

**GOOD PATRIOT - THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE
RUSSIAN STATE PROGRAMS OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN
THE YEARS 2001-2020**

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<p>Tiivistelmä</p> <p>2000-luvulla Venäjän poliittista kenttää on luonnehtinut valtiojohtoinen patrioottinen toimintaideologia, jonka keskeisenä ajatuksena on ollut tehdä Venäjästä jälleen suurvalta. Ideologian konkreettinen ilmenemismuoto ovat ohjelmat, joissa hahmoteltu koulutusjärjestelmä pyrkii kouluttamaan kansalaiset uudelleen patriootteina ja vieraannuttamaan heidät 1990-luvun demokratian periaatteista. Jotta ohjelmissa esitetyt politiikkatoimet nähtäisiin legitimeinä, kansalaiset täytyy saada kannattamaan niissä ehdotettua patrioottista kasvatusta. Tähän pyritään määrittelemällä kansalaisuus valtion ja yksilön välisenä suhteena uudelleen.</p> <p>Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan tämän uudelleenmäärittelyn ilmentymistä patrioottisten ohjelmien kansalaisuusdiskursseissa. Tutkimusaineisto koostuu neljästä Venäjän kansalaisten patrioottisen kasvatuksen valtiollisesta ohjelmasta sekä kahdesta teoretisoivasta konseptiasiakirjasta. Diskursseja analysoidaan kriittisen diskurssianalyysin keinoin hyödyntäen Michel Foucault'n metodologiaa, ja saatuja tuloksia arvioidaan suhteessa kansalaisuusteorioihin ja venäläisen patriotismin ja nationalismin historialliseen kontekstiin. Keskeisiä analyysityökaluja ovat subjektivoinnin ja objektivoinnin käsitteet.</p> <p>Analyysissä löytyneistä kansalaisuusdiskursseista ensimmäinen legitimoivat patrioottisen kasvattamisen kyseenalaistamalla demokraattisen järjestelmän ja markkinatalouden toimivuuden viittaamalla vallitsevaan yhteiskunnalliseen tilanteeseen. Sen johdosta kansalaiset määritellään patrioottisen kasvatuksen kohteeksi. Toinen diskurssi kuvaa yhtenäistä valtionpolitiikkaa, jossa eri hallinnon tasot ja yhteiskunnalliset instituutiot sitoutetaan ohjelmien edistämiseen yksilöiden saavuttamiseksi paikallistasolla. Kolmas diskurssi kuvaa patrioottisen kansalaisuuden moraalista sisältöä.</p> <p>Tutkimusaineiston diskursseissa rakentuva kansalaisuus muistuttaa republikaanista kansalaisuus käsitystä, jonka keskeisiä piirteitä on kansalaisten velvollisuudet valtiota kohtaan. Kansalaisiin suhtaudutaan alamaisina ja heitä puhutellaan 1800-luvulta juontuvan hierarkkisen käytännön mukaisesti. Kansallisvaltion relevanttuitta ylimpänä kansalaisten etuja vartioivana tahona korostetaan samalla kun globalisaatioon ja ylikansallisiin yhteisöihin suhtaudutaan vihamielisesti.</p>	
Asiasanat patriotism, patriotic education, citizenship, critical discourse analysis	
Säilytyspaikka Jyväskylän yliopisto	
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Tiivistelmä <p>On the 21st century, the Russian political field has been characterized by a state-led patriotic ideology of action the central aim of which is to restore the great power status of Russia. A concrete indication of the ideology are Programs that outline an education system that aims to re-educate citizens as patriots and alienate them from the democratic principles of the 1990s. In order to make the policy measures of the Programs to look legitimate, patriotic education must be supported by citizens. For this purpose, citizenship as a relation between an individual and a state is redefined.</p> <p>This thesis examines how this redefinition appears in the citizenship discourses of the Programs. The research material consists of four State Programs of patriotic education of Russian citizens and two more theoretical Concept documents. The discourses are analyzed by using a method called critical discourse analysis that is based on Michel Foucault’s methodology. The results are compared to the citizenship theories presented in this thesis and examined in relation to the historical context of Russian patriotism and nationalism. Central analytical tools are concepts of subjectivation and objectivation.</p> <p>The first of the three citizenship discourses found in the analysis legitimizes patriotic education by questioning democratic system and liberal market economy by referring to the prevailing societal situation. Due this questioning, citizens are defined as objects of patriotic education. The second discourse describes a single state policy in which different levels of administration and societal institutions are bound to the promotion of the Programs in order to achieve individuals at the local level. The third discourse describes the moral content of patriotic citizenship.</p> <p>The citizenship constructed in the discourses of the research material resembles republican model of citizenship in which citizens’ obligations towards the state are one of the central features. Citizens are treated as subjects of the state and they are address according to a hierarchical discursive practice that originates in the 19th century. The relevance of nation-state as the highest guardian of its citizens is emphasized, while the relation to globalism and supranatural communities appears antagonistic.</p>	
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1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, the Russian political field has been characterized by the government instituted patriotic ideology that is advanced with authoritarian and nationalistic measures (Kratocvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 4-5; Laruelle 2010, 1, 7-8). According to Laruelle (2010), patriotism is an ideology of action to remobilize Russian society detached from the state, and thereby to achieve a certain type of westernization and modernization. Patriotism has also become the key criterion in the evaluation of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of political proposals concerning Russian society. (1.) Today, according to the Freedom House, Russia is defined as a consolidated authoritarian regime with a democracy score of 1.39 in a scale of 1 to 7. In this scale, 7 represents the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest (Trickett, 2021). In the contemporary authoritarian system, power concentrates to the president. As said by the Freedom House (2021), the Kremlin has manipulated elections and suppressed genuine dissent by utilizing loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions. Moreover, rampant corruption blurs the lines between bureaucrats and organized crime groups. (Freedom in the World 2021 report: Russia).

The government-led patriotic policy originates from the difficult circumstances of the 1990s in which Russia was feared to become too polarized politically. To prevent this, a so-called patriotic consensus promoting strong state authority and stability was formed across the political field. In the 21st century, the politics that followed the patriotic consensus have largely been characterized by the officially re-appropriated nationalist idea and an increased patriotic rhetoric that outlines visions of rebuilt Great Russia. The political life has also narrowed around the presidential party and the Kremlin's efforts to monopolize the discourse of the nation and to make the population support its visions. (Laruelle 2010, 23-25.)

Since legitimacy is essential for any political system (Sperling 2014, 3), patriotic politics is one way of the Russian government to ensure its popularity despite its simultaneous

authoritative tendencies. The popularity of patriotic politics is based on the success of the government to improve the living standards of the Russian people, and material well-being and restored pride of the country are seen as a reward for giving up political participation and leaving the decision-making to the power-brokers. (Laruelle 2010, 25.)

A concrete form of patriotic politics are the Programs of patriotic education of citizens (Laruelle 2010, 25). They support the Kremlin's efforts to rebuild Russia as a great power by outlining a system of patriotic education that is aimed to re-educate citizens to see themselves as patriots and to alienate them from democratic principles. Therefore, I argue that the Programs ultimately are an attempt to redefine the perception Russians have of their citizenship by setting certain educational goals citizens should fulfil as a society. In order to achieve and maintain legitimacy of the system, the Programs must be able to convince citizens of the necessity of patriotic education and persuade them to accept the educational measures the Programs suggest. Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to examine how the Russian government redefines citizenship in the patriotic education Programs. For this purpose, I analyze how citizenship is constructed in the discourses of these documents. My specific research question is: What kind of citizenship discourses can be found in the Programs and Concepts of patriotic education from 2001 to 2020? The results of the analysis are compared with theoretical notions of democratic citizenship and examined in the historical context of Russian patriotism and nationalism.

My research material consists of four State Programs of patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation in addition to which I have included two Concepts of patriotic education that explain patriotic education from a more theoretical perspective. I analyse the documents by using a method called critical discourse analysis, and its background theory comes from the methodological tools and recommendations of Michel Foucault.

After the introduction chapter, I continue with a theoretical approach in the second chapter where I present the key concepts of the study that are citizenship, patriotism and nationalism, and give an overview of the main schools of nationalism studies and citizenship education. In the third chapter, I cover the history of patriotism and nationalism in Russia from the 19th century to this day, and describe patriotic education in the USSR, in the 1990s and on the 21st century. A special attention is given to the State Programs of patriotic education in the chapter. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the method of critical discourse analysis and the main tools of my analysis that both are based on Foucault's methodological instructions and recommendations.

In the fifth chapter, I present my analysis of the research material. I have divided the chapter into three subchapters according to the discourses I have identified from the research material. In the last chapter of this thesis, I present my results of the analysis and the conclusions I have made based on them.

2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

In this thesis, I examine the citizenship constructed in the research material in the light of citizenship theories connected to democratic system. Therefore, I begin this chapter with an introduction to two major traditions of citizenship, the republican and liberal model, after which I continue by presenting their relation to the citizenship in the modern state. Until recently, the concept of citizenship is understood to be inherently connected to a (nation-)state due to which it is seen as a relation between an individual and a state. This relation is usually described with individual rights and duties. In consequence of the French Revolution, citizenship became to be associated with nationalism and was seen especially as an identity in which citizenship appears as a membership of a certain community (usually a nation). Recent globalization development has, however, challenged the perception of citizenship as a relation between an individual and a state due to which I briefly introduce an idea of global citizenship. After the introduction of the concept of citizenship, I proceed to study nationalism and a concept close to it, that is patriotism. The concept of patriotism is introduced here due to its extensive use in the research material and its significance in the Russian political field in which it usually appears as an official label for nationalist issues (Laruelle 2010, 1). In the context of patriotism and nationalism I also make an overview on nationalism studies. Since education has a notable role in the research material, I briefly introduce citizenship education in the last subchapter.

2.1 Republican and Liberal Citizenship Traditions and Citizenship in the Modern Era

The modern understanding of the concept of citizenship has in the Western political thought been shaped by two major traditions, republicanism and liberalism (Leydet 2017). The older republican model has its foundations in the early conceptions of Plato

and Aristotle whose so-called civic-republican model emphasized duty, civic virtue and participation (Piattoeva 2010, 129). At their time, the citizenship of the ancient city-state of Greece referred to free men who were in charge of the political matters, while other social functions were taken care of by wives, tenant farmers and slaves. Citizenship status was, thus, exclusionary and understood primarily as a political agency which marked the divide between public and private spheres. (Constant 1988, as cited in Poole 2008, 132–133; Aristotle Politics, 1253a11, as cited in Leydet 2017).

Since the republican model is based on an idea of civic self-rule embodied in classical institutions and practices, such as the rotation of offices (Leydet, 2017), an ideal citizenship in the Ancient Greece was a near full time activity involving engagement in the common life of the state (Constant 1988, as cited in Poole 2008, 132–133). Republican citizenship was focused on the idea of politically active citizen, who was involved in public affairs, was prepared to play a role in administration, was aware of the threats which tyranny and corruption posed to the republic being ready to oppose them and was prepared to risk his life in military service in the defense of the republic against external and internal enemies. A community organized as republic was a political entity considered as *patria*, that is, the object of patriotic commitment (Poole 2008, 129–130). Because the ancient city-states were small, citizens were close to the exercise of power, and were even likely to be directly involved in it since their contribution mattered to how the power was exercised. However, as much empowering as the status of the citizen was, it was also mandatory in a sense that free-riding was not a plausible option. (Constant 1988, as cited in Poole 2008, 132–133). Alongside Plato and Aristotle of the Ancient Greece, the origins of republicanism can be traced to the later writings of Tacitus and Cicero in Republican Rome, to Machiavelli in the Italian city-states and workers' councils and to Rousseau in the 18th century (Poole 2008, 129; Leydet 2017). Republican tradition was especially influential in the political life of Western Europe and North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Poole 2008, 129).

Liberal model of citizenship began to develop from the 17th century onwards when citizenship became to be understood as a legal status instead of political agency. The main idea of the liberal model was to see political liberty as an important means to protect individual freedoms from interference of other individuals or the authorities (Leydet 2017). This idea originates from the Roman Empire and early-modern reflections on Roman law (Walzer 1989, 211, as cited in Leydet 2017) when the meaning of the concept of citizenship was profoundly transformed to ease the governing of the expanded Roman Empire (Leydet 2017; Faulks 2000, 19). At the time, citizenship rights were extended to concern conquered peoples (Leydet 2017) as a tool

of social control and pacification (Faulks 2000, 19). Due to this development, citizenship became to mean being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution (Leydet 2017). Furthermore, in contrast to republican tradition, liberal tradition advocates citizens' rights to pursue self-interests and requires only a weak form of identification with the state (Heater 1999, 5-7, as cited in Piattoeva 2010, 130). One of the most notable authors of liberal tradition is John Locke with his writings on natural rights. (Heater 1999, 5-7, as cited in Piattoeva 2010, 130).

Both the republican and liberal traditions have been pointed to be problematic by the later critique. The republican model is considered impractical in the scale and complexity of modern states in which republican civic engagement is hard to achieve. Since the field of politics is changed from an individual city to a modern territorial state, the work of politics and administration has been made subject to the social division of labor and is carried out by professionals. This has on its part affected the responsibilities of individuals associated with citizenship to become marginal to the main business of life and many sees them pointless. Since individual's time is mostly spend on work and matters of private life, the obligations of citizenship are often seen as an intrusion and a burden instead of being an ingredient in a privileged and fulfilling life. Therefore, in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century political thought the republican emphasis on the responsibilities of the citizen has largely been replaced by the liberal concern with the rights of the person. (Poole 2008, 133-134.)

However, concentrating on rights on the expense of responsibilities have given republicans a reason to criticize liberalists about the private citizen's passivity and insignificance since it presents a threat to the maintenance of the political community (Leydet 2017). The question of citizen's responsibilities has then been recognized by liberal theorists (Walzer 1989, Macedo 1990, Galston 1991, as cited in Poole 2008, 134) as well as the fact that the rights they celebrate presuppose certain social and political conditions some of which are institutional. Rights are admitted needing an appropriate framework of law and law enforcement through which they are defined and protected, disputes adjudicated, and so on. Also, to prevent decaying of this framework, political institutions and procedures are needed to make criticizing and changing the laws and their administration possible. Therefore, what a stable liberal order seems to require, is some form of constitutional democracy. Liberals also acknowledge that the mere existence of appropriate institutions is not on its own sufficient to sustain the regime of rights, but it must be confirmed in the behavior and attitudes of those subject to them as well, meaning that liberal and democratic institutions need a liberal and democratic culture. From an individual, this kind of a culture demands activity in a form of making use of the opportunities the institutions

provide to them, and commitment in accepting the legitimacy of democratic processes and of the results they deliver. (Poole 2008, 134–135.)

One of the major critiques both the traditional models of citizenship have received, is that they share too abstract approach to politics (Faulks 2000, 12). Both assume that citizenship only takes place on the public sphere of life (seen as opposite to the private one) and, therefore, is not concerned about the inequalities of power in society. Feminist theorists have since the 1970s sharply criticized the assumption of a rigid separation between the private and public spheres (Leydet 2017) which they see as mythical because of both the separation itself and the radically unequal conception of the household that it presupposed “were clearly the outcome of political decisions made in the public sphere” (Okin 1992, 60, as cited in Leydet 2017).

Along with the French Revolution, citizenship became to be associated with the nation. At the time, an idea called nationalism began to emerge in an explicit doctrinal form adopting the language of republicanism. Most apparent republicanism was in the writings of Rousseau due to which he can be considered as one of the last great republican thinkers or one of the first theorists of nationalism. (Poole 2008, 131.) With his writings on civic liberty and the centrality of civic duty to the preservation of the republic, Rousseau had crystallized the ideas of emphasizing loyalty to and participation in the city-state, the polis. He saw that a republic was the precondition for the true freedom of individuals but in order to exist it needed active support from its citizens. Citizens had both to get involved to prevent subjecting their liberty to the arbitrary will of others and be willing to fight for the republic from its external enemies to prevent its destruction. (Heater 1999, 53, 64, as cited in Piattoeva 2010, 129.)

Rousseau’s language entered public discourse in the early period of the French Revolution and its presence was more or less consolidated by the revolutionary and Napoleonic military successes of the following years. Through these events, the concept of a nation as a form of community which demands political recognition entered political discourse. Over time, the republican tradition became marginalized, whereas nationalism and its symbiotic opposite, liberalism, came to dominate discussions of citizenship, state legitimacy, and self-determination. Nationalism is, thus, a relatively modern phenomenon that emerged in Western Europe along with the modern territorial state and a capitalist market economy. (Poole 2008, 130–131.) The marginalization of republicanism is explained by the radically different conceptions of the state and the state-citizen bond the two traditions of citizenship had that led to different concepts of nationhood. The republican tradition saw the state being constituted by the people, while the liberal state was understood as separate

from the people, functioning as a 'night watch' over citizen's private property. (Piattoeva 2010, 130).

As a legacy of French Revolution, from the eighteenth century onwards, modern citizenship is understood to belong inseparably to the institution of the nation-state (Brubaker 1992, 23, as cited in Faulks 2000, 29; Faulks 2000, 30) and republican and liberal traditions have had a great influence on its content (Leydet 2017). According to this perception, citizenship is interpreted through the relationship between an individual and a nation-state, and it is largely accepted that loyalty to the state and a common identity are central ideas for citizens to adopt (Lawson and Scott 2002, as cited in Rapoport 2015, 11). Citizenship implies that individuals have a number of responsibilities to the state and to other members of the community but as compensation for fulfilling their responsibilities they enjoy state secured rights. Through rights, society members can actively resist increasing political apathy and indifference among voters, exercise individual rights against malpractices of government, and struggle to achieve desirable equality and status for minorities. A notable theory describing the historical progression of citizenship in a nation-state is Marshall's theory from the 1950s. In this theory citizenship is seen to be based on the development of civil, political and social rights. (Rapoport 2015, 11-12.) Its significance is in the claim that there is an ongoing tension between democratic principles of equality and the inequalities of wealth and income characteristic to the capitalist market system. Between these two, citizenship is an institution which levels out the negative impact of capitalism by redistributing resources on the basis of rights. (Turner 20012, 190)

Although rights and obligations of citizens in the nation-state have dominated the discussion about citizenship, a strong identification with the nation-state has also caused citizenship to become exclusionary by its nature. This means that exclusion from and inclusion into the polity is determined by cultural and physical boundaries between states. (Faulks 2000, 29-30.) If citizenship is examined as a process inside the states, it can be seen both as inclusive and exclusive: inclusive since it provides criteria for the allocation of scarce resources in society, exclusionary since it builds identities of the basis of a common or imagined solidarity (Turner 2001, 192). These identities that function as the basis of citizenship are not only juridical but often contain assumptions about ethnic, religion and sexuality (Isin and Wood 1999, as cited in Turner 2001, 192). Since the exclusive factors mentioned above undermine the liberal ideal of citizenship being essentially an egalitarian and universal status, in liberalist terms, modern citizenship appears ambiguous (Faulks 2000, 29).

Until recently, the interpretation of citizenship as an individual's relationship with a nation-state, and an achievement of loyalty to the state and building a common identity through citizenship education have been universally accepted features of citizenship. (Lawson and Scott 2002, as cited in Rapoport 2014, 11). However, the core principles and foundations of citizenship as inherently nation and nation-state related concepts has begun to be challenged by the rising globalization and unification. Globalization has become to be associated with further modernization and economic development that cannot be stopped. (Rapoport 2015, 12.) This has an influence on the areas of rights, responsibilities, duties, and privileges that expand and multiply causing that individuals' expectations of loyalty, commitment and belonging do not only focus on a living place or nation but concern a more expanded community, the world. (McIntosh 2005, as cited in Rapoport 2015, 12.) For this reason, some scholars and the corporate world have started to discuss global citizenship even though the concept is not universally accepted due to the difficulties to define it (Rapoport 2015, 12). Supra-national models of citizenship have gained an increased interest due to globalization, increasing cultural and social diversity, erosion of traditional nation-state related models of citizenship, creation of supra-national governing bodies, codification of international human rights, proliferation of transnational nongovernmental organizations and the rise of global ethics, global consciousness, and global law, among other things (Banks 2004, Dower 2003, Gaudelli 2009, Myers 2006, Stromquist 2009, as cited in Rapoport 2014, 12). These expanding phenomena have undermined the centuries old nation-centered hegemony by questioning the perception of the nation-state as the only protector of individuals and as the repository of stability, wealth, and also belonging. Instead of nation-state, global community through its agencies and through the formation of public opinion has become to be seen as a universal protector of rights and freedoms which has caused national citizenship to become an instrument of national elites to convince citizens that contractual relations with a given system and within a given geographic space is the only way to protect oneself from outsiders. (Rapoport 2015, 17.) In this effort, patriotism and nationalism disguised as nation building and citizenship education (Zajda 2009, Zajda 2015a, as cited in Rapoport 2015, 17) have been increasingly used as a counterpoint to globalization, especially by particularists and conservative anti-globalists.

2.2 Patriotism and Nationalism

Patriotism and nationalism are concepts that often fail to be distinguished from each other in discussions, and many authors use them interchangeably (Poole 2008, 129;

Primoratz 2020). This is because of both terms imply commitment to one's country, special concern with its well-being and one's fellow citizens, and readiness to make sacrifices on the country's behalf, especially in times of crisis (Poole 2008, 129). Therefore, in the efforts to define the difference between the terms, patriotism and nationalism tend to be contrasted to each other, for example, by defining one as an instinct or a mere sentiment of affection for one's country and another as a moral relation to the political community or a philosophical and political doctrine about nations (Acton 1972, 163, as cited in Primoratz 2020; Kedourie 1985, 73–74, as cited in Primoratz 2020). Another way used in political discourse and in everyday discussions, is to seek difference through a double standard of the form of 'us vs. them'. (Primoratz 2020.) Then, patriotism – being usually associated to 'us' – is likely used in a positive sense, whilst 'nationalism' is meant for those on the other side carrying a negative connotation. Similarly, patriots tend to be associated with measured and reasonable commitments, responsible behavior, respect to the commitments of fellow patriots in other countries, and a search for a rational resolution of occasional differences, while nationalists are considered extreme, absolute, uncritical in their commitments, and too ready to claim superiority for their country over others and to bellicose in their behavior. (Poole 2008, 129.)

Connotations related to patriotism and nationalism are explained by their place in the two traditions of citizenship discussed above. Patriotism is an important part of the republican tradition in which a community organized as republic was at same time a political entity considered as patria, that is, the object of patriotic commitment. Nationalism instead expresses commitment to the nation, and, as was mentioned above, often appears together with liberalism. The nation is seen as a certain type of community the members of which are united by (1) the state insofar as it represents the nation (nation-state), (2) the particular territory the people live in, and/or (3) by common tradition and heritage that makes the people living in the area consider it as their homeland, meaning that the territory is the ground of their identity. (Poole 2008, 129–131.) 'Nation' can also be referred to without political sense in which case it is understood only in ethnic or cultural sense, meaning that it is enough to characterize 'nation' in terms of common ancestry, history, and a set of cultural traits. The ambiguity of the definition of 'nation' often causes ambiguity in the use of the concept of nationalism as well, and therefore it is often proceeded at cross-purposes in debates causing a wide range of competing definitions and conceptions. (Primoratz 2008, 18.) As its most visible form, nationalism manifests itself in insurgent activities through which communities struggle for an appropriate form of political recognition but there are also more familiar, everyday forms of nationalism that often go unnoticed, such as the rituals and practices, the symbols and the rhetoric of public life, the school books,

the currency, and all the artefacts which implicate the idea of the nation (Poole 2008, 130).

Since the 20th century, nationalism has been studied in a discipline called nationalism studies. Traditionally, nationalism studies and debate are divided into schools of primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. However, boundaries between the schools are quite flexible and placing researchers into a certain school is debatable. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 14–15, 22.)

Primordialism usually refers to some kind of originality, elementariness and obviousness, and nationality is seen as a natural and indisputable part of human life. Primordialist school contains approaches such as naturalist, socio-biological and culturalist ones, but all share premises of individuals' love for their fatherland and nation and identifying a nation with a family. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 23–24.) Scholars usually considered as primordialists are Joseph R. Llobera, Adrian Hastings, Pierre van der Berghe (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 23–24), Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz (Eller & Coughlan 1993, Leoussi 2002, as cited in Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 23–24.)

Modernist school emerged as a general critique to primordialist and essentialist views and research settings, and to overall nationalist parlance. In modernism, nationalism is seen to have a rather short history, and the concepts referring to people and nation are seen to have crucially changed in the modern age. Modernization and general modernizing are used to explain nations and nationalism but there are different ideas whether nationalism emerges on the basis of economic, political or socio-cultural changes. Scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hechter, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernst Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch are usually associated with modernist school. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 25–30, 33–36.)

Modernists have been criticized for underrating historical continuity and overemphasizing artificiality of nations and national identities. Their approach is also seen incapable of explaining why nationalism in the first place became so fast so widely accepted worldview, and how nation became an unquestionable and primary source of loyalty and social identification for millions of people. Some of the critics of the modernist approach became to be called ethno-symbolists. They see nation to be something that cannot be invented out of thin air but is always based on, for example, earlier myth structures, historical memories, values and symbols. According to ethno-symbolists, nation-building and nationalism are long-standing phenomena which

have to be studied by examining development that is even centuries old. The most well-known ethno-symbolist is Anthony D. Smith. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 35–36.)

In recent decades, social-psychologists, gender researchers, geographers and scholars of literature and culture studies have started to pay attention to nationalism and its parallels alongside historians, political scientists and sociologists. Along with this development, people's own experiences, and formation and maintaining of social identities are started to give more value in the research work. Previous nationalism studies have also been criticized for their euro-centricity which has led to a search for new methods of studying anti- and postcolonial nationalism outside Europe. Moreover, recent global phenomena, such as supranational political-economic efforts, have made researchers to re-evaluate their views on nationalism and the place and significance of nations and nation-states in the global system. (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2004, 37–39.)

2.3 Citizenship Education

Alongside the republican tradition, citizenship education has also been debated already in antiquity where Aristotle presented that citizenship education should serve the requirements of the state. According to this view people were seen as mere objects of citizenship indoctrination. Later writings of the liberal theorists, such as of Locke, went to the other extreme by speaking for citizenry that was critical and ready to change the existing societal and political structures. Even though this view advanced active citizenship, it also had a tendency to promote centrifugal forces that endangered societal stability. (Janmaat & Piattoeva 2007, 530.)

Due to the conflicting interests of republican and liberal traditions, today modern citizenship often has to balance between loyalty to the state and compliance with its rules, and participation in and scrutiny of the governing bodies (Piattoeva 2010, 130). At the latest since the rise of the state education system, this contradiction is aimed to be solved through citizenship education (Piattoeva 2010, 130) which traditionally also implies instilling patriotic sentiments as a significant part of civic education rationale (Rapoport 2012, 81). In their article, Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007) state that as a membership of a political and national community, citizenship requires both knowledge and skills to act in the community, and a sense of identification with it. They understand citizenship education to cover all educational norms and practices that socialize future generations into the realm of the state and the nation. As a future-

oriented process, citizenship education always contains visions of the desirable society which also gives it a contested and deeply political nature. (529–530.) In the modern era, the political nature of citizenship is further complicated by its link to the ideology of nationalism and nationality which means incorporation of a sense of tradition, community and identity to citizenship along with rights and duties. (Heater 2002, 99, as cited in Janmaat and Piattoeva 2007, 530). This means that one of the objectives of citizenship education has become to create and strengthen the bond between the citizen and the nation which involves inventing traditions, rewriting and even falsifying history and assimilating ethnic groups. Questioning the inherited cultural norms and myths is not encouraged since criticism could put the fate of the nation at danger. (Janmaat & Piattoeva 2007, 530.)

3 PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA

In this chapter, I discuss patriotism and nationalism in the Russian context. The subchapter 3.1 describes state nationalism and patriotism in the Russian Empire and in the USSR. The purpose of this subchapter is to offer a historical context of state patriotism in Russia which can be later compared to the results of the analysis in the conclusion chapter. In the subchapter 3.2, I deal with patriotism and nationalism in the 1990s and during the Putin era. In this subchapter, I aim to describe the social developments that have led to the increase of patriotic sentiments in the Russian society and to the development of patriotic education Programs. The subchapter 3.3 portrays patriotic education from the Soviet Union to this day and focuses especially on the development of the contemporary patriotic education Programs.

3.1 State Nationalism and Patriotism in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union

The 19th century Russian nationalism can be divided into three different movements, each of which emphasized the significance of the nationalist culture and glorified the authenticity of the nation's rural life-world and its millenary fidelity to orthodoxy. These groups were Slavophiles (1830–40), Pan-Slavists (1850–1870), and later at the turn of the century, neo-Slavophiles. (Thaden 1964, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 13.) They were all influenced by the German philosophical tradition of romanticism (Thaden 1964, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 13) that was imported to Russia in the 1820s–1840s (Riasonovsky 1952, Zenkovsky n.d., Walicki 1989, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 4). However, the German label of the new ideas was removed in the process of acquiring which transformed the terms 'Enlightenment' and romanticism into 'West' and 'Russia' (Riasonovsky 1952, Zenkovsky n.d., Walicki 1989, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 4). The change in terminology reflects how Russian nationalism from the nineteenth

century on has been built on the feelings of the European domination and Western intellectual colonization, although the confrontation between Russia and the West already had its roots in the reforms of Peter the Great (Angenot 1997, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 4) in the 18th century (Rapoport 2009, 143).

Peter the Great's policy was to make the Russian empire a powerful European country which would be politically, economically, and ideologically closer to the West (Rapoport 2009, 143). The large-scale reforms, however, provoked a sense that Russians were no longer the makers of their own civilization (Laruelle 2010, 4) which created a fertile ground for an opposition that employed Russian national sentiments as its major ideological stance to emerge. Two distinct political ideologies – progressivism and traditionalism – appeared on the Russian political arena of which progressivists argued for European development of Russia, while traditionalists claimed Russia to be too unique and different from other nations and should, therefore, go its own way. (Rapoport 2009, 143.)

Parallel and in contrast to the nationalist sentiments existing in intellectual circles, state nationalism being grounded in the dynastic fidelity to the Romanovs emerged in the nineteenth century (Thaden 1964, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 13). This orientation was due to an unsuccessful attempt of an uprising in 1825 made by a group of intellectuals and military officers aiming to turn Russia into a democratic constitutional republic (Rapoport 2009, 143). The uprising made the then-tsar Nicholas I afraid that Russia had caught the “European disease” in the form of revolutions which turned him to embrace the ideas of traditionalists (Yanov 1999, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 143), even though the Imperial power had up to the present represented a pro-Western party (Rapoport 2009, 143).

As a result of the new traditionalist orientation, Official Nationality, or the policy of State Patriotism, was established combining the iron fist of the power and a newly adopted Russian Idea. The idea contained various perceptions about the messianic nature and providence of Russian people indicating that Russia was considered to have its own unique way. (Dostoyesky 1949, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 143; Rapoport 2009, 143.) Its rationale became to be the famous Russian triad of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” that has ever since been used by conservative and nationalist circles to represent the idea's authentic incarnation (Torosyan 2004, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 143). After Nicolas I, the tripartite formula also dominated the ideological doctrine of the reigns of Alexander III and the last tsar Nicolas II (Riasanovsky 1967, as cited in Rapoport 2012, 83).

After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, patriotism was, for a while, pronounced an outdated bourgeois value based on an interpretation of Marx and Engel's (1910, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 144) dictum that proletariat does not have a fatherland. However, official position regarding patriotic sentiments and the concept of patriotism in general started to change gradually after the efforts to ignite the world revolution were realized to be futile, and Stalin had announced in 1925 that the Soviet Union would continue building socialism alone. At first, the previous policy of proletarian internationalism managed to coexist peacefully with newly emerged Soviet patriotism – as long as both were based on a class approach – but little by little it became to be replaced. (Rapoport 2009, 144.)

In mid-1930s, Stalin revived nationalism by allowing more favorable interpretations about tsarist empire than before and allowing to celebrate Russian historical events and heroes. This policy fortified an already existing vision of Russia as the “big brother” of other nationalities. (Rapoport 1990, Kostyrchenko 1995, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 16.) In accordance with Soviet patriotism, that was a proxy of Russian nationalism (Laqueur 1993, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 144), many Russian historical political figures and heroes, such as princes and tsars, previously condemned as exploiters were rehabilitated; Russian History became a mandatory subject in all schools of a multi-ethnic country; and all languages became to be written with Cyrillic alphabet (Rapoport 2009, 144; Rapoport 2012, 83). Towards the end of 1930s, the changes in the official policy regarding patriotism became more obtrusive, and patriotic discourses were filled with more pronounced Russian nationalist overtones (Rapoport 2012, 83). Glorification of patriotism grew tenfold when the Soviet Union entered to the World War II (Rapoport 1990, Kostyrchenko 1995, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 16), that was known as the Great Patriotic War in the USSR (Rapoport 2009, 144–145).

While Soviet patriotism was, at first, used for the purposes of ideological, political, and social changes, it later facilitated maintaining status quo by conducting various well-planned reusable nationalistic campaigns under the motto of patriotism (Rapoport 2009, 144–145). To consolidate its political legitimacy, the regime needed a language common with the population, to which nationalism provided excellent material since it had always resonated with people much better than the discourse on classes. Perhaps then it is no coincidence that Stalin used in his rhetoric terms the form and content of socialism and nationalism, which were open to dual interpretation, that led to the forging of new collective representations of national identity whose allegiance was to the socialist state. (Laruelle 2010, 15.)

Later development in the USSR created a basis for the doctrines of the contemporary nationalism since nationalists outside of the official sphere did not wait for the perestroika (reconstruction) or glasnost' (transparency) of the 1980s to make a comeback and seek to attain institutional recognition. Instead, nationalists were present throughout the Soviet era being intimately if somewhat ambiguously connected to the state and Party apparatuses. (Mitrokhin 2008, 23–42, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 15.) It was, however, not until the end of terror following Stalin's death that more liberal ways of a certain public expression (Brudny 2000, 46, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 16), such as nationalism, were able to emerge, and not until the events around the time of Brezhnev's assumption of power that an actual dissident movement was able to be born (Zawilski 1996, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 16–17). One of the reasons leading to the proximity with the political power was the period of political détente with the United States and of rising nationalist sentiment in the federated republics in the 1970s (Mitrokhin 2003, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 17). During this time, the Party apparatus and the state were constantly indecisive (Mitrokhin 2003, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 17) whether nationalists were more dangerous than liberals and whether the nationalist organizations should, therefore, be banned from publishing or should they actually be seen as a good weapon against prevailing liberal tendencies (Brudny 2000, 103, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 17).

By the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, the Russian nationalist movement had largely become socially and ideologically independent since the political authorities no longer seemed able to exert control over them (Laruelle 2010, 17). During the years of perestroika, Russian nationalists were divided into various groups but by supporting Gorbachev's modernizing approach they nevertheless had major influence on questions relating to perestroika (O'Connor 2006, as cited in Laruelle 2010, 18). Even though there were numerous attempts to unify different nationalist movements, official recognition of multi-partyism in 1990 at the latest divided nationalist camp into numerous small political parties. (Laruelle 2010, 20–21.)

The difficult and often unacknowledged proximity to the political power had influence on Soviet nationalism that hoped to win the Party over to its cause, and considerable theoretical influences and personal relations between "officials" and "dissidents" even assisted these two to merge into one another after perestroika. This explains the difficulties of contemporary nationalism identify with an imperial state, its desire to be recognized as a national ideology without a will to give up its autonomy, and the multiple sites of passage between individuals and institutions. These traits make it difficult to define an oppositionalist or dissident nationalism by contrast to an official nationalism. (Laruelle 2010, 21–22.)

3.2 Patriotism and Nationalism in the 1990s and during the Putin Era

In the 1990s, Russia ended up in a situation in which citizens' life expectancy had dropped, standard of living crumbled and poverty levels skyrocketed due to the political and economic reforms. At the same time, corruption and crime had increased dramatically, while an oligarchy kept distributing the country's wealth among themselves. Moreover, state institutions had collapsed, and life had become unpredictable as a result of wild inflation. To top it all, while large numbers of young men had lost their lives or were disabled fighting an unpopular war in the Russian republic of Chechnya, Russia's international power and reputation had also gone. (Laruelle 2010, 23–24.)

The difficult situation and particularly the Kremlin's inability to deal with the Chechen question made competing power groups in Russia fear more than anything else that the country was becoming too polarized politically. This pushed the Russia's political elites to form a political consensus that was seen as a best solution to a situation in which the Chechen war had further exacerbated the feeling among citizens that the Russian state was weak, unable to control its own army and finance a competent one. The new consensus – that as a political idea might be called “patriotic centrism” – was produced as an effort to unite the country and reached approval across the political spectrum, including liberals. Patriotic centrism championed strong state authority and stability, while it marginalized the more extreme groups, such as liberal or communist ones that had been on their part inflicting the country's polarization. Its aim was to eliminate ideological oppositions and encourage political reconciliation of different factions through patriotic rhetoric. The new direction of the Russian domestic policy was realized in the 1999 legislative elections in which a widespread consensus became to be built around the idea that Russia's development should take a particular national path that focused not only on reform but on order and stability. (Laruelle 2010, 23–24.)

What might explain for choosing patriotism as the new political idea at the time, is that it contained a positive connotation compared to nationalism. Even though the word “patriotism” possesses a positive aura both in Russian and in English presented as a respectable and moral way to defend one's country, unlike the English term which designates both national construction and an ideology of national supremacy, Russian term is usually understood in contrast to “nationalism”. This is due to the Soviet tradition that shaped nationalism to designate aggressive attitudes in which the interests of one ethnic group were placed above those of others. However, folkloric glorifications of one's “nationality” were, instead, seen as positive and harmless which

indicated that “nationalism” was seen only as the exaggerated form of an otherwise natural phenomenon of being proud of one’s nation and self-evident by virtue of each individual’s belonging to a national collective. The introduction of Western European terminology and concepts in the 1990s added to the definitional complexity, as new definitions have gradually become to replace the old ones. Today “nationalism” is portrayed as a political necessity for Russia in its desire to become a modern nation like any other by several Russian nationalist movements. (Laruelle 2010, 4–5.)

Patriotism was a convenient choice also because it allowed to manipulate the already existing sense of patriotism of citizens for the advantage of the political elites or, at least, to manipulate what citizens see the societal significance of patriotism to be like. Based on his interviews concerning patriotic policies of the government, Goode (2016) notes that Russians distinguish “patriotism” from “being a patriot” by perceiving the practices related to “patriotism” as individual, local, and normative, while the practices of “being a patriot” are considered as expressly political, denoting both loyalty and collective membership. Although, the official patriotic narratives have not succeeded in making citizens patriotic in a sense that they would be said to have generated regime legitimacy, they have caused the narrowing of public space for the airing of dissent which have created a perception among individuals that society is comprised of loyal patriots. (444–445.)

Since taking the presidential office in 2000, Vladimir Putin benefited from the idea of “patriotic centrism” which he was able to manipulate to his advantage (Laruelle 2010, 23). The political consensus formed in the end of the 1990s facilitated his government’s efforts in the following decades to narrow political life around the presidential party and monopolize the discourse on the nation in order to maintain stability in the country (Laruelle 2010, 24). Putin also benefited politically from the fact that his predecessor Yeltsin’s government policies were generally considered complete failures, and the “return to order” has actually been a phrase championed by Putin since his election for the first term. Rising patriotic sentiment has also increasingly obviously bolstered the will of the authorities to start taking control. (Laruelle 2010, 23.)

Both increasing patriotism as well as authoritarianism on the twenty-first century have largely been personified in Putin who is now on his fourth term in office. He has in large part been the key person affecting the developments of Russia during the past two decades, and even though Dmitri Medvedev acted as president between the years 2008–2012, Putin is still considered to have been the actual ruler of Russia. During his presidency, Medvedev was seen more as a something of a placeholder for Putin who

wanted to honor the Russian Constitution that did not allow to serve three presidential terms or – what turned out to be the definite interpretation of this article in the Constitution – serve three presidential terms in a row. (Sperling 2014, 30.)

National surveys¹ show that Putin was considerably popular in the 2000s which can partly be explained by the Kremlin's stranglehold over the media and a control of the whole political field (Laruelle 2010, 6–7). Opposition parties had virtually no access to the media, actions of political opponents were hindered or derailed, and the Duma and the government bureaucracy carried very little power (Laruelle 2010, 7). Much of Putin's popularity could have also be presumed to lie in his macho strongman character that was highly likely a result of an intentional image building made by Kremlin public relations (PR) sector (Sperling 2014, 41–42). The restrictive and undemocratic conditions of Russian political life or macho media image do not solely explain Putin's popularity, but the endorsement is also due to the series of positive changes in the 2000s he has been able to personalize. Especially economic and political stabilization for which a great majority of the population had been hoping for are an example of such changes, even though the improvement of the economic situation was largely due to increases in oil and gas prices that virtually happened with no link on Putin's actions. He nevertheless became to embody Russia's 'recovery'. (Laruelle 2010, 7.) Putin's popularity has continued also in the 2010s since public opinion survey results of the Levada Center, VTsIOM, and FOM have consistently shown that citizens appreciate both major socioeconomic strides realized for the majority of the population and the bolstered regional and international standing of Russia. Due to these advances, Putin has kept enjoying strong public support that has somewhat trickled down to the other political actors in his governing team as well. (Willerton 2017, 212.)

In their article, Kratochvíl and Shakhanova (2020) examine the presidential narratives on patriotism and state that the narratives have undergone several notable changes in the last two decades. Patriotism as a term was relatively rare in presidential statements before 2005 being typically connected to celebrations of World War II anniversaries and the role of Russia as the rescuer of Europe and the world but after Putin's re-election for a second term in 2004 it became a key reference point in his presidential speeches. Instead of being understood primarily as a celebration of past events, patriotism became to be seen as a guiding principle enabling Russian citizens to connect past events with the country's present predicaments and challenges, and

¹ In national surveys made since 2000, Putin has gained high supporting figures: in January 2000, the approval rating was 84 percent, in March 2004 it was 81 percent, in December 2007 87 percent, and in September 2008 it reached its highest, 88 percent. After the post-election protests in 2010–2011, though, Putin's approval ratings declined in the sixties. (Levada Center 2012, in Sperling 2014, 46.)

especially its enemies, creating hope for a better future. Putin's patriotism also acquired a new feature according to which an ideological vacuum had emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union being now in danger to be filled by either extremists and nationalists or with Western ideas. Therefore, Russia must become patriotic again and unified around a strong state and its traditional values which requires that a sense of common Russian history, culture, and traditions have to be fostered and defended from Russia's enemies. (5-6.)

The beginning of Medvedev's presidency meant a certain pause in the Putinist continuum. In his speeches, Medvedev constantly linked patriotism with the notions of liberalization and modernization, considering the ideas of a progressive and democratic society, modernization, and technological and intellectual advancement as reflections of "genuine patriotism". Simultaneously, the West was seen as a role-model to follow. Medvedev's rhetoric, however, was changed by 2010 when he had taken a sharp turn toward a renewed conservatism after which his rhetoric began to resemble that of Putin's. Thus, instead of reflecting democratic ethos, "genuine patriotism" became to be about the celebration of Russia's military past, and following Putin, Medvedev also started to extoll the periods of Russia's glory (during and after the war) and criticize the periods of its weakness (most frequently, the 1990s). These events were associated with Russia's present struggle with the West which eventually led the West again to become the centrally important hostile force endangering Russia. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 6-7.)

Despite admitting its considerable biases, Medvedev also started to criticize the loss of the Soviet heritage of military-patriotic education because he saw favorably the Soviet practice of using historical memory for nation-building and, according to him, the state should instill "the right perception of the historical events" into the people. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 6-7.) He also established a commission "to prevent attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests" to protect the memory of the Second World War (Miller 2010, 21, as cited in Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7).

Putin's return to the presidential office in 2012 meant an intensified attention of the government to the development of patriotic and military education (Tsygankov 2014, 7, as cited in Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7) and indoctrination of patriotism and other virtues in the Russian youth and general public (Sharafutdinova 2014, 618, as cited in Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7). Reconnecting the past greatness with the present challenges and stressing the essentiality of historical memory as a resource for Russia's strength were carried on but Putin had also become worried about negative

cultural influences from the West which he claimed were aiming to destroy traditional spiritual and moral values and threatened the people's identity (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7).

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the following war in eastern Ukraine made Putin to begin to interpret Russia's actions abroad as a part of its defensive strategy against Western would-be hegemony. In this framework, the annexation of Crimea was seen as a "restoration of historical justice" and in public discussion patriotism became to mean an active support for it. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7.) Expanding patriotism to involve Russia's actions abroad turned out to be a successful strategy for their legitimization since after the annexation of Crimea the approval rating of the president surged to an unprecedented 86 percent (Volkov 2018, as cited in Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7). This caused Russia to become more active in its foreign policy when Putin began to repeat the same rhetorical strategy in which patriotism was reinterpreted even more broadly and beyond the confines of the post-Soviet space. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 7.)

In their analysis of the speeches by the Putin and Medvedev, Kratochvíl & Shakhanova (2020) show how patriotism has gradually changed from an obscure topic to nation-wide prominence becoming a fashionable term from 2009–2010 onwards. The use of patriotism has been particularly high after 2012 especially when there has been a need to emphasize the difference between Russia and the West. The analysis also shows the discourse of the education ministers to correlate with that of the presidents but in a delayed way suggesting a dependence on the presidential input. (7.)

Putin and Medvedev have both argued that instilling of patriotic education should start from childhood and at school, stressing the importance of military patriotism. While the patriotic discourse revolves around Russia's relationship with the West which is seen as the key "Other", the emphasis is increasingly put on external threats and citizen's readiness for war. In this connection, patriotism means a refusal to comply with the wishes of the West or to willingly absorb its cultural influences. Therefore, according to Kratochvíl & Shakhanova (2020), the patriotic campaigns highlight how deeply dependent the patriotic discourse is on Russia's ambivalent relationship with the West. (7–8.)

3.3 Patriotic Education in the USSR, in the 1990s and Today

In the Soviet education system, patriotic education was considered as one of the most important aspects. Even though the Soviet authorities used nationalistic discourses to manipulate nationalistic aspirations, the primary focus of the Soviet patriotism and patriotic education was on military rationale and only secondly on nation building and social identity development. This can be explained by Soviet patriotic sentiments being more ideologically determined rather than nationally or ethnically. In practice, this meant that Soviet citizens were supposed to experience patriotic sentiments no so much toward a nation state but toward an ideological construct called the Soviet Union. The mental construct was further complicated by the class approach and the never-ending class struggle against domestic and foreign enemies which gradually transformed Soviet patriotism into a commitment to a certain type of ideology and obligation to protect this ideology. The Soviet patriotic education paradigm, then, focused on instilling political phraseology and on militarizing citizens' consciousness. (Rapoport 2012, 82–84.)

Soviet educational activities had three objectives in translating the 'love of one's Socialist Motherland' into practical educational discourses. Patriotic education was expected to (1) teach a pronounced and unequivocal commitment to the actions of the Communist party and the Soviet government. It was achieved mostly through campaigns focused on justifying everything government had done and downplaying the role of other countries or accusing other non-satellite countries of all possible evils. Another objective was (2) to create and develop civic identity of a Soviet citizen sometimes at the expense of ethnic identity. A third objective was (3) to mobilize and prepare warriors who would unquestionably follow military orders. This was aimed through uncritical analysis of military operations conducted by the USSR in the courses of History or Literature, compulsory military training in high school, and numerous extra-curricular activities that included national military games, meetings with veterans and acting military, festivals of military songs, and so on. (Rapoport 2012, 84.)

Soviet military patriotic education has its roots in the 1930s when Stalin's government mounted an enormous propaganda campaign focused on the need to prepare for a future war with capitalist states. The Soviet population underwent a thoroughgoing series of military-patriotic initiatives aimed at "Soviet youth" in particular which repeatedly presented the future conflict as youth's great historical test that was equivalent to the one their parents had already passed in the preceding battles of the Bolshevik Revolution and the civil war of 1918–1921. Thus, during the 1930's, bringing

up young Communists increasingly became to mean raising “fighters”. (Krylova 2004, 631, as cited in Sperling 2010, 228.)

After the World War II, intensive military-patriotic education in a very militarized form was revived again in the 1970’s for the younger generation which had had no direct experience of the war itself. In the context of relative stability in the mid-1970’s, patriotic education that specifically focused on World War II was seen as a means to consolidate society and to ensure that future generations would be devoted – or at least loyal – citizens to the state. Basic military training (known as *nachal’naia voennaia podgotovka*, NVP) introduced in schools in 1967 became ubiquitous meaning for example that students assembled and disassembled Kalashnikovs and practiced hitting in target with Makarov pistols “at the school shooting range” (Abdullaeva 2003, as cited in Sperling 2010, 228–229).

The patriotic consensus achieved in the end of the 1990s, harsh circumstances of collapsing economy, lost superpower status and Russia’s army having devastatingly bad reputation were all factors that led the Putin’s government to create the first patriotic education Program (FOM 2002, as cited in Sperling 2010, 218). Its aim was to reinvigorate citizens’ sense of patriotism and reverse the development of a widespread draft resistance (Sperling 2010, 218) that was due to the army’s bad financial shape (WPS 1998, as cited in Sperling 2010, 218), an unsettled conflict in Chechnya (RFE/RL Newline 2001, as cited in Sperling 2010, 220), the sinking of the submarine Kursk in 2000 and most notably a gross number of non-combat deaths produced by severe dysfunction within the ranks, and widespread brutal hazing called *dedovshchina*. Draft resistance was threatening the military reforms planned for 2008 that were meant to be a step toward an all- or mostly volunteer army but to be realized, a larger pool of willing draftees was needed. (Sperling 2010, 218, 220–221.)

From a point of view of a political power struggle, focus on patriotism made it possible for the Putin’s government to reclaim the concept from Communists and right-wing nationalists who had been appropriating patriotism during the Yeltsin era (Zolotukhina 2006, as cited in Sperling 2010, 220). Ideologically, this meant a shift away from the pro-Western orientation of the Yeltsin years toward a firm stance of Russian “independence” that later became known as “sovereign democracy” (Sperling 2010, 220).

Even though Putin has become to embody the rising patriotism in Russia in the 21st century, the patriotic education Programs were, however, a joint effort by varying compositions of Ministries and intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security

Service (FSB) right from the start (Medetsky 2005, as cited in Sperling 2010, 231). As part of the first patriotic education Program was also created a new government institution, the Russian Centre for the Civic and Patriotic Education of Children and Youth (Rospatriotsentr). Although Rospatriotsentr works under the Russia's Ministry of Education and Science, all its collaborators mentioned in the Program are some way tied to the military. (Rospatriotsentr, as cited in Sperling 2010, 232.)

The patriotic campaign launched in the beginning of the new millennium relied firmly on militarized patriotism and was tightly linked to the Russian armed forces (Sperling 2010, 218). Even though militarized patriotism had not been absent under Yeltsin administration, it became more visible under Putin's regime (WPS 1998, as cited in Sperling 2010, 220). Emphasis on militarism was chosen because it was seen as a necessary recruitment device and motivator for army service for draft-age men, and because patriotic feelings are somewhat dependent on the citizens' view of the army in general. The devising of the campaign also drew heavily on the Soviet experience of military-patriotic education, while the defeat of the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War was made as its centerpiece that worked as one of the recruitment tools. (Sperling 2010, 218–219, 221.) The focus was due to the notion that the war was the best example of an effort to mobilize the Soviet Union's multinational population to defend the state toward which some of its citizens had mixed feelings at best. The war, thus, was used as a model for reinventing post-Soviet-Russia's national idea as a multinational one. (Sperling 2003, 235–253, as cited in Sperling 2010, 221.)

The focus on the war also corresponded with the public sentiment suggested by several national surveys made in beginning of the twenty-first century which indicated that a significant plurality of the population shared a strong feeling of militarized patriotism. The survey results also implied that the past military victories were a far more popular source of pride than the contemporary Russian armed forces. This observation led the patriotic education planners to make an explicit link between the Soviet forces' victory in 1945 and the contemporary army in order strengthen public support of the latter. (Sperling 2010, 239–340.) The Soviet forces' victory also stood out as a potential source of patriotic pride when compared to the otherwise tarnished and repressive Soviet history (Sperling 2003, 235–253, as cited in Sperling 2010, 221). Therefore, an imagined continuity between Soviet and post-Soviet armed forces became one the goals of the Programs explaining why the globally recognized victory against fascism was especially emphasized instead of highlighting the Russian military more generally (Sperling 2010, 239–340).

The first five-year patriotic education Program was focused on all social and age groups and it aimed at advancing patriotism on the fields of law-making, institution development, propaganda in the media, civil society and science. Its appendix included a number of events to be carried out under the patriotic education Program that ranged from light-hearted contest to produce patriotically themed material to the explicitly military-patriotic activities that dominated the Program. (Sperling 2010, 218, 226, 233.)

Due to the patriotic campaign, a revival of militarized patriotism similar to Soviet times has become visible in various ways in Russian schools, popular culture, the mass media and state-sponsored public events during the years and it has been openly encouraged by the Russian government through the Programs (Sperling 2010, 240, 243). While schools in the 1990's were less militarized environment than in the Soviet times, in the twenty-first century there has been some resurgence of military-patriotic education (Sperling 2010, 240) and Soviet time military games (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 6).

In addition to the military-patriotic education, the first patriotic education Program demanded that textbooks should foster patriotic values among youth "to prepare [them] for military service and dignified service to the Fatherland" (Patriotic Education Program 2001–2005, as cited in Sperling 2010, 240). The demand was answered in 2004–2005, when Russian history textbooks were started to be reworked to present a more unified narrative from Soviet times to what Russia stands for today and later the methodological approaches of teaching other schools subjects were reviewed. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 6.) As a result of the reworking, the new history textbooks presented Stalin in a positive light, while they downplayed the political repressions of his regime in 1937–1938 as unavoidable downside of the rapid industrialization. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 6.) The positive reframing of Stalin is explained by Putin's aim to legitimize his personal authority and his approach to state building and state-led modernization in which history education is an important tool (Sherlock 2007b, 217, as cited in Nelson 2015, 37). According to Nelson (2015), the Stalinist narrative implicitly legitimizes Putin's authoritarianism since it glorifies the strong, centralized state that existed under Stalin (38.)

Tsyrlina-Spady and Lovorn (2015) explain the patriotic boom within the curriculum with the changes in the education legislation from the 1990s to this day (42). The first post-perestroika law considering education was issued in 1992 introducing several democratic principles, such as protection and promotion of core human values and personal freedoms (Ob Obrazovanii 1992, as cited in Tsyrlina-Spady & Lovorn 2015,

42). After a great number of revisions, this law was replaced with a new one that still involved many of the original democratic principles, but it also contained language that clearly promoted Russian patriotism and national identity (Article 3, item 3, as cited in Tsyrlina-Spady & Lovorn 2015, 42). According to Tsyrlina-Spady & Lovorn, the new law turned away from an emphasis on global democratic citizenship to promote patriotism and national identity through a lens of cultural and national superiority (National Educational Standard 2012, as cited in Tsyrlina-Spady & Lovorn 2015, 42).

In 2012, a mandatory discipline called “The Basics of the Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics” was introduced in the Russian elementary schools offering the framework for teaching patriotism (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 4). The course consists of six optional modules from which parents choose the most suitable for their children to attend. Four of the modules concentrate on teaching the fundamentals of the Russian “traditional” religions, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Judaism. The last two are the modules of “World religions” and “Secular Ethics” that are non-confessional. (Blinkova & Vermeer 2018, 195.) The religion-based modules contain teachings that reinforce the relationship between the traditional Russian religions and patriotism by giving lessons, such as “Protection of the Fatherland,” (module of Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture), that offers answers to questions like “What Is a Just War?,” “When Should a Christian Take Up Arms?,” or “Why Should a Christian Not Feel Fear When Going to War?”. However, patriotism does not cover only the religious modules since the “Secular Ethics” also teaches that “[a] patriot is a person who loves the Motherland, the people; who is ready for sacrifice, labor, and heroic acts.” (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 4–5.)

In popular culture, a revival of military-patriotism has ranged from animated films, patriotically themed books and toys for children, to full-length movies, television serials and documentaries some of which emphasize Russia’s history of “hard and brilliantly won” battles. In the field of mass media, a notable financial effort was put to promote militarized patriotism when Russia’s Media Ministry announced to be spending \$16 million on over 200 military-patriotic media projects in the early 2002, aiming to rouse media interest in military-patriotic education. In April 2005, a well-funded military-patriotic television station called Zvezda (Star), that was closely tied to the Defense Ministry, was launched, and later in 2007, an incentive for the large-scale media to take up more patriotic programming was created as part of the efforts of the patriotic education Programs. The government has also sought to advance militarized patriotism through public celebrations by introducing a variety of military-patriotic holidays that celebrate not only World War II but other military

victories of the Russian history as well. One such holiday is the Day of National Unity (on the 4th of November) that was officially introduced by Putin's government in 2005. It celebrates Moscow's liberation from Polish forces in 1612 that is an embodiment of the values expressed in the patriotic education Programs since it represents both a military victory and an instance of national cohesion. (Sperling 2010, 241–244.)

The first patriotic education Program was considered to be at least a limited success since there was some pressure to introduce a second stage of the Program. The pressure came primarily from top-level officials in the defense and security agencies but also from the defense ministry's top brass and a number of Russian military-connected NGOs. The second Program continued to draw a link between fostering a militarized patriotism and Russian youth's readiness to enter army service, and Putin himself made explicit the connection between patriotic education and military service in his annual address to Russia's Federal Assembly in May 2006. Even though the main goal of the first Program – establishing a system of patriotic education – was considered to be achieved, the purpose of the second Program was to continue and expand it in order to fill in the gaps in the system. (Sperling 2010, 234–235.)

The third Program reflects the early phase of the Medvedev presidency when Medvedev spoke for a gradual liberalization. In the document, Russia is seen to evolve into a “free and democratic state” in the future, while less importance is put on military strength, and also patriotism is interpreted differently being described as a “civilian and patriotic duty”. Emphasis on militarism makes a comeback in the fourth Program and its Concept that focus on protecting Russia both militarily and culturally pointing explicitly to external threats that threaten Russia's identity. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 5.)

What comes to their effectiveness, surveys indicate that the patriotic education Programs have had more or less influence in society (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 4). The first patriotic education Program made some change to the level of perceived patriotism among Russian citizens but the shift in attitudes of its foremost target audience, the 18 to 35-year-olds, was not visible. Therefore, the second Program undertook the task to upgrade the military-patriotic education of the population and especially of young people which was supported by the majority of Russians (Sperling 2010, 226, 253–254). A high level of support showed that the demand for patriotism was not only a desire of the state, but it echoed on the grass-root level of society as well (Blum 2006, 4, as cited in Sperling 2010, 254). The highest rate of support for patriotism was measured in 2018 when a public opinion poll conducted by the state-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) showed that almost 92

percent of the respondents considered themselves as patriots. Even though the high figure was nothing unusual as such, it demonstrated a significant growth compared to, for example, the figure in 2016 that was 80 percent. (Kratochvíl & Shakhanova 2020, 4.)

Though the intensification of patriotic education in society has been favored by the majority of Russians, this direction of domestic policy has also been countered by certain organizations, such as the Committee of Soldier's Mothers and the Antimilitarist Radical Association (ARA). Despite their minor scale activity, the state has tried to disable anti-militarist groups and other organizations critical of the regime, the military project and related human rights abuses, revealing a certain level of state anxiety about maintaining a hegemonic discourse and practice regarding militarism, patriotism, and the Kremlin's power. NGOs and journalists have been persecuted by suing them on dubious grounds, threatening with closure, refusing registration of new organizations, and restricting the freedom of independent journalism. (Sperling 2010, 245–249.) In its most severe form, the persecution has led to “contract-style” killings of journalists the murders of which none was solved. (Committee to Protect Journalists 2005, as cited in Sperling 2010, 245–249.)

Kremlin's sponsorship of “patriotic” youth organizations that embrace the regime's militarized-patriotic agenda, has been another way of the Putin administration to maintain idealized image about the Russian armed forces hegemonic. In 2005 founded pro-patriotic, pro-Putin youth organization NASHI (Ours) has been the most visible organization of this kind. NASHI's activity intends to foster patriotic sentiments among Russia's youth and to reinforce the political status quo in Russia and the power of Putin's party, United Russia. Although NASHI labels itself as the “Democratic Anti-Fascist Youth Movement, ‘NASHI’”, much of the group's activity supports the promotion of militarized patriotism². (Bush 2005, as cited in Sperling 2010, 249–250.)

In her article, Laruelle (2015) states that in today's Russian society patriotic clubs and associations run many societal functions, such as offer leisure time activities or function as a last remaining alternative to prison or delinquency (15). They function

² The organization labelling itself as anti-fascist and still supporting militarized patriotism may not necessarily seem so contradictory if the word “fascist” is understood in a way like it often is in the Russian context. During the Second World War, Soviet propaganda identified the enemy as “fascist” creating an image that the war was a part of a major historical shift in which the Soviet victory would bring the capitalist system to its end. This image was based on a perception of Soviet ideology that saw fascism to arise from capitalism. In later years of the USSR, the capitalist connotation was dropped from the term after which “fascism” became to mean the eternal threat from the West. In contemporary Russian language “fascism” refers to “anti-Russianness”. See Timothy Snyder (2018): *The Road to Unfreedom – Russia, Europe, America*. Page 133.

as a professional tool on the job market and offer a source of cultural capital and a way to develop a depoliticized social engagement (Laruelle 2015). Patriotism that unites different clubs and associations is a broad umbrella that covers multiple activities and practices. Clubs and associations vary from school, patriotic, military patriotic, and Orthodox patriotic clubs to patriotic pageant groups and search teams that look for the remains of unburied soldiers on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War in order they could be provided a grave. (9-14.)

4 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

In this chapter, I introduce the methodological tools I use to analyze the construction of citizenship in the patriotic education Programs and Concepts. My research method in this study is critical discourse analysis in which I use Michel Foucault's methodological instructions on discourses, knowledge and power as the background theory.

In general, a term discourse analysis is often used for a group of methods that study language and other meaning-mediating activities aiming analyze in detail how social reality is produced in different social situations. Despite the word "analysis" in the method's name, discourse analysis is not a clearly defined research method but more like a loose theoretical frame of reference that allows varying research focuses and methodological applications. One such application in this frame of reference is critical discourse analysis that is focused on the wider ideological consequences language may have that go beyond individual situations and are related to the intertwining of discourse and power. (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2016, 17, 25, 48.)

Interest in power, ideologies and political nature of things has been in the focus of critical discourse analysis since the beginning, and the method is greatly indebted to Michel Foucault's ideas on discourses, intertwining of knowledge and power, and construction of a subject. One of Foucault's central statements is that organization of language is connected to power structures. According to him, temporarily and locally developed norms and practices define what aspects of language are desired, possible or sanctioned related to historically formed social practices and structures. In his own research, Foucault brought up ways how perceptions of madness and sexuality have changed over the course of history. (Pietikäinen & Mäntynen 2019, 33-34.)

I have divided this chapter into three subchapters. In the first one, I will introduce the main principles of Foucault's methodological recommendations for discourse analysis

and his methodological concepts of practice, discourse and statement. These are concepts that occur often in the research material and therefore need to be clarified. Then, I introduce the two methodological tools of my study, objectification and subjectivation, and describe how the rules guiding their formation can be found in the research material. In the second subchapter, I introduce the critical side to the discourse analysis by presenting Foucault's views on power and governmentality, and on the relationship between knowledge and power. In the last subchapter, I introduce the research material and tell about the methodological choices concerning its analysis.

4.1 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

The central idea of Foucault's critical history of thought is that development of thought is not guided by some universal and unchanging patterns, but its formation is affected by historical and non-contingent events. Therefore, instead of making universal generalizations of human nature and historical development, Foucault studies phenomena from a perspective of historically formed particular practices (*pratiques*) that are always temporal and local. (Alhanen 2007, 24 - 31.)

With the concept of practice, Foucault brings ideas of thought and action together. This means that people acquire a certain way of perceiving reality and themselves through different established practices. At the same time, these practices define how people observe, analyze and conceptualize the world. Practices that guide thought also guide people's actions. (Alhanen 2007, 31-32.)

Foucault divides practices into discursive and non-discursive ones. Discursive practices refer to a socially established way to produce statements in a discourse, guide the presentation of new statements, and set limits for the statements. While discursive practices guide people's actions in a discourse dictating what can and cannot be said, non-discursive practices simply refer to all the other practices outside them. (Alhanen 2007, 30, 59-60.)

Foucault uses in his works two terms that somehow refer to a concept of discourse. First, there is an actual concept of *discourse* that refers to an entity of statements that belong to the same discursive formation but there is also a concept of *discursive formation* defined as a group of statements that is formed following the rules of the same discursive practices. Since Foucault somewhat identifies discursive formation with discourse, there is hardly any difference between the concepts in his writings.

(Alhanen 2007, 71.) For this reason, I think that the concept of discursive formation is included to the concept of discourse which allows me to use only the latter in this thesis for fluency. In this thesis, I define a discourse on the grounds of the task it perform in the research material as an entity constructing citizenship.

Foucault bases his analysis on studying statements (*énoncés*) that occur in a discourse. Statements are basic units of discourses that are selected from the research material in order to study their mutual relations. (Alhanen 2007, 56.) Foucault calls statements also as discursive events to bring out their historical and non-contingent nature. The focus of Foucault's discourse analysis is on the study of historical timeline in which statements appear either for the first time or as repeated. Since statements are connected to other past, simultaneous and future statements, Foucault sees that they must be analyzed both as discursive events and as factors affecting in discourses. (Alhanen 2007, 57–58.) Statements also form different series based on what kind of objects they refer to and who might have presented them. By identifying series of statements, it is possible to see what kind of regularities the statements follow, and then define the rules that regulate the formation of the statements in question. (Alhanen 2007, 56–59.)

The rules that are found in the study only guide the formation of statements that have been approved as knowledge in that particular discourse they occur. However, acknowledging statements as knowledge does not mean that they necessarily are acknowledged to be true but instead the rules regulate what kind of statements can be seen as an approved and serious part of a certain discourse. (Alhanen 2007, 88.) Statements that do not follow the rules of a certain established discourse are not considered to be a part of it because they deviate too much from the other statements in the discourse and are therefore seen as strange (Alhanen 2007, 89).

According to Foucault, the rules that guide the formation of statements in a certain discourse can be divided into four different groups that interact with each other. These groups guide the formation of objectivization, subjectivation, discursive concepts and strategies at the level of statements but for the purposes of this study, I will introduce only the first two groups of rules since they form the toolkit of my analysis. Limiting the analysis to discovering a smaller group of discursive rules is justified and meaningful, since Foucault himself did not demonstrate a single discourse to have all these four types of rules, much less interaction among them (Alhanen 2007, 70–73).

Foucault uses the term objectivization to refer to a manner in which a thing or a phenomenon is turned into an object of thought. Objectifications can be discovered by

looking for places where individual differences between people make their appearance, are pointed out and are analyzed (Alhanen 2007, 21, 64). Foucault calls this kind of places as surfaces of emergence which refer to contexts where a thing of a phenomenon can possibly become objectified. Foucault's example of this are the places where mental illness can be recognized, such as family, work place or religious community. Objectification also happens where some instances turn something into an object by distinguishing, pointing and naming it. For example, a mental illness can be defined by medicine but also by the judicial system or religious authority in which case the perspective to the illness varies by the instance. Objectification also occurs in different specialization scales that have been created to distinguish, contrast, compare, group, classify and derive the objects from each other. For instance, different specialization scales measure the severity of illnesses and distinguish one illness from another. Besides analyzing separately, Foucault instructs to examine mutual relations of these three ways of objectification inside a certain discourse. For example, the psychiatric discourse contains information where mental illness is defined to occur in society, which instances defined it, and what scales of specialization these instances use in this task. (Foucault 1969/2005, 58–62).

With a term subjectivation, Foucault refers to the way subjects are placed, defined and shaped in a discourse. Definition of subjects and objects is guided by the relationship between these two: subjects always think of or treat objects in some way or another. According to Foucault, discursive practices offer different subject positions or positions for different textual voices. These positions are then adopted by the people acting in the frame of a discourse. However, having a certain position does not mean that users of a discourse could fully control it, but instead discursive rules are those who guide their actions. (Alhanen 2007, 21, 67–68.)

Subjectivation can be discovered in the criteria which users of a certain discourse must follow in order to successfully participate in it. These criteria define aspects, such as who is speaking, who has the permission to use the language of the discourse, and who overall is qualified to use the discourse. It defines who acquires uniqueness and authority by using the discourse, and respectively who gives the discourse its presumed truthfulness or even its guarantee. (Foucault 1969/2005, 70.)

Discursive criteria also define the position of the individuals who have an exclusive statutory or traditional, judicially defined or voluntarily accepted right to use a certain discourse. The criteria arise from (1) the position itself but also from (2) the institutional places that give the individuals the position, and from (3) the relations the individuals have with things and people they objectify. Doctors, for instance, have

different discursive positions on the basis of their medical profession, such as the criteria of the qualifications and knowledge, the judicial requirements and the characteristics of doctors' work in a societal scale, but their discursive positions are also defined by institutional places, such as hospital, private practice, laboratory or medical literature. (Foucault 1969/2005, 70-72.) Moreover, doctors' discursive position also depends on the position they take in relation to the patients and their disease (Alhanen 2007, 67). Subjectivation occurs also in different techniques that are aimed to influence the thinking, behavior and action of people and which work according to a certain plan. Prison institution, for example, uses techniques to control the actions and lives of the prisoners in order to change their mindset and way of life. In other words, in prison the subjectivity of prisoners is changed by objectifying them. According to Foucault, certain mechanisms of subjectivation are shown in wide social practices that direct people to examine themselves as thinking, willing and acting beings, and urge them to turn themselves into certain kinds of subjects. Foucault's example of this are the practices that make modern Western people to think and shape themselves as sexual objects. These practices do not only have influence in health institutions or institutions of science, but they affect various spheres of private life as well (Alhanen 2007, 22-23).

4.2 The 'Critical' Side of Discourse Analysis

While the previous subchapter introduced the 'discursive side' of critical discourse analysis, in this subchapter I aim to explain what the word 'critical' means in the context of this study. I begin by introducing Foucault's ideas of power, power relations, dispositives and governmentality and its forms. After that I shortly present Foucault's views on the relationship between knowledge and power.

Since Foucault uses various differing definitions of power in his works (Alhanen 2007, 118), Alhanen presents paraphrasing Deleuze that the concept of force (force) must be distinguished from the concept of power (pouvoir) in order to have a general idea of it (Deleuze 1986/2004, 77-79, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 119). With force, Foucault refers to people's ability to make and carry out things as well as to their ability to think, imagine, explore, fight, make somebody to do something and persuade each other. Power, instead, can be understood as an attempt to control forces, that is to say, it is an activity aiming to shape and organize certain forces and their mutual relations. Power acts by combining, isolating or turning different forces against each other. On the societal level, it can manifest itself strategically by gathering and directing force relations towards certain desired goals. In the study of Foucault's conception of power,

it is important to understand that power is an activity that constantly aims to control forces and is also productive by nature. Thus, power does not comprise someone's property or have an aim to oppress. (Alhanen 2007, 120.)

Foucault understands the use of power as a struggle between two parties and a power relation (*relations de pouvoir*) as action aimed at action. This refers to an attempt of one party to control the forces of another in order to advance certain goals. However, an essential precondition of a power relation is the freedom of an object of power to act against the will of a power user. The possibility to act must also remain for the resigned party when the power relation is established since otherwise it turns into violence. Due to the possibility to act otherwise, a power relation is never an ultimately established position but requires constant struggle to be held on. (Alhanen 2007, 122.) Thus, power relations are constantly renewed and changing (Foucault 1976/1995, 121–123 and Foucault 1975/1994, 31–32, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 120).

Foucault perceives power as an inherent part of human relations for why it is impossible for individuals to escape its influence in any social activity. Since no individual can be independent from power relations, individuals are always somehow shaped by them. This is a point that makes Foucault's analysis of power politically significant. (Pulkkinen 1998, 96–111, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 121–122.) Even though Foucault was not interested in power as such, he saw analysis of power relations to be necessary in order to find out how people are objectified as subjects in various practices. In other words, Foucault was interested in knowing how individuals' characteristics and ability to act are the result of subjectivizing use of power. (Alhanen 2007, 117.)

Foucault uses a concept of *dispositif* (dispositif) to describe an entity of interconnected practices and, hence, solves questions concerning the relation between discursive and non-discursive practices (Deleuze 1994, as cited in Alhanen 105). Dispositives contain various different power relations that are connected to each other in different ways. In dispositives, power thus forms a network but it, however, does not do so independently. Instead, power relations form connections as a part of practices and functional relations guided by practices. In Foucault's terminology, function refers both to complex interdependent relations between practices and to a task of an individual practice in a dispositif. Dispositives do not have one single regulating principle, logic or function but instead each dispositif forms different kinds of functional relations. The influence of one practice in a dispositif is defined by its relations to other practices of the dispositif (Alhanen 2007, 106, 129).

According to Alhanen, it can be said that in the light of Foucault's historical studies, use of power turns into governmentality (*gouvernement*) when practices create and maintain systematic and persistent power relations. Before the modern era in the 17th century, governmentality of the European feudal states ruled by kings and princes was based on sovereign power that aimed to ensure the loyalty of subjects by showing off grandiosity and evoking terror. This was done by organizing festive processions and bloody spectacles of torture or beheading in order to show subjects that the ruler was capable of suppressing revolts and making subjects to follow his will. In the 20th century at the latest, sovereign power became replaced almost entirely by modern forms of governmentality that Foucault calls biopower (*biopouvoir*) or biopolitics (*biopolitique*). Biopower is based on treating people primarily as living beings in the biological sense of the word and it aims to increase, strengthen and guide of forces. (Alhanen 2007, 125, 140-142.)

Foucault sees that power and knowledge are always interconnected, presuppose each other and, therefore, always appear together. According to him, power produces knowledge and, respectively, knowledge produces power. Thus, power does not only utilize knowledge by favoring applicable information and using it due to its usefulness but in addition power relations always create their respective field of knowledge. Correspondingly, knowledge always presupposes and creates power relations. (Alhanen 2007, 133, 136-137.) Alhanen (2007) interprets this to mean that since Foucault sees power relations to have an effect on all social activity, they also influence on the discourses of knowledge that are based on social activity. According to Alhanen, knowledge can also be seen to create power relations constantly since discourses affect the way people guide each other's actions (135-136). Foucault's statement of power and knowledge must not, however, be understood too broadly because with power Foucault usually refers to governmentality and with knowledge to scientific discourses. The statement is also mostly meant as a methodological instruction rather than an ontological argument about the nature of power and knowledge. Foucault does not think that power relations define the content of knowledge or the truthfulness of a certain piece of knowledge, but they define who is allowed to dictate the acceptable criteria for knowledge in a certain discourse. Foucault's statement should not be understood too strictly either because even his own studies on history show that exercise of power has many forms that do not always acquire a "respective field of knowledge". (Alhanen 2007, 133 -134, 137-138.) Alhanen (2007) therefore suggest a reformulation "power usually has a tendency to produce knowledge" (138).

4.3 Research Material

The research material of this thesis consists of four State Programs of Patriotic Education of Russia's Citizens³ for the years 2001 – 2005, 2006 – 2010, 2011 – 2015 and 2016 – 2020 and two Concepts of the Patriotic Education of Russia's Citizens⁴. The first Concept was written out following the implementation of the Programs for the years 2001– 2005, the other Concept was published at the same time with the Program for the years 2016 – 2020. The purpose of the Concepts is to explain theoretical foundations of patriotic education in more detail than it is done in the Program documents.

The research material was originally downloaded from the website gospatriotprogramma.ru that was dedicated to the patriotic Programs and was following the progress of patriotic education in the country in general. Today this website is not in use anymore, but the original documents written in Russian can be found by making searches via a Russian search engine Yandex.

All the Programs contain introduction and chapters about the goal and the role of the Program, the measures planned for its implementation period, the mechanisms of its implementation, and about financing, as well as a chapter about the expected results for the Program and the evaluation of its efficiency. Moreover, the first and the second Program contain a chapter about “the content of the problem” of patriotic education that justifies why patriotic education is an issue to be cared for. Every Program ends with two or three appendixes the first of which always contains charts that introduce particular measures of patriotic education organized by themes named in the text part of the Program. The second appendix informs about the individual budgets of the Program measures, and the possible third appendix either describes the criteria of the evaluation indicators of the Programs or presents expected numerical results for the coming years. While the first patriotic Concept uses a lot of space to define and describe what patriotism and patriotic education are and who are the objects of patriotic education, the Concept of the fourth program does not do such definition work so much anymore as it explains why the new Concept is actually needed and focuses largely on policy formulations.

³ The Russian titles of these programs are *Gosudarstvennaia programma “Patrioticheskoe vospitanie grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii”*. Direct translation of the title: State Program: “Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation”.

⁴ In Russian: *Kontseptsiia patrioticheskovo vospitaniia grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii*.

Since the overall size of printed out version from HTML-form of the research material would have been around 200 pages, I decided to concentrate only on the programmatic parts of the Programs and leave the appendices aside which narrows the material into 55 pages. I refer to the appendices only in cases when they bring some added value to the analysis but otherwise I do not study them in any systematic way. The reason for studying only the programmatic parts is to have a deeper understanding of the way citizenship is constructed throughout the years as it would have been with a single or more limited number of Programs. I consider the temporal dimension to be crucial for my research question because otherwise the results would remain too specific and narrow to enable to form a big picture of citizenship in Russia. I also see this kind of research material to enable to recognize temporal changes which is important especially when it is known that certain political events likely have affected the content of the documents.

It is evident that there is a downside to my decision to discard the appendices. The implementation of the measures of patriotic education on a grass root level inevitably remains in the shadows while more theoretical statements are analyzed in detail. I am, nevertheless, more interested in studying citizenship on a so-called macro level since discursive practices create norms and expectations for citizens that eventually may change the activities on the grass root level. Even though the Programs concern education which is typically associated with children and the youth, the notion in the Programs that patriotic education is practically meant to everyone tells that the project specifically aims at building a nation-state.

5 DISCOURSES OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTIC CITIZENSHIP

In this chapter, I analyze patriotic education Programs and Concepts to discover the discourses that discuss citizenship and the statements of which construct an ideal Russian citizenship in some way. For this purpose, I have identified four different discourses from the research material on which basis I have divided the chapter into subchapters. To make the text more readable, I have in places substituted the full names of the documents with abbreviations in which P equals Program, C equals Concept and an abbreviation app. means appendix. The number after the letter refers to the place in the order the documents have been issued. The Concept of the fourth Program is abbreviated into a form C4.

The first discourse in the subchapter 5.1 deals with the legitimation of patriotic education, and its main purpose is to problematize a lack of patriotism in the Russian society as a relevant social issue. The central component of the problematization is to mark the citizens as a solution to this issue and to point them as the objects of change. The aim of the discourse is to offer a necessary justification for the entire patriotic education project and to legitimize the power relation that is established through it.

An analysis of the discourse of education and control in the subchapter 5.2 examines a strategy the documents use to establish control and implement patriotic education on a local level. The aim of the strategy of patriotic education is to gather all instances and dispositives of society under a single state policy where they share common practices. I examine in the analysis in what way they objectify citizens as the subjects of patriotic education.

In an analysis of the discourse of patriotic morality in the subchapter 5.3, I use Foucault's views on morality and self-constituting practices to examine social norms that guide citizens to shape themselves as moral subjects. In this subchapter, I analyse

what are the central values and rules of behavior of patriotism and how they are turned into social norms according to which citizens should evaluate themselves and behave in their daily lives.

5.1 Discourse of Legitimation

In order to create a system of patriotic education, the patriotic campaign has to present strong enough arguments to justify its necessity for the citizens and to legitimize the power relation it involves. I see that the basis for the reasoning of the campaign lies primarily on a lack of patriotism which in the research material is identified as an underlying cause for the misfortunes Russia has experienced in the recent years. This kind of identification can be understood with Foucault's concept of problematization (problématisation) which refers to a historically changing way of seeing something as problematic and therefore requiring particular consideration and attention. According to Foucault, the forms of problematization guide the way problematic phenomena are thought of, and hence affect the actions that are taken to improve the situation. Foucault also sees that problematizations get their form in the practices that guide the ways of thinking. This happens when practices guide the objectification of things and make them appear as problematic in a certain way. However, even though things are constantly objectified in the practices, only a part of these objectifications are considered as problematic. (Alhanen 2007, 152-154.)

My aim in this subchapter is to examine what are the discursive practices the documents of the research material use to objectify citizens as "the problem" and the objects of change. Along with creating the foundation for the legitimation of the system, the objectification also legitimizes the power relation that is based on it. Over time, this power relation becomes to be established as governmentality. If citizenship is examined from the point of view that sees it as a relation between an individual and the state, the power relation formed through patriotic education defines a citizenship that is based on different premises than the citizenship defined in the 1990s.

The problematization of the lack of patriotism appears for the first time in the first patriotic education Program where in the chapter "The content of the problem of patriotic education and the rationale for the need to solve it programmatically" it is described as following:

"The recent events have confirmed that the economic disintegration, social differentiation of society and devaluation of spiritual values have had a negative impact on public consciousness in the most social and age groups of the population, [and] have sharply reduced the educational (vospitatel'noe) influence of the Russian culture, art and

education (obrazovanie) as the most important factors in the formation of patriotism. It has become increasingly noticeable that our society has gradually lost the traditional Russian patriotic consciousness. Objective and subjective processes have escalated into a national question. Patriotism has in places degenerated (pererozhdat'sja) into nationalism. Many have lost the true meaning and understanding of internationalism. Indifference, egoism, individualism, cynicism, unmotivated aggressiveness and disrespectful attitude towards the state and social institutions have become widespread in the public consciousness. A steady tendency of depreciation of the prestige of the military and state service is manifested.

Under these circumstances, the urgency to resolve the most acute problems of the system of patriotic education at the state level as a basis for the consolidation of society and strengthening of the state is obvious."

According to Foucault, forms of problematization usually follow from historical events such as different kinds of political, economic and social processes which Foucault sees as contingent (Alhanen 2007, 153). Historical events that create a basis for the problematization in the research material are the "recent events" mentioned in the quotation. They refer to the chaotic decade of the 1990s (Rapoport 2009, 147) of which Russians had personal experience, especially in the year 2001 when the Program was released. The events of the 1990s are also referred to elsewhere in the text with statements such as "contemporary realities and problems" and "taking into account the current tendencies related to the consolidation of society and the rise of patriotism". The last phrase in the text before the appendixes mentions a "successful solution of the tasks of overcoming the crisis and determining the future of Russia".

The events of the 1990s are mentioned in the text because they create contrast to the new period that is about to start along with the Program and function as an opposite for the visions of a better future outlined in it. With the contrast citizens are aimed to be distanced from the decade and the systems of liberal market economy and democratic form of government that were introduced during it. These systems are referred to in the above quotation with euphemisms of "the economic disintegration" and "social differentiation of society" that followed the collapse of the USSR and were opposite to its economic and political principles of central planning and common Soviet ideology. The "devaluation of spiritual values" instead, likely refers to the high rate of criminality, such as vast malpractices in the financial sector in the 1990s. According to the quotation above, liberal market economy and democratic form of government are considered to have caused the "recent events" and other issues described in the passage which are shown as a proof of their inferiority as economic and political principles, or at least of their failure to function in the Russian context. They are simultaneously also indirectly blamed for the gradual disappearing "the traditional Russian patriotic consciousness" which highlights the image of the market economy and democracy as foreign imports that somehow threaten the authenticity of the Russian people.

Foucault states that even though historical events affect the way certain things begin to appear as problematic, they do not, as such, dictate what form the problematization will eventually acquire (Alhanen 2007, 153–154). The “bad choices” of the 1990s are made a scapegoat for the contemporary problems of society but the search for people to blame are stopped there in the text. Although someone would still point a finger at the government of the time, the gaze in the text is already turned to look for a solution to the issue of disappearing patriotic consciousness, or a lack of patriotism in society. The solution is to objectify the citizens as the objects of change which in the above quotation is more implied than presented. Citizens are indirectly criticized for the rise of nationalism and the decadence of values by using a passive voice that deplores the negative phenomena in the society but avoids saying openly that these phenomena are naturally caused by citizens. The passive voice is meant to hint about the agency of the citizens in the matter and then lead to a conclusion that the key for change is to change the Russian people. Once this is done, the end of the quotation where it is said that the system of education must be improved, presents the suggested solution to the problem.

Objectifying citizens as the objects of change is done in the first Concept even more indirectly than in the Program and it is also done from a different perspective. It is said in the document that

“Radical transformations in the country in the end of the 20th □and□ the beginning of the 21st centuries, which determined a sharp turn in the modern history of Russia, are accompanied by changes in the socio-economic, political and spiritual spheres of society and the consciousness of its citizens. The educational potential of Russian culture, art and education as the most important factors in the formation of patriotism has sharply decreased.

Patriotism is designed to give a new impetus to a spiritual recovery of the people [and] a formation of a unified civil society in Russia. Therefore, the development of scientifically based conceptual approaches to the organization of the patriotic education of citizens [and] its theoretical foundations is an urgent task.”

The quotation follows the same pattern than the quotation from the first Program including the points that there were some radical transformations in the country (reforms of the 1990s) that caused a sharp turn in its history (economic and social instability) which affected the consciousness of citizens (disappearing of patriotic consciousness) who now require spiritual recovery (patriotic education). Compared to the Program, the Concept remains on a more abstract level in its presentation when it omits the original initiating force behind the radical transformations and thereby obscures the causality between them and societal changes. As a result, the radical transformations appear in the text as something similar to an extreme weather

phenomenon that emerges and comes from somewhere and causes havoc. Citizens are seen in the quotation as victims of these unfortunate forces similar to the elements and therefore needing recovery to return to the state they once were. Compared to the Program that objectified citizens as objects needing re-education, here citizens are objectified as needing cure or care which patriotism can offer.

The aim of both these above quotations is not only to portray democracy as an alien and badly functioning system but also to distance citizens from its inherent values and principles creating an impression that they are not worth adopting. At the same time, it is implied in the quotations that patriotism is something that everyone should strive for. I argue that this contrast to demonstrate a larger dynamic in the documents in which the content of the citizenship adopted in the 1990s that saw citizenship as a political membership of a liberal democratic polity is aimed to be changed into a citizenship more characterized by a commitment to a certain ideology, that is patriotism. This is done specifically by associating citizenship with patriotism and alienating it from democracy.

The replacement of the content of citizenship is shown both on the level on vocabulary and in the way the significance of patriotism is emphasized in general. The association on the level of vocabulary happens already in the titles of the documents where their topic is told to be about patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation. This observation is relevant because there are alternatives to the formulation of the title that do not require the word citizens in them. For example, the title could have simply been “The Program of patriotic education of the Russian Federation”, and the information of whom it concerns could have been found in the text. Because the word *citizens* is elevated to the title, it must have some rhetorical significance. Another indication of association is a word combination citizen-patriot that occurs in the first Program and its Concept five times in total. Even though the word combination occurs only a few times in these two documents, the association is also created by using other statements such as “formation of high patriotic consciousness among the citizens (P2)”, “familiarizing citizens [...] with patriotic values (C1)”, “formation of a patriotic worldview of citizens (C4)”, and “to shape the attitude of citizens to have a need for patriotic values (C4)”. The statements strengthen the association because they link patriotism as a new way of political participation into the old status of citizenship as a membership of a polity.

The significance of patriotism is discussed especially in the first Concept where patriotism presented to be “the moral basis of the viability of the state” which “forms

an important domestic mobilizing resource for the development of society, an active civic stance of the individual and their readiness to serve the Fatherland selflessly”.

Similarly, the document states “the underestimation of patriotism as the most important component of social consciousness” to lead to a “weakening of the socio-economic, spiritual and cultural foundations of the development of society and the state” which determines “the priority of patriotic education in the general system of education of citizens”. This statement suggests that in order to improve the state of society, patriotism is the only option for citizens to internalize.

However, the campaign planners do not believe the adoption of patriotism to be a walkover but instead it is said in the first Concept that patriotic education must achieve an “approval of socially significant patriotic values, attitudes and beliefs in society [and] in the minds and feelings of citizens”.

The reason behind the aim to associate citizenship with patriotism is to strengthen in the Russian citizens an image according to which citizenship is considered primarily as an identity of belonging to a certain nation which overshadows and muddles a perception of citizenship as a description of individual’s agency in a political community. Therefore, I see the patriotic education campaign most importantly to be the government’s attempt to develop Russians a shared patriotic identity which, in other words, means that the question of advancing patriotism is about a nation-building in Russia. In this case, national unity would not only mean that the Russian citizens consider themselves as a one nation but also that the state is acknowledged to have sovereignty over the Russian territory among citizens. In other words, achieving national unity through patriotism is not meant to work only as a nation-building process in which the government aims to make Russian citizens see themselves as a unified nation instead of a multinational state⁵ with more or less decentralized government. It is also as a state-building process ultimately meaning that the citizens abide the legislation enacted in the highest state bodies.

The view of the unified nation comes up clearly in the first Concept where patriotism as a social phenomenon is said to be the “cementing basis for the existence and development of any nation and statehood”. This statement reveals how patriotism is seen as the key tool for nation-building and relates how nation-states are believed to be the primary actors in international politics instead of supranational unions, such as

⁵ For this reason, there are two words for *Russian* in the Russian language. A word *russkii* refers to ethnic Russians whereas a word *rossiiskii* is used for a Russian citizen. (Rapoport 2009, 147; Sperling 2010, 260.)

the EU. However, while patriotism is aimed to be made the common factor to unite Russians, it is at the same time aimed to become the ideological basis for individual's political participation. This advances culture in which the judicial position of a citizen is not consistently and equally based on human rights, the rule of law and international treaties but instead entitlements and punishments are distributed depending on an individual's acknowledged contributions to the society the significance of which is evaluated by the political elite.

Despite the efforts to distance citizens from democratic principles, the documents also contain a few statements expressing commitment to democracy. This is shown in the first two Programs but after that this attitude changes the closer it comes to the present day. The first Concept is in its so-called afterword proclaimed to be "open in nature" and "based on democratic principles". However, this statement more likely expresses commitment only to the form of democracy as the text continues saying that "all government bodies, regions of the country, public associations, scientific unions and organizations" are expected to participate into the improvement and development of the Concept "based on their own initiatives". The second Program has a similar statement according to which the Program is "based on the principles of the functioning of a democratic state and civil society" that "is available for all government bodies, public organizations (associations), scientific and creative unions and organizations to participate in based on their own initiatives". The main objective of the second Program is also told to be

"to improve the system of patriotic education, ensuring the development of Russia as a free, democratic country, the formation of high patriotic consciousness among citizens of the Russian Federation, loyalty to the Fatherland, and readiness to fulfill constitutional duties".

Explicit statements about democracy fade after the second Program, when neither the third and fourth Program mentions democracy anymore. While the third Program does not take a stand on the matter, it is stated in the Concept of the fourth Program that

"The Program relies on the constitutional principles of the Russian state and civil society, involving participation of all government bodies and local governments, public organizations (associations), scientific and educational organizations, creative unions, religious denominations, organizations and institutions of all forms of ownership in its implementation".

Since Russia is in its constitution defined as a democratic federal-law bound state with a republican form of government (Constitution of the Russian Federation, article 1), relying on the constitutional principles still indicates some kind of commitment to democracy. However, I argue that it is important to notice the change in mentioning democracy because I interpret that using the term in the previous statements signaled

a commitment to the democratization process promoted by supranational bodies which later changed probably due to the situation that prevailed during the fourth Program and its Concept was published: the War in Ukraine was going on and Crimea was recently annexed to Russia causing restlessness on the international arena. The fourth Program also refers to the tense situation in world politics by stating that the current Program is prepared

“taking into account [...] the continuity of the educational process aimed at shaping the Russian patriotic consciousness in difficult conditions of economic and geopolitical rivalry”.

The places where citizens are objectified as the objects of change can be identified from the spheres that are told to be negatively influenced by modern phenomena. Such spheres in the above quotation from the first Program are sectors of culture, art and education that are noted not to be able to educate citizens to become patriotic enough anymore, and the federal authorities that have noted some nations of the country to express nationalistic ambitions instead of wanting to belong to one big Russian nation. Moreover, the other authorities such as the army and perhaps also religious institutions suffer from individuals' values and negative attitudes to social institutions that do not support collective living and hence the unity of people and stable social development.

The documents contain some specialization scales that classify citizens in some way or another. The first Program and its Concept say to address all categories of different social and age groups and observe them in this framework, but it is not opened further what the categories are. However, the first Concept also contains a loose classification into objects and subjects of patriotic education which is based on citizens' role in the system. This classification must not be confused with Foucault's concepts of subjection and objectivization discussed earlier in the methodology chapter, but it is, instead, an explicitly expressed classification that can be found in the document. The Concept first lists the main groups of objects of patriotic education in which family is seen “as the main social unit of society” since families have a responsibility to educate their children as patriotically conscious. Other objects of patriotic education are young citizens and youth organizations, military personnel, employees of the law enforcement system, labor collectives, representatives of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, state and municipal employees, representatives of the creative intelligentsia and the media, teachers, educators, and the representatives of traditional religious denominations. Despite the classification to objects and subjects in the Concept, the status of being an object is told to be relative because – being included in the system – the objects also act as subjects of patriotic education at the same time.

This idea seems to be expressed also in the “principle of a targeted approach in the formation of patriotism” presented in the Concept which

“involves use of special forms and methods of patriotic work considering the specificities of each age, social, professional and other groups of people. In other words, this principle means a multi-level involvement in the upbringing of a citizen-patriot in which family, the inner circle, educational institution, ethno-cultural environment, workplace collective, region of residence with its economic, social, cultural and other features and the society as a whole take part.”

Therefore, the subject of patriotic education can be anyone from an ordinary citizen to a representative of state power “who manifests patriotism, has loyalty to his civic duty and has become an incentive example and a role model”. However, the Concept also names some subjects of educational activities, such as the state represented by federal, regional and local authorities and educational institutions at all levels, various kinds of public organizations and religious associations, cultural institutions, family, labor and military collectives, and the media. The subjects of patriotic education are told to be those who have specific capabilities and means to solve the tasks of patriotic education concerning certain groups of population or citizens of the country as a whole.

Through all the documents, patriotic education is told to be targeted to “all categories of citizens” but in the second Program the priority is said to be set in children and the youth. This is due to a desire to increase patriotism especially in these age groups as was discussed in the Chapter 3. It is likely that the third Program follows the policy of the second Program since there are some notions mentioning specifically young people, such as the chapter concerning the expected results of the Program which states that one of the end results should be “an increase in social and labor activity of citizens, especially young people”. The fourth Program again states that the priority is in children and the youth.

The subject position of the discourse of legitimation in the documents is occupied by the state. I interpret this to come up in the parts where the Programs are told to be explicitly state Programs and the responsibility for the functioning of the system of patriotic education lies with the state (C1). In the above quotation from the first Program, a practice guiding the problematization is the way in which the relation between the state and the objects of change is formed hierarchically. This is best manifested in the parts stating that a “disrespectful attitude towards the state and social institutions have become widespread in the public consciousness” and that “a steady tendency of depreciation of the prestige of the military and public service is manifested”. These statements suggest that the relationship between citizens and the authorities in the Program is primarily based on a hierarchic perception according to

which the inferior is automatically expected to respect the superior regardless of the superior's actions because this is the way hierarchies are understood to work. The state does not use space in the quotation to reflect what could have caused the disrespect because the blame is already put on liberal market economy and democracy but also because the self-reflection could direct the discussion to the past and present actions of the government and, thus, weaken the argumentation for patriotic education. The hierarchical attitude towards citizens indicates that the state does not see the legitimacy for patriotic education to arise primarily from the acceptance of the citizens but, instead, the attitude refers to a perception of a sovereign ruler whose legitimacy derives its origin from some higher being. In this set-up, the citizens are seen as mere subjects that just have to obey.

Foucault characterized governmentality to have a tendency of to produce knowledge (Alhanen 2007, 138) which is also shown in the discourse of legitimation where the state has the necessary authority to use and produce knowledge to back up its argument for patriotic education through its subject position. The authority also guarantees the truthfulness of this knowledge. The state creates knowledge in the above quotation from the first Program by stating that there has been a "negative impact on public consciousness in most social and age groups of the population" and that "our society has gradually lost the traditional Russian patriotic consciousness". It is not further clarified in the text what is meant with these statements nor are they backed up with any verifiable information. The presentation of knowledge also gets a hierarchical flavor when it uses rhetoric that implies the state has the proper knowledge about the reality which is not, however, shared with the reader. Thus, the power relation established in the text does not only create knowledge but also withholds it. While the state appeals to tradition and/or established practices by using a statement "traditional Russian patriotic consciousness" that would be a pity to give up, it is not explain what is exactly meant with the statement. Similarly, it is stated there to be people who do not have the "true meaning and understanding of internationalism" and should therefore be educated. However, the true meaning of the term is not revealed in the text either. Moreover, patriotism is also told to have degenerated into nationalism which separates the two concepts from each other and sets them into a hierarchical order: patriotism is something more valuable and noble than nationalism which is something inferior. This is also one categorization that divides people into those who know which is better and those who are ignorant and should be therefore thought the difference. Citizens are, thus, objectified based on what knowledge they have. I interpret that the concepts with the notion of "objective and subjective processes" escalating into national question are used to refer especially to the struggle in Chechnya at the time and the difficult situation which ended with

Russia's troops withdrawal and an unsettled conflict in the area (RFE/RL Newswire 2001, as cited in Sperling 2010, 220).

The first Program and its Concept create the foundation for the legitimation of the system of patriotic education and the power relation based on it. However, in order to justify the necessity of the following Programs both the impression of the relevance of the problematization has to be kept up, while it has to be shown that the first Program has had some influence on the solution of the problem. This is achieved in the Programs by informing about the accomplishments of the previous one and adding that the project is yet not finished. The second Program, for example, says in its chapter "The content of the problem and the need to continue solving it programmatically", that the main tasks of the first Program, such as the creation of a system of patriotic education, were solved during the years 2001–2005 but "for the effective functioning of the system of patriotic education all is not done", however. Some regions still lack coordination councils and centers of patriotic education, and educational and cultural institutions lack methodological support in the field. Moreover, the Program states that "Patriotism has not yet become the fully unifying basis of society" either. Therefore, the chapter ends with words "All this testifies to the need to continue work aimed at solving the whole complex of problems of patriotic education by program method, and the relevance of this work". The third Program also takes an overview on the accomplishments of the previous Programs repeating the message that "The country has basically created a system of patriotic education of citizens". The coordination councils and centers are told to have been set up and operate in most of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation which either implicates that the second Program made little progress or did not achieved its set goal regarding this task. The organization of patriotic education is told have been improved in many ways which has resulted a rising level of patriotic consciousness of citizens. However, this information is not verified in which case the subject position of the state in the text must suffice as the guarantee of its truthfulness.

Gradual establishment of the power relation can be observed in the way the second Program follows the policy formulation of the first Program. While the first Program and its Concept set as their main purpose to "define the main ways of developing the system of patriotic education of citizens, [and] its main components" (1P) and to "determine the place and role of patriotism education among Russian citizens as the most important activity of the society and the state" (1C), the second Program is told to determine "the content and main ways of developing the system of patriotic education" and to be "aimed at further shaping the patriotic consciousness of Russian citizens as the most important value from the foundations of the spiritual and moral

unity of society". However, the power relation seems not to be yet totally trusted to be turned into governmentality, since the second Program still aims to establish patriotic consciousness as the central value in uniting the country.

At the time of the third Program, the power relation seems to have taken a lasting form since the Program describes its purpose to be to continue the process of further shaping the patriotic consciousness as one of the factors of the unity of the nation. Since patriotic education already has a stable position in the country, it can become only one sphere among others to be governed. Similarly, the reasons for why the patriotic project is needed in the first place are not presented anymore but, instead, the Program appears to be written for its own sake.

According to Foucault, power relations are never stable but are based on constant struggles. To enable more detailed, dense and long-term power relation, governmentality often impacts on the formation of new discourses by constantly creating and pointing out new objects and areas for exercise of power (Alhanen 2007, 122, 136).

This issue is at stake in the case of the Concept of the fourth Program (and, thus, the fourth Program) where the lack of patriotism is re-problematized in order to legitimate the continuation of the patriotic education. The document, however, begins by reminding the readers about the power relation already established during the previous Programs. The Concept states that the latest Program is "a logical continuation in the development of socio-economic and political conditions of the second decade of the 21st century, previously adopted by the state Programs of patriotic education". The need for a new Program is, therefore, justified by the mere existence of the patriotic education system and the necessity to maintain it. The text continues with a maintaining argument by saying that the "main project and Program benchmarks" of the new Program are to "preserve the traditions of patriotic education [...] established over the past decades" and to "ensure the continuity of the educational and socio-cultural process of forming patriotic consciousness [...] in the context of innovative processes of development of Russian society".

After the readers are reminded about the existing power relation, the text continues to describe its new form. The focus of the new Program is told to be on

"the integration processes of various institutions of socialization in the patriotic education [...] and its novelty lies in the fact that it lays the foundation for the interaction of state structures and civil society in solving a wide range of problems in realizing the historical mission of modern Russian patriotism in ensuring the future of Russia, strengthening its position in the international arena and ensuring national security, as well as giving the

process of patriotic education the dynamics that correspond to the innovation processes of the development of Russian society.”

Even though, the goal of the Program is told to still further harmonize the activities of different institutions in advancing patriotic education and, hence, to strengthen governmentality even more, the Program also takes a step toward intensifying the relationship between the state and the civil society. Although the previous Programs also contain various goals to include civic organizations into the patriotic education work, mentioning civil society as an entity and as an acknowledged actor in a state project is something new. The text recognizes this as well since it states the novelty of the fourth Program to lie “in the fact that it lays the foundation for the interaction” of these two.

Before the actual re-problematization, the Concept introduces it by outlining visions about the future of the Russian young:

“In the conditions of the second decade of the 21st century, the further development of the system of patriotic education of young people should correspond to the policy of building an innovative society in Russia and contribute to the solution of this indigenous (korennoij) state and social task of the coming decades. The innovativeness of patriotic education as a social institution should create opportunities for young people to choose their future, linking it with national interests and developmental prospects of the country.”

The purpose of these visions is to create contrast to a following description about the present situation:

“At the same time, already today it becomes obvious that the forms and methods used in the educational process do not fully ensure the increase of the role of Russian patriotism in the public consciousness as the value-semantic core of personal development, family, [and] civil society, which is one of the reasons for not high rates of innovative development of the Russian state. The obvious tendency of reduction in the society of people capable of perceiving the values of patriotism was marked.”

A key feature in the new form of problematization that comes up in each of the three above quotations from the fourth Concept, is the focus on the lack of innovativeness in the society. This differs from the previous Programs in which the problematization was primarily based on achieving social stability and national unity. Instead, innovativeness is mentioned once in the previous Programs in the first Concept. From the perspective of governmentality, the change in the parameters can be interpreted to mean that the problematization of the previous Programs is not relevant anymore and, hence, not significant enough to justify the need for the current Program. Thus, to maintain the established power relation that is achieved through the Programs, the old problematization must be reformulated. This may be the reason the new Concept was created at the same time with the Program.

The new way of problematization does not change who are defined as the objects of power but it changes the way they are objectified. Citizens are still recognized as the weakest link in the patriotic education process which is said not to “fully ensure the increase of the role of Russian patriotism in the public consciousness as the value-semantic core”. This can be observed on the personal development of an individual, family and civil society which are the surfaces of emergence of the objectification. What tells about a concern that the role of patriotism is not secured enough in the society is “the obvious tendency of reduction” in the ability of people to perceive the values of patriotism but yet again it is not said what this claim is based on. The new problematization somewhat changes this way citizens are objectified since low rates of innovative development are now being linked with weak patriotic consciousness. Thus, the new parameter for observing citizens is the level of innovativeness in the society but it still remains unclear, though, how innovativeness is actually thought to correlate with the level of patriotism.

Innovativeness is a kind of buzzword that is eagerly used in the Concept of the fourth Program. To give the reader some kind of picture, the term innovativeness or one of its derivatives appears in the research material 20 times in total of which once both in the first Concept and the fourth Program but 18 times in the Concept of the fourth Program. The frequent use of the term is explained by the fact that since innovativeness is the main ingredient in the re-problematization of the lack of patriotism, it is important to repeat it often enough in order to convince the readers that there really is something new in this way of seeing patriotism. What gives the impression of innovativeness being a mere buzzword in the text is its unfocused use and the fact that its content is not clarified more specifically. Therefore, the Concept of the fourth Program includes statements such as “the context of innovative processes of development”, “introducing innovative technologies to form the ideals of patriotic values”, “the policy of building an innovative society in Russia”, “Innovative parameters of social development”, “the development of innovative forms and methods of patriotic work”, and “innovative forms, methods and technologies of coordination and interaction of the subjects of patriotic education”.

The establishment of governmentality more or less goes hand in hand with the establishment of patriotism as a central value in society. After the first Program and its Concept in which the significance of patriotism is highly emphasized, the second and the third Programs use only a few short statements to repeat this message implying that patriotism already has an established position in society. These are the above mentioned statements about the aim of the second Program to further shape the patriotic consciousness as the most important value of the spiritual and moral

unity of society, and the purpose of the third Program to continue the process of further shaping the patriotic consciousness as one of the factors of the unity of the nation. Moreover, the third Program shakes off some of the previous notions about patriotism (such as serving the Fatherland) by mentioning that the system of patriotic education is only “aimed at the establishment of patriotism as the moral basis for the formation of an active life position” for the Russian citizens.

The Concept of the fourth Program also seem to have adopted the idea that the message about stressing the significance of patriotism hardly needs emphasizing anymore. In the Concept, the only clear references to this view state that patriotic education is “a basic social factor” that “proves the priority of patriotism in the value structure of Russian society and state policy”, and that the implementation of the Program is based on methods that meet the “strategic objective of modernizing the country and move it onto the innovative path of social development” which validates the status of patriotism as “the spiritual and sociocultural basis of Russian society”.

However, the Concept of the fourth Program also involves statements that seem to refer to some kind of a readjustment of the ideology as it were Patriotism 2.0 following the general re-problematization of the lack of patriotism. The Concept states that “the historical mission of modern Russian patriotism” is to ensure the future of Russia, strengthen its position in the international arena, ensure national security, and to give “the process of patriotic education the dynamics corresponding to the innovation processes of the development of Russian society”. In this quotation, patriotism seems to be detached from its everyday political context where the rationality of different policy measures is (or, at least, should be) deliberated and debated on, and removed to a sphere of historical narration which treats the present already as the future history people cannot have an effect on. Historical perspective and solemn goals alone are meant to work as a justification for continuing patriotic measures.

The fourth Program and its Concept also contain statements I interpret to imply a firm enough assumption that a perception of Russians belonging to a one nation based on patriotism has been achieved or at least is close to being achieved among citizens. The documents namely use expression of Russian civic identity which is a new feature compared to the previous documents. The Concept, for example, says that in the task of adjusting various features of patriotic education, the activities of the state and society should solve “the problems of the formation of Russian civic identity based on the values of Russian patriotism”. Mentioning the civic identity being based on patriotic values fortifies the interpretation that the content of citizenship is aimed to be replaced with patriotism. It also said in the document that patriotic education is

understood as “a basic social factor in [...] achieving Russian civic identity among the country’s population [...]”. Although both of these quotations refer to an uncertainty whether a common perception of civic identity is achieved yet by mentioning the problems relating to its formation, I however argue that the mere statement of civic identity is already an indication that it is believed to exist. The fourth Program is more confident as it states that the document is prepared “taking into account the importance of ensuring Russian civic identity”. From the citizenship theoretical point of view discussed in the Chapter 2, the word choice civic identity would imply that the Program planners aim to form a common Russian identity as a polity and not as a nation, even though the third Program mentioned “shaping the patriotic consciousness [...] as one of the factors of the unity of the nation”. Nevertheless, I believe that the purpose of it is to avoid connotations a word nation would evoke in a multinational country and to unite the Russians by using a term that refers to citizens everyone can relate to. I think this is a reasonable explanation since based on what is discussed above, it would be inconsistent to aim to form a polity if the goal had all along been to distance the citizens from democratic values and, hence, from political participation to the decision-making. However, nation-building may still be the ultimate goal of the Programs since the fourth Program also speaks about “promoting strengthening and development of national consciousness”

The discourse of legitimation discussed in this subchapter problematizes the status of democracy and liberal market economy in the Russian state context referring to both their systemic problems and the decreased level of patriotism seen to be caused by them. The suggested cure to the contemporary problems of society is to re-educate the Russian citizens to know the “traditional Russian patriotic consciousness” while alienating them from democratic principles. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop a system of patriotic education in which citizens are objectified as subjects of patriotic education. This system aims to make patriotism the basis of political participation and turn the concept of citizenship primarily into a question of identity. Citizens are loosely categorized either as objects or subjects of patriotic education depending of their level of patriotism. Patriotic education basically concerns every Russian citizen but starting from the second Program, the education focuses especially on children and the youth. The objectivation of citizens as subjects is in the research material based especially on hierarchicity and the practices welling up from the status the state has as a producer of knowledge. They objectify the status of citizens as obedient subjects in relation to the state. The problematization discourse is meant to legitimate the creation of the system of patriotic education but at the same time it legitimates the power relation involved in it. As the patriotic campaign progresses, the power relation created by it is established as governmentality but in order to

maintain it the problematization must kept relevant. The lack of patriotism is re-problematized in the Concept of the fourth Program which changes the objectivation of citizens as subjects of patriotic education. In addition to the previous objectivations, their level of patriotism is started to be measured based on the level of innovativeness in society.

5.2 Discourse of Education and Control

According to Foucault, governmentality creates strategies as an attempt to control some area of society. This area can be, for example, production, economy, the military, criminality or living conditions of the population. In order to achieve control, governmentality aims to make local power relations, their practices and dispositives, and entities of governmentality as a part of a wider and more coherent exercise of power. According to Foucault, this aim can be explained with the fact that no systematic and wide attempt to control society can be successful if its aims do not reach the local level and are not put in use in individual practices. An example of reaching the local level and individual practices are reproduction and child-rearing policies. They are influential only if the power relations in families are made to be a part of the population policy. (Alhanen 2007, 130–131.)

The problematization discourse presented in the previous subchapter gives a necessary legitimation and an entitlement for the government strategy of patriotic education I will examine in this subchapter. I argue that the area the Russian government aims to take control of is the perception that Russians have of citizenship, and the tool to control is patriotic education of citizens. The previous subchapter already discussed the government's aim to turn the content of Russian citizenship into patriotic one through problematization but in this subchapter I concentrate on the strategy and the practices that are aimed to achieve this.

Foucault perceives power both as an action that shapes and organizes forces and their mutual relations that appear on a certain area, and as an action that can be used strategically by gathering and directing power relations centrally towards some particular goals at the level of whole society (Alhanen 2007, 120). An aim to gather and direct power relations to gain control over citizenship comes up especially clearly in the statement that says patriotism to serve as “an important domestic mobilizing resource for the development of society” (C1). The same is expressed in the afterword of the first Concept where the document is said to be “designed to contribute to a significant intensification of the direction of domestic policy that is most important for

society and the state". However, a certain possibility to make changes to the patriotic education system is reserved in the first Concept in which it is stated in the chapter "Basics of the organization of the work of patriotic education" that the system of patriotic education cannot remain unchanged. According to the Concept, its

"change and development is conditioned both by the achievements of the priority tasks of the system of patriotic education and by changes in the economic, political, social and other spheres of Russian society, as well as by the new conditions of the modern world".

I interpret this quotation to mean that the aim is not to form a stiff and static institution that functions by itself without political guidance but instead it is wanted to be a flexible and easily modified entity when needed. The above statements imply that the institutional boundaries of the system are not fixed but can be altered depending on the prevailing situation in the society and the world. This means that the system can be expanded to the new social spheres if it is seen necessary from the perspective of the patriotic goals.

Local power relations are made a part of this strategy first by building a centralized administrative structure in which the decisions of the government are conveyed to the local level along a hierarchically formed administrative path. This makes the local power relations then strong enough to direct other instances and dispositives, such as families, educational institutions, the army and scientific institutions, to introduce educational measures on their own spheres of influence. The quality of these measures is controlled, among other things, with practices of a common legislation and a shared set of patriotic measures given in the Programs. A general patriotic parlance coming from different sources affects the conceptualizations and objectifications of people influencing on the practices around them. Moreover, since militarism is an integral part of patriotism (see Chapter 3), along with patriotic education, militaristic practices spread to the other spheres of society blurring the line between civil and military and advancing general militarization of society. Patriotic education also utilizes the authority of the sciences and scientific practices. While the system of patriotic education is developed ubiquitous and effective, it is also built to function as a system of surveillance that observes the progress of the system with a certain set of indicators.

The goal and the significance of the strategy of patriotic education are highlighted in a few places in the documents. Patriotic education is in the first Program defined as

"a systematic and purposeful activity of the state and public organizations to form a high patriotic consciousness among citizens, a sense of loyalty to their Fatherland, readiness to fulfill civic duty and constitutional duties to protect the interests of the Motherland.

Patriotic education is aimed at the formation and development of a person who has the qualities of a citizen-patriot of the Motherland and is able to successfully perform civil duties during peace and wartime."

The first half of this definition appears also in the first Concept almost in the same form except patriotic education is told to be an activity of civic organizations as well. The document also states that "patriotic education should be planned, systemic and ongoing" activity and "one of the priorities in Russia's state policy" in the field of education. It is a "one type of multifaceted, large-scale and ongoing activities" that includes "social, targeted, functional, organizational and other aspects that have a high level of complexity" (C1). Therefore, the main purpose of the Concept is told to be to "determine the place and role of patriotism education among Russian citizens as the most important activity of the society and the state". Patriotic education is described as "an integral part of the general educational process" (C1) and also later as "an integral part of all life activity of Russian society and its social and state institutions" (C1). These statements present patriotic education as a state-led activity that hierarchically defines the relationship between the state and its citizens as such that the state has a right to instill its citizens a certain kind of worldview. Therefore, it is questionable whether patriotic education really is about education or is it about a state ideology instead. Because the constitution of Russia unequivocally states that "No ideology may be established as state or obligatory one" (Constitution of the Russian Federation, article 13 § 2), framing virtually inescapable ideological components as education is a useful way to bend the law. The definition of patriotic education can next time be found in the fourth Program where the definition is otherwise identical with the first half of the definition of the first Program but, alongside the state authorities and civil society institutions, families are also raised to the position of the realizers of the education. Patriotic education is presented as an answer to multiple problems which strengthens an impression of it as a state ideology. It is said to be understood as

"a basic social factor in strengthening Russian statehood, consolidating society, ensuring national security, achieving Russian civic identity among the country's population and turning it to an innovative way of development".

Since citizenship education is not only conveyed in schools and other institutes of formal education but also by multiple influences from other sources, such as parents, peers, culture, media, literature and so on (Rapoport 2015, 17), the aim of the government is to extend the system to concern every Russian citizen starting "with family, educational institutions, labor, military and other collectives" and ending "with the highest state bodies" (C1) covering "all generations with its influence" (C1). For this purpose, the system of patriotic education must be compiled as such that it is

administratively integrated and therefore capable of controlling the actions of every instance in the society, and ultimately every individual citizen. Therefore, the system is told to need a unified state policy for its support. The first Program and its Concept state:

“In order to unite the efforts of the federal executive authorities, the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, to coordinate and direct their work to all social and age groups, the family as the main unity of society, we need a unified state policy in the field of patriotic education of Russian citizens and the state system of patriotic education of citizens corresponding to this policy, able to consolidate and coordinate this multifaceted work.”

Moreover, the first Concept states that patriotic education is meant to permeate all aspects of life involving socio-economic, political, spiritual, judicial and pedagogical spheres. Foucault says that although strategies of governmentality need local power relations to thrive, are local power relations dependent on these strategies as well because they become stronger and more efficient by becoming a part of them (Alhanen 2007, 131). I interpret the above quotation to be persuasion of the authorities to cooperation. This is revealed in the statement to unite the efforts referring to an idea that together the government and the authorities are stronger and also can mutually strengthen each other. A message of working on the same side is conveyed with a statement we need a unified state policy in which the government and the authorities are identified as one unified group. The above quotation reveals that the government needs the support of the authorities in order to create a comprehensive system that gets close to individual citizens and is able to educate them patriotically. This was especially important at the time of the first Program, because the state was seen quite weak. As the quotation from the first Program in the previous subchapter told, it was considered as an urgent task to resolve the problems of the system of patriotic education “as a basis for the consolidation of society and strengthening of the state”. The unified state policy was, thus, a step towards strengthening the state control on a local level.

According to Foucault, along with modern biopolitics, power relations have increasingly become the objects of comprehensive, effective and centralized governmentality (Alhanen 2007, 139). This kind of development concerns also the system of patriotic education according to which the administrative structure is built to follow the unified state policy. The structure follows “the principle of system-organized approach” (C1) which involves all the levels of administration and has a very centralized decision-making hierarchy. On the top of this structure, the state bears the responsibility of the functioning of the system as “the most highly organized and equipped subject of patriotic education” and, therefore, administers it while making “extensive use of public institutions”. The federal executive authorities,

among other things, “ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Government”, develop departmental programs, organize their implementation, and interact with the executive authorities of the constituent entities in this process. These authorities then make proposals to improve the system and take measures to involve public and religious associations and organizations to advance patriotic education with local governments. Moreover, councils of patriotic education are created in the federal bodies and regional interdepartmental coordinating councils in the bodies of the constituent entities to develop departmental and regional programs of patriotic education. This is done because “in modern conditions” it is “necessary to create interdepartmental structures to manage the system”, to “implement a common strategy in this field of activity”, and to “unite the efforts of federal executive bodies, public and religious organizations and movements”. To bind different administrative levels and also other instances more tightly together, the creation of the system of patriotic education is also told to involve “the regulatory legal base of educational activities at all levels” (P1), and “a set of measures to shape the patriotic feelings and consciousness of Russian citizens” (P1). A common legislation and all the measures that can be placed under the label of measures to shape patriotic feelings and consciousness create shared practices in and between instances which potentially multiplies the influence the system has on people.

The patriotic measures suggested in the Programs are often validated by achieving, ensuring or increasing the efficiency or effective functioning of the system of patriotic education, and effectiveness and efficiency also appear as important values in these documents. Measures validated with these values are, for instance, a need to train specialists of patriotic education that are “capable of effectively [...] solve the tasks of patriotic education” (C1), an investment to the volunteer movement because it is “an effective tool of civil-patriotic education” (P4), and an evaluation of “the effectiveness of the use of facilities intended for military-patriotic education” (P4). They also form a parameter for evaluating different measures. The documents mention an increase in the “level of efficiency of holding art festivals, competitions, exhibitions and contests” (P3), a “use of the most effective forms and methods of the whole variety of pedagogical means and approaches to the patriotic education” (C4), and a use of measures “to increase the effectiveness of young people’s readiness to defend” the Fatherland (C4). In general, effectiveness and also efficiency are mentioned rather frequently in the research material where the former appears 29 times and the later 7 times in total.

Creation of the system is acknowledged to require certain investments which also refers to an aim of seeking efficiency. It is said in the first Program that at all stages of

its implementation federal and regional measures for training personnel in patriotic education are required. This includes measures aimed at developing common approaches to organizing patriotic education which includes creating courses, conducting scientific and practical conferences, seminars, and round tables on patriotic education, as well as the organization of the All-Russian congress of social and patriotic associations, all-Russian organizational, methodological and educational materials, meetings of heads of patriotic associations and clubs.

More than having a necessary administrative structure to implement patriotic education, the system of patriotic education also needs to incorporate other dispositives of society in order to be able to affect their individual practices. It is said in the first Program that the system of patriotic education should include “the relevant state structures” but the creation of the system involves also

“the consolidation of the activities of state authorities at all levels, scientific and educational institutions, veterans, youth, other public and religious organizations, [and] working parties to address a wide range of problems of patriotic education [...]”.

The first Concept specifies the nature of these activities saying that the government agencies, social movements and organizations organize and carry out mass patriotic work. The activities of the media, scientific and other organizations and creative unions working parties are “aimed at considering and highlighting problems of patriotic education” in “the formation and development of the personality of a citizen and defender of the Fatherland”. The system is also told to involve

“the organization of patriotic events both at the federal and regional levels, in individual collectives, and in the carrying out of individual educational work with an individual person” (C1).

As it can be seen from the above quotations, the system of patriotic education is a comprehensive system that includes all possible dispositives from top of the society to the grass root level, despite of whether the people in these dispositives themselves want it or not. A common task of different dispositives is primarily to spread the word of patriotism whether this happens with means of mass communication, maintaining the theme in the limelight, organizing patriotic events, or giving individual education in smaller collectives. Since the creation of the system requires consolidation of the activities of different instances, it can be said that, in a sense, the system is developing into one giant dispositive the practices of which support each other and, hence strengthen the dispositive as a whole. Due to the inclusion to the system, all the dispositives objectify citizens as objects of patriotic education which inevitably

changes the practices they use. How the practices change depends on what purpose each dispositive is built around of.

Besides extending the system of patriotic education to every instance of society and organizing the administrative bodies according to it, the government must also make sure that it also holds a territorial control over Russia. This was not necessarily an axiom in the circumstances of the first Program which expresses concerns over nationalistic sentiments in certain regions. Perhaps therefore, in some parts of the research material “the center” and the rest of Russia are contrasted to each other. For example, the creation of the system of patriotic education system is told to necessarily imply “the consolidation of the activities [...] both in the center and in the regions” (C1). Moreover, it is said that in the development of the measures of patriotic education must taken into account “the transfer of the main efforts of patriotic education into the regions” that demonstrate “a negative attitude towards separatism indicating the need for more active participation of the center in patriotic events held in the local level” (P1). Due to its capital status, the Moscow region is likely “the center” these parts refer to and mentioning it as separate from the regions adds the contrast between them. At the same time, the arrival of patriotic education to the regions may suggested to be in the hopes of the locals themselves as it is said in the first Program:

“The mechanism for the implementation of the Program is determined by its state status and takes into account [...], the transfer of the main efforts in patriotic education to the regions whose public is in favor of more active participation of the center in solving military-patriotic tasks.”

However, while patriotic education is brought to the regions so that the presence of the state can be strengthened at the local level, the special characteristics of the regions are also acknowledged. The first Concept states that one of its principles is to take into account “regional conditions in the propaganda of patriotic ideas and values” which means that “the propaganda of ideas and values” do not promote only “all-Russian patriotism but also local or regional” patriotism “characterized by affection, [and] love for the native land, city, village, street, enterprise, sports team, etc”. Consideration of regionality is also referred in the statement saying that

“It is envisaged to continue the elaboration and coordination of questions about the possibility of creating reference zones in certain regions for testing the system of patriotic education, [and] different approaches to its regulation” (P1).

The first Concept also states that “a model for the implementation of the main activities for the patriotic education” should be tested “in a number of regions of the country”.

Involving all the instances of society to the patriotic education system touches another aspect that Foucault says about modern biopolitics. According to him, biopolitical development has led to an increasing involvement of the state machinery into the lives of different groups of people and individuals (Alhanen 2007, 139). This is best shown in the research material in family. As the closest dispositive to an individual citizen, family is both in the first Program and its Concept defined “as the main social unit of society” that “occupies the leading place in the system of patriotic education” (C1). Families are important because in them begins “the education process of the individual” and “the formation and development of patriotism” (C1). They lay the “foundations of moral, spiritual cultural, physical and other personality development” (C1) and form person’s “life orientations and values, attitudes towards oneself, to other people and to the Fatherland” (C1). This process continues later “in educational, training, labor and military collectives, cultural-educational institutions, and in civic organizations” (C1). Elsewhere in the documents, the significance of family is mentioned in passing in the second Program and in the Concept of the fourth Program. In the fourth Program, the position of family is elevated as one of the actors alongside state authorities and civil society institutions in forming citizens a high patriotic consciousness. One of the goals of the Program is also told to be to bring up “a citizen who loves his Motherland and family [...]”.

The above statements objectify parents and other adults taking care of the children in families primarily as subjects of patriotic education the main task of which is to ensure the children grow into patriots with desired personality traits. Depending on how thoroughly this subject position is internalized, it affects the relationship between these adults and children because they must take the interests of the state into account in their daily lives and educational practices. The objectification creates practices of surveillance between citizens because since the state holds families accountable for the patriotic education, it implicitly gives people a permission to interfere their private lives and evaluate how well their educational style fits to the common patriotic goals. Moreover, a commitment to a certain worldview that comes with patriotic education narrows the choice of values that can be fostered in families. For example, since patriotic education is inherently militaristic, it is hard to act as a patriotic educator and teach pacifism.

Other instances that are quite close to an individual, are schools and other educational institutions. Involving them to the system of patriotic education is shown in the research material, for instance, as an aim to standardize methods, forms and means used in the educational system nation-wide. The “pedagogical and methodological support” for patriotic education presented in the first Concept involves “a

fundamental development of a complex of educational and special programs” and “methods for organizing and conducting patriotic education”. It is also presented in the document that the results of educational and methodological developments are generalized, and that representatives of the education system and organizers of mass patriotic work are informed about the innovations in this field. Since these statements are presented in a nation-wide Program, I interpret them also to mean that the educational programs and pedagogical methods the state aims to develop are meant to be introduced in a similar form everywhere in the country.

This kind of standardization of education is consistent with the general centralization development of the sphere where it has been interpreted as a regressive response to the ambitious educational reform of the early 1990s (Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005, 23, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 142). Originally, the aim of the 1990s reform was to humanize, democratize and decentralize schools in Russia (Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005, 23, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 142) corresponding to the general democratization development of the society and a particularly strong political will to establish a federated state model (Piattoeva 2010, 133). However, already in the mid-1990s cautious appeals for the all-Russian (state) values to dominate started to appear, and in the 2000s concrete legislative steps to the direction of strengthening national cohesion in and through education were taken (Piattoeva 2010, 134).

The “pedagogical and methodological support” also involves a “whole variety of pedagogical forms and means” that take “into account the characteristics of a particular category of people” (C1). This statement suggests that in the development of patriotic education, citizens are divided into groups based on certain characteristics remaining unknown to the reader that are thought to affect their competence as objects of education. These different categories, then, need different pedagogical methods. This kind of categorization manifests practices that subjectify people as individuals. According to Foucault, individualization happens by comparing people to each other, differentiating them and putting them into a hierarchical order based on their level of “normality” or “abnormality”. These practices force people to think of themselves according to a certain model and guide them to live by certain norms. (Alhanen 2007, 143, 144.) Even though category of people does not refer to putting people into a hierarchical order, there are still elements of comparison and differentiation in the statement since the categories are told to need different types of pedagogy.

The first Concept also contains a measure of a “regular publication of relevant literature covering this field of activity” that takes into account “advanced domestic and foreign pedagogical experience” which is an example of Foucault’s notion that

power produces knowledge. A whole new area of publication of literature must be established in order to assist the authorities in the implementation of the measures of the system of patriotic education.

The implementation mechanism of the second Program is told to be

“based on improving the working methods of government institutions at all levels in order to ensure state influence on the process of education, propaganda of patriotism in the media, the consolidation of social organizations (associations), [and] the coordination of their activities”.

What is new in the Program is that while one of its tasks is to “improve the quality of patriotic education in educational institutions”, the Program also aims turn into them into “centers of patriotic education of the younger generation.” Little later it is said in the text that

“The main focus [of the patriotic education activities of the Program] is on work in educational institutions as integrating centers for joint educational activities of the school, family and civic organizations (associations)”.

Based on these statements, there seems to have developed a perception at the time of the second Program that patriotic education is inseparable from other education, and that the main task of educational institutions is to convey patriotic ideology while other instances take part in the process as well. Educational institutions functioning as integrating centers intensifies the interaction between schools, family and civic organizations which creates peer pressure for different instances to stay in line with patriotic recommendations. The second Program aims to improve the process of patriotic education by continuing and expanding “work on patriotic education at all levels of activity of state institutions”, enriching the content of patriotic education, and – as a new characteristic – by developing “forms and methods of patriotic education based on new information technologies”. The Program also aims to improve

“the system of training specialists in the field of patriotic education and improve the efficiency of work on patriotic education through the legal regulation of the processes taking place in the system of patriotic education”.

Legislation makes patriotic education more effective because it obliges the authorities and other actors to act according to the Program measures. Compared to the previous Programs, the third Program continues more or less with the same measures but its new feature is the “modernization of the material and technical base of patriotic education”.

In the fourth Program and its Concept, patriotic education is made more visible than before, while its military-patriotic side is emphasized. As a change to the previous

Programs, one of the tasks is now to create “a system of patriotic education in each educational organization, labor and military collective, turning them into centers of patriotic education” (C4). Similarly, the documents aim to “fundamentally strengthen the material and technical base of patriotic education in educational, labor, creative, military and service collectives and public associations”. The fourth Program aims to improve and develop “successfully proven forms and methods of work on patriotic education” that take into account “the dynamically changing situation, age characteristics of citizens and the need for active interdepartmental, inter-sectoral interaction and public-state partnerships”. The dynamically changing situation can be a reference to the situation in the sphere of international affairs at the time that requires preparedness for swiftly changing situations. The political situation might have also been a reason to unify and intensify the interaction between various administrative and institutional bodies.

Perhaps the most conspicuous change compared to the previous Programs is the creation of “a subsystem of military-patriotic education of citizens” (C4) which is meant “to increase the prestige of the military and law enforcement agencies” (C4). According to the fourth Program this means developing “military-patriotic education of citizens, strengthening the prestige of service in the Armed Forces [...] and law enforcement agencies” and “improving the practice of patronizing military units over educational organizations and patronizing labor collectives, business structures, districts, cities, regions, territories and republics over military units”. Thus, the army has been given a position in which it answers for the educational leisure activities of citizens. Even though local governments and business still have power over military units, the position of the army further blurs the line between civil and military which can be considered as a step towards the militarization of society. This observation also comes up in a statement where the subsystem is told to include “development of active cooperation of the subjects and objects of patronage work in the field of patriotic education” in order to increase the effectiveness in “strengthening cooperation between civil and military, as well as veteran organizations” (P4). The subsystem is also told to include “a system of continuous military-patriotic upbringing of children and youth” and it aims to maintain its presence in the young person’s life by developing “patronage practices of military units over educational organizations” (P4). Due to the militaristic policy, citizens are from early on objectified, if not directly as soldiers, then at least defenders of the country.

Since patriotic education is traditionally used as a code phrase referring to military education, military training, and military preparation (Rapoport 2009, 150), it is not surprising that also in the research material military-patriotic education is described

as “an integral part of patriotic education” (C1). Military-patriotic education was a commonly used expression for patriotic education in the Soviet Union due to which the majority of people in Russia today associate patriotic education closely with militarism and have no difficulties to decode it “correctly” (Rapoport 2009, 150). Because militarism has a central position in patriotic education, it is important to examine it also as a central practice influencing society outside the army institution. As it is discussed above, the system of patriotic education contains measures that advance general militarization of society by bringing militaristic practices into civilian life. How this effect on citizens is that militarization creates and entails practices that force citizens to adapt into militaristic views on discipline and order, and direct them to consider the possibility of war to be real. This idea is conveyed in the research material, for example, with a statement that says patriotic education to aim at the formation of a person that is “able to successfully perform civil duties during peace and wartime” (P1). Since wartime is separately mentioned in the statement, it cannot be ruled out that besides activating citizens for peaceful development of society, patriotism also aims to increase their preparedness for war. Since the main purpose of the army is to defend the country from foreign invaders, militarization teaches citizens to live under an idea of a constant threat of a foreign attack. This question of survival –produced artificially or not – inhibits citizens from concentrating on other social issues that would otherwise require an absence of an existential threat. Militarization creates internal inhibitions for citizens that prohibit them from demanding different kinds of policies. Therefore, a threat of war against a foreign enemy is strategically a great way of creating social stability inside the country and to unify people to act for social goals.

Militarism and being prepared for war are continuing themes that in a form or another are present in every document of the research material; either they are present in ensuring the defense capability of the country, using the experience of the veterans in the education of the young, organizing military-patriotic defense camps or contests, or then they are remembered by publishing military history, or celebrating the defeat in the Great Patriotic War. Since the themes of war and militarism are so prevailing in the research material, it also affects the way the documents address their readers. Since the army is traditionally understood as a masculine field, gives the notable presence of militarism and military education in the research material an impression that the citizens are primarily assumed to be men. Two revealing examples in which war is associated with masculinity are a plan to organize and implement the “Lessons of manhood” with the veterans of the army and the navy (item 47, in P1 app.1) and a measure of organizing an all-Russian exhibition of fine arts called “Russian military history in the fine arts” (item 23, in P3 app.1). In the column of the expected results, the exhibition is stated to be “propaganda of heroism and masculinity of the immortal

feat of the Soviet nation in the fight for the independence of the Motherland in the field of fine arts". Perhaps because of the more or less visible assumption of citizens being primarily men, the documents are characterized by the relative absence of women. The only sphere that can be implicitly thought to refer to women is family and in a sense the statements of "ensuring the continuity of generations of Russians" (P4) and of meeting "modern challenges of [...] the social and age structure of Russian society" (P4) which refer to reproduction.

The befuddling of the line between civil and military is expressed also more subtle way in the research material by using an expression "serving the Fatherland" which appears rather frequently in one form or another and can be understood both militaristically and in a civilian way. What makes the expression so peculiar is that the documents seem to utilize, specifically its dual meaning. One the one hand, "serving the Fatherland" can be interpreted to be a euphemism for performing military service based on how it is often used in everyday language. One the other hand, the expression can also be understood more broadly than just as military service. The latter interpretation is supported by a statement that says military-patriotic education to be "aimed at the formation of readiness for military service as a special type of state service" (C1) which implies that military service is just one form of serving the Fatherland while there are other ways as well. The reason the observation of the dual meaning of "serving the Fatherland" is relevant is that although the statement is not explicitly told to refer only to the military service, its colloquial connotation gives it a militaristic undertone. Since the patriotic campaign is meant for all the citizens, the militaristic undertone stretches the meaning of the statement from the military to the civilian life which again entails the idea of military hierarchy and military-type chain of commands to the society at large. Respectively, this enables the spreading of militaristic practices that support hierarchical submission to orders and unquestioning of the appointed measures, but which also suppress people's own initiatives, narrow the freedom of speech and in general passivate societally. Since the Fatherland is stated to be primarily something to be served, the expression creates a hierarchy in which the objects of patriotism are those who serve, and the state is the instance who inevitably decides how "the Fatherland" wants to be served. It is clear that the Fatherland in this context means in all but name the representatives of the government. "Serving the Fatherland" is a useful expression for the government because since "serving" as a term is not perceived as reciprocal, the Fatherland - otherwise the government - does not need to answer to the needs of those who serve it.

Alongside militarism, another important instance that objectify citizens and influence the practices of society are the sciences. I argue that referring to the sciences functions both as a rhetorical ploy to strengthen the credibility of the argument for patriotic education but also to distance the issue from the area of politics and remove it to the area of natural sciences and laws of nature instead. This relocation makes the question about the necessity of patriotic education more difficult to debate about.

Justification by the sciences can be seen in the first Concept where the primary task of scientific and theoretical support is told to be to develop “scientifically based conceptual approaches to the organization of the patriotic education” and “its theoretical foundations” (C1). The Concept also states that

“It is envisaged to develop teaching and methodological manuals and recommendations [...] with a scientific justification for ways of familiarizing the younger generation with patriotic values, preparing it for military service and worthy service to the Fatherland”.

The authority of the sciences is used in these statements as an argument for the functionality and effectiveness of the suggested measures. Its purpose is specifically to add credibility of the argument but, however, it does not indicate that the central principles of scientific inquiry are internalized. This comes up clearly in the above statement about developing recommendations with scientific justification referring to a belief that scientific justification is possible to guarantee for certain measures in advance. This perception suggests that in the context of the documents scientific inquiry is understood more like as an engineering-type problem solving. It explains why the “formation of scientific-theoretical and methodological foundations of the patriotic education” is in the first Program acknowledged as one of the most important spheres of patriotic activities which requires “mobilization of the creative potential of scientists for a comprehensive scientific-theoretical reasoning and solution to the problems of patriotic education”. The perception of the sciences as engineering connects patriotic education even more to the sphere of natural sciences and also associates it with technology. For example, the first Concept states that “The technology of patriotic education should be aimed at creating conditions for the national revival of Russia as a great power”. In this statement, a major ideological decision to become a great power position again is shrunken into a mere issue of technological development.

The technical attitude is reflected in the statements of the documents that see citizens primarily as passive and involuntary objects that must be filled with desired information like they were blank canvases, *tabula rasas*. Seeing people as objects that can be formed as one pleases, resembles the behavioristic idea of man that was used

in psychology in the first half of the twentieth century. It believed that the development of personality only depended on the outside factors influencing a child.

This objectifying offset is usually indicated in the research material with words form or forming but is sometimes also expressed with verbs such as to shape, transform or instill. The first Program, for instance, aims to form "a citizen-patriot of the Motherland in modern conditions" and a "personality of a citizen and defender of the Fatherland". One of its tasks is also an "education of the personality of a citizen-patriot of the Motherland, able to stand up for the protection of the state interests of the country". The first Concept contains a task of "instilling in citizens a sense of pride, deep respect and reverence for symbols of the Russian Federation", while one of the principles of patriotic education aims at "transforming the worldview of citizens and their value systems, focused on the national interests of Russia". The first Concept also contains a statement according to which the system of patriotic education requires a "set of measures to shape the patriotic feelings and consciousness of citizens".

The behavioristic attitude is shown also in the level of measures that are taken in order to find the most effective ways of "forming" the patriotic consciousness in citizens. The first Concept, for instance, states that the scientific and theoretical support of patriotic education means organization of

"research in the field of patriotic education and using the results in practical activities, developing methodological recommendations for the formation and development of a citizen's personality, and enriching the content of patriotic education by including cultural, historical, spiritual, moral, ideological and other components in it which are based on the most important achievements in the field of social sciences and humanities".

The second Program states that measures to develop scientific-theoretical and methodological foundations of patriotic education include continuing research in the field of patriotic education, using the results in practical activities, and developing methodological recommendations for the formation and development of the personality of the Russian patriot. One of the tasks of the Program is also told to be to "carry out scientifically grounded organizational and propaganda activities with the aim of further developing patriotism as the core spiritual component of Russia".

The fourth Program and its Concept bring even more technological thinking to the patriotic education by emphasizing the role of innovative technologies in its development. The Concept of the fourth Program aims to introduce "science-based innovative technologies and mechanisms of education of patriotism in modern conditions" and develop scientifically justified teaching aids and recommendations "for the use in modern conditions of innovative working methods with each category

of citizens". The fourth Program also aims to improve "the methodology for measuring and refining the set of indicators reflecting the level of patriotic education in the context of the tasks of ensuring the national security".

Alongside the justification by the sciences, I argue that the authority of science is also utilized to express ideas of ideal citizenship and to develop criteria for it. For example, it is said in the first Concept that the research in the field of patriotic education is organized and the results used in practical activities, developing "guidelines for the formation and development of a citizen's personality" and evolving scientific justification for guiding citizens toward patriotic values and spiritual development (osvoeniya). Besides that, the above statement again reflects the behavioristic way of seeing people, it also hints that criteria that define the characteristics of an ideal citizen, to which the formation and development of citizen's personality is compared to, are created. Creating criteria is a similar individualization practice than dividing people into categories based on certain characteristics discussed above. People are compared, differentiated and put to hierarchical order based on these criteria, and they also function as a measuring scale in the evaluation of the patriotic development of a certain person which is the basis for further practices of punishment and rewarding. There are no clear signs of educating citizens by punishing them in the research material, but people are, instead, put into a hierarchical order by organizing competitions and rewarding the winners.

According to Foucault, biopolitics uses practices to objectify people as a population that has biological qualities, such as birth and death rate, life expectancy and certain living conditions. This objectification forms a basis for various regulatory controls, such as demography and exploration of the health and fertility, that enable modern societies to gather information of their inhabitants. Modern societies see monitoring of population important because population is seen as the foundation of the wealth of the nation and as a source of healthy and efficiently controlled work force for capitalist economy. (Alhanen 2007, 142.) Even though I do not argue that people are objectified as population based on biological qualities in the documents, I still see similarities to Foucault's thoughts in them since the increase of patriotism is numerically measured on a population level using specified scales, citizens are gathered information of (see subchapter 5.3), and the level of patriotism has been set specific numerical goals. With the increase of the level of patriotism is tried to achieve many positive changes in the society many of which imply economic rise as well. These changes are discussed in more detail below.

The success of the system of patriotic education is often in the documents told to be measured based on an obscure parameter of the level of patriotism or patriotic consciousness. For example, patriotism has been evaluated not yet to become “the fully unifying basis of society” (P2) or the level of patriotic consciousness of citizens is seen to have risen as a result of the work done (P3). The Concept of the fourth Program contains information that

“the result of the implementation of state programs was a tendency to deepen an understanding of Russian patriotism as a spiritual guide and the most important resource for the development of modern Russian society in the mass consciousness of citizens”.

Expected results of the implementation of the first Program are evaluated on socio-ideological and socio-economic fields and the field of the country’s defense. Expectations on the socio-ideological field fall on spiritual and moral development such as “ensuring the spiritual and moral unity of society, reducing the degree of ideological confrontation”, and “reviving the true spiritual values of the Russian people”. On the socio-economic field, expectations are directed to things like “reducing social tensions” and “maintaining social and economic stability”. Expectations of the field of defense focus on increasing will to defend the nation and to have more recruits to the army. Despite this classification in the first Program, the document does not relate how the results are to be verified at the end. Therefore, the evaluation process is already in the first Concept developed a little further as it is stated in the document that the managing of the system of patriotic education includes “analyzing, evaluating, forecasting and modelling the state of the patriotic education process in the country taking into account the development of social trends” and that the “status and the effectiveness of educational work are monitored”. The evaluation of the effectiveness is told to be “carried out on the basis of using a system of objective criteria which includes a focus of the educational process and its systemic nature”, “the scientific validity of the methods and the use of modern technologies having educational impact”, and “the breadth of coverage of the objects of the education”. It is unclear what is meant by the objective criteria but considering that it includes a focus on scientific validity, it is likely that the word objective refers to measurability of certain chosen variables. The main criterion of performance of the first Concept is told to be

“the level of patriotism as one of the main characteristics of the individual and the citizens [...] as a whole, manifested in the worldview, attitudes and values, socially significant behavior and activities”.

Evaluation based on indicators appears in the second Program where the effectiveness of the implementation of the program is told to be based on “generalized assessment indicators”. Their focus is on “the educational process and its systemic, informative

and organizational character”, and on the “scientific validity of the methods and the use of modern technologies” reaching “educational impact”, and “the breadth of coverage of education facilities”. The effectiveness is told to be measured by the

“degree of readiness and the desire of the Russian citizens to fulfil their civic and patriotic duty in all the variety of forms of its manifestation, their ability and desire to combine social and personal interests, [and] the real contribution they make to the prosperity of the Fatherland”

Indicators are continued to be used in the third Program in addition to which their necessity is justified by relating that “The most important condition for the effectiveness of the work on patriotic education is a constant analysis of its condition [...]”. Indicators are used because they “make it possible to determine not only the state of patriotic education in general but also individual aspects of this work”. The “generalized assessment indicators” are also continued to be used at the time of the fourth Program where the focus of the is otherwise the same but participation of the subjects is added in (C4). The indicators are virtually based on the same variables as well. As the main result of the implementation “a formation of a system of patriotic education that meets modern challenges and objectives of the development of the country, as well as the social and age structure of the Russian society” is expected (P4).

All the documents except the fourth Program contain a conclusion paragraph that presents expected final results of the implementation often involving romantic language to bring the document to a sublime end. Things like patriotic consciousness, spiritual and cultural development, strengthening the state and achieving or strengthening (socio-) economic stability are often repeated in these passages, and the documents also expect “spiritual and cultural boom” (P1) and “positive dynamics of growth of patriotism and internationalism in the country on the basis which ensures favorable conditions for spiritual and cultural growth in society” (P2, a similar statement in C4). Expectations considering militarism revolve around mentions of strengthening the defense capability (P1, C1) or national security (P3), or then aim higher to “raising the international prestige of Russia” (P2) or increasing “the international authority of the Russian Federation” (P4). This ‘fluctuation’ can be explained by the unstable situation of society in the beginning of the 2000s and by the Medvedev presidency and more liberal policies in the beginning of his term. The third Program is the most thorough and perhaps also the most pragmatic of the documents what comes to the expectations of the end results as it assumes

“a positive growth of patriotism in the country, an increase in social and labor activity of citizens, especially young people, [and] their contribution to the development of the main areas of life and activity of society and the state, overcoming extremist manifestations of certain groups of citizens and other negative phenomena, the revival of spirituality, social-economic and political stability and the strengthening of national security”.

In this subchapter, I have examined the strategy of patriotic education that is created by the Russian government to achieve control over the perception of citizenship of Russians. The strategy is aimed to be extended from the top of the society to the grassroots level by creating a single state policy which involves centralized and hierarchical administrative structure and inclusion of all possible instances and dispositives of society into it. The result of this effort is a giant dispositive in which shared practices and practices from militaristic and scientific spheres bind different dispositives together. Alongside education, the dispositive also functions as a system of surveillance. Militaristic practices that belong to patriotic education blur the limit between civilian and military life which advances general militarization of society. Due to the emphasis on military, citizens are seen primarily as defenders of the Fatherland, and citizenship is mostly associated with men, while women remain relatively absent in the research material. The authority of science is used in the documents to make patriotism to look a matter of natural sciences than a political issue. Scientific discursive practices are also used to objectify citizens behavioristically and to create criteria of an ideal citizen.

5.3 Discourse of Patriotic Morality

While the previous subchapter concerned the system of patriotic education and its practices that objectifies citizens as subjects of patriotic education, in this subchapter I focus on examining how patriotic education is seen as a moral question. For this purpose, I use Foucault's perceptions on morality and self-constituting practices and study what they look like in the context of patriotic education.

In his own studies, Foucault used the concept of problematization to analyze how sexuality was developed into a moral question in various historical times. The problematization of sexuality objectified modern Western people as sexual subjects creating practices that guide people to think and shape themselves as individuals having sexual desires. These practices do not only have influence in health institutions or institutions of science, but they affect various spheres of private life as well (Alhanen 2007, 22-23, 154-155).

Problematization of the lack of patriotism resembles Foucault's way to see sexuality as a moral question. Citizens are objectified as subjects of education and guided to examine and shape themselves accordingly. It is also stated that even though the responsibility of the functioning of the system lies with the state, it "does not remove the moral responsibility for its functioning from the society and every citizen" (C1).

Moreover, the Russian term for patriotic education (*patrioticheskoye vospitaniye*⁶) itself refers to education as moral upbringing which implies moral approach to the lack of patriotism in the documents as well. Russian pedagogy traditionally consists of two equally important components of academic education (*obucheniy*) and of moral education or upbringing (*vospitaniye*). The former providing students with knowledge and skills, while the latter focuses on moral development by teaching values and manners. Moral education is provided both in and out of classroom, but it is included in extracurricular activities as well. (Rapoport 2009, 141–142.) Although the term for moral development (*vospitaniye*) also translates into spiritual development, the expression is almost completely deprived of its religious connotation (Kliucharev & Muckle 2005, as cited in Rapoport 2009, 142).

In order to have an idea of patriotic morality, I examine the documents by using Foucault's perceptions of morality. Foucault saw morality to have several different meanings, such as morality as (1) a collection of moral laws, (2) as moral behavior, or (3) as practices people use to build moral subjects of themselves. Morality as a collection of moral laws refers to an entity that guides values and rules of behavior people are given through different institutions, such as family, educational institutions and church. The rules and values may either be formulated precisely inside a coherent doctrine and implemented through explicit educational measures, or they are a complex and badly conveyed group of factors that substitute, correct and refute each other enabling various compromises and sidesteps. (Foucault 1998, 133, Foucault 1984/1997, 32, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 154.)

As regards of moral laws of patriotism, I examine values that are either explicitly mentioned in the documents or are implied through the problematization of a lack patriotism, the definition and goals, or by naming the opposites of patriotic values. The explicitly stated values in the documents are law-abidingness, tolerance and internationalism. Two tasks of the first Concept are

“to educate citizens in a spirit of respect for the Constitution of the Russian Federation, legality, and the norms of social and collective life, and to create conditions for ensuring the realization of constitutional human rights and duties meaning civil, professional and military duty”

⁶ Considering the goal of fostering patriotic consciousness among citizens and to catch better the initial meaning of the Russian term lost in the translation, it would be reasonable to call Russian patriotic education with a term patriotic upbringing instead. However, I have chosen to stick to the term *patriotic education* in this thesis because I believe it describes Russian current education policy better as a social and political phenomenon.

and to form “racial, national and religious tolerance, and development of friendly relations between nations”. The Concept of the fourth Program that also states inter-ethnic and interfaith relations to be improved, and the citizens to be “educated to respect the spirit of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rule of law and the norms of social life”. Internationalism as a value of patriotism is expressed in the first Concept that says:

“Patriotism harmoniously combines the best national traditions of the people with devotion to serving the Fatherland. Patriotism is inextricably linked with internationalism, alien to nationalism, separatism and cosmopolitanism.”

Besides internationalism, the quotation promotes strong collective will to serve the nation and opposes the spread of undesired foreign influences. Patriotism is linked with internationalism, while it is distanced from nationalism, separatism and cosmopolitanism. This is likely due to a need to separate the state idea of patriotism from that of right-wing extremists and of nations seeking independence with arms. Based on what was said in the Chapter 3, the statement of patriotism being alien to cosmopolitanism can be interpreted to refer to opposing Western influences.

The definition of Russian patriotism in the first Concept also contains values that can be considered to belong to patriotic morality. Patriotism is told to be “one of the most striking features of the Russian national character” and Russian patriotism is told to have “its own characteristics”. It is somewhat circularly noted to be “a high humanistic orientation of the Russian patriotic idea” that includes toleration, conciliarism (*sobornost'*), law abiding, “community as a stable inclination and the need of the Russians for collective life”, and “special love for the native nature”. The values listed in this definition also aim to promote social stability and prevent ethnic conflicts. The definition is yet another example of the way governmentality produces knowledge since Russians are seen in it as one nation that is essentialistically thought to have a common character one of the most striking features of which is patriotism. Thus, Russians are in the definition stated to be both unified and patriotic by nature.

Moral laws of patriotism can also be found in the goals of the Programs some of which have endured rather consistently throughout the documents. Forming a high patriotic consciousness is mentioned often (P1, C1, P2, P3) along with a sense of loyalty to the Fatherland and readiness to fulfill civic duty and constitutional duties (P1, C1, P2). The first Program and its Concept also mention high spirituality and civic position. The fourth Program diverges from the previous documents at level of its abstraction since its goal in the sphere of patriotic education is

“to create conditions for increasing civil responsibility for the fate of the country, raising the level of society’s consolidation to meet the challenges of ensuring national security and

sustainable development of the Russian Federation, strengthening the citizen's sense of belonging to the great history and culture of Russia, ensuring the continuity of generations of Russians, bringing up a citizen who loves his Motherland and family as an active life position".

Examining the values and ideas patriotism is compared or contrasted to is another way to found out what the moral laws of patriotism are. The first Program contains a statement that relates "indifference, egoism, individualism, cynicism, unmotivated aggressiveness and disrespectful attitude towards the state and social institutions" to have become widespread due to the lack of patriotism which means that patriotism signifies solicitude, self-sacrifice, collectivism, optimism, peaceability and respect. Prestige of the military and public service can also be seen as part of patriotism since the first Program mentions it to have fallen steadily.

A frequently occurring value in the research material is *dukhovnost'* which usually translates as spirituality (Rousselet 2020, 38). Originally a religious term (Rousselet 2020, 40), *dukhovnost'* became associated with Russian identity in the early nineteenth century (Strelianyi 2001, as cited in Rousselet 2020, 39). Its secularized version was later used in the Soviet Union to develop citizens moral sense, encourage them to prioritize non-material values, make them a part of tradition, and call for solidarity and a sense of collectivity. In the 1970s and 1980s, *dukhovnost'* became to define Russian people and contrast Russian identity against the West in the nationalist rhetoric. The concept was also used in the Soviet pedagogy which intended to develop a spiritual sphere during the Brezhnev regime. At that time, spiritual life became a keystone of education which it has been till today. Contemporary use of the concept is aimed at reinforcing social bonding and conveying Russian tradition, even though its meaning is diverse and is in places contested. Besides binding contemporary citizens together, the concept is also meant to unite Russians in a diachronic perspective, throughout history, in order to feed citizens' commitment to Russian society. In addition, *dukhovnost'* is in the current political debate used to contrast 2000s and 2010s with 1990s because the concept stands in opposition to western liberal values and the experience of the 1990s. In the 21st century, the use of the concept in the public discussion has intensified probably because of its ability to nourish national particularism has been further reinforced by the rise of patriotism and nationalism. (Rousselet 2020, 38–39, 42, 44–47.)

Usually *dukhovnost'* is used in statements that have some kind of an otherworldly tone in them. The "devaluation of spiritual values" (P1) is presented as a proof of the country's degradation that requires "formation of spiritual-patriotic values" (P1). Patriotism is also said to give a new impetus to "the spiritual recovery of the people" (C1). According to the document,

“the underestimation of patriotism as the most important component of social consciousness leads to a weakening of the socio-economic, spiritual and cultural foundations of the development of the society and the state” (C1).

Other statements recommend veteran organizations and associations of artists to make “a fuller use of their experience and spiritual potential” (P1), expect results that ensure “the spiritual and moral unity of society”, revive “the true spiritual values of the Russian people” (P1), and bring a “socio-economic, spiritual and cultural boom” as a final result contributing to the overcoming of the crisis. In the second Program patriotism is aimed to be developed further “as the core spiritual component of Russia”, and it is acknowledged that the “multi-nationality of the country, the diversity of national cultures and their mutual understanding contribute to the material and spiritual progress of society”. It is stated in the Concept of the fourth Program that there has been a tendency to deepen the “understanding of Russian patriotism as a spiritual guide and the most important resource for the development of modern Russian society” in the mass consciousness of citizens. In the fourth Program patriotism is also described as the spiritual guide of modern generations of Russian citizens (P4), and it is also told to act as the spiritual and sociocultural basis of Russian society (P4).

The moral laws of patriotic ideology focus on values and rules of behavior that promote social stability, spirituality, respect for institutions, responsibility of the public interest, and collectivity. They also foster high patriotic consciousness, and loyalty and readiness to serve and protect the interests of the Fatherland even up to making the ultimate sacrifice for it. The moral laws also encourage to oppose cosmopolitanism and foreign influences.

According to Foucault, morality as a moral behavior refers to the actual behavior people carry out compared to the rules and values that are given to them (Foucault 1998, 132 and Foucault 1984/1997, 32–33, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 155). There is a reference to surveillance of people’s moral behavior in the first Program where it is told about a proposition to create “public information and analytical centers” that accumulate information about “the problems of the formation and development of the personality of a citizen-patriot of the Motherland”. In the second Program it is then told that centers of patriotic education have been established and operate in most of the constitutional entities. Later in the fourth Program it is told about a monitoring of the civil-patriotic and spiritual and moral education that was carried out in 2013–2014. It analyzed, among other things, the involvement of citizens in the system of patriotic education, and the introduction of modern forms, methods and means into the activities of the organizers and specialists of patriotic education. The results present a great amount of numerical data about the development or increase in different fields

compared to the previous years. One of the effective forms of work with young people of pre-conscription age is told to be “the organization of defense and sports camps, the total number of which was about 2000”, while “the share of young citizens participating in patriotic education events held as a part of regional programs on patriotic education or pre-conscription training for young people” is told to average “21,6 percent of the total number of young citizens in the country”. Moreover, the country is said to have now more than 22, 000 patriotic associations, clubs and centers, including those of children’s and youths.

According to Foucault, morality can also be understood as practices people use to build moral subjects of themselves. This side of morality refers to different habits and techniques that people use to shape themselves as moral agents. Foucault calls these habits and techniques as self-constituting practices (*pratiques de soi*) which he divides into four categories. These categories are determination of ethical substance of subjects (*détermination de la substance éthique*), mode of subjection (*mode d’assujettissement*), forms of ethical work (*formes de l’élaboration*) and telos (*téléologie*) (Alhanen 2007, 156, 164).

Self-constituting practices determine the ethical substance of human activity by defining what part of it is morally significant and, thus, objectify the sphere in which individuals are expected to shape themselves as moral subjects. Ethical substance can refer to actions, desires, feelings, thoughts or intentions, but it can also use more delicate distinctions, such as expectations on the amount and volume of desires or feelings. (Alhanen 2007, 164–165.)

I see that citizens are expected to shape themselves as moral subjects in the areas of patriotic worldview, militarism, history and societal activity. In the sphere of patriotic worldview, citizens must develop a high patriotic consciousness on a personal level and then perform it on a macro level with other citizens. In addition, citizens must acquire necessary qualities of a citizen-patriot such as spirituality and proper way of living private life.

The definitions of patriotism presented in the research material can be characterized both as a personality and as a performance. In the first Concept, patriotism is primarily defined as a feeling that is “love for the Motherland, devotion to one’s Fatherland, a desire to serve its interests and a willingness, even self-sacrifice, to defend it”. On a personal level “patriotism acts as the most important stable characteristic of a person, expressed in his worldview, moral ideals [and] norms of behavior”. On a macro level, patriotism is told to be “a significant part of public consciousness, manifested in

collective moods, feelings, and assessments” in relation to individual’s “people, lifestyle, history, culture, state and the system of fundamental values”. Citizens must be instilled “a sense of pride, deep respect and reverence for the symbols of the Russian Federation” (C1) as well as to support their “affirmation of patriotism, [and] readiness for decent service to the Fatherland as the most important values in the minds and feelings of citizens”. “[F]ostering pride in the Russian state and its accomplishments” is also mentioned in the second Program. The fourth Program promotes

“strengthening and development of national consciousness, high morality, civil solidarity of Russians, nurturing citizen’s pride in the country’s historical and modern achievements, respect for the culture, traditions and history of peoples inhabiting Russia”

but in the Concept of the fourth Program citizens are reprimanded that the “role of Russian patriotism as the value-semantic core of personal development, family, civil society [...]” has not become strong enough among them. Patriotism is in the above statements described as a feeling of love and self-sacrifice that forms – I would say – a cognitive basis for citizens’ attitudes and actions. Patriotism is a name for a group of norms according to which citizens evaluate themselves as patriots. These norms involve identifying and presenting oneself as a patriot, respecting and defending the Fatherland and its history, and conforming to the public mood.

A part of patriotic personality and, hence, performance is formed by the qualities of a citizen-patriot of the Motherland that “is able to successfully perform civil duties during peace and wartime” (P1). These qualities are provided by “a system of measures of state institutions to improve the process of patriotic education” that answers for the

“formation of the Russian citizens of spiritual and patriotic values, professional qualities and abilities, a sense of loyalty to the constitutional and military duties as well as readiness to manifest them in various spheres of society, especially in the military and public service”.

Moreover, the first Concept says that

“The goal of patriotic education is the development in Russian society of high social activity, civic responsibility, spirituality, the formation of citizens with positive values and qualities capable of displaying them in a constructive process in the interests of the Fatherland, strengthening the state, ensuring its vital interests and sustainable development.”

The Concept of the fourth Program also states that

“The strategic goal of the Program is to shape the attitude of citizens to the need for patriotism values which is the basic condition for the reproduction of the motives and meanings of the defense and creation of the Fatherland.”

Therefore, it is not enough that citizens identify themselves as patriot and act according to publicly but, in addition, they must develop necessary skills, qualities and abilities, and an active lifestyle to be able to advance the development of society.

Another sphere in which citizens are expected to shape themselves is militarism. Although militarism already widely affects in the practices of patriotic education, an individual is still expected to develop a proper inner motivation to defend the country which ultimately means being ready to be killed in a battle. This expectation is shown in the first Concept where patriotism is, among other characterizations, defined as “a willingness, even self-sacrifice, to defend it”. Therefore, military-patriotic education contains its own set of values due to which it is

“characterized by a specific focus, a deep understanding by each citizen of his role and place in serving the Fatherland, high personal responsibility for fulfilling the requirements of military service, [and] the conviction of the need to form the necessary qualities and skills for performing military duty in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops, [...]” (C1).

Based on this quotation, militaristic values involve components such as hierarchy, personal responsibility and professionalism. The first Program also adds to this list a sense of loyalty to the military duty and readiness to manifest it. Militarism also contains a certain spiritual element as “familiarizing the younger generation with patriotic values, preparing it for military service and worthy service to the Fatherland” (P1, P2) is present as one of the measures of patriotic education. Moreover, militarism also highlights traditions and a certain type of military honor by preserving the continuity of “glorious military and labor traditions” (P1) and with “education of readiness for decent and selfless service to society and the state, to fulfill the duties of defense of the Fatherland” (P2). While the first Program and second Program approach military service from the perspective of military duty, by the third Program the tone changes into discussion of individual’s motivation when “the formation of a positive attitude of society towards military service and positive motivation among young people regarding military service under contract and conscription” is told to be one of its tasks. In the fourth Program, the duty rhetoric makes a comeback but still the motivational angle is kept alive beside it. For example, citizens are “trained citizens with high motivation for military and public service” (P4) and “the best practices in the practice of military patriotic education of youth, [and] the formation of a positive attitude to the military and public service” are studied and implemented (P4). Moreover, a new emphasis on skills and orientation is involved to military education as it is planned to form “young people of moral and psychological readiness to defend the Fatherland, loyalty to the constitutional and military duty during peace and wartime, [and] high civil responsibility” (C4) and also to create “conditions for the recruitment of the Armed Forces [...] and other military formations [...] morally,

psychologically and physically trained citizens with high motivation for military service” (C4).

Historical (military) success stories as inspiring examples of proper patriotic behavior an individual should reach toward are also a one sphere of ethical substance explaining why history teaching and respect for historical achievements have so much importance in the research material where they also intertwine with *dukhovnost'*. Since the concept of *dukhovnost'* has been used to unite contemporary Russians with their forebears, it is easy to imagine it to bring some extra dimension to the identification with historical narration. An indication of the importance of history appears first time in the first Program in which the “experience and achievements of the past” in the development of the main ways the system of patriotic education is said to be taken into account. A clearer indication of the significance of the history for patriotic education is given later when it is said that

“the heroic events of the national history, the country’s outstanding achievements in the field of politics, economics, science, culture and sports still retain qualities of moral ideals that create real prerequisites for the development of a set of measures of the patriotic education of citizens, taking into account the current tendencies related to the consolidation of society and the rise of patriotism”.

The history is, thus, seen primarily as a resource of educational examples and alongside education, culture, the state and ethnicities it is one of the components that patriotic education relies on (C1). The significance of history for patriotic education is also described in the Concept of the fourth Program in which the “heroic years of struggle and labor” are told to have accumulated an entire resource with “a very rich educational potential” that is actively used to “form ideals of patriotic values about the service of the Fatherland among modern generations of Russian citizens” and “their readiness to protect it”. Teaching respect for traditions and the sacrifices of the past generations of Russia is also connected to the exemplariness of history as the first Concept mentions a task of “approval in society, in the minds and feelings of citizens of [...] respect for the cultural and historical past of Russia, [and] for traditions” in order to increase “the prestige of the state, especially military service”. Moreover, to improve the process of patriotic education, the second Program presents a “perpetuation of the memory of soldiers who died during the defense of the Fatherland”.

In addition of perceiving history as a collection of examples, it is also wanted to be seen as an inspiration or a source of motivation for serving the Fatherland. For example, the first Concept presents a

“principle of universality of the main directions of patriotic education which implies a holistic and integrated approach and a need to use socially valuable experience of past generations in the formation of patriotism that cultivate a sense of pride in one’s ancestors, national traditions in everyday life and in intrafamily relations, studying and approaches to work, and methods of creativity”.

Concept of the fourth Program also states that patriotism

“as the spiritual guideline of modern generations of Russians, the historical mission of Russian patriotism is to revive and develop in the feelings, consciousness, actions, motives and senses of activity of citizens the heroic past of Russia [...]”.

On the basis of the last quotation, history could be claimed even to form a part of individual’s identity since in the quotation a collective narrative is wanted to become a part of an individual’s consciousness almost as it was a part of individual’s own life story. This observation is also supported by a statement from the fourth Program according to which the goal of state policy in the sphere of patriotic education in the modern conditions is to “strengthen citizens’ sense of belonging to the great history and culture of Russia”. It clearly is not enough that individuals are conscious about the events of the country in the past, but they must take part in it and carry their responsibility in ensuring the continuity of the heroic story of Russia in the future. However, even though history and history teaching have a great role in the patriotic ideology, the Concept of the fourth Program also acknowledges that it cannot be the overriding part of the patriotic education since it states that

“Patriotic education should be aimed at realizing the goals of advanced development of Russia in the world community which places new demands on the institutions of socialization, education, culture which in their activities should be based not only on past achievements but also develop methods and technologies necessary for the emergence of the younger generation in the future”.

Finally, citizens are expected to shape themselves as moral subjects on the sphere of societal activity to which I include individual responsibility of the proper functioning of the system of the patriotic education. The first Program hardly pays any attention to the societal activity as a sphere of ethical substance but in the first Concept, patriotism is described to be “manifested in actions and in human activities” that are “always concrete, aimed at real objects”. Patriotism is also said to be active by its nature “which enables it to transform a feeling (chuvstvennoe nachalo) into concrete things and act for the Fatherland and the state”. Patriotism is thought to form the moral basis for the “active civic stance of the individual” and one’s “readiness to serve the Fatherland selflessly” (C1). One goal of patriotic education is told to be to develop a high social activity and civic responsibility in Russian society. The system of patriotic education is said to be designed to ensure

“the purposeful formation of an active position among citizens, to promote their full inclusion in the solution of the state tasks, to create conditions for the development of their

state thinking, habits to act in accordance with the national interests of Russia. It should prepare young people and encourage other generations to engage in such a nature of activity, in which knowledge and life experience are combined with the position of civic duty and participation in the fate of the Motherland, personal interests – with the public” (C1).

Moreover, it is told in the afterword of the first Concept that the document is meant to work as “the basis for [...] increasing the activity of citizens [...] to perform socially important functions in various spheres of social life”. Next time the sphere of societal activity as an ethical substance is commented in the third Program in which the system of patriotic education is said to be “aimed at the establishment of patriotism as the moral basis for the formation of their [citizens’] active life position” and mentions that “Young people are actively working in public associations whose activities are aimed at the patriotic education of citizens”. The third Program also expects to be “an increase in social and labor activity of citizens, especially young people, their contribution to the development of the main areas of life and activity of society and the state [...]”. The significance of societal activity is also discussed in the fourth Program that mentions

“the formation of citizens, including children and young people, an active citizenship, a sense of belonging to the processes taking place in the country, the history and culture of Russia by involving them in volunteer practice”

and “creation of conditions for the development of civic activism in the formation of a patriotic culture in electronic and print media, the Internet information and telecommunications network”. The expected result is a “significant increase in the level of citizen involvement in volunteer and social practice” (P4).

In the context of societal activity, the documents often highlight a sense of responsibility as a moral characteristic. As mentioned before, a statement in the first Concept says that even though the main responsibility of the system of patriotic education is on the state, “it does not remove the moral responsibility for its functioning from the society and every citizen”. The fourth Program also speaks for “the promotion of the creation of conditions for the realization of duties, civil and military duty” and that the goal of state policy

“is to create conditions for increasing civil responsibility for the fate of the country, raising the level of society’s consolidation to meet the challenges of ensuring national security and sustainable development [...]”.

An interesting thing in the research material is that down the line the documents highlight the significance of fulfilling the duties of a citizen while larger discussion about the rights and duties is absent. Human rights are mentioned only once in the research material and even then, its mentioned in relation to duties. The first Concept

namely demands “the creation of conditions for ensuring the realization of human constitutional rights and their duties, civil, professional and military duty”. In addition to that citizens are obliged to act according to their duties in the present, they also have responsibilities in relation to the future. The Concept of the fourth Program states that “the formation of Russian civic identity based on the values of Russian patriotism” makes “possible to raise the consciousness of every Russian citizen as the creator of the future of his country and defender of its national interests.”

According to Foucault, self-constituting practices also determine the mode of subjection by defining the way the subjects should submit themselves to the moral laws. In the history of the Western world, this has meant, for instance, submission to a divine or natural law, resignation to the requirements of reason, or attempts to achieve an existence as esthetic as possible. However, mere moral laws do not dictate the way individuals have to submit to their requirements. Instead, the mode of subjection is produced by the practices that construct moral subjects. (Pulkkinen 1998, 96–111, as cited in Alhanen 2007, 165.)

As it is already mentioned a few times in other contexts of this analysis, all of the spheres of ethical substance presented in the research material also contain a hierarchical undertone that requires individuals to submit to the will of someone higher in the social system. It is said more or less explicitly that at the top of this hierarchy is the state. The mode of subjection presented to the citizens in the documents is the discursive practice according to which citizens have to bring together their personal interests with the interests of the state. Citizens are given a nominal freedom to act as they desire in the research material, but this freedom is watered down by statements that outline it to a sphere which simultaneously implies a limitation of the political power of citizens. For example, in the first Concept patriotism is said to be a “voluntarily accepted position of citizens in which the priority of public, state is not a restriction but an incentive for individual freedom”. It is “a special focus of self-realization and social behavior of citizens [...]” which suggests “the priority of social and state principles over individual interests and aspirations” (C1). Patriotic education is also told to involve “the harmonious combination of personal and social interests” (C1) which suggests that individuals must take the interests of the society into consideration in their life choices. According to the Concept of the fourth Program, it “should create opportunities for young people to choose their future, linking it with national interests and development prospects of the country” and its “strategic reference point” is told to be “in creating conditions for every citizen of Russia to freely choose their future in the context of the interests, goals and objectives of development and ensuring Russia’s national security” (C4). The level

of subjection is also measured as the effectiveness of the Program is told to be measured by “the degree of the ability and desire of citizens to combine social and personal interests, with the real contribution they make to the benefit of the Fatherland”.

Self-constituting practices consist of various forms of ethical work which subjects use to shape their behavior on the field of ethical substance defined by practices. Forms of ethical work are different individual techniques, such as bodily and mental exercises, exercises of abstinence, learning and recalling of rules, and examining one’s own thoughts and desires. (Alhanen 2007, 166.)

The forms of ethical work are in the research material most often included into the means of publications, events and educational activities. I see that techniques advanced through these means are encouragement to study fields and topics considered as patriotic, identification with patriotism and patriotic examples, repetition, collective activity and associating positive experiences with patriotism. Moreover, perhaps competing can be counted in to these techniques as well. Many of these techniques advance socialization in general which is an effective tool to involve especially younger citizens who are looking for friends and want to belong to some collective.

I see publications to involve techniques of encouraging to learn and repetition. Publications produced for the purposes of patriotic education are domestic study guides (P1) and printed products depicting the state symbols of Russia the production of which is aimed to be expanded and which are aimed to be provided to educational institutions, cultural institutions, military units, public organizations, patriotic clubs and centers (P2). Events may at their best contain all the techniques of ethical work given above. The events mentioned in the research material are, among other things, art festivals, competitions, exhibitions and contests (P3) but also patriotic events held in traditional folk culture centers, theaters, libraries and museums (P3). Alongside events, educational activities can also be seen to use all the techniques above. Therefore, there is, for example, an aim to strengthen “the patriotic orientation in the courses of social and humanitarian disciplines” (P2) and develop “training courses on the history of the Fatherland, Russian science and technology in relation to each specialty” (P2). The third Program mentions reviving of traditional forms of educational work and introduction of innovations.

Some of the forms of ethical work are in the research material specifically targeted to some specific group such as families or younger people the reproductive ‘health’ of

which there is a concern. Families are in the documents expected to have a proper family model and traditional family values. There is, for instance, an aim to develop methods and organization of work to form “minors and young people a proper reproductive behavior and attitude for starting a family [formirovaniju...ustanovok na sozdanie sem’i] as a basis of reviving traditional moral values” (item 97, in P1, app.1). The second Program presents that methodological materials are prepared for this purpose (P2, app.1). Forming a proper reproductive behavior can be interpreted to be a result of the intolerant attitudes toward homosexuals which are shown in the Russian society as homophobic attitudes among citizens based on public opinion polls⁷, an embracement of the Russian Orthodox Church of homophobic attitudes, and as a number of legislative actions that ban this ‘non-traditional orientation’ (Sperling 2014, 73–75). Based on the above measures, patriotic education, thus, objectifies citizens as heterosexuals and as supporters of traditional (family) values. After the second Program, the measures of this kind sexual education are not presented but instead the third Program presents measures of organizing all-Russian family festival called “A Strong Family – Strong Russia” (item 39, P3, app.1) and a nationwide contest of young families called “Love towards the Fatherland begins in the Family” (item 40 P3, app.1). The purpose of both of these measures is “to develop the educational potential of families in raising children and the youth as a partner of the state” being concrete actions to strengthen the sense of responsibility of families of patriotic education and to objectify parents and other adults as subjects of patriotic education.

Another group that forms of ethical work are especially targeted to be young people and especially those who are in the conscription age. The most often mentioned means of ethical work on the field of militarism are sports, sport events and other type of competing, such as all-Russian military-sports games (P1, P4), defense and sport camps (P4), the all-Russian sports and sports complex “Ready for Labor and Defense” (TRP)” (P4) and competition of projects, programs, forms and methods of patriotic education (P1). Another means is to create themed clubs and associations that are one way or another relating to militarism and establish “clubs and training centers for a future warrior” (P1). The fourth Program also mentions the organizations of search work that look for remains of the people killed in battles in order to offer them a

⁷ According to public opinion polls from the year 2012, 45 percent of people surveyed nationwide “experienced negative emotions when interacting with homosexuals”, 61 percent believed that homosexuality was acquired rather than inherent, and according 47 percent of the respondents thought that homosexuality resulted from exposure to the mass media and other sources of propaganda. Moreover, according to a poll by Levada Center, homosexuality was seen as the result of “an illness or loose morals” by three-fourths of Russians. (Sperling 2014, 73.)

⁸ A nationwide ban on homosexual “propaganda” was passed by the Russian parliament in January 2013. Before this, multiple Russian cities had passed laws that banned promotion of homosexuality to minors, or outlawed gay right rallies and distribution of literature about homosexuality. (Sperling 2014, 73–74.)

proper burial (app.1). Militarism is also advanced in the society by keeping it in the lime light in order to maximize its repetition. This is done by holding days and months of “the Defender of the Fatherland” (P1) as well as involving veteran and creative organizations and associations in working with young people (P1). There is also an aim to organize permanent programs and publications in television, radio and in the press about the problems of patriotic education to which war veterans and military staff take part (P1), and to encourage publishing companies and scientists to publish more military history literature and research (P1). The forms of ethical work in the sphere of militarism also include some spiritual practices since assistance of the denominations of the traditional Russian religions in forming citizen’s need to serve and protect the Motherland as the highest spiritual duty is mentioned in the documents (C1, C4).

The last of the areas of the forms of ethical work is history teaching. Although this area does not concern some particular group of people, I see important to bring it out as a separate sphere. Before the fourth Program and its Concept, history teaching can be said to occur only in the second Program where the “development of training courses on the history of the Fatherland, Russian science and technology in relation to each specialty” is mentioned. The significance of history is otherwise emphasized in other documents as well, except in the third one. History teaching in general aims at the “Formation of a patriotic worldview through the development of patriotic-oriented historical knowledge of citizens” (C4) which includes “the intensification of interest in the study of the history of the Fatherland and the formation of a sense of respect for the heroic past of our country” (C4). Younger generation is wanted to be develop a sense of “pride, deep respect and reverence for the symbols of the state” which are “the coat of arms, flag, anthem of the Russian Federation, [and] other Russian, especially military symbols and historical shrines of the Fatherland”(P4, C4). The general historical knowledge is also wanted to be increased by preserving of the historical memory, developing interest in “Russian science and its prominent figures – the patriots of Russia”, and organizing “all-Russian competitions, seminars, conferences, exhibitions and expositions dedicated to glorious historical events and significant dates in Russia” (C4). General history teaching is tightly linked with militarism and military history often described with romanticizing language of heroism and heroic deeds. There is, for example, an aim to intensify the interest in studying the history of Russia and forming

“a sense of respect for the past of our country, its heroic pages, including the preservation of the memory of the exploits of the defenders of the Fatherland, enhancing citizens’ knowledge of the events that became the basis of public holidays and memorials of Russia and its regions” (P4).

“[T]he heroic deeds and prominent figures of Russian history and culture from ancient times to the present day” are also aimed to be popularized (P4) and “interest of Russian citizens in the military history of the Fatherland during the preparation and celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945⁹” (C4) to be increased.

The last category of the self-constituting practices defined by Foucault comprises habits and techniques that define the telos – a certain form of existence – that moral subjects should strive for. A telos can mean, for example, a full control of the self, withdrawal from the world, wisdom or ablation. Moral subjects aim to achieve their telos through moral acts that are seen as a part of a whole formed by behavior. In this whole, each moral act takes subjects closer to their desired form of existence. (Alhanen 2007, 167.)

I see that the multiple goals of patriotic education presented in the documents can be crystallized into one goal that strives for – as the first Concept states – to “the national revival of Russia as a great power”. Even though this goal is explicitly mentioned only once in the research material, it can, nevertheless, be seen to contain all other expected results mentioned in the documents, whether they are strategical or moral. A great power status the country implies a strong inner unity and stability, and a good defense capability which all require a strong state. Russia must also have economic power so that the country’s interests are listened to in the international arena when financial interests are at stake. Alongside natural resources, this usually requires an efficient work culture that is capable of producing innovations rather frequently. This kind of culture requires trust among its members and a sense of physical, mental, social and financial security so that citizens have resources to be efficient, take responsibility of each other and think creatively. At this point, the morality comes into the picture because in order to function as a political community, citizens must have a common moral basis that they can commit to and act based on it. I interpret that patriotism is meant to function as this kind of a moral basis but because it is traditionally understood as an apolitical issue, it easily lacks the necessary content that would make it look as a dynamic and attractive force to be used as a mobilizing resource. The spheres of ethical substance presented above aim to form the missing content of patriotism where the subjects perform forms of ethical work trying to achieve the telos of which they already have experience historically.

⁹ The Great Patriotic War are stated to be waged in the years of 1941–1945 even though the Soviet Union was in war against Finland already in 1939.

In this subchapter, I have tried to examine patriotism as moral question following Foucault's thoughts of morality and self-constituting practices. The collection of moral laws of patriotism includes values that especially aim to advance social stability and prevent ethnic conflicts. Other important values of patriotism relating to these goals are spirituality, respect of institutions, responsibility of the common good and collectivity. In addition, citizens are expected to have a high patriotic consciousness, loyalty and readiness to serve the Fatherland and a will to oppose foreign influences. In order to have information about the citizens' moral behavior, public information and analytical centers are established in different places around the country. Citizens are expected to shape themselves as moral subjects by pursuing self-constituting practices which in the case of patriotism means shaping oneself in the areas of patriotic worldview, militarism, history and social activity. Patriotic worldview involves patriotic personality, performance and certain skills and abilities, whereas militarism stresses readiness to die for the Fatherland, good motivation for the military service and certain nobility which is promoted with religious practices. History is seen especially as a resource of educational examples and a source of motivation. Social activity concerns also social responsibility. The central mode of subjection presented in the research material is putting interests of the state before personal ones. The techniques for people to develop themselves as moral subjects are most often those that I see to advance socialization anyway. Another important technique is repetition. Finally, the ultimate goal of patriotic education is that Russia achieves again the great power status it once had.

6 CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have examined how citizenship is constructed in the discourses I have identified from the Russian state patriotic education Programs. The analysis results reveal that the creation of the system of patriotic education is justified by the improvement of the difficult circumstances of society, and the system is based on an idea that citizens must be educated to become patriotic members of society. The current societal conditions are seen to be due to the lack of patriotism caused by democratic reforms in the 1990s. Therefore, patriotic education of citizens requires that citizens mostly abandon the democratic principles learned in the 1990s and adopt instead a new perception of citizenship as a patriotic identity.

The patriotic education of citizens implies re-organization of the institutional basis of society so that the state has a possibility to affect individual practices at the local level. For this purpose, the state gathers basically all dispositives in society under a single state policy, and their integration is strengthened by creating shared practices and adopting militaristic and scientific ones into a common use. Militaristic practices objectify citizens as defenders of the Fatherland advancing militarization of society, and associate citizenship especially with men. Scientific practices contribute to a development in which citizens are treated behavioristically as objects of endless outside modification. Moreover, certain criteria for an ideal citizenship are created following scientific practices.

Besides the societal structure that supports patriotic development, patriotic education also needs an ideological foundation on the basis of which a common morality of citizens can be developed in different institutions. Patriotic morality involves values, rules of behavior and self-constituting practices according to which citizens are expected to shape themselves as moral subjects. Self-constituting practices of citizens concentrate on the areas of patriotic worldview, militarism, history and societal

activity. Citizens are directed to submit to an order in which the interests of the state are primary to personal ones, and this is emphasized with statements of duties and responsibilities. All the efforts of individuals' self-development are seen as a contribution in achieving societal goals that are believed eventually to lead to a restoration of Russia as a great power.

The perception of citizenship described in the research material in many places resembles the republican citizenship tradition. Like the republican tradition, patriotic education highlights the responsibilities and duties of citizens, loyalty to the Fatherland, societal activity and participation for the common good and readiness to defend the county. Both also advocate citizens being educated for the needs of the state. However, patriotic citizenship differs from republicanism by excluding political participation from its content. Citizens are free to decide their lives only in the limits defined by the state, and they should set the priority on the interest of the state rather than their own. Political participation is omitted from the citizenship and it appears more as an identity of belonging to a certain nation than a membership of a political community.

The common factor that is aimed to bind the multinational population of Russia into one nation is patriotism. This resembles the development of citizenship in the Soviet times when citizens were directed to identify themselves as Soviet citizens before their ethnic nationality. Even though this policy of the Brezhnev era hardly produced the anticipated results in the end, the contemporary patriotic politics contains echoes from this period. This is shown in the way patriotic education aims to promote tolerance and friendship between nations, and to make serving the state as the core task of every individual.

There are also echoes from the previous State Patriotism of the nineteenth century in patriotic education. The documents utilize a hierarchical discursive practice that treats citizens as subjects of the state. This is shown in the expectations of citizens' actions, but it is not told what citizens will have in return for acting according to the patriotic perception of citizenship. The documents only contain an implicit promise that an improvement in the status of the state brings personal well-being to individuals as well. This promise, as it is stated above, has worked since it has guaranteed the necessary legitimacy for patriotic education.

The state utilizes history for political purposes in the documents. Patriotic education promotes citizens an idea of intergenerational historical obligation according to which

the loyalty of the previous generations to the Fatherland forms an obligation for the activity of contemporary citizens. According to the logic of this idea, the previous generations have suffered and made sacrifices – even lost their lives – due to their loyalty obliging contemporary citizens to a similar loyalty to the Fatherland so that all the suffering would have a meaning. Here, a use of history as a tool of politics comes to the picture. By using a sense of duty towards the previous generations, citizens are mobilized to the needs of the contemporary society which are defined by the state.

Citizenship is seen particularly as a relation between an individual and a nation-state, and the relevance of nation-state as the highest guardian of its citizens is emphasized in the documents. This outlook defines its relation to globalization and international communities quite antagonistic which enables a unification of citizens by inciting fear of losing one's own national identity and threats of a foreign occupation. The expectations of patriotic citizenship undoubtedly affect the way other cultures are understood in the Russian politics, how democracies, citizens and leaders of other countries are evaluated and how foreign influences are perceived. These perceptions can be utilized in the Russian media presentations of foreign countries and cultures and thereby used to foster nationalistic sentiments and increase national cohesion domestically. It is, however, questionable can the Russian government keep up nationalist policy for long if the world is becoming increasingly globalized and supranational issues, such as the global climate change, require more intense cooperation between countries. In the future, it can be difficult to combine national well-being and economic interests with citizenship that functions only on the nation-state basis.

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