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ABSTRACT

The central question of this dissertation is "What is the function of utopia today?". This question already implies a certain kind of historicity. It implies the possibility of utopias having different functions in different times. This is why a larger question is in this dissertation asked as well: "what functions of utopia have become emphasized in the history of utopian thought?". And to answer both of these questions will I need to ask a third question: "What kind of different forms has the concept of utopia taken during its historical existence?".

Herein it is argued that utopias can be understood as relational counter-images and counter-practices grounded in the historical circumstances they are developed in. This dissertation focuses especially on the historical changes the function of utopia has gone through and on the function of utopia in the current neoliberal era in which utopianism has become suspicious socio-political mode of thought.

The main function of utopia, in this context is the disruptive function, which has the possibility of opening social and political imagination to new possibilities. Especially the possibility of different experimental social practices is explored in this dissertation. These practices are described with the concept of a "utopian counter-logical social practice". This concept is one developed through the usage of autonomist Marxist theoretician John Holloway's texts. The concept refers here to a collectively carried out practice which is at the same time *within*, *against* and *outside* of the present. It is *within* the present since it exists in the here-and-now. It is *against* since it orients itself according to a logic of practice that challenges and relativizes the practices of the existing society. It is *outside* of the present since it prefigures new and better forms of being in its very existence.

Utopian counter-logical social practice is here regarded as having a disruptive function which has the possibility of causing "cracks", not only in the social cohesion of the existing society, but also in the worldview of the subject. Utopian counter-logical social practice has the potential to offer new, surprising perspectives on the existing society for the subject. It is argued that utopian counter-logical social practices have the potential to cause disruption on both ideological and practico-structural levels.

Keywords: utopia, utopianism, functions of utopia, history of utopian thought, utopian studies, John Holloway

TIIVISTELMÄ

Väitöskirjan keskeinen kysymys on: "Mikä on utopian funktio tänään?" Kysymys implikoi jo itsessään tietynlaista historiallisuutta. Se implikoi sen mahdollisuutta, että utopioilla voi olla eri aikoina erilaisia funktioita. Tämän vuoksi väitöskirja kysyy myös laajempaa kysymystä: "Millaiset utopian funktiot ovat korostuneet utooppisen ajattelun historiassa?". Ja vastatakseni molempiin näistä kysymyksistä minun on kysyttävä vielä kolmaskin kysymys: "Millaisia muotoja utopian käsite on historiallisen olemassaolonsa aikana ottanut?".

Väitöskirjassa esitetään, että utopiat voidaan ymmärtää relationaalisiksi vastakuviksi ja -käytänteiksi, jotka nousevat niistä historiallisista olosuhteista, joissa ne on kehitetty. Väitöskirjassa keskitytään erityisesti utopian funktion historiallisiin muutoksiin sekä siihen funktioon, joka utopialla on nykyisessä uusliberaalissa aikakaudessa, jossa utooppisuudesta itsestään on tullut epäilyttävä sosiaalis-poliittisen ajattelun muoto.

Utopian ensisijainen funktio tässä uusliberaalissa kontekstissa on sen "disruptiivinen funktio", jolla on mahdollisuus avata yhteiskunnallista ja poliittista mielikuvitusta uusille mahdollisuuksille. Väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan erityisesti erilaisten kokeellisten sosiaalisten käytäntöjen mahdollisuuksia. Näitä käytäntöjä kuvataan "utooppisen vastaloogisen sosiaalisen käytännön" käsitteellä. Tätä käsitettä kehitellään autonomimarxilaisen teoreetikon, John Hollowayn tekstien pohjalta ja se viittaa kollektiivisesti toteutettuihin käytäntöihin, jotka ovat yhtä aikaa nykyisyyden *sisällä*, sitä *vastaan* ja sen *ulkopuolella*. Ne ovat nykyisyyden sisällä, koska ne toteutetaan tässä-ja-nyt. Ne ovat nykyisyyttä *vastaan*, koska ne asettavat vaihtoehtoisen toiminnan logiikan, joilla on potentiaali kyseenalaistaa olemassa olevan yhteiskunnan käytäntöjen oikeutus. Nämä käytännöt ovat myös nykyisyyden *ulkopuolella*, koska ne ennakoivat toisenlaisia ja parempia yhteiskunnallisen olemassaolon muotoja.

Utooppisella vastaloogisella sosiaalisella käytännöllä katsotaan tässä väitöskirjassa olevan disruptiivinen funktio, joka kykenee aiheuttamaan "halkeamia" (*cracks*) paitsi olemassa olevan yhteiskunnan sosiaalisessa koheesiossa, niin myös näihin käytäntöihin osallistuvan subjektin maailmankuvassa. Väitöskirjassa esitetään, että utooppisilla vastaloogisilla käytännöillä on mahdollisuus aiheuttaa disruptioita sekä ideologisella että käytännöllis-rakenteellisella tasolla.

Avainsanat: utopia, utooppinen ajattelu, utopioiden funktiot, utooppisen ajattelun historia, utopiatutkimus, John Holloway.

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"When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word, but the scream. Faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a scream of refusal: NO." – John Holloway[1]

"But we have no ideology for sale. Only our sadness." – Kristoffer Rygg[2]

The process of writing this dissertation has not always been easy. However, even in the darkest of times there have been people that have supported me and helped me to finish this project. Every human endeavour is, of course, always conditioned by the work of others either through direct co-operation or through the global division of labour, but there are some individuals who have influenced this work a little more than other members of the human species:

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[1] Holloway 2019a, 1.
[2] Dick & Rygg 2013.

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent decades it has become so common to pronounce the death of social utopia that it can be considered something of a cliché. It has become part of the general mentality shared by the majority of laymen and intellectuals alike. It has become assumed as common sense. The death of utopia refers in this context to the idea that humanity has progressed from the era of totalitarian ideologies to the era of liberal capitalist democracies where there is no room for forcing people to adapt to any large-scale utopian vision imposed by others.

In this context, one cannot avoid mentioning Francis Fukuyama who in 1989 published an article which achieved symbolic status: "The End of History?" Based on Alexandre Kojève's reading of Hegel's philosophy of history and inspired by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the article proclaimed that history in the sense of fundamental ideological contradictions was over (Fukuyama 1989, 8).

However, Fukuyama's ideas should not be overstated. The exhaustion of utopian energies and political ideologies was noted already 29 years earlier by Daniel Bell (1960) and Jürgen Habermas argued in his 1986 essay on "new obscurity", that the modern time consciousness based on the ideas of progress and revolution had become narrower, along with the horizon of the future (Habermas 1986, 2). Jean-François Lyotard analyzed postmodernism as the intellectual condition in which metanarratives of modernism, including utopianism, have been left behind (Lyotard 1984).

Another formulation of this anti-utopian sentiment has been articulated by Fredric Jameson. According to Jameson (1991, 331), it is possible to talk about the "anxiety of utopia" that leads to thinking that "the social or collective illusion of Utopia, or of a radically different society is flawed first and foremost because it is invested with a personal or existential illusion that is itself flawed from the outset" (Jameson 1991, 335).

Contextualized in contemporary society, the anxiety of utopia leads to a lack of means to think beyond capitalism. Mark Fisher (2009) coined the concept of "capitalist realism" to describe the tendency to see capitalism as the only possible mode of society. The "realism" in Fisher's concept "is analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depressive who believes that any positive state, any

hope, is a dangerous illusion" (Fisher 2009, 5). Capitalist realism is then a mode of thought in which it is impossible to hope for different and better futures. It is a cultural framework within which it is possible to think and which sets the limits of imagination. Fisher (2009, 16) elaborates:

> Capitalist realism as I understand it cannot be confined to art or to the quasi-propagandistic way in which advertising functions. It is more like a pervasive atmosphere, conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action.

However, as thought-provoking as these descriptions of anti-utopian impulses are, they still force to ask what they mean for the concept of utopia. Has utopianism as such disappeared or is it only a particular form of concept of utopia that has lost its ability to interpret hopeful and transformative social movements? Instead of the death of utopia maybe utopias have taken new forms which cannot be understood with old concepts of utopia? Maybe a new concept of utopia is needed for the theoretical understanding of utopian tendencies of the present? Maybe utopias have now taken a completely new form and acquired a completely new function? And if so, what is the form and the function of utopia today?

In this introductory chapter I will first position this study within contemporary philosophy and within utopian studies. After that I will explore the various conceptualizations of utopia and utopianism on three levels: (1) first I will elaborate on the differences between utopia, utopianism, and utopian mentality (or "the utopian") (2) after which I will proceed to elaborate on the different functions of utopia. This exploration of different conceptualizations of utopia and utopianism will end in (3) the distinction made between the so-called absolutist and relationalist interpretations of the concept of utopia.

After this review of different conceptualizations of utopia, I will continue to formulate my own concept of utopia as a counter-image motivated by a desire for a better being and as a counter-logical social practice. The concept of "utopian counter-logical social practice" refers here to a collectively carried out practice which is simultaneously *within*, *against* and *outside* of the present. It is *within* the present since it exists in the here-and-now. It is *against* the present since it orients itself according to a logic of practice that challenges and relativizes the practices of the existing society. It is *outside* of the present since it prefigures new and better forms of being in its very existence. After these preliminary examinations of both utopian counter-images and counter-practices I will proceed in articulating the most important methodological positions behind my reasoning in this dissertation. Finally, at the end of this introductory chapter I will continue with the elaboration of the structure of this dissertation.

1.1 Positions within Philosophy and Utopian Studies

This dissertation is a philosophical study of the concept of utopia. It is a study in political philosophy whose approach can be described as conceptual and historical. In the following, I will position this study within the field of contemporary Western philosophy. The following section should not be, however, understood as an exhaustive presentation of the status of the concept of utopia in contemporary philosophy but to position my own conceptualizations and clarify the philosophical traditions I mainly rely on. In the following, the classification of different philosophical traditions should be understood as a heuristic framework and not as a final word on the subject. The point here is to clarify my own position within utopian philosophy.

Philosophical positions of this dissertation

In contemporary philosophy the concept of utopia and utopian thinking in general has been approached from different perspectives. In the tradition of analytic philosophy utopias have been both attacked and moderately defended. Attacks on utopia made by Karl Popper (1963) and Isaiah Berlin (1997a) are well known but for example in John Rawls' (1999; 2001, 4) it is possible to find an attempt to establish a practicable political possibility with the framework of a "realistic utopia" (see Rawls 1999, 11; Rawls 2001, 4; Förster 2017). Another well-known advocate *for* utopia in analytic philosophy is libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick who in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1999) developed the idea of a "meta-utopia" in which different kinds of lifestyles and communities can be experimented with. Meta-utopia is for Nozick a framework wherein different kinds of utopias can be created. Meta-utopia is a place where "people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can *impose* his own utopian vision upon others".

Overall, there is very little theorizing of utopia in analytic philosophy. According to Raymond Geuss (2016, 235) this has to do with the division of "is" and "ought" most analytic philosophy relies on. For Guess this division leads to a separation between purely empirical "political science" on the one hand, and "pure normative theory" on the other. From the basis of this division, the normative side of analytic political philosophy tends to proceed to the construction of "ideal theory" which, according to Geuss (ibid), "refers in the first instance to the practical circumstances and moral characteristics of individual human beings". In analytic philosophy political philosophy becomes reduced to applied ethics.

This division is a problem for Geuss for two reasons. Firstly, in real political life ethical evaluations are "inextricably intertwined with complex assumptions about the structure of society, human possibility, and the expected course of our actions" (ibid, 236). Every evaluation is already intertwined with the empirical. Secondly, the concepts used by analytic philosophy are themselves risen from the problems faced in the empirical reality. "Concepts like, 'the state,'

'sovereignty,' or 'division of powers' were, after all, deliberately introduced in the early-modern period in order to deal cognitively with problems that had hitherto not existed". Introducing new concepts is for Geuss one of the main tasks of political philosophy. When new social processes appear, new concepts are developed as analytical tools that "could allow one to think more clearly about social processes in train, and could help one to see what actions are required" (Geuss 2008, 46). Because of the distinction between "is" and "ought", between the empirical and the ideal, analytic philosophy tends to reify theoretical concepts that have an empirical origin. According to Geuss (2016, 246), for example John Rawls' theory suffers from exactly this: "Rawlsian theory is *both* insufficiently realistic *and* insufficiently utopian. It is insufficiently utopian because the basic structure of the North American social and economic order is simply presupposed and never questioned".

Geuss' own political theory is not a form "applied ethics" but a realist theory of politics. In Geuss' philosophy "realism" refers to assessment of a situation that is not "limited, impeded, or distorted by wishful thinking or ideology" (ibid, 245). "Realism" in this sense refers to an assessment of a situation that does not depend on taking for granted "identities or forms of valuation just because they are presupposed in everyday life" (ibid). However, in Geuss' thoughts "realism" is not necessarily antiutopian. Even if one assesses the existing world with a sober eye, one can still hold on to utopian wishes of a better world. According to Geuss (ibid), utopian wishes have an important role in our psychological constitution and, for example, our common political projects in changing reality. The point of Geuss' "realism" is that one should not confuse these wishes with reality itself.

In analytical philosophy the dichotomy between realism and utopianism is often based on the interpretation of the concept of utopia as "the best of all possible worlds" (Anthony 2017, 6). In this interpretation the theoretical task of utopian political philosophy is to "start from the scratch" in building the social world where humans live and set no limits to the use of imagination (ibid). A more modest account of this kind of utopianism can be formulated by stating that this kind of utopian political philosophy "allows us to largely ignore concerns about feasibility and achievability when constructing a picture of what the perfect society is" (ibid, 7).

One example of this kind of utopian political philosophy can be found from political philosopher G.A. Cohen's 2009 book *Why not Socialism?* In his book Cohen argues for the desirability of socialism but chooses to stay largely agnostic about whether or not this ideal is achievable:

> In my view, the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do not know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is not, primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational technology: our problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design problem, and it is a design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish propensities, but a design problem, so I think, is what we've got. […] Our problem is that, while we know how to make an economic system work on the basis of the development, and, indeed, the hypertrophy, of selfishness, we do not know how to make it work by developing and exploiting human generosity. (Cohen 2009, 57-58; See also Cohen 2009, 75-76.)

This agnosticism about the achievability of socialism does not, however, constrain Cohen from formulating the political principles of socialism. The construction of utopia is here "an exercise that is independent of the question of how to implement such a society in the actual world" (Anthony 2017, 7). Cohen's socialism can be understood here as a form of Kantian regulative ideal (ibid, 7-8).

In addition to analytic philosophy, utopias have been explored in pragmatist philosophy as well. In the tradition of philosophical pragmatism for example John Dewey has sometimes been read as a utopian thinker. Especially his *Democracy and Education* (1916) has been read as a utopian work (see, e.g., Freeman-Moir 2011, 208). In her *The Task of Utopia* (2001) Erin McKenna has developed a pragmatist approach to utopian theory. Although McKenna acknowledges that pragmatist philosophy has not usually been associated with utopianism but rather it has in many ways been hostile to utopian thought, she nevertheless proceeds to use John Dewey's pragmatist theory of democracy to develop a processual model of utopia (ibid, 8-12). For McKenna, at the heart of Dewey's vision democracy is the experimental method that prepares to interact with the world and guides to a better future "in the method of critical intelligence" (ibid, 12). According to McKenna, democracy is not for Dewey a perfected end-state but "the development of a method of living with regard to past, present, and future" (ibid).

Another pragmatist philosopher who is in my opinion interesting from the utopian point of view is William James (2002, 212-213). James saw utopian ideals as analogical to religious experience. Both express a feeling of being part of something larger than oneself: "the Utopian dreams of social justice in which many contemporary socialists and anarchists indulge are, in spite of their impracticability and non-adaptation to present environmental conditions, analogous to the saint's belief in an existent kingdom of heaven. They help to break the edge of the general reign of hardness, and are slow leavens of a better order" (ibid, 280).

Much later in the history of pragmatist philosophy Richard Rorty (1999) has been vocal about the need for "social hope". Rorty argues that rather than from philosophical theories the best background for political deliberation can be found from "historical narrative and utopian speculation" (ibid, 231-234). More specifically, the best background for political deliberation is found from the kind of historical narrative that "seques into a utopian scenario" (ibid, 231). Without this kind of narrative a loss of hope, "an inability to construct a plausible narrative of progress" becomes a real possibility (ibid, 232). According to Rorty (ibid, 208), the "moderns" are superior to "the ancients" because the moderns have the "ability to imagine a utopia here on earth". The locus of human hope was shifted by the moderns from eternity to future time, "from speculation about how to win divine favour to planning for happiness of future generations" (ibid). Rorty's social hope is essentially hope for "full social justice" (ibid, 203), it is a hope for a future when humanity "shall be willing and able to treat the needs of all human beings with the respect and consideration with which we treat the needs of those closest to us" (ibid, 202-203). Rorty's utopia is a "global egalitarian utopia" (ibid, 234).

In continental philosophy such intertwined philosophical traditions as phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics have also explored the concept of utopia and the phenomenon of utopianism in general. In hermeneutics for example Paul Ricoeur (1986) has explored the concept of utopia in relation to ideology. And in the phenomenological tradition for example Timo Miettinen (2013, 44) has argued that "the political potential of phenomenology resides in a novel understanding of political idealism as a form of dynamic utopianism the twofold creation and renewal of the normative ideals of humanity on the basis of historical teleology". Different existential interpretations of utopia and utopianism on the other hand have been articulated for example by Michael Marder and Patricia Vieira in *Existential Utopia* (2012) which they also have edited.

For Marder and Vieira existential utopia is a theoretical practice that re-signifies the lifeworld of a community and enables the formation of a new world (ibid, 38). This formation of a new world refers here to "facilitating the emergence of a new set of shared semantic coordinates" (ibid). According to Marder and Vieira, utopia "ruptures the hermetically sealed totality of meanings" (ibid). Here Marder and Vieira refer to Martin Heidegger's idea of *Zeuge*, "the conglomeration of usable things" (ibid). According to Heidegger (2010, 75), our being becomes interrupted and our semantic coordinates shattered when a tool refuses to function in our everyday life or when we are faced with our inevitable death. In both cases we react with a shock and are forced to resignify the world due to the total breakdown of previously established meaning. According to Marder and Vieira (2012, 38), the existential utopia begins "with the experience of displacement and dislocation, the realization that the world one inhabits is imperfect". When the world becomes uncanny and where we are shaken by the anticipation of death, we are already stepping out of the everyday life and seeing it from another perspective. In my opinion, this stepping outside of the everyday can be seen as a utopian orientation but it can also be described as an "atopia", as a place that is "outside of all common places" (Neyrat 2018, 24).

In the currents of philosophy that have been influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, especially Giorgio Agamben's philosophy has been explored from a utopian point of view. Although Agamben's thought has been interpreted as anti-utopian (see, e.g., Salzani 2012), his work has been understood as weakly messianic and utopian as well (see, e.g., Lewis 2012). Especially Agamben's concepts of *potentiality* and *profanation* can be seen having utopian dimensions (see, e.g. Agamben 1999; Agamben 2007; Haines 2016).

One of the more known theoreticians of utopia who can be located in the tradition of existential philosophy is Martin Buber. In his *Paths of Utopia* (1996) Buber defends utopian socialism and a so-called "pre-revolutionary", anarchist ("prefigurative" as one could say today) form of socialism. Although Buber relies heavily on anarchist theory developed by Gustav Landauer, his utopian thinking has also existential dimensions. According to Sarah Scott (2020), in Buber there is an ever-present existential human need to feel at home in the world "while experiencing confirmation of one's functional autonomy from others".

Utopias have been approached from a post-structuralist perspective as well. For example Louis Marin's (see, e.g., Marin 1984) contribution to utopian theory is well known but the idea of "heterotopia" as developed by Michel Foucault (1986) and the concept of "immanent utopia" as developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1994, 99-101) should be noted here also. Utopias have been sometimes described in this context as "fragmented" since they are based on fragmentation of desire and subject itself (see, e.g., Pennings 2006; Garforth 2009, 23). Utopia is here interpreted as an affect and a promise (or a threat) "to disrupt or reorganize from the bottom up who we think we are" (Garforth 2009, 20). The intention of utopias become irrelevant here. More important than the intention of utopia, is what utopia does to the subject.

Utopian scholar Lucy Sargisson has in her past work utilized poststructuralist theory, especially deconstructionist philosophy developed by Jacques Derrida for articulating a non-perfectionist form of utopia (see, e.g., Sargisson 1996; Sargisson 2000). Sargisson's work is critical towards the idea of perfectionist utopia that can only represent "a confinement or enclosure" (Sargisson 1996, 89). Deconstruction is in her work used to strip "the construct of utopia of its pretensions towards neutrality and universalism" (ibid, 91). Sargisson's formulation of non-perfectionist utopianism "represents the manifestations of a conscious and necessary desire to resist the closure that is evoked by approaches to utopia as perfect" (ibid, 226). For Derrida himself utopia was not wholly useless yet he still had some reservations about the concept. According to Derrida, utopia has critical powers that should not be abandoned, but at the same time he sees that there are "some contexts in which utopia, the word at any rate, can be too easily associated with dreams, or demobilization, or an impossible that is more of an urge to give up than an urge to action" (Derrida 2005, 131).

Another philosophical tradition that has explored utopia is feminism. Sargisson has in her work combined post-structuralist theory with feminist theory and in her *The Task of Utopia* (2001) above-mentioned Erin McKenna combines feminist theories with pragmatist philosophy. Feminist literature on utopias and utopianism has grown extensive during the last few decades (see, e.g., Bartowski 1989; Bammer 1991; Sargisson 1996; McKenna 2001). It could be said that within utopian theory feminism is one of the main tendencies. However, feminism also contains an important critique towards traditional utopianism and it has been more frequently associated with what Tom Moylan (1986, 11) has called "critical utopia". According to Anjelica Bammer (1991, 14-15), for feminists it has been easy to see, that what was considered a utopia for men was not necessarily a utopia for women. "Reviewing the images of women throughout the history of utopia […] feminist critics found that on the whole women were hardly better off in utopia than in reality" (ibid, 15). Even in utopia, women still had no real power.

This critical stance towards traditional utopias does not, however, mean complete abandonment of utopianism as such. In fact, feminist philosophy has a strong utopian side to it. Bammer (1991, 5) for example refers to Hélène Cixous' philosophy as utopian when Cixous writes in her essay *The Laugh of Medusa* about women writing themselves into the text, into history. According to Cixous (1986,

309), this new writing will break the new (feminine) from the old (masculine): "The future must no longer be determined by the past. I do not deny that the effects of the past are still with us. But I refuse to strengthen them by repeating them […] Anticipation is imperative". Bammer (1991, 5) sees a strong utopian orientation in this position.

Another utopian feminist philosopher that should be mentioned here is Julia Kristeva and her adjective utopianism (Ellis 2014; Kristeva 1986). When Kristeva engages with Thomas More's *Utopia* directly, she makes an observation that a number of key words of More's text are etymologically negative: "the Achoriens are a people *without* a territory; Anyder is a river *without* water; the chief city, Amauratum, is a mirage; Adamus is a prince *without* a people; and Hythloday himself is one who lets inventions shine […]'" (Kristeva 1991, 117). Kristeva argues that the purpose of this negative rhetoric is to communicate to the reader the text is "not a piece of reporting" but "a work of the imagination" (ibid). By emphasizing the imaginary side of More's *Utopia,* Kristeva wants to draw her reader's attention to the psychic meaning of utopia, that the utopia is primarily an experience of the individual (Ellis 2014, 46). Kristeva's utopianism is focused on the individual: "When one dreams of a happy, harmonious, utopian society, one images it built upon love, since love exalts me at the same time as it exceeds or overtaxes me" (Kristeva 1987, 4; see also Reé 1997).

In addition to feminist philosophy, other philosophical traditions with emancipatory orientation have explored utopia as well. Here I mention three such traditions: anarchism, utopian socialism, and Marxism. The connection of anarchist theory to utopianism was already touched upon in the context of Martin Buber but here the utopian nature of anarchist theory should be elaborated more.

What can be said to be at the core of anarchist theory, is the idea of voluntary communities "based on shared values and principles as forms of social change" (Firth 2018, 495). This idea can be found from most anarchist theoreticians – even from such individualist anarchists (egoists) as Max Stirner who in his *The Ego and Its Own* (1995, 160-161) proposed a utopia based on a "union of egoists" (*Verein von Egoisten*). However, more commonly this idea has been associated with such social anarchists as Gustav Landauer for whom the utopia of anarchism was a socialist society which emerges "from the spirit of freedom and voluntary union" and arises "within the individuals and their communities" (Landauer 2010b, 216).

One of the key ideas in both of forms of anarchism is "prefiguration" which refers to different kinds of experimentations which anticipate the anarchist utopia in the form of experimental practices (see, e.g., Firth 2012, 11-28). Sometimes anarchists have found these prefigurative utopian practices from the past. For example, Peter Kropotkin (2009) found elements of anarchism from primitive and medieval societies which practiced what he called "mutual aid". Colin Ward has interpreted anarchism wholly from the perspective of prefiguration. Ward's interpretation of anarchism "suggests that, far from being a speculative vision of a future society, it is a description of a mode of human organization, rooted in

the experience of everyday life, which operates side-by-side with, and in spite of, the dominant authoritarian trends of our society" (Ward 1996, 18). To use the terminology developed by David Graeber (2007, 301-312), one of the core elements of anarchist theory is "utopian extrapolation", a process of studying already-existing utopian experimental practices that can "provide inspiration for further anarchist practices whilst helping to explore problems and tensions that arise in practice" (Firth 2018, 495).

In addition to the above-mentioned anarchist theoreticians, political theorist Saul Newman (2010) has in his work also explored and utilized the concept of utopia. Newman describes his own position as "post-anarchist" since in his work he combines both anarchist and post-structuralist positions. Newman makes a distinction between what he calls "scientific utopianism" and "utopianism of here and now". In "scientific utopianism" the future anarchist society ought to be founded on scientific and rational principles – and it is from these principles the revolution against the state is expected to rise. In "utopianism of the here and now", however, the focus is not so much on the inevitable outcome of a revolution against the state but on "a transformation of social relations within the present" (ibid, 162). According to Newman, utopian thinking "might be seen a way of puncturing the ontological status of the current order, introducing it a moment of disruptive heterogeneity and singularity" (ibid).

"Utopianism of here and now" is a form of utopianism that links itself on the living social practices instead of blueprints and/or rationalistic principles. "Utopianism of here and now" means "escaping from the mental confines of the current order" and it is also "present in concrete forms of resistance to domination" (ibid). "Utopianism of here and now" "expresses both the desire for alternative forms of existence and the need to confront politically the dominations of the present" (ibid).

Another tradition that ought to be mentioned here is the tradition of utopian socialism consisting of what Manuel & Manuel (1979, 581) call "The Utopian Triplex": Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Henri de Saint-Simon. The word "tradition" might be a bit strong word here to describe these thinkers since it can be argued that they did not form a "natural class" and were mutually unsympathetic (Paden 2002, 67). But as far as they *did* have something in common, they were theorists that could be described as theorists who combined a rationalist faith in science with a radical critique of individualism (ibid, 68). They did not emphasize political activity but focused instead of formulating plans of societies which would be more cooperative and in which production would be more efficient and distribution would be fairer (ibid, 68). They also focused on proposing educational programs to strengthen various "social" tendencies within human beings thus downplaying the egoistical and individualist tendencies of man and creating social harmony (ibid; see also Claeys 1991, 23).

The notion of "harmony" can be seen as the key in understanding the utopian socialist tradition. This tradition was formed during the great social upheavals of the 18th and 19th centuries. During this time old pre-capitalist social norms lost their relevance and possibilities for imagining new ones opened up. Utopian

socialism can be seen as an attempt "to formulate new normative systems in a period of upheaval" (Taylor 1982, 3; See also Manuel & Manuel 1979, 588). The existing state of affairs was seen as chaotic and irrational. In this kind of context the word "harmony" referred to a vision of rational society where the contradiction between the individual and the community was to be resolved. Various attempts to realize this vision of a rational society were carried out but none of these experiments were very successful.

In recent years for example critical theorist Axel Honneth has been vocal about the importance to re-examine the legacy of utopian socialism. In his *The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal* (2017) Honneth makes an argument for a return to utopian socialism in order to strengthen the experimentality of socialism by adopting the concept of social freedom as developed by the utopian socialists. Honneth (2015, 25-26) claims that the failure of later Marxist socialism was that it focused solely on the economic and forgot that socialism was first and foremost "a communitarian life-form" and not just a "system of distribution" (ibid, 28).

Honneth builds his vision of socialism heavily on John Dewey's experimental concept of democracy mentioned above. In Honneth's view socialism should build on past experiments of collectivization of the economy. This "logic of historical experimentalism" dictates that different kinds of preliminary designs of social alternatives can be tested "under real economic conditions" (ibid, 70). Honneth's "revised socialism" would also "maintain an overview of current explorations of alternative economic forms" (ibid, 71). In this context Honneth cites sociologist Erik Olin Wright's *Envisioning Real Utopias* (2010) which provides multiple examples of different experimental economic and social inititatives.

Axel Honneth is a contemporary representative of the Frankfurt school of critical theory. In this theoretical tradition the concept of utopia has been very evidently present although not always in the most obvious form. Some theoreticians of this tradition relate to the concept of utopia more positively (see, e.g., Marcuse 1955; Marcuse 1969; Marcuse 2014; Fromm 1968; Fromm 2008) but others, such as Theodor Adorno approach utopia from a more critical perspective.

For example, in his debate with Ernst Bloch (whose influence on the development of the Frankfurt School should not be understated[3]) Adorno argues for the position that one should express utopia only as in the form of negation: "utopia is essentially in the determined negation, in the determined negation of that which merely is, and by concretizing itself as something false, it always points at the same time to what should" (Bloch & Adorno 1996, 11). This kind of utopianism can be described as "iconoclastic utopianism" (Jacoby 2005, xvii) since it refuses to depict any image of utopia. In the history of ideas this kind of utopianism can be traced to the Jewish background of the early members of the Frankfurt School. In Jewish thought it is forbidden to create images of the God. In the context of utopian thought this same prohibition applies to the utopia as well. Russell Jacoby (2005, 33) explains: "[The Jewish utopian thinkers] translated a largely mystical and individualist tongue into a political language. They fashioned an

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[3] See, e.g., Plaice, Plaice & Knight 1986, xxii-xxiii, Wiggershaus 1995, 65-90, Hudson 1982, 8-10 & Hudson 2013, 27.

utopianism committed to the future but reserved about it. Against the dominant tradition of blueprints, they offered an imageless utopianism laced with passion and spirit" (see also Löwy 2017).

The last tradition of utopian philosophy that I explore here is the tradition of Marxism. Although Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (2000) were famously not calling communism "a *state of affairs* which is to be established" but a real movement "which abolishes the present state of things", it is not sure that this should mean that there is no utopian vision of postcapitalist society at all in Marx and Engels. It is true that one cannot find a fixed blueprint of communist society from Marx or Engels but this does not mean that there is no general view of where humanity is headed. For example, in *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx (1999) describes communism as a classless society, a society "in which class antagonism will have ceased" and in which the time of production "devoted to different articles will be determined by the degree of their social utility". In Marx there is a vision of what comes after capitalism even if this vision lacks details. In recent years for example Peter Hudis (2012; 2013) has argued for the idea that a vision of postcapitalist society can indeed be reconstructed from Marx's writings.

This interpretation of Marx's utopianism can be taken even further. For example Nina Rismal (2017, 191) has argued that Marx's thinking as such is constitutively utopian. Rismal builds her argument to Marx's ideas of "species-being" (*Gattungswesen*) and non-alienated labour. According to her, these ideas imply a vision of utopia of communist society where all contradictions have been overcome between human individuals and between humanity and nature as such. Marx's powerful general depiction of communism in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* can be seen testifying of this "constitutive utopianism" of Marx:

> Communism as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* as *human self-estrangement*, and therefore as the real *appropriation* of the *human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being - a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man-the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. (Marx 1974, 90.)

Whatever the case may be, the relationships of Marx and Marxism with utopianism is a complex one (see, e.g., Paden 2002). In his *Utopianism and Marxism* (2008) Vincent Geoghegan has aimed to solve some of the contradictions between the two through careful exploration of both the thoughts of Marx and Engels and the theories of some later Marxists who had more positive relationship with the notion of utopia or had an otherwise utopian approach to social theory and politics. Geoghegan's list of utopian Marxists include Ernst Bloch (e.g. 1986; 2000), Rudolf Bahro (e.g. 1978) and André Gorz (e.g. 1985). In my opinion this list can be extended for example with such thinkers as Darko Suvin (e.g. 1979), Raymond

Williams (e.g. 1980), Terry Eagleton (2000), Norman Geras (2000), Fredric Jameson (e.g. 2005; 2016) and Erik Olin Wright (2010).

Many of these above-mentioned Marxist theoreticians will be utilized in this dissertation. In this dissertation I mainly draw from the Marxist and anarchist traditions but also the thinkers categorized as "utopian socialists" are important for my argument. Especially I draw from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, the utopian philosophy of Ernst Bloch and the autonomist Marxism of John Holloway who in turn draws heavily from Theodor Adorno's critical theory and from Ernst Bloch's philosophy. In addition to this I also draw from anarchist theory. There are of course some contradictions between Marxist and anarchist theory but here I follow Guy Debord's stance on the relationship between anarchism and Marxism. Debord (2014, 34) sees these two traditions sharing the same origin in the critique of Hegelian philosophy and thus being part of a larger tradition of emancipatory thought (see also Angaut 2012). These two traditions have also been intertwined in practical struggles for emancipation. Especially those versions of Marxism that can be categorized under the label "libertarian socialism" (e.g. autonomism, council communism and situationism) come in practice very close to anarchism (especially those versions of social anarchism that emphasize the importance of class struggle) although their theoretical positions stem from Marxist theory (see, e.g., Pinta 2012).

The role of utopian socialism and especially that of Robert Owen becomes evident in the last chapter of this dissertation where the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice is developed to describe certain contemporary utopian phenomena. Utopian counter-logical social practices can be seen as continuing the utopian socialist tradition in a different form. Especially the practical experimentality of both utopian socialism and contemporary forms of utopianism is elaborated more thoroughly in the last chapter.

Positioning this dissertation within utopian studies

This dissertation can be classified as a philosophical study, but it can also be located in the field of utopian studies. As a discipline utopian studies is fairly new and its proper development can be dated in the 1960s and 1970s. Earlier research of utopia was shadowed by both the totalitarianisms of the 20th century and the Cold War. The disastrous 20th century with its two world wars, Stalinism and fascism had a strong negative effect on the study of utopianism and utopia as a political concept. Utopian studies were kept alive, James D. Ingram (2016, xv) claims, after the second world war mostly by historians. In the 1950s utopian research was heavily affected and restricted by the anti-communist McCarthyism.

It was not until the 1970s when utopian theory really began to take new forms (see, e.g., Levitas 2013, 103). As Peter Fitting (2009, 121) writes: "Utopian studies – like utopia itself – found a new life with the revival of utopianism in the 1970s – most obviously following the general social upheaval of the 1960s, which contributed to efforts to understand better radical traditions and alternative visions, particularly in a US in which the Cold War and McCarthyism had nearly

silenced a generation of activists". It was also in the 1970s when SUS, the Society for Utopian Studies was founded.

Utopian scholar Tom Moylan has in his *Demand the Impossible. Science Fiction and Utopian Imagination* (1986) argued that from the 1960s onwards, utopian fiction has become more self-aware of its critical function. This observation has had a great impact on utopian thought in general outside of utopian fiction. According to Moylan "critical" refers here to two things. Firstly, "critical" in the sense of "critique", critical utopias are expressions of oppositional thought. They are in opposition to the current society. Secondly, critical utopias are critical in the sense of "critical mass" which is needed for radical social change. Critical utopias are in part creating that critical mass. Critical utopias are aware of the shortcomings and flaws of utopian thought, literature, and tradition and therefore they abandon the idea of utopias as blueprints for future society but preserve the dreams of better future that utopias contain. (Moylan 1986, 10; see also Sabia 2002.)

The central theme of critical utopias is the conflict of the utopian society and the society from which it has originated from. The utopian society they depict, however, is not in any sense perfect. It is imperfect and flawed. It has its share of social and political contradictions. This makes them inherently dynamic and reflexive. They cannot be understood as depictions of the perfect society but only as temporary constructions which will change into something new in the future. In this sense they can be seen as being in the process of becoming. Critical utopias are not about perfection, they cannot be understood as images of *perfect* societies, but the core of critical utopias is in their orientation towards a better world.

Critical utopias are constantly dissatisfied with the present, they are constantly in a conflict with the existing state of affairs.[4] This conflictual nature of critical utopias can be explained with its connection to the 1960s counterculture and "the new imagery in the alternatives explored in the 1970s" (Moylan 1985, 11)". Critical utopias were part of the political practices and visions shared by various autonomous oppositional movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they rejected the domination of globalizing capitalism with the nation state which they also saw as a form of domination. According to Moylan, ground of radical politics was "shifting from the older strategies of class struggle at the point of production to broader and deeper challenges in the general name of autonomy and justice for humanity and nature" (ibid).

Moylan's "critical utopia" refers here to a certain type of literary utopia that does not understand utopias as perfections. "Critical utopias" present an "ambiguous utopia" (Le Guin 1974) where the utopian society "is shown with its faults, inconsistencies, problems, and even denials of the utopian impulse in the form of the persistence of exploitation and domination in the better place" (Moylan 1986, 44). However, the study of utopias does not necessarily have to focus on utopia as a literary genre. In addition to literary studies, there are other ways to practice research in utopian studies as well. In his classic article Lyman

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[4] On utopia and the notion of conflict see, e.g., Jakonen 2020, 81-128.

Tower Sargent (1994) presents the "three faces of utopianism" which refer to the three possible research orientations in utopian studies:

1. Utopian literature
2. Utopian practice
3. Utopian social theory

The study of utopian literature relies mainly on the notion of utopia as a literary genre. The study of utopian practice on the other hand focuses not only to different alternative, intentional communities but it also studies every form of social and political activity intended to bring about a better society (Sargent 2010, 7). Sometimes it even studies personal transformation (ibid). Finally, utopian social theory focuses on such topics as role of utopia as a method of analysis, the relationship between utopia and ideology and the ways in which utopianism is used to explain social transformation (ibid).

Although the lines between these three "faces" will of course become blurred in actual research process, here I am mainly focused on utopian social theory. This dissertation will focus especially on how utopia as a political concept can help us open social imagination and further social change. However, as it becomes clear for the reader, I will also make excursions to utopian literature and utopian practice in order to build an argument in utopian social theory. This argument revolves essentially around the ways in which it is possible to conceptualize utopia. In the next subchapter I will explore the ways in which utopias have been conceptualized in the past. After this literature review, I will continue to formulate my own definition of the concept of utopia in the subchapter 1.3.

1.2 Previous Conceptualizations of Utopia

In this subchapter, I will explore some of the earlier theoretical discussions on the concept of utopia. First, I will briefly iterate the prehistory of utopian thought in order to contextualize historically the emergence of the concept of utopia. After this I will elaborate on some of the most common conceptualizations that revolve around the adjective "utopian" (utopia as an orientation or as a quality found from different cultural phenomena), "utopianism" (a tradition of thought based on social dreaming) and utopia itself. In the context of the "utopian" and "utopianism", I will also explore the notion of "utopian mentality" which I will also distinguish from the concept of utopia itself. The notion of "utopian mentality" refers to a kind of orientation *towards* utopia but not to any particular utopia as such.

After these preliminary definitions, I will continue to define the concept of utopia itself. Here I will distinguish between two possible interpretations of the concept of utopia: absolutist and relationalist. "Absolutism" refers here to an interpretation in which utopias are understood as closed, static and perfect.

"Relationalism" on the other hand interprets utopias as dynamic, historically situated, and open. In relationalist understanding utopias are always *in relation* to the society and to the historical period they are constructed in. They are seen at the same time as mirroring the present and offering a radical alternative to it. At the end of this subchapter I will continue to formulate my own definition of utopia as a counter-image of the present motivated by a desire for a better being. The details of this definition will be elaborated upon in the next subchapter.

The Prehistory of Utopia

The answer to the question "how old is utopia?" depends on whether this question refers to utopia as a literary genre, as a specific form of political thought or as something more universal.[5] Although examples of utopianism can be found from very early sources of Western thought (see, e.g., Manuel & Manuel 1979, 33-116; Vieira 2010, 3; Claeys 2020, 21-40) and although it is now widely acknowledged that utopian forms of thought can be found from non-Western cultures as well (see, e.g. Sargent 2010, 66-85; Dutton 2010) as a literary genre, and as a form of political thought, utopias can be seen mainly as a modern, European tradition that was started by Thomas More. Fatima Vieira (2017, 19) has even argued that although utopianism can be found from earlier periods in history, it was Thomas More's *Utopia* that created a wholly new form of thought, a new discursivity:

> More offered a totally different perspective on the world, no doubt framed by the age he lived in (and for the advancements of which he contributed), namely by the way Humanism valued the agency of human beings. This new perspective, which in rigour corresponded to a revolution in thought, had its foundation act a practice of thinking where the discourse on the Other is centered on oneself.

However, this does not mean that More's *Utopia* did not have any predecessors. Utopian thought has a long prehistory which can be traced back on the other hand to the ancient Greece and on the other hand to the Jewish and Christian traditions. In the ancient Greece the stories about the mythical Golden Age already expressed a utopian orientation towards a better being. One of the first traces of utopian thought can be found in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (2010, 59-60). *Works and Days* is a meditation on the lost paradise, the mythical Golden Age where everything was better. According to Manuel & Manuel (1979, 67-68), Hesiod's description of the golden human race of the Golden Age contains "many

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[5] The important questions about postcolonial forms of utopianism and the relationship of utopia with colonialism cannot be answered here properly. Utopia is here perceived mainly as a western concept, a concept of the colonial core. It is here seen a fundamentally contradictory concept that has both emancipatory and oppressive (including colonial) potentials. The latter potentials will be discussed in the subchapter 2.4 of this dissertation where I explore the blueprint tradition of utopianism. One way to overcome the dilemma of colonialism in utopian tradition is point to the distinction between utopia and utopianism where "utopia" refers to certain kind of form of thought and "utopianism" to the universal human orientation towards a better being. For the discussion about postcolonial utopianism see, e.g., Ashcroft 2001; Ashcroft 2009; Ashcroft 2016; Niezen 2007; Pordzik 2001.

elements of the utopia of calm felicity, a dream of happiness that will endure until the end of eighteenth century".

The myth of golden race was presented also in Plato's *Republic*, the model for classical utopias. In *Republic's* third book Plato presents a noble lie of different races in order to impose a hierarchical order on his imaginary society:

> "Although all of you in the city are brothers," we will say to them in telling our story, "when the god was forming you, he mixed gold into those of you who are capable of ruling, which is why they are the most honorable; silver into the auxiliaries; and iron and bronze into the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part, you will produce children like yourselves; but, because you are all related, a silver child will occasionally be born to a golden parent, a golden child to a silver parent, and so on. Therefore, the first and most important command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing they must guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of their offspring. If an offspring of theirs is born with a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but assign him an honor appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen or the farmers. On the other hand, if an offspring of the latter is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries. For there is an oracle that the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian. (*Republic* 415a-c.)

In *Republic* Plato describes a state ruled by philosopher kings contemplating the idea of good itself. They are the golden race of his utopia. For Plato, only those who were able to reach the idea of good, would be suitable as rulers. Plato's utopia is authoritarian, closed and static in its form. Once it has been established it does not change. The historical background of Plato's work explains why this is so. The Peloponnesian War had created a chaotic situation between Greek city-states which in turn created the need for creating a stable social order. Plato was not satisfied with any of the existing political orders so he ended up creating his own. Not one city-state was ruled by philosophers which is why they were in such a chaotic state. In *Republic* Socrates says: "There is not one city today with a constitution worthy of the philosophic nature. That is precisely why it is perverted and altered" (*Republic* 497b).

It is well known that Plato's *Republic* was heavily influenced by Sparta and its constitution (see *Republic* 544c). As Manuel & Manuel (1979, 97) write, over the years Sparta had become the perfect example of "perfect social cohesion, of patriotic devotion, to be admired by the young of all nations" and the constitution written by Lycurgus of Sparta had become sort of a utopian blueprint for all societies. Although it is not sure if Lycurgus the lawgiver of Sparta ever lived, his name nevertheless became influential in the designs "for a hard, ascetic utopia" (ibid). According to Plutarch (1914, 220-221), Lycurgus made many important innovations including his institution of a senate, the so-called "Council of Elders". The council was named this way because, according to Xenophon (2002, 83), Lycurgus "ruled that the Elders were to be in charge of trials for capital offences and thus brought it about that old age was honoured more highly than the physical strength of men in their prime".

Another important innovation, "a very bold political measure" (Plutarch 1914, 228) made by Lycurgus was his idea about the redistribution of the land:

> For there was a dreadful inequality in this regard, the city was heavily burdened with indigent and helpless people, and wealth was wholly concentrated in the hands of a few. Determined, therefore, to banish insolence and envy and crime and luxury, and those yet more deep-seated and afflictive diseases of the state, poverty and wealth, he persuaded his fellow-citizens to make one parcel of all their territory and divide it up anew, and to live with one another on a basis of entire uniformity and equality in the means of subsistence, seeking pre-eminence through virtue alone, assured that there was no other difference or inequality between man and man than that which was established by blame for base actions and praise for good ones. (ibid, 228-229.)

Sparta was a warrior state that spent most of its existence either fighting or preparing for battle. "From birth to death the agents of the state – the kings, elders, and appointed platoon leaders – supervised every act of life" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 97). Among themselves Spartans were equal. The land was divided into lots of the same size. This, according to Manuel & Manuel (ibid), "set the pattern for future utopian plans of agrarian communism".

Although Sparta and its constitution had a great influence on the development of utopian thought, so had the utopian image of Athens as depicted by Athenian statesman and poet Solon whose dream was "to submit the society of Athens to *eunomia*, lawfulness, order, and *arpos,* that which is fitting, without recourse to tyranny" (ibid, 94). In Solon's Athens the poor were to be granted sufficiently and the rich would have only what was considered rightfully theirs:

> For I gave the common folk such priviledge as is sufficient for them, neither adding nor taking away; and such as had power and were admired for their riches, I provided that they too should not suffer undue wrong. Nay, I stood with a strong shield thrown before sorts, and would have neither to prevail unrighteously over the other. […] So best will the people follow their leaders, neither too little restrained nor yet perforce; for excess breedeth outrage when much prosperity followeth those whose mind is not perfect. (Solon 1931, 121.)

In addition to these Greek utopians, another element should be mentioned here that is important for the early developments of utopias: Jewish and Christian eschatologies and their basic ideas of the Days of the Messiah, the Paradise and the Millennium. These ideas can be seen coming close to the idea of utopia before the emergence of the concept itself:

> With the theological thought of the Middle Ages the ideal commonwealths are projected in the next world either, in the mystic and philosophic manner of St Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, or in the poetical and naive fashion of the narrative of the great Irish traveller St Brendan. This intrepid monk tells how, during one of his travels, his ship was driven towards the north, and how after fifteen days he and his companions reached a country where they saw cathedrals of crystal and where day followed day without night and they landed on an island which was the abode of the blessed. Though in this 6th century legend, Utopia is identified with Paradise, the combination of actual travels with the vision of an ideal island is a feature which will be found in many later utopias. (Marineri 2019, 60.)

The different relationships of Jewish and Christian eschatologies with utopian thought will not be fully resolved in this dissertation but I will elaborate some important aspects of these relationships in the third chapter of this dissertation. Here it is important only to understand that connections between them exist and that Jewish and Christian eschatologies have had a great impact on the

development of utopianism before the emergence of the concept of utopia. In the next subchapters I will move on to the elaboration of this concept itself. I begin with the basic conceptual distinction between utopia, the utopian and utopianism. After that I will continue to the examination of the possible functions utopias can have.

Utopia, the utopian, and utopianism

The concept of "utopia" itself is a combination of Greek *topos* (for place), and (depending on the interpretation) *ou* for general negative or *eu* for good (or ideal and prosperous) (Manuel and Manuel 1979, 1), "(e)utopia" carries the double meaning of no-place/good-place. "A good place that does not exist" can well be a dream or a criticism, rather than a blueprint. This concept was first used in Thomas More's 1516 eponymous book. However, if one uses the adjective "utopian" instead of the noun "utopia" the answer to the question of the age of utopian thought is bit different. Here "utopian" refers to a certain orientation, towards a better mode of being, that can be found in many different forms of human culture. This orientation towards a better mode of being seems to be a universal disposition within humanity. It can be found through an interpretative process of "utopian hermeneutics", which interprets cultural phenomena from the utopian perspective. Next, I will look closer to Ernst Bloch's way of conceptualizing utopia since in Bloch's work one can find the best example of utopian hermeneutics.

Ernst Bloch has argued that political utopias are just one manifestation of the *utopian* principle of hope (see Bloch 1986; 1995). According to Bloch, utopian features could be found in almost every form of human culture: daydreams, religions, popular music and even in fascist ideologies (Bloch 1990). These utopian elements, according to Bloch, stem from what is lacking. They stem from what is not. They stem from hunger.

Humans are for Bloch *Not-Yet*. They are unfinished (Geoghegan 1996, 33). They are not in self-possession of their "own full being: the *humanum* or not-yet-actual countenance" (Hudson 1982, 93). They are always lacking something. This lack keeps on creating wishes and wants. It keeps humans striving for better. This lack, this *Not* is the negative which creates the positive, *Hope.* Hope is something that keeps us overcoming the Not – which on the other hand keeps recurring to be overcome. For example, hunger (as both concrete phenomenon and as a metaphor for the lack) is something that keeps us striving for fulfilment, it keeps on negating its poor existence and affirming the better state of being that looms in the future. The hunger produces a revolutionary interest against the lack. Hunger as a form of the self-preservation drive strives to overcome any obstacle that comes in its way. According to Bloch, for overcoming hunger one needs a premeditated plan. One also needs to anticipate the goal of the plan as something excellent. There is a hopeful element within hunger that can either deceive and exhaust us or activate and stimulate us to strive for a better life. This is how the Hunger, the Not creates daydreams. Daydreams are not just pure escapism. They

also orient towards the better state of being. They are a form of subjective hope (Bloch 1986, 76. See also Moisio 2009, 28-29).

According to Bloch we humans are always striving for better. We are never finished. We are Not-Yet. "We never tire of wanting things to improve. We are never free of wishes, or only in moments of delusion. It would be more comfortable to forget this longing rather than to fulfil it, but what where would this lead to? These wishes certainly would not stop, or they would disguise themselves as new ones, or worse still: without wishes we would be the dead bodies over which the wicked would stride on to victory" (Bloch 1986, 77). Without striving for better we really would not be alive. This wishing for a better life, this subjective hope can take multiple forms. It can be seen in fairytales, happy endings of the movies, in world-religions and in their promise of everlasting life and in art. The subjective hope can be seen in almost every form of human culture (Geoghegan 1996, 34). Bloch's *The Principle of Hope* is filled with examples of manifestations of Hope.

According to Bloch, humans constantly orient themselves towards a better state of being. Ruth Levitas (2010) has formulated a definition of utopia that is very close to Bloch's formulation. According to Levitas, utopias express the "desire for a better being". Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel (1979, 5) could call this desire a "utopian propensity" which has manifested itself in diverse forms of human experience during the history of mankind. This "principle of hope" or "desire for a better being", this propensity towards the utopian can be seen as a core element of any utopia itself. Where there is an orientation towards a qualitatively better mode of being, there can be seen utopian qualities within that orientation. According to Vincent Geoghegan, "we can speak of a utopian disposition, a utopian impulse or mentality, of which the classic utopia is but one manifestation. This impulse is grounded in the human capacity, and need, for fantasy; the perpetual conscious and unconscious rearranging of reality and one's place in it. It is the attempt to create an environment in which one is truly at ease" (Geoghegan 2008, 17).

"The utopian" associated here with the principle of hope, with desire for a better being can be understood as analogical for what Karl Mannheim would call the"utopian mentality" (Mannheim 1979, 173-236). [6] For Mannheim utopian mentality is something that orients towards a new *topos* from the present, it

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[6] There is, of course, important differences between the concepts of utopian mentality, desire for a better being and the principle of hope. Especially the roles of desire and hope have been debated in the field of utopian studies. In her *The Concept of Utopia* Ruth Levitas (2010, 219-220) argues that the concept of hope does not include all forms of utopianism. According to Levitas, the concept of hope is connected to the concept of possibility. The hope in utopias would be in vain if the possibility of them being realized was not real in some way. The concept of desire, however, is not so strongly connected to the possibility of realization. Humans can desire even something completely impossible. One can desire a better being even though there is no hope of this desire being fulfilled. But whether we use the concept of hope or the concept of desire we are in both cases dealing with orientating ourselves towards a better world (be it possible or not). This orientation in itself can be seen referring to the idea that our current state of being is somehow flawed and needs to be transcended. For discussions of the relationship of hope and desire in utopian theory see, e.g., Levitas & Sargisson 2003 & Webb 2008.

transcends the reality and "breaks the bonds of the existing order" (Mannheim 1979, 173). A similar kind of definition of utopia has been presented by Leszek Kołakowski in his essay *The Concept of the Left* where he defines utopia as "a state of social consciousness, a mental counterpart to the social movement for radical change in the world" (Kołakowski 1968, 69). "To construct a utopia is always an act of negation toward an existing reality, a desire to transform it" (Kołakowski 1968, 67).

The idea of "utopian mentality" should be conceptually distinguished from utopias themselves. Utopian mentality is essentially a type of orientation towards another, qualitatively better *topos* and utopias themselves are descriptions of the *topos* utopian mentality orients towards. This means that a distinction between "utopia" and "utopianism" should be made where "utopia" refers to "a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space" and "utopianism" to "social dreaming" (Sargent 1994, 3-7). Another way to put this distinction is to talk separately about the utopian program (realization of a new totality) and the utopian impulse found in political theories, philosophy, and cultural products (Jameson 2005, 6).

As it has become clear, there is a difference between utopian orientation and utopia itself. The word "utopia" has had multiple meanings in history, and it has also been approached from various perspectives. One perspective is the perspective of content. What is interesting from this perspective is the normative descriptions of good society. From this perspective the most important part of a utopia is the values it embodies. Another perspective one can take to utopia is the perspective of form. From this perspective utopia is understood mainly as a literary genre. Yet another perspective is the perspective of the social function of utopia. This perspective has been especially prevalent in Marxist theory (see, e.g., Levitas 2010, 7) and it is also the perspective I am mostly interested in here. In the next section I will elaborate in detail the discussions surrounding the functional approach to utopias.

Functional approach to utopia

In her classic study *The Concept of Utopia* (2010), utopian scholar Ruth Levitas proposes three different approaches to utopias in the field of utopian studies: content, form and function. The functional approach can in itself be further divided into three different subfunctions: the subfunction of preventing social change, the subfunction of facilitating social change and the subfunction of critique. In this dissertation the last subfunction of this list is emphasized: utopias function as a critique of the present.

The approach of content to utopias is based on the assumption that utopias should first and foremost be descriptions of a good society. This of course is in a certain sense true, but it cannot really be the full definition of utopias. According to Levitas, this is because the portrayals of utopias "will vary, being a matter not just of personal taste, but of the issues which appear to be important to different social groups, either in the same society or in different historical circumstances" (Levitas 2010, 4-5).

Different utopias have different contents, and one cannot really say anything generalizable about what kind of values utopias carry within them. For most people this is however the most interesting approach to utopias. The approach of content to utopias invites people to reflect what kind of society really is good and would it really be good if it were real. The content approach to utopias underlines the prescriptively normative side of utopias and because these normative elements are in many ways highly contingent and historical, there can be no one utopia which would work as a model for all the other utopias. The contents of utopias are contradictory, and they clash against each other. In other words, there is no normative feature of utopias that would *necessarily* be a feature found in all utopias. And even if all the utopias have had a certain feature until this day, it is not necessary for this feature appear in later utopias. (ibid.)

Levitas' second approach to utopias is the approach of form. Some commentators take the form of classical utopias (especially Thomas More's *Utopia*) and argue that utopia is first and foremost a literary genre involving a more or less detailed fictional depiction of an alternative society. This approach to utopias is very common, but it is also very restrictive. According to Levitas, "depictions of the good society do not necessarily take the form of literary fictions – and indeed this form is only available under certain very specific historical conditions; is it then to be assumed that when these conditions do not exist, there are no utopias?" (ibid, 5). For sure there is a genre of utopian literature, but utopias themselves do not always take this form. They can also take the form of a political program or a philosophical treatise for example. They can also take the form of a social experiment or an intentional community. Broader historical comparisons need to take a more inclusive approach to utopias. Utopia as a literary genre is just one of the possible manifestations of utopian thought (Vieira 2010, 7).

Levitas' (2010, 6) third approach to utopias focuses on the *function* of utopias. This functional approach is not as obvious as her first two approaches because it is further away from the everyday usage of the words "utopia" and "utopian". The functional approach to utopias asks: What are utopias for? There has been many different answers to this question. For example even within the Marxist tradition of political philosophy utopias have been seen as having both negative and positive functions: the negative function of preventing social change and positive function of facilitating it (ibid). In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* for example Marx and Engels (2004) wrote that:

> The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social Utopias, of founding isolated "phalansteres", of establishing "Home Colonies", or setting up a "Little Icaria" — duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem — and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois.

Marx and Engels saw that utopian socialists were progressive in their own time and they made important contributions to the critique of the capitalist system. However, as time went on their abstract and static utopian blueprints became obsolete. They could not function as mobilizing and facilitating plans for social struggles but rather, according to Marx and Engels, utopian socialists sank (at least partially) "into the category of the reactionary [or] conservative Socialists" because they eventually left the proletariat within the bounds existing capitalist society (ibid). Utopian socialists could only present a critique of capitalist society, but they could not facilitate real social change. They even ended up preventing it.

The idea of the preventive nature of utopias was also expressed by Lenin in 1912: "In politics utopia is a wish that can never come true – neither now nor afterwards, a wish that is not based on social forces and is not supported by the growth and development of political class forces" (Lenin 2004). Utopias are for Lenin only day-dreams, fantasies and inventions that can only express the historical situation, but they cannot work politically, revolutionarily. For example, the utopia of the Narodniks is, according to Lenin, "correct from the *historical* point of view" but in real political struggles it can only prevent social change (ibid).[7]

The function of preventing social change is a feature which can be found, especially, in the abstract and static forms of utopian thought. This negative function of utopian thought can also sometimes be understood as a compensatory function. Dreaming of abstract utopian worlds can sometimes become an end in itself, which can be seen negating concrete social action. Lewis Mumford has named these kinds of abstract utopias as "utopias of escape" (Mumford 1922, 20). According to Mumford, a utopia of escape is "an enchanted island" where one loses the "capacity for dealing with things as they are" (ibid). It is an aimless and reactionary utopia. It is pure daydreaming. In contrast to it, Mumford introduces the "utopia of reconstruction". Utopia of reconstruction recognizes the hazards and evils of the present society to human beings as animals and aims to reconstruct the society more suitable for humans. "The utopia of reconstruction is what its name implies: a vision of a reconstituted environment which is better adapted to the nature and aims of the human beings who dwell within it than the actual one; and not merely better adapted to their actual nature, but better fitted to their possible developments" (ibid, 21). The utopia of escape leads back to the ego of the utopian thinker, but the utopia of escape orientates towards outside world and aims to change it.

The utopias which have mainly a compensatory function undermine the possibilities for social change. However, this negative function is not the only function utopias can have. Utopias can be understood as dynamic and historically sensitive as well. Utopias can also facilitate and mobilize social change. This kind of view on utopianism emphasizes the so-called facilitating

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[7] Lenin's relationship with utopianism is not, however, purely negative. In *What is to be done?* (2008) Lenin has a cautious affirmation of certain type of utopian dreaming. See for example Geoghegan 2008, 73-74.

function of utopia and it can be found for example in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. Bloch (1986, 205) sees Marxism too as a form of utopian thought, but he makes a distinction between "cold" and "warm" streams within Marxism. The cold stream of Marxism means here the conditional analysis on the whole historical situation, unmasking of ideologies and disenchantment of metaphysical illusions. It is the critical-scientific part of Marxism. The warm stream of Marxism on the other hand is the facilitating and mobilizing part of Marxism which contains the revolutionary enthusiastic emancipatory intention and the socialist vision of Marxism.

In addition to compensatory and facilitatory functions, utopias can be seen as having another function. This is the "function of critique" (Levitas 2010, 208), which is the approach that I mainly take in this dissertation. Constructing a utopia is implicitly critical towards the present and expresses the need for social change. Why would anyone create utopias if there was nothing to improve upon in the present society? Putting a utopia side-by-side with the current society creates a situation where the imaginary utopian society and the real society are being compared to each other. This juxtaposition creates a contrast effect, where the current society will be seen as more unjust, more faulty, and more problematic than the utopia constructed in imagination. This is just as Manuel & Manuel (1979, 446) write: "Building utopia as antithesis to reality, [is] a kind of counterpoint, one of the oldest devices in utopia-writer's repertory". This trick based on the contrast effect was already in use when Thomas More wrote his *Utopia*.

In utopian counter-logical social practices the critical function mentioned above becomes emphasized. Within counter-logical social practices there is always, at least implicitly a criticism of the present. There is an element of refusal in these practices. However, more important than the critique in these practices is the way it can disrupt the ordinary flow of social life. This is somewhat different from the critical function which essentially means disruption only on the level of consciousness against the ideological closure of society. However, the idea of utopian counter-logical social practice that creates cracks in the social cohesion can potentially have a disruptive function not only on the ideological, but also on the more concrete, structural, and practical levels.

Disruptions on both of these levels are needed in the neoliberal era. In an era when it has become so difficult to envision radical, collective and future oriented alternatives for capitalism a dialectic between the ideological and the practico-structural disruptions needs to be established. On the one hand the theoretically disruptive utopian counter-*images* motivate and guide (at least implicitly) the utopian counter-*practices* in the here-and-now. And on the other hand, the practico-structurally disruptive utopian counter-practices can also open the utopian imagination and further the production of utopian counter-images in the present. First the utopian counter-images offer a critique of the present that disrupts on the ideological level and motivates the utopian counter-practices. Then the utopian counter-practices open the present even further through the creation of cracks.

The opening of the present (on both ideological *and* practico-structural levels) which is the desired outcome of this dialectic leaves, of course, the *contents* of the future open. This does not mean that contents of the future utopian goals cannot be proposed and advocated. Neither does this mean "pathological pluralism" (see Levitas 2001), in which commitment to any politics is suspicious. I am mainly arguing for the idea that today the main function of utopias is to open up the present for alternative ways of thinking and especially for alternative ways of being. A possible concept for describing these alternatives is proposed in this dissertation: utopian counter-logical social practice. These practices can have the potential to change the people participating in them by offering them new experiences of social being. These new experiences can offer a critical distance to the ordinary ways of being and this way possibly open the future again for utopian speculation as well.

There is no final state of being for utopian thought, which focuses on the function of critique and disruption. From the perspective of these functions the world is seen as inherently open and changeable. From the perspective of these functions of utopias are only more or less temporary, historical constructions that emerge from the historical reality. There are no closed absolutes here.

On absolutist and relationalist interpretations of utopia

One can argue that there are generally speaking two ways to interpret the concept of utopia: absolutist and relational. The absolutist interpretations of utopia are not the only possible ones. Absolutist interpretations approach utopias as static models, the implementation of which can only take place in the manner of imposing a blueprint upon society. On this basis, it is easy to interpret utopias as signifying nothing but totalitarianism, as opposed to liberty. Absolutist interpretations of utopias can take a variety of forms. Aspects of absolutist utopias emphasized by different authors are moral monism, holistic methodology and utopias as closed systems.

Here it is, however, important to note that I do not use the concepts of "absolutist" and "relationalist" as categories of utopias. I use them as interpretative frameworks through which different aspects of utopias become visible. Absolutist interpretations see utopias as inherently rigid, static, and authoritarian. Relational interpretations on the other hand interpret utopias as open, historical sensitive and dynamic. Absolutism and relationalism express here different ways to relate to the concept of utopia and the phenomenon of utopianism in general.

The distinction made here between absolutism and relationalism is intended as a statement in the discussions surrounding the relationship of utopias with totalitarianism. The historical experience of both fascism and Stalinism challenged utopian thought in the 20th century and forced theoreticians of utopia to distinguish the desired forms of utopianism from those forms of utopia that were associated with totalitarianism. This created a need to make distinctions and oppositions between closed totalitarian and more open forms of utopia. For example, Erin McKenna (2001, 3) has written about the difference

between "the end-state model of utopia" and "the process model of utopia"; Russel Jacoby (2005, xiv) about the difference between "the blueprint tradition of utopianism" and "the iconoclastic tradition of utopianism"; and David Harvey (2000, 169-189) about the difference between the "utopia of spatial form" and the "utopia of social process".

The absolutist critique of utopia as a form of moral monism, as opposed to plurality and versatility, is particularly associated with Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1997a; Berlin 1997b). In Berlin's (1997a, 5) words, utopias assume an objective and coherent, and unavoidably dogmatic, system of "moral truths". In such a system, for every genuine moral question there can be only one correct answer, there is a reliable method for finding the correct moral answers, and all correct answers to moral questions are compatible with each other (ibid). Yet a perfect whole, "the ultimate solution" (ibid, 11) to moral questions, or a "perfect social harmony" (Berlin 1997b, 191), are conceptually incoherent ideas. A choice between different values is always necessary. "We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss" (Berlin 1997a, 11). No society can realize all values coherently. This, according to Berlin, renders utopias impossible.

The interpretation of utopias as based on a holistic methodology leading to totalitarianism derives chiefly from the work of Karl Popper. According to Popper, the utopian desire for impossible perfections and this striving for perfection will inevitably cause violence and repression. For Popper, utopianism is a view according to which "rational political action must be based upon a more or less clear and detailed description or blueprint of our ideal state, and also upon a plan or blueprint of the historical path that leads towards this goal" (Popper 1963, 358). The concept of utopia is thereby associated with social blueprints and thereby with totalitarianism (e.g. Schapiro 1972, 85; Popper 1963, 357–360). The rational organization of the ideal society that Popper calls *utopian engineering* is inevitably in the hands of few and therefore inclined to violence and totalitarian control (see Popper 1957, 64-79; Popper 1963, 357-358).

A third interpretation, in an absolutist fashion, is to see utopias as closed and static systems. Ralf Dahrendorf (1958, 116) argued, that one structural characteristic of utopias is their uniformity, based on a universal consensus on values and institutional arrangements, and the absence of disagreement and conflict. "Utopias are perfect – be it perfectly agreeable or perfectly disagreeable – and consequently there is nothing to quarrel about. Strikes and revolutions are as conspicuously absent from utopian societies as are parliaments in which organized groups advance their conflicting claims for power" (ibid). Utopias might have "a nebulous past" (ibid), but they do not have a future. Utopias "are suddenly there, and there to stay, suspended in mid-time or, rather, somewhere beyond the ordinary notions of time" (ibid).

Many other theorists have landed on interpretations similar to those of these canonical authors. John Gray in *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* (2007, 2) claims, that the whole of Western history has been terrorized by utopian projects: "entire societies have been destroyed and the world changed forever". Jacob Talmon (1952, 252) defines utopia as the

"complete harmony of interests, sustained without any resort to force, although brought about by force". Hans Achterhuis argues, that as utopias are seen as perfections, utopia sees itself as legitimizing all violence that could potentially be needed in this realization (Achterhuis 2002, 160–161). Similarly to both Talmon and Achterhuis, Hannah Arendt refers to utopia in her essay *On Violence* (1970, 51-52) as "nonpolitical ideal, which if tried out in earnest cannot but end in some kind of tyranny".

Another formulation of absolutist interpretation of utopia can be found from J.C. Davis for whom utopia is all about absolute perfection (Davis 1983, 38-40) by which he means the end of all confusion and "change of heart". For Davis, the idea of "dynamic utopia" of scientific progress is "a myth" since science has the potential to produce limitless innovation and "restless change" (ibid). And because there can be no change in absolute perfection, there can be no dynamic utopias (ibid, 34). This perfection, however, does not mean that utopias cannot be realistic. According to Davis, utopias do not deny human nature: in utopia crime, poverty and war remain but they are always successfully limited by "restraint or punishment of recalcitrant individuals" (ibid, 37). Utopia's perfection is not about human nature but about the level of social organization in which the individual is only secondary. Utopia is for Davis about social cohesion and common good which is threatened by individual freedoms (ibid, 19). The only freedom utopia allows is "freedom from disorder and moral chaos, freedom from moral choice altogether" (ibid, 384). Similarly to Isaiah Berlin, J.C. Davis claims that pluralism is always the greatest threat to utopia. In Davis' absolutist interpretation utopias cannot be anything but forms of totalitarianism: utopia is always organized through "discipline of totalitarian kind" (ibid, 40; see also Bell 2013, 59).

However, these absolutist interpretations of utopias, while widely assumed in popular discourse, is far from being the whole truth about utopias. The absolutist position can be contrasted with the "relationalist" interpretation. Relationalists see utopias as first and foremost criticisms and counter-images of the present. In fact, it is very much possible to think of utopia as an epistemological rather than ontological category. Utopian texts can be understood as heuristic tools for social imagination rather than blueprints for an ideal society. I am interested here exactly in this "critical function" of utopias, or the role of utopias in criticizing and relativizing the present by showing a radical alternative to it.

The concept of "utopia", as such, does not carry any absolutist connotations. Because the present is never static, utopian counter-images assume different interpretations at every point in time. The relationship between reality and dynamic utopias therefore constantly changes, rather than reality just approaching a given fixed utopia. Utopias force observers to reflect on their own *topos*. In its most general interpretation, the concept of utopia refers to a place that is more desirable than the current one. For the relationalist, the idea that utopias are about perfection is a crude misunderstanding (see, e.g., Abensour 2008; Claeys 2017).

Relationalist interpretations of utopia foster critical thinking about the existing conditions of current society and encourages envisioning alternative ways of living. It crystallizes the core problems of the present and makes us ask questions regarding the collective goals of the current society. Are they worth pursuing or could some other goals be more important? Is the purpose of utopian philosophy to create static blueprints for a new society or to create critical counter-images of a society in which radically new and better principles are put into practice? Here I understand the role of utopian philosophy in the latter way. The role of utopias as counter-images of the current society makes them historically conditioned and relational. Utopianism as a method for creating counter-images is always dynamic because the counter-images are always grounded in their particular historical *locus*, which they reflect negatively. There is no fixed utopia since the historical *locus* is always changing.

Relationalist views on utopia regard utopia both openly and critically. One example of a relationalist interpretation of utopia can be found from Tom Moylan's *Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and Utopian Imagination* (1986) in which he formulates the notion of critical utopia. The central theme of critical utopia is the conflict of the utopian society and the society from which it has originated from. The utopian societies they depict, however, are not in any sense perfect. They are imperfect and flawed. They have their share of social and political contradictions. This makes them dynamic. They cannot be understood as depictions of the perfect society, but only temporary constructions which will change into something new in the future. Critical utopias are in the process of becoming. They do not claim to have created the optimal society, but the core of critical utopias is in their endeavors towards a better world. The core of critical utopias is in their conflictual relationship with the present.

In critical utopias the critical function of utopias is not only in the form of a critical counter-image, but also in *praxis*, in the form of oppositional critical practice. These practices can best be seen in the activities of utopian or intentional communities. Sociologist Lucy Sargisson has explored these communities during her career and seen the critical function not only in utopian thought but also in the utopian practices of these communities (see, e.g., Sargisson 2012, 129-145; Sargisson & Sargent 2016). Utopias and utopian communities are transgressive by nature. They are not only in opposition to the mainstream, but they also aim to overcome the boundaries set by current society. This is why Sargisson (2000) calls her own theory "transgressive utopianism". It can be summarized in three main features. First, it is internally subversive. This means that the theory itself constantly challenges the aims and assumptions of the grounds whence it comes from. It is a self-critical theory. Second, it is flexible and resists permanent constructions. It accepts its own imminent dissolution. Historical circumstances change all the time which means that the constructed utopias must themselves change too. "Nothing lasts forever in a changing environment" (Sargisson 2000, 2). Thirdly, even though it does not believe in permanent constructions, transgressive utopianism is still intentionally and deliberately utopian.

This problematic of relationalist and absolutist interpretations of utopia will be explored more thoroughly in the following subchapters 1.3 and 1.4 where I present my own definition of utopia and elaborate on my methodological positions.

1.3   Defining Utopia as Counter-Image and Counter-Practice

As the reader can see, the perspective of the critical function of utopia is highly important for understanding the relationalist way of interpreting the concept of utopia. Utopia is for me "a critical counter-image of the present motivated by desire for a better being". This definition can be broken down into three basic components:

1. "a critical counter-image"
2. "the present"
3. "desire for a better being".

The first component "a critical counter-image" expresses the emphasis on the critical function of utopias. Although utopias can, of course, offer facilitative goals for socio-political action, this definition emphasizes the way utopias can relativize and criticize the existing society. The second component "the present" on the other hand expresses the relationalist stance this definition grows out of. I define "the present" here as *the historical totality of material conditions and social relations the utopian subject imagines and/or realizes her utopias in*. It is the material and social totality for which the utopian writer or actor seeks alternatives. This component expresses the fundamental historicity of utopia: the present is in constant change and therefore utopias too have to be open for change. The last component of my definition of utopia "a desire for a better being" is, of course, taken from Ruth Levitas (2010). This component refers not only to the overall orientation of all utopias, but it also refers back to the relationalist stance of this definition: utopias are about a being that is significantly *better* than the current one. Utopias are not about perfection but about a significantly better mode of being.

However, what is considered "better", will, obviously, be subject to historical change as well. How we understand the nature of the present dictates how we imagine the alternative for the present. It would be naive to think that utopias can reflect the present without any mediations. A utopian counter-image that aims to solve the core problems of the present cannot be constructed without any theoretical vision and analysis of the present itself. Without any theoretically articulated vision of the present and its central tendencies and latent potentialities, utopia cannot be useful as a tool of social criticism. Utopian counter-images are not unproblematic reflections of the current historical situation but always conceptually mediated: the nature of the utopian counter-image depends on how we understand and conceptualize the present.

Another formulation the relationalist interpretation of utopia can be found from the writings of utopian scholar Miguel Abensour (2008, 412) who has argued that utopia is essentially "an antagonistic concept", that the concept of utopia is an object of struggle between positions. The concept of utopia has "a completely different meaning depending on whether the one who uses it favors or opposes the existing order" (ibid). The position that favors the present produces that is at once "broad and derogatory" (ibid). In this position the concept of utopia becomes synonymous with impossible, unrealistic, and unreasonable. In this position the concept of utopia seems to become an attempt to violate the natural order of things. According to Abensour, this position attempts to naturalize history and seems to confuse natural laws with historically developed institutions (ibid). However, the position which is critical to the present produces, according to Abensour (ibid, 413), a concept of utopia that is a specific method of transforming society, a concept of utopia that orients itself against a specific institution of the present, i.e. the institution of private property. This concept of utopia is based on displacement. It abandons the present *topia* in favor of new one.

My own concept of utopia follows the latter, critical position. In my own definition of utopia I follow Francis & Barbara Golffing, who in their article *An Essay on Utopian Possibility* (1971, 34-35) elaborated the idea of utopia as a counter-image:

> Each generation entertains its own image of the future, and the image is eminently historic. Even as the world has not stood still since Campanella, or Bacon, or William Morris wrote, so neither has that counterworld – no-world, no-place (Utopos) – stood still which forms its inevitable complement. Any yes-world requires a no-world to balance it. (The signs may be inverted; indeed, any Utopian writer will invert the conventional assignment, viewing as he must his Utopia as the world of yes.) It is, then the state of the world in which Utopian writer finds himself that will determine his counter-image of a world-other-than-it-is. The counter-image is never the best of all possible worlds in an absolute sense: it is a world in which what is deficient in ours is supplied, except for such deficiencies as are radical, i.e., common to all man-inhabited worlds, be the actual or "merely" possible.

As critical counter-images, utopias are always "yes-worlds", in addition to being "no-worlds". "Yes-world" refers here to a positive depiction of a desired world desire. "No-world", on the other hand refers to the troublesome present the "yes-world" aims to overcome. A utopia is then not only a critical counter-image for highlighting the problems of its own time, but also a historical and a political goal. Utopianism can be understood as a political philosophy that investigates, compares and analyzes ends, means and existing historical conditions, in order to encourage transformative action. A concern with the ends of action can be found in several imagined societies.

Utopian philosophy does not just construct alternative principles for the current society, but also tries to imagine what society would be like if utopias were put into practice. When exploring these principles, utopian philosophy also questions the principles that organize existing institutions. This task of utopian philosophy has been well articulated by Peter G. Stillman (2001, 11):

> The utopian societies (what is not) serve as new perspectives from which to investigate the ideals, undertakings, and institutions of contemporary society, encourage a critical perspective on them, inspire a thoughtful evaluation of present and alternative individual and social ideals and activities, and consider if and where change is feasible and desirable.

For me utopias "relativize" the present (see Bauman 1976, 13), meaning that the present is always only a moment in an open-ended historical process. This has two implications: (1) the present can always be imagined to be different, and (2) the present does not determine the future, but can lead to a number of different futures depending on choices made in the present.

Utopias are then tools for extrapolating the possibilities of the present. Utopias do not transcend the current reality, but draw from the experience and the cravings of their own time. The utopian ideals of an era are born from the double pressure of the real needs of that era's generation and the stubborn historical realities found in their time. This connection to the real needs of the historical era and the material pressures is what constitutes one of the basic components of the relationalist stance advocated here.

However, utopias should not be reduced to being just counter-*images*. The critical distance that utopias offer to the existing society can be understood on a very concrete level of social counter-*practices*. Both utopian counter-images and counter-practices are expressions of utopian desire for a better being, but they also have certain dialectics between them. Counter-images can either implicitly or explicitly inform and motivate counter-practices. All counter-practices do have at least an implicit vision of what kind of world they want to create and at least an unreflected counter-image behind them that facilitates and motivates their inner logic. Often this counter-image can also take explicit, reflected, and conceptually mediated forms. Counter-images can be translated into a more or less coherent set of principles, values and objectives the utopian counter-practice aims to achieve.

In this case, what needs to be observed is the inner structure and logic of these practices. Utopian qualities can be found in different communal, economic, and cultural experiments, when one pays attention to the logic according to which they are carried out. These practices can be described as counter-logical social practices that clash with the logic of the present and potentially create cracks in the existing social cohesion. Utopian futures grow out of these cracks.

The nature of this utopian counter-practice can be, I argue, elaborated, and developed further with John Holloway's concept of the crack, as formulated in his book *Crack Capitalism* (2010). Holloway defines the crack as "the perfectly ordinary creation of a space or moment in which we assert a different type of doing" (Holloway 2010, 21). According to Holloway cracks are created in the social cohesion of the society when an alternative, logic of doing, to the logic of domination is put into practice (ibid, 72, 74 & 121). This is essentially what I will call in this dissertation utopian counter-logical social practice. It is an alternative logic of doing that clashes against the logic of the present and potentially creates cracks on the surface of the social cohesion of the present.

I have in this dissertation chosen to build my argument from the perspective of practice, not of space. Although the notion of utopia (*ou-/eu-topos*)

itself on one level refers to *topos*, to a space distanced from the existing space either spatially (a space located elsewhere, on a secluded island for example) or temporally (a space that will be in the future), the word "utopian", as already established in the beginning of this introduction, emphasizes the orientation towards a better way of being. This orientation can be found from different kinds social practices and it is these practices I am here interested in. Although there is a rich discussion of so-called "heterotopias" (Foucault 1986), of "promising spaces" of everyday life (Cooper 2014) and lots of writing on the intersections of utopia and the sociology of everyday life (see, e.g., Gardiner 1995; Gardiner 2000; Cook 2018) here I approach the topic from the perspective of *praxis* as articulated by Marxist theory.

In this dissertation I understand *praxis* as "free, universal, creative and self-creative activity through which man creates (makes, produces) and changes (shapes) his historical, human world and himself" (Petrović 1991, 435). This kind of Marxist understanding of *praxis* refers to the kind of social practice that not only transforms the historical human world (creates cracks within it) but also transforms the subject doing the world transforming. *Praxis* can take multiple forms from environment-transforming production and creation of institutions, to communication, competition, co-operation, and education (see, e.g., Marković 1969, 28-29), but what is here emphasized is the way how different *praxis*es operate. Attention is paid to their inner logic and how practices not only change the historical context where subjects are situated, but the subjects themselves by altering their perspectives on social reality.

It can be said that utopias have here some kind of "disruptive" function. Especially the so-called "critical function" of utopias becomes heavily emphasized here. Different utopian functions become emphasized in different times and utopian images of a better world themselves change according to the historical situation. This is one of the main methodological positions of this dissertations. In the next subchapter I will elaborate on this idea in detail.

1.4   Main Questions and Methodological Orientations

The central question of this dissertation is "What is the function of utopia today?". This question already implies a certain kind of historicity. It implies the possibility of utopias having different functions in different times. This is why a larger question is in this dissertation asked as well: "what functions of utopia have become emphasized in the history of utopian thought?". And to answer both of these questions will I need to ask a third question: "What kind of different forms has the concept of utopia taken during its historical existence?". To answer this historically oriented questions I group the history of utopia into three historical periods:

1) Classical utopianism, which covers the thematic period of classical utopias

from Thomas More to Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon. The period covers the era from the beginning of 16th to the 17th century.

2) Temporal utopias of the Enlightenment, which covers the era from 17th to 20th century and includes such utopian thinkers as Turgot, Condorcet, and Kant.

3) Utopianism in the era of neoliberalism. This covers the era from the 1970s to the present. Neoliberalism is here understood as a form of state management that ought to be viewed in the context what is in Marxist theory referred as process of "real subsumption" (see, e.g., Marx 1975, 104-109). In this process the society itself (and not just labour) becomes subsumed under the rule of capital. As Hardt & Negri (2018, 416) write: real subsumption is about "*the incarnation of capitalist production in society*", it is about how capital is "put to work the social terrain". In real subsumption capitalist mode of production becomes interwoven with "forms of life" (ibid). Under neoliberal order this process of real subsumption of social life intensifies and advances even further.

In every period different functions of utopias have been emphasized by me. In Thomas More's time utopias could function mainly in two ways: either by criticizing the existing society, or by offering an escape from it. The main reason for this was, that the material circumstances in which these utopias were created were not developed enough: the visions these utopias projected were not yet realizable. This is why they could not function as believable political goals. When material circumstances began to develop because of the scientific and industrial development, when capitalism began to change not only the world itself but also the possible perceptions of it (especially the possible perceptions of time), the facilitating function became emphasized in utopias. In the Enlightenment era utopias became political, social, and civilizational goals projected onto the future. This development of the so-called "temporal utopias" had its history in Jewish and Christian eschatologies but during modernity this temporal dimension of utopia got stronger. Today this temporal dimension of utopias is in trouble. In the neoliberal era the facilitative function of utopias is in trouble. But does it have to mean the end of utopias as such? Can utopia be revitalized? In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, the possibility of the revitalization of utopia is sought from the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice.

Methodologically this dissertation represents historically oriented text analysis in which different utopian texts are read from the perspective of historically variable functions of utopia. The texts I use in each chapter have been chosen according to how well they represent the different functions of utopia. The distinctions between different functions of utopia made by Ruth Levitas (2010) in her *The Concept of Utopia* will be used as my methodological perspective in this dissertation.

In this dissertation, utopias will be historicized and the changes in their function will be the main focus of this study. In every chapter a different function of utopia gets emphasized. The first chapter emphasizes the critical function that

can be seen in Thomas More's *Utopia*. More than offering a static blueprint, *Utopia* offers a critique of its own time. In the second chapter utopias become temporalized (put reminder of what this means) and the so-called facilitatory function of the Enlightenment utopianism becomes emphasized. And in the third chapter that explores the possible function of utopia in the present day, the function of disruption becomes emphasized. One could say that the disruptive function combines both the critical and the facilitatory functions since in it utopias both inspire political action *and* (in the form of *praxis*) criticize the present. The question of the function of utopia is at the heart of this dissertation. Next, I will elaborate more on the possible ways utopias can be historicized. This will illuminate more comprehensively the path I am in this dissertation taking.

Methodological orientations

What has been covered in this introduction is called the relationalist interpretation of utopia and it emphasizes the historicity of utopias and utopianism. My position here is that utopias should always be grounded in their historical context and the social and political factors that produced them should also be considered. Although definitely needed, a purely philosophical approach is not enough. And although some prominent non-Marxist theoreticians have also addressed the historicity of utopias (see, e.g., Mannheim 1979; Elias 2009; Kilminster 2014), this approach stems in this dissertation largely from the tradition of Marxism. This dissertation should be read from this perspective.

In the second volume of Ernst Bloch's *The Principle of Hope* (1995, 479-481) there is an interesting distinction made between the different historical utopias and the certain transhistoricity of the utopian orientation towards a better state of being. Bloch writes that "utopias have their timetable" but "even the boldest are tied to it in their direct anticipation" (Bloch 1995, 480). The contents of utopias are not arbitrary but socially conditioned images of the historical tendencies of the historical era and the latent potentialities within it. A utopia is at the same time "the tendency of its age and the next age expressed in images" (Bloch 1995, 479). They anticipate *Novum*, something radically new arising from history. Although different images of future(s) are historically and socially conditioned, the anticipation of a better future in general is not. "What is invariant is solely the intention towards the utopian, for it is continuously discernible throughout history: yet even this invariance immediately becomes variable when it gets beyond expressing the first word, when it speaks the contents which are always historically varied" (Bloch 1995, 480).[8]

However, although Bloch writes about the historical conditioning of utopias he does not try to reduce utopia – or any other ideological construction – to the mode of production under which it was conceived or to the class

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[8] This approach can be seen as a form of "historical specification" according to which all "general ideas" "must always have a specific historical element" (Korsch 2016, 26). This applies the concept of utopia as well.

background of the author of it.[9] Bloch (1986, 154) writes about the "cultural surplus" of all ideological elements in human history. Bloch writes that ideology is not only false consciousness, but it also carries within it an overcoming utopian element that as such cannot be reduced to the economic base of society. Bloch neither reduces nor opposes utopia to ideology (Boldyrev 2014, 12).

In Bloch's theory of cultural surplus, cultural products contain a utopian orientation towards the future, they contain "a premonitory and pre-figurative images" of the possible future (Plaice, Plaice & Knight 1986, xxvii- xxviii). In the more recent historical stages or periods it becomes possible to refunction this ideological material of the past politically. According to Douglas Kellner, Bloch developed a particular method of cultural criticism and ideology critique which expands the traditional Marxist approaches to ideology: "Bloch's practice of ideological criticism discerns emancipatory utopian dimensions even in ideological products, ferreting out those aspects that might be useful for radical theory and practice" (Kellner 1997, 80).

All this expresses a very different understanding of ideology than what can be found in traditional Marxist theory. According to Kellner, traditional Marxist ideology critique (including Louis Althusser and to some extent the Frankfurt School) the bourgeois culture and ideology is seen primarily as instruments of mystification, error and domination which contrasts to the science of Marxism or, as the members of the Frankfurt School would say, critical theory. The role of ideology critique in traditional Marxism is only to demonstrate the errors of bourgeois ideology and the class interests which motivate it. According to Kellner, this kind of ideology critique of course has its roots in Marx's own writings for whom ideology meant the same as the ideas of the ruling class (see Marx & Engels 2000). In traditional Marxism, ideology means the same as false consciousness and bourgeois class domination.

In contrast to this kind of negative view of ideology, Lenin developed a much more positive concept of ideology which sees ideology (including Marxist theory) becoming a material force of transformation when it appeals "to the masses and to the proletariat" (Lenin 1914). This idea can be traced back to Marx's introduction to his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* where he writes: "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses" (Marx 2005). Socialist ideology can for Lenin be a positive force which develops revolutionary proletarian consciousness and promotes socialist development.

For Bloch, however, ideology is always two sided: "it contains errors, mystifications, and techniques of manipulation and domination, but it also contains a utopian residue or surplus that can be used for social critique and to advance progressive politics" (Kellner 1997, 82). Ideology has both negative and positive sides to it. Utopia is for Bloch a contradictory element within ideology:

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[9] Here it should be noted that Bloch views the problem of ideology in the context of the problem of cultural inheritance. For Bloch the central question is how works of the superstructure progressively reproduce themselves in cultural consciousness even after the disappearance of their social bases.

> Even the class ideologies, within which the great works of the past lie, lead precisely to that surplus over and above the false consciousness bound to its position, the surplus which is called continuing culture, and is therefore a substratum of the claimable cultural inheritance. And now it becomes clear that this very surplus is produced by nothing other than the *effect of the utopian function* in the ideological creations of the cultural side. (Bloch 1986, 156.)

Here Bloch anticipates some of the distinctions that have been made between the concepts of utopia and ideology in later utopian theory. Similarly to Bloch, for Louis Marin also utopia is always "inside" ideology. Utopia is for him "an ideological critique of ideology" that "subverts the picture of reality given by ideological discourse" (Marin 1976, 71). Fredric Jameson (2005, 171) has in his *Archeologies of the Future* presented a similar idea. For Jameson ideology refers to the distortions of our perspectives by our situatedness in class, in gender, in race, in nationality and in history. And utopia is no different. It is also part of ideology and that is why it also is distorted by definition: "all possible images of Utopia, will always be ideological" (ibid). There is no neutral utopia for Jameson, but a utopia is always in relation to the present and to the social position of the utopian thinker.

These views can be contrasted with the dichotomy between utopia and ideology proposed by Karl Mannheim (1979) and further developed by Paul Riceour (1986). For Mannheim "utopia" is the kind of mentality that "breaks the bonds of the existing order" (Mannheim 1979, 173) and has transformative effects on the existing society (see, e.g., Hempel 2019). "Ideology" on the other hand refers to the kind of mentality that aims to justify and eternalize the existing order. Similarly to Mannheim, both utopia and ideology are for Paul Riceour forms of social imagination but whereas ideology merely "repeats what exists by justifying it" and gives a picture of "what is", utopia "has the fictional power of redescribing life" in fictional form (Ricoeur 1986, 309-310). "Ideology" seems to be for both Mannheim and Ricoeur merely false consciousness that is designed to prevent social transformation.

In this dissertation I adopt the view on utopia and ideology represented here by Bloch, Jameson, and Marin. Like any other works of the ideological superstructure of society, utopias too can and have been reworked in new ways in later periods of history. As the ideological material of Jewish and Christian eschatologies of the pre-modern age were refunctioned in the temporal utopianism of Enlightenment, similarly the critique of the present found from Thomas More's *Utopia* can be refunctioned today – although in a different form, in a form of utopian counter-logical social practice. Whereas More creates a critical counter-*image* of the present bring counter-*practices* the critique of the present into everyday life. The history of utopian thought has lots of reworkable material for the needs of today. The cultural surplus that utopian thought carries within it is to be used (and is in this dissertation used) in relation to the present.

This dissertation does not aim to be an exhaustive history of utopia. Rather, the aim is to locate different ideal-typical forms of utopia from the history of utopian thought. For example, when I write about the emergence of temporal utopia in the Enlightenment I do not claim that the temporal utopia becomes the

only possible form of utopia. Rather, temporal utopia of the Enlightenment should be understood as a hegemonic form of utopia of its era and not as the only one. The same applies to the last chapter of this dissertation. Although I claim that in the current era utopias orient themselves towards the present, I do not claim that any future-oriented has become impossible or that future-oriented utopias do not exist anymore (they very clearly do exist). What I do claim instead is that today future-oriented utopias do not have the same facilitatory power as they have had in the past. The revitalization of future-oriented utopianism remains a real possibility but at the moment it seems that its role today must be de-emphasized.

The historical relationality of utopian content, form, and function

The idea of the historicity of utopias can be developed further by using Marxist theoretician and literary critic Darko Suvin's theory of open and closed utopias which too expresses the distinction between variable utopian contents and the invariable utopian orientation. According to Suvin, utopias can be divided into two kinds: open and closed utopias. Suvin sees no theoretical (nor empirical) grounds to see utopias as always closed and static. And even if all utopian texts would have historically been static and closed, it does not follow that this would necessarily be the case in the future too. The concept of utopia is not so much ontological than it is epistemological. Utopia is a thought experiment. Especially literary utopias are heuristic tools for envisioning a better world. (Suvin 1997, 126–128.)

The concepts of open and closed (dynamic and static) utopia can be elaborated by making a distinction between utopias focused on *locus* and those focused on the utopian horizon. Utopian *locus* refers to the historical situation which shapes the utopian vision. Utopian horizon, on the other hand, refers to the vision itself. The utopian horizon is dependent on the utopian *locus* and its historical development and therefore the utopian vision will be different in every historical situation. This distinction can be further developed via analysis of three necessary elements for utopian thought: (a) the place of the agent who is moving, their *locus*; (b) the horizon toward which the agent is moving, and (c) the orientation, a vector that conjoins *locus* and horizon. What is essential for the horizon is that it keeps changing as the agent moves through different *loci*. (Suvin 1997, 130–133.)

Orientation, on the other hand, can remain more or less stable even when the space where the agent moves changes. This is why it can conjoin *locus* and horizon together. In utopian texts, the orientation of the agent is always towards a better mode of being. In utopian texts, orientation towards a better mode of being is expressed by creating possible analogical worlds to the empirical world, counter-images of the present.

Two aspects of utopian counter-images should be distinguished here: (1) the historically changing normative content of utopia and (2) the historically changing institutional form of the depicted utopian society. Both of these are ultimately historically variable but these two aspects do not necessarily need to

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change together. There is no reason why such utopias should be unthinkable where their institutional form has changed over time but the normative contents of them have stayed more or less the same.

Here I want to use the communist utopia of Marxism as an example to illuminate this distinction. Friedrich Engels (2005) writes in his *The Principles of Communism* that communism "is the doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat". This definition expresses the view that instead of a fixed, static finality, communism is an emancipatory horizon that changes according to the historical circumstances, according to the conditions in which the proletariat lives in. It can be argued that although the institutional form of communism needs to take into consideration the changing historical circumstances, the normative content or the deeper intention of communism does not have to. The utopia of communism, the utopia of a world where all relations are overthrown "in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned and despicable essence" (Marx 2000) can be seen as an invariant normative content in all the different institutional forms this utopia can take. It is possible to commit to the moral vision of communism and still be open to the variation it on institutional level takes.

The ultimate goal of communist politics (the world where all relations are overthrown in which man is a debased essence) should be distinguished from the possible world one envisions in their mind, from the "imaginary reconstruction of society" (see Levitas 2013) where this ultimate goal could be achieved. In order to set strategic short-term goals and to compose a program for policies (without which achieving the ultimate aim is impossible) one has to first imagine or approximate a possible world where things are as they ought to be. Understanding utopia as a goal in this way denies the idea of utopia as dogmatic blueprint or vague delusion. Rather, this version of utopia means an alternating approximation of a possible world that becomes clearer as the knowledge of historical tendencies becomes clearer (Salo 2020, 13-14).

Everything that has been said above has still been about the historicity of the *content* of utopias. However, the content of utopias is not the only thing that should be viewed in its historical and socially conditioned context. Also, the *form* of utopia can be viewed as historically variable.

During the historical development of utopian thought the concept of utopia can be seen going through a significant change from spatiality to temporality. Both the concept of utopia itself and the genre of utopian literature get new temporal layers during the 18th century. Unlike the classical utopias of Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon the new Enlightenment utopias of the 18th century were not imagined as secluded islands or otherwise closed spatial organizations. They were now projected into the future. The development of capitalism, scientific progress and especially the great revolutions of the time gave the concept of utopia a new temporal, euchronical form. Although some elements of this kind of temporal utopianism can be found from Jewish and Christian eschatological thought, it was the process of modernity that gave these eschatological tendencies new political *gravitas*. The historical processes behind this change are elaborated below.

In addition to the levels of content and form, the historicity of utopias can take yet another aspect: that of *function*. In different historical times different functions of utopia become emphasized. For example, the facilitative function of utopia becomes possible in a wholly new way when the developing capitalist modernity begins to shape the experience of time and the concept of utopia with it. In the facilitative function of utopias the goal-oriented dimension of utopias is raised to the foreground. And the idea of "goal" itself expresses an idea of temporal distance between the present and the utopian future. This way the euchronical *form* of modern utopias and the facilitative *function* of utopias are entwined. This kind of orientation towards the future cannot be found within classical utopias, which is why they do not have the power to facilitate social transformation. Even if they criticized the existing society or offered escapist, compensatory fantasies, they could not offer goals for effective political *praxis* for transformation of society in its totality.

From the Marxist perspective this change of utopian function can be seen connected to the material tendencies of the modern era. Because the material conditions had not yet matured enough, for example Thomas More's utopia could only orient critically towards the existing society, but it could not yet base goals of a better society scientifically to the material tendencies of historical development. To use Ernst Bloch's concepts: More's utopia was only a formal possibility but not yet a "objectively-real" possibility (Bloch 1986, 235-246). The subjective was not objectively mediated, hope was not yet taken the form of "materially comprehended hope" (ibid, 200). However, even though the question of the "objectively-real" is important, it is also important to notice the importance of the subjective factor as well. In order for utopia to function as a goal for politics, both the material and the ideological, the objective and the subjective factors should be taken into account. As Ernst Bloch (ibid, 247-248) writes:

> The subjective factor is the unenclosed potency to turn things here, the objective factor is the unenclosed potentiality of the turnability, changeability of the world within the framework of its laws, its laws which are however also legally variable under new conditions. Both factors are always interwoven with one another in dialectical interaction and only the isolating overemphasis of the one (causing the subject to become the ultimate fetish) or of the other (causing the object, in apparent self-motivation, to become the ultimate Fatum) tears subject and object apart. Subjective potency coincides not only with what is turning, but also with what is realizing in history, and it coincides with this all the more, the more men become conscious producers of their history. Objective potentiality coincides not only with what is changeable, but also with what is realizable in history, and it coincides with this all the more, the more the external world independent of man is also one which is increasingly mediated with him.

It is ultimately the subjective factor, the human capacity to imagine a better future and to plan the way there that is in trouble in the neoliberal era. This does not, however, mean that all utopias have become impossible. It has just become difficult to project utopias into the future as facilitative goals for mass movements. The possibility for a temporal distance so crucial for future-oriented utopias has become very thin. When this temporal distance can be found, it is found from the past in the form of "retrotopias" (Bauman 2017). But this does not mean that

utopias as such have become obsolete: this just means that the orientation of utopias has changed from the future to the present.

A Note on Utopia as a Method

In this dissertation utopia is seen mainly as a method for opening the present to the future. However, this is not the only way utopias have been interpreted in a methodological manner. In her 2013 book *Utopia as Method* Ruth Levitas distinguishes analytically three methodological (often intertwined) modes that utopia can take: architectural, archeological, and ontological. Of these three, the *architectural* mode refers to depictions of a better world, designs of a better society and delineation of the good society, a more or less detailed picture of a desired world. This "imagining a reconstructed world and describing its social institutions" (Levitas 2013, 153) is the understanding of utopias on which most critics of utopianism base their skepticism.

The *archeological* mode of utopian method involves identifying utopian elements in what is typically seen as pragmatic or non-utopian. It pieces together utopian elements embedded for example in political programs and social and economic policies (ibid). This mode comes close to the so called "utopian hermeneutics". This interpretative research orientation aims to find utopian elements in all areas of human culture. This kind of orientation can be found for example in the works of Ernst Bloch (1986), Douglas Kellner (1997) and Fredric Jameson (1979). Especially in Bloch's *The Principle of Hope* (1986) utopian archeology (or utopian hermeneutics) finds utopian, premonitory and prefigurative images of the future from the works of the past and catalogues this utopian surplus from the early Greek philosophers to the present day. Further, the *ontological* mode of utopian methods entails imagining ourselves otherwise. It also entails a judgment about what constitutes human flourishing. According to Levitas, the central point of the ontological mode of utopian method "is that the utopian method necessarily involves claims about who we are and who we might and should be" (Levitas 2013, 196).

Levitas writes about utopia as a method in social scientific research. She writes about utopia as a method in epistemological sense. Although Levitas' view on utopia as a method is not without its connection to transformative social and political action (it most certainly has this connection), it still emphasizes utopia as a method for social sciences. In this dissertation, however, utopia is seen as a method for social transformation. The point of utopianism is not only to foster and cultivate social imagination. Utopias exist also to facilitate social transformation, even if not in the absolutist sense. Utopia is then not only a method of reflecting upon, but also changing the world. Political imagination cannot be detached from movements for changing the world. Utopias as counter-images can also be developed into counter-practices that concretely enable doing and otherwise here-and-now. In the neoliberal era the main function of utopia is not to articulate goals for political programs or any visions of perfection, but to open the present for the possibility of a better being, so that systemic alternatives become visible again. Utopia is a method for opening the present for the future.

1.5   The Structure of this Dissertation

This dissertation begins with the idea of utopia as "topography", utopia as an ideal space that compares itself to the existing space of the utopian writer. Classical utopias were mainly spatially oriented utopias of order, that created a hierarchical spatial organization, which did not essentially change over time. This way of understanding utopia was based on programmatic misinterpretation of Thomas More's *Utopia*. More and his book were both more ambiguous, ironic, and critical than those utopias that followed him. More did not intend his *Utopia* to be a plan for future society, but rather an abstract spatial play within and against the present. What is here called "classical utopianism", however, read *Utopia* more literally than was intended, it lost the fundamental open-endedness of the idea of utopia. Yet this reading of More dictated the early developments of utopian thought. It created the basis for the absolutist interpretation of utopia in which the relationship between utopia and political practice became one of implementation: utopias became blueprints to be forced upon reality. This absolutist interpretation of the concept of utopia is not followed in this work.

The second part of this dissertation explores the metamorphosis of utopianism into future-oriented temporal utopias. Utopias became now associated with the concept of Progress developed by Enlightenment thinkers. This version of utopia had, of course, in a certain sense been anticipated in Jewish and Christian eschatologies which saw human history as a grand narrative which had an inner logic of its own. In its future-oriented temporal form utopias became associated with the idea of grand narratives. This connected them to the notion of revolution too. Utopia became a point of arrival for historical process, it became a socio-political goal projected onto the future. In this form utopia could function as a facilitating promise of a better world. One reservation should be made here. The relationship of eschatology and utopianism is a complex one and this problematic relationship will not be resolved wholly here. I will discuss eschatology in this dissertation mainly from the perspective how it has affected the development of temporal utopianism.

During the 20th century temporally oriented utopianism came eventually to its end. The horrors of Stalinism and fascism gave useful weapons for anti-utopians to bring to the attack against the concept of utopia and the theory of the postmodern condition proclaimed the grand narratives of modernity dead. In the early 1990s it was already common sense to think that history as a process had ended and so there was no-longer any need for utopias. In fact, it was now common-sense to approach utopias with suspicion or even with open hostility. The future was cancelled. In this context one can speak of an "anxiety of utopia", of a "utopophobia" or of "capitalist realism" in which it becomes difficult to think of utopian futures. This does not, however, mean the total disappearance of utopias. Only the orientation of utopias changes. They do not orient themselves so much to the future as they orient towards the present. And in their orientation

towards the present they also emphasize a different function: the function of disruption.

For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to go through the main forms the concept of utopia has taken during its history so that it becomes possible see the potential usages of the concept in the present. It has been claimed that utopias have vanished and that the social imagination is in trouble. It seems to me, however, that it is only some specific historical forms of the concept of utopia that are in trouble. On the one hand the concept the archistic, order-oriented form of "blueprint" utopianism of early modernity has been heavily criticised. And on the other hand the temporal conception of utopias projected onto the future, the eschatologically tuned conception of utopia as a metanarrative has also become problematic. However, the history of utopian thought shows that these two formulations of the concept of utopia are not the only possible ones. Utopia can also be seen as a form of critique of the present. It can be seen as a method for opening the hidden possibilities of the present.

This idea is emphasized not only in the section exploring Thomas More and his *Utopia* but also in the final chapter where I formulate my concept of utopian counter-logical social practice. This concept too aims to avoid the problems of both the blueprint understanding of utopia and the metanarrative understanding of temporal utopianism. Both the idea of utopia, as a critique of the present, and especially the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice are presented in this dissertation as alternatives both to the authoritarian, "archistic" blueprint utopianism and to the temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment.

This difference is not, however, categorical. Rather, the difference between temporal utopianism and the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice is that of perspective. The focus of utopian counter-practices is much more in the present than it is in the future – unlike the focus of temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment. Much like in the chiliastic radical Christian forms of utopianism presented in the beginning of Chapter 3, utopian counter-logical social practices too aims to be "a disruption of the present that is also in the present" (Newman 2009, 70). The idea of utopian counter-logical social practice draws also from the idea of utopia as a critique of the present and from the more radical forms of Christian chiliasm.

It is important to note that the transition from one form of utopianism to another should not be understood as a strict, categorical transition. This transition process should be understood here as dialectical instead: elements of later forms of utopianism can sometimes be seen in its earlier forms. For example, the early Jewish and Christian eschatologies can be seen including elements that would later evolve to take the form of temporal utopianism. Also, for example the utopian socialist experimentalism of the 19th century can be seen as containing elements of the counter-logical social practices that are examined in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Older utopian elements become articulated in new ways in the later history of utopias.

In the final chapter of this dissertation I will argue for the idea that even though utopias projected onto the future, as a goals for socio-political action, are

still under great suspicion, utopian thought can orient itself towards the present instead of the future. This does not mean that the future disappears totally, or the utopian intentions become irrelevant. Rather, it means that the task of utopianism becomes to open the present *in order* to create cognitive and imaginary space for thinking about the future. The orientation of utopianism changes from the future to the present but the future as such does not disappear. This opening of the present can happen not only through the utopian counter-images of utopian fiction and theory, but also through utopian counter-logics of social practice that has the potential to create cracks on the surface of the social cohesion of the present. Instead of a monolithic present, the possibility for the plurality of futures becomes real. At the end of the last chapter, I will explore some practices that I consider to represent the idea of utopian counter-logical social practices fairly well.

Although this dissertation is structured around a historical narrative, about the development and transformation of utopia and utopian thought, the point of this study is not to present an exhaustive history of utopian thought. My reading of different utopian writers from different eras is more of a thematic one than it is purely historical. The main point of the historical presentation of this dissertation is to articulate different possible formulations of the concept of utopia from Thomas More's original *Utopia* through what I call "blueprint-oriented utopianism" of such thinker as Tommaso Campanella to the future-oriented utopianism of the Enlightenment. The point here is to reconstruct thematically the main forms of the concept of utopia which the utopian tradition has produced during its history.

All these different formulations present a different version of the notion of utopia and how they can be used in other contexts as well. In Thomas More the concept is mainly a tool for the critique of the present. In blueprint-oriented classical utopianism the main focus is on the creation of social order and in maintaining that order. In the future-oriented utopianism of Enlightenment, utopias become grounded in the real possibilities of history: utopia is a *telos* for civilizational development, formal end-state of progress and/or a historically grounded real possibility for radical change. Whereas in Thomas More's *Utopia* the critical function is utopian thought is emphasized, in future-oriented utopianism the facilitating or mobilizing function of utopias gets stronger. The last chapter on the other hand emphasizes again the critical function of utopianism, but now on the level of social practice. Utopia is no longer only a critical counter-*image* of the present but also a critical counter-logical social *practice*.

2 THOMAS MORE'S *UTOPIA* AND ITS AFTERMATH

In this chapter I will examine the early developments of utopian thought from Thomas More's *Utopia* to the formation of classical utopianism which has served as a starting point for the so-called "blueprint school of utopianism" (Jacoby 2005). Utopias of this kind are not only detailed depictions of the desired society but also absolutist. They strive towards perfect social harmony in which (once these utopias have been established) nothing will essentially change. However, as the following examination will show, More's *Utopia* itself was not about perfection, it was about critical, ironic, and parodic play of spatial figures. In this chapter the absolutist blueprint interpretation of utopianism is criticized as authoritarian and a more open, relational reading of the concept of utopia is favored. More's *Utopia* and the concept of utopia itself is in this chapter interpreted as a critique of the present. This idea of utopia as critique will be crucial in the final chapter of this dissertation where I develop my concept of utopian counter-logical social practice.

In this chapter More's *Utopia* becomes historicized. It is seen as a counter-image to the present and therefore relational and inherently open. There are many ways to historicize utopias. One example can be found from sociologist Norbert Elias who by using his theory of civilizing processes claims that More's *Utopia* should be located to the stage of humanities social development at which the secularization of belief systems had gone so far that they were not directed towards the afterlife, but towards social conditions (Elias 2009; Kilminster 2014). At this stage people were able to judge their own socio-communal experiences and compare these experiences with those of other groups (ibid).

In this chapter, however, the historicization of both Thomas More's *Utopia* and utopianism in general is done from an economic perspective. Following Karl Kautsky's presentation of the historical context of Thomas More's thinking, the development of the concept of utopia is in this chapter seen as a part of the economic development of early modern Europe. More is here seen among other things as an early socialist who directed his critique towards the economic inequality of his own time in which a feudal economy based on agriculture was about to be supplanted by a very early form of capitalism (see, e.g., Fortunati

2016). More's *Utopia* is in this chapter seen as a critical counter-image of this inequal present. *Utopia* is here seen as an "attack on the social and economic injustices of early sixteenth-century England" (Greenblatt 1980, 37). The point here is not, however, reduce More's *Utopia* to its immediate historical and economic context: the fundamental open-endedness of *Utopia* becomes acknowledged in this chapter as well.

The critical function of utopia becomes emphasized here. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that even if More had meant his *Utopia* as a blueprint for future society, there would have not been material possibilities for realizing this blueprint. It was mainly an abstract utopia that was not, as Ernst Bloch (1986, 146) would have put it, "connected to the Real-Possible". The historical circumstances were not yet fully developed for a socialist society to grow out of the historical and material movement. Therefore it could not yet have a strong facilitative function. The second reason for the emphasis of critical function in Thomas More is that he never meant his *Utopia* to be a blueprint for new, perfect society, but a critique of the present. More's *Utopia* is an open utopia. This opposition between More's intention and the blueprint tradition of utopianism marks also the opposition between relational and absolutist interpretations of utopia.

At the end of this chapter, I will examine especially two examples of utopian writers that I consider to be in opposition to More's relational and critical utopianism. The first one is Tommaso Campanella whose *The City of Sun* is here read as an absolutist utopia of order in which freedom of the individual is absent and the right place of the individual in the social order is emphasized. The second one is Francis Bacon whose *The New Atlantis* (similarly to Campanella's utopia) can be described as an archistic (order oriented) utopia without much emphasis on individual or collective freedom. The difference to Campanella, however, is that in Bacon one can find anticipatory elements of historical progress that are absent from Campanella's utopia and that become more visible in the temporal, progressive utopianism of the Enlightenment.

2.1   Elements of *Utopia*

Thomas More was born in London, England on 7th of February 1478 as a son of Sir John More, a lawyer and later a judge. Sir John More hoped that Thomas would follow his footsteps in the legal profession. This wish was fulfilled when Thomas was sent to Oxford where he began as a law student. During his time in Oxford Thomas More became more and more influenced by a group of literary scholars, the central figures of the emerging tradition of Renaissance humanism. "Humanism" did not here refer to a philosophical position but to a particular scholarly orientation. It referred to *studia humanitatis* which in turn refered to a group of disciplines ranging from grammar, rhetoric and poetry to history and moral philosophy. (Logan & Adams 2003, xiii-xiv.)

Earlier in his professional career, More managed to maintain independent scholarship and writing. As a grammarian, he translated Greek poems into Latin and four short prose works of Lucian, a Greek ironist. As a rhetorician he wrote a declamation in reply to Lucian's *Tyrannicide*, a (lost) dialogue defending the community of wives advocated in Plato's *Republic.* As a poet, he wrote both poems in English and epigrams in Latin. As an historian, More wrote an historical biography on King Richard III and translated a biography of the 15th century Italian philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. And most importantly, as a moral and political philosopher, More wrote near the end of this phase of his literary career *Utopia.* It was published in 1516 (after his death) in Leuven, the capital of the Flemish province in Belgium today known as Brabant. (Logan & Adams 2003, xv-xvi.)

Utopia has become the best-known text Thomas More ever wrote. It was in many ways a product of the Renaissance era for it shows many references to Greek literature and philosophy. More was part of the second generation of English writers who were fascinated by Hellenic culture. More was fascinated especially by those Hellenic novels which could be retroactively (or anachronistically) described as "utopian". These novels were known to him through fragments preserved through Diodorus Siculus' work and also through Greek biographies as recorded by Plutarch. Scholars who have studied More's *Utopia* have traced many connections to these novels and found parallels between it and the tales of Iambulus and Euhemerus. They have suggested that King Utopus from More's text was inspired by the Spartan monarch Agis IV. The Greek influence can also be seen in More's style. "The devices, traditions, and mannerisms of different genres of Greek literature were artfully commingled in *Utopia*, to achieve an effect of density without loss of elegance and grace – a dramatically new creation" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 119). Especially Plato's *Republic* is referenced frequently in More's book. For example, in a long passage in the first book of *Utopia*, Raphael Hythloday (a visitor to the island of Utopia) defends passionately Plato's philosophy (More 2003, 37).

One clear inspiration for More's *Utopia* was the letters of Amerigo Vespucci, Christopher Columbus and Angelo Poliziano wherein the discovery of America and other new worlds and new peoples were described. The geographical expansion implied the discovery of the Other, the discovery of other spaces, other peoples, and different forms of social and political organization. The social organization hitherto known in Europe was no longer the only possible one. The discovery of the Other made it possible for More to have a critical reflexivity towards his own society. This expansion of geographical horizons influenced the broadening of mental horizons. (Vieira 2010, 4.)

The influence of discovering new worlds is easy to see in Thomas More's *Utopia.* The influence of Plato, however, in More's book is much more complex. It is commonly argued that *Utopia* is mainly an imitation of Plato's *Republic,* but that is not entirely the case. More was not a pure Platonist who follows Plato everywhere his philosophy might lead but a highly eclectic thinker who drew influences from various sources. *Utopia* shows this well. More uses various forms

of classical moral, social, and political philosophy to criticize the England of his time. But as Thomas I. White (1982) has argued, Plato does have an important place in the formation of *Utopia*. The Renaissance humanism which More was a part of created an atmosphere where the imitations and uses of classical literary forms and philosophical ideas were encouraged to be used especially when they were seen to have moral usefulness (ibid, 331).

More sees a close connection between classical philosophy and practical virtues. And because ethics and political philosophy can be seen as mainly theoretical reflections of practical virtues, it is not surprising at all that More held those branches of philosophy in high regard throughout his life. Even though More was a devoted Christian, he argued that the true danger to religion is the abandonment of philosophy and the liberal arts. Reason alone is not sufficient for the right understanding of Christianity, but it is nevertheless necessary. And philosophy in turn is necessary to train reason. However, it is not any particular philosophical tradition that More follows but philosophy as such: this is why his way of using philosophy is so eclectic. Plato's *Republic* is just one piece in the mixture of different philosophies varying from Democritus to Lucretius and from Cicero and Seneca to Epictetus and Plutarch. (ibid, 332.)

According to White, the references to classical philosophers is supposed to tell us that they "are practical signposts to social justice and moral virtue" (ibid, 333). More uses classical philosophy in many ways (for example, he uses classical parallels to make an argument and employs Socratic irony in his texts) but in general More is interested in either general principles of the classical philosophies or specific institutions of the classical era which he sees in many ways as superior to those of 16th century England. More's purpose is to demonstrate the utility of an eclectic approach to philosophy. This is why, according to White, a major element in *Utopia* is the demonstration of "both why and how ancient philosophy should be studied" and in this respect *Utopia* is "almost more significant from the point of view of the history of educational philosophy than from that of the history of moral and political theory" (ibid). More uses Plato in this manner too. He uses Plato's ideas to demonstrate the social, moral, and political utility of them. This is the major link between More and Plato: both of their philosophies are governed by the principle of securing the common good. However, the way More uses Plato however is very unsystematic. More is not a Platonist and he uses Plato mainly to achieve his own practical, social, and moral goals. (ibid, 333-335.)

There are many reasons why Plato was so important to More. Firstly, Plato is one the first examples of utopian speculators in the tradition of utopian thought. More did see Plato as an intellectual ancestor to himself. Secondly, for More Plato embodied the combination of philosophical wisdom and literary beauty that the Renaissance humanists took as their goal. Thirdly, as White argues, More probably thought that Plato was much more interesting than other classical philosophers since his ideas were "particularly amenable to Christianity" (ibid, 336). Especially the communism presented in Plato's *Republic* could be combined with More's experience with "monastic life and his knowledge of the communism

of the early Christians" (ibid). Both Plato and More advocate the idea that philosophy should foster public interests. Fredric Jameson has in his *Archeologies of the Future* (2005) even argued that the communism More's *Utopia* seems to advocate is more reminiscent of medieval monasteries than the communism of the industrial world (Jameson 2005, 27).

2.2   Thomas More and Socialism

After over five hundred years *Utopia* is still regarded as classic work of political philosophy. And like all classics, it too has wide range of interpretations. The text itself is written in the form of dialogue in which the central narrative about the society of Utopia. It is divided into two books and it is the second one which describes Utopia in detail. The first half of the book is focused on the desperation of the poor in the England of his day. More (2003, 103) writes that the poor must steal food in order to live, which causes them to be sentenced to death:

> There is no need to wonder: this way of punishing thieves goes beyond the call of justice, and is not in any case for the public good. The penalty is too harsh in itself, yet it isn't an effective deterrent. Simple theft is not so great a crime that it ought to cost a man his head, yet no punishment however severe can restrain those from robbery who have no other way to make a living. In this matter not only you in England but a good part of the world seem to imitate bad schoolmasters, who would rather whip their pupils than to teach them. Severe and terrible punishments are enacted for theft, when it would be much better to enable every man to earn his own living, instead of being driven to the awful necessity of stealing and then dying for it.

Because the inequality between citizens is so striking and because this inequality causes societally problems through crimes, private property must be cancelled and shared equally between everyone. This will cause the reduction of crime in society which in turn means that only few laws are needed. According to Hythloday, on the island of Utopia, this has been realized:

> So I reflect on the wonderfully wise and sacred institutions of the Utopians, who are so well governed with so few laws. Among them virtue has its reward, yet everything is shared equally, and everyone lives in plenty. I contrast with them the many nations, none of which, though all are constantly passing new ordinances, can never order its affairs satisfactorily. In such nations, whatever a man can get he calls his own private property; but all the mass of laws enacted day after day don't enable him to secure his own or to defend it, or even to distinguish it from someone else's property – as is shown by innumerable and interminable lawsuits, fresh ones every day. When I consider all these things, I become more sympathetic to Plato, and wonder the less that he refused to make any laws for people who rejected laws requiring all goods to be shared equally by all. Wisest of men, he saw easily that the one and only path to the public welfare lies trough equal allocation of goods. (ibid, 37.)

This quasi-communist solution is described in detail in the second half of the book. The purpose of the second part was to relativize More's own society. The criticism utopias present do not necessarily have to be explicit, but they always are critical towards present society even if this critique is quiet and implicit. As

long as the constructed utopias include better alternative principles and institutions than those of the present society they function as critical counter-images which can help the reader to perceive his or her own society critically. Utopias can make the reader doubt the moral supremacy of the current society. Utopias can be understood in this sense *relational* not *absolute.* They are in relation to the society in which they are created. The communism of the island of Utopia in the second half of the book is created as an answer to the woes of England as described in the first half of the book. More is himself skeptical as to whether or not Europeans could actually live as Utopians live. The two islands of Britain and Utopia may be too far away from each other, as societies, so that Europe would be able to imitate the societal model of Utopia (Claeys 2016, 16). But it is the critical function of More's *Utopia*, which makes it valuable for later generations, not the content of the model presented in the book as such.

This does not, however, mean that the content of More's *Utopia* is totally irrelevant. More is one of the most important figures in the history of socialism and it would be a great understatement not to analyze *Utopia* from the socialist perspective. One of the notable presentations on More's social, economic, and political philosophy can be found in Karl Kautsky's *Thomas More and His Utopia* (2002) where this perspective is predominant. According to Kautsky, More was first and foremost a forerunner of socialism. As a humanist and as a politician he was among the best of his contemporaries, but his socialism made him immortal. As a typical Marxist theoretician Kautsky argues that More's socialism cannot be explained by the movement of ideas alone but by the contradictions and antagonisms of economic development. These contradictions and antagonisms "stimulate thought and provoke investigations" by those thinkers who are situated in society such a way that they can see "the suffering which contemporary conditions entail" (Kautsky 2002). Thomas More was situated in his society this way. He was one of the few thinkers of his time who could see the essential features of the capitalist mode of production in its infancy. In *Utopia*, More created an alternative which he contrasted with early capitalism as a remedy for its evils. *Utopia* "contained the most important ingredients of Modern Socialism" (ibid). According to Kautsky, the key ideas of *Utopia* were still present in modern socialism.

There is one problem with this statement though: if socialism is the successor mode of production to capitalism (as Marxists argue), how could socialism find a theoretical expression before capitalism was even fully developed? Kautsky approaches this problem from four perspectives: More's personal character, his philosophical training, his political activities, and the economic situation of England. Kautsky's explanation is not economic reductionism but it gives weight to the person of Thomas More as well. He regards More's personal character as one of the causes of his socialism. Here Kautsky refers to Erasmus of Rotterdam who had called More "the protector of all the poor" because of his altruistic and disinterested character.

According to Kautsky, the formation of this kind of character was possible only in the northern countries of Western Europe. For example, in the mercantile

republics of Italy the egotism of the rising capitalism was much more powerful. In Italy egotism reigned openly and absolutely. But in England agriculture still provided the basis for production, which also meant that the features of primitive communism were still visible in the English culture of the 16th century. These features were the basis for the character formation of Thomas More:

> At the commencement of the sixteenth century the primitive agrarian communism still existed in England. It had survived under cover of feudalism, and only then began to yield place to another system of agriculture. The features which corresponded to primitive communism still existed, especially among the lower population, and we meet them in More only slightly glossed over with the Humanistic and courtier traits and the self-censure which the conditions imposed upon him. In his serenity, tenacity, unyieldingness, selflessness, and helpfulness we see the impress of all the characteristics of communistic "Merry England." (ibid)

As Kautsky reminds, sympathy with the poor as such does not make anyone a socialist. Sympathy with the poor needs to be combined with a particular economic position in the socio-economical structure. Thomas More's position was in this regard unique in the countries in the northern parts of Europe. He was a humanist and according to Kautsky humanists were the "only persons who had learnt to think scientifically and methodically, to generalise, and who were, therefore; capable of formulating a theoretical socialism" (ibid). In the northern parts of Europe humanists were not usually busily engaged in active affairs but they were rather merely "schoolmasters with no glimmering of practical affairs" (ibid). Humanists in northern Europe were not politically active but rather they retired to their studies and stayed away from the struggles of the society.

This was especially true in Germany where science and social life were completely divorced from each other. According to Kautsky, this was due to the economic backwardness of Germany caused by the alteration of the trade routes after the end of the fifteenth century. The discoveries made by the Portuguese in the second half of the fifteenth century opened a sea route to India while the old routes to the East through the Middle East and Egypt were interrupted by the Turks and the old caravan routes from Central Asia were closed by local upheavals. This interrupted not only the trade of Mediterranean area but also the trade to Germany which had been trading with Italy and the East via Trapezunt, the Black Sea and land routes to Russia. Especially the Hansa towns on the Baltic and in Southern Germany were affected greatly by these changes. (ibid.)

The towns on the Rhine for example suffered less from these changes but the direction of their trade changed. The trade did not flow anymore from east to west or from south to north but from west to east and from north to south. This caused Antwerp to become "the centre of world trade" (ibid). According to Katusky, the closeness of Antwerp to England also helped to stimulate the economy of England and especially London. England's trade began to increase at the same time as Germany's declined. England quickly developed economically and according to Kautsky, the beginnings of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture began to be perceptible. This was one of England's peculiarities, that agriculture would be capitalist before industry. According to Kautsky, the causes

for this can be traced to the quality of English wool which made it a useful raw material for high-quality woolen goods. (ibid.)

As the markets grew, the traders and especially the great landowners of England doubled the production of wool. The simplest way to do this was to ruthlessly take the common lands which the peasants had the right to use. The common land was no longer common but private. The peasants had less and less opportunities to keep cattle and they became financially ruined. As the great landowner's greed for land grew bigger, the peasants had to leave their towns and villages because the landowner needed to make more room for sheep. Earlier this was not so much of a problem because earlier the landlords farmed their estates themselves. Their land did sometimes grow but ultimately there was not point for extend the property unless the landlord was also able to add his plant and stock. According to Kautsky, this "melted away and the land hunger of the great landowners knew no bounds with the arrival of the capitalist farmer, who used his own capital to employ wage workers to cultivate the land which he leased" (ibid). The class of agricultural capitalists was born.

This particular class arose in England in the late 15th century and quickly gained social power in the next because of the great profits it could produce. The agricultural capitalist class managed to accelerate the accumulation of capital and this way attract other capitalists from the towns. According to Kautsky, the rise of profit can be attributed to the deprecation of gold and silver. This was caused by the transfers of the precious metals from America to Europe which caused monetary inflation. This in turn caused the rise of prices of agricultural products during the sixteenth century: the prices rose up to 200 to 300 per cent. Rents, on the other hand, did not rise at the same pace as the prices of the products. This caused the farmers' profits to grow at the expense of rents which in turn increased the number of farmers and the amount of capital they had. All this also caused the larger landowners to extend their estates. The consequence of this was the rapid impoverishment of the smaller landholding peasants. Capital started to accumulate in the hands of the few landowners. (ibid.)

While the late 14th and early 15th centuries were a Golden Age for peasants and wageworkers of England, at the end of fifteenth century they suddenly plunged into deepest poverty. The number of workless workers and peasants grew immensely. The propertyless workers began to be a numerically significant class in society. The large number of workless workers created a reserve army of the workless, which caused real wages to fall and working hours to be extended. The price of food rose about 300 per cent but wages only 150 per cent. This was the beginning of "that steady decay of the English workers in town and country, whose position reached its lowest level in the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth century" (ibid).

Typically Marxists have theorized that, first capitalism creates industry, and then spreads to agriculture. In this process capitalists need to outbid craftsmen and peasants in order to persuade away the journeymen and bondsmen, which makes wages rise. In England however, agriculture was revolutionized before industry and its improved methods reduced the need for labor power in

agricultural production. But because industry was developing so slowly, these "freed" laborers had no place to work in towns. According to Kautsky, "Nowhere else in Europe, therefore, were the unfavourable reactions to the capitalist mode of production upon the working classes so immediately obvious as in England; nowhere did the unhappy workers clamour so urgently for assistance" (ibid).

This situation in England forced Thomas More to deeply reflect what could be done to ease the suffering of the laborers. More was not, of course, the only person to fight against these injustices, but according to Kautsky, none of More's contemporaries had the same wide outlook on society as More did. According to Kautsky, More came to the conviction that the sufferings of labourers could only be removed by establishing a new mode of production, by establishing socialism. Kautsky claims that the theory of socialism could arise only within the realm of humanism. "As a Humanist, More learned to think methodically and to generalise. As a Humanist he was enabled to look beyond the horizon of his time and his country" (ibid). The writings of classical antiquity gave More the possibility to step outside of his time and his country and become familiar with different kinds of social conditions. Especially Plato's communist ideal found in *Republic* stimulated his imagination to set the same ideal "as a goal which humanity should strive to attain" (ibid).

However, More's *Utopia* can hardly be seen as an expression of the pure communist ideal. As Christopher Kendrick (1985, 245) has written, More's *Utopia* is an "imaginary combination of modes of production". In the island of Utopia at least four distinct aspects of modes of production can be found. The first aspect is that the economic arrangements of Utopia are partly modelled upon those of tribal communism. For example the relative arbitrariness of the household or family refers to "a quasitribal group structure" (ibid). Not only the influence of the encounter of Europeans with tribal communism in the New World can be seen in this aspect especially well but also elements of the group structure of Germanic communal society can be found in *Utopia* (ibid).

Another aspect of modes of production found in More's *Utopia* is what Kendrick calls "accomplished" communism (ibid), which essentially refers to the kind of communism that may be assumed to exist in More's time. This accomplished communism insists upon the social rights adhering to work, rejects in a militant way any form of private possession, and makes an "assumption of an existing abundance of goods as the system's premise" (ibid). The third aspect of the modes of production in *Utopia* is the classical mode of production which emphasizes urban crafts and slavery. *Utopia* has not abolished slavery, but relies on it in many ways (see, e.g., More 2003, 77-78). The fourth aspect of the modes of production in *Utopia* is a mainly feudalist one. In Utopia the household has been given the central place of all social institutions and religion is seen as the naturally dominant force of social cohesion (ibid, 66).

The first thing about the social relations, that the reader of More's *Utopia* comes across, is that the manual labour, i.e. agricultural labour is everyone's duty. Everyone has to participate some way in it. It is the common duty for everyone to provide subsistence. They are trained for it in the schools, where they learn the

theory of farming, and in field-trips to the farms, where they learn the practicalities of agricultural production. Besides agriculture, utopians have to learn a particular trade of their own. Women, "as the weaker sex" (ibid, 49) as More puts it, participate in lighter crafts, such as working in wool or linen. All the heavier crafts are reserved for men. All the children usually continue their parents' craft (because it will usually feel the most natural to them), but if someone wants to learn a different craft, the authorities will guide him to a responsible householder who can teach him this craft. After utopians have learned one craft, they have to ask for permission if they want to learn another one (ibid).

The main task of the syphogrants, the elected representative leaders of groups of thirty families, is to take care that no-one sits idle and that everyone keeps working hard. The point, however, is not to torture people with work: "But no one has to be exhausted with endless toil from early morning to late at night like a beast of burden. Such wretchedness, really worse than slavery, is the common lot of workmen almost everywhere but in Utopia" (ibid, 49-50). Although utopians need to work hard, their workdays are no longer than six hours. "They work three hours before noon, when they go to lunch. After lunch, they rest for two hours, then go to work for another three hours. Then they have supper, and about eight o'clock (counting the first hour after noon as one) they go to bed, and sleep eight hours" (ibid, 50). The free time is devoted to intellectual activities: they have established a custom of giving daily public lectures early in the morning before dawn. During supper they either play music or amuse themselves with conversations (ibid, 49-50).

The six-hour workday does not, however, mean that the productivity of Utopia is low. This is because unlike in England there are no rich and lazy idlers who do not participate in the labor process. Everybody works and no-one lives off the work of others like in contemporary European societies. Only syphogrants are freed from work yet they do not take advantage of their privileges. Some scholars are also freed from manual labor, but for that freedom they need a recommendation from the priests and syphogrants. If scholars disappoint them, they will be sent back to normal work. Utopia is not therefore fully democratic society, although it is of utmost importance to share equally the wealth the society has produced. Everyone has an equal share to the wealth of society. This means on one hand that no-one lives in luxury, and on the other hand it means that no-one is forced to beg or die of hunger. Utopians consider their society to be like one single big family. The structure of this family is, however, deeply patriarchal and gerontocratical. For example, women and children are seen as inferior to the head of the family who is always the oldest man of the family. "The oldest of every household, as I said, is the ruler. Wives act as servants to their husbands, children to their parents, and generally the younger to their elders" (ibid, 55).

Utopia is a self-sufficient community which focuses its production to keeping itself alive. But because there is no lack of workforce utopia and the productivity is high, there is always surplus to be exported. After the utopians

have "accumulated enough for themselves – and this they consider to be a full two-years' in store, because next year's crop is always uncertain – then they export their surpluses to other countries: great quantities of grain, honey, wool, flax, timber, scarlet and purple dyestuffs, hides, wax, tallow and leather, as well as livestock. One seventh of all these things they give freely to the poor of the importing country, and the rest they sell at moderate prices" (ibid, 59). In exchange they will receive some useful goods, but also precious metals such as silver and gold. Some portion of these precious metals they will put in a treasury "as a protection against extreme peril and sudden emergency" (ibid, 60). But for example gold is not appreciated in Utopia at all: it is considered to be much less useful metal than iron for example and criminals who have committed some disgraceful acts are forced to wear golden jewelry as a mark of infamy.

The economics of Utopia are supported by moral philosophy. The Utopians make a distinction between higher and lower goods as well as the supreme good which is happiness. This age-old question about human happiness they will solve by identifying pleasure with happiness: honest pleasure is the measure of happiness. However, not every pleasure is desirable, for not every pleasure will create happiness as such. Only the honest and good pleasures will do that, and only a virtuous life will create honest and good pleasures. Similarly to some versions of stoicism, the Utopians define virtue "as living according to nature […] When an individual obeys the dictates of reason in choosing one thing and avoiding another, he is following nature" (ibid, 67; See also Cicero 2004, 75).

According to the Utopians, reason urges us to not only love God, who has created us, but also to live life as anxiety free and joyfully as possible and encourage others to live that way too. Encouraging others to live a virtuous, happy life will bring joy for the encourager as well (ibid, 68). According to the Utopians, it is especially praiseworthy "when we provide for the comfort and welfare of our fellow creatures. Nothing is more humane […] than to relieve the misery of others, remove all sadness from their lives, and restore them to enjoyment, that is, pleasure" (ibid, 67).

In some sense, the ethics of Utopians can be described as "Epicurean" (see, e.g., Surtz 1949; Vilar 2016). Similarly to Epicurus, in the ethics of Utopians, nature itself guides us towards happiness and pleasure. Therefore living according to nature is to live virtuously. But nature also orders us to make others' lives as cheerful as possible and warns you not to seek only your own advantage in ways that bring misfortune to others. The Utopians think that one should abide not only by private agreements, but also by the public laws which are established to control the distribution of the vital goods which the Utopians understand as "the very substance of pleasure" (More 2003, 68). All those laws that have been established by the king and ratified by the common consent of a people free of tyranny must be obeyed. So long as one obeys these laws, one is free to pursue their own interests, but one cannot pursue their own pleasures if it deprives others of their pleasures. One is, however, free to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of others (ibid).

The Utopians have a particular definition in mind when they talk about "pleasure". Pleasure is "ever state or movement of body or mind in which we find delight according to the behests of nature" (ibid, 69). By using our senses and reason we humans will find what is pleasant by nature. These pleasures are the delights which do not injure others, do not make greater pleasures, and are not followed by pain. There are, however, pleasures which are against nature. The Utopians claim that there are also false pleasures which do not really make us happy. The happiness they create is just an illusion. For example, consuming alcohol in large quantities is a false delight since in the next day it causes great pain for the drinker. (Ibid, 69-71.)

According to the Utopians, there are two kinds of real pleasures: pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind. The first category here, pleasures of the body, can also be divided in to two subcategories. The first is the category of immediate delights of the body. These kinds of pleasures range from drinking water when thirsty and eating food when hungry to eliminating the excess of the body and relieve an itch by scratching it. However, sometimes immediate pleasure "arises, not from restoring a deficiency or discharging an excess, but from something that affects and excites our senses with a hidden but unmistakable force, and attracts them to itself. Such is the power music" (ibid, 72).

The second category of bodily pleasures the Utopians describe as "the calm and harmonious state of the body" (ibid). It is the state of health when body is in undisturbed state without any disorders. Not only does health give bodily pleasures but it is also the prerequisite of bodily pleasures. Without being healthy one cannot enjoy anything. According to the Utopians, it is the foundation and basis of all the pleasures since without it there can be no possibility for any other pleasure. "Mere absence of pain, without positive health, they regard as insensibility, not pleasure" (ibid). There is certain hierarchy between these two subcategories of bodily pleasures: the immediate pleasures only contribute to the much more important pleasure of being healthy. Immediate pleasures "are not pleasant in themselves, but only as ways to withstand the insidious encroachments of sickness" (ibid).

Although bodily pleasures are important for human happiness, the Utopians consider the pleasures of the mind to be much more important. The Utopians primarily seek these pleasures. The most important mental pleasures one can have is from practicing virtues and being conscious of a good life. To make it possible for everyone to cultivate their mental capacities and virtues, everyone needs to have lots of free time on their hands. And because in Utopia no-one lives off the work of others, and the workload is shared more evenly, everyone has more time to cultivate their mental faculties. In intellectual activities the Utopians are tireless. They study Greek literature and philosophy (which they have received from the Europeans) and contemplate nature. "They think that when, with the help of philosophy, they explore the secrets of nature, they are gratifying not only themselves but the author and maker of nature" (ibid,

76). Especially medicine is the area of natural philosophy they hold in great honor.[10]

The socialism of Utopia is not of course the same as later Marxist socialism which Kautsky argues to be based on two factors: "the development of the proletariat as a class and the development of large-scale machine production, which enlists science in its service and to-day imposes a scheme of systematically organised social labour within each undertaking" (Kautsky 2002). The large-scale industrial production creates the technical foundation upon which the proletariat "will shape production in accordance with its interests" (ibid). In modern socialism the large-scale industry and the question of who controls it becomes a politically decisive factor. It is not surprising as such that More's socialism is different from that of the modern labor movement. More lived in the times when capitalism was just developing its first forms. But even so, More's *Utopia* still has few elements that anticipate modern socialism. According to Kautsky (2002), "More's intention is [...] to free the citizens of his commonwealth as much as possible from physical labour, in order to procure them leisure for intellectual and social activity. His chief means to this end are the organisation of labour, to avoid all the useless work which the existing anarchy introduces into the economic life". As Kautsky puts it: the goals of More's *Utopia* are modern, but their realisation is not possible given the low technological development of the mode of production of his time compared with the current one.

2.3 *Utopia* as a Critique of the Present

Kautsky's reading of More is focused on its reception within the socialist tradition. More, of course, has a place in that tradition, but at the same time More's *Utopia* should not be reduced to its possible socialist or communist content. In a proper analysis of More's classic work, the playfulness and purposeful ambiguity of its structure should also be noted. *Utopia* is not so much of a socio-political program or blueprint for social transformation as it is a critique of the present and playful creation of a counter-image of this present. It would be a great misunderstanding to rely *solely* on the basic Marxist critique according to which More's *Utopia* was doomed to failure because of a supposed backward mode of production. More's *Utopia* is much richer and more layered than this critique implies: it is a playful

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[10] It is important to notice here the collective aspect of More's moral philosophy. More approaches the question of pleasure from a social perspective. According to the Utopians, as Vilar (2016, 159-160) writes, "pleasure can never be thought individually: it is always the result of a structured system of values that reproduce the organization of society". This aspect of More's *Utopia* Vilar (2016, 160) sees "as one of the most evident *biopolitical* features of the Utopian Society". Utopians do publicly control and shame people for living the wrong way. The collective perspective is central to everything in More's *Utopia*. As Stephen Greenblatt (1980, 39) has written, the institutions of the island of Utopia are designed "to reduce the scope of the ego: avenues of self-aggrandizement are blocked". "Possessive individualism" as theorized by C. P. Macpherson (1962) is under attack in More's *Utopia* (ibid, 38-39).

critique of the present (Marin 1984; Garforth 2009, 12). More's *Utopia* is not a straightforward advocation of communism (although these elements cannot, naturally, be excluded completely), but a polyphonous text that puts multiple different perspectives in dialogue with each other (Blaim 1982).

French post-structuralist philosopher Louis Marin (1984) has in his *Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces*, paid attention to the way More's *Utopia* creates counter-images by using imagination in a very particular manner. Marin writes about "utopic discourse" (hence the word "utopics" in the title of his book) in which utopia is the so-called "neutral". The concept of neutral refers to the situation where utopia is not understood as being part of the historical space it was written in, nor referring to an alternative historical space. It is an imaginary space which is "'neither one, nor the other' of the contraries" (Marin 1984, xiii). As Marin puts it, "More's *Utopia* is neither England nor America, neither the Old nor the New World; it is the in-between of the contradiction at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Old and New Worlds" (ibid).

Utopic discourse moves in the terrain of the imaginary and because of that it can be seen as a creative or even as a playful endeavor. Marin wants to let the concept of utopia play (ibid, xiv). For Marin utopics is playfully drawn discursive spatial figures, they are discursive places or "topics". Marin compares utopics to Immanuel Kant's (1998) "schemas" from his *Critique of Pure Reason.* Like schemas, utopics is also both intellectual and sensible. And they both can experience something which has no empirical counterpart. The same way the "schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space" (ibid, 273), the same way utopics is a product of creative imagination. It exists in experience and it is created by intellect, but it does not have an empirical counterpart. Utopic writing draws spatial figures into our experience. The same way as utopia is neither Old World nor New World, but somewhere in-between, the same way schemas are neither transcendental categories nor exist in the empirical reality, but are somewhere in-between.

For Kant, schemas are both intellectual and sensible, they are products of imagination (ibid). According to Marin, the same applies to utopias: utopias are not purely conceptual, nor are they purely sensual images. They are both: "Utopia is not at the level of the concept, but neither does it belong to the level of the image. It is a figure; a schema of the imagination" (Marin 1984, 22). Utopia appears "in the position of the schematism of the imagination between the concept and intuition" (ibid). According to Marin, in Thomas More's *Utopia* utopics is close to poetic fiction for it plays with signs and does not worry too much about representation of the world outside the text (ibid, 55). Or better yet, utopia creates the object of representation itself. The real society is mainly a negative referent within *Utopia. Utopia* is a play of spatial figures, which establishes transgression of the boundaries of the real society as a norm – especially the boundaries of private property.

Utopia is a playful text. It is likely that More was not entirely serious when he wrote the book that would later create the tradition of perfect imaginary

societies. For example Jorge Bastos da Silva (2013) has argued that the whole creation of utopian tradition was a "necessary accident". "Necessary accident" is a concept that refers "to the fact that our perception of new data may be strongly conditioned by what we already know. In other words, sometimes we approach reality or face a new experience expecting it to fit our preconceptions, and then, of course, we are bound to find what we expected" (da Silva 2013, 28). The concept of "necessary accident" can be considered synonymous with the concept of "programmatic misinterpretation" used by Umberto Eco in his work (see, e.g., Eco 1998, 74). It is something which creates or invents a new tradition out of misreading or misinterpretation of a text. Da Silva (2013, 29) argues that something similar has happened with Thomas More's *Utopia.* According to da Silva, More never meant to create a new genre of literature nor a new tradition of thought, but it was the misreading of More's most famous book that created them both (ibid).

More's own writing is much more parodic and undogmatic than much of the later utopian works. In the end of *Utopia* the character named "Thomas More" (not to be confused with Thomas More, the author of *Utopia*) urges us to disbelieve what Raphael Hythloday ("Speaker-of-nonsense" as "Hythloday" translates into English) has told to him and us about the island of Utopia: "When Raphael had finished his story, I was left thinking that not a few of the laws and customs he had described as existing among the Utopians were really absurd. These included their methods of waging war, their religious practices, as well as other customs of theirs; but my chief objection was the basis of their whole system, that is, their communal living and their moneyless economy" (More 2003, 106). Hythloday on the other hand is fully committed to realizing the values of the utopians.[11]

The ending of *Utopia* "leaves the reader with very little certainty about the author's beliefs and intentions" (da Silva 2013, 34; See also Vieira 2017, 23). Unlike for example in Campanella's *The City of the Sun* (in which Campanella asserts the the superiority of his utopia over every type of society known) the ideological content of More's *Utopia* is ultimately open-ended. It does not so much dogmatically propose a fixed blueprint for an alternative society as it criticizes and relativizes the 16th century England and its discontents. It is a disruption on the ideological level. More playfully creates an imaginary alternative for us to contemplate and doesn't offer a fixed solution to all the problems. More's *Utopia* can be mainly seen as a thought experiment, not as a serious proposition or blueprint for a new society. It relativizes the present and plays with alternative states of being. It does not try to facilitate social change to create a new society. Its function is mainly critical.

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[11] Giulia Sissa (2012) has claimed that Raphael Hythloday of *Utopia* is supposed to be a friendly parody of Erasmus of Rotterdam. According to Siss, the distance between More's other works and *Utopia* is so great that Hythloday's opinions cannot be the same as More's. In fact, according to Sissa, the differences between Hythloday and the fictional Thomas More of *Utopia* matches the differences between real life Erasmus and More. "*Utopia* reports a debate, and a politely polemic one" (Sissa 2012, 130).

da Silva is not alone with his emphasis on open-endedness of More's Utopia. For example J.C. Davis (2010, 33) has written: "There is a case for caution in reaching for any definitive interpretation of a work which has all the playfulness of a puzzle, teasing with both words and ideas. More's intention is, in part, to present multiple perspectives, to open and reopen the question from many directions and to deepen our engagement with the problem". Dominic Baker-Smith (2000, 230) has also claimed that "the value of a book like *Utopia* lies in its stimulus to moral imagination". Gregory Claeys has emphasized this point also. According to him, in More's *Utopia* no single "narrative perspective is given greater authority than any other" (Claeys 2020, 59).

Followers of Thomas More did not, however, understand the notion of utopia this way. Their reading of More was much more dogmatic and blueprint-oriented.[12] To follow da Silva (2013, 37), their reading was truly a misreading, but it happened to create a new tradition of utopian thinking and literature. Even if More did not mean to create a new tradition, his work accidentally did it. In retrospect this accident could be called a "necessary accident" since this misreading was necessary for later utopian thought to develop. More's *Utopia* is an open-ended playful counter-image to the present. It implies the profound openness of the world. However, the tradition which *Utopia* accidentally created, made utopias closed, hierarchical, and dogmatic. The open-ended playfulness of More's classic was soon abandoned and the so-called "blueprint tradition" (see Jacoby 2005) of utopian thought was born out of this "programmatic misinterpretation". Utopias were now understood as something absolute. There was originally a possibility for a relationalist understanding of utopia in More's text, but it ended up creating the idea of absolutist utopia which can be seen especially well in Campanella's *The City of the Sun* and largely in Francis Bacon's *The New Atlantis* as well.

2.4   Classical Utopianism After More

In More's time, capitalism was still in its embryonic form and far from being fully developed.[13] Still, in the eyes of Thomas More the new social formations capitalism created were morally questionable. If one looks at More's *Utopia* from the point of view of function of utopias, it can be seen presenting a critical counter-image to rising capitalism, to capitalism in its most embryonic form. It cannot be seen giving a true alternative since the historical conditions are not matured enough. But it can be seen criticizing the present, it can relativise the present. Most of the classical utopias following (and misreading) More's *Utopia*

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[12] A follower of Thomas More and translator of *Utopia* Vasco de Quiroga (1470-1565) even attempted several times to realize a utopian blueprint modelled after More's *Utopia*. See, e.g., Pohl 2010, 53.

[13] Here I follow Immanuel Wallerstein who has dated the birth of capitalism in the "long sixteenth century" beginning in 1450 and ending in 1640 (Wallerstein 2011, 66-162).

created only an imaginary space as a critical counter-image to their own societies. They could function mainly as critiques of their present not as futuristic goals.

Utopias are always critical towards present society, even if this critique is quiet and implicit. As long as the constructed utopias' present better alternative principles and institutions than those of their contemporaneous present society they function as critical counter-images which can help the reader to perceive his own society critically. Utopias make us doubt the moral supremacy of the current society. Utopias are always in this sense *relational* not *absolute.* They stand in relation to the society in which they are created.

Classical utopias were mostly ahistorical and static. They focused mainly on organizing and structuring the social space in order to create social harmony and stability. To follow David Harvey (2000, 160), it is possible to state that classical utopianism aimed to achieve these aspirations by excluding those social forces (such as money and private property) that had the ability to disrupt the possibilities for social harmony. This exclusion was in classical utopias possible through organizing tightly the spatial form of the society: the "internal spatial ordering of the island strictly regulates a stabilized and unchanging social process" (ibid). This spatial form controls the temporality in utopia, it controls the possibilities for social change. It controls history. For Harvey this means that the dialectic of social process becomes repressed: history is excluded "in favor of perpetuating a happy stationary state" (ibid). In classical utopias there is no need to envision a better future since the perfectly harmonious social order has already abolished all disrupting factors from society.

This is why in so many classical utopias the spatial and socio-political order is so important. They are what Ernst Bloch (1995, 471-479) would call utopias of order in contrast to utopias of freedom. Order is an essential component of classical utopias. An extreme example of this focus on order can be found in Tommaso Campanella's *The City of Sun* in which the utopian society is organized around the scientific knowledge and the division of intellectual labour. The order of knowledge manifests itself in the social and even in the physical space: in Campanella's City of the Sun the geological and biological samples, mathematical formulas and mechanical knowledge have been classified as belonging to the different parts of the city.

The City of the Sun (as described by Campanella) is "divided into seven rings or huge circles named from the seven planets, and the way from one to the other of these is by four streets and through four gates, that look toward the four points of the compass" (Campanella 2009, 5). In the middle of the city there is a temple where the city is run by experts (or "doctors" as Campanella puts it) of different disciplines. The leader of these experts is called "the Metaphysic" who is the head of all "temporal and spiritual matters, and all business and lawsuits are settled by him". He is "the supreme authority" (ibid, 9). Under his command there are three equal princes: Power, Wisdom and Love. The most important one for Campanella is Wisdom who is the ruler of all sciences. All the experts from Astrologus to Cosmographus, from Geometra to Logicus and Moralis are under his command. And under the command of these experts are the different rings of

the city. For Campanella the organization of knowledge is not just cognitive. It is also socially and physically spatial. Everything and everyone have their scientifically determined place in the City.[14]

Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) (or Giovanni Domenico Campanella as he was baptized) was an Italian philosopher, poet, astrologist and theologian who has in more recent history become known for his utopia, which in many ways was an imaginative attempt to popularize scientific knowledge. Imagination or image was for Campanella a superior way of communication, which in part explains the detailed nature of *The City of the Sun*. This devotion to concrete illustration was a great contrast to the scholastic and Aristotelian styles of argumentation. Campanella believed that the world seen in pictures was more real than the world described in pictures. This is why Manuel & Manuel (1979, 268) call Campanella's utopia "speaking-picture utopia" by which they mean "a dramatic narrative portrayal of a way of life" (ibid, 2). It is a picture of a better way of life in which the City of the Sun becomes a total display of knowledge, knowledge displayed in a set order.

According to Manuel & Manuel (ibid, 273), the true scandal of *The City of the Sun* is not the worship of science but the aim to abolish both private property and family. The people of the City of the Sun believe that private property is collected because everyone lives by themselves in their homes with their families. Property is acquired to protect the family. According to Campanella (2009, 16), this is where selflove stems from. However, if the family is abolished there will be no need for private property and selflove will also disappear. "But when we have taken away selflove, there remains only love for the State". The abolition of private property makes people to love their country and creates an altruistic society.

When Campanella gives his eulogies to the City of the Sun, the adjective "communal" is constantly used. The people of the City of the Sun, the Solarians are brought up in communal dormitories and both speculative and practical arts are taught to both men and women. The women usually perform lighter tasks and men the heavier. Music and cooking are seen as wholly feminine areas of society. But, as Manuel & Manuel (1979, 275) write, "despite the stress on equality and community, the officials got better victuals than others and offered a portion of their good food to those who had triumphed in scientific discussion or military excercises". The Solarians are also put into peer groups in order to enforce brotherhood between individuals.

There is no need to go too deep into Campanella's detailed vision of the City of the Sun since many of those details "were lifted straight out of More's *Utopia*"

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[14] Campanella's City of the Sun can be seen as an archetypal form of the idea of the city in utopian and urbanistic discourse. According to Michel de Certeau, this utopian-urbanistic discourse relies on a threefold operation of creating the city: 1) creation of rational organization that represses all the physical, mental, and political pollutions that would compromise it, 2) the substitution of traditions and their stubborn resistances by univocal scientific strategies, and 3) the creation of a universal and anonymous subject which is the City itself. According to de Certeau (1984, 94), the City "provides a way of conceiving and constructing space on the basis of a finite number of stable, isolatable, and interconnected properties".

(ibid, 276). What makes Campanella's utopia distinct, however, is the way Campanella builds the City of the Sun according to the strict hierarchy between sciences. The same kind of orientation toward social planning can be seen in Francis Bacon's *The New Atlantis* (1890) which also focuses on the analogy between order of knowledge and order of society. Bacon's book is a story about travelers sailing from Peru through the South Seas to Japan and China. However, a strong wind takes them north and they end up finding a new island, Bensalem. The inhabitants of the island reveal themselves to be Christians and they receive the travelers with hospitality. The island seems like a paradise for the travelers. After spending some time on the island, they are invited to meet the leader of the island, who tells the story of the island to the travellers. It is told that the island was ruled 1900 years ago by a king named Salomona who the inhabitants of Bensalem regard as a "divine instrument" (Bacon 1890, 188) and a law giver of the nation. He had let those who wanted to, to leave the island, yet for everyone else he gave livelihoods from the state and they thus lived pleasant lives. The most important achievement of Salomona was however creating the institution called Solomon's House, which is "dedicated to the study of the works and creatures God" (ibid, 190).

According to the leader of Bensalem, the purpose of the brotherhood of Solomon's House (which in the form of fiction anticipates a modern research university) is to find out "the true nature of all things" and to men "fruit in their use of them" (ibid). The experimental nature of natural sciences has a central place in their work. These experiments are performed in "The caves we call the lower region. And we use them for all coagulations, indurations, refrigerations, and conservations of bodies. We use them likewise for the imitation of natural mines and the producing also of new artificial metals, by compositions and materials which we use and lay there for many years" (ibid, 203). The people of Bensalem have also built high towers on the island. These towers are called the "higher region" and they are used "according to their several heights and situations, for insulation, refrigeration, conservation, and for the view of divers meteors – as winds, rain, snow, hail; and some of the fiery meteors also" (ibid).

In Bensalem there are also lakes, which are used to study birds and fish, and pools from which they strain fresh water out of salt. These lakes also have violent streams which are used to give energy for machinery. There are enclosures for animals. which the people of Bensalem use for both exotic attractions, but also experimental dissections and trials. The animals are also used to test different kinds of medicine and poisons. Surgical tests are performed on them too. Through these kinds of experiments they will additionally learn more about the human body. The pharmacies of the Island are considered to be among the best in the world. One can find medicine for everything. For making the medicine, the people of Bensalem have precise knowledge about the mixtures so the medicine can be considered as completely natural. The knowledge about the structure of matter and the laws of its movement makes it possible to manipulate it. (ibid, 203-210.)

In this kind of reliance on science and its effects to industrial productivity Bacon's utopia is astonishingly modern. In comparison to More's *Utopia,* which focused more on the relations between men Bacon's utopia focuses on technological production. Bacon clearly steps outside of Morean nostalgia for the medieval. This difference between More and Bacon can be described with the conceptual distinction between utopias of *relations of production,* which More represents, and utopias of *forces of production,* which, naturally, Bacon can be seen representing in his *New Atlantis* (Kendrick 2004, 289).[15]

The way how Bacon envisions the scientific community to have power in *The New Atlantis* is, in a way, quite a modern feature in the history of utopias and utopian thought. It is one of the most important scientific utopias. The modern trust in progress and optimism considering humanity are both present in Bacon's utopia. Bacon did subscribe to the Renaissance humanistic idea on the possibilities of man. However, the difference between the humanism of Bacon and, for example, that of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola is that Mirandola emphasized the internal potential of man, but Bacon emphasized the external potential, the power of man over nature – and over man himself as well. As Nicole Pohl (2010, 61) writes: "[In Bacon's utopia] the utopian subject is the subjected *object* of Atlantan utopian principles".

Bacon's utopia contains the belief to almost unlimited techno-scientific possibilities of man. The echoes of Bacon's utopia can be heard in later scientific utopias too. One of the most glaring examples of this, is perhaps, the utopia of behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner, in which the so-called "population explosion" and problems as such are fixed with the new science Skinner calls "a technology of behavior", which based on the results of behavioral psychology. In his 1971 book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* Skinner (1971, 10-11; see also Skinner 2005, 244-260) writes:

> What we need is a technology of behaviour. We could solve our problems quickly enough if we could adjust the growth of the world's population as precisely as we adjust the course of a spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry with some of the confidence with which we accelerate high-energy particles, or move towards a peaceful world with something like the steady progress with which physics has approached absolute zero (even though both remain presumably out of reach). But a behavioural technology comparable in power and precision to physical and biological technology is lacking [...].

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[15] An extreme example of technologically oriented utopianism can be found from transhumanist philosophy which claims that humanity is perfectible through progressive processes guided by reason, science, and technology. In transhumanist thought the utopian goal can be expressed through the idea of enhanced humanity whose bodily and cognitive limitations have been overcome and humanity has been perfected (Bostrom 2008). Usually this perfection will, in the transhumanist narrative, become a reality after an eschatological event called the Singularity, "when the machines will surpass human intelligence" (Paura 2016: 25; see also Kurzweil 2005; Vinge 2013). Similar form of Promethean utopianism can be found from Russian cosmism in which the ultimate task of humanity is to achieve immortality and literal, technologically executed resurrection of the dead: "Coming of age will bring perfect health and immortality, but for the living immortality is impossible without the resurrection of the dead" (Fedorov 1990, 76; see also Groys 2018; Vidokle & Zhilyaev 2017).

The negative reputation of utopias today seems to come from these kinds of authoritarian and controlling types of absolutist utopias. Classical utopias almost always focused on the order of their imagined societies. As Ernst Bloch would say, most classical utopias were so-called "utopias of order" (Bloch 1995, 476). The source for happiness of all was thought to be found from a strict order and individuals place within this order. This kind of idea can already be found in Plato's *Republic* where he claimed that a human being finds happiness by living by their nature, and finding their role and place in the Republic. According to Plato (*Republic,* 433a-c), justice and happiness can be found in the principle of "doing one's own work and not meddling with what is not one's own". The utopias of order represent the nastier side of utopian thought. They are authoritarian and static by nature. The order in them is planned down to the slightest detail and they do not give an individual the opportunity to actualize the wide range of their potentials, but shows the place in which they have to live. The classical utopias always came with the burden of rules which dictated every hour of the day, every pleasure of body and mind.

This brings me to another problematic side of classical utopias. They were static and ahistorical. To use the concept developed by Lewis Mumford, classical utopias had the tendency to become "utopias of escape":

> In its most elemental state, this utopia of escape calls for a complete breach with the butcher, the baker, the grocer, and the real, limited, imperfect people that flutter around us. In order to make it more perfect, we eliminate the butcher and baker and transport ourselves to a self-sufficient island in the South Seas. For the most part, of course, this is an idle dream, and if we do not grow out of it, we must at any rate thrust other conditions into it; but for a good many of us, idleness without a dream is the only alternative. Out of such fantasies of bliss and perfection, which do not endure in real life even when they occasionally bloom into existence, our art and literature have very largely grown. (Mumford 1922, 19.)

Classical utopias were ahistorical places of withdrawal, where all the dangers and imperfections of empirical reality were removed. Of course, classical utopias also had a critical function, but in the context of their historical time of writing they were mainly projects of escape (see, e.g., Jameson 2005, 23-24). They escaped conflict, history, and politics altogether into an imaginary place. The function of compensation becomes emphasized here. Here these utopias of escape can be seen in contrast to those utopias, which Mumford (1922, 20) calls "utopias of reconstruction", which are always rooted into the historical situation they are created in. They aim to reconstruct the old into something new.

Andreas Voigt has in his *Die Sozialen Utopien* (1906) made a distinction between archistic and anarchistic types of utopian thought. According to Voigt, there are anthropological grounds for this distinction. According to Voigt, people have different kinds of attitude toward serving and ruling, coercion, and freedom. The so-called "archistic utopia" is based on those attitudes which emphasize ruling and coercion. In archistic utopias there is usually a strong state, which has coercive authority to regulate the social relations of its society. This coercion usually encompasses the whole of human life from cradle to grave – all nuances and details of human life are controlled. The so-called "anarchistic" type of utopian thought is directly opposed to this. In anarchistic utopias all coercion,

ruling and government has been abolished in favor of absolute social freedom. (Voigt 1906, 20-22; Saage 2016, 65.)

Although these two types of utopian thought are irreconcilable, they do share a common enemy: the possessive-individualistic egoism of the rising capitalist society from which they both arose. They both were fictional social models which "oriented along solidary-communitarian lines" (Saage 2016, 65). According to Richard Saage, the basic model for archistic utopias was provided by More's *Utopia* and all the other utopias of order of early modernity, but later as utopias developed the so-called anarchistic type of utopian thought became more common (ibid). Unlike Voigt however, Saage does not see these two types of utopia reducible to anthropology but rather sees them both as answers to their own times. According to Saage, archistic utopias can be interpreted as "an answer to the chaotic conditions of their authors' times, just as anarchistic versions can be traced back to high degrees of regimentation" (ibid, 65).[16]

The archistic type of utopia can be seen as archetypical for the absolutist classical utopianism of early modernity and even the mentality of modernity itself. According to Zygmunt Bauman (2003, 12), classical utopias belong originally to the solid phase of modernity. They expressed a desire for certainty and stability. In classical spatial utopias the certainty was found in a particular *territory.* In temporal utopias, however, the certainty and stability were to be found in the future. A *finality* could be found in them.

The first attribute, "territory", can, according to Bauman (ibid), be found from Thomas More's book *Utopia* and from the word "utopia" itself. The "*topos*" part of the word refers not only to "place" but also to "territory". Those utopias which followed More "were always territorially defined: associated with and confined to a clearly defined territory" (ibid). According to Bauman, this was because the world of "solid modernity" was "a self-consciously territorial world" (ibid). All identities, as well as differences, contradictions, and antagonisms, were *glebae adscripti* [adscript to the soil]. They all brandished, whether as a badge of honor or a brand of shame, fixed and registered addresses" (ibid). "Running things" meant in the world of solid modernity arresting and holding things in the natural places or territories (ibid).

In the "solid" phase of modernity, power and sovereignty in society were defined by their physical and geographical boundaries. There "was an intimate correspondence between space and power" (ibid). Power was understood as a spatial notion. Geographical and physical spaces were divided according to the powers that ruled over them. "State power was measured by the size of its territory and supposed to grow (or diminish) in parallel with territorial acquisitions (or losses)" (ibid, 13).

And like the rest of the thought of early modernity, during the phase of solid modernity, utopian thought took this territorial conception of power and also the conception of "good order" that came with it) for granted. In the solid phase of modernity "good life" meant a life lived in a good society. A "good

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[16] Dorothy F. Donnelly (1999) has in her book *Patterns of Order and Utopia* also connected classical utopianism with the notion of order.

society", however, was understood as a population inhabiting a mapped territory. This mapping of the territory was then "projected upon the physical space" (ibid) by the wise powers of a benevolent state. In solid modernity utopia meant organizing the physical space. This is why, according to Bauman (ibid)., utopian imagination was essentially architectural and urbanistic: the purpose of utopian imagination "was to design a spatial arrangement in which there would be a right and proper place for everyone for whom a right and proper place would have been designed". Classical utopias, the utopias of solid modernity, were interested mainly in constructing a good or even a perfect order.

The second attribute of utopias of the solid modernity is "finality" which refers to the idea that things could always be improved until they have reached their final state, the perfect state. Utopia was seen as this kind of state, which was to be achieved after a long series of improvements of social reality. This kind of idea of utopia as a final destination hints not only at the finality of utopia, but also the futurity of it. The current "really existing reality" (ibid, 15) was progressing towards the perfect society situated in the future. Arriving at utopia would be "the end of pilgrimage" (ibid) that would make the past hardships worth the pain.

> At the time when the blueprints of utopias were penned down, the world seemed to have entered a state of permanent revolution. The most harrowing adversities and setbacks of the modern order-building were the perpetual, seemingly no-end dislocations, resembling earthquakes following volcanic eruptions and followed by tornadoes. The crumbling of familiar landscapes, cutting the bonds of friendship, care and mutual support, made the customary ways and learning them useless, while the new and untried ways, for the reason of being new and untried, appeared treacherous, risky and untrustworthy. Utopia was to put an end to all that. (ibid., 15-16.)

The permanent revolution of modernity created the desire for certainty and stability. And that is exactly what utopia as a vision of the future could offer. Utopias of solid modernity offered a blueprint that would resurrect the lost routine of the pre-modern times. But the desire for certainty and stability meant also visions of a closely monitored and administered world. The utopias of solid modernity aimed to create a pre-designed world in which prediction and planning would have removed all the ambivalence.[17]

> Modern utopias differed in many of their detailed prescriptions, but they all agreed that the 'perfect world' would be one remaining forever identical with itself, a world in which the wisdom learnt today will remain wise tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and in which the life skills acquired will retain their usefulness forever. The world depicted in the utopias was also, expectedly, a transparent world – one in which nothing dark or impenetrable stood in the way of the eye; a world with nothing spoiling the harmony; nothing 'out of place'; a world without 'dirt'; a world without strangers. (Bauman 1997, 12.)

The utopias of solid modernity were "utopias of order" since rather than freedom alone, they aimed at creating a "rational" order where everyone would have find

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[17] It is no wonder why, especially the early modern, classical forms of utopianism can be very unsettling for the socially conscious, progressive reader today. They do have certain authoritarian and colonial qualities that should not be overlooked (see, e.g., Hardy 2012).

their place – and with their place their happiness. "Utopia had to be a world of tight and intimate, day-in day-out engagement between the rulers and the ruled: stern yet benevolent rulers and their obedient yet happy subjects. And the world of sages – whose job was to secure the benevolence of the rulers and the happiness of the ruled" (Bauman 2003, 16). The desire for a better being that these solid utopias presented focused on the search for the model for a good (or perfect) society. This model was thought to be "more solid, reliable and resistant to corruption than any other model could provide" (ibid, 17). Utopian blueprints were the findings of this search process.

Such classical utopian blueprints as those of Campanella and Bacon were all focused on the arrangement of social space which made them archistic utopias or utopias of order. They were primarily fictional, abstracted social alternatives that primarily existed to criticize (and also to escape) the social relations under which they were conceived (Saage 2016, 59). They were also static and ahistorical since in them there is a radical break with history. Classical utopias step outside of the corrupt and messy history and create an abstract blueprint which really can only express the desire for social transformation, but not actually work as an achievable political goal. If the absolutist interpretation of utopias elaborated in the introduction of this dissertation is justified at all, it is justified in the context of this blueprint tradition of utopianism.

The term "goal" implies the distance in time between the current historical situation and the situation that is hoped for. Utopias must become states projected into the future for them to take the form of a political goal. The futurity of utopias means the temporalization of utopian thought. This temporalization will be the focus of the next chapter of this dissertation. The temporality of utopias became stronger during modernity. The spirit of temporal utopianism is especially strong in the concepts of "progress" and "revolution". These two concepts should be understood as mediating concepts between the two historical situations, between the Now and the Future. Both "progress" and "revolution" refer to the process of the coming of utopia.

3 TEMPORALIZATION OF UTOPIA

The following chapter will examine the transformation and the temporalization of utopian thought. The elements for this temporalization can be found in the history of eschatological ideas within Jewish and Christian eschatological traditions and from the process of the birth of capitalist modernity. Jewish and Christian eschatologies influenced utopianism in two major ways. One way it has influenced utopianism is in the form of grand narratives of history having a *telos* that society is inevitably moving closer to. The Jewish and Christian grand narratives of world history as salvation history can be seen as a prototype for this kind of utopianism. The temporal utopianism of Enlightenment in turn can be seen as a secular form of this salvation history. This kind of temporal utopianism is in this dissertation seen to be in deep trouble due to the disaster that is the 20th century.

Another way Jewish and Christian traditions have influenced utopianism can be seen in the chiliast tradition which has, as Karl Mannheim (1979, 198-199) has shown, influenced all sorts of radical political philosophies and movements that focus on the destruction of obstacles for freedom in the immediate present. Although there is a distance between the two, this chiliast influence can also be seen in the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice that is developed below. Utopian counter-practices too, focus more on the immediate present than they focus on the future. They focus on transforming socially organized time itself by interrupting the everyday, and changing the course of time, thus opening the present for the future.

In this chapter the transformation of the concept of utopia will be examined in the context of the further development and expansion of capitalism. Capitalism starts to overthrow old social relations and creates a new form of time consciousness: the future begins to look more open. The old social order does not seem like the only possible one. This gives the utopian function its facilitative emphasis.

During the historical development of utopian thought the concept of utopia can be seen going through a significant change from spatiality to temporality. Both the concept of utopia itself and the genre of utopian literature got new

temporal layers during the 18th century. Unlike the classical utopias of Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon the new utopias of the 18th century were not imagined as secluded islands or otherwise closed spatial organizations. They were now projected into the future. The development of capitalism, scientific progress and especially the great revolutions of the time gave the concept of utopia a new, temporal, euchronical form. Although some elements of this kind of temporal utopianism can be found from Jewish and Christian eschatological thought, it was the process of modernity that gave these eschatological tendencies a new political *gravitas*. The writings of Karl Marx and especially the reading of Marx offered by Marshall Berman are here used as articulations of the historical experience of capitalist modernity which creates the experiental basis for the formation of temporal utopianism.

I have chosen three thinkers as examples of temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment: Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781), Marquis Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet (1740-1794) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). All of them structure their utopianism in the form of a universal historical metanarrative in which the notion of progress is central. For Turgot, Condorcet and Kant history has certain direction and certain goal it is constantly approaching. In temporal utopianism utopia is a part of the historical process itself. It already exists in the here-and-now as a potentiality. History is temporal utopianism seen as the actualization of this potentiality. Utopia becomes a real possibility. The future becomes something that can be mastered (Cole 2017, 15). The relationship between utopia and the concept of possibility is examined in the latter part of this chapter where I examine the idea of concrete utopia. Again, I must remind the reader that instead of purely historical reading, my reading of different utopian theoreticians will be read from a more thematical perspective. I use different historical theoreticians to articulate and reconstruct different concepts of utopia. What interests me in this chapter are the different versions of one concept of utopia, namely that which I call here "temporal".

All three examples of temporal utopian of this chapter have been widely studied in the context of utopian studies. For example, with Condorcet, and his eschatological vision of a utopian epoch, which humanity is constantly approaching, there has been a connection made to the birth of science fiction (Bellagamba 2016). Condorcet has also been seen as an advocate of technocracy due to his emphasis on "social mathematics" (Beauchamp 2009). Condorcet comes close to Francis Bacon in his belief that not only should politics be based on science, but that it also should be a science "capable of the same degree of certainty as physics" (ibid, 31).

However, despite this emphasis on science it is not incorrect to say that Condorcet's (and Turgot's) utopian philosophy of history is based more on belief and on a certain kind of theology than on science and reason. According to Karl Löwith (1949, 92), in men like Condorcet and Turgot "passion for reason and justice engendered a fervor which can indeed be called 'religious', though it was

irreligious".[18] Both Condorcet's and Turgot's utopianisms express a certain kind irreligious religiosity that has its roots in Christian eschatology and especially in the eschatological framework of the three ages, developed by Joachim of Fiore that I will examine below (Potter 2012, 37). In this chapter this problem of reason versus belief in the context of the temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment will not be resolved. Rather the Enlightenment utopianism of Turgot and Condorcet are seen mainly as examples of how historical developments changed the concept of utopia, or at least gave new dimensions to it, during the process of modernization.

Immanuel Kant's connections to the concept of utopia and utopianism in general have recenty been examined in various ways. For example Jürgen Habermas (2010) has seen Kant offering a "realistic utopia of human rights" relying on the concept of "human dignity". In their seminal history of utopian thought in the western world, Manuel & Manuel (1979, 519) write that in his philosophy of history Kant sets "forth the underlying principles of the German School of the progressive utopia". Garofalo & Geuras (2015) and Hill (2019) on the other hand have located Kant's utopianism in his concept of the "Kingdom of Ends". For Chepurin (2017) Kant's utopia is not merely an idealistic vision of the perfect future, but also a method and standpoint of the whole Kantian philosophy. In this chapter Kant is, however, seen mainly as an example of certain kind of temporal utopianism. And although there is very little discussion of utopia or utopianism as such in Kant, it is possible find an implicit (cosmopolitan) utopia from Kant's work (Lettevall 2020, 96). Anitta Kananen (2021, 24) has also argued that it is possible to interpret Kant as a utopian thinker since he dreamt of such states of affairs that did not exist in his lifetime.

In Kant there is a "supposed teleology", an "as if" philosophy according to which the history might not as such have a final end but that we only should think as if history had one (Lettevall 2020, 96). Kant's philosophy of history is a "thought experiment" (ibid, 97) and not a fixed truth about history itself. Kant looks for empirical evidence for progress of mankind but more than the past he is interested in the future and only assumes its way towards a perpetual peace. Kant's thinking here is eschatological and millenarian, but in a self-conscious, reflexive way. As Kant himself writes, philosophy has its "chilialistic expectations" but these expectations are not to be understood as "overfanciful" (Kant 1996a, 50).

This chapter ends in the problematization of possibilities of temporal utopianism in the 21st century. It has been frequently argued that we are currently

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[18] This so-called "secularization thesis" has been questioned in recent years. For example Matthew Benjamin Cole has in his dissertation pointed to the Christian idea of an apocalyptical "Final Judgment". No such thing seems to exist in for example Condorcet. "[T]he modern utopians orient themselves toward an indefinite expanse of time; Condorcet, for example looks out on an 'ocean of futurity,' with no limitations, let alone 'Last Things,' on the horizon" (Cole 2017, 18). Even Cole, however, does not dispute the influence of eschatology to temporal utopianism. He only wants to point out certain crucial differences between the two. For the proponents of different versions of the secularization thesis see, e.g., Löwith 1949, Cohn 1970 & Voegelin 1987. For the criticism of this thesis see, e.g., Blumenberg 1985 & Wallace 1981.

living in the era of neoliberal "capitalist realism" (Fisher 2009) where the possibility of utopian future has been blocked off and all collective alternatives to the capitalist social order appear impossible. It seems to me, however, that this situation does not have to imply the total disappearance of utopia. In my view it only implies the weakening of temporal, future-oriented utopias and the changing of utopian orientation. If the possibility of utopian future disappears, utopias begin to orient themselves towards the present, towards the here-and-now. This examination will provide contextualization for the last chapter of this dissertation in which I develop the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice which has the potential to cause disruption on both the level of social cohesion of the present and the level of the everyday consciousness. Not only can it create cracks in the social cohesion of existing society, but it can also change the perception of the possibilities of everyday life.

3.1 Utopia and Eschatology

Utopianism has in part its roots in the Jewish and Christian eschatological traditions. Its myth of the paradise of Eden and the eschatology it contains can both be seen in later developments of utopian thought. As Manuel & Manuel (1979, 33) write, the idea of paradise in its Jewish and Christian forms must be accepted as "the deepest archeological layer of western utopia". Although the idea of paradise can be perhaps seen as universal, in the Western world it has been assimilated by each succeeding generation in new, different specific guises. By the time Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) was published, the idea of paradise was present in all forms of Western culture.

Although the kind of utopia More constructed was mainly a product of early modernity, the age of the Renaissance humanism and reformation, it still carried within it the older connotations of paradise. The idea of utopia contained specifically two forms of paradise: 1) Eden and 2) the World to Come (the Days of the Messiah, the millennium). These two forms of paradises can be found in all subsequent utopian thought. "The history of paradise is a prolegomenon and perennial accompaniment to utopia [...] Images of paradise and the millennium constitute a treasury on which utopian thinkers draw, though they are not always conscious of their borrowing" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 33). As More's *Utopia* borrows heavily from the paradise narrative of Jewish and Christian traditions and from Greek tradition too, so too does the later revolutionary utopianism draw from the Jewish and Christian eschatologies and their millenarist ideas of the World to Come.

Christian eschatology is about conversion, not about the ultimate end, nor the vanishing of everything, nor is it about interruption, but about conversion to a new life. As Jürgen Moltmann in *The Coming of God* (1996, 24) writes:

> An interruption certainly deranges the normal course of things and the desired goals of our own affairs, for it disrupts the notion of linear time, the causalities and homogeneous

temporality of 'the river of time'; but it interrupts only 'for a time'; afterwards everything goes on as before, and the general run of things remains completely unchanged. But whenever the eschatological event interrupts the conjunctions of time, these are changed fundamentally. The prophets 'interrupt', but not just for a moment; they call the people to the conversion of the courses of time. Conversion and the rebirth to a new life change time and the experience of time, for they make-present the ultimate in the penultimate, and the future of time in the midst of time.

This new life can be interpreted as utopia much like Ernst Bloch in his *Spirit of Utopia* (2000, 117) does*:* "how could things be consummated, without apocalyptically ceasing to be". The new world is born out of the ashes of the old. This sentiment can later be seen in modern revolutionary utopian movements which interpret the history itself in eschatological terms and presuppose meaning in history, which is revealed in an apocalyptic event. History has a meaning; it is directed towards consummation.

Faith, Hope, and Love: Augustine of Hippo's Eschatology

Besides the Bible, one of the most important influences upon utopian thought is Augustine of Hippo's *The City of God* (2003) and the philosophy of history it contains. The central theme in the book is the division into "cities" (*Civitate*): the city of God (*civitas dei*) and the city of the world (*civitas terrene*). According to Augustine, they will be in conflict with each other through the history of mankind. The city of the world is also sometimes called by Augustine as the city of the devil (*civitas diaboli*). Although this latter name for the city of the world is usually avoided by Augustine, it still expresses very well this strong opposition between the two cities which becomes "the guiding principle of history for Augustine and the medieval philosophy of history" (Taubes 2009, 81). The concept of "the city of God" refers to a spiritual community of Christians which live side by side with the city of the world until the end times. The city of the world and its earthly powers are a necessary evil due to original sin. It is also due to original sin that man cannot enter the City of God by himself. The city of God can be achieved only through the grace of God (Augustine of Hippo 2003).

In his *Enchridion* or *Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Love* Augustine of Hippo writes his philosophy of history from a different point of view. He starts from the Christian dogma of three main virtues of Christianity: faith, hope and love, the last one being the most important. It is needed for a true encounter with God. The love of God only can bring the faith and the hope to human life. On the other hand, the love of God can come to be only through the grace of God.

> Now this is the true faith of Christ which the apostle speaks of, 'which worketh by love,' and if there is anything that it does not yet embrace in its love, asks that it may receive, seeks that it may find, and knocks that it may be open unto it. For faith obtains through prayer that which the law commands. For without the gift of God, that is, without the Holy Spirit, through whom love is shed abroad in our hearts, the law can command, but it cannot assist (Augustine of Hippo 1996, 135-136).

The orders of the law can be only an external necessity without love. Law can only give us information about sin, about what is forbidden and what is

permitted. Living according to the law is not yet living in the love of God because the spirit of God is not yet helping man, but it is never-the-less a step in the right direction. Because man does not live in the grace of God, the law can only be a disciplinary guidance. Augustine quotes the Bible: "Now the Law came on the scene so that trespassing might increase" (Romans 5:20). However, if man has already started to love God (if he is already living in grace), the external law turns into genuine faith. Man starts to live in the Holy Ghost and new phase begins in a man's life, the phase of hope. God gives man the true hope of salvation.

These stages of development apply to both the life of an individual and to the history of mankind as a whole: "Of these four different stages of man, the first is before the law, the second is under the law, the third is under grace, and the fourth is in full and perfect peace. Thus, too, the history of God's people has been ordered according to His pleasure who disposeth all things in number, and measure, and weight" (ibid, 137). The first epoch of mankind was before the law in the Garden of Eden. The second epoch was the epoch of Law which was given through Moses to the people of Israel. It was the first step towards salvation. The third epoch was "first made manifest in the coming of the Mediator", Jesus Christ (ibid). This is the epoch of Grace when the Mediator comes to the world in the form of Jesus and makes true faith a true possibility for mankind. According to St. Augustine, he was still living the time of Grace. The City of God has not yet won the world's historical battle between flesh and spirit, between sin and God and therefore the epoch of Love is yet to come.

Novus Ordo: Joachim Of Fiore's Communist Brotherhood

This kind of grand narrative of stages with the final goal of human history which goes all the way back to the Old Testament (Murariu 2014, 76) influenced some forms of utopian thought. One of the best-known versions of this can be found in the thoughts of Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202), a theologian who "was illuminated with a vision of the true meaning of cryptic passages in the Old and New Testaments, and was inspired to write of a new historical order in which the Church of Christ would be superseded by the Reign of the Holy Ghost on earth" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 56). Joachim of Fiore's thoughts were part of the theological tradition of paradise, Days of the Messiah and millennium, which had been accumulating in the West for centuries. From the exegetical, topological, allegorical and numerological elements of this tradition he created his own symbolism of history. There are three stages (*status*) in progression which correspond in their nature to the three aspects or persons of the Holy Trinity. Each of these states are divisible into seven periods (*aetates*) which are all named after characters from sacred history. Each of these periods and states are inherently better than the last one. History is for Joachim of Fiore "a stadial ascent toward goodness and absolute love" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 57).

The three stages of Joachim's theological philosophy of history are the Reign of the Father, the Reign of the Son, and the Reign of the Holy Ghost. The Reign of the Father corresponds with the events of the Old Testament and it is an era when people live under God's commandments, under the obedience to the Rules

of God. The second era, the Reign of the Son is the period between the birth of Christ and the year 1260. This era is represented by the New Testament. The third era of human history in Joachim's theology is the Reign of the Holy Ghost. It is the transitional stage before the "indefinitely postponed" Judgment Day (ibid). The Reign of the Son was mainly a "reign of justice" or "reign of law", but the Reign of the Holy Ghost will be the reign of love, a "reign of freedom". According to Eric Hobsbawm (1959, 14), the reign of law is to be understood here as an "imperfect society" in contrast to the perfection of the reign of freedom. The world history according to Joachim is a transition from an imperfect society to a perfect one.[19] Ernst Bloch (1990, 124) has described Joachim's vision as follows:

> Joachim's doctrine of the third status, the third kingdom is this: the first age was that of the servitude of the law, that of the Father and his Old Testament, of the laity and the married. The second age is an intermediate condition between flesh and spirit, it is initiated by the Son and his New Testament, is governed by the Church and its clerics. But the third age, which precedes the end of the world, is now in the process of being born; it is inhabited by monks, that is, by the *viri spirituales*, by the 'freedom of the spirit'. The letter of the gospel of Christ with its Church and its clerics will pass away, the early Christian community descends from heaven to earth, a communist brotherhood and realm of peace begin.

As Karl Löwith (1949, 150) has written, Joachim's interpretation of history can be called prophetic. In Joachim the right understanding of past events of history depends on the right perspective of the future consummation that does not occur outside of history as the end of the world, but at the end of history in the final stage. Joachim's eschatology consists not in a simple millennium nor in the expectation of the end of the world. Joachim's eschatology is twofold: the first part of it is "an ultimate historical phase of the history of salvation" that precedes the transcendent *eschaton* of the new aeon brought into existence by the second coming of Christ (ibid, 150). The Reign of the Holy Ghost is the last historical stage and in this stage the institutions of the papacy and clerical hierarchy will disappear. They are no longer needed. This also implies "the liquidation of preaching and sacraments" (ibid, 151). In the Reign of the Holy Ghost no mediating power is needed between God and humanity. In the Reign of the Holy Ghost the spiritual order becomes realized and it is this spiritual order, the communist brotherhood itself, that "possesses knowledge of God by direct vision and contemplation"(ibid).

"The communist brotherhood" Joachim envisions (or prophesizes) is called *novus ordo*, "the new monastic order" or "the new social order". These two meanings are combined in "*novus ordo*" because Joachim envisioned the future society to be much like a monastery (Riedl 2012, 66-67). It can be found from a drawing created by the followers of Joachim from his drafts. It is entitled

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[19] This so-called "Trinitarian" view of history can later be found in the philosophy of Georg: "The Trinitarian nature of God is explained in Joachim's theology in a purely historical way so that one of the three divine persons is prominent in each of the three ages. Like Hegel, Joachim sees the three persons of the Trinity as three world periods of history. It is within the context of these three periods that the unity of the three persons [God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit] in the Trinity emerges. […] The Hegelian trilogy [*Dreitakt*]; thesis-antithesis-synthesis, can only be understood in terms of Joachim's rhythm of the ages of Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit" (Taubes 2009, 91).

Dispositio novi ordinis pertinens ad tertium statum ad instar supernae Jerusalem, "the constitution of the new order of the third stage according to the image of heavenly Jerusalem". This new social order is not just theological, but also a constitution of the future society prophesized by Joachim.

Practically every detail of the pragmatic structure of this future society is expressed in the *Dispositio.* It is not purely "futuristic", because Joachim integrated different religious developments of his own time into the constitution. Some of the features of the constitution were already real in Joachim's own time, especially the monastization of the clergy. Because Joachim's constitution is based in many ways on the Rule of Benedict, he did not have to emphasizes that private property would be strictly forbidden in this new society. But unlike the Rule of Benedict, the laics too will receive all their food and clothing out of communal property. However, there are some differences regarding the distribution of the common property. Unlike the lay people, the lower clergy may possess meat and furs. And because they also engage in agriculture, they can possess land and livestock too. (ibid, 70.)

In his *Dispositio* Joachim praises the uniformity of the Benedictine monasteries and extends this ideal of uniformity to his future society in its entirety. Joachim is in strong favor of collectivism (although he also allows for exemptions from the rule in individual cases) and wants everyone to share manual work in a highly sophisticated division of labor, which takes into account the special gifts of each social group. The contemplative monks follow the strictest fasting rules and they never wear working clothes. The working monks on the other hand have a much richer diet and a much more practical clothing. The lay people do not fast at all and their lives are the most unrestricted overall. As Riedl writes: "Clearly, Joachim's *dispositio* is meant for the masses, as it does not expect too much from the less gifted and less determined members of the *novus ordo*" (ibid, 71).

As one can already tell, the power relations in Joachim's vision of the future society are highly hierarchical. At the centre of the future society we find the abbot who conforms with the Rule of Benedict addressed as the spiritual father of the society. His command must be followed by everyone. According to Joachim, in the beginning of the Reign of the Holy Ghost, several spiritual fathers will divert the believers from the vanity of the world and make them enter the monasteries. He prophesizes twelve monastic founders and according to the exegetical principle of threefold concordance (*trina concordia*) they correspond to Joseph and his brothers (the twelve tribal founders of the reign of the father) and to the twelve ecclesiastical founders in the reign of the son. The spiritual fathers of the Reign of the Holy Ghost will "sit on the thrones as the highest prelates of a theocratic order, where everything will be ordered according to the will of God" (ibid, 72). The spiritual fathers, and not the papacy, will play the leading role in the spiritual church of the future. In Joachim's *Dispositio* the administrative structure, which the spiritual fathers control, controls the spiritual progress of the monks. They decide who will rise in the hierarchy of the *novus ordo*. They are are accountable to the abbot. The abbot on the other hand is accountable only to God.

The main office of the abbot is the administration of persons and goods. According to Riedl, the term "*dispositio*" denotes the description of a law-making act. "At the same time *dispositio* is the Latin translation of the Greek term *oikonomia*, since Aristotle denoting private and not public administration" (ibid, 73). According to Joachim, at the dawn of the third era, at the dawn of the Reign of the Holy Ghost the spiritual church will publicly manifest throughout the whole world. The Reign of the Holy Ghost will not only break down all temporal rule and governance, but also cause the dissolution of the public sphere. There will be no differentiation of the public and private spheres. Also, strict economic rules will apply in the Reign of the Holy Ghost.

In Joachim's economic conception the lay people will take care of all the material necessities of human life. For this purpose Joachim divides the lay people into vocational groups. Each of them will be led by their own master. What Joachim probably had in mind here were the craft guilds that were flourishing in his time and the Cistercian granges which later gave birth to large manufactures. The economical dimension of Joachim's *Dispositio* is restricted to the subsistence of the monastery. Trade with other societies is not mentioned at all. This might be because according to Joachim's vision, the *novus ordo* is meant to integrate the whole of human society, which means that there will be no outside world to trade with. (ibid, 74-74.)

Economy belongs in Joachim's *Dispositio* solely to the sphere of necessity. The true goal of human life is the liberty from bodily necessities. This is why the economic production is restricted only to the subsistence of this society. For example, the idea of economic growth is totally absent. The liberation from bodily necessities also means that the highest perfection can only be found in pure contemplation in the life of "the contemplative monks of the oratory of John the Evangelist who, except in emergency situations, never work and separate from the rest of the society to the greatest extent possible" (ibid, 76).

According to, Joachim's *Dispositio* is really all about education. Joachim's system of education is the core of his social and political vision: "It represents us with a hierarchically structured society of knowledge, mirroring the whole course of humanity, which Joachim describes as the gradual divine re-education of mankind after the fall" (ibid, 77). All female members of *novus ordo* cannot become members of the clergy but are destined to ever remain in the lay estate. They must be trained in the fear of God. Different vocational groups teach different crafts much like in the guild system. The lay people do not need to learn to read or write. "All they need to know for their salvation they will learn from the priests who descend to the lay oratory to celebrate mass" (ibid). According to Joachim, boys who prove to be suitable for higher education may attend the school of priests and rise from the laics to the clergy. In the school they will learn about doctrine (*doctrina*), which, however, is still restricted to the teaching of the letter.

In the school of priests, boys will study especially Latin grammar and mainly the Bible. If they are talented enough, the boys will learn to recite the whole Bible by heart. This will prove their readiness to receive the spiritual

doctrine, *doctrina spiritualis*. The doctrine is taught only within the monastic estate, but only those who wish to fully complete their education as contemplative monks will attend a higher school. The highest insight into divine reality is given to the contemplative monks and from them the knowledge descends through the estates to the bottom. The contemplative monks are constantly in a meditative state, but they know that "they must use their knowledge for the service of the community" (ibid, 78). Joachim's vision of the future society is a highly hierarchical and patriarchal system. The highest place is reserved for the gifted males and from their minds the knowledge descends to the lay people.

Joachim's vision of a future society is one of the better known "utopian" systems of the middle ages. After the death of Joachim, his follower continued to preach of the new man of the Third Age, the age of the Holy Ghost, the age of the Spirit.[20] The idea was that, although this Third Age was not yet achieved, history was still in progress. It had a teleology towards perfection, with the salvation future to be fulfilled. As Gianni Vattimo (2002, 30) has written: "The third age, therefore, is merely announced. Joachim's prophecy remains only a prophecy". It is the end goal of history that has not been achieved yet. The obvious echoes of this kind of idea in the later temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment thought cannot be dismissed (see, e.g., Murariu 2014, 77).

Chilialism, Apocalypse, and Utopian Mentality

Sociologist Karl Mannheim claimed in his classic work in sociology of knowledge *Utopia and Ideology* that Jewish and Christian eschatologies - or "chilialism" as he puts it – can be seen as forms of utopian thought or utopian mentality. Utopian mentality, for Mannheim, is a state of mind which is incongruous "with the state of reality within which it occurs" (Mannheim 1979, 173). A state of mind is utopian when it orients "towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation" (ibid). It transcends the immediate given situation and departs from reality. However, for orientation to be truly utopian it has to have the tendency "to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time" (ibid). Utopia is for Mannheim the orientation which transcends the reality and at the same time breaks "the bonds of the existing order" (ibid).

Utopian mentality can, however, sometimes be confused with ideological states of mind. For Mannheim, ideology too is incongruent with reality, but it does not break the bonds of the existing order but rather ends up maintaining and reinforcing the existing order. Although this distinction sounds simple enough, in practice it is not easy to say which state of mind is ideological and which utopian since the same ideas can take both forms depending on the times. For example, liberalism can be seen as a utopian set of ideas during the ascent of the bourgeoisie, but later as the bourgeoisie consolidates its power it becomes an

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[20] This Third Age can also be called "the Third Kingdom" which might sound quite disturbing to us, the people living after the horrors of the second world war. The of "Dritte Reich" in Nazi Germany can first be found in the eschatological visions of Joachimite thought – although, as Bloch (1990, 128) puts it, in a "totally polluted, perverted, betrayed form".

ideology which eternalizes the bourgeois society. Liberalism no longer offers revolutionary possibilities; it is now a set of ideas which do transcend the existing order, but do not operate with a utopia function.

Every period in history has had these kinds of ideas which have been harmoniously integrated into the dominant world-view. One example of this is "the clerically and feudally organized medieval order" which "was able to locate its paradise outside of society, in some other-worldly sphere which transcended history and dulled its revolutionary edge, [wherein nevertheless] the idea of paradise was still an integral part of medieval society" (ibid, 174). It was not until there were certain social groups which tried to realize the wish-images within ideology, did it become utopian. Here Mannheim refers to Gustav Landauer's theory of revolution and calls "every actually existing and ongoing social order" a *topia* (ibid).

Landauer (2010a, 112-113) writes in his essay on revolution about *topia* thusly:

> Revolution concerns communality in all its dimensions. This means not only the state, the estates of the realm, the religious institutions, economic life, intellectual life, schools, arts, or education, but the combination of all of those; a combination that, for a certain period of time, rests in a relative state of authoritative stability. We call this combination – the current state of communality – topia. Topia is responsible for affluence and satiation as well as for hunger, for shelter as well as for homelessness. Topia organizes all matters of communality, wages war, exports and imports, closes and opens borders. Topia implies intelligence and simplemindedness, virtue and vice, happiness and unhappiness, harmony and disharmony. Topia impacts on the sub-areas of communality (those that are not identical with topia itself): the private lives of individuals and families. The borders here are not clearly drawn.

In both Mannheim's theory of utopia and Landauer's theory of revolution, each *topia* is followed by a new utopia. Each historical situation creates utopias which in turn help to create a new *topia*, a new historical situation. There is no end to this process, there will always be new utopias to create new *topias*. One could say that in Mannheim's theory ideology can be defined as those kinds of situationally transcended ideas which are not able to create new *topias*. Utopias on the other hand are able to do this. One of Mannheim's examples of ideological ideas that are not able to realize their contents is the idea of Christian brotherly love. In a society founded on serfdom it "remains an unrealizable and, in this sense, ideological idea" (Mannheim 1979, 175; See also Saage 2016, 60-61).

According to Ruth Levitas (1997), Mannheim's distinction between utopia and ideology can be seen as analogical to the distinction between abstract and concrete utopia made by Ernst Bloch. In Bloch's thinking abstract utopia is a utopia which does not have the possibility to be realized. The concrete utopia on the other hand does have this possibility to be manifested. The same is true with Mannheim's distinction between utopia and ideology. Mannheim's utopia can here be seen analogical to Bloch's concrete utopia since Mannheim claims that utopia is a realizable state of mind. Similarly, Mannheim's ideology can be seen analogical to Bloch's abstract utopia since both are by definition unrealizable.

In the history of Western thought, one of the first set of ideas which can be said to be having a "utopian mentality" is, according to Mannheim, Christian

eschatology, or, "chiliasm" as Mannheim puts it. According to Mannheim one of the most important turning-points in the history of utopian thought was when "chiliasm" "joined forces with the active demands of the oppressed strata of society" (Mannheim 1979, 190). The idea of the millennium, the kingdom of God on earth had always had revolutionary energy, but the spiritually stiff church had successfully paralyzed this tendency within Christianity. The revolutionary side of Christianity had appeared first in Joachim of Fiore and later in Thomas Müntzer and the Anabaptists. Their ideas were situationally transcendent ideas that became "transformed into the activist movements of specific social strata, which up to that time had been either unattached to a specific goal or concentrated upon other-worldly objectives suddenly took on a mundane complexion" (ibid, 191). In Joachim of Fiore, Müntzer and the Anabaptists the ideological Christian ideas became embraced by the oppressed strata of society which turned those ideas from ideological to utopian ideas. Situationally transcendent Christian ideas "were now felt to be realizable – here-and-now – and infused social conduct with a singular zeal" (ibid).

Mannheim calls this process "the spiritualization of politics" and it affected all currents of the time. The source of this spiritual tension was the birth of utopian mentality among the oppressed strata. Mannheim argues that from this point forward the politics in the modern sense of term begins. Politics was now "a more or less conscious participation of all strata of society in the achievement of some mundane purpose" (ibid). Before this, the general worldview contained "a fatalistic acceptance of events as they are, or of control from 'above'" (ibid). Now the lower classes assumed the mobilizing function in the social process and gained their social and political significance. According to Mannheim, this process would later gradually lead to the stage of "proletarian self-consciousness".

The inner nature of this Christian radicalism of medieval and early modern times can be described by the concept of "absolute presentness". In chiliast thought the time and place we occupy is always only incidental and they can be transformed through bursts of ecstatic action. The chiliast is able to do this because he is always one with the immediate present: the millennium happens here and now "as a sudden swing into another kind of existence" (ibid, 195). Chiliasm relies on the notion of *kairos* which signifies a historical moment into which eternity erupts, transforming the world into a new state of being (see, e.g., Tillich 2008, 43-62).

The chiliast is always ready for the transformation of the world, he is always waiting for the millennium. According to Mannheim, the chiliast sees the revolution as a value in itself. It is "the only creative principle of the immediate present" and not a means to a higher end (Mannheim 1979, 196). The chiliast is not interested in a rationally developed blueprint for a future society, but rather he aims to destroy the obstacles of freedom in the immediate present. As Mikhail Bakunin, one of the modern chiliasts wrote: "Let us therefore trust the eternal Spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unfathomable and eternal source of all life. The passion for destruction is a creative passion" (Bakunin 1971, 57).

Chiliasm can focus on the here-and-now because it does not project the better world onto a different space or different time, but instead it connects itself to the "world beyond events" (Mannheim 1979, 196). The chiliast is detached from the process of becoming and does not therefore orient himself to the future. The better world happens here and now, not in the distant future. The chiliast restlessly awaits "the critical juncture of events and that moment when the external concatenation of circumstances coincides with the ecstatic restlessness of his soul" (ibid). Here the chiliast tradition differs from the other forms of utopian thought. It especially contradicts with the utopias formulated in the "Age of Reason and Enlightenment" since it does not create a "closed system of deductive procedure" (ibid). The closed rational utopias of early modern times are always distanced from concrete reality. Chiliasm on the other hand is enthusiastically invested in the present situation. "The abstract nature of the rational utopia contradicts the intense emotional drive of a sensually alert Chiliastic faith in the complete and immediate present" (ibid, 197).

This chiliastic mentality, connected to the present, will in the evolution of utopian thought get spiritual predecessors in the more radical forms of political philosophy. One of the most notable chiliasts who have influenced radicalism in history is Thomas Müntzer, who interpreted the Gospel and its Evangelical texts of spiritual hunger as literal hunger. And when the prophet Daniel talks about "the people of the saints of the most High", Müntzer claimed that Daniel is speaking of the common poor people since they suffered the most. According to Müntzer, the common people were the ones carrying the cross, they were purged and therefore they were able to be in direct communication with God. "The clergy have never been able to discover, nor will they ever, the beneficial tribulations and useful abyss that the providential spirit meets as it empties itself. The spirit of the fear of God has never possessed the clergy, but the elect firmly clings to this spirit as their only goal" (Müntzer 2010, 2).

Müntzer always raised the common man above the rulers who were blinded by their luxurious lifestyles. Only the poor could truly see the truth of the Scriptures. "God despises the powerful and mighty, the likes of Herod, Caiaphas and Annas, and he accepts for his service the small, like Mary, Zechariah, and Elizabeth. For that is God's way of working, and down to the present day he does not act otherwise" (ibid, 56-57). Because of his way of lifting the common man to the center of his theology, Thomas Müntzer has been seen as a predecessor of communism and the socialist labor movement. Ernst Bloch (1969) even saw him as "the theologist of revolution". He even demanded everything be shared equally with everyone: *Omnia sunt communia*, "All property should be held in common" (Müntzer 2010, 96). It is almost this slogan alone that makes Münzer a representative of a communist utopia:

> By the kingdom of God, Muenzer [*sic*] understood nothing else than a state of society without class differences, without private property, and without superimposed state powers opposed to the members of society. All existing authorities, as far as they did not submit and join the revolution, he taught, must be overthrown, all work and all property must be shared in common, and complete equality must be introduced. In his conception, a union of the people was to be organised to realise this programme, not only throughout

Germany, but throughout entire Christendom. Princes and nobles were to be invited to join, and should they refuse, the union was to overthrow or kill them, with arms in hand, at the first opportunity. (Engels 2016.)

In a certain way my idea of utopian counter-practice of the here-and-now, as found in this dissertation, reflects these chiliastic ideas. In the last part of this dissertation the chiliastic ideas elaborated here can be found from John Holloway's theory of the crack on which I will build a lot of my own argument about utopian counter-practice. Holloway explicitly states his own theory as apocalyptic. Holloway sees the phenomenon of social revolution in a way that could be called chiliastic. For Holloway revolution is about shedding the time itself and blending with eternity in the here-and-now (Holloway 2010, 236). It can be argued that in Holloway's thought revolution breaks the continuum of Progress, the continuum of History. The revolution means for Holloway the transformation of time. It means the change in the course of time itself.

On the other hand, the same Jewish and Christian eschatologies from which the chiliastic mentality rose offer building blocks for other forms of utopianism as well. For example, the temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment and the idea of revolution associated with it) seems to – at least partially – get its inspiration from Jewish and Christian eschatologies.

Marxist philosopher Richard Gunn (1985) has analyzed the relationship of the concepts of apocalypse and utopia in his essay *'The Only Real Phoenix' Notes on Utopia & Apocalypse*. For the apocalyptical radicals of the early modernity (Müntzer included) the road to earthly happiness goes through revolution. The sense of something extraordinary happening, the sense that the end of times is at hand is typical for apocalyptical thought. The early modernity was the time of rising capitalism and when destroyed the old feudal social relations, it almost literally caused the end of the world for the consciousness raised in the old world. The modern world confronted the start of series of social, technological, and cultural changes which was full of signs of destruction for the feudal-agrarian consciousness. Apocalyptical thought relies heavily on this experience of radical change. Apocalyptic thought believed the old world was coming to an end and new, better world was being born. Apocalypse does not simply mean the end of the world, but also the rising of the new, the rising of the "only Real Phoenix" of the title of Gunn's article. In the midst of the crisis the apocalypse creates a new world.

In Gunn's thought apocalypticism is an emancipatory, revolutionary challenge against the present. In this sense it contains an "anarchistic" impulse. It aims to revolutionize the human world as a whole. According to Gunn (1985, 3-5), the concept of utopia however, refers to a form of thought which aims to organize the physical space of society and set an order to the world. The difference between utopia and apocalypse is defined by Gunn as follows:

[There are two contrasts between utopianism and apocalypticism.] The first is obvious enough: the transparency of utopia is linked to spatial considerations, while the intelligibility of apocalypse depends on a particular interpretation of historical time. Apocalypse is history's last, or second last, act: it retrospectively illuminates the plot of which has unfolded over previous millennia while at the same time deriving its own sense

from the drama which it brings to close. The conception of time implied in by apocalypse is 'linear', although not in the sense of an indefinite quantitative extension because (a) time is characterised by 'closure' in the sense that the plot has a beginning and an end, and (b) the time elapsing between these two points in not homogenous but, rather, structured in terms of a continuously resumed project which can be viewed either as God's or man's. In utopia, time disappears [...]. (ibid, 6.)

The second contrast between utopia and apocalypse is that, according to Gunn, ideal utopian societies are "characterised by rules, regulations and constraint" but the apocalyptical scenario "is regenerative and redemptive" (ibid, 6-7). The temporality and spatiality are now for the first time put into a tense relationship within utopianism. This dichotomy of space and time will be present in utopian thought for the rest of its history. There are however some problems with this distinction between apocalypse and utopia in Gunn's article. If one looks at this distinction from the perspective of Ruth Levitas' definition of utopia (utopia as "desire for a better being") both of them seem very much utopian. Both of them are oriented toward radically different and better states of being. They are both forms of utopian mentality.

The "utopia" Gunn mainly refers to is the classical, blueprint-oriented utopia and apocalypse transforms into a radical revolutionary utopia during the development of modern society. Gunn's "utopia" refers to a specific type of utopia, spatial utopia or utopia of order in contrast to a utopia of freedom – or "apocalypse" in Gunn's terminology. There is no need to put Gunn's "utopia" and apocalypse against each other for they stem from different sources of utopian thought. Apocalyptic – or "chiliastic" – thought has such strong utopian aspects and features within it, and it has influenced utopian thought and movements so heavily, that it would problematic to handle them in totally different categories. In many ways their histories have intertwined.

This intertwining of utopia and apocalypse is especially true in later, temporally oriented utopias of the Enlightenment where the utopia was seen to realize itself after proceeding via a long road of historical progress.[21] As utopian scholar Krishan Kumar has argued, although apocalyptic thought is not identical with utopianism (apocalyptic thought relies heavily on the idea of divine intervention, but in utopianism human reason and human agency have a more important role), apocalyptic, millenarian visions of perfected order on earth have still had remarkable influence on utopianism:

> The vision of a perfected order on earth, one that was predestined and therefore not an empty dream, inspired by countless radical movements in the West and affected Western thought in innumerable ways. It is impossible to say whether or not utopianism would have arisen without millenarianism, but it is certain that it contributed immeasurably to the expressive force of utopia. The imagery of the new heaven and the new earth from Revelations, elaborated by many later writers, insinuated itself into the Western utopia. Later the secularization of the millennium in the idea of progress continued to lend utopia

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[21] There are, however, some crucial differences between Jewish and Christian eschatologies and modern temporal utopianism. As Hayden White (2008, 13-14) writes: "Modernist utopias are temporal – in the way that Christian apocalypse and millennium are temporal – but are material, bodily immanent, and this worldly rather that spiritual, soulful, transcendental and other-worldly, like their Jewish and Christian prototypes".

a dynamism and an emotional force without which its appeal would undoubtedly have been severely diminished. (Kumar 1991, 36.)

Psychoanalyst and Marxist-humanist philosopher Erich Fromm has connected utopia and apocalypse by connecting the temporal utopias of the Enlightenment to Jewish and Christian eschatological traditions. The ancient Greeks understood the concept of history as something that did not have *telos,* an aim towards which it was developing. According to Fromm, history had no purpose for the Greeks but in the Jewish and Christian traditions the purpose of history was characterized by the idea of salvation of man which would take place in the *eschaton*, in "the end of days". According to Fromm (2008, 227) the "symbol for this final salvation was the Messiah; the time itself, the Messianic time".

There are, however, two different concepts of *eschaton.* The first connects the biblical myth of Adam and Eve with the concept of salvation. To put it shortly, the essence of this concept of *eschaton* is that originally man was one with nature. He lived in harmony with nature and there was no conflict nor contradiction between the two. Man did, however, lack "the most essential human trait: that of knowledge of good and evil" (ibid). This is why man was unable to make free decisions and to take responsibility for his decisions. The first act of freedom was the act of making one's own decisions and to disobey the commandments of God. This was also the beginning of human history. "Man is expelled from paradise, he has lost his harmony with nature, he is put on his own feet" (ibid). At this point man is weak and his reason still undeveloped. Man has to develop his reason in order to grow into full humanity and achieve a new harmony with nature, with himself and with other men. "The aim of history is the full birth of man, his full humanization" (ibid). The aim of history is the realization of the hidden potentialities of man. Essentially the same idea can later be found in the temporal utopias of the Enlightenment.

In this first concept of *eschaton* the salvation brings the unity of mankind. All nations will form a single community and the violence among men will stop. According to Fromm, this concept of *eschaton* does not include God's grace (ibid, 228). God does not perform an act of grace but man has to go through many painful errors before he achieves salvation. Man has to sin and take the consequences before he can be saved. God does not solve problems for man – "expect by revealing to him the aims of life" (ibid). Salvation is in the end man's own achievement. He has to realize all the potentials within himself and thereby give birth to his full humanity. At "the end of the days, the new harmony, the new peace will be established, the curse pronounced against Adam and Eve will be repealed, as it were, by man's own unfolding in the historical process" (ibid).

This concept of *eschaton* can be described as an historical-messianic concept of *eschaton*. The other version of this concept, which became predominant in the Christian Church, says that man can never save himself without an act of grace by God. This version of *eschaton* can be found for example in the thought and writings of Augustine of Hippo and it is essentially supernatural in its core because it makes the grace of God the main condition for salvation. Man's own efforts in history do not matter, only God's grace does. Only through the

sacraments of the church, man "becomes a participant in this salvation – and thus obtains the gift of God's grace. The end of history is the second coming of Christ – which is a supernatural and not a historical event" (ibid). This is why this version of the concept of *eschaton* can be described as supernatural rather than historical-messianic.

3.2 Temporality and Modernity

These apocalyptic, eschatological sentiments became stronger in utopian thought during the rise of capitalist modernity. Marxist philosopher Marshall Berman has in his book *All that is solid melts into air* (1988) analysed these changes on the level of modern literature. The title of the book is of course taken from Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels' *Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels claim that the bourgeoisie had revolutionized the whole society by revolutionizing the instruments and the relations of production. This had created a pressure to get rid of all "fixed, fast-frozen" (Marx & Engels 2004) social relations of the feudal society that were considered holy and unchangeable. "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind" (ibid). For Berman, Marx is a modernist writer in the vein of Franz Kafka and T.S. Eliot. Berman sees the *Communist manifesto* as one of the key texts for understanding the modern experience (and with it the modern perception of time). According to Berman, the central drama of the *Manifesto* can be found not only from the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but inside "the author's consciousness over what is really going on and what the larger struggle means" (Berman 1988, 90). He describes this inner conflict as a "tension between Marx's 'solid' and his 'melting' visions of modern life" (ibid).

Marx's descriptions of the devastating power of modernization are not, of course, as such that unique experience. Similar kinds of sentiment about modern life can be found from Hegel too. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977, 6-7) Hegel writes as follows:

> [I]t is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth-there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born-so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world.

For Hegel modernity was a transitional era of human history. The old world was dying and the new, modern world was being born. The first section of Marx's

and Engels' *Manifesto* deals with this process that could in one word be called "modernization". *Manifesto* also deals with the process of industrialization which, Marx believes, will set the stage for revolutionary change in social relations. The description of this stage includes Marx's "solid" vision of core institutions of modernity (Berman 1988, 90-91). Even capitalism in all of its revolutionary power, has to have some relatively solid institutional arrangements. The first new institution of capitalism is the world market:

> Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages (Marx & Engels 2004).

The world market destroys every local and regional market and makes production and consumption (human needs, that is) increasingly cosmopolitan and international. Here Marx and Engels essentially describe the process which has later been called "globalization".

The emergence of the world markets also creates the situation where financial capital is increasingly concentrated into the hands of the few. Independent peasants and artisans are not able to compete with capitalist mass production which is why they are forced to leave their lands and close their workshops.

> The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (Marx & Engels 2004.)

The production becomes more and more rationalized and centralized which also requires (in order for these changes to go smoothly) legal, fiscal and administrative centralization. This creates the pressure for the big cities to become the core areas of capitalism and the rural areas to stay as the periphery of capitalism (see, e.g., Wallerstein 2011). "The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life" (Marx & Engels 2004).

This frantic rhythm of capitalism and the change it causes affects all parts of modern life. According to Berman, the *Manifesto* makes the reader feel this in a very lively manner, the *Manifesto* makes the reader feel the constant onward rush of capitalism which has made the solid social formations and institutions to melt away (Berman 1988, 92). This "melting vision" of the *Manifesto* sees the potential of change in capitalism. The bourgeoisie has shown the world that the

world can be changed, they have shown the world "what man's activity can bring about" (Marx & Engels 2004).

However, this "melting vision" of capitalism needs to be complemented with the "solid vision" of capitalism. The bourgeoisie is the activist class, which has changed the world as much it is the exploiter and the establisher of the new hierarchies. "The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones" (ibid). The bourgeoisie has obstructed the development of society by excluding the majority of mankind from the riches it has created. Capitalism has not fulfilled its promises. Communism, as Marx and Engels understand it, however, will actualize all the potentials that capitalism could not actualize. Communism is the fulfilment of modernity. Capitalism is only a transitory phase in history, and it will end when communism emerges.

As *Manifesto* shows, the role of the bourgeoisie is important for revolutionary thought. The bourgeoisie showed mankind that revolution could have world-improving results and that the world in itself was changeable. Mankind could now dictate the outcomes of its own history. According to Marxist theoretician Guy Debord, the transformation of time with the rise of the bourgeoisie was "the victory of a *profoundly historical* time" (Debord 2014, 77). The rise of the bourgeoisie marked the transformation of the cyclical time of the agricultural economy into "the irreversible time of the bourgeoisie" where history was not just a chronology of "individual members of the ruling class" but "a general movement – a relentless movement that crushes any individuals in its path" (ibid, 77-78).

This transformation of time-consciousness applies also to the development of utopian thought. Classical utopias invited us to take a journey to an imagined better place. They created a rupture, a break between the historical reality and the reality of the imagined society. Classical utopias tended to reject their past and to eliminate "the idea of future from their horizon" (Vieira 2010, 9). The idea of progress was not present in the works of More or Campanella. Although for example in More's *Utopia* the island of Utopia has a fictious past (see, e.g., More 2003, 46), it does not seem to include any historical dynamics that would further the real historical space (England) towards the desired place of Utopia. It only weakly interacts with the historical processes outside of itself. The island of Utopia exists outside of the real tendencies of historical development. Classical utopias were frozen blueprints that could only criticize the present but they did not, as Vieira (2010, 9) puts it, "open new paths to the future". This lack of futurity and further development makes them seem static and closed finalities.

In comparison, the new temporal utopias of rising capitalism saw utopias the realization of the potentials hidden in the present. The new temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment projected utopian wishes into the future and this way implied "a change in the very nature of utopia" (Vieira 2010, 9). Utopias became "euchronias", good places in the future, and expressed the optimistic mentality so common in Europe in the age of the Enlightenment:

In the Renaissance, man discovered that there were alternative options to the society he lived in, became aware of the infinite powers of reason and understood that the construction of the future was in his hands. In the Enlightenment, man discovered that reason could enable him not only to have a happy life but also to reach human perfection. More's Utopia is the result of the discovery that occurred in the Renaissance; euchronia is the product of the new logic of the Enlightenment. (ibid.)

By favoring the notion of time and projecting their visions of the ideal society in the future, temporal utopias developed an historical dimension to utopian thought. History was seen as a process of improvement where the ideal society always stayed on the horizon, but could not ever be fully achieved. Utopias were now just "one of the rings in the chain of progress" (ibid, 10). Progress realized the imagined societies and brought utopias closer to historical reality the utopian thinkers experienced. By projecting the ideal society in the future, the utopian discourse expressed a logic in which certain (political) actions were necessary in order to make the imagined society come true. "In this way, utopias became dynamic, and promoted the idea that man had a role to fulfil" (ibid). Utopias were no longer just counter-images of the present. Now they were potentialities that could be actualized in the future. Now the present was pregnant with the future utopia. What this essentially meant was the metamorphosis of utopia into the philosophy of history (see, e.g., Koselleck 2002, 85).

3.3   The Idea of Progress

One of the first temporally oriented literary utopias ("euchronias") was Louis-Sébastien Mercier's (1740-1814) 1770 novel *L'An 2440* ("The Year 2440") in which the utopia was for the first time situated in a concrete and existing place, Paris. For the first time utopia was not situated in some exotic, isolated and static island but in the future of a real historical place. Mercier's utopia was not without connection to everyday life (Forsström 2002, 208). Mercier was one of the first one to bring utopias to history and therefore also creating the hope that utopias could someday become realized. For Mercier, utopia existed as a potential to be, through slow progress, realized one day in the future. This is how utopia became connected to the concept of progress. Utopia was for Mercier an ideal projected, in the future, and mankind was marching towards it.

The story of Mercier's *L'An 2440* is simple: in 1768 the Parisian protagonist of the novel has a conversation about the state France is in with an Englishman. The protagonist tries to argue that conditions in France had been improving. When discussion ended, the protagonist falls into deep sleep, from which he wakes up 672 years later, in the year 2440 where the protagonist finds everything to be improved in the earlier so gloomy, impolite, and chaotic city (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 459).

The "awakened sleeper" -trope of *L'An 2440* - which has since been imitated by variety of utopian writers from Edward Bellamy (1888) to H.G. Wells (1899) - makes it possible for Mercier to create distance in time rather than in space.

Mercier's protagonist opens his eyes to the fulfilment of promises made almost 700 years earlier. This perspective of time on utopia supposes that the potential for utopia to become actualized had already been present in the past, that it only needed time to become fully realized. This was an important moment in the history of utopias. Utopias had now become part of history.

> Inherent in this projection of utopia into the future, and aiding the process of convergence of the utopian discourse with the historical reality, was a change at the spatial level, at which Mercier's utopia operated: it no longer made sense, at a time when the utopist believed that his ideals could be rendered concrete with the help of time, to place the imaginary society on a remote island or in an unknown, inaccessible place. Man's trust in his intellectual capacities was thus stretched to the social possibilities of his country, and it was there that utopia was now to be located. Furthermore, as historical progress was believed to be inevitable, it affected not only the utopist's country, but all nations. The utopian project thus took on a universal dimension. (Vieira 2010, 11.)

Utopias were no longer just abstract counter-images set outside of history. Utopias were now achievable historical goals. Whereas the classical utopias of More, Campanella and Bacon were characterized by the difference between the present space that the writers' occupied and the imaginary counter-image of it, the imaginary space created by the utopian writer, modern temporal utopias were characterized by distance in time between the present and the desired future utopian society. Next I will elaborate on three thinkers that I consider to be examples of this kind of modern, temporal form of utopianism.

Turgot: Novelty and Innovation

New temporal utopias anticipated a better world to come in the future. They believed deeply in civilizational progress which would eventually bring a utopia to life. The first important version of the ideology of progress was presented by Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781), French economist and politician. Turgot's theory of progress was based on the sensationalist theory of knowledge. According to this theory, man's capability of receiving impressions from the outside world, combine them and reflect upon them was the basis for indefinite progression in human knowledge and culture. The accumulation of experience over time created the possibilities for a limitless expansion of the human mind. In the primordial stages of human development the motives of human beings are almost entirely based on passions. Rational reflection was almost non-existent in early man. He is "goaded into action by their pains and their pleasures, their lusts and their necessities, their hunger, their thirst for power and conquest" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 464). Only the Enlightenment in the latter days of human history will increase reflection in man. Only the rational forces of man will begin to guide history.

The primordial man first associated sensations and images of objects and learned to give names to those which were of the same kind. Not only were there individual trees, but there was also now the idea of a tree. In other words, man has the capability of abstraction. "Ideas, being the indicators of the existence of external objects, do not represent them at all exactly; from a distance an oak looks

like an elm, and thus arises the idea of *a tree*—not because I have the idea of a tree which is neither an oak nor an elm, but because I have an idea which informs me of the existence of a tree without telling me whether it is the one or the other. This is the origin of abstraction" (Turgot 2011b, 374). Little by little these abstractions, ideas, created an infinite assemblage of ideas. "Time [...] has multiplied ideas to infinity" (ibid, 376). However, at some point of human development, the network – or assemblage – of ideas man has created from the sensations he has will become the only thing he knows anymore. The ideas will become his blindfold. He becomes unable to doubt the truth of these ideas. Ideas now form an abstract labyrinth of metaphysical confusion from which man needs to escape. "From this in all ages there has arisen the obscurity of logic and metaphysics; from this have arisen arbitrary definitions and divisions" (Turgot 2011b, 377).

The main problem of Turgot's theory is how does this leap to rational reflection happen at all if primordial man is primarily guided by his sensations, his pleasures and pains? How could primordial man ever achieve Reason? This is possible because man does not only desire his wants and needs to be fulfilled. He does not just want safe routines, but he wants changes too. According to Turgot, man has the instinct to innovate, to create new things in the world. Man desires change and detachment from "the rut of sameness" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 464). Turgot thinks that human civilization aims, through the operation of institutions, to keep man in the sameness, in routine, but the innovative nature of man has always fought against this. According to Turgot, world history can be described as a war between man's desire for routine and safety and man's desire for change and novelty, the desire for innovation.

However, not every man desires true innovation as much as another. The geniuses, who are the true innovators, can be found equally among all peoples: barbarous and civilized alike. "Genius is spread through the human race very much as gold is in a mine. The more ore you take, the more metal you will get. The more men there are, the more great men you will have, or the more men capable of becoming great" (Turgot 2011b, 378). "Nature, while distributing genius to only a few individuals, has nevertheless spread it out almost equally over the whole mass, and with time its effects become appreciable" (Turgot 2011a, 325). However, for the geniuses to blossom, the social and historical circumstances need to be just right. According to Turgot, if Newton had not seen his sixteenth birthday, humanity would still perhaps be living in much more ignorant world. If it wasn't for the geniuses, the would be no innovation and therefore no progression.

The idea of innovation is the basic concept of Turgot's view of human history. The traditional society had accepted the changeless being as the greatest good. The millenarians like Thomas Müntzer, who had been promising radical, eschatological change in society, were seen as dangerous agents by the rulers of their society and the church. "With an acute sense of self-preservation institutionalized religions have always fought the millenarians" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 465). In the context of millenarian movements, the millenarians represented the innovative desire of mankind and the institutions of traditional

society the desire for routine in mankind. Innovators within mankind represent the progression of world history. They represent the future; whereas the institutions upholding the routines represent the inevitably disappearing past. However, novelty, innovation in Turgot's thought does not mean that anything lasting could not be created. The new configurations created by the innovative desire of man were not just replacements of the old configurations. Instead, there "was a process of eternal transmission, an ever-growing accumulation, an increasing inheritance, a sort of vast worldly repository of intellectual merit" (ibid, 466). The civilized man was distinguished from primordial man by the complexity and diversity of ideas, experiences, and knowledge – especially knowledge in the field of natural sciences.

Turgot emphasizes novelty and innovation so much, that for him any innovation was desirable – even when it could lead men into something terrible. This was because even those unfortunate new innovations caused new experiences and that way provoked man to learn something new. "It was preferable to allow men to wander into dangerous pathways and break their legs rather than to limit experience and to promote the false belief that perfection had already been attained" (ibid, 467). To make errors was for Turgot a right – almost a duty. Repetition, routine should be disrupted any way possible since disruption meant progression for Turgot. "It is not error that opposes so much the progress of truth; it is indolence, obstinacy, the spirit of routine, everything that favors inaction" (Turgot 2011c, 509).

In Turgot's thought progression is divided into four subsidiary progressions according to different areas of human creativity: speculative science, technology, moral behavior, and artistic expression. Each of these progressions have a different pattern of growth, which is why their development is also uneven. Different conditions contribute to different progressions. Of all the progressions, the technological progression has the toughest structure since it is almost impossible to totally destroy all technology in human civilization. And because almost everyone uses some kind of technology to fulfil his or her everyday needs, the chance of novelty is much greater than in other progressions. "As a consequence, technological discoveries had accumulated throughout history at a relatively even tempo" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 477). Turgot saw the force of technological progression as so great that he even saw progression of speculative science as secondary progression compared to it. The progressions in modern science were not generally speaking possible without inventions such as maritime instruments, the magnifying glass, and the art of printing. (ibid, 467-477.)

The progression of artistic expression is according to Turgot the most sensitive for political and cultural changes. What is considered "good taste" in art can easily be corrupted by bizarre notions of beauty prevailing in society. "Of all forms of human expression, art was the most vulnerable to the influence of a hostile environment" (ibid, 477). "Great men in the fields of eloquence and poetry have the same immortality, and in a way a still more lasting one, because their works are perpetuated and multiplied by means of copies. Their progress

depends on languages, on circumstances, on manners, and on the chance which causes several great geniuses to arise in a nation" (Turgot 2011b, 398).

The main difference however between artistic and speculative scientific progressions is that the knowledge in fine arts is not cumulative. This is why even speaking of "artistic progression" is questionable in Turgot's conceptual framework. Bad taste could prevail even when for example technological progressions were made in engineering. Turgot consider the Gothic cathedral an example of this – which is why it was considered a hideous monstrosity by many in the 18th century. The Gothic cathedral was a technological marvel but an artistic disaster. The lack of appreciation of artistic expression in Turgot's thought was caused by the fact that he had no developed conception of high, serious art. While he saw the role of technology and speculative science in progression of mankind, art aimed only to please the senses. The senses, because of their biological origins, restricted what could please us. And according to Turgot, the perfection of what could please the senses was already achieved. There was no more progression left in the progression of artistic expression. (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 477-478.)

The fourth and last progression in Turgot's theory is the progression of moral behavior. Moral overall implied for Turgot fixed criteria, the generally accepted ideals of his time. This morality was a combination of stoicism, some form of early utilitarianism and the Christian values of love and charity. Moral progress meant for Turgot the extensions of virtues to all strata of society and the end of war, cruelty, and crime. The moral future of mankind could be described as tolerant, compassionate, and obedient to reason which meant acceptance of law out of rational conviction, and not out of fear of the torments of hell as in traditional Christianity. If men acted solely on grounds of utility and reason, if they extended free inquiry and assimilated its scientific findings into the practical sphere of everyday action, then they were progressing. To the degree that man became mild, gentle, loving, tranquil, his moral behavior was improving" (ibid, 478). Turgot believed that Europe of his own time was already highly progressive: "Men who are taught by experience become more and more humane; and it would appear that in recent times generosity, the virtues, and the tender affections, which are continually spreading, at any rate in Europe, are diminishing the dominion of vengeance and national hatreds" (Turgot 2011b, 357).

From these four progressions it is possible to see, that for Turgot, the main progressions he was most interested in were the speculative scientific and technological progressions. He saw them as the main motors of history. There are, however, two dimensions for Turgot's conception of progress which have not yet been highlighted. The first dimension of progress is intensive or vertical and the second dimension is extensive or horizontal. The intensive-vertical dimension refers to the additions of units of scientific truth in time. It refers to the amount of factual knowledge that has been scientifically gathered. The second, extensive-horizontal dimension of progress refers to the sowing of scientific truths throughout the world, so that everyone can learn the truth. The

strengthening of this dimension became possible because of the development of communications networks. This strengthening also accelerated both speculative scientific and technological progressions and made possible for a variety of new ideas to become available more easily. This also meant that Europe – where the speculative scientific progress was the most advanced – had the duty to "civilize" the world. As Manuel & Manuel (1979, 480) write: Turgot's "belief that eighteenth-century Europeans were in manifest control of the savage world and had only to disseminate their teachings to eradicate the last remnants of the historic dread of barbarian invasions which hung over them".

The concept of progress had for Turgot not only philosophical, but also a theological – or even theodicean – meaning: progress would in time eradicate the evil passions and dangerous irrationalism from the world. According to Manuel & Manuel, like for example for Saint-Simon, Comte, and Condorcet later, the theory of progress was for Turgot a fervent attempt "to solve the theodicy problem and to give meaning to historical experience once the sanctions of future rewards and punishments were removed" (ibid, 483). The wars, violence and the aggressive, evil passion of man were all justified because without them "there would have been no progress in the early stages of history and man would have been doomed to peace and mediocrity" (ibid). Turgot (2011b, 356-357) writes:

> Reason, which is justice itself, would not have taken away from anyone what belonged to him, would have banished wars and usurpations for ever, and would have left men divided up into a host of nations separated from one another and speaking different languages. As a result the human race, limited in its ideas, incapable of that progress in all kinds of understanding, and in the sciences, arts, and government, which takes its rise from the collective genius of different regions, would have remained for ever in a state of mediocrity. Reason and justice, if they had been more attended to, would have immobilized everything, as has virtually happened in China. But what is never perfect ought never to be entirely immobilized. The passions, tumultuous and dangerous as they are, became a mainspring of action and consequently of progress; everything which draws men away from their present condition, and everything which puts varied scenes before their eyes, extends the scope of their ideas, enlightens them, stimulates them, and in the long run leads them to the good and the true, toward which they are drawn by their natural bent. It is like the wheat which is shaken over and over again in a winnowing-basket, and which under its own weight always falls more and more purified of the light chaff which was debasing it.

The evil passions of man are in the larger picture just part of how true progress happens. Although the wickedness of man was not willed by God, it was nevertheless utilized by progress. The evil that men do is not permitted and men should be held responsible for what they have done, but still the outcome of those wicked acts can create opportunities for progress to advance. "And they thereby unwittingly achieved a divine purpose" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 483). Vice becomes a part of progress and progress in itself becomes a part of Christian apologetics. Individual vices can now generate historical forces that lead to a better world. This kind of theodicy can later be found for example from the philosophies of Kant and Hegel which in this sense can be seen as followers of Turgot. However, the most famous of Turgot's followers was the Marquis de Condorcet whose ideas of progress have had a great impact on temporal utopian thought.

Condorcet: Progress and Utopia

Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1740-1794) was a friend of Turgot and he too can be seen as an important developer of the concept of progress. It was in the form of Condorcet's *Outlines of an Historical View of the Human Mind* (2011) in which the occidental world learned the idea of progress. Cordorcet's book aims to present the mechanics of secular history. It aims to show that:

> no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. The course of this progress may doubtless be more or less rapid, but it can never be retrograde; at least while the earth retains its situation in the system of the universe, and the laws of this system shall neither effect upon the globe a general overthrow, nor introduce such changes as would no longer permit the human race to preserve and exercise therein the same faculties, and find the same resources. (Condorcet 2011, 10.)

According to Condorcet, in the progression of human civilization there are ten distinct epochs or stages. The most utopian element in Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique de l'esprit humain* (2011) is the final, the tenth epoch which he sets in the future. The progress will, according to Condorcet, continue and mankind will become more and more enlightened. There are three things in the future we can hope for: "the destruction of inequality between different nations; the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and lastly, the real improvement of man" (ibid, 119). Mankind will emancipate itself from its chains, it will release itself from "the dominion of chance" (ibid, 137) and defeat the enemies of progress. Even in the darkest of times, mankind "unites himself in imagination with man restored to his rights, delivered from oppression, and proceeding with rapid strides in the path of happiness" (ibid). This idea is "the asylum into which he retires, and to which the memory of his persecutors cannot follow him" (ibid).

Along with Turgot, Condorcet is one of the main thinkers to formulate the idea of progress, which in the course history became associated with the concept of utopia as well. Utopia became intertwined with a philosophy of history. Utopia was now the formal end of human progression, which can never be achieved totally, but which humanity can approximate. Humanity can come closer and closer to utopia, yet it can never say that it has achieved it. Karl Mannheim has in his *Ideology and Utopia* labelled this kind of progressivist utopianism as "liberal-humanitarian utopia" (Mannheim 1979, 197).

Like the utopias of classical utopianism, the vision of a better world of progressivists arose out of conflict with the existing order. However, whereas classical utopias were primarily counter-images of the societies they were created in or blueprints of societies deemed perfect, progressivist utopias were more like "ideas" – or "measuring rods", as Mannheim describes them - against which one could measure reality. Progressivist utopias were not blueprints, but ideas. The

concept of idea is here crucial. It is not the concept of idea from platonic tradition. In the progressivist tradition of utopianism the concept of idea was "conceived of as a formal goal projected into the infinite future whose function it is to act as a mere regulative device in mundane affairs" (ibid).

The progressivist utopianism was based on the bourgeois ideal of reason set up as a goal. This goal was contrasted with the existing state of affairs. This rational goal showed, for the progressive utopian, there is a gap to be bridged between the imperfections of the things as they occurred in nature and the ideals formulated by reason. Progress was essentially just the process of the bridging of this gap. "This reconciliation of norms with the existing state of things succeeded through the belief that reality moves continually towards an ever closer approximation to the rational" (ibid, 200).

Kant: Utopia and Philosophy of History

According to Mannheim, the standard form of this idea was given by Condorcet, but there were also German influences that helped to formulate progressivist utopianism. The pietistic tradition, transplanted from Holland to Germany, in which the chiliast ideas of apocalypse were transformed from revolutionary visions of the end of the world into an evolutionary metanarrative was one. Pietists believed that God's creation of the world extended from the beginning to the end of times. God would not be finished with creating the world until the apocalypse. As Mannheim states, the apocalyptical "here-and-now" of the chiliast tradition was in progressivist utopianism transformed into an ongoing process. The idea of progress brings to utopianism the idea of the realization of utopia in the future. Utopia becomes increasingly intertwined with the process of historical becoming. (ibid, 200-201.)

This progressivist utopianism can be seen especially well in Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) philosophy of history. The history of the world and human species is perceived by Kant as a gradual progression from irrationality to rationality, from barbarism to the Enlightenment. What is new in Kant's vision of history is that for Kant this progression to utopia is not a straightforward march from beginning to the fulfilled end but a messy and contradictory road driven by what Kant calls man's "unsocial sociability". History progresses through contradictions, rationality develops through irrationality and reason is created by unreason. Progress happens through the unintended consequences of the actions of men.

The progressivist utopia of Immanuel Kant can be found from four of his texts: "Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784), "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784), "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795) and "The Conflict of the Faculties" (1798). Kant can be seen as one of the most important thinkers of the age of Enlightenment. He sees the process of enlightenment creating a path toward an enlightened age. According to Kant, humanity is not yet living in an enlightened era, but it is steadily arriving there (Kant 1996b, 58). Mankind is not in the present fully enlightened but in the future it will be. In the present humanity lives in the time

of self-inflicted immaturity. This immaturity, however, is not caused by humanity's lack of understanding, but the lack of courage to use understanding, lack of courage to think for ourselves "without the guidance of another" (ibid, 54). The motto of the Enlightenment therefore is "*Sapere aude!*", "Have the courage to use your own understanding!".

For Kant human beings are not yet fully autonomous and mature, but they will be in the future. For him humans, as a species, require historical development to rise above the immature and unenlightened state they are in. According to Kant (1996a, 41), world history can be seen as manifestations of human will or as a series of human actions. History narrates these manifestations and permits humanity to hope that, when examining the free exercise of human will on a large scale, it will find some progression in them. History allows humanity to find progression in humanity in the seemingly complex and chaotic actions of individuals. From the standpoint of the human race as a whole, the chaotic and seemingly irrational actions of an individual can be seen as rational and progressive. What is irrational for the individual, may be rational for humanity as a whole.

Here Kant expresses essentially the idea similar to what Hegel (1975, 89) described as the cunning of reason in history, Adam Smith (2003, 527) as the invisible hand of the markets and Bernard de Mandeville (1988) as public benefits caused by private vices. Because men do not act according to any general, prearranged plan, it would seem that there is no law governing the course of history. The history of mankind does not have any conscious, rational purpose of its own. But, according to Kant (1996a, 42), there is a purpose in nature behind the "senseless course of human events". The plan of history, the purpose in nature is working behind the backs of individuals and slowly guiding man to a certain civilizational goal.

Kant claims that "[a] philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself" (ibid, 51). Kant admits that it may seem strange to write a history in accordance with some rational idea of how the course of the world should be, if it is to lead certain rational ends. Nevertheless, Kant claims that if one assumes that nature works according to a plan, this rational idea of the course of the world can still prove useful – at least in broad outlines. If this rational idea of a plan of nature is assumed, there will be grounds for a consoling view of the future. "For such a plan opens up the comforting prospect of a future in which we are shown from afar how the human race eventually works its way upward to a situation in which all the germs implanted by nature can be developed fully, and in which man's destiny can be fulfilled here on earth" (ibid, 52-53).

Kant's philosophy of history is important both as an example of Enlightenment thought, but also as an example of the new temporal utopianism created during the rising capitalism and modernity of his time. As I have shown in the chapter on apocalyptic thought and its influence on utopianism, the influence of the Jewish and Christian ideas of *eschaton* can also be found in that

kind of temporal utopia of the Enlightenment. According to Erich Fromm (2008, 228), the tradition embracing the idea of *eschaton* has continued in that part of the Western world in which the Catholic Church had remained dominant. In other parts of Europe and America where Catholicism has not had that great of an influence, theological thinking has lost its vitality. According to Fromm, although the age of Enlightenment was characterized by its fierce fight against the Church and clericalism and also by skepticism towards religion altogether (even atheism), the religious enthusiasm of eschatological thought did not disappear, "especially as far as the meaning and purpose of history was concerned. In the name of reason and happiness, of human dignity and freedom, the Messianic idea found a new expression" (ibid).

One of the most important developments in temporal utopianism was the development of the concept of revolution during early modernity. Revolution was originally associated with natural sciences and the cycle of the stars but later it got new, more future-oriented content. Progress was seen as a series of revolutions, which would bring new kinds of social forms into existence. The element of novelty is inherent in all revolutions (see, e.g., Arendt 1990, 27). Especially the French Revolution can be seen as a first great watershed in the transformation of the concept of utopia into its temporal form. As utopian scholar Gregory Claeys (2016, 19) has written, the French Revolution indicated that crucial trend towards seeing utopian aims as realizable imminently in a future-to-come: "Utopia now became *euchronia*, the good time which is not yet but upon which we are advancing. The modern concept of progress, an indefinite process of becoming better and more perfect […], had emerged. Now we would remake mankind, not in the image of Original sin, but in that of millenarian felicity".

The tradition of utopian socialism is no doubt one of the more important branches of what has been here called "temporal utopianism". All of them saw history as progression towards better world. In their writings there is a clear metanarrative of progress and perfectibility of mankind. However, there is another side to utopian socialists as well. In addition to being temporally oriented, they are also known for their experimental communities. In them we can find attempts to realize utopia in the here-and-now. This way they on a certain level prefigure what in this dissertation are called "utopian counter-logical social practices". Because I want to emphasize this experimental side of utopian socialists, I will explore them in the last chapter of this dissertation.

3.4   The Concept of Revolution

Although it has been argued that something similar to the idea of revolution can be found from such Greek thinkers as Plato, Polybius and Aristotle the concept of revolution itself is usually seen as modern at its core (Jakonen 2013, 134-135). The concept was originally derived from modern natural sciences and its study of the cycle of the stars. The pathbreaking work by Copernicus was published in a book titled *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*, "The Circular Movement of

Celestial Bodies" where the word "revolutionibus" refers to the circular movement. In the same way that stars and other celestial bodies run their course in a circular manner independently of the men on earth while still affecting their lives, the same way political revolutions "take place above heads of their participants, but those concerned [...] remain imprisoned in their laws" (Koselleck 2004, 46).

Later in the work of Thomas Hobbes the idea of "return" became stronger in the concept of *re*-volution. Hobbes knew the astronomical connotations of the word but the idea it contained could be found from the political sphere too. Hobbes, however, uses the word "revolution" in the political sense only once in his *The Elements of Law* and *Leviathan.* In *De Cive* the word is not even mentioned. At other times Hobbes uses the word "revolution" as it is used in its astronomical sense. Instead of using the word "revolution", Hobbes uses terms such as "rebellion", "sedition" and "tumult" to describe an action against the sovereign power (Jakonen 2013, 141-142). For Hobbes, political revolution meant the circulation of sovereign power: the change of power structure would through certain phases eventually come back to the starting point. "He saw a circular movement, leading from the absolute monarch via the Long Parliament to the Rump Parliament, then to Cromwell's dictatorship, and back via oligarchic intermediary forms to the renewal of monarchy under Charles II" (Koselleck 2004, 46). The same way that the celestial bodies would, after every cycle, come back to where they started, so would sovereign power.

This naturalistic and transhistorical concept of revolution would later change into more political one. From the early 18th century on, "revolution" referred to sudden upheavals and change of power relations of society. This would have been called "civil war" earlier in history, but during the Enlightenment era thinkers started to use the word "revolution" instead. This was essentially due to the revolution in England where the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was accomplished virtually without the spilling of blood (ibid, 48-49). This made it possible to create a distance between revolution and the terrors of civil war. And should "it come to the spilling of blood, then the example of the American independence movement appeared to guarantee a happy conclusion" (ibid, 49).

That the 18th century was going to be a century of revolution was not left unnoticed by European intellectuals of the time. Leibniz (1996, 462), for example, had indicated the coming "universal revolution" in Europe. According to Koselleck, Rousseau thought that Europe was "approaching the condition of crisis, and the century of revolutions" (Koselleck 2004, 49). What kind of society would become after the revolution was, however, still an unknown. The revolution created a new horizon of expectation. From this point on, there was no returning to the given conditions. The task of politics became the mastery and recognition of this still obscure future. The French Revolution in 1789 was the event that opened the future for Europe.

The revolution of 1789 had a long-lasting impact on the conceptual field of revolution. Koselleck has identified seven common attributes in the ways the

concept of revolution was used after 1789 (ibid, 50-57). The first insight Koselleck makes is that from this point on, revolution was understood as a metahistorical concept, completely separated from its naturalistic origin. The concept was condensed to a "collective singular". Collective singular refers here to the fact that the concept of revolution was used to describe the process of total and radical change of the world. The same way the German concept of *Geschichte* described history in its pure and simple form that "contained within itself the possibilities of all individual histories, Revolution congealed into a collective singular which appeared to unite within itself the course of all individual revolutions" (ibid, 50).

After 1789 the concept of revolution assumes a transcendental significance. It becomes a regulative principle of both knowledge and action of all those yearning for change. It becomes the regulative idea of all-encompassing and total change of things. "From this time on, the revolutionary process, and a consciousness which is both conditioned by it and reciprocally affects it, belong inseparably together" (ibid). This metahistorical background creates the basis for a modern notion of revolution.

The second attribute of the modern concept of revolution is the experience of acceleration. The experience of a rising bourgeois society radically altering the old social order and the melting away of all that is solid, as described by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* was already a very real experience. According to Koselleck, one can find an unconscious secularization of eschatological expectation in this experience (ibid). The modern conception of revolution was already influenced by Christian theological eschatology in the rectilinear conception of time, which implied a uniqueness of events and novelty (Arendt 1990, 27). This conception of history and rectilinear time, however, was now strengthened by the accelerating tempo of capitalist modernity.

The third attribute of the modern notion of revolution can be found from the descriptions of what it meant to be a revolutionary movement in and after 1789. According to Koselleck, the concept of revolution grasped even the state (Koselleck 2004, 51). This makes it understandable that the neologism *contrerévolutionnaire* "counter-revolutionary" was translated into German as *Staatsfeind*, "the enemy of the state". The state had the central role in the way the concept of revolution was used. The idea was that whoever considered himself a revolutionary, had to respect the state – and the other way around too: he who respected that state, had to be a revolutionary. It was not a question of getting rid of the state, but of transforming it whether in a bloody or a peaceful fashion: either through revolution from above or below. The concept of "reform" developed at this time to describe a version of revolution. It was not an alternative to revolution, but a peaceful revolution from below. Both concepts of revolution and reform were converged. This convergence, "while often severely strained by political polemic, was in essence contained within a general impulse to plan the social future" (ibid).

The fourth attribute of the modern notion of revolution is that revolution not only changed the prospects of the future, but it also changed the view of the past. The concept of revolution was transformed into an historical and

philosophical concept in which time moved in a constant and steady direction from the past to the future. "According to interest and situation, one could identify oneself with one or the other stages of the last revolution, and in this way draw conclusions for the future" (ibid). Revolution was, however, just one possible historico-philosophical perspective with prognostic orientation: evolution too became one of these perspectives. Revolution and evolution are both antitheses to each other but also partisan concepts: "their similar usage denotes the general expansion of a movement for social emancipation driven by industrialization" (ibid).

The fifth attribute of the modern revolution is the transition from political to social revolution. According to Koselleck, it is of course obvious that all political unrest involves social elements (ibid, 52). But what is new in the modern notion of revolution is the idea that the purpose of a political revolution should be transformation of the social structure, the social emancipation of all men. According to Koselleck, the sixth feature of the modern concept of revolution arises directly from this transition (ibid). If the declarations of American, French, and Russian revolutions are taken seriously, their "achievements" were intended to be to the advantage of all mankind: the modern concept of revolution always spatially implies world revolution and temporally it implies the permanence of their achievements until their objective is reached completely. "If the earth is to be revolutionized in its entirety, it necessarily follows that the revolution must last until the time this goal is achieved [...] the history of the future will be the history of the revolution" (ibid, 53).

The end of revolutionary process promised utopia. However, at the same time the modern concept of revolution understands itself as permanent. Revolution is a permanent process which is always arriving at utopia, yet it never completely does. One way to describe this modern connection of utopia and revolution can be described by H.G. Wells' concept "kinetic utopia". According to Wells, the so-called "modern utopia" differs from the utopias that were written before Darwin in that the modern utopia is not static and perfect, but "kinetic" and imperfect (but potentially perfectible). It is a part of long human evolution: after one utopia the next utopia will come. According to Wells (1905, 8), the modern utopia "must shape not as a permanent state but as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages". Utopia was for Wells a process of ethical evolution that did not have an end state (Partington 2000). This kind of dynamic (or "kinetic") notion of utopia can be also found from the writers of the socialist Fabian Society of which Wells' was once a member (see, e.g., Hyde 1956). For example, in a collection of essays edited by George Bernard Shaw, one of the most famous Fabians, Sidney Webb (1891, 5), describes the evolution of utopias or "ideal societies" in modern times as follows: "[Previously, the ideal society] was represented as in perfectly balanced equilibrium, without need or possibility of future organic alteration. [...] Owing mainly to the efforts of Comte, Darwin, and Herbert Spencer, we can no longer think of the ideal society as an unchanging State. The social ideal from being static has become dynamic". Utopia in its dynamic form is utopia in a process of becoming.

There are two ways of interpreting the nature of this process. The first one can be called "gradualist" since it emphasizes the continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary societies. The nature of this understanding of the concept of revolution can also be described as bourgeois understanding of revolution since it was a very common view among bourgeois thinkers. As Karl Korsch (2016, 31) has written: even the most progressive bourgeois thinkers "set their hopes on the slow and gradual process of so-called 'evolution'".

The second possible way to understand the concept of revolution on the other hand can be called Marxist since it has its basis in the writings of Karl Marx. According to Korsch, what differentiates Marxist view on revolution from the bourgeois understanding is that although Marx agrees with the evolutionary side of the concept of revolution, he also emphasizes the discontinuous relation between the pre- and post-revolutionary societies (ibid; see also Marx 1977, 21). Korsch elaborates on the differences between the bourgeois and the Marxist view on the concept of revolution:

> Even the most violent and disruptive revolution remains, according to Marx, a mere step within an historical process through which the productive forces of man, and thus also the whole economic, political, and ideological structure of society, 'evolve' in a solemn and gigantic rhythm from revolution to revolution. Just as there is – in spite of all the intervening revolutions, and, in fact, realised by those revolutions – one progressive line of development leading up from the historic and 'prehistoric' past to the contemporary form of bourgeois society, so will the socialist and communist society springing from the revolutionary action of the proletarian class, in spite of its break with the established bourgeois order, still remain a further outgrowth of the whole past and present history of an identical 'subject' (mankind) acting upon and adapting itself to an identical 'object' (nature). (ibid.)

This elaboration on the differences between two possible understandings on the concept of revolution guides us to the seventh feature of the modern notion of revolution which is that although revolution has been presented as a metahistorical category, it can also be understood as action, as *praxis*. The German noun denoting action, *Revolutionierung,* and the verb associated with it, *revolutionieren*, express this idea. The concept associated with both of these words, *Revolutionär*, on the other hand expresses the idea of "the *duty* of activism, a meaning earlier inconceivable, but which directly heralds the professional revolutionary as a figure molded in the course of the nineteenth century and typified by Lenin" (Koselleck 2004, 54). The conception was that men themselves make revolution by recognizing the future laws of revolution.

The eighth feature of the modern concept of revolution is that it derives its legitimacy from the future prospect of a revolutionized world. Revolution's legitimacy was not derived from tradition, but rather revolutionary legitimacy "became a coefficient of movement, mobilizing history in terms of the prevailing prospect of the future" (ibid, 55). This concept of legitimate revolution appeared at the same time with its contrary, "counter-revolution" which was continually reproduced as the foe of revolution "as a means through which it could be permanent" (ibid, 56). It could be said that, while revolution finds it legitimacy from the future state of things, the future utopia, counter-revolution is illegitimate because its intention is to stop this *summum bonum* becoming realized.

The idea of revolution in "romantic anticapitalism"

There exists, however, an alternative understanding of the concept of revolution which can be found from the writings of Walter Benjamin and especially from his *On the Concept of History* (2005) where Benjamin formulates an idea of revolution which refuses combine the idea of revolution with the simplistic modern concepts of social evolution and progress:

> Social democratic theory, and still more the praxis, was determined by a concept of progress which did not hold to reality, but had a dogmatic claim. Progress, as it was painted in the minds of the social democrats, was once upon a time the progress of humanity itself (not only that of its abilities and knowledges). It was, secondly, something unending (something corresponding to an endless perfectibility of humanity). It counted, thirdly, as something essentially unstoppable (as something self-activating, pursuing a straight or spiral path). Each of these predicates is controversial, and critique could be applied to each of them. This latter must, however, when push comes to shove, go behind all these predicates and direct itself at what they all have in common. The concept of the progress of the human race in history is not to be separated from the concept of its progression through a homogenous and empty time. The critique of the concept of this progress must ground the basis of its critique on the concept of progress itself. (Benjamin 2005.)

According to Michael Löwy, various philosophies of history can be classified by their supposed progressive or conservative, revolutionary, or nostalgic character. Benjamin's conception of history, however, does not fit into these classifications: "He is a revolutionary critic of the philosophy of progress, a Marxist opponent of 'progressivism', a nostalgic who dreams of the future, a Romantic advocate of materialism" (Löwy 2005, 2). For Benjamin, the revolutionary *Jetztzeit* (the here-and-now) is something which explodes out of the continuum of history. Revolution does not happen in the homogenous temporality of *Chronos*. Rather, it is an event that creates a new temporality of its own. It means a radical break from History. Revolution is not about further acceleration of progress but about a qualitative leap from the dimension of progress (ibid, 71; see also Lindroos 1998, 44).

As Löwy writes, Benjamin's revolution is simultaneously oriented towards the future *and* the past: "The communist society of the future is, to a certain degree, the return to primitive communism, to the first form of classless society 'at the dawn of history'" (Löwy 2005, 67). Benjamin's conception of the historical process is cyclical and dialectical rather than simply progressive. For Benjamin, the classless society of the future – "the new Paradise" (ibid) – is the dialectical synthesis of "the whole of humanity's past" (ibid). Here Benjamin can be seen as a representative of what can be called "romantic anticapitalism" (LaCoss 2009) which refers to the a "tradition of protest against exploitative society in the name of values of the past" (Löwy 2009, 99-100).

One of the most noteworthy examples of this kind of "romantic anticapitalism" can be found from William Morris' utopian novel *News from Nowhere* (2004) in which a pastoral utopia is projected into the future where a proletarian revolution has created a socialist society. The function of Morris'

utopia is to criticize Edward Bellamy's utopia *Looking Backward* (1888) which celebrates industrial revolution and is essentially a state socialist utopia. Bellamy's key idea is "the industrial army": every citizen has the duty "to contribute his quota of industrial or intellectual services to the maintenance of the nation" (Bellamy 1888, 86). This duty is in Bellamy's utopia "regarded as so absolutely natural and reasonable that the idea of its being compulsory has ceased to be thought of" (ibid, 87).

In opposition to this celebration of industrialism, Morris celebrates the organic way of life where machines do help to make life easier and shorten the workday but do not control life as such. Bellamy's utopia is too satisfied with modern civilization for Morris' taste:

> In short, a machine-life is the best which Mr Bellamy can imagine for us on all sides; it is not to be wondered at then that his only idea of making labour tolerable is to decrease the amount of it by means of fresh and ever fresh developments of machinery. […] I believe that this will be always so, and the multiplication of machinery will just — multiply machinery; I believe that the ideal of the future does not point to the lessening of men's energy by the reduction of *labour* to a minimum, but rather to the reduction of *pain in labour* to a minimum, so small that it will cease to be a pain; a gain to humanity which can only be dreamed of till men are even more completely equal than Mr Bellamy's utopia would allow them to be. (Morris 1889.)

Morris himself had lots of admiration for pre-modern, more simple societies. Especially the Germanic societies that had survived in the 19th century Iceland were of much inspiration for Morris. In Iceland Morris learned that even though these communities were very poor, they were much more equal than England of the 19th century (Ross 2015, 109). These Germanic communities valued much more for example good craftmanship, personal courage, good health, and closeness to nature than social distinctions or material wealth and luxury (Wilmer 2004, 27). This romanticizing attitude towards the pre-modern can also be seen in Morris' *News from Nowhere* (2004): although Morris' utopia is set in the future, it in many ways orients itself towards the idealized past. It is radical and nostalgic at same time: it is both a temporal utopia and a retrotopia.

In the last chapter of this dissertation I will explore the revolutionary ideas of Marxist theoretician John Holloway that have a lot in common with Walter Benjamin's theory of revolution. According to Holloway, revolution is not something that happens in the future, it is not something that should be waited for. Revolution is for Holloway an interstitial process of refusing to do according to the logic of the existing society and choosing to do otherwise. Revolution does not necessarily have to be understood as something that is planned to be realized in the future. It can also be understood as something that is lived in the immediate present. Revolution is about breaking the socially organized time, breaking the continuity of history, and giving it a new direction altogether. For Holloway revolution is something immanent, something that is lived in the here-and-now, not something that is waited for:

> We create the world that does not yet exist by living it. We simply assert our own world. The organic gardeners of the world do not wait for the revolution to create a less aggressive relation with plants: they do it now. The movement for a free transport system in Oslo does

not lobby the government for a reduction of fares, it simply organizes people not to pay. The critical teacher does not wait for a change in the curriculum to introduce a different concept of learning and teaching: she just does it. Squatters do not wait for the abolition of private property and rents to live in vacant houses: they just do it. Many, many migrants do not wait for the abolition of border controls before crossing from one country to another: they just go. (Holloway 2010, 241.)

3.5 The Concreteness of Utopia

The temporalization of utopias takes utopias from abstract non-places to ground them in the historical process. Utopias are no longer abstract spaces put outside of history (as in classical utopianism), but real possibilities grounded in the potentialities of history itself. However, a temporal utopia does not need to be a formal goal that can be only approximate, as in liberal-humanitarian utopias. A temporal utopia can also be connected to the idea of "the possible transformation of the future of humanity" (de Sá 2012, 27) and through the connection to the concept of possibility it also connects itself to material reality. Utopias are no longer non-places, but materially possible places that have not arrived yet but which could possibly become a reality.

One conceptual distinction should be made here. Temporalization of utopias does not mean that utopias become a form of futurology. Utopias do not just "guess" the way the future is going to unfold. Utopias express the desire for the change for better. To use a conceptualization suggested by anarchist theoretician Murray Bookchin, utopianism differs from futurism in that unlike futurism, utopianism does not just extrapolate the present but it emphasizes the more imaginative dimensions of futurity. "[F]uturism is essentially an extrapolation of the present into the century ahead [...] It does not challenge existing social relationships and institutions, but seeks to adapt them to seemingly new technological imperatives and possibilities – thereby redeeming rather than critiquing them. Futurism, in effect, does not enlarge the future but annihilates it by absorbing it into the present" (Bookchin 2005, 431; See also Bookchin 1980, 275-286).

Utopianism on the other hand does not just focus on the objective processes of history but also expresses a vision of how the world should be, it also desires the world to be in a certain way. It possesses a desire for *Novum*, something radically new and different. It is exactly this tension between utopian desires and the tendencies of the historical reality itself which is in the heart of modern temporal utopianism. This tension can be best expressed by using Ernst Bloch's distinction between abstract and concrete utopias.

For Bloch both, passive acceptance of the facts, and disregarding of the facts are wrong. Flat empiricism and naive fantasizing are both external, abstract attitudes. The difference between them is that flat empiricism leads often to fact-fetishism which stays in the realm of the given (it cannot see that which is not-yet, that which is not now, but what might become), but the naive fantasies can in many ways teach us. Flat empiricism of science "keeps a firm hold on

individual moments of process and anchors them as facts" (Bloch 1986, 222). "Sailing over" the facts on the other hand can make allies with art and artists, it can dream of a better world, but it cannot really change the world. Facts are needed to keep the imagination grounded and realistic. The concept of possibility is needed to combine the fantasies and the facts. The facts need to be taken into account, but they also need to be overcome. Bloch tries to grasp the objective tendencies which restrict our actions with the concept of possibility. Historically developed tendencies determine what is objectively possible. (ibid.)

The logical category of "the possible" is central to Bloch's philosophy. Utopia is for Bloch always *in potentia*. The concrete utopia that facilitates social and political action is the latent potentiality of the world itself. The world is pregnant with utopia. Categorically impossible is something that is *a priori* impossible. That which is categorically impossible cannot become the object of our hopes and dreams and cannot therefore become the foundation of utopia. The essence of utopia is that in utopia the future is already reality today. The future is Not-Yet, it exists only as a potential, but it exists nevertheless. It could be said that in this kind of conception of utopia the future "is not a point that is outside the reality in which we live. It is this reality, it is its supersession" (Les Amis des 4 Millions de Jeunes Travailleurs 2013).

This idea can be clarified with Bloch's idea of theoretical and real possibilities. Theoretical possibility means the possibility of an object which is not yet realizable. It is possible but only theoretically. It is a kind of fantasy, a dream of the object of longing. It does not have sufficient connection to existence and history. The real possibilities on the hand are linked concretely to the hoped for utopia. In Bloch's terminology utopia is not just a theoretical possibility. The utopias also have a real possibility to become realized. Bloch's concept utopia does not just sublimate, but it also presents the tools and means to realize itself. Utopia is the striving towards a real possibility because the Now is always pregnant with the elements of future change. The possibilities do not exist in actuality, but are in reach potentially. The idea of utopia implies the waking and realization of the creative skills of mankind. (Levy 1997, 178.)

Ultimately it is nature that sets the limits to what is possible. The utopias of the future can only be realized within the limits set by nature. In creating a concrete utopia one needs an understanding of the possibilities of both nature and the historical situation. Creating utopias needs mapping and scientific study of the potentials of the objective reality. Bloch distinguishes four layers of the concept of possibility.

The first layer is a pure formal possibility which means the kind of ideas that are neither internally nor logically contradictory. Non-contradictory thought is always in some sense possible. However, its possibility is nothing, but a formal and abstract possibility because it is not in a concrete relationship with reality. A formally possible utopia is nothing but a thought produced by an individual brain. It is only a general negation of reality. It does not describe the means of how to reach that utopia. According to Bloch, classical utopias are mostly formally possible utopias because they do not have the means to realize

themselves. This is why they are doomed to fail. (Bloch 1986, 223-241; Levy 1997, 181-182.)

The second layer of possibility Bloch calls the "factually-objectively Possible" (Bloch 1986, 225). It deals mostly with particular problems and suggests new solutions. It is grounded in reason, but it cannot become a comprehensive program for social change. The formal possibility layer dealt with the logically possible, but the factually-objectively possible layer refers to a partially conditioned possibility. It is only partially conditioned because it does not help to understand the whole of the circumstances. It deals only with isolated problems and solutions. The factually-objective possible deals only with modalities of individual propositions.

The third layer of the possible Bloch calls "The fact-based object-suited Possible". It deals with the possibility of Object. It does not deal with the statements or propositions about the object but with the objective conditions themselves. There are according to Bloch two kinds of conditions: internal and external ones. The fact-based possible is possible even if the other kinds of possibility are not fulfilled. "Thus a blossom can of course let the fruit ripen within it with complete internal conditionality, but if the complete external condition of good weather is missing, then the fruit is still merely possible" (ibid, 232).

The fourth and the last layer of possibility Bloch calls "the objectively-real Possible". It can also be called the "dialectically possible" (Levy 1997, 182). The idea of this kind of possibility is that everything that is possible in the world is hidden in the world and matter itself. And because human beings are also matter and a part of this world too, humans are the realized possibility of everything that has come into being through their own actions. However, humans cannot step outside of the world and act outside the boundaries set by matter itself. Matter gives the conditions wherein humans can act. Matter contains latently all the forms and beings that arise from it. Human beings can realize these latent forms through their actions. According to Bloch, anticipating the future is not possible without a material foundation and without an anticipatory horizon nothing new arises from matter. (Bloch 1986, 235-237.)

The concept of dialectical possibility highlights the dialectical interconnection of the utopia of human emancipation and the utopia that is grounded in material reality. The dialectical possibility highlights the way utopias are conditioned historically and materially. Utopias are ideal possibilities which express the resistance against the prevailing reality. This kind concept of utopia has been developed by Zygmunt Bauman in his 1976 book *Socialism. The Active Utopia*:

> Utopias relativise the present. One cannot be critical about something that is believed to be absolute. By exposing the partiality of current reality, by scanning the field of the possible in which the real occupies merely a tiny plot, utopias pave way for a critical attitude and a critical activity which alone can transform the present predicament of man. The presence of utopia, the ability to think of alternative solutions to the festering problems of the present, may be seen therefore as a necessary condition of historical change. (Bauman 1976, 13.)

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For both Bloch and Bauman utopias are something that can be found as potentials of the present reality. They are not just fantasies out of touch with reality, but visions of potential futures. There will be no social transformation without some kind of vision of what the future would and should look like. Those utopias that can be described as "concrete" are grounded in reality. This concept of concrete utopia has here been taken from Ernst Bloch's philosophy. By concrete utopia Bloch refers to those utopias that are grounded in historical processes, which use scientific research to find the real possibilities for social change in the given historical situation.[22] Bloch's concept of concrete utopia is important when trying to understand the historical groundedness of utopia. Utopias not only relativize the present, but they also aim to transcend the present. They do not just criticize the current society, but they also create a historically grounded political goal. This goal is of course different in different times in history and it should not be understood as the final goal for human development. It is a temporary, grounded, and relational goal which is constructed in order to overcome the present and the problems that plague the existing society.

Utopia is not for Bloch an abstract blueprint for future society, but also a concrete goal for political action. This concrete utopia is something which is grounded in the tendencies of historical movement. History is not for Bloch fully deterministic nor mechanistic, it is not some inevitable march towards socialism and communism but it develops through historical potentialities. The concept of potentiality refers here to an open, unfinished process. For Bloch, history itself is constantly giving birth to something new. The world is an open process where there is always a possibility for something new. The universe is not predetermined for Bloch. Indeterminacy has an important role in Bloch's thinking. However, this indeterminacy does not mean that *everything* is possible. "From a human perspective the open-endedness of processes is both an opportunity and a limitation; the possibility of choice coexists with the hazards of uncertainty" (Geoghegan 1996, 32). Human beings are free to act, but only within certain historically and naturally formed restrictions. Both nature and historically formed society restrict human action.

Here Bloch comes close to Marx who writes in his *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* that: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living" (Marx 2006, 15). The historical situation sets limits on what can be done and what can be hoped for. This applies also to utopias: if one wants to realize their utopia, they need to construct it in the context of the historical situation and not separate from it.

This kind of idea of a grounded concrete utopia can be formulated in another way. American Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright has written

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[22] To use David Harvey's conceptualizations, Bloch's concrete utopianism can also be called "dialectical utopianism", "utopianism that is rooted in our present possibilities" (Harvey 2000, 196). See also Sheppard 2000.

extensively about the so-called "real utopias" and their relation to emancipatory social science. Wright admits that it may seem like a contradiction in terms to talk about "real utopias" since utopias are usually considered mainly morally inspired fantasies, abstract designs for a humane world. They are also seen unconstrained by realistic considerations of human psychology and social feasibility. Utopianism is usually seen as opposing political realism but Wright's notion of "real utopia", however, precisely embraces the tension between dreams and reality. Reality restricts dreams, but dreams also shape reality. "Real utopias" are, according to Wright, "grounded in the belief that what is pragmatically possible is not fixed independently of our imaginations, but is itself shaped by our visions" (Wright 2010, 6). They function as political goals which guide action that aims to change the world. They are grounded in the real potentials of humanity (ibid).[23]

However, for Wright (ibid, 5) the "real" of "real utopias" does not mean just simply "realistic". It also refers to such real-life utopian experiments as Mondragon worker owned co-operatives, ecovillages, Wikipedia, and Universal Basic Income (UBI). "Real utopia" refers to the real world alternatives that can be found within the capitalist society. My concept of utopian counter-logical social practice can be seen as an alternative perspective on the same phenomena Wright's concept of "real utopia" tries to capture. In my view these real world utopian experiments can be best described as realizing a radically alternative logic of social practice that can clash against the existing hegemonic social structures and create cracks to the social cohesion of the present. Utopian counter-logical social practice is a real utopian social practice.

3.6   After Temporal Utopianism

Temporal utopianism has been under suspicion because of the horrific failures of those grand narratives associated with such disasters as the two world wars, the Holocaust, and the crimes of Stalinism. For a long time the concepts of revolution and progress were suspicious concepts to use in the sphere of political thought and discourse. This condition was famously summarized by Jean-Francois Lyotard with the concept of "postmodern". For Lyotard postmodern means incredulity toward metanarratives, mistrust of the grand narratives of Progress, Enlightenment and Emancipation that offer a meaning to historical development, that offer *telos* to it (Lyotard 1984, xxiv).

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[23] Both Bloch's concrete utopianism and Wright's real utopian project could be described – to use a concept developed by Immanuel Wallerstein – as forms of "utopistics": "[Utopistics] is the sober, rational, and realistic evaluation of human social systems, the constraints on what they can be, and the zones open to human creativity. Not the face of the perfect (inevitable) future, but the face of an alternative, credibly better, and historically possible (but far from certain) future. It is thus an exercise simultaneously in science, in politics, and in morality" (Wallerstein 1998, 1-2).

Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo refers to Arnold Gehlen's idea of "post-history" in his book *The End of Modernity* (1988) and uses it to describe this postmodern situation: progress attached to modern temporal utopias becomes routine. For Christianity (where modernity inherited its metanarratives) history appears as the history of salvation. But in the end of modernity, progress becomes secularized, it no longer has a divine meaning. According to Vattimo (1988, 101), modernity is characterized as the era of abandonment of the sacred vision of existence. Modernity secularizes the faith in progress and progress becomes a value in and of itself, it becomes routine. Progress no longer aims at a better world, progress is now about progress itself. Progress means now "more the same" and not salvation. Progress means now for example more profit and more technological innovation, but the progression to the truly new becomes forgotten. Creation of something "new" - the emergence of a Blochian *Novum* (see Bloch 1986, 195-223) - becomes more and more difficult. Transformation of progress into routine means the vanishing of "all pathos of the new" (Vattimo 1988, 102). This, in the final analysis, means fundamentally the dissolution of progress itself. The term "postmodern" refers here to the crisis of the future.

This crisis of the future can be seen also as a parallel process, to the process of exhaustion of utopian energies, as described by Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas (1986, 2), the modern time-consciousness based on the ideas of progress and revolution has narrowed, the "horizon of future has now narrowed itself". The future has become, according to Habermas, occupied by the merely negative, by social, ecological, and political problems of catastrophic proportions. Dystopian helplessness has replaced the utopian hope for a better tomorrow. "When the utopian oases dry up, a desert of banality and helplessness spreads" (ibid, 16).

The most popular version of the idea of a crisis of the future has, however, been presented by Francis Fukuyama in his article titled "The End of History?" (1989). The article claimed (by relying on Alexandre Kojève's (1980) reading of Hegel's philosophy of history) that history (which was given its movement by the struggle for recognition) had ended. This "end of history" did not, of course, mean the end of all movement in history, but it did mean the end of fundamental contradictions within human-life that could not be resolved by liberalism, that would be resolved by an alternative ideology and political-economic structure (Fukuyama 1989, 9). In 1989 the Soviet Union was near its inevitable collapse and this gave Fukuyama the conclusion that Soviet communism was no longer a true rival for Western liberalism. Liberalism had won the competition.

In the 20th century there had, according to Fukuyama, been two major challenges to liberalism. The first one was fascism, and the other one was communism. According to Fukuyama fascism "saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies" (ibid). The fascist solution to these contradictions was to establish "a strong state that forged a new 'people' on the basis of national exclusiveness" (ibid). According to Fukuyama, fascism as a

living ideology, as a true challenge for liberalism was destroyed by World War II. After World War II fascism could no longer be seen as a successful ideology.

Today Fukuyama's 1989 analysis might seem quite weak. It is obvious that fascism is not done with challenging liberalism: the rise of far-right movements in Europe and Donald Trump in the United States of America show this very clearly. The most interesting part of Fukuyama's article is not, however, in how "accurate" it is or is not. The most interesting part of it is how it can be seen as a symptom of what has sometimes been called the "postmodern" era of late capitalist societies. Fukuyama's "The End of History?" was truly a symptom of the *zeitgeist.* As Slavoj Žižek (2009, 53) writes: "Though it is easy to make fun of Fukuyama's notion of the End of History, the majority today is Fukuyamaist. Liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society; all one can do is to render it more just, tolerant and so on".

It has become truly difficult to think about utopian futures. This trouble with social imagination can be described as – to borrow Fredric Jameson's concept - the "anxiety of utopia" (Jameson 1991, 331). This anti-utopian sentiment leads to an argument according to which "the social or collective illusion of Utopia, or of a radically different society is flawed first and foremost because it is invested with a personal or existential illusion that is itself flawed from the outset" (ibid, 335).

"Anxiety of utopia" means the fear of utopianism, it means the impossibility to think about alternatives for the present.[24] And because the present is determined by the existence of a capitalist mode of production, utopophobia in this context means the impossibility to think beyond capitalism. In fact, that kind of thinking is discouraged in every way. Capitalism is the only possible mode of social being. To describe this kind of thinking the late Mark Fisher coined the concept of "capitalist realism". The "realism" in Fisher's (2009, 5) concept "is analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depressive who believes that any positive state, any hope, is a dangerous illusion". Capitalist realism is a mode of thought in which it is not possible to hope for any utopia, it is impossible to hope for a better tomorrow. Fisher elaborates: "Capitalist realism as I understand it cannot be confined to art or to the quasi-propagandistic way in which advertising functions. It is more like a pervasive *atmosphere*, conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action" (ibid, 16). It is a cultural framework within which it is allowed to think. It could be described as a context wherein there occurs a disabling of political will (see, e.g., Gupta 2001, 258).

One way to avoid this predicament of the post-future is to orient towards the what-has-been through nostalgic "retrotopias". The concept of "retrotopia" as developed by Zygmunt Bauman (2017) refers to this exact temporal turn in political imagination. Contemporary political imagination seems to be more focused on the past than on the future. According to Bauman, retrotopias

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[24] One can also talk about "utopophobia", "unreasonable fear of utopianism" as Estlund (2014, 116) does.

are "visions located in the lost/stolen/abandoned but undead past, instead of being tied to the not-yet-unborn and so existent future" (ibid, 4). Retrotopia calls to re-establish the past. This can be heard in the nationalist rhetoric of making one's country great again, but also in the social democratic left's rhetoric about rebuilding or defending the welfare state (see, e.g., Eskelinen, Lakkala & Pyykkönen 2020).

In reference to these kinds of ideas about postmodernity, the crisis of the future, capitalist realism, retrotopia and the end of history, Lisa Garforth (2009, 12) has claimed that the future itself has disappeared from utopian thought and the notion of intention has become irrelevant. Utopian studies have, according to Garforth, become more and more interested in what utopias do to the present than how they imagine the future. Contemporary utopianism is not so much about planning the future, but about "acting critically in the present" (ibid). Of course, utopianism has not been exclusively about planning the future before either (here Garforth refers to Louis Marin's reading of Thomas More's *Utopia*) but especially today utopianism is much more interested in the present than it is in the future. Garforth writes that because of the anti-utopian or even dystopian sentiments of the present, the utopian can live in more accidental, unintentional forms (ibid, 10). According to her, utopias cannot orient themselves to the future anymore and this is why utopian thought cannot rely on the idea of a utopian future. Utopias can only rely on the fleeting moments of the present and accidental experience of the utopian, a fragmented desire for a better being (ibid).

Although the alleged weakening of utopias was noticed already earlier in the late 1950s and the early 1960s (see, e.g., Bell 1960), most of these expressions of anti-utopian sentiment mentioned above can be seen as products of the era of hegemonic neoliberalism (beginning in the early 1970s) in which certain advanced forms of individualism seems to affect the possibilities to the collective orientation towards the future. What are some of the possible mechanisms that produce anti-utopianism from this individualistic mindset? This will be elaborated in the next subchapter. First, I will briefly iterate the history of neoliberal thought and after that I will move on to elaborate on how neoliberalism acquired its hegemonic status. And lastly, I will explore some consequences neoliberalism has had materially, politically, and psychologically.

As a disclaimer it should be noted that neoliberalism as an ideology is here understood as a form theory of state management that ought to be viewed in the context what is in Marxist theory referred as process of "real subsumption" (see,

e.g., Marx 1975, 104-109).[25] In this process society itself becomes subsumed under the rule of capital. As Antonio Negri (1991, 113) writes, real subsumption is about "the effective, functional and organic subjugation of all social conditions of production, and, concomitantly, of labor as an associated force". Or, as Jacques Camatte has written, real subsumption is about "the domestication of men by capital" (Camatte 2011, 82) where "it is no longer merely labour, a defined and particular moment of human activity, that is subsumed and incorporated into capital, but the whole lifeprocess of man" (ibid, 156).

Under neoliberal order this process of real subsumption and domestication of social life intensifies and advances even further than before when neoliberal policies commodify and valorize more and more aspects of social life. Neoliberalism is here understood as an ideological articulation of a particular historical phase of value-production (i.e. the process referred here as "real subsumption") on the level of state management.

Neoliberalism and the Fate of Utopia

Neoliberalism as a theory and as an ideology has its origins in the crisis of liberalism that was witnessed in the early twentieth century. During that time liberal hegemony (which was never a coherent, unified phenomenon) was divided into two antagonist groups of liberals. On one side were those who emphasized and championed individual liberty (understood as private property rights and free markets) above anything else. They argued against government interventions in private life, including the markets. On the other side were those social reformist liberals who believed that government should aim for the common good and not just individual liberties. The first group of liberals had long been in a dominant position but in the decades leading up to the Great Depression it began to lose its hegemony. The "individual-liberty side" of liberalism was seen as "inadequate for managing huge transformations in capitalism that were underway" (Wilson 2018, 25). Industrialization, urbanization, and internationalization were not possible to realize within the framework of the more individualistically oriented liberalism. State interventions were seen necessary and this, of course, benefited the state-interventionist group of liberals and got the individual-liberty group into deep trouble (ibid, 25-26).

To the individual-liberty side of liberalism, all state interventions "smelled a lot like socialism" (ibid, 26). It could not accept them. It feared that state

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[25] In philosophy the notion of "subsumption" refers "to the ranging of some mass of particulars under a universal" (Endnotes 2010). For example, whales, or the concept of "whale" can be conceptually subsumed under the category of "mammal". In Marx's theory "the subsumption of the particularities of the labour-process under the abstract universality of the valorisation-process of capital" (ibid). Abstractions become real forces in human society: "The abstract universal — value — whose existence is posited by the exchange abstraction, acquires a *real* existence vis-à-vis particular concrete labours, which are subsumed under it. The real existence of abstractions, which acquire the ability to subsume the concrete world of production under them — and posit themselves as the truth of this world — is for Marx nothing other than a perverted, enchanted, ontologically inverted reality" (ibid).

interventionism represented a threat to its core values of individualism, private property, and free markets. To defend these values American author and political commentator Walter Lippmann organized in 1938 a gathering of leading liberal thinkers in Paris for discussions about the fate of that side of liberalism which emphasized individual liberty. At this gathering the term "neoliberalism" was coined to refer to a new form of liberalism that was at once "anti-common good *and* anti-laissez-faire" (ibid). This duality of neoliberalism is important to notice. For previous versions of individual-liberty liberalism, laissez-faire was a dogma that could not be questioned. Neoliberalism, however, imagined the state working not in the interests of the common good (as in state interventionist liberalism), but in the interests of free markets (ibid, 26-27).

Even though the Walter Lippman Colloqium is a very important part of the history neoliberalism, the first mature versions of the neoliberal theory were, however, formulated during the years between World War I and World War II by relatively small group of economists (ibid, 24) and the culmination of the development of the theory was achieved at Mont Pelerin, Switzerland where a society advocating neoliberal ideas was established (Jones 2012, 31). The Mont Pelerin Society (as it called itself) based its ideas on three important theoreticians who formulated a comprehensive critique of political, economic, and social life of the 1930s and 1940s: Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich A. Hayek.

These three scholars wanted to reconstruct liberalist theory because they felt that liberalism was under attack from three directions. In the 1930s fascism had challenged liberalist theory but also the type of socialism that was implemented in Soviet Union was a clear threat to liberalism. In addition to these two, the state oriented social democracy was also seen as a problem (ibid, 31-33). Especially after 1945 social democracy and New Deal type of liberalism were heavily criticized by the neoliberals (ibid, 85).

These neoliberal theoreticians also attacked utopianism. For example in his *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957) Karl Popper claimed that utopian thought has an essential connection to holistic social theory. Utopian thought aims to the transformation of society as a whole. This "utopian social engineering" is in Popper's thought opposed to what he calls "piecemeal social engineering" (Popper 1957, 64) which sees social institutions functionally or instrumentally. They are only instruments for achieving certain goals. However, from the point of view of utopian social engineering society is seen as an organic, holistic totality in which no institution can be viewed separately from the whole: one needs to change the whole in order to change anything. (ibid, 64-66.)

In Popper's view utopian thought aims to reorganize the whole society according to premeditated plan or blueprint. It aims to take control of society as a whole and steer it towards the future. Unfortunately, this holistic orientation towards social transformation tends to have unplanned consequences due to human unpredictability. This is why utopian social engineering also needs to control humans. This in turn has some obvious totalitarian implications. (ibid, 69-79.)

Utopia becomes here associated with totalitarianism. Totalitarianism in turn becomes associated with centrally planned socialism. This line of thinking can be seen for example in Hayek who in his *The Road to Serfdom* (2001, 24-32) calls socialism "the Great Utopia" in which individual freedom is supressed for the benefit of the collective. Although socialism appeals to the concept of freedom, it nevertheless ends up in serfdom. This accusation is repeated by Ludwig von Mises in his *Bureacracy* (1944, 1-2) where he seeks to prove the inherently bureaucratic nature of socialism. In the same book Mises also connects the idea of utopian blueprint to the bureaucratization of society:

> Plato's ideal and perfect state is to be ruled by unselfish philosophers. They unbribable judges and impartial administrators, strictly abiding by the eternal Plato's ideal and perfect state is to be ruled by unselfish philosophers. They are unbribable judges and impartial administrators, strictly abiding by the immutable laws of justice. For this is the characteristic mark of Plato's philosophy: it does not pay any attention to the evolution of social and economic conditions and to changes in human ideas concerning ends and means. There exists the perennial patterns of the good state, and every deviation of actual conditions from this model cannot be anything else than corruption and degradation. The problem is simply to establish the perfect society and then to keep it from any alteration, as change must be tantamount to deterioration. Social and economic institutions are rigid. The notion of progress in knowledge, in technological procedures, in business methods, and in social organization is foreign to Plato's mind. And all later utopians who shaped the blueprints of their earthly paradises according to Plato's example in the same way believed in the immutability of human affairs. (Mises 1944, 101.)

The relation of neoliberalism to the concept of utopia is, however, somewhat contradictory. Namely, despite all this apparent anti-utopianism, sometimes neoliberalists *themselves* considered their project to be inherently utopian. Just after the first meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, Hayek insisted that liberal intellectuals should regain the courage to express their utopian convictions (Peck 2010, 50). Since socialism was for Hayek nothing more than a construction of elite theorists that was only later sold to the working class, liberalist utopia too could be advanced by intellectuals (ibid). Following Hayek's ideas on liberal utopia, the Mont Pelerin Society made long term commitment to wage war in the battle of ideas. The immediate goal was present alternatives for the existing (Keynesian) order and change the elite opinion of society "in order to establish the parameters within which public opinion could then be formed" (Srnicek & Williams 2015, 55).

However, intellectuals and ideas alone do not change the society. Ideas need to have social demand before they can acquire a hegemonical status. This can be seen also in the way how neoliberalism's "liberalist utopia" was advanced in its later history. According to David Harvey, the birth of neoliberal hegemony had two sources. The first source is the crisis of accumulation in the 1970s, characterized by stagflation and falling profits (Harvey 2005, 5-38). The second source for the development of neoliberal hegemony can be, according to Harvey (ibid, 44), found from the social upheavals of 1968. For the participants of these upheavals the desire for greater personal freedom was central. This was especially true for students all over the world. From Paris to Berlin and Bangkok

students rose up to demand freedom from "parental, educational, corporate, bureaucratic, and state constraints" (ibid).

In addition to these individualistic demands, students also demanded social justice. According to Harvey, these two sets of demands are not necessarily compatible: "Pursuit of social justice presupposes social solidarities and a willingness to submerge individual wants, needs, and desires in the cause of some more general struggle for, say, social equality or environmental justice" (ibid). These two sets of demands were "uneasily fused" in the movement(s) of 1968 and the tension between the two was visible in the "fraught relationship" between the traditional left of labour organizations and political parties and the student movement "desirious of individual liberties" (ibid).

According to Harvey, the tensions between the traditional left and the student movement created a division from which the neoliberal project could rise out of (ibid). The individual demands of the student movement created a basis for the later neoliberal rhetoric which also (at least in principle) emphasized the importance of individual freedoms. According to Harvey, this rhetoric "has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice" (ibid). The rhetoric of fulfilment of individual desires creates a firm basis for the neoliberal project which exploits these distinctions between the individual desires and the collective project of social justice (ibid, 41-42).

In the 1970s those seeking individual freedoms and social justice could find a common enemy from powerful corporations allied with an interventionist state. This alliance was both individually oppressive and socially unjust which not only caused such unjust wars as the Vietnam War but also destroyed nature, pushed towards mindless consumerism and failed "to address social issues and respond adequately to diversity"(ibid, 42). It also imposed intense restrictions on individual possibilities and behaviours. Almost everyone taking part in the movement of 1968 saw the state as intrusive enemy that needed to be reformed. According to Harvey, this was the point where the neoliberals could easily agree with the radicals of 1968 (ibid). The neoliberals moved on to capture these ideals of individual freedom and turned them against state's interventions and regulations and this the interests of capitalist class could be protected (ibid).

This neoliberal attack against the state was, however, one-sided. In neoliberal theory the state has a very important role to play: it should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and "the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade" (ibid, 64). These institutional arrangements are in neoliberal theory considered to guarantee individual freedoms. Legally the relationships between individuals are seen through the framework of freely negotiated contractual obligations between judicial individuals in the marketplace. Neoliberal theory emphasizes the sanctity of contracts and wants to protect the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice. The role of the state is here to use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve and protect these individual freedoms. The idea of individual freedom applies to businesses and corporations as well since they too

are legally regarded as individuals. In neoliberal theory they have the freedom to operate within the framework of free markets. Free trade is in itself seen as a fundamental good: private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen "as the keys to innovation and wealth creation" (ibid) and continuous privatization of assets is encouraged (ibid, 65).

One of the definitive features of neoliberalism as a theory and as an ideology is its "explicit attempt to remake laissez-faire for twentieth-century conditions" (Peck 2008, 4) and some of its core values are individualism, universalism, and meliorism (Eagleton-Pierce 2016, 19). It is an individualist theory because in it the individual tends acquire ontological priority over the collective. It is also a universalist theory since it promotes the continuous expansions of world markets. And lastly, it is a melioristic theory since it believes that humans have the potential to improve and remake themselves according to changing environment. Meliorism refers here to "a pragmatic adaptability in the face of change" (ibid, 23).

The neoliberal version of individualism is distinctive for two reasons. First, it defines "the individual" through the category of "the consumer", which becomes extended into other areas, such as politics, education, and health. Second, neoliberal individualism valorizes choice and competitiveness as guiding principle for all societal organizations. It also appeals to personalization and customization to offer further extensions of neoliberal thought (ibid, 20).

The second core value of neoliberalism mentioned above is universalism. Universalism refers here simply to the global rule of markets as a kind of utopia. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of forming "a global business" or at least the aspiration to be seen as global became a real possibility for many corporations. Similar conceptual evolution can be seen in the notion of "emerging markets". It is an expression that was coined by World Bank economists to encourage banks to make investments in developing countries. For the investors from the outside of developing countries the phrase "emerging markets" "carries with it an imagery of discovery and opportunity" (ibid, 23). Therefore it is not surprising that that it also helps to "convey an impression that all countries should orientate themselves to a market-based vision as a universal goal" (ibid, 23).

The third and final core value of neoliberalism is meliorism. Generally speaking the concept of meliorism refers simply to the belief that world can be made better by human effort. It differs from optimism because meliorism does not believe in the inevitable improvement of the world. It only believes that the world *can* be improved *if* humankind wants to improve it. As William James in his *Pragmatism* (1907, 285) writes, meliorism stands between optimism and pessimism: meliorism "treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become". However, in the neoliberal context meliorism refers to the adoption of a "reformist" mindset, "one which is often not bound to a sentimental faith or excessive optimism but a pragmatic adaptability in the face of change" (Eagleton-Pierce 2016, 23). In neoliberal

context meliorism refers to the idea that one can truly succeed if one truly wants to succeed.

The neoliberal theory and its core values of individualism, universalism and meliorism have not only had material but also political and psychological consequences. The material outcomes of neoliberalism can be seen in the way how services and state-owned enterprises have been privatized, how budget cuts have been targeted at social security systems and how labour markets have been liberalised. This has caused an increased sense of precarity and sharp polarisation of incomes, wealth, and access to services (see, e.g., Fiorentini 2015; Schatan 2001).

Political consequences of neoliberalism on the other hand can be seen in attempts to reorganise the arena of democratic politics and change the framework within which politics operates (see, e.g. Gill 1998; Gill 2002; Bruff 2012). This reorganisation of politics can be seen fairly well in the way for example EU treaties and trade agreements are designed so that their modification is extremely difficult by normal democratic means. And even if these treaties and agreements could be modified, it would unleash a set of punitive measures against those modifying them. This kind of political system is governed through the use of expert power and thus through the depoliticization of inherently political issues. Certain sets of policies are locked in, they become very difficult to change. (Eskelinen, Lakkala & Pyykkönen 2020, 45-47.)

As important as both material and political consequences of neoliberalism are, from the utopian point of view the psychological outcomes of neoliberalism are the most interesting. It is possible to ask if the above-mentioned policy lock-ins cause also a lock-in of imagination. If social reality proves to be extremely difficult to change through normal democratic means, does this difficulty lead to the difficulty of imagining what such change could be like? This kind of tendency can certainly be seen in neoliberal ideology which further fosters the lock-in of imagination by describing social reality through a worldview which is strongly grounded on an ontology based on the individual agent and her interests needs and desires (see, e.g., McGuigan 2009, 176). This in turn can lead to a conception of social reality in which these atomistic desires are communicated only to form temporary agreements and not social change. This way neoliberalism tends to continuously advance ideological closure and block off prospects of further utopian developments. (Eskelinen, Lakkala & Pyykkönen 2020, 47.)

As bleak as this scenario may seem, there are still real possibilities for utopian thought and practice. Although the present may seem like an ideologically closed totality, there are theoretically speaking many possible ways that the present could be opened for the future again. One way for opening this closed totality could be opened is through what Suman Gupta (2001) has called "rational utopian thinking". For Gupta, utopia is inherently about revitalizing "an effective political will" (ibid, 255). The form of utopianism which could revitalize political will should, however, be rational. It should be "fully cognisant of the dangers of irrationality and visionary ideas and repressive demagogy or totalitarianism" (ibid, 258). It should also possess "a complete awareness of the implications of pertinent historical experience" (ibid). Practicing

rational utopian thought could help us free us from the shackles of anti-political anti-utopianism. Practicing, developing, and cultivating rational utopian thought could help us to open the political horizons of the present.

This kind of perspective on the role of the utopia in the age of anti-political anti-utopianism comes close to the second way utopias can be used to open the present. For Fredric Jameson utopianism works as kind of cultural psychotherapy. Utopianism must take an indirect approach, concentrating "not on visions of future happiness, but rather on treatments of that stubborn resistance we tend to oppose to it and to all the other proposals for positive change" (Jameson 2016, 54). The main point of utopianism is to open up the social imagination, to cure us from the disease of anti-utopianism. This does not mean to create fixed visions of a future society nor social blueprints, but rather to create an indirect path to self-knowledge of the current society, to make us appreciate our current fears and anxieties and through them grasp our hopes and desires. "[E]very utopia today must be a psychotherapy of anti-utopian fears and draw them out into the light of day, where the sad passions like blinded snakes writhe and twist in the open air" (ibid, 55). As Jameson has elsewhere written, the task of utopia is mainly a negative one: the task of utopia is to make us "aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment" (Jameson 2005, xiii).

Another way this opening of ideologically closed totality could happen is through the ecological crisis the current global capitalist society is facing. The climate crisis humanity is at the moment living in could create the need for new counter-images of a better, ecologically stable society that could facilitate the masses towards the future. There is, of course, a long tradition of eco-utopianism in the form of both utopian literature (see, e.g., Callenbach 1990; McCutcheon 2015) and utopian practice (see, e.g., Liftin 2014; Hong & Vicdan 2016) but so far these kinds of utopias have not facilitated large scale social transformation. The current situation is, however, so much, much worse than before that it could potentially work as a pressure to the creation of counter-images of the future. In fact, weak signs of this can be seen already. The IPCC report from October 2018 – that demands "rapid and far reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure […] and industrial systems" (IPCC 2018, 29) - has already influenced new, more social movements such as Extinction Rebellion who demand a radical change in the current system through the usage of non-violent strategies and tactics (Extinction Rebellion 2019). They describe themselves as "an international apolitical network using non-violent direct action to persuade governments to act on the Climate and Ecological Emergency" (ibid). Their vision of the future, however, is hardly utopian. Their vision of change can be reduced to the vision of survival and it can be described mainly as "anti-dystopian".[26] There is nothing inherently wrong about this. The future might be impossible to think of because of the urgency of the current problems. The problems we as mankind are dealing with right now, do not offer a possibility or

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[26] However, there can be seen a turn from anti-dystopianism to more utopian orientation in Extinction Rebellion (XR). In Finland the Finnish version of XR, Elokapina, has already taken more consciously utopian approach to their activism. See, e.g., Elokapina 2020.

time to think about all-encompassing alternatives. This experience of the urgent need for change can, however, later work as a catalyst for new future-oriented utopias.

Another global event that might have stimulating consequences to our cultural, social, and political imagination in the future is the currently ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It has already motivated in creating mutual aid groups (see, e.g., Sitrin & Colectiva Sembrar 2020; Chevée 2021) and made the idea of nuclear family questionable (see, e.g., Lewis 2020) but it has also created some politico-philosophical discussions about the need to reorganize society in wholly different manner. One possible vision of the reorganized society can be found from Slavoj Žižek who has in the context of COVID-19 pandemic endorsed the idea of "war communism" as a solution to the ongoing crisis. According to Žižek (2020, 103), the current crisis can only be solved if the state assumes a more active role, "organizing the production of urgently needed things like masks, test kits and respirators, sequestering hotels and other resorts, guaranteeing the minimum of survival of all new unemployed, and so on, doing all this by abandoning market mechanisms". In war communism the state apparatus is used to ensure everyone's survival.

However, from the utopian point of view this solution seems insufficient. As Žižek himself writes: war communism "is not a utopian Communist vision" but "a Communism imposed by the necessities of bare survival" (ibid, 92). It is not a vision that embodies a desire for a better way of being, but a vision that orients towards the continued existence of human race. Similarly to the vision proposed by Extinction Rebellion, the nature of Žižek's war communism is by its nature more anti-dystopian (a vision that tells us how to avoid the completion of dystopian processes) than it is utopian (a vision that tells what we should desire for).

These anti-dystopian visions may have the potential to develop later into future-oriented utopias that can facilitate large-scale social transformation. To paraphrase Žižek (2021, 78), utopia can sometimes be "masked as dystopia". At the moment, the idea of temporal utopia is not completely impossible but it certainly is not in any way hegemonic (although it certainly can become

hegemonic in the future). [27] Neoliberalism has weakened (although not completely destroyed) the idea of collectively facilitating future-oriented utopia with its individualistic social ontology. The idea of collectively shaped future seems to be in trouble today. This does not, however, mean that all forms of utopianism have vanished. On the contrary, utopianism seems to be very much alive, but it has taken a very different form. Utopia has never disappeared; it has only taken a new form in the current era. Instead of aiming to realize a utopia in the future, contemporary forms of utopia aim to create utopias in the present, in the here and now. In the next chapter I seek to formulate a new concept that could help us to locate utopian orientations in the present. This is the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice. With this concept I aim to uncover those kinds of practices that I find to have utopian qualities, those kinds of practices that have the ability disrupt the ordinary flow of things and prefigure possible ways humanity could reorganize itself.

In the next chapter I also argue that utopian counter-practices can potentially open the ideologically closed present towards different ways of thinking and different ways of being in the here-and-now. And if it is possible to create new ways to think about and live in the present, it is also possible to imagine different futures. Their function is in this sense critical and disruptive. Utopian counter-practices can create cracks on the surface of social cohesion (and into our experience of the society we live in) and give us the possibility to think and debate about the future again. Utopian counter-logical social practices can be seen fostering both ideological and practico-structural disruptions.

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[27] There have been various ways to commit to the idea of future-oriented utopia. One way is to commit to the idea of Progress and trust piecemeal social engineering to do the work and bring us along the way, closer to a future utopia. There are many proponents of this kind of temporal utopianism, but the best summarizes of it we can find are from liberals such as Steven Pinker who in his *Enlightenment Now. The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, And Progress* (2018) has argued that under capitalism we have progressed in almost every aspect of social life. Only piecemeal social engineering is need for the betterment of society. An alternative version of this kind of utopianism can be found in contemporary socialist thought where the commitment to the idea of Progress can be found. Thinkers and authors such as Leigh Phillips (2015), Nick Srnicek & Alex Williams (2015), and Aaron Bastani (2019) all have an enthusiastic, even Promethean belief and trust in the idea of societal and civilizational Progress. The difference to Steven Pinker's enthusiasm for Progress is that Progress does not just advance through piecemeal social engineering, but it also needs a revolution, it needs a radical alteration in our social and power relations in regard to the means of production. Third way to commit to the idea of future-oriented utopia can be found from Serge Latouche (2009) whose vision of a non-growth society is based on the concept of future oriented concrete utopia explored above.

4   UTOPIA AS COUNTER-PRACTICE

In this chapter utopia is understood as a form of social practice that orients towards the present and is motivated to open the closed present of the post-utopian age so that orienting towards the future becomes possible again. In the context of the current era, utopia should be understood neither as a static blueprint that organizes the social space (as the programmatic misinterpretation of More's *Utopia* provided by classical utopianism understands utopia) nor as an ultimate end goal, as a *telos* of historical progress. Utopia is here understood as a form of social practice that operates according to a radically different logic of doing, when compared to the present society. This social practice is utopian since it is motivated by desire for a better being. By using John Holloway's concept of the "crack" I argue that utopian counter-logical social practices have the potential to create cracks on the social cohesion of the present society and that way give room for alternative ways of being and thinking in the here-and-now.

This chapter offers a kind of "return" to the idea of utopia as a critique of the present that can be found from Thomas More, before the developments of the blueprint concept of utopia or the temporal utopias of the Enlightenment. Here, however, the criticism is not presented solely in the form of counter-images of the present. Rather, the criticism presented here develops into a counter-logic of social practice. Utopias are counter-images of the present, but they are not just counter-*images.* The critical distance that utopias offer to the existing society can be understood on the very concrete level of social counter-*practices.* Both utopian counter-images and counter-practices are expressions of utopian desire for a better being, but they also have certain dialectics between them. Counter-images can, either implicitly or explicitly, inform and motivate counter-practices.

All counter-practices do have at least an implicit vision of what kind of world they want to create and at least an implicit counter-image behind them that facilitates and motivates their inner logic. Often this counter-image can also take explicit, reflected and conceptually mediated forms. Counter-images can be translated into a more or less coherent set of principles, values and objectives the utopian counter-practice aims to achieve.

This chapter divides into three parts. In the first part I describe the core dimensions of the concept of utopian counter-logical social practices. These dimensions are immanence, prefigurativity, and disruptivity. By immanence I refer to the idea that utopian counter-practices are realized in the here-and-now. Utopia is not here projected into the future, but it is something that is expressed in the here-and-now as a form of social practice. The second dimension, "prefigurativity", refers here to the idea that utopian counter-logical social practice is not only realized in the here-and-now, but it also anticipates the coming of an alternative social universe in a larger context.

The third dimension of utopian counter-logical social practice, "disruptivity", refers here to the way how these practices have the potential to create "cracks" on the surface of the social cohesion of the present, how utopian counter-practices can disrupt the flow of social life on the everyday level. Utopianism becomes here understood as "a disruption of the present that is also in the present" (Newman 2009, 70). This kind of thought can, as shown in Chapter 3, be traced back not only to anarchist political philosophy, but also to the eschatological thought of "chiliast" tradition.

The idea of utopian counter-logical social practice not only draws from Thomas More's *Utopia*, and its critique of the present, but also from the apocalyptical thought found in radical forms of Christianity. However, unlike in the temporal utopias of the Enlightenment, the utopia is not projected in the future as the climax of history, but enacted in the here-and-now as a radical alternative in the form of utopian counter-logical social practice. This form of social practice has not only the power to transform the social world an individual lives in, but also the individual themself through its pedagogical functions. To use Karl Mannheim's vocabulary, it is possible to see chiliast dimensions in the idea of utopian counter-logical social practice. It does not place utopia at the end of linear development, but breaks the continuity of history and gives it a new direction.

In addition to Thomas More and Christian chilialism, utopian counter-logical social practices can also be seen as a form of "historical experimentalism" as elaborated by Axel Honneth in his *The Idea of Socialism* (2017). Similarly to utopian socialist experiments (which Honneth uses as examples), utopian counter-logical social practices represent anti-teleological form of utopianism. This connection to utopian socialism is also why utopian socialism in general is explored specifically in this chapter. Especially the work of utopian socialist Robert Owen is in this chapter utilized for theoretical purposes. Utopian counter-logical social practices can in the right historical context possibly become cellular forms of the future society (and many times they are even intended as such), but more importantly they function as disruptors of the present that open new possibilities for thinking and being in the here-and-now.

After elaborating these core dimensions of the utopian counter-logical social practice I will focus in the second part of this chapter more closely on the disruptive dimension of utopian counter-practices by examining the so-called theory of the "crack" developed by John Holloway. The third part of this chapter

on the other hand gives couple of examples of how utopian counter-logical social practices can manifest themselves and what kind of effects they can potentially have on the surrounding society surrounding and its participants.

4.1 Utopian Disruptions

One way to describe utopian counter-logical social practices is to emphasize their "immanent" nature. Here I am using the term "immanence" in the sense Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1994) use the term in their book *What is Philosophy?* In their book Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 99-101) link the concept of utopia with the concept of "deterritorialization". "Deterritorialization" means "movement by which something escapes or departs from a given territory" (Parr 2005, 70). Deterritorialization is something that happens all the time to every society. This means that "fundamental social change happens all the time, even as the society reproduces itself on other levels. Sometimes change occurs by degrees, as with the steady erosion of myths about sexual difference and its role in social and political institutions. Sometimes change occurs through the eruption of events which break with the past and inaugurate a new field of social, political or legal possibilities" (ibid, 71). Described this way, it can be argued that deterritorialization can be seen as a form of disruption in the present.

Immanent utopia

If the word "utopia" truly means "nowhere", then it, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 100), etymologically "stands for absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu, and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu". In Deleuze's and Guattari's vocabulary, "utopia" refers to the absolute line of flight which at the same time is truly connected to its own time. "*Erehwon,* the word used by Samuel Butler, refers not only to no-where but also to now-here" (ibid). The "now-here" part is what distinguishes Deleuze's and Guattari's "utopianism" from the temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment: for them utopias are immanent creations that change the existence here and now. The now-here does not make way for distant utopian goals in the future when it revolutionizes the present: "Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people" (ibid, 101). For Deleuze and Guattari revolution is the immanent utopia. Or, to be more precise: *revolutionizing* is the form that the immanent utopia takes. Immanent utopia means the constant revolutionizing of social relations. Revolution is no longer a way to utopia, but utopia itself. Means and goals come together in immanent utopia. Utopia is in constant movement, it constantly revolutionizes the world and it never stops revolutionizing. "Utopia of immanence is in fact permanent revolution" (Michael-Matsas 2016, 293).

> But to say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, 100.)

I want to emphasize here the verb "revolutionizing" to make a point about the process nature of utopias of immanence. Because they are always here-and-now, they cannot be understood as stable and eternal. Because they can be defined as a form of "absolute deterritorialization", no permanent reterritorialization is possible. This would be typical for authoritarian utopias of transcendence – not for libertarian utopias of immanence. Utopias of immanence are constantly escaping the given social field: a utopia of immanence is always somewhere else, it is always not-here. Because a utopia of immanence is a form of "absolute deterritorialization", it is also constantly evolving and shaping its form. There can be no one perfect state which could not be deterritorialized, which could not be revolutionized.

Very similarly to Deleuze and Guattari, anarchist theoretician Saul Newman (2010, 162) has in his book *The Politics of Postanarchism* developed a concept of "utopianism of here and now". He develops the concept in contrast to what he calls "scientific utopianism" in which the future anarchist society should be founded on scientific and rational principles – and it is from these principles the revolution against the state is expected to rise. In "utopianism of the here and now", however, the focus is not so much on the inevitable outcome of a revolution against the state, but on "a transformation of social relations within the present" (ibid). Similarly to Deleuze's and Guattari's idea of immanent utopia, Newman claims that utopian thinking "might be seen [as] a way of puncturing the ontological status of the current order, introducing it [as] a moment of disruptive heterogeneity and singularity" (ibid).

Prefigurative utopian practice

The idea of utopia as an "absolute deterritorialization" in the "here-and-now" connects immanent utopianism to the second way to describe utopian counter-logical practices – that is as "prefigurative". "Prefiguration" is a concept used in anarchist political philosophy whereby the *telos* and *praxis* of political action must be compatible with each other. Certain harmony must prevail between them. According to Ruth Kinna (2016, 198-199), "prefiguration" is a core concept in contemporary anarchist thinking; and its key principle is that "means have to prefigure ends". Means cannot contradict the ends. For example, if one wants a world where no animals are killed for human consumption, one needs to give up one's carnivorous habits. And if one desires a community where sexism no longer exists, one needs to create non-sexist communal practices here-and-now. To desire utopia is to live utopia. Basically every political group can use prefiguration as a tactic, but in living the utopia one gives prefiguration a priority

(Franks 2018, 31). Prefiguration cannot in the utopian sense of the word be just a tactic, but the way utopia is made manifest here and now.

According to Kinna (2016, 199), in normative political theory the idea of means prefigurating the ends leads "to reject both consequentialism, the idea that the outcomes of actions are the proper measures of rightness, and deontology, which instead considers the justness of actions in terms of duty or conformity with established norms or laws". The idea of prefiguration steers toward virtue ethics, "a position that grounds morality in character or behavior and the intentions of actors" (ibid). This means rejecting instrumentalism in politics. When instrumentalism sees means and ends divided, in prefiguration this distinction does not exist. In classical anarchism the prefiguration has meant "action which embodies liberatory values" (Franks 2018, 39). The ideal has been to melt the *telos* and *praxis* together. The closer this fusion comes, the closer the idea of "living the utopia" is to becoming realized.[28]

Prefigurative utopianism does not draw detailed blueprints of the desired society, it creates new institutions of the new society inside the old. "Prefiguration is best understood as relating to material social practices, which unify norms, social organisation, and method in generating immediate, internal goods as well as shared, external goods" (ibid, 40). The goals prefiguration aims to realize in action, however, should not be understood as fixed *telos*'. There is no single *telos* that is realized in *praxis* but there are "multiple, developing goals, specific to the evolving traditions of prefigurative practice" (ibid). The goals and values embodied in action are capable of evolution and transcendence. In practical situation the goals and values embodied in prefigurative action are somewhat stable and coherent, but they are not fixed and non-negotiable. As Peter Marshall has written, for anarchists the means can not only influence the ends themselves, "but means are ends-in-the-making" (Marshall 2008, 637). Long term goals of the future are lived real in the here and now (ibid, 638).

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[28] In Marxist theory one of the most interesting ideas surrounding the concept of "prefiguration" can be found from left communist theoretician Jacques Camatte who in his essay on the origin and function of the party form argues that two concepts of the revolutionary party should be distinguished: the formal party and the historical party (Camatte 2006). The first concept understands the idea of party as something external to the revolutionary class: it is first and foremost understood as an organization that is first built and then *used* to further revolution. For Camatte, however, this is not what the concept of "the party" means in Marx's texts. Instead of a formal party, the true historical party of the revolutionary proletariat is a social formation that in its very existence aims to prefigure the coming of true *Gemeinwesen*, the coming of communism (ibid). "The party thus represents the *Gemeinwesen*. It cannot be defined by bureaucratic rules, but only by its existence, and the party's existence is its programme, the prefiguration of communist society, of the liberated and conscious human species. The corollary is that the revolution is not a question of forms of organization. It depends on the programme. Only one proved, that the party form is the one most suited to represent and to defend the programme. The organizational rules in this case are not adopted from bourgeois society, but derive from the vision of the future society […]" (ibid).

Disruptive function of utopia

Although prefiguration is about creating utopia in the here-and-now it still has an orientation towards the future. Utopian counter-logical social practices have this side in them too. They do anticipate new, future forms of being in the present. However, when the utopian counter-logical social practices are approached from the perspective of disruption the focus is on what this kind of utopian practice does to the present. "Disruption" refers to the way utopian counter-logical social practices break the ordinary flow of things or, to use John Holloway's vocabulary, create "cracks" on the surface of social cohesion of the present. The idea of disruption of the present can itself be approached from two perspectives: 1) the perspective of space, and 2) the perspective of the logic of practice.

These two dimensions, of course, are not two separate things, but two aspects of one dialectical process: practices form spaces and spaces restrict and guide the practices. Social space is created not only through the social relations prevailing in a society but also through everyday practices of living bodies existing in that society (see, e.g., Lefebvre 1991, 170). However, it is natural to think about utopias through the notion of space since the word "utopia" itself refers to this notion (*topos*). From the perspective of space, disruptions created by utopian practices become articulated theoretically as "counter-spaces". One formulation of the idea of counter-space can be found from Michel Foucault's work on "heterotopias".

One possible way to understand heterotopia is as space or zone of being otherwise that contests and subverts the present, that disrupts the everyday. In *The Order of Things* Foucault writes that "*Heterotopias* are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this *and* that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance […] [Heterotopias] desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences" (Foucault 2005, xix). Heterotopias are "other spaces" where being otherwise becomes possible. They open up spaces that shatter the discourses and representational systems of the present. Heterotopias do have a close relationship with the concept utopia. Foucault (1986, 24) understands "utopias" as "fundamentally unreal spaces". Heterotopia on the other hand is for Foucault a real place, "a kind of effectively enacted utopia" that work as counter-hegemonic sites of resistance to the social order of the present (ibid). "Other spaces" are spaces of Other voices, marginalized voices (Hetherington 2003, 7).

The disruptive quality of utopian practice is brought up frequently in the study of the so-called "everyday utopias" too. Everyday utopias can be described as promising or hopeful spaces where hope is actively created through practice. In recent years there has been a certain trend in utopian studies to focus on the small-scale experiences and expressions of hope on the level of the everyday (see Cook 2018). In recent discussions this kind of thinking has been advanced by Davina Cooper in the 2014 book *Everyday Utopias. The Conceptual Life of Promising Spaces*. According to Cooper (2014, 4), everyday utopias are dynamic spaces that

are neither entirely spontaneous nor planned according to a blueprint. Instead of materializations of plans or ideas, everyday utopianism involves constant adaptation and change. Behind the everyday utopia there might be an original vision to which all of these changes are measured against, but it might also respond to entirely new wants and desires.

Cooper gives five examples of these everyday utopias, of the promising, hopeful spaces of the everyday. The first of these is the phenomenon of public nudism. The second form of everyday utopianism Cooper finds from Women's and Trans Bathhouses and the third from different kinds Local Exchange Trading Schemes. The fourth example of promising spaces Cooper locates to the Summerhill School and fifth one to Speaker's Corner, an area of free discussion and debate in Hyde Park in London. According to Cooper, all of these are examples of spaces where that which is considered "normal" becomes suspicious. Against the assumption that anything outside the "normal" is impossible, everyday utopias reveal their possibility. Indeed it may be the everyday aspect of the activities that most intensifies perceptions of them as strange and unsettling as they offer an alternative model for doing the things people take for granted as necessary to do. Everyday utopias do so with confidence, refusing to view their activities as the "outside" world does" (ibid, 4-5). What the outside views as bizarre and ludicrous, is seen from the inside as completely normal. The conceptual hierarchy of normality and abnormality are turned upside down. Everyday utopias aim to imagine and actualize counterhegemonic practices, they aim to put such everyday concepts as property, care, work and equality into practice in "counter-normative ways" (ibid, 11), in an ambitiously "counter-hegemonic manner" (ibid, 130).

This paradigm of everyday utopia and the theoretical orientations surrounding it, has been elaborated by sociologist Michael Gardiner in his book *Critiques of Everyday Life* (2000). Gardiner develops the idea of everyday utopia on one hand through such artistic traditions as Dadaism, surrealism, situationism and on the other hand through the theoretical writings of such thinkers as Mikhail Bakhtin, Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord, Raoul Vaneigem, Agnes Heller, Michel de Certeau and Dorothy E. Smith. According to Gardiner, everyday utopia should not be understood as absolutist blueprints. Rather, utopia should, according to Gardiner (2000, 17), critique the *status quo* without projecting "a fullblown image of what a future society should look like". Everyday utopias should create transgressive moments that problematize, defamiliarize the everyday, relativize it. For Gardiner, the point of everyday utopias is to make commonsensical notions of the everyday weird to us and make us more receptive to alternative modes of being in the here-and-now (ibid, 20). The everyday utopianism presented by Gardiner does not explicitly dictate what the future state of things should be. Rather, it aims to disrupt the present and give us room to imagine, think and practice alternative ways of being.

The notion of everyday utopia moves here closer to a perspective of the logic of practice than the perspective of space. It emphasizes the alternative logic of doing things in the present. This is also the perspective that is emphasized here.

The point is not about a withdrawal of alternative practices to alternative spaces. The point is about bringing the alternative practices into the present and subverting, the logic of doing in the here-and-now. It could be said that utopian counter-logical social practices are both *within, against* and *beyond* the present (cf. Bell 2017, 15). They are *within,* since they are immanent forms of practices in the here-and-now. They are *against,* because they develop alternative logics of doing that can potentially clash against the logics of the present. And they are *beyond,* because they inevitably prefigure the new world, potentially coming into existence in the future, whence the utopian social practices carried out in the present have become the new normal.

Utopian experimentalism

Utopian counter-logical social practices can be seen as experimental practices and as such they can be grouped under the concept of "historical experimentalism" developed by Axel Honneth (2017). Historically experimental practices abandon all teleological conceptions of history and sees history more as a process of trial and error. Here Honneth relies heavily on the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey who in his work emphasized the importance of practical experimentality not only for scientific inquiry but also for historical development in general. Knowledge in all of its form is acquired through a process of experimentation involving trial and error:

> When we say that thinking and beliefs should be experimental, not absolutistic, we have then in mind a certain logic of method, not primarily, the carrying on of experimentation like that of laboratories. Such a logic involves the following factors: First, that those concepts, general principles, theories and dialectical developments which are indispensable to any systematic knowledge be shaped and tested as tools of inquiry. Secondly, that policies and proposals for social action treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed. They will be experimental in the sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences. (Dewey 1927, 202-203.)

This kind of experimentality Honneth sees not only in utopian socialist tradition but also in many contemporary socialistically oriented projects and initiatives. For Honneth (2017, 67) the process of socialist experimentation must begin with exploration of different ideas which point up "possibilities for economic value-creation beyond capitalism as a cooperative process aided by various institutional mechanisms". The point of socialist experimentation is the strengthening of "the social" in economic sphere, "enabling all those involved to satisfy their needs through complementary activity without compulsion or restricted influence" (ibid). According to Honneth, socialist experimentation should not shy away from the idea of market but to aim to socially reorganize market exchange according to socialist principles (ibid, 70-71).

Today his kind of view on socialism can be found also from the writings of Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright who in his *Envisioning Real Utopias* (2010) has emphasized the importance of different real world utopian experiments that

offer alternatives to capitalism. Wright's examples of these experimentations include worker co-operatives, universal basic income (UBI), Wikipedia and participatory budgeting (ibid, 89-269). What connects all of these projects and initiatives is that they have the power to strengthen power of the social against the economical power of capitalist firms and the coercive, political power of the state.[29]

However, in my view this experimentalism can be taken even further. Utopian experimentation does not need to stay within the confines of value-creation and exchange at all. Even more radical forms of utopian experimentalism can be found for example in the concept of the gift as elaborated by situationist thinker Raoul Vaneigem in his *The Revolution of Everyday Life* (2012, 58-65). The difference between the situationist utopian experimentalism and Honneth's utopian experimentalism is that the situationists did not think this experimentalism would be sufficient on its own. It needed a larger revolutionary movement to be of any real use:

> This temporary, historical utopianism is legitimate; and it is necessary because it serves to incubate the projection of desires without which free life would be empty of content. It is inseparable from the necessity to dissolve the present ideology of everyday life, and therefore the bonds of everyday oppression, so that the revolutionary class can disabusedly discover present and future possibilities of freedom. Utopian practice makes sense, however, only if it is closely linked to the practice of revolutionary struggle. The latter, in its turn, cannot do without such utopianism without being condemned to sterility. Those seeking an experimental culture cannot hope to realize it without the triumph of the revolutionary movement, while the latter cannot itself establish authentic revolutionary conditions without resuming the efforts of the cultural avant-garde toward the critique of everyday life and its free reconstruction. (Canjuers & Debord 2006, 392.)

In the next subchapter I will examine the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice. As already stated above, these kinds of practices can also be understood as forms of utopian experimentalism but in the next I will examine this concept first and foremost from the perspective of the disruptive and critical functions of utopia. It will be obvious for the reader that I have some intellectual sympathies for the idea of utopian experimentalism being important for radical transformation of society but ultimately the question of the exact role of utopian experimentalism in this transformation will be left open. Here I am interested first and foremost in the role that utopian experimentalism has in contemporary forms of utopianism and in the process of opening social imagination in the here-and-now. In this context utopian socialism in general and especially Robert Owen's utopian socialism in particular will be examined from this perspective as well.

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[29] It is important to note, however, that for example UBI can be supported from a pro-capitalist position as well. See, e.g., Friedman 1980, 120; Friedman 2002, 190-195. Not all examples of real utopias used by Wright are unambiguously anti-capitalist.

4.2 Utopian Counter-Logical Social Practice

In addition to the ideas of prefiguration, immanence, everyday utopianism and utopian experimentalism, the idea of what is here referred to as "utopian counter-logical social practice" draws heavily from the works of autonomist Marxist theoretician John Holloway. In this subchapter I will first position Holloway's work within the autonomist Marxist intellectual milieu and after that I will explore the utopian dimension of Holloway's thoughts in detail. The emphasis of this subchapter is in the disruptive function of utopia. This disruptiveness has two dimensions: practico-structural and ideological. Utopian counter-logical social practices do not only cause disruptions in the ordinary flow of things in the everyday, but also disrupt thinking. These practices do not only create cracks on the social cohesion of the present. They can also potentially create cracks in the way we perceive the existing social order. This can be called their "pedagogical function". Here utopian counter-logical social practices will be likened to the "pre-revolutionary" socialism of Martin Buber and to the utopian socialism represented by Robert Owen.

Autonomist Marxism: positive and negative

The label "autonomist Marxism" refers to a specific tradition of Marxist theory and *praxis* that emphasizes the active role of workers within capitalism. For autonomist Marxists workers have the power to act autonomously within, against, and outside the capitalist system. Whereas many other Marxist theories focus more on an objective structure of capitalism ("laws of movement" of capitalist social system), autonomist Marxist emphasize the proletariat's position as an active subject that has a certain independence from capital: the people put in the position of the proletariat (here understood both as a wage laborers and as such a component of capital) can live without capital, but capital's whole existence is dependent on the labor of the people put in the position of the proletariat (see, e.g., Negri 1991). There is no capital without workers.

But the dialectic goes in the other direction too: if the capital would cease to exist, so too would the workers as wage laborers and the components of capital - the workers would be freed from wage labor. As Marx (1956) writes in *The Holy Family*: "The proletariat [...] is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat". The working class position is not an identity to be cultivated, but a social category that needs to be abolished along with capitalism itself. As Peter Hudis (2012, 25) has put it: autonomist Marxists – or "subjectivists"

as he describes them - "contend that the focus of Marx's work is delineating the forms of subjective resistance that arise against the logic of capital".[30]

One of the earliest examples of this kind thinking can be found from Mario Tronti (1964) who in his essay *Lenin in England* writes how the objective development of capitalism has in orthodox Marxism always come first but how the perspective should be turned around and how the proletariat, the subject, should be put first in Marxist theory:

> We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the class struggle of the working class. At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist development becomes subordinated [to] working class struggles; it follows behind them, and they set the pace to which the political mechanisms of capital's own reproduction must be tuned. (Tronti 1964.)

In most versions of autonomist Marxism, the proletariat is even seen as a positive subject that replaces, conceptually, capital as a driving force of capitalism. As Harry Cleaver (2000, 45) has written, whereas the more structurally oriented Marxists tend to talk about objective laws and motions, autonomist Marxism sees, as Marx saw, how the struggles of the working class have forced the development of productivity-raising innovations, which have raised the organic composition of capital. This kind of view has been described by John Holloway (2009) as a positive conception of autonomy. In his view capitalism "develops under the impulse of the struggles of the working class, and the working class recomposes itself with each wave of struggle" (ibid, 96). In different stages of capitalism the class composition is also different. In each stage of capitalist production the proletarian resistance takes new forms.

For this kind of positive conception of autonomy, working class seems to be an identity, a positive category in which one can place others or him-/herself. According to John Holloway (ibid, 99), this way positive autonomism slides into descriptive sociology and identarian thought. Positive autonomism reifies the working-class position, makes it an identity and affirms this identity thereby downplaying the original intention of autonomist Marxism: abolition of the working class along with capitalism itself. "Since the conceptualisation of the subject as positive, the polar antagonism that gives meaning to class as class gets lost" (ibid, 97).

For Holloway this is a problem. According to him, the only way to avoid this is to understand autonomy as something negative. The theoretical framework of positive autonomism puts the positive subject of the worker against capital. However, the point is not to put the worker in the center, but to figure out ways how it is possible to stop being a worker (an element of capital,

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[30] One possible concept to describe this subjective resistance is "self-valorization"(*autovalorizzazione*) developed by Antonio Negri (1991). The concept is very abstract and almost devoid of any concrete meaning, yet in all generality it is designated to denote the kind of working class activity that does not merely react to the demands and attacks of capital, but also positively, creatively and imaginatively re-invents the world in the here-and-now. For Michael Ryan (1991, xxx) "self-valorization" refers to a process in which the working class makes its own needs as primary to capital's need for value.

that is). For sure, even for Holloway the point of departure is the working class and the class struggle of it against capital (ibid). The point of the struggle does not lie in the working class, but in its self-abolition of itself: class struggle "means a struggle against the working class itself as a class" (ibid, 98).

But if the subject of Holloway's branch of autonomist Marxism is not the working class what is it? For Holloway "working class" is not the subject of social transformation but "We". "We" refers to the working class but it cannot be reduced to the working class. We are and are not the working class, we are more than working class. We are living in a contradiction: *we* is in the position of the working class at the moment, but it has the potential to be something else too. "We" cannot be *defined* as working class: "Definition merely adds the locks to a world that is assumed to be closed. By being defined, the working class is identified as a particular group of people. For socialists, 'working class' is then treated as a positive concept and working-class identity as something to be prized, such that the consolidation of that identity is part of the class struggle against capital" (Holloway 2019a, 141). "We" is an anti-identarian subject that struggles against being defined within capitalism as abstract *labor* as opposed to a concrete *doing*.

Here Holloway refers to the two-fold character of labor within capitalism as defined by Karl Marx in his *Capital*. In this *magnum opus* Marx writes that on one hand labor is the producer of use-values that satisfy some particular needs; and on the other hand, labor is the producer of commodities, products that not only have use-value, but also exchange-value (Marx 1976, 131-133). Commodity has use-value because in order to become exchanged the commodity must satisfy *some* particular need(s). However, in order to become exchanged the commodity has to also become stripped from its particular qualities: it needs to have equivalence with other commodities. The products of labor (and therefore labor itself) has to become abstract. And because the particular characteristics of the commodity have been removed the only thing that can matter is the quantity of commodities, not the qualities. "Exchange-value appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind" (ibid, 126). "From the point of view of value, the only thing that matters about labor is its quantity, not its particular characteristics" (Holloway 2010, 91).

Abstracted labor is that which keeps adding value to capital and therefore keeps it expanding since it keeps producing new exchange-values. Concrete, useful labor - useful *doing* as Holloway (ibid, 98) puts it - that creates use-values in order satisfy human needs is here put against abstract labor that is only a way of producing exchange-value. Holloway (ibid, 92-93) elaborates:

> I bake a cake. I enjoy baking it, I enjoy eating it, I enjoy sharing it with my friends and am proud of the cake I have made. Then I decide that I will try to make a living by baking cakes. I bake cakes and sell them on the market. Gradually, the cake becomes a means to gaining an income sufficient to allow me to live. I have to produce the cake at a certain speed and in a certain way so that I can keep the price low enough to sell it. Enjoyment is no longer part of the process. After a while I realise that I am not earning enough money and think that, since the cakemaking is in any case merely a means to an end, a way of earning money, I might as well make something else that will sell better. My doing has

become completely indifferent to its content, there has been a complete abstraction from its concrete characteristics. The object I produce is now so completely alienated from me that I do not care whether it is a cake or a rat poison, as long as it sells.

The useful labor – or doing – operates here around the logic of communal benefit, enjoyment, and self-realization. Abstract labor on the other hand operates here around the logic of exchange, money, and capital accumulation. [31] Human activity and social practices are here organized around very different logics. It is on the basis of this distinction I build my concept of utopian counter-logical social practice. Utopian counter-logical social practice is that kind of social practice that can challenge the existing practices, similarly the useful doing can challenge the logic of abstract labor. It can also create cracks in the social cohesion of existing society by disrupting the ordinary flow of social-life and the way we think of social-life.

These two logics determine how the human world is produced and changed and how human beings are produced and transformed as subjects in the process. Different logics of *praxis* produce different kinds of worlds and different kinds of subjects inhabiting these worlds. To paraphrase John Holloway, in these logics of *praxis* there is the negation of the logic of capital and the affirmation of *the possibility* of alternative *praxis* existing as negation, as opposition in the "mode of being denied" (Holloway 2019a, 213; Dinerstein 2018, 543). I articulate this two-way interaction as follows: utopian counter-logical social practices can not only cause changes in the historical human world (create cracks within it), but also change the consciousness' of the people participating in these practices. A different logic of social practice produces a different kind of consciousness. It transforms the experience of social life (cf. Holloway 2019a, 213).

When I write about utopian counter-practices, I am writing about utopias as creating points of departure, about utopias as practices that open up the present to the future. Here I am not interested in utopias as points of arrival, as permanent states of being. Rather, utopia is for me a method of opening the present for the exploration of the future. It is not about dictating the contents of the future. These conceptual developments will be elaborated more thoroughly in the following sections.

Creating utopias through cracks

It is somewhat problematic to connect John Holloway's theory of the crack to any form of utopianism since he himself problematizes the notion of utopia in his *Crack Capitalism* (2010). According to Holloway (ibid, 236), utopias "tend to define the perfect society in spatial terms". This kind of perfectionist stance on

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[31] The relationship between doing and abstract labor is not symmetrical in capitalist society. Within capitalism doing (or useful labor) can only exist in a "mode of being denied" (Gunn 1987, 20). As Ana Cecilia Dinerstein (2018, 542) has written, this is because doing (or useful labor) "is constantly transformed into abstract labour (value, money)". However, total subordination of doing to abstract labour is not possible: "doing does not fit in to abstract labour without a remainder" (Holloway 2010, 173). There is always a surplus, an overflowing element that stays antagonistic towards abstract labor.

the notion of utopia can be, as I have shown, found in certain types of utopianism. Most notably this kind of idea of utopia can be found in archistic forms of classical blueprint utopianism. Holloway openly relies on the philosopher Richard Gunn's (from my perspective misguided) formulation of the concept of utopia (ibid, 236-237). For Gunn (1985, 6) utopia is a "police action" against reality and life itself. Utopias assimilate political action to the frames of utopian blueprints. Not only that, utopias are for Gunn also "calm images of eternity, disconnected from the storm and stress of a world where desiring prevails" (ibid). Utopias are for Gunn abstract, absolutist blueprint-utopias of order and their function he sees mainly as a preventative one.

This absolutist notion of utopia is why instead of calling his theory utopian, Holloway calls it apocalyptic. According to Holloway, unlike utopias which focus on organizing space, the apocalyptic "focuses on the breaking and transformation of time" (Holloway 2010, 236). The usual understanding of social transformation (i.e. revolution) has been spatial and in its spatiality it has associated revolution with capturing or radically altering spaces, "those spaces being understood in traditional theory as states" (ibid). However, to Holloway revolution should be understood in apocalyptic terms, in terms of transforming not only space (state, town, or social center) but also time and relations within it. This for Holloway, means breaking duration, it means seeing "each moment as distinct, as full of possibilities: the realisation of these possibilities can mean driving each moment beyond its limits" (ibid). The goal for revolution is to go beyond all limits, to the point of shedding time itself and blending with eternity. A strong influence of chiliast tradition (explored in chapter 3 of this dissertation) can be seen in Holloway's theory of the crack.

To be more specific, the radical transformation of time is the transformation of social time, of socially organized time. It is possible to elaborate the idea as follows. Within the context of capitalism one could even say that one task of revolution is the breaking the dictatorship of abstract, external time (socially necessary labor time) that commands humanity from outside in the form of demands of capital. In capitalism, time is organized on the terms of capital accumulation, not on terms of human sensuousness.

There is a contradiction within capitalism between two different temporalities. The first one is capitalism's own temporality which reduces time to a uniform, regularized abstraction that does not care about the rhythm of human bodies and sensuousness. The second kind of temporality is more varied, and a contingent movement of events "that expresses the sensuous differentiations of the individuals" (Hudis 2013, 26). As Marx writes in *Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863* (1991, 493), time "is in fact the active existence of the human being. It is not only the measure of human life. It is the space for its development. And the encroachment of capital over the time of labour is the appropriation of the life, the mental and physical life, of the worker". Transformation of time can be understood as the transformation in the active existence of human beings, it is the transformation of their rhythm of life altogether, through alternative social practices.

This transformation of time can be, I argue, located in everyday behaviors and practices of the present. It can be located in the movements, rhythms and paces of the bodies within the present. It can be located in the logic of the current social practices. The active existence of human beings, the rhythms and paces of their lives, the time they occupy are conditioned by different kinds of social logics of practice. In capitalism this logic is the logic of capital. The point of utopian counter-logical social practices is to offer radically different logics to how we socially organize the active human existence in the present.

Although I disagree with Holloway's way of using the word "utopia", I still find Holloway's theory useful for developing a new kind of disruptive utopianism that does not dictate the outcome of history, but aims to open up the present. Not only are there obvious utopian qualities in Holloway's theory (see, e.g., Dinerstein 2018, 543) but it can also be used to formulate a new kind of understanding of utopia. In this new understanding utopia is not only a counter-image of the present but also a counter-practice of the present that is motivated by the desire for a better being, and which operates according to radically different logic, when compared to the logic of the existing society of the present. In this new kind of understanding it is possible to talk about utopian counter-logical practices that create cracks in the present.

Creating a crack on the surface of the present begins with saying "No". It begins with abandoning the present and creating an alternative through revolutionary capitalism cracking *praxis*. Holloway writes:

> Break. We want to break. We want to break the world as it is. A world of injustice, of war, of violence, of discrimination, of Gaza and Guantanamo. A world of billionaires and a billion people who live and die in hunger. A world in which humanity is annihilating itself, massacring non-human form of life, destroying the conditions of its own existence. A world ruled by money, ruled by capital. A world of frustration, of wasted potential. We want to create a different world. (Holloway 2010, 3.)

The different world Holloway writes about is created through the "method of the crack" (ibid, 6). The axiom of the method of the crack is that the world is always open for change, it is only the ideology of the dominating class that makes the world seem closed and finished, the present society to be the final and best society there ever could be. The walls of the closed world are rapidly shutting but the possibility for change always exists. It is only the question of revolutionary method that solves how these closing walls are to be torn down. Some revolutionaries aim to create a party led by a revolutionary avant-garde to "denounce the movement of the walls" but some (Holloway included) "run to the walls and try desperately to find cracks, or faults beneath the surface, or to create cracks by banging the walls" (ibid). Holloway of course assumes that these cracks are always there. Finding, locating, and opening these cracks is just a matter of practical-theoretical activity, a matter of *praxis*. Theory is needed for understanding the nature of the closing wall, locating the weak spots of the wall and practical activity is needed for creating and opening the cracks of the wall.

Opening of these cracks found on the walls of the present is for Holloway "the opening of a world that presents itself as closed" (ibid, 9). The

method of the crack is dialectical in the sense of Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics (see Holloway, Matamoros & Tischler 2009). It contains "a dialectic of misfitting" (Holloway 2010, 9). This simply means to think from the point of view of those who do not fit, who are left outside. It even encourages this misfitting. It encourages non-identity, escaping from the identities given by capitalism: it encourages the worker to become a non-worker. "We" are not working class, "We" are not men or women, "We" do not have a nationality. Our subjectivity cannot be reduced to the categories of the present. "We" are the non-identity, "We" are "the force that contradicts all identification, the force that overflows is subjectivity" (ibid, 14).

"We" is, according to Holloway the indefinable subject that cannot be reduced to any given identity category (ibid, 9). "We" is something that could be described as negative universality. This is where the "dialectic of misfitting" comes into play. "We" are the people who do not fit in to capitalism. "Ever more people simply do not fit in to the system, or, if we do manage to squeeze ourselves on to capital's ever tightening Procrustean bed, we do so at the cost of leaving fragments of ourselves behind, to haunt" (ibid). The fragments that do not fit into "capital's ever tightening Procrustean bed" are the basis of the crack that could open a new world. "We" who do not fit in are the basis of the crack. "We want to understand the force of our misfitting, we want to know how banging our head against the wall over and over again will bring the wall crumbling down" (ibid).

"We" is the subject that is not able to fit into the present society, into the capitalist system. But it is also the subject that does not want to fit in. It is the subject that screams "No!". "No, in this space, in this moment, we are not going to do what capitalist society expects of us. We are going to do whatever we consider necessary or desirable" (ibid, 21). The creation of the crack begins with a scream, with a "No". "In the beginning was the scream" (Holloway 2003, 15). Screaming "No!" is an act of dignity. It means that "here and now, we refuse to subordinate our activity to the rule of capital: we can and will and are doing something else" (Holloway 2010, 26).

I tend to interpret all this so that in Holloway's thought the new world is created through an alternative logic of practice. In Holloway's method of the crack, utopia is not so much a goal for social and political action, but the utopian power is in the disruptive social practice itself. The method of the crack does not accept the logic of capital or the state but creates an alternative logic of social practice in order to challenge and even overthrow the logic of the present.

According to Holloway, the most obvious way of thinking the method of the crack is in spatial terms (ibid, 27). Practicing an alternative logic of social practice will need a space, a territorial base for developing different social relations. The territorial-material base for alternative social practice "can give a particular strength to movements of negation-creation" (ibid). The creation of the crack, however, cannot be thought in terms of territory and space alone. The action that aims, for example, to decommodify vitally important resources is a form of cracking capitalism, although it cannot be reduced to any specific

territory. In this situation the crack is opened through the creation of "commons" (ibid, 29). This resource and action related cracking is the second way of understanding the crack.

The third way of understanding the crack is to understand it in temporal terms. For Holloway temporality is a crucial dimension of the struggle (ibid, 30). This dimension is important when cracks are created in complex spaces such as big cities. Creating an autonomous zone that covers the whole city might be a too far-fetched dream to be realized. Sadly, the sense of community that is, according to Holloway, needed for creating an autonomous zone is in the big cities usually lacking. "Certainly there are plenty of spatial cracks in the cities: social centres, squats, community gardens, publicly enjoyed spaces, but often our communities are formed on a temporal basis" (ibid). These spatial cracks are usually only temporary and after a finished project the organizers go their different ways. However, although these cracks are only temporary, their "rage" can "create an otherness, a different way of doing or relating" (ibid). One example of this kind crack, that has a strong temporal dimension, was created during the 2001 economic crisis in Argentina:

> The argentinazo of 19/20 December 2001 in the cities of Argentina was not just a spatial crack, it was also a temporal crack, a moment of rage and celebration when people descended to the streets with their pots and pans to declare that they had had enough, that all the politicians should go […] and that there must be a radical change. A social energy was released, different ways of relating were created. This was a temporal crack in the patterns of domination. (ibid.)

Holloway's examples of temporal cracks in the patterns of domination include carnivals and disasters. Carnivals of the medieval world were temporal cracks in which the normal relations of hierarchy were reversed or even abolished. According to Holloway, the function of carnivals is not just letting off steam (this is actually required for reproduction of social domination), but they have a much deeper meaning. Holloway refers here to Mikhail Bakhtin (ibid, 31). According to Bakhtin medieval carnivals "celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions" (Bakhtin 1984, 10). In medieval carnivals people were born in new, purely human relations that were not just products of imagination or abstract thought, abstract principles. They were experienced. The renewal of human relations happened in practical life itself. "The utopian ideal and the realistic merged in this carnival experience, unique of its kind" (ibid, 11).

However, according to Bakhtin carnivals were not exclusively medieval. For Bakhtin carnivals are "a primary indestructible ingredient of human civilization; it may become sterile and even degenerate, but it cannot vanish" (ibid, 276). Even after the rise of a utilitarian bourgeoisie, carnivals were still a part of human culture in the distorted form of private feasts:

> The private, "chamber" feast of the bourgeois period still preserves a distorted aspect of the ancient spirit; on feast days the doors of the home are open to guests, as they were originally open to "all the world." On such days there is greater abundance in everything:

food, dress, decorations. Festive greetings and good wishes are exchanged, although their ambivalence has faded. There are toasts, games, masquerades, laughter, pranks, and dances. The feast has no utilitarian connotation (as has daily rest and relaxation after working hours). On the contrary, the feast means liberation from all that is utilitarian, practical. It is a temporary transfer to the utopian world. (ibid.)

The second example, of cracks in the patterns of domination, used by Holloway is different sorts of disasters (Holloway 2010, 31). Wars and natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes for example) are (strangely) all things with utopian potential, since they not only cause suffering, but also "a breakdown of social relations and the sudden emergence of quite different relations between people, relations of support and solidarity" (ibid). Holloway refers here to Rebecca Solnit who suffered the consequences of Hurricane Juan in Halifax, Nova Scotia (ibid, 32). According to Solnit (2016, xviii), disasters such as Hurricane Juan suspend ordinary time and our roles and fates in society. The disasters cause the limits to fall away and offer new possibilities of what one can do, who one might speak to and where one's life might be going. Everyday troubles and petty desires do not matter in the disaster situation. This is the hopeful side of these often horrible and devastating disasters. The disasters change our expectations about time and how things are supposed to work. "The world is turned upside down just as surely as it is in a carnival: not just the physical but the social world as well […] they open a window onto the possibility of another world and lay bare the miseries of the existing one"(Holloway 2010, 32).

It could be said that here Holloway is (paradoxically) interpreting dystopian disasters as utopian disruptions. It could be said that here utopia can be found "masked as dystopia" (Žižek 2021, 78). His thinking can in this context be interpreted as a form of "disaster communism" as theorized by the writing collective known as Out of the Woods Collective (2020). According to them disaster communism aims to organize forms of communist relations within, against and outside capitalism in order to survive the ecological crisis caused by capitalism. Here Out of the Woods Collective stresses the importance of social reproduction. The lives of poor, the dispossessed, and the colonized are not only shaped by capitalism but involve also acts of survival and persistence *within* capitalism. These acts of survival often take form of knowledges and skills passed from generation to generation. For example, Indigenous peoples are quite familiar with disasters caused by capitalism in the form of hundreds of years of attempted colonial domination. The skills of resistance and survival they have developed during this time can be interpreted as forms of counter-logical social practice. Where these practices go beyond mere anti-dystopian survival is, however, when they open "communal horizons beyond mere despair" (Out of the Woods Collective 2020, 237), when manage to organize and govern themselves and this way prefigure new forms of social existence and social reproduction, when they manage to reproduce themselves according to an alternative (counter-)logic.

Cracks open the closed world of the present. They break with the logic of capitalist economy, of capitalist society. Cracks propose a different way of doing

things that is both parallel and antagonistic to the capitalist logic of social practice. Cracks aim to break the social cohesion that hold people in their places and obliges them to act in certain ways. Cracks aim to create autonomous space-moments of exodus (they are a form of deterritorialization) that are in conflict with the world surrounding them. "There is a constant antagonism, a constant pressure to make the otherness yield to the enormous cohesive force of the society that surrounds us [...] To make a new world means to cut the web that binds us into the cohering force of capitalist society, so that we can create something different. The enemy is the social synthesis of capitalist society" (ibid, 49-50).

In a lecture given in the California Institute of Integral Studies in San Francisco Holloway (2016, 38-40) summarizes his notion of the "crack":

> What are those cracks? We can see some cracks easily enough, we can see [...] Zapatistas. If you go into the Zapatista areas in Chiapas, you pass a sign that says 'Bad Government Stay Out, Here the People Rule.' This is obviously a declaration that here, in this territory, We are walking in the opposite direction. We're not going to let the government in and We are not going to follow the logic of the government. We are not going to follow the logic of capital [...] We reject the logic of alienated labor, we reject the logic of abstract labor, we reject the logic of value, we reject the logic of money.

The word "logic" is crucial here. One should pay special attention to it. Creation of a crack is social practice that follows a very different logic of doing than the logic of a capitalist society. It is a form of social practice that follows a (counter-)logic of its own. It can be interpreted as a form of utopian practice that opens the social world and makes room for something completely different. A crack is a rupture. It is not just a response to the evils of the present society; it is an attempt to move beyond it. It is an attempt "to create now a different set of social relations" (Holloway 2010, 55-56).

The core of Holloway's thought here seems to be in both rejecting the logic of the present and an carrying out an alternative logic of social practice. Holloway does not, however, offer a detailed description of the future society: "There is no five-year plans here, no blueprint for the new society" (Holloway 2019b, 151). The focus of Holloway is almost entirely in the present and in the fundamental openness of the future. Those utopian counter-practices that disrupt the present are about making the envisioning of a future possible. The point of Holloway is not to create a stable and permanent system that would replace the present, the point is not even in the creation of alternative institutions. In fact, institutionalization seems for Holloway to be a negative tendency that should be avoided in favor of the constant disruption of the present through what I have in this dissertation called counter-logical social practices:

> The third question, on institutions and what is an institution. I suppose what I think of as an institution is an established or habitual way of doing things. We institutionalize a practice, supposing we say here, this evening, we're all going to come back tomorrow, and we'll all come back the day after and next week again at the same time, and Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and the week after that, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, then this may be an appealing practice, it may be fine, but what I feel is that it gradually gets hollowed out, it gradually becomes a set of rules that loses its own force. If you think of assemblies, again, I think they can become institutionalized, but if an assembly is to have

life, it has to be something that people come to because they are enthusiastic about it and when they're not, they'll stay away from it. In other words, any kind of establishment of patterns is always an attempt to lay down what people in the future will do. I think that that is generally harmful; not always, but on the whole it is not the way to think about the sort of change that we want to create. (Holloway 2016, 21.)

When utopian counter-practices become institutionalized, they tend to lose their utopian qualities. Institutions dictate the future and close the world from being otherwise. When institutions are created they acquire an existence of their own, independent from the people who created them. When a political movement institutionalizes, it creates a party that goes on existing independently from this movement claiming that it represents the movement, "that it still has the same relation to us as in the moment of its creation" (Holloway 2010, 139). The institution of marriage institutionalizes love and separates it from a living relationship. It acquires "a temporality measured by anniversaries of the moment and no longer by seconds of infinite fragility" (ibid).

Institutionalization makes a part of the process of life a thing, a part of the process of life becomes an object. Institutionalization closes off the possibility of being otherwise by creating patterns of doing, creating patterns for how "things are done around here". Institutions close the world. Holloway's method of the crack is in this sense highly anti-institutional. Although I might agree with the different arguments in favor of institutions it is also true that because utopias are always (either in the form of counter-image or in the form of counter-practices) reaching outside of the present, there can be no such thing as a utopian institution. Utopianism is always dissatisfied with the present and aims to open up it and reach beyond its limits.

Utopia understood as counter-image and/or counter-practice stemming from and directed against the present excludes the idea of utopia as an end state of progress. There can be no institutional whole that could claim itself to be the realized utopia after which no change is possible. Utopias are not about achieving a given goal. Utopias are about breaking the illusion of an end, about breaking petrified institutions. They are not about arriving, they are about leaving, escaping. Utopias are about screaming "NO!" to the present.

These very abstract ideas should be made more concrete through some distinctions and examples. First of all, what is in this dissertation called "utopian counter-practice" should not be confused with the idea of "intentional communities". Intentional communities that aim to create utopian reality in the here-and-now are just one form of utopian practice. Intentional communities can be here defined as "a group of five or more adults and their children, if any, who come from more than one nuclear family and who have chosen to live together to enhance their shared values or for some other mutually agreed upon purpose" (Sargent 1994, 14-15).

Intentional community is a community that aims to be more-or-less independent and autonomous from the existing society, both in its values and in its everyday practices. It can take the form of shared households, cohousing communities, ecovillages, communes, survivalist retreats, kibbutzim, ashrams, housing co-operatives and squats (Firth 2018, 496). Intentional community is a

form of community that is guided by a certain intention, a certain idea of the good life. It aims to create spaces for a different life "outside" of the existing social and power structures. The strategy of intentional communities is in many cases one of apolitical withdrawal. However, not all forms of utopian practices are like this. Intentional communities can be seen as a form utopian practice that requires a certain distance from the existing society in order to become possible. They need a space, at least partially, outside of the existing social relations in order to make it possible to live according to shared, radically different values.

Intentional communities can in the long history of utopian thought and practice be linked with the utopian socialist tradition which, as is well known, too established experimental communities in hopes of bringing about a better society. Similarly to intentional communities today, utopian socialists too established their experimental communities outside of the prevailing social relations. They aimed to create utopia in the here-and-now as well. To use Martin Buber's concepts, utopian socialist experimental communities expressed the so-called "pre-revolutionary" utopia which can be distinguished from "post-revolutionary" utopia. The latter form of utopianism, according to Buber, places utopia in the future, after the revolution. This "post-revolutionary" form of utopianism can, according to Buber, be found from the Marxist tradition where the communist utopia is placed in the future at the end of history (Buber 1996, 10-12).

The former form of utopianism, the so-called "pre-revolutionary" form of utopianism, on the other hand, prepares in advance for the social transformation by establishing a new society in cell-form. This new cell-form society Buber (1996, 14) understands as "living and life-giving collaboration, an essentially autonomous consociation of human beings shaping and re-shaping itself from within". To use the terminology of contemporary anarchist theory, Buberian pre-revolutionary utopia is a form of prefiguration. The underlying idea here is that in these cell-form societies human beings re-shape themselves in new forms of collaboration, in these cell-form societies human beings educate themselves to be ready to live in a wholly transformed society. This "pre-revolutionary" form of utopia can be seen especially well in utopian socialist tradition in general and in the thoughts of utopian socialist Robert Owen (cf. Buber 1996, 21) in particular. Both of them will be elaborated on next.

4.3   The Utopian Socialist "Tradition"

In the introduction of this dissertation, I wrote that the tradition of utopian socialism can be seen consisting of the so-called "The Utopian Triplex": Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Henri de Saint-Simon. However, the word "tradition" should be used here cautiously since they do not form a "natural class" and were mutually unsympathetic (Paden 2002, 67). Aware of this, I will nevertheless treat them as one group of thinkers with generally shared utopian orientation towards socially harmonious society.

In terms of the historical narrative of this dissertation, utopian socialists can be in general seen as a form of temporal utopianism (they all share a general idea of progress towards better future but especially strong the temporal dimension is in Saint-Simon). However, utopian socialist tradition also contains elements of what has in this chapter called "utopian counter-logical social practice". The experimental communalism of utopian socialism can be seen as an early example of attempt to realize utopia in the here-and-now. Next I will elaborate on all three thinkers of "The Utopian Triplex". Especially Robert Owen and Owenite experimental communities become important in this chapter since they will be used as examples of the potential disruptive and pedagogical consequences of participating in utopian counter-logical social practices.

Henri de Saint-Simon

To describe the influence of Henri de Saint-Simon in the 19th century one can quote Arthur John Booth's 1871 book *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism. A Chapter in the History of Socialism in France*:

> The Saint-Simonians were among the earliest to advocate free trade through the press, and one their disciples has been called the Cobden of France. They were likewise among the first to press the claims of women to political enfranchisement, and they maintained that some of the evils most injurious to society can only be removed by securing a greater freedom of divorce. They dwelt upon the injustice inflicted upon the majority of mankind in civilised communities by the inequalities of education and of fortune. [...] The name of Count Henry de Saint-Simon has attracted far more attention since his death than during his life. It has become associated with a singular sect of religious and social innovators, who entertained the Parisians, for a few years, with long beards and grotesque costumes, and concerning whose morality certain sinister rumours were current. (Booth 1871, iv & 3.)

Saint-Simon's influence is not, however, limited to his direct followers. According to Ghita Ionescu (1976, 18), without Saint-Simon the western world would not have Comte's positivism, Durkheim's sociology, Marx's communism nor Proudhon's anarchism in the form as they are now known. The common denominator of all these big names of social theory is that they theorized what Saint-Simon in his own work called "industrial society" or "industrial system". It is also possible use such terms as "modernity" or "capitalism" to describe this system depending on what aspect of it one wants to emphasize. Saint-Simon himself, however, wrote and talked only about "industrial society". This is why Saint-Simon's utopia is also constructed around industry and his politics of industrial society developed around the idea of "politics of abilities" (ibid).

According to Vincent Geoghegan (2008, 24), the contrast usually suggested between scientific and utopian thinking is inapplicable to Saint-Simon. According to Geoghegan (ibid), Saint-Simon's aim was to construct a science of humanity which would reveal the tendencies which would inevitably lead to a new society. This new utopian society was for Saint-Simon nothing but "the culmination of current trends" (ibid, 26). Utopia and science were not opposed in Saint-Simon's thought. They had a complementary relationship.

According to Saint-Simon (1976, 99), we cannot imagine any other kind of society than one which "is the whole unified body of men who are engaged in useful work". According to Saint-Simon (ibid), society has two equally evil enemies: anarchy and despotism. To keep both of them under control, society needs a constitution which is the only barrier one must respect: "against and outside it, no work is useful. Within the limits which it lays down, the widest freedom can do no harm" (ibid). For Saint-Simon freedom is the only true need of the men who are engaged in industry, in useful work, and who collectively form the legitimate society. For them, freedom means the freedom to produce and to have uninterrupted enjoyment from the products they have produced.

According to Saint-Simon (ibid), man is naturally lazy and will only work in order to fulfil his needs and desires. However, in a society where the pleasures are manifold and far greater than his productive capacities the producers are forced to exchange some of that which they produce for those products they cannot obtain directly from their own labour. "This necessity (which becomes a source of wealth for him) is the only one he recognizes, the only one to which he willingly submits. Thus, the industrious man as such is only really subject to one law, that of self-interest" (ibid).

In the present society, however, there are a group of parasites who have not been able to overcome their natural laziness and who produce nothing while still consuming. They live on the work of others, "they are idlers, that is, thieves" (ibid, 100). And because of these parasites, the producers are in danger of being deprived of the good things they have worked for. This creates the need for government, which, according to Saint-Simon (ibid), exists solely to combat idleness and the harms it causes for the industry. The problems, however, begin to appear when the government does not respect its boundaries:

> Idleness is the concern of the government. The moment government activity moves outside this sphere, it becomes arbitrary, usurping and thus tyrannical and hostile to industry. It promotes the very evil it is supposed to prevent. Since a man works for himself, he wants to work in his own way. Whenever an action from above, external to industry, interferes with it and claims to rule it, industry is hampered and discouraged. Industrial activity ceases in proportion to the constraint it suffers. If those engaged in industry can be ruled, it is not in their capacities as industrial workers. (ibid.)

The government has some usefulness but the industry itself needs as little government as possible. According to Saint-Simon (ibid, 101), there is only one way to ensure this: to make the government govern as cheaply as possible. According to Saint-Simon (ibid), even the man of lowest intelligence will agree to pay taxes if it secures safeguarding his peace and "sees that he is not molested in the enjoyment of his possessions". The man of lowest intelligence would also agree that this task should be carried out in the cheapest and efficient way possible.

In Saint-Simon's theory of industrial society there are total of three orders of workers: those who produce, those who guard the producers and, finally, those whose profession it is to think about the general interest of the society. These workers Saint-Simon calls "the political writers" (ibid, 102). These writers

are, according to Saint-Simon (ibid), needed to make the government to administer the society rationally, according to the general interest. The ideal situation for Saint-Simon would, however, be one where government itself is no longer needed and the work of political writers illuminates the work of industry without the government as an intermediary. Industry should make common cause with the political writers. (ibid, 102-103.)

Saint-Simon's theory is both an attempt to describe the rising modern industrial, capitalist society and an expression of an industrial-scientific utopia. It could be said that Saint-Simon's utopia is essentially an idealization of the modern industrial society. It is also essentially an organicist utopia. Saint-Simon adapts the theory of anatomy from Marie Francois Xavier Bichat and turns it into a theory of three social functions. Bichat had identified three types of humans and these types would determine the three main functions and therefore the three orders of society in Saint-Simon's theory. In Saint-Simon's theory the good society would a one where harmonious association or co-operation between the three orders would exist and the three functions would work properly. What important in Saint-Simon's vision is that everyone has their place in society. In a way, the spirit of Plato's *The Republic* is still strong in Saint-Simon's utopia. In Saint-Simon's vision of a good society a natural elite corps capable of leading direct the other classes. Leadership is not for Saint-Simon a generalized capacity in which all men were more or less equal, but a very scarce capacity reserved for a chosen few. And since the natural elite of the industrial society was based on their capabilities, there is no room for class or power conflict in the future utopian society. Men find their way into the elite because their natural talents draw them there and not through political struggle. (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 600-605.)

In Saint-Simon the temporal, future-oriented dimension is much stronger than its experimentalist, "pre-revolutionary" side. In its temporality Saint-Simon's utopianism comes very close to that of Condorcet. Like Condorcet, Saint-Simon believed that it is possible to trace the general course of development of human society (Taylor 1982, 51). Much stronger emphasis on utopian experimentalism can be found from the other two members of "The Utopian Triplex". Although there is a temporal, future-oriented dimension in Fourier and Owen too, in them we can also find attempts to reorganize the social world in the here-and-now in the form of experimental social practices. In the case of Charles Fourier, I will emphasize his ideas about reorganizing the way labour as a social practice is carried out in society. In the case of Robert Owen, I will emphasize his attempts to transform humanity itself through the pedagogical effects of the social organization and practices carried out within it.

Charles Fourier

The utopia of Charles Fourier can be described as psychological, affectual, and even hedonistic. In Fourier's utopian philosophy, the concept "passionate attraction" has a central place, and it refers to the problem of the social. How do people come together? How do they form societies and communities? The theory of "passionate attraction" is essentially a theory of association and its opposition:

repulsion. Fourier argues that his theory agrees "in all respects with the laws of material attraction as explained by Newton and Leibniz" (Fourier 2006, 16). Here Fourier refers, of course, to the third law of Newtonian physics according to which to "every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts" (Newton 1846, 83). In Fourier's theory attraction and repulsion are interchangeable to Newtons "action" and "reaction".

Fourier, however, develops this analogy between attraction/repulsion and action/reaction into a theory of four movements where the law of attraction and repulsion extends from purely physical reality to material, organic, animal and even social realities (Fourier 2006, 16). The "four movements" in Fourier's theory are different parts of one "universal movement" of social evolution in which social, animal, organic and material elements become combined (ibid, 36).

According to Fourier (ibid, 40) the process of social evolution of mankind has four phases. The first phase Fourier (ibid) calls "infancy". The second phase is the phase of growth. The first two phases are the phases of ascending. In these two phases mankind rises out of incoherent social life and starts to form new social combinations. According to Fourier (ibid, 41), because of the incoherence of the human social life, humans have been "excessively unhappy for five or six thousand years, the history of which has been chronicled. Hardly seven thousand years have elapsed since the creation of men, and for all that time we have gone from one torment to the next". The beginning of human history has been the history of suffering. In the second phase of history, however, mankind will discover the laws of social movement and begins to reorganize its social life.

The first two phases are phases of unhappiness but the next two phases of the four are in turn the phases of happiness. According to Fourier (ibid), the latter two will "last seven times as long as the ages of unhappiness" and the age of happiness will begin when mankind learns to create new combinations of social life which will replace the old forms of social life. The concept of "passionate attraction" (ibid, 74) will explain how these new combinations are created. The passions of man have twelve known forms: "the five luxurious or sensuous passions (sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste), the four affective or group passions (friendship, love, familism, and ambition) and the three distributive passions (the cabalist, seeking intrigue; the butterfly, seeking variety; and the composite, seeking synthesis)" (Hayden 1976, 150). All these passions will be fulfilled in Fourier's utopia which he calls "Harmony".

According to Fourier (1971, 274), workers were in early capitalist society motivated to work only because of the fear of starvation and punishment. Their passions were not fulfilled. Industrial work was monotonous, dull, and exhausting and it caused only suffering and alienation. This problem of industrial work was at the heart of Fourier's idea of "attractive labour". Fourier's aim was to transform work into a pleasurable activity since pleasure was the only thing that truly motivated man. The law of attraction is for Fourier the central law of nature which can develop work into something more motivating:

> Only God invested in the power to distribute attraction. He wishes to guide his universe and its creatures by attraction alone. To attach us to agricultural and manufacturing work he has devised a system of industrial attraction. Once this system is put into practice, it will endow manufacturing and farming tasks with a host of charms. It may even make work more alluring than are the festivities, balls, and spectacles of today. In other words, the common people will derive so much pleasure and stimulation from work in the societary state that they will refuse to leave their jobs to attend balls and spectacles scheduled during work periods. (ibid.)

If work is to be made attractive, Fourier argues, the new form of work "must have none of the loathsome aspects that work in the present state so odious" (ibid). The new form of work must fulfil seven conditions. Firstly, each worker must be made an associate who is compensated by dividend and not by wages. In other words, workplaces must become co-operatives. Secondly, "each person – man, woman or child – must be paid in proportion to his contribution to his contribution in capital, work and talent" (ibid). The principle in the new form of work would something like "to each according to their abilities". (ibid.)

The third condition for transforming work more attractive is to make work sessions more varied. Work sessions should be varied eight times a day. This is, according to Fourier (ibid, 274-275), "because a man cannot remain enthusiastic about his job for more than an hour and a half or two when he is performing and agricultural or manufacturing task". Work sessions must be divided in eight different tasks a day because man tends to get bored if he does the same job more than one to two hours.

> By working in very short sessions of an hour and a half, two hours at most, every member of Harmony can perform seven or eight different kinds of attractive work in a single day. On the next day he can carry his activities by taking part in different groups. This method is dictated by the eleventh passion, the Butterfly, which impels men and women to flit from pleasure to pleasure, to avoid excesses that ceaselessly plague the people of civilization who prolong a job for six hours, a festival six hours, a ball six hours (and that during the night) at the expense of their sleep and their health. (ibid, 275-276.)

Fourier (ibid, 276) presents an example day of living in Harmony. A day of a worker in Harmony would start at 3:30 am and by 4:00 am the worker would join a group assigned to the stables. The work at the stables would last for one hour and after that (at 5:00 am) the worker would join a group of gardeners. After two hours of gardening (at 7:00 to 7:30) the worker would eat breakfast and after enjoying it the worker would join the reapers' group. After two hours of reaping an hour and a half long session would start with the vegetable-growers' group. This would take place under a tent. At 11:00 the worker would have a session with the barn yard series and after that at 1:00 the worker would enjoy dinner. After the dinner three two-hour long sessions would take place until a half hour session at the Exchange. At 8:30 the worker would enjoy his supper and after that the work of the day would be over and the time for entertainment would begin. After one hour of entertainment (from 9:00 pm to 10:00 pm) the worker would go to bed. In the next day the rhythm of labour would be same as the previous one but the tasks the worker performs would be totally different. (ibid.)

> The accord of identity exercises a powerful charm or attraction when a man finds that he is aided in his work by a group of zealous, intelligent and good-natured collaborators rather that the coarse, inept mercenaries, the ragged rascals that he would have had to associate within civilization. The company of polite and friendly associates makes people enthusiastic about the work which they perform during their short sessions; it makes them eager to return to work and to meet at other times for group meals. (ibid, 282.)

In his utopian thought Fourier opposes any kind of "enforced specialization" and demands education that is "unitary and integrally composed" in order to enrich "the relationship of mind and body to promote the harmonious development of the individual" (Ross 2015, 69-70). Fourier's ideas about this kind of "polytechnic" education were advanced in 1880s in the Paris Commune where Eugène Pottier demanded that at a young age every child should pass back and forth between the school and the workshop in order develop all her aptitudes and become fully developed human beings (ibid, 70).

The fourth condition of transforming work is that these different tasks must be performed in a group composed of friends who have gathered together spontaneously and "who are stimulated and intrigued by very active rivalries" (ibid, 275). This will fulfil man's desire for groups. According to Fourier (ibid, 282), members of any group are necessarily linked by an accord of identity. They share the same preference for the tasks they have chosen passionately and which they are free to change at any time. (ibid, 275 & 282.) The fifth condition for the transformation of work is about the aesthetic qualities of working environment. According to Fourier (ibid, 275), "workshops, fields and gardens must offer the worker the enticements of elegance and cleanliness". The aesthetics of man's working environments should be taken into serious consideration. Hayden (1976, 154) points out that even the location for the trial Phalanx should be located "in a pictoresque, varied location". Fourier (ibid, 235) describes the Phalanx's ideal environment as follows:

> A good stream of water should be available; the land should be hilly and suitable for a variety of crops; there should be a forest nearby; and the site should be fairly near a large city but far enough away to avoid unwelcome visitors. The trial Phalanx will stand alone and it will get no help from neighbouring Phalanxes. As a result of this isolation, there will be so many gaps in attraction, so many passional calms to fear in its manoeuvres, that it will be particularly important to provide it with the help of a good site ifr for a variety of functions. Flat country, like that surrounding Anvers, Leipzig or Orleans would be quite inappropriate and would cause the breakdown of many series, owing to the uniformity of the land surface. It will therefore be necessary to select a diversified region, like that near Lausanne, or at the very least a fine valley provided with a stream and a forest, like the valley from Brussels to Halle. A fine location near Paris would be the stretch of land between Poissy and Conflans, Poissy and Meulan.

The sixth condition for transformation of work is that the division of labor must be developed so that there would be suitable tasks to people of each sex and every age. According to Fourier's seventh condition for transformation of work this distribution of tasks "must assure each man, woman, or child the right to work or the right to take part at any time in any kind of work for which he or she is qualified" (ibid, 275). So, although the division of labor should be carried to the supreme degree, the different tasks should not hold workers as prisoners but the

workers should have the right to change tasks whenever they feel like needing change. (ibid.)

The eighth and final condition for the transformation of work from dull, oppressive and alienating labor to attractive labour is that people should have to be able to enjoy "a guarantee of well-being, a minimum income sufficient for present and future needs. This guarantee must free them from all anxiety either for their own welfare or that of their dependents" (ibid). Here Fourier seems to be referring to a system similar to what we today call universal basic income (UBI).

These eight conditions should be met before attractive labour becomes possible. The idea of attractive work is based on the premise that man is not motivated primarily by morality but mainly by the law of attraction. Man moves to direction where he is attracted to. If one wants men to work harder, work itself needs to be more attractive. The civilization that has relied on morality (or moralism) to guide man has only been able to repress and cause neurotic behaviour. For example, according to Fourier (ibid, 332), love is something that has only been misled by the political and the moral systems. Moralists want to restrict man's passionate attraction and control it through different social institutions – one being the institution of marriage. Moralists are in "relentless war against pleasure" (Fourier 2006, 85). Although man's sexual needs might sometimes be as urgent as their hunger or need to sleep, the moralist still begins to cite "200,000 volumes of theology and the 400,000 volumes of philosophy" (Fourier 1971, 336) to keep the sexuality of men and women in order.

According to Fourier (ibid, 336-337), this kind of repression can, however, have serious consequences not only to the repressed individual but to others as well. Fourier (ibid, 337) argues that all sorts of acts of sexual violence can be seen as distorted version of the original human passions. As an example, Fourier (ibid) tells a story about a young man who went on a raping spree and raped at least six women whose ages ranged from sixty to eighty. According to Fourier (ibid), it "is evident that this young paragon was acting out of need, and it is also evident that the sexual needs of men and women can become just as urgent as their need for food".

The repressive nature of civilization's moral systems and speculative philosophy only creates this sort of pathological behaviour. To remove all sexual violence from human societies, all sorts of passions should be allowed, even the destructive ones. "In the state of harmony the patently destructive passions are not sublimated, they are merely channelized and used in a salutary manner by being appropriately combined with others" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 663). For example, Fourier wanted use hordes of little boys as disposers of filth since they were so keen on wallowing in dirt (ibid). For Fourier, there is no point in repressing these passions but to use them in something useful.

Fourier's philosophy inspired many communal experiments especially in the United States during the 1840s (Hinds 1908, 250). These Fourierist communities were mostly organized around the principle of reconstructing society "by gathering large numbers into unitary dwellings" (Noyes 1870, 193).

The economic structure of these dwellings was based on the Joint-stock principle. Here Fourier's plan differs from Robert Owen's communal experimentalism which was based on what Noyes describes as "Communism" (ibid, 194). In Fourier's plan people come together as business partners. In Owen's plan, however, people come together as families and communities (ibid). Next I will elaborate on Robert Owen's version of utopian socialism.

Robert Owen

As Friedrich Engels (2003) writes in his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Robert Owen had adopted the teachings of those philosophers who Engels labels as "materialist". That is, the teachings of English empiricists and French Enlightenment thinkers and materialists. According to Engels, the ideas of these thinkers can be found in Owen's doctrine which claims that "man's character is the product, on the one hand of heredity; on the other, of the environment of the individual during his lifetime, and especially during his period of development" (Engels 2003). This idea is presented in Owen's (1816) work *A New View of Society.*

In the beginning of the first essay of *A New Vision of Society* Owen writes as follows: "Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men" (Owen 1816). The character of men is formed by the social surroundings and social practices of their communities and societies.

According to Owen, in the 19th century there lived over 15 million members of the poor and working classes in Great Britain and Ireland. The character of these people was, according to Owen, "permitted to be very generally formed without proper guidance and direction, and, in many cases, under circumstances which directly impel them to a course of extreme vice and misery; thus rendering them the worst and most dangerous subjects in the empire" (ibid). And those who had been formed with guidance and direction were educated "upon the most mistaken principles of human nature" (ibid). This situation could produce nothing but personalities "totally unworthy of the character of rational beings" (ibid). He felt this situation also could not rise above the disorder it created: because of the nature of its inhabitants, the society needed efficient corrective measures to keep itself together.

To correct this situation, Owen offered his own principle of character formation. This principle is: "Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means" (ibid). These means were, according to Owen, "to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men" (ibid). For Owen, the formation of character, education was a deeply cultural, social and even political process.

The control of this process should be in the hands of the likes of Owen himself. Owen's system can be for a good reason described as paternalistic

(Manuel & Manuel 1979, 679; Simeon 2017, 4). When Owen took control over the cotton mills at New Lanark in 1800, he found there a community of workers already in existence. The workers had been recruited by Owen's future father-in-law David Dale. Owen had to reason these workers "out of drunkenness and irregular habits and into perfect communal order" (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 679). Owen also established an educational system in New Lanark which was based on molding children through changing their habits gradually. "The power of habit" (ibid) was like a god for Owen. The power of habit "shaped good moral characters fit to live in a new moral world" (ibid).

According to Owen, the education of children should have a rational plan. These plans should guide and train children from their earliest infancy in good habits. The children must then "be rationally educated, and their labour be usefully directed" (Owen 1816). When educated and trained properly the children would, he envisioned, embrace "an active and ardent desire to promote the happiness of every individual" without preferring any sect, party, or country. The children will also be ensured with health, strength, and vigour of body. "[T]he happiness of man can be erected only on the foundations of health of body and peace of mind" (ibid). According to Owen, the future utopia is created through the education of utopian men. The lives of men should be organized rationally in order to create rational society. Owen's thought and practice grew out of the normative, rationalist Enlightenment school that believed that every man was capable of listening to the voice of reason, that every man could be persuaded by argument (Manuel & Manuel 1979, 680).

This vague and abstract idea of educating utopian men is one of the key ideas of Owen. It was mocked as his "one idea" and he developed it his whole life (ibid, 683). A more developed version of the idea can be found in his 1854 book *The Future of the Human Race*. The book aims to present "the actual practice that will make the human race good, wise, and happy" (Owen 1854, 3). The book still emphasized the role of environment, those conditions that man is surrounded by from his birth. According to Owen, it is by tinkering with the environment that the goodness, wiseness and happiness of man can be achieved. Only when man is surrounded with those conditions that train and educate everyone physically, intellectually, morally and practically the full potential of each individual can be actualized. Owen believed that these kinds of conditions could be commenced in his own time all over the world. These new conditions would "supersede the existing most injurious conditions which prevail throughout the entire society over our globe" (ibid).

There are three key elements in these new conditions that Owen emphasizes: 1) abolishment of religion, 2) abolishment of marriage, and 3) abolishment of private property (ibid, 5). When Owen's utopia has been realized through education and training, mankind will not need religion, marriage nor private property. If even one of these three still exists, mankind has not yet arrived in utopia. For Owen, no religion other than the religion of increasing happiness of mankind is useful or truthful. Otherwise religions have no place in human

society. Religion only obstructs the growth of man into a rational being. (ibid, 5-6; see also Davis 2011, 99.)

Abolishing marriage too is a precondition for men and women becoming rational. The relationship between men and women will become rational only after the time when men and women do not have to obey man's irrational laws. Also, when marriage is abolished the traditional family will also disappear. Children will no longer be raised and educated within the family and they will, therefore, no longer be made "family-selfish, and unjust to all other families" (Owen 1854, 6). This is why abolishing marriage and family will bring about true equality. "It is only thus that men and women can be trained and educated from birth to become truly good, wise, and happy, and that the human race can become superior citizens of the world, and be united to form one cordial brotherhood" (ibid). In Owen's utopia, man will be so trained and placed that he will love his neighbor as he loves himself and will not have any enemies. This would, according to Owen ensure permanent peace and good will on earth (ibid).

Once religion, marriage and family had been abolished, the third abolishment, the abolishment of private property would, according to Owen, "naturally and gradually cease to exist. For private property and truth, charity, love, justice, goodness, wisdom, unity, and happiness, can never co-exist" (ibid). According to Owen, the institution of private property is possible only in the lower states of human development. In rational society private property would not exist. All property would be public. Abolishing private property would also remove the need for protection of private property: no longer would the possessors of property need to be afraid of thieves or robbers. When everything is owned publicly, the incentive for stealing disappears. All the protection that is now needed for private property would disappear in a rational society (ibid, 6-7).

Owen's thinking not only guided his own practical social experiments in New Lanark, Scotland and in New Harmony, Indiana, United States, but also inspired a new co-operative movement. This Owenite movement, as it was called, built new utopian communities in the surrounding areas of London, Glasgow, Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and New York. Although all of these communities identified as "Owenite" there was a lot of ideological variation among them: enthusiasm for Owen's utopia attracted not only supporters of co-operative thought, but also Christian socialists, feminists and other kinds of dissenters and radicals. What unified this heterogenous bunch was agreement on the validity of Owen's labor theory of value according to which "manual labour, properly directed, is the source of all wealth, and of national prosperity" (Owen 1820, 2) and the promise it contained that the workers alone should control the production and trading relations. (Simeon 2017, 143; see also Thompson 1966, 790.)

In Robert Owen's utopia human beings are formed in new ways through different communal practices. Human beings are formed in communal education (Kumar 1990, 17). They are educated to become social, unselfish, and rational. It is not an overstatement to say that in Robert Owens's thinking, education is seen

as the most powerful utopian force which is the key factor in bringing about a better world (O'Hagan 2011; Donnachie 2014; Rogers 2018, 262-265). "With its ability to fashion new human beings, education was both the means and ends of social regeneration" (Simeon 2017, 98). Education has a prefigurative function in Owen's thought. Although this core idea should not be overstated, it should still be acknowledged when talking about any type of utopian social practice. Alternative forms of social practice do have the potential to change the people participating in it.

This is why counter-logical utopian social practices can be seen having the power to not only change the world but also create a possibility for subjective change. They have the power to not only create cracks in the social cohesion of the existing society, but also can potentially create cracks to the perception of the social world, in the way we experience and interact in the social world. Counter-logical utopian social practices can teach us to see the present society from a surprising perspective, they can teach us to see the possibilities for being otherwise. These practices do not, however, need to exist in a community separated from the existing society. These practices can also exist within the present in the form of a lived utopia.

Utopian counter-logical social practices have a certain pedagogical function: they can teach us how to see the social world otherwise and how to be otherwise in the here-and-now. This pedagogical function links the idea of utopian counter-logical social practice to Owen whose whole philosophical and political project centered around the utopian potential of education, the utopian potential that social practices can have when take part in the formation of a person. What is obviously missing from this dissertation is the discussion and elaboration of utopian pedagogy. At best pedagogy has an enormous utopian potential. Or at least this can be the case when pedagogy is not located solely in schools or other formal institutions of education: it should be seen as a crucial dimension of all social practices and, therefore, a crucial dimension of utopian counter-logical social practice as well.

4.4 Examples of Utopian Counter-Logical Social Practices

What is here called "utopian counter-logical practice" is about creating new forms of practices within the present and it does not need to step outside of the present, it can also work against the present within the present itself. It is about following a radically different logic of doing in the here-and-now which is motivated by desire for a better being. Examples of this kind of counter-practices can be found from the theory of P2P (*peer to peer*) and timebanking which both abandon the profit logic in favor of a logic of benefit in social practices – a benefit logic. Both these examples express the idea of the possibility of an alternative logic for the present. They do not, however, imply that a new community should be created outside of the present, they aim to turn the logics of the current social practices into new configurations.

In their *Peer to Peer. The Commons Manifesto* Michel Bauwens, Vasilis Kostakis and Alex Pazaitis (2019, 15) argue for the possibility of a new social logic of value production to emerge from within the present social world. This new logic of value creation is based on what Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis call the generative model of peer production in opposition to the extractive model of capitalism. The extractive model of capitalism relies on the profit logic: everything it does is aimed at maximizing the profit through exploiting nature, human labor and human interaction, social cooperation. The latter form of exploitation can be seen especially well in the form of cognitive capitalism which exploits networked social cooperation through unpaid activities that can be capture and financialized by propriety "network" platforms. Cognitive capitalism extracts the positive externalities created through human cooperation. For example, the logic of practice of many commercial social media platforms such as Facebook, Uber, Airbnb and Kickstarter are based on capturing the value of their members' social exchange, on gathering the data of their users' interactions and then monetizing this data for profit. Cognitive capitalism focuses on the logic of extraction in every step it takes (ibid, 37).

The general logic of capitalism can be derived from this extractivist model of value creation: it is the logic of profit that motivates the whole capitalist social system. What Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis suggest is a shift of logic from the extractivist capitalist logic to a new logic of social practice, to a new logic of production. This new logic of production can be called "commons-based peer production" - CBPP in short. CBPP can be seen as a counter-practice to the extractivist logic of capitalism since it does not work according to logic of profit but rather according to logic of benefit: its priority is to produce use-values instead of exchange-values (ibid, 11)."CBPP is socially embedded and oriented towards the creation of use-value. It does not rely on individual motives to gain from barter and trade to allocate resources; sharing freely is considered virtuous" (ibid, 15).

CBPP can be described as "a new logic of collaboration between networks of people who freely organize around a common goal using shared resources […] The creative energy of autonomous individuals, organized in distributed networks, produces meaningful projects, largely without traditional hierarchical organization or, quite often, financial compensation" (Bauwens & Kostakis 2016, 163). Examples of this kind of logic of practice can be found from such projects as Wikipedia and Linux which do not work according to the logic of profit but according to the logic of benefit and use-value (ibid).

According to Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis, this new logic of social practice has its political effects. From "a Gramscian perspective" they argue that CBPP can potentially have the power to advance alternatives to "what is considered 'normal' and legitimate" (Bauwens, Kostakis & Pazaitis 2019, 31). CBPP has the potential to create cracks on the social cohesion of the present and open up the possibility for a different future. CBPP "relativizes" the extractivist capitalist logic with a radically different logic of doing, and creates a crack from which a different future can arise. Even if the future society does not as a whole

evolve resemble the CBPP, it still has had its political function of creating cracks on the surface of the social cohesion, it has had its political function in counter-hegemonical endeavors.

A similar counter-logic of social practice can also be found from the idea of time-based currency or "timebanks". They too organizes themselves around the logic of communal benefit, instead of around the logic of profit. The core idea of timebanks can be described as follows:

> The main principle of timebanking is that everyone's time, work and needs are of equal worth. One hour of babysitting is equal to one hour of helping an elderly neighbor or providing accounting services. It is fair to say that this essential principle of timebanking stands in stark contrast to the premises of the current money system and capitalist markets, which value everyone's time and effort in highly unequal ways. Timebanking provides an alternative by helping people meet important personal and household needs in more socially satisfying, equal ways. (Peltokoski, Toivakainen, Toivanen & van der Wekken 2015.)

The logic of timebanking is here put against the logic of capital, against "the premises of the current money system and capitalist markets". Timebanking offers a radically different logic of social practice, a radically different form of economical interaction. Timebanking presents a counter-logic that has the potentiality to clash against the logic of the present. In 2013 this clashing happened in Finland, when the tax authorities of the state came out with new taxation guidelines. These new guidelines required taxing skilled work services of timebanks according to their market value (in euros) (ibid). The State of Finland required translating the logic of the social practice of timebanking to the logic of money, to the logic of profit. The two logics were fundamentally incompatible, and the new logic of social practice realized by timebanking clashed against the logic of the present.

In addition to CBPP and timebanking, there are plenty of other examples of what I consider to be utopian counter-logical social practices that clash against the present and have the possibility to create cracks on the surface of the present where from a future could arise. Chris Carlsson (2008) has in his book *Nowtopia* presented all sorts of different versions of utopian counter-logical social practice: vacant-lot gardeners, "outlaw" bicycling and cash-free gift economy practices (cf. Vaneigem 2012, 58-65). All of these practices can be seen as standing against the logic of the present society. It could be argued that they are all practices that live utopia in the here-and-now. These practices enter, to paraphrase John Holloway, "into another world, a world based not on abstract labour but on useful-creative doing, not on value but on use value" (Holloway 2018, 387). Utopia can be understood here as a world that already exists here-and-now, in the cracks, as a movement.

Instead of the context of intentional communities, the utopian counter-logical social practice should be interpreted as "lived utopianism", as "a process in which utopian critique and creativity are enacted in attempts to change thing for the better, here and now" (Sargisson & Sargent 2017, 22). The notion of utopian counter-logical social practice should be interpreted as a process that in its existence alone relativizes the present social logics of the current society. It is

a process that by shifting the logic of social practice in a radically new position has the possibility to create cracks within the existing society.

However, many differences can be seen between different utopian counter-practices. Some of these practices can be described as "single-issue utopian social practices" meaning that they deal with a specific social issue: above mentioned timebanking and CBPP are both representatives of utopian counter-logical social practice that takes the single-issue form (although they do, of course, have larger utopian implications). They both aim to answer and offer alternatives to very specific social problems.

In addition to this single-issue utopian counter-practice, the second kind of utopian social practice can be described as "integrated". These utopian social practices can be seen as integration of multiple single-issue social practices. Usually, this integration takes place in some form of intentional community where different alternative logics of social, economic and political practices become integrated but this integration can also happen on even larger scale. For example, the Kurdish autonomous administration of North and East Syria, Rojava can be seen as a larger scale example of this integration.

When compared to the authoritarian regimes of the region, Rojava strives operate politically according to a deeply democratic logic by demanding for example the obligatory presence of women (Knapp, Flach & Ayboga 2016, 69). It also aims to operate against the very concept of nation state by creating alternative structures of decision making in civil society: through "empowerment, civil society tries to free itself from the hands of the state and its religious, economic, and administrative structures and so to build counter-hegemony and to activate individual parts of the society to represent civil society in councils and communes" (ibid, 123). Economically Rojava is underdeveloped, but it still strives to create an alternative logic of economic practice that differs from and opposes both neoliberal capitalism and old state socialist economies (ibid, 197). In Rojava co-operatives are seen vitally important way to establish a democratic form of economy. The goal in Rojava is to have all resources, including factories, self-governed through autonomous communes. The intention is that every economic entity is a material constituent of its institutional framework, that it is part of a larger whole that is controlled by an assembly of citizens.

When different utopian counter-logical social practices become integrated this way they move from everyday utopianism towards what has been in revolutionary theory described as "dual power" of alternative structures created by revolutionary working class against the old structures and institutions (see, e.g., Lenin 2005; Trotsky 2013). In my view, however, "dual power" does not necessarily need to refer to another government that has been erected against the existing government, as it did for Lenin (2005). Dual power does not need to be seen as a state within a state but more modestly as project of developing alternative practices against the existing social totality (see Lynd & Grubacic 2008, 68). Dual power can be here understood a starting point for the creation of a new kind social system, a new kind of community in the here-and-now outside of the present society and against it. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt (1990, 244), utopian

counter-logical social practices of the integrated kind can contain "the germs, the first feeble beginnings, or a new type of political organization". Dual power can be seen as an integrated form of utopian counter-logical social practice which already prefigures the utopia it strives to arrive at.

This connection to the theory of dual power shows that the idea of utopian counter-logical social practices can be seen having larger political and strategic implications. Although the focus or the emphasis of this dissertation is not in strategic questions, next I will nevertheless briefly elaborate on the distinction between the so-called "insterstitial" strategy of social transformation and different interstitial activities as such.

Interstitial strategies and activities

In the context of discussions about the strategies of large scale social transformation, the shifting of the logic of social practice and the creation of the crack can be located in what Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright has called the "interstitial strategy" of social transformation. The word, "interstitial" in Wright's vocabulary is used to describe "various kinds of processes that occur in the spaces and cracks within some dominant social structure of power" (Wright 2010, 322). One can find interstices from an organization, from a society and even from global capitalism. One can find interstices even from the so-called "totalitarian" systems in which centralized power can control almost every area of social life. Even in totalitarian societies there are still possibilities to follow a different logic of practice, than the logic dictating the practices of the totalitarian system. These different logics of practice within a totalitarian system do not necessarily manage to create cracks within the system, but even in a totalitarian system there is still a possibility to "act in relatively autonomous ways, rather than following the dictates of the logic of the system" (ibid, 323).

Wright gives a historical example of what this interstitiality can look like in real life social transformations. What is today called the capitalist society is often described as having developed in the cracks of feudal society. Feudal societies were usually characterized by a dominant structure of power relations in which nobles of various ranks controlled much of the land by means of military violence. Peasants with different kinds of rights engaged in agricultural production and produced a surplus to be appropriated by the dominant feudal class. Market relations (working according to a very different logic of practice) were developed in the cities where the logic of feudal social practices did not fully dictate the logic of social practice. It could be argued that over time the logic of the markets created "the context within proto-capitalist relations and practices could emerge and eventually flourish" (ibid).

It can be argued, however, as Wright has noticed, that it is different matter to: find different kinds interstitial "process and activities" within a society, and to say that they play a significant role in social change; than it is to argue for a conscious interstitial strategy (ibid). The conceptual distinction between interstitial *activities* and interstitial *strategy* should be made here. "The urban artisans and merchants in feudal society whose interstitial activities fostered new

kinds of relations did not have a project of destroying feudal class relations and forging a new kind of society. They were simply engaged in profit-seeking activities, adapting to the opportunities and possibilities of the society in which they lived" (ibid). Capitalism, which was in part the outcome of these adaptions, was merely an unintended by-product of interstitial activities born within feudalism.

There are certain interstitial activities that work according to a radically different logic of social practice than that of capitalism - community-based social economy services, worker co-ops, community-controlled land trusts and workers' factory councils – but only some of them are guided by a grand vision for the reconstruction of society as a whole. Some are mainly reactions to the realities of the existing society. What both interstitial activities and interstitial strategy have in common, however, is that they both express the idea of creating alternative social relations that are created primarily through direct action rather than through the state. It is not surprising that interstitial strategies are usually advocated by anarchist and autonomist strands of anti-capitalist thinking (ibid).

To use John Holloway's language, both interstitial strategy and interstitial activities are about creating the crack. Or, to put it in Erik Olin Wright's terms, interstitial strategy and interstitial activities are about "eroding" the existing society (Wright 2015). Interstitial strategy is, I argue, about creating counter-logical social practices. In the context of feudalism it was about following a non-feudalist logic of social practice. In the context of capitalism, it is about following the non-capitalist logic of social practice.

> The strategic vision of eroding capitalism sees the process of displacing capitalism from its dominant role in the economy in a similar way: alternative, noncapitalist economic activities emerge in the niches where this is possible within an economy dominated by capitalism; these activities grow over time, both spontaneously and, crucially, as a result of deliberate strategy; struggles involving the state take place, sometimes to protect these spaces, other times to facilitate new possibilities; and eventually, these noncapitalist relations and activities become sufficiently prominent in the lives of individuals and communities that capitalism can no longer be said to dominate the system as a whole. (ibid.)

Although Wright has in mind certain vision of the future society (see Wright 2010, 110-269) (one could call it "social socialism" since it emphasizes social ownership over private and state ownership), those activities that aim to erode capitalism are not, in my opinion, about creating a new monolithic system. They are, I argue, about eroding the present and celebrating the possibility of institutional plurality, heterogeneity, and fundamental openness for further change (cf. ibid, 368). To translate this idea into the language of this dissertation, the eroding, interstitial strategy and the eroding, interstitial activities existing in the present are about relativizing and opening the present to alternative futures.

What is here called utopian counter-logical social practice is a form of historical experimentalism and it bases itself on the idea that history in itself does not have an inner teleology that will eventually bring us to utopia. Instead, utopian counter-logical social practices experiment with different logics of social interaction, economic activities and political decision making. The teleological idea about historical progress eventually bringing us to utopia implies a static

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goal that eventually wraps itself under the crust of closed totality. But utopian counter-logical social practices do not orient themselves towards a closed future state of being, but aim constantly to keep the present dynamic and be open for change. For utopian counter-logical social practices the idea of closed totality and end of history are inherently absurd and meaningless. The closure of the world - the end of history - are impossible in the context of utopian counter-logical social practices. Rather than about closure and perfection, utopianism is about openness and about offering radical alternatives.

5 CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have examined how different functions of utopia have become emphasized at different times in the history of utopian thought. I have obviously not tried to present an exhaustive history of utopianism, rather to articulate the different forms the concept of utopia has taken during its history. The second chapter attempted to articulate the oppositional relations between what was in the introduction called relational and absolutist interpretations of the concept of utopia. The relational interpretation of the concept of utopia was in this chapter represented by Thomas More and his *Utopia* which was read as an open, ambiguous, and playful text that more than anything else functioned as a criticism of the present. The utopia presented in More's classic work was meant as a critical comparison to the existing society of 16th century England and not as a fixed blueprint, not as an absolute.

This relational character of More's utopia was, however, lost in the following decades and centuries when the so-called blueprint tradition of utopianism was developed. In the second chapter of this dissertation, it was argued that this blueprint tradition of utopianism and the absolutist reading of the concept of utopia it contains was developed through what was called "programmatic misreading" that created an "accidental tradition" in which utopias were presented in an absolutist manner. In this second chapter, this absolutist interpretation of utopia was criticized and relationalism was favored.

One of the main reasons why absolutist blueprint utopias were seen as so problematic was that they were constructed as utopias of order instead of utopias of freedom. What was central to them was not the personal freedom of the inhabitant of utopia, but a scientifically and rationally justified hierarchical social order. Here they can be seen following Plato who in his *Republic* associated happiness with living by one's nature and finding one's rightful place in the social totality. Personal expression and freedom were not at the center of these blueprint utopias, but rather social order, and this is why they could also be called "archistic utopias" that were based on ruling and coercion in opposition to an "anarchistic utopia" in which personal freedom is seen as more important than social order.

The question of the function of utopias is at the heart of this dissertation. What is the function of Thomas More's utopia? And what is the possible function of the archistic and absolutist utopias of the blueprint tradition? As was shown in the second chapter, in Thomas More's *Utopia,* the function of critique was emphasized. More's *Utopia* was in this chapter seen as having mainly a critical function. Two reasons for this were given: 1) More's *Utopia* was not meant as a facilitating goal for political action, but as a critique of the present, and 2) even if More's *Utopia* was meant as a serious political goal it could not function as such because the material circumstances were not yet fully developed for More's utopia to become realized in empirical reality. In this sense, More's utopia was still an abstract utopia without sufficient connection to the historical tendencies that would make it possible. It was an immature utopia. This kind of non-possible utopia can only be desired and not realized.

Another function emphasized in both Thomas More's *Utopia,* and especially in the utopias of the absolutist blueprint tradition, is the function of prevention or function of compensation. In the second chapter of this dissertation, it was argued that especially archistic, absolutist utopianism has the tendency to try to step outside of corrupt and messy history, and create an abstract blueprint. This can only really express the escapist desire for something different, but not function as an achievable goal of political action. For this kind of utopianism, the absolutist interpretation of utopias is the correct one. It is also at this kind of utopianism that many anti-utopian criticisms are usually targeted.

In the third chapter the formation of the so-called "temporal utopianism" was examined. Two main factors for this formation were identified. The first factor in the formation of the temporal was Jewish and Christian eschatological thought, in which history was thought to have some general meaning and *telos* behind it. The second factor in the temporalization process of utopias was argued to be the revolutionizing effect of the development of capitalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie.

As analysis of the *Communist Manifesto* in the third chapter of this dissertation showed, the historical role of the bourgeoisie was important for revolutionary thought. The bourgeoisie showed mankind that revolution could have world-improving results and that the world in itself was changeable. This development of time-consciousness applied also to the development of utopian thought. The utopias of the blueprint tradition of utopianism invited us to take a journey to an imagined better place. They created a rupture, a break between the historical reality and the reality of the imagined society. They rejected their past and eliminated the future. The new temporal utopias of rising capitalism on the other hand saw utopias as a realization of hope, the realization of the potentials hidden in the present. The new temporal utopianism of the Enlightenment projected utopian wishes into the future and this way expressed a change in the concept of utopia itself. Utopias became "euchronias", good places in the future, and expressed the optimistic mentality so common in Europe in the Age of Enlightenment. In this chapter I also explored the concept of revolution which was seen as a crucial element for the development of temporal utopias. The

writings of Karl Marx and especially the reading of Marx offered by Marshall Berman were in the third chapter used as articulations of the historical experience of capitalist modernity which creates the experiental basis for the formation of temporal utopianisms of Turgot, Condorcet and Kant.

In the third chapter of this dissertation temporal utopias were seen either as formal ideas we can only approximate or as potentials found from the movement of historical materiality itself. As formal ideas, temporal utopias were seen as measuring rods against which the empirical reality was measured. The concept of progress expressed movement towards this formal idea. This is why temporal utopias were in the third chapter seen as part of so-called "progressivist utopianism" in which utopias as formal goals were projected in the infinite future and in which utopias acted mainly as regulative devices. Progressivist utopianism was based on the bourgeois ideal of reason, set up as an ultimately unachievable goal. This goal was contrasted with the existing state of affairs. This rational goal showed for the progressive utopian that there is a gap to be bridged between the imperfections of things as they occurred in the present and the ideals formulated by reason. Progress was essentially just the process of bridging this gap.

As an alternative to this idealist version of temporal utopianism a more historically and materially grounded interpretation of temporal utopia was presented. Temporal utopias were not only formal ideas but also concrete historical possibilities. Ernst Bloch's analysis of the concept of possibility was used to articulate this more materialist understanding of temporal utopianism in which utopia itself is hidden in the material world itself. This idea can be clarified with Bloch's idea of theoretical and real possibilities.

At the end of the third chapter of this dissertation, I argued that utopianism and our capability to imagine alternative social realities, in general, has run into problems. History seems to have ended, our imaginative capabilities weaken, and positive, future-oriented alternatives to the present do not seem as easily constructed as in the past. However, as it has been shown in this dissertation, this does not mean that utopias have disappeared totally and forever. On the contrary, today there exists various utopian projects, initiatives and practices that aim to create alternative forms of being *inside* the present. Intentional communities, gift-economies, outlaw bicycling groups, vacant-lot gardeners, squats, timebanks, commons-based peer production, ecovillages, cohousing communities, survivalist retreats, kibbutzim and worker co-operatives can all be seen as forms of utopianism. Even such larger scale revolutionary projects as Rojava can be seen as a concrete, integrated form of utopian counter-logical social practice. Utopia has not disappeared. It has only taken a new form. This observation implies that the thesis of the exhaustion of utopian energies can be seen as somewhat misleading. The existence of these projects and initiatives proves something else entirely. Utopian energies have not exhausted. It is only if one clings on the temporal concept of utopia when one tends to subscribe to the pessimist notions of the end of utopia.

Many of these utopian projects and initiatives do not, however, orient according to a teleological view of history in which a temporal utopia has been placed at the end of history. This temporal conception of utopia is not able to recognize the above-mentioned projects and initiatives as utopian. New concepts are needed. One possible concept for the utopian interpretation of these projects and initiatives has been formulated in this dissertation. This is the concept of "utopian counter-logical social practice". The elaboration of this concept was the task of the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

In the fourth chapter utopian counter-logical social practices were defined as being *within*, *against*, and *beyond* the present. They are within the present since they are practices operating in the here-and-now. They are against the present since the logic according to which they are operating is different and in conflict with the logic of the practices operating in the existing society. They are beyond the present since they are also prefigurative. They prefigure possible new forms of social being in the here-and-now. The focus of utopian counter-logical social practices is in opening the present by the creation of cracks, but they also prefigure possible better futures.

In this kind of context one specific function of utopia becomes emphasized: the function of disruption. The disruption caused by utopias can happen on two levels: ideological and practico-structural. Ideological disruption refers here to the critical function elaborated especially in the second chapter in the context of Thomas More's *Utopia. Utopia* was here seen as a critique, a counter-*image* of the present that both relativizes the present and opens imagination to the possibility of an alternative.

Practico-structural disruption on the other hand refers here to the crack-creating utopian counter-*practices* examined in the fourth chapter. These practices can be seen creating cracks in the social cohesion of the present and creating new perspectives of the present for the subjects participating in them. Participating in utopian counter-logical social practices can offer new perspectives to existing society. Participating in these practices can teach us to distance ourselves cognitively from the present and evaluate critically the meaningfulness and legitimacy of our current social practices.

At the end of chapter 4 some examples of utopian counter-logical social practices were given. Especially so-called "commons-based peer production" (CBPP) was shown as a social practice which is realizing a counter-logic against the central logic of capitalist society. Another example that was used was time banking where an example could be found of how two different logics of social practice can clash against one another. These examples are in no way the only possible ones and in reality, these practices can operate at the same time in different areas of social life. The point of these examples was in the fourth chapter mainly to illustrate the way how utopian counter-logical social practices could possibly work in reality. The point, however, has not been to claim that large scale social transformation could happen solely based on these practices. These practices were examined in the fourth chapter from the perspective of the disruptive function of utopias.

To create a utopian subjectivity one needs to practice being utopian. Utopian counter-logical social practices can potentially be useful tools for the formation of such subjectivity. They can potentially teach us to see the possibilities of being otherwise in the here-and-now. The words "can" and "potentially" are very important here. Nothing is guaranteed. Utopian thought and practice are experimental by nature and there are no guarantees for success. Utopian counter-logical social practice orients more towards the present than it orients towards the future. But it does not abandon the future. Rather, it aims to open it to a plurality of different possibilities. To express one of the central ideas of this dissertation in a very compact form: utopian counter-logical social practices are *within*, *against,* and *outside* the present. They are *within* the present since they exist in the here-and-now, they are *against* the present because they tend to clash against the logics of social practices of the existing social totality. And they are *outside* the present since they prefigure a better way of being since they reach out to the future state of being. They are social practices that already in this world give glimpses of another, better world. Utopias disrupt as well as anticipate.

This disruptive function of utopias articulated in this dissertation is not based on the idea of a simple and straightforward Progress. More than about expressing any metanarrative (be it Jewish, Christian or Enlightened) utopian counter-logical social practices are about offering a radical alternative in the here-and-now. Utopian counter-logical social practices are not about homogenous historical time but about creating new temporalities, new rhythms of active existence. They are about giving history new directions; they are not about approaching some pre-given *telos*.

There are some problems that utopian counter-logical social practices will eventually have to face. One such problem is that capitalism tends to integrate these practices with itself. Those practices that are intended to work against capitalism, can end up reinforcing the power capitalism. In the case of worker co-operatives this problem was recognized already in the early 20th century. Marxist theoretician Paul Mattick has elaborated on this integration process as follows:

> The cooperative movement was easily integrated into the capitalist system and, in fact, was to a large extent an element of capitalist development. Even in bourgeois economic theory it was considered an instrument of social conservatism by fostering the savings propensities of the lower layers of society, by increasing economic activities through credit unions, by improving agriculture through cooperative production and marketing organisations, and by shifting working class attention from the sphere of production to that of consumption. As a capitalistically oriented institution the cooperative movement flourished, finally to become one form of capitalist enterprise among others, bent on the exploitation of the workers in its employ, and facing the latter as their opponents in strikes for higher wages and better working conditions. The general support of consumers' cooperatives by the official labour movement - in sharp distinction to an earlier scepticism and even outright rejection - was merely an additional sign of the increasing 'capitalisation' of the reformist labour movement. (Mattick 2007, 216-217.)

Utopian counter-logical practices need larger structural transformations to work strategically. A successful social transformation needs to rely on an interplay of multiple different strategic logics which in turn is dependent of specific historical

circumstances and on the real possibilities for (and limits on) social transformation that these circumstances enable (see Wright 2010, 371). However, the concept of utopian counter-logical social practice is not meant in this dissertation as the be-all and end-all solution to these strategic questions. Rather, the concept is meant here as a theoretical tool for uncovering certain utopian tendencies that can be found in the present. The main strategic value of this concept can be found in its disruptive function.

This disruptive function should not, however, be understood as fixed and final. Rather, like any other function of utopia, it too should be historicized and contextualized. Other functions of utopia can become emphasized in the future and it even seems that the facilitating function of utopia is getting stronger. It is possible to argue that increasing economic inequality, rampant racism, rising fascism and worsening global warming have already created demand for the return of the future-oriented utopia in which the facilitating function is emphasized. As Naomi Klein (2017, 134-136) has written, future-oriented utopia seems to be "back by popular demand":

> It's becoming possible to see a genuine path forward—new political formations that, from their inception, will marry the fight for economic fairness with a deep analysis of how racism and misogyny are used as potent tools to enforce a system that further enriches the already obscenely wealthy on the backs of both people and the planet. Formations that could become home to the millions of people who are engaging in activism and organizing for the first time, knitting together a multiracial and intergenerational coalition bound by a common transformational project. (ibid, 136.)

Especially the climate crisis has already mobilized both social movements and political parties. The international climate activist group Extinction Rebellion has for example demanded radical changes in the current system through the usage of non-violent strategies and tactics. Also, the set of policies which has been called "Green New Deal" have become a popular initiative. But how "utopian" are these kinds of movements and policies exactly? In the third chapter of this dissertation I have already expressed my doubts about the utopian nature of Extinction Rebellion (I would call it an "anti-dystopian" movement rather than utopian) but isn't Green New Deal also only vaguely utopian? Isn't Green New Deal in the final analysis only a set of policies that strive for the *improvement* of capitalist society and *not* for the creation of an alternative society? Surely there are some utopian impulses present in such demands as Green New Deal but in my opinion it is safe to say that it does not offer radical alternatives to the present (although it can arguably function as a stepping stone for more radical demands).

However, even if these policies and movements cannot be fully classified as utopian, they still express a real need for a radical change. They are the "scream" John Holloway writes about: "Faced with the destruction of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, above all a scream of anger, of refusal: NO" (Holloway 2003, 15). They can be seen as symptoms cracks on the surface of social cohesion of capitalism caused by economic, social and ecological crises. They can be seen as symptoms of "the end of end of history" (Hochuli, Hoare & Cunliffe 2021) but offering only weakly utopian alternatives.

The Gramscian concept of *interregnum* might be useful here. To paraphrase Gramsci (1992, 276), the contradiction between the No and the Yes, between the unbearable present and the desired future, consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born. In this *interregnum*, movements striving for social transformation are lacking a coherent image of the desired future. They lack a coherent program. In this sense they can be described as "non-movements" which are perhaps not utopian in themselves, but which can foster utopian orientation by attacking the social forms of the present and by making claims through direct actions (see Endnotes 2020). The struggles of the unorganized poor, the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States for the defunding of the police (and sometimes against the police institution itself), the fight against neoliberalism in Chile and still ongoing climate strikes all over the world are all part of these "non-movements" which do express their desire to leave the present but which do not yet have a facilitating, future-oriented utopia that could be used as an organizing vision.

In this kind of historical context, the task of utopias seems to be mainly to articulate the possibilities for radical social change, to open up the present and cultivate radical imagination. The point of utopianism today is to create a utopian subjectivity that is able to orient itself outside of the confines of the given social practices. The re-strengthening of the facilitating function of utopia is a real possibility but so far those future-oriented utopias that could guide social transformation are not in sight. It might be too early to declare the return of temporal utopia. Of course, there are some future-oriented utopias that have caused a lot of theoretical and popular discussion, but can these utopias be considered in any meaningful way having a hegemonic position? Can they truly facilitate social transformation? Although this is in theory possible in certain historical contexts, it seems to me that this not the case right now. It will be the task of future research to find out if temporal utopias will be able to facilitate radical large-scale social transformation in the future and help to create a wholly new and significantly better society.

YHTEENVETO

Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan sitä, kuinka yhteiskunnallisten utopioiden eri funktiot ovat tulleet korostuneiksi eri historiallisina aikakausina. Tutkimus ei ole tarkoitettu kattavaksi historiankirjoitukseksi, vaan tutkimus keskittyy niihin utopian käsitteen historiallisiin muotoihin, joita historiallisista utopiateksteistä voidaan nostaa esille, kun niitä tarkastellaan utopian mahdollisten funktioiden kautta. Tutkimus jakautuu johdantoon sekä kolmeen varsinaiseen lukuun, joissa jokaisessa tarkastellaan eri aikakausina korostuvia utopian funktioita.

Tutkimuksen keskeinen kysymys on: "Mikä on utopian funktio nykyaikana?". Tämä kysymys implikoi tietynlaista historiallisuutta. Kysymys implikoi sitä mahdollisuutta, että utopioissa voisi korostua eri aikoina erilaisia funktioita. Kysymys implikoi, että utopialla voisi olla eri aikoina eri tehtäviä. Tämän vuoksi myös laajempi kysymys on esitettävä: "Millaiset funktiot ovat utopioiden historian aikana tulleet korostuneeksi?". Ja jotta tähän kysymykseen voitaisiin vastata on kyettävä vastaamaan myös kolmanteen kysymykseen: "Millaisia muotoja utopian käsite on ottanut historiansa aikana?".

Tutkimus nojautuu utopiatutkija Ruth Levitasin teoksessa *The Concept of Utopia* tekemiin kehittelyihin, joiden mukaan utopioita voidaan lähestyä kolmesta näkökulmasta: sisällön, muodon ja funktion. Levitas erittelee kolme keskeistä utopian funktiota: yhteiskunnallista muutosta estävä funktio, yhteiskunnallista muutosta edistävä, ns. fasilitoiva funktio sekä kriittinen funktio.

Tutkimuksen toisessa luvussa artikuloidaan niitä ristiriitoja, joita ns. "relationalistisen" ja "absolutistisen" utopiatulkinnan välillä ilmenee. Absolutistisella utopiatulkinnalla viitataan tässä yhteydessä sellaiseen utopiakäsitteen tulkintaan, jossa utopiat nähdään staattisina, suljettuina ja muuttumattomina ideaaleina, joille on ominaista erityisesti autoritaarisuus, yhteiskunnallisen elämän yksityiskohtainen suunnittelu ja kontrolli. Relationalistinen utopiatulkinta puolestaan viittaa sellaiseen utopian käsitteen tulkintaan, jossa utopiat nähdään luonteeltaan avoimina, monimerkityksellisinä ja dynaamisina teksteinä, joissa esitetään ennen kaikkea kritiikkiä nykyisyyttä kohtaan. Erityisesti Thomas Moren *Utopiaa* tulkitaan tästä näkökulmasta. Moren teos on tutkimuksessa tulkittu ennen muuta 1500-luvun Englannin kriittisenä vastakuvana, ei niinkään lukkoon lyötynä, staattisena vaihtoehtoisen yhteiskunnan pohjapiirroksena. Moren utopia ei ole absoluuttinen vaan suhteessa omaan aikaansa sekä sen keskeisiin ristiriitoihin ja ongelmiin.

Tämä Moren utopian relationaalinen luonne kuitenkin unohdetaan myöhempinä vuosisatoina, jolloin kehittyy niin sanottu utopismin absolutistinen "pohjapiirroskoulukunta". Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että tämä utopismin "pohjapiirroskoulukunta" sekä siihen likeisesti liittyvä absolutistinen utopiakäsitteen luenta syntyy niin sanotusti "ohjelmallisen väärinluennan" kautta. Thomas Moren *Utopian* absolutistinen tulkinta luo niin sanotun "vahinkotradition", jossa utopia käsite yleensä aletaan ymmärtää absolutistisesti. Tähän traditioon katsotaan tässä tutkimuksessa kuuluvan erityisesti Tommaso Campanellan

Aurinkokaupunki ja Francis Baconin *Uusi Atlantis*. Tämän absolutistisen tulkinnan rinnalle nostetaan ja sitä vastaan asetetaan tässä tutkimuksessa Moren *Utopian* relationaalinen luenta.

Koska kysymys utopian funktioista on tämän tutkimuksen keskeisin, on myös kysyttävä toisaalta Thomas Moren utopian ja toisaalta Thomas Moren *Utopiasta* kehittyneen "pohjapiirrosutopismin" utopioiden funktioita. "Pohjapiirrosutopioilla" katsotaan olevan ainoastaan yhteiskunnallista toimintaa estävä, ns. "kompensatorinen" funktio, mutta Thomas Moren osalta tutkimuksessa korostetaan, että Thomas Moren utopialle ominaista on nimenomaan utopian kriittisen funktion korostuminen. Tälle annetaan tutkimuksessa kaksi syytä: 1) Moren *Utopiaa* ei tarkoitettu poliittista toimintaa fasilitoivaksi yhteiskunnalliseksi päämääräksi vaan lähinnä oman aikansa yhteiskunnan kritiikiksi (utopiansa toteutettavuuden suhteen More oli vähintäänkin ambivalentti) ja 2) vaikka Moren *Utopia* olisikin tarkoitettu vakavasti otettavaksi poliittiseksi tavoiteohjelmaksi, ei se olisi abstraktisuutensa vuoksi toimia sellaisena. Yhteiskunnan materiaaliset olosuhteet eivät olleet vielä kehittyneet niin pitkälle, että *Utopian* visioima yhteiskunta olisi ollut mahdollinen. Moren utopialla ei ollut kytköstä historiallisen todellisuuden materiaalisiin tendensseihin ja latentteihin mahdollisuuksiin, jotta se olisi ollut todella mahdollinen.

Tutkimuksen kolmannessa luvussa tarkastellaan niin sanotun "temporaalisen utopian" historiallista kehitystä. Tähän kehitykseen katsotaan tässä vaikuttaneen kaksi tekijää. Ensimmäinen temporaalisen utopian kehitykseen vaikuttanut tekijä koskee juutalais-kristillisen eskatologisen ajattelun vaikutusta, jossa historialla katsotaan olevan jokin yleinen merkitys ja päämäärä. Toinen utopioiden temporalisoitumiseen vaikuttanut tekijä on kapitalismin kehityksen ja porvariston nousun vallankumoukselliset seuraamukset. Tätä tekijää tutkimuksessa kuvataan tarkastelemalla Karl Marxin ja Friedrich Engelsin *Kommunistisen puolueen manifestiin* sisältyvän historiallisen murroksen kuvausta, jossa porvaristo osoittaa vallankumouksella olevan maailmaa parantavia vaikutuksia ja siten myös maailman olevan itsessään perustavanlaatuisesti muutettavissa. Tähän historialliseen murrokseen liittyy aikatietoisuuden muutos, joka vaikuttaa utooppisen ajattelun kehitykseen siten, että utopiat ovat abstraktien, historian ulkopuolisten tilojen sijaan nyt tulevaisuuteen sijoitettuja historiallisia, enemmän tai vähemmän saavutettavissa olevia päämääriä. Tämän utopian käsitteen historiallisen muodonmuutoksen vuoksi myös utopian keskeinen funktio muuttuu kriittistä ja kompensaatiosta fasilitoivaksi. Tutkimuksen kolmannessa luvussa nostetaan esille esimerkkeinä temporaalisista utopioista Anne Robert Jacques Turgot'n, Nicolas de Condorcet'n ja Immanuel Kantin filosofiset utopiat. Luvussa tarkastellaan myös vallankumouksen käsitettä eräänä temporaalisten utopioiden piirteenä.

Kolmannen luvun lopussa esitetään, että utooppinen ajattelu ja kollektiivinen kykymme ajatella parempia tulevaisuuksia yleensä on uusliberalismin yksilökeskeisen ideologian vaikutusvallan vuoksi ajautunut ongelmiin. Mahdollisuus sijoittaa utopioita tulevaisuuteen on ajautunut umpikujaan. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että tällaisessa kontekstissa utopiat eivät kuitenkaan katoa tyystin vaan

ainoastaan utopioiden ajallinen orientaatio muuttuu. Utopiat eivät enää projisoi toiveikkaita kuviaan tulevaisuuteen vaan orientoituvat pikemminkin kohti nykyisyyttä. Tämä muutos utopioiden orientaatiossa muuttaa myös painotusta utopian funktiossa. Utopiat eivät ole enää niin voimakkaasti tulevaisuuteen sijoitettuja yhteiskunnallisen ja poliittisen toiminnan päämääriä, jotka fasilitoisivat ihmisjoukkoja, vaan tässä-ja-nyt toteutuvia sosiaalisia käytäntöjä, joiden keskeistä funktiota kuvataan tutkimuksessa termillä "disruptio". Utopiat aiheuttavat disruptioita, häiriöitä nykyisyyteen ja mahdollistavat nykyisyyden avautumista kohti uusia tulevaisuuksia.

Tutkimuksessa myös, että nämä utopioiden aiheuttamat disruptiot voivat tapahtua kahdella tasolla: ideologisella ja käytännöllis-rakenteellisella. Ideologinen disruptio viittaa tässä siihen kriittiseen funktioon, jota tarkastellaan erityisesti tutkimuksen toisessa luvussa Thomas Moren *Utopian* kontekstissa. Ideologinen disruptio viittaa tässä ideologiseen kyseenalaistamiseen. Käytännöllis-rakenteellisella disruptiolla puolestaan viitataan niihin sosiaaliseen koheesioon halkeamia tuottaviin utooppisiin vastaloogisiin, kokeellisiin sosiaalisiin käytäntöihin, joita käsitellään tutkimuksen neljännessä luvussa. Näiden käytäntöjen teoretisoinnin lähtökohtana tutkimuksessa käytetään autonomimarxilaisen teoreetikon John Hollowayn tekstejä sekä erityisesti hänen vuonna 2010 julkaisemaansa *Crack Capitalism* teosta.

Käytännöllis-rakenteellisen ja ideologisen disruption välillä vallitsee kuitenkin myös vuorovaikutusta. Tutkimuksen neljännessä luvussa esitetään, että osallistuminen utooppisiin vastaloogisiin sosiaalisiin käytäntöihin voi vaikuttaa myös ihmisten tietoisuuksiin ja siten sen vaikutus voi olla myös ideologista. Ne voivat opettaa ihmisiä tarkastelemaan olemassa olevaa yhteiskuntaa uusista, yllättävistä näkökulmista. Utooppisiin vastaloogisiin sosiaalisiin käytäntöihin osallistuminen voi opettaa meitä etäännyttämään itseämme kognitiivisesti nykyisyydestä ja arvioimaan kriittisesti nykyisten sosiaalisten käytäntöjemme tarkoituksenmukaisuutta ja legitimiteettiä.

Neljännessä luvussa utooppiset vastaloogiset sosiaaliset käytännöt määritellään olevan samanaikaisesti nykyisyyden sisällä, sitä vastaan ja sen ulkopuolella. Ne ovat nykyisyyden sisällä sikäli kuin ne toimivat immanentisti tässä ja nyt. Ne ovat nykyisyyttä vastaan sikäli kuin utooppisten vastakäytäntöjen logiikat tarjoavat vaihtoehtoisia käytännön logiikkoja, jotka voivat potentiaalisesti törmätä olemassa olevan yhteiskunnan vallitsevia käytäntöjä vasten. Utooppiset vastaloogiset käytännöt ovat myös nykyisyyden "ulkopuolella" sikäli kuin ne ennakoivat, prefiguroivat toisenlaista, parempaa maailmaa. Utooppisten vastaloogisten sosiaalisten käytäntöjen fokus on paitsi nykyisyyden avaamisessa sekä ideologisella että käytännöllis-rakenteellisella tasolla, niin myös parempien mahdollisten tulevaisuuksien ennakoinnissa. Neljännessä luvussa esimerkkeinä utooppisista vastaloogisista sosiaalisista käytännöistä käytetään muiden muassa aikapankkeja sekä Michel Bauwensin, Vasilis Kostakiksen ja Alex Pazaitiksen kehittämää vertaistuotannon mallia.

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