Migrants' Economic Integration: Problematising economic citizenship Nathan Lillie, Quivine Ndomo

Abstract

Labour market policies to include migrants in their host societies through strategic integration activities usually relate host country belonging to labour market success, commodifying citizenship. Labour market success, however, is not “belonging;” raising the question of whether “economic citizenship” is a misnomer. National citizenships embed territorial, social and ethnic hierarchies in unequal ways. Migrants at the moment of their mobility are outside these national solidarities, and thus are commodified, with their rights depending on their labour market value. Access to national citizenship rights is an important structuring element in segmenting globalizing labour markets.

Introduction

Inclusive migrant integration is a common policy objective; however, it has a complex relationship with economic citizenship. In practice, migrant integration from both the side of the migrant and the host society is shaped by economic market rationality and its principles of valuation. Migrant economic integration is complex, dynamic, contextual, and intersectional, riven by tensions between contradictory ideals and practices. On the one hand, international labour migrants operate in an environment that structurally lies between the national and the global, so that social integration is not necessarily an objective for them, complicating their socio-political position of belonging. On the other hand, dedicated efforts to include migrants
in their host societies through strategic integration activities usually relate host country belonging to labour market success, commodifying citizenship. There are inherent contradictions in this commodification, which we explore, using TH Marshall’s theorisation of evolving and inclusive democratic citizenship as a point of departure.

Citizenship is belonging in a community, which in the modern world means belonging in a capitalist class-based society. Therefore, citizenship is at its basis, economic: egalitarian in principle but hierarchical in practice. As Dahrendorf (1974) points out, the etymology of “citizen” is suggestive of a member of the bourgeoisie. The existence of the bourgeoisie requires a subaltern working class, thus incorporating political and economic inequality into the structure of capitalist citizenship. In Citizenship and Social Class, TH Marshall’s insight was that through political struggle, there has been an extension of the notion of citizen to include the working class in Western democracies (1950). However, seventy years later, the struggle for universal citizenship remains incomplete, even as marketization, racism, (Somers, 2008) and globalization (Ong, 2006) undermine progress toward universalism. The main reason for this is the close association between citizenship and the creation and enforcement of boundaries and borders. There is a fundamental tension within a world that is predominantly structurally ‘national’, but experiences growing global and transnational mobility of people (Benhabib, 2005). As society becomes less nationally insular, more global and transnational, so do labour markets, and capital actively exploits the terrain of state sovereignty to carve out new, deregulated realms (Palan, 2003). In this context, access to national citizenship becomes an important structuring element in access to rights for migrant workers in globalizing labour markets, while citizenship becomes an important element in capitalist development and class struggle.
Migrant integration, or conversely, exclusion, should be interpreted in light of this struggle to extend or restrict citizenship. Integration is often seen as occurring along a spectrum or timeline; migrants move along it as various milestones are achieved, becoming ever more integrated. As Ager and Strang show, formal citizenship in a host country is in many respects considered an endpoint, or at least a milestone in migrant integration, as are developments such as acquisition of host country social ties, language skills and cultural skills. Similarly, obtaining employment and secure economic status (which are not the same thing) are also considered indicators of migrant integration (Ager and Strang, 2008). However, this idea of citizenship moving along a line until the migrant has “paid her dues” and becomes a member of society in good standing does not match the hierarchical and contingent structure of citizenship practice. In practice, there are individuals whose wealth, ethnicity, skills, high value passport and status let them travel freely and enjoy extensive rights wherever they go, while others, by dint of their social class, low value passport, low value skills, and ethnicity, are at best tolerated, if not excluded, when they migrate. This exclusion can be permanent, and indeed also affect the second generation of migrants (Kempton, 2002). Thus, citizenship is, alongside other labour market structuring factors such as age, race, gender, and class, both a cause and reflection of labour market segmentation and variegated integration.

This means it is important to deconstruct the idea of “economic citizenship”, which however is complex, as it embeds contradictory concepts such as equality and class stratification, and because the practice of citizenship is embedded in the structure of capitalism and the nation state system (Polanyi, 1947; Somers, 2003). Global capitalism is at once open, fluid and transnational, yet riven by inequalities along class, ethnic and national lines. Economic citizenship embeds within it tensions between a global society built on nation states with defined territories, boundaries and identities, and global capitalism which crosses these boundaries while reducing human value to an economic calculous. Further, territorial, social
and ethnic hierarchies interact in ways that define national citizenship unequally between social groups, but also commodifies and embeds social solidarity within groups. Thus, economic citizenship requires and enables an individual’s right to produce, consume and invest, that is, to engage in “market citizenship”. Global capitalisms’ hierarchies interact with the hierarchies of national citizenship, but are not identical to them. Notably, migrants are an exception to the normal status of citizenship, and more than other social groups, migrants are a useful category for our purposes because of the way their citizenship is readily commodified into *homo economicus*, or perfect market-based citizens.

Marshall’s historical progression (Marshall, 1992), first commodifying individuals through civil rights and eventually decommodifying them through social rights, allows us to theorise integration as decommodification further linking integration and citizenship as follows. Civil rights enable market freedoms, on which capitalist societies are built, and which require and assume individual autonomy and equality before the law. Market freedoms, however, destabilize society, creating risks and inequalities (Polanyi, 1947), so that realizing the egalitarian citizenship under capitalism requires *social citizenship*, which can only be realised through political struggle built on the power base created through *industrial citizenship*. *Industrial citizenship*, in its turn, results from collective attempts to realize the aspiration of citizenship in a capitalist context, but functions at odds with societies’ market basis. However, the normative and institutional foundations of citizenship are built within the confines of insular nation states, which mean that the categories and concepts make sense in their preconceived contexts, but are challenged in various ways when transnational influences such as migrants enter the equation. The remainder of this chapter is organised into five sections exploring the complex and dynamic process of migrant economic integration through economic citizenship, and concluding remarks.
Valorization of Migrants as Market Citizens

In Arendtian terms, an entirely market-based conception of the citizen sees individuals only as economic actors who lack an inherent right to have rights, except the right to buy, sell and make contracts. Migrants fit the *homo economicus* model because they must “earn” their rights through economic success and/or economic exploitability. It is in this vein that *market citizenship* develops as an alternative relational arrangement based on contingent acceptance, as opposed to full community membership requisite for substantive citizenship, which bestows identity, rights, responsibilities, and participation (Somers, 2008; Isin, 2002).

Labour markets have an explicit role in valuing migrants; most migrants are labour migrants, and, if they arrive legally, they do so on visas granted based on the labour market value of their work. The spectrum of international migrants is diverse, however roughly 70% of the international migrant stock consists of humanitarian migrants (25.9 million) and economic migrants (164 million) whose integration efforts focus mainly on economic citizenship (WEF, 2020). Humanitarian migrants are in principle not so explicitly commodified, but rather allowed entry on the basis of their need for personal safety. In fact, they are sometimes excluded from the labour market for a considerable time, until their asylum applications are decided upon (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2019). Nonetheless, being allocated to an unemployed underclass dependent on social assistance and illegal work often places them within the labour market and its’ hierarchies in the long term. Lacking nationally specific socio-economic capital for inclusion, migrants’ labour market capacity becomes the core attribute defining their relationship with the host society (Anderson, 2013).

Migrants perceived as having high status skills have many options in where they can travel and live, while those with lower status and lower demand skills have fewer and less attractive options (Shachar, 2006, p.151). Ong emphasises that “market norms of citizenship” and
governance ensure that the security, well-being and quality of life of citizens are dependent on their capacities as free individuals to confront globalized insecurities by making calculations and investments in their lives (Ong, 2006). This means access to rights for the mobile is closely correlated to class status. Because migrants who are highly valued in labour markets are likely to have a more favourable visa status than those that aren’t, they are also likely to have more social protections than those in more precarious and informal situations (Khoo et al., 2005).

The “capacities” mentioned by Ong refer partly to skills and abilities; however, labour markets are also structured by national, ethnic, and gender segmentation. What is defined as “skill” is also not independent of who holds it, and whether they are deemed an appropriate type of individual for a particular job such. One example is the monopolised and racialized ownership and use of English language as social capital among native English speaking migrants in Taiwan (Lan, 2011). Thus, there is a sorting of who can be a global cosmopolitan citizen, based on an intersection of class, country of origin, ethnicity, and gender all of which affect an individuals perceived suitability for particular work – their market value. Markets serve to legitimate the results of this sorting, concealing the inequalities and deviations from meritocratic principles underneath by turning the hierarchies into technical exercises, concealing the role of differential access to citizenship. An example is the division of labour among migrants in London on the basis on institutionally discriminative practices (Wills et al., 2009, p.259). This market power, however, is not distributed according to norms of fairness, equality, or even merit, but rather carries forward historical inequities in power and resources within and between societies. Market citizenship follows a model of human behaviour based on the economic rationality of Homo Economicus, but whether this enables freedom, autonomy and influence, or demands compliance with restrictive market norms, depends on where in the hierarchy one falls.
Market citizenship is not and never has been a completely realized project, but is nonetheless a foundational principle of contemporary capitalist society, already beginning from the formative early modern period. Margaret Somers (2008) charts how historically, the development of citizenship as civil rights and the therein-embedded economic rights, created an environment in which capitalism thrived, and drove the growth of market mechanisms as the predominant ideational regime in society. Countries adopting market regulation also became the hegemonic powers of the colonial period, and even until today continue to export the idea of markets as the fundamental regulatory institution of society. Pre-capitalist community ties which were non-contractual thus not requiring individual consent, changed as the growth of capitalism transformed community membership from non-contractual reciprocal ties to market-based citizenship quid pro quo exchanges. In sum, citizenship marketization destroyed pre-capitalist social hierarchies and categories, while also creating new ones.

Marshall, and Somers, argue that citizenship should involve full social and political inclusion as a foundational necessity, which would seem to necessitate countermovement to pure market based citizenship regimes (Somers, 2008, p.156; Marshall, 1992, p.16), because Market citizenship falls short of “substantive citizenship” (see also Delanty, 1997). Substantive citizenship denotes a richer delimitation of citizenship that exceeds a passive rights bestowing status, to an active (Delanty, 1997, p.286) social process (Isin, 2002, p.4) encompassing duties, responsibilities, participation, and identity; all as different aspects of what membership in a community entails (Holston, 1998, p.50; Delanty, 1997). The solution in modern capitalist welfare states has been “decommodification,” which happens when large-scale national social programmes (for example pension and unemployment benefits) successfully emancipate the labour force from sole dependency on the labour market for sustaining a basic standard of living (Room, 2000, p.333). Essentially, decommodification reduces workers’ dependence on their labour and thus, on the market. Paradoxically, decommodification gives both capital and
the working class in migrant host countries reasons to exclude outsiders from social rights. Native workers may want to exclude migrants to prevent their accessing benefits, which could make the programs more expensive while capital may want to exclude migrants from social citizenship, while granting labour market access, because in doing so it creates a fully commodified group, which is desperate and entirely dependent on work to live.

As Piore (1979) observed in his seminal work on labour migration, recent labour migrants find themselves in a position similar to that of Homo Economicus because they enter a new host country as supplicants whose access to rights are based on market value. Thus, although human behaviour does not normally conform to economic rationality; it is possible to compel individuals to conform to economic rationality by stripping them of alternatives. When migrating, a person with valued skills and/or wealth retains the power to refuse undesirable constraints on their rights, but poor, unskilled workers’ migration opportunities are often bound up with onerous conditions. For labour migrants the moment of mobility is usually a time of pure market citizenship, and nothing else.

**Temporary migration**

Temporary international labour migration is generally on the rise and enjoys widespread support of rich western countries’ employers, multilateral institutions such as World Trade Organization, and the majority of migration-development discourse proponents (Costa and Martin, 2018; Lenard and Straehle, 2011). It makes for a half way compromise between full-blowen liberalisation of global labour markets and nation state sovereignty and border control demands (Rosewarne, 2010). Temporary labour migration is therefore made out as a win-win arrangement where the rich Western countries receive labour from developing and transitioning countries, which in turn receive export income through economic remittance, to which their development is tied. At this macro level of negotiation, temporariness is legitimised by
transnationalism, circular migration and development rhetoric (Costa and Martin, 2018). For this reason, many migration systems exist that are temporary by design.

The moment of mobility from one context to another provides a moment of partial statelessness, during which an unintegrated migrant is vulnerable to exploitation, giving both states and employers have an incentive to extend this moment. For example, Berntsen writes of Polish warehouse workers in the Netherlands, whose employers design temporary contracts, which obliged them to return to Poland before their temporary status becomes permanent, creating circular migration pattern, which undermines the Dutch sectoral collective agreement (Berntsen, 2016). Market forces are introduced through the transnationalization of the labour market regulation and the alienability of labour rights during mobility (Piore, 1979; Lillie 2016). Temporary labour migration programmes circumvent international human rights norms and labour standards leading to extreme vulnerabilities and exploitation thereby furthering the commodification of temporary labour migrants (Costa and Martin 2018, p.38-41). Migrant workers on temporary labour contracts face different labour laws and regulations and commonly bear social risks related to self-employment, lack of access to work related benefits and exclusion from minimum wage regulations (p. 3).

From extreme kefala residence regime in the Middle East to employer tied residential permit for domestic workers in the UK, temporary labour migration programmes ensure social exclusion of migrants from the host country as well as intermittent but repeated absence from the country of origin (Surak, 2013; Hahamovitch, 2003). Typically, temporary labour migrants’ mobility within the host country is characterised by strict regulations such as prohibition to change employers, which is an infringement of civil freedom – and belies the theoretical autonomy of market citizenship. Additionally, human rights such as the right to family life is hindered by immigration regulation on family reunification, and settlement or naturalisation
For labour migrants, a conspiracy of circumstances make inevitable the choice of behaving as a version of *Homo Economicus*, internalizing market norms and legitimating self-exploitation and/or acquiescence with exploitive migration regimes (Matyska, 2019).

**“Earning” Citizenship through Integration**

Migrants are not always held in a permanent state of suspended access to rights, and whether they arrive for a temporary job or for some other purpose, as they stay they become “integrated” into their host society. The International Organization for Migration defines integration as a two way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, resulting in migrants incorporation in the social, economic, cultural, and political life of the receiving community, demarcating the overarching objective of integration as social inclusion and social cohesion. (IOM 2019, 104). Visa programs and sometimes even supporting policies are designed with the idea of attracting migrants who are perceived as desirable, by reason of their profession, personal resources or willingness to work. Social class does not predetermine whether a migrant will be admitted or eventually integrated, but does put them into categories with varying paths to integration and possible eventual citizenship. For this reason, if a migrant is needed for a job, and willing and able to do it, social integration is rarely a priority, while even second generation immigrants who are unsuccessful on the labour market are only reluctantly accepted. This priority is underlined by the fact that most migrant integration programmes today are shifting their focus to economic integration first then social integration (Damm and Åslund, 2017).

Migrants gain access to citizenship rights as they spend time in the host country; in the economic realm of the market, and this occurs in terms of 1) legal access to rights 2) progress
in finding work and possibly advancing in their careers, and 3) becoming more aware of local working conditions, and demanding equal treatment.

Integration can be understood as essentially concerned with migrants’ social security, and could in principle minimise the risks associated with relocation from a country of citizenship to a foreign host country. However, legal migration regimes are constructed so that the longer a migrant lives in a country and the more permanent the status of her residence, the more social rights the migrant acquires, and the more decommodified she becomes. For instance, guestworkers in Switzerland in the 60s had to maintain employment through the first five to ten years after which their residential status became independent of their work contracts and afforded them social freedoms such as career choice (Hahamovitch, 2003). Thus, integration is also a process of decommodification since through integration migrants gain access to the social rights available to host country natives, although this is directly contradicted by the fact that integration is conditional. Often in part the migrant gains access to social benefits by not needing social benefits. On the other hand, until, and in some respects even after, legal citizenship is acquired, this status is highly precarious, depending on the legal whims of the government, and possible loss of employment. For example, EU citizens working in Brussels in precarious, though high-skilled, employment are regularly denied social benefits and deported when they lose their jobs (Simola 2018). Even more dramatically, the UK Windrush scandal of 2018 demonstrates that even full citizenship is not safe, as minorities are always vulnerable to the advent of a racist political regimes. In Windrush, the UK deported long integrated UK citizens coming from British imperial possessions between 1948 and 1970 for no evident reason.

In terms of integrating through work, the length and openness of a path to citizenship is highly contingent on the perceived value of the migrant’s work. We address these in three categories:
1) high skill migrants who come for work 2) low-skill migrants who come for work and 3) refugees and asylum seekers.

Workers whose skills are in demand are highly sought after by many countries, in some cases through favourable visa policies that try to attract such immigrants, and in other cases relatively easy to obtain visas when there is a job offer e.g., the green card programme for attracting IT professionals to Germany (Kogan, 2011). There may be some restrictions on access to social support, or there may actually be advantages, such as the high-skilled-worker tax break in the Netherlands (Hercog, 2008). The right to stay may or may not be tied to an employer, and in cases where it is, such as the case of skilled temporary subclass 457 visa IT workers in Australia, workers’ rights can be significantly constrained (Vehayutham, 2013). However, high skilled migrant workers such as managers, administrators and expatriate executives usually have the right to normal social services, including for their families (Khoo et al., 2005, p.18).

For high skilled labour migrants, “integration” into the labour market is often automatic, as they immigrate based on a job offer. This is most common with sponsored workers immigrating on targeted visa programmes such as the German green card programme, Australia’s 457 visa programme, US’ H-1B visa programme, and similar programmes in the UK, France, New Zealand and Ireland (Khoo et al., 2007, p.484). However, they too may have difficulties with other aspects of integration especially host country language learning, because of time constraints due to their job (Chaloff and Lemaitre 2009:39).

On the other hand, workers with low valued skills may be in temporary mobility visa programs with a time-limited right to stay, and restricted rights as is common for seasonal workers, and contemporary guestworkers (Costa and Martin 2018; Strauss and McGrath 2017, p.203). They may also arrive informally, with no right to stay. Many in this category are kept in suspension with no prospect for integration, as discussed in the previous section. Others find themselves working in the informal or semi-informal economy in the early phase of the migration, which
combined with an irregular residence status, compounds their dependence on the employer and increases their willingness to accept substandard working conditions (Danaj et al., 2018). However, cases such as this sometimes change as migrants settle and gain rights.

Although refugees and asylum applicants have a wide variety of skill levels and professional backgrounds, they face a common challenge of skill qualification and high incidence of low formal education levels (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2019; Yu, Ouellet and Warmington, 2007), resulting in lower labour market integration rates. In European some countries, comprehensive assistance programmes target refugees and asylum seekers, fuelling political debate about when they should have access to these programmes and the host country labour markets (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2019). In other places, they are kept in suspension and out of the labour market for long periods by bureaucratic administrative immigration procedures, visa, and residential policies. For instance, many countries withhold integration services for asylum seekers prior to confirmation of refugee status, effectively transforming the issue of service provision into a question of citizenship rights (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2019, p.271; Yu, Ouellet and Warmington, 2007, p.27). Confirmed refugees on the other hand, spend significant periods taking language classes and undergoing formal education. Some employers are slow to hire refugees because of widespread ethnic, gender, and religion stereotypes about refugees (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2020, p.81; Rydgren, 2004). Additionally, random and mismatched spatial distribution of refugees across regions in host countries as practiced in Switzerland, Canada and Sweden further slows down labour market integration as evidenced by refugees poor integration outcomes in the initial immigration phase (Yu, Ouellet and Warmington, 2007:27). Arguably, for refugees and asylum seekers the problem is sometimes that they are not commodified rather than overcommodified.

The literature suggests that, as migrants stay longer in a labour market they will lose their sending country points of reference, abandon their migrant mentality, and become more
embedded in the host society. They also become more likely to absorb union perspectives (Gorodzeisky and Richards, 2013). They move from ignorance and indifference towards appreciation of unions’ role during their integration process, with the shift often coinciding with their transferral from the underground economy to formal employment, usually in unionised sectors and workplaces (Gorodzeisky and Richards, 2013). In other words, their membership is determined not only by their own inclinations, individually or collectively, but also by the presence of appropriate structures to facilitate their organization in the segment of the labour market where they operate.

Moreover, economic migrants’ acceptance is limited to the section of the labour market where they relate to other categories of less-than-fully-valued citizens, such as the failed citizen, the Illegal immigrant, the benefit scrounger, claimant and criminal, from which the ‘hard working migrant’ is differentiated by his economic value (Anderson, 2013). Often, migrant workers are admitted into a host country because of embodied characteristics that predispose them to adapt or adhere to the values of the host society; for example, in popular imagination, the ‘Polish plumber’ is synonymous with cheap and hardworking migrant workers. By presenting the economic value of hard working migrants, the discourse at once elevates this figure, but also sets up a conflict. The migrant is then presented as a “good worker” in contrast to lazy locals, who are demanding and ungrateful. For example, MacKenzie and Forde (2009) show how, in one factory in Barnsley, UK, employers used such narratives to describe and justify recruitment of certain migrant ethnicities.

It is important also to keep in mind that integration prospects are limited further by racism and ethnic segregation, so that in many cases full integration only results in additional rights rather than achieving equal citizenship (Wills et al., 2009, p.258). Racial and ethnically distinct groups who integrate continue to be members of minority groups, susceptible to possible
discrimination and exclusion. Host country born members of immigrant ethnic groups are subject to various levels of discrimination as has been shown by field experiments in recruitment in Finland (Ahmad, 2019), and Germany (Kaas and Manger, 2012), among other places. Integration is a way to “earn” host country citizenship rights, but what that citizenship means is still contingent on racial and ethnic hierarchies.

**Industrial Citizenship: Bounded Egalitarian Communities**

Bonacich (1973) observes that when new ethnic groups enter into a labour market, they are susceptible to exploitation by capitalists seeking to undermine existing wage levels and working norms, who turn them into pawns in the local class struggle. Forced by circumstance to work harder for less, separated from family and other distractions by distance, and often only interested in short term earnings, migrants are well situated to out-compete locals (Piore, 1979). In this way, the migrant is at once considered an asset providing cheap labour for employers; a characteristic that enables their weaponization by elites as a goad to discipline the native working class (Anderson, 2013). More blatantly, history is replete with cases of migrants being used as strike-breakers (Hahamovitch, 2003), as tension between migrants and natives is deliberately stoked and exploited by capital as a way of undermining trade unions (Bonacich, 1973). However, such limited integration and exploitative use of migrant labour undermines their ability to gain membership into the host country working class. On the other hand, industrial organising and incorporation can help bridge the gap between migrants’ pure market citizenship and more substantive citizenship forms.

Industrial citizenship refers to economic and social rights gained through political/industrial struggle. It allows for decommodification and inclusion of subordinate groups such as migrants, women and youth. Industrial citizenship relies on social processes regulating entry into the labour market contradicting the economistic narratives of market citizenship which
requires migrants to “earn” their “right to have rights” via economic success. Rather, industrial citizenship is “earned” equally through work and participation in working class struggles, which control and undermine markets through collective action. Further, it is embedded in the worker-employer (power) relationship, relies on structural political power consolidated through class-based collectivism, and uses this power to advance workers’ interests (Zhang and Lillie, 2016). The archetypical industrial citizen within western democracies is a white, male industrial worker, who is protected by laws and is represented by trade unions. He is in a permanent full time job with wages sufficient for a single earner to raise a family in reasonable comfort. In reality however, labour markets tend to be more diverse, with discriminated groups playing various subordinate roles. Additionally, over time, feminization (Turner and D’art, 2003) and multiculturalism (Virdee, 2000) have broadened this definition. Nonetheless, while not universal, the archetype applied in certain contexts to certain labour market segments, and to the extent it was a reality, there is now a sense that it is no longer the norm. New sources of precarity have emerged, including part time and temporary work, short-term contracts, and platform work and the groups that disproportionately fill jobs on these terms include women, young people, ethnic minorities and migrants (Doellgast et al., 2018). The increase in worker precarity correlates to a decline in industrial citizenship.

Industrial citizenship is thus emancipatory, but this emancipation does not necessarily extend beyond individuals who can join the “insider” group represented by working class organizations. Unions can be inclusive or exclusive (Marino, Roosblad and Penninx, 2017), and migrants or other excluded groups in some cases successfully organize their own emancipatory workers’ struggles, separate from mainstream unions (see, for example, Benvegnú, Haidinger, and Sacchetto 2018).
The way in which national citizenships define who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of a particular polity (Brubaker, 1992) does not necessarily match with the logic of class struggle, which defines a collective working class ‘us’ opposed to a ruling class ‘them’. By necessity, industrial citizenship excludes the ‘class enemy’: managers and owners of firms and depending on its ideological formulation, it sometimes includes and sometimes excludes subaltern social groups, such as migrants and ethnic minorities.

For this reason constructing multicultural and inclusive unions is challenging, as it goes to the heart of national class identity, but it can and has been done (Virdee, 2000; Aberti et al., 2013). Marino (2015) argues that including migrants in the trade union movement depends on union legitimacy as migrant representatives, and on support for active participation of migrant workers on the shop floor and in the union structures. The many examples of grassroots self-organisation by precarious workers, in contexts that are theoretically covered by mainstream unions (Mattoni and Vogliatzoglou, 2014; Benvegnù et al., 2018) suggest dissatisfaction, or insufficiency of trade union representation. There is a perception of a distinctive worker identity with specific interests separating them from core workers, raising the prospect of a fractured class structure.

**Migrants caught between National and Economic citizenship**

Citizenship is embedded in nationally focused historical struggles, in terms of modern nation building around class compromises. Migrants do not gain access into this imagined community of the nation simply by finding a good job. Belonging in the workplace is not only about the employer valuing the migrant as a cheap worker, but rather about joining a worker collectivity, including certain norms of treatment. Citizenship understood as a measure of social and political belonging, and a milestone of integration, raises the question of whether including the economic aspect cheapens the concept and its practice. Buying citizenship is an extreme
example, which many find offensive. Nonetheless, some degree *de facto* citizenship rights for migrants derive from migrants’ position in the global labour market.

If we disambiguate economic status from integration, we arrive at Figure 9.1. The bottom horizontal axis indicates the measure of the migrants’ economic status, or market citizenship, while the vertical axis indicates embeddedness or level of local social and political integration, and decommobilization. The diagram is specific to a context. At the top right corner is the local elite, who are both full local citizens, and wealthy. The bottom right corner consists of top-level mobile professionals, entrepreneurs, and expatriate business managers: i.e. those who, in Ong’s terms, make calculated investments in their capacities, and strategically manage their transnational lives. On the far left bottom corner are recently arrived low skilled workers without papers, who have mobility and strategic calculation in common with the international professionals, but who lack power and resources. On the upper left are the indigent, long-term unemployed, workers in low paid jobs, and those dependent on social assistance. In reality, most people are between the extremes presented here, with many migrants arriving with some skills and legal papers or a plausible asylum claim, but without many options or resources to fall back on. As these average migrants begin to settle in the host country, advance in their careers, and acquire more social rights, they might move both upward and to the right simultaneously. However, it is also possible to integrate socially, becoming a member of an immigrant underclass without ever being employed; or to advance economically in international work circles without integrating into the host country.

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For analytical purposes, we set aside for the moment the argument that social and economic integration can be highly connected, in order to illustrate that they are not *necessarily* always interlinked. If citizenship is the right to have rights, then market citizenship is a misnomer
because citizenship implies inherent rights, rather than rights contingent on power to enforce them. On the other hand, market citizenship provides rights compensating for a lack of local citizenship ties, and facilitates mobility, because the market citizen is not tied to one particular state. There is also a danger in assessing citizenship, and therefore integration, according to economic success criteria, as it entirely ignores those on the left side of the diagram. In generous welfare states such as the Nordic countries, Borjas (1999) welfare magnet theory has raised policy concerns, which have resulted in a variety of measures, including punitive labour activation programmes, targeted at encouraging migrant employment.

However, only full economic integration holds the potential to deliver citizenship’s egalitarian promise of equal opportunity so that migrants’ labour market outcomes – employment rate, wages, protection, upward mobility – are equal to those of native workers (Rydgren, 2004). Yet, migrant economic integration programmes in developed Western countries such as the OECD focus narrowly on improving employment rates, motivated by the evident significant gap between the labour market performance of migrants versus natives (See Damm and Åslund, 2017; Rydgren, 2004). Whether the meter of success for employment policy is helping the migrant to advance in her career, or to lock her into low wage employment to reduce the unemployment figures as quickly as possible, has important implications. “Jobs First” at the cost of quashing the ambitions of talented migrants, raises the danger of ethnic labour market segmentation (Bontenbal and Lillie, 2019). Active labour market programs serve the function of disciplining the unemployed, turning them into market citizens, with undesirable social side effect (Greer et al., 2016). This returns us to Anderson’s (2013) notion of “failed citizen”, which is an outcome of privileging market citizenship as a dimension of citizenship.

Conclusion
Economic citizenship, and in particular market citizenship, are problematic concepts because citizenship as an idea derives its utility precisely from the fact that it is not directly reducible to economics. It could be argued that belonging and the rights and obligations deriving from community membership cannot be bought and sold. Obviously, this is not true, however: in many communities belonging can be bought. So more plausibly, we argue instead that citizenship should not be bought and sold, and that marketizing the integration process undermines decommodification and leads to inhumane outcomes. The wealthy and highly skilled move about the world and enjoy certain rights, while the poor are much more constrained. Citizens of rich countries usually have easy access to mobility, while borders present as moments where citizens of poor countries have their mobility confirmed, or denied. The inequalities embedded in the variability in access to the “right to have rights” configure in complex ways, reflecting tensions between territorial nation states, and global capitalism.

There is clearly an economic aspect to citizenship rights, as becomes clear when examining the migrant experience of integration into new host societies. While in some sense rights exist as abstract ideas, they mean little until implemented through the actions of national actors and institutions. The implication is that rights and citizenship exist as an outcome of historical national struggles to expand their meaning to new groups. In western capitalist democracies, this means that most rights exist because of class struggles that established modern welfare states. Market citizenship reduces humans to atomistic bare units of labour, eroding the society’s social core,. The manner in which the market incorporates migrant labour in the global labour market undermines and threatens national institutions of industrial citizenship including work status, remuneration, and bargaining. In addition, industrial citizenship’s countermovement is hindered by the nationally insular underlying logic from which its power emerges. As new groups enter the labour market its points of reference as to who is “in” and “out” must change if bargaining leverage is to be preserved, and this is a difficult and contested
process, often lagging behind labour market realities. Migrant integration generally, labour market integration policy, and policies which promote temporary labour migration but inhibit social and political integration, must be understood in terms of their relation to national class hierarchies, and the national class conflicts and compromises that relate to them.
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