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"In the rich treasure of proverbs of the Finnish people you can find a whole group of sayings, apparently made and repeated by men and therefore more or less disparaging of the female gender, and other witticisms made by the older generation to praise themselves and to belittle the young. It is, however, a sign of considerable spiritual vigour that this kind of propaganda has not remained without a counter-effect."

"Suomen kansan rikkaasta sananlaskuaarteesta löytää koko joukon sananparsia, jotka ilmeisesti ovat miesten laatimia ja hokemia, siis naissukupuolelle enemmän tai vähemmän epäsuopeita, ja toisia sutkauksia, jotka vanha ikäpolvi on sorvannut omaksi ylistyksekseen ja nuorten halventamiseksi. Osoittaa kuitenkin huomattavaa henkistä vireyttä, että tuontapainen propaganda ei ole jäänyt vaille vastavaikutusta." (Tarkiainen, "Kun kuulemme sanan propaganda...")

"The effort toward universality closes in on itself, and parochiality is protected."

"Pyrkimys universaaliuteen käpertyy sisäänlämpiävyydeksi ja nurkkakuntaisuuden varjelemiseksi." (Keller 1985, 12; suom. s. 16)

ABSTRACT

Starting from the notion of an exceptional lack of mediation between political science and feminist studies, the study focuses on Finnish political science of the postwar period as a "pure" case of a gendered scientific discourse. Applying textual analysis with resources drawn from feminist studies, rhetorical studies of science and reading science as literature, the work attempts to create a "method" for gendered reading. The texts studied – from the period between 1945 and 1965 – were any texts authorised as "political science" by the disciplinary institution. Any genre or part of a text qualified as data. A key to gendered meaning was expected to be found by starting from the words "man" or "woman" as clues to gendered meaning. The texts were grouped into two main categories: metatexts telling what political science is and research texts telling about the world.

In studying a continuum of metatexts – textual constructions of the political science community – it was found that establishing political science as a scientific discipline was processed by gradually demarcating the community from various others that were described in terms of a feminine semantic matrix. The boundaries of the discipline were marked by images of Woman.

The fields of objects constructed for political science to study were contrarily expanded to include even women and areas marked as feminine, while at the same time an objectifying and mechanizing vocabulary of science was adopted. In constructing an equation where "what political science is" became the opposite of "what women are", political science established itself as a language game of professional expertise.

Keywords: history of political science, rhetoric of science, feminist studies, science as literature, women and science.

FOREWORD

Why I ever came to start this project is plain and clear. Upon beginning postgraduate studies in political science, I came to realize my abnormality: while being a woman had not been "a problem" before, in the political science community it became a cause of confusion but also a source of intellectual pondering. Since then I have been part of a stimulating collective process, a web of friendship between invisible and visible colleagues.

Paradoxically, writing is still a lonely business. The loneliness of writing this book has been relieved by many colleagues and friends. Without Kyösti Pekonen's help in the early stages of the work and his firm, even if perhaps illusionary, belief in the value of scientific writing, the project would have seemed meaningless. I also thank Kyösti and Hilkka Summa for commenting on the final version of the text. An earlier version was read by Leena Eräsaari, Risto Eräsaari, Anne Holli, Sakari Hänninen, Kari Palonen, Ismo Pohjantammi and Arja Rosenholm. Their invaluable comments became the form of dialogue that should characterise academic debates should be about but which only occasionally are the lot of a privileged few. Virginia Nikkilä revised my language with wonderful flexibility, and Aila Viholainen was a tremendous help in checking notes and references. The project was supported financially by Väinö Tannerin Säätiö and Heikki ja Hilma Honkasen Säätiö. The Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Jyväskylä has offered a very supportive institutional base, and has accepted the book for its publication series. The most solid support always came from my mother and father, to whom I dedicate the work.

Finally, I want to thank my friends, named or unnamed, who hopefully did not need to suffer terribly because of the work, and hopefully at times even shared the positive sides of it. As is customary, the responsibility is mine. I did it my way, and I am glad it is over.

Marja Keränen

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Prologue: The crisis of the word "and"

One of recent changes in scientific debates has been in how we relate different fields - disciplines, discursive formations, genres of speech or writing, texts and contexts, representations or realities - to each other. Earlier the word "and" connected concepts that were considered separate, forming concept pairs like "knowledge and power", "the scientific and the social" or "the scientific and the political".

Now it has become increasingly problematic to legitimately differentiate between the concepts (dis)connected by "and". The pairs no longer refer to separate entities that relate to each other in clear-cut ways. Now, instead, they form hybrid fields or spaces meaninglessly cut in two by "and". We ask questions about the construction, historical constitution or "origin" of the separations and reconsider the limiting effects of them on our thought. We try to erase concepts thought of as independent entities or as "things" frozen into hypostatized entities and loosened from their conditions of formation. "And" no longer legitimately separates conceptual constructs such as fields of study, scientific disciplines or institutions.

One of the hybridized fields is the field of "sociology of science". Earlier it was possible to differentiate between "science" on one hand and "sociology" ("the social" or the "political") on the other and maintain the primacy of "science" or "knowledge" in the pair of concepts. Mertonian sociology of science studied the social relations between scientists but these were still separated from the "content" of science, from the knowledge produced. The separation of the concepts "knowledge" and "power" offered the scientist a simple and unproblematic possibility to identify himself with "knowledge", in relation to which "power" or the "social" was external. The blending of the concepts represented itself as an illegitimate exception that was fought against through the norms of the scientific community. The norms were considered neutral though the political functioning and the power mechanisms of scientific communities were well known to their members.

The unproblematic usage of "and" has been brought to a crisis by different directions in the sociology and philosophy of science that reflect upon the socially constructed character of scientific knowledge. Knowledge is, after all, a product of some human beings who have a history, a psyche and even a gender and who relate to the scientific community and the society via language-mediated practices. The separated frozen concepts formerly thought of as independent entities are now more often brought "back into" their social and historical contexts and subjective, human "origins". Relations of knowledge and power are blended into hybrid fields.

The concepts of knowledge and power can finally also be brought into the same, either into one-dimensional, vulgar relativism, when knowledge merely becomes a direct reflection or function of power. Then the truth is decided in the sphere of politics. Power becomes the primary, heavy part of the concept

pair. Or, on the other hand, power and knowledge are seen as the two sides of the same coin. Knowledge/power is productive, but is it in the end also monolithic? The "truth" has disappeared, but so have ambiguity and dynamics. Opposition to knowledge/power cannot - according to the model - exist. The changes in power/knowledge can no longer be explained by anything, because everything is already included in the model. The praxis of a scientific community following the model may turn into a language game that refers only to itself, legitimating any action but leaves others outside. Then the relationships of "power and knowledge" or "science and society" have not changed. The politics of knowledge is already over, though in fact everything remains the same.

This work navigates between the hybrid fields of "ands", where the concepts connected by "and" may neither be put into opposition nor blended into the same. The word "and" opens up a field that covers approximately all problems of theory of knowledge, from crises of truth-discourses to full relativism and even determinism. These are problems that will not be solved in this work, either, but a route must be lined through them for the time being.

1   INTRODUCTION

1.1   When and where is it allowed to speak about gender?

Most of the time we do not think of ourselves as gendered, yet in some situations, locations or contexts we do. We do not continuously think about whether we are men or women, feminine or masculine, yet sometimes we do.

Most of the time being gendered is to be involved in naturalised, cultural orders of meaning that do not require that they be talked "about". Being part of a culture does not require reflection; it is not problematic. It does not become a question, and therefore there is no need for reflexive knowledge production "about" gender.

Yet gender gets "talked" – conveyed, produced or constructed – in many situations. We can think of these situations as cultural practices that direct us to see ourselves and each other in different ways, and direct us to do different things in connection to – in association or dissociation – with cultural values and orders of meaning.

We all "know" that the cultural – and therefore ideological – meanings of gender vary in time and place. What is natural in one location is unnatural in another one. One way of being gendered is interpreted as being funny and weird in another context. Gender codings differ between Northern and Southern Europe, Sweden and Finland, Kallio and Eira. What it means to be a woman or a man, feminine or masculine, varies in time and place. What is considered feminine in one location is seen as masculine in another. What formerly was considered masculine can now signify femininity. Gender is "done", continuously constructed, produced and resignified.

In addition, "things" considered neutral or natural in one location become gendered in another one. The *locations* where gender is "talked about" can be thought of as spheres of cultures or arenas of representation; it has not been proper to talk about gender "in public", with "ladies present", in mixed groups. The locations can be thought of as domains or specific genres of representation that differ from each other. The visibility of gender issues varies from one culture to another.

The locations can, more specifically, be thought of as different speech genres, textualities or texts, each one having its cultural, ideological ways of "talking/not talking about gender" and each of us being involved in numerous texts at the same time. There seems to be endless variability and freedom of choice regarding which texts to get involved in.

Talking about *time* makes the issue more problematic. It leads to the problem of changing narratives of history. The story of gender could be told in different ways. Thinking about time as a locality or specificity points at narratives, stories or conceptual systems that organize the ways in which we understand the world.

One way of telling the story would go like this: It appears that gender has become "talked about" in "the domain of sciences"[1] in the 1960s and has remained so for the past quarter of a century. Since then gender has been "written about"; it has become knowable within this domain.

Bringing up the question of gender within the domain of sciences meant that the distinction between neutral and gendered was brought into the domain. Doing this broke a pre-contract according to which gender, from the point of view of sciences, was an external and natural category and that sciences "within" were neutral and genderless.

The previously natural meaning of gender within sciences was made problematic by asking why there were so few women scientists, why women were not represented within the fields of objects of study, whether the methods used had led to an exclusion of women or whether the scientific enterprise in itself excluded women[2]. It was asked whether there had been an order of meaning that excluded women from the domain of sciences. The naturalised meanings of gender were made problematic by making them social, cultural and textual. The domain of sciences was genderised.

The domain was made problematic by the ones excluded from the domain. Women non-naturalised the seemingly neutral domain, named themselves and claimed a right to represent themselves in the texts produced within the domain of sciences. Women resignified a naturalised order of meaning.

The question of gender was *named*, brought into the domain of sciences and institutionalised as a "woman question", as a question of *women and science, an asymmetrical "and"-question.*

The "woman-question" – placed in the new context, the domain of sciences – made visible the role of women as "dust"; just as fine particles are considered dust when on a table but quite "normal" in a dustbin, women had been considered normal at home, at work (when the work or the professions were labelled feminine), or in some sciences (when the sciences were marked feminine), but abnormal and deviant in masculine contexts of work, science or areas of culture.

The obvious question in such a situation was *how men could name themselves neutral and genderless and claim not to represent themselves in texts written within the domain of sciences. Or, in what way was male gender embedded, written into the texts or the representations made of the world?*

Now, about 25 years later, another obvious question to ask is: Are sciences *still* marked by asymmetrical gender? Or is there a new order of gender, a naturalisation of neutral and gendered meanings, that does not put women in the position of "dust" within sciences? *Is the "free choice" of gendered positions still anchored in some orders of meaning – limited by versions of histories, conventions and traditions of interpreting the world or "social structures" as reifications of lived realities? And how do these change?*

<center>***</center>

The *locations and times* can be thought of as interrelated perspectives. The perspective of endless variability of speech genres where gender is talked about can be contrasted to orders of discourse where meaning is organized and limited.

The perspectives can also be thought of as separate narratives or conceptual architectures. We can think of ourselves as travelling in time between them, as leaving behind and forgetting "old" conceptual architectures and starting to inhabit "new" ones. The conceptual architectures would construct different images of the world, different languages or speech genres. This could also lead to a situation where people speaking these different languages could no longer understand each other. It could also lead to constructions of historical ruptures: seeing through the breaks could become impossible. It would not be possible to understand another world.

The metaphor of travelling in time can also be thought of as the variable, different conceptual architectures *being present simultaneously*, forming disparate conceptual architectures, dialects and speech genres.

1.2   Are there "still" prohibitions?

Is it "still" meaningful to ask questions about women and scientific disciplines? Why, under the conditions of gendered meaning becoming more and more "free floating" and intertextuality becoming more and more "limitless", would it be meaningful to ask how meaning has been ordered and disciplined? At the same time as gender is represented and visible in numerous speech genres, some genres "still" seem to be marked by a prohibition against speaking about gender and an asymmetrical ordering of it.

If we accept the logic of "and" as a capability to separate knowledge into scientific disciplines and institutions, we seem to be facing a paradox. By looking at the names of different fields of knowledge in curricula or spatial organizations of universities in different locations, buildings or corridors, it would seem that the existing fields of knowledge are organized in peculiar ways.

Most of the *names* of the disciplines look gender neutral. The interrelationship between gender and science, the genderedness of science, is structured as if the majority of sciences were neutral and genderless, although they are still often produced mostly by men, although science formerly was considered a male sphere of culture and though cultural imageries of scientific activity often have been connected to masculinity. Yet, there is this one field *named women's studies. An exception to a rule, a deviation from a norm.*

This peculiar piece of non-logic is repeated within numerous institutionalised fields of knowledge. Very clearly this is the case in *political science*. It has "traditionally" born a strong mark of masculinity. It has been quite unquestionably a discipline produced by men. Its "object" of study, politics, has traditionally been thought of as a male sphere of activity. And although now we can perhaps see that women, too, are recruited to the science communities of political science, a prohibition against naming gender – as women or men – still prevails.

Yet political science represents itself as gender neutral. What does this mean? What are the consequences of this for political science? What is its interconnection to masculinity?

These questions have been asked by yet another "field", *women's studies in political science*. It has posed the question about the interrelationship between gender and political science – the genderedness of the discipline. In the case of political science, the conflictual non-logic of neutrality and genderedness seems to be exceptionally strong. The appearance of neutrality prevails and yet, at the same time, is vulgarly plain and obvious. There seems to be a very strong barrier to the concepts of "woman" and "political science" becoming connected. And there seems to be no change in this respect.

In 1981 Joni Lovenduski wrote[3] that "no one would deny that

the longstanding dissociation of political scientists from the female half of the population has distorted the discipline". You could expect that such a partial knowledge would have been corrected in the name of scientific objectivity.

Still, in 1991 Nancy Hartsock wrote[4] that political science has not been receptive to feminist concerns. The barrier has been documented by studying publishing in the discipline, by classifying themes of articles published in scientific journals and by looking at books evaluating the state of the discipline. Feminist research does not seem to have had any effect on the disciplinary canon in recent years. The situation is described as "the radical deafness of political science"[5] and a question is posed: "Is anyone listening?"[6]. In political science, the promised perspectives of the early 1980s have not been successful[7].

The deafness of the discipline is not due to a lack of feminist criticism in political science. Following the logic of other "fields", feminist political scientists have genderised the seemingly neutral discourse and made visible a structure where man is the universal norm and woman is the other, the negation, the exception or the mirror of man. The canonical fields of political science, like studies on political behaviour, have been analyzed and criticised. The classics of political science have been reread. Central concepts and conceptual systems have been reinterpreted[8].

The consequence of the maleness of the discipline has been considered to be that politics, the "object" of research, has become defined as a masculine activity; the subject matter has become seen as profoundly masculine. The taken-for-granted assumptions of the discipline have become based on gendered structures of societies. And, as a consequence of this kind of construction of the field and the content of knowledge, women, again, have become excluded from the scientific communities.

The critique has remained relatively ineffective. Is there an invisible border between political science and women?

Strategic scientific debates are an issue in the sociology of science[9]. In these terms, the relationship between political science and women's studies can be seen as a strategic non-debate, a lack of debate where there obviously is a place for one. It is a paradigmatic case of non-communication. A debate between the deaf and the mute.

The "nature" of the problem of non-communication is perhaps not limited to "women, only". To quote Joni Lovenduski (1981):

"No-one would deny that the long-standing dissociation of political scientists from the female half of the population has distorted the discipline. But this failure is, I would argue, best regarded as one of many symptoms of a fundamental failure by the vast Majority of Political Scientists to come to terms with our object of study."[10]

"Our concerns have, not surprisingly, been shaped by our training,

and this training has been predominantly in the scientism of Easton and Almond. Inside this tradition women have rooted away sexism from science. Now that the work is nearly done, it has become apparent that for our work to mean anything at all, it must be seen as preliminary to a confrontation with and challenge to *the way in which knowledge has come to be constructed* in the Political Science profession[11].

Since 1981 there would seem to have been very little "progress" in political science neither in terms of the role of women in the discipline or in terms of the "inherent crisis" of political science. And still worse, some people say[12] that the "crisis" is not about disciplines but about the whole disciplinary system or the "nature" of knowledge.

"At the same time" as we can see that the old orders of meaning – limitations of meaning within disciplines and genders – reached a crisis and erupted "long ago", we can "still" see that there are some speech genres where this "has not even started".

Insofar as scientific disciplines "still" organize daily life in science communities – through spatial organization of departments, budgetary processes regulating jobs and resources, through curriculums creating horizons for understanding the world, by offering points of identification in studies or research, by supplying routes to labour markets, or by writing histories for themselves that interpret the past and thereby create identities for the present – insofar as this happens, it can "still" be meaningful to talk about disciplines and genders.

1.3   This work

An approach to reading gender

What would it take to make one *hear* a debate between the deaf and the mute[13]? What kinds of resources would one need? How can I approach the question?

Framing the question of lack of mediation as *cultural, local and variable* leads to other questions: Why is it allowed to speak about – to name – gender in some discourses, but not in others? Why are women "normal" at home, in the humanities and in sociology, but not in political science? Why are some representations considered neutral while others are considered gendered? And, last but not least, why are some things considered "problems", while other things are so "natural" that it would not occur to us to talk about them in the first place?

Going beyond simple oppositions between institutionalised fields of knowledge that do not seem to communicate leads to asking about the nature of the relationship between gender and science. The oppositional way of structuring the relationship may function within an

institutional field, but it may also lead to false conclusions; it may lead to perceiving gender as a constant, essential category. In that case it will lead to a loss of sight: the changeability of the category of gender gets lost. Therefore, even the relation between genders and sciences needs to be studied in specific contexts. As the variability of these kinds of cultured codings is endless, there can be no general statements about "how things really are".

The question asked here is the one also suggested by Lovenduski: *what are the ways in which knowledge has come to be constructed in political science?* Is the lack of mediation between the deaf and the mute built into conceptual architectures and structures of knowledge that have come to be used in political science? How does it vary in different locations and at different times? The perspective approached here would need to conceptualise the relationship between gender and science by asking in what way gender is embedded, woven into the text, into the texture of the discipline[14]; how is the discipline produced as feminine/masculine, and how does it change in terms of a textual/sexual process? The approach of this work is to study the changeable interconnections of gender and science in a concrete process – a change process of a discursive formation or an institutional textuality.

The special type of debate, the non-debate, is thought of as produced rather than natural, changeable rather than eternal. The naturalised ways of perceiving the world, thinking and writing in political science are thought to carry gendered meanings. The texts/the institutional textuality of political science can therefore be *reread* as gendered. The naturalised presuppositions of gender can be made visible.

The point of departure in this work is to study the discipline "in itself", focusing on texts written. Scientific activity is, no doubt, predominantly a textual and textually mediated practice. I will therefore ask whether textually constructed *identities of the discipline and the world constructed* in texts of political science are gendered and how they construct gendered meaning and gendered identities. The work studies representations of gender and gendered ways of representation in political science texts.

The work is primarily research on research that focuses on typical ways of thinking and producing knowledge in political science. It does not in the first place deal with questions of how to represent politics but instead with the politics of representation. It aims at a new interpretation of a history of political science, in this way serving the purpose of writing history in order to understand the present.

The questions posed are "no longer" placed in the binary matrix of "and" words. The work is not about revising the discourse but about deconstructing a metadiscourse of the discipline, in Lyotard's words, –

about how regimes of truth are organized. The break in communication, nobody listening, is not seen as a voluntary conspiracy by men, but as a default that has been programmed and processed into the discursive formation but is still changeable. It is seen as a genuine break or intercession in communication. The connection of gender and science is read from "within" a local and contextual institutional textuality or disciplinary formation.

The aim of the study

How was it possible to construct gender as a non-issue in political science? How was the meaning of gender naturalised? The aim of the study is to analyze naturalisation of gendered meaning in Finnish political science of the postwar period, 1945-1965.

This is done by asking: Is the world constructed in political science texts nevertheless gendered, and is the identity of the discipline constructed in the texts gendered? What are the borderlines of the "world" and the "identity" of political science? In what ways is gender embedded in the processes of constructing borderlines for the discipline?

Political science is studied here as a textual or textually mediated activity. This activity that produces representations of the world and of itself is studied as a rhetorical activity within an intertextual situation.

By looking at

1.   *how the identity of the discipline was constructed and processed over time as constructions of "us", the discipline as a textually constructed community, the self-images and self-understanding of political science, and*
2.   *how the "world of politics", the subject matter of the discipline, the objects of study, the map of the world as "them" is constructed,*

the work seeks traces of gender in processes of textual production (encoding and decoding/ writing and reading) of political science.

Via this process the work aims to interpret how gender was rhetorically produced as a non-issue – how it was "ruled out" of political science. The final aim of the study is to analyze and interpret where the border of knowledge/power lies.

Studying texts of the past involves an attempt to reopen hypostased, petrified, sedimented, institutionalised meanings as conventions of reading the history of the discipline – to read anew. The question of the specific mode of non-communication within this domain of discourse involves a question of power as production of silence. In this work the problem of present non-communication is projected onto the past, although not to any "origin" that would have predetermined everything to "go wrong". I assume that a relatively recent "past" may still be working in limiting the formation of the present, of what can be

written in political science today. Is the present lack of mediation due to hypostased conceptual architectures or dead metaphors that go on functioning? Is political science a discourse formation that cannot possibly authorise women as its speakers?

The ambivalent and conflictual character of neutral and gendered meanings can be stated in idiotic-looking, non-sensical terms as a question of referentiality: we "assume" that there were women even in the 1950s; why are they not represented in the texts of political science, although the genre claimed to be objective and neutral?

Another non-sensical looking question is about the "obvious" genderedness of the "participants" in scientific writing seen as communication between author, text and reader. There is an apparent conflict between the "social" gender of the scientific community and the claimed non-genderedness of the representations. How can a male scientific community produce neutral texts? Do not male authors represent themselves in texts written?

These "assumptions" frame some questions that are dealt with later on in the text. To start with, they appear as *apparent contradictions* that would seem to require some explanation.

"Applying reading"; Finnish political science of the postwar period

The case analyzed here is Finnish political science of the postwar period. This is an illustrative case of a conflict between the "inside" and the "outside" of the gender/science problem: The political science community of the period consisted almost totally of men. Yet, the paradigm rising at the beginning of the 1950s explicitly aimed at neutrality, scientificity and modernity but also constructed gender as neutral or irrelevant. This is potentially an extreme case of neutral and gendered speech genres in conflict. *Why this case? What is its context?*

Why political science? In Finland, as in other countries, political science occupies one of the very leading positions in the contest for the most male-dominated discipline. Still in 1981 the percentage of women in the Finnish political science community was a mere 4%[15]. Since a gender division like this cannot be random, it is reasonable to conclude that gender has functioned as a structuring principle in constituting the discipline. Political science seems therefore to offer a good example of a gendered discourse.

Why the 1950s? In the history of the Finnish society and gender system, the 1950s appears as "silent" or "mute"[16], as a period when women were not visible and the women's movement was not active. The 1950s appear as *the* period when the question of gender was not posed at all. This mute period was preceded by wartime; a gender order that took active women for granted was converted into a more

"traditional" one after the war. The 1950s was again followed by a new debate on gender roles in the 1960s. In between, the fifties appears as a period of strong gender demarcation when "men were men, women were women and the reality was real"[17].

Although *the discipline of political science* has been thoroughly dominated by men even during other periods of time during its history, the *1950s* appears to be a period when gender was most totally excluded from the discourse. The contents of political science debates of the 1950s appear gender-mute. A preceding conceptual architecture by Snellman, for instance, debated the relations between the state, the civil society and the family and thereby explicitly dealt with questions of gender. And again, the 1960s brought up research on gender roles, and the rise of women's studies/feminist studies started to make gender an explicit issue.

The "neutrality" of the paradigm of the 1950s can be expected to go for the style and the rhetoric of science, too. The aims of neutrality, scientificity and modernity would not have accepted the view that language may have a mediative or creative power in constituting a discipline. The rhetoric of the paradigm was a *rhetoric of denying rhetoricity*. And certainly, in comparison to this period, the texts of the preceding one appear to be emotional and ethical.

The political science of the 1950s is still characterized as one of relatively *homogeneous disciplinary identity*, which is then said to have erupted or dissolved. The former image of the homogeneous discipline, its goals or contents, still functions as a base that is reproduced and transmitted to new generations of political scientists or "to the public", building an image of the scientific community for the outside and a worldview for the inside, policing the borders of the discipline.

The 1950s is also a period, when *"discipline order"* seemed to function relatively unproblematically. The counter-orders of inter-disciplinarity – among them women's studies – did not exist. Still, many of the problems of creating conceptual "counter-orders" face the workings of conceptual structures of "disciplinary order", creating non-communication, deaf and mute.

Why Finland? "Choosing" Finland or political science as cases in point is quite naturally due to very personal reasons, they being the ones I know and am part of. Situating Finland in a *periphery* in relation-ship to centres of scientific debate locates Finland as a periphery that has changed the centre from a Continental-European to an American tradition, and as a *borderland* between East-European and West-Euro-pean gender systems. In the case of the political science of the 1950s, conceptual imports based on an American gender system can be expected to be blatantly inappropriate. The Finnish gender system can be situated as "more different" than the continental or American loca-

tions of origin even in respect to the later imports of feminist theorizing.

Resources for reading

In what way is science gendered? How can one develop a research strategy for reading gender/gendered reading of texts of political science and of political science as a specific textuality? Resources for such a reading will be sought after in the following discursive fields.

The first field of resources is a heterogeneous field of theoretizations about *gender and "language"*. The relationship between gender and textuality is structured in different ways in different approaches of research. There is no one and only methodological point of departure for a gendered reading of texts. Theories of reading have undergone a transformation from a focus on the writer/the autonomous writing subject to a focus on the text and its internal relations, and to problematizing the relationship between the text and the readers. In the course of this transformation, the question of reading gender has been transformed from a focus on the gender of the writer to how the text can be gendered. Reception research has opened the question of gendered reading or thematizing the meaning of a gendered reader. And finally, theories of intertextuality have brought back the role of the writer in a specific context, although turning the conception of travelling in time upside down: interpretation advances from the present to the past.

In terms of author-text-reader relations, the question of the interrelationship between gender and science has been studied by focusing on the author and by looking at percentages of men and women in science communities, in different disciplines, at different levels of the hierarchy, and at different times. On the other hand, the gendered character of scientific activity – the textual – has been thematised. Contrasting "social" and "textual" perspectives on scientific writing opens up a field of debates where causal explanations are hardly valid. It is not possible to think that equalizing the percentages would automatically lead to a change in the language of science. We cannot think, either, that an "equal language" would lead to equal recruitment. Yet it is apparent that the different accents or speech genres of different disciplines can be described as more feminine or masculine and that the change processes of disciplines in feminine or masculine directions have something to do with social gender in science communities. "Soft" humanities recruit more women than "hard" sciences. The fact that fields like medicine have been feminised seems to imply a change in the "content" of knowledge.

The methodological tension of the work revolves around these different perspectives. A general vague frame of thought is the background of different and complicated connections between gender as textual and contextual. In these terms, a loosely formulated cause of puzzlement is this: How can an all-male scientific community claim to produce neutral science? Or rather: How did it become possible to mask an apparent gender difference and neutralise it in the discourse studied? Could the discourse still be gendered? How, then, could this genderedness be studied?

The second field of resources are theoretizations of *the rhetoricity of "neutral" texts*. To start with, any scientific text will seem to be an unproblematic representation of reality, a neutral transmitter of facts. This is sometimes considered to be the very criterium for scientificity. But the discipline of political science cannot be thought of without a connection to language or textuality. The object matter and the identity of the discipline are constructed in language or via language (though not by political science only). Neither "politics" nor "state" exists as a referent of the "real world"; they, as well, are constructed via language and conceptual systems. What is included or excluded in the discipline is a question of conceptual differentiation.

Put this way, the reason for women being excluded from political science can only be found in "language". The question of women participating in politics or not is a matter solved "in language". This process of naming, differentiation, conceptualization and interpretation is, of course, political. Women's having been excluded from political science is not because women would not have participated in politics. It is not even because women would have practiced "different politics". The exclusion is produced in what has become named and classified as "politics" in culture and in the sciences' interpretations and textualisation of what "politics" is. As the problem is of interpretations, the solution can be a reinterpretation.

The seeming neutrality of the texts raises the question of how language works, what it does, what is meant by rhetoricity. Rhetorics in this work does not mean manipulative language or pure propaganda. Neither is it limited to figurative language, isolated tropes or metaphors that steal the meaning from "factual" or "literal" language. Rhetoricity is an unavoidable characteristic of all speech and writing. Metaphoricity is the very "normal" characteristic of scientific modelling, abstracting or theory building. Therefore, the aim cannot be to isolate hidden rhetoricity from language. There is no desire to strip off the rhetorics, to build up a more neutral language. The aim is to make rhetoricity visible, to open the possibility to reflect upon it.

The stabilization of meaning may appear stronger from a historical distance. The meanings we transfer to/from the past are taken out

of their context, abstracted and monologized from the situation of being born in an intertextual context, being forums for multiple voices.

Recent studies on *rhetoric* make it possible to think about the role of language and textuality in science and offer methodological devices to work with. Studies on rhetoric of science offer discussions on specific disciplines and problems of self-reflexivity in science. These discussions have been connected to genealogical and deconstructive approaches[18].

Studies of rhetoric are sometimes said to offer the advantage of "stepping aside" and "studying from the outside" the discourse of one's own discipline[19]. Even though "the outside" would not exist, there is the hope of being able to create a distance, a position of self-reflection. This leads me to see the discipline of political science as a specific literary textuality or institution with its own rules and regulations and to study the genealogy of its process of formation.

The third field of resources are approaches studying *disciplines as literary institutions*[20]. Disciplines can and have been studied by tracing their archeologies and genealogies, the long-term conditions of formation of knowledge. Disciplines, then, constitute themselves by referencing "real objects", by relying upon practices of classification and specific practices of textualisation, and by references to earlier storages of knowledge[21]. Disciplines constitute *institutions* that regulate and cumulate resources for reading and writing. These can, in a more pragmatic way, be approached by conceptualizing disciplines as *literary production, literary genres, processes of canon formation, and literary institutions of reading*.

Concepts borrowed from arts rather than sciences accentuate the fact that science is also "just reading and writing" that is authorised by specific norms for textualisation. What one is supposed to say/ allowed to say within a discursive formation and what is forbidden is decided by norms of textualisation. What one is supposed to say/not to say determines norms for becoming authorised as a political scientist. The limitation mechanisms for writing "science" determine lines of demarcation between science and non-science. A certain style or vocabulary is obligatory as a criterium for including a text in genres taken for "political science". This is so even with the style of science that might be the "rhetorics of denying rhetoricity", the latent minus-rhetoric of realism[22].

Political science texts belong to different kinds of genres (the article, the textbook, the review), each having its own norms. This leads to the notion that not all genres have been *read* as "science". Texts "proper" of political science also include bits and pieces that – although they quite obviously "are there" and carry meaning – do not always become read as "science": the foreword, the margins, the pictures and the notes. Here it is taken seriously that the bits and pieces have some-

thing to do with the "science". A frame of *intertextuality* is used in order to make sense of them. The concept of literary institution brings along with it a set of views on *processes of canonization and exclusion* that always presuppose each other. The aim is to conceptualize *a transformation process* in political science.

A strategy for reading gender/science

The approach to reading gender/gendered reading in this work is formed as a crossing point between different approaches to gender, textuality and science. The approach of the work is *textual*: interconnections between science and gender are dealt with as textual ones, as questions of writing and reading. How is gender written into scientific texts? How should it be read? How is the meaning of gender/gendered meaning textually produced?

"A word discharges a pile of rubbish." This quotation from Hollo, cited by Makkonen[23], refers to the impossibility of saying "I love you" without considering the numerous intertexts where the phrase has been used before and that load the phrase with meaning. The method for reading political science texts here starts from this point.

In reading a rather large amount of political science texts I have used a method that is *marginal and trivial*: I have been looking for what they say about women or men. This finally led me to selecting texts or parts of texts, often rather marginal notes or bits and pieces. It is possible that I have missed some women- or men-words, but not very probable. *How I make sense of the words* is a more important question. Rather than just collecting words, the attempts to make sense of them are based on *what meanings are given to them and where in the texts they are mentioned*. The selection of data never exceeds the limits of the author.

Semantic meaning of single words is the starting point of the interpretation. Therefore, generically male expressions are also taken seriously and translated as literal. Although the generic males of the Finnish language would "refer" to both males and females, they perhaps do not "bring women into people's mental landscapes" and are therefore taken as literal, cultural artefacts.

The obvious and simple choice is to see what the texts explicitly say about gender: how they *name* gender; in what kinds of *frames of meaning is gender associated, in what not?* Where is gender talked about, where not? What is seen as neutral, what is seen as gendered? What is seen as male vis-á-vis female?

Another choice is to ask whether gendered meaning is created as "second-level messages", in the rhetorical functioning of language that makes the texts believable and "natural": metaphors, tropes, sym-

bolic meanings and narrative structures that rely on "natural" habits of reading as conditions of believability, and yet carry power. That metaphors have persuasive power is commonly acknowledged. That rhetoricity of language has wider applicability is a point I shall try to make.

A third choice is to look for gendered meaning in other levels or types of *textualities* (texts as co-texts, con-texts, intertexts or countertexts, the ones the texts depart from, discuss with or echo in their expressions. Is gender represented in other registers or genres, in the most canonized texts or the ones of "minor value"?

Starting from what is explicitly said, the discussion will advance to *what else is told*. Are gendered meanings created in language or narration? What view of the world or of gender are we persuaded to believe? How are the neutrality effect and the universality effect produced? The notion that sciences are thought to be realistic representations of the world excludes the imaginary character of scientific thinking. The *reading* will pay special attention to what is said and *how – by reading science as art*.

How then to choose data for reading a margin? A vast majority of political science literature will not discuss men or women. There are no criteria for selecting representative samples of literature on gender/ no gender in political science. The type of data studied as political science texts in itself represents a gendered problem. Determining which texts to study when studying a discipline is dependent on gendered practices of what already has been canonised as texts or as a proper manner of reading them. And reading already canonized texts leads to the further stabilization of and increase in the power of the canon. The role of canonised texts must therefore be relativized and seen in a frame of parallel processes of canonization and exclusion, where canonization presupposes its other. The Other of the positivist man becomes a hysterizised woman. The Other of public language becomes a sexual language, a language of pornography.

What "parts" of activities of scientific communities are, indeed, "scientific" or in other ways defined as relevant for studying the object "science"? Studying science or a scientific community does not need to be based on "texts as papers". Studying how scientists *talk*, for example, could produce other kinds of representations or draw upon other types of repertoires for understanding "science"[24]. In a historical study, "talk" is not available. To avoid the fallacy that the *texts* studied become acontextual things in themselves, the texts are seen as traces of a dialogue bygone, as in an intertextual dialogue with each other where texts integrate into themselves con-textual elements, references to other texts.

The data of the study is *public*; no "private" data or archive material has been gathered. There is no interest in the scientists' personal lives, their biographies, their motives, intentions, literary influ-

ences, practical contexts of living or situational factors of acting and writing. The only things studied are the scientific texts produced. While remaining within strictly "public" data, it is, however, argued that "private matters" - as common cultural phenomena - become written into and can be read in the public papers.[25]

However, even public texts acquire *different statuses* and become classified and hierarchised into more or less formal ones and into higher and lower genres of writing, some considered "scientific", some not. While the question of classifying a text as scientific in this work is part of the problem rather than a self-given fact, it is necessary to avoid reproducing hierarchies of *high and low publications*. The data can therefore not be limited to "important", "central" texts – texts already canonized in one way or another – nor notable historical persons as individualised actors with (hidden) motives or influences, and stable selves "outside of the texts". The criteria for "importance or centrality" is for the purpose of this work irrelevant or different from studies in the "history of political science proper".[26] Neither are pre-given and ready-made classification in terms of content classes, generations, the highlights of a time or selections/inclusions in bibliographies proper here[27]. The classifications, distinctions and periodisations easily tend to ignore the history of the losers or to construct periodisations that marginalise large or even major parts of what was actually written.

Nor is it relevant to this study to pre-determine choices of texts in terms of *forum for publishing*, classified as more or less scientific. The information about where a text was published is relevant, as it implies *audiences* of texts. It can be noted here that the arenas for publishing political science have changed: Compared to the present situation, the publishing arenas of the fifties were more often than not general and wide, whereas now political scientists decreasingly write for larger audiences. Whereas the channel for publication used to be "Suomalainen Suomi" it later became exclusively "Politiikka"[28]. Whereas publishing books with the major publishers used to be common, it now is rare. The debate has turned from external to internal audiences. The appearance of in settings is relevant for their interpretation. Apart from audience positions written into the texts, audience relations in terms of classifying types of publications are not relevant for the purposes of this study.

The *time period* of the collected texts covers the years between 1945-65, although it goes somewhat beyond those limits to see what came before and after. Whereas the "beginning" from the start of institutionalized political science in Finland (from 1924 a professorship at the University of Helsinki) is better covered, the period after 1965 is less so.

Science communities do not need to be, and are not, *national*. Interpretive communities of reading do not require spatial organisation

bases[29]. For choice of data this study, however, limits itself to Finnish political science.

The previous remarks lead to a need to go beyond some "conventional" selection criteria while others are simply considered irrelevant. Since what "belongs" to political science is part of the problem rather than a natural given, the textual corpus must be defined *nominalistically*. What is seen as "political science" texts is determined *institutionally*:

> – *what is authorized as political science by the institutions* of the discipline; this includes, for instance, dissertations in the discipline, publication series of departments of political science, and political science journals "Valtio ja yhteiskunta" and "Politiikka". Since the institution has authorized the texts as "political science", so they be.
> – *who is authorized to write as a political scientist* by way of institutional connection. However, the choices are not limited to "important texts" that always already have an institutionally canonized character. The statuses of texts may as well be trivia that goes beyond the processes of canonization and the end results of purifying the banalities of the everyday. *Any text* written by an authorized author of political science is included. *Any part* of the texts will be included. Special attention is paid to different types of paratexts or genres of scientific writing[30]. The limit on choice is *what is included in the collections of the Parliament Library*, where the collection of political science literature from this period of time must be considered excellent[31].

What is taken for granted is:

> – the qualification processes for an author to become licensed to speak as a political scientist, and
> – the qualification process for a publication to be classified by the library as something that should be preserved and catalogued.

The criteria of the library still lead to a rather "public" version of science, although the collections are extensive. What is "written in" is regulations of writing and publishing for certain public stages: propriety and normality, distilling a front-stage representation of a scientific community.

This work starts from the position that even *contexts* are textual; there is no way they could not be. Other textualities, co-texts, are not seen as the "real reality" against which the "ideological texts" are contrasted. Still, cultures do not consist of uniform "language-babble" but of differently stratified "speech-worlds".

This is also the situation of the writer writing. He or she enters the discourse, for instance the tradition or the intertextual community of political science. The writer both follows and reworks the rules of the discourse. Intertextual connections to different co-texts become inscribed into the text. The borderline between text and context withers away. But erasing the borderline totally would also destroy the possibil-

ity to explain why discourses change or what actors do to change them. Everything may be textual, but everything is not in the text (text as one piece of writing).

Although textual traces of scientific writing may be purified and texts cleaned of their contextual meaning, "a discipline" consists of different kinds of *genres of writing*, differently located and hierarchically organised in an institutional textuality, for everybody to read if only noticed. With this background, different genres of scientific writing, texts and paratexts, are grouped here according to the different aspects of gender/text-relations discussed above. A gender/genre-frame – reflecting "regimes of production and reception"[32], loosely structures the "applying" of reading Finnish political science.

Within the frame of a logonomic system, *a regime of production and reception* of texts, genders and texts may relate to each other in various, connected or disconnected ways. The relation can be thought of as

- contextual or co-textual; as the gender of the author, the writer of the text
- gendered conventions of representation; as gender written into texts as choices of signification, a gendered "language" forming associations and dissociations, semantic matrixes that direct our thinking.
- representations of gender; as gender represented or rather constructed in texts, or
- as gender in reception, the gender of the audience or the reader, or the interpreter.

The idiotic-looking contradictions (male authors writing genderless texts and genderless representation of a gendered world) are relations of reading and writing ordered within logonomic systems. To make sense of connections or disconnections between different conceptualisations of gender, *chapter two* will specify the frame of gender and genre, negotiating different meanings given to gender and scientific writing.

In reading political science, the main focus will turn onto "enunciative modalities", subject positions, selves and Others, constructed in the discursive formation or institutional textuality. The main questions asked are:

- *How is gender inscribed in the constructions/the construction process of political science as a discipline. This question deals with gender in terms of femininity and masculinity.*
- *How is gender represented or constructed in political science texts and how do the constructions change? This question deals with gender in terms of categories of women and men.*
- *Are the textual processes of representing a self and representing a world - as processed of inclusion and exclusion, boundary work - related in terms of gender? Are femininity and masculinity connected to men and women?*

Drawing upon debates on gender and language, rhetoric of science and science as literature chapter two will discuss further how gender and

science are textually produced, how scientific facts are produced and disciplines textually constructed, and how texts relate to other texts or textualities.

How a naturalised institution of textuality can be approached and "opened" will be discussed in *chapter 3*.

"What political science is" is worked out in metatexts defining political science: defining its field of research, its methods, its character and its relationship to "others". Metatexts are studied as representations and constructions of "us", as constructs of self-images, identities and Others for the discipline. Con-text, previous texts of the same textuality or neighbouring discourses, become written into texts as reference points of difference between the self and the other, to create the contrast in order to define the self. *Chapter 4* will be a reading of these metatexts.

Articles and textbooks, "ordinary research publications", construct a world out there, the object studied by political science, a map of the world. These are studied as textual constructions of "them" in *chapter 5*[33].

For different chapters, the method of reading differs. The metatexts are read by looking at metaphoric meanings of gender, the "proper" research texts of political science by looking at literal meanings attached to men and women.

Finally, *reception* of research is studied regarding the one and only female researcher of the discipline, as *located in a position of non-identity between the image of Woman and " the real life" of a female political scientist in chapter 6*.

The different themes are followed up in processes of change: *how did the discourse change between 1945 and 1965; what went before and what came after that period?*

Con-textualisation of texts does not aim at revealing the truth about the political science of the 1950s. The authors of texts will not be accused of ideological or unscientific interpretations of the world. (They are not fought with their own weapons.) The aim of a critical interpretation is not necessarily to "know better" but maybe to open up a monolithic genre and erase the barriers or stone walls around it.

The work deals with *conditions of credibility or believability* of scientific representations of gender. The question can be stated as: how was it possible for the postwar political science to represent itself as credible? To understand how it became possible for political science to represent itself as believable, we need to know in what contexts it was produced; what were the cultural coordinates of the discipline. What were the preconditions of its naturalisation? *Chapter 7* will turn back to the con-textual question.

How do "scientists" write; how should I write? Scientific texts are written by somebody. A normal practice in "scientific" writing is to

mention *the author*, a practice "individualizing the honour and the blame". Although having felt severe embarrassment about it, I have followed the normal practices of citing for these reasons: The author is a producer of the texts although he might disguise himself beyond the neutrality of the text, as is normally done in scientific literature. He or she does create new meanings as the text is produced. An authorial position in the text is not difficult to detect, if you just look for it. And the name of the author is a part of the text, that may alter the reading.

Mentioning the author, as is normally done, does not, however, imply that the texts should be reduced to attributes of the individuals and their personalities. What the author says becomes possible only in an intertextual situation. The author uses the resources available. What becomes written in the text is cultural codings and representations of culture that are not controlled by the author alone. The authorial function[34] organizes horizons of interpretation. As this reading focuses upon unintended meaning, contextual and contingent codings of culture, the name of the author is placed in the notes. The text is prior to who wrote it.

Another normal practice is the practice of *quoting* what texts say. The following chapters will include a lot of citations or text extracts which I frame into my own text. This is to "make you believe" that the meanings created are "original" and what I say *is there*: the rhetorical strategy of "showing". As I write I translate meaning, the voice of the "object", into a new context. To cite is to make past texts and voices present. This does not mean, however, that my writing would represent the past texts in a universalizing present tense. Neither are the past texts translated into "modern language" that would make the texts seem more matter of fact.

To write a text is to organize things and to put them into some order - *to narrate*. What gets produced is a story "telling about" the thing constructed as the object of the study. The text will be one version of "Finnish political science".

How is it possible to translate meaning? The perspective of *rhetoric of naturalisation – to study the construction of gender as a non-issue in political science – puts on its head the assumption* that gender is a "new" issue within the domain of sciences or that it should be "added" to that domain. Rather, it is assumed that gender is "already" there, embedded in the texts and text-mediated practices of sciences, that sciences are gendered through and through.

The reading aims at breaking up the pre-contract according to which gender was/is considered a natural category whereas science is neutral and genderless. A gendered reading aims at deciphering *how the social was turned into the natural, how dialogical was turned into monological, and how the contextual became reified and abstracted. The aim of the reading is to polyphonize and politicize stabilized and monological meaning.* By read-

ing in another way I will aim at writing gender into political science. By proposing a method for gendered reading, I try to conceptualise and produce a situation where the concept pairs of neutral and gendered, visible and invisible, and Woman and women become ambivalent and incompatible.

This requires resources that "already" cross the border of naturalised meaning, the "formerly" naturalised conception of the relationship between science and gender that could not have been asked in the 1950s. A precondition for this reading is a situation where gender has become knowable. It is *now* possible in scientific discourses to pose this kind of a question. To get sight of gendered meanings in the text was not possible before gender became unnatural. Reading across time is possible just because of a change in ways to talk gender, *a rupture* in discourse or a transfer to another conceptual system. And the texts of the fifties also acquire metaphoricity or become "more rhetorical" because they differ from how we now write. They are texts of Another time.

It is said that historical interpretation always starts from the present and proceeds by projecting metaphors of the present to the past. Thus even here: the metaphor of gendered reading is "applied" to texts of postwar political science. The problem of lack of mediation is projected to "an origin", a stabilised reading of history assumably still at work.

The starting point of reading is in the present, and the texts of the past are brought into this new context. Reading involves a *traffic in time*. While suggesting a boundary in the past, the *reading is dependent on equally contingent boundaries of the present*. On the other hand, my reading is preceded by *a tradition of reading* the history of Finnish political science. The preconception of neutrality may therefore well lie in the convention of writing and reading history, the "second-hand" interpretations of the past, histories written on political science. While gender might have been a lively debated issue in the 1950s, it has not been recorded in interpretations of history.

Furthermore, this reading of history may be a projection that is my personal one. While writing history is always to project present conceptions onto past problems, not all projections are valid. My reading is dependent on a relative stability of semantic meaning, that words like men and women do have *some* correspondence between now and then, and that I am *somewhat* capable of a dialogue with the past. The traffic in time is always a recontextualisation, bringing past texts to present contexts more or less intersubjectively. Translating meaning over time and place does start from where you stand, but it must be validated, in some sense, by what is "out there". I face the situation where I have to understand the Other in terms of time and gender location/identity, beyond a breach. The aim of the reading is to under-

stand the discourse in a *specific location in time and place* that was culturally bound: was there a prohibition against representing gender in the Finnish political science of the fifties? Why? How can it be made understandable? How can one reopen a closed interpretation of the 1950s?

Denaturalizing gender in scientific texts uses the method of *cross-reading, reading wrong, reading science as art, reading social science as literature, reading meaning not intended by the author but rather carrying the cultural values of the time and vocabularies available in storages of the culture.* Crossreading science and art is based on the conception that gender/genre is an expectation horizon of the reader rather than a stable quality of a text. A text can be read from different horizons, in different ways. What makes a scientific text scientific and credible, fact rather than fiction, is the expectation horizon of reading that is backed up by its institutional location: scientific texts are texts published by scientific institutions and persons authorised as scientists.

Crossing the art/science contract displaces me as a reader: "Anyone who aims at overcoming the boundary between arts and sciences is a dilettante"[35]. However, crossing the convention of reading is necessary to make visible institutional boundaries that direct how meaning is constructed, how science communities are constructed and delineated. Reading political science through the metaphor of gender aims precisely at making visible the boundary between science and non-science and the convention of reading, institutionalising and authorising texts as scientific.

The study aims at an interpretation, a gendered reading of the identity and boundary of the discipline. Reading through the metaphor of gender, I will ask how boundaries between science have been constructed and how constitution of meaning has been limited. Does the discipline have a limit to what can be said? Is the limit marked by gender/is it gendered? The reading aims at recovering polyphonic voices and showing how the process of production has been political.

Reading through the metaphor of gender is also about crossing a boundary of gender. The logic of interpretation revolves around the logic of norm and deviance: a cultural norm can be studied by studying how deviance is conceptualised and defined. Maleness that in the texts is constructed as transparent (even to itself) can be studied by looking at what is said about women/Woman. The question of whether men do not represent themselves in scientific texts is studied by looking at the Other/Woman and asking whether the women of the texts are "real" or male projections.

Finally, *the cultural contingency of science* relocates the scientific rhetoric of transparency and naturalness of gendered meaning. It is put on its head by the assumption of intentionality in relation to determination (speech act versus structuralism). It is not assumed that the authors

consciously intended to exclude gender and women from political science, though that, of course, may also have been the case. It is assumed, instead, that the codes of culture became written into their discourse and therefore also can be changed and denaturalized. While claiming that scientific activity is culturally contingent, located in time and place, it detaches the gender/power field from individual actors and their intentions.

This means a return to the "socio-historical question": how should we understand the meanings of gender and the transformations of them constructed in texts of the discipline? The end result of reading, then, is to locate *the cultural coordinates of the discipline*, the economies of neutral and gendered and the feminine and the masculine in a cultural transformation process. Was it so that political science was masculinized in the fifties? If so, why did this become necessary and how should it be understood? Or was it so that the problem merely was about lacking masculinity, the risk of feminization rather than the abundance of masculinity? What were the types of masculinities constructed in texts? What about women?

And is the fifties already over? How can one *relocate in time* the conceptual architectures of the fifties to those of today? At the end, there has to be some conclusion about how things are now. Something has to be said about what should be the place of Woman/women in political science. Should the aim be to construct some new positive visions or is it just to cause belief to waver? Should there be a choice between the two postmodern tendencies, the nostalgia of a return to the fifties or a new multiplicity of voices? What would be the place of woman - as an image and a speaking subject?

Gender as a metaphor of reading does not acquire hegemonic, universal quality. Texts always allow many kinds of readings. There is no one and only true interpretation. This means that the aim is not to look for continuities of the history of ideas. Nor is it to compare the texts with any true realities outside. The interpretation is not understood as "revealings" but as "remaskings". What you can find beyond a representation is another dirty surface, what you produce is another mask. What you can try to do is to make the questions of true realities academic.

1.4   Locating the work and the I / the author

It is commonly acknowledged that power relations are an object of study in political science, although the versions of "what political science is" are many. In spite of this, reflection on the power practices

of political science, itself, is surprisingly uncommon. Political science seems to be a "virgin land" in the area of self-reflection.

In terms of the earlier conception of the relationship between "science and politics", this could be considered legitimate. The scientist could differentiate between knowledge and power, identify himself with knowledge in relation to which power was conceived as an object of study "out there". This offered the illusion and legitimation for announcing the results of research to be objective and neutral.

Today many a political scientist would reject this view as naive. Many of my colleagues would agree that discourses, among them scientific ones, carry power. They are not considered innocent in terms of power. Many a colleague would agree that language and narrative conventions work "actively" in the process of producing knowledge and that language does not describe the world "out there" transparently. Still, reflection on how one's own representation of the world is a fictive, non-transparent representation of "things", "the society" or "politics" is lacking. How does the researcher identify himself in a hybrid field of power/knowledge? Is the new identity based on self-reflection or mere self-satisfaction, – one's own uses of knowledge/power simply become legitimized?

Self-reflection presupposes that we ask where the self is and what is outside of it. In what way does the outside exist? What is our part in constructing the outside? Is there a subject that produces the knowledge/power? Is this subject gendered, for example? How is knowledge connected to the historical, the social, the psychic? Is knowledge in the end a mirror image of the subject producing it? (Are we already solipsists?)

Reflexive projects always meet the question of their self-reflexivity. Does my discourse carry power? Is my story just another fiction, a narrative? Yes, just like the previous ones - just *another* one.

This work will, no doubt, be *named and classified* as one in "women's studies in political science", and rightly so. The existence of such a field within the institutional setting and the imagined textual communities where I work is a precondition for this text to be produced in the first place. The perspective of this work is not, however, very typical for this genre. There is no aim at studying "political theory" as, for instance, images of women in the classics of political philosophy. Hopefully the perspective applied will more directly connect to the "daily" workings of the politics of knowledge. Nor is the work directly any critique of the empirical main stream, a revision of its sexist biases or a claim for expanding the "area" of research. I would like to see the work as also reflecting the rhetorics of marginalization and production of counter-identities in the scientific community. A small margin of a small science community is in danger of remaining in

an iron cage of its own counter-rhetoric, if not capable of reflecting upon its own part in the language game.

To problematise the naturalised meanings of what it means to be gendered, I was led to the fields of feminist philosophy and literary criticism. Although the work is "about men", an interpretation of texts written by men, resources for interpretation are available first and foremost in feminist research. To write a work like this would not be possible without these thematisations of gender and textuality.

The work also reflects an old interest in politics of knowledge and genealogies of disciplines and "disciplinary" systems, where my view is – as I have come to realise – "still" framed by Foucaultian questions. As for many others, this interest later developed into an interest in rhetorics and politics of representation.

Questions posed by the "sociology of science" or "social studies of science" are not very common within the field of political science. The metadiscourse of political science is occupied with questions of defining an identity or problematizing the fragmentation of the discipline. An immediate frame of debates for this work is the one of writing the history of Finnish political science, which – for some reason – is a very lively debate. In Finland this self-reflection in terms of history of ideas has been very popular. This has offered an image of the development and formation of the identity of the discipline. These studies have marginally commented on the very obvious genderedness of the discipline whereas this work will take it seriously. The aim here is not quite to step into the same debate, but rather to look at the debate from another perspective and possibly open it somehow. Yet, this has lead me to pose questions about the meanings of "inherited" and thereby naturalised versions of the history of the discipline. To this debate I want to contribute one reading.

The work is deeply motivated by the experience of living in or between at least two worlds, two dialects at a time. The dialects of political science and feminists studies still seem asymmetrically ordered, the voices of the feminist studies dialect are not mediated into the political science dialect. The situation is comparable to other cases in point[36]. There is a break in communication, a lack of mediation, a difference in dialects between two worlds.

Living in two worlds can be seen as semi- or bi-lingualism. Studying the saame population in Finland led Lea Laitinen to conclude that bilingualism offers the possibility to reflect upon the langue itself, the structure of language, instead of being caught inside, prisoned, within one structure[37]. I hope that my work will produce this kind of additional information due to bilingualism.

The period of the 1950s surpasses the limits of my experience or at least my memory. Therefore I face the problems of making the strange familiar. On the other hand, there is a problem in making the

familiar strange. After studying and internalizing the dialect of political science, the oddities of it may be difficult to spot.

The criterium for approving doctoral dissertations usually is that they produce "something new": the work should be related to previous research, it should differ from work previously done and somehow overcome its problems, the problems constructed as "being there". The situation is analogical to seeing writing as the struggle between Laius and Oedipus; the phenomenon of "anxiety of influence"[38]. I do not believe that this work will meet the criterium of departing and differing from others. I write about things that everybody knows. More than to differ, I hope the work will meet the need to reflect or reread.

This process of translation is thought of as one of translating "science into art". Rather than making feminist studies scientific, I would want to make political science "artistic". Being "at a slight angle to"[39] genre locations is, however, very relative. It is up to the audience to decide whether this is science, art or something else/Other.

NOTES

1. "Sciences" here refers to human sciences as well as natural sciences. The Finnish language does not distiquish between the two. Pluralis is used to point out that there is no one science but many local and contingent fields or disciplines.

2. Keller 1982, 589-602; Keller 1985, introduction.

3. Lovenduski 1981, 83.

4. Hartsock 1990, 151.

5. Ferguson 1987, 211.

6. Gertrud Steurnagel 1986 (unpublished paper) Is anyone Listening?, referred to in Hartsock 1990, 151-160.

7. A recent bibliography on womens' studies in different disciplines ends the presentation of political science laconically: "During almost two decades of critiquing and proposing alternatives to existing political science research methods, feminists have questioned norms, gathered new data, broadened the definition of the political, and narrowed the split between the public and the private. They have not, however, transformed the political science discipline." Miller & Treitel 1991, 139.

8. To name some, Siltanen & Stanworth (Eds.) 1984; Evans et all 1986; Jones & Jonasdottir (Eds.) 1988; Pateman 1980; Pateman 1988; Pateman & Gross (Eds.) 1986; Shanley & Pateman (Eds.); Cocks 1989; Okin 1978; Okin 1989; Halsaa 1992.

9. See, for instance, Czubaroff 1989, 28-47; Hariman 1989, 211-232; Kitzinger 1990, 61-75.

10. Lovenduski 1981, 83.

11. Lovenduski 1981, 96. Her evaluation of the work done so far (1981) was: "...instead, what is one of the minor tragiedies of contemporary scholarship, an absorbtion of a rather constrained branch of women's studies by a one-dimensional academic discipline has taken place." (p.83).

12. Disciplines in crisis are discussed by, for instance, Parker & Shotter 1990, 5; Hodge 1990, 1-20.

13. See also Irigaray 1987.

14. See Sivenius 1984; Moi 1985.

15. Naisen tutkijauran ongelmat ja esteet. Komiteamietintö 1982:33.

16. Jallinoja 1983; for discussion about this view see, for instance, Saarinen 1986, 311-319.

17. Doane & Hodges 1987, 3.

18. In Finland Summa 1989; Klamer, McCloskey, & Solow (Eds.) 1988 in economics; Edmondson 1984 in sociology; Simons & Aghazarian (Eds.) 1986 in political science; Simons 1989; Parker & Shotter (Eds.) 1990; Hunter (Ed.) 1990; Woolgar (Ed.) 1988; Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Latour 1987, etc.

19. McCloskey 1988, 280-294.

20. Brown 1977; Shapiro 1986a; Lepenies 1988.

21. Foucault 1982a.

22. Lotman 1989, 277. The case in point, Finnish political science of the fifties, is an illustrative case of changing anological footing from "arts to sciences". As "science" in Finnish language refers to even humanities and social sciences, "arts and sciences" will be used in a specific sense.

23. Hollo, cited in Makkonen 1991, 10.

24. Gilbert & Mulkay 1984.

25. The selection criteria differs for instance from "historical" research proper, like in Nousiainen & Anckar 1983; Paakkunainen 1985. "What really happened" is not asked here.

26. Compared to previous interpretations of Finnish political science, the choise of data differs. What is not applied here is, for instance, Anckar's (1973) selection criteria on "scientific and half-scientific" texts, Palonen's (1978) and also Anckar's and Grönholm's (1980) delineation to dissertations. Neither is any selection made in terms of illustrative representativity like in Paakkunainen (Ed.)1986 and Borg 1980, where the difference between selection criteria and the ordering of texts constructs interestingly differing narrative structures.

27. Scandinavian Political Studies, Bibliography for years 1960-1964; Anckar 1972.

28. Suomalainen Suomi was a journal of a general cultural character whereas Politiikka was the specialised journal of political scientists.

29. On interpretive communities, Fish 1980.

30. For extensive classification of different types of paratexts, see Genette commented on in Viikari 1991; for genre, see Todorov 1990; Swales 1990.

31. The practical implications of the choises – compared to the criteria of the Scandinavian Political Science bibliograhpy of 1966 – are:
– all title areas of the SPS-bibliography have been covered;
– authors coming from for example juridicial disciplines, national economics or sociology are excluded although they might be included in SPS. Authors authorised primarily in other disciplines are e.g. Kastari, Merikoski, Jyränki, Huuska, Luoma, Knoellinger, Roslin, Sipponen, Soikkanen, Hakalehto.
– work done by political scientists, although sometimes named and classified as "sociological", has been included (f.ex. some texts by Pesonen, Rantala);
– any text by an authorised political scientist is included here, while SPS excludes "popular literature", texts written for wider audiences.
   Compared to some work with a "systematic approach" – Anckar 1973, Palonen 1978, Grönholm 1980, the text corpus here is wider, as it extends to "all" political science literature instead of the specific genre of dissertations of conceptually defined content classes. Anckar's flow model for inclusion or exclusion does not show great differences between "content" or "instituti-

on". A possibility of including a woman on the basis of theme for dissertation was discussed by Anckar 1973. She was, however, found "parapolitical". Institutionally she gets classified as a sociologist, so the end result is the same.

The comparison to work with "historical interest proper" – Paakkunainen 1985 and Nousianen & Anckar (eds.) 1983 the comparison becomes difficult but also meaningless because the approach to reading is so different. Kari Paakkunainen generously handed to my use the archives of his own project, which extended the material on some very fruitful points.

32.   Hodge & Kress 1988.

33.   Political research proper has been classified into the classes of 1) political ideas, 2) institutions 3) parties and pressure groups and 4) individuals, which have been the "normal" classification of the time. See, for instance, Jansson 1959. The group of studies in parties and pressure groups is not studied in detail, as in dealing with behaviourist studies, the main focus will be in class 4) that includes studies in voting and participation.

34.   Foucault 1980a.

35.   "Jokainen joka pyrkii ylittämään luonnon- ja hengentieteen välisen kuilun on dilettantti." Gronow 1990 citing Lepenies 1988.

36.   Reader-response research of fictive literature shows that women read books written by women and men, men only read books by men. The voting studies of the 50's analysed later on this work confirmed, that women voted for women and men; men only voted for men. (Who's behaviour is gender-bound?)

37.   Laitinen 1989, 248.

38.   Harold Bloom discussed by Gilbert & Gubar 1979.

39.   Rushdie 1989, 24.

2   READING GENDER AND SCIENCE

2.1   Framing I; reading gender

How is it possible to suggest or claim that the neutral-looking texts of
political science could be gendered or could be read as gendered?
Where does gendered meaning reside? How can it be interpreted?

Or: How can an all-male scientific community claim to produce
neutral knowledge? Is gender an external, contextual category from the
point of view of scientific knowledge production? Is not the female part
of the humankind included in and represented in scientific knowledge?
We do know that women have existed throughout time; why are they
not "told about" in sciences? Has not maleness or masculinity had any
effects on the knowledge produced? Do not the male producers of
knowledge represent themselves, making themselves present in the
texts they write?

Wrapping up naturalised meaning could be started by posing an
origin, a starting point where meaning is political, and following a
process of its naturalization. Posing *a process of naturalisation of meaning,
i.e., neutralisation of gendered meaning*, would lead to focusing on
naturalisation rather than politicization: How can an automatic society
be organized? How can one delimit the political? How can neutrality
and nature be produced? How can one not see obvious contradictions
between the two?

However, there is no way to imagine such a starting point, inde-
pendent of the ways gender or science is already talked about or not
talked about, or independent of the ways knowledge production is
organised and institutionalised. There is no truth about gender or

science, independent of the ways of its previous textualisation. *You cannot escape your own textual locatedness.*

In order to frame the question of how seemingly neutral texts of political science could be read as gendered, there needs to be a view of how gender or science are currently "talked about", conceptualised, in different conceptual systems. Current resources for reading gender and science have to be discussed because they are the frame to which past texts of political science will be brought.

Debates on women and science or women and language have been brought to the scene of scientific debates, named, made into a "realm", a "theme" or an "area". These "fields" are also the reference point of my discussion. The point of departure is that there is no one privileged conceptual system for studying gender and science; different systems offer their own architectures for gender, too. However, institutionalizing women's studies has produced a situation or *a hybrid field* where the different conceptual systems meet each other more probably than in traditional disciplines, forming an interdiscipline where different constructions of gender enter into dialogue. Narrating such a debate is sometimes done in a linear manner, as if paradigms would change to others as the result of some rational causes. Changes in the debates are then described as a continuum or as a development story. On the other hand, changes can be described as different, yet simultaneous speech genres that can coexist and interrelate in many ways.

The discussions between different directions or lines of research are sometimes represented as disagreements on a subject matter. Instead, I see them as differences in how they construct the subject matter. On some point they may be incommensurable in a final way: choosing one would necessarily lead to rejecting the other. On other points, maybe crossing the borders of conceptual systems just relocates concepts instead of destroying them. To construct a story of different views is to create a dialogue between them. What is told is, however, just one version or construction of a theory debate. *You cannot escape the constructed, narrated character of your own text.*

Searching for processes of naturalisation of gendered meaning could start from gaps and discrepancies between different conceptual systems, by looking at contradictions between them and asking questions about their interrelationships. Feminist theorizing is a domain of discourse that has advanced as a debate on denaturalizing gender (but also produced its own naturalisations), debating obvious conflicts between neutral and gendered, the natural and the social, the textual and the contextual. The conflict between *the contextual and the textual* is a reoccurring theme in the debate. Here it is brought into a frame of a linguistic halfturn or ontological gerrymandering, managing the boundary between texts and context, appearance and reality[1].

A manifold vocabulary of "turns" (the linguistic turn, the rhet-

oric turn, and so on) is an expression of this watershed. The turn is seen here as a cultural turn: society has no culture, it is culture. The turn is taken between positions: "is culture before or after, the subject or the object, active or passive, constituting or constituted"[2]. Applying the metaphor of a cultural turn to the theme of this work: the society is either seen to have a separate cultural sphere and women are outside of it or the previous way to locate women or Woman in the sphere of "nature" outside of culture is in itself a cultural construction.

How the relationship between language and reality is conceptualized leads to how concepts like ideology, power and gender are seen. Presupposing a "natural" relationship (causal, mimetic or analogical[3]) leads us to see language as a representation of reality, of "the world out there". A representation can then be criticised as "wrong ideology", which the researcher is supposed to reveal by comparing it to the outer reality, the context that is seen as unideological.

According to the other view, there is no necessary connection between language and the "world out there". Language structures the way the world is thought of. It creates a referential illusion: it represents itself as transparent, as a neutral transmitter of natural reality. In producing the way the world is seen, it also discloses other ways of seeing. The language in itself is ideological and power laden. The previous way to compare ideological representations to real contexts becomes merely tautological. The world out there can also only be studied via language.

This, of course, also goes for ways of conceptualizing gender: as gender, according to the first model, is an external, natural and contextual category, in the other model it is a product of language. It is "only in language". But if everything is "just language", how is it then possible to make knowledge claims, to say that one representation is better than another one? On what terms can women claim a representation in political science? What about the relationship between the "texts" of political science and "women as a reality"? Doesn't it make any difference? Or are we forced to see some things as more real than others?

Stating a paradox like the above in this very banal way is to give different statuses to different "things" (women, political science), to create a contrast between *facts* and *representations of those facts*, and to claim that the representations are "false ideology". It is to place in the "foreground a problematic representation against a seemingly unproblematic background of facts"[4]. Managing the *boundary between the real and the constructed, the text and the context*, is to make certain phenomena problematic while leaving others unproblematic. Woolgaar and Pawluch call this type of selective relativism *ontological gerrymandering* and see it as a common textual strategy in the social science studies. Implying a realist assumption about a context seems to them to be part of the rhetorical functioning of explanatory practices in social sciences

and sociological argumentation as a whole.

The *case of women and political science* seems like a good case for *managing the boundary*. It represents a disjunction between a representation and a context; it is a case of *discursive asymmetry*. The metaphor of boundary is used in this work on more levels than one. *In this chapter, the focus is on reflecting upon the boundaries of the work itself in asking: do women exist/are the scientific texts neutral?*

Framing gender is necessary for studying how characteristics associated with gender are woven into the social texture, how social positions of women and men are woven into and constructed in concert with social structures, making up for "technologies of gender" as societal orders. The question remains whether gender, now that it can be talked about, actually is already dead, the meaning of gender so denaturalized and made so flexible that it does not structure society any more – that all this talk about gender is now possible just because gender has already lost its role as a structuring principle.

The first parts of the chapter deal with problems of textuality, power and gender, where the problem of reification of the debate itself is constantly present. "Theories of language" tend to form into reifications of their own. Structurally based and formalist theories are opposed by dialogical and contextual ones as the very critiques of reification. Feminist theorizing, too, must be seen as dialogical, contextual and contingent. But *can you ever escape reification, the reification of your own text?*

2.2   The problem; women and science

The debate on the "problem of women and science" is a debate where the perspective of ontological gerrymandering applies. I will discuss here the debate as shifts and turns in constructing "text and context" and managing boundaries between different domains of discourse.

The problems discussed are common to any "theory of meaning", not just to "theories of gender". The story told here reflects a development in feminist theorizing which is not "above" or "outside" habits of telling stories – or their political implications or consequences. The story about feminist research can be told as a development story: perspectives change to others because of rational reasons; the story is as linear and advancing. On the other hand, we can think of the story as different, multiple, parallel debates. Naming and classifying perspectives of debates make them appear different and works to represent them as separate entities rather than shifts and changes in emphasis. Previous ways of debating gender and science are an intertextual frame, into which texts of political science will be brought.

Women and science; inside or outside?

Starting from a delineated domain of "sociology of science", how do you structure the problem of gender? Going beyond simple oppositions between institutionalised fields of knowledge like political science and women's studies that apparently do not communicate, we have to ask: *what kind of relationship exists between gender and science?* The question about the interrelationship has been posed as a new *asymmetrical and-question*: What is the relationship between *women and science?* What is at stake in asking this question?

There are different *versions of answers* to this question. The versions I construct here approach the issue from different conceptual systems and different angles regarding divisions of texts and contexts, the internal and the external. The following stories are to be considered simplified, "normal" constructs of debates on "women and science".

Story 1:
The first story draws upon Evelyn Fox Keller, reviewing the development of women's studies/feminist studies. Versions of the same story have been told by many others[5].

> From the 1960's the question of science and gender was posed by looking at percentages of men and women in different disciplines, different levels of hierarchy of the scientific communities, at different times. The critique was pointed at the small number of women in sciences, and the hindrances for women's advancement were discussed. The problem was seen as a problem of equality; equal opportunities and a loss of a "talent reserve".
>
> Later on the problem was posed as follows: What are the consequences for science of women's underrepresentation? How has the underrepresentation of women biased the choice of research problems? How has it biased the planning of experiments and the interpretation of results? This critique was seen as directed to the "soft sciences" and it could be seen to lead to strengthening the standards of scientificity.
>
> The next developmental step asked whether the very criteria for defining scientificity were bound to gender. Was objectivity a male-centred aim? Was science in itself a masculine activity? Was scientific objectivity the name given to male subjectivity? The critique reached the domains of natural sciences. It asked whether scientific thinking in itself was gendered.

This story produces a linear model of development that makes us believe in progress. The narrative structure of this story could probably be used – and certainly *is commonly used* – to establish and legitimate any new field of research, perhaps especially many of the new hybrid fields that do not form separate disciplines but rather interdisciplinary perspectives. This is a way to textually construct "fields" of research.

Looking at the narrative, we can see that the movement of the story goes from extra-scientific, social criteria of evaluation to

intrascientific ones. The story deals with a reconceptualization of the relation between science and society. The point of departure of the story is within a conceptual system with a strong division between knowledge and power. *To start with, it treats gender as a secondary context of knowledge and gradually comes to pose the question of the content of science, the texts written.*

To evaluate it from the starting point of the story, the separatedness between "the social context" and "the content" of science seems quite unproblematic. This version would soon lead to simplistic views of relativism or determinism: more women – another kind of science. It would still be possible to think that changing the gender division of the scientific community either changes the "content" of science, or not. Or, it would be possible to think that a feminization of the "content" of science – changing the content to be more woman-friendly – would change the mechanisms of recruitment, or would not. The problems of the model are apparent. Would scientific communities then have to recruit a representative sample of the population on this or that grounds? What would the valid criteria be and who would decide them? Who would decide the truth? *It does not seem possible to reduce science to mere context. There has to be a problematization of the text, the "content".*

Story 2:

Another way of approaching the problem would be *to start from the text*. The problem arising from such an approach obviously leads to *the possibility of reducing science to mere text*. In spite of all criticism of binary thinking, the later discussion in feminist theory has been structured around two poles: "American contextualism and French textualism"[6]. The "America" and the "France" of the story are naturally fictive. *The second story* could go like this:

> Whereas the "American" tradition of feminist thought has approached the question of women "from the outside", by making visible the unmapped areas of western science, by thematizing the social position of women and the experience and the standpoint of women based on this social position, the "French" tradition has started "from the inside", from language, text, discourse and the positioning of Woman as the metaphor for what is repressed in the text.
>
> Readings of the "French" approach have, however, come to consider it deterministic, eternalizing and essentializing the feminine. The "French model" would seem to doom women into a marginal position in the breaks of the symbolic order where women can only function as separatists and hysterics outside of language. From an "American" point of view, the "French" view remains ahistorical and universalizing.
>
> The "French" has been read as elitist and excluding from the point of view of the "American" feminist theory. From the "French" point of view, the "American" view remains naive and voluntaristic. "The French" do not seem to say anything about women; they merely dissolve the categories of men and women.

Citing Kolodny[7], the "French" view would see the "American" one as humanist but not political: whereas the humanist solution is "to seek women's specifity and give it expression, the political one would be to look at the words "specificity", "woman", and "writer", each in the structure of its definition and to work to change that structure."

One short note still has to be added to the story:

> In American literary criticism the "French" lucrative theory was soon adapted by men, which left the women to wonder about the prevalence of social gender marking and its importance for career advancement in American universities.[8]

The problem of men's taking over and colonizing feminism would seem to imply that the "French" model has been too hasty in reducing everything to mere text and leaving out the "social and material conditions" of science. It is easy to see the "French" and the "American" lines of thinking as *reductions to either text or context*. It would, it seems to me, be all too easy.

What would be a proper basis of denaturalizing the configuration where the *inside of science* – i.e., texts of men – appears as neutral and genderless, whereas women as bearers of gendered meaning remain *outside*?

Denaturalizing gender I; a halfturn?

The need to reorganise the self-given boundaries between the inside and outside of science makes it necessary to widen the scope beyond the "mere" question of women and science to the different traditions that were contrasted above. In the meaning framed above, the inside/outside – debate can be be structured in terms of the cultural turn: is culture first or after, constituting or constitutive? The debate can also be called "a French-American disconnection", "France" and "America" not referring to geography, perhaps not even to theory.

The "American" point of view departed from the social and material, from women's experiences having *no name* or no value and attempting to make women *visible*, making their *voice heard*. This led to research on women previously excluded from the canons of literature, science and societal representations. Consequently, this led to argumentation for *expanding* the fields of sciences and *mapping* the blank areas of them.

The early aim of feminist research was to *denaturalise* the category of sex previously thought of as *biological and therefore natural*[9]. Since biology had functioned as a textual frame for naturalizing and preserving gender order, it became important to argue for the category of social gender that is variable and changeable. Focusing on the con-

cept of social gender made it possible to see how gender was co-structured with societal institutions. It was also thought that the social division of labour produces different *experiences*; this established the possibility to talk about women's perspective or standpoint as an epistemological point of departure. The perspective could be grounded on the social, not the essential[10].

Starting from women's experience not yet represented is one way of creating a rupture between *image and reality*. This was one of the argumentative figures of early feminism: it was claimed that the images and representations of women (in schoolbooks as well as films or scientific texts) were false and in conflict with the reality of women's lived experiences or the factual situations in which women lived. *Image should correspond with reality. The representations should be more realistic[11]*.

As gender had been excluded from the representations of the world – in scientific texts, for instance – the argument for making it visible was to *claim it facticity*. From this perspective, studying "texts" and "language" becomes read in a context of a preceding division between bases and superstructure and interpreted as "mere culture". *From the "contextual" perspective the truth resides outside of the text and science is legitimated via referencing to a truth "outside"*. Studying mere language and text becomes read as a luxurious elitistic masking of "the real" – the social division of labour, the inequality, the true reality. The question is: How are facts mediated, if not via language, culture and symbolic systems?

Whereas the concept of social gender in "America" was used to establish an naturalise a field of speech and representation, in "France" the point was to denaturalize it. But as the poststructuralist theory was firmly institutionalised in literary criticism, this could promote the conception that the "language" or the "texts" talked about were literary products, works of art[12], not that the concept of language could be seen as a structuring vehicle in observing and understanding the world or a metaphor for non-linguistic or pre-linguistic semiotic systems or societal and cultural structures or any textually mediated practices. No doubt, gender is not constructed just in cultural products that can be brought back into a sphere of an ideological superstructure.

As "American" feminist research strongly stressed that research was *for* women, it focused upon changing the audience relationships, reporting research in a popularly understandable form and changing the hierarchy between the researcher and the "objects" of research. When moving to "America", the "theory" of poststructuralist thinking (to deconstruct monological language) seemed to conflict with its "practice". The alien conceptual system acquired an elitistic character and produced an elitist effect: the "in-people" could accumulate their cultural capital. In social stratification of language use, women remained secondary.

Women's experience as women seemed to become nihilated, since women – neither as a social category nor as individual units of the liberalist thinking – occurred in the "French" conceptual system, where the concepts of women and Woman become separate. Men could occupy and speak from the place of Woman. It was asked what was happening when men became experts in "French" feminist theory. Were women silenced again? In "America", the deconstruction of subjectivity was seen as premature, as dispersing something that was not yet strong. Female identity had not yet developed into the atomistic individual of liberalism, as it already was dispersed. As it was said that "Woman" only existed in language, the category of *gender* as a point of departure for feminist research was dissolved[13].

The "French" disregarded the problems of social division of labour and the societal, institutional and material conditions of structuration of gender. They did not focus on the social construction of gender in connection to material and institutional practices. In concentrating upon "just" language, they did not deal with other conflicting ideological and material structures.

From an "American" point of view the "French" view wanted to cement the repression of women by basing its theory on a determinist structure of language and a compelling genderedness of the process of entering the symbolic order. The different conceptualizations of "language" led some researchers to conclude that the "French" theory dooms women to alienation in language (as natural language rather than symbolic orders or culture), and to argue for women's verbal capabilities[14].

As "Woman" in the "French" debate was thought of as a relational position within a symbolic order, the "Woman" of an "American" debate became a universalised, ahistorical essence, the eternal Nature that had legitimated the oppression of women for so long. As the "French" concept of language *was* material and social structure, the "American" concept of language was *a reflection* of material reality.

This conflict has led some researchers to continuously presume an extra-linguistic material reality or context as a precondition, a cause or an originator for textual practices, and to restore a distinction between language and reality. There is a tendency to close out the other and to produce *a French-American missunderstanding*, that problematically leaves the cultural turn to hang in the middle, taking only a cultural half turn. Textual theories based on "after-the-turn" premises are applied to "culture" in the pre-turn meaning of the term as a cultural sphere of the society, as an ideological superstructure of the society. The "social", "the societal base", is still seen as transparent, immediate reality[15]. This is *a cultural half turn; as the concept of "language" has been totalised, the meaning of a linguistic, cultural turn has been marginalised. Texts are studied as cultural phenomena whereas the social is studied as trans-*

50

parent.

How could this happen? As poststructuralism "went America", it was loosened from its context. The misunderstanding was intensified as the textual approach became *a travelling theory* and the texts were reified into objects. Texts, produced in a dialogue with another tradition of thought turned into representations of reality, were universalised and ahistoricized. Deconstructive texts were turned into abstract objects; *they were naturalised.*

The dialogue constructed here points at a *specific point of view of reading: reading "French" as an "American", reading texts of the Other, reading texts from another conceptual system.* The interesting point is whether the "American" *reading* of the "French" texts is totalising, or whether there is a deterministic delay in poststructuralist thinking. Does an aim at dissolving deterministic structures end up producing reification and abstraction? Is the blame on the "French" author or the "American" reader[16]?

In order to relocate the "misunderstanding" discussed above, the following will have to deal with the *tendency of reification and naturalisation written or read into "theories of language" and symbolic systems.* The critique of reification and naturalisation of theorizing language aims at re-constructing language, culture and symbolic systems as *processes of communication, writing and reading, rather than abstract "things".* Where "in language" does gender reside?

2.3   Textual production of identities, genders and sciences; back to reality?

As gender differences in speech behaviour, according to the *"American view"*, were explained by extralinguistic, social relations – i.e., relations of power – from the *"French"* point of view of, power is embedded in the universal structure of language, langue, that speaks the speaker. As, from the "American" point of view, language *reflects* a reality that precedes it and determines it, from the other point of view, language *has* the power; it does not immediately *represent* a material world outside of language but constructs, moulds ways of conceiving, observing and structuring that reality and at the same time constructs the subject that perceives him/herself as a user of language but yet is used by it. As the first perspective distinguishes between language and ideology, the second one connects them, making language work as "ideological control."

How about *"France", a tradition of treating gender as an abstract structure in language, a metaphor, a symbolic system, as a grammar of femi-*

ninity and masculinity? In a dialogical relationship with the structuralist theories of the phallic nature of culture, the symbolic system or language, poststructuralist feminist theoretisations have become "text-internal" critiques. However, as "there is nothing outside the texts", neither is there any extralinguistic location where the critique could come from. As the "text" refers to the totality of culture or its signifying practices, there remains no extralinguistic, transparent reality to refer to. Remaining "within" linguistic signifying practices does not mean, however, that the critiques would support the monological view of language.

Where would it lead us to start from a conception that gender is "within" texts of science and no "truth about gender" can be found outside of texts by contrasting them to a reality outside? Where does this lead theoretizations of gender? Here, the question is discussed in terms of reification/re-contextualisation of "theories of language" as a process of hiding traces of its own canonization.

Gender as a metaphor; a monolithic view of language, its Other and other Others

Models of the structuralist tradition[17] seem to open easily for thematization of gender, and come, in fact, to be based on it. On the level of the structural infrastructure of language, gender becomes built into langue; the structure of langue "demands a hierarchised gender"; the structure of meaning depends on sexual difference. Langue and the symbolic system are structured around an oppositional grid, and gender is built into the foundation. The grid is repeated in lists like:

    male - female
    sun - moon
    logos - pathos
    reason - emotion.

The pairs of binary oppositions are the very grammar of signification, language, sign-systems, the symbolic order, where the feminine side always represents the negative and repressed. In the symbolic order, Man represents the norm and Woman represents everything that the man is not. As a symbolic category, Woman represents the boundary of the universe. The qualities projected onto Woman do not fit into the order of language. Woman is placed between Man and chaos to represent the discourse Nature, passion, instinct, the body, the Mother. Since these are cast as feminine symbols, reason is constructed as the opposite of femininity, as the exclusion of feminine symbols. Woman represents the pleasure that remains outside of language that breaks and disturbs the linear discourse. She represents the irrational, the non-civilised, that which escapes the order of language, the threatening

chaos that must be repressed. Woman has the role of garbage in the symbolic order, she is the threatening wolf, the dirt and the filth. The place of Woman in structuralist thinking is the place of the Other, the negation, the prelinguistic animal, the place of the sign of exchange.

Any attempt to give meaning to gender will be caught up in this matrix of metaphors, semantic fields that force themselves upon signification. To talk about men and women fires in our minds a series of associations and cultural meanings connected with these matrixes. We are trapped in networks of cultural definitions and forced to play in an ideological theatre where different kinds of representations, allusions or myths from the start direct any analysis[18]. Ideology represents genders, men and women, and their positions as natural. Discursive practices imprison "men" and "women" in the snares of their definitions.

This view focusing on langue, an abstract structure of hierarchised binary oppositions that bases meaning in binarity of gender and the exclusion of Woman, has been criticised from various perspectives.

If "everything is already written into the text", it can only be changed from within this text, from the place allotted to Woman in the margin of the symbolic order, by making visible the hierarchised binaries that have "under cover" structured the text, to read the feminine subtext. Critiques from a place "within" start by looking at the place assigned to Woman in the symbolic systems, locating Woman as Other, Woman's language as a counter-language representing what the rational language is not. Woman, then, represents everything that the rational language is afraid of, yet what is necessary for its very existence. By disrupting the surface of the universal, monological discursive order, you can trace Other voices in the text, reread the repressed in the process of textualisation.

To devalorise a symbolic order where Woman is put to represent the negative half of man is to celebrate feminine creativity, which is seen as nourishing and maternal, open, non-linear, unfinished, fluid, exploded, fragmented, polysemic, and to give it a revolutionary potential. To speak the body, the unconscious, the ambiguous and non-logical is placed as the opposite of so-called transparent, functional language. To construct a special Woman's language is meant to undermine the oppressive phallic seriousness of neutral language and to resignify those forms of expression linked metaphorically and symbolically to female speech which have been silenced by the dominant discourse of authority. Woman's language is the underside of official language that has secured its authority by opposing itself to emotive connectedness or compassion. Feminine writing is writing which – although not necessarily by a woman – "jams the machinery of theory and ruins representation"[19].

Part of Woman's role is to symbolise the private as opposed to

the public. The dominant discourse of authority places strict limits on the publicly expressible and limits critical reflection about the norms and values which structure "private life" and which affect the melody of public speech. The image of Woman is important in defining the boundary.

Feminine language is the Other language. From the point of view of a monological system of meaning, it is a counter-language, the discourse of a hysteric, representing that which is repressed, covered and marginalised. The strategy of valorising feminine language leads to attempts to represent this Other and to displace its marginal position. But, as an Other, it is also dependent on its position as a counter-language and doomed to be a project of mimicry and irony.

The previous debate has taken a turn from a "natural" conception of gender as a self-given biological or social category to discuss femininity and masculinity within symbolic systems or a symbolic order that directs signification and precedes categorizations of gender or sex. The discussion about gender as a symbolic construct posed a symbolic order where Woman is put to represent nature, earth, materiality, carnality, emotionality and chaotic plurality whereas masculinity signifies culture, order and homogeneity. As Woman within this symbolic order is bound to represent the Other, we then have to ask: *when is this model valid, are there other ways of modelling, where do symbolic meanings of gender reside and what is their "place"? Are symbolic meanings merely "textual"? Is gender just a metaphor? Is there only one symbolic rder?* Is this view still based on an abstract, ahistorical and acontextual conception of language.

Gender as a social construct; polysemic languages and textual constructions of gender

Opened and modified, the problem of the "French-American disconnection" has been seen as *reductions into texts or contexts*, which both tend to turn into their own reifications and "construct their own essentialisms. Whereas "social realism" can produce concrete empirical research, it threatens to just repeat naturalised conceptions of gender and turn into tautologies of pre-given conceptions. On the other hand, debates on "gender as a metaphor" have been criticised for ignoring "the social" and remaining purely textual; tracing Woman as metaphor always in the end finds a binary structure, repeats the binarism and turns into a universalisation of sexism. "Woman" remains a purely ahistorical, textual figure, an essentialisation of femininity. Textually focused approaches produce "virtual realities" that turn to their own objectifications. To treat language as unitary interprets the gender division as one dividing the totality of culture. Therefore, the abstraction

works to eternalize a binary matrix. To treat language as an abstracted langue, as opposed to parole, makes the system universal, deterministic and monological. To conceptualise language as an abstract structure beyond the social leads to destroying different kinds of speech genres, different relationships to language. *But language is not one unit but different language games that are socially stratified and also hierarchically organized.*

The "French" theory of gender and language has met here with criticism that it was already supposed to have made: even *post*-structuralist theorizing is criticised for being too structuralist. Representations have become "things in themselves, texts have been turned into objects, the criticism has turned into canon. "The problem" seen in the "French" position is that it remains *textual and internalist*. How, then, should one criticise the model if even the critique of the monolithic view of language tends to return back to the Same? Posing "an other language" or some languages as Other threatens to turn into its own mystification; it is not enough as a basis for concrete analysis.

"Language", "culture" or "symbolic order" as such do not offer concepts for actually studying signifying practices. "Texts" have to be placed in "con-texts" and located in time and space. There has to be a more specified basis for dealing with the "French-American misunderstanding".

As the poststructuralist theory does not presume that there is only one language, "a fixed order of meaning to which the subject should enter", the focus is displaced *from structure to process. Language is not a monolithical system but a heterogeneous process*. Then, the focus turns onto specific discourses and textual strategies that are always *contextual*. Structures of language have no meaning unless situated in contexts. It is therefore important to erase the unified, monoglossic order of signification and to make fluid the frozen, naturalised meaning, to return broken connections between the separated and oppositional concepts. The place of Woman within the symbolic order is also relational; Woman represents its margin, not the essentialised, "true nature" of women.

The criticism repeats the Bakhtinian critique of de Saussurean analytical linguistics: abstracting a universal langue is formalism, a reified model that in itself carries power, naturalises power-laden meaning. Seeing langue as ahistorical and determinist was criticised by Bakhtin as a ideological illusion, in itself produced by somebody:

> ..."an author of a political and normative code. He is a social subject. He occupies the topos of authority and of institutional arbitrariness. He represents the "source" of the authoritarian rule.[20]

The authority of the formalist position was secured by separating the code from its social context of use. The separation of langue and parole

eternalised langue to an objectivistic norm and made the significance of speech disappear. The structural characteristics of langue were essentialised, universalised and eternalised. It became impossible to conceptualise change. It reified an institutional praxis of those in power. Distinguishing between langue and parole "produced a significant social boundary that coincides with social actors and position of power."[21]

The *monoglossic model* presumed speech to be repeating the formula of an abstracted and reified language, a ritualistic form of communication. The Bakhtinian idea was to form a theory of language that would restore *a dialogue* between langue and parole, structure and speech. The Bakhtinian countermodel attempted to return language to its role as communication – not an object in itself. It also returned the place of a speaker as subjected to language, yet a genuine agent that can transgress inherited meanings. As the world according to the structuralist model is "given" and "consensual", the Bakhtinian world of language is social and contextual.[22]

Bakhtin distinguished between *monological official language and polyphonic forms of speech: monoglossia and polysemia.* Beyond official formal language, "multilingualism", the carnival, laughter and parody – no one and single truth – was found. The place of the Other of official language would be taken by the banal. Polyphonizing "language" meant making the model multiple and situational. The Bakhtinian conceptualisation of language focused upon polyphonic speech genres as the Other of official language, socially open systems and stratified language games.

The Bakhtinian critique of an abstracted language theory has been repeated in various forms in other approaches of textual analysis focusing on speech rather than abstract structure. The opposition is also reflected in different lines of semiotic analysis, one an analytical direction and another a social direction[23]. The alternative views pose language as activities performed through speech in contexts, in themselves productive and reflexive. Opening up the monoglossical conception of language makes it possible to see differences between social positions, different accents or speech genres. Brown has conceptualised such a social community as one with a collective grammar of the polity, yet different accents of speech:

> "By uniting persons in a system of political communication, the textual grammar constitutes them as polity. Membership brings the possibility that people speak the same language but different dialects - i.e., conflicting interests. What is most meaningful in one class or gender position, for example, might be intelligible but unimportant in another. Different readings of the common text may stem from different levels of interpretation, different segmentations, different perceptions of primacy between the segments or punctuations of causality".[24]

The community is orchestrated by a common grammar that defines the normal and the deviant, duties and obligations, syntaxes of self and other. Every institution, then, is a symbolic system that normalizes its members and divides the roles. But the roles are in constant change.

Where does this lead the analysis of gender? Gender can be thought of as a categorization, a cultural conception of male and female, into which people are placed. It is a system of categorization and differentiation, sometimes stripped to the bare bones of a grammar, a separation of masculinity/men and femininity/women divided into two separate worlds. It constitutes within each culture a gender system, a symbolic system or system of meanings that correlates sex with cultural contents according to social values and hierarchies. The meanings of gender vary, but the gender system is always intimately interconnected with political and economic factors of each society.

Gender is a cultural categorization that structures the meanings given to sexual categories and preferences. For someone to be represented and to represent oneself as male or female implies the assumptions of the whole set of those meanings. To speak gender is anchored in previous ways of speaking it, in connection to various discourses and social practices.

Gender is a *performatory* category. This means that the categorizations of gender do not have original meanings, no essence or universal structure, no origin. They are "only copies, and copies of copies". Structure does not lie in an origin. There is no essence or natural meaning of gender. Gender exists, is given meaning to, in how it is talked. It is continuously re-produced, reinterpreted in individual-social practices re-signifying the inherited meanings of gender[25]. Gender also has a history.

As gender is a performative category, speaking gender produces and constructs gender, repeats naturalised meanings or resignifies them. Construction is not the opposite of agency, but a necessary scene of agency, a product of discursive forces[26]. Paradoxically, to define gender is always to construct it as a difference (or as differences) and to take the risk of constructing what one was supposed to deconstruct.

There is no one, single symbolic order but different kinds of symbolic systems, different cultures or (imagined) communities. Studying semiotic production of gender must therefore be historical and local. Additionally, the cultural significations of Others or processes of othering have to be specified; they are local and specific, and they depend on a perspective and relations of power.

How, then, to read gender? Is the Other language of femininity also the language of Other? And what Other? How and why is femininity connected to women?

Disconnecting "symbolic" and "social" gender means that the "natural" binary between men and women is erased. The division is not simply located between "social men" and "social women" but opens a

space for reading metaphoric and symbolic meanings of masculinity and femininity as processes of representing and constructing gender. This also opens the question of othering and makes it serialised. Women do not have a "privileged access" to being Others; other Others are continuously constructed in cultural processes of power. Relations of Othership are not connected to persons but to changeable relations. Femininity or masculinity can be attached to any Others.

Furthermore, different discursive formations construct different subject positions, enunciative modalities, but discursive formations are not closed. In different discourses, you will find yourself as one – or the Other. Women and men as living people have no unitary subjectivities; subjectivities are constructed in various texts, practices, textual practices. Subjectivity is formed at crossing points between different texts, as subject position in texts. "The division into categories of 'men' and 'women' divides the culture, but it also divides the subject"[27].

Othering, then, is a rhetoric of constructing cultural categorisations where feminine characterisations can be attached to any category. The rhetoric of Othering has no stable reference or universality. Positions of Others and Other Others become serialised and multiplied, at times making turns and changing places. Othering, in these terms, can be a culturally common rhetorical strategy that works by feminizing the Other, but it does not necessarily have anything to do with women.

But, as it becomes possible to dissociate the "natural" categorizations of men and women from the symbolic categorizations of Man and Woman, it remains to be explained how they have come to be associated. According to Kristeva, among others, to collapse "language into biology" – femininity and masculinity into actual living people – is to force men and women into patriarchal straitjackets. Following this thought leads to concluding that women do not have any special relationship to language[28]. Then, attempts to valorize feminine language can lead dangerously close to repeating the traditional assumptions about women.

While femininity and women may no longer be the same, it is said that they coincide in patriarchy. Patriarchy makes them appear identical. *Because* women, inaccurately but unproblematically, are identified with femininity, feminine subjects remain marginal to symbolic orders and come to represent the boundary between symbolic order and imaginary chaos. Then, to treat gender as just a metaphor "desexualizes and androgynizes it and turns it into a purely discursive effect".[29]

As the Foucaultian project was to analyze technologies of power – how woman's body is "hysterised", analyzed, qualified and disqualified, saturated with sexuality and socially located in association with the family – de Lauretis has started to talk about *technologies of gen-*

der[30], *textual apparatuses of gender construction.* According to her view, different textualities or texts that construct gender are socially organised, diversified, separated and asymmetrically hierarchised. de Lauretis re-states the question of a lacking representation of gender in canonical texts as a separation and a distance between the canonical and the everyday language – as a question of a hierarchical relationship between the two. Women are not absent from "language" but from some modes of language use: high language and the institutions. *"There is a conceptual distance between two orders of discourse: philosophy or political theory and 'reality'. Gender is granted in one but excluded from the other."* The "high" discourses represent the imaginary relations of individuals to the "real" relations in which they live. And there is *"rhetorical violence"*, construction of invisibility as an effect of power[31].

The lacking representation of women, the invisibility of women in public discourses, must then be conceptualised in relationship to *social relations of textual production: in expanding the limits of "text" into its social con-text, in relativizing the place of texts of "science" that have been marked as canonical. It is to recognize the texts of science as placed in power/knowledge fields. No doubt, gender is not constructed only in canonical discourses, literature or even the social sciences. Surely it is constructed in various – textually mediated – daily practices[32].*

It would be "false to mistake male projection for female identity[33]", to believe that women did not exist just because they were not represented in the public discourses. That discourses are asymmetrically organized does not mean, however, that women are doomed to be represented just as male projections. Perhaps they *can still be read "from spaces not represented, yet implied:* blind spots, space of, margins of hegemonic discourse, social spaces carved in intersections of institutions" – in ruptures of the power/knowledge-apparati. This is not a space outside of language or culture. It is to suggest that women "were there" and that they could be made space for within discourses.[34]

In the languages of sciences, for instance, women have been found to remain metaphors or male projections on the Other. They remain distant to meanings and subjectivities constructed in the domains of sciences. The conceptions of the feminine subject as irrational, passive, and emotional has been effective in excluding women from public discourses. The representations are produced from somebody else's perspective.

But an opposition between "real realities" and textually constructed realities does not solve the problem; experience already comes to us as a textualisation of that experience. Gender is not knowable in any unmediated way. Neither is there any mystical femininity that would be beyond culture; there is no outside. Gender as a social construct and a signifying practice does not have any original meaning beyond its textual production. But also the texts are "real". Sciences as technologies of gender produce their own realities.

In analyzing law as a "technology of gender", Smart[35] has motivated an approach to studying law as a mechanism for 'fixing' gender differences. Law is no longer analyzed as that which 'acts upon' pre-given gendered subjects. Rather law is part of the process of continual reproduction of gender differentiation.

Certainly political science, too, can be studied as such a technology of gender. Political science as a technology of gender is not studied by contrasting it to other, "more real", realities outside of the discipline or outside culture, but rather by locating it in a social/textual field. Political science is then be seen as part of a process of fixing gender, a discourse that constructs gender in specific, changing ways. So how does political science, or sciences more generally, produce realities?

2.4 Constructing facticity in scientific texts; studying the rhetoric of realism

If women are "just textual", so is science. In what way do sciences produce their own realities? Why do we believe in scientific texts? What makes them persuasive and credible? Languages of science have a special capability to represent themselves as transparent. The illusion of textual truth-value, facticity and realism is exceptionally strong when sciences are talked about. Sciences, more than other discourses, are expected to tell us how things *really* are, to reveal hidden truths, as if scientific discourses had access to a reality without the mediation of language or social practices, as if sciences were not mediated by texts or materialise in them. Scientific texts have a special capability of becoming artefacts larger than life, as if not produced by human beings in specific contexts. The specific societal practice of science is expected to be neutral, referential and realistic.

This *ideology of representation* does not take into account that facts are not there just for the scientist to observe. Rather, he or she is the active constructor of the "objects" studied. Facts and observations cannot be mediated by other means than language, rhetoric and narration. The illusion of transparent language maintains an ideology of out-thereness and correspondence rather than contextually embedded communication in specific genres of writing. A prerequisite for maintaining the illusion of transparency is the disappearance of the author from texts working with a rhetoric of realism. The scientific style maintains a special illusion of impersonality, non-personality, a style denying that the author is a person at all, a stereotype of academic maleness[36]. The illusion of out-thereness can be maintained on the presupposition of a separation between subject and object.

An illusion of transparency can also coexist with various versions of productivity of language: a residual dualism of still maintaining an idea of an extratextual "reality", yet something outside of language. Drawing a boundary between something as real and something else as rhetorical can vary, for instance, in different disciplines. As literary criticism explicitly deals with textual productivity, it is sometimes maintained that "the social domain or background" of the literary institution can be dealt with as transparent, or that the metalanguage of literary criticism would not work according to the same rhetorical apparatus as the "objects" of study, i.e. literary works of art. The emergence of cultural studies in the social sciences has raised an analogical debate in Finland on "some studying only discourse while true problems of societal transformation are ignored". The logic of residual dualism – *ontological gerrymandering*[37] – works as a rhetorical device.

For some time now, this view of scientific discourses as abstract, universal and factual representations of the real has been under increasing criticism from various perspectives, among them *rhetorical studies of science*. The study of rhetoric poses language as communication, argumentation and persuasion between an author and an audience[38]. Acknowledging the rhetorical functioning of human communication inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is no way that sciences could escape being mediated and constructed through language. The "rhetorical turn" in studies of science means acknowledging that scientific texts are communication from an author to an audience.

It is unavoidable that scientific texts are rhetorical communication and persuasion and not just formal deductive structures, but this presents no problems. It means, however, a shift from philosophy to rhetoric[39], turning from traditional philosophy of science and classical methodology to the actual practices of writing science, from methodological prescription to studying what actually happens when doing research. Rather than seeing scientific texts as neutral sequences of arguments, analyzable in terms of logic, the approach is to see them as personal communication that incorporates the authors' preferences and perspectives. Instead of seeing the language of science as abstract and referential, a representation of something, rhetorical studies see it as performative, productive and contextually located.

Rather than claiming that scientific texts actually are personal and persuasive communication, I will for a while look at how they succeed in appearing as something else. Different versions, approaches and applications of rhetorical studies focus on different things. Debates between different versions are about whether the approaches should be formalistic or pragmatic. Another problem is whether the persuasiveness of the rhetoric of science should be accounted for and explained in terms of structures of the texts or in terms of the situatedness and contextuality of speech, as meaning constituted in context. How can one

study science as a *social* practice, and what are the con-textual conditions of believability? Is rhetoric – in the different versions of rhetorical studies – conceptualised as artefact or action, static or dynamic, identifying tropes or studying speech acts in context? In the following, the argumentation will advance from *1)artefacts to 2)action and to 3) action in context.*

The rhetoric of artefacts

The persuasiveness of scientific writing can be seen as its very ability to represent itself as non-style, non-rhetoricity – as *factual*. It can also be seen as a rhetoric of representing research questions as self-evident and neutral. Scientific language represents itself as a transparent and neutral medium of reporting *about* reality, about objects outside, depending on an illusion of descriptive language. Distinguishing between descriptive language and the world it is designed to represent depends on a separation of language and the world of things, disregarding that there being no "things" apart from human practices that constitute those things. This limits analyses to *"things" already reified, to the domain of the self-evident and already "given"*, and disregards knowing being an active, meaning-giving force. The *rhetoric of substance* represents science as being "about" something rather than productive of something.

There is a *mutuality* in posing the author as nonexistent and transparent and representing the world "out there" as independent of the speaker, as "speaking for itself". This *ideology of representation* is based on a separation of the self from the field. It works by representing the object of research as previous to its construction in research and existing independently of the research. This makes it possible for the researcher to represent himself/herself as a passive observer who enters the text in passive forms; the analyses "were performed", the objects were "found" and the results "tell" by their own force and voice. The scientific style constructs a transparent image of reality by means of disclosing the authorial voice. The common way of constructing the authorial position in science texts is to distance oneself from "the objects", to represent oneself as neutral, uninvolved and objective. The illusion of non-metaphoric, realist language relies on a presupposition that scientific writing is non-personal and non-subjective, not affective or emotional: the style of non-style, *the rhetoric of realism*[40]. Repressing personal aspects of communication leads to a *style* specific to scientific writing. The use of the passive voice destroys traces of the author, the audience and the context. The style of "primitive purity and shortness of scientific language" presupposes the language of science as *non-rhetorical, nonfigurative and non-metaphorical.*

In debates on rhetorical qualities of languages of science, *meta-*

phors have therefore been a catchy focus. Turning from the conception that metaphors of science are mere decorations, there has been a shift towards seeing the metaphoric character of scientific thinking: metaphors as *constitutive* of scientific discourse. Identifying metaphoricity as the "natural", necessary prerequisite of scientific thinking, theorising or modelling has dissolved a previous positivist distinction between cognitive and emotive aspects of language, according to which metaphors are only ornamental literary devices, and that there can be a division between metaphoric and literal language. Instead of a belief in rational discourse, contrasted to metaphors that "move the passions and thereby mislead the judgement"[41], metaphors, as models and theories, are seen as an unavoidable device of scientific thinking. They make new ideas possible. Models and new vocabularies of science are metaphors that transfer meaning, making the unfamiliar familiar. Much more than mere decoration, they create new meaning, reduce the insecurity of meeting the new, work as short cuts to explanations. As social sciences do not have natural referents, the construction of referents is always purely textual[42].

It has also been widely noted that metaphors have political effects. Metaphors impose an order of another semantic frame and in so doing they create value, evoke equivalence, provoke and politicise. The figures of speech bring along philosophical commitments and theories of value. Metaphors impose allusions and order our realities in specific ways. "They do partisan work under the disguise of the literal."[43]

Are metaphors of science, then, action or artefacts? A purified version would focus on metaphors as specific devices of language that transform meaning and value from one semantic frame to another in order to make the unknown familiar and at the same time model it, give it a shape. But it is still customary to consider something as literal and something as figurative. Metaphor, like irony, is dependent on a standard meaning. Maintaining a difference between the two, however, becomes one of framing or adoption of a perspective[44]. *The question of whether words are literal or figurative depends on their familiarity in a specific context. By noticing that metaphors have life cycles[45], the separation between denotative and connotative meaning becomes relative. The problem of "isolating metaphors" becomes one not of choices but of a continuum, a process of reification that can be opened.*

In scientific discourses, changes of analogical footings or metaphorical "roots" of scientific discourse is what paradigm shifts are about. A Kuhnian notion that paradigm shifts in science happen by force of rhetorical persuasion rather than logical argumentation is associated with historical changes within disciplines: established disciplines are those of single metaphors. Eternalised root metaphors carry political power and function persuasively by their very self-givenness. Stability of metaphors carries control. Concepts as abstractions create histories,

become "totems of membership in academic tribes and give magical powers to their users". Dominant but implicit metaphors of knowledge and understanding establish stasis. Dead metaphors turn the social into nature, whereas to refigure is to reopen a dead metaphor that carries value. In science, a good metaphor is a dead one.[46]

If the role of metaphors is to make the realm of the unfamiliar familiar, is it not, in scientific language, rather a question about defamiliarizing the familiar? Processes are turned into objects, new language games are created to oddify everyday language and objectify social practices. *Rather than chasing and identifying metaphors, the question becomes one of looking at the processes by which language turns from metaphoric to literal, from familiar to unfamiliar.*

The processes of reification can be seen in many figures of speech. Science discourses, specifically, are expected to single themselves out by the use of a *rhetoric of methodolathry*. We recognize a text as scientific by the persuasive powers offered by "method". Scientific style is expected to be characterised by exactness and preciseness, exact quantification, a rhetoric of percentages, a detailedness of examples, a conceptual clearness in documentation, operationalizations carried out following norms of validity and reliability[47]. Scientific language is abstract, static, objective and credible.

The rhetoric of method establishes metaphors as naturalised artefacts. "Method" works as a persuasive element that confirms that the "reality" is properly represented and translated into the language of science with the help of a proper code of translation. Procedures of data collection and analysis quarantee that the scientist is just reporting about an external reality: "data confirms...". Different forms of textualisation, texts and figures, "showing and telling", are put in practice in reporting for results[48]. Different genres of science writing acquire specific narrative structures that must be followed. Scientific style, characterised by a rhetoric of method, establishes the claim that you are doing science and that the text should be read as a scientific one.

The scientific-looking language of classifications, statistics, models, mathematics and formal logic uses the persuasive power of diagrams and quantification that, for some reason, are read as not-language. But the quantification procedures also produce reification: problems become desocialised, ahistorical and atomised. Actions are turned into objects – instrumentalised, externalised, aggregated. Texts appear as being "above rhetoric", as abstract and decontextual. Language departs from the social, and the language games constructed become absurd[49].

Whereas the rhetoric of methodolathry translates everyday language into an abstraction and a reification, the rhetorical shift has made a new translation, translating scientific data into symbolic constructs,

scientific descriptions and theories into narratives and mathematical proofs into rhetorical tropes. It has switched to seeing scientific activities as communication and conversation. *If the aim of the rhetorical approach is to study textual processes of reification and de-reification, it has to account for these processes even in the rhetoric of its own. Rather than naming and listing metaphors or isolated tropes as abstract lists of devices, and thereby reifying them into objects and conceptual totems inherited as such in science discourse, there needs to be a view of rhetoric of science as action rather than artefacts and as processes of reification or renewal of language rather than language as a "thing in itself", inherited from history and separated from contexts of use.*

Rhetoric as action

Starting from a notion that all language is rhetorical and that denotative and metaphorical language are inseparable leads to studying rhetorical organisation of texts in writing "science".*What do scientific texts do? How do they manage to do it? How are texts organized to present versions of "the world" as factual and independent of the speaker? What are the devices through which the out-thereness and facticity of scientific writing is generated? In what way are texts productive of realities?*

Looking at the language of science as communicative and persuasive leads to looking at how persuasiveness is textually produced and for textual strategies for constructing facts and reality effects as an active process of textualisation. This means that scientific texts are studied as *actions* performed through writing: what the texts *do*. Rather than seeing texts as descriptions or representations of any outside world, they are seen as productive of that world. In this view, textual devices less and less can be seen as "biased"; the reality effects must, instead, be seen as textual accomplishments. Seeing texts as action, performative and dynamic, concerns "all kinds of language", not just isolated tropes, figures of speech or "fake language". Common strategies are summarised here on the basis of previous literature[50]:

Naming
Research problems do not "walk up to us with labels on their backs". The moment they are named they become *named something*. When named, the "thing" gets defined and identified as a certain kind of "thing". There are no neutral ways of naming or describing "things" without being caught up in fields of *connotation*. Naming and labelling connects things to social fields of connotation, classifications and narratives – conventional sequences of cause and effect. Naming creates reality. It is to linguistically mark and structure social problems[51].

Framing

Categorizations are not natural facts. Classifications are ways of combining and separating things that already suggest "problems". Texts manage interests and consensus by framing some things as problematic while others are made to appear natural. By using contrast structures, some things are made to appear true and real, while others are made to be mere appearance. While some part of reality is made to seem stable, neutral and objectively there, other parts appear abnormal, ideological or false.

Semantic, denotative meanings imply choices of connotation and pragmatic frames of meaning. Connotations to second-level messages, metacommunication, imply ideological metamessages. Connotations imply choices made by the author aimed at undermining alternative meanings. Meanings are not intrinsic to denotative messages but depend on the sets of alternatives the message comes from.

Different ways of framing the world are ways of managing interests. Texts construct versions of the objects studied by giving *presence* to some features while repressing others, *emphasizing* some qualities of the problem while repressing others, focusing on some items rather than others, by *repeating or amplifying*, framing and sensitizing the reader to the author's value frame while blocking other values and interests.

Metaphors have framing effects. They imply a perspective and function as clues to implicit frames. Tropes like metaphor, hypotyposis and example work not only as illustrations and vivid descriptions but also as "problem setting" devices: the way they frame things in itself suggests the solution. Vocabularies can be clues to frames: whether government subsidies are "help" (if poor) or "promotion" or "tax reduction" (if rich) carries perspectival solutions.[52] Constructing issues implies what is seen as a social problem, what not. How a problem is talked about brings in categories and linkings. They imply larger systems of beliefs.

Constructing them

Texts "lend identities" to other persons. Assigning identities to persons ("the voter", "the drunken driver") are metonymies that reduce people to some partial attributes and already imply motives. They extend the meaning of data metaphorically and at the same time suggest interpretative frames for the phenomenon. Description of "a problem" implies decisions to classify a person as erring or pathological and suggests inclusion in an interpretative frame or discursive domain. While some things are made to appear normal, others are constructed as deviant. By reference to different kinds of interpretative frames, "they" can be made abnormal and strange, while the authorial position is made to seem reasonable and right. Devices for constructing facticity of the represen-

tations of others can be made stronger by appealing to common sense and "normality" of behaviour[53].

Representation of self

Texts represent the identity of the speaker in particular ways. Self-representation of the authorial position is done by means of textual strategies while seemingly separating the self from the world of the text and making oneself invisible. While out-thereness of the world is accomplished by making oneself look like a neutral observer of facts, merely reporting and describing, representing oneself as normal and reasonable is a textual achievement of self-representation, easily readable from how the text is structured.

The texts construct narrative characters or subjects' positions. While the narratological concepts and different positions of internal, implied authors or implied readers, ideal reader positions written into the text, are not focused upon here, texts can be seen as a mutual playgrounds for identifications, or journeys advancing from the beginning to the end.

Ordering and narrativity

Any text must be textualised in some order or *narrative sequence*. Narrative structures, the stories and the plots,[54] take the reader through the text and set up "the action" of the texts from its beginning to its end. The reader travels between segments of the text, through perspectives and shifting themes. In reading, the blanks and gaps of the text become filled. The place allotted to elements alters their significance. The position held by the speaker can be read from the ordering; starting an argumentation from a commonly accepted point of view, leading the reader to believe the points which follow by winning the audience's mental cooperation. The organization of a text is designed to counter alternatives and to successfully compete with other versions of the world.

Narratives contain values, myths and symbols, and constitute models of how the society works. The plot carries social patterns. The structures of the texts – oppositions, metaphors, transformations, contradictions – constitute polarities of self and other, good and evil, past and future. Different types of narratives constitute different versions of the world, successful negotiations of polarities, happy ends, or paranoid stories where the bad wins. The Other is either integrated into the self or it may become alien, threatening and dangerous.

The structuralist models of narratology have been criticized for being too objectivistic, for killing the patient to study blood circulation. However, the narrative voice is never single and unitary. Different levels of texts may be read as double voices to bring in contextuality and diversity, for also reading non-canonical texts.[55]

Staging

Texts also set the stage, *representing relations between the observer and observed versus the observer and the audience*. The separation between the researcher and the "world out there" makes the text into a *stage*, a window for looking at "the world or the people out there", of whom the author, and thus the audience, are not part. The objects may come in as authentic voices of the field that make the representation look like a true reality. Yet the stage is set by the author who is framing "the real" for an audience and assuming shared interests between them. By textual devices for representing "the objects" – for instance, the use of humour or ridicule – the text removes blocks of comprehension and helps the reader to overcome prejudices and loyalties that kept him/her from assuming the author's viewpoint.

Thus, the texts

> – *construct images of the world – i.e., worlds – and produce specific versions of the world as self-given and natural,*
> – *name, produce categorizations, typologies that work by labelling and stigmatising;*
> – *draw on implicit frames that are preconditions for making a reading coherent, and rely on implicit assumptions that require inferring and gap-filling, naturalised assumptions about "the people" and what they are like;*
> – *construct narrative characters, identities and subject positions, ideal readers built into the texts, built-in perspectives persuading the reader to share the authorial perspective;*
> – *construct communities, symbolic constructs like nations or groups, or science communities. They construct us and them, relations between an author, a text as a field of voices and significations, and a reader, and relations between these. They construct these textual worlds as natural and non-ideological.*

Texts as action in context; intertextuality

That texts become considered factual and scientific, credible and believable, cannot be explained merely in terms of a skilful or unsuccessful use of rhetorical devices in singular texts. Production of reality effects cannot be solely controlled by devices of rhetoric. Part of the reality effect is not due to arguments presented. Contextual factors are crucial for constructing facticity. Facticity is a social, communal achievement – a contingent one. How to make sense of this?

In Perelmanian rhetoric[56], the audience enters the scene as the horizon of textual production and becomes written into the texts as a universal audience or a specialised one. Facticity in Perelman relies upon implicit, taken-for-granted values and assumptions, shared by the writer and the audience, that concern both the reality and valorisation of phenomena[57]. Yet the rhetorical categories of ethos and pathos tend to remain bleak or fade away from practical analyses. *Facticity remains dependent on the pre-contracts shared between the author and the audience,*

but these remain invisible for analysis. The analysis may remain logistic and acontextual.

What, then, would account for "con-textual" bases for facticity? Why, then, are some representations more successful than others? How can one treat texts as action in context and actions performed through language, not as static idealised textual structures? How can one avoid treating language as abstract and thereby reifying history as well as one's own analysis, into something normative, idealised and eternal? How can language be studied as a practice rather than an abstract corpus of sacred texts?

Starting from a Bakhtinian notion, *meaning is always contextual.* The meaning of an utterance alters in context of use.[58] The meaning of texts depends on the setting in which they appear and the context of coding. In Lotmanian terms this could be seen as "second level signification": the same movements are interpreted in one frame as dance, in another one as losing one's balance or being drunk. Tomato soup cans become art when brought into a museum, or a page of the telephone book becomes a poem when published in a literary magazine. Analogically, the meaning of a scientific text is altered depending on where it is published or who the author is.

This means that the same text acquires different meanings in different contexts. A word gets a meaning only in its linguistic, historical context of use or in relationship to its cultural background. Meaning is never singular; there are as many meanings as there are contexts. Therefore, con-texts are relatively freely choosable. "There is no limit to intertextuality."[59] The "number" of possible contexts has no end. This means that con-texts can be both textual and extratextual, or rather, even extratextual con-texts are textual, not transparent. Yet texts are socially located.

In an *intertextual* frame the passive voice of science can be seen as *dialogical*, as texts in dialogue with other texts. In Bakhtinian narrative pragmatics, texts can be seen as *acts*, as productive instead of representative of something. In line with Bakhtin's opposition to formalism, meaning does not reside in structures of the text, but in dialogical relations within the texts and in relations of texts to other texts. The opposition between texts and contexts fades away.

Within an intertextual frame, a text can be in a *dialogue* with con-texts or co-texts. *Intertextual relations* can be dealt with as relations of texts, writing and reading in different "directions". It becomes possible to see texts as communication (except between the *author and the reader*): as communication with *other texts of the time, genre conventions and genre stratification of the time, and previous texts as a cultural tradition*[60]. A word activates its previous contexts of use. A text gets its meaning in relationship to other texts. A quotation brings an old text into a new context and gives it new meaning. And a text reflects the

conventions of its own genre.

The opposition between text and context becomes erased in seeing texts in social locations and considering the internal stratification of languages; social dialects, professional jargons, languages of generations or age groups. Relations between "texts" of different social locations become cultural dialogues, moves between different levels of speech or textuality (the formal and the informal), between orientation towards the speaker or the listener, between centrifugal and peripetal processes of cultures[61]. *The process of culture is one between reification of meaning and a return to the chronotope, the specific context and subject, between turning the social into nature – and back again.*

Furthermore, text become *heterogeneous*. Starting from the notion of the novel as an explicitly polyphonic genre, other genres can be treated as such, although the "other voices" may appear in them in a repressed form. Heterogeneity is a quality of all texts. There is, however, a movement, an oscillation between totalisation and multiplicity, *monoglossia and heteronomia*, one meaning and a multiplicity of meanings. "Master narratives always bring the different back to the same."[62] Truth discourses are monolithic. A monological voice requires one meaning, one interpretation, while heteronomia suggests many voices and conflicting interpretations[63].

Treating texts as polyphonic is to see them as narratives, as "places" along which the reader travels or as "characters" in a dialogue. Following the idea of Boethius topoi, Cvetkova describes the text as "a geography of significations; concepts located in a framework of space and time". The texts refer to previous texts that become texts within texts or other voices, quotations, literary references, or subtexts (already existing texts that appear or are reflected in the new texts. The ordinary types of other voices in scientific texts can be "the voices of the field represented in the text as translated into a language of science, citations made explicit in notes and references and the whole tradition of "a discipline", a textuality that a singular text "relies upon".

A text has two subjects, an author and a reader. Therefore, the text becomes a social field, a social relation of mediation, between two perspectives[64]. A writer writes, using the resources of language and tradition, as if "against" something, in dialogue with previous and contemporary texts that he or she cannot possibly "govern" or be aware of all meanings written into them. Writing is always dependent on previous writing. Reading, likewise, is a dialogue between the text and the reader in contexts and between the text and the previous texts of the cultural context and tradition.The texts form new meanings. The same text gets different meanings in different contexts.

The "texts" can be thought of as different genres, paratexts of different sorts. Lists of different types of paratexts can be made quite extensive. The ordinary types of paratexts in scientific writing could be,

for instance, the author's name, the title, epigraphs, forewords, notes separated from the main text, pictures and tables. In the "normal" practices of scientific writing, in bringing in voices of the field, in writing notes and references, the texts of science become polyphonic.

In tracing subtexts in texts, historical interpretation advances from texts to previous texts and references to the textual world inherited. Instead of searching for preceding influences on an author, the "implanted" subtexts are searched from present texts to hints of previous ones.

What about textualities of science? In his inaugural lecture, Foucault outlined institutionally imposed constraints on rhetorical choice. According to him, disciplines impose constraints on contents and subjects to be dealt with, topics that are relevant. Disciplines form professions that have power to regulate entry conditions and access to discourse. They distribute academic ability and licence specific forms of reading and writing. They form professional jargons and police conventions of speech and writing. A licence to participate requires that you learn to speak the specific jargon, whereas muteness is a function of exclusion from the dominant system. Disciplinary institutions or textualities are regulated by "regimes of production and reception". They form "logonomic systems".[65]

Foucault listed forms of control and ways of limiting rhetorical choice in the disciplinary institution, dividing them into *internal and external*. The *external* or institutional constraints were the taboo of the object, the ritual of the circumstance, the privileged right of the speaking subject, drawing boundaries between utterances allowed or excluded or considered factual or untrue. These are secured by institutional practices of education, publishing, libraries and forms of organizing science.

Internal constraints (commentary, ritual, doctrines, canons, citation techniques) also form and limit rhetorical practices. Notes and references to authorities and credible intellectual traditions show the author as a reliable member of the academic tribe. Arguing with authority is done by appealing to higher authorities and numerous allies. Bringing friends in and referring to former texts helps the representation to become factual; it constructs solid points of reference and creates allies by transforming earlier texts to suit one's needs. In the Latourian view, as well, the strategies of writing science become contextualised: "*In hostile environments* articles fortify themselves by becoming more technical and stratified, by stacking in pictures, figures, numbers and names, staging, framing and captioning: they anticipate the critique through subtle control of the objectors' motives." The conclusion of Latour's advice for scientific authors is: numbers, more numbers[66].

In the Lotmanian view[67] of the *formation and change processes of genres or textualities*, the facticity of scientific texts has come to depend

on the "latent minus rhetoric of realism". Authenticity and facticity of scientific texts depend on a genre classification and a distinction between different genres into *factual and fictional, literary and scientific*. Scientific communities are professions that represent themselves as being above rhetoric. Part of the belief in texts is due to a style showing that what you do is science, persuading the audience that this is not mere fiction, and due to the contexts of the text: where it is published, by whom. The text is classified as a scientific one by an *institution* and its processes of authorization[68].

The distinction between science and art depends on the very distinction between literal and figurative language. Therefore, studies on rhetorics of science have displaced this distinction between facts and fiction and regard studies science as literature and as specific genres of writing. It has become an expanding field to study specific writing practices and practices of textualisation in different disciplines and genres as well as the poetics of disciplines: economics, sociology, history, ethnography or literature as a form of poetry. This entails studying how discursive practices in different disciplines construct the authority of the scientist, a subject position from which it is allowed to speak.[69]

The notion of studying *science as literature* also relies upon a historical perspective where the separation of factual and fictional forms of writing is studied in terms of a historical transformation. A process of separating art from science, fiction from fact, figurative from realistic language, and *demarcating* different areas of activity has advanced in a specific historical process which is fairly recent[70].

On the other hand, *fusions* of disciplinary boundaries – "traditionally" considered autonomous, "pure in their objects, self-evident in their founding premises and independent from social issues and concerns"[71] – have been blurred and vanished into thin air. A rhetoric of realism is connected to periods of culture and constructed in contrast to earlier periods of romanticism[72]. *Therefore, the boundary between art and science is in constant historical transformation, not a natural and self-given fact.*

2.5   Framing II; reading gender and science

Reading science

In the tradition of the sociology of science[73], a normal starting point for legitimation of the version of scientific knowledge as factual is a listing of Mertonian norms for scientific inquiry: universalism, communism,

disinterestedness and organized scepticism. The norms tell how to organize scientific activity so that it would best produce objective facts. They are the institutional imperatives for modern science that are supposed to quarantee the acquiring of abstract and universal knowledge and legitimate scientific discourses as representations of this knowledge: science as discourses *about facts*, telling the facts, representing knowledge *on* facts. A precondition of the empiricist belief in "finding facts" is the possibility of direct and unmediated access to the world. According to the belief in pure observation, facts are produced by observation, empiricism, looking, seeing, viewing, visual experience as direct and self-evident, and mediated by a transparent language of "description", not seeing things *as something*, via presupposed theoretical assumptions, observations embedded in webs or conventions of beliefs.

From a rhetorical point of view, the norms have rhetorical functions. They function as symbolic resources for warranting claims. And furthermore, the debate on the Mertonian version of the norms of science has a specific structure.[74]

Although seldom taken as a description on how science "actually" is or works, the Mertonian version of science has been a starting point for a range of debates on the sociology of science, producing arguments and counter-arguments on a continuum of internal and external reductions. While the internal reduction (Merton) seeks to secure a "pure" internal space for knowledge, it established power as a secondary context of knowledge. While external reductions seek the contingent character of knowledge, they establish knowledge as a secondary reflection of power. But when looking at the structure of the debate, the norms and counter-norms of science become *interdependent*: there is no identity without the other, no "us" without "them", no inside without an outside. In this sense, the outside – what is departed from – always becomes written in[75]. The coexistence of norms and counternorms of science establishes in itself a field of discourse, basically positioning knowledge and power as opposite to each other, constructing "the inside", the factual, objectivist, empiricist version as pure and "the outside" as fraud, interestedness, contextuality, i.e., the contingent version, as dirty. The repertoires have been seen as *rhetorical opoi*[76], whereof the participants in scientific debates choose their subject positions and argue according to rhetorical resources available to the positions. This *"boundary work"*[77] of separating science from non-science is in itself a process of rhetorical work.

Studying how scientists' talk and writing is organized, Gilbert and Mulkay concluded that the two repertoires were used in different contexts. Whereas successes were accounted for by empiricist repertoires, failures were explained by contingent ones. The empiricist version was used for self-representation, the contingent one for representing others. In this way, one's own true beliefs could always be war-

ranted. Apparent differences in repertoires could coexist without any problem. At the same time that contingent properties were dealt with on a daily basis, they still could be considered irrelevant for the empiricist enterprise.

The contradicting, yet coexisting repertoires are easily identified in daily practices of knowledge production. While we may believe in the universality of knowledge and possibilities in gathering cumulative facts, it is very apparent that knowledge production and what is counted as knowledge varies in time and place. Facts are not found in equal numbers in various parts of the world. Different kinds of knowledge are produced in different places, histories of disciplines do not confirm the view of gathering facts or advances towards the truth for very long periods of time.

Therefore, rather than seeing the norms of science as descriptions of what science is or what goes on in science communities, the debate has been focused on the interplay of *norms and counter-norms* acting in concert, and the use of *two repertoires* used in different situations: *an empiricist version,* according to which knowledge is based on careful observation and choice of theories is determined by the facts, a version legitimated by a philosophical discourse on production of true knowledge; and *a contingent version,* according to which knowledge is a product of power struggles, prejudices, cliques etc, and ideas become accepted because of *contingent social factors*[78].

The point of departure in reading "what political science is" starts from the view that science, in general, is defined by demarcating science from non-science. The traditional Mertonian criteria for scientific activity (universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism) are not seen as universal norms. Following Gieryn and others, constructing science is seen as rhetorical "boundary work"; constructing a boundary between science and non-sciences is useful for scientists' pursuit of professional goals and authority and protection of the autonomy of science by contrasting it to other, non-scientific activities.

The view allows a contextual and processual – an *intertextual* – view on defining science. The ideological attribution varies in different situations. The boundaries drawn are changing, ambiguous and even contrary, – all according to the situation and drawing on different repertoires of motivation. Defining the identity of science, then, is accomplished in continued debates, on a daily basis. This interest work is done by using the rhetorical devices available. Boundary work is used to protect one's own autonomy and resources, and to exclude challenging views of science.

Boundary disputes sometimes challenge the norms and make the counter-norms visible. Another binarity has been produced between the front-stage (texts, public speech) and the backstage (unofficial norms, private speech) of scientific activity. Debates with alternative views

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appear as *strategic scientific debates.*

How about strategic scientific non-debates, the rhetorical accomplishing of what is not talked about? Is production of silence, non-questions and non-debate on the outer limits to what rhetorical analysis can do? What are the boundaries of conceptions of reflexivity? Is it a "text-internal" or intertextual concept? How does it relate to historicity and the question of transformation of discursive formations, a "boundary of contingency"?

In a long-standing debate[79], speech act theory and Foucaultian discourse analyses have been displayed as an analogical opposition between voluntarism and determinism, one studying broad historical changes of discursive formations and the other studying in detail the active production of talk and texts. The one, seeing writing as an active selection of resources of language and endless variability of choice, bases authenticity or facticity on constructing meaning through anchoring or objectification, though rhetorical choices. The other sees facticity as bounded by discursive formations that limit the choice and create broad historical conditions of what gets considered as factual. Whereas one type of analysis would be focused on the performative, interpersonal and explicit, the other would focus on the unintended, ideological and hidden. But whereas one would be illustrative and detailed, it could also remain within the confines of a given field of power-knowledge. While Foucault was studying broad systems of interpretative repertoires, from a "voluntarist" point of view Foucaultian analyses become acontextual, monolithic and abstract, not situated in social practices of human making. Can this opposition be deconstructed?

The equation between divisions into internal and external practices of fact construction can be crossed by posing two moves: 1) the functioning of "internal constraints" regulating rhetorical choice depends on an intertextual conception of textuality, and 2) the functioning of "external constraints" depends on rhetorical boundary work.

Seeing boundaries between discursive formations as a rhetorical accomplishment rather than a reified institutional "fact" crosses the internal/external divisions. Disciplinary institutions, too, are products of rhetorical constructions, of disciplinary identities and boundaries. Demarcation between science and non-science is routinely accomplished in determining curricula, standards for funding, and criteria of publishing. Disciplinary identities – descriptions of a discipline – are continuously produced for external uses: for getting funded, for getting access to publicity, for recruiting students. Or for internal uses: for forming occupational ethos of professional ideology and *for constructing communities. Imagined scientific communities are continuously constructed by rhetorical work – boundary work demarcating science from non-science, one discipline from another, self from other*[80].

Demarcating science from non-science, truth from ideology,

subjective from objective, the empirical from the metaphysical, or whatever, is an ongoing process of rhetorical reconstruction of an identity for a discipline, constructing norms and counternorms for science practices, where the Mertonian norms of science offer a cultural repertoire and vocabularies for ideological self-representations of sciences. The constructs of professional ideologies are used for acquiring positions of intellectual authority; they are ideological self-representations.

The continuing process of boundary work is used to work out separate institutional and professional niches, differentiations for acquiring and monopolizing professional authority by separating scientists from pseudoscientists, us from non-us, norms from counter-norms. At times, the norms and counter-norms become explicit and visible in scientific controversies. The demarcation is worked out by posing an "anti-discipline" of what the discipline is not. At times, the lines of demarcation are accentuated in periods of expansion, monopolisation or protection of autonomy; at times disciplinary boundaries are breached, and hybrid fields are created. Loss of coherence creates new possibilities for forming identities. Categorizations of fields are not natural facts of life; they work in policing groups of scientists. Histories of disciplines are continuously constructed; they construct communities by projecting origins and thereby constructing present self-understandings, versions of histories with continuities and breaks, linear developments or "crises". The identities, worked out as versions, categorizations, histories, etc. are self-produced in intertextual encountering, rhetorical acts in intertextual contexts.[81]

"Internal devices" of fact construction are dependent on their belonging to specific realms of facts, disciplines as institutions and settings of publishing. The use of rhetorical devices of fact construction is dependent on *previous realms* considered as factual. Sciences are textual formations, institutions with histories; disciplines can be treated as language games. What is considered as knowledge is constructed by a collective rhetoric. *Facticity, then, can be seen as an ambiguous and situational choice of interpretative repertoire, genre location or the expectation horizon of the reader.*

The model would then connect textuality and contextuality, locatedness in social practices but also historical transgressions, neither collapsing social relations into ahistorical speech nor remaining unreflexively within limited domains of discourse – dealing with strategies for fact construction as rhetorical strategies that make your work seem more objective, more consensually agreed. Production of science is seen as textual production where discourses of science form technologies of power and where a web of social contexts becomes written into the text; text and context are incorporated in this process of "inventing worlds"[82].

Starting from the perspective of science and scientific knowledge

as a product of social, cultural and historical processes, the argument leads to seeing the *rhetoric of realism in the language of sciences* as not a given description of an actual fact but rather as an achievement, a product of rhetorical work, a rhetoric producing reality effects. Science is then seen as a social construction made by human beings rather than as an extra-terrestrial abstraction of non-human making. It is seen as communication from a human sender to a likewise human audience – as relations of writing and reading in context – relations that are gendered.

Denaturalizing gender II; is "normal" science gendered?

Gender is *one frame for locating oneself in contexts from which you speak, read or write*, comparable to locating oneself in other terms. Texts of science, detached from their contexts, becoming abstracted things in themselves, canonized, sacred texts, surely can also be thought of as embedded in contexts of gender[83]. So why are women not talked about in the sociology of science? Is it yet another field where the question of the exclusion of women does not enter the discourse, where it is not problematic? What, then, is the meaning of *reflexivity* in debates on the (socially) constructed character of sciences?

Returning to the level of the "sociology of science" discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The structure of the "women and science" question protects the pure, objectivist model of science from female and feminine claims of the social and subjective character of science that can only be polluted by the feminine. It constructs a matrix of men inside and women outside, coming with filthy, political claims. The structure of this debate does not pay attention to the asymmetrical gender-order of the questions posed: why are the questions posed as issues on *"women and science"*; who is the producer of knowledge in the "sciences" talked about; what is the role that women play in these "sciences"? It is without any doubt true that the sciences talked about have been produced mostly by *men*. Yet there are very few questions asked about *"science and men"*.

The sciences produced by men have been conceived as universal. In this situation, posing the woman-and-science question leads to the misconception that only women, not men, are gendered and that reflection on the relationship between gender and science is to reflect on the relationship between women and science and to do research on women. In the institutional field of sciences we end up in a situation where the "new" that can no longer be kept in the sphere of non-science is institutionalized as "women's studies", which is constituted via the research object "women". In the field of scientific disciplines, it is situated in the margin as a "separate" question, as a new sector or sphere of

the research field. And you can go on thinking that women are gendered but science is universal, neutral and subjectless.

Another institutional reaction is to establish men's studies; recognizing "men as subjects" leads to an institutional logic establishing still a new field. Yet the men studied within men's studies often represent deviant masculinities rather than the dominant and hegemonic ones. A seriality of identities gets built into the institutional structures of sciences. Beyond the institutional solutions it becomes clear that the power/knowledge field is structured by a differentiation between *normality and deviance*, a structure of hierarchised gender and an asymmetrical relationship of power.

What about "normal science"/science as normal? Is it not marked by gender? Do not men represent themselves in the texts? Is the rule of men still taken as normality and an expression of reason? As male experience is also constructed through discourse, should there not be a theory of masculinity that would show "how men are rendered invisible to themselves, how they learn to think of themselves as neutral standards of reason"[84]?

The effect of this kind of gender/science system for women is that they remain outside the field of knowledge or become integrated as deviances from the male norm. In Braidotti's words, there is "a persistent habit of turning femininity into a set of metaphors for Other". The structure is binary and asymmetric and it is connected to cultural definitions of valued/nonvalued, sacred and banal. In scientific communities, asymmetric binaries work to form a fallocentric culture that discloses the feminine. The feminine 'dark continent' becomes the "flip side" of masculine self-legitimation[85]. An order of binary oppositions forms a discursive order where women represent nature to men's culture, where they play the role of the outsider.

Evelyn Fox Keller once used the term gender/science system[86] to denote a complicated dynamics of the interconnected forces – be they cognitive, emotive or societal – that in parallell form men, women and science. To her, the question was not of "women and science" but of a simultaneous construction of both gender and science: there are interrelated formations of ideologies concerning gender and science. She was looking for ways in which the historical interconnection between science and masculinity has been reproduced and how the disconnection between science and women has been created[87]. The interconnection between science and gender, in Fox Keller's conceptual system, works through a network of connections and disconnections, denotation and connotation. Connecting objectivity to masculinity simultaneously connects subjectivity to femininity. The politics of denotation and connotation works essentially through the "and", forming an iron cage of power.

"And" seems to offer very few alternatives. "And" works by

severely limiting our choices or actually creating a situation of imposs-ible choice. Instead of asking which choice to make, it is important to ask: What is the structure that puts us in this dilemma and creates the impossible choices?

Asking the "and" question leads us to accept the borders of the concepts of "women" and "science" and creates a frontier between them. The "women and science" question deals with both concepts as internal-ly coherent and homogeneous. It cannot conceptualize a situation where women would not be outside or where at least some women or increasing numbers of women are inside. The "and" question treats "science" in the same way, stereotyping it to "all the same". Obviously, male science also consists of different paradigms and conceptual sys-tems, and the differences between them are often gender-marked. "Female science" clearly does not form a totally different alternative to male science. Women's studies or feminist studies is not built upon any one privileged conceptual system, but works through different concept-ual systems.[88] An interconnected system of gender and science is con-tinuously reproduced. Is it then better to erase or strengthen the net-work of denotation and connotation structured around "and"?

An opposition between internalism and externalism, textualism and contextualism casts "textual" critiques of science as integrative, but it also poses women as outside of culture. From an internalist perspec-tive, there is no "sphere" of gender that is placed "outside" of science; rather, science is gendered through and through. This also means that women have to give up the positionings of happy hookers outside of the symbolic order and to take up a subject position. Yet, at the same time as it would be naive to assume that the gendered power asymme-try loaded into sciences has already been erased, it would be as naive to assume that it has not yet been erased – that women would now be totally outside of science. It would be equally false to assume that once the male power has been built into the structures of science, it will remain there forever. Therefore, it is not necessary to go on searching for the "roots" of the problem, the "original sin" that predetermined everything to go wrong. The "classics" do not determine the develop-ment of sciences. Rather, the classics are interpreted from today's per-spective and always bear the projections of our contemporary problems.

So what has happened to men? As there is no universal Woman/women or feminism, is there still a unitary man? Where does he hide himself? Is it still possible for some to represent themselves as universal standards of reason and subjectivity, as neutral and non-gendered? Is the shift of focus in feminist theorizing onto diversities between women and non-homogeneous conceptions of self a sign of devalorisation of women/Woman in some fields, while leaving others intact? Are men's identities still considered universal, unitary and homogeneous, monolithic rather than historical and processual? Are

men unitarily identified with hegemonic masculinities that represent themselves as universal? Is there a specific type of masculinity that has learned to consider itself "normal"; *a specific kind of subjectivity.*

There is no "science" in general just as there are no "women" or "Woman" in general. What constitutes femininity and masculinity varies in time and place. Characteristics associated with genders vary contextually, even in the case of men. There are different disciplines and fields of research that are contextually constructed, processed and recreated. So are categorizations of gender. In these terms gender and science are continuously formed into the same fabric. Since this work will aim at studying the concrete construction process of a discipline as a sexual/textual construct, I shall now turn to the practice of reading gender and science.

How to read?

The previous chapters have aimed at developing an approach that treats gender as textual and con-textual, readable only in concrete textual practices, and that treats science as textual action in con-text. Sciences are seen as specific textualities that work as technologies of gender, – self-evidently not the only discourses or practices where gender is constructed in. Rather than being "outside" of scientific texts, gender is seen as a textual construct, not outside of language or the textuality of political science. This implies a break with the "inside/outside"-presuppositions that assume gender – from the point of view of sciences – to be an external and natural category and science "in there" as neutral and genderless. The view is here replaced with a view of sciences as sexual/textual practices. Then, the question to be asked turns into one of studying how, in textual practices, the social has been turned into the natural, the dialogical into the monological or the contextual into the abstract and reified:

> *How was it possible to construct gender as a non-issue in political science? How was the meaning of gender naturalised? The aim of the study is to analyze the naturalisation of gendered meaning in Finnish political science of the after-war period.*

The texts of political science are seen as productive rather than transparent descriptions of a world outside of the text. This means that gender is not studied in terms of transparency, re-presentation or correspondence, although such an approach would be possible and even very accurate for studying texts that claim themselves realistic. Here texts of political science are not contrasted to another "reality" of the fifties that, as well, would rely upon some other conventions of textualisation. Referencing the real is here treated as a rhetorical strategy. And then again, also the texts of political science are real.

The reading does not claim any generalizability as a representation of "gender in the fifties". A possibly lacking representation of women from texts of political science in the fifties does not lead to a conclusion that women would have been excluded from "language" or "discourse." Differences between types or levels of textualities could be studied as contradictions or discursive asymmetries. Reading other kinds of discourses of the fifties would lead to other kinds of images of the world that also give voice to women. What it meant to be a woman or a man in the 1950's could be read from a wide variety of different kinds of discourses, giving different names and meanings to the category of gender, constructing it in different ways. Here, however, the texts of political science are studied as such, in their own right, as one technology of gender.

The main focus is here placed in studying the change processes of constructing the identity of the discipline and of constructing "a world out there" to be studied by political science. How are these change processes gendered? How do they construct gender? How do they delineate gendered meaning? How do they delineate science from non-science? How is gender woven into the text/ile of science? How is it constructed as masculine or feminine? Who is allowed to write or read science?

That the term of gender includes more categories than one leads to reading the invisible man. The language of science hides the subject, the abstracted rhetoric of realism makes scientific texts to appear as if not written by anyone. Does not male gender become written into science discourse or does masculinity equal to representing oneself as universal and neutral? How is it made possible to represent a male world as genderless in the neutral-appearing language of sciences? How does the politics of naturalisation, non-politization and neutralization work? Unreflexive masculinity; representing oneself as the norm, the normal and the neutral. Historical processes of gender construction and changes in economies of gender. When and where was universal patriarchy as a specific space/time-location? Self and Other, projection or representation.

Gender can be read at least as:

1. what is said about gender; how are women and men constructed in texts, as representations, textual constructions and categorizations of women and men. Read as semantic signs as clues to gender, associative frames and connotative matrices can be traced.

2. what are the gendered ways of writing science; is science constructed as feminine or masculine, as textual constructions of identities, "us and them", textual subject positions, implied authorial positions or implied audiences. Subject positions constructed in the texts, narrative characters, textual internal authors and audiences, or enunciative modalities of discursive formations.

3. as the gender of the author or the audience; regulated by logonomic systems, regimes of production or consumption, as mediation between author, text and audience. Discourses effect and sustain the different

categorizations and positions of women and men. The name of the author as a paratext carries the gender sign.

Genre, like gender, is a classificatory system, a system of categorizations. This leads to the conception that not even "the texts inside" can be dealt with as coherent and unitary but polyphonic and heterogenous: it becomes important to pay attention to genres or different types of texts. The meanings of gender are taken as a "genre-frame" for reading texts of political science: reading "spaces not represented, yet implied", reading margins of texts, the unofficial and unintended. This is simply done by reading genres of scientific writing "normally" not read as such, following processes of canonization and asking what was not canonized, paying attention to the statuses of genres, avoiding repetitions of what is already reified.

The text advances from a "sender-focused" approach asking whether there is an I in the foreword of dissertations. Reading metatexts and representations of the world leads finally to a "reception-oriented". From the gender of the author, I will turn to the gender written into texts, to gender constructed in texts as representations, and finally to the reception of a female author.

While the "social/contextual" gender in science communities is treated as secondary by asking whether the author represents himself in "I-speech", or what is the reception of texts marked by a female authorial name, the focus of the reading is in how texts of political science construct us and them, images of political science and the world "out there". While the first frame deals with logonomic systems, the second one can perhaps be thought of as enunciative modalities. "Us" is read by reading metatexts, descriptions of political science; "them" are read by reading descriptions of the world.

> 1. "Us" has to do with what a discipline is like; how it constructs its own identity in constructing self/its Others. Describing the change processes of textual identity construction and asking how gender is woven into this process.
> 2. "Them" deals with construction of what the discipline has set itself to study, how it constructs its object. The world constructed can be "mapped" on spatial coordinates of high and low, left and right.

The first question of constructing an identity for the discipline deals with how the scintific community was constructed, the rhetorical work though witch the community constructed itself and delineated itself from others; How it separated us from them. What were the processes of inclusion and exclusion in terms of femininity and masculinity, i.e. metaphoric meanings of gender. In the following, I will chase traces of boundary work of political science in metatexts, texts that explicitly define what political science is or what it should be. I see the texts as a process of reworking the boundary between political science and not-

political science; the borderline between "a culture" and its Other, its outside.

Among genres of scientific writing, metatexts as such have a canonical place they acquire canonized positions. They are often seen as the most sacred texts. They are considered to be "the most permanent, the most central ones"[89]. Therefore, writing metatexts is not allowed for anybody. Defining a discipline is a canonical genre. To say "what political science is" is only for the highly authorized. They also have a special function in field battles of a discipline: entering the field of metatexts counts as a taking up a position in the field or a failure to do so. Success in entering the metafield quarantees a place in the brotherhood.

The discipline of political science is a discursive community, an imagined community that is essentially constructed by or via texts, a literary institution or textuality with its own conventions. The discipline of political science is, however, just one textuality among many in a net of societal intertextual relations. And, the discipline itself is constructed of many genres, many types of writing, some of them considered more "scientific" than others.

The research texts "proper" are another type of texts. What kind of image of the world do the texts construct and persuade us to believe? What kinds of genderless/gendered worlds do they map, represent? Is there gender in the world constructed? Is there women or femininity? Where does the boundary of the world lie? How does the boundary change? The world constructed is studied by simply asking how the world is constructed and delineated, whether gender gets named within this world, whether men or women are included and where "on the map" they are named and placed. The changing conceptual architectures and spatial organizations of an object of political science transform limits of the discipline, redefine boundaries between what can be studied within/as political science and what cannot; policing the boundary between political and non-political.

That gendered meaning in scientific texts cannot be read in very explicit terms is quite possible. While representations of "the world out there" do write *about* women in the literal meaning of living persons to be "re-presented", metatexts are not *about* women. The reading is therefore based on the *metaphorical vocabularies of femininity and masculinity, and their relationships to the subject positions produced in the narratives. Are the selves constructed in texts gendered? What are the locations of gendered meaning, the "roles" of Woman (and M/man).*

My place for reading is another textual tradition where gender is talked about. That textuality forms the frame into which I bring the texts of the past. The previous chapters on reading gender discussed a tradition of interpretation that gives resources for this reading; to talk about gender is always dependent on previous ways of talking about

gender. On the basis of those debates it has become possible to locate gender as internal rather than external from the point of view of disciplines.

Calling back texts of the past as "authentic" traces of the past, involves political choices of selection, ordering, framing. Any *encore* will acquire different meanings. The "origin" and the "foundation" of a discipline is recreated in every interpretation[90]. A debate "about the past" can only be understood in a frame of the present. Reinterpreting history has a communal function; it is to re-construct a community. An act of constructing community always involves establishing regulations and defining borders. It does not only tell about the community but is an act of constructing a community. It also expresses the ethos of the community and tells about the heroes and the villains. Therefore, it also has a *mythical function.*

Reading historical texts is to bring them into a contemporary context – to re-present the texts of the past. On the road from author-focused to reader-focused theories of reading, the last move finishes the chain by saying that literature is in the reader. This mode of reading is not focused on authorial intentions. The texts are seen as speech acts in con-text, in an intertextual location. The focus here is on "cultural, collective modes of speaking gender". It is therefore impossible to suggest or claim that an author could be in control of meanings written into the texts or conscious of its ways of functioning. This also leads to the authorial monopoly of controlling meanings of texts being displaced. The shift in focus leads out of a closed author-controlled interpretation to an open and multiple one – out of a centralized and hierarchizised tradition of reading, made monological "in the name of the author", to multiplicity of readings. In re-presenting a historical text to a current context, there cannot, therefore, be any aim of finding "the original, true meaning" of the texts.

What the texts says does, however, matter. Reading as if in a dialogue with the texts is certainly based on that the texts "objectively" say the things they say. But this merely leads to the question of conventions of reading. There are no transparent ways of writing history; there can only be dull, tautological readings that reproduce previous conventions of reading, repeating the naturalised, sedimented, institutionalised modes of reading that turn culture into nature and confirm the cultural convention. And there can be modes of *"reading wrong"* that make conventions of reading visible and, instead of re-producing the canon, change versions of history. *Reading* is the point where naturalised, reified and abstracted meaning can be re-constructed into a social field of significations[91]. *The aim of reading must be to unnaturalise naturalised meaning, to open a closed, monological reading and to make it polyphonic.* But this chain of interpretations does not end. I turn my reading into a writing that, again, is your reading.

NOTES

1. Woolgar & Pawluch 1985. Also Brown 1987 on "a false opposition between culture as generated on the one hand by real material interests, and the other of symbolic representations. This would be an unreflective opposition that forgets that symbols themselves are phenomena of experience and that human reality is experiences only with the mediation of symbols." Brown's answer is symbolic realism: the realities to which symbols refer are also symbolic.

2. Pekonen 1991.

3. White 1987.

4. Woolgar & Pawluch 1985.

5. Keller 1982, 589-602; repeated in Keränen 1984.

6. See Jardine 1986. Jardine explicitly refers to french *textualism* and American *contextualism*, and she – an American in Paris – sees in France a great gap between women and Woman, – the metaphor.

7. Kolodny 1980; also Moi 1985.

8. See Jardine & Smith 1987.

9. See, for instance, Jordanova 1986.

10. See, for instance, Harding 1986. Her conceptual system is based on levels of gender symbolism, gender structure and individual gender.

11. For a description of the idea of destroying images see, for instance, Kuhn 1985.

12. See, for instance, Wolff 1990, 103-114.

13. Jardine 1985; also Jardine & Smith 1987; Nicholson (Ed.) 1990; for counter-arguments on "experience" as an epistemological foundation for feminist theory, see, for instance, Ruotsalainen 1991, 21-35 and Ruotsalainen 1992, 28-36.

14. For the problems of language theory in linguistics see, for instance Cameron 1985; and Cameron (Ed.) 1990.

15. See, for instance, Newton & Rosenfeldt 1985; Moi 1985, 15 and 158.

16. See also Butler 1992, 3-21.

17. See, for instance, Nye 1988; Jardine 1985; Braidotti 1991; Haavind 1989.

18. Cixous & Clement 1986, 83.

19. Irigaray 1985, 78.

20. Cvetkova 1988, 33.

21. "Kielen ykseyden vaikutelma korostuu kirjoitusta tutkittaessa. Kielestä tulee kirjoituksen kautta esine, joka irtoaa tuottajastaan ja käyttöyhteydestään ja näennäisesti objektivoituu. Teksteistä tulee pyhiä ja koskemattomia, niitä saa tulkita vain koulutettu eliitti, joka useimmiten koostuu miehistä." Purra & Tainio 1989, 220-223.

22. Bakhtin 1979, 90; Cvetkova 1988, 37.

23. According to Hodge & Kress 1988, analogical applications of the concept of structure or langue on other sign systems have on one hand lead to a direction of developing "analythical semiology" (Greimas, Eco). On the other, it has lead to different kinds of poststructuralist theoretizations. The Saussurean analyses of the structure of language have been seen as presented *in an intertextual relationship with studies on historical changeability of language use.*

    Hodge & Kress's rereading of the history of linguistic theory as "a return of the repressed" presents an anti-guide to the abstract objectivist

system: In rewriting the history of the de Saussurean as *dialogical* in relations to previous forms of historical linguistic analysis and as a development of successive sharp dichotomies, separating internal from external: language from its social and historical context, langue and parole, synchrony from diachrony, syntagmatic and paradigmatic, signifier and signified, – and after posing the successive divisions, eliminating one half of the dichotomy.

The re-reading of the history of linguistics then places the history into an intertextual relations to other debates, i.e. place it in a context, rereads other, neglegted parts of "the theory" and re-constructs previous interpretations of this history.

However, the normative and abstract definition of language as a form-in-itself served the growth of linguistics as autonomous science", while at the same time isolating it from other disciplines, each of them forming their own mechanised language games. A growth tendency of reified linguistic determinations.

As the structuralist model dualised and separated *form and content*, language was detacted from referentiality but it also lost its history. (The separation of form and content limited textual manifestations to the formal meanings strictly related to established ideological contexts.) Detaching language from the social created an associative matrix between the social as ideological and the abstract as scientific. The science of language could become technical and mechanical classification of its own "parts" – a form of grammatical classification that was taken for a "pure form of knowledge".

24. Brown 1987.

25. See, for instance, Kessler & McKenna 1978; Foucault 1980b; Coward 1984; Smith 1990a; Smith 1990b; Butler 1990.

26. Butler 1992, 3-21.

27. Jardine 1986.

28. Kristeva quoted in Tong 1989, 229-230; also Moi 1985; 81.

29. Braidotti 1991.

30. de Lauretis 1987; de Lauretis 1986; de Lauretis 1989; also Keränen 1989; Karvonen 1991, 25-32.

31. de Lauretis 1987, 14-31.

32. Foucault 1982b, 369. "So it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subjects is constituted. It is constituted in real practices. There is a technology of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them."

33. Petro 1989.

34. de Lauretis 1987, 25-26.

35. Smart 1989.

36. Edmondson 1984; see also McGloskey 1988, 282.

37. Woolgar & Pawluch 1985.

38. Summa 1990.

39. Veron 1971, 60-61: "Science has been studied on the levels of syntactic (logical) or semantic (epistemological or methodological) points of view. Only on pragmatical level can you study how meanings are 'used', how meanings come into being as empirical facts of social communication."

40. Gusfield 1976; Lotman 1989.

41. Locke cited in Bicchieri 1988, 100-114.

42. See Shapiro 1981; Gerken 1989,141; Parker & Shotter 1990,12; Czarniavska-Joerges 1988.

43. Shapiro 1986b, 15.

44. Czarniawska-Joerges 1988; Moran 1989, 87-112.

45. Czarniawska-Joerges 1988.

46. White 1982; Aronowitz 1988; Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991; Shapiro 1986b; Gerken 1989, 144-145.

47. Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991, 131; Latour 1987.

48. Gusfield 1976.

49. Shotter 1989,167.

50. Edmondson 1984; Fairglough 1989; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Shapiro 1986a & b; Shapiro 1988; Gusfield 1976; Summa 1989.

51. Potter & Wetherell 1987; Brown 1987; Pekonen 1991; Czarniawska-Joerges 1988.

52. Moran 1989; Veron 1971, 66-67.

53. Smith 1990a; Shapiro 1986b; Gusfield 1976.

54. Chatman 1976; Rimon-Kenan 1983; in Finland Apo 1990; Alasuutari 1989.

55. Lanser 1986.

56. Perelman 1982; in Finland Summa 1989 and 1990.

57. Summa 1990,18.

58. Volosinov 1987.

59. Makkonen 1991,9.

60. See Viikari 1991.

61. Bachtin 1981, 272-275; Cvetkova 1988; Uspenski 1981; Lotman 1989.

62. Booth 1983; Carroll 1987; Bauer 1988.

63. Pekonen 1991, 60.

64. Cvetkova 1988, 42.

65. Foucault 1982a; Hodge & Kress 1988; Fairglough 1992.

66. Latour 1987.

67. Uspenski 1981; Lotman 1989.

68. Simons 1989, 4; Weber 1987.

69. Brown 1977; Edmondson 1984; Klamer & McGloskey & Solow 1988; Simons & Aghazarian 1986; Hunter 1990; Gusfield 1990.

70. Lepenies 1988; Shapiro 1986a.

71. Hodge 1990.

72. Uspenski 1981.

73. A "normal story" constructed on the basis of Aronowitz 1988 and repeated in many textbooks.

74. Prelli 1989; Czubaroff 1989, see the Mertonian norms and counternorms as vocabularies; Kitzinger 1990 on a strategic debate: separating true science from false one, science from non-science; reorganizing internal and external world; see also Weber 1987; Kusch 1991.

75. Weber 1987; Prelli 1989.

76. Czubaroff 1989.

77. Gieryn 1983.

78. Gilbert & Mulkay 1984; Gieryn 1983; Kusch 1991. Many of the studies on how scientific communities actually work – rather than philosophically should work – have dealt with the hard sciences, i.e., natural sciences. Only lately has the problem of the rhetorical organization of the social sciences "themselves" become a theme of research.

79. For different version on this debate see, for instance, Parker & Shotter 1990, Shapiro 1981; Summa 1989.

80. Gieryn 1983; Anderson 1983.

81. Gieryn 1983, 791; Rouse 1990, 192; Brown 1977, 9.

82. Woolgar 1988; Latour 1987; Aronowitz 1988.

83. "... a resistance to the elitist and alienating language of poststructuralism; bringing to the fore an altogether different agenda, the social construction of gender." Parker and Shotter create a narrative sequence advancing from deconstruction as "merely textual" to genealogy and finally feminism. Parker & Shotter 1990, 1-14.

84. Hearn & Morgan 1990, introduction; Cvetkova 1988 on seriality of identities; Seidler 1989 on seeing oneself as the norm.

85. Braidotti 1986, 44-60.

86. Keller 1985 on gender/science-systems. Other ways of expressing relationships or mediation between the "internal and the external" of science are f.ex. Hodge & Kress 1988, logonomic systems regulating licences to read and write or Dorothy Smith (1989) on textually mediated social practices; systems that direct people into positions of reading and writing.

87. Keller 1982; 8,12.

88. Braidotti 1986.

89. Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991.

90. Nelson 1989; Honig 1991.

91. Pekonen 1991, 34.

3 INSTITUTIONS, CONCEPTS AND TEXTS AS REIFIED POLITICS

3.1 The institution in numbers

"Finnish political science" can be described in different measures of institutionalisation: as an expansion of positions in the discipline; as students graduated with majors in it; as a gradual increase in the number of departments within the expanding university system of the country.

By the end of the Second World War the number of teachers in the discipline was five, increasing to 15 by 1965. The institutional base for a scientific community must be characterised as small. Of the fifteen persons engaged as political scientists as of 1965, one was female[1]. The number of students in political science during the period 1945-65 was also modest. Before 1945 - between 1925 and 1945 - the number of students who earned MAs in political science had barely exceeded 50. The total university system of the country still being relatively small, political science was represented at the University of Helsinki, Åbo Academy and The School of Social Sciences (Yhteiskunnallinen korkeakoulu) that later moved from Helsinki to Tampere.[2]

The fall term of 1944 at The School of Social Sciences had to be opened later than usually, since the students and teachers still were needed in farming, mostly in digging up potatoes. The number of students did, however, increase during the term in spite of male students being hindered because of military service and female students because of their wartime work obligation[3].

The postwar period was characterised by a modest increase until the middle of the fifties, turning into a huge expansion by the sixties.

The number of students at the faculty of social sciences of the University of Helsinki grew from 190 by 1957 to 1000-1100 by the fall term of 1961[4]. Only after 1965 did the expansion of the university system (beyond Helsinki, Åbo Academy and The School of Social Sciences) increase the number of MAs in political science, still further expanding the "discipline".

During the war the University of Helsinki had a large female student population[5]. Women did study political science, although sociology was considered a more "natural" choice[6]. However, they did not graduate as licentiates, let alone doctors. By 1959, two of the 38 licentiates of the faculty of social sciences in Helsinki were women[7]. None of the 15 doctoral dissertations in political science of the period was by a woman[8]. The amount of women in the Finnish Political Science Association, founded in 1935, increased in number but decreased in percentage from 8.45% (6) in 1945 to 4.58% (19) in 1965[9].

So studying "the Finnish political science of 1945-65" is not explained by large numbers. The institution was small in terms of numbers of teachers, students, departments and members of the political science association. The number of women within it was even smaller, but yet not nonexistent.

3.2   Studying an institution; naming and classification

"Institutions" are not prior to but products of textual construction, rhetorical production and reproduction. Yet the existence of disciplines named and described in different ways appears to us as a natural and given fact – as structures that regulate our actions but do not require further reflection. Institutions become reifications that impose constraints upon rhetorical choice. The institution of disciplines/the disciplinary institution functions as a conservative memory; its history is already part of nature while its present reconstitution appears "unnatural", as a process formed by acts of will, as political.[10]

The politics of institutionalisation distributes definitions of belonging, roles for insiders and outsiders. An outsider faces a decision between integration and autonomy, between deciding to seek access or seeing the institution as totally corrupt and remaining outside. An outsider has to decide whether to establish a new discipline or to integrate himself into the already existing ones. The role of an outsider appears to be political, while an insider enjoys the luxury of an "unpolitical" position. However, the old institution certainly is political, too. Power is already imbedded into the structures and institutions of science but therefore not determined and eternal.

How should one study the production process of the naturalised institutions as political? Institutions can be approached in many ways. We can start "from the beginning", trace the historical processes by studying the archives, looking at when and through which processes and actions the institutions were founded or established and where the influences came from, and finally show how we unavoidably ended up with what we now have. On the other hand, we can start from what we have, trace the choices made along the way, and imagine what there could have been.

We can locate political science in relation to its place *within a system of disciplines* and by looking at its *internal* classifications and divisions. By looking at the politics of *naming and classificatio*, we can start to *denaturalize* what is now called "political science" and see how it has been rhetorically constructed, legitimated and reconstructed, by studying how interests were promoted and processed as a "structure" and how naming and classifying was used in order to occupy domains and areas of knowledge that became stabilised.

As an example, we can start by reading "an origin" a situation where the system of scientific disciplines did "not yet" exist. In 1919, Yrjö Ruutu, at the time called Ruuth[11], designed such a system, arguing for a system of sciences and curriculums and evaluating which disciplines should be founded. "On paper", the text constituted a field of sciences of the state (valtiotieteet) and distinguished between disciplines included in these sciences. Like later rhetoricians Ruutu certainly was imbedded in a context of interests for which the plan and its totalising and systematic rhetoric was suitable[12]. That is not the point here, however.

In "the system", *"sciences of the state (valtiotieteet)"* referred to "all those disciplines that have the scientific study of the different forms and sides of human societal life" as their aim. The *"main forms of societal life"* were divided into *"juridical* and *political"*. The *political main form* (päämuoto) was divided into two "functional modes" (toimintamuoto) or phenomena of different natures which are the *"economic* and the *political* ones in a limited sense", whereof the latter referred to "governmental (valtiollisia) power relations, forms of action, procedures, motives, conditions, movements, and so on". Research on these was primarily represented by *"political science (valtio-oppi) or politics and its young parallel discipline, the art of government (valtiotaito, Politik als Kunst)"*[13].

It was further stated that the sciences of the state "naturally limit themselves only to human societal life within the state"; from this, the conclusion was "deduced" that *"the system of sciences"* was structured by a division into relations between states and within states. The main divisions of these sciences were also represented in the form of a "for-

mula" (kaava)[1] [14].

Sciences of the state:

Juridical sciences / Political sciences
Economical sciences/ Political sciences in a limited sense

Of "the political subjects" within the MA curriculum, *political science* (valtio-oppi) would include a short course in

- *knowledge of the state* (valtiotieto), i.e. knowledge of the governmental and societal conditions of different countries, in
- *theoretical political science* (teoreettinen valtio-oppi), which studies governmental and societal, that is, political movements and phenomena, in
- *the art of government* (valtiotaito), which is knowledge of governmental procedures and forms of action (toimintamuodot), and
- *administration* (hallinto-oppi).[15]

Education in social sciences should, according to the plan, aim to serve both practical and scientific ends. As the practical requirement was "to raise able civil servants and state officials, it is best to bring the scientific fields at least to some degree into conformity with the governmental work fields". Teaching and research should follow *"real conditions"* (vastata tosioloja). This required that:

"the existing conditions and the nature of governmental phenomena force us to consider the general system of sciences of the state, which at the same time is the system of governmental activity."[2] [16]

And soon:

"It may be appropriate that the system mentioned above should be taken as the point of departure for planning university studies in social sciences in Finland"[3] [17].

Thus, curriculums were outlined for an MA degree in social sciences, licentiate degrees in law and economics, and a degree in diplomacy[18].
     The text gives evidence of the strong rhetorical power of divi-

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1   "Ylläolevan perustuksella syntyy seuraava kaava:
     Valtiotieteet:
          Oikeustieteet/Poliittiset tieteet:
          Taloustieteet/Poliittiset tieteet rajoitetussa merkityksessä."

2   "Täten olevat olot ja valtiollisten ilmiöiden luonne pakottaa meidät ottamaan huomioon seuraavan yleisen valtiotieteellisen järjestelmän joka siis samalla on valtiollisen toiminnan järjestelmä."

3   "Lienee siis tarkoituksenmukaista ottaa yllämainittu järjestelmä lähtökohdaksi suunniteltaessa valtiotieteellisiä yliopisto-opintoja Suomessa."

sions and classifications. Since a division was just created and con-
structed as systematic by the author on page 6, already on page 7 it
"requires" that the studies be organised according to the system. The
"systematic scheme of studies", "the study system of social sciences for
Finnish universities", required implementation, therefore the article
closes by pointing to an increasing need for resources.

> "With the help of these subjects, **the Finnish man's view is opened** to see
> further than the borders of his own peripheral country, and he learns to under-
> stand the forces, conditions and preconditions that function in international
> governmental life."[4] [19]

Where do the distinctions come from? Why does the text appear odd
for a current political scientist? That the text is old makes some of the
expressions appear amusing. That the translation further demolishes
terms from the German tradition of political science does not help. The
rhetorical strategies taken out of context do not retain the persuasive
power that was intended. And the classifications and divisions
attributed to disciplines and subjects appear vague and haphazard. We
may wonder what "real conditions" are. What is "political" on the differ-
ent levels of classification? What are the "forms of action" or the "func-
tional modes", the "phenomena", the "motives, conditions and move-
ments" that are said to form the object of study of political science?

The system is not unlike the Foucaultian list of Chinese animals
that does not appear systematic to us, although the Linnaean list of
plants does. The system – the terminology, the names and classifica-
tions, the references to "the real" – did not become established as the
basis of disciplines and curriculums. They did not become naturalised
parts of institutions and the organization of science. They remain odd,
because they are concepts that have lost the fight.

The approach of reading "an origin" that has become odd can be
contrasted with the conceptual systems that actually became realised
and what we have today. Representations of political science come to
us in different forms and shapes, as constructed images of the disci-
pline. Studying political science involves internalizing "political science"
as images represented in curriculums as different "lines" and "levels" of
courses. Political science is listed and classified as content areas of
specialisation and hierarchies of levels of knowledge. Being classified
"as an area of study" is to be included, to have a space or domain of
your own.

Learning political science involves internalizing *images and
mappings*; constructions are rebuilt for every generation. At one point
"politics" may be constructed as "boxes and piles" named "the political

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4   "Näiden aineiden avulla avartuu suomalaisen miehen katse näkemään kau-
     emmaksi oman syrjäisen maan rajojen ja hän oppii ymmärtämään..." (s. 20)

system" that becomes a natural way of envisioning politics. At some other time they may come as "sectors", "boxes", charts or graphs. The images of science or its object of study varies[20].

The moment of establishing an image differs from the moment of internalizing it as the "given". The moment described in the following differs from the moment of studying Millbrath's model as the first thing in an introductory course in political science.

> *"The chart has been developed on the basis of a model drawn on the blackboard by Lester Milbrath during his lecture at the University of Turku on the 1st of November 1961."* [5] [21]

Once established and internalized, the images become *nature*. The central images become *dead metaphors* that form conceptual architectures. Their "systematic" character guarantees them strong rhetorical power that is hard to contest.

Organizing sciences involves connecting and separating different "things", separating social science subjects from the faculty of humanities and, by so doing, connecting social sciences nearer to each other. The disciplines are discussed as being "close or distant, supporting each other, having an organisation of their own and students of their own". Curriculums are organized by discussing relationships between the entities called disciplines and hierarchised into levels. Reaching "a high level" in one discipline is balanced with "the number of disciplines" included in a degree. "Knowledge" is processed in boxes of quantity and quality.

The "systematic" character of the images and representation appears natural and is believed in by the people who belong to the intertextual community in question, not to other people. The naturality effect is stronger, the closer/more closed you are to the way of "seeing". And the stronger it is, the stronger the exclusion of other "things" outside of "the system".

By the beginning of the 1950s the disciplinary system had already become structured into a form not alien to the present one. The disciplines were "ready". The issues of constructing the institution were turned into issues of cooperation between existing "units", demarcations between units and internal fragmentations into areas and fields within each unit.

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5   "Kaavio on kehitetty piirroksesta, jonka Lester W. Milbrath laati esitelmöi-
     dessään 1.11.1961 Turun yliopistossa."

3.3 Concepts as totems; what is the object of political science?

How can we talk *about* politics in political science? What happens when we do that? Why would one image or metaphoric representation be "better" than another one? Why is politics better seen as "an organism" rather than with the help of Tarot cards? Why do we see some of the images as natural but others not?

> *"In the area of formal sciences, the research object is in a way a conceptual construction created by the researcher or the science himself, and 'outside' of him (although 'in his mind'), and therefore without the multiple hindrances brought by everyday experience, language and social relationships, that in the area of the social sciences - like tropical underbrush - hamper the birth of clear concepts and the separation of the research objects from the researcher."*[6] [22]

Is political science about the state or a state of mind? Is it "outside of the researcher (although in his mind)"? Can the research object be separated from the researcher?

The question of what political science is, is often thought as a question of what it is *about*. Sciences/disciplines legitimate themselves by referencing the "real", being "about" something. How does the researcher know what the state or politics is, as neither of them "comes to the researcher with a label on its back"[23]?

The "aboutness" of the objects of research becomes textually produced, with the aim of the representation to enable/persuade us to see the external world in a certain way. A specific quality of scientific texts is to display neutrality, to use "neutral language". Science as a writing practice follows norms for textualisation; scientific method is a style that hides the traces of its own textualisation. A discipline is a literary genre, in a constant process of genre formation.

The naturalization of concepts, images and classifications destroys the traces of an actor, action, deeds and the politics of structuration and institutionalisation. Institutions become reified politics. Yet, the images also have a history and show enormous variability. That the naturalised, totemic power of concepts is relative and contestable is, however, not always recognised.

The most common definitions of "what political science is about" certainly are that it is *about the state* or *about politics*. However, what "the

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6   "Formaalitieteiden alueella tutkimusobjekti siis on tavallaan tutkijan tai tieteen itsensä luoma käsitteellinen konstruktio ja hänen "ulkopuolellaan" (tosin "mielessä") ja täten vailla niitä moninaisia arkikokemuksen, kielen ja sosiaalisten suhteiden tuomia esteitä, jotka viidakkomaisen aluskasvillisuuden tavoin sosiaalitieteiden piirissä vaikeuttavat selkeiden käsitteiden syntyä ja tutkimusobjektin erottamista tutkijasta."

state" is or what "politics" is has been a very ambivalent and contestable issue. It is not clear what they are or where they lie.

> *"... the claim caused a lively debate at the meeting of the Political Science Association. Among other things, it was doubted **whether the concept of state is an empirical concept**. In my view, the state is as empirical or non-empirical a concept as organized societies in general: the reality basis of the concept is even in this case in that certain people can be observed to follow certain organizational forms."[7] [24]*

> *"**Politics** is, in the last instance, what it is defined to be in each context"[8] [25]*

The metaphorical footing for political science during the postwar period has balanced and changed between the two metaphors or conceptual totems: the conceptual architecture has changed from a state-focused to a politics-focused one. This is also to be seen in the *name* of the journal of the Finnish Political Science Association, formerly named "The State and the Society" (1941-56) and later called "Politics" (1959 –).

3.4 Before reading; who has written the foreword?

> *"The question therefore becomes purely personal and remains outside of scientific evaluation."[9] [26]*

Who has written the scientific text? Does it have an author? Is there a subject in the language of science? Is the subject gendered? Gender is, from the point of view of scientific activity, at times considered a private matter that is and should be kept separate from scientific activity. Writing science is often characterised by a common habit of displaying neutrality, by representing the texts as separate from their originators. It is a "stereotype of academic maleness" to represent the texts as if not authored by anyone at all[27].

Are there no private matters in scientific writing? Is there no gender in scientific texts? Where does it show? Should "I" be written

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7   "... väite aiheutti Valtiotieteellisen yhdistyksen kokouksessa vilkasta keskustelua. Mm. epäiltiin, onko valtion käsite empiirinen käsite. Mielestäni kuitenkin valtio on yhtä empiirinen tai yhtä vähän empiirinen käsite kuin organisoidut yhteisöt yleensä: käsitteen todellisuuspohja on tässäkin siinä, että voidaan havaita määrättyjen ihmisten noudattavan määrättyjä organisatorisia muotoja."

8   "Politiikkahan on viime kädessä sitä, miksi se määritellään kussakin yhteydessä."

9   "Kysymys muodostuu siis puhtaasti henkilökohtaiseksi ja jää tieteellisen arvioinnin ulkopuolelle."

into the texts?

The easiest way to look for "the personal" is certainly to look for *the author*. Where does he/she show himself or herself? *The name* of the author is a paratext that most often comes first, marking the originator of the text. Or it may come last, as a signature, marking responsibility for what is said, but referencing somebody else's text. In any case, the name of the author must be there. Lack of it makes the reading shaky and ambivalent[28]. The authorial function organizes horizons for reading[29]. However, we keep on living under the impression that the name is not part of the text.

In my "data", the names of the authors are predominantly male. The reader of this text can carelessly expect that the texts I am reading are by male authors. I will return to the one exception at the end.

In my "data" there is also another paratext where the author might show himself. *The foreword* is a textual element, a paratext that does and does not belong to the texts of science. It is placed at the beginning, usually before the list of "contents". It appears systematically in *doctoral dissertations*, not in articles or speeches. (There are forewords in books, too, but they are disregarded here.) *What does the foreword do at the beginning of a dissertation?*

The foreword is a place where "I" appears[30], basically the only part written in the first person. Is this the site of subjectivity in scientific writing, telling about the person? The separation of the foreword from the "proper" text leaves us with the expectation that it is something personal. Is that why the science community eagerly skims the foreward of a new dissertation as the first thing?

When one looks at the forewords of dissertations in political science from the beginning until 1965[31], reading them one after another, they appear surprisingly alike. Being the only "personal" part of the text, the forewords were surprisingly fixed in form, following the same scheme.

The "normal" structure followed the order of representing the text proper, telling about its background and conditions of production, and thanking others who had contributed to the work or made it possible. The standard, conventional order of thanking advanced in a regular chain: the scientific father or other professional assistants, the financiers, funds or scholarships, the technical helpers, the biological father and mother, and finally the wife.

The scientific father is the supervisor of the dissertation who has "helped and supported". In some cases, the father has "given the theme", that is, told the author what to write about, in others "closely followed the production of the work". A chain of fathers and sons is explicit in the forewords.

Godfathers of the work are experts inside or outside of the scientific community who have commented on the text, provided expert

help, assisted in the use of archives. The pre-Second-World-War dissertations could even thank the presidents of the country. Can the text possibly be poor if the godfathers of it were such grand patriarchs or if it is dedicated to the memory of the late Marshal Mannerheim?

The biological father is sometimes mentioned in the foreword; occasionally both of the parents are. The father is cited for financing the studies or the dissertation work, or he has drawn the figures for the book. Mothers are not mentioned for any specific functions in assisting in the work.

Women mentioned by name are apparently proofreaders or typists. Sometimes this, however, remains unclear. The thanks go to Mrs X or Y, who does not seem to have any specified function or profession.

And last but not least, the thanks go to the wife. She is sometimes given a name and a title and thanked for proofreading or gathering the data. Sometimes she is thanked for an "inspiring attitude, unselfish helpfulness and patience, encouragement and sacrifices, as *she has gone through* the strains that face a person married to somebody who writes a dissertation." Mostly, the wife is thanked for *enduring hardship and suffering*, for "an understanding attitude towards the dissertation work that has taken years". The hero researcher is simply forced to cause suffering to his nearest and dearest.[32]

Other times the wife is not mentioned.

Negative evaluations of the surrounding milieu are apparently not proper in a foreword. Someone does mention the source that did not provide material for use in the study. One foreword rather laconically states: "I also thank professor X for his critique of the study", and we are left wondering whether the remark was positive or negative. This points to the interesting problem of *reading* the genre of forewords.

The formula, the standard list of delivering thanks, forms a model for expectations for the reader that also provides for the possibility *to read what was left unsaid*: was there no scientific father in the first place, did no one support the writer, did the wife go mad and threaten with divorce, did the children forget what their father looked like? The "personal", subjective message of the foreword may well be written into what is left unsaid but what the scientific community can decipher on the basis of the formal structure of the texts and the contextual knowledge of the community. In this sense, the forewords may be thick description of the science community[33].What is left unsaid becomes loaded with meaning.

Another construction of "I" can be read from the ways the author writes himself into the intertextual field of the community, in representing the "value" or the "novelty" that the work represents, in placing oneself and one's contribution in relation to "the field", in *self-presentation*[34]. Is the contribution "opening a new field of research,

making political science scientific? Or, as sometimes, applying a foreign model to Finnish conditions[35]?

Considering the standard formula character of the forewords, the "I" of the texts does not seem very personal. The texts merely appear as performances, made by writing "I-speech". The norms of the genre are determined by the ritual function, the function of *a rite of passage*, where variation in the performance is minor. The communal norms of a scientific community get expressed in giving the gift to the community, thereby acknowledging the debt to the significant sources by going through this initiation in order to gain maturity and become an authorised member.

Looking at the standard formula of the foreword, *the order of thanking as a narrative structure*, the foreword tells – if not so much about authorial subjectivity – about a gendered context that is hierarchically ordered and structured by a public/private split. In the mental landscapes of the ritual subjects, gender becomes hierarchical and predominantly male. The order of thanking advances *from high to low, from public to private*. The private is not always mentioned, as if totally irrelevant to the scientific enterprise. A scientific mother is missing from the model. A separation between head and hand is written in the ordering of mental and manual helpers, *the spirit and the body*.

This genre of "I-speech", in its location as a liminal genre, finally also constitutes a separation between the personal and the scientific. What it *does* in the beginning of each dissertation is to mark a threshold[36] that *separates the supposedly personal and the contextual from the supposedly impersonal and uncontextual text proper*. In representing "personal acknowledgements" as separate from "texts of science", the texts proper become purified. Separating the personal from the scientific makes it possible to display neutrality and forget subjectivity, as if the text proper would be produced by no-body[37]. What is to come after the foreword is the creation of a *bodyless head, no-body*.

Now the credibility of the scientific text can be based on a style of impersonal narrating, telling "true stories about things" rather than textually constructing versions of the world[38]. The Mertonian ideal of non-personality and universality of science presupposes a closure of the personal outside of the scientific. The common habit of separating the self from science is formed into genre conventions, and to break those conventions makes subjectivity vulnerable, exposing the self rather than the text to criticism from the science community[39].

In spite of the "I-speech" quality of the forewords, the "I" was not found there. The forewords were not found to be personal or subjective but rather bound by strict narrative conventions and rules, where only a deviation from the norm can be seen as "personal", yet collective communication.

3.5. What to read when reading a discipline

In the following chapters the focus will turn to how, within the framework of one discipline, the constructions of a scientific community vary and change through time. How does a discipline, Finnish political science, rhetorically produce itself and its objects of study? How does it legitimate its position, create and reconstruct its identity? This is studied purely by *reading texts as constructions of imagined communities*. The texts are seen as imprints of identity work and distributions of belonging and exclusion. These textual identities are thought to be gendered.

There are many ways to study science or disciplines, scientific institutions. Here the approach is textual and rhetorical. The science community is seen as a textual construct and an intertextual community. Scientific activity is seen as textual production. Instead of asking what political science is about, I will ask here how it was made. To *do* political science is primarily to read and write. A discipline is a textual practice, a writing practice with its own conventions, constructed by distinctions. This specific textual practice is constructed by distinguishing it from everyday language, from other genres or other disciplines.

This statement implicates choices between different alternatives of constituting an object for this study. *What to study when studying a science involves choices of constructing the object "science" and has consequences in what version of "science" will be produced. To write history is to construct identities for the present. To define a discipline is in itself to discipline.*

In writing history, the versional character of the texts produced easily disappears from sight. History loosens itself from time and context, becomes abstracted and reified; one ends up canonizing that which is already canonised. It becomes detached from the perspective of historical texts as acts of interest work and purified from the heteronomic, unofficial, banal and dirty details of its conditions of production. Different versions of history come to construct different identities – for example, long or short memories for a discipline.

> *"The younger generation, in particular, may find it somewhat bewildering why Jussi Teljo's articles from decades long past have been dug up. This is simply because they still are very timely and solid addresses about the general character of political science as realistic scientific research. It was precisely these articles that created a basis for the change in Finnish research in this field that led political science research to become specifically social science research and realistic scientific research."*[10 40]

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10 "Varsinkin nuorempaa polvea saattaa jonkin verran hämmentää, miksi Jussi Teljon jo vuosikymmenien takaiset artikkelit on kaivettu esiin. Tämä johtuu yksinkertaisesti siitä, että ne edelleen ovat hyvin ajankohtaisia ja vankkoja puheenvuoroja valtio-opin yleisestä luonteesta reaalitieteellisenä tutkimukse-

To focus and select is thus to produce a version. To choose data is to draw boundaries around a field[41]. To classify is to produce differences and distinctions, hierarchies, normalities and deviances. To measure and index is to construct images of what "science" is and to police what is considered scientific.

> "Regarding articles in journals, deviance from this principle of perfect coverage has been necessary. A review of the journals included, however, leads to the conclusion that all those that in a reasonable sense can be considered relevant for political science have been included, and that exclusions concern articles published in journals of a broader, semi-scientific and generally cultural character."[11]
>
> "Newspaper articles, due to lack of space, not having been included cannot be considered a serious deficiency in representativeness. It must be considered rare that these forums should contain texts of scientific importance."[12 42]

Any "washing, selection or cleaning of unscientific elements"[43] is an important choice. What in "reasonable sense" can be considered relevant to study is an effect of conventions of reading.

In this work, the choice of data is in no sense radical. The choice is made in relation to previous choices made in writing the history of Finnish political science. What I have tried to do is to avoid unreflexive replication of too many of the boundaries of previous interpretations or to slightly exceed them in order to make them visible – to go somewhat beyond earlier selection criteria to see where the boundary was laid. In other respects, I take part in reconstituting a boundary, just slightly displacing it. What may differ is the convention of reading. To displace the workings of the authorial function and to focus on the text, the names of authors come in notes after the text.

Stepping over the threshold between a foreword, expected to be personal, and the text, expected to be impersonal, in the following chapters "the subjective" will be sought in the "proper" texts of science, in the textual strategies and narrative conventions of the texts that claim themselves to be "scientific and universal". The texts are seen as acts of will of gendered authors in gendered cultural contexts. "How gender is written into scientific

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na. Nehän juuri loivat pohjan sille muutokselle alan kotimaisessa tutkimuksessa, jonka tuloksena valtio-opillisesta tutkimuksesta tuli nimenomaan yhteiskuntatieteellistä ja reaalitieteellistä tutkimusta."

11 "Beträffande tidningsartiklar har däremot avkall på denna fullständighetsprincip varit nödvändiga. En granskning av vilka tidskrifter som registrerats ger emellertid vid handen att alla de som i rimlig mening kan betecknas som statsvetenskapligt relevanta har medtagits och bortfallet gäller därför artiklar som publicerats i tidskrifter av en bredare, halvvetenskaplig och allmänt kulturell karaktär."

12 "Att tidningsartiklar av utrymmesskäl inte har medtagits kan inte bedömas som en svår representativitetsbrist - det får väl betecknas som sällsynt att dessa fora innehåller skrifter av vetenskaplig betydelse."

writing" is sought in textual constructions of selves in texts of "what political science is", and "descriptions of the world out there", constructions of the "object of political science". What will be read is gendered subjects positions constructed in "normal, proper" texts of political science.

NOTES

1. Nousiainen & Anckar (eds.) 1983, appendix, 336-341; of the authors of the texts used as data in this study, the one female professional author has a very extensive production. As to the other texts, one (Flemming et al. 1961) is co-authored by two women. By reading notes to the texts it appears as if there might have been a potential female recruit to the community (Karen Eriksson). She was, however, preparing a dissertation for Harvard University. See Allardt & Pesonen 1960, 365.

2. Nousiainen & Anckar (Eds.) 1983, appendix, 336-341.

3. Ruutu 1944, 3.

4. Helsingin yliopiston valtiotieteellisen tiedekunnan esitys Konsistorille, syksy 1961, 1.

5. Klinge 1991, 140-141.

6. See Valtiotieteen kandidaatit, 1966, a list of MAs of the faculties of social sciences graduated from Åbo Academy and the University of Helsinki up to the end of 1965; Leppo 1955, according to whom sociology was for female students.

7. Pesonen 1959, 147-149.

8. The number of dissertations according to Anckar's classification; Anckar 1973, 16-19.

9. Hirvikallio 1941, 99-101; Saarela 1985, 44.

10. For argumentations for institutionalisation, see, for instance, Juva 1938; Brotherus 1944; Leppo 1955.

11. Ruuth 1919.

12. For counterargumentation, see, for instance, Laurila 1923.

13. Ruuth 1919,6.

14. Ibid.,6.

15. Ibid.,10.

16. Ibid.,7.

17. Ibid.,7.

18. The degree in diplomacy included, among other subjects,
    - the art of government: "this discipline, as rich and interesting a material as it has to offer, is still so far very poorly developed";
    - rhetoric: "This, of course, would not be the rhetorics of old days, but a modern sort of combination of disciplines for practical uses"; and
    - still one subject, namely basic knowledge in war sciences. Ibid.,25.

19. Ibid.,20.

20. For an interesting account of "the state and its origin", see, for instance, Ruuth 1927, 6-9. For images of "politics", see, for instance, an image of "sectors" in Borg 1980, 6-8, 17; for "lines and levels", see the reading requirements in political science at the University of Helsinki, the chart on "Suuntautumisvaihtoehdon mukaan erityvät aineopinnot; for a chart on inclusi-

on/exclusion, see Anckar 1973; for "areas and fields", see Jansson 1959 and Scandinavian Political Studies, bibliography 1966.

21. Pesonen 1965, 15.

22. Borg 1980, 20.

23. See Potter & Wetherell 1987, 23.

24. Jansson 1961b, 35.

25. Hyvärinen 1959, 83-94.

26. Kaira 1934, 352.

27. Edmondson 1984,1-5. The question of subjectivity in scientific writing has in different ways been asked by many; see, for instance, Irigaray 1987. For experiments of making texts dialogical, see, for instance, Woolgar 1988.

28. The review institution is expected to function disregarding the name of the author. For ambivalences in "genderless" reviewing, see Mulkay 1989 describing a utopia of a feminine scientific community in the year 2000, and the prereviews of the article, based on differing expectations about the gender of the writer.

29. Foucault 1980a.

30. A comparable paratext representing "I" would be ethnographers' stories of entering the field, where I is explicitly present; see Eräsaari, forthcoming.

31. The dissertations according to the list by Grönholm 1980. I have not felt it necessary to include specific notes in this chapter. Neither have I included the dissertations in the list of references. I have thereby conformed to the habit of considering forewords as liminal, non-proper parts of texts, for reasons of space and economy.

32. Luostarinen & Väliverronen (1991, 194) refer to how much pain and suffering even the dog of the family has had to go through.

33. Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991, 146

34. Ibid., 83-94.

35. The genre of dissertation statements is one where the value and the criteria for evaluation are explicitly put and very interestingly contingent and changing. For the purposes of this work, they are, however, omitted.

36. Mulkay 1988,1.

37. Also Mulkay 1981,1; Mulkay 1984; Katriel & Sanders 1989 on epigraphs.

38. Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991, 86-87.

39. See Eräsaari (forthcoming).

40. Borg 1980, 1.

41. Hicks & Potter 1991, 462.

42. Anckar 1973, 6-7.

43. Ibid., 7, 11.

4 DEFINING A DISCIPLINE; CONSTRUCTING A SELF

"... metalanguages can become institutionally naturalised to the point where one no longer knows that one is speaking them, or being spoken by them..."[1]

"Disciplines are political institutions that demarcate areas of academic territory, allocate the privileges and responsibilities of expertise, and structure claims on resources."[2]

4.1 Boundary work as a gendered process

What is political science? If one scans at recent literature reflecting and evaluating the status of the discipline, the titles[3] in themselves would seem to indicate that political science is something which has "borders", "frontiers", "limits", "compartments", or "margins" which can exist only on borders or in liminal states. To be able to define what political science is – to give it an identity – there has to be a border: what political science is must be separated from what it is not. The book titles would seem to suggest that political science today has severe difficulties with its identity; the identity of the 1950s often appears homogeneous and solid.

This chapter will deal with explicit definitions of political science, the identity of the discipline, and its borders. By looking at *processes of setting boundaries in the genre of metatexts*, texts explicitly dealing with "what political science is", *the chapter will outline a self-portrait or a development story of the discipline.*

As this work deals with a discipline where a strategic scientific debate is radically lacking, there is no possibility of reading explicit

turns in a controversy. A controversy – in terms of silence and exclusion – is read through the different ways texts defining political science seemingly exclude gendered meaning but express it in the rhetoric they use. The perspective is one of textual construction of identities, textual interpretation of demarcation practices of the discipline, of boundary marking, the practices of dividing between science and non-science, telling the inside from the outside.

As no "explicit I" could be found in the forewords, here the question is whether the I/dentity can be found as subject positions produced in texts, as textually produced points of identification or separation, as distinctions between the I and the Other in processing the identity of the discipline.

By reading *texts – mere texts –* that explicitly deal with the question of identity and that proclaim themselves as dealing with "what political science is", I will re-construct processes of the rhetorical construction of *us and them: political science and not-political-science*. Different themes in the demarcation of the discipline will be connected to a *narrative of the identity of the discipline*. The process of demarcation is read as intertextual identity construction. *All texts that could be found to deal with defining what political science is or should be, representing it for an internal or external audience, were classified as metatexts and interpreted as if in dialogue with each other*.

The structuring frame of the narrative is one of *time sequence*, a development of the discipline starting from the prewar period as a"background description", towards which a new identity was constructed. The period from 1950 to 1960 was one of "consolidation" of a relatively homogeneous identity, which then was fragmented into different directions. Narrating the history of identities follows the "common laws" of narration from early childhood to adulthood and old age.

In the development story of Finnish political science, *different themes have been central at different points of time*. As if already revealing the murderer at the beginning, I will state the main features of "the story" to come. The version is not to be seen as an objective story of "what really happened", but a frame for changes in the debate. To tell "what really happened" is not separate from "how it was produced". However, I will point here at *who* were the "significant others" in the process at different times. In processing an identity, a discipline defines itself – in an intertextual situation – against its Others: inclusion and exclusion, border and demarcation are processed in different relations. What is the *"object"* of research and how political science relates to its "object"? How does political science relate to its "clients" and *audiences*, how the discipline is legitimated in terms of societal purposes served and values established? How does the discipline relate to *values*, feelings, questions of ethics? How does political science relate to *other disciplines* or fields of research? How does it construct the *history and future*

of the discipline – i.e. what political science has been and what it should/will be.

The early phases of identity construction dealt thematically with becoming a "real" scientific discipline/ becoming scientific. The significant others in this process were the disciplines of history and the law – governmental law "that also had the state as its object of research". Political science became an independent discipline in departing from juridics and history.

The legitimation for the new science was, essentially, processed in relationship to practical politics. The need for establishing the discipline was based in a rhetoric of national consciousness, needs of the nation-state and the national identity, needs of the state apparatus and the Finnish society. A belief in the practical relevance of science was strong and the societal need for scientific knowledge overwhelming[4].

After the war the identity of political science was defined "as one of the social sciences" on the same frontier as sociology and economics. The legitimacy for political science was no longer the service of practical politics; on the contrary, the scientification of the discipline required that it should be separated from politics, values and emotion.

The 1950s was characterised as a decade of elevation of political science from utopia to science, and a strong rhetoric of modernity, development and expansion, which got its rhetorical formulation in the strong contrasting of tradition and modernity. The rhetoric became binarily structured, with the old and the new political science in opposition to one another. In these terms, the history of political science was also restructured. As the previous state-centred conceptual architecture was changed into a new "politics"-centred one (while actually just broadening the hierarchical cosmology into new areas nearer to nature), the view of the past, its own history, was rewritten. The brand new political science would form a homogeneous identity for the discipline.

Shortly after, signs of fragmentation started to appear. *In the early 1960s* political science started to fragment into different lines; administrative studies and international politics became diversified fields of research. The new lines wrote their own stories of origin. The theme of interdisciplinarity was actualised. Later on, the relationship to sociology and economics – the other social sciences that were seen as "the new front" of the postwar situation – were renegotiated. In the late 1960s the relationship to sociology again became problematic because of a loss of the boundary, and an attempt was made to get closer to economics.

Furthermore, after the establishing of behaviourism as the "normal paradigm" in political science, a shift was made in the middle of the 1960s from empiricism to theory building. A theme discussed was the distinction between pure and applied research.

Finally, the end of the 1960s brought a contextual crisis to the

university system, changing the context of the disciplines and the disciplinary system. Due to the large age groups, the university expanded and the overall political climate of the country changed.

Of Anckar's terms[5] of external diversification (into subfields like international politics and administrative studies) and internal diversification (in terms of consensus on methodological conceptions and descriptions of the subject matter), the external diversification will now be left in the background as different contexts in time and space. The previous description of the development story of political science highlights the major shifts in this external frame of identity work. The issue here, however, is how the development story was rhetorically produced. How did the texts solve the problem of identity for political science? How did they construct that identity? For the purpose of analyzing the identities, *rhetorical and narrative analysis is applied here in reading imageries of the discipline – constructed communities with mythical functions*. The plot of the boundary work process will be about the internal constructions of the science community.

Defining a community, a culture, involves a processing of oscillation between an inside and an outside, inclusion and exclusion, identity and Other. What Lotman[6] calls "a process of culture" and what Shapiro[7] calls a sovereignty impulse (order, homogeneous subjectivity, firm boundaries) versus an exchange impulse (flow; relaxation of specialisation) describes tendencies and distributes roles that are here interpreted within a gendered frame. In Irigaray's words[8], I/dentity is always masculine, which is not to say that it is male.

Reading "what political science is" here will involve interpreting the constructed identities of political science as *gendered*. Are they feminine or masculine? What is the "place" of gendered meaning in discourse? How is gender written into the construction of political science, of the identity of the discipline? Is it really cleaned out of and suppressed from such a high and formal register as metatexts, a canonical field of discourse in itself? *Who is the subject/subjects constructed in the texts? Who are the Others?* By looking for semantic traces of gender, gendered metaphors of science and gendered subject positions in the narratives, the processing of boundaries will be interpreted in a *frame of gender*, as *associations and dissociations with feminine and masculine semantic matrices or fields*.

4.2   Image and reality in political thought

> "...therefore, attempts to derive phenomena of the state from such solid factors as nature of geography have not lead to any results worth mentioning."[1] [9]

The ambivalent relationship between image and reality

Before the Second World War, conceptualisations of a field for political science negotiated themselves against an earlier construction, *a theory of the state*. The earlier period of political science had been a version of Hegelian theory of the state, represented in Finland by Snellman. Between the world wars this version appears to have become obsolete.

The new rhetoric of constructing political science was ambivalent about what proper metaphors to use, and in fact ambivalent about the metaphoric nature of scientific thinking. Erasing the old imagery of state theory led to the conclusion that images should be erased altogether. *A rupture was brought between the old metaphors of science and a new rhetoric of realism, "a true reality". The following will represent three versions of the relationship between image and reality.*

An early text[10] (1922) differentiated between three methodological directions for political science: "the philosophical, that is, the metaphysical method", the comparative method of classifying governmental institutions and forms of government and "the biological method that is also called sociological".

Within the *sociological* direction, the state had been considered a naturally evolved organism; it was compared to "the human body and its organs"[11]. Researchers of this direction "had proven similarities" between societal organizations and natural organisms. The text cites Hertwig, according to whom "comparing the state with a living organism was not a product of any trivial and superfluous imagination".[12] The text's own voice, however, came to another conclusion: metaphors drawn from the animal kingdom were not considered accurate[13].

> "The comparisons between biological organisms and societal phenomena, mainly the state, are also misleading. Such attempts often violently force the adjustment of phenomena into predetermined formulas, although they do not fit into them, or to ignore even important matters if they are not in agreement with preconditions of research."[2] [14]

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1   "Yksinpä yritykset johtaa valtiolliset ilmiöt niin kiinteistä tekijöistä, kuin luonto tai maantieteellinen ympäristö, eivät ole tuottaneet sanottavia tuloksia."

2   "Harhaanjohtavia ovat myös vertailut biologisten organismien ja yhteiskunnallisten ilmiöiden, lähinnä valtion välillä. Sellaiset yritykset pakottavat

In addition, the *"philosophical, that is metaphysical"*, Hegelian state theory was discussed in the text. Questions posed in this direction were, for instance, whether the state apparatus was "a result of an unconsciously creative national spirit" or a result of "human labour".[15] Abstracting the essence of the state was seen as primary compared to research on "this or that specific state".

> "Hegel has been the first representative of this kind of interpretation of the state while explaining that research on the state should not focus on this or that state during this or that period of time, but to explain the deepest content of the state, the idea of the state."[3][16]

In another version[17] (1924), the ambivalences of metaphysics and realism led to serious problems. "The factual, stable values due to the essence of the state" were central ideals for the political science constructed in the text. The text asked "whether the stable existed". Having to admit that the state did not exist during the Middle Ages, the political science of the text had to limit itself to "the so-called modern state".

The ambiguities in constructing a discipline on this basis are apparent, however. In conflict with a realism-based conception and yet conceptions of essences, the version of political science became jammed between images and realities. "Special political science" (erikoinen valtio-oppi) would be directed towards specific phenomena whereas "general political science" (Allgemeine Staatslehre, yleinen valtio-oppi) was "constructed on the basis of the special one, but would still have the stable essence as its ideal". "The *highest* question known by political science is therefore: what is the purpose of the state."[18]

The ambiguities about "the metaphysical view" got a rather nostalgic and idealistic expression: although the metaphysical view "is not popular at the moment it is difficult to keep the ideals apart".

> "Naturally, it must be borne in mind that political science is a discipline that deals with the state as a factual phenomenon. In our times, theological or metaphysical approaches are not highly valued in this field. But in a world of aims and interests, it is extraordinarily difficult to keep ideals at a distance."[4][19]

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usein väkivaltaisesti sovittamaan ilmiöitä edeltäpäin määrättyyn kaavaan, vaikka ne eivät sellaiseen sovi, tai jättämään huomioon ottamatta tärkeitäkin seikkoja, jolleivät ne ole yhtäpitäviä tutkimusedellytysten kanssa."

3   "Hegel oli ensimmäisenä tällaista valtiotulkintaa edustanut selittäessään, ettei valtiota tutkittaessa ole päähuomio kiinnitettävä siihen tai siihen valtioon tai sen tai sen aikakauden valtioon, vaan on selvitettävä valtion syvin sisältö, valtion idea."

4   "Tietysti on muistettava, että valtio-oppi on tiede, joka koskee valtiota tosiasiallisena, faktillisena ilmiönä. Meidän aikanamme teologiset taikka metafyysilliset otteet eivät tällä alalla ole korkeassa kurssissa. Mutta tarkoitusperien maailmassa on erinomaisen vaikeata pitää ihanteet loitolla."

The "metaphysical conception" was also clearly associated with subjectivity. Thereby, subjectivity was not totally denied, although ambivalently dealt with. It seemed to belong to the nostalgic *past*. If read as a founding act for the *future*, the text failed to produce a coherent version of political science.

A third version of the relationship between image and reality appeared in the 1930s (1934)[20]. For this version, the separation of the self was not a problem - it was the requirement. The critique of the metaphysical conception was based on a clear distinction between reason and emotion.

> "There seems to hide an endless need for metaphysical meditation and even religious devotion in human nature, and perhaps there is no reason to hope for this need to disappear, either; but in *science* metaphysics as well as religion should already be considered as a conquered stance. *Natura non nisi parendo vincitur.* It is possible that scientific research will never be able to definitively make clear the basis for human societal life, but the results that can perhaps be attained, can in any case only be reached on an empirical footing."[5] [21]

An *"atomistic" and "mechanistic"* contract-based theory was put against a *"holistic, idealistic"* theory that conceptualised the state as a human body, a living organism, in terms of spirit, spirituality and personality that has an essence beyond appearance.[22]

The *"suprapersonalistic"* and *"transpersonalistic"* ideas of Hegelianism were characterised as a religion, as "worshipping the state". The idea of the state was labelled "anti-individualistic". The "metaphysical" conception became associated with religious beliefs, mysticism and finally fascism. The state acquired the meaning of *the sacred, the high, a mere image in contrast to reality, to realism.* The "metaphysical view" was described as *anti-intellectual and emotional;*

> "To presuppose a state personality – or any other collective personality – is as senseless as explaining a forest as a tree or a bee colony as one bee."[6] [23]

In explaining away the higher will of the state that superseded individ-

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5   "Ihmisluonnossa näyttää piilevän häviämätön metafyysillisen mietiskelyn samoin kuin uskonnollisen hartaudenkin tarve, eikä tämän tarpeen katoamista ole kenties syytä toivoakaan; mutta tieteessä tulisi metafysiikkaa samoin kuin uskontoakin pitää jo voitettuna kantana. Natura non nisi parendo vincitur. Mahdollista on, ettei tieteellinen tutkimus kykene koskaan lopullisesti selvittämään inhimillisen yhteiskuntaelämän perusteita, mutta niihin tuloksiin, jotka kenties ovat saavutettavissa, voidaan joka tapauksessa päästä ainoastaan empiirisellä pohjalla."

6   "Valtiohenkilön - tai minkä muun kollektiivihenkilön tahansa - olettaminen on yhtä järjetöntä, kuin jos metsän selittäisi puuksi tai mehiläisyhteiskunnan mehiläiseksi."

ual wills, the new critique used a rhetoric of *emancipation*. Individuals "submitting and sacrificing themselves"[24] to the general will of the state was put into question. But it also explained away cultural conceptions, identities or collective conceptions that exceeded the limits of singular rational individual actors.

> "As Jellinek has noted, the terms "collective soul" or "national soul" can reasonably be used *only as a shortened, figurative collective label* for the complicated psychic interaction between individuals belonging to the same community, but if they are meant to be overly individual, more or less mystical substances, they are *real ghost-like beings*."[7] [25]

What should be studied in political science was "objects perceivable to the senses".

> "And thus have Duguit and Loening pointed out that the state cannot be dealt with as a psychical organism for the simple reason that no others than objects perceivable to the senses can be objects of scientific research."[8] [26]

The ambivalent oppositions of image and reality, romantics and realism, and emotion and reason were solved by fighting "the spiritual" with technique, mechanics, atomism and individualism. The opposition of art and science was solved in favour of science, thereby transgressing to the latent minus-rhetoric of realism[27] Associating "false images" with German idealism – and with fascism – made the central concepts of early political science, "the nation" and "the state", increasingly suspicious[28]. It is no wonder that the rhetoric of realism was to be supported by very strong political changes. Although the versions of political science studying "objects perceivable to the senses" would not seem to leave very many objects of study for the new discipline, it did become a very popular version in the years to come.

A return of the story repressed

> "The culture has reason to hold on to the idea of nationality. It is connected to an irrational but powerful fact – a feeling of nationality – *and it*

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7   "Jellinek on huomauttanut, että nimityksiä "kollektiivisielu" ja "kansansielu" voidaan järjellisesti käyttää ainoastaan sen monimutkaisen sielullisen vuorovaikutuksen lyhennettynä kuvaannollisena yhteisnimityksenä, joka vallitsee samaan yhteisöön kuuluvien yksilöiden kesken, mutta jos niillä tarkoitetaan yliyksilöllistä, enemmän tai vähemmän mystillistä substanssia, ne ovat oikeita kummitusolentoja."

8   "Niinpä ovat Duguit ja Loening huomauttaneet, ettei valtiota voi käsitellä psyykkillisenä organismina siitä yksinkertaisesta syystä, etteivät muut kuin aistillisesti havaittavat ilmiöt voi olla tieteellisen tutkimuksen kohteena."

is rational to take the irrational into consideration.[9] [29]

Discussing "the rationality of considering the irrational" did not gain wide popularity in the ensuing years. That political science should study *feelings* was to be met with mixed feelings. Although the version excluding images from science was to attain a strong position after the war, *there could have been another story*. As any story of power, hegemony and control simultaneously establish their repressed Other and the possibility of the return of the repressed, the following will point to such a potential: there was a basis for another story that was not realised.

Images were also discussed in other terms than just as a feature of mysticism or fascism. The fact that "metaphysical features" in scientific thinking could not be totally erased was pointed out (1940)[30]. Dissociated from German idealism and sacralization of the state and associated with the rhetorical functioning of language, the argument was that "metaphysical thinking" was common beyond the domains of German philosophy.

> "We people have a very natural tendency to presume or imagine that beyond observable phenomena there is something that is difficult to reach with our limited spiritual capacities."[10] [31]
>
> "Thinking requires concepts and images that have been acquired by generalizing and combining observations, but the more we let ourselves be led by them, the more we distance ourselves from the immediate empirical reality, and if furthermore, as often happens, we let our imagination personify the concepts we have created and let them appear to be independent, perhaps as independently acting subjects that rule life, we have actually ended up in a world that is outside of empirical reality. More or less metaphysical features in thinking are therefore so natural and self-given, that we hardly even notice them."[11] [32]

The text gave examples of such "unnoticed metaphysical effects": for instance, the habit of talking about "Germany", "France" or "Sweden"

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9 Kulturen har skäl att hålla fast vid nationalitetsidén. Den anknyter till ett irrationellt, men mäktigt faktum – nationalitetskänslan – och det är rationellt att ta hänsyn till det irrationella!"

10 "Meillä ihmisillä on varsin luonnollinen taipumus olettaa taikka kuvitella, että havaitsemiemme ilmiöiden takana on jotakin, johon meidän rajoitetuilla sielunkyvyillämme voi olla vaikea päästä käsiksi."

11 "Ajattelu kaipaa käsitteitä ja kuvia, jotka on saatu havaintoja yleistämällä ja yhdistämällä, mutta mitä enemmän me antaudumme niiden johdettaviksi, sitä enemmän me loittonemme välittömästä empiirisestä todellisuudesta, ja jos vielä lisäksi, kuten niin usein on tapana, annamme mielikuvituksemme personifioida luomamme käsitteet tai annamme näiden esiintyä itsenäisinä, ehkäpä itsenäisesti toimivina subjekteina, jotka hallitsevat elämää, olemme itse asiassa päätyneet maailmaan, joka on empiirisen todellisuuden ulkopuolella. Enemmän tai vähemmän metafyysilliset piirteet ajattelussa ovat siksi luonnolliset, itsestään antautuvat, että tuskin edes aina niitä huomaammekaan."

wanting this or that, or talking about "a state" as an acting subject, which "actually is a thought-created image".[33] "Metaphysical" came to mean "metaphorical".

"In fact, all thinking includes both metaphysical and empirical features."[12][34]

Although the nature of thought was considered metaphysical, a distinction was made between metaphysical thinking and empiricism that

"...starts from the people, such as they are, with their material and spiritual aims, such as they appear in reality."[13][35]

The metaphoric nature of scientific thinking was a reoccurring theme in texts by an active author[36] in the late 1940s and mid-fifties. Whereas a text from 1947[37] still sought the *sublime* ideas of a higher reason in historical development, somewhat later the state of the texts became secularized. This became clear in a text from 1950[38]: Kjellén's political science – consisting of geopolitics, governmental politics (regements-politik), sociopolitics, ethnopolitics and economical politics – was criticised because it did not stick to the "subject matter, the state as an *organization*".

"Only through introducing the figurative language of organism theory and recreating the state as a mythical being is it possible for Kjellén to argue away *the fact that the state is a juridical organization*. The powerful spiritual unities that Kjellén fumbles after are, rather, the *nations* that under their historical existence *put on if not one, then another, state costume.*"[14][39]

The abandonement of "metaphysical theory" did not, however, cancel imageries in science. *"Ideal types"* were a necessity in scientific thought. Kelsen's "fight against the hypostatization of the state into a psycho-physical essence" also led the interpreter to explicit discussions about image and reality: the typical and the average, the "heightening of an empirical type" into thought images, "Gedankenbilder". Photographic realism was not evaluated as better than an artist's image that, strictly speaking, "does not exist" but mediates the idea of a caricature, based

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12   "Itse asiassa kaikkeen ajatteluun sisältyy sekä metafyysillisiä että empiirisiä aineksia."

13   "... lähtee ihmisistä, sellaisina kuin ne ovat, aineellisine ja henkisine pyrki-myksineen, sellaisina kuin nämä todellisuudessa esiintyvät."

14   "Endast genom att införa organismteorins bildspråk och omskapa staten som ett fabelväsen kan Kjellén resonera bort det faktum att staten är en juridisk organisation. De mäktiga andliga enheter, som Kjellén famlar efter, är snara-re nationerna, som under sin historiska tillvaro iklär sig än den ena än den andra statliga dräkten."

on *intuition*. "The renaissance person, the individual of the Enlightenment, the Romantic person, the asthenic or the pyknic type" seldom appear "in reality", but they are still useful as ideal types[40]. The texts point out how

> "... our thinking actually is and has to be through and through full of *"constructions"*."[15][41]

"A male scientist working like a miniature painter" gathering loads of data in the cultural sciences did not come any nearer "the truth" than Picasso, who also claimed his images to be "true". The painter has the chance to express the typical in the motif "in a truer, more naked way" than a photograph that is "blended by contradictory details in the "reality".[42]

A reference was made to Eino Kaila, who had chosen to call "value neutral forms of idealisation" *"rationalization"*[43]. The text's own voice represented "ideal types" as "idealisation":

> "In daily speech, idealisation is synonymous with 'beautification'. *One idealises a woman, one idealises the political conditions in this or that country.*[16][44]

The later fates of images

Whether metaphors were "right or wrong" – whether political science should be "metaphysical" or "realistic" – had consequences for establishing the field of research. What was established was a rhetoric of realism, establishing a firm illusion of naturalness of the phenomena studied and a legitimation of the activities of the scientists, suspending the need for reflection. The notion of political science as a "cultural science" was put on the analogical footing of "natural sciences". However, the cultural footing had existed quite explicitly.[45]

Images not being "for real" still caused some problems during the 1950s. A meeting of the Finnish political science association in 1961 was found to have argued about "whether the concept of the state was an empirical concept at all"[46]. The new metaphor of "a political system" was met with some suspicion in 1964. It was characterised as

> "...David Easton's *somewhat obscure definition* according to which the political process includes those actions that are connected to the auth-

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15 "Viktigast förefaller det mig vara att påpeka, hur genomdraget av konstruktioner vårt tänkande i själva verket är och måste vara."

16 "I dagligt tal betyder idealisering detsamma som skönmålning. Man idealiserar en kvinna, man idealiserar de politiska förhållandena i det ena eller det andra landet."

oritative allocation of values for a society."[17] [47]

Looking forward in time, of the ambivalent views on image and reality, the project of erasing images was to become very successful during the fifties. But then again, in the middle of the 1960s, "realism" became characterised as "raw empiricism" and made obsolete. *Images* were brought back in terms of abstraction and theoretization. Or, before going so far in time, we can ask: *did they actually ever disappear?*

In the debate on image and reality, Woman appeared as a brief note on idealised images that may affect the ways "things" are seen. As images were shipwrecked, what was to become of Woman?

4.3 Demarcations; establishing an independent identity for a discipline

Founding a discipline will be narrativised here as *demarcations from what the discipline is not*. In studying the processes of demarcating of science from non-science in the metatexts basically *prior to 1950*, it turns out that different themes follow sequentially, although partly overlapping and returning. Central themes in establishing an autonomous discipline were demarcations towards other disciplines, separating science from values, emotions, and demarcating political science from practical politics.

Demarcating political science from other disciplines

In relationship to other disciplines, political science started from a position of *fertile non-science*. The rhetoric of constructing political science as departures from governmental law and history started from positioning political science as *art rather than science*.

"The art of government", one of the subdivisions of "the systematic for the social sciences" from 1922[48], was described not so much as science as it was *instinct, "the instinct of comprehending the realities of life".* It was a question of *"emotion and inspiration, judgement and instinct"*[49]. Political science was to study "living life". The aim of the discipline was to *"shed light upon* governmental life". Political research should *"guide political life* away from *vagueness, blindness and haphazardness"*[50]. This is

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17   "... David Eastonin hämärähkö määritelmä, jonka mukaan poliittiseen prosessiin sisältyvät ne toiminnat, jotka liittyvät arvojen auktoritatiiviseen jakamiseen yhteiskunnassa."

the position of a helper: political science was to help the society, to guide the blind.

The subfields of political science were named as both "knowledge" and "art"/skill". "The art of government", the most artistic of the subfields, was described as unstudied, although offering "rich and interesting" material for research."[51]

> "In researching these three groups of questions, a wide working field is opened up for political research, and it becomes all the more interesting for a researcher, as it has been studied only imperfectly in the literature of the entire world."[18][52].

This positioning of political science was made in relation to juridical disciplines. *From the point of view of governmental law*[53], political science was described as vague and haphazard, but it could have a *fertilizing* effect. Political scientists were, however, characterised as *dilettantes*.

> "... the representatives of the mentioned discipline, as many examples show, easily form misconceptions, use false concepts and have vague if also rich ideas and argumentations, and so on, if the method of juridical science is unknown, the basic concepts unclear and its achievements more or less unknown to them." [19][54]

What was to be considered "politics" in the sense of "the disciplines of the state" (valtiotieteellisessä merkityksessä) was "*to some degree a matter of taste*".[55] Political research, "insofar as this research actually is of a scientific nature", did, however, belong to the area of science, as the field was *"rich and heterogenous"*.

> "It should therefore not be considered a disadvantage that political science is ambiguous."[20][56]

From the point of view of governmental law, the new political science represented fertile nature that still resided in the domains of non-science. It was more emotional than rational. It was feminine and submitted to the "proper science" of law. The rich and "varied" nature was categorised as infantile, but necessary – a submissive auxiliary science

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18   "Näiden kolmen suuren kysymysryhmän selvittämisessä avartuu poliittiselle tieteelle laaja työala, joka muodostuu tutkijalle sitäkin mielenkiintoisemmaksi, kun sitä toistaiseksi koko maailman kirjallisuudessa on vain vaillinaisesti käsitelty."

19   "... viimeksimainitun tieteen edustajat, kuten moni esimerkki osoittaa, helposti tekevät harhapäätelmiä, käyttävät virheellisiä käsitteitä, tekevät virheellisiä ryhmityksiä, ym. jos oikeustieteellinen arvostelu- tutkimustapa on heille vieras, valtio-oikeuden peruskäsitteet epäselvät ja saavutukset enemmän tai vähemmän tuntemattomat."

20   "Eikä olekaan katsottava miksikään haitaksi, että yleisen valtio-opin ala täten jää suhteellisesti epämääräiseksi."

of unprofessional dilettantes.

> "A devotee of political science who is ignorant of legal research is threatened by the danger that he lets himself into more or less arbitrary, if however often inventive, political "debates" and imagines himself thereby draining the real essence of political science."[21] [57]

The doubts of whether "politics", that is, "the art of government", could be "learned at all through scientific methods" had to be met by the newly established discipline[58]. Explicitly contrasting instinct and rationality, the art/skill and the facts, a text in *1924* represented *the point of view of a political scientist:* the, old, established juridical sciences were characterised by *"shallow doctrinairism and strict attachment to the borders of science".* It was *"closed, internally coherent and confined".* An opposition was constructed between *the closed and the open.*

> "...juridical regulations form, or they must be presumed to form, a so to say closed, internally coherent system. Research on this belongs to the juridical disciplines and follows the juridical method. But juridical science cannot go further than this. From its point of view, it is basically indifferent to what factors *factually* influence governmental life." [22] [59]

"Where governmental law stops, there political science starts." What is "real and factual" was put in opposition to the "doctrinaire and the formal". As the juridical point of view (1924)[60] was that political science could develop into a science "only in close contact with law, i.e., in dependency on it", by the 1940s the relation was still characterised as complementary.

> "The in itself important jurisprudence must be *completed* with political science, the primary aim of which is to study *governmental life in its factual, concrete outline* with the help of a *realistic*-historical method." [23] [61]

The realistic bastard of governmental law was included among "every science that wishes to represent itself as independent". What distinguished political science from governmental law was *realism,*

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21 "Valtio-opin harrastajaa, jolla ei ole kosketusta valtio-oikeudellisen tutkimuksen kanssa, uhkaa helposti se vaara, että hän antautuu enemmän tai vähemmän epämääräisiin, joskin ehkä monesti aaterikkaisiin poliittisiin "resonemangeihin" ja luulee niillä tyhjentävänsä valtio-opin varsinaisen olemuksen."

22 "...oikeussäännöt muodostavat tai niiden täytyy edellyttää muodostavan niin sanoakseni umpinaisen, sisäisesti eheän järjestelmän, jonka tutkiminen kuuluu oikeustieteelle oikeudellista eli juridista tutkimusmenetelmää noudattamalla. Mutta pidemmälle oikeustiede ei voi mennä. Sille on pohjaltaan yhdentekevää, mitkä tekijät tosiasiallisesti vaikuttavat valtiollisessa elämässä."

23 "... i och för sig viktig juridik måste kompletteras av den politiska vetenskapen, statskunskapen, som till sin uppgift har att med en realistisk-historisk metod undersöka statslivet i dess faktiska, konkreta gestaltning."

although the object of study was the same. What distinguished political science from political history was the distinction between the one being descriptive and the other "explanatory" ("selitteleväa").[62] The rhetoric of realism remained rhetorically effective and meaningful for years to come. It was effective *in relationship to* juridical disciplines, in establishing *autonomy* for political science.

The *relationship between politics and law* was compared in 1948[63] with *fluids that take a solid form*: "The state is like King Midas. Everything he touches takes the form of law"; concepts become "frozen and congealed". Politics is "the breathing that brings the organism the oxygen it needs". It is "the process, the power of life, the constant change". Politics was characterised as "the debate, the fight, accusations, explosions of anger."

> "It is not infrequently *streams of blood*, everywhere it is trampled rights that mark the road the Law has gone. Thus the Law is a Saturn who eats his own children, the Law can be renewed only through breaking with its past... The struggle that results in new Law is *politics*.[24] [64]

In order to control the horrors of politics, chaos and violence, a *"technique of freedom"*, the democratic process, is needed.

> "The legal state annuls the figurative claim that there is a status quo within the ethical and political domain, which is sheer violence and chaos, whereas the natural sciences and the technique built upon them triumph."[25] [65]

The chaotic life of politics – the "violence, chaos and the passions" – should be controlled by technique; they were to be rationalised. Chaos, life, politics – associated in a feminine semantic matrix – were to be controlled by order, solid form, suppression of emotion and the state. What called for neutral technique and natural sciences may have been an implicit intertext of fascism.

Separation of self from the area of ideals, values, subjectivity and emotions

> "It is apparent that a sharp line of demarcation must separate subjective political writings on daily politics and a systematically developed scien-

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24 "icke sällan är det strömmar av blod, överallt är det förtrampade rättigheter som beteckna den väg rätten gått. Ty rätten är en Saturnus som åter sina egna barn, rätten kan förnyas ändast därigenom att den förbryter med sitt förflutna... Denna strid som utmynnar i ny rätt är politiken."

25 "Rättstaten dementerar det bildliga påståendet att man står stilla på det etiska och politiska området, som endast är våld och kaos, medan naturvetenskaperna och på dem byggda tekniken triumferar."

tific presentation."[26] [66]

As "politics" – i.e., "the art of government" – was a "method of instinct", the question of whether it is at all possible to learn it with "scientific methods" arose. This caused problems for the new discipline. *Ideals*, equalled to "metaphysics", were seen as untimely, yet tempting. *Criticism* of existing conditions of institutions "was not totally avoidable", and *subjectivity* was a problematic issue in research.

> "You do not need to cast many glances at political science literature to notice how, if the word is allowed, subjective judgements put their label on well-known scientists' representations of governmental matters."[27] [67]
>
> "And it is equally clear that it is not possible for any person to *totally free himself from his own self and his own ideas.* The researcher can at the most be required to be aware of this and in his work, if possible, aim to reach *only externally valid results.*"[28] [68]

By *1944* the problem of subjectivity was clarified considerably by a separation of *value judgements and judgements of reality*[69]. In this version, the model for social sciences was to come from natural sciences that were "on a *higher* developmental level" but did not principally differ from the social sciences. The claim that science would be "subjective political speculation and unscientific politicking" was definitely to be rejected[70]. As the real and the factual became associated with objectivity, so did value judgements become associated with subjectivity. *Value judgements were to be excluded from the area of science.*

How, then, could one separate the area of values from the area of facts?

> "As the German economist Werner Sombart has stated, science can solve economic, social or political questions of value no more than it can determine *whether fair women are more beautiful than dark women.*"[29] [71]

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26 "Selvää on, että tällöin on jyrkällä rajaviivalla toisistaan erotettava päivänpolitiikan subjektiiviset poliittiset kirjoitelmat ja toiselta puolelta järjestelmällisesti kehitetty tieteellinen esitys."

27 "Ei tarvitse paljoakaan silmäillä valtio-opillista kirjallisuutta havaitakseen kuinka, jos sana sallitaan, subjektiiviset arvostelmat painavat leimansa tunnettujen tiedemiesten esityksiin valtiollisista kysymyksistä."

28 "Ja yhtä selvää on, ettei kenellekään ihmiselle tällöin ole mahdollista kokonaan vapautua omasta minästään ja omista käsitystavoistaan. Tutkijalle voidaan korkeintaan asettaa se vaatimus, että hän on tästä tietoinen ja että hän mikäli mahdollista koettaa työssään pyrkiä vain ulkokohtaisesti päteviin tuloksiin."

29 "Tiede voi, niinkuin saksalainen kansantaloustieteilijä Werner Sombart on lausunut, yhtä vähän ratkaista taloudellisia, sosiaalisia ja poliittisia arvokysymyksiä kuin ratkaista, ovatko vaaleaveriset naiset kauniimpia kuin tummaveriset."

The example was found so illustrative that it was repeated in the same text:

> "So, for instance, the question of the superiority of democracy in comparison to oligarchy or dictatorship cannot be scientifically solved *any better than the question of whether fair women are more beautiful than dark ones.*" [30] [72]

The separation of values and facts was marked by the sign of a Woman. A linking together of values, subjectivity and femininity produced a connotative chain for "what is outside of science". Later on, hair colour became a repeated figure of speech in the genre of "what political science is". In the 1980s, however, it lost its gender specificity: hair colour was no longer associated with women, it just signified "unpolitical matters"[73].

Some later versions of "what political science is" dealt with questions of values, subjectivity and ethical problems.

> "Quite in spite of ethical rules, a society that disregards the health of the people, the social welfare or a fair distribution of the national income directs a weapon towards its own heart."[31] [74]

In terms of the rhetorical effects of words like "nationalism", "the common interest" and "a question of rights", an article in 1951[75] discussed where to draw the line between *ethics and rhetoric*. The question of rights was exemplified by the issue of women's right to vote, a question "where, from the point of view of the activists for women's rights, a feeling for right and fairness should be decisive".

> "The opponents of feminism would for their part see the whole issue as a problem of expedience; their arguments were dictated by an unwillingness towards changes, a distrust towards the capacity of women, a fear for the consequences, etc."[32] [76]

By coincidence(?), a question of ethics brought up women as explicit actors in politics. Still, a perhaps more representative view from the fifties was presented as follows:

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30   "Siten esimerkiksi kysymystä demokratian paremmuudesta diktatuuriin verrattuna ei voida tieteellisesti ratkaista yhtään sen paremmin kuin kysymystä siitä ovatko vaaleaveriset naiset kauniimpia kuin tummaveriset."

31   "Alldeles bortsett från etiska regler riktar t.ex. ett samhälle som försummar folkhälsan, den sociala välfärden eller en förnuftig fördelning av nationalinkomsten vapnet mot sitt eget hjärta."

32   "För kvinnosakens förkämpar – för att ta en numera neutral sak – är den kvinnliga rösträtten i högsta grad en fråga, där känslan för rätt och billighet måste fälla utslaget... Feminismens motståndare däremot är benägna att se hela saken som ett problem on ändamålsenlighet – deras argument dikterades av ovilja mot förändringar, misstro mot kvinnornas kapacitet, fruktan för följderna, o.s.v.".

"It is not easy to objectively map an area that is full of emotional and value charges."[33] [77]

Audience relations and demarcations towards practical politics

"Why should governmental life, which is the *highest* form of societal life, be left primarily as *a battlefield of instincts, prejudices, speculation and superficiality?*"[34] [78]

Establishing a (battle) field for political science was – to start with – motivated and legitimated by *the practical, societal need for information and knowledge about politics*. However, this soon became problematic, as the new science was too closely associated with politics. The departure from the area of practical politics, *the construction of political science as scientific and professional* finally finished the separation process and established the discipline as distinguished from the area of *art and emotion*.

Starting from a position "near the living life", political science was legitimated as a *practical science* "for the help of men of practice" that was badly needed, in contrast to "science for its own sake"/the juridical disciplines. The texts establish a "need out there", a social necessity that called for the establishment of the discipline.[79] The audiences for political science and the purpose of the discipline were described as *giving advice to "men in public life, statesmen, public employees and male civil servants, but even ordinary citizens."*[80]

The first versions of legitimation were quite modest and not that excited about the practical side of politics:

"... there seems to be a short step to the requirement that political science should come to the service of practical politics. As for my part, I have rejected this requirement. In my view one has to hold on to the fact that political science, too, is a theoretical science and not guidance in the art of government or knowledge of this art. But it is, of course, clear that as the aim of political science is to explore the stable factors and values that function in governmental life, criticism towards existing conditions or institutions is not altogether avoidable."[35] [81]

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33   "Ei ole helppoa objektiivisesti kartoittaa aluetta, joka on niin täynnä tunne-ja arvovarauksia."

34   "Miksi valtiollinen elämä, joka on yhteiskunnallisen elämän korkein muoto, jätettäisiin ensisijaisesti vaiston, ennakkoluulojen, keinottelun ja pintapuolisuuden taistelutantereeksi."

35   "... näyttää olevan lyhyt askel siihen vaatimukseen, että valtio-opin olisi astuttava käytännön palvelukseen. Alussa mainitsemillani perusteilla olen omasta puolestani torjunut tämän vaatimuksen. Mielestäni on pidettävä kiinni siitä, että valtio-oppikin on teoreettinen tiede, ei opastusta valtiotaitoon taikka valtiotaidon oppia. Mutta selvää tietysti on, että kun valtio-opillisen tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää valtiollisessa elämässä vaikutta-

Clearly, this was not the line of argumentation to raise budget money for a new discipline.

The debate of the 1940s dealt centrally with a distinction between practical politics, opinions, values and *scientific* political science. Science was to be distinguished from dilettantism. The study of international politics was to be separated from *"hobbyism and scribbling that is one-sided and misleading"*. The dilettantes' writings were even described as directly harmful: they *"appeal to the prejudices, instincts and emotions of the public"*. Instincts and emotions were contrasted to "knowledge and careful consideration". "Hobbyism and one-sided propaganda" were opposed to "explaining the truth". *"The will to factual knowledge* and *mastering* the development of conditions" were opposed to "superficiality and haphazardness".

> "All kinds of scribblers *fish in murky waters.*"[36] [82]

The task of a political scientist was to *"educate the public to a matter-of-factness,* as the public was doomed to become disappointed in the hobbyist writings and ask: 'Why did not anyone tell us the truth'". The explanation for the scientific study of international politics was that "the men practicing in the field did not have the time" or that "even more secondary things are studied scientifically".[83]

The possibility that scientific research could be a "weapon against war" was also suggested. The future of small nations required "experience and good intuition, but also research". A further reason was "the requirements of the time" that called for a different kind of masculinity:

> "Formerly, the bravery of soldiers and the skilfullness of officers meant so much."[37] [84]

Now the requirement was technique.

However, the interest in practical politics was never warmly supported by all. Especially in a small country where the number of social scientists was small, *the temptation or the risk* of engagement in public tasks was considered problematic. A sign that separated practical politics from scientific research was *"prostitution"*.

> .." the temptation towards *scientific prostitution* that the representatives of

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via pysyviä tekijöitä ja arvoja, ei oleviin oloihin kohdistuva kritiikki ole kokonaan vältettävissä."

36   "Tämä antaa erinäisille kynäniekoille mahdollisuuden kalastella sameissa vesissä..."

37   "Ennen sotilaiden urheus ja upseerien taito merkitsi niin paljon."

social research heavily engaged in public matters easily face." [38] [85]

While establishing political science in the first place was possible only by establishing "a need out there", the professionalisation of political science required a departure from the area of values, emotions and "irrationality". The practicality should not be taken too far. And while the audiences in the beginning were made explicit and wide, the audience relationship seems to have become narrower:

> "Political science research can never, however, be developed into an applied science that *could give politicians detailed instructions on how to rule the people.*"[39] [86]

Starting from a position near the feminine "living life" and the life-giving forces of nature and earth - the position of submissive helper - autonomy and professionalism could be established only by separating the I/dentity from the feminised position, the "murky waters" of the feminine unconscious/ignorance, walking side by side with the statesmen and being wary of the risk of prostitution regarding practical matters, mater, materia. Establishing a boundary towards the private, the bodily, and the sexual, "girded up" the scientist for the battlefields of "true science" and established control of self as a precondition of control over others.

4.4   The canonised text ... and its shadow

"The tasks and methods of political science" – a basic myth

In the following I will analyze *a process of boundary work within one text,* a text telling us "what political science is" and consequently processing what it is not. The text is seen as processing the borderline between political science and not-political-science, the *borderline between "culture" and "non-culture"* in terms of a narrative interpretative frame[87].

Published in 1950[88] the text appeared in a specific institutional setting, being an inaugural lecture for a professorship in political science. This particular text has often been cited, commented on and analyzed. It has been seen as a programmatic text for a paradigm shift in Finnish political science, signifying the rise of "modern political

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38   "Därtill kommer den frestelse till vetenskaplig prostitution som en i det allmänna starkt engagerad företrädare för samhällsforskning lätt råkar ut för."

39   "Mutta politiikan tutkimuksesta ei koskaan voi kehittyä sovellettua tiedettä joka voisi antaa poliitikoille yksityiskohtaisia ohjeita siitä kuinka ihmisiä hallitaan."

science" in Finland. It is, no doubt, the most *canonical* text in the field, cited by a long list of references and interpretations[89].

What "happens" in the text on the way from the beginning to the end is taken as a basic structure for the analysis; the text has a beginning, a middle and an end. Analyzing the text as a narrative or a story leads us to expect the "common" models for narrative structure (a negative state – the state is improved; the hero meets with an obstacle – the villain enters the stage – counterattacs are started – the hero receives the magical weapon – the hero moves into the villains' space – the fight – the victory – the wedding of the hero and the princess)[90].

The story told advances on an apparent level as follows: The beginning sets the stage and describes "the old political science" and the "new political science". The middle compares the old and the new (concerning area, examples of research approaches and methods) the deficiencies of "the old" and the conquests of "the new" are described. The end describes the demands of the time and relates "the new" to them.

The beginning of the text places the narrative on a *time axis*: in the beginning, references are made to the past or ancient times (... ever since Plato and Aristotle). The end directs the story to the present and the future. By creating *a rupture in time and placing itself in that rupture*, the conflict between the old and the new is introduced: the "characters" OLD and NEW are constructed. The plot is developed by discussing the relations between the OLD and the NEW through the text.

There is no doubt about on whose side the authorial voice of the text is and the reader is expected to be. The *subject position constructed in the text* is clearly on the side of the NEW. In the end, the authorial voice is explicitly represented by "the researchers" associated with the NEW. This is taken as self-evident from now on. The reading is structured by a framework used many times, looking for *semantic* fields in the text, interpreting them on a *symbolic level*, and finally looking for a *hermeneutic* code in the text[91]. It looks at *how the text rhetorically motivates the transition* from the beginning to the end.

THE BEGINNING:

Theme a): TIME

The beginning of the text presents a time sequence where "the events" are placed. A "rhetorical scene" is created.

On one hand:

> "The phenomena of governmental life have been of interests to researchers *ever since* Plato and Aristotle wrote their works on the philosophy of the state three thousand years ago; and some of the state philosophers of bygone times, like Machiavelli and Montesquieu,

reached such fame that *still today* every civilised person is expected to know something about their teaching and opinions."

On the other hand:

"Yet we can say that political science belongs to those disciplines that are still at the beginning of their developmental route. *Only recently* has political science research started to direct itself to scientifically significant tasks and to use as help methods that can lead to exact results. Research on governmental life *has old origins* but political science as a science *is young*."

The first sequence establishes an opposition between the OLD and the NEW. Time is not constructed as a continuum; a rupture, a turning point is constructed and it becomes necessary to place the NEW in time and describe how it has evolved: the turn has happened

"... almost unnoticed. It would not be easy to point to any turning point in time, although you can say in general that the decisive development happened first after the turn of the century."

The uncomfortable task of any author is to decide which trope is stronger: to have old, ancient origins and traditions or to be something totally new and fresh, but without tradition, unstable, not yet legitimate and less credible. In case the reader may have doubts at the beginning about the new and the radical, the text starts a debate with the OLD, persuading the reader to follow the text and accept the author's point of view[92].

The motivation for the new is actually not located in any specific historical context or among specific historical events that could explain the necessity of the NEW. What motivates it is "development", "special phenomena that have caused the researchers to direct their interests to new fields of research".

Theme b): The "characters" in the text: the OLD and the NEW

The semantic coding of the "characters" goes as follows:
The NEW is described:

"... *blazing new trails*; ... scientific political science has had many *forerunners*, each of whom has had a *fertilizing effect* on the *development* of research and these *forerunners* have emerged in many countries."

So the phenomenon is common, but the appearance of it somehow vague.

"... no single researcher can be *placed ahead of others as paving the way for the new direction*."

But...

> "There are good grounds for claiming that scientific research on politics has *on a broad front* been done only on the other side of the Atlantic. This *strong development* of the American political science...
> ... The new direction has *become visible to the outside* in that the research field has been *widened* and the *focus* of research has been turned onto new areas.
> ... the new *tasks* are *significant..*
> ... *by means of methods that can lead to exact results."*

The OLD is described as:

> *"... speculative and metaphysical...*
> It was directed almost solely towards *governmental and official state institutions.* Political science was in the first place study of governmental law, which was *in a subjugated position* in relationship to constitutional law.
> ... although is was acknowledged that governmental life included things that the constitution did not mention at all... such phenomena were taken into consideration only if they could be explained to be in accordance with the prevailing conventions of the constitution. In other cases, they were seen as *non*-governmental and *extra*parliamentary."

The *semantic aspects* underlined here can easily be placed on a *symbolical level* on the oppositional axes of *nature and culture*: the OLD is positioned as the formal, the dry, the inside and the order. It has been directed towards regulation, but in so doing has not been able to form an independent identity. The position of political science in relationship to constitutional law is one of *dependency*. The OLD remains *blind and prudent in relationship to the nature beyond its borders*. The *nature outside is vulgar, impure and indecent – forbidden to be talked about, at the same time both shameful and fascinating*. The OLD is the space of the inside, order and regulation.

The rhetoric of the NEW is based on "development". It is associated with power, expansiveness, weight and importance. It is characterised by the fertility of *nature*. The relationship between the OLD and the NEW is *in the beginning* a relationship between *the rigid culture and the virile nature*, a relationship between a Master and a Challenger.

THE MIDDLE:

Theme a): The expansion of the NEW; spatial metaphors

Spatial metaphors have a central role in the dealings between the OLD and the NEW that promises to break the boundaries of political science.

"the *first, unknown* political phenomenon that was *connected to the area* of political research was party life. (This happened...) as late as... and yet, competition and struggle for power among the parties had been the mobilizing force in the British governmental system for two hundred years.

... After the establishing of parties as an area of political research, the researchers started to direct their interest even towards such *non-official* communities and institutions that had larger or more minor political importance, although their actual and original tasks were not of an official nature.

... for instance, economic and idealistic organizations, so-called 'pressure groups' that in specific areas strive to influence the decisions of state organs.

... the researchers' *fields of vision have continuously widened...*

... the centre of gravity has been turned to *newly occupied areas...*

... *in reality* this implies a *deeper*, more principal turn...

The older political science directed itself towards the *forms* of political life.. the object of the newer research is power relations".

The new object of research is

"... *a power field*
... to explain *how individuals and groups* use political power
... how *specific individuals* rise to leading positions."

The space of the NEW is expanded into all possible directions (length, depth, quantity and quality). But reaching out to *nature*, chaos, intimacy or privacy becomes limited by how people are labelled. The expressions of "specific individual" or "specific areas" where pressure groups can have political functions limit the vagueness of the outside. Even these transgressions and expansions appear to be quite bold; farther than that you cannot go. *New conquests and expansions of the area are made, but only within the limits of specific areas where the threatening chaos can be held in control.*

Theme b): The final duel; the OLD is buried in disgrace

The middle of the text describes the difference between the OLD and the NEW in some specified issues: governmental institutions, the state, electoral systems and finally the methods. The argumentations start by stating that there was *also* something good in the OLD, *but...*

The formal, rigid aims of the OLD were

"... to *name and to classify, to build up as tenable a conceptual system as possible*, or to *complete and repair* the existing system. Due to this there was a *striking* interest among the researchers of the old direction in new governmental institutions; because as soon as such institutions *happily had been named and classified, so to say written on the books or placed into boxes with labels, research had again advanced by major steps. But to name and to classify is not to explain ... you cannot reach real knowledge ... no real-scientific theory building."*

The efforts of the OLD to expand its area are met with ridicule. Its efforts to integrate the outside are based on a mechanical expansion of the area of *order*. This is done in a formalistic way, bound to lead into a dead end.

This also goes for theories of the state:

> "Numerous researchers had used their best efforts and knowledge to try to clear up the concept of the state."

Of this we understand that even their best intelligence was not much to count on. It was characterised as

> "...metaphysical, verbalistic *hobbyism* that cannot lead to *real knowledge*."

Talking about methods, even the early pioneers of the NEW are poor devils:

> "... even *in the best cases* quite deficient."

About Mosca and Michels:

> "...their results reminded one *to a certain degree* of sharply and spiritually written essays
> ... were *close to speculation*."

About Toqueville and Bryce:

> "... give a *to some extent* journalistic impression, resemble unexceptionally intelligent and carefully written newspaper reportage... The researches were bothered by *a kind of* superficiality."

The text's efforts to evaluate the classics as positively as possible are effectively cancelled out by the euphemisms used. This is, however, an effective way of integrating the OLD into the NEW. This happens, for instance, in the case of electoral systems. We are told that the classifications of electoral systems made by the old have retained their value, but in the light of the NEW, even they are to be seen in a new perspective. The final nail in the coffin of the OLD is delivered with the notion that the OLD, the formal, works as a facade, a means that *prevented the eye from seeing the real power relations*. The result of the rhetoric is that the NEW becomes empowered while the relationship to the OLD is not totally destroyed; the change is that *"the objects have changed and the basic ends dislocated"*.

Theme c): The NEW receives help from scientific methods and from America

The NEW meets hindrances – not only in its relationship to the OLD – but also because political science is about

> "very complicated causal relations".

But

> "*In realising* the methodological flaws in the earlier research, the representatives of the new directions have *sought* methods *by the help of which* it would be possible to avoid the dangers of speculativeness and superficiality and reach as *exact* results as possible."

Through the whole text *"researchers"* are involved in

> "*seeking* answers to, *seeking* methods by the help of which we could *reach* results, *directing* their interest to...
> *using* methods or tools
> *managing* tasks,... the research tasks they *are faced with*."

In the end it is finally shown that

> "*with the help of skilfully planned methods some researchers have been able to reach beautiful results*".

The ideal case represented is a test situation in which different groups were *subjected to* different kinds of propaganda.
The research methods have been developed side by side with the tasks for research:

> "New tasks require new methods in order to manage the tasks."

Alternatively, as a consequence of the development of research methods,

> "the researchers' interest has *so to say spontaneously* been directed to new tasks".

Through the text, "America" signifies an external, exotic-ethnic referent where the dream has almost come true.

> "There are good grounds for saying that scientific research has on a broad front been conducted by the *other* side of the Atlantic."

What is located there is

"a strong development".

In "America", research is done on new areas, for instance on "pressure groups". The references to American political scientists are called out for in many turns, but mostly they remain anonymous. That "an American" has said something activates a rhetorical function and is enough for legitimating the message.[93]

To the end of the text the "researcher" is, no doubt, *a free agent that chooses his methods, casts his X-ray gaze on different research objects. He has overcome the OLD identity of dependency in the shadow of governmental law. He has turned to a new path that leads towards autonomous ends.* He has, with the assistance of the "helpers", become strengthened in his identity and has established a position *within culture.*

THE END:

At the beginning of the final chapter the hero establishes a position by the side of *order*; the rhetoric of the NEW turns into a rhetoric of order instead of chaos.

> "The setting of new tasks and taking on of new methods has also in the area of political science led to the conclusion that successful research requires the *organized and systematic* cooperation of several researchers of different levels. The times are already bygone when it could be considered natural that every researcher laboured alone in his chambers at his own desk."

And now comes the final credo of the text:

> "An *organised and systematic* cooperation requires, though, corresponding facilities and grants-in-aid.
> ...In reality, successful research in political science – as in other social sciences – would require *putting at the researchers' disposal* research institutions whose existence is *considered perfectly natural* in the case of the so-called *exact* sciences."

The message should be easy enough to interpret: Give money!

In case the money would not come, the result is already predicted:

> "Even in America... complaints are heard that the new researchers in need of sufficient material resources have been forced to direct their research work towards secondary tasks or to devote themselves to writing *textbooks that tramp on beaten tracks or day-to-day politics and quasi-scientific work directed to the general public.*"

The hero is commonly expected to bring about a positive condition in his environment as well. Here the result is that the hero's identity has

become so empowered that he starts to tyrannize his environment: lay the money at my feet!

The article ends with the evaluation that it will probably still take a long time before "it is generally realized" that the hero's requirements are legitimate. Today we know that the money did not come! Are we sure that it is a bad thing?

The *semantic* codes of the text – in its beginning, middle and end – can now be read on a *symbolic level*, from story to the plot as follows.

At the beginning, the OLD occupies the place of culture, the inside and order. The NEW enters, breaks in by force of the virility and strength of nature. The NEW expands the area of culture, integrates parts of the OLD while at the same time declaring it dead, ridiculing the OLD's attempts to transgress its borders. The NEW occupies the place of culture, the inside and order, legitimates its authority and starts to require resources.

As such, the narrative is not unique. It has certainly been considered the most common narrative in the history of western civilization. It has also been considered a narrative of hegemonious masculinity, leaving in its shadow other possible narrative solutions.[94]

Still following the code apparatus, there remains the task of solving "the riddle" of the text: to read the *hermeneutical code*. The key to the puzzle could be in a connection between the beginning and the end of the text, in something that is *almost left unsaid*. Both times it is the voice of the anonymous "American researcher" that comes with *it*.

In the beginning, *it* is about the criticism of the OLD's way of only studying the constitution, and taking "real life" into consideration only if it can be explained within the boundaries of the conventions of the constitution.

> "In other cases it (real life) was disregarded as "non-constitutional" and "unparliamentary", and as such they were treated – to borrow the words of an American researcher of the new direction – in slightly the same style as *the natural aspects of life that are not allowed to be discussed in respectable company*."

In the end *it* is about an example of successful and beautiful research results that have been reached with the help of the new methods in the paradigmatic test situation. The researcher is *an American by the name of* Hartman who was both a researcher and a politician. He organized his own campaign so that

> "the different areas of the constituency were *subjected to different kinds of propaganda or were left without propaganda*. The result was, *incidentally*, the following: the number of votes for Hartman's party rose in the whole constituency compared to previous elections, but in the area where the propaganda had been purely demagogical and appealed to emotions and passions, the increase in votes was 50%; in the area where the propaganda practised was exclusively matter-of-fact, the increase was 36%; and in areas where propaganda was omitted, it was 24%."

That researchers of the new direction were, *in any case*, winners is perhaps nothing to wonder about. What is more essential is that both at the beginning and at the end the citations deal with *the relationship of the culture to its outside; what in the beginning is not utterable – but what everybody thinks about because it is mystical and fascinating – is in the end something you just say incidentally, something you hardly bother to express. It represents the outside as something you subordinate to propaganda and something that is classified into categories of seriousness and emotion, – despiteful but still popular among the stupid masses. What is almost left unsaid reveals the difference between the OLD and NEW ways of perceiving Nature.*

The connection between the beginning and the end opens our eyes to the metaphors of *seeing* in the text. They circle around the opposition between the *hidden and the revealed, the naked*. The rhetoric of the NEW proclaims

> "... that the researchers' perspectives have been widened...
> ... that researchers reveal *hidden* centres and factors of power
> ... that institutions used to be *facades* that hid power relations from the eye
> ... that researchers *directed their gaze* towards the *phenomena* of governmental life..
> ... that research should reveal hidden laws in nature.
> All real-scientific research has as its aim to find invariance,.. reveal hidden laws in political power relations... to prove the laws that steer governmental life, peoples' political activities and attitudes."

The opposition between the formal and the real/the realist implies that the NEW is "like" Nature: the real thing that is more genuine than the OLD. It describes Nature in a transparent way. But at the same time it is precisely in Nature that we will find "laws", invariance, Order. The Order belonging to Culture is projected onto Nature. The Order of the NEW contaminates, integrates, possesses and totally nihilates its Nature and Chaos.

Whereas Nature for the OLD was mystical and teasing, the relationship of the NEW to its own Nature is, incidentally, truly arrogant and mechanised. Nature can now be classified, made passive and subjugated to laws. The authority of the NEW is totalizing; it will steer more effectively on a broader area and with a firmer hand. While the NEW has taken the place of Culture, Order is projected onto Nature. Nature is congealed. The Internal nihilates its Other/Outer space. *The object of research is steered by laws and submitted to total control, but the Subject is free!*

But, in the process of culture – the processing of the tension between the Inside and its Outside – no victory is everlasting.

...and a shadow

Intertextual en-countering? There is, however, a text, published in 1952 and signed by an anonymous "-n", intersperced, in small print, with another text, that counters the natural science version of the method for political science[95].

The story goes like this:
While the laws of nature may repeat themselves "in just about the same way as a tautology", history does not repeat itself. Therefore, political scientists are bound to work with analogies and probabilities. As the male political scientist (working as a natural scientist) studies something that is basically static, the "political worker" studies something that is in constant change, as is he himself. As the truths of natural sciences can be cumulative, a political truth is valid only within a specific time and place. To understand other locations and cultures as well as other times is therefore more demanding.

As the task of a "political worker" is more demanding than that of a natural scientist, he should have a reflexive relationship to his method and learn from his experiences.

> "Human beings in general learn more from their misfortunes than from their successes. Power and success stupidifies; a misfortune makes you wise. The political worker who has succeeded with one working method has a natural tendency to repeat himself."[40] [96]

As the mechanical knowledge produced by the natural scientific method can only produce general and, consequently, trivial truths, the experience of the "political worker" must constantly be put to the test with the concrete reality he is applying his knowledge upon, the context he is working in.

Now why would this have anything to do with political science? As the interpretation of the text is not kept in firm control by any authorial name, this will have to remain the riddle of *this* text.

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40   "Människan lär i allmänhet mer av motgången än av framgången. Makten, framgången fördummar, av skadan blir man vis. Den politiska arbetaren, som lyckats med en viss arbetsmetod, har en naturlig fallenhet att upprepa sig."

4.5   Replicates/replications/repetitions

After a period of relative silence in "metapaper" production, the debate became lively again during *the late 1950s*. The new metapapers, however, curiously followed the very same formula that had been established by the canonical paper. Their themes, vocabulary, rhetorical solutions and narrative structures look very much like *replications* of "The tasks and methods of political science" from 1950.

Space; mapping, expanding, controlling

The NEW, "modern" political science - *"the happy-to-fight renewal"*[97] - was predominantly described using a vocabulary of space. "A map" was a reoccurring metaphor in characterizations of politics and research activity.

> "Today the mapping out of Finnish political life has advanced approximately to the same level as the charting of Africa in the days of Stanley and Livingstone. The coastal features as well as the major mountain ranges are known, and certain regions have been subjected to somewhat closer study. But the whole continent still contains huge blank areas alongside more or less fanciful interpretations created by cartographers on the basis of hearsay for lack of anything more precise."[41] [98]

In the vocabulary of mapping, research activity now "expanded" into wider and wider areas. The new orientation in research led to an expansion into new "areas" and to "adoption of new methods"[99]. As research "developed and expanded", new phenomena came into its domain or sphere. That "the field" of political science was "expanded" was often seen as *due to* an expansion in the field of politics "out there", just calling for and even requiring research activity. The "field of objects" for political research having expanded led to the need for research activity to expand. Objects of research "out there" legitimated the expansions of the discipline.

> "Spirited political activity led to a research interest."[42] [100]

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41   "Suomen poliittisen elämän kartoitus on tänään edistynyt suunnilleen samalle tasolle kuin Afrikan kartoitus Livingstonen ja Stanleyn aikoihin. Rannikkomuodostus on selvillä ja suurimmat vuorijonot tunnettuja, minkä lisäksi tietyt paikkakunnat ovat jo olleet lähemmänkin tutustumisen kohteena. Mutta koko mannermaalla on vielä valtavia valkoisia alueita, rinta rinnan niiden enemmän tai vähemmän mielikuvituksellisten tulkintojen kanssa, jotka kartanpiirtävät ovat paremman puutteessa vain kuulopuheiden mukaan soveltaneet paperille."

42   "...vilkastunut poliittinen toiminta johti mielenkiintoon..."

"New fields of research appear, if not every day, then at least every year." [43] [101]

"... novelties in research techniques and tasks... a huge amount of material and ideas that each day brings in the feverish political development" [44] [102]

"One of the most evident features in the intellectual development of the postwar period is the powerful expansion of the social sciences"...(which) has put its imprint on the thought of the time in a way that can only be compared with the breakthrough of the historical perspective one and a half centuries ago." [45] [103]

"The brisk march" of the social sciences, "the accumulation of an enormous amount of knowledge" brought along with it a need for new research methods and represented new theoretical problems. "New tasks crowd each other." There was "a stream of engagements and ideas." "The pressure of this development" forced research activity. Political science was described as "a vital discipline, filled with new and tempting problems". The heroic researchers who

" have set themselves with their limited resources *to patrol* as wide an area as this can at times get a feeling that *borders between ecstacy and desperation"*. [46] [104]

The space written into the texts is predominantly *external or expanding into external space.* Yet some spaces are internal. The researcher was "not to sit in the library from morning until evening." [105]

"It is understandable that the male scientists holding this attitude *stayed in their studies without letting their gaze glide out over the living life* and the people that acted in politics." [47] [106]

"In spite of this (the risk of subjectivity) research does not need to remain *mere 'chamber science'*. Its results can be useful in practical politics." [48] [107]

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43   "Nya forskningsområden uppträder nämligen om inte varje dag, så åtminstone varje år."

44   "... nyheter i fråga om forskningsteknik och -uppgifter... en hisnande mängd material och synpunkter som varje dag för med sig i den feberaktigt uppdrivna politiska utvecklingen."

45   "Ett av de mest framträdande dragen i efterkrigstidens intellektuella utveckling är samhällsvetenskapernas kraftiga expansion....(Den) har satt sin prägel på tidens tänkande på ett sätt som bara kan jämföras med det historiska betraktelsesättets genombrott för ett och helt århundrade sedan."

46   "...har satt sig att med sina bristfälliga krafter avpatrullera ett så pass vidsträckt område som detta ibland känna en känsla som står på gränsen mellan extas och desperation."

47   Det är förståeligt, att vetenskapsmän som hade denna inställning stannade i sina studiekammare utan att låta blicken glida ut över det levande livet och de människor som verkade inom politiken."

48   "Tästä huolimatta tutkimuksen ei tarvitse jäädä pelkäksi kamaritieteeksi, vaan sen tulokset voivat olla käyttökelpoisia käytännön politiikassa."

What resided "within the sheltered walls of the university"[108] and occupied an inner space was the OLD political science, whereas the NEW would reach out, expand to larger areas, enter and conquer larger space."

Time; constructing hierarchy and rupture

The opposition between the OLD and the NEW was put on stage time after time[109]. A common formula for repeating the division would go like this:

> "It is true that both research and teaching in the field of political science began in Finland *at least in some form* in the middle of the 17th century when the first university was established. *The real development* of this discipline, however, started *a great deal later, possibly in the 1930s*, and really extensive work, as in most European countries, did not get under way until after the Second World War."[110]

Managing to be simultaneously "a relative newcomer" with "an honourable history"[111], political science had undergone "a deep-reaching development and adopted quite new tasks, aims and methods"[112]. The discipline was characterised as young and at the same time having an origin in the Antiquity.[113]

The rhetoric of OLD and NEW was now in the past tense; the NEW had made a breakthrough, "the modern breakthough"[114]. In Finnish political science this was *located in time* in the middle of the 1950s[115].

> "Only after the Second World War, as political science was transferred to the newly founded faculty of social sciences, *did the development evolve at a faster pace.*"[49]
> "Measured in terms of doctoral dissertations and chairs established, the advancement has been rapid. Progress has been made especially since the middle of the 1950s, when a new postwar generation of researchers began to make its contribution and when the value of social science researchers has won more general acceptance in society."[116]

The shift from OLD to NEW was placed at a specific time: the watershed was the year 1955. Lists of political science publications of the "old" and the "new" type were presented[117]. "The field" could now be divided and personified. A field of "us" and "them" was constructed, now placed on the time axis and WITHIN political science. As the separation of "us" and "them" earlier was constructed in relationship to other disciplines, now the discipline's Other was constructed as the not-so-distant past of the discipline's own history. Luckily,

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49 "Vasta toisen maailmansodan jälkeen, kun yleinen valtio-oppi siirrettiin juuri perustettuun valtiotieteelliseen tiedekuntaan, edistyi kehitys nopeammin askelin."

*the most advanced and progressive generation of all times turned out to be that
of the authors' themselves. History became rewritten from the perspective of
the protagonists.*

> "In comparison to the results and ambitions of the political science
> research *of today*, political science still *half a century ago* stood on a highly
> *unscientific level*."[50][118]

Not only was the relationship between the past and the present
hierarchised, but the NEW was set as *the very criterium* for develop-
ment, modernity and scientific value.

> "... where research has been *developed furthest*, primarily in the Anglo-
> Saxon world, modern political research has already *attained a position of
> power*, whereas in other places it has only during the past decade started
> to make its appearance, and has not yet been able to *edge out* the old
> direction."[51][119]

The new theme

> ..."nowadays is to clarify political behaviour, more exactly electoral – that
> is, voting-behaviour. The appearance of this kind of research can be
> considered as a certain sign of the arrival of modern political science in
> the country or at the university in question; the lack of it can, on
> the other hand, be seen as *pointing to a certain kind of underdevelop-
> ment*."[52][120]

By hierarchising the OLD and the NEW, it also became possible to to
make the OLD disappear. A *historical break* was constructed, separating
the undeveloped past from the modern or modernizing present. The
modernist conceptualisation of time produced a fallacy that "there was

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50   I jämförelse med den statsvetenskapliga forskningens resultat och ambitio-
      ner i dag stod statskunskapen ännu för ett halft århundrade sedan på en
      högst ovetenskaplig nivå."

51   Politiikan tutkimus on kuluneen puolen vuosisadan aikana joutunut syvälle
      ulottuvan kehityksen alaiseksi ja sen seurauksena omaksunut aivan uusia
      tehtäviä, tavoitteita ja menetelmiä. Muutos ei ole tapahtunut äkillisesti eikä
      yhtäaikaisesti, siellä missä tutkimus on pisimmälle kehittynyttä - lähinnä
      anglosaksisessa maailmassa -, on uudenaikainen politiikan tutkimus jo pääs-
      syt valtaa, kun taas muualla se on alkanut vasta viimeksi kuluneen vuosi-
      kymmenen aikana tehdä tuloaa eikä ole vieläkään pystynyt syrjäyttämään
      vanhaa suuntausta."

52   "Millä hyvänsä tieteenalalla käy niin, että sitä mukaa kuin tutkimus kehittyy
      ja laajenee, tulee sen piiriin uusia mielenkiintoisia ongelmia samalla kun
      eräät varhemmin keskeiset ilmiöt jäävät taka-alalle, mikä aiheuttaa painopis-
      teen vaihtelun ajasta ja paikasta toiseen. Valtiotieteessä on tätä nykyä eräänä
      keskeisenä teemana poliittisen käyttäytymisen, tarkemmin sanoen vaali- eli
      äänestyskäyttäytymisen selvittely. Tällaisten tutkimusten ilmaantumista
      voidaan itse asiassa pitää varmana merkkinä uudenaikaisen valtio-opin
      saapumisesta ao. maahan tai yliopistoon, niiden puuttumisen taas katsotaan
      viittaavan tietynlaiseen kehittymättömyyteen."

nothing before us". Since history was constructed as Other, there was no "real" history. Finnish political science was easy to radicalise because

"...there is no old domestic tradition in Finnish political science that would slow down the change of focus."[53] [121]

By producing the past as non-science, a historical rupture - a rupture in time - was created. The earlier history of Finnish political science was made to "nothing". By constructing history as a feminised Other and denying the value of the past, political science started to appear as historyless. And, as there was nothing before, there was no consciousness of the relativity of time, space or contingency. As "we" possess the truth, there can never be any change.

Identity: autonomy, homogeneity, boundary

In one respect, in comparison to the natural sciences, political science was still "young". The modelling after natural sciences was in no way implicit.

"The endlessness of work is a common feature for all sciences. This should also comfort political scientists, who, when comparing their own field to the natural sciences are forced to state that political science is only *at the beginning of its development*."[54] [122]

"The *advancement of the natural sciences gave rise in other fields* to a wish to mimic, and, in this way, the aspiration to give general causal explanations."[55] [123]

"Of the many branches of political science, international politics is one of the youngest. In spite of the interest towards this area through time, the established and *independent* research of international politics was born only during our century and to a special degree during the last few decades."[56] [124]

By calling upon a hierarchical order between the natural and social sciences, political science would reach to a *higher level*. By following the

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53   "...ettei Suomen valtio-opissa ole vanhaa kotimaista perinnettä, joka saattaisi jarruttaa painopisteen siirtymistä."

54   "Työn päättymättömyys on kaikelle tieteelle yhteinen piirre. Tämän seikan pitäisi lohduttaa politiikan tutkijoita, jotka verratessaan omaa alaansa luonnontieteisiin joutuvat huomaamaan, että valtiotiede on vasta kehityksensä alussa."

55   "Luonnontieteiden edistyminen herätti muilla aloilla jäljittelynhalun ja täten pyrkimyksen yleisten kausaaliselitysten antamiseen."

56   "Valtiotieteellisen tutkimuksen lukuisista haaroista on kansainvälinen politiikka nuorimpia. Huolimatta tätä alaa kohtaan kautta aikojen eri tavoin tunnetusta kiinnostuksesta sen vakiintunut ja itsenäinen tutkimus on syntynyt vasta meidän vuosisatamme ja erityisessä määrässä parin viime vuosikymmenen kuluessa."

model of natural sciences, political science would "become *autonomous*". "The model from natural sciences had led to the birth of an *independent* discipline."[125]

The OLD was described as faulty because it had used suspicious methods; it did not prove

> ..."whether what was said was *true*. And, in this field that is full of *emotional charges*, one has to pay special attention to the *objectivity of observations and the reliability of methods.*"[57] [126]
>
> "When the results of impartial scientific research are made to influence the general consciousness, they tend to give the citizens a more *truthful* image of politics with its different phenomena. In the same way they root out many prejudices that have been indoctrinated into the minds of people by *a strongly emotional attitude.*"[58] [127]
>
> "What is required of the researcher is *constant vigilance* and honesty so that his *personal* attitudes would not be allowed to cause *mistakes* in the results."[59] [128]

The researcher himself must be on his guard towards the power of feelings, although he "actually lives in the events he is studying and - as a citizen - has his own personal values".

> "To receive objective information is, however, possible only *by adopting a scientific method of observation.*"[60] [129]

A *vocabulary of measurement* was established in order to realize the aim for research stated by the canonical paper: "finding invariances and revealing hidden laws of behaviour"[130]. The new vocabulary was about "cohesion and homogeneity, balance and stability, and sociometric mapping", in contrast to the earlier humanistic speculation.

A quotation from Deutsch floated around in several metapapers: The distinction between theoretical propositions and value propositions had been applied to the classics of political thought. When different types of propositions were counted, it turned out that only Machiavelli fared well in the measurement of an index between fact and value statements "and got full points". The metaphysical ponderings of the

---

57   "... jätti todistamatta, oliko se mitä sanottiin aina totta. Ja kuitenkin tällä tunnevarauksista täydellä alalla on kiinnitettävä erityisen suurta huomiota havaintojen objektiivisuuteen ja menetelmien luotettavuuteen."

58   "... kun puolueettoman tieteellisen tutkimuksen tulokset saadaan vaikuttamaan yleiseen tietoisuuteen, ne ovat omiaan antamaan kansalaisille entistä todenmukaisemman kuvan politiikasta eri ilmiöineen. Samoin ne juurivat monia ennakkoluuloja, joita voimakkaan tunnepitoinen asenne on iskostanut mieliin."

59   "Tutkijalta vaaditaan näin ollen alituista valppautta ja rehellisyyttä, etteivät hänen henkilökohtaiset kannanottonsa pääsisi aiheuttamaan erheitä tuloksiin."

60   "Objektiivisen tiedon saaminen on kuitenkin mahdollista vain tieteellisen tarkastelutavan käyttöönottamisen avulla."

classics had "produced so many hypotheses that the researchers have so far been able to control only a part of them".[131]

The general methodolathry of structures, mechanisms, invariances and generalisations, measurement and aggregation cast the object of research as measurable, countable and controllable. It constructed a distance to the object. As the object was constructed, so was the subject. The establishing of a new autonomous identity for political science redistributed and reconstructed identity positions. The texts constructed specific kinds of subject positions in "political science". The power of the modernist rhetoric *carried forth a specific subjectivity, an identity for the group of "new political scientists".* The modernist conceptualisation of time created a powerful image of a new science, of development and progressivity.

> *"The research of Finnish political life is in need today of a marching forth of such young male scientists who are inspired by the spirit of pioneers and who are ready to bravely invade unmapped areas."*[61][132]

The imagined scientific community constructed in the texts made up for a homogeneous identity, a vanguard collectivity of male political scientists. Possible disagreements could be solved and the community could be held together by marking a boundary between the inside – what unites the collectivity, what you can agree upon – and the outside. A spirited congress debate on parties and classes could solve its disagreements in this final conclusion:

> *"The lively debate, however, ended in an agreeable remark: political parties are like women.   It   is difficult to live without them and difficult to live with them."* [62][133]

4.6   Reflections

At *the beginning of the 1960s,* the NEW was – for the first time – given *a name*: "behaviourism" or "behavioral research in political science". The act of naming also allowed one to reflect upon the named and evaluate its significance, status and future prospects. The evaluations came in different versions: a *"take all" imperialist version, a modest return to the OLD and an attempt at synthesizing contingency.*

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61   "Suomen poliittisen elämän tutkimus kaipaa tänään sellaisten nuorten tiedemiesten esiinmarssia, joita elähdyttää uranuurtajan henki ja jotka ovat valmiit rohkeasti tunkeutumaan kartoittamattomille alueille."

62   "Vilkas väittely päättyi kuitenkin sovinnolliseen toteamukseen: poliittiset puolueet muistuttavat naisia. On vaikea elää ilman heitä ja vaikea elää heidän kanssaan."

A "take all" imperialist version

This version[134] pointed out strongly that behaviourism was "not a specific object or a special area of research, but an approach that was applicable to almost all special areas of political research". Behaviourism had brought "sound empiricism" into political science. However, it did not make "qualitative analysis, general historical theories or speculation" worthless. A report from a congress in Paris stated that behavioural research on politics was *not* considered *"an opposite"* to other kinds of research but a complement to it[135]. In the debates of the congress, it had, however, turned out that *"developed"* political research was already done in several countries. Therefore, the prospects were quite promising.

> "The Paris congress was perhaps the last world congress where there was reason to discuss research on political behaviour as a separate topic. This obvious protest against the inexactness and even unscientific nature of the methods of political science will probably soon have fulfilled its task. The approach of the new school *will then be generally acknowledged* within political science."[63][136]

The aim was to arrive at "non-moralising" political research. The debates in Paris were characterised as "unfortunately emotional", but this would soon be overcome as soon as the approach was adopted by everybody.

> "After the adoption of the approach there should not be any reason to discuss behavioural research of politics *as emotionally* as happened in Paris..." [64][137]

The problem of separating the researcher and his values from research was also discussed.

> "In many debates it was remarked *how difficult it is for male scientists to "disengage themselves"* from the ideology they have adopted and, for instance, national goals *to become objective observers of facts."*[65][138]

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63   "Pariisin kongressi oli kenties viimeinen maailmankongressi, jossa on aihetta käsitellä poliittisen käyttäytymisen tutkimusta erillisenä keskustelunaiheena. Tämä ilmeinen protesti valtiotieteen menetelmien epätarkkuutta ja epätieteellisyyttäkin vastaan lienee näet pian tehnyt tehtävänsä. Uuden koulukunnan ajattelutapa tunnustetaan silloin yleisesti valtiotieteen piirissä."

64   "Sanotun ajattelutavan omaksumisen jälkeen ei enää lieneekään syytä keskustella politiikan behavioraalisesta tutkimuksesta niin affektipitoisesti kuin Pariisissa tapahtui tämän alan ensimmäisessä istunnossa."

65   "Monet keskustelujen puheenvuorot muistuttivat myös siitä, miten vaikea tiedemiesten on "irrottautua" omaksumastaan ideologiasta ja esimerkiksi kansallisista tavoitteista objektiivisiksi tosiasiain tarkastelijoiksi."

Why national goals were addressed may have been associated with a central topic of the Paris congress, polyethnicity. The report appears quite straightforward on problems of polyethnicity. In the report, problems of integration or autonomy became solved in a bold and clear way: "after integration has occurred, a specific group is no longer an ethnic whole that deviates from others... it does not aim at preserving its specific character or isolating itself from the society."[139]

Not only was it told how ethnic groups should solve their (political?) problems, but furthermore, the report states that problems of polyethnicity were only of limited interest to political science.

> "The problems of polyethnicity seem to give political science lots of cause for research, and the studies could also be more concrete and objective than so far. The problems of integration and pluralism that were the core of the debate can also be studied sociologically and anthropologically. Political research is very interested in these kinds of tendencies as soon as they affect the functioning of the political system or even endanger the persistence of a system."[66][140]

All in all, it was reported that "the fast development of science was a fact", and that prospects for the future were promising.[141]

> "If made to predict the future of the discipline, you can hardly leave unmentioned the homogenization of this discipline. "The successful protest movement, behaviourial research on politics, will presumably soon be adopted in political science."[67][142]

And, in order for behaviourism to be able to conquer the whole field, to become universal, it had to conceal its origin in a specific context and location[143].

> "It is only recommendable that behaviourial research on politics loses its special status if it is defined only as research done *at the Columbia University* and Ann Arbor, Michigan."[68][144]

The universalising "take all" version did not, however, become as suc-

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66   "Polyetnisyyden aiheuttamat poliittiset pulmat näyttävät antavan valtiotie-teelle paljon tutkimisen aihetta, ja tutkimukset voisivat myös olla tähän astista konkreettisempia ja objektiivisempia. Keskustelun runkona olleita integroitumisen ja pluralismin ongelmia voidaan kyllä selvittää myös sosi-ologisesti ja antropologisesti. Valtiotiedettä tällaiset tendenssit kiinnostavat suuresti niin pian kuin ne vaikuttavat poliittisen järjestelmän toimintaan tai jopa vaarantavat tietyn järjestelmän säilymisen."

67   "... ennustettava tieteenalan suuntaa, niin tuskin voisi jättää mainitsematta tämän tieteen homogenisoitumista. Menestyksellinen protestiliike, politiikan behavioraalinen tutkimus, omaksuttaneen pian yleisesti valtiotieteessä."

68   ..."on vain suotavaa että politiikan behavioraalinen tutkimus menettää eri-koisasemansa £ jos se määritellään ainoastaan tutkimustyöksi, jota tehdään Columbian yliopistossa ja Ann Arborissa, Michiganissa."

cessful as was hoped. Still in 1972, political science was found to be in doubt about becoming enriched by the behaviourial movement. Now, "political science" appeared in the role of an object, separated from the authorial voice of the text.

> "In a presentation given in September 1966, Gabriel A. Almond compared political science to Rachel. Always *upon waking, this aging lady* thought about Jacob and asked herself: "Am I already or am I not?" and "Can I or can I not?" Applied to the *desire* of political science, these daily questions are: "Are we already on a scientific level or are we not"? and "Can we mature into a science or can we not?" The comparison could have been made before and it has not lost its timeliness in six years. Nor has there been a complete decline in the number political scientists who also ask, Do we want to or do we not?"[69] [145]

The version of modest return to the OLD

This version[146] contrasted "traditionalism and behaviouralism" in less excited terms than the previous one. It did not so much reappraise the OLD; political science "had been brought into a bad light by thousands of years of speculation. Neither was it that interested in the NEW.

The version discussed whether "the behaviouralist reform movement" was a perspective, an approach or a field of research. According to this version, behaviourism was to be seen as "a complement" to "traditional" political science[147].

> "The title of my presentation with all its 'isms' may give an impression of *rigidified stances* and long development of schools within political science. This is luckily not what has happened and hardly will in this situation..."
>
> "The status of behaviourism has been *stabilised and clarified...* it is not a question of *replacing* traditional research but of *completing* it...
>
> "In fact, a major part of especially the younger generation of researchers has remained impartial, although not indifferent, in the debate; aiming at results by selecting accurate methods, by *borrowing some new and some old, but not attaching labels to themselves* or committing themselves to schools." [70] [148]

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69   "Syyskuussa 1966 pitämässään esitelmässä Gabriel A. Almond vertasi valtio-oppia Raakeliin. Tämä ikääntyvä rouva ajatteli aina herätessään Jaakoppia ja kysyi itseltään: "Jokohan minä nyt olen vai enkö ole?" ja "Kykenenkö minä vai enkö kykene?" Valtio-opin kaipuuseen sovellettuna nämä joka-aamuiset kysymykset kuuluvat: "Jokohan me nyt olemme tieteellisellä tasolla vai emmekö ole"? ja "Kykenemmekö kypsymään tieteeksi vai emmekö kykene?" Vertaus olisi voitu esittää ennenkin eikä se ole kuudessa vuodessa menettä-nyt ajankohtaisuuttaan. Eivätpä niidenkään valtio-oppineiden rivit ole tyys-tin harventuneet, jotka myös kysyvät, haluammeko vai emmekö halua."

70   "Esitykseni otsikko kaikkine ismeineen saattaa antaa mielikuvan kannaotto-jen jäykistymisestä ja pitkälle kehittyneestä koulukuntaistumisesta valtiotie-teen piirissä. Näin ei onneksi kuitenkaan ole käynyt ja tuskin tässä tilantees-

"Just like revolutionary groups and even more moderate political and social reform movements, even scientific schools and research directions seem to have a tendency to give birth to their own extremist directions that in moving consistently forward make as far-reaching conclusions of the basic propositions of the school as possible and usually are *driven into one-sidedness.*"[71] [149]

In following the behaviourist approach, research in political science had ended up in *"individual psychology and mental characteristics"*, whereas associations, institutions and the political system had been unreasonably bypassed. "Mere measurement would not make research scientific."

"*Isolating* individuals from the political system or the political process and *subjecting them to microscopic analysis* threaten to totally estrange politics from political science.

".. the stance means in any case that *rigid* behaviourism is considered to be a one-sided, insufficient starting point in studying political phenomena."[72] [150]

"According to one author, the behaviourial method of politics is like *the Loch Ness monster;* it can with relatively great accuracy be said what it is not, but it is hard to say what it is. Or it is like a *huge umbrella, under which most different kinds of people gather only to disperse themselves again after the storm is over.*"[73] [151]

The third, synthesizing version

This version[152] also discussed the instability of the discipline. Accord-

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sa käykään.

.. behaviorismin asema on vakiintunut, selkiytynyt.. kysymys ei traditionaalisen tutkimuksen korvaamisesta vaan täydentämisestä...

"Itse asiassa valtaosa varsinkin nuorempaa tutkijapolvea on pysynyt keskustelussa puolueettomana, vaikka ei välinpitämättömänä; pyrkien tuloksiin valikoimalla sopivia menetelmiä, lainaamalla uutta ja vanhaa, mutta kiinnittämättä itseensä kylttiä tai sitoutumatta koulukuntiin."

71   "Samoin kuin vallankumouksellisilla joukoilla sekä maltillisemmillakin poliittisilla ja sosiaalisilla uudistusliikkeillä näyttää tieteellisen elämän koulukunnilla ja tutkimuslinjoilla olevan taipumus synnyttää omat äärisuuntauksensa, jotka johdonmukaisesti edeten tekevät mahdollisimman pitkälle menevät johtopäätökset oppisuuntansa peruslähtökohdista ja ajautuvat tavallisesti yksipuolisuuteen."

72   " ...yksilöiden eristäminen poliittisesta järjestelmästä tai poliittisesta prosessista ja heidän alistamisensa mikroskooppiseen analyysiin uhkaavat vieroittaa politiikan kokonaan pois politiikan tutkimuksesta.

... "kannanotto merkitsee joka tapauksessa jyrkän behaviorismin katsomista yksipuoliseksi, riittämättömäksi lähtökohdaksi poliittisia ilmiöitä selvitettäessä."

73   "Erään kirjoittajan mielestä behavioraalinen tutkimustapa on kuin Loch Nessin hirviö; joltisellakin todennäköisyydellä voidaan sanoa mitä se ei ole, mutta työlästä on sanoa mitä se on. Tai se on kuin suuri sateenvarjo, jonka alle hakeutuvat suojaan mitä erilaisimmat ihmiset hajaantuakseen taas eri suuntiin myrskyn laannuttua."

ing to it, political science "had not reached a stable situation", and it was asked *whether a common discipline existed* in the first place. The line of argumentation, however, aimed at homogeneity and precision, to "make a tentative contribution to the mental efforts to free our science from *the inner contradictions and uncertainties* it has suffered for too long".[153]

One of the problems was *"homelessness"* among political scientists, which resulted from rejecting the concept of the state. As political science was and had been "a field in turmoil in the recent decades", "the new matters, concepts and methods" should be "moulded into a comprehensible whole, to increase the stringency and homogeneity of the discipline"[154].

The NEW was described by giving it *a name and a location in time and space:* "The happy-to-fight renewal movement" had been represented "in the 1930s and 1940s in the United States by the so-called behavioural school". The approach was described as an attempt at exact methods and realistic political science, not as a coherent school, since not everything was behaviour. It was pointed out that quantitative methods could make us blind to qualitative issues. The evaluation of quantification in content analysis, for example, was quite laconic.

> "There is, however, a highly unhappy tendency – that, one can say, bears witness to *lacking scientific maturity* – to believe that only quantitative studies qualify as exact science. *This is, naturally, not at all the case.*"[74][155]

To compare political science with natural sciences was described as "a common mistake" and a "regrettable mistake"[156].

What was suggested was a definition that synthesised a rhetorical processing of versions of political science of the past decades. It first appeared as

> ... "an attempt at a definition: political science is a realistic and systematic study of politics." [75][157]

Later on it was specified :

> "I would claim that the words *"realistic" and "systematic"* determine the locations of political science among sciences in the same way as *longitude*

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74   "Det finns emellertid en högst olycklig och, kan man säga, om bristande vetenskaplig mognad vittnande tendens att tro, att endast kvantitativa undersökningar utmärker sig genom vetenskaplig exakthet. Det är naturligtvis inte alls fallet."

75   "...försök till definition, som lyder: statvetenskapen är ett realistiskt och systematiskt studium av politiken."

and latitude express the location of a region on the globe."[76] [158]

The coordinates of longitude and latitude, systematic and realistic, determined the location of political science in relationship to the Others of the pre-war period, the juridical and historical disciplines, and joined it to the others of the present time, sociology and economics. Political science was

realistic...

> "It *serves in drawing a boundary* between a "politological" and a normatively oriented juridical research method. It also symbolises the independence of political science towards some metaphysical and ethical-religious views that even today have a remarkable significance as incentives to political action but do not belong to the sphere of actual cience."

... and *systematic*:

> "In the debates it has already been stated many times that political science cannot *step into the group of fully sovereign social ciences* unless it seriously aims at connecting its separate generalisations that move within narrow special areas into broader "laws" that form a system as complete as possible."[77] [159]

The characteristics of longitude and latitude were used to construct an identity that could be differentiated from other disciplines, yet as one of equals. The other move was to push political science from *"raw empiricism"* to a *"higher"* level of generalisation, to aim at general theory:

> "The male political scientist searches for regularities in order to be able to describe political phenomena in general categories. One can probably say that the final aim of political science research is to form so inclusive a theory of political life that all political phenomena could be ordered under it." [78] [160]

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76   "Väittäisin että sanat "realistinen" ja systemaattinen" määräävät valtio-opin sijan tieteiden piirissä samalla tavalla kuin leveys- ja pituusaste ilmaisevat jonkin paikkakunnan sijainnin maapallolla."

77   "Se palvelee rajan vetämistä politologisen ja normatiivisesti orientoituneen oikeustieteellisen tutkimustavan välillä. Samoin se symboloi valtio-opin itsenäisyyttä eräitä metafyysisiä ja eetillis-uskonnollisia katsantotapoja kohtaan, joilla tänäkin päivänä on huomattava merkitys poliittisen toiminnan kannustimina, mutta jotka eivät kuulu varsinaisen tieteen piiriin."
"Käydyissä keskusteluissa on ehditty todeta jo useasti, ettei valtio-oppi voi lopullisesti asettua täysvaltaisten yhteiskuntatieteiden piiriin, ellei se vakavasti pyri yhdistämään irrallisia ja ahtailla erikoisaloilla liikkuvia yleistyksiään laajempiin "lainalaisuuksiin", jotka muodostavat mahdollisimman aukottoman järjestelmän."

78   "Statsvetenskapsmannen söker regelbundenheter i den politiska verksamheten för att kunna skildra de politiska fenomenen i allmänna kategorier."(-

As if reorganizing space, *a spatial reorientation* was made to include the *cultural contextuality* of phenomena into political science; a critique of ethnocentrism – Euro-centrism and America-centredness – of political science was taken into consideration[161].

> "It has become common within international political science to reproach research done so far for its *"provincialism" (parochialism)* and it is obvious that the governmental life of *the new countries is an object as worthy and as important as that of the older states ever was."* [79] [162]

It was pointed out that to study separate nation-states in their isolation was not sufficient: "there was no universal key to participation". "Backwardness" in political participation had cultural, contextual explanations. Therefore, cultural contexts should be taken into account.

The rapid breakthrough of non-European states beginning in the late 1950s was seen as an important step *for* Western political science. While offering new data, this also made it necessary to reconsider the concepts used so far: "We still operate too slavishly with concepts that are constructed exclusively for studying European democracies and that are not always applicable *in a truly general political science.*"

> "We are *on the threshold of a new developmental phase* during which we may be forced to state that many of our basic conceptions have been "provincial", biased by our own political contexts, and that many *truths* so far considered as certain now *require revision.*" [80] [163]

Adjusting borderlines

The 1960s brought up new questions in the discipline/disciplining political science. As "the field" of research had "widened and expanded", a new issue of *specialization into "subfields"* was brought up. Political science now became a "mother science" (emätiede) for the (male) "professionals and specialists" in international politics and administrative studies.[164] Before this borderline confusion could be settled into the firm fields of the disciplinary system, there was, how-

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Key-citat) Man kan väl säga, att slutmålet för den statsvetenskapliga forskningen är att utforma en så omfattande teori om det politiska livet, att alla politiska fenomen restlöst skulle kunna inordnas under den."

79   "Det har blivit vanligt att inom den internationella statvetenskapen klandra den hittilsvarande forskningens "provincialism" (parochialism) och det är självklart, att de nya ländernas statsliv är ett objekt av lika stort värde och lika stor betydelse som någonsin de äldre staternas."

80   "Olemme tieteellisen kehityskauden kynnyksellä, jonka kuluessa ehkä joudumme toteamaan, että monet peruskäsityksistämme ovat olleet "provinsialistisia", oman poliittisen ympäristömme värittämiä, ja että monet tähän saakka varmoina pidetyt totuudet kaipaavat tarkistusta."

ever, some debate about *interdisciplinary* tendencies. International politics faced a choice of either becoming interdisciplinary "international relations" (which was described as a catastrophe) or a relatively autonomous subfield of political science[165]. Administrative studies faced the same choice[166]. As "the field" was already set, even these new "phenomena" could be integrated into "objects" of science. The subfields were legitimated with the very same rhetorical choices of the 1950s, in the name of "replacing vague conceptual systems and speculative theoretization", and even vague promises of "universal theories of administration".[167]

In relationship to *other disciplines*, the emphasis on the systematic and scientific nature of research had "resulted in a more precise delineation of the boundary between political science and the purely historical and juridical approach, while the line between political science and sociology had grown more ambiguous"[168]. The blurring of the borders of disciplines actually was a result of a "universal" adoption of behaviourist methods in all social sciences. A need for interdisciplinarity[169] was motivated by the fact that sociologists, in particular, were doing precisely the same thing as political scientists – and perhaps more successfully.

The "expanding field of science" was associated with accelerating modernization – "the Finnish society currently being in a huge cumulative process of change, moving into the jet age". The social sciences represented opportunities to "*plan* the changing society by means of short, middle-range and long-term prognoses", even in questions of world peace. The wars were, after all, determined by some causal forces and not just destiny, and should therefore be brought under control.[170]

4.7   Image and reality, masculinity and femininity

"One of the most remarkable phenomena in our time's spiritual development is the *sharpening border* that has developed between *ethics and explanation of the world*. The starting point of the development is the absolute *mastery of religion over society*. Religion implies that *theory and praxis still live together like twins in the womb*"[81] [171]

The story told above was constructed by following rhetorical devices

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81   "Till de mest markanta dragen i vår tids andliga utveckling hör den allt skarpare gräns som har uppstått mellan världsförklaring och etik. Utvecklingens startpunkt är religionens absoluta herravälde över samhället. Religionen innebär att teori och praxis ännu bor samman som tvillingar i livmodern."

and narrative solutions in constructions of an identity for a discipline. Papers on "what political science is" were read as located in different layers of time. After focusing on specific themes and constructing bits of narratives of the reoccurring themes in the metapapers, *a diachronic story of the identity development and the boundary work of political science can now be told,* a narrative that has its beginning in the years before the Second World War and the early fifties (before 1950), a middle (1950-60), and an end (the mid-60s and after).

The *themes* followed were central themes in relational identity construction: how did political science define its identity in relation to significant Others: the object of study, other disciplines, audiences; how did it construct a past, present and future for political science? How was an imagined community of political scientists constructed? Was the community homogeneous or fragmentary?

The development story of political science was read by focusing on the plot: oppositions, metaphors, contradictions, transformations. The identity of the discipline was rhetorically constructed in successive separations between self and Other, telling the inside from the outside, separating science from non-science, us from them. This rhetorical process of boundary setting delineated spaces and times for the discipline to occupy.

How did the hero solve the problems of relating self and Other, good and evil, the past and the future? Is there a happy end? Is this a Bildungsroman, a comedy or a tragedy?

In relation to[172] earlier discoursive fields, political science represented itself as a counter-discourse: an "original unity" of ethics and explanation, religion and society, and theory and praxis was split. Ambivalences about what proper metaphors to use for constituting an "object" for study led to negotiations of a "field" for political science in terms of conflicts and ambiguities between image and reality, sein/sollen, metaphysics and realism. The mythical, spiritual and the sacred were cast as "appearance" and replaced by "the real and the factual". Old images had been shattered by constructing a barrier to emotions, anti-individualism, collectivity and mysticism associated to fascism. They were to be replaced by reality, facticity and individualism. The *rhetoric of realism* (fotorealism, typbildning, Gedankenbilder, idealisation, discussing whether the state existed) established a firm illusion of living in a "real world" and a denial of the metaphorical nature of scientific thinking. The period of the rhetoric of realism endured from the war to the middle of the sixties.

In relationship to *other disciplines,* political science was established by demarcating it from juridical disciplines that came to represent "high culture". The old type of discourse was represented as a cultural artefact. In this relationship, political science was non-scientific, yet fertile and fruitful, diversified; a Nature contrasted to the formal,

senile, higher sphere of law. The powers of life and materiality were on the side of political science whereas "the LAW" was formalised and dry. Starting from the childlike feminine position – by defining identity in relationship juridics and political history – political science started an identity development from "a young, yet old science" into "maturity and adulthood". The relationships to judicial disciplines and political history finally became settled and reified into a textbook in the late sixties as "realistic and systematic". In relationship to sociology and economics, political science gained maturity as one among the social sciences.

> "No doubt, one reason is that civilization – which fundamentally signifies an attempt to *free man from his narrow subservience to "nature."* [173]

Although the development story – the hero's journey through history – started from the positions of Nature, the hero, even though using the powers of life provided by Nature, must not be identified with the Nature for long. On the contrary, the self had to be separated from Nature by sequences of separations and delineations.

At the beginning, the political science *audiences* were practical politicians or administrators but also the general public that was to be educated and civilised. The relationship to practice was praised as long as the new science needed legitimation. Soon after, the relationship to "practice" had to be delineated. In order for political science to become *scientific*, demarcations were to be produced in relationship to practical politics, values, feelings and emotions.

> "...the requirement of being politically neutral – in the role of a male scientist. Another matter is, of course, his private political opinions." [82] [174]

> "The thought that science could have as its aim to show the truthfulness or one or another moral theory becomes meaningless, as it preferably cannot be the task of science to express feelings but solely to confirm facts with a cool disengagement." [83] [175]

The successive separations of self and other delineated a domain for political science by constructing more and more boundaries around the self and establishing a vocabulary of scientific language less and less accessible to amateurs. But it also separated political science from the connectedness to chaotic Nature.

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82   "...kravet att vara politiskt neutral – i egenskap av vetenskapsman. En annan sak är naturligtvis hans privata politiska åsikter."

83   "Tanken att vetenskapen skulle ha till syfte att visa den ena eller andra moralteorins sanning blir meningslös, då det inte gärna kan vara vetenskapens uppgift att uttrycka känslor, utan enbart att med kyligt desengagemang fastställa fakta."

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As a result of the split between religion and science, values and facts, science acquired "a *dynamic character*, in sharp contrast to the *static* character of religion". The NEW could be cast as dynamic and *modern*.

> "...a freedom that – like all experience of ceaselessness – causes dizziness.
> ... an experence of unbounded ethical frredom of choise...
> ... earthly weights that keep one from being thrown into boundlessness."
> "Science therefore acquires a dynamic character that stands in the sharpest contrast to the unchanging, static nature of religion." [84] [176]
> "... a game with high human values... traditional models for communal life have been broken to pieces... a social technique inspired by human motives that can rush in to fill the gap that was left wide open."[85] [177]

By constructing a break, *a rupture in time*, the self could be separated from the *history of the discipline*. The past, the origin, was declared unscientific, emotional, value-laden, feminine, and separated from the self. The memory of the discipline was shortened. However, this also made a huge vision of emancipation possible. Placing the very central line of demarcation between the past and the present promised a glorious future: political science could now expand and become *modern*.

> "The dynamic society profits from the results of science and finds an ideological ally in *researchers*; it returns its support by breaking apart social borders that hinder the development of science. Freedom of expression, of religion and of advancement for talents disregarding social status or property are *the counter-gifts of society to the male scientist*." [86] [178]

The "modern" discourse provided for a specific kind of *subject position*. "Researchers" became the chosen people of modernity. For the new generation of male political scientists, the alliance with modernity meant emancipation. The sacralised, holy state, defined as the domain of the Philosopher Kings[179], could now be replaced by a new masculinity that was constructed in a rhetoric of machines – as technical, mechanical, scientific. This was associated with modernity, linear devel-

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84 "... en frihet som, liksom all förnimmelse av ändlöshet, ger henne svindel.
... förnimmelsen av obegränsad etisk valfrihet
... jordiska tyngder som hindrar människan att kastas ut i gränslösheten."
"Vetenskapen får därigenom en dynamisk karaktär, som står i skarpaste kontrast till religionens principiellt oföränderliga statiska natur."

85 "... ett spel med höga mänskliga värden... traditionella mönster för samlevnad har slagits sönder.... en av humana motiv inspirerad social teknik som kan skynda in för att fylla den lucka som gapar vidöppen."

86 "Det dynamiska samhället profiterar på vetenskapens resultat och finner en ideologisk bundsförvandt i forskarna; stödet återgäldar det genom att med sin makt bryta ned sociala skrankor som hindrar vetenskapens utveckling. Yttrandefrihet, religionsfrihet och fritt avancemang för talangen oberoende av stånd och förmögenhet är samhällets gengåvor åt vetenskapsmännen."

opment and advancement. Science became an icon of modernity, and modernity called for "the marching forth of young men" as its new heroes.

In order to construct an *object* for political research, Nature had to be taken into possession, distanced, objectified, mechanised and reified. A mechanisation and atomization of discourse can be seen in an explicit change in *vocabulary* for what was to be studied: *"idea(l)s" became "ideologies" and "attitudes"*[180], *"the state" became "the administrative machinery"*[181], *holistic and collective identities became individual, atomised ones*[182]. The new vocabulary established a language game of *professionals* that was less and less accessible to amateur audiences, but was useful in giving authoritative statements "about the world".

Other methods for dealing with the object were *mapping and control*, domesticating the jungle.

> "Half a decade is not a long time for completing a mapping project of this size, and one could say that the *compass* has improved to such an extent that today *one can move in the jungle of Finnish politics with a great deal more safety than in 1959."* [183]
> "Public administration in its modern meaning therefore requires a more and more *total control* of situations that occur in the society."[87] [184]

Troops of professional scientists could now perform the mapping activities of normal science. The unified and heterogenous troops of scientists could for a period of time form *a homogenous community*. The Other voices of the prewar period within the discipline could be integrated. The individualistic image of research as intellectual, solitary work of philosophers was replaced by a technical and mechanical image.

> "Leonardo da Vinci said that *in research work theory is the general and experiments are the soldiers*. If we take this ingenius metaphor one step further, we can say that the general, when planning his operations, necessarily has to consider the capacity of the soldiers in each situation." [88] [185]

However, constructing a rupture in time in relationship to the history of the discipline also placed a very central conflict in the midst of the community, the self. The Other most fought against was not another discipline, another field of discourse. The Other now became an inner

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87 "Julkinen hallinto nykyaikaisesti käsitettynä edellyttää siten yhteiskunnassa syntyvien tilanteiden yhä totaalisempaa hallintaa."

88 "Leonardo da Vinci on sanonut, että tutkimustyössä teoria on kenraali ja kokeilut sotilaita. Jos viemme tämän nerokkaan vertauskuvan astetta pidemmälle, voimme sanoa, että kenraalin on suunnitellessaan operaatioitaan välttämättä otettava huomioon sotilaitten kapasiteetti kulloisessakin tilanteessa."

152

enemy, placed in the history of its own discipline and personalised in the "still present" representatives of "the OLD". The well-organized and hierarchised troops of researchers turned out to be fighting each other.

There would seem to be two ways of reading the history of the discipline. The first one, producing a rupture, stating that "there was nothing" before behaviourism; scientific political science started with behaviourism[186]. Some narratives, however, point at a view of history where there is continuity[187]. Here the fathers are appreciated. By way of change(?), these are also the narratives that mention women as living people.

The narratives can be thought of as relationships between different kinds of masculinities and different generations of men. Reading a text about the relationship between Plato and Aristotle as an allegory of a relationship between two kinds of masculinities, the old philosopher kings and the ordinary men representing technical masculinity (as Laius and Oedipus) could be located in time in Antiquity as well as in the Finland of 1949, or some other point of time. As long as one is in suppressed position, the story is told with a feminine voice, in allusions[188].

The decade of the 1950s was a high period of spatial metaphors which were declared invalid in the middle of the 1960s. Attempts to control outer space, to domesticate the wild, chaotic, feminine Nature by mapping and measuring it, did not work any more. By the end of the sixties, the rhetoric of realism was found inaccurate. The metaphors of mapping were found naively empirical, and the version of political science atheoretical. What was needed was *"raising the level"*: more generalization and abstraction – a move from empiricism to theory. Political science was no longer to expand the field but to refine the chaotic Nature by conceptualising, abstracting and reifying it. By raising from materia to a pure mind.

> "In the first decades of our century researchers disapproved of theorizing and directed themselves to gathering facts about governmental life; they remind one of *settlers who with an axe in hand, without a compass or a map, cut their way though a jungle.* During the most recent years, there has been a reaction to what David Easton in "The Political System" (1953) calls "hyperfactualism", an unplanned gathering of data without any support of a theory that would help research to hold the amount of facts together and give them a place in a wider totality." [89] [189]

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89   "Under vårt århundrades första decennier tog forskarna avstånd från teoretiserande och inriktade sig på insamlandet av fakta om statslivet; de påminde om nybyggare som med yxan i hand men utan kompass och karta röjde väg i en obanad djungel. På senaste år har en reaktion inträtt mot vad David Easton i "The Political System" (1953) kallar "hyperfaktualism" – ett planlöst hopande av fakta utan stöd av en teori, som skulle hjälpa forsningen att hållan mängden av fakta samman och ge dem en plats i ett mera omfattande helt."

"Political scientists have a great predilection for methodological reports that enumerate important research problems and different approaches in their field... However, these reports are mostly *spatially organised*, i.e., they are inventories of models, conceptual schemes.... encyclopedic enumeration (this has "two reasons: the *intense concern with the unity and independence of political science* and, secondly, the *unwillingness to make the existing cleavages in the heterogenous field still more acute* by pointing out the critical methodological differences among the predominant approaches."[190]

The type of narrative – describing the old as deficient and the new as potent – surely is a very ordinary one. New generations of men could now come and ask for relevancy, realism and loosening of the borders towards the outside. Any new generation of men could come, take the name of Nature and ask for practicality, relevancy or applicability, or they could reintroduce values in political science. Or replace all this with theory, generalizability, or whatever. New room for fluidity, heterogenity and flexibility or or a trench warfare between frontiers?

Later versions of images of a "political scientist" describe him as a *gardener* cultivating nature, as a *doctor* curing patients – whomever they might be – and as *"we professionals of the field"*[191]. Or describe Woman as a source of utopia and the new women's studies as a future potential for political science, somewhere at a remote time or place.

What about Woman? As the opposite is always already part of the self, where does this lead when considering the representations of the scientific community, its ideology and its conception of community? In constructing a self image as objective, rational, culture, light, gaze, up, centre, modern, order, actor/subject, and public requires an Other that is cast as practice, materia, emotion, nature, darkness, down, periphery, chaos, primitive, object.

In the successive separations of self and Other, telling the inside from the outside, Woman signified a boundary, the separations of science from non-science. The community was constructed by separating "us" from practical politics (prostitution, private matters) and values (fair and dark women). What still could unite a fragmented field – and constitute a community as one – could only be the Other outside (agreeing on one thing). What promised to reveal the secret of femininity (the aspects of life not discussed in the public) turned out to cast the community as Rachel, refusing to become fertilised. Is the feminine Nature to be suppressed and raped or is it a potential for fertility?

The problems of different generations of male political scientists seem to wind up projecting an Outside marked as Woman or casting each other as feminine. Different models of masculinity can perhaps still be traced in different versions of history, in continuity or discontinuity. Perhaps then there could also be different relationships to Woman, to women and to different kinds of femininities. Perhaps there could be an inclusive version of history where even Woman/women have a voice.

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"A view is easily born in a society like ours – in itself actually a typical product of a bourgeois culture – *that politics is something anti-human, something that has no connection to the deeper layers of the soul. The classical literature that devotes itself in equal parts to politics and the erotic, knows better. It knows that it is a question of two comparable passions with comparable life-giving and deadly effects.* If an activity directed to some of the basic structures of politics promotes the strengthening of this insight is it possibly of some use.[90] [192]

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Binary orders of signification have at times been read as universal. And indeed, othering may be a cultural universal. The feminine Other may be a "location" in a symbolic order. Or it may be a rhetorical strategy that has nothing to do with categories of women or men. Commonly, some men are described as "nearer to Nature", as more material, sexual or infantile[193], and some women are described as cultured, orderly and civilised. Even if a "universal" rhetorical strategy, othering still comes from a point of view in a context. From issues of masculinity and femininity, the following chapter will turn to issues of women/men constructed on the map drawn by political science.

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90   "I ett samhälle som vårt uppkommer lätt uppfattningen – i och för sig en typisk produkt av en borgerlig kultur – att politik är någonting anti-mänskligt, någonting som är utan samband med själens djupare skikt. Den klassiska litteraturen, som i ungefär lika delar ägnar sig åt politik och erotik, vet bättre besked: den vet att det gäller två jämförbara passioner med jämförbara livgivande och dödande verkningar. Om ett sysslande med några av politikens grundstrukturer bidrar till att befästa det medvetandet, har det kanhända sin nytta."

NOTES

1.   Rossi-Landi referred to in Threadgold 1990, 17.
2.   Kohler cited in Gieryn 1983, 792.
3.   For example, Freeman & Robertson 1980; Johnson 1989; Almond 1990; Dall-
        mayr 1989.
4.   See, for instance, Kastari 1938.
5.   Anckar 1988.
6.   See Lotman 1989.
7.   Shapiro 1993, 2-3.
8.   Irigaray 1987.
9.   Brotherus 1924, 266.
10.   Ruuth 1922.
11.   Ibid., 263.
12.   Hertwig, citation in Ruuth 1922, 264.
13.   Ibid., 264.
14.   Ibid., 266.
15.   Ibid., 260-261.
16.   Ibid., 262.
17.   Brotherus 1924.
18.   Ibid., 267.
19.   Ibid., 267.
20.   Teljo 1934a, 320.
21.   Ibid., 320. The citation in Latin creates an intertextual "deep hole" to Descar-
        tes. In free translation: You cannot win nature other than by submitting to
        its will. For this notion I am gratefull to Sakari Ollitervo and the Latin De-
        partment of Jyväskylä University.
22.   Ibid., 312.
23.   Ibid., 317.
24.   Ibid.,317.
25.   Ibid., 318.
26.   Ibid., 314.
27.   Lotman 1989.
28.   Compare to Theweleit 1987; Kristeva 1982.
29.   Jansson 1947, 227.
30.   Brotherus 1940.
31.   Ibid., 1.
32.   Ibid., 1.
33.   Ibid., 1, 4.
34.   Ibid., 2.
35.   Ibid., 9.
36.   Jansson 1947; 1950a; 1950b; 1951a; 1955a.
37.   Jansson 1947, 225-229.
38.   Jansson 1950a.
39.   Ibid., 300.
40.   Jansson 1950b, 9-10; Jansson 1950a, 309-311.
41.   Jansson 1950b, 10.

42. Jansson 1950a, 310.
43. Jansson 1950b, 10.
44. Ibid., 10.
45. Ibid., 9.
46. Jansson 1961b, 35; cited in the previous chapter.
47. Nousiainen 1964, 353.
48. Ruuth 1922.
49. Ibid., 264.
50. Ibid., 264.
51. Ruuth 1919; Ruuth 1922.
52. Ibid., 259.
53. Erich 1924.
54. Ibid., 187.
55. Ibid., 31-32.
56. Ibid., 188.
57. Erich 1924, 187. Apparently "political science" was understood in a much wider sense of the word than today, as "valtiotiede" as in the name for the faculty of "social sciences", HY, ÅA.
58. Brotherus 1924.
59. Ibid., 260.
60. Erich 1924; see also Kaira 1934 and Laurila 1923.
61. Lindman 1945, 12.
62. Ibid., 261.
63. Jansson 1948, 131.
64. Ibid., 131; also Jansson 1951c, 187.
65. Ibid., 132.
66. Ruuth 1922, 259.
67. Brotherus 1924, 44.
68. Ibid., 268.
69. Teljo 1944.
70. Teljo 1944 (in Borg 1980, 156, 157, 164).
71. Ibid., (in Borg 1980, 160.)
72. Ibid., (in Borg 1980, 163).
73. Jansson, 1985, 4th edition.
74. Jansson 1955b, 46.
75. Jansson 1951a, 157-8.
76. Ibid., 157-8.
77. Rantala 1956b, 291.
78. Inhala 1935, 267-8.
79. Brotherus 1924; Ruuth 1922; Teljo 1949a.
80. Teljo 1944.
81. Brotherus 1924, 268.
82. Ruutu 1943, 119-120.
83. Ibid., 121.
84. Ibid., 127-8.
85. Lindman 1946, 139-138.
86. Nousiainen 1958a, 76.
87. See Apo 1990; Rimon-Kenan 1991; Chatman 1978.

88.   Teljo 1950a; also to be found in Paakkunainen 1986.

89.   Ahonen 1984; Palonen 1986, and others.

90.   See, for instance, Apo 1990.

91.   Barthes 1991; Lehtonen 1989:
    – the semantic code (the information given on the "persons", how they are characterised, what kinds of connotations are created)
    – *the symbolic code* (basic oppositions in the text; culture/nature, order/chaos, inside/outside),
    – *the hermeneutical code* (a question posed at the beginning – answered at the end, and
    – *the referential code* (the background, the historical context, references to earlier texts *within* the text.

92.   See also Morris 1992, 91-107.

93.   On the transatlantic gaze, see Hearn & Melechi 1992. Czarniawska-Joerges 1988 on functions of foreign language in the text.

94.   For a feminist critique see, for instance, Lanser 1986.

95.   "-n" 1952, 11-14.

96.   Ibid., 13.

97.   Jansson 1965, 46.

98.   Jansson 1959, 6; translation in Nousiainen 1966, 260.

99.   Jansson 1959, 3.

100.   Hyvärinen 1959.

101.   Jansson 1961a, 11.

102.   Ibid.

103.   Jansson 1965, 45.

104.   Jansson 1961a, 14.

105.   Pesonen 1960a, (in Paakkunainen 1986, 115).

106.   Ibid., 105.

107.   Nousiainen 1958a, 76.

108.   ..."inom universitetets skyddade murar", Jansson 1957, 9.

109.   Nousiainen 1958a; Hyvärinen 1959; Pesonen 1960a; Jansson 1961a; Tarkiainen 1961a; Jansson 1965; Nousiainen 1964.

110.   Nousiainen 1966, 257.

111.   Jansson 1961a, 4.

112.   Nousiainen 1958a, 73, titled "Politics as science".

113.   For instance, Hyvärinen 1959.

114.   Jansson 1965, 45.

115.   Jansson 1959; Nousiainen 1966, 257.

116.   Nousiainen 1966, 257.

117.   Jansson 1959; also others.

118.   Pesonen 1960a, (in Paakkunainen 1986, 104).

119.   Nousiainen 1958a, 73.

120.   Nousianen 1964, 123.

121.   Jansson 1959, 3; Also Nousiainen 1983, 179-224.

122.   Pesonen 1958a, 369.

123.   Hyvärinen 1959, 84.

124.   Hyvärinen 1959, 83.

125.   Hyvärinen 1959, 84-5.

126.   Nousiainen 1958a, 75.

127.   Ibid., 76.

128. Ibid., 76.

129. Hyvärinen 1959, 84.

130. Jansson 1959, 2.

131. Machiavelli's laudatur, Tarkiainen 1961a; Rantala 1956b, 290; Pesonen 1961; Jansson 1961a, 4-5.

132. Jansson 1959, 6.

133. Sipponen 1955, 479.

134. Pesonen 1961.

135. Ibid., 207.

136. Ibid., 207.

137. Ibid., 208.

138. Ibid., 215.

139. Pesonen 1961, 209. It appears from the report that another Finnish delegate - himself a representative of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, had given a paper at the workshop on polyethnicity.

140. Ibid., 210-11.

141. Ibid., 215.

142. Ibid., 216.

143. Chronotope; see Cvetkova 1988, 9.

144. Pesonen 1961, 207.

145. Pesonen 1972a, 238.

146. Nousiainen 1964.

147. Ibid., 355.

148. Ibid., 357.

149. Ibid., 355.

150. Nousianen 1964, 357.

151. Ibid., 353.

152. Jansson 1960a; Jansson 1961b; Jansson 1964a; Jansson 1965; Jansson 1966; Jansson 1969.

153. Jansson 1961b, 29; Jansson 1966, 13.

154. Jansson 1961b, Jansson 1966.

155. Jansson 1961a, 13.

156. Jansson 1966, 16; Jansson 1961b, 34.

157. Jansson 1961a, 6.

158. Jansson 1964a, 137.

159. Jansson 1964a, 137, 139.

160. Jansson 1961a, 9.

161. Jansson 1965, 140-141.

162. Jansson 1961a, 11.

163. Ibid., 150.

164. Hyvärinen 1959, 86-87, 93; Jansson 1965, 45: "navelsträngen till historien".

165. Jansson 1960c, 89-92; Elovainio & Huopaniemi 1965.

166. Jansson 1960b, 44-46; Hoikka 1965, 22-27.

167. Hoikka 1965, 25-26.

168. Redrawing boundaries, Nousiainen 1966, 260; also Jansson 1965, 50.

169. Borg 1965a.

170. Hoikka 1965, 22; Hyvärinen 1959, 93.

171. Jansson 1955b, 43.

172. Lotman (1989) sees the rhetoric of realism as a phenomenon of changes and cycles of culture; it can only be produced in relation to a previous period of "non-realism"; see also Jansson 1972a.

173. Jansson 1966, 16.

174. Jansson 1961a, 7.

175. Jansson 1955b, 44.

176. Jansson 1955b, 45, 43.

177. Jansson 1961a, 14.

178. Jansson 1955b, 43-44.

179. Teljo 1949a.

180. Jansson 1955a; Jansson 1958; Borg 1961b.

181. Jansson 1959; Jansson 1960b. However, see Jansson 1960a and 1960d as attempts to holistic conceptualizations.

182. For instance, Hoikka 1965, 24: "Itsehallinto on tuonut individualismin ajatuksen hallintoon. Se on suorittanut osin saman tehtävän kuin humanismi tieteessä, renessanssi taiteessa ja liperalismi politiikassa."

183. Nousiainen 1966, 260.

184. Hoikka 1965, 22.

185. Jansson 1964a, 139.

186. Teljo 1949a; Teljo 1950a; Nousiainen 1958a; Pesonen 1960a and 1961; Nousiainen 1964; Pesonen 1972a; also Jansson at some points.

187. Jansson 1948, Jansson 1950a; Lindman 1964.

188. Teljo 1949a; Lanser 1986.

189. Jansson 1961a, 9.

190. Heiskanen 1966, 25, 39.

191. See Politiikka 1988 (1) on future perspectives for political science.

192. Jansson 1960d, 92, 186.

193. Showalter 1989; Connell 1987.

5 CONSTRUCTING "A FIELD OUT THERE"

"It would be most natural, of course, to talk about 'political science', but in its Finnish-language version the word 'political' does not seem – at least at first sight – quite suitable and can even lead to misconceptions."[1] [1]

5.1 Conceptual architectures; old and new

This chapter will deal with political research "proper", the "ordinary" texts that tell something "about the world". What kinds of images of "the world" were produced in Finnish political science literature? What was the representation of politics produced in the texts? What kind of "field" was constructed for political science to study?

The textually constructed world of Finnish political science is studied here asking whether there were men and women in the world constructed. The simple method of chasing men- and women-words is used in order to see *where* men and women are talked *about*. The words are thought of as semantic keys to gendered meaning. Was gender talked about? If yes, when, how and where? What "things" were associated with gender, and what not? Where was gender talked about, where not? How were men and women described in the texts? What was the place of "gender-talk" in the discourse? What was "the field" and what was the location of gender within this field?

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1   "Luonnollisinta olisi tietysti puhua 'poliittisesta tieteestä', mutta sana 'poliittinen' ei tunnu suomenkielisessä asussa - ainakaan ensi kuulemalta - oikein soveltuvan ja saattaa johtaa jopa väärinkäsityksiin."

Since the explicit rhetorical constructions of "what political science is" were the theme of the previous chapter, what "things" there were to be in the world constructed by political science is here taken as it was given; the classifications that were used during the research period are taken as a basis for structuring this chapter. "The areas" of political science normally come as classifications of the field used in bibliographies, commentaries and presentations of research[2]. Basically following them, political science was *about* political ideas or political theory, institutions, parties and pressure groups, and individual political behaviour.

As the *object* of study in political science changed during the period, the classification was combined with a *periodisation*. A break or a turn in what political science is and what it does was placed in the middle of the 1950s. The fields of study were said to have changed notably in 1955. The literature is therefore basically classified here into two periods; 1945-55 and 1955-1965. According to Jansson[3]:

> 1. "Before the mid-fifties, Finnish political science focused mainly on two directions: on one hand on research on *political ideas*, on the other on research on the functions of *governmental organs*."
> 2. "Directing of research into new areas and adopting new methods is clearly reflected in the dissertations of the past few years."

The new dissertations of the late fifties were focused on *the political participation of voters* and international politics.

Connecting topics and the periods may appear – and certainly is – sudden and drastic: there cannot be such a drastic change within any discipline, changing its *"objects"* of study from one year to another. The connection was explicitly expressed as a change of metaphors and the adoption of a new vocabulary. In Jansson's words, the new areas of research were to be "political ideologies (that are misleadingly called political theory), mass movements, opinions and newspaper and election propaganda (which used to be called research on 'ideas'), research on the governmental machinery (that used to be called the study of institutions), and research on parties"[4].

The conceptual architectures of the "old world of political science" and the "new world", simplistically studied as packages of "ideas and institutions 1945-55" and "behaviourial studies 1955-65", are studied by looking at their *metaphors of space*, in their own terms of "broadening the space" of political research. As the metaphor of *mapping*, commonly interpreted as a metaphor for sexuality, imagination, the unconscious and femininity, was a reoccurring figure in the metatexts of the previous chapter, this chapter will look at *spatialisations of the field* of political science. How did "the mapping of unknown areas" advance? Was there gender or women on the map? How were they located?

The mapping of politics and gender is studied in terms of

spaces: narrow and broad, high and low, inner and outer, sectors or divisions of a space. How was the mapping done in *two conceptual architectures, the Old and the New*? What were the textual devices of policing the space, policing the political?

One should bear in mind that the data gathered here represents a small marigin of a broad literature. In the texts of the "old architecture" references to genders are truely mariginal. And although gender became explicit in the texts of the "new architechture", the "data" analyzed here still has a marginal character in political science literature as a whole. The genre of behaviourial studies in itself was just one part of the political science literature of the 1950s and the 1960s. Even within behaviourial studies, there was no single work explicitly on gender. Yet in some texts the question of gender actually was a very central one. For them the analysis followes the narrative structure normalised for empirical research reports.[5]

5.2   The old; pre-behaviourism 1945-1955

Recontextualizing "origin stories"

The division between *the state and the society*, recognised as a hidden spatialisation[6], was a central metaphor for earlier political research. A pre-war dissertation (1934)[7] explicitly discussed this relationship. One view – and presumably not an illegitimate one[8] – would be to see the text as an "origin" for Finnish political science. What were the central coordinates of prewar conceptual architectures? What was the "origin" of Finnish political science like?

The dissertation dealt with Snellman's conceptions of the relationship between the state and the society. What Snellman meant by "society" can, according to the interpretation, be given two definitions. A *wider* definition referred to "the totality of human societal life". This concept of society was at times replaced by the concept of "the state" in Snellman's texts. In the later lectures by Snellman, the wider concept of society was explicitly defined: "The forms of virtuous life, i.e. societal life, are these three: family, civil society and the state."[9] According to the interpretation, "the totality of human societal life" was to be seen as the same concept of society that was in use "in the sociology of today".

The *narrow* concept of society was defined as "the civil society", which referred to all human societal life that neither belonged to the sphere of the actual state nor to the sphere of the family.[10] The family was its own, autonomous community, but families, on the other hand, belonged to the civil society."

"If we think specifically of the relationship between the actual state and the civil society, then Snellman's concept of civil society – *disregarding the special status of the family in his conceptual system* – means the same as what is meant nowadays in everyday language by "society" as an opposite to the "state", or even clearer by the adjective "societal" as opposed to "governmental"[2] [11]

If we believed in origin stories and continuity of tradition as legitimation bases for disciplines, then we could say that this remarkably clear conceptual foundation had long-term consequences. It ruled out the concept of family from the sphere of "the society and the state", and thereby placed it outside of the objects of political science. This is how the dissertation delineated itself to the relationship between the state and the civil society. As the concepts in Snellman's philosophy of the state were interconnected and the family and woman's position much debated themes, this connection was now forgotten.

The distinction between the state and the society – *"disregarding the status of the family"* – became written into the founding act of the Political Science Association as an opposition and interaction *between* the two poles. Was something forgotten in the foundation act?

"An intensified *governmental activity* is a special characteristic of our time. *Society* is no longer content that *the state* offers it protection under the law and, if possible, even protects it against internal and external agitation. The current *state* has even had to take care of the economic, cultural and structural development. The governmental power cannot, however, deal with these matters on the basis of its own discretion, so it has secured the assistance of different circles of the society. All of these want to be included when decisions about their exigencies are made. But *society* is not equal to its task, because it does not have at its disposal knowledge, with the help of which the nature of the matters to be solved could with some measure of certainty be defined. Therefore, the solutions to the matters too often remain dependent upon short-lived motives and emotional reasons.

Correcting these lacks is possible only by as *multifaceted research on the problems of the state and the society* as possible. In big countries this work is already going on. But that is not enough. Each state and each society has its own specific character. We cannot be satisfied with accomplishments that are made in America and England: we cannot automatically apply them to our own conditions. This kind of research work is urgently needed even in Finland." [3] [12]

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2   "Jos ajatellaan nimenomaan kansalaisyhteiskunnan ja varsinaisen valtion suhdetta, tarkoittaa tämä Snellmanin kansalaisyhteiskunta - ellei oteta huomioon perheen erikoisasemaa hänen järjestelmässään - itse asiassa samaa, mitä nykyään tavallisessa kielenkäytössä tarkoitetaan "yhteiskunnalla" vastakohtana "valtiolle" tai vielä selvemmin adjektiivilla "yhteiskunnallinen" vastakohtana "valtiolliselle."

3   "Meidän ajallemme on ominaista erikoisesti tehostunut valtiollinen toiminta. Yhteiskunta ei tyydy enää siihen, että valtiovalta suo sille oikeusturvan ja mikäli mahdollista myös suojaa sen sisäisiä ja ulkonaisia järkytyksiä vastaan. Nykyinen valtio on joutunut huolehtimaan myös yhteiskunnan taloudellises-

This long since forgotten "founding act" gave the reasons why knowledge produced by political science was needed and necessary: there had to be knowledge to control uncertainty. The opposite of this – the lack that had to be removed – was the present state where "decisions too often come to depend on *momentary influences and emotional reasons*". The central opposition of the text was the one between the state and society. Knowledge was needed as a helper in the changing interrelationship between them, *in order to oppose emotion and instability*. The reason for "founding" lay in *the opposition between knowledge and emotion*.

Neither men nor women appear as semantic signs in the founding acts of the scientific community. In other prewar texts as well the references are few. It does not qualify as serious argumentation that "opinions about women's position" became classified as "merely personal and not worth repeating[13]" or that in the early days of diplomacy the beauty of women was relevant to the diplomatic relations between nations[14]. Nor the citation from Hitler:

> "The best heads of the nation should rule, not representatives that have ballot boxes as their mothers and anonymous ballots as their fathers." [4] [15]

The lack of explicit discussion about men or women in the texts of political science still somehow appears an insufficient sign that gender had no meaning. Or could we draw some conclusions about the *man*-words still present in some texts? A dissertation of 1938[16] mentioned "the male head of the state (a true one or an unreliable one), the male elector, the male head of the government, the male elected official, the male statesman, the king, the male head of the parliament, and the chairmanship of the parliament", whereas the only woman-word in the text was "mother earth"[17].

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ta, sivistyksellisestä ja rakenteellisesta kehityksestä. Valtiovalta ei kuitenkaan voi käsitellä näitä asioita oman harkintansa nojalla, vaan on ottanut avukseen yhteiskunnan eri piirien myötävaikutuksen. Nämä kaikki haluavat olla mukana niiden elinehtoja ratkaistaessa. Mutta yhteiskunta ei ole tämän tehtävänsä tasalla(,) sillä ei ole vielä käytettävänään tietoa, jonka avulla ratkaistavien asioiden luonne voitaisiin joltisellakin varmuudella määritellä. Näinollen asioiden ratkaisut jäävät riippumaan liian usein hetkellisistä vaikuttimista ja tunnesyistä.

Näiden puutteiden korjaaminen on mahdollista ainoastaan yhteiskunnan ja valtion probleemien mahdollisimman monipuolisella tutkimisella. Suurissa maissa tämä työ on jo käynnissä. Mutta se ei riitä. Jokaisella valtiolla ja yhteiskunnalla on oma erikoisluonteensa. Emme voi tyytyä niihin saavutuksiin, joita tehdään Amerikassa ja Englannissa, emme voi soveltaa niitä ilman muuta omiin oloihimme. Suomessakin tarvitaan välttämättömästi tällaista tutkimustyötä.

4   "Kansakunnan parhaiden päiden tulee hallita, ei edustajien joiden äitinä on vaaliuurna, ja isänä nimetön äänestyslippu."

Could it be that the texts of political science were still gendered?

Institutions and democracy

The *postwar* political science literature, still dealing with political ideas and institutions, does not seem to disclose much more about gender. The topics of the Finnish constitution, the status of the president, parliamentarism, governmental institutions or political ideas did not seem to call for such a debate.

Democracy and the theory of democracy were raised as issues after the war in two significant monographs. The first one[18] (1952) posed the question:

> "Democracy means rule by the people, but when is a state ruled by the people? Does a constitution become democratic when the right to vote includes the majority of adult men? Or when women and men are politically equal?[5] [19]

The matter was not discussed after the opening lines, however. An answer was delivered in the second book[20], in 1959. This study on democracy in Antiquity also explicitly pondered women's position and the definitions of democracy. It was disclosed that women had no property rights, nor did they appear in the public sphere.

> "Women's juridically disregarded and – from the point of view of intellectual development – ignored position did not, as far as is known, cause any notable resistance. As often can be observed, when such a subordinate relationship becomes a permanent, inherited convention, it leads to the establishing of the view that the suppressed, even spiritually, morally and intellectually, are weaker than their rulers. This was the attitude taken towards women already in ancient Greece."[6] [21]

The text further debated both positive and negative views on women. St. Paul was cited for his negative view. When coming to modern times, signs of emancipation in the text became stronger. It was noted that the juridical and especially political emancipation of women even in modern democracies was a relatively late phenomenon, although it

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5   "Demokrati betyder "folkvälde", men när är en stat ett folkvälde? Blir ett statsskick demokratiskt när rösträtten omfattar lejonparten av de vuxna männen? Eller först när kvinnor och män är politiskt jämställda?"

6   "Naisten oikeudellisesti syrjäytetty ja älyllisen kehityksen kannalta laiminlyöty asema ei tiettävästi herättänyt mitään merkittävää vastustusta. Kuten monesti saattaa havaita tuollaisen alistussuhteen muuttuessa pysyväksi, periytyväksi tottumukseksi, johtaa helposti sen käsityksen vakiintumiseen, että vallanalaiset ovat henkisestikin, moraalinsa ja intellektinsä puolesta, heikompia kuin heidän hallitsijansa. Tämän mukaisesti suhtauduttiin naisiin jo muinaisessa Kreikassa."

had been spreading to different countries in recent decades. As "according to some theoreticians", women did not form a separate, distinct societal group of their own but were part of the same social groupings and strata as men, the ignoring of women in governmental life did not threaten the preconditions for democracy stated in "the theory".The position of women did not therefore put into conflict the usages of the concept "democracy" in Antiquity or in the present time, as did the case of slavery.[22]

Thus two Finnish works on democratic theory.

The Finnish record in women's right to vote does not seem to have created much enthusiasm. In later years it acquired some advertising value: "Finland was actually the first country in Europe where women gained the same voting rights as men."[23]

In another text the issue of representation was considered a parliamentary technique: "The *higher* the level of governmental thinking in a country, the less irrelevant it is via which *methods* the solutions are found and decisions made."[24] Therefore, it was not irrelevant whether women had a vote or not, even if that would not change the end result. While women's vote in Switzerland had been considered an unnecessary waste of time.....

"In Finland, where the question of women's political emancipation was removed from the agenda half a century ago, hardly anyone would approve of such a way of thinking."[7] [25]

The main point of the text is not that women should have a vote or that they could vote differently from their husbands: The right to vote is conceived as a sign of development, integration of the citizenship, "adjustment to a democratic system and willingness to maintain it"[26]. But the text can also be read as expressing *a true belief* that equality between genders already had been established when women were given the vote. The question was already taken care of; women's emancipation was about the vote.

In referring to an issue on the equal rights amendment in the USA, equality was even contrasted to special laws for protection of women:

"The President has also recommended the addition to legislation that has been current for a long time about equal rights for women. Here it must, however, be remarked that important women's organizations lately have taken a sceptical position towards such an addition to the legislation. Women will soon have reached the desired equality and such an addition to the constitution would mean that a number of important laws for

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7   "Suomessa, jossa kysymys naisten poliittisesta emansipaatiosta on jo enemmän kuin puoli vuosisataa sitten poistettu päiväjärjestyksestä, tuskin monikaan hyväksyy tuollaista ajatustapaa."

the protection of women would be annulled in the federal states."[8] [27]

A major textbook published in 1949 confirmed the crucial conflict lines in Finnish politics: the social question, the language question, the Russian question, party conditions, the parliament. But no gender. This structuration of the field of politics seems to have prevailed long afterwards.[28]

When women were mentioned in the texts of the earlier period, they fairly commonly ended up in the notes, margins or parentheses:

> – "an assembly elected by general (even for women), equal vote and direct, proportional elections"[29].
> – "the commission proposed voting rights and abolishment of the income level requirement – but did not go as far as eligibility for office – even for women."[30]
> – "the regulations for eligibility to office deny access to the parliament to some population groups, for instance the highest juridical officers, the regular military personnel, sometimes the highest civil servants and ministers, and even women."[31]

The special exceptions of women in the texts collided at times with the general, generically male expressions. The Finnish constitution...

> "has turned out to include values which the free Finnish people from one male generation to another has learned to value and develop and for which it has learned to fight".[9] [32]
>
> "While the status of the ruling states*man* of the nation had to be passed on as inheritance in foreign royal families during both the Swedish and the Russian rules, since 1919 it has been open to every Finnish native citizen, *man or woman*, with no regard to one's family relations, wealth or education." [10] [33]

Harold Laski's "The American Democracy" inspired a description of America even in Finland:

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8   "Presidenten har också förordat det sedan länge aktuella författningstillägget om lika rättigheter för kvinnor (equal rights for women). Här förtjänar dock att beaktas, att viktiga kvinnoorganisationer på sistone ställt sig skeptiska mot ett dyligt författningstillägg. Kvinnorna har snart uppnått den eftersträvade jämlikheten och ett dyligt grundlagstillägg skulle innebära slopandet av en rad betydelsefulla kvinnoskyddslagar i delstaterna."

9   "on osoittanut sisältävänsä sellaisia arvoja, joita Suomen vapaa kansa on oppinut miespolvesta toiseen vaalimaan ja kehittämään ja joiden puolesta se on oppinut taistelemaan."

10   "Sen sijaan että valtionpäämiehen asema Suomessa oli sekä Ruotsin vallan kaudella että Venäjän vallan aikana joutunut kulkemaan perintönä vierasmaalaisissa ruhtinassuvuissa, se on vuodesta 1919 lähtien ollut jokaisen syntyperäisen Suomen kansalaisen, niin miehen kuin naisenkin tavoiteltavissa, riippumatta asianomaisen sukulaisuussuhteista, varallisuudesta ja sivistystasosta."

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"The average American works hard, maybe all too hard. He is optimistic, frank, peace loving, democratic. He has a sense for practical problems and he admires the victories of science. But he lives in a superficial atmosphere of "Business Spirit", a businessman's belief in success, prosperity, happiness. The worker earns well, he can buy himself a new car, household appliances for his wife, he can take a weekend trip and enjoy the fruits of his efforts."[11] [34]

And as the General Assembly of the United Nations 1948 accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which the rights should be guaranteed to everybody "with no consideration to race, gender, language or religion", we are told that the commission for human rights that had prepared the declaration

"... had Eleanor Roosevelt as the chair. So you can say that the work of the commission was performed *in the shadow of* Franklin D. Roosevelt."[12] [35]

The contradictory character of language is perhaps clearest in a 1956 dissertation on international politics[36], where gender is explicitly dealt with.

"War is the father and king of all things. Of one it makes a slave, of another a free man."[13] [37]

Which are women supposed to become?

"It is also important that the war commander has the support of the whole nation. It is therefore important that he is a colourful and dynamic personality who inspires confidence even in the man in the street."[14] [38]

How about the ordinary women? Are women freed of the obligation to support the war leadership? It is not possible to claim that the following text would be gender neutral or indifferent in its representation of the institution of war:

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11   "Genomsnittsamerikanen arbetar hårt, kanske alltför hårt, han är optimistisk, ärlig, fredsälskande, demokratisk, han har sinne för praktiska problem och beundrar vetenskaptens vinningar. Men han lever i en ytlig atmosfär, Business Spirit, affärsmannens tro på framgång, "prosperity", lycka. Arbetaren förtjänar bra, han kan köpa sig en ny bil, hushållsmaskiner åt sin fru, han kan fara på weekend lördag-söndag och njuta frukterna av sin möda."

12   "hade Eleanor Roosevelt till ordförande. Man kan säga, att kommissionens arbete utfördes i skuggan av Franklin D. Roosevelts gestalt."

13   "Sota on kaikkien asioiden isä ja kuningas. Toisesta se tekee orjan, toisesta vapaan miehen."

14   "Tärkeää on myös että sodanjohdolla on koko kansakunnan tuki. Tästä syystä on tärkeää, että hän on värikäs ja dynaaminen persoonallisuus, joka herättää kadun miehessäkin luottamusta."

> "Young men go battle, married men forge weapons and transfer ammu-
> nition, women make tents and uniforms and serve in hospitals, children
> make bandages of old linen and old men are taken to the market places
> to encourage the soldiers by proclaiming the unity of the nation and the
> hatred towards kings."[15] [39]

Later, in 1965, the same author wrote a book entitled "The Sword of
Neutrality" (sic!), which was already somewhat more peaceful[40].

The old map

How is it possible to construct a coherent reading of the texts? What
should one believe? At the same time as there appears to have been a
true belief that democracy and equality already had been reached in
Finland, that "feminism now was a neutral issue"[41], the textual devices
construct women as marginal and gender as a non-issue. The texts very
literally put women in the margins, in paratexts like notes, parentheses,
pictures, in subordinate clauses; they separate women from the sen-
tence. "Equal citizenship (for women, too)".

As the generic male of the Finnish language does not bring
women into people's minds, they must be specifically mentioned. The
generic male expressions collide with words referring to women and
activities performed by women, not men. (Now that language has been
neutralised, it is possible, in Finnish, to establish that childbirth is not
gendered and therefore not within the field of equality legislation.)

More interestingly, it is surprising to see how two separate
kinds of discourse, "a democracy-discourse" and "a gender-discourse",
coexist in seeming coherence, although the lack of logic would seem
apparent: the "natural" gender order of the description of a nation at
war coexists with a discourse of seeming neutrality, equality and gener-
ality. It could be sincerely believed that "we" already had democracy
and equality. At the same time as "we" *already* had equality, the places
where equality had *not yet* been reached were places far away, both in
time (Antiquity) and place (Japan, Switzerland). The "not-us" had not
yet reached our level of development and civilization.

This relatively positive valorisation of "us", however, is based on
the equalling of "democracy/equality" with "voting", other possible
matters of democracy/equality being non-issues, part of nature. Non-
issue production, the construction of silence, is based on coexisting,
incoherent discursive fields.

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15   "Nuoret miehet lähtevät taisteluun, naimisissa olevat miehet takovat aseita
ja siirtävät ammuksia, naiset valmistavat telttoja ja virkapukuja sekä palvele-
vat sairaaloissa, lapset valmistavat siteitä vanhoista liinavaatteista ja vanhat
miehet viedään toreille kannustamaan rohkeutta sotilaisiin julistamalla tasa-
vallan yksimielisyyttä sekä vihaa kuninkaita kohtaan."

As "women" in the politico-discourse were associated with "voting", they do not rank very *high* in the *spatial* organization of "the field of political science" (state–society–family). In the world according to political science, women were excluded, marginal and low. But then again, according to the New political science, this world was said to be too lofty and centre-focused. In order to look more closely at the *"low"*, I shall now turn to a field that announced itself to be "nearer to the individual".

5.3 The new; constructions of women in participation studies, 1955-65

"At about 10 o'clock, 32 men and 68 women walked past the second observer. Only three men and four women stopped to look at some advertisement. In addition, 12 men and 21 women noticed an advert but did not read it. One passenger car stopped so that its passengers could get acquainted with the dispute between two parties displayed on the large hoardings."[16][42]

Introduction

Quite a lot is actually said *about* women and men in the later phase of the political science literature of the postwar period. The importing of behaviourial studies in the late fifties and early sixties established a new conceptual architecture in Finnish political science. It opened up a new structuration of questions to be asked in research. And, for some reason, this genre became more influential than the number of studies would show.

The new genre opened up a field of *"the individual level"*. *"Getting nearer the individual"* was seen as a new opportunity for voting studies. What was sought were "fluctuations in individual voters' opinions and chances to affect them". By interviewing voters it was possible to determine "the effects of the voters' characteristics and attitudes and the environment on the voting intention and the final voting decision".[43]

The general rhetoric of importing behaviourial studies to replace previous genres was that of *realism*. Even the move "nearer to the indi-

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16   "Noin kello 10 Hämeensillalla käveli toisen tarkkailijan ohi 32 miestä ja 68 naista. Vain kolme miestä ja neljä naista pysähtyi katsomaan jotakin mainosta; lisäksi 12 miestä ja 21 naista havaitsi mainoksen, mutta ei lukenut sitä. Yksi henkilöauto pysähtyi, jotta sisällä olijat saivat tutustua kahden puolueen suurilla tauluilla käymään kiistaan."

vidual" can be seen as a move in the direction of realism, getting nearer the referential, the "true reality". This was sought with the help of survey techniques for interviewing "voters". Referencing "the real" empowered the texts and legitimated the research as true science.

However, referencing "the real" also made the texts dialogical and multivocal; the "other voices" coming from the "field" were represented in the texts (by the textualizer/author). Therefore, it is possible to trace "other voices" and to analyze the dialogue between the referential and the authorial voice *in* the texts.

As referencing "the real", referring to the voices of the objects of study and other texts, is the normal characteristic of scientific writing, I will try to see here how the texts orchestrate these "other voices" into a multivocal textuality and retextualise the voices into a new context.

Getting into the dialogue also implied a counter-tendency; the "other voices" were translated into another language game, given new meanings by the textualizer. And the question is, were not behaviourist studies creating a new vocabulary and a new language that "oddified" the everyday language and created a distance to "the individual".

One of the "characteristics of the individual" was gender. In behaviourism, representations of gender became visible in political science. In the new conceptual architecture, gender became visible by becoming one of the variables determining political behaviour or political activity. The standard of having gender as a background variable was established, though not always followed. Via this method the texts gave meanings to gender and created value for it.

So what were the representations of gender like? How was gender constructed? What meanings were created, what value created for genders? What do the representations tell us? This chapter examines *what was said about women in behaviourial studies and how.*

Furthermore, I ask *how the discourse was organized and what the representation of women, the "placing of women in the discourse" tells about the discourse itself.* Turning the question around: by looking at the representations of gender, I intend to pose questions about the conceptual architecture within which gender became visible.

Without exaggeration the conclusion of the studies can be stated to be that *"women are passive in politics"*. The conclusion can be seen as *a fact produced by the discourse in a context*[44]. The "findings" of behaviourist studies on gender can be summarised in the following:

> "Men were more interested in politics, more exposed to the mass media, offered more numerous political opinions and were more often opinion leaders than were women." [45]

An addition to this "finding" was that women were also *more conservative than men*[46].

The more specific questions asked here are therefore:

- What is the rhetorical organization of the fact that "women are passive in politics"? How was the fact produced? How did the fact gain its facticity? How did it become believable?

- What is the rhetorical organization of the fact that "women are conservative"? How and to what was the fact anchored? What was meant by conservativeness?

Before going to the main focus of behaviourial studies I will, however, present some *counter-, con- or pre-texts* in order to frame the behaviourial architecture of the world.

Two con-texts

The first Finnish behaviourial studies were published in 1956. The data used in them were official election statistics and the unit of analysis was geographical area rather than individuals.

The first con-text was a map without people[47]: it represented an ecological analysis modelled after French ideals. It analysed the support for the Communist movement in two neighbouring electoral areas consisting of 53 municipalities.

The work represents a conceptual architecture that did not actually include individuals – thus no gender. Although women's and men's voting behaviour were not focused on in the study, the differences between voting behaviour in the neighbouring municipalities of Vehmersalmi, Riistavesi and Siilinjärvi were thoroughly analyzed. The soil, the climate and the natural environment of the Kuopio province was analyzed in great detail.[48]

The architecture of political regionalism was followed up by other works and produced a vocabulary of "political behaviourial areas" (poliittinen käyttäytymisalue) and "political climate areas" ("poliittinen ilmastoalue")[49]. The concepts were drawn from geography or biology. The metaphors of atmospheres and changing weather became common, but in addition the perspectives of anthropology, cultural studies, and cultural traditions were implied[50].

Today the conceptual map of political regionalism appears extremely fascinating. Why, indeed, should individuals be relevant in political topographies? When did individuals actually become relevant units in politics? Why could the metaphors of climate and soil not be used just as well as the ones we currently use and that appear natural to us today?

The second pre-text from 1956[51] was also based on analyzing *voting statistics*. Gender was easily drawn from statistics, so the work also gave information about the voting percentages of men and women. The pre-text is *a map based on voting statistics that includes gender*.

For the period from 1945 to 1954, the difference between the voting percentages for men and women for the whole country was

found to be approximately 5%. However, upon elaborating the results for Helsinki with age and marital status and standardizing the effect of these intervening variables, it turned out that the gender difference diminished to a very insignificant one. Elaborated this way, the percentage for men was 76.9% and for women 76.2%[52]. The text concludes:

> "It would be interesting to know to what extent the larger voting passivity among women reported in other studies can be referred back to these demographic factors." [17] [53]

Although the work is treated as con-textual (also in accordance with the institutional criteria applied in my work; it comes from the discipline of sociology and not political science), it must, however, be regarded as a relevant inter-text, as common knowledge in the scientific community of political science of the time, being the first and fairly important work in the area. Therefore I call it pre-textual. The pre-text, based on voting statistics, seems to indicate that no gender difference existed in political activity.

Assumptions about families in studies on political socialization

Implicit traces of the *family* were still to be found in new studies on political behaviour. Starting with a pre-text from 1950[54], assumptions about families and a "natural" gender order shine through texts on political socialization. The text discusses political psychology and the influence of early childhood experiences on later political behaviour as the *basic causes*.

> "The political optimism of the *United States* is explained by the *American mother's* taking good care of her child and attempting to fulfil his/her needs according to the functions expressed by the child. At a later age this causes a wish to act in society in one way or another because of an underlying consciousness of the probable success of the action. ... That passivity of *Rumanians* is at least partly due to the mother's usually directing her care only to the eldest child, whereas the others may often become objects of her sudden bursts of anger. The child does not understand the reason for this, and s/he even as an adult maintains a belief in fate, which may be good or bad."[18]

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17   "Det vore intressant att veta i vilken mån den i andra undesökningar rapporterade större väljarpassiviteten bland kvinnorna kan återföras på liknande demografiska faktorer."

18   *Yhdysvalloissa* luonteenomaisen poliittisen optimismin selitetään johtuvan siitä, että *amerikkalainen äiti* huolehtii hyvin lapsestaan ja pyrkii täyttämään lapsen ilmaisemien toimintojen mukaisesti hänen toiveensa. Myöhemmällä iällä tämä aiheuttaa halun toimia yhteiskunnassa tavalla tai toisella, koska sen takana on tietoisuus toiminnan todennäköisestä onnistumisesta. - *Romanialaisten* passiivisuus johtuu ainakin osaksi siitä, että sikäläinen äiti omistaa

The father may also have an impact on adult political behaviour.

> "The German family has through time been characterised by the considerable powerfulness of the father's status. This and above all a wish to return to nature – as opposed to a bourgeois way of life at the beginning of the century – has had the effect that boys, in their youthful wish to rebel, left to wander as 'Wandervogels' and adopted a certain kind of mystical-romantic world view which, mixed with the admiration of masculinity caused by the father's strong status, created a basis for the national-romantic ideology to take form. Also the romantic tradition of militarism, that started to affect the Germans especially after Prussia became stronger, made its own contribution to the German myth of the 20th century."[19] [55]

The child was seen as the starting point for studying the state; "a way of approaching the study of the state from the child" (lähteä tutkimaan valtiota lapsesta), because the omnipotence of parents later on was transferred to political leaders. In this, psychology could bring remarkable contributions to the results of political science. However, this kind of perspective was not the one to gain larger popularity in the actual behaviourial studies, where "cultural" explanations vanished among the other less popular ingredients.

Hereafter it was simply assumed that families were patriarchal. Mothers were not expected to have a role in political socialization.The absent mother of socialization studies was produced by assuming that fathers' occupations and party affiliations were inherited by children and the result was assured by not asking whether the mother had something to do with the matter[56].

> "If a person belongs to the same occupational group as his father and lives in the same kind of environment as he does, the inheritance of the father's party affiliation is an easily understandable consequence. But when social and regional mobility occur – as the son moves to another social stratum or a new region, which often happens in parallel and at the same time means a transfer to a new small group – this kind of change of environments may cause insecurity and even an alienation

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huolenpitonsa yleensä vain vanhemmalle lapselleen, kun taas toiset saattavat joutua usein hänen äkkinäisten vihanpuuskiensa kohteeksi. Lapsi ei ymmärrä mistä tämä johtuu, ja niin hänelle aikaihmisenäkin jää usko sattumaan, joka on siten hyvä tai paha.

19 "Saksalaisessa perheessä on kautta aikain ollut luonteenomaista isän aseman huomattava voimakkuus. Tämä ja ennen kaikkea halu palata luontoon - vastakohtana vuosisadan vaihteen porvarilliselle elämäntavalle - vaikuttivat siihen, että pojat nuoruutensa kapinanhalusta lähtivät vaeltamaan "Wandervogeleina" ja omaksuivat tietynlaisen mystisromanttisen maailmankuvan, joka sekoittuneena isän vahvan aseman osaltaan aikaansaamaan maskuliinisuuden ihailuun loi pohjaa kansallissosialistisen ideologian muovautumiselle. Myös sotilaallisuuden romanttinen traditio, joka varsinkin Preussin voimistumisen jälkeen alkoi enemmän vaikuttaa saksalaisissa, antoi oman lisänsä 20. vuosisadan germaaniseen myyttiin."

from the father's party affiliation."[20] [57]

The mother was made to disappear by other, even more explicit, means than not asking:

> "Children adopt the party affiliation of their parents so commonly, that we can talk about inheritance of party choice from one generation to another. A precondition for this is that parents agree politically, and this is common. Even if husband and wife should disagree upon getting married, the wife often adjusts to comply with her husband's opinion." [21] [58]

How did they know, as this was not asked about in the empirical studies? In order to gain control over the inheritance problem, parents were given some advice:

> "... the inheritance of party affiliation was strongest when political debates between parents and children had been uncontrived and normal in number."[22] [59]

In spite of this, the results of a study from 1958 actually showed that female students tended to follow their father's opinion less than did male students[60]. *When the mother's party affiliation was finally asked in a study in 1965, the result turned out not to follow the patriarchy assumption*[61].

"Finding" a gender difference and meeting the Finnish "reality": The rhetoric of measuring political activity

a) Importing the difference from abroad

A stabilised narrative structure for writing science was established in behaviourial studies reporting for empirical results. Following this narrative structure, what were the ways of introducing gender to the

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20   "Jos joku henkilö kuuluu isänsä ammattiryhmään ja toimii samanlaisessa ympäristössä kuin hän, isän puoluekannan periytyminen ja kannan säilyminen ovat helposti ymmärrettävä seuraus. Mutta sosiaalisen ja alueellisen liikkuvuuden ilmetessä, pojan siirtyessä toiseen sosiaaliseen kerrostumaan tai uudelle paikkakunnalle, mitkä usein tapahtuvat yhtäaikaisesti ja merkitsevät samalla siirtymistä uuteen pienryhmään, tällaisesta olosuhteiden muuttumisesta saattaa seurata epävarmuutta ja helposti vierautuminen isän puoluekannastakin,..."

21   "Lapset omaksuvat niin yleisesti vanhempiensa puoluekannan, että voidaan puhua puoluekannan periytymisestä sukupolvelta toiselle. Tämän edellytyksenä on, että vanhemmat ovat poliittisesti samaa mieltä; tämä onkin tavallista. Vaikka mies ja nainen olisivat eri mieltä naimisiin mennessään, niin usein vaimo mukautuu noudattamaan miehensä poliittista kantaa."

22   "... puoluekanta periytyi kaikkein voimakkaimmin kun vanhempien ja lasten välisiä poliittisia keskusteluja oli käyty luontevasti ja normaali määrä."

reader, the ways of representing the gender difference? How was it framed? How was it motivated in the *initial parts* of the texts?

Assumptions about a gender difference in political behaviour were normally brought in on the first pages of an empirical report. The gender difference in political activity was constantly represented in connection to comparable results abroad. It was introduced as "observations on Anglo-Saxon voters", and stated as hypotheses for research.

– "It is generally found that women take part in elections relatively unenthusiastically in comparison to men."

– "Even in general, women have been found to be more conservative than men."

– "... as women everywhere being a repressed group... even in Finland..."

– "... as women in general not being interested in politics..."

– "... more significant is this characteristic that reflects the even more commonly observed lesser interest and participation of women in political life..."

– "Also in England, it has been found.."[62].

The most specified version was:

– "In the USA and Great Britain, it has been found..."[63]

Located between Anglo-American participation studies and "Finnish reality", how did the argumentation advance?

> "It has been commonly found that women take part in elections relatively less enthusiastically than men17[64]). That is how it has been even in Finland in all national elections since women got the vote half a century ago. Even in the elections of 1956 there was a difference. The voting percentage of men was 76.1 and of women 71.0. It should, however, be especially pointed out that in the electoral district of Helsinki, the difference had diminished to become almost nonexistent: 75.6% of the men and 75.2% of the women voted. Even in general, the voting frequencies of men and women were less different in cities than in the countryside."[23] [65]

However, since the possibility of variation and "less different" political activity in Finland was indicated here, we would expect this to make a good beginning for empirical research. Such was not the case.

The difference was shown to be *international*. It became imported into the pre-stated hypotheses of the Finnish studies. In fact, no Finnish

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23   "Yleisesti on todettu, että naiset osallistuvat vaaleihin suhteellisesti laimeammin kuin miehet (17). Niinhän Suomessakin on käynyt kaikissa valtiollisissa vaaleissa sen jälkeen kun naiset puoli vuosisataa sitten saivat äänioikeuden".

......

"Eroa oli myös vuoden 1956 vaaleissa Miesten äänestysprosentti näet oli 76.1 ja naisten 71.0. On kuitenkin erityisesti tähdennettävä sitä, että Helsingin vaalipiirissä ero oli supistunut miltei olemattomaksi: miehistä äänesti 75.6% ja naisista 75.2%. Yleensäkin miesten ja naisten äänestysfrekvenssit olivat kaupungeissa vähemmän erilaiset kuin maaseudulla."

study ever set out to find local variation or suggested the possibility of results deviating from the "international law" of women's passivity. *The "finding" of women's passivity was imported as universal – it became generalized over space.* The "general observation" was confirmed by references to Anglo-American participation studies, not for instance by the previous Finnish ones[66].

Except for becoming generalized over space, the *"finding"* of women's passivity also seems to have become *generalized over time*. That a difference was found "over a half century ago" did not diminish the value of the generalization; on the contrary, it starts working to make the difference eternal.

> "In studying children of only six years of age, E. Barnes, W.G. Chambers and H.H. Goddard stated *over half a century ago* that boys tend to idealize and choose their heroes from public persons and historical figures."[24]
> [67]

In the behaviourial studies, the gender difference in political behaviour was "found" so generally valid that it is not an exaggeration to say that it became the most general, the most lawlike truths of the behaviourial *laws and regularities* in politics which the behaviourial studies set out to find. As the aim of the new political science was "to find invariances, to uncover the regularities which prevail in political activity and in the political attitudes of human individuals and human groups"[68], women seemed to fo and provide this kind of human group that behaved in a regular manner.

As an argumentative strategy, the references to the universality of women's non-participation created believability by the force of its quantity; the argument became all the more convincing, the more common it was. The general and the normal were made the normative. The utterance was justified by citing the sources from the USA and Great Britain. The referential power of the USA as an ideal authorized the utterance and made the phenomenon worldwide. Sources of information coming from the US did not even need to be mentioned specifically. They were cited without comments or references which gave them the status of a fact and made them part of the author's interpretation. The reference replaced an argument with the sign of an argument. By repeating the sentence of women's passivity time after time it became all the more true[69].

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24   "Tutkiessaan jopa 6-vuotiaita lapsia ovat E. Barnes, W.G. Chambers ja H.H. Goddard todenneet yli puoli vuosisataa sitten, että pojat pitävät ihanteinaan ja sankareinaan mieluummin julkisen elämän henkilöitä ja historian hahmoja."

b) Constructing political activity

So far the discussion has only dealt with how the texts frame the question of gender difference – the initial parts of the empirical reports. What, then, was political activity? How was it constructed in the texts?
A previous citation on socialization continues:

> "...boys tend to idealize and choose their heroes from public persons and historical figures. Girls, instead, tend to choose their ideals from their parents, teachers or friends. Schoolboys prefer to read historical fiction and newspaper articles that deal with the society, whereas girls are more willing to read other fiction. These kinds of differences which appear at early ages should be noted because, even as adults, men turn out to be more 'political' than women."[25] [70]

The quotation marks around "politics" in the original text do seem highly motivated: *Why reading historical novels rather than other fiction predestines children to political activity is not explained. What makes one practice more political than another one?* Could it be gender?

"Interest in politics" was associated with the most imaginative practices. The gendered practices of the time were written into the measures of political activity: into who read newspapers; who listened to the radio and to what programmes; who went to church; who discussed politics with whom – at home or at work – and who discussed, who listened. The neutral concept of "the individual" broke up time after time into *gendered practices, whereof one was named political, the other unpolitical.* How this was made to happen and look believable appears at times amazing.

Going to public libraries to read newspapers was found to be a gendered practice that was "explained" by the "general" observation that men were more interested in politics.

> "A clear gender difference could be observed in visiting public libraries, as women made up only 17% of the total number. As a hypothetical explanation, it can be said that women in general are not interested in politics and that they satisfy their curiosity in other ways than by going to libraries to get acquainted with newspapers. It can be mentioned that a study performed in the USA stated that women prefer to listen to the

25   "Pojat pitävät ihanteenaan ja sankareinaan mieluummin julkisen elämän henkilöitä ja historian hahmoja. Tytöt sen sijaan valitsevat ihanteensa kernaimmin vanhemmistaan, opettajistaan tai ystävistään. Koulupojat lukevat kernaasti historiallisia romaaneja ja yhteiskuntaa käsitteleviä sanomalehtiuutisia, tytöt sen sijaan halukkaammin kaunokirjallisuutta. Tällaisiin nuorella iällä esiintyviin eroihin on syytä kiinnittää huomiota siksi, että aikuisinakin miehet ovat osoittautuneet naisia "poliittisemmiksi". Vastaavan eron ilmeneminen jo lapsuudessa vahvistaa sitä käsitystä, että politiikkaa opitaan harrastamaan ja siihen kiinnostutaan ennen äänioikeuden saavuttamista. Sittenhän poliittinen aktiivisuus kyllä edelleen lisääntyy aina 50-60 vuoden ikään asti."

radio rather than to read newspapers, since they can do their housework while listening to the radio at the same time. Men, on the other hand, do not have an opportunity to listen to the radio at their work places, while they can read newspapers there (Campbell et al.,47; Lane,83). The same phenomenon has been found in most other studies. Regarding visits to the library it can be observed very clearly, because reading room visitors can be considered to be very active newspaper readers, who on the basis of the above-mentioned statement are more often men than women. In general, women seem to feel less interest in politics than do men; especially among young women and men the difference is remarkable. It can be mentioned as an example that in the elections of 1951, 70.1% of men between 21-25 years used their vote in Helsinki, while the voting percentage of women in the same age group was 59.4%. The comparable percentages in the age group between 26 and 30 years were 76.2 and 71.9. This should partly explain why women under 20 hardly visited the library reading room at all. Visiting the reading room is therefore a typically male habit that can be stated to correspond with men's interest in politics and public matters, which manifests itself in, among other things, reading newspapers and taking part in elections." [26] [71]

The explanation for women's not going to reading rooms is that they generally are not interested in politics. Why would going to a reading room be a measure of political activity? The result of this argumentation seems to be that people who go to reading rooms can be considered very active newspaper readers.

This explorative study led the author to draw some hypotheses for future research. These were:

– "Men visit reading rooms more often than do women.
– The gender difference is biggest in the age group under 20.

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26   "Sukupuolten välillä on havaittavissa selvä ero lukusalissa käynnin suhteen, sillä naisia on aineiston mukaan vain 17% kokonaismäärästä. Hypoteettisena selityksenä voidaan sanoa, etteivät naiset yleensä ole kiinnostuneita politiikasta ja että he tyydyttävät uteliaisuuttaan muulla tavoin kuin käymällä lukusaleissa tutustumassa eri sanomalehtiin. Mainittakoon, että USA:ssa suoritetussa tutkimuksessa on todettu naisten kuuntelevan mieluummin radiota kuin lukevan sanomalehtiä, sillä radiota kuunnellessaan he voivat samanaikaisesti tehdä taloustöitään. Miehillä sitä vastoin ei ole tilaisuutta kuunnella radiota työpaikalla, sen sijaan he voivat lukea siellä sanomalehtiä (Campbell et. al.,47; Lane,83).Useissa muissakin tutkimuksissa on havaittu sama ilmiö lukusalissa käynnin suhteen se on todettavissa hyvin selvänä, koska lukusalissa kävijöitä voidaan pitää erittäin aktiivisina sanomalehden lukijoina, jotka ovat edellä esitetyn toteamuksen perusteella useammin miehiä kuin naisia. Yleensäkin naiset tuntevat vähemmän mielenkiintoa politiikkaan kuin miehet; varsinkin nuorten naisten ja miesten kohdalla ero on merkittävä. Mainittakoon esimerkkinä, että vuoden 1951 vaaleissa käytti Helsingissä äänioikeutetuista 21-25-vuotiaista miehistä 70.1% äänioikeuttaan samanikäisten naisten äänestysprosentin ollessa 59.4%. Vastaavat prosenttiluvut ikäryhmässä 26-30-vuotiaat olivat 76,2 ja 71,9. Tämä selittänee osaksi sen, miksi alle 20-vuotiaita naisia ei käy juuri ollenkaan lukusalissa. Lukusalissa käyminen on siis tyypillisesti miehinen tapa, jonka voidaan olevan yhteydessä miesten politiikkaan ja yhteisiin asioihin tuntemaan kiinnostukseen, joka ilmenee mm. sanomalehden lukemisessa ja vaaleihin osallistumisessa."

– The difference is due to men's and women's interests being directed towards different objects."

Why "men's special tendency to read newspapers", this "typically male habit"[72], was preferred over listening to the radio does seem to remain unexplained. The gender difference in using reading rooms was explained by men's generally being more politically active than women, and this is true because it has been repeated so often. Women's practices, on the other hand, are unpolitical because they are. And women are passive and unpolitical because they are not men. The texts work by *calling what men do "political"*.

c) Constructing results: The wonders of data analysis

How about the actual empirical data analyses of political behaviour, the results of the Finnish surveys? After all, referencing the "real" was the "thing that gave behaviourism its believability". How were women and men represented? How was the "fact" of women's passivity established in relation to the "reality" of Finland? I will go on following the narrative structure for reporting an empirical study, reconstruct a relationship between *voting* (voting statistics) and *political activity* (interview data) as it appears in the texts, and see how results on gender difference are produced.

When sorting out the *voting percentages* of women and men from the larger monographs, one from 1958 and the other from 1965[73], the result of equal voting percentages was actually confirmed. The 1958 study on a student population in the presidential elections of 1956 reported the following voting percentages[74]:

men 88.6%   women 89.1%

From this, the following conclusion is drawn:

"In Helsinki female students voted as actively as men did."[75]

The study from 1965, based on the parliamentary elections of 1958, reported the following voting percentages[76]:

– Tampere   men 82.4%   women 73.9%
– Korpilahti   men 79.6%   women 70.1

Whether the difference in this heterogenous population would have disappeared when controlled with some other intervening variable, we do not know.

A political scientist does not control the production of voting

statistics, whereas the freedom of defining "political participation" with the help of *survey methods* is considerably bigger. A clearly modelled gender difference was "found" in political participation.

A study in 1958[77] on student voters' behaviour was a two-stage interview, a panel study based on interview data: the students were asked about *"political activity" before the elections and after them*. Interestingly, the acknowledged aim of the study was "not to study only language"[78]. Apparently, the "not only language" aim led to using structured interviews for gathering data. How this succeeded in being "something else than language" remained unexplained.

The measures of political activity were taken from the Anglo-American voting studies represented at the beginning as hypotheses based on "observations on the Anglo-Saxon voter", where men had already been found to be more interested in politics, to discuss politics more, to gather more information about the elections, and to vote more often than women (p. 27). Thus, the measures for political activity became *interest in politics* (p.72-74), the *number of opinions* (p.86-89), and *explaining the choice of party* ("could not explain the choice of party" (p.95). The students' *activeness in gathering information about the elections* was measured by activity in reading newspapers and listening to the radio (the programmes were listed). Let us look at the results!

Looking at how the results are reported in the text, we can read about "interest in politics"[79]. The narrative structure for reporting advances as follows: the chapter on "interest in politics" starts with a normative claim that students as "the hopes of the nation" should be interested in politics. Then a reference is made to the USA and England, where "politics is found to interest men more than women". After this, the results of the survey are represented in a table and in the text. A gender difference was confirmed. And it was emphatically concluded in a separate sentence, whatever the distribution of results:

> "Male students were more interested in political issues than were female students."[27] [80]

Looking at the text we learn that information about "interest in politics" was gathered by asking the respondents: "How interested would you say you are in politics and government affairs?"

Who is talking? When did the respondents' own "verbal responses" turn into objective reality, a fact taken at face value? The study starts to tautologize cultural conceptions of what is considered politics and what is not, what is considered culturally proper gender behaviour and what is not. The same structure is repeated on other

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27   "miesylioppilaat olivat poliittisista kysymyksistä kiinnostuneempia kuin naisylioppilaat."

variables for political activity.

That gender could be cross-tabulated with other variables, like marital status, brought up an interesting variation of table headings, labels, and categorizations of people.

> "Widows in particular supported the Social Democratic Party and widowed women do not seem to have the same inclination to lack a party preference as other women have."[28]
> "Not many wives knew much about politics, and again there were few husbands among those who new little about politics."[29]

Unmarried women were categorised into widows and "young ladies". The behaviour of "husbands and wives" showed expected differences. A table was structured into categories of 1)married (men and women) and 2) non-married (men, women and widows (p.261). Again, we could perhaps expect gender to be cross-tabulated with age, income or some other variable than the implicit traces of the family category.

Soon the variables also begin to form weird quantification and "tautologies of tautologies" as in the case of *"the number of opinions"*:

> "Those more interested in politics had more political opinions than those less interested." (p.86)[30]

The study of 1965 also shows that analyzing political activity can be trickier than one would expect. In the comparison of voting in Tampere and Korpilahti, *a law of positive correlations* was found between different variables: the "good things" tended to cumulate.

> "Different ways to take an interest in politics tended to cumulate in Korpilahti as well as in Tampere in the same active persons." (p.77)[31]

This is verified by the following results, for instance:

> "The more the inhabitants of Tampere thought themselves to be interested in politics in May, the more actively they discussed politics in July, too." (p.54)[32]

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28   "Varsinkin leskirouvat kannattivat sosialidemokraattista puoluetta, eikä leskeksi jääneillä naisilla näytäkään olleen samaa taipumusta puoluekannan puuttumiseen kuin muilla naisilla."

29   "Eihän monikaan rouva tuntenut politiikkaa hyvin, eikä huonojen politiikan tuntijain joukossa taas ollut paljon aviomiehiä."

30   "Poliittisia mielipiteitä politiikasta kiinnostuneilla oli enemmän kuin politiikasta kiinnostumattomilla."

31   "Eri tavat harrastaa politiikkaa pyrkivät kasatumaan Korpilahdella, niinkuin Tampereellakin, samojen aktiivisten henkilöiden osalle."

32   "Mitä enemmän tamperelaiset toukokuussa arvelivat politiikan itseään kiinnostavan, sitä aktiivisemmin he keskustelevat politiikasta myös heinäkuussa."

"In some studies it has been found that *the number of opinions* grows with increasing interest. Table 3.8. shows that the previous conclusion also holds for Tampere in May of 1956. The more interested the persons were, the more opinions they had.... On the other hand, it must be stated that party members did not have significantly more opinions than the other inhabitants of Tampere. Although men who belonged to parties had more opinions than other men, no such correlation was found among women. It rather seems that women who remained outside parties had more political opinions than the women who were party members. No special expertise seems to lie behind the great number of opinions." (p.71)[33]

"A correlation was found between political interest – which was different between men and women – and considering elections important." (p.74)[34]

"Table 3.3.a. does show consistently that the more active the inhabitants of Tampere were politically, the more certain they were of their party preference."[35]

"Besides gender, political interest was also found to depend on the certainty of party choice." [36]

However:

"Women were, however, generally more reluctant than men to give the reasons for their opinions...The abundance of opinions was observed to be a consequence of being interested in politics. And this correlated with the readiness of the interested persons to explain their opinions."[37]

"Different ways of participating in politics seem to accumulate in Korpilahti as well as in Tampere in the lot of the same active people." [38]

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33   "Joissakin tutkimuksissa on havaittu, että mielipiteiden määrä kasvaa kiinnostuksen lisääntyessä." ... Taulukko 3.8. osoittaa, että aikaisempi johtopäätös piti paikkansa myös Tampereella toukokuussa 1958. Henkilöillä oli sitä enemmän mielipiteitä, mitä enemmän politiikka heitä kiinnosti. ... Toisaalta on todettava, ettei puolueiden jäsenillä ollut sanottavasti enempiä mielipiteitä kuin muilla tamperelaisilla. Puolueissa olevilla miehillä tosin mielipiteitä oli enemmän kuin muilla miehillä, mutta sellaista riippuvuutta ei ollut naisten keskuudessa. Pikemminkin näyttää siltä, että puolueiden ulkopuolelle jääneillä naisilla oli enemmän poliittisia mielipiteitä kuin puolueihin kuuluvilla. Mikään erityinen asiantuntemus ei näytä olleen mielipiteiden runsauden perustana."

34   "Poliittisen kiinnostuneisuuden - joka miehillä ja naisilla oli erilainen - ja vaalien tärkeänä pitämisen välillä oli kuitenkin riippuvuutta."

35   "Taulukko 3.3.a. osoittaakin johdonmukaisesti, että tamperelaiset olivat poliittisesti sitä aktiivisempia, mitä varmempia he olivat puoluekannastaan."

36   "Paitsi sukupuolesta poliittisen kiinnostuneisuuden havaittiin riippuvan mm. puoluekannan varmuudesta."

37   "Naiset olivat kyllä yleensä pidättyvämpiä kuin miehet perustelemaan kantojaan....
...Yhdeksi politiikasta kiinnostumisen seuraamukseksi siis havaittiin mielipiteiden runsaus. Ja siihen liittyi kiinnostuneiden henkilöiden valmius perustella kantojaan."

38   "...eri tavat harrastaa politiikkaa pyrkivät kasautumaan Korpilahdella, niinkuin Tampereellakin, samojen aktiivisten henkilöiden osalle."

The conclusion of the study remains clear and unambiguous:

> "Those more interested than average were namely men, especially the married ones as well as middle-aged and wealthy and high-income persons."[39]

The information value of the correlations is especially clear in this statement:

> "Only a minority of about two-fifths of the persons that had been unemployed were satisfied with their income." (p.88)[40]

The citations illustrate "the law of positive correlations" which coincided with the gender difference: men were more interested in politics in any measure of interest (p.63) whereas the list of passive citizens was headed by women (p.65).

In spite of this "finding", even the studies themselves would seem to suggest a lot of evidence for other conclusions. The studies show that women were not especially passive: only their profile of behaviour differed from men's behaviour (pp.29-31). They show that women supported parties actively and had clear opinions of them although they did not participate actively in the activities coded as party activities (pp.36-37, 45, 189-192). Actually, it would seem quite possible to come to opposite conclusions.

The conclusions drawn from all this were, however, as follows:

> "Researchers have made conclusions about political activity, especially on the basis of who goes to vote on election day. Then their knowledge actually concerns only one form of taking an interest in politics. It may, however, be possible to define different forms of political activity *that have not yet been possible to clearly separate from each other.*" (p.79)[41]

The fact that distinquishing different forms of political activity may not have succeeded so well in the study – that maybe the same question was asked in different forms and correlated with itself – does not seem to have disturbed the textualizer. It might, however, have occurred to the objects of the interviews:

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39   "Keskimääräistä kiinnostuneempia näet olivat miehet, varsinkin naimisissa olevat, sekä keski-ikäiset ja varakkaat ja paljon ansaitsevat henkilöt."

40   "Vain noin kahden viidesosan vähemmistö työttömänä olleista henkilöistä oli siis tyytyväisiä toimeentuloonsa..."

41   "Tutkijat ovat tehneet poliittista aktiivisuutta koskevia johtopäätöksiä varsinkin sen perusteella, ketkä käyvät vaalipäivänä äänestämässä. Silloin heidän tietonsa koskevat oikeastaan vain yhtä politiikan harrastamisen muotoa. Saattaa kuitenkin olla mahdollista määritellä erilaisia poliittisen aktivisuuden lajeja, joita ei vielä ole osattu selvästi erottaa toisistaan."

"Even the interviewees themselves seemed to connect voting and a general interest in politics."(p.55)[42]

d) Relating voting and activity

On the whole, women did not manage so well in meeting the criteria set by the text on political activity. Yet, after all, for instance according to the 1958 study, they were found to *vote* as actively as men. How can this be explained? The text starts on two tracks.

First, it introduces an explanation that *even persons not interested in politics vote*, and that *voting actually is a less important and less reliable measure of political activity than the criteria constructed by the political scientist himself.*

> "Let us still point out that mere information about participation in elections seems to measure the political activity of the voter groups very inexactly. Great differences occur among persons who go to vote, and many persons can in their other behaviour turn out to be politically passive. As stated above (p.140), even people who are not otherwise interested in politics go to vote." (p.147)[43]

Secondly, it manages to *construct a new gender difference even in voting.* As Finland by that time had two election days, the eager voters had already voted during the first day.

> "Women voted, maybe against expectations, as actively as men (p.136). However, 36% of the women and only 26% of the men voted during the second election day. If we now utilize the observation that was just made, according to which political activity can be observed, besides on the basis of voting also on the basis of which election day a person goes to vote, then male students can after all be said to be more active than female students even as voters." [44] [81]

Even in the study of 1965 the question of two voting days became cen-

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42   "Haastatellut näyttivät itsekin yhdistävän äänestämässä käymisen ja yleisen politiikasta kiinnostumisen."

43   "Tähdennettäköön vielä, että pelkät tiedot vaaleihin osallistumisesta näköjään mittaavat äänestäjäryhmien poliittista aktiivisuutta hyvin epätarkasti. Äänestämässä käyvien henkilöiden kesken vallitsee suuria eroja, ja monet henkilöt saattavat muussa käyttäytymisessään osoittautua poliittisesti passiivisiksi. Edellä (s.140) onkin jo esitetty, että äänestämässä käy myös henkilöitä, joita politiikka ei muussa suhteessa kiinnosta."

44   "Naiset äänestivät, ehkä vastoin odotuksia, yhtä aktiivisesti kuin miehet (s.136). Toisena vaalipäivänä naisista kuitenkin äänesti 36%, mutta miehistä vain 26%. Jos käytetään hyväksi juuri tehtyä havaintoa, jonka mukaan poliittista aktiivisuutta voidaan tarkkailla osanoton lisäksi sen perusteella, kumpana vaalipäivänä käydään äänestämässä, niin miesylioppilaiden voidaan sittenkin sanoa olleen myös äänestäjinä naisylioppilaita aktiivisempia."

trally gendered. Husbands were seen to drag their wives to the polling places and even now there did not seem to be enough time for women, who, just because of the start of the summer holiday, remained non-voters (pp. 256-7,261-3, 269, 275,280). That their might be some gendered practices, for instance in the time budgets of men and women, was not considered.

So, in the end the preconception of women's passivity even in Finland and among the students could be maintained. Moreover, the data produced by the political scientist could be confirmed as being more reliable than mere voting statistics.

e) Concluding results: a closure?

The final conclusions of the 1958 study were the following:

> "Men were more interested in politics than were women, and they were also more susceptible to campaign propaganda. In the whole country, the voting percentage of men was higher than that of women, but students' participation in the elections was equally active, although a larger portion of the men voted during the first election day. An equally large proportion of male and female students recalled having had discussions about politics; even a larger proportion of the women considered having received most of the information about elections via discussions, but men still had more opinions about politics and a larger proportion of the men could *on the basis of conversation manner* be considered political opinion leaders."[45]

Why "conversation manner" suddenly becomes the basis of evaluation here is slightly surprising. However, in the end, the conclusions drawn about Finnish students were explained as following the model of the Anglo-Saxon voters, with this model being valid for the whole Finnish electorate. The conclusion was:

> "The information received about Anglo-Saxon voters with the help of panel studies can, applied to our conditions, be assumed to hold true for Finnish voters as well."(p.201)[46]

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45   "Politiikka kiinnosti miehiä enemmän kuin naisia, ja miehet olivat myös enemmän alttiina vaalipropagandalle. Koko maassa miesten äänestysprosentti oli korkeampi kuin naisten, mutta ylioppilaat osallistuivat vaaleihin yhtä aktiivisesti, joskin miehistä kävi suurempi osa äänestämässä jo ensimmäisenä vaalipäivänä. Mies- ja naisylioppilaista muisti yhtä suuri osa keskustelleensa politiikasta; katsoivatpa naiset useammin kuin miehet saaneensa enimmät vaaleja koskevat tiedot keskustelemalla, mutta miehillä oli kuitenkin enemmän mielipiteitä politiikasta ja miehistä voitiin suurempaa osaa keskustelutavan perusteella pitää poliittisina mielipidejohtajina."

46   "anglosaksista äänestäjistä paneelitutkimuksilla saatujen tietojen voidaan otaksua pätevän oloihimme sovellettuina myös suomalaisiin äänestäjiin nähden."

If the narrative structure of research reports is seen as a dialogue of many voices,

(a) a voice of earlier research with whom the researcher constructs a dialogue with the aim of producing something new[82], and

b) another voice of the referential, the "reality",

then what is going on here? Instead of producing something new, the researcher joins in the great chorus of the Anglo-American narrative: "women are passive in politics".

f) Afterthoughts?

Did the author of the 1958 report revise his opinions about the generalizability of the results? In an article in 1960 he was still looking for "internationally valid dimensions of a higher order" but this time "only sex and to some extent the size of community correlated positively with the voting turnout. Most of the results contradicted earlier findings"[83]. And now even the female turnout was reported to be equal to that of the men (although not in the whole of Finland). This time there is an "explanation":

> "The observed differences may be due to the different conditions in Finland and to the special character of the population of this study. For a further comparison, *the psychological implications of social characteristics ought to be studied.*"[84]

Why should further explanations be sought by becoming even more private? Why not see the systematicity and sociality in gendered behaviours and start studying them?

Attributing attitudes; ideal countries and modern orderings

> "Certain other correlations between social characteristics and party preferences *seem to be more international*: female students tended to favour the conservatives, male students to support the centre."[85]

The other basic "finding" of behaviourial studies was that women were more conservative than men. What was radical and what was conservative? What were the associations and dissociations created in the texts? Here I will look at the framing of behaviour and ideology on the axes of *left/right and high/low in connection to attitudes, participation and representation* in politics.

a) The left and the right; women as conservatives

The left/right axis was studied as an ideological coordinate of politics, as an orienting axis on the "map" or "terrain"[86]. On this coordinate, the "finding" of women's conservativeness was produced even in Finland[87]. Conservativeness was measured[88] regarding, for instance, *"social attitudes"*, and the result was:

> "Men were somewhat more radical than women. In specific, the most radical category included more of the former than the latter."[47]

The second measure was *"general conservativeness"*; here the result was as follows:

> "The working class and the middle classes, that is, the lower social classes, turned out more generally to be more radical than other classes. Women, in turn, were more conservative than men, and the married more conservative than the unmarried. Especially among unmarried men, a radical attitude seems to have gained a foothold." [48] [89]

Whereas *social attitudes* were measured by asking questions about 1) the amount of social activity conducted with the help of state finances, 2) the distribution of health service costs between the state and the private sector, and 3) confessing to conservativeness, regarding *"general conservativeness"*, the measures were 1) honouring tradition, 2) attending church, and 3) regulation of the private sector.

The problem with this information is not whether it is "right or wrong". The problem is that it has lost its frame of meaning. It is difficult to imagine, which way the scales of radicalness or conservativeness were expected to go. What indeed was and is radical or conservative in these questions? The ideological coordinates have to be read, therefore, from the way of framing and describing conservativeness. The ideological positions of the authors are also embedded in the descriptions. Views about the left-right axis become paradoxically messy.

A survey on "voters' opinions on ideals of social and economic development[90] disclosed that gender explained attitudes very strongly. It was a very significant background variable; the coherence within gender groups was stronger than within parties. But the paper does not start wondering why this might be; it starts classifying respondents.

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47 "Miehet olivat jonkin verran radikaalisempia kuin naiset. Nimenomaan radikaalisimpaan asteikkoluokkaan kuului edellisiä suhteellisesti enemmän kuin jälkimmäisiä."

48 "Työväestö ja keskiluokka, so. alemmat yhteiskuntaluokat, osoittautuivat yleisestikin muita luokkia radikaalisemmiksi. Naiset olivat puolestaan miehiä ja naimisissa olevat naimattomia konservatiivisempia. Erityisesti naimattomien miesten parissa näyttää radikaalinen asennoituminen saaneen jalansijaa."

> "As clear differences between men and women can be observed regarding the number of opinions and the degree of certainty in answering, in Tables 5 and 6, the gender of the respondents has been controlled. We can then observe that men regularly answer more certainly than women; among female voters independent of party choice there are considerably more who *could not – it is most apparently a question of ability more than will* – mention one single ideal country."[49] [91]

The result was that men chose to idealize western superpowers and West Germany; women chose the Nordic countries or did not name any ideals: They even mentioned Finland. That women may have had reasons for choosing Nordic welfare states rather than cultures with more private arrangements for women as ideals did not come to mind. Neither was the reader told why on earth anybody should have other countries as ideals. It did not occur to the textualizer that his questions might have been irrelevant to respondents. How could it, when the article starts:

> "It is part of human nature to search for ideals."[50]

As development and advancement were the norm, the radicalness of a conservative party also had to be made credible: radicalness could occur in a conservative party as well. The right-wing party had to represent itself as something other than reactionary, to be for *"true"* progress and development[92]. The conservative party was in danger of colliding with the coordinates of modernity and advancement, to represent the static and peripheral, when the traditional values of national unity, Christian values and the ethical foundation of the family did not count as advancement. The conservative party's significant support from women (c. 50%) did not exactly count as a merit.

The question of stability of party affiliation was studied with regard to "social-psychological and ecological reasons".

> "It is difficult for the voter to change political views in old age, when voting in itself may be a laborious task. Women are usually more loyal to their party, which may be due to their not following politics to the same extent than men do; neither do they have to discuss politics as much with people who disagree."[51] [93]

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49   "Koska mielipiteiden määrän ja vastausvarmuuden suhteen voidaan havaita selviä eroja mies- ja naisvastaajien kesken, on taulukoissa 5. ja 6. kontrolloitu vastaajien sukupuoli. Tällöin havaitaan, että miehet vastaavat säännönmukaisesti varmemmin kuin naiset; naisäänestäjissä on puoluekannasta riippumatta huomattavasti enemmän niintä, jotka eivät pystyneet - pystymisestä aivan ilmeisesti on kysymys enemmän kuin haluamisesta - mainitsemaan yhtään esikuvamaata."

50   "Inhimilliseen luontoon kuuluu etsiä esikuvia ja ihanteita."

51   "Vanhoilla päivillään on valitsijan vaikeata vaihtaa poliittista katsomusta, pelkkä äänestäminenkin on jo silloin työläs toimenpide. Naiset ovat yleensä

Static behaviour was expected to occur in rural voters of less populated areas, in old people, and in women, but both in the upper class and the working class.

What does this mean? As conservativeness became an individual attitude, a problem of the "psychological level"[94], "the levels of psychological conservativeness" could be measured. The question became one of attitudes, characters and temperaments.

"The attitudes" were, however, structured by a public – private/ state – family axis that also structured gender. As "family interests" were ruled out of the public and constructed as psychological attributes of an individual, women were associated with the periphery and dissociated from the prime locations of "modernity".

Although associations and dissociations of the dimensions radical/conservative, left/right, dynamic/static appear flexible and manageable, the texts so far would seem to indicate than women were conservative, right-wing and static - and too dumb to idealise other countries. If this representation holds for a horizontal axis of attitudes, how about a vertical axis of participation and representation?

b) The low and the high; women as radicals?

How about *political representation* – a "higher" level of political activity? How was women's representation in politics represented in studies of political science? Following the path to top positions, from "influentials" to candidates and MPs, the story goes like this.

On the "low" end of political participation, active political behaviour was "leadership at its simplest". What were the chances for women to become *"political influentials"*?

> "It is not leadership on the high level of Churchill, nor of a local politics, nor even of a local social elite. It is at quite the opposite extreme: it is the almost invisible, certainly inconspicuous, form of leadership at the person-to-person level of ordinary, intimate, informal, everyday contact."[95]

In order to identify political influentials, the following questions were asked: Have you tried to convince anyone of your political ideas recently? Has anyone asked your advice on a political question recently? Or do you show political newspaper articles to your workmates and other acquaintances? Have you shown them campaign literature and asked them to read it?[96]

Why this kind of behaviour should be idealized or preferred

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puolueelle uskollisempia kuin miehet, mikä saattaa johtua siitä, etteivät he siinä määrin kuin miehet seuraa politiikkaa eivätkä myöskään joudu niin paljon keskustelemaan politiikasta toisinajattelevien kanssa."

seems puzzling and problematic now and would hardly make you popular among your friends. That this kind of behaviour is also gendered is not a surprise. The process of becoming a "politically influential" was more successful if you discussed politics at the work place rather than at home and followed a model of behaviour more often described as masculine than feminine.[97]

Following the way to the top in politics, how about women as *candidates* in elections?

"Of the elector candidates put up by electoral coalitions, 15% were women, and of the 300 persons elected, 38 or 13%, were women. Every tenth student vote went to a woman candidate. Not one of the male students interviewed voted for a woman, and of female students only a quarter (24%) gave their votes to female candidates."[52][98]

In this study on elections in 1956, the women voting for women were found to be like all the other women in all respects except one. The women "highly interested in politics showed a special tendency to vote for a woman" (p.170). According to a study in 1965, women in Tampere voted quite equally for men and women, while men voted only for men. This was not the case in Korpilahti, where all the local candidates were men[99].

Campaign themes were represented as follows[100]:

"The female candidates of the electorate directed their campaign advertising to female voters, whereas on the other hand only one man (list no. 50) appealed once to the men of the district of Northern Häme."[53]
"New themes were represented by, for instance, talk about how increasing radioactivity in the air had already destroyed schoolchildren's teeth, and among the signs of specialization were women candidates' worries about women's role in politics." [54]

The choice of candidates in elections and the reasons for the choices were also reported in some studies. "A true man, a competent man and a horse-man" were just some of the characteristics the choice of candidates was based on. In the classification of voters' behaviour, the stu-

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52   "Vaaliliittojen asettamista valitsijamiesehdokkaista oli naisia 15% ja valituista 300 henkilöstä heitä oli 38 eli 13%. Ylioppilailta tuli joka kymmenes ääni naisehdokkaalle. Yksikään haastateltu miesylioppilas ei äänestänyt naista, ja naisylioppilaistakin vain joka neljännes (24%) antoi äänensä naispuoliselle valitsijamiesehdokkaalle."

53   "Vaalipiirin naisehdokkaat kohdistivat ilmoittelunsa naisäänestäjille, mutta toisaalta vain yksi mies (lista no 50) vetosi kerran pohjoishämäläisiin miehiin."

54   "Uusia näkökohtia edusti mm. puhe siitä, kuinka lisääntynyt ilman radioaktiivisuus oli jo ehtinyt turmella koululaisten hampaat, ja erikoistumisen esimerkkejä olivat mm. naisehdokkaiden huoli naisten osuudesta politiikassa."

dents influenced by the female gender of the elector were classified as voting for "meikäläinen", "a representative of one's own group".

> "Even taken altogether, women and young candidates, Karelians and 'men in the same field' were the choices of only every eleventh respondent."[55] [101]

Finally, *women as MPs* were also studied. Political representation, perhaps surprisingly, was not studied in the late 1950s in the frame of democracy, as a question of whether there was democratic representation. It was studied as a means of social advancement and as a profession[102].

> "The reform of the parliament brought women for the first time into political life on the national level and inthis respect, while the reform was under consideration, no serious doubts were expressed about women's maturity and interest in general issues." [56]

"Finland" allowed women the vote (at the same time as men), and was thereby "a forerunner". The passive voice of the metonymic "Finland" makes the agent disappear and makes the vote for women a gift from heaven. What brings women in is not any person but the agency of "a reform" that "had been considered". With just a suggestion of doubt, soon denied, of whether they would be competent in "public" issues – as opposed to deviant, minor and particular women's issues – women were therefore in the position of "entering" something.

> "In the increase of the number of voters, the entrance of women had a decisive effect, as 52% of those allowed to vote were women."[57]

Taken percentage-wise, maybe "the voters" should instead have joined the group of "women". The synechdochic relationship of the part and the whole was repeated in the generic paradoxes of the Finnish language:
– "the proportion of women MPs of the farmer population"
– "Among the long-time female MPs was, among others, the 73-year-old honorary chairman."
– "Thus even women acquired considerable experience in legislation."
    As women rhetorically were constructed as deviances from a

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55   "Yhteensäkin naisten ja nuorten ehdokkaita, karjalaisia ja "saman alan miehi-ä" sanoi äänestäneensä vain joka yhdestoista vastaaja."

56   "Eduskuntauudistus toi naiset ensi kerran mukaan poliittiseen elämään valtakunnallisella tasolla, eikä tässä suhteessa ollut uudistusta harkittaessa edes esitetty vakavia epäilyjäkään naisten kypsyydestä ja mielenkiinnosta yleisiä asioita kohtaan."

57   "Äänestävien lukumäärän kasvuun naisten mukaantulo vaikutti ratkaisevasti sillä äänioikeutetuista oli ... 52% naisia."

norm, so were they treated as a deviant, internally homogenous group in the research design.

> "Because of the small amount of female MPs it is not possible to compare their social background. However, it is interesting to know whether this homogenous group essentially differs in some respect from the total membership of the parliament."
>
> "Because of the small number of female MPs, their social background does not essentially effect the total image of the representatives. Therefore it has not been considered necessary to compare their percentage distribution to mens' distributions but to comparable distributions of all representatives."[58]

As women's representation became treated as a deviancy, we can perhaps ask whether it actually was very much desired, in spite of the "forerunner" position of "Finland".[103]

Turning the high-low axis of political activity back to the left-right axis, the desirability of women's having top positions in politics is put into some doubt. Finally facing the question of representation in terms of a debate on democracy, it was asked whether parliaments should represent the people as "miniature images" of the population or whether competent leadership and ruling was more important:

> "Women everywhere are an example of a very suppressed societal group within the area of politics in spite of women's right to vote and even to get elected having become generally accepted principles during this century. Even in Finland, a forerunner in women's eligibility for election, the representation of women has risen only to 10-15% of the number of MPs. Elsewhere the number is even smaller although female voters everywhere are more numerous than male ones. A specific type is represented even in this respect by the Soviet Union and some other communist states, where women comprise more than 25% of the parliament. This is made clear in the following list that gathers information about percentages of women in the parliaments of some countries:

United States (House of Representatives, 1959)	3%
" (Senate, 1945)	-
France (1951)	3%
United Kingdom (1947)	4%
Norway (1949)	4%
Sweden (1948)	6%
West Germany (1953)	9%
Finland (1958)	14%

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58   "Naiskansanedustajien pienen lukumäärän vuoksi ei heidän sosiaalisen asemansa vertailu ole mahdollista. Mielenkiintoista on kuitenkin, poikkeaako tämä homogeninen ryhmä jossain suhteessa oleellisesti koko eduskunnan jäsenistöstä."
"Naiskansanedustajien vähyyden vuoksi ei heidän sosiaalinen taustansa merkittävästi vaikuta edustajien kokonaiskuvaan. Sen vuoksi ei heidän prosenttisia jakautumiaan ole pidetty tarpeellisena vertailla mieskansanedustajien vaan kaikkien edustajien vastaaviin jakautumiin."

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Soviet Union (1958)   26%
East Germany (1957)   27%   [59] [104]

Put in an intertextual relationship with the "ideal countries" discussed earlier, what does the list rhetorically do? Why are these countries chosen rather than some others? Why is the order of listing reversed, starting from the small percentages rather than the usual ordering from big to small? Is it too tendentious to suggest that the text creates an association between women's representation in parliament and communist states, in a context of western orientation in Finland? Is there not just a faint suggestion that women's representation equals communism? Beginning by stating that "women are a repressed group in society", does it not close the question by rhetorically creating the association: "and that is good"? But then, of course, this was never said.

The same connection between women and communists was, however, repeated in another work[105], where women's representation in parliament was represented as follows:

"The largest number of women MPs were elected for the years 1922-23, when the raising of their number to as high as 20 was affected especially by the communists coming into the parliament. Of the representatives of the Socialist Workers Party, six – that is, almost every fourth – were women. In addition, in the diminished parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party, the number of women was over 20%. The number of women MPs was at its lowest – only 11 – in 1930, when the abolishing of the Socialist Workers Party and the diminishing of the representation of the left in the parliament influenced this trend. Going into the campaign with "Against Communism" slogans made the bourgeois parties align more than ever with each other or for other reasons concentrate their forces on some "true men", strong main candidates, and to give up nominating very many female candidates. The number of female candi-

59   "Naiset ovat kaikkialla esimerkkinä erittäin syrjitystä yhteiskuntaryhmästä politiikan alalla siitä huolimatta, että naisten äänioikeus ja vaalikelpoisuuskin ovat tulleet tällä vuosisadalla lähes yleisesti hyväksytyiksi periaatteiksi. Suomessakin, naisten vaalikelpoisuuden edelläkävijämaassa, naisten edustus on kohonnut vain 10-15 prosenttiin eduskunnan jäsenmäärästä ja muualla luku on yleensä vielä pienempi, vaikka naisäänestäjiä on kaikkialla runsaammin kuin miehiä. Aivan omana tyyppinään esiintyvät kuitenkin tässäkin suhteessa Neuvostoliitto ja eräät muut kommunistiset valtiot, joissa naisia on parlamentissa yli neljäsosa. Tämä selviää parhaiten seuraavasta luettelosta, johon on koottu naisten prosenttista osuutta edustuslaitoksissa koskevia tietoja eräistä maista:

Yhdysvallat (edustajainhuone, 1959)   3%
    "   (senaatti, 1945)   -
Ranska (kansalliskokous, 1951)   3%
Englanti (alahuone, 1947)   4%
Norja (suurkäräjät, 1949)   4%
Ruotsi (toinen kamari, 1948)   6%
Länsi-Saksa (liittopäivät, 1953)   9%
Suomi (eduskunta, 1958)   14%
Neuvostoliitto (liittoneuvosto, 1958)   26%
Itä-Saksa (kansankamari, 1957)   27%

dates in 1930 was therefore only half of the amount of previous years." [60] [106]

Later on, it becomes clear that even other parties, among them The National Coalition and the Liberal Union, had about the same percentage of women MPs[107]. It is also confirmed that the low total percentage of women MPs was due to a low percentage among the candidates[108]. Regional differences inside Finland are also described; the west coast and some eastern districts were found to have fewer women MPs. Instead of on explanation, a quotation is offered to explain voting behaviour:

> "Even in Norway it has been found that women have the most difficulty getting into the parliament in districts dominated by farmers, because 'farmers do not want to be ruled by women.'(Greve)" [61] [109]

In discussing women's representation, the associations and dissociations to the left-right axis were turned upside down. On a high – low axis of politics, the placing of women in high places would seem to turn them into communists. At the same time as it was maintained that women were more conservative than men, it was also suggested that high representation of women in the parliament was to be associated with communism, under the circumstances of strong USA-mindedness in Finland. The road "from a static to a dynamic society" and the road of social advancement through a career in politics was perhaps meant to be opened "from father to son", (not so much to the daughter)[110]. It would seem that the paradigmatic identity of a "political behaverour" constructed in the texts was male rather than female.

While politics was turning more and more into an occupation, a professional and modern activity, amateurs were turned "unpolitical". This was the fate of representatives in rural municipalities and social, communal activities that still, for example, linked party activities with

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60   "Eniten naisedustajia tuli valtiopäiville vuosiksi 1922-23, jolloin heidän määränsä kohoaminen niinkin korkeaksi kuin 20:ksi vaikutti etenkin kommunistien tuleminen eduskuntaan. Sosialistisen työväenpuolueen edustajista oli tällöin kuusi eli miltei joka neljännes naisia, minkä lisäksi vahvuudeltaan supistuneessa sosialidemokraattisessa eduskuntaryhmässäkin naisten osuus kohosi yli 20%:n. Alimmillaan – vain 11:ssä – naisedustajien luku taas oli vuonna 1930, jolloin vastaavasti sosialistisen työväenpuolueen lakkauttaminen ja siitä johtunut vasemmistoedustuksen heikkeneminen eduskunnassa oli omiaan vaikuttamaan tähän suuntaan. "Kommunismia vastaan"-tunnuksin vaalitaisteluun lähteminen sai sitä paitsi porvarilliset puolueet tällöin entistä enemmän liittoutumaan keskenään tai muusta syystä keskittämään voimansa joidenkin "miehisten miesten", voimakkaiden pääehdokkaiden ympärille ja luopumaan kovin useiden naisten asettamisesta ehdokkaiksi. Naisehdokkaita olikin vuonna 1930 vain runsas puolet edellisen vuoden määrästä."

61   "Norjassakin on todettu naisten olleen vaikea päästä valtiopäiville ennen kaikkea viimeksi mainittujen kaltaisilla talonpoikien valta-alueilla, koska "talonpojat eivät halua jäädä naisen hallittaviksi" (Greve, 49)."

local levels of action and peoples' daily lives[111]. However, returning to Turku, one text actually dealt with local politics.

> "The women's association and divisions of all parties are characterised by social activities. A general, final conclusion is that activity in political associations in Turku as a whole is nevertheless fairly lively. This is probably due to political associations offering their members other activities in addition to actual political action. An important basic factor in the activities of political associations is still that people in cities, because they are active in the associations, acquire like-minded friends and acquaintances. This is also a reason for seeking membership, and, once the members have joined, they stay, which is common to all parties and associations. In this way, a core group which continuously keeps up the activity of the association is formed. And someone is then available for the election campaign of the party... A common feature of the local associations of all parties is the increase in finances through fund-raising, lotteries and women's sewing circle activities."[112]

Mapping the citizens

a) Ideal and deviant voters

> "Almost two million Finns came to express about themselves a lot of things that we cannot know about those who stayed away."[62] [113]

The meanings given to "filling in the ballot" were, however, borrowed from Robert E. Lane, not from the Finnish voters. What meanings were given to non-voting was similarly decided by somebody other than the voter:

> "One segment of the voters was simultaneously unwilling to vote and unable to make a choice. They were also ill aware of the time of the elections and doubtful about the significance of taking part. Some of these insecure ones voted, others remained in the sleepers' party."[63] [114]

The opposite of this dull personality was the interested person, discussing the elections with his friends and expressing plenty of opinions. The motives for voting were assigned by the author; he was not interested in the objects' own reasons. And the authority of the author to legislate the motives was unquestionable.

What was the model constructed on the basis of participation studies? What is the map of the electorate like? How were voters classified? As the

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62   "Melkein kaksi miljoonaa suomalaista tuli ilmaisseeksi itsestään paljonkin sellaista, mitä emme voi tietää pois jääneistä".

63   "Eräs osa äänestäjäkunnasta oli samanaikaisesti sekä äänestyshaluton että kykenemätön tekemään valinnan. He olivat myös huonosti selvillä vaalien ajankohdasta ja epäilivät osallistumisensa merkitystä. Toiset näistä epävarmoista äänestivät, toiset jäivät nukkuvien puolueeseen."

identities constructed for people were largely implicit, some texts explicitly dealt with constructing normality and deviance.

> "No doubt, facts are oversimplified if the emphasis is only put on dividing the electorate into two: the sleepers' party that has turned its back on society and the party of alert citizens who have fulfilled their obligation to vote. There are, of course, great differences among nearly two million voters. *Their positions in the political system vary from the most central and responsible ones to the most remote ones.* Even these remote ones can, however, be influential as opinion leaders among their own acquaintances. On the other hand, many of them content themselves with just listening and following passively."[64] [115]

The explicit central coordinate of the map of the electorate seems to be *the centre-periphery coordinate;* the positions of the voters can be *high or low*[116]. Citizenship was hierarchically organized.

Why this "increasing interest in elections and political behaviour"[117]? If the map is seen in connection with *a project on citizenship*, it becomes connected to a wider time perspective. This was actually done[118] in an article that referred to choices made in deciding about the 1906 Legislation on General Suffrage in Finland. References were made to the Hermanson committee that prepared the reform:

> "Unfortunately, no coherent presentation was made in 1906 that would show how and on what basis the Finns were requested to make their choices among parties. We can, however, draw conclusions from some prestigious utterances as to *what was required of an "ideal voter"* when general suffrage was legislated here."[65] [119]

Why the "model voter" and his/her qualities should be discussed, rather than "the model government" and the voters' opportunities to control the public use of power, was not explained.

The qualities attached to "the model voter" clearly have something to do with *maturity, adulthood and enlightenment*. The two groups that might not fill these criteria were

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64   "Epäilemättä tosiasioita yksinkertaistetaan aivan liikaa, jos pannaan painoa vain yhdenlaiselle äänestäjäkunnan kahtiajaolle: Toinen eli nukkuvien puolue, joka on kääntänyt selkänsä yhteiskunnalle, ja toinen eli valveutuneiden äänestysvelvollisuutensa täyttäneiden puolue. Vallitseehan lähes kahden miljoonan äänestäjän kesken sentään suuria eroja. Heidän sijaintinsa poliittisessa järjestelmässä vaihtelee kaikkein keskeisimmistä ja vastuunalaisemmista asemista syrjäisimpiin. Mutta nämä syrjäisetkin saattavat vaikuttaa mielipidejohtajana omassa tuttavapiirissään. Toisaalta monet heistä tyytyvät vain kuuntelemaan ja passiivisesti seuraamaan mukana."

65   "Valitettavasti vuonna 1906 ei laadittu mitään yhtenäistä esitystä, jossa olisi osoitettu kuinka ja millaisin perustein suomalaisten toivottiin tekevän valintansa eri puolueiden välillä. Joistakin arvovaltaisista lausunnoista voidaan kuitenkin päätellä, mitä "ihanneäänestäjältä" virallisesti toivottiin, kun täällä säädettiin yleinen ja yhtäläinen äänioikeus."

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1) *the youth;*

> "Mature age seems required, dependence may easily lead the youth to fall under the influence of political agitators, who can turn the sensitive mind of the youth with their melodious, ornamental speeches and phrases to party aims."

2) *women;*

> "Another dispute dealt with women's right to vote, whereupon two views existed in the committee. According to some, young women, who would make up a rather large part of the electorate, have on the whole so far paid very little attention to governmental and societal matters of legislation, of which they hardly have any comprehension. And one may, with reason, doubt whether it is good that we try in this respect to achieve rapid maturation in them artificially, with the regulations of election laws." The majority of the committee considered, however, that married women, who are the majority, have learned in the school of life to weigh reasons and counter-reasons."[66] [120]

A B-population is constructed of youth and women, whose "maturity", "independence", and "growth into a truly active politics" - to "mature and independent discretion" - is found lacking. The maturation of these groups does not seem to have advanced since the beginning of the century, when the vote was "given" to these groups. The "problem" still seems "surprisingly fresh" to the author[121]. The Hermanson committee is said to especially have wanted to "protect young women from *"rapid maturation"*.[122]

Examples of the B-population are brought into the text by giving them a voice. How was this done? How was "the other voice" treated?

> "In Korpilahti, an interview was conducted with a farmer's wife who said that she had not taken part in a single election. She had visited a polling place only once. This was in 1939, when she was too young to vote. Two decades later, she said, still offended: As they didn't let me vote then, I haven't tried since, either."[67]

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66 "varttuneempi ikä näyttää tarpeen vaatimalta", "epäitsenäisyys voi helposti saattaa nuorison valtiollisten yllyttäjien valtaan, jotka osaavat sointuvilla korupuheilla ja lauseparsilla puoluetarkoituksiinsa kääntää nuorison kaikille vaikutuksille herkän mielen".
"Toinen kiista koski naisten äänioikeutta, josta komiteassa myös oli kaksi näkökantaa. Eräiden mielestä "nuoret naiset, jotka tulisivat olemaan melkoinen osa vaalioikeutettujen määrästä, ovat tähän asti ylipäätään kiinnittäneet varsin vähän huomiota valtiollisiin ja yhteiskunnallisiin lainsäädäntökysymyksiin, joista ei heillä myöskään liene sanottavaa käsitystä. Ja saattaa syystäkin epäillä, onko hyvä että teennäisesti, vaalilain määräyksillä koetetaan heissä aikaansaada tässä suhteessa äkkikypsyyttä". Komitean enemmistö oli kuitenkin sitä mieltä että "Naidut naiset, jotka ovat enemmistönä, ovat elämän koulussa oppineet punnitsemaan syitä ja vastasyitä".

67 "Korpilahdella haastateltiin muuatta emäntää, joka ei sanonut ottaneensa osaa yksiinkään vaaleihin. Hän oli mennyt vaalihuoneistoon vain kerran. Se tapahtui vuonna 1939, jolloin hän oli vielä liian nuori saadakseen äänestää. Kaksi vuosikymmentä myöhemmin hän sanoi yhä loukkaantuneena: "Kun eivät silloin päästäneet, niin en minä ole myöhemminkään yrittänyt."

Who is the stupid one in this case, the farmer's wife or the person who conducted the interview? How does the text represent the farmer's wife as being ridiculous? And how can this representation be put into question? Knowing the population of the district of Häme, one could also assume that the farmer's wife was not quite *literal* about her motives and was silently fooling the young student from the big city.

> "A young woman had moved to the city and married a communist from Tampere. In May of 1958 she still supported the Agrarian Party, which was her father's party. But during the interview, which took place in July, she said that she had given her vote to the 'Workers' Union'. In reality, her new opinion did not mature quite as easily; according to the notes in the election register she did not vote at all."[68]

Even here the author sets himself on the same side as the audience, saying: see how ridiculous this poor voter is[123]. If the poor woman really did change her mind like that, there would have been good reason for Finnish political scientists to study patriarchal power relations in the country.

How do voters fulfil the requirements of "the ideal voter"? We can clearly see that the farmer's wife from Korpilahti (the non-voter) and the communist's wife from Tampere (the fluent voter) did not fulfil the requirements of the ideal. But the question is whether the third example (the stable voter) does that:

> "As, for instance, a retired factory worker from Tampere told about having been a member of the Social Democrats from the beginning, this in a way indicates that the party affiliation of 1958 had already been decided upon half a century ago."[124]

The "bad" voters are for some reason exemplified by women[125]. The opposite of these poor souls is the interested person, who discusses the elections with his friends and "presents the greatest number of opinions"[126]. Incidentally, "the good ones" seem to have the same characteristics as the researcher himself.

> "Above the average in interest were men, especially married ones, and middle-aged and wealthy persons with good incomes."[127]

In discussing the "ideal voters", the author underlines the effect of the original citation from the Hermanson committee by still marvelling

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68   "Nuori rouva oli muuttanut kaupunkiin ja mennyt naimisiin tamperelaisen kommunistin kanssa. Vielä toukokuussa 1958 hän kannatti maalaisliittoa, joka oli hänen isänsä puolue. Mutta jo heinäkuun haastattelussa hän kertoi antaneensa äänensä Skdl:lle. Todellisuudessa hänen uusi kantansa ei tosin kypsynyt näin helposti, sillä vaaliluettelon merkintöjen mukaan hän ei äänestänyt ollenkaan."

twice at how "fresh and timely the text is". The references were made to a text from 1906. However, the article that is making the references was written in 1964. Thus, the construction of the B-population endures through time in spite of the results based on voting statistics from 1956, and the results of the author's own study in 1958, which showed that female students voted slightly more actively than male ones.

What is "the problem"? The texts establishes differences between "the norm" and "the problematic", "the normal and the deviant" populations of voters. The "norm" is the population not specified: the non-young, non-female, non-working-class. "The norms" themselves decide the criteria for normality, in relation to which everybody else is constructed as being deviant. No matter how "near the voter" the researcher aims, the jurisdiction, the criteria are set by him, as an image of himself. The right to give meanings to voting remains his. The project of citizenship has been expanded, and the youth and the women have been integrated into the citizenship, but as a B-population, as marginal.[128]

b) Participation studies as citizen control

The vocabulary of participation studies also seems to imply that voting studies have something to do with *normalization, integration and control* of citizenship. The objects studied appear to be seen as determined. "In some countries, race, religion, nationality and native origin have this kind of *remote-controlling* effect"[129].

What is this knowledge good for? How "near the voter" can the inquiries reach? Looking at some of the texts, the visions become frightening:

> "Even without performing an interview, it is possible to know whether or not a particular Finnish citizen voted, simply because the election board makes notes of such in the register of voters. ...
>
> The sex, age, marital status, address, occupation, and even the native language spoken are additional variables readily available from the register...
>
> It is possible to add data from other official and private records to this basic information: for instance, the taxable income, the length of the residence in the commune, membership in some associations, etc., of each person; and with the additional trouble of searching the records of previous elections, as far as they are preserved, the habitual and occasional non-voters could be traced. *Moreover, as this application of the law of the publicity of documents is hardly known at all, it provides the interviewer with a reliable way of checking whether the interviewees have given correct answers regarding their participation.*"[130]

Since political beliefs were said to be extremely private, a second control was now introduced; official documents were used to countercheck the survey data. In this way the previous "communist's wife" was

revealed to be non-voter instead of a fluent one. The perspective for studying voting behaviour was that of surveillance: "observing voters' behaviour"[131].

Facts, Others and selves

"Research on political behaviour is like a house... A part of the foundations lie on sand, and some of the walls hang weirdly, but from the top, a marvellous view is opened."
"There are even such opinions that 'research on political behaviour' does not, in fact (Finnish:in reality), mean anything."[69] [132]

How could anybody believe in this representation? How was the "fact" of women's passivity produced? What made it believable, credible and factual? How was this normative view established?

In the above, I have been trying to establish that the "fact" of women's passivity is "not true": there is no reason to believe in it. However, no claim is made that another fact should be produced to replace it. I have been looking at how the fact was rhetorically produced, and I expect other facts to be produced in similar ways.

The rhetorical devices used in the texts are the ones commonly used in sciences in general and in the behaviourial sciences in particular. The language of science appears to us to be transparent, objective, static and logical. This "scientific-looking" language uses the usual rhetorical devices based on the "ideology of representation"; it makes us believe that the objects of research exist "out there" independently of the researcher, before he starts "looking" at them and "finding the facts".

One of the strategies for establishing the "out-thereness" of an object for research was the establishment of *central concepts*, i.e. processing dead metaphors. A new vocabulary was brought into political science. Concepts and methods became totems, signs of belonging to the academic tribe, a scientific community, and they were given magical powers[133].

Attitude:
Party preferences and choices were called "attitudes":

"Party affiliation is the central concept of this presentation. It, too, is an attitude that has been defined in different ways. It can at least in principle be anchored in actual behaviour. But it can also be accounted for

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69   "Poliittisen käyttäytymisen tutkimus on kuin talo... Perustuksista on osa hiekalla ja jotkut seinät riippuvat omituisesti, mutta huipulta avautuu loistava näköala."
"Onpa sellaisiakin mielipiteitä ettei "poliittisen käyttäytymisen tutkimus" todellisuudessa merkitse mitään."

on the basis of purely verbal reactions."[70] [134]

The "verbal reactions" of persons could be studied by survey methods, which were seen as "soft" in comparison to statistics or observing people's behaviour. "Gathering data on people's opinions and looking for "consistency" in them was to gather "verbal reactions".

> "Attitude is in a way a hypothetical concept. It is explanatory and useful, but at the same time only an invention of the researcher and not any quality of persons observable in itself."[71] [135]

Although "an attitude" was defined very reflexively here, "attitudes" soon became attached to people in most radical ways, creating identities they could not escape.

Behaviour:
The difference between *voting behaviour* and *electoral behaviour* was defined as follows:

> "The term *voting behaviour* has generally been used to cover electorate behaviour during the actual campaign period and polling day.......
> It is a well-known finding that changes in voting decisions are less numerous during the election campaigns than between them."[136]
> "Although voting behaviour, either mainly limited to the act of voting, or, as in this paper, more widely defined and therefore better called electoral behaviour, has mainly stimulated behavioural research in this field, it should not be separated from its *natural, more general context of the political behaviour of the electorate. The latter is present every day*, the former only in the periodical highlights of political life."[137]

Although the reader now would expect the text to deal with the "behaviour that is present every day", the author goes on to present "certain aspects of the political and electoral system of Finland", which turns out to mean the procedures for Parliamentary elections. What part of my everyday life, for instance, would be considered *"political behaviour"* remains undisclosed. The "behaviour" of walking to Kallio Secondary School where I vote? The "behaviour" of walking to the corner shop to buy food? I get the feeling the one should be considered "political behaviour", the other not. But why?

The conceptual totems like "attitudes", behaviour", "verbal responses" and "verbal reactions" translated everyday actions into a

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70   " Puoluekanta on tämän esityksen keskeinen käsite. Sekin on asenne, joka on määritelty eri tavoilla. Se voidaan ainakin periaatteessa ankkuroida tosiasialliseen käyttäytymiseen. Mutta se voidaan myös selvittää puhtaasti verbaalien reaktioiden avulla."

71   "Asenne on aina tavallaan hypoteettinen käsite. Se on selittävä ja käyttökelpoinen, mutta samalla se on oikeastaan vain tutkijain keksintö eikä mikään itsessään havaittavissa oleva henkilöiden ominaisuus."

new language of political science. Actions and processes were turned into objects by nominalisation; politics was not about action but about behaviour that could be named, classified and measured.

The behaviourial discourse was furthermore authorized by the use of metaphors from the natural sciences. Quantification and seeming exactness made the argument all the more convincing. Methods appeared as "tools". It was forgotten that the questions were posed by the researcher and the scales were loaded with values[138]. A scientific-looking language was established by the common use of *quantification rhetoric*, classifications, statistics, mathematics, and formal logic, as if the exactness and detailedness of the rhetoric made the representation transparent, or as if the aggregation of data could hide the quasi-logical nature of the argumentation. The "problem of measuring feelings" became easier to deal with from the safe distance that was created. Values and emotions vanished in the aggregation process. "Knowledge" was materialised in the method. It was forgotten that the questionnaire was also constructed by the researcher and, indeed, expressed in some language.

Extra help was given by positioning "Anglo-America" as a contextual ideal for the scientific community of Finnish political science of the time and the political climate of the time, where a reference to the US was enough to legitimate a representation.

This process of constructing "neutrality" oddified everyday language, translated the language of the objects into a new language game that not everybody could use. The language of objects out there could now be presented to a (civilised) audience and established as expert knowledge[139] about "them". However "near the voter" the researcher aimed, this translation proves to have the counter-tendency of distancing the voter.

The language game of the researcher *produced the object of research and constructed specific kinds of identities*. "The voter" became a reified subject that produces reified social relations. In political science, a human being received value only as this kind of reified subject. Identity was reduced to a social category[140]. Political activity was reduced to voting, which also was remote-controlled. The voter identity constructed people as being controllable and countable[141].

Among these "voters", women were constructed as peripheral, marginal and deviant. The appalling feature of the discourse is that there was no attempt to *explain* women's behaviour. Gender explained; nothing explained gender. It was merely produced, reproduced from cultural stereotypes, classified as binary, produced as a natural category, hierarchised and eternalized.

It seems that the "fact" of women's passivity was imported rather than researched. The "American" voices over-shadowed the local voices of the Finnish "reality". Gendered practices were embedded in

constructions of central concepts. Analyses of data were turned into tautologizations of cultural conceptions and to tautologies of tautologies explaining, in fact, nothing. A gender difference was forced upon the interpretations of an already gendered survey data.

The texts do produce "others", but also selves. The behaviourist style was legitimated in the beginning by *referencing the real*, telling the facts about a true reality, presenting the researcher as a passive observer of reality. Looking at the total organization of the discourse, we can, however, figure out that the implicit construction of the researcher's position is built into the discourse. For the researcher himself, the effects seem quite nice. *The discourse followed the logic of professionalization and established the researcher as an expert on something. It established a monopoly of giving meaning to other people's choices.*

Believability is, however, not based on rhetorical devices alone. Nor is it only based on the *social position of science as a canonical practice*, which the rhetoric of behaviourism helped to create and heighten and as a habit of reading scientific textualities as fact rather than fiction.

The fact that the texts were believed (I assume) is also based on "implicit preconditions and precontracts of argumentation"[142]. How things become facts or lose their facticity, and how things are valued, is based on *author-audience precontracts*, shared views on values and hierarchical grounds for evaluation. Within the value frames of the fifties it might not have been possible to contest the representation of women's passivity.

My now being able to produce a believable counter-text (I hope) and illustrate the illogicality of the texts is not because the former political scientists were fools and we are so clever now. Destabilizing and questioning the author-audience reading contract is now possible because of *contextual changes*. Facticity is questioned because of the time difference and the change of social conventions and values. The "value-kit" that made the representation appear logical has vanished.

In "referencing the real", the texts brought in Other voices, voices of the field, that tend to be or can be read as ruptures in discourse. The voice of the farmer's wife breaks through the textual control of the author, turning *the stage*.

Looking at the total organization of the discourse, it constructed women as deviant and limited the political to what men do. This representation may have had some effects upon the women of the fifties who, of course, still voted and "behaved", although their "behaviour" was not culturally confirmed. The main effect was probably still upon *Finnish political science that in this way established and strengthened its own border.*

So what? What exactly has changed?

Some signs indicate that the naturalised gender order of the fifties became problematic very soon after these voting studies were

published, in the late sixties. Even in political science it was suggested that the *respondents* to an interview might gear their answers in accordance to cultural expectations and norms on the behaviour of men and women[143]. The gender variable again became cross-tabulated with other variables like age, region or party affiliation[144]. It was suggested, in the context of political science criticised as being ethnocentric and atheoretical, that the statement of women's passivity explained in fact nothing unless it was culturally contextualized, and that change in women's position was possible and even desirable[145]. The first work of a female political scientist studying women – women's organizations within parties – was published in 1967[146]. And a major monograph, posthumously published in 1971, dealt with women as well as men in the elections to the parliament, seeing women's representation as something to be favoured rather than ridiculed[147]. The reasons for women's dislike of candidacy in elections were explained as follows:

> "It appears to be a rure in all parties that the number of women willing to become candidates and to be accepted is minor in comparison to male candidates. An actual lack of female candidates has been a very common feature. Of the reasons for this, some are very obvious, some unclear. It is, for instance, considered relatively natural that a mother of a family does not easily leave her children and her household in other people's care to create a political career for herself. But it may not have been studied whether the Finnish woman in general is freer of the vanity that is satisfied by public life than is the Finnish man. However, it seems undeniable that some prejudiced attitudes among women as well as among men have had an effect upon the result."[72] [148]

Paradoxically, if not uniquely, the women's role in politics was then becoming *visible* at the same time as the acceptability of separate activities for women were considered ineffective and untimely, and came to be integrated into "men's" activities in the name of the new equality politics of the late sixties.[149] *Visibility coincided with integration and a new invisibility, bringing women back to the same.*

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72   Kaikissa puolueissamme näkyy olleen sääntönä, että ehdokkaaksi suostuvia ja hyväksyttyjä naisia on ollut tarjolla vain vähäinen määrä miesehdokkaisiin verrattuna. Suoranainen naisehdokaspula on ollut hyvinkin tavallinen ilmiö. Tähän johtaneista syistä jotkut ovat varsin ilmeisiä, toiset epäselviä. Katsotaan, esimerkiksi, jokseenkin luonnolliseksi, että perheenäiti ei jätä lapsiaan ja talouttaan toisten hoiviin luodakseen itselleen poliittista karriääriä. Mutta lienee tutkimatta, onko suomalainen nainen yleensä vapaampi kuin suomalainen mies siitä turhamaisuudesta, jota julkinen elämä tyydyttää. Kiistämättömältä sen sijaan näyttää, että eräät ennakkoluuloiset asenteet niin hyvin naisten itsensä keskuudessa kuin miesten joukossa ovat vaikuttaneet tulokseen."

5.4   Mapping women; the map talking

So what are they like, the worlds constructed by the texts of political science? What are the *spaces* covered in the maps constructed of politics? Metaphors of mapping and ideas of covering white areas of the maps, the object constructed for political science, were common in the rhetoric of my "object" of study, the textuality of political science. The rhetoric was characterised by strong commitments to spatial images and by ideas of ready-made, self-given spaces to be brought into the sphere of research. Texts were evaluated in terms of "filling a hole in the field of research", of "filling a place as an orientation to the field". The "sectors", "arenas", "spheres" and "domains" of politics formed and still form hidden spatialisations.

Conceptual architectures form maps that regulate what can and cannot be said within a discursive formation. They can be thought of as root metaphors that gradually have turned into nature and thereby regulate what kinds of questions can be asked? Imageries of knowledge constitute meaning, metaphors constitute social reality. The "aboutness" of the objects studied creates the illusion of neutrality and naturalness. Conceptual architectures form cosmologies, worlds of their own, contingent virtual "realities".

The two conceptual architectures of postwar Finnish political science were "the *state-centred* architecture" and "the *politics/power*"-centred one, here rhetorically reconstructed as a dialogue between the old and the new. Within these architectures, the study of political science was classified into different areas or domains: institutions, democracy, ideas and ideologies, parties or pressure groups, political behaviour, and so on. "Natural" phenomena, named and classified, divided the domain of political science in different ways, i.e. constructed different domains. How about women within the domains? Contrary to expectations, women were actually talked about in political science. Where were women talked about?

The old architecture of political science evolved explicitly around a distinction and dichotomisation between the state and the society, a categorization that easily became conceived as a dichotomy[150]. However, "behind" the duality of state and society you can easily find "a third": the family. By looking at an "origin" of the duality of state and society you can find an "original triad" of state, civil society and family.

If "grounding texts"[151] were to be seen as speech acts that were "the starting point" of everything, "beginnings" that made the rest possible by combining alien discursive fields in new ways[152], the process of constructing political science looks more like one of "forgetting", closing out and limiting meaning. Family was forgotten in the concept-

ual field of political science.

The duality of state and society formed the implicit spatialisation around which the old architechture was built. It formed the essential coordinates for the way of perceiving the world, or giving the world a shape. Debating this duality was a central way of constructing the object of political science.

Within the old architecture, women were talked about in texts about democracy, although ruled out as a problem already solved in Finland. A "natural place" for women was established as the vote was "given to them". Other "objects" of political science were dissociated from women. Women and politics was about *the right to vote*, and as this right had been established, there were no questions to be asked – *there was no issue*.

In Bakhtinian terms of centrifugal and peripetal moves, Geertz[153] *has described a cosmology of politics that is structured by a basic ambiguity between a centrifugal and a centripetal element, a tension between centre and periphery where the centre acts as an ideal. In these terms the cosmology of state and society can be seen as a centre-periphery structure that has "forgotten about its periphery" and suppressed its margins.*

The first architecture was a centre-focused and hierarchical one. (Its Outside was the family.) There was a co-existence between an explicitly gendered and a "neutral" discourse: a co-existence of a regime where gender was talked about and a regime of political institutions that did not touch each other, which made it possible to believe that "we" had equality.

> "It appears perfectly clear that a phenomenon can be called 'political' – and thereby fall within the sphere of political science – only if its relationship to the state organization is considered."
> "All attempts to decide the concept 'political' without consideration for this organization are in vain... When the state organization is placed at the centre of research, *a boundary is also marked* by which the interest of political science in social relations diminishes or totally disappears. Naturally there is in all relations of reality something that can be brought into connection with the research object of political science. But the interest in the relation is *reduced as the connection to the formal state apparatus becomes looser.*" [73] [154]

What happened to *the new conceptual achitecture of politics and power?*

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73   "Det förefaller alldeles klart, att en företeelse kan benämnas "politisk" – och därmed falla inom statslärans ram – endast om man beaktar dess förhållande till den statliga organisationen.
"Alla försök att bestämma begreppet "politisk" utan hänsyn till denna organisation är fåfänga.... Då statsorganisationen placeras i centrum för undersökningen markerar man också en gräns, vid vilken statslärans intresse för de sociala smmanhangen avtar eller helt försvinner. Det finns givetvis i alla verklighetssammanhang något som på något sätt kan bringas i samband med statslärans forskningobjekt. Men intresset för sammanhaget reduceras, ju lösare förbindelsen med den formella statsorganisationen är."

Was it less centre-focused? Did it include and integrate women?

In the new architecture, the "sphere of political science" was expanded to new areas. The new cosmology of "politics" and "power" argued for itself in terms of widening the space. The rhetoric of replacing the state-focused architecture advanced in terms of expanding the area or domain of the discipline's objects of study, expanding it from the high to the low, to the individual as the "real reality" that could reveal the truth about politics.The transfer from the old to the new cosmology was said to widen the area of politics from the centre to the periphery. The new area reached out to "individuals" and to "psychology" as the final explanation, thereby constructing an atomistic individual level as an opposite to a centre. Parties and individuals as new objects of research were explained as causative factors that act *"behind"* the governmental order, as "political forces". The reason for including individuals as "objects of study" was to get to the *"basic"* causes and reasons for political behaviour.

"Politics and power" as central metaphors were potentially decentralistic. However, soon after the establishing of the new cosmology one can find signs of problems of *losing the boundaries, boundary confusion, and consequently, new delineations of the boundaries, demarcations of policing the political.*

Liminal states had to be explicitly exemplified. In the case of international politics, the New presupposed a crossing of borders of the nation state. "International relations" had been defined as

> "... all human behaviour that has its origin on one side of a state border and affects human behaviour on the other side of it."

The new field of international relations should deal with international relations in all forms, but...

> "Naturally, international relations in this wide meaning includes a lot of things that have *absolutely no political label, for example tourist trips, marriages between persons of different nationalities and international scientific congresses.*" [74] [155]

The field of international politics as a study of power relations could stretch itself from *"sport clubs to families of states"*, - but not ordinary families.

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74   "...allt mänskligt beteende som har sitt upphov på en sida av en statsgräns
      och påverkar mänskligt beteende på andra sidan denna gräns.
      Självfallet omfattar internationella relationer" i denna vida bemärkelse en-
      mängd saker som absolut inte har politisk prägel, t.ex. turistresor, äktenskap
      mellan personer av olika nationalitet och internationella vetenskapliga kon-
      gresser."

"All exercise of power is therefore not politics, for instance exercise of power in *the family*."

"What makes these phenomena relevant for political scientists is that they appear in the actions of the *central actors of politics*."

"On the other hand, not all exercise of power is interesting from the point of view of political scientists - just the exercise of power that happens within a framework that is relevant to political science." [75] [156]

As characteristics of individuals could become political in the new cosmology, a distinction had to be made between political and non-political ones. After a long intertextual wandering in different texts the specification of the colour of women's hair disappeared and became gender neutral, finally becoming an example of non-political characteristics of individuals.[157]

The second architecture, decentering the state and expanding into the lower spaces, met problems in integrating gender into its discourse. It met the problems by hierarchising gender. The abnormal case of associating women and the centre, women in wrong places like sand on a table, turned their coding from conservatives to communists. The embarrassing genderedness of discourse could be covered by abstracting gendered practices into variables, separating people from their "opinions" and making them "things", countable and controllable. Making a reduction of "politics" to "attitudes" and attributing these metonymic identities to people in a neutralised and depoliticised form made it possible to hide the fact that male practices were normativised and universalised, constructed as bases for categorizations of ideal and deviant behaviour, and reestablished a high and low ordering. The move towards the domain of women and the private sphere was returned back to the Same. But the authority to give expert evaluations on people's behaviour had already been established. Widening the domain of "neutral" discourse, it intensified control and individuation.

At the same time that the map/architecture was widened and decentralised, the language of science was abstracted and reified. But in addition, the embarrassing maleness of discourse could now, after abstraction and reification of the objects and of knowledge, be claimed neutral and universal.

Even if political science was to deal with all power relations anywhere, there had to be a limit. Looking at the later architechture, one can find that the *wider definition* was never made real[158]. In terms of centrifugal – peripetal moves, the second architecture met a backlash. Having been "too individual" and low, political science returned to the

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75   "Kaikki vallankäyttö ei siis ole politiikkaa, esimerkiksi vallankäyttö perheessä."

"Politologeille relevanteiksi nämä ilmiöt tekee kuitenkin vasta se, että ne esiintyvät politiikan (?) *keskeisten* subjektien toiminnassa."

"Toisaalta kaikki vallankäyttökään ei ole politologien kannalta mielenkiintoista, vain se *vallankäyttö joka tapahtuu "politologisesti relevanteissa puitteissa."*

centre, to institutions and to more reified theory. A boundary towards sociology was constructed.

The centrifugal – peripetal movement can be seen as two counter-moves: one of expansion, the other of reification. Once taken into possession, the Other could be objectified and kept in control. Having established itself as expert discourse of a profession, the rhetoric of realism and true reality was replaced in favour of a more abstract conceptual language game, still furthering the exclusivity of the language of game of the profession. The fear of losing boundaries could be held at a distance by demarcations and separations from others, but it was replaced by the logic of professionalisation offering less and less space, more and more narrow lines of demarcation, more boundaries.

Although the second wave was rhetorically grounded and made its breakthrough as a decentering move, everything now seems to have remained about the same. Hereafter, the structure of "the map" of politics was stabilised, petrified and naturalised into the structures of the major textbooks that were written in the late sixties, and that still – although with revisions of content but basically the same mapping of what "belongs" to politics – are in common use in the curricula of political science in Finland[159].

However, beyond monological, reified forms of knowledge, the voices of history echo heterogenously, in multiple forms and open to varied interpretations.

> "The political sociology research that has been vigorously practiced during the recent decades has brought clarification to people's voting behaviour and habits, to many such *laws* that in conditions of competition direct large masses to vote in predictable ways, as well as to some of those that make some groups to remain non-voters. (Crossed out: The prognoses are mostly based on observed correlations. But correlations alone are not enough to explain causes. Therefore, proceeding this way...) (Addition: However, there can be no full previous certainty about how people vote in changed conditions or when a changed govern-

mental situation faces them with an unforeseen range of alternatives. (Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory). Recent elections (for the Governor) in New York caused one observer to excitedly claim that "political rules considered as established were broken one after the other in the hands of an electorate (that is) becoming more and more self-conscious and more independent." (James Reston, The New York Times 8.11.1965.) *Reality is more miraculous than sociology.*" [76] [160]

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76   "Viime vuosikymmenien kuluessa erittäin vireästi harrastettu poliittisen sosiologian tutkimus on tuonut selvyyttä ihmisten äänestyskäyttäytymiseen ja -tottumuksiin, moniin sellaisiin "*läkeihin*", jotka kilpailuoloissa ohjaavat suuria joukkoja äänestämään ennakolta ennustettavalla tavalla, samoin kuin eräisiin niistä, jotka saavat jotkin ryhmät jättämän äänestämättä. (Yliviivattu: Ennusteet pohjautuvat useimmiten havaittuihin korrelaatioihin. Mutta korrelaatiohan ei yksinään riitä syyn selittämiseen. Tästä johtuu että näin menetellen) Lisä: Kuitenkaan ei voida saavuttaa täyttä ennakkovarmuutta siitä, millä tavoin ihmiset käyttäytyvät kokonaan vaihtuneissa oloissa tai silloin, kun muuttunut valtiollinen järjestelmä asettaa heidän eteensä ennen näkemättömän valikoiman vaihtoehtoja. (Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory) Äskettäiset New Yorkin (kuvernööri)vaalit saivat erään tarkkailijan innostuneena väittämään, että "vakiintuneina pidetyt poliittiset säännöt rikkoutuivat (yksi) toisensa jälkeen yhä itsetietoisemmaksi ja itsenäisemmäksi käyvän äänestäjäkunnan käsissä". (James Reston, The New York Times 8.11.1965.) Todellisuus on ihmeellisempi kuin sosiologia."

NOTES

1. Nousiainen 1958a, 76.
2. Jansson 1959; Scandinavian Political Studies, Bibliography 1966.
3. Jansson 1959, 3, 4. Whether the break is "true" or not is not is a question of dispute. By comparing the titles of articles in the journals of the community, Valtio ja yhteiskunta and Politiikka the change would seem clear. The break in publishing the journal and changing the name appears to be a clear sign of change. On other criteria, it might not be so clear that there was a change in research; see, for instance, Anckar 1972 on the SPS-bibliography. To prove whether there really was a break is, however, not an issue in this work.
4. Jansson 1959, 1-6; on ideologies also Jansson 1955a.
5. Studies on parties and evolving studies on pressure groups are left aside for reasons of research economy.
6. Petersson 1987.
7. Teljo 1934b.
8. Another, even more supressed origin story - adequately put in notes, would be a text from 1927, telling about different theories about the origin of the state. About "what is the state" we learn f.ex. from Machiavelli: "Kaikki valtiot, kaikki herruudet, joilla on ollut valta hallita ihmisiä..."; according to contract theory, the state was born "as a result of a contract between all free men or all free men and the ruler". About the pathriarchal theory we learn, that family is the origin of the state and as the family grows, the father of the family is transformed into "the eldest of the kin"/heimonvanhin". This person is not the oldest in age, but chosen on the criteria that he is "heimon väkevin ja uljain edustaja". Ruutu 1927,6-9. Compare with Pateman 1988. The most hidden origin of the state, as a contract between men that presupposes the exclusion of women.
9. Snellman, citation in Teljo 1934b, 15.
10. Ibid., 16.
11. Ibid., 16.
12. An announcement/invitation to the meeting for grounding the Finnish Political Science Assication 25.11.1935, published in the first number of the journal Valtio ja Yhteiskunta 1941; Hirvikallio 1941, 99-100. /Julkilausuma/kutsu Valtiotieteellisen yhdistyksen perustavaan kokoukseen 25.11.1935.
13. Kilpeläinen 1936, 392.
14. Ruutu 1949, 89, 82. "Venäjän tsaarin ja Englannin kuningatar Elisabethin suhteita ratkaisemaan 1583 joutui Maria Hasting, joka valitettavasti oli "suurikasvuinen, ylen laiha, nenä suora ja sormet laihat ja pitkät."
"Venetsian lähettiläät eivät saaneet ottaa rouvaansa mukaan oleskelumaahan, koska pelättiin rouvan voivan varomattomasti ilmaista valtiosalaisuuksia. Sen sijaan lähettiläs kyllä sai ottaa mukaansa kokin, ollakseen varma, ettei häntä myrkytettäisi."
15. Ruutu 1937, 81.
16. Tarkiainen 1938.
17. Tarkiainen 1938. Valtionpäämies was mentioned (page/occurence) on pages 13, 20, 22, 39, 39, 39, 40, 51, 58, 59, 59, 59, 60, 64, 70, 78, 80, 81, 87, 89, 91; valitsijamies, 52, 54, 56, 71, 71, 71, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 91; hallituksen päämies 22; luottamusmies 25; johtomies; kansaneduskunnan puhemies 40; eduskunnan herruus 81; emämaa 11.
18. Jansson 1952a; also Jansson 1960d, 152.
19. Jansson 1952a, 7.
20. Tarkiainen 1959a.
21. Ibid., 60.

22.   Ibid., 61.
23.   Tarkiainen 1965.
24.   Tarkiainen 1959b, 2.
25.   Tarkiainen 1959b, 2.
26.   Tarkiainen 1952, 522.
27.   Krusius-Ahrenberg 1952, 19.
28.   Teljo 1949b; see also Allardt & Pesonen 1967.
29.   Tarkiainen 1957, 187.
30.   Teljo 1949b, 39, 41.
31.   Noponen 1959, 16.
32.   Tarkiainen 1944, 4.
33.   Tarkiainen 1957, 187.
34.   v. Bonsdorff 1951, 11.
35.   Jansson 1951b, 255.
36.   Killinen 1956.
37.   Ibid., 21.
38.   Ibid., 275.
39.   Ibid., 15.
40.   Killinen 1964.
41.   Jansson 1951a, 157.
42.   Pesonen 1965, 171.
43.   Pesonen 1958b, 19.
44.   Summa 1990, 18; Pekonen 1991.
45.   Pesonen 1960b, 6.
46.   Ibid., 8.
47.   Nousiainen 1956.
48.   Ibid., 127, 114.
49.   Nousiainen 1958b; Burman 1957; Lehto 1959; also Killinen 1958.
50.   Nousiainen 1960, 123-138; Rantala 1962.
51.   Allardt 1956; also Allardt & Bruun 1956.
52.   Ibid., 125, 128-130.
53.   Allardt 1956, 130.
54.   Hyvärinen 1950.
55.   Hyvärinen 1950, 344-346.
56.   Pesonen 1958b, 97, 104.
57.   Noponen 1965a, 18.
58.   Pesonen 1960c, 538.
59.   Pesonen 1964a, 8.
60.   Pesonen 1958b, 150.
61.   Pesonen 1965.
62.   Pesonen 1958b, 23-31, 57; Pesonen 1965, 31; Noponen 1959, 15; Rahkonen 1961; Noponen 1964a; 176-178; also Allardt & Pesonen 1967, 326-7, 346.
63.   Pesonen 1958b, 72-3.
64.   Number 17 refers to results on Anglo-Saxon voters, already stated in the beginning of the book as hypotheses, p. 27.
65.   Ibid., 57.
66.   Allardt 1956; Allardt & Bruun 1956.
67.   Pesonen 1960c, 538.

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68.　Teljo 1950a, cited in Pesonen 1962.

69.　Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991, 96. For critiques of the original Anglo-American participation studies, see for instance Siltanen & Stanworth 1984.

70.　Pesonen 1960c, 538.

71.　Rahkonen 1961, 95-96.

72.　Ibid., 96.

73.　Pesonen 1958b and 1965.

74.　Pesonen 1958b, 136-7. The students who refuced to answer the survey were described as "one young lady"/muuan neitonen"(s.41), "a couple of female students"/"pari naisylioppilasta" (s.41). These respondents were reported to have seen the survey as "political curiosity"/"poliittista utelua"; "My opinions about these things are no business of Y",/"mielipiteeni näistä asioista eivät kuulu Y:lle (tutkimuksen tekijänä Ylioppilaslehti), that they "had more important things to do" and that the inquiry was seen as intrusion in privasy and personal matters" (s. 41).

75.　Pesonen 1958b, 137.

76.　Pesonen 1965, 242.

77.　Pesonen 1958b.

78.　Ibid., 23.

79.　Ibid., 72-74.

80.　Pesonen 1958b.

81.　Pesonen 1965, 144; also Pesonen 1967.

82.　Swales cited Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991, 100.

83.　Pesonen 1960b, 6.

84.　Ibid., 6.

85.　Ibid., 8.

86.　Borg 1965c, 6; also Borg 1963 and Borg 1961a.

87.　About 50% of the members of the Conservative party were women, which probably was slightly more than in other parties in general.Rantala 1956a, 208. The first more covering data on women's party membership appears to be Tarkiainen 1971, 243-244.

88.　Rantala 1960, 5-7.

89.　Ibid., 5-7.

90.　Borg 1965b.

91.　Borg 1965b, 215.

92.　"The right wing is for true advancement and development." "Oikeisto ajaa todellista edistystä ja kehitystä." A citation from an election campaign booklet of the Concervative Party from 1933, in Rantala 1960, 4; also Rantala 1957 and Rantala 1961.

93.　Rantala 1956b, 83.

94.　Rantala 1960, 5.

95.　Pesonen 1964b, 1, a citation from Katz and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet – study on Erie County.

96.　Pesonen 1964b, 1-2.

97.　Pesonen 1965, 165-170.

98.　Pesonen 1958b, 167.

99.　Pesonen 1965, 329, 339.

100.　Pesonen 1965.

101.　Ibid., 226, 219, 330, 324-327, 169, 165.

102.　Noponen 1964a.

103.　Ibid., 79, 176, 184, 185, 82.

104. Noponen 1959, 15.
105. Noponen 1964a.
106. Noponen 1964a, 179-180.
107. Ibid., 180-1; also Noponen 1959, 11.
108. Noponen 1964a, 178.
109. Noponen 1964a, 179-80. Also, women's "own voice" was put in a note to explain why women would not want to put up more female candidates: "Women, themselves, underlined..."/"Naisten omalta taholta korostettiin..." ibid, 180.
110. Noponen 1964b, 236-7, 242: "The amount of social advancement/sosiaalisen kohoamisen määrää" is usually measured by comparing differences in social status between two generations, fathers and sons (and daughters)."
111. Noponen 1969, 210; Helander 1965; Flemming, Nikkari & Niskanen 1961.
112. Flemming, Nikkari & Niskanen 1961, 82, 76.
113. Pesonen 1960c, 536-7.
114. Ibid., 536-7.
115. Ibid., 537.
116. Pesonen 1962, 219; Noponen 1965b, 11; Pesonen 1964b, 16.
117. The expression from Pesonen 1962, 217.
118. Pesonen 1964a.
119. Pesonen 1964a, 4.
120. Pesonen 1964a, 4-5.
121. Ibid., 5.
122. Ibid., 6-7.
123. More about staging research objects for the audience, Gusfield 1976.
124. Pesonen 1964a, 6.
125. Also Pesonen 1965, 55, 81; according to the book even the stable voter, the factory worker, was a woman.
126. Pesonen 1960c, 537.
127. Ibid., 80.
128. Another study actually drew the lines of normality and deviance slightly differently. See Tarkiainen 1971, 20-53.
129. Pesonen 1960c, 539.
130. Pesonen 1962, 221-222.
131. Pesonen 1958a, 369.
132. Pesonen 1961, 206, 207. The house-metaphor is a citation from Ranney & Miller.
133. Luostarinen & Väliverronen 1991.
134. Pesonen 1964a, 3.
135. Ibid., 3.
136. Pesonen 1962, 218.
137. Ibid., 218.
138. Shapiro 1986b.
139. Compare Gusfield 1976 on constructing drunken-drivers.
140. Potter & Wetherell 1987.
141. Rose 1989.
142. Summa 1990.
143. Pesonen 1972b, 71.
144. Allardt & Pesonen 1967, 346-347; Allardt & Pesonen 1960, 4.

145. "The process of generalization in political science ranges from very crude observations of recurrent phenomena in political life to theories of a rather complex structure. On the lowest level of abstraction, we encounter what might be called *desciptive generalizations*. One example of this is the common observation that women tend to vote less, and in general to participate less in politics, than men. If we, for the sake of simplicity, suppose that the statement is valid in this crude form, it is obvious that it increases our empirical knowledge of politics and that it also will render some elementary predictions about the political behaviour of both sexes possible. In itself, however, the statement remains isolated, without any meaningfull connection to our knowledge about other political phenomena. We feel that it "explains" nothing at all.; because our need for explanation, of social as well as natural phenomena, is satisfied only to the extent that the several detached observations are linked to a logically coherent body of theory. The situation will be different if the relative passivity of women is interpreted in the light of the role that the prevailing culture assigns to women and the picture it presents of the "normal" relation of women to political affairs.... This mights be called an *explanatory* generalization. It correlates the passivity of women with a phenomenon that varies from one cultural environment to anothern (and which, in principle, can also be varied in experimental situations). It also helps us to explain possible deviations from the general rule of female political passivity in milieus where cultural conditions differ from the average. It finally gives rise to expectations that a change in cultural norms will influence the political behaviour of women." Jansson 1966, 19.
Tarkiainen 1965, 2, 3; also Noponen 1964a, 176; Allardt 1967, 233-234, however Pesonen 1962, 224 still claimed that the equal voting activity of women was a characteristic of the Swedish speaking female population and was due to "the Swedish womens' social segregation which protected them against cross pressures". I.e. internal space protects against the pressures of politics; active women can be found among not-us.

146. Ruusala 1967.

147. Tarkiainen 1971, 18, 25, 199, 200-206, 210, 243, 264-265, 354-358.

148. Tarkiainen 1971, 354.

149. See Tarkiainen 1971, 354-5; Jallinoja 1983; Holli 1992.

150. Peterson 1987, 81.

151. See Nelson 1989; Honig 1991.

152. Shapiro 1981.

153. Peterson (1987, 158) refers to Geertz who called this system "the theatre state". The place was Bali during 1800. What held the system together was, that those in power confirmed their position by constantly proclaiming it. The ceremonies did not serve the power; they were the power.

154. Jansson 1950a, 299-300.

155. Jansson 1960c, 90.

156. Borg 1980, 11-12, 15.

157. Teljo 1944 ja Jansson 1985 on hair colour. However, see Pesonen 1960d, 16:
"Male students sporting activities groupped according to military rank during Spring term:
"A: How many times during the spring term approximately did you practice sports? More than 10 times, between 1 and 10, I did not practice sports, and B: What?
I did not practice sports
Skiing
Walking, camping, mass marches
Orientations, cross-country running
Shooting
Basket ball, volleyball, football
Gymnastics
Track and field

Swimming
Weight-lifting
Netball
Other.
It can be mentioned that about a third of the male students had not practised any sports att all, one third had practised between 1 and 10 times and one third more often than that.
While male students' sporting activities hereby became well analyzed, this cannot be held as a primary research interest in the political science of the fifties. However, not asking about female students' sporting activities can also be considered a political choise.

158.   Jansson 1969; Jansson 1985.

159.   Nousiainen 1959; Noponen 1968; Jansson 1969; also Jansson (ed.) 1968.

160.   Tarkiainen 1966, 8.

6   LOLO; THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
A SUB-/OB-/JECT

"... the whole time they see the one and only woman". [1] [1]

The textual selves, the identities constructed for political science, can be interpreted as masculine, constituting themselves against a feminine anti-discipline. The texts of the field describing "politics", in their turn, construct living women as mariginal and mechanised objects of a new science. Whereas there is no natural connection between metaphoric matrixes of femininity or masculinity and men or women, a question poses itself: do they still become connected? Can a woman write political science? Does not the position of a female political scientist become anomalous? Can a woman be authorised as a speaker in political science discourse?

The only woman authorised as a political scientist in the postwar period was Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg. She studied in Germany, wrote her dissertation in 1934[2], and held professorships at the University of Helsinki and the Swedish School of Economics. For a period of time, she chaired the Political Science Association. A prolific writer, her publications span many decades. As a woman, as a Swedish speaker, and a migrant from Germany, she actively maintained international contacts. Lolo was a multiple Other in the Finnish political science community.

How did she manage in the intersection between image and reality, at the crossing point between the metaphorical image of Woman, the denotative meanings given to women, and an agency of an acting subject?

The interpretation does not presuppose that an author's gender

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1   "... de ser hela tiden den ända kvinnan."

could determine what the text would be like. It would be unreasonable to burden a single female writer with expectations of writing Otherwise. I am not asking whether she as an original voice of Womanhood could have written political science differently, but how she, as a bearer of the mark of Womanhood, was classified and constructed. How was she seen? How was she gender marked and what meanings were given to the deviancy of being a woman?

Some aspects in the *reception* of her texts seem interesting: a book of hers that had been highly praised in other places was seen as unscientific in a very interesting way[3]. The book was seen as "value-laden and ordinary"; it dealt with an ordinary person instead of a historically notable one. The choice of subjects was "a mediocre person with modest achievements", not remarkable in any way. It could be that he – "the tyrant-murderer" Ehrensvärd – was "talented above the average", but this talent did not demonstrate itself in any originality. He was certainly "a sympathetic person, but hardly any psychological riddle". "His life had its moments of misfortune and hardship, but it never developed into any ultimate misery. The tragedy of it was caused mostly by himself."

The review asked whether this type of personality deserved as much attention as was given him in Krusius-Ahrenberg's work, with its

"... formless wide and swelling richness of words?"... "The marked over-dimensioning merely had its roots in a certain inability to protect oneself against an overpowering amount of sources than a direct misinterpretation of the man and his work. Nobody could complain about lack of emotional response. It is a pity, though, that the author's thorough knowledge of the Gustavian epoch has not been used for a greater task than the one she has chosen as her aim. The reader is at risk of losing the theme of the presentation. Under the split image of side tracks and argumentations in different directions, one, at times, loses the conception of both the persons and the chain of events. With a stricter disposition and a concentration on the essential, the author could certainly have offered a much clearer and more ponderous image of her 'hero' than is now the case."

The rest of the review – which is the major part – dealt with the main character Ehrensvärd and his deeds, not with the text written by Krusius-Ahrenberg: Were Ehrensvärd's texts about agricultural accounting worth mentioning or not?

This review of the book has been transmitted to later generations, although the value of writing about "ordinary" persons was recast. The problem of the text was that Krusius-Ahrenberg "writes far too much"[4]

And certainly some of the texts appear quite intolerable. A text titled "In the Margin"(sic!)[5] is just terrible. The author writes in the first person singular; she replies explicitly to a criticism directed towards her. The title refers to the text's actually being notes written in the

margins of an earlier text by the author herself. The remarks are tremendously long and tedious gossiping about the persons that are dealt with and about their personal relationships. *Private details. A certain sign of a feminine style of writing?*

"Woman's language" is said to be characterised by repetition, hyperbole, convolution and grammatical anomaly. It is "speech that is polite, emotional, enthusiastic, gossipy, talkative, uncertain, dull and chatty", in contrast to men's speech, or powerful speech, which is "capable, direct, rational (ha!), illustrating a sense of humour, unfeeling, strong (in tone and word choice) and blunt". The feminine voice of self-effacement and emotionality is contrasted to the masculine voice of authority.[6]

"Krusius-Ahrenberg writes far too much." Lolo became marked as a stereotypically feminine narrator. Did she learn the rules of the brotherhood later on? Her production in the fifties was directed towards pressure groups and interest articulation, a new, "unexplored field" not in the old core of the discipline.[7] Her earlier production showed a thread of underlined individualism: "the I-person's right and interest" or "the dilemma of individualism in the modern democracy[8]. What happened when individuals turned into masses – when the human being was turned into "an object of research"?

In 1960[9], Lolo commented on a text of the behavioural school, starting with the notion that mere articles were not often reviewed, so the text was considered very important. Why was it written? That the text reviewed had been critical towards the history of the discipline and that the author "gives his critique of the past a somewhat simplified form that can fully value neither the achievements" of political science nor other disciplines was not considered a major fault. The text was intended to be "forward-looking"; the review of the past was turned into "a challenging view of the promising fields" now to be studied.

What was the message of the review? That the behavioural school was not that new (a reference was made to "American Soldier")? That this type of research was already being done all over the place? That the behavioural school can and should also produce theory and not just "empirical mappings" (a reference to Simon was made here)? The review ends up in what seems an appraisal of the contributions of the representatives of the behavioural school, but is that certain?

Was the review written in order to praise the new school, to take a position on the same side, to reframe behaviourism and put it in a relativised context, or to add a perspective to the conversation and point out that behaviourism was lacking in theory? Is there more to the text than meets the eye? Would some other perspective open a text that seems to be saying nothing? *A mute voice? A double text with more than one voice? I do not know.*

To decipher and reread women's voices "below the surface" has

not been the aim of this work: it has dealt with men. The interpretation work on reading in women's voices in political science - as acting subjects rather than just mirror images - has hardly even started. To interpret Lolo's texts in their own right would be a research task of its own.

Was there a surface, a border? In an interview a few years back, Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg was asked about how it was to be the sole woman in a male science community. Her answer was: difficult. It was not that you became disregarded in terms of salary policies, nor in terms of publishing - although more harshly judged, perhaps.

> "What often happened to a female researcher was ... that whenever the tasks called for were fun – *something where you were seen* – then: no women, at least not over 35 years of age."[10]

Singled out as an eyesore, an exception, a one-woman quota, the one not *seen*, perhaps not *heard*, multiply marked as Other, she was perhaps even stranger than other women.

NOTES

1. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1991.
2. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1934.
3. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1947b; Grauers 1948, 183-4.
4. Anckar 1983b, 153-156.
5. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1949.
6. Lanser 1986, 617.
7. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1955b; Krusius-Ahrenberg 1958.
8. "Jag-människans rätt och fördel", Krusius-Ahrenberg 1947b, 5; "Individualismens trångmål i den moderna demokratin", Krusius-Ahrenberg 1955a.
9. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1960.
10. Krusius-Ahrenberg 1991. According to the interview, her application for "docent" met with difficulties because there already was a female docent nominad that year.

7   LOOKING BACK

"The fact is the first thing. Make sure of it. Get it perfectly clear. Polish it till it shines and sparkles like a gem. Then connect it with other facts. Examine it in its relation to them, for in that lies its worth and significance... To counsel you to stick to the facts is not to dissuade you from philosophical generalizations, but only to remind you... that the generalizations must spring out of the facts, and without the facts are worthless."[1]

While the male gaze has been a reoccuring metaphor in this work as in many others[2], how about turning the gaze to look back in time, from a woman's position? While the observations of facts, described as "the soldiers in the procession of science"[3], turned out not to follow the expectations of cumulativity, stability and non-dependence on value judgements, the question of facticity becomes one of contextuality and reflexivity. When, where, and from whose perspective are texts of science factual?

While the constructions and images of women produced in the texts can hardly be seen as mimetic representations of women[4], reading political science texts of the fifties as representations of "a reality" has turned out to be an absurd idea. So what do the texts represent? While recognizing that any survey respondent is likely to answer as he or she is expected to answer, as his/her "culture conditions him/her to do, is it not then as reasonable an expectation that any political scientist ask what he or she is expected to ask, what his or her cultural context, gender, age, or any "background variable" conditions him/her to write? Images of the world turn to representations of the self that once produced the texts; they turn out as mirrors of the self. Othering does not tell about the Other; it tells about the subject(?) himself. Universals of science that claim general identity "are relativised by the particularity of

their cultural coordinates"[5]. Objectifications – based on disconnections of texts from their "conditions of production" and consumption – have to be returned to their con-texts in time and place by reconstructing the processes of their objectification, by turning "nature back to culture".

In the above, gender has been read as metaphoric constructions of identities for the discipline, and as denotative constructions in texts representing the world. Is there a connection between the two?

The textually constructed maps of the world according to political science produced different versions of the world. The expectation of no women on these maps turned out to be false: women were talked about. While the first architecture in its centre-focusedness mainly excluded women, the second one, in reaching out to expand the map of political science, intensified talk about women. The constructions of an object for political science to study reached out to include and integrate women into the field – to map them. Womens' place on the map was still negligible, peripheral and deviant. They were constructed as the mechanised objects of the new type of political science.

In constructions of the community of political science, its founding myths and stories of origin, the direction is reversed: the community is constructed by successive separations from areas marked as feminine. The borderline between science and non-science is produced by demarcations from femininity. The ethos of the community, the stories told about its heroes, are clearly marked as masculine. Political science was made scientific by masculinizing it.

The positions constructed in the texts create an equation where the self – the community – is constructed by separating it from the object studied. The separation of self and Other creates an equation where "what political science is" becomes "what women are not". When differentiating between the self and the object, the political scientists constructed the objects as countable and controllable – and themselves as an expert profession.

While the binary of masculinity and femininity may work as a general structure that forces any discipline to construct an identity by separating the self from femininity, the plots of these construction stories may still vary. Different types of plots represent different ways to solve the tension between the hero and the society. While the hero originally was to help the weak society out of its trouble, the later plots more often characterise the hero as a tragic figure messed up in internal conflicts, or turn into plots of revenge and place the hero outside of the society[6].

Starting from a glorious position, the relationship of political science to the "general public", the audience, was open. Science had a national task to fulfill. There was a call for knowledge to be mediated by the political science discipline in order to educate the citizen. Later on, the prospects of the discipline seem to have diminished.

"During the peculiar period of time when the Finnish nation as a Lilliputian, but nevertheless with some success, struggled against the oppression of a mighty superpower, the book was one of our most effective weapons. The learned stretched their strength to the utmost, aware of being the first in front line. The result was a remarkably exhaustive and competent juridicial and historical clarification of the status of our country which turned the attention of scientific circles of the whole world to our struggle.

During our independence, the interest of governmental questions has, while changing character, deepened in the broad circles of the people. Scientific cultivation, however, has hardly been able to stay on the previous level, let alone rise. And still, the scientific clarification of the structure and functioning of our state is – if not to stand in the front line of national defence – to mark important guidelines and borderposts of an independent, individual governmental life.

It is therefore a great joy to welcome the newly published works of doctors Teljo and Tarkianen, which shed light upon such central features of our political life as the formation of the budget and the status of the president."[1] [7]

Commenting on the annual colloquium of researchers held since 1968, a later observer reported a less enthusiastic science community.

"Can it then be said that the colloquium for political research serves its purpose well? Not everybody seems to think so. In the previous issue of the journal Politiikka, Pertti Laulajainen states, although 'slightly overstating', that Finnish political science researchers are a group of 70 silent beings who do not debate with each other, at least in public, and who once a year gather for a rather anemic and unenthusiastic colloquium for political research. Furthermore Laulajainen refers to a 1973 statement by one Raimo Väyrynen, according to whom political research is characterised by unenthusiasm and a kind of civil servant mentality, so research therefore needs a willingness to reform and the enthusiasm to make it into a reality."[2] [8]

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1   "Sinä merkillisenä aikakautena, jolloin Suomen kansa pienenä peukaloisena, mutta kuitenkin joltisellakin menestyksellä ponnisteli mahtavan suurvallan sortoa vastaan, oli kirja tehokkaimpia aseitamme. Oppineet jännittivät silloin voimansa äärimmilleen, sillä he tiesivät olevansa etulinjassa ensimmäisinä. Tuloksena oli maamme silloisen aseman verrattoman perinpohjainen ja pätevä oikeudellinen ja historiallinen selvittely, joka käänsi koko maailman tieteellisten piirien huomion taisteluumme.
Itsenäisyytemme aikana on valtiollisten kysymysten kiinnostus, samalla kun se on saanut toisen luonteen, suuresti syventynyt kansan laajoissa piireissä. Tieteellinen viljely sitä vastoin on tuskin jaksanut pysytellä aikaisemmalla tasolla, saatikka nousta. Ja kuitenkin on valtiomme rakenteen ja sen toiminnan tieteellinen selvittely, ei tosin maanpuolustuksen etulinjalla oloa, mutta itsenäisen, omintakeisen valtioelämän tärkeätä suuntaviivojen ja rajapaalujen merkitsemistä.
Sen vuoksi onkin erityisellä ilolla tervehdittävä trien Teljon ja Tarkiaisen äskettäin ilmestyneitä teoksia, joissa valaistaan poliittisessa elämässämme niin keskeisiä seikkoja kuin tulo- ja menoarvion muodostelua eduskunnassa ja tasavaltamme presidentin asemaa."

2   "Voidaanko sitten sanoa, että politiikan tutkimuksen päivät hyvin vastaavat tarkoitustaan? Kaikki eivät ilmeisesti ole sitä mieltä. Niinpä edellisessä Poli-

How could this happen?

Of what kind are the masculinities constructed in the texts of political science, what are their images of Woman, what is their relationship to different types of femininities? Given that the universality of the categories is illusionary, what is their specificity? What is their location in space and time?

In a text from 1949[9], the aliases "Plato" and "Aristotle" illustrated a difference in their points of view that resembles the difference between "old" and "new" political scientists. Plato's ideal of intellectual activity was the rule of Philosopher Kings, the replacement of chaos by "a higher, rational level of political thought". Exact knowledge should replace the ambivalences, passions and the unrest of the time. The relationship between Plato and Aristotle was that of a teacher and an apprentice. Compared to Plato, the Philosopher King, Aristotle was "just an intelligent and knowledgeable ordinary man" who represented common, practical knowledge and could in so doing fittingly criticize the genius and imaginative but one-sided father figure. Aristotle represented a fresh, more democratic alternative of "purely technical" rules of decision-making that could solve the problems of authoritarianism and arbitrariness. Aristotle, in the beginning described as "a bleak apprentice", turned out by the end of the text to be the supreme choice.[10] As an allegory of a relationhip between different generations of men, the story of 1949 was still told with the suppressed, hidden voice of those in powerless positions.

For the young generation of political scientists the desacralization of the state meant democratization, the breaking away from entreched patriarchal power – and the establishment of new patriarchal power. In constructing a self upon the strong oppositions of reason and emotion and fleeing from the areas marked as emotional and feminine, the new Method offered a scientific-looking vocabulary that created distance to the chaotic world around – and offered precisely "a flight from reality", from the messy relations of the everyday world. Sticking to the Method remained the only way to keep the self from falling apart. It became more and more central to protect and safeguard the identity threatened by fragmentation.

Since so many of the development stories of political science failed to integrate the conflict between old and new into a peaceful

tiikka-lehden numerossa Pertti Laulajainen toteaa, tosin "vähänsen kärjistäen", että puhuttaessa suomalaisista politiikan tutkijoista, kysymys on noin 70:stä maan hiljaisesta, jotka eivät ainakaan julkisuudessa sanottavasti keskustele keskenään ja jotka kerran vuodessa kokoontuvat melko aneemisille ja innottomille politiikan tutkimuksen päiville. Laulajainen lainaa lisäksi erään Raimo Väyrysen v. 1973 esittämän lausunnon, jonka mukaan suomalaista politiikan tutkimusta leimaa innottomuus ja tietynlainen virkamiesmentaliteetti, joten tutkimus tarvitsee uudistushalua ja intoa sen muuttamiseksi todellisuudeksi."

solution, they thereby doomed themselves to repeat the same conflict time after time. While in sociology "the paradox" between the old and the new was described as precisely calling for and accentuating the importance of old wisdom[11], in political science, integrative stories were rare. The following generation, in turn, described the previous one as having "one foot in the trench" (toinen jalka juoksuhaudassa)[12].

> "Finland has endured these two wars. In both of them it has suffered defeat and lost important areas and a substantial amount of what is most valuable for a nation, namely the work force of young men."[3][13]
> "The highest goal for our medicine and our military hospitals at the moment is the recovery of the woundeds' ability to work and their fitness for service at the front. During this hard time, the nurses have a difficult and important task in trying to overcome the woundeds' passivity and despondency, a task that requires skill, energy and empathy, and for which she – in order to be successful – must use all the potential of her personality.
> It is understandable that *the skin of the hand that has become thin* under the bandages becomes thicker and stronger in that the patient handles different, heavier or lighter objects. Even muscles that have not been used for a long time thereby become stronger and firmer."[4][14]

While the allegory of Plato and Aristotle dealt with relationhips between different types of masculinities and developed a model for a new kind of technical masculinity, the story about "Plato" and Aristotle" also begins by describing an "original state" preceding the separation from femininity. Described as "chaos", as "a state of happy changeability" (onnellinen muuttuvaisuus), multiplicity with no hierarchical order, this original feminine state of affairs brings to mind later debates on "postmodernism". In this origin story (too), Woman remained in the matrix of outside positions – the positions remaining outside of history and culture, representing mater, materia and nature.

While the *"thin skin"* separating the self from the world – and representing dependency of women – had to be hardened, made into an armour, the reason for constructing objects of research and making them countable and controllable may have been the very closeness of

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3   "Suomi on kestänyt nämä kaksi sotaa. Molemmissa se on joutunut tappiolle ja menettänyt tärkeitä alueita sekä runsaasti sitä, mikä on kansakunnalle kallisarvoisinta, nimittäin nuorten miesten työvoimaa."

4   "Det högsta målet för vår läkekonst och våra krigssjukhus är för närvarande återställandet av de sårades arbetsförmåga och duglighet till fronttjänst."
"Under denna svåra tid har avdelningarnas sjuksjöterskor en svår och viktig uppgift i att försöka övervinna den sårades passivitet och nedslagenhet, en uppgift som forsdrar förmåga, energi och förståelse och till vilet hon, för att det skall lyckas, måste använda kraften av hela sin personlighet."
"Det är förståeligt att handens hud, som blivit tunn under förband och spjälor, genom att patienten handskas med olika, tyngre och lättare föremål, blir tjockare och starkare. Även sådana muskler som länge varit ur bruk, bliva på detta sätt starkare och fastare."

the threatening disorder, just calling for a strong, paternalistic and at times despotic leadership, a mythical leadership which combined a public image of decisiveness with an equally commonly known "private" image of womanizing and pornography, and uniting a nation under one rule, a monological word. The postwar political atmosphere described as suspicious – agitated, inflamed, hysterical – is part of cultural history of masculinity that has to read against a background of threatening emasculation. The wartime experience of "invalidity" – literal as well as metaphoric – was to be turned into its opposite: total control could only be reached by establishing more and more boundaries around the self. Fragmentation was to be hindered by protection of the narrowong boundaries. A precondition for uniformity is to create common enemies. In a system of cultural differences, Others and other Others were to be separated from the self. Other men (Swedish) came to be described as homosexual. Other ethnic groups represented the boundaries of the self in common cultural products like Finnish cinema.

As the gender economy of the fifties turned the wartime confusion of gender into a new order that binarised the roles of women and men, it drew upon the well-known repertoires of "Kinder, Küche, Kirche" to define the role of women. In the Finnish conditions, however, this move never turned out to be a big success. In the Finnish gender economy, it did not mean that women actually should have been newly domesticated - they were silenced while remaning in the work force. The male breadwinner model never entered the country on levels other than the collective symbolic representations. The number of women in the workforce and in education remained at high levels despite a thin layer of "ideology", elite men's wishful thinking of domesticating women[15]. Despite views on lowering birthrates as a sign of "degeneration of the nation", female mobility from rural to urban areas - and another kind of gender order - was high[16]. The threatening feminization of society or the male self was attacked by making women diasappear from representation of culture. In order to find texts about women mediating lived experiences of women in the fifties, you will have to look in other places, in other texts. Women were there, right by one's side.

> "Finally I want to direct my words to you, Kirsti, who as a spouse has stood beside our Yrjö in good times as well as in the difficult moments in the course of life. We are happy that Yrjö has had such an understanding and tranquil life partner, while Yrjö in many respects was a man of struggles who wanted to stand for what he considered to be right and truthful."[5] [17]

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5   "Lopuksi tahdon kohdistaa kiitolliset sanani Sinulle Kirsti, joka puolisona olet seissyt Yrjömme rinnalla niin hyvinä kuin myös elämän taistelun vaikeinakin hetkinä. Olemme onnellisia siitä, että Yrjöllä on ollut niin ymmärtäväinen ja rauhallinen elämäntoveri, sillä Yrjöhän oli useassa mielessä taistelujen

What about women and science? While the metaphoric nature of science was condemned, the metaphors for separating science from non-science were equipped with images of Woman. In the mutual constructions of gender and science, the way of ordering and hierarchising the two systems of classification was clear. It is perhaps reasonable to say that this kind of discourse does not authorize women as its speakers. Political science of the fifties became occupied by male persons. A (thin) line of demarcation separated women from the profession.

> "As an academic teacher, Lindman was liked and respected. One felt at home at his department, and it was part of the picture that the teacher's slightly old-fashioned manners and his tvirly way of relating to the youth did not irritate – on the contrary, they were respected. Male students could be received in shirt sleeves, although with humble apologies for the unconventional clothing. *The jacket* was always close by, however, ready to be put on if the student seeking audience turned out to represent the fairer gender."[6] [18]

But in the constant reorganization of gender identities as well as construction of science, there is nothing that determines women to be anomalistic or mere representations of Other denied the right of expression. In the constant reorganization of boundaries of neutral and gendered, feminine and masculine, scientific and unscientific, scientific or artistic, both sides of the gender — science configuration are in constant flux and change. Any "crisis" of gender systems may coincide with many a crisis of the disciplinary system.

While "Finnish political science" never seems to have been able to construct "whole" identities, more flexible or inclusive boundaries, it seems that the problem of fragile identities cannot be solved by a ritualistic repetition of the origin stories of the community or by safeguarding the purity of the inside and by protecting the borders of the community. Political science never became an established discipline based on well-rooted and naturalised metaphors. Political science never became "adult" or "mature", but perhaps it never will. The "wholeness" or consensus of the fifties was always fictive; there is no need to long for it. The 1950s does not need to make a comeback. While the uncertainty of any "postmodern situation" may imply a possibility of nostalgia, of going "back to the 1950s" when things seemed simple and well

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mies, joka halusi seistä sen puolesta mitä piti oikeana ja totuutena."

6 "Som akademisk lärare var Sven Lindman omtyckt och uppskattad..... Vid hans institution trivdes man, och det hör till bilden att man inte irriterades utan tvärtom värdesatte lärarens litet gammaldags manér och hans sirliga sätt att umgås med de unga. Manliga elever kunde han ta emot i skjortärmarna, förvisso framförande förbindliga ursäkter för sin okonventionella klädsel. Kavajen låg dock alltid nära till hands, klar att trädas på om den elev som sökte audiens visade sig representera det täckare könet."

(hierarchically) organised, it also carries the tendency of multiplicity and polyphony.

In terms of the debate between the deaf and the mute, this could imply a turn to a dialogical relationship, a dialogue. A debate between a subject and a subject, however, requires reinventing an intersubjective space, reinventing "and"[19]. Perhaps, instead of looking, the metaphors of science should concentrate more on listening, hearing...even the mumble of feminised voices, the other side in any dialogue. Is womens' studies or feminist studies still to be considered unscientific? Perhaps this question finally can be considered *relatively academic*.

> "There is no need to state the one and perhaps most useful piece of advice for life in these conditions. The youth themselves are certainly aware that they had better use their short seeking time intensively to gather the knowledge required for making decisions in a way that does not make it necessary to make radical turns and corrections later on, *when old age perhaps takes one by surprise without bringing wisdom.*"[7][20]
>
> "Nobody can deny us the right to set ourselves the aims that we consider valuable, but we have no right to condemn the aims of the past generations with the measures of our own, nor decide in advance which values or ideals future generations should honour. 'Each epoch finds its own route to Good', as the German historian Ranke metaphorically stated. That is a conception of history dictated by scientific thought free of illusions, and it is - from a practical and ethical point of view - the conception of history of free individuals."[8][21]

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7   "On tarpeetonta sanoa mikä on ehkä yleispätevimmin käyttökelpoinen elämänohje näissä oloissa. Nuoriso itse on varmasti selvillä, että sen on parasta käyttää tiiviisti lyhyttä etsikkoaikaansa kootakseen sitä tietoa, joka auttaa sitä ratkaisujen tekemisessä sillä tavoin, ettei käy välttämättömäksi suorittaa radikaalisia käännöksiä ja korkauksia myöhemmin, jolloin vanhuus mahdollisesti yllättää ilman viisautta."

8   "Kukaan ei voi kieltää meiltä oikeutta asettaa toiminnallemme sellaisia tavoitteita, joita me itse pidämme arvokkaina, mutta meillä ei ole oikeutta omien tavoitteidemme mittapuulla tuomita menneiden sukupolvien pyrkimyksiä eikä ennalta määrätä, mitä arvoja tai ihanteita tulevian sukupolvien on pidettävä kunniassa. "Jokainen aikakausi löytää oman tiensä Jumalan luokse", niin kuin saksalainen historioitsija Ranke on vertauskuvallisesti lausunut. Se on tieteellisen, illuusioista vapautuneen ajattelun sanelema historiankäsitys, ja se on - käytännölliseltä ja eettiseltä kannalta katsoen - vapaiden ihmisten historianfilosofia."

NOTES

1. Lord Bryce (Modern Democracies, 1921) cited in Jansson 1963, 9.
2. Saco 1992, 28.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. An analogical critique on sociolinguistics as a mirror of the producer is presented by Brown 1987, and others.
5. Cvetkova 1988, 16.
6. Alasuutari 1989.
7. Kastari 1938, 438.
8. von Bonsdorff 1980, 4.
9. Teljo 1949a.
10. Ibid., 124, 131-2.
11. Allardt 1958, 140. "Näin ollaan sosiologiassa varsin paradoksaalisen tilanteen edessä: sosiologia on nuori tiede, mutta sosiologian kehittyessä ja menetelmien parantuessa vanhojen viisaus on tullut yhä käyttökelpoisemmaksi."
12. Julkunen 1993.
13. Ruutu 1945, 48.
14. Brofeldt 1941, 3, 6, 8.
15. Of academic degrees the percentage of women in 1950 was 35%, in 1960 47%. See Julkunen 1993.
16. Waris 1952, 216-246.
17. Ruutu 1958, 29.
18. Anckar 1983a, 156.
19. Salvaggio 1990, 160.
20. Tarkiainen (mimeo) "Kun kuulemme sanan propaganda...", 15.
21. Teljo 1953, 40-41.

TIIVISTELMÄ

MODERNI VALTIO-OPPI JA NAINEN
Mykkien ja kuurojen välinen keskustelu

1 Tutkimuksen tavoite ja ongelma

Kahden tiedeinstituution - valtio-opin ja naistutkimuksen - kielipelien erityisen välittymättömyyden ongelmaa lähestytään tutkimalla valtio-opin lähihistoriaa ja siten projisoimalla ongelma menneeseen. Lähtien paikasta jossa "sukupuolesta voi puhua" tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa sukupuolesta oletettavasti ei puhuttu.

Tutkimus käsittelee suomalaista sodanjälkeistä valtio-oppia "puhtaana" esimerkkinä sukupuolitetusta tieteenaladiskurssista. Työ kohdentuu valtio-opin tieteenalan kirjallisuuteen aikavälillä 1945-65. 1950-luvun keskivaiheilta paradigmaattiseen asemaan kohonnut behaviorismi tavoitteli ohjelmallisesti objektiivista ja faktuaalista tietoa, jonka ymmärrettiin olevan sukupuoletonta, neutraalia ja universaalia. Tiedeyhteisö koostui kuitenkin miehistä.

Tutkimusongelmana on pinnalta sukupuolettoman tiedon kätketyn sukupuolisuuden esiinlukeminen. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan retorisia strategioita, joilla sukupuolta tuotettiin ja joilla se näytettiin sulkevan pois tieteellisestä argumentaatioista ja tieteenalan diskurssista. Tutkimuksessa on kyse representoinnin politiikasta: valtio-opin tieteenalaidentiteetin tekstuaalisen tuottamisen sukupuolisuudesta ja valtio-opin tekstien tavoista representoida sukupuoli.

2 Metodi ja aineisto

Kun tehtävänä on lukea sitä mistä ei puhuta, tulee lukutavasta nimenomaan mariginaalinen. Kun suuressa osassa valtio-opin tutkimuskirjallisuutta sukupuolesta ei puhuta, on tulkinta kuitenkin aloitettava sieltä missä siitä puhutaan.

Tutkimuksen *tekstikorpukseksi* määrittyy kaikki, mikä, institutionaalisin kriteerein määrittyi valtio-opin tieteenalan kategoriaan kuuluviksi teksteiksi. Mikä tahansa teksti tai tekstin osa saattoi valikoitua aineistoksi. Näistä luettiin kaikki, mitä sukupuolesta on sanottu. Laajasta aineistosta valikoitui näin vain osa ja siitä ehkä vain mariginaalisia osia, joista lähdettiin avaamaan sukupuoleen liitettyä kielellisten merkitysten kenttää.

Toki suuressa osassa valtio-opillista kirjallisuutta ei lainkaan puhuta sukupuolista. *Lukutapa* onkin siksi eksplisiittisesti mariginaalinen. Sukupuolisen luennan kannalta ei näyttänyt olevan olemassa kriteerejä aineiston "representatiiviselle otannalle". Päinvastoin voitiin olettaa, että puhe sukupuolista olisikin mariginaalista. Sitä löytyisi satunnaisesti minkä tahansa tekstin sisältä, mariginaaleista, alaviitteistä tai sulkeista, tai tieteellisen kirjoittamisen genreistä, joita ei mielletä "varsinaisiksi" tieteellisiksi teksteiksi. Luennan avaimina toimivat semanttiset merkit, nais- ja mies-sanat, vihjeinä tai osviittoina semanttisiin raameihin tai matriiseihin, joissa sukupuolelle annetaan merkityksiä.

Koska työssä luettiin *tekstejä* eikä kirjoittajanimiä, on viitteet sijoitettu tekstin loppuun. Tulkinnan kannalta ei ole oleellista kenen tekstistä on kysymys vaan se, miten sukupuolista 1950-luvun kulttuurissa kirjoitettiin ja uskottavasti voitiin kirjoittaa. Diskurssin heterogenisyyteen kiinnitettiin erityistä huomiota.

Hyödyntäen kolmea tutkimuskirjallisuuden aluetta - feminististä tutkimusta, tieteen retoriikan ja kirjallisuuden - tutkimusta, työssä hahmotettiin sukupuolisen lukutavan "metodi". Sukupuolen luennan tasoiksi ajateltiin

- kirjoittajan sukupuoli; sukupuoli "luonnollisena" kategoriana
- tekstin sukupuoli;
+ symbolisen järjestyksen metaforisena binaarioppositiona
+ eri tekstuaalisuuksissa tuotettuna sosiaalisena konstruktiona
- näiden intertekstuaalisena yhdistymisenä, jolloin sukupuolta voidaan tuottaa eri tasoisissa tekstuaalisuuksissa. Tällöin "todellisuus" tai kirjoittajan sukupuoli palautuu sisään malliin, mutta ei determinoi tekstin sukupuolta.

Tekstin sukupuolta ei myöskään ajateltu jonkun toisen todellisuuden representaatioksi niin, että valtio-opin tekstit transparentisti heijastaisivat toista todempaa todellisuutta vaan omaksi todellisuudekseen. Valtio-oppi ajateltiin yhdeksi sukupuolen teknologiaksi. Feminisoiminen/ toiseaminen mielettiin retoriseksi strategiaksi, joka sinänsä voi olla universaali, mutta joka ei välttämättä liity naisiin.

3   Työn eteneminen

Työn empiiriset osat kertaavat sukupuolen lukemisen tasojen järjestystä: Onko sukupuoli kirjoittajan nimessä? Onko se tekstissä, metaforisena vai denotatiivisena merkityksenä? Vai onko se metaforan ja denotatiivisen merkityksen risteyksessä, tavoissa kuvata naistieteilijää?

Analyysin pääkappaleet käsittelevät sukupuolen kirjoittautumista tieteenalan identiteetti- ja rajatyöhön sekä tieteenalan kohteen konstruointeihin. Analyysin reunakappaleet käsittelevät tekstuaalisen sukupuolen yhteyttä kon-tekstuaaliseen sukupuoleen tiedeyhteisössä, kysymyksinä kirjoittavan minän sukupuolisuudesta sekä sukupuolen reseptiosta.

Kappale 3 avaa kysymystä siitä, millä tavoilla tutkimuksen näennäinen sukupuolettomuus on naturalisoitunut ja peittynyt. Luonnolistunutta tapaa lukea tieteenalaa ja sen tekstejä voidaan avata tarkastelemalla tieteenalan keskeisiä käsitteellisiä toteemeja ja metaforia. Luonnollistunutta rajaa tieteellisen tekstin ja sen "ulkopuolelle" jäävän henkilökohtaisen sfäärin välillä merkitään esimerkiksi esipuheella kynnystekstinä ja tavoilla lukea se toisin tavoin kuin "varsinainen" tieteellinen teksti.

Kappale 4. käsittelee tekstuaalisesti tuotettua valtio-opin yhteisöä, sille teksteissä tuotettua symbolista järjestystä, sen identiteettiä ja yhteisökonstruktioita. Luennan metodi valtio-opin tieteenalan määrittelyn osalta on metaforinen: millaisia maskuliinisia tai feminiinisiä konnotatiivisia ilmaisuja käytettiin tieteenalan identiteetti- ja rajatyössä. Luennan aineistona kappaleessa 4. olivat kaikki löytyneet tekstit aiheesta "mitä valtio-oppi on". Ne miellettiin intertekstuaaliseksi jatkumoksi ja keskusteluksi ja luettiin suhteessa maskuliinisen ja feminiinisen semanttiseeen matriisiin. Yhden tekstin osalta tehtiin narratiivisen kulun analyysi.

Kappaleessa 5. valtio-opin tutkimuskohteen konstruoinnin osalta luenta on denotatiivinen: mitä merkityksiä annetaan naisille ja miehille konkreettisina empiirisinä olentoina. Luennan aineistona kappaleessa 5. olivat kaikki sukupuolia koskevat ilmaisut. Kysyttiin, missä osissa tuotettua tutkimuskohdetta sukupuolesta puhuttiin, missä ei. Millä valtio-opin maailmasta piirtämän "kartan" alueilla puhuttiin naisista, millä ei? Osasta aineistoa oli mahdollista tehdä "normaalin" tutkimusraportin narratiivista kulkua seuraava analyysi.

Kappaleessa 6. kysyttiin, mitä tapahtuu naiselle "kuvan ja todellisuuden risteyksessä": miten kuvattiin ajan ainoaa naispuolista valtio-oppinutta.

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4 Johtopäätökset

Luettaessa metatekstien jatkumoa - teksteissä konstruoitua valtio-opin tiedeyhteisöä - voitiin havaita että valtio-oppi konstruoi itsensä autonomisena, erillisenä tieteenalana, erottautumalla eri vaiheissa eri tahoista. Eron ja rajan merkkinä toimi Naisen metaforinen merkki. Toisen kuvauksessa käytettiin feminiinistä semanttista matriisia.

Luettaessa valtio-opin itselleen tuottaman kohteen konstruointeja intertekstuaalisena jatkumona havaittiin, että valtio-opin uusi käsitearkkitehtuuri pyrki laajentamaan valtio-opin karttaa niin, että sille tulisivat myös naiset ja feminiinisiksi merkityt alueet. Samalla kuitenkin omaksuttiin objektivoiva ja mekanisoiva, tieteellisen näköinen sanasto.

Tilanteessa, jossa se "mitä valtio-oppi on" ja "mitä naiset ovat" muodostuivat toisilleen vastakohdiksi, valtio-oppi etabloi itsensä professionaalisena kielipelinä.

Maskuliinisten ja feminiinisten assosiaatiomatriisien sekä miesten ja naisten välille ei voida olettaa mitään "luonnollista" yhteyttä. Tieteenalan "tieteellistäminen", institutionalisoiminen, professionalisoiminen, on ehkä mahdollista vain maskuliinistamalla sen identiteetti, mutta tämä ei merkitse sitä, että naiset on suljettava ulos tieteenalan kohteesta tai sen tutkijayhteisöstä. Tavat kuvata tiedeyhteisön ainoaa naispuolista jäsentä kuitenkin näyttivät yhdistävän nämä kaksi.

Valtio-oppi tieteellistyi maskuliinistamalla. Miksi maskuliinistaminen sitten kävi välttämättömäksi? Syytä voidaan etsiä 1950-luvun polarisoituneesta sukupuoliekonomiasta tai tarpeesta tuottaa uusi hierarkkinen järjestys aikaisemman kaaoksen sijaan. Syytä voidaan etsiä miesidentiteettien horjuvuudesta paremminkin kuin niiden vahvuudesta. Muistojen kultaamana mennyt tiedeyhteisö esiintyy yhtenäisenä, vahvojen eikä fragiilien identiteettien kautena. 1950-luvun valtio-opin kon-tekstina oli polarisoitunut sukupuoliekonomia, joka 1960-luvulla kriisiytyi.

Ajatus siitä että valtio-opin tekstit olisivat "representoineet 1950-luvun todellisuutta" on kääntynyt absurdiksi. Luenta on pyrkinyt tuottamaan vastatekstin aikaisemmille teksteille, uuden luennan valtio-opin historiasta. Vastatekstin tuottamisen ehto on matkustaminen ajassa, ero menneen ja nykyisen välillä. Menneen erottaminen itsestä tekee myös mahdolliseksi miettiä, onko 1950-luku vielä osin läsnä ja halutaanko se todella takaisin.

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