) which they mainly refer. However, the broad theoretical perspectives cannot be limited to particular studies and their frameworks. Rather, each background perspective contains various premises that overlap each other – much like the foreground of this study, teachers' pedagogical knowing, does.

2.1 KNOWING AS *PHRONESIS* (I)

In The *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle describes three approaches to knowledge: *episteme* (N.E., 1139b18-36), *techne* (N.E., 1140a1-23), and *phronesis* (N.E., 1140a24-1140b12). Roughly, they can be characterized as follows. *Episteme* refers to universal, invariable and context-independent knowledge that is based on general analytical rationality. *Techne* is mostly based on practical instrumental rationality and is governed by a conscious goal. It is pragmatic, context-dependent, and variable. *Phronesis* refers to deliberation about values

with reference to practice. It is variable and context-dependent. According to Aristotle,

> [w]e may grasp the nature of prudence [*phronesis*] if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous ... But nobody deliberates about things that are invariable ... So ... prudence cannot be science or art; not science [*episteme*] because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done at all), and not an art [*techne*] because action and production are generically different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing *well*. What remains, then is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man. [N.E. 1140a24-1140b12]

Phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (*episteme*) and technical knowledge or know-how (*techne*) and involves judgements made in living social contexts. It addresses the ways that people act in everyday situations and deals with human action in terms of practical situations. The stance focuses on the question "What should I do in this situation?" Therefore, in order to understand what *phronesis* means, we must look at a person who possesses it, the *phronimos*. That person is in "a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (N.E. 1140b5). The different interpretations of this statement are indicative of the different directions that the philosophical discussions and the educational applications of *phronesis* can go.

The concept, *phronesis*, has no analogous modern term in English (Noel, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 2001, Coulter & Wiens, 2002). Translations have included, among others, practical reasoning, practical wisdom, moral discernment, and prudence. As Noel (1999, p. 273) states, each of these translations points to a different facet of *phronesis*. Here, I limit myself to three philosophical interpretations and their educational applications: the rationality interpretation; the nature of perception and insight of *phronesis*; and the moral character of *phronesis*.

2.1.1 RATIONALITY INTERPRETATION

Philosophical investigations

Within the rationality interpretation, the *phronimos* approaches the problem of what to do in a given situation with actions based on reason. When examining how a person explains her/his actions, we are interested in the rationality evident in them. Audi (1989) has presented a scheme of practical reasoning by showing what it means to answer the *phronetic* question through the rationality interpretation. He sets certain premises for those who use this interpretation. According to Audi (1989, pp. 6-7), they must take into account at least two questions: i) what does it mean for an agent to act for a reason?; ii) is there a pattern of reasoning by which intentional actions can be explained? This approach can be called the 'reasons giving' approach to the analysis of human action. The interpretation calls for aspects of rationality that makes actions that are based on practical reasoning intelligible because "these actions, in turn, are based on at least one proposition (major premise) which is held as a guiding principle" (Audi, 1989, p. 25). The definition takes us to three key issues within the rationality interpretation: practical syllogism, practical deliberation and standards for appraisal of *phronesis*.

The form of the practical syllogism usually consists of a major premise, which is an expression of some wanted thing or end in action. It is generally considered to be a desire on the part of the individual agent. The next part of the syllogism takes into account the individual agent's perception of her/his own particular situation. This minor premise relates some action to this end. It is a collection of possible alternatives that the agent has in her/his present situation. The conclusion, finally, is a propositional statement about an action to be taken (Anscombe, 1963, p. 60; von Wright, 1971, p. 27).

Whether or not the practical syllogism truly represents the actual reasoning that occurs when the person makes her/his decision, the practice of deliberation plays a crucial role in the rationality interpretation. Aristotle describes the *phronimos* as "the man who is without qualification good at deliberating" (N.E., 1141b8-18). The approach comprises a chain of reasoning that leads from an initial desire to the final decision to act in a particular situation. According to Audi (1989), this purposive chain "unifies all our actions in relation

to our final end" (p. 33). The existence of such a purposive chain implies that the chain can also be used as a device to explain our actions.

If deliberative chains of reasoning are provided as explanations for our actions, there should be a way to determine the appropriateness of the arguments for explaining those actions. It is important that practical knowing is set to conform to certain standards. This appraisal can be made according to ether strict or loose standards. Audi (1989) prefers the former as he proposes that there is a set of specific philosophical standards for determining the justifiability of practical reasoning. He states that the full appraisal of practical reasoning requires logical, inferential and epistemic standards in order to verify the conclusions of the reasoning (p. 189). Fenstermacher (1994b), on the other hand, prefers a more minimal form of warrant for practical reasoning. According to him,

> the provision of reasons, when done well, makes action sensible to the actor and the observer ... Such reasoning may also show that an action is, for example, the reasonable thing to do, the obvious thing to do, or the only thing one could do under the circumstances. Each of these is ... a contribution to the epistemic merit of a practical knowledge claim (p. 45).

Educational applications

Green (1976) was among the first who claimed that competence for practical arguments was needed for successful teaching. As Green stated: "[t]o say that instruction is competently carried on is to say that the activities of instruction are guided by practical reason, that is, by certain practical arguments in the mind of the teacher" (p. 250). For Green, practical arguments meant not only formal statements but also "statements of pleasure, pain, and the expressions of desires" (p. 252) may be constructed as premises in teachers' practical arguments. Therefore, practical reasoning takes serious account of the emotions that are central to human life.

Later, Fenstermacher (1986) used the Aristotelian concept of practical argument in his research on teaching. His rationality interpretation of *phronesis* sought "to supply teachers with the means

to structure their experiences" (p. 46) in ways that would enlarge their knowledge. In the case of teachers' pedagogical competence, Fenstermacher aimed to recognize the implicit practical arguments underlying in teachers' action. He assumed that they could be reconstructed after the actual teaching had occurred. Then, the premises could be altered, extended, or incorporated by using different methods. It was believed that the process would improve teachers' practical reasoning. (Fenstermacher, 1986, 1987; Fenstermacher & Richardson, 1993)

However, some viewed these efforts as 'impractical' (Buchmann, 1987b) or 'dubious' (Munby, 1987). According to their arguments, one cannot adequately describe practical arguments without introducing the person who makes them. Teaching decisions are ultimately personal and they presuppose commitment. In addition, it is often difficult to analyze the statements underlying teachers' actions. As Vásquez-Levy (1993) argued, some of the teachers' beliefs and actions may seem irrational, awkward or incoherent to others. According to her, this particularly concerns those activities that guide teachers' daily activities. They are often acquired from the demands of the work tasks teachers perform and from beliefs generated within their own workplace culture.

2.1.2 SITUATIONAL PERCEPTION AND INSIGHT INTERPRETATION

Philosophical investigations

Within this interpretation, the *phronetic* question "What should I do in this situation?" is answered by focusing its primary attention on the circumstances. The stance addresses to perceive all that is involved in the situation, and was emphasized by Aristotle as he wrote that "practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular which is perception" (N.E., 1142a25-27). His authoritative statements were followed by many competing, even conflicting interpretations. Here, according to the advice of Noel (1999), I limit myself to three explanations: the issue of practical perception, the concept of discernment, and the notion of *phronetic* insight.

The necessities of everyday life presuppose that we must take into account many different things when we consider our situations.

Reeve (1992) talks about the person who "has the practical perception needed to determine what type of circumstances [she/] he is in and what type of action [she/] he is actually doing" (p. 97). Pendlebury (1990) calls this "situational apperception." Situations requiring actions are often full of possibilities, and the person is capable of perceiving those possible actions. She/he can consider them in order to accomplish a given purpose. As Noel (1999, p. 280) notes, this kind of interpretation of perception draws heavily on the rationality interpretation with its emphasis on the deliberative chain.

Shifting the focus from perception to discernment brings a small but significant distinction within the situational interpretation. Instead of merely perceiving what is present, the concept of discernment focuses on how things 'appear' to people. According to Nussbaum (1978, p. 255), it is a question of the interpretative power of the individual to see the object as something. Here, "both emotions and imagination play an essential part of the proper grasp of situations" (Pendlebury, 1990, p. 147). In the Aristotelian sense, it is the task of *phantasia* (imagination) to focus on all the concrete particulars rather than to create unreality. It is through imagination, Pendlebury emphasizes, that people "discern an item in the world ... *as* something that answers one or more of our practical concerns or interests" (*ibid.*, italics original).

Consequently, *phronesis* can be seen as a dynamic and flexible concept that presupposes a sort of insight into its use. In this sense, Dunne (1993) notes that *phronesis* allows "the greatest degree of flexibility, openness, and improvisation" (p. 245). This is because we need to focus on the acts of insight at the point of their emergence before they become "a part of our habitual pattern of experience" (p. 295). Without this insight, a person can not recognize the full layout of the practical situation in question. Because the stance does not solely rely on rationality, it is not crucially concerned with an appraisal of a person's reasoning process. Thus, there are no formal criteria by which to compare the claims of the competing ways of thinking and acting. The soundness of *phronetic* insight depends upon how well the person can determine the suitable response in a given situation.

Educational applications

As indicated, situational perception and insightful interpretation is largely based on experientially developed *phronesis*. Due to our experiences and personal relationships, we have our unique insights into the practical situations we face. What is perceived can be something that might not be at all apparent to others who are also present in the situation but do not have an 'eye for it,' i.e. they are not in the same position or they do not share the same experiences. Therefore, Pendlebury (1990) argues, "deliberation in teaching, if it is any good, relies crucially upon situational apperception" (171). It is crucial to sound pedagogical reasoning because

> if a practitioner is wrong in her [/his] identification of the salient features of a case, the result will be inappropriate or misguided action, regardless of the internal coherence of the argument she [/he] may give in support of her [/his] actions (p. 176).

It is a question of deliberations about what should or should not be done. However, this is not an easy task because in practice there lies a uncertainty about which one of several competing concerns a teacher should pay attention to in this particular situation (Jackson, 1986, pp. 53-74).

Elbaz's (1983) study of teachers' practical knowledge was among the first to uncover the situational perception and insight orientation in its pedagogical use. Actually, the term *phronesis* does not come up in her book, but she relies on Aristotle's distinction between theory and practice. She explains her use of the concept of practical knowledge, because "it focuses attention on the action and decision-oriented nature of the teacher's situation, and construes her [/his] knowledge as a function, in part, of her [/his] response to that situation" (p. 5). The term 'orientation' indicates the way knowledge is applied in active relation to surrounding situations. Elbaz (1983, pp. 101-130) reports various orientations in teachers' knowledge that describe the complex nature of matching teaching actions to the schooling practices. The importance of situational perception and insightful interpretation comes from the belief that it is possible for teachers to become aware of and articulate their own practical

knowledge. And consequently, this can lead to greater self-understanding and professional growth among teachers.

Lampert (1984) studied teachers in their daily activities within classrooms. She started with the notion of two types of knowledge: intuitive knowledge and formal knowledge. Intuitive knowledge refers to a store of "commonsense information from personal experimentation in practical settings" (p. 2). It is not usually made explicit but it is often useful and powerful. In contrast, formal knowledge refers to "commonly accepted set of well-articulated 'descriptions' of experience," which may have little connection with the knowledge teachers regularly apply in their work (*ibid.*). Lampert (1984) found that the way teachers structured their knowledge made it difficult to say whether it was 'intuitive' or 'formal.' The way teachers taught suggested that the dichotomy between these two kinds of knowledge was a false one. Teachers did not put aside the formal aspect of their knowledge while examining the intuitive aspect, not could they simply impose the formal without making some kind of sense of it for themselves and for their class.

Later, e.g. Nias (1989) and Page (1999) tackled teachers and teaching with the same kind of perspective. Nias aimed to uncover the situational wholeness of the teaching profession. She attempted to explain "What it means to be a teacher?" In her study, the self of the teacher was a crucial element in the way teachers themselves construed their job. Teachers' 'affective reality' consisted of both contradictory and complementary feelings associated with teaching. Page (1999), in turn, speaks of the "uncertain value of school knowledge." In a cultural analysis focused on school lessons, she has traced how teachers and students together produced a sort of common sense framework which was understandable in their particular institutional and social circumstances. What emerged in her study was the extraordinary complexity of school activities.

2.1.3 MORAL CHARACTER INTERPRETATION

Philosophical investigations

The circularity between *phronesis* and virtuous character is evident. According to Sherman (1989), this circularity aims "to capture the way in which the sentiments and practical reason together constitute character … [and] to demonstrate that character is inseparable from the operations of practical reason" (p. vii). Aristotle laid the foundations for this interpretation by stating that "it is evident that is impossible to be practically wise without being good" (N.E., 1144a29 b1). Thus, *phronesis* is not a concept that can be used or determined separate from the individual. Rather, it lies in the person and is part of the way that one goes about her/his everyday life.

For Dunne (1993), *phronesis* is not a cognitive capacity that one has at one's disposal. Rather, it is closely bound up with the kind of person that one is. The person's actions and her/his possibilities can only be found within particular situations, informed by particular histories, societies and social institutions. The actions of the person are made strong by repeated encounters with those actions and possibilities. Consequently, the person sees it not only as a way of behaving in particular contexts, but also as her/his 'way of being' that arises in those situations. Here, we have the circularity between *phronesis* and moral character. As a result, Dunne (1993) concludes, *phronesis* for a person has "its own personality which is rooted in a definite ethos with its own favored dispositions and habits" (p. 273). The way a person acts allows for the development of her/his *phronesis* and moral character.

Interpreting the moral character sense of *phronesis* through a person's living and actions, highlights its emphasis on the individual. However, Noel (1999) underlines the social nature of this conception and interpretation. She recalls that Aristotle's *phronimos* considers not only actions that are good for her-/himself as an individual, but also for society as a whole (p. 285). Also, Sherman (1989) implies this social nature of the moral character when she sees the deliberative aspects of practical reason as a "collaborative dimension" through which persons "conceive of their well-being as including the well-being of others" (p. 6).

At first, it might seem that the moral character interpretation is quite distinct from the two other interpretations. This is because, as

Sherman (1989) notes, "to act for the right reasons … is to act from the sort of wisdom that itself includes the vision and sensitivity of the emotions" (p. 2). The stance implies that personal emotions and attachments need not be justified from some 'high-order' rational perspective. However, a person's moral character must match various requirements of a particular situation. Therefore, it is not possible to separate moral character from rationality, deliberation or perception.

Educational applications

Recently, education has shown an increasing interest in professional ethics. These activities warrant consideration of the field that addresses these issues. However, as Hansen (1994) classifies, the majority of those studies have their roots in the customary ways of regarding roles and occupants in teaching and learning. The studies that deal with the personal character, disposition, and virtue are fewer.

Tom (1984) was among the first who portrayed teaching as a 'moral craft.' He approached the moral nature of teaching through the questions that each educator must address on a daily basis: "What really matters during one's career? During the next day or two? To what end does one pursue a particular activity?" (p. 78). In his study Tom uses the vocabulary of the moral character interpretation. For example, he states that every individual "comes to terms with countless moral situations in [her/his] lifetime" (p. 79), and through these people learn some answers to these questions.

Some researchers have focussed on the interactions between teachers and students. Jackson *et al.* (1993) speak of '*The moral life of schools*' and Jackson (1992) himself emphasizes '*The enactment of the moral in what teachers do.*' Hansen (1993a) prefers such character-oriented terms as 'attentiveness,' 'sensitivity,' and 'respectfulness' which are "heavily laden with moral meaning" (p. 663). In considerations of teacher conduct they are often called moral virtues or vices that are associated with the teacher's character rather than with her/his roles. Hansen (1994) describes what teachers feel for teaching as a 'vocation.' Vocation denotes more than a psychological state, it presupposes an 'inner urge' to commit oneself in an enduring way to a particular practice. A vocation cannot exist as a state of mind alone, disembodied or removed from practices.

Noddings (1992) suggests that education might be best organized around a "center of care." Her approach focuses on moral education. By moral education she means not only a form of education that tries to educate moral people but also an "education that is moral in purpose, policy, and methods" (p. xiii). If development of character is the objective, it is obvious that the educational choices are moral in nature if they are intended to have their impact on such development. For Noddings, the moral purpose of education precedes and guides all other purposes.

Sockett (1993) examines '*The moral base of teaching profession*,' in which the concept of professionalism describes the quality of practice. It portrays a teacher's manner of conduct within her/his occupation, how she/he integrates her/his obligations with the ethical relations with her/his students. Teaching is seen as an interpersonal activity directed at shaping and influencing students by means of a teacher's pedagogical skills. For Sockett (*ibid*.), a teacher is a person who helps to shape what a student becomes. Therefore, the moral good of every learner is of fundamental importance in every teaching situation. The character and the commitment of a teacher are integral parts of teacher professionalism. As a result, Sockett concludes, it is "impossible to talk extensively about teachers and teaching without a language of morality" (p. 13). In this vein, he constructs an epistemology of practice for teaching from a virtue base.

2.1.4 EMPOWERING *PHRONESIS*

These three interpretations of *phronesis* should not be separated from each other. Rather, each interpretation is linked to the others. The combination of the different interpretations makes up the concept of *phronesis* as a totality. In this form, the nature of practical knowing contrasts with the certainty often attributed to the concepts of 'formal' or 'propositional' knowledge (Fenstermacher, 1994b).

It is difficult to make *phronesis* explicit. According to Bourdieu (1990), this is because the logic of practice articulates itself implicitly in action. It is not usually available for explicit articulation in a structured format. As a result, it is hard to make *phronesis* visible for both practitioners themselves and researchers.

Perhaps the best way of approaching *phronesis* is to look at the starting point. Where *techne* or 'formal' or 'propositional' knowledge

begins with a plan or design, practical reasoning does not have such a concrete starting point. Instead, it starts with asking what one should do in a given situation. Then, the person starts to think about her/his situation in the light of her/his understanding of what is good. Smith (1994, p. 164) represents the process as follows:

People begin with a situation or question which they consider in relation to what they think makes humans flourish

The Good

They are guided by rational, situational and moral dispositions to act truly and rightly

Phronesis

This enables them to engage with the situation as committed actors

Practice

The outcome is a process

Interaction

FIGURE 1. PRACTICE: MAKING JUDGEMENTS.

Practical knowing is grounded in a person's experience, and with the aid of her/his conception of the good, a person chooses the appropriate course of action. Usually, in practice there is no body of prior knowledge of the right means by which a person can reach the end in a particular situation. Partly for this reason, "ends always *emerge* in the course of inquiry" (Dewey, 1916/1966, cited from Garrison, 1999, p. 295, emphasis in Garrison). Within this stance, the means cannot be distinguished from the end in a given context until the process of inquiry is complete and the relations between the persons involved are well established. Therefore, in practical

reasoning the good is not a fixed end. Dewey (1916/1966) took this premise to its conclusion by stating that "ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences" (*ibid.*).

Here we witness "the fluidity of practical reasoning" (Grundy, 1987, p. 147). As we think about what we want to achieve, we tend to alter the ways we might achieve it. And vice versa, as we think about the way we might get on with something, we often change what we were aiming at. There is a continuous interplay between ends and means. And simultaneously, there is a continuous interplay between thought and action. The process ties together interpretation, understanding, and application into one unified process. According to Heidegger (1990),

> in interpreting we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it, but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world (p. 122).

This 'ready-at-hand' is always understood in terms of the totality of involvements in a particular situation, but also beyond it. Therefore, practice is not simply action based on intention and reflection. It is action which embodies certain qualities that, in turn, are not easily grasped explicitly. Practice is "grounded in *something we have in advance* – in a *fore-having* (Heidegger, 1990, p. 122, original emphasis). Particularly in educational contexts, these qualities include a commitment to human well-being. As a result, practice is other-seeking and dialogic by its nature. And it is always risky: it requires that a person makes wise and prudent judgements about how to act in particular situations.

2.2 Relational Knowing   (II)

One way to approach the concept and practice of relational knowing is to contrast it with the main premise of cognitive psychology. As Williams (1989) argues, though there are many differences within the cognitive sciences, they share certain common and characteristic conceptions of cognition. Their guiding ideal is that of "finding the 'internal' rules governing mental action" (p. 108). What a person does can be explained in terms of operations of her/his internal and personal mental structures. Therefore, according to the cognitive stance, what we need is the knowledge *of* the interiors of the mind. The emphasis is on the individual.

This approach can be contested with the concept and practice of relational knowing (Hollingsworth *et al*., 1993; Webb & Blond, 1995; Clandinin & Connelly, 1995). The concept of knowing through relationships draws towards that which lies ahead of a person in a given situation. This interactive meaning making involves a certain fluid and present character. Due to this, Hollingsworth *et al*. (1993) state, it would seem problematic to call it "relational *knowledge*" (p. 9; emphasis original). According to this stance, pedagogical knowledge is not solely located in persons; it is not a static, fixed and predetermined commodity but something individuals know in contextualized situations.

To view our knowing abilities in this way – as being formed through a matrix of relations, rather than as an already existing storage – shifts our attention to people's responsive understanding of each other. In Shotter's (1993) words, knowing in this sense is "the joint activity between people and their socially constituted situations that 'structures' what people do or say, not wholly they themselves" (p. 8). When individuals come to know in relationships they enter a hermeneutic circle as "conversational participants" (Shotter, 1993) or as persons whose "paths through life have fallen together" (Rorty, 1980). According to the stance, in these situations they do not rely on a clearly articulated epistemological framework to reach some fixed end. Their rhetorical-responsive approach makes a case for continual questioning of received information through dialogue.

In such a space, the knower and the known cannot be separated. On the contrary, the task becomes seeking an understanding of how an individual is engaged in her/his interactive processes of knowing. Thus, people are not "spectators to bodies of knowledge that are out there somewhere" (Fenstermacher & Sanger, 1998, p. 468). They are, rather, creators of knowledge, as they engage in the world beyond the self. Knowing is not isolated from practice but is itself a relational practice. As such, "to know is a form of competence, an ability to navigate the puzzlements and predicaments of life with moral and intellectual surefootedness" (Fenstermacher & Sanger, 1998, p. 471).

This relational character of knowing can be understood through an intersecting tapestry of theoretical perspectives. I limit the theories to three. Next, I present briefly how theories of sociocultural construction of knowledge, theories of self/others relationships, and theories of dialogism and joint action can contribute to the concept and practice of relational knowing.

2.2.1 SOCIOCULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

Where cognitive and early constructivist theories focused to the interior of the mind, sociocultural approach (Wertsch 1985, 1991, 1998) shifts our interest to the social situation within which the action takes place. The perspective relies largely on a Vygotskian theory (1978, 1987) of the social formation of the mind. At the core of that theory is the idea that mental structures are not 'given' or solely 'constructed' in the individual mind. They are created through interaction with social environment. To a certain degree, mental functions are the product of social interaction in such a way that they cannot be characterized or described independently of that interaction.

The stance urges us to go beyond the individual agent when trying to understand the forces that shape human action. We cannot understand thinking and action unless we take into account the cultural setting and its resources. As Bruner (1996, ix) states, the individual and the social are interwoven even when one focuses primarily on an individual actor.

This is not to say that knowing and action do not have an individual dimension. They clearly do. The point is to view this individuality as

a relational character rather than as a "separate process or entity that exists somehow in isolation" (Wertsch, 1998, p. 23). Even if I focus on the individuals, my aim is to formulate my claims in such a way that their relationship to their social context is considered and presented. It is here that a methodological question also arises (cf. Chapter 3.2).

Certain claims characterize the sociocultural construction of knowledge. Here, I consider briefly five tenets of sociocultural knowledge construction (Wertsch, 1998, pp. 25-65). First, while we can isolate certain elements for an analysis, it is important to note that these elements are phenomena that do not actually exists independently of action. Second, sociocultural action typically has multiple simultaneous goals which are often in conflict with each other. This means that in many cases sociocultural knowledge cannot be adequately interpreted if we presuppose only one neatly identifiable goal. Instead, multiple goals, often in interaction and sometimes in conflict, are typically involved. Third, we can understand actions only if we understand their origins and the changes they have undergone. They also involve a great deal of uncertainty and accident. As Wertsch (1998) sums up: a certain complexity and ambivalence characterize most actions and interpretations of sociocultural knowledge. (pp. 34-38) Fourth, culture constrains as well as enables our actions. We either tend to emphasize the enabling potential of our environment or we may perceive our surroundings in more restricted ways. This process affects how we perceive our situations in general. Fifth, sociocultural construction of knowledge is associated with issues of power and authority. Instead of arguing whether it is either the individual agent or our social institutions that really is the foundation of power and authority, sociocultural view makes it possible to 'live in the middle' and to address the situatedness of action.

The perspective implies education as a social process and school as a form of community life. Thus, the true center of teaching lies in its multiple social activities (Goodson, 1990; Schwandt, 1994). Understanding them requires knowledge of social relations as they occur in their natural settings.

2.2.2 SELF/OTHER RELATIONS IN PEDAGOGICAL KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION

In order to understand the social processes that contribute to teacher knowledge, many authors (Greene, 1979; Elbaz, 1983; Lyons, 1983; Noddings, 1984, 1992; Nias, 1989, Bowman, 1989; Kelchtermans, 1993; Kelchtermans & Vandenberghe, 1994; Clandinin & Connelly, 1995, Powell, 1996; Donnelly, 2000; Graue *et al.*, 2001; Kelchtermans & Ballet, 2002) suggest that teaching requires a dynamic understanding of self in relationship to others.

The crux of these approaches is that knowing through relationships is central to the practice of teaching. Teachers perceive their practice through their own values, beliefs, feelings, and habits. The self not only influences the way teachers perceive their concrete conditions and requirements but also the way they act. This is because selves do not reside in contemplation but become clarified in action. Then, knowing mainly becomes "the embodied forms" (Connelly & Clandinin, 1995, p. 26) – e.g. images, metaphors, personal philosophies, rules and principles – by which teachers interact with their particular settings.

Within this process, self is not a monolithic unity, but rather a collection of different types of self-representations. Since we can never have access to the complete set of representations of ourselves, Markus & Wurf (1987) use the term "working self-concept" or "self-concept of the moment" (p. 306). Kelchtermans (1993) employs the concept of "professional self" which largely consists of the knowledge, opinions, and values a teacher holds while performing her/his job. It develops throughout the interaction of the teacher with her/his professional environment. Conceptions of teachers' selves and their professional knowledge usually go together, since self and professional self tend to overlap (cf. Meriläinen & Syrjälä, 2002)

Connelly & Clandinin (1995) speak about a "matrix of relations" that calls for a major move in the area of teacher knowledge in which "common terms are reshaped" (p. 25). The process means an epistemological and moral shift in viewing teacher knowledge. The shift is epistemological in a sense that it represents a "redefinition" of educational knowledge, and it is a moral one representing "a shift in the moral landscape of inquiry" (p. 25). This connection of

epistemological and moral matters is intimate to such an extent that, as Connelly & Clandinin (1995) emphasize, we might "overlook the significance of the shift in perspective because the terms remain the same while the language and arguments appear as dialects" (p. 26). But underneath differences are significant and the concept of teacher knowledge shifts in its meaning, too.

Within this shift, the notion of commitment becomes central to how teachers reason and justify their pedagogical ideas and action (Noddings, 1984; Elbaz, 1992; Hollingsworth *et al.*, 1993; Tirri *et al.*, 1999). Often, the committed teacher seems to act in an intuitive mode. Within this disposition, her/his 'gut feeling' acts as her/his reference point. A teacher is responding to an apparent 'feeling' that has entered in her/his consciousness and provoked her/his response. In other words, as Smith (1994) explains, what we usually label as intuition is "knowledge or perception not gained through conscious thought or reasoning" (p. 137). Even if 'immediacy' characterizes intuition, that may simply be "the surfacing of a thought or image … [and therefore] a whole chain or process of thinking has taken place without our being alive to it" (*ibid.*).

This accords with Dewey's (1926/1984) notions concerning people's selective attention and its intuitive base. He maintained that our primary relation to reality is not cognitive. Rather, the experience of the situation, i.e., what is perceived from the contextual whole, is immediate. According to him, the word intuition describes that "qualitativeness underlying all the details of explicit reasoning" (Dewey 1926/1984, p. 249). This intuitive background may be relatively simple and unexpressed and yet penetrating; it often underlies the basis for explicit reasons and justifications (Estola & Syrjälä, 2002)

Pedagogically, the perspective of self-other relations is largely based on interdependence and concern for another's well-being. One's relationships are experienced as one's responses to others in their own situations and contexts. The issue is, as Lyons (1983) formulates it, how to respond to others in their particular terms in such a way that also maintains those relations and promotes the welfare of others. Usually, the place of these encounters is some sort of discussion between the partners. These 'meetings' can have various forms, but generally "[c]onversation, understood widely enough, is the form of human transaction in general" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 197).

2.2.3 RHETORICAL–RESPONSIVE KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION

Researchers can also use discursive practices as tools to interpret teachers' knowledge construction. Shotter (1993, p. 18) speaks about "the knowing of the third kind" which redirects attention from a focus upon how individuals understand and apply formal theories and principles to how they understand each other in their practical settings. The stance focuses upon people's use of their ways of talking to construct both their social relationships and their knowing. Within this flow of responsive and relational practices, socially significant dimensions of interaction originate and are formed. Here, people's responsive understanding of each other is the important issue. Shotter (1993) argues that this kind of joint activity between people actually structures what people do and say. Attention to it reveals a complex and uncertain process of testing and checking various kinds of knowledge issues that have to do to do with judgements about obligations such as care, responsibility, and justice.

This rhetorical-responsive view coincides with the manner of conduct within the occupation of teaching, too. A vast majority of educational problems cannot be solved procedurally by applying a uniquely suitable formula or technique. Instead, solutions to such problems must be found by an interactive consideration of means and ends. In addition, teaching is strongly connected to the betterment of students. Professionally, teachers are morally responsive to their client's needs, whether the client is defined as the student, the parent(s) or the public community. The teacher has moral obligations to these individuals or groups and this responsibility can be expressed through responsive relationships.

As already noted, the social context of teaching is not solely teachers' personal or professional property. Rather, it is 'out there' as an interpersonal domain. Buchmann (1987a) has used the phrase "the knowledge teachers live by" to indicate the lack of clarity about much of what teachers know is professionally-special to them. This is because teachers acquire knowledge by participating in various pervasive patterns of schooling. Sociological studies of the teaching profession have illuminated this social adaptation of professional practices and beliefs (Lortie, 1975). In philosophy, those problems teachers face in their work relate most closely to the class of questions that Gauthier (1963) referred to as "uncertain practical questions."

Consequently, because the knowledge base of teaching cannot be considered as special, both teachers themselves and parents (even students) are often ambivalent about its real value. Teachers feel entitled, but also forced, to use their common sense in teaching. It suggests that the knowledge teachers use cannot be placed on either side of the divide between professional knowledge and common sense knowledge. In this sense, Shotter (1993) speaks of "joint action." It occurs in a "zone of uncertainty" and it has two major features which he states in the following way:

1. As people coordinate their activity with the activities of others, and 'respond' to them in what they do, what they as individuals desire and what actually results in their exchanges are often two very different things. In short, joint action produces *unintended* and unpredicted outcomes. These generate a 'situation,' or an 'organized practical-moral setting' existing between all the participants. As its organization cannot be traced back to the intentions of any particular individuals, it is *as if* it has a 'given,' a 'natural,' or an 'externally caused' nature; though, to those within it, it is 'their/our' situation.

2. Although such a setting is unintended by any of the individuals within it, it nonetheless has an *intentional* quality to it: it seems both to have a 'content,' as well as to 'indicate' or to be 'related to something other than beyond itself;' that is, participants find themselves both immersed 'in' an already *given* situation, but one with a *horizon* to it, that makes it 'open' to their actions. Indeed, its 'organization' is such that the practical-moral constraints (and enablements) it makes available to them influence, that is, 'invite' and 'motivate,' their next possible actions. (p. 39; original emphasis).

The notion of joint action can be used as a tool through which to look at the workings of rhetorical-responsive knowledge construction. By its use, Shotter (*ibid.*) concludes, "we can see that in the ordinary two-way flow of activity between them, people create, without a conscious realization of the fact, a changing sea of *moral* enablements and constraints … – in short, an ethos" (p. 39, emphasis original).

Thus, our daily lives are not basically rooted in the doctrines of formal knowledge, but in our encounters and our reciprocal speech. For some (e.g. Rorty, 1980), this approach seems like an open door to 'anything goes' chaos. However, as Shotter (19393) contends, it is just "this 'rooting' of all our activities in our involvements with others around us, which prevents an 'anything goes' chaos" (p. 29). This requires that we have a certain kind of common sense to perceive and feel what others are trying to do in their actions. This common sense and these feelings work as 'standards' against which our more explicit formulations are judged for their adequacy and appropriateness. Here, Shotter (1993, p. 29) claims along with Wittgenstein (1980, II):

> [w]e judge an action according to its background within human life … The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within this bustle … Not what *one* man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgement, our concepts, and our reactions. (Nos. 624-629, original emphasis)

2.3 THE PERVASIVENESS OF PEDAGOGICAL KNOWING   (III)

In the previous section we found that essential features of teaching are embedded in the act of teaching, and consequently, they do not have be imported from without. Teaching depends on teachers' personal presence and their relational perceptiveness of what to do in various contingent situations. In their everyday practices teachers often intuitively understand that their performances are conditioned by such broad issues as the atmosphere of the school and classroom and by the relational qualities that pertain among students and teachers. It is part of the teachers' professional task to be attuned to these experiential dimensions teachers face all the time in their work. These "current concerns" (Fuller & Brown, 1975) do not wait. Instead, as Roth *et al*. (2001, p. 185) postulate, they continuously unfold. Due to them, some kind of an action is always required even if that action is non-action.

According to Labaree (2000), another pervasive character of teaching that makes it difficult is the way it requires teachers to

establish and actively manage relationships with their students. Here, teaching is in contrast to the norms that govern most professions, including those that focus on human improvement. This is because usually professional practitioners are expected to maintain a certain emotional distance between themselves and their clients. This relative independence from clients is based on secondary relationships (Labaree, 2000). They are characterized by such features like affective neutrality and specificity. However, teachers find themselves in a more complicated professional environment. They need to develop a broad relationship with their students in order to understand them and support their learning (cf. Fenstermacher, 1990). In this effort, teachers need to establish an emotional link to motivate their students to participate in the instructional process. Here, primary relationships characterize the scene: teachers must do their work in the midst of affective, diffuse, and often collectively oriented relationships with their students.

This affectionate relationship with students adds profoundly the difficulties involved in being a teacher. Labaree (2000) mentions two reasons for this. First, the practice of teaching casts the teacher into a complex role that combines characteristics of both primary and secondary relationships. Teaching requires emotional closeness with students and, simultaneously, it is embedded in diffuse interactions, of which both are characteristics of primary relationships. However, a teacher's task is also to evaluate individual students, encourage them to rely on their own skills and knowledge, and to treat all students the same. These professional duties belong to the secondary roles and relationships. As a result, teaching rests on an ever-present tension and contradiction between primary and secondary relationships. Second, teaching is a work that calls for "emotional labor" by requiring the teachers to produce an emotional state in their students (cf. Hochschild, 1983). This causes stress in teaching because usually a teacher can produce the desired emotional state in student by effectively managing her/his own emotions. This role of the "emotion worker" is an integral part of the teaching profession.

Within this context, there are few possibilities for 'time out' in order to think about the next move. Actually, as Roth *et al.* (2001) argue, in real school world, "teachers would be out of synch as soon as they engaged in such process of continuous time out" (p. 185). Teachers have to act constantly, without much time to contemplate

their actions. Usually, they are so involved in their activities that they cannot experience themselves as separate from those activities. Teachers relate to their work in such a manner that there is no longer "a subject that experiences itself in an objectified world – there is only enacting performance that contitutes an event" (*ibid.*).

van Manen & Li (2002) use the concept of "pathic knowledge" to describe this partly pre-reflective and pre-theoretic and, in a sense, non-cognitive stance to teachers' knowing. They define their term 'pathic' in two ways. First, pathic refers to em-pathic and sym-pathic which are usually discussed as certain types of understandings that involve "imaginatively placing oneself in someone else's shoes, feeling what the other person feels ... [and] to be understandingly engaged in other people's lives" (p. 219). This kind of understanding presupposes relational, situational, and action-oriented qualities. Second, as the term 'pathic' derives from the Greek word 'pathos,' meaning 'suffering' and 'passion,' it refers to the "general mood, sensibility, and felt sense of being in a world" (p. 220).

This resembles Heidegger's (1962) notion of *Dasein* as the fundamental mode of human existence. *Dasein* (literally 'being-there') makes a person's self and world into a single irreducible entity: being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 192). According to *Dasein*, we are always somewhere, for some purpose, at some time, and absorbed in some activity. As Roth *et al.* (2001) interpret, teachers' *Dasein* is "one of being-in-*this*-classroom to teach *this* subject matter to *these* children" (p. 186, original emphasis). Teachers find themselves immersed in school settings in which they cannot but participate (cf. Donnelly, 1999).

Shifting the focus from teaching as a scene where we ought to apply this or that principle, to a scene where the conditions or contingencies of its premises may be found, means perceiving teachers' knowing through its pervasive practices. This means exploring the day-to-day details of pedagogical encounters to see what they might offer in putting forth an understanding of teaching as involving implied, rather than applied knowing. Next, I present the concepts of manner, tact, style and identity due to their analytic weight for understanding taechers' pedagogical knowing. They emphasize the importance of ordinary, everyday school activities that easily escape scholarly notice because of their apparent casualness.

2.3.1 MANNER IN PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICES

Over twenty years ago, when Fenstermacher (1980) started to write about the concept of manner, the area was largely uncharted terrain. However, his efforts (1986, 1990, 1992, 1999; 2001) were tenacious. The aim was to investigate how research might account for "some of the more elusive, yet highly significant, aspects of teaching, such as the cultivation of highly regarded intellectual traits, as well as the development of moral virtue" (Fenstermacher, 2001, p. 640). He was guided by his desire to find out whether it was possible to develop a more robust conception of teaching by introducing a term that would serve as a contrast to 'method.' The idea was to use the concept of manner to focus on the teacher's role in fostering the moral and intellectual development of the students.

Fenstermacher's rationale for studying manner mainly came from the philosophical literature and was based on an Aristotelian view of *aretaic* ethics and the works of Ryle (1949, 1972). The crux of the matter was that students acquire virtue by being around virtuous people and that these virtuous people "impart a capacity for virtuous conduct" when they engage the students in certain ways (Richardson & Fenstermacher, 2001, p. 632).

Even as a pioneer, he was not alone in his efforts. Hansen (2001a, pp. 836-838) has traced the roots of the concept of manner and presents the works of Oakeshott (1965/1989) and Peters (1964, 1963/1968). According to Oakeshott, the teacher's manner can play a significant role in students' learning such things as judgement. As Hansen (2001a, p. 837) interprets, the stance means discerning what is at stake or what is significant in a situation and thinking the matter through with persistence and care. Also, it means appreciating contrasting viewpoints and their consequences. As Oakeshott (1965/1989) states,

> this cannot be *taught* separately … but it may be taught in everything that is taught … in the manner in which the information is conveyed, in a tone of voice, in the gesture that accompanies instruction, in asides and oblique utterances, and by example (p. 61, original emphasis).

Peters (1964) argues that manner is important because of the nature of teaching itself. He makes his point metaphorically:

> to be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it is to travel with a different view. What is required is not feverish preparation for something that lies ahead, but to work with precision, passion and taste at worth-while things that lie to hand. (p. 47)

Precision involves working attentively and persistently to get things right. Passion involves caring so much for what one is doing that, during the course of action, nothing else seems more important. Taste implies ways of decision-making: the point is not just getting things done, but doing them well and doing them with style. Peters (1963/1968) suggests that teachers can convey such qualities within their action through the manner of their working. As he contends: "it is surely the *manner* in which any course is presented rather than its matter which is crucial" (p. 93, original emphasis).

As presented, both Oakeshott and Peters emphasized that much of a teacher's influence on students proceeds indirectly and tacitly rather than through deliberate, planned activities. Nevertheless, Fenstermacher (1990, 1992) built his conception of manner on more self-conscious and deliberative components. He stressed their importance due to his view of manner as decisive for the quality of student learning in schools. According to him, "[n]early everything a teacher does while in contact in students carries moral weight" (1990, p. 134). For this reason, teachers should become mindful of their manner and its possible influence on students.

Fenstermacher (1990, 1992) favors Scheffler's (1960/1968, p. 17) idea of a "restriction of manner" on how teachers conduct themselves. The restriction centers on a teacher's task to reason and judge well regarding the particular situations. Here, reason alone is insufficient because it does not tell teachers what particular virtues actually mean in practice. As Fenstermacher (1994a) argues,

> the problem is seldom whether or not to be compassionate or courageous, but what it means to act courageously or compassionately in this or that particular situation. These are deliberations in daily life …[which] require a finely developed capacity to reason and judge. (p. 218)

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Therefore, in order to behave in a professionally competent way, teachers need to build practical reasoning *into* their manner.

In practice, as Fallona (2000), Richardson & Fallona (2001), Sanger (2001), and Chow-How (2001) have argued, teachers appear to conduct themselves as if moral and intellectual virtues can be taught. However, teachers do not believe that they can be taught directly, but rather through immersion in meaningful classroom activities and interactions. It is a question of a complex set of beliefs about morality intertwined with other beliefs regarding teachers' teaching, education, and society in general. This posture does not rule out that manner can also be 'caught,' even if it is often outside of teachers' conscious and intended plans and actions. Consequently, as Hansen (2001a) concludes, "the interplay and the tensions between the intended and the unintended in teaching remain ever-present" (p. 731). Perhaps for this reason, Fenstermacher (2001) made his personal confession:

> [w]hen I began writing about the concept of manner, I thought I knew the answers to [the] questions. … Now, after [twenty years of] intense investigation of the concept in both philosophical and empirical contexts, my early assurance no longer seems justified. [And therefore] I explore grounds for my growing wonder towards the notion of manner, and look more carefully at its nuances in practice. (p. 639)

It seems evident that both the utmost complexity of the concept of manner itself and the high levels of interpretation needed in investigating teachers' expressions of it suggest the need for further study.

2.3.2 TACT AND THOUGHTFULNESS IN TEACHING

As van Manen (1991a, pp. 128-133; 1991b, pp. 523-527) traced the historical notes on tact, he found that in the German context the notion of tact occasionally surfaced in discourse on the nature of pedagogical practice. Herbart introduced the notion of tact in educational discourse in 1802. In his first lecture on education, Herbart told: "[t]he real question as the whether someone is a good or a bad educator is simply this: has this person develop a sense of tact" (quoted in van Manen, 1991a, p. 128). According to him,

> tact forms a way of acting which is first of all dependent on *Gefühl* [feeling or sensitivity] and only more remotely on convictions derived from theory, and beliefs ...[it is] the immediate ruler of practice (Herbart, in Muth, 1982, p. 55).

However, in the English speaking world the notion of tact has not been systematically studied. According to van Manen (1991a), references to tact in English texts about teaching are rare. One of them comes from William James (1842-1910), in a lecture he gave in 1892. There, James argues, in order to be good teachers,

> teachers need a happy tact and ingenuity to tell [them] what definite things to say and do when the pupil is before [them]. That ingenuity in meeting and pursuing the pupil, that tact for the concrete situation ... are the alpha and omega of the teacher's art. (quoted in van Manen 1991a, p. 129)

In his own work, van Manen (1982) has described pedagogical moment as a situation in which a teacher does something appropriate to learning in relation to a student. According to him, pedagogy is not a particular kind of doing, but rather, *"pedagogy is something that lets an encounter, a relationship, a situation, or a doing be pedagogic"* (p. 285, original emphasis). In practice, these encounters between teachers and students mostly involve normative considerations, and only secondarily, rational ones. According to van Manen (1991b, p. 515), this is because pedagogical situations usually do not permit teachers time to analyze the situation, deliberate about possible alternatives, decide the best course of action, and act on decision. Frequently, pedagogical moments require teachers to act instantly. The point is that this "instant action may look like a kind of decision-making-on-the-spot, but it is not really decision making in the usual problem-solving and deliberative sense" (*ibid.*).

What actually is learned within these pedagogical moments is a deeper understanding of the challenges in teaching. Here, van Manen accords with Aristotle's notion not to seek more precision than the situation permits. As Aristotle claimed: "[e]very statement concerning matters of practice ought to be said in outline and not with precision ... [because] statements should be demanded in a way appropriate to the matter at hand" (N.E. 1103b-1104a). Like Aristotle, van Manen

(1977, 1982, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 1995, 2000) emphasize the need for wise judgement rather than application of a specific set of rules and skills.

As a result, pedagogical action is "thoughtful action." van Manen (1991b) defines its peculiar structure:

> [t]houghtful action differs from reflective action in that it is thinkingly attentive to what it does without reflectively distancing itself from the situation. ... Living the pedagogical moment is a total personal response ... in a particular situation. (p. 516)

This response van Manen (1986, 1991a, 1991b, 1994) refers to as tact. It deals with a teacher's immediate involvement in situations where she/he must instantly respond, as a whole person, to often unexpected and unpredictable situations. On the use of tact, van Manen (1991a) writes:

> [t]o exercise tact means to *see* a situation calling for sensitivity, to *understand* the meaning of what is seen, to *sense the significance* of this situation, *to know how and what to do*, and to actually do something right. To act tactfully may imply all these and yet tactful action is instantaneous (p. 146, original emphasis).

As presented, tact is a very broad and complex notion which covers any encounter or interaction where a teacher can contribute to a student's development. Tact is nearly everything, and nearly everything can be labeled as tact. Therefore, it is tact that 'makes the moves' and defines what a teacher does in a pedagogical moment. And consequently, tact can be use as a lens through which to uncover different meanings in pedagogical situations.

However, van Manen (1991a) cautions that tact does not describe everything teachers do or know. There are still many routine and technical aspects in teaching. But the real stuff of teaching "happens in the thick of life itself when one must know with a certain confidence just what to say or do" (p. 130). As a result, pedagogical thoughtfulness and tact can be seen to constitute the essence and excellence of teachers' pedagogical knowing.

2.3.3 TEACHER STYLE AND IDENTITY

As the concepts of manner and tact have shown, teaching is a kind of activity where teachers (and also students) are sending more messages than they can possibly keep track of or control. In order to better identify teachers' many-sided influence on students and colleagues, I focus on the concepts of style and identity. Both concepts underscore the dynamic relation between teachers' and their contexts but their emphasis is different.

Jackson *et al*. (1993) used the concept of style to capture the moral importance of teachers' everyday ways of interacting with students. In their use, the term style was rooted in art. We tend to speak of a painter's style and, in so doing, "merge the artist's vision with his or her technique" (Hansen, 2001a, p. 838). Similarly, in order to identify teachers' influence on students as it occurs in schools, we can point to their styles of teaching. The concept aims to uncover the often complex and ambiguous interplay between teachers' intentions and their actual conduct within particular situations.

For Jackson *et al*. (1993), style calls attention to teachers' personal qualities and their patterns of action. It refers to the teacher's typical ways of handling the demands of the job. Style is ongoing and nearly permanent, even if evolving. As Hansen (2001a) interprets it: "[t]eachers cannot turn off their styles nor control all the [moral] messages they emit" (p. 838). The consistency of style can give meaning to even the most mundane features of everyday school life. It can also reflect larger ideals of life that a teacher can bring to her/his everyday work. Consequently, style can be seen as a central vehicle for interpreting a teacher's influence on her/his students.

Hansen (1993b) has studied the concept of style by using a framework from sociological analysis of everyday social interactions. For him, style denotes "a set of habits … [and] encompasses a teacher's customary ways of attending students" (p. 397). For example, style implies how a teacher typically responds to what students say or do. Hansen argues that style reflects more than a teacher's personality or her/his conventional behavior. Rather, it can be seen to reveal the interest, the involvement and the expectations that guide the teacher's efforts by providing her/him a relative consistent model of conduct. Style constitutes a medium through which teachers' values and

aspirations, some of which may not be fully aware of themselves, infuse the ethos of their work.

Recently, Gee (2001) has used the concept of identity in education in order to describe our being and action at a given time and place. According to him, when we act and interact in a given context, others recognize us as acting and interacting as a certain 'kind of person' or even as different 'kinds' at once. This is just what Gee (*ibid.*) means by identity. In his sense of the term, "all people have multiple identities connected not [only] to their 'internal states' but to their performances in society" (p. 99). Just like styles can be multiple and "complex interweavings of dispositions and powers" (Harré, 1998, p. 4), identities are not separate from each other. Rather, they interrelate in complex and important ways. Identities can be used as an analytic tool to focus our attention on different aspects of teaching and how they are formed and sustained in educational settings (cf. Leeferink & Klaassen, 2002).

What is important about the concept of identity, is that almost any identity trait can be understood in terms of many competing, but also completing interpretative systems. According to Gee (2001), "people can actively construe the same identity trait in different ways, and they can negotiate and contest how their traits are to be seen (by themselves and others) in terms of the different perspectives on identity" (p. 108).

From this it emerges that both the concepts of style and identity are broad frames. They are both, in part, interactional concepts through which teachers can recognize themselves as certain sorts of professionals. However, they should not be interpreted as 'fixed' or 'natural categories' that are rooted in teachers' capabilities and abilities even if style is more stable than identity. Instead, their fluid and loose character is essential.

2.4 Summary

2.4.1 Theory as multifocal and developing explanation

This chapter has presented three theoretical approaches and their premises in an effort to interpret and understand teachers' pedagogical knowing. The approaches – *phronesis*, relational knowing and pervasive knowing – are not separate nor autonomous entities. On the contrary, they are interrelated and overlap each other, just like their active object, practice, does. Each of them contains manifold contingent premises over which we have only limited control, even in the theoretical sense. As a result, in making our interpretations using their 'lenses,' we should be aware of their limitations. We should be aware of the many alternative and competing theories that can be used in order to analyze teachers' pedagogical knowing in practical situations. This awareness of the possible alternative approaches and their underlying assumptions should help us to avoid adopting an excessively narrow and doctrinaire perspective.

Young (1999) has argued that because most educational studies take place within a single theoretical framework, the findings of these studies do not provide a comprehensive understanding of the problems being researched (cf. e.g. Ball, 1994; Rist, 1994; Scheurich & Young, 1997). In response to this problem, she argues in favor of using more than one theoretical approach to examine and analyze the same issues. The process of analyzing and interpreting the data from different points of view provides a forum for comparing the findings that emerge from different perspectives.

This multifocal process involves viewing from one lens and subsequently reconsidering the phenomena from another. Here, within the three sets of studies (I, II, III), this multifocal approach has helped me better understand the problems I study and the dynamics of their contexts. Each framework has provided a particular vantage point which I call a perception. A perception is always a partial, incomplete view of a something that we cannot (ever) know fully. With the aid of multiple theories I have seen the issue from different viewpoints. Actually, the word and the concept of 'theorizing' comes from the Greek word *theorein* meaning 'to perceive,' 'to be able to look at' (Webster, 1985).

Another way to look at the theoretical approaches to the three sets of studies (I, II, III) is by way of Weber's notion of 'ideal type' (Coser, 1977; van Manen, 1977). The starting point of the ideal type is that no scientific system is ever capable of reproducing concrete reality in its entirely, nor can any conceptual framework ever do full justice to the utmost diversity of a particular phenomena. Therefore, all theories involve selection as well as abstraction. Here, the danger lies in two directions. First, if we use very general concepts they might leave out what is most distinctive to the phenomenon in question. Second, if we prefer very narrow concepts they do not allow any room for comparison with related phenomena. The notion of the ideal type was meant to provide an answer to this dilemma. According to Coser (1977, p. 223), it is created by means of a one-sided emphasis and intensification of one or more points of view and by synthesis of a great many diffuse and individual phenomena, which are then arranged into a unified construct. The ideal type is a descriptive device usable both as a tool for classification and as an instrument for understanding reality.

In this chapter, I have presented how teachers' pedagogical knowing is developed through personal experience and participation in teaching activities. Therefore, a knower's view of knowledge has become highly relevant. This participator view of knowledge exemplifies a relational epistemology (Kvernbekk, 2001). This relational quality is found in countless recursive movements between teachers and their environment. It is in these recursive movements between ideas and practice that teachers' knowledge mainly evolves. However, as I have committed myself to this kind of relational epistemology, I also acknowledge that no areas of teacher knowledge should be exempt from this kind of interaction. As Kvernbekk (*ibid.*) states, "a recursive movement should incorporate all ideas" (p. 348).

Thomas (1997) views that many kinds of thinking and heuristics have come to be called as 'theory.' He proposes case-studies of theory-construction and theory-use that have their origin in teaching practice. Also, he thinks that educational theory does not have to confront to conventional criteria of academic legitimacy. Rather, Thomas agrees with Carr (1995) who thinks that educational theory should rather demonstrate "a capacity to explore a particular range of problems in a systematic and rigorous manner" (p. 32). Theory in

this sense is legitimated to the extent it throws light on the matters of interest or concern. It aims to show how matters can be consistently and coherently developed with its aid. Therefore, theories should be potentially open and constantly evolving.

Linking various methods with studying teachers' pedagogical knowing

Coming to terms with narrative understanding

During the last two decades interest in narrative inquiry has increased significantly. From the ranks of literary theory (e.g. Barthes, 1977) and linguistics (e.g. Saussure, 1915/1974; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987) narrative has become the focus of attention for philosophers (e.g. MacIntyre, 1981; Ricoeur, 1981, 1986) and psychologists (e.g. Bruner, 1986, 1990, 1996; Mishler, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; Shotter, 1993). In educational studies, narrative inquiry has been favored in the studies of teacher knowledge (e.g. Elbaz, 1983, 1991; Connelly & Clandinin, 1987, 1988; Clandinin & Connelly, 1990, 1995; Mattingly, 1991; van Manen, 1994; Carter, 1995), teacher 'voice' (e.g. Clandinin, 1992a; Milburn, 1992; Goodson, 1992; Elbaz, 1992; Moss, 1996; Hargreaves, 1996; Huttunen *et al.*, 2002), and teacher education (e.g. Clandinin, 1992b; Carter, 1993; Olson, 1995; McEwan & Egan, 1995; Elbaz, 1997; Doyle, 1997). This large use suggests a growing recognition that narrative provides a powerful tool for understanding human experience in various contexts.

Within the field of literary, theory narrative is seen as a fundamental human activity. Barthes (1977) sees it as transhistorical and

transcultural: "[i]t is simply there, like life itself" (p. 79). Whenever it is necessary to report "The way things really happened," our natural impulse is to compose a narrative, to tell a story that recounts events and our actions in some kind of temporary sequence. Such a story, Tappan & Brown (1989, p. 185) emphasize, does more than simply outline a series of events: it places those incidents in a particular narrative context and gives them a particular meaning. White (1981) considers narrative as a solution to a problem of "how to translate *knowing* into *telling*" (p. 1, original emphasis). Lakoff & Johnston (1980), in turn, argue that most of our abstract concepts are organized in terms of common metaphors and narratives which are rooted in our physical and cultural experiences. As a result, they can serve as a vehicle for understanding due to their experiential basis.

Philosophically, narrative inquiry leads back to Aristotle as a source for deliberation, daily action and moral wisdom (Conle, 2000). Narrative inquiry is considered as especially suited to get in touch with practical knowledge. MacIntyre (1981) promotes narrative for the study of practices, lives and traditions. It can help us to uncover such qualities in practice that often tend to get lost both practically and theoretically. According to him, the worth of narrative lies in its role in helping us to understand human actions in general. People are essentially "story-telling animals," hence narrative is "the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 194). This is because, in order to understand the actions of others and also of our own, we tend to place a particular event or episode in a particular narrative context.

Bruner (1986) makes a distinction between paradigmatic and narrative modes of thought as providing different ways of perceiving reality. The paradigmatic mode is associated with logico-mathematical approach to reality, the narrative mode with the storyteller approach. Later, Bruner (1996, p. xiv) put flesh on the narrative mode by claiming that it is through narrative that culture provides models of identity and agency to its members. Within a culture, Bruner (1990) argues, narrative is the "organizing principle" by which "people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world" (p. 35). It provides a scheme through which people give meaning to their experiences and actions.

Narrative representations are often open-ended, experiential, and quest-like qualities by their nature (Mishler, 1990; Conle, 1992, 1999, 2000; Riessman, 1993; Bullough & Baughman, 1996; Luttrell, 2000). For this reason, it is often difficult to develop terms and criteria for narrative inquiry. Basically, what counts in narrative is the subjective meaning that intentions and actions have for a person. Lyotard (1984, pp. 20-21) suggests that narrative is "nonconfrontational," and unlike traditional academic discourse, it need no outside explanation or legitimization to be acceptable. A narrator needs no other qualifications than the ones she/he shares with other narrators who know the context and topic of narration. The person her-/himself is the primary holder of her/his knowing. An individual 'dwells in' her/his narrative knowing and is only subsidiarily aware of it as her/his attention is focused on its use. According to Connelly & Clandinin (1985), "we tend to attend to what is thought and not to the mode of knowing by which we do our thinking" (p. 182).

For this reason, Connelly & Clandinin (1985) argue, three consequences arise. First, the user's goal is usually to "put the modes of knowing out of 'sight'" (p. 182). The more effective the narrative tool is, the less the user attends to it. It is submerged in her/his awareness and its multiple uses depend on particularity of situations. This situatedness highlights the second character of narrative understanding. As Schutz (1970) puts it, due our 'natural attitude' to our life-world, all our modes of knowing are 'on hand' in our inquiries. Thus, narrative provides a loose frame of reference as a producer and transmitter of our knowing. Third, within our practical settings our narrative modes of knowing "are *not* 'on call'" (Connelly & Clandinin, 1985, p. 183, original emphasis). A user does not mobilize her/his modes of knowing in the sense that she/he applies certain conscious strategies or specific rules and guidelines. This clarity is lost and had to be reconstructed out of a person's narratives.

The process of reconstruction is complex, party because its results do not 'prove' anything, they only incline (Buchmann, 1987b, Buchmann & Floden, 1993). Partly because our search for 'explanations' or 'conceptions' tend to simultaneously implicate 'other' explanations and 'better' conceptions. Conle (1992) sees this is a symptom of a "dialectical unity between the speaker and the listener,

speaker and language, and speaker and her [/his] situation" (p. 167). These dialectical qualifications often have strong tacit components. These tacit dimensions (Polanyi, 1958, 1967) reside in our subsidiary awareness when we act and focus on some particular problem. Narrative analysis aims to direct our attention to an implicit articulation of these tacit components in narratives.

Upon analysis, however, tacit elements can be made visible only partially. In many cases, as Connelly & Clandinin (1985, p. 176) caution us, when we have identified an act or event as fitting a certain interpretation, the identification "slips away" in the midst of other competing interpretations. For instance, a teacher helping a student during a lesson turns out, among other things, to be acting 'interpersonally' (going from student to student), 'intuitively' (it is her/his 'gut reaction' when someone has problems with her/his studying), 'formally' (it is a teacher's task to guide her/his students' schoolwork), or 'ethically' (a teacher has a caring relation to this particular student). Each of these interpretations often has certain limitations that simultaneously exclude other possible understandings. Indeed, an event may be a proper blend of all of the possible interpretations. As Connelly & Clandinin (1985) state, narrative understanding often portrays as "ill-defined and ultimately undefinable with precision and exclusivity" (p. 177).

In the next sections, I turn to three different methodological approaches to tackle the premises and promises of narrative understanding. After presenting narrative interviews and their emergent structures, I move into multiple case analyses and try to show how we proceed from contingencies of cases to various types of relational categories. Finally, I present a method for particular case study analyses from multiple perspectives.

3.1 NARRATIVE INQUIRY: EXPLORING AND DESCRIBING THE LANDSCAPE

(I)

As presented, narrative accounts of events and experiences provide material for interpretative reconstructions. The reflected issues are usually embedded in a person's experiences which make them meaningful through the unity they achieve for a person. The study of narrative typically aims at describing experiential understanding of a person in terms of her/his everyday meanings. As Riessman (1993) states, the purpose is to see how respondents "impose order on the flow of experiences to make sense of events and actions in their lives" (p. 2). Methodologically, the task is to examine an informant's knowing and how it is put together, the contextual and cultural resources it draws on, and how it persuades the listener/reader of its authenticity. Analysis of narratives opens up the forms of telling about the investigated issues, not simply the content to which narratives refer.

Grumet (1990) gives narrative a major role in her approach to the situations of educational significance. Overall, she distinguishes three parts: situation, narrative, and interpretation. Situation acknowledges that people report their knowing in their speech that involves social and cultural relations in and to which they speak. There, narrative "invites all the specificity, presence and power" (p. 281) that our speaking can provide. Interpretation, in turn, means reflection on the wider meaning of a narrative and its relevance to current circumstances. In effect, the study of a person's narrative is also a study of her/his own interpretations of her/his practices.

Mishler (1986, pp. 105-116) and Cortazzi (1993, pp. 54-59) suggest the use of research interviews as narratives. The central and unifying idea of their proposal is that respondents' accounts can also be understood as stories. The 'answers' to questions often display the features of narratives. As Mishler (1986, pp. 105-106) states, narratives can undoubtedly be elicited by direct questions to 'tell a story,' but they also appear as responses to questions about more specific topics. According to him, questions often elicit narratives when interviewers allow respondents to speak and when investigators are alert to the possibility of narratives and consciously look for them.

Cortazzi (1993, pp. 54-55) provides a further methodological point regarding their length. In narratives, he explains, tellers feel obliged

to provide both the context and the interpretation of the events asked. Interviewees often provide background of their events and actions so that a recipient can interpret their narratives. This means that there will be sufficient context for a listner/researcher to understand the point. In this sense, narratives are contextually self-contained.

The fact that stories appear in interviews supports the view that narratives are natural cognitive and linguistic forms through which individuals attempt to organize and express their meanings. According to Mishler (1986, p. 106), the absence of narratives implies that interviewers explicitly or implicitly tend to suppress the expression of stories, and stories that make it through in the data are often discarded at the stages of coding and analysis. In turn, these decisions to omit depend on a theory adopted to analyze narrative discourse and meaning.

There exists a variety of interests and theoretical concerns that can be pursued through the analysis of narrative interviews. For example, narrative accounts can be viewed as socially organized and normatively regulating interpersonal actions and relationships (Labov, 1982). The other way is to study them as expressions of general cultural themes and values (Agar & Hobbs, 1982). van Dijk (1980) sees narratives as basic linguistic forms through which our beliefs and intentions are expressed. As a result, this diversity of views only highlights the fact that a variety of interests and theoretical concerns can be pursued through narrative interviews (cf. Huttunen *et al.*, 2002).

Although conducting and interpreting of narrative interviews can benefit from various theoretical lenses, the scope of the approach used must be set. The question is whether an interview in its entirely is viewed as the story or if instead it is seen as containing 'stories' along with other types of accounts. As Mishler (1986) emphasizes, "the aims, general shape and specific features of a study are largely determined by how this question is answered" (p. 106). Here, we have two major ways at our disposal. Labov (1982) thinks that narrative is only one way of analyzing and interpreting respondent's talk. Within this conception a central task is to establish criteria to distinguish narrative and non-narrative segments from an interview. Agar & Hobbs (1982) prefer the other way: everything a respondent says is relevant to and has a place in the narrative. Within this stance, a researcher's task is to determine how parts of the narrative interview

fit together. The task is compelling because the meanings of questions and answers are not fixed by nor adequately represented in the interview schedule or by predetermined coding category systems. Instead, the meanings emerge and develop in the due course of the interpretation and analysis of a study. This approach is preferred in the first set of studies (I).

As we have seen, narrative interviews are interpretative and, in turn, require interpretation. They do not speak for themselves, or provide a direct access to a teller's world and experiences. Therefore, numerous interpretations and re-interpretations are needed. A part of this complexity is tied to the relationship between a narrative and events in the world to which it refers. Narrative structure stems from the fact that most social action is problematic. Almost any act can be interpreted with diverse causes and meanings. Therefore, as Bennett & Feldman (1981) argue, constructing an interpretation "requires the use of some communicative devise that simplifies the natural event, selects out a set of information about it, [and] symbolizes the information in some way" so that others can make some valid judgements of it (p. 67, cited in Mishler, 1986, p. 160). Narratives are the most common devices for these purposes.

3.1.1 DATA SET

Attending to data

In the first set of studies (I) narrative interview was used as a research tool in order to investigate teachers' pedagogical knowing. However, as investigators we do not have any direct access to someone else's world and experiences. On the contrary, many times we have to deal with ambiguous representations of them – talk, text, and their interpretations. Therefore, the way (i.e. what and how) we attend to the issues being investigated is of crucial importance. As Riessman (1993, p. 9) acknowledges, by attending we make certain phenomena meaningful. It determines what we notice and what we select from the totality of information provided by interviewees. During these first steps of the empirical work we already actively construct our 'final' representations and results.

The narrative interview consisted of three related theme areas: themes of teachers' teaching and students' learning activities, themes

of social relationships within the profession, and themes of teachers' professional selves. The first theme of teaching and learning intended to explain how teachers organized their teaching in their classrooms and to account for the kind of student activity teachers preferred, as well as the rationales behind these preferences. The ways teachers perceived their students in general and the ways they talked about them were equally important.

The second theme focused on relations with parents and the surrounding local community and on how teachers cooperated with their colleagues in order to perform their tasks as teachers. This theme area focused on the prevailing school culture and how it supported or hindered teachers' work.

The third theme of narrative interview aimed to look into the connection between the teachers' views of themselves and their ideas about teaching in general. The narrative interview aimed to investigate how teachers' teaching activities were related to their personal values and how teachers perceived themselves as translators of personal values into specific behaviors in their classrooms.

Twenty-nine elementary school teachers, 20 females and 9 males residing in the capital area of Helsinki, were interviewed in 1996. The teachers were chosen from a body of teachers that had supervised student teachers in their classrooms. This selective procedure made it possible to obtain teachers with various backgrounds and pedagogical methods. The teachers described themselves 'common,' 'traditional,' 'progressive,' 'favoring alternative pedagogical approaches,' and so on. The duration of each interview was one and a half to two hours (per teacher) and each interview was conducted by the author. All the interviews were conducted in Finnish and tape-recorded.

Following the example of Hirsjärvi (1981, pp. 89 90), after each interview, the interviewer noted the location and the extent to which the respondent was interested in the conversation themes. On the basis of the analysis of these notes, the respondents were categorized into three groups of 'involvement.' The attitude of the teacher interviewed towards the interviewer was also noted. These attitudes were also organized into three gategories of 'openness.' The groupings of these analyses are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1. RESPONDENTS INVOLVEMENT AND OPENNESS IN A NARRATIVE INTERVIEW.

Involvement	f	%	Opennes	f	%
Respondent answered in a formal, correct manner and showed only small interest and took no initiatives	4	14	Reserved	1	3
Respondent showed interest and took some initiatives	11	38	Kind and polite in the usual way	11	38
Respondent was very interested, involved, and took initiatives	14	48	Cordial, warm, and open	17	59
Total	29	100	Total	29	100

Transcribing the data

As Wengraf (2001, pp. 209-223) and Silverman (2001, pp. 163-167) emphasize, much of our work of analysis and interpretation is dependent upon the transcripts that are generated. Due to its representational nature, transforming talk into written text involves selection and reduction. Within the first set of studies (I) this process was two-fold. First, a rough transcription of all the interviews was provided in Finnish. This first draft of the entire interview included spoken words and other striking features of the interview situation (e.g. mumbles, pauses, sighs, laughs). These rough transcriptions produced approximately 350 pages of text. A considerable amount of time was spent re-reading of the rough interviews before the narrative segments of the data analysis could be identified.

Then, these portions of the rough interview texts were re-transcribed and translated in English for more detailed analysis to be presented in the first set of studies (I). Here, talk/text was rid of extraneous material in order to render it more easily readable. Miles & Hubermann (1994, p. 91) favor for this kind of reduction because unreduced text alone is a weak and cumbersome form of display. However, even if the re-transcription is more user-friendly, it has certain limitations which should be kept in mind in its use. Riessman (1993, p. 31) lists two important issues. First, as already presented, the entire interview implicitly constitutes the narrative. Then, excerpts are not narratives, at least in the strict sense of the term. They do not pull the reader into the detailed description of the events but instead summarize and gloss events and actions of the original transcript text/interview talk. Second, what is also lost is the nature of interaction that produced narrative interviews. The readers do not see the actual dialogues that took place within the data for the interviewer is edited out. According to Wengraf (2001, p. 216), it is the cost of going formal.

In order to fill this gap, an except of the re-transcription of a narrative interview is provided in Table 2.

TABLE 2. AN EXCERPT OF A RE-TRANSCRIPTION FROM A NARRATIVE INTERVIEW

Interviewer: Tell me about your work is this school?
Teacher: The school where I presently work puts a lot of emphasis on school development. I personally appreciate this because I can see the difference between this school and the school where I used to work. I come from a school where time had stopped! My former school had totally stagnated, and I worked there 12 years! I also taught in upper secondary classes for two years. When I compare these schools I can really see the differences. The developmental gap between my two former schools and this present one is so obvious. Changing schools gave me a kick in the backside that I really needed professionally. In my old school I was really locked into my routines. I had the feeling that I was doing the same thing again and again, and so I just wanted to get out. In this school I have a feeling that I am going somewhere. Here we are constantly developing our

curriculum and updating our aims and projects. So far, I can say from my own experience that as a teacher you have many ways to do things, and there's not just "the one and only way" to do them. I have found that very inspiring. This has given me a kind of a boost to try out some new things in my work that I have learned from my colleagues. For example, they have encouraged me to base my teaching more on constructivistic principles and student initiatives and less on textbook-based routines. I am also eager to participate in some of my colleagues' teaching projects and get the chance to learn new ways of teaching. I also find it very rewarding that my professional growth as a teacher doesn't depend solely on me any more. My colleagues share their knowledge and experience and they update my "tool kit," which is great because school life is filled with so many tasks and duties.

Interviewer: How do you cooperate?

Teacher: When you work in a big school like this, teachers are not just one big, united and happy family that always works together. You just have to realize that it does not work out that way. Here we have a group of 10 teachers who work together. We have some kind of common vision about how to organize our teaching, what aims and goals we prefer and so on. I see this as a tremendous resource for myself as a teacher, but also for this group of close colleagues and for our whole school community as well. This gives me a feeling of loyal support whatever I am doing and whenever I face problems and difficulties in my work. I really appreciate this support and encouragement because it has helped me through many tough times. I have reached a certain level of collegiality within this group of teachers. This strikes me as a minor miracle because we are also quite different in many respects. For example, we don't use the same kind of teaching methods and we don't have a common pedagogical idea. Rather I think its our personalities that make us an effective, cohesive working team. Perhaps we are the kind of teachers who want to extend their professional abilities.

Interviewer: How does this relate to your work in the classroom?

Teacher: In my case it means that I want to be able to create the kind of atmosphere that gives my students a feeling that they are safe: "School without tears"—that's my slogan. I see it as my professional task to be able to create the kind of good and enjoyable safe place where my students can spend their schooldays. That's the key element in my professional attitude that has to be taken into consideration whatever I do in my classroom: the feeling that school should be enjoyable for all students in my classroom. And when I reflect on my

teaching career, this has not always been an easy thing to do. I have had a lot of students in my classes whom I had regarded as "weak" students, or as "difficult" students—whatever those definitions mean. At any rate, I use those terms to describe the great diversity of students I have had during my teaching career. And when I look back, I don't remember that I had students who protested against school and that they had to come to my class every day. I strive hard to create the kind of friendly atmosphere in my classroom that makes it easy for my students to come here, even if they are confronting difficult and tormenting problems in their lives. And it is not just a question of *thinking* that way, it's also a question of *feeling* that way. I just feel that this is the right way to relate to my students. And when I look at them, I have become quite convinced that what I am doing, and the way I do it, works, too. The idea that my students enjoy attending is at the top of my professional priorities. It is number one. Everything else comes after it. It's the key issue that I always emphasize whatever I do in my classroom. It is a sort of a basic premise for my professional being, and I think that I have succeeded in it quite well. This gives me courage to carry on the same way in the years to come, too.

Interviewer: What kind of a teacher do you consider yourself to be?
Teacher: When I think myself as a teacher I see myself more as an educator than a teacher. It is my task to educate my students to become good and decent citizens of our society. This is the starting point and the main goal in my work. I believe that my students will learn many valuable things as a side-product while we are working together and I am educating them. That's the key issue in my work. I am not that much into carefully planned and well-planned teaching on subject-content issues. Instead, I put sincere effort into educating these students to become good, self-sufficient people who will learn to get together with others. I may be wrong, but I feel that this guiding principle is worth working for. I do not have a huge number of pedagogical ideas that guide my work with my students. I'll try to be fair and honest towards every one of them. I try to guide them to do their work and activities in an appropriate manner and so on. But all this can only happen if they really like to come to school and enjoy being in my classroom. If I have failed to create that sort of good atmosphere among my students, then even my sincere efforts to teach something valuable may be useless. And as a teacher I myself must act accordingly. It is not only a question of principles and a question of what I believe in. It is also a question of the character of the teacher. I see myself as a quite spontaneous person, and I am not used to planning my academic teaching tasks carefully. In that sense I feel that I am professionally

incompetent. I am not very good at planning and putting into practice my formal academic teaching in an appropriate and adequate manner. I am a spontaneous person who feels that the long-ranging planning and execution of formal academic teaching just doesn't suit me well. Some of my new colleagues have that ability. And since I started here, perhaps I have changed a little bit in that respect, too. It is all because of my new, supportive colleagues. They have given me good tips and guidelines for my teaching; e.g. how to teach things in mathematics, in science, and so on. I get the materials and the advice I need from this group of colleagues. With their help I hope that I can develop my formal teaching ability and become more systematic. I see this lack of self-discipline as an important element of my personality as a teacher. I think I am a sort of a spontaneous "sense-maker" who is trying very hard to get some understanding of the students I am working with. When I teach, I try to study my class very carefully in order to understand how my teaching methods and my teaching in general are working out with my students. Are they able to perform the tasks I am giving them, do they like to do them, etc? Overall, I think it is foolish to base my teaching solely on my own personal preferences. I have to take into consideration my students, who actually have to do the other part of the job. If they have to do their part against their own will, it is no good for them or for me. In that case the teacher must use his/her authority to persuade the students to act according the teacher's ideas. Real learning does not take place that way even if the teacher thinks that "this is my idea for the class." All my years as a teacher have learned me how to size up my students so that I know how to navigate with them. The students are clever. Why shouldn't I as their teacher listen to them, too?

3.1.2 DATA ANALYSIS

Initial analysis

At the beginning of the data analysis the researcher tried to establish broad outlines of the phenomenon studied. Numerous readings of the rough interview transcripts aimed to reduce the material towards a 'core narrative' (Bell, 1991). The purpose was to provide a generalizable structure that the investigator could use as a working tool for the whole data set. As Reissman (1993p. 58) emphasizes, the task of identifying narrative segments and their representation should not be delegated. It is not a technical operation but the essential procedure of the analysis itself because this unpacking also structures interpretation. There were five stages in this process. Each of them aimed to represent a higher level of generality (cf. McCracken, 1988; LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Riessman, 1993; Miles & Huberman, 1994).

In the first stage of the analysis an attempt was made to try out whether one can treat certain passages of the rough transcripts as an 'entranceway' to the phenomenon being investigated. I searched for possibilities to go through the narrative segments into the assumptions and beliefs from which they spring. This stage involved numerous readings of the transcripts. Here, I relied on both myself and the literature reviews that were prepared for the first set of studies (I).

As McCracken (1988) states, at the preliminary stages of the analysis the reader must read the data "with a very careful eye both to what is in the data, and what the data 'sets off' in the self" (p. 44). Eisner's (1991) notion of "*The enlightened eye*" describes the process quite well. Simultaneously, I relied on the literature in this field to assist me in searching out the common features in the transcribed data. Through the process, certain patterns emerged and the first broad outlines of the phenomenon became visible. Step by step I responded to meaningful 'chunks' of the transcripts. In this phase, these 'chunks' of the data or narrative segments were treated on their own terms, ignoring their possible relationships to other parts of the texts.

In the second stage, I aimed to develop the narrative segments created in the first stage. Here, the object was to go beyond their original form until their implications and possibilities were more fully played out. This 'testing' was a three-fold process. First, each narrative segment was given a close reading and its interpretation

fine-tuned. Second, when this was complete, the segments were related back to the transcripts. Each segment worked as a kind of lens through which the transcript could be further examined. When this was done, the narrative segments were again examined according to the literature of the first set of the studies (I). All the narrative segments created in the first stage of the analysis were included in this process.

In the third stage, the narrative segments were again developed on their own accord and in relation to other segments. By this stage of the analysis, the main interest had shifted away from the main body of rough transcripts. They were consulted only to confirm or reject the possibilities to develop the analysis. Gradually, a process of refinement ensued and a field of patterns and themes emerged. These tentative findings, in turn, made the scene of analysis less 'crowded' and clearer to me. Here, according to the advice of McCracken (1988, p. 45), I speculated in a "better organized, more exacting context." 'Speculation' involved playing with possibilities of interpretation: with them, I was able to go beyond the narrative segments and make some tentative conceptualizations concerning the investigated phenomena. As the process went further, general properties of the data emerged and broad outlines of the narrative segments became more apparent.

Conceptual analysis

During the fourth stage I moved into conceptual analysis. Here, a certain amount of the narrative segments from the rough interview transcripts had gained more prominence than others. Other segments had joined them and, simultaneously, they were receiving interpretative comments of their own. At this point I began to focus my attention on the constellations of narrative segments in order to sort out the general themes implicit in them. At this point in the analysis I was not thinking about how this or that general point was to be found on any of the other parts of the transcripts but was working only within each formation with the intention to 'draw out' and present its general theme.

During the fourth stage of the narrative analysis I began to make judgements. Having established the narrative segments, the next step

was to interpret what they generally meant. This was done by identifying themes within these clusters of segments. The process was both deductive and inductive. It was deductive in the sense that the interpretation was partly based on literature review from the first set of studies (I). The process was inductive in the sense that it relied on local coherence within the narrative segments under consideration (Mishler, 1986, 1990). Once the themes were identified in this manner, decisions were made concerning their linkages and relationships. Some of the themes were regarded as redundant, while some formulations were rated as having greater validity. Therefore, some of the narrative segments were rejected while certain themes were labeled as keynotes under which the remaining themes could be subsumed.

The fifth stage of the analysis called for a review of the decisions made in the previous stages of the analysis. Here, the constructed themes were tested in the research papers of the first set of studies (I). In keeping with McCracken (1988, p. 46), it was here that a process of transformation took place in which the tentative categories that had been constructed during the examination of the rough interview transcripts and particular narrative segments became analytic categories. At this level, I was no longer concerned with the particulars of individual teachers but about the general properties of pedagogical thought and action within this group of teachers. Furthermore, I was no longer describing the situations as the respondents personally saw them. Instead, I was presenting teachers' pedagogical situations as they appeared to me from the perspective of the narrative interpretation.

In sum, the analysis produced various 'concepts' and/or 'themes.' The constructs were intended to posses such general and abstract properties that they could be presented as preliminary results and, in turn, be incorporated in the first set of studies (I).

3.1.3 THE IDEA OF ALTERNATIVE READINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Next, two different theoretical frameworks were used in order to interpret and better understand the meaning of the constructs. According to LeCompte & Preissle (1993, p. 119), even the simplest theories can be broken into two parts: the things to be connected and the connection itself. Here, the things to be connected were the concepts or 'constructs' which characterize and describe how teachers perceive and organize their professional practice. Essentially, they are names or labels with definitions that we attach to features which are salient to teachers' own settings. Within the first set of the studies (I), they were abstract referents – 'being themselves,' 'social selves,' 'commitment and hopefulness,' 'rules and principles of practice.'

Concepts and constructs were grouped into clusters that shared similar characteristics. Here, my theorizing extended the second stage. Two different theoretical frameworks were used with the aim to show how concepts or constructs could be linked together once they had been identified. These relationships were descriptive and explorative in nature.

The first set of studies (I) aimed to develop partial descriptions of how things happen in teachers' pedagogical knowing. In the first study (I/1), teachers' practical knowing was linked with general and relative justifications and the relationships that could be identified in and between them. The second study (I/2) integrated two epistemological stances – 'ways of being in practice' and 'ways of acting in practice' – into teachers' pedagogical knowing.

3.2 MULTIPLE CROSS–CASE ANALYSES: FROM CONTINGENCIES TO RELATIONAL CATEGORIES (II)

As noted above, the first set of studies (I) aimed to uncover certain conceptual relationships within teachers' pedagogical knowledge. It was apparent that the methods used in the first set of studies (I) would produce 'broad,' even 'vacuous' findings (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994). Therefore, a case-oriented analysis was conducted in order to obtain more specific and contextually-oriented information about teachers' pedagogical actions. It was hoped that the findings would remain particularistic but simultaneously would gain certain generality. For that reason, the second set of studies (II) focused on multiple individual cases of early education teachers.

As mentioned, one aim of studying multiple cases was to increase the generalizability of the whole study project. The aim was to perceive processes and outcomes across many cases and to understand how they were affected by local conditions. The approach aimed to develop competent descriptions and workable explanations of the investigated cases. However, as Silverstein (1988) cautions, those who do this kind of research are faced with the tension between the particular and the universal: reconciling an individual case's uniqueness with the need for more general understanding of broad processes that occur across cases.

According to Ragin (1987), a case-oriented approach considers the case as a whole entity. It starts with looking at configurations, relationships, and effects within the case. Then, it turns to comparative analyses of a limited number of cases. It looks for underlying similarities and constant relationships, compares cases with different outcomes, and aims to form more general explanations. Our approach within the second set of studies (II) consisted of the use of both case-oriented strategies and variable-oriented strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 174-177).

Our approach was 'case-oriented' in a sense that we used multiple exemplars and tried to create an interpretative synthesis of them (Denzin, 1989). Various working examples were collected from the cases and then they were bracketed for closer inspection. Those elements were then analyzed, and across-case comparisons permitted various descriptive categories to be formed. We investigated the cases

of the second data set (II) in order to see whether they fall into categories that share certain common patterns. However, we did not confine ourselves to 'case types' but, in addition, wanted to explore whether all the cases could be sorted along some similar dimensions.

Following the terminology of Miles & Huberman (1994, pp. 175-177), this took us in the field of variable-oriented strategies. We looked for themes or 'relational categories' that cut across the cases. After careful inductive coding, we located recurring themes, such as 'relationship,' 'care,' and 'responsibility.' As these variables or themes were not explicit without cross-case analysis, we used a more or less standard set of coding categories which allowed the variables to become explicit as the analyses progressed. With the help of these matrices we analyzed each case in depth. After each case was understood, we put the case-level displays into a matrix, which was then further condensed. This matrix made systematic comparisons possible.

Our cross-case analyses made it possible to investigate parts of the case reports in a way that did not obscure the wholes of the reports while it simultaneously allowed us to compare the whole cases as configurations of parts. In addition, we wanted to preserve the narrative sequence of the cases and not lose their complexity. With these premises in mind, we applied the Reading Guide method (Brown *et al.*, 1991) to our cross-case analyses.

3.2.1 DATA SET

Attending to data

In the second set of studies(II), narrative case reports were used as a research tool. The data included 26 written case reports of ethical conflicts experienced by early education teachers. These teachers represented Finnish kindergarten and early elementary school teachers from urban public schools. The data were gathered during an in-service training session on ethical issues in teaching. Here, narrative was used both as research tool and as a medium for teachers' professional development (Conle, 2000).

Teachers were asked to write about a real-life moral dilemma they had experienced in their work and to provide a just resolution to it. The request was formulated in the following way: "describe a

situation in your work in early education in which you have had difficulties deciding what would be the right thing to do from an ethical point of view." In addition, the teachers were provided with some detailed questions about the relationships, context and solution of the dilemma in question.

Transcribing the data

Teachers' case reports were written in Finnish and were used as rough transcripts of data. All and all, they comprised approximately 50 pages of text. The Reading Guide analysis was performed using these rough transcripts of data. During the time of data development, the case reports that were included as examples in the second set of studies were re-transcribed and translated into English. The following quote from a case report in Table 3. demonstrates the data.

TABLE 3. AN EXCEPT OF THE RE-TRANSCRIPTION FROM A CASE REPORT (STUDY II/1)

I have a child in my kindergarten group who is developmentally delayed in many areas. This is a very difficult thing for his parents to admit. We have tried to discuss this issue with them with a medical doctor but these discussions have not changed their attitude. The child should start a school after a year and a half but I don't think he is mature for it. Every time I talk with his parents I feel I am torturing them with suggestions of speech therapy etc. However, I think I didn't have a choice here. I told the parents that their child needs professional help in order to be ready for the school. The parents were very angry to me and they told me they would transfer their child to another kindergarten. The co-operation with me was finished. I knew I did the right thing because I had the support from my supervisor and colleagues. I had to take the perspective of the child even it did not please his parents. I had to be honest with the parents. Now it is their choice what to do with their child. I could only make them suggestions to help the child to develop.

3.2.2 DATA ANALYSIS

The method for reading and interpreting teachers' lived experiences focused on the reading process and the creation of interpretative accounts of case reports. The Reading Guide (Brown *et al*., 1989, 1991) is a relational method and thus contributes to a view of educational inquiry itself as a relational enterprise, as opposed to an 'objective' or decontextualized activity. According to this view, the relationships, by virtue of shared backgrounds and cultural conventions, provide a good starting place. Methodologically, the interpretation of texts is such a relational activity.

By reading with several interpretative lenses in succession, we aimed to present how features could be seen differently from different perspectives and how the case report could be interpreted from more than one angle. In the Reading Guide method, procedures for attending to various relational interpretations reflect the recognition that the same words in a case report can be used as evidence for different interpretative categories, depending on the lens through which they are read.

This method focused on the reading process and the creation of an interpretative account of each narrative. According to Bahktin (1981, p. 276), individual words and phrases that are used to describe moral thought, feeling, and action are in and of themselves unable to explain the particular meaning. Therefore, as Brown *et al*. (1991) interpret, "the living language exists only in a web of interrelationships that allow a narrator's meaning to become clear only if the context, the narrative, is maintained" (p. 27). Thus, only by allowing language to exist in narrative relationships was it possible to interpret and understand another person's experiences.

The Reading Guide method offered an approach to the interpretation of written reports. The two authors read the story four different times. Each reading considered the narrative from a different standpoint. Then, in each reading, the readers attended to a different aspect of the narrative thought to be relevant in uncovering the relational aspects of a particular moral dilemma.

Next, a brief descriptive overview of the method used in the second set of studies (II) is presented. The example is an application from one of the studies (II/2).

The first reading

The first of the four readings was intended to identify the main features the story written by the narrator. The readers aimed to understand the story and its context (the who, what, where, when, and why of the story). Such close attention to the text helped the readers to locate the person telling the story, set the scene, and establish the flow of events. In our analysis, the first reading produced the main types of conflicts and their sub-categories.

The second reading

The second reading focused on the writer's expressed concerns about the source of the moral problem. Here the two readers attended to the sources of the conflict between the teacher, who appeared as an actor in the story, and others who were often represented as rivals in the best interest of the pupils. The reading produced the categories that were used to characterize the problems of relevance and conflict.

The third reading

Here, the readers aimed to uncover the joint action in teachers' narratives. It was a question of actions and attitudes that they had or employed in order to work out, or live with, the problems they faced. Pedagogically, solutions to these problems were often found by an interactive consideration of means and ends. In our analysis, the third reading produced categories of actions teachers felt they were obliged to take in given situations.

The fourth reading

This last reading focused on the evaluation of the actions taken and their possible consequences. Solutions to conflicts were found only by doing something, by acting. The elements of a just solution were often interwoven throughout the story, and evaluating them required comprehensive reading. The fourth reading produced the end results of the analyzed cases.

3.2.3 THE IDEA OF ALTERNATIVE READINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Next, two different theoretical frameworks were used to interpret and better understand the scope and meanings of the constructed cross-case analyses. A relational care approach (study II/1) together with a rhetorical-responsive approach (study II/2) were used as alternative frameworks for investigations. With the aid of these premises we hoped to develop coherent descriptions of what things happen and how, across a number of cases. All in all, by combining multiple cases (methodologically) with multiple perspectives (theoretically) we aimed to generate descriptions that could be analyzed systematically.

3.3 INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES: FROM DESCRIPTION TO EXPLANATION – AND THEN TO PROLONGED REFLECTION

(III)

So far, the studies have described my effort to find out *what* was happening in pedagogical situations both generally and particularly. From the standpoint of teachers, I constructed broad interpretative frameworks (I) and more focused relational categories (II). In the course of these studies, however, the question of *why* things happen had become more prominent. This came as no surprise, inasmuch as that question is salient for teachers in their everyday work in schools. Countless pedagogical situations provoke "why" questions. The 'answers' to these 'questions' are not always explicit. Rather, implicit assumptions often have a driving, pervasive quality as well. Various explanations are to be found both at the individual level and at the institutional level.

As Draper (1988) points out, explaining can mean a range of activities. The term is not limited to providing requested information or description in response to posed question or situation. In addition to that, it can mean justifying an action or non-action or belief, giving reasons, or supporting a claim. According to Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 144), the last two are often at the forefront in 'scientific' explanations of human behavior. In 'real world' situations, however,

justifying an action or non-action tends to have a more prominent role. In practice, (implied) explanations are often vague by nature. This is because, as Miles & Huberman (1994) state, our everyday explanations are "intermediate, containing elements that are themselves, in turn, to be explained" (p. 144).

For this reason, Kaplan (1964, pp. 351-355) emphasizes, explanations should be left open. They depend on certain conditions and are partial, approximate, and indeterminate in their application to specific cases. Generally, the difficulty lies in their uncertainty. But then, what sorts of explanations are we left with? Kaplan (1964) favors "purposive explanations," which either depend on individual goals or motives or serve some function. They presuppose explanations that are contextual and highlight background information that makes sense of a series of events. Similarly, in real world situations, Kruglanski (1989) states that individual actions can be explained purposively or by referring to internal and external conditions. Explanations should take into account both personal meanings and public actions.

Furthermore, Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 144) add that good explanations will need to link the explanations given by individuals we are studying with explanations we develop as researchers. According to them, this link tends to present problems. In the third section of studies (III) we tackled these issues. The case method was advanced as a means by which this task could be filled.

3.3.1 DATA SET

Attending to data

The third set of studies (III) employed narrative interviews (Cortazzi, 1993, pp. 55-56; Mishler, 1986, pp. 75 87). The aim was to obtain as accurate and authentic a picture as possible of teachers' pedagogical dilemmas.

The study (III/1) was guided by the following research questions. What kinds of situations did teachers consider pedagogically difficult? What aspects did teachers consider when they act on these situations? What considerations did they have with regard to their own role in such situations? How did they account for their actions and behavior in such pedagogically problematic situations?

This particular study set (III) focused on the professional character of the teachers' work: the manner of conduct within an occupation and its members' integration of their obligations with their knowledge and skills. In interviews, teachers were encouraged to tell about a real-life dilemma they had experienced in their work. The teacher's story served as a core narrative (Riessman, 1993) of the interview. The data included 33 narrative interviews of secondary school teachers. All the teachers worked in urban public schools in the capital area of Helsinki, Finland. The duration of each interview was approximately 45 minutes.

Transcribing the data

All the interviews were conducted in Finnish, audiotaped, and later transcribed. Again, the process of transcription was two-fold. First, a rough transcription of the interviews was made. Considerable time was spent on re-reading the transcripts before selecting one narrative interview as a core narrative (Bell, 1991) for detailed analyses. This interview was then re-transcribed and translated into English for more detailed analysis to be presented in the third section of studies (III). The following quote in Table 5. demonstrates the analyzed core narrative.

TABLE 5. AN EXCEPT OF THE RE-TRANSCRIPTION FROM A NARRATIVE INTERVIEW (STUDY III/1)

I have been very concerned about the smoking policy in our school. I think a great number of our students smoke and many of the teachers smoke as well. This is an acute and frequent problem that I have to consider every single day in my work. Everybody knows that students smoke under the bridge that is near our school. However, the law forbids smoking during school hours. We have this law but hardly anybody observes it. Some teachers smoke, too, and other teachers and students know it. And the law also forbids teachers from smoking during school hours. Nobody really knows what to do about smoking. I know myself that smoking is bad for your health and the students know it, too. It is not a question of not being informed about the negative consequences of smoking. What can I do as a single teacher to change the situation? It doesn't help to send notes home if I am the only teacher doing it. I think homes and elementary schools play a

keyrole in finding solutions to this problem. The complicated thing is that some teachers smoke with their students. They may even suggest a smoke break. I know that notes home and forcing students to stay in school after hours don't help the situation. I myself smoked for 15 years, I know what I am dealing with. I have tried to be a role model for my students, and I have told them about my former smoking habit. I have assured them that it is possible to quit smoking. Every single morning I walk by the bridge and tell the students to put their cigarettes away. Some of the students obey me and some don't. I have also tried to discuss this with my colleagues. I talked with the music teacher about a girl who has a beautiful voice. I think she could be a professional singer some day and smoking might seriously affect her voice. I asked the music teacher to talk with this girl about protecting her voice. I don't see any concrete way to influence our school community. I should build a fence to stop the students from going to the bridge. However, then they might start to smoke in the toilets and that would be even worse for those who don't smoke. The principal should do something. We used to have a smoking room for teachers but it was shut down. Now the teachers smoke outside as well. The principal should take steps to prevent teachers from smoking during their working hours. I don't think we can solve the problem with students before we can influence the teachers.

3.3.2 DATA ANALYSIS

The third set of studies (III) primarily used the Reading Guide method (Brown *et al.*, 1989, 1991). The approach aimed to highlight various interpretations, as well as the sense of tension teachers often conveyed in their narratives. The method attempted to record the complexity of the narratives and to capture the personal, relational, and cultural dimensions of the teachers' experiences. It focused on interpreting the narrator's way of seeing and speaking of the phenomenon.

During the analyses we constantly attempted to link the data with various explanations, trying to understand why specific things happened as they did – and how teachers in the cases explained why things happened as they did. Methodologically, the task of developing explanations that seemed relevant within particular readings was demanding. Various readings were used to create a matrix for the dynamics of teachers' pedagogical explanations and actions.

The study consisted of a initial analysis and three comprehensive readings of the core narrative. Each reading focused on a particular representation of pedagogical ethics and attempted to uncover various relational aspects of the representation in question. The three representations and their multiple readings provided a practical frame of reference for the dilemma investigated by analyzing it from different viewpoints

Initial analysis

The analysis started with numerous readings of the rough interview transcripts and aimed to reduce each interview towards a 'core narrative' (Bell, 1991). Gradually, after various re-readings one case study from the whole data set was chosen, a narrative told by one female teacher, which presented a dilemma that was to be very difficult for the teacher to resolve. The case differed from the other dilemmas in that it resulted in the teacher's decision to do nothing in order to avoid further harm. In most other cases, the teachers made active efforts to solve the dilemmas they faced. In this particular case, the teacher could not find a suitable rationale that would support her judgement. The case was presented as an example of a dilemma that could be approached with multiple alternative readings and interpretations. Theoretically, the case manifested a pedagogical situation where an action was required even if that action was non-action.

The first reading

The first reading tried to uncover the ultimate purpose of the pedagogical practice in question. It focused on the narrator's expressed concerns regarding the sources of the problem. It was a question of attitudes, specifically those attitudes revealed in actions to work out, or live with, the problem faced. Solutions to these problems could often be sought for by interactive consideration of means and ends.

The second reading

The second reading was aimed at revealing the criteria a teacher relied on to solve a practical pedagogical problem. They were usually brief statements of what should be done in a particular situation. The major purpose of the teacher's stance was to justify or defend educational decisions based on certain appropriate guidelines. The reading provided information on what professional principles could be applied to resolve the practical dilemma.

The third reading

The third reading investigated dilemmas that surfaced when those guidelines were put into practice. What pedagogical dilemmas arose, and how did teachers try to cope with these situations? The perspective of the third reading focused on evaluating the actions taken or contemplated and their possible results.

3.3.3 THE IDEA OF ALTERNATIVE READINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

As Kaplan (1964) stated, explanation means establishing linkages by relating one interpretation with others. During the process we actually make explanations intelligible. Therefore, the world of explanations is an endlessly interpretable world, and there rarely is a final or definite explanation or clarification to a particular situation. All forms of representation are 'limited portraits.' Their meaning arises out of a complex process of interaction with individuals in their practical settings. Within those interactions, meanings are fluid and contextual, they can not be fixed with certain, predefined theoretical constructs.

However, as Hansen (2001b) has argued, without certain starting points, we would find nothing at all. To say that three relational readings provided the working basis is not to say that they solely determined what was taken note of in the teacher's reflections. Instead, the three readings created conditions for our learning as researchers – we were learning what the teacher believed and why she believed it. In such learning, the basic purpose was not as much to discover 'final explanations,' as it was to aid in uncovering the web of educational decisions and actions within a particular case.

The process of analyzing and interpreting the data from different points of view provided a forum for comparing the similarities and

differences in the findings that emerged. This process involved viewing through one lens and subsequently reconsidering the phenomena through another. According to Barrow & Woods (1988), this type of study consists of sustained attempts to "think things through" (p. 186). Jackson (1992) spoke about "prolonged reflection," which was as essential as the time spent gathering, transcribing, and labeling the data. It often took longer as well. Indeed, Jackson (1992, p. 406) recommended a data/reflection ratio on the order of 1/10. When applied to the present study this meant one sheet of transcribed data, followed by 5-10 pages of interpretative comments of reflection.

3.4 SUMMARY

3.4.1 UNDERSTANDING VALIDATION IN NARRATIVE STUDIES

Validity has been an important issue in the debates over the legitimacy of qualitative research. Those who favor quantitative and experimental approaches have criticized qualitative research for the absence of 'standard' means of assuring validity. Whereas the criteria for quantitative research are based on the validity of instruments and internal validity, in qualitative research the primary criterion often seems to be the credibility of the study (McMillan, 1996). Lather (2001) defines this call for credibility as "the extent to which the data, data analysis, and conclusions are believable and trustworthy as based on a set of standard practices" (p. 244). However, as she states in her review, the field itself is nowadays scattered and contradictory, and it seems like all educational inquiry is positioned in as a site of crisis. Nevertheless, as Bosk (1979, p. 193) reminds us, we are still faced with the notion: the interpretation done by a single or a few researchers invites the question, Why should we believe it?

Maxwell (1992) favors an another stance which does not concentrate solely on data and methods. According to him, validity is not an inherent property of a particular method, but pertains to data, accounts, or conclusions reached by "using that method in a particular context for a particular purpose" (p. 284). It is relative to, and dependant on, the persons on whose perspective the account is based. Therefore, as Maxwell (*ibid.*) states, validity is relative in this

sense because understanding is relative – it is not possible for an account to be independent of any particular perspective. Connected to this standpoint, Mishler (1990) sketches out a perspective of "validation as the social construction of knowledge" (417). He redefines validation as the processes through which we make claims for and evaluate the trustworthiness of reported interpretations and generalizations.

Mishler's (1990) definition makes certain meaningful moves. First, by using validation rather than validity as a key term, the stance focuses on "the range of ongoing activities" through which claims are made and evaluated (p. 419). Validation is not a question of application of certain static procedures; rather it depends on the ways the whole study process is undertaken. Second, validation is understood to be embedded within "the general flow of scientific research" (*ibid.*). It cannot be separated and treated as a distinct type of assessment. This linkage with the researcher's common working knowledge and experience ties validation more closely to everything that researchers actually do. Third, focusing on trustworthiness moves validation into "the social world" (p. 420). There, it is constructed in and through everything we do, through our practice. Since our social worlds are constantly changing, it is evident that our judgements of credibility also change. For this reason, we do not reach the 'same' conclusions from the 'same' findings. Finally, the truth claims of our work are not assessed in isolation. Rather, as Mishler (1990) argues, they enter a more general field of validation that includes not only other educational scientist but many parties in the larger community with different and often conflicting views.

But if validity claims cannot be met by any standard procedures, what are we left with? Here, the three sets of studies (I, II, III) relied on the analyses of "exemplars" (Mishler, 1990) to suggest ways how claims for trustworthiness can be met, especially in studies of narrative. As presented through this chapter, special attention was paid with regard on the following four issues within the three sets of studies (I, II, III). First, how the studies focused on a piece of interpretative talk/text? Second, how did the studies take this talk/text as its basic data? Third, how this basic data was re-conceptualized into more abstract and general type of categories? And fourth, what kind of structures or relations could be specified among those units of data?

RESULTS

Coming to terms with broad descriptions of the results

What can we learn from the results of the three sets of studies (I, II, III)? The answer to the question largely depends on the respondent. As Marland (1998, p. 15) has noted, teachers place little reliance on researchers and the research enterprise for knowledge about teaching; instead, they draw heavily on their practical knowledge. However, as Buchmann (1993, p. 114) argues, perhaps it is not sensible to deny the value of researchers' ability to give meaning to their data and to formulate their results. This is because research findings can be adequately valued by persons who sufficiently master a body of work and methods and, consequently, can judge how results from different lines of inquiry may or may not be consistent with one another. This does not mean that everything can be left to the authority of research and the researchers.

The possibilities for achieving meaningful research results are many. As already Dewey (1916/1966) noted, it all depends upon context or perceived connections in which we place our results. Naturally, this causes variation but it is not just a matter of personal taste or preference. Instead, Toulmin (1982, p. 104) argues, it reminds us only that "different occasion and topics, subjects and contexts, may give us good reasons for adopting one standpoint rather than another." Buchmann (1993, p. 116) calls this "the coexistence of reasonable perspectives" which provides grounds for "open-mindedness" in interpreting the results of educational studies.

As the three sets of studies (I, II, III) indicated, another reason for this disposition might be that the results of educational studies tend not to necessitate anything: they only incline (Buchmann, 1988, 1993). The connections between results and practice are loose in many ways. The same empirical features can occur as examples in various theoretical approaches and can contribute to various results. This quality derives partly from the fact that the issues the results describe are themselves broad, perhaps indeterminate by their nature. Buchmann (1988, p. 211) uses Feinberg's (1970) term "accordion effect" (p. 134) in order to present that notion of the language whereby a person's action can be described almost as narrowly or as broadly as we please. Teachers' actions, or more specifically, the interpreted descriptions of their actions which I here call results, are either narrow and broad. In narrow descriptions, researchers stick 'labels' to their findings and present the phenomena using them. Within the broad description, however, I do not aim towards ultimately valid results. Rather, my premises allow me to move along as one result and interpretation leads to another. My choice depends on what I theoretically include in my results.

Reid (1979, 1999) has emphasized that the urge to simplify the view of results is strong. According to him (1979, p. 190), there exists a tendency to interpret approximate results as procedural outcomes by establishing a formula or method of doing and presenting things. Pressures for this kind of simplification are especially strong where the practical questions are of great public concern. Current concerns of the state of education in general and teacher education in particular (cf. Cochran-Smith & Fries, 2001) belong to this category. It is precisely in these areas that we face the danger of limiting ourselves to procedural solutions and results to complex practical problems.

As Buchmann (1988) has emphasized, this simplification should be resisted not only because it is misleading but also because it builds up a false picture of the nature of the pedagogical problems and our possibilities to alleviate them. According to her (p. 212), rationality in teaching cannot ask for more than pedagogical practices are capable of giving. Already Aristotle claimed that within these kind of issues the capacity of human thought is essentially loose or indefinite. Therefore, the matter at hand in educational situations tends to be imprecise by nature. If we ask for more, we face a risk of getting

'false truths.' In teaching, this means that we may end up identifying an 'exact order' of things. In turn, it can give us a false "*feeling* of certainty" (Buchmann, 1993, p. 125, original emphasis). We may end up reporting "difficult practices that look easy" (Labaree, 2000).

This chapter interprets the combined results of the three sets of studies (I, II, III). It traces the web of common patterns and processes (the first set of studies, I), structured relations (the second set of studies, II), and practical maneuvers (the third set of studies, III) and tries to reveal certain fundamental tensions inherent in teaching. Five stand out: care and respect for students, the compelling power of teachers' personal justifications, the absence of a shared code of practice, the struggles to balance teachers' public and private roles, and the basic uncertainty within the profession.

4.1 CARE AND RESPECT FOR STUDENTS

Within all the three sets of studies (I, II, III), the notion of pedagogical relationship was emphasized. As presented, these relationships with students were often intensely experienced. Here, three interconnected characteristics appeared. First, the pedagogical relationship was often characterized by a spontaneous personal quality that emerged between teachers and students. Teachers felt they had to 'be themselves' when establishing relationships with students. In most cases they experienced that they wanted and needed to work as collaborators with their students. According to teachers, their pedagogical ideas and actions were largely justified on the basis of how well they worked with the students.

This intuitive background might be relatively simple and unexpressed, and yet it was penetrating. It directed attention and thereby determined what was perceived. For example, hopefulness and commitment led a teacher to seek "weak signals" to prove that at least some learning and progress was taking place in students. It often implied that some personally relevant and optimistic beliefs were placed above "the reasoned facts" of explicit and formal reasoning. But without this intuitive background, those weak signals of student learning and progress would not even be recognized.

Besides these spontaneous forces, which could be linked with a teacher's person, there was a more intentional and role-oriented feature in these relations, as well. This second quality challenged teachers to take professional responsibility for their students. It was a teacher's task and professional duty to perceive 'the best interest of a student.' In many cases, this led teachers to mediate between conflicting interests. I have shown that these competing values brought their own content and meaning in efforts to resolve the competing interests. This plurality of understandings was interpreted to be an integral part of the teaching profession.

Third, despite normative guidelines, practices of raising and educating seemed often diverse and contradictory. It became apparent that school ethos had considerable effect on teacher-student relations. School culture appeared to operate like culture everywhere: it both constrained and liberated teachers' agency and conduct. A school culture could generate, both explicitly and implicitly, professional support for teachers. It could enhance their commitment to educate students. However, school ethos could also dampen teachers' sincere strivings. It could wear away their hope and aspiration for better relations, and it could become a constant negative force teachers had to contend with every day. School culture appeared to generate complicated forces and pressures of many kinds that affected how teachers perceived their students.

Pedagogically, the social dynamics of teaching seemed to imply that the 'subject' teachers 'taught' was their students. This result refers to teaching as a "prototypical caring relation" (Noddings, 1984) in which a teacher has two major tasks. On the one hand, a teacher's task is to extend the students' world by presenting an effective selection of that world with which a teacher is in contact. On the other hand, it is a teacher's task to work cooperatively with her/his students in their efforts toward competence in that world. According to this stance, teaching takes place collaboratively around those issues. And, as presented in this research, this reflects back to students as a resource and/or source of contradictions.

4.2 COMPELLING POWER OF PERSONAL JUSTIFICATIONS

Ryle's (1949) notion that practical performance "has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents" (p. 32) accords also with the results of my studies (I, II, III). When teachers talked about their work, they also talked about themselves; the events were filtered through the person of the teacher. Teachers used themselves as tools to manage their work, and a large proportion of teachers responses contained self-referential comments. The blurring of boundaries between the personal and the professional was evident. The personal aspects emerged quite implicitly, without much conscious thinking, in teachers' pedagogical knowing. The exploring of pedagogical encounters permitted me to assume that teachers' pedagogical knowing could be described, at least to some extent, as implied, rather than applied knowing.

It became evident that teachers' knowledge was not based to any great extent upon pre-established forms of reasoning. Rather, it tended to be founded on certain "socially shared identities of feeling" (Shotter, 1993, p. 54) that teachers created in the flow of their pedagogical activities. This 'type' of knowing was meant to work for teachers in ways that secured methods for action, not reflection. 'Being pedagogical' seemed to require a sort of combination of teachers' selves and particular situations into a single, irreducible entity. Teachers described they were always somewhere, for some purpose, and that they were absorbed in some activity. Usually, they could not separate themselves from these entities in order to perceive them objectively as 'properties.' Instead, teachers felt that those situations required their personal investment. They found themselves in particular situations in which they had no other option than to participate.

The tasks were various and teachers perceived them both professionally and personally. What must a teacher do? Normatively, teachers had to teach and act according to the curriculum. But, in addition, they were also able to bring in their personal pedagogical tastes and preferences. They felt that 'good practice' took innumerable forms and was individually dynamic. Actually, there were as many versions of good practice as there were teachers striving to attain it. Therefore, 'good practice' seemed to be based on each individual teacher's reasoning and character. This kind of knowing presupposed the authority of the

person and required an epistemological capacity to use personal values and understandings as standards to test the claims of knowing.

For teachers themselves, these first-person attributions of their knowing were internally motivating and often normative. When discussing their justifications for their actions, teachers tended to refer to personally motivating states, e.g. their ideas, wishes, and desires. These features seemed to have compelling power in teachers' deliberations of what to believe, and what to do in particular situations. What was known and how that knowledge was justified were related to the person of the teacher. They were matters of each teacher's individual epistemology (Goldman, 1986) where the knower and the known could not be separated (cf. Tirri *et. al.*, 1999).

Teachers perceived and selected issues they were personally and situationally inclined to. Partly for this reason, there was a great deal of variation, uncertainty and unpredictability in pedagogical enterprises. Teachers – as well as students, parents, and colleagues – brought a host of idiosyncracies into pedagogical situations which, in turn, became (even more) difficult to deal with and control.

4.3 ABSENCE OF A SHARED CODE OF PRACTICE

As shown above, it is not enough to characterize teachers' pedagogical knowledge as taking care of students and as a first-person kind of knowing. In practice, caring relationships and a teacher's caring person were inseparable, and serving professional aims was a deeply personal matter. How, then, is it possible to address concern for defensible professional action? According to Buchmann (1986),

> personal reasons – centering one's habits, interests, and opinions – are relevant for considering the wisdom of actions where questions is what the individual per se wants to accomplish, but not for professional situations where goals (and perhaps a range of means) area a given (p. 530).

Teachers are in the latter position. Therefore, more is needed when we interpret teachers' actions and decisions in a larger public and professional framework. In other words, this position calls for the importance of valid justifications concerning the judgements in teaching.

What has this research found? In the first set of studies (I) I constructed a framework for describing teachers' 'relational epistemologies' (study I/2) and their 'general' and 'relative justifications' (study I/1). In both studies, the boundaries between categories were often obscure and frequently the categories were interrelated. I was forced to shunt the problem back and forth, looking at it first in one light, then in another. Here, perhaps, my methodological approach resembled the practice of teachers' pedagogical knowing. Nevertheless, I concluded that teachers' knowing was "not a method but a manner of knowing" (study I/1 & 2).

In the second set of studies (II) the outcomes of all kinds of conflicts appeared quite unsatisfactory. In most of the cases, ethical conflicts were left "open," and the participants in them found "no improvement" or they even faced the "end of co-operation." There existed much uncertainty both in private and public spheres of pedagogy. As a result, political (in some cases even legal), cultural, and moral norms and values could not confidently provide a secure basis for their pedagogical actions. Teachers' diverse conceptions of the guidelines appeared as a problem. When two or more moral stances were applicable to a case, but recommended different moral judgements and/or different courses of action, the dilemma appeared as a true stumbling block to pedagogical decision making. As our results indicated, it was not enough that educators regarded themselves as "pro-kids" in order to justify their pedagogical decisions. Accordingly, we emphasized that we should view teachers as professionals who are responsible but also capable of building workable and successful social relations with their pedagogical partners.

In the third set of studies (III) three representations of pedagogical ethics were used to guide the analysis of the teacher's professional dilemma. The smoking case provided an example of a real-life dilemma that could not be understood using only one interpretative perspective. We concluded that the teacher simultaneously used different ethical perspectives in her practical reflection. Her pedagogical decisions were shaped by the interrelationship of several elements: basic beliefs, workplace norms, circumstances, personal philosophies, feelings, and intuitions. In deciding what to do, the teacher blended them into a situationally functioning whole.

Caution requires modesty in drawing conclusions from the results of these three different sets of studies (I, II, III). However, the importance of justification in teaching has been shown to be of paramount importance. The basic question "What must a teacher do?" set a standard that was at least elusive. As indicated, that teachers were able to account for their actions on the basis of what was right for their students did not settle the matter. This was because teachers' pedagogical knowledge did not constitute a formally organized discipline, with "explicit standards for what counts as proper action, good reasons, or adequate evidence" (Loewenberg Ball, 1993, p. 201). It seemed that because teachers were on their own to invent and develop their pedagogy, their knowing was often very personal. Thus, being responsible to the many imperatives of practice remained a highly individual and personal matter.

4.4 BALANCING THE PERSONAL WITH THE PUBLIC

In this research teachers' pedagogical knowledge concerned those norms, values, and principles that seemed to govern their conduct. It emphasized the inherent normative meanings that seemed to determine the appropriateness of their practices. Therefore, this normative core provided ways to appraise the reported educational practices in schools. Teachers work in public institutions and make decisions that affect others: they distribute resources, evaluate performance, make curricular choices, and deal with comparatively naive and vulnerable students. Therefore, they need to provide 'good reasons' to support their decisions and actions. And thus, the process of justification should be regarded as inescapably social, as well.

The first set of studies (I) showed how teachers 'selves' were interconnected with significant others (e.g. parents and colleagues). Nevertheless, the main basis for legitimating ideas and actions seemed to be their value for the classroom. The experience "how it worked" seemed to be the an important criterion for justifying teachers' performances. Thus, the 'others' that mattered the most were the students. This was not only a matter of formal teaching. Many teachers at the primary and secondary level reported that they also wanted to establish warm and caring relationships with students. Frequently,

they wanted to work as a collaborating allies of their students, not as authoritarian dispensers of knowledge. Here, from the perspective of teacher knowledge, teachers' epistemological stances (study I/2) were supported by their ways to justify their pedagogical knowing (study I/1) which both acted as an interrelated entity.

The research scenario became more complicated within the second set of studies (II). There, all the dilemmas identified by teachers dealt with human relationships and teachers' different ways of perceiving the 'best interest of the child.' In many cases, teachers' responses to children's needs manifested themslves in taking a stand for students by making judgements in troubled circumstances about what was to be done and how to accomplish it. This led teachers to mediate between conflicting private and public interests, including those pertaining to personal, professional, organizational and societal values.

This plurality of understandings was interpreted to be an integral part of the teaching profession. It was one of teachers' professional tasks to discern how these competing interests could be best served. As our data indicated, conflicts between private and public interests were common. When they happened, teachers apparently attempted to act according their professional codes, parents relied more on their personal opinions. In such situations, teachers' particular actions and general dispositions should be based more on their interpretations of public standards and goals than on their personal preferences. However, it often turned out that teachers were unable to separate their own moral character from their professional stance. Teachers' personal character functioned as an approach in their reasoning, guiding their ways of interaction with others. Thus, teachers' personal preferences and their professional code merged. Teachers seemed to accept this oneness as 'natural,' as part of their taken-for-granted life as teachers.

In the third set of studies (III), we took a closer look at the uncertainty and unpredictability of the pedagogical encounter itself. As study III/1 shows, teachers introduced accidental and unconscious associations in pedagogical situations that couldn't be predicted or controlled. Therefore, instead of asking what ought to be, we approached the situation by investigating what conditions might explain pedagogical actions and decisions. This meant shifting our focus to places where the conditions and contingencies of pedagogical

judgements can best be found. The stance implied exploring the day-to-day details of school life to find out what pedagogical knowing entails. Here, 'private' and 'public' were investigated within a school setting involving teachers and students.

Study III/1 shows how school ethos had considerable effect on teachers' pedagogical practices. The study highlighted the links between a school's ethos and teachers' orientation to their work. Here, it emerges that school cultures appeared to operate like cultures everywhere. School cultures appeared to generate complicated forces and pressures of many kinds that affected teachers' professional practices. Its forces and pressures seemed to influence teachers' attitudes in many ways.

4.5 PEDAGOGICAL UNCERTAINTY

For many, one unspoken purpose of teaching is the reduction of uncertainty in students. From this perspective, it seems paradoxical that teachers themselves have to live through such tensions that seem to be inherent to their work. My research shows that no single goal or method was successful in guiding teachers' judgements and action on its own. Teachers lived with stable tasks and urgent obligations which often conflicted with each other. Pedagogically, the obligations were mostly tied with teachers' professional duties to promote the interests of their students. In addition, they were engagements of a personal nature that were related to mutuality and ties, such as commitment, hopefulness, kindness, and gratitude. Teachers' compliance with these obligations made them have 'second thoughts.' As Floden & Buchmann (1993) eloquently describe this syndrome, these second thoughts often involved "periodic, attentive inspections of one's assumptions, actions, and ramifying consequences" (p. 205). In practice, this kind of engagement couldn't usually rest upon single-minded solutions, but depended on "the mind-opening presence of others, real or imagined" (*ibid.*).

Generally, teachers dealt with the human behavior of others. This meant that they were dependent on the actions of their pedagogical partners which, in turn, introduced a great deal of ambiguity into their work as teachers. This was because teachers aimed to consider

not only their own values and purposes but also those of their pedagogical partners. The result was often a messy interaction between teachers and students/parents/colleagues.

More specifically, my purpose was to demonstrate the complexity of pedagogical knowledge (the first set of studies, I) by interpreting and documenting the diverse reactions people have to various pedagogical situations (the second set of studies, II & the third set of studies, III). What a pedagogical dilemma was and ought to be, and about whom and what it was good for – including whether it was good at all. In study III/1 we explored diverse notions of pedagogical dilemmas and how they portrayed a process in which rationales not only conflicted but, under some conditions, cancelled each other out so that actually no solution could be presented. Taken together, all these sets of studies (I, II, III) aimed explore the largely tacit and fluid character of teachers' perspectives in their pedagogical knowledge.

The multiple tensions made it evident that no 'definite answers' appeared to exist and that the given answers could always be contested. It appeared that it was unclear whether much of what teachers knew was professionally specific to them in the sense that the knowledge teachers employed could be considered highly different by character or degree from the knowledge of their pedagogical partners.

Pedagogical knowing was characterized as an active process by which individuals perform their duties in situations involving intense social interactions. Accordingly, definitive statements as to which decision or whose 'good reasons' should be observed were of fleeting value. In the context of the school community, the values of teachers, parents and students were in a constant engagement with each other. The tension between 'private' and 'public' suggested that pedagogical knowing could be viewed in terms of how eloquently the participants in question were able to persuade others of the validity of their judgements. The pedagogical "argument" in this art was not the construction of a "proof," as is commonly assumed. Rather, the idea of "argumentation" tied together the issues debated. This kind of rhetorical understanding enabled teachers to perceive the different sides of issues and, therefore, to gain a better conception of them.

This pedagogical uncertainty motivated teachers to relocate their 'inner' reasoning towards more spontaneous encounters between

them and students/parents/colleagues. Instead of viewing the resolution of pedagogical issues functioning according to a set of pre-established rules and principles, solving problems involved active dialogical processes of testing what was at stake for all parties in the issue. Pedagogical problems presupposed that one's actions could be successful only if they could be accepted by other participants. By adopting different 'voices,' teachers were more successful in responding to others under the particular circumstances involved.

DISCUSSION

Coming to terms with contraries and uncertainties in teaching

This study has treated teachers' pedagogical knowing as a broad theoretical concept and as an extended practice. Pedagogical activity was not simply what happened in schools and classrooms, it was also found 'inside' teachers and 'outside' institutions. However, I have shown that many of these personal features and cultural aspects collapse into one another in teachers' pedagogical knowing. Teachers are personally involved in their actions and reflections and combine intellectual skills, virtues, habits of mind, appropriate social behavior etc. In addition, I found it important to treat a wide array of issues that are, at least in part, ethical in nature. Most actions teachers took in schools and classrooms contained some moral meaning that, in turn, influenced others. Frequently, it was a question of familiar, routine aspects of teachers' work that were conveying moral meanings. This could also happen without teachers being aware of it.

It was hard to find a common denominator that held together teachers' pedagogical actions and their judgements. In terms of the issues presented in the three sets of studies (I, II, III), there could be many centers: ways of justifications, individual epistemologies, relational ethics, practices of dilemma managing etc. Therefore, I considered teachers' pedagogical knowing as an activity that cut across those areas. Within that activity, one common feature was identified: uncertainty. Pedagogical knowing and action were both interpreted to involve uncertain practical problems. While teachers had the responsibility for resolving them, the basis for their judgements

and actions was often implicit and unclear. This was due to the fact that situations were already tied to other agents, histories, and institutional arrangements. Consequently, teachers could not foretell the outcomes of the solutions they adopted

Earlier, I emphasized the prevailing tendency to reduce complex practical problems to procedural ones. According to these studies and additional evidence (Reid, 1979, 1999; Barbules, 1990; Buchman & Floden, 1993; Waks, 2000), these tendencies are flawed because they i) fail to show how method in pedagogical knowing can be rendered into pedagogical practice with the aid of human agency; ii) obscure the multiple contexts within which pedagogical knowing is engaged; iii) neglect the evidence that knowledge develops in ourselves and in others through practical activities and communicative interchange.

For these reasons, educational researchers can find themselves unable to speak authoritatively about teachers' pedagogical knowing. For some, this can be a problem; for others, the situation can open up new possibilities. However, as Labaree (1998) has asked: what does it mean if we start to live with a lesser form of knowing?

5.1 INSIGHTS FOR TEACHER LEARNING

For teachers, an important task is for them to learn to analyze pedagogical issues from different points of view in a way that allows them to become objects of conscious reflection. Therefore, what are needed are forums that emphasize this kind of analysis and articulation of pedagogical knowledge. As Strike (1993) has argued, creation of such opportunities also seeks to help students perceive the pedagogical issues in a more consistent manner.

According to my studies, it is important to promote teachers' dialogical understanding. Analyzing and discussing pedagogical issues can help teachers to identify and articulate their knowing more clearly. The process also may help them to see the worth of social skills required for pedagogical judgements. Teachers may learn to listen more meaningfully, to acquire a sharper sense of moral diversity, and to respect differences of opinion. It may promote the understanding that schools are characterized by personal moral encounters, but they are also influenced by extrapersonal entities such as social realities.

Within these studies, teachers' actions were heavily informed by their professional obligations. Moreover, teachers' own moral character comes to the fore here – for example, in the teacher's very willingness, in the first place, to accept the professional obligations in question. To be sure, teachers should be virtuous and caring persons. As leaders that formulate goals of teacher education programs, they should consider not only what kinds of teachers are needed in schools but also what can be done during formal teacher education to help them become ethical individuals.

Important, pedagogical knowledge and judgement cannot be learned sufficiently during formal teacher preparation. It is the product of years, not credit hours. Teacher education programs should acknowledge that actual work in school settings persistently informs teachers' practice. According to my results, a considerable variability in the quality and capability of teachers' pedagogical knowing must be expected. Therefore, rather than blame teachers themselves or teacher educators for incomplete attention to the issue, policy considerations should attend to teachers' professional learning in their practical school settings.

Special attention must be accorded to create social conditions in schools that permit appropriate conditions for the teachers' continuous development in their work. Clark (2001, pp. 149-155) calls for professional learning and growth in four major areas: personal, professional, staff development and curriculum development. Personal growth is a form if inner growth that involves an increased awareness of self related to a teacher's individual needs, values, and beliefs. Growth in this area can lead to a change of perspective and new ways of thinking about self and others. Professional growth is focused on what it means to be a professional educator and a learner. Here, the contexts are many, ranging from teachers' individual competencies to the ability to deal with the social and political nature of schooling. Staff development relates to the opportunities of collective enrichment within a profession. These opportunities include workshops, seminars, and guiding teachers to reflect their practices. The fourth area relates more closely to administratively defined quality in teaching. Curriculum development involves opportunities for teachers to expand their teaching skills in order to ensure sufficient quality in student learning. Content standards and student achievement tests will require

teachers to 'update' their teaching skills in order to enhance learning and achievement by students.

However, no matter what the teacher's personal and professional commitments, each teacher is strongly affected by the school's ethos (cf. Donnelly, 2000). No amount of time spent in college classes can develop sufficiently pedagogical thinking and action; such continuous improvement is attained only through teachers' reflected experience as they work in schools. Schools all too often engender structures and atmosphere that fail to support teachers' pedagogical behavior and reflection. Sophistication of pedagogical reasoning largely depends on the existence of forums at which teachers reasonably may deal with particular dilemmas and their more general pedagogical knwowing. What are the conditions needed for sound professional judgement? Arendt (1982) notes that decision making and meaning are only tested and widened when different meanings exist in a community and when individuals are willing to subject the content of meanings to general debate. Frequently, contemporary schools tend not to be such forums.

However, if policymakers value pedagogical reflection in the teaching profession and follow the demand for a situationally adequate practice connected to deliberation and judgement, then, according to Colnerud *et al.* (1999), a number of consequences arise. If educational decision making is based upon discourse, then different meanings must be expressed in public dialogue within the school community. Such a collective exchange of meanings presupposes that many different types of meanings become visible. Consequently, such an exchange presupposes a willingness and means to create conditions for open dialogue. Among the attributes of this situation is the need to move away from a rule-governed understanding of practice and open up the number of meanings and descriptions of practice. Finally, collective reflection accepts difference and divergence. It does not regard them as potentially debilitating. One learns to "live with doubt." Then, the key is not unanimous agreement, but discourse and the testing of plural meanings.

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PART II

ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

Some of original publications are removed from this electronic version for copyright reasons.

THE FIRST SET OF STUDIES (I)

1) Husu, J. (2000). How teachers justify their practical knowing? Conceptualizing general and relative justifications. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education and Development*, *3*(1), 163-186.[1]

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   DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203166185

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[1] Original source of publication; The Hong Kong Institute of Education, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po, N.T., Hong Kong; http://www.ied.eduhk/cric/apjted/apjted.htm

[2] Original source of publication; RoutledgeFalmer, 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE, UK & 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001, USA; http://www.routledgefalmer.com

THE SECOND SET OF STUDIES (II)

1) Tirri, K. & Husu, J. (2002). Care and responsibility in "the best interest of a child": Relational voices of ethical dilemmas in teaching. *Teachers & Teaching: theory and practice*, *8*(1), 65-80.[3] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13540600120110574

2) Husu, J. & Tirri, K. (2001). Teachers' ethical choices in socio-moral settings. *Journal of Moral Education*, *30*(4), 361-375.[4] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240120094850

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[4] Original source of publication; Taylor & Francis, Ltd, P.O. Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, OX14 3UE; http://www.tandf.co.uk

II/1

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THE THIRD SET OF STUDIES (III)

1) Husu, J. & Tirri, K. (in press). A case study approach to study one teacher's moral reflection. *Teaching and Teacher Education*[5]

Published version:
Husu, J & Tirri, K. 2003. A case study approach to study one teacher's moral reflection. *Teaching and Teacher Education 19*(3), 345–357.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0742-051X(03)00019-2

III/1

A case study approach to study one teacher's moral reflection

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ABSTRACT In this paper we present a case study approach to study one teacher's moral reflection. The theoretical framework is built on three philosophical and ethical reference points that the teacher uses in her reflection. We focus on the ethic of purpose, ethic of rules and principles, and ethic of probability together with their philosophical perspectives. Our data includes one narrative of a moral dilemma experienced by a female secondary school teacher. We have applied a qualitative reading guide to analyze this case regarding smoking from different ethical reference points. Our goal is to show how abstract philosophical theories can be translated into real world ethics in education and how these reference points can help teachers in their practical ethical reflection.

Introduction

Educators are called upon to mediate upon many private and public interests that pertain to personal, professional, organizational, and societal values. This work of mediating conflicting values relates to guarding and promoting the best interests of a student. But what is meant when we say we are making decisions in the best interests of students? Each of the philosophical, ethical, and pedagogical justifications contributes content and meaning to the phrase. While each of these perspectives deserves consideration, in this paper we limit ourselves to an exploration of three interpretations from the field of philosophy and ethics. We focus on *the ethic of purpose, the ethic of rules and principles*, and *the ethic of probability,* together with their philosophical perspectives and practical interpretations (Walker, 1998).

Our goal is to determine what moral issues mean to a teacher in practice. We aim to interpret and translate a teacher's understanding from the language she uses, and to give concrete expressions to these interpretations by her daily ethical actions (Bernstein, 1992). In this effort, Pring (2000) argues, it is necessary to pay attention to the nature of 'educational practice' and the distinctive language and values through which such a practice can be understood and evaluated. We need to ask what *educational* practice actually means? And that requires, according to Pring (2000), "a little more philosophical homework than is normally given" (p. 497).

Educational research cannot escape philosophical questions about the nature of an 'educational practice' and thus of 'educational inquiry.' The nature of the

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language used to describe educational practice by researchers needs to be related to the language of the teachers through which they understand and define the reality of school life. The process of 'educational practice' will be different for individual teachers as they approach it from different starting points and different perceptions. The procedure presents many kinds of complexities. As Gauthier (1963) has remarked, "the sphere of the practical is necessarily the sphere of the uncertain" (p. 1). A practical problem is "a problem about what to do ... whose final solution is found only in doing something, in acting" (p. 49).

Young (1999) has argued that because most educational studies take place within a single theoretical framework, the findings of these studies do not provide a comprehensive understanding of the problems being researched (cf. e.g. Ball, 1994; Rist, 1994; Scheurich & Young, 1997). In response to this problem, she argues in favor of using more than one theoretical approach to examine and analyze the same issues. The process of analyzing and interpreting the data through different frames provides a forum for comparing the similarities and differences in the findings that emerge from different perspectives. This multifocal process involves viewing from one lens and subsequently reconsidering the phenomena from another.

In this paper, our frames of reference are three interpretations from the philosophy and ethics. We argue that the use of more than one theoretical approach will expand and complement our traditional approaches in educational studies. The practice may help us better understand the ethical problems we study, clarify the dynamics of educational contexts, and value the impact of different ethical approaches on teachers and students. We also hope that using more than one theoretical approach will increase the trustworthiness of research findings because each approach can serve as a check on the other. Thus, as Young (1999) emphasizes, "inaccurate assumptions and problematic interpretations should be more easily revealed, and tenets formerly accepted as given are more likely to be questioned" (p. 679). As a result, our ability to construct the ethical dilemmas in education should be moved to a level of deeper understanding.

Theoretical background: frames of ethical reference points

The ethic of purpose

The development of an interpretative account on moral issues starts from the ethic of purpose. Without this standpoint, Nash (1996) argues, a coherent moral dialogue between ourselves and the world cannot take place. The perspective is intended to provide a sort of self-understanding that can lead to an adequately informed and defensible ethical action.

Here the ethical dilemmas are understood from the teleological perspective. According to Aristotle, determination of a proper purpose or *telos* (final end) can help people in defining the best interests of their fellow men. As Walker (1998) emphasizes, "[t]he attention of this ethic is on the agent and the act" (p. 297). He explains that in educational settings a particular decision is justified if it facilitates the development of students' individual potentials as human beings. Educators' self-evaluations as well as the evaluations of people outside the profession are carried out with the ethic of purpose in mind. According to this ethic, the purpose of educational institutions resides in the conscious potential, which in turn directs the organization's resources and its practical actions.

Nash (1996) calls this the "first moral language" or the language of "grounding beliefs." It gives us an opportunity to identify some important systems of morality and their accompanying claims. It also provides a chance to examine the underlying assumptions determining why something is regarded as right or wrong. Within this realm teachers develop a more or less comprehensive and coherent account of their moral convictions. It is important for them, as professionals (Sockett, 1993), to be both conscious of and able to articulate these fundamental sources of their working ethics.

Gee (2001) uses the concept of "identity" to describe our being and action at a given time and place. According to him, when we act and interact in a given context, others recognize us as acting and interacting as a certain "kind of person" or even as different "kinds" at once (p. 99). These multiple and simultaneous 'identities' are not separate from each other. Rather, they interrelate in complex and important ways. This is just what Gee (2001.) means by 'identity.' In his sense of the term, "all people have multiple identities connected not [only] to their 'internal states' but to their performances in society" (p. 99). They are ways to focus our attention on different aspects of how our action is formed and sustained.

Taylor (1992) speaks about these realms as a person's "background of intelligibility," those "moral horizons against which things take on significance for us" (p. 37). In many cases it is the world we know only dimly. However, as Nash (1996, p. 40) argues, this perspective is not meant for immediate utility. Its premises are not meant to apply straightforwardly to the analysis and resolution of a particular ethical dilemma. That will come later. Its task is to provide an essential basis for further levels of ethical reasoning. The major purpose of this perspective is an effort to understand the unique and inescapable nature of the "ethical centers of reference" (Nash, 1996, p. 40).

The ethic of rules and principles

Moral dilemmas can also be viewed from a deontological or principle-based perspective. The approach "judges educational decisions according to implicit and explicit rules and duties owed" (Walker, 1998, p. 298). The aim is defined by *a priori* duties, rules, and principles. The focus tends to be, as Walker points out, "on the policy decisions (means) and on the educator's conformity to an ethical principle or a set of rules" (ibid.).

Philosophically the stance can be linked to Kant. Among moral philosophers he is mostly associated with the notion that one should act according to a maxim that would aptly become a universal rule for all. This rule of universality, or the "categorical imperative," was formulated in his doctrine of respect for persons (Kant 1785/1983). A deontological approach appeals to certain rules and principles as being good in themselves. These principles are regarded as valid independently of whether or not they produce benefits or maximize good consequences.

The perspective of principles is, according to Nash (1996, p. 110), "a 'thin' moral language" and it is procedural by its nature (Reid, 1979). It relies not on metaphysical accounts of morality, but on abstract, general and principled accounts of appropriate guidelines of how to act. Thus, the stance requires teachers to agree on ethical courses of action based on a set of general moral rules and principles. They provide a general guide to action, a certain authority in ethical decision-making.

Whenever asked what these moral principles are, teachers tend to speak in simple maxims, which for them can be desirable rules of conduct. Be caring. Be available when your pupils need you. Practice what you preach, and so forth. These general principles and moral rules can be seen as the underpinnings for such formal principles as thoughtfulness, accessibility, and coherence. As action guides, these principles indicate the moral rights and obligations that are at stake in a dilemma. Nash (1996) argues that they can clarify and justify the solutions to moral problems because they "provide the standards by which ethical actions and decisions are made" (p. 111).

The ethic of probability

Moral dilemmas can also be interpreted through a calculation of the probable positive and negative consequences (short and long term) of a particular educational decision. Once the likely outcomes are predicted, the alternatives that provide the greatest benefit and least harm may be chosen.

Philosophically the stance is backed by utilitarian perspectives. Utilitarians such as Mill (1861/1979) are concerned primarily with the results of an activity. According to simple utilitarianism, one may judge the best way by determining which

policy decision is likely to produce the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. In other words, the best interests of students are served if the negative consequences are minimized and positive benefits are maximized (Walker, 1998, p. 300). The problem of attaining a fair and just resolution that also works usually means the balancing of the pros and cons of the conflict. The problems usually compel us to choose between competing goals and values. We may choose a solution that aims to maximize the desired results across a range of students involved, but some will suffer at the expense of others.

The process through which this is achieved resembles "practical reasoning" (Carlgren & Lindblad, 1991; Pendlebury, 1993) and "deliberation" (Johnston, 1993). It shows that the problems teachers face in their work relate most closely to the class of questions that are referred to as "uncertain practical questions" (Gauthier, 1963). According to Reid (1979, p. 188-9), they are problems that usually have many common features: i) They are problems that have to be answered - even if the answer is to decide to do nothing. ii) The grounds on which decisions should be made are uncertain. Nothing can tell us infallibly which method should be used, what evidence should be taken into account or rejected, what kinds of arguments should be given precedence. iii) We always have to take the existing state of affairs into account. We are never free from past or present contexts and their arrangements. iv) Each problem is in some ways unique, belonging to a specific time and context, the particulars of which we can never exhaustively describe. v) We can never predict the outcome of the particular solution we choose, still less know what the outcome would have been had we made a different choice.

Lampert (1985) speaks about "dilemma managing" in which teachers cannot choose a solution to a problem without compromising other goals they seek to accomplish. Teachers cannot see their goals as a neat dichotomy between one and the another and their job as making clear choices. In many cases, teachers' aims for any particular student are entangled with teachers' aims for each of the others in the class and in the school's professional community

Method and data

The method of our study is a personal interview with 33 Finnish lower secondary (22 females/ 11 males) school teachers. The teachers were given a structured interview in their native language lasting approximately 45 minutes. In the interview, the teachers were asked to describe one particular case of a moral dilemma they had experienced during their teaching career and the principles they used in the solving process. They were encouraged to choose a situation in which they had had difficulty in deciding the right way to act. The teachers were asked to tell about the case in detail, with all of the

important context factors. All the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. All the materials were translated from Finnish into English with the help of a native English speaker. The main themes of moral dilemmas were categorized by content analyses. Special attention was given to the solutions to different dilemmas and the principles guiding them. The results of the whole study are reported in various international journals (see Tirri, 1999; Tirri, Husu, & Kansanen 1999).

In this paper, we have chosen one case study of a moral dilemma from the whole data set, a narrative told by one female teacher, which was shown to be very difficult for the teacher to solve. The case differed from the other dilemmas as it involved a teacher's decision to do nothing further in order to avoid further harm. In all the other cases, the teachers had made active efforts to solve the dilemmas by referring to their guiding moral principles (Tirri, 1999). In this case, the teacher could not find a single ethical framework that would support her in her decision-making process. We present this case as an example of a dilemma that can be approached with multiple moral approaches. The case shows that teaching is a continuously unfolding event, and that teachers must engage in some action, at some instance. As Roth et al. (2001) state, "in each situation and moment, an action is required even if that action is non-action" (p. 185).

The particular case has been analyzed using a hermeneutical approach (Gadamer, 1976) to better understand the multifocal perspectives in teachers' ethical reflection. According to Bernstein (1992), the goal of the hermeneutical approach to ethics is to determine what moral issues mean to us and to interpret and translate this understanding by analyzing the language being used. It aims to give concrete expressions to these interpretations by our daily ethical actions. Hermeneutics derives from the Greek *hermeneuein,* "to interpret into one's own idiom, to give expression to, to attribute meaning to." We also share Nash's (1996, pp. 56-57) argument that the world of ethics is an endlessly interpretable world, and there is rarely a final or definite response to an ethical dilemma.

Reading guide

In the analysis, we have adopted a qualitative reading guide to examine the ethical frameworks underlying a teacher's practical reflection in the case of smoking. The reading guide is based on the evidence that persons simultaneously know (can recognize, speak in, and respond to) various different perspectives in discussing moral issues and may show a preference for one over the other (Brown *et al.,* 1991; Gilligan *et al.,* 1990; Johnston, 1989). Evidence of the ability of individuals to speak in various perspectives suggests that the narrative self (Bruner, 1995) is multivoiced and involved in choices about how to speak. In reading texts, we regard persons as moral

agents with respect to the concerns about the relationship they present and those they keep silent. The reading guide aims to highlight the various ethical perspectives, as well as the sense of tension people often convey in their case reports of lived moral experiences. Thus, it is a voice-sensitive method that attempts to record the complexity of case reports of moral conflicts and choice, and attempts to capture the personal, relational, and cultural dimensions of lived experiences (Brown *et al.*, 1991, p. 29). The reading guide focuses on interpreting the narrator's way of seeing and speaking about the phenomenon.

The method focuses on the reading process and the creation of an interpretative account of a narrative case report. According to Bahktin (1981), individual words and phrases that are used to describe moral thought, feeling, and action are meaningless in and of themselves to explain the particular meaning (p. 276). Therefore, as Brown *et al.* (1991) interpret, "[t]he living language exists only in a web of interrelationships that allow a narrator's meaning to become clear only if the context, the narrative, is maintained" (p. 27). Thus, it is only by allowing language to exist in narrative relationships that it is possible to interpret and understand another's moral experiences.

Interpretative procedures

The reading guide aims to provide an approach to interpreting case reports of conflict and choice. It allows a reader to specify the ways in which a person chooses between or lives with them. Both authors of the paper read the story a total of three consecutive times from three ethical perspectives. The three perspectives and their multiple readings provided a practical frame of reference for the investigated dilemma by analyzing it from different philosophical and ethical viewpoints. Table I presents the three perspectives together with their consecutive readings.

Table I. The interpretative procedures of the reading guide.

I perspective: the ethic of purpose
This perspective tries to uncover the final ends of the pedagogical practice in question. According to this stance, within the domain of moral judgement, a global assessment comes before the specific practical actions. The perspective focuses on the narrator's expressed concerns about the sources of the problem. It is a question of attitudes and attitudes revealed in actions to work out, or live with, the faced problems. Solutions to them can often be sought by an interactive consideration of means and ends. The first comprehensive reading aims to uncover *what lies behind the moral dilemma*?

II perspective: the ethic of rules and principles
The second perspective aims to reveal the practical action guides teachers rely on. Rules and principles are usually brief statements of what to do or what should be done in a particular situation encountered in practice. The major purpose of the perspective is to justify or defend educational decisions based on certain appropriate rules and principles. The second reading provides the answer to the question *what are the profession's code of ethics regarding the moral dilemma*?

III perspective: the ethic of probability
The third distinction investigates the emergent dilemmas when rules and principles are put into practice. What kind of pedagogical dilemmas arise, and how do teachers try to cope with these situations? The stance focuses on the evaluation of the taken or intended actions and their possible results. Solutions to moral conflicts are often found only by doing something, by acting. The third comprehensive reading concentrates on the issue *what are the practical choices in a moral dilemma*?

After each reading, the authors filled in a summary worksheet. For the readers, the worksheets provided a place to document relevant pieces of the text and to make interpretative remarks. The worksheets were intended to emphasize the move from the narrator's written words to a reader's interpretation or summary of them. They require the reader to substantiate her/his interpretation with quotes from the written story itself. As such, the worksheets stand between the written story and the main generalized philosophical and ethical perspectives drawn from the particular cases. According to Brown *et al.* (1991), "they provide a trail of evidence from the reader's interpretations of the narrative" (p. 33).

In the final step of the reading process, the authors used the summary worksheets that aim to capture the details of three philosophical and ethical perspectives in order to summarize the chosen viewpoints. Summary worksheets provide a brief interpretation of the writers' representation of their lived moral experience. The authors acted as autonomous readers who both used the reading guide independently of each other. After each reading, the authors checked the

reliability of the interpretations by comparing their summaries with each other. In mutual discussions, some of the interpretations were changed. All coding disagreements were discussed to reach common interpretation.

Here the point is that it takes time and effort to perceive moral qualities in dilemmas. They do not become visible at a glance. As Jackson (1992) has emphasized, it is a matter of becoming sensitive to how those qualities are characteristically expressed in the case report of this particular person (p. 404). The process of getting to know requires various phases of reflection. We learn moral qualities "by thinking about them, by reflecting what our observations mean" (Jackson, 1992, p. 406). This notion is not unique, but the fact that the importance of that reflection is brought to the fore is worth noting. Jackson speaks about "prolonged reflection" which is as essential as the time spent gathering, transcribing, and labeling the data.

Learning moral reasoning using case reports

In recent years there has been a growing interest in case methods, including those pertaining to ethical and moral issues (Shulman, 1992; Strike & Ternasky, 1993; Hostetler, 1997). It is believed that case methods provide a vehicle to determine how the stances and actions come up in concrete situations. According to Shulman (1992, p. 21), cases have certain shared characteristics: i) they are particular and specific. They are not statements of what generally or for the most part is or has been. ii) Cases place events in a frame of place and time. Usually they are locally situated. iii) Human agency and intention are central in the accounts of case reports. Cases can reveal the working of human minds, motives, needs, stances, misstances, frustrations, faults, etc. iv) Cases reflect the professional and cultural contexts within which events occur. Usually they are first-person accounts; i.e. reports written by someone who is reporting her own experiences, activities, and interpretations.

Strike argues (1993, p. 112) that case reports can provide instructional forums to practice moral reasoning and dialogue. According to him, the task is not so much to acquire the appropriate stances as it is to allow the moral discussion to become objects of conscious reflection. Consequently, the process also enhances the sophistication of the employment of stances. In such learning, the basic purpose is not so much to discover "moral truth," as it is to uncover the web of educational decisions and actions in particular cases. Due to their situated and contextual nature, case reports integrate what otherwise can remain separated. As Shulman (1992) emphasizes, in cases "[c]ontent and process, thought and feeling, teaching and learning are not addressed theoretically as distinct constructs. They occur simultaneously as they do in real life, posing problems, issues, and challenges for new teachers that their

knowledge and experiences can be used to discern" (p. 28). Case reports can be used as a vehicle to present that teaching is a complex domain demanding subtle and multi-faced judgements.

A case

Smoking has been identified as a typical moral dilemma in a secondary school community that lacks common ethical standards and rules. Smoking is one of the things that are forbidden by law in Finnish schools. Nobody should practice smoking during the active school hours. However, both teachers and students break this rule in several ways. Schools have different practices and teachers often disagree with each other and with their students about the best practices. The following quote in Table II from a teacher's interview reflects many problems associated with smoking in Finnish secondary schools:

Table II. The analyzed narrative

I have been very concerned about the smoking policy in our school. I think a great number of our students smoke and many of the teachers smoke as well. This is an acute and frequent problem that I have to consider every single day in my work. Everybody knows that students smoke under the bridge that is located next to our school. However, the law forbids smoking during school hours. We have this law but hardly anybody observes it. Some teachers smoke, too, and other teachers and students know it. And the law also forbids teachers to smoke during school hours. Nobody really knows what to do about smoking. I know myself that smoking is bad for your health and students know it too. It is not a question of not being informed about the negative consequences of smoking. What can I do as a single teacher to change the situation? It doesn't help to send notes home if I am the only teacher doing it. I think homes and elementary schools play a key role in finding solutions to this problem. The complicated thing is that some teachers smoke with their students. They might even suggest a break to have a cigarette. I know that notes home and forcing the students to stay in school after hours don't help the situation. I smoked myself for fifteen years, I know what I am dealing with. I have tried to be a role model for my students and I have told them about my former smoking habit. I have assured them that it is possible to quit smoking. Every single morning I walk by the bridge and tell the students to put their cigarettes away. Some of the students obey me and some don't. I have also tried to talk with my colleagues. I talked with the music teacher about a girl who has a beautiful voice. I think she could be a professional singer some day and smoking might seriously damage her voice. I asked the music teacher to talk with this girl about protecting her voice.

I don't see any concrete way to influence our school community. I should build a fence to stop the students from going to the bridge. However, then they might start to smoke in the toilets and that would be even worse for those who don't smoke. The principal should do something. We used to have a smoking room for teachers but it was shut down. Now the teachers smoke outside as well. The principal should take steps to prevent teachers from smoking during their working hours. I don't think we can solve the problem with students before we can influence the teachers.

Results: frames of practical reference

Background beliefs

When the teacher was talking about responsibility, the law, rights, ideals, and professional obligations, she was actually describing her most fundamental assumptions. They guided her perception of educational practice and what she experienced as good or bad, right or wrong, important or unimportant. These assumptions seemed to be the ultimate bases by which the teacher made her decisions. From this personally held life-space the teacher experienced educational dilemmas from the vantage point of her own unique "horizon of meanings" (Barnes, 1971, p. 65). This life-space was her vantage point, her ethical center of reference. The stance led her to question several of the purposes of her actions in the school context within which she worked: What was this educational organization trying to achieve? What was the right way to go about this task? Did all teachers and students see the purpose in the same way? Table III provides examples of text excerpts and readers' interpretative comments using the ethic of purpose as the reading perspective.

Table III. Reading perspective: the ethic of purpose

Text excerpts	Interpretative comments
The law forbids teachers as well as students to smoke during school hours. We have this law but hardly anybody observes it. The complicated thing is that some teachers smoke with their students. Some teachers might even suggest a break to have a cigarette.	Behind this perspective lies the fact that smoking is prohibited by the law. From the professional perspective the prevailing situation is unbearable because both teachers and students consciously break the law
Nobody really knows what to do about smoking ... I don't see any concrete way to influence our school community.	The teacher's immediate moral intuitions and stirrings about the situation seem helpless.
Students' homes and previous school levels play a keyrole in finding solutions to this problem.	Due to the nature of the dilemma she argues that the responsibility lies with students' parents. This belief is reflected in the teacher's scheme of justification: Someone else has to do the job.
I don't think we can solve the problem with students before we can influence the teachers.	Here, professional ideals collide with organizational realities.
I don't see any concrete way to influence our school community. ... The principal should take steps to prevent teachers from smoking.	Collegially teachers are not capable to co-operate with each other. Therefore, primary argumentation is directed towards the principal.
I myself smoked for fifteen years, I know what I am dealing with ... . I have assured them [students] that it is possible to quit smoking.	In spite of the institutional realities, the teacher is personally committed to the issue.

McCadden (1998) calls organizational morality the moral basis of teachers' practical actions in school settings. He defines organizational morality as the teacher's belief that her/his role as a teacher demands that s/he instills in her/his students an adherence to public school life (p. 35). It concerns ideas about what students need to learn socially about school life. They are things that students need in their life: For example, what does it mean to act legally, what are the consequences of breaking the norm? According to Finnish curricular guidelines, the social preparation of students comes prior to a concentration on academic work in the progression of school. The aim is not to educate children to become 'good students' but active and decent future citizens. From this perspective, organizational morality can be seen as a socially constructed morality among members of the teaching profession.

As the excerpts and their interpretative comments in Table III indicated, moral dilemmas were presented to the teacher - beyond her personal self - in the sense that they involved others. But moral conflicts were also subjective - inside the teacher - in that they each brought a unique center of reference to these issues. The teacher reported that she had smoked for fifteen years and she was very concerned about the smoking policy in her school. Despite the lack of collegial support at the organizational level she was confident that students could quit their smoking habit.

Standards of action guides

In looking for evidence of rules and principles, we were not interested primarily in statements having an outward form of a rule or a principle, but rather in the way such statements operate in structuring the teacher's knowledge (cf. Elbaz, 1983; Tirri *et al*., 1999). At first sight, the teacher's statements might look like mere description, yet they functioned as a rule or principle, or sometimes in both ways simultaneously. Rules and principles told the teacher what to do and/or how to act and react in certain specific situations.

The stance functioned as a guide to action and presented an authority in the teacher's decision-making. The perspective was basically procedural. It led the teacher to identify the relevant, yet often implicit principle, apply it to the case, and act accordingly. On this level the teacher relied on implications which guided her when making educational decisions. She identified herself as a principled professional that had a set of norms by which she lived and which she was willing to stand by and defend. Table IV provides examples of text excerpts used and interpretative comments made by authors using the ethics of rules and principles as a reading perspective.

Table IV. Reading perspective: the ethic of rules and principles

Text excerpts	Interpretative comments
We have this law but hardly anybody observes it ... The complicated thing is that some teachers smoke with their students. ... The teachers might even suggest a break to have a cigarette	The prevailing situation clearly breaks both professional norms and their organizational applications. Legal principles tended to reduce problem-solving to a series of laissez-faire exercises. This was apparent on the professional level where teachers consciously broke the rule.
What can I do as a single teacher to change the situation? It doesn't help to send notes home if I am the only teacher doing it.	Here, on the individual level, the teacher summarized the dilemma of rules and principles.
I have been very concerned about the smoking policy in our school ... This is an acute and frequent problem that I have to consider every single day in my work. ... Nobody really knows what to do about smoking. I know myself that smoking is bad for your health and the students know it, too. It is not a question of not being informed about the negative consequences of smoking. ... I myself smoked for fifteen years, I know what I am dealing with. ... *I have tried to be a role model for my students and I have told them about my former smoking habit. I have assured them that it is possible to quit smoking. Every single morning I walk close by bridge and tell the students to put their cigarettes away.*	The code of practical guidance also grew intuitively out of the teacher's personal experiences. However, it was often difficult to separate the general aspects from the individual ones as the rules and principles seemed to develop from some conjunction of the two. The excerpt reflects mediation between thought and action. Rules and principles functioned as a guideline on or from which the teacher acted; she followed their often implicit and personal dictates.

According to the teacher's narrative, what happened within this particular dilemma was that most teachers in the school were unable to satisfy either the legal or the practical requirements of the situation. The teacher did try to take some action (individual response), but the organization was not supportive (other teachers, principal), and her individual influence was not sufficient to change the situation

As presented, rules and principles were often "open-textured" by their nature (Brennan, 1977). That is, they were difficult to interpret in such an explicit manner that they could encompass the varied kinds of actions that could be counted as instances of acting on that rule and principle. Simply getting to know the principle did not tell the readers whether their interpretation of a problem was desirable or justifiable.

Skills of dilemma managing

As presented above, the teacher's work was embedded in practical actions and it was situated mainly in and between students and colleagues. The teacher had to stand in a constant relation to both these parties and her emphasis was on concrete particulars. They were interpreted through the eyes of the practitioner. Therefore, the starting point could be formulated as "what was perceived?" To be able to consider and choose appropriate actions, the teacher had to be able to perceive the relevant features of the dilemma. As presented, these could not be transmitted in some general and abstract form because it was a matter of fitting her choices to the "complex requirements of a concrete situation" (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 303), taking all its contextual features into account.

The ethic of the teacher had a great deal to do with both the way she defined the dilemma and what could be done about it. The dilemma arose because the state of affairs in the school community was not what she would have liked it to be. Thus, the practical nature of the dilemma involved the teacher's wish for a change, and simultaneously, her powerless reaction to the prevailing situation. Even though the teacher was influenced by many strong forces in her school community, the responsibility to act still remained.

From the teacher's point of view, the intention to act in a professionally coherent manner led to even more problems. She could not hope to arrive at the "right" solution or action in a sense that the two preceding perspectives, background beliefs and the standards of action guides, can be said to be "right." This is because each member of the community brought her/his own, often contradictory aims to the situation, and the resolution of their dissonance could not be neat or simple. The juxtaposition of varied views and responsibilities could easily lead to even further paradoxes. Table V provides examples of text excerpts used and interpretative comments made by authors using the ethic of probability as a reading perspective.

Table V. Reading perspective: the ethic of probability

Text excerpts	Interpretative comments
What can I do as a single teacher to change the situation? It doesn't help to send notes home if I am the only teacher doing it. ... I know that notes home and forcing the students to stay in school after the hours don't help the situation ... I don't see any concrete way to influence our school community. I should build a fence to stop the students from going to the bridge. However, then they might start to smoke in the toilets and that would make the situation even worse for those who don't smoke.	Here, even if the teacher could not find the "right" solution, the problem had to be answered in some way or another - even if the answer was to decide to do nothing in order to avoid causing any further problems.

In practice, all the possible "solutions" seemed to lead to further problems. The teacher felt that she could not choose a solution without compromising other goals she wished to achieve. Nevertheless, she was convinced that some action had to be taken. As the whole narrative implies (see Table II), the teacher continued to act as an individual, trying to influence individual students, even though she did not act to influence the organization.

As shown in the interpretative comments in Table V, the teacher did not consider the conflicts as a choice between abstract beliefs or between competing rules and principles. What she perceived were tensions between individual colleagues, and personal confrontations between herself and a particular group of students. She could not see her basic beliefs and rules and principles as a neat and workable scheme to guide her job as making clear choices. Instead of engaging in a decision-making process that would eliminate various alternatives, she pursued a series of loose arguments with herself as she considered the consequences of the practices. Her aims for any particular colleague or student were tangled up with her aims for each of the others in the school context. The working perspectives were formed in a community which provided both the professional and personal settings and structures, as well as the guiding exemplars necessary for her practical action.

Discussion: moral reflection as interplay between
theoretical and practical reflection

In this paper, we have presented a case study of a practical dilemma that one teacher has found difficult to deal with in her professional practice. The case of smoking has been presented through a teacher's narrative. Our aim has been to approach one case from multiple theoretical and practical perspectives. We have adopted three interpretative viewpoints from the field of philosophy and ethics. These viewpoints have guided our analysis to focus on the ethic of purpose, the ethic of rules and principles, and the ethic of probability, together with their philosophical perspectives and practical interpretations. Our analysis uncovered the background beliefs of a teacher that guided her ethical reflection in the smoking case. These background beliefs included the teacher's own values that guided her educational practice. Furthermore, the teacher's own attitudes and concerns were identified as influential factors affecting her practical reflection. Both her colleagues and the students could have recognized her as being a "kind of teacher" who acted upon her background beliefs concerning the issue. Personally, the teacher was so involved both in the activity and non-activity of the issue that she did not experience herself separate from the particular situation. Due to this absorbed oneness, her reflection of her background beliefs did not catch the 'objects of thought' to be constructed. Instead, they had to be interpreted from her implicit beliefs and from the tacit layers of her practical maneuvers in school.

The teacher's perceptions of the professional code of ethics were revealed in her reflection on the rules and principles guiding her educational practice in the case of smoking. The legal norms and organizational morality guided the teacher's standards as they applied to the smoking case. However, this teacher's own interpretations of rules and principles were identified as the most important sources of the standards guiding her professional practice.

In a practical dilemma, the teacher's skills of dilemma managing revealed her interpretation and identification of the most relevant issues concerning the case. In our case study, the teacher could not find the "right" solution, though she had to find some practical ways to deal with the dilemma. The teacher's justification for doing nothing further in order to avoid further harm revealed the ethic of probability in her practical reflection.

We can conclude that a teacher can use different ethical perspectives in his/her practical reflection. Our case of smoking provides an example of a real-life dilemma that is not possible to understand using only one interpretative perspective. In real-life pedagogical dilemmas, teachers need the capability to hold together several

perspectives simultaneously. They need the capacity to synthesize and analyze, to hold together under a general idea and to break things down into their separate particulars (Whitehead, 1999).

Nash (1996, p. 148) has pointed out that there is a lack of integrative models in the professional literature today. According to him, teachers need some kind of justification schema with both theoretical and practical viewpoints. According to our results, a schema for teachers' practical reflection is presented in Figure 1. In this representation, real-life dilemmas can be approached using both theoretical and practical reflection.

Figure 1. A justification schema for teachers' practical reflection

Our schema for teachers' practical reflection integrates the three ethical perspectives presented in the theoretical framework of the study. The ethic of purpose reveals the largely tacit and implicit background beliefs of a teacher concerning the nature of the healthy life of students. The ethic of rules and principles provides the standards of action guides for teachers to defend the healthy life. The ethic of probability helps the teachers to act or not to act in order to defend the healthy lives of their students. Teachers should be guided to reflect on all these ethical perspectives and their implications in practice.

We argue, in accordance with Nash (1996), that educational decisions are shaped by the interrelationship of several elements: metaphysical beliefs, virtues,

personal philosophies, communities, workplace norms, circumstances, consequences, feelings, and intuitions. Our schema has integrated these elements into three practical reflection sources: background beliefs, standards of action guides, and skills of dilemma managing. In pursuit of action teachers blend the bits and pieces of the different frameworks into a situationally functioning whole.

In our case study, we have tried to explore the interrelationships of different elements in one teacher's practical reflection. We have used both theoretical and empirical frameworks in order to create an integrative model of applied ethics for teachers. As our analysis revealed, smoking is a case that required different ethical perspectives to inform teachers in their decision-making. In addition, the case can be used as a learning case in the sense that there are no absolutely indisputable decisions. Pedagogical actions can't be 'proved,' they can only be defended.

No ethical framework, even in combinations with other frameworks, will ever be totally satisfying. In the final decision each teacher must find a way through difficult ethical cases with thoughtful deliberation. We agree with Nash that in a good ethical decision "the final discernment is an informed intuition" that always involves a risk. This risk is what teachers need to take in order to make educational decisions in the best interests of their students.

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