

Ukraine's memory war

The order of discourse in Ukrainian memory politics about
the WW2

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Tämä pro-gradu tutkielma käsittelee Toista maailmansotaa koskevaa muistipolitiikkaa Ukrainassa vuoden 2014 tapahtuneen vallankumouksen jälkeen. Ukrainan hallitus aloitti tuolloin mittavat toimet niin kutsutussa dekommunisaatio-projektissa, joka pyrki neuvostoperinnön purkamiseen kaikilta yhteiskunnan osa-alueilta. Tähän projektiin liittyen vuonna 2015 Ukrainan silloinen presidentti Petro Poroshenko allekirjoitti neljä muistilakia, joissa määriteltiin millä tavoin kommunistista menneisyyttä ja Toista maailmansotaa sai julkisesti tulkita. Huolimatta näiden lakiuudistusten herättämästä laajasta kritiikistä, dekommunisaatiota perusteltiin Ukrainan turvallisuuspoliittisena välttämättömyytenä, kiristyneessä poliittisessä kriisitilanteessa Venäjän kanssa. Pääasiallinen vastuu Ukrainan historiankirjoituksesta siirrettiin tällöin Ukrainan kansallisen muistin instituutille. Vuonna 2018 instituutti julkaisi Toista maailmansotaa käsittelevän kirjan, jonka tarkoituksena oli purkaa Neuvostoaikaisia sotamyyttejä ja tuottaa uudistunutta näkemystä sodan aikaisista tapahtumista ja Ukrainan menneisyydestä kommunistisen hallinnon alla. Kyseisen kirjan sisältö muodostaa pääasiallisen tutkimusmateriaalin tässä pro-gradussa.

Teoreettisen viitekehyksen tutkielmalle muodostavat nationalismin, kansallisen identiteetin ja muistin käsitteet Neuvostoliiton jälkeisessä poliittisessä tilassa. Lähtökohta on konstruktivistinen näkökulma identiteetin rakentumiseen, jossa historia ja muisti nähdään keskeisenä osana kansakunnan itsetietoisuuden rakentamista. Tutkielmassa keskitytään tarkastelemaan, kuinka Ukrainan historiallinen kehityskulku ja muistipolitiikka ovat vaikuttaneet ymmärryksen muodostumiseen Toisesta maailmansodasta. Aineistona toimivaa kirjaa tarkastellaan ranskalaisfilosofi Michel Foucaultin kehittämän diskurssianalyysin valossa. Foucaultilaisessa diskurssianalyysissä huomion keskiössä ovat ne diskurssin sisäiset ja ulkoiset prosessit, jotka osallistuvat tiedon ja merkityksien tuottamiseen tietynlaisessa yhteiskunnallisessa todellisuudessa, toisaalta osaltaan myös muokaten edelleen tätä todellisuutta.

Tuloksista käy ilmi, että ymmärrys Toisesta maailmansodasta on muodostunut hyvin vahvasti niiden puolien entisöinnin varaan, jotka aikoinaan joko poistettiin neuvostoliittolaisesta historiankirjoituksesta täysin, tai joita väristeltiin huomattavasti propagandatarkoituksessa. Ukrainan vallankumouksen jälkeinen muistipolitiikka pyrkii neuvostovastaisia elementtejä hyödyntäen luomaan Ukrainalle itsenäistä historiaa, joka perustelee suvereeniuuden merkitystä parhaillaan käynnissä olevassa konfliktissa. Toisaalta analyysi kuitenkin paljastaa myös, että Ukrainalainen historiankirjoitus on tästä huolimatta vielä kiinni Neuvostoaikaisessa diskurssissa.

Avainsanat: Ukraina, Ukrainan kriisi, muistipolitiikka, dekommunisaatio, Toinen maailmansota

Abstract

This master's thesis concentrates on Ukrainian memory politics of WW2 after the 2014 revolution. During this period Ukrainian government launched remarkable efforts in the so-called decommunization project, which sought to deconstruct the Soviet legacy in all levels of society. Related to the decommunization project, in 2015, Ukrainian president at the time, Petro Poroshenko signed four memory laws, which defined the way how the Communist past and the WW2 were allowed to be publicly interpreted. Despite the vast criticism of these legal reforms, decommunization was justified as a security political necessity in the intensified political crisis with Russia. The main responsibility about the history writing was back then transferred to Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance. In 2018 the institute published a book concerning the WW2, which aim was to demolish the Soviet war myths and produce renewed historiography about the war events and Ukrainian past under the Communist regime. The content of this book forms the main material for the analysis in this master's thesis.

The theoretical framework of this thesis consists the concepts of nationalism, national identity and memory in the post-Soviet political space. The starting point is a constructive perspective to the identity building, where history and memory are seen as a significant part in the building process of national consciousness. The thesis focuses on how Ukraine's historical development and memory politics have had an impact on the forming of understanding about the WW2. The book serving as a research material is examined through the discourse analysis developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault. In the Foucauldian discourse analysis the center of attention is in the internal and external processes of the discourse, which participate to the production of information and meanings in a certain societal reality, and at the same time on their part modify this reality further.

The results show, that the understanding of the WW2 has been formed strongly through restoring those parts of history, which originally were either fully excluded, or heavily distorted for propaganda purposes in Soviet historiography. Ukrainian post-revolution memory politics seeks to create an independent history for Ukraine by using anti-Soviet elements, which work to justify the meaning of sovereignty in the current conflict. On the other hand, the analysis also reveals, that despite this, Ukrainian history writing is still attached to the Soviet discourse.

Key words: Ukraine, Ukrainian crisis, memory politics, decommunization, World War II

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1. Introduction

Ukrainian nationalism and questions about the country's national identity have gained a significant amount of attention among political scientists and scholars due to Ukraine's unique and volatile status situating it at the geopolitical crossroads. Ukrainian national identity has been a subject of debates both internally and externally for a long time, which has on its part accelerated the complicated political development of Ukraine. Especially Euromaidan demonstrations, Revolution of Dignity 2014, the following annexation of Crimea with the Eastern Ukrainian war, followed by a prolonged political crisis, put Ukraine to the spotlight of international attention and sparked the interest to examine the complicated reality with several overlapping and interconnected layers affecting Ukraine's situation. At the time of Euromaidan, the national identity still seemed to be at the verge of transformation and redefinition, but later developments have proved these questions being much more complex than what was expected back then with the fresh optimism.

Despite the large interest to the formation of Ukrainian identity in the scientific community, less case studies about single data samples of the information war have been studied surrounding the heated historical topics. The so-called "war over the ownership of history" as part of the ongoing hybrid warfare, has been one of the main interests in the research on this field, but in order to gain deeper understanding of the larger discursive dynamic it would be also important to examine smaller units in more detailed level. These smaller units as part of a bigger discursive whole are at the end accumulating to the archive of this specific period giving an insight to the discursive formation at its very grass root level. Examining the formation of history narrative at its core level helps to understand the impact of the power dynamics playing the key role in forming the political reality and participating to the demarcation of the future for the country. This thesis will be concentrating mainly on a single sample of the information warfare - a book about the WW2 published by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance - which has been a significant executive organ in the knowledge production of the past especially during the time after the Ukrainian revolution 2014. WW2 has been a major subject of dispute in the memory war between Ukraine and Russia, affecting not only to the relations between these two countries, but actually opening also many much older wounds of the past in larger

European and even international space. Ukrainian crisis revealed a vulnerable spot, which forced the whole Western world to re-evaluate its relations to Russia and former Soviet area. This crisis has proven more than anything, that history does not merely concern the past, but also the future.

1.1. Memory politics of the World War II in the post-Soviet space

The memory of the WW2 has played a key role in the Ukrainian nation-building process especially with the Petro Poroshenko's government risen to power after the revolution of 2014. The war memory's redefinition is a part of larger decommunization process, which seeks to deconstruct the Soviet heritage on all levels of the society. The Soviet memory has been considered as problematic in the process of reaching out to European Union. It has underlined the need for reforms and repositioning considering the issues surrounding the difficult questions of the past. The memory of the WW2 was raised to the center of the Ukrainian post-Soviet history writing specifically due to the intensity of the devastation it left behind in this area and traumatically touched a large part of the local population. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the archives started to open, revealing many subjects which were silenced in Ukraine for many decades. There were many unanswered and painful questions the communist regime left behind. This is one big reason why the rewriting of history relies heavily on the presentation of those events and sides of the WW2 which were excluded from the official Soviet war canon. Ukraine's new direction in the view of WW2 has also brought many tensions to the surface, especially the part of the population, which still relates more to the Soviet version of the WW2 narrative. These two views have become heavily politicized and instrumentalized in Ukrainian politics, which has raised fears among some scholars about the possible further polarization of the society and mutually exclusive interpretations deepening the already challenging situation.

Russia has taken a very different approach to its past compared to Ukraine starting from the early 2000s, where it continues to embrace the Soviet legacy of the Great Patriotic War, seeking to reinforce and establish its own version of history in the former Soviet Union area. This can be seen as part of the larger hybrid warfare strategy. Ukrainian government has justified the decommunization as a security political necessity and it has been seen as an

crucial way of fighting against Russian propaganda influence. As the myths of the WW2 are understood as a tool of Russia seeking hegemony in Eastern Europe on the Soviet basis, the need for modifying a distinct memory to highlight the differentiation from this tradition has become a lifeline in post-Euromaidan politics. These factors have made sure that the question about the interpretation of the WW2 has stayed at the centre of attention in Ukrainian nation-building politics during the crisis.

1.2. The outline of the thesis

This master thesis concentrates on the analysis of the discursive power dynamics over the memory of the WW2 and with more detail how they come forward in the book *”War and Myth - The Unknown WW2”*. This book was published by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, one of the most significant organs in the decommunization process producing the rehabilitated historiography of the WW2. It can be considered being at the core of forming the state’s discourse during this specific political period, which is why this book has been selected as the research material of this thesis. The main goal is to understand what kind of object is being formed by this order of discourse. The question concerning the book itself can be summarized as: *What kind of discursive mechanisms of exclusion, rarefaction and restriction serve to construct the essence of the object of WW2 in this specific publication?*

In the first section of the thesis we shall take a look at the theoretical background of the concepts of nationalism, nation-building and memory politics from the constructivist, and post-modernist perspective. Constructivism as an approach starts from the assumption that national identity is always constructed through different processes in the society. Post-modernism takes this a step further by understanding the identity as overlapping or mixed layers, which are possible to suppress or activate in certain, even rapidly changing circumstances. The theory part culminates to the interpretation of Benedict Anderson, who understood nation as a community bound together by shared imagination. This shared imagination develops the feeling of belonging among people, who together form one nation as a single whole. Even if the imagination is not seamless, all societies need to find some balance and solutions in order to form and maintain a political community through this

imagination. Based on this, we can argue that in every society this imagination is also an object of desire for which, and by which there is an ongoing struggle. Memory politics play a significant role in this formation of a national imagination and identity, which in Ukrainian case is specifically concentrated around the memory of WW2. This imagination of the WW2 memory is sought to be constructed and controlled by different discursive procedures in the society. These approaches combined help to create a foundation for further understanding of the processes around Ukrainian memory war and the dynamics of identity politics.

Considering the Ukrainian case, there is a complex variety of identities and historical memories among the people. This starting point brings forward some challenges for the creation of an unified view about nation's history, which traditionally has been a goal for political elites as a way of establishing the legitimacy for their policies. Each new government or political regime needs to re-evaluate somehow its relationship to the past. In a country like Ukraine - which is characterized by pluralism and diversity, combined with relatively unstable political system, uncertainty when it comes to economical development and prevalent distrust towards state institutions - this task has proven to be extremely complicated. The political incoherency in the nation-building project has resulted the Ukrainian civic identity being formed relatively separately from the official state interpretations. It is possible to detect also the tensions between the ruling political elites and the civil society of Ukraine in this issue, where the governments of the state have tended to lean on more radical interpretations of the history.

The methodology used in this thesis is based on the idea of French philosopher Michel Foucault's discourse analysis, and more precisely to the method he is presenting in his lecture in Collège de France 1970 called "The order of discourse" (fr. "*l'ordre du discours*"). This method helps to see what kind of structures define the knowledge production during a specific era, examining how the power is exercised through discourses in the society. What is common for the constructivist theoretical starting point and for Foucauldian discourse analysis, is that both of them start with the assumption of the object being produced somehow due different factors in the society, which are in constant negotiation relation to one another. Therefore, it is meaningful to combine these two approaches as they complement each other considering this kind of topic. Even though

Foucault's method was originally designed to analyze more defined ways of knowledge production (such as different scientific disciplines), its ideas can be still applied to this kind of smaller sample of a larger discourse, as long as we understand not to draw too far-reaching conclusions based on it. The discourse organizes itself through different procedures, which determine its foundation, internal and external ordering. This includes answers to questions like; how the discourse draws its lines with itself in relation to other discourses, what sort of requirements need to be fulfilled by people and the knowledge itself before entering the discourse, what are the major texts that form the substructure for new enunciations to appear, and what are the mechanisms to ensure the maintenance and control of a discourse on societal level. These procedures limit the amount of possible statements, but on the other hand they also allow and enable new information to be formed. The material presented in the book published by Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance is analyzed through this method concentrating on the main procedures of exclusions, rarefactions and restrictions present in the text, which at the end reveal ordering schemes through which the knowledge object of the WW2 is being formed. The findings are presented, discussed and reflected further in the results- and conclusions- sections at the end of the thesis.

2. Nationalism

Nationalism as a concept is familiar to many. On the first glance, nationalism, nation and nation state seem quite obvious terms and create the foundation for the political world order we are living in today. Etymologically the word *nation* comes originally from the latin root of ”*natio*” which refers to a birth, and from this it is derived the idea of classifying people based on their place of birth¹. The origins of nationalism in Europe can be traced to the era of romanticism and especially to the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, when the base for the modern Western political community was created.

In this thesis, we will be concentrating mainly to the ideas of Benedict Anderson, the author of one of the most well-known and groundbreaking books at the time about the birthprocesses of nationalism. According to Anderson, the secularisation couldn’t answer the question about the purpose of life as religion once did. There was a need for continuation of the meaning beyond death and one’s individual existence. According to him there wasn’t (and there isn’t) more convinient instrument to fill this gap than an idea of a nation. Anderson talks about the tombs of unknown soldiers as an example of how the identity of each with his fellows and his nation takes priority over an individual name. Anderson also notes, that nationalism shouldn’t be understood as ”new religion”, but rather as something that can be compared to previous systems against which, and from which it was born. (Anderson 2017 p. 45-47).

The era of romanticism sparked the interest to explore the origins of people and emphasized the meaning of languages as a determination of a common heritage. This happened mainly thanks to explorations and encounters with other cultures, which resulted comparisons, creating the sense of uniqueness and self-awareness among people belonging to the same group. At the same time the expansion of print media, blooming of arts and literature (which got their inspiration from these new ideas) and several technological and institutional advancements (like school- and university systems) in the 18th and 19th century Europe accelerated this development further and ensured the vast predomination of

¹ Etymoline: Nation (2021), available at: www.etymonline.com/word/nation

these new thoughts in societies. The revolutionary thoughts at the time of Enlightenment suggested that people should be understood as the only legitimate source of power. (Anderson 2017 p. 113-116).

The dynamic of nationalism can be seen working in two ways: nations can seek for a statehood to protect and to perpetuate the national culture and language, when states try to enhance their stability and legitimacy by constructing a national identity among its population (Stahl 2017, p. 11 & O'Duffy 2009, p. 2). Still, the main open question seems to be why nationalism, from all other ideologies, has been so successful defining the world order and absorbed to our consciousness so fundamental way quite universally? It's surprisingly hard to define exactly what nationalism actually is, despite the wide use of the term. One part of the problem seems to be that nationalism as a phenomena has taken numerous different forms during different times and in different geographical locations.

2.1. Perspectives on national identity

Scholars of nationalism are usually spoken of as representatives of either the two biggest schools of modernism (constructivism) or primordialism. The first view believes that nations are historical innovations that have emerged with modern societies and the idea of nationality, as a result of a conscious and purposeful transformation of tradition and identities. The closest to this view are probably theorists like Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawn. Primordialism, on the other hand, understands nations as ancient, or at least very old, self-existing subjects who, at most, have sometimes "awakened" to a clearer self-awareness. Anthony D. Smith is perhaps closest to the primordialist school, although he called himself as "ethnosymbolist". (Nurminen 2017 p. 15-16).

The strictest modernists like to note that nationalism doesn't mean an awakening of a self-awareness of a nation, but nations are invented or produced, and they don't exist before that. Klaus Sondermann (2008) adds that nations also need to be newly reproduced regularly through traditions, symbols and ceremonies. These symbols or ceremonies can be a flag, national feasts, singing the national anthem etc. basically anything that creates wanted sense of communality and an attachment to one another (Sondermann 2008, p. 111-119). Ernest

Gellner argued that the idea of nations was born in the modern era, after the great industrialization and the vast changes of the society, when creating this new concept was useful for the mobilization of the masses to capitalist production through institutions like school system, communication infrastructure and standardization of one common language (Stahl 2017 p. 11).

Ethnosymbolistic school of thought answers that nations can't be created out of nothing. Nations lean to older memories, myths, values and symbols from the history. According to the best-known ethnosymbolist Anthony D. Smith, Ernst Gellner and some other modernists have been too strict. Actually many ethnic identities are based on older identities before the modern times, even though industrialization did have an affect on them (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004 p. 36). Even though the reality is very elastic, it's not totally arbitrary, and there is always a minimum of incontestable and non-interpretable facts available (Fowkes 2002 p. 2). Nations must legitimize themselves using history, language science and anthropology etc. It still has to fit in the tradition and be convincing enough, so nationalists don't have necessarily that much space to move as some might think (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004 p. 64).

Benedict Anderson's perspective can be classified as modernist or constructivist, as in his view modern developments made it possible the imaginary of nations to be born and formed. However he doesn't completely agree with the claim about the idea of modern era that *invented nations* or *invented traditions*, like some modernists do. Instead he actually underlines the historical continuity significantly in his book, this cause-effect relation chain being quite prominent. There is also room for pure coincidences and unintentional evolution. Nationalism inherited its position from the previously ruling social structures as well as nationalistic policies inherit their content one way or another from the past. Anderson understood romanticism in Europe as a "peak" to the imagination, which was caused when these different societal developments culminated with one another.

2.1.1. The paradox of nationalism - an imagined community

Benedict Anderson evaluated the paradox of the concept by illustrating it in three ways. First of them is the contradiction between scholars and the nationalists themselves; on the other hand, there is the idea of objective modernity of nations among scientists, and on the other, there is the strong subjective belief among nationalists themselves, that the nation is an ancient entity with its unique history. Secondly, the formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept (everyone should have a nationality) versus the particularity of its concrete manifestations (all nations have their own specific attributes, history, perception of identity etc.). Third complex is the political power of nationalism versus its philosophical poverty and even incoherence (unlike other -isms, nationalism never had a specific ideological architect or architects in the same way as so many other political thoughts). (Anderson 2017 p. 37-38).

Anderson presents his own solution considering the scientific debate and argues, that maybe it is better to treat nationalism like a religion (instead of as one of the -isms); as an umbrella. This is because nationalism is modular; its idea is able to be modified and transplanted into a great variety of social realities. This might be one answer to the question about its popularity. Anderson states his famous words as following in the introduction of his book:

"In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation; it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign"

Community is *imagined*, because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow- members, meet them, or even hear from them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. These imagined communities are *limited*, because even the largest nations have boundaries beyond which lie other nations. A nation is *sovereign*, because the idea of a nation was born from the French Revolution, from the age of Enlightenment, that destroyed the old divinely justified dynastical order (lat. *"a deo rex, a rege lex"* engl. *"the king from God, from the king the law"*), and nations were seeking to be free. Finally, it is a *community*, because despite all the inequalities and exploitations present

inside a nation, it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. This imagined fraternity is so deep, that people are even ready to kill and die for it. However, even though communities are imagined, this doesn't mean that nations should be understood as somehow "less true" or "fake", but instead they should be distinguished by the style in which they are imagined. (Anderson 2017 p. 38-41).

2.1.2. Instrumentalisation and hybrid identity

The so called post-modern school of thought sees identity as multiple and complex interaction of different sub identities, as a *hybrid identity* (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004 p. 38). The term *situational identities*, on the other hand refers to a so-called border identity, where particular periods of time determine which one of a person's collective identities or multiple loyalties are promoted (Kuzio 1998, p. 12). The identity can also be used as an temporary instrument to achieve certain political goals. According to the instrumentalist view, the identity is very flexible and tied to certain political circumstances. Most people have multiple identities that are somehow nested or overlapping. (Kaufman 2018, p. 382-383).

Norwegian antropologist Fredrik Barth (1969) among first proposed that ethnicity is based on those mechanisms and rationales with which people draw lines between their own group and the outside groups, and these drawn lines are made because of real and supposed culture differences and conflicts in changing interests. The meaning of ethnicity can vary in situations and even to different individuals; it's possible to underline those aspects of ethnicity or nationality that work best at a certain point, and similarly, obscure those characteristics which, in the same situation, are against the interests of the group. This means that the the individual's commitment to one's own ethnicity may be strengthened or weakened by political and economic circumstances. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkola 2004 p. 108-109). The questions about why and how memory is constructed and what are the risks regarding this are presented in the next two paragraphs.

2.2. Remembering and forgetting - memory politics and identity building

Every state (or sometimes other organization in power position) seeks to reproduce the idea of a nation actively through social structures to support the imaginary of this community among its members. Shared memories have a particularly significant role in this process of identity building, which can be seen as a result of systematic remembering and forgetting. Something is always left out, and something else is embraced. National collective memory has its own heroes and villains, achievements and traumas which are transferred through generations. Basically every society and culture has its own way of forming this relationship to the past with its memory politics and create stories to understand the present. History can never be truly objective. This is because;

"The politics of identity consists in anchoring the present in a viable past; the past is, thus, constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produce historical textbooks in the present. All history including modern historiography is mythology, because history is an imprinting of the present on to the past." (Kuzio 2002 p. 246).

In this way, a past as such can be understood as being a neutral collection of all events happened before present, but memory or historiography forms the rules under which the parts considered as important are selected and through which *history*, is constructed.

Anderson gives an example of how a person doesn't necessarily remember his early childhood, but other family members can tell him about it and show pictures or other proofs of it to support their stories. These stories become part of the identity even though the person doesn't remember experiencing them himself. Historians' job in the society works similarly to fill these blank pages in nation's identity narrative. This *plotted history writing* is a creation of the historians who are obliged to speak "for the dead" and give their actions meanings, explaining the now living what these actions really meant back then. For example why were some class conflicts presented as *civil wars* or *wars between brothers*? Or why some people were portrayed as *French* or *English* even though these concepts didn't exist in modern forms during the days of their lives? All significant changes in the consciousness of a nation themselves lead to the memory loss typical for them. (Anderson 2017 p. 274-279).

Frederick Corney has concluded, that the successful foundation narratives are commissioned in a complex relationship between rulers and the ruled and their viability depends on their ability to draw individuals into the process of meaning-making (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 13). French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs explains the reconstruction of the past as psychological processes and methods that societies use to revisit, recollect and collectivize past events. The reconstruction of the collective memory serves purposes both of esteem and nurturance for the individual of the group. The nurturance that reconstructed memory provides, involves the revisiting of those painful periods of the past for psychological purposes that now remain in the obscurity. It is the endless need of the victim to revisit the phenomenological object of their trauma in order to repair the imbalance between the obscured story and that of the public record. Without this repair, the individual remains unintegrated with the collective in terms of memory and identity signaling alienation and shame of victimization. It is the dissonance between the two records of memory (collective and the unintegrated individual) that creates the tension in the collective memory. The collective memory and the memory of the individual are in constant dialectical negotiation relation with one another. Each generation reconstructs past memories to adapt them to present identity in an endless chain of creating *collective effervescence*. This explains the *sacred* history's appeal and the strength of generational linkage with the pain of disruption of historical narrative. (Christian 2012 p. 5-7).

Memories can be always newly modified in the light of current political purpose. After revolutions (or just elections), the new government always inherits their kingdom from the old regime, it "*climbs to the still warm throne*", like a mansion changing its owner (Anderson 2017 p. 225). The new owners are always connected to the old continuum. Therefore it is not surprising if the new policies use materials already known from before in their nation building purposes. Rather it is a process of selecting, what parts are relevant to remember and in what way for this new era. As Ernest Renan famously formed the slightly sarcastic phrase in his lecture in Sorbonne on March 11th 1882 called "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*" (engl. "What is a nation?"):

”L'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et que tous aient oublié bien des choses.” (engl. ”the essence of the nation is that individuals have a lot in common, and that they all have forgotten many things.”)²

2.3. Nationalism, conflict and war

Nationalism has been often described as a double-edged sword. On the bright side of the issue, nationalism creates solidarity, love and collectiveness among its members. Nationalism indeed brings people together and removes individual differences among them, but on the other hand it also can be an instrument of dividing people in different camps. Every time something needs to be defined, in this case a nation, it always happens in relation to another(s). Sometimes this separation can turn into hatred, prejudices and intolerance towards people who don't belong the same group, and here lies the main potential for conflicts. (Butt 2010, p. 47).

All ethnic conflicts seem to occur - expressed in a simplified way - more or less around the same reason: the political power in a disputed territory (Kaufman 2018, p. 385). Conflicts tend to lead to violence when the government of the state is weak, narratives of group identity lead to see each others as hostile, group members fear for the survival of the group and both sides demand political dominance over the some territory (Kaufman 2018, p. 380). But not only aggressive nationalism creates discrimination, injustice or hatred, that makes violent conflicts explode. Some sort of stimulus needs to be there. They do create tensions that are the fuel, but the actual breaking point is usually the spark that makes the fuel burn. This means that even there are tensions and the spark, usually the conflicts wouldn't be able to be that destructive and long-lasting if there was no some sort of elite or state leaders involved, who justify (even encourage) the violence, and also supply arms and other resources to the conflict.

Following the approaches presented above, it can be thought that in those situations where peoples' identity is formed strongly from mixed elements, drawing clear lines between different groups can be challenging without creating some tensions. In the

² Translation note: subjunctive verb form in the original phrase.

constructivist approach, we can assume that all these lines between groups are actually somehow formed by human interactions and that they don't exist with their meanings automatically. This doesn't mean, however, that there wouldn't be some truth behind the claims or a set of undeniable facts, but the point is to understand how different cultures or communities during different periods interpret these facts differently. Maybe only time and "evolution" of ideas will tell which interpretations are the most successful in the long run. These paragraphs give a better theoretical understanding to the Ukrainian dilemma characterized by pluralism among its people and on the other hand the temptation of the political forces to use certain elements of these complex identities for political purposes. These challenges and tensions will be explained and discussed with more detail in later chapters of this thesis. The next section will present the methodology which is designed to identify these power structures and mechanisms through which the narrative is constructed during a certain period.

3. Methodology - Michel Foucault and the order of discourse

Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French philosopher and professor of history of ideas who is especially known for his theories about the relationships between identity, power and knowledge. Foucault himself and his unique theories have gained a significant status and are widely debated in different scientific fields still today. Throughout his works he sought to question the traditions of thinking and knowledge, making its formation structures visible. In this thesis, the focus will be specifically in Foucault's lecture given in Collège de France in 1970, called "*The order of discourse*", which constructs the main methodological framework of the analysis. First, the main ideas and concepts of Foucauldian thinking concerning discourses are introduced to give a deeper understanding of the background for this method.

3.1. Introduction to the Foucauldian thinking: episteme, knowledge and power

Foucault's idea begins with the assumption, that at any given period in a given domain, there are substantial constraints on how people are able to think (Gutting 2019 p. 44). Constraints enabling thinking and at the same time restricting are called *episteme* as a whole. The term refers to the macro-level unity that dictates the conditions of possibility for the discourse (Walker 2018 p. 47). Individuals operating within this system that determines their thinking can't be fully aware of it (Gutting 2019 p. 46). This is one reason why Foucauldian approach is not interested in the conscious processes of individual minds. Foucault doesn't exclude the subject-centered approach, but introduces factors outside the conscious that question the continuity and consistency of history as we tend to think it (Gutting 2019 p. 48).

One key trait of an episteme is that at any one time in particular culture there is only ever a single episteme that gives conditions to all knowledge within a specific society (Walker 2018 p. 48). In his book "*The order of things*" Foucault presents historical shifts

between epistemes, from the Renaissance, into the Classical age, up to the Modern episteme. One result of the hegemony of a particular episteme is that there is greater similarity between discourses within the same episteme than between discourses on the same topic, but from different epistemes (Walker 2018 p. 48). This can mean, that even though there are disagreements and even conflicts between some discourses during one epistemic period, they can still share the same presumptions about how something is knowable, how the *truth* is reachable. For example knowledge about medicine in Europe during Middle Ages looks very different, even pseudo-scientific from our modern medicine perspective despite concentrating on finding a solution to the same problems. Previous episteme becomes truly observable only when the paradigm in the science changes. This is the reason why we can never truly achieve complete understanding of the present, but we can try to see some glimpses of it through an archaeological examination of the past discourses.

The knowledge is a product of discursive practices which are in turn conditioned by the prevailing episteme. In this way, what can be considered as truth, is always bound to certain circumstances where it becomes possible. Foucault's approach is critical in the sense, that it refuses to take any truths, claims or concepts as something self-evident. It must be shown that all forms of continuity and unquestionable syntheses are a result of construction "*by the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized*" (Foucault 2007 p. 39). Discourses are seen as constructing our reality, but this doesn't mean, however, that the reality would be somehow "fake". In Foucauldian thinking the discourses are not only restricting power, but also an enabling one. Foucault didn't deny reality or existence of truths, but rather saw that truth is in a way non-necessary for the existence of a discourse (Prozorov 2018 p. 27). Foucauldian analysis is not interested in the actual truth value of a statement, or how well the claim is responding to the reality. In other words, it treats all discourses "equally" as constructions. Foucauldian discourse analysis seeks an answer to the questions such as how this worldview is possible, how it is organized, what makes it powerful and so on. The analysis is concentrating rather to the structures which tell what kind of discourse we have in question. Statements are seen as monuments of a particular type of a discourse, important as such. Discourses shouldn't be

seen as representation of reality, but rather as fragment of reality itself, and the real existence of discourse cannot be explained by the reality of what it says (Prozorov 2018 p. 22). Presumably, Foucault's idea was to recognize and become aware of the ways in which knowledge and norms around the *truth* are produced in order to evaluate them.

Foucault's methodology was mainly developed to examine discourses of disciplines and sciences, very organized ways of producing information. Still, some use of discursive practices can be found in many different fields of society. In Foucauldian thinking, power is understood as a kind of a *metapower* or *regime of truth* that pervades society, and which is in constant flux and negotiation³.

"Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true". (Rainbow 1984 p. 73).

Discourses can be examined as well as a form of resistance and to challenge the prevailing strategies of power. *"Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it"* (Foucault 1998 p. 100-101). There is a constant struggle over the definition of truth in societies by different discourses governing the knowledge formation, their maintenance and role in society. Discourse is understood as a power structure itself and through the examination of discourses, the use of power and its ways of working in society can be studied. In Foucault's own words:

"In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and retributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality - - - discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is a struggle" (Foucault 1970 p. 52-53).

³ Powercube; Foucault - power is everywhere (2021), available at: <https://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-everywhere/>

3.2. Key terms in Foucauldian discourse analysis

3.2.1. Statement

Statement can be understood as the basic element, "atom", of a discourse (Foucault 2005 p. 108). However, it is difficult to define exactly what it is. This is, as the statement is dependent on the conditions in which it emerges and exists within a field of discourse, and on scope of the "field of use" in which it is to be analyzed⁴. Discursive field refers to the large set of relationships between language, social institutions, subjectivity and power. Concentration is focused on those structures that contain the content of how something is thought. The level of analysis by which we can describe the statement lies between the analysis of grammar and propositional content on the one hand, and the fact of pure materiality on the other⁵. Statement always exists in "things said", it is always somehow observable, but it also goes beyond the material being.

Foucault starts his description of the statement through exclusions; what the statement is not, how it differs from other units. The statement is undivided, it is not reducible to the proposition, sentence or speech act (Foucault 2005 p. 109-112 & 116). For example two identical propositions can have different "meaning" depending on their location within separate discourses, neither the statement is identical with the sentence (lists, mathematical equations, botanical tables, and even graphs must be regarded as statements), and speech act can entail multiple statements or in contrary same statement can be present in multiple speech acts (like for example in group prayer)⁶. Statement operates on one more level of abstraction than the proposition, speech act or sentence, working on the level that conditions the possibilities of these mentioned (Walker 2018 p. 9).

A statement exists always in a network of relations with other statements, and it is not even possible in the first place without these other statements. The analysis is precisely

⁴ Sparknotes; Archeology of knowledge; Important terms (2021), available at: <https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/arch/terms/>

⁵ Same as number 4

⁶ Sparknotes; Archaeology of knowledge; Summary part III (2021), available at: <https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/arch/section10/>

focused on these relationships between statements. The statement does not depend on its origin or immediate cause, but on its "*relation of the statement to what it states*" (Foucault 2005 p. 119 & 122). The statement is linked to the *referential* that is made up of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it (Foucault 2005 p. 122). This referential of the statement forms the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself.⁷ The statement gets its definitive lines and its "conditions of existence" through this network.

Statements are constructed using sign(s), but not all signs are statements, and statement is not operating the same level as language. Foucault uses an example, that in a writing machine, letters on the typewriter keys themselves are not a statement, but the way they are organized in order already represents a discourse and is a statement (Foucault 2005 p. 115-116). The idea is that there is some sort of power, some rules that dictate the order of letters and signs of keys and create a norm out of this. Still, a statement is not fully governed by these rules, even though it enables rule-governed groups of signs to exist⁸. Statements should be understood rather as (enunciative) functions than units (Foucault 2005 p. 116-117). Questions like what rules make letters being organized in this precise way and through which procedures this norm is made possible, could be asked. For Foucault, language and signs are the channel to capture discourse's emergence and its change, it is the structure through which statements can be made visible. Language constructs a system that enables endless amount of possible performances, but a discourse dictates the possibilities of existence for the statement (Foucault 2005 p. 41-42).

3.2.2. Statements as monuments within an archive

To understand the idea of a monument, it is necessary to explore further the distinction Foucault is making between a monument and a document. According to Foucault, a

⁷ Sparknotes; Archaeology of knowledge; Summary part III, Ch. 2 (2021), available at: <https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/arch/section8/>

⁸ Same as number 7

document means some historical object or source that historians use to construct a narrative (Walker 2018 p. 10). Their job is to tell the story behind this object, explain the hidden truth what it is holding within itself. In this way document is a trace of something bigger than itself, a piece of life once lived, a proof of event once happened. A document is speaking beyond what can be seen. Its importance and examination value is determined by its position as a part of historical narrative (Walker 2018 p. 10). Based on what the document is telling, the aim is to reconstruct the past where it's originating from (Foucault 2005 p. 15).

The approach of traditional history is problematic to Foucault, as it entailed a certain neglect or disregard of the object itself (Walker 2018 p. 10). Foucault presents an approach, that turns backwards the traditional process of history writing. Where the traditional history turned monuments into documents, Foucauldian approach instead is turning the focus from documents back to monuments and concentrates to their internal examination (Foucault 2005 p. 16-17). Unlike a document, a monument is isolated from the surrounding narrative, presenting only itself as singular monument with its own complexities (Walker 2018 p. 13). According to Foucault, monuments are *silent* or *inert* objects, left behind by the past (Foucault 2005 p. 16). The goal is to examine the historical discourses that have existed by seeing assemblages of monuments rather than developmental chains of documents, which goes back to the hermeneutic approach of Foucault (Walker 2018 p. 13-14). By understanding the statements as monuments, the idea is to turn the focus on the discursive formations as such. This distinction between a monument and a document is connected to the approach to truth, presented earlier in this methodology section, the goal being the "neutral" examination of the discursive structures, when it comes to knowledge production.

Different monuments together are a collection which Michael Foucault refers as an "archive" - a storage of texts and everything else that forms the discursive system during a specific cultural period. The archive is rather "the law of what can be said", the law of how what is said is transformed, used, preserved, and so on⁹. In *Archaeology of knowledge*, Foucault describes discourses as practices of the archive (Foucault 2005 p. 174). Archive is

⁹ Sparknotes; Archaeology of knowledge; Summary part III Ch. 5 (2021) available at: <https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/arch/section11/>

not a stable collection of statements, but a whole constitution of discursive processes, which control the accumulation of statements. The term *archive* is used in Foucauldian analysis to describe the distance necessary to the target of the analysis (same could be said about the term monument). This comes back to the basic Foucauldian assumption, that we can't be fully aware of the present we are living in and for that reason we are not able to see it in its entirety. It is impossible to describe the archive of our own society clearly in the present with our consciousness, as the archive precisely the very thing that gives what we say its system of emergence and existence (Foucault 2005 p. 172). The more we go back in time chronologically or the more distinct cultural environment we are living in, the more objectively we are able to see *what couldn't be said*, as we are more separated from the circumstances defining our possibilities of thought.

3.3.3. Discourse as a system of statements

Discourses are understood as systems and rules of existence, maintenance, transformation and disappearance of knowledge objects (observable as statements or signs) with their fields of use. The unity of discourse defines a limited communication space (Foucault 2005 p. 167). Systems of formation are not some outside categories that are made to analyze the discourse, but the ways a discourses are organizing themselves. The horizon of this examination is to describe the discursive events (Foucault 2005 p. 41). The goal is the examination of discourses, as collections of related statements and as the mechanisms that allow knowledge objects to appear (Walker 2018 p. 38). Like a statement, also discourse for Foucault is a wide concept and can be found in many different shapes and forms. Most importantly, discourses are set of rules that govern the appearance and formation of knowledge objects, practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Discourse can refer to a regulated practice, space of all statements or single group of statements (Foucault 2005 p. 108). According to Foucault, in a nutshell:

" A discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation " (Foucault 2005 p. 143).

Based on this introduction to the Foucauldian thinking and concepts, in the next section I will present with more detail the precise method used in the analysis of this thesis.

3.3. The order of discourse

In this lecture held in Collège de France the 2nd of December in 1970, Foucault introduces how the discursive practices work to establish power over knowledge objects, dictating and determining what and how something can be said. Order of discourse is presenting discourse more specifically as power relations in the society. The central questions are, what allows some statements to be made instead of others and what makes them *legit*? There are grammatically and technically many possibilities to say something, but only specific statements are considered knowledge or truth in certain time and place. The ordering of discourse is born through three different main procedures. These procedures include exclusion, rarefaction and restriction.

Starting with the exclusion procedures, they define simply what the object is not, operating from the exterior in certain sense. As the first example of this procedure Foucault mentions straight prohibition. This can mean the prohibition the object of discourse itself, the (talking) subject, or the circumstance. The second procedure of exclusion is the division or rejection: the opposition to the term which is excluded, like in the case of the fool (madman) - - - he is not allowed to speak elsewhere than in theatre (fr. *le partage/rejet - une opposition à terme exclu, comme en le cas du fou - - - on ne lui prête la parole qu'au théâtre*). The third procedure of exclusions is the opposition between truth and false. This distinction between false and truth exerts pressure on the other discourses, which converge towards the discourse of *truth*. (Foucault 1970 p. 52-54 & Landa 2014 p. 2-3). By these procedures the objects are delimited and controlled. Foucault continues again with example about madness and its opposition to reason. In his example what actually differs mad from sane, can vary depending on the context, just as the standards how to recognize *the truth* from *the false*. This has a lot to do with society's value system. These distinctions strongly govern *our will to know* or *will to truth*, as it is ruled by this exclusion system (fr. *la volonté de savoir est régie par un système d'exclusion*) (Foucault 1970 p. 54 & Landa 2014 p. 3), as Foucault is calling this phenomenon of discourses directing our attention. There is a whole system of institutions, like libraries, schools, research institutes etc., which impose and renew these systems of exclusion (Foucault 1970 p. 54-55).

Another group includes internal procedures of rarefaction which function rather as principles of classification, ordering and distribution (Foucault 1970 p. 56). These are the principles according to which the discourse orders itself (fr. *des principes d'ordre des discours mêmes*) (Landa 2014 p. 3). These procedures include commentary, author and discipline. Commentary refers to a kind of gradation among discourses; in every society there are so-called primary texts, major narratives which are repeated, recounted and varied, such as judicial or religious texts, even literary and scientific text to some extent, that give a rise to certain number of speech acts and discourses (Foucault 1970 p. 56-57). This hierarchy always supports itself, the one that opposes the original text and the commentaries of others - despite the dispute (fr. *cette hiérarchie se soutient toujours, celle qui oppose le texte vraiment originel et les commentaires de l'autre - malgré les brouillements*) (Landa 2014 p. 4). Commentary refers to texts, which somehow continually reaffirm the meanings enacted by the primary discourse, without ever breaking the discursive paradigm. The second one is the author (as a function). The author is a principle that someone is responsible for the unity, coherence and origin of the meaning of the text or its insertion into the reality (fr. *son insertion dans le réel*) (Foucault 1970 p. 58 & Landa 2014 p. 4). The actual individual author receives his behavior from the author function as defined by his epoch, "or as he in turn modifies it" (fr. *L'individu réel reçoit son comportement de la fonction-auteur telle qu'elle est définie par son époque, "ou telle qu'à son tour il la modifie"*) (Landa 2014 p. 4). These two internal procedures mentioned above limit the chance element in discourse, by the play of identity through repetition (commentary) and individuality (author) (Foucault 1970 p. 59). In contrary to these two is the principle of discipline, as a principle of organization. Discipline is defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules, definitions, techniques and instruments (Foucault 1970 p. 59). It means, that a proposition must fulfill complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong to the grouping of a discipline. Discipline allows the construction of new statements, but within confines. Discipline is an element of constraint for discourse, and at the same time an element of its fruitfulness (fr. *la discipline est un élément de contrainte pour le discours, et à la fois un élément de fécondité*) (Landa 2014 p.

5). This can be seen both as an opportunity, an enabling basis, but also as restrictive and obstructive one.

The third group of procedures permit the control of discourse; procedures of restriction or requirements to join the discourse or to have access to it (fr. *l'accès au discours*). They determine the conditions of application for discourse by imposing rules over those individuals who have access to them and thus of not permitting everyone to have this access (Foucault 1970 p. 61). These can take forms of ritual, discourse doctrines and social appropriation of discourses (Foucault 1970 p. 62-64). Ritual defines the qualification which needs to be possessed by individuals who perform (Foucault 1970 p. 62). This can mean for example a specific education of a person to gain an authority position on certain field. Societies of discourse that preserve discourses make them circulate in a closed space (Landa 2014 p. 5). Doctrine tends to be diffused, and it is by the holding in common of one and the same discursive ensemble that individuals define their reciprocal allegiance (Foucault 1970 p. 63). Doctrine works both ways by bringing about a double subjection (of the speaking subjects to discourses and of discourses to the group of speaking individuals) (Foucault 1970 p. 64). The social appropriation of discourses refers to the point, that education works as a political instrument of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry (Foucault 1970 p. 64).

In the next section, the aim is to present some context and deeper insights of the discursive power dynamics present in this specific political period in question. It works as a representation of how the discursive mechanisms are seeking to establish their regime of truth on societal level through institutional reforms and political speech. It explains how the struggle over the control of the discourse is possible to detect and how it becomes visible in the material form. This serves as a useful background for the analysis part, where the method of the *order of discourse* is applied to examine the book with more detail.

4. Nation-building in Ukraine - the post-Soviet dilemma

”Ще не вмерла України і слава, і воля. Ще нам, браття молодії, усміхнеться доля.

Згинуть наші воріженьки, як роса на сонці.

Запануєм і ми, браття, у своїй сторонці.

*Душу, тіло ми положим за нашу свободу.
І покажем, що ми, браття, козацького роду.”*

- Гімн України: Ще не вмерла України

(engl. "Ukraine has not died yet, nor her glory nor freedom. Still, shall fate smile upon us, young brothers.

Our enemies will perish like dew in the sun.

We shall rule, brothers, our homeland.

*Soul and body we'll sacrifice for our freedom.
And we'll show, that we, brothers, are of the cossacks' lineage.”*

Ukraine's national anthem: Ukraine has not died yet)

Ukraine's development to the current state has been ragged. Its borderlines have changed a lot through its history, and its different geographical areas have developed in a distinctive way from each other due different cultural influences. The question about how highly diverse society like Ukraine could find a solution that could please all different political forces and groups of the country, has proved to be extremely complicated. State and nation-building aims to convert these mutually exclusive identities loyal to the one state and to the emerging political nation (Kuzio 1998, p. 119). Western Ukraine has been traditionally the core region of Ukrainian nationalism. The area belonged first to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and later to Austria-Hungarian Empire. Its cultural influences developed distinctively compared especially with the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, which were more influenced by Russian Empire and later Soviet Union. The Western regions introduced a significant portion of historians, many of whom moved to North America due the Soviet control, which led their predominance in the production of Ukrainian historiography in the rehabilitation project.

In the Ukrainian case it's very difficult to talk about one national identity without making generalizations; Ukraine with its different areas is full of contradictory histories,

divided memories and dissimilar identities (Luukkainen 2015 p. 44). The creation of common self-image is even more difficult when social, economic and political problems are added to the calculation. Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart have pointed out, that the legacy of "incomplete nations" that the Soviet empire left behind is perhaps the most important threat to the project of economic and political liberalism in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian nation-building can be described as a project of *reclaiming the past* after the Soviet imperialism. Soviet historiography restricted the collective memory and identity of each nation within the former USSR to that of an ethnic and geographical unit through a Russo-centric bias. Therefore the gaining of self-esteem requires the removal of racial discrimination and inferiority complexes imposed by the former ruling imperial power. (Kuzio 2002 p. 246-251).

4.1. Russia's hybrid warfare in Ukraine - the neo-Soviet sphere of influence and the clashing nationalist discourses

In literature, often presented nation's identity-building dilemma has been portrayed as circulating around one main issue: should Ukraine be culturally and politically more part of the West or the East? The political forces of the country often tend to be divided into two camps: the more Western-oriented and more Russian-oriented. Especially this rhetoric has intensified after the start of the Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict. The geopolitical narrative emphasizes the traditional "Russian world" versus "the liberal Western world" - positioning, where Ukraine is not actually in the main role, but rather an object of a struggle over spheres of influence between East and West (Smor 2017 p. 68). On the other hand, this perspective of "two Ukraines" has been also criticized as oversimplifying the Ukrainian question.

It is still unavoidable not to talk about the dynamic between current Russian memory politics in relation to Ukraine. This is because Russia's propaganda and active interference to Ukraine's inner politics arguably has greatly influenced the determination of Ukrainian's identity politics both directly and indirectly. Michael Doyle has defined an empire as, "*a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society*" (Kuzio 2002 p. 242). Domination of the subject

nations' history is one aspect whereby the colonizer appropriates and directs its various spheres of activity (Kuzio 2002 p. 247). As Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well-known Polish-American diplomat and political scientist who served as a national security advisor for US president Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), stated already in 1994: "*Russia could never accept the existence of independent and strong Ukraine*" (Luukkainen 2015 p. 31). It could be argued that Russia has actively continued this imperialist or colonial policy towards Ukraine even after the independence of 1991.

In the research literature, Ukrainian crisis has been explained a lot based on the Ukraine's geopolitical significance to Russia. Russian security political doctrine lies on the idea of an area of influence surrounding the Russian Federation and Ukraine was the foundation and the precondition of the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's superpower position (Luukkainen 2015 p. 18). In this geopolitical view of the conflict the situation can be seen as a part of a process caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin has described the USSR's collapse as "*the worst geopolitical catastrophe*" and especially NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe has showed, that the old dividing lines have n't really disappeared after the end of the Cold War (Sakwa 2015 p. 11-27). Especially in the Western world, Russia has been strongly criticized for owning the history in its imperialist logic; that all parts that were once in history the same kingdom as Russia should be returned to the rule of modern Russia, resulting this constructed continuum denying the existence of the peoples of Ukraine and Belarus as separate entities (Riabchuk 2012 p. 441).

The Russian rhetoric about denying Ukraine's existence in its modern form is not a new phenomenon, but it actually has long roots that go back even to the times of Russian empire. In the Russian national romantic tradition Ukraine has been seen as part of the so-called *Russian world* (rus. Русский мир). This view has had several names throughout history, such as *all-Russian nation* or *triune Russian nation* (rus. общерусский народ, триединый русский народ), which basically claims that the Russian nation consists from three "sub nations" emphasizing the connection of the Eastern Slavs' through the Orthodox faith, cultural similarities, the wide use of Russian language and common history based on Kievan Rus, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This comes forward even in the widely used names of these territories in Russian historiography; Belarus being called *White*

Russia ("bela" delivered from the word "white", while "rus"- ending referring to ancient state of Kievan Rus, the claimed ancestor state of modern Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) and Ukraine being called as *Little Russia* (rus. Малороссия). Also *New Russia* (rus. Новороссия) has been used to refer especially to Crimea and South-Eastern Ukrainian territories (the term can be traced back to the days of Russian Empire, when a governorate carrying this name was established in the area). New Russia as a term experienced a true renaissance in Russian state rhetoric marking the start of a new political reality with the Crimean annexation and the establishments of Donetsk's and Luhansk's Peoples' Republics in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine's modern name presumably was originally delivered from the ancient Slavic word *okraina* meaning borderland or outskirts area.

Direct line with Vladimir Putin (rus. Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным) is a well-known political Q&A session in Russia, broadcasted by governmentally controlled channels annually, where president Vladimir Putin answers different kind of questions from citizens all over Russian Federation and even abroad. In his article following this program he described the relationship between Ukraine and Russia as follows:

*"Недавно, отвечая в ходе «Прямой линии» на вопрос о российско-украинских отношениях, сказал, что русские и украинцы – один народ, единое целое. - - - Говорил об этом не раз, это моё убеждение. - - - Сразу подчеркну, что стену, возникшую в последние годы между Россией и Украиной, между частями, по сути, одного исторического и духовного пространства, воспринимаю как большую общую беду, как трагедию. И русские, и украинцы, и белорусы – наследники Древней Руси - - - были объединены одним языком, - сейчас мы называем его древнерусским - хозяйственными связями, властью князей династии Рюриковичей. А после крещения Руси – и одной православной верой."*¹⁰

(engl. "Recently, as an answer to the question during 'Direct line' about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians - were are one people, a single whole. - - - I have talked about this more than once, this is my conviction. - - - Let me emphasize right away that the wall, emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between parts, that in fact are essentially the same historical and spiritual space, I perceive it as a great common misfortune, as a tragedy. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are descendants of Ancient Rus - - - united by the same language - nowadays we call it Old Russian - , by economic ties, by the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty. And after the christening of Rus - one Orthodox faith.")

¹⁰ - Статья Владимира Путина «Об историческом единстве русских и украинцев» (engl. Article of Vladimir Putin "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians") 12.7.2021, available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>

In this article Putin continues explaining chronologically with more details the whole history from the Kievan Rus until the present day, explaining why Ukraine and Russia share the same heritage and are therefore inseparable. According to Kremlin's political view, these points historically bound Eastern Slavs together much more strongly than any modern state boundaries and, on the other hand, distinguishes this civilization from Western values, foreign to it (Zhurzhenko 2014 s. 259). This view obviously excludes many aspects of later political developments of Ukraine and ignores those events and sides of history that don't support the goal of representing these three nations destined to be somehow integrated to the Russian sphere of influence.

Despite this idea of being part of the same people (or nation), the Kremlin rhetoric has a dualistic approach to Ukraine. Predictably, the rhetoric turned to more intense direction after Euromaidan, before and during Crimean annexation and with the start of Eastern Ukrainian war. For example in one of his speeches held the 1st of July 2014 Putin declared:

*"I would like to make it clear to all: this country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means"*¹¹

This quote was related to Crimean annexation, where Ukrainians were now portrayed as a threat for the Russian speaking part of the population. Ukrainian nationalists (among many other political opponents of Russian political leadership) are often classified as "fascists" or "anti-Russian" forces and sometimes as the "Trojan horse" of Western agents in state propaganda. There is a discursive opposition between *false* or *artificial* Ukraine and *true* Ukraine. The term *compatriot* (rus. соотечественник) refers to people with Russian decent or people who consider themselves somehow as part of Russian community. This rather broad and ambiguous definition (according to Russian constitution and authorities) refers to a person "*with a legal, spiritual, or cultural connection to the Russian Federation*" (Wanner 2014 p. 430). The constitutional declaration is one concrete example of an institutionalized statement. It basically includes all those people who relate and agree with the view presented above about the one united Russian world, and excludes the meaning of official

¹¹ Atlantic Council: Putin vows to 'actively defend' Russians living abroad, 2.7.2014, available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/>

nationality or the state's passport if it is not aligned with this view. Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has actually distributed passports of Russian Federation to the habitants of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian *brothers* had now become *traitors*, so according to the Russian narrative, it became its duty to "save its compatriots" from this moral catastrophe. The propaganda campaign was obviously designed to appropriate Putin's political goals at the time.

The underlying logic in all of its simplicity seems to be that Ukrainians, who support the Russian views and its political interests, are presented as the "true Ukrainians", "brothers" and "the sane ones" in contrast to those who oppose them and in return end up being demonized. This exclusion procedure is designed to establish a dominant position over the opponent, seeking to put Ukraine "back to its place" alongside Russia. Russia's neo-Soviet discourse does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state, but sees Ukraine as part of a Slavic and post-Soviet nuclear community. Ukraine, on the other hand, sees its nationalism as a lifeline to guarantee its sovereignty, which has been openly repeated in the Ukrainian political rhetoric, especially after the two latest revolutions (Orange 2004 and Dignity 2014). It is therefore not just two states that use the same material as part of their own nation-building processes, but also that the other one justifies its right to control the other with history and alternative identity-building promotion.

4.1.1. The Crimean transfer

The battle about the right to Crimea can be traced back to the days of Kievan Rus, an early, mainly Eastern Slavic federation existing between the 9th and the 13th centuries, where both, Russian and Ukrainian history writing is usually considered to begin. Both of these states understand Kievan Rus as the cultural cradle of their civilizations, but interpret its meaning in different ways. Crimea is especially important considering one of the main event in Russian and in Ukrainian history. The ruler of Kievan Rus at the time, Vladimir the Great, was baptized as orthodox 19.5.988 in Chersonesus (nowadays part of the Sevastopol area) and made orthodoxy the official state religion of the Kievan Rus. This later became one important cornerstones for the Russian promoted pan-slavinist history writing. According to the Russian history writing, the orthodox heritage was transferred to

Moscow's patriarchate after the collapse of the Kiovan Rus, whereas Ukraine sees Kiyv continuing this orthodox heritage as it was the capital and home of the court of the empire.

Celebrating the treaty of Pereyaslav and the union of Ukraine and Russia (Ukrainian and Russian interpretations of this differ as well) Crimea was transferred from Russian SSR to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 as a formal and symbolic gesture (Luukkainen 2015 p. 57). At the time, this transfer happened inside a single state, from one Soviet republic to another. It has been also discussed whether the Crimean transfer was a sort of a personal compensation gift from Nikita Khrushchev to Ukrainian SSR as the decision was never discussed publicly and it was never unanimous (Sakwa 2015 p. 153). The transfer later in 1992 was even declared as illegal by Russian State Duma (Luukkainen 2015 p. 57).

It is more likely though, that the decision of the Soviet leadership was made rather for practical reasons. After the destructions of the war and the deportations of Crimean tatars, Crimea needed new settlers and investments for reconstruction. From the perspective of the Soviet leadership, Ukrainian SSR was able to realize the rebuilding of Crimea better than Russian SSR, as from the Russian SSR even a land connection to the peninsula didn't exist (Remy 2015 p. 215-216).

4.2. The memory of the 2nd WW in Ukrainian nation-building

The 2nd WW in the area of Eastern Europe was especially traumatic. The population experienced enormous human losses, the destruction of the basic infrastructure, repressions under two occupational regimes, mass murders, deportations and ethnic cleansing. Timothy Snyder (2010) has referred to this area as the *bloodlands* due to these facts. The brutalities of the war tend to be often mixed with the mass crimes of Hitler and Stalin also in the larger sense, causing these two merging together as one huge trauma. (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 2-4).

Ukraine's nationalist narrative of the 2nd WW began to take different direction compared to the Soviet times after the country's independence. The memory politics in Ukraine haven't been always coherent around this issue and different political periods have had a notable impact on them. The current repetition and institutionalization of the memory around the 2nd WW can be seen as the renewal of old power structures. In the modern

nationalist narrative of Ukraine, the country is seen specifically as a post-colonial country whose honor and identity is not based on winning the war as part of a larger state, but as a nation suppressed and designated to the pursuit of independence and freedom. (Yurchuk 2017 p. 111). The restorative way of reconstructing the memory is particularly visible in the decommunization process, which will be presented in the next chapter.

4.2.1. Decommunization - institutionalizing the new discourse

Decommunization (ukr. *декомунізація*) refers to a process of dismantling the communist regime's heritage. In April 2015 Ukrainian parliament adopted 4 new laws concerning the decommunization of Ukraine, drafted by the controversial historian and the head of Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (2014-2019), Volodymyr Viatrovykh. President Petro Poroshenko signed these laws the 15th of May in 2015. The titles of these laws were:

1. On the legal status and honoring the memory of fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century
2. On perpetuation of the victory over nazism in WW2 of 1939-1945
3. On access to the archives of repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991
4. On condemnation of the communist and national socialist (nazi) regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols

These kind of laws can be seen as a statement of how history is wanted to be interpreted on an institutional level. They can be understood as a restriction procedure, which shows, what kind of discussion is preferred on these topics. The decommunization laws were criticized widely both inside and outside Ukraine, also Western scholars included (Marples 2018 p. 13). Even OSCE has expressed concerns over these laws as a threat to the freedom of speech¹². Inside the Ukrainian parliament the support for the laws varied among the factions, even though only the Opposition Block was completely against them.

¹² OSCE: New laws in Ukraine potential threat to free expression and free media, OSCE Representative says (2015), available at: <https://www.osce.org/fom/158581>

The first law effectively creates an official canon of national heroes, thus limiting critical public debate and complicating academic research on these issues (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 19). The *condemnation* - law included the prohibition of symbols and propaganda of nazism and communism in Ukraine. This resulted the ban of all three Communist Parties at the time in Ukraine (Marples 2018 p. 2). This also resulted several name changes of public places, towns and villages as well as the removal of statues and other symbols considered communistic. In 2016 51,493 streets and 987 cities and villages were renamed, 1,320 monuments to Lenin and 1,069 monuments to other communist leaders and figures were removed¹³. One law stated the change of the term Great Patriotic War into the 2nd World War. In his speech in August 2016, the head of the UINR Volodymyr Viatrovych described these decommunization procedures as an essential element in order to integrate Ukraine into democratic Europe and that without them, Ukraine couldn't become a developed country (Marples 2018 p. 7). According to Viatrovych, the decommunization laws only gave a framework to the process that was already present before the revolution of 2014 (Marples 2018 p. 8). While the conversation about the Soviet past is restricted, at the same time a new narrative is enabled to be built. The law about the opening of the archives supports the goal of reforming the history by providing material for this process.

4.3. The civic Maidan identity - unambiguous and ambiguous

It's important to note that even with the official state-level interpretation of Ukrainian history, the neo-Soviet discourse hasn't disappeared, but is still present in the official speeches, on the symbolical level as well as in media of Ukraine. There are several competing discourses of history in Ukraine still today. The so-called Maidan nationalism actually unified people from different social classes, political, linguistical and religious backgrounds, as at the time the differences in attitudes were blurred by the common goal of overthrowing the corrupted regime. Euromaidan became precisely the symbol of the unity of the people (Kulyk 2014 p. 98). As TV anchor Vitaly Haidukevych stated in his Facebook

¹³ Ukrinform: Decommunization reform: 25 districts and 987 populated areas in Ukraine renamed in 2016 (2016), available at: <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/2147127-decommunization-reform-25-districts-and-987-populated-areas-in-ukraine-renamed-in-2016.html>

post; *“nothing connects like a common tragedy. First, the Ukrainians were united by Yanukovich, now by Putin ”*. (Kulyk 2014 p. 109).

However, it seemed like there wasn't such a hostility towards Russians or Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as the Russian propaganda machinery sought to convince during Euromaidan protests. Many Russian native speakers took part in the protests (according to some estimates, as many as 1/3 of the protesters). They supported independent Ukraine and perceived themselves as Ukrainians. The so-called “Russia hatred” did not really arise before Russia's aggression intensified and it began its military intervention in Ukraine (Kulyk 2014 p. 108-111). With the annexation of Crimea, the number of Ukrainians who felt positively about Russia dropped from 80% to 48% (Zhurzhenko 2014 p. 263). Hatred of Russia in Ukraine appeared mainly precisely as opposition to Russia at the political level, not so much as hatred towards Russian people, culture or language itself.

The language question in Ukraine has long been a highly politicized topic, although Ukrainian and Russian often coexist quite smoothly at the level of everyday life. The mother tongue is not necessarily the same as the language of daily use, which to some extent distorts language statistics (Bureiko & Moga 2019 p. 152-153). The vast majority of Ukrainians know both Ukrainian and Russian, and in everyday life people often have no problem changing the language at home, at school, at work, or when talking to different friends (Wanner 2014 p. 430-432). The languages are even mixing with one another, like in the case of shurzhyk, (engl. ”mixed grain bread”), as the mixture of these two is sometimes called. Even though officially almost 30% of the people of Ukraine speak Russian as their first language only 17,3% of them call themselves as ethnic Russians¹⁴. Especially the identity boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians in southeastern Ukraine are weak to non-existent (Arel 2014, p. 6). In 1996 Ukrainian was constitutionally declared as the only official language of the state. Today the situation is that the new language legislation (2012), that was about to secure Russian language's status as a regional language (allowing the use of Russian language in administration, in schools etc. in the areas where the amount of

¹⁴ CIA factbook: Ukraine (2019) available at: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/>

Russian speaking people is more than 10% of the population), was refused as unconstitutional in February 2018¹⁵.

During the Soviet era, Russian was the language of communication and administration between peoples, while Ukraine remained marginalized. The Ukrainian language developed a symbolic value as an expression of resistance to the Soviet rule, as one of the key roles in the use of the Ukrainian language historically was to oppose the Soviet occupation and to show support to an independent Ukrainian statehood (Wanner 2019 p. 431). Comparing the results with previous studies, the use of the Ukrainian language has slightly increased in the post- Euromaidan period, as has the number of people experiencing themselves as Ukrainians (Bureiko & Moga 2019 p. 144 & 147-150). Positive attitude towards the use of the Ukrainian language (among Russian-speakers) anticipates greater loyalty to the Ukrainian state (Smoor 2017 p. 77). The political significance of language choice is illustrated by the quote from Yalyzaveta Bohutska's Facebook post during the Euromaidan protests, highlighted in Volodymyr Kulyk's study (2014):

"We - - - two Russian-speaking people started talking to each other only in Ukrainian. We started this to support our dignity as Ukrainians" (Kulyk 2014 p. 118).

As we can note, Ukrainian identity consists many overlapping layers. At the civic level, the identity perception seems to lean on more to the liberal nationalist direction, which is traditionally considered as more inclusive form of nationalism. The significant factor seems to be the attitude towards Ukrainian statehood regardless of ethnicity or cultural background. It would be maybe recommendable for politicians to resist the temptation to politicize the identity question too far, as it can lead to unnecessary polarization of the Ukrainian society. This could complicate further the goal of creating a stable and well functioning political community based on democratic principles.

4.4. Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR)

Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance is a state-sponsored executive department responsible for the official state level interpretation of Ukrainian history. It operates under

¹⁵ CIA factbook: Ukraine (2019) available at: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/>

the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the Ministry of Culture. It was established in May 2006, and during the years of 2010-2014 its status changed to a research budget institution. In 2014 it regained its current position as a governmental institution with a special status. It focuses on the restoration and the preservation of the national memory of Ukrainian people. UINR's main purpose officially announced is to increase public awareness of the history of Ukraine, to ensure a comprehensive study of the stages of the struggle for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood and to take measures to commemorate the participants of national liberation struggle, victims of famine and political repression. It's operating mainly by publishing different articles, news and books, but also promoting campaigns and organizing exhibitions concerning the history of Ukraine. The annual report of the UINR was released on its website in mid-February 2017 stating six main priorities: decommunization, popularizing Ukrainian history, commemoration of the fighters for Ukrainian independence and victims of totalitarian regimes (Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Nazi-Germany), preserving the memory of Euromaidan and the creation of a Museum of the Revolution of National Dignity, creating an INR archive (which is linked to the general opening of archives as well as the transfer of the SBU archive to the INR offices) and improving the teaching of history in schools (Marple 2018 p. 5). In Foucauldian terms, UINR could be described as an institution that supports the *social appropriation of a discourse*.

UINR's status and existence has been closely linked to the political development of Ukraine. It was firstly established after the Orange Revolution of 2004 during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency. In 2010 president Viktor Yanukovich discontinued the institution and the status changed. After the Revolution of Dignity 2014 during Petro Poroshenko's presidency the institute was newly recognized with a governmental status. This suggests UINR's importance as a governmental organ offering the interpretation that serves the prevailing political direction. The way history is presented is one of the most important part of identity politics of a country and UINR can be understood as significant organ promoting Ukrainian version of history in the memory-oriented conflict with Russia.

5. Rehabilitating the memory of the 2nd WW: *The War and the Myth - Unknown WW2*

The book *"The War and the Myth - The Unknown WW2"* (ukr. *"Війна і міф - Невідома Друга світова"*) presents all together 50 different Soviet myths that one by one are opened, demolished and then reconstructed.¹⁶ The book was published by UINR and organized by three different authors including the head of the institute at the time, Volodymyr Viatrovych, who has been a relatively significant figure in the discussion about Ukrainian new political direction. The articles in the book are written by 15 different historians. Everything that the Soviet discourse excluded, distorted and ignored, is now brought to the daylight in order to rehabilitate and restore the memory of the 2nd WW. In this sense the existence of this specific book can be understood being governed by the *will to truth* or the *will to know* using Foucauldian terms. The book announces at the very beginning its agenda by seeking to defend its own bias in current circumstances, and at the end of the book, it returns to the same theme. It states the goal and justification for the publication in question as follows:

"This book - - - in no way claims an ultimate truth and a standard of knowledge of the Second World War - - it is just historical fast-food, its appearance caused by the acute desire to satisfy the hunger for information about this period in terms of the information war. With War and Myth we declare war on myths. Fire!" (p. 16).

"Therefore, the myths of the war are used not only as a humanitarian function – they are seen as an important tool for restoring this geopolitical influence. - - - Myths about the past war became weapons in the present war. That is why debunking them is important. Not only to understand what actually happened but to see the true face of one of the greatest tragedies in our history. This is important not only within the new humanitarian policy of the state but also as an element of our security policy." (p. 321-323).

The book starts with the chapter that basically is the umbrella theme for the whole text: tearing down the myth about the Great Patriotic War. The opposition to the myth about the Great Patriotic War (rus. Великая Отечественная война) as a whole forms the main backbone of the book. The Great Patriotic War is a term constructed by the Soviet

¹⁶ This book will not be referred to later in the text by its full title or by the names of its authors, but only by its page numbers, to avoid unnecessary repetition.

historiography to portray the military confrontation between Nazi-Germany and Soviet Union during the 2nd WW. It is the overall core of post-war Soviet identity propaganda, which represents the war as a triumphalist and heroic narrative about united and brave Soviet nation fighting against Nazi-Germany, saving the motherland and the rest of the world from fascism. This Soviet historiography, where the world was divided strictly into two camps (the fascist and anti-fascist) in a completely black and white way, was part of the propaganda designed to prove and legitimize the superiority of the Soviet system (Yurchuk 2017 p. 108). Soviet Union's opposition to Nazi-Germany serves as the base structure for this discourse. In order to preserve the purity of this myth, no questioning or criticism was allowed towards the Soviet leadership or the actions of the Red Army (Yurchuk 2017 p. 108). This is a notable reason why the actions of the Communist regime, the foundation order about the Nazi-Communist opposition, as well as the *sanctity* of the Red Army are all under an attack in this book. All the topics that were strictly forbidden during the Soviet times are now forming the core of the understanding about the 2nd WW in Ukraine. According to Etkind (2013) the policies around this Soviet narrative also helped to suppress the traumatic memories not just of the war itself, but also of the unacknowledged Stalinist repressions in the late Soviet nation-building (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 8). As Russian writer and journalist Alexandr Kabakov once summarized:

"It's not so important to ask what Stalin did and with what price but the most important thing is to note what resulted from it - an empire where a single person was just a way to achieve the bigger goal - - - Stalin is dead but he is not buried yet" (Luukkainen 2015 p. 24-25).

The Great Patriotic War and the so-called Stalin renaissance have played a key role in the nation-building goals in modern Russia during Putin's regime, and these two are also used as a propaganda tool justifying the imperialist foreign policy. It creates a link between the past and present, even to the extent where the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is seen as a some kind of continuation of the WW2 in modern circumstances. The anti-Soviet attitude is actually in many ways also the anti-Russian attitude in Ukraine, and these two are relatively hard to distinguish from one another. In this sense, the Ukrainian and Russian discourses work actually similarly to one another by using the 2nd WW period as the base

for their current identities in the conflict. In both of these cases the line between the past and the present is significantly blurred.

5.1 The order of discourse and the research question

It is important to note, that this analysis of the book will be representing only a small sample of a larger discourse. More complex discursive analysis would require more extensive data material. In this section, the concentration is mainly on the textual level in order to examine how the struggle over the *truth* is visible on the enunciative level. As the data sample set to be analyzed is produced by an executive political organ in the Ukrainian society, so it can be argued as having a significant impact on participating to the building of state level discourse. The discursive procedures that deal with the societal aspect of a discourse and give it its conditions for existence are explained in the earlier sections.

Foucault himself has added, that all these types for the subjection and ordering of discourse are found mixed up or combined, their separation is an act of abstraction (Landa 2014 p. 3). Many of the procedures can have double functioning at the same time, or they can be hard to classify as part of one specific category. The ordering schemes always depend on the discourse itself, and also the way of recognizing them. Moreover, the goal in this case is to find out what kind of rules are the most significant in order to understand why something is said as it is. The book's topics are organized based on the most prominent discursive procedures in them, starting from the foundation structure. It is important to detect those statements, which give the rise to all enunciative functions in the discourse and rule over their essence. At the end, this kind of analysis will produce the ordering scheme for the object of 2nd WW. The main results will be presented in a summarized form at the end of this analysis. The research question can be summarized as:

What kind of discursive mechanisms of exclusion, rarefaction and restriction serve to construct the essence of the object of WW2 in this specific publication?

5.2. USSR and Nazi-Germany - the cooperating totalitarian regimes

As the Soviet war canon excluded the fact that Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany were allies in the 2nd WW for years before the actual military confrontation between them, the book concentrates on drawing the foundation for its history discourse from this excluded part. The text presents all the factors that position USSR and Germany on the same level, concentrating on their cooperation, assistance for one another, similarities in regime and to those factors that emphasize their friendly nature towards each other. Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and war in Poland are the most significant examples of this cooperation, to which the book devotes its own chapters.

Chapter 3 is concentrating solely on Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The pact is seen precisely as a deal between Hitler and Stalin (p. 29-30). The text is arguing how Stalin actually desired the beginning of the 2nd WW with the pact. The text continues to describe how the Soviet leadership planned the great war and saw Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as a chance to achieve their geopolitical goals and to strengthen economic relations. The war and the division of Europe is presented indeed as an intentional act by Stalin. The culprits of the devastation facing the smaller countries involved are clear.

" The Soviet-Nazi pact only accelerated the beginning of the Second World War - - -. The choice in favor of a union with Germany gave the Kremlin a chance to successfully implement their geopolitical goals. The Soviet leadership planned the ascent of these countries into a big war during a convenient time. " (p. 27-29).

In chapter 2 Germany and Soviet Union are placed in the same position based on their discrimination in the European power structure and with their common goal to tear down the the system created by the winner states of the 1st WW. Germany, which was defeated in the 1st WW, needed to be isolated in order to prevent it from regaining its military capacity and Soviet Union from spreading the Communist revolution (p. 22-23). Even though the reason for their shunning by other European powers was different, the similarity concerning their positioning encouraged them to combine their forces (p. 28-29). Chapter 2 continues to talk about the cooperation between Germany and Soviet Union with more detail, how they supported each other before and during 2nd WW. Events such as military training cooperation is brought forward. Rapallo treaty is seen as the first step

towards more warm direction in the relations (p. 23-24). To underline the friendliness between the two, the book presents an example of the speech of a Soviet Military theoretician Mikhail Tukhachevsky in May 1933 while visiting the Reichswehr delegation:

“Do not forget, that our policies divide us but not our feelings, feelings of friendship between the Red Army to the Reichswehr - - - Germany and the USSR can dictate terms to the world, if we act together.” (p. 24-26)

Chapter 5 continues to describe more precisely how Germany and Soviet Union collaborated as allies in the war against Poland. They worked together in order to put Molotov-Ribbentrop pact into effect to divide Poland territorially between them. The point that the two countries treated each other as ideological enemies is explained to be a tactical choice, a propaganda, which was used for foreign policy purposes (p. 24-26). Behind the smoke screen, USSR and Germany still shared common goals, and continued the cooperation on all those fields that were beneficial to them. Also their ideological similarities are discussed with more detail later in this analysis, which is highlighted especially in their relation to Ukraine.

In chapter 9 the focus is on Nazi-Soviet cooperation during the years 1939-1941, after the division of Poland until the beginning of the war between them. Soviet Union is presented taking Germany's side in the conflict against France and England (p. 65-66). Also later in the text it's mentioned how Soviet propaganda presented Nazi-Germany's aggression as justified, and by doing so, actually defending its so-called "opponent" (p. 67-68). The other example shows how Germany indirectly aided Soviet Union during the Winter War with Finland by not allowing Finns to use its cables to reach out to United States via radio for help or urging Finns to make peace (p. 66-67). The cooperation examples continue by presenting how USSR established official diplomatic relations and made trade with Nazis, how the leaders exchanged congratulatory telegrams, how they offered strategic and military assistance for each other and so on (p. 67-69). Even detailed statistics about raw materials and agriculture products like oil, grain and timber delivered to Germany by Soviet Union until June 1941 are brought forward (p. 68-69). The conclusion is made that this cooperation actually led USSR being on the side of Nazi-Germany against

Western Allies all the way until June 1941, and even after that, during the Great Patriotic War they helped each other indirectly.

5.2.1. Nazi-Germany's role in Ukrainian discourse

Chapter 13 delves into the Soviet myth about their fascist opponent. Fascism as a term is described as "*an ideological bogey man in order to identify all their opponents*" (p. 90-91). The chapter seeks to explain the history of this term in Soviet propaganda as well as the explanation from where the actual fascism really originated. Soviet propaganda expanded the term to include many different kind of political regimes and organizations. By reframing the term, Ukrainian interpretation seeks to demolish and restrict the Soviet war myth in its justification for its actions. The term *fascism* is stated to incorrectly describe the nature of Nazi-Germany's political regime (p.94-95). The accusation furthermore actually turned around to show that actually this propaganda was made in order to hide the unpleasant fact that there were many similarities between Nazis and Communists (p. 94-95). This goes back to the juxtaposing the two regimes.

Chapter 19 is talking about the Soviet propaganda around the so-called Ost (East) Plan of Nazi-Germany. The plan was created by Nazi-Germany to colonize the occupied territories of Central and Eastern Europe with population transfers, *Germanization* of the original population, ethnic cleansing and rehabilitation of the areas with Germans. The idea of the extermination of "subhumans" was one part of the Nazi ideology and theories that classified the racial hierarchy among humans. The book is stating this plan as exaggerated by the Soviet government using the idea to justify the "salvation" of all Slavs from this genocide (p. 120-121). The commentary text is rather downplaying the cruelty and the enforcement of the plan. The genocide section of the plan is mentioned to be questionable in the first place (p. 123-124). The most repressive methods are mentioned anyway to be targeted towards Russians and Poles, not Ukrainians and the Ukrainians being more a targeted by "softer" methods of Germanization, such as birth control and eviction (p. 121-122). Also the fact that Nazi plans included extensive construction projects and improvements of the infrastructure is brought up (p. 123-124). Even possible cooperation between Germans and Ukrainians are mentioned alongside with the glimpses of the

Germans promising independence of Ukraine and the point is made that Nazi authorities treated Ukrainians "fairly loyally" during the years 1939 and 1941 (p. 123-124).

The role of Germany is maybe the most interesting part in the foundation ordering in the discourse. Even though Ukraine is firstly drawn as a sufferer between USSR and Nazi-Germany, and Germany is mainly talked as the other oppressor, the dynamic is slightly changing when Soviet Union is attacking against Nazis in its propaganda. In these situations the text positions itself as *correcting* the reputation of Germans. The focus however always stays in the Soviet Union, and Germany's place is determined whether it is joining somehow the Soviet cruelties towards Ukraine or whether it is possible for Ukraine to use the opportunity to turn something against USSR. In this sense, Germany doesn't have an equally absolute and stable position as Soviet Union has in the Ukrainian discourse. The Ukrainian relationship to Nazi-Germany in the war is determined by the actions of Soviet Union, so basically, even in the cases where the text seemingly concentrates on Nazis, it is actually still discursively focusing on reforming the history of Ukraine's relationship to RSFSR. Germany's position is more flexible compared to Soviet Union, which is portrayed coherently only as tyrannic in the book. The logic seems to be that the enemy of my enemy can be sometimes at least a less worse option to cooperate with. This point also comes forward in OUN-UPA cooperation with the Nazis during the 2nd WW, which is reflected deeper in the later paragraph of this thesis.

5.3. Excluding the Soviet narrative - traumas, distortions and deceptions

All the chapters to be presented are more or less are built in a very similar way. They are concentrating on the presentation of facts and claims that overturn the myths in question upside down. The Soviet heroes are turned into villains, triumph into tragedy, success into failures and so on. It is a discursive logic of mix between restrictions and exclusions. The rhetorical style could be described as "salting the wounds", and the reasoning behind it is to ultimately attack against everything the Soviet Union's discourse stands for. In this section

we shall take a closer look into the examples of the main exclusion style of identifying the poor fabrication of the myths and most of the time - the extreme cruelty of the reality behind these deceptions.

5.3.1. Soviet fairytales

All these three stories work as an example of straight Soviet lies, where a fairytale turned insidiously into reality throughout the years. They are completely denied as having any historical roots in any sense of the word and are classified simply as *absurd* and *false*. They were mainly fabrications which served implanting the Soviet patriotism through emotionally engaging stories. It is possible to detect the continuation of these traditions to the present day in Russia, as many of these stories are still repeated in the state propaganda, and they have their place in the entertainment industry.

Chapter 16 presents the famous football game in Kiyv during German occupation on the 9th of August 1942 between local city team Start and German team Flakelf. This particular football match got later the name *Death match* (rus. Матч смерти) claiming that Nazis executed the players of the Kiyvan team after the game. According to the Soviet storytelling, Germans demanded the Start players to loose for the sake of their lives, but they still played seriously and won the match. The story gained popularity due to Soviet articles, novels and films, especially one significant film called "*The Third Half*" (rus. Третий Тайм) directed by Jevgeny Karelov in 1962. Still in 2012 a new Russian propaganda film about the game by Andrey Malyukov was released by the name "*The Match*" (rus. Матч). The propaganda of the event comes down to the theme of Soviet dignity and patriotism as the players of the team are presented to end up refusing to submit to conspiring Germans and instead deciding to sacrifice their lives for their home country. The text comments, that in reality 8 of the players were arrested around a week after the match by Germans and 3 of them were killed half a year later in the Syrets concentration camp near Kiyv, but it is very unlikely that the game had anything to do with their capture and execution. More likely, this happened because of their suspected cooperation with NKVD. Few of the players also were punished by NKVD with penal labour after the war, as they were accused of the cooperation with Nazis. Majority of the players still survived the

war and imprisonments. The lives of the players are shown to have been well known to the KGB (p. 113-116). In short the point of the chapter is in to show the Soviet ways of creating straight lies about history for propaganda purposes and how Russia is still keeping this tradition alive by repeating the myth in its modern propaganda publications (p. 116-117).

The myth 21 is about a famous Soviet story of Panfilov's 28 guardsmen (rus. 28 панфиловцев). The story's essence is in the bravery of the soldiers of Panfilov's division who sacrificed their lives to stop 50 Nazi tanks in the Battle of Moscow during the 2nd WW. The iconic encouraging words of the company's political instructor Vasilij Klochkov have become immortal part of Soviet historiography; *"Велика Россия, а отступать некуда - позади Москва!"* (engl. *"Russia is a vast land, yet there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us!"*). The story was first published in a Soviet newspaper *"Red Star"* (rus. Красная звезда) in 1941 by the name *"The testament of 28 fallen heroes"* (p. 132-133). The story has become an important example again for the loyalty, war heroism and the dignity to fight for the Soviet motherland even for the cost of one's life in seemingly overpowering circumstances. As in the case of the Death match, also the 28 guardsmen have been a widely popular subject in Soviet Union and also present day Russia, including press releases, songs (it is for example mentioned in Moscow's hymn) and memorials even though the story was officially declared later as being invented. The latest Russian film about the legend was released in 2016, directed by Kim Druzhinin and Andrey Shalopa. The chapter shares the interesting story of originally Ukrainian Ivan Dobrobabin who was arrested in Kyrgyz town of Kant and claimed being one of the Panfilov heroes. Kharkiv's prosecutor's office started an investigation of the case in 1947 and ended to the document known as Afanasyev report (named according to the head of the investigation process), which confirmed, that even though the division and the mentioned soldiers existed, the story's plot itself was fake.

Myth 18 is rather extraordinary at the first glance: German soldiers stealing famous Ukrainian black soil in wagon trains to their home country during the war. The black soil or chernozem (ukr. чорнозем, rus. чернозём) is a type of dark, very fertile soil, which is typical for the southern Ukrainian steppes. The chapters mentions the overall idea in the background being Germans exporting raw materials and workers from occupied territories and planning agricultural colonization of Ukraine (p. 118). As Ukraine has faced devastating

famines during Soviet regime, such as the Holodomor (which is mentioned in the book several times in pages 14, 20, 127 and 189 as an example of systematic and intentional Soviet terror against Ukrainians), the myth's claim that Nazis were stealing the black soil and planning the agricultural colonization of Ukraine is rather ironic, as the ones colonizing the agriculture with devastating consequences were the Soviets from Ukrainian perspective. The whole myth is just excluded as "*simply never happening*" (p. 119).

5.3.2. The tanks of Pokhorovka and other military myths

According to the Soviet myth number 14, the biggest tank battle of the 2nd WW took place near Prokhorovka in 1943. The importance of this battle in the Soviet historiography is due USSR's victory in this confrontation, which is considered to be a turning point in the Battle of Kursk, the largest series of tank combats between Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany in the Eastern Front. The chapter turns the attention towards another tank battle which took place in the area of Western Ukraine known as the Battle of Brody (sometimes also Battle of Dubno or Battle of Rovne) at the beginning of the German Operation Barbarossa. Measured by the amount of weaponry involved in the battle as well as the length of the confrontation, Brody's tank battle can be considered being larger than Prokhorovka (p. 98-99).

However, the question about which one of these two battles is surpassing the other in significance, comes down to their formation as part of different discourses. The importance of Brody compared to Prokhorovka is based on mainly two points: firstly, the battle took place on the territory of modern day Ukraine (so it is natural that this starting point is more relevant to the Ukrainian interpretation) and secondly the armed forces of Soviet Union were defeated by Germans in this conflict (demolishing the element of the Soviet war glory). The defeat of Soviet Union serves as a discursive weapon against USSR by turning the attention towards its failures. The chapter highlights how the Soviet history writing downplays the Battle of Brody because it reveals uncomfortable facts about their poor military logistics and mistakes on the field that resulted significant losses and "*such a shameful defeat*" (p. 99-100).

Also chapter 11 presents statistical tables to compare the military capabilities of USSR and Nazi-Germany and ends up to a conclusion that Soviets should have prevailed against its opponent (p. 77-78). The main point highlights that USSR was well prepared for the war (taking into account the amount of military equipment), but it had inadequate military training and it was inferior to Germany on the level of technological development (p. 76-77 & 80-81). In chapter 10, the Soviet Union is portrayed as an aggressor towards Germany. Documents from 1940-1941 containing Soviet plans about possible war with Germany, only describes offensive war and not defense plans (p. 73-74). According to chapter 12, USSR wasn't a victim of an unexpected attack, but actually knew very well about Germany planning the war. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany gave written note and a memorandum regarding the beginning of the war to Soviet Union's ambassador in Berlin and to Vyacheslav Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of USSR in Moscow, which is presented as the official declaration of war *de facto* and *de jure* against the USSR (p. 82-83).

These points go back to the previously introduced base functioning: when Germany is compared to Soviet Union, it is presented as the more capable- or the more misunderstood one to oppose the element of the Soviet glory. Ukraine, even though technically part of the Soviet Union at the time, it is actually separated from Soviet Union in this publication. The propositional content suggests, that Ukraine wasn't responsible for any of the actions of these two totalitarian regimes. Ukraine's participation is basically ignored, and the defeats or failures are not commented on its part. The criticism is solely targeted against Soviet regime.

5.3.3. Massacre of Katyn

One of the biggest examples of the Soviet terror and lies is Massacre of Katyn, which is presented actually two times in the book (in the introduction part and later in chapter 8). Chapter 8 is committed to this series of executions of over 20 000 people, mostly Polish military officers and *intelligentsia*, implemented by NKVD (the secret police of USSR) in spring 1940. The executions took place in several locations including Kharkiv and Kalinin (present day Tver), but the massacre was named after Katyn, as the mass graves were first

discovered by Germans in a forest nearby this village. Soviet Union denied the mass killings and blamed Nazis for the executions until the final years of USSR's existence. During Gorbachev's era the politics allowed the archives to be examined more, and the Soviet leadership finally admitted the Katyn massacre being ordered by Stalin.

The scale, the intentionality and the unethical nature of the massacre is being presented by the protocol based on the proposal of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD), Lavrentiy Beria to the Politburo (the executive committee of Communist Party) in 1940 (p. 59-60). The chapter includes detailed examples about the web of falsifications surrounding the Katyn massacre in USSR. Different documents, like the ones in the special folder No. 1, proving the evidence Katyn massacre being implemented by USSR, were denied officially as falsified by the Soviet leadership (p. 62-63). Another example of these cover-up lies is that the ammunitions found in executed bodies in Smolensk were from German firearm manufacturer Walther, and in Soviet Union this was used as a proof of Germans being responsible for the killings (p. 61-62). Later on it was discovered that the firearms used in Kalinin operation were indeed German-made, but used by Soviet executioners. The reasoning behind this choice is explained by the testimony of the KGB general Dmitry Tokarev, who in 1940 was the head of the Kalinin NKVD. For example the calculations of external hemorrhage caused by Walther pistols compared to Soviet equivalents. The point is made later in the chapter to note that there were so many people to be shot during one night, that it was more convenient to choose a smaller caliber gun to reduce the amount of blood on the floor of the killing chamber. Also Kharkiv NKVD's execution method is explained as solving this same problem with another tactic by shooting the prisoners to the cervical vertebrae in a specific way. The text states at the end of the chapter that all these evidences leave no doubt about the Soviet Union's responsibility of being the guilty for this tragedy. (p. 61-64).

These descriptions underline the impression of a very cold-blooded, calculating and inhuman nature of the acts committed by Soviet executioners. Katyn massacre planning, implementation and its cover-up propaganda serves as one the most dramatic examples of the cruelty and ultimate deception of the Communist regime in the whole book. It summarizes well the Soviet logic of first committing horrific crimes and then propaganda

twisting it as a "proof" of the cruelty of the opponent. As it is a very well known case also abroad and manages to show all those immoral sides of the Soviet operating methods, it works as to justify Ukraine's political direction on why it is so urgent to resist all neo-Soviet influences so that crimes like this wouldn't repeat themselves.

5.3.4. The Ukrainian tragedy

Myth 15 continues with similar theme to the Massacre of Katyn. Most remarkably the ruthlessness and outright cruelty of the Soviet warfare causing incredible suffering especially for Ukrainian people and their country as a whole. In contrary to previous chapters in this section, the chapter actually starts to build an image about the actual separate Ukrainian experience in the war. The main point is built around the Soviet Union, and especially, the NKVD committing outrageous activities and then blaming Nazis for their own sins. In this chapter, the "sufferer" is Ukraine's architecture and infrastructure, most remarkably the hydroelectric dam of Dniepr river in Zaporizhzhia, Khreschatyk street in Kiyv and the Assumption cathedral in one of the most famous and beautiful historical landmarks of Ukraine - Kyiv-Pechersk monastery (ukr. Києво-Печерська лавра). All these constructions faced their destruction alongside many human casualties. In all of these cases, the extermination of the infrastructure with explosives was part of the so-called scorched earth tactics proclaimed by Stalin in cities handed over to Germans (p. 102-103). These operations also ended up costing the lives of huge amount of civilians and Soviet soldiers in addition to the famine deaths, caused by the removal or destruction of food stockpiles in the Nazi-occupied territories (p. 103-104). The scale of the destruction is presented in the devastating statistics of victims in these catastrophes and this project as a whole is condemned to be a war crime from the perspective of international law (p. 103-105). Even the horrific massacre of Jews by the Nazis in the Babi Yar ravine is mentioned being indirectly caused by the Soviet secret services, as the German occupiers ended up blaming the Jews of Kiyv on the mines planted all over the city (p. 107).

Chapter 20 opposes similarly the myth around "the mighty" Communist Party by showing examples about the brutalities of the regime. Such a terrible event as Holodomor (ukr. Голодомор) is mentioned among the Great Terror of Stalin. Holodomor was a

catastrophic famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, when at least around 4 million people (calculations vary greatly from 3 million all the way to 15 million) starved to death due poor Soviet collectivization policy and confiscation of the grain from the collective farms. It is almost impossible to calculate how many people were killed on purpose, but the name Holodomor can literally be translated into English as "*causing death with hunger*", which points towards the actual intentionality of the act by the Soviet leadership. The Ukrainian interpretation argues that the famine was systematically organized genocide towards Ukrainian people, implemented by Stalin in order to suppress and destroy nationalist thoughts from Ukrainian SSR. After the Orange revolution, during Viktor Jutshenko's presidency Holodomor gained an official genocide status (2006) and Ukraine sought its recognition from international community. Even though Holodomor happened before the 2nd WW, the crimes of the Soviet regime and the war horrors are understood often as one large continuous tragedy. Holodomor can be pointed out as one of the great national traumas of the Ukrainian people, which has been closely related to UINR's work as well. Other examples include the Great Terror of Stalin. Overall the focus is on the Soviet exclusion about the complete unablness (or unwillingness) of the Soviet regime to protect its own citizens who were left to die despite the notable size of the army (p. 127-128). The huge violence machinery of the state was used against its own people as much as outwards.

"The communist system had lasted only twenty years and demonstrated its cruelty, inhumane nature and at the same time, its economic failure." (p. 126-127)

Chapter 7 is presenting the event of Red Army's invasion of today's Western Ukrainian areas from Poland in September 1939, also known as "*Golden September*" (rus. Золотой сентябрь) in Soviet history writing. In contrary to the Soviet myth about people of Western Ukraine cheerfully welcoming Soviet troops as liberators, the attention is focusing on those sides that prove how this was actually a turn to the worse for Western Ukrainians. The chapter is underlining that in reality the joyful mood quickly turned into disappointment, fear and resistance (p. 51). The receptive atmosphere by Ukrainian population towards Red Army at the beginning of the occupation is reasoned as being a consequence of discriminative politics towards Ukrainians (and Jews) under Polish rule, though this optimism is rejected as being "*illusional*" (p. 51-52). The enthusiasm of the

citizens about the arrival of Soviet troops is described being exaggerated, and also partly orchestrated by Soviet political instructors (p. 51-52). The memoirs of the local people about Soviet soldiers focus on portraying how they appeared depressed and miserable and how even their clothes were made from poor quality fabrics (p. 53-54). Even some jokes and anecdotes about soldiers' amazement about the amount of groceries available in Galicia are mentioned compared the average living standards in the USSR (p. 54-55). The misery was not only limited to material goods, but also to mental and spiritual qualities of the Soviet people:

"After 20 years of economic Bolshevism in the USSR, the strangers looked miserable and showed everyone what kind of poverty – not only material but also spiritual – existed in Soviet society." (p. 54-55)

5.3.5. The Red Army villains

Chapter 43 turns the attention towards the actual criminal actions of the Soviet troops during the 2nd WW. The descriptions about the Soviet war barbarism vary from raping women to killing children and overall outrage towards innocent civilians (p. 273-276). The problem is mentioned being so severe, that even the Soviet command was forced to intervene (p. 276). Actually chapter 43 is a continuation to chapter 42, which is dealing with the Soviet accusations towards the crimes of Ukrainian Insurgent Army. This is part of a larger ordering concerning the Ukrainian nationalists, which will be presented with more detail later in this analysis.

Myths 28 and 29 are dealing with the hero myths about Soviet partisans. In contrast to the Soviet myth, which represents Soviet partisans as heroic defenders of the civilians, first exclusion is made by stating that unlike in Western Europe, the partisan movements of Soviet Union were actually organized and controlled by the Communist Party and NKVD - they didn't consist volunteers from the civilian population and many people weren't part of the partisan movement from their own will or ideological convictions (p. 186-187). The word is usually used to refer a non-governmental military component resisting the occupiers. There were significant losses of the partisans due the disloyalty of the soldiers

and weak structures of governance (p. 187-188). These two points come down to the opposition to the Soviet propaganda theme of the united people and magnitude of Communist resistance. By reframing the definition of a *partisan*, and revealing the *truth* behind the actions of the Red Army, the chapters repeal the Soviet construction of their *heroes* and turns them into *villains*.

Chapter 47 continues this theme with an example about Gregory Zhukov, a Marshal and general of the Red Army who usually considered as one of the most important Soviet military commanders of the 2nd WW. He is described as being able to be determinant and goal oriented thanks to his cruelty, ruthlessness, uncompromising nature and "*Napoleon complex*" (p. 295-296). His success is considered to be more a result of his advantages in army strength and capability rather than his own prowess as a leader (p. 295-296). His failures and heavy military losses are listed one after another and shortly explained in the text.

"Calling Gregory Zhukov the 'Victory Marshal' is not just incorrect but also has no foundation. As a front commander during the war, he also suffered crushing defeats and military setbacks." (p. 295)

5.3.6. The destiny of Crimean tatars

The Crimean peninsula has been historically under many cultural influences and has belonged to different states and empires over times with its several significant ethnic minorities. A significant wave of deportations, which was severe in numerical terms affecting different ethnic minorities inside USSR, took place towards the end of the 2nd WW. All the deported groups were from non-Christian religious background and located in or very close to zones held briefly by the Nazis in 1942–1943 (Fowkes 2002 p. 76-77). The official reason given for deportation was that they had collaborated with the Nazi invaders, but most likely the reasons for these deportations were more complex than this.

Chapters 35-37 concern a sensitive issue related to the tragic destiny of Crimean Tatars under the Soviet regime during the 2nd WW. Crimean tatars are an ethnic group historically inhabiting Crimean peninsula. They belong to turkish-related people with their

own Tatar language and main religion being Islam. In the Soviet myths in question, this minority is portrayed as cowards and traitors. Their claimed disloyalty to the Red Army and overall to the Soviet statehood served as a justification to large deportations mainly to Central Asia which proved to be fatal for many. Their deportations and sending to Gulags is seen as an intentional, planned act executed by Stalin, which purpose was to *Russificate* Crimea. The chapters overall continue the theme of the tyranny of the Soviet regime, where human life was easily sacrificed in order to achieve geopolitical goals.

The chapter 35 restricts the claim about Tatars deserting en masse from the Soviet army ranks stating it as a clear overestimation, which was made up to justify the relocations (p. 232-233). According to the chapter, the amount of those Tatars who deserted in the summer of 1941 from Soviet troops, were proportionally no more than the representatives of other nations' of the USSR who were in similar conditions (p. 234-235). The point specifies later, that unfairly, the whole ethnic group was to be punished, even though only some of their members participated to the collaboration with Nazis. Even those were punished who fought on the Soviet side until the end, and those who didn't even participate to warfare like children and elderly people (p. 234-235). In chapter 36 this comes to the conclusion, that the plan of the Soviet leadership was actually to systematically destroy the whole minority on purpose.

"The punishment of an entire nation for the sins of some of its members is a crime against humanity that shows signs of genocide." (p. 236)

At the end of the chapter, this is stated being one of Stalin's many genocides, which goal was to create a *Russian* Crimea through an ethnic cleansing (p. 240-241). Chapter 37 continues to deal with this web of lies. In the myth in question, the deportations were branded as salvation to Tatars, as the other option would have been executions for their betrayal (p. 242-243). In this way, Stalin is actually turned twistedly into a merciful character in the propaganda. This reasoning became famous mainly due Russian sociologist Sergey Kara-Murza in his book *Soviet civilization*. The main point of all of these three chapters is that the whole narrative of "Tatar traitors" is just another example of Soviet propaganda which gave an excuse to enforce this terror for geopolitical purposes.

According to the text, suffering tatars were the target of Soviet terror, just as many Ukrainians were. Crimea was occupied by USSR and it had a tragic cost for the ethnic minority while propaganda machinery sought to convince that these horrific actions were the correct thing to do. The current Crimean question is forming the background for this Crimean related topic to exist in the book. These echoes are brought to the present moment. Now Crimea is occupied and annexated again for geopolitical purposes by the successor of the RSFSR, using the propaganda to argue how this was for the best of the local people. Crimea is again intended to become *Russificated*. The peninsula was dependent on Ukraine with its infrastructure and especially the water supply system, which was originally a significant motive to its transfer inside USSR in the first place. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin has a strong pressure and need to develop the area, but Crimea has faced many practical problems linked to these facts after the annexation. Russia had to launch massive investments and infrastructural projects in order to solve these problems and connect the peninsula to the mainland Russia. Maybe the most remarkable example of this has been the Crimean bridge (also known as the Kerch Strait bridge), which at the moment holds the record of the longest bridge in geographical Europe.

5.3.7. Towards new remembrance traditions

"Ніколи знову! 1939-1945" (engl. *"Never again! 1939-1945"*) - slogan with a red poppy flower (also known as the Ukrainian remembrance poppy, ukr. Червоний мак) is printed in the logo launched in 2014 and promoted by UINR symbolizing the new direction in the Ukrainian memory about the 2nd WW. It is an option to the orange-black St. George's ribbon, which has traditionally being associated with Russian Victory Day and the memory of the Great Patriotic War. The new symbol represents more European oriented interpretation when it comes to the dates and as the red poppy is a common symbol of the memory for victims of war in Western tradition. The Ukrainian poppy design can be also seen as a blood stain to reminding the human sacrifice of the war.

"The myth about the 'most important holiday' (Victory day) was intended to create a link between contemporary Russia and the Soviet Union, one which was 'feared' and 'respected' by all Western countries. Due to this propaganda, the period of time has come to be perceived as a kind of golden age and the current Russian leadership appear to be the

successors of this 'glorious' Soviet tradition. But time to get back to the facts..." (p. 289-290).

Chapter 45 and 46 summarize the overall exclusion themes by criticizing the established date for the celebration of Victory Day (rus. День Победы, which is celebrated in many parts of the post-Soviet world the 9th of May). It is understood as a Soviet tradition, as an *"exploitation of the patriotic theme and the creation of the cult of war veterans"* (p. 291-292). In return, new dates for the ending of the 2nd WW for Soviet Union is established - the 2nd of September 1945 (p. 284) and January 25th 1955 when the state of war was officially declared to be over between USSR and Germany (p. 287-288). The argumentation behind this is that even though the signing of the surrender ceremony of Germany happened at 22:43 the 8th of May 1945 Central European time in Berlin (00:43 the 9th of May 1945 Moscow time), the fighting still continued along the front and USSR was in war with Japan until the 2nd of September (p. 286-287). The 8th of May, which is the official day for the end of the 2nd WW in many Western European countries due to the time difference, is now established alongside the 9th of May (newly named as the *"Victory over Nazism in the 2nd WW"*). By doing so, the meaning making is guided to a new direction. The renaming and an establishment of a new national celebration can be seen yet another way of making a statement to reach towards integration with the more Western understanding of the 2nd WW. A new page in history is initiated to be turned:

"In Ukraine, this tradition (Victory Day) is gradually receding into the past. From 2015, 8 May is celebrated as a national Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation and 9 May a Day of Victory over Nazism in the Second World War." (p. 294)

Chapter 50 is the final chapter of the book where the whole idea of the selective memory politics is culminated. The chapter's title *"No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten"* (rus. *"Никто не забыт, ничто не забыто"*) is a citation from a poem by Olga Bergholz, written on a memorial dedicated to the victims of Leningrad's siege in Piskaryovskoye Memorial Cemetery in St. Petersburg. Later it became a popular phrase repeated by Soviet historiography referring to the memory of those who lost their lives in the Great Patriotic War. The chapter dives into the core of the Soviet discourse's exclusions by specifying what and who was actually forgotten and why.

The first notion is that many names of the victims of the war were indeed lost and forgotten due to negligent attitude towards the military burials (p. 313-314). Also the fact that many Soviet veterans remained disabled after returning from the battlefields and were sent to prison-like nursing homes was ignored (p. 314-315). So were forgotten the several military setbacks of USSR during the 2nd WW, Nazi-cooperation, tragedy of Crimean tatars among other minorities, the Holocaust, Ukrainian liberation movement and above all, those unnamed casualties of Soviet terror throughout the years of war (p. 314-316). This summarizes well the restorative way of building the 2nd WW memory in Ukraine, which is gaining its power from the exclusions of the Soviet narrative, and turning it in turn as the target of exclusion. This is why the overall discursive logic could be described as the *mirror discourse*.

5.4. The other side of exclusions - the commentary

Even though the whole book is designed to debunk and exclude the Soviet war myths, this functioning can be also seen from the perspective of *rarefactions*. The opposition to Soviet myths doesn't change the fact that the content of this publication is completely based on *correcting* these myths. This is why the book contains all of the myths about the 2nd WW. All the chapters are constructed in the same way: first the myth in question is presented in the Soviet form, then the summarized version of the counter argument is made, and later the actual text in the chapter is commenting why it is distorted with more detail, finally ending up to a certain conclusion. As an example we can take a look at the chapter 22 (about the Lend-Lease Aid program), which is randomly selected from the book to demonstrate how this commentary works by forming the opposition to the propaganda claim:

"The essence of the (Soviet) myth: Aid from America and other Western countries to the Soviet Union as part of the Lend-Lease program during the war was insignificant.

Fast facts: The Lend-Lease assistance program was one of the decisive factors in the victory of the Allies over the Axis powers. - - -

Detailed facts: - - - And given the calorie content of the food provided by individual companies and humanitarian organizations and the drinking alcohol imported into the USSR, it can be argued that the food which came from the Allies, per calories, was not only

enough to fully maintain the Red Army during the war but was also a significant supplement to the diet of the civilian population.” (p. 140).

The commentary and exclusions are basically detectable in the same enunciations, which is why there is no need to present them all again from this other perspective. They work as the different sides of the same coin in this discourse. With the commentary, the Soviet narrative as is excluded, and with this material left from these exclusion, the inner ordering of the Ukrainian discourse about the 2nd WW is constructed. In the next chapters we shall take a closer look to these procedures which form more precisely the Ukrainian nationalist narrative about the 2nd WW.

5.5. Rarefactions and resrtictions - restoring the right to sovereignty

”The “Great Patriotic War” - - - does not correspond with the experience of the Ukrainian people during the Second World War. - - - Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were not ready to fight for the Stalinist regime and did not perceive the war to be patriotic.” (p. 17-21).

The ordering draws Ukraine as its own entity inside USSR. Where the Soviet discourse included Ukraine as one of the core republics of the Soviet Union, the book very strictly rejects this view, instead drawing Ukraine on its own, with its distinct experience in the 2nd WW. If Ukraine would agree on the Russian promoted view about itself, it would also at the same time deny its own sovereignty. This is because the neo-Soviet discourse basically allows Ukraine to engage only with one type of solution - accepting the so-called *union-view* and staying under Russian influence. This logic was explained with more detail in the earlier section of the thesis, dealing with the Russian neo-Soviet sphere of influence. The rarefaction procedures suggest Ukraine as a sovereign, indivisible country, based on the interpretation of international law. Especially the law question became crucial during the Crimean annexation, as the event was clearly violating the sovereignty of an independent state and breaking international agreements.

This dynamic forces Ukraine to underline the differences in order to justify its independence. Ukrainian war is presented beginning actually earlier than the war between

USSR and Germany, already in 1939 when the first bombs were dropped to the streets of Kiev (p. 33-34). In addition to Red Army, Ukrainians fought also in many other armies during the war, including for example Romanian, Slovakian, Hungarian and Finnish armies (p. 35-36). In chapter 5, areas of Western Ukraine are mentioned as being under Polish defense against Soviet Union's aggression (p. 39-40). The battle for the short-lived state of Carpatho-Ukrainian republic are mentioned as Ukrainians' "*freedom fight from Hungary*" (p. 33-34). These kind of propositions underline the distinctiveness and scattered nature of Ukrainian experience in the 2nd WW, in contrast to the Soviet narrative, which embraces the unity of all Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

Ukrainian current status as an independent country with its modern borders (assumably also Crimea included) determine the most important basis of how Ukraine is perceived in the chapters of the book. This part of the ordering, that creates boundaries between the Ukraine in relation to the rest of the world, comes down to the basic statements of nationalism, more precisely the *Western* interpretation, where the world order is defined by the international law respecting the independence, sovereignty and freedom of nations. By accepting this statement, Ukraine basically restores its right to itself in the modern form. These distinctions are made even during the periods when Ukraine was technically part of Soviet Union. In chapter 3 Ukrainian territory (alongside with Belarus) is described as their "*ethnic land*" which ended up being on the Soviet side (p. 30-32). In chapter 5, those areas belonging to modern-day Ukraine are mentioned as "*Ukrainian (and Belarusian) regions of Poland*" (p. 38-39). Soviet troops are mentioned being on Ukrainian territory (p. 77-78). Also repeatedly many other ethnic minorities of the USSR are referred as "nations" in the book even though technically this term can't be used to describe a group without their own statehood. This proposition puts Ukraine side by side with other nations who were experiencing similar fates in the 2nd WW, such as previously mentioned Crimean tatars. By underlining the anti-Soviet mindset, attitudes and actions during the war the discourse functions by highlighting the distinctiveness of the experience and reinforcing it. Ukraine is seen as one country and nation which were torn apart between several participants of the war. Ukrainian people, even living outside of Ukraine and fighting in different armies, are included to this one nation. The absence of an Ukrainian state is presented as the main

reason for this massive tragedy. As the tragedy is thought to be a consequence of the absence of own state, it is also at the same time proposed, that the state would be a a vital condition and a guarantor of the security for Ukrainian people.

"The tragedy of the Ukrainian people was the lack of their own state and therefore, they were distributed among all the warring parties in this conflict." (p. 35-36)

At the same time this part of the ordering states also who has the right to Ukraine, or who is allowed to join the discourse. If this basic requirement of accepting Ukrainian sovereignty and distinctiveness is not fulfilled, the opportunity to join the discourse is denied. The importance in relying this basic statement of Ukrainian independence defined by Ukrainians themselves as a sovereign nation comes particularly visible in chapter 6. The text in question emphasizes the unification of Ukrainian People's Republic and Western Ukrainian People's Republic on the 22nd of January in 1919 as the first unification act of Ukraine.

"The unification of Ukrainian lands actually occurred in 1919 by the Unification Act of the UPR and WUPR. Unlike 1939, it was on behalf of two Ukrainian nations who advocated independence and were equally sovereign governments." (p. 45-46)

This is seen as the *real* and *actual* unification of Ukraine, which goes back to the exclusion procedure of what is defined as *the truth*. The creation of Ukrainian SSR is rejected as an occupation. Stalin's Ukrainian unification in 1939-1940 into Ukrainian SSR is seen simply as an annexation and redemption of occupied territories. Soviet Union was an aggressor to destroy the Ukrainian independence in 1921 and the creation of Ukrainian SSR turned Ukraine only into a puppet state (p. 45-46). It is pointed out that this wasn't meant for the Ukrainians' best interest, but rather it was a side effect of Soviet expansion. The Soviet rhetoric about the liberation of fraternal nations is condemned only as a *"screen to mask expansionist plans"* (p. 46-47).

The same type of argumentation continues in the chapter 38, considering Ukrainian "liberation". This event on 28th of October 1944, branded in the Soviet myth in question as liberation of Ukraine from fascist invaders, is actually a holiday still celebrated in Ukraine annually. The discourse however rejects the meaning of this event as a *liberation* and instead creates the meaning as yet another occupation with devastating consequences. The

date of the *true* liberation is the day of the establishment of independent Ukraine in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

"Ukraine did not receive freedom rather it was only occupied by another totalitarian regime. The result of which was mass repressions and deportations including hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Poles and the entire Crimean Tatar people and the mass starvation of hundreds of thousands of residents in Ukraine between 1946–1947. - - True freedom and sovereignty for the Ukrainian people only came on 24 August 1991, with its acquisition of independence." (p. 246-251)

True Ukraine is existing only when Ukrainian people themselves are the initiators of the unification in order to establish an independent state. In this way, restriction procedure is in place to legitimize only people who are understood as Ukrainians having the right to define Ukraine. Ukraine is drawn as its own being in between of two collaborating totalitarian regimes, which forms the important part of the discursive base ordering about the 2nd WW.

5.5.1. Battle for Sevastopol

"Кто пойдёт по следу одинокому?

Сильные да смелые

Головы сложили в поле в бою

Мало кто остался в светлой памяти

*В трезвом уме, да с твёрдой рукой в строю"*¹⁷

Who will follow the footsteps of the lonely?

The strong and brave

Laid down their heads on the field, in the battle

The few who stayed in the bright memory

In the sober mind, with a firm hand in the ranks"

Chapter 16 in the book touches on a particularly important issue raised on focus especially after the Crimean occupation and annexation by Russia in spring 2014. Sevastopol has played a significant role in Russian patriotic propaganda as almost a mythical city of Russian military dignity. Upon the annexation of Crimea patriotic rhetoric about Sevastopol's (as part of all Crimea's) cultural importance to Russia was used to justify the occupation and annexation. For example in the speech held in Kremlin on 18th of March in 2014 after the publication of the results of Crimean referendum, Putin described Sevastopol as follows:

¹⁷ The *"Cuckoo"* (rus. *Кукушка*), originally from a rock band called Kino, written by Viktor Tsoi. The song was newly recorded by Polina Gagarina as the official soundtrack for the movie *"Battle for Sevastopol"* (rus. *"Битва за Севастополь"*), also known in Ukrainian as *"Indestructible"* (ukr. *"Незламна"*), directed by Sergey Mokritskiy in 2015.

”Крым – это Севастополь, город-легенда, город великой судьбы, город-крепость и Родина русского черноморского военного флота. Крым – это Балаклава и Керчь, Малахов курган и Сапун-гора. Каждое из этих мест свято для нас, это символы русской воинской славы и невиданной доблести.” - Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года, Москва, Кремль¹⁸

(engl. ”Crimea - this is Sevastopol, a legendary city, city of great destiny, fortress-city and the homeland of the Russian Black Sea navy. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakoff hill and Mount Sapun. Each one of these places is sacred for us, they are symbols of Russian military glory and wondrous valor.” - President of Russian Federation, the 18th of March 2014, Moscow, Kreml)

This part of the Putin’s speech summarizes well the core of the myth presented in the chapter - the idea of Russian glorious past and war heroism associated with the city of Sevastopol. This has served as one of the most important parts in the Russian information war over the ownership of this territory. The book’s response is a clear rejection of this idea of *Russian* military glory, and later the text is restricting the view about Ukraine having the right to Crimean heritage as well.

”This cliché is used in the Russian information sphere to encourage the reader to think that the city is indeed shrouded in glory and secondly, it being exclusively Russian. Both cases are serious perversions: firstly, concerning the glory and secondly, it being exclusively Russian.” (p. 108-109)

In the detailed facts section, Russian military failures in Sevastopol are brought to the daylight to oppose the view about the city filled with Russian military glory, continuing the procedure of attacking with the exclusions, similarly witnessed already before. This can be seen in the presentation of events like forced submerging of the entire fleet of Russian Empire in the Crimean war 1853–1856, or the humiliating end of Malakoff hill defense in June 1942 against German troops when 100 000 Soviet soldiers were left behind to die and captured while the high command was evacuated without ever ordering the soldiers to stop fighting (p. 108-110). These events were obviously excluded from the official Soviet publications. Even though the *Soviet* or *Russian* military glory is demolished in the chapter,

¹⁸ Original Putin speech available at: <http://kremlin.ru/Обращение>

the *Ukrainian* military glory on the other hand is revived. The power dynamic of establishing the dominance over the other view with exclusions and restrictions is maybe the most visible here. The theme continues forward in the next paragraph as well.

5.5.2. Ukrainian war heroism in the 2nd WW - honor to whom it belongs

The discourse continues to restore the merits of people who would have been considered Ukrainians in the modern circumstances. It follows the same nationalistic logic where the Ukrainian people are the ones that have the right to their own independent heritage. This could be seen as building a story about precisely *Ukrainian heroes*. The movie "*Battle for Sevastopol*" (which soundtrack was present at the beginning of the previous chapter) is a biographical war film about a famous Ukrainian-born Red Army sniper in the 2nd WW named Lyudmila Pavlichenko, who is claimed to have the highest confirmed hit list ever. Where the book's discourse draws Pavlichenko as precisely an *Ukrainian* war hero, the neo-Soviet draws her as a *Soviet* war hero. The biographical film of Pavlichenko was presented only shortly after the Crimean occupation. Several Russian propaganda products were published shortly after the annexation, but this movie was filmed just before the military confrontation of 2014 as Ukrainian-Russian joint production, and it managed to avoid the worst polarized political tensions in the issue. Pavlichenko's photo is present in the chapter 16 with the text "*Hero of the Soviet Union, sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko – one of the many Ukrainians who heroically defended Sevastopol*" (p. 109-110). She is presented as an example of Ukrainian war heroism in the Red Army to point out how Russians can't own alone the Soviet war glory of Sevastopol.

At the end of the chapter 16, the percentage of Ukrainians among the defenders of Sevastopol is suggested to be at least 23%, based on the numbers of Ukrainians in the Red Army in average (p. 110-111). The amount of soldiers coming from the different areas of Ukraine is claimed to be even higher than this. These both groups of ethnic Ukrainians and habitants of Ukraine are combined as being included to the same group. They are brought forward relying on the same nationalistic base statement, where their value is constructed on their status as the citizens of today's sovereign nation of Ukraine. The final sentence of the

chapter indicates that the Russian narrative not only glorifies the importance of Russians, but also downgrades the contributions of other nationalities involved in Sevastopol's defense (p. 110-111). The neo-Soviet discourse ignores the concepts of modern nationality in the case of former Soviet republics. Those people who were bringing somehow merit to the Soviet motherland are recognized *despite* their ethnicity or nationality that they would hold in the current moment. Rather Russian neo-Soviet narrative seeks to own the whole heritage of the Soviet Union, and the existence or value of certain people as part of the discourse are determined by their "usefulness" for the propaganda. The Ukrainian discourse instead seeks to restore the glory of these people as representatives of the modern nation, especially those Ukrainians whose efforts were left out from the Soviet canon.

Unlike Pavlichenko, according to the book, there were actually many other Ukrainian war heroes who were instead excluded and dismissed completely from the official Soviet war narrative. In chapter 44 the myth is dealing with the famous event of raising the Soviet victory flag over Reichstag (Germany's parliament building in Berlin). This event is particularly iconic, as it is immortalized as one of the best known photographs of the 2nd WW (taken by Yevgeny Khaldei) and became a symbol of Soviet victory over Nazi-Germany (rus. Знамя Победы над Рейхстагом). The whole situation was orchestrated and staged by the Soviet leadership. The Soviet narrative dismissed the role of Ukrainian Alexei Berest in the flag bearing and in contrast emphasized the two other heroes, Mikhail Yegorov and Meliton Kantaria (p. 279). Questions about why he was removed from the list of the Heroes of the Soviet Union remain still unsolved. Berest was posthumously granted the title Hero of Ukraine on 6 May 2005 by Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko (p. 282-283).

Putin's words in chapter 46 are quoted, where he claims the losses of the RSFSR being 70% of the total losses of the Soviet Union (p. 306). The chapter notes at the beginning, that the calculations of Russian authorities ignore the concept of ethnicity and people whose origins can be traced back to modern Ukrainian territory (p. 306-307). There are several name lists mentioned about Ukrainians who were granted honor badges and the status of being a Hero of the Soviet Union (p. 308-309). Both calculations are present separately in the chapter; ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian citizens participating to the 2nd WW (in different armies, including Allied forces). In the Soviet troops alone, they made more than fifth of the Red Army.

5.5.3. Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes! - the new core of the national pride

”Слава Україні! Героям слава!” (engl. *”Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!”*) is a famous salute, which has been widely used by Ukrainian nationalists. The history of this salutation can be loosely detected all the way back to Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko in 1840, when the first part originally appeared in one of his poems called *”To Osnovuapenko”* (ukr. *”До Основ’яненка”*). The phrase became truly significant among Ukrainian nationalists during the conflict series in 1917-1921, also known as Ukrainian war of independence. This period was especially important to the Ukrainian nationalist narrative, as we saw earlier with the chapter 6 about the unification act of 1919, as it marked the start of the pursuit of independence. The phrase achieved its specific significance in its current form as an objection to the Soviet rule during the period of the 2nd WW, and it became the official salute for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA (ukr. *Українська повстанська армія*), a paramilitary formation of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN (ukr. *Організація Українських Націоналістів*), which advocated and fought for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian statehood. The underground organization was officially formed in Vienna at the beginning of February in 1929, and later split into two branches, from which OUN-B, among its leader Stepan Bandera became the more famous- and also the more radical one (the other branch was led by Andriy Melnyk, and became known as OUN-M).

The glorification of OUN and UPA as key nationalistic symbols is rather a recent phenomenon, as it has only strengthened since the 1980’s. This was mainly thanks to national democratic organizations like People’s Movement of Ukraine (ukr. *Народний Рух України*), which became the first opposition party in Soviet Ukraine. Some of the members had personally encountered UPA fighters in the Gulags. During the final years of the existence of Soviet Union, different associations were established to the victims of Soviet repressions and many UPA veterans joined them. Before the independence, OUN and UPA were popular mostly in certain Western Ukrainian areas and with the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and in the United States. After the Orange Revolution, during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, the role of OUN became more visible part of the Ukrainian nationalistic

policies. His victory in the elections marked the beginning of the normalization of OUN-UPA memory on a state level. Yushchenko's most significant attempt to institutionalize the memory of OUN was the declaration of UPA commander Roman Shunkevych and OUN leader Stepan Bandera as national heroes in 2007 and 2010. The reform was later cancelled. (Yurchuk 2017 p. 107-122).

However, with the new memory laws, the situation has changed. The hero-status of UPA fighters has been dividing opinions. The dispute about OUN's meaning in Ukrainian nation-building comes down mostly to their connections with Nazis during the war, their ideology and attitude towards ethnic minorities, events like Volhynia massacres or the organization's participation to the Holocaust (Yurchuk 2017 p. 109). It could be argued though, that the terrors to which OUN was engaging, should be seen as a part of a bigger war concept, where violence was an inevitable part of warfare. Smoor (2017) points out in his article that it is not possible to say with certainty whether the number of Nazi collaborators was relatively higher in Ukraine than in other Soviet republics (Smoor 2017 p. 81). There has also been evidence of similar movements in Russian SFSR at the time, in addition to which the violence used by the UPA did not differ significantly from the violent practices of others at that time (Smoor 2017 p. 81-82). The alliance with Nazis lasted overall not more than 4 years, and for example the massacre of Poles by UPA in Volhynia was a part of a wider conflict in which as many Ukrainians lost their lives in the hands of Poles (Kuzio 2016 p. 503-504). Kuzio also notes, that the Western Ukrainian anti-Semitism was existing mainly due to economic reasons rather than racism (Kuzio 2016 p. 106).

One interesting aspect of the development of Ukrainian nationalism on the civic level during the Revolution of Dignity, has been the reshaping of the meaning of OUN symbols. In his study, Volodymyr Kulyk (2014) estimated that for most Euromaidan protesters, carrying of the Bandera's pictures, waving the UPA's red-black flag and using the *Glory to Ukraine*- slogan together with Ukrainian yellow-blue flag and singing the national anthem, were constructed to symbolize especially the unity of the people against government's oppression. Previously these symbols had been associated with more extremist nationalist forces in Ukraine. Russian propaganda was using these symbols as an example of the Ukrainian ethnonationalists taking over Kiyv, although extremist nationalist forces (such as the Svoboda, Freedom party, which is equated with the neo-Nazis and generally glorifies the

UPA as the OUN) were involved in the protests, they still formed a clear minority of protesters with their own values. (Kulyk 2014 p. 97-100). The overall support for far-right parties in the country did not rise after the Euromaidan (Zhurzhenko 2014 p. 261). The meaning of these symbols at that time changed to a much more inclusive direction and made them more generally accepted (Yurchuk 2017 p. 125). The display of UPA symbols aroused contradicting feelings in many protesters, but they were more acceptable in these circumstances, as extreme nationalism was a secondary problem for most compared to the reason why people originally marched to the streets (Kulyk 2014 p.100). The significance took the shape of representing the pride and honor of Ukraine, the people's struggle against the regime and later Russian military intervention without the clear ethnic emphasis (Yurchuk 2017 p. 125 & Kulyk 2014 p. 100-101).

5.5.3.1. The restricted Nazi-cooperation

During the Soviet times, OUN was excluded completely from the Great Patriotic War-narrative as they were simply rejected as enemies of the state, fascists who fought against USSR with the Nazis. As presented earlier, the opposition of the Soviets and the Nazis is also a part of this fundamental structure of the Soviet war myth as a whole. The chapter 23 of the book starts a series of myths dealing mainly with the OUN's Nazi-cooperation and their ideological connections to fascism. The chapter series around this topic is ruled mainly by restriction procedures, where the division between heroes and villains is turned the other way round, and Russians are stated as being the main collaborators with Nazis, having fascist values and engaging with unethical warfare. The chapters defend the actions and ideology of OUN and UPA, and reject the claims of them having any connections to ethnic nationalism or participating unnecessary killings during the war. Ukrainian insurgents are presented as victims of propaganda and misunderstandings.

The view of OUN as Nazi-collaborator is restricted already in the first chapter of the OUN series, and actually the counterattack is being made by throwing the accusation back to the sender and claiming the amount of Russians being greater than Ukrainians in collaboration with the Nazis (p. 148-149 & 150-151). For certain extent, the Ukrainian collaboration with Nazis is admitted, but the speaking of it is delimited in representing the cooperation as an absolute necessity. The collaboration in the Ukrainian case is presented

being a forced move, last resort and a matter of survival - not a matter of voluntary choice. Basically the responsibility is transferred to the surrounding situation. Ukrainians were the victims of a totalitarian regimes in these circumstances:

"Its basis was political motivations and social causes – the need to survive in extreme conditions of warfare and a totalitarian regime. - - - The nature and extent of cooperation was determined by the occupiers themselves and not their enslaved people." (p. 148-150).

Flipping of accusation around, the text is stating that Russians were instead the *true* collaborators because according to the text, they, as a greater power and mostly not occupied by the Germans, had the choice for doing a cooperation in contrast to Ukrainians (p. 149-150). There are several Soviet military formations and political parties serving and following the Nazis that are collected as a list in the chapter (also Ukrainian organizations, like Free Cossacks, are mentioned, but its role downplayed as their influence being *"negligible"* in contrast to mainly Russian organizations) (p. 150-152). The final sentence summarizes ironically the idea of stinging back with the same argument:

"In this way, Russian 'success' in cooperating with the Third Reich seems more reputable and the Ukrainians should give up their place to them." (p. 152-154)

In myth 41 (about Ukrainians being butchers of the Warsaw uprising) the focus is in the portrayal of Ukrainians as inglorious bastards. Again in the chapter, the same allegation is thrown back to the sender, claiming that actually Russian formations were the ones playing the significant role in the suppressions of the Warsaw uprising in the ranks of SS-divisions (p. 264-265). Russians are claimed to be many times mistaken to Ukrainians among Polish citizens, and these misunderstandings are explained to be the reason why Ukrainian representation is often exaggerated (p. 265-266). Also the division is made by arguing, that those who were ethnic Ukrainians and participating suppressions were associating themselves with Russia, not Ukraine (p. 266-267). The responsibility of possibly punitive actions is indirectly transferred to Russians, as USSR is portrayed being the one in control of them. The involvement of the Galician SS division is kept to a minimum, arguing that this formation didn't technically even exist at the time of the Warsaw uprising (p. 267-268). The participation of the Galician SS is limited to single soldiers who *possibly* fought against Warsaw rebels before the Galician division was formed (p. 268).

Myth 24 is stating, that in contrast to the Soviet view, Galicia SS division was never part of the notorious general German SS-division (Ger. Allgemeine SS, which participated various war crimes during the 2nd WW), but only part of the armed Waffen-SS which was used primarily as a battle unit (p. 157-159). This is a way of denying, that Ukrainian resistance movement would have been participating to the killings of innocent civilians, by creating a distinction between these military formations. OUN is presented forming Nachtigall and Roland Battalions together with Wehrmacht officers and the German military intelligence (Abwehr) in order to pursue the independent Ukrainian state, working on their own objective. The nature of their tasks are cleansed also in the chapter 25 to show that these formations didn't participate in cruelties as the Soviet version of them claims (164-165). Myths 25 and 26 concentrate more precisely on the myths about OUN-B leaders, Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych. The myths claim them being agents of Nazi's secret services and them having a criminal status based on famous Nürenberg trials, where many Nazi officers were prosecuted for their war crimes. Both of these claims are strictly rejected, arguing that simply no evidence of this is available.

The rift in the relations between Nazis and OUN is brought forward to create the differentiation between OUN and the Nazis. Chapters 25 and 30 underline that the relations overall between the Nazis and OUN weren't rosy and they had many fractions and disagreements on different issues during their cooperation. The tensions are described to be constantly on the air, as the Ukrainian nationalists' independence goal was not in line with Nazis' objectives. In chapter 30 there are more detailed cases of Germans' difficulties in order to control and fight against anti-German uprising canalized by the Ukrainian nationalists. The forming the 201st police battalion (which has been claimed participating to the genocide of Jews) was done without OUN-B's control over the issue and Ukrainian soldiers were serving there in order to avoid arrest by Germans (p. 165-167). Ukrainian soldiers' activities in Belarus as fighting against Soviet partisans is mentioned, but the claimed participation to the genocide of Jews is not specifically touched upon at all. Later the Ukrainian soldiers are mentioned to refuse "*continue their service*" which led to the arrests of many Ukrainian officers including Shukhevych at the end (p. 167-168). In

particular, the pragmatic essence of the cooperation is emphasized over the ideological one in contrast to the Soviet myth:

"These relations had a pragmatic character for the union when both sides extracted their own benefits, without any political commitment." (p. 167-168)

Finally, the irreversible rift and conflict between the Nazis and OUN took place after OUN's refusal to withdraw the Act of restoration of the Ukrainian state, which sealed the last traces of cooperation (p. 171-172). All the way existing tensions ignited into armed conflict at this point. This is described being *"the moment of truth in OUN relation with the Germans"* (p. 172). The pursuing of the Ukrainian independent state is precisely the *true* goal that forms the hero-status for OUN and UPA in this narrative. This goal is presented as the ultimate achievement which permeates all the layers of their existence and seeks to rationalize their choices in the conditions of war. This point is presented with more detail in the next paragraph.

5.5.3.2. Heroes of the people and Ukrainian independence

Ukrainian insurgents are defended as having an important additional motive for the collaboration with Nazis which was the dream of restoring their independent state (these hopes were especially high in Western Ukraine, which has been traditionally the strongest support area of Ukrainian nationalism) (p. 149-150). Western European countries (Allied forces) are mentioned not being ready to accept the OUN as an independent player, and for this reason it wouldn't been able to get any help from them (p. 156-157). The independence as an ultimate goal is basically presented as compensating the limited collaboration with the German totalitarian regime, in other words, the end justifying the means.

Chapter 33 delves into the core question about OUN's relation to nationalism. The Soviet propaganda portrays a picture of fierce and ruthless organization which seeks to establish a mono-ethnic state at the expense of several Ukrainian minorities' disposal (p. 220). The opposition formed by the chapter instead emphasizes OUN's liberal-nationalistic view of a nation. According to the text, OUN was not only on the side of independent Ukraine, but also on the side of *all* other ethnic groups oppressed by the USSR. OUN's

solidarity is expanded to include not only Ukrainians, but also other peoples in similar situation:

"This struggle was to bring freedom to all people enslaved by Moscow and to create their own lives on their own native lands based on their own decisions. Its objectives also included dignity and human freedom, freedom of conscience, religion and belief." (p. 220-221).

According to the chapter 39, UPA was avoiding confrontation even with the Red Army and even though armed clashes with the insurgents and Soviet soldiers occurred, they were taking place only when it was a necessity (p. 252-253). Even the captured Red Army prisoners are described being treated with respect by UPA and acts of friendliness and solidarity occurring between insurgents and the Soviet troops during the war. The insurgents are presented as morally superior, and for this reason, even the Soviet soldiers were even willing to cooperate with them in certain situations.

"The prisoners were supposed to be handled correctly, spoken to politely, avoid indiscretion, fed, provided recreation and – if necessary – their wounds treated. - - - In August 1945 near the village of Nevochyn, the Red Army soldiers told the insurgents where the KGB divisions were located and on their farewell, said 'goodbye' and advised them to 'beat those bastards.' A month before this event, the Red Army soldiers and insurgents peacefully 'divided' among themselves the village of Pidpechery in Ivano-Frankivsk province." (p. 254-256).

One big theme in the Nazi cooperation with the Ukrainian nationalists is their relation to Nazi ideology and especially their attitude towards Jews. Chapter 27 comes down to the point that not all Ukrainian nationalist movements had anything to do with the massacre of Jews nor antisemitism (p. 179-180). The spreading anti-Jewish sentiments in Western Ukraine at the time are explained to be a consequence of the brutalities of the Red Army, as people of the city of Lviv were looking for someone to target their anger with (p. 181-182). At the end of the chapter, even examples of OUN members (including the wife of the UPA commander Roman Shukhevych) saving and helping Jews by sheltering them and giving them falsified passports (p. 184-185). The fact that there were Ukrainians participating in the execution of Jews in the military and police formations of the Nazis, is placed to a larger war concept, where prisoners consisting also many other nationalities (including Russians especially) were forced to perform these tasks (p. 178-179). The limited fighting against Jews is justified in chapter 33 by stating, that UPA was in conflict only with

those Jews (among representatives of other ethnic minorities) who somehow hampered the Ukrainian independence aspirations (p. 222-223, p. 226-227). At the end of the chapter 33 several Jewish people serving in UPA's ranks are mentioned by name as to support the claim above that Jews weren't persecuted as a whole ethnic group (p. 225-226). Different proofs are presented to support this claim that the participation of Ukrainian nationalists to the pogrom of Jews was definitely minimalistic (p. 180-181). In those cases where it undoubtedly happened it is reasoned with other factors. OUN is represented as trying to create a common homeland for *all oppressed people* and calling them to the "*joint struggle against state occupiers*" (p. 224-225). In this way, the discourse seeks to construct OUN and the insurgents as the heroes of all Ukrainians in an inclusive way.

The question about if, or how much, antisemitism was truly present inside OUN or to what extent the organization participated to Holocaust is actually relatively hard to estimate, as the information about this issue is controversial depending on the source. It is likely that ethnic-nationalist sentiments among OUN members were present enough that it could be considered as a motivation for some of their actions during the war. Especially far-right forces in Ukraine are well known to glorify OUN and UPA, and The UINR's director at the time, Volodymyr Viatrovych, has been criticized of diminishing the more painful or uncomfortable sides like ethnic cleansing in Ukrainian history executed by UPA¹⁹. For example the highly polarizing topic of Volhynia massacres has understandably had its impact especially to Ukrainian-Polish relationships²⁰.

It seems clear that establishing independent Ukraine was the main focus for the OUN and this is ruling their essence as the main characters in the new Ukrainian nationalist discourse. All the other factors seem more or less selected to justify their actions and construct a meaning of them as defenders of all Ukrainians. The whole discourse in the book works like a mirror image: in the Soviet propaganda, USSR was portraying itself as the protector of people from these fascist forces (which included OUN), and in the

¹⁹ Report: Josh Cohen - The Historian Whitewashing Ukraine's Past, Foreign Policy, 2.5.2016, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/02/the-historian-whitewashing-ukraines-past-volodymyr-viatrovych/>

²⁰ Article: Andrii Portnov - Clash of victimhoods; Volhynia Massacre in Polish and Ukrainian memory, 16.11.2016, available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/clash-of-victimhood-1943-volhynian-massacre-in-polish-and-ukrainian-culture/>

Ukrainian version the OUN is the protector of people against Soviet oppressor which shares similarities to fascism and collaborated with Nazis from free will. In both of these discourses, the facts that would present the *heroes* in negative light, are excluded from the discourse. This statement is also very evident in the decommunization law about honoring the memory of fighters of independent Ukraine, which was criticized the most out of these laws. For example in October 2012 a Swedish-American historian Per Anders Rudling from Lund University received a complaint signed by leading figures of Ukrainian nationalist groups in Canada²¹. He was accused on hate speech based on his research and writings about Stepan Bandera's antisemitism, OUN and UPA's participation to Holocaust and his critic towards their glorification by Ukrainian historians. Many well-known Holocaust scholars and University professors around the world signed a response defending Rudling in an open support letter²². The question about how far this restriction procedure around OUN is ready to be taken, would be worth considering. Maybe precisely in the way of avoiding and denying certain aspects in the national *hero narrative*, the procedures of the Soviet discourse echoes the most.

²¹ The letter available at: <https://defendinghistory.com/ukrainian-nationalist-groups-in-canada-complain-to-the-vice-chancellor-of-lund-university-in-sweden/43748>

²² The letter available at: <https://defendinghistory.com/open-letter-in-support-of-per-anders-rudling/44285>

6. Results

In the analysis section, the discursive procedures were introduced around different themes of the book, and shown how they are detectable on a textual level. In this section, the aim is to summarize the main results. Returning to the research question, the procedures of exclusion, rarefaction and restriction are highlighted differently, as they together reveal the overall ordering scheme of the 2nd WW in this specific book. These results are reflected together with the larger discursive field to form a deeper understanding about the mechanisms defining the essence of the object. In the conclusions- section these results are discussed further with the earlier research material and the theoretical concepts presented in the background section.

6.1. Foundation ordering for the object of the 2nd WW in Ukrainian nationalist discourse

The foundation ordering for the WW2 is Ukraine as its own independent entity between two collaborating totalitarian regimes. Ukraine's identity as its modern form with its current state borders and people is recognized as the foundation of the nationalist narrative, which seeks to prove separate Ukrainian path during the war years. Nazi-Germany's role is more flexible compared to Soviet Union in the discourse, as it is presented as being the only option for Ukraine to collaborate with during some periods of the war in order to save itself from the Soviet regime. The main focus is in the formation of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, or Ukrainian SSR and Russian RSFSR at the time. The essence of this is characterized by tyranny towards Ukraine and Ukrainians and the Soviet lies surrounding it. Instead of being part of a bigger country as the winner in the Great Patriotic War, Ukraine is formed as a victim who is forced to join the war as an occupied territory. The topic of being part of Soviet Union is understood as an occupation. Overall Ukraine's destiny in the war is extremely tragic. The core of war heroism is based mainly to the efforts of OUN and UPA, who are presented as the true liberators and pursuers of independence, resisting the oppressive Soviet regime and fighting behalf of all Ukrainians. This new discourse is

establishing its *regime of truth* on a societal level over the new narrative through several legal and practical changes in the remembrance tradition. The most notable ones from them are the memory laws with the establishment of the new national celebration for the Victory over Nazism on the 8th of May. Alongside these changes also many symbols have experienced redefinitions and innovations.

6.2. Exclusions: the mirror discourse - what couldn't be said, must be said

The exclusion procedures of the book are probably the most prominent and easiest to detect. In other words the aim is to represent what the discourse is in relation to what it isn't; those measures that form the outline of the discourse. The exclusion procedures define the *will to truth* or *will to know* in Foucauldian terms and form the prominent structure for the discursive ordering. Soviet discourse's statements are simply excluded as complete lies or at least as severe distortions. The Soviet narrative can't be trusted or taken anyhow seriously for this reason. It is like the speech of a "madman" in Foucault's example, where only a very limited and strictly guarded space is reserved for him to speak in the society. It can't have the truth value or the same "currency" as the Ukrainian interpretation, which is not based on *myths* but on *facts* (according to what the book states about itself).

The mirror discourse refers to the fact, that the text forms everything in the very contrast to the Soviet war canon. Already in the introduction-section of the book, the text presents clearly its most obvious procedures of exclusion, which come forward already in the basic structure of the book: the opposition between truth and false, the rejection of the (neo-) Soviet war narrative and the division of this discourse from the Ukrainian one. All these procedures are very much integrated with one another, and also hard to distinguish separately for this reason. These procedures together are probably the strongest statement, which is coherent throughout the book in every chapter and in every enunciation. As the Soviet war narrative with its argumentation is excluded, those who support these views are not reliable sources for information. Everyone who is not recognizing the statements of *truth*, is excluded from the discourse. This is why for example Putin is not qualified to speak

about the topics related to Ukraine, as he doesn't recognize the Ukrainian sovereignty. As the book is based on the idea on the demolition of the Soviet discourse, Ukrainian discourse constructs its object about the WW2 by choosing its material from those parts which the Soviet discourse originally excluded. In other words, *the will to truth* is governed by this goal to represent all those sides of history which were silenced for many decades during the Soviet regime. It is probably purposefully taken to the extreme in order to underline the differentiation between the modern states of Ukrainian and Russia in this heated battle over the control of *truth*.

6.3. Rarefactions: the Ukrainian paradox

After the exclusions determining what is left out, commentary, author function and discipline form the inner ordering procedures of a discourse. As Foucault originally designed the method for very organized ways of knowledge production in the discursive field, it is rather difficult to identify some of these rarefactions. The book is rather one part in this larger discourse, which is on its part developing the discipline further. In the book the sources are mainly gathered from different kind of documents, speeches and memoirs that support the goal of producing information of those sides which the Soviet discourse neglected. On the institutional level, the memory laws determine what kind of research on the field of history is needed and especially the law about archives' opening can be seen as one important enablement procedure for this project. Discipline is rather establishing boundaries and the instruments to the search of the *truth* around author function and commentary.

The author function forms the text its source and identity going beyond the concrete creator(s) of the text. It describes the characteristics by which it is possible to detect who or what is responsible for the text. It's rather a classification that puts the text into a certain category of texts and gives it its form of existence. The actual author is actually just an individual who gets his modes of behavior from this function. The historians working under UINR are the official authors of this book, but the actual author function could be described as being the Ukrainian nationalism. Maybe more precisely, it is the nationalistic interpretation, which has been often identified as being more *Western Ukrainian*. Why is the

precisely the Western Ukrainian interpretation then dominating the Ukrainian discourse at the moment? Throughout the chapters, different historical developments around these phenomena have been presented, even though not all of them in one specific paragraph. The reasons why the Western Ukrainian interpretation has raised to the dominant position in the state's discourse in current circumstances goes back to the exclusion procedures, which determine that the ingredients for the Ukrainian nationalistic narrative need to be somehow anti-Soviet. Western Ukraine, especially Volhynia and Galicia have had historically and culturally the most connections to Central Europe from all Ukrainian areas. These areas also had the least Soviet influences, as they stayed under Soviet rule less than the rest of Ukraine. Western Ukraine is the most "European" part of the country in this sense. They also managed to hold most of the cultural heritage which is understood being exclusively Ukrainian. If Ukraine is wanted to be presented especially as an European nation, it is natural that these areas hold the most value to this representation. Presenting Ukraine precisely as part of Europe can be seen as being aligned with the political goals at the time of the publication of the book. These areas are mostly Ukrainian speaking and also have the strongest support base for OUN and UPA in the whole country. The book *War and Myth-The Unknown WW2* is published only in Ukrainian and in English, which is also a statement as such. The director of UINR, Volodymyr Viatrovych, is also originally from Western Ukrainian town of Lviv, which is often described as the heartland for Ukrainian nationalism. The question is mainly about the renewal of power structures, where the previously marginal narrative is now raised to the dominant position in order to build a more *Ukrainian* and *European* identity.

Maybe the most interesting procedure of the book is the commentary. After all, the main focus for the identity-building still stays strongly on the 2nd WW period. In this sense Ukraine and Russia are actually not significantly different. They both see the current conflict very much as a continuation of the 2nd WW and draw a lot of the symbolism and justifications for their political actions from this period. Overall these two countries have shared much of the same eras in history, even though their interpretations on them differ. Ukraine, Belarus and Russia formed the core republics of the Soviet Union and in these countries the impact was probably the most prominent. Ukraine simply can't ignore this

period on its history, so the only option remains to construct the meaning of it differently. Even though the book strongly disagrees with the Soviet war myths, it is still completely based on commenting them. Actually, the whole book would be pointless without them. The very fact that this kind of commentary on the Soviet war narrative is needed to be done, tells how much it still has an impact inside the Ukrainian society. This comes forward even in the rhetorical style of the book. As Michel Foucault described: the commentary exercises *"a paradox which it always displaces, but never escapes"* (Foucault 1970 p. 58). This means that at the same time the text needs to say something that has never been said before, while continuing to say what already has been said. Commentary always seeks to somehow "complete" or "correct" the primary text. It carries the primary text within itself for this reason. The end result is somewhat of a paradox, as at the same time when Ukraine is seeking to fiercely get rid of the Soviet heritage, it ends up still being bound to it.

6.4. Restrictions: who has the right to join the discourse?

The restriction procedures are formed around the question of who has the right to speak or what kind of argumentation is allowed about the 2nd WW in Ukrainian case. There are certain preconditions to join the discourse, which mainly concern the speech about Ukraine. The formation of Ukrainian SSR is rejected as an occupation and the unification between Ukraine's People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1919 is recognized as the real unification of Ukraine. Also the true freedom is not achieved by the Soviet "liberation", but the Ukrainian independence declaration in 1991. The state is being established by the Ukrainian people themselves, to whom the right of doing so is restricted. They are the only legitimate holders of this right, based on the international laws, which are the major guarantors of sovereignty in the legal sense.

Another question is, are all Ukrainians really qualified to do so? The exclusion procedures and the nationalist base statements determine the precondition for joining the Ukrainian discourse. If a person doesn't recognize these fundamental principles about Ukrainian statehood which are stated in the book, his/her right to take part in the debate is possibly endangered. Especially the memory law, which restricts the criticism towards the UPA fighters, can be understood as a significant precondition, which legally guarantees that

only certain kind of debate is allowed in the society. Especially the discussion about the OUN's Nazi-cooperation is accepted only with strict confines. Now this previously marginalized narrative is seeking to establish its *society of discourse* with different governmental institutions like school system and museums. Most remarkably UINR is the main institutional body working on this project of *appropriating the discourse* on a state level.

7. Conclusions

Basically the book has a double purpose: on the other hand it seeks to demolish the Soviet war mythology, but also to build nationalist history for the independent Ukraine. The new national narrative seeks to prove the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people in the 2nd WW and demonstrate during the Soviet times. All the enunciations in the book are designed to support these goals. As the book is designed to show what kind of deceptive and tyrannic regime the Soviet Union was, it is also serving as a warning statement. If we go back to the point of seeing the whole ongoing conflict as a continuation to the 2nd WW and Russia being the successor of the Soviet Union, these examples are actually a reminder of which must not be allowed to happen again - just as the Ukrainian remembrance poppy is stating. The book's meaning is not just to correct and comment on the past, but more than anything - form the justification for present day politics.

The experience of the 2nd WW has a powerful emotional charge in the minds of people even through several generations. Stephen Kotkin (1995) has pointed out that an effective propaganda needs to offer a story that people are prepared to accept to certain extent. It must retain the capacity to capture people's imagination and it needs to offer something which they can learn to express with their own words (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 14). The Soviet war myth created a base for this "imagined community" in the later Soviet identity building. For decades, it was used for political purposes to manipulate collective memory and people's emotions. During Gorbachev's era the Perestroika (engl. "rebuilding", "reconstructing") reformation policy resulted the time of Glasnost (engl. "openness"). It meant allowing the discussion about previously silenced historical issues. This era most of the time has been understood as the breaking point for the acceleration of the USSR's collapse. It started a strong urge in late-Soviet space to find answers and fill the "blank spots" of history that communist rule had been censoring and controlling for decades. Glasnost gave for the first time the access to the information, that became an important part for the new nation building-project and national liberation agenda in Ukraine.

The so-called memory wars represent a situation of an ongoing struggle to define and narrate the past as a foundation for present and future identities (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 4). As John R. Gillis (1994) has showed in his book about commemorations, memory and remembrance are selective and serve certain ideologies and interests. Foucault was originally criticizing this process of classic history writing, which he saw as having fundamental methodological errors to begin with. He even referred this process as the *history of the present*, which suggests a form of presentism; a kind of historical writing that approaches the past using the concepts and concerns of the present, and is projecting contemporary values and meanings onto a past that may have been actually constituted quite differently (Garland 2014 p. 367). Benedict Anderson was describing similarly in *Imagined Communities*, that the history writing tends to have this need to *speak for the dead* and explain the now living what the actions and thoughts of those in question *really* meant back then.

This is not necessarily a problem as such, but rather it seems more or less inevitable in the light of nation building purposes. Another question is, from what kind of values or belief systems this history narrative is being built, or what is the discourse working on it. Foucault himself approached every object as a monument, meaning that he sought to get rid of these personal bias guiding thinking and looking at the discourse simply as a knowledge producing structure, and the origins of this structure. At the same time, however, he was very much aware about the fact that this is not fully possible, as episteme is always working on the background to determine the possibilities of thought for the individual. Taking this dilemma into an account, he attempted to create terms like "archive" and "monument", marking the required chronological distance to the object. This is important to note also in the analysis of this thesis, which represents only a small sample of a larger discursive structure, concentrating mainly on one book and examining those relatively recent political circumstances where it has become possible. The analysis has its constrains for the results for this reason. Even though a wider and more complex analysis of discursive formations or archeological examination doesn't come to a question in this thesis, it could possibly provide a good basis for further research in the future.

Maurice Halbwachs presented the more psychological perspective to this analysis of memory policies. His theory about the tensioned process of meaning making between the

collective and the individual about an obscured trauma was presented in the theory part of this thesis. He talked about the sacred history's appeal and the strength of generational linkage with the pain of disruption of long prevailed historical narrative. In the Ukrainian case, this could be described as a sort of attempt to go through a collective "trauma therapy" by revisiting the painful communist past and trying to make sense of it in a reconstructed way in the present. At the same time there is still also the pain of letting go the story about the Great Patriotic War. Preferring the other narrative over the other with these two hardly compatible interpretations of history can result a situation, where the other part of the population is always left out from the meaning making process.

Some scholars have even expressed their concern about the possible risks of this quite trauma driven approach to the past. Especially this was evident in the disputed memory laws of 2015. As Oxana Shevel (2016) has aptly summarized:

"The fundamental dilemma in Ukraine's decommunization process is how to undo the legal, institutional, and historical legacy of the Soviet era without repeating the Soviet approach of mandating one 'correct' interpretation of the past and punishing the public expression of dissenting viewpoints" (Shevel 2016 p. 258).

Russian propaganda machinery will intentionally use and twist this kind of material further to justify its "war against Ukrainian fascism". Part of the game is probably to provoke and force Ukrainian side to react, which actually possibly ends up keeping Ukraine stuck in this information war and stalemate with Russia. In this kind of vicious circle it will be very difficult for Ukraine to truly move forward.

In Ukrainian society, finding a solution to which even the clear majority people could relate is proven to be challenging. In nationalistic policies, usually the key idea is to create or preserve the imaginary of a collective identity, which forms the core of a nation and at the same time legitimizes the existence of a national state as a political entity. As Taras Kuzio has noted, especially in the post-Soviet states often only the elites share a state-wide conception of the *imagined community*, while citizens remain more or less parochial (Kuzio 2002 p. 249). Civic nationalism has formed an important counter movement to overcome this lack of political or societal cohesion (Kuzio 2002 p. 250). This became particularly

evident in Maidan movement, which - in contrast to Orange Revolution - wasn't originally under the control of the political opposition.

The big paradox seems to be, that even though Ukraine is seeking to justify its right to sovereignty through the rejection of the Soviet war myths, it still ends up being bound to them. The intensity of decommunization, proves on its part how much *the Soviet* still has an effect in the imagination of the people. Mark R. Beissinger pointed out already in 1993:

“The deconstruction of the former USSR remains an ongoing and potentially endless process, even after the USSR formally ceased to exist” (Beissinger 1993 p. 32).

The Soviet legacy is still profound in its successor states and determines the trajectory, speed and content of the nation-building projects (Kuzio 2002 p. 248). As a result of this, cultural identities are inherently contested, embedded and overlapped because state boundaries are often not coterminous with identities, but incomplete entities replete with overlapping sovereignties (Kuzio 2002 p. 248). Michael Rothberg (2009) has argued, that the virulence of the memory conflicts is actually often the result of *“the rhetorical and cultural intimacy of seemingly opposed traditions of remembrance”*; the seemingly radical attempts to reject the Soviet paradigm tend to only paradoxically serve to entrench it further in the society (Fedor, Lewis & Zhurzhenko 2017 p. 12). It could be necessary to ask, whether Ukraine as a nation and as a society is truly ready for all aspects of the decommunization process. The main challenge for Ukrainian memory politics seems to come down to the dilemma about how to effectively respond to Russian provocations and aggression while still preserving the inclusive and responsible nature of the policies around identity and meaning making.

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